[Cite as State v. Artagos, 2024-Ohio-1369.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 113107

v. :

DOMINIQUE ARTAGOS, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 11, 2024

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CR-23-679744-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Patrick White, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorneys, for appellee. 

Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and 

Rick Ferrara, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:

Defendant-appellant, Dominique Artagos (“Artagos”), appeals a 

judgment of conviction and sentence, rendered after a jury verdict, and claims the 

following errors:
1. Insufficient evidence supported appellant’s conviction for improper 

handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle. 

2. The manifest weight of the evidence did not support appellant’s 

conviction for improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle.

3. The trial court abused its discretion in ordering a child support order 

as a condition of community control. 

We affirm Artagos’s conviction but remand the case to the trial court to 

vacate the condition of his community control requiring him to establish a childsupport order.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Artagos was charged with one count of improper handling of a firearm 

in a motor vehicle, in violation of R.C. 2923.16(D)(1), a fourth-degree felony. The 

charge included a forfeiture-of-firearm specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.1417 and 

a furthermore clause alleging that Artagos owned or possessed a Glock 19, which 

was contraband derived through the commission of an offense or was an 

instrumentality that he used in the commission an offense. 

Officer Matthew Gilmer (“Officer Gilmer”) testified at the jury trial that 

he is a patrol officer with the Euclid Police Department. As part of his patrol duties, 

he and his partner, Officer Brandon Moore (“Officer Moore”), routinely check public 

parks at night because many people frequent the park to use drugs and alcohol after 

dark when the park is closed. They were patrolling Sims Park in Euclid on the night 

of February 24, 2023, when they encountered Artagos and his friend, Heaven 

Jenkins (“Jenkins”), in a parked car after dark. 
Officer Gilmer approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and Officer 

Moore approached the passenger’s side. When Officer Gilmer shined a flashlight on 

the car, Artagos opened the driver’s door and asked if everything was alright. Officer 

Gilmer informed Artagos that the park closes at dark. Artagos apologized and asked 

if he should leave the park. Officer Gilmer testified that he smelled burned 

marijuana as soon as Artagos opened the door. He also smelled the distinct odor of 

alcohol on Artagos’s breath. 

Officer Gilmer asked Artagos for his identification. Artagos informed 

him that he did not have his license with him but that he had memorized his driver’s 

license number, which he gave to police. Artagos repeatedly tried to exit the car and 

stand up, and the officers repeatedly asked him to remain seated. Artagos asked, “Is 

this a traffic stop?” to which Officer Gilmer replied, “Yes, you’re in the park after 

night.” Officer Gilmer asked if there was anything else in the car and whether 

Artagos had a firearm. Artagos replied that he had a firearm on his hip and that he 

had a concealed weapons permit.

The officers explained to Artagos that he was being ticketed for 

trespassing because he was in the park after it was closed. Artagos asked if 

trespassing was an arrestable offense. The officers replied that ordinarily trespass 

is not an arrestable offense but they were going to search the car because they 

smelled marijuana emanating from the car. Artagos allowed the officers to take his 

firearm, and they placed it in their police cruiser. Thereafter, the officers escorted 

Artagos to the police cruiser where Officer Gilmer explained that they could have 
“jammed him up” for drinking and smoking marijuana in the car in the park, but 

they were not going to do that. Artagos nodded his head in acknowledgment and 

said, “No, you’re right man.” Meanwhile, Officer Moore searched Artagos’s car and 

found an empty can of Olde English malt liquor and a small jar of marijuana. (Tr. 

180.) The officers’ interaction with Artagos was captured on the officers’ body 

cameras. Footage from the body cameras was played for the jury and introduced 

into evidence as state’s exhibit Nos. 1.1, 1.2, 5.1, and 5.2. 

The officers confiscated Artagos’s gun because they determined he was 

under the influence of alcohol and/or marijuana. (Tr. 176.) The officers did not 

perform any field sobriety tests, but both officers believed Artagos showed the 

typical signs of intoxication. Officer Gilmer testified that he did not perform field 

sobriety tests because he was not charging Artagos with operating a vehicle under 

the influence (“OVI”). He also wanted to avoid a confrontation with Artagos because 

he was already agitated. Officer Gilmer explained:

I didn’t want to get into a confrontation with Mr. Artagos as he was 

already pretty agitated. Our job is not to try to use force, it’s to 

minimize force or not use force at all. I didn’t feel there was any 

necessary reason to continue that testing. 

(Tr. 200.) Officer Gilmer explained that the field sobriety tests “[do] not determine 

someone’s impairment level on marijuana, it only determines their impairment level 

on alcohol.” (Tr. 200.) He testified that field sobriety testing is one way to 

determine if a person is intoxicated, but there are others. He explained that he was 
trained to determine whether someone is intoxicated based on “a person’s actions, 

demeanor, and their appearance.” (Tr. 199.) 

Officer Gilmer testified that he encounters intoxicated individuals on 

an almost daily basis and that he has interacted with thousands of intoxicated people 

during his 13-year career as a police officer. (Tr. 164.) Officer Gilmer is also a state 

instructor for field sobriety. (Tr. 164.) Officer Gilmer testified that upon meeting 

Artagos, he immediately noticed typical signs of impairment including “glassy eyes, 

bloodshot, slurred speech, and the repetitive questioning of commands, and having 

to repeat [him]self multiple, multiple times to get any compliance[.]” (Tr. 170.)

Officer Moore also testified that he observed signs of intoxication 

when interacting with Artagos. He stated: 

Mr. Artagos was very repetitive. He kept asking the same questions, 

saying the same things. I detected an odor of alcohol on his breath, and 

I even mentioned it to him.

(Tr. 224.) Officer Moore observed agitated behavior, red, glassy eyes, and slurred 

speech. (Tr. 232.) Finally, Officer Moore testified that he smelled the odor of 

marijuana emanating both from the car and from Artagos himself. (Tr. 224.) 

Officer Gilmer testified that Jenkins did not present any signs of 

intoxication. (Tr. 180.) Her speech was “very normal,” her eyes were not glassy, and 

Officer Gilmer did not detect any alcohol on her breath. She was also very 

cooperative. Therefore, rather than arresting Artagos, they instructed him to ride 

home with Jenkins. (Tr. 184.) 
Artagos testified at trial and denied smoking marijuana. He stated 

that he smokes Black & Mild cigars and that he smoked a cigar and cigarettes in the 

car. (Tr. 279.) Artagos also denied drinking alcohol on the night in question. He 

explained that the empty beer can was probably there from the day before. (Tr. 279.) 

Artagos stated that he has allergies, which might explain why his eyes were red, and 

he has braces which might explain why the police thought he was slurring his speech. 

Finally, Artagos explained that he and Jenkins had been in the park for hours before 

the police arrived on the scene. (Tr. 279-280.) 

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Artagos guilty of improper 

handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle but not guilty on the furthermore 

specification requiring forfeiture of his weapon. The court sentenced him to one and 

a half years of community-control sanctions. As a condition of community control 

the court ordered Artagos to establish a child-support order and to provide 

verification of the order to the probation department within 60 days of the court’s 

sentencing entry. Artagos now appeals the trial court’s judgment. 

II. Law and Analysis

A. Sufficiency and Manifest Weight

In the first assignment of error, Artagos argues there is insufficient 

evidence to support his conviction. He contends there is no evidence that he was 

under the influence when Officers Gilmer and Moore encountered him at Sims Park 

on the night of February 24, 2023. In the second assignment of error, Artagos 

argues that even if there were sufficient evidence establishing that he was “under the 
influence,” the evidence was not credible and his conviction is against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. 

Although the terms “sufficiency” and “weight” of the evidence are 

“quantitatively and qualitatively different,” we address these issues together because 

they are closely related, while applying the distinct standards of review. State v. 

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).

The test for sufficiency requires a determination of whether the 

prosecution met its burden of production at trial. State v. Bowden, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 92266, 2009-Ohio-3598, ¶ 12. The relevant inquiry is whether, after 

viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier 

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a

reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), 

paragraph two of the syllabus.

In contrast to sufficiency, “weight of the evidence involves the 

inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence.” Thompkins at 387. While 

“sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy as to whether the evidence is legally 

sufficient to support a verdict as a matter of law, * * * weight of the evidence 

addresses the evidence’s effect of inducing belief.” State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 

382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 25, citing Thompkins at 386-387. “In 

other words, a reviewing court asks whose evidence is more persuasive — the state’s 

or the defendant’s?” Id.
In a manifest-weight-of-the evidence challenge, the reviewing court 

must consider all the evidence in the record, the reasonable inferences, and the 

credibility of the witnesses to determine “‘whether in resolving conflicts in the 

evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of 

justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins

at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). 

Artagos was convicted of improper handling of firearm in a motor 

vehicle in violation of R.C. 2923.16(D)(1), which states that “[n]o person shall 

knowingly transport or have a loaded handgun in a motor vehicle if, at the time of 

that transportation or possession, * * * [t]he person is under the influence of alcohol, 

a drug of abuse, or a combination of them.” 

The term “under the influence” has been defined as

“‘the condition in which a person finds himself after having consumed 

some intoxicating beverage in such quantity that its effect on him 

adversely affects his actions, reactions, conduct, movement or mental 

processes or impairs his reactions to an appreciable degree, thereby 

lessening his ability to operate a motor vehicle.’” 

Cleveland v. Martin, 2018-Ohio-740, 107 N.E.3d 809, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), quoting 

State v. Carozza, 2015-Ohio-1783, 33 N.E.3d 556, ¶ 22 (5th Dist.), quoting Toledo 

v. Starks, 25 Ohio App.2d 162, 166, 267 N.E.2d 824 (6th Dist.1971). In addition, 

“‘[u]nder the influence’ means that the accused consumed some intoxicating 

beverage, in such a quantity ‘whether small or great’ that adversely affected the 

accused’s ability to operate a vehicle.” Id. Not every case will involve overt signs of 
intoxication. Id., citing Chagrin Falls v. Bloom, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101686, 

2015-Ohio-2264, ¶ 9.

Artagos argues there is insufficient evidence to establish that he was 

intoxicated because he testified that he did not consume any alcohol or marijuana. 

However, Officers Gilmer and Moore both testified that Artagos exhibited many 

telltale signs of intoxication, including glassy eyes, slurred speech, agitated behavior, 

and repetitive questioning of commands. (Tr. 170, 224-225.) The officers smelled 

marijuana emanating both from Artagos’s car and from Artagos himself. They also 

smelled alcohol on his breath when he spoke. Moreover, they found evidence of both 

marijuana and alcohol in his car. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence that 

Artagos was under the influence when the police encountered him on the night of 

February 24, 2023. 

Artagos further asserts that his conviction is against the manifest 

weight of the evidence because he served nine years in the Marines and is a skilled 

weapons operator. He also argues his conviction is against the manifest weight of 

the evidence because he testified that he did not consume any alcohol or marijuana 

on the night in question and the body-camera footage does not accurately reflect his 

condition. Artagos contends the officers’ opinion testimony that he was under the 

influence lacks credibility because it was not corroborated with objective tests such 

field sobriety, breath, or blood-alcohol testing. He also asserts the fact that the 

officers did not arrest him but released him to his own car is proof that he was not 

intoxicated.
Although Artagos’s military service is commendable, it is irrelevant to 

the question of whether he was under the influence when Officers Gilmer and Moore 

confiscated his firearm. The lack of field sobriety testing and blood or breath testing 

is also not dispositive of Artagos’s claim. Officers Gilmer and Moore both had 

extensive experience interacting with intoxicated citizens and were familiar with the 

signs and symptoms of intoxication. The officers testified that Artagos smelled of 

alcohol and marijuana, presented with glassy eyes and slurred speech, and exhibited 

agitated behavior typical of a person under the influence. (Tr. 232 and 176.) 

Although it is difficult to see whether Artagos had bloodshot or glassy eyes in the 

body-camera footage, his repetitive questioning of the officers’ commands and his 

agitated behavior is evident. The officers testified, and the body camera shows, that 

they found an empty can of malt liquor and marijuana in Artagos’s car. 

The fact that the officers released Artagos rather than arresting him is 

also not proof that he was sober. Officer Gilmer explained that they released Artagos 

rather than arresting him because Jenkins did not exhibit any signs of intoxication 

and the officers instructed him to ride home with her. Furthermore, the fact that 

the officers did not cite Artagos for OVI does not establish that he was sober because 

Officer Gilmer testified that they did not arrest him for OVI because they did not 

witness him operating the vehicle. 

There was competent, credible evidence to support the jury’s finding 

that Artagos was under the influence at the time Officers Gilmer and Moore 

confiscated his firearm. Therefore, this is not a rare case in which the jury clearly 
lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction 

must be reversed and a new trial ordered. 

The first and second assignments of error are overruled.

B. Child-Support Order

In the third assignment of error, Artagos argues the trial court abused 

its discretion in ordering him to establish a child-support order as part of his 

community control. The state concedes the error. Indeed, this court has held that a 

trial court errs and abuses its discretion by issuing a child-support order as a 

condition of community control where the “child-support order does not share a 

relationship” with the offense. State v. Cintron, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110600, 

2022-Ohio-305, ¶ 24. The trial court’s order requiring Artagos to establish a childsupport order is not related to his improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle 

conviction. Therefore, the third assignment of error is sustained.

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in part and vacated in part. We 

affirm Artagos’s convictions but vacate the community-control condition requiring 

Artagos to establish a child-support order within 60 days of the sentencing entry.

It is ordered that appellee and appellant share costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., and

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR