* The Honorab le Ann Aldrich, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of Ohio, si tting by designation.
1 RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Six

th Circuit Rul e 206

ELECTRO NIC CIT

ATION: 2004 FED App . 0172P (6th C ir.) File Name: 04a01 72p.06



### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXT H CIR CUIT

_________________
T ENNESSEE P ROTECTI ON & A DVOCACY , I

NC ., Plaintiff- Appellant

,

v.

J ON A. W ELLS , E SQUIRE ; R ONALD B RUCE A RRI SON ; and KING ’ S D AUGH TERS & S ONS N URSI

NG H OME , I

NC ., Defenda nts-Appe llees. X - - - -
> , - - - - - - - N No. 02-6221

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Cookeville. No. 01-00078—William J. Haynes, Jr., District Judge.

Argued: March 9, 2004
Decided and Filed: June 9, 2004

Befor e: BOGG S, Chief Judg e; DAUGH TREY, Circ uit Judge; and ALDRI CH, District Judge. * 2 Tenn. Protection & Adv ocacy v. W ells, Esqu ire, et al. No. 02-6221

_________________ COUNSEL

ARGUED: Gary House

pian, TENNESSEE PROTECTION & ADVOCACY, INC., Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellan t. Tyre e B. H arris IV, WI LLIS & KNIGHT, Nashville, Tennessee, Brigid M. Carpenter, BAKER, DON ELSON, BEARMAN, CA L DWELL & BERKOWITZ, Na shville, Tennessee, f

or A ppellees. ON BRI EF: Gary House pian, T ENN ESSEE PROTECTION & ADVOCACY, I NC., Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Ty ree B. Harris I

V, WILLIS & KNIGHT, N a shvil le, Tennessee, B rigid M. Carpenter, BA KER , DO NELS ON, BEARMAN , CALD WE LL & BERKOWITZ, Na shville, Tennessee, Ronald L. Smith, Michael Kirkman, OHI O LEGAL RIGHTS SERVI CE, Columbus , Ohio, for Appelle es. BOGGS, C. J., delivered

the opinion of the court, in which ALDRI CH, D. J., joined. DAUGHTREY, J. (pp. 18

- 20), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

_________________ OPINION

_________________ BOGGS, Chief

Judge. Tennessee Protection &Ad vo ca cy, Inc. (TP&A)is a

federally-mandated independent non-prof it agency that investigates allegation s of abuse against the disabled. It

appeals the distri ct court ’s holding that one o f its clie n ts, Martin Earle Bentley , is not covered under the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (DD Act), and

that therefore TP&A has

no statutory

authority to obtain Bentley’ s records with out the pe rmission of

his court-appointed

conservator. We hold

that the plain meaning of the statutory definition of developmenta l disability coversNo. 02-6221 Tenn. Protection & Adv ocacy v. W ells, Esqu ire, et al. 3

individua ls with Bentley’ s kind of traumatic brain injury , and
we reve rse the d ecision o f the distr

ict cour t.

I

Martin Earle Bentley , a long-haul truck driver, suffer ed a traumati c brain injury from a non-the-job crash in 1976, when he was 2 0 yea

rs old. As a

result, he was pe

rmanent ly disabled and must live in anursing home bec ause he i s unable to care for himself. In light of Bentley ’s condition after the
acc id ent, the Probate Court of Macon County, Te nnessee appointed attorney Jon Wells to be the co ns ervator of Bentley’ s person and estate in 1980.

In2001, Bentley c ontacted TP&A because he had concerns about both the ha

ndling of his financial aff

airs and restrai nts
onhis person al a

utonomy. In a conference call with TP&A repre sentative s, including a TP&A staff attorney , Bentley explained his grievances. I

n the staff attorney ’s opi n ion, Bentley demonstrated “adequate co gnit ive ability” to speak for himself, and expressed his wishes in an “unequivocal consistent mann er.” Bentley summed up his situation as follows: “A man of my a

ge and ability

should n o t be locked up ina nursing home.” Bentley authorized

TP&A to examine all the necessary

records to advocate on his behalf.

TP&A is the Tennessee chapter of a networ k of independent agencies, known as the Protection & Advocacy Syst em, that C ongr es s funded in the DD Act as part of the Protection a nd Advocacy for Persons with Developmental Disabilities (PADD) Program. I n order to receive funding under the Act, ea ch s tate must “ have in e ffect a

sys tem to protect and advocate the rights of ind ivi duals with developmental disabilitie s. ” 42 U.S.C. § 15043(a)(1). For the state to qualify for f unding, the agency

must “notb e administered

by the State Council on Developmental Disabilities [and must] be i ndepend ent of any a gency that provides treatme

nt, servi ces, or habilitation to individ uals 4 Tenn. Protection & Adv ocacy v. W ells, Esqu ire, et al. No. 02-6221

with developmental disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 15043(a)(F)- (G). In gener

al, the P&A System serve s ind ividuals with a range of devel opmental

disabilitie s by , among

other thin

gs, investigatingallegations of abuse; the agency is authorized

to take legal action on beha l f of its clients if claims cannot otherwis e be resolved. See 42 U.S.C. § 1 5043(a)(giving full recitation of the agency ’s powers). Following normal procedu res, a c ase advo cate wit

hTP&A faxed a le tter to Wells on December 8, 2000 asking to see Bentley’ s record s and off ering t o help re solve any

dispute between the two. S he then called Wells on December 11, when he infor med her t h at he would only relea se Bentley ’s records in response

to a cour

t order. TP&A als o tried to
secure the records through the King’s D aughters and Sons NursingHome, where Bentley is a resident, but met with the
same response. The Nursing Home admi

nistrator also fo rb ad e h is st af

f t o d is cu ss th e l it ig at io n w it h B en tl ey.
Unable to obtain the necessary

infor mat ion to inve stigate Bentley’ s allegations , TP&A fi led suit in d istrict c ourt in September

2001 against Wel l s, the Nur sing Home, and its administrator, Ronald Arrison. T P&A moved for summary judgment and a preliminary injunction; Wells cross-claimed for summary

judgment. The Nursing

Home did not respond to TP&A’ s motion for

summary judgmen t.

InSeptembe

r 2002, the

district c ourt grante d Wells summary judg ment on the grounds that the DD Act did not
cover traumatic brain injury, B entley’s ty pe of di sa bi li ty, and therefore TP&A had no right to revie w Bentle y’ s recor ds. This appeal then followed.

II
This court reviews a gran t of summar

y ju dgment de novo. Copeland v. Machu lis, 57 F.3d 476, 478 (6th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Summary

ju dg ment is appropriate when theNo. 02-6221 Tenn. Protection & Adv ocacy v. W ells, Esqu ire, et al. 5

1 There a ppea rs to be no dis pute that i f Bentl ey is covered, t hen TP&A has au thority to acce ss hi s r ecor ds u nder th e DD Act . 42 U.S. C. § 15043 (a)(2)(I)(ii i) (st ating that the P& A system shall have a ccess to all

recor ds of

any ind ividua l with a de velop men tal disab ility in a situatio n in wh ich 1 ) the indivi dual has a legal conservat or; 2) a compl aint has been recei ved; 3) ther e is probable caus e to beli eve the person has been subject to abuse or neg lect ; an d 4) the repre sentati ve has been contacted and offered assistanc e but h as failed to act o n beh alf of the ind ividua l). evidence submitted shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any materi al fact and th e movi ng p arty is entitled t

o judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The facts in this case are not disputed, and therefore one of the parties is entitled to summary judgmen t as a matter of law. Jerome-Duncan, In c. v. Auto-By -Tel, L.L.C. , 176 F.3d 904, 909 (6th Cir. 1999).

To demonstr

ate that i t has leg al author

ity t o gain a ccess to Bentley’ s records, TP&A must show that he is covered

by the DD Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1500 1 et seq

. 1 This case turns on whether the term “deve lopmental disability,” as used in the Act, can app ly to

those who

suffer from tra umatic br

ain inj ur y, rather

than bein

g limited to those afflicte d by

so m e type of congenital or

disease-related

defect. The district court concluded

that the “clear languag e of the statut e reflects that it is intended to cover individuals who have some physica l or ment a l disability or condition as a result of natural causes .” Tenn. Pr ote ction &

Advocac y v. W ells , No. 2:01- 0078, at 4 (M.D

. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2002) (Mem. Op.) (emphasis add ed)

. The court invoked the r

ule of sta tutory constructio n that all words of the statute are inten de d to have meaning and no interpretation

should be adopted that “would render statutory phras es meaningless, redundant, or superfluous.” Ibid. ( citing United States v. Holmquist

, 36 F.3d 154, 160 (1st Cir. 1994)). To expand the definition further to includ e disa bilities resulting from

injury, would, accor

ding to the district

court’s opinion, ignore the m eaning of the word “developmental,” 6 Tenn. Protection & Adv ocacy v. W ells, Esqu ire, et al. No. 02-6221

and therefore Bentley

was not qualified for protection under the Act. Id . at 5.
However, the statut

e in Holmquist

did not define the term indispute. Instead, the c ourt had to solve an “interpretive riddle” presented by

a customs statute. Holmquist , 36 F.3d at 158. In contrast, the DD Act contains an explicit

and multifaceted definition of the term “developmental disability,” and that definition must govern

the resolution of this case; we are not at liberty to put our gloss on the de finition thatCongre ss provided by looking to the g enerally a ccepted meaning of the de fine d term. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Commu nities f

or a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 698 n.10 (1995) (pointing

out t hat “ Congress explicitly defined the operative term ‘take’ in the [Endangered Species Act] . . . thereby obviating the need for us to prob e it s meaning”); United States v. Smith , 155 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9 th Ci r. 1998) (observingthat when

“the mea

ning of a word is cl early explained in a statute, courts are not at libert y to look beyond the statutory

definition”). Therefore, although it may not be intuitive t o think of a brain i njury that resu lts from a vehicle accident when the victim is 20 years

old as a “developmental disability,”we must do so because Bentley ’s conditionfits the definition that is provided in the statute.

TP&A is not reading the term “developmental” out of the statute, butis asking u s to follow the defi nition that

Congre ss crafte d. Accor

ding to the statute :
The term “developmental disability” means a severe, chronic disability of an individual that-- (i) is attributab l e to a mental or physic al impairment or combinat ion of men

tal and ph ysi cal impai

rments; (ii) is manifested before the individual attains age 22; (i ii ) i s l ik el y to co nt in ue in de fi ni te ly;No. 02-6221 Tenn. Protection & Adv ocacy v. W ells, Esqu ire, et al. 7

2 Th is opinion refers t o the app ellees c ollective ly as “Wells .” Bruce Arrison, the nur sing home adminis trat or, i ndicat ed that he was following W ells’s ins tru cti ons an d does no t obje ct per se to relea sing B entley’s information. T herefore, W ells is de fac to the sole app ellee in this c ase. (iv) results in substantial functional limitations in 3 or
mo re of th e f ol lo wi ng ar ea s o f m aj or li fe ac ti vi ty: (I) Self-car

e. (II ) Receptive and expressive languag e. (III) Learning. (IV ) M ob il it y. (V) Self-direction. (VI) Capa city for i ndepe ndent livi ng. (VII ) Economic self-sufficiency ; and (v) reflects the indiv

idual's need for a combina

ti on and sequence of speci al, interdisciplina ry , or ge neric se rvices, individualizedsupports, or other forms of assistance that
are of lifelong or

extended duration and are individua

lly planned and coordinated. 42 U.S.C. § 15002 (8)(A).

F or the reasons below, we reject Wells’s 2 argume nts t ha t Bentley does not ha

ve a dev elopment

al disa bili ty b ecause 1) he did not gradually

acquire it; 2) hi s conditi on does not satisfy the medi cal de finition of chronic; and 3) it did not manif est, or reveal, itself over a period of time. Unde r a straightforward reading

of the statute, Bentley

is covered. Nature of th e Disabili ty
The definition of developmental disability in the DDAct is framed in terms of a person’s functionallimitations and does notrefer to any

specific diseases or

causes. Earlier

versions of the D D Act de fined the term by a list of sp ecific condition s, such as me

ntal reta rdati on or ce re br al pa ls y. 8 Tenn. Protection & Adv ocacy v. W ells, Esqu ire, et al. No. 02-6221

3 Bentley ’s br ain injur y is perm anen t (42 U .S.C. § 150 02( 8)(A )(iii) and has re sulted in more than three “substantial functional limitations” (subs ecti on iv). Finally, B entley requ ir es “li felong” speciali zed and gene ral care (subse ction v ). Congre ss consistently expanded the definition to include
more diagnoses; in 1978, it amended the statute again, “deletingall references to specific h andic apping conditions and establishing a definition based on functional limitations.” Rehabilitation, Comprehe nsive Se rvices, and Developmental Disabilitie

s Am endments of 1978 , Pub. L. No. 95-602, Sec. 503, 42 U.S.C. § 6 001, 92 Sta t. 2955 (1978); S. Rep. No. 103- 120, at 5 ( 1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 164, 168. Functional limitations, i.e. , the result of the condition, govern t he determination of w

hether a person f alls unde r the Act ’ s protection, not medical history, i.e. , the cause. No one doubt s that Bentley me ets the functional limitation requirements of the DD A ct. 3 The statute treats the words “functional” and “develo pmental” as essentially sy

nonymous and we conc lude that his disability meets the statutory definition.

Chronic Condition Bentley ’ s brain injury resulted in a severe, “chronic” disability that is a res ul t of physical impairment (subsec tion i). Chronic me ans “per

sist in g over a long period of time.” Dorland’s Illustrate

d Medica l Dictiona ry 3 63 (30th ed. 2003). The DD Act does not definethe term, but the Fami ly Leave an d Medi cal Act d

efines a “chroni c seriou s health condition” as one which “[c]ontinues over an extended period of time (including recurring episodes of a single underly

ing condition); and [is characterized by a ] . . . perio d of inca

pacity whichis permanent

or long-term

due to a condition for which treatment may not be eff

ective. . . . Examples include Alzheimer

's, a sever e stroke , or the terminal stages of a disease.” Perry v. Jaguar of Troy
, 353 F .3d 510, 51 5 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825. 114(a)(2)). A “severeNo. 02-6221 Tenn. Protection & Adv ocacy v. W ells, Esqu ire, et al. 9

4 We cons true the te rm “ch ronic ” in the D D A ct in par i mate ria with the FMLA, as both act s seek to protec t th ose who have pre ssi ng medical needs and their fa mi lies. Cf. Sho tz v. City o f Plan tation , Fla
., 344 F.3d 1161, 1168 (11 th Cir. 2003) (drawing upon T itle VII, the Americans with Disabil iti es Act, and the Fair La bor Standards Act to construe the term “pers on” in the FM LA in confo rmity with o ther civil rig hts statutes)

. stroke” is also a c ondition that comes on sudden

ly, with devastatingconsequences, meaning that a chr o nic condition is not limited to those charac teriz ed by a slow and ste ady deterioration. The focus is on the prognosis for recovery , not on the cause or onset of the medical disorder. 4
Furthermore, a chroni c conditioncan result from an outside
a gent: the Black Lung Be nefits Act define s “pneumoconiosis,” the condi tion needed for an award of benefit s, as “a ch ronic dust disea se of t he lun g and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary

impairme

nts, arising out of coal mine employment .” 30 U.S.C. § 902(b) ( emphasis

added). On one occasion, this circu it eve n desc ribed a series of suicide attempts as a “chronic” he al t h problem. Williams v. Mehra, 135 F.3d 1105, 1109 (6th Cir. 1998) rev’d en banc , 186 F.3d 685 (6th C ir. 199 9). T he refore, neither

Congre ss nor this c ircuit ha s limited its understandingof a chronic medical problem to a long-term condition resulting from

natural causes. It isundisputed that Bent le y’ s br ai n i nj ur y ha s r es ul te d i n p er ma ne nt in ca pa ci ty, whichwould qualify it under the g eneral understanding of the term “chronic,” as used in § 15002(8)(A). Manifesta tion of the D isability Bentley’ s di sa bi li ty “ manifest ed” itse lf, that is

became obvious, before age 22 (subsection ii). The dictionary define s “manife st” as “[c]l early a pparent to the sight or under stand ing; obvious” and “manif ested” as “[t]o show or demonstr ate plainly.” American Heritage Dictionary 1064 (4th ed. 2000). Black ’s L aw Dictionary uses the t

erm in 10 Tenn. Protection & Adv ocacy v. W ells, Esqu ire, et al. No. 02-6221

various legal c ontexts, consistently with th e m eaning of obvious: e.g ., “manif

est injusti ce,” de fined as

“[a]n err or in the trial court tha

t is direct, obvious, and observable,” Black’s Law Dicti o nary 974 (7th e d. 1999); “ manifest necessi ty” is defin edas a “sudden and overwhelming emergency” that precludes completion of a trial. Id. at 975.

Wells argues that “manifest” means “r eve ale d” and therefore refers exclusively to the e xposure of something that already existed but was hidden. Bentley’ s brai n injury was not a condition

that lay dormant, but rathe

r was the in stan t result of his collision in the truck, leading Wells to conclude that Bentley’ s injury did not “manifest” itse lf, as the statute requires. Althoug

h “reve al” is one

plausible meaning , it i s notthe only

one. This circuit has consistently used the term “manife st” to mean “be apparent:” Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Compens at ion Programs, United States Dep’t of Labor, 865 F.2d 727, 732 (6th C ir. 19 89) (s tati ng a preexisting condition must have manifeste d itself either to the employer through observation or to a doctor from a medical examination for the c ompany to qualify

for sp ec ial fund disability pay ments due

to subseque

nt injury ); Abbott v. Sullivan
, 905 F.2d 918, 926 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that an impai rment must be taken into consideration under the Medical-Vocationalguideli nes for d

ete rmi ni ng di sa bi li ty,
even if it does not manifest i tself as a limitation on strength) (emphases added). Therefore, nothing in either the dictionary definitionof “mani fest,” the le ga l usage of the term, or the way that this circuit has used the word, sug gests that it must refer to a conditionthat

always existed and becameobvious. We see no re ason why

“manife st” cann

ot just as easily be used to describe something newly created that is now visible. It simply is another way

of saying that a con dit ion is rea

dily observable.No. 02-6221 Tenn. Protection & Adv ocacy v. W ells, Esqu ire, et al. 11

5 See, e .g. , Ame rican A cad emy o f Child a nd A dole scent P sychiatry, Practice Paramet ers forthe As sess ment and Tr eatment of Chi ldre n, Ado lescents, and Ad ults with Me ntal R etard ation and Co mo rbid Mental Disord ers , 1999 (explain ing t hat “deve lopm ental d isability is actu ally not

a me dical te rm b ut a ‘legislative /legal co ncep t’”). End point of the Developmental Period

Nor is age 22 a ran dom cut-o ff point; i t is an elig

ibility requirem ent th at result

ed from p olicy , rather

than medi cal, 5 judgmen ts. In 1978, Congress re

vised the DD Act and

raised the el igibility

age for assista

nce from 18 to 22 y

ears. H .R. Rep. No. 95 -1188, at 8 (1978), reprinte d in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7355, 7362 . The init ial ob jective was to include everyone

with a severe disability

within the purview of the statute. Advocates for disa bled children objected, however, fearing that universal covera ge would spread the availab le resources too thinly. Rehabilitation Amendments of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human Re s ources of the Unite

d States Se

nate , 95th Cong. 83, 11 3 (197 8) (testimony

advocating that the Senate adopt the definition of development

di sa bi li ty d ra ft ed by a t ask force that recommended

aneligibility cut off a

t age 22). Therefore, the eligibil ity age of 22 repre sents the

limitation t

hat C ongre ss determined w ould provide the optimal balance between a gene r al commitment to helping the disabled and funding realitie s. Restricting eligibility f urther through the cramped reading of the statute that Wells proposes would ignore both the plain meaning of the legislation and its intent.

Inadjudica

ti n g disability claims, we must re spect the eligib ilit y requirements established by Congress. For instance, the Supplem ental Security I ncome (SSI) progr

am considers someone disabled “if he is u

nableto engage in any substantial gainfu l activity by r eason of any medicall

y determinable physical or ment al impairment which can be expected to r esu lt in death or which has lasted or can be 12 Tenn. Protection & Adv ocacy v. W ells, Esqu ire, et al. No. 02-6221

expected to last fo ra continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (c)(3 )(A). H owever , to receive SSI dis ability

pay ments for mental retardation evidenced

simply by a low I Q score , a claima nt must demonstr ate “a significantly

subaverage ge

neral intellectual function ing with defici ts in adapt ive fu nctio ning initially manifested

during the

developmenta l period ; i.e., th e evidence demonstrates or supports onset of the impairme nt before age 22. ” 20 CFR Pt. 40 4, Subpt. P, A pp. 1 § 12.0 5 (empha sis added). This circuit has denied be nefits t o claimants who could not demonstrate me

ntal d efici ency be fore age 22. Foster v. Halter, 279 F .3d 348, 354-55 (6th Cir. 2001) (denying claim because Foster’s first IQ test was done when she was 42 yea

rs old and thereforeshe could not demonstr ate that her su bavera ge intellectual functioning m anifeste d itself before age 22); Brown v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs
., 948 F.2d 268, 271 (6th Cir . 1991) (r emanding to deter mine if the claimant's menta

l imp airme nt was “‘manifested during [claimant's] developmental period’ o r rather [was] a partial consequence of

claimant's history

of heavy a

lcohol use after the age of twenty

-two”). We accept the eligibility provision inthe DD Act at face value in order to be consistent with our interpretation

of the same age requirement in the context of other public welfare legislation. Congre ss has det ermine d that it is appropriate to consider
a person’ s “devel opmental p eriod” to extend to

age 22to
assesseligibility for g overnment assistance. However natural it would be to con sider a 2 0-y ear old t ruck dri ver as a fully grown adult, it is

well-settle d law th at when a statutory defin ition contrad

icts the e very day meaning of a wor d, th e statutory langua ge gener

ally controls : judges

should “construe legislation as it is written, not as it might be read by
a layman.” Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 485 (1987 ). Only when following the li teral langua ge of the statute would lead to “an interpretation which is inconsistent with the legislative intentor to an absurd result” can a court modify the me aning of the statutory lang

uage. Appleton v

. Fir s t Nat’l Bank ofNo. 02-6221 Tenn. Protection & Adv ocacy v. W ells, Esqu ire, et al. 13

Ohio, 62 F.3d 791, 801 (6th Cir. 1995). Congress may not have had truck drivers with bra in injurie s inmind w hen it drafted the legislation, but Bentley easily falls into the category of people whom Congress intended to prot ect

. Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Grou p , 917 F.2d 266, 270 (6th Cir. 19 90) (cla

rifying that if the plain language of a statute leads to a broader r esult t han Congress might have anticipated, it is still not automati call y tantamount to an absurdre sult). We have no basis on which to second gue s s the langua ge that Cong

ress use d becau se apply

ing the statute to Bentle y neither contradicts the legislative intent nor produces an absurd result.

The district c ourt err

ed in infe rring a require ment that t

h e disability result fr om natura

l causes because refer ence to injury i s lackin g in the statute. It is axiomatic that the statutory definition of the term excludes unstated meanings of that term. Colaut t i v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 n.10 (1979). Th e Supr eme Court reitera ted this ru

le last te rm, rejecting the plaintiff’s attempt to read a requirement fo r heightened

burden of proof for a “mixed motive” jury instruction into the 199 1 Civil Rights Act. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa , 5 39 U.S. 90 (2003). In a unanimous opinion, the Court dismissed the plaintiff’s interpretation b ecau se “[o]n its face, the statut

e does no t mention, m

uch lessrequire, that a plaintiff make a heightened showing through direct evidence.” Id. at 99.

Inthis case , the statu

te does not dist inguish

between disabilities caused by in

jury and those that result fr om orga nic defect s, but empha sizes i mprovi ng the c ondition of all ci tizens with disabilities by delivering var ious kinds of assistanc e: (1) dis ab ility is a natural part of human e xperience that does not diminish the right of individual s w ith developmental disabilitie s to live independently, to exert control and choice over their own lives, an d to fully 14 Tenn. Protection & Adv ocacy v. W ells, Esqu ire, et al. No. 02-6221

particip ate in and con

trib ute to their communities throu ghfull integ ration . . .; [but that] ( 5) individ uals withd evelopmental disabilities are at greater r isk than the general population of abuse, neglect, financial and
sex ual exploitation, and the violation of their legal and human rights.

42 U.S.C. § 1500 1(a)(1), (5). The statute contrasts the disabled with the g eneral

population, but doe s not disting uish amongt he diffe

rent ca tegori es of disa

bility , becau se its purpose is to erase

all distinctions made

because of handicap. Narrowing

the definition of “develop menta l disability ” to prevent TP&A from assisting Bentley in achieving greater personal autonomy contrave nes the basic intent of the statute. The declar

ation tha t it is a “g oal of the

nation” t hat peopl e with disabilities “live free of abuse, n egle ct, financial and
s ex ual exploitation, and violations of their legal and human rights,” 42 U.S.C . § 15001(a)(16)(F), confirms the conclusionthat the cause

of the disability is immaterial for the purposes of deter mining e ligibility

under the DD Act.

III
The district c ourt bolste

red its re ading o f the stat ute to exclude Be ntley from its protection by pointing to the
enac tm ent

in 2000 of the “State Grants for Protection and Advocacy

Service s,” which auth orizes the Sec retary of Healt h and Human Service s to make grants to agencie s such as TP&A to provide

service s to individu

als with trau

matic bra in injuries. 42 U.S.C. § 300d -53. The statute’s general provision states:
The Secretary , acting through the Administrator of t he Health Resources and

Services Administration (referred to in this section as the “Administrator”), shall make grants to protection and a

dvocacy sy

stems for the purpose of enabling such sy stems to pr

ovide ser vices to individuals with traumatic brain injury.No. 02-6221 Tenn. Protection & Adv ocacy v. W ells, Esqu ire, et al. 15

6 The parti es dispu te the lega l significanc e, if any, of this d ocu men t: TP&A argue s that it is the wo rk of a p rivate organizat ion that has t he

same weight as “com mentary by a co lumnist in a trade journ al.” Appellant Br . at 34. W ells argu es in his b rief that it is a “fed erallymandated ” re port and therefore authorit ative. Appellee Br. at 8. The report it sel f wa s pre pa red by the Advocacy Traini ng and Technical Assis tance Center, which receives funding fr om three government agencies. Be cause the go vernm ent pa id for the pub licati on , and i t does not bear a dis clai mer divorcing the sponsoring agencies from the opinions expresse d in the repor t, we cons ider the ext ent to wh ich we sh ould be guided by the report’ s char acter ization of those with traum atic bra in injuries a s a “new ” po pulatio n und er the D D A ct. 42 U.S.C. § 300d -53. The rest of the section describes funding mechanisms. Therefore, the statute i s most easily read a s a fundin

g earmark to sup

port those

with trau

mati c brain injury . Its

language does not shed any light on whether TP&A should have a ccess to Bentley ’s records under the current statutory regime because it doesnot addre ss author ity to s erve those with brain injuries under the DD Act. The langua ge i s too sketchy to support the district court’s conclusionthat it is “highly probative of Congress’ intention
as [to] the scope of

Section 15002(8) [the statutory definition of developmental disability].” Mem. Op. at 4.

The Protection and Advocacy System is thenet work of congr essional ly mandated advocacy

agen ci es, of which TP&A is a member. The 2001 annual report de scribed the § 300d-53 legislation as a program “f or [a] new popul ation in special need of our services — personswith traumati c brain injury.” 6 Mem. Op. at 5. A court sh ould consider any

agency publicationbecause

it refle cts exper

tise in the subject

matter. Unit ed States v. Mead Corp. , 533 U.S. 218, 234-35 (2 001)

. Nevertheless, this court is not bound by the annual repor t’s assertion that those with traumatic brain injuries constitute a “new po pulat ion” of clients. Christense n v. Harri s County , 5 29 U.S. 576, 5 87 (2000)(holding that inter

pretations “i n po licy statements, agency

manuals, and enforcemen t 16 Tenn. Protection & Adv ocacy v. W ells, Esqu ire, et al. No. 02-6221

guideli nes, all of which lack the force of law, do not warrant Chevron -sty

le deference”). Furthermore, we are forbidde n to defer to agency

guidelines that contradict the plain meaning of the statute. Sutton v. United Air Lines , 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999 ) (ho lding that the EEOC guidelines reflected a n impermiss ible interpre

tation of t

he Ameri cans with Disabilities Act andtherefore did not warrant judicial deference).

The statement in the ann

u al repor t may reflect the rea

lity that agencies such asTP&A have gene rally not, as a matter of fact, included

people with trauma

tic brain injuries i

n their progra ms. It ca nnot, howe

ver, provid e a b asis to preclude suchindiv iduals from receiving services under the DD Act because, on its face, the statute’s definition of “development di sa bi li ty” encompasses individuals, such as Bentley, w

ho have suffered traumatic brain injury

. The case law is not helpful in resolving this que stion of st atutory construction. TP&A

is corre ct that fe deral court s have generally

interpre ted 42 U.S.C. § 15043 to allow the P&A system acce ss to clientrecord s. Wisconsin Coalition for Advocacy v. Czapl ewski , 131 F. Su pp. 2d 1039(E.D. Wis. 2001) (holding right of access to patient re cords under the DD Act preempts more r estrictive state reg ulations) ; Iowa Protection & Adv

ocacy Services v. Rasmussen , 206 F.R.D. 630 (S.D. Iowa 20 01 ) (same). Wells has not provided any
caselaw that

prevents us from following the gener al trend of allowing organ

izati ons in

the P&A syst

em libera l acces s to patient r ecords.

Wells properly c

hallenges the cases that TP&A cites in it s brief for the proposition

that trau matic bra ininjury is covered under the DD Act because the cited prec edent addr esses t he l egal ri ghts of those with traumatic brain injuries under different statutes, e.g. , the Fe deral Tort Claims A ct. Se e Colleen v. United States , 843 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1987). Furthermore, the court in each cited case assum ed that theNo. 02-6221 Tenn. Protection & Adv ocacy v. W ells, Esqu ire, et al. 17

disability is covered under the relevant statute. See, e.g., Blackmon ex rel. Blackmon v. Springfield R-XII School District , 198 F.3d 648 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting without elaboration

tha t stude nt with a bilateral brain injury was covered under the

Indiv iduals wit h Disabilities Education Act). However, Wells did not cite any c ase in which a court held that traumati c brain injury is not covere d under the DD Act

. Since Bentley c an fulfill the five requirements in the statute and cons truing t

he statute to include his kind of

injury furthers the legislative intent of the Act, the district court erred i n finding that it did n

ot apply to him.

IV

We therefore REVERSE the dist rictcourt’s grant of summary judgment and R E MAND so that the district court may consider the rele ase of Mr . Bentley’s records to T P&A under the standards of the DD Act. 18 Tenn. Protection & Adv ocacy v. W ells, Esqu ire, et al. No. 02-6221

_____________ DISSENT

_____________ MARTHA CRAI G DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge, diss en ting. In c onstruing statutes, we are

freque ntly admonished

to avoid interpretations that will produce absurd
resu lts. In str

etching the mean ing, intu itive or a s statutor

ily defined, of the term “dev elopm ental disability” to cover the effect of a tra umatic brain injury suffe

red spontaneously by

a fully-functioning

20-year -old, however, the maj ority in this
caseha s failed to heed the admonition. To demonstrate the absurdit y of this interpretation of the statute at issue here, one need only ask: Why would

Congress provide protection under the Developmental Di sabilitie s Assistance and B ill of Rig hts Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1 5043, to a n adult w

ho s uffers such an injury one day short

of his or her twenty- second birthday, but notto the same person injured in exactly the same manner 24 hours later? The a

nswer is, o f cours e, as t he dis trict judge held, that the Act w as never

meant toapply

to individuals in Martin Bentley’ s situation – the holder of a GED, who served two years in the U

nited States Army and then became a longdistan ce truck dr

iver, an d who, ac cording

to the majority
, re ta in s t he “‘ ad eq ua te co gn it iv e a bi li ty’ to speak for himself

. . . and expr

ess[ ] his wishes in an ‘unequivocal consistent manner’.”

It is not surprising that Congr ess initia ll y a ttempted t

o describe the t erm “developmental disability” in terms of a diagno sis but then aba

ndoned th e effor

t. The ter

m is a contemporary

euphemism for “mental retardation,” which itself came into

use in an e ffort to e

rase the stigma a ttached to muchcruder

descrip tive term s used in

the early part of the last century and before, terms suchas “moron” (used to describe those w ith intelligence quotients ranging from 50-69)
, “i mbecile” (havi ng an IQ of 2 5-50) , “idi ot” (h aving a n I Q under 25), and the like.No. 02-6221 Tenn. Protection & Adv ocacy v. W ells, Esqu ire, et al. 19

But there are many

causes of mental retardation, and the disability c an ( but does not necessarily ) accompany

other condit ions, such as c erebra l palsy and autism – hence

th e effort to de sc ri be de ve lo pm en ta l d is ab il it y i n terms of function, rather than diagnosis. As the district court recognized, however, the key conc ept here is not “disability,” fromwhich Mr. Bentley undoubte dly

s uf fe rs . T he ke y, rather, is th e d escriptive term “developmental,” refer ring obviously to an impair

ment that “

manifest s” itself

over time and impedes an individual’s progress from childhood

to postadolescence and into adu lthood , equipped with what are recognized

as adequ

ate skil l s to live independently and pr od uc ti ve ly. Mr . B en tl ey w as li ving independently , and presuma bly productively, at the

time he became the victim of
an unexpected and debilitating accident, one which unfortunately

befalls other adu

lts all too frequently but

which does not implicate a pot ent ial for the denial of civil r

ights
suc h as the statute in question here was designed to protec t against. Perhaps the problem here is merely poor legislative draft ing, an impedi

ment we someti mes face in try ing rationa ll y to constr ue statute s concei

ved by special interest groups , drafted by committee s working under pr essure t o reach political consensus, and thereafter amended a nd made increa singly

complex. If so, t

he ma jority has compounded the problem by rea

ding a badly

drafted statute too li terally and has thereby

reached what I

believ e is a result that Congre ss did no t intend and would never have envisioned, had it been pr escient enough to fores ee the a

pplication of this civilrights s t atut e to a situa tion such a s the one b efore u s. This seems obvious from

the fact that

this case present s itself as one of first impression, suggesting that the legislation has
never been unders tood to apply to victims of sudden traumatic injury, re gardless of age. Despite my sy mpathy for Mr. Bentley ’s disabled condition and my convi ctio n that the plaintiff here is acting with the 20 Tenn. Protection & Adv ocacy v. W ells, Esqu ire, et al. No. 02-6221

bes tof intentions, I would affirm the district court for the reasons set out in its memorandum opinion and deny r elief.