PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

JANE POWERS HUGGINS, trading as 

SADISCO of Maryland,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY,

MARYLAND; CYNTHIA D. BARRY,

Individually and in her Official

Capacity as Zoning Inspector’s

Supervisor for the Prince George’s

County Department of

Environmental Resources; ERV T.

BECKERT, Individually and in his  No. 10-2366

Official Capacity as District

Engineer in the Prince George’s

County Department of Public

Works and Transportation; JEFFREY

M. DEHAN, Individually and in his

Official Capacity as Code

Enforcement Officer in the

Community Standards Division,

Site Development Inspection

Section of the Prince George’s

County Department of

Environmental Resources; 
THOMAS F. MATZEN, Individually 

and in his Official Capacity as

Associate Director of the

Community Standards Division of

the Prince George’s County

Department of Environmental

Resources; ANNE E. WILLIAMS,

Individually and in her Official 

Capacity as Environmental Crimes

Specialist for the Division of

Environmental Health of the

Prince George’s County

Department of Public Works and

Transportation,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.

Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge.

(8:07-cv-00825-AW)

Argued: May 16, 2012

Decided: June 27, 2012

Before AGEE and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,

Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by published opinion. Senior Judge Hamilton wrote

the opinion, in which Judge Agee and Judge Diaz joined.

2 HUGGINS v. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY
COUNSEL

ARGUED: Matthew Woodruff Sawchak, ELLIS & WINTERS, LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. William

Walter Wilkins, NEXSEN PRUET, LLC, Greenville, South

Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Thomas H. Segars, Jeremy M. Falcone, ELLIS & WINTERS, LLP, Raleigh, North

Carolina; Linda S. Woolf, K. Nichole Nesbitt, GOODELL

DEVRIES LEECH & DANN, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for

Appellant. Shelley Lynn Johnson, PRINCE GEORGE’S

COUNTY OFFICE OF LAW, Upper Marlboro, Maryland;

Kirsten E. Small, NEXSEN PRUET, LLC, Greenville, South

Carolina, for Appellees.

OPINION

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge:

Jane Huggins, trading as SADISCO of Maryland

(SADISCO) brought the present civil action against Prince

George’s County, Maryland (the County) and five County

officials (the Officials) after the County shut down the salvage automobile wholesaling business operated by SADISCO

on a parcel of land that SADISCO owned within the County.

SADISCO’s complaint alleged one count under federal law

and four counts under Maryland’s common law. The district

court dismissed certain counts pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and granted summary judgment in

favor of the County and the Officials with respect to the

remaining counts. This timely appeal followed. We affirm the

judgment below in toto. 

I.

In November 2001, SADISCO purchased a 99.7 acre parcel

of land located in the County, with the intention of operating

HUGGINS v. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY 3
a salvage automobile wholesaling business on such parcel,

which use is a permitted use within the industrial zones in

which the parcel is located.1 The Property is bisected north-tosouth by Foxley Road, a dedicated public right-of-way. The

majority of Foxley Road is not paved.

Of relevance to the issues on appeal, the Property directly

abuts a portion of the southeastern fence line of Andrews Air

Force Base. Also of relevance to the issues on appeal is the

fact that Andrews Air Force Base is a designated Superfund

site. A Superfund site is a site which the United States Environmental Protection Agency has added to its Superfund list,

also known as the National Priorities List, pursuant to its

authority under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42

U.S.C. §§ 9601 to 9675. United States v. General Electric

Co., 670 F.3d 377, 381 n.3 (1st Cir. 2012). "‘Superfund’ sites

are those which require priority remedial attention because of

the presence, or suspected presence, of a dangerous accumulation of hazardous wastes." United States v. Cannons Eng’g

Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 83 (1st Cir. 1990).

The real estate purchase contract pursuant to which

SADISCO purchased the Property reflects SADISCO’s

knowledge of the Property’s environmental condition in relation to Andrews Air Force Base. Specifically, under the

bolded and underlined heading " Environmental," such contract provided, in relevant part:

Purchaser acknowledges (1) that the Property is

located adjacent to Andrews Air Force Base, an

active U.S. Department of Defense facility which

was listed on the National Priorities List in 1999, (2)

that contaminants from Andrews Air Force Base

have migrated beneath the County-owned right-of1From here forward, we will refer to the 99.7 acre parcel at issue as "the

Property." 

4 HUGGINS v. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY
way which provides access to the Property, and (3)

that contaminants from Andrews Air Force Base

may affect the Property now or in the future. Purchaser accepts the Property "as-is" and shall have no

recourse against Seller with respect to the environmental condition of the Property under any theory of

liability.

(J.A. 2562). 

On December 20, 2001, SADISCO applied to the County

for a use and occupancy permit in order to operate a salvage

automobile wholesaling business on the Property. Approximately three months later, SADISCO applied for a permit in

order to temporarily house a construction trailer on the Property.2

The record is undisputed that on June 12, 2002, the County

issued SADISCO a permit to house a construction trailer on

the Property. However, the parties hotly contest whether the

County actually issued SADISCO a use and occupancy permit

in response to its December 2001 application for one. Nonetheless, the record is undisputed that by the end of October

2002, the County had legitimately revoked any and all outstanding permits that it had issued to SADISCO with respect

to the Property based upon SADISCO’s violation of numerous County Code provisions. For example, on October 16,

2002, the County cited SADISCO for performing grading

work on approximately twenty acres of the Property without

obtaining the required grading permit. For a second example,

on October 30, 2002, the County cited SADISCO for imper2While the Prince George’s County Code provides that "[a] temporary

permit may be issued for a construction contractor’s office," such code

further provides that "[t]he permit shall be issued only when actual construction on or in the immediate vicinity of the temporary use site necessitates the structures and uses; [and] [t]he permit shall remain valid only for

the time required for the construction . . . ." Prince George’s County Code

(County Code) § 27-261(a). 

HUGGINS v. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY 5
missibly operating its salvage automobile wholesaling business out of the construction trailer.

Undaunted, SADISCO continued to operate its salvage

automobile wholesaling business on the Property and continued to perform grading work without applying for any of the

required permits. Consequently, in May 2003, the County

filed two petitions in Maryland state court for injunctive

relief, one based upon SADISCO’s grading permit violations

and the other based upon SADISCO’s zoning code violations.

On September 3, 2003, SADISCO and the County entered

into two consent orders, one for each petition for injunctive

relief. The consent order pertaining to SADISCO’s illegal

grading activities (the Grading Consent Order) provided that

within sixty days SADISCO would, inter alia, "[o]btain the

required grading permit and approved erosion and sediment

control plan." (J.A. 1867). The consent order pertaining to

SADISCO’s zoning violations (the Zoning Consent Order)

provided that within ninety days SADISCO would: (1) "Vacate the premises until a valid use and occupancy permit is

obtained"; (2) "Cease use of the premises until a valid use and

occupancy permit is obtained"; and (3) "Obtain a building

permit for the existing trailers or remove them from the premises" (J.A. 1864). The Zoning Consent Order further provided

that if SADISCO did not take these corrective actions within

ninety days, the County

shall have the authority to take all action necessary

to enter onto the [Property] to execute this Order,

and to remove the occupants and close down the

operation of the business/use on the premises by

posting and securing the [P]roperty, and permit no

one to enter onto the [P]roperty for the purpose of

conducting business until a valid use and occupancy

permit is obtained and the costs of the suit are paid

. . . .

6 HUGGINS v. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY
(J.A. 1864). 

On appeal, SADISCO makes much of the fact that the day

before it signed the consent orders, its attorney Lawrence

Taub sent a letter to Associate County Attorney Anne

Magner, stating:

On behalf of my client, I have discussed the timing

issue with both you and [County Department of

Environmental Resource’s] staff (Inspectors [Fred]

Holtzberger and [Jeffrey] DeHan), and I have been

told by all that even though the Consent Order[s]

[are] limited to these specific timeframes, if the

required permits and other actions have not been

fully accomplished by the end of those time periods,

but the County staff sees that my client has been diligently pursuing these applications and that the failure to obtain these permits is not as a result of any

inaction by my client, the County staff will continue

to work with my client, will not take actions to cause

it to cease operations upon [the] [P]roperty, and will

allow my client to continue to operate upon its property while continuing to diligently pursue issuance of

the required permits. My client’s execution of these

Consent Orders is thus premised upon its understanding and acceptance of this representation by

you and the County [Department of Environmental

Resources] staff.

(J.A. 1852) (letter dated September 2, 2003). The record is

undisputed that the letter described the standard practice of

the County to work with property owners to resolve County

Code violations and to forbear from enforcement as long as

the property owner was making good faith efforts to cure its

violations. Associate County Attorney Anne Magner never

responded to the letter. According to SADISCO, this letter

memorialized an oral contract between SADISCO and the

County that predates the consent orders. 

HUGGINS v. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY 7
The County then granted SADISCO a series of requested

extensions of the deadline for compliance with the terms of

the Grading Consent Order based upon SADISCO’s representations that it was diligently working to meet such requirements. Ultimately, the County extended the deadline for

SADISCO’s compliance with the terms of the Grading Consent Order to July 3, 2004.

Moreover, based upon requests by SADISCO to allow it

more time to comply with the requirements of the Zoning

Consent Order, the County permitted SADISCO to operate its

salvage automobile wholesaling business on the Property until

the middle of March 2004. However, on March 18, 2004, the

County notified SADISCO in writing that it intended to carry

out enforcement of the Zoning Consent Order on or after

March 28, 2004.

At an April 27, 2004 meeting of various County officials,

the decision was made to enforce the Zoning Consent Order.

The sign-in sheet in the record reflects that such officials

included, among others: (1) Cynthia Barry, Zoning Inspector

Supervisor for the County’s Department of Environmental

Resources (County Zoning Inspector Supervisor Barry); (2)

Jeffrey Dehan, Code Enforcement Officer in the Community

Standards Division of the Site Development Inspection Section of the County’s Department of Environmental Resources

(County Code Enforcement Officer Dehan); and (3) Anne

Williams, Environmental Crimes Specialist for the Division

of Environmental Health of the County’s Health Department

(County Environmental Crimes Specialist Williams). Of relevance to the issues on appeal, prior to this meeting, the

County knew that groundwater at Andrews Air Force base

had long been contaminated with chlorobenzene and other

volatile organic chemicals. The County also knew that preliminary studies had found low concentrations of chlorobenzene

within ground water seeps along the fence line between

Andrews Air Force Base and the Property and at higher concentration levels on property not owned by SADISCO but

8 HUGGINS v. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY
nonetheless adjacent to the Property and next to the fence line

at Andrews Air Force Base. Furthermore, the County knew

that it would not be able to learn the exact extent of the

groundwater contamination in regard to the Property until

issuance of an environmental report, based upon sampling

data, that was expected to be issued later in the year (2004).

A written document, entitled "Sadisco Property (Foxley

Road) Action Items," detailed how the County intended to

proceed, as determined at the April 27, 2004 meeting. The

County’s Department of Environmental Resources would

actually padlock the gate SADISCO had installed across the

Foxley Road right-of-way on the Property. Until SADISCO

obtained the necessary County permits (e.g., for grading and

use and occupancy), SADISCO would only be allowed to

access the Property to remove cars and perform other tasks on

the Property that would bring SADISCO into compliance.

The County padlocked the Property the next day on April 28,

2004.

Nearly three years later, on March 30, 2007, SADISCO

filed the present civil action in the United States District

Court for the District of Maryland against the County and the

Officials, individually and in their respective official capacities. The Officials consist of: (1) County Zoning Inspector

Supervisor Barry; (2) Erv Beckert, District Engineer in the

County’s Department of Public Works and Transportation

(County District Engineer Beckert); (3) County Code

Enforcement Officer Dehan; (4) Thomas Matzen, Associate

Director of the Community Standards Division of the County’s Department of Environmental Resources (County Associate Director of the Community Standards Division); and (5)

County Environmental Crimes Specialist Williams.

The complaint alleged five counts as follows. Pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983, Count 1 alleged the County and the Officials (collectively the Defendants) violated SADISCO’s substantive due process rights under the Due Process Clause of

HUGGINS v. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY 9
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Count 2 alleged the Defendants violated SADISCO’s substantive due process rights under the Maryland Declaration of

Rights. Count 3 alleged breach of contract under Maryland

common law against the County alone. Count 4 alleged tortious interference with economic relations under Maryland

common law against the Defendants. Count 5 alleged negligent misrepresentation under Maryland common law against

the Defendants.

In February 2008, the district court dismissed Counts 2, 4,

and 5 on the basis that SADISCO had failed to comply with,

and was not entitled to waiver of, the pre-suit notice requirements of the Local Government Tort Claims Act (the

LGTCA), Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-304(b). The

district court dismissed Count 3 as time barred to the extent

SADISCO alleged breach of a written contract. The district

court allowed discovery to proceed on Count 3 to the extent

such count alleged breach of two oral contracts. The district

court also allowed discovery to proceed against the Officials

with respect to Count 1, but stayed discovery against the

County for any potential liability under Monell v. Department

of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See id. at 690 (limiting liability of local governmental units not part of the state

for Eleventh Amendment purposes for constitutionally offensive actions of its employees to actions taken by such employees in furtherance of some municipal policy or custom);

Vathekan v. Prince George’s County, Md., 154 F.3d 173, 180

(4th Cir. 1998) (observing that Monell "established that

municipalities and counties could be liable for constitutional

deprivations under § 1983").

On February 9, 2009, the Defendants moved for summary

judgment on the remaining counts, with the Officials in their

individual capacities each seeking to be dismissed on the

basis of qualified immunity. On July 24, 2009, the district

court ruled as follows. The district court dismissed the Officials in their individual capacities from the action on the basis

10 HUGGINS v. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY
of qualified immunity. Because SADISCO’s naming of the

Officials as defendants in their official capacities served as

suits against the County, the County remained as the sole

defendant with respect to Count 1.3See Kentucky v. Graham,

473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) ("As long as the government entity

receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an officialcapacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated

as a suit against the entity."). The district court denied the

County’s motion for summary judgment on Count 1. However, the district court granted the County’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the remaining portion of Count

3, i.e., for allegedly breaching two alleged oral contracts.

On May 3, 2010, the County again moved for summary

judgment with respect to Count 1, which motion the district

court granted on November 9, 2010. Huggins v. Prince

George’s County, Md., 750 F. Supp. 2d 549 (D.Md. 2010).

This timely appeal followed.

On appeal, SADISCO challenges: (1) the district court’s

grant of summary judgment in favor of the County with

respect to Count 1; (2) the district court’s dismissal, based

upon qualified immunity, of the Officials in their individual

capacities with respect to Count 1; (3) the district court’s

grant of summary judgment with respect to Count 3’s allegation of breach of two alleged oral contracts between

SADISCO and the County; and (4) the district court’s Rule

12(b)(6) dismissal of Counts 2, 4, and 5. 

II.

We first address SADISCO’s challenge to the district

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the County

with respect to the portions of Count 3 alleging breach of two

oral contracts that SADISCO alleges existed between it and

3From here forward, we treat the County and the Officials sued in their

official capacities as the County. 

HUGGINS v. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY 11
the County. SADISCO contends that such oral contracts arose

from two identical promises made by the County, approximately nine months apart, to forbear shutting down SADISCO’s salvage automobile wholesaling business on the

Property, as long as SADISCO diligently pursued issuance of

the necessary permits. According to SADISCO, the first

promise occurred on November 21, 2002, during a meeting

between SADISCO representatives on the one hand and

County Zoning Inspector Supervisor Barry and County Code

Enforcement Officer Dehan on the other. SADISCO contends

the second promise occurred on September 2, 2003, one day

before the County and SADISCO entered into the consent

orders, when the County, through Associate County Attorney

Anne Magner, made the same promise.

When the district court asked SADISCO at the summary

judgment hearing regarding the remaining portion of Count 3

"what . . . the county [was to] get out of that so-called agreement?," referring to the alleged second promise, SADISCO

responded:

Two things mainly. First of all, SADISCO’s entry

into the consent orders. SADISCO could have litigated this matter instead of entering into consent

orders at that point in September of ’03, but

SADISCO relinquished that opportunity and entered

into the consent orders. That’s the consideration.

(J.A. 426). SADISCO also represented at the same summary

judgment hearing that the alleged oral contracts had no fixed

terms. SADISCO alleges the County breached the alleged oral

contracts when it padlocked SADISCO’s business on April

28, 2004. On appeal, as it did below, SADISCO points to various portions of deposition testimony, including deposition

testimony by Associate County Attorney Anne Magner, as its

primary evidence in support of the alleged oral contracts.

Below, after considering the parties’ written arguments in

the summary judgment motion papers and the parties’ oral

12 HUGGINS v. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY
arguments at the summary judgment hearing, the district court

granted summary judgment in favor of the County on the

ground that no consideration in favor of the County existed to

support a valid oral contract which predated the Consent

Orders. 

We agree with the district court. First, because the first-intime of the two alleged oral contracts (November 2002) predates the County’s filing of its two enforcement actions

against SADISCO (May 2003), SADISCO’s agreement to

enter into the consent orders to settle the enforcement actions

cannot serve as consideration for such alleged oral contract.

Although the second-in-time of the two alleged oral contracts (September 2003) post dates the County’s filing of its

two enforcement actions against SADISCO (May 2003), such

alleged oral contract suffers from a different, but nonetheless

fatal problem. The County adamantly denies the existence of

such an oral contract and the evidence upon which SADISCO

attempts to rely in order to prove that it gave the County valid

consideration for the alleged second-in-time oral contract is

barred from admission by the parol evidence rule because

such evidence directly contradicts the two subsequent written

consent orders. Between the consent orders, which are matters

of contract under Maryland law, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stinebaugh, 824 A.2d 87, 97 (Md. 2003), SADISCO collectively

agreed, inter alia: (1) to relinquish its rights and opportunities

to defend itself in the two then pending enforcement actions;

(2) to obtain a grading permit and an approved erosion and

sediment control plan and to perform various work at the

Property within sixty days; (3) to vacate the premises within

ninety days unless SADISCO obtained a valid use and occupancy permit; and (4) unless SADISCO took the corrective

actions specified in the Zoning Consent Order within ninety

days, the County possessed the authority to shut down

SADISCO’s salvage automobile wholesaling business on the

Property "until a valid use and occupancy permit is obtained

and the costs of the suit are paid . . . ." (J.A. 1864). By relying

HUGGINS v. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY 13
on parol evidence, SADISCO attempts to contradict the deadlines for its compliance with its obligations under the consent

orders with an open-ended period of time for compliance.

Maryland substantive law, which the parties agree applies

to analyze SADISCO’s breach of oral contracts claim, is clear

that the parol evidence rule bars admission of SADISCO’s

evidence of a prior agreement to vary or contradict the terms

of the written Consent Orders in an effort to establish that it

gave consideration for the second-in-time alleged oral contract. Calomiris v. Woods, 727 A.2d 358, 361 (Md. 1999)

("Maryland law generally requires giving legal effect to the

clear terms of a contract and bars the admission of prior or

contemporaneous agreements or negotiations to vary or contradict a written contractual term."); Higgins v. Barnes, 530

A.2d 724, 726 (1987) (in absence of fraud, duress, or mutual

mistake, parol evidence is not admissible to show the intention of the parties or to vary, alter, or contradict the terms of

a contract that is complete and unambiguous).

Despite the fact that SADISCO’s claims of open-ended

deadlines directly contradict the unambiguous sixty-day and

ninety-day deadlines in the Consent Orders, SADISCO argues

that the parol evidence rule does not apply because neither

Consent Order contained an integration clause. SADISCO’s

argument is without merit. Under Maryland law, although an

integration clause is indicative of the intention of the parties

to finalize their complete understanding in a written contract,

the existence of such a clause in a contract is not a prerequisite to application of the parol evidence rule. See, e.g., Kasten

Constr. Co. v. Rod Enterprises, Inc., 301 A.2d 12, 17 (1973)

(Maryland follows objective test for interpreting written contracts; where contract is plain and unambiguous and in

absence of fraud, duress, or mutual mistake, court cannot look

beyond four corners of the written contract to evidence of

prior statements or agreements, especially when contract contains integration clause).

14 HUGGINS v. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY
Here, the bottom line is that, pursuant to the written Zoning

Consent Order, which consent order post dates the second

alleged oral contract, SADISCO plainly and unambiguously

agreed that if it "d[id] not take the corrective actions ordered,"

in the Zoning Consent Order within ninety days of September

3, 1993, the County "shall have the authority to take all action

necessary to enter onto the [P]roperty . . . to execute this

Order, and to remove the occupants and close down the operation of the business/use on the premises . . . ." (J.A. 1864).

The effect of SADISCO’s claim alleging breach of the second

oral contract and its offer of deposition testimony and other

various evidence in support, is to directly contradict this plain

and unambiguous language of the Zoning Consent Order.

Because SADISCO has not shown (or even alleged) that it

entered into the Zoning Consent Order because of fraud,

duress, or by mutual mistake, the parol evidence rule steps in

to bar such effort. Kasten Constr. Co., 301 A.2d at 17. See

also Strickler Eng’g Corp. v. Seminar, 122 A.2d 563, 568

(Md. 1956) ("Where parties have expressed their intention in

clear and definite terms the paper must be construed according to the true meaning of the words used therein."). In sum,

we hold the district court properly granted summary judgment

in favor of the County with respect to the portion of Count 3

alleging breach of two alleged oral contracts and affirm the

judgment below in that respect.

III.

We next address SADISCO’s challenge to the district

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants

with respect to Count 1, its substantive due process claim

under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

to the United States Constitution. SADISCO’s challenge is

without merit.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

states, in relevant part, "No State shall . . . deprive any person

of . . . property, without due process of law. . . ." U.S. Const.

HUGGINS v. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY 15
amend. XIV. In County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833

(1998), the Supreme Court explained that "the core of the

concept" of due process is "protection against arbitrary

action," id. at 845, and that "only the most egregious official

conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional

sense," id. at 846 (internal quotation marks omitted). The

Court further explained, "the substantive component of the

Due Process Clause is violated by executive action only when

it can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience

shocking, in a constitutional sense." Id. at 847 (internal quotation marks omitted). "[C]onduct intended to injure in some

way unjustifiable by any government interest is the sort of

official action most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking

level." Id. at 849.

SADISCO premises its substantive due process claim on

the following two property interests: "(1) its right to use the

[P]roperty under permits issued by the County and (2) the

County’s express agreement to allow [it] to continue operating." (SADISCO’s Opening Brief at 29). Notably, SADISCO

does not contend that the decision to shut down its salvage

automobile wholesaling business on the Property was motivated by any intent on the part of the Defendants to injure

SADISCO. Rather, according to SADISCO, the Defendants

violated its right to substantive due process in regard to these

asserted property interests by shutting down its salvage automobile wholesaling business on the Property based upon the

Officials’ respective individual fears as well as their collective

fear that the County would incur liability for expensive environmental clean-up costs in connection with the Foxley Road

right-of-way. 

The district court disposed of this count with respect to the

County on the basis that SADISCO had not forecast sufficient

evidence that it had a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. We agree with the district court on this

point. First, assuming arguendo that a party can make out a

substantive due process claim based upon a property interest

16 HUGGINS v. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY
in an existing contract, SADISCO cannot maintain a substantive due process claim upon this basis because, as we just held

in Part II of this opinion, supra at 15, SADISCO failed to

establish an enforceable contract between it and the County in

which the County agreed to allow it to continue operating its

salvage automobile wholesaling business on the Property as

long as SADISCO diligently pursued obtaining the necessary

permits.

SADISCO’s asserted property right to operate its business

on the Property pursuant to permits issued by the County does

not work either. Critically, the record is undisputed that by the

end of October 2002, the County had legitimately revoked

any and all outstanding permits that it had issued to

SADISCO with respect to the Property because of SADISCO’s violation of numerous County Code provisions, so that

by the time the County shut down SADISCO’s salvage automobile wholesaling business on April 28, 2004, SADISCO no

longer held any valid permits. 

SADISCO addresses the revocation issue by citing A Helping Hand, LLC v. Baltimore County, Md., 515 F.3d 356 (4th

Cir. 2008), for the proposition that "once a permit is issued,

even one day of noticeable use of a permit creates a vested

right." (SADISCO’s Opening Br. at 34 n.6). A recitation of

the relevant facts of A Helping Hand, LLC and the relevant

law makes clear why this proposition is irrelevant to SADISCO’s substantive due process claim.

In A Helping Hand, LLC, a methadone treatment clinic (the

Clinic) obtained a valid permit to operate on a particular parcel of land in Baltimore County, Maryland (the Slade Avenue

location), as required by the applicable county zoning ordinance, and had exercised the permit on the land such that the

surrounding neighborhood was advised that the Slade Avenue

location was being devoted to use as a methadone clinic. Id.

at 371. One day after the Clinic obtained the permit, a bill was

signed into law changing the applicable Baltimore County

HUGGINS v. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY 17
zoning ordinance to add additional requirements for statelicensed medical clinics, including drug abuse treatment centers, to operate in Baltimore County. Id. at 360. The new zoning law became effective the day of enactment. Id. Soon

thereafter, Baltimore County moved to enforce the new zoning law against the Clinic. Id. at 360-61. The Clinic ultimately

sued Baltimore County in federal court for, inter alia, violation of its substantive due process rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment based upon its

property interest in its permit to operate its methadone clinic

at the Slade Avenue location. Id. at 370. The jury returned a

verdict in favor of the Clinic on this claim, and Baltimore

County appealed. Id. at 361.

On appeal, Baltimore County challenged the district court’s

jury instruction that the Clinic had a vested property interest

in its continued operation at the Slade Avenue location. We

rejected this challenge on the basis that the district court did

not err in so instructing the jury. Id. at 372. In this regard, we

first observed that state law governed the issue of whether the

Clinic had a cognizable property interest that could trigger

federal due process guarantees. Id. at 370. Next, we set forth

requirements under Maryland law for the Clinic to have a

vested property right in continued operation at the Slade Avenue location:

"‘it is established that in order to obtain a "vested

right" in the existing zoning use which will be constitutionally protected against a subsequent change in

the zoning ordinance prohibiting or limiting that use,

the owner must (1) obtain a permit or occupancy certificate where required by the applicable ordinance

and (2) must proceed under that permit or certificate

to exercise it on the land involved so that the neighborhood may be advised that the land is being

devoted to that use.’"

Id. at 370-71 (quoting Powell v. Calvert County, 795 A.2d 96,

102 (Md. 2002) (quoting Richmond Corp. v. Bd. of County

18 HUGGINS v. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY
Comm’rs for Prince George’s County, 255 A.2d 398, 404

(1969))). After reviewing the evidence, we held the Clinic had

met both of these requirements.

We next rejected Baltimore County’s argument that "the

district court erred in instructing the jury that the Clinic had

a vested property interest in its continued operation at the

Slade Avenue [location] because ‘under Maryland law, a person has no vested rights in a permit that is the subject of continuing litigation.’" Id. at 371. Although we recognized that

Baltimore County had accurately quoted this principle, we

held that such principle was irrelevant to the case because

"neither the issuance of the permit nor the ordinance pursuant

to which it was issued [wa]s the subject of ongoing litigation."

Id. Rather, we observed, the litigation concerned Baltimore

County’s attempt to change the zoning law to preclude the

Clinic from operating. Id. Thus, we upheld the instruction. Id.

at 372.

The obvious and material distinction between the present

case and A Helping Hand, LLC is that the permit held by the

Clinic was still in existence at the time of the challenged

action. This, of course, is not so with respect to SADISCO’s

permits. Thus, A Helping Hand, LLC does not provide any

sort of a helping hand to SADISCO.

Finally, to the extent SADISCO has any residual interest in

the revoked permits that could possibly serve as a property

interest for its substantive due process claim, a proposition for

which we are gravely doubtful, the claim nonetheless fails

because it does not approach the conscience shocking threshold for a substantive due process violation by executive

action. Here, there is absolutely no evidence that any of the

Defendants deliberately intended to injure SADISCO. Indeed,

the record bespeaks the opposite in that the Defendants

worked with SADISCO for over two years in an effort to help

it obtain all of the proper permits and operate in accordance

with all County laws. Moreover, the desire to avoid the crushHUGGINS v. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY 19
ing financial liability that comes with "responsible party" status under CERCLA if SADISCO were permitted to continue

its activities on the Property is an understandable governmental concern. Although SADISCO attempts to make this case

all about the Defendants’ desire to avoid CERCLA liability,

the undisputed evidence in the record shows a mixed motive

situation with the fact that SADISCO had never obtained all

of the proper permits playing more than a minimal role in the

decision to shut down SADISCO’s salvage automobile

wholesaling business on the Property.

Because SADISCO cannot establish a substantive due process violation, the district court properly granted summary

judgment in favor of the County with respect to Count 1.

Moreover, SADISCO’s failure to establish a constitutional

violation at all under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitled the Officials to qualified immunity with respect to Count 1. Brockington v. Boykins, 637 F.3d

503, 506 (4th Cir. 2011). In sum, we affirm the judgment

below with respect to Count 1.

IV.

Lastly, we address SADISCO’s challenge to the district

court’s dismissal of Counts 2, 4, and 5, which the district

court dismissed on the basis that SADISCO failed to comply

with the notice requirements of the LGTCA (either fully or

substantially) and failed to show good cause for its noncompliance.

By its terms, the LGTCA prohibits "an action for unliquidated damages . . . against a local government or its employees unless" the plaintiff provides notice of the claim "within

180 days after the injury." Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc.

§ 5-304(b)(1). For claims arising in Prince George’s County,

the LGTCA provides that the notice: (1) "shall be given in

person or by certified mail . . . by the claimant or the representative of the claimant," id. § 5-304(c)(1), "to the county

20 HUGGINS v. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY
solicitor or county attorney," id. § 5-304(c)(3)(iii); and (2)

"shall be in writing and shall state the time, place, and cause

of the injury," id. § 5-304(b)(2).

Although Maryland courts have recognized a substantial

compliance exception to the LGTCA, the exception is narrow:

The touchstone of substantial compliance is whether

the alleged notice was sufficient to fulfill the purpose

of the requirement. The purpose of the notice

requirement is to apprise local governments of possible liability at a time when they can conduct their

own investigation into the relevant facts, while evidence and the recollection of witnesses are still

fresh. Thus, substantial compliance will occur when

the local government receives actual notice such that

it is given the opportunity to properly investigate the

potential tort claim.

Hansen v. City of Laurel, 996 A.2d 882, 891 (Md. Ct. Spec.

App. 2010) (alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks

omitted). A plaintiff must not only demonstrate substantial

compliance as to the content of the notice within the 180-day

period, but also as to the statutory recipient. Wilbon v. Hunsicker, 913 A.2d 678, 689-204 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006).

In the event a plaintiff fails to strictly or at least substantially comply with the LGTCA’s notice requirements, his tort

case seeking unliquidated damages against a local government in Maryland can still proceed if the plaintiff can show

good cause exists to waive such requirements and the defendant cannot affirmatively show that its defense has been prejudiced by lack of required notice. Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud.

Proc. § 5-304(d). A showing of good cause is mandatory; lack

of prejudice to the defendant alone does not justify waiver of

the LGTCA’s notice requirements. Hargrove v. Mayor and

City Council of Baltimore, 807 A.2d 149, 151 (Md. Ct. Spec.

App. 2002) "Good cause exists when a claimant prosecutes a

HUGGINS v. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY 21
claim with that degree of diligence that an ordinarily prudent

person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances." Wilbon, 913 A.2d at 693 (internal quotation

marks omitted). A court’s determination that good cause for

failure to comply with the LGTCA’s notice requirements has

or has not been shown is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Hargrove, 807 A.2d at 152.

Here, SADISCO does not assert that it strictly complied

with the LGTCA’s notice requirements. Rather, it asserts that

its lack of strict compliance should be excused because it substantially complied with the LGTCA’s notice requirements or,

alternatively, because it has shown good cause for its lack of

compliance.

After careful review of the record, the written briefs of the

parties, the relevant legal precedent, and after hearing oral

argument in this appeal, we hold the district court correctly

rejected both of these arguments. Accordingly, we affirm the

district court’s dismissal of Counts 2, 4, and 5 on the basis

that SADISCO failed to comply with the notice requirements

of the LGTCA (either fully or substantially) and failed to

show good cause for such noncompliance.

V.

In conclusion, we affirm the judgment below in toto.

4

AFFIRMED

4SADISCO also raises several additional arguments they contend

should be resolved in their favor. We have fully considered such arguments and find them to be without merit. 

22 HUGGINS v. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY