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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII

---o0o---

STATE OF HAWAII,

Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

COREY THOMPSON,

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellee.

SCWC-17-0000361

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

(CAAP-17-0000361; FC-CR NO. 3FC16100320K)

DECEMBER 10, 2021

RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, AND WILSON, JJ.,

AND CIRCUIT JUDGE SOMERVILLE, ASSIGNED BY REASON OF VACANCY

OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J.

Pursuant to Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes § 805-1, the State 

must ensure that a criminal complaint is supported by either 

(1) the complainant’s signature or (2) a declaration submitted 

in lieu of an affidavit.

Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellant State of Hawaiʻi (the 

State) charged Petitioner/Defendant-Appellee Corey Thompson 

Electronically Filed

Supreme Court

SCWC-17-0000361

10-DEC-2021

07:52 AM

Dkt. 9 OP
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(Thompson) by complaint with the offense of abuse of a household 

or family member. Critically, the complaint was neither signed 

by a complainant nor supported by a declaration. The State 

consequently did not comply with its statutory obligation to 

perfect the complaint. In turn, the family court erred in 

issuing a penal summons. We therefore reverse the Intermediate 

Court of Appeals’ (ICA) June 15, 2020 Judgment on Appeal.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Family Court Proceedings.1

On November 23, 2016, the State charged Thompson with 

abuse of family or household member, in violation of Hawaiʻi 

Revised Statutes (HRS) § 709-906(1),2 via complaint. The 

complaint consisted of a single page signed by a deputy 

prosecuting attorney. The complaint did not bear any other 

signatures, and the State did not attach a declaration or an 

affidavit to the complaint.

Based on the complaint, the clerk of the Family Court 

of the Third Circuit (family court) issued a penal summons 

compelling Thompson to appear in the Kona district court on 

January 11, 2017.

 

1 The Honorable Ronald Ibarra presided.

2 HRS § 709-906(1) (Supp. 2016) provides in relevant part: “It shall be 

unlawful for any person, singly or in concert, to physically abuse a family 

or household member[.]”
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On January 11, 2017, Thompson appeared in family court

in response to the penal summons. On March 2, 2017, Thompson 

filed a “Motion to Dismiss for Penal Summons Issued Absent 

Probable Cause Affidavit, Complaint Lacking Supporting 

Affidavit, and Improper Arraignment” (motion to dismiss). 

Thompson asserted that the family court should dismiss the case 

for three reasons. First, the complaint was deficient because 

it was “not by declaration, and it does not contain the required 

sworn affidavit,” as required by HRS § 805-1.3 Second, because 

the complaint was deficient, the family court lacked probable 

 

3 HRS § 805-1 (2014) provides:

Complaint; form of warrant. When a complaint is made 

to any prosecuting officer of the commission of any 

offense, the prosecuting officer shall examine the 

complainant, shall reduce the substance of the complaint to 

writing, and shall cause the complaint to be subscribed by 

the complainant under oath, which the prosecuting officer 

is hereby authorized to administer, or the complaint shall 

be made by declaration in accordance with the rules of 

court. If the original complaint results from the issuance 

of a traffic summons or a citation in lieu of an arrest 

pursuant to section 803-6, by a police officer, the oath 

may be administered by any police officer whose name has 

been submitted to the prosecuting officer and who has been 

designated by the chief of police to administer the oath, 

or the complaint may be submitted by declaration in 

accordance with the rules of court. Upon presentation of 

the written complaint to the judge in whose circuit the 

offense allegedly has been committed, the judge shall issue 

a warrant, reciting the complaint and requiring the 

sheriff, or other officer to whom it is directed, except as 

provided in section 805-3, to arrest the accused and to 

bring the accused before the judge to be dealt with 

according to law; and in the same warrant the judge may 

require the officer to summon such witnesses as are named 

in the warrant to appear and give evidence at the trial. 

The warrant may be in the form established by the usage and 

practice of the issuing court.
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cause to issue the penal summons under HRS § 805-3.4 Third, in 

the absence of a supporting affidavit or declaration, the State 

could not arraign Thompson in compliance with Hawaiʻi Rules of 

Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 5(b)(1),5 which requires the State to 

 

4 HRS § 805-3 (2014) provides:

Summons in what cases. Where, from the complaint, it 

appears to the district judge that the offense charged 

therein is not of a serious nature, or not one for which a 

severe penalty should be imposed, and where the person 

complained against is so situated as to raise no 

presumption of the person’s attempting to elude justice in 

the premises, the district judge may, in the district 

judge’s discretion (unless the complainant in writing 

requests the immediate arrest of the alleged offender), 

issue the district judge’s summons, wherein shall be 

recited the substance of the complaint, commanding the 

alleged offender to appear before the district judge upon a 

time to be therein stated, not less than twenty-four hours 

from the time of service of summons, and then and there to 

answer the charge. The summons shall contain a warning to 

the person summoned that failure to obey the same will 

render the person liable to attachment for contempt.

5 HRPP Rule 5(b)(1) (2014) provides in relevant part:

(1) Arraignment. In the district court, if the 

offense charged against the defendant is other than a 

felony, the complaint shall be filed and proceedings shall 

be had in accordance with this section (b). A copy of the 

complaint, including any affidavits in support thereof, and 

a copy of the appropriate order, if any, shall be furnished 

to the defendant. . . . . When the offense is charged by 

complaint, arraignment shall be in open court, or by video 

conference when permitted by Rule 43. The arraignment 

shall consist of the reading of the complaint to the 

defendant and calling upon the defendant to plead thereto. 

. . . . The defendant may waive the reading of the 

complaint or the recitation of the essential facts 

constituting the offense charged at arraignment . . . . In 

addition to the requirements of Rule 10(e), the court 

shall, in appropriate cases, inform the defendant of the 

right to jury trial in the circuit court and the defendant 

may elect to be tried without a jury in the district court.
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give Thompson “[a] copy of the complaint, including any 

affidavits in support thereof[.]” (Emphasis omitted.)

Following briefing from the State and a hearing, the 

family court issued its Findings of Fact/Conclusions of Law 

Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Penal Summons Issued 

Absent Probable Cause Affidavit, Complaint Lacking Supporting 

Affidavit, and Improper Arraignment (dismissal order). As 

relevant here, the family court determined that

As the complaint in this case is fatally defective due to a 

lack of supporting affidavit as required by HRS §805-1, the 

penal summons was issued upon a faulty complaint, and the 

arraignment was improper for failure to provide Defendant 

with the supporting affidavit, this case must be dismissed 

without prejudice.

B. ICA Proceedings.

The State appealed the dismissal order to the ICA. 

The State claimed that the phrase “declaration in accordance 

with the rules of court” was ambiguous insofar as “[t]here is no 

definition of or allusion to a specific rule of court.” In the 

absence of any identified rule, the State asserted that the only 

relevant rule of court was HRPP Rule 7.6 The State thereby 

 

6 HRPP Rule 7 (2012) provides in relevant part:

(a) Use of Indictment, Information, or Complaint. 

The charge against a defendant is an indictment, a 

superseding indictment, an information, or a complaint 

filed in court . . . .

. . . .

(d) Nature and Contents. The charge shall be a 

plain, concise and definite statement of the essential 
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argued that the complaint was not defective because it complied 

with the requirements identified in HRPP Rule 7(d).

The State added that the district court did not err in 

issuing the penal summons because HRPP Rule 9(a)(1) does not 

discuss probable cause in the context of issuing a summons, 

while HRPP Rule 9(a)(2) explicitly requires probable cause for a 

warrant to issue.7 

Lastly, the State asserted that the text of HRPP Rule 

5(b)(1) does not require that all complaints be accompanied by 

 

facts constituting the offense charged. . . . . A 

complaint shall be signed by the prosecutor. . . . .

7 HRPP Rule 9 (2017) provides in relevant part:

Obtaining the Appearance of Defendant

(a) Methods.

(1) Summons. Upon request of the prosecutor, the 

clerk shall issue a summons for a defendant named:

(i) in the complaint;

(ii) in the indictment; or

(iii) in the information.

When a defendant is a corporation or any legal entity 

other than a natural person, a summons instead of a warrant 

shall issue to an authorized representative of the entity.

(2) Warrant. The court may order issuance of a 

warrant instead of a summons upon request of the 

prosecutor; provided however, that no warrant shall issue:

(i) Upon a complaint unless it appears from the 

sworn complaint, or from affidavit(s) or 

declaration(s) filed with the complaint, that there 

is probable cause to believe that an offense has been 

committed and that the defendant has committed it[.]
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an affidavit, and therefore any failure to provide an affidavit 

did not render the arraignment improper. 

In a published opinion, the ICA held that Thompson and 

the family court were correct that “Section 805-1 required the 

Complaint to be signed by the complainant under oath or made by 

declaration in lieu of an affidavit consistent with HRPP Rule 

47(d).”8 The ICA therefore determined that the complaint against 

Thompson did not comply with HRS § 805-1. 

Nevertheless, the ICA decided that a non-compliant

complaint could still be used to initiate and maintain a 

prosecution by penal summons. The ICA reasoned that the crucial 

element for initiating and maintaining a prosecution is the 

prosecutor’s signature – and not a complainant’s signature – for 

two reasons. First, the ICA noted that HRPP Rule 7 was amended 

in 2008 to remove the option that a complaint “shall be sworn or 

 

8 HRPP Rule 47(d) (2000) provides:

(d) Declaration in Lieu of Affidavit. In lieu of an 

affidavit, an unsworn declaration may be made by a person, 

in writing, subscribed as true under penalty of law, and 

dated, in substantially the following form:

“I, __________, declare under penalty of law that the 

foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge 

and belief.

Dated:

_________________________

(Signature)”
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affirmed in writing before the prosecutor by the complaining 

witness and be signed by the prosecutor.”9 Second, the ICA read 

this court’s decisions in Territory v. Williams, 41 Haw. 348 

(Haw. Terr. 1956), and State v. Knoeppel, 71 Haw. 168, 785 P.2d 

1321 (1990), as supporting the proposition that a complaint only 

needs to be signed by a prosecutor to initiate and maintain a 

criminal prosecution. The ICA therefore concluded that the 

family court erred in dismissing the complaint even though it 

did not comply with HRS § 805-1. 

Additionally, the ICA agreed with the State that a 

district court may issue a penal summons on a non-compliant

complaint because HRPP Rule 9(a) “distinguishes between a penal 

summons and an arrest warrant, requiring a probable cause 

showing for issuance of a warrant, but not for issuance of a 

penal summons.” Thus, the ICA concluded that the district court 

did not err in issuing the penal summons.

The ICA also agreed that Thompson was properly 

arraigned because HRPP Rule 5(b)(1) only obligates the State to 

provide defendants with affidavits when such affidavits exist. 

Relying on the premise that the State did not need an affidavit 

to initiate the prosecution against Thompson, the ICA reasoned 

 

9 HRPP Rule 7(d) (2000) provided in relevant part that “[a] complaint 

shall be signed by the prosecutor, or it shall be sworn to or affirmed in 

writing before the prosecutor by the complaining witness and be signed by the 

prosecutor[.]”
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that there was no need for the State to provide Thompson with a 

document that the State did not need to produce.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Statutory Interpretation

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law 

which this court reviews de novo. State v. Ruggiero, 114 Hawai‘i

227, 231, 160 P.3d 703, 707 (2007).

B. Interpretation of Court Rules

“When interpreting rules promulgated by the court, 

principles of statutory construction apply.” State v. Baron, 80 

Hawaiʻi 107, 113, 905 P.2d 613, 619 (1995) (quoting State v. Lau, 

78 Hawaiʻi 54, 58, 890 P.2d 291, 295 (1995)).

C. Motion to Dismiss Charge

“A [trial] court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss [a 

charge] is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” State v. 

Akau, 118 Hawaiʻi 44, 51, 185 P.3d 229, 236 (2008) (citation 

omitted).

The trial court abuses its discretion when it clearly 

exceeds the bounds of reason or disregards rules or 

principles of law or practice to the substantial 

detriment of a party litigant. The burden of 

establishing abuse of discretion is on appellant, and 

a strong showing is required to establish it.

State v. Wong, 97 Hawaiʻi 512, 517, 40 P.3d 914, 919 (2002) 

(citation omitted).

State v. Hinton, 120 Hawaiʻi 265, 273, 204 P.3d 484, 492 (2009).
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III. DISCUSSION

A. The State may not request a penal summons using a complaint 

that does not comply with HRS § 805-1.

1. The State must comply with the requirements of HRS 

§ 805-1 when filing a complaint for a penal summons.

On application for writ of certiorari, Thompson 

asserts that the ICA erred in holding that a complaint used to 

seek a penal summons need not satisfy the requirements of HRS 

§ 805-1. Thompson is correct.

It is well-established that “when [a statute’s] 

language is plain and unmistakable[,] the court is bound by the 

plain, clear and unambiguous language of the statute.” State v. 

Sylva, 61 Haw. 385, 387-88, 605 P.2d 496, 498 (1980). 

Hawaiʻi law provides for only a single type of criminal 

complaint regardless of whether the complaint is used to 

initiate proceedings through an arrest warrant or a penal 

summons. Pursuant to HRS § 805-1,

When a complaint is made to any prosecuting officer of the 

commission of any offense, the prosecuting officer shall 

examine the complainant, shall reduce the substance of the 

complaint to writing, and shall cause the complaint to be 

subscribed by the complainant under oath, which the 

prosecuting officer is hereby authorized to administer, or 

the complaint shall be made by declaration in accordance 

with the rules of court.

These statutory obligations apply regardless of whether the 

State uses the complaint to seek a penal summons or an arrest 

warrant. Notably, HRS § 805-1 goes on to provide that

Upon presentation of the written complaint to the judge in 

whose circuit the offense allegedly has been committed, the 
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judge shall issue a warrant, reciting the complaint and 

requiring the sheriff, or other officer to whom it is 

directed, except as provided in section 805-3, to arrest 

the accused and to bring the accused before the judge to be 

dealt with according to law[.]

(Emphasis added.) In turn, HRS § 805-3 explains that

Where, from the complaint, it appears to the district judge 

that the offense charged therein is not of a serious 

nature, or not one for which a severe penalty should be 

imposed, and where the person complained against is so 

situated as to raise no presumption of the person’s 

attempting to elude justice in the premises, the district 

judge may, in the district judge’s discretion (unless the 

complainant in writing requests the immediate arrest of the 

alleged offender), issue the district judge’s summons[.]

(Emphasis added.) In other words, once the State provides the 

district court with a complaint that complies with HRS § 805-1, 

only then may the district court choose to issue a penal summons 

if certain requirements are met. See id. §§ 805-1, 805-3.

The requirements of HRS § 805-1 therefore apply to all 

criminal complaints, regardless of whether the State uses the 

complaint to seek a penal summons or an arrest warrant.

2. Pursuant to HRS § 805-1, a complaint must either be 

signed by a complainant or supported by a declaration 

in lieu of an affidavit.

Although HRS § 805-1 unambiguously obligates the State 

to either have a complaint subscribed under oath by a 

complainant or make the complaint by declaration in accordance 

with the rules of court, the phrase “made by declaration in 

accordance with the rules of court” is ambiguous. In 

particular, the statute does not identify the “rules of court” 

to which the declaration must conform. See HRS § 805-1.
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“When there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or 

indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a 

statute, an ambiguity exists.” Gray v. Admin. Dir. of the 

Court, 84 Hawaiʻi 138, 148, 931 P.2d 580, 590 (1997).

Where the words of a law are ambiguous

(1) The meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by 

examining the context with which the ambiguous words, 

phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to 

ascertain their true meaning.

(2) The reason and spirit of the law, and the cause which 

induced the legislature to enact it, may be considered to 

discover its true meaning.

(3) Every construction which leads to an absurdity shall 

be rejected.

HRS § 1-15 (2009). “Moreover, the courts may resort to 

extrinsic aids in determining the legislative intent. One 

avenue is the use of legislative history as an interpretive 

tool.” Gray, 84 Hawaiʻi at 148, 931 P.2d at 590 (quoting State 

v. Toyomura, 80 Hawaiʻi 8, 18-19, 904 P.2d 893, 903-04 (1995)).

The legislative history of HRS § 805-1 establishes 

that the legislature intended for complaints “made by 

declaration in accordance with the rules of court” to be 

complaints made or accompanied by declarations in lieu of 

affidavits. When the legislature amended HRS § 805-1 to provide 

prosecutors with the option to make complaints by declaration, 

the Senate Committee on Judiciary and Labor explained that 

“allowing the use of declarations in lieu of affidavits for 

arrest citations and traffic crime complaints is consistent with 

current rules of court, and would not harm the offender’s right 
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to challenge the veracity of the officer.” S. Stand. Comm. Rep. 

No. 1194, in 2007 Senate Journal, at 1557-58 (emphasis added). 

Similarly, the judiciary submitted testimony that the amendment

“would also authorize an alternative form for verification of 

arrest citations and traffic crime complaints by allowing the 

issuing or complaining officer to verify the citation or 

complaint by declaration. Declarations in lieu of affidavits

are authorized by court rules.” Judiciary, Testimony to the 

Senate Committee on Judiciary and Labor on H.B. 1204, 24th Leg., 

Reg. Sess. (Mar. 9, 2007) (Hon. Russel Nagata, District Court, 

First Circuit) (emphasis added); see also Judiciary, Testimony 

to the Senate Committee on Judiciary and Labor on S.B. 1520, 

24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Feb. 26, 2007) (Hon. Corinne Watanabe, 

ICA). Thus, this elaboration that declarations in lieu of 

affidavits were allowed by court rules demonstrates that the 

legislature intended to allow for complaints made or accompanied 

by “declarations in lieu of affidavits.”

Here, HRPP Rule 47(d) is the applicable rule of court 

pertaining to declarations in lieu of affidavits. Pursuant to 

Hawaiʻi Family Court Rules (HFCR) Rule 81(c) (2015), “[c]ases for 

adults charged with the commission of a crime coming within the 

jurisdiction of the family courts shall be governed by the 

Hawaiʻi Rules of Penal Procedure.” In turn, the only HRPP Rule 
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that describes how a declaration in lieu of an affidavit may be 

made is HRPP Rule 47(d).10

Thus, in order to comply with HRS § 805-1, the 

underlying complaint should have been subscribed under oath by 

the complainant or made by declaration in lieu of an affidavit 

in conformity with HRPP Rule 47(d).

3. A complaint that does not comply with HRS § 805-1 

constitutes a fatally defective complaint, upon which 

a penal summons may not issue.

Although the ICA acknowledged that the underlying 

complaint did not comply with HRS § 805-1’s requirements, it 

nevertheless held that the district court may issue a summons on 

a non-compliant complaint. In particular, the ICA reasoned that 

the State did not need to establish probable cause to request a 

penal summons. However, by focusing on the issue of probable 

cause, the ICA overlooked the preliminary question of whether a 

district court may issue a penal summons upon a complaint that 

does not comply with HRS § 805-1. It may not.

The courts must give effect to the State’s statutory 

obligations. As previously discussed, when the text of a 

 

10 The State argued before the ICA that “HRPP Rule 47(d) concerns Motions” 

because HRPP Rule 47(a)-(c) addresses motions. However, HRPP Rule 47’s 

title, “Motions, Affidavit or Declaration, and Responses,” identifies three 

related but distinct subjects: (1) motions, (2) affidavits or declarations, 

and (3) responses. See HRPP Rule 47. Further, HRPP Rule 47 is categorized 

under the HRPP’s “General Provisions” heading. We therefore disagree that 

the “declaration[s] in lieu of affidavit” identified in HRPP Rule 47(d) may 

only be filed alongside motions.
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statute is clear, “the court is bound by the plain, clear and 

unambiguous language of the statute.” Sylva, 61 Haw. at 387-88, 

605 P.2d at 498. Again, HRS § 805-1 unambiguously requires the 

State to ensure that complaints are either subscribed under oath 

by a complainant or accompanied by a declaration in lieu of an 

affidavit. Supra at 10-14. Given that the legislature 

recognized the need to protect “the offender’s right to 

challenge the veracity of the [accuser],” we cannot say that the 

State’s failure to comply with HRS § 805-1’s requirements 

constitutes a mere formal defect for which dismissal is not 

warranted under HRPP Rule 7(d). S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1194, 

in 2007 Senate Journal, at 1557-58. Thus, the courts must hold 

the State to its obligations under HRS § 805-1 before granting 

the State a penal summons. Sylva, 61 Haw. at 387-88, 605 P.2d 

at 498.11

Our holding that a defective complaint may be

dismissed is not without precedent. For instance, this court 

held in Knoeppel that “[t]he absence of the prosecutor’s 

signature in the complaint . . . rendered the complaint fatally 

 

11 Notably, an incomplete complaint that does not comply with HRS § 805-1, 

HRPP Rule 7(d), or both is distinguishable from an insufficient charge. In 

the case of an incomplete complaint, the State does not satisfy the threshold 

requirements articulated by HRS § 805-1 or HRPP Rule 7(d). See, e.g., 

Knoeppel, 71 Haw. at 171, 785 P.2d at 1322. By contrast, when a charge is 

insufficient, the defendant is deprived of due process. See State v. 

Wheeler, 121 Hawaiʻi 383, 391, 219 P.3d 1170, 1178 (2009) (quoting State v. 

Jendrusch, 58 Haw. 279, 281, 567 P.2d 1242, 1244 (1977)).
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defective.” 71 Haw. at 171, 785 P.2d at 1322. Given that the 

prosecutor bears “the responsibility of determining whether or 

not to instigate a formal criminal proceeding,” the omission of 

the signature was not a mere formal defect and therefore 

constituted “a proper ground for dismissal[.]” Id. Similarly, 

the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals has explained that when 

a State obtains a warrant based on a defective complaint, “[t]he 

State could have dismissed the defective warrant and 

reinstituted proceedings against the Defendant through, for 

instance, re-arrest, indictment, or presentment.” State v. 

Wilson, 6 S.W.3d 504, 507 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

Consequently, the ICA erred in holding sub silentio

that the State need not comply with its statutory duties. In 

turn, the ICA also erred in concluding that “the Complaint was

not defective and the penal summons was properly issued.”

B. The State did not satisfy its burden of showing that the 

family court abused its discretion in dismissing the 

complaint without prejudice.

Although the State acknowledges that the complaint did 

not comply with the requirements of HRS § 805-1, it contends 

that the family court erred in dismissing the complaint without 

prejudice. In particular, the State asserts that if there is no 

probable cause to support a complaint, HRPP Rule 5(b)(2) only 

authorizes the court to release the defendant on his or her own 
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recognizance, not dismiss the complaint without prejudice. This 

argument is flawed for two reasons.

First, the family court dismissed the complaint 

without prejudice because it did not comply with the 

requirements of HRS § 805-1. The presence of probable cause, or 

lack thereof, was therefore irrelevant to the family court’s 

dismissal of the complaint.

Second, nothing in the text of HRPP Rule 5(b)(2) 

precludes a trial court from dismissing a non-compliant 

complaint. The rule provides:

The plea shall be entered in accordance with the 

provisions of Rule 11. The defendant shall not be entitled 

to a preliminary hearing; provided that if a defendant, 

having been arrested without a warrant, is held in custody 

for a period of more than 48 hours, Rule 45 

notwithstanding, after the defendant’s initial appearance 

in court without a commencement of trial, the defendant 

shall be released to appear on the defendant’s own 

recognizance unless the court finds from a sworn complaint 

or from an affidavit or affidavits filed with the complaint 

or pursuant to subsection (a)(2) of this rule that there is 

probable cause to believe that an offense has been 

committed and that the defendant has committed it; provided

further that if the defendant demands a jury trial under 

subsection (b)(3) of this rule, the court shall, upon the 

defendant’s motion, discharge the defendant unless probable 

cause is found as aforesaid.

HRPP Rule 5(b)(2) (2014) (emphasis added). Consequently, unless 

there is a showing of probable cause, a trial court is obligated 

to release an arrested defendant who has been held in custody 

without an arrest warrant for more than forty-eight hours. See

id. However, nothing in the rule prevents the trial court from 

dismissing a complaint that does not comply with HRS § 805-1.
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Having failed to identify any “rule[] or principle[] 

of law or practice” that barred the family court from dismissing 

the complaint without prejudice, the State has not made “a 

strong showing” to establish any abuse of discretion. See Wong, 

97 Hawaiʻi at 517, 40 P.3d at 919. This court therefore cannot 

say that the family court abused its discretion in dismissing 

the complaint without prejudice. Id.

IV. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, HRS § 805-1 does not 

distinguish between complaints for penal summons and complaints 

for arrest warrants. The ICA therefore erred in holding that 

the State need not comply with its statutory obligations simply 

because it sought a penal summons.

Accordingly, we reverse the ICA’s June 15, 2020

Judgment on Appeal, which vacated the family court’s April 17, 

2017 Findings of Fact/Conclusions of Law Granting Defendant’s 

Motion to Dismiss for Penal Summons Issued Absent Probable Cause 

Affidavit, Complaint Lacking Supporting Affidavit, and Improper 

Arraignment.

William H. Jameson Jr. /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald

for petitioner

/s/ Paula A. Nakayama

Charles E. Murray III

for respondent /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna

/s/ Michael D. Wilson

/s/ Rowena A. Somerville