Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 45A04-1609-CR-2056 | March 29, 2017 Page 1 of 11

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kristin A. Mulholland

Crown Point, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

George P. Sherman

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Dominique Brianna Bowman,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

March 29, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

45A04-1609-CR-2056

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court

The Honorable Samuel L. Cappas, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

45G04-1508-F3-39

Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Dominique Brianna Bowman (Bowman), appeals her 

conviction for Count I, aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-

2-1.5(2); and Count II, battery resulting in serious bodily harm, a Level 5 

felony, I.C. § 35-42-2-1(b)(1);-(f)(1).

[2] We affirm.

ISSUE

[3] Bowman raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether the 

trial court properly permitted the victim to remove her prosthetic in the 

presence of the jury.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] During the early evening of July 23, 2015, Crystal Washington (Washington), 

together with her sister, Angela Washington (Angela), and their friends, Melvin 

Quinn (Quinn) and Janice Allen (Allen), were relaxing in the shade of a tree at 

Allen’s house in Gary, Indiana. In the course of the evening, Angela’s son and 

daughter, Bowman, stopped by. After Bowman exited the vehicle, Angela 

asked Bowman why she had been smoking marijuana in Angela’s house. 

Bowman replied, “I don’t give a fuck. Auntie Crystal acts like this is her house 

anyway.” (Transcript pp. 92, 31-32). Washington “got out of the chair, [and] 

walked around to the car because [Bowman] was being disrespectful to [her]

and [her] sister.” (Tr. p. 58). Washington and Bowman began “tussling and 

wrestling.” (Tr. p. 32). Angela, Allen, and Quinn broke up the fight.
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[5] After the altercation was broken up, Washington walked back toward Allen’s 

residence while Bowman went to the car and grabbed “some kind of object,” 

that appeared to have been made of iron. (Tr. p. 34). Bowman struck 

Washington in the eye with the item. Washington started bleeding profusely 

and fell to the ground. Quinn took off his shirt and used it in an attempt to stop 

the bleeding. When Washington reached the hospital, the doctors determined 

that her left eye had ruptured and needed to be removed. 

[6] On August 25, 2015, the State filed an Information, charging Bowman with 

Count I, aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony, and Count II, battery resulting in 

serious bodily injury, a Level 5 felony. On April 4 and 5, 2016, the trial court 

conducted a jury trial. During the proceedings, the trial court admitted, 

without objection, a photograph of Washington’s injury upon her initial 

hospitalization. The State subsequently requested permission for Washington 

to remove her prosthetic eye in the presence of the jury to demonstrate “the 

injury that was suffered[.]” (Tr. p. 38). Bowman objected and the trial court 

conducted a bench conference, during which the following colloquy occurred: 

[TRIAL COURT]: You know what I think I should do, after 

thinking about this and listening to this, excuse the jury and look 

and see how it appears to me before I allow her to do that in front 

of them.

[STATE]: I personally think – I mean, it’s a charge of aggravated 

battery. And I think that the mere fact of removing [an] eye has 

value, not value to be prejudicial, but value to show how serious 

this injury is. It’s just not a punch in the eye. And the jury 
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deserved to see what happened, what actually happened to her as 

the victim. I think it’s important.

[BOWMAN]: It’s prejudicial to show that. And the State has –

pulling the emotional strings of the jury. And they have 

photographs to show that. To show the actual impact with the 

eye being out of the head. So they are basically doing that.

[STATE]: That means you can never demonstrate an injury?

[TRIAL COURT]: No, it doesn’t mean that. The scars are not 

as likely to inflame a jury as to remove an eye. It is something 

that’s unusual and has the possibility of – I mean, the more I 

think about it, of if it’s – it could be gut wrenching reaction. So 

what I think I am going to do is dismiss for five or ten minutes. I 

am going to have her do it in here to see if it’s – the effect it has 

on me. And then I will consider letting them see it. But I think 

your arguments [State] make sense to me. But it is an unusual 

circumstance the more I think about it. So I am going to have 

them go into the jury room for just five minutes. We will have 

her do the demonstration and we will bring them back out.

(Tr. pp. 38-40). Accordingly, the jury was excused and the trial court 

proceeded with the demonstration outside the presence of the jury. After 

Washington removed the prosthetic, the following exchange took place:

[TRIAL COURT]: Okay. It appears to me the procedure is – I 

don’t know how to say this in the correct way. But it’s not, and 

again my apologies. The way she removed her eye was almost 

like – I feel bad saying this, but it’s kind of like she removed a 

contact, just for purposes of the record, although a little bit more 

effort. And obviously it’s more severe. And I don’t mean to 

minimize the injury. But the way she did it, to me does not look 

like it would inflame the jury. In other words, if she took a 
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protracted amount of time removing it, if there were, you know, 

screaming and yelling associated with it, whatever, then I could 

see that being a problem. But clearly it has an emotional impact 

on her. But I think she handled it in a proper way. And I am 

going to allow the jury to see the demonstration.

[BOWMAN]: I will continue my objection.

[TRIAL COURT]: It’s noted.

[BOWMAN]: After seeing the removal of the eye, which I think 

was bad enough, combined that with her reaction, which is 

normal, I think that her emotional state is normal. However, I 

think the combination of that, the jurors seeing that, it only has 

one impact, only has one result. And that is impact of inflaming 

their emotions regarding the injury.

[TRIAL COURT]: Well, you know, any other victim of a crime, 

someone paralyzed from a gunshot or having lost a limb has 

some – the same – I don’t want to say the same. But has 

attendant, you know, emotions connected with describing their 

injuries. And this woman’s wasn’t any different. She should be 

allowed to testify to it. So I note your objection. I am going to 

overrule it. In other words, many people come through the 

courtroom with a variety of severe injuries to varying degrees. 

And this is substantial, but – you understand what I am saying? I 

mean, there are – not minimizing her injury, but there are people 

from their own perspective who could say they have lost a leg, 

lost an arm. They are quadriplegics. And again the photos of 

that I don’t think are necessarily any less inflammatory than 

what we have witnessed today. I will allow it.

(Tr. pp. 41-43). At the close of the evidence, the jury found Bowman guilty as 

charged.
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[7] On August 4, 2016, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing. After 

hearing arguments, the trial court merged Count II into Count I and sentenced 

Bowman to nine years of imprisonment with five years executed and four years 

to be served in community corrections. 

[8] Bowman now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary. 

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

[9] Bowman contends that she was unduly prejudiced when the trial court 

permitted Washington to remove her prosthetic eye in the presence of the jury 

to demonstrate the severity of her injury. Noting that the State had already 

admitted photographs showing Washington’s eye injury, Bowman maintains 

that the relevancy of a live demonstration was substantially outweighed by the 

prejudicial effect of the “gruesome” injury and inflamed “the passions of the 

jury” in violation of Indiana Evidence Rule 403. (Appellant’s Br. p. 7). 

[10] The trial court has inherent discretionary power over the admission of evidence, 

and its decisions are reviewed only for an abuse of that discretion. Myers v. 

State, 887 N.E.2d 170, 185 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), reh’g denied, trans. denied. 

Accordingly, we will reverse the trial court’s decision only when it is clearly 

against the facts and circumstances before the court. Duvall v. State, 978 N.E.2d 

417, 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. Even if the trial court abused its 

discretion in admitting evidence, the judgment will be undisturbed if the 

decision to admit evidence is harmless error. Id. “Harmless error occurs ‘when 

the conviction is supported by such substantial independent evidence of guilt as 
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to satisfy the reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood that the 

questioned evidence contributed to the conviction.’” Id. (quoting Lafayette v. 

State, 917 N.E. 2d 660, 666 (Ind. 2009)). 

[11] By applying Indiana Evidence Rule 403, “[t]he court may exclude relevant 

evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . .

unfair prejudice[.]” Ind. Evid. R. 403. “‘Unfair prejudice’ addresses the way in 

which the jury is expected to respond to the evidence; it looks to the capacity of 

the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means, or the tendency of the evidence 

‘to suggest decision on an improper basis. . .’” Ingram v. State, 715 N.E.2d 405, 

407 (Ind. 1999) (quoting 12 ROBERT LOWELL MILLER, INDIANA PRACTICE § 

403.102 AT 284 (1995)). However, we recognize all relevant evidence is 

necessarily prejudicial in a criminal prosecution. Wages v. State, 863 N.E.2d 

408, 412 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), reh’g denied, trans. denied. Therefore, the danger 

of unfair prejudicial impact arises from the potential for a jury to substantially 

overestimate the value of the evidence, or its potential to arouse or inflame the 

passions or sympathies of the jury. Id. 

[12] To convict Bowman of a Level 3 felony aggravated battery, the State was 

required to prove that Bowman had inflicted an injury on Washington “that 

caused protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or 

organ.” I.C. § 35-42-2-1.5(2). To support its argument that the best evidence of 

the protracted loss was established through the live removal of the prosthetic, 

the State focuses our attention on Crain v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1223 (Ind. 2000). 
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[13] In Crain, the trial court permitted the State to introduce the deceased victim’s 

skull into evidence as a visual aid to supplement its expert witness testimony. 

Crain, 736 N.E.2d at 1233. During the State’s case-in-chief, the jury members 

were given the opportunity to come forward and examine the skull, which was 

presented in three pieces on a table in front of the jury box. Id. On appeal, the 

defendant argued that any relevance from this evidence was substantially 

outweighed by its prejudicial value. Id. at 1234. “At first blush,” our supreme 

court found “it a bit unsettling that the trial court would allow the prosecution 

to use the actual skull of the victim to supplement its expert testimony. In our 

view, other conventional alternatives—such as high resolution photographs, 

video, and charts—could no doubt have been used to assist the State’s expert 

witnesses in ‘demonstrat[ing] various healing stages of the injuries, colorations 

of the bone, and staining in the skull.’” Id. Nevertheless, observing that the 

trial court had carefully balanced the probative value against the skull’s 

prejudicial effect, the supreme court found that “the skull was neither 

particularly gruesome nor ominous as it lay in three separate pieces, appearing 

as if it was found on an archeological dig.” Id. Reiterating its concern that “the 

State could have just as easily supplemented its witness testimony with other 

conventional exhibits,” the court nonetheless affirmed the trial court’s 

evidentiary decision. Id.

[14] Although the removal of a prosthetic eye in the presence of the jury is an issue 

of first impression for Indiana, other jurisdictions have addressed this situation 

under the particular circumstances of personal injury cases. In Burnett v. Caho, 
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285 N.E.2d 619, 622 (Ill. Ct. App. 1972), reh’g denied, a farm employee 

instituted an action to recover damages for his injury which resulted when, 

while cutting a roll of steel-woven wire, the son of the farm’s manager failed to 

hold the wire in position, causing it to snap up and destroy the employee’s right 

eye. While photographs of the scene of the injury were being identified, the 

trial court allowed the plaintiff to remove his artificial eye in the presence of the 

jury. Id. at 623-24. On appeal, the court affirmed the admission of evidence, 

noting “[i]t is common practice to display personal injuries to the jury even 

though there is no controversy as to the existence, nature and extent thereof.” 

Id. at 624. Likewise, in Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Perrin, 64 P.2d 309, 314 (Okla.

1936), reh’g denied, the supreme court allowed the removal of a prosthetic eye in 

the presence of the jury by the four-year-old victim of a car accident. 

Analogizing the situation to “instances where dead members, such as 

amputated legs, were exhibited to the jury,” the supreme court found that “this 

was a form of wound, and wounds are ordinarily permitted to be shown the 

jury.” Id. See also Bowerman v. Columbia Gorge Motor Coach System, Inc., 284 P. 

579 (Or. 1930) (“[W]ith due regard of decency,” it was permitted for the 

plaintiff to remove her glass eye in the presence of the jury.); Davis v. Christmas, 

248 S.W. 126 (Tex. Ct. App. 1923) (Because the victim could have removed his 

artificial eye prior to taking the witness stand, it was permissible for him to do 

so while on the stand.), reh’g denied.

[15] In this case, the prosthetic eye was relevant and probative given the State’s 

burden to prove a protracted injury. While the State had already introduced 
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into evidence, without objection by Bowman, a photograph taken on the date of 

the incident which clearly showed Washington’s eye injury and Bowman did 

not dispute that Washington had lost an eye due to the fight, the State was 

required to establish a “protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily 

member or organ., not merely an injury on the day of the incident. See I.C. § 

35-42-2-1.5(2) (emphasis added). Even though, a “conventional alternative” 

was already in front of the jury, the State still needed the live demonstration to 

carry its burden of proof. See Crain, 736 N.E.2d at 1234. As in Crain, the trial 

court carefully balanced the probative value against the prosthetic’s prejudicial 

effect by requesting an initial demonstration outside the presence of the jury 

prior to admitting and publishing this evidence. See id. Accordingly, we 

conclude that the trial properly admitted the relevant and probative evidence of 

Washington’s actual physical injury and no unfair prejudice occurred.

[16] Assuming arguendo, the trial had abused its discretion in admitting the live 

demonstration, which it did not, this would still have amounted to harmless 

error. In an attempt to allege that there is a substantial likelihood that the 

questioned evidence contributed to the conviction, Bowman contends that “it 

likely affected the jury’s impression of” Bowman’s self-defense claim. 

(Appellant’s Br. p. 9). Pointing to Washington’s admission that she was the 

initial aggressor, Bowman claims that she was merely defending herself from 

Washington’s attack. We disagree. While a person is justified in using 

reasonable force for protection, “a person is not justified in using force if the 

person has entered into combat with another person or is the initial aggressor 
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unless the person withdraws from the encounter and communicates to the other 

person the intent to do so and the other person nevertheless continues or 

threatens to continue unlawful action.” I.C. § 35-41-3-2(g)(3). Evidence 

presented at trial reveals that the State rebutted Bowman’s self-defense claim. 

After the initial altercation between Bowman and Washington was broken up 

by the bystanders, Washington took “two to three steps” towards Allen’s 

residence. (Tr. p. 47). Despite the fight being over and Washington retreating, 

Bowman reached into the car, grabbed “some kind of object,” and hit 

Washington in the eye. (Tr. p. 34). Therefore, Bowman did not have a valid 

self-defense claim and she failed to establish that the removal of the prosthetic 

contributed to the guilty verdict. 

CONCLUSION

[17] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly admitted and 

allowed publication of the actual physical injury. 

[18] Affirmed.

[19] Crone, J. and Altice, J. concur