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i 

73–797 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–125] 

THE SECURITY SITUATION ON THE 

KOREAN PENINSULA 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 28, 2012 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

KIMBERLY SHAW, Professional Staff Member 

WILLIAM (SPENCER) JOHNSON, Professional Staff Member 

LAUREN HAUHN, Research Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, March 28, 2012, The Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, March 28, 2012 ................................................................................... 31 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 28, 2012 

THE SECURITY SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Lavoy, Dr. Peter, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (Policy) for Asia 

and Pacific Affairs ................................................................................................ 3 

Thurman, GEN James D., USA, Commander, United Nations Command, 

Republic of Korea—United States Combined Forces Command, and United 

States Forces Korea ............................................................................................. 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Lavoy, Dr. Peter ............................................................................................... 38 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 35 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 37 

Thurman, GEN James D. ................................................................................ 43 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Larsen ........................................................................................................ 65 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 70 

Mr. Conaway ..................................................................................................... 71 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 71 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 69 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 69 

(1) 

THE SECURITY SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 28, 2012. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m. in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. 

The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive 

testimony about the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. 

Our witnesses are Dr. Peter Lavoy, Acting Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Asia and Pacific Security Affairs, and General James 

Thurman, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea. 

This is our first opportunity to have a dedicated hearing on this 

topic, but I cannot think of a more opportune time. The President’s 

new defense strategy underscores the importance of the larger 

Asia-Pacific theater. Northeast Asia is a dynamic region of key 

strategic importance to the global economy, regional stability, and 

U.S. national-security interests. 

What is more, the coming year will bring a number of regional 

leadership transitions for North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, 

and Russia. And as some may have forgotten, the Korean war isn’t 

officially over; the peninsula remains divided. It is home to one of 

our strongest allies and one of the world’s most militaristic states. 

In fact, although the North Korean regime is willing to starve its 

own citizens, it maintains the world’s fourth-largest army. North 

Korea has more than 1 million Active Duty personnel and thousands of artillery systems, tanks, armored personnel carriers, aircraft, and surface combatants. 

More than 70 percent of North Korea’s combat power is positioned within 90 miles of the demilitarized zone. This puts our 

280,000 troops and 24 million citizens of Seoul, the world’s fourthlargest city, easily within the erratic regime’s lethal reach. 

Last month, the United States and North Korea announced that 

the regime would stop uranium enrichment and missile testing and 

allow international inspectors to return to North Korea’s nuclear 

facility in exchange for nutritional aid. 

But 2 weeks ago, North Korea said they would launch a longrange rocket into space in April, a clear violation of their agreement with the Administration. This is typical behavior shown by 
2 

the regime; a cycle of provocations and reconciliations designed to 

get what they want without giving up their nuclear weapons program. It has becoming clear that the same aggressive, reckless 

cycle will continue under the new North Korean dictator. 

Although the Chinese and Russian governments publicly expressed concern about the planned missile launch, they have been 

unable or unwilling to bring their North Korean ally back to the 

negotiation table. Meanwhile, there are reports that North Korea 

and Iran are working together in the production of ballistic missiles. 

In contrast, South Korea is a vibrant democratic nation that has 

one of the world’s largest economies and contributes to global security. 

Just a few days ago, South Korea hosted the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit. Our troops stationed in South Korea form the backbone of our mutual defense treaty, promote regional stability, and 

promote and protect U.S. national security and economic interests. 

The readiness and posture of U.S. troops on the peninsula are 

key to stopping a dangerous regime from destabilizing the region 

with unwarranted attacks. 

Dr. Lavoy and General Thurman, we look forward to your testimony shedding light on the range of security matters facing us on 

the Korean Peninsula, and are glad to have you with us here today. 

Ranking Member Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I concur completely in 

your opening remarks about the importance of the region, the importance of our alliance with South Korea, and the danger and the 

threat that North Korea poses to security in that region and, indeed, security in the world. 

I thank General Thurman for his leadership and for all those 

who serve under him for their part in protecting South Korea and 

trying to maintain the peace in that very, very unstable region. 

South Korea is an absolutely critical ally and partner in many 

ways. Our presence there builds and strengthens that relationship. 

We are, you know, pleased we passed the Korean Free Trade 

Agreement. My own state of Washington has a very strong KoreanAmerican population that watches closely what goes on on the Korean Peninsula. So we appreciate your leadership and understand 

the incredible importance of this particular region of the world. 

And obviously North Korea is about as unpredictable and dangerous actor as we have to deal with in the world today. So it is 

a complicated job to make sure that we maintain security there 

without rising too much to the provocations and without ignoring 

them at the same time. It is a delicate balance. We appreciate your 

work and your effort to do that. 

I look forward to your testimony, particularly in talking about 

the proposed missile launch that North Korea is talking about 

doing in mid-April; how you see that playing out with other part-
3 

ners in the region that we are working with to try to contain it; 

and in particular what you think about China and they role that 

they could play in trying to better contain North Korea. 

Is that improving? Are they becoming any more cooperative in 

terms of working with us to try to make sure that North Korea 

stays under control? And no country in the region has greater 

power over North Korea than China, given North Korea’s dependence upon China’s support for energy and other issues. That is a 

critical part of it as well. 

And as the chairman mentioned, the whole region is very important to our national security strategy, and a big piece of making 

sure that we make clear to those countries in Asia that we are a 

Pacific power and we will maintain a presence in the region; it is 

the role we play on the Korean Peninsula. 

So I thank you for your leadership and for all you are doing to 

represent us well in that part of the world, and I look forward to 

your testimony. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. Lavoy. 

STATEMENT OF DR. PETER LAVOY, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY) FOR ASIA AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS 

Dr. LAVOY. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for inviting us here 

today to discuss the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. 

General Thurman shortly will provide a detailed assessment of 

the security landscape on the peninsula, and I will concentrate on 

our policy priorities relating to North and South Korea. 

For over 60 years, the United States has maintained presence on 

the Korean Peninsula to deter aggression against the Republic of 

Korea and to fight and win should deterrence fail. We must never 

forget that more than 36,000 members of the U.S. military gave 

their lives in support of this mission during the Korean War. 

Today the U.S.-Korean alliance continues to be a cornerstone of 

U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region and, at its most basic level, 

the mission of our alliance remains the same today as it was 6 decades ago. 

The Department of Defense’s rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific 

region, as laid out in the defense strategy guidance, is a reaffirmation of our commitment to our Korean ally and our mission on the 

Korean Peninsula. 

As President Obama stated during a joint press conference with 

President Lee in Seoul 2 days ago, the United States, as a Pacific 

nation, will play a larger and long-term role in shaping the region 

and its future. And the cornerstone of our efforts is our strong alliances, including our alliance with the Republic of Korea. 

We will continue to strengthen the U.S.–ROK [Republic of Korea] 

alliance, make our forces in Korea more efficient and effective, and 

enhance presence, power projection, and deterrence in the region. 
4 

North Korea’s provocative behavior, large conventional military, 

proliferation activities, and pursuit of asymmetric advantages 

through its ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction program, including uranium enrichment, continue to present a serious 

threat to the United States, our allies, and the region as a whole. 

It was almost 2 years ago that North Korea brazenly sank the 

ROK naval vessel Cheonan. That event, coupled with the 

unprovoked shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010, provides a reminder that Pyongyang is willing to utilize military capabilities with deadly consequences. 

These incidents demonstrate that the United States and the 

ROK need to take further steps to bolster deterrence and preserve 

security. We are working closely with our ROK allies and armed 

forces to ensure that the responses to any future North Korean 

provocation are effective and appropriate and integrated into alliance plans, and conducted from an alliance perspective. 

Furthermore, through our Extended Deterrence Policy Committee, we meet biannually to identify ways in which the full range 

of alliance capabilities, including conventional forces, missile defense, nuclear capabilities, strategy and doctrine can be leveraged 

to maximize deterrence. 

The potential for a North Korean act of provocation in 2012 remains a major concern. The April 15th centennial celebration commemoration of Kim Il-sung’s birth provides a milestone for North 

Korea to try to show it has become a strong and prosperous nation. 

Kim Jong-un, in the process of consolidating power and establishing his legitimacy, perhaps through a provocative act or display 

of force, is a real possibility. The upcoming ROK parliamentary and 

presidential elections in April and December, respectively, are opportunities for Pyongyang to disrupt and potentially influence 

South Korean political outcomes. 

Our suspicions about North Korea using its celebrations this 

year to enhance its missile program were confirmed when North 

Korea announced on March 16th that it plans to conduct a missile 

launch between April 12th and 16th. 

This planned launch is highly provocative because it manifests 

North Korea’s desire to test and expand its long-range missile capability. 

In addition, the launch, if it occurs, would be in direct violation 

of Pyongyang’s international obligations, including U.N. Security 

Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, which prohibit North Korea 

from conducting any launches that use ballistic missile technology. 

North Korea’s announcement is also troublesome because only 2 

weeks prior, in a February 29th statement after three rounds of bilateral talks, North Korea had agreed to implement a moratorium 

on long-range missile launches. During those discussions, the 

United States made it very clear that a satellite launch would be 

a deal-breaker. 

Let me turn briefly, just—if you permit me one more minute— 

to South Korea. Over the last year, the United States and the ROK 

have sought to transform the alliance so that it remains viable not 

only for the security of the Korean Peninsula, but also regionally 

and globally. 
5 

We frequently consult and coordinate with our ROK counterparts 

across a variety of issues, with immediate focus being on preparation for the transfer of wartime operational control and the relocation of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula. 

To ensure the alliance remains well positioned to promote peace 

and stability for decades to come, our two countries have a comprehensive plan under Strategic Alliance 2015 framework to transition wartime operational control from the U.S.–ROK Combined 

Forces Command to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff by December 

2015. This transition will enable the ROK to take the lead role in 

the defense of its nation while maintaining an enduring U.S. defense commitment and capability. 

As part of that effort—and General Thurman will speak to this 

with more depth—we are working to consolidate and relocate U.S. 

forces from the north of Seoul and the Seoul metropolitan area to 

centralized locations south of Seoul. 

The movement of units and facilities to areas south of the Han 

River improves efficiency, reduces costs, contributes to the political 

sustainability of our forward presence, and enhances force protection and survivability by placing the majority of personnel and 

equipment outside the effective range of North Korean artillery. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Lavoy can be found in the Appendix on page 38.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General Thurman. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES D. THURMAN, USA, COMMANDER, 

UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, REPUBLIC OF KOREA—UNITED 

STATES COMBINED FORCES COMMAND, AND UNITED 

STATES FORCES KOREA 

General THURMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, and distinguished 

Members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to update you on United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea. 

It is a great honor to lead the soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines serving our country in the Republic of Korea. And I thank the 

Members of this committee for their support for our warriors. 

The relationship with South Korea is the finest military partnership I have experienced in my 37-year career. Together, our militaries deter aggression and maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. U.S. military presence in the Republic of Korea 

supports U.S. national interests and a key ally in Northeast Asia. 

Since the United States and the Republic of Korea forged an alliance in battle over 60 years ago, the Republic of Korea has become 

a vibrant democracy, economic success and global security partner 

currently serving beside us in Afghanistan and off the Horn of Africa. 

In stark contrast, one of the world’s poorest, most closed, and 

most militarized countries, North Korea, lies less than 20 miles 

from the northern districts of Seoul, a city of over 24 million people. The change in North Korean leadership has led to a period of 

increased uncertainty on the Korean Peninsula. 
6 

The new leader appears to be following the same pattern of his 

late father and grandfather. Examples of this are North Korea’s recent announcement of their intention to launch a satellite with a 

ballistic missile and their continued rhetoric denouncing both the 

Nuclear Security Summit and alliance military exercises. These actions are increasing tensions on the peninsula. 

Additionally, North Korea continues to adhere to its military-first 

policy. They maintain the fourth-largest conventional military force 

in the world, the world’s largest special operating force, and significant long-range artillery capabilities. Over 70 percent of their combat power is arrayed within 90 miles of the demilitarized zone. 

North Korea also continues to pursue asymmetric capabilities, 

especially in the areas of nuclear, missile, and cyber. The development of these asymmetric capabilities and the forward stationing 

of its conventional forces provide North Korea the ability to attack 

or provoke the Republic of Korea with little warning. 

Kim Jong-un’s recent appearances, including a visit to the joint 

security area, continue to stress his role as military commander 

and further reinforce the importance North Korea places on its 

military-first policy. It is undetermined at this time whether or not 

he will change any North Korean strategies or policies in the future. 

An armistice agreement keeps our forces separated from North 

Korean forces. The 16 sending-state members of the United Nations Command maintain the armistice from the Republic of Korea, 

promoting stability and investigating any alleged armistice violations. The participation of the sending states in the Republic of 

Korea demonstrates a commitment of the international community 

to stability on the Korean Peninsula and enhances our ability to 

successfully deter aggression. 

Our deterrent capability is based on U.S. and ROK military readiness, and this is my primary focus. I have conducted a thorough 

review, including two combined exercises, and I have determined 

our forces remain ready to defend the Republic of Korea and the 

peninsula. 

The ROK military is a well-led, modern, well-trained ready force. 

It is also essential that we maintain U.S. force readiness at its 

highest level, given our requirement to fight tonight. 

Congress asked me to review and assess tour normalization and 

force relocation initiatives at my confirmation hearing. It is my assessment that expanding tour normalization beyond our current 

authorization of 4,645 family members is unaffordable under the 

current construct. 

Our two relocation plans are on track and I intend to execute 

them. I will continue to review these plans to ensure they place the 

right capabilities in the right places to meet the operational requirements on the peninsula. The charge to maintain the armistice, 

deter aggression, defend the Republic of Korea, and take care of 

our warriors and their families is my primary concern. 

Again, I thank you for your support of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and Department of Defense civilians and the families serving in Korea. 

Thank you very much, and I now look forward to your questions. 
7 

[The prepared statement of General Thurman can be found in 

the Appendix on page 43.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. Lavoy, you commented about a deal-breaker, shooting the 

rocket. What is our deal? And what happens if they violate it and 

break the deal? 

Dr. LAVOY. Thank you for that question. 

We have reached an agreement with the North Koreans that will 

enable us to provide food assistance to North Korea. And we have 

been under the—it has been very important to us to de-link humanitarian assistance, including nutritional assistance, and other 

kinds of activities such as operational remains recovery operations, 

from politics and from North Korea’s provocative behavior. That 

has been our intent all along. 

However, when we recently reached this deal, this did prohibit 

North Korean missile launches. And we indicated at the time that 

a satellite missile launch we would interpret as a missile launch 

because it would use missile technology. 

The North Koreans have announced that they will launch a missile. We are working very closely with allies and other partners in 

the region to try to discourage North Korea from launching this 

missile as they have intended. But we believe that this reflects 

their lack of desire to follow through on their international commitments. 

And so we have been forced to suspend our activities to provide 

nutritional assistance to North Korea, largely because we have now 

no confidence that the monitoring mechanisms to ensure that the 

food assistance goes to the starving people and not the regime elite; 

that these monitoring mechanisms—we have no confidence that 

they would actually abide by the understandings. 

The CHAIRMAN. So we have suspended, then, nutritional—— 

Dr. LAVOY. Yes. Yes we have, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. General Thurman, readiness is one of your top 

priorities, as you have stated. The President’s new strategic guidance shifts the focus to Asia, but to date we haven’t seen an increase in resources to reflect the pivot. We understand that each 

of our contingency plans is under review to assess the level of resources required. 

Assuming you are engaged in a similar activity, can you tell us 

how prepared the U.S. forces are to respond to possible aggressive 

actions by North Korean military? And what are your top three 

readiness issues for U.S. forces? 

General THURMAN. Chairman, first off, I can tell you that we are 

prepared to defend the peninsula and can do that. And we can 

repel any type of attack that should the North Koreans decide to 

do that. So I am confident, based on what I have seen through the 

exercises, and the fact of the—that with the capabilities we have. 

And I would be more than happy to go in a closed session and discuss specific readiness concerns that I have, and can go into further detail on that. 

In response to overall readiness, I would tell you that on the U.S. 

side, the U.S. Army has done a very good job of modernizing us 

with the forces that we have on the peninsula. We have the very 

best equipment, top-of-the-line equipment, and we have done the 
8 

same thing with the United States Air Force and the maritime 

forces. 

So I am confident the capabilities we have there, we can defend 

the peninsula. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

For the Members, immediately following our questioning here in 

open session, we will move into a closed session. And it is scheduled for 12 o’clock, but if we finish earlier, we will move into it at 

that time. 

Ranking Member Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Lavoy, could you elaborate a little bit on what you think the 

consequences you think will be of the missile launch if North Korea 

goes through with it; and I assume that they will. And they have 

never been ones to be responsive to any sort of international pressure before; hard to imagine this would be a first time. 

How do you see that playing out? How will South Korea, Japan, 

others in the region respond to that? And what should we do as a 

result? 

Dr. LAVOY. Thank you for that question, Ranking Member Smith. 

We are very concerned about the possibility of missile launch 

that the North Koreans have announced that they would indeed 

conduct. And as you implied, a number of countries in the area— 

and a broader area, in fact—are concerned about this. 

The North Koreans have indicated that they will launch the missile in a southward direction. And I don’t know if we have any confidence on the stability of the missile or where the actual impact 

will be. A number of countries are potentially affected. The debris 

could fall on their countries; could cause casualties. This affects 

South Korea, of course, but also Japan; Okinawa, the island of 

Japan. And the intended impact is probably somewhere close to the 

Philippines or maybe Indonesia. 

So this is now an issue that not only concerns the South Koreans 

and, of course, us and the Japanese, but more broadly everybody 

in Asia-Pacific has become concerned about North Korea’s growing 

missile capability, especially as they are continuing to develop their 

nuclear-weapons capability. 

I can’t speculate on specifically what measures would be taken 

if indeed they conduct a test, but I can assure you that we are consulting with all of the countries affected about measures to be 

taken. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you. 

General Thurman, you mentioned the great partnership we have 

with South Korea and particularly the South Korean military. Can 

you tell us a little bit about the capability of the South Korean 

military? 

It is my understanding that it has improved dramatically over 

the years—and where they are at, and how that might impact the 

size of our presence as we partner with them, and we are looking 

to help them be in the strongest possible position; but as they grow 

stronger perhaps give us a little bit ability to downsize or reduce 

what contribution we would make. 

How do you see that balance playing out? 
9 

General THURMAN. Ranking Member Smith, first off, I do believe 

the ROK military is a very professional and competent force. They 

have modernized their ground forces significantly. They have done 

the same thing with their air forces by adding their F–15Ks fighters and the KF–16s. So they have done very well with that. They 

have done the same thing as they work with our maritime forces, 

procured three Aegis cruisers. 

And so they are going through that process right now. I think 

they have made some considerable investments as they continue to 

look to improve and modernize their force. And we have seen evidence of that. 

As far as our forces, we have an agreed number of 28,500 on the 

peninsula. I would recommend, given the current conditions, as we 

move toward operational control eventually to—in 2015 to maintain that level of force. But I think it is also prudent to always look 

at our capabilities and make sure we are capabilities based, as we 

have to offset some of the capabilities that they do not have currently. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

And Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the ranking member for having this hearing and for your questions on this. 

And General, one of the things that we know is that in early 

2011 the Secretary of Defense, then Robert Gates, said that North 

Korean ballistic missiles could pose a threat to the United States 

within 5 years. 

What, if anything, does North Korea’s upcoming launch of the 

new Unha-3 rocket tell us about its ballistic missile technology advances? And to your knowledge, are we within 4 years of North 

Korea fielding a functional intercontinental ballistic missile? 

General THURMAN. Congressman Forbes, first off, the continued 

development and willingness of the North Korean regime there to 

test ballistic missiles—and we have seen that continue for a period 

of time—is a major concern of ours. 

It has the potential to destabilize the region. And, as you point 

out, left unchecked if their development continues, poses a serious 

threat to us. 

And it is something that I think we have got to maintain close 

vigilance on and, obviously, work to try to dissuade them from the 

continued development of that and maybe focus on feeding their 

people, is what I would say. 

And I would be more than happy to go into full details of what 

we are seeing in a closed session on their full development of what 

we know. 

Mr. FORBES. General, are there any projections on timetable that 

you could give outside of a classified setting as to what we have 

heard or seen as far as the projections of when they will be on target for these missiles. 

General THURMAN. Congressman, I would not want to go into the 

exact timetables in here, but it is of concern with their continued 

willingness to test this capability. 
10 

Mr. FORBES. And can I ask one other question? This is kind of 

along what the ranking member said; when we do know that there 

is a very good cooperation between the United States military and 

South Korean military, and that they do a wonderful job there. 

But sometimes no good deed goes unpunished, and sometime the 

people outside of the military are not always as appreciative in 

some of the areas that we are. 

How do you assess the public opinion in South Korea outside of 

the military-to-military contacts as far as our relationship? Is that 

better, worse? How do you project that? 

General THURMAN. Congressman, I believe the ROK–U.S. alliance is as strong as it has ever been. And public opinion over there 

welcomes U.S. presence. And we are a stabilizing influence in that 

region. 

And I think it is very important. There is no doubt this alliance 

was forged on a very bloody battlefield and we learned many lessons. And I think just by having forward presence that is a calming 

effect. And I have talked to many of the leaders in the ROK Government and the normal ROK people and they welcome our presence there. 

Mr. FORBES. Also, last week, the South Korean president announced that he thought South Korea would soon reach an agreement with the United States on extending the missile range, which 

is currently limited, as I understand it, to 300 kilometers. 

Can you tell us what your assessment is about South Korea’s 

missile requirements? And do South Korea’s military leaders view 

the need for such an agreement as urgent? And what is your take 

on that? 

General THURMAN. Congressman, I will defer to Dr. Lavoy, but 

they have expressed desires to me to have a longer-range missile. 

Mr. FORBES. Doctor, what are your thoughts? 

Dr. LAVOY. Thank you. I would be happy to add to that. 

We and the South Koreans have had very good discussions about 

dealing with North Korea’s growing missile inventory and the 

threat that that poses. And we have a process that we have in 

place. There have been numerous meetings. And we have identified 

a comprehensive array of measures to take to deal with this threat. 

And I think this is an area where we really are in sync with the 

South Koreans. And this process is not concluded, however. And I 

think we are nearing conclusion of this. In the closed session we 

could talk to you a little bit more about that. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. And I yield back the balance of my 

time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Can you outline for us the concern of proliferation of WMD 

[Weapons of Mass Destruction] out there in the peninsula? Can you 

talk to us about whether our current policies and programs to effectively counter proliferation, in other words, how are the countries 

around North Korea feeling about their ability to have nuclear 

arms? 
11 

And do you think that that—are they staying close to the whole 

issue of not proliferating, or do you think that they are getting a 

little bit antsy because maybe they see that things are moving 

along faster than we had hoped? 

Dr. LAVOY. Representative Sanchez, I think you have put your 

finger on a very important issue. 

The whole region is concerned about the North Korea’s missile 

and nuclear programs. These are disconcerting to everybody because with extended range of missiles potentially North Korea 

would have the ability to put nuclear warheads on, and that affects 

not only their neighbor, South Korea, but affects other countries in 

the broader Asia-Pacific area. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And we have sort of been able to hold them off 

from really building anything up, most of those countries, saying 

that we were going to contain this or we were going to be the 

pushback on that. But how are they feeling now? 

Dr. LAVOY. Well, it has been a consistent goal of the United 

States and other countries in the region to discourage North Korea 

from proceeding with its WMD programs. 

And in fact it is this objective that led us to these talks that we 

had on the 23rd and 24th of February in Beijing to get the North 

Koreans to commit, to suspend, put a moratorium on flight tests 

of long-range missiles, to continue work on missiles. 

That is why we and the region are so troubled by this possible 

missile test going forward. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Turning to another subject, the subject of 

cyberwarfare. I know that North Korea is increasing its effort in 

that arena. And I know that we have a very close relationship with 

South Korea and that we share a lot of information with them. 

What is the process or what—are we working hand-in-hand? Are 

we doing enough with them to ensure that we, again, contain or 

counterattack what may be coming out of North Korea with respect 

to cyberwarfare? 

General THURMAN. Congresswoman Sanchez, in a closed forum I 

will be more than happy to go into the details of that. But first I 

would tell you that we work hand-in-hand with the ROK military 

on the protection of our networks; and particularly looking at interoperability, I have come to realize that cyber is a key warfighting 

domain. And it is important as our air, maritime, and ground operations. 

And so, yes, we have raised the awareness on that, and it is 

something that we are looking at on a daily basis with the ROK 

military. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, the other questions I might have 

would probably be a little bit more sensitive and more for a closed 

session. So I will end right there, thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you General for being here; and Secretary. 

I have a unique perspective. I was honored to be on a delegation 

with former Congressman Curt Weldon, where we visited 

Pyongyang. So I have seen the contrast between the totalitarian 

state of the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] and to 
12 

see the success of the Republic of Korea. And it is really inspiring 

as we visit Seoul, we have had to travel by helicopter because of 

the heavy traffic of brand new SUVs filling up the six- and eightlane boulevards; quite a contrast from Pyongyang. 

But it is really a classic example of the success of free market 

democracy over totalitarian government. At the same time, it is 

really led to a concern that I have about the role of China and Russia. 

It would seem like it would be in their interest that there be a 

level of security, economic security, military—to have some reforms 

in North Korea. But what is the role of China and Russia, and particularly with the transition in government, what have they—how 

have their actions been matched? 

Dr. LAVOY. I could answer that first, Congressman. 

China, as the chairman indicated, has a great deal of influence 

on North Korea; probably more than any other country in the 

world. And we look to China to use its influence constructively to 

pressure and cajole the North Koreans to adopt the reforms that 

you mentioned, which are really critical to meet the needs of the 

people, which is really a human tragedy that is occurring in North 

Korea; but also for North Korea to abide by the standards of international conduct and not to pose the threats to the broader AsiaPacific region that it does. 

We have not been entirely satisfied with China’s activities in this 

regard, but I can assure you this is an issue that we do discuss 

with China regularly. And we hope that China will take a more 

constructive approach. We also discussed this with Russia, with 

other countries in the region as well. 

Mr. WILSON. And I know that South Korea—actually it is my understanding through investments in China—employs 2 percent of 

the people of China. That is a lot of people. And it would seem like 

they would see the benefit of having a more normal regime in 

Pyongyang, so I appreciate your efforts there. 

I also like to know your assessment, each of you in regard to the 

transition from Kim Jong-il to Kim Jong-un. It is my understanding in the foreign affairs committee that we learned that the 

new leader recently placed his military on high alert, General; and 

with the understanding that it was not to prepare for conflict, but 

to prepare for your surrender. 

Could you comment on such bluster? 

General THURMAN. Congressman Wilson, we see quite a bit of 

rhetoric on a daily basis coming out of North Korea. My sense is 

that this succession has occurred with Kim Jong-un, the young 

leader. 

He has been given one title, as Supreme Commander of the military. I think he is being closely advised by his uncle, Jang Songthaek, and some of the other old elite advisers that are shepherding him along, is my sense. 

It is unclear at this time, as I believe, of what policies he is going 

to follow. He has been more active, and we have seen him more 

out. But I could go into specific details in a closed forum on this. 

But my sense is the policies that they are—have taken with their 

military first policy is not going to change. 
13 

Mr. WILSON. And again, I appreciate you effort so much; and to 

have to face bluster when in fact indeed North Korea could develop 

itself into a positive entity. 

And a final point I want to make: I had the privilege of visiting 

with troops from the Republic of Korea in Afghanistan for the provincial reconstruction teams. Indeed, these are professionals; people who reflect well on their country in the values of democracy 

and freedom. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, back to some of the operational issues in South 

Korea— probably for General Thurman—but can you talk a little 

bit about the tour normalization, the decision to delay or to stop 

the tour normalization; a little bit about the cost estimates that 

you foresaw, or you foresee, and what that might mean in the future for normalization? 

General THURMAN. Well Congressman, first off I was asked to go 

do a good review of the current policy of tour normalization. 

We are authorized 4,645 families, and that was a cap that was 

put on this last National Defense Authorization Act. What I determined when I got over there, given the cost of bringing additional 

families—that would be additional requirements and additional 

costs—I do not think, under the current environment, that that is 

feasible. 

So I am okay with leaving 4,645 families. When we built Camp 

Humphreys, which is part of the Yongsan Relocation Plan and the 

Land Partnership Plan, that plan was based on the authorized 

4,645 families. So I see staying at that right now is what I would 

tell you. 

The biggest issue that I have is the constant turnover of personnel, primarily Army; because we are on 1-year tours. And you 

can imagine the turn that is ongoing every day. We typically lose 

about 600 to 700 soldiers a month that are rotating either in or 

out, back to the continental United States. 

Mr. LARSEN. About every month there is about 600 go home, 

about 600 hundred who come—— 

General THURMAN. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 

So I have asked General Odierno and the Army to look at how 

we can build readiness at best value, and see what we can do. And 

I am very mindful of the cost. And I don’t want to create a requirement that is not operationally focused. 

Mr. LARSEN. Good. On the relocation plan, what do you see as 

anticipated problems? Do you see any more anticipated delays in 

implementing the relocation plan, either for Yongsan or just the 

land partnership? 

General THURMAN. Congressman, first off, the Land Partnership 

Program was a U.S. initiative. 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

General THURMAN. That is on track. 

I am, in fact, looking at some of those capabilities to make sure 

the positioning is right on the peninsula, i.e., fires brigade for instance, that I am looking at right now. 
14 

The second program, the Yongsan relocation, it was a little behind. We have got that back on track. We will have both of those 

programs completed by 2016, is what the estimate is right now. 

And I would be more than happy to provide you the cost breakout and I would like to take that for the record if I could. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 65.] 

Mr. LARSEN. I would appreciate that. So you say you still anticipate by 2016. Anything in the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program] that causes you concern about meeting that goal? 

General THURMAN. The only thing which is not associated with 

the land partnership program or the Yongsan relocation—there is 

a requirement in the 2013 budget for a battalion headquarters, for 

a chemical battalion that is going to be deployed from the states 

as part of force posture adjustments to the peninsula. And that is 

an additional requirement. 

Mr. LARSEN. So not originally anticipated; so that is added in the 

2013; so you have to find some way to accommodate that? 

General THURMAN. That is correct, Congressman. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, good. Thank you. That is all I have. 

General THURMAN. Yes sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Lavoy, it is very timely that we are having this hearing. 

As we look to the news of what has just been coming out of the 

talks the President attended. We know that the news also reported 

on Monday—for example this is a CNN story I am going to be reading from—‘‘Just hours after the United States warned that North 

Korea would achieve nothing with threats or provocations, 

Pyongyang moved a long-range rocket it plans to test fire, to a 

launch pad, Monday.’’ 

Now, North Korea’s threat of a missile launch can only be an effort to test, perhaps, ahead of deployment, an intercontinental ballistic missile that would have capability of reaching the United 

States. 

Secretary Gates said as he was leaving that one of his concerns 

was the rising threat of North Korea; that it could in fact get to 

the point where it could threaten mainland United States. We also 

know of its, of course, nuclear weapons program, which makes 

their missile program that much more of a concern. 

Also Monday, news broke of the President having a conversation 

with an open mike, where the President says to Medvedev, ‘‘On all 

these issues, but particularly missile defense, this can be solved, 

but it is important to give me space.’’ This is the President speaking. 

Medvedev says, ‘‘Yes, I understand, I understand your message 

about space; space for you,’’ meaning our President. 

Obama says, ‘‘This is my last election. After my election I have 

more flexibility.’’ 

Medvedev says, ‘‘I understand. I will transmit this information to 

Vladimir.’’ 

Now, obviously, the concern that everyone has is that, as we talk 

to the issue of North Korea; as we talk to the issue of their missile 
15 

program; their nuclear weapons program—Gates indicating that 

they are a rising threat to mainland United States—it raises the 

question of what is the President’s secret deal to limit our missile 

defense system? 

I mean, the President is talking to another world leader about 

once he gets through the election, his last election, then unfettered 

from the electorate, he will be free to have flexibility on our missile 

defense system. And we are all very, very concerned as to what this 

secret deal could be as we face the rising threat of North Korea. 

Is this limits on the deployment of our missile defense system? 

Limits on our use of our missile defense system? Limits on our operation of our missile defense system? 

I mean, clearly you can understand how everyone would be concerned as we look to the news of the rise of North Korea and the 

threat that it provides to mainland of our President making any 

deal, especially a secret deal, that is only to be revealed after the 

election, that might affect our missile defense system. 

Dr. Lavoy, you are the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Policy for Asia and Pacific Security Affairs. 

Dr. Lavoy, what is in this secret deal? Are we to be concerned 

about the effects of limiting our missile defense system, our only 

protection that we have with respect to the emerging and rising 

threat of North Korea to our homeland? 

Dr. LAVOY. Congressman, I am not aware of any secret deal. We 

do take the growth of North Korea’s missile capability very seriously. As I indicated, we are working very closely with South Korea 

operationally and with other countries in the region—— 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Lavoy, before the time expires—— 

Dr. LAVOY. Yes. 

Mr. TURNER. Since you said you are not aware of any secret deal, 

perhaps it is not a secret deal to you. It is a secret to us until it 

was caught on the microphone with the President, so let me re-ask 

you the question. 

Are you aware of the deal the President has with Medvedev and 

with Russia that would be revealed to us after the election that 

perhaps isn’t secret to you, that would limit our missile defense capability either in deployment, use, or scope, that of course is a serious concern to this committee as we look to the rise of North 

Korea? 

Are you aware of the subject matter of the President’s missile defense deal, secret or not, with the Russians? And if you are not, 

why are you not? 

Dr. LAVOY. No, sir, I am not. 

And I can assure you that we do believe that missile defense and 

our Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in the Asia-Pacific region is very much alive. It is very much part of our comprehensive approach to deal with the threat posed by the North 

Koreans. It is something we are committed to. 

And in the closed session I would be happy to describe in detail 

the steps we are taking—— 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Lavoy, you are an appointee by the President, 

are you not? 

Dr. LAVOY. Yes, I am, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. Okay. 
16 

I would greatly appreciate it if you would ask the President what 

are the details of his deal with the Russians concerning missile defense that cannot be disclosed until after the election; and please 

report it back to this committee, because we have grave concerns 

as to a President having any restriction on our defensive systems, 

especially with, as you have eloquently described, ‘‘the rising threat 

of North Korea.’’ 

I would greatly appreciate that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for being here this morning. 

General, it is always good to see you. 

I guess one concern that I have and others have had as well has 

been whether or not there is any intention of drawing down further 

the presence of U.S. troops in theater. 

Is there any plan or are there any contingency plans to do that 

in light of all of the issues, including sequestration, that would play 

into that kind of scenario? 

General THURMAN. Congressman Reyes, there are no plans that 

I am aware of that draws down any forces on the peninsula. We 

are staying at 28,500. There may be some adjustments inside those 

capabilities. But those adjustments would be to improve our overall 

force posture. But there are no plans that I am aware of. 

Mr. REYES. And in terms of the agreement that we have with 

the—particularly for the stability of the Korean Peninsula, with 

the South Koreans—are there any concerns? 

And I apologize for not having been able to be here. I had another meeting that I had to be at. But are there any changes that 

we contemplate based on the new leadership in North Korea, in 

that partnership with the South Koreans? 

General THURMAN. Congressman Reyes, first off, I believe the alliance is as strong as it has ever been, particularly our military 

partnership. 

The concerns that the South Koreans relay to me is obviously 

they are very concerned about the continued willingness on part of 

the North Koreans to continue to test ballistic missiles and the 

pursuance of nuclear capability. That causes great angst and concern. 

And I think right now that is probably one of the biggest things. 

Obviously they have not forgotten the sinking of the Cheonan that 

occurred in March of 2010 and the shelling of the Yeonpyeong Island that occurred in November of 2010. They are very watchful of 

that and mindful of it. They have put a lot of emphasis on their 

military for overall readiness, I will tell you that. 

Mr. REYES. In terms of the progress that had been made prior 

to the demise of Kim Jong-il, are there any indications that those 

kinds of efforts or talks are taking place, in lieu of the concerns 

that you just expressed of the sinking and the shelling of the—by 

the North Koreans? Is there any prospect that those talks of economic opportunities being sought out by South Koreans at this 

point? 
17 

General THURMAN. Congressman, I have not seen any great 

change as a result of the succession with the new leader. I would 

welcome any discussion, obviously. I think if the parties can discuss their differences; that is always a good thing. But I have not 

seen any change. 

I defer to Dr. Lavoy on any policy issues in regard to that. 

Mr. REYES. All right. 

Doctor. 

Dr. LAVOY. I could add to that, Congressman. 

North Korea is an authoritarian regime, of course, and it has— 

political successions are extraordinarily difficult when you don’t 

have a representative government, which is the case there, of 

course. 

And so what we are seeing now and what we anticipate is provocative behavior because, unfortunately, this seems to be the only 

way that the North Korean regime can try to demonstrate its bona 

fides to a population that is suffering terribly. They can’t meet the 

needs of the population, the nutritional or educational or other 

needs of the population, so they resort to provocative behavior. 

And despite efforts to stabilize relations with the North and to 

de-escalate tensions on the peninsula following these very dangerous activities in the past; now, once again, because of an internal political dynamic on North Korea, it appears that they are once 

again inclined to take these provocative steps, most specifically the 

announced long-range missile ballistic test flight. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I was just going back and forth with my aunt, who has got a 

nephew serving under you over there in Korea, a young man 

named Jake Butler. So forgive me for tasting, General. But I know 

you were also the commander of the 3rd I.D. [Infantry Division] in 

Georgia, and we are very proud of Fort Stewart and what you ladies and gentlemen accomplished over there in representing Georgia well, and the United States well. 

I want to speak just very briefly about the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System] out of Robins Air Force 

Base that we are very, very proud of. And could you just speak to 

the JSTARS program and what it means in a potential conflict 

with North Korea? 

General THURMAN. Congressman, first off, in respect to JSTARS, 

that gives us moving-target capability; without going into the classified portion of it. But, more importantly, what I am looking for 

as a commander is I have a set of priority intelligence requirements, and I welcome any system that is going to help me answer 

those requirements. 

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, sir. 

General THURMAN. And it is an added capability that does help 

us on the peninsula. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, my cousin is honored to serve under you as a 

commander. His mom wanted to ask why he was issued live ammunition. I would like to ask why he didn’t already have it. But 

we will answer that behind closed doors. 
18 

Thank you, Mr. General. 

I yield the remainder of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Andrews. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize to you and 

the witnesses for being tardy. I was in a hearing with the Secretary of Education and wanted to hear him. 

But no disrespect to you gentlemen—thank you for your service 

to our country. 

Dr. Lavoy, within the confines of this public discussion, I wanted 

to get the thinking behind the linkage of the missile test that is 

coming up, presumably next month, and our decision about whether to execute and follow through on the food-aid agreement with 

North Korea. 

I am not sure what I think about that idea, but let me play devil’s advocate here. One argument might be that linking the two 

punishes the North Korean people without having any significant 

impact on the North Korean leadership; would further intensify 

anti-U.S. or anti-Western hostility, and therefore strengthen the 

hand domestically of the North Korean leadership to engage in 

such extra-legal and unwelcome activities on the international 

stage. 

How would you assess that argument and respond to it? 

Dr. LAVOY. Well, I can tell you that it is regrettable that the food 

aid is not moving forward. The North Korean population really 

needs nutritional assistance, and we are prepared to provide that 

to North Korea. 

The real motivation and the linkage as you—this is not intended 

to be linked to anything else; to any movement by the North Koreans. However, the fact that North Korea so brazenly violated commitments that it just so recently agreed to in the discussions in 

Beijing, and its commitment that it announced on February 29th 

on Leap Day, indicates that they are not reliable and we cannot expect them to meet other international commitments, including the 

commitments that they have agreed to that are associated with the 

provision of nutritional assistance to the needy population in their 

country. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I understand the basis, the rationale that, you 

know, they dishonored their agreements so they really abandoned 

their right to claim what they would get under the agreement. 

My question really more is whether we think that is going to be 

effective in altering the behavior of this government, or whether it 

is going to worsen our position. 

You obviously think it is going to be effective, relatively speaking? 

Dr. LAVOY. Well, Congressman, we don’t believe that nutritional 

assistance should be a lever to achieve a political outcome. It is a 

humanitarian effort that we have intended. Again, it is regrettable 

that this has stopped. 

So by the reason, again, why we are not providing that food assistance at this point is because our confidence in their ability to 

meet their agreements has been diminished. We do not use it as 

a lever to change their policies. 
19 

Mr. ANDREWS. Okay. They might see it differently, but that is 

okay. 

Again, within the confines of this public discussion, if either of 

you would be pleased to answer it, how do you assess the role of 

the People’s Republic of China in dealing with this outlaw behavior 

by North Korea? Are they more helpful than not? Are they more 

harmful than not? Are they neutral? 

Put another way: What do you think the optimal behavior of the 

PRC [People’s Republic of China] toward this problem is, and how 

close are they to obtaining it? 

Dr. LAVOY. Congressman, I think, as we have discussed already, 

China has potentially a great deal of influence, and probably more 

than any other country, on the regime in North Korea. 

So of course, we, for a long time, have been talking to the Chinese, consulting regularly with the Chinese, about how best to influence the North Koreans in a manner to affect reforms at home 

and to conform their international behavior to acceptable standards. 

Objectively, we can see that North Korea continues to behave 

outside the rules of normal and acceptable international conduct. 

So that influence has not been as effective to date as we would 

have liked. We continue to consult with the Chinese and with other 

countries that have relations with North Korea about North Korea’s behavior. 

And as our partnership with China deepens, we hope that China 

will see the interest in the spirit of this partnership and in the interest of—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. I am really hopeful of that, too. Unless you see everything as a zero-sum game between the U.S. and the PRC, which 

we certainly don’t and I hope they don’t, this kind of instability in 

their own region can’t possibly be good for the PRC. And it is certainly not good for the rest of the world. 

So, I hope that we would continue those efforts to find common 

ground that would encourage North Korea to act within the community of nations. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. West. 

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and ranking member, also. 

Annyeong haseyo, and I just want to also say ‘‘steadfast and 

loyal.’’ 

General Thurman, great to see you again. 

I want to kind of dovetail off of what my colleague, Mr. Andrews, 

talked about, because I was stationed in Korea in 1995 at Camp 

Casey up in Tongduchon. And I think that we continue to see this 

series of saber-rattling and us giving in, and more saber-rattling 

and us giving in; and no honoring of their commitments and their 

promises. 

So Dr. Lavoy, my simple question is: Do you ever see an end to 

this Pavlovian experiment of international extortion that is coming 

out of North Korea? 

Dr. LAVOY. Well, we certainly hope to see the end to that, and 

we are doing everything possible to do this, but it is a very recalcitrant regime. 
20 

And as I indicated, because of their own internal compulsions, 

which are completely dysfunctional and really out of step with the 

21st century, that leads them to this provocative international behavior. And probably only when they can reform internally can 

they get international behavior to align to acceptable standards. 

Mr. WEST. But does there come a time when our perceived benevolence, which they translate into weakness, must be ended in 

order for us to stop this crazy cycle of international extortion; because that is how I see it. I am just a simple guy from the inner 

city of Atlanta, Georgia, and that is how we call it. 

Dr. LAVOY. Well, Congressman, I wouldn’t expect you are a simple guy. But let me just say that I wouldn’t characterize our approach as benevolent or weak at all. 

Mr. WEST. But they perceive it as being weak. 

Dr. LAVOY. I am not sure that they do, sir. 

Mr. WEST. There are quotes in some of the papers coming out of 

DPRK that say so. 

Second question, and also dovetailing off of my colleague, do you 

believe that the incredible debt situation where China holds 28 percent to 30 percent of our debt; the trade imbalance situation—I 

mean, we are almost at an economic disadvantage against China— 

does that have an adverse effect on our foreign policy in dealing 

with North Korea? 

Dr. LAVOY. As I indicated just a moment ago, we do have a 

strong partnership with China. We are consulting with China on 

a range of issues, particularly on North Korea because China does 

have so much influence. And we believe that China can be an effective partner and can provide more influence on the North Korean 

regime than it has been to date, and we are working with them—— 

Mr. WEST. But do you think that China sees itself as being able 

to be somewhat belligerent because of the fact they do have this 

control of 28 percent of our debt and a little bit of a trade imbalance advantage over us? Do you think that that gives them some 

leverage? 

Dr. LAVOY. Congressman, that is not apparent to me. We talk 

with China about real-world international problems and how to 

deal with them. 

Mr. WEST. And General Thurman, commanders like yourself always taught me two questions that you have to answer when you 

are briefing a plan. Sir, what do you see as the most dangerous and 

most likely courses of action coming out of North Korea? 

General THURMAN. Thanks, Congressman West. 

The first thing I worry about every day is a miscalculation on 

somebody’s part that causes a conflict that we hadn’t planned for. 

That is the first thing. 

Secondly, I worry about the asymmetric capabilities that the 

North Koreans have, whether it be with special operations forces 

or the introduction of chem-bio and then cyber. Those are some of 

the things that I worry about. I think we are postured very well 

to repel an attack. However, they have a considerable number of 

indirect fire systems. And as expansive as Seoul is, any round coming our direction could potentially do damage. 
21 

So I worry about that. So the importance of staying ready and 

remaining vigilant is very important for both ROK and U.S., and 

that is 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. 

Mr. WEST. Kamsa Hamnida. And Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Palazzo. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to thank our witnesses for being here this morning 

and testifying. I had to spend most of my—this committee in another committee where I am Chairman of the [Subcommittee on] 

Space and Aeronautics, so I haven’t been able to follow the entire 

line of questioning. 

But I do want to—well, first of all, I am sure Chairman Wittman 

talked about his PACOM visit. I was a part of that, when we did 

that this past August, and it was a wonderful trip. And the Republic of Korea was on there, along with the Philippines and Japan. 

And everywhere we went, one of our common denominators of 

concern was China, and also, ‘‘What was our U.S. posture going to 

be?’’ And if we moved our posture to where our allies thought that 

we were maybe retreating or just falling back a little too far for 

their general welfare, that then they would have to do whatever 

they have to do to take care of the security and stability of their 

population. 

So, I guess what I am saying is I hope we are focusing on China. 

I mean, I know the President was talking about it being an emerging threat; that and cybersecurity; the Middle East; you know, 

making sure that the shipping lanes around the world are continuously open because our economic and national security depends so 

much on it. 

And then next thing you hear, we are talking in another hearing 

and we hear that, I don’t know—this is a separate conversation, actually, that, you know, the Chinese are even building icebreakers 

to go up into the Arctic so they could begin claiming the North 

Seas for those resources. So, that causes me some concern, and 

hopefully we will perhaps continue to focus on their behavior and 

expose it. 

And all the while, you know, they are increasing their spending 

on their military and we are cutting a half a trillion over the next 

decade, and we are staring down the barrels of a double-barreled 

shotgun stuck at our head with the possibility of sequestration. 

And that scares me. 

But I guess I will just switch gears. And from a CPA standpoint, 

I like to see the cost-benefit. And I know we are doing some realigning from Yongsan, and we are moving further back. I had a 

chance to visit Yongsan, and I didn’t have a chance to visit the new 

site, I guess, where Camp Humphreys was going to be. 

Are we getting the best value for our dollar? I mean, we have 

kind of kept the peace for them for decades now. And I know typically wherever the U.S. military has been, that footprint is one of 

the most valuable pieces of property left on that continent or in 

that country. So are we doing a fair exchange? Are they paying for 

their fair share? Or are we giving up a nice piece of property just 

for false appeasement? 
22 

General THURMAN. Congressman, thank you for that question. 

First thing I would tell you—I think we are getting a very good 

deal with the ROK Government. The property of Yongsan; we will 

keep a residual in Yongsan because that is important with our dayto-day business that we do. I interface daily with the ROK chairman of their military, as well as their Ministry of Defense. So we 

will have a small footprint there. 

And, of course, the U.S. embassy will eventually relocate out to 

Yongsan on some property there. 

In regard to the costs, there are shared costs. And I would be 

more than happy to give you a detailed cost breakout of that so you 

can see. But I believe we are getting a very good deal. And I believe that the ROK Government welcomes U.S. presence. 

You just spoke of China. We are a stabilizing influence as long 

as we are forward-deployed. And that would be something that 

needs to be factored in all of these discussions because that is important to maintain stability in that region. 

But I think overall the ROK has been more willing—and you can 

go back to 1991. They have continued to increase their spending to 

assist U.S. forces that are stationed there. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Well, thank you, General. 

And I know on our trip over there that they were very receptive 

and they were very supportive of U.S. troops and ROK. 

So keep doing a great job. I enjoyed seeing you. I have already 

made it aware to Chairman Wittman I would like to go on another 

PACOM trip, because it is such of grave importance. You know, it 

is important we gather as much information as possible and we 

come back better prepared for hearings just like this. 

So thank y’all both. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Hochul. 

Ms. HOCHUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, just like my colleague, I am a little disadvantaged. I just came from a markup in 

Homeland Security, so I don’t know what went on before me, although the question I had, I think, has been addressed. 

I was concerned about the overall cost of realignment of U.S. 

forces in South Korea and how much is being funded by the Republic of Korea. 

So if we can get that information—is it 20 percent? What are we 

talking here? I don’t need raw numbers today; I would like them 

in the future. But, you know, what is their shared responsibility for 

that and what kind of numbers does that equate to? 

General THURMAN. Congresswoman, first off, on Yongsan relocation, the ROK Government is paying for that. 

Ms. HOCHUL. Okay. 

General THURMAN. Now, there will be some ancillary costs associated with our communications and specific requirements and related to our unique requirements for our communications networks. 

That is a responsibility of ours, as well as some of the O&M requirements and SRM requirements that will be required in the future. 

The Land Partnership Program was a U.S. initiative and that 

was funded by the U.S. primarily. We did use special-measures 
23 

funding from the ROK Government to assist in that, but I would 

be more than happy to give you the detailed cost breakout. 

Ms. HOCHUL. Okay, thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Hartzler. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I was interested in your comments, General, about what keeps 

you up at night: worrying about the special op forces that North 

Korea has; their cyber, as well as the weapons of mass destruction 

capabilities. And those are the things that stood at me as I read 

your testimony, as well. 

I have to admit, I did not realize that North Korea has the 

world’s largest special operations force, over 60,000 trained and 

loyal soldiers at the President’s beck and call at any moment. So 

that is very concerning. 

But I wanted focus in on the other two areas. You say, regarding 

the cyber, that the newest addition to their arsenal is the growing 

cyberwarfare capability; that North Korea employs sophisticated 

computer hackers trained to launch cyberinfiltration and 

cyberattacks against the ROK and U.S. 

Such attacks are ideal for North Korea, providing the regime a 

means to attack the Republic of Korea and U.S. interests without 

attribution; and have been increasingly employed against a variety 

of targets, including military, governmental, educational, and commercial institutions. 

So I was wondering what are we doing to help counter this 

threat? 

General THURMAN. Congresswoman, first off, that is correct there 

what you just read. And it is an area that I have placed greater 

emphasis on to make sure, first off, our networks are properly protected. And I would be more than happy in a closed session to go 

into the detailed capabilities of what the threat is that we see in 

a closed forum. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. 

I especially am concerned to hear that they have already deployed this against our military, so I would like to know more 

about what actually happened there. 

All right; so let me move to the weapons of mass destruction 

question, saying that—you list that as a significant concern; and 

that you assess the capability to manufacture, transport and deliver a variety of both persistent and non-persistent chemicals to 

include nerve, blood, choking, and blister agents; could be delivered 

through artillery or missile systems; and that if they were to employ them it could use highly pathogenic agents such as anthrax 

or plagues. 

And certainly in dense populations, this would be a tremendous 

problem. 

So I guess my question is: Are our current non-proliferation and 

counter-proliferation policies and programs effective tools to mitigate these threats? And what more can we do? 

And so—General or Secretary. 

General THURMAN. Congresswoman, first thing, in regard to our 

protection of our men and women who are serving on the penin-
24 

sula, I have placed a lot of emphasis on our overall chemical, biological defense training. We train on that on a frequent basis. I am 

confident we have the right capabilities; that is the first thing. 

Secondly, in terms bio-detection, we have placed a lot of emphasis on our installations with our biological-detection capabilities. 

And so it is important to keep that current. We do work with our 

ROK forces. They are very good with their chemical capabilities. 

And we train in those types of environments. So I am confident in 

regard to that. 

I do not see the North Koreans giving up this capability. I think 

it is something we are going to have to continually deal with given 

the current set of conditions. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Would you like to add to anything? 

Dr. LAVOY. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. 

I think what the Department of Defense brings to bear, and particularly what General Thurman and his capability in theater 

brings to bear, are three very important things; number one, a 

strong deterrence capability to deter the north from using these 

horrendous weapons of mass destruction; secondly, as he indicated, 

a very robust defensive capability. Should these weapons be used, 

General Thurman and his forces, together with the South Koreans, 

have a good defensive capability to deal with the consequences if 

these were to be used. 

And to complement both of these and really enhance that deterring capability is this constant operational readiness of our forces 

in the theater. So this is what the Department of Defense brings 

to bear against this. 

But I have to agree with you, North Korea is an outlier today 

in the world. The President was just in Seoul over the last couple 

of days with the Nuclear Security Summit. Over 50 of the world’s 

leaders were there. And everybody is getting aboard to eliminate 

weapons of mass destruction and decrease that danger. Again, 

North Korea’s an outlier. 

So in addition to what we are doing in the Department of Defense, we are also supporting a broader international diplomacy 

and non-proliferation efforts to try to deal with that threat. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. All right; appreciate what you are doing; very, 

very important. Thank you so much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for being here, for your service. 

I am sorry I missed the early discussions, but I wanted to ask 

you—I guess, extend the discussion on the tour normalization and 

what you are finding in terms of—I think this is morale on those 

unaccompanied tours; because the turnover, as I understand it, is 

about 600, 700 service members every month. Is that normal? Is 

that what we would anticipate? And what kind of resources are 

there, then? And how is that affecting readiness in any way on the 

base? 

General THURMAN. Yes, ma’am. 

Congresswoman Davis, first off, most of the turnover we see that 

is occurring out of that 600 to 700 are the lower enlisted grades, 

which are predominantly over there on a 1-year assignment. 
25 

As you can imagine, that constant turnover affects the crew’s stability inside the 2nd Infantry Division, so that is something that 

commander has to deal with. 

In regard to the number on tour normalization, we have roughly 

today around 3,800 families that are command-sponsored. There is 

another 1,700 who are soldiers elected to bring their family members over there that are non-command sponsored. So that is really 

what we have. 

We have not achieved the 4,645 as of yet. So that is why, based 

on the current fiscal environment, I looked at, number one, could 

we afford more families over there over and beyond the 4,645? And 

I determined that that is not feasible at this time. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Do you have other concerns that that really are affecting the—you know, basically the quality of life for service members that are there? Well, in fact, you wouldn’t necessarily—you 

don’t see those numbers getting to that number getting to that 

level, do you see major differences in terms of their ability to conduct their mission? 

General THURMAN. Ma’am, I do not. 

I think what makes Korea unique is we have a threat to the 

north. We have a well-stated mission. And I have not seen a decline in any morale issues. This requires active leaders, leaders 

that are sensitive to the needs of their service members. And that 

is where I put my effort, in making sure that if there is any quality-of-life issues, then we quickly try to resolve that. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. 

And of the people that are—have been deployed—the service 

members, are there numbers, I guess, maybe at some of the height 

of some of the deployments that were actually going into Iraq or 

Afghanistan? 

General THURMAN. Yes, ma’am. 

We see a lot of returnees from Iraq and Afghanistan. I mean, we 

are a combat-seasoned force now. And, frankly, we welcome the 

combat experience over there as we work with our ROK counterparts because that just helps strengthen our capabilities. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Have you been able to strengthen any of your service 

providers in the medical, mental health areas in order to accommodate some of the needs of returning soldiers? 

General THURMAN. Yes, ma’am. I have placed a lot of emphasis 

on that, particularly in regard to any type of PTSD [Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder]. To make sure that one, we have the capabilities there to treat our service members. We’ve de-stigmatized 

that, and we are very active with our chaplain’s support programs 

to make sure we are quickly dealing with any service member that 

may have a problem. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Because in their case they are really not able to go 

out on to the economy essentially when it comes to service providers, is that correct? I mean they really have to stay in the family—— 

General THURMAN. The medical community does write consultations that go out if there is some specific need, but so far, our capabilities have been very good on the peninsula to take care of our 

service members and their families. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you very much. Thanks for your service. 
26 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Lavoy and General 

Thurman, thank you so much for joining us today, and thank you 

for your service. 

General Thurman, I thoroughly enjoyed our visit out there to 

your command. And South Korea was a great opportunity to go 

there and understand the challenges that you face. And we wanted 

to make sure that we understood a little bit more about those 

today. 

You speak in your testimony about the North Korean army, the 

Korean People’s Army, having about 800 surface combatants. Can 

you tell us what are their capabilities and limitations in relation 

to our fleet structure, our surface combatants that are currently 

forward-deployed in Japan, and the Japanese maritime self-defense 

force ships that are also there in the region? 

General THURMAN. Congressman Wittman, thanks. 

First off, in regard to maritime, the thing that concerns me most 

out of the 800 combatants are their submarine forces, that the 

North Koreans possess; particularly the ones in the West Sea, because that is shallow water out there. And that is of concern; and 

also on the East Sea, so we watch that very carefully. And I could 

go in more detail in a closed session on that. 

Their other maritime capabilities, I think some of that has atrophied, frankly, from what I can tell. The ROK navy maintains a 

robust patrol capability every day. And some of the things we look 

at with them is obviously our interoperability with the U.S. 7th 

Fleet that supports me out of Japan. 

And for the Japanese defense forces, I don’t have any purview 

over those forces other than working through Admiral Scott Swift 

who is the 7th Fleet Commander, but I know he has got a very 

good relationship with the Japanese as well as the ROK. 

Mr. WITTMAN. General, can you tell us what needs do U.S. and 

ROK forces have in the area of ground attack and air-assault 

equipment there to support our men and women who serve there? 

And also, where are we in relation to manning requirements 

training and equipment requirements there in the region? And especially looking of there being a cap 28,500 U.S. forces there in the 

Republic of South Korea, where does that, in relation to our 

needs—and especially in the area of aviation? I wanted to get your 

thought on where we are there with those equipment needs, and 

where we may be adequate or where we may be falling short. 

General THURMAN. Congressman Wittman, first off, in regard to 

aviation forces, we do not have a full combat aviation brigade 

there. I have asked the Department, as well as the Department of 

the Army, and back through the PACOM and the joint staff, to look 

at adding that battalion back that was repositioned out of there to 

meet requirements for the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

So I have asked that be relooked; so I would welcome that requirement. And that would help with our helicopter fleet there. 

In regard to our overall equipping posture, I feel we are equipped 

very well. We are getting many of the new pieces of equipment. We 

just modernized the 2nd Infantry Division with new tanks. We got 

the best tank this Nation can provide, as well as new Bradley 
27 

Fighting Vehicles. The preposition stocks are in good shape; we just 

issued some of that out as we have Exercise Foal Eagle going on. 

So I am confident, in regard to ground capabilities, we are in 

pretty good shape. I can talk in closed session about precision munitions, and would be more than happy to talk about that and some 

of the other capability gaps we have. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Let me ask one final question. 

We talk about conventional capabilities, talk about missile 

threats, let me ask about this: We made a significant investment 

in special operations forces and also asymmetric warfare capability. 

Let me ask you: Are we properly positioned from a resources standpoint in that region with our special operations forces and asymmetric warfare capability? 

And if not, what do we need to do? And what do you see as the 

major threats from the special operations and asymmetric side? 

General THURMAN. First off, in regard to the special operation 

forces we have SOCKOR [Special Operations Command Korea] 

Korea, which is the special operations command there that works 

side-by-side with the ROK special operating forces. The ROKs have 

a very good force; we are working with them to continue to improve 

that. So if we go to war tonight, that is what I have, in addition 

to what would be flown in from USSOCOM [United States Special 

Operations Command]. 

So we are working with the Department on those unique capabilities in regard to U.S. capabilities for soft platforms, as an example. And that is one of the things that, as I did my assessment, 

that I looked at that I think we need to improve on. 

Secondly, in regard to the North Korean asymmetric problems, 

they have the capabilities to infiltrate. And that is probably one of 

the biggest worries that I see with what they have with their 

forces. And they could do that very quickly, whether it be through 

sleeper cells or whatever. And we can also go into that in more detail in a closed forum. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. If North Korea were to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile that could carry a nuclear weapon, and was 

capable of reaching our shores, and they launched it toward our 

Nation, what would our response be? 

Dr. LAVOY. Well sir, I can’t speculate on that hypothetical situation. We do not assess that North Korea has that capability today, 

but we are aware that North Korea is developing both its longrange ballistic-missile capabilities and it has continued to work on 

its nuclear weapons capabilities. 

So it is a future threat we are very concerned about. And the Department is considering the best responses to this. 

Mr. BARTLETT. What do you think North Korea expects our response to that would be? 

General THURMAN. Congressman, the way I look at this: North 

Korea uses a coercive strategy, and they use that strategy to get 

concessions. First off, they will not, I don’t believe, give up their capabilities in regard to ballistic missiles because they see that as a 

means to protect the regime. 
28 

In regard to the coercive strategy, we have seen this cycle, where 

they demand concessions; they don’t get what they want, or they 

get what they want; they antagonize; they provoke; and then they 

go back into an appease mode. We have watched that on a continuous basis. So my sense is they are going to continue to use that 

as long as they follow their military-first policy, which I believe 

goes to protect the Kim family and the whole Communist party 

there. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Isn’t there a general perception in this country, 

in their country, and any other country watching our two nations, 

that if they launched a ballistic-missile nuclear-armed toward our 

shores that we would respond in kind? 

Is that not a general perception? 

General THURMAN. I would just say to you: I don’t know what 

our responses would be right now on that. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I am not asking you that, I was asking you what 

you thought the general perception was among observers of this 

process between our two countries. 

General THURMAN. I can’t—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. Isn’t there a general perception that if they 

launched a nuclear-tipped weapon toward our shores that we would 

most likely respond in kind? 

General THURMAN. I mean, my sense, Congressman, is that is 

what fuels the anxiety and the concern over the North Koreans 

having that capability. And it has got to be dealt with in some 

manner. 

Dr. LAVOY. Could I add to that, Congressman Bartlett? 

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes. 

Dr. LAVOY. I think we have a robust deterrent capability. And we 

have national capabilities as well as capabilities in the theater that 

General Thurman commands. And again, it is our policy to deter 

that kind of behavior that you are talking about. 

And while we don’t assess that they have the capability that you 

outline today, which I think you agree with, it is the development 

of capabilities in this regard is something we are very concerned 

about. 

We maintain a robust deterrent capability to deter that kind of 

action. 

Mr. BARTLETT. And they are aware of that robust deterrent capability. I think that it is very unlikely that even if they had a nuclear weapon capable of reaching our shores that they would 

launch it towards—why would they need to do that if they could 

simply put a medium-range missile on a ship and launch from that 

ship anywhere on our West Coast or our East Coast against which 

we have little defense, and for which we have little capability of determining for certain who was responsible for it? 

Why isn’t that the most likely mode of attack from North Korea; 

if in fact they are interested in attacking us? 

Dr. LAVOY. Well Congressman, I think we have to be aware of 

a whole range of possible attacks or provocative actions that the 

North Koreans could take. 

And over the course of decades of history, they have pursued 

many different kinds of asymmetric means to provoke the South 
29 

and us. So we have to be alive to the full array of threats including 

the ones you outlined. 

Mr. BARTLETT. They are certainly evil, I am not sure they are idiots. Nor do I think that they are collectively suicidal. I think the 

major threat is the possibility of a launch, which they could do tomorrow, with a tramp steamer, and even a Scud launcher, which 

they could buy for $100,000 in the open market. 

And any crude nuclear weapon could take out our whole mid-Atlantic area with an EMP, could it not? 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, gentlemen. 

The committee will now stand in recess as we move to closed session; and we will reconvene there. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 28, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 28, 2012 

(35) 

Statement of Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

The Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula 

March 28, 2012 

The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive 

testimony about the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. 

Our witnesses are Dr. Peter Lavoy, Acting Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Asia and Pacific Security Affairs, and General James 

Thurman, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea. 

This is our first opportunity to have a dedicated hearing on this 

topic, but I cannot think of a more opportune time. The President’s 

new defense strategy underscores the importance of the larger 

Asia-Pacific theater. Northeast Asia is a dynamic region of key 

strategic importance to the global economy, regional stability, and 

U.S. national security interests. What’s more, the coming year will 

bring a number of regional leadership transitions—for North 

Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia. And as some may 

have forgotten, the Korean War isn’t officially over—the peninsula 

remains divided. It’s home to one of our strongest allies and one 

of the world’s most militaristic states. 

In fact, although the North Korean regime is willing to starve its 

own citizens, it maintains the world’s fourth largest army. North 

Korea has more than 1 million active duty personnel and thousands of artillery systems, tanks, armored personnel carriers, aircraft, and surface combatant. More than 70% of North Korea’s combat power is positioned within 90 miles of the Demilitarized Zone. 

This puts our 28,000 troops and the 24 million citizens of Seoul, 

the world’s fourth largest city, easily within the erratic regime’s lethal reach. 

Last month, the United States and North Korea announced that 

the regime would stop uranium enrichment and missile testing, 

and allow international inspectors to return to North Korea’s nuclear facility, in exchange for nutritional aid. But 2 weeks ago, 

North Korea said they would launch a long-range rocket into space 

in April—a clear violation of their agreement with the Administration. This is typical behavior shown by the regime—a cycle of 

provocations and reconciliations designed to get what they want 

without giving up their nuclear weapons program. It’s becoming 

clear that the same aggressive, reckless cycle will continue under 

the new North Korean dictator. 

Although the Chinese and Russian governments publicly expressed concerns about the planned missile launch, they have been 

unable or unwilling to bring their North Korean ally back to the 
36 

negotiating table. Meanwhile, there are reports that North Korea 

and Iran are working together in the production of ballistic missiles. 

In contrast, South Korea is a vibrant democratic nation that is 

one of the world’s largest economies and contributes to global security. Just a few days ago, South Korea hosted the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit. Our troops stationed in South Korea form the backbone of our mutual defense treaty, promote regional stability, and 

protect U.S. national security and economic interests. The readiness and posture of U.S. troops on the peninsula are key to stopping a dangerous regime from destabilizing the region with unwarranted attacks. Dr. Lavoy and General Thurman, we look forward 

to your testimony shedding light on the range of security matters 

facing us on the Korean Peninsula. 
37 

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith 

Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

The Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula 

March 28, 2012 

I would like to welcome each of our witnesses and to thank them 

for appearing before us this morning. General Thurman, Doctor 

Lavoy, we value your assessments of the security situation on the 

Korean Peninsula, and I look forward to your testimony. 

I also wish to commend those service men and women, whose 

daily efforts help to maintain the truce on the Korean Peninsula. 

Their courage and commitment contribute greatly to stability and 

peaceful progress in the region. 

The United States will continue to offer security assurances 

through its forward military presence in East Asia and the Western Pacific. To that effect, the Department of Defense’s new strategic guidance, which highlights a rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region, emphasizes: maintaining existing alliances, expanding 

cooperative international networks, and cultivating long-term strategic partnerships. Our deep, historic relationships with the Republic of Korea and other regional partners are fundamental to fulfilling each of these strategic priorities. Our relationship with 

South Korea is also instrumental to promoting mutual prosperity 

and to realizing the immense potential for growth in the region. 

Unfortunately, the North Korean regime continues to defy the 

international community and to present a serious threat to its 

neighbors as well as its own long-suffering populace. North Korea’s 

recent pledge to suspend uranium enrichment and its nuclear 

weapons and long-range missile testing is welcome. However, 

North Korea’s history of rescinding similar promises and resorting 

to bellicosity, brinksmanship, and open hostility requires that we 

proceed with caution. 

The President has made it clear that North Korea’s nuclear 

weapons aspirations are unacceptable, as is North Korea’s proven 

preference for provocation. The President has also plainly stated 

that the United States is firmly committed to peace and that it is 

prepared to improve relations with North Korea. I am hopeful that 

the new North Korean leadership will take this opportunity to pave 

a path to lasting peace on the peninsula. 

Maintaining our strong and enduring alliance with the Republic 

of Korea is a national security priority. Together, our two countries 

are committed to peacefully improving the security situation on the 

Korean Peninsula. We must provide U.S. Forces Korea with the 

support it needs to uphold its part of this shared commitment. 

I look forward to continuing our dialogue on these and other important issues. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
38 
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 28, 2012 

(65) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN 

General THURMAN. The total estimated cost for the Yongsan Relocation Program 

is $7 billion. The total estimated cost for the Land Partnership Plan is $3.7 billion. 

[See page 14.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 28, 2012 

(69) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. How are cyber operations and cybersecurity factored into USFK’s 

Theater Security Cooperation Plans? 

Dr. LAVOY. USFK and the Department’s Chief Information Officer have been 

working with the Republic of Korea to strengthen military-to-military cooperation 

on cybersecurity and information assurance. In conjunction with our Cyber Policy 

office, they have met with ROK officials in recent months to advance cyber cooperation and to ensure that these issues are discussed at senior bilateral forums. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I am very concerned about the capabilities of our bases on the peninsula to withstand a cyberattack directed against outside supporting infrastructure, such as the electrical grid. I have had conversations with Secretary Panetta, 

General Dempsey, and others before this committee about our resilience in the face 

of such a threat. Have you examined the ability of our bases in Korea to operate 

and recover in the event of such an attack? 

General THURMAN. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The cyber landscape is a dynamic one that continues to evolve at 

an alarming rate. Can you describe the cyberthreat landscape within USFK? What 

cybertrends are you seeing and which of these trends keep you up at night? 

General THURMAN. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. What will the reaction of the United States be to North Korea illegally—per UN Security Council resolutions—launching this missile? Will the U.S. 

take steps to intercept it, as Japan has indicated it may do? Or will the Administration lead from behind and merely watch it fly by? 

Dr. LAVOY. The United States had assets in place to track the missile launch; at 

no time was it oriented to threaten the U.S. homeland. Following this launch, which 

was in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, the United States has responded firmly by obtaining a swift and strong condemnation from the UN Security 

Council reflected in a Security Council Presidential Statement, and by the Security 

Council directing that existing sanctions be strengthened through specific actions to 

be taken to adjust the measures imposed by the UN Security Council resolutions 

1718 and 1874. We have made clear to the new regime in North Korea that further 

provocations will lead to further actions by the United States and the international 

community. 

Mr. TURNER. Have you had any discussions with your South Korean counterparts 

concerning South Korean Government scientists reporting that North Korea may 

have conducted two clandestine nuclear weapons tests in 2010? What do you make 

of their reports? Have you been briefed by the U.S. Intelligence Community on these 

tests? I am concerned because, after almost 3 years, we still can only identify North 

Korea’s 2009 nuclear test as a ‘‘probable nuclear test’’ suggesting we have not been 

able to secure sufficient evidence to conclusively identify it as a nuclear weapons 

test. This seems to be a critical capability to understand the state of North Korea’s 

nuclear weapons development, including its ability to miniaturize a weapon and 

mount it on a ballistic missile. 

Dr. LAVOY. I have extensive conversations with the Intelligence Community and 

place full faith in their judgments regarding North Korean nuclear testing. I am 

confident that North Korea did not conduct a nuclear test in 2010. I will continue 

to ensure that the Department of Defense is well-positioned to monitor, collect, and 

analyze any future North Korean nuclear events. 

Mr. TURNER. What will the reaction of the United States be to North Korea illegally—per UN Security Council resolutions—launching this missile? Will the U.S. 

take steps to intercept it, as Japan has indicated it may do? Or will the Administration lead from behind and merely watch it fly by? 
70 

General THURMAN. The 13 April 2012 North Korean missile launch failed, dropping debris throughout the seas west of the Korean Peninsula and causing no harm 

to people or property. 

With consideration of our capabilities, United States Forces Korea (USFK)—along 

with our Korean allies—are prepared to defend the Republic of Korea (ROK) against 

an errant launch or any other concurrent or subsequent provocation. In preparing 

for the 13 April 2012 North Korean missile launch, USFK primarily supported the 

U.S. response via intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. 

Actions taken against future missile launches will depend on our capabilities and 

guidance from national leadership. A key factor will be the level of threat posed by 

the North Korean missile launch to U.S. territory and our allies. 

Mr. TURNER. Have you had any discussions with your South Korean counterparts 

concerning South Korean Government scientists reporting that North Korea may 

have conducted two clandestine nuclear weapons tests in 2010? What do you make 

of their reports? Have you been briefed by the U.S. Intelligence Community on these 

tests? I am concerned because, after almost 3 years, we still can only identify North 

Korea’s 2009 nuclear test as a ‘‘probable nuclear test’’ suggesting we have not been 

able to secure sufficient evidence to conclusively identify it as a nuclear weapons 

test. This seems to be a critical capability to understand the state of North Korea’s 

nuclear weapons development, including its ability to miniaturize a weapon and 

mount it on a ballistic missile. 

General THURMAN. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. As the U.S. enhances its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region and Guam prepares to receive the Marine Corps Forces from Okinawa, how 

important is Guam’s role in assisting the USFK in fulfilling their mission in the Korean Peninsula? How does the overall realignment of forces in the Asia-Pacific region enhance our ability to respond to contingencies on the Korean Peninsula? 

Dr. LAVOY. The Department is committed to establishing Guam as a strategic hub 

in the Asia-Pacific region, including an operational, deployable Marine Corps presence there. Guam, as the western-most U.S. territory, will enable power projection 

across a range of platforms, ensuring efficient response options across a wide range 

of scenarios. This presence is consistent with our strategy to have an operationally 

resilient, geographically distributed, and politically sustainable force posture 

throughout the region and will enhance our ability to meet our treaty commitments 

and respond effectively to the entire range of contingencies. 

Ms. BORDALLO. With Kim Jong-un now in power, can you expound on the progress 

we made, if any, in reference to the six-nation denuclearization talks? 

Dr. LAVOY. Our exploratory talks with North Korea were designed to probe the 

intentions of its new leadership. The President has been clear that he is prepared 

to engage constructively with North Korea. However, he has also insisted that 

North Korea live up to its own commitments, adhere to its international obligations, 

and deal peacefully with its neighbors. North Korea’s decision to launch a ballistic 

missile violates the moratorium agreement announced on February 29, 2012, and 

violates UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874. 

Ms. BORDALLO. With a young dictator in power in North Korea, what impact, if 

any, may this cause in South Korea assuming wartime operational controls of the 

ROK forces by 2015? What challenges remain in achieving this goal? 

General THURMAN. The recent transition of power in North Korea will not impact 

Republic of Korea (ROK)–U.S. agreements to transfer wartime operational control 

in 2015. The bilaterally agreed upon Strategic Alliance 2015 Plan carefully lays out 

a plan that ensures adequate capabilities on the part of the ROK to lead the 

warfight, including a U.S. agreement to bridge any shortfalls (U.S. Bridging Capabilities) pending full acquisition of that capability by the ROK. Additionally, the 

U.S. has agreed to provide specific capabilities (U.S. Enduring Capabilities) that will 

contribute to the support of the defense of Korea for the duration of Alliance. While 

not yet complete, the critical steps needed to be taken to achieve the goal of South 

Korea assuming wartime operational control of the ROK forces by 2015 are well 

under way. 

Ms. BORDALLO. As the U.S. enhances its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region and Guam prepares to receive the Marine Corps Forces from Okinawa, how 

important is Guam’s role in assisting the USFK in fulfilling their mission in the Korean Peninsula? How does the overall realignment of forces in the Asia-Pacific region enhance our ability to respond to contingencies on the Korean Peninsula? 
71 

General THURMAN. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Mr. FRANKS. DIA Director LTG Ronald Burgess has warned us that North Korea 

may already have plutonium-based nuclear warheads that can be delivered by 

ICBM. Other experts have noted that nuclear tests carried out in 2009 by North 

Korea are consistent with development of a low-yield ‘‘super-EMP’’, or electromagnetic pulse, device. What is your current assessment of their development of 

plutonium weapons including a super-EMP device and related launch delivery technology? 

General THURMAN. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. FRANKS. The FY12 NDAA requires the Department of Defense to submit by 

November 1, 2012, a report on current and future military and security developments in North Korea. The report should address, among other things, the current 

and probable future course of military-technological development of the North Korean military. Can you provide assurances that an assessment of North Korea’s 

EMP-producing capabilities will be included in this report? 

General THURMAN. Efforts are currently under way in the Department of Defense 

to develop this report, in coordination with the United States Pacific Command, 

United States Forces Korea, and the Intelligence Community. I will have to defer 

to the Department of Defense over the specific contents of the report and whether 

North Korea’s EMP capability will be addressed in the final report or not. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY 

Mr. CONAWAY. Can you expound on any proliferation of technology from North 

Korea to countries in the Middle East? 

Dr. LAVOY. North Korea has a record of global proliferation, including to countries 

in the Middle East. International enforcement of UN Security Council Resolutions 

1718 and 1874, and counterproliferation capacity building through the Proliferation 

Security Initiative, have improved our ability to impede North Korea’s proliferation 

activities. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Potential miscommunication between North Korean actions and 

South Korean or U.S. actions can pose a very real threat of action. In these cases, 

clear, concise communication between nations can play a key role in averting or diffusing any impending disaster. What are you doing at your level to make certain 

North Korea doesn’t take irreversible military action based on incorrect conclusions 

surrounding U.S. or South Korean activities on or around the peninsula? 

General THURMAN. United States Forces Korea works very closely with the Republic of Korea to enhance deterrence and reduce the prospects for miscalculation. 

My command engages in a concerted strategic communications effort designed to enhance transparency and minimize miscalculation. We do this via multiple means including the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission and Neutral 

Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Based on history and your experience with North Korea, can you 

draw any parallels between present-day North Korea and a nuclear Iran, should 

Iran succeed in obtaining the nuclear capability that they are pursuing? 

General THURMAN. Both North Korea and Iran are pursuing nuclear weapons as 

a means to safeguard the existing regimes from overthrow by external means. The 

possession of a nuclear capability will also provide each regime with a tool of extortion to use against its adversaries. However, while Iran is pursuing a nuclear capability from a position of strength, North Korea is pursuing this capability from a 

position of weakness. Nuclear weapons would solidify Iran’s position as the dominant regional military power in the Middle East. For North Korea, nuclear weapons 

would not change the fact that its relative position against China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States is weak, although it does provide North 

Korea with another tool with which to extort aid from the international community. 

Regardless of similarities or differences, having either country achieve a viable nuclear weapons capability is not in the best interest of the United States. 

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