Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed April 2 , 2020
.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14
- 18
- 00473
- CV
SGG, LLC; STORM GUARDIAN GENERATORS, LP; AND RONNIE

BOEGLER II , Appellant s

V. JARED POR CHE , Appellee
On Appeal from the 239th District Cour t Brazoria County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 77007
- CV

MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellan ts , SGG, LLC, Storm Guardian Generators, LP, and Ronnie Boegler II, appe al from a final ju dg ment signed following a jury trial. Appellants ’ sole argument on appe al argues the trial court ’ s judgment is void and must be
vacate d because the trial court did not have subject

- ma tter jurisdiction over appellee Jar ed Porche ’ s causes of action. Beca u s e we conclude that the trial court had subject

- matter jurisdicti on , we overrule a p pellants ’ issue and affirm the trial2

court ’ s judgment

. B ACKGROUND This appe al is the culmination of a long

- runn ing dispute between the parties. Beca use appellants d o not challe nge the sufficien cy of the evidence supporting the trial court ’ s judgment, w e include only th e background facts necessary to understand appellants ’ arguments and to apprise the parties of our decision and the reasons for that dec ision.
In 2011 , a ppellants obtained a $76,000 judgment ( underlying judgment) against Porche for attorn e y s ’ fees incurred in a lawsuit ini tiated b y Porche

. As part of thei r effort to collect on th e underl ying judgment, appellants obtained a turnover order requiring Porche to t urn over to them his 33.9 percent part nership interest i n Storm Guardian Ge n er ator s in partial satisfaction of the underlying judgment. The 2012 turnover order does not include a determina tion of the va lue of Porche ’ s 33.9 percent interest. The order also award ed $1,500 in a ttorney s ’ fees to app ellants

. T he trial court ’ s plenary powe r over the underlying judgment had expired by the time it signed the tur nover order

. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(d); Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith S. Equip., Inc. , 10 S.W

. 3d 308, 310 (Tex. 2000).
In 2 014, Porche filed a law suit again st appella nts in distric t court assert ing several causes of action , all relat ed to the underlying judgment and sub sequent turnover order

. Porch e a l leged the fol lowing claims : (1) a request fo r a valuation of his form er partnership inter est in Storm Guardi ans Gen erators ; (2) a re q ues t for reimbursement of any overpayment that may have occ ur red on the underlying judgment a s a result of the t urnover of his former partnership interest ; (3) constructive fraud as a resu lt of appellants not re t urning the excess l eft after the underlying jud gment wa s paid ; (4) breach of fiduciary duty as a result of app ellants
not re t urning the excess payment left after the underlying judgment was paid; (5)3

str ict liability for loss of custodial prop erty; (6) a suit f or an acc ounti ng ; (7) a requ est to set asi de fraudule nt t ra nsfers; a nd (8) a request to set aside the t urno ver order. Appellants filed an a nswer to the lawsuit in which they pled res judicat a and collateral estoppel as affirmative def e nse s
. The ir answer also i n cl uded a plea to the jurisd ictio n asserting that the trial court did not have subject

- matter jurisdiction because the all eged errors in the turnover order at issue in Porche ’ s lawsuit should have been corre cted on a direct appeal fro m the trial court ’ s en try of the order

. Appellants als o included th eir plea to the juris diction in a no
- evid ence motio n for summary judgment, w hich the trial court denied

. The case was eventually submitted to a jury

. The jury was a s ked to determine the f

air market value of a 33.9 p ercent interest in St orm Guardian Generators on a specifi e d date

. 1 The jury answered $123,000. The trial co urt then awarded $45,500 to Porche. This appeal fo llowed

. A NALYSIS Appellants raise a s ingle issue on appeal a rguing th at the trial cour t did not have subject

- matter juri sdiction o v er the claims Por che alleged in his law suit . In appellant s ’ view, Porche ’ s lawsuit challen ges the “ evidentiary underpinnin g s ” of the turnove r order , constitutes a collateral attack o n the turnover ord er, and his complaints should have bee n ad dr ess ed through a di rect appeal

. Appe llants continue that b ecause Porche did not appeal the turnover order, the trial court was without subject

- matter jurisdic tion to grant the r elief Por che requested in his l awsuit. Subject

- matter jurisdicti on concerns a court ’ s “ autho rity to adjudicate the

1 The jury charge is not included in the appellate record . The trial court ’ s final judgment quotes “ Question No. 1 ” o f t he c harge.4

t ype of c ontroversy involved in the action. ” Dubai Pe troleum Co. v. Kazi , 12 S.W.3d 71, 74

– 7 5 (Tex. 20 00). “ A judgment rendered without subject

- mat ter jurisdiction is void and subject to collateral attac k. ” Engelman Irrigation Dis t. v. S hields Bros., Inc. , 514 S.W.3d 746, 7 50 (Tex. 2017). The ri ght of a plaintiff to main tain a suit on the other hand, concerns the right of the plain tiff to the rel ie f he seeks, but it does not con cern the jurisdiction of the court to a fford the reli ef soug ht. Dubai Petroleum Co

. , 12 S.W.3d at 76

– 7 7. Whether subject

- matte r jurisdiction exists is a question of law that we review de novo. City of Houston v. Rhule , 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 201 3 ) (per c uriam).
Texas distric t courts are c ourts of gener al jurisdiction. Dubai Petrol. Co. , 12 S.W.3d at 7 5

. A district court ’ s jurisdiction “consists of exclusive, appellate, and original j urisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, e xcept in cases where exclusi ve, appellate, and original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitut ion or other l aw on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body.” Tex. Const. art. V, § 8 ; see al so Tex. Gov ’ t Code § 24.007 (grant ing jurisdiction to district courts as prov ided in a rticle V, sect ion 8 of Texas Constitution ). A district court may hear any case “t hat is cognizable by courts of law or equity and may grant any relief that could be granted by either c ourts of law or equity.” Tex. Gov ’ t Code § 24.008

. Courts of general jurisd iction are pre sumed to h ave subject

matter jurisdiction unless lawm akers mandate they be heard el sewhere. Dubai Petroleum Co. , 12 S.W.3d at 75 ; see Sumner v. Bd. o f Adjustment of the Ci ty of Spring Valley Village , No. 1 4

- 15

- 00149

- CV, 2016 WL 2935881, at * 8 (Tex. App.

— H ouston [14th Dist.] May 17, 2016, pet. denied) ( mem. op.) ( “ Although district courts typically are courts of general jurisdiction, the Legislature has vested exclusive juri sdiction over inverse conde mnation claims in the Harris County Courts at Law

. ” )

.5

We beg in with Porche ’ s causes of action asserted in his laws uit , w h ich are set out above

. See Cty. o f Cameron v. Brown , 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002) ( when deciding a plea t o the juri s diction, we cons ider only the plaint iff ’ s pl e adings and the evidence pert inent to the jurisdic tional inquiry)

. We conclude that each of these claim s fit within the general jurisdic tion of Texas district courts. Tex. Gov ’ t Code § § 24.007; 24.008

. Ap p ellants have not poi nted ou t any statute or consti t utio n al provision t hat has assign ed exclus ive jurisdiction to hear any of Porche ’ s causes of action to another court or a state agency
. Dubai Petroleum Co. , 12 S.W.3d at 75 (stating there is a presumptio n that courts of general jurisdictio n

“ have subject matt e r jurisdiction unless a show ing can be made to the contrary ” )

. As a result, we conclude that they have not shown the trial court la c ked subject

matter jurisdic tion over Porche ’ s claims. See Partain v. Maples , 438 S.W.3d 6 9, 73 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi 2013, no pet.) ( holding judgment debtor could not use turnover order issued outside trial court ’ s plen ary power to obtain reimbursement for overpayment of underlying judgment but was instead “ required to seek reimbursement for the overpayment on the judgment in a separat e su it. ” ) ; Woody K. Lesikar Spec ial Trust v. Moon , No. 14

- 1 0

- 00119

- CV, 2011 WL 3447491, at *6 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 9, 2011, pet. denied) (stating that merits of a reimbu r sement claim are not the proper subject of a
t urnover proceeding).
The c asel aw appellants cite does not change th is result. Appellant s primaril y rel y on two cases in supp ort of their argument that Porche ’ s lawsuit is a prohibited collateral attack on the tri a l court ’ s turno ver order

. In the f irst cas e, In re Wiese , the rel ator sought a writ of habeas corp us in connection with a contempt order signed after she failed to comply with a turnover order requiring her to turn

over all sums received from the sal e of merchandise in any of her busi nesses until6

the un derl ying debt was paid. 1 S.W.3d 246 , 24 8 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi 1999, orig. proceeding) . The relator argued the turnover over was void and unenforceable by cont empt because it d id not all ow for th e deducti on of reasonable and necessary expense s befo re her business re cei p ts were turned over to the c ourt. Id. at 249. The court of appe als rejected this argumen t stating that “ the fact the
turnover order is contrary to a statute or contains errors onl y makes the judgm ent

‘ voidable ’ and does not give a p arty the right to circumvent ordinary appellate or other direct procedures to correct it. ” Id. at 250

– 51. The court then conclu de d that because the “ re lator has failed to directly attack the turnover o r der , ” i t was

“ without juris diction to grant habeas relief based upon a n order that is mere ly voidable and not void. ” Id

. In the second case, Davis v . West , 317 S.W.3d 301, 3 0 8 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) , Davis challenged the “ vali dity o f a t urno ver order

. ” She argued that the turnover order was invalid d ue to evidentiary deficiencies in the proof supporting the order and also because the order did “ not specify the dollar amount of the underlying judgment

. ” Id. at 309. The court of appea ls co n strued Davis ’ s argu ments “ as a collateral attack on the t urnov er order

. ” Id. The court then held that
even if the turnover order in this case failed to in clude the amount of the underlying judgment to be sati sfi ed, required Davis to turnover exemp t pro p erty or contained other requir ements in contraven tion of the t urnover statute, the order would be voidable

— not void

— and it must therefore have been the s ubject of a direct attack. Davis ca nnot use these alleged def

icienc ies to defeat [the receiver ’ s] de r ived judicial immuni ty or to hold [the receiver] or the Bank l iable fo r actions taken in reliance upon the turnover order when she failed to timely prosecute a direct appeal of the turnover order or seek injunctive or mandam us relief prohibiting the execu t ion of the t urnover order. Id

. at 31 0 (internal citation omitt ed)

.7

We conclude that both cases cited by appellants are distinguishable because P orche ’ s lawsuit is not a collateral attack on the tur nover order

. U n like the relator in In re in Wiese a nd the judgment debtor in Dav is , Porche did not argue that the
turnov er order was void

. Porc he also did not ch allenge the amount of the underlying judgment. See Lesikar v. Rappeport , 104 S.W.3d 310, 31 5 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2 002, pet. d en ied) ( “ Any attem pt by t he Lesikars now to claim

an enlarged ownership inte rest in tho se funds would constitute a redete rmination of matters that were actually litigated in the underlying lawsuit. ” )

. Porc he instead sought , through a separate lawsuit, a v aluation of his pa rtners h ip interest and a reimbur sement of any overpayment that may ha ve occur red as a result of the
turn over order. The trial court had subje ct matter jur isdiction to hear and adjudicate that controversy. See i d. at 316 ( “ The r efore, while Rappep ort is ent itled to a turnover order in this case, the Lesikars should not have been pr ecluded by the trial court from seeking relief elsewhere for any reimbursement claim based on an alleged over payment of the Money Judgme nt

. ” ). Rather than challenging the t r ial court ’ s subject

- matter jurisdictio n , we conclude a ppellants ’ co mpla int s on appeal instead attack Porche ’ s right to the relief he sough t t hrough his lawsuit

. See Du bai Petroleum Co. , 12 S.W .3d at 76

– 77 ( “ Thus, while defendants in this Court and the Kazis in the court of appeals framed t heir argument in terms of whet h er th e district court did or did not hav e subject

- matter jurisdiction, we consider those arguments in the context o f whether the Kazis established their right under the statute to go forward with this suit. The righ t of a pl aintiff to maintain a suit, wh i le fr equently treated as goi ng to the qu estion of jurisdiction, has been said to go in reality to the right of the plaintiff to relief rather than to the jurisdiction of the court to afford it. ” ) (internal quot ation

m arks omitted). Appellants recognized t his w hen they alleged Porche ’ s claims8

we re barred by the doctrines of res judica ta and collateral estoppel. For res judicata to apply, a party must establish the following elements: (1) a prior final judgment on the me rits by a court of com petent juris d i c tion; (2) iden tity of the pa rties or tho se in privity with them; and (3) a secon d action based on the same claims that were raised or could have been raised in the first ac tion. T ravelers I n s. Co. v. Joachim , 315 S

. W

. 3d 860, 86 2 (Tex. 2010)

. C ollateral e stopp el, also known as issue preclusion, prevents a party from relitigating an i ssue it previously litigated unsuccessfully

. Calabrian Corp. v. Alliance Specialty Chems., Inc. , 41 8 S.W.3d 154, 158 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.)

. B oth res judic ata and collateral esto ppel a re aff irmative defense s a nd t he party assertin g t hem has the burden of pleading and pr oving the m. W hile b oth doctrines may p r event a particular plaintiff from recovering on a specif i c cause of action , neither impacts a t r ial c ourt ’ s subject

- matter j uri s diction

. See Zerm eno v. Garcia , No. 14

- 17

- 0084 3

- CV, 2019 WL 2063090, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] May 9, 2019, pet. denied) ( mem. op.) ( “ In an apparent effort to avoid the er r or
preservation requirements of Rule 3 3 .1 , G loria ’ s first argument r egarding su bject

matter juri sdiction confl ates the defenses of release or res judicat a with the separate and distinct concept of subject

- matter jurisdiction. ” ) ; Mestiza v. De Leon , 8 S.W

. 3d 770, 773 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi 1 999, n o pet. ) ( “ Res judicata and collate ral estoppel a r e affirmative defenses un der Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 94 and should be treated as a plea in bar, rather than as a plea in abat ement or a plea to the j urisdi c tion. ” )

. Beca use appellants have not s hown t hat the tri al court lac ked subject

- matter jurisdiction, we overrule their si ngle issue on appeal.9 C ONCLUSION Having o verrule d appellants ’ s ole issue on appeal , we affirm the trial court ’ s judgment

.

/s/ Jerry Z immerer Justic e

Panel con sists of Justi ces Christopher, Bourliot, and Zimmerer.