United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-30565

____________

In the Matter of Roman Catholic Church of the 

Archdiocese of New Orleans,

Debtor, 

Minor Children,

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

versus

Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New 

Orleans,

Defendant—Appellant. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:22-CV-4552

______________________________

Before King, Jones, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.

Edith H. Jones1

, Circuit Judge

_____________________

1 Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 17, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Appellant-Debtor Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New 

Orleans (“Archdiocese”) appeals the district court’s reversal of the 

bankruptcy court’s order that enforced the automatic stay against Minor 

Children pursuing a state court suit against the Archdiocese. We agree with 

the district court that the bankruptcy court erred in enforcing the automatic 

stay against Minor Children Appellees. Thus, we REVERSE the 

bankruptcy court’s order.

I. BACKGROUND

The Archdiocese filed for bankruptcy in May 2020 after more than 

500 alleged instances of child sexual abuse by local clergy came to light. 

Minor Children’s suit, however, has no connection with the tort claims at 

issue in the underlying bankruptcy. Instead, Minor Children are a group of 

disabled Catholic school-aged children in the New Orleans area whose 

parents wish for them to attend Catholic schools that are either directly or 

indirectly controlled by the Archdiocese. Minor Children assert that the 

Catholic schools they seek to attend are asking pre-admission questions about 

disabilities and/or requesting medical evaluations of students in violation of 

Louisiana civil rights laws. As a result, Minor Children claim that they have 

been dissuaded from applying to the Catholic schools they wish to attend.

Minor Children filed a (later amended) class action lawsuit in 

Louisiana state court in August 2022, alleging that Catholic schools in the 

New Orleans area directly or indirectly controlled by the Archdiocese are

violating Louisiana civil rights laws. The lawsuit seeks an injunction to 

prevent the Archdiocese from asking such questions of prospective 

applicants, as well as attorney’s fees. The lawsuit also explicitly disclaims 

any claims to damages for past misconduct.

Later that month, the Archdiocese removed the action to federal 

district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a), premising removal on the court’s 

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“related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) as a result of

the Archdiocese’s bankruptcy case. Minor Children moved to remand and 

requested a “comfort order” from the bankruptcy court, seeking judicial 

confirmation that their action against the Archdiocese was not subject to the 

automatic stay.1

 On October 3, 2022, before the bankruptcy court could rule 

on the comfort order motion, the district court granted Minor Children’s 

motion to remand, as it concluded that their suit was not “related to” the 

Archdiocese’s bankruptcy because it could not conceivably affect the 

bankruptcy estate. The Archdiocese did not appeal this decision because 

remand orders predicated on jurisdictional decisions are unappealable. 

28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).

Notwithstanding the district court’s ruling, the bankruptcy court 

orally denied the motion for a comfort order and enforced the automatic stay 

against Minor Children’s state court lawsuit at a hearing. The bankruptcy 

court subsequently signed a formal order confirming its ruling, which is the 

order presently on appeal. Minor Children appealed to the district court 

without seeking leave to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 158. In the district court, 

the Archdiocese moved to dismiss, arguing that Minor Children lack 

standing to appeal and the bankruptcy court’s underlying order was 

interlocutory and unappealable. In June 2023, the district court rejected the 

_____________________

1 “‘[C]omfort order’ is a bankruptcy term of art”. In re Hill, 364 B.R. 826, 

827 n.1 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007). Its origins are “elusive, but comfort orders are 

generally sought as declarations from a bankruptcy judge that the automatic stay 

has been terminated or else never came into existence with regard to some element 

of a bankruptcy case. Comfort orders are usually sought so that the movant can 

proceed with legal action in some other court.” In re Ross, No. 18-11356, 2019 WL 

480269, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. Feb. 6, 2019). See also 11 U.S.C. 

362(j)(authorizing bankruptcy court to issue an order confirming that the automatic 

stay has been “terminated”).

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Archdiocese’s procedural contentions. The district court held that the 

bankruptcy court’s order was appealable, and that Minor Children had 

standing to prosecute their appeal.

A month later, the district court ruled on the merits of the Minor 

Children’s appeal. Consistent with its previous position, the district court 

reversed the bankruptcy court and held that the automatic stay does not apply

to the Minor Children’s lawsuit. In re Roman Catholic Church of Archdiocese 

of New Orleans, 653 B.R. 524 (E.D. La. 2023)[hereinafter “Minor Children”]. 

The Archdiocese timely appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews “a bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions de novo

and its findings of fact for clear error.” Viegelahn v. Lopez (In re Lopez), 

897 F.3d 663, 668 (5th Cir. 2018). Because the scope of an automatic stay is 

a legal question, this Court reviews that issue de novo. Reliant Energy Servs., 

Inc. v. Enron Canada Corp., 349 F.3d 816, 825 (5th Cir. 2003).

III. DISCUSSION

The parties dispute a number of threshold procedural issues, which, 

after analysis, are red herrings. Specifically, they dispute whether Minor 

Children have standing to prosecute this appeal; whether this court has

appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), and whether the bankruptcy 

court had subject matter jurisdiction to enter its order denying the motion to 

lift the stay. After overcoming these issues, we consider on the merits

whether the automatic stay applies to the Minor Children’s state law claims

and conclude that Minor Children’s claims could not have been filed 

prepetition nor do they impermissibly interfere with the bankruptcy case.

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A. Standing

The district court applied the “person aggrieved test” for bankruptcy 

appellate standing that has been applied by various panels of this court in 

recent years. See In re Highland Cap. Mgmt. L.P., 74 F.4th 361, 366 (5th Cir. 

2023); In re Dean, 18 F.4th 842, 844 (5th Cir. 2021);In re Technicool Sys.,Inc., 

896 F.3d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 2018); Fortune Nat. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Interior, 806 F.3d 363, 366 (5th Cir. 2015); In re Coho Energy, Inc., 395 F.3d 

198, 202 (5th Cir. 2004). But as we explained in another recent opinion, that

test is based on a statute that Congress repealed in 1978 and was introduced 

into this court’s post-1978 jurisprudence “by a footnote’s worth of dicta in a 

1994 opinion.” In re Roman Catholic Church of Archdiocese of New Orleans, 

101 F.4th 400, 408 (5th Cir. 2024) [hereinafter “Adams v. Roman Catholic 

Church of Archdiocese of New Orleans”] (citing Rohm & Hass Tex., Inc. v. Ortiz 

Bros. Insulation, 32 F.3d 205, 210 n.18 (5th Cir. 1994)). 

Adams reasoned: 

In light of the statutory change, the ground for imposing this 

superseded gloss on the provisions governing bankruptcy 

appeals to district courts and courts of appeals is uncertain at 

best. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 158(a), 158(d)(2); see also In re Cap. 

Contracting Co., 924 F.3d 890, 896 (6th Cir. 2019). Indeed, this 

court’s “exacting” “person aggrieved” test may be 

incompatible with the Supreme Court’s decision in Lexmark, 

which cast doubt on the role of prudential standing rules in 

federal courts. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 

Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014); see also In re GT 

Automation Grp., Inc., 828 F.3d 602, 605 n.1 (7th Cir. 2016). 

Id. Consistent with this view, we applied the traditional Article III standing 

test in Adams. Id. at 408–09. We do the same in this case, albeit with 

different results. Unlike the former members of the Official Committee of 

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Unsecured Creditors in Adams, Minor Children have demonstrated a 

cognizable injury in this case.

 “To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she 

suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and 

particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” 

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016), as 

revised (May 24, 2016) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of 

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992)). In this case, Minor 

Children cannot prosecute their state court lawsuit so long as the automatic 

stay applies to their case. The Bankruptcy Code subjects parties that willfully 

violate the automatic stay to potentially severe penalties: 

[A]n individual injured by any willful violation of a stay 

provided by this section shall recover actual damages, 

including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate 

circumstances, may recover punitive damages.

11 U.S.C.§ 362(k)(1). Contrary to the Archdiocese’s assertions, this risk of 

sanctions is not “conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560,

112 S. Ct. at 2136. As the district court noted, the Archdiocese has accused 

Minor Children of violating the stay on multiple occasions. That the 

Archdiocese has not yet moved for sanctions is of no moment, because a party

need notrun afoul of the law in order to have Article III standing, and litigants 

can demonstrate standing before they face liability so long as they 

demonstrate a credible threat of enforcement.

Such a credible threat exists here. The actions of the Archdiocese 

demonstrate that it views any attempt by the Minor Children to litigate their 

state court lawsuit as unlawful and would seek to enforce sanctions against 

Minor Children for violating the automatic stay. Minor Children have thus 

established a sufficiently credible threat of enforcement to confer standing, 

consistent with the precedents of both the Supreme Court and this circuit. 

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See Braidwood Mgmt., Inc. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 70 F.4th 914, 

926–27 (5th Cir. 2023) (plaintiffs had demonstrated a credible risk of 

enforcement because the EEOC had a history of enforcing the guidance at 

issue, viewed the plaintiffs’ actions as unlawful, and refused to affirmatively 

declare that it would not enforce Title VII against the plaintiffs).2 In short, 

Minor Children have demonstrated far more than a “purely subjective fear,” 

that would be insufficient to demonstrate standing. Prasco, LLC v. Medicis 

Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

Further, unlike Adams, the bankruptcy court’s imposition of the 

automatic stay order on Minor Children affects rights that exist completely 

outside the bankruptcy context and are based on Louisiana state law. The 

bankruptcy court’s order prevents Minor Children from vindicating those 

rights, despite the fact that their lawsuit has been remanded to state court 

because the federal district court held that it lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction. Hence, unlike the Adams plaintiffs, Minor Children have not 

“lost nothing.” 101 F.4th at 400. Minor Children have standing to prosecute 

this appeal.

_____________________

2 See also Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 15–16, 130 S. Ct. 

2705, 2717 (2010) (holding that there was a credible risk of enforcement because 

about 150 people had been previously charged with violating the relevant statue—

several for violating the statutory terms at issue in that case); Virginia v. American 

Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 392-93, 108 S. Ct. 636, 642–43 (1988) (holding 

that the plaintiffs had standing because they faced immediate compliance costs and 

the government did not “suggest[] that the newly enacted law will not be 

enforced,” with the Court seeing “no need to assume otherwise”); Steffl v. 

Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459, 94 S. Ct. 1209, 1215–16 (1974) (holding that the 

plaintiff had standing because he was twice warned that if he did not cease the 

challenged conduct, he would be prosecuted). 

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B. Appellate Jurisdiction

28 U.S.C. § 158(a) governs appeals from the decisions of bankruptcy 

courts. That statute provides:

The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction 

to hear appeals

(1) from final judgments, orders, and decrees;

 . . . . and

(3) with leave of the court, from other interlocutory 

orders and decrees. 

Rule 8004(d) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure allows a district 

court “to treat the notice of appeal [of an interlocutory order] as a motion for 

leave and either grant or deny it.” See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8004(d)(1). 

This court has held, however, that “a district court cannot impliedly grant 

leave to appeal by merely ruling on an appeal before it from the bankruptcy 

court.” In re Delta Produce, 845 F.3d 609, 618 (5th Cir. 2016) (emphasis 

added) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The district court here 

expressly elected to treat the Minor Children’s notice of appeal as a motion 

for leave to appeal.

The Archdiocese complains that the district court’s reasoning was 

deficient based on some Fifth Circuit district court authority holding that a 

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) analysis is required before a district court can grant leave 

to appeal under Rule 8004. See Sims v. Sunnyside Land, LLC, 425 B.R. 284, 

290 (W.D. La. 2010). But this circuit has never so held. And in tension with 

the Archdiocese’s position, this court concluded that Sections 158(a) 

and 1292(b) are alternative, and thus distinct, means for our exercise of

appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory orders of the bankruptcy court. See 

In re Sullivan, 20 F.3d 468, 1994 WL 122169, at *2 (5th Cir. Mar. 25, 1994).

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In any case, the district court’s comprehensive analysis of its 

jurisdiction, resulting in its well-reasoned footnote approving an 

interlocutory appeal, was more than sufficient to comply with the 

requirements of Section 158, Rule 8004, and Delta Produce. 

C. Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction over Motion for a Comfort Order

Minor Children argue now that the bankruptcy court lacked

jurisdiction because the automatic stay could not apply to a suit that has been 

remanded for lack of jurisdiction under Section 1334. To be sure, the 

bankruptcy court may have been imprudent in ruling on a stay motion in the 

teeth of the district court’s remand order, but that raises no question of 

jurisdiction. Instead, Minor Children’s rather confusing argument puts the

merits cart before the jurisdictional horse.

 “The automatic stay provision of section 362 is a key component of 

federal bankruptcy law” and only exists because of Title 11. In re S.I. 

Acquisition, Inc., 817 F.2d 1142, 1146 (5th Cir. 1987). Bankruptcy court 

proceedings concerning the scope of the automatic stay are “core 

proceedings” within Section 1334’s basic “arising under” language. 

28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (“the district courts shall have original . . . jurisdiction 

of all civil proceedings arising under title 11 . . . . ”). This court has treated 

the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to enforce the automatic stay as a broad 

grant that applies even to property “arguabl[y]” within the bankruptcy 

estate. In re Chesnut, 422 F.3d 298, 300 (5th Cir. 2005). And if practical 

recognition of the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction were needed, it is 

demonstrated in the fact that Minor Children themselves chose to file their 

comfort order motion in the bankruptcy court, seeking itsjudicial declaration 

that the automatic stay did not apply to their claims against the Archdiocese. 

Minor Children, 653 B.R. at 532. 

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D. Application of the Automatic Stay

1. Waiver Under Rule 8009

One more technical threshold issue is whether Minor Children

sufficiently designated their issues on appeal to the district court. See Fed. 

R. Bankr. Pro. 8009. That designation stated:

Whether the Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction to enforce the 

automatic stay with regard to a lawsuit that the district court 

has already concluded is not within its jurisdiction, because the 

suit is not conceivably “related to” the debtor’s bankruptcy 

case.

The Archdiocese contends that this statement of issues lacked precision and 

accordingly, Minor Children waived any argument that the automatic stay 

does not apply to the state court action.

We disagree. Under Rule 8009, “the statement of issues need not ‘be 

precise to the point of pedantry’ to avoid waiver.” In re Galaz, 841 F. 316, 

324 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Am. Cartage, Inc., 656 F.3d 82, 91 (1st Cir. 

2011)). The statement of issues clearly put the Archdiocese and the district 

court on notice that the scope of the automatic stay would be at the heart of 

the issues litigated on appeal at the district court. Specifically, whether the 

Minor Children’s case is sufficiently “related to” the debtors’ bankruptcy 

case overlaps exactly with the applicability of the automatic stay to the Minor 

Children’s bankruptcy case.

2. Possibility of Prepetition Filing

Finally, we reach the merits. The Archdiocese argues that the Minor 

Children’s state court lawsuit is subject to the automatic stay because it could 

have been filed prepetition, thus invoking Section 362(a)(1), and because it 

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affects property of the estate, invoking Section 362(a)(3). We disagree with 

both arguments.

Under Section 362(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, the automatic stay 

applies to

the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or 

employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other 

action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have 

been commenced before the commencement of the case under this 

title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before 

the commencement of the case under this title.

11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (emphasis added). As this court has put it, “[t]he stay 

simply does not apply to post-bankruptcy events.” Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. 

Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 996 (5th Cir. 1985).

3

 The district court

correctly determined that Minor Children’s state court lawsuit implicated 

only post-petition conduct. Nothing in the record indicates that the named 

plaintiffs in this class action were aware of the Archdiocese’s alleged 

discrimination against children with disabilities, or that they were in any way 

aggrieved by the Archdiocese prior to May 2020. Simply put, a lawsuit filed 

in 2022 that only seeks prospective relief cannot enjoin conduct that 

occurred in 2020, before the Archdiocese filed for bankruptcy.

_____________________

3 We must also consider the underlying function of the automatic stay. As 

our court has put it: 

The automatic stay is designed to protect creditors as well as 

debtors. Without the stay, creditors might scramble to obtain as 

much property of the debtor’s limited estate as possible. The 

automatic stay prevents such a scramble by providing “breathing 

room” for a debtor and the bankruptcy court to institute an 

organized repayment plan.

In re Chesnut, 422 F.3d at 301.

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3. Property of the Estate

The Archdiocese also argues that the automatic stay applies to Minor

Children’s claims under Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, which 

states that “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of 

property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.”

11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (emphasis added.) The Archdiocese argues that Minor 

Children’s state court lawsuit seeks to exert control over the operations of 

the Archdiocese’s estate property by designating how children can be 

admitted to its schools, and by seeking recovery of attorney’s fees. This

broad reading of Section 362(a)(3), if accepted, would effectively immunize 

debtors from all suits seeking post-petition prospective equitable relief to 

abate a debtor’s post-petition tortious conduct. After all, the debtor is 

specifically authorized to operate its business pursuant to Section 1108 of the 

Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 1108. Operating the business necessarily 

implies operation in conformity with non-bankruptcy law. We agree with the 

district court that this provision of the automatic stay does not cover Minor 

Children’s post-petition suit.

Moreover, the automatic stay is not implicated merely because the 

debtor may be required to “expend funds.” In re Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 

Inc., 805 F.2d 1175, 1186–88 (5th Cir. 1986). This court rejected that 

argument in Commonwealth Oil because it was premised on inappropriately 

collapsing the distinction between government agencies’ efforts to enforce 

monetary judgments and injunctions. Id. The same principle applies here. 

As the Sixth Circuit stated, “[t]he automatic bankruptcy stay ‘protects 

interests in a debtor’s property, not tortious uses of that property by the 

debtor.’” Dominic’s Rest. of Dayton, Inc. v. Mantia, 683 F.3d 757, 760 (6th 

Cir. 2012) (quoting Larami Ltd. v. Yes! Ent. Corp., 244 B.R. 56, 60 (D.N.J.

2000)). The bankruptcy automatic stay “was intended to prevent 

interference with a bankruptcy court’s orderly disposition of the property of 

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the estate, it was not intended to preclude post-petition suits to enjoin 

unlawful conduct.” Id. (quoting Larami, 244 B.R. at 60).

A reading of Section 362(a)(3) that blocks suits seeking purely 

injunctive relief from proceeding in state court because the debtor might 

incur compliance costs would allow “bankrupt businesses . . . operat[ing] 

post-petition [to] violate plaintiffs’ rights with impunity.” Id. at 760–61; see 

also Larami, 244 B.R. at 60. “Because this matter involves the 

[Archdiocese’s] use of [schools it operates] to commit a tort, specifically the 

tort of [violation of state civil rights laws], application of the automatic stay 

would permit [the Archdiocese] to continue to commit this tort.” Id. at 761. 

“As for any tort, [the Archdiocese’s] bankruptcy does not protect it from 

liability” in suits to abate ongoing violations of state law. Seiko Epson Corp. 

v. Nu-Kote Intern., Inc., 190 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

In sum, Section 362(a)(3) does not stymie Minor Children’s state 

court suit for prospective injunctive relief. This lawsuit does not implicate 

the automatic stay’s core function of preventing a race to the courthouse 

among creditors and does not undermine the provision’s role in 

“preserv[ing] property for use in the reorganization of the debtor 

and . . . prevent[ing] the dismemberment of the estate.” Hillis Motors, Inc. v. 

Hawaii Auto. Dealers’ Ass’n, 997 F.2d 581, 586 (9th Cir. 1993).

Further, the possibility of an award of attorney’s fees by the Louisiana 

state court does not invoke the automatic stay. Any such fees should be 

considered “administrative expenses” under Section 503 of the Bankruptcy 

Code, because those expenses would be the necessary and predictable 

consequences of post-petition tortious activity by a debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 

503; Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 482, 88 S. Ct. 1759, 1765 (1968) 

(holding that tort claims that arise against a debtor under bankruptcy 

protection are “actual and necessary expenses” of the bankruptcy and not 

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debts of the bankrupt). A fee award would be analogous to interest expenses 

awarded to a public authority because of a debtor’s decision “not to carry out 

its statutory obligations under [state] law in a prompt manner.” In re Al 

Copeland Enterprises, Inc., 991 F.2d 233, 240 (5th Cir. 1993) (concluding that 

interest costs added to the debtor’s liability for failing to transfer tax revenues 

on time were administrative expenses under Section 503).4 Any potential

attorney’s fees award plays no role in evaluating the Section 362(a)(3) issue.

For the foregoing reasons, the bankruptcy court’s order enforcing the 

automatic stay is REVERSED.

5

_____________________

4 Similarly, the First Circuit concluded that compensatory fines and attorney’s fees 

awarded against a Chapter 11 debtor for violation of an injunction were administrative 

expenses under Section 503. In re Charlesbank Laundry, Inc., 755 F.2d 200, 201, 203 (1st 

Cir. 1985). “If fairness dictates that a tort claim based on negligence should be paid ahead 

of pre-reorganization claims, then, a fortiori, an intentional act which violates the law and 

damages others should be so treated.” Id. at 203. 

5 We further DENY the Minor Children’s motion for summary affirmance of the 

district court and DENY the Archdiocese’s motion for fees and costs. 

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