IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-20222

VICTORIA EAGLIN, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

TEXAS CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL, 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:17-CV-2245

Before OWEN, Chief Judge, and BARKSDALE and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff Victoria Eaglin appeals the summary judgment granted in favor 

of Texas Children’s Hospital on her employment discrimination claims under 

Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. We affirm.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 4, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I.

A.

Plaintiffs Annette Williams (“A. Williams”) and Victoria Eaglin—who 

are both black—worked for Texas Children’s Hospital (“TCH”) as Patient 

Access Representatives at the cardiology reception desk. Eaglin worked under 

various supervisors at TCH. The first was Kelly Crumley, who supervised 

Eaglin for about a year. The next supervisor was Sheila Jones, who took over 

for Crumley as an interim supervisor. A short time later TCH hired Danielle 

Williams (“D. Williams”) as a permanent supervisor. Enrique Gonzalez was the 

Director of Patient Admissions and Registration and was the second-level 

supervisor for both Eaglin and A. Williams.

From time to time, Eaglin’s supervisors made comments she found 

offensive. For example, Crumley once “flipped” Eaglin’s hair and asked her how 

much she paid for it. Crumley also asked if Eaglin and A. Williams ate 

watermelon and fried chicken on holidays. Jones once told Eaglin that she 

needed to “[e]ither . . . change [her] hair [color] or . . . go home for the rest of 

the day.” D. Williams referred to Eaglin and A. Williams as “the black girls” 

and questioned the style and color of Eaglin’s hair, asking Eaglin whether she 

thought “it was professional to wear braids in the medical field.” 

Eaglin’s supervisors also occasionally made comments indicating that 

someone in TCH’s administration wanted to replace Eaglin with a Hispanic 

employee. For example, Crumley once told A. Williams that “they needed a 

Hispanic person at” the reception desk because the current desk employees 

“couldn’t communicate with the patients.” Jones once told Eaglin that “they 

want to replace you-all with Hispanics.” 

Similar incidents with non-supervisors also occurred. Maria Berrera, 

another TCH employee, once said to A. Williams and Eaglin that the hospital 

wanted someone Hispanic working at the reception desk. Eaglin was once told 

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that other clinic employees called Eaglin, A. Williams, and a third reception 

desk worker “the black girls.” 

But not everyone at TCH made offensive remarks. Eaglin testified in her 

deposition that Gonzalez—her second-level supervisor—never did anything 

that she felt was discriminatory.

B.

The events that led to the termination of A. Williams’ and Eaglin’s 

employment took place in the summer of 2015. A. Williams testified in her 

deposition that on June 12, 2015, she clocked in at 7:30 or 7:32 a.m. She took 

her first break around 7:45 a.m. so she could visit her daughter, who had been 

admitted at the nearby St. Luke’s Hospital. She walked to St. Luke’s, which is 

connected to TCH by a walkway. She returned to TCH at approximately 8:00 

a.m. 

Another hospital employee told a different story about the events of that 

morning. Tamika Jones, a Patient Access Coordinator at TCH, testified in her 

deposition that she saw A. Williams on the employee parking garage shuttle 

between 7:50 and 8:00 a.m. Jones noticed that A. Williams was carrying her 

work bag and her lunch bag, and so she believed that A. Williams had just 

come from her car. Apparently suspicious of seeing A. Williams on the bus after 

the start of Williams’ shift, Jones checked the hospital’s clock-in system.1 The 

system showed that A. Williams had in fact clocked in at 7:32 a.m., at least 18 

minutes before Jones saw her on the bus. Jones reported her observations to 

D. Williams, A. Williams’ supervisor.

1 Jones testified in her deposition that she decided to check the clock-in system 

because of recent complaints from patients that the cardiology check-in desk was always 

“severely backed up” because of understaffing.

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After hearing Jones’ story, D. Williams checked the employee time 

system herself and confirmed that there was no documentation that A. 

Williams had received permission to come in late. D. Williams notified 

Gonzalez, her supervisor, of her initial findings. D. Williams then spoke to A. 

Williams, who seemed to give somewhat conflicting answers. First, she said 

that she had tried to clock in, but the timekeeping system was not working. 

But A. Williams also denied having instructed anyone else to clock in for her 

and stated that she did not know how she could have clocked in at 7:32 a.m. 

since she was not at the hospital.2 D. Williams also asked Jones to speak to 

Eaglin. Eaglin told Jones that she did not know how A. Williams could have 

been clocked in at 7:32 a.m. 

At this point, D. Williams spoke again to Gonzalez, who instructed her 

to contact Beth Camp in HR. Camp asked TCH’s security coordinator, Larry 

Buzo, to review relevant video surveillance footage, and he reported seeing A. 

Williams enter the floor on which her desk was located around 8:00 a.m. He 

also noted that a female employee had been at the cardiology desk since at 

least 7:00 a.m. (The woman was later identified as Eaglin.) Buzo gave several 

still images from the footage to Camp and D. Williams. A check of the parking 

garage records revealed that A. Williams’ card had been used to enter the 

garage at 7:41 a.m. 

Ultimately, the investigation showed that Eaglin had been present at 

the desk since before 7:00 a.m.; that A. Williams was not present at the desk 

at 7:32 a.m. when her username and password were used to clock her in; that 

A. Williams had first entered the 20th floor at approximately 8:00 a.m.; that 

Eaglin had clocked in at 6:04 a.m. and was working when A. Williams’ 

2 This is a different story than A. Williams later recounted during her deposition. See 

supra.

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credentials were used to clock her in at 7:32 a.m.; that Eaglin was the only 

person working at the check-in desk at the time A. Williams’ credentials were 

used to clock her in; and that A. Williams had been clocked in on Eaglin’s 

computer.

D. Williams concluded that A. Williams had asked Eaglin to clock her in 

before she arrived at work and that Eaglin obliged. D. Williams presented her 

findings to Gonzalez and recommended terminating both Eaglin and A. 

Williams’ employment for violating TCH policies. Gonzalez reviewed the 

investigation materials himself and decided that termination was appropriate. 

Camp agreed. D. Williams prepared records of the decision, which she and 

Gonzalez signed, and then met with the two women and informed them of the 

decision.

Eaglin and A. Williams filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission and received right-to-sue letters. They 

then filed this action, alleging they were terminated because of their race in 

violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 

After the discovery deadline, Eaglin filed a motion to compel, arguing 

that TCH had engaged in bad faith in the discovery process. The district court 

denied the motion, concluding that “the dispute involves matters that fall 

outside of the agreed discovery period.” The district court ultimately granted 

summary judgment for TCH on the discrimination claims. It concluded that 

“Enrique Gonzalez’s decision was based on the investigation by the plaintiffs’ 

supervisor,” and that A. Williams and Eaglin had “fail[ed] to discredit the 

timekeeping records, parking records and video footage stills that show that 

Williams was not at work when she was clocked in.” Eaglin—but not A. 

Williams—timely appealed. 

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II.

We review a summary judgment de novo and apply the same standard 

as the district court. Rogers v. Pearland Indep. Sch. Dist., 827 F.3d 403, 406 

(5th Cir. 2016). “Summary judgment is proper ‘if the movant shows that there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.’” Rogers v. Bromac Title Servs., L.L.C., 755 F.3d 

347, 350 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). A genuine dispute of 

material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return 

a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248 (1986). “We construe all facts and inferences in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party,” Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 

2010), but “[s]ummary judgment may not be thwarted by conclusional 

allegations, unsupported assertions, or presentation of only a scintilla of 

evidence.” McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 571 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing 

Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 2007)).

“We review a district court’s denial of a discovery request for abuse of 

discretion.” JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. DataTreasury Corp., 936 F.3d 251, 

255 (5th Cir. 2019). Generally, “[w]e ‘will affirm such decisions unless they are 

arbitrary or clearly unreasonable.’” Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 

F.3d 812, 817 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 

F.3d 871, 876 (5th Cir. 2000)). “A district court abuses its discretion if it: (1) 

relies on clearly erroneous factual findings; (2) relies on erroneous conclusions 

of law; or (3) misapplies the law to the facts.” Texas v. Alabama-Coushatta 

Tribe of Texas, 918 F.3d 440, 446–47 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Volkswagen 

of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 310 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc)).

III.

Eaglin argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying her 

motion to compel discovery because TCH’s “deleterious conduct” made it 

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impossible for her to file the motion within the discovery period. She also 

contends that the court erred in granting summary judgment to TCH because 

there remained genuine disputes of material fact regarding her discrimination 

claims. We address the discovery issue first before turning to the summary 

judgment order.

A.

District courts “enjoy[] wide discretion in determining the scope and 

effect of discovery, and it is therefore unusual to find an abuse of discretion in 

discovery matters.” Id. (quoting Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. BDO 

USA, L.L.P., 876 F.3d 690, 698 (5th Cir. 2017)). District courts have broad 

discretion to enforce deadlines set in scheduling orders. Culwell v. City of Fort 

Worth, 468 F.3d 868, 872 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Geiserman v. MacDonald, 893 

F.2d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 1990)).

Eaglin’s arguments that the district court abused its discretion by 

denying her motion to compel are unconvincing. The predicament in which 

Eaglin found herself during discovery was one of her own making. Eaglin did 

not file a motion to compel until after the discovery and motions deadlines had 

expired—deadlines the district court had set in response to the parties’ joint 

motion and proposed schedule. The district court did not abuse its discretion 

by holding the parties to their word.

Eaglin fails to justify her delay. Instead, Eaglin states that her attorney 

“had naively not checked the word-for-word details of the [joint proposed] order 

with an eye to deviations from the court’s standard language.” Naivete by

counsel does not equal abuse of discretion by the district court. Eaglin has 

failed to show that the district court’s decision was “arbitrary or clearly 

unreasonable.” See Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 817.

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B.

The district court assumed without deciding that Eaglin had established 

a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, but concluded that TCH 

offered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Eaglin’s 

employment. It then ruled that Eaglin failed to show that TCH’s reasons were 

pretextual. We agree.

1.

Title VII prohibits employers from discharging or otherwise 

discriminating against any individual because of race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1).3 Discrimination in violation of Title VII may be shown through direct 

or circumstantial evidence. Alvarado v. Texas Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 611 (5th 

Cir. 2007) (citing Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 219 (5th Cir. 

2001)). We must first decide whether Eaglin’s proffered evidence is direct or 

circumstantial because this distinction determines the standards we apply. See 

Herster v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. St. Univ., 887 F.3d 177, 184–85 (5th Cir. 

2018).

“Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the fact without 

inference or presumption.” Brown v. E. Miss. Elec. Power Ass’n, 989 F.2d 858, 

861 (5th Cir. 1993). “[S]tatements or documents which show on [their] face that 

an improper criterion served as a basis—not necessarily the sole basis, but a 

basis—for the adverse employment action are direct evidence of 

discrimination.” Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp., L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 993 (5th Cir. 

2005) (quoting Fabela v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 329 F.3d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 

2003)).

3 “When used as parallel causes of action, Title VII and Section 1981 require the same 

proof to establish liability and it would be redundant to refer to both of them.” Outley v. Luke 

& Assoc., Inc., 840 F.3d 212, 216 n.3 (5th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up) (quoting Shackelford v. 

Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 403 n.2 (5th Cir. 1999)).

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Eaglin’s proffered direct evidence merely constitutes “stray remarks.” 

See Patel v. Midland Mem. Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 298 F.3d 333, 343 (5th Cir. 

2002). To establish that a comment is more than a stray remark, a plaintiff 

must show that the comment was (1) related to the plaintiff’s status as a 

member of a protected class, (2) proximate in time to the adverse employment 

action, (3) made by someone “with authority over the challenged employment 

decision,” and (4) related to the challenged decision. Etienne v. Spanish Lake 

Truck & Casino Plaza, L.L.C., 778 F.3d 473, 476 (5th Cir. 2015). The test 

focuses on “whether the comments prove, without inference or presumption, 

that race was a basis in employment decisions in the plaintiff’s workplace.” Id.

(cleaned up).

None of the statements Eaglin points to satisfy the test. Eaglin points 

out that Sheila Jones told plaintiffs, a week before their termination, that 

hospital management wanted to replace them with Hispanic employees. But 

that evidence is not direct evidence of discrimination. Jones never identified D. 

Williams or Gonzalez as the individuals seeking to replace Eaglin with a 

Hispanic employee. And at the time Jones made the remark, she was not 

Eaglin’s supervisor. Though there is evidence that D. Williams asked Jones to 

help with the timecard violation investigation, Eaglin points to no evidence 

that Jones somehow influenced Gonzalez’s decision—arrived at after his own 

review of the investigation—to terminate Eaglin’s employment. Jones’ 

statement is only a “stray remark” because Eaglin fails to show that it was 

related to her termination or that it was made by someone with authority over 

her employment. See Brown, 989 F.2d at 861.

Eaglin offers various other statements by both Jones and Crumley. But 

the statements—even if offensive—were either not made by someone with 

authority to terminate Eaglin’s employment, were not proximate in time to her 

firing, or were not related to the termination decision. None of the statements, 

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even “if believed, proves the fact [of intentional discrimination] without 

inference or presumption.” Id. For those reasons, we hold that Eaglin’s 

proffered evidence constitutes only “‘stray remarks,’ and standing alone, [is] 

insufficient to defeat summary judgment.” Jackson v. Cal-Western Packaging 

Corp., 602 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2010) (footnote omitted) (citing Rubenstein 

v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 401 (5th Cir. 2000)). Eaglin has 

produced no direct evidence of discrimination.

2.

Without direct evidence, Eaglin’s claim must be analyzed under the 

McDonnell Douglas framework. Alvarado, 492 F.3d at 611. The analysis 

proceeds in three steps. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–

04 (1973). First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of race-based 

discrimination. Id. at 802. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate 

a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection”—a reason 

that “must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant.” Rogers, 

827 F.3d at 408 (cleaned up). If an employer does so, the employee then has 

the burden of showing that the proffered reason was a pretext for 

discrimination or that the plaintiff’s protected characteristic was “a motivating 

factor for the employment decision.” Id. (cleaned up). Thus, plaintiffs can avoid 

summary judgment if they establish a question of material fact showing 

“(1) that the employer’s proffered reason is not true but is instead a pretext for 

discrimination; or (2) that the employer’s reason, while true, is not the only 

reason for its conduct, and another motivating factor is the plaintiff’s protected 

characteristic.” Alvarado, 492 F.3d at 611 (cleaned up).

The parties vigorously dispute who the final decisionmaker over Eaglin’s 

termination was. We do not reach the issue because we conclude that

regardless of whether D. Williams or Gonzalez was the decisionmaker, the 

evidence fails to show a genuine dispute of fact that TCH’s legitimate 

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justification for firing Eaglin—violation of company policy—was pretext.

Summary judgment in TCH’s favor was therefore appropriate.

TCH asserted that it fired Eaglin because its investigation concluded 

that she violated TCH policy by falsifying timekeeping records. That is a 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. See Wallace, 271 F.3d at 220; see also 

Twymon v. Wells Fargo & Co., 462 F.3d 925, 935 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[V]iolating a 

company policy is a legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for terminating 

an employee.”). Gonzalez had information that could lead to the reasonable 

conclusion that Eaglin had clocked A. Williams into the system when she was 

not at work. 

Once TCH offered a nondiscriminatory reason, the burden shifted to 

Eaglin to show that the proffered reason was pretextual. See Outley v. Luke & 

Assoc’s, Inc., 840 F.3d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (plaintiff must produce 

substantial evidence showing pretext). The key inquiry is whether the 

employer acted with discriminatory motive. Alvarado, 492 F.3d at 611. 

Establishing that the employer’s conclusion may have been incorrect is not 

enough to show pretext. Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 1086, 1091 

(5th Cir. 1995) (“The question is not whether an employer made an erroneous 

decision; it is whether the decision was made with discriminatory motive.”). 

Here, the evidence does not show a genuine fact issue regarding 

Gonzalez and D. William’s belief that Eaglin violated TCH policy based on the 

investigation. D. Williams testified that she independently arrived at her 

recommendation to terminate Eaglin’s employment after conducting the 

investigation. Gonzalez testified that he viewed both Tamika Jones and D. 

Williams as trustworthy. He, like D. Williams, reviewed the materials 

produced by the investigation and agreed that they suggested that A. Williams 

and Eaglin had violated the timekeeping policies.

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Eaglin’s proffered evidence fails to raise a fact issue regarding whether

Gonzalez or D. Williams acted with a discriminatory motive. Instead, Eaglin 

attacks the conclusions reached after the investigation. But her contentions, 

even if correct, do not create a fact issue about D. Williams’ or Gonzalez’s good 

faith belief that Eaglin violated company policy. Rather, Eaglin’s evidence goes

to the accuracy of that conclusion. “Even an incorrect belief that an employee’s 

performance is inadequate constitutes a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. 

We do not try in court the validity of good faith beliefs as to an employee’s 

competence.” Id. (quoting Little v. Republic Refining Co., Ltd., 924 F.2d 93, 97 

(5th Cir. 1991)). Eaglin fails to show a fact issue on whether D. Williams and 

Gonzalez had a good faith belief that she violated company policy.

Other evidence Eaglin points to is not probative on the question of 

pretext because it centers around TCH’s actions during litigation. This 

evidence includes Eaglin’s assertions that TCH “intentionally misidentif[ied] 

the decision maker”; that TCH has failed to identify a non-African American 

employee who was fired for timekeeping violations; that TCH submitted sham 

affidavits at summary judgment; and that TCH “refused” to provide 

information regarding the individuals who replaced A. Williams and Eaglin at 

the cardiology desk. None of these assertions, even if true, show that TCH’s 

stated reason for termination was pretextual.4

Finally, the evidence Eaglin identifies that might be probative turns out 

not to suggest pretext and therefore fails to create a genuine issue of fact. 

Eaglin notes that the surveillance video at issue here was erased—but that 

4 Eaglin also asserts that “[a]t every step TCH has behaved like it has something, or 

multiple things, to hide.” Her argument seems to be that TCH did not have a good faith belief 

that she violated company policy because it interpreted the investigation results differently 

than she would have. But those unsupported assertions are insufficient to withstand 

summary judgment. See McFaul, 684 F.3d at 571.

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was done pursuant to the hospital’s data retention plan, and that policy does

not suggest that the hospital fired Eaglin because she is black. She also argues 

that there was scant documentation of TCH’s investigation, and that Gonzalez 

and Camp never met with A. Williams or Eaglin before Gonzalez terminated 

them. But again, this evidence does not show that TCH’s stated reason was 

pretextual.

Eaglin also points to D. Williams’ questioning whether Eaglin’s braided 

hair was “professional.” D. Williams—who is black—also apparently referred 

to Eaglin and A. Williams as “the black girls with red hair.” But Eaglin fails to 

connect either statement to her termination. These isolated statements are 

insufficient to create an issue of fact regarding whether Eaglin was fired 

because of her race. Cf. Faruki v. Parsons S.I.P., Inc., 123 F.3d 315, 320 n.4 

(5th Cir. 1997) (isolated comments not close in time to termination insufficient 

to show discriminatory animus).

Eaglin’s strongest piece of evidence is that after the incident, TCH 

investigated not only A. Williams and Eaglin, but also Anthea Glenn (also a 

black woman), a third worker at the cardiology desk. But D. Williams 

explained that she met with Glenn because she noticed inconsistencies with 

Glenn’s timekeeping records. Since this is a reasonable explanation, the

evidence is not “substantial evidence” showing pretext. See Outley, 840 F.3d at 

216.

For these reasons, we hold that Eaglin failed to show that TCH’s 

proffered justification for firing her was pretextual. She therefore fails to 

demonstrate that any questions of material fact remain on her claims under 

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Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Summary judgment in TCH’s favor was 

appropriate.5

AFFIRMED

5 Eaglin’s evidence likewise fails to show that TCH’s stated reason, while true, “is not 

the only reason for its conduct, and another motivating factor” was Eaglin’s race. Alvarado, 

492 F.3d at 611 (cleaned up). While Eaglin points to evidence suggesting that “someone” in 

TCH wanted to have a Hispanic individual working at the cardiology desk, she fails to show 

that Gonzalez, the decisionmaker, considered that issue in reaching his decision to fire her.

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