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62–190 PDF 2010

S. HRG. 111–709 

AFGHANISTAN: GOVERANCE AND 

THE CIVILIAN STRATEGY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 14, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

DAVID MCKean, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Holbrooke, Hon. Richard, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Department of State, Washington, DC ..................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Russell D. 

Feingold ......................................................................................................... 44 

Response to question submitted for the record by Senator Roger F. 

Wicker ............................................................................................................ 45 

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening statement ..... 1 

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 3 

(III)

(1) 

AFGHANISTAN: GOVERNANCE AND THE 

CIVILIAN STRATEGY 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 14, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:09 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Kerry, Feingold, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, 

Webb, Shaheen, Kaufman, Lugar, Corker, DeMint, and Wicker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing will come to order. 

Let me say, at the outset of the hearing, that the rules of the 

committee are crystal clear with respect to any kind of demonstrations of any sort, whatsoever. This committee prides itself in listening carefully and in probing and having a thoughtful dialogue, even 

about the most emotional and contentious issues, and we ask every 

member of the public to respect that and the rights of the Senators 

and the committee to be able to conduct their business. 

I want to thank everyone for coming this afternoon, and I want 

to extend a very special thank you and welcome to Ambassador 

Dick Holbrooke, who has taken time from an exceedingly busy 

schedule in order to appear again before the committee. 

We look forward to hearing your insights, Ambassador Holbrooke, and I thank you for doing this. 

I might mention that Ambassador Holbrooke is a little conscribed 

in the amount of time that he can be with us, simply because he’s 

got to leave from here directly for the airport in order to leave to 

go to Islamabad and Kabul. And Secretary Clinton will be following, I think, in a few days. So, a lot is happening, and it is timely 

for us to be able to meet here today and have this discussion. 

I also want to say, very clearly, that I think Ambassador 

Holbrooke has assembled an outstanding team, a group of people 

many of whom I know personally and who I think bring an enormous amount of experience and intellectual ability to this challenge. And I congratulate him and the Secretary for that, and I 

want to also say that I think he has been doing an outstanding job 

under exceedingly difficult circumstances. 

I think all of us know that, for 7 or 8 years, the war in Afghanistan proceeded as if there was no, really, clear definition of the 

mission or the strategy. I think it’s in the last year or so that we’ve 

2 

begun to try to pull that together. But, it’s obviously been complicated by the events that intervened over the course of those 7 

or 8 years. 

This is the Foreign Relations Committee’s 11th hearing on 

Afghanistan in the past year and a half, and the number reflects 

both our commitment and our concern about understanding the 

challenges of this part of the world—Afghanistan, Pakistan, South 

Asia—and our recognition of the critical role that this conflict plays 

in our own national security. 

I have said that the committee will continue, over the course of 

these next months, to continue a series of hearings on this topic, 

and I think it is a reflection of the importance of what is happening 

there, the importance of the region. It also is a reflection of an unfortunate fact. Last month, Afghanistan surpassed Vietnam, a 

place that both Ambassador Holbrooke and I are all too familiar 

with, as the longest military campaign in American history. More 

than 1,000 men and women have lost their lives in Afghanistan; 

nearly 6,000 of them have been grievously injured. And we owe a 

duty to every single one of them, and to their families and to the 

tens of thousands of other military and civilian personnel in 

Afghanistan from our country, and our partners from other countries—we owe them all the exercise of our oversight role in order 

to seriously and responsibly present them with the best strategy 

possible. 

It would be avoidance if we didn’t say that this is a difficult moment in the Afghan conflict. Our progress is decidedly mixed, particularly in the south, where the Taliban are strongest. The 

Taliban are currently assassinating government officials and tribal 

leaders, embarking on a campaign of intimidating Afghans who 

want to support coalition efforts. 

Regrettably, corruption in some quarters appears to grow. One in 

three Afghan households reports having to pay a bribe to obtain 

public services. And our civilian aid efforts to bring stability and 

consolidate military gains are off to a slow start in the south and 

in the east. 

Many people have asked the question, whether or not we have 

the right strategy. So, this is a good time to be asking hard questions about the progress that we’re making toward our objectives 

of defeating al-Qaeda and bringing a measure of stability to 

Afghanistan. It’s also time to demand accountability from our partners on the battlefield and in the corridors of government, from 

Washington to Brussels, from Kabul to Kandahar. 

It is also time to assess how our strategy fits the realities on the 

ground. Over the past year, some of those realities have changed, 

and, I might say, few for the better. I happen to believe that the 

conditions, which I set out last October for deploying more troops, 

still hold today. And I’m concerned as to whether or not those 

kinds of conditions are being adequately met. 

First, the insistence on the presence of reliable Afghan troops to 

partner with our military as we decide to proactively clear an area. 

Second, when we engage in holding those areas, I believe it is 

critical to secure capable local leaders with whom we can partner, 

in order to provide effective governance. Governance remains one 

of the great challenges, if not the great challenge. 

3 

And finally, the ‘‘build’’ and ‘‘transfer’’ components of our mission 

really require that area to shift to Afghan control. And in order to 

do that, the civilian side must be prepared to move quickly, with 

well-implemented support structure, underneath the ‘‘clear’’ and 

‘‘hold’’ efforts. When those conditions are met, it’s hard to imagine 

that you’re not going to have a better outcome. 

Today’s hearing is intended to take a tough look at the civilian 

strategy to see if we are on the right path. The administration requested $4.4 billion in fiscal year 2010 to support civilian efforts 

in Afghanistan, and another $3.9 billion for the next fiscal year. 

And needless to say, we need to make sure this money is spent as 

well as possible. 

In recent weeks, the committee staff conducted 16 briefings with 

the State Department and USAID in order to examine how we are 

spending the taxpayers’ money, dollar by dollar, sector by sector, 

in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It’s our intention, needless to say, to 

continue to keep a close eye on how that money is being spent to 

promote stability in the region. 

I might add that the committee will shortly be releasing a report—I’ve informed Ambassador Holbrooke about this—a report on 

this topic of corruption, and hopefully it is a report which will set 

out some recommendations for how we might be able to better respond to some of these issues. 

In the end, all of the billions of dollars and all of the United 

States efforts—best efforts—all of the sacrifices by our troops, are 

all going to be irrelevant if the United States and our partners do 

not have the right strategy to establish effective Afghan governance 

and, ultimately, effective Afghan takeover of responsibility. The 

problem is that the key element of this strategy is the one over 

which we have the least control, and that is the willingness and 

ability of Afghans to assume ownership of the effort. 

For nearly 9 years, most Afghans have seen themselves as bystanders in a conflict between the West and al-Qaeda, and a conflict being fought in their homeland. In recent months, we’ve 

launched a concerted effort to convince Afghans that this is their 

fight. It’s not an easy task, given the historic distrust of foreigners 

on Afghan soil, but it’s a vital one. 

Ultimately, we need a better understanding of exactly what the 

definition of ‘‘success’’ is in Afghanistan, and what an acceptable 

state looks like there, and how achievable it is. 

Many have said repeatedly—I think, Ambassador Holbrooke 

among them, myself, others—that there is no military solution in 

Afghanistan. Having said that, we absolutely need to understand 

what the political solution looks like, and how we get there. And 

those are the most relevant questions that we want to examine in 

the course of the hearing today. 

Senator Lugar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. I join the chairman in welcoming Ambassador 

Holbrooke back to the committee. 

This hearing provides an opportunity to review our progress and 

refine our understanding of United States policy in Afghanistan. 

4 

There is substantial concern about our course in Afghanistan, in 

part because of the recent disruption in our own military leadership, but also because gains in governance, development, military 

training, and other areas have not occurred at a pace that boosts 

confidence in President Obama’s original timetable. 

Some security improvements have been achieved and more are 

likely to follow, but they have been hard won. In 6 months, the 

President expects a review by his commanders on the status of our 

efforts in Afghanistan. This review presumably would determine 

the shape of an expected transition of responsibilities to Afghan security forces in July 2011. But absent a major realignment on the 

ground, it is unrealistic to expect that a significant downsizing of 

U.S. forces could occur at that time without security consequences. 

This conclusion is reinforced by recent GAO and inspector general reports that have raised deep concerns over the viability and 

quality of training for the Afghan National Army and police. The 

lack of clarity in Afghanistan does not end with the President’s 

timetable. Both civilian and military operations in Afghanistan are 

proceeding without a clear definition of success. There has been 

much discussion of our counterinsurgency strategy and methods, 

but very little explanation of what metrics must be achieved before 

the country is considered secure. 

At some moments it appears as if we are trying to remake the 

economic, political, and security culture of Afghanistan. We should 

know by now that such grand ambitions are beyond our resources 

and powers. 

At other moments, it appears we are content with a narrow, security-driven definition of success: Namely, preventing an implacably hostile Taliban regime from taking over the government and 

preventing Afghanistan from becoming a terrorist safe haven, regardless of what government is in power. 

But even if this narrow definition of success were embraced by 

the Obama administration, it would require amplification. How 

much Taliban military capability and territorial control is tolerable? What are we currently doing in Afghanistan that is not required to achieve this narrow objective? What are reasonable mileposts for judging progress toward success? What time constraints 

do we perceive, given resource and alliance pressures? How do dynamics in Pakistan factor into our strategy in Afghanistan? 

I recognize that the situation in Afghanistan is fluid and not easily defined. I also understand why an administration would not 

want to be pinned down to a specific definition of success. The 

problem is that we are expending enormous resources in Afghanistan. Our resources are finite, and they must be focused effectively. 

We need to know if some missions that currently are receiving resources are not intrinsic to our objectives. We also need to know 

what missions are absolutely indispensable to success, however it 

is defined. 

We can’t fall back on measuring our military and civilian activities in Afghanistan according to relative progress. Arguably we 

could make progress for decades, on security, employment, good 

governance, women’s rights and other goals—expending billions of 

dollars each year—without ever reaching a satisfying conclusion. In 

5 

such circumstances, avoiding mission creep toward unattainable 

goals is essential. 

Given this situation, it is reasonable to consider the enlistment 

of local militias in security operations under the authority of a 

Ministry of Interior or Defense. This tactic has been frequently debated, and may not be applicable in all cases. But since his arrival 

in Kabul, General Petraeus appears inclined to explore it. 

This decision is a difficult one, given Afghanistan’s history of conflict under warlords. As such, local militias are best integrated 

within a longer term institutionalization plan for such forces. President Karzai presented a draft Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program to NATO for consideration. The issues of reconciliation and 

reintegration are now in broad discussion. The committee would 

welcome some remarks on the status of the draft program and its 

elements, as well as the position of our government toward it. Who 

is participating and leading the coordination of such discussions 

with the Afghan Government and groups seeking reconciliation? 

I am hopeful that the administration will not wait 6 months to 

refine its explanation of our goals in Afghanistan. It is up to the 

President to define success, and delineate how much time and how 

many resources should be devoted to achieving it. 

I appreciate today, as always, Ambassador Holbrooke, your willingness to join us, and I very much look forward to our discussion. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. 

Mr. Ambassador, thank you for your patience. We appreciate it. 

We look forward to your statement. If you want to try to summarize, and then engage—you’ve been through this many times—we 

put the full text in the record as if read in full. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD HOLBROOKE, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s a great, 

great honor to be back before this committee. 

Thirty-fourth year I’ve testified before this committee, and 

there’s no committee that plays a more important role in the national security interests of our country. 

And I especially want to thank you and Senator Lugar for your 

historic leadership in the last year and a half in regard to at least 

two issues, your personal role in regard to the Afghan elections and 

the leadership you and Senator Lugar provided in what is now 

known as the KLB, Kerry-Lugar-Berman, legislation for Pakistan 

which has had an enormous effect, and which I will refer to again 

in the future. 

As you said, Senator, I will be leaving for Islamabad, directly 

from this hearing, through Andrews Air Force Base, stopping in 

Germany to refuel and going on to Afghanistan with Secretary 

Clinton. And I want to be as brief as I can. 

First of all, Mr. Chairman, you began by saying we need to 

demand accountability of our partners. And I think the partners 

include our partnership, and I welcome the chance to speak again 

before this distinguished group on our role in this effort. 

6 

I want to just begin with the most critical point. And if you will, 

may I submit my formal statement. 

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely. Without objection, it’ll be placed in 

the record as if read in full. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Eighteen months ago, we inherited a 

situation in which Afghanistan and Pakistan were treated as separate issues and there was no single approach to it; hence, the unattractive acronym AfPak, which we do not use in public, but which 

was designed to stress the fact that these issues are closely related. 

I will return to that theme repeatedly as we go forward. 

But, I would just note that, once President Obama and Secretary 

Clinton gave me this job, 35 other nations appointed counterparts. 

The U.S. Government reorganized to reflect the fact that you cannot succeed in Afghanistan without Pakistan’s involvement. And 

that, Mr. Chairman, is the underlying strategic principle by which 

we approach the issues we’re discussing today. 

In Afghanistan, since I last testified before you, there’s been considerable activity in many areas, all of which you know about: the 

increase in American troops, the implementation of the counterinsurgency strategy under General McChrystal and now General 

Petraeus. We have worked very closely to do the civilian support 

for that plan. But, I need to stress, as all of us in this room know, 

that security is the essential prerequisite for everything else. 

In regard to the elections last year, you all know what happened, 

but the point I want to underscore is that, for the first 10 months 

of the administration’s tenure, from January 21 of last year to 

November 19, the elections hung over us like a dark cloud, often 

reaching critical mass, never more tense than when Senator Kerry 

himself was in Kabul, playing such an instrumental role in the resolution of that near disaster, which, in the end, produced a legitimate government, but in a very messy way. 

At that time, we were finally able to look forward to implementation of the strategies we’re here to discuss today. And first and 

foremost among those was the implementation of a change in agriculture, a change in counternarcotics, a change in rule of law, and 

changes in our attitude about funding contractual efforts. 

In this regard, Mr. Chairman, and with your prior permission, I 

brought members of 6 of the 10 agencies which work with me, and 

which you referred to, with me today, and very briefly, with your 

permission, I would just like to introduce them, not simply because 

of who they are, but because they represent a unique interagency 

effort. And if they could just quickly stand as I read their names, 

starting on my left, my chief of staff from the State Department, 

Rosemarie Pauli; next to her, you all know Assistant Secretary of 

State for Congressional Affairs, Richard Verma; next to him, my 

deputy, Dan Feldman, who used to work for your committee; next 

to Dan, Rami Shy, from the Treasury Department; next to him, 

Matt Stiglitz, from the Justice Department; next to him, Shannon 

Darcy, from AID; next to Shannon, Quentin Gray, from the U.S. 

Department of Agriculture; next to Quentin, Raul Ortiz, just joined 

us from the Department of Homeland Security; and next to him, 

Kim McClure, on her last day as a State Department staffer—she 

is going on to a Council on Foreign Relations fellowship. 

7 

In the—now, the six agencies not here are CIA, Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, the FBI, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

No office in the Department’s history has had this interagency. 

And this is designed—I brought them here today, Mr. Chairman, 

to illustrate to you, as succinctly as possible, that we have a wholeof-government approach here, and there is very good civilian/military coordination. 

On the second row, Rina Amiri, our Afghan political expert and 

a former member of the United Nations team; Tim Lenderking, our 

new Pakistan country director; and Jim DeHart, our new Afghan 

country director. 

So, with that team behind us, Mr. Chairman, we have embarked 

on full implementation, in close coordination with CENTCOM and 

ISAF and the American Embassy in Kabul, of the efforts that you 

want to discuss today. 

I’d like to take a quick look forward, if I might, toward what’s 

coming up. On July 20, Secretary Clinton will lead the American 

delegation to the Kabul Conference. This will be a conference that 

involves Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, 

NATO Secretary General Rasmussen, and somewhere between 35 

and 55 Foreign Ministers, numbers still to be determined. It will 

be the largest gathering of foreign leaders in Afghanistan since the 

1970s. She is going because she wants to demonstrate our support 

for the commitment, our support for the government’s efforts, our 

support for an integrated civilian/military effort that combines our 

resources and those of the government. 

Both you and Senator Lugar correctly made the point that, in the 

end, it’s the Afghan Government that must succeed. We can only 

help them. Anyone who shared the experience that you and I and 

Senator Webb and others shared in another war, in another century, know full well what the consequences are if we Americanize 

the war. We cannot afford to repeat the mistake which at least 

three people today lived through, personally. And we carry forward 

those memories, not to be imprisoned by the memories of Vietnam, 

but to learn from the tactical issues that took place. 

But, I want to underscore the fundamental difference between 

those two wars, since you mentioned it, Mr. Chairman. In this war, 

our national security interests are at stake, our homeland security 

is threatened. In Afghanistan that is true, and it affects our policy 

toward Pakistan. 

Now, the biggest change in policy, which could not be implemented until the political situation was behind us, is the reintegration program that President Karzai announced in London, signed 

the implementing decree on 2 weeks ago, and will unveil fully in 

Kabul next week. That is the program that was missing from the 

Afghan equation, the program designed to bring Taliban fighters in 

voluntarily. As you said, Mr. Chairman, there’s no military solution 

here. So, as General Petraeus and General McChrystal said, you’re 

not going to win this war by killing every member of the Taliban. 

It just doesn’t work that way in this kind of war. 

So, the goal here is to create a new program. It was a massive 

gap in the food chain of our efforts. Led by the Japanese and the 

British, almost $200 million has been assembled for this fund. The 

United States, for its part, with the support of Congress, has 

8 

assigned $100 million of CERP funds for this effort, under General 

Petraeus’s personal control. And those of you who have talked to 

General Petraeus know that he attaches the highest importance to 

this issue. 

Mr. Chairman, you mentioned your corruption report, and we 

have, as you said, talked privately about it. We share your concern, 

we share the concern of Chairwoman Lowey in the other body, and 

we will read your report with great attention. We are prepared, at 

some later date, at your convenience, to give you a very detailed 

briefing of what we have done in the last 18 months. And several 

of the people sitting behind me have been instrumental in that. I 

just want to say that we inherited no serious program on this 

issue. We now have a very large number of people from Treasury, 

FBI, CIA, DEA, AID, and State working on corruption. Still, Mr. 

Chairman, it isn’t enough, and we well understand that. 

President Karzai has committed himself, publicly and privately, 

to upgrading his anticorruption office, and this will be a major 

topic of conversation during the Kabul Conference. And we will 

read your report with great interest. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to return to the issue of Pakistan 

and Afghanistan. I said, at the outset, that we cannot succeed in 

Afghanistan without Pakistan’s participation. Let me go a little 

further. When we came into office early last year, we set—as an 

implementing goal for our strategic objective, which is to defeat alQaeda and destroy them and protect our homeland—we set several 

subordinate goals. One of the most important was to bring Afghanistan and Pakistan closer together. Since the day Pakistan became 

independent, in 1947, there’s been a substantial problem between 

the two countries, most dramatically illustrated by the fact that, 

the day after Pakistan became independent, Afghanistan opposed 

their entry into the United Nations, a story which every Pakistani 

schoolchild is taught in school. The border is still disputed, and the 

overlay of recent events has made it even more serious. 

In the last 15 to 20 years, there has been no serious dialogue between these two neighbors, which are intertwined, and the history 

of it, the Charlie Wilson’s War, you’re all familiar with. 

We set out the goal of improving that relationship, and in recent 

months there has been the first narrowing of the distance between 

Kabul and Islamabad. There have been visits in both directions by 

both leaders. Those are continuing. General Petraeus has been involved in those. Secretary Clinton, myself, the President of the 

United States has encouraged it. I do not want to leave your committee, or anyone who’s listening to this hearing, with the impression that any agreements have been reached; they have not. I do 

not want to leave anyone in this committee with the impression 

that some of the news reports recently, fevered accounts of secret 

deals between elements in Pakistan and elements in the Taliban, 

are accurate. We have no evidence whatsoever of the accuracy of 

those reports. But, there is movement. And that movement, below 

the radar screen, has been massively supported by the KerryLugar-Berman legislation. 

I cannot thank this committee enough—and I mean this sincerely—for what you did last year. It was difficult, and the initial 

reaction in Pakistan was not, shall I say, pleasant, because there 

9 

was a serious misunderstanding. Your personal intervention, Mr. 

Chairman, ameliorated the problem. We believe it is more or less 

gone. 

The money is beginning to flow. The implementing operating 

plans have been filed. Some of the money is going forward. Secretary Clinton and I will be making further announcements about 

this. But, the effect of the legislation is unmistakable, and it has 

encouraged an improvement in United States-Pakistan relations, a 

better dialogue between Kabul and Islamabad, and some sense that 

we are also simultaneously, with the war effort, looking for other 

ways to move this process forward. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Holbrooke follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE, SPECIAL REPRE- SENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHING- TON, DC 

Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, thank you for this opportunity to provide an update on our efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

Tonight I depart for Islamabad, and then will travel on to Kabul, and New Delhi. 

This will be my 14th visit to Pakistan in the past 19 months. In addition to meetings with key leaders on a range of topics, I will join Secretary Clinton when she 

leads the U.S. delegation to the Kabul Conference. While the Kabul Conference has 

attracted more international attention, we have seen a significant intensification of 

our dialogue with Pakistan, where we have convened 13 successful Strategic Dialogue Working Group meetings over the past 2 months. These meetings followed the 

March 24–25 U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue in Washington, and the Secretary’s 

highly successful visit to Pakistan in October 2009. The Kabul Conference and other 

upcoming events—including another Afghanistan-Pakistan-United States trilateral 

meeting later this year—are part of a series of milestones concluding with the administration’s planned assessment of our progress in December 2010. 

As President Obama reiterated just a few weeks ago, our Core Goal in Afghanistan and Pakistan is clear: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda, and prevent 

its return to both countries. I participated in the fall 2009 policy review. And in 

close consultation with Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, General 

Petraeus, Ambassadors Eikenberry and Patterson, and Dr. Shah, my interagency 

team has been working tirelessly to help implement the President’s strategy. We 

face huge implementation challenges on the ground. But our political and diplomatic 

engagement with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other influential countries has evolved 

significantly since my first official visit to the region in January 2009, bringing us 

closer to facilitating a durable and favorable resolution of the conflict. 

Nowhere is this more apparent than in Pakistan, where we have seen a steady 

improvement in our bilateral relationship. As members of this committee have recognized, what happens in Pakistan has tremendous implications not only for our 

goals in Afghanistan, but also for the stability of South-Central Asia and for U.S. 

national security. We have been pursuing three objectives simultaneously in Pakistan: (1) Enhancing stability (political, economic, and security); (2) supporting Pakistan’s offensive against extremists who threaten Pakistan and the United States; 

and (3) encouraging a closer relationship between Islamabad and Kabul. Through 

a carefully calibrated approach, we are seeing signs of progress. For the first time 

in more than a decade, we recognize and are engaging the people of Pakistan on 

their legitimate interests and priorities, even as we encourage greater collaboration 

in areas of mutual interest. 

Politically, Pakistan’s civilian and military leaders have settled into a relatively 

stable equilibrium as a result of recent constitutional reforms. The upgraded and 

intensified U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, which Secretary Clinton and Foreign 

Minister Quereshi convened in March, has provided a framework to engage Pakistan on mutual priorities and assisted the Pakistani Government in structuring reforms crucial to long-term stability. 

Economically, Pakistan’s leaders have made many tough decisions necessary to 

meet the mutually agreed conditions of the IMF’s Stand-by agreement. As a result 

Pakistan has shifted from economic crisis to a period of economic recovery. Other 

tough decisions and reforms will be necessary to ensure that Pakistan remains on 

the path toward economic self sufficiency. Our overhauled assistance programs, 

10 

made possible by the landmark Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, will help 

reinforce these reforms in areas such as energy. They also will further improve our 

relationship with the Pakistani people by signaling our support for addressing Pakistan’s most pressing problems. 

These programs would not have been possible without this committee’s leadership. We have been engaged in a substantive dialogue on how to best structure our 

assistance to maximize its impact, and I look forward to continued close collaboration as initial Kerry-Lugar-Berman funding comes online. Equally important is 

passage of Reconstruction Opportunity Zone (ROZ) legislation, which would further 

bolster our efforts to stabilize Pakistan’s border areas by creating licit economic 

opportunities. ROZs would also support Pakistani reconstruction efforts in the border areas by stimulating economic opportunity. 

On counterterrorism issues, Prime Minister Gilani and President Zardari have 

united the Pakistani people—including the opposition—behind the Pakistani military’s offensive in the tribal areas. We cannot forget that the Pakistani people and 

armed forces have made huge sacrifices as part of this fight. In the past month 

alone, scores of innocent Pakistanis have been killed or wounded in suicide attacks. 

Hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis have also had their lives upended. 

As Secretary Clinton emphasized during her October 2009 visit and again at the 

March Strategic Dialogue, the American people will continue to stand by the Pakistani people in their time of need. We are proud to be the world’s largest provider 

of assistance to displaced Pakistanis and we will build on that support, as I announced during my June visit to Pakistan. USAID and State are continuing to provide a range of stabilization assistance in post-conflict areas. We appreciate this 

committee’s support for innovative approaches to ensuring that this assistance 

reaches Pakistani communities most affected by violence and most in need of our 

support. Through this assistance and new mobile and radio communications programs, we are helping the Pakistani people to overcome the extremist narrative and 

end the cycle of extremist violence. 

Our focused security assistance and close cooperation with the Pakistani military 

are, of course, critical tools for building Pakistani counterinsurgency capabilities and 

shaping Pakistan’s counterterrorism operations. Even as we increase our civilian 

assistance levels, I believe we must maintain our security assistance and adapt it 

to emerging needs. 

Perhaps the most significant Pakistan-related development since January 2009 

has been its improved relationship with Afghanistan. Recognizing that Pakistan’s 

and Afghanistan’s futures are intertwined, we have consulted closely with both governments on our strategy. Through the trilateral process, we have facilitated a significant thaw in relations between Islamabad and Kabul and encouraged progress 

on regional economic integration. There is not yet strategic symmetry on all topics, 

but the thawing of differences should create additional opportunities as our regional 

diplomacy and political strategy develops. Significantly, Pakistan’s leaders now publicly acknowledge the cross-border nature of the extremist threat and that Afghan 

stability is in Pakistan’s interest. Meanwhile, we have also welcomed the resumption of more frequent high-level dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad, which 

should benefit regional stability. 

Across the border, the July 20 Kabul Conference will provide an opportunity for 

the Afghan Government to offer concrete plans to benefit the Afghan people. This 

is the first major international conference held in Afghanistan since the 1970s and 

an important step toward greater Afghan ownership and sovereignty. We expect 

that President Karzai will address commitments he made in his November 2009 

inaugural address and at the January 2010 London Conference—including on topics 

such as on governance and accountability, rule of law, and economic and social 

development. 

Among the most important announcements will be the formal launch of an operational reintegration program, supported by an international trust fund. Additionally, the Department of Defense has been authorized to spend up to $100 million 

to support initial Afghan reintegration efforts. Achieving a durable and favorable 

resolution of the conflict will require the Afghan Government to increasingly address the Afghan people’s grievances and economic needs. This includes the sizable 

number of insurgents who are not affiliated with al-Qaeda and have been attracted 

to the insurgency for nonideological reasons. President Obama discussed reintegration and reconciliation with President Karzai when he visited Washington in May. 

We welcomed the Afghan Government’s plan to host a Consultative Peace Jirga 

with a representative group of Afghan society to discuss the details of this reintegration plan and broader outreach efforts. We are now supporting the Afghan Government’s efforts to implement several Jirga outcomes. 

11 

During President Karzai’s recent visit, President Obama reiterated that our 

support for Afghan-led reintegration and reconciliation is based on a shared commitment to full transparency and basic principles. Insurgents must: (1) cut ties to 

al-Qaeda; (2) cease violence against the Afghan state; and (3) accept the Afghan 

Constitution, including its protections for human rights and women’s equality. Our 

position on this last point is unambiguous. Afghan-led peace efforts must not be a 

vehicle for reversing the progress of Afghan women and girls since 2001. As Secretary Clinton reiterated during President Karzai’s visit, ‘‘it is essential that women’s rights and women’s opportunities are not sacrificed or trampled on in the reconciliation process.’’ We will not abandon Afghanistan’s women. 

Another important outcome of the Kabul Conference will likely be the announcement of a joint NATO-Afghan Government provincial transition plan. In April, ISAF 

partners and allies endorsed a decisionmaking framework to discuss with the 

Afghan Government. NATO Senior Civilian Ambassador Mark Sedwill has been coordinating with Afghan ministers to outline a detailed mechanism. Transition will 

not be a single event, nor will it represent the end of the international military and 

civilian assistance to the Afghan Government in a particular province. Instead, 

transition will be a process by which the Afghan Government assumes greater responsibility for security. As conditions improve on the ground, the Afghan Government will be able to provide improved services in key districts at the subnational 

level. 

In this context, it is also important to understand the meaning of July 2011. As 

President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and Secretary Gates have made clear, July 

2011 is not a withdrawal date for all U.S. combat forces. In the President’s words, 

we will not ‘‘be switching off the lights and closing the door behind us.’’ While in 

July 2011 we will begin reducing U.S. combat troop levels, the size of and timing 

of any reduction in forces will be determined after a thorough assessment that will 

account for the views of the Afghan Government, as well as our ISAF allies and 

partners. The eventual pace of the reduction in U.S. combat troops will depend on 

the conditions on the ground. And even then, our partnership with the Afghan Government and Afghan people will not end. 

As President Obama explained during his joint press conference with President 

Karzai on May 12, ‘‘Even as we begin to transition security responsibility to Afghans 

over the next year, we will sustain a robust commitment in Afghanistan going forward . . . will partner with the Afghan people for the long term—toward a future 

of greater security, prosperity, justice, and progress.’’ The shape of this long-term 

commitment will be clarified in coming months as we negotiate a new Strategic 

Partnership with the Afghan Government. The Strategic Partnership will provide a 

framework for transitioning to a more normal bilateral relationship with the Afghan 

Government. Discussions will focus on themes critical to the U.S.-Afghanistan relationship, including our long-term commitment of security and economic assistance. 

We have committed to consult Afghanistan’s neighbors and key partners as part of 

these deliberations, and will also keep Congress fully informed. 

Equally important will be a sustained international commitment to supporting the 

Afghan Government. Parallel to our negotiation of a new U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic 

Partnership, we will consult with our ISAF allies and partners, encouraging them 

to publicly commit to: (1) continued assistance for training and equipping Afghanistan’s security forces; and (2) providing long-term development assistance. This 

long-term commitment is the only way to ensure that our gains are durable and 

that Afghanistan does not once again become a safe haven from which extremists 

plot attacks on our homeland. 

Prudent planning for the future should not be mistaken for a lack of commitment 

to our ongoing civ-mil efforts. I outlined our civilian initiatives when I appeared before this committee in January and presented the Afghanistan and Pakistan 

Regional Stabilization Strategy. Over the past 6 months, General Petraeus and I 

have further synchronized our civilian and military plans by continuing a series of 

civilian-military coordination sessions. In April, we convened for 2 days in Kabul 

with the entire civ-mil Embassy-ISAF team, President Karzai, and his senior ministers to review our progress and further refine our programs. We agreed to reconvene in this format again in October. As General Petraeus has now transitioned to 

a new role as COMISAF, our close collaboration has intensified on a range of issues, 

including support for Afghan-led reintegration and a sustainable approach to increasing electricity production for Kandahar. 

Like many of you, I have traveled outside of Kabul over the past 6 months to see 

our civ-mil efforts firsthand. Contrary to some press accounts, our civilians have 

surged. More than 1,000 USG civilian employees from 10 departments and agencies 

are now serving in Afghanistan, with a goal of further increasing the civilian presence by as much as 20 percent by the end of 2010. Many of these civilians are deVerDate Nov 24 2008 18:50 Nov 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
12 

ployed on the front lines, working and living in the same dangerous conditions as 

our combat troops in places like Kandahar and Marjah. Each civilian in the field 

often employs up 10 Afghan partners. They are engaged in a range of activities, 

from rebuilding Afghanistan’s once vibrant agricultural sector, to working with key 

Afghan ministries to improve provision of health, education, justice, and other services outside of provincial capitals. 

We have committed to be providing enhanced levels of oversight and to working 

with the Afghan Government to improve the transparency and accountability of its 

ministries. Key to these efforts has been a reduction of our reliance on large international contractors and establishment of an accreditation process for Afghan ministries to receive increased direct assistance if they improve transparency, oversight, 

and accountability. These measures help us manage the risk we assume by working 

in such a complex environment. 

We have also engaged in a clear-eyed discussion with President Karzai on the 

challenges of corruption—including on the question of how the United States and 

other international donors can ensure that our contracting practices do not contribute to it. President Karzai identified corruption as a major concern in his inaugural address and we support steps he has taken to begin addressing this problem. 

These include issuing a Presidential Decree in March 2010 that provided the 

USAID-supported High Office of Oversight additional investigative powers. It also 

outlined a process, which we are supporting, for establishing a Monitoring and Evaluation Committee on corruption comprised of Afghan and international experts. 

Along with other U.S. assistance to the Major Crimes Task Force and Afghanistan’s 

judiciary, we are helping the Afghan Government implement additional safeguards 

aimed at reducing corruption. 

For sure, we face many other challenges to achieving our civilian goals in Afghanistan, including a resilient insurgency and limited, albeit increasing Afghan Government capacity. But we are beginning to see initial results from our new strategy 

in several areas. We plan to provide a more detailed overview of these results later 

this year, but let me cite a few brief examples: 

• USAID’s agriculture voucher program, launched in September 2009, has distributed wheat seed to more than 366,000 farmers, trained 80,000 Afghan farmers 

in best practices, and employed over 70,000 Afghans on short-term rural infrastructure projects. In many places throughout the Afghanistan’s south, these 

programs are increasingly being administered under the auspices of the Afghan 

Ministry of Agriculture, whose extension agents receive training from forwarddeployed USDA and UAID agriculture advisors. 

• In 2009, we shifted our counternarcotics strategy away from eradication, which 

did little to reduce poppy cultivation and pushed poor farmers into the Taliban’s 

hands. Our new counternarcotics strategy is comprehensive, combining: law enforcement; intelligence; interdiction; demand reduction; regional coordination; 

and alternative livelihoods programs. Since implementing it, we have seen significant increases in: the number of drug labs destroyed; the numbers of drug 

traffickers arrested; the amounts of opium, poppy, heroin, and morphine base 

seized; and the number of joint operations with Afghan forces. Civilian DEA 

agents are helping to train Afghan Counternarcotics Police, and working with 

Afghan personnel to identify and destroy narcotrafficking networks. In the first 

quarter of 2010, international and Afghan forces conducted 56 military and lawenforcement interdiction operations in Afghanistan, largely in the south. These 

operations destroyed 16.3metric tons (MT) of opium, 195 kilograms of morphine, 

1.2 MT of heroin, 9.8 MT of hashish and, 10.1 MT of precursor chemicals. 

• We are working to restore cellular service in areas where the Taliban has destroyed or deactivated towers. One of our civilians embedded with the Marines 

in Nawa, Helmand province reported that soon after a local cell tower resumed 

operation ‘‘three cell phone shops opened in the district bazaar and SIM cards 

were available in the whole of the district—without involvement from the 

Marines or U.S. civilians. Farmers now call their relatives in the district and 

provincial capitals to see if prices make it worthwhile to transport their goods. 

Families can warn each other about influxes of Taliban or mines on the road.’’ 

Cell service has recently been extended to Marjah and Garmsir, with similar 

economic and security benefits. In the coming months, ISAF and our Embassy 

will work to create a backup network in areas where the Taliban shuts down 

private carriers. This will provide uninterrupted access for Afghans, improving 

security for communities as well as our own civilian and military personnel. 

Indeed, Afghans in areas previously dominated by the Taliban are slowly supporting the Afghan Government. They are appreciative of the improvements that 

our civilian programs are bringing to their communities. When I met with a group 

13 

of elders during my recent visit to Marjah, they expressed gratitude for our agricultural support. They also underscored the great personal risks they were undertaking 

to stand up against the Taliban. 

Ultimately, our goal is to empower the Afghan Government so that it is in the 

strongest possible position as Afghan-led political and economic efforts move forward. This will require continued progress by the Afghan Government and continued international support. It is important to remember that we are not alone in this 

endeavor. Since President Obama spoke at West Point on December 1, ISAF allies 

and partners have provided roughly 10,000 additional troops and several hundred 

additional trainers to support security efforts. More than 60 countries are providing 

civilian assistance to Afghanistan. Under the highly capable leadership of U.N. Special Representative Staffan de Mistura and Ambassador Sedwill, members of the 

international community are increasing their coordination on the ground and in the 

implementation of their programs. They are focusing on Afghan priorities and implementing them in a way that builds Afghan Government capacity. 

Simultaneously, we are engaging India, Russia, China, and the Central Asian republics to discuss ways that they can support regional stability while ensuring their 

legitimate interests. And building on President Obama’s June 2009 speech in Cairo, 

my team has made it a top priority to increase Muslim countries’ support for 

Afghanistan. Their contributions carry political weight beyond providing positive 

effects on the ground. To cite only a few of many examples: 

• The UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia have posted their first resident Ambassadors to Kabul. Seven Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) countries participate in the international SRAP support group. • Turkey has greatly expanded its training of the Afghan National Security 

Forces. • The UAE has expanded financial assistance and is funding several innovative 

initiatives. • Malaysia and Egypt have committed important medical resources. It is hard to 

overstate the practical and symbolic influence of Muslim women doctors treating Afghan patients. 

As President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and General Petraeus have emphasized, 

our civilian mission is crucial to the progress of our overall strategy in Afghanistan. 

Additionally, our civilian programs provide a foundation for our long-term commitment to helping the Afghan people rebuild from 30 years of endless war. While our 

military mission in Afghanistan is not open-ended, our civilian commitment will endure long after our combat troops come home. It is essential that we remain focused 

on our objectives and adapt our strategy to conditions on the ground, while also allowing time for our new programs to demonstrate progress. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward 

to a continued dialogue on these issues and am pleased to take your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Ambassador Holbrooke. 

I think we’ll go with 7-minute rounds. We have a fair number of 

Senators, and I want to give everybody a chance to get their questions in. 

Share with us, if you would, what you see as the major impediments to a more rapid sense of progress in the governance issues, 

the local governance issues, as well as the top-down Kabul-to-thelocal-districts components of this. And particularly, looking at 

something like the Marjah offensive and the lessons we might 

learn from that, what can you share with us, marks a sign of 

progress there, and—and/or what are the hurdles that you’re struggling through that you see the potential of resolving with respect 

to that? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. The impediments, Mr. Chairman, are 

extraordinary. The sheer capacity of the government and its personnel, the risks that—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I assume you mean the absence of capacity. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yes. The sheer capacity problem. To 

get qualified Afghans, after 30 years of war, is very difficult. A 

handful—a relative handful of people from the diaspora have returned to help their country, but there’s so much talent, at counVerDate Nov 24 2008 18:50 Nov 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
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tries like the United States and others, of Afghan Americans who 

are living here, I would love it if more of them would help their 

government. But, to go back and work for the—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Why are they not? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Some did, but it’s a very difficult problem. It’s very dangerous. They’re frustrated by the government 

structure. Corruption has been an impediment. And they’re giving 

up a wonderful life here. We’ve talked to them. Some have—as you 

know, have gone back. Human resources is the most important 

variable. 

You know, Ashraf Ghani has said to us, and I’m sure to you, that 

if you had 6,000 well-trained people, you could change it. 

Second, the immense poverty of the country, the poorest nonAfrican country in the world; the corruption issue; the history of 

the country; the illiteracy rate. You take the police, for example. 

For 7 years, for reasons I cannot understand, the United States 

participated in training Afghan police, at vast expense, without giving them literacy training. We were turning out police with 88 percent illiteracy, and it went right by everyone. I wrote about it, as 

a private citizen. As soon as I was given this job, we went at it. 

And with the support of my then-counterpart, General Petraeus, 

we made literacy training a mandatory part of the effort. But, how 

could that have been allowed to happen? How can you have a 

policeman who can’t read an ID card? 

Now, you mentioned Marjah. Marjah’s uniquely difficult because, 

as those of you who have been there know, while it has a long legacy of interaction with the United States, it was the area where the 

Kennedy and Johnson and—Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and 

Nixon administrations really put in the effort, and the people down 

there remember America very fondly. It’s also been ground zero for 

the Taliban, and it’s a very difficult area to operate in. And what 

the Taliban have done, Mr. Chairman, is targeted assassinations. 

It’s a very tough problem. 

So, the effort is multiple. Now, what are we doing about it? We 

have sent more than—we have more than tripled the American 

civilian presence, while always mindful of the issue you and I just 

discussed earlier of avoiding the dependency trap. We have particularly increased—increased by, in fact, 600-fold—our field presence. 

When I was in Marjah, 2 weeks ago, I saw the best civilianmilitary interaction I’ve ever seen in my experiences in wars like 

this. And I’ve seen more than my share. They really were working 

together seamlessly, under hellish conditions. 

The tribal leaders I met with said, ‘‘We’re glad you’re back,’’ referring all the way back to the Kennedy-Johnson era, ‘‘but we need 

agriculture, we need seeds, we need security. And we risked our 

lives to come meet with you today.’’ And, in fact, as if to underline 

the point, while we were meeting at the tribal shura, two suicide 

bombers detonated themselves in the marketplace, who had apparently been waiting for our delegation, but, when we didn’t go to the 

marketplace because we ran out of time, they went ahead and did 

their thing, anyway. 

So, the point I want to underscore, Mr. Chairman, is how difficult it is in a place like Marjah. That doesn’t mean it’s impossible, 

but it will take time, and it will take resources. 

15 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me ask—if Marjah was difficult, is 

Kandahar going to be any easier? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yes, I think it will. I think Marjah was 

really, really extraordinary. And you’ve been there, you know that 

it is so remote and isolated, and yet it’s so—it’s viewed as so critical, in strategic terms—— 

The CHAIRMAN. What I worry about the Kandahar operation is 

that, you know, prior to American troops announcing they were 

going to go in, there were not assassinations, there was not a level 

of violence. The mere announcement has now brought on the process of assassination and intimidation. And I doubt that we’re going 

to have a sufficient level of troops to be able to, ‘‘pacify the city.’’ 

I’m unsure of the strategy, to be honest with you, and I wonder if 

you can help us understand exactly where we’re heading in that 

regard. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, first let me be clear, 

Marjah is not Fallujah. Marjah is not going to be a battle for the 

city for exactly the—— 

The CHAIRMAN. No, that’s not Kandahar. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE [continuing]. Excuse me—Kandahar 

will not be a battle for the city, like Fallujah. And you, yourself, 

just made that point, and I want to underscore it. 

Second, General Petraeus is currently doing his own strategic review. It would be premature of me, not having talked to him about 

this issue in a couple of weeks, and about to see him, to give you 

a more detailed statement, but I am—your perception is one that 

I’m fully aware of and, I think, basically, has great merit. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Ambassador, as I finish up my time 

here, I’d just say to you that if, as you and I believe—and I think 

you do—I know you do believe this—Pakistan is central to the resolution, and if, as we all know, there isn’t a military solution, but 

you need a political one, it seems to me that the greatest pressure 

comes, maybe, possibly, with Kandahar, but certainly not in the absence of pressure on the western part of Pakistan, which we’re 

struggling with the Pakistanis to get to be a sufficient level. But, 

if that doesn’t meet with some kind of barrier or some sort of military presence, which I think has been withdrawn from the area to 

some degree on the other side of that border, the immediate part 

of that border, I think it sort of undermines what we’re trying to 

get the Pakistanis to do. I’m not sure you can do both. Maybe General Petraeus has a view of how that can happen. But, it seems to 

me that that review is perhaps well, you know, that it’s appropriate. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, let’s see what he comes up with, 

Mr. Chairman. For our part, our focus on Pakistan is based on the 

fact that we recognize—and this has not been recognized in the 

past—that Pakistan has legitimate security interests in its neighbor, with an undefined border, and those have to be taken into account; but, at the same time, nobody is saying that Pakistan has 

the right to determine what happens next door. It is simply that 

they—we hope they can get along, and we’ve been encouraging 

that. And we believe that recent dialogue between Islamabad and 

Kabul has been beneficial. 

16 

As for the situation on the border, General McChrystal, and now 

General Petraeus, have repeatedly traveled to Islamabad. General 

Petraeus made his first trip, in his new job, to Islamabad just a 

few days ago. The coordination between GHQ and Pakistan and 

ISAF headquarters in Kabul, virtually nonexistent a year ago, is 

now well advanced. Is it as far advanced as it should be? No, sir. 

But, it is moving in that direction. And Admiral Mullen will be also 

traveling out to the region in the near future to move that forward, 

as I will be when I visit, in a few days. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Ambassador, I want to just congratulate you on the efforts you’ve made, which have really been unprecedented. I don’t think I can recall anytime in any war, certainly not 

in Iraq or otherwise, where the kind of coordinated effort took place 

to bring civilian and military leaders here to Washington, and to 

meet in the kind of concerted way that we did. That several-day 

meeting, I think, was exceedingly helpful. The key now is, obviously, translating it to their followthrough and execution over 

there. But it certainly laid some important groundwork. 

And I also want to say to you that I think you are really onto 

something. The complications of India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, 

we all know very, very well. It is very, very difficult, with years 

and years of history, suspicion, conflict, paranoia. But, if that can 

somehow be managed, that may be, by far, the most effective way 

to resolve this conflict. I think you know that, and I think you’re 

pursuing it. But, that is perhaps the avenue of greatest potential 

nonmilitary resolution, and I really wish you well with that, because I think it is critical to the outcome. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Ambassador Holbrooke, at the risk of oversimplifying the history of the situation, in 1998 we had two of our 

Embassies in Africa attacked by, apparently, al-Qaeda cells. This 

was a severe shock. But Afghanistan was different, because alQaeda had training camps there that were protected by the 

Taliban. From those camps came attacks upon New York City and 

Washington, DC. We went to war because the Taliban refused to 

give up the al-Qaeda camps, and that began the war that we’re discussing today. 

Now, many Americans reading about al-Qaeda today would say 

that a good number of them probably reside in Pakistan, and therefore they would accept the fact that the two neighboring countries 

have to be considered together. It should be noted that al-Qaeda 

has the potential of basing operations far beyond the borders of 

Afghanistan and Pakistan. For instance, the New York Times had 

a Sunday story in their magazine about Yemen. The suggestion 

was that Yemen might be such a place. This is because of, among 

other things, the country’s remoteness and the central government’s continued difficulty in addressing political unrest there. 

Others have suggested Somalia because of the overall lack of governance that has plagued the country for several years, which has 

endured in part because of intruding elements from neighboring 

states. 

The point that I’m making is that we started in Afghanistan because we thought that’s where al-Qaeda was, and we wanted to 

17 

disrupt any further activity that might threaten us in the United 

States of America. Now, 10 years later, as we’ve all pointed out, we 

are still there. My point in raising these questions about metrics 

was—and you’ve answered this in part—perhaps in the future they 

could lend us credible evidence that President Karzai’s efforts have 

been successful, and that a central government has been formed 

which possesses reasonable ability to maintain law and order within the country and repel outside forces. They could also quantify 

that the United States and our allies are doing a great number of 

good things with regard to improving the country’s agriculture, 

strengthening its economy, and so forth. This is at least a possible 

scenario. 

But, as you pointed out, it’s not quite that simple, because President Karzai will continually be under pressure from those in Pakistan who say that, after all, Afghanistan is a legitimate security interest of ours, not just because it’s a neighbor, but, because it is 

seen by some Pakistani leaders as contested territory with their 

perceived adversary India. Furthermore, they note that Taliban 

from Pakistan come over into Afghanistan and vice versa. Right 

now, President Karzai appears to be dealing with some types of 

Taliban hopefully trying to define those with whom he can work as 

opposed to the other elements that are not willing to negotiate. 

Even as we engage in Kandahar and pursue success in our engagement, once again, at this time it is hard to tell what the definition 

of success may be. We will need metrics to quantify, for example, 

the effects upon any elements in the city as our operations proceed 

and after they conclude, especially among those who do not wish 

either the United States or even Afghanistan itself well. 

I’m coming to the conclusion that fighting al-Qaeda through trying to reform or reshape Afghanistan may not have been where we 

should have started or hoped to have finished. The question is, 

How do we best address our threats and interests in Afghanistan 

without broadening that mandate and move on? 

I raise this because at the beginning of the Obama administration, the President called some of us around the table. He discussed 

the withdrawal from Iraq, and some persons in attendence, who 

shall remain nameless, said, ‘‘Mr. President, get a sharper pencil. 

July 1 of this year is too long.’’ Well, the President stuck to the 

plan and we are, in fact, withdrawing. But, right now we don’t 

have a strong government in Iraq. The Parliament is there, but has 

only met once since a legitimate election. This is a tough endeavor, 

and similar difficulties will continue to emerge in Afghanistan. 

I think we really have to begin to define our objectives because 

the wealth of the United States is not limitless, nor are the casualties of our forces and the number of people we have available. The 

thought that we can meander on without calibrating metrics on the 

basis of which we can define success unacceptable. 

So, I am hopeful that at some point after the Kabul Conference, 

you and the Secretary of State and others will bring us clarity of 

what is going to be an acceptable definition of success in Afghanistan. At the same time, we must worry about the threat al-Qaeda 

poses to Yemen, Somalia, and all sorts of other places. We must 

also consider strategies, a different strategy, for dealing with alQaeda cells throughout the world, as opposed to sending tens of 

18 

thousands of forces and trying to revamp the country in question. 

I hope you can sharpen the focus a little bit as to what might come 

out of the upcoming conference. It is possible that clarifying the future with regard to our efforts in Afghanistan is premature right 

now, and that the release of the commander’s review in December 

signifies the time at which these issues should be addressed. But, 

in order to have the continuing strong support of the Congress and 

the American people, a better sense of success, and a real definition 

of the term as it applies to Afghanistan are going to be required. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator, first of all, there’s no part of 

your analysis that I would take issue with. Now, let me address 

your specific points. 

First, quickly, the Kabul Conference. The Kabul Conference is 

going to have several focuses, but the one I want to draw our attention to is the reintegration program, which has finally been announced, and which is now—the money has been assembled, a good 

chunk of money—and we all agree, there’s no final military solution to this war, there has to be a way to get Taliban fighters off 

the battlefield, and this is the route. 

Second, you mentioned the December review process. That is a 

review process, and the President will look at how the policy is 

done and make his own judgments. It would be inappropriate for 

me to foreshadow it, but we’re ready, thinking—you asked, earlier, 

not to wait until December. As a matter of fact, only this week and 

last week, I’ve sat down with my colleagues at the National Security Council staff, and we’ve talked about how to do this. And we 

will be continuing that discussion in Kabul next week with Secretary Clinton and myself and General Petraeus and Ambassador 

Eikenberry. And, in addition, we are going to have another one of 

our civilian-military exercises in Kabul, in the fall, one that David 

Petraeus and I planned before he took his current assignment. 

Second point concerns our—the fact that our commitment—our 

combat commitment in Afghanistan is not open-ended, a point you 

made, which we all agree with. There’s been a lot of dispute about 

what July 2011 means, and you will—you mentioned it in your 

opening statement; you raised some questions about it. 

So, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I’d like to address that 

absolutely critical issue. 

What the President said was clear. He was going to send additional troops to Afghanistan and then, in July of next year, he 

would begin careful withdrawals, in accordance with the situation, 

but withdrawals would begin. The size, scope, timing, pace, and an 

endpoint for combat troop presence has not been decided on, nor 

would it be appropriate to decide on it when troops are still arriving in the country and when issues like the situations that Chairman Kerry just mentioned, in Marjah and Kandahar, are still in 

a very intense phase. But, we’re looking at it continually. 

Second, and most importantly, from my point of view, since this 

team behind me and myself have been charged, not with the military operations, but with the civilian support of those military 

operations, it has been stated flatly, by the President and the 

Secretary of State and others of us, that there will be a continued 

economic and development assistance, Congress permitting, and 

19 

continued support for training of the army and police, Congress 

permitting, beyond the combat troop presence. 

Senator Levin, in your other committee, has made very clear how 

much importance he attaches to it, as have you and Chairman 

Kerry and others. I cannot stress how important this is, because 

Afghanistan cannot go forward unless the international community, led by its greatest nation, the United States, continues to fulfill its commitments in the area, beyond combat troops. Now, it’s 

obviously much cheaper, and it’s obviously something that can only 

occur as the police and army are trained and able to stand on their 

own feet. 

And, as for economic and development assistance, that’s essential. What happened in 1989, when the Soviets left and the world, 

led by the United States, just turned its back on Afghanistan and 

watched the liberation of eastern Europe, never recognizing that 

the fall of communism had begun in Afghanistan, never recognizing 

we had a commitment, is a lesson of history we cannot afford to 

repeat. And it was a direct line from the 1989 decisions to 9/11. 

And we all know the history here. 

So, I want to stress what 9/11—what July 2011 is, and is not, 

Senator, and the importance of continuing it. 

And, in terms of your saying ‘‘sharpen our pencils,’’ I will take 

this pencil with me, and it is very sharp, and we will continue to 

drill down. As both you and Chairman Kerry have said, we are 

fully committed to this effort. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I’d like to welcome Ambassador Holbrooke. 

It’s, of course, always great to see you. 

And I want to thank Chairman Kerry for calling this hearing 

today. It reminds us that our engagement with Afghanistan can 

and must extend beyond military operations. I’d like to add, given 

the questions raised about whether further changes are needed to 

our leadership team in Afghanistan, I think all of us should think 

carefully before calling for the replacement of those whose assessments on the ground have provided candid insights, including the 

assessment of our Ambassador in Kabul, that adding more troops 

will only increase instability. And I think the time has come for the 

President to set a flexible timetable for responsibly drawing down 

our troops so that we can focus on pursuing a sustainable global 

strategy to combat al-Qaeda. We’ve been talking about the countries of Somalia and Yemen, here, for almost 10 years on this committee, and yet somehow we get focused on an Afghanistan, we get 

focused on an Iraq, and we’ve never seriously addressed these other 

places, despite the repeated warnings that have been available ever 

since 9/11. 

Ambassador Holbrooke, I’m pleased that President Obama did, at 

least, set the start date for the redeployment of the troops, 

although I think a start date alone is insufficient. People in Wisconsin agree. And a new CBS News poll found that 54 percent of 

respondents now say the United States should set a timetable for 

the withdrawal of United States troops from Afghanistan. 

20 

Secretary Clinton, here before us, has suggested it’ll take 3 to 5 

years to transition control to Afghan security forces. I think that 

timeframe’s too long. But, I’d ask you to just comment again—I 

know you were already saying a little bit in response to Senator 

Lugar—but wouldn’t it be helpful for the President to at least lay 

out a flexible timetable for maintaining United States troops in 

Afghanistan, to address not only the concerns among the American 

people, but the concerns among the Afghan population, that this 

should not be an open-ended occupation? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. First of all, Senator Feingold, it’s a 

pleasure to see you again. And I’m not entirely surprised at your 

question. It’s one you and I have discussed before in other forum. 

I have to, respectfully, say that I am very leery of setting a date 

certain, made here, for the absolute withdrawal of our support to 

the Afghan police and army. Now—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. But, you heard my question, my friend. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. You were talking about—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. I said ‘‘a flexible timetable.’’ 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. OK. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I did not say—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. But, then—— 

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. A hard and fast—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. But, then you talked—OK. So, I want 

to be clear, then, so you and I are on the same wavelength, because 

it’s very important. When you say ‘‘a flexible timetable,’’ you want 

to set a notional end date, but you’re willing to reexamine it? 

Senator FEINGOLD. I don’t want—actually, I would rather not set 

it; that’s not my job. I’m asking the President—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. OK. 

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. The administration—to give us a 

vision, with some time guidelines, about when they think the 

troops can come out of Afghanistan. No, I think it’s much more—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. You’re talking about the combat troops. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Yes. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. OK. That is above my paygrade. I 

thought we were talking about the other parts of our presence 

there. But, I think we have to start by understanding several 

things about this extraordinarily difficult country that fate and 

destiny has placed us in. It’s not where you choose to fight to defend the American homeland. It’s the most remote logistical place 

the United States has ever fought in its history, a landlocked country which is very difficult to resupply in under these extraordinary 

conditions. 

But, given that fact, and given the direct correlation between 

Afghanistan and our homeland security—and I should be more precise; Afghanistan, Pakistan, and our homeland security—I am very 

leery about setting an end date at this point. But, I must leave that 

to the President after he’s done the review. 

I do not have any problem with July 2011, in reference to the 

earlier colloquy I had with Senator Lugar. The idea here was quite 

clear: to tell the world and the Afghans that we do not have an 

open-ended, limitless Vietnam-type escalation. When I got to Vietnam, we had 10,000 troops. When I left, we had 500,000. At least 

two members of your committee were there, under much more danVerDate Nov 24 2008 18:50 Nov 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
21 

gerous circumstances. And we cannot repeat that. And President 

Obama was very conscious of that. 

At the same time, I stress again why this isn’t Vietnam. This is 

about our national security. Vietnam was not. And if our national 

security requires us to continue to fight because you have organizations like the TTP in western Pakistan training people like the 

Times Square bomber—luckily, training him quite badly—and declaring that they wish to target the United States, in addition to 

al-Qaeda’s targeting, we cannot be oblivious to that. 

Now, both you and Senator Lugar mentioned Somalia and 

Yemen. It is not correct—this is not my area, but I follow it, and 

it is not quite correct to say the United States is ignoring it or has 

no plans in it. We are taking actions in it—and the New York 

Times article, which you referred to, Senator Lugar, was very clear. 

It began with a drone strike, which was very effective in taking out 

an al-Qaeda group in Yemen. And that article was—it was a very 

interesting article, but we—the al-Qaeda and other organizations, 

like the TTP, are specifically targeting us, and we cannot ignore 

them. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Ambassador, let me just switch to another 

question before my time runs out. 

United States civilian strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan 

pledges support for the Afghan Government reintegration efforts 

for Taliban and other fighters. And you touched on this, but how 

have the Karzai administration’s efforts at reintegration—the 

Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program plan and the Consultative Peace Jirga—translated, so far, on the ground, in terms 

of rolling out this plan in the initial districts where it’s envisioned? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. The rollout has not yet reached the 

provinces and districts, Senator Feingold. That is the next phase. 

We do have, as I think I mentioned, maybe before you arrived— 

we have put $100,000 with—$100 million, with Congress’ approval, 

of CERP funds, at the disposal of General Petraeus and ISAF, to 

do this through ISAF, but the main route for doing this—what you 

and I called ‘‘reintegration’’—is through the Afghan Government 

and the trust funds, which the British and the Japanese have led, 

to which the United States did not contribute. The Japanese took 

the lead. 

It is our absolute goal, highest priority, to urge and encourage 

and press the Afghan Government to fulfill its already-stated commitment to put reintegration officials in every one of the contested 

districts in the country immediately, and to support them with 

logistics and make this plan work. Because every day, under the 

intense pressure that ISAF has put on the Taliban, there are people contacting local authorities and saying, ‘‘We want to get out of 

this war, we want to have—we want to have land, we want to have 

a job we’re—we don’t have any ideological commitment to Mullah 

Omar or the Taliban.’’ And up to now, there was no way they could 

do it. And it’s only now that, with this program—and the program 

is—just been unveiled, so this—again, to me, this is the most important new development, and this is one of the main things that 

Secretary Clinton will focus on, on her trip. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Feingold. 

22 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I—and I want to 

thank the Ambassador for coming. I know he has a wealth of 

knowledge, and certainly has served our country for many years. 

A number of us wrote a letter to you, asking for this hearing— 

and my guess, is you might have had hearings anyway—but, the 

reason we wrote the letter—bipartisan letter—was to provide Congress and the American people with a definition of the ‘‘end state’’ 

for our civilian operations in Afghanistan, clear objectives for the 

civilian mission, and a detailed plan for achieving those objectives, 

and the very specific, measurable metrics being used to measure 

progress toward achieving those objectives. 

I have to say, I’ve been here for an hour and 10 minutes, I have 

heard nothing—nothing about that. And, while I respect the 

Ambassador—I’ve heard a lot about process, I’ve heard a lot about 

meetings—I have no earthly idea—no earthly idea what our objectives are on the civilian front. And I don’t know if you have time 

to begin doing that right now, but this has, so far, been an incredible waste of time, from the standpoint of hearing those. 

And I have tremendous respect for you, but maybe we have the 

wrong witness. I hope we’ll have, maybe, Secretary Clinton and 

Eikenberry, maybe Crocker—I know he’s supposed to come. But, 

could you answer the question that was the purpose of these hearings in the first place? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I’m sorry, you don’t feel that I’ve told 

you what our civilian—— 

Senator CORKER. You’ve told me—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE [continuing]. Programs are? 

Senator CORKER [continuing]. A lot of process. I’d like to know, 

with definition, what our end state is for civilian operations—the 

very question we asked when we set this hearing up—is, in 

Afghanistan, clear objectives for the civilian mission, a detailed 

plan for achieving those. I’d like to hear you talk about that. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well—— 

Senator CORKER. I mean, I’d glad—I mean, we have a lot of 

interagency folks here, but I’m not hearing anything that talks 

about where we’re going. 

I’d also like to know how the withdrawal date that’s been set 

affects that, and how it affects those we’re working with in the—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well—— 

Senator CORKER [continuing]. Country. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. First of all, Senator Corker, I believe 

I have discussed our civilian programs in very considerable detail, 

within the constraints of time. But we did prepare a report for this 

committee, earlier this year, which was entered into the record, 

and which I will be happy to enter into the record again, if you 

wish, and you can go through every one of the programs. 

The reason I brought my colleagues with me was to show that 

this was a whole-of-government and unprecedented effort. 

Now, on the specifics, since you want specifics, Afghanistan is an 

agricultural country. It exported agricultural products until 1978 

and the Soviet invasion. We have—trying to rebuild it. This was 

not being done for the first 7 years of this war. We have—your 

committee has given us a great deal of money for agriculture, and 

23 

we are spending it wisely in a joint AID/USDA effort, which Senator Lugar has, particularly, been involved in—food, seeds, cashfor-work programs, encouraging alternatives to opium production. 

Second, rule of law. We are spending the money you’ve authorized for us to create a justice system which can cut into the 

Taliban’s propaganda about corruption and lack of a justice system. 

Third, counternarcotics. We have ended poppy eradication, a radical change, because all we were doing by eradicating poppy 

seeds—poppy crops—was driving farmers—poor farmers—into the 

hands of the Taliban. 

Fourth, a major program of subnational governance, where we 

are putting aid directly to the district level. 

Fifth, a major effort in specific areas, some of which were alluded 

to earlier, such as electricity for Kandahar. Senator Kerry asked 

earlier about Kandahar. One of the major issues here is to bring 

electricity to the people as a benefit of the international presence. 

The whole range of activities we have is designed to support the 

country and to support General Petraeus’s counterinsurgency 

effort. He and I—I was his counterpart until 2 weeks ago, when he 

moved to Kabul. We have worked intimately in an effort to create 

a joint civilian/military effort. 

And I am happy to provide you with every detail you wish, in 

private briefings, on behalf of me and my team. 

Point No. 2, in regard to the end-state issue you raised. I want 

to be clear on the difference between ‘‘end state’’ and ‘‘exit strategy.’’ If we—it—this is my personal view, Senator, but if we walk 

away from Afghanistan again, as we did 21 years ago, the consequences will be similarly catastrophic because of the unique strategic position of Afghanistan and the reaction that would have in 

Pakistan, China, India, and the country to Afghanistan’s west— 

Iran—as well as the larger region—that includes Russia, Saudi 

Arabia, India—and even extending to Western Europe, which is 

concerned about terrorism from that region just as much as we are. 

So, I hope that, when we talk about ‘‘end state,’’ we talk about 

a sustainable end state which can—involves continued American 

economic and development assistance, and we continue to fulfill 

our obligations to train the police and the military. This will not 

be cheap, but it will be a fraction of the money that is now being 

authorized and appropriated for the military campaign. 

When we will be able to transition to that is impossible for me, 

or anyone, to say, but it won’t be on a single day; it will be a gradual process. And that is what the review in December and the 

President’s decisionmaking will focus on. 

Senator CORKER. You know, our foreign policy, generally speaking—I know we’ve had some rough times over the last several 

years—has been something that we’ve been able to address in a 

bipartisan way. And I think that the issues that you’re dealing 

with, that we’re dealing with, in Afghanistan are incredibly tough. 

I still don’t—I haven’t understood what the administration was 

saying in the beginning. That’s not to be critical of them; I just 

don’t understand. I still don’t understand. I’ve met with you and 

your staff over at the State Department. It’s just incredibly vague 

to me. And I think what we are doing—we have partners, which 

include the Pakistanis and everybody around—that—they don’t 

24 

know what we’re doing, they don’t know when we’re leaving. They 

think we’re leaving shortly, I think. We’ve just had colleagues who 

have come from there. We’ve got a President there that’s having to 

play both sides, because he wants to survive, because he doesn’t 

know what our intentions are. The Pakistanis don’t know what our 

intentions are, I don’t think, and they’re making accommodations 

on both sides. 

So, I just have to tell you, I send letters to parents and spouses, 

and what I feel, because of this lack of clarity, is that we are in 

Afghanistan because we’re in Afghanistan, and that we don’t have 

the will to be successful, and we don’t have the will to leave, because of some of the things you just outlined. But, I just don’t hear 

any clarity. And again, I want to support the administration, I 

want to support you, because that’s what we need to do, as a country, is, at the shore’s line, let the partisanship that—but, I have to 

tell you, as a person who wants to do that, I still don’t understand. 

OK? And I have average intelligence. 

So, I would ask you to please—or maybe let’s have some witnesses in here that can shed more light or be more specific. But, 

I don’t understand, and I’m very concerned, and I think we’re sending a lot of mixed signals. And I think there’s a lot of dissension, 

actually, as I listen to you, even within the administration itself; 

and that has to end. 

And I’d just ask you, please—you have a lot of experience—help 

us understand. You haven’t done that today. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well—— 

Senator CORKER. And I would ask the chairman to please have 

some witnesses come in and explain to us what the end state is, 

what we can envision Afghanistan being whenever this withdrawal 

does take place, because I still do not understand. We’ve changed 

it. Now it’s sort of a degraded country, where they have conflict, 

but it’s not out of control. I mean, the bar continues to change. 

And I’m just concerned, as an individual; and yet, I want us to 

be as—if we can, all on the same page, as much as possible; but, 

I think, to do that, this has got to be much clearer than has been 

outlined. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator, I’m sorry that my answers 

don’t fully satisfy you, but I want to be very clear on this, because 

I understand your comments, and I respect them. 

First of all, the core question, the one you’re asked by your constituents and I’m asked by everybody, ‘‘Why are we in Afghanistan?’’ The short, simple answer is: 9/11, direct threats to our national security interests, and the fact that, while our enemies 

against our homeland are on the Pakistani side of the border, this 

is a single struggle, and we have to strengthen the Afghan Government and teach it to stand on its own feet over time, so that we 

can move forward while we do other things, that fall outside the 

scope of this hearing, to dismantle, deter, and defeat al-Qaeda. 

Now, if you do not believe that it’s a threat to the homeland, 

then we have an honest difference of opinion. But, I think the 

Times Square bombing incident shows clearly how dangerous that 

situation is. 

Second, on the civilian mission, again, it’s in support of a single 

civilian/military counterinsurgency mission. And we have benchVerDate Nov 24 2008 18:50 Nov 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
25 

marks, requested and required by the Congress and submitted to 

you, and our overarching goal here is always the same: to disrupt, 

dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda, and prevent its ability to threaten 

the United States. And we believe, all of us—and there is no division on this in the executive branch—that the situation we face out 

there is a direct threat. We believed that before the Times Square 

situation occurred, and I don’t think anything could have proved it 

more vividly. 

And to achieve this, we have to degrade the Taliban, as well, because they are part of the enemy’s structure—a different part, but 

an integral part—that we face. 

Now, the Afghan Government doesn’t yet have the capacity to 

deal with this on its own. How could they, after 30 years of war? 

And so, the civilian part of it, the things I’ve just mentioned to 

you—police, government capacity, rule of law, subnational government, training provincial officials, women’s empowerment, and a 

whole series of other major issues—are part of our civilian programs, and we’re happy to come back up to your office—we appreciated your visit to us—and continue this dialogue. 

Our civilian strategy is designed from keeping al-Qaeda at bay, 

and it’s designed to help Afghan institutions establish conditions 

for stable governance. Our plan has these benchmarks, which have 

been briefed to you and your colleagues, and we’re happy to discuss 

them in detail at any time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Ambassador. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Holbrooke, thank you very much for your extraordinary service. We appreciate it very much. Always appreciate your 

appearing before our committee. 

I want to, first, ask a followup question to Senator Feingold. We 

talk a lot about the July 2011 and the—as you put it, the beginning of a careful withdrawal. Well, the President made this announcement in late 2009. Can you just give us an update whether 

we are on target, as the administration had envisioned when these 

statements were made in late 2009, as to the careful withdrawal 

of our troops, or are we ahead of schedule? You seem to be somewhat optimistic on some of the progress that had been made, but 

would you—would you say that we are meeting the expectations 

that the administration set out when the President addressed this 

issue in late 2009? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Are you talking about the December 1 

speech, the West Point speech? 

Senator CARDIN. Correct. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator, I appreciate your personal 

comments. In regard to your question, I do not want to give a optimism/pessimism report to you of that sort at this time. I’m about 

to go back out there again on my 15th trip. I’d like to report back. 

I think that there—significant elements of movement forward, in 

many areas, but I do not yet see a definitive turning point in either 

direction. And we now have a new and a tremendously dynamic 

commander on the ground—General Petraeus—and I’m looking forward to seeing him, for the first time in his new capacity. And I 

do—simply do not have a personal judgment on that issue now. 

26 

Senator CARDIN. Well, I do think we’re entitled to be informed 

as to how well we are meeting the expected schedule that the 

President obviously had in mind when he gave his speech in 

December. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, excuse me for interrupting, I— 

perhaps we had a miscommunication. As I mentioned to Senator 

Corker in my previous answer, we have put forward the benchmarks, which you requested. We’ve briefed on those, and those go 

through the specific criteria, point by point by point. 

Senator CARDIN. No—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. And we can go back over them. 

Senator CARDIN. No—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I thought you were addressing a—kind 

of a larger—— 

Senator CARDIN. No, I was—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE [continuing]. Almost intuitive answer. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, what I’m trying to get is that—obviously, 

the President had certain expectations in mind as to where we 

would be in July 2011, when he made his speech in December 

2009. I’m just trying to figure out whether we’re on schedule to 

meet the expectations that the administration had when the speech 

was given. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I guess my simplest answer to you 

would be, in some areas we’re ahead of schedule, in other areas 

we’re on schedule, in other areas there’s much to be desired. And 

the—for example, the attrition rate for the army and the police has 

gone down. That is a really important factor. But, I honestly don’t 

know whether it’s seasonal, anecdotal, or it’s sustained. We won’t 

know for a while. That’s why the President did not—does not want 

to pull this tree up by the roots every month and reexamine it. It 

has to nurture. 

General Caldwell, in charge of the training, is in constant touch 

with us, and he’s reporting how they’re moving forward. Nothing 

is more important than getting the police and army up to sustainability. 

On the other hand, as the colloquy with Senator Kerry indicated, 

in Marjah there are not enough judges, there are not enough local 

police yet, and people are being assassinated. And, as General 

McChrystal said publicly, Marjah is not gone quite at the pace expected, but it’s moving forward, in the estimation of ISAF. 

So, you have to take these, issue by issue. There is no single answer, yet, to this extraordinarily complicated situation. 

The elements that I stressed in my opening statement, sir, involving the progress in Pakistan, should not be neglected. Pakistan 

is at least as important to our national security. 

Senator CARDIN. And I understand that, and I understand that’s 

not an easy issue. I’m just trying to judge whether we can expect 

the careful withdrawal that will begin in July, whether we’re on 

target to accomplishing that. 

Let me go on to the second point, and that is—we all talk about 

the ability of Afghanistan to control—that is, the security of its 

own people and to run a country with good governance and respect 

for human rights. I’ve expressed, previously, my concern that the 

United States aid and the international aid not be a source of 

27 

funds for corruption in Afghanistan, that there be accountability in 

these funds. And I know that the administration has set up certain 

accountabilities on the funds that are being made available. 

I would like to add to that the information that Afghanistan has 

mineral wealth, and whether we are certain that these are not just 

fungible dollars, and therefore, the international assistance and 

United States assistance could be a source to fund a corrupt regime 

which robs the country of good governance which is absolutely 

essential. How can you assure me that we’re making progress on 

the funds getting to its intended purpose and not being used for 

corruption? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator, just one point on your previous question. I think I may have answered part of the question 

you asked prior to your arrival. I want—— 

Senator CARDIN. I was here from the beginning. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Oh, OK, then I—— 

Senator CARDIN. Promise, the whole time. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE [continuing]. Apologize. But, I want to 

underscore that the pace and scope of the drawdowns will depend 

on the situation. 

Senator CARDIN. I heard you say that. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yes, OK. 

On the accountability and mineral wealth problems—very, very 

important issues—on accountability—and this committee has been 

really aggressive in pushing us on this, and we share your concern. 

When we came into these jobs, about 8.8 percent of all the aid 

money was going through the government, so 91 percent was bypassing it through NGOs, and that was undermining the government we were trying to strengthen. Yet, to funnel it all through the 

government ran the very serious risk of losing accountability. 

So, we set out a plan, a timetable, year by year, to increase the 

amount of money that goes through the government. And we’re 

now up in the high teens, and we hope to keep increasing it to 30, 

40, and 50 percent. But, the accountability issue is critical. 

We have accountability criteria for each ministry. Some ministries have been certified, others have not. For example, agriculture, the ministry—our most important nonsecurity program— 

the ministry hasn’t been certified yet, because we don’t feel their 

accounting will meet the GAO standards, the SIGAR standards, 

our own standards. So, this is a very, very tough issue for us. But, 

we have made accountability our hallmark, while also trying to 

build government capacity. There’s sometimes a tension between 

those two. 

On the mineral wealth issue reported in the New York Times, 

perhaps a little misleadingly, it’s not a new discovery that Afghanistan is a wealthy mineral area. What is, however, new is that, with 

modern techniques, the extractive industries can reach areas that 

were quite remote. Afghanistan’s mineral wealth, according to the 

U.S. Geological Survey, is very substantial. I’m not going to throw 

the numbers around that you read about in the New York Times, 

because I have no independent corroboration of those. But, there’s 

no question about copper, lithium, and some very critical, strategically important, rare earth elements. 

28 

And we—the Defense Department has a group, under Paul 

Brinkley, a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, that has been 

working on this. He has been working with us to work with AID, 

Ex-Im Bank, OPIC, and TDA, to make sure that we help the 

Afghan people, No. 1, develop those resources for the benefit of the 

people, strengthen their own economy through doing it, avoid the 

resource curse that has plagued so many oil-producing and copperproducing nations, and, finally, make sure that the United States 

has a level playing field. In the case of the famous copper mine at 

Aynak, China dominated that. There have been all sorts of questions about how they got that contract. They paid a lot more for 

it than any Western country would have paid, and so it was a strategic investment for them. They have the ability to do that in a 

way that we don’t, and we’re working hard on that. 

I would be happy to brief you further on this, but, I do want to 

say one last thing about it. Secretary Clinton is personally engaged 

on this issue. And if I’m not mistaken, Ashraf Ghani probably 

talked to you about it, Mr. Chairman, as well, because it’s a very 

important issue. 

Senator CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, I’d just urge we have complete 

transparency—our government insists—on the mineral issues in 

that country. 

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. We will insist on it. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. And we’re going to—Senator, we’re 

also—I think the Afghans are seriously considering joining up to 

the Extractive—— 

Senator CARDIN. EITI. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. EITC, yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Holbrooke, I need to—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. EITI, I apologize. 

The CHAIRMAN. I need to apologize; I need to go to a meeting on 

the START agreement now. Senator Lugar will chair, in my 

absence, and Senator DeMint is recognized. I’ll try and get back, 

if I can. 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Holbrooke, thank you, and your whole team behind 

you, for your service to our country. I recognize probably the most 

difficult diplomatic situation anyone could work in. 

I’d like to ask just a couple of questions related to the civilianpolitical side of the equation in Afghanistan. My question really 

comes from a perspective of some folks who have been on the 

ground in Afghanistan over the last couple of years to—well, 3 or 

4 years—as part of a religious group that’s working through an 

NGO. And I’ve got a good friend who’s been a part of that. A year 

and a half ago, he came back, after a long stay there, and one of 

his colleagues had been killed by the Taliban. There wasn’t a lot 

of security. But, the enemy was clearly the Taliban. And the people 

were, at that time, more looking to the United States for protection. And the folks working through the NGO were afraid of the 

Taliban. 

He just returned, and I had a good conversation with him last 

week after another long stay of working on the ground. But, the 

29 

situation has changed and deteriorated, in his mind, to the point 

where they fear the government now more than they do the 

Taliban, that government leaders are increasingly speaking out 

against non-Muslims in the country. And the bottom line from his 

perspective is, the deadline is defeating us, is that the people know 

we’re leaving. Even if we make it somewhat flexible, we’ve made 

it clear that our commitment’s not to finish the job, but to leave. 

And this is not my own opinion, but one I’m getting from people 

working on the ground, that the people are developing alliances 

with the Taliban for protection, and other insurgents in the country. Government figures are developing stronger relationships with 

the Taliban, which is making them increasingly antagonistic to 

non-Muslims in the country. And all the alignment now, on the 

civilian side, is in expectation of America being gone. Even the government is moving more that way. 

And we have a situation now where we’ve got soldiers fighting 

and dying there for a government that, if left to their own devices, 

might throw them in jail or even kill them for being non-Muslim. 

And so, after just listening to the conversation, first of all, it comes 

back to what you said before—and I was glad to hear you say that 

the deadline—that you don’t agree with a deadline. But, the President, even though he’s equivocated to some degree, has still left 

that out there, that that is his goal, to get out. And I agree somewhat with Senator Corker, in that we have not said, ‘‘Here is what 

we are going to achieve before we leave.’’ We talk about a situation 

on the ground, but what are we going to achieve before we leave? 

But, to—I know that’s more of a question—or, I mean, a perspective than a real question, but I’d just like to hear your comment 

on what appears to be a deteriorating situation brought on by the 

presumption that the United States will be gone in a year, or in 

a year and some time period after that. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I have no doubt, Senator, that your report of your friends and associates is accurate—a perception on 

their part—because I’ve heard the same things. You hear many different things about policy, from many different people. And the 

President’s position has been misrepresented, whether intentionally or unintentionally, by a lot of people—journalists, columnists, leading public figures. But, I think it’s quite clear he did 

not say, ‘‘We’re withdrawing in July 2011.’’ He said, ‘‘We’re beginning withdrawing.’’ And you heard one of your colleagues on the 

other side question that as being insufficient. Now you’re questioning it as being too far. This is an issue in which there’s a legitimate grounds for disagreement. But, I did not say I disagreed with 

the deadline. What I said was, this is what the deadline means, 

and the U.S. military command has supported and accepted this 

deadline, and has endorsed it, publicly. 

Now, the deadline applies to combat troops. And it’s not a deadline; it is the beginning of a departure. And the size and scope and 

end state of that departure will be determined by the situation on 

the ground, but it will begin. And that is to incentivize the local 

authorities in Kabul to take on their own responsibility for their— 

for solving this problem so it is not open-ended situation. 

In that regard, the President will make specific decisions down 

the road after the—or—during or after the policy review. And he 

30 

will deal with that, based on what he hears from General Petraeus 

and the Command and Ambassador Eikenberry and the Embassy 

and other people advising him. 

In terms of the reaction on the ground, Senator, I have a slightly 

different perception—but, again, it’s hard to come by firm data— 

is—there have been many public opinion polls taken in Afghanistan, despite the conditions. They’re all face-to-face, because telephones obviously won’t do it. Every poll shows that less than 10 

percent of the people support the Taliban. Less than 10 percent. 

ARD, ABC, BBC, the Charney Group, which briefed us the day before yesterday here in Washington, they all come up with the same 

number. A lot of the other people—nobody wants to return to the 

black years of the Taliban—the women, especially; they suffered so 

much, and they remember it so vividly. 

On the other hand, they’re not all satisfied with the services and 

support they get from the Kabul government. And Kabul itself, for 

reasons that go back to the discussion I had with some of your colleagues earlier, is not always capable of producing the right kind 

of human resources, infrastructure, and programs for this, and corruption and rule of law are huge problems. 

But, if you look at every indicator—electricity, cell phones, roads, 

the GDP of the country, agricultural production—every one of these 

things has had a dramatic improvement. Last year, Afghanistan 

had a 22-percent growth in GDP, obviously against a very small 

base. That’s nondrug, legitimate GDP, by the way. 

So, I think that the situation is not quite as clear-cut as you say 

it is. As I said earlier, there are elements of movement in many 

areas. And if you go around Afghanistan, you see these extraordinary visions of women cooperatives and farmer efforts to rebuild 

and undo 30 years of war. We need to be able to continue to support those efforts as we go forward, even after the combat troops 

leave Afghanistan. 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you, sir. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, sir. 

Senator DEMINT. Thank you. 

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Thank you very much, sir. 

Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator Lugar. 

Ambassador, we welcome you again, and thank you for your service to the country. 

I wanted to raise an issue that reminds me that—in Washington 

we use a lot of acronyms describing programs and agencies. Unfortunately, there’s one acronym I think that a lot of Americans actually know what it is, and it’s IEDs. And we’ve talked about this a 

number of times, and I appreciate your work on it. There are actually two. It’s—the acronym IED, plus the acronym AN, for ammonium nitrate when we talk about improvised explosive devices. The 

question I have—well, let me just first set forth the predicate. 

We’ve all been concerned about this issue, as you have, and I 

know the administration, at all levels, has. We introduced a resolution a couple of days ago that passed. A number of us were cosponsors of that—Senator Webb, along with me and several other colleagues. And what we asked for in that—or, I should say, what we 

set forth as the reason for the resolution was the following: No. 1, 

31 

urging the Governments of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other central Asian countries to fully commit to regulating the sale, transport, and use of ammonium nitrate, the main destructive ingredient in the IEDs; second, calling on the Secretary of State to 

continue to diplomatically engage—she and your team has already 

done this, but more needs to be done; third, to work with the World 

Customs Organization and other bodies on initiatives to improve 

the controls on IEDs; and then, fourth, urging the Secretary of 

State to work with Pakistan, Afghanistan, and central Asian countries to encourage and support improvements in infrastructure. 

So, the question I have is—I realize that this resolution has been 

passed recently, but the question I have is, give us a status report 

as to how our government, and especially the State Department, 

has been already engaged in fulfilling those objectives, and what 

you can tell us about it. Because we have a basic problem, where 

you have a legal prohibition on ammonium nitrate in Afghanistan, 

but a huge problem in Pakistan that is both a problem of law, but 

also a problem of figuring out ways to stop the inflow of ammonium 

nitrate into Afghanistan from Pakistan. 

And the numbers are stunning. I mean, we know that it’s—IEDs 

are the—by far, the biggest killer. Pennsylvania, just since the beginning of the year, we’ve lost six soldiers, four as a result of IEDs. 

We’re over 51 killed in action in Pennsylvania, and over 270 

wounded. So, I just wanted to get your latest update and give us 

the benefit of that. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator Casey, I share your concern, I 

share your astonishment that so little was done on this in the past, 

and I want to commend you and Senator Webb for continuing to 

push. And in the privacy of this room, I would urge you to continue 

to do it, because this is a really critical issue, and your public pressure has helped those of us who share the concern. 

The Pentagon has a task force on this—on the IED issue, as you 

know, headed by Ashton Carter. And we’re working with him. 

As far as ammonium nitrate goes—AN—we were successful in 

getting the Afghan Government to issue a Presidential decree banning the import, production, transportation, use, and sale, and storage of AN fertilizer. However, it is still legal to bring it in for mining and construction sectors, as you well know. And that’s a 

major—that’s a legitimate use. And there are not adequate alternatives, except something like dynamic, which brings similar problems with it. 

We do not have enough action, yet, on the Pakistani side of the 

border. And here is a perfect example of why the two countries cannot be disaggregated for purposes of policy. We got what we wanted 

on one side of the border, but we haven’t gotten it on the other yet, 

and Americans are being killed and wounded because of this. And 

I can assure you that we will take this up again when I go to Pakistan in a few days, and other senior officials go, as well. 

I don’t know if we need to go any further with that answer now, 

because you and I have spent so much time on it. But, I’m glad we 

got a chance to raise it in public and to assure you that this administration has task forces and puts it as a priority, and we will continue to do so. 

32 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, and I appreciate that. We’ll continue 

to push on our end, as well. And I know—I failed to mention Senator Kaufman was also one of our cosponsors. 

I wanted to go to the question of President Karzai. I don’t have 

much time left, but I do want to raise this question. You say, on 

page 3 of your testimony, ‘‘We expect’’—and I’m quoting, ‘‘We expect that President Karzai will address commitments he made in 

his November 2009 inaugural address.’’ I and others have been 

very critical of his leadership, or sometimes what can only be described as lack of leadership. I don’t expect you to evaluate my 

analysis. But, I guess I’d ask you—and I think the American people 

have a real concern about—they know it’s an uneasy alliance and 

there are all kinds of problems, but I guess the one question I’d ask 

you is, What are the—how should we measure his performance, 

based upon those commitments? What are the signals or the signs 

or the substantive achievements or goals that he should meet that 

you are most interested in, in terms of advancing our mission 

there? I realize that we have been frustrated sometimes, and I realize that we can’t expect perfection, but I think we need some way 

to measure progress, and I wanted to get your sense of what indicators you are most interested in. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I think, in specific regard to your question, which focused not on the government or the war, but one 

individual, I think, as chief executive of the country, the way to 

evaluate him is the way you evaluate any chief executive. Does he 

lay out a clear program? He did. Does he fulfill his own deadlines? 

Sometimes. And are the programs he lays out effective? Sometimes. 

I’m not here to plead on his behalf, or to criticize him, but only 

to point out what we all know, which is that he may have the hardest job of any chief executive in the world, because of the complexities and poverty of the country. The programs he has laid into 

place are programs that we all feel comfortable with. And the difficulty of implementation, which has been the subject of repeated 

exchanges this afternoon, is one that we just have to keep working 

on. 

And then there’s the issue of corruption. And we all agree—and 

President Karzai has said this publicly—that corruption is a serious issue. And he’s working on it, and he’s upgrading the High 

Office of Oversight, which is in charge of that issue. 

It would be unfair, however, to hold any one person accountable 

for the totality of events inside any country, even if that person is 

the chief of state. And in this particular case, even more so, with 

a good chunk of the country insecure, ethnic divisions, and, historically, a complicated relationship between Kabul and the outlying 

regions, which have different ethnicities to them. 

So, I am not—I think he’s doing the best job he can under the 

circumstances. I know that doesn’t satisfy some of your colleagues, 

but I do absolutely know he’s doing that. And if the reintegration 

program gets off the ground, and if it’s successful, it will have a 

huge effect. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Senator Casey. 

Senator Wicker. 

33 

Senator WICKER. Mr. Chairman, one bit of housekeeping. In response to Senator Corker, Mr. Holbrooke referenced a report. I’d 

like to ask unanimous consent that that report be inserted in the 

record of this hearing at that point in the testimony. 

Senator LUGAR. Without objection, the report will be placed in 

the record. 

Senator WICKER. I think that the context is important there, and 

I don’t want people who read this transcript to have to refer back 

to a previous hearing. So, thank you for that. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The report mentioned above ‘‘Afghanistan and 

Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy,’’ was first submitted for 

the record at the January 21, 2010, hearing on Afghanistan. It was 

too voluminous to include in the printed hearing but will be maintained in the permanent record of both hearings.] 

Senator WICKER. You know, I think, Ambassador Holbrooke, you 

have answered a lot of questions today. And clearly you are an experienced and longsuffering diplomat, and you have demonstrated 

that today, too. 

Why are we in Afghanistan today, in 2010? Well, we are in 

Afghanistan because of 9/11. And we’re in Afghanistan in 2010 

because we still are not sure that the situation that arose from 

Afghanistan in 2001 might not happen again there. 

I think you’ve made a compelling case that there are direct 

threats to the United States of America that could arise from that 

area. I think you’ve made an excellent case about the unique strategic position of Afghanistan and its neighbor, Pakistan. Clearly, 

we’re interested in Yemen, we’re interested in Somalia, but there 

are things about the location in Afghanistan that give al-Qaeda an 

advantage for being in Afghanistan that it would not have to have 

if they had to rely on a safe haven in Yemen or Somalia. 

You’ve made a very telling statement, Mr. Ambassador, about 

the consequences if we walk away from Afghanistan, as we did 20 

years ago. And I believe that’s almost a direct quote of your testimony today, that the results could be catastrophic, as they were 

earlier because we walked away. 

And in that context, I want to ask you to respond, Mr. Ambassador, to the comments of CIA Director Leon Panetta recently, 

when he said that United States officials had not seen any firm intelligence that insurgent troops in Afghanistan are interested in 

reconciliation, which I think we’ve acknowledged in this room 

today, is important if we’re going to bring this effort to a successful 

conclusion. 

Mr. Panetta said this—and you’ve read the testimony, but let me 

quote, for the record—‘‘We have seen no evidence that they are 

truly interested in reconciliation, where they would surrender their 

arms, where they would denounce al-Qaeda, where they would 

really try to become part of that society. My view is that, unless 

they’re convinced the United States is going to win and that they 

are going to be defeated, I think it is very difficult to proceed with 

a reconciliation that is going to be meaningful.’’ That’s as far as I 

will quote this President’s CIA Director, and ask you to respond 

there. 

You may feel that the President’s position on the July 2011 beginning of withdrawal is clear, as you’ve said. But I would submit 

34 

to you, Mr. Ambassador, that it is not clear to everyone who listens, and it’s not clear to the Taliban, and it’s not clear to the people who feel threatened by the Taliban. 

I agree with you, the vast majority, overwhelming majority, of 

Afghan people do not want the Taliban back, but they are legitimately worried about who would fill a vacuum if indeed they are 

interpreting the President’s position in a way that is different from 

the way you are. 

We have walked away before, according to your own testimony. 

And so, how can our enemy in Afghanistan who might be willing 

to acquiesce and say, ‘‘Yes, we want to be part of a peaceful society 

and a peaceful government’’—how can they feel that they’re going 

to be defeated if we are sending a signal that, depending on conditions on the ground in 2011, we might yet make a decision to walk 

away? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator, in regard to Director Panetta’s comments that you quoted, I agree with his comments. They 

are not inconsistent with what I said, because he was referring to 

reconciliation, the idea of higher level negotiations—or, effectively, 

negotiations—with the leadership of the Taliban Supreme Shura, 

also known as the Quetta Shura. And the press, at the time of his 

hearing, was filled with reports—erroneous reports—of deals in the 

offing. It just wasn’t true. And Director Panetta was trying to clarify the record. And what he said was precisely right. 

I have been talking about reintegration, the program announced, 

supported by the United States and the international community, 

which is so critical to take fighters off the battlefield. There’s some 

overlap between the two. But, I think we all see the clear distinction. 

In regard to your other question, you stated correctly the misunderstandings. All I can say is that the misunderstandings are, 

in an ironic sense, enhanced by constant questioning of the date. 

The President has been clear on what he said. I’ve tried to be clear 

this afternoon, in testifying before you. But, some people continually—in the guise of helping the United States, some people 

assert that the President is leaving, when he made clear he is not. 

He is starting a withdrawal, and that it will be—the size and scope 

and pace will be determined based on the situation and our 

national security interests. But, some troops will begin to leave. 

That’s a big distance from the misperception that both you and I 

have seen. 

And I understand your point, because it concerns me greatly. 

And I never make a speech where this doesn’t come up, and especially overseas. So, I appreciate your comments, and I take them 

to heart. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. 

Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador, it is good to see you again. I have great admiration 

for your spirit of public service and the energy that you bring into 

anything that you do here. 

I would also like to say that I identify with Senator Lugar’s opening statement and, to a certain extent, with the concerns that Senator Corker was laying out that there are a lot of people in this 

35 

country who are very confused. And I think, when you’re working 

on this as intently as you are, the perception may be different. But, 

there is a real need for clarity in terms of what actually can be accomplished through the way that we are going about this. 

We know that we have an obligation to be doing something here 

because of 9/11, but we also know that international terrorism is, 

by its very nature, fluid and mobile. There were no real operational 

al-Qaeda in Iraq when we got to Iraq. They came and they left 

largely before we decided to withdraw. We know that al-Qaeda is 

active in other countries. We have seen estimates, from Mr. Panetta, General Jones, and other people, that the level of al-Qaeda 

inside Afghanistan is less than 100 people. I know where your jurisdiction is, and I know the work that you’re doing cross-border. 

But, for a lot of Americans, this is a very confusing thing. 

Also, you and I know, from history, how effective targeted assassinations are. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yes. 

Senator WEBB. You will recall, when you were talking about the 

very beginning of when you were in Vietnam, when President Kennedy first announced the escalation in Vietnam and the Vietcong 

were assassinating an average of 11 government officials a day. 

So, a lot of this talk about people being nervous about our 

timeline in Afghanistan, I would venture that a good bit of them 

are more nervous about the wedge that is being driven between 

them and this government because of the policy of targeted assassination. 

So, all this sort of comes together in a way that, just speaking 

honestly because I greatly respect what you’re trying to do and I’ve 

withheld any judgment about our policy until this December review—I said that when General Petraeus was at his confirmation 

hearing—but this is becoming more and more opaque to the public 

understanding as it has evolved. 

What I’m looking for is what we’re going to need to see, what the 

American people need to see by December are measurable results 

in a policy not simply program by program but evidence of political 

stability, rather than operation by operation and an agreed-upon 

conclusion. I take your point, which isn’t whether we will walk 

away from an obligation, but there has to come a time when it will 

be appropriate for us to withdraw. We’re not going to be there forever. 

That’s what the American people need to see here. And that’s 

what I’m going to be looking for. And I wish you well. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator, there’s almost nothing you 

said I can quarrel with. And you used the two words that you used 

which echo, and I hope that we all remember, are ‘‘measurable results.’’ We—Senator Kerry began by saying ‘‘accountability,’’ and 

you talk about ‘‘measurable results.’’ So, we’re judging ourselves by 

that. The President is demanding that of the military and civilian 

team that you have had testify before you. 

That’s why I’m making this trip. I was just in the region 2 weeks 

ago. I’m going back. I’m not doing it for the Frequent Flyer miles. 

And I cannot tell you how deeply we feel that pressure, particularly 

because, as several of your colleagues have said, American men 

36 

and women are risking their lives, sometimes paying the ultimate 

price, for this policy. And it has to work. We owe it to them. 

At the same time, we recognize, as Senator Wicker said, that this 

began with 9/11. We’re not there in the way we were in that other 

war that you and I remember. And so, we have to make this work. 

No one knows it better than the outstanding general who is commanding ISAF. I’ve known a lot of four-star generals in my career, 

and I’ve never seen anyone better than David Petraeus. And he is 

coming in under extraordinary circumstances. And he has immediately intensified the efforts. 

Just to give you one example, which shows civilian/military and 

addresses you point, the very first issue he raised with us, in his 

first telephone conversation with Ambassador Eikenberry and me, 

and General Lute from the NSC, of civilian/military, was electricity 

in Kandahar. You all understand the relevance of that to the war 

effort. 

We’re going to give it our best. 

Senator WEBB. Well, again I don’t want to belabor this. I just 

want to be very clear here, I would agree that our difficulty, with 

respect to responding to international terrorism, was illuminated 

by 9/11. The question I’m going to be looking at over the coming 

months is whether we can address the issue of international terrorism through the structure that we’re putting on the ground in 

Afghanistan. And that will be the—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well—— 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. Benchmark here. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator Webb, I just want to finish my 

response, then, by focusing again on what I really actually wanted 

to talk about more here today, which is Pakistan. And you understand why I answer your comment with that comment. 

The western part of Pakistan, the lawless areas, are the epicenter of the issues that threaten our country. They’re directly 

linked to the Taliban, but they’re in Pakistan. 

We have made real progress in Pakistan in the last year and a 

half. But, the focus is so overwhelmingly on Afghanistan—for valid 

reasons; that’s where our troops are—that we have lost—we 

haven’t even recognized the movement in Pakistan, across the 

board—economically, politically, strategically—and the fact that 

that is an important step forward. You want measurable results? 

There’s one. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Senator Webb. 

Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Ambassador Holbrooke, for being here. And, to you 

and all of the folks who are sitting behind you, thank you all very 

much for the work that you’re doing. 

I would like to go back to the issue of reconciliation and focus 

on that a little bit. You mentioned, Ambassador Holbrooke, the 

polling that has been done shows consistently that women, in particular, have concerns about the Taliban and would not like to see 

them return. 

One of the concerns that I have heard consistently about any reintegration or reconciliation efforts with the Taliban are that that 

37 

would be at the expense of women and progress on women’s rights 

and women’s issues on the ground. So, I wonder if you could talk 

a little bit about what’s being done to ensure that any efforts at 

reintegration and reconciliation will not undermine progress for 

women in Afghanistan. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I can assure you, as I know the Secretary of State has assured you, that this will not be allowed to 

happen. I could give you many facts on this—in London, in the conference coming up next week; in the visit here by President Karzai 

and his Cabinet—we have—in the percentage of women in the 

Jirga—we have—in the National Assembly—we and the previous 

administration have consistently made this a priority issue. On 

every trip I make, I meet with women legislators or women civic 

society groups. They are the bravest people in the world, as you 

know firsthand from when you and I were over there together. And 

I can assure you that the United Sates will make sure that they 

are involved in every area. 

We also have these direct programs. They used to be handled 

under contracts. I felt the contracts distanced us too far from the 

actual issues, so we eliminated most of the contracts. There were 

some complaints, and some of the complaints reached your committees. So, I want to explain very clearly to you, Senator, that we terminated as many contracts as we could in order to give more flexibility and more responsiveness in the women’s programs through 

the Ambassador—the Ambassadorial Fund for Women—instead of 

these long 2-, 3-year lead times for programs which don’t meet the 

current crisis. This is also true in Pakistan. I know you’ve talked 

to the Secretary of State about this, as have many of your colleagues. I can assure you, we will never let this issue out of our 

sight. 

Now, in regard to reconciliation, if you read Secretary Clinton’s 

speeches on this, and her comments, mine, and, of course, the 

President’s, we have always made this is critical variable. If somebody wants to be reintegrated or reconciled, they have to accept the 

constitution and they have to renounce violence, and we need specifically, in any reconciliation talks, due respect for all minorities 

and the role of women. It would not be possible to go back to the 

black years. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, could you, then, talk a little bit more 

about how this process might work. Are we on the same page with 

President Karzai on how reintegration and reconciliation will happen? What elements of the Taliban are we focused on? And what’s 

the role of Pakistan as we’re looking at how any negotiation efforts 

would go forward? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. You’re talking about the role of women 

or the whole reconciliation? 

Senator SHAHEEN. I’m talking about the whole process, but I 

assume that the role of women is part of that. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. We’re on the same page with President 

Karzai on the role of women. But, I would be misleading you if I 

said that everyone in Afghanistan society and public life agrees 

with that. There are many conservatives who are anti-Taliban, but 

have the same views of the role of women that you and I would 

38 

object to. And in Pakistan, it’s even more evident. And so, we can 

never cut down our vigilance on this. 

The last three times I was in Afghanistan, I called on the Ulema 

Council, the senior religious governing body, specifically to discuss 

about these issues, because here are anti-Taliban people, but 

they’re very conservative. That’s a legitimate part of Afghan society. And many Afghan women themselves have told me that it’s 

legitimate, in their views. But, at the same time, we cannot leave 

it where it is. And we are constantly talking about it. 

Now, on the larger issue about reconciliation, we and President 

Karzai have begun an intense dialogue on this issue, which Secretary Clinton and I will continue on this trip. And we’ve had similar talks in Islamabad. But, I would tell you, in all frankness, that 

we’re in the early stages of those talks. We couldn’t begin them 

until after the inauguration, after the London conference, and after 

a certain sorting out. And, very importantly, Senator, we want reintegration programs to be out there and established before we 

start getting out in front. That’s why Director Panetta made the 

comments that Senator Wicker referred to. 

And the last point here is critical. The success or failure of reconciliation efforts will be linked directly to the success of the military operations. The more pressure, the more success that General 

Petraeus and his troops have, the more likely it is that the other 

side will recognize the impossibility of their situation. 

Many people come to us and say, ‘‘You ought to have a cease-fire. 

Stop it. It’ll work.’’ I have, based on my own experience, the opposite view. Military success on the battlefield dictates the conditions 

of this sort of process. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So, can you just briefly address Pakistan’s 

role? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Pakistan’s role in reconciliation is ambiguous and opaque at this point. It is something that we want to 

learn more about Pakistani attitudes toward—remember, we’re 

talking about reconciliation in Afghanistan—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. Right. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE [continuing]. Not Pakistan’s own relationships. But, they have five major insurgencies going on in their 

country: the Afghan Taliban; the Pakistani Taliban, who are the 

trainers of the Times Square bomber; LET, which was responsible 

for the Mumbai bombing; the odious Haqqani network group— 

Haqqani group are the ones in north Waziristan who have been 

attacking the American Troops; al-Qaeda itself; and several other 

groups. So, their situation is enormously complicated and unique to 

Pakistan. 

And this is the first time, Senator, we’ve really had these discussions in Islamabad. And we’re very grateful to the leadership that 

has been shown by the Pakistani Government and its military 

leaders for the kind of dialogue that is underway as part of the 

strategic dialogue that Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister 

Qureshi have headed. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. 

Senator LUGAR. Let me intrude for just a moment. The Ambassador will need to leave for the airport in 15 minutes. This does 

allow for two 7-minute question periods, which would be allotted to 

39 

Senators. But, I would ask Senators to be respectful of that. The 

Ambassador, as we know, is flying directly to the scene. 

Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I’ll let Senator Kaufman—— 

Senator LUGAR. Senator Kaufman. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Ambassador, I want to thank you for your service. And I 

especially want to thank your team. This is tough duty, under the 

best of circumstances, and the sacrifices that your team makes 

over. 

And the second thing I’d say is, I think it’s really key—you know, 

we kind of gloss over it—it’s the civilian side of this that’s going 

to make the difference in this. I think our military is performing 

incredibly. They know what they’re doing. They’re doing it well. 

But, it’s going to be the civilian part of this that’s going to make 

this a success, or not, in my opinion. 

In that—with that in mind, you know, we talk about benchmarks. One of the benchmarks I’ve had for the last year and a half 

is not just generally corruption, but what happens when we get the 

many people we’ve brought in, our civilian people, and they start 

working with the ministries, and they start uncovering corruption, 

and they find specific cases that—they have wiretap information, 

they have all kinds of investigative information. So, I’d like your 

comment about—there was a June 28th article, in the Washington 

Post, that the Kabul government’s been derailing these as the cases 

are being brought. To me, this is extremely, extremely serious. It 

goes right to what he said in his statement. It goes to our success. 

Not that there’s corruption in general, but that, when you find corruption and you bring the case, that the case—the people are 

either—the cases are being pushed aside or the people are being 

pardoned. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Could you just clarify the specific question, sir? 

Senator KAUFMAN. Oh, June 28, there was an article in—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yes—— 

Senator KAUFMAN [continuing]. The Washington Post—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE [continuing]. I remember it. 

Senator KAUFMAN [continuing]. That says that the—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. This is the corruption article. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Well, not just corruption. The article says 

that when—they’re finding cases. They are checking—investigating 

them. They’re bringing in the cases. And the cases are being dismissed—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I see. 

Senator KAUFMAN [continuing]. By the Kabul government. I 

mean—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, I read the article carefully, and 

the companion one in the Wall Street Journal. We’re very concerned about it. And I just can’t comment on the specifics of the 

cases, because I just don’t know enough about them. And I don’t 

think I should comment on internal Afghan ongoing investigations. 

The man they’ve talked to—mentioned—Mr. Zima, was part of 

the bribery case against Muhammad Noor. He was the former 

treasurer of Hajj operations. Mr. Noor’s boss, the minister, escaped 

40 

the country before he could be arrested under the indictment. Noor 

himself has been convicted by the anticorruption tribunal, sentenced to 15 years in prison and a $900,000 fine. And I understand 

that the Afghans are commencing an extradition effort against 

Minister Chakari. 

We have a huge anticorruption effort underway, but it built on 

nothing. There was nothing when we came. 

Senator KAUFMAN. No, I—look, I totally—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. And so, to set it up has taken some 

time. Also, as I said earlier, Senator Kaufman, the elections really 

slowed it down. I’m not trying to defend our inability to have done 

more on this issue. It is of the highest importance. General 

Petraeus and I and Ambassador Eikenberry all share that concern. 

And we take that article very, very seriously. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Because I—you know, there’s a general 

charge of corruption, and clearly that’s been one of the issues that 

people have talked about, and I think that’s serious. But, I think 

what my—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. You’re talking about Task Force 2010. 

Senator KAUFMAN. 2010? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. On the—you mean, on the American 

side. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yes. 

Senator KAUFMAN. So—but, I’m just saying the—to me, where 

the rubber hits the road, the benchmark, the civ-mil metrics, all 

that kind of stuff—one of them is, when we get our folks over 

there, and we bring in good folks from DEA, FBI, and the rest of 

it—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Right. 

Senator KAUFMAN [continuing]. And we start to bring cases, you 

know, will the cases actually—will the government have the will to 

actually bring the cases, is one of the key—not just general corruption—you know, allegations, discussions, rumors—but, actually 

bringing cases. And I think this is especially true when you go into 

Kandahar, because I think when we go into Kandahar, we’re going 

to find many, many cases of corruption. This is the Pashtun. This 

is the—the government. So, I’m just concerned that—I’m going to 

be watching very carefully. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. You know, Senator, the Anticorruption 

Tribunal of Afghanistan just convicted a border police general, 

named Saifullah Hakim, and two of his aids, on corruption charges. 

He had 800 ghost soldiers on his payroll. This tribunal’s only been 

in existence for 5 months. It’s a direct result of the efforts of the 

team that’s seated behind me. It’s part of the major—on the U.S. 

side—— 

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE [continuing]. We have the Major Crimes 

Task Force. I don’t want to leave you with the impression that 

we’re solving the problem. But, at least we’ve identified it. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Right. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. We’re working on it. It’s one of our 

highest priorities. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Right. 

41 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. And this tribunal in Kandahar has a 

conviction rate of about 90 percent. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Good. And I’m just—and, as you know, in a 

war on counterinsurgency it’s a battle between whether the people 

respect the government, or not. It’s kind of basic to counterinsurgency. There’s a lot of talk, in the committee, about all these different things that not true. We know what counterinsurgency is. 

And one of the things, Do they respect the government, and will 

the rule the government? And clearly this is whether the government do that. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. One last point, Senator. Admiral 

Mullen, responding to these concerns and recognizing a previously 

unrecognized fact, which was, one of the major sources of corruption was in U.S. military contracts, established the task force I 

mentioned a minute ago—Task Force 2010. And I think that the 

admiral in charge of it is—I think you met with her—I think that’s 

the admiral you’re referring to. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Right. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. And I apologize for not remembering 

her last—— 

VOICE. Dussault. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Admiral Dussault. Yes, she has been 

into our offices, and we’re working very closely with her. And 

they—and their Task Force 2010 is really important, and its task 

is to review all contracts in order to limit contract-related fraud. 

Imagine that a year and—a year ago, this—the issue wasn’t even 

acknowledged. Not an excuse, and it’s not a solution, but at least 

we’re being open and addressing it directly now. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you. 

And thank you, Senator Menendez, for yielding. I appreciate 

that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Senator Kaufman. 

Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Thank you, Ambassador, for your service. I appreciate you have 

to leave. I hope you appreciate I have to cast votes on lives and 

billions of dollars. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yes, sir. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So, I’ll try to make it as quick as possible. 

I remain deeply concerned. I agree that you cannot talk about 

Afghanistan without talking about Pakistan. Obviously the more 

troops we deploy to Afghanistan, the more dependent we become on 

Pakistan for transit, logistical, and other support. So, as we developed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, I sought 

to include provisions that would ensure the United States has, one, 

a comprehensive strategy to eliminate terrorist threats and close 

safe havens to Pakistan; and, two, to assess the effectiveness of 

assistance provided, including—as it relates to efforts undertaken 

by the Government of Pakistan—to disrupt, dismantle, defeat extremist and terrorist groups in the FATA and settled areas. 

Now, as of this moment, the administration has yet to provide 

these congressionally mandated reports, as the law calls for. I highVerDate Nov 24 2008 18:50 Nov 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
42 

lighted that fact in a letter to Secretary Clinton last week, and 

urged the completion of those reports. 

Have you been involved in the preparation of those reports? And 

are you ready to make such congressionally mandated reports to 

Congress? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator, of course I’m ready to comply 

with any congressional mandates, as I have throughout my career. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And have you participated in the creation of 

these reports? 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. With your permission, Senator, may I 

just consult Assistant Secretary Verma for a second? 

Senator MENENDEZ. Surely. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Because I just need to clarify what 

we’re talking about here. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Surely. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I was not aware of a noncompliance on 

a mandated report. 

[Pause.] 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator, my colleagues believe we are 

in compliance with the dates and the deadlines of the requirements 

from this committee and the Congress, and that there was a request for an update. I am not familiar with your letter to Secretary 

Clinton. Perhaps Secretary Verma can address that. 

But, I do want to assure you, because it is—not just because we 

have an obligation to you, but because it is everything I’ve believed 

in, in my career, that we owe you whatever information—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE [continuing]. You ask for. 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. I would just simply—— 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. And I don’t know what we would—— 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. I would just simply ask you, 

and through you to the State Department, reiterate my request to 

Secretary Clinton. If you’re all in conformance, then somehow this 

member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has yet to see 

that report. So, I would like to see it, and I’d like to get a copy tomorrow, if I can. If it’s already out there, then we should be able 

to have it. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Of course you—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. I certainly will not vote for any more money 

unless I have a clear sense that we are headed in the right direction or that we are meeting goals and our resources are being well 

spent. And I can’t do that unless I start off with the basis of understanding that we have benchmarks, and those benchmarks are 

being met. So, I hope we can get the report. Somehow maybe it 

missed my office. 

I have one other question, and then I’ll let you go. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I absolutely—I will commit that we 

will—as soon as this meeting’s over—will drill down, determine 

what the issue is, and locate where it is, and we will be back to 

you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Now, one more question. General 

McChrystal had a series of comments that he made about our civilian side overall. Of course, he was relieved of his command. I just 

want to know this: Are we all on the same page? You, the AmbasVerDate Nov 24 2008 18:50 Nov 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
43 

sador, now General Petraeus—are we all on the same page? 

Because even being on the same page, it is a hard battle and challenge to win. But, if we’re not all on the same page, it certainly 

doesn’t create confidence in those of us who are asked to cast votes 

here for a continuing engagement. So, maybe you can reassure me 

that we are all on the same page, moving in the same direction, 

executing the same strategy, and moving toward a goal that we can 

collectively have success with. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. It’s a very legitimate question, of 

course, in light of the Rolling Stone article, which obviously was 

extraordinarily unfortunate and necessitated a completely correct 

decision by our Commander in Chief, because basic issues of civilian/military control were involved. And although it brought to an 

end the career of a very distinguished and fine officer, it was necessary to do. 

As far as your core question goes, let me assure you and state 

again, for the record, that my counterpart, until 2 weeks ago, was 

David Petraeus. For a year and a half, we worked seamlessly, continually. He is now the counterpart, of course, of the Ambassador. 

There was never a problem between us. We had tactical disagreements. But, we traveled around the world together. We testified 

before your committee together. And we forged a common civilian/ 

military strategy. I’ve been involved in civilian/military efforts all 

my career. This is the best one I’ve ever seen. And, as I’ve said before, General Petraeus is the outstanding senior officer I’ve ever 

worked with. And we are absolutely on the same page when it 

comes to the overall strategy and working together. There are disagreements once in a while, and the press exaggerates them. 

The article was a group of ad hominem remarks, some of them 

aimed at me, which made no difference to me, in my conduct of the 

war, nor, in fact, for my regard for General McChrystal. President 

Obama, addressing exactly the point that you raised in his meeting 

with us the day that he changed the command, and then in his 

public statements, made absolutely clear that we were all on the 

same page. 

I’ve done CIVMIL before, and we’re in good shape here. And I am 

fully satisfied about it. And I will be seeing General Petraeus in 

just a couple of days, and we will continue this. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Have a good journey. I look forward to the 

report. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, sir. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Senator Menendez. 

And special thanks to you, Ambassador Holbrooke, once again, 

for remarkable testimony and responsiveness to the questions of 

our members, and likewise pledges to bring additional materials, as 

requested, in a timely way. 

And we wish you godspeed in your travels. We’re hopeful that 

the conferences you have will be very productive for our country, 

as well as those with whom you are working. 

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Senator Lugar. 

And thank you, again, for Kerry-Lugar-Berman. It really made 

a difference. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, sir. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

44 

[Whereupon, at 4:26 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD HOLBROOKE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Question. The U.S. Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy 

pledges support for the Afghan Government reintegration efforts for Taliban and 

other fighters. Human Rights Watch, in a new report, has noted concerns that 

reintegration incentives, for example, to mid or higher level commanders, who can 

bring in combatants under their command, may be given without proper vetting for 

human rights and other abuses. What kinds of mechanisms are in place or should 

be put in place to ensure appropriate protections? 

Answer. The program document for the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program 

(APRP), which was endorsed by participants at the July 8 meeting of the Joint 

Coordination and Monitoring Board and unveiled at the Kabul Conference, makes 

it clear that the APRP ‘‘is not a framework for pardoning all crimes and providing 

blanket amnesty. Grievance resolution and afwa [forgiveness] will be sought in accordance with Afghanistan’s Constitution, laws and treaty obligations.’’ The program 

document notes that ex-combatants will be granted political amnesty, freedom of 

movement and freedom from arrest for past political actions only if they agree to 

live within the laws of Afghanistan and subject themselves to its treaty obligations. 

It also states that the Afghan Government will ‘‘set a legal framework for political 

amnesty and forgiveness . . . in consultation with the justice sector, respecting 

Afghanistan’s laws, Constitution, and treaty obligations, and the Afghan people’s desire for peace.’’ The APRP also provides for the formation of a legal team within the 

APRP’s Joint Secretariat which will ‘‘align the terms of political amnesty and grievance resolution/afwa with the Afghan Constitution and existing domestic counterterrorism and criminal legislation.’’ This team will also provide advice to the Afghan 

Government including the APRP’s High Peace Council and will ‘‘prepare the legal 

framework and guidelines for amnesty and grievance resolution within the boundaries set by Afghanistan’s Constitution and treaty obligations.’’ 

Question. Under Secretary Flournoy, in her testimony before the Senate Armed 

Services Committee last month, mentioned a ‘‘high peace council or commission, 

which will be the Afghan mechanism that will really begin to try to start thinking 

through reconciliation.’’ How does the Afghan Government plan to ensure broad and 

effective representation on such a high council, including by women and minority 

religious and ethnic groups? How will it assure the Afghan people of the representative and transparent nature of such a mechanism? 

Answer. The Afghan Government is in the lead on reconciliation and reintegration 

initiatives in Afghanistan and they are making every effort to ensure that the High 

Peace Council will be inclusive. At the Kabul Conference they released their reintegration plan, the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP), which offers 

the following assurances about representation on the High Peace Council: 

• ‘‘The High Peace Council will seek to represent the views of all Afghans and 

provide political and strategic leadership to the Program [APRP]. The Council 

will be comprised of state and nonstate actors, women and minorities, military, 

civilian and respected individuals, including representation from both Afghan 

Houses of Parliament. There will be space reserved for existing/potential 

reconcilees within the HPC, contingent upon their acceptance of the laws of 

Afghanistan.’’ 

• ‘‘Afghan men and women will be seated on the High Peace Council, and Afghan 

women, victims, and civil society groups will play a vital role in monitoring the 

peace and reintegration process; providing advice to the Government on how to 

promote peace that benefits all Afghan citizens and ensuring that all opinions 

can be expressed and all voices heard. The APRP will also promote the role of 

victims and civil society groups in promoting constructive debate, building conflict management and grievance resolution capacity, leading advocacy for rights 

of all and ensuring inclusive processes.’’ 

• ‘‘Social outreach and communications for the APRP will be conducted at national and subnational levels using contemporary media, governors’ spokesmen, 

and traditional forms of communication through mosques and provincial jirgas. 

The National Ulema Council—which will be represented on the High Peace 

Council—will encourage cooperation. According to the APRP’s program docuVerDate Nov 24 2008 18:50 Nov 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
45 

ment, ‘‘The communications and outreach plan will promote peace, and will continuously and transparently convey information on progress to the public.’’ 

RESPONSE OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD HOLBROOKE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

Question. Afghanistan’s parliamentary elections are scheduled for September 18, 

2010. What steps are being taken to ensure that the same difficulties that plagued 

the 2009 Presidential elections do not resurface in September? 

Answer. The Independent Electoral Commission [IEC], which is under new and 

improved leadership this year, is working to address problems that surfaced in the 

2009 Presidential elections. We assess that it is on track to improve security, transparency, and accountability for the upcoming parliamentary elections. The IEC is 

largely on schedule in registering voters, preparing polling center and ballot materials, and hiring staff. We are encouraged by the IEC’s plans to detect and mitigate 

fraud for the September 18 parliamentary elections, some of which are described 

below: 

—The IEC has developed a number of new security features to prevent the reproduction and/or tampering of sensitive materials, which include a unique serial 

number on each ballot for tracking purposes as well as barcode readers that will 

scan the ballot packs and tamper evident bags. 

—As a means of improvement from previous elections, the IEC also plans to finalize 

the list of polling centers at least 1 month prior to Election Day. The development 

of a two-tiered assessment this year is a more comprehensive approach for determining and establishing the list of viable polling centers. 

—In order to ensure that there will be no movement of materials prior to counting, 

votes will be counted at the polling station, in full view of political agents and 

observers. The number of votes cast for each candidate will be entered both in 

numbers and words to mitigate the tampering of the result sheets—another notable improvement from last year’s elections. 

We are also encouraged that the Electoral Complaints Commission appears to be 

well led. Two of the five electoral commissioners are international experts—one 

Iraqi and one South African. Both are highly regarded. 

A persisting problem for the upcoming elections is the difficulty of recruiting 

female searchers for prospective polling centers, which, according to the Ministry of 

the Interior (MOI), is due to budget constraints. We will continue to push this issue 

with the MOI to ensure that enough female searchers are recruited and trained for 

the elections. 

Security also continues to be a problem, more so in some provinces than others. 

Security will most likely be the ultimate determinant of voter turnout on Election 

Day, especially with regards to female voters, who require extra protection. MOI has 

also been tasked to provide police forces to guard female voters, but has yet to do 

so. 

Æ