### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00196- CV

Na th an Bu sh, App e lla nt

v. Colem an Powerm ate, Inc. and Tecum seh P roducts Com pany, Ap pellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF SAN SABA COUNTY , 33RD JUDICIAL DISTRI CT NO. 7871, H ONO RAB LE GUILFO RD L. JONES, JUDGE PRESI DING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Nathan B ush was injured by a fire that erupte d while he wa s ref ueling a g ener ator manufa cture d by Coleman Powermate , I nc., and power ed by a Tec umseh Products Company motor. He a sserted ne g lige nce a nd products liability

clai m s ag ainst both Coleman and Tec umseh. The distric t c o u rt g r an te d a

p p e ll e e s ’ mo ti o n s to e xc lu d e f o u r o f B u s h ’ s e xp e rt w it

n e s s e s an d

g rante d summary judgme nt in favor of appellee s on all claims. Bush appea ls the exclusion of his e x pert witnesses and the summary judgme nt ag ainst his marketing defe ct claims under neg lige nce and strict pr od uc ts l ia bil ity the or ie s. We a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt.
BACK GR OUND This backg round sec tion is derived from the depositions and other doc uments filed in this case, as w ell as live testimony taken at the Robinson hear ing. Se e E. I. du Po nt de Ne mo ur s v. Robinson , 923 S.W .2d 549, 557 (Tex. 1995).2 A tt h e t i m e o f

t h e f i r e , B u s h w a s c o n s t r

u c t i n g h i s h o m e w i t h t o o l s p o w e r e d b y a Coleman g ener ator e quipped with a Te cumseh ga soline eng ine. Whil e he was using a skill saw, the g ener ator ra

n out of g as. The g ener ator wa s just outs ide the bac k door. Bush chec ked the oil and
remove d the g as ca

p, then walke d around the house to his tr uck to g et a g as ca

n. He a lso picked up a g allon jug of

water , took a drink, and pour ed water ove r himself to cool down. Bush testified that he did not kn o w h o w m u ch time elapse d afte r the g ener ator ra n out of g as bef

ore he attempted to re fuel it. He a nd Tec umseh’s attorne y

had this exchang e: Q. How much time ela

psed fr om when the g ener ator ran out of g as and y ou actua lly started pour ing f

uel in it? I n other words, was that a 30-sec ond period of time, wa lk to the truck and ba ck— A. Oh, no. Q. —or wa s it fiv e minutes bec ause you wer e messing around doing something e lse? A. Yea h. I t w as—I don’t have an exact time. L ong enoug h for me to c heck the oil and walk to my truck and g et a dr ink of wate r. I mean, I didn’t—I wa s in no hurr y . I t w a s p re tty

ho t.
Bush r eturne d to t he g ener ator, re chec ked the oil, re place d the oil cap, a nd beg an re fueling . He testified that he did not spill any g asoline. As he be nt over to monitor the level of g as, B ush hear d a “woof” noise and dropped the g as ca n, splashing g asoline on himself. His fa ce a nd neck c aug ht fire. With some difficulty , he extinguished the f lames on his body

and soug ht help. The g ener ator B ush used was pur chased at a pa wn shop by

Bush’ s stepfathe r for Bush’ s brother. It did not come to B ush in a manufa cture r’s box , and he was unsure whether it was3

acc ompanied by

an owne r’s manua l. Bush pre viously had used this g ener ator without mecha nical problems or fir e, and ha d used other g ener ators while in the military
.

I n J une 2000, B ush sued Coleman and Te cums eh, allegingdesig n and mar keting de fe c t c la ims un de r str ic t pr od uc ts lia bil ity and ne g lig e nc e the or ie s. Ap pe lle e s fi le d mot ion s to exclude testimony

by Bush’ s experts L ori Hasselbr ing, Joe Fow ler, Way mon J ohnston, J udd Clay ton, and Paul Be aver . Hasselbr ing a nd Fowle r we re t o testify about the auto- ignition of g asoline. Johns ton was to testify about t he need for a warning on the gene rator to wait two minutes afte r shutting it down bef ore r efue ling. Clay

ton was to testify

abo u t t he likely

source of ig nition. Be av er, the fire ma

rshal, wa s to testify

about his investigation of the fire . Appellee s alleg ed that the se wi tne sse s w e re no t qu a lif ie d to g ive op ini on s a s to de sig n d e fe c ts, da ngers ass ociat e d w ith ref ueling a hot g ener ator, or c ausation. Appe l lees a lso claimed that Ha sselbring and F owler’ s opinions were ba sed on flaw ed re asoning and methodolog y and that the unde rlying f acts did not pr ov ide an a de qu a te ba sis fo r t he ir op ini on s. Ap pe lle e s f

ile d tr a dit ion a l and

no -e vid e nc e mot ion s f

or su mma ry jud g me nt a s to a ll
c la ims . T he se mot ion s c ha lle ng e d the e vid e nc e B us h h a d a dd uc e d o n d e sig n a

nd mark e tin g de fe c ts and his ability

to prove causation. Bush defende d the neglig ence and marketing defe ct claims; he
e xpre ssl y did no t c on te st j ud g me nt a g a ins t hi s d e sig n a nd manu fa c tur ingde fe c t c la ims
. At the Robinson he ari ng , h e ld a ft e r t he a g re e d d isc ov e ry

de a dli ne pa sse d, a

pp e lle e s’ witnesses cr iticiz ed B ush’s expert witnesses’ r eliance on estimates o f the closed- containerautoig nit ion te mpe ratur e of

g a so lin e in c onclu di ng that the g e ne ra

tor ha d b e e n h ot e no ug h to ig nit eDwig ht Pfennig has three deg ree s: a bac helor’s in pe troleum eng ineer ing a nd master’ s and 1 do c to r ’ s i n c he mic a l e ng ine e ri ng . H is w or k f oc us e s o n p ote nti a l f

ir e s and e xplos ion s f

ro m c he mic a ls and hot equipment. The district cour

t said it did not exclude Be aver ’s t estimony beca use B eave r did not offe r 2 an opinion reg ardingcausation. 4 g a so lin e va

po rs wh e n B us h r e fu e le d it . App e ll ees’ e xpe rt Dw ig ht P fe nn ig te sti fi e d th a t th e fa c ts 1 of thi s c a se re qu ir e d ap pli c a tio n of t he a uto -i g nit ion

te mpe ratur e fo r o pe n- a ir

c on dit ion s, wh ic h is about 360 deg ree s Fa

hrenhe it (360oF) hig her tha n the closed- container

temperature. The district cour

t stated at the he aringthat it would ex clude testimony from four

of Bush’ s witnesses. Subsequently , the dis t ri ct cour t sent the parties a

n e-ma il “order

/ruling of the 2 court” that was “ to be re duced to a formal or der.” The court found t hat t he “fit” of t he science to the fac ts of the ca se wa s fa t ally flawe d beca

use B ush’s experts’ fa iled to consider the ope n-air autoignition t emper ature of gasoline. The court also noted that B ush’s experts had fa iled to ge t ga soline to auto-ig nite during their t ests. The c ourt furthe r found no e vidence of ca usation in the rec ord as a matter of law. I t c oncluded that failing to attach a war ning to the g ener ator rec ommending atwominute waiting pe riod betwe en turning the g ener ator off and refueling , as B ush advocated, could not have c aused the fire be cause (1) B ush “cle arly waited at least two minutes” bef ore r efue ling the g ener ator, a

nd (2) r eg ardle ss of the wa it, “ open-a ir auto-ig nition of this ty pe of e ng ine/g ener ator ha s been pr oven to be a ll but im possible even without a cooling off period.” The court g rante d summary judgme nt to appellees on a ll claims without specifying whether it relied on traditional or no- evidenc e g ro un ds fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt.5 Th e c ourt

su bs e qu e ntl y

sig ne d s e pa

ra te ord ers g ra

nti ngsu mma

ry jud g me nt t o Col e man and Te c ums e h o n ( 1) the c on te ste d d e sig n a nd manu fa c tur ingde fe c t c la ims , a nd (2 ) a ll
re ma ini ngc la ims . T he c ourt did no t e la bo rate on the ba sis fo r i ts r

uli ng s. B us h f ile d a motio n for ne w tri a l and to r e c on sid e r t he e xclu sio n o f h is e xpe rt s. B us h also asked the court to c onsider re ports submitt ed by two expert witnesses on Dec ember 31, 2003, afte r the c ourt’s ruling s. This moti on was ove rruled by operation of law, and this appe al ensue d.
DI SCU SSIO N Bush a ppeals the district court’s exclusion of his ex pert witnesse s and g rantingof the
summa ry jud g me nt a s to his mark e tin g de fe c t c la ims
. Exclusion of experts

We reviewthe d i s t ri ct cour t’s exclusion of ex pert testimony for a n abuse of discretion. See R obinson , 9 2 3 S
. W
. 2 d a t 5 5 8
. W e d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l c o u rta c t e d ar b i t r ar i l y,
unrea sonably , or without ref ere nce to any g uiding rules or principles. See D owner v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc. , 701 S.W .2d 238, 241-42 (Te x . 1985). The te st is not whether, “in the opinion of the reviewing court, the fac ts prese nt an appr opriate c ase f or the trial c ourt’s ac tion.” Id. a t 2 4 1
. We cannot c onclude that a

trial court ab u s ed i t s discretion mer ely beca use we would have r

uled differ ently
. See id. at 242. The tria l court enjoy s wide latit ude in deter mining the admissibili ty

of expert testimony
. W

olfson v. Bic Corp. , 95 S.W .3d 527, 532 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2002, pet. denied)
.6 Texas Rule of Evidence 702 permits a witness qualifie d as an e x pert by knowledg e, sk ill , e xpe ri e nc e , tr a ini ng , o r e du c a tio n to te sti fy on sc ie nt i f i c , t e c hnic a l, o r o the r s pe c ia lize d s ub je c ts if the testimony

would assist the tr i er o f fa ct in understandingthe evidenc e or de termining a fa ct issue. Tex. R. Evi d. 702. The party offe ring the expert’s testimony bear s the burden to pr ove that the witness is qualified under Rule 702. Gammill v. Jac k W illiams C hevrole t, Inc. , 972 S.W .2d 713, 718-19 (Te x . 1998) (trial courts must “ensure that those who purpor t to be experts truly

have
e xpe rt ise c on c e rn ingthe a c tua l su bje c t a bo ut whic h th e y

are of fe ri ng an o pin ion ” ). I n a dd iti on to sh ow ingthat th e wi tne ss i s an ex pert , the p ro po ne nt m us t sh owtha

t th e e xpe rt ’s te sti mony

is rele vant to the issues in the case and is ba sed upon a reliable foundation. Robinson , 923 S.W .2d at 55 6; see D aubert v. Me rrell Dow Pharm., Inc. , 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).

To be re le va

nt, the pr op os e d e xpe rt

te sti mony

mus t be “ su ff

ic ie ntl y tie d to t

he fa c ts of the c ase that it will aid the jury in re s o lving a

fac tual dispute.” Robinson , 923 S.W .2d at 556. Ev ide nc e that be ars no re latio ns hip to t he iss ue s o f t

he c a se is irr e le va

nt an d doe s not s a tis fy

Rul e 702’s re quirement that the te stimony be of a ssistance to the jury
. Id. To be re liable, the expert’s method must be g rounded in the me thods and proce dures of scienc e and the opinion must be more than subjective be lief or unsupporte d speculation. Se e id
. a t 55 7. I f a

n e xpe rt re lie s o n unr e lia

ble fo un datio na l data , a

ny op ini on dr awn fr om t hat da ta is unreliable
. Merre ll Dow Pharms., Inc. v . Havne r , 953 S.W. 2d 70 6, 71 4 ( Te x. 19 97 ); Union Carbide Cor p. v . M ay fie ld , 66 S.W .3d 354, 362 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi 2001, pet. denied). Even when based on sound data, an e x pert’s te stim ony is unreliable if the expert’s methodolog y is flawed. Havne r , 953 S.W .2d at 714. The trial court must decide only whether the ana ly sis used to reac h the7

conclusions i s reliable , not whether the expert’s conc lusions are c orre ct. Perez v . Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tex., Inc

. , 127 S.W .3d 826, 830 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet. denied).

The Robinson opinion provides a non-e x clusive list of fac tors a trial c ourt may consider in makingthe threshold admissibility deter mination under Rule 702; these include: (1) the extent to which the expert’s theory has been or can be tested, ( 2) the e x tent to which the tec hnique
re lie s u po n th e su

bje c tiv e int e rp re tatio n o f t he e xpe rt , (3) wh e the r the the or y ha s bee n sub

je c te d to peer revie w and/or othe r publication, (4) the technique ’s p o tential rate of er ror, ( 5) whe ther the
un de rl yingthe or

y or te c hn ique has be e n g e ne ra lly a c c e pte d a s v a lid

by the re le va

nt s c ie nti fi c community , and (6) the non-judicial uses w hich have been ma de of the t h eo ry or tec hnique. Robinson , 9 23 S.W. 2d

a t 55 7; see Volk

s w a g en of Am., Inc. v . Ramirez , N o . 0 2

- 0 5 5 7 , 2 0 0 4 WL 3019227, at *4 (Te x . 2004).

We will begin by

consideringtoge ther the ex clusion of t estimony from Ha sselbring
and Fowl er beca

us e the y fi le d a joi nt r e po rt

and be c a us e the ir re po rt un de rl ie s th e oth e r e xpe rt s’ testimony
. We w ill then se parately consider the exclusion of testim ony from Johnst on and Clay

ton.
Hasselbrin g and Fow ler Hasselbr ing a

nd Fowle r ar e both licensed professional eng ineer s. Hasselbr ing holds a bac helor’s de g ree in paper scienc e and e ng ineer ing a nd master’ s and doctora l de g ree s in chemica l eng ineer ing. She has many y ear s of experienc e in the petr ochemica l industry with an emphasis on pla sti c s p ro du c tio n, pr oces sing , a nd c omm e rc ia l a

pp lic a tio ns . Sh e ha s p e rf or me d f a ilure ana ly sis and ac ci d en t documentation and investig ation, particula rly in the chemica l and petroc hemical i n d u s t ri es . F o wl er

h o l d s a b ac h el o r’ s , m as t er ’s , an d d o ct o ra l d egr ee s i nm ec h an i ca l en gi n ee ri n g. Fowle r has c ons u l t ed with more than two hundre d companies r eg ardingthe mecha nical desig n of8

proce ss plant equipm en t , d evelopment of pipeline desig n criter ia and ope ratingproce dures, f ire
sa fe ty of me c ha

nic a l and c on sume r p ro du c t e qu ipm e nt, fatigue de sig n, fi nit e e le me nt a na ly sis , s tr a in g aug e testing , drilling and production equipment desig n and operation, failure analy sis, and g ener al mecha nical eng ineer ing te sting a nd desig n. I n their j oint repor

t, Hasselbr ing and Fowler stated that, in order f or g asoline to autoignite dur ing r efue ling of

a g ener ator, g asoline vapor s must contact s ome part of t he gene rator that is heated at or a

bove the c losed-conta iner a uto-ig nition temperature of g asoline, which the y ident if ie d a s b e in g b e tw e e n6 3 5 o F an d 8 5 3 o F
. V ar ia

b le s th e y id e n ti f ie d th a t a f f e c t a u to
- ignition include vapor

conce nt ra t i o n , ambient temper ature , wind speed, w inter ver sus summer blends of g asoline, re g ular unlea ded g asoline ver sus premium unleade d g asoline, g asoline additives, amount of g asoline poure d, elevation of the ca n, whether

g asoline has been spilled, a nd the exact seque nce of e ve nts le a din g to a

pa rt ic ula r i nc ide nt. Ha sse lbr ingand F ow le r c on c lud e d th a t it is d if fi c ult to deter mine s p ec i fi c combinations of these va riables that may

lead to the a

uto-ig nition of ga soline d u ri n g re fu el i n g.

Hasselbr ing a

nd Fowle r conduc ted a se ries of tests to determine if B ush’s g ener ator had re ache d the closed- container auto-ig nition temperature of g asoline. They place d an exemplar Coleman g enerat or in the cor ner of a fire box with the firebox doors left open. The y measure d surfa ce te mperature ne ar the muffler exhaust, which they

found wa s the hottest contact surf ace on the g ener ator. Ha sselbring and F owler r an two diffe rent ser ies of tests: “load tests” measuringthe temperature of the g ener ator whe n used to power a devic e, and “ fire te sts ” in which they spilled g asoline on the g ener ator.The temperature rea ched 756oF in another te st, but the eng ine ra n out of g asoline bef

ore 3 the te ste rs c ou ld s pil l g a so lin e on it. Ap pe lle e s’ e xpe rt Pf e nn igsa id t

he g e ne ra tor re a c he d 8 91 oF in on e of hi s tes ts , but di d not app roac h the ope n-ai r auto -i gnit io n tem pera tu re of gasol in e of 1 15 5o F, and sti ll d id n ot c a

us e a uto -i g nit ion

of g a so lin e va

po rs . 9 D u r i n g t h e l o a d t e s t s , t h e g e n e r a t o r r a r e l y r e a c he d th e min imum te mpe ratur e thr e sh old Hasselbr ing and Folwer identified for the closed-c ontainer auto-ig nition of g asoline. The muf fler temperature stay ed nea

r 600oF with no load (594oF in one test, 603oF in the second), a nd fluctuate d betwee n 378oF to 644oF with loads. Wit hin two minutes afte r the g ener ator wa s shut off, the muffle r temperature droppe d to 441oF.

Duringthe fire tests, Hasselbringand F owler were not able to g et g asoline to autoignite. U sing r egular g asoline with no load on the g ener ator, the muffl er reac hed a c onstant temperature of 558oF and 585oF in two tests. When the y spilled 20 milli liters of g asoline onto the muf fl e r, no ig nit ion

oc c ur re d; B us h’ s e xpe rt s c on c e de d that th e y we re no t surp ri se d b y

thi s development be cause the muffler temperature was below the 635oF tempe rature minimum they had identified for

closed-c ontainer a

uto-ig nition of ga soline. Nor did ig nition occur when they

ran the g ener ator on pre mium unleaded gasoline, which raised the g ener ator’s ma x imum temperature . The muffler temperature re ache d 693oF a nd 612oF wi t h n o l o ad , and 734oF when a 150-watt load was added t o the g ener ator. Wit hin two minutes after the g ener ator wa s shut off, the muffle r 3 te mpe ratur e dr op pe d to 49 5o F to 5 00 oF . O nc e aga in, g a so lin e sp ill e d o n th e mot or did no t ig nit e during an y o f th e te s ts , e v e n w h e n th e te mp e r a tu r e w a s w it

h in th e a u to
- ig n it io n r an g e f

o r closed container s, althoug h white smoke twice emanated from the r otor and fr om underne ath the bottom of the g ener ator.B u s h a tt e mp te d to f il e an a d d it io n a l e xp e rt r e p o rt a f te r s u mm ar

y ju d g me n t w h e n the 4 discovery deadline, the evidenc e-f

iling dea dline, and the Robinson hear ing all had passed. L ate- filed e vid e nc e is no t pa

rt of the summa

ry -j ud g me nt r e c or d unle ss t he dis tr ic t c ourt

g ra nte d le a ve to f

ile it. See Te x. R. A

pp . P. 16 6a (c ); see also Benc hmark Bank v. Crowder , 9 1 9 S. W. 2 d

6 5 7 , 6 6 3 ( T e x. 1 9 96 ); B a s in Credit Consultants, Inc. v. Obregon , 2 S.W. 3d 37 2, 37 4 ( Te x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 1 999, pet. denied) . Finding no indication that the district court g rante d such leave, we cannot c on sid e r t his e vid e nc e on

a pp e a l. 10 Ha s s el b ri n g an d

Fo wl er o ff er ed co n cl u s i o n s t h at (1 ) t h er e w er e i n s u ff i ci en twa rn i n gs in operating manua ls and on the g ener ator a nd eng ine re g ardingpossible auto-ig nition of ga soline during ref ueling and contact wit h hot surfa ces, and (2) both Coleman and Tecumseh we re ne g lige nt in not testing the g ener ator a nd eng ine to deter

mine the possibili ty of auto-ig nition of g asoline during
re fu el i n g. We c on c lud e that th e c ourt a c te d r e a so na

bly in e xclu din g the se witnes se s b e c a us e they wer e not shown to be e x perts in the re levant field and bec ause the ir opinions do not satisfy Robinson . Although ha

ving e x pertise in other

are as, Ha sselbring had not per formed a ny wor kon
a g e ne rator be fo re thi s c a se . Sh e te sti fi e d th a t sh e ha d n o e xpe rt ise or sp e c ia lize d k

no wl e dg e wi th respe ct to internal-c ombustion engine s, g ener ators, produc t warning s or the or i gins and ca uses of fire. F owler a dmitted that he had no expertise or spe cialize d k n o wl ed ge wi th respec t to product
wa rn ing s. No r did Ha sse lbr ing and F ow le r sa tis fy the fi rs t Robinson require ment that their theorie s
o nc a u s a t i o nh a v e b e e no r c an b e p r o v e nt h r o u g h o t h e r s c i e n t i f i c a l l y v a l i d

t e s t i n g . T o t h e c o n t r ar

y, Hassel b ri n g an d Fowle r fa iled to start a fire by dripping g asoline on a hot g ener ator whe n testing t h e i r t h e o r y. 4 T h e c o n c lu s io n s dr aw n b y H a s s e lb r in g an d F o w le r a ls o d o n o t s a ti s f y th e sec ond R o b i n son f

a c to r b e c a

u s e th e y ar e b a s e d o n s u

b je c ti v e in te r

p r e tati o n , a s th e e xp e rts p r o d u c ed no11

objective e vidence —and only unsucce ssful tests—to support their theory of causation. Nor did they show that their theor

y is supported by

other tests or studies, has be en subjec ted to peer revie w or pu bli c a tio n, is g e ne ra lly a c c e pte d as va lid by the re le va nt sc ie nti fi c c omm

un ity , or h a s b e e n u se d in non-judicial setting s. See V olkswagen , 2004 WL 3019227, at *5. Under these c ircumstance s, the potential rate of er ror with re spect to the c onclusions
and op ini on s o f H a sse lbr ingand F ow le r i s h ig h, and

the g a p b e tw e e n th e the or

y and the fa c ts o f t

his
case is too larg e. The y

wer e unable to obtain ignition even when pourin g g asoline on the hot g e ne rator imm e diate ly

a ft e r i t st op pe d r

unnin g (i n c on tr a st t o the de lay of un c e rt a in d

ur a tio n in thi s
case ). The c ourt could have conclude d that their use of the auto-ig nition temperature of g asoline for
c los e d- c on ta ine rs wa s im

pr op e r g ive n th a t th e g e ne ra tor wa s outs ide the ba c k doo r in this c a se ; us e of the ope n-air te mperature would re q u i re the g ener ator to re ach a temperature fa

r above any achie ved in B ush’s expert’s tests. There is a g ap betwee n the fa cts of this case and Ha sselbring and Fowle r’s theor

y and tests bec ause the latter are predicated on conditions that Bush himself de nied exis ted. The district cour

t did not abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony

of Ha sselbring and Fowle r as unr eliable. See V olkswagen , 2004 WL 3019227, at *5.
Johns ton John sto n, a

lic e ns e d p ro fe ssi on a l e ng ine e r a nd c e rt if ie d saf e ty pr of e ssi on a l, h old s a bache lor’s deg ree in mechanic al eng ineer ing a nd a master ’s an d d o ctora l deg ree in industrial eng ineer ing. He taug ht huma n fac tors, product safe ty , and industrial safe ty eng ineer ing f

or 24 y ear s
a t T e xas A & M Uni ve rs ity
. He ha s ove r te n y e ars of ind us tr ia l e xpe ri e nc e and

ha s b e e n invo lve d in12

safe ty eng ineer ing and acc ident preve ntion a ctivities in the milit ary and the petroleum a nd aer ospace ind us tr ie s. John sto n c on c lud e d th a t Co le man a nd Te c ums e h k

ne w o r s ho uld

have kn ow n th a t: (1) individuals occ asionally would spill gasoline while r efue ling hot g ener ator e ng ines, (2) a fire
c ou ld o c c ur

a s a re su lt, (3 ) s e ri ou s in

jur ie s c ou ld o c c ur

fr om s uch a fi re , ( 4) the wa rn ing s in the ir
owner ’s manuals we re ina dequate with respec t to these dang ers, a nd (5) the g ener ator a

nd eng ine
we re d ef ec t i v e an d u n re as o n ab l y d an ger o u s wi t h re s p ec t t o t h e da n ger s as s o ci at ed wi t h re fu el i n g a hot eng ine. He te stified, howeve r, that “I ’m not g iving any opinions a bout c ausation.” I n forming his opinion, J ohnston relied on his review of mater ials furnished to him (including the re port by Ha sse lbr ingand

Fowl er), hi s tra ini ng , a

nd his y e ars of

e xpe ri e nc e ; he did

no t c on du c t any

te sts himself to determine w hat spec ific dang ers we re possible.

J ohnston testified t hat t he gene rator should have borne a war ning to wait two minutes afte r the g ener ator stopped be fore ref ueling
. He said that a two-minute war ning is not pe rfe ct, but would have be en ade quate. Johnston ex plained that he use d a two-minute pe ri o d b ased on Ha sse lbr ing ’s data

on ho w f a st the e ng ine c oo le d. He a dd e d th a t he ha d a ssume d th a t th e tw o- min ute period must have be en base d on test results beca use later models of engines manufac tured by Tec umseh and other s car ried wa rning s that users shou l d al l o w the g ener ator to cool two minutes befor e re fueling
. J ohnston admitted that he had only the data in Hasselbring ’s re port and de position
and the tw o- min

ute wa rn ingon c omp ara ble e ng ine s. The district cour

t did not abuse its discretion by finding J ohnston’s testimony unreliable
. J ohnston depende d on Hasselbr ing a nd Fowle r’s re port, which we have de termined wa s13

proper ly excluded. He pe rfor

med no testing or ana ly sis to determine the scie ntific signific ance of the two-minute per iod. J ohnston failed to satisfy the Robinson fac tors conce rning objectiv e , e x terna l support for his theory
. See R obinson , 9 23 S.W. 2d a t 55 7. He a lso re lie d o n und e rl yingfac ts square ly reje cted by

Bush’ s uncontrover

ted testimony

that he did not spill g asoline and that he had
wa ited befo re re fu e lin g the g e ne rator . B e c a us e the re is n o e vid e nc e re g ard ingthe sc ie nti fi c signific ance of the two-minute pe riod for the war ning, the court did n o t abuse its discretion by excluding Johnst on’s opinion reg ardingits effica cy . See V olkswagen , 2004 WL 3019227, at *5. Clayton Cla

y ton , w ho ha s a

ba c he lor of sc ie nc e de g re e in e le c tr ic a l e ng ine e ring , c la ims expertise reg ardingelec t rica l product fa ilures, elec trocutions, fires, a nd explos ions. Clay

ton was hired b y B u s h to e v a lu a te th e s o u r c e s o f ig n it io nan d

d e te r mi n e w h ic h w a s th e mo s t p r o bable. C l a yt o ns a i d t h a th e h a s n e v e r b e e n i n v o l v e d i na c a s e o r t e s t i n g i nw h i c h a

f i r e w a s c a

u s e d b y a g ener ator that wa s n o t ru n n i n g at t he time of ig nition. He did not perfor m any tests based on the fac ts in thi s case and did not revie w other te sting in this case
.

Cla y t o n s aid the ig nition source wa s most probably the heat from the g ener ator’s exhaust sy stem. I n his report, he excluded all potential source s of ig nition of the g asoline vapor s except for the g ener ator. He conclude d that a def ective condition of

the g ener ator, whic h allowed fo r i g nit ion

of g a so lin e , w a s a

dir e c t pr od

uc ingc a us e of thi s in c ide nt a

nd B us h’ s in jur ie s. Clay ton’s testimony

is predicated on under ly ing f acts contra

ry to B ush’s testimony and the e vidence of the tempe rature the g ener ator re ache d in testing. Clay ton stated that he wa s hired only to addre ss the cause of the fir e in terms of w hat ava ilable source of i gn i t i o n ex i s t ed. He
conce ded that a g ener ator in the off position would have to be excluded as a potential ignition source14

if its surfac e temper at u re was lowe r than the a uto-ig nition temperature . Wit h the exclusion of Hasselbr ing a

nd Fowle r’s e vidence , there is no evidenc e that the g ener ator re ache d any rec og nized,
a pp licable a

uto -i g nit ion

te mpe ratur e ; f

ur the r, a uto -i g nit ion

ne ve r o c c ur

re d in any of the ir experiments. The cour

t did not abuse its discretion by deciding that Clay

ton’s testimony

reg arding
a h yp o t h e t i c a l g e n e r a t o r

t h a td i d r e a c h t h e a

u t o - i g n i t i o nt e mp e r a tu r e w o u l d n o th e l p t h e j u r

y. We conclude that the d i s t ri ct cour t did not abuse its discretion by deter mining that B u s h f a i l e d t o s h o w t h e r e l e v an c e an d r e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e s e e x p e rt s ’ t e s t i m o n y.
Sum m ar y j udgm e nt

On a pp e a l, on ly B us h’ s c la ims fo r str ic t pr od uc ts lia bil ity market in g de fe c t,
ne g lig e nc e , a

nd g ro ss n e g lig e nc e re ma in. B us h a rg ue s ( 1) that Col e man a

nd Te c ums e h f

a ile d to prese nt evidence to rebut the pre sumption t hat B ush would h av e h ee d ed a wa rning had one be en provided, (2) that the district c ourt committed e rror by making a fa ctual conc lusion that Bush waited in excess of two minutes before ref ueling the g ener ator, a

nd (3) that the di strict court ig nored evidenc e fr om Tecumseh a nd Coleman personn el as t o t he nec essity of the “ cool-down” period b ef o re re fu el i n g.
Rebuttabl

e presum ption Bush c ontends that the district court e rre d b y ignor ing the rebuttable presumption reg ardingproduct wa

rning s discussed in Magro v. Ragsdale Brothers, Inc

. , 7 2 1 S. W. 2 d 8 3 2 ( T e x. 1987). Onc e a pla intiff proves that the lack of adequate war nings or instructions render ed a pr oduct
unrea sonably

dang erous, a

rebuttable presumption arises that the us er would have rea d and hee ded15

such wa rning s and instructions. Id . at 834. Bush, howe ver, of fer ed no evide nce that a cool-dow n period is nec essar

y befor e refuelingor that the lac k of a w arningrende red the g ener ator a nd eng ine
unrea sonably dang erous. Wit hout suc h evidenc e, the r ebuttable pr esumption of Ma gr o did not arise.
Factual determ inati on Bush a lso all eges that the district court improper ly made a fac tual deter

mination reg ardinghow much time passed be fore Bush r efue led the g ener ator. In its e-mail “orde r” g ranting summary judgme nt, the district court s t ated that Bush clea rly waited at least two minutes before
re fu e lin g and that, re g ard le ss of the wa it, a uto -i g nit ion

of g a so lin e on

thi s o c c a sio n w a s p ro ve n to be all but impossible, even without a cooling -off period. The findingin the e-ma il “order ” is not binding
. I t is not t he for mal order g ranting summary judgme nt to which we must look for the c ourt’s re asons for r uling. See Sharpe v. Roman Cat h o l i c Dioceseof Dallas , 9 7 S. W.3 d 7 91 , 7 96 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 3, pe t. d e nie d) ; Strather v. Dolgenc orp of Tex., Inc. , 9 6 S. W.3 d 4 20 , 4 26 (T e x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 20 02 , n o p e t.) ; se e als o Che ro k e e W ate r Co. v. Gr e

gg Cou nty Ap

prais al D ist
. , 801 S.W .2d 872, 878 (Tex. 1990). Fur ther,
we c annot consider

any finding of fa ct m ad e in a summ ary -judg ment context. Se e IK B I nd us . ( Nigeria) Ltd. v. Pro-Line Corp. , 938 S.W .2d 440, 441 (Tex. 1997).
Me rit s o f t he summ ar y jud gment As the district court’s order did not specify whether it gr anted summary

judgme nt on traditional or no-evide nce g rounds, we must a ffirm summary judgme nt if any o f t h e s u m mary judgme nt gr ounds are meritorious. Pr ov ide nt L ife& Ac c ide nt I ns . Co . v . Kn ott , 128 S.W .3d 211,16

216 (Tex. 2003). We revie w t he dis trict court’s gr ant of summary judgme nt de novo. J oev . Two Thi rty Nin e J oin t V e ntu re , 145 S.W .3d 150, 156 (Tex. 2004). Th e sta nd ard fo r rev ie wi nga

mot ion fo r t ra dit ion a l summa

ry jud g me nt i s w e ll established: (1) the movant for summary judgme nt has the burd en of showing that there is no g enuine issue of materia l f act and that it is entitled to judg ment as a matter of law, ( 2) in dec iding whether there is a disputed materia l fac t issue pr ecluding summary judgme nt, we will take e vidence favor able to the non-movant as t rue, and (3) we wil l indulge ever y rea sonable infe renc e in favor of the non-movant and resolve any doubts in its favor
. See Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (c ); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co. , 6 90 S.W. 2d

54 6, 54 8- 49 (T e x. 19 85 ); Tril ogy Software, I nc. v. Calli dus Softwar e, Inc

. , 143 S.W .3d 452, 458 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. filed). A de fenda nt is en t itled to summ ary judgme nt under Rule 166a(c) if it conclusively neg ates at least one of t he esse ntial elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action or conclusively proves eac h element of its a ffirmativ e d ef en s e, there by showing that it is entit led to judgme nt as a matter of law bec ause no g enuine issue of materia l fac t
rema ins. Rhone-P oulenc, I nc. v. Ste el , 997 S.W .2d 217, 222-23 (Te x . 1999). Under the no-evide nce summar y -judg ment rule, a

party may move for summar

y jud g me nt i f, a ft e r ad e qu a te tim e fo r dis c ov e ry , the re is n o e vid e nc e of on e or mor e e sse nti a l e le me nts of a claim or defe nse on which the nonmovant would have the burden of proof at trial. Tex R . Civ. P. 1 66 a (i ); Jaimes v . Fiesta Mart, Inc. , 21 S.W .3d 301, 303-04 ( T ex . Ap p . — Hous ton [ 1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) . Once the movant spec ifies the ele m en t s on which ther e is no evidenc e, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to produc e summary judgme nt e vidence raising a g enuine issue of
m a t e r i a l f a c to nt h o s e e l e m e n t s . T e x. R
. C i v . P
. 1 6 6 a (i ); T rilogy , 143 S.W .3d at 459. A g ener al17

issue of mater ial fac t exi sts if more than a s ci ntilla of evidenc e esta blishing the e x istence of

the challeng ed ele ment is pro duced. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway , 135 S.W .3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). Mo re tha n a sc int ill a of e vid e nc e e xists if

the e vid e nc e “ ri se s to a le ve l that wo uld e na ble re a so na

ble and fair- minded people to dif fer in their conc lusions.” Id
. at 601. B ut when “the evidenc e off ere d to p ro ve a v i t a l f

a c t i s s o w e a k a s t o d o n o m o r e t h an c r e a t e a m e r e s u r m i s e o r s u s p ic ion of

its exis tence , the evidenc e is no more than a scintilla and, in leg al ef

fec t, is no evidence .” Id
. The centr al flaw undermining Bush’ s claims is the absenc e of evidenc e that either a de fe c t in the g e ne rator

or th e abs ence of

a wa it w arn ingc a

us e d th e fi re and

inj ur ie s. Th e on ly evidenc e is that he did not spill gasoline, a nd that the tested g ener ator did not rea ch temper ature s that
cause d or should have c aused a uto-ig nition of vapors in open-a ir conditions. There is no evidence that the abse nce of

war ning r ecommendinga wa iting per iod before ref ueling cause d any

injury or that th e pr e se nc e of

su c h a wa rn ingwo uld

have pr e ve nte d B us h’ s in jur ie s.
Products liabili ty: mark

eting defec t Bush challeng es the summary judgme nt a g ainst his ma rketing -def

ect theor y of strict products li ability
. Bush contended that the g ener ator a nd motor were defe ctive for failing to warn
o f t h e n ee d

t o al l o w t h e e n gi n e t o co o l fo r two m i nu t es af t er s h u t o ff b ef o re re fu el i n g. A m ark et i n gdefe ct ca use of a ction consists of five e lements: (1) a risk of har

m that is inhere nt in the product or that may arise f rom the intended or

rea sonably an t i ci p at ed use of the produc t must ex ist, (2) the product supplier must actually know or re asonably

fore see the risk of har

m at the time the produc t is marketed, ( 3) the produc t must poss ess a mar keting defe ct, (4) the absenc e of the warning s and/or instructions must render the pr oduct unre asonably dang erous to the ultimate user or consumer of the18

product, a nd (5) the f

ailure to w arn and/or instruct must c onstitut e a causative nexus in the produc t user’ s injury
. Jaimes , 21 S.W .3d at 305-06.

Bush did not pre sent evidenc e of a causal link betwee n any alleg ed fa ilure to war

n and his injur ies. Some of his experts affirmatively denied they

wer e providingevidenc e of c ausation. J ohnston testified that determining whether the lack of a wa rning cause d the ac cident “w ould be pure speculation.” J ohnston flatly stated, “I ’m not givingany opinions about causation.” H asselbringand Fowle r also testified in their de positions t hat they wer e not there to speak t o causation. More imp or tant, the re is no ev ide nc e that the g e ne rator and e ng ine we re unre a so na bly da ng e ro us du e to the abse nce of

a wa rning . Bush’ s experts did not provoke auto-ig nition even wh en they poured g a so lin e dir e c tly

on the g e ne rator

imm e diate ly

a ft e r shut- of

f. Cla y ton , wh o te sti fi e d re g ard ingc a us e and fire orig in, noted that if the g ener ator did not rea ch the a uto- i gn i t i o n temperature of g asoline, then the g ener ator would have to be r uled out as an i gn i t i o n s o u rc e. Without evidence that the g ener ator met or e x cee ded an a cce ptable auto-ignition temperature, Cl ay ton provided no evide nce of ca usation. Be cause Bush did not produc e more than a sc intill a of evidenc e that the a bsence of a
war ning c aused his i n

j u ri es, the district cour

t properly

g rante d summary

judgme nt as to the
mark e tin g de fe c t c la im.

This f ailure obviates any

harm fr om the court’s a lleg ed fa ilure to consider evidenc e from C oleman and Tec umseh employ ees about their aware ness of the need for a cool-down pe riod at the time of mar

keting . Evidence that many employ ees w ere unawa

re of any need f or a c ool-down period would not he lp B ush beca use it doe s not show the awa rene ss ne ede d t o p ro v e a marke ting de fe c t. A lth ou g h Co le man e mpl oy e e Ke nn e th F ra nk a c kn ow le dg ed th at havin g a tw o- min uteEvidence of subseque nt remedia l measure s curr ently is not admissible to prove ne g lige nce, 5 culpable c onduct, a defec t in the product, a defe ct in the produc t’s desig n, or a ne ed for a wa rning or instruction. Tex. R. Evid. 407(a). When this case wa s filed, howeve r, subseque nt remedia l me a sure s w e re a dmi ssi ble in s tr ic t pr od uc ts l ia bil ity c a se s. 19 wa rn ingwo uld

make the pr od

uc t be tte r t

ha n h a vin g no wa

rn ing , w e ne e d n ot r e so lve wh e the r t his is releva nt evidence beca

use there is no evidence of ca usation. B us h a lso po int s to the fa c t that, a lth ou g h the 19 89 Col e man g e ne rator us e d in thi s
c a s e d id n o t h a v e a w ar

n in g r e g ar d in g r e f

u e li n g , th e s a me mo d e l g e n e r a to r ma nu f a c tu r ed in 1995 included a w arninglabel that re ads “G asoline is flammable. A llow eng ine to cool at lea st two minutes before ref

ueling .” But use of this wa rning on later models markete d by the appe llees is not 5 evidenc e that the g ener ator in this case was unreasona bly dang erous without t he wa rning , and, in the absenc e of othe r evidence of causation, is no evidence that the lack of a wa rning on this ge nerator
c a us e d B us h’ s in

jur ie s. Negligenceand gross negligence Bush did not support his a lleg ation that Coleman and Tec umseh wer e neg lige nt by failing to provide ade quate wa rning s and instructions reg ardingthe hazards associate d with the fore seea ble uses of the g ener ator. To pr evail in a neg lige nce cause of action, a plaintiff must show that (1) de fenda

nt owed pl ai n t i ff

a duty , (2) de fenda

nt brea ched that duty , and (3) the bre ach proxi mately

caused plaintiff’s injuries. Greater Houston Trans. Co. v. Phillips , 801 S.W .2d 523, 525 (Tex. 1990). As discussed a bove, B ush’s experts were unable to show that the ge nerator cre ated a hazar d or dang er dur ing r efue ling. Without evidence that the g asoline vapor s on this gene rator would auto-ig nite during ref ueling , Bush cannot prove that a warning was ne eded or that the abse nceB us h a pp e ars to h a ve a

ba nd on e d h is c la im f

or ne g lig e nt d e sig n. Ev e n if he did no t, 6 summary judgme nt a g ainst the claim was proper beca use no evidenc e of a rea sonab l e a lternative desig n was a dmitted into t he re cord. Se e Am e ric an Tob ac c o Co ., In c . v . G rin ne ll , 951 S.W .2d 420, 437 (Tex. 1997). 20 of a w ar n i n g ca used either the fire or his injuries. Summary judgme nt was prope r ag ainst Bush’s
ne g lig e nc e c la ims
. 6

The failure of Bush’ s neg lige nce claims fore closes his g ross neg lige nce c laims. See Trevino v. Lightning L aydown, Inc. , 782 S.W .2d 946, 949 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 1990, writ denied) (“ c on du c t c ann ot b e g ro ssl y ne g lig e nt w ith ou t be ingne g lig e nt” ); se e als o Te x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. Code § 41.001(11) ( West S upp. 2004) (de fining g ross neg lige nce)
. CO NC LU SION We hold that the distri ct co urt did not abuse its discretion in excluding the e x pert testimony of B ush’s expert witnesses L ori Hasse lbring , J oe F owler, Way mon J ohnston and J udd Clay ton. I n addition, we conc lude that the district c ourt did not err in g ranting summary judgme nt i nf a v o r o f C o l e m anan d

T e c u m s e h o na l l c l a i m s t h a t ar e t h e s u

b j e c to f t h i s a p p e a l
. A c c o r d i n g l y,
we a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
.

__________________________________________

Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices B . A. Smith, P ury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: May

26, 2005