FEDERAL 

PROTECTIVE 

SERVICE

Better Data on Facility 

Jurisdictions Needed 

to Enhance 

Collaboration with 

State and Local Law 

Enforcement

Report to the Ranking Member, 

Committee on Homeland Security, 

House of Representatives

March 2012

GAO-12-434

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-434, a report to the 

Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security, House of Representatives.

March 2012

FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE

Better Data on Facility Jurisdictions Needed to 

Enhance Collaboration with State and Local Law 

Enforcement 

Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Homeland 

Security's (DHS) Federal Protective 

Service (FPS) protects over 9,000 

federal facilities under the custody and 

control of the General Services 

Administration (GSA). In 2007, FPS 

adopted an inspector-based workforce 

approach and indicated it would 

increase its reliance on state and local 

law enforcement agencies to respond 

to incidents at these facilities. These 

facilities range from facilities of 

proprietary or concurrent jurisdiction—

where authority is shared by federal 

and state and local police—to facilities 

of exclusive jurisdiction, where only 

federal law enforcement has authority. 

As requested, this report assesses 

FPS’s efforts to collaborate with state 

and local law enforcement for 

assistance in responding to incidents 

at these federal facilities. GAO 

reviewed documents on collaboration, 

GSA and FPS facility data, and GAO’s 

work on key collaboration practices 

and internal control standards. GAO 

also contacted 73 selected state and 

local law enforcement agencies from 

geographic jurisdictions of varying 

population sizes and FPS buildings 

throughout the United States and 

interviewed FPS and GSA officials.

What GAO Recommends

In conjunction with the revised MOU 

that is being developed between 

GSA and FPS, GAO recommends 

the administrator of GSA ensure that 

efforts to identify the jurisdictions of 

all GSA buildings are completed and 

that these data are provided to FPS. 

GSA concurred with the 

recommendation. 

What GAO Found

To collaborate with state and local law enforcement, the Federal Protective 

Service (FPS) uses memorandums of understanding (MOU), long-standing 

working relationships, written guidance to FPS staff, joint operations, and other 

initiatives. For example, FPS has MOUs ranging from sharing radio frequency 

usage in Alabama, to a mutual aid agreement with the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid 

Transit Authority in Georgia. In some jurisdictions, such as the suburbs of the 

District of Columbia, FPS has no MOUs but has regular contact and longstanding mutual aid relationships with state and local law enforcement. To 

collaborate with state and local law enforcement, FPS has guidance that 

addresses issues such as the scope of law enforcement authorities on federal 

property and information sharing among jurisdictions. FPS established regional 

staff positions intended to improve collaboration with other organizations and has 

engaged in joint operations with state and local law enforcement. By comparison, 

other federal organizations with law enforcement responsibilities similar to FPS 

also use a variety of methods, ranging from the Department of Veterans Affairs’ 

policy to seek MOUs with state and local law enforcement to the Smithsonian 

Institution’s established relationships with the Metropolitan D.C. Police and 

others. 

GAO found that state and local law enforcement organizations it contacted are 

generally willing to assist with incidents at federal facilities. For example, 48 of 52 

respondents from state and local law enforcement agencies GAO contacted 

about this issue said that they would respond to a call at a federally owned 

facility; 27 said they had done so since 2007. Overall, the variety of efforts FPS 

has under way is consistent with the key collaboration practices GAO has 

previously identified and reflects a reasonable approach to collaboration, 

especially when combined with the willingness of state and local law enforcement 

to assist. 

Although FPS has a reasonable approach to state and local collaboration, GAO 

found issues related to the quality of data exchanged between GSA and FPS on 

buildings and their locations. Through working groups, GSA is working with FPS

to address these data inconsistency issues and is establishing a permanent GSA 

liaison at FPS’s headquarters to improve data coordination. But as of the end of 

GAO’s review, FPS still lacked complete data from GSA on the jurisdiction of 

about one third of the buildings it protects. GSA officials informed GAO that they 

are making progress with identifying building jurisdictions but were not yet in a 

position to provide complete information to FPS. These data are important 

because state and local law enforcement generally has no authority to enforce 

state and local law on properties of exclusive federal jurisdiction. An additional 

effect of not having these data is that FPS lacks assurance that in relying on 

state and local law enforcement to respond to incidents at federal facilities, it is 

not creating a situation where these entities may be exercising police authority 

where they lack such authority. As a result, incomplete jurisdictional data leaves 

FPS and state and local law enforcement less equipped to define and agree to 

respective roles and responsibilities when there are incidents at federal facilities. View GAO-12-434. For more information, 

contact Mark L. Goldstein at (202) 512-2834 

or goldsteinm@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

Letter 1 

Background 4

FPS Uses Various Approaches to Collaborate with State and Local 

Law Enforcement, but Jurisdictional Data on Federal Facilities 

Are Incomplete 9

Conclusions 19

Recommendations for Executive Action 19

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 19

Appendix I Objective, Scope and Methodology 21

Appendix II Comments from the General Services Administration 24

Appendix III Comments from Department of Homeland Security 25

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 27

Tables

Table 1: State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies’ Responses to 

Selected Questions in GAO’s Structured Questionnaire 

Regarding FPS Collaboration 14

Table 2: Jurisdiction of Properties under the Control of GSA with 

FPS Responsibility 16

Figures

Figure 1: Federal Protective Service MegaCenter, Suitland, 

Maryland 6

Figure 2: Notification and Response Actions Following an Incident 

at an FPS-Protected Facility 7

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

Abbreviations

ADFO Assistant Director for Field Operations

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

FPS Federal Protective Service

GSA General Services Administration 

MOU memorandums of understanding

MPD Metropolitan Police Department

NPS National Park Service

SI Smithsonian Institution

VA Department of Veterans Affairs

VAMC Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Centers

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

March 27, 2012

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security

U.S. House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Thompson:

The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Federal Protective 

Service (FPS) protects over 9,000 federal facilities under the custody and 

control of the General Services Administration (GSA) by delivering 

integrated law enforcement and security services. To secure these 

buildings and safeguard their occupants, FPS employs about 1,225 

federal staff, including law enforcement officers, investigators, and 

administrative personnel, and is responsible for management and 

oversight of approximately 14,000 contract security guards. These federal 

facilities range from facilities of proprietary or concurrent jurisdiction—in 

which authority is shared by federal and state and local police—to 

facilities of exclusive jurisdiction in which only federal law enforcement 

has authority. FPS conducts its mission by providing security services 

through two types of activities: (1) physical security activities, such as 

conducting risk assessments of GSA facilities and recommending riskbased countermeasures to GSA and tenant agencies aimed at reducing 

the likelihood and severity of incidents at facilities, and (2) law 

enforcement activities, such as responding to incidents, conducting 

criminal investigations, and exercising arrest authority. In order for FPS to 

track the continuous changes in the inventory of buildings that it 

protects—including new construction, disposed buildings, and over 8,000 

leases—GSA, through its Public Buildings Service,1

 

1

The Public Buildings Service acquires space on behalf of the federal government through 

new construction and leasing and acts as a caretaker for federal properties across the 

country. 

provides building 

data to FPS weekly from GSA’s building property system.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

In 2007, FPS adopted an inspector-based workforce approach to protect 

GSA-controlled facilities.2 In testimony to Congress that same year, a 

DHS senior official stated that the agency was increasing its reliance on 

state and local law enforcement agencies to assist in responding to law 

enforcement incidents at these facilities as a way of ensuring that GSA 

buildings are adequately protected.3 While FPS is statutorily responsible 

for enforcing federal laws and regulations for the protection of federal 

property and persons located on federal property regardless of the 

location, state and local law enforcement agencies are responsible for 

enforcing state laws and local ordinances within the particular state on 

concurrent and proprietary jurisdiction locations. In 2008, we 

recommended that FPS clarify roles and responsibilities of local law 

enforcement agencies in responding to incidents at GSA-controlled 

facilities.4 Since this report was issued, FPS has issued specific agency 

instructions regarding coordination, hired new personnel to oversee 

coordination in the regions, and pursued additional memorandums of 

understanding (MOU)5

You asked us to provide an update on these issues. This report assesses 

FPS’s efforts to collaborate with state and local law enforcement for 

assistance in responding to incidents at federal facilities. To meet this 

objective, we reviewed relevant documentation on federal facility building 

when needed, such as in the case of clarifying 

roles and responsibilities between FPS and state and local law 

enforcement.

 

2

This model was intended to make more efficient use of FPS’s declining staffing levels by 

increasing focus on FPS’s physical security duties and consolidating law enforcement 

activities. FPS’s goal was to shift its law enforcement workforce composition from a mix of 

about 40 percent police officers, about 50 percent inspectors, and about 10 percent 

special agents, to a workforce primarily composed of inspectors and some special agents. 

FPS’s inspectors are responsible for law enforcement and security duties, including: 

patrolling building perimeters, responding to incidents, completing risk assessments for 

buildings, recommending security countermeasures, and overseeing the contract security 

workforce. 

3

Hearing on “Proposals to Downsize the Federal Protective Service and Effects on the 

Protection of Federal Buildings,” Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U. S. 

House of Representatives, April 18, 2007.

4

GAO, Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several Challenges 

That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal Facilities, GAO-08-683 (Washington, D.C.: June 

11, 2008). 

5

For consistency, we are using the term MOU throughout this report for both 

memorandums of understanding (MOUs) and memorandums of agreement (MOAs). 
 

Page 3 GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

data from GSA. In addition, we emailed a self-administered set of 22 

structured questions to the heads of 73 state and local law enforcement 

agencies in jurisdictions throughout the United States that we determined 

had FPS-protected buildings. Our non-random selection of locations 

included varying population sizes served by the state and local law 

enforcement agencies located in a mixture of urban and rural areas as 

defined by the United States Department of Agriculture. We used the 

most recent Rural-Urban Continuum Codes.6

Further, we interviewed GSA officials at GSA Headquarters in 

Washington, D.C. We also interviewed FPS officials at the Suitland, 

Maryland, and Battle Creek, Michigan, FPS MegaCenters

We followed up our emails 

with phone calls to these state and local law enforcement agencies to 

obtain clarification of the responses as needed. Not every respondent 

answered every question. Although the results of our structured 

questionnaires cannot be generalized to the universe of jurisdictions that 

interact with FPS, the results provide key insights and illustrate how these 

organizations can help FPS respond to incidents.

7

 

6

Rural-Urban Continuum Codes form a classification scheme that distinguishes 

metropolitan (metro) counties by the population size of their metro area, and 

nonmetropolitan (nonmetro) counties by degree of urbanization and adjacency to a metro 

area or areas. See USDA Economic Research Service at 

and toured the 

Suitland MegaCenter. We interviewed each of the 11 FPS Regional 

Directors to determine how their respective regions coordinate with state 

and local law enforcement agencies for the properties in their jurisdiction. 

For comparison with FPS, we contacted three federal agencies that 

provide their own law enforcement services at their facilities—the 

Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of the Interior’s National 

Park Service, and the Smithsonian Institution. We obtained relevant 

documents pertaining to their collaboration with state and local law 

enforcement and interviewed key officials. Lastly, we reviewed prior GAO 

work, including reports on key practices in interagency collaboration, 

facility protection, and internal controls. We also reviewed FPS data on 

buildings protected, staffing, procedures, and MOUs that are in place and 

http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Rurality/RuralUrbCon/. 

7

In 2000, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) transitioned all alarm-monitoring and 

dispatching capabilities from several regional control centers to four MegaCenters. 

Currently, each MegaCenter monitors multiple types of alarm systems, closed circuit 

television, and wireless dispatch communications within federal facilities throughout the 

nation. These centers—located in Michigan, Colorado, Pennsylvania, and Maryland—are 

equipped with state-of-the-art communication systems and operate continuously. 
 

Page 4 GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

assessed the quality and completeness of these data. Collectively, this 

multifaceted approach enabled us to make conclusions about whether 

FPS’s collaboration approach is reasonable. Appendix I contains more 

information on our objective, scope, and methodology.

We conducted this performance audit from February 2011 to March 2012 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

FPS—located within the National Protection and Programs Directorate8 of 

DHS—protects the over 9,000 federal facilities that are under the control 

and custody of GSA, as well as the persons on those properties. FPS 

headquarters is located in Washington, D.C.; regional offices are located 

in New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Denver, Chicago, San 

Francisco, Seattle, Fort Worth, Kansas City, and the District of Columbia. 

FPS is authorized to enforce federal laws and regulations aimed at 

protecting GSA buildings and persons on the property and to investigate 

offenses against these buildings and persons.9

• Exclusive: Under exclusive federal jurisdiction, the federal 

government—and federal law enforcement entities—have all of the 

legislative authority within the land area in question, while the state—

and its state and local law enforcement entities—have no residual 

police powers.

These federal facilities 

include buildings of exclusive, concurrent, and proprietary jurisdictions.

 

8

GAO, Federal Protective Service: Progress Made but Improved Schedule and Cost 

Estimate Needed to Complete Transition, GAO-11-554 (Washington, D C.: July 15, 2011).

9

Section 1315(a) of Title 40, United States Code, provides that: “To the extent provided for 

by transfers made pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Secretary of 

Homeland Security...shall protect the buildings, grounds, and property that are owned, 

occupied, or secured by the Federal Government (including any agency, instrumentality, 

or wholly owned or mixed-ownership corporation thereof) and the persons on the 

property.” 

Background 
 

Page 5 GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

• Concurrent: In concurrent jurisdiction facilities, both federal and state 

governments—and law enforcement entities—have jurisdiction over 

the property.

• Proprietary: Under proprietary jurisdiction, the federal government has 

rights—similar to a private landowner—but also maintains its

authorities and responsibilities as the federal government. Under 

proprietary jurisdiction, the local government is the principal municipal 

police authority.

To enable FPS to track changes in the inventory of federal buildings that 

it protects, GSA, through its Public Buildings Service, provides building 

data in electronic files to FPS weekly from GSA’s building property 

system. These data include each building number with address; type of 

jurisdiction; and square footage and number of personnel to assist FPS to 

bill for its services, among other things. FPS personnel then input this 

information into its systems electronically. MegaCenters—the four 

regional dispatch centers within FPS that are the primary focal points for 

incident notification (see figure 1)—use the data to direct calls concerning 

building incidents and emergencies to FPS personnel as well as state and 

local law enforcement agencies.
 

Page 6 GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

Figure 1: Federal Protective Service MegaCenter, Suitland, Maryland 

As a general practice, MegaCenters make direct radio calls for incident 

response to FPS personnel and telephone calls to state and local law 

enforcement agencies. FPS instructs tenants to contact the MegaCenter 

by calling 1-877-4FPS-411 and, in areas where FPS responders cannot 

provide an immediate response; tenants are often directed to also dial 

911. (See fig. 2.) 
 

Page 7 GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

Figure 2: Notification and Response Actions Following an Incident at an FPS-Protected Facility 

In this report, we assess GSA and FPS’s processes against GAO’s 

collaboration key practices and internal control standards. Our previous 

work has broadly defined collaboration as any joint activity that is 

intended to produce more public value than could be produced when 

organizations act alone.10

• identifying and addressing needs by leveraging resources to support 

the common outcome and, where necessary, identifying opportunities 

to leverage resources;

We have found that key practices for 

collaboration include:

• agreeing upon agency roles and responsibilities; and

 

10GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).
 

Page 8 GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

• establishing compatible policies, procedures, and other means to 

operate across agency boundaries.

Additionally, agencies can strengthen their commitment to work 

collaboratively by articulating their agreements in formal documents, such 

as an MOU. We have also reported that organizations may face a range 

of barriers when they attempt to collaborate with other organizations. One 

such barrier stems from agencies’ concerns about protecting jurisdiction 

over missions. In addition, interagency collaboration is often hindered by 

incompatible procedures, processes, data, and computer systems. GAO 

has identified standards in facility protection that provide a framework for 

guiding agencies’ efforts in this area, such as establishing a means of 

coordinating and sharing information with other government entities and 

the private sector.11 Finally, standards for controls over information 

processing come from GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the 

Federal Government. According to these standards, internal control is a 

major part of managing an organization and comprises the plans, 

methods, and procedures used to meet missions, goals, and objectives.12

Some other federal agencies provide their own law enforcement at their 

facilities. These include the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Police, 

National Park Service (NPS) law enforcement within the Department of 

the Interior, and Smithsonian Institution (SI) Police. VA Police provide law 

enforcement duties to the 152 VA Medical Centers (VAMC).

Internal control standards specific for information systems help ensure the 

completeness and accuracy of data.

13 U.S. Park 

Police is a unit of the National Park Service, with jurisdiction in all 

National Park Service areas and certain other federal and state lands.14

 

11GAO, Homeland Security: Further Actions Needed to Coordinate Federal Agencies’ 

Facility Protection Efforts and Promote Key Practices, 

U.S. Park Police provides law enforcement services to designated areas 

within the National Park Service (primarily in the District of Columbia, 

New York City, and San Francisco, California metropolitan areas). 

Additionally, Law Enforcement Park Rangers, belonging to the “Visitor 

GAO-05-49 (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 30, 2004).

12GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

1338 U. S. C. § 902. 

1416 U. S. C. § 1A-6(b). 
 

Page 9 GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

and Resource Protection Division” within the National Park Service, are 

authorized to carry firearms, conduct investigations, make arrests, and 

serve warrants pursuant to law and policy. Protection and security 

services at Smithsonian Institution facilities are provided by the 

Smithsonian Police.15

FPS uses a variety of methods to collaborate with state and local law 

enforcement, ranging from establishing MOUs to document agreement on 

roles and responsibilities with some, to relying on long-standing working 

relationships with others. FPS also has guidance and various other efforts 

under way related to coordination with state and local law enforcement. 

More specifically, FPS reported that it had 21 signed MOUs with state 

and local law enforcement agencies across the United States as of 

September 2011.16

 

1540 U. S. C. § 6306.

For example, there is an MOU for radio frequency 

usage in Alabama; MOUs for arrest authority on properties adjacent to 

federal property in California and Florida; and MOUs for mutual aid in the 

District of Columbia and Georgia, such as FPS’s reciprocal support 

agreement with Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority. MOUs are 

mechanisms that can be used to formalize key practices in agency 

collaboration such as agreeing on roles and responsibilities, including 

16We did not determine the total universe of state and local law enforcement jurisdictions 

where FPS-protected properties are located.

FPS Uses Various 

Approaches to 

Collaborate with State 

and Local Law 

Enforcement, but 

Jurisdictional Data on 

Federal Facilities Are 

Incomplete 

FPS’s Approach Involves a 

Variety of MOUs, Reliance 

on Long-standing 

Relationships, Guidance, 

and Other Initiatives
 

Page 10 GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

leadership, and to establish compatible policies, procedures, and other 

means to operate across agency boundaries.17

While FPS has often found MOUs helpful, the general consensus among 

FPS officials was that effective coordination did not depend on having 

MOUs. FPS prefers a flexible approach of pursuing MOUs only when it 

determines they are needed, as opposed to seeking them in all cases. 

FPS’s Director stated that FPS has generally not found it necessary to 

create written documents, requirements, or MOUs because FPS has 

always received good cooperation from state and local law enforcement 

agencies when their assistance was needed. For example, in some 

jurisdictions such as the suburbs surrounding the District of Columbia, 

FPS has no MOUs with state and local law enforcement agencies but has 

regular contact and longstanding mutual aid relationships. In addition, 

several FPS Regional Directors highlighted the importance of local 

response to incidents in and around federal facilities in rural areas 

because of the lack of FPS staff at these locations and noted that their 

informal relationships have worked successfully because state and local 

law enforcement agencies were consistently reliable in their response to 

these locations. FPS officials stated that mandating the pursuance of 

MOUs with all law enforcement entities would not be in the best interest 

of effectiveness and efficiency and would increase the burden on already 

task-saturated FPS staff. In addition, it is generally up to state and local 

law enforcement agencies as to whether they would be willing to enter 

into an MOU with a federal agency.

With regard to long-standing working relationships and regular contact 

with state and local law enforcement, FPS Inspectors and Regional 

Directors have developed relationships with state and local law 

enforcement agencies and collaborate on different levels. Regional 

Directors in all 11 FPS regions stated that their offices routinely had direct 

contact with state and local law enforcement agencies at multiple types of 

security meetings such as the Federal Executive Boards, joint terrorism 

 

17GAO-06-15. 
 

Page 11 GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

task forces, and regional fusion center meetings.18

FPS also has guidance for FPS staff and other efforts under way to 

collaborate with state and local law enforcement. Regional Directors are 

responsible for carrying out FPS policy and guidance, and state that 

many of these written policies contain directives for collaboration with 

state and local law enforcement. One such directive is FPS Directive 

15.1.2.1, Law Enforcement Authority and Powers, which outlines the 

scope of law enforcement authority on federal property. Other policies 

that reference state and local law enforcement agencies’ coordination 

include FPS’s Regional Information Sharing Program, Detention and 

Arrest, and Joint Terrorism Task Force Policy, among others. Best 

practices and lessons learned are also communicated throughout FPS 

regions with weekly regional director conference calls, a regional 

director’s council that meets monthly, and yearly Regional Director 

conferences.

Attendance by both 

state and local law enforcement agencies and FPS at these meetings 

establishes mutually reinforcing or joint strategies designed to help align 

activities, core processes, and resources to achieve a common outcome. 

For example, FPS participates in monthly meetings of the Law 

Enforcement Working Group of the Atlanta Downtown Improvement 

District. State and local law enforcement chiefs or deputy chiefs from the 

surrounding area, officials from 15 local colleges, and officials from other 

federal agencies participate. According to an FPS regional official, the 

group acts as a “force multiplier” to fight crime within the district, which 

includes GSA-controlled facilities. FPS officials also have discussions 

with state and local law enforcement agencies as needed during 

operational planning associated with special events such as the 

Olympics, protests, and parades.

 

18The Federal Executive Boards, established by Presidential Directive in 1961, are a 

forum for communication and collaboration among federal agencies outside of 

Washington, D.C. Joint terrorism task forces (JTTFs) are small cells of highly trained, 

locally based investigators, analysts, linguists, special weapons and tactics experts, and 

other specialists from dozens of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies. JTTFs 

are used as a multi-agency effort by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation to combine the resources of federal, state, and local law 

enforcement. Fusion centers serve as focal points within the state and local environment 

for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information between the 

federal government and state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners.
 

Page 12 GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

In addition to guidance, FPS added three new positions in fiscal year 

2011 intended to improve communication and standardization across 

FPS by coordinating with federal, state, and local law enforcement 

officials to reduce crime at, and potential threats to, federal facilities. 

These positions are titled Assistant Director for Field Operations (ADFO) 

for west, central, and east operations. The ADFO will be a spokesman for 

FPS, representing the Director in his or her designated area.

Other initiatives employed by FPS include collaborative operations to 

avert or obstruct potential threats inside the facility, such as the presence 

of unauthorized persons, or potentially disruptive or dangerous activities, 

such as potential terrorist operations and criminal activity in and around 

federal buildings. Using a combination of law enforcement agencies is 

consistent with facility protection key practices to establish a means of 

coordinating and sharing information with other government entities. 

These operations begin with planning meetings involving FPS and any 

other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies that may be 

called upon to assist. The operations combine physical security expertise 

and law enforcement authority into an enhanced security team to provide 

a visual deterrent at FPS-protected facilities. The combined team then 

selects a federal building for which FPS has security oversight and 

provides a highly visible presence for a select period of time with patrol 

operations, explosive detection dog sweeps, and an enhanced security 

posture. As a means to leverage resources, FPS has collaborated with 

state and local law enforcement to assist in conducting these operations 

by enlisting their support in Chicago, Illinois; New York, New York; 

Newark, New Jersey; and the District of Columbia.

Other federal organizations with law enforcement responsibilities similar 

to FPS also used a variety of methods to collaborate with state and local 

law enforcement. For example, VA has a policy requiring all locations of 

VA-controlled property to have formally documented MOUs with state and 

local law enforcement agencies to ensure timely backup support for VA 

Police officers.19

 

19Department of Veterans Affairs: Security and Law Enforcement VA Handbook 0730

(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 11, 2000).

VA headquarters officials stated that MOUs are useful 

because VA Police typically transport detainees to state and local law 

enforcement agencies for arrest and processing, while state and local law 

Like FPS, Other Federal 

Agencies Use a Variety of 

Methods to Collaborate 

with State and Local Law 

Enforcement 
 

Page 13 GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

enforcement agencies typically provide first response to leased property 

under VA control. However, VA Police reported they cannot provide 

mutual aid to state and local law enforcement agencies on non-VA 

controlled property because existing law20

According to U.S. Park Police headquarters officials, the Park Police has 

MOUs with federal, state, and local law enforcement including a 

longstanding formal relationship with the District of Columbia Metropolitan 

Police Department (MPD). Some of the MOUs are for events and are 

short-term, such as the last presidential inauguration in the District of 

Columbia. The U.S. Park Police also stated they have MOUs that are 

formal incident response plans, which outline the roles and 

responsibilities of the various entities. In the District of Columbia, the U.S. 

Park Police responded to the U.S. Holocaust Museum shooting incident 

in 2009 and have provided service to the Kennedy Center for the 

Performing Arts for a fee.

limits the authority of 

Department police officers to VA property.

According to a Smithsonian Institution headquarters official, the 

Smithsonian police rely on MPD and the Park Police to arrest and 

process suspects in the District of Columbia. Aside from a limited MOU 

with the District of Columbia, MPD21 the Smithsonian police does not 

have MOUs with other law enforcement agencies. In the District of 

Columbia region as well as nationally, Smithsonian police rely on informal 

relationships with state and local law enforcement agencies for 

coordination of law enforcement at Smithsonian-controlled property. 

However, Smithsonian police officials stated they cannot provide mutual 

aid— due to lack of authority—to state and local law enforcement 

agencies on non-Smithsonian-controlled property.

 

2038 U. S. C. § 902.

21The MOU assists the Metropolitan Police Department. D.C. to conduct crime prevention 

and law enforcement activities for specific instances or periods of time specified by the 

Smithsonian Institution’s Office of Protective Services. The MOU allows officers from the 

National Zoo in Washington, D.C. to direct traffic in the immediate surroundings of the Zoo 

or in the instances of hot pursuit for example, to take action from outside the perimeter of 

the Zoo if appropriate to protect the Zoo’s property, visitors, and animals.
 

Page 14 GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

Our questionnaire of state and local law enforcement agencies and 

follow-up discussions showed a general willingness of those that replied 

to respond to incidents at federal facilities. For example, 48 of 52 

agencies that answered the question replied that they would respond to 

calls that dispatch to a federally occupied (owned and/or leased) building, 

and 27 of 44 had actually responded to a federally occupied building 

since 2007. As for MOUs, 11 of 43 agencies that answered the question 

reported having formal MOUs with FPS and 4 of 40 reported having 

informal agreements. (See table 1.) Four state and local law enforcement 

agencies stated that they would decline to respond to an incident at a 

federal building in their jurisdiction. Three of these four law enforcement 

agencies were sheriff or highway patrol entities that stated that they are 

not the first responders to incidents at the facilities in question and that 

there were local police available for response. A fourth questionnaire 

responder did not clarify why it answered negatively; however, additional 

inquiry with the federal property owner in this law enforcement’s 

jurisdiction stated the particular law enforcement agency did coordinate 

and respond to calls at the property. Only one state and local law 

enforcement agency replied that it was denied access to a federal 

building when responding to an incident within its jurisdiction; however, it 

declined to clarify the specific instance in which it was denied access. The 

only law enforcement agency that answered it had declined to respond to 

a call dispatched at a federally occupied (owned and/or leased) building, 

later clarified that the answer applied to non-GSA-controlled facilities such 

as buildings of Department of Defense and other federal agencies. Table 

1 shows the specific questions and responses provided by state and local 

law enforcement.

Table 1: State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies’ Responses to Selected Questions in GAO’s Structured Questionnaire 

Regarding FPS Collaboration

Answers

Questionsa Yes No

No

answer

To your knowledge, are there federal buildings located within your jurisdiction?b 55 1 1 

Would your law enforcement entity respond to calls that dispatches to a federally occupied (owned 

and/or leased) building? 48 4 5 

Since 2007, has your law enforcement entity been denied access into federally occupied (owned 

and/or leased) building in response to an incident under your entity’s purview (proprietary of the 

state or local government, or concurrent with the federal government)? 1 38 18

Since 2007, has your law enforcement entity responded to a call that dispatches to a federally 

occupied (owned and/or leased) building? 27 17 13

State and Local Law 

Enforcement Generally 

Willing to Assist with 

Protecting Federal 

Facilities
 

Page 15 GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

Answers

Questionsa Yes No

No

answer

Since 2007, has your law enforcement entity declined to respond to a call that dispatches to a 

federally occupied (owned and/or leased) building? 1 43 13

Since 2007, does your law enforcement entity have any formal memorandums of understanding 

(MOUs) with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Protective Service? 11 32 14

Does your law enforcement entity have any informal agreements with the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, Federal Protective Service? 4 36 17

Source: GAO structured questionnaire of state and local law enforcement agencies.

a

Not every respondent answered every question.

b

Although we selected our respondents based on addresses of federal buildings located in their 

probable geographic jurisdictions, upon further examination, one respondent noted that a building 

address we chose was actually one street out of its jurisdiction. Therefore it answered that it had no 

federal buildings in its area of jurisdiction.

Overall, the variety of efforts FPS has under way reflects a reasonable 

approach to collaboration, especially when combined with results we 

found from our questionnaire of state and local law enforcement 

agencies. The practice of maintaining working relationships and having 

regular contact with state and local law enforcement officials establishes 

mutually reinforcing or joint strategies designed to help align activities, 

core processes, and resources to achieve a common outcome. The 

MOUs that FPS has in place are mechanisms consistent with facilitating 

key practices in agency collaboration, such as defining and agreeing to 

roles and responsibilities. Establishing compatible policies, procedures, 

and other means to operate across agency boundaries are key practices 

that can help enhance and sustain collaboration. Pursuing MOUs on an 

as-needed basis is also consistent with how other federal law 

enforcement agencies approach collaboration. Performing operations 

such as extra patrol activities using a combination of law enforcement 

agencies is consistent with facility protection key practices to establish a 

means of coordinating and sharing information with other government 

entities.

Although FPS’s approach to collaboration is reasonable, issues related to 

data quality arose during our review. Specifically, we found that FPS 

lacked complete data from GSA on the type of jurisdiction (e.g., 

concurrent or exclusive) for about one-third of the buildings FPS protects, 

making it difficult to ensure that it is addressing the full scope of issues 

related to jurisdictional roles and responsibilities. At the end of our review, 

FPS’s Approach Is 

Reasonable and Consistent 

with Key Practices

Missing Jurisdictional Data 

Are of Concern, and Data 

Inconsistencies with GSA 

Are Being Addressed
 

Page 16 GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

GSA officials informed us that they had made significant progress 

addressing this issue. More specifically, when we reviewed the property 

list that GSA provided to FPS in December 2011—which is provided on a 

weekly basis—about thirty-four percent of the properties lacked recorded 

jurisdictions, including blank and pending jurisdiction categories. (See 

table 2.)

Table 2: Jurisdiction of Properties under the Control of GSA with FPS 

Responsibility 

Jurisdictiona,b Number of GSA Properties Percentage

Pending 1594 18

Exclusive 329 4 

Concurrent 662 7 

Partial 31 0 

Proprietary 4969 55

Combined 21 0 

Blankb 1432 16

Total 9038 100

Source: GAO analysis of GSA data.

a

GSA provides the following guidance when assigning jurisdiction to its properties: Pending: requires 

value assignment in the database; Exclusive: the U.S. enjoys exclusive legislative jurisdiction and the 

state has no legislative jurisdiction except for minor forms of taxation; Concurrent: both the U.S. and a 

state enjoy complete legislative jurisdiction; Partial: the state has selectively ceded certain aspects of 

legislative jurisdiction to the U.S; Proprietary: the state exercises complete legislative jurisdiction and 

the U.S. is considered only a property holder; Combined: any location at which more than one of the 

above jurisdictions exist.

b

Blank represents number of facilities missing GSA jurisdictional data.

GSA officials stated that they were aware of the numerous blank data 

fields pertaining to jurisdictions and that they were trying to individually 

assess these fields building by building. They further stated that it was a 

time-consuming process that included reviewing individual property 

historical records. GSA officials stated they had made progress and the 

jurisdictions that have not been identified were down to 2 percent. 

However, these data had not yet been added to GSA’s building property 

system or contained in the electronic files GSA sends to FPS weekly. 

GSA officials also stated the jurisdictional field on the GSA property list 

was not in the top fifty fields that the agency typically monitors because of 

the large number of data fields, although the officials recognized the 

importance of this field to FPS.
 

Page 17 GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

During our review, we found no instances in which state or local law 

enforcement exceeded their jurisdictional authority. In some instances, 

state and local law enforcement responded to the perimeter of buildings 

with exclusive jurisdiction for matters such as traffic accidents and 

suspicious packages. FPS officials said that state and local law 

enforcement may also be granted access if officers are in pursuit of a 

suspect. Furthermore, FPS officials said that inspectors and GSA staff at 

the building level generally know the jurisdiction of the individual buildings 

for which they are responsible.

Nonetheless, given that facilities of exclusive jurisdiction are unique 

because state and local law enforcement agencies generally have no law 

enforcement authority on these properties, incomplete data leaves FPS 

less equipped to define and agree to respective roles and responsibilities 

with regard to state and local law enforcement collaboration. An additional 

effect of not having these data is that FPS lacks assurance that, in relying 

on state and local law enforcement to respond to incidents at federal 

facilities, it is not creating a situation where these entities may be 

exercising police authority where they lack such authority as in the case 

of exclusive jurisdiction properties. In addition, having incomplete data is 

inconsistent with established standards for internal control over data 

systems, including those standards that relate to accuracy and 

completeness. While only 4 percent of GSA’s inventory was known to be 

of exclusive jurisdiction, 34 percent of GSA’s inventory had incomplete 

data on the type of jurisdiction in GSA’s building property system.

In our review, we also found inconsistencies between FPS and GSA data 

on buildings and their locations—6 of the 11 FPS regions reported that 

the GSA list does not match the current property inventory. One FPS 

regional official stated that GSA does not keep the property list as current 

as FPS needs; changes occur but are not captured by GSA. For example, 

the official stated that in his region, agencies sign leases about a dozen 

times a year without FPS’s knowledge or timely notice. FPS officials 

noted that the overall number could be greater across all FPS regions. 

The current MOU between GSA and FPS calls for a pre-lease 

assessment of the building by FPS, but these assessments cannot be 
 

Page 18 GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

completed if FPS is unaware of the new lease.22 Another FPS regional 

official stated that the region uses its own building list, which is updated 

by FPS regularly as information becomes available. A third FPS official 

stated that the GSA list does not capture changes to buildings with a 

security risk level of 1 or 2 as quickly as FPS needs.23

GSA officials recognize that the exchange of building data with FPS is an 

issue. GSA stated that only recently did it have the ability to crossreference and address these differences, and is working with FPS to 

correct them. For example, in 2011, GSA and FPS held working groups to 

begin to improve the building property list, and established a permanent 

GSA liaison in FPS’s headquarters to improve data coordination. 

Although this effort is still in progress and data inconsistencies remain, 

GSA and FPS are addressing concerns about data inconsistencies. 

Further, GSA and FPS are currently negotiating a new MOU that is 

expected to be finalized in early 2012. GSA officials told us that the new 

MOU will include an agreement on sharing information, such as the 

building data, and specifically sharing information at the regional level. 

FPS and GSA did not indicate whether the revised MOU would address 

the aforementioned issue related to incomplete jurisdictional data. 

However, it would seem that addressing this issue in conjunction with 

revising the MOU would ensure that data shared were not only 

consistent, but more complete as well.

A fourth regional 

official stated that the region relies on a combination of building lists from 

GSA, FPS provided lists, and its own regional list. This official stated 

these lists often do not reconcile because of changes that are not 

updated in a timely manner. In addition, a majority of state and local law 

enforcement agencies we sent questions to replied that they did not 

identify the jurisdiction of the individual federal buildings in their 

geographic areas, while three entities replied that they only identified 

some building jurisdictions.

 

22The current MOU between FPS and GSA began on June 1, 2006, and was valid for 2 

years. However, the MOU states that upon expiration of the initial term, the MOU will 

automatically be renewed and will remain in full force and effect until modified in writing, 

executed by both parties, or terminated by either party upon 90 days’ written notice to the 

other party. 

23Each federal building is assessed a security risk level, with Level 1 as lowest and Level 

5 as highest. FPS uses Interagency Security Committee guidelines to determine a 

facility’s security level, which in turn determines the level of physical protection services 

needed at each of the approximately 9,000 buildings. 
 

Page 19 GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

FPS’s approach to collaborating with state and local law enforcement is 

reasonable and consistent with key practices in that the approach uses 

mechanisms such as MOUs to document agreements on roles and 

responsibilities in some cases, long-standing working relationships, 

written guidance to FPS staff, joint operations, and other initiatives to 

promote mutual collaboration. Other federal organizations with law 

enforcement responsibilities similar to FPS—such as VA, U.S. Park 

Police, and Smithsonian—also use a variety of methods for collaboration 

with state and local law enforcement. State and local law enforcement 

agencies we contacted were generally willing to assist FPS with incidents 

at federal facilities. Related to the quality of data exchanged between 

FPS and GSA on buildings and their locations, FPS and GSA had taken 

action to address data inconsistency issues. However, as of the end of 

our review, FPS still lacked complete data from GSA on whether the 

jurisdictions of about one-third of the buildings FPS protects are 

exclusive, concurrent, or proprietary. Having these data is important 

because state and local law enforcement generally have no authority to 

enforce state and local law on properties of exclusive jurisdiction. At the 

end of our review, GSA informed us that it had made progress with 

addressing this issue. GSA and FPS are negotiating a revised MOU that 

will include agreement on sharing information such as the building data. 

As such, addressing the issue related to incomplete data on jurisdictions, 

in conjunction with revising the MOU, would ensure that data were not 

only consistent, but more complete as well. Otherwise, FPS would remain 

less equipped to define and agree to respective roles and responsibilities 

as it proceeds with its efforts to rely on state and local law enforcement 

for assistance in responding to incidents at federal facilities.

In conjunction with the revised MOU that is being developed between 

GSA and FPS, we recommend the Administrator of GSA ensure that 

efforts to identify the jurisdictions of all GSA buildings are completed and 

that these data are provided to FPS so that FPS is better equipped to 

manage jurisdictional roles and responsibilities at GSA buildings.

We provided a draft of this report to GSA, DHS, DOI, VA, and 

Smithsonian Institution for their review and comment. GSA provided 

written comments, which are reprinted in appendix II. GSA concurred with 

our recommendation that the Administrator of GSA ensure that efforts to 

identify the jurisdictions of all GSA buildings are completed, and that 

these data are provided to FPS so that FPS is better equipped to manage 

jurisdictional roles and responsibilities at GSA buildings. DHS provided a 

Conclusions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 20 GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

letter, reprinted in appendix III, describing its efforts to collaborate with 

state and local law enforcement. DHS also provided technical comments, 

which we incorporated, as appropriate. DOI, VA, and the Smithsonian 

Institution provided minor technical comments, via email, which we 

incorporated, as appropriate.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of 

Homeland Security, the Director of FPS, the Administrator of GSA, the 

Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and Secretary 

of the Smithsonian Institution. In addition, the report will be available at no 

charge on the GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you, or your staff, have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix IV. 

Sincerely yours,

Mark Goldstein

Director

Physical Infrastructure Issues
Appendix I: Objective, Scope and Methodology

Page 21 GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

To assess the Federal Protective Service’s (FPS) efforts to collaborate 

with state and local law enforcement for assistance in responding to 

incidents at federal facilities, we reviewed FPS data on buildings 

protected, staffing, procedures, and memorandums of understanding 

(MOUs). We also reviewed relevant federal facility building data from the 

General Services Administration (GSA) including for example, each 

building number with address; type of jurisdiction; and square footage and 

number of personnel, among other things. We interviewed FPS officials 

throughout the regions, and FPS and GSA officials at their respective 

agency’s headquarters in Washington, D.C., regarding the processes and 

procedures for exchanging these data. We reviewed the building data for 

completeness, but did not verify the accuracy of the information contained 

for each building. To ensure we were assessing the exact data that FPS 

uses, we requested data samples for fiscal year 2011 from both GSA and 

FPS and replicated the jurisdiction category results. We assessed the 

extent to which there were missing jurisdiction assignments by reviewing 

pending and blank jurisdiction categories. We then assessed GSA and 

FPS’s processes for managing these data against GAO’s Standards for 

Internal Control in the Federal Government, Homeland Security: Further 

Actions Needed to Coordinate Federal Agencies’ Facility Protection 

Efforts and Promote Key Practices, and Results-Oriented Government: 

Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among 

Federal Agencies. 1

 

1

GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

According to GAO’s standards for internal control in 

the federal government, internal control is a major part of managing an 

organization and comprises the plans, methods, and procedures used to 

meet missions, goals, and objectives. Internal control, which is 

synonymous with management control, helps government program 

managers achieve desired results through effective stewardship of public 

resources. Control activities—such as reconciliations performed to verify 

data completeness; an agency’s data entry design features contribute to 

data accuracy; data validation and editing performed to identify erroneous 

data; and erroneous data that is captured, reported, investigated, and 

promptly corrected—contribute to data accuracy and completeness. We 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999); GAO, Homeland Security: Further Actions Needed 

to Coordinate Federal Agencies’ Facility Protection Efforts and Promote Key Practices, 

GAO-05-49 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2004); GAO, Results-Oriented Government: 

Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, 

GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).

Appendix I: Objective, Scope and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objective, Scope and Methodology

Page 22 GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 

report.

For comparison with FPS’s coordination efforts, we contacted three 

federal agencies that provide law enforcement at their facilities—the 

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the National Park Service (NPS) 

within the Department of the Interior, and the Smithsonian Institution (SI). 

To gain insight into FPS, VA, SI, and NPS coordination with state and 

local law enforcement agencies, we emailed a self-administered set of 22 

structured questions to the heads of 73 state and local law enforcement 

agencies. Our non-random selection of locations included varying 

population sizes located in a mixture of metro, urban, and rural areas as 

defined by the United States Department of Agriculture using the most 

recent Rural-Urban Continuum Codes for jurisdictions that we determined 

had FPS, and/or VA, NPS, and SI buildings throughout the United States. 

The state and local law enforcement agencies we chose included a mix of 

police, sheriff, highway patrol agencies in each of the 11 FPS regions. We 

also followed up our email with phone calls to these state and local law 

enforcement agencies. Not every respondent answered every question 

related to coordination with FPS, VA Police, U.S. Park Police, and SI 

police. Additionally, the responses had varying levels of staff within the 

state and local law enforcement organization reply for the organization. 

Furthermore, the structured questions were related to coordination with 

the Federal Protective Service, Veterans Affairs Police, Smithsonian 

police, and the U.S. Park Police. Although the results of our questions 

cannot be generalized to the universe of jurisdictions that have interaction 

with FPS, the results provide key insights on how state and local law 

enforcement collaborates with FPS to assist with federal facility 

protection. These results illustrate how FPS relies on these organizations 

to respond to incidents and collectively, how this multi-faceted approach 

enabled us to make conclusions whether FPS’s approach is reasonable.2

Further, we interviewed officials at two FPS MegaCenters—the four 

regional dispatch centers within FPS that are the primary focal points for 

initial incident notification—and toured the Suitland, Md., MegaCenter 

facility. We attended an FPS operational exercise in the District of 

Columbia. We also interviewed each of the 11 FPS Regional Directors to 

 

2

Results from nonprobablity samples cannot be used to make inferences about a 

population because in a nonprobability sample, some elements of the population being 

studied have no chance or an unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample.
Appendix I: Objective, Scope and Methodology

Page 23 GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

determine how their region coordinates with state and local law 

enforcement entities for the properties in their jurisdiction. We interviewed 

GSA officials at GSA headquarters in the District of Columbia. We 

obtained relevant documents pertaining to VA, NPS, and SI collaboration 

with state and local law enforcement and interviewed agency officials. 

Lastly, we reviewed prior GAO work, including reports on key practices in 

interagency collaboration and facility protection.

We conducted this performance audit from February 2011 to March 2012 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Comments from the General 

Services Administration

Page 24 GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

Appendix II: Comments from the General 

Services Administration
Appendix III: Comments from Department of 

Homeland Security

Page 25 GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

Appendix III: Comments from Department of 

Homeland Security
Appendix III: Comments from Department of 

Homeland Security

Page 26 GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 27 GAO-12-434 Law Enforcement Collaboration

Mark Goldstein, (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, David Sausville (Assistant 

Director), Maren McAvoy, and George Depaoli made key contributions to 

this report. Additionally, Colin Fallon, Kathleen Gilhooly, Hannah Laufe, 

and Andrew Stavisky aided in this assignment.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(543282)
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