DEFENSE 

BIOMETRICS

Additional Training 

for Leaders and More 

Timely Transmission 

of Data Could 

Enhance the Use of 

Biometrics in 

Afghanistan

Report to Congressional Requesters

April 2012

GAO-12-442

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
 

United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-442, a report to 

congressional requesters. 

April 2012 

DEFENSE BIOMETRICS 

Additional Training for Leaders and More Timely 

Transmission of Data Could Enhance the Use of 

Biometrics in Afghanistan

Why GAO Did This Study

The collection of biometrics data, 

including fingerprints and iris patterns, 

enables U.S. counterinsurgency 

operations to identify enemy 

combatants and link individuals to 

events such as improvised explosive 

device detonations. GAO was asked to

examine the extent to which (1) DOD's 

biometrics training supports warfighter 

use of biometrics, (2) DOD is 

effectively collecting and transmitting 

biometrics data, and (3) DOD has 

developed a process to collect and 

disseminate biometrics lessons 

learned. To address these objectives, 

GAO focused on the Army and to a 

lesser extent on the Marine Corps and 

U.S. Special Operations Command, 

since the Army collected about 86 

percent of the biometrics enrollments

in Afghanistan. GAO visited training 

sites in the United States, observed 

biometrics collection and transmission

operations at locations in Afghanistan, 

reviewed relevant policies and

guidance, and interviewed 

knowledgeable officials. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD take 

several actions to: expand leadership 

training to improve employment of 

biometrics collection, help ensure the 

completeness and accuracy of 

transmitted biometrics data, determine 

the viability and cost-effectiveness of 

reducing transmission times, and

assess the merits of disseminating 

biometrics lessons learned across 

DOD for the purposes of informing 

relevant policies and practices. GAO

requested comments from DOD on the

draft report, but none were provided. 

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) has trained thousands of personnel on the 

use of biometrics since 2004, but biometrics training for leaders does not provide 

detailed instructions on how to effectively use and manage biometrics collection 

tools. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services, and U.S. 

Central Command each has emphasized in key documents the importance of 

training. Additionally, the Army, Marine Corps, and U.S. Special Operations 

Command have trained personnel prior to deployment to Afghanistan in addition 

to offering training resources in Afghanistan. DOD’s draft instruction for 

biometrics emphasizes the importance of training leaders in the effective 

employment of biometrics collection, but existing training does not instruct 

military leaders on (1) the effective use of biometrics, (2) selecting the 

appropriate personnel for biometrics collection training, and (3) tracking 

personnel who have been trained in biometrics collection to effectively staff 

biometrics operations. Absent this training, military personnel are limited in their

ability to collect high-quality biometrics data to better confirm the identity of 

enemy combatants. 

Several factors during the transmission process limit the use of biometrics in 

Afghanistan. Among them is unclear responsibility for the completeness and 

accuracy of biometrics data during their transmission. As a result, DOD cannot 

expeditiously correct data transmission issues as they arise, such as the 

approximately 4,000 biometrics collected from 2004 to 2008 that were separated 

from their associated identities. Such decoupling renders the data useless and 

increases the likelihood of enemy combatants going undetected within 

Afghanistan and across borders. Factors affecting the timely transmission of 

biometrics data include the biometrics architecture with multiple servers, 

mountainous terrain, and mission requirements in remote areas. These factors 

can prevent units from accessing transmission infrastructure for hours to weeks 

at a time. The DOD biometrics directive calls for periodic assessments, and DOD 

is tracking biometrics data transmission time in Afghanistan, but DOD has not 

determined the viability and cost-effectiveness of reducing transmission time. 

Timeliness of the Biometrics Transmission Process from October 2009 through October 2011 

Lessons learned from U.S. military forces' experiences with biometrics in 

Afghanistan are collected and used by each of the military services and U.S. 

Special Operations Command. Military services emphasize the importance of 

using lessons learned to sustain, enhance, and increase preparedness to 

conduct future operations, but no requirements exist for DOD to disseminate 

existing biometrics lessons learned across the department. 

View GAO-12-442. For more information, 

contact Brian Lepore, 202-512-4523, 

leporeb@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

Letter 1 

Background 5

DOD Conducts Biometrics Training, but Its Training for Leaders 

Does Not Fully Support Warfighter Use of Biometrics 12

Biometrics Collections Occur across Afghanistan, but Several 

Factors during the Transmission Process Limit the Effectiveness 

of Biometrics Data 16

Biometrics Lessons Learned Are Collected, but Not Disseminated 

across DOD 25

Conclusions 26

Recommendations for Executive Action 26

Agency Comments 27

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 30

Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 34

Related GAO Products 35

Tables

Table 1: Summary of DOD Biometrics Roles & Responsibilities 7

Table 2: DOD Organizations Visited 30

Figures

Figure 1: Example of Biometrics Used to Identify an Enemy 

Combatant 2

Figure 2: Key DOD Biometrics Organizations 6

Figure 3: Biometrics Collection Devices in Use 10

Figure 4: Responsibility for Biometrics Data 17

Figure 5: Timeliness of the Biometrics Transmission Process from 

October 2009 through October 2011 19

Figure 6: Biometrics Architecture in Afghanistan 23

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

Abbreviations

ABIS Automated Biometric Identification System

DOD Department of Defense 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548

April 23, 2012

Congressional Requesters

The long-term strategic success in counterinsurgency operations—such 

as Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan—involves separating 

enemy combatants from innocent civilians in the general population. U.S. 

military forces in Afghanistan are using biometrics to identify enemy 

combatants and link individuals to events such as improvised explosive 

device detonations. Biometrics and related biometrics-enabled 

intelligence1 are decisive, nonlethal battlefield capabilities that deny 

enemy combatants the necessary anonymity to hide and strike at will. 

From 2004 to 2011, U.S. military forces collected biometrics data in the 

form of over 1.6 million enrollments2

Biometrics is the measurement and analysis of a person’s unique 

physical or behavioral characteristics, such as fingerprints or written 

signature recognition, which can be used to verify personal identity.

involving more than 1.1 million 

persons in Afghanistan, and used biometrics to successfully identify 

approximately 3,000 known enemy combatants.

3

 

1 Intelligence information associated with biometrics data that matches a specific person 

or unknown identity to a place, activity, device, or weapon and facilitates individual 

targeting, reveals movement patterns, and confirms claimed identity.

In 

Afghanistan, the U.S. military is using more than 7,000 electronic devices 

to collect biometrics data in the form of fingerprints, iris scans, and facial 

photographs. Fingerprints are made up of the minute ridge formations 

and patterns found on an individual’s fingertips; iris scans are the pattern 

of a person’s irises, which are muscles that control the amount of light 

that enters the eyes; and facial photographs are images that identify the 

location, shape, and spatial relationships of facial landmarks such as 

eyes, nose, lips, and chin. U.S. forces are using these three modalities to 

confirm a person’s identity. When used in combination, the likelihood of 

matching biometrics data to a unique individual is substantially increased. 

2 To biometrically enroll an individual is to create and store a record that includes 

biometrics data and typically non-biometrics data, including intelligence information such 

as interrogation reports.

3 Biometrics is a component of identity management—generally understood as the 

management of personal identity information. Examples of non-biometrics personal 

identity information include a person’s name, Social Security number, and date of birth.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

All biometrics data collected in Afghanistan are to be transmitted to the 

Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) Automated Biometric Identification 

System (ABIS) in West Virginia, where they are stored and used to 

identify enemy combatants by comparing and matching against 

previously collected biometrics data. Figure 1 is an example of how 

biometrics was used to identify an enemy combatant in Afghanistan.

Figure 1: Example of Biometrics Used to Identify an Enemy Combatant

Note: Names and photographic information have been redacted for privacy purposes. The match is 

based on the biometrics information; the biographical information may vary depending on what the 

subject has provided. 
 

Page 3 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

In this example, in March 2009, the individual was initially biometrically 

enrolled during an operational encounter. In March 2011, this individual’s 

latent fingerprints4

The Secretary of the Army was designated the DOD Executive Agent for 

DOD Biometrics by Congress in July 2000 and assigned responsibility for 

leading and coordinating all DOD biometrics programs.

were extracted from evidence and submitted to DOD’s 

authoritative biometrics database—ABIS—where they were matched to 

the prior enrollment. In November 2011, the individual was voluntarily 

enrolled as a host nation hire and biometrically linked to the latent 

fingerprint submission from 8 months earlier.

5

To date, we have issued three reports in response to your two requests 

related to DOD biometrics. Our first two reports in 2008 focused on 

DOD’s management of its biometrics activities and on the need for clearer 

guidance for the collection and sharing of biometrics data.

To assist him in 

carrying out his Executive Agent responsibilities, the Secretary of the 

Army designated the Biometrics Task Force in April 2008 to serve as the 

DOD Executive Manager for DOD Biometrics. In March 2010, the 

Biometrics Task Force was renamed the Biometrics Identity Management 

Agency. As the Executive Manager for DOD Biometrics, the Biometrics 

Identity Management Agency is charged with coordinating the 

department’s efforts to program, integrate, and synchronize biometrics 

technologies and capabilities across the four military services and the 

nine unified combatant commands. The Biometrics Identity Management 

Agency also is responsible for developing and maintaining policies and 

procedures for the collection, processing, and transmission of biometrics 

data. To date, neither the Army nor the Marine Corps has institutionalized 

biometrics as a formal program of record, which would make biometrics a 

permanent capability. However, the Special Operations Command has a 

sensitive site exploitation program of record that includes biometrics.

6

 

4 Latent fingerprints are images left on a surface touched by a person.

Our third 

report, issued in 2011, examined DOD’s development of biometrics 

5 Pub. L. No. 106-246, Division B, § 112 (2000).

6 GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Establish Clear Goals and Objectives, 

Guidance, and a Designated Budget to Manage Its Biometric Activities, GAO-08-1065 

(Washington, D.C.: Sep. 26, 2008) and GAO, Defense Management: DOD Can Establish 

More Guidance for Biometrics Collection and Explore Broader Data Sharing, GAO-09-49 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2008). 
 

Page 4 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

standards and the department’s interagency biometrics information 

sharing efforts.7

Of the more than 1.6 million biometrics enrollments completed by U.S. 

military forces in Afghanistan, the Army collected approximately 86 

percent, the Marine Corps collected approximately 11 percent, and U.S. 

Special Operations Command collected approximately 2 percent.

As agreed with your offices, given the continued 

importance of biometrics in military combat operations in Afghanistan, this 

report examines the extent to which (1) DOD’s biometrics training 

supports warfighter use of biometrics, (2) DOD is effectively collecting 

and transmitting biometrics data, and (3) DOD has developed a process 

to collect and disseminate biometrics lessons learned.

8

Therefore, the focus of this report is on the Army, and to a lesser extent 

the Marine Corps and Special Operations Command, biometrics 

collection efforts in Afghanistan.9

 

7 GAO, Defense Biometrics: DOD Can Better Conform to Standards and Share Biometric 

Information with Federal Agencies, 

To determine the extent to which DOD’s 

biometrics training supports warfighter use of biometrics, we reviewed 

relevant Army, Marine Corps, U.S. Central Command, and Special 

Operations Command training policies and guidance; interviewed DOD 

officials in the United States and Afghanistan; and observed several 

training courses. DOD also has implemented biometrics training for 

intelligence analysts, but it was not included in our review. To determine 

the extent to which DOD is effectively collecting and transmitting 

biometrics data, we reviewed relevant policies and guidance and 

interviewed officials from Office of the Secretary of Defense, Biometrics 

Identity Management Agency, Army, Marine Corps, Central Command, 

and Special Operations Command. We observed the collection and 

transmission of biometrics data at installation entry points and other 

locations in Afghanistan. We also toured DOD laboratories in Afghanistan 

that exploit evidence obtained from the battlefield for biometrics data and 

interviewed officials at these sites. To determine the extent to which DOD 

has developed a process to collect and disseminate biometrics lessons 

learned, we reviewed relevant DOD guidance and interviewed officials 

GAO-11-276 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2011).

8 While forces under Special Operations Command collect a small proportion of biometrics 

in Afghanistan, the collections they do make are often from specific, high-value 

individuals. Due to rounding, percentages do not total 100 percent.

9 We met with Navy and Air Force officials to confirm that they have collected 

comparatively few biometrics enrollments in Afghanistan.
 

Page 5 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

from the Army and Marine Corps lessons learned centers as well as 

knowledgeable Joint Staff, military service, Central Command, Special 

Operations Command, and Biometrics Identity Management Agency

officials. More detailed information on our scope and methodology can be 

found in appendix I of this report.

We conducted this performance audit from May 2011 through April 2012, 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Defense biometrics activities involve a number of military services, 

commands, and offices across the department. Figure 2 depicts the 

relationship among several of the key DOD biometrics organizations.

Background

DOD Biometrics 

Organization
 

Page 6 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

Figure 2: Key DOD Biometrics Organizations

Roles and responsibilities for defense biometrics activities are explained 

in DOD’s 2008 biometrics directive, and summarized in table 1.10 

 

10 DOD Directive 8521.01E, Department of Defense Biometrics (Feb. 21, 2008).
 

Page 7 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

Table 1: Summary of DOD Biometrics Roles & Responsibilities 

DOD entity Roles and responsibilities for DOD biometrics

Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics, Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Research & 

Engineering

As the Principal Staff Assistant

a

• oversee biometrics programs, initiatives, technologies, and policies

• oversee interagency coordination

• oversee biometrics funding

Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy

• Support DOD biometrics with policy development, implementation, and oversight

• Coordinate with the Biometrics Principal Staff Assistant on certain biometrics issues, such 

as certain acquisition programs and submissions

Office of the Secretary of the Army As the Executive Agent

• appoint an executive manager

• appoint a program management office

• coordinate biometrics requirements

Biometrics Identity Management 

Agency

As the Executive Manager

• provide biometrics research and technology support

b

• develop policies, processes, and procedures for biometrics data and associated 

intelligence

• manage authoritative biometrics database

• act as the focal point for biometrics data sharing

Office of the Project Manager for 

DOD Biometrics

• develop, acquire, and field common biometrics systems to support military service and 

joint service requirements

Military Services and Special 

Operations Command

• coordinate biometrics strategies and requirements prior to acquisition

• conform to approved DOD biometrics hardware and software architecture

• comply with DOD-approved policies, standards, and processes for biometrics

• coordinate with the Executive Agent to avoid program duplication

• develop service-level biometrics training, direction, and implementation guidance

• develop joint warfighting requirements

• develop resource requirements process for acquisition program objectives

c

Combatant Commands

c

• develop joint warfighting requirements

• develop resource requirements process for acquisition program objectives 

Defense Intelligence Agency • develop, maintain, and share a DOD biometrically enabled watchlist

• develop intelligence collection and analysis capabilities to incorporate information derived 

from biometrics

d

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.

Notes: 

a

DOD Directive 8521.01E assigns responsibilities to the “Director, Defense Research and 

Engineering.” The Director, Defense Research and Engineering has been redesignated as the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. For purposes of this report, we use the 

new position title when referring to responsibilities or activities of both the current and prior office. 

b

By September 30, 2012, a number of Executive Manager responsibilities are expected to transfer to 

the Army’s Office of the Provost Marshal General. 

c

Specific to Special Operations Command. 
 

Page 8 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

d

Since 2006, the Army’s National Ground Intelligence Center has established and maintained the 

biometrically enabled watchlist. The 2008 DOD biometrics directive assigns this responsibility to the 

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. 

DOD is revising its biometrics directive based on, among other things, 

new requirements in the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2011.11

To oversee biometrics activities in Afghanistan, Central Command 

established Task Force Biometrics in 2009. According to the 

Commander’s Guide to Biometrics in Afghanistan, Task Force Biometrics 

assists commands with integrating biometrics into their mission planning, 

trains individuals on biometrics collection, develops biometrics-enabled 

intelligence products, and manages the biometrically enabled watchlist for 

Afghanistan that contains the names of more than 33,000 individuals.

Office of the Secretary of Defense officials said 

that they plan to issue the revised biometrics directive in the fall of 2012. 

The office had started to draft an implementing instruction for biometrics 

based on the 2008 directive but suspended this effort pending issuance of 

the updated directive. According to DOD officials, the implementing 

instruction is expected to contain a more detailed description of roles and 

responsibilities based upon the revised directive.

12

U.S. forces are collecting biometrics data on non-U.S. persons

This watchlist is a subset of the larger biometrically enabled watchlist 

managed by the National Ground Intelligence Center. Additionally, 

according to Army officials, the Army established the Training and 

Doctrine Command Capabilities Manager for Biometrics and Forensics 

with responsibilities for ensuring that user requirements are considered 

and incorporated in Army policy and doctrine involving biometrics. 

Further, the Army gave its Intelligence Center of Excellence 

responsibilities for developing and implementing biometrics training, 

doctrine, education, and personnel.

13

 

11 Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 121 (2011).

in 

Afghanistan at roadside checkpoints, base entry control points, and 

12 U.S. Army, Commander’s Guide to Biometrics in Afghanistan: Observations, Insights, 

and Lessons, Center for Army Lessons Learned (April 2011).

13 Non-U.S. persons are individuals who are neither U.S. citizens nor aliens lawfully 

admitted into the United States for permanent residence.

Biometrics collection process 

in Afghanistan
 

Page 9 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

during patrols and other missions. U.S. forces use three principal 

biometrics collection devices to enroll individuals.

• The Biometrics Automated Toolset: Consists of a laptop computer and 

separate peripherals for collecting fingerprints, scanning irises, and 

taking photographs. The Toolset system connects into any of the 

approximately 150 computer servers geographically distributed across 

Afghanistan that store biometrics data. The Toolset system is used to 

identify and track persons of interest and to document and store 

information, such as interrogation reports, about those persons. This 

device is primarily used by the Army and Marine Corps to enroll and 

identify persons of interest.

• The Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment: Is a selfcontained handheld biometrics collection device with an integrated 

fingerprint collection surface, iris scanner, and camera. The Handheld 

Interagency Identity Detection Equipment connects to the Biometrics 

Automated Toolset system to upload and download biometrics data 

and watchlists. This device is primarily used by the Army and Marine 

Corps.

• The Secure Electronic Enrollment Kit: Is a self-contained handheld 

biometrics collection device with a built-in fingerprint collection 

surface, iris scanner, and camera. Additionally, the Secure Electronic 

Enrollment Kit has a built-in keyboard to facilitate entering 

biographical and other information about individuals being enrolled. 

The Kit is used primarily by the Special Operations Command, 

although the Army and Marine Corps have selected the Kit as the 

replacement biometrics collection device for the Handheld 

Interagency Identity Detection Equipment.

The Biometrics Automated Toolset, Handheld Interagency Identity 

Detection Equipment, and Secure Electronic Enrollment Kit collection 

devices are shown in figure 3.
 

Page 10 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

Figure 3: Biometrics Collection Devices in Use

U.S. forces in Afghanistan collect biometrics data and search for a match 

against the Afghanistan biometrically enabled watchlist that is stored on 

the biometrics collection devices in order to identify persons of interest. 

Soldiers and Marines connect their biometrics collection devices to the 

Afghanistan Biometrics Automated Toolset system’s architecture, at 

which point the data are transmitted and replicated14

 

14 Data replication is the process of sharing data so as to ensure consistency between 

redundant resources, such as software or hardware components, to improve reliability or 

accessibility. 

through a series of 

computer servers in Afghanistan to the ABIS database in West Virginia. 

Special operations forces have a classified and an unclassified Webbased portal that they use to transmit biometrics data directly from their 

collection devices to the ABIS database in West Virginia. Biometrics data 

obtained during the enrollment using the biometrics collection devices are 

searched against previously collected biometrics records in the 
 

Page 11 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

Afghanistan biometrically enabled watchlist, and in some cases the 

Biometrics Automated Toolset servers, before searching against stored 

biometrics records and latent fingerprints stored in ABIS. Match/no match 

watchlist results are reported to Task Force Biometrics and other relevant 

parties. The biometrics data collected during the enrollment are retained 

in ABIS for future matching by DOD.

Once collected, biometrics data and associated information are evaluated 

by intelligence analysts to link a person with other people, events, and 

information. This biometrics-enabled intelligence is then used to identify 

persons of interest, which can result in his or her inclusion on the 

biometrically enabled watchlist. The biometrically enabled watchlist for 

Afghanistan contains five levels, and according to the level of assignment, 

an individual who is encountered after his or her initial enrollment will be 

detained, questioned, denied access to U.S. military bases, disqualified 

from training or employment, or tracked to determine his or her activities 

and associations.

In addition to DOD, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the 

Department of Homeland Security collect and store biometrics data to 

identify persons of interest. The Federal Bureau of Investigation uses its 

biometrics system for law enforcement purposes. The Department of 

Homeland Security uses its biometrics system for border security, 

naturalization, and counterterrorism purposes, as well as for visa approval 

in conjunction with the Department of State. While the three biometrics 

organizations are able to share information, the biometrics databases 

operate independently from one another, as we have noted in our March 

2011 report.15

 

15 See GAO-11-276. 

Other Biometrics Databases 

Operated by U.S. Federal 

Agencies 
 

Page 12 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

DOD has trained thousands of personnel on the collection and 

transmission of biometrics data since 2004; however, training for leaders 

does not fully support warfighter use of biometrics because it does not 

instruct unit commanders and other military leaders on (1) the effective 

use of biometrics, (2) selecting the appropriate personnel for biometrics 

collection training, and (3) tracking personnel who have been trained in 

biometrics collection to effectively staff biometrics operations.

The Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Command have trained 

thousands of personnel on the use of biometrics prior to their deployment 

to Afghanistan over the last 8 years. This training includes the following:

• Army: Offers classroom training at its three combat training centers at 

Fort Polk, Louisiana; Fort Irwin, California; and Hohenfels, Germany 

as well as home station training teams and mobile training teams that 

are available to travel and train throughout the United States as 

needed. In addition, the Army is developing virtual-based training 

software to supplement its classroom training efforts.

• Marine Corps: Offers classroom training at its training centers at 

Camp Pendleton, California and Camp LeJeune, North Carolina as 

well as simulation training at Twentynine Palms, California.

• Special Operations Command: Offers classroom and simulation 

training at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Moreover, the military services and Special Operations Command have 

mobile training teams in Afghanistan to provide biometrics training to 

personnel during their deployment. Additionally, the military services rely 

on personnel who have been trained in biometrics prior to deployment to 

train others while deployed.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services, and Central 

Command each has emphasized in key documents the importance of 

training. The 2008 DOD directive, which was issued by the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 4 years 

after biometrics collection began in Afghanistan, emphasizes the 

importance of biometrics training, including the need for component-level 

guidance to ensure training is developed as required.16

 

16 DOD Directive 8521.01E, Department of Defense Biometrics (Feb. 21, 2008).

The Office of the 

DOD Conducts 

Biometrics Training, 

but Its Training for 

Leaders Does Not 

Fully Support 

Warfighter Use of 

Biometrics

DOD Conducts Biometrics 

Training
 

Page 13 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering17

subsequently drafted an implementing instruction that includes guidance 

for the establishment of training programs designed to enable DOD units 

and leaders to effectively employ biometrics collection capabilities and 

utilize biometrically enabled watchlists.18 As noted earlier, this instruction 

will not be issued until the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics reissues the biometrics directive, 

potentially in the fall of 2012. Both the Army and Central Command have 

issued guidance that requires soldiers to be trained prior to deployment.19

Additionally, an Army regulation on training says that first and foremost, 

training must establish tasks, conditions, and standards to prepare units 

to perform their missions.20 Similarly, a Marine Corps order on training 

states that units focus their training effort on those missions and tasks to 

which they can reasonably expect to be assigned in combat.21 This Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, Army, Marine Corps, and Central Command 

guidance underscores the importance of biometrics training.

DOD’s draft instruction for biometrics emphasizes the importance of 

training leaders in the effective employment of biometrics. However, 

existing biometrics training for leaders does not instruct unit commanders 

and other military leaders on (1) the effective use of biometrics, (2) 

selecting the appropriate personnel for biometrics collection training, and 

(3) tracking personnel who have been trained in biometrics collection to 

effectively staff biometrics operations. When leaders are not invested in 

the importance of biometrics as a tool for identifying enemy combatants, 

the warfighters serving with them may be unaware of the value of 

biometrics because their leaders have not conveyed to them the 

importance of biometrics. Moreover, existing biometrics training for 

 

17 The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering is within 

the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

18 DOD Instruction 8521.bb, DOD Instruction on Biometrics (draft as of October 2011). 

19 U.S. Army Forces Command, Predeployment Training Guidance In Support Of 

Combatant Commands, (September, 2011), and U.S. Central Command, Fragmentary 

Order 09-1700: Central Command Theater Training Requirements (March 2011).

20 Army Regulation 350.1. Army Training and Leader Development (Sep. 4, 2011). 

21 Marine Corps Order P3500.72A, Marine Corps Ground Training and Readiness 

Program (Apr. 18, 2005).

Biometrics Training for 

Leaders Does Not Provide 

Detailed Instruction on the 

Effective Use and 

Management of Biometrics
 

Page 14 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

leaders limits the ability of military personnel to collect higher quality 

biometrics enrollments22

The military services and Special Operations Command have developed 

biometrics training for leaders to varying degrees, but the existing training 

does not communicate how leaders can effectively use biometrics in their 

mission planning. As noted in Army Training Needs Analysis for Tactical 

Biometrics Collection Devices issued in March 2010, a majority of the 

Army’s unit commanders were unaware of how biometrics collection 

contributes to identifying enemy combatants, and that failure to address 

biometrics in training for leaders hampers force protection measures. This 

analysis also stated that Army leaders need to train on how and when to 

incorporate biometrics in mission planning and how to subsequently 

deploy soldiers to use biometrics systems. As a result of the analysis, the 

Army developed a 1-hour briefing for unit commanders and other senior 

officials, but according to an Army training official, it is voluntary training 

provided by mobile training teams and not a part of the Army’s formal, 

required training for leaders. Furthermore, even if leaders take the 

briefing, they may still not be fully aware of the importance and use of 

biometrics in combat missions because the briefing focuses primarily on 

operating biometrics devices for collecting and transmitting biometrics 

data and not on the value of biometrics’ contribution to identifying enemy 

combatants. In addition, neither the Marine Corps nor the Special 

Operations Command has incorporated training for leaders into its 

biometrics training efforts. A Marine Corps official told us that biometrics 

training for leaders will not be developed until the Marine Corps finalizes 

its Marine Corps Identity Operations Strategy 2020, which will establish 

biometrics as a fully integrated capability. Officials at Special Operations 

Command said that while they offer biometrics training for the warfighter, 

they do not have dedicated biometrics training for leaders.

to better confirm the identity of enemy 

combatants through biometrics.

Existing Army biometrics training for leaders also does not stress the 

importance of (1) selecting appropriate personnel for biometrics training, 

and (2) tracking which personnel have completed biometrics training prior 

to deployment. These two omissions likely contribute to less effective 

biometrics operations. For example, the Army found that unit 

 

22 Higher quality biometrics enrollments—that is, enrollments that contain fingerprints and 

iris scans that have a large number of clear and complete data points—result in improved 

matching performance by DOD ABIS and reduced search times.
 

Page 15 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

commanders frequently made inappropriate choices regarding which 

soldiers should attend biometrics collection training prior to deploying to 

Afghanistan (e.g., vehicle drivers) compared to other occupations (e.g., 

military police) who are more likely to utilize biometrics in operations. 

Similarly, a Marine Corps official told us that commanders have selected 

personnel for biometrics missions who were never identified for 

predeployment training, including, in one instance, musicians. With 

respect to tracking personnel with biometrics training, the Army requires 

unit commanders to document soldiers’ completion of unit-level training in 

the Army’s Digital Training Management System.23 However, the Army 

Audit Agency reported in March 2011 that units routinely do not use the 

system to document training—biometrics or otherwise—and Army 

biometrics officials with whom we spoke during the course of our review 

were unaware of this system or any other mechanism to track completion 

of biometrics training.24 Similarly, the Marine Corps does not have a 

tracking mechanism to identify personnel trained in biometrics prior to 

deployment. A Marine Corps training official said that because they have 

not developed biometrics doctrine and training guidance, biometrics 

training is not tracked. Consequently, Army and Marine Corps unit 

commanders in Afghanistan do not have accurate information on which 

and how many of their personnel have received training for conducting 

biometrics operations. This lack of accurate information impedes unit 

commanders’ ability to assess whether they have sufficient expertise 

among their personnel to effectively staff biometrics operations.

 

23 Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development (Sep. 4, 2011).

24 U.S. Army Audit Agency, Digital Training Management System, Report No. A-2011-

0075-FFT (Mar. 10, 2011).
 

Page 16 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

Since 2004, U.S. forces in Afghanistan have collected biometrics from 

more than 1.2 million individuals with approximately 3,000 successful 

matches to enemy combatants, but factors during the transmission 

process limit biometrics’ timely identification of enemy combatants using 

biometrics.25

Every week, thousands of biometrics enrollments are collected in 

Afghanistan and transmitted to ABIS in West Virginia; however, 

responsibility for assuring the completeness and accuracy of the 

biometrics data during the transmission process is unclear. According to 

the DOD biometrics directive, the Executive Manager for DOD Biometrics 

is responsible for developing and maintaining policies and procedures for 

the collection, processing, and transmission of biometrics data.26

However, no policy has been articulated that assigns responsibility for 

maintaining the completeness and accuracy of biometrics data during the 

transmission process. In addition, the Standards for Internal Control in the 

Federal Government state that (1) controls should be installed at an 

application’s interfaces with other systems to ensure that all inputs are 

received and are valid, and that outputs are correct and properly 

distributed; and (2) key duties and responsibilities are divided among 

different people to reduce the risk of error.27

As shown in figure 4, the warfighter has responsibility for the biometrics 

data from collection to the point of submission into the Biometrics 

 

25 By transmission process we mean the time period between when warfighters submit 

biometrics enrollments into the Biometrics Automated Toolset system and when the data 

are received by ABIS for matching and storage.

26 DOD Directive 8521.01E, §E4.4 (2008).

27 GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

Biometrics 

Collections Occur 

across Afghanistan, 

but Several Factors 

during the 

Transmission Process 

Limit the 

Effectiveness of 

Biometrics Data

Responsibility for 

Biometrics Data during the 

Transmission Process Is 

Unclear
 

Page 17 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

Automated Toolset system, and the Biometrics Identity Management 

Agency assumes responsibility for the biometrics data once they are 

received by ABIS. The Project Manager for DOD Biometrics has 

responsibility for the physical infrastructure of the Biometrics Automated 

Toolset system. DOD officials we spoke with were unable to identify who 

has responsibility for the completeness and accuracy of the biometrics 

data during the transmission process. Specifically, officials from Central 

Command stated that it owns the biometrics data, but the Project 

Manager for DOD Biometrics is responsible for their completeness and 

accuracy. Officials from the Project Manager for DOD Biometrics told us 

that it is not responsible for the completeness and accuracy of the 

biometrics data.

Figure 4: Responsibility for Biometrics Data

In some cases, issues during the transmission process have surfaced 

impacting the completeness and accuracy of the biometrics data. 

Specifically, data synchronization28

 

28 Data synchronization is the process of establishing consistency among data from a 

source to a target data storage and vice versa and the continuous harmonization of such 

data over time. Hence, biometrics systems which are not properly synchronized could 

result in de-linked data, rendering them unreliable.

issues led Central Command to issue 
 

Page 18 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

an urgent requirement in September 200929 to improve data 

synchronization to avoid further hindering DOD’s ability to transfer 

biometrics data; however, the urgent needs statement was rescinded30

following more than a year of inaction without improvements having been 

made in order to reallocate funding towards the Last Tactical Mile pilot 

project.31 This issue has continued to impact the completeness and 

accuracy of biometrics data. For example, during the Last Tactical Mile 

pilot project in summer 2011, Army officials found that of the more than 

33,000 people on the Afghanistan biometrically enabled watchlist, 

approximately 4,000 biometrics collected from 2004 to 2008 had become 

separated from their associated identities and 1,800 remained separated 

as of October 2011. Officials stated that the separated data were most 

likely due in part to synchronization issues during the data transmission 

process. This decoupling of an individual from his or her associated 

biometrics data undermines the utility of biometrics by increasing the 

likelihood of enemy combatants going undetected within Afghanistan and 

across borders since the separated biometrics data cannot be used for 

identification purposes. Although DOD officials said they are aware of this 

and other synchronization issues, the absence of clearly defined 

responsibility during the biometrics data transmission process has 

contributed, in part, to DOD’s inability to expeditiously correct data 

transmission issues as they arise, such as instances in which biometrics 

data collected in Afghanistan have been separated from their identities.

 

29 U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, Biometrics Data Synchronization Joint Urgent Operational 

Need Statement CC-0385 (Sep. 22, 2009). 

30 Memorandum for Central Command Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan Request to 

Rescind Joint Urgent Operational Need Statement CC-0385 for Biometrics 

Synchronization (May 18, 2011).

31 The Last Tactical Mile pilot project originated as part of a joint urgent operational need 

to utilize wireless infrastructure to transmit biometrics data from handheld biometrics 

collection devices to a wireless communications tower, with a capability of providing 

match/no match responses to the warfighter with watchlist and latent fingerprint matches 

within 2 to 5 minutes of transmission.
 

Page 19 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

Several factors in transmitting biometrics data from Army and Marine 

Corps forces affect DOD’s ability to identify and capture enemy 

combatants with biometrics in a timely manner. The transmission process 

for biometrics data involves a unit’s submission of collected enrollments, 

matching in ABIS, and a match/no match response back to the unit. From 

the time data are submitted, the transmission process can take from less 

than 1 day to 15 days or more to complete, as shown in figure 5. 

However, the design specifications for the Biometrics Automated Toolset 

system for Afghanistan state that biometrics data should transmit from the 

point of data submission to ABIS within 4 hours.

Figure 5: Timeliness of the Biometrics Transmission Process from October 2009 through October 2011

In contrast, according to officials from the Biometrics Identity 

Management Agency, once enrollments are received by ABIS, the time it 

takes to match the data and transmit a response to the National Ground 

Intelligence Center for intelligence analysis, and ultimately back to the 

unit that performed the biometrics enrollment in Afghanistan, averages 22 

minutes.32

Multiple factors contribute to the time it takes to transmit biometrics data 

from the warfighter to ABIS, and back. These factors include:

• Biometrics architecture: The Biometrics Automated Toolset system’s 

architecture constructed for use in Afghanistan requires biometrics 

submissions to be replicated sequentially across multiple computer 

servers before reaching ABIS. As noted in figure 5, biometrics data on 

the Biometrics Automated Toolset system’s architecture can take

 

32 Special operations forces receive match/no match responses directly from the 

Biometrics Identity Management Agency. 

Other Factors Occurring In 

the Biometrics 

Transmission Process 

Affect Timely Enemy 

Combatant Detection with 

Biometrics
 

Page 20 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

more than 2 weeks to transmit from Afghanistan to ABIS. However, 

DOD is unclear on how the number of servers correlates to 

transmission timeliness.

• Geographic challenges to connectivity: The mountainous terrain in 

Afghanistan’s northern regions highlights the limited ability of U.S. 

forces to transmit biometrics data within the country. For example, 

under optimal conditions (i.e., flat terrain), wireless transmission, such 

as that used in the Last Tactical Mile pilot project, is capable of 

transmitting biometrics data up to approximately 50 miles.33

• Multiple, competing demands for communications infrastructure: 

Multiple, competing demands for communications infrastructure by 

U.S. forces in Afghanistan limit bandwidth available to transmit 

biometrics data to ABIS, thus resulting in delayed submissions. 

According to DOD officials, available bandwidth is a continuing 

problem in Afghanistan, which limits the amount and speed of 

information transmitted within or outside of Afghanistan. DOD has 

increased bandwidth capacity in Afghanistan over the years, but new 

military capabilities add to the demand for additional bandwidth.

However, 

wireless transmission requires line-of-sight from a handheld 

biometrics device to a wireless tower, which would necessitate 

acquiring and erecting many towers to cover a relatively small 

geographic area. DOD is still evaluating the viability of expanding the 

pilot project in Afghanistan.

• Mission requirements: According to the Commander’s Guide to 

Biometrics in Afghanistan, forces should submit enrollments to ABIS 

within 8 hours of completion of a mission; however, missions can 

keep units operating in remote areas away from biometrics 

transmission infrastructure for weeks at a time.34

DOD has pursued two key efforts to reduce the time it takes to transmit 

biometrics data in Afghanistan outside of the Biometrics Automated 

Toolset system: communication satellites used by special operations 

While on missions, a 

unit’s biometrics collection devices have a preloaded Afghanistan 

biometrically enabled watchlist and are typically updated weekly, but 

again, mission requirements can delay updating these devices with 

the most current watchlist.

 

33 The Last Tactical Mile pilot project utilizes mobile transmission points and fixed wireless 

towers capable of transmitting biometrics data approximately 50 miles. In situations with 

reduced line-of-sight, transmission distances decrease.

34 U.S. Army, Commander’s Guide to Biometrics in Afghanistan: Observations, Insights, 

and Lessons, Center for Army Lessons Learned (April 2011).
 

Page 21 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

forces and the Last Tactical Mile pilot project. Special operations forces 

upload their biometrics enrollments to a dedicated classified or 

unclassified Web-based portal using communications satellites.35 The 

Biometrics Identity Management Agency monitors the portal and 

accesses the enrollments therein to match against biometrics data stored 

in ABIS. In addition to fingerprint, iris, and facial biometrics, the Webbased portal supports the cataloguing and analysis of other biometric and 

nonbiometric evidence such as DNA, documents, and cell phone data. 

Match/no match responses are provided to the warfighter via the portal 

within 2 to 7 minutes, assuming satellite or other Internet connectivity is 

available.36

Central Command was responsible for conducting the Last Tactical Mile 

pilot project during 2011 to provide the warfighter with a rapid response 

time on biometrics data submissions. In the pilot project, matching is 

initially against a biometrically enabled watchlist stored on the warfighter’s 

handheld device before searching against data stored in a stand-alone 

computer server in Afghanistan prior to transmission to ABIS––the 

authoritative database. The Last Tactical Mile pilot project originated as a 

joint urgent operational need

Additionally, special operations forces can match individuals 

against a preloaded biometrically enabled watchlist on the handheld 

biometrics collection devices.

37 to utilize wireless infrastructure to transmit 

biometrics enrollments from a handheld biometrics collection device to a 

wireless communications tower.38

 

35 Since the portal is Web-based and the biometrics collection devices are handheld, this 

approach can be used worldwide.

A goal of the pilot project was to 

receive a match/no match response in 2 to 5 minutes against the 

biometrics data stored on the computer server in Afghanistan, including 

possible latent fingerprint matches. Army officials told us that expanding 

the Last Tactical Mile pilot project across all of Afghanistan would cost 

approximately $300 million, in large part due to the number of wireless 

36 The Biometrics Identity Management Agency prioritizes biometrics data submissions 

based upon user needs, with special operations forces receiving the highest priority.

Therefore, some biometrics submissions may have longer response times.

37 U.S. Forces-Afghanistan Joint Urgent Operational Need for Biometrics Last Tactical 

Mile Solution, CC-0434 (Jan. 4, 2011). 

38 In addition to direct transmission to the wireless communications tower, the handheld 

biometrics collection devices can wirelessly transmit to a mobile transmission point 

attached to a military vehicle that then relays the biometrics data to the wireless 

communications tower.
 

Page 22 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

communications towers that would be necessary to provide connectivity 

across the mountainous terrain in the northern part of the country. DOD 

had not completed its evaluation of the Last Tactical Mile pilot project at 

the time of our review, and had not documented plans to utilize wireless 

infrastructure for biometrics in Afghanistan beyond the continued 

operation of the pilot project.

Figure 6 highlights the differences between the Biometrics Automated 

Toolset system’s architecture used by the Army and the Marine Corps, 

the Web-based architecture used by Special Operations Command, and 

the architecture in the Last Tactical Mile pilot project.
 

Page 23 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

Figure 6: Biometrics Architecture in Afghanistan

Note: aIn the Last Tactical Mile pilot project, match/no match reports are initially provided to the 

warfighter from a biometrically enabled watchlist stored on the handheld collection device followed by 

the Central Command Forward Server for latent fingerprints and watchlist match results. Once 

biometrics data are received by ABIS, another match/no match report is generated back to the 

Central Command Forward Server based upon the full ABIS database. 
 

Page 24 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

Although DOD is tracking biometrics data transmission time in 

Afghanistan to facilitate timely responses to the warfighter, it has not 

assessed several of the factors that contribute to transmission delays. 

Officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense told us that the 

Project Manager for DOD Biometrics had conducted a limited analysis of 

some known factors affecting transmission delays in Afghanistan, and 

found that the warfighter was largely responsible for submission delays. 

However, this analysis did not evaluate technical and geographic factors 

that can contribute to extended transmission times. According to the 

biometrics directive, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and 

Engineering—within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics—is responsible for periodically 

assessing biometrics activities for continued effectiveness in satisfying 

end-user requirements.39 However, no comprehensive assessment of 

factors contributing to transmission timeliness has been conducted by this 

office. In addition, DOD’s draft biometrics instruction states that testing 

and evaluation expertise must be employed to understand the strengths 

and weaknesses of the system, with a goal of early identification of 

deficiencies so that they can be corrected before problems occur.40

Factors contributing to transmission delays can lead to enemy 

combatants going undetected and subsequently being released back into 

the general population because their identities could not be confirmed 

with biometrics data in a timely manner. If a watchlist stored on a 

biometrics collection device does not lead to a confirmed match to an 

enemy combatant, it may be months or years before the individual is 

stopped again by U.S. forces at a roadside checkpoint, border crossing, 

or during a patrol or another mission, if ever.

For 

example, it is unclear whether the benefits of additional communications 

satellite access, expansion of the Last Tactical Mile pilot project’s 

technology, or an alternative approach outweigh their associated costs.

 

39 DOD Directive 8521.01E, § 5.1.2.1 (2008).

40 As noted, this instruction is in draft, and is not mandatory until issued. It is not planned 

for issuance until the Office of the Secretary of Defense reissues the biometrics directive, 

potentially in the fall of 2012.
 

Page 25 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

Lessons learned from U.S. forces’ experiences with biometrics in 

Afghanistan are collected by and used within each of the military services 

and Special Operations Command, but those lessons are not 

disseminated across DOD. Army and Marine Corps guidance both 

emphasize using lessons learned to sustain, enhance, and increase 

preparedness to conduct current and future operations.41

DOD also uses informal processes to capture biometrics training-related 

lessons learned. For example, monthly teleconferences are held by and 

open to training representatives from Central Command’s Task Force 

Biometrics and the Army to discuss biometrics training-related issues and 

experiences. However, this information is not disseminated across the 

department. Army biometrics officials told us that it would be 

advantageous to share biometrics lessons learned across the military 

services and combatant commands.

The Army, 

Marine Corps, and Special Operations Command each rely on their 

respective existing processes to collect lessons learned pertaining to 

biometrics to facilitate knowledge sharing. To collect lessons learned, the 

military services and Special Operations Command draw from a variety of 

sources, including through surveys administered to students and 

instructors during training, and through interviews with personnel who 

have recently returned from a deployment. These lessons learned are 

analyzed to identify opportunities to improve existing practices within the 

military services and Special Operations Command. For example, Army 

officials said that about 10 to 15 percent of the lessons learned it collects 

are subsequently identified as either best practices or issues that require 

further action to resolve.

Currently, DOD has no requirement to disseminate biometrics lessons 

learned across the department. However, the unpublished DOD 

implementing instruction for biometrics that was drafted by the Office of 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering42

 

41 Army Regulation 11-33, Army Lessons Learned Program (Oct. 17, 2006); Marine Corps 

Order 3504.1, Marine Corps Lessons Learned Program (MCLLP) and the Marine Corps 

Center For Lessons Learned (July 31, 2006).

42 According to DOD Directive 8521.01E, §5.1.2.1 (2008), the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Research and Engineering—within the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics—is responsible for periodically 

assessing biometrics activities for continued effectiveness in satisfying end-user 

requirements.

Biometrics Lessons 

Learned Are 

Collected, but Not 

Disseminated across 

DOD
 

Page 26 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

includes a provision that would require DOD organizations to provide 

feedback and biometrics lessons learned to the Biometrics Identity 

Management Agency in its role as the Executive Manager for DOD 

Biometrics. In this role, the Biometrics Identity Management Agency could 

disseminate biometrics lessons learned collected by the various military 

services and combatant commands to inform relevant policies and 

practices. Biometrics Identity Management Agency officials told us that 

while they have established a process to receive Army lessons learned 

for biometrics, the agency does not plan to assume the additional 

responsibility of collecting the other military services’ and combatant 

commands’ lessons learned for biometrics issues and disseminating them 

across DOD without an explicit requirement to do so. By not 

disseminating biometrics lessons learned from existing military service 

and combatant command lessons learned systems across the 

department, DOD misses an opportunity to fully leverage its investment in 

biometrics.

U.S. military forces have used biometrics as a nonlethal weapon in 

counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan to remove the anonymity 

sought by enemy combatants. However, issues such as minimal 

biometrics training for leaders; challenges with ensuring the complete, 

accurate, and timely transmission of biometrics data; and the absence of 

a requirement to disseminate biometrics lessons learned across DOD 

persist. As a result, these issues limit the effectiveness of biometrics as 

an intelligence tool and may allow enemy combatants to move more 

freely within and across borders.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following seven 

actions:

To better ensure that training supports warfighter use of biometrics, direct 

the military services and Special Operations Command to expand 

biometrics training for leaders to include

• the effective use of biometrics in combat operations,

• the importance of selecting appropriate candidates for training, and

• the importance of tracking who has completed biometrics training prior 

to deployment to help ensure appropriate assignments of biometrics 

collection responsibilities.

Conclusions

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 27 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

To better ensure the completeness and accuracy of transmitted 

biometrics data, direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research 

and Engineering, through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics, and in coordination with the military services, 

Special Operations Command, and Central Command, to identify and

assign responsibility for biometrics data throughout the transmission 

process, regardless of the pathway the data travels, to include the time 

period between when warfighters submit their data from the biometrics 

collection device until the biometrics data reach ABIS.

To determine the viability and cost-effectiveness of reducing transmission 

times for biometrics data, direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Research and Engineering, through the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to comprehensively assess and 

then address, as appropriate, the factors that contribute to transmission 

time for biometrics data.

To more fully leverage DOD’s investment in biometrics, direct the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, through 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics, to

• assess the value of disseminating biometrics lessons learned from 

existing military service and combatant command lessons learned 

systems across DOD to inform relevant policies and practices, and

• implement a lessons learned dissemination process, as appropriate.

We requested comments from DOD on the draft report, but none were 

provided. DOD did provide us with technical comments that we 

incorporated, as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional 

parties; the Secretary of Defense; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the 

Secretaries of the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Air Force; the 

Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of 

Management and Budget. In addition, this report will be available at no 

charge on the GAO Website at http://www.gao.gov. 

Agency Comments
 

Page 28 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-4523 or at leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix II.

Brian J. Lepore

Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
 

Page 29 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

List of Requesters

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable W. “Mac” Thornberry

Chairman

The Honorable James R. Langevin

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Jeff Miller

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 30 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

To address our audit objectives, we reviewed relevant Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, military service, and combatant command policies 

and guidance, such as the Department of Defense’s (DOD) biometrics 

directive1 and accompanying draft instruction,2 and the Army’s 

Commander’s Guide to Biometrics in Afghanistan.

3 We obtained these 

and other relevant documentation, and interviewed officials from the DOD 

organizations identified in table 2.4

Table 2: DOD Organizations Visiteda

Office of the Secretary of Defense

 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Office of 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Research and Engineering; Defense Biometrics & 

Forensics

The Joint Staff Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate, Requirements, Force Protection 

Division 

U.S. Army Headquarters, Intelligence Directorate 

Intelligence and Security Command

Biometrics Identity Management Agency 

National Ground Intelligence Center, Charlottesville, VA

Training and Doctrine Command Capabilities Manager – Biometrics & Forensics, Fort 

Huachuca, AZ

Training and Doctrine Command, Intelligence Center of Excellence, New Systems Training 

and Integration Division, New Equipment Technology Team, Fort Huachuca, AZ 

Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS 

Project Manager for DOD Biometrics 

Project Manager for Relevant Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance to the Edge, 

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 

U.S. Navy Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, Test and 

Evaluation 

Office of Naval Intelligence

 

1 DOD Directive 8521.01E, Department of Defense Biometrics (Feb. 21, 2008).

2 DOD Instruction 8521.bb, DOD Instruction on Biometrics (draft, as of October 2011).

3 U.S. Army, Commander’s Guide to Biometrics in Afghanistan: Observations, Insights, 

and Lessons, Center for Army Lessons Learned (April 2011). 

4 We met with Navy and Air Force officials to confirm that they have collected 

comparatively few biometrics enrollments in Afghanistan.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 31 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Biometrics Division

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure Office, Surface 

Warfare Directorate

U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, Plans, Policies, and Operations Division, Identity Operations Section 

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Integrated Systems Training Center, Camp Pendleton, CA 

Marine Forces Systems Command 

Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned 

U.S. Air Force Headquarters, Cyberspace Operations Directorate, Cyber Surety Division 

U.S. Central Command Headquarters, Intelligence Directorate, Command, Control, Communications, 

Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems Branch. MacDill Air 

Force Base, FL 

Headquarters, Operations Directorate, MacDill Air Force Base, FL

U.S. Special Operations Command Headquarters, Identity Operations Directorate, MacDill Air Force Base, FL

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan Headquarters, Task Force Biometrics, Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-435, Bagram 

Air Field 

Biometrics Support Element – East, Bagram Air Field

Biometrics Support Element – South, Kandahar Air Field

Marine Corps Biometrics Liaison Office, Camp Leatherneck

Tactical Biometrics Cell – Afghanistan, Bagram Air Field

Tactical Biometrics Cell – Afghanistan, Kandahar Air Field

Task Force Biometrics, Last Tactical Mile Pilot Project, Forward Operating Base Pasab

Joint Expeditionary Forensic Facility, Kandahar Air Field

Joint Expeditionary Forensic Facility, Camp Leatherneck

Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell, Camp Leatherneck

Joint Prosecution Exploitation Center, Camp Leatherneck

Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan, Camp Vance, Bagram Air 

Field

Source: GAO data.

Note: a

Unless otherwise indicated, these offices and agencies are located within the Washington, 

D.C. metropolitan area. 

To determine the extent to which DOD’s biometrics training supports 

warfighter use of biometrics in Afghanistan, we reviewed relevant Army, 

Marine Corps, and Central Command policies and assessments 

pertaining to biometrics training for warfighters and leaders to determine 

the biometrics training requirements for U.S. forces operating in 

Afghanistan. To understand the frequency and types of biometrics 

training offered by the Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations 

Command, we reviewed training schedules and we observed the Army’s 

Soldier Field Service Engineer Course 2nd Pilot and Biometrics 

Operations Specialist/Master Gunner Training at Fort Drum, N.Y.; the 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 32 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

Marine Corps’ Biometrics Automated Toolset Basic Operator’s Course at 

Camp Pendleton, CA; and the Special Operations Command’s Technical 

Exploitation Course I and the Sensitive Site Exploitation Operator 

Advanced Courses training at Fort Bragg, N.C.. In addition, we discussed 

training with military officials in Afghanistan from the organizations listed

in table 2.

To determine the extent to which DOD is effectively collecting and 

transmitting biometrics data, we obtained, reviewed, and analyzed 

relevant Central Command issued Joint Urgent Operational Need 

Statements. In addition, we reviewed documents on biometrics collections 

and transmissions and spoke with Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

Army, Marine Corps, Central Command, and Special Operations 

Command officials. We reviewed DOD biometrics submission latency 

data to understand data transmission over time. We assessed the 

reliability of the data by reviewing related documentation and interviewing 

knowledgeable officials. Although we found the data sufficiently reliable to 

provide descriptive and summary statistics, problems were identified with 

the completeness and accuracy of the data due to external factors, such 

as inaccurate time/date stamps on biometrics collection devices. As a 

result, we developed a recommendation to assign responsibility for 

biometrics data throughout the transmission process, to include the time 

period between when warfighters submit their data into the Biometrics 

Automated Toolset system until the biometrics data reach ABIS to better 

ensure completeness and accuracy of biometrics data during the 

transmission process. We also reviewed the Standards for Internal 

Control in the Federal Government for information on data completeness 

and accuracy assurance.5

 

5 GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

We conducted site visits to four military 

installations in Afghanistan to ascertain how biometrics are being

collected, utilized, and transmitted. Specifically, we visited Bagram Air 

Field, Kandahar Air Field, Marine Corps Base Camp Leatherneck, and 

Forward Operating Base Pasab to meet with military officials responsible 

for leading and performing biometrics collection, analysis, and 

transmission activities in Afghanistan and for operating the Last Tactical 

Mile pilot project.

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 33 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

To determine the extent to which DOD has developed a process to collect 

and disseminate biometrics lessons learned, we analyzed relevant Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, Army, and Marine Corps guidance and 

policies, and met with officials from each of these organizations to discuss 

current practices.

We conducted this performance audit from May 2011 through April 2012 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 34 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

Brian J. Lepore, Director, 202-512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Marc Schwartz, Assistant 

Director; Grace Coleman; Mary Coyle; Davi M. D’Agostino, Director 

(retired); Bethann E. Ritter; Amie Steele; and Spencer Tacktill made key 

contributions to this report. Ashley Alley, Timothy Persons, Terry 

Richardson, John Van Schaik, and Michael Willems provided technical 

assistance.

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 35 GAO-12-442 Defense Biometrics 

Defense Biometrics: DOD Can Better Conform to Standards and Share 

Biometric Information with Federal Agencies. GAO-11-276. Washington, 

D.C.: March 31, 2011.

Defense Management: DOD Can Establish More Guidance for Biometrics 

Collection and Explore Broader Data Sharing. GAO-09-49. Washington, 

D.C.: October 15, 2008.

Defense Management: DOD Needs to Establish Clear Goals and 

Objectives, Guidance, and a Designated Budget to Manage its Biometrics 

Activities. GAO-08-1065. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2008.

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