In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 19-440C

(Filed: October 28, 2019)

VICTORIA SZUGGAR and

KIANA BARTON, on behalf of 

themselves and all others similarly 

situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

 

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Keywords: Reported Opinion, 

Class-Action, Motion to Dismiss, 

RCFC 12(b)(1), Subject-Matter 

Jurisdiction, Money-Mandating, 

Back Pay, Benefits, Temporary 

Appointment, 38 U.S.C. § 7405

Michele R. Fisher, Nichols Kaster, PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, with whom was Jay E. 

Eidsness, for plaintiffs.

Kara M. Westercamp, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of 

Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

HERTLING, Judge

Plaintiffs Victoria Szuggar and Kiana Barton (“the Nurses”) acting for themselves and on 

behalf of other similarly situated part-time registered nurses employed by the Veterans Health 

Administration of the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) filed this putative class action 

against the United States acting through and on behalf of the VA. The VA has moved to dismiss 

the complaint. The Nurses seek back pay, alleging that the statute authorizing the VA to appoint 

them as temporary part-time registered nurses requires the VA, after their first two years of 

service, to treat—and compensate—them as if they had been appointed to permanent positions.

The Court grants the VA’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Legal Framework

For purposes of the VA’s motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded 

allegations of the complaint. In every state, the VA employs healthcare workers, including 

registered nurses, in clinics that care for veterans. (Am. Compl. ¶ 4, ECF 6.) Federal 
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employment is generally governed by Title 5 of the United States Code, and federal employees 

generally have certain procedural rights to their continued employment. Title 38 of the United 

States Code, however, authorizes the VA both to appoint certain healthcare employees, including 

registered nurses, outside of Title 5’s civil-service requirements and to impose a two-year-long 

probationary period during which these Title-38-employees can be terminated at will. See 38 

U.S.C. §§ 7401(1), 7403(a)-(b).

38 U.S.C. § 7405 is among these personnel authorities specific to the VA.1 The section 

authorizes the VA to make full-time and part-time appointments on a time-limited or 

“temporary” basis. A temporary employee appointed under § 7405 has no right to continued 

employment after the term of that appointment ends. See Woods v. Milner, 955 F.2d 436, 439

(6th Cir. 1992) (temporary physicians appointed under § 7405 (formerly § 4114) and terminated 

at the end of their appointments had no right to permanent employment offers). Further, “[w]hile 

permanent [VA] appointees have certain statutory rights incident to the review of discipline and 

 1 Insofar as relevant, 38 U.S.C. § 7405 provides:

(a) The Secretary, upon the recommendation of the Under Secretary for Health, 

may employ, without regard to civil service or classification laws, rules, or 

regulations, personnel as follows:

(1) On a temporary full-time basis, part-time basis, or without compensation 

basis, persons in the following positions:

(A) Positions listed in section 7401(3) of this title [physicians, dentists, 

podiatrists, chiropractors, optometrists, registered nurses, physician 

assistants, and expanded-function dental auxiliaries].

* * *

(b) Personnel employed under subsection (a)--

(1) shall be in addition to personnel described in section 7306, paragraphs (1)

and (3) of section 7401, and section 7408 of this title; and

(2) shall be paid such rates of pay as the Secretary may prescribe.

* * *

(g)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (3), employment of a registered nurse on a 

temporary part-time basis under subsection (a)(1) shall be for a probationary period 

of two years.

(2) Except as provided in paragraph (3), upon completion by a registered nurse 

of the probationary period described in paragraph (1)—

(A) the employment of such nurse shall—

(i) no longer be considered temporary; and

(ii) be considered an appointment described in section 7403(a) of this 

title; and

(B) the nurse shall be considered to have served the probationary period 

required by section 7403(b).

* * *
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termination, including peer review, temporary appointees are subject to termination at will 

without advance notice.” Id. at 437.

Congress added subsection (g) to § 7405 in 2010 under the title “Prohibition on 

Temporary Part-Time Registered Nurse Appointments In Excess Of 2 Years.” Caregivers and 

Veterans Omnibus Health Services Act of 2010, P.L. 111-163, sec. 601(c), May 5, 2010, 124 

Stat. 1130 (2010). Subsection (g) singles out registered nurses, providing that “employment of a 

registered nurse on a temporary part-time basis . . . shall be for a probationary period of two 

years . . . .” Subsection (g) further provides that “upon completion by a registered nurse of the 

[two-year] probationary period . . . the employment of such nurse shall—no longer be considered 

temporary; and [the employment of such nurse shall] be considered an appointment described in 

[§] 7403(a) of this title.” 38 U.S.C. § 7405(g). Section 7403 of Title 38 governs the permanent 

appointment of healthcare workers, including registered nurses.

B. The Plaintiffs

Plaintiff Victoria Szuggar was appointed in May 2012 as an “intermittent,” temporary 

part-time registered nurse “pursuant to § 7405(a)” and has worked at VA clinics in Northern 

California. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10-13, ECF 6.) The VA has renewed her appointment annually. 

(Am. Compl. ¶ 12, ECF 6.) Plaintiff Kiana Barton was appointed an “intermittent” registered 

nurse in July 2014 and has worked in a VA facility in Maryland. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15-17, ECF 

6.) Both have worked as temporary intermittent registered nurses for at least two years but have 

remained “unbenefited” employees. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 14, 17, 18, ECF 6.)

C. Amended Complaint

The Nurses’ one-count Amended Complaint alleges that the VA violated its 

“appointment statutes” when it “failed to convert temporary part-time [registered nurses to 

permanent status] according to [38 U.S.C.] § 7405(g).” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8-9, ECF 6.) The 

Amended Complaint alleges that this nationwide practice “results in significant financial harm to 

temporary part-time [registered nurses]” because “[e]mployees appointed under § 7405(a) do not 

receive certain wages and benefits . . . available to permanent [registered nurses].” The Nurses, 

“upon information and belief,” further allege that the VA values these benefits “at over 25% of 

[a permanent] employee’s hourly rate.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8-9, ECF 6.) The Amended Complaint 

alleges that this amount includes “pay, employer retirement contributions, paid time off, and 

other benefits that [permanent] employees appointed under 38 U.S.C. § 7403(a) receive.” (Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 9, 33, ECF 6).

The Amended Complaint seeks class certification for “[a]ll temporary, part-time 

[registered nurses] appointed under 38 U.S.C. § 7405(a) at any time since March 22, 2013, 

anywhere in the United States, who completed the two-year probationary period requirement of 

38 U.S.C. § 7405(g) and were not converted to a non-temporary benefitted appointment pursuant 

to 38 U.S.C. § 7403(a).” (Am. Compl. ¶ 20, ECF 6.)

Further, the Amended Complaint seeks “back pay due to Plaintiffs, and all other eligible 

opt-in class members, for periods of unpaid benefits and wages from six years prior to the 

original complaint filing and thereafter in an amount equal to what they would have received had 
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they been properly converted to a permanent benefitted employee under 38 U.S.C. § 7403(a).”

(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34(a)-(b), ECF 6.) It also seeks interest and attorneys’ fees. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 

34(c)-(d), ECF 6.)

D. Motion to Dismiss

The VA has moved to dismiss the Nurses’ Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) of 

the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 

under RCFC 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (ECF 14.) 

The VA argues that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because neither 38 U.S.C. § 

7405(g) nor § 7403(a) is a money-mandating statute on which a plaintiff can base a claim in this 

court. The VA further argues that the only statutes cited in the Amended Complaint would, even 

if violated, not mandate the payment of money damages because they concern appointments to 

certain positions at the VA, and do not contemplate pay or create a claim for money damages. 

Alternatively, the VA argues that the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted because it fails to identify any statutory or regulatory provision 

indicating that permanent appointees are entitled to additional pay or leave benefits that are not 

made available to those persons appointed on an intermittent or temporary basis. 

The Nurses respond by identifying statutes and regulations related to eligibility for annual 

raises and benefits that they argue should be read together with the VA-appointment statutes in 

Title 38 to create a “fair implication” that the VA-appointment statutes are money-mandating. 

(See, e.g., Opp’n Mot. Dismiss at 8-9, ECF 18 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 5335, applying to annual raises 

to permanent employees, and 5 U.S.C. §§ 8906 and 8906a applying to health-insurance premium 

contributions for temporary employees); Suppl. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss at 5, ECF 32 (citing 5 

U.S.C. §5335, applying, in conjunction with performance standards in 5 C.F.R. § 531.404 and 

other regulations, to annual pay increases).)

After the government’s motion was fully briefed, the Court heard oral argument and 

requested supplemental briefing, which has been submitted.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Standard of Review

This Court “tests the sufficiency of the complaint as a matter of law, accepting as true all 

non-conclusory allegations of fact, construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Samish 

Indian Nation v. United States, 419 F.3d 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The plaintiff bears the 

burden of establishing this court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Reynolds v. Army & Air Force 

Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs must (1) establish a court’s power to hear their case, subject matter jurisdiction; 

(2) establish their own right to relief from particular conduct, a cause of action; and (3) allege 

facts that satisfy the elements of their cause of action. See Greenlee Cty., Ariz. v. United States, 

487 F.3d 871, 876 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979).
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In this Court, the first two of these three requirements are both jurisdictional because the 

Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, has been interpreted to condition this Court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction on plaintiffs identifying a money-mandating source of law on which to base their 

cause of action. Greenlee Cty., 487 F.3d at 876. Most statutes do not qualify as moneymandating. Adair v. United States, 497 F.3d 1244, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing United States v.

White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 473 (2003)).

United States v. Testan specifically rejected the argument that all government violations

of federal employment laws automatically give federal employees a cause of action under the 

Tucker Act. 424 U.S. 392, 401-02 (1976). The classification statute at issue in Testan had an 

express purpose provision providing that “the principle of equal pay for substantially equal work

will be followed.” Id. at 399. Despite this provision, the Supreme Court held that the statute at 

issue was not money-mandating and therefore did not give the employees a cause of action to sue 

in this Court’s predecessor court. Id. at 403-04 (“They are without the remedies in the Court of 

Claims of retroactive classification and money damages to which they assert they are entitled.

Additional remedies of this kind are for the Congress to provide and not for the courts to 

construct.”)

“[A] statute is money-mandating only if it ‘can fairly be interpreted as mandating 

compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.’” Id. (emphasis added) 

(quoting United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206, 217 (1983)). This “‘fair 

interpretation’ rule is satisfied when the statute is ‘reasonably amenable to the reading’ that it is 

money-mandating.” Id. (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. at 473).

C. Money-Mandating Statutes

To meet the requirement of suing under a money-mandating statute or regulation, 

plaintiffs must present a claim that may allege a violation of a statute that expressly requires 

payment. A claim may also meet the legal threshold even if it adds links to the interpretive chain 

between the provision violated and the provision requiring payment. For example, a statute 

authorizing a certain payment, but leaving the conditions for payment to the regulator’s 

discretion, may be rendered mandatory and nondiscretionary when read together with its 

implementing regulations that define the conditions for the payment. See, e.g., Doe v. United 

States, 463 F.3d 1314, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Multiple interrelated provisions may be read 

together to make out a money-mandating statutory “scheme.” See Sharp v. United States, 80 

Fed. Cl. 422, 427 (2008) (rejecting the government’s argument that the Tucker Act’s reference to 

a singular “Act” of Congress requires a stand-alone provision that is money-mandating).

A money-mandate may also be implied. See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224. In United 

States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I), the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Claims, rejecting Indianland allottees’ breach-of-trust claim, which sought damages for the Department of Interior’s 

mismanagement and sale of timber below market value. 445 U.S. 535, 542 (1980). The 

Supreme Court held that the allotment statute created a limited trust, but the statute was not 

sufficient to create fiduciary duties to the Indian-land allottees that could support a cause of 

action for money damages. Id. at 546. On remand, the plaintiffs argued that other statutes and 

regulations should be read in conjunction with the allotment statute to create fiduciary duties to 

the allottees. In Mitchell II, the Supreme Court agreed. 463 U.S. at 224 (“In contrast to the bare 
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trust created by the General Allotment Act, the statutes and regulations now before us clearly

give the Federal Government full responsibility to manage Indian resources and land for the 

benefit of the Indians. They thereby establish a fiduciary relationship and define the contours of 

the United States' fiduciary responsibilities.”).

Despite some flexibility as to the form a money-mandating source of law may take and 

how direct it must be, it “must grant a right of action with specificity.” Collins v. United States, 

67 F.3d 284, 286 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Testan, 424 U.S. at 400).

D. Back-Pay Claims

The Supreme Court’s decision on jurisdiction in Testan rejected a specific kind of backpay claim—federal employees’ claims that the treatment of their actual duties under a 

classification statute required their appointment to a higher pay-grade and thus entitled them to 

back pay. Testan,424 U.S. at 402-03 (“Congress has not made available to a party wrongfully 

classified the remedy of money damages through retroactive classification.”). Thus, in the 

context of back-pay claims, Testan erected two hurdles. First, consistent with the principle that 

employees are entitled to the benefits of their employment by statutorily authorized appointment, 

not by contract, Testan confirmed that federal employees are only entitled to pay for the position 

to which they were appointed, and that nothing in the Back Pay Act changes this principle. 

Testan, 424 U.S. at 406.

Second, as discussed supra at II.B, Testan held that, even under the Back Pay Act, a 

back-pay claim in this Court requires a source of law that mandates payment of damages or 

otherwise creates a cause of action for the law’s violation. Some provisions of Title 5 have 

qualified as money-mandating, see, e.g., Doe, 463 F.3d at 1325, but Testan’s rejection of a 

general right of action in this Court for federal employment-law violations still stands.

Post-Testan back-pay cases have not always required an express money-mandate 

contained in a single statutory provision. They have, however, placed limits on the length of the 

interpretive or causal chain that links the provision an agency allegedly violated to a provision 

requiring payment. In doing so, the cases have largely rejected misclassification-back-pay 

claims as coming under a money-mandating provision and have required plaintiffs seeking back 

pay to plead a violation of a statute or regulation that specifically mentions or relates directly to

payment of employees.

For example, the Federal Circuit held that a statute that “authorizes the [VA] Secretary to 

appoint medical personnel” but “does not mention pay . . . nor . . . create a cause of action for 

monetary damages . . . cannot be construed as a money-mandating statute.” Khan v. United 

States, 201 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000); accord Semper v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 621, 

636 (2011) (statute authorizing appointment of probation officers was not money-mandating), 

aff'd on other grounds, 694 F.3d 90 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Price v. United States, 133 Fed. 

Cl. 128 (2017) (statute creating right to return to same or equally senior position in the United 

States after foreign assignment was not money-mandating); Reeves v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 

560, 565 (2001) (promotion-eligibility regulation “does not mandate the payment of money 

damages as compensation for breach”).
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III. DISCUSSION

A. VA Temporary-Nurse Appointment Statute

For this Court to have Tucker Act jurisdiction over the Nurses’ claim that the VA 

violated § 7405(g) by failing to recognize their permanent status after two years, § 7405(g) must

mandate money either expressly or by reasonable implication. The statute must give to the 

Nurses a right to payment, to the award of benefits, or to both if the Nurses are to be able to 

maintain an action in this Court.

Section 7405(g) is “reasonably amenable” to the reading that it requires the VA to treat 

temporary part-time nurses as permanent part-time nurses after two years. It is not “reasonably 

amenable,” however, to the reading that treating such nurses as permanent mandates money or 

the award of benefits.

Nothing in § 7405(g) expressly mandates the payment of money or the award of benefits 

to all permanent part-time nurses. Reading all of § 7405 together with § 7403 (the only other 

substantive source of law cited in the Amended Complaint) does not reveal a broader statutory 

scheme expressly requiring payment of benefits to all permanent part-time nurses.2

Section 7405(g) also is not reasonably amenable to a reading that it mandates payment or 

benefits for all permanent nurses by implication. Context, including the rest of § 7405, its title, 

and its surrounding sections, suggests that the section’s purpose is to add to Title 38’s 

appointment power the authority to make “temporary” appointments. If “temporary” were 

uniquely used as a label for unbenefited employees, then § 7405(g)’s command to stop 

“consider[ing] temporary” the Nurses’ “employment” might be sufficient to imply a mandate 

requiring the payment of money or award of benefits.

Nothing in §§ 7403, 7405, or the other surrounding sections, however, can reasonably be 

read as expressly or impliedly setting up a pay and benefits dichotomy between temporary and 

permanent employees.

This context suggests that “temporary” in §§ 7403 and 7405 simply means time-limited. 

Section 7405(g) requires the VA to stop treating the Nurses’ “employment” as time-limited after 

two years. This is no small matter. By removing the expiration date from the Nurses’ 

appointment, § 7405(g) gives the Nurses substantial procedural rights to their continued 

employment unavailable to other kinds of temporary healthcare workers appointed under § 7405. 

See Woods, 955 F.2d at 437 (“While permanent [VA] appointees have certain statutory rights 

incident to the review of discipline and termination, including peer review, temporary appointees 

are subject to termination at will without advance notice.”).

 2 The Amended Complaint also cites the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596. The Back Pay Act, 

however, “is merely derivative in application; it is not itself a jurisdictional statute.” United 

States v. Connolly, 716 F.2d 882, 887 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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B. “Other Statutes and Regulations”

The Nurses rely on Mitchell II to argue that § 7405(g)’s lack of an express moneymandate does not defeat jurisdiction because “[i]t is . . . other statutes and regulations, working 

in concert with the appointment statutes, that satisfy the money mandating requirement; the 

appointment statutes simply convert Plaintiffs’ employment to a position that is eligible to 

receive the alleged pay and benefits.” (Pl.’s Suppl. Opp’n to Mot. Dismiss 4, ECF 32.)

The Nurses’ theory that a broader statutory and regulatory scheme (including § 7405(g)

and other pay and benefits provisions) implies a money-mandate reflects an effort to meet the 

elements of Mitchell II, but it lacks the logic behind the holding in that case. The statutes and 

regulations at issue in Mitchell II were sufficient to create a trust relationship, the trust 

relationship was sufficient to create fiduciary duties to the allottees, and the fiduciary duties were 

sufficient to mandate compensation for the United States’ sale of trust assets for less than market 

value.

Here, by framing their cause of action around a violation of § 7405(g), the Nurses fail to 

establish an inferential chain between the statute violated and the money mandated because a

part-time nurse’s conversion to “permanent” status is not necessarily a condition sufficient for

better pay and the award of benefits. The language of the Amended Complaint describes types 

of pay and benefits, but not specifically enough to identify statutes or regulations mandating 

added pay and the award of additional benefits that permanent part-time nurses receive and 

temporary nurses do not.

3

 The plaintiffs cite statutes and regulations that they argue exclude 

temporary part-time nurses from particular pay and benefits, but they stop short of pleading how 

those laws or other statutes mandate the award of benefits for part-time nurses on the basis of

their being considered permanent as opposed to temporary pursuant to § 7405(g).

4 The Nurses’ 

“information and belief” as to the enhanced pay and increased benefits permanent nurses receive 

that temporary nurses do not suggest a correlation between permanent status and the receipt of 

 3 Precedent suggests that some provisions awarding the types of benefits the Nurses seek may be 

discretionary and therefore not money-mandating. See, e.g., Duke v. Dep't of Air Force, 230 Ct. 

Cl. 977, 979 (1982) (within-grade raises) (“[A] within-grade increase will be granted only where 

the employee's performance meets ‘an acceptable level of competence, as determined by the 

head of the agency.’ This is therefore a discretionary function.”); Berry v. United States, 86 Fed. 

Cl. 750, 755 (2009). The Amended Complaint offers no basis for this Court to reach the issue of 

discretion (or to decide whether regulations or policies eliminate such discretion) for specific 

benefits provisions.

4 This failure is jurisdictionally relevant because § 7405(g) is specific to part-time nurses and the 

Nurses’ theory of § 7405(g)’s implied money-mandate makes the recognition of § 7405(g)’s

permanent status the on-and-off switch for payment. The Court is not evaluating whether the 

Nurses alleged facts sufficient to show that they are within the class of temporary part-time 

nurses that their purported cause of action for violation of § 7405(g) would entitle to relief. That 

is a merits issue. See Adair v. United States, 497 F.3d 1244, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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more pay and benefits, but this factual correlation is not a legal mandate by statute or regulation. 

The Amended Complaint fails to identify any such statute or regulation.

The Amended Complaint’s deficiency is in the logic used to demonstrate a moneymandate, either express or implied, not a mere lack of citations or lack of specificity in its factual 

recitation. “To be clear, the court does not find that an individual in [the Nurses’] position is not, 

pursuant to any statute, entitled to compensation. The court does hold, however, that the source 

of any right to compensation, and thus the foundation of this court's jurisdiction, cannot be [38 

U.S.C. §7405(g)], as alleged by plaintiff[s] in this case.” Price, 133 Fed. Cl. at 133.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Nurses have failed to identify a money-mandating provision creating a cause of 

action sufficient for this Court to assert jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. Accordingly, this 

Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case.

The court will enter a separate order GRANTING the defendant’s motion to dismiss and 

DISMISSING the case without prejudice under RCFC 12(b)(1).

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s/ Richard A. Hertling 

Richard A. Hertling

Judge

 5 Because the Court dismisses for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under RCFC 12(b)(1), the 

Court does not reach the government’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted under RCFC 12(b)(6). The 12(b)(6) motion, to the extent its arguments 

were not in actuality jurisdictional, is dismissed as moot.