COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Coleman and Bray 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

JOSE MARTINEZ 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2762-95-1 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 JULY 16, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 

Randolph T. West, Judge 

 George B. Pavek, III, for appellant. 

 Richard B. Smith, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Jose Martinez (defendant) entered pleas of guilty to 

possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and a related 

firearm offense, reserving his right to appeal the denial of an 

earlier motion to suppress the substantive evidence of these 

offenses. Defendant now pursues such appeal, arguing that the 

trial court erroneously admitted evidence resulting from an 

unlawful seizure. We disagree and affirm the convictions. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record in this 

case, and we recite only those facts necessary to a disposition 

of this appeal. 

 Upon review from a trial court's denial of a motion to 

suppress, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the prevailing party below, the Commonwealth in this instance, 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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granting to it "all reasonable inferences fairly deducible from 

that evidence." Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 

1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991); Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. 

App. 430, 436, 388 S.E.2d 659, 663 (1990). The factual findings 

of the trial court will not be disturbed unless "plainly wrong," 

Grimstead, 12 Va. App. at 1067, 407 S.E.2d at 48, and the burden 

is upon the appellant to show that the denial constituted 

reversible error. Reynolds, 9 Va. App. at 436, 388 S.E.2d at 

663. However, in accord with Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 

 (1996), we conduct an "independent appellate review of [the] 

ultimate determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable 

cause . . . ." Id. at . 

 The record discloses that, on April 24, 1993, Newport News 

Police Officers Adrien Schraudt and Bryan Haas, while on routine 

patrol "in a high crime, high drug area," observed a Ford Taurus 

"rental vehicle" traveling in the wrong direction on a one way 

street. After stopping the Taurus, both officers approached, and 

Haas asked the driver, "Noo Noo" Dupree, for his driver's license 

and automobile registration certificate. Haas recalled that 

Dupree "stuttered a little bit" and appeared "jittery." The 

defendant, the front seat passenger, seemed similarly "nervous." 

 After Dupree provided the requested documents, including the 

rental agreement, Haas advised Dupree that he was issuing a 

summons for the traffic violation, and the officers returned to 

the police vehicle. 
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 While preparing the summons, the officers learned that the 

Taurus had been rented at Norfolk International Airport. Officer 

Schraudt testified that a recent FBI bulletin advised that "major 

drug gangs were renting . . . Ford Taurus vehicles . . . [and] 

run[ning] drugs from Norfolk to Williamsburg . . . ." Schraudt 

then noted that Dupree and defendant "were both looking at each 

other, . . . looking around, . . . looking back toward [their] 

vehicle, talking to each other, [and] looking over their 

shoulders . . . constantly" and advised Haas that "for [their] 

safety, it would be best to take Mr. Dupree out of the [Taurus] 

and pat him down, [to] make sure he didn't have any kind of 

weapons on him." 

 Haas instructed Dupree to exit the Taurus, "patted him down 

for weapons" and, finding none, placed him in the rear seat of 

the police car. Meanwhile, Schraudt observed defendant, still 

seated in the Taurus, "constantly looking back at [them]. At one 

point, [Schraudt] didn't even see [defendant's] head. 

[Defendant] kept bending over [as if] he was reaching down, 

[while] looking back . . . ." Based on his observations, 

Schraudt "became . . . very nervous," and told Haas that he 

"wanted to take the passenger out of the [Taurus], also, for 

. . . safety reasons." As Haas "covered" him, Schraudt "asked 

[defendant] if he would step out" and opened the door. As 

defendant exited, it appeared that "he was going down toward his 

shirt area" with his right hand, and Schraudt instructed him "not 
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to touch anything, not to move, keep his hands where [Schraudt] 

could see them[,] and place his hands up on the car." When 

Schraudt inquired if defendant had any weapons on his person, 

defendant motioned toward his waistband, acknowledged that he had 

a gun, and Schraudt removed a loaded "Cobray Mach 11" firearm. 

 Defendant was then arrested for possession of a concealed 

weapon and escorted to the police car, where he volunteered, "I 

also have drugs on me. Do you want those, too?" Schraudt 

responded affirmatively, "reached into [defendant's] right front 

pocket and . . . pulled out . . . [several] plastic bags" 

containing marijuana and cocaine. 

 Defendant concedes that the initial stop of the Taurus was 

properly supported by the traffic violation, thereby subjecting 

the occupants of the vehicle to the related seizure. However, he 

contends that the officer's command to exit the vehicle 

constituted a further, unreasonable seizure of his person in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

 "[T]he fourth amendment does not proscribe all searches and 

seizures, only those that are 'unreasonable.'" Thompson v. 

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 478, 481, 431 S.E.2d 72, 74 (1993) 

(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)). "Whether a search 

or seizure is unreasonable is determined by balancing the 

individual's right to be free from arbitrary government 

intrusions against society's countervailing interest in 

preventing or detecting crime and in protecting its law 
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enforcement officers." Id. 

 "The state's interest in the personal safety of its police 

officers is "'legitimate and weighty.'" Bethea v. Commonwealth, 

14 Va. App. 474, 478, 419 S.E.2d 249, 251 (1992) (quoting 

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977)), aff'd on other 

grounds, 245 Va. 416, 429 S.E.2d 211 (1993). 

 By requiring a passenger to exit a vehicle, a 

police officer who, in a traffic stop, is 

involved with unknown individuals, is able to 

establish 'a face-to-face confrontation 

[which] diminishes the possibility, otherwise 

substantial, that [the occupants of the 

vehicle] can make unobserved movements 

[which], in turn, reduces the likelihood that 

the officer will be the victim of an 

assault.' 

Id. at 478, 419 S.E.2d at 251-52 (quoting Mimms, 434 U.S. at 

110). Thus, "Fourth Amendment interests are not violated when a 

police officer can 'point to specific and articulable facts 

which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 

reasonably warrant that intrusion.'" Bethea v. Commonwealth, 245 

Va. 416, 419, 429 S.E.2d 211, 213 (1993) (quoting Lansdown v. 

Commonwealth, 226 Va. 204, 209, 308 S.E.2d 106, 110 (1983), cert.

denied, 465 U.S. 1104 (1984)). 

 Here, both Dupree and defendant appeared nervous, "looking 

over their shoulders back toward [the officers] constantly." 

This behavior, combined with the "high crime, high drug area" of 

the stop and official information of "major drug gangs . . . 

renting . . . Ford Taurus vehicles" for the transportation of 

narcotics from Norfolk to Williamsburg, prompted reasonable 
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safety concerns which justified the removal of Dupree from the 

vehicle. See Williams v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 53, 67, 354 

S.E.2d 79, 87 (1987). Defendant's subsequent exaggerated 

behavior while alone in the Taurus provided additional reasonable 

suspicion that he, also, posed a threat to the officers and 

supported the limited intrusion which attended disclosure of the 

offending contraband. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the convictions. 

 Affirmed.