1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANDRE FERGUSON Plaintiff,

v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY Defendant. Civil Action No. 20-3395 (CKK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION (September 21, 2022) Plaintiff Andre Ferguson (“ Plaintiff”) brings this em ployment discrimination action against Defendant Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“Defendant” or “WMATA”). Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint rais es three claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: (1) racial discrimination; (2) hostile work envir onment based on race; and (3) retaliation based on engaging in protected activity. Pending before the Court are the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. In its [19] Motion for Summary Judgment, WMATA contends that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his hostile work environment and retaliation claims, as well as certain actions underlying his racial disc rimination claim, by failing to include them in a Charge of Discrimination submitted to the U.S. Equal Em ployment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). WMATA also argues that, as to any remaining act ions underlying Plaintiff’s racial discrimination claim, he has failed to rebut WMATA’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for taking these actions. Plaintiff, in his [24] Opposition and Cr oss-Motion for Summary Judgment, contends that WMATA has not offered legitimate, non-discriminator y reasons for its actions, and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law in his favor as to each of the acts specified in his Amended Complaint.2 Upon consideration of the pleadings, 1 the relevant legal authorities, and the record as a whole, the Court shall GRANT WMATA’s Motion for Summary Judgment and DENY Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background Plaintiff is an African American male , who was first employed by WMATA in 2012. See Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 1; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 1, 2; Pl.’s Res p. Stmt. ¶ 1, 2. Beginning in 2015, he served as Transit Asset Business Systems Manager. Pl.’s Resp. Stmt. ¶ 2. Plaintiff’s claims against WMATA involve events occurring in 2017 through 2019. The Court shall recount the facts underlying his clai ms chronologically. In so doing, the Court “assume[s] that facts identified by the moving party in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controvert ed in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to the motion.” LCvR 7(h)(1). As both parties have moved for summary judgment, the Court has considered each party’s statement of material facts and the opposing party’s response thereto, 2 as

1 The Court’s consideration has focused on the following: Defendant WMATA’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 19; Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant WMATA’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Opp’n & CrossMot.”), as corrected , ECF No. 24; Defendant WMATA’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.’s Reply & Opp’n”), EC F No. 25; and Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Reply”), ECF No. 27. In an exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that holding oral argument in this action would not be of assistance in rendering a decision. See LCvR 7(f).
2 The Court shall refer to the parties’ factual statements as follows: Defendant WMATA’s Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute (“Def.’s Stmt.”), EC F No. 19-1; Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts (“Pl.’s Resp. Stmt. ”), ECF No. 24-2; Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Facts (“ Pl.’s Stmt.”), ECF No. 24-3; and De fendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Counter-Statement of Undis puted Facts (“Def.’s Resp. Stmt.”), ECF No. 25-2.3 well as the cited portions of the record. The Court notes where facts are disputed, as well as where evidence relied upon by either party does not support the fact proffered.
1. WMATA’s Decision Not to Interview or Hire Plaintiff for the Position of Director of Office of Transit A sset Management in 2017. In 2017, Plaintiff was serving as the “Acting” Director of WMATA’s Office of Transit Asset Management (“TAMO”). Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 3. He applied to serve as the full-time Director for that position. Id. Plaintiff claims that he was required to submit his application twice, after being told that his initial application had not been received. Id. ¶ 6. The exhibit cited by Plaintiff appears to list all applicants for that position, and lists his name twice with diff erent “last updated” dates (11/15/17 and 2/5/18). See Pl.’s Ex. 2, at 7 (Job Opening Printable Details). 3 The entry for the earlier “last updated” date is coded as an applic ation from an “external applicant,” whereas the latter is marked as an “employee.” Id. Although this exhibit app ears to confirm Plaintiff’s statement that he submitted two different appli cations, it does not demonstrate his reason for doing

so. Id. Plaintiff was not interviewed or hired for th e TAMO Director position. Def.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 2, 3; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 7. Instead, WMATA hired Gregor y Collins, a white male, in February 2018. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 3; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 8. Mr. Collins became Plai ntiff’s direct supervisor. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 4. During his deposition, Plaintiff recounted an encounter with Mr. Collins in 2016 (before Mr. Collins became his supervisor), in which Mr. Collins wrote “trash” on a drawing of an “asset management system” that Plaintiff had created. See Def.’s Ex. Deposition of Andre Ferguson (“Ferguson Dep.”) 38:4–41:11, ECF No. 19-4. 4 Although Plaintiff claime d that he believed that

3 Because Plaintiff has filed all of his exhibits in a single PDF document at ECF No. 24-4, the Court shall cite to the exhibit number and the page number in the bottom, righthand corner of each page. 4 Defendant has not numbered its exhibits, but instead identifie s them only by docket number.4 this was a “discriminatory” inter action, there is no evidence thatMr. Collins’ alleged action was racially motivated or involved race at all. Mo reover, during his deposition, Plaintiff testified that, during that time that he was Plaintiff’s supervisor, Mr. Collins did not make anyrace-related comments or slurs to him. Id. 62:22–63:12; 139:5–14.
2. Exclusion of Plaintiff from EALM/EASI Presentation to WM ATA’s Management in April 2019. Plaintiff was one of the “program owners” of the “Enterprise Asset Lifecycle Management” (“EALM”) program. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 8. Although Plainti ff’s phrasing suggests that he was the sole owner of this program, the exhibi t upon which he relies also identifies a “project sponsor” and another “project owne r” (other than Plaintiff). See Pl.’s Ex. 4, at 14 (Maximo Improvement Project, Executive Summary). Moreove r, nothing in this exhibit supports his claim that he was that program’s “author”—however, WMATA does not appear to dispute this point, indicating only that his “authorship is immaterial.” See id. ; Def.’s Resp. Stmt. ¶ 10. The name of this program was changed to the “Enterprise Asset Management Initiative” (“EASI”). See Pl.’s Ex. 5, at 16 (2/22/2018 Emails between G. Collins and A. Ferguson). It is undisputed that Mr. Collins—without Plai ntiff—presented information about the EASI to WMATA’s Executive Management Team in April 2019. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 5. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Collins “did not fully understand” the program a nd did a “poor job” presenting it. Pl.’s Resp. Stmt. ¶ 5. However, he cites only an email exchange from 2018 in which Mr. Collins requested Plaintiff’s “feedback” on an att ached document, and Plaintiff inqui red about the name change to
“EASI.” Id. (citing Pl.’s Ex. 5, at 16 (2/22/2018 Email from G. Collins to A. Ferguson)).
3. Plaintiff’s 2019 End of Year Performance Evaluation. In January 2019, Mr. Collins provided Plaintiff with a 2019 performance goals plan, which was signed by Plaintiff and Mr. Collins. Pl.’s St mt. ¶ 12. Plaintiff claims that in April 2019, Mr.5 Collins “sought to change the January 2019 perform ance goals,” and used a “handwritten note to identify the change[ ], and the same electroni c signature from the January 2019 document. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff cites to the first page of his Exhi bit 6, without furnishing a precise citation to the particular page which he app ears to contend was changed. Th e only handwriting that the Court identifies is written: “January – March” above the typed title of the document (“Performance Management Evaluation, January – June 2019”). See Pl.’s Ex. 6, at 18 (Performance Management Evaluation). Plaintiff points to no other change to this document. See Pl.’s Opp’n & Cross-Mot. at 7 (observing that “January – March” was handwritten on the document). Therefore, it is unclear to the Court what (if any) substantive “change” Plai ntiff refers to, and what effect, if any, he is claiming any “change” had on his employment status. On August 1, 2019, Mr. Collins presented to Plaintiff his 2019 end-of-year (“2019 EOY”) performance evaluation. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 6. Plaintiff received a score of “7” based on his performance of the objectives agreed to atthe beginning of the review period. Id. ; see Def.’s Ex. (Performance Management Eval uation), ECF No. 19-7. This rating correlated to a “needs improvement” designation, which mandated that the employee be assigned to a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”). Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 7. Plaintiff contends that the 2019 EOY performance evaluation “was not credibly created,” citing a letter he appears to have drafted, explaining that he received three EOY performance evaluations from Mr. Collins within a few days. See Pl.’s Ex. 9, at 36–37 (8/2/19 Email to T. Webster). In this le tter, Plaintiff states that on July 29, Mr. Collins gave him “two performance evaluations,” with “my digital signature, time, and date of review with objectives and commentary that I had never seen before.” Id. He noted that one evaluation stated that he was a “solid performer,” whereas the s econd included the “improvement need” designation. See id. Plaintiff suggests that his performance objectives had been m odified without his6 knowledge. Id. at 37; see also Pl.’s Resp. Stmt. ¶ 6. However, neither of these documents contains

anysignature in the “Rating” section of the document. Pl.’s Ex. 6, at 26, 28. WMATA has provided a memo from Mr. Collins, dated August 2, 2019. See Def.’s Reply Ex. (Memo RE: Performance Management Plan for Andre Ferguson (Aug. 2, 2019)), ECF No. 25-1. The memo explains that an “initial [Performance Management Plan (“PMP”)] was developed in January” with respect to Plaintiff to “capture[] objectives which were to be attained” for January through June 2019. Id. It further states that in March 2019, a “business decision was made to realign the roles and responsibilities of the office.” Id. Mr. Collins indicates that he consulted with an HR representative regarding Plaintiff’s EOY performance evaluation because Plaintiff’s “duties had been modified in March.” Id. According to the memo, HR told Mr. Collins that the “creation of a revised Plan second page with dut ies and performance during the latter part of the period could be included in the Plan.” Id. Mr. Collins indicates that this document was “created and shared with [Plaintiff] for discussion” and to “demonstrate th e direction provided by HR,” but noted that “the new document would not modify the original Plan.” Id. WMATA has submitted a copy of the fina l August 2, 2019 performance rating, which indicates that Plaintiff received a score of “7.” See Def.’s Ex. (Performance Management Evaluation), ECF No. 19-7. Other evidence on the record confirms that the “other” evaluations Plaintiff received from Mr. Collins were not signe d by any supervisor or by Plaintiff and were not made part of Plaintiff’s employment record as they were not final. See Pl.’s Ex. 6, at 26, 28 (unsigned 2019 EOY “ratings”); Def.’s Reply E x. (Memo RE: Performance Management Plan for Andre Ferguson (Aug. 2, 2019)), ECF No. 25-1. On August 16, 2019, Collins was terminated fo r violating WMATA’s Workplace Violence Policy. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 8. Two days earlie r, on August 14, 2019, Plaintiffs submitted a “Witness7 Statement,” explaining that he had overhead a conversation between Collins and an African American female employee, in which Mr. Collins was “yelling and screaming profanity.” See Pl.’s Ex. 8, at 34 (Ferguson Witness Stmt.). There is no evidence that Mr. Collins made any racial comments during this incident.
4. Plaintiff’s EAP Leave and Delayed Receipt of Pay in October 2019. At some point in August 2019, Plaintiff “sought out help” from WMATA’s Employee Assistance Program (“EAP”). Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 17. 5 From August 2019 until October 2019, Plaintiff took a Paid Leave of Absence after participating in EAP sessions. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 9. Plaintiff indicates that he went on leave due to “workplace hostility” and after being advised by EAP to do so. Pl.’s Resp. Stmt. ¶ 9. Howeve r, he cites only an EAP intake form that provides no explanation for his reason for seeking assistance or going on leave. 6 As of October 1, 2019 (while Plaintiff was still on leave), WMATA realigned some of its departments. Francesco Palmeri became the Acting Vice President of Reliability and Asset Management (“REAM”) and was charged with overseeing the “realignment of TAMO into REAM.” Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 10. Due to this realignm ent, Mr. Palmeri was also tasked with hiring a new TAMO Director, the position left vacant by Mr. Collins’ termination. Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff claims that when he returned to work from EAP leave in October 2019, his “pay code” was incorrect, which “prevented” him fro m being paid on time. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 22, 23. Plaintiff alleges that his sec ond-level supervisor, S hyam Kannan, intentiona lly changed the pay

5 Plaintiff characterizes this action as a “protected activity,” which is not a fact, but a legal conclusion. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 17. WMATA does not object to the fact thar Plaintiff sought help through EAP, but objects only to Plaintiff’s characterization of this as a protected activity. Def.’s Resp. Stmt. ¶ 17; see also infra Section III(C). 6 The Court observes that this document contains some handwritten responses, with others that appear to have been ove rwritten by random text ( e.g. , in the space for “Counselor Assigned to the Case,” the entry contains in typewritten text: “Dv-, ll?on \ (e... 1\1.”).8 code to reflect that he was on a “leave of absence” rather than paid EAP leave. Id. ¶ 23. In support of this claim, Plaintiff cites an email he wrote to HR dated Octo ber 24, 2019, in which he explained that he “was not paid” on October 9. He indicat ed that he asked TAMO’s Acting Director, Quang Nguyen, why he had not been paid; Mr. Nguyen re sponded that Mr. Kannan was handling HR and payroll issues tasks since Mr. Collins had been terminated and that Mr. Nguyen did not know why Plaintiff had not been paid. See Pl.’s Ex. 10, at 40 (10/24/19 Email from A. Ferguson to B. Creavalle); Pl.’s Ex. 13, at 61 (10/10/19 Email fro m Q. Nguyen to A. Ferguson). Plaintiff then stated that he had called “payroll,” and was informed that a “manager” had “coded [him] with a Leave of Absence code” so that he “could not get paid.” Pl.’s Ex. 10, at 41 (10/24/19 Email from A. Ferguson to B. Creavalle); see also Pl.’s Am. Compl. Ex. 14 (email from “payroll specialist” indicating that “HR will need to change your status to Leave With Pay . . . As of now you are in the system as just Leave of Absence”). Plainti ff then claims that he spoke with Mr. Nguyen on October 10, because Plaintiff had heard that Mr . Nguyen had tried to contact EAP to obtain “personal information.” Id. Mr. Nguyen reportedly told Plain tiff that he had contacted EAP to determine “why [Plaintiff] did not come to work,” and when he did not receive information, Mr. Nguyen was “forced not to pay” Plaintiff. Id. ; see also Pl.’s Ex. 13, at 61 (10/11/19 Email from A. Ferguson to Q. Nguyen”). Plaintiff testified during his deposition that this incident was resolved when he received his paycheck within one or two weeks. See Ferguson Dep. 187:15–188:10; see also Pl.’s Reply at 8 (characterizing this incident as “withholding Plaintiff’s pay for a week”).
5. WMATA’s Decision Not to Interview or Hire Plaintiff for TAMO Director Position in 2019. In November 2019, Plaintiff again applied fo r the TAMO Director position. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 25. Plaintiff was not selected to interview for the position. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 12; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 28.9 An individual named Doojin Han was ultimately hired for the position, as of December 9, 2019. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 13; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 26. Plaintiff was no tified that he was not selected on December 11, 2019. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 27. The parties dispute the reasons Plaintiff wa s not interviewed or hired for the TAMO Director position in 2019. WMATA has offered the declaration of Mr. Palmeri, who was serving as Plaintiff’s second-line supervisor at the time. See Def.’s Ex. Declaration of Francesco Palmeri (“Palmeri Decl.”) ¶¶ 3–4, ECF No. 19-2; see also supra Section I(A)(4) (noting that in his role as Vice President of REAM, Mr. Palmeri oversaw the realignment of TAMO into REAM). Mr. Palmeri attests that “[d]uring realignment, I became aware that one of the employees being realigned was to be put on a [PIP] due to his 2019 [EOY] performance evaluation, but that the PIP process was still in the pr ocess of finalization.” Id. ¶ 6. Initially, Mr. Palmeri did not know which employee this was. Mr. Palmeri attests that he inquired if Plaintiff was the employee who was “to be placed on a PIP” after he observed “several unacceptable behaviors from [Plaintiff], including speaking over colleagues in a mee ting, employees expressing a refusal to work with him because of this erratic behavior, and a lack of competency expected of a person at his level.” Id. ¶¶ 7, 8. He explains that he had planned to interview Plaintiff for the TAMO Director position, until he learned that Mr. Collins had recommended that Plaintiff be placed on a PIP based on his 2019 EOY performance evaluation. Id. ¶ 9. Mr. Palmeri states that WMATA’s “Employee Relations” confirmed that a “PIP was to be enforced” against Plaintiff, which made him ineligible for “promotion.” Id. ¶ 10. Mr. Palmeri avers that based on this confirmation, as well as his own observations of Plaintiff’s job performance, Plaintiff was removed from the list of candidates to be interviewed for the TAMO Director position. Id. ¶ 11. Finally, Mr. Palmeri notes that after he learned that Plaintiff should have been placed on a PIP after hi s 2019 EOY evaluation, the “official10 PIP” was finalized as of December 16, 2019; signed by Mr. Kannan on December 24, 2019; and presented to Plaintiff on December 27, 2019. Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff contests WMATA’s explanation. Notably, however, he does not offer any evidence or otherwise dispute Mr. Palmeri’s observations of Plaintiff’s “unacceptable behavior.” Instead, Plaintiff contends that there was “no existing” PIP at the time he applied for the position. He claims that he me t with Mr. Palmeri on December 20, 2019, and was told that he was not going to be selected for the position because he was on a PIP. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 31. In support of this, Plaintiff cites only an untitled and unaddressed document that he appears to have drafted, dated May 24, 2020, which indicates that Mr. Palm eri told him on December 20, 2019 that he was not interviewed for the Director job because he was “on a PIP” and “not allowed to interview for jobs.” Pl.’s Ex. 46, at 233 (U ntitled Summary dated 5/4/2020). 7 Plaintiff claims that the PIP was not “created” until after the Director position had been filled and after his conversation with Mr. Palmeri—and so Mr. Palmeri’s justification for not interviewing him because he was on a PIP was false. See Pl.’s Resp. Stmt. ¶ 12; see also Ferguson Dep. 214:11–216:20. Based on the record before the Court, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was not immediately placed on a PIP when he received his 2019 EOY pe rformance evaluation in August. However, Plaintiff’s former seco nd-level supervisor wrote in an email dated September 27, 2019 that Plaintiff had been recommended for a PIP ba sed on his 2019 EOY evaluation, but that “[Mr. Collins] never put together the actual PIP with Employee Relations and Mr. Ferguson.” Pl.’s Ex. 13, at 60 (9/27/19 Email from S. Kannan). The same email indicates that ther e remained an “issue” relating to whether Plaintiff’s EAP leave would be characterized as “intermittent” or “continuous,”

7 Plaintiff also cites the August 2019 memo by Mr. Collins, which says nothing about his conversation with Palmeri in De cember 2019. He appears to rely on this memo to demonstrate that there was no PIP in place in August, after he received his EOY review. See Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 30.11 which affected the timing of his PIP placement. Id. In sum, Plaintiff’s supervisors knew that he was supposed to be on a PIP but that its impleme ntation had been delaye d due to Mr. Collins’ termination and Plaintiff’s EAP leave. Based on the record, no PIP had been finalized or presented to Plaintiff when he applied for the TAMO Director position in November 2019. Mr. Palmeri attests that the “official” PIP was “finalized” on December 16, 2019. Palmeri Decl. ¶ 12; see also Def.’s Ex. PIP dated 12/16/2019, ECF No. 19-8. But emails provided to the Court indicate that a “draft” version was still being circulated between December 17 and 20, 2019, and a finalized PIP was circulated for supervisors’ signatures until December 24, 2019. See Pl.’s Ex. 16, at 71 (12/17/2019 Email from, F. Palmeri); see also Palmeri Decl. ¶ 12 (noting that Mr. Kannan signed the PIP on December 24, 2019). Mr. Han (the newly hired TAMO Director) presented the PIP to Plaintiff on December 27, 2019. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 32; Pl.’s Ex. 16, at 86 (12/27/2 019 Email from D. Han). Mr. Han reported that when he discussed the PIP with Plaintiff, Plaint iff refused to sign it because he “contest[ed]” the performance evaluation upon which the PIP was based. Pl.’s Ex. 16, at 86 (12/27/2019 Email from D. Han). Mr. Han recounted in an email thatPlaintiff “showed [him] 2 different evaluations . . . the Jan – March evaluation ha d ‘needs improvement’ and the Apr il – June evaluation had ‘solid performer.’ Neither evaluati on[ ] was signed by anyone.” Id. Plaintiff successfully completed hi s PIP as of February 28, 2020. See Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 35; Pl.’s Ex. 41, at 219 (5/29/2020 WMATA Memo Re: Employ ee Relations Complaint). During the period while he was on a PIP, on February 20, 2020, he was offered a position as a Project Manager, Vehicles for WMATA. See Pl.’s Ex. 18, at 95 (Offer Letter to A. Ferguson). Plaintiff accepted that position and left TAMO. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 16. He contends that the fact that he was hired for a12 different position while he was still on a PIP under mines Mr. Palmeri’s explanation that he could not be promoted to TAMO Director because he was supposed to be on a PIP. Pl.’s Resp. Stmt. ¶ 16. However, Plaintiff himself testified that his new position was not a “promotion.” See Ferguson Dep. 225:1–226:3 (testifying that the ne w position he accepted was a “lower role” for which he received “the same pay”). And even if it was, there is no evidence on the record indicating that Plaintiff was excluded from considering or interviewing for anyjob at WMATA due to his PIP; Plaintiff testified only that Mr. Palmeri had purportedly told him that he had not been interviewed for this particular position due to his PIP, not thathe was barred from pursuing any other open position at WMATA. See Ferguson Dep. 215:3–6; 221:6–20.
6. Plaintiff’s Complaints to WMATA and EEOC. Plaintiff submitted a complaint to WMATA’ s Office of Equal Employment Opportunity (“OEEO”) on December 27, 2019, alle ging that Palmeri had discr iminated against him based on his “race” and “sex” by declining to interview hi m for the TAMO Director position. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 15; Def.’s Ex. WMATA OEEO Report of Investigation, ECF No. 19-9. WMATA’s OOEO concluded that Plaintiff had “not suffer[ed] an adverse employment action” a nd that “the decision not to interview him for the Director’s position wa s [not] based on race an d gender”; rather, “[i]t appears that management’s decision not to c onsider [Plaintiff] for the position was based on [Plaintiff’s] poor performance.” WMATA OEEO Report of Investigation at 8. Plaintiff wrote a letter to the EEOC, dated Ap ril 30, 2020 (“EEOC Letter”), indicating that he was “writing to file an EEOC charge of discrimination.” 8 See Def.’s Ex. (EEOC Letter), ECF No. 19-5; see also Ferguson Dep. 58:8–13 (indicating that he “submitted” this letter on April 30,

8 WMATA misstates the date of this submission in its Statement of Facts as March 30, 2020. See Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 17. The date stated on the document is April 30, 2020 (next to Plaintiff’s signature). See ECF No. 19-5.13 2020). The letter is stamped as “received” by the EEOC’s Washington Field Office on May 5,
2020. Id. Under a heading entitled “a short descri ption of the actions you believe were discriminatory,” Plaintiff wrote: I have been subject to discrimination based on my race and gender because I was not provided an oppor tunity to be considered for promotion to the vacant Director of Asset Management. On Dec. 20th 2019, I was harassed by Frank Pa lmeri (VP) and he indicated that I had not been selected to in terview because I had been placed on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP). I explained to [F]rank that I had never been put on a PIP. I also explained to him that I had been selected for interviews recently, so it is obvious that I was not on a PIP. He stated that they are going to make one up on me and I would have it soon.
Id. In addition, Plaintiff indicatedthat the discriminatory actions “took place” only on “Dec. 29th.” Id. Plaintiff noted that he believed he was discri minated against “[b]ecause they do not want a Black Male to represen t that department.” Id. Plaintiff filed a formal Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC (“EEOC Charge”) on June 23, 2020. See Def.’s Mot. Ex. EEOC Charge, ECF No. 19-6. Plaintiff selected “Race,” “Color,” and “Sex” as the basis for Discrimination a nd provided July 1, 2019 through December 20, 2019 as the “date(s) discrimination took place.” Id. He did not select “Retaliation” as a basis for discrimination. Id. In the space provided for a description of his claim, Plaintiff indicated: On November 15, 2019, I applied for position of Director of Asset Management On December 20, 2019, I met with Frank Palmeri (VP) and he indicated that I had not been selected to interview because I had been placed on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP). I explained to Frank that I had never been put on a PIP. I also explained to him that I had been selected for interviews recently, so it is obvious that I was not on a PIP. He stated that I was on PIP and that he would get one created on me and I woul d have it soon. Fr ank Palmeri had Shyam Kannan, someone who I no longer work for, create a fraudulent PIP on Dec. 24th, 2019, to justify Palmeri not interviewing me for the position because I am a black male.14 I believe I have been discriminated against due to my race (black), color and sex (male), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. Id. at 1. On August 27, 2020, the EEOC dismissed Plai ntiff’s Charge, concluding that it was “unable to conclude that the information obtained establishes a violation” of Title VII. See Pl.’s Am. Compl. Ex. 2 (EEOC Dismissal), ECF No. 8-1.
B. Procedural Background Plaintiff filed his Original Complaint in this action on November 23, 2020. Compl., ECF No. 1. His Original Complaint included claims for race discriminati on, retaliation, and hostile work environment under Title VII, as well as hostile work environment and race discrimination claims under the D.C. Humans Right Act (“DCHRA”). See id. WMATA filed a [7] Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s DCHRA claims on the basis that WMATA, “as an interstate compact agency, is not subject to cla ims under the DCHRA.” See WMATA’s Mot. to Dismiss at 1, ECF No. 7. Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complain t on December 17, 2020, which eliminated the DCHRA claims. See Am. Compl. ECF No. 8. As a result, the Court denied without prejudice WMATA Partial Motion to Dismiss. See Minute Order (Dec. 17, 2020). WMATA answered Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint on January 7, 2021. See Answer, ECF No. 10. After proceeding with discovery, which concluded as of September 23, 2021, the parties f iled their pending cross motions for summary judgment, both of which are ripe for the Court’s review.
II. LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgmen t as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The mere existence of some factua l dispute is insufficient on its own to bar summary15 judgment; the dispute must pert ain to a “material” fact. Id. Accordingly, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law w ill properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Nor may summary judgment be avoided based on just any disagreement as to the relevant facts; the dispute must be “genuine,” meaning that there must be sufficient admissible evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to find for the non-movant. Id. In order to establish that a fact is or cannot be genuinely disputed, a party must (a) cite to specific parts of the record—inc luding deposition testimony, documentary evidence, affidavits or declarations, or other competent evidence—in su pport of its position, or (b) demonstrate that the materials relied upon by the opposing party do not actually establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Conc lusory assertions offered without any factual basis in the record cannot create a genuine disput e sufficient to survive summary judgment. See Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO v. Dep’t of Transp. , 564 F.3d 462, 465–66 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also Sibert-Dean v. WMATA , 751 F. Supp. 2d 87, 90 (D.D.C. 2010) (requiring the non-moving party’s factual representations in a sworn affidavit to be supported by facts in the record). Moreover, where “a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fa ils to properly address another party’s assertion of fact,” the district court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). When faced with a motion for summary judgment, the district court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence; instead, the evidence must be analyzed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, with a ll justifiable inferences drawn in his favor. Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 255. If material facts are ge nuinely in dispute, or undisputed facts are susceptible to divergent yet justifiable infe rences, summary judgmen t is inappropriate. Moore v.16 Hartman , 571 F.3d 62, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The district c ourt’s task is to determine “whether theevidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so onesided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 251–52. In this regard, the non-movant must “do mo re than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 249–50 (inter nal citations omitted). In recognition of the difficulty in uncovering clear evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory intent, the district court should approach summary judgment in an action for employment discrimination or retaliation with “special caution.” Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr. , 116 F.3d 876, 879–80 (D.C. Cir. 1997), vacated on other grounds , 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc). But the Court’s “special caution” does not relie ve the plaintiff of his burden to support his allegations with competent evidence. See Brown v. Mills , 674 F. Supp. 2d 182, 188 (D.D.C. 2009). As in any context, where the plaintiff would bear the burden of proof on a dispositive issue at trial, at the summary judgment stage he bears the burd en of production to designate specific facts showing that there exists a ge nuine dispute requiring trial. Ricci v. DeStefano , 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009). Otherwise, the plaintiff could effectiv ely defeat the “central purpose” of the summary judgment device—namely, “to weed out those cases insufficiently meritorious to warrant . . . trial”—simply by way of offe ring conclusory allegations, speculation, and argument. Greene v. Dalton , 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Race Discrimination Claim (Count I) Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, it is unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect17 to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privilege s of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). Title VII “requires that an employee exhaust [his] administrative remedies by filing a claim with the EEOC prior to filing suit in the district court.” Headen v. WMATA , 741 F. Supp. 2d 289, 294 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1), (f)(1)); see also Park v. Howard Univ. , 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“Title VII requires that a person complaining of a violation file an administrative charge with the EEOC and allow the agency time to act on the charge.”). Plaintiff contends that the following actions constitute adverse actions taken by WMATA on the basis of his race: the denial of an interv iew for the TAMO Director position twice (first in 2017 and again in 2019); the denial of the opportunity for him to present the EALM/EASI in April 2019; having his pay delayed after returning fromEAP leave in October 2019, and being placed on a PIP in December 2019. See Am. Compl. ¶ 92. The Court must first determine which claims Plaintiff has properly exhausted. See Dudley v. WMATA , 924 F. Supp. 2d 141, 155 (D.D.C. 2013).
1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies A plaintiff seeking to pursue a Title VII claim in federal court must have first exhausted his administrative remedies by filing a claim with the EEOC. Park , 71 F.3d at 907. An EEOC charge must “be filed within one hundred and ei ghty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” § 2000e–5(e)(1). 9 A plaintiff must “exhaust [his] administrative remedies

9 Ordinarily, if a claimant has “i nitially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from” a discrimin atory act, the 180-day timeframe is extended to 300 days. Whorton v. WMATA , 924 F. Supp. 2d 334, 345 n.8 (D.D.C . 2013) (internal citations omitted). “But, because WMATA is part of an interstate compact agency, the compact jurisdictions have conferred th eir sovereign immunity upon it.” Id. (citing Jones v. WMATA , 205 F.3d 428, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). Therefore, “WMA TA is not subject to the state or local antidiscrimination laws,” and so the local authorit y was “without authority to grant or seek relief for the plaintiff. Consequently, the 300[-]day pr ovision is inapplicable and the 180[-]day provision controls.” Id.18 within the Title VII limitations period for each discrete act of discrimination alleged or lose the ability to recover for it.” Lipscomb v. Winter , 577 F. Supp. 2d 258, 271 (D.D.C. 2008) (emphasis added); see also Wada v. Tomlinson , 517 F. Supp. 2d 148, 183 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[A] Title VII plaintiff is required to exhaust his or her administrative remedies with respect to each discrete allegedly discriminatory or retaliatory act[.]”). The Supreme Court has directed that “[d]iscrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to an act alleged in timely filed charges.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan , 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002) (emphasis added). Accordingly, “[t]he theories of discrimination in [a] plaintiff’s lawsuit are limited to the theories contained in the EEOC Charge he filed.” Marcelus v. Corrs. Corp. of Am./Corr. Treatment Facility , 540 F. Supp. 2d 231, 236 (D.D.C. 2008). WMATA argues that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to the following alleged discriminatory acts by failing to ra ise them in an EEOC Charge: (1) the failure to be promoted to Director of TAMO in 2017; (2) the denial of the opportunity to present EASI to the WMATA executive management team in April 2019; and (3) the late receipt of pay in October 2019. The incidents involving the failure to be promoted in 2017 and his exclusion from the EASI presentation in April 2019 are plainly time-barre d, because they occurred well beyond the 180- day period preceding his April 30, 2020 EEOC Letter and June 23, 2020 EEOC Charge. 10 Based on the record before the Court, the incident regard ing Plaintiff’s delayed receipt of pay in October 2019 also falls outside the 180-day window precedi ng his initial contact with the EEOC on April 30, 2020. 11

10 Plaintiff’s only response to this argument is th at these claims are not time-barred because he “waited 180 days to file suit.” Pl .’s Reply at 6. This argument mis ses the point. He was required to file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of an “unlawful employment practice.”
11 The Court has calculated that 180 days before April 30, 2020 was November 2, 2019.19 More importantly, neither Plaintiff’s EEOC Letter nor his formal EEOC Charge references

anyof these alleged discriminatory acts. WMATA contends that his failure to raise these events in his EEOC submissions bars him frompursuing them in federal court. See Def.’s Mot. at 7. The Court agrees, based on the Suprem e Court’s clear directive in Morgan that “discrete discriminatory

acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to an act alleged in timely filed charges.” Morgan , 536 U.S. at 114 (emphasis added). T hough not succinctly articulated, Plaintiff appears to ask the Court to adopt a “more forgiving standard,” citing Dudley v. WMATA for the proposition that some courts “have read Morgan narrowly” and found that “incidents of discrimination . . ‘like or reasonably related to those claims in the administrative complaint’ do not need to be separately charged.” 924 F. Supp. 2d at156 . But, even under this “more forgiving standard,” Plaintiff has not offered any argument or pointed to any evidence connecting the denial of a promotion in 2017, the denial of the opportun ity to present EASI in April 2019, or his late receipt of pay in October 2019 to the incidents described in his EEOC submissions. Both his EEOC Letter and his formal EEOC Charge recoun t only WMATA’s decision not to interview him for the vacant TAMO Director position in Nove mber/December 2019 and his allegation that his supervisors created a “fraudulent” PIP during that same time period. See supra Section I(A)(6). Plaintiff argues that the failure to interview h im for the TAMO Director in 2017 “correlates” to the failure to interview him for the same positi on in 2019 because both incidents “involve the same position and person.” Pl.’s Reply at 6. But this c onclusory assertion is insufficient to establish any connection between these events—ignoring, for example, that these in cidents occurred years apart, and involved different d ecisionmakers who provided differ ent reasons for declining to interview Plaintiff based on entirel y different factual circumstances. He offers no other reason for20 the Court to view these discrete events as “reasonably related” to those raised in his submissions to the EEOC, and so the Court shall not consider them. Plaintiff correctly notes that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies under Title VII is not a “jurisdictional bar.” Pl.’s Opp’n & Cross-Mot. at 11; see Fort Bend Cty., Texas v. Davis , 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1851 (2019) (“Title VII’s charge-filing requirement is a processing rule, albeit a mandatory one, not a jurisdictional prescription delineating the adjudi catory authority of courts.”); Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States , 614 F.3d 519, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (explaining that Title VII does not “incorporate[ ] a jurisdictional exhaustion requirement”). However, “[t]he plaintiff has the burden of pl eading and proving any equitable reasons for his or her failure to comply with T itle VII’s time requirements.” Bass v. Bair , 514 F. Supp. 2d 96, 99 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing Saltz v. Lehman , 672 F.2d 207, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). And “[t]he court’s power to equitably excuse noncompliance with ad ministrative filing deadlines” will be “‘exercised only in extraordinary and carefully circumscribed instances.’” Smith-Thompson v. Dist. of Columbia , 657 F. Supp. 2d 123, 132 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Mondy v. Sec’y of the Army , 845 F.2d 1051, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Plaintiff has not offered any persuasive reas on to excuse his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies as to incidents not included in his EEOC Letter or EEOC Charge. He asserts (without any supporting ar gument) that “equitability” we ighs in his favor because WMATA “was aware” of all of these incidents. Pl.’s Opp’n & Cross-Mot. at 11–12. But “if filing internal grievances [was] sufficient, alone, to put WMATA on notice that [Plaintiff] intended to pursue Title VII actions, then requiring an EEOC Charge would be superfluous” because “Plaintiff could simply avoid the administrative process entirely by filing an internal grievance, and21 proceeding directly to federal court[.]” Dudley , 924 F. Supp. 2d at 158. Plaintiff has failed to offer any persuasive reason compelling the Court to waive Title VII’s exhaustion requirement. Plaintiff’s EEOC Letter and EEOC Charge discuss only WMATA’s decision not to interview him for the TAMO director position in 2019 and his placement on a PIP thereafter. Because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to the other alleged discriminatory acts—and has not articulated a reason compelling the Court to excuse this failure— Plaintiff is barred from proceedi ng with his race discrimination claim insofar as it relies on the denial of a promotion in 2017, the denial of the op portunity to present EASI in April 2019, and his late receipt of pay wh en he returned from leave in October 2019.
2. Merits of Plaintiff’s Remaining Race Discrimination Claims The Court next proceeds to the merits of Plaintiff’s remaining race discrimination claims, which rely on not being interviewed or hired fo r the TAMO Director position in December 2019 and being placed on a PIP shortly thereafter. To prove a claim of racial di scrimination under Title VII, a pl aintiff must demonstrate that the actions taken by an employer were “more lik ely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors,” including race. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (internal citation o mitted). Absent direct evidence of discrimination, 12 the plaintiff may indirectly prove discrimination pursuant to the tripartite burden-shifting articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973). “Under McDonnell Douglas , the plaintiff has the initial burden of production to establish a prima facie case of discrimination; if [he] does, then the employer must articulate a legitima te, non-discriminatory reason for its action; and if it does, then

12 “Direct evidence of discrimination is evidence that, if believed by the factfinder, proves the particular fact in questions without any need for inference .” Brown v. Small , 437 F. Supp. 2d 125, 130 n.7 (D.D.C. 2006) (emphasis in original) (citing Randle v. LaSalle Telecomms., Inc. , 876 F.2d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 1989)).22 the plaintiff must receive an opportunity to show that the employer’s reason was a pretextual cover for discrimination.” Wang v. WMATA , 206 F. Supp. 3d 46, 64 (D.D.C. 2016) (citing McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802–05).On summary judgment, however, if the employer puts forth a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its actions, the “question whether the employee actually made out a prima facie case is no longer relevant.” Brady v. Office of the Sergeant at Arms , 520 F.3d 490, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citations a nd quotation marks omitted). “[W] here an employee has suffered an adverse employment action a nd an employer has asserted a legitimate, non- discriminatory reason for the decision, the district court need not— and should not —decide whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas .” Id. at 494 (emphasis in original). Rather, “the district court must resolve one central question: Has the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the em ployer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer inte ntionally discriminated against the employee[?] ” Id. (emphasis added) (citati ons omitted). If a plaintiff fails to produce evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s legitim ate, non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason for the employer’s action, then summary j udgment in favor of the employer is proper. See id. at 496–97. According to WMATA, Plaintiff was not interviewed for the TAMO Director position because of “Palmeri’s observations of Plainti ff’s poor job performance and leadership skills, as well as the fact that Plaintiff was supposed to be placed on a PIP following his 2019 EOY evaluation.” Def.’s Mot. at 8 (emphasis adde d). The reason for placing Plaintiff on a PIP was based on the unsatisfactory score he received on his 2019 EOY performance evaluation in August 2019. The Court finds that WMATA has offered legitimate, non-discriminat ory reasons for its23 decision not to interview or hire Plaintiff fo r the TAMO position in 2019 and his placement on a PIP. Therefore, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to prove that “the proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination.” McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 804. A plaintiff can demonstrate pr etext by “providing evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the employer’s prof fered, lawful reasons for acting are ‘unworthy of credence.’” Jackson v. Dist. Hosp. Partner, L.P. , Civil Action No. 18-1978 (ABJ), 2022 WL 3910501, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2022) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. , 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000)). It is not sufficient for a plaintiff to “show that a reason given for a job action [was] not just, or fair, or sensible,” nor is it sufficient to challenge “the correctness or desirability of [the] reasons offered.” Id. (quoting Fischbach v. D.C. Dep’t of Corrs ., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “If th e employer’s stated be lief about the underlying facts is reasonable in light of the evidence, . . . there ordinarily is no basis for permitting a jury to conclude that the employer is ly ing about the underlying facts.” Brady , 520 F.3d at 495. Plaintiff has not offered any evidence to rebut Mr. Palmeri’s sw orn testimony that his decision not to interview Plaintiff for the TAMO Director position resulted from “several unacceptable behaviors from [Plaintiff], incl uding speaking over colleagues in a meeting, employees expressing a refusal to work with him because of this erratic behavior, and a lack of competency expected of a person at his level.” Palmeri Decl. ¶¶ 7, 8. Instead, Plaintiff attacks Mr. Palmeri’s declaration as “lacking credibility.” Pl.’s Opp’n & Cross-Mot. at 9, 14. But merely attempting to discredit Mr. Palmeri’s testimony as “unworthy of credence,” without offering any supporting evidence is insufficient to create a triable issue. See Dudley , 924 F. Supp. 2d at 160. Based on Plaintiff’s failure to present any evidence to contravene Mr. Palmeri’s observations, he has not demonstrated that there is a genuine issue for trial that this reason for declining to interview24 Plaintiff for the TAMO Director position was pretext for racial discrimination. See Jackson , 2022 WL 3910501, at *5. Plaintiff further claims that Mr. Palmeri told him on December 20, 2019 that he was not selected to interview for the TAMO Director j ob “because he was on a PIP,” even though Plaintiff did not receive the PIP until several days later. Pl.’s Opp’n & Cro ss-Mot. at 9. Plaintiff claims that this explanation was false, both because he did not receive the PIP until later and because he later obtained another position in a different WMATA department while he was still on a PIP. Id. at 10; Pl.’s Reply at 7–8. Mr. Palmeri’s declarat ion indicates that he decided not to interview Plaintiff when he learned thatPlaintiff had been “recommended” for a PIP based on his 2019 EOY evaluation, which rendered him “ineligible for prom otion.” Palmeri Decl. ¶ 10. However, even crediting Plaintiff’s version of events (that Mr. Palmeri to ld him that he could not be promoted because he was “on a PIP”), the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not produced sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that this reason was pretext for un lawful discrimination. Rather, the evidence on the record indicates that the PIP was already being finalized by the time Plaintiff purportedly spoke with Mr. Palmeri. Because Plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence that would enable a reasonable juror to conclude that WMATA’s stated reasons for its actions against plaintiff were a pretext for unlawful discrimination on the basis of race, summary judgment in WMATA’s favor on th is claim is appropriate.
*** Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies insofar as his race discrimination claim relies on the denial of a promotion in 2017, th e denial of the opportunity to present EASI in April 2019, and his late receipt of pay when he re turned from leave in October 2019. As to the remaining claims involving the denial of an in terview for the TAMO Director position in 2019 and25 PIP, Plaintiff has failed to offer evidence to rebut WMATA’s leg itimate, non-discriminatory reasons for these actions. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS WMATA’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count I of the Amende d Complaint (race di scrimination) and DENIES Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment as to the same.
B. Hostile Work Environment Claim (Count II) WMATA next argues that because Plaintiff failed to allege a hostile work environment in his EEOC Charge, he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for that claim. See Def.’s Mot. at 5–8. “The exhaustion of administrative re medies requirement is le ss stringent for hostile work environment claims than for discrete claims of discriminati on or retaliation.” Na’im v. Rice , 577 F. Supp. 2d 361, 372 (D.D.C 2008) (citations omitte d). A plaintiff may adequately exhaust administrative remedies without specifically alleging a hostile wo rk environment claim in his formal EEOC complaint so long as the hostile wo rk environment claim is “like or reasonably related to the allegations . . . [in the formal EEO[C ] complaint] and grows out of such allegations.” Roberson v. Snow , 404 F. Supp. 2d 79, 96 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing Jones v. Billington , 12 F.Supp.2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1997)). Plaintiff alleges in his EEOC Charge that WMATA declined to interview him for a position in 2019, that his supervisor “harassed” him, and th at his supervisors created a “fraudulent” PIP. His hostile work environment claim in the Amende d Complaint is supported by these same factual allegations, see Am. Compl. ¶ 105, and so the Court shall not bar Plaintiff from proceeding with his hostile work environment claim due to his failure to explicitly identify “hostile work environment” as the nature of hi s claims in his EEOC submissions. See, e.g. , Dudley , 924 F. Supp. 2d at 163.26 The Court nonetheless concludes that summary judgment in WMATA’s favor is appropriate as to Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim. To pr ove a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the “workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult” and that this behavior is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. , 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal citati ons and quotation marks omitted). “In determining whether a hostile work environment claim exis ts, [courts] look to ‘all the circumstances,’ including ‘the fr equency of the discriminatory c onduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Morgan , 536 U.S. at 116 (quoting Harris , 510 U.S. at 23). This standard ensures that “Title VII does not become a general civility code,” requiring the courts to “polic[e] the ordi nary tribulations of the workplace.” Bonnett v. Skinseki , 907 F. Supp. 2d 54, 80 (D.D.C. 2012) (internal citations and quota tion marks omitted). Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim rest s on the same actions as his discrimination claim (the two denials of an interview for th e TAMO Director position; the denial of the opportunity for him to present the EALM/EASI in April 2019; having his pay delayed after returning from EAP leave in October 2019, and being placed on a PIP in December 2019). 13 Am. Compl. ¶ 105. As an initial matter, Plaintiff has failed to exhaust many of these discrete discriminatory acts, see supra Section III(A)(1); a “plaintiff cannot cure his failure to timely exhaust his complaints about these incidents by sweeping them under the rubric of a hostile work

13 Although Plaintiff relies on multiple incidents in his Amended Complaint as the basis for his hostile work environment claim, his Opposition and Cross-Motion appears to limit this claim to incidents occurring in 2019 and later. See Pl.’s Opp’n & Cross-Mot. at 15 (“The hostile work environment commenced in 2019[.]”). Nonetheless, the Court addresses all incidents addressed in the Amended Complaint.27 environment claim.” Dudley , 924 F. Supp. 2d at 164 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff must demonstrate that the time-barred incidents are “adequately linked” with the exhausted incidents “into a coherent hostile work environment claim.” Baird v. Gotbaum , 662 F.3d 1246, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 2011). To do so, the plai ntiff must demonstrate that all events “involved the same type of employment acti ons, occurred relatively frequently, and were perpetrated by the same managers.” Dudley , 924 F. Supp. 2d at 164 (quoting Morgan , 536 U.S. at 120–21). Here, Plaintiff relies on a number of “d iscrete acts” without de monstrating that they are “part of the same unlawful employment practice.” Morgan , 536 U.S. at 117. Rather, the evidence on the record demonstrates that these di screte actions spanned at least two years and involved decisions made by different supervisors. Plaintiff has not demonstrated any “link” connecting these various actions as part of “the same unlawful employment practice.” Moreover, courts have “generally rejected” su ch “work related actions by supervisors” as the basis of hostile work environment claims. Grosdidier v. Chairman, Broadcasting Bd. of
Governors , 774 F. Supp. 2d 76, 110-11 (D.D.C. 2011); see Nurriddin v. Bolden , 674 F. Supp. 2d 64, 94 (D.D.C. 2009) (“[T]he removal of impor tant assignments, lowered performance evaluations, and close scrutiny of assignments [cannot] be characte rized as sufficiently intimidating or offensive in an ordinary workplace context.”); Houston v. SecTek, Inc ., 680 F. Supp. 2d 215, 225 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Allegations of unde sirable job assignmentor modified job functions and of [supervisor’s ] unprofessional and offensive tr eatment are not sufficient to establish that [plaintiff’s] work environment was permeated with di scriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.”) (internal c itations and quotati on marks omitted), aff’d , 407 F. App’x. 490, 2011 WL 318401 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 31, 2011). The challenge d actions here are the type of “work-28 related actions by superv isors” that provide insufficient grounds for a hostile work environment claim. Grosdidier , 774 F. Supp. 2d at 111. Plaintiff has also failed to present evidence to connect any of the actions underlying his hostile work environment claim to his race. “Courts in this jurisdiction have routinely held that hostile behavior, no matte r how unjustified or egregious, cannotsupport a claim of hostile work environment unless there exists some linkage be tween the hostile behavior and the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class.” Grosdidier , 774 F. Supp. 2d at 108–09 (quoting Na’im v. Clinton , 626 F. Supp. 2d 63, 73 (D.D.C. 2009)). Plaintiff has produced no evidence connecting any alleged adverse actions to his race. During his deposition, he could not point to anyexamples of race-related comments or sl urs directed towards him. See Ferguson Dep. 45:17–20; 62:22– 63:12; 214:14–216:21.At most, Plaintiff references an incident in which Mr. Collins yelled at a female AfricanAmerica co-worker in August 2019. See Pl.’s Reply at 9; Ferguson Dep. 228:17–21. There is no evidence on the record that this incident i nvolved any racially disc riminatory comments or motivation. See Ferguson Dep. 228:17–21 (indicating only that Mr. Collins “yell[ed] and scream[ed] at a Black woman in the officer”); Pl.’s Ex. 8, at 23 (Ferguson Witness Stmt.) (same). Even assuming arguendo that this incident was an “incident of workplace racism,” the Court must “be careful when weighing” evidence of in cidents not directly involving Plaintiff. Dudley , 924 F. Supp. at 166–67; Nurriddin v. Goldin , 382 F. Supp. 2d 79, 108 (D.D.C. 2005) (“When racial statements are not made direc tly to a plaintiff, generally a hostile environment cannot be established.”); Lester v. Natsios , 290 F. Supp. 2d 11, 31 (D.D.C. 2003) (“conduct directed at others rather than at plaintiff . . . is less indicative of a hostile work environment”). Here, the Court finds that this discrete incident does not overcome the absence of anyevidence pertaining to pervasive29 hostility based on race directed towards Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not proffered any evidence establishing that the predicate acts upon which his hos tile work environment cl aim rest were severe or pervasive enough to suggest that Plaintiff suff ered an abusive working environment “permeated with discriminatory intimidati on, ridicule, and insult.” Harris , 510 U.S. at 21. Nor has he pointed to any evidence (beyond his mere speculation) per mitting a reasonable juror to conclude that any of the actions upon which his cl aim relies were motivated by or connected to his race. Finally, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to pursue an implied “constructive discharge” claim, that claim also fails. See, e.g. , Am. Compl. ¶ 105 (claiming that Plaintiff sought another job due to the alleged hostile work environment). A constructive discharge claim requires Plaintiff to show (1) he was subjected to severe and pervasive harassment that altere d the conditions of his employment (a hostile working environment), and (2) the work environment was “so intolerable that a reasonable person would ha ve felt compelled to resign.” Penn. State Police v. Suders , 542 U.S. 129, 147 (2004); Steele v. Schafer , 535 F.3d 689, 695 (D.C. Cir. 2008). For the same reasons Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim fails, so too does his constructiv e discharge claim. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS WMATA’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count II of the Amended Complaint (hostile work environment) and DENIES Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment as to the same.
C. Retaliation Claim (Count III) Finally, WMATA contends that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his retaliation claim by failing to identify “reta liation in his EEOC submissions. Def.’s Mot. at 7. As with discrete incidents of discrimination, “[d]iscrete claims of retaliation must be separately charged and exhausted within the appropriate limita tions period.” Dudley , 924 F. Supp. 2d at 181 (citing Morgan , 536 U.S. at 113). Notably, Plaintiff did not check the available box for “Retaliation” as a basis for his EEOC Charge an d nowhere does his EEOC Charge or EEOC Letter30 provide facts about any protected activity or basis for WMATA’s purported “retaliation.” See

. Although Plaintiff’s ability to proceed with his Ti tle VII claim does not hinge on his invocation of “magic words,” Dudley , 924 F. Supp. 2d at 175, he must at the very least establish some connection between any exhausted claims and the retaliatory acts. Although not entirely clear from Plaintiff’s pl eadings, he seems to argue that WMATA took two retaliatory actions: first, it withheld his pay when he returned from EAP leave in retaliation for him taking leave; a nd second, it assigned him to a PIP after he applied for the TAMO director position. 14 Pl.’s Opp’n & Cross-Mot. at 22. Be fore addressing the WMATA’s exhaustion argument, the Court concludes that neither of these claims can proceed as a legal matter. To prove retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that he (1) engaged in statutorily protected activity ; (2) suffered a materially adverse action by her employer; and (3) “a causal link connects the two.” Jones v. Bernanke , 557 F.3d 670, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). “Protected activity under Title VII includes having ‘made a charge , testified, asserted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing’ on the basis of discrimination” under, in this instance, Title VII. Arias v. Marriott Int’l ., 217 F. Supp. 3d 189, 195–96 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Jones v. Billington , 12 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 1997)). Plaintiff has cited no legal authority for the proposition that taking leave or applying for a promotion is a “protected activity” under Title
VII. See Pl.’s Opp’n & Cross-Mot. at 16. Moreover, WMATA is correct that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies to the extent his retaliation claim hinge s on “seeking EAP leave”; his EEOC submissions

14 Plaintiff appears to abandon this second basi s for retaliation in his Reply, indicating that “withholding the Plaintiff’s pa y for making use of EAP, is the retaliation from which Plaintiff seeks relief,” without making any reference to his th eory that the PIP was “retaliation” for applying for a promotion. Pl.’s Reply at 9. Nonetheless, the Court addresses both arguments out of an abundance of caution.31 are entirely devoid of facts related to that event. See Pl.’s Opp’n & Cross-Mot. at 22 (arguing that “Plaintiff engaged in protected activity seeking EAP leave.”). There are no facts relating to Plaintiff’s EEOC complaint to his EAP, his leave, or the issues with his pay in October 2019 contained in his EEOC Charge. 15 Accordingly, his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies insofar as his retaliation claim relies on his delaye d receipt of pay when he returned from EAP leave supplies an additional basis for granti ng summary judgment in WMATA’s favor. The Court GRANTS WMATA’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count III of the Amended Complaint (retaliation) and DENIES Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment as to the same.
IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS WMATA’s Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgmen t. This case shall be dismissed with prejudice. An appropriate order acco mpanies this Memorandum Opinion. /s/ COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY United States District Judge Date: September 21, 2022

15 As noted, supra Section III(A)(1), his delayed pay inOctober 2019 also falls outside the 180- day limitations period preceding hi s letter to the EEOC.