UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4188

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RODNEY R. HAILEY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District 

Judge. (1:11-cr-00540-WDQ-1)

Submitted: March 18, 2014 Decided: March 27, 2014

Before KING, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Gerald C. Ruter, THE LAW OFFICES OF GERALD C. RUTER, P.C., 

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United 

States Attorney, Stefan D. Cassella, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Following a six-day jury trial, Rodney R. Hailey was 

convicted of eight counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1343 (2012); thirty-one counts of money laundering, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (2012); and two counts of 

violating the Clean Air Act, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 

§ 7413(c)(2)(A) (2012) and various federal regulations. The 

district court sentenced Hailey to 151 months’ imprisonment, 

three years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay 

$42,196,089.78 in restitution.

On appeal, Hailey does not raise any trial issues or 

dispute the restitution order. He challenges only the custodial 

term of imprisonment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm 

the judgment.

In his lead argument, Hailey asks that we extend the 

holding in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), to 

preclude the district court from making factual findings as 

relevant to sentencing enhancements, in addition to prohibiting 

factual findings that increase the applicable statutory 

mandatory minimum sentence. We find no support for this 

proposition. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2163 (explaining that 

the Court’s holding “does not mean that any fact that influences 

judicial discretion must be found by a jury”); see also United 

States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) (“[W]hen a trial 
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judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence 

within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury 

determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant.”); 

United States v. Valdez, 739 F.3d 1052, 1054 (7th Cir. 2014) 

(declining to interpret Alleyne as overruling Booker to require 

that factual issues related to the determination of the 

defendant’s advisory Guidelines range be submitted to a jury, 

and expressly concluding that “[t]here is no conflict” between 

Alleyne and Booker). 

Hailey next challenges the reasonableness of his 

sentence. We review any criminal sentence, “whether inside, 

just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range,” 

for reasonableness, “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion 

standard.” United States v. King, 673 F.3d 274, 283 (4th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 216 (2012); see Gall v. United States, 

552 U.S. 38, 46, 51 (2007). Of course, the first step in 

procedural reasonableness review is to evaluate the district 

court’s Guidelines calculations. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 

Hailey maintains that the district court erred in 

determining his Guidelines range by failing to make express 

findings as to the two-level enhancement for the number of 

victims of the offense, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

(“USSG”) § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) (2011), and the one-level increase for 
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having a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1957, see USSG 

§ 2S1.1(b)(2)(A). 

Generally, in reviewing the district court’s 

calculations under the Guidelines, this court “review[s] the 

district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual 

findings for clear error.” United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 

621, 626 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

However, because Hailey failed to object to the Guidelines 

calculations challenged on appeal, Hailey’s claim is reviewed 

for plain error. United States v. Blatstein, 482 F.3d 725, 731 

(4th Cir. 2007).

We find no such error on this record. Although Hailey 

complains of the district court’s failure to make factual 

findings regarding these two enhancements, he did not dispute 

them at sentencing. Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A), 

the sentencing court “may accept any undisputed portion of the 

presentence report as a finding of fact.” Moreover, even if a 

defendant objects to a finding in the presentence report 

(“PSR”), in the absence of an affirmative showing that the 

information is not accurate, the court is “free to adopt the 

findings of the presentence report without more specific inquiry 

or explanation.” United States v. Love, 134 F.3d 595, 606 (4th 

Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
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Given Hailey’s failure to object to these enhancements 

and his related failure to affirmatively show that the PSR was 

inaccurate, there is no error, let alone plain error, in the 

district court’s reliance on the PSR. 

Hailey next claims the court failed to adequately 

analyze the particular facts of his case in terms of the 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) sentencing factors and to provide a 

sufficient explanation for the selected sentence. We disagree. 

Prior to imposing sentence, the district court detailed the 

facts of this case, focusing particularly on the sophistication 

and scope of the underlying fraud and Hailey’s personal history 

and characteristics. The court expressed its concern regarding 

the motivation for these crimes, emphasizing that Hailey’s 

actions were born of blatant greed. The court also noted the 

public interests that were harmed by Hailey’s crimes, which took 

advantage of a “well-intended government program.” 

The sentencing transcript thus makes clear that the 

district court received the parties’ sentencing arguments, 

weighed the § 3553(a) sentencing factors it viewed to be the 

most relevant, and relied on those factors to select a sentence 

for Hailey. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-50. The court’s 

explanation for the sentence, which was within Hailey’s advisory 

Guidelines range, was more than sufficient. See United States 

v. Hernandez, 603 F.3d 267, 271-72 (4th Cir. 2010) (recognizing 
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that a within-Guidelines sentence does not require an “elaborate 

or lengthy” explanation). We thus readily conclude that the 

district court fulfilled its duty to analyze the sentencing 

factors and offer an individualized explanation for the sentence 

it imposed. See United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576, 584 

(4th Cir. 2010). 

The final issue, then, is the substantive 

reasonableness of this within-Guidelines sentence. We presume 

that a sentence within the Guidelines range is substantively 

reasonable. See United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 168-69 

(4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 

217 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e may and do treat on appeal a district 

court’s decision to impose a sentence within the Guidelines 

range as presumptively reasonable.”). 

To overcome this presumption, Hailey again asserts 

that the court failed to engage in individualized sentencing 

analysis and contests the propriety of accepting the 

Government’s evidence as to the relevant sentencing issues. 

This argument simply re-packages the first two procedural 

errors, which we have rejected. Hailey also suggests that the 

court’s failure to explain why it rejected his request for a 

twenty-four-month variant sentence renders the sentence 

substantively unreasonable. But, in offering an extensive 

explanation for the within-Guidelines sentence, the court amply 
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illustrated its reasons for rejecting the proposed variance. We 

thus conclude that Hailey’s sentence is substantively reasonable 

in light of the circumstances, particularly as it was within his 

advisory Guidelines range. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 

338, 347 (2007) (upholding rebuttable presumption of 

reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentence). 

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s 

judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED