# Official Journal C 170/2013

| | ISSN 1977-091X
  doi:10.3000/1977091X.C_2013.170.eng |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 170 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 5615 June 2013 |

ISSN 1977-091X

doi:10.3000/1977091X.C_2013.170.eng

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 170

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 5615 June 2013

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| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions |
| | RECOMMENDATIONS |
| | European Systemic Risk Board |
| 2013/C 170/01 | Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board of 4 April 2013 on intermediate objectives and instruments of macro-prudential policy (ESRB/2013/1) | 1 |

Notice No

Contents

page

I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

RECOMMENDATIONS

European Systemic Risk Board

2013/C 170/01

Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board of 4 April 2013 on intermediate objectives and instruments of macro-prudential policy (ESRB/2013/1)

1

| | II   Information |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2013/C 170/02 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.6915 — OJSC Unimilk Company/NDL International/JV) (
  1
  ) | 20 |
| 2013/C 170/03 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.6909 — Qatar Investment Authority/Kingdom Holding Company/FRHI Holdings) (
  1
  ) | 20 |
| 2013/C 170/04 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.6889 — Sogecap/Cardif/Ensemble Immobilier Clichy-la-Garenne) (
  1
  ) | 21 |

II   Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2013/C 170/02

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.6915 — OJSC Unimilk Company/NDL International/JV) (
  1
  )

1

20

2013/C 170/03

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.6909 — Qatar Investment Authority/Kingdom Holding Company/FRHI Holdings) (
  1
  )

1

20

2013/C 170/04

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.6889 — Sogecap/Cardif/Ensemble Immobilier Clichy-la-Garenne) (
  1
  )

1

21

| | IV   Notices |
| --- | --- |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2013/C 170/05 | Euro exchange rates | 22 |
| 2013/C 170/06 | Commission Implementing Decision of 14 June 2013 concerning the financing for the year 2013 of activities in the veterinary field related to the European Union's information policy and support of international organisations, to several measures necessary to ensure the application of the food and feed and the plant health legislation | 23 |
| 2013/C 170/07 | Commission Implementing Decision of 10 June 2013 on financing the 2013 work programme on training in the field of food and feed safety, animal health, animal welfare and plant health in the framework of the Better training for safer food programme | 38 |

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2013/C 170/05

Euro exchange rates

22

2013/C 170/06

Commission Implementing Decision of 14 June 2013 concerning the financing for the year 2013 of activities in the veterinary field related to the European Union's information policy and support of international organisations, to several measures necessary to ensure the application of the food and feed and the plant health legislation

23

2013/C 170/07

Commission Implementing Decision of 10 June 2013 on financing the 2013 work programme on training in the field of food and feed safety, animal health, animal welfare and plant health in the framework of the Better training for safer food programme

38

| | V   Announcements |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION POLICY |
| | European Commission |
| 2013/C 170/08 | Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.6955 — KKR/Bidco/South Staffordshire Plc) — Candidate case for simplified procedure (
  1
  ) | 43 |
| 2013/C 170/09 | Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.6946 — BayWa/Bohnhorst Agrarhandel) — Candidate case for simplified procedure (
  1
  ) | 44 |
| 2013/C 170/10 | Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.6885 — SDNV/Germanischer Lloyd) (
  1
  ) | 45 |
| | OTHER ACTS |
| | European Commission |
| 2013/C 170/11 | Publication of an application pursuant to Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs | 46 |
| 2013/C 170/12 | Publication of an application pursuant to Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs | 51 |

V   Announcements

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION POLICY

European Commission

2013/C 170/08

Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.6955 — KKR/Bidco/South Staffordshire Plc) — Candidate case for simplified procedure (
  1
  )

1

43

2013/C 170/09

Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.6946 — BayWa/Bohnhorst Agrarhandel) — Candidate case for simplified procedure (
  1
  )

1

44

2013/C 170/10

Prior notification of a concentration (Case COMP/M.6885 — SDNV/Germanischer Lloyd) (
  1
  )

1

45

OTHER ACTS

European Commission

2013/C 170/11

Publication of an application pursuant to Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs

46

2013/C 170/12

Publication of an application pursuant to Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs

51

| | Corrigenda |
| --- | --- |
| 2013/C 170/13 | Corrigendum to the Call for expressions of interest for membership of the Scientific Panels of the European Food Safety Authority (Parma, Italy) — Ref.: EFSA/E/2013/001 (OJ C 107, 13.4.2013) | 55 |

Corrigenda

2013/C 170/13

Corrigendum to the Call for expressions of interest for membership of the Scientific Panels of the European Food Safety Authority (Parma, Italy) — Ref.: EFSA/E/2013/001 (OJ C 107, 13.4.2013)

55

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance |

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(1)   Text with EEA relevance

1

| EN | |
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EN

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I Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

RECOMMENDATIONS

European Systemic Risk Board

| 15.6.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 170/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.6.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 170/1

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RECOMMENDATION OF THE EUROPEAN SYSTEMIC RISK BOARD

of 4 April 2013

on intermediate objectives and instruments of macro-prudential policy

(ESRB/2013/1)

2013/C 170/01

THE GENERAL BOARD OF THE EUROPEAN SYSTEMIC RISK BOARD,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board (1), and in particular Article 3(2)(b), (d) and (f) and Articles 16 to 18 thereof,

Having regard to Decision ESRB/2011/1 of the European Systemic Risk Board of 20 January 2011 adopting the Rules of Procedure of the European Systemic Risk Board (2), and in particular Article 15(3)(e) and Articles 18 to 20 thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Financial stability is a precondition for the financial system to provide credit, supporting sustainable economic growth. The financial crisis has clearly revealed the need for macro-prudential oversight that mitigates and prevents systemic risk in the financial system. The objective of this Recommendation is to take a necessary next step towards an operational macro-prudential oversight. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Financial stability is a precondition for the financial system to provide credit, supporting sustainable economic growth. The financial crisis has clearly revealed the need for macro-prudential oversight that mitigates and prevents systemic risk in the financial system. The objective of this Recommendation is to take a necessary next step towards an operational macro-prudential oversight.

| (2) | Resilience against systemic risks in the Union depends on establishing a sound macro-prudential policy framework alongside the micro-prudential supervision. This Recommendation follows up on Recommendation ESRB/2011/3 of the European Systemic Risk Board of 22 December 2011 on the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities (3), by elaborating on intermediate objectives and instruments of macro-prudential policy. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Resilience against systemic risks in the Union depends on establishing a sound macro-prudential policy framework alongside the micro-prudential supervision. This Recommendation follows up on Recommendation ESRB/2011/3 of the European Systemic Risk Board of 22 December 2011 on the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities (3), by elaborating on intermediate objectives and instruments of macro-prudential policy.

| (3) | Recommendation ESRB/2011/3 requires Member States to designate an authority entrusted with the conduct of macro-prudential policy. Similarly, the proposed new framework establishing prudential requirements for credit institutions (hereinafter the ‘CRD IV/CRR’) requires Member States to set up a designated authority responsible for taking measures necessary to prevent or mitigate systemic risk or macro-prudential risks posing a threat to financial stability at national level (4). |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Recommendation ESRB/2011/3 requires Member States to designate an authority entrusted with the conduct of macro-prudential policy. Similarly, the proposed new framework establishing prudential requirements for credit institutions (hereinafter the ‘CRD IV/CRR’) requires Member States to set up a designated authority responsible for taking measures necessary to prevent or mitigate systemic risk or macro-prudential risks posing a threat to financial stability at national level (4).

| (4) | The ultimate objective of macro-prudential policy is to contribute to the safeguard of the stability of the financial system as a whole, including by strengthening the resilience of the financial system and decreasing the build-up of systemic risks, thereby ensuring a sustainable contribution of the financial sector to economic growth. Recommendation ESRB/2011/3 refers to the identification of intermediate policy objectives as operational specifications of the ultimate objective. Identifying intermediate objectives makes macro-prudential policy more operational, transparent and accountable and provides an economic basis for the selection of instruments. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The ultimate objective of macro-prudential policy is to contribute to the safeguard of the stability of the financial system as a whole, including by strengthening the resilience of the financial system and decreasing the build-up of systemic risks, thereby ensuring a sustainable contribution of the financial sector to economic growth. Recommendation ESRB/2011/3 refers to the identification of intermediate policy objectives as operational specifications of the ultimate objective. Identifying intermediate objectives makes macro-prudential policy more operational, transparent and accountable and provides an economic basis for the selection of instruments.

| (5) | Moreover, the effectiveness of macro-prudential policy in the Union depends on the establishment of a set of macro-prudential instruments to be effectively applied by the relevant macro-prudential authorities guided by a set of indicators, alongside expert judgement. Macro-prudential authorities should have under their direct control or under recommendation powers the necessary macro-prudential instruments, namely one or more instruments for each intermediate objective of macro-prudential policy. Instruments used to tighten the macro-prudential policy stance shall be released if deemed appropriate to stabilise the financial cycle. Macro-prudential instruments could be applied to broad or targeted categories of exposures, the latter including, for instance, exposures to specific foreign currencies. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Moreover, the effectiveness of macro-prudential policy in the Union depends on the establishment of a set of macro-prudential instruments to be effectively applied by the relevant macro-prudential authorities guided by a set of indicators, alongside expert judgement. Macro-prudential authorities should have under their direct control or under recommendation powers the necessary macro-prudential instruments, namely one or more instruments for each intermediate objective of macro-prudential policy. Instruments used to tighten the macro-prudential policy stance shall be released if deemed appropriate to stabilise the financial cycle. Macro-prudential instruments could be applied to broad or targeted categories of exposures, the latter including, for instance, exposures to specific foreign currencies.

| (6) | In its letter to the Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament of 29 March 2012, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) expressed its view on the capacity of the macro-prudential authorities to implement macro-prudential instruments, as defined in the CRD IV/CRR. In particular, the ESRB underlined that macro-prudential authorities at both the Member State and Union level need discretion to tighten temporarily the calibration of a diverse range of Pillar I requirements and to require additional disclosures. These requirements include aggregate capital levels, liquidity requirements and limits to large exposures and to leverage, as well as capital requirements targeting individual sectors or addressing specific vulnerabilities across the different parts of banks’ balance sheets. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

In its letter to the Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament of 29 March 2012, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) expressed its view on the capacity of the macro-prudential authorities to implement macro-prudential instruments, as defined in the CRD IV/CRR. In particular, the ESRB underlined that macro-prudential authorities at both the Member State and Union level need discretion to tighten temporarily the calibration of a diverse range of Pillar I requirements and to require additional disclosures. These requirements include aggregate capital levels, liquidity requirements and limits to large exposures and to leverage, as well as capital requirements targeting individual sectors or addressing specific vulnerabilities across the different parts of banks’ balance sheets.

| (7) | The CRD IV/CRR, while having mostly a micro-prudential focus, also envisages a set of macro-prudential instruments to be applied by the corresponding macro-prudential authority under certain conditions. This Recommendation suggests an indicative list of instruments, including but not limited to those envisaged in the CRD IV/CRR, that Member States could assign to macro-prudential authorities in order to pursue the identified intermediate objectives, while not restricting Member States in applying further instruments. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

The CRD IV/CRR, while having mostly a micro-prudential focus, also envisages a set of macro-prudential instruments to be applied by the corresponding macro-prudential authority under certain conditions. This Recommendation suggests an indicative list of instruments, including but not limited to those envisaged in the CRD IV/CRR, that Member States could assign to macro-prudential authorities in order to pursue the identified intermediate objectives, while not restricting Member States in applying further instruments.

| (8) | Furthermore, macro-prudential authorities should develop an overall policy strategy on the application of macro-prudential instruments to foster decision-making, communication and accountability of macro-prudential policy. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Furthermore, macro-prudential authorities should develop an overall policy strategy on the application of macro-prudential instruments to foster decision-making, communication and accountability of macro-prudential policy.

| (9) | The effectiveness of macro-prudential policy also depends on the coordination between Member States on the application of macro-prudential instruments at national level. While macro-prudential policy will in general have substantial positive cross-border spillover effects, negative cross-border spillovers may occasionally arise. Macro-prudential authorities should assess the materiality of the net impact of such positive and negative spillovers, also to preserve the single market. The ESRB will consider potential cross-border spillovers of macro-prudential policy and, without prejudice to any relevant provisions of Union law, promote an appropriate coordination framework to address these issues. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The effectiveness of macro-prudential policy also depends on the coordination between Member States on the application of macro-prudential instruments at national level. While macro-prudential policy will in general have substantial positive cross-border spillover effects, negative cross-border spillovers may occasionally arise. Macro-prudential authorities should assess the materiality of the net impact of such positive and negative spillovers, also to preserve the single market. The ESRB will consider potential cross-border spillovers of macro-prudential policy and, without prejudice to any relevant provisions of Union law, promote an appropriate coordination framework to address these issues.

| (10) | Over time, as authorities learn about the effectiveness of different macro-prudential instruments, the intermediate policy objectives and/or macro-prudential instruments may be revised, also taking into account potential new risks to financial stability. This requires a periodic assessment of the adequacy of the established intermediate policy objectives and macro-prudential instruments. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Over time, as authorities learn about the effectiveness of different macro-prudential instruments, the intermediate policy objectives and/or macro-prudential instruments may be revised, also taking into account potential new risks to financial stability. This requires a periodic assessment of the adequacy of the established intermediate policy objectives and macro-prudential instruments.

| (11) | The current and proposed Union legislative framework is characterised by a complex and diverse set of macro-prudential provisions, which would greatly benefit from simplification and overall consistency in future reviews. Union institutions might also consider including macro-prudential instruments in the legislation affecting areas of the financial sector other than banking. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The current and proposed Union legislative framework is characterised by a complex and diverse set of macro-prudential provisions, which would greatly benefit from simplification and overall consistency in future reviews. Union institutions might also consider including macro-prudential instruments in the legislation affecting areas of the financial sector other than banking.

| (12) | In order to achieve a coherent application of macro-prudential instruments and to ensure macro-prudential oversight across the Union, the ESRB might consider in the future addressing recommendations to macro-prudential authorities to guide their application of macro-prudential instruments. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

In order to achieve a coherent application of macro-prudential instruments and to ensure macro-prudential oversight across the Union, the ESRB might consider in the future addressing recommendations to macro-prudential authorities to guide their application of macro-prudential instruments.

| (13) | Policymakers within and outside Europe are assessing the merits and drawbacks of an even larger set of possible instruments to prevent or mitigate systemic risks and legislative reforms to ring-fence risks in the financial system. The ESRB will continue to analyse the effectiveness and efficiency of other instruments being discussed as part of the macro-prudential policy framework. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Policymakers within and outside Europe are assessing the merits and drawbacks of an even larger set of possible instruments to prevent or mitigate systemic risks and legislative reforms to ring-fence risks in the financial system. The ESRB will continue to analyse the effectiveness and efficiency of other instruments being discussed as part of the macro-prudential policy framework.

| (14) | The proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a single supervisory mechanism (SSM) (5), as agreed by the Council on 12 December 2012, confers on the European Central Bank (ECB) the power to apply, if deemed necessary, higher requirements for capital buffers than applied by competent or designated authorities of participating Member States, and apply more stringent measures aimed at addressing systemic or macro-prudential risks, in accordance with the procedures set out in the framework of the CRD IV/CRR and in cases specifically set out in relevant Union law. The ESRB aims to cooperate with the ECB and the national competent authorities composing the SSM, as well as with the European Supervisory Authorities and other ESRB members, for the exercise of a coherent set of macro-prudential policies within the Union. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a single supervisory mechanism (SSM) (5), as agreed by the Council on 12 December 2012, confers on the European Central Bank (ECB) the power to apply, if deemed necessary, higher requirements for capital buffers than applied by competent or designated authorities of participating Member States, and apply more stringent measures aimed at addressing systemic or macro-prudential risks, in accordance with the procedures set out in the framework of the CRD IV/CRR and in cases specifically set out in relevant Union law. The ESRB aims to cooperate with the ECB and the national competent authorities composing the SSM, as well as with the European Supervisory Authorities and other ESRB members, for the exercise of a coherent set of macro-prudential policies within the Union.

| (15) | This Recommendation is without prejudice to the monetary policy mandates and the oversight role for payment, clearing and settlement infrastructures of the central banks in the Union. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

This Recommendation is without prejudice to the monetary policy mandates and the oversight role for payment, clearing and settlement infrastructures of the central banks in the Union.

| (16) | ESRB Recommendations are published after informing the Council of the General Board’s intention to do so and providing the Council with an opportunity to react, |
| --- | --- |

(16)

ESRB Recommendations are published after informing the Council of the General Board’s intention to do so and providing the Council with an opportunity to react,

HAS ADOPTED THIS RECOMMENDATION:

SECTION 1

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation A —   Definition of intermediate objectives

Macro-prudential authorities are recommended to:

| 1. | define and pursue intermediate objectives of macro-prudential policy for their respective national financial system as a whole. These intermediate objectives should act as operational specifications to the ultimate objective of macro-prudential policy, which is to contribute to the safeguard of the financial system as a whole, including by strengthening the resilience of the financial system and decreasing the build-up of systemic risks, thereby ensuring a sustainable contribution of the financial sector to economic growth. This implies, inter alia, releasing instruments that were previously used to tighten the macro-prudential policy stance; |
| --- | --- |

1.

define and pursue intermediate objectives of macro-prudential policy for their respective national financial system as a whole. These intermediate objectives should act as operational specifications to the ultimate objective of macro-prudential policy, which is to contribute to the safeguard of the financial system as a whole, including by strengthening the resilience of the financial system and decreasing the build-up of systemic risks, thereby ensuring a sustainable contribution of the financial sector to economic growth. This implies, inter alia, releasing instruments that were previously used to tighten the macro-prudential policy stance;

| 2. | these intermediate policy objectives should include:






  (a) | to mitigate and prevent excessive credit growth and leverage; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

these intermediate policy objectives should include:

(a)

to mitigate and prevent excessive credit growth and leverage;

| (b) | to mitigate and prevent excessive maturity mismatch and market illiquidity; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

to mitigate and prevent excessive maturity mismatch and market illiquidity;

| (c) | to limit direct and indirect exposure concentrations; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

to limit direct and indirect exposure concentrations;

| (d) | to limit the systemic impact of misaligned incentives with a view to reducing moral hazard; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

to limit the systemic impact of misaligned incentives with a view to reducing moral hazard;

| (e) | to strengthen the resilience of financial infrastructures; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

to strengthen the resilience of financial infrastructures;

| 3. | assess the need for further intermediate objectives on the basis of underlying market failures and the specific structural characteristics of the country and/or Union financial system that could give rise to systemic risk. |
| --- | --- |

3.

assess the need for further intermediate objectives on the basis of underlying market failures and the specific structural characteristics of the country and/or Union financial system that could give rise to systemic risk.

Recommendation B —   Selection of macro-prudential instruments

Member States are recommended to:

| 1. | assess, in cooperation with the macro-prudential authorities, whether the macro-prudential instruments, currently under the direct control or recommendation powers of the latter, are sufficient to effectively and efficiently pursue the ultimate objective of macro-prudential policy, established under Recommendation ESRB/2011/3, as well as their intermediate objectives as defined in accordance with recommendation A. The assessment should take into consideration that macro-prudential authorities should have under their direct control or recommendation powers at least one macro-prudential instrument for each intermediate objective of macro-prudential policy, although more than one instrument may be needed; |
| --- | --- |

1.

assess, in cooperation with the macro-prudential authorities, whether the macro-prudential instruments, currently under the direct control or recommendation powers of the latter, are sufficient to effectively and efficiently pursue the ultimate objective of macro-prudential policy, established under Recommendation ESRB/2011/3, as well as their intermediate objectives as defined in accordance with recommendation A. The assessment should take into consideration that macro-prudential authorities should have under their direct control or recommendation powers at least one macro-prudential instrument for each intermediate objective of macro-prudential policy, although more than one instrument may be needed;

| 2. | if the assessment indicates that the available instruments are not sufficient, consider, in cooperation with the national macro-prudential authorities, additional macro-prudential instruments that should come under the direct control or recommendation powers of the latter. To this end, an indicative list of instruments is suggested for consideration in Table 1 below:

  Table 1


  Indicative list of macro-prudential instruments

  1.   Mitigate and prevent excessive credit growth and leverage

  Counter-cyclical capital buffer
  Sectoral capital requirements (including intra-financial system)
  Macro-prudential leverage ratio
  Loan-to-value requirements (LTV)
  Loan-to-income/debt (service)-to-income requirements (LTI)
  2.   Mitigate and prevent excessive maturity mismatch and market illiquidity

  Macro-prudential adjustment to liquidity ratio (e.g. liquidity coverage ratio)
  Macro-prudential restrictions on funding sources (e.g. net stable funding ratio)
  Macro-prudential unweighted limit to less stable funding (e.g. loan-to-deposit ratio)
  Margin and haircut requirements
  3.   Limit direct and indirect exposure concentration

  Large exposure restrictions
  CCP clearing requirement
  4.   Limit the systemic impact of misaligned incentives with a view to reducing moral hazard

  SIFI capital surcharges
  5.   Strengthen the resilience of financial infrastructures

  Margin and haircut requirements on CCP clearing
  Increased disclosure
  Structural systemic risk buffer |
| --- | --- |

2.

if the assessment indicates that the available instruments are not sufficient, consider, in cooperation with the national macro-prudential authorities, additional macro-prudential instruments that should come under the direct control or recommendation powers of the latter. To this end, an indicative list of instruments is suggested for consideration in Table 1 below:

Table 1

Indicative list of macro-prudential instruments

1.   Mitigate and prevent excessive credit growth and leverage

Counter-cyclical capital buffer

Sectoral capital requirements (including intra-financial system)

Macro-prudential leverage ratio

Loan-to-value requirements (LTV)

Loan-to-income/debt (service)-to-income requirements (LTI)

2.   Mitigate and prevent excessive maturity mismatch and market illiquidity

Macro-prudential adjustment to liquidity ratio (e.g. liquidity coverage ratio)

Macro-prudential restrictions on funding sources (e.g. net stable funding ratio)

Macro-prudential unweighted limit to less stable funding (e.g. loan-to-deposit ratio)

Margin and haircut requirements

3.   Limit direct and indirect exposure concentration

Large exposure restrictions

CCP clearing requirement

4.   Limit the systemic impact of misaligned incentives with a view to reducing moral hazard

SIFI capital surcharges

5.   Strengthen the resilience of financial infrastructures

Margin and haircut requirements on CCP clearing

Increased disclosure

Structural systemic risk buffer

| 3. | following paragraphs 1 and 2, select any additional macro-prudential instruments, taking into account:






  (a) | their effectiveness and efficiency to achieve each of the intermediate objectives in their respective jurisdictions, in accordance with recommendation A; |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

following paragraphs 1 and 2, select any additional macro-prudential instruments, taking into account:

(a)

their effectiveness and efficiency to achieve each of the intermediate objectives in their respective jurisdictions, in accordance with recommendation A;

| (b) | their capacity to address the structural and the cyclical dimension of systemic risks in their respective jurisdictions; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

their capacity to address the structural and the cyclical dimension of systemic risks in their respective jurisdictions;

| 4. | further to the selection of macro-prudential instruments, ensure that macro-prudential authorities are involved in the design and contribute to the national implementation of:






  (a) | recovery and resolution regimes for banking and non-banking financial institutions; |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.

further to the selection of macro-prudential instruments, ensure that macro-prudential authorities are involved in the design and contribute to the national implementation of:

(a)

recovery and resolution regimes for banking and non-banking financial institutions;

| (b) | deposit guarantee schemes; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

deposit guarantee schemes;

| 5. | establish a legal framework that permits the macro-prudential authorities to hold the direct control or recommendation powers over the macro-prudential instruments selected pursuant to this Recommendation. |
| --- | --- |

5.

establish a legal framework that permits the macro-prudential authorities to hold the direct control or recommendation powers over the macro-prudential instruments selected pursuant to this Recommendation.

Recommendation C —   Policy strategy

Macro-prudential authorities are recommended to:

| 1. | define a policy strategy that:






  (a) | links the ultimate objective of macro-prudential policy with the intermediate objectives and the macro-prudential instruments under their direct control or recommendation powers; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

define a policy strategy that:

(a)

links the ultimate objective of macro-prudential policy with the intermediate objectives and the macro-prudential instruments under their direct control or recommendation powers;

| (b) | establishes a sound framework for the application of instruments under their direct control or recommendation powers to pursue the ultimate and intermediate objectives of macro-prudential policy. This should include appropriate indicators to monitor the emergence of systemic risks and to guide decisions on the application, deactivation or calibration of time-varying macro-prudential instruments as well as an appropriate coordination mechanism with relevant authorities at the national level; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

establishes a sound framework for the application of instruments under their direct control or recommendation powers to pursue the ultimate and intermediate objectives of macro-prudential policy. This should include appropriate indicators to monitor the emergence of systemic risks and to guide decisions on the application, deactivation or calibration of time-varying macro-prudential instruments as well as an appropriate coordination mechanism with relevant authorities at the national level;

| (c) | fosters the transparency and accountability of macro-prudential policy; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

fosters the transparency and accountability of macro-prudential policy;

| 2. | conduct further analysis, on the basis of the practical application of macro-prudential instruments, to strengthen macro-prudential policy strategy, including on:






  (a) | instruments not established in Union legislation, for instance loan-to-value and loan-to-income requirements, and instruments to prevent or mitigate excessive maturity mismatches and market illiquidity; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

conduct further analysis, on the basis of the practical application of macro-prudential instruments, to strengthen macro-prudential policy strategy, including on:

(a)

instruments not established in Union legislation, for instance loan-to-value and loan-to-income requirements, and instruments to prevent or mitigate excessive maturity mismatches and market illiquidity;

| (b) | the transmission mechanism of instruments as well as on the identification of indicators that may inform decisions on their application, deactivation or calibration. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the transmission mechanism of instruments as well as on the identification of indicators that may inform decisions on their application, deactivation or calibration.

| 3. | without prejudice to relevant provisions of Union legislation, inform the ESRB prior to the application of macro-prudential instruments at national level if significant cross-border effects on other Member States or the single market are to be expected. |
| --- | --- |

3.

without prejudice to relevant provisions of Union legislation, inform the ESRB prior to the application of macro-prudential instruments at national level if significant cross-border effects on other Member States or the single market are to be expected.

Recommendation D —   Periodical evaluation of intermediate objectives and instruments

Macro-prudential authorities are recommended to:

| 1. | periodically assess the appropriateness of the intermediate objectives defined in accordance with recommendation A, in view of the experience gained in operating the macro-prudential policy framework, structural developments in the financial system and the emergence of new types of systemic risks; |
| --- | --- |

1.

periodically assess the appropriateness of the intermediate objectives defined in accordance with recommendation A, in view of the experience gained in operating the macro-prudential policy framework, structural developments in the financial system and the emergence of new types of systemic risks;

| 2. | periodically review the effectiveness and efficiency of the macro-prudential instruments selected in accordance with recommendation B, in achieving the ultimate and intermediate objectives of macro-prudential policy; |
| --- | --- |

2.

periodically review the effectiveness and efficiency of the macro-prudential instruments selected in accordance with recommendation B, in achieving the ultimate and intermediate objectives of macro-prudential policy;

| 3. | if warranted by the analysis under paragraph 1, adjust the set of intermediate objectives whenever necessary and, in particular, in case of the emergence of new risks to financial stability that cannot be sufficiently addressed within the existing framework; |
| --- | --- |

3.

if warranted by the analysis under paragraph 1, adjust the set of intermediate objectives whenever necessary and, in particular, in case of the emergence of new risks to financial stability that cannot be sufficiently addressed within the existing framework;

| 4. | inform the relevant authority in their Member State, so that the appropriate legal framework is established, in case new macro-prudential instruments are considered necessary; |
| --- | --- |

4.

inform the relevant authority in their Member State, so that the appropriate legal framework is established, in case new macro-prudential instruments are considered necessary;

| 5. | report to the ESRB any change in the set of intermediate objectives and macro-prudential instruments that are under their direct control or recommendation powers and the underlying analysis supporting this change. |
| --- | --- |

5.

report to the ESRB any change in the set of intermediate objectives and macro-prudential instruments that are under their direct control or recommendation powers and the underlying analysis supporting this change.

Recommendation E —   Single market and Union legislation

The Commission is recommended, in the framework of forthcoming revisions of Union legislation, to:

| 1. | take account of the need to establish a coherent set of macro-prudential instruments affecting the financial system, including all types of financial intermediaries, markets, products and market infrastructures; |
| --- | --- |

1.

take account of the need to establish a coherent set of macro-prudential instruments affecting the financial system, including all types of financial intermediaries, markets, products and market infrastructures;

| 2. | ensure that adopted mechanisms permit Union institutions and Member States to interact efficiently and establish a sufficient level of flexibility for the macro-prudential authorities in order to activate those macro-prudential instruments whenever needed, while preserving the single market. |
| --- | --- |

2.

ensure that adopted mechanisms permit Union institutions and Member States to interact efficiently and establish a sufficient level of flexibility for the macro-prudential authorities in order to activate those macro-prudential instruments whenever needed, while preserving the single market.

SECTION 2

IMPLEMENTATION

1.   Interpretation

| 1. | For the purposes of this Recommendation, the following definitions apply:






  (a) | ‘financial system’ means financial system as defined in Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

For the purposes of this Recommendation, the following definitions apply:

(a)

‘financial system’ means financial system as defined in Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010;

| (b) | ‘macro-prudential authority’ means national macro-prudential authorities with the objectives, arrangements, powers, accountability requirements and other characteristics set out in Recommendation ESRB/2011/3. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

‘macro-prudential authority’ means national macro-prudential authorities with the objectives, arrangements, powers, accountability requirements and other characteristics set out in Recommendation ESRB/2011/3.

| (c) | ‘direct control’ means real and effective capacity to impose and modify, where necessary to achieve an ultimate or intermediate objective, macro-prudential instruments over the financial institutions that are under the scope of action of the corresponding macro-prudential authority; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

‘direct control’ means real and effective capacity to impose and modify, where necessary to achieve an ultimate or intermediate objective, macro-prudential instruments over the financial institutions that are under the scope of action of the corresponding macro-prudential authority;

| (d) | ‘recommendation powers’ means capacity to guide by means of recommendations the application of macro-prudential instruments, where necessary to achieve an ultimate or intermediate objective; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

‘recommendation powers’ means capacity to guide by means of recommendations the application of macro-prudential instruments, where necessary to achieve an ultimate or intermediate objective;

| (e) | ‘structural dimension of systemic risk’ means the distribution of risks across the financial sector; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

‘structural dimension of systemic risk’ means the distribution of risks across the financial sector;

| (f) | ‘cyclical dimension of systemic risk’ means the changes of systemic risk over time, originating from the tendency of financial institutions to assume excessive risks in the upswing and become excessively risk averse in the downswing; |
| --- | --- |

(f)

‘cyclical dimension of systemic risk’ means the changes of systemic risk over time, originating from the tendency of financial institutions to assume excessive risks in the upswing and become excessively risk averse in the downswing;

| (g) | ‘effectiveness of the instrument’ means the degree to which the instrument can address market failures and achieve the ultimate and intermediate objectives; |
| --- | --- |

(g)

‘effectiveness of the instrument’ means the degree to which the instrument can address market failures and achieve the ultimate and intermediate objectives;

| (h) | ‘efficiency of the instrument’ means the potential of the instrument to achieve the ultimate and intermediate objectives at minimum cost. |
| --- | --- |

(h)

‘efficiency of the instrument’ means the potential of the instrument to achieve the ultimate and intermediate objectives at minimum cost.

| 2. | The Annex forms an integral part of this Recommendation. In the case of conflict between the main text and the Annex, the main text prevails. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The Annex forms an integral part of this Recommendation. In the case of conflict between the main text and the Annex, the main text prevails.

2.   Criteria for implementation

| 1. | The following criteria apply to the implementation of this Recommendation:






  (a) | regulatory arbitrage should be avoided; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

The following criteria apply to the implementation of this Recommendation:

(a)

regulatory arbitrage should be avoided;

| (b) | due regard should be paid to the principle of proportionality in the implementation, with reference to the different systemic significance of the financial institutions, to the different institutional systems and taking into account the objective and the content of each recommendation. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

due regard should be paid to the principle of proportionality in the implementation, with reference to the different systemic significance of the financial institutions, to the different institutional systems and taking into account the objective and the content of each recommendation.

| 2. | Addressees are requested to communicate the actions taken in response to this Recommendation, or adequately justify inaction. The reports should as a minimum contain:






  (a) | information on the substance and timeline of the actions taken; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Addressees are requested to communicate the actions taken in response to this Recommendation, or adequately justify inaction. The reports should as a minimum contain:

(a)

information on the substance and timeline of the actions taken;

| (b) | an assessment of the functioning of the actions taken, from the perspective of the objectives of this Recommendation; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

an assessment of the functioning of the actions taken, from the perspective of the objectives of this Recommendation;

| (c) | detailed justification of any inaction or departure from this Recommendation, including any delays. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

detailed justification of any inaction or departure from this Recommendation, including any delays.

| 3. | Further information on the characteristics and particularities of each of the proposed intermediate objectives can be found in the Annex to this Recommendation, as well as an indicative list of macro-prudential instruments to pursue intermediate objectives. The Annex can assist the addressees in the selection of macro-prudential instruments as well as in the preparation of the policy strategy for their application. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Further information on the characteristics and particularities of each of the proposed intermediate objectives can be found in the Annex to this Recommendation, as well as an indicative list of macro-prudential instruments to pursue intermediate objectives. The Annex can assist the addressees in the selection of macro-prudential instruments as well as in the preparation of the policy strategy for their application.

3.   Timeline for the follow-up

| 1. | Addressees are requested to communicate the actions taken in response to this Recommendation, or adequately justify inaction, as specified in the following paragraphs:






  (a) | recommendations A and B — by 31 December 2014, addressees are requested to communicate a report to the ESRB, the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the Council explaining the measures undertaken in order to comply with the content of recommendations A and B. Member States may report the measures undertaken with regard to recommendation B through their macro-prudential authorities; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Addressees are requested to communicate the actions taken in response to this Recommendation, or adequately justify inaction, as specified in the following paragraphs:

(a)

recommendations A and B — by 31 December 2014, addressees are requested to communicate a report to the ESRB, the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the Council explaining the measures undertaken in order to comply with the content of recommendations A and B. Member States may report the measures undertaken with regard to recommendation B through their macro-prudential authorities;

| (b) | recommendation C — by 31 December 2015, macro-prudential authorities are requested to communicate a report to the ESRB, the EBA and the Council explaining the measures undertaken in order to comply with the content of recommendation C(1). Recommendations C(2) and C(3) do not require a specific reporting deadline. Information provided by macro-prudential authorities to the ESRB under recommendation C(3) should be made available with reasonable notice; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

recommendation C — by 31 December 2015, macro-prudential authorities are requested to communicate a report to the ESRB, the EBA and the Council explaining the measures undertaken in order to comply with the content of recommendation C(1). Recommendations C(2) and C(3) do not require a specific reporting deadline. Information provided by macro-prudential authorities to the ESRB under recommendation C(3) should be made available with reasonable notice;

| (c) | recommendation D — recommendation D does not require a single reporting deadline. If there is a change in the intermediate objectives and instruments under the direct control or recommendation powers of macro-prudential authorities, they are requested to deliver a report thereon in good time to the ESRB, in line with recommendation D(5); |
| --- | --- |

(c)

recommendation D — recommendation D does not require a single reporting deadline. If there is a change in the intermediate objectives and instruments under the direct control or recommendation powers of macro-prudential authorities, they are requested to deliver a report thereon in good time to the ESRB, in line with recommendation D(5);

| (d) | recommendation E — recommendation E does not require a specific reporting deadline. The Commission delivers a report to the ESRB on a biennial basis on the way in which macro-prudential policy objectives are included in the preparation of financial legislation. The first report should be delivered by 31 December 2014. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

recommendation E — recommendation E does not require a specific reporting deadline. The Commission delivers a report to the ESRB on a biennial basis on the way in which macro-prudential policy objectives are included in the preparation of financial legislation. The first report should be delivered by 31 December 2014.

| 2. | The General Board may extend the deadlines set forth in the previous paragraphs where legislative initiatives are necessary to comply with one or more recommendations. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The General Board may extend the deadlines set forth in the previous paragraphs where legislative initiatives are necessary to comply with one or more recommendations.

4.   Monitoring and assessment

| 1. | The ESRB Secretariat:






  (a) | assists the addressees, including by facilitating coordinated reporting, providing relevant templates and detailing where necessary the modalities and the timeline for the follow-up; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

The ESRB Secretariat:

(a)

assists the addressees, including by facilitating coordinated reporting, providing relevant templates and detailing where necessary the modalities and the timeline for the follow-up;

| (b) | verifies the follow-up by the addressees, including by assisting them upon their request, and reports on the follow-up to the General Board via the Steering Committee. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

verifies the follow-up by the addressees, including by assisting them upon their request, and reports on the follow-up to the General Board via the Steering Committee.

| 2. | The General Board assesses the actions and the justifications reported by the addressees and, where appropriate, decides whether this Recommendation has not been followed and if the addressees have failed to adequately justify their inaction. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The General Board assesses the actions and the justifications reported by the addressees and, where appropriate, decides whether this Recommendation has not been followed and if the addressees have failed to adequately justify their inaction.

SECTION 3

FINAL PROVISIONS

1.   ESRB guidance on the application of the macro-prudential instruments

The ESRB may give guidance to the macro-prudential authorities on how to better implement and apply macro-prudential instruments, by means of recommendations pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010. This may include indicators to guide the application of macro-prudential instruments.

2.   Future reform of the macro-prudential toolkit

The ESRB may consider, in the future, expanding the indicative set of macro-prudential instruments contained in this Recommendation, by means of a recommendation pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010.

Done in Frankfurt am Main, 4 April 2013.

The Chair of the ESRB

Mario DRAGHI

---

(1)  OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 1.

1

(2)  OJ C 58, 24.2.2011, p. 4.

2

(3)  OJ C 41, 14.2.2012, p. 1.

3

(4)  Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate (COM(2011) 453 final) and Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms (COM(2011) 452 final).

4

(5)  Proposal for a Council Regulation conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (COM(2012) 511 final).

5

---

ANNEX TO THE RECOMMENDATION ON INTERMEDIATE OBJECTIVES AND INSTRUMENTS OF MACRO-PRUDENTIAL POLICY

1.   Introduction

Macro-prudential authorities have been, or are in the process of being, set up in most Union Member States. The next step towards making macro-prudential policy operational constitutes selecting effective and efficient macro-prudential policy instruments that will prevent or mitigate systemic risks in the financial system as a whole. This Annex presents a framework for this selection.

The ESRB Recommendation on the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities (1) refers to the identification of intermediate policy objectives as ‘operational specifications of the ultimate objective’. Identifying intermediate objectives makes macro-prudential policy more operational, transparent and accountable, and provides an economic basis for instrument selection. The framework presented in this Annex is therefore based on a set of pre-identified and broad ranging intermediate objectives. It details how indicative instruments would help achieve those intermediate objectives and what indicators would signal a need for their activation or deactivation. Information on the legal base of individual instruments is also included. Forthcoming Union legislation is expected to provide a common legal base for some of the instruments.

In applying the framework, macro-prudential authorities should take risks to financial stability at the national level as a starting point. These risks may differ from country to country, given that the characteristics of financial systems and financial cycles vary across the Union. As a result, and in reflection of the fact that macro-prudential policy is at an early stage of development, different instruments may be selected in different Member States. At the same time, the fact that financial markets in the Union are highly integrated also calls for a coordinated approach. Coordination can strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of macro-prudential policy by limiting the scope for arbitrage and leakage. It is also key for internalising positive and negative spillovers to the financial systems and economies of other Member States and protecting the functioning of the single market. While further Union-wide convergence in the macro-prudential toolkit can be expected over time, the application of the tools will need to be tailored to diverging financial cycles and heterogeneous risks.

The Annex is structured as follows:

| — | Section 2 identifies the intermediate objectives of macro-prudential policy and links them to the underlying market failures which are considered to be most relevant for macro-prudential policy, |
| --- | --- |

—

Section 2 identifies the intermediate objectives of macro-prudential policy and links them to the underlying market failures which are considered to be most relevant for macro-prudential policy,

| — | Section 3 suggests criteria for selecting macro-prudential instruments and provides an overview of intermediate objectives and indicative macro-prudential instruments, |
| --- | --- |

—

Section 3 suggests criteria for selecting macro-prudential instruments and provides an overview of intermediate objectives and indicative macro-prudential instruments,

| — | Attachment 1 provides an analysis of individual macro-prudential instruments; Attachment 2 discusses macro-prudential elements in insurance. |
| --- | --- |

—

Attachment 1 provides an analysis of individual macro-prudential instruments; Attachment 2 discusses macro-prudential elements in insurance.

2.   Identifying intermediate objectives

The ESRB Recommendation on the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities asks Member States to ‘specify that the ultimate objective of macro-prudential policy is to contribute to the safeguard of the stability of the financial system as a whole, including by strengthening the resilience of the financial system and decreasing the build-up of systemic risks, thereby ensuring a sustainable contribution of the financial sector to economic growth’.

The relevant literature classifies systemic risk into two dimensions; structural and cyclical. The structural dimension concerns the distribution of risk across the financial system. The cyclical dimension is related to the tendency of banks to assume excessive risk in the upswing and become excessively risk averse in the downswing. While it is useful to take the structural and cyclical dimensions into account for the purpose of identifying the drivers of systemic risk and corresponding instruments, it is difficult to make a clear-cut distinction between the two dimensions given their close interlinkages.

Identifying intermediate objectives on the basis of specific market failures documented in the literature may allow for a clearer classification of macro-prudential instruments, ensure an economic base for the calibration and use of those instruments and foster the accountability of macro-prudential authorities. In practice, macro-prudential instruments are often already linked to intermediate objectives. The countercyclical buffer, for instance, aims to mitigate systemic risk arising from excessive credit growth. To develop a comprehensive view on intermediate objectives, this Annex uses the literature to identify the market failures relevant for macro-prudential policy and then maps them to individual objectives (see Table 1) (2).

The first intermediate objective is to mitigate and prevent excessive credit growth and leverage. Excessive credit growth has been identified as a key driver of financial crises, in which leverage acts as an amplification channel. The contrast between the impact of the collapse of the ‘dot-com’ bubble, which was largely equity funded, and the burst of the credit-fuelled sub-prime mortgage bubble illustrates the importance of leverage. In this respect, a distinction can be made between leverage within the financial system and that between financial institutions and real economy borrowers (i.e. by netting out intra-financial system claims). Macro-prudential policy could address excessive risk-taking in the upturn by tightening capital and collateral requirements. The buffers created in the upturn could be released in the downturn to absorb losses, alleviating the need for deleveraging and preventing bank runs, while supporting the extension of credit to sustain economic growth.

Table 1

Intermediate objectives of macro-prudential policy and related market failures

| Intermediate objective | Underlying market failures |
| --- | --- |
| Mitigate and prevent excessive credit growth and leverage | Credit crunch externalities: a sudden tightening of the conditions required to obtain a loan, resulting in a reduction of the availability of credit to the non-financial sector.
  Endogenous risk-taking: incentives that during a boom generate excessive risk-taking and, in the case of banks, a deterioration of lending standards. Explanations for this include signalling competence, market pressures to boost returns, or strategic interaction between institutions.
  Risk illusion: collective underestimation of risk related to short-term memory and the infrequency of financial crises.
  Bank runs: the withdrawal of wholesale or retail funding in case of actual or perceived insolvency.
  Interconnectedness externalities: contagious consequences of uncertainty about events at an institution or within a market. |
| Mitigate and prevent excessive maturity mismatch and market illiquidity | Fire sales externalities: arise from the forced sale of assets due to excessive asset and liability mismatches. This may lead to a liquidity spiral whereby falling asset prices induce further sales, deleveraging and spillovers to financial institutions with similar asset classes.
  Bank runs
  Market illiquidity: the drying-up of interbank or capital markets resulting from a general loss of confidence or very pessimistic expectations. |
| Limit direct and indirect exposure concentrations | Interconnectedness externalities
  Fire sales externalities: (here) arise from the forced sale of assets at a dislocated price given the distribution of exposures within the financial system. |
| Limit the systemic impact of misaligned incentives with a view to reducing moral hazard | Moral hazard and ‘too big to fail’: excessive risk-taking due to expectations of a bailout due to the perceived system relevance of an individual institution. |
| Strengthen the resilience of financial infrastructures | Interconnectedness externalities
  Fire sales externalities
  Risk illusion
  Incomplete contracts: compensation structures that provide incentives for risky behaviour. |

Intermediate objective

Underlying market failures

Mitigate and prevent excessive credit growth and leverage

Credit crunch externalities: a sudden tightening of the conditions required to obtain a loan, resulting in a reduction of the availability of credit to the non-financial sector.

Endogenous risk-taking: incentives that during a boom generate excessive risk-taking and, in the case of banks, a deterioration of lending standards. Explanations for this include signalling competence, market pressures to boost returns, or strategic interaction between institutions.

Risk illusion: collective underestimation of risk related to short-term memory and the infrequency of financial crises.

Bank runs: the withdrawal of wholesale or retail funding in case of actual or perceived insolvency.

Interconnectedness externalities: contagious consequences of uncertainty about events at an institution or within a market.

Mitigate and prevent excessive maturity mismatch and market illiquidity

Fire sales externalities: arise from the forced sale of assets due to excessive asset and liability mismatches. This may lead to a liquidity spiral whereby falling asset prices induce further sales, deleveraging and spillovers to financial institutions with similar asset classes.

Bank runs

Market illiquidity: the drying-up of interbank or capital markets resulting from a general loss of confidence or very pessimistic expectations.

Limit direct and indirect exposure concentrations

Interconnectedness externalities

Fire sales externalities: (here) arise from the forced sale of assets at a dislocated price given the distribution of exposures within the financial system.

Limit the systemic impact of misaligned incentives with a view to reducing moral hazard

Moral hazard and ‘too big to fail’: excessive risk-taking due to expectations of a bailout due to the perceived system relevance of an individual institution.

Strengthen the resilience of financial infrastructures

Interconnectedness externalities

Fire sales externalities

Risk illusion

Incomplete contracts: compensation structures that provide incentives for risky behaviour.

The second intermediate objective relates to excessive maturity mismatch (i.e. the extent to which long-term assets are funded with short-term liabilities). Experience shows that credit cycles coincide with increased reliance on short-term funding. This increases risks to financial stability owing to more illiquidity, fire sales and contagion. The focus of this intermediate objective is on the market liquidity of assets and reliance on short-term funds, as well as on information asymmetries that may link funding issues to asset prices. To address maturity mismatch, macro-prudential policy may require banks to finance their non-liquid assets with stable funding and to hold high-quality liquid assets to ensure refinancing of short-term funds. These measures aim to shield banks against market illiquidity and the related pressure of fire sales as well as against runs by depositors and other financial institutions.

The third intermediate objective is to limit direct and indirect exposure concentrations, taking into account their degree of riskiness. Direct concentration risk arises from large exposures to the non-financial sector (e.g. the housing market, sovereigns) as well as between financial sectors and/or financial entities. In addition, indirect exposures arise within the system owing to the interconnectedness of financial institutions and the contagious consequences of common exposures. Limiting large exposures can be achieved by establishing caps for specific financial sectors and (groups of) counterparties or by introducing circuit-breakers, such as CCPs, that help reduce the possible domino effect (e.g. contagion and fire sales) arising from an unexpected default or common exposures across financial institutions.

The fourth intermediate objective aims to limit the systemic impact of misaligned incentives with a view to reducing moral hazard. This involves strengthening the resilience of systemically important institutions, while counterbalancing the negative effects of an implicit government guarantee. Credible arrangements for orderly wind-down and resolution are also fundamental to address moral hazard. Finally, other measures such as asking market participants to ‘keep skin in the game’, or relating to management remuneration, could be applied.

The fifth intermediate objective is to strengthen the resilience of financial infrastructures. This can be achieved in two main ways: addressing externalities within the financial system’s infrastructure (3) and correcting the moral hazard effects that could arise from the institutional set-up. This could include legal systems, credit rating agencies, deposit guarantee schemes and market practices.

3.   Selecting macro-prudential instruments

Having established the intermediate objectives of macro-prudential policy, the next step is to select instruments that can be used to pursue these objectives. Instruments should be selected on the basis of their effectiveness and efficiency in achieving intermediate and final objectives.

Effectiveness concerns the degree to which market failures can be addressed and intermediate and final objectives achieved. As a minimum, at least one effective instrument is needed for each intermediate objective (the Tinbergen rule). In practice, the use of multiple, complementary instruments can be justified, especially if it dampens the impact of regulatory arbitrage and uncertainty about the transmission mechanism.

A relevant consideration in this connection is how coordination can be used to avoid policy arbitrage: while some instruments are effective when applied at the country level (e.g. loan-to-value or loan-to-income limits), others would require an at least Union level of application (e.g. margin and haircut requirements, CCP clearing requirement). While most instruments would have some positive effects when applied at the country level, they would nevertheless benefit from Union-wide coordination. Coordination plays a role not only in enhancing the effectiveness of instruments, but also in internalising positive and negative spillovers to the financial systems of other Member States as well as protecting the proper functioning of the single market.

Efficiency relates to the achievement of objectives at minimum cost. A key issue is the trade-off between resilience and growth, since increasing resilience is not cost-free. This means that instruments that support long-term growth while containing systemic risk, and instruments that have a lower impact on other policy instruments, are preferable.

Table 2 contains a list of indicative macro-prudential instruments according to intermediate objectives (4). In addition to the instruments included in Table 2, Member States may want to select instruments that best address specific risks to financial stability at the national level. Moreover, the framework of objectives and instruments should be subject to periodical evaluation and should reflect advances in the state of knowledge on macro-prudential policy as well as the emergence of new sources of systemic risk.

Table 2

Intermediate objectives and indicative macro-prudential instruments

1.   Mitigate and prevent excessive credit growth and leverage

| — | Countercyclical capital buffer |
| --- | --- |

—

Countercyclical capital buffer

| — | Sectoral capital requirements (including intra-financial system) |
| --- | --- |

—

Sectoral capital requirements (including intra-financial system)

| — | Macro-prudential leverage ratio |
| --- | --- |

—

Macro-prudential leverage ratio

| — | Loan-to-value requirements (LTV) |
| --- | --- |

—

Loan-to-value requirements (LTV)

| — | Loan-to-income/debt (service)-to-income requirements (LTI) |
| --- | --- |

—

Loan-to-income/debt (service)-to-income requirements (LTI)

2.   Mitigate and prevent excessive maturity mismatch and market illiquidity

| — | Macro-prudential adjustment to liquidity ratio (e.g. liquidity coverage ratio) |
| --- | --- |

—

Macro-prudential adjustment to liquidity ratio (e.g. liquidity coverage ratio)

| — | Macro-prudential restrictions on funding sources (e.g. net stable funding ratio) |
| --- | --- |

—

Macro-prudential restrictions on funding sources (e.g. net stable funding ratio)

| — | Macro-prudential unweighted limit to less stable funding (e.g. loan-to-deposit ratio) |
| --- | --- |

—

Macro-prudential unweighted limit to less stable funding (e.g. loan-to-deposit ratio)

| — | Margin and haircut requirements |
| --- | --- |

—

Margin and haircut requirements

3.   Limit direct and indirect exposure concentration

| — | Large exposure restrictions |
| --- | --- |

—

Large exposure restrictions

| — | CCP clearing requirement |
| --- | --- |

—

CCP clearing requirement

4.   Limit the systemic impact of misaligned incentives with a view to reducing moral hazard

| — | SIFI capital surcharges |
| --- | --- |

—

SIFI capital surcharges

5.   Strengthen the resilience of financial infrastructures

| — | Margin and haircut requirements on CCP clearing |
| --- | --- |

—

Margin and haircut requirements on CCP clearing

| — | Increased disclosure |
| --- | --- |

—

Increased disclosure

| — | Structural systemic risk buffer |
| --- | --- |

—

Structural systemic risk buffer

The limited use of macro-prudential instruments impedes a robust quantitative analysis of their effectiveness and efficiency. Evidence gathered from experience at the national level is, on the whole, limited. However, the analysis of the transmission and practical application of instruments presented in Attachment 1 indicates that knowledge is more advanced in respect of some instruments (e.g. capital-based instruments, large exposures limits, LTV/LTI limits) than others (e.g. margin and haircut requirements, the CCP clearing requirement). The different transmission channels and application scope of instruments support possible complementarities. For instance, capital-based instruments (affecting asset prices) and LTV/LTI limits (curtailing the quantity of financial services) could be used in parallel to limit excessive credit growth. Large exposure restrictions and CCP clearing requirements could also be applied contemporaneously, as they aim to contain counterparty risk across different types of transactions. In addition to the instruments shown in Table 2, macro-prudential authorities should be involved in the design and implementation of recovery and resolution plans and deposit insurance schemes, given their implications for the sound functioning of the financial system. While some of the specific tools listed in Table 2 have been designed with the banking sector in mind, they could be applied to other sectors: Attachment 2 discusses the potential role of macro-prudential policy in insurance.

Finally, with regard to the legal base of the instruments, the upcoming Capital Requirements Regulation and Capital Requirements Directive (CRR/CRD IV) for banks and large investment firms are expected to provide the flexibility to tighten the calibration of some of the instruments presented in Table 2 under certain conditions. This is in line with the ESRB letter on the principles for macro-prudential policies in Union legislation on the banking sector (5). Instruments not enshrined in Union legislation (6) can be implemented at the national level if they have a proper legal base (7). Still, the absence of detailed rules at Union level does not mean that Member States will be completely free to impose national rules, as some principles of Union law, such as the prohibition of introducing restrictions on the free movement of capital, could pose limits to national discretion.

Attachment 1

Macro-prudential instruments analysed by the ESRB

This attachment provides a summary of insights into the macro-prudential instruments analysed by the ESRB, grouped according to the intermediate objectives. It summarises how each instrument is defined, how it works (i.e. what we know about the transmission mechanism), the types of indicators that, alongside expert judgement, could guide a decision to activate or deactivate it, and how it can complement other instruments. While the conceptual analysis is already at an advanced stage with respect to several instruments, experience in using most of these instruments in the Union is limited (even though some instruments, such as LTV/LTI limits, have been applied before). Further analysis of their potential impact, indicators and scope for complementarity will be crucial.

1.   Mitigate and prevent excessive credit growth and leverage

Countercyclical capital buffer (CCB)

The CCB is a capital add-on to the conservation buffer. The capital add-on can be raised or reduced in a countercyclical manner according to variations in systemic risk over time, in particular driven by the credit cycle. The purpose of the CCB is to protect the banking system against potential losses when excessive credit growth is associated with an increase in system-wide risk. The instrument has a direct effect on resilience: capital buffers will be built up during periods in which system-wide risks increase and can be used when those risks recede.

As a possible indirect effect, the CCB may help to counter the expansionary phase of the credit cycle by decreasing the supply of credit or increasing the cost of credit. The supply of credit can decline if banks increase capital ratios by decreasing risk-weighted assets. The cost of credit can rise due to a higher total cost of capital, which banks pass on to clients through higher lending rates. Both transmission channels can contribute to a decrease in credit volumes, which in turn helps to avoid the build-up of system-wide risk. Similarly, a release of the buffer may reduce the risk of the supply of credit being constrained by regulatory capital requirements when the credit cycle turns. Uncertainty regarding the indirect effect is higher than regarding the direct effect, and further research in this area is needed. The possible dampening of credit growth during the upturn of the credit cycle should be seen as a potential positive side-effect, rather than an objective of the CCB regime.

Policymakers setting the CCB may be guided in their judgment by the deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio from its long-term trend as well as other relevant indicators. The empirical discussion has so far mostly focused on the properties of the credit-to-GDP gap. The gap represents the deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio from its long-term trend, with a positive gap considered a proxy for excessive credit growth. Cross-country studies by the Bank for International Settlements underline the credit-to-GDP gap’s good historical performance in signalling financial crises. At the same time, experiences at the national level show that it has not always given the right signal for activating the buffer or performed consistently well in signalling the release phase. An ESRB expert group has been set up to provide additional guidance for setting the buffer, in particular by conducting further cross-country analysis of other possible indicators for the Union Member States.

The CCB is provided for in the draft CRD IV and thus has to be implemented in national law. The draft CCB regime allows flexibility for macro-prudential authorities in setting the buffer subject to principles and guidance on indicators (8) and provides for a level of reciprocity in doing so.

Sectoral capital requirements (including requirements for intra-financial system exposures)

Aggregate capital requirements such as the countercyclical capital buffer may be a relatively blunt instrument when dealing with exuberance in particular sectors. In such cases, sectoral capital requirements (9) may be a more targeted tool if systemic risk is not adequately captured by micro-prudential requirements. They may be applied by (a) scaling micro-prudential capital requirements associated with a particular sector or asset class by a multiplier or (b) applying a capital surcharge or add-on to a bank’s risk-weighted exposures to a particular sector or asset class. Risk weight floors could also be set.

The transmission mechanism is similar to that of the CCB, with two differences. First, an increase in capital requirements for a particular sector changes relative prices, thereby reducing lending (growth) to the targeted sector as the relative marginal funding costs for this sector would tend to rise. Second, banks might be more likely to reduce exposure than to raise equity if a sector has been singled out as particularly risky.

This instrument should be brought into play when systemic risk is seen to build up within a particular sector or asset class. One potential indicator of such a build-up could be credit data by sector, which could be calculated as sectoral credit-to-GDP gaps. Complementary data, such as mortgage volumes or real estate prices for the real estate sector, could also be significant for signalling the build-up of risk.

The draft CRR foresees the possibility to adjust capital requirements for residential and commercial property as well as intra-financial system exposures for macro-prudential or systemic risk reasons, subject to a procedure at Union level.

Macro-prudential leverage ratio

The leverage ratio is defined as the ratio of a bank’s equity to total (non-risk-adjusted) assets. To serve macro-prudential purposes, a leverage ratio requirement could be applied to all banks as an add-on and possibly also in a time varying manner. In particular, where macro-prudential risk-weighted capital requirements are applied in a time varying manner, the leverage ratio requirement could also be changed over time, to maintain its function as a backstop. As a macro-prudential instrument, the leverage ratio requirement has the advantage of being relatively simple and transparent.

The transmission mechanism for the leverage ratio requirement is similar to that of risk-weighted capital requirements. Where the leverage ratio is more restrictive than risk-weighted requirements, banks could raise equity, retain earnings or reduce assets to meet the higher requirements (10). The price of credit would be likely to increase, and the quantity of credit extended might decline (11).

The leverage ratio is sometimes considered an indicator of systemic risk. Indeed, a BCBS study found that the leverage ratio enabled banks that required public sector support during the recent financial crisis to be identified (12). In addition, other indicators, potentially also relevant for the countercyclical capital buffer, could be used to guide decisions on the leverage ratio.

Once it has been adopted as a detailed binding instrument after an observation period in accordance with the forthcoming CRR, the tightening of the leverage ratio requirement for macro-prudential purposes may be allowed subject to a procedure at Union level. Before its harmonisation across the Union, its use may be envisaged at the national level.

Loan-to-value (LTV) and loan-to-income/debt (service)-to-income (LTI) requirements

The LTV requirement is a limit on the value of a loan relative to the underlying collateral (e.g. residential property); the LTI requirement is a limit on debt servicing costs relative to disposable income. The reference point differs from the instruments discussed until now: it is the contract between the client and the financial institution, rather than the institution itself.

The macro-prudential purpose of LTV and LTI limits is to dampen the credit cycle and to increase the resilience of financial institutions. The effect on the amplitude of the credit cycle results from the mitigating impact of more stringent LTV ratios on the ‘financial accelerator’ mechanism: when a positive income shock leads to an increase in housing prices, the increase in borrowing is expected to be lower in countries with lower LTV ratios (13). Furthermore, lower LTV limits can increase the resilience of the banking system via a lower loss given default, while lower LTI limits can reduce the probability of default. LTV and LTI limits are generally seen as complementary instruments. Since income is more stable than housing prices, LTI limits may become more restrictive in times of rising housing prices. Although in practice LTV and LTI limits have typically been used as static limits, they can also be used in a time-varying way. Expectations may, however, play a destabilising role. If households expect a tightening in caps, they might rush to get loans with high LTV/LTI ratios.

Although LTV or LTI limits have been applied in several EU countries, they are not applied in a harmonised way across the Union. Given the lack of harmonised definitions or guidelines for these instruments at the Union level, a more thorough assessment by the ESRB could be useful with a view to providing guidance to macro-prudential authorities.

Complementarity

The CCB, sectoral capital requirements and leverage ratio requirement complement each other in their focus (ranging from broad to narrow), risk sensitivity and implementation (some addressing cyclical, others structural, manifestations of systemic risk). LTV/LTI limits are sometimes seen as substitutes to sectoral capital requirements for the housing market. They can, however, also be seen as complementary to capital-based tools for a number of reasons. First, while capital based tools may have an impact mainly on the supply of credit, LTV/LTI limits mainly affect the demand side (i.e. the banks’ loan customers). Second, if risk is not adequately captured, for example by sectoral capital requirements for the housing market, LTV/LTI limits can act as necessary backstops. Finally, the effectiveness of capital based instruments could be affected by the need for coordination between Member States; this is not the case for LTV/LTI, as their reference point is the contract between the client and the financial institution, rather than the institution itself. Therefore, they are less prone to regulatory arbitrage that shifts business abroad or to the shadow banking system (14).

2.   Mitigate and prevent excessive maturity mismatch and market illiquidity

Macro-prudential adjustment to liquidity ratio (e.g. liquidity coverage ratio — LCR) and macro-prudential restrictions on funding sources (e.g. net stable funding ratio — NSFR)

The LCR (ratio of high-quality liquid assets to total net cash outflows over the next 30 days) measures banks’ ability to withstand a short predefined period of liquidity stress and ensures that banks’ liquid assets can counterbalance a potential short stressed outflow of liquidity; its definition has been agreed on by the Basel committee. The NSFR (ratio of available to required amount of stable funding) seeks to put a floor on the amount of long-term funding banks hold against less liquid assets, but the Basel committee have yet to agree on a precise definition. Macro-prudential policy action could take the form of an add-on or other macro-prudential adjustment to the regulatory levels for both instruments; it could also be possible to target only specific groups of banks (e.g. systemically important banks) rather than the entire banking sector.

The primary intermediate objective of these instruments is to mitigate excessive maturity mismatch and funding risk (15). Moreover, they may increase the system’s resilience to excessive credit and leverage (16). Banks can meet these liquidity requirements by increasing funding maturity or investing in liquid assets (or both). To avoid pro-cyclicality, banks should be allowed to use their buffers in times of liquidity stress.

Indicators for tightening the requirements could include data on banks' balance sheets, economic indicators and market (equity, CDS) data. Indicators such as strong changes in interbank volumes and rates, use of ECB facilities, the use and availability of collateral and signals of bank runs (e.g. urgent withdrawals or payments) could help determine when relaxing limits may be appropriate (17). Some indicators may overlap with those related to time-varying capital-based tools.

The LCR and the NSFR are expected to be introduced as detailed binding requirements by the CRR only after respective observation periods. Before the harmonisation of the instruments at the Union level, Member States are expected to have the possibility to apply national liquidity requirements or prudential charges taking into account a number of considerations, including systemic liquidity risk. In addition, the draft Union legislation foresees the possibility to adjust liquidity instruments for macro-prudential purposes subject to a procedure at Union level.

Macro-prudential unweighted limit to less stable funding (e.g. loan-to-deposit ratio)

In some countries, an unweighted liquidity limit to less stable funding such as the loan-to-deposit (LTD) ratio has been applied with a view to limiting excessive dependence on less stable funding sources. Customer deposits are generally seen as a stable source of funding, meaning that the LTD ratio (or extended versions of it) can be used to limit excessive structural dependence on less stable market funding. However, the instrument does not take into account the maturity structure of market funding, and its impact varies across banks with different business models. Core funding ratios or wholesale funding ratios are related measures.

The LTD requirement can be met by either reducing lending or increasing deposits. The experience of the last crisis has shown that in a downturn deposits gain relative to loans in some cases, as the former remain stable or even increase (due to shifts from other types of savings) while the demand for the latter decreases due to a decline in economic activity. Thus, the LTD ratio may follow the cycle, making a related requirement restrictive in booms and non-restrictive in downturns. There may be incentives for regulatory arbitrage if loans and deposits are not properly defined; banks may set up new financing structures with debt securities to avoid inclusion in the numerator.

Where necessary, the LTD ratio can be used to address excessive leverage or credit (as signalled by the credit-to-GDP ratio or its development) and enhance the structural liquidity position of banks.

Margin and haircut requirements

Haircuts and initial margins determine the level of collateralisation in secured financing and derivatives transactions. Broadly speaking, in secured financing transactions the level of collateralisation is determined by the haircut applied to securities received as collateral. In derivatives transactions, the level of collateralisation depends primarily on the initial margin requirement (which protects a market participant against potential changes in the value of their position, in the event that their counterparty defaults), as well as on the haircut applied to securities posted to meet that requirement. Haircuts and margins imposed by supervisory authorities can curb financing booms and dampen the contraction of secured funding in downturns (i.e. reduce the pro-cyclicality of market liquidity, potentially mitigating liquidity hoarding and fire sales). They can also help to limit excessive credit growth and leverage.

Employing a through-the-cycle approach (using long historical data sets that include stressed and stable market conditions) will mean that margins and haircuts are less dependent on current market conditions. This can be complemented by a discretionary countercyclical add-on to regulate secured funding when necessary, ensuring a more realistic pricing of risks and a reduction of exuberance. However, a tightening of requirements, particularly at the height of the financial cycle, can destabilise markets as this imposes strains on funding. As a result, asset prices may fall, which increases haircuts and margins and can lead to a downward spiral (18).

Current legislation does not provide a role for macro-prudential authorities in this area. For over-the-counter derivatives, this might be considered in the first review of the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR). Further, margins and haircuts, being instruments that target market transactions, would be subject to regulatory arbitrage and would benefit from global application.

Complementarity

Possible complementarities can be envisaged between the LCR, NSFR and LTD requirements, owing largely to differences in their maturity, scope and risk sensitivity. The liquidity instruments can also complement solvency instruments such as the CCB in reducing leverage and increasing resilience. Furthermore, margin and haircut requirements complement the bank-specific measures (especially the NSFR and LTD) as they could have an impact on aggregate market liquidity and the stability of funding.

3.   Limit direct and indirect exposure concentrations

Large exposure restrictions

The CRD defines a large exposure as an ‘exposure to a client or group of connected clients ... where its value is equal to or exceeds 10 % of its own funds’. Credit institutions and investment firms cannot incur an exposure of more than 25 % of their own funds (capital) to any one client or group of clients. The CRD also foresees discretion for Member States in handling certain types of exposures (e.g. to systemically relevant sectors) in view of their riskiness, which could provide scope for macro-prudential intervention. Large exposure restrictions can mitigate concentration risk, reduce counterparty risk and possible contagion (also to the shadow banking sector) (19). They also limit the sensitivity of financial institutions to common or sectoral shocks.

By setting limits on exposures to specific counterparties or sectors (e.g. real estate or other financial institutions), the large exposure restriction directly promotes the distribution of risk through the system (20). It also improves the depth of the interbank market and diversifies funding for financial and non-financial institutions. Moreover, exposure limits reduce the potential impact of a single counterparty default. As with most macro-prudential instruments, pro-cyclicality can arise: an increase in capital during booms can increase the exposure limit, while a capital reduction during downturns can make the limit more restrictive. Moreover, the restriction can inhibit growth or prevent institutions from taking advantage of expertise in certain sectors.

Under the CRD, financial institutions are required to report exposures exceeding 10 % of capital. Network analysis can use this information to determine whether macro-prudential restrictions are appropriate. If necessary, the reporting threshold can be lowered to incorporate systemically relevant global institutions with a large capital base. The draft CRR foresees the possibility of tightening large exposure requirements at the national level for macro-prudential purposes subject to a procedure at Union level.

CCP clearing requirement

Regulators can require certain transactions by financial institutions to be cleared through central counterparties (CCPs). Replacing a network of bilateral exposures with a structure in which each participant has a single exposure towards the CCP can redistribute counterparty risk and centralise risk control and default management. This can help contain spillovers and maintain market stability in the interbank market.

However, this measure also involves transaction costs and raises the potential for regulatory arbitrage, for example by moving towards transactions that are not subject to CCP clearing. Furthermore, the systemic importance of CCPs increases, since they concentrate counterparty risk, which may lead to excessive market power, moral hazard or systemic risk (from defaults) (21). Moreover, the risk management and risk absorption capacity of CCPs are largely untested, especially at the possibly much higher transaction level. Strict regulation of CCPs will therefore be required, including on the development of suitable resolution and recovery plans for CCPs. The selection of products requiring CCP clearing must also be made with care.

Suitable selection indicators to decide which contracts should be subject to the CCP clearing requirement include standardisation, liquidity, complexity and risk characteristics, as well as the potential reduction of systemic risk and the possibility of international harmonisation.

There are global efforts under way to mandate central clearing of standardised over-the-counter derivatives; in the Union, this will be introduced under EMIR. Still, further research on the effects of its implementation is needed before it can be included in the macro-prudential toolkit. Moreover, to be effective the requirement must be implemented on a Union-wide, if not global, basis.

Complementarity

The two aforementioned measures are complementary, as they can mitigate the systemic effects of counterparty risk across different types of transactions. While the large exposure restriction reduces the concentration of risk in one counterparty or sector, the CCP clearing requirement reduces the propagation of counterparty defaults by managing the risk in one place where it can be contained. Tightening large exposures restrictions can also work alongside sectoral capital requirements or LTV limits and structural buffers to strengthen financial structure. Finally, central clearing should be supplemented with margin and haircut requirements for CCPs to make them resilient to counterparty risk; these should be aligned with the requirements for non-centrally cleared transactions.

4.   Limit the systemic impact of misaligned incentives with a view to reducing moral hazard

SIFI capital surcharges

Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) could be subject to an additional capital buffer requirement. The objective of the surcharge is to enhance SIFI loss-absorption capacity. This reduces both the probability of stress events and their potential impact. The capital buffer could be applied to systemically important banks, but could be extended to other systemically important institutions.

The buffer can also correct potential funding subsidies for SIFIs stemming from an implicit government guarantee. As such, a level playing field for small and medium-sized (non-systemic) banks is maintained and SIFIs are better equipped to withstand shocks. On the negative side, the surcharge can push activities into the shadow banking sector and make the SIFI status explicit, thus activating the implicit funding subsidy and distorting competition. Overall, the Macroeconomic Assessment Group has concluded that the financial stability benefits of the SIFI surcharge outweigh the economic costs (expressed as a temporary reduction in GDP).

The systemic nature of banks (and other institutions) is determined by comparing indicators in the following categories: size, interconnectedness, substitutability and complexity. For banks, the requirements are planned to be introduced in parallel with the Basel III capital conservation and countercyclical buffers. SIFI capital surcharges are expected to be introduced at Union level in some form in the forthcoming CRD IV.

Recovery and resolution regimes

Regulatory authorities need tools to prevent financial crises and mitigate their effects if they nevertheless arise. Prevention and mitigation require recovery plans (drawn up by banks) and resolution plans (drawn up by the authorities). Early intervention powers for authorities allow them to act to seek to prevent the failure of a bank should recovery actions taken by the latter prove insufficient. Resolution powers enable them to assume control of a failing bank if preventive measures taken by the bank or the authorities have failed. This regime, as proposed in the draft Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), aims to minimise the systemic impact of bank distress and failure by ensuring the continuity of banks’ functions, containing the impact of failures and minimising losses to taxpayers by allocating them to stakeholders (e.g. through bail-in or leaving them behind in an administration procedure whilst critical functions are transferred to a bridge bank or third-party purchaser). From a macro-prudential perspective, the BRRD helps minimise the systemic implications of exposure concentrations, improve understanding of connectedness and mitigate the impact of crisis externalities.

The transmission works through two main channels. First, it limits moral hazard in systemically important banks and the implicit subsidy they may enjoy by helping to ensure that creditors, rather than third parties such as national governments, bear losses in the event of a bank’s failure. Second, effective resolution mitigates the impact of direct or indirect spillovers from an individual bank’s failure (contagion). It can also bolster public confidence in financial institutions. The removal of implicit state guarantees could be expected to cause bank funding costs to rise and sovereign funding costs to fall, by roughly equal amounts. However, bank funding costs would be much more elevated if the only alternative to a government bailout were a disorderly and potentially prolonged and costly bankruptcy process. So, overall effective resolution regimes should help to improve access to credit by the real economy in the medium to long term.

Effectively dealing with banks that fail could be undermined by a lack of resolution powers and tools, insufficient credibility in applying them and too little temporary funding to provide the necessary liquidity to support resolution measures. These deficiencies should be taken into consideration and avoided in setting up resolution regimes.

Complementarity

The SIFI surcharge and resolution regimes complement each other in reducing implicit bailout subsidies, competitive distortions and the systemic impact of defaults. The surcharge can act as an ex ante complement to ex post resolution regimes (22). The SIFI surcharge should be seen as part of a package of capital charges including the capital conservation, countercyclical and structural buffers.

5.   Strengthen the resilience of financial infrastructure

Deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs)

In case of bank failure, a DGS acts as a safety net for bank account holders by reimbursing them up to a certain coverage amount. A DGS thus strengthens the resilience of financial infrastructures by helping to avoid bank runs and improving confidence in the financial system. It also safeguards the stability of payment systems, as deposits are an integral part of these.

Since bank deposits are guaranteed, depositors have fewer incentives to withdraw their deposits in case of bank distress; this avoids bank runs and their systemic implications. More generally, by acting as a safety net, DGSs improve the efficiency of the financial system by increasing confidence. The effectiveness of DGSs depends on their credibility, which is related to adequate funding arrangements. Ex ante funding of DGSs, based on bank risk, is countercyclical and can thus have direct macro-prudential stability effects (23).

When coverage is very high, unlimited or ill-defined, or when funding is not risk-based, adverse incentive effects can arise; depositors may not monitor banks closely, leading to moral hazard. Additionally, unfunded DGSs can require payments from banks in downturns, leading to negative pro-cyclical effects. Finally, a lack of cross-border coordination can lead to unwelcome competition among DGSs. It is thus important that the Union continue with its effort to harmonise the structure of DGSs, also in the context of the draft recast of the DGS directive proposed by the Commission. Macro-prudential authorities should closely follow and have a say in the design and implementation of DGSs, in particular with regard to coverage and funding arrangements.

Margin and haircut requirements on CCP clearing

As with bilaterally cleared trades, the margin and haircut requirements of centrally cleared trades can have systemic implications. When setting appropriate haircuts and initial margins, CCPs should take into account market liquidity, pro-cyclical effects and systemic risks. In particular, the look-back period (time horizon to calculate historical volatility) should be set to avoid excessive pro-cyclicality. This limits disruptive changes in margin requirements and establishes transparent and predictable procedures for adjusting the requirements. Furthermore, a CCP should limit dependence on commercial credit ratings in calculating margins and haircuts. Both these requirements are captured in the draft technical standards that support EMIR.

In applying these requirements, CCPs must remain flexible and responsible, balancing the need to self-protect with the desire to ensure systemic stability. As the role and systemic importance of CCPs in the financial system is likely to increase in the future, the appropriate regulation of CCPs will become more important, and this is recognised for micro-prudential purposes in EMIR. Although EMIR does not yet provide a role for macro-prudential authorities in setting CCP margin requirements, this can be reconsidered during the first scheduled reviews.

Increased disclosure

Alongside disclosure for micro-prudential reasons, macro-prudential authorities could introduce additional disclosure requirements in view of structural or cyclical systemic risk. Transparency enables market forces to act as a disciplining mechanism on individual institutions’ behaviour and enables more accurate pricing of risk within the financial system. Disclosure also has the potential to limit the amplification of stress in the financial system by reducing uncertainty about the size and location of certain exposures and system interlinkages.

Where clearer information is disclosed, risk awareness can be promoted and market discipline can be enhanced. This enhances market confidence and safeguards financial stability, thereby avoiding market breakdowns such as that of the interbank market after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. On the other hand, macro- and micro-prudential disclosure requirements may not always be in line. An aggregate improvement in disclosure may, for instance, reveal ailing banks, leading to individual failures without systemic effects. In general, the available empirical evidence supports enhanced disclosure (24). In terms of legal implementation, the draft CRR foresees the possibility of enhancing disclosure requirements at the national level for macro-prudential purposes subject to a procedure at Union level.

Structural systemic risk buffer

The upcoming CRD IV is expected to introduce a systemic risk buffer to prevent and mitigate structural risk (hereafter ‘the structural buffer’), subject to a procedure at Union level. The structural buffer can be used to strengthen the resilience of the banking system, or its subsets, to possible shocks stemming from structural systemic risk. This risk can arise from changes in legislation or accounting standards, cyclical spillovers from the real economy, a large financial system relative to GDP or financial innovation that increases complexity.

The structural buffer increases resilience through an increase in loss-absorption capacity. It shifts more downside risk to equity holders and increases solvency, thereby reducing the likelihood of structural risk materialising. Possible negative effects of the structural buffer include a loss of the cross-border level playing field, a decline in banks’ voluntary capital and leakages to the shadow banking system. However, higher structural buffers also restrict leverage and risk-taking.

It is difficult to pinpoint indicators for applying the structural buffer; the aforementioned structural vulnerabilities can serve as a guide. When experience in the application of the structural buffer has been gained, an analysis of its capacity to address structural risks should be carried out.

Complementarity

As the aforementioned measures aim to increase the overall resilience of financial infrastructure, they interact with many other instruments. For instance, DGSs could complement liquidity instruments by ensuring a stable deposit funding base. They could also complement the structural buffer (and other capital-based instruments) as they reduce the impact of failures. Margin and haircut requirements for CCPs and for non-centrally cleared transactions should be aligned to ensure a level-playing field. Moreover, margin and haircut requirements (for both CCPs and other transactions) could complement leverage ratios by reducing excessive leverage. As disclosure reduces information asymmetries, it has the potential to improve market confidence and increase market liquidity.

The effect of the structural buffer can interact with the effects of other capital-based instruments such as the countercyclical buffers. Coordination is therefore necessary in deciding on the appropriate aggregate level of the capital requirements.

Attachment 2

Intermediate objectives of macro-prudential policy in insurance

Macro-prudential considerations in the field of insurance are still at the inception stage. There are a number of reasons for this:

| — | most insurance companies emerged from the crisis relatively unscathed, |
| --- | --- |

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most insurance companies emerged from the crisis relatively unscathed,

| — | the low systemic risk of traditional insurance activities, which are characterised by a predominantly liability-driven investment strategy, a high degree of substitutability, and a low likelihood of runs, |
| --- | --- |

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the low systemic risk of traditional insurance activities, which are characterised by a predominantly liability-driven investment strategy, a high degree of substitutability, and a low likelihood of runs,

| — | the lack of an international standard for insurance supervision, although the introduction of the Solvency II framework will set a common standard for the Union. |
| --- | --- |

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the lack of an international standard for insurance supervision, although the introduction of the Solvency II framework will set a common standard for the Union.

Still, some insurance companies have expanded their operations to activities that are more likely to contribute to or amplify systemic risk. In particular, non-traditional insurance activities and non-insurance activities could result in correlated common exposures to the financial and business cycle. This is the case, for example, of credit default swaps (CDS) transactions for non-hedging purposes (25).

Non-traditional insurance activities could have wider implications for the financial system and the economy, as in the case of financial guarantees used to improve the rating of complex structured products prior to the crisis. Non-insurance activities (e.g. securities lending) and group structures (e.g. ‘bancassurance’) could also increase interconnectedness in the financial system. These types of activities are also perceived as having a higher systemic relevance by the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) which uses them to identify Global Systemically Important Insurers.

Imposing measures upon non-traditional insurance and non-insurance activities as defined by IAIS is challenging. This is because there is no clear-cut separation and the same activities are often classified differently by the supervisors (e.g. third-party asset management). Therefore, a ‘substance over form’ analysis is necessary to determine the risk of a specific product or service.

In addition to the abovementioned structural considerations, systemic risk in the insurance sector has a cyclical dimension, since insurers are important investors and may take on more or less risky assets. In the Union, the Solvency II framework introduces market-consistent valuation of insurers’ balance sheets. This entails marking the asset side to market, while valuing liabilities by discounting cash flows using risk-free interest rates. This leads to volatile balance sheets and capital levels for insurers that sell long term products. This has the potential of exacerbating pro-cyclical dynamics within the sector and across the financial system. During the upturn, exuberance in risky asset prices can expand market-consistent capital, relative to regulatory capital requirements, while contracting it in the downturn. This could generate capacity for excessive risk-taking in the upturn and pressure to dispose of risky assets in the downturn. Therefore, Solvency II currently contains countercyclical mechanisms, including the equity dampener for equity risks, the possibility of an extended recovery period, and the extrapolation of the risk-free interest-rate curve to a fixed ultimate forward rate. Moreover, discussions are taking place about the inclusion of the ‘countercyclical premium’ and ‘matching adjustments’, which both aim to correct capital levels taking excess volatility into account. Without careful design, some of these proposed mechanisms could give rise to unintended consequences for both insurers and the system as a whole. It is important that such mechanisms are transparent and induce, in upturns, the build-up of buffers which can be used in downturns.

Overall, it can be argued that the structural dimension of systemic risk mainly concerns non-traditional and non-insurance activities. These are the activities that are most likely to distribute risk across the financial system and, as such, can be framed in terms of the intermediate objectives and instruments set out in this document. To the extent that these activities constitute relevant criteria for identifying Systemically Important Insurers, they would fall under the intermediate objective of limiting the systemic impact of misaligned incentives with a view to reducing moral hazard. It should be noted, however, that this scenario has been less frequent in the case of insurers than in the case of banks. The structural dimension is also linked to the interconnectedness of insurance and other financial sector entities and the resulting potential for risk contagion. This falls under the intermediate objective of limiting direct and indirect exposure concentrations. Finally, the cyclical dimension is closely linked to endogenous risk taking and fire sales.

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(1)  ESRB/2011/03 (http://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/recommendations/2011/ESRB_2011_3.en.pdf).

(2)  The literature is far too extensive to be summarised here. See, for example, Brunnermeier, M., Crockett, A., Goodhart, C., Persaud, A. and Shin, H. (2009), ‘The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation’, Geneva Report on the World Economy 11, ICBM, Geneva and CEPR, London; Gorton, G. and He, P. (2008), ‘Bank Credit Cycles’, Review of Economic Studies 75(4), pp. 1181-1214, Blackwell Publishing; Bank of England (2009), ‘The Role of Macro-prudential Policy’, A Discussion Paper; Bank of England (2011), ‘Instruments of macroprudential policy’, A Discussion Paper; Hellwig, M. (1995), ‘Systemic aspects of risk management in banking and finance’, Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik, 131, pp. 723-737; Acharya, V. V. (2009), ‘A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation’, Journal of Financial Stability, 5(3), pp. 224-255; Hanson, S., Kashyap, A. and Stein, J. (2011), ‘A Macro-prudential Approach to Financial Regulation’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 25, pp. 3-28; Longworth, D. (2011), ‘A Survey of Macro-prudential Policy Issues’, Mimeo, Carleton University.

(3)  The oversight role of central banks is usually considered an integral element of their function in ensuring financial stability. Irrespective of institutional arrangements, the macro-prudential authority should work in close cooperation with the authority in charge of infrastructure oversight to achieve this intermediate objective.

(4)  The instruments are selected from a ‘long list’ of all potential instruments, on the basis of top-down ‘gap’ analysis and surveys among members of the ESRB Instruments Working Group, according to the above mentioned selection criteria.

(5)  ESRB, Principles for macro-prudential policies in EU legislation on the banking sector, 2 April 2012 (http://www.esrb.europa.eu/news/pr/2012/html/pr120402.en.html).

(6)  Some instruments not included in Table 2 are envisaged in EU legislation (e.g. the ban on short-selling).

(7)  An ESRB stocktake for instruments not enshrined in EU law indicates that: LTV limits are available in the national prudential framework of 16 Member States, but only 7 can use them for macro-prudential purposes; LTI limits are available in the national prudential framework of 12 Member States, but only 2 can use them for macro-prudential purposes; an unweighted liquidity ratio is available in the national prudential framework of 3 Member States and can also be used for macro-prudential purposes; recovery and resolution regimes/plans are available in the national prudential framework of 11 Member States, 8 of which can use them for macro-prudential purposes. In 6 Member States, some steps have been taken to implement such a regime. In 4 of these countries, recovery or resolution plans are expected to be available for macro-prudential purposes.

(8)  The principle of ‘constrained discretion’ involves ESRB guidance, setting a benchmark against a macro variable, communication and transparency.

(9)  Sectoral capital requirements cover both risk weights and the calibration of Internal Ratings Based models for specific sectors or asset classes.

(10)  See the discussion of the transmission mechanism for risk-weighted capital tools.

(11)  The reverse should hold for a loosening in requirements. Market pressures might, however, imply that banks cannot lower their leverage (or risk-weighted capital) ratios by the full amount, potentially reducing the effectiveness of the tools in a downturn.

(12)  See BCBS (2010), ‘Calibrating regulatory minimum capital requirements and capital buffers: a top-down approach’. In addition, a number of other studies have found that leverage is a powerful indicator of systemic risk — for example Barrell, Davis and Liadze (2010), ‘Calibrating Macro-prudential Policy’; Kato, Kobayashi and Sita (2010), ‘Calibrating the level of capital: the way we see it’; Adrian and Shin (2010), ‘Liquidity and Leverage’; and Papanikolaou and Wolff (2010), ‘Leverage and risk in US commercial banking in the light of the current financial crisis’.

(13)  Almeida, H., Campello, M. and Liu, C. (2006), ‘The financial accelerator: evidence from international housing markets’, Review of Finance 10, pp. 1-32.

(14)  Still, LTV limits can be subject to their own forms of circumventing, by resorting to uncollateralised loans. Insofar as banks have discretion to judge the value of the collateral (e.g. when part of the loan is used for improving the quality of the house) they might have incentives to give more optimistic valuations in order to mitigate the impact of a limitation in the LTV.

(15)  Evidence on the effectiveness of liquidity-based macro-prudential instruments is scarce. A few papers show that a countercyclical application of LCR or NSFR is beneficial in dealing with liquidity stress. See, for example, Giordana and Schumacher, ‘The impact of the Basel III liquidity regulations on the bank lending channel: A Luxembourg case study’, Working Paper No 61, June 2011; Bloor, Craigie and Munro, ‘The macroeconomic effects of a stable funding requirement’, Reserve Bank of New Zealand Discussion Paper Series DP 2012/05, August 2012; or Van den End and Kruidhof, ‘Modelling the liquidity ratio as a macro-prudential instrument’, DNB Working Paper No 342, April 2012.

(16)  See CGFS Working group on the Selection and Application of Macro-prudential instruments (SAM), ‘Transmission Mechanisms of Macro-prudential Instruments’, interim report by Workstream 4, March 2012.

(17)  Heijmans and Heuver, ‘Is this bank ill? The diagnosis of doctor Target 2’, DNB Working Paper No 316, August 2011.

(18)  See, for example, Brunnermeier, M. and Pedersen, L. (2009), ‘Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity’, Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, Vol. 22(6), pp. 2201-2238, and Gorton, G. and Metrick, A. (2012), ‘Securitized banking and the run on repo’, Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Vol. 104(3), pp. 425-451.

(19)  Specific empirical evidence is scarce, but historical experience shows that concentration in certain sectors (often real estate) is at the epicentre of financial instability.

(20)  Note that exposures to sovereign debt are currently exempted from large exposures restrictions.

(21)  For more discussion of these adverse effects see, for example, Pirrong, C. (2011), ‘The economics of central clearing: theory and practice’, International Swaps and Derivatives Association Discussion Paper No 1 and Singh, M. (2011), ‘Making OTC Derivatives Safe — A Fresh Look’, IMF Working Paper 11/66.

(22)  See, for example, Claessens, Herring and Schoenmaker (2010), ‘A Safer World Financial System: Improving the Resolution of Systemic Institutions’, Geneva Reports on the World Economy (London, UK: CEPR), and Claessens et al., ‘Crisis Management and Resolution: Early Lessons from the Financial Crisis’, IMF Staff Discussion Note 11/05, March 9, 2011.

(23)  See, for example, Acharya, Santos and Yorulmazer: ‘Systemic Risk and Deposit Insurance Premiums’, FRBNY Economic Policy Review, August 2010.

(24)  Hirtle, B. (2007), ‘Public disclosure, risk, and performance at bank holding companies’, Staff Report No 293, Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Goldstein, M. A., Hotchkiss, E. S., Sirri, E. R. (2007), ‘Transparency and liquidity: A controlled experiment on corporate bonds’, The Review of Financial Studies 20(2), 235-273; Botosan, C. A. (1997), ‘Disclosure Level and the Cost of Equity Capital’, The Accounting Review, Vol. 72, No 3, pp. 323-349.

(25)  International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), 2011, ‘Insurance and Financial Stability’.

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II Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

| 15.6.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 170/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.6.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 170/20

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.6915 — OJSC Unimilk Company/NDL International/JV)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2013/C 170/02

On 3 June 2013, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32013M6915. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32013M6915. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law.

---

| 15.6.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 170/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.6.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 170/20

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.6909 — Qatar Investment Authority/Kingdom Holding Company/FRHI Holdings)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2013/C 170/03

On 6 June 2013, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32013M6909. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32013M6909. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law.

---

| 15.6.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 170/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.6.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 170/21

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.6889 — Sogecap/Cardif/Ensemble Immobilier Clichy-la-Garenne)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2013/C 170/04

On 13 May 2013, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in French and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32013M6889. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32013M6889. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law.

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IV Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

| 15.6.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 170/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.6.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 170/22

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Euro exchange rates (1)

14 June 2013

2013/C 170/05

1 euro =

| | Currency | Exchange rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US dollar | 1,3303 |
| JPY | Japanese yen | 126,37 |
| DKK | Danish krone | 7,4582 |
| GBP | Pound sterling | 0,85150 |
| SEK | Swedish krona | 8,6096 |
| CHF | Swiss franc | 1,2322 |
| ISK | Iceland króna | |
| NOK | Norwegian krone | 7,6405 |
| BGN | Bulgarian lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Czech koruna | 25,718 |
| HUF | Hungarian forint | 291,41 |
| LTL | Lithuanian litas | 3,4528 |
| LVL | Latvian lats | 0,7017 |
| PLN | Polish zloty | 4,2347 |
| RON | Romanian leu | 4,4588 |
| TRY | Turkish lira | 2,4674 |
| AUD | Australian dollar | 1,3841 |
| CAD | Canadian dollar | 1,3524 |
| HKD | Hong Kong dollar | 10,3258 |
| NZD | New Zealand dollar | 1,6469 |
| SGD | Singapore dollar | 1,6638 |
| KRW | South Korean won | 1 498,62 |
| ZAR | South African rand | 13,2051 |
| CNY | Chinese yuan renminbi | 8,1558 |
| HRK | Croatian kuna | 7,4718 |
| IDR | Indonesian rupiah | 13 139,52 |
| MYR | Malaysian ringgit | 4,1445 |
| PHP | Philippine peso | 56,895 |
| RUB | Russian rouble | 42,2453 |
| THB | Thai baht | 40,681 |
| BRL | Brazilian real | 2,8302 |
| MXN | Mexican peso | 16,8411 |
| INR | Indian rupee | 76,5390 |

Currency

Exchange rate

USD

US dollar

1,3303

JPY

Japanese yen

126,37

DKK

Danish krone

7,4582

GBP

Pound sterling

0,85150

SEK

Swedish krona

8,6096

CHF

Swiss franc

1,2322

ISK

Iceland króna

NOK

Norwegian krone

7,6405

BGN

Bulgarian lev

1,9558

CZK

Czech koruna

25,718

HUF

Hungarian forint

291,41

LTL

Lithuanian litas

3,4528

LVL

Latvian lats

0,7017

PLN

Polish zloty

4,2347

RON

Romanian leu

4,4588

TRY

Turkish lira

2,4674

AUD

Australian dollar

1,3841

CAD

Canadian dollar

1,3524

HKD

Hong Kong dollar

10,3258

NZD

New Zealand dollar

1,6469

SGD

Singapore dollar

1,6638

KRW

South Korean won

1 498,62

ZAR

South African rand

13,2051

CNY

Chinese yuan renminbi

8,1558

HRK

Croatian kuna

7,4718

IDR

Indonesian rupiah

13 139,52

MYR

Malaysian ringgit

4,1445

PHP

Philippine peso

56,895

RUB

Russian rouble

42,2453

THB

Thai baht

40,681

BRL

Brazilian real

2,8302

MXN

Mexican peso

16,8411

INR

Indian rupee

76,5390

---

(1)  Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.

---

| 15.6.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 170/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.6.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 170/23

---

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION

of 14 June 2013

concerning the financing for the year 2013 of activities in the veterinary field related to the European Union's information policy and support of international organisations, to several measures necessary to ensure the application of the food and feed and the plant health legislation

2013/C 170/06

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 (1) on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Financial Regulation’) and in particular Article 84 thereof,

Having regard to Council Decision 2009/470/EC of 25 May 2009 on expenditure in the veterinary field (2) and in particular Articles 16, 19, 20, 21, 23 and 27 thereof,

Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC (3) and in particular Article 76(1) thereof,

Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules (4) and in particular, Article 66(1)(c) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | In accordance with Article 84 of the Financial Regulation and Article 94 of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1268/2012 of 29 October 2012 on the rules of application of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (5) (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules of Application’), the commitment of expenditure from the Union budget shall be preceded by a financing decision setting out the essential elements of the action involving expenditure and adopted by the institution or the authorities to which powers have been delegated by the institution. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

In accordance with Article 84 of the Financial Regulation and Article 94 of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1268/2012 of 29 October 2012 on the rules of application of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (5) (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules of Application’), the commitment of expenditure from the Union budget shall be preceded by a financing decision setting out the essential elements of the action involving expenditure and adopted by the institution or the authorities to which powers have been delegated by the institution.

| (2) | The Rules of Application identify the degree of detail considered sufficient to describe the framework of a financing decision. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The Rules of Application identify the degree of detail considered sufficient to describe the framework of a financing decision.

| (3) | In accordance with Article 128 of the Financial Regulation, an annual work programme must be adopted for grants. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

In accordance with Article 128 of the Financial Regulation, an annual work programme must be adopted for grants.

| (4) | It is necessary to lay down a work programme for the activities of the European Union in the veterinary field related to information policy, support of international organisations and computerisation of veterinary procedures. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

It is necessary to lay down a work programme for the activities of the European Union in the veterinary field related to information policy, support of international organisations and computerisation of veterinary procedures.

| (5) | As the work programme in the annexes is a sufficiently detailed framework in the meaning of Article 94 of the Rules of Application, the present decision constitutes a financing decision for the expenditure provided for in the work programme for grants and procurements. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

As the work programme in the annexes is a sufficiently detailed framework in the meaning of Article 94 of the Rules of Application, the present decision constitutes a financing decision for the expenditure provided for in the work programme for grants and procurements.

| (6) | Pursuant to Article 22 of Decision 2009/470/EC, the Union may undertake, or assist the Member States or international organisations in undertaking, the technical and scientific measures necessary for the development of Union veterinary legislation and for the development of veterinary education or training. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Pursuant to Article 22 of Decision 2009/470/EC, the Union may undertake, or assist the Member States or international organisations in undertaking, the technical and scientific measures necessary for the development of Union veterinary legislation and for the development of veterinary education or training.

| (7) | In accordance with Article 53d of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the General Budget of the European Communities (6), evidence has been obtained by the authorising officer that the international organisations, OIE and FAO, to be entrusted with the implementation of the Union budget by joint management, apply standards which offer guarantees equivalent to internationally accepted standards in their accounting, audit, internal control and procurement procedures. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

In accordance with Article 53d of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the General Budget of the European Communities (6), evidence has been obtained by the authorising officer that the international organisations, OIE and FAO, to be entrusted with the implementation of the Union budget by joint management, apply standards which offer guarantees equivalent to internationally accepted standards in their accounting, audit, internal control and procurement procedures.

| (8) | A joint EU-OIE project was completed on the study on listing and categorisation of priority animal diseases, including those transmissible to humans. Within the framework of this project, a tool was developed for disease categorisation and prioritisation. Currently, a financial contribution is needed for gathering of the information and adjustment of the tool to be used also for diseases of aquatic animals which is necessary for the listing of diseases under the new EU Animal Health Law. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

A joint EU-OIE project was completed on the study on listing and categorisation of priority animal diseases, including those transmissible to humans. Within the framework of this project, a tool was developed for disease categorisation and prioritisation. Currently, a financial contribution is needed for gathering of the information and adjustment of the tool to be used also for diseases of aquatic animals which is necessary for the listing of diseases under the new EU Animal Health Law.

| (9) | On 29 November 2003, the European Union and the United Nations signed a financial and administrative framework agreement, which provided the enabling environment for the Agreement between the Commission of the European Communities and the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, signed on 17 July 2003. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

On 29 November 2003, the European Union and the United Nations signed a financial and administrative framework agreement, which provided the enabling environment for the Agreement between the Commission of the European Communities and the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, signed on 17 July 2003.

| (10) | In accordance with Commission Decision 2009/492/EC of 22 June 2009 on a Community financial contribution towards Trust Fund 911100MTF/INT/003/EEC (7) to assist the campaign against foot-and-mouth disease outside the Community, the European Commission concluded on 1 September 2009 the Implementing Agreement MTF/INT/003/EEC on EC Funded Activities (2009-13) carried out by the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) European Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (EuFMD). The duration of the Agreement was 48 months. As outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease and, in some cases, severe epidemics continue to occur in third countries neighbouring the Member States which are liable to threaten the health status of susceptible livestock in Member States, it is appropriate to renew that Implementing Agreement and fix the Union contribution to the Trust Fund 911100MTF/INT/003/EEC. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

In accordance with Commission Decision 2009/492/EC of 22 June 2009 on a Community financial contribution towards Trust Fund 911100MTF/INT/003/EEC (7) to assist the campaign against foot-and-mouth disease outside the Community, the European Commission concluded on 1 September 2009 the Implementing Agreement MTF/INT/003/EEC on EC Funded Activities (2009-13) carried out by the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) European Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (EuFMD). The duration of the Agreement was 48 months. As outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease and, in some cases, severe epidemics continue to occur in third countries neighbouring the Member States which are liable to threaten the health status of susceptible livestock in Member States, it is appropriate to renew that Implementing Agreement and fix the Union contribution to the Trust Fund 911100MTF/INT/003/EEC.

| (11) | It is appropriate that that Union contribution be fixed at a maximum level of EUR 4 000 000 for a period of 24 months. The budget of the Trust Fund for 2013 should be made up of the final balance of its funds on 31 August 2013 and a Union contribution to bring the amount to an equivalent in USD of EUR 2 000 000. Subsequent expenditure should be replenished by annual transfers or by a schedule of payments specified in a new implementing agreement that is concluded on the basis of the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement for Union financing of United Nations’ programmes. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

It is appropriate that that Union contribution be fixed at a maximum level of EUR 4 000 000 for a period of 24 months. The budget of the Trust Fund for 2013 should be made up of the final balance of its funds on 31 August 2013 and a Union contribution to bring the amount to an equivalent in USD of EUR 2 000 000. Subsequent expenditure should be replenished by annual transfers or by a schedule of payments specified in a new implementing agreement that is concluded on the basis of the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement for Union financing of United Nations’ programmes.

| (12) | Article 19 paragraph (a)(i) of Decision 2009/470/EC provides that the Union shall make a financial contribution to the gathering and storing of all information relating to Union legislation in the field of animal health, animal welfare and food safety in products of animal origin. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Article 19 paragraph (a)(i) of Decision 2009/470/EC provides that the Union shall make a financial contribution to the gathering and storing of all information relating to Union legislation in the field of animal health, animal welfare and food safety in products of animal origin.

| (13) | A financial contribution is required to give access to an interactive database of veterinary legislation, to enable Member States to have access to relevant information of a veterinary nature on an annual basis. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

A financial contribution is required to give access to an interactive database of veterinary legislation, to enable Member States to have access to relevant information of a veterinary nature on an annual basis.

| (14) | Article 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (8) requires the Union and the Member States to pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals in formulating and implementing some of the Union's policies. Following the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee on the European Union Strategy for the protection and welfare of animals 2012-15 (9), it is appropriate to fund initiatives aiming at implementing this strategy. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

Article 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (8) requires the Union and the Member States to pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals in formulating and implementing some of the Union's policies. Following the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee on the European Union Strategy for the protection and welfare of animals 2012-15 (9), it is appropriate to fund initiatives aiming at implementing this strategy.

| (15) | Communication activities were put in place in previous years to promote animal health issues and the Animal Health Strategy principles to stakeholders, organisations and society as a whole. It is appropriate that these communication activities, including the horizontal ones, continue in 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Communication activities were put in place in previous years to promote animal health issues and the Animal Health Strategy principles to stakeholders, organisations and society as a whole. It is appropriate that these communication activities, including the horizontal ones, continue in 2013.

| (16) | Article 27 of Decision 2009/470/EC provides for Union financial contribution for the implementation of national eradication and surveillance programmes. According to that same Article, the Commission shall assess these programmes. A pre-assessment of these programmes submitted for 2014 shall be made by external experts. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Article 27 of Decision 2009/470/EC provides for Union financial contribution for the implementation of national eradication and surveillance programmes. According to that same Article, the Commission shall assess these programmes. A pre-assessment of these programmes submitted for 2014 shall be made by external experts.

| (17) | The fight against the trade of illegal and counterfeited plant protection products is necessary for the protection of human and animal health and of the environment. According to Article 76(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 the Commission may provide for the expenditures for activities contributing to the aims of the Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

The fight against the trade of illegal and counterfeited plant protection products is necessary for the protection of human and animal health and of the environment. According to Article 76(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 the Commission may provide for the expenditures for activities contributing to the aims of the Regulation.

| (18) | Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 lays down rules for the performance of official controls to verify compliance with rules aiming in particular at preventing, eliminating or reducing to acceptable levels risks to humans and animals, either directly or through the environment, guaranteeing fair practices in feed and food trade and protecting consumers interests, including feed and food labelling and other forms of consumer information. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 lays down rules for the performance of official controls to verify compliance with rules aiming in particular at preventing, eliminating or reducing to acceptable levels risks to humans and animals, either directly or through the environment, guaranteeing fair practices in feed and food trade and protecting consumers interests, including feed and food labelling and other forms of consumer information.

| (19) | According to Article 66(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004, the appropriations required for the financing of other measures necessary to ensure the application of this regulation shall be authorised each year within the framework of the budgetary procedure. The measures referred to in Article 66 include in particular the organisation of studies, the publication of information and the organisation of meetings and conferences. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

According to Article 66(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004, the appropriations required for the financing of other measures necessary to ensure the application of this regulation shall be authorised each year within the framework of the budgetary procedure. The measures referred to in Article 66 include in particular the organisation of studies, the publication of information and the organisation of meetings and conferences.

| (20) | A study questioned the validity of the CEN detection method EN 1785:2003. It is necessary to repeat it in order to verify the validity of the method. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

A study questioned the validity of the CEN detection method EN 1785:2003. It is necessary to repeat it in order to verify the validity of the method.

| (21) | The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is an organisation recognised worldwide for the experience on economic analysis and recommendations for policymakers. Therefore, in line with Article 134(1)(b) of the Rules of Application, the contract can for technical reasons only be awarded to OECD. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is an organisation recognised worldwide for the experience on economic analysis and recommendations for policymakers. Therefore, in line with Article 134(1)(b) of the Rules of Application, the contract can for technical reasons only be awarded to OECD.

| (22) | In a joint technical report published in 2009, ‘The bacterial challenge: time to react’, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) estimate the cost of antimicrobial resistance in humans to be annually EUR 1,5 billion. As follow-up to this estimation of EMA and ECDC, and to better demonstrate the impact of antimicrobial resistance, an appropriate economic analysis is needed by a recognised partner such as OECD to be used as support of the policy proposals. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

In a joint technical report published in 2009, ‘The bacterial challenge: time to react’, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) estimate the cost of antimicrobial resistance in humans to be annually EUR 1,5 billion. As follow-up to this estimation of EMA and ECDC, and to better demonstrate the impact of antimicrobial resistance, an appropriate economic analysis is needed by a recognised partner such as OECD to be used as support of the policy proposals.

| (23) | Communication on food and feed control cannot always be linked to a specific subject. Therefore, it is appropriate to foresee some resources to horizontal communication activities relating to it. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

Communication on food and feed control cannot always be linked to a specific subject. Therefore, it is appropriate to foresee some resources to horizontal communication activities relating to it.

| (24) | The Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) has an important role to help to maintain a high standard food safety system in the EU and in third countries exporting to the EU. The work of FVO can be seen as a key element of the EU food safety system and it is important that information related to inspection tasks is disseminated. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

The Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) has an important role to help to maintain a high standard food safety system in the EU and in third countries exporting to the EU. The work of FVO can be seen as a key element of the EU food safety system and it is important that information related to inspection tasks is disseminated.

| (25) | In 2012, the Commission commissioned a specific study to examine existing GMO-free labelling schemes in the EU, and to identify and analyse elements to be considered in the context of a possible EU harmonised approach on such labelling. The results of this study will be discussed with the Member States and stakeholders in 2013. Depending of the outcome of the study and of the follow up discussions, it may be deemed necessary to consider further harmonising this area. The Commission would therefore have to perform a comprehensive impact assessment of several harmonisation approaches, which would require in-depth analysis of the economic, social, trade, consumer and environment impacts. Appropriate financial means should be provisioned in view of the realisation of data collection and options appraisal work in support to this impact assessment. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

In 2012, the Commission commissioned a specific study to examine existing GMO-free labelling schemes in the EU, and to identify and analyse elements to be considered in the context of a possible EU harmonised approach on such labelling. The results of this study will be discussed with the Member States and stakeholders in 2013. Depending of the outcome of the study and of the follow up discussions, it may be deemed necessary to consider further harmonising this area. The Commission would therefore have to perform a comprehensive impact assessment of several harmonisation approaches, which would require in-depth analysis of the economic, social, trade, consumer and environment impacts. Appropriate financial means should be provisioned in view of the realisation of data collection and options appraisal work in support to this impact assessment.

| (26) | Regulation (EC) No 1333/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on food additives (10) and Regulation (EC) No 1334/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on flavourings and certain ingredients with flavouring properties for use in and on foods (11) require the adoption of a common methodology for gathering of information by the Member States on the consumption and use of food additives and flavourings in the EU. Such a common methodology is needed to assure that the use of these substances in the EU remains safe for the consumers. Monitoring should in the first place focus on the typical and the maximum use levels of additives and on the undesirable substances that are present in natural flavourings or in certain food ingredients. It will allow the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) to make reliable exposure assessments and the Commission to make effective and proportionate risk management measures. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Regulation (EC) No 1333/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on food additives (10) and Regulation (EC) No 1334/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on flavourings and certain ingredients with flavouring properties for use in and on foods (11) require the adoption of a common methodology for gathering of information by the Member States on the consumption and use of food additives and flavourings in the EU. Such a common methodology is needed to assure that the use of these substances in the EU remains safe for the consumers. Monitoring should in the first place focus on the typical and the maximum use levels of additives and on the undesirable substances that are present in natural flavourings or in certain food ingredients. It will allow the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) to make reliable exposure assessments and the Commission to make effective and proportionate risk management measures.

| (27) | The EU reference laboratories (EURL) should submit the working programme for 2014 by the end of September of this year. The Commission assesses these programmes. A pre-assessment of these programmes submitted for 2014 shall be made by external experts. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

The EU reference laboratories (EURL) should submit the working programme for 2014 by the end of September of this year. The Commission assesses these programmes. A pre-assessment of these programmes submitted for 2014 shall be made by external experts.

| (28) | The scope of Commission Regulation (EU) No 619/2011 laying down the methods of sampling and analysis for the official control of feed as regards presence of genetically modified material for which an authorisation procedure is pending or the authorisation of which has expired (12) covers the presence of non-authorised genetically modified (GM) material in feed only. That Regulation included a review clause requesting the Commission to monitor its application and its impact on the internal market as well as on feed, livestock and other operators and, if necessary, to bring forward proposals to review the measure. Initial data submitted by stakeholders and any new data should be collected, analysed and form the basis for the Commission to support an impact assessment of the present situation versus an extension of the scope to food. To support this study appropriate financial means should be provisioned. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

The scope of Commission Regulation (EU) No 619/2011 laying down the methods of sampling and analysis for the official control of feed as regards presence of genetically modified material for which an authorisation procedure is pending or the authorisation of which has expired (12) covers the presence of non-authorised genetically modified (GM) material in feed only. That Regulation included a review clause requesting the Commission to monitor its application and its impact on the internal market as well as on feed, livestock and other operators and, if necessary, to bring forward proposals to review the measure. Initial data submitted by stakeholders and any new data should be collected, analysed and form the basis for the Commission to support an impact assessment of the present situation versus an extension of the scope to food. To support this study appropriate financial means should be provisioned.

| (29) | This financing decision may also cover the payment of interest due for late payment on the basis of Articles 92 of the Financial Regulation and 111 of the Applicable Rules. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

This financing decision may also cover the payment of interest due for late payment on the basis of Articles 92 of the Financial Regulation and 111 of the Applicable Rules.

| (30) | For the application of this decision, it is appropriate to define the term ‘substantial change’ within the meaning of Article 94(4) of the Rules of Application. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

For the application of this decision, it is appropriate to define the term ‘substantial change’ within the meaning of Article 94(4) of the Rules of Application.

| (31) | The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health, |
| --- | --- |

(31)

The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

TITLE I

Work programme implementing Council Decision 2009/470/EC

Article 1

The annual work programme for the implementation of Articles 16, 19, 20, 21, 23 and 27 of Decision 2009/470/EC, as set out in Annex I, is hereby adopted.

Article 2

The maximum contribution authorised by this Title for the implementation of the programme is set at EUR 6 764 700 to be financed from budget line 17 04 02 01 of the General Budget of the European Union for 2013.

Article 3

The budget implementation of tasks related to points I.2.1 and I.2.2 in the Annex I may be entrusted to the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), which apply standards offering guarantees equivalent to internationally accepted standards in their accounting, audit, internal control and procurement procedures.

TITLE II

Work programme implementing phytosanitary legislation

Article 4

The annual work programme for the implementation of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 set out in the Annex II is hereby adopted.

Article 5

The maximum contribution authorised by this Title for the implementation of the programme is set at EUR 100 000 to be financed from budget line 17 04 04 01 of the General Budget of the European Union for 2013.

TITLE III

Work programme implementing Regulation (EC) No 882/2004

Article 6

The annual work programme for the implementation of Article 66(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004, as set out in the Annex III, is hereby adopted.

Article 7

The maximum contribution authorised by this Title for the implementation of the programme is set at EUR 888 582 to be financed from budget line 17 04 07 01 of the General Budget of the European Union for 2013.

TITLE IV

General provisions

Article 8

The work programmes mentioned in Titles I, II and III constitute financing decisions in the meaning of Article 84 of the Financial Regulation.

Article 9

1.   The authorising officer may adopt any changes to each Title which are not considered substantial within the meaning of Article 94(4) of the Rules of Application, in accordance with the principles of sound financial management and of proportionality.

2.   Cumulative changes of the allocations to the actions within each work programme not exceeding 10 % of the maximum contribution provided for in Articles 2, 5 and 7 of this Decision shall not be considered to be substantial within the meaning of Article 94(4) of the Rules of Application, provided that they do not significantly affect the nature and objective of the work programmes.

Article 10

The appropriations mentioned in Articles 2, 5 and 7 may also cover interest due for late payment.

Article 11

This Decision is addressed to the authorising officers by delegation.

Done at Brussels, 14 June 2013.

For the Commission

Tonio BORG

Member of the Commission

---

(1)  OJ L 298, 26.10.2012, p. 1.

1

(2)  OJ L 155, 18.6.2009, p. 30.

2

(3)  OJ L 309, 24.11.2009, p. 1.

3

(4)  OJ L 165, 30.4.2004, p. 1; as corrected by OJ L 191, 28.5.2004, p. 1.

4

(5)  OJ L 362, 31.12.2012, p. 1.

5

(6)  OJ L 248, 16.9.2002, p. 1.

6

(7)  OJ L 164, 26.6.2009, p. 64.

7

(8)  OJ C 83, 30.3.2010, p. 47.

8

(9)  COM(2012) 6 final.

9

(10)  OJ L 354, 31.12.2008, p. 16.

10

(11)  OJ L 354, 31.12.2008, p. 34.

11

(12)  OJ L 166, 25.6.2011, p. 9.

12

---

ANNEX I

Council Decision 2009/470/EC of 25 May 2009 on expenditure in the veterinary field, and in particular Articles 16, 19, 20, 21, 23 and 27 thereof — Work Programme for 2013

I.1.   INTRODUCTION

This programme contains 7 main topics for the year 2013. On the basis of the objectives given in Decision 2009/470/EC of 25 May 2009, the distribution of the budget and the main actions are the following:

| (a) | for expenditure implemented in joint management (point I.2):






  (i) | up to a maximum of EUR 540 000 to OIE (point I.2.1) for the organisation of:






  — | global conference on biosecurity; |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

(a)

for expenditure implemented in joint management (point I.2):

(i)

up to a maximum of EUR 540 000 to OIE (point I.2.1) for the organisation of:

—

global conference on biosecurity;

| — | regional seminars on wildlife, animal disease notification and animal production safety and |
| --- | --- |

—

regional seminars on wildlife, animal disease notification and animal production safety and

| — | regional meetings/conferences on animal welfare, on foot-and-mouth disease progressive control pathway and on the joint permanent committee of the Mediterranean animal health network and on aquatic animal health; |
| --- | --- |

—

regional meetings/conferences on animal welfare, on foot-and-mouth disease progressive control pathway and on the joint permanent committee of the Mediterranean animal health network and on aquatic animal health;

| (ii) | up to a maximum of EUR 4 000 000 to FAO (point I.2.2) for assisting the campaign against foot-and-mouth disease outside the Union; |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

up to a maximum of EUR 4 000 000 to FAO (point I.2.2) for assisting the campaign against foot-and-mouth disease outside the Union;

| (b) | for procurement (implemented in direct centralised management) (point I.3):






  (i) | Use of call for tender on a contribution to enable access to a database of veterinary legislation for administrators in Member States: EUR 150 000 (point I.3.1); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(b)

for procurement (implemented in direct centralised management) (point I.3):

(i)

Use of call for tender on a contribution to enable access to a database of veterinary legislation for administrators in Member States: EUR 150 000 (point I.3.1);

| (ii) | Contribution towards horizontal communication related to animal health activities: EUR 112 700 (point I.3.2); |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

Contribution towards horizontal communication related to animal health activities: EUR 112 700 (point I.3.2);

| (iii) | Events to support on-going policy on animal welfare and maintenance of existing communication tools: EUR 782 000 (point I.3.3.); |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

Events to support on-going policy on animal welfare and maintenance of existing communication tools: EUR 782 000 (point I.3.3.);

| (iv) | Publications and dissemination of information to promote animal health issues, the animal health strategy principles and animal welfare EUR 1 030 000 (point I.3.4.); |
| --- | --- |

(iv)

Publications and dissemination of information to promote animal health issues, the animal health strategy principles and animal welfare EUR 1 030 000 (point I.3.4.);

| (v) | External pre-assessment of the eradication/surveillance programmes for 2013: EUR 150 000 (point I.3.5). |
| --- | --- |

(v)

External pre-assessment of the eradication/surveillance programmes for 2013: EUR 150 000 (point I.3.5).

I.2.   ACTION UNDER JOINT MANAGEMENT

I.2.1.   THE WORLD ORGANISATION FOR ANIMAL HEALTH (OIE)

Global conference on biosecurity, regional seminars for OIE Focal Points of Europe for wildlife, for animal disease notification and for animal production food safety; regional meetings of the Steering Group of the Animal Welfare Platform for Europe; regional conference on the implementation of the FMD progressive control pathway in Central Asia; regional meetings of the Joint Permanent Committee of the Mediterranean Animal Health Network (REMESA); adjustment of the disease categorisation and prioritisation tool within the OIE study and listing and categorisation of priority animal diseases, including those transmissible to humans, for it to be used also for diseases of aquatic animals.

LEGAL BASIS

Article 23 of Decision 2009/470/EC

BUDGETARY LINE

17 04 02 01

INDICATIVE NUMBER AND TYPE OF AGREEMENT ENVISAGED

One contribution agreement for 2013-2014

IMPLEMENTING ENTITY

The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) is an intergovernmental organisation responsible for improving animal health worldwide. The OIE also issues animal health standards for the international trade on live animals and their products that are recognised by the World Trade Organisation as reference international sanitary rules.

In order to:

| — | improve the animal health worldwide and consequently lower the animal disease risk in the EU, |
| --- | --- |

—

improve the animal health worldwide and consequently lower the animal disease risk in the EU,

| — | promote the Union’s animal health and welfare policy and standards and |
| --- | --- |

—

promote the Union’s animal health and welfare policy and standards and

| — | facilitate in this way EU exports, |
| --- | --- |

—

facilitate in this way EU exports,

it is important that the EU approach to animal health and welfare is shared with all member countries of the OIE and that the EU actively supports conferences and training seminars organised by the OIE.

The Commission and the OIE have signed on June 7, 2010 a long-term Framework Agreement laying down the administrative and financial arrangements for their cooperation (here attached), whereby the ‘European Union Contribution Agreement with an International Organisation’ (the ‘Standard Contribution Agreement’ or ‘SCA’) applies to global, regional or national programmes and actions administered by the OIE and financed or co-financed by the European Union.

A thorough and complete assessment of the OIE had been done previously, through a ‘four pillar assessment’ that established that the OIE applied, in its accounting, audit, control and procurement procedures, standards that offer guarantees equivalent to internationally accepted standards.

OBJECTIVES TO BE FULFILLED AND FORESEEN RESULTS

To share the EU approach to animal health and welfare and veterinary public health with all members of the OIE through the promotion of the Union’s policy and standards at the occasion of conferences and training seminars organised by the OIE. Eventually to improve the animal health, welfare and veterinary public health status worldwide, lower the risk in the EU and facilitate EU exports.

To complete the study on Listing and Categorisation of Priority Animal Diseases, including those transmissible to humans and to adjust the tool for disease categorisation and prioritisation developed within that framework, for it to be used also for diseases of aquatic animals. This completion is necessary for the listing of diseases under the new EU Animal Health Law. It will lead to a better prioritisation of EU actions and use of resources.

DESCRIPTION AND OBJECTIVES OF THE IMPLEMENTING MEASURE

An overview of the different actions to be financed under this point can be found below.

IMPLEMENTATION

Joint management

INDICATIVE TIMEFRAME FOR CONCLUSION OF THE CONTRIBUTION AGREEMENT

3rd quarter of 2013

MAXIMUM AMOUNT AND RATE OF THE CONTRIBUTION

EUR 540 000

Summary of the activities to be organised by the OIE in 2013-2014:

| — | one global conference on biosecurity (EUR 100 000), |
| --- | --- |

—

one global conference on biosecurity (EUR 100 000),

| — | six regional conferences/seminars (EUR 360 000) and |
| --- | --- |

—

six regional conferences/seminars (EUR 360 000) and

| — | one study on the disease categorisation (EUR 80 000). |
| --- | --- |

—

one study on the disease categorisation (EUR 80 000).

I.2.2.   FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS EuFMD TRUST FUND 911100MTF/INT/003/EEC AT FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANISATION (FAO)

The aim is to assist the campaign against foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outside the Union. To this end EuFMD has established a strategic plan for 2013-2017 comprising four pillars.

The first pillar aims at the improvement of readiness for FMD crisis management in member countries, including the development of a frame of European experts in FMD crisis management through real-time training, support for contingency planning, development of decision support tools for disease control managers and a programme for the development of an early warning and disease management system in the Balkan region.

The second pillar aims at the reduction of risks to member countries from the FMD situation in the European neighbourhood through the progressive control of FMD in neighbouring regions, mainly the areas bordering Turkey and Israel but also the countries in the North of Africa.

The third pillar aims at the promotion of the global strategy of progressive control of FMD through expert support to FAO and OIE agreed activities.

The fourth pillar includes a mechanism for emergency response to a FMD crisis in the European neighbourhood, which could include the supply of emergency vaccines to regions that represent a risk to member countries.

LEGAL BASIS

Article 16 of Decision 2009/470/EC

BUDGETARY LINE

17 04 02 01

INDICATIVE NUMBER AND TYPE OF THE CONTRIBUTION

One contribution agreement for 2013-2015 which will be implemented in the following way:

| 1. | The balance of Trust Fund 911100MTF/INT/003/EEC as at 31 August 2013. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The balance of Trust Fund 911100MTF/INT/003/EEC as at 31 August 2013.

| 2. | The financial contribution from the Union to the Trust Fund shall be set at a maximum of EUR 4 000 000 for a period of 24 months from 1 September 2013. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The financial contribution from the Union to the Trust Fund shall be set at a maximum of EUR 4 000 000 for a period of 24 months from 1 September 2013.

| 3. | The first instalment of the amount referred to in paragraph 2 for the year 2013 shall be made up of:






  (a) | the balance referred to in paragraph 1, |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

The first instalment of the amount referred to in paragraph 2 for the year 2013 shall be made up of:

(a)

the balance referred to in paragraph 1,

| (b) | a Union contribution of the amount necessary to bring the total amount of the Trust Fund to an equivalent in USD of EUR 2 000 000. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

a Union contribution of the amount necessary to bring the total amount of the Trust Fund to an equivalent in USD of EUR 2 000 000.

| 4. | Expenditure incurred by the Trust Fund from 1 September 2013 until 31 August 2015 shall be replenished by annual Union contributions payable in 2014 and 2015 respectively. However, the payment of those contributions shall be subject to the existence of available funds in the Union Budget. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Expenditure incurred by the Trust Fund from 1 September 2013 until 31 August 2015 shall be replenished by annual Union contributions payable in 2014 and 2015 respectively. However, the payment of those contributions shall be subject to the existence of available funds in the Union Budget.

| 5. | The annual Union contributions provided for in paragraph 4 shall be based on the financial report produced by the European Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (EuFMD) to either the annual Session of the Executive Committee or the biennial General Session of EuFMD, supported by detailed documentation in accordance with the rules of the FAO and the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement for Union funding of FAO activities. |
| --- | --- |

5.

The annual Union contributions provided for in paragraph 4 shall be based on the financial report produced by the European Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (EuFMD) to either the annual Session of the Executive Committee or the biennial General Session of EuFMD, supported by detailed documentation in accordance with the rules of the FAO and the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement for Union funding of FAO activities.

| 6. | An Implementing Agreement on the use and operation of the Trust Fund shall be concluded between the Commission and FAO for a period of 24 months, starting on 1 September 2013. |
| --- | --- |

6.

An Implementing Agreement on the use and operation of the Trust Fund shall be concluded between the Commission and FAO for a period of 24 months, starting on 1 September 2013.

| 7. | The Trust Fund shall be operated jointly by the European Commission and the EuFMD in accordance with the Implementing Agreement referred to in paragraph 6. |
| --- | --- |

7.

The Trust Fund shall be operated jointly by the European Commission and the EuFMD in accordance with the Implementing Agreement referred to in paragraph 6.

MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF THE RATE OF THE CONTRIBUTION

EUR 4 000 000

I.3.   PROCUREMENT

The global budgetary envelope reserved in 2013 for the procurement contracts amounts to EUR 2 224 700.

I.3.1.   AVAILABILITY OF VETERINARY LEGISLATION IN AN INTERACTIVE DATABASE TO THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF MEMBER STATES

LEGAL BASIS

Article 20 of Decision 2009/470/EC

BUDGETARY LINE

17 04 02 01

INDICATIVE NUMBER AND TYPE OF CONTRACTS ENVISAGED

One service contract

SUBJECT OF THE CONTRACTS ENVISAGED (IF POSSIBLE)

Veterinary legislation contains many elements where it is useful for Member State administrators to have this available in an interactive way. Such a database should be kept up to date within 24 hours of new legislation being published and contain the consolidated versions of the concerned legislation. It should also contain easy to use overviews of related data that are important for the day to day work of veterinary authorities in Member States.

The foreseen contribution will enable veterinary legislation and related data to be made available to administrators in Member States in an interactive and easily accessible way for the years 2014 and 2015.

IMPLEMENTATION

Direct centralised

INDICATIVE TIMEFRAME FOR LAUNCHING THE PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE

Third quarter of 2013

INDICATIVE AMOUNT OF THE CALL FOR TENDERS

EUR 150 000

I.3.2.   HORIZONTAL CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS COMMUNICATION RELATED TO ANIMAL HEALTH ACTIVITIES

LEGAL BASIS

Article 20 of Decision 2009/470/EC

BUDGETARY LINE

17 04 02 01

INDICATIVE NUMBER AND TYPE OF CONTRACTS ENVISAGED

Approximately 10 specific contracts using several framework contracts

SUBJECT OF THE CONTRACTS ENVISAGED (IF POSSIBLE)

Horizontal contribution towards communication related to animal health activities.

IMPLEMENTATION

Direct centralised

INDICATIVE TIMEFRAME FOR LAUNCHING THE PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE

Throughout 2013

INDICATIVE AMOUNT OF THE CALL FOR TENDERS

EUR 112 700

I.3.3.   EVENTS TO SUPPORT ONGOING POLICY ON ANIMAL WELFARE AND MAINTENANCE OF EXISTING COMMUNICATION TOOLS

LEGAL BASIS

Articles 20 and 23 of Decision 2009/470/EC

BUDGETARY LINE

17 04 02 01

INDICATIVE NUMBER AND TYPE OF CONTRACTS ENVISAGED

6 specific contracts using several framework contracts

SUBJECT OF THE CONTRACTS ENVISAGED (IF POSSIBLE)

| (a) | Production of written publications on animal welfare (EUR 30 000) |
| --- | --- |

(a)

Production of written publications on animal welfare (EUR 30 000)

| (b) | Activities to support education of children on animal welfare (EUR 162 000) |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Activities to support education of children on animal welfare (EUR 162 000)

| (c) | Organisation of 2 regional workshops for veterinary practitioners (EUR 120 000) |
| --- | --- |

(c)

Organisation of 2 regional workshops for veterinary practitioners (EUR 120 000)

| (d) | Study for the preparation of a report on the impact of animal welfare activities on the competitiveness of European livestock producers in a globalised world (EUR 100 000) |
| --- | --- |

(d)

Study for the preparation of a report on the impact of animal welfare activities on the competitiveness of European livestock producers in a globalised world (EUR 100 000)

| (e) | Study on the welfare of dogs and cats (including a workshop on trade) (EUR 200 000) |
| --- | --- |

(e)

Study on the welfare of dogs and cats (including a workshop on trade) (EUR 200 000)

| (f) | Organisation of a training for the data collection on broilers (EUR 170 000). |
| --- | --- |

(f)

Organisation of a training for the data collection on broilers (EUR 170 000).

IMPLEMENTATION

Direct centralised

INDICATIVE TIMEFRAME FOR LAUNCHING THE PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE

From second quarter onwards to third quarter of 2013

INDICATIVE AMOUNT OF THE CALL FOR TENDERS

EUR 782 000

I.3.4.   PUBLICATIONS AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION TO PROMOTE ANIMAL HEALTH ISSUES, THE ANIMAL HEALTH STRATEGY PRINCIPLES

LEGAL BASIS

Article 20 of Decision 2009/470/EC

BUDGETARY LINE

17 04 02 01

INDICATIVE NUMBER AND TYPE OF CONTRACTS ENVISAGED

Conclusion of at least 10 specific service contracts using a framework contract.

SUBJECT OF THE CONTRACTS ENVISAGED (IF POSSIBLE)

| (a) | veterinary conference in 2013 in Brussels on the new Animal Health Law in order to promote a modern, flexible and simplified legislative framework (EUR 100 000) |
| --- | --- |

(a)

veterinary conference in 2013 in Brussels on the new Animal Health Law in order to promote a modern, flexible and simplified legislative framework (EUR 100 000)

| (b) | veterinary student seminar in view of reinforcement of the farm-to-fork message (EUR 75 000) |
| --- | --- |

(b)

veterinary student seminar in view of reinforcement of the farm-to-fork message (EUR 75 000)

| (c) | participation to international events to promote the integrated approach to food safety ‘from farm to fork’ via 2 main fairs (EUR 300 000) and three smaller fairs (EUR 300 000). Participation to such fairs will aim at reaching some 2 million citizens with a view to make the added value and benefits of our policy for their daily lives known |
| --- | --- |

(c)

participation to international events to promote the integrated approach to food safety ‘from farm to fork’ via 2 main fairs (EUR 300 000) and three smaller fairs (EUR 300 000). Participation to such fairs will aim at reaching some 2 million citizens with a view to make the added value and benefits of our policy for their daily lives known

| (d) | support to various communication activities related to Trade Control and Expert System (TRACES), including website, annual report, leaflet and media event (EUR 55 000) |
| --- | --- |

(d)

support to various communication activities related to Trade Control and Expert System (TRACES), including website, annual report, leaflet and media event (EUR 55 000)

| (e) | production of publication and promotional material for animal health (EUR 200 000). They will serve to reinforce our messages about the benefits of animal health to citizens (as they relate to food safety, human health and the economy), and to support activities to promote these messages at a local level. |
| --- | --- |

(e)

production of publication and promotional material for animal health (EUR 200 000). They will serve to reinforce our messages about the benefits of animal health to citizens (as they relate to food safety, human health and the economy), and to support activities to promote these messages at a local level.

IMPLEMENTATION

Direct centralised

INDICATIVE TIMEFRAME FOR LAUNCHING THE PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE

Throughout 2013

INDICATIVE AMOUNT OF THE CALL FOR TENDERS

EUR 1 030 000

I.3.5.   EXTERNAL PRE-ASSESSMENT OF THE ERADICATION/SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMMES FOR 2014

LEGAL BASIS

Article 27 of Decision 2009/470/EC

BUDGETARY LINE

17 04 02 01

INDICATIVE NUMBER AND TYPE OF CONTRACTS ENVISAGED

Conclusion of at least 30 expert contracts with external experts to be selected via Appel à Manifestation d’Intérêt (A. M. I).

SUBJECT OF THE CONTRACTS ENVISAGED (IF POSSIBLE)

According to that Article 27 of Decision 2009/470/EC, the Commission shall assess the programmes submitted for 2014. Programmes can be submitted for 11 diseases. The aim is to look for a pre-assessment of these programmes by 2 external technical assistants per disease.

IMPLEMENTATION

Direct centralised

INDICATIVE TIMEFRAME FOR LAUNCHING THE PROCEDURE

June-July 2013

INDICATIVE AMOUNT OF THE ACTION

EUR 150 000

---

ANNEX II

Work programme for 2013

Pesticide legislation

II.1.   INTRODUCTION

This programme contains one implementing measure for the year 2013.

II.2.   PROCUREMENT

STUDY ON ILLEGAL AND COUNTERFEITED PESTICIDES PROVIDING AN EVALUATION OVERVIEW OF CONTROL ACTIVITIES BY MEMBER STATES’ AUTHORITIES AND INFORMATION ON THE TRADE OF ILLEGAL AND COUNTERFEITED PESTICIDES

LEGAL BASIS

Article 76(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009

BUDGETARY LINE

17 04 04 01

INDICATIVE NUMBER AND TYPE OF CONTRACTS ENVISAGED

One contract

SUBJECT OF THE CONTRACTS ENVISAGED (IF POSSIBLE)

| — | evaluate existing control measures performed by Member States’ authorities for plant protection products and active substances and other substances contained in plant protection products, |
| --- | --- |

—

evaluate existing control measures performed by Member States’ authorities for plant protection products and active substances and other substances contained in plant protection products,

| — | collect information on trade of counterfeited and illegal pesticides, and |
| --- | --- |

—

collect information on trade of counterfeited and illegal pesticides, and

| — | assess adequacy of the regulatory framework and of the measures and make suggestions for improvement/best practices. |
| --- | --- |

—

assess adequacy of the regulatory framework and of the measures and make suggestions for improvement/best practices.

IMPLEMENTATION

Direct centralised

INDICATIVE TIME FRAME FOR LAUNCHING THE PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE

3rd quarter of 2013

INDICATIVE AMOUNT OF THE CALL FOR TENDERS

EUR 100 000

---

ANNEX III

Work programme for 2013

Regulation (EC) No 882/2004

III.1.   INTRODUCTION

This programme contains three implementing measures for the year 2013. On the basis of Article 66(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 on Union financial support of measures necessary to ensure the application of the Regulation, the distribution of the budget and the main actions are the following:

For procurement:

| — | verification of the validity of CEN detection method EN 1785:2003 for food treated with ionising: EUR 60 000 (point III.2.1); |
| --- | --- |

—

verification of the validity of CEN detection method EN 1785:2003 for food treated with ionising: EUR 60 000 (point III.2.1);

| — | economic study on antimicrobial resistance, to be developed by OECD: EUR 50 000 (point III.2.2); |
| --- | --- |

—

economic study on antimicrobial resistance, to be developed by OECD: EUR 50 000 (point III.2.2);

| — | horizontal contribution towards communication related to food and feed control, notably for the update of relevant parts of websites, and design and creation of audiovisual and printed material: EUR 203 582 (point III.2.3); |
| --- | --- |

—

horizontal contribution towards communication related to food and feed control, notably for the update of relevant parts of websites, and design and creation of audiovisual and printed material: EUR 203 582 (point III.2.3);

| — | communication on FVO inspection tasks: EUR 150 000 (point III.2.4); |
| --- | --- |

—

communication on FVO inspection tasks: EUR 150 000 (point III.2.4);

| — | impact assessment on the need to set EU provisions concerning a voluntary GMO-free labelling scheme: EUR 100 000 (point III.2.5); |
| --- | --- |

—

impact assessment on the need to set EU provisions concerning a voluntary GMO-free labelling scheme: EUR 100 000 (point III.2.5);

| — | development of a common methodology for gathering of information by the Member States on the consumption and use of food additives and flavourings in the European Union: EUR 150 000 (point III.2.6); |
| --- | --- |

—

development of a common methodology for gathering of information by the Member States on the consumption and use of food additives and flavourings in the European Union: EUR 150 000 (point III.2.6);

| — | external pre-assessment of the programmes presented by the EU reference laboratories: EUR 75 000 (point III.2.7); |
| --- | --- |

—

external pre-assessment of the programmes presented by the EU reference laboratories: EUR 75 000 (point III.2.7);

| — | study to collect new and existing data for assessing the impact on the internal market as well as on feed, livestock and operators on the implementation of Commission Regulation (EU) No 619/2011: EUR 100 000 (point III.2.8). |
| --- | --- |

—

study to collect new and existing data for assessing the impact on the internal market as well as on feed, livestock and operators on the implementation of Commission Regulation (EU) No 619/2011: EUR 100 000 (point III.2.8).

III.2.   PROCUREMENT

The global budgetary envelope reserved in 2013 for the procurement contracts amounts to EUR 694 000.

III.2.1.   VERIFICATION OF THE VALIDITY OF CEN DETECTION METHOD EN 1785:2003 FOR FOOD TREATED WITH IONISING

LEGAL BASIS

Article 66(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004

BUDGETARY LINE

17 04 07 01

INDICATIVE NUMBER AND TYPE OF CONTRACTS ENVISAGED

One administrative arrangement

SUBJECT OF THE CONTRACTS ENVISAGED (IF POSSIBLE)

Tests by Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the robustness of the available methods to detect markers for irradiation

IMPLEMENTATION

Direct centralised

INDICATIVE TIME FRAME FOR LAUNCHING THE PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE

First half of 2013

INDICATIVE AMOUNT OF THE CALL FOR TENDERS

EUR 60 000

III.2.2.   ECONOMIC STUDY ON ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE, TO BE DEVELOPED BY OECD

LEGAL BASIS

Article 66(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004

BUDGETARY LINE

17 04 07 01

INDICATIVE NUMBER AND TYPE OF CONTRACTS ENVISAGED

One contract

SUBJECT OF THE CONTRACTS ENVISAGED (IF POSSIBLE)

The Commission's current policy initiative regarding antimicrobial resistance should be supported by economic analysis making evident the impact of antimicrobial resistance.

IMPLEMENTATION

Direct centralised

INDICATIVE TIME FRAME FOR LAUNCHING THE PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE

Second half of 2013

INDICATIVE AMOUNT OF THE CALL FOR TENDERS

EUR 50 000

III.2.3.   HORIZONTAL CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS COMMUNICATION RELATED TO FOOD AND FEED CONTROL, NOTABLY FOR THE UPDATE OF RELEVANT PARTS OF WEBSITES, AND DESIGN AND CREATION OF AUDIOVISUAL AND PRINTED MATERIAL

LEGAL BASIS

Article 66(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004

BUDGETARY LINE

17 04 07 01

INDICATIVE NUMBER AND TYPE OF CONTRACTS ENVISAGED

Approximately 10 service contracts using several framework contracts

SUBJECT OF THE CONTRACTS ENVISAGED (IF POSSIBLE)

Horizontal contribution towards communication related to food and feed control notably for the update of relevant parts of websites, and design and creation of audiovisual and printed material

IMPLEMENTATION

Direct centralised

INDICATIVE TIME FRAME FOR LAUNCHING THE PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE

Throughout the year 2013

INDICATIVE AMOUNT OF THE CALL FOR TENDERS

EUR 203 582

III.2.4.   COMMUNICATION ON FVO INSPECTION TASKS

LEGAL BASIS

Article 66(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004

BUDGETARY LINE

17 04 07 01

INDICATIVE NUMBER AND TYPE OF CONTRACTS ENVISAGED

Approximately five specific contracts using several framework contracts

SUBJECT OF THE CONTRACT ENVISAGED

Production of publication and promotional material linked to inspection activities

IMPLEMENTATION

Direct centralised

INDICATIVE TIME FRAME FOR LAUNCHING THE PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE

Spread all over 2013

INDICATIVE AMOUNT OF THE CALL FOR TENDERS

EUR 150 000

III.2.5.   IMPACT ASSESSMENT ON THE NEED TO SET EU PROVISIONS CONCERNING A VOLUNTARY GMO-FREE LABELLING SCHEME

LEGAL BASIS

Article 66(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004

BUDGETARY LINE

17 04 07 01

INDICATIVE NUMBER AND TYPE OF CONTRACTS ENVISAGED

One or several contracts, depending on the outcome of the ongoing study launched by the Commission

SUBJECT OF THE CONTRACTS ENVISAGED (IF POSSIBLE)

Data collection and option appraisal in support to the impact assessment of EU approaches for harmonisation at EU level of voluntary labelling rules on GMO-free schemes

IMPLEMENTATION

Direct centralised

INDICATIVE TIME FRAME FOR LAUNCHING THE PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE

Second half of 2013

INDICATIVE AMOUNT OF THE CALL FOR TENDERS

EUR 100 000

III.2.6.   DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMON METHODOLOGY FOR GATHERING OF INFORMATION BY THE MEMBER STATES ON THE CONSUMPTION AND USE OF FOOD ADDITIVES AND FLAVOURINGS IN THE EUOPEAN UNION

LEGAL BASIS

Article 29 of Regulation (EC) No 1333/2008 and Article 23 of Regulation (EC) No 1334/2008

BUDGETARY LINE

17 04 07 01

INDICATIVE NUMBER AND TYPE OF CONTRACTS ENVISAGED

One or several contracts

SUBJECT OF THE CONTRACTS ENVISAGED (IF POSSIBLE)

| — | Gathering of information on current monitoring systems of food additives and flavourings |
| --- | --- |

—

Gathering of information on current monitoring systems of food additives and flavourings

| — | Identify specific needs of the European Food Safety Authority |
| --- | --- |

—

Identify specific needs of the European Food Safety Authority

| — | Recommending guidelines for a EU wide approach on the monitoring of food additives and flavourings |
| --- | --- |

—

Recommending guidelines for a EU wide approach on the monitoring of food additives and flavourings

IMPLEMENTATION

Direct centralised

INDICATIVE TIME FRAME FOR LAUNCHING THE PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE

Second half of 2013

INDICATIVE AMOUNT OF THE CALL FOR TENDERS

EUR 150 000

III.2.7.   EXTERNAL PRE-ASSESSMENT OF THE PROGRAMMES FOR 2014 FROM THE EU REFERENCE LABORATORIES

LEGAL BASIS

Article 66(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004

BUDGETARY LINE

17 04 07 01

INDICATIVE NUMBER AND TYPE OF CONTRACTS ENVISAGED

Conclusion of at least 15 expert contracts with external experts to be selected via Appel à Manifestation d'Intérêt (A.M.I.)

SUBJECT OF THE CONTRACTS ENVISAGED (IF POSSIBLE)

The EURL's should submit the working programme for 2014 by the end of September 2013. The Commission shall assess these programmes. Programmes can be submitted for 44 topics. The aim is to look for a pre-assessment of some programmes by external experts.

IMPLEMENTATION

Direct centralised

INDICATIVE TIME FRAME FOR LAUNCHING THE PROCEDURE

Autumn 2013

INDICATIVE AMOUNT OF ACTION

EUR 75 000

III.2.8.   STUDY TO COLLECT NEW AND EXISTING DATA FOR ASSESSING THE IMPACT ON THE INTERNAL MARKET AS WELL AS ON FEED, LIVESTOCK AND OPERATORS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 619/2011.

LEGAL BASIS

Article 66(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004

BUDGETARY LINE

17 04 07 01

INDICATIVE NUMBER AND TYPE OF CONTRACTS ENVISAGED

Conclusion of one specific service contract

SUBJECT OF THE CONTRACT ENVISAGED (IF POSSIBLE)

Collection and analysis of data from all concerned stakeholders regarding the likely impact of the extension or non-extension of the scope of Regulation (EU) No 619/2011 to food, in preparation for an impact assessment

IMPLEMENTATION

Direct centralised

INDICATIVE TIME FRAME FOR LAUNCHING THE PROCEDURE

Autumn 2013

INDICATIVE AMOUNT OF ACTION

EUR 100 000

---

| 15.6.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 170/38 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.6.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 170/38

---

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION

of 10 June 2013

on financing the 2013 work programme on training in the field of food and feed safety, animal health, animal welfare and plant health in the framework of the ‘Better training for safer food’ programme

2013/C 170/07

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 (1) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Financial Regulation’), and in particular Article 84 thereof,

Having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1268/2012 of 29 October 2012 on the rules of application of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (2) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules of Application’), and in particular Article 94 thereof,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 58/2003 of 19 December 2002 laying down the statute for executive agencies to be entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Community programmes (3), and in particular Article 12(3) thereof,

Having regard to Council Directive 2000/29/EC of 8 May 2000 on protective measures against the introduction into the Community of organisms harmful to plants or plant products and against their spread within the Community (4), and in particular Article 2(1)(i) thereof,

Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules (5), and in particular Article 66(1)(b) and (c) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 lays down general rules for the performance of official controls to verify compliance with rules aiming, in particular, at preventing, eliminating or reducing to acceptable levels risks to humans and animals and guaranteeing fair practices in feed and food trade and protecting consumer interests. Article 51 of that Regulation provides that the Commission may organise training courses for the staff of the competent authorities of Member States responsible for the official controls referred to in that Regulation, which may be opened to participants from third countries, in particular developing countries. Those courses may include in particular training on Community feed and food law and animal health and animal welfare rules. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 lays down general rules for the performance of official controls to verify compliance with rules aiming, in particular, at preventing, eliminating or reducing to acceptable levels risks to humans and animals and guaranteeing fair practices in feed and food trade and protecting consumer interests. Article 51 of that Regulation provides that the Commission may organise training courses for the staff of the competent authorities of Member States responsible for the official controls referred to in that Regulation, which may be opened to participants from third countries, in particular developing countries. Those courses may include in particular training on Community feed and food law and animal health and animal welfare rules.

| (2) | Article 2(1)(i) of Directive 2000/29/EC on protective measures against the introduction into the Community of organisms harmful to plants or plant products and against their spread within the Community provides the legal instrument for organising courses in the field of plant health. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Article 2(1)(i) of Directive 2000/29/EC on protective measures against the introduction into the Community of organisms harmful to plants or plant products and against their spread within the Community provides the legal instrument for organising courses in the field of plant health.

| (3) | The ‘Better training for safer food’ programme has been established by the Commission in order to achieve the aims set out in Regulation (EC) No 882/2004. The Commission Communication of 20 September 2006 on ‘Better training for safer food’ (6) explores options for future organisation of training. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The ‘Better training for safer food’ programme has been established by the Commission in order to achieve the aims set out in Regulation (EC) No 882/2004. The Commission Communication of 20 September 2006 on ‘Better training for safer food’ (6) explores options for future organisation of training.

| (4) | The 2013 work programme on training in the field of food and feed safety, animal health, animal welfare and plant health for the implementation of ‘Better training for safer food’ programme in Member States should therefore be adopted. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The 2013 work programme on training in the field of food and feed safety, animal health, animal welfare and plant health for the implementation of ‘Better training for safer food’ programme in Member States should therefore be adopted.

| (5) | Commission Decision 2008/544/EC (7) of 20 June 2008 transformed the ‘Executive Agency for the Public Health Programme’ into the ‘Executive Agency for Health and Consumers’ (hereafter ‘the Agency’). Commission Decision C(2008) 4943 of 9 September 2008 delegated to the Agency certain management and programme implementation tasks pertaining to the food safety training measures performed pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 and Directive 2000/29/EC. A subsidy should therefore be granted to the Agency in 2013 for financing the operating costs of the activities related to the ‘Better training for safer food’ programme. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Commission Decision 2008/544/EC (7) of 20 June 2008 transformed the ‘Executive Agency for the Public Health Programme’ into the ‘Executive Agency for Health and Consumers’ (hereafter ‘the Agency’). Commission Decision C(2008) 4943 of 9 September 2008 delegated to the Agency certain management and programme implementation tasks pertaining to the food safety training measures performed pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 and Directive 2000/29/EC. A subsidy should therefore be granted to the Agency in 2013 for financing the operating costs of the activities related to the ‘Better training for safer food’ programme.

| (6) | In accordance with Article 84 of the Financial Regulation and Article 94(1) of the Rules of Application, the commitment of expenditure from the budget of the European Union shall be preceded by a financing decision setting out the essential elements of the action involving expenditure and adopted by the institution or the authorities to which powers have been delegated by the institution. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

In accordance with Article 84 of the Financial Regulation and Article 94(1) of the Rules of Application, the commitment of expenditure from the budget of the European Union shall be preceded by a financing decision setting out the essential elements of the action involving expenditure and adopted by the institution or the authorities to which powers have been delegated by the institution.

| (7) | The 2013 work programme being a sufficiently detailed framework, the present decision constitutes a financing decision within the meaning of Article 94(2) and (3) of the Rules of Application. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

The 2013 work programme being a sufficiently detailed framework, the present decision constitutes a financing decision within the meaning of Article 94(2) and (3) of the Rules of Application.

| (8) | For the application of this Decision, it is appropriate to define the term ‘substantial change’, within the meaning of Article 94(4) of the Rules of Application. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

For the application of this Decision, it is appropriate to define the term ‘substantial change’, within the meaning of Article 94(4) of the Rules of Application.

| (9) | Pursuant to Article 92 of the Financial Regulation, the validation, authorisation and payment of expenditure must be completed within the time limits laid down in the Rules of Application. Those rules are also to specify the circumstances in which creditors paid late are entitled to receive default interest charged to the line from which the principal was paid. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Pursuant to Article 92 of the Financial Regulation, the validation, authorisation and payment of expenditure must be completed within the time limits laid down in the Rules of Application. Those rules are also to specify the circumstances in which creditors paid late are entitled to receive default interest charged to the line from which the principal was paid.

| (10) | This Decision should therefore provide rules on the payment of default interest due for late payments related to actions included in the 2013 work programme, |
| --- | --- |

(10)

This Decision should therefore provide rules on the payment of default interest due for late payments related to actions included in the 2013 work programme,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1

The work programme for the implementation in 2013 of the ‘Better training for safer food’ programme as set out in the Annex is hereby adopted. It constitutes a financing decision in the meaning of Article 84 of the Financial Regulation.

Article 2

1.   The total amount of the financial contribution for the implementation of the work programme shall be EUR 16 170 000, to be financed from the following budget lines of the general budget of the European Union for 2013:

| (a) | budget line No 17 04 07 01: EUR 14 200 000; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

budget line No 17 04 07 01: EUR 14 200 000;

| (b) | budget line No 17 04 04 01: EUR 600 000; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

budget line No 17 04 04 01: EUR 600 000;

| (c) | budget line No 17 01 04 05: EUR 200 000; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

budget line No 17 01 04 05: EUR 200 000;

| (d) | budget line No 17 01 04 31: EUR 1 170 000. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

budget line No 17 01 04 31: EUR 1 170 000.

2.   The amount provided for in paragraph 1(d) shall be paid to the Executive Agency for Health and Consumers and shall constitute an operating subsidy.

3.   Default interest due for late payment may also be paid from the budget lines referred to in point 1(a) and (b), in accordance with Article 92 of the Financial Regulation.

Article 3

Cumulated changes of the allocations to the specific actions covered by the work programme not exceeding 20 % of the maximum financial contribution provided for in Article 2(1) shall not be considered to be substantial within the meaning of Article 94(4) of the Rules of Application, provided that they do not significantly affect the nature and objective of the work programme.

The authorising officer may adopt such changes in accordance with the principles of sound financial management and of proportionality.

Done at Brussels, 10 June 2013.

For the Commission

Tonio BORG

Member of the Commission

---

(1)  OJ L 298, 26.10.2012, p. 1.

1

(2)  OJ L 362, 31.12.2012, p. 1.

2

(3)  OJ L 11, 16.1.2003, p. 1.

3

(4)  OJ L 169, 10.7.2000, p. 1.

4

(5)  OJ L 165, 30.4.2004, p. 1.

5

(6)  COM(2006) 519 final of 20 September 2006.

6

(7)  OJ L 173, 3.7.2008, p. 27.

7

---

ANNEX

2013 work programme on training in the field of food and feed safety, animal health, animal welfare and plant health in the framework of the ‘Better training for safer food’ programme

1.1.   Introduction

This work programme contains three implementing measures for 2013. On the basis of the objectives laid down in Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 and Directive 2000/29/EC, the distribution of budget and the main actions are the following:

| 1.2.   Procurement (implemented in indirect centralised management) |
| --- |
| 1.2.1. | Training: external contracts for the execution of the training programme |

Procurement (implemented in indirect centralised management)

1.2.1.

Training: external contracts for the execution of the training programme

EUR 14 800 000

| 1.2.2. | Training: IT equipment, tools and support, promotional material, information and communication support and conferences |
| --- | --- |

1.2.2.

Training: IT equipment, tools and support, promotional material, information and communication support and conferences

EUR 200 000

| 1.3. | Other actions: operating subsidy for the Executive Agency for Health and Consumers |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

Other actions: operating subsidy for the Executive Agency for Health and Consumers

EUR 1 170 000

TOTAL

EUR 16 170 000

1.2.   Procurement

The global budgetary envelope reserved in 2013 for the procurement contracts amounts to EUR 15 000 000.

1.2.1.   Training: external contract for the execution of the training programme

LEGAL BASIS

Regulation (EC) No 882/2004, Article 51 and Article 66(1)(b)

Directive 2000/29/EC, Article 2(1)(i)

BUDGETARY LINE

Budget lines: 17 04 07 01 and 17 04 04 01

INDICATIVE NUMBER AND TYPE OF CONTRACTS ENVISAGED

For each of the technical issues referred to below, one or more direct or framework service contracts will be signed. It is estimated that around 15 direct or specific service contracts will be signed. External contractors are mainly involved in the organisational and logistical aspects of the training activities.

SUBJECT OF THE CONTRACTS ENVISAGED (IF POSSIBLE)

For 2013, the training action in Member States will concern the following subjects:

| Activities | Amount in EUR |
| --- | --- |
| HACCP | 1 930 000 |
| Animal health (bees and exotic animals) | 1 240 000 |
| Control of food additives | 1 085 000 |
| Control of residues of veterinary medicinal products | 855 000 |
| Risk assessment | 880 000 |
| Contingency planning and disease control | 1 090 000 |
| Control of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies | 515 000 |
| Surveillance in new and emerging plant health risks | 600 000 |
| Support to Union overview audits | 855 000 |
| Plant protection products (authorisation and sustainable use) | 1 165 000 |
| Food hygiene and controls at primary production | 975 000 |
| Food hygiene and flexibility | 1 165 000 |
| New food investigation techniques | 615 000 |
| RASFF | 600 000 |
| Control of semen and embryos production | 640 000 |
| Other animal health and welfare, plant health and food safety issues and studies, conferences, assistance, learning tools and assessments | 590 000 |
| TOTAL | 14 800 000 |

Activities

Amount in EUR

HACCP

1 930 000

Animal health (bees and exotic animals)

1 240 000

Control of food additives

1 085 000

Control of residues of veterinary medicinal products

855 000

Risk assessment

880 000

Contingency planning and disease control

1 090 000

Control of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies

515 000

Surveillance in new and emerging plant health risks

600 000

Support to Union overview audits

855 000

Plant protection products (authorisation and sustainable use)

1 165 000

Food hygiene and controls at primary production

975 000

Food hygiene and flexibility

1 165 000

New food investigation techniques

615 000

RASFF

600 000

Control of semen and embryos production

640 000

Other animal health and welfare, plant health and food safety issues and studies, conferences, assistance, learning tools and assessments

590 000

TOTAL

14 800 000

IMPLEMENTATION

EUR 14 620 000 (financing of food safety measures under Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 and Directive 2000/29/EC) will be managed and implemented by the Executive Agency for Health and Consumers (Commission Decision 2008/544/EC). The remaining EUR 180 000 will be used by the Commission to cover studies, conferences and assessments.

INDICATIVE TIME-FRAME FOR LAUNCHING THE PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE

Approximately between May and September in order to have the contracts signed during 2013.

INDICATIVE AMOUNT OF THE CALL FOR TENDERS

EUR 14 800 000

1.2.2.   Training: IT equipment, tools and support, promotional material, information and communication support and conferences

LEGAL BASIS

Regulation (EC) No 882/2004, Article 66(1)(c)

BUDGETARY LINE

Budget line: 17 01 04 05

INDICATIVE NUMBER AND TYPE OF CONTRACTS ENVISAGED

It is estimated that around two specific contracts will be signed on existing framework contracts.

SUBJECT OF THE CONTRACTS ENVISAGED (IF POSSIBLE)

The actions to be financed under this budget are aimed at arranging the training programmes, IT and e-learning equipment, tools and support, promotional material, information and communication supports as well as conferences.

IMPLEMENTATION

This action will be implemented directly by DG Health and Consumers.

INDICATIVE TIME-FRAME FOR LAUNCHING THE PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE

Approximately between May and October.

INDICATIVE AMOUNT OF THE CALL FOR TENDERS

EUR 200 000

1.3.   Other actions: operating subsidy for the Executive Agency for Health and Consumers

LEGAL BASIS

Council Regulation (EC) No 58/2003, in particular Article 12(3)

BUDGETARY LINE

Budget line: 17 01 04 31

AMOUNT

EUR 1 170 000

DESCRIPTION AND OBJECTIVE OF THE IMPLEMENTING MEASURE

This budget finances the Agency's operating subsidy for 2013 related to the programmes under ‘FP Heading 2’. Budget line 17 01 04 31 finances the Agency's 2013 operating subsidy for the part related to the ‘Better training for safer food’ programme. According to Article 12(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 58/2003, the operating subsidy is to be drawn from the financial allocation to the Union programmes managed by the Agency. Two separate budget lines have been created in the 2013 budget for the subsidy to be paid to the Agency, one for programmes under heading 2 and another for programmes under heading 3b of the Financial Perspectives.

---

V Announcements

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION POLICY

European Commission

| 15.6.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 170/43 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.6.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 170/43

---

Prior notification of a concentration

(Case COMP/M.6955 — KKR/Bidco/South Staffordshire Plc)

Candidate case for simplified procedure

(Text with EEA relevance)

2013/C 170/08

| 1. | On 7 June 2013, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which Selena Bidco Limited (‘Bidco’, Jersey), a company controlled by KKR & Co. LP (‘KKR’, USA), acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation sole control over South Staffordshire Plc and associated companies (‘Target’, UK) by way of a purchase of shares. |
| --- | --- |

1.

On 7 June 2013, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which Selena Bidco Limited (‘Bidco’, Jersey), a company controlled by KKR & Co. LP (‘KKR’, USA), acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation sole control over South Staffordshire Plc and associated companies (‘Target’, UK) by way of a purchase of shares.

| 2. | The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:






  — | for KKR: provision of a broad range of alternative asset management services to public and private market investors and capital markets solutions for the firm, its portfolio companies and clients, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

—

for KKR: provision of a broad range of alternative asset management services to public and private market investors and capital markets solutions for the firm, its portfolio companies and clients,

| — | for South Straffordshire Plc: supply of water services in the South Staffordshire and Cambridge water supply areas; supply of other ancillary water-related services; and supply of water coolers. |
| --- | --- |

—

for South Straffordshire Plc: supply of water services in the South Staffordshire and Cambridge water supply areas; supply of other ancillary water-related services; and supply of water coolers.

| 3. | On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the EC Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the EC Merger Regulation (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in the Notice. |
| --- | --- |

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the EC Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the EC Merger Regulation (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in the Notice.

| 4. | The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.
  Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by email to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference number COMP/M.6955 — KKR/Bidco/South Staffordshire Plc, to the following address:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by email to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference number COMP/M.6955 — KKR/Bidco/South Staffordshire Plc, to the following address:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the ‘EC Merger Regulation’).

(2)  OJ C 56, 5.3.2005, p. 32 (‘Notice on a simplified procedure’).

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| 15.6.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 170/44 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.6.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 170/44

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Prior notification of a concentration

(Case COMP/M.6946 — BayWa/Bohnhorst Agrarhandel)

Candidate case for simplified procedure

(Text with EEA relevance)

2013/C 170/09

| 1. | On 7 June 2013 the Commission received notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1), by which BayWa Agri GmbH, a wholly owned subsidiary of BayWa AG (Germany), acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation sole control of Bohnhorst Agrarhandel GmbH (Germany) by other means. |
| --- | --- |

1.

On 7 June 2013 the Commission received notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1), by which BayWa Agri GmbH, a wholly owned subsidiary of BayWa AG (Germany), acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation sole control of Bohnhorst Agrarhandel GmbH (Germany) by other means.

| 2. | The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:






  — | BayWa AG is a worldwide trading and services group in its three core segments of agriculture, energy and building materials. The agriculture segment comprises agricultural trade, fruit and agricultural equipment. Among other things, the company trades in agricultural equipment, acquires and sells plant products, and sells farm equipment and facilities, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

—

BayWa AG is a worldwide trading and services group in its three core segments of agriculture, energy and building materials. The agriculture segment comprises agricultural trade, fruit and agricultural equipment. Among other things, the company trades in agricultural equipment, acquires and sells plant products, and sells farm equipment and facilities,

| — | Bohnhorst Agrarhandel GmbH is an international agricultural trading business that sells agricultural products and equipment to farmers and traders. In addition, Bohnhorst provides services in connection with the supply of equipment and the purchase, storage, transfer, marketing and transport of harvested crops. |
| --- | --- |

—

Bohnhorst Agrarhandel GmbH is an international agricultural trading business that sells agricultural products and equipment to farmers and traders. In addition, Bohnhorst provides services in connection with the supply of equipment and the purchase, storage, transfer, marketing and transport of harvested crops.

| 3. | On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the EC Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the EC Merger Regulation (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in the Notice. |
| --- | --- |

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the EC Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the EC Merger Regulation (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in the Notice.

| 4. | The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.
  Observations must reach the Commission not later than ten days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by email to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference number COMP/M.6946 — BayWa/Bohnhorst Agrarhandel, to the following address:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than ten days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by email to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference number COMP/M.6946 — BayWa/Bohnhorst Agrarhandel, to the following address:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the ‘EC Merger Regulation’).

(2)  OJ C 56, 5.3.2005, p. 32 (‘Notice on a simplified procedure’).

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| 15.6.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 170/45 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.6.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 170/45

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Prior notification of a concentration

(Case COMP/M.6885 — SDNV/Germanischer Lloyd)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2013/C 170/10

| 1. | On 10 June 2013, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 and following a referral pursuant to Article 4(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which Stiftelsen Det Norske Veritas (‘SDNV’, Norway) acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation sole control of Germanischer Lloyd SE (Germany) by way of purchase of shares. |
| --- | --- |

1.

On 10 June 2013, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 and following a referral pursuant to Article 4(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which Stiftelsen Det Norske Veritas (‘SDNV’, Norway) acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation sole control of Germanischer Lloyd SE (Germany) by way of purchase of shares.

| 2. | The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:






  — | for SDNV: testing, inspection, certification/verification/classification services and related consulting services in the maritime, oil & gas, energy and business assurance sectors, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

—

for SDNV: testing, inspection, certification/verification/classification services and related consulting services in the maritime, oil & gas, energy and business assurance sectors,

| — | for Germanischer Lloyd: testing, inspection, certification/verification/classification and related consulting services the maritime, oil & gas and renewable energy sectors. |
| --- | --- |

—

for Germanischer Lloyd: testing, inspection, certification/verification/classification and related consulting services the maritime, oil & gas and renewable energy sectors.

| 3. | On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope the EC Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. |
| --- | --- |

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope the EC Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved.

| 4. | The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.
  Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by e-mail to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference number COMP/M.6885 — SDNV/Germanischer Lloyd, to the following address:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by e-mail to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference number COMP/M.6885 — SDNV/Germanischer Lloyd, to the following address:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the ‘EC Merger Regulation’).

---

OTHER ACTS

European Commission

| 15.6.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 170/46 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.6.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 170/46

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Publication of an application pursuant to Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs

2013/C 170/11

This publication confers the right to oppose the application pursuant to Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1).

SINGLE DOCUMENT

COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 510/2006

on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs
   (2)

‘LILIPUTAS’

EC No: LT-PGI-0005-0868-14.03.2011

PGI ( X ) PDO ( )

1.   Name

‘Liliputas’

2.   Member State or third country

Lithuania

3.   Description of the agricultural product or foodstuff

3.1.   Type of product

| Class 1.3. | Cheeses |
| --- | --- |

Class 1.3.

Cheeses

3.2.   Description of product to which the name in point 1 applies

‘Liliputas’ is a handmade, high-fat (50 % in dry matter), semi-hard cheese in the shape of a cylinder with rounded ends. It is 7,5-13 cm in height, 7-8,5 cm in diameter and 0,4-0,7 kg in weight. The cheese is made in the village of Belvederis from pasteurised, standardised cow’s milk, by coagulating the milk and then processing the coagulum, wrapping the cheese mass in woven cotton napkins and pressing it in the traditional cylindrical moulds. The cheese is matured for at least a month by means of internal microflora and surface microflora, namely the microscopic mould Penicillium pallidum Smith, which grows naturally in cheese cellars in the geographical area defined in point 4.

The cheese got the name ‘Liliputas’ because of its size and derives its organoleptic characteristics from maturing in small rounds in the presence of the microscopic mould Penicillium pallidum Smith.

Table 1

Organoleptic indicators of ‘Liliputas’ cheese

| Indicator | Description |
| --- | --- |
| Appearance | The rind is smooth, with no thick layer underneath, and is covered with a paraffin/polymer or other composite coating. It may bear the imprints of the napkin and the cheese mould |
| Flavour and aroma | Lactic acid, fresh flavour and aroma that is distinctive to this fermented cheese. There may be a slight sharpness and saltiness |
| Texture | Homogeneous, quite firm, elastic, yielding in the mouth |
| Cross-section | The cross-section may or may not show small, unevenly distributed oval, angular or slightly flattened holes |
| Colour | Cream to yellow, uniform throughout |

Indicator

Description

Appearance

The rind is smooth, with no thick layer underneath, and is covered with a paraffin/polymer or other composite coating. It may bear the imprints of the napkin and the cheese mould

Flavour and aroma

Lactic acid, fresh flavour and aroma that is distinctive to this fermented cheese. There may be a slight sharpness and saltiness

Texture

Homogeneous, quite firm, elastic, yielding in the mouth

Cross-section

The cross-section may or may not show small, unevenly distributed oval, angular or slightly flattened holes

Colour

Cream to yellow, uniform throughout

Table 2

Physical and chemical characteristics of ‘Liliputas’ cheese

| Indicator | Amount (%) |
| --- | --- |
| Fat content in dry matter | 50 ± 1,6 |
| Minimum dry matter content | 56 |
| Common salt content | 2-3 |

Indicator

Amount (%)

Fat content in dry matter

50 ± 1,6

Minimum dry matter content

56

Common salt content

2-3

Table 3

Average nutritional value of 100 g of ‘Liliputas’ cheese

| Fat (g) | Protein (g) | Carbohydrates (g) | Energy value |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| kcal | kJ |
| 30 | 23,5 | — | 364 | 1 510 |

Fat (g)

Protein (g)

Carbohydrates (g)

Energy value

kcal

kJ

30

23,5

—

364

1 510

3.3.   Raw materials (for processed products only)

| — | cow’s milk, |
| --- | --- |

—

cow’s milk,

| — | lactic acid and aromatic bacteria starter cultures, |
| --- | --- |

—

lactic acid and aromatic bacteria starter cultures,

| — | milk-coagulating enzymes, |
| --- | --- |

—

milk-coagulating enzymes,

| — | common salt. |
| --- | --- |

—

common salt.

3.4.   Feed (for products of animal origin only)

There are no specific quality requirements or restrictions as regards place of origin.

3.5.   Specific steps in production that must take place in the identified geographical area

| — | Preparation and enzymatic coagulation of the milk: Milk for cheese production is pasteurised and standardised in such a way that the fat content in dry matter of the mature cheese meets the requirements laid down in point 3.2. The milk is coagulated by adding the enzyme, starter cultures and calcium chloride. |
| --- | --- |

—

Preparation and enzymatic coagulation of the milk: Milk for cheese production is pasteurised and standardised in such a way that the fat content in dry matter of the mature cheese meets the requirements laid down in point 3.2. The milk is coagulated by adding the enzyme, starter cultures and calcium chloride.

| — | Processing of the coagulum and curd grains: The coagulum is mechanically processed until the grains are of the required size and then stirred. During formation of the curd grains, a third of the whey is drained off, after which the curd grains are heated. After heating, the curd grains are stirred until they reach a size of 4-5 mm, are no longer sticky and become dry and solid. The moisture content of the cheese must be no higher than 44 %. |
| --- | --- |

—

Processing of the coagulum and curd grains: The coagulum is mechanically processed until the grains are of the required size and then stirred. During formation of the curd grains, a third of the whey is drained off, after which the curd grains are heated. After heating, the curd grains are stirred until they reach a size of 4-5 mm, are no longer sticky and become dry and solid. The moisture content of the cheese must be no higher than 44 %.

| — | Shaping and pressing of the cheese: The cheese is formed from the curd layer. The process takes 20 to 25 minutes, after which the curd layer is cut into pieces, which are placed in the cylindrical moulds by hand to compress under their own weight. During self-pressing, the cheeses are turned in the moulds two or three times. Self-pressing takes 20 to 25 minutes.
  After self-pressing, the cheeses are taken out of the moulds, wrapped in damp napkins to allow a rind to form and placed back in the moulds before putting the lids on. The moulds containing the cheeses are placed in presses and pressed for between one and a half and two hours. After pressing, the cheeses are taken out of the moulds, the napkins are removed and any crusts that may have formed between the cheese mould and the lid during pressing are trimmed off. |
| --- | --- |

—

Shaping and pressing of the cheese: The cheese is formed from the curd layer. The process takes 20 to 25 minutes, after which the curd layer is cut into pieces, which are placed in the cylindrical moulds by hand to compress under their own weight. During self-pressing, the cheeses are turned in the moulds two or three times. Self-pressing takes 20 to 25 minutes.

After self-pressing, the cheeses are taken out of the moulds, wrapped in damp napkins to allow a rind to form and placed back in the moulds before putting the lids on. The moulds containing the cheeses are placed in presses and pressed for between one and a half and two hours. After pressing, the cheeses are taken out of the moulds, the napkins are removed and any crusts that may have formed between the cheese mould and the lid during pressing are trimmed off.

| — | Salting of the cheese: The cheeses are weighed and placed in brine. After 48 hours, the cheeses are removed from the brine, placed on shelves, dried for 24 hours and then placed on the maturing racks in the cellar, which is kept at a temperature of 10-14 °C and a humidity of 93-94 % and where the microscopic mould Penicillium pallidum Smith grows naturally. |
| --- | --- |

—

Salting of the cheese: The cheeses are weighed and placed in brine. After 48 hours, the cheeses are removed from the brine, placed on shelves, dried for 24 hours and then placed on the maturing racks in the cellar, which is kept at a temperature of 10-14 °C and a humidity of 93-94 % and where the microscopic mould Penicillium pallidum Smith grows naturally.

| — | Maturing of the cheese: The cheeses on the racks are turned every five days, as described by the first producers of the cheese, in order to prevent them from lying on their sides and to maintain their shape. After several days, the surface of the cheese becomes covered with a coating of microscopic mould, which is washed off after 15 days. The cheese is dried and returned to the rack to continue maturing. After 30 days, when the cheese has fully matured, the coating of microscopic mould that has again covered the surface of the cheese like a cocoon is washed off, and the cheese is dried and covered with a wax coating. |
| --- | --- |

—

Maturing of the cheese: The cheeses on the racks are turned every five days, as described by the first producers of the cheese, in order to prevent them from lying on their sides and to maintain their shape. After several days, the surface of the cheese becomes covered with a coating of microscopic mould, which is washed off after 15 days. The cheese is dried and returned to the rack to continue maturing. After 30 days, when the cheese has fully matured, the coating of microscopic mould that has again covered the surface of the cheese like a cocoon is washed off, and the cheese is dried and covered with a wax coating.

3.6.   Specific rules concerning slicing, grating, packaging, etc.

The cheeses are packaged in cardboard boxes. To preserve the unique characteristics of the cheese, to protect it from drying out if the protective paraffin layer becomes damaged, and because of its small size (weighing 0,4-0,7 kg), it is sold only uncut.

3.7.   Specific rules concerning labelling

The label must clearly show the product name, i.e. ‘Liliputas’, the name of the manufacturer, the words ‘protected geographical indication’ and/or the EU symbol.

4.   Concise definition of the geographical area

‘Liliputas’ cheese is made in the village of Belvederis, which is a small Lithuanian village in Jurbarkas District Municipality that is situated in the Panemunė Regional Park, on the right bank of the River Nemunas, 1 km west of Seredžius.

5.   Link with the geographical area

5.1.   Specificity of the geographical area

Belvederis is the historical cradle of dairy specialists in Lithuania. In 1921, an agricultural school was set up in the manor house, where the subjects taught included dairying. After a few years, it was reorganised as a dairy college and, in 1944, as a technical dairy college. For many years, it fostered Lithuania’s dairy training traditions. During its 34 years of existence, the college/technical college trained more than 800 dairy specialists, most of whom gained their experience in Lithuania’s oldest cheese dairy, which was built in 1928 and is where ‘Liliputas’ is made. The milk used to produce the cheeses was heated in a vat with a wood-burning furnace. The separator was manual, and the cheese moulds wooden. The cheeses were washed using hand-held brushes, in the cellar in winter and in the open air in summer. The cheese dairy was next to an ice house, which was used to store blocks of ice brought from the River Nemunas. The ice was used to cool the cheese cellars. Initially, Belvederis cheese dairy produced larger (2,5-3 kg), round semi-hard cheeses, but, from 1958, when the dairy was extended, it started to produce small 0,4-0,7 kg cheeses, and the name ‘Liliputas’ caught on right away. Master cheese-maker Jonas Jarušaitis was the first to master the production of this cheese. In its first year of production, barely 8 tonnes of the cheese were matured, but, 40 years later, production had increased to 130 tonnes. The old wooden cheese moulds have been kept for posterity at Belvederis cheese dairy, along with souvenir cardboard packaging boxes and a postcard dating from the mid-20th century, which depicts cheeses being washed in a vat and issues an invitation to attend a kingly banquet and taste handmade Belvederis cheeses and other delicacies.

Today, ‘Liliputas’ is still made using the unique and authentic technology of 1958. The production skills and knowledge handed down from generation to generation by the employees of the cheese dairy have made it possible to preserve the product’s distinctive size, organoleptic characteristics and quality.

5.2.   Specificity of the product

A specific characteristic of ‘Liliputas’ cheese is that it is small, weighing only 0,4-0,7 kg, and is covered by a wax coating that protects it against damage. ‘Liliputas’ cheese gets its fresh, lactic-acid flavour and aroma from maturing in small rounds in a cool, damp cellar, cloaked with spores of the microscopic mould Penicillium pallidum Smith. No traces of the microscopic mould are visible on the walls, shelves or ceiling in the maturing room, but, a few days after the ‘Liliputas’ cheeses have been salted and lined up on the shelves, they start to resemble silkworm cocoons. In order to prevent the microscopic mould from penetrating into the cheese while it matures, it is protected by the rind formed during pressing. In order to form the rind, the cheeses are removed from the cylindrical moulds after self-pressing and wrapped in woven cotton napkins before being placed back in the cylindrical moulds and pressed in presses.

The cheeses are produced in the traditional way, almost entirely by hand, i.e. the curd layer is cut and placed in the moulds and the cheeses are wrapped in napkins, turned, washed, wiped and waxed by hand, a process during which each individual cheese is handled more than 50 times.

5.3.   Causal link between the geographical area and the quality or characteristics of the product (for PDO) or a specific quality, the reputation or other characteristic of the product (for PGI)

The application for registration of a protected geographical indication is based on tradition, the specific production method and reputation.

In the public consciousness, Belvederis, as the cradle of dairy science in Lithuania, is directly associated with the peerless ‘Liliputas’ cheese, which has been produced in the same way since 1958. Belvederis cheese dairy is currently the only producer of this unique handmade cheese.

‘Liliputas’ cheese gets its specific flavour and aroma from maturing in small rounds by means of internal microflora and the microscopic mould Penicillium pallidum Smith, which grows in cellars in the geographical area defined in point 4 when they are kept at a constant temperature of 10-14 °C and a humidity of 93-94 %.

‘Liliputas’ cheese has been exhibited at many exhibitions, both in Lithuania and abroad, meeting with great success at exhibitions in Leipzig, Poznań, Zagreb, London, Paris, Copenhagen, Vienna and elsewhere. ‘Liliputas’ won a gold medal at the ‘Agra-76’ exhibition in what was then the German Democratic Republic. It was awarded a first-class diploma in the cheese quality survey/competition in 1984 in Uglich, USSR, and won a gold medal in the ‘Lithuanian Product of the Year 2002’ competition, which was organised by the Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists. At the international food and drink exhibition ‘World Food Moscow 2005’, it won a bronze medal, and, at the international exhibition for the agricultural and processing industries ‘Zolotaya osen 2008’, also in Moscow, ‘Liliputas’ graced the Lithuanian national stand put together by the Lithuanian Ministry of Agriculture. At ‘AgroBalt 2010’, a specialised international exhibition for companies in the agricultural, food and packaging industries, ‘Liliputas’ won an award for its natural and ecological qualities. Both ‘Liliputas’ and its dedicated producers have been written about many times in the Lithuanian press (1999-2003).

Although ‘Liliputas’ costs twice as much as cheese produced in a mechanised dairy, it has a loyal following of customers who appreciate quality and natural and handmade products. Production volumes have remained stable over the years.

Reference to publication of the specification

(Article 5(7) of Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 (3))

http://www.zum.lt/l.php?tmpl_into[0]=index&tmpl_name[0]=m_site_index2&tmpl_into[1]=middle&tmpl_id[1]=2704

---

(1)  OJ L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 1.

(2)  OJ L 93, 31.3.2006, p. 12. Replaced by Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012.

(3)  See footnote 2.

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| 15.6.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 170/51 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.6.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 170/51

---

Publication of an application pursuant to Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs

2013/C 170/12

This publication confers the right to oppose the application pursuant to Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1).

SINGLE DOCUMENT

COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 510/2006

on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs
   (2)

‘COZZA DI SCARDOVARI’

EC No: IT-PDO-0005-0981-12.03.2012

PGI ( ) PDO ( X )

1.   Name

‘Cozza di Scardovari’

2.   Member State or third country

Italy

3.   Description of the agricultural product or foodstuff

3.1.   Type of product

| Class 1.7. | Fresh fish, molluscs and crustaceans and products derived therefrom |
| --- | --- |

Class 1.7.

Fresh fish, molluscs and crustaceans and products derived therefrom

3.2.   Description of the product to which the name in point 1 applies

The ‘Cozza di Scardovari’, which belongs to the species Mytilus galloprovincialis, is a bivalve mollusc with an elongated shape, with a purple-black coloured shell. The valves are convex, symmetrical in their shape which is almost triangular with subtle concentric markings. Relatively tough brown threads are attached to the shells, known as the byssus or beard, used to secure the mussel to its substrate or other support.

The ‘Cozza di Scardovari’ has the following physical and organoleptic characteristics:

| — | glistening flesh that fills the shell (flesh as a percentage of the total weight of the mollusc — quality indicator > 25 %), |
| --- | --- |

—

glistening flesh that fills the shell (flesh as a percentage of the total weight of the mollusc — quality indicator > 25 %),

| — | specific sweetness of the flesh (sodium content < 210 mg/100 g), |
| --- | --- |

—

specific sweetness of the flesh (sodium content < 210 mg/100 g),

| — | flesh that is particularly tender and ‘melt-in-the-mouth’ with high taste levels. |
| --- | --- |

—

flesh that is particularly tender and ‘melt-in-the-mouth’ with high taste levels.

The ‘Cozza di Scardovari’, at the time of sale, has to have a shell that is dark and does not fracture when tapped; the mussels may be sold live in netted packages, vacuum-packed or in a protective atmosphere, or frozen with or without shells.

3.3.   Raw materials (for processed products only)

—

3.4.   Feed (for products of animal origin only)

The ‘Cozza di Scardovari’ mussel principally feeds on the large amounts of organic and inorganic particles and the high levels of phytoplankton and zooplankton, specific to the Sacca di Scardovari.

Growth of organic and inorganic nutrients is favoured by the abundant inflows of fresh water from the various rivulets of the River Po, while the Sacca di Scardovari’s shallow water, temperature and oxygen levels combine to promote the development of rich phytoplankton and zooplankton populations. The mussels are not given any additional food or supplements.

3.5.   Specific steps in production that must take place in the identified geographical area

The insemination, growth and harvesting phases for the ‘Cozza di Scardovari’ must take place exclusively in nurseries within the Sacca di Scardovari; the cleaning, washing, and product selection phases, which require clean Sacca di Scardovari water, must take place in units located in the area of Scardovari, Ca' Mello and Santa Giulia in the municipality of Porto Tolle.

3.6.   Specific rules concerning slicing, grating, packaging, etc.

The product must be packed in the area specified in point 4, within the production chain, immediately after the mussels are taken out of the cleaning tanks, so as to guarantee their vitality and freshness and to ensure compliance with hygiene/food safety criteria and enable due control, so as to prevent fraud consisting of mixing the product with mussels from other production areas.

3.7.   Specific rules concerning labelling

The package must be sealed in such a manner as to ensure that opening the package breaks the seal. The label must bear the words: ‘Cozza di Scardovari’ and ‘Denominazione d’Origine Protetta’ (‘protected designation of origin’), or the letters ‘DOP’ (‘PDO’). The logo of the designation ‘Cozza di Scardovari D.O.P.’ must also appear as well as the European Union PDO logo.

Image

4.   Concise definition of the geographical area

The Sacca di Scardovari production area comprises the territory of parts of Scardovari, Ca’ Mello and Santa Giulia in the municipality of Porto Tolle, in the province of Rovigo.

The term ‘Sacca’ refers to the marine inlet formed by the partial closure of a stretch of sea, which retains access to open sea via a lagoon.

The Sacca di Scardovari is located in the southern part of the Po Delta, between the branches of the Po di Tolle to the north-east and the Po di Gnocca to the south-west. It is bordered to the south by the following Gauss-Boaga West Zone geographical coordinates, which refer to the two offshore points dividing the Sacca from the Adriatic sea:

| — | 4971445,99 N — 1773953,45 E, |
| --- | --- |

—

4971445,99 N — 1773953,45 E,

| — | 4967536,31 N — 1770965,25 E. |
| --- | --- |

—

4967536,31 N — 1770965,25 E.

5.   Link with the geographical area

5.1.   Specificity of the geographical area

The Sacca di Scardovari is an environment that owes its specific characteristics to the meeting of fresh water currents from the River Po, rich in nutrients and suspended particles, with the salt water of the sea, subject to the tides.

The environmental characteristics of the Sacca di Scardovari stand out on account of the low salinity of the waters, as the sea water, with a salinity of around 35 %, is diluted by the fresh river water, with the result that the saline concentration of the waters in this area fluctuates between 10 % and 30 %, with an average of around 20 %. Furthermore, the river water provides high inputs of nutrients and suspended organic particles.

The shallow waters of the Sacca with maximum depths of 3 m allow good light diffusion throughout the whole column of water and ideal temperature conditions, on average higher than in the open sea, plus high phytoplankton growth levels. Furthermore, the changes of water, due to the tides, produce ideal hydrodynamic conditions and optimal oxygenation of the water, and contribute to a favourable environment for the growth of the mussels.

The first local fishermen’s cooperative was founded in Sacca di Scardovari in 1936. The transformation of the area over the last century happened very rapidly, both due to human intervention, and through natural and man-made influences, and the Sacca di Scardovari acquired its current aspect after the flooding of 1966. It was at this time that the first forays into mussel farming started with small nurseries within the Sacca, as an alternative to sea fishing, as testified by the report of the Fishermen’s Cooperative Board, with regard to the Scardovari mussel cleaning plant set up in the 1980s. Even the product quality is also the result of the producers’ savoir faire who, as far back as the 1960s, started experimenting with mussel farming in small nurseries within the Sacca, as an alternative to sea fishing. The mussel farming, which is done as a family business or through an association, uses traditional techniques to prepare the nurseries and to process the product, which is mostly done manually, and which consists of interventions to separate and thin out the mussels, remove parasites and select mussels by size in the various beds to allow more efficient growth.

5.2.   Specificity of the product

The ‘Cozza di Scardovari’ is characterised by low sodium levels in the flesh (less than 210 mg/100 g of product), which is much lower than in mussels grown in the open sea and which results in the particular deliciousness and delicacy of the product on the palate and the sweetness of the flesh.

Furthermore, the Cozza mussels have a high quality indicator, over 25 %, which determines the remarkable fullness of the flesh in the shell due to the high metabolism and considerable growth of the edible parts. This mussel growth, which takes place in just eight or nine months of the settling of the young mussels, yields high productivity typical of the ‘Cozza di Scardovari’.

5.3.   Causal link between the geographical area and the quality or characteristics of the product (for PDO) or a specific quality, the reputation or other characteristic of the product (for PGI)

The quality, physical and organoleptic characteristics of ‘Cozza di Scardovari’ are the result of the special environmental conditions of the Sacca after which they are named. Specifically, the low saline levels of the waters in the Sacca where the ‘Cozze di Scardovari’ are produced result in low levels of sodium in their flesh — less than 210 mg/100 g of product — a characteristic that helps to make the taste of the mussels particularly delicious, delicate and tender on the palate.

The high concentration of suspended organic particles and the high growth levels of phytoplankton in the shallow waters of the Sacca result in the mussels’ high metabolism and the remarkable development of the edible parts with a quality indicator of over 25 % as well as the rapid growth typical of the ‘Cozza di Scardovari’.

The geographical and morphological characteristics of the Sacca di Scardovari (low water levels, constant changes of water due to the tides, ideal temperature, oxygenation and hydrodynamic conditions) and the professionalism of the producers as regards the traditional production and farming techniques directly influence the mussels’ well-being, thus allowing faster and more uniform growth and quality control of the final product.

The reputation of the name and product is documented by the photo of the Cozza di Scardovari Festival in the 1980s; the production of mussels from the Sacca di Scardovari is at present of great economic significance for this region, employing many operators and family enterprises and the product is recognised by consumers both in Italy and in other European countries.

Reference to publication of the specification

(Article 5(7) of Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 (3))

The Ministry launched the national objection procedure with the publication of the proposal for recognising ‘Cozza di Scardovari’ as a protected designation of origin in Official Gazette of the Italian Republic No 271 of 21 November 2011.

The full text of the product specification is available on the following website:

http://www.politicheagricole.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/3335

or alternatively:

by going directly to the home page of the Ministry of Agricultural, Food and Forestry Policy (http://www.politicheagricole.it) and clicking on ‘Qualità e sicurezza’ (in the top right-hand corner of the screen) and then on ‘Disciplinari di Produzione all’esame dell’UE’.

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(1)  OJ L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 1.

(2)  OJ L 93, 31.3.2006, p. 12. Replaced by Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012.

(3)  See footnote 2.

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Corrigenda

| 15.6.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 170/55 |
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15.6.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 170/55

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Corrigendum to the Call for expressions of interest for membership of the Scientific Panels of the European Food Safety Authority (Parma, Italy) — Ref.: EFSA/E/2013/001

(
  Official Journal of the European Union C 107 of 13 April 2013
  )

2013/C 170/13

On page 16, ‘11. Closing date for sending applications’, first paragraph:

for:

‘... 17 June 2013 at midnight ...’,

read:

‘... 1 July 2013 at midnight ...’.

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