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i 

73–434 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–108] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FROM 

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 1, 2012 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

KIMBERLY SHAW, Professional Staff Member 

WILLIAM (SPENCER) JOHNSON, Professional Staff Member 

LAUREN HAUHN, Research Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, March 1, 2012, Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Request from U.S. Pacific Command .................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, March 1, 2012 ........................................................................................ 29 

THURSDAY, MARCH 1, 2012 

FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUEST FROM U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 3 

WITNESSES 

Willard, ADM Robert F., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command ................. 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 33 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 35 

Willard, ADM Robert F. ................................................................................... 37 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Coffman ...................................................................................................... 65 

Mrs. Davis ......................................................................................................... 65 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 71 

Mr. Conaway ..................................................................................................... 73 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 70 

Mr. Heinrich ..................................................................................................... 74 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 70 

Mr. McKeon ....................................................................................................... 69 

Mr. Reyes .......................................................................................................... 69 

Mr. Schilling ..................................................................................................... 75 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 75 

Mr. Wittman ..................................................................................................... 73 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 1, 2012. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m. in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. You know 

with the busy schedule we have had the last couple of weeks I inadvertently overlooked the fact that we have a new Member of our 

committee, my colleague from California, Jackie Speier. We want 

to officially welcome you to the committee and are happy that you 

are here with us. 

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The House Armed Services 

Committee meets today to receive testimony from Admiral Robert 

Willard, Commander of the United States PACOM [Pacific Command], more than 38 years of service, almost 39. You have distinguished yourself as one of our top military leaders, one of our top 

pilots. I understand that your claim to fame is wearing the black 

hat, flying the enemy plane in ‘‘Top Gun.’’ Congratulations you survived that. 

Admiral Willard, thank you for your long, distinguished service 

to our Nation. And thank you to Donna, your spouse, your partner. 

She has also been a great support of the Navy. I know when we 

were down there she was the—I don’t know the title but it was 

kind of like you did everything for the USS California and their 

crew. 

Admiral WILLARD. Sponsor. 

The CHAIRMAN. Our newest attack submarine and I was able to 

participate a little bit in that and saw the love that the crew had 

for you and those who built that boat. So it was good to see Admiral Willard taking your picture and fitting in the role reversal 

model. 

Admiral, with your retirement next week I know you have been 

very busy handing over command to Admiral Sam Locklear. So I 

thank you for taking the time to appear before this committee one 

last time. I apologize in advance, we will be having some votes. I 

know Members will be leaving, but we do really appreciate you taking the time to be with us. 
2 

Our economy and security has never been more dependent on our 

military, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. The President’s new 

strategy focuses on a so-called pivot to the Asia-Pacific. While I 

don’t quite question the critical importance of this theater, I am 

concerned that our forces may not be properly postured to support 

this ship. The Chief of Naval Operations has said that ship and 

aircraft deployments in the Pacific would remain at current levels. 

Over the next 5 years we cut 16 ships out of our new construction 

budget and retire 9 more. Further, our tanking and airlift capacity 

will be reduced, limiting our ability to project power and sustain 

our forces. 

This budget does not address reductions to our nuclear deterrent, 

but the Administration is reportedly contemplating unilateral reductions below New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] levels. As you have discussed often with us, quantity does have a 

quality all of its own, especially in a theater that covers half of the 

Earth’s surface. 

We must be prepared to effectively respond with the needed 

manpower and assets. As I stated at last year’s hearing, it is important our forces in the Pacific have the personnel, training, 

equipment, and the authorities they need to instill confidence in 

our allies, deter aggression, and remain ready to respond decisively 

to any contingency. It is not yet clear how the new strategy will 

meet these goals. Events in Asia can change rapidly as we saw in 

December with the death of North Korean dictator Kim Jong-il. 

Alongside our South Korean allies, our forces must be ready to 

deter further North Korean provocation. 

China’s growing influence creates concern for many of our regional allies. The balance of power against the Taiwan Straits continues to shift in the direction of Beijing. The South China Sea is 

a vital shipping lane through which more than $5 trillion in trade 

passes each year. Deterring, delaying, or denying U.S. forces from 

operating along China’s periphery is still a key goal of the People’s 

Liberation Army. As China’s military budget continues to grow annually by double digits, the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] is focused on improving their capacities to counter U.S. military capabilities and exploit any potential weaknesses that we may have. 

We also see the growing threat of terrorism in the region as aims 

of certain groups like LeT [Lashkar-e-Tayyiba] expand beyond their 

traditional border disputes. 

In partnership with our allies and friends, our forces must stand 

ready to respond to unprovoked, hostile behavior and defend our 

regional allies and security interests. 

We look forward to your testimony and shedding the additional 

light on the matters and the range of security challenges that we 

face in the Pacific. 

Ranking Member Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 
3 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to join you 

in welcoming Ms. Speier to the committee. It is great to have her 

on. We have already worked on some issues that she has been interested in on the Armed Services Committee. It is great to have 

her on the committee and welcome. It is great to have you join us. 

I also definitely want to thank Admiral Willard for being here 

today, but also for his service. He is retiring soon, his last opportunity to testify before us, and we certainly want to thank Mrs. 

Willard as well. It is a total team effort, a career like the one that 

you built. And we really appreciate all of have both done for our 

country. 

I also appreciate talking to Mrs. Willard before and she said that 

her presence she always thought it would make the Members be 

nicer to Admiral Willard, but she did point out that it never actually worked, but it is still sentiment. We really appreciate all that 

you both have done, great service to our country. And your last 

command incredibly important in the Asia-Pacific theater, we have 

a number of allies and partners in the region and a number of challenges in the region. I agree with the list the chairman rolled out, 

trying to figure out how to deal with the rising China, the unpredictability of North Korea, a number of different terrorist groups 

in the Philippines, Indonesia, and elsewhere. It is a critically important region. 

The Navy is one of our best, best allies in terms of delivering a 

positive U.S. message; it shows our presence in the region. I think 

that is the most important thing about our strategy going forward. 

The President has said we are a Pacific power. We want to make 

it clear to everyone in the world, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, that we will continue to be a Pacific power, and the Navy is 

one of the best ways that we demonstrate that. Our presence there 

builds those partnerships and builds those relationships. 

I remember reading somewhere that last year alone there were 

over 700 port calls in Asia by the Pacific Command, and all of 

those are opportunities to build relationships and build friendships 

and build partnerships. Of course our Pacific Command has responded to many natural disasters in the area, most recently that 

earthquake and tsunami in Japan but certainly the earthquake 

and tsunami before that in Thailand and Indonesia. 

You put the best face on U.S. policy in the region and we really 

appreciate that work. It is critical that we give you the resources 

to enable that mission to go forward. 

I look forward to your testimony, look forward to your answers 

to our questions, and again thank you very much for your service 

and your leadership. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Admiral. 
4 

STATEMENT OF ADM ROBERT F. WILLARD, USN, COMMANDER, 

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you very much, Chairman McKeon. 

Mr. Chairman, in order to accommodate the committee’s questions 

sooner, I will keep my remarks brief and ask that my full statement be included for the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered. 

Admiral WILLARD. Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss 

United States Pacific Command in the Asia-Pacific region. I would 

like to begin by thanking you for recognizing my wife Donna and 

her sponsorship of the USS California. She is present today and 

has been at my side for nearly 38 years. She is an outstanding ambassador for our Nation and a tireless advocate for the men and 

women of our military and their families. Together we have thoroughly enjoyed this experience both with our counterpart foreign 

friends and with all of you who advocate for our men and women 

in uniform. Thank you. 

I would like to acknowledge this committee’s enduring support 

for our joint forces and by your actions their contribution to our 

Nation’s security. Your visits to the region have been and will continue to be an important reminder of the United States’ national 

interests there. 

North Korea, the world’s only remaining nation divided by armistice, continues to threaten peace and security in Northeast Asia 

now under the leadership of a 29-year-old son of Kim Jong-il. There 

we are observing closely for signs of instability or evidence that 

leadership transition is faltering. As General Thurman will attest 

in his testimony to you, we believe that Kim Jong-un is currently 

tightly surrounded by KJI [Kim Jong-il] associates and for the time 

being that the succession in North Korea appears to be on course. 

With that said, we also believe Kim Jong-un will continue to pursue his father’s course of strategy that embraces nuclearization, 

missile development, WMD [Weapons of Mass Destruction] proliferation, provocations, and totalitarian control over North Korean 

society. 

As you stated, management of the China relationship continues 

to be a challenge to U.S. Pacific Command on many levels. Our 

military-to-military relationship is still not where it should be. Although a strategic level exchange of views with DOD [Department 

of Defense] persisted throughout 2011, the PLA continues to advance its military capabilities at an impressive rate, is growing 

bolder with regard to their expanding regional and global presence, 

and China continues to challenge the United States and our partners in the region in the maritime, cyber and space domains. 

President Obama and Secretary of Defense Panetta recently reaffirmed the strategic importance of the Asia-Pacific and our Nation’s future focus on its security challenges in the document ‘‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.’’ It appropriately addressed the opportunities and challenges 

that PACOM faces in a region covering half the world and containing the majority of great powers, economies, populations, and 

militaries. 
5 

Importantly, our five treaty allies, Australia, Japan, South 

Korea, Republic of the Philippines, and Thailand, together with 

many regional partners, represent the greatest opportunities for 

the United States and Pacific Command to contribute to a broad 

security association in the region. Of particular note we seek to advance our important relationship with India in South Asia. 

We are making progress in adjusting PACOM’s force posture toward Southeast Asia, following overtures from Australia, Singapore, and the Philippines to help enable and increased rotational 

military presence in this important subregion. 

As was evidenced by United States support to Japan during the 

epic triple disaster last March, close military cooperation, frequent 

exercises, and interoperable systems merged to create the type of 

partnerships that take us to levels of cooperation such that we are 

ready and effective. 

Throughout the Asia-Pacific numerous transnational threats, 

such as bio and extremist organizations, proliferation, trafficking, 

piracy and perpetual natural and manmade disasters, challenge 

our Nation and our allies and partners in the region. Across this 

wide spectrum of current and potential future threats PACOM 

must provide persistent overwatch, ensuring our Nation retains 

continued strategic access and freedom of movement in the global 

commons. 

Amidst this challenges everyday our soldiers, sailors, airmen, 

marines, and civilians devote their efforts to contributing to AsiaPacific security. Their success has long been enabled by this committee’s enduring support, including the resources and quality of 

life that you provide them to accomplish their important missions. 

During the 21⁄2 years that I have been in command you have allowed me and my commanders to share our perspectives with you, 

sought to understand the dynamics of this complex region, and 

traveled and met with our military families and foreign partners. 

Yours has been a powerful message and demonstration of U.S. 

commitment to the 36 nations in the Asia-Pacific. On behalf of the 

more than 330,000 men and women of the United States Pacific 

Command, thank you for your support and for this opportunity to 

testify one final time. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Willard can be found in the 

Appendix on page 37.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Admiral, and again thank 

you for your distinguished career, your tremendous service to the 

Nation. I think this command that you are retiring from is one of 

the most important to our Nation and to the world. And with the 

President’s new switch in strategy and moving, as he said, moving, 

I don’t know exactly how he put it, but moving more emphasis on 

the Pacific region, I think as we have had other chiefs coming in 

and testifying talking about the budget cuts and how we are going 

to be asked to do more with less, it seems that no region will be 

asked to do more with less than your command. And what I would 

like is if you could lay out for us are you gaining any additional 

capacity or ability to carry out this new effort? And could you let 

us know what in your best military judgment the requirements, capabilities, any potential gaps that we should be looking at as we 
6 

go through the budget process and reaffirming this announcement 

by the President. Please. 

Admiral WILLARD. Yes. Thank you, Chairman. And I think one 

of the relevant questions of the day, given both the budget that has 

been presented and the strategy that has been articulated by the 

President, by Secretary of Defense Panetta. U.S. Pacific Command 

in the 21⁄2 years that I have been in command and in my previous 

assignment as U.S. Pacific Fleet, has been well served I think by 

the Nation in terms of the force structure that is there. And while 

we have been there we have been endeavoring to adjust posture to 

optimize the forces that we do have. We have been at war for 10 

years and during a decade of warfare we have given to the theater, 

as all the combatant commanders have, such that particularly our 

Army and our Marine Corps have been decremented by about 10 

percent as they have rotated in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan 

over the last 10 years. 

When you ask the question will we gain more, I think as we 

draw down from two wars that are now a decade old, we will see 

a recovery of particularly the ground forces that have been so dedicated to those conflicts. As well the strategy that has been laid out 

by the President and Secretary of Defense prioritize the security 

environment globally, and I think that is very important to both 

recognize and then track to ensure that we actually take the actions that those words I think so appropriately establish. And it 

provides focus on the Asia-Pacific region as one of those important 

security environments globally. And your summary of the rationale, the reasons why I think was very accurate. 

So I think what is important is to recognize that even in a situation where the budget will cause for force reductions postwar and 

given our current economic environment within the country, that 

where we bias the forces that we do have will be most relevant, 

and given the focus on the Asia-Pacific and the focus on the Middle 

East, I think that in the future we should anticipate that the force 

structure that we attempt to optimize will be biased in those directions. So I expect U.S. Pacific Command to continue to be well 

served. 

So to the extent that the budget focuses on particular capabilities, ballistic missile defense, cyber and others, I think all the combatant commanders will enjoy increased emphasis there, but in the 

Pacific Command I look forward to the ground forces in particular, 

our special forces, returning to the region on a permanent basis 

and for the focus to be represented by a biasing of other forces such 

as our Naval forces and Air forces there. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Ranking Member Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Admiral, give us a little bit of a look at 

the repositioning of troops between Okinawa, Guam, mainland 

Japan and Hawaii. And I was particularly concerned with how it 

impacts Guam and when those plans are going to be finalized, and 

how you see us resolving the continuing difficulty on Okinawa in 

terms of how we place Marine Corps base there, trying to shut 

down Futenma but we can’t find a new place. How do you see that 

coming out? The sooner we can figure it out the better for all involved, but certainly for Guam and particularly to understanding 
7 

exactly what they are going to have. Just give us a little bit of a 

preview on what is happening with that. 

Admiral WILLARD. As you know, we are still in discussions with 

the Japanese on this. We have working groups on both sides that 

are attempting to finalize plans for the 8,000 or so marines that 

we committed in 2006 to redistribute from Okinawa. And you refer 

to a Futenma replacement facility, the air field that actually contains the rotary wing lift for the marines that are currently on Okinawa and, as a separate issue within the Defense Policy Review 

Initiative, the shift of the location of that airfield from the urban 

area in Okinawa to Camp Schwab, an area further north on the 

island. 

In the past within the Defense Policy Review Initiative, DPRI, 

the two were linked together, FRF, the Futenma Replacement Facility, and the movement of the 8,000 marines. One of the agreements between Japan and the United States recently was to delink 

the two so that the challenges, the policy challenges that have been 

posed that have caused delays and the Futenma replacement facility could be dealt with separate from the issues of Guam and other 

sites for our Marine Corps. And at the same time, the Marine 

Corps, Secretary Panetta and U.S. Pacific Command, in the course 

of deliberations of optimum sites for our marines, given both the 

economic environment that we are in and the specific strategic 

needs of U.S. Pacific Command in the region to have those marines 

sited properly, have been working on the distribution of both the 

headquarters elements from Okinawa and the marine troops from 

Okinawa and where they should be located. And presently the view 

is for about 4,700 marines to be located on the island of Guam and 

others to be distributed to sites such as Hawaii and, as you know, 

a rotational presence out of Darwin, Australia. Those combinations 

are part of the ongoing working group deliberations with Japan 

and the United States. 

There is a way to go with it and the Futenma replacement facility issue has resulted in strong advocacy by Tokyo, by the governance there, and continued challenges locally in Okinawa. And we 

think that Camp Schwab remains the best option. The Government 

of Japan appears to sanction that. We will continue the deliberations with them and attempt to see progress made over the coming 

year. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Admiral. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. We are well into the first vote. Looks like there 

is going to be five votes. What I am going to do is call on Mr. Bartlett and then we will resume questioning as we return back from 

the vote. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. Admiral, thank you very 

much for your long years of service to our country. For several 

years now I have been watching a global phenomenon that could 

enormously affect your area of responsibility and I wanted to get 

your insights into it. The United States has only 2 percent of the 

known reserves of oil in the world. We use 25 percent of the world’s 

oil. China has even on its mainland less oil than we have. They do 

not yet use as much as we. But last year they bought more auto-
8 

mobiles than we bought in this country so their use of oil is increasing. 

China is very aggressively buying oil all over the world. While 

we are an enormously larger user of oil than China, we are buying 

oil reserves nowhere in the world. And I am wondering why you 

think China is buying oil reserves all over the world. Sir, it doesn’t 

make any difference today who owns the oil, the person who comes 

with the dollars, and let’s hope it stays dollars, who comes with the 

dollars to the global oil auction gets the oil they need. Why would 

we not be buying oil when China is very aggressively buying reserves of oil all over the world? 

Admiral WILLARD. Congressman Bartlett, I can’t speak to U.S. 

rationale for its oil energy policies in their entirety. I would certainly direct you to the Department of Energy to answer that question, but I would offer to your point China is very much interested 

in energy sources globally, as is India. We have more than one nation, as you know, in the Asia-Pacific region that are both industrial, growing, expanding economies and very much interested in 

energy resources worldwide. Energy security is a concern of the 

United States Pacific Command; both the security of the energy as 

it moves around the world and the potential disputes that challenges and competition over energy could generate. And so we pay 

a great deal of attention to the issues in regions such as the South 

China Sea and emerging regions in the Indian Ocean where energy 

is being tapped. And again to your point, there is great competition 

for this; China, India, Japan and others very much concerned about 

their access to energy and their ability to secure it globally. 

Mr. BARTLETT. At the same time that China is buying oil reserves all over the world, they are very aggressively, as you know, 

sir, building a blue water navy. They don’t really need a blue water 

navy if they are only interested in protecting their shores, do they? 

Won’t a brown water navy do just fine there? 

Admiral WILLARD. The Chinese have been fairly clear in their desire to not only have a navy that can project itself within the region 

immediately surrounding China, but also be influential enough to 

both protect its interests and contribute to global security concerns 

elsewhere beyond the first island chain region and out into the Pacific as well as in the Indian Ocean. As you know, they have committed now for several years to counter piracy operations off the 

Gulf of Aden. I think that their focus is on sea lines of communication that they consider to be vital to their commerce and to their 

economy. 

Mr. BARTLETT. They have 1,300,000 people, 900 million of them 

in rural areas that through the miracle of communications know 

the advantages of industrialized economy, and they are saying, 

Hey, guys, what about us? 

Do you think that there is a possibility that with their need to 

satisfy the needs of this huge population that the time would come 

and they would say, Hey, guys, I am sorry but we own the oil and 

we can’t share it? Wouldn’t that require a big blue water navy to 

make sure they control the sea lanes so that they could absolutely 

certify that the oil was theirs and they would not need to share it 

with the rest of the world? 
9 

Admiral WILLARD. Again, I think China’s view of the need for a 

blue water navy as they see their economy expand and their great 

power status establish itself, they would reflect on other great 

economies and great powers and the use of navies and other arms 

of their military to secure and protect what is theirs. 

I wouldn’t speculate that China has designs on challenging the 

rest of the world with regard to what is on the waterways. In fact 

our military-to-military engagement with China is aimed at both 

learning to coexist with their military and also ensuring that at the 

end they are a constructive contributor to global security and not 

an impediment to it. So I would have a more optimistic view of the 

trends with regard to the PLA–Navy and what their goals are. We 

don’t believe that their goals are to challenge other nations’ access 

to energy or other commerce but rather to secure their own. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, sir. I hope you are right. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We will recess now for votes. We will 

return back as soon as the votes are done. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for your patience. The committee will 

come to order. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, Admiral Willard, 

thank you so much for all of your service, all of these years. You 

have so many great experiences and reflections I am sure. If I get 

through my questions I want to ask you to give Congress a word 

of advice, if you might, from what you have seen in the give and 

take, and it doesn’t all have to be positive. I want you to go out 

on a limb a little bit since you are retiring. Okay? 

The first question I wanted to ask you was about the retiring 

seven cruisers. And I understand that we sometimes get about 35 

years of service, most of these have 20, I know that some are in 

a state of disrepair that they don’t want to move forward with, but 

on the other hand there is a concern about that. Do you share that? 

And what does it take to bring them back to service if in fact we 

do retire them? 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, a great question. In my previous 

assignment I was a Pacific fleet commander and I spent a considerable amount of time worrying over life cycle maintenance and challenges associated with our surface ship Navy. And I have had the 

discussions fairly recently with our Chief of Naval Operations with 

regard to his plans and the 30-year shipbuilding plan in order to 

produce enough ships to be able to accommodate our security needs 

throughout the world. And as was mentioned earlier, as a combatant commander and especially one in a maritime area such as the 

Asia-Pacific, a quantity of surface ships has a quality all its own. 

And there is time distance factors in this area of responsibility that 

are unique in the world. 

The overall ship count in my view matters, but matters less than 

what we do with those ships when we have them. And the Chief 

of Naval Operations I think would attest that his plan calls for a 

gradual increase in our ship count, but that it won’t occur in the 

next several years, it occurs beyond that as a consequence of some 

of the decommissionings and retirements that are ongoing. 
10 

So the short answer is, am I concerned? We are always concerned about the number of ships and type model series of ships 

to meet our needs throughout the world. I have been well served 

both as a Pacific fleet commander and now as a Pacific Command 

commander that the forward-deployed Naval force and the other 

Naval forces concentrated in San Diego and Pearl Harbor and forward in Guam have been adequate to serve our presence needs in 

the region. I am confident that given the priorities that President 

Obama has established and that Secretary Panetta has very much 

supported, the Asia-Pacific will continue to get the number of and 

type of surface ships that it needs. 

We will still have, I think, a little over 80 Aegis ships that will 

continue to serve our Navy. And I know a lot about the life cycle 

challenges that the Chief of Naval Operations faces and his need 

to retire some of these ships earlier than the ideal life cycle would 

have called for. But I think he does that eyes wide open. He does 

that knowing that eventually we will recover from this. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Are they sometimes brought back? 

Admiral WILLARD. They are sometimes brought back. I guess the 

most notable example would be our battleships that were retired 

after World War II and some of those were recovered, recommissioned four times in the course of my career. Actually as they were 

brought back into service for varying conflicts and at varying times 

when we were in buildup periods within our Navy. So it is possible 

to reconstitute the ships that we retire and we can actually put 

ships into lay-up status in a decommissioned status at varying levels so that we can bring them back quicker. Sometimes they take 

longer. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Admiral. I just wanted to say at the 

onset that San Diego is very proud to play the critical role they are 

playing now in the Pacific, and I think we anticipate being able to 

do that. We are not moving and neither is the Navy. So we appreciate that very much. 

My time is up. I just want to, on personnel issues with families 

do you see particular challenges that families and personnel have 

in the Pacific that you would like to address? And you can do that 

with me at another time if you would like. 

Admiral WILLARD. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady’s time has expired if you could respond to her for the record, please. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 65.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Admiral, we do 

thank you for your service. We are going to miss you a great deal 

as you retire, but we thank you for all that you have done. This 

is probably one of the most delicate parts of your job in coming in 

here and testifying and knowing what you can say and what you 

can’t say. But I know that when we established our network of 

bases in the region we did so partly to ensure that we would never 

have to fight our way in again. And the question I would ask you 

is what would be the impact on your ability to perform the duties 

that you need to perform if we were to bring especially the marines 

back on to the continental United States? Because you know we 
11 

have a lot of voices that say we ought to no longer have them forward deployed. 

And the second thing is how much is it going to impact you if 

we do away with the prepositioned stocks that we have been having in the Pacific? 

The third thing, I hate to give you three, but the third one is, 

I am concerned, like you said, sometimes numbers start becoming 

a serious thing in and of themselves. How do you see the comparison between the number of subs we are going to have and the number of subs the Chinese will have over the next 8-year period in the 

Pacific? 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you. Should the marines be withdrawn 

from their period presence in the Pacific to Garrison in the United 

States, it would be very impacting to the United States Pacific 

Command. The marines that are located in Okinawa now on paper, 

about 18,000 strong—they have been decremented over the course 

of the wars to 13,000 or so—are generally our first responders in 

the region, disaster response. We respond to natural disasters in 

the Asia-Pacific region on the average of once every 8 weeks. Most 

recently we were in Thailand and the marines were in Thailand to 

handle some of the deflooding, some of the flooding challenges that 

they had when Thailand experienced the worst flooding in 50 

years. And a year ago nearly today when Japan had its epic series 

of disasters, the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force commander himself and the marines deployed immediately to northern Honshu to 

assist the Japanese ground forces in the recovery efforts following 

the tsunami and earthquake, continued earthquake series that occurred there. 

Our marines are part of every contingency plan that we have. 

And when you consider the time-distance factors in the Pacific, the 

largest ocean in the world, it is very important that we maintain 

the posture and presence forward that we do. In fact I was asked, 

have been asked many times what is most important to you, and 

it is the forward presence within the Asia-Pacific simply because of 

the time-distance challenges that we face there and being able to 

be responsive as flexible as we need to be. 

And I guess the last point I would make is our marines, our 

ground forces, the nations in the Asia-Pacific, even those that are 

some of the largest archipelagos in the world, like Indonesia, and 

Philippines, and even Japan, have militaries that are generally 

ground force centric, they are army centric, surprisingly. And the 

ground forces are a major tool for engagement and capacity building within these nations and our marines play a special role in 

that. So their forward presence to me is very, very vital. 

Mr. FORBES. How about prepositioned stocks? 

Admiral WILLARD. Prepositioned stocks, not just servicing our 

marines but servicing virtually any contingency in the area? Again 

very, very vital. I know that there have been discussions with regard to putting some of our prepositioned stocks into a lesser readiness status. Fortunately there is no plan to do that with our 

prepositioned stocks in Guam or Diego Garcia, and they are vital 

to me as well. So the prepositioned stocks are necessary in our contingency planning but they are also a source that we exercise with 
12 

our marines on a frequent basis to ensure that we know how to use 

them correctly. 

Mr. FORBES. I only have 20 seconds left. Can you hit me with 

your forecast of where we are going to match up over the next 8, 

10 years with our subs versus what you see happening with China 

in the Pacific? 

Admiral WILLARD. Submarine activity in China, the growth in 

both capability and capacity has been impressive to watch in the 

submarine force. And our submarines fortunately are biased 60 

percent in the Pacific and that is very helpful. So it is necessary, 

I think, that the United States maintain a substantial submarine 

force in the Pacific and the forward presence of our submarines as 

well in order to contend with all the challenges that we face there 

and the submarine community contributes to a lot of what we do. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Willard, 

thank you for appearing before this subcommittee today and for 

your many years of service to our Nation. As the chairman has 

mentioned and you mentioned yourself this morning, this will be 

your last appearance in a policy hearing before this committee as 

you will be retiring later this year. With that in mind, I just want 

to thank you again for your nearly 40 years of service to this country and to the sacrifices that you have made to ensure that we continue to have those freedoms that we all enjoy and that so many 

take for granted. You have our most sincere gratitude. 

I would like to start, really to continue on with the discussion 

that my colleague Mr. Forbes just raised with the future of Naval 

assets. With the coming focus, added focus and the pivot to the 

Asia-Pacific region and China’s continued investments in power 

projection and A2/AD [anti access area denial] capabilities, can you 

speak to the future utilization of our submarine force? Specifically, 

can you discuss the need for the capabilities offered by the Virginia 

class submarines and the future challenges presented by a declining submarine fleet size? 

Admiral WILLARD. First, I don’t think there is a question that the 

United States possesses the finest submarine force the world has 

ever seen. And I have every confidence in our submarines in the 

Pacific and anywhere else in the world that they can perform the 

job that they perform and the very quiet way that they go about 

achieving that. So we rely on our submarines greatly for a great 

many things. They are multimission capable assets and we employ 

them globally, and again they serve to secure the Pacific in every 

way. 

The Virginia class submarine is our newest, most formidable, 

and provides increased capacities in some cases that we very much 

need. I am not prejudiced because my wife has sponsored one. I 

would offer that the Virginia class subs are the best submarine the 

world has probably ever seen. And that is not to take away from 

the great service our Los Angeles class have performed. They have 

done remarkably well and they continue to perform remarkably 

well across our oceans. 

Submarines happen to be an area where there is a proliferation 

in this part of the naval forces throughout the Asia-Pacific. Vietnam is acquiring additional submarines, the Japanese are acquir-
13 

ing submarines, Malaysia recently acquired submarines, Indonesia 

has designs on increasing its submarine fleet. India just took possession of a Russian submarine that is very capable. So we see the 

submarine forces in the region themselves proliferating, not to 

mention China’s advancing submarine capability. 

It is important that the submarine forces among our allies and 

partners are coordinated with our own efforts, and again I think 

we establish a pretty good benchmark for everyone to consider in 

terms of how to professionally employ that particular asset. Great 

boats. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. With regard to cyber security, which 

I focus a great deal on, I believe that we can no longer expect to 

have a single domain conflict. I am pleased that you mentioned 

that several times this morning, obviously it is on your radar, and 

you realize what a challenge we face in that area. And quite frankly, the low barriers to entry into the cyber arena means that any 

future conflict will have a cyber dimension. To that end I am very 

concerned about the capabilities of our basis to withstand a cyber 

attack directed against outside supporting infrastructure. So much 

is owned and operated by the private sector which we don’t control, 

such as the electric grid. And I have had conversations with Secretary Panetta, General Dempsey, Secretary Mabus, Admiral 

Greenert, and many others before this committee about the resilience in the face of such a threat. Have you examined the ability 

of our bases in PACOM’s AOR [Area of Responsibility] to operate 

and recover in the event of such an attack? Do you feel that our 

bases and networks are adequately resourced in the cyber domain 

and have the resilience to support full spectrum operations in the 

face of coordinated A2/AD [Anti-Access/Area Denial] cyber threats? 

Admiral WILLARD. I have examined it. I think vulnerabilities 

exist and I am as concerned as you are with regard to the cyber 

threat. I think it threatens not only infrastructure broadly across 

the United States and elsewhere in the region among our allies and 

partners as well, but it also challenges every day my command and 

control capabilities in the region, whether that is to the bases or 

to the forces that are afloat or flying themselves. Cyberspace of all 

the domains is probably the most broadly challenged right now and 

most in need of very strong governance and the necessary authorities to defend it both passively and actively. 

I think Cyber Command was a great initiative on the part of the 

United States. I work very closely with Keith Alexander. We are 

conducting a year long pilot in the Pacific right now trying to advance our cyber defense capabilities and we will continue to do 

that. We have done that for several years, and I think we are making progress. But across domains, I am concerned about the maritime certainly in the region, I am concerned about space, I think 

I am concerned about cyberspace most of all. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you again. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral, 

very much for being here. My father served with the 14th Air 

Force, the Flying Tigers, in India and China. And so, as you know, 

military service impacts your whole family. And so I grew up with 

a real understanding and appreciation of how hardworking and ca-
14 

pable the people of India and China are. It has been really good 

to see the developing relationship with India. Because of my dad’s 

service I became the chairman of the India Caucus. So I have seen 

a relationship develop between our countries. What is the status of 

the partnership with India? 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, great question, and thank you for 

bringing India up and South Asia as a very important subregion 

within the Asia-Pacific. 

The relationship with India is strong and growing stronger. It is 

not without its challenges. We don’t have a great, a long history 

between the countries, as you know. We went through a cold war 

without much of a relationship at all and following the nuclear 

tests in the late 1990s, we suspended relations government-to-government. So we have really only been acquainted with India in the 

past decade. And mil-to-mil we began at a pretty nascent stage and 

have progressed to the point that today we exercise with India 

across all the Services. It is one of the most significant security assistance programs that we have in the Asia-Pacific theater right 

now. I think government-to-government the United States and 

India have made great progress. And I have had the opportunity 

to be introduced into India’s senior leadership and they are very interested in an ongoing relationship with the United States. 

At the same time they pride themselves in what they term strategic autonomy, kind of a nonalliance philosophy. And as a consequence of that, we are challenged in the relationship by virtue 

of India seeking to balance its associations with many other nations as well. We are challenged in our relationship with Pakistan 

as a consequence of the animosity that has existed historically between India and Pakistan. And India is in a very challenged part 

of the world, as we all know, with Afghanistan close by, Pakistan 

is a neighbor, the Kashmir issue which has persisted for a long 

time, and disputed border between India and China. So there are 

a lot of issues on the plate and we are seeking to continue to dialogue with India, terror being one of them, and try to improve the 

relations where we can. 

Mr. WILSON. I was grateful to be in Islamabad last week during 

the same time that the Speaker of the Indian Parliament of all 

things was visiting. And so to see the relationship and trade has 

resumed between India and Pakistan and to me a stable Pakistan, 

the greatest beneficiary would be India. So I hope that is the case. 

In fact too they have a joint enemy, that is LeT. And of course LeT 

led the murderous assault on Mumbai. 

What efforts are being made to counteract that level of terrorism? 

Admiral WILLARD. Yeah, thank you. We have currently special 

forces assist teams, Pacific assist teams is the term, laid down in 

Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives as well as India, and we 

are working very closely with India with regard to their 

counterterrorism capabilities. And in particular on the maritime 

domain, but also government-to-government, not necessarily DOD 

but other agencies assisting them in terms of their internal counter 

terror and counter insurgency. Lashkar-e-Taiba is very dangerous, 

Pakistani based, very good operational security, and a lot of international design in terms of their aspirations. So it is a very impor-
15 

tant threat and we are working very closely with the nations in the 

region to help contain it. 

Mr. WILSON. That is really very positive. Another positive spot 

is Palau and the strategic significance of Palau with the territory 

of Guam that we appreciate so much. For America what are we 

doing working with Palau? 

Admiral WILLARD. We just changed over the small team of engineers that we maintain in Palau on a continual basis. I think our 

Army engineers just turned over with Navy Seabees in a ceremony 

in the region. Palau is one of our compact association states. There 

are three, the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall Islands. Strategically the three provide a southern flank to 

Guam which is obviously a very strategic territory of the United 

States. I am obligated to defend the compact states, and we work 

closely with the compact states on many of their challenges. Small 

teams of engineers is one method of doing that, but we also frequently visit with Pacific partnership and Pacific angel, the hospital ship, and provide engineering, veterinary and medical services 

where we can. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Admiral 

Willard, thank you for your dedicated service and your testimony 

today, and I know this will be one of your last times before Congress. I want to take this opportunity to thank you and your wife 

Donna for the services to our country. I think you are the Navy’s 

number one team. 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you. 

Ms. BORDALLO. As you know, the realignment of marines from 

Guam to Okinawa has recently undergone significant changes. And 

I appreciate DOD’s recent efforts to address local concerns about 

the rotational forces. However, I do remain concerned that this decision was driven primarily by concerns raised in the Senate, not 

this committee, as well as budgetary considerations. 

Can you elaborate on the strategic rationale for these proposed 

changes? Aren’t we just potentially shifting costs from MILCON 

[Military Construction] over to O&M [Operations and Maintenance] 

accounts over the long term? 

Admiral WILLARD. I have been part of the Global Posture Review 

by the Department of Defense over the course of the last couple of 

years. Former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates, as you recall, called 

for that review following the last Quadrennial Defense Review. And 

the posture review has been a hard look at where United States 

Pacific Command forces are. 

Notwithstanding defense policy review initiative with Japan, but 

where they are broadly. And there was a strong desire to balance 

the forces more effectively in Southeast Asia and South Asia. Right 

now as you know, all of the permanent forces, with the exception 

of those in Guam and those in Singapore, are by and large in 

Northeast Asia. Whether or not they are permanently based or rotational forces is inconsequential, frankly, to me. I can work with 

either one. There are benefits to both. 

In general, when we think of our foreign partners and their appetite for permanent bases, there isn’t one. So rotational force pres-
16 

ence, for example in Darwin, Australia, I think will be very effective. 

What is most important to me is that the forces that we have 

present in Guam and elsewhere are maintained at a readiness level 

where they can be the first responders in the region so they have 

to dwell there long enough to be trained and exercised and 

equipped, resourced and engaging on a fairly continuous basis. 

So the duration with which they are present in Guam matters 

to me. And the work, the ability to lift those marines or other 

forces where they can do the most good matters to me as well. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Admiral. The next question I have is 

last year General Dunford testified before the Readiness Subcommittee that it would take seven consecutive miracles to move 

marines from CONUS [Continental United States] to respond to 

contingencies or operational plans in PACOM AOR if portions of 

the III MEF [Marine Expeditionary Forces] were based in CONUS. 

Now, do you share this view and could you elaborate on some of 

the strategic considerations why III MEF, Marine Expeditionary 

Forces, need to remain in the PACOM AOR? 

Admiral WILLARD. Well, the Pacific Command AOR, just as a review, extends from the West Coast of the United States to a dividing line between India and Pakistan. But the fact that it covers 

half the world and that the Asia-Pacific theater extends entirely 

across the Pacific Ocean, the strategic imperative that the marines 

be forward and present exists. In fact that is true for all the Service forces. 

So the fact that we have Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, 

and Special Operations Forces readily accessible, forward and 

present in the Asia-Pacific, very crucial because of the lift requirements at great expense and time to cover the distances involved in 

bringing them from garrison in the United States. So very, very important strategically to Pacific Command that the forces are forward and accessible. 

And we talk about forces beyond the international dateline. 

Frankly, I think the forces that are located in Hawaii are strategic 

in terms of their ability to respond into the region. But forces on 

the West Coast become more problematic simply because they have 

to be mobilized and moved such a great distance. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral, and again 

thank you for your service to our country. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, thank you for 

your service and certainly your distinguished career. 

I chair the Strategic Forces subcommittee so as you go from that 

subcommittee we have nuclear weapons, missiles, missile defense, 

space—several areas that overlap within your area of expertise. I 

have three questions. Two I am going to lump together, even 

though they are not similar. The two I lump together I know you 

can provide an answer as your perspective on these occurrences. 

Secretary Gates referenced when he was at the Shangri-la conference in June of 2011 a potential new North Korea mobile intercontinental ballistic missile. He said: With the continued developments of long-range missiles and potentially a road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile and their continued development of nu-
17 

clear weapons, North Korea is in the process of becoming a direct 

threat to the United States. 

Admiral, I would like your thoughts on the development by 

North Korea of this ballistic missile technology, a road-mobile 

intercontinental ballistic missile, and your thoughts on what must 

be done to counter such a threat. 

And then secondly, our subcommittee held a hearing last year on 

Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons modernization programs. 

And one hearing that I had I think was the first actually in Congress to discuss a report authored by Dr. Phil Karber, and the report detailed an unclassified report of the existence of a large Chinese tunneling program, perhaps 5,000 kilometers of tunnels. In 

fact, the tunneling seems to have doubled from 25 kilometers to 

5,000 kilometers in the past 20 years. 

Would you please discuss why you believe China is racing to construct these elaborate underground facilities and what are they trying to protect, hold at risk? How many of these tunnels are we able 

to hold at risk with our U.S. nuclear weapons technology? What do 

you propose or suppose the tunnel’s purpose is, Admiral? 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, Congressman. First on the issue 

of road-mobile, as you know we are challenged by mobile missile 

systems. That is why they are created. I mean, holding mobile missile systems at risk is always problematic for any armed force and 

we are no exception. 

There is development within North Korea of a road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile system that we have observed. We 

have not observed it being tested yet, to my knowledge, and we are 

watching the development very closely. 

The missile system is advertised to be significant in terms of its 

range capability, and I think it is something that we will continue 

to monitor very, very closely as it develops. And you know, what 

will it mean to us when it proves itself? There will be a decision 

made with regard to how we posture to deal with what could be 

something less predictable than Taepo Dong II or some of the other 

ballistic missile capabilities that are a little more easy to observe. 

Mr. TURNER. Before we go on to China, as you just said, the ability to hold the missile at risk because it is mobile means I am presuming that there should be that much more of increased focus on 

defense, if this is a system that we should face in its use; is that 

correct? 

Admiral WILLARD. I think that is one of the posture options that 

will have to be considered, yes. 

Mr. TURNER. And the Chinese tunnels? 

Admiral WILLARD. Many nations in the Asia-Pacific region utilize 

hardening of facilities in order to provide for their security, their 

defense. I would offer that North Korea is a prime example of this, 

where tunneling is very much a part of the defensive infrastructure 

in the—among the armed forces in North Korea with regard to 

their being hardened and defensible. We see it, frankly, in many 

locations. China, no exception. The tunneling activities associated 

with China’s submarine force is very obvious and have been widely 

publicized. 
18 

When we anticipate the purpose of that, the purpose of that is 

generally to provide both a hardened environment for the force 

structure that they utilize there, whatever that happens to be. 

Mr. TURNER. Which you presume to be? 

Admiral WILLARD. I think we would take that into closed session 

and discuss it. But, again, there is the point of hardening. There 

is also the point of being able to move forces in tunnels, 

unobserved. So there are a variety of benefits that come from developing underground facilities to occupy the needs of the Armed 

Forces. And again, China is one example; there are many in the 

world. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Ms. Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Admiral, 

for your incredible service to our country and to your spouse for 

standing with you. 

I have a question. As we move into an era of shrinkage in terms 

of our fleets, and we look at new ways to be innovative and efficient, I am told that there are ways in which we can transfer our 

troops from our large ships by keeping them in the—in place, rather than spending 6 months getting to where they are supposed to 

be serving their time there, and then spending 6 months returning 

to the United States for maintenance and repair. And in particular, 

there is a suggestion that has been made by a number of people 

who are fairly noteworthy, that we could basically fly in new troops 

to these destroyers and cruisers rather than have them moving 

across the waterways long distances that take as much as 6 

months. Do you have any thoughts on that? 

Admiral WILLARD. Being a sailor and having deployed 6 or more 

months many, many times, I certainly have an opinion on it. I 

think that—a couple of important things to note. First of all, the 

suggestion that we can fly in, fly out crews and locate a ship in a 

distant port has been experimented with in fairly recent times 

within the last decade. We have attempted to at least demonstrate 

the capability to do this. It comes at some expense. There are disadvantages to it. And one of the disadvantages is the ability of that 

ship to be brought back to a location where it can be maintained 

properly. 

So it is generally, if we talk about ships forward in Australia or 

ships forward in Singapore, there has to be a place to service those 

ships when they require it, in order to achieve the life cycle duration that we desire out of those ships. And there is the continuity 

associated with a crew manning a ship for a long period of time. 

So flying in, flying out crews is also a challenge that has to be overcome in that scenario. 

That said, one of the discussions that we are having regarding 

the overture that Singapore made to perhaps utilize Changi Naval 

Base for our littoral combat ships, one of the concepts for doing 

that would be a rotational presence of the ship’s crew. So it is possible, it comes with advantages and disadvantages. It is not without cost. And I think there are times when it is appropriate. 

I think the rotational cycle that we have developed with the 

ships coming out of the major force concentration area, fleet concentration areas in the United States has been effective. And it is 
19 

not as if we are not conducting business as soon as we leave port, 

I mean, whether it is training and exercise or whether it is the opportunity to touch many areas across the Pacific. The transit of 

ships is not without utility to me I guess is the way I would put 

it. 

Ms. SPEIER. So you are suggesting there is a cost associated to 

it. What I have been told is that you can do with 31⁄2 ships what 

normally takes 5 ships and you can actually see an efficiency of 40 

percent. So I am a little confused as to whether there are cost savings here or costs associated with doing that. 

Admiral WILLARD. Well, there will be costs either way. Once 

again, the idea of rotating crews forward to man up a ship, leaving 

that ship in place, comes with its own dynamics in terms of how 

we manage that ship’s maintenance cycles and so forth. So it is not 

without its challenges. 

What you are referring to is what it takes to maintain a single 

ship forward in terms of the cyclical nature of deployment, when 

we are conducting forward deployment. And typically it is about 

four to make one, to your point. 

I would again contend that there are advantages to that. One of 

the advantages is the ability to return the ship and return the 

crews to a home base and a level of continuity and maintenance 

continuity that advantages the ship. And it is not as if there is a 

point A, point B in this calculus. When ships transit the Pacific, 

we have them working the entire time they are in transit, whether 

it is in the southern Pacific, island nations, territorial areas, or 

whether it is forward in the western Pacific or whether it is in the 

Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf region. So—— 

Ms. SPEIER. My time has expired. 

Admiral WILLARD. Ships that deploy are continually in work. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Willard, 

thank you so much for joining us today. I deeply appreciated you 

hosting our congressional delegation that visited the Pacific Command during the summertime. That was one of the most eye-opening and rewarding experiences of my service here in Congress. So 

I thank you. And thank you for your 39 years of service to our Nation and to our Navy. From being a squadron commander to carrier 

commander, to fleet command, to being part of what I think is one 

of the greatest movies ever made, that is an absolutely stellar career. We deeply, deeply appreciate it. It is an honor to have men 

such as yourself leading our All Volunteer Force. 

And Donna, thank you for your unlimited passion for our sailors 

and for our Navy and your commitment. You have been a stellar 

example of service and sacrifice to our Nation and to our military. 

So thank you so much. It is great to have such a great Navy family 

out there serving this Nation. So we deeply appreciate that. 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. I wanted to ask this question. You had spoken 

about the new strategy in the Asia-Pacific. As we look at that, and 

we are looking at $487 billion in reductions to defense budgets, my 

question is this: Are you going to be able to achieve that new strat-
20 

egy with these reductions? And I think you are being asked to do 

an awful lot with a lot less. 

And if we look at what is happening, you look at the SCN [Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy] Navy account being reduced, you 

look at the number of ships being reduced. You also see some decommissioning of ships before the end of their service lives. You see 

a number of programs being moved to the right, outside of the 

FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], the SSNs, we are going 

down 1 year to a single ship being built that year. The F–35, the 

SSBN(X). It seems like we are asking an awful lot. 

And my question is: In the Pacific Command, will there be the 

assets, the ships, the planes necessary for you to be able to carry 

out that mission? It seems like we are asking an awful lot with this 

big shift, but we are doing it in a time of some pretty severe reductions in resources. I want to get your perspective on how you see 

that unfolding. 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you. First, Congressman, I think you 

characterize it very well. It should be a concern for all of us that 

the actions that we take with the fleet and with the other Service 

forces that we have are the right ones in accordance with a strategic design. I think that one of the real strengths of what President Obama and Secretary Panetta unfolded as a set of strategic 

priorities was to try and establish the places in the world that we 

felt from a security standpoint were of the greatest importance for 

our Nation, and I was pleased but not surprised that the Asia-Pacific was prominent in that discussion. 

What that means is that the commitment we are making is that 

we will put the forces into those highest priority regions that are 

required. And I think that is the answer to your question. I would 

anticipate that my successor will vocalize his requirements very 

clearly to the Pentagon and elsewhere, and that by and large these 

requirements will be met. 

I think in the Aegis we are challenged across the Services with 

regard to these budgets. And should, heaven forbid, sequestration 

or other very severe cuts take place, then I think the Department 

of Defense is going to be challenged to execute to these set of priorities. But I think the strength in the work that has been done is 

to try to establish a strategy whereby we can make the right decisions with regard to where the forces go. 

Mr. WITTMAN. I want to get a little bit of your perspective about 

things that are happening currently with China. As your great career as a naval aviator, you spent a lot of time in the Asia-Pacific. 

You also were there at a time when we watched the buildup in 

Russia through the seventies and eighties. We watched that Cold 

War scenario. We have seen that wane. You have also been a part 

of watching a buildup in China, an exertion of China’s influence in 

that particular region. 

What do you see as the biggest challenge for us in the Asia-Pacific in years to come? And having that metric of the Russian buildup in the Cold War, where do you see the United States being 5 

years, 10 years, 15 years down the road in the Asia-Pacific with 

what is currently happening in China and elsewhere, even in 

places like North Korea? 
21 

Admiral WILLARD. Chairman McKeon talked about the more 

than $5 trillion of commerce, of which a sizable portion is U.S. commerce that is on the water in the South China Sea. As we look forward to our greatest challenges it is going to be the ability to coexist among all of the nations in the Asia-Pacific region, China being 

one of them. And right now, one of my daunting strategic challenges is to engage effectively with China and with the People’s 

Liberation Army in order to be able to coexist and both contribute 

to the security of this region for its future prosperity. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Hanabusa. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Hi, Admiral. 

Admiral WILLARD. Aloha. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Aloha. I was going to tell you the same thing. I 

won’t repeat my colleagues, especially Congressman Wittman, but 

my mahalo to both you and Donna for everything that you have 

done. And I would like to add to that my mahalo on behalf of the 

people of the State of Hawaii. You have been absolutely great. You 

have embraced them and I think they have embraced the both of 

you right back. 

Having said that, Admiral, you know one of the things that we 

take for granted is munitions. Do you have any concerns regarding 

the DOD’s current inventory of munitions? 

Admiral WILLARD. I do. The short answer is yes, I have concerns. 

When we look across our munitions inventories, notwithstanding 

what has been expended over the past 10 years, there exists gaps 

and shortfalls and insufficiencies in a variety of different areas. In 

the new strategic design in terms of priorities, there is emphasis 

on improving our missile defense capabilities, as one example, and 

our crew missile capability. So we think that there will be advances 

in some munitions inventories. But the short answer to do I have 

concerns? The answer is yes. 

When we talk about major operations, nation state level operations, there are munitions, acquisition production rates, and in 

some cases insufficiencies that we have got to overcome. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So how does that look in terms of the fiscal year 

2013 budget request? Are we procuring a sufficient number of 

weapons to basically ensure you and other combatant commanders 

the sufficient numbers that you will need? 

Admiral WILLARD. We have spent the last couple of years articulating the munitions status very clearly into the Department of Defense. And I have had a good association with Deputy Under Secretary Carter and others with regard to determining what to do 

about some of the munitions challenges that we face. 

Again, the 2013 budget will improve some areas that we have regarded as critical in the past, specifically related to ballistic missile 

defense where the production rates of SM3s and other capabilities 

have been limited—and cruise missile inventories. There remain 

other areas in which we are challenged. And our responsibility has 

been and will continue to be to articulate those as clearly as we can 

so that the Services make the appropriate investments to try and 

overcome some of these shortfalls. 

Ms. HANABUSA. I guess in another conversation before you retire, 

we can see where those other areas are. 
22 

Now, Admiral, we have had this discussion before, but I would 

like you to be able to walk us through. We talked about basically 

rotational bases and afloat. Now, we know kind of what that 

means, but can you use the remainder of this time to tell us what 

do you envision when we talk about rotational bases and we have 

basically service men afloat, especially since we are going to be forwarding them to areas where we don’t have bases, traditional 

bases? 

Admiral, WILLARD. Thank you. When we talk about posture, we 

are generally talking about where we are either permanently based 

or where we are able to rotate from. So Hawaii is a permanent 

base for us. We have a fleet concentration area there. We have 

some very significant strategic assets, such as the shipyard there 

that we are able to operate from and we deploy and we employ the 

forces that are stationed in Hawaii. 

Elsewhere, such as the offering made by Singapore, Australia, in 

terms of the Darwin marines, and the discussions that we are currently having with the Philippines, may afford us opportunities to 

rotate forces—not fly, in fly out, but it is a term they use—but essentially bring forces forward, allow them to train and operate from 

those bases for a temporary period of time, and then replace them 

with other forces that will in turn rotate. 

So we have the responsibility to posture correctly. And then 

there is the presence requirement, which is entirely different. This 

is where day to day, the forces should be operating to engage with 

other countries to exercise or to be present to help secure the AsiaPacific region. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So when we are talking about a rotational type 

of force and they are deploying from a particular area, like the 

Philippines or Darwin, are they envisioned to have—to live there 

for a period of time? To have actual quarters there? 

Admiral WILLARD. They have quarters there, yes. We do not anticipate that they will be taking their families there, so there is not 

a permanence to their presence there. They will dwell there to exercise with their Australian counterparts and eventually deploy 

into the region where we need them. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Palazzo. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Admiral Willard, 

thank you for being here and thank you for your service to your 

country. I was on Chairman Wittman’s CODEL [Congressional Delegation] to PACOM and I would have to say it was—I echo everything that he said. Eye opening. It was very professional. Your 

staff was wonderful. It was definitely a learning experience and 

also ratified a lot of the concerns I guess we pick up in our dayto-day job. But it elevated it to put it on our radar, and that is 

what Secretary Panetta and the President and their new defense 

strategy kind of echoes as well; that we are looking at emerging 

threats, we are looking at the security and safety and safe passage 

of our shipping lanes because of the commerce and the economies 

and the fragile alliances that are out there. And there is no way 

to separate America’s national security from our economic security 

and vice versa. 
23 

One of the things that I did pick up throughout—and many of 

my questions have already been answered—was talking to our 

friends in the Philippines, Japan, the Republic of Korea, was that 

they want to know what we were doing. They were looking to us 

for leadership. Not only just, you know, just the leadership that 

America has provided for hundreds of years, but of course they are 

wanting to know what our fiscal affairs are like and are we getting 

our house in order. Because my takeaway was that we have some 

very good friends over there, but at the end of the day they are 

worried about their personal security and stability of their nation 

and their sovereignty, and that if we had a reduction of force or 

we started doing some shifting back and forth, that these alliances 

could be put into jeopardy. Would you care to comment on that? 

Admiral WILLARD. I think you make great points. And our alliances and partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region are the great opportunities that exist there. And our current alliances with nations 

such as Japan and South Korea, the Philippines, Australia and 

Thailand, to name our allies, are very, very important to the overall security of the region. And to your point, there is a refrain there 

that expresses concern about the staying power of the United 

States, the commitment to the region which has been allayed, 

frankly, in the last couple of years because of the very strong commitment that this Administration and our various secretaries have 

made to the Asia-Pacific. 

But there is a concern, especially witnessing the economic situation that the United States finds itself in regarding our ability to 

sustain ourselves and be influential and continue to be a partner 

in the region, and I assure them that we will, and assure them that 

a presence—forward presence remains paramount to the United 

States. 

So I am frankly, you know, very pleased to see the emphasis that 

the Asia-Pacific has received in this strategic design by this administration and our Secretary. And I think it is vital to the region to 

take that message and then to see us back it up with the actions 

that we take. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Well, if the opportunity comes up again to go back 

on a PACOM CODEL, Mr. Chairman, please put my name and Ms. 

Bordallo’s on there too, I think she would like to go. Because we 

just touched the surface and we would like to learn a lot more 

about our assets over there. 

Now, knowing that this has become part of the emerging, possible emerging threats somewhere that we have to have on our 

radar, I am concerned that the Secretary and others, not just the 

Navy and the Army and other branches of Services, that their rhetoric is really not matching the reality or the level of concern that 

we may have in this region, because we are looking forward to the 

30-year shipbuilding plan. Are we going to be at 313 ships, or is 

it going to be less than that? So we are all anxious to look at that. 

Are we going to have the resources and assets in the theater to 

address this? But it looks like we are going to be decommissioning 

ships decades before their useful lives are up. We are pushing new 

shipbuilding to the right. A lot of these things just do not make a 

lot of sense. We are saying there are future threats, but at the 
24 

same time we are not going to address them currently. What do 

you see as your most important needs for the next 5 years? 

Admiral WILLARD. The sustainment of the force structure and 

forward presence of that force structure that we have enjoyed in 

the past, and the additions that will come out of the conclusion of 

the last two wars that have occurred. So there is a reconstitution 

that is ongoing, and certainly the capacities that the United States 

Armed Forces have are important to us. That they be biased appropriately into the Asia-Pacific region is very important to the AsiaPacific Command. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, good to see 

you, and thank you for hosting us a few months back, the small 

business panel, as part of this committee. We had a great set of 

visits out there, and appreciate the time out there. 

I have four questions. They are kind of all over the place. I will 

be quick with each one of them and if you could answer them one 

at a time. Can you characterize the relationship with Indonesia? 

Admiral WILLARD. Very strong, 140 or so activities annually with 

Indonesia. Very impressed, frankly, with President Yudhoyono and 

his democratic government and the progress that they have made, 

particularly in military reform. And we are reengaged with 

KOPASSUS [Indonesian Army Special Forces Command] at a pace, 

but nonetheless reengaged. They are effective in counterterrorism 

and they are reaching out to many countries but particularly to the 

United States. 

Mr. LARSEN. Great. Second, we are shifting from P3s to P8s now, 

and Whidbey Island is part of that and Jacksonville is part of that. 

Can you just talk briefly about the role—what the P8s will be giving you versus moving from the P3s and what the P8s might give 

you in the Pacific Command? 

Admiral WILLARD. I think in general we get dwell from those assets that we haven’t—that we just can’t enjoy from an asset like 

the P3. So we are very much looking forward to the fact that this 

is a jet that can move quickly, and it is going to come with a great 

deal of capability. 

So the P8 will be a great addition in what is an inherently maritime area of responsibility. I have great use for them and we are 

very much looking forward to a P8 community out there. 

Mr. LARSEN. Great. I think when you first sat down in my office 

when you first started as PACOM, we had this discussion about— 

PACOM had just started, or was in the middle of further discussions with the Government of Japan about ballistic missile defense 

and the operations of BMD [Ballistic Missile Defense], not necessarily the cooperation, but how it is going to be operating. Can 

you give an update on that? 

Admiral WILLARD. I think the Japanese have advanced greatly. 

We continue to team in this, as you would expect, very much, 7th 

Fleet with the Japanese self-defense force. Able to work ballistic 

missile defense scenarios into many of the exercises that we perform. I right now regard the Japanese as a very credible BMD force 

and continuing to grow in its capacities. 

Mr. LARSEN. So any issues left over from the operational questions that existed because of the—it was embedded—the problem 
25 

was embedded in the Japanese Constitution about self-defense and 

whether or not we could fully operate BMD if we needed to if there 

was a fly-over—to fly over the islands. 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you. I think these are manageable 

issues. What I have learned over the past 21⁄2 years is that in 

working closely with the Japanese—and, frankly, their defense 

force appropriately brings their civilian oversight into the room frequently as we have these discussions—they have been very good 

about educating the Diet and others in the Ministry of Defense 

with regard to what it really takes to defend Japan. And as you 

know, I have that responsibility. 

So in the deliberations that we have with the Japanese joint staff 

and others in developing the concepts to cooperate in ballistic missile defense, I think there has grown a good understanding of the 

requirements to accomplish this. There continue to be constitutional limitations in what those Japanese defense forces can do, as 

you you know. But again I think in the way in which we have 

structured our tactics, techniques, and procedures we are able to 

work our way through those. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. And finally, the last page of your testimony 

you discuss JPAC [Joint Personnel Accounting Command], specifically China, Burma, and DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of 

Korea]. Could you maybe briefly touch on maybe Burma, what next 

steps we are going to be taking to continue recovery operations 

there? 

Admiral WILLARD. We are going to move back into Burma—we 

have been there before, as you know—but looking very much forward to that opportunity. And with the level of cooperation that we 

have seen from the Burmese Government recently, the overtures 

that they have made and some of the reforms that they are committing themselves to, I think we will have less concern about the 

security of those forces when, in fact, they go in there. So the Personnel Accounting Command is very busy out in the Asia-Pacific 

and, frankly, globally right now, and ready to move back into the 

DPRK, to your point. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, Ma’am, thank 

you for your service to our country. Admiral, I was glad to hear you 

say that China’s goal, you thought, was to be a constructive contributor, if you will, to commerce and peace in the region. Did I understand that correctly? 

Admiral WILLARD. I think they would certainly assert that, and 

despite the challenges that we face and continue to endeavor to 

overcome, it is my hope as well. 

Mr. SCOTT. Could you speak to the cross-strait relationships between China and Taiwan? And I guess what you said is the first 

I have heard that, and certainly respect your opinion. But they 

keep approximately 1,500 missiles and rockets pointed at Taiwan 

which certainly would lead you to believe that maybe they weren’t 

going to be such a constructive contributor, if you will, to peace in 

that region. Could you speak to that briefly? 

Admiral WILLARD. There is very impressive combat power across 

the strait on mainland China. Whether that is integrated air de-
26 

fense system, ballistic—offensive ballistic missile capabilities or 

force structure in their ports and airfields. It is very impressive. It 

has been there a long time now, several years, and has not diminished. They continue to improve the capability. So in terms of a 

balance of power, I mean, it is generally one-sided. 

The cross-strait relations have improved since President Ma was 

elected in 2008 and reelected just last year, we have witnessed improved relationships between mainland—the People’s Republic of 

China and Taiwan. And we anticipate that will continue with 

President Ma’s reelection. And we are encouraged by that, frankly. 

That said, the combat power, as you allude, is somewhat incongruous to those improved relations cross-strait. But as they improve their relationship economically and diplomatically, we think 

that it should lower the likelihood of coercion or conflict taking 

place. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. And when I woke up this morning and 

saw the news, the comments about North Korea and our food aid 

in exchange for them stopping their nuclear programs, how optimistic should we be that there will be a long-term change, if you 

will, in the approach of North Korea’s leadership towards nuclear 

weapons, if you will? 

Admiral WILLARD. First to clarify, in the ongoing negotiations 

that have been going on, there are discussions of food aid. There 

have been now for, by and large, the past year. And the United 

States has been engaged in discussions very recently with regard 

to quantities of food that we anticipate providing to North Korea 

on the humanitarian side. In the same discussion but a separate 

topic, has been the discussion of nuclearization and the efforts to 

verifiably denuclearize North Korea. 

We have a new—a new successor in North Korea, as you know, 

since Kim Jong-il passed. He passed on leadership to his 29-yearold son, Kim Jong-un. We know something of him, not everything. 

We are observing closely the actions of the new administration in 

Pyongyang with regard to how they will deal with a variety of security and coercive strategy issues, nuclearization being one of them. 

And we are encouraged by the outcome of the talks that talked 

about the possibility of IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] 

being let back into Yongbyon [Nuclear Scientific Research Center] 

and the cessation of some of the activities, including ballistic missile development. But I think this is something that we need to 

watch very carefully, wait and see. In the past we have not seen 

much change out of what is now a third generation of leadership 

in Pyongyang. 

Mr. SCOTT. Hopeful, but not optimistic; Is that it? 

Admiral WILLARD. I think that is well said. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, Admiral, with 10 seconds left to go, I represent 

Robins Air Force Base, home of the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance 

and Target Attack Radar System]. I know that they have flown 

many missions for you and I certainly would appreciate your support of that platform as we go forward. 

Admiral WILLARD. It is a brilliant platform and you certainly 

have my support. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Coffman. 
27 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Willard thank 

you so much for your service to our country and your role as the 

commanding officer for U.S. Pacific Command. And I wish you the 

best in retirement, which will be coming up pretty soon. 

First, if I understand it right, we no longer have ground forces 

in the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea; is that 

correct? 

Admiral WILLARD. That is correct. We continue to—our United 

Nations commander, J.D. Thurman, General Thurman, continues 

to be responsible for the overall security across the DMZ [demilitarized zone] and maintenance of the armistice. But the forces that 

were previously forward on the DMZ have been relocated. 

Mr. COFFMAN. And is there a plan to give operational control to 

the South Korean military? 

Admiral WILLARD. In December 2015 is the currently scheduled 

date. As you will recall, the 2012 date passed and there was a 

delay. But right now, what we term operational control transition 

is scheduled to occur in December 2015. 

Mr. COFFMAN. And am I right to understand—I think we have 

28,000 U.S. military personnel, about that number—— 

Admiral WILLARD. Roughly. 

Mr. COFFMAN [continuing]. In South Korea today? 

Admiral WILLARD. We do. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Now, is there still in place a plan for a multimillion-dollar military construction program to bring the families 

up, sort of as a program for tour normalization in South Korea? 

Where is that right now? 

Admiral WILLARD. Somewhat in suspension, I guess is the best 

way to term it. And J.D., I am sure when he testifies, will provide 

you the details on that. But looking at the number of families that 

currently reside in South Korea with their service member, I think 

J.D. recognizes that in this fiscal environment, completing tour 

normalization as it was originally scoped is probably not viable, 

and he is continuing now to look at it and dialogue with the Pentagon with regard to what he perceives to be the right mix of families and service members, both accompanied and unaccompanied, 

on the peninsula. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Do you know if they are having—one thing that 

the United States Army does versus the Marine Corps, and I 

served in both, is the Army tends to on some of its forward-deployed units rotate individuals in and out of those units, whereas 

the United States Marine Corps rotates units at the battalion level 

in and out of the area of operation. So is the Army having a discussion to move to more of a rotational basis for forces as opposed to 

assigning individuals? Are you aware of any discussion like that? 

Admiral WILLARD. No, I am not, though there is an ongoing discussion with regard to the Army in the Asia-Pacific region writ 

large, and how, with a reconstituted ground force following the two 

wars, the Army intends to support my needs in the region. 

I would offer that the Army forces on the Korean peninsula, especially given the decisions that have been made recently with regard to tour normalization and us, you know, slowing or stopping 

this now, are the dominant ground force on the peninsula, where 

the marines are down in Okinawa, Japan. 
28 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. After we reach—after we hand over operation and control to the South Koreans, if we are able to achieve 

that in 2015, are there any projections as to drawing down our 

forces at that point in time? 

Admiral WILLARD. There are not. Operational control is at the 

leadership level. And this is now to say that rather than the 

United States commanding the defense of the Republic of Korea in 

wartime, that the Republic of Korea themselves will command and 

the United States will be in support. So that 28,000 or so ground 

forces that we have maintained on the peninsula throughout the 

period since the war and during armistice are intended to continue 

to support the defense of the Republic of Korea. 

Mr. COFFMAN. The South Koreans, as I understand it, are spending 2.7 percent of their gross domestic product, their GDP, on defense. The U.S. right now is about 4.7 percent. What kind of burden sharing—maybe you could get back to me because we are running out of time. I wonder if you all could get back to me, Admiral, 

as to what exactly the South Koreans are paying in terms to support our presence in the peninsula. 

Admiral WILLARD. We will provide those numbers to you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 65.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, Donna, once again on behalf of the entire committee, we thank you very much for your 39 years of service. Wish you all the best in the new venture that you will be embarking on shortly. And this committee stands adjourned. 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

your continued support for our Armed Forces. 

[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 1, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 1, 2012 

(33) 

Statement of Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Budget 

Request from U.S. Pacific Command 

March 1, 2012 

Our economy and security has never been more dependent on our 

military, especially in the Asia-Pacific Region. The President’s new 

strategy focuses on a so-called ‘‘pivot to Asia-Pacific.’’ While I don’t 

question the critical importance of this theater, I am concerned 

that our forces may not be properly postured to support this shift. 

The Chief of Naval Operations has said that ship and aircraft deployments in the Pacific would remain at current levels. Over the 

next 5 years, we will cut 16 ships out of our new construction budget and retire 9 more. Further, our tanking and airlift capacity will 

be reduced, limiting our ability to project power and sustain our 

forces. This budget does not address reductions to our nuclear deterrent. But the Administration is reportedly contemplating unilateral reductions below New START levels. As you have discussed 

often with us, quantity does have a quality all its own—especially 

in a theater that covers half of the Earth’s surface. 

We must be prepared to effectively respond with the needed 

manpower and assets. As I stated at last year’s hearing, it is important our forces in the Pacific have the personnel, training, 

equipment, and the authorities they need to instill confidence in 

our allies, deter aggression, and remain ready to respond decisively 

to any contingency. It is not yet clear how the new strategy will 

meet these goals. 

Events in Asia can change rapidly, as we saw in December with 

the death of North Korean dictator Kim Jong-il. Alongside our 

South Korean allies, our forces must be ready to deter further 

North Korean provocations. 

China’s growing influence creates concern for many of our regional allies. The balance of power across the Taiwan Straits continues to shift in the direction of Beijing. The South China Sea is 

a vital shipping lane through which more than 5 trillion dollars in 

trade pass each year. Deterring, delaying, or denying U.S. forces 

from operating along China’s periphery is still a key goal of the 

People’s Liberation Army. As China’s military budget continues to 

grow annually by double digits, the PLA is focused on improving 

their capacities to counter U.S. military capabilities and exploit our 

weaknesses. 
34 

We also see the growing threat of terrorism in region, as aims 

of certain groups like LeT [Lashkar-e-Tayyiba] expand beyond their 

traditional border disputes. 

In partnership with our allies and friends, our forces must stand 

ready to respond to unprovoked, hostile behavior and defend our 

regional allies and security interests. We look forward to your testimony shedding additional light on these matters and the range of 

security challenges we face in the Pacific. 
35 

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith 

Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Budget 

Request from U.S. Pacific Command 

March 1, 2012 

I would like to welcome Admiral Willard and thank him for making a long journey to be here with us today. I look forward to his 

expert testimony on a variety of important matters. 

Earlier this year, the President released the findings of a strategic review, which clearly articulated the global threat environment, and presented a broad strategy to address those threats moving forward. This strategic review appropriately places a renewed 

focus on the critically important Asia-Pacific region, a shift that 

will surely call for additional resources and an enhanced role for 

U.S. Pacific Command. 

The Asia-Pacific region is a vital region of the world that includes a number of important U.S. allies and partners. Without 

question, U.S. service men and women play a crucial role in maintaining these relationships and in promoting peace in the Pacific. 

Many of our partners in the regions are concerned about the recent rise of China. While I do not believe that a conflict with China 

is inevitable, we should continue to work to promote mutual interests, mitigate concerns, and perpetuate multilateral cooperation in 

the region. We should also continue to develop our security relationship with India and continue to strengthen existing relationships with partners such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and 

Singapore. 

Transnational threats, such as violent extremism, cyber-threats, 

and illicit trafficking in persons, narcotics, and weapons continue 

to menace the region. Disease, malnourishment, environmental 

degradation, resource scarcity, and natural disaster do as well. The 

more we can do to defuse tensions through cooperative efforts with 

our many allies and strategic partners in the region, the more we 

can help to realize the immense potential for growth in the region. 

The United States will continue to lead in the Pacific and to offer 

assurances through our forward military presence in the region, 

and the U.S. Pacific Command’s flexible force posture will continue 

to be essential to surmounting security challenges now and in the 

future. 

While I believe that the defense budget provides PACOM with 

the resources necessary for securing our strategic objectives, I 

would like to remind the Committee that the defense budget is consistent with the Budget Control Act that was passed by Congress. 

Although I did not support passage of that law, many members of 

the House Armed Services Committee did. The Department of Defense submitted a budget that complies with congressionally mandated funding levels and that supports our strategic objectives. 
36 

I look forward to receiving your testimony and to continuing our 

dialogue on these and other important issues. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 
37 
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 1, 2012 

(65) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

[See page 10.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

[See page 28.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 1, 2012 

(69) 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON 

Mr. MCKEON. A recent report issued by the Congressional Research Service points 

out that China has repeatedly suspended its mil-to-mil contacts with the United 

States as a retaliatory measure for various U.S. actions. It also describes the limitations of those relationships. The report does not suggest suspending mil-to-mil contacts, but what is your opinion on ways to improve them? Does the U.S. get as much 

benefit from mil-to-mil contacts with the PLA as they do? Are there different approaches that we could take to improve the value of those contacts? 

Admiral WILLARD. The Department of Defense conducts mil-to-mil contacts with 

the PLA because we believe such contacts help build a cooperative capacity to address common security challenges, foster institutional understanding of each others’ 

military doctrines and intentions, and build a common view of the international security environment. The PLA continues to suspend mil-mil contacts as a means to 

express displeasure for various U.S. actions that run contrary to PRC interests, a 

practice which indicates the PLA places less value on a sustained, reliable, and continuous military-to-military relationship with the United States. 

One method of raising the value of mil-to-mil contacts is to increasingly conduct 

such contacts in a multi-lateral setting or to link bilateral mil-to-mil contacts with 

multi-lateral engagements where the PLA has an interest of increasing its level of 

participation. One of the greatest strengths of USPACOM’s forward presence in the 

Asia-Pacific region is that we are there at the invitation of our partners and allies, 

who hold a like-minded view of the security environment. By inviting the PLA to 

mil-to-mil engagements where our partners and allies already either co-host or actively participate makes it increasingly difficult for the PLA to regret without adversely impacting their relationships with those nations. The intent is to bring the 

PLA more frequently to the table, to demonstrate that it is better for the PLA to 

be a part of the conversation, rather than apart from the conversation. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. REYES 

Mr. REYES. I understand that China is becoming more economically involved in 

both Central and South American countries. What visibility does PACOM have on 

these activities and what are your greatest concerns involving these actions? 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. REYES. Since 2002, it appears that the activities and the numbers of the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf have decreased in the Philippines. What actions is PACOM 

taking in order to ensure that this group and others in the country are eradicated? 

Has there been an issue with drug trafficking out of the country in order to fund 

the terrorist groups? How are you engaging international partners on the terrorist 

groups in the area? 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. REYES. What is the status of mil-to-mil engagements with China? How would 

you propose improving the value of such contacts? 

Admiral WILLARD. Although the Defense Consultative Talks took place in December (an institutionalized dialogue) there have been no other bilateral mil-to-mil engagements since last September. However, some engagement still takes place sporadically along the periphery through a multitude of multilateral, rather than bilateral, venues across the Pacific theater. 

When China’s President, Xi Jinping, visited Washington in February and met 

with Secretary Panetta, the two sides agreed to move forward in developing the specifics of this year’s program of military-to-military exchanges and also expressed 

support for an exchange of visits between Secretary Panetta and China’s Minister 

of National Defense at an appropriate time. 

During the week of 26 March 2012, representatives from the Department of Defense and the Chinese military will hold discussions detailing the bilateral militaryto-military engagement plan for 2012 which will include Secretary Panetta’s trip to 

China. 
70 

One method of raising the value of mil-to-mil contacts is to increasingly conduct 

such contacts in a multi-lateral setting or to link bilateral mil-to-mil contacts with 

multi-lateral engagements where the PLA has an interest of increasing its level of 

participation. One of the greatest strengths of USPACOM’s forward presence in the 

Asia-Pacific region is that we are there at the invitation of our partners and allies, 

who hold a like-minded view of the security environment. By inviting the PLA to 

mil-to-mil engagements where our partners and allies already either co-host or actively participate, makes it increasingly difficult for the PLA to regret without adversely impacting their relationships with those nations. The intent is to bring the 

PLA more frequently to the table to demonstrate that it is better for the PLA to 

be a part of the conversation, rather than apart from the conversation. 

Military engagement can be valuable, but can only truly work if China is equally 

committed to open and regular exchanges that serve to enhance and deepen the milto-mil relationship. We should use military engagement with China as one of several means to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security of the Asia-Pacific region, to encourage China to play a constructive role in the region and to press China 

to partner with the United States and our Asian Allies and Partners in addressing 

common security challenges. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. Given the limitations of the Harpoon, how would you assess the requirement for a new ASCM with greater range against other competing priorities? 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. FORBES. Despite describing the great potential of the UCLASS program in 

testimony for negating emergent A2/AD technologies, this program appears to be 

downgraded in the Navy’s FY13 budget request and the FYDP. The UCLASS program was cut by $240 million this year and the limited operational capability (LOC) 

date is being delayed by two years from 2018 to 2020. Also, UCLASS was not mentioned as a key program for projecting power in contested areas in the Defense 

Budget Priorities and Choices document nor was it identified in the written testimony of Secretary Mabus as a capability the Navy is investing in to counter advanced A2/AD challenges. How important does PACOM consider the capabilities 

found in the UCLASS program for meeting its mission requirements? 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. FORBES. What are the challenges presented to U.S. Navy undersea dominance 

by the numerical growth and modernization of the PLA(N) submarine fleet over the 

next 8–10 years. What risk assessment has been conducted relative to contingency 

plans given PLA(N) submarine force structure projections versus the projected U.S. 

SSN shortfall in the 2020–2030 timeframe? What mitigation strategies have been 

emplaced by the Commander to address the potential inequity in undersea warfare 

between the U.S. submarine force and the PLA(N) submarine force in the out years? 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Yesterday the State Department announced that North Korea 

agreed to implement a moratorium on long-range missile launches, nuclear tests, 

and nuclear activities at Yongbyon, including enrichment in exchange for food aid. 

While I’m sure all of us here will continue to carefully examine all aspects of the 

security situation on the Korean peninsula, how do you expect this announcement 

to affect PACOM’s security posture, if at all, as well as that of our regional allies? 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. During your testimony you mentioned a yearlong cyber pilot with 

CYBERCOM to advance cyber capabilities in the Pacific. Could you elaborate more 

on the progress and goals of this pilot? How do you plan on integrating lessons 

learned into future operations and capabilities? 

Admiral WILLARD. 1. USPACOM established the Cyberspace Operations Command-Provisional (CYBERPAC–P) in February 2011 in order to bring together key 

PACOM stakeholders into a single entity for the synchronizing of cyberspace operations. With the pending approval of the Transitional Cyberspace CONOPS, 

CYBERPAC–P was renamed the Cyberspace Operations Center Pacific 

(CYBERPAC) to serve as the theater’s Joint Cyber Center (JCC). 
71 

2. CYBERPAC’s mission is to plan and conduct theater cyberspace operations by 

synchronizing regional, national and allied cyberspace capabilities in support of 

USPACOM objectives in order to maintain freedom of action in cyberspace for U.S. 

Forces, our Partners, and Allies while denying the same to our adversaries. 

3. CYBERPAC’s essential tasks include: a. Coordinate Theater DOD Global Information Grid Operations. b. Direct and coordinate Theater Defensive/Offensive Cyber 

Operations. c. Plan against designated cyberspace threats. d. Coordinate with Direct 

Reporting Units, Sub-Unified Commands, and appropriate U.S. government agencies for cyberspace effects. e. Synchronize Cyber Operations with Allies and regional 

partners. 

4. As the Regional JCC, CYBERPAC continues to direct, coordinate and synchronize the planning and execution of regional cyberspace operations with 

USCYBERCOM, as the agent for global cyberspace operations. Over the past 13 

months, the CYBERPAC has greatly enhanced PACOM’s ability to integrate cyberspace operations into the full spectrum of operations and has emerged as the standard model for a regional JCC. Lessons learned and best practices continue to be integrated into the CYBERPAC construct through Tier 1 exercises and current contingency operations. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. In the discussion on the realignment the overall strategic imperatives of this move have not been adequately addressed. The key to these realignments is about strengthening our alliance with Japan. To that extent, what message 

are we sending the Japanese by utilizing U.S. Forces Japan as primarily a logistics 

and administrative function versus being an operational command like U.S. Forces 

Korea? U.S. Forces Japan did a tremendous job during Operation Tomodachi but 

how could the operation have been enhanced by an operational command based in 

Japan? If U.S. Forces Japan was being utilized as an operational command in every 

sense of the word, could they be assigned a mission of enhancing U.S.–Japan bilateral training? 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. Can you comment on your view of future Navy ship maintenance 

and repair requirements and capabilities required in the Western Pacific? In particular, do you foresee maintenance and repair requirements for submarines or the 

LCS on Guam? 

Admiral WILLARD. The current Submarine repair model for Guam will remain unchanged for the foreseeable future. As the number of Littoral Combat Ships home 

ported in the Pacific increases, more voyage repairs in support of Western Pacific 

deployments are likely. However, the support provided would be similar to that currently given to other Navy ships that transit in the vicinity of Guam. 

Ms. BORDALLO. With the increased military presence ramping up in the Asia-Pacific region, I find it concerning that the Department of Defense is cutting critical 

resources in that particular AOR. A recent example is the Air Force announcing the 

divestiture of the Global Hawk block 30, of which there are currently 3 aircraft at 

Andersen Air Force Base. Do you feel that you will still have adequate ISR capabilities in the PACOM AOR if these 3 aircraft and potentially other assets are divested 

from the inventory? What risk are we currently facing with ISR capabilities in the 

PACOM AOR and what steps are being taken to mitigate that risk? 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. President Obama has made reducing reliance on contractors and 

rebalancing the workforce a major management initiative of his Administration. In 

your opinion, given the restrictions on the size of your civilian workforce imposed 

by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, does the current PACOM workforce construct reflect an appropriately balanced workforce between civilian, military and 

contract support across all major capabilities, functional areas, and requirements? 

Please support your response with workforce and cost data as required by statutes 

and policies. 

Admiral WILLARD. USPACOM’s sourcing of functions and work between military, 

civilian and contracted services must be consistent with workload requirements, 

funding availability, readiness and management needs, as well as applicable laws 

and statutes. USPACOM’s FY 2013 budget requests, and associated civilian workforce reductions, reflect USPACOM’s best judgment today. It represents a carefully 

coordinated approach based on the overall command strategy and policy, balancing 

operational needs and fiscal reality. USPACOM remains committed to meeting its 
72 

statutory obligations to annually review missions, functions and workforce composition, including reliance on contracted services, and to ensure the USPACOM workforce is appropriately balanced and aligned to our most critical priorities. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Did PACOM seek relief from DOD mandated civilian personnel 

levels in order to insource contracted work more cost-effectively performed by civilians? 

Admiral WILLARD. USPACOM requested a SECDEF exception to the FY10 civilian personnel cap for 38 contractor-to-civilian conversions in the FY12 program. The 

38 conversions were determined to be exempt from private sector performance for 

readiness/management needs. These in-sourcing actions were expected to result in 

net savings for USPACOM, as civilian performance has been estimated to be more 

cost-effective than contract performance. 

Ms. BORDALLO. To what extent has PACOM used insourcing to reduce reliance on 

contractors, rebalance its workforce, and generate efficiencies? 

Admiral WILLARD. HQ USPACOM’s current workforce percentages are 50% military, 34% civilian and 8% contractor with the remaining 8% as over-hires and activated reservists. As a result of in-sourcing, USPACOM’s rebalanced workforce has 

generated significant cost saving which is reflected in the USPACOM budget. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Are you comfortable that all contracted services currently supporting PACOM are the most cost-effective and risk-averse source of labor? 

Admiral WILLARD. We have diligently scrutinized our contracted services and are 

convinced we have the right balance of support. 

Ms. BORDALLO. What processes are in place within PACOM to ensure the workload associated with reductions being made in the civilian workforce is in fact ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by other labor sources such as contractors or military personnel? 

Admiral WILLARD. The civilian workforce and associated fiscal funding reductions 

are being managed through a functional assessment of workload priorities. 

USPACOM tracks manpower authorizations, personnel and associated funding to 

manage workload requirements for military, civilians, activated reserves, 

USPACOM-funded contractors and civilian overhires for the current and future fiscal years. When civilian employees resign or retire, the vacant position is reviewed 

based on organizational assessments, prioritization of missions and functions, and 

the associated risk and degradation to USPACOM readiness. 

Ms. BORDALLO. In the PACOM plan for direct labor reporting, signed by your 

Chief of Staff on November 21, 2011, and submitted to the congressional defense 

committees as part of the consolidated DOD plan, PACOM planned to incorporate 

manpower reporting language beginning October 1, 2011. How many contract actions have been executed with this requirement since October 1, 2011? 

Admiral WILLARD. No contracts, with this requirement, have been executed with 

this requirement since 1 October 2011. 

Ms. BORDALLO. There was a lot of discussion last year about the ‘‘exceptions’’ to 

the FY10 civilian levels Secretary Gates mandated. Please provide a detailed list of 

all exceptions PACOM has had approved to date and the reason for those exceptions, as well as any exceptions that were requested but not approved, and the justification for such. 

Admiral WILLARD. The SECDEF approved the conversion of 38 contractors to civilian in the FY12 program which were previously approved and programmed in the 

FYDP. The 38 contractors consisted of 12 at USPACOM Headquarters, 21 for Joint 

POW/MIA Accounting Command and five for Defense Intelligence Agency/ 

USPACOM Joint Intelligence Operations Command. None of USPACOM’s requests 

were disapproved. 

Ms. BORDALLO. As efficiencies are being executed across PACOM, is the workload 

and functions associated with those being tracked as eliminated or divested through 

the annual inventory of functions? 

Admiral WILLARD. USPACOM submits an annual inventory of inherently governmental and commercial activity (IG/CA) inventory of all appropriated funded military and DOD funded civilian manpower authorizations, categorized as either inherently governmental or commercial activities. Workload and functions tied to military 

or civilian authorizations that have been eliminated or divested are tracked and reported in the IG/CA inventory using the manpower mix criteria and functional 

codes. 
73 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY 

Mr. CONAWAY. Are DOD’s ISR platforms appropriate for use in the contested airspace environment that we see in the PACOM AOR and if not, what should we be 

doing to prepare our ISR assets for the contested environment? 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. CONAWAY. The PACOM AOR has some of the most technologically advanced 

nations in the field of cybersecurity. What can we do as a nation and in the PACOM 

AOR to defend and defeat any attacks on our network? 

Admiral WILLARD. 1. Defending our networks and defeating attacks requires the 

following: 

a. Exercise a Whole-of-Government or Whole-of-Nation Strategy. The DOD must 

partner closely with U.S. government departments, agencies and the private sector 

to enable a whole of government strategy to address diverse cyber threats to military targets, civilian infrastructure, personal identifiers and intellectual property. 

Many of the DOD’s critical functions and operations rely on commercial assets, including internet service providers and global supply chains, over which the DOD has 

no authority to mitigate risk. The DOD is developing partnerships with the private 

sector and government agencies, including law enforcement, to best defend U.S. interests in cyberspace. For example, a memorandum of agreement has been signed 

between DOD and DHS to enhance inter-departmental strategic planning, synchronization of operations and mutual support for capability development. 

b. Recruit, Train, Retain, Organize, and Equip a Cyber Workforce. Meeting the 

dynamic needs of cyber operations and managing cyber risks requires a talented, 

trained force to develop innovative capabilities and provide information assurance, 

real-time situational awareness and network environments that are secure and resilient to evolving threats. DOD will need to continually develop the integration and 

resourcing of cyber workforce requirements and make itself competitive to entice 

and retain skilled personnel. 

c. Invest in the Development of Industrial Cyberspace Capabilities. Technological 

innovation is at the forefront of national security. The DOD will need to enhance 

its research, development, testing, evaluation and acquisition processes to employ 

rapid cycles of technological innovation. The DOD should focus significant investments on developing game changing approaches to strengthen its defense capabilities and make its systems unrecognizable to malicious activity. For example, we 

should focus research on mission assurance and maintaining effective cyberspace operations, including cyberspace maneuvering, active cyber defense and full spectrum 

cyberspace operations. We should also pursue new architectures to defend its critical 

networks, harden systems and create assured environments to protect current and 

future systems from attack. 

d. Build Relationships with U.S. Allies and International Partners. The development of international shared situational awareness and warning capabilities will enable collective cyber self-defense and deterrence. By sharing timely indicators and 

threats, allies and international partners can increase collective cyber defense. 

Thus, DOD will need to build and improve relationships with key allies and international partners, including efforts to develop standard operating procedures for 

strategic communications, establish cyber centers of excellence and advance international cyberspace norms and principles that protect the free flow of information, 

goods and ideas. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN 

Mr. WITTMAN. Admiral Willard, with the new strategy to shift our focus to the Asia-Pacific how do the $487 billion in defense cuts over the next 10 years affect 

your ability as the Combatant Commander responsible for the Asia-Pacific to execute this strategy? In my opinion you are being asked to do more with a lot less. 

The Navy’s SCN account is decreasing, our ship count is decreasing, we are decommissioning ships before the end of their service life, and we are moving advanced 

weapons platforms like SSNs, F–35, and SSBN(X) further to the right and well outside the FYDP. Do you feel the Navy and Air Force will be able to provide PACOM 

the numbers and types of ships and aircraft sufficient to support PACOM’s responsibilities under the Department’s new strategic guidance? 

Admiral WILLARD. USPACOM has not assessed an ‘‘inability’’ to focus on Asia-Pacific issues in the near term. As DOD provides further details on future expectations, USPACOM will assess current readiness accordingly. 

We believe USPACAF and USPACFLT will be able to provide USPACOM the 

numbers of forces sufficient to support our responsibilities. This assumes a commit-
74 

ment by the Air Force, Navy and Department of Defense to focus investments in 

the Pacific and availability of partner nation capability. The fiscal realities will challenge all of us; however, USPACOM and this nation have a long tradition of meeting its responsibilities during tough times and will continue to do so in the future. 

The Navy and Air Force will find ways to work together in unprecedented ways to 

meet this challenge through efforts like the Air Sea Battle strategy. These efforts 

will identify requirements, establish ownership, find efficiencies and eliminate duplicative efforts. Ultimately, this will drive us towards better theater integration 

and coordination of efforts. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Admiral, in the ’70s and ’80s you dealt with the Soviet Union and 

operations that supported the Cold War. With China’s rapid military modernization, 

do you see the United States entering into a Cold War-type scenario with China in 

the coming years? We have the number 1 Navy in the world, how do we mitigate 

Chinese Navy from securing a foothold in the Asia-Pacific that projects power and 

asserts their maritime dominance of the region? Particularly in areas like the South 

China Sea and the East China Sea. 

Admiral WILLARD. The United States’ relationship with China is more complex 

than the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 

Cold War. The U.S. and USSR bilateral relationship existed largely in the diplomatic and security realms. By comparison, in addition to our diplomatic and security relationship with China, we have robust economic, cultural, environmental, and 

other linkages that make the U.S. and China far more interdependent than the U.S. 

and USSR ever were. I don’t think a return to the days of the Cold War is plausible 

and it is certainly not desirable. With regard to maritime dominance, the U.S. Navy 

asserts its right to free and unfettered access to the waters beyond the territorial 

seas of any nation in accordance with UNCLOS. We don’t question the right of 

China or any nation to enjoy the same free and unfettered access to those waters 

in accordance with international norms and we consistently support the peaceful 

resolution of disputes. The East China Sea and South China Sea are congested waterways with multiple overlapping claims of sovereignty, including territorial and 

maritime claims. USPACOM conducts routine, coordinated presence operations in 

the Western Pacific in order to ensure a consistent presence, fulfill multiple operational requirements, and retain the necessary operational flexibility to address contingencies. Throughout the conduct of these operations, USPACOM is careful to 

strike the appropriate balance between operations that reassure allies and partners, 

operations which challenge excessive maritime claims, and actions that serve to 

deter behavior which is not consistent with international norms. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Admiral, the South China Sea continues to become a more contentious region with the convergence of sovereignty claims, vital international trade 

routes, expansive natural resources, and increasing military strength of multiple 

countries in the region. With the escalating tensions concerning oil and natural gas 

drilling plans, with potentially some American companies involved as well as American allies, it seems the question is when the region will spark, not if. My question 

is: What do you see ahead for the South China Sea in the next 2–5 years? What 

would you anticipate PACOM’s reaction to be if a small kinetic conflict broke out 

between two countries’ maritime assets in the region? Lastly, do you see the 

homebasing of 4 LCSs and marines in Darwin as a significant gamechanger in future South China Sea issues? Do you feel those shifts will escalate or decrease tension in the region? 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HEINRICH 

Mr. HEINRICH. ADM Willard, please detail for the Committee the operational benefits that the capabilities being developed under the Counter-Electronics High 

Power Microwave Advanced Missile Project (CHAMP) JCTD offer in your area of operation. In addition, what would be the benefits of having additional resources to 

enhance those capabilities? 

Admiral WILLARD. The Counter-Electronics High Power Microwave Advanced Missile Project (CHAMP) JCTD provides us with new approach to engage soft electronic 

systems with significantly reduced collateral damage on non-targets. This in turn 

allows us to engage critical targets that are difficult to engage due to location in 

sensitive areas currently on the restricted strike list. An attack by a CHAMP-like 

system also potentially reduces the post-conflict reconstruction over kinetic effects. 

The CHAMP JCTD was designed to demonstrate the benefits of engaging targets 

with High Power Microwaves. Additional resources would provide for a program of 
75 

record for the capability and incorporate the solutions to the identified deficiencies 

of the demonstrator system. 

Mr. HEINRICH. CENTCOM’s Urgent Need for ISR Data led to the development 

and launch of ORS–1, which went operational in January 2012 and is getting very 

high marks. Given the new strategic emphasis on Asia and the Pacific, with large 

areas of denied-access terrain, does PACOM have an Urgent Need for a similar capability? 

Admiral WILLARD. The short answer to your question is ‘‘yes’’. USPACOM has 

been working closely with the Operationally Responsive Space program on a satellite of our own. ORS–2 is in development and scheduled to be launched in 2015. 

While it has a different payload than ORS–1, the capability will have a positive impact on USPACOM ISR collection gaps, most notably, those areas that are out of 

the reach of our airborne systems. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCHILLING 

Mr. SCHILLING. There are proposed changes to the basing arrangement in the Pacific Theater. How will they affect PACOM’s ability to address North Korea’s nuclear ambitions? How will this affect our ability to respond to China’s military buildup? 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. SCHILLING. What are PACOM’s plans to optimize our alliances and regional 

partnerships and do you have benchmarks you are trying to achieve? 

Admiral WILLARD. In general, while cooperation with regional allies and partners 

is generally strong and on a positive trajectory, we recognize the need to continue 

to strengthen our alliances and regional partnerships while building new ones. Our 

bilateral alliances remain the cornerstone of regional security and U.S. policy. Our 

relations with our treaty allies have never been better. We aim to encourage Korea’s 

increasing emergence as not just a regional power, but a responsible global leader. 

We’re working closely with the government in Australia on a host of critical security 

issues and it is our indivisible bond with Japan that has driven the United States, 

especially our armed forces, to lead the world’s effort to help our ally in its time 

of greatest need. In addition to our close cooperation and exercise with our Philippine and Thai allies, the United States is also transforming its mil-to-mil relations 

with a number of emerging partners, including Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam and 

India. Our strategic partnership with India, in particular, holds immense potential 

for shaping a geo-political balance within and beyond the region that favors political 

and economic freedom. In short, the United States is well positioned in the AsiaPacific region, both in terms of our expanding partnerships as well as our enduring 

capabilities, to promote our National interests in the dynamic 21st century. 

The United States Pacific Command’s Theater Campaign Plan is the mechanism 

used to manage security relations with allies and other countries and collaborative 

relationships with other organizations. The plan establishes both long and short 

term objectives all aimed toward achieving the strategic end states outlined in our 

national level strategic guidance. To mitigate risk this plan, and its execution, remain adaptive. Twice a year, USPACOM will formally assess the campaign. From 

this assessment, the Command will decide whether to adjust the resourcing, execution or priorities of the theater campaign. 

Mr. SCHILLING. How do you see PACOM moving forward in our relationship with 

Taiwan? 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

Mr. SCOTT. What were the contributions of the U.S. Coast Guard to PACOM in 

2011? 

Admiral WILLARD. a. The Coast Guard Pacific Area Commander, at the request 

of Pacific Command’s Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic Studies, visited India and 

participated in a workshop held in Mumbai entitled ‘‘Exploring India-U.S. Cooperation, Safeguarding Prosperity in the Indian Ocean.’’ 

b. As the Executive Agent for USPACOM to the Quadrilateral Defense Working 

Group, Coast Guard District 14 worked closely with representatives from Australia, 

New Zealand and France to plan and conduct maritime operations across Oceania. 

These operations were primarily related to preventing illegal commercial fishing, 

but they also entailed the sharing of information at several levels. 
76 

c. The Coast Guard Pacific Area Command established a Coast Guard Reserve 

Unit at USPACOM. This Reserve Unit will ultimately have a complement of 17 

Coast Guard Reservists assigned to various Pacific Command directorates. 

d. Coast Guard District 14 served as an adjunct component to USPACOM in a 

number of contingency situations. Of particular note, in conjunction with New Zealand, District 14 provided critically needed fresh water to the New Zealand Territory 

of Tokelau. Tokelau was just a few days away from having no fresh water, whatsoever, when Coast Guard Cutter WALNUT arrived with 36,000 gallons of drinking 

water and a New Zealand needs assessment team. Similarly, a District 14 C–130 

aircraft transported a Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit and Center for Disease Control personnel to the Republic of Marshall Islands (Marjuro) to 

combat an outbreak of Dengue Fever (608 confirmed cases). This rapid deployment 

of control specialists was instrumental in preventing the spread and increase in severity of the outbreak; consequently there was no loss of life. 

e. Coast Guard District 14 participated with USPACOM in Operation Pacific Partnership, the theater’s premier humanitarian civic assistance program. The program 

builds and strengthens alliances and partnerships with participating host nations 

and integrated partners. 

f. Coast Guard Pacific Area Command Cutters and personnel participated in the 

Cooperation Afloat and Readiness Training exercise. This is a USPACOM-sponsored 

exercise consisting of a series of multi-national bi-lateral maritime training events 

between forces from the United States and participating Asian countries. 

g. Coast Guard Pacific Area Command Cutters and personnel participated in the 

Rim of the Pacific Exercise, a biennial field training exercise that includes ships, 

cutters, units and personnel from the United States (Navy and Coast Guard), Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Peru, the Republic of Korea, and the United Kingdom. 

The exercise is designed to enhance interoperability of combined forces and improve 

war fighting capabilities. 

h. Coast Guard District 14 conducted operations with USPACOM as part of the 

Oceania Maritime Security Initiative. Coast Guard Liaison Officers rode onboard 

Navy ships that transited Oceania for the purpose of Maritime Domain Awareness 

involving commercial fishing vessels in United States Exclusive Economic Zones and 

in waters of partner nations in Oceania. 

i. Coast Guard District 14 exercised United States Shiprider Agreements (there 

are currently 8 such agreements) with various Pacific Island nations by conducting 

commercial fisheries law enforcement patrols that included foreign shipriders onboard Coast Guard Cutters. These patrols deterred illegal fishing and protected 

vital marine resources in United States Exclusive Economic Zones, as well as those 

of the Pacific Island nations; thus dove-tailing with Pacific Command’s broader regional security goals. District 14 has expressed interest in establishing two more 

Shiprider Agreements with additional Pacific Island nations, resources permitting. 

j. At the request of USPACOM, Coast Guard Pacific Area Command provided support for and participated in various annual training exercises with the Republic of 

Korea. 

k. Coast Guard Pacific Area Command’s Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center Pacific provided various intelligence products for the Pacific Commander: 

1) Maritime Domain Awareness to Navy/Military Sealift Command vessels and 

submarines; 

2) awareness regarding transnational crime, alien migration and living marine resources; 

3) daily targeting products regarding foreign flagged ships with Chinese, Russian 

and Ukrainian crews; and 

4) targeting products in support of Operation TOMADACHI, e.g., the tracking of 

vessels that may have been exposed to low level radiation when their transit was 

near Fukushima, Japan. 

l. The Coast Guard acted as a ‘‘door opener’’ for USPACOM to various foreign nations—notably including (but not limited to) Vietnam and India—vis a vis capacity 

building by conducting 14 Maritime Training Team visits and hosting 34 students 

in resident courses. Topics for the Maritime Training Teams included Law Enforcement, Search and Rescue, Port Security, Pollution Response and Leadership. 

m. The Coast Guard maintained a Maritime Advisor in Indonesia to assist its 

maritime service with training, capabilities and professionalization. 

n. In an effort to enhance the naval capabilities of a USPACOM strategic partner, 

the Coast Guard provided the Republic of the Philippines with a former High Endurance Cutter, along with requisite training, via the Excess Defense Article process. This Cutter will be used by the Philippines to project a greater maritime presence in its territorial waters. 
77 

o. The Coast Guard Liaison Officer to USPACOM supported Pacific Command initiatives in a variety of instances, e.g., serving as the United States Co-Chairman 

of the Maritime Security Committee for the Republic of the Philippines–United 

States of America Military Defense Board/Security Engagement Board. 

p. The Coast Guard funds seven active duty billets at Joint Interagency Task 

Force West (JIATF–W), at a cost of $1,074,184.00. JIATF–W is the USPACOM Commander’s executive agent for counter narcotics. Other JIATF–W support includes: 

—The USCG District Fourteen Intelligence Branch Chief attended the JIATFW 

daily intelligence brief once a week and worked closely with JIATFW staff on illicit 

trafficking events, and provided liaison to other Coast Guard and law enforcement 

entities in the region. 

—During multiple smuggling events, the USCGC SEQUOIA and the Maritime 

Law Enforcement Team from Maritime Safety and Security Team Honolulu (91107) 

were on stand-by to conduct intercept and boarding operations against vessels suspected of smuggling. 

—The Coast Guard Cryptologic Unit Hawaii provided direct intelligence support 

for JIATFW’s Illicit Tracking Cell and Collections Management Branch. 

—The USCG Maritime Intelligence Center Pacific (MIFCPAC) provided living marine resources expertise which enabled JIATFW to determine the legitimacy of maritime targets, and a myriad of documentation-related requests for information concerning suspect vessels. 

—Coast Guard Air Station Barber’s Point C–130 maritime patrol aircraft provided 

airborne maritime domain awareness during scheduled patrols for District Fourteen, 

which enabled JIATFW analysts to determine an accurate picture of what vessels 

were actually on the water at any given time. 

—The Coast Guard Investigative Service worked closely with JIATFW’s Special 

Programs Application program manager, and this collaboration resulted in the seizure of 900 kilograms of marijuana; the confiscation of one fishing vessel suspected 

of drug trafficking; nine illegal migrants taken into custody, including one with an 

outstanding warrant in another state, and identified maritime smuggling routes 

from Mexico to the United States. 

Mr. SCOTT. What is the role of military bands within PACOM and are they a costeffective way of bringing people together and fostering greater understanding? 

Admiral WILLARD. The military bands within USPACOM are one of the most effective means of fostering relationships between allies, partners and even our adversaries. They use music to bridge language, cultural, societal and socio-economic differences. These bands provide a soft power projection tool for theater security cooperation efforts and helps build strong relationships with countries throughout the 

USPACOM AOR. Each band has objectives which include building partnerships, 

sustaining war fighter morale, encouraging and enabling coalition partners, providing precise ceremonial engagements, recruitment of talented service members 

and fostering military pride, patriotism and service. 

In portions of the Pacific, there are times when a military band is the exact right 

instrument of national power to employ, especially when other combat capabilities 

are in short supply and better employed elsewhere. The USPACOM military bands 

have bridged gaps in relationships that are decades old, such as the Marine Forces 

Pacific Band being the first U.S. band to visit Cambodia since the Vietnam War or 

the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) Band being the first U.S. band to 

travel to mainland communist China. During that trip, the band performed at the 

Shanghai International Music Festival where they were able to interact with the 

People’s Liberation Army Band, as well as bands from Japan, Malaysia, Thailand 

and the Republic of Korea. The band was able to positively influence relations with 

the people of these nations through their participation in the festival as well as engaging with the local schools by providing one-on-one instruction and training students how to repair and maintain the longevity of their instruments. 

USPACOM military bands also perform multiple community relations roles 

through participating in humanitarian assistance and civic initiatives. The U.S. Pacific Fleet and Marine Forces Pacific Band both contribute to the annual Pacific 

Partnership deployment where they and other Services members work closely with 

host nations, partner nations, non-governmental organizations and other U.S. government agencies to leave a lasting impact through cooperative engagements in the 

region. 

In 2010 the Acting Consul General of Russia, Patricia Miller, stated, of the 25th 

Infantry Division Band’s visit to Sakhalin Island region, ‘‘their concerts in three 

days did more to showcase America than what the Consulate could have done in 

several months. The Russians were able to see a very human side of the U.S. 

Army.’’ 
78 

Due to the unique capabilities of USPACOM bands and the ability to reach hundreds of thousands of people through the universal language and appeal of music, 

there is no other PACOM asset that can reach so many people in such a meaningful, 

peaceful and lasting way. 

Mr. SCOTT. What is the role of the U.S. Coast Guard in building partnerships 

within PACOM’s AOR? 

Admiral WILLARD. a. The U.S. Coast Guard’s (USCG) 27,000 personnel in the Pacific Area frequently support USPACOM, engaging in a wide range of activities that 

support USPACOM’s Theater Campaign Plan. In addition to USCG International 

engagements such as the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum and International Ship 

& Port Facility Security Code assessments, the USCG supports USPACOM’s exercises such as Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), a biennial Field training exercise that 

includes ships, cutters, units and personnel from the U.S., Australia, Canada, Chile, 

Japan, Peru, the Republic of Korea and the United Kingdom. The USCG also supports Pacific Fleet’s CARAT exercise in Thailand, the multi-lateral Southeast Asia 

exercise Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT) and the proliferation security initiative exercise DEEP SABRE. 

b. As the Executive Agent for USPACOM to the Quadrilateral Defense Working 

Group, Coast Guard District 14 (based in Honolulu HI) worked closely with representatives from Australia, New Zealand and France to plan and conduct maritime 

operations across Oceania. These operations were primarily related to preventing illegal commercial fishing, but they also entailed the sharing of information at several 

levels. 

c. Coast Guard District 14 served as an adjunct component to USPACOM in a 

number of contingency situations. Of particular note, in conjunction with New Zealand, District 14 provided critically needed fresh water to the New Zealand Territory 

of Tokelau. Tokelau was just a few days away from having no fresh water whatsoever when Coast Guard Cutter WALNUT arrived with 36,000 gallons of drinking 

water and a New Zealand needs assessment team. Similarly, a District 14 C–130 

aircraft transported a Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit and Center for Disease Control personnel to the Republic of Marshall Islands (Marjuro) to 

combat an outbreak of Dengue Fever (608 confirmed cases). This rapid deployment 

of control specialists was instrumental in preventing the spread and increase in severity of the outbreak; consequently there was no loss of life. 

d. In 2011, the USCG supported U.S. Pacific Fleet’s premier Humanitarian Exercise, Pacific Partnership, for the first time with two cutters, supporting engagements 

in Tonga and Micronesia. Pacific Partnership consisted of 600 military, interagency 

and non-governmental organizational medical professionals and engineers engaging 

the countries of Tonga, Vanuatu, Papua-New Guinea, Timor-Leste and the Federated States of Micronesia. The USCG is currently programmed to support Pacific 

Partnership 13, next year, which is scheduled to visit the Oceania region of the 

USPACOM AOR. 

e. The USCG provided significant support to USPACOM by acting as a ‘‘door 

opener’’ to various foreign nations—notably (but not limited to) Vietnam and India— 

vis a vis capacity building by conducting 14 Maritime Training Team visits and 

hosting 34 students in resident courses. Topics for Maritime Training Teams included Law Enforcement, Search and Rescue, Port Security, Pollution Response and 

Leadership. f. Coast Guard Pacific Area Command Cutters and personnel participated in the Cooperation Afloat and Readiness Training exercise. This is a 

USPACOM-sponsored exercise consisting of a series of multi-national bi-lateral maritime training events between forces from the United States and participating Asian 

countries. 

g. In an effort to enhance the naval capabilities of a USPACOM strategic partner, 

the Coast Guard provided the Republic of the Philippines with a former High Endurance Cutter, along with requisite training, via the Excess Defense Article process. This Cutter will be used by the Philippines to project a greater maritime presence in its territorial waters. 

h. Coast Guard District 14 exercised United States Shiprider Agreements (there 

are currently 8 such agreements) with various Pacific Island nations by conducting 

commercial fisheries law enforcement patrols that include foreign shipriders onboard Coast Guard Cutters. These patrols deterred illegal fishing and protected 

vital marine resources in United States Exclusive Economic Zones, as well as those 

of the Pacific Island nations, thus dovetailing with Pacific Command’s broader regional security goals. District 14 has expressed interest in establishing two more 

Shiprider Agreements with additional Pacific Island nations, resources permitting. 

i. The USCG International Training Detachment provides Mobile Training Teams 

(MTTs) on various maritime safety and security topics to countries throughout the 
79 

Pacific. Last year countries included Bangladesh, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, 

Malaysia, Marshall Islands and Western Samoa. 

Mr. SCOTT. How would you rate the performance of E–8C JSTARS aircraft within 

PACOM? 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. SCOTT. The hospital ships Comfort and Mercy are high-demand, low-density 

platforms. If the United States had a larger fleet of hospital ships, would there be 

enough work for them to perform within PACOM’s AOR? 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. SCOTT. How would you assess the current state of Taiwan’s submarine fleet? 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. SCOTT. Which aircraft is better suited in combat against China’s J–20: an upgraded F–16 A/B or the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter? 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. SCOTT. Besides the Republic of China, are U.S. Flag and General Officers 

banned from visiting any other country within PACOM’s AOR? 

Admiral WILLARD. State Department and OSD have strict policies that restrict 

U.S. Flag and General Officers from visiting Burma. Officers of the rank of O–6 and 

above require permission from the highest levels of OSD and STATE. The U.S. DOD 

policy on military engagement with Burma has not changed. The below excerpt is 

from OSD–P: 

—DOD policy is not to engage with Burma’s military. This policy includes, but 

is not limited to, a prohibition on any form of security assistance or cooperation, 

such as Foreign Military Financing or International Military Education and Training, arms transfers, foreign counterpart visits and bilateral meetings—State has the 

lead on diplomatic engagement with Burma and the Department of Defense is prepared to provide any necessary support. 

Mr. SCOTT. Does the present ban on U.S. flag and general officers from visiting 

the Republic of Taiwan violate the Taiwan Relations Act? 

Admiral WILLARD. No, the present restrictions on visits by U.S. flag and general 

officers to Taiwan do not violate the Taiwan Relations Act. The Act does not expressly mandate such restrictions, nor does it expressly prohibit such restrictions. 

Mr. SCOTT. What would be the deterrence value if Taiwan were to acquire 10 diesel-powered submarines? 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. SCOTT. If Taiwan had 20,000 sensor fuzed munitions, would it greatly increase Taiwan’s ability to deter a Chinese invasion force? 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. SCOTT. Would MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) compatible (300km 

range) missiles offer Taiwan any numerous asymmetric advantages? 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. SCOTT. Will Taiwan require 5th generation fighters in the 2020s given the 

current security situation? 

Admiral WILLARD. I believe Taiwan will require an inject of additional fighter aircraft in the future to address the decline of its overall fighter inventory and to ensure it can carry out its basic defense functions. Any such capability would still need 

to be part of a truly integrated air and missile defense system that is mobile and 

redundant to include an air force protection plan that promotes airbase hardening. 

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