J-S52026-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

RAYMOND LEROY ADAMS, 

 Appellant No. 213 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of October 15, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-07-CR-0000960-2010 

 and CP-07-CR-0000961-2010 

BEFORE: SHOGAN, OLSON and WECHT, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 09, 2015 

 Appellant, Raymond Leroy Adams, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered on October 15, 2014, following the revocation of 

probation. Upon review, we affirm. 

 We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history of this case as 

follows. On October 4, 2010, Appellant pled guilty to four counts of 

possession with intent to deliver (PWID) narcotics. As per the terms of a 

plea agreement with the Commonwealth, the trial court sentenced Appellant 

to an aggregate term of two to four years of incarceration on the first two 

counts of PWID, followed by a consecutive term of five years of special 
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probation on the second two PWID counts.1 While on parole for the first two 

counts of PWID, the Pennsylvania Department of Probation and Parole 

alleged that Appellant committed three technical violations of his probation 

and parole, including failure to: (1) receive permission to change 

residences; (2) report to supervision staff, and; (3) attend and complete 

batterer’s intervention, specifically, the “Men Helping Men” program. The 

trial court summarized the resulting procedural history as follows: 

Although [Appellant] admitted to violating his supervision at 

a parole hearing, [he] contested the violations at the 

[revocation of probation] hearing on October 14, 2014. 

After hearing from both parties, the [trial] [c]ourt found 

[Appellant] had violated his probation as alleged above. 

The [trial] [c]ourt revoked [Appellant’s] five[-]year period[] 

of special probation [] and resentenced him [] to a period of 

incarceration of 9 to 24 months at S.C.I. Camp Hill[.] [This 

sentence was] consecutive to the []sentence [Appellant] [] 

received from the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and 

Parole [as a result of his parole violations]. 

On October 24, 2014, [Appellant] filed a timely motion for 

reconsideration of the [trial] court’s sentence averring that 

9 to 24 months ‘was too harsh’ as this was [his] first 

probation violation and the Pennsylvania State Parole Board 

had sentenced [Appellant] for the same technical violations. 

The [trial] court denied [Appellant’s] motion for 

reconsideration without a hearing on November 6, 2014. 

[Appellant] filed a motion for appeal nunc pro tunc on 

December 30, 2014 which the [trial] court granted on 

January 20, 2015. [Appellant] filed a notice of appeal on 

January 29, 2015 and the [trial] court directed [Appellant] 

to file a concise statement of matters pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

____________________________________________ 

1

 Special probation directs supervision by the Parole Board by order of the 

court of common pleas. See 37 Pa.Code §§ 65.1 – 65.7. 
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1925(b) by order dated February 10, 2015; [Appellant] 

complied on February 19, 2015. 

Trial Court Opinion, 3/27/2015, at 3 (superfluous capitalization and record 

citation omitted). 

 On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue for our review: 

Whether the [s]entencing [c]ourt abused its discretion and 

imposed a [] grossly disproportionate [sentence] on

[Appellant] for technical violations of his probation [by] 

failing to adequately consider this was [Appellant’s] first 

violation of probation after serving a two year period of 

parole, as well as failing to take into account his age? 

Appellant’s Brief at 9. 

Appellant initially “admits there was a basis to find a violation of [his 

special probation] conditions[.]” Id. at 16. He claims the trial court “only 

considered the violations of probation” but, “did not consider [his] successful 

period of parole[, which showed that] supervision was working for him[.]” 

Id. at 17. Appellant also claims the trial court failed to take his age into 

account. Id. In sum, he avers the trial court abused its discretion and 

should have sentenced him to an additional period of probation or sixmonths of concurrent imprisonment commensurate with the sentence 

imposed following revocation of his parole. Id. at 18. 

This claim does not challenge the revocation of Appellant’s probation. 

Rather, Appellant’s claim challenges the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. See Commonwealth v. Schutzues, 54 A.3d 86, 91 (Pa. Super. 

2012), appeal denied, 67 A.3d 796 (Pa. 2013); Commonwealth v. 
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Rhoades, 8 A.3d 912, 916 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal denied, 25 A.3d 328 

(Pa. 2011). “[T]his [C]ourt’s scope of review in an appeal from a revocation 

sentencing includes discretionary sentencing challenges.” Commonwealth 

v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1034 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). 

“Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a 

manifest abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Clarke, 70 A.3d 1281, 

1287 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 85 A.3d 481 (Pa. 2014) (citation 

omitted). Pursuant to statute, Appellant does not have an automatic right to 

appeal the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9781(b). Instead, Appellant must petition this Court for permission to 

appeal the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Id.

As this Court has explained: 

To reach the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue, we 

conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, Pa.R.A.P. 902, 903; 

(2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in 

a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, Pa.R.Crim.P. [708]; 

(3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the 

sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing 

Code, 42 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 9781(b). 

 

Commonwealth v. Cook, 941 A.2d 7, 11 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also 

Commonwealth v. Kalichak, 943 A.2d 285, 289 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“when 

a court revokes probation and imposes a new sentence, a criminal defendant 

needs to preserve challenges to the discretionary aspects of that sentence 
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either by objecting during the revocation sentencing or by filing a postsentence motion”). 

Here, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and the issue was 

properly preserved in a post-sentence motion. Appellant includes a 

statement pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2119(f) in 

his brief. Thus, we turn to whether the appeal presents a substantial 

question. 

Since Appellant was sentenced following the revocation of probation, 

the sentencing guidelines do not apply to Appellant’s sentence. 204 Pa. 

Code § 303.1(b); Commonwealth v. Williams, 69 A.3d 735, 741 (Pa. 

Super. 2013), appeal denied, 83 A.3d 415 (Pa. 2014). “[U]pon sentencing 

following a revocation of probation, the trial court is limited only by the 

maximum sentence that it could have imposed originally at the time of the 

probationary sentence.” Commonwealth v. Coolbaugh, 770 A.2d 788, 

792 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation omitted). Thus, in sentencing Appellant, the 

trial court was required to “consider the general principles and standards of 

the Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth v. Russell, 460 A.2d 316, 322 (Pa. 

Super. 1983). Section 9721 expresses these general principles in the 

following manner: 

the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is 

consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the 

offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on 

the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). As we have explained: 
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The determination of whether a particular case raises a 

substantial question is to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 

Generally, however, in order to establish that there is a 

substantial question, the appellant must show actions by the 

sentencing court inconsistent with the Sentencing Code or 

contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing 

process. 

Commonwealth v. Marts, 889 A.2d 608, 612 (Pa. Super. 2005) (internal 

citations omitted). 

In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Appellant states that the trial court’s 

sentence of nine to 24 months’ incarceration for technical probation 

violations is excessive. He contends that he was a good candidate for 

rehabilitation, because he successfully completed two years of parole before 

committing technical violations. He also argues that the trial court failed to 

consider he is 62 years old as a mitigating factor. 

We have previously determined that a challenge to the discretionary 

aspects of a sentence imposed following the revocation of probation presents 

a substantial question when an appellant “argues that the trial court’s 

sentence is not consistent with the gravity of his violation, the need for 

public protection, or his needs for rehabilitation” under 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9721(b). See Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1042 (Pa. 
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Super. 2013) (en banc). Thus, we will review this aspect of Appellant’s

claim.2

Here, the trial court determined: 

[O]n October 14, 2014, [the trial court] heard testimony 

from Agent James Yaworksi of the Pennsylvania State Board 

of Parole and Probation regarding [Appellant’s] three 

alleged violations for changing his approved residence 

without permission, failing to maintain regular contact with 

parole supervision staff, and failing to successfully complete 

Men Helping Men. Agent Yaworksi’s testimony demonstrated 

that [Appellant] admitted to [absconding] in a telephone 

conversation on March 4, 2014 and in a parole hearing on 

September 22, 2014. Agent Yaworski further testified that 

[Appellant] had failed to maintain regular contact with him 

after January 3, 2014. 

However, the most concerning violation to the [trial court] 

was [Appellant’s] failure to successfully complete Men 

Helping Men. [Appellant] who was subject to a special 

[d]omestic [a]buse condition, was directed numerous times 

____________________________________________ 

2

 We note that Appellant also suggests the trial court abused its discretion in 

sentencing him consecutively to the sentence imposed upon violation of his 

parole. Appellant did not present this aspect of his argument in his Rule 

2119(f) statement. Moreover, Appellant’s claim does not present a 

substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1270 

(Pa. Super. 2013) (“[A] bald claim of excessiveness due to the consecutive 

nature of a sentence will not raise a substantial question.”). Thus, we will 

not examine that facet of Appellant’s discretionary aspect of sentencing 

claim. 

Moreover, Appellant did not raise the trial court’s alleged failure to consider 

his age in his concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant 

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). He cannot raise the claim for the first time on appeal. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 302. Thus, we are constrained to find this portion of 

Appellant’s claim waived. See Commonwealth v. Hill, 16 A.3d 484, 488 

(Pa. 2011) 

(“any appellate issues not raised in a compliant Rule 1925(b) statement will 

be deemed waived.”). 
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to complete Men Helping Men, a well-respected educational 

course for men who have been involved in [d]omestic

[v]iolence. [Appellant] alleged at the [revocation] hearing 

that he was discharged from Men Helping Men because he 

was [having trouble reading and writing] and could not 

complete the required paperwork; he further asserted that 

the Men Helping Men coordinator was ‘very ignorant, rude 

and disrespectful.’ The [trial court] simply did not find 

[Appellant] credible, particularly his reasons for not 

successfully completing Men Helping Men. 

The record demonstrates that [Appellant] was discharged 

from this program on August 8, 2013, September 12, 2013, 

and December 26, 2013 for lack of attendance despite 

Agent Yaworksi’s clear instructions to re-enroll and 

complete treatment. [Appellant] was provided a fourth and 

final opportunity to report to Men Helping Men on January 

13, 2014, but instead he absconded. Agent Yaworksi

testified[:] 

This is not a fellow who simply didn’t do a couple of 

things. This is a guy who decided consciously, even 

though I told him this would, I literally told him in 

March in a phone conversation. I said if you walk 

through the door and turn yourself in, I won’t revoke 

your probation. If I have to arrest you and the cops 

get you, I’m going to revoke your probation. Five 

months later he is finally arrested by the police. 

Here is a person who every day woke up and decided 

I’m not going to play by the rules. I’m not going to 

report; they’re going to have to come get me. This

is not someone who is amenable to supervision. 

He’s not someone who deserves a probation 

sentence. 

It was abundantly clear to the [trial court] that [Appellant] 

had violated his probation and was incapable of following 

the conditions of his probation. 

 

* * * 

The [trial court] believed that a sentence of 9 to 24 months 

was necessary based on [Appellant’s] refusal to comply with 

the probation conditions; moreover, this sentence would 
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provide [Appellant] with sufficient time to successfully 

complete the necessary rehabilitation programs required by 

the Department of Corrections. 

 

Trial Court Opinion, 3/27/2015, at 4-7 (record citations omitted). 

Here, the trial court credited the probation officer’s testimony over 

Appellant’s testimony. We will not usurp those credibility determinations. 

See Commonwealth v. Emler, 903 A.2d 1273, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(“As a reviewing court, we may not re-weigh the evidence, substitute our 

judgment for that of the fact-finder, or usurp the fact-finder's prerogative to 

make credibility determinations and accept all, part, or none of the 

evidence.”). The trial court looked at the gravity of his probation violations 

and determined Appellant absconded from supervision and treatment. 

Appellant’s probation officer gave him multiple opportunities to comply with 

the terms of his probation and he refused them. It took police seven 

months to arrest him. As a result, the trial court declared Appellant a poor 

candidate for rehabilitation and imposed a sentence of total incarceration to 

protect the public. We conclude the trial court carefully weighed the factors 

set forth in Section 9721. Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion in 

imposing Appellant’s sentence following the revocation of his probation. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 
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Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 11/9/2015