T h e H on or abl e Ave r n L. Cohn , U n i t ed St at es D i s t r i ct J u dg e f or t h e Eas t er n D i s t ri ct of M i ch i g an , s i t t i n g by * d esi gnat i o n. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0105n.06 F iled: F ebruary 8, 2007 Case No. 05- 2027 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT MICHAEL OZIER, P laintif f-App ellant,

v. RTM ENTERP RISES OF GEORG IA, INC., doi ng bus ine ss a s A r by’ s, Defendan t-Appellee.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE WE STE RN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

BEFORE: BATCHELDER, MOORE, Circuit Judges; and COHN, District Judge. * ALICE M. BATCHEL DER, Circ uit Jud ge. Plaintiff-Appellant, M ic h a e l O zi e r (“O zier”), ap p e a ls th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s d e c is io ng r an ti n g s u mm a r y ju d g me n t i nf

av o r o f D e f e n d an t- Ap p e ll e e, RTM Enterpri s es o f Georg ia, Inc. (“ RTM”), in this action in which Ozier cla imed rac e and se x discrim in a ti o nin

v io lati o no f

M ic h ig an ’ s E ll io tt
- L ar s e nCi v il Ri g h ts A c t a n d 4 2 U

. S. C. § 1981; reta liation in viol ation of Michig an’s Elliott-L arse n Civil Rights Act a nd 42 U.S.C

. § 1 9 8 1 ; and violation of Mi chig an’s Bullard- Plawecki Employ ee Rig ht to Know Act. B eca use we conclude that Ozier did not establish a pr im a fa c ie case of discrimination or re taliation , an d did not present2

sufficien t ev idence to raise a g enuine issue of

fac t with respec t to his Bullard-Plawe cki claim, we

a ff ir m. I. RTM owns and operates Arby ’s fast food restaur ants nationwide, with two re staurants – one on Gull Road and one on Cork Stree t – i n Kalama zoo, Mi chig an. On De cembe r 27, 2000, RTM hired Ozier, a

n Afric an-A merica

n male, to work as an entry -leve l team member at t he C ork Street Arby ’s, making$8.00 per hour . Ozier g ener ally rec eived positive work pe rfor mance revie ws, and by ear ly 2002, he had r ece ived sever al pay raises and had been ma de a te am traine r, ea rning $8.60 per hour

. Ozier’s first manag er, Fr ank Davis, rec ommended to the are a supervisor, Phil Morris, that Ozi e r s ho uld

be pr omo te d to sh if

t ma na g e r. A s ub se qu e nt m anager , B a se m Sh amus , a lso

rec ommended Ozier’s pr omotion to s hift manag er, but Ozier wa s never promoted. I n November 2001, D’Ann Tie rney (“Tie rney”), tra

nsfer red f rom an Ar by ’s in Indiana to an assistant manag er position with t h e Gul l Road and Cork Street Ar by ’s. She bec ame the store manag er of

the Cork Street re staurant in June 2002. Tierney observe d that Ozier had “ ex cellent customer se rvice skills,” and she g ave him posit ive eva luations early in her tenur e, obser

ving that “he w as re liable, he wa s alway s there .” Tierne y ’s evaluation of Ozier was not unmixed, however

. Her chief criticism and conc ern w as that Ozier wa s not a productive e mploy ee when lef t unsupervised. She testified that Ozier would do whateve r was asked of him, but that she would have to ask him to do it, and he was not self-motivated. Tierne y expressed her conce rn that “if I

couldn’t t r u s th i mt o d o t h e m a i n t e n an c e p o s i t i o n , th e nh o w w o u l d I tr u s t h i m t o r

un a s h i f t , u n s u p e r v i s e d ?” She explained to Ozier that she would not simply promote him based on the numbe r of year s he had worke d there , and that he ne eded to pr ove himself bef ore be ing pr omoted. Ti er n ey believed that3

Ozier’s work pe rfor

mance declined unde r her manag ement bec ause h e wa s n ot working with a manag er pr esent, whe rea s under both Davis and Shamus, Ozier had wor ked alongwith a manag er. Previous store mana g ers ha d promised Ozier that h e would be promoted to shift mana g er. W h en she bec ame store manag er, Tie rney talked with Ozier about his frustration at not being promoted; she said that she unde rstood that frustration and provided him with the restaur ant’s 44- pag e tra ining manua l for the shift mana g er position. This training prog ram is la rg ely driven by

the employ ee, a

nd the employ ee is e x pecte d to take the initiative to lear n the mater ial in the manual, and to complete the manua l and pre sent it to the manag er. Tierne y assig ned Bi l l Goodwin, an a ssistant manag er, to a dvise Ozier duringthe training prog ram. She stated that she met with G oodwin and Ozier to disc uss the trainingprog ram, but Ozier claims that they never

discussed Goodwin’s he lping him with the training . Rather, Ozier te stified that Mr . G oo dw in me re ly “ sh ow e d me so me pa pe rw or k that I wa s su

pp os e d to be le arn ing

. . . ju st littl e odds and e nds that would update me on the [shi ft manag er’ s] book.” Tierne y explained that Ozier was g iven ver bal tests related to the shift ma nag er position, on whichh e d id

n o t p e r f o r m w e ll , an d

th a t h e f a il e d to c o mp le te mo s t o f

th e s e c ti o n s o f

h is training book, so he did not qualify for a ny wr i t t en ex aminations, which we re r equire d to qualify for the promotion. Tierne y claimed that Ozier beg an complainingto other employ ees in late 2002 that he was be ing pa ssed over

for pr o m o t i o n b ec ause he is Africa n-Amer ican. Ha

ving he ard a

bout the complaints, Tierne y

confr onted Ozier and he denied makingthem. Ozier claims that Tierne y then said to him that no one is promoted unless they “kiss a l ittle butt.” Tierney denies makingthat state me nt.4

Duringthis ti me, Tierne y

trained thre e other employ ees – all cauc asian women – for manag er positions. Ozier claims that Tierne y promised to train him after she wa s finished trainingCarale e Waswick, the first o f t h e t h re e, and that no one at RTM ever e x plained to him why he wa s not trained f o r the shift manag er position. Tierne y denies e ver making suc h a promise. Ozier the n

c omp la ine d to the oth e r mana g e rs in the sto re , inc lud ing Was wi c k, that T ie rn e y wa s n ot t ra ini nghim beca use of his ra ce. I

n J anuar y 2003, wee ks befor e Oz ier’s te rmination, Waswick informed Tie rney of his c omm e nts
. RTM maintains that Ozi er’ s dismis sal was unr elated to his comments and c omplaints about Ti e rn e y , a

nd that he wa s f

ir e d b e c a us e on fo ur se pa rate oc c a sio ns , O zie r h a d e nd -o f- the -d ay c a sh shortag es in his c ash reg ister. Ozier claims he only reme mbers the third and four th shortag es. The third shortag e, in the amount of $20.87, occur red on Dec ember 9, 2002, and Ozier rec eived a wr itten

war ning f rom Tierne y , including notice t hat another shortag e would result i n his termination. The fourth shortag e, in the amount of $5.09, oc curr ed on F eb ru ar y 3, 2003. Tierne y

did not count the dr awe r h e rs e lf

, b ut Wa sw ic k r e po rt e d th e sh or ta g e to h e r. Ozi e r de nie d that his dr awe r w a s sh or t, b u th e d i d

n o tc o u n tt h e m o n e y i nt h e dr aw e r a tth e e n d

o f th e d ay. After the fourth shorta g e, Tier

ney repor ted to Phil M orris, the area supervisor, that Ozier’ s draw er w a s s h o r

t a g a in a f te r h e h a d b e e ng iv e na

f in a l w ar n in g , an d M o r r is a g r e e d th a t O zier’s employ ment should be terminated. T ierne y stated that the c ash shortag es we re the only rea son she had for firingOzier. Whe n O zie r a

rr ive d at w or

k a ft e r t he fo ur th c a sh sh or ta g e , T ier ne y

inf or me d h im that hi s draw er w as short ag ain and that he was being fired. Ozier claims that during this meeting, Tie rney told him t hat “I

hear d y ou been ta lking a

bout me behind my

back.” Ozier denied that his draw er w as5

short, and questioned wh ether he wa s beingfired f

or comments he ha d made to Waswick. Acc ording t o Oz i er , Tierne y responde d that in fac t his drawer was short a

nd that was why

“we ’re g etting r id of y ou.” Shortly afte r he w as fire d, Ozier reque sted his personnel file. O zier claims that he re ceive d only parts of the file, which did not include any perf ormanc e re views or disciplinary write-ups that would ordinarily

be included in a

personne l file. Ozier submitt ed a se cond re quest for his per sonnel file alongwith a letter f

rom his attorney , but RTM has not given him the file, claiming that it cannot be located. Ozier filed a thr ee- count complaint ag ainst RTM in the Michig an state cour t, alleg ing that RTM’s failure to promote him was the re sult of rac e and sex discrimination and re taliation and that RTM’s failure to turn over his per sonnel file violated Michig an’s Bul l ar d -P lawec ki Act. RTM

remove d the ac tion to the United States District Co u rt for the Western District of Michig an, and moved for summary judgme nt on all claims. After hear ing or al ar g ument, the district court g rante d RTM ’s mot ion . O zie r f

ile d th is t ime ly

a pp e a l. II. We review de novo the district court’s grant of summar y judgme nt. Hammon v . DHL Airways, Inc. , 1 65 F .3 d 44 1, 44 7 ( 6th Cir . 1 99 9) . Summa

ry jud g me nt p ur su ant t o F e d. R. C iv. P. 56 is appropriate if the plea dings, de positions, answers to i n t err og atories a nd admissions on file, toge ther with the a ffidavits, if any , show that there is no g enuine issue as to any materia l fac t and that the moving pa

rty is entitled to judgment as a matter of la

w. Fe d. R. Civ. P . 56(c)

. When considering a motion for summary

judgme nt, “the infe renc e to be dr awn f rom the under lying f

acts . . . must be viewed in the lig ht most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” A d k in s v . U n ite d MineAl t h ou g h O zi er ’ s c ompl ai n t a l s o c l ai med di s cr i mi n at i on on t h e bas i s of s ex , t h e di s t r i ct cou r t di d n ot me n t i on 1 s ex di s cr i mi nat i on i n i t s o pi ni on, O zi er does not ment i on i t i n h i s bri ef s on appeal , an d he h as appare nt l y aban do ned t hat c l a i m. 6 W or k e rs , 9 4 1 F. 2 d

3 9 2 , 3 9 9 (6 t hC i r. 1 9 9 1 ) ( qu o t i n g Un ite d Sta te s v . D ie bo ld , 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)) . The standa

rd for d et ermini ng whether summary judgme nt is appropriate is whether “ the evidenc e pre sents a suff

icient disag ree ment to require submissi on to a jury or whe ther it is so onesided that one party must preva il as a matter of law .” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)

. A. O Z I ER ’ S R

A C I A L D I S CRI M I NAT I ON C L AI M F OR A L L E GE D F AI L URE T O P R OM OTE Ozier alleg es that RTM discriminated ag ains t him on the basis of rac e in violation of 42 1 U.S.C. § 1981. He may

establish a cla im of discrimination either by introducing direc t evidence of discr im in a ti o n , o r b y p r o v id in g c ir c u ms ta n ti a l e v id e n c e w h ic h w o u ld s u p p o rt an in f

e r e n c e of discrimination. Se e Kline v. T e nn . V alle yAu th ., 128 F.3d 337, 348 ( 6th Cir. 1997). “The dir ect evidenc e and the circ umstantial evidence paths are mutually exclusive; a plaintiff nee d only prove

one or the other, not both.” Id

. at 348-49. “Unde r the direc t evidence approa ch, once the plaintiff int ro du c e s e vid e nc e that th e e mpl oy e r t e rm inate d h im b e c a us e of his ra c e or

oth e r p ro te c te d s tatus , the burde n of per suasion shifts to the employ er to prove that it would have terminated the plaintiff even ha d it not been motivated by discrimination.” J

oh ns on v . U

niv . o f Cin c inn ati , 215 F.3d 561, 572 (6th Cir. 2000). See also Manzer v. Diamond Sham rock Chem icals Co. , 29 F.3d 1078, 1081 (6th Cir.1994). Under the circ umstantial evidence approa ch, we apply the McD onnell Douglas test. See McD onnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The variant of that test that we have applied in fa ilure-to-pr omote case s require s that in order to e stablish a prima fa ci e ca s e o f ra cial7

discrimination, Ozier must demonstrate that: (1) he is a member of a prote cted c lass; (2) he a pplied for and was qualified for a promotion, ( 3) he was considere d for and denied the pr omotion; and (4) other e mploy ees of

simil ar qua lifications who wer e not member s of the protect ed cl as s rec eived promotions at the time the plaintiff' s reque st for promotion was de nied. Nguyen v . City of Cl eve land , 22 9 F .3d 55 9, 56 2-6 3 (6 th C ir . 2 00 0) . I f O zie r e sta bli sh e s h is pr im a fa c ie case , a mandatory presumption of discrimination is cre ated a nd the bu r d e n s h if ts to RTM t o “ar

ticulate some leg itimate, nondiscriminatory

rea son for the e mploy ee' s rejec tion.” McD onnel l Douglas Corp. , 411 U.S. at 802. I f RT M c ar r ie s th is b u r d e n , th e nO zi e r mu s t p r o v e th a t t

h e p r o f f e r e d r e a s o nw a s a c tu a ll y

a p r e te xt to hide unlawful discr imination. Id . at 804. He may establish that the proffere d rea son was a me re prete x t by

showing that 1) the stated r eason ha d no b as i s in fac t; 2) the stated re ason wa s not the actua l rea son; or 3) that the stated r eason w as insuffic ient to expl ain the def endant' s action. See W he e le r v . M

c Kin le yEn te rs ., 937 F.2d 1 1 58, 1162 (6th Cir.1991). “[A] reason ca nnot be prove d to be ‘a pr e te xt f

o r d is c r im in a ti o n ’ un le s s it is s h o w nb o th

th a t t h e r e a s o nw a s f

a ls e , an d th at discrimination was the re al re ason.” St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993). The district cour

t properly reje cted Ozier’ s claim that Tiern ey ’s alleg ed comment that he would have to “ kiss a littl e butt” to be pr omoted am o unted to direc t evidence of ra cial dis c ri min a tio n. As we have he ld, “ ‘s imp le te a sin g ’ or ‘o ff ha nd c omm e nts , a

nd iso late d in c ide nts ’ do not a mount to direc t e vidence of discrimination under Title VI I .” Singfi e ld v . A k ro n M e tro . H ou s. Auth. , 3 8 9 F. 3 d

5 5 5 , 5 6 1 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 0 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Faragher v. City of Boca Raton , 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)) . I n addition, the district court cor rec tly observe d that it was pure spe culation to infer that the alleg ed comment wa s rac ially motivated.8

Findingno direc t evidence of di scrimination, the di strict court analy zed Ozier’s cla im using the McD onnell Douglas approa ch. The district court ac knowledg ed that Ozier satisfied the first and third prong s of the te s t , n am ely that he is a membe r of a protec ted class a

nd that he suff

ere d an adver se employ

ment action. See Nguy en , 229 F.3d at 562 (“F or t he purposes of Title VI I , a fa ilure to promote is an adve rse e mploy ment action.”) The c ou rt then turned to the se cond prongof the prima fa cie c ase, which re quires Ozier to demonstrate that he wa s qualified for the pr omotion he

so ug ht. The d i s t rict cour

t found that Ozier had f

ailed to pre sent evidenc e that he w as qualified f or the promot ion to shift manag er. The court noted t hat although Ti erne y was sy mpathetic to t he fa ct that previous mana g ers ha d rec ommended Ozier for promotion, she had ex plained that Ozier lacke d ini tiati ve and did no t pe rf or m w e ll w ith out su

pe rv isi on , a

nd that sh e be lie ve d th a t th e se char acte ristics disqualified Oz i er for a shift manag er position. This evidence is unrefute d in the

re c or d. F ur

the rm or e , it

is und is pu ted th a t O zie r’ s tr a ini ngbo ok “ re ma ine d a lmo st e nti re ly

un mark e d” ; th a t th e sh if

t ma na g e r t ra ini ngpr og ra

m is dr ive n b y

the e mpl oy e e and

the e mpl oy e e is expected to take the initiative in comp l et i n g the trainingbook and pre paringfor the pr omotion examinations; that RTM require s that the t ra i n i n g p rog ram be completed in orde r to qualify for promotion, and that Ozier per formed poor ly on verb al tests, and there fore was ne ver g iven the written tests nec essar

y for pr omotion. Fr om the rec ord, it is clear that the di strict court did not err in concluding that Ozier was not qualified for

the promotion he soug ht. Be caus e Oz ier fa iled to satisfy the sec ond prongunder McD onnell Douglas , h e fa ile d to e sta bli shhis prima facie c a se fo r r a c ia l di sc ri min a tio n. F a ilure to satisfy the sec ond prongis disposi tive of the issue, a nd while we there fore do not need to dete rmine,9

as the district cour

t did, that Ozi er a lso failed to satisfy t he four th element of the pr im a fa c iec a se beca use he could not show that he was repla ced by a person outside of the protec ted class o r w as treated less favorably

than a similarly

situated individual outside of his protected class, we f ind no

err or in that conc lusion. B. O Z I ER ’ S RE T AL I AT I ON C L A I MS Ozier alleg es t hat R TM reta liated aga inst him by dismiss ing him afte r he claimed that he wa s the vic timof

ra c ia l di sc ri min a tio n. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt fo un d th a t O zie r’ s c la im l a c ke d me ri t and did not cre ate a

g enuine issue of

fac t for trial, a

nd we a g ree . Ozier complained a

bout Tierney behind her

back on se vera l occa sions, making de rog atory comments about her

and her work e thic, as we ll as acc using her of discrimination. Tierney testified that in October

2002 she had he ard r

umors from the other employ ees that Ozier had bee n

c omp la ini nga

bo ut h e r, and that sh e wa

rn e d him that if he ha d a pr ob le m wi th he r, he sh ou ld c ome talk to her a

bout it. Shortl y

befor e Tier

ney fired O zier in Febr

uary 2003, she alleg edly

said, “I hear d y ou been ta lking a

bout me behind my

back

. ” Ozier argues that this statement provides dire ct evidenc e of r etaliation. The district c ourt disag ree d, finding that it would have to spec ulate about wh a t T ie rn e y

me ant b y

the state me nt b e c a

us e the state me nt o n it s o wn do e s n ot “ un e qu ivo c a lly connote discriminatory motives,” and, ther efor e, wa s not direct evide nce of reta liation. W e agree . As we have held, “ direc t evidence is that evidence which, if be lieved, re quires the c onclusion that unlawful discr imination was at least a motivating fac tor in the employ er’ s actions.” Jack lyn v. Sc he rin g-Plough Hea lt hca rePr od s. Sa le s Co rp ., 176 F.3d 921, 926 ( 6th Cir.1999). I t does not require the fac t f

inder to dra

w any infere nces to re ach that conclusion. See A bbott v. Crown Motor Co ., 34 8 F .3 d 5 37 , 542 (6t h Cir . 2 00 3) ; se e als o Nguyen , 229 F.3d at 563. Here , as the c ourt10

explained, Ozier has provided only infere nces a

nd speculatio n and the statement itself does not

re qu ir e us to c on c lud e that Ti erne y wa s mo tiv a te d, e ve n in pa rt , b y un lawf ul d isc ri min a tio n in de c idi ngto t e rm inate Ozi e r’ s e mpl oy me nt. Finding no direc t e vidence of reta liation, the court turne d to whether Ozier had e stablished

a pr im a fa c ie case of re taliation. To meet this light burde n, Ozier must show: 1) that he e ng ag ed in a pr ote c te d ac tiv ity ; 2) that this wa s kno wn to t he de fe nd ant; 3) tha

t th e de fe nd ant t oo k a

n a dv e rs e employ ment action ag ainst him; and 4) that there was a causa l connec tion between the protec ted activity and the adver se employ ment action. Se e Singfi e ld , 389 F.3d at 563. The c ourt assumed for the sake of ar g ument t h at Oz i er m et the first ele ment of the test, and the n noted that it was

un dis pute d th a t he a lso me t th e se c on d a nd thi rd e le me nts
. Under fede ral law, in or der to show a causa l connec tion between the protec ted ac tivity and the adve rse a ction – the fourth e lement of the pr ima fac ie ca se – Ozier must produce suffici ent evidenc e to support an infe renc e that RTM took the adverse employ ment action bec ause O zier had complained of

discrimination. Se e EE OC v. Av e ry De nn iso n Co rp ., 104 F.3d 858, 861 ( 6th Cir. 1997). Ozier has submitted no evidenc e other than temporal proxi mity

to support his assertion that there was a

causa l connec tion be tween his c omplaints a g ainst Tierne y and his termination. We have held that tempora l prox imity alone is insufficie nt to establish a causa l connec tion. See Little v. BP Explorations & Oil Co. , 265 F.3d 357, 364 ( 6th Cir. 2001) ; Nguyen , 229 F.3d at 566 ; C oo pe r v . Ci ty of North Olmsted , 795 F.2d 1265, 1272 ( 6th Cir. 1986). The re cord indicates that Ozier has fa iled to meet his burden of

establishing a

causa l connec tion and we a g ree with the district court’s de cision. We also ag ree with the district court that eve n assuming that Ozier proper l y established a

causa l connec tion, he failed to show that RTM’s articulated reason for dismi ssal was pre text ual. As11

the cour t rig htly observe d, RTM ha s never wave red f

rom its assertion that it dismi ssed Plaintiff for

re pe a te d c a shsh or

ta g e s. I t is un dis pute d that te rm ina tin g e mpl oy e e s fo r re pe a te d c a sh sh or ta g e s is

c on sis te nt w ithc omp any po lic y , and that Ozi e r ha d be e n wa rn e d that any

a dd iti on a l sh or

ta g e s w ou ld result in termination. Ozier, althoug h he denie s that he wa s terminated be cause of the c ash shortag es in h is r e g ist e r, ha s o ff

e re d n o e vid e nc e that he wa s no t in f a c t te rm inate d b e c a

us e of his fo ur th c a sh shortag e. Summary

judgme nt for RTM in this case wa s appropr iate. C. O Z I ER ’ S B UL L ARD -P L A W E C K I A C T C L A IM Ozi e r r e qu e ste d f

ro m RT M a

c op y of his c ompl ete personn e l f ile , w hic h RT M f

a ile d to pr ov ide . RT M c la ims tha

t it c ann ot loc a te the fi le

. Ti e rn e y te sti fi e d that upon re c e ipt of Ozi e r’ s f ir st reque st, Morris copied the entire file and Tie rney persona lly

sent it to Oz ier by

cer tified mail. She testified furthe r that Morris e ventually took the file to Cleveland, Ohio, to the g ener al re pository for personne l files for indivi duals whose e mploy ment with RTM had been te rminated. Af fidavits from RTM e mpl oy e e s in dic a te that th e y e xten siv e ly se arc he d fo r Ozi e r’ s pe rs onne l fi le , but w e re un a ble to find it. Ozier alleg es t hat R TM intentionally destroy ed or conce aled the f ile, but has provided no evidenc e to support his claim. He c ontends t h at RTM has violated Michig an’s B ullard-Plawe cki Ac t, M ic h. Com

p. L aws . § 42 3. 50 3, by

fa ili ngto p ro du c e his pe rs onne l f ile up on re qu e st. Th e B ull a rd -P lawe c ki A c t pr ov ide s in pe rt ine nt p art : An e mpl oy e r, up on wr itt e n re qu e st wh ic h de sc ri be s the pe rs onne l re c or d, sh all pr ov ide the e mpl oy e e wi th an op po rt un ity to p e ri od ic a lly

re vie w at r e a so na

ble intervals, g ener ally not more than 2 times in a ca lendar y ear . . . the employ ee’ s personne l rec ord if the e mploy er ha s a per sonnel rec ord for that employ ee. Mich. Comp. L aws § 423.503. Un de r § 42 3. 51 1 o f t

he Ac t:12

I f a n e mpl oy e r vio late s this a c t, an e mpl oy e e may

c omm e nc e an a c tio n in

the c ir c uit court to compe l compliance w ith this act . . . . F ailure to c omply with an orde r of the court may be punished a s contempt. In addition, the court shall awa rd an employ ee pr e va ili ngin a

n a c tio n p ur su ant t o th is a c t th e fo llo wi ngdama g e s: (a ) F or a vio latio n o f t

his a c t, a c tua l da

ma g e s p lus c os ts. (b ) F or a wi lf ul a nd kn ow ingvio latio n o f thi s ac t, $20 0. 00 plu s c os t, re a so na ble a tto rn e y ’s fe e s, and

a c tua l da ma g e s. Whether an employ er violate s the Bullar d-Plawec ki Act by losing a n employ ee’ s personne l file is a question of f

irst impression for this Court. Miche ls v. Delaware Mc Donald’s Corp. , No. 83- CV-1380-DT, 1985 U .S. Dist. L EXI S 21074 (E.D. M ich. Apr. 3, 1985), i s the only case in Michiga

n or this Circuit addre ssing the issue of a lost personnel file unde r B ullard-Plawe cki. In Mi c he ls , the

e mpl oy e r l os t th e e mpl oy e e ’s re c or d but late r dis c ov e re d it, and the c ourt he ld that if a pe rs onne l f

ile is lost, then the employ er doe s not have a personne l rec ord for

that employ ee w ithin the meaning of the B ullard-Plawe cki Act a nd there fore the employ er is not required to produc e it. Mi c he ls , 1985 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 21074, at *2. Her e, the dist rict cour t followed Mi c he ls and conc luded that RTM could not produce what it did not have and di d not violate Bullard-Plawe dki as l ong as the file w as los t. I n this case, Tie rney tes t i fi ed t h at she copie d Ozier’s per sonnel file and se nt it to hi m by

cer tified mail, and RTM produce d sworn af fidavits from RTM employ ee’ s indicating an extensive b u t f r u it le s s s e ar c hf

o r th e mi s s in g f

il e . O zi e r p r e s e n te d

n o e v id e n c e to th e c o n tr ar y . We r e c o g n iz e that it would be difficult for a plaintiff to demonstrate that an employ er intentionally destroy ed or

conce aled a

file, but the only

evidenc e in the re cor d i s t h at Oz ier’s f ile is lost. W e agree with the district court that the re asoning in Mi c he ls is sound, and we aff irm the court’ s conclusion that, under the se c ir c ums tanc e s, Ozi e r ha s fa ile d to pr e se nt e vid e nc e su ff ic ie nt t o p re se rv e thi s c la im f or tr ia l.13 CO NC LU SION For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f d ist ri c t c ourt
.