[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 19-11796

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 7:18-cr-00397-LSC-JEO-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOHN CHRISTOPHER DOBBS, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

________________________

(February 3, 2020)

Before BRANCH, GRANT, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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John Dobbs appeals his 120-month sentence for possession of a firearm as a 

convicted felon. Dobbs raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues that the 

district court violated Rule 32(i)(3)(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 

by failing to find that he used the firearm in connection with kidnapping his 

then-wife. Second, Dobbs argues that, even if the district court did not violate 

Rule 32(i)(3)(B), it clearly erred by applying an upward offense-level adjustment 

because there was insufficient evidence that he kidnapped her. We hold that the 

district court’s finding that Dobbs used a firearm in connection with a kidnapping 

was neither procedurally nor substantively defective. Accordingly, we affirm

Dobbs’s sentence. 

I.

A. Facts 

On January 24, 2018, J.B.1 called the police from a fire station in 

Tuscaloosa, Alabama. When the police arrived, J.B. was “emotionally distraught,”

“[t]errified,” “shaking,” and visibly injured. She reported that her husband, Dobbs, 

had beaten her and held her against her will. 2

 She also told the police that Dobbs

was currently armed with a pistol. The police then located Dobbs, arrested him, 

1 Although Dobbs’ former wife testified in open court at the sentencing hearing, in the 

interest of J.B.’s privacy, the parties reference her by her initials in their briefs and therefore we 

do so here. 

2 J.B. and Dobbs divorced in December 2018. 

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and recovered his firearm, which was loaded with 13 rounds of ammunition. 

Dobbs and J.B. provided different descriptions of the circumstances leading up to 

J.B.’s frantic call and Dobbs’s arrest. We begin with the undisputed facts. 

In January 2018, J.B. picked up Dobbs from a drug treatment facility in 

Birmingham, Alabama. The couple spent three or four days using drugs in a hotel 

room before continuing their drive to Tuscaloosa, Alabama. They arrived in 

Tuscaloosa on January 23, 2018 and immediately went to a Title Loan store. With 

cash in hand, they bought two cell phones and then got a hotel room. Next, they 

went to a pawn shop. Here is where the stories begin to diverge. 

At the sentencing hearing, J.B. testified that it was Dobbs who wanted to 

buy the gun from the pawn shop, and he told her that “if [she] didn’t go get the 

gun, he was going to—he would kill [her] regardless.” J.B. told Dobbs that she did 

not want to buy the gun and he replied, “[y]ou’re going to buy the f**king gun.” 

J.B. feared disobeying him because he had abused her in the past. Dobbs walked 

J.B. through the necessary steps to buy the gun at the pawn shop—or, as J.B. put it, 

“he might as well walked in there and got it hisself [sic].” And after J.B. 

purchased the gun, Dobbs took it and loaded it with ammunition. Dobbs kept the 

gun in his possession for the remainder of the time J.B. was with him. 

As Dobbs tells it, they went to the pawn shop to buy a gun because Dobbs 

planned to get a night job and J.B. needed a gun for protection. He claims that he 

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did not fill out the paperwork for J.B. but stood near the bullets in a separate area 

of the pawn shop. He argues that J.B. could have asked the clerk for help at that 

point, and other points during their trip, if she believed he was holding her against

her will. 

According to J.B., when the two returned to the hotel after purchasing the 

gun, Dobbs beat her and would not let her leave the room. J.B. testified that in the 

past, Dobbs had been mentally, physically, emotionally, and sexually abusive. 

And at some point, Dobbs told J.B. that if she called 9-1-1, he would kill her. J.B. 

testified that if she tried to leave the hotel, “he would have hurt [her].” 

They went to another title loan store the next morning. J.B. drove. She

testified that she did not want to be with Dobbs at all but believed Dobbs would 

kill her if she refused to drive to the store. Dobbs still had the gun at that point. 

They parked in front of the store, and Dobbs got out of the car, leaving the keys 

behind with J.B. As soon as Dobbs closed the door, J.B. turned the car on, drove

to a nearby fire station, and called the police.

During his allocution, Dobbs admitted that he had hit his wife, but 

maintained that he never kidnapped her. He claimed he would never “kill her, hurt 

her or her family to the point where it was just out of control.” 

B. Plea and Sentencing 

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Upon his arrest on January 24, 2018, Dobbs was charged with kidnapping in 

the first degree, domestic violence in the third degree, and unlawful possession of a 

firearm. In September 2018, the grand jury returned a one-count indictment for 

possession of a pistol as a convicted felon. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Dobbs entered 

an unnegotiated guilty plea. 

In the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”), the probation officer 

determined that the proper sentencing guideline for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

922(g)(1) is U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1. That section provides that if the defendant was a 

“prohibited person” when he committed the instant offense, the base level offense 

is 14. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(6)(A) (U.S. Sentencing 

Comm’n 2004). The Guidelines define a “prohibited person” as any person who 

has been convicted of any crime punishable for a term exceeding one year. Id.,

cmt. (n.3).

3

 Because Dobbs had prior felonies, he was a prohibited person at the 

time of the offense. The probation officer then found that, because Dobbs used the 

firearm in connection with another felony—here, kidnapping—the base-offense 

level should be increased by 4 to 18 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K.1(b)(6)(B). And 

after applying the cross reference in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A), the probation 

3 The “commentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is 

authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a 

plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.” Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993). 

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officer determined that the base offense level for the substantive offense should 

apply.

4

 Because the substantive offense was kidnapping, the probation officer

applied U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(a), which established Dobbs’s base-offense level at 32. 

Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(b)(3), the probation officer increased the baseoffense level by two because Dobbs’s offense involved a dangerous weapon. The 

probation officer then applied a 3-level downward adjustment for Dobbs’s 

acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) and (b), for a total 

offense level of 31. 

The PSI also recited Dobbs’s criminal history, which included several felony 

convictions. The probation officer calculated Dobbs’s criminal history score as 16, 

which placed him in criminal history category VI. The probation officer noted that 

the statutory maximum sentence for Dobbs’s offense was 120 months. Based on 

Dobbs’s offense level of 31 and criminal history category of VI, the probation 

officer determined that the Guidelines imprisonment range was 188 to 235 months. 

But because this range exceeded the statutory maximum sentence, the probation 

officer concluded that the appropriate Guideline imprisonment term was 120 

months. 

4 The level for the substantive offense applied because under the cross reference in 

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A), if the defendant used or possessed a firearm in connection with the 

commission of another offense, U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1 is applied in respect to that offense so long as 

the resulting offense is higher than the calculation under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1. Section 2X1.1 

directs that the base offense level from the guideline for the substantive offense is applied. 

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Dobbs filed two objections to the PSI.5 He first objected that his offense 

level should not have been increased to 32 pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 2A4.1(a) and 

2K2.1(c)(1)(A) in paragraph 13 of the PSI. His first written objection states: 

The Defendant objects to the increase to level 32. The Defendant 

denies that he used the firearm other than the possession it [sic] which 

he has already pled guilty to. Additionally, he has not been found 

guilty nor pled guilty to any other charges related to his wife [sic] 

allegations. 

In addition, Dobbs objected to the two-level enhancement for use of a firearm in 

paragraph 14: 

The Defendant was increased 2 levels. The Defendant denies the use 

of the firearm. He has pled to possession of said firearm. He would 

also argue that this increase is a double counting and should not be 

applied.

After Dobbs filed these objections, the district court continued the sentencing 

hearing to allow witnesses to testify. 

At this continued hearing, the government called two witnesses who testified 

to the facts surrounding the alleged kidnapping and the timing of the acquisition of 

the gun: the victim and the police officer who interviewed her. The victim testified 

that on the same night that Dobbs purchased the gun, Dobbs beat her and would 

not let her leave the hotel room. The police officer then took the stand and 

5 In making these objections, Dobbs objected to only the paragraphs in the PSI which 

summarized the base-level calculations and adjustments (paragraphs 13 and 14) but not the 

factual paragraphs underlying the proposed offense-level adjustments (paragraphs 5 through 8). 

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described the victim’s injuries following the kidnapping, as well as Dobbs’s arrest. 

Dobbs did not testify, and he did not call any witnesses. At the conclusion of the 

government witnesses’ testimony, the district court overruled Dobbs’s objections 

to the PSI and determined that the enhancement based on the kidnapping was 

proper:

the guideline calculations as stated are correct; that is, the guideline 

offense level – and this Court adopts the factual statements contained 

in the presentence report and makes specific findings that the 

guidelines offense level is thirty-one, the criminal history category is 

VI, the advisory guideline imprisonment range is one hundred twenty 

months, the supervised release period is one to three years . . . 

In so ruling, the district court necessarily found that the kidnapping elements were 

met and that a gun was used in the kidnapping. When the district court asked for 

Dobbs’s response, his counsel replied that “he stands on the objection that we filed, 

and we certainly deny the allegations of the kidnapping.” 

The district judge then allowed Dobbs to speak to the court before 

pronouncing the sentence. He repeatedly stated that he did not kidnap his wife and 

that she could have left or asked for help at any time. Following Dobbs’s unsworn

statements, the district court sentenced Dobbs to the statutory maximum of 120 

months. The district court asked whether Dobbs had any objections regarding the 

findings of fact, the calculations, the sentence or the manner in which the sentence 

was pronounced or imposed. Dobbs’s counsel replied that he had none. This 

appeal followed. 

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II.

A. The District Court Did Not Violate Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure. 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3)(B) provides that during 

sentencing, the district court “must—for any disputed portion of the presentence 

report or other controverted matter—rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling 

is unnecessary either because the matter will not affect sentencing, or because the 

court will not consider the matter in sentencing.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B). 

Dobbs argues that the district court violated this rule because it did not make 

any specific factual findings regarding Dobbs’s objections to the kidnapping 

enhancement pursuant to § 2K2.1(c)(1), but rather the district court summarily 

overruled his objection at the conclusion of the hearing. In response, the 

government argues that the district court ruled on Dobbs’s objection, thereby 

satisfying Rule 32(i)(3)(B). 

In general, we review a district court’s application of Rule 32 de novo. See 

United States v. Spears, 443 F.3d 1358, 1361 (11th Cir. 2006). But if the 

defendant does not preserve the objection in the district court, we will review only 

for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Henderson, 409 F.3d 

1293, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005). Under this standard, an appellant must show an error 

that is plain and affects substantial rights. Henderson, 409 F.3d at 1307. Even 

assuming de novo review applies, the district court did not violate Rule 32(i)(3)(B).

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A defendant triggers Rule 32(i)(3)(B) only by objecting to statements of fact 

that are in the PSI. See United States v. Owen, 858 F.2d 1514, 1517 (11th Cir. 

1988) (discussing Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D)—the predecessor to Rule 

32(i)(3)(B)). Defendants must assert challenges to factual statements from the PSI 

“with specificity and clarity.” United States v. Bennett, 472 F.3d 825, 832 (11th 

Cir. 2006). If a defendant’s objections do not satisfy the specificity and clarity 

requirements, they are waived. See id. 

Here, Dobbs objected to the application of the kidnapping enhancement 

pursuant to §2K2.1(c)(1) because he did not plead guilty to charges related to his 

wife and because he only possessed the gun but did not actually use it. 

Accordingly, the district court held an evidentiary hearing and heard testimony 

about the kidnapping and the firearm issues. The district court then ruled on 

Dobbs’s objections to the kidnapping enhancement. It adopted the factual 

statements in the PSI, determined that the guidelines calculations were correct, and 

overruled Dobbs’s objections. Rule 32 requires the district court to rule on 

disputed issues, and, following an evidentiary hearing, the district court did just 

that: it ruled that the kidnapping sentencing enhancement pursuant to the 

Guidelines was proper. Accordingly, the district court did not violate Rule 

32(i)(3)(B).

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Dobbs also argues that the district court failed to consider the timing of 

when J.B. was kidnapped for the purposes of the enhancement and failed to make 

specific factual findings regarding the elements of kidnapping. Dobbs did not 

object to the timing or elements of kidnapping before the district court. Therefore, 

plain error review applies. See Henderson, 409 F.3d at 1307. 

As an initial matter, Dobbs did not make “clear and focused objections” to 

these factual issues. Owen, 858 F.2d at 1517. He therefore did not trigger the 

district court’s obligation under Rule 32 to rule on these objections. More 

importantly, however, both the timing and the elements of the kidnapping were 

sufficiently addressed in the evidentiary hearing that the district court convened to 

address Dobbs’s objections to the PSI. The district court’s subsequent ruling on 

this objection necessarily resolved these issues as well. Accordingly, there is no 

error and certainly no plain error. 

B. The District Court’s Findings About Kidnapping Were Not Clearly 

Erroneous 

Dobbs also argues that the district court clearly erred in finding that the 

enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A) was warranted because Dobbs 

used or possessed the firearm in connection with kidnapping J.B. In general, this 

Court reviews a district court’s factual findings, as well as its application of the 

Sentencing Guidelines to the facts, for clear error. United States v. Rothenberg, 

610 F.3d 621, 624 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Williams, 340 F.3d 1231, 

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1239 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Where a determination turns primarily on the evaluation of 

facts . . . that are more accessible to the district court than to the court of appeals, 

we will defer to the district court's application of the law to those facts and apply 

‘clear error’ review.”). A finding will not be considered clearly erroneous if it is 

plausible in light of the record as a whole, see United States v. Ladson, 643 F.3d 

1335, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011), or if it is based on one of two permissible views of 

the evidence. United States v. Saingerard, 621 F.3d 1341, 1343 (11th Cir. 2010). 

Dobbs asserts the district court clearly erred because the record was insufficient to 

establish (1) if and when J.B. was kidnapped; and (2) whether Dobbs used or 

possessed the pistol in connection with the kidnapping. We take each issue in turn. 

i. Kidnapping 

Here, the district court imposed an enhanced sentence because it adopted the 

PSI’s findings that Dobbs possessed a gun in connection with the kidnapping of his 

wife.

6

 Dobbs contends that the district court clearly erred in finding that the 

elements of kidnapping were met. Our review of the record reveals otherwise. 

In Alabama, “a person commits the crime of kidnapping in the first degree if 

he abducts another person with intent to . . . accomplish or aid in the commission 

6 Dobbs was charged with, but not convicted of, felony kidnapping. Still, sentencing 

courts may consider both uncharged and acquitted conduct in determining the appropriate 

sentence “so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” United 

States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997); United States v. Hasson, 333 F.3d 1264, 1279 n. 19 

(11th Cir. 2003). 

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of any felony . . . [i]nflict physical injury upon him or abuse him sexually . . . or 

terrorize him. . . .” Ala. Code § 13A-6-43(a).7

 Kidnapping in the first degree is a 

felony. Ala. Code § 13A-6-43(c). Kidnapping in the second degree is also a 

felony and occurs when a person abducts another person. Ala. Code § 13A-6-44. 

For the purposes of these crimes, the term “abduct” means “[t]o restrain a person 

with intent to prevent his liberation by either secreting or holding him in a place 

where he is not likely to be found, or using or threatening to use deadly physical 

force.” Ala. Code § 13A-6-40(2). “Thus, in order to be abducted, a person must 

be restrained.” Grayson v. State, 824 So. 2d 804, 816 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999). To 

“restrain” someone is to:

intentionally or knowingly restrict a person's movements unlawfully 

and without consent, so as to interfere substantially with his liberty by 

moving him from one place to another, or by confining him either in 

the place where the restriction commences or in a place to which he 

has been moved. Restraint is ‘without consent’ if it is accomplished 

by . . . [p]hysical force, intimidation or deception.

Ala. Code § 13A-6-40(1)a.

The record establishes that Dobbs intentionally used physical force and 

intimidation to restrict and confine J.B. in the motel room while in possession of 

the firearm. According to paragraph 5 of the PSI report (to which Dobbs did not 

7 Because there has been no allegation that the alleged kidnapping in this case involved 

interstate commerce, the federal kidnapping statute does not apply. See 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a); 

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 (cmt. 14(C) (“‘Another offense’, for purposes of subsection (c)(1), means any 

federal, state, or local offense, other than the explosive or firearms possession or trafficking 

offense, regardless of whether a criminal charge was brought, or a conviction obtained.”)).

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object), J.B. told the police that Dobbs “held her against her will and physically 

abused her the night before.” She reported that Dobbs made her purchase a pistol 

for him and “she feared Dobbs would hurt her” if she refused. At the hearing, J.B. 

testified that she “didn’t want to be with him at all” and that Dobbs “wouldn’t let 

[her] out of the hotel that night.” She also testified that he “had the gun” in the 

hotel room and was “punching and beating on [her],” and that “he’d kill [her]” if 

she called 9-1-1 or refused to go to the title loan shop with him. The record clearly 

shows that Dobbs used physical force and intimidation to prevent J.B. from leaving

the motel room. See Ala. Code §§ 13A-6-43(a), 13A-6-44; 13A-6-40(1)a. Thus, 

in light of the record of the whole, it is plausible that Dobbs kidnapped his wife 

and therefore the district court did not err in applying the enhancement. 

That J.B. initially consented to joining Dobbs—in fact, she picked him up 

from the drug treatment facility—does not affect our conclusion. “[I]t is not 

necessary that” J.B.’s lack of consent “exist from the beginning of the course of 

conduct as long as it is present during the course of conduct.” Grayson, 824 So. 2d 

at 816 (holding that defendant kidnapped hitchhiker even though victim voluntarily 

entered defendant’s car); see also Mims v. State, 591 So. 2d 120, 128 (Ala. Crim. 

App. 1991) (“Even if a victim voluntarily enters a room, a defendant can still be 

found guilty of first degree kidnapping if the victim was then intentionally and 

unlawfully confined or concealed against her will.”); Musgrove v. State, 519 So. 2d 

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565, 581 (Ala. Crim. App.), aff’d 519 So. 2d 586 (Ala. 1986) (holding that 

defendant was guilty of kidnapping in the first degree where victim voluntarily 

entered the defendant's motel room and was then intentionally and unlawfully 

confined against her will). Accordingly, the record shows that the kidnapping 

began as early as the night J.B. and Dobbs purchased the pistol when Dobbs

prevented J.B. from leaving the hotel room. 

ii. Using a firearm in connection with the kidnapping

For the kidnapping enhancement to apply however, Dobbs must have used 

or possessed the firearm in connection with the kidnapping. U.S.S.G. § 

2K2.1(b)(6). Dobbs contends that because the district court erred in failing to 

identify exactly when the kidnapping occurred, it necessarily failed to find that 

Dobbs possessed the firearm at the time of the commission of the kidnapping. 

Thus, he argues, the cross reference could not apply. We disagree. 

For the purposes of U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(A) and (c)(1)(A), a defendant 

is considered to have used a firearm in connection with another crime if the firearm 

“facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating,” that offense. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, 

cmt. (n.14(A)); see also United States v. Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d 82, 93 (11th Cir. 

2013) (adopting the commentary’s definition of “in connection with”). 

As discussed above, the record shows that Dobbs kidnapped his wife at the 

hotel room when he prevented her from leaving through threats and intimidation. 

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Dobbs does not dispute that he possessed a gun in the motel room. And J.B.’s fear 

of the gun prevented her from leaving: when asked during the sentencing hearing if 

she could have left the hotel room, she specifically stated, “No, he had a gun.” 

Thus, the record indicates that the firearm facilitated or had the potential of 

facilitating Dobbs’s abduction of J.B. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, cmt. (n.14(A)). That 

he may have kidnapped her before acquiring the gun does not affect the conclusion 

that the kidnapping continued after he obtained it. 

In summary, the record shows that Dobbs kidnapped J.B. and used the 

firearm in connection with the crime. While Dobbs argued that J.B. was free to 

leave the hotel room, his assertion, at best, presents one of two permissible views 

of the evidence. See Saingerard, 621 F.3d at 1343. Accordingly, the district court 

did not clearly err when it found that Dobbs used the firearm in connection with 

kidnapping J.B. and applied the cross-reference in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A) 

based on that finding. 

AFFIRMED. 

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