### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON O n- Br ie fs Ma y 19, 200 6
STATE OF TENNESS EE v . PHYLLI S MCCRARY, ET AL 

### .
A Dire ct A ppeal f

romthe Juvenile Court for Shelb y County No. M6012 The Honorable Herber t Lane, Special Jud ge

No. W2005-02881-C OA-R3-JV - F iled Jul y 6, 2006

This is a termination of parental rights case. Both Mother and Father appea l from the order of the J uvenile Court of Shelby

Countyterminating their re spective pa renta l rights. Spec ifically , Mother
a sse rt s th a t th e g ro un ds c ite d f or te rm inatio n ar e no t supp orte d b y c le ar andc on vin c ing e vid e nc e in the rec ord, and that the Depa rtment of Children’s Service s did not meet the statu t o ry v er i fi cation requ irement. F ather

asserts that the g rounds cited f or termination of his par ental rig hts are not supported by

clea r and c onvincing eviden ce i n t h e rec ord, and tha t the Depa rtment of Children’s Service s did not meet the statutory verific ation require ment. Be cause we f ind clear and convinc ing
e vid e nc e in the re c or d to su pp ort th e Ju v e n i l e Cou rt ’s fi nd ing s te rm inatin g the pa rt ie s’ pa re nta l r ig hts ba se d o n a t le a st o ne g ro un d u nd e r the statut e , a ndthat th e De pa rt me nt o f C hil dr e n’ s Se rv ic e s d id
m e e t t h e s t a t u t o r y v e r i f

i c a t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t , w e a f f i r m

. Phy

llis McCra

ry (“Ms. McCra

ry”) is the mother of the thr ee minor c hildren at issue in this case , A.L .M. (d.o

. b

. 9 / 18/92), D.D.M. (d.o.b. 9 /4 / 9 3 ) , a n d R

. R

. M

. ( d

. o

. b

. 9 /4 / 0 0 )

. R a n d y M a d i s o n ( “ M r

. M a d i s o n ” , t o g e t h e r w i t h M s

. M c C r ar y, “Respondents” ) i s the father of R.R.M. (d.o.b. 9/ 4/00). The parental rights of the fathe rs of A.L .M and D.D.M. w ere terminated on N ovember 10, 2005, and they

are not parties to this appea l.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Juvenile Court Re verse d in P art and Af fi rm ed in Par t

W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J . and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., joined.

Curtis D. J ohnson, J r. of Me mphis, Tennessee for Appe llant, Randy Madison, Sr. Mitz i H. Spell of Memphis, Tennessee for Appe llant, Phy llis Mariah McCrary Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; Amy T. Master, A ssistant Attorney Gene ral for Appellee , Tenne ssee De partment of Children' s Services

OP IN IONO n ly the p a re n ta l rig h ts o f t h e thr e e id e n tif ie d c h ild re n , A .L .M ., D .D .M ., an d R .R .M ., ar e a t i ssu e o n a p p e a l. 1

-2- On May 24, 2001, the Depa

rtment of Children’s Se rv i ce s (“ DC S” or “Petitioner” ) filed a petition in the J uvenile C ourt of Memphis and Shelby Countyseeking the re moval of the nine minor children of Ms. Mc Crary from the home that Ms. Mc McCrary and Mr. Madison share d, including

1 A.L .M., D.D.M., and R.R.M. The petition state d that Ms. Mc Crary was an admitted “cr ack” addict living with her

nine minor children in a two-be droom apa rtment, and wa s preg nant at the time the petition was filed. F urther, the petition stated that the apa rtment had no utilities, there wa s no food in the apartment, and that the fa milywas a bout to be evicted. T he petition identified additional pr ob le ms, su c h a s a

re c or d o f v iol e nc e in the ho me , tru ancya ndme dic a l ne g le c t th a t a lle g e dly persisted, de spite DCS’s attempts to i nterve ne. On Ma y 24, 2001, the J uvenil e C ourt enter ed a protec tive custody order , and the children wer e re moved from the home . At a pre liminary hearing on J une 7, 2001, the Juvenile Court awar ded tempora ry custody to DCS. A gua

rdian a d litem was appointed to ac t on behalf of the childre n in the matter be fore the Court, and sepa rate attorney s were appointed to re prese nt Ms. McCrary and Mr. Madison. On J uly 13, 2001, the children wer e found to be depe ndent and ne g lected. R.R.M., was born prematurely at twenty -eig ht (28) we eks and suffe red f rom numerous medic al problems. The Tenne ssee Depa rtment of Children’s Service s took custody of R.R.M., and he was place d with a foster f amily , with whom he has re mained since that time. A.L .M. and D.D.M. we re pla ced in the c ustody of Yo l an d a R o o k s, D.D.M.’s kinder g arte n teac her. The J uvenile Court’s Or der c ondition ed v i s i t ati on by Ms. McCrary

and Mr. Ma dison on their passing three random drug scre en tests, and completing an evaluation at t he C enter for Children and Pare nts. The couple were not awa rded supervised vis itation until twenty -six (26) months later. I n October of 2002, A.L .M and D.D.M. wer e returned to DCS protec tive custody when Ms. Rooks underw ent surg ery , and they wer e plac ed in foster

car e in J anuary

2003.

On J une 14, 2001, DCS develope d the first perma nency plan for R.R.M. The plan had a dual g oal of re tu r n in g R. R. M

. to h is p ar e n ts o r r e lati v e p la c e me n t. U n d e r th e p lan , M s

. M c Cr ar y

w as require d to submit to random drug testing; obtain a n alcohol and d rug asse ssment and follow the assessment’s r ecommendations; complete inpatient treatment f or drug abuse; stop the use of a lcohol and n o n -p re s cr i b ed m ed i ca t i o n s ; at t en d m ed i ca l ap p o i n t m en t s fo r R

. R

. M

. ; learn how to properly care for R.R.M. and his specia l medical nee ds; and learn how to cr eate an appr opriate home environment conducive to R.R.M.’s g rowth and development. Under R.R.M.’s pe rmane ncy plan, Mr. Madison
was re quired to submit to ra ndom dr ug scre ens; obtain an alcohol and drug assessment; attend AA and drug g roup sessions; and, attend a n ger manag ement cla sses. The objec tive for R.R.M.’s perma nency plan w a s f

o r b o thM s

. M c Cr ar y

a n d M r

. M a d is o n to b e ab leto p r o v id e a s a f e and nurturing environment for R.R.M. Ms

. M cC ra ry

signe d the plan on June 14, 2001, however , Mr. Madison did not sign the plan.
Subsequent perma nency

plans wer e d ev el o ped for R.R.M. on J anuary

9, 2002, J une 12, 2002, and June 10, 2003. These plans r equire d Ms. McCrary to attend and c omplete a ce rtified pare nting c lass; to continue to submit to random drug scre ens; attend Southeast Menta l Health for individual and family thera py ; attend R.R.M.’s medical appointments; and, continue to lea rn how to cre ate a n appropriate home e nvironment conduc ive to R.R.M.’s grow th and deve lopment. Mr.-3-

Ma dis on wa s to c on tin ue to s ub mit to rand om dr

ug sc re e ns ; c omp le te a lc oh ol anddr ug tr e a tme nt; attend fa mily thera

py ; a nd, stay out of leg al trouble and ja il. The J une 12, 2002 permanenc y plan,
a nd su bs e qu e nt pla ns , re vis e d the ob je c tiv e to a

du a l g oa l of

re turn h ome or

a do pti on . B othpa

re nts sig ne d th e se pe rm a ne nc y

pla ns , a ndthe plans we re a do pte d b y the Juve nil e Cou rt

. DC S de ve lop e d a no the r p e rm a ne nc y plan f or R.R .M . o n A pril 1 3, 20 04

. Th e g oa l f or thi s pla n r e ma ine d a

du a l g oa l of

re turn h ome or

a do pti on . A dd iti on a l r e qu ir eme nt s pl ace d o n M s. McCrary wer e to obtain stable housing and esta blish it for a minimum of six (6) months; learn how to m e dic a lly

c are fo r R.R. M. ; pro vid e pr oo f of he r ab ili ty to en su re that th e ba sic ne e ds of R.R .M

. wo uldbe me t in c lud ing a de qu a te fo od , sh e lte r a nd c lothin g

. I n a dd iti on to p re vio us re qu ir e me nts , Mr . M a dis on wa s in str

uc te d to pr ov ide a ndma in tai n adeq uate , s ta ble ho us ing ; le arn ho w t o me dic a lly c are fo r R .R. M. ; a nd pr ov ide pr oo f of his abil ity to e ns ur e that th e ba sic ne e ds of R.R .M

. would be met including adequate food, shelter and clothing

. DCS develope d perma nency plans for A.L .M. and D.D.M. on N ovember 21, 2002, howeve r, copies of those plans are not inc luded in the rec ord. Subsequent perma nency plans wer e deve loped for A.L .M. and D.D.M. on April 8, 2004. These pla ns had the dua l goa ls of return home or adoption. Un de r the pla ns , re qu ir e me nts fo r Ms. Mc Cr ary we re to c on tin ue to s ub mit to r a nd om d ru g sc re e ns ; to o bta in a nd ma int a in s ta bleho us ing fo r a

min imu m of

six ( 6) mon ths ; pr ov ide pr oo f o f h e r a bil ity to ensure that the basic ne eds of the c hildren would be me t including a dequate foo d , shelter a nd clothing; a nd, attend ea ch sche duled visit with t he childre n.

Pur su a nt t o R. R.M .’ s in iti a l pe rm a ne nc y plan, on No ve mbe r 2 7 a ndDe c e mbe r 4 , 2 00 1, Ms. Mc Cr ary un de rw e nt an e va luatio n b y the Ce nte r f

or Chi ldr e n a nd Pare nts (“ CCP” ). CCP
rec ommended fr equent r andom drug s cr eens a nd intensive psy chother apy , family thera py , and pa re nti ng c la sse s. Ms. McCrary was refe rre d to Ba by L ove, an alcohol and drug treatment prog ram for preg nant women administere d by

t he Midtown Mental He alth Center. Ms. McCra ry was a dmitted to the p ro gra m on September 25, 2001, f our months after

the childre n wer e re moved from he r home. Ba by L ove off

ers pa renting classes, e ducational a nd vocational tra ining, a nd g roup and individual thera py . Ms. McCrary

was discha

rg ed fr om the prog ram on De cembe r 6, 2001, for v i o l ati ng the prog ram’s medication policy

. Specifica lly , Ms. Mc Crary ’s urine scre en taken on Dec ember 1, 2001, returne d positive for alc ohol.

Ms. Mc Cr ary

wa s a dmi tte d to the Sa lvatio n Ar my ’s Re ne wa l Plac e on Ap ri l 9, 20 02 . T his is a residential trea tment prog ram that off ers a lcohol and drug reha

bilitation foll owed by

educational and vocational assistance. Ms. McCra ry left this prog ram on June 4, 2002, after complaining that money had bee n stolen from her

.
Fr om J uly

2002 throug h J une 2003, Ms. McCra ry participated in outpatient prog rams at the Southeast Mental Hea lth Clinic. Ms. McCrary succe ssfully

completed the e ight- month Cocaine and-4-

Alcohol Awa

rene ss Progr am in Fe bruary 2003. Durin g t his prog ram, she c onsistentlytested neg ative for

drug s.

Ms. Mc Cr ary

e nte re d So ph ia ’s Ho us e , a sh e lte r f or abu se d w ome n, on Ap ri l 23 , 2 00 3. Whil e a t So ph ia ’s Ho us e , s he pa rt ic ipate d in a

dr ug tr e a tme nt pr og ram. Ms. Mc Cr ary le ft Sop hia ’s Ho us e on September 6, 2003. She te stified that she left be cause she found a job.

Ms. Mc Cr ary

un de rw e nt r a nd om dru g sc re e ns wh i le he r c hil dr e n w e re in the c us tod y of DC S. She had a total of

twenty -two (22) neg ative drug scre en s

. Howeve r, Ms. McCrary tested positive for alcohol on October 27, 2001, and again on Dec ember 1, 2001. On April 20, 2004, Ms. McCrary tested positive for c ocaine and ca nnabis.

Pursuant to R.R.M .’s initial permane ncy plan, Mr. Madison under went an ev al u at i o n by CCP . CCP rec ommended frequent random drug scre ens, ange r mana g ement tre atment, thera py , and a drug reha

bilitation progra m. Mr. Madison completed a work re adine s s training prog ram on November , 8, 2001, and a pare nting classes throug h the Ex chang e Club on Dec ember 14, 2001. He
succe ssfully

completed a n ang er ma nag ement class offe red by Be tter Da y s, I nc., on June 17, 2002. Additionally , Mr. Madison enr olled in the New D irec tions int ensive outp at i en t al cohol and drug tr e a tme nt pr og ra m. Up un til June 10 , 200 3, Mr . Mad iso n re ma ine d in compli a nc e wi th the pr og ra m. Mr. Madison under went ra ndom drug scre ens whil e his child was in the c ustody of DCS. He had a total of ten ( 10) drug screen s, six which showe d positive results for the pr esenc e of dr ug s. On April 20, 2004, Mr. Madison tested positive for cocaine and c annabis.
Supervised visitation with the children wa s g rante d to both Ms. McCrary and Mr. Ma dison
on September 24, 2003. Be tween September 30, 2004 and May 27, 2004, both pare nts had thirteen schedule d visits wit h the childr en

. Of t h e thirtee n (13) a rra ng ed visitation periods, Ms. McCrary missed three ( 3) visits, was prese nt for ten ( 10), an d wa s late for three of those attende d. Mr. Madison missed five (5) visits, was present for eig ht (8), and w as late f

or three of those eig ht.

On June 4, 20 04 , D CS pe tit ion e d th e Juve nil e Cou rt to te rm inate the pa re nta l r ig hts of

Ms. M cC ra ryt o A. L

. M

. , D. D. M

. , an d R

. R

. M

. , an d t h e pa re n t al ri gh t s o f M r. M ad i s o n t o R

. R

. M

. T h o u gh the c a se ma na g e r at th e tim e , Ch e ry l F a ulkne r, sig ne d th e pe tit ion , s he ne g le c te d to sig n th e a ff ida vit verifying the fac ts a lleg ed in the petition. DCS team coor dinator Diane Hurth sig ned Ms. Fa ulkner’s name in her

place . The Juvenile Court gr anted the D CS l eave to amend the p etition with a new verific ation pag e on Oc tober 5, 2005.

On Novembe r 10, 2005, the J uvenile Court of Memphis and Shelby Countyenter ed a f

inal order terminating the par ental rig hts of Ms. McCrary

and Mr. Ma dison to R.R .M., and terminating the par ental rig hts of Ms

. McCrary to A.L .M. and D.D.M. The termination of pare ntal rig hts was based on the g rounds of persistenc e of conditions, substantial noncompliance with the perma nency plan, and a

bandonment. The J uvenile Court also found by clea r and convincing evidenc e that it was in the children’ s best interest to terminate Ms. McCrary ’s and Mr. Ma dison’s pare ntal rig hts.-5-

Ms. Mc Cr ary

app e a ls a ndra ise s f

ou r i ssu e s f

or re vie w a s st a te d in he r b ri e f:

1. Whether the J u v en i l e Court er red by not dismi ssing the pe tition for termination of pare ntal rig hts because DCS failed to mee t the statutory require m en t that it must be verifie d?
2. I s there clea

r and convincing evidenc e that Phy llis McCrary abandone d her children by willfullyfailing to visit her c hildren during the i mmediate four months prior to the filing of the pe tit ion to t e rm inate he r p are nta l r ig hts ?
3. Whe the r the e vid e nc e su pp orts the Juve nil e Cou rt ’s fi nd ing that Ms . M c Cr ary faile d to
su bs ta nti a lly

c omp ly wi th the pe rm a ne nc y

plans ?
4. Whether the Juven i l e C o urt’s finding that the conditions which led to re moval of the children still persist is supported by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e?
Mr. Madison appe als and raises three issues for re view as state d in his brief:

1. Whether the Juvenil e C o u rt er re d i n fa i l ing to dismiss the petition for termination of pare ntal rig hts due to the failure of the Depa rtment of Children’s Service s to verify the petition properly

as re quired by

T.C.A. § 36-1-113( d)(1) ? 2. Whether the J uvenile Court er red in ruling that the Appellant Randy Madison, Sr. “fa iled to s ub sta nti a lly

c omp ly wi th thr e e pe rm a ne nc y plans pr e pa re d by the De pa

rt me nt” , o r i n failing to rule that t h e g oals set forth in these plans wer e not re asonably related to the
re a so ns fo r the ini tia l r e fe rr a l? 3

. Whe the r t he Juve nil e C o u r t e rre d in ru lin g tha t Ra nd yMa dis on , Sr

. “ wi llf ull y aba nd on e d” his so n, R.R .M ., wh e n he in fa c t he ha d att e nd e d s ix of e ig ht s c he du le d v isi ts in the fo ur

mon ths pr e c e din g the fi lin g of the pe tit ion to t e rm inate his pa re nta l r ig hts ?
Since this case w as tried by the court sitt ing w ithout a jury , we r eview the case de novo upon the re c or d w ith a pr e su mpt ion of c or re c tne ss of the fi nd ing s of fa c t by the Juve nil e Cou rt . U nle ss the evidenc e preponde rate s ag ainst the finding s, we must a ffirm, absent err or of law. See Te nn . R. App. P. 13(d).

T.C.A. § 36-1-113( c)( 2005) g overns termination of pare ntal rig hts a n d re q u i res that suc h te rm inatio n b e ba se d u po n:

(1) A f inding by the court by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that the g rounds for te rmination of par ental or g uardia nship rights ha ve bee n established; and

(2) That termination of the par ent' s or g uardia n' s rig hts is in t he best intere st of the child.-6-

Th e sta nd ardfo r the te rm inatio n of pa re nta l ri g hts is we ll se ttl e d. Th e Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Cou rt h a s r e c o g n i z e d t h e i m p o r t a n tn a t u r e o f c a s e s i n v o l v i n g t h e t e r m i n a t i o n o f p ar e n t a l r ig hts , statin g that " [f]e w c on se qu e nc e s o f j ud ic ia l a c tio n a re so g ra ve as th e se ve ranc e of natur a l f a mil y t i e s. " M.L.B. v. S.L.J ., 5 1 9 U. S

. 1 0 2 , 1 1 9 (1 9 9 6 ) ( q u o t i n g Sant os ky v . Kr

amer , 455 U.S. 745 (1 98 2) (R e hn qu ist , J., dis se nti ng ))

. Ac c or din g ly , " the int e re st of pa re nts in the ir re la tio ns hip wi th their children is sufficiently fundame ntal to come within the finite cla ss of liberty interests protec ted byth e Fou rt eent h Am end men t. " Id. Th e c on sti tut ion a l pr ote c tio ns of the pa re nt- c hil d r e la tio ns hip require certain safe g uards be for e t he re lationship can be se vere d. Se e O' Da nie l v . M

e ssi e r, 905 S.W .2d 182, 186 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) ( rev' d on other g rounds, In re : S wans on, 2 S

. W

. 3 d 1 80 (Tenn. 1999) ).

As a saf eg uard, c ou rt s are require d to apply the heig htened " clea

r and c onvincing " pr oof standard. See Santosky, 45 5 U.S. a t 76 9; O' Da nie l, 905 S.W .2d at 186. To justify the termination of par ental rig hts, the g rounds for te rmination must be established by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. See T. C.A . § 36 -1 -1 13 (c )( 1) (2 00 5) ; State De p't of Hum an Serv s. v. De friece , 937 S.W .2d 954, 960 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 6)

. Al tho ug h it do e s no t re qu ir e a s muc h c e rt a int y a s the " be y on d a re a so na ble dou b t" s ta n d ar d , th e " c le ar a n d c o n v in c in g e v id e n c e " s tan d ar d is mo r e e xa c ti n g th an the "pr eponder ance of the evidenc e" standard. O' Da nie l v . M

e ssi e r, 90 5 S.W.2 d 182 , 1 88 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. 19 95 ); Bra ndo n v . W right, 838 S.W .2d 532, 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). In order to be clea

r and convinc ing, evidence must eliminate any serious or substantial doubt about the c orre ctness of the conclusions to be dra wn from the e vidence

. Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W .2d 896, 901
n. 3 ( Te nn .1 99 2) ; O'

Da nie l, 9 0 5 S

. W

. 2 d at 1 8 8

. S u ch ev i d en ce s h o u l d p ro d u ce i n t h e f ac t -f i n d er 's mind a firm belief

or convic tion as to the truth of t he allegations sought to be esta blished. O'

Da nie l, 90 5 S. W.2 d a t 18 8; Wiltcher v. Bradley, 70 8 S.W.2 d 407 , 411 (T e nn . Ct. A pp . 1 98 5) . In c on tr a st to the pr e po nd e ra nc e of

the e vid e nc e sta nd ard , c le ar and c on vin c ing e vid e nc e sh ou ld d e mon str a te that the truth of the f

acts a sserted is " highly

probable " a s opposed t o mere ly "mor e proba

ble" than not. Le ttne r v . P

lumm e r, 55 9 S. W.2 d 7 85 , 7 87 (T e nn . 1 97 7) ; Go lds mith v . Ro be rts , 622 S.W .2d 43 8, 44 1 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 1) ; Bra ndo n, 838 S.W .2d at 536.

I. Fai lure of

DC S to V e rif y Pe tit ion

Ms. Mc Cr ary

a ndMr . M a dis on bo th as se rt that the Juve nil e Cou rt e rr e d in faili ng to d ism iss the pe tit ion fo r t e rm inatio n o f p are nta l r ig hts du e to the failu re of DC S to ve ri fy

the pe tit ion pr op e rl y as re quired by

T.C.A. § 36-1-113( d)(1) . The pertinent part of the statute states that “[t] he petition, or alleg ations in the adoption petition, to t erminate pare ntal rig hts may be made upon information and belief

and sha l l b e verifie d.” DCS filed its petition t o terminate Ms. McCra ry and Mr. Madison’s par ental rig hts on J une 4, 2004. DCS case mana g er Chery l Faulkne r sig ned the pe tition, howeve r, she ne g lected to sig n t h e af fidavit verif

y ing the fac ts alleg ed in the petition. DCS team coordina tor Diane Hurth signe d Ms. F aulkner ’s name in he r plac e. On Oc tober 5, 2005, during the t ri al , t h e J u v en i l e C o u rt gra n t ed DC S p er m i s s i o n t o am en d t h e p et i t i o n wi t h a n ew v er i fi ca t i o n p age signe d by DCS case mana g er Mr . Guy . Both Ms. McCra ry and Mr. Ma dison contend that the-7-

Juve nil e Cou rt e rr e d whe n it a llo we d DCS lea ve to am e nd its pe tit ion , an d tha t the pe tit ion sh ou ld have be en dismissed at that time. This Court reviews a

trial court' s ruling on a motion to amend under an abuse of discre tion standard. Me rri

man v. Smith, 599 S.W .2d 548, 559 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979) ( citing Ze nith R ad io Corp. v. Hazeltin e Researc h, In c., 401 U.S. 321, 28 L .Ed.2d 77, 91 S.Ct. 795 (1 9 7 1 ))

. A trial court’s discr etionary

decision will be set aside only when the t ri al court has misconstrued or misapplied the controlling leg al principles or has acte d inconsistently with the substantial weig ht of the evidenc e. Whit e v. V anderbilt Un iv., 21 S.W .3d 215 , 2 2 3 (T en n

. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Ove rstreet v. Shoney's, Inc. , 4 S.W .3d 694, 709 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)). When r eviewing a trial
c ou rt ' s d isc re tio na

ry de c isi on , w e be g in w ith the pr e su mpt ion that th e de c isi on is c or re c t a ndsh ou ld revie w the evide nce in the lig ht most favorable to the decision. Ov e rst re e t, 4. S.W .3d at 709.

Te nn . R. Civ . P. 15 .0 1 s ta te s:

A p art y ma y a me nd th e party ' s p le a din g s o nc e a s a matter of c ourse at any time befor e a r esponsive pleading is served or , if the plea din g is one to which no responsive ple ading is permitted and the action has not been set for trial, the pa rty may so amend it at any time within 15 day s after it is served. Other wise a party may amend the pa

rty ' s pleading s only

by written consent of the adver se party or byleave of court; and leave shall be fr eely

g iven when justice so require s. A party shall plead in re sponse to an ame nded plea ding within the time rema ining for response to the orig inal pleading or within 15 day s af t er se rvice of the amende d pleading , whichev er period may be long er, un le ss the c ou rt

oth e rw iseor de rs

.
Te nn . R. Civ. P. 15.0 1. Un de r the pr ov isi on s o f R ule15 .0 1, a t th e tim e DC S so ug ht t o a me ndthe ir petition, they

could do so " only

by written conse nt of the adve rse pa rty or by leave of court." The rule further provide s that such " leave shall be fr eely g iven when justice so require s." I n Branch v. W

arren , the Tenne ssee Supre me Court empha s i z ed t h e libera lityof this rule whe re amendments a

re soug ht. Rule 15 "ne eds no construc tion, it means pr ecise ly what it say s, that ' leave sh all be fr eel y

given .' " Bra nc h v . W

ar re n, 527 S.W .2d 89, 92 (Tenn. 1975) . Cases since Branch v. W arren have e mphasized the liberality with which t ri al courts shoul d approa ch the que stion of whether a motion to amend should be g rante d. Se e , e .g ., Cra v e n v . L

aws on, 534 S.W .2d 653, 655 (T e nn . 1 97 6) ; Walden v. Wylie, 64 5 S.W.2 d 247 , 250 (T e nn . Ct. App . 1 98 2) ; Douglass v. Rowl and, 54 0 S. W.2 d 2 52 , 2 56 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 97 6) ; se e als o M e rri man, 59 9 S. W.2 d a t 55 9; cf. Li be rty Mutu al I nsur anc e Co. v . T

ay lor , 590 S.W .2d 920, 921 (Tenn. 1979). The a mendment in the instant
case was n ecessary

to bring befor e the Juvenile Court the issue of the we lfare of the thre e minor children in this case . The Responde nts’ rig hts were not prejudice d. We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the Juvenile Court in allowing the ame nd m en t

. Al t houg h T.C.A. § 36-1-113( d)(1)-8-

mandates tha t the petition to term i nate pa renta l rig hts shall be verifie d, we f ind nothing in the la ng ua g e of

the statut e that w ou ld p ro hibit a tr ia l c ou rt fr om p e rm itt ing a

pa rt y to ame ndthe ir petition in order to comply with the require ments of the statute. II. Groun ds for Termi nation
Any one of the nine statutory

g rounds for termination of parental rights l isted in T.C.A. § 36- 1- 11 3( g ) is s uf

fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

a n o rd e r t e rm inatin g pa

re nta l r ig hts wh e re te rm inatio n is in the be st interests of the c hild. In re D.L.B., 118 S.W .3d 360, 367 (Tenn. 2003)

. The J uvenile C ourt relied on three of the statutory

g rounds in terminating Ms. McCrary and Mr. Madison’s par ental rig hts: (1) abandonme nt; (2) substantial n o n co m pliance w ith the permane ncy plan, and ( 3) per sistence of conditions. T.C.A. § 36-1- 113(g )(1) , (2), ( 3). We have revie wed the e ntire re cord in this case and we f ind that the rec ord is re p l et e wi t h evidenc e to support the Juvenile Court's finding that termination of Ms. McCra ry and Mr. Madison’s parental rights is war rante d on at least one of the g rounds listed in the J uvenile Court’s fina l order.

A. A ba ndo nment Although the DCS has waived the issue in its brief for f ailure of the trial court to make sp e c if ic fi nd ing s o f f

a c t, w e wi ll b ri e fl y

a dd re ss this issue. Th e Juve nil e Cou rt fo un d th a t Ms

. McCrary and Mr. Madison willfully abandone d their children. The Juvenile Court’s Order , relating to a ba nd on me nt, state s:

Respondents have willfully abandone d said children, in that f or four (4) c onsecutive months pre cedi ng the filing of this petition, the Respondents have failed to visit (or has only eng age d i n t oken visitation). Respondents either canc elled vis its, appea red 30 minut es to an hour late , or did not show up for se vera l visit s. T.C.A. § 36-1-113( g )(1) states that the initiation of termination of par ental rig hts may be base d upon
aba nd on me nt b y

the pa re nt a s def

ine d in T.C. A. § 36- 1- 10 2. Th e statut e de fi ne s “ aba nd on me nt” a s:
For a period of four ( 4) conse cutive months immediately prec eding the fi lin g of

a pr oc e e din g or

ple a din g to t e rm inate the pa re nta l r ig hts of the pa rent(s) or g uardia n(s) of the child who is the subject of the petitio n fo r t ermination of pa renta l rig hts or adoption, that the pare nt(s) or g uardian (s ) either have w illfullyfailed to visit or have willfullyfailed to support or ha ve willfully failed to make

T. C. A . § 36 -1 -1 02 (1 )( A) (I ). Th e statut e de fi ne s “ wi llf ull y faile d to vis it” a s:

For purposes of this subdivision (1), " willfullyfailed to visit" means the wi llf ul f a ilu re , f or a pe ri odof fo ur (4 ) c on se c uti ve mon ths , to vis it-9- or eng ag e in more tha n token visitation.

T. C. A . § 36 -1 -1 02 (1 )( E) . T he statut e de fi ne s “ tok e n v isi ta tio n” a s:

For purposes of this subdivision (1), "token visitation" means that the visitation, under the circ umstances of the individual case, c onstitut es nothing more t h an perf

unctory visitation or visi tation of such an inf re qu e nt n a tur e or

of s uch sh ort du ratio n a s to me re ly e sta bli sh minimal or insubst antial contac t with the child.
T. C. A. § 36-1-102 ( 1)(C).
The pe tition t o terminate Ms. McCra ry and Mr. Ma dison’s pare ntal rig hts was fil ed on J une 4, 2004. Only a par ent' s conduct in the four months im mediately

prec eding the filing of a te rmination petition the n b e fo re the c ou rt ma y

be us e d a s g ro un ds to t e rm inate pa re nta l r ig hts

. In re D.L.B., 118 S.W .3d 360, 366 (Tenn. 2003) . The re levant f o u r- m o nth period to determine abandonme nt includes the
mon ths of F e br ua ry , M arc h, Ap ri l a nd Ma y 20 04

. Du ri ng thi s fou r- mon th pe ri od , th e Re sp on de nts
we re on ly a llo we d s up e rv ise d v isi ts wi th the c hil dr e n. B e g inn ing on Janu ary 8, 20 04 , Re sp on de nts had sche duled visitation for two hours every other Thursday

. Be tween Fe bruary 4 and J une 4, 2004, DC S ha d s c he du le d e ig ht s up e rv ise d v isi ts f or the R esp on den ts w ith the ir c hil dr e n. B othMs. Mc Cr ary a ndMr

. Madi so n a tte nd e d s ix of the e ig ht v isi ts, a ndwe re be tw e e n th irty (3 0) a ndsixty (60) minutes late f

or two of the visits attended.

The Petitioner ar g ues that DCS ha d provided both pa rents with c alenda

rs of the sche duled visits, and any failure to visit was willful on the part of the Respondents. The Respondents arg ue that there is no clear

and convinc ing e vidence to support the finding of the Juvenile Court that they failed to visit, or eng ag ed in only token visitation. W e ag ree with the Respondents.

I n a termination of pare ntal rig hts case, the elem ent of will fulness is centr al to the determination of abandon ment . In re Swan so n, 2 S. W.3 d 1 80 , 1 88 (T e nn .1 99 9) . F a ilu re to v isi t
or su pp ort a c hil d is " wi llf

ul" wh e n a

pe rs on is a wa

re of his or he r d uty

to v isi t, h a s th e c apa c ity

to do so, makes no attempt to do so, and has no justifiable excuse for not doing so. In re Au drey S., 182 S.W .3d 838, 864 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). Respondents wer e limit ed to supe rvised visits with the children onc e eve ry

two wee ks. Respondents attended six of the eig ht visit s during the re levant four

month period. " Token visitation" means that the visitation, “under the ci rc u m s t ances of the individual case, c onstitut es nothing more than pe rfunc tory visitation or visi t at i o n o f such a n infreque nt nature or

of such short dur ation as to merely establish minimal or insubst antial contac t with th e c h il d

. ” T

. C. A

. § 3 6

- 1

- 1 0 2 ( 1 ) ( C) ( 1 ) ( 2 0 0 5 )

. Wh il e th e v is it s w e r e in f r e q u e n t ( tw ice monthly ) and w ere of short dur at ion (two hours), these constraints we re de termined for the Respondents. Unde r the circ umstances of this case, we find that the sche duled visits cannot be define d as token. The Respondents took advantag e of most (75%) of the time allotted to visit the children. From the re cord be fore us, we c annot conc lude, by clea r and convincing evidenc e, that the Respondents willfully

abandone d their childre n, and that their parental rig hts should be terminatedT he p et i t i o n fo r t erm i nat i o n did no t al l ege t hi s ground fo r t erm i nat i o n of t he p arent al ri ghts of t he 2
R espo nd ent s; how ever, pro o f was i nt rod uced i n t he t ri al c o urt , a nd thi s i ss ue was in f act t ri ed by t he t ri al co urt

. P urs uant t o T enn. R

. C i v. P

. 15

. 0 2 , we wi l l co nsi d er t he p et i t i o n am end ed t o i ncl ud e t hi s ground fo r t erm i nat i o n.

-10- on that g ro un d. Ho wev e r, sin c e T. C.A . § 36 -1 - 1 13 (c ) a llo ws fo r t e rm inatio n o f p are nta l r ig hts if any one of the g rounds outlined in T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g ) is found by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e, we will nex t addre ss whether there is clear

and convinc ing e vidence to support termination on the g ro un d o f s ub sta nti a l no nc omp lianc e or pe rs ist e nc e of

c on dit ion s. B. Su bstant ial Noncom

pliance with the Perm anency Plan 2

T.C.A. § 37-2-403 outlines the require ments of any perma nency plan and the c onsequenc es of su bs ta nti a l no nc omp lia nc e by a pa re nt, a ndre a ds , in pe rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s:
(2)( A) The perma nency plan for any child in foster c are shall include a stateme nt of responsibilities betwee n the par ents, the ag ency and the
case worke r of suc h ag ency . Such st at ements shall include the
re sp on sib ili tie s of e a c h p art y in s pe c if ic te rm s a ndsh a ll b e re a so na bly rela ted to the achievement of the goal specified in subdivision (a)(1). * * * (C) Su b s ta n ti a l n o n c o mp li a n c e b y th e p ar e n t w ith th e s tate ment of responsibilities provides g rounds for the termi n at ion of pare ntal rig hts, notwithst anding other statutory provisions for termination of p ar en t al ri gh t s , an d n o t wi t h s t an d i n g t h e f ai l u re o f t h e p ar en tt o s i gn or to ag ree to su ch statement if the c ourt finds the par ent was inf o r me d o f it s c o n te n ts , a n d th a t th e r e q u ir e me n ts o f th e s tate me nt
ar e rea sonable a nd are related to reme dy ing the conditions that
ne c e ssi ta te fo ste r c are pla c e me nt.

T. C. A. § 37-2-403. As discusse d by this Court i n In re M.J.B., 140 S.W .3d 643 (Tenn. Ct. App. 20 04 ):
Terminating pare ntal rig hts based on T enn.Code Ann. § 36- 1-

113(g )(2) re q u i re s more proof than that a pa

rent ha s not complied with every

jot and tittl e of the perma nency plan. To succ eed unde r Te nn .Co de An n. § 3 6- 1- 11 3( g )( 2) , th e De pa rt me nt m u s t d e mon str a te first that the re quirements of the permanenc y plan ar e re asonable and rela ted to reme dy i n g the conditions that cause d the child to be
remove d from the pare nt's custody in the first place , In re V alentin e, 79 S.W. 3da t 54 7; In re L.J.C., 124 S.W .3d 609, 621 (Tenn. Ct. App. 20 03 ), a ndse c on d th a t th e pa re nt' s n on c omp lia nc e is s ub sta nti a l in light of the deg ree of no n co mpliance a nd the importance of the-11- particula r re quirement that ha s not been met. I n r e Valentin e, 79 S.W. 3da t 54 8- 49 . T ri via l, m in or, or te c hn ic a l de viatio ns fr om a pe rm a ne nc y

plan' s r e qu ir eme nt s will no t be de e me d to a mou nt t o substantial noncompliance. In re V alentin e, 79 S.W .3d at 548.
In re M.J.B., 140 S.W .3d at 654. Furthermore , for purposes of terminating pa renta l rig hts based on noncompliance with a re quirement unde r a pe rmane ncy plan, the re al wor t h and importanc e of a pare nt's nonc ompliance should be me asure d by both the deg ree of noncomplianc e and the weig ht
a ssi gned to that r e qu ir e me nt. In re V alentin e, 79 S.W .3d 539, 548 (Tenn. 2002) . Substantial noncompliance is a question of law w hich we r eview de novo wi th n o p re su mpt ion of c or re c tne ss. In re V alentin e, 79 S.W .3d at 548 -549.

1. Ms. Mc Cra ry

The Juvenile Court held that p u rs u an t to T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g )(2) , Ms. McCrary had fa iled to substantiallycomply

with permane ncy plans prepa red by DCS. The court found that Ms. McCrary signe d the numerous pe rmane ncy plans and that the Juvenile Court had ratified all the pl ans. The court further found that the g oals and objec tives set out in the plans wer e necessary for r eunification of the pa rents with the children, and were reasona ble and rela ted t o rea sons that nece ssitated foster
car e. The court spec ifically identified Ms

. McCrary ’s noncompli ance as her inability to quit doing dr ug s, de sp ite ha vin g a tte nd e d f ou r d if fe re nt t re a tme nt p ro g rams, a ndhe r i na bil ity to o btain s uit able housing. The pe rmane ncy

plans deve loped for R.R.M. re q uired that Ms. McCra ry submit t o random dr ug te sti ng ; ob ta in a n a lc oh ol and dr ug a sse ssm e nt a nd fo llo w the a sse ssm e nt’ s r e c omm e nd a tio ns ; c o mp le te inp atient treatment; stop the use of a lcohol and non-pr escribed medications; attend medical appointments for R.R.M.; learn how to proper ly car e for R.R.M. and his special medica l needs; and to learn how t o cre ate a n appropriate home e nvironment conduc ive to R.R.M.’s grow th and development. Subs equent permane ncy plans require d that she also attend and complete a certified pa re nti ng c la ss; a tte ndSou the a st M e nta l H e a lth fo r i nd ivi du a l a ndfam il y the ra py ; ob ta in s ta

ble housing a nd establish it for a minimum of six (6) months; provide proof of her ability to e nsure that the ba sic ne e ds of

R.R .M . w ou ld b e me t in c lud ing a de qu a te fo od , sh e lte r a ndc lothin g . A s to A. L .M

. and D.D.M., the perma nency plans develope d for them require d that Ms. McCrary submit t o random drug scre ens; obtai n and maintain stable housing for a minimum of six (6) months; provide proof of her ability to ensure that the basic needs of the children would be met including adequate food, sh e lte r a ndc lothin g ; a nd , a tte nde a c h s c he du le d v isi t w ith the c hil dr e n. We c on c ur wi th the Juve nil e Court’s finding that the permanenc y plans’ re quirements we re r easona ble and r elated to r emedying the c on dit ion s that c a us e d the c hil dr e n to b e re mov e d f ro m Ms . M c Cr ary ’s c us tod y , g ive n th a t th os e conditions included R.R.M.’s health problems, Ms. McCrary ’s drug use, a home without utiliti es or f o o d , m e d i c a l n e g l e c t , a n d tru a n c y. Ms. McCrary

made notable attempts to comply with the perma nency

plans; howeve r, she ha s failed to c omply

with the plans’ mos t i m p o rtant re quirements, which w ould insure the saf ety and-12-

welfa re of her children. She rec eived a n evaluation by CCP , which re commended f reque nt random drug scre ens and intensive psy chother apy , family thera py , and par enting classes. Ms. McCra ry attended pa

renting classes a nd psy chother apy

. Ms. McCrary attended multi ple rehabilitation and counseling prog rams with vary ing de g ree s of succ ess including Ba by L ove, Rene wal Place , Sophia’s Ho us e a ndSou the a st M e nta l H e a lth Clin ic . Sh e te ste d n e gati ve on a ma jority of he r dru g te sts

. Whil e Ms. McCra

ry did not attend medical a

ppointments for R.R.M., DC S admitted that she was
never informed of

such a p p o i n t ments. Despite comply ing w ith many aspec ts of the permanenc y p l a n s , M s

. M c C r ar y t e s t e d p o s i t i v e f o r c o c a i n e a n d c a n n ab i s a s l a t e a s A p r i l 2 0 , 2 0 0 4

. A d d i t i o n a l l y, Ms. McCrary ’s mother testified at trial that she was still us i n g drug s. From the time the c hildren
wer e re moved from her home, Ms. McCrary had not obtained suitable housing for he rself a nd her fa mil y . Sh e stay e d with re la tiv e s, liv e d in she lte rs a nd inp a tie nt tr e a tme nt fa c ili tie s, be e n h ome le ss, and at the time of

trial was living in a boarding house. Of the require ments entitled to significa nt weig ht - ref

raining from drug s and alc ohol, maintai n i n g s t ab l e housing f or a minimum of six (6) months, and providing proof of her ability to ensure that the basic ne eds of the c hildren would be me t inc lud ing a de qu a te fo od , s he lte r and clo th in g – Ms. Mc Cr ary ha s n ot c omp lie d w ith a ny of the m. Ba sed on our indepe ndent re view of the rec ord, we have de termined that the r ecor d contains cle ar and convinc ing e vidence that Ms. McCrary has bee n unable to comply s u b s t an t i ally

with her ob lig a tio ns un de r the se pla ns . A c c or din g ly , w e a ff ir m th e Juve nil e Cou rt ' s c on c lus ion that the DC S has ca rried its burde n of proof

for terminating Ms. McCra ry ’s par ental rig hts under T.C.A. § 36-1- 113(g )(2)

. 2. Mr. Madison

Th e Juve nil e Cou rt

he ld tha t pu rs ua nt t o T.C. A. § 36- 1- 11 3( g )( 2) , Mr. Ma dis on ha d f a ile d to substantially

comply with permane ncy

plans prepa

red by DCS for R.R.M. The court found that Mr. Ma dis on sig ne d thr e e of the pe rm a ne nc y plans a nd that the Juve nil e Cou rt ha d ratif ie d a ll the pla ns

. The c ourt furthe r found that the g oals and objec tives set out in the plans were n ec es s ary for reunific atio n o f t h e par ents with the children, and wer e re asonable and re lated to re asons that
ne c e ssi ta te d f

os te r c are . T he c ou rt sp e c if ic a lly ide nti fi e d M r. Ma dis on ’s no nc omp lia nc e a s h is inabilityto quit doing drug s, and his inabilityto obtain suitable housing.

Under R.R.M.’s permanenc y

p l an , Mr. Madison was r equire d to submit to random drug
scre ens; obtain an alcohol and drug assessment; attend AA and drug g roup sessions; a n d , at t end
a ng e r ma na g e me nt c la sse s. Th e ob je c tiv e fo r R .R. M. ’s pe rm a ne nc y plan w a s f

or Mr . M a dis on to be able to provide a sa fe a nd nurturing environment for R.R.M. S ubsequent pe rmane ncy plans wer e develope d for R.R.M., which re quired that Mr. Ma dison attend fam i l y thera py ; stay out of leg al trouble and ja il; obtain and maintain ade quate, stable housing f or a minimum of six (6) months; and, attend each scheduled visi t with his son; learn how to medically car e for R.R.M.; and provide proof of his ability

to ensure that the basic ne eds of R.R .M. would be met including adequate food, shelter and clothing

.
M r. M ad ison arg ues that the Juvenile Court erre d when it neg lected to f ind that the require ments of the permanenc y plan wer e “r easona

ble and r elated to r emedying the co n d itions-13-

which nec essitate foster

car e plac ement” a s dictated by T.C.A. § 36-2-403( a)( 2)(C). How ever , Mr. Madison is in error

in his assertion, beca

use the Juvenile Court’s Order dated Nove mber 10, 2005, sp e c if ic a lly state s th a t “ [t]he g oa ls a ndob je c tiv e s w e re ne c e s s a

r y fo r r e un if ic a tio n o f the pa

re nts wi th the childre n, and ar e re asonable and re lated to re asons that nec essitated foster car e.”

I n the alternative, Mr. M ad i s o n arg ues that the g oals and objec tives set forth in the p e r ma n e n c y

p la n s f o r R. R. M

. w e r e n o t r e a s o n ab ly r e late d to th e r e a s o n s f

o r th e in it ia l r e f

e rr a l. We
concur with the J uvenile Court’s finding that the re q u i rements set out in t he permanenc y plans de ve lop e d f

or R.R .M

. we re re a so na

ble a ndre la te d to re me dying the c on dit ion s th a t c a us e d R. R.M

. to b e re mov e d f

ro m Mr. Ma dis on ’s c us tod y , g ive n th a t th os e c on dit ion s in c lud e d R. R.M .’ s h e a lth problems, Mr. Madison’s dr ug use, a home without util ities or food, and a rec ord of violence in the h o m e , m e d i c a l n e g l e c ta n d tru a n c y. Mr. Madison made sig nificant attempts to comply with the perma nency plans; howeve r, like Ms. Mc Cr ary , h e ha s f

a ile d to c omp ly

wi th the mos t impo rt a nt r e qu ir ement s – tho se that w ou ld insure the sa fety

and we lfare of his son. Mr. Madison rec eived an evaluation by CCP , which
rec ommended fr equent r andom drug scre en s , p ar ticipation in and completion of an a ng er manag emen t p ro gram, psy chother apy , and drug reha bilitation. M r. Madison complete d a wor k
rea diness training prog ram, pa renting classes, a nd an ang er ma nag ement prog ram. Additi o n a lly , Mr. Madison enrolled in an outpatient alcohol and drug trea tment prog ram, a nd rema ined out of jail. Mr. Madison underw ent t en (10) random drug scree ns while hi s child was in the custody of DCS , six (6) of which showe d positive results for the pr esenc e of illeg al drug s.

Mr. Madison ar g ues, that he ha d complied with all of the written terms of the pe rmane ncy plans deve loped for R.R.M. Mr. M ad i s on asserts that the permane ncy plans had no written
re qu ir e me nt “ in b la c k a ndwh ite ” that he pa ss a ll the dr ug sc reen s, on lythat he su bmi t to the m. F urthe r, Mr . M a dis on arg ue s th a t he “ c a nn ot b e he ld t o a sta nd ardwh ic h r e qu ir e s him to c omp ly wi th u nw ri tte n terms of c omp lia nc e fo r pe rm a ne nc y plans wh ic h ha ve ne ve r b e e n c ommun ic a te d to him,” and to do so would be “ manifestly unfair and should not be tolerated a s a co n d i t i o n for the return of his child.” We find Mr. Madison’s arg ument to be tenuous, at best. Whil e it is t rue tha t the permanenc y plans only state t hat M r. Madison submit to the drug scr eens, the very clea r objec tive of sa id t e st w a s to ins ur e that Mr

. Ma dis on re fr a in fr om the us e of ill e g a l dr ug s a nda lc oh ol. Th is iss ue is w ho lly

wi tho ut m e ri t.

Despite c omply ing w ith many aspec ts of the perma nency plans, of the r equire ments entitled to significa nt weig ht - ref

raining from drug s and alc ohol, maintaining stable housing f or a minimum of six ( 6) mon ths , a nd pr ov idi ng pr oo f of his abil ity to e ns ur e that the ba sic ne e ds of his c hil d w ou ld be met including adequate food, shelter and clothing – Mr. Madison has not complied with any of them. He teste d positive for coc aine, a nd at trial he a dmitted to the reg ular use of marijuana . At trial Mr. Madison testified that he w as living in his ca r, or in the a lternative, w ith M s

. McCrary in the boarding house, and he was une mploy ed. Based on our i ndepende nt review of the re cord, w e have de te rm ine d th a t th e re c or d c on ta ins c le ar andc on vin c ing e vid e nc e that Mr . M a dis on ha s b e e n u na bleM r

. M adi s on do es not pres ent an i s s ue of t he Juv eni l e Co ur t ’ s deci s i on t er mi nat i ng hi s par ent al r i gh t s bas ed 3

o n p e rs isten c e o f co n d iti o n s.
-14- to c omp ly su bs ta nti a lly

wi th h is o bli g a tio ns un de r the se plans . A c c or din g ly , w e a ff ir m th e Juve nil e Court's c onclusion that the DCS has car ried its burden of

proof f or terminating Mr. Ma dison’s pare ntal rig hts under T.C.A. § 36-1- 113(g )(2)

.
C. P e rsi ste nc e of Cond iti ons Ms. Mc Cr ary

take s is su e wi th the Juve nil e Cou rt ' s c on c lus ion that he r p are nta l r ig hts sh ou ld be terminated bec ause she failed to r emedy the conditions tha t c aused DCS to remove the childre n from her home, and beca

use there is little likelihood that she will remedy those conditions in the near fu tur e

. Th e e le me nts of the " pe rs ist e nc e of c on dit ion s" g ro un d fo r te rm inatio n of pa re nta l r ig hts 3

are de fi ne d in T. C.A . § 36 -1 -1 13 (g )( 3) (A ) a s f oll ow s:
The c hild has been r emoved f rom the home of the pare nt or g uardia n by or de r o f a

c ou rt fo r a pe ri odof six ( 6) mon ths a nd : (I ) The c onditions t hat led to the child' s remova l or other c onditions that in all rea sonable proba bilitywould cause the chil d t o be subjected to further a

buse or ne g lect and that, there fore , preve nt the
c hil d' s sa fe re turn to the c are of the pa re nt (s) or g ua rd ia n( s) , s til l pe rs ist ; (ii) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at
a n e arl y da te so that the c hil d ca n be sa fe ly re turne d to the pa

re nt( s) or g uardia n(s) in the ne ar f uture; and (i ii) Th e c on tin ua tio n o f the pa re nt or g ua

rd ia n a nd c hil d r e la tio ns hip g reatly diminis hes the child' s chanc es of early integ ration into a saf e, stable and pe rmane nt home.
A biologic al parent' s pare ntal rig hts cannot be terminated pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g )(3) (A) unless the Depa

rtment prese nts clear and convinc ing e vidence establishing e ach of the statutory elements. In re V

alentin e, 79 S.W .3d at 550.

I t is undisput ed that the children have been in DCS custody since May

2001, at the time of trial a pe riod of more than three y ear s. The conditions that led t o A.L .M., D.D.M., and R.R.M. being
remove d from Ms. McCra ry ’s custody

included her

drug addiction, the lack of suitable housing , and medical ne g lect. Ms. McCrary attended f

our diffe rent drug and alc ohol reha bilitation programs, but
a s late a s A pr il 2 0, 20 04 , M s. Mc Cr ary te ste d p os iti ve fo r c oc a ine a ndc a nn abis

. Ad dit ion a lly , M s. McCrary ’s mother testified at trial that her daug hter wa s still usin g d rug s. Since the time the
c h i l d r e n w e r e r e m o v e d f

r o mh e r c u s t o d y , M s

. M c C r ar y

h a s l i v e d w i t h r e l a t i v e s , l i v e d i n s h e lte rs , inpatient trea tment fac iliti es, bee n hom eless, and at the time of trial was living in one room of a bo ard ing ho us e . A Cou rt Ap po inted S peci al A dv oc a te (C ASA ) r e pr e se ntativ e c on du c te d a ho me study for the Juvenile Court prior to trial, and in re fer ence to her living conditions stated:-15- Ms. Mc Cr ary

is l ivi ng in a

bo ard ing ho us e

. . . w it h her thre e -y e ar- old daug hter. There are additionally three other pe ople that dwell in the house. Ms. Mc Cr a

ry do e s n ot kno w t he ful l name s o f the se ind ivi du a ls. B e c a us e there is lit tle known about the c hara cter of these tenants such as their criminal backg round, this CASA is c oncerned about the safe ty of any children r esiding in this ho us e . I n a dd iti on , M s. Mc Cr ary sh are s a n a lr e a dy c ro wd e d r oo m w ith her daug hter. The se living arra ng ements ar e not conduc ive to another child. . . . During the v i s i t wi th Ms. McCrary , this CAS A observe d a dirty living
are a. The beds in the ro o m had dirty linen and had not be en made . The living spac e is quite small and it does not appea r t hat this room is conducive to a mother a nd two children.

On e of the iss ue s of g re a t c on c e rn ha s a lw a y s b e e n M s. Mc Cr ary ’s wi lli ng ne ss andabil ity t o ca re fo r R.R.M. and his special medica l needs. Ms. McCra ry attended pa

renting classes a nd t h e r ap y t o a s s i s t h e r i n t h i s ar e a

. H o w e v e r , w h e n t h e C A S A r e p r e s e n t a t i v e v i s i t e d M s

. M c C r ar y a few months be fore trial, he discovere d that her three -y ear -old daug hter was missing all o f h er t op teeth. Ms. McCra

ry stated that the c hild’s teeth “ha d just disi nteg rate d.”
Ms. McCrary

has consistently

demonstrated an i nability to reme dy the conditions that have undermined he r childre n’s welf are . Most of the signif

icant proble ms r eporte d by DCS in 2001, a lack of suitable housing, evidence of drug abuse and medical neg lect, st ill exis ted at the time of the hearing on D CS's termination petition in November 2005.
Finally , we f

ind that there w as cle ar a nd convincing evidenc e pre sented that c ontinuation of Ms. McCrary ’s re lationship with t he childre n g reatly diminis hes the c hildren' s chanc es of i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o a

s a f e , s t ab l e a n d p e r m a n e n th o m e

. R

. R

. M

. h a s b e e n l i v i n g w i t h a f o s t e r f a m i l y, the Hende rsons, since he enter ed DCS custody five (5) y ear s ag o. There was e vidence prese nted that he appe are d to be thriving in this environment. Furthe rmore, the Hende rsons have indicated
a n in te re st i n a do pti ng R.R .M . if the Cou rt a ff ir ms the te rm inatio n o f M oth e r' s p are nta l r ig hts

. A. L .M . a ndD. D. M. ha ve a c ou sin , Co nn ie Ne lso n, a tte nd ing a do pti on pr e pa ratio n c la sse s so that she mig ht adopt both of these c hildren.

Ac c or din g ly , w e fi ndthat th e re c or d c on ta ins c le ar andc on vin c ing e vid e nc e that Ms

. McCrary has fa iled to remedy

the conditions that led to the children’ s removal, a nd, g iven the
a mou nt o f t ime sh e ha s h a d to a c c omp lis h th e se g oa ls, that th e re is l itt le lik e lih oo d th a t sh e wi ll be able to remedy

these c onditions at an ear ly date. B ased on the se finding s, we ha ve dete rmined that th e Juve nil e Cou rt

pr op e rl y fo un d th a t g ro un ds e xiste d u nd e r T .C. A. . § 36 -1 -1 13 (g )( 3) (A ) t o te rm inate Ms. Mc Cr ary ’s pa re nta l r ig hts

. The Juvenile Court held that termination of Ms. McCrary ’s par ental rig hts as to A.L .M., D.D.M., and R.R.M., and Mr. Ma dison’s pare ntal rig hts to R.R .M., was in the best intere st of the children pur suant to T.C.A. § 36-1-113(i) . Neither Ms. McCrary , nor Mr. Madison, c ontested this iss ue on appe al, but our re view of the rec ord conf irms that the trial court f

ound clea r and convincing evidenc e that termination is i n the childre n’s best intere st..-16-

For the fore g oing r easons, we reve rse the or der of the trial court terminating the par ental rig hts of Respondents on the g round of a bandonment. The order

of the trial c ourt terminating the pare ntal rig hts of Respondents in all other re spects is aff irmed. Costs of this appeal ar e asse ssed one-ha lf to Appellant Phy llis McCrary , and one- half to Randy Madison, and their r espec tive
su re tie s.

__________________________________________ W. F RA NK

CRA WF OR D, PRE SI DINGJUDG E, W.S.