alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 99-1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACTOF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of TheNavigators Group, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending September30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the datehereof (the “Report”), I, Terence N. Deeks, Chief Executive Officer of theCompany, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to§ 960 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)               The Report fully complies with therequirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and

 

(2)               The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/ Terence N.  Deeks |   |
|----------------------------|--------|
|                       |
|                       |
| Terence N. Deeks           |
| Chief Executive Officer    |
| November 14, 2002          |

 

----
#### THE UNITED STATES v. BOSTON INSURANCE COMPANY

November 23, 1925.

[58 C. Cls. 603; 269 U. S. 197]

Judgment was rendered against the United States in the court below. On appeal the judgment was reversed, the Supreme Court deciding:

The revenue act of 1916, sec. 12, par. “ First,” subdiv. (c), in defining deductions from gross income allowable in ascertaining the net income of domestic corporations, included, in the case of insurance companies, “ the net addition, if any, required by law to reserve funds.” *Held,*that “ reserve funds ” does not embrace funds held by a fire and marine insurance company, as required by the New York Superintendent of Insurance, to cover accrued but unsettled claims for losses. *McCoaeh*v. *Insurance Co., 244 V.*S. 585, followed; *Maryland Casualty Co.*v. *United States,*251 U. S. 342, explained and in part disapproved.

Mr. Justice McReyNolds

delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court
HomeReportsBureau of Economic and Business Affairs2022 Fiscal Transparency Report…Bahrain

# 					2022 Fiscal Transparency Report: Bahrain			

 In this section										

                -  Government-by-Government Assessments: Bahrain 

## Government-by-Government Assessments: Bahrain

During the review period, the government published its executive budget proposal, enacted budget, and mid-year budget execution report within a reasonable period.  Information on debt obligations was publicly available.  Publicly available budget documents were incomplete and provided only limited detail on allocations to and earnings from state-owned enterprises and debt of all major state-owned enterprises was not disclosed.  Royal court expenditures were not included in the budget.  The government sufficiently accounted for discrepancies in projected and actual revenues in its end-of-year report.  The supreme audit institution met international standards of independence and audited the government’s executed budget, but only published portions of its audit report.  The government specified in law or regulation and appeared to follow in practice the criteria and procedures for awarding natural resource extraction contracts and licenses.  Basic information on natural resource extraction awards was publicly available.  The sovereign wealth fund had a sound legal framework and disclosed its source of funding and general approach to withdrawals.

Bahrain’s fiscal transparency would be improved by:

- Disclosing comprehensive information on allocations to, earnings from, and debt obligations of all major state-owned enterprises;
- Publishing royal court expenditures; and
- Making the supreme audit institution’s audit reports available and accessible to the public.

## View report by:

### On This Page

                    -  Government-by-Government Assessments: Bahrain 

Tags

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## U.S. Department *of* State

#### The Lessons of 1989: Freedom and Our Future
Editorial Note on Part 3
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 3 appear at 61 FR 7216, Feb. 27, 1996; 62 FR 35970, July 3, 1997; 62 FR 47532, Sept. 9, 1997; and 67 FR 46868, July 17, 2002.

§ 3.805 Loan guaranty for surviving spouses; certification. A certification of loan guaranty benefits may be extended to surviving spouses based on an application filed on or after January 1, 1959, if: ( a ) The veteran served in the Armed Forces of the United States (Allied Nations are not included) at any time on or after September 16, 1940; and
( b ) The veteran died in service; or
( c ) The veteran died after separation from service and such separation was under conditions other than dishonorable provided the veteran's death was the result of injury or disease incurred in or aggravated by service in line of duty rendered on or after September 16, 1940, regardless of the date of entrance into such service (cases where compensation is payable because of death resulting from hospitalization, treatment, examination, or training are not included); and
( d ) The surviving spouse meets the requirements of the term “surviving spouse” as outlined in § 3.50; and
( e ) The veteran's surviving spouse is unmarried; and
( f ) The applicant is not an eligible veteran.

Cross References:
Wife, widow or spouse. See § 3.50(b). Terminated marital relationships. See § 3.55. [26 FR 1605, Feb. 24, 1961, as amended at 31 FR 4347, Mar. 12, 1966; 37 FR 24662, Nov. 18, 1972; 40 FR 54245, Nov. 21, 1975, 41 FR 49636, Nov. 10, 1976; 44 FR 22721, Apr. 17, 1979; 62 FR 5529, Feb. 6, 1997]
§ 77.4 Applications. ( a ) *Initial application.* To apply for an initial grant, an applicant must submit to VA a complete grant application package, as described in the NOFA.
( b ) *Renewal application.* After receiving an initial grant, grantees may apply for a renewal grant if the grantee's program will remain substantially the same. The grantee must submit to VA a complete renewal application as described in the NOFA. Because evaluations of renewal applications rely on performance data related to the initial grant, the application and supporting documentation may vary from the initial application; however, renewal applications are competitive grants and will be evaluated under competitive grant selection processes.
( c ) *Noncompetitive application.* When a condition exists for a noncompetitive grant as outlined in § 77.15, the adaptive sports entity may submit a noncompetitive application that meets the same format as outlined for competitive grants set forth in the NOFA.
(OMB has approved the information collection requirements in this section under control numbers 2900-0820, 4040-0004 for Standard Form 424, and 4040-0008 for Standard Form 424C) (Authority: 38 U.S.C. 521A)
[79 FR 37217, July 1, 2014, as amended at 80 FR 25235, May 4, 2015]
42345.

#### TAYLOR v. LEWIS.

*559Submitted October 4, 1966

Decided November 2, 1966.

*560
      *Roberts & Thornton, Jack M. Thornton,*for appellant.

*Lawrence S. Rosenstrauch,*for appellee.

Felton, Chief Judge.

The trial court based its final ruling on the renewed general demurrer partly on the fact that the disputed word in the handwritten amended loan application, as indicated in the statement of facts hereinabove, might be “loan” or “com.,” and that the spelling, construction and meaning of said disputed word were questions of fact for a jury. While this is undoubtedly true as a rule, in this case the petition states a cause of action regardless of whether the disputed word is “loan” or “com.,” the abbreviation of “commitment,” as was indicated by the trial court.

*561The pleadings show that the parties had a valid contract for the procurement of a loan and that the defendant had complied with all of the conditions and requirements insisted upon by the lending company except for the $500 deposit. The fact that the deposit was not specified as a condition of the loan in the loan application does not make it an invalid condition. As indicated in the statement of facts hereinabove, the defendant agreed in the loan application that he would pay the company’s expenses in processing the application if the loan was not closed because of his failure to comply with *any terms*of accepted commitment *or approval letter.*In the plaintiff’s letter notifying defendant of the approval of his loan application, the deposit was clearly made one of the terms. It is true that the loan application provided for an expiration date of the commitment of May 19, 1964, and that the defendant’s deposit tendered prior to that date was rejected. It will be noted, however, that this expiration date applies to the commitment *“if accepted by applicant.”*Although the application specifies no other time limit for the acceptance of the commitment, the defendant was apprised of the condition of the deposit not only by the company’s written commitment, but by one letter from the plaintiff and no less than four letters from the company. Defendant is estopped to deny the validity of this required condition after failing to answer any of said letters, make any protest whatsoever, and finally sending his check for the deposit to the company subsequent to the deadline of which the company had notified him.

Thus, the plaintiff had complied with his obligation under the contract whether the disputed word was “loan” or “com.” (commitment), since he had procured a written commitment for a loan, the consummation of which was prevented by the defendant’s failure to comply with the conditions and requirements of the loan, as specified by the lending company. The petition as amended stated a cause of action; therefore, the court did not err in its judgment overruling the renewed general demurrer thereto.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Frankum and Pannell, JJ., concur.*
<PAGE>
 
                                                                    EXHIBIT 10.6
                                                                    ------------

                                  AMENDMENT TO
                          KENT ELECTRONICS CORPORATION
                      STOCK OPTION PLAN AND AGREEMENT FOR
                 EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT OF SALES-DISTRIBUTION

     This Amendment to Kent Electronics Corporation Stock Option Plan and
Agreement for Executive Vice President of Sales-Distribution (the "Plan"), is
effective as of the 2nd day of July, 1997 (the "Effective Date"), between Kent
Electronics Corporation, a Texas corporation (the "Company"), and Larry D. Olson
(the "Optionee").

     WHEREAS, the Company adopted the Plan effective May 8, 1995; and

     WHEREAS, on July 2, 1997, the Compensation Committee of the Board of
Directors approved certain amendments to the Plan;

     NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the premises herein, this
Amendment to the Plan further evidences the amendment of the Plan as follows:

     1.   Amendment to the Plan.  The Plan is hereby amended as set forth on
          Exhibit A attached hereto.

     2.   Full Force and Effect.  The Plan, as amended hereby, shall remain in
          full force and effect.

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Amendment to the Plan to be
signed on its behalf by the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized.

                              KENT ELECTRONICS CORPORATION


                              By: /s/ Morrie K. Abramson
                                  ----------------------------------------------
                                  Morrie K. Abramson
                                  Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive
                                    Officer and President

ACCEPTED AND AGREED TO
AS OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE:

Optionee:

/s/ Larry D. Olson
----------------------------------------
Larry D. Olson
<PAGE>
 
                                   EXHIBIT A

                                  AMENDMENT TO
                          KENT ELECTRONICS CORPORATION
                      STOCK OPTION PLAN AND AGREEMENT FOR
                 EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT OF SALES-DISTRIBUTION

     Section 5 of the Kent Electronics Corporation Stock Option Plan and
Agreement for Executive Vice President of Sales-Distribution shall be amended in
its entirety to provide for transferability of stock options as follows:

     5.  Transferability of Option. Except as set forth below, the Option
     granted hereunder shall not be transferable by the Optionee otherwise than
     by will or operation of the laws of descent and distribution or pursuant to
     a qualified domestic relations order as defined in the Code or Title 1 of
     the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, or the
     rules thereunder; provided, however, that the Option may be transferable,
     without payment of consideration, to immediate family members of the
     Optionee or to trusts or partnerships for such family members.
Exhibit 99.6



Certification of Principal Executive Officer and
Principal Financial Officer Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350



As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



In connection with the Annual Report on Form 40-F
of Glass House Brands Inc., a corporation organized under the laws of British Columbia (the “Company”), for the period ending
December 31, 2021 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), each of the
undersigned officers of the Company certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|   |                                                                                                                                                      |  |  | 
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  |  | 
|1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                              
|  
|2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|Dated: March 22, 2022 | /s/ Kyle Kazan                                       
|--------------------- | -----------------------------------------------------
|                      | Kyle Kazan                                           
|                      | Chief Executive Officer (principal executive officer)
|                      |                                                      
|Dated: March 22, 2022 | /s/ Mark Vendetti                                    
|                      | Mark Vendetti                                        
|                      | Chief Financial Officer (principal financial officer)
#### § 18.515 Burden of proof.

The burden of proving that an age distinction or other action falls within the exceptions outlined in §§ 18.513 and 18.514 is on the recipient of Federal financial assistance.

(Authority: 42 U.S.C. 6101-6107)
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-18-00687-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF J.A.R., a Child

From the 57th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2017-PA-01303

Honorable Peter A. Sakai, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

Beth Watkins, Justice

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: March 22, 2019

AFFIRMED

Appellant E.C. appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her child, 

J.A.R. Appellant’s court-appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw and a brief in which he 

concluded there are no arguable grounds to be raised on appeal. The brief satisfies the 

requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 

n.10 (Tex. 2016) (recognizing Anders procedures apply in parental termination cases). 

Additionally, counsel certified he sent appellant a copy of the brief and the motion to withdraw, 

advised appellant of her right to review the record and file her own brief, and provided appellant 

a form motion to request access to the record. This court issued an order setting deadlines for 

appellant to request the record and file a pro se brief; however, appellant did not request the record 

or file a pro se brief.
04-18-00687-CV

- 2 -

After reviewing the record and counsel’s brief, we agree there are no arguable grounds to 

be raised on appeal. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order. We deny counsel’s motion to 

withdraw because he does not assert any ground for withdrawal other than his conclusion that the 

appeal is frivolous. See id. at 27–28 (holding counsel’s obligations in parental termination cases 

extend through the exhaustion or waiver of all appeals, including the filing of a petition for review 

in the Texas Supreme Court).

Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice
§ 1070.46 Other disclosures of confidential information. ( a ) To the extent permitted by law and as authorized by the Director in writing, the CFPB may disclose confidential information other than as set forth in this subpart.
( b ) Prior to disclosing confidential information pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section, the CFPB may, as it deems appropriate under the circumstances, provide written notice to the person to whom the confidential information pertains that the CFPB intends to disclose its confidential information in accordance with this section.
( c ) The authority of the Director to disclose confidential information pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section shall not be delegated. However, a person authorized to perform the functions of the Director in accordance with law may exercise the authority of the Director as set forth in this section.
##### 



EXHIBIT 32
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. §1350 AS ADOPTED
PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1.
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 Date: August 14, 2006
    
    /s/ Tom DeeryTom Deery, Chief Executive OfficerDate: August 14, 2006
    
    /s/ Brian CarterBrian Carter, Chief Financial Officer
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-6350
DAVID BELTON, JR., Petitioner - Appellant, versus LLOYD L. WATERS, Warden, Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District ofMaryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, District Judge. (CA95-1867-DKC) Submitted: May 15, 1997 Decided: May 29, 1997 Before RUSSELL, HALL, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. David Belton, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Ann Norman Bo sse, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals the district court's order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997). We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find noreversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. Belton v. Waters , No. CA-95-1867-DKC (D. Md. Feb. 27, 1997). We deny Appellant's motion for appointment of counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-7359

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Petitioner - Appellee,

v.

VICTOR PERKINS,

Respondent - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior District Judge. (5:92-hc-00654-BR)

Submitted: December 19, 2019 Decided: December 23, 2019

Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Victor Perkins, Appellant Pro Se. Genna Danelle Petre, Special Assistant United States 

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Victor Perkins appeals the district court’s order denying his pro se motion for a 

hearing. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm 

for the reasons stated by the district court. United States v. Perkins, No. 5:92-hc-00654-

BR (E.D.N.C. Sept. 11, 2019). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
42234.

#### CROKER v. THE STATE

*493Argued September 12, 1966

Decided September 29, 1966

Rehearing denied October 20, 1966.

*Henritze, Baker & Bailey, Walter M. Henritze, Jr.,*for appellant.

*494
      *Lewis B. Slaton, Solicitor General, Jess H. Watson, J. Walter Le Craw,*for appellee.

Deen, Judge.

An arresting officer may arrest under a warrant issued by a judicial officer in any county in the state. *Code*§ 27-209. However, the officer should have the warrant, whether for search or arrest, in his physical possession or so near at hand that it can be exhibited on demand. *Shafer v. State,*193 Ga. 748 (20 SE2d 34); *Hall v. State,*113 Ga. App. 587 (149 SE2d 175). “For the purpose of making an arrest, a warrant is not in the possession of the officer when it is in his house some distance from the scene of the arrest.” *Adams v. State,*121 Ga. 163 (3) (48 SE 910). Where the offense is a misdemeanor not committed in the presence of the arresting officer, and where flight is not involved, no arrest may be made without a warrant, and the mere fact that a warrant exists but is not accessible at the time of the arrest will not justify the arrest. *Adams v. State,*supra; *Giddens v. State,*154 Ga. 54 (113 SE 386); *Huffman v. State,*166 Ga. 296 (143 SE 371). Indubitably, where the crime is a felony the rule is broader. “[W]hen a felony has been committed, any private person acting upon a reasonable and probable ground of suspicion, may also apprehend the person suspected of the crime. The apprehension, under these circumstances, may be without a warrant, but it is only for the purpose of taking the offender before a magistrate. He may be taken and detained, until he can be committed to the custody of the law. The arrest is for no other purpose.” *Long v. State,*12 Ga. 293, 318, and see *Code*§ 27-211. Under *Code*§ 27-207 an officer may arrest without a warrant if the offense is committed in his presence, if the offender is endeavoring to escape, or if “for other cause there is likely to be a failure of justice for want of an officer to issue a warrant.” What the last quoted phrase includes is obscure, but it is definite that it does include a situation where a police officer, knowing that a warrant has been issued for a felony, and with probable cause to believe that if he takes the time to procure it the offender will escape, makes the arrest although the warrant is not in close physical proximity at the time. *Paige v. State,*219 Ga. 569, 572 (134 SE2d 793); *Cash v. State,*222 Ga. 55 (2), *49557 (148 SE2d 420). The arrest was not illegal, and the burglary-tools, discovered by a lawful search incident to the arrest, were properly admitted in evidence.

The second headnote needs no elaboration.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Nichols, P. J., and Hall, J., concur.*