## INTRODUCTION

### Admiral William A. Owens, USN 

### Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

## The Emerging U.S. System of Systems

Three simultaneous revolutions have pushed us toward change. The first is from the revolution in world affairs brought about by the implosion of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. We are also experiencing a related revolution -- the reduction in the defense budget, which began almost a decade ago and accelerated because of the demise of the Soviet Union. The third revolution affecting the U.S. military is what some call the revolution in military affairs. In part because of earlier investments, particularly in technologies, our military capability is improving rapidly, and these improvements point toward a qualitative jump in our ability to use military force effectively. We will be the first nation to pass through the revolution, emerging with different strengths that can give us an edge across the entire spectrum of contingencies against which the nation may need to commit its military. 

What kinds of requirements are emerging from these revolutions? They fall into three general categories, which, for convenience, we may call intelligence, command and control, and precision force: 

- The first category, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), involves sensor and reporting technologies associated with intelligence collection, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as the new means by which we are able to keep track of what our own forces are doing. Because of advances in this area, we are expanding quite dramatically our capacity to maintain real-time, all-weather awareness of what is occurring in and above a wide geographical area. 
- The second is command, control, communications, computer applications, and intelligence processing -- advanced C41, the technologies and techniques by which we translate the awareness of what is occurring in a broad geographical arena into an  understanding  of what is taking place there, and communicate that understanding quickly, surely, and accurately -- in usable form -- to combat forces. Advanced C41 is where processes like target identification, mission assignment and force allocation take place. In other words, it is the realm in which we convert the understanding of a battlespace to missions and assignments designed to alter, control, and dominate that battlespace. 
- Then there is precision force, which many understand to be precision-guided weaponry, and it certainly includes this category of weapons. It is a broader concept, however, that emphasizes speed, accuracy, and precision in the use of force and therefore encompasses all our forces, the infantry as well as strategic bombers, and includes things like information warfare. This is the area in which the knowledge generated from the overlap of the first two areas leads to action. It is easy to miss the power generated by the interaction of ISR, advanced C41 and precision force, because we tend to see developments in each of the areas as discrete and separate. Consider table 1, which lists some of the weapons and systems already budgeted and programmed that have entered the active inventories or will do so in the years ahead. Something about the way we plan and program in the Defense Department keeps us in compartmented perspectives. We are more adept at seeing some of the individual trees than that vast forest of military capability the individual systems are building, so it is easy to miss the fact that, together, these programs posit a qualitatively different military potential. 

```

TABLE 1.  Weapons and Systems In or Entering U.S. Military

Inventories

ISR (sensors)      C4I                Precision Force

AWACS              GCCS               SFW

Rivet Joint        MILSTAR            JSOW

EP-3E              JSIPS              TLAM (BLK III)

JSTARS             DISN               ATACMS/BAT

HASA               JUDI               SLAW

SBIR               C4I FTW            CALCM

Tier 2+            TADIL J            HAVE NAP

Tier 3-            TRAP               AGM-130

TARPS              TACSAT             HARM

MTI                JWICS              AIR HAWK

REMBAS             MIDS               SADARM

MAGIC LANTERN      SONET              HELLFIRE II

ISAR               LINK-16            TLAM (BLK IV)

FDS                DMS                JAVELIN

ATARS              SABER              THAAD
```

What is happening, driven in part by broad conceptual architectures, in part by serendipity, is the creation of a new *system of systems*. Merging our increasing capacity to gather real-time, all-weather information continuously with our increasing capacity to process and make sense of this voluminous data builds the realm of dominant battlespace knowledge (DBK). DBK involves everything from automated target recognition to knowledge of an opponent's operational scheme and the networks relied on to pursue that scheme. The result will be an increasing gap between U.S. military forces and any opponent in awareness and understanding of everything of military significance in any arena in which we may be engaged. 

Likewise, our growing capacity to transfer DBK to all our forces, coupled with the real-time awareness of the status of all our forces and the understanding of what they can do with their growing capacity to apply force with speed, accuracy, and precision, builds the realm of "near perfect" mission allocation. We will increasingly assign the right mission to the right force, matching our forces to the most successful course of action at both the tactical and operational levels of warfare. Further, our increasing capacity to use force faster, more accurately, and more precisely over greater distances and interacting with the advances in ISR will build a qualitatively better realm of battle assessment. We will know the effects of our actions -- and understand what those effects mean -- with far more fidelity, far earlier than anything we have experienced to date. This dominant knowledge, in turn, will make any subsequent actions we undertake even more effective, because we will truly be able to operate within the opponent's decision cycle, and the opponent's capacity to operate at all will have been greatly eroded. 

This new system-of-systems capability is at the heart of the American revolution in military affairs (RMA). It embodies a new appreciation of joint military operations, for the system-of- systems depends ultimately on contributions from all the military services, a common appreciation of what we are building, and a common military doctrine. 

This transition is inevitable, but the speed at which we complete it depends on recognition of what is emerging and on our defense planning and programming decisions over the next several years. If we decide to accelerate the transition, it can be completed early in the next century. We could therefore be on the other side of this new revolution in military affairs years, perhaps decades, before any other nation. This is important for many reasons; one of the most significant is that completing the revolution offers us the opportunity to shape the international environment, rather than simply react to it. 

This, then, is the essence of the argument in favor of accelerating RMA. It is a bold vision and a controversial one. Visions count, however, only if people try to make them real, and the professional military should not try to reify this one unless it holds up to honest critique. Let us turn to the five most serious criticisms that have surfaced so far. 

### Opponents Fight Back

Postmortems of the American experience in Vietnam include the suggestion that, although the United States could put men on the moon, it could not "win" in Vietnam because, unlike the inanimate moon, the opponent in Vietnam fought back. Does a version of this homily apply to the system-of-systems vision, in the sense that no matter how technologically sophisticated the U.S. military may become, small opponents would "fight back" by channeling their aggression in ways that circumvent, undermine, or neutralize the technology Americans bring to the conflict? Those making this argument do not usually get very specific about how an opponent might be able to do this. They sometimes allude to "people's war" or weapons of mass destruction or terrorism without explaining what it is about these forms of aggression that would necessarily defy the capabilities inherent in the system-of-systems -- but their general point is a serious one. The conflicts we face will remain competitions among thinking, learning, and adaptive human beings, so we need to recognize that any future opponent could diligently and intelligently try to counter capabilities the system-of-systems gives us. 

Assuming opponents will try to counter the system-of-systems does not mean they will succeed, however. History is replete with examples of how advances in military technology were eventually countered or matched. Yet history also has intriguing examples of real revolutions in military affairs -- Guderian's *blitzkrieg*, Ellis's vision of amphibious warfare, and the nuclear revolution come to mind. These gave the revolutionaries dominance in conflict, in some cases for extended periods. None of these revolutions lasted forever, and the edge they provided ultimately eroded, but it was good to have the edge, not only because it paid off in conflict, but also because it gave leverage to foreign policy. 

A better consideration than historical precedent is the inherent character of the system-of-systems. The technology it rests upon emphasizes flexibility and adaptability. It will enable the U.S. military to know more about the flow of conflict than an opponent and to operate better within the decision cycle of that opponent. It will arm American forces with the means of learning faster on a battlefield (traditional or otherwise) and being more adaptable and flexible than an opponent. In other words, it starts from the fundamental assumption shared by its critics: war is a human contest that rewards innovation, learning, adaptability, and flexibility. The system-of-systems theory suggests that Americas can be better in meeting those criteria, criteria armed with technology designed to support them, than others can be without the technology 

### Relying on Technology is An Achilles' Heel

One of the most frequently leveled criticisms by those who think the vision is really a mirage is that the reliance on "information" technologies -- the kind of sensors, data processing and communications subsystems that appear in table 1 -- carries an inherent weakness that opponents can exploit: the vulnerability of such technologies to offensive information warfare, or "hacking." Do information technologies carry an electronic Achilles' heel that opponents can exploit? If so, heavy reliance on the system-of- systems might make the United States vulnerable to catastrophic failure in efforts to use it successfully in conflict. 

There is, to be sure, great danger in relying on military systems that have exploitable flaws. Indeed, the characteristic that gives any system its potency -- that the parts of a system enhance the effectiveness of one another -- also makes some systems susceptible to catastrophic failure if one of their central parts can be jeopardized. Yet there are some aspects of the system-of- systems that ought to alleviate if not refute these concerns. 

First, the people implementing the vision are far from ignorant of the danger of inherent flaws. A great deal of thought, planning, money, and continual effort goes into reducing real or hypothetical vulnerability. A lot of that effort follows the same kind of approach used so successfully in the SSBN security program -- namely, don't wait until someone else finds a vulnerability; instead, think and work continually to find and eliminate it first. 

Second, the computer and communications technologies on which the system-of-systems are based are becoming less, not more, susceptible to the various forms of information warfare. A race will probably always exist between those who seek to ensure the security of information-based systems and those who seek to overcome their security measures. Yet, the trend favors the effort to increase, not degrade security. In part, this is because of the relative "hardness" of the new generations of communications equipment. Fiber optic cable, for example, has physical characteristics that make it inherently more difficult to "tap" surreptitiously. 

Third, there is a robust redundancy to the emerging American system-of-systems. This redundancy works against the possibility of breaking the whole system; it also means that if there are ways of successfully attacking parts of the system, the overall system would not collapse but rather would degrade slowly. In one sense, this is faint praise; we don't want the system-of-systems to degrade at all. In another sense it suggests an opponent would be defeated or dead before he could defend against, counter, or defeat the capabilities we could bring against him. 

Clearly, none of this is cause for complacency; we need to continually bear in mind potential vulnerabilities and work hard to find and end them. Neither can a case be made that the vision is flawed or that moving to the system-of-systems carries more risk than sticking with the status quo. 

### It Applies Only to the Last War

Some argue that the system-of-systems may work only in a conflict similar to *Desert Storm,* with relatively open terrain and with an opponent who turns out to be scared and stupid, one who gives us enough time to amass an overwhelming force. That was the last war, however, not the next one. Future conflicts may take place in terrain less open, with an opponent not as militarily naive as Saddam Hussein, and against an army that is a lot more skilled in hiding. Urban areas, jungles, and mountains are as likely to be arenas as open deserts. There, it is argued, the system-of-systems is less applicable, and relying on it at the expense of a force built for close combat, in very ambiguous tactical situations, is a recipe for failure. 

However, the system-of-systems can apply *across* the spectrum of conflict . Americans will always seek the capacity to use military force with speed, precision, effectiveness and low risk to the participants. The dispositions, movements, and capabilities of an opponent's forces may be easier to discern in open desert than in the middle of Mogadishu or triple-canopied jungles, but this is no reason to refrain from trying to discern them. The fact is that the system-of-systems will give us far better capacity to do this, and with greater effectiveness and lower risk than we currently have. What other approach can better solve the military difficulties posed by the kinds of terrain, missions, and opponents we may face in the years ahead? 

We owe the men and women who may be in harm's way every edge technology can provide. Technology will never be a substitute for courage or human toughness in conflict, but it can increase the likelihood that the tough and courageous will be successful. 

### The System-of-Systems Ignores the Fog and Friction of War 

Some argue the vision refutes the wisdom of combat experience and military history regarding the fog and friction of war. War, they point out, is inherently chaotic and ambiguous. The only things certain about it are that you will know less than you need to and your strategies and plans will not work out as well as you had hoped. These critics appeal to observers as varied as Clausewitz and Sun Tzu as authorities and to personal anecdotes as proof. 

Of course they are correct. Conflict is chaotic, confusing, and messy. We will never have *perfect* understanding of a battlefield, our systems and weapons will never work flawlessly *all the time*, and the forces we ask to wage war will never do everything correctly *every time.* The system-of-systems does not promise perfection; it promises to reduce the fog and friction of war faced by the U.S. military and to do so sufficiently to give the United States a radically better edge in conflict over any opponent, at least so long as the United States has the system-of-systems and the opponent does not. 

Much of this hypothesis is susceptible to analysis. Over the last year, the joint warfare capabilities assessments have applied considerable analytic effort to testing it, and a lot more has to be done before we can say it's right or wrong. We can quantify the coming improvements in things like battlespace awareness, target recognition, connectivity, data exchange rates, weapons reach and accuracy, and destructive power. These all point to large jumps, quantitatively, over the remainder of this century. Impressive numbers do not necessarily constitute the RMA, however. Obviously, we must watch these assessments and analyses over the next year very carefully, but so far, the analytic view supports the vision that the United States is on the cusp of a qualitative change in its capability to use military force. 

### It's Not Broken; Don't Fix It 

There is considerable agreement within the Pentagon on the central issues: that we ought to continue to develop our capacity to understand the battlespaces in which we may operate, to improve joint operations, and continue to pursue the technologies that promise the RMA. The real issue is the rate at which we should go down these paths. 

The amount of effort needed to accelerate the achievement of the vision is not substantial; most of the programs that drive the RMA are already funded. They will reach fruition relatively soon, and not all of them should necessarily be accelerated. Their significance is, after all, a function of their interaction. Accelerating some but not others may give only marginal gains; some simply cannot come any faster no matter how much money we throw at them. 

At the center of the debate is whether we should take away from some programs and give to others. Such change is not new to Pentagon planning. What is new is the basic rationale for changing. In the past, change was driven either by the perception of threat (e.g., we developed new capabilities because of improvements our competitor, the Soviet Union, was making in military capabilities) or by the belief that things inside the military were broken enough to seek different solutions. The Army went through such a period of introspection after Vietnam. 

Now, however, neither of these motivations is particularly relevant, so the intellectual basis for arguing for change cannot rest in traditional rationales. It rests, therefore, in a sense of opportunity to make high dividend changes that pay off in maintaining a U.S. military superiority beyond the turn of the century and in forging a new link between American military capabilities and American foreign policy, one better suited to the post-Cold War world. 

The system-of-systems vision may provide a means of recementing this link. In an increasingly ambiguous world, where coalitions will parallel and perhaps replace alliances, and where nations will look for continued U.S. leadership, smart, flexible, mobile, effective forces make sense. 

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