In the Senate of the United States, 

September 26 (legislative day, September 17), 2008. 

Resolved, That the bill from the House of Representatives (H.R. 2631) entitled ‘‘An Act to strengthen efforts in 

the Department of Homeland Security to develop nuclear 

forensics capabilities to permit attribution of the source of 

nuclear material, and for other purposes.’’, do pass with the 

following 

AMENDMENT: 

Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert: 

1 SECTION 1. FINDINGS. 

2 Congress finds the following: 

3 (1) The threat of a nuclear terrorist attack on 

4 American interests, both domestic and abroad, is one 

5 of the most serious threats to the national security of 

6 the United States. In the wake of an attack, attribu7 tion of responsibility would be of utmost importance. 

8 Because of the destructive power of the weapon, there 
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1 could be little forensic evidence except the radioactive 

2 material in the bomb itself. 

3 (2) Through advanced nuclear forensics, using 

4 both existing techniques and those under development, 

5 it may be possible to identify the source and pathway 

6 of a weapon or material after it is interdicted or deto7 nated. Though identifying intercepted smuggled mate8 rial is now possible in some cases, pre-detonation 

9 forensics is a relatively undeveloped field. The post10 detonation nuclear forensics field is also immature, 

11 and the challenges are compounded by the pressures 

12 and time constraints of performing forensics after a 

13 nuclear or radiological attack. 

14 (3) A robust and well-known capability to iden15 tify the source of nuclear or radiological material in16 tended for or used in an act of terror could also deter 

17 prospective proliferators. Furthermore, the threat of 

18 effective attribution could compel improved security 

19 at material storage facilities, preventing the unwit20 ting transfer of nuclear or radiological materials. 

21 (4)(A) In order to identify special nuclear mate22 rial and other radioactive materials confidently, it is 

23 necessary to have a robust capability to acquire sam24 ples in a timely manner, analyze and characterize 
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1 samples, and compare samples against known signa2 tures of nuclear and radiological material. 

3 (B) Many of the radioisotopes produced in the 

4 detonation of a nuclear device have short half-lives, so 

5 the timely acquisition of samples is of the utmost im6 portance. Over the past several decades, the ability of 

7 the United States to gather atmospheric samples, 

8 often the preferred method of sample acquisition, has 

9 diminished. This ability must be restored and modern 

10 techniques that could complement or replace existing 

11 techniques should be pursued. 

12 (C) The discipline of pre-detonation forensics is 

13 a relatively undeveloped field. The radiation associ14 ated with a nuclear or radiological device may affect 

15 traditional forensics techniques in unknown ways. In 

16 a post-detonation scenario, radiochemistry may pro17 vide the most useful tools for analysis and character18 ization of samples. The number of radiochemistry 

19 programs and radiochemists in United States Na20 tional Laboratories and universities has dramatically 

21 declined over the past several decades. The narrowing 

22 pipeline of qualified people into this critical field is 

23 a serious impediment to maintaining a robust and 

24 credible nuclear forensics program. 
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1 (5) Once samples have been acquired and charac2 terized, it is necessary to compare the results against 

3 samples of known material from reactors, weapons, 

4 and enrichment facilities, and from medical, aca5 demic, commercial, and other facilities containing 

6 such materials, throughout the world. Some of these 

7 samples are available to the International Atomic 

8 Energy Agency through safeguards agreements, and 

9 some countries maintain internal sample databases. 

10 Access to samples in many countries is limited by na11 tional security concerns. 

12 (6) In order to create a sufficient deterrent, it is 

13 necessary to have the capability to positively identify 

14 the source of nuclear or radiological material, and po15 tential traffickers in nuclear or radiological material 

16 must be aware of that capability. International co17 operation may be essential to catalogue all existing 

18 sources of nuclear or radiological material. 

19 SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL AGREE20 MENTS FOR FORENSICS COOPERATION. 

21 It is the sense of the Congress that the President 

22 should— 

23 (1) pursue bilateral and multilateral inter24 national agreements to establish, or seek to establish 

25 under the auspices of existing bilateral or multilateral 
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1 agreements, an international framework for deter2 mining— 

3 (A) the source of any confiscated nuclear or 

4 radiological material or weapon; and 

5 (B) the source of any detonated weapon and 

6 the nuclear or radiological material used in such 

7 a weapon; 

8 (2) develop protocols for the data exchange and 

9 dissemination of sensitive information relating to nu10 clear or radiological materials and samples of con11 trolled nuclear or radiological materials, to the extent 

12 required by the agreements entered into under para13 graph (1); and 

14 (3) develop expedited protocols for the data ex15 change and dissemination of sensitive information 

16 needed to publicly identify the source of a nuclear det17 onation. 

18 SEC. 3. RESPONSIBILITIES OF DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETEC19 TION OFFICE. 

20 (a) ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES.—Section 1902 of 

21 the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 592) is 

22 amended— 

23 (1) by striking ‘‘(a) MISSION’’; 

24 (2) in paragraph (9), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the 

25 end; 
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1 (3) by redesignating paragraph (10) as para2 graph (14); and 

3 (4) by inserting after paragraph (9) the fol4 lowing: 

5 ‘‘(10) develop and implement, with the approval 

6 of the Secretary, and in consultation with the Attor7 ney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary 

8 of Energy, the Secretary of State, the Director of Na9 tional Intelligence, and the heads of appropriate de10 partments and agencies, a ‘National Strategy and 

11 Five-Year Implementation Plan for Improving the 

12 Nuclear Forensic and Attribution Capabilities of the 

13 United States Government’ and the methods, capabili14 ties, and capacity for nuclear materials forensics and 

15 attribution, including— 

16 ‘‘(A) an investment plan to support nuclear 

17 materials forensics and attribution; 

18 ‘‘(B) the allocation of roles and responsibil19 ities for pre-detonation, detonation, and post-det20 onation activities; and 

21 ‘‘(C) the attribution of nuclear or radio22 logical material to its source when such material 

23 is intercepted by the United States, foreign gov24 ernments, or international bodies or is dispersed 
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1 in the course of a terrorist attack or other nu2 clear or radiological explosion; 

3 ‘‘(11) establish, within the Domestic Nuclear De4 tection Office, the National Technical Nuclear 

5 Forensics Center to provide centralized stewardship, 

6 planning, assessment, gap analysis, exercises, im7 provement, and integration for all Federal nuclear 

8 forensics and attribution activities— 

9 ‘‘(A) to ensure an enduring national tech10 nical nuclear forensics capability to strengthen 

11 the collective response of the United States to nu12 clear terrorism or other nuclear attacks; and 

13 ‘‘(B) to coordinate and implement the na14 tional strategic plan and 5-year plan to improve 

15 national forensics and attribution capabilities 

16 for all Federal nuclear and radiological forensics 

17 capabilities; 

18 ‘‘(12) establish a National Nuclear Forensics Ex19 pertise Development Program, which— 

20 ‘‘(A) is devoted to developing and maintain21 ing a vibrant and enduring academic pathway 

22 from undergraduate to post-doctorate study in 

23 nuclear and geochemical science specialties di24 rectly relevant to technical nuclear forensics, in25 cluding radiochemistry, geochemistry, nuclear 
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1 physics, nuclear engineering, materials science, 

2 and analytical chemistry; and 

3 ‘‘(B) shall— 

4 ‘‘(i) make available for undergraduate 

5 study student scholarships, with a duration 

6 of up to 4 years per student, which shall in7 clude, if possible, at least 1 summer intern8 ship at a national laboratory or appro9 priate Federal agency in the field of tech10 nical nuclear forensics during the course of 

11 the student’s undergraduate career; 

12 ‘‘(ii) make available for graduate study 

13 student fellowships, with a duration of up 

14 to 5 years per student, which shall— 

15 ‘‘(I) include, if possible, at least 2 

16 summer internships at a national lab17 oratory or appropriate Federal agency 

18 in the field of technical nuclear 

19 forensics during the course of the stu20 dent’s graduate career; and 

21 ‘‘(II) require each recipient to 

22 commit to serve for 2 years in a post23 doctoral position in a technical nuclear 

24 forensics-related specialty at a national 
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1 laboratory or appropriate Federal 

2 agency after graduation; 

3 ‘‘(iii) make available to faculty 

4 awards, with a duration of 3 to 5 years 

5 each, to ensure faculty and their graduate 

6 students have a sustained funding stream; 

7 and 

8 ‘‘(iv) place a particular emphasis on 

9 reinvigorating technical nuclear forensics 

10 programs; and’’. 

11 (b) JOINT INTERAGENCY ANNUAL REPORTING RE12 QUIREMENT TO CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT.— 

13 (1) IN GENERAL.—Section 1907(a)(1) of the 

14 Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 596(a)(1)) 

15 is amended— 

16 (A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking 

17 ‘‘and’’ at the end; 

18 (B) in subparagraph (B)(iii), by striking 

19 the period at the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 

20 (C) by adding at the end the following: 

21 ‘‘(C) the Director of the Domestic Nuclear 

22 Detection Office and each of the relevant Depart23 ments that are partners in the National Tech24 nical Forensics Center— 
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1 ‘‘(i) includes, as part of the assess2 ments, evaluations, and reviews required 

3 under this paragraph, each relevant agen4 cy’s activities and investments in support of 

5 nuclear forensics and attribution activities; 

6 ‘‘(ii) attaches, as an appendix to the 

7 Joint Interagency Annual Review, the most 

8 current version of the plan required under 

9 section 1902(a)(10); and 

10 ‘‘(iii) after March 31 of each year, 

11 funds allocated for activities authorized 

12 under section 1902 are not spent until the 

13 submission to Congress of the report re14 quired under subsection (b).’’. 

Attest: 

Secretary. 

110TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H.R. 2631 

AMENDMENT