1

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

____________________

NO. 09-17-00262-CR

____________________

MEGAN BARRETT JEFFERIES, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1

Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 16-316420

________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Megan Barrett Jefferies pled guilty to the misdemeanor offense of Driving 

While Intoxicated (DWI) and was sentenced to three days in the Montgomery 

County jail with a fine of $1200.00. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a), (b) (West 

Supp. 2018).

1 In her sole issue on appeal, Jefferies complains that the trial court 

erred when it denied her pretrial motion to suppress evidence, arguing that her 

 

1 We cite the current version of the Penal Code as any subsequent amendments

do not affect the outcome of Jefferies’s appeal.
2

warrantless detention and arrest by the responding officer was not based on 

reasonable suspicion or probable cause and therefore was illegal. See U.S. CONST. 

amend. IV; Tex. Const. art. I, § 9. We affirm. 

Background

At the hearing on Jefferies’s motion to suppress, Deputy Stephanie Lee of the 

Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office was the sole witness called to testify regarding 

the events leading to Jefferies’s arrest. Lee testified that on the night of August 19, 

2016, her department received a 911 call regarding a possible intoxicated female in 

the drive-through lane of a Taco Bell in Montgomery County. Lee stated she was 

told by the 911 dispatcher that a woman in the drive-through lane was passed out in 

her vehicle holding up the line. The woman, who believed she was at Whataburger,

was trying to order food from the Whataburger menu and kept exiting her vehicle to 

vomit. Upon arrival, Lee parked her cruiser and began to enter the Taco Bell when 

she was immediately directed to the drive-through line by the employees inside the 

restaurant. She acknowledged that she did not otherwise speak to any of the 

employees inside the Taco Bell before she approached Jefferies’s car in the drivethrough line. Lee testified that upon exiting the Taco Bell, she drove her police 

cruiser to the front of the restaurant, then exited her car and approached a small, tan

SUV in the Taco Bell drive-through lane. She observed that the car was running, 
3

Jefferies was alone, seated in the driver’s seat, and there was vomit on the ground

outside of the vehicle. Lee stated that when she approached the vehicle, she noticed 

that Jefferies’s face appeared flushed, she had bloodshot eyes, and she smelled

alcohol. Surveillance photographs admitted at the hearing show Lee standing by the 

driver’s side of the vehicle and Jefferies seated in the driver’s seat.

During cross examination, Lee acknowledged that the initial call placed to 

911 had been classified as a welfare check. She confirmed the sheriff’s department 

does not have a code for the investigation of a “reasonable suspicion of a DWI,” and 

that for coding purposes, a welfare check is a code commonly used for DWIs. Lee 

testified that she was told by a 911 dispatcher before arriving at the Taco Bell that 

there was a possible intoxicated female in the drive-through lane of the restaurant,

and when she approached Jefferies’s vehicle, she was investigating a DWI. She 

believed she had probable cause to approach and investigate Jefferies because of the 

information provided by the caller to the 911 dispatcher that “[the driver] was 

intoxicated...believed she was at Whataburger – and [was] passing out behind the 

wheel.” Lee admitted that she did not witness Jefferies vomit in the drive-through

lane and that the Taco Bell employees did not tell her after she arrived that Jefferies 

was exhibiting signs of intoxication. Subsequently, Jefferies was arrested and 

charged with DWI. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a), (b). Jefferies filed a pretrial 
4

motion to suppress, arguing that police lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a 

warrantless detention and arrest. After a contested hearing, the trial court denied 

Jefferies motion to suppress. She then pled guilty to DWI and timely filed her appeal.

Standard of Review

We use a bifurcated standard of review when reviewing a trial court’s ruling 

on a motion to suppress. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2007) (citing Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). Under 

that standard, we “must give ‘almost total deference to a trial court’s determination 

of the historical facts that the record supports especially when the trial court’s fact 

findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.’” Id. (quoting 

Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). Likewise, if the trial 

court resolves a motion to suppress based on a resolution of mixed questions of law 

and fact, its evaluation of the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses is given 

almost total deference. Id. (citing Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 107 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2006)). In contrast, if the trial court’s findings do not depend on the trial 

court’s evaluations of the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses or turned on 

resolving a pure question of law, we review its ruling using a de novo standard. Id. 

(citing Montanez, 195 S.W.3d at 107); Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89 (citation omitted).
5

The record before us reveals that Jefferies did not ask the trial court to prepare 

written findings and conclusions explaining its ruling on her motion to suppress. 

Because there are no written findings in the record, we “impl[y] the necessary fact 

findings that would support the trial court’s ruling if the evidence (viewed in the 

light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling) supports these implied fact findings.”

State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818–19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); accord State v. 

Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Carmouche v. State, 10 

S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).

Analysis

In her single issue on appeal, Jefferies argues that Lee lacked reasonable 

suspicion to detain and ultimately arrest her because her information was based “on 

a conclusory statement from dispatch – that a suspect is possibly DWI at [the] drivethrough window[,]” which is insufficient information to establish reasonable 

suspicion. Jefferies argues that because Lee had nothing more than “an 

unsubstantiated hunch of criminal activity” to establish that she was intoxicated, she 

was illegally detained and arrested. 

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures 

by government officials. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing O’Hara v. State, 27 S.W.3d 548, 550 (Tex. Crim. 
6

App. 2000)). To suppress evidence because of an alleged Fourth Amendment 

violation, the defendant bears the initial burden of producing some evidence that 

rebuts the presumption of proper police conduct. Amador v. State, 275 S.W.3d 872, 

878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Russell v. State, 717 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1986)). “A defendant satisfies this burden by establishing that a search or 

seizure occurred without a warrant.” Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492 (citation omitted). 

Once the defendant has made this showing, the burden then shifts to the State to 

prove that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to a warrant or was 

reasonable. Id. The State stipulated this case involved a warrantless stop and arrest.

Therefore, the State had the burden to establish the reasonableness of the stop. See 

id.

A detention may be justified on less than probable cause if a person is 

reasonably suspected of criminal activity based on specific, articulable facts. Terry 

v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968) (citations omitted); Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 328

(citations omitted). “An officer conducts a lawful temporary detention when he has 

reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual is violating the law.” Ford, 158 

S.W.3d at 492 (citing Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2002)). “Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has specific, articulable facts that, 

when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to 
7

reasonably conclude that a particular person actually is, has been, or soon will be 

engaged in criminal activity.” Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2007) (citing Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). In

determining whether an officer’s suspicion was reasonable, we employ an objective 

standard, asking whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of the 

detention warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the action taken was 

appropriate. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22 (citations omitted); Aviles v. State, 23 S.W.3d 

74, 77 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d) (citations omitted). We 

disregard the actual, subjective intent of the detaining officer and look, instead, to 

whether an objective basis for the stop exists. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492 (citing 

Garcia, 43 S.W.3d at 530). In determining whether the officer had a reasonable 

suspicion for initiating the stop, we consider the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 

492–93. “[T]he detaining officer need not be personally aware of every fact that 

objectively supports a reasonable suspicion to detain; rather, ‘the cumulative 

information known to the cooperating officers at the time of the stop is to be 

considered in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists.’” Derichsweiler v. 

State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (quoting Hoag v. State, 728 S.W.2d 375, 380 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1987)) (additional citations omitted). Moreover, “[a] 911 police dispatcher is 
8

ordinarily regarded as a ‘cooperating officer’ for purposes of making this 

determination.” Id. (citations omitted).

The United States Supreme Court has held that the justification for reasonable 

suspicion must be viewed in light of the “‘content of information possessed by police 

and its degree of reliability.’” Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014) 

(quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)). “Although a mere ‘hunch’ 

does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires is 

‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,’ 

and ‘obviously less’ than is necessary for probable cause[.]” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 

U.S at 27; United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). 

In Navarette, the Court held that a 911 caller’s use of the 911 emergency

system, coupled with a detailed description of the “alleged dangerous driving[,]” 

including specific details of the actions of the driver and identifying features of the 

vehicle, “lends significant support to the tip’s reliability.” Id. at 399. A concerned 

citizen placed a call to the 911 emergency system to report a suspected drunk driver. 

Id. The caller provided information that she had been “run off the road” by a vehicle 

and provided the 911 operator with the suspected drunk driver’s vehicle make and 

model, including license plate number. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that this

information, coupled with the caller’s use of the 911 emergency system which has
9

safeguards in place to identify callers and guard against false tips, was detailed and 

specific enough to be a “significant indicator of drunk driving” and justified the 

officer’s reasonable suspicion. Id. at 401, 403. In explaining its decision, the Court 

did not lend any significance to the fact that the officer following the suspected 

vehicle did not observe any indicators of intoxication stating, “it is hardly surprising 

that the appearance of a marked police car would inspire more careful driving for a 

time . . . . [A]n officer who already has such a reasonable suspicion need not surveil 

a vehicle at length in order to personally observe suspicious driving.” Id. at 403.

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and our sister Courts of Appeals have

repeatedly determined that a detailed, contemporaneous, first person report by a 911 

caller coupled with the officer’s own observations corroborating the reliability of the 

concerned citizen’s tip is enough to justify reasonable suspicion to stop and 

investigate a driver for suspected DWI. See Leming v. State, 493 S.W.3d 552, 565

(Tex. Crim. App. 2016); see also Oringderff v. State, 528 S.W.3d 582, 588–589 

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.); Pate v. State, 518 S.W.3d 911, 915–916

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d); LeCourias v. State, 341 S.W.3d 

483, 488 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.); (each Court determining 

that an officer had reasonable suspicion to investigate a suspected intoxicated driver 

because the 911 caller provided a detailed, reliable report of the alleged intoxicated 
10

behavior of the driver including license plate numbers, identifying descriptions of 

the driver, accounts of erratic driving, or other behavior that indicated intoxicated 

driving, which information was then objectively verified by the officer when 

observing the allegedly intoxicated driver); compare with State v. Jennings, 511 

S.W.3d 306, 311–312 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.) (The Court of 

Appeals affirmed a trial court’s decision to grant defendant’s motion to suppress 

because the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to detain the 

defendant when he relied on a “subjective opinion” from an employee of a nursing 

home that a person was intoxicated without additional “specific, articulable facts.”

The State did not call the 911 dispatcher or admit the 911 recording into evidence,

and the officer testified that he did not observe the defendant violate any traffic laws 

or appear to be intoxicated after she left the nursing home. The Court held that the 

State failed to demonstrate the “specific, articulable facts” that would justify 

reasonable suspicions of drunk driving.).

During the suppression hearing, Lee testified that she was conducting a DWI 

investigation when she approached Jefferies in her vehicle. She stated she believed 

she had probable cause to approach Jefferies to conduct this investigation because 

of the information relayed to the 911 dispatcher by the concerned citizen and her 

own observations as she approached the vehicle. The State admitted into evidence 
11

the audio recording of the 911 call placed by the concerned citizen and the dispatcher 

logs at the suppression hearing. The 911 caller identified himself and then identified 

Jefferies’s car in the drive-through lane by her license plate. He stated that he was in 

front of her in line and that he observed Jefferies attempting to order from another 

fast food restaurant’s menu, exiting her car to vomit, and she was passed out for at 

least five minutes in the line. Lee testified that she responded to the 911 call about 

the potentially intoxicated person in the drive-through lane, and before she 

approached Jefferies’s vehicle, she was aware of the information provided by the 

911 caller. As she approached Jefferies’s vehicle, she observed vomit on the ground 

by Jefferies’s car, Jefferies’s bloodshot eyes, flushed faced, and “an odor of an 

unknown alcohol beverage emitting from the vehicle.” Lee had enough reasonable 

suspicion to detain and investigate Jefferies for DWI, because Lee’s own 

observations of Jefferies corroborated the information provided by the 911 caller.

In her brief, Jefferies relies on a case from our sister Court that on its face has 

similar facts but is distinguishable. Jefferies cites to State v. Griffey, in which the 

trial court granted a motion to suppress on the grounds the arresting officer lacked

reasonable suspicion to investigate or detain the defendant for a possible DWI. 241 

S.W.3d 700, 702 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. ref’d). In Griffey, an unidentified 

manager of a fast food restaurant called 911 and reported that a person was “passed 
12

out behind the wheel in the drive-through lane.” Id. at 702. The caller did not provide 

any additional information. Id. When the officer arrived at the fast food restaurant, 

he observed the driver of the vehicle was awake and waiting in the drive-through

lane. Id. Nevertheless, the officer blocked the drive-through lane and prevented 

Griffey from leaving the restaurant. Id. It was upon Griffey’s exit of the vehicle that 

the officer reported smelling alcohol and Griffey was subjected to a series of field 

sobriety tests. Id. at 703. Griffey argued in a motion to suppress that the officer did 

not have reasonable suspicion to investigate her for a possible DWI and therefore,

her detention and arrest were illegal. Id. The trial court agreed and granted Griffey’s 

motion to suppress finding the officer was not authorized by law to initially detain 

Griffey. Id. The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Id. at 

702. The Court of Appeals held that the information from the manager of the fast 

food restaurant did not provide enough information to indicate “criminal behavior.” 

Id. at 705. The Court emphasized that “the manager did not report the driver was 

intoxicated or that [the driver] exhibited any signs of intoxication.” Id. Further, when 

the officer arrived at the scene, he testified that the driver was awake. Id. at 702. This 

was in direct contradiction of the managers’ report and did not justify “an 

investigative detention without obtaining any additional corroboration of the 

managers tip.” Id. at 705.
13

This case is distinguishable from Griffey. The 911 caller identified himself 

and described in significant detail Jefferies alleged intoxicated behavior. Lee 

testified the 911 caller provided information that the driver was attempting to order 

from a different menu than provided by Taco Bell, was continuously exiting her car 

and vomiting, had passed out in her car, and was blocking the drive-through lane. 

When Lee arrived at the scene, she observed Jefferies still in the drive-through lane 

of the Taco Bell sitting in the driver’s side of her car with no other passengers, vomit 

on the ground, Jefferies’s red bloodshot eyes and flushed face, along with the distinct

smell of alcohol coming from her vehicle. The court in Griffey failed to find 

reasonable suspicion because the responding officer did not corroborate his

observations with the citizen tip provided by the anonymous caller, a clear 

distinction from the facts before the Court in this case, where Lee personally 

observed and verified the information and behavior of the defendant provided by the 

911 caller. We are unpersuaded by Jefferies’s argument that Lee’s reliance on the 

statements provided by the 911 caller failed to establish reasonable suspicion that 

Jefferies was possibly intoxicated. 2

 

2 Jefferies relies on two additional cases in her brief that she contends illustrate

that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain and arrest for DWI. Both cases 

are distinguishable from the facts before us. First, Jefferies cites to Hernandez v. 

State, in which an officer observed a vehicle in a parking lot at 2 a.m., with the

vehicle’s headlights on, turn signal blinking, and driver’s side door open. 376 
14

Conclusion

Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the record from the 

suppression hearing contains sufficient, articulable facts from which the trial court 

could have determined that the initial detention of Jefferies was objectively 

reasonable. We therefore conclude the trial court did not err in denying Jefferies’s

 

S.W.3d 863, 866 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.). After the officer pulled 

behind the driver, the driver pulled forward and stopped suddenly, slamming his 

head on the steering wheel. Id. When the officer approached the driver, he smelled 

alcohol and ultimately arrested the driver for DWI. Id. The Fort Worth Court of 

Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of the driver’s motion to suppress holding,

in part, that the officer did not “articulate any specific facts” combined with any 

rational inference that would lead him to conclude that the driver was, had been, or 

was about to engage in criminal activity, and therefore he did not have reasonable 

suspicion to detain the driver. Id. at 870. Hernandez is not analogous to the case 

before this Court. In Hernandez, the officer did not rely upon information provided 

by a 911 caller of a possible intoxicated driver. Accordingly, the officer’s initial

observations did not objectively provide enough information to give the officer 

reasonable suspicion of the driver’s intoxication.

Jefferies further relies on Stewart v. State, arguing that the Austin Court of 

Appeals held an officer did not have reasonable suspicion to investigate a driver for 

DWI because the officer did not observe the driver break any traffic laws or drive 

erratically. 22 S.W.3d 646, 648 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref’d). The 

information the officer relied upon in that case was from an anonymous call stating 

that the driver “fell down a couple of times . . . and appeared to be highly intoxicated” 

while at a gas station. Id. This information “was uncorroborated...[and] did not 

objectively support reasonable suspicion that [the driver] was driving while 

intoxicated.” Id. at 650. The information received from the anonymous caller did not 

corroborate with the officer’s own observations of the defendant’s behavior and 

failed to provide reasonable suspicion, whereas, in the case before us, the police 

officer’s observations of Jefferies as she approached her vehicle objectively verified 

the information provided by the 911 caller that Jefferies was possibly intoxicated. 
15

motion to suppress. We overrule Jefferies’s sole issue on appeal and affirm the 

judgment of the trial court.

AFFIRMED.

_________________________

 CHARLES KREGER

 Justice

Submitted on August 15, 2018

Opinion Delivered January 30, 2019

Do Not Publish 

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.