Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

DEBORAH K. SMITH GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Sugar Creek Law Attorney General of Indiana

Thorntown, Indiana

JUSTIN F. ROEBEL

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

JOHN ORVILLE STUDY, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 06A04-1308-CR-391

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee/Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE BOONE SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Matthew C. Kincaid, Judge

Cause No. 06D01-0710-FB-115

April 10, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BRADFORD, Judge 
2

CASE SUMMARY

Over the course of an approximately eighteen-month period, Appellant-Defendant 

John Orville Study committed four bank robberies in Boone County. These robberies 

included two separate robberies of a Key Bank branch in Zionsville and two separate 

robberies of a State Bank of Lizton branch in Dover. During each of the four robberies, 

Study wore what appeared to be the same clothing, was armed with what appeared to be the 

same gun, and used a similar modus operandi. After one of the robberies, Study led police on

a high speed chase after a concerned citizen heard a description of the suspect’s vehicle over 

the police scanner and notified police as to the location and direction of travel of the 

suspect’s vehicle. At some point, Study also stole a truck from an auto dealership that is 

located in Boone County. He later used the stolen truck to drive away from one of the 

robberies.

Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana subsequently charged Study with four counts of 

Class B felony robbery, six counts of Class B felony criminal confinement, one count of 

Class D felony resisting law enforcement, one count of Class D felony pointing a firearm, 

and one count of Class D felony auto theft. The State also alleged that Study was a habitual 

offender. Following trial, the jury found Study not guilty of pointing a firearm but guilty of 

each of the remaining charges. The jury also determined that Study was a habitual offender. 

On appeal, Study raises numerous claims which we restate as follows:

I. whether the trial court erred in denying Study’s request to sever the 

charges and order separate trials;

II. whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Study’s request 

to dismiss the charge relating to the March 21, 2006 robbery;
3

III. whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain 

evidence at trial; and

IV. whether the trial court erred in entering separate convictions for the 

related robbery and criminal confinement charges.

We affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Facts Relating to the March 21, 2006 Robbery of the

Key Bank Branch in Zionsville

During the early afternoon hours of March 21, 2006, the Key Bank branch in 

Zionsville was robbed. The robber was wearing a dark-green colored Carhartt jacket, boots, 

gloves, jeans, and a ski mask. The robber was also armed with a gun that was at least 

partially silver in color. 

Upon entering the bank, the robber yelled “this is a bank robbery” and walked behind 

the teller line. Tr. p. 427. The robber stated that he wanted a trash can to put the money in 

and that he did not want bait money or dye packs. The robber removed the money straps and 

checked for dye packs. After collecting the money, the robber ordered the employees to go 

behind the bank’s counter and to get down onto the floor. The employees complied as the 

robber “pointed the gun” in their direction. Tr. p. 359. After the robber left the bank, one of 

the employees ran to the bank’s door and observed the robber leaving in a red Jeep. The 

robber took approximately $4,000 from the bank on this date.

B. Facts Relating to the April 16, 2007 Robbery of the

State Bank of Lizton Branch in Dover

On April 16, 2007, at approximately 5:00 p.m., a robber entered the Dover branch of 
4

the State Branch of Lizton. The robber was wearing a ski mask, a green Carhartt-style jacket, 

blue jeans, work boots, and gloves. The robber had a gun that was at least partially silver in 

color in his hand, which he was “kinda waving, pointing.” Tr. p. 372.

Upon entering the bank, the robber went behind the teller line and took cash from the 

bank employees. The robber grabbed a trash can from the drive-up teller’s workspace. The 

robber said that he wanted money without dye packs, straps, or bait money. After the robber 

collected money from each employee and placed the money in the trashcan, the robber 

ordered the employees into the vault. The robber ordered one of the employees to give him 

additional money from the vault and again demanded “no dye packs.” Tr. p. 374. After 

receiving money from the vault, the robber closed the employees inside the vault and 

“attempted to turn” the wheel which locks the vault. Tr. p. 384. The employeesstayed in the 

vault until they heard the robber leave the bank. The employees then observed the robber 

leaving in a white Chrysler or Dodge vehicle. The robber took approximately $40,000 from 

the bank on this date. 

C. Facts Relating to the July 19, 2007 Robbery of the 

State Bank of Lizton Branch in Dover

On July 19, 2007, at approximately 5:00 p.m., the Dover branch of the State Bank of 

Lizton was robbed. The robber was “dressed exactly the same” as the robber who committed 

the April 16, 2007 robbery. Tr. p. 254. The robber wore a mask, gloves, and a bulky jacket 

that was described as “greenish” in color. Tr. p. 267. 

Upon entering the bank, the robber wielded a gun and demanded money. The robber 
5

indicated that he wanted money without dye packs, straps, or bait money. The robber came 

around behind the teller line and took the employees’ money. The robber used a trash can to 

collect the money. The robber also took an employee’s purse. The robber then ordered the 

employees into the vault at gunpoint and demanded additional money from the vault. After 

receiving money from the vault, the robber shut the vault door, leaving the employees inside. 

The employees stayed in the vault until they heard the robber leave the bank. The robber 

took approximately $25,000 from the bank on this date. 

A bank customer, who had just left the bank, observed the robbery from outside. The 

customer had a clear view of the man with a mask holding a trashcan in the tellers’ area. The 

customer had seen this same man exit a white Dodge Stratus with Indiana license plate 

93T1720 before entering the bank. The customer saw the robber leave the bank wearing a 

green Carhartt jacket and black mask. The customer also saw that the robber was carrying a 

gun that was at least partially silver in color and a trash can with money and other items. The 

customer shared a description of the robber’s vehicle with police.

A short time later, a farmer, who had overheard police radio traffic describing the 

robber’s vehicle and direction of travel, noticed a white Dodge Stratus matching the 

description driving at a relatively high rate of speed. The farmer pursued and at one point 

observed the Stratus run off of the road, through a fence and a ditch, and then come back up 

on the road. The Stratus then stopped and the driver removed wire from the vehicle.

Eventually, police officers caught up to the farmer, took over the pursuit of the 

Stratus, and followed the vehicle for another fifteen to twenty minutes at speeds of 
6

approximately 125-130 miles per hour. One of the pursuing officers noticed the driver of the 

Stratus retrieve and point a handgun at the pursuing officers. The chase ended when one of 

the pursuing officers ran out of fuel, another crashed, and the remaining officers lost sight of 

the vehicle.

D. Facts Relating to the Theft of a 

Silver 2008 Ford F-350 Super-Duty Pickup Truck

At some point in September of 2007, Study went to the Kenny Vice Ford auto 

dealership in Lagoda, Indiana. Study told the salesman that he was interested in looking at a

2008 Ford F-350 Super-Duty pickup truck, and the salesman showed Study the truck. The 

key, which was in the truck when it was shown to Study, could not be located later that same 

day.

One evening, during the middle of September of 2007, Study asked histhen-wife, Jill 

Ridge, to take him to the Kenny Vice Ford dealership. Study indicated that he needed to pick 

up a truck from the dealership. Ridge found it unusual that Study was picking up a truck 

after the dealership closed for the evening but complied with Study’s request. Ridge 

observed that Study sped as he left the dealership in the truck. On October 2, 2007, the 

dealership reported to police that a silver 2008 Ford F-350 Super-Duty pickup truck was 

missing. 

E. Facts Relating to the September 19, 2007 Robbery of the

Key Bank Branch in Zionsville

On September 19, 2007, the Key Bank branch in Zionsville was robbed. The robber 

was wearing a dark green Carhartt jacket, jeans, gloves, and a ski mask. The robber wielded 
7

a gun that was at least partially silver in color, which he pointed at bank employees. 

Upon entering the bank, the robber ordered the bank employees to let him behind the 

teller line. He took a trash can, emptied each of the cash drawers, and placed the money in 

the trash can. The robber asked for no dye packs and opened each pack of bills. After 

robbing the bank, the robber drove away from the bank in a silver or gray Ford pickup truck. 

The robber took approximately $12,000 from the bank on this date.

F. Facts Relating to the Identification of Study as a Suspect in the 

Theft and Robberies and Study’s Arrest

In October of 2007, a Putnam County Sheriff’s Deputy encountered a white Dodge 

Stratus with a broken windshield and no license plate “parked down somewhat off a little

lane” away from the nearest residence in a “rural and remote” area near Reelsville. Tr. p. 

512. The land upon which the deputy found the Stratus was owned by Study and Ridge. 

Because the deputy had been involved in the pursuit of a similar vehicle traveling toward this 

location on July 19, 2007, the deputy compared the vehicle with pictures from the prior 

pursuit and determined that “it was obvious that the vehicle was one in [sic] the same.” Tr. p.

512.

Officers subsequently obtained warrants to seize the vehicle and to search a travel 

trailer and a partially constructed garage, both of which were located on the property. During 

the search of the garage, officers recovered two trash cans. During the search of the travel 

trailer, officers recovered the registration application for a red Jeep bearing the name Jill 

Ridge of Zionsville, the window sticker for the 2008 Ford F-350 Super-Duty pickup truck 
8

that was stolen from the Kenny Vice Ford dealership, and Study’s social security card. 

Zionsville police subsequently obtained and executed search warrants on Ridge’s 

residence and Jeep, which was parked in front of the residence. During the search of the 

Jeep, officers recovered a hotel receipt bearing Study’s name, a loaded black and silver Smith 

and Wesson revolver, and a pair of brown men’s shoes. During the search of the residence, 

officers recovered a pair of men’s Carhartt jeans. 

On November 21, 2007, Study was arrested after a police chase in Madison County, 

Florida. The chase ended when the motorhome which Study was driving caught fire after an 

officer shot the tires of the motorhome. At the time of his arrest, Study was in possession of 

the key to the stolen truck. Officers recovered a green Carhartt jacket and at least some of 

the contents of the purse that was taken from the bank employee during the July 19, 2007 

robbery, including a wallet, a cellular phone, and other personal items, from inside the 

motorhome. Police also recovered various licenses plates, including Indiana plate 93T1720, 

from inside the motorhome. 

On November 27, 2007, officers in Livingston County, Illinois recovered the stolen 

truck outside of Pontiac, Illinois. Around the same time, the motorhome was reported stolen 

from Pontiac R-V Sales, which was located a few miles from where the truck was recovered.

G. Facts Relating to Criminal Charges and Pre-Trial Motions

On October 29, 2007, the State charged Study with one count of Class B felony 

robbery in relation to the April 16, 2007 robbery, and with one count of Class B felony 

robbery in relation to the July 19, 2007 robbery. On September 14, 2010, the State filed an 
9

allegation that Study is a habitual offender. On March 29, 2012, the State charged Study 

with four counts of Class B felony criminal confinement in relation to the April 16, 2007 

robbery. The State also charged Study with two counts of Class B felony criminal 

confinement, one count of Class D felony pointing a firearm, and one count of Class D 

felony resisting law enforcement in relation to the July 19, 2007 robbery. The State amended 

the habitual offender allegation on August 2, 2012. On August 20, 2012, the State charged 

Study with one count of Class B felony robbery in relation to the March 21, 2006 robbery, 

one count of Class B felony robbery in relation to the September 19, 2007 robbery, and one 

count of Class D felony auto theft in relation to the theft of the 2008 Ford F-350 Super-Duty 

pickup truck. 

In motions filed September 17, 2012 and September 24, 2012, Study moved to dismiss 

the criminal confinement charges, the pointing the firearm and resisting charges, and the 

robbery charge relating to the March 21, 2006 robbery, alleging various defects. The trial 

court denied the motions with regard to the criminal confinement, pointing the firearm, and 

resisting charges. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the robbery charge 

relating to the March 21, 2006 robbery, finding that prosecution was barred by the statute of 

limitations. However, the trial court subsequently allowed the State to amend the charge to 

include an allegation that the statute of limitation had been tolled due to concealment.

On October 5, 2012, Study filed motions to sever the charges and to dismiss the 

amended robbery charge relating to the March 21, 2006 robbery. The trial court denied these 

motions on October 22, 2012. 
10

H. Facts Relating to Trial

Beginning on April 29, 2013, the trial court conducted a three-day jury trial. At trial, 

Study renewed his motions to sever the charges and to dismiss the amended robbery charge. 

Study also filed a motion to suppress certain evidence. The trial court denied the motionsto 

sever and suppress and took the motion to dismiss under advisement. During trial, the State 

presented multiple witnesses who testified regarding the four bank robberies and the theft of 

the 2008 Ford F-350 Super-Duty pickup truck.

With respect to the March 21, 2006 robbery, bank employees described the dark-green 

Carhartt jacket worn by the robber as being the same as or similar to the green Carhartt jacket 

that was recovered at the time of Study’s arrest and admitted into evidence as Exhibit Eightytwo. Bank employees also described the gun that was wielded by the robber as being the 

same as or very similar to the revolver which was recovered during the search of Ridge’s 

Jeep and admitted into evidence at trial as Exhibit Thirty. In addition, bank employees 

indicated that the red Jeep which the robber drove away from the bank in appeared to be the 

same as or similar to the red Jeep which was depicted in Exhibits Twenty-two and Twentythree.

With respect to the April 16, 2007 robbery, bank employees described the gun that 

was wielded by the robber as being the same as or very similar to Exhibit Thirty. Bank 

employees indicated that the white vehicle in which the robber drove away from the bank 

appeared to be the same as or similar to the white vehicle which was depicted in Exhibit Ten.

With respect to the July 19, 2007 robbery, the customer who witnessed the robbery 
11

from outside the bank described the gun that was wielded by the robber as being the same as 

or very similar to Exhibit Thirty. Another customer, who had gone through the drive-up 

window, identified the white vehicle in which the robber drove away from the bank as being 

the same as or similar to the white vehicle depicted in Exhibit Ten. One of the officers that 

pursued Story during the high-speed chase testified that during the chase, he noticed a hole in 

the Status’s windshield that was similar to the damage to the vehicle depicted in Exhibits 

Nine through Fifteen. In addition, one of the employees who was present during both the 

April 16, 2007 and July 19, 2007 robberies testified that the robber’s voice “sounded like the 

same one from the first” robbery. Tr. p. 254.

With respect to the theft of the truck, the salesman testified that the truck that he 

showed Study was the truck that was depicted in Exhibits Thirty-four through Thirty-seven. 

The salesman also testified that the truck had just arrived at the dealership and Study was the 

only potential customer to see the vehicle.

With respect to the September 19, 2007 robbery, bank employees described the gun 

that was wielded by the robber as being the same as or very similar to Exhibit Thirty. One 

described the jacket worn by the robber as being the same as or similar to Exhibit Eighty-two. 

This employee further testified that the trash cans recovered from Study’s property looked 

similar to the trash cans placed in employee work spaces by the bank. Bank employees also 

indicated that the truck in which the robber drove away from the bank appeared to be the 

same as or similar to the truck depicted in Exhibit Thirty-five. 

I. Facts Relating to the Jury’s Verdict and Sentencing
12

Following the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, the jury found Study guilty 

of four counts of Class B felony robbery, six counts of Class B felony criminal confinement, 

one count of Class D felony resisting law enforcement, and one count of Class D felony auto 

theft. The jury found that Study was not guilty of Class D felony pointing a firearm. The 

jury subsequently determined that Study was a habitual offender. On May 29, 2013, the trial 

court sentenced Study to an aggregate term of sixty-eight-and-one-half years imprisonment. 

This appeal follows.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

On appeal, Study contends (1) that the trial court erred in denying his request to sever 

the charges and order separate trials; (2) that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

his request to dismiss the charge relating to the March 21, 2006 robbery; (3) that the trial 

court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence at trial; and (4) that the trial court 

erred in entering separate convictions for the related robbery and criminal confinement 

charges. We will address each contention in turn.

I. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Denying Study’s Request to

Sever the Charges and Order Separate Trials

Study contends that the trial court erred when it denied his request for severance of the 

charges. In ruling on such a request, the trial court is guided by statute. Indiana Code section 

35-34-1-9(a) provides: 

Two (2) or more offenses may be joined in the same indictment or information, 

with each offense stated in a separate count, when the offenses: (1) are of the 

same or similar character, even if not part of a single scheme or plan; or (2) are 

based on the same conduct or on a series of acts connected together or 

constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.
13

However, Indiana Code section 35-34-1-11(a) provides:

Whenever two (2) or more offenses have been joined for trial in the same 

indictment or information solely on the ground that they are of the same or 

similar character, the defendant shall have a right to severance of the offenses. 

In all other cases the court, upon motion of the defendant or the prosecutor, 

shall grant a severance of offenses whenever the court determines that 

severance is appropriate to promote a fair determination of the defendant’s 

guilt or innocence of each offense considering:

(1) the number of offenses charged;

(2) the complexity of the evidence to be offered; and

(3) whether the trier of fact will be able to distinguish the evidence and apply 

the law intelligently as to each offense.

Thus, when two or more charges are joined for trial solely because they are of the same or 

similar character, the defendant is entitled to severance as a matter of right. See Pardo v. 

State, 585 N.E.2d 692, 693 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). We review arguments that the trial court 

improperly denied a motion to sever as a matter of right de novo. Booker v. State, 790 

N.E.2d 491, 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. 

To show the charges were not joined solely because they were of the same or similar 

character, the State may show that the charges contain a common modus operandi, thus 

establishing that the charges were joined because they were the work of the same person. Id. 

“Modus operandi refers to a pattern of criminal behavior so distinctive that separate crimes 

are recognizable as the handiwork of the same wrongdoer.” Craig v. State, 730 N.E.2d 1262, 

1265 n.1 (Ind. 2000) (internal quotation omitted). If the court determines that the defendant 

was not entitled to severance as a matter of right, the decision of whether to sever the charges 

is committed to the trial court’s discretion, and we will reverse only for an abuse of that 
14

discretion. See id. “An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the 

logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Ziebell v. State, 788 N.E.2d 902, 908 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2003) (internal quotation omitted).

In arguing that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a severance of the 

charges, Study first claims that he was entitled to a severance as a matter of right. 

Alternatively, Study claims that even if he was not entitled to a severance as a matter of right, 

the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for a severance. We note that 

Study concedes that the various charges relating to each individual robbery could properly be 

tried together. Study also concedes that the auto theft charge could properly be tried with the 

charge relating to the September 19, 2007 robbery because the truck at issue in the auto theft 

charge was used in connection to the commission of that robbery. Study, however, argues 

that he should have been granted four separate trials, i.e., one trial for the charges stemming 

from each individual robbery.

A. Severance as a Matter of Right

Study claims that he was entitled to severance as a matter of right. In making this 

claim, Study points to the fact that the four robberies occurred on different dates, multiple 

months apart, at two different locations. One location was located in southern Boone County 

and the other in western Boone County. Further, Study claims that although the perpetrator 

wore a mask in all four robberies, it is not uncommon for a bank robber to try to conceal his

identity. 

Study relies on this court’s decision in Pardo for support for his claim that he was 
15

entitled to severance as a matter of right. In Pardo, the defendant was charged with multiple 

counts relating to four thefts that occurred in September of 1989 and an attempted theft in 

November of 1989. 585 N.E.2d at 692. Upon review, this court determined that the record 

lacked any evidence that the September thefts and the November attempted theft constituted 

a series of acts connected together or parts of a single scheme or plan, and that the charges 

were joined for trial simply because the offenses were of the same or similar character. Id. at 

695. Thus, the defendant was entitled to separate trials, one for the September offenses and 

one for the November offense. Id. 

However, upon review, we conclude that unlike in Pardo, the charges relating to the 

four separate robberies were not joined at trial simply because the offenses were of the same 

or similar character. Again, to show the charges were not joined only because they were of 

the same or similar character, the State may show that the charges contain a common modus 

operandi, thus establishing that the charges were joined because they were the work of the 

same person. See Booker, 790 N.E.2d at 494. We believe the State has successfully done so 

here.

The evidence relating to each of the four robberies reveal a pattern of criminal 

behavior so distinctive that separate crimes are recognizable as the handiwork of the same 

wrongdoer, i.e., a common modus operandi. See Craig, 730 N.E.2d at 1265 n.1. In each of 

the four robberies, the perpetrator was dressed exactly the same, wearing a ski mask, a green 

Carhartt-style jacket, blue jeans, work boots, and gloves. The perpetrator was also armed 

with a gun that was at least partially silver in color during each of the robberies. Upon 
16

entering the bank, the perpetrator went behind the teller line and forced bank employees to 

place money in a trash can that he picked up from behind the teller line. The perpetrator also 

demanded that the money not include dye packs, straps, or bait money. In two of the 

robberies, the perpetrator forced the employees down on the floor. In the other two, he 

forced the employees into the vault. 

Moreover, the State argued and the trial court recognized additional reasons for trying 

all of the charges in a single trial. These additional reasons included concerns for judicial 

economy, the fact that the crimes all appeared to be part of a common scheme and plan, the 

overlap of evidence and witnesses who would be called to testify regarding each of the 

robberies and the actions taken by officials after each of the robberies, and the public interest 

in concluding judicial matters in a reasonably expeditious fashion. 

Upon review, we determine that the above-stated additional reasons for trying the 

charges together in one trial coupled with the common modus operandi used in each of the 

robberies demonstrates that the charges were not joined solely because they were of the same 

or similar character. As such, we conclude that Study has failed to demonstrate that he was 

entitled to severance as a matter of right.

B. Discretionary Denial of Severance

Alternatively, Study argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his 

request for a severance because the facts relating to the four separate robberies were so 

confusing such to warrant four separate trials. We disagree. During trial, various witnesses 

testified about each of the robberies as well as the auto theft and the actions that led to 
17

Study’s arrest. As for the robberies, each witness was clear in his or her testimony as to 

which robbery his or her testimony related to. The same is true for the testimony relating to 

the theft of the truck. Further, the testimony regarding police action following the robberies 

and the theft was the same for each of the charges. 

Study has failed to make a showing that the alleged complexity of the evidence 

rendered the jury incapable of rendering a fair verdict or that he was prejudiced by the joinder

of the charges. As such, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Study’s motion to sever.

II. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Denying Study’s Request to

Dismiss the Charge Relating to the March 21, 2006 Robbery

Study next contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because 

the prosecution of the charge relating to the March 21, 2006 robbery was barred by the fiveyear period of limitation set forth in Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2. We review a trial 

court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss a criminal charge for an abuse of discretion. Reeves v. 

State, 938 N.E.2d 10, 14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Lindsay, 862 N.E.2d 314, 317 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied), trans. denied. “We will reverse a trial court’s decision 

for an abuse of discretion where the court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of 

the facts and circumstances.” Id. (citing Lindsay, 862 N.E.2d at 317). When reviewing a 

motion to dismiss based on a statute of limitation, we have explained that:

A statute of limitation is designed to insure against prejudice and injustice to a 

defendant which is occasioned by a delay in prosecution. State v. Jones, 783 

N.E.2d 784, 786-87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). The limitation period seeks to strike 

a balance between a defendant’s interest in being placed on notice so as to be 

able to formulate a defense for a crime charged and the State’s interest in 
18

having sufficient time to investigate and develop a case. Id. at 787. Any 

exception to the limitation period must be construed narrowly and in a light 

most favorable to the accused. Id. 

Lindsay, 862 N.E.2d at 317. It is the State’s burden to prove that the crime charged was 

committed within the statute of limitation. Id. 

Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2(a) provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by 

this section a prosecution for an offense is barred unless it is commenced: (1) within five (5) 

years after the commission of the offence in the case of a Class B ... felony.” However, 

Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2(h) provides that “[t]he period within which a prosecution 

must be commenced does not include any period in which: ... (2) the accused person 

conceals evidence of the offense, and evidence sufficient to charge the person with that 

offense is unknown to the prosecuting authority and could not have been discovered by that 

authority by exercise of due diligence.” In Sloan v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court noted 

that the language “conceals evidence of the offense” found in Indiana Code section 35-41-4-

2(h)(2) was seemingly broader than its predecessor’s language, which read “conceals the fact 

that the offense has been committed.” 947 N.E.2d 917, 922 n.8 (Ind. 2011) (comparing Ind. 

Code § 35-41-4-2(h)(2) to its predecessor, Ind. Code § 35-1-3-5 (1976)). In noting the 

General Assembly’s adoption of the arguably broader language, the Indiana Supreme Court 

further noted that “[i]t is arguable that the new language applies to concealment of any 

evidence, including evidence of guilt, and thus would toll the statute of limitations in any 

crime in which a defendant tries to avoid apprehension.” Id. We agree with this 

interpretation, and accordingly conclude that the five-year statute of limitation may be tolled 
19

by a defendant’s concealment of any evidence, including evidence of guilt.

In arguing that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Study’s motion to 

dismiss the charge relating to the March 21, 2006 robbery, the State claims that the five-year 

statute of limitation was tolled from the date of the robbery until November 21, 2007, 

because Study had concealed both his identity and the evidence relating to the charged 

offense. Given the fact that concealment is a fact-intensive issue, where the State relies on 

this exception, “it must plead the circumstances of the concealment exception in the 

information so that the “defendant is apprised of the facts upon which the State intends to 

rely and may be prepared to meet that proof at trial.” Reeves, 938 N.E.2d at 17 (internal 

quotation omitted). 

With respect to the challenged charge, the State alleged concealment in the amended 

charging information. Specifically, the State alleged that Study concealed his identify by 

wearing a mask at the time of the offense. The State also alleged that Study concealed the 

white Dodge Status that he used to drive away after committing the robbery, the trash can 

that he used during the commission of the robbery and took from the bank, the clothing that 

he wore during the robbery, personal property that he took from one of the victims, and the 

weapon that he used during the commission of the offense. The State additionally alleged 

that Study concealed evidence relating to the other bank robberies which displayed a 

common modus operandi as the March 21, 2006 robbery. The State alleged that Study’s act 

of concealing the above-stated evidence 

made it impossible for the prosecuting authority to identify [Study] as the 

offender in the bank robbery which occurred on March 21, 2006 until [Study] 
20

was apprehended on November 21, 2007. Furthermore, evidence sufficient to 

charge [Study] with the offense charged herein was unknown to the 

prosecuting authority and could not have been and was not discovered by that 

authority by exercise of due diligence until [Study] was apprehended on 

November 21, 2007. 

Appellant’s App. pp. 137-38. 

Upon review, we determine that the State’s allegations in the charging information 

were sufficient to put Study on notice of the facts on which the State intended to rely on at 

trial. Study was made aware of the date of the charged offense and given a sufficient 

opportunity to prepare a defense for trial. As such, given our interpretation of the language 

adopted by the General Assembly in Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2(h)(2) relating to 

concealment coupled with the fact that the State sufficiently pled concealment in the 

amended charging information, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in 

denying Study’s motion to dismiss the charge relating to the March 21, 2006 robbery.

III. Whether the Trial Court Abused Its Discretion 

in Admitting Certain Evidence at Trial

Study next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain 

evidence at trial in violation of Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b). 

Our standard of review for rulings on the admissibility of evidence is 

essentially the same whether the challenge is made by a pre-trial motion to 

suppress or by an objection at trial. Ackerman v. State, 774 N.E.2d 970, 974-

75 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), reh’g denied, trans. denied. We do not reweigh the 

evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial 

court’s ruling. Collins v. State, 822 N.E.2d 214, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), 

trans. denied. We also consider uncontroverted evidence in the defendant’s 

favor. Id.

Cole v. State, 878 N.E.2d 882, 885 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). 
21

A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. 

Washington v. State, 784 N.E.2d 584, 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Bradshaw v. State, 

759 N.E.2d 271, 273 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)). Accordingly, we will reverse a trial court’s 

ruling on the admissibility of evidence only when the trial court abused its discretion. Id. 

(citing Bradshaw, 759 N.E.2d at 273). An abuse of discretion involves a decision that is 

clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. (citing 

Huffines v. State, 739 N.E.2d 1093, 1095 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)). 

Study claims that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence relating to 

an uncharged bank robbery and the theft of the motorhome which he was driving at the time 

of his arrest. Specifically, Study argues that the challenged evidence was evidence of other 

crimes, wrongs, or acts alleged to have been committed by Study, and, as a result, was 

admitted in violation of Evidence Rule 404(b). 

When addressing the admissibility of evidence under [Evidence] Rule 404(b), 

courts must utilize a two-prong analysis. Scalissi v. State, 759 N.E.2d 618, 

623 (Ind. 2001). First, the court must assess whether the evidence has some 

relevancy to a matter at issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit 

the charged act. Id. Second, the court must weigh the probative value of the 

evidence against its prejudicial effect, pursuant to Evidence Rule 403. Id. We 

will reverse a trial court’s determination of admissibility only for an abuse of 

discretion. Id.

Wages v. State, 863 N.E.2d 408, 410 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

“Evidence Rule 404(b) was designed to assure that ‘the State, relying upon evidence 

of uncharged misconduct, may not punish a person for his character.’” Lee v. State, 689 

N.E.2d 435, 439 (Ind. 1997) (quoting Wickizer v. State, 626 N.E.2d 795, 797 (Ind. 1993)). 
22

Evidence Rule 404(b)(1) provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not 

admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the 

person acted in accordance with the character.” However, “[t]his evidence may be 

admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 

plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Ind. Evid. R. 404(b)(2). 

In addition, “‘[e]vidence of happenings near in time and place that complete the story of the 

crime is admissible even if it tends to establish the commission of other crimes not included 

among those being prosecuted.’” Wages, 863 N.E.2d at 411 (quoting Bocko v. State, 769 

N.E.2d 658, 664-65 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied).

A. Evidence Relating to an Uncharged Bank Robbery

Study claims that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence relating to 

the January 20, 2006 robbery of a Charter One bank branch. Study argues that the evidence 

of the January 20, 2006 robbery was evidence of an uncharged robbery that, at most, could be 

admitted to show that he had a propensity to commit bank robberies. For its part, the State 

argues that the evidence relating to the January 20, 2006 robbery was properly admitted 

because it was admitted not for the purpose of proving that Study acted in accordance with 

his character but rather because it was probative of Study’s identity as the perpetrator. The 

State also argues that the evidence relating to the January 20, 2006 robbery was relevant to 

explain how Study came up with the modus operendi used in the four charged robberies. 

During the January 20, 2006 robbery, the perpetrator dressed in clothing similar to that 

worn by Study during the commission of the four charged robberies and wielded a gun 
23

similar to the gun wielded by Study during the commission of the four charged robberies. In 

addition, following the January 20, 2006 robbery, the perpetrator also drove away in a white 

vehicle similar to the white Dodge Stratus in which Study drove away from two of the 

charged robberies. Further, while it is of note that the perpetrator in the January 20, 2006 

robbery did not specify that the money received not contain dye packs or place the money in 

a trash can, the State argues that the fact that the money received by the perpetrator did 

contain dye packs which exploded after the perpetrator took the money from the bank 

explains why Study was so concerned that the money received during the four charged 

robberies not contain dye packs. We agree with the State that this evidence is relevant to 

prove Study’s identity and to provide an explanation for the modus operendi developed and 

used by Study during the commission of the charged robberies. 

Moreover, even if it was error to admit the challenged evidence at trial, we conclude 

that such error was harmless. 

Errors in the admission of evidence ... are to be disregarded as harmless unless 

they affect the substantial rights of a party. Ind. Trial Rule 61; Sparkman v. 

State, 722 N.E.2d 1259, 1263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). In determining whether 

error in the introduction of evidence affected a defendant’s substantial rights, 

we must assess the probable impact of the improperly admitted evidence upon 

the jury. Id. When there is substantial independent evidence of guilt such that 

it is unlikely that the erroneously admitted evidence played a role in the 

conviction or where the offending evidence is merely cumulative of other 

properly admitted evidence, the substantial rights of the party have not been 

affected, and we deem the error harmless. Smith v. State, 839 N.E.2d 780, 784 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

Robertson v. State, 877 N.E.2d 507, 514 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); see also Crocker v. State, 989 

N.E.2d 812, 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.
24

The State presented substantial, independent evidence of Study’s guilt during trial. 

This evidence included pictures of the vehicles used by Study in the commission of the 

crime, the clothing worn by Study during the commission of the robberies, the gun wielded 

by Study during the commission of the robberies, the window sticker for the stolen 2008 Ford 

F-350 pickup truck, and some of the trash cans taken from the banks during the robberies. In 

addition, Study was in possession of the key to the stolen truck at the time of his arrest. 

Police also recovered the purse, including some of the contents thereof, stolen during the July 

19, 2007 robbery and various license plates, including Indiana plate 93T1720. Some of this 

evidence was recovered from property belonging to Study and Ridge and was intermixed 

with personal identification evidence belonging to Study and Ridge. The other evidence was 

recovered from the motorhome which Study was driving at the time of his arrest. In addition, 

the State also presented the testimony of numerous witnesses at trial, all of whom 

consistently testified to Study’s actions during the robberies. These witnesses also gave 

consistent descriptions of Study’s clothing and the gun wielded by Study. In light of the 

substantial independent evidence of Study’s guilt, we conclude that the admission of the 

challenged evidence was at most harmless. As such, we further conclude that the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence at trial.

B. Evidence Relating to the Motorhome

Study also claims that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that 

the motorhome which he was driving at the time of his arrest was stolen. With respect to the 

motorhome, Study argues that it was irrelevant that the motorhome was stolen because the 
25

State was capable of showing that Study was in possession of the motorhome and its contents 

without disclosing that it was stolen. For its part, the State argues that the evidence 

indicating that the motorhome was stolen was properly admitted because it helped complete 

the story relating to Study’s commission of the charged crimes. 

During trial, the trial court allowed the State to present evidence that the motorhome 

was stolen from Pontiac R-V Sales in Livingston County, Illinois, which was located a few 

miles from where Study abandoned the stolen 2008 Ford F-350 Super-Duty pickup truck. 

We believe that this evidence was admissible because it was relevant to complete the story of 

the charged crimes. At some point following the commission of the September 19, 2007 

robbery, Study fled Indiana. He was subsequently arrested following a police chase in 

Florida. Study was driving the motorhome at the time of his arrest. Study was in possession 

of the key to the stolen truck at the time of his arrest. In addition, during a search incident to 

Study’s arrest, officers recovered a green Carhartt jacket and at least some of the contents of 

the purse that was taken from the bank employee during the July 19, 2007 robbery, including 

a wallet, a cellular phone, and other personal items, from the motorhome. Police also 

recovered numerous license plates, including Indiana plate 93T1720. The fact that the 

motorhome was stolen from a dealership that was located a few miles from where the stolen 

truck was ultimately recovered is relevant to complete the story relating to the charged 

offenses and to explain why police officers from Illinois were present at the time of Study’s 

arrest and testified during Study’s trial. As such, we conclude that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence at trial.
26

IV. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Entering Separate Convictions for the

Related Robbery and Criminal Confinement Charges

Study also contends that the trial court erred in entering separate convictions for the 

related robbery and criminal confinement charges. He argues that the confinement was part 

of the robbery and therefore the trial court simultaneously charged him for an offense and a 

lesser-included offense in violation of Indiana Code section 35-38-1-6. Indiana Code section 

35-38-1-6 provides that “[w]henever: (1) a defendant is charged with an offense and an 

included offense in separate counts; and (2) the defendant is found guilty of both counts; 

judgment and sentence may not be entered against the defendant for the included offense.”

Robbery consists of taking property from another person “(1) by using or threatening 

the use of force on any person; or (2) by putting any person in fear.” Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1. 

Criminal confinement consists of “(1) confin[ing] another person without the other person’s 

consent; or (2) remov[ing] another person by fraud, enticement, force, or threat of force from 

one (1) place to another.” Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3. “Confinement is not a lesser-included 

offense of robbery.” Hopkins v. State, 759 N.E.2d 633, 639 (Ind. 2001). Furthermore, where 

the confinement of a victim is greater than that which is inherently necessary to rob the

victim, the confinement, while part of the robbery, is also a separate criminal transgression. 

Id. at 639 (citing Harris v. State, 716 N.E.2d 406, 412 (Ind. 1999)). 

In Hopkins, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld the defendant’s robbery and 

confinement convictions, finding that the defendant’s confinement of his victims “extended 

well beyond what was necessary to rob them.” Id. at 640. Defendant forced his victims into 
27

a basement at gunpoint and took money from them before going upstairs to search the 

residence. Id. The Indiana Supreme Court determined that it was not necessary to force the 

victims into the basement to rob them. Id. The Indiana Supreme Court further determined 

that after initially taking the money, it was not necessary for the defendant to force his 

victims to stay in the basement as he searched the residence. Id. Thus, the Indiana Supreme 

Court concluded that both the defendant’s removal of the victims to the basement and the 

confinement after robbing them were separate criminal transgression from the robberies 

themselves. Id.

In the instant matter, Study’s confinement of the bank employees during both the 

April 16, 2007 and July 19, 2007 robberies extended beyond what was necessary to rob the 

bank. During both robberies, Study ordered the employees into the vault at gunpoint after 

taking the money in each of the teller’s drawers. Study then took additional money from the 

vault. Arguably, Study’s actions up to this point were necessary to rob the bank. However, 

in both instances, after taking money from the vault, Study continued to confine the 

employees in the vault. After taking the money, Study ordered the employees to stay in the 

vault after the completion of the robbery. Study also shut the vault door, effectively shutting 

them in the vault. During the April 16, 2007 robbery, Study even attempted to lock the 

employees in the vault. Like the confinement of the victims in Hopkins, Study’s confinement 

of the employees in the vault during both robberies constituted separate criminal acts as the 

confinements went beyond what was necessary for Study to complete the robberies. See id. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in this regard.
28

CONCLUSION

In sum, we conclude that (1) the trial court did not err in denying Study’s request to 

sever the charges and order separate trials, (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Study’s request to dismiss the charge relating to the March 21, 2006 robbery, (3) the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence at trial, and (4) the

trial court did not err in entering separate convictions for the related robbery and criminal 

confinement charges. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

PYLE, J., concurs.

MATHIAS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.
29

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

JOHN ORVILLE STUDY, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

 vs. ) No. 06A04-1308-CR-391

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

MATHIAS, Judge concurring in parts and dissenting in part

I concur in all parts of the majority opinion except that portion holding that the applicable 

statute of limitations had been tolled as to the March 21, 2006 robbery. 

The applicable statute of limitations, found in Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2(a)(1), provides 

that “a prosecution for an offense is barred unless it is commenced . . . within five (5) years after the 

commission of the offense, in the case of a Class B, Class C, or Class D felony[.]” (emphasis added). 

It is undisputed that, in the present case, the State did not file charges regarding the March 21, 2006 

robbery until after more than five years had elapsed since the robbery. 

The State argues, and the majority agrees, that the limitations period was tolled by operation 

of Section 35-41-4-2(h)(2), which states that “[t]he period within which a prosecution must be 

commenced does not include any period in which . . . the accused person conceals evidence of the 

offense, and evidence sufficient to charge the person with that offense is unknown to the prosecuting 
30

authority and could not have been discovered by that authority by exercise of due diligence[.]” 

(emphasis added). The majority accepts the State’s position that this tolling provision is applicable 

any concealment of evidence, including evidence of guilt. 

Our case law, however, has long held that the statute of limitations is tolled by concealment 

only when there is a positive act performed by the defendant calculated to prevent discovery of the 

fact that a crime has been committed. Reeves v. State, 938 N.E.2d 10, 17 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010); Sipe 

v. State, 797 N.E.2d 336, 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); Kifer v. State, 740 N.E.2d 586, 587 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2000); State v. Chrzan, 693 N.E.2d 566, 567 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); Umfleet v. State, 556 

N.E.2d 339, 341 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), trans. denied; see also Crider v. State, 531 N.E.2d 1151, 1154 

(Ind. 1988) (concluding that statute of limitations was tolled where defendant concealed the facts of 

his crimes by his positive acts of intimidation of his victims). 

In support of its position to the contrary, the majority cites to Sloan v. State, 947 N.E.2d 917 

(Ind. 2011). In that case, our supreme court did note that the use of the phrase “conceals evidence of 

the offense” in our current statute of limitations seemed broader that the language of the predecessor 

statute, which required concealment of “the fact that the offense has been committed.” Id. at 922 n.8 

(quoting Ind. Code § 35-1-3-5 (1976)). Decisions from this court, however, have assigned no 

significance to this change and have held that, to constitute concealment, “‘there must be a positive 

act performed by the defendant calculated to prevent discovery of the fact that a crime has been 

committed.’” Id. (quoting Sipe v. State, 797 N.E.2d 336, 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). The court then 

wrote: 

It is arguable that the new language applies to concealment of any evidence,

including evidence of guilt, and thus would toll the statute of limitationsin any

crime in which a defendant tries to avoid apprehension. Because concealment

is not an issue in this case, we leave this question for another day.
31

Id. (emphasis supplied). 

Accordingly, this portion of the Sloan opinion is obiter dicta and not binding on this court. 

Since our case law has long held a contrary position, I do not think it necessary to abandon our longstanding precedent in the light of dicta contained in a footnote. The majority nevertheless disagrees 

with our precedent and instead agrees with the State that the statute of limitations is tolled in any 

crime in which a defendant tries to avoid apprehension. I respectfully disagree. 

I start with the premise that exceptions to statutes of limitations must be construed narrowly 

and in a light most favorable to the accused. Sloan, 947 N.E.2d at 922. To construe the tolling 

provision of the statute of limitations so broadly as to include any case in which a defendant tries to 

avoid apprehension effectively lets the exception swallow the rule. Indeed, it is hard to conceive of a 

crime in which the culprit does not attempt to avoid apprehension. It is a rare case indeed where the 

culprit actively turns himself in to the authorities immediately after commission of the crime. Under 

the majority’s reading, any time a defendant attempts to avoid arrest, the statute of limitations is 

tolled. If this is the case, our criminal statutes of limitation are pointless and can be ignored. 

The purpose of the statute of limitations in criminal law is “to protect defendants from the 

prejudice that a delay in prosecution could bring, such as fading memories and stale evidence.” Id. at 

920. Limitations statutes “strike[ ] a balance between an individual’s interest in repose and the 

State’s interest in having sufficient time to investigate and build its case.” Id. Our legislature has 

made the public-policy choice of setting a five-year statute of limitations for Class B, Class C, and 

Class D felonies. To read the concealment portion of the tolling provision as broadly as does the 

majority vitiates this public policy in all but very few crimes, leaving us with an effectively 

meaningless statute of limitations. 
32

Until our supreme court directly holds that concealment includes the mere act of avoiding 

apprehension, I would continue to hold, as a long line of cases currently holds, that concealment tolls 

the statute of limitations only when the accused performs a positive act calculated to prevent 

discovery of the fact that a crime has been committed. This is not what happened in this case, as the 

fact that the bank had been robbed on March 21, 2006 was well known. Thus, the statute of 

limitations ran on March 21, 2011, and the State did not file charges for this robbery until August 20, 

2012, well after the statute of limitations had run. 

Accordingly, I believe that the trial court should have granted Study’s motion to dismiss the 

charge stemming from the March 21, 2006 robbery, and I respectfully dissent from the majority’s 

holding to the contrary.