In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: May 29, 2024

S24A0521. TARVER v. STATE.

 MCMILLIAN, Justice.

Ricquavious Tarver was convicted of murder and other crimes 

in connection with the shooting death of Roosevelt Demmons.1

Tarver argues on appeal that (1) the trial court erred in excluding 

evidence of Tarver’s knowledge of Demmons’s previous acts of

1 Demmons was killed on August 27, 2016, and Tarver was charged by 

special presentment in McDuffie County in June 2017 for malice murder 

(Count 1), felony murder predicated upon aggravated assault (Count 2), 

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count 3), and possession of a 

firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 4). He was tried before a jury 

in September 2018 and found guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced

Tarver to serve life in prison with the possibility of parole on Count 1, and five 

years in prison to be served consecutively on Count 4. Count 2 was vacated by 

operation of law and Count 3 was merged into Count 1. Tarver filed a timely 

motion for new trial on October 2, 2018, which was amended by new counsel 

on July 31, 2019, and amended a second time by current counsel on March 24, 

2021. Following a hearing on June 28, 2021, the trial court denied the motion 

as amended on November 27, 2023. Tarver filed a timely notice of appeal, and 

the case was docketed to the April 2024 term of this Court. The Court heard 

oral argument on the case on April 18, 2024.
2

violence to support his claim of self-defense and (2) the trial court 

erred in excluding, on the grounds of hearsay, the video-recorded

interview of Tarver by police because the interview was not being 

admitted for the truth of the matter asserted and should have been 

admitted to show how cooperative Tarver was after the shooting. For 

the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

1. The evidence presented at trial showed2 that Alton Tucker 

owned a car wash business in Thomson in a former garage, and on 

August 27, 2016, Tarver went there to wash his car. Tucker had 

known Tarver and Tarver’s father, a police officer, for a long time 

and considered them to be like family. Tucker’s 13-year-old son, 

Shamar, was also at the car wash that day. Shamar and Tarver left 

the car wash together to go to a store and then to Tarver’s parents’ 

house. After they left, Demmons came to the car wash to collect 

money from Tucker for a set of tire rims Demmons was selling. 

2 Because this case involves an analysis of whether errors in excluding 

evidence were harmless, “we review the record de novo and weigh the evidence 

as we would expect reasonable jurors to have done instead of viewing it in the 

light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.” Jivens v. State, 317 Ga. 859, 863 (2) 

(896 SE2d 516) (2023). 
3

Tucker asked Demmons to wait because he was in the process of 

washing a car for a customer, Cedric Williams. Williams knew 

Demmons and asked if he wanted to walk to a nearby gas station to 

get something to drink while they were waiting, and Demmons 

agreed.

At some point, Tarver drove back by the car wash and saw

Demmons’s truck parked there. He then called Tucker and told him 

that Demmons was the man he “got into it with a few months back” 

and asked if he could come to the car wash to talk to Demmons “to 

get this over with.” At trial, Tarver, who testified in his own defense,

explained that a few months earlier, in May or early June 2016,

Tarver and Demmons had a confrontation at an apartment complex 

as they both sat in their vehicles with their windows open. Demmons 

yelled, so that everyone around could hear, that Tarver was “a 

police[, a n****r] and you just like your daddy.” Demmons accused 

Tarver of calling the police and getting Demmons “locked up” in 

connection with a prior incident. When Tarver told Demmons that 

he had no idea what Demmons was talking about, Demmons replied, 
4

“I tell you what, just don’t speak my name no more, just don’t talk 

my name no more, the next time you speak my name I’m coming to 

see about you.” Tarver testified that he had never had trouble with 

Demmons before, and he had no further contact with Demmons 

between that incident and August 27. However, based on 

Demmons’s statement, Tarver thought that Demmons wanted “to 

try to beat [him] up,” “to hurt [him],” or to “cause [him] harm.” 

Tarver further testified that he applied for a permit to carry a 

weapon on July 7, 2016, which he received on July 25, and that he 

purchased a “.45 1911A Rock Island firearm” at some point between 

his receipt of the permit and August 27. However, Tarver said that 

there was nothing about the words Demmons used in the prior 

incident that made him feel threatened enough to get his gun 

permit; rather, he obtained the gun for his own protection and not 

because of Demmons. 

When Tarver arrived back at the car wash with Shamar on 

August 27, Demmons and Williams had not yet returned from the 

gas station. Tucker asked Tarver if everything was going to be all 
5

right with Demmons, and Tarver responded, “yeah, I’m good.” 

Tucker asked this question because Tarver had shown Tucker his 

gun permit earlier in the day, and Tucker sought assurance from

Tarver that he was not carrying a weapon and was just intending to 

talk to Demmons. Tarver testified at trial that he only wanted “to 

make peace” with Demmons. However, he admitted that every time 

he went anywhere, he “always tote[d]” his gun on his side, and, even 

though Tarver usually carried his gun and ammunition separately, 

that day, he put the ammunition clip in his gun when he got to the 

car wash because he “knew [Demmons] was already there.”

Williams testified that as soon as he and Demmons got back to 

the car wash from the gas station, Tarver came up to Demmons, and 

when Tarver got close enough, “they went to arguing.” Tucker 

testified that he was washing Williams’s car when Williams and 

Demmons returned, and he did not pay much attention to what 

Tarver and Demmons were saying. Both men were standing in one 

of the two open garage bay doors within ten feet from where Tucker 

was working, and Tucker overheard Demmons tell Tarver “to find 
6

somebody to play with or I’ll give you something you don’t want.” 

Tucker told police at the time of the incident that he also heard 

Demmons tell Tarver, “Oh, I think I’m going to lay you out” and 

something to the effect of “get out of my face.” Williams testified that 

he was sitting in the other garage bay, about 15 feet away from

Tarver and Demmons. He heard Demmons say, “I know what you 

did” and “don’t make me whoop your a** out here with these shower 

shoes on,” after which Demmons turned and walked away. 

Both Williams and Tucker testified that Demmons was 

walking toward the back of the garage, and away from Tarver, when 

they heard the first gunshot. They then observed Tarver walk 

toward Demmons, who fell to the ground. After Demmons fell, 

Tarver, as he later admitted, pointed the gun down at him and kept 

shooting until he had emptied his clip of eight .45 caliber bullets. 

Demmons was unarmed, and the only gun Williams or Tucker saw 

that day was Tarver’s. No evidence was presented that any physical 

interaction occurred between Tarver and Demmons before the 

shooting began, and Tarver admitted that Demmons never punched, 
7

pushed, or even touched him. 

After the shooting, Tucker and Tarver walked out of the 

garage, and Tarver put his arm around Tucker, saying that it was 

not Tucker’s fault, that it was “something [Tarver] wanted to do.” 

«V3-80» Tucker testified that he called the police and that Tarver 

called his mother and told her, “Mama, I just killed me a MF.”

Tarver stayed at the scene and put his gun in the glove box of his 

car. 

When police and EMS arrived, Demmons, who was lying face 

down on the garage floor, was not breathing and had no pulse. 

Tarver had his hands in the air and kept them there until officers 

ordered him to the ground and handcuffed him. Tarver was 

cooperative with police, following their instructions and telling them 

that the gun he used to shoot Demmons could be found in his car. 

Police patted Tarver down and the officer who escorted Tarver to a 

waiting police car testified that Tarver repeatedly volunteered that 

he knew he was wrong for what he had done, and he should have 
8

walked away.3 The officer said that Tarver also voluntarily spoke to 

police at the police station, saying that Demmons had tried to fight 

him before and that Demmons was again trying to fight him that 

day, so Tarver “did what he had to do,” but he knew it was a mistake. 

During the autopsy, the medical examiner identified ten 

gunshot wounds on Tucker’s body, some of which were caused by the 

same bullet. Only one of the wounds was found on the front of 

Demmons’s body. The medical examiner described this wound as a 

“complex wound,” which she testified consisted of “an entrance, an 

exit, a reentrance, and a re-exit,” meaning that “the bullet went in, 

out, in, out.” The cause of death was attributed to multiple gunshot 

wounds. 

A GBI crime scene specialist testified that he found flattened 

bullets at the scene and in Demmons’s clothing, suggesting that they 

had passed through Demmons’s body and struck the concrete floor, 

3 Tarver testified that he told the officer. “I know I was wrong, but I have 

the right to defend myself. And I said: it wasn’t supposed to happen like that, 

I was just trying to talk to him.” He also testified that, at the jail, he just kept 

repeating, “I wish it would’ve never happened like that, I wish it would’ve 

never happened like that.” 
9

which supported that Demmons had been lying down when those 

shots were fired. He also found two bullets in the parking lot and the 

rest inside the garage. 

In addition, Tarver testified that although Demmons never 

physically touched him, Demmons “got very aggressive” when they 

talked that day at the car wash. Demmons called Tarver “a rat” and 

asked why Tarver was there after he had “already snitched on 

[Demmons] one time.” When Tarver denied these accusations, 

Demmons asked Tarver, “what you coming up here for, to try me or 

something, you know I’m chain gang bound.” Tarver said he took

that statement to mean that Demmons had intentions of hurting 

Tarver and that because Demmons had already been to prison, he 

did not care what the consequences would be if he were to hurt 

Tarver. Demmons also told Tarver that he did not need a pistol to 

fight him; Demmons said he “could beat [Tarver] with these slippers

on.” Tarver testified that he believed that Demmons knew Tarver

was “at a disadvantage” because Tarver was disabled from a work 

accident, which had severely injured his left knee so that he could 
10

not bend it and reduced the strength in both of his legs.

According to Tarver, after making these statements, 

Demmons balled up his fists and turned sideways into a “fight 

stance,” asking Tarver if he was “ready.” Tarver said that Demmons 

was walking toward him, so Tarver pulled out his gun to stop 

Demmons. Tarver testified that when he did that, Demmons said, 

“you got to use it,” which Tarver interpreted to mean that if he did 

not use the gun, Demmons would get the gun from Tarver and use 

it on him. Demmons outweighed Tarver by almost 100 pounds 

although they were about the same height, and Tarver testified that 

when Demmons turned sideways and “came at [him],” Tarver felt 

threatened and was “fighting for [his] life.” He then took two steps 

back and shot Demmons. Tarver said he shot Demmons eight times 

because he was taught in a firearm defense course not to quit 

shooting until he knew the person he was shooting was down. Tarver 

further testified that after the shooting, he called his mother to tell 
11

her he had shot someone and also called 911.4

However, Tarver admitted on cross-examination that after he 

confronted Demmons at the car wash, Demmons said he did not 

want to talk about the prior incident, and it was Tarver who insisted 

on carrying the conversation further. And when Tarver persisted, 

Demmons told Tarver to “get out of [his] face.” 

2. Tarver first asserts that because self-defense was an issue in 

the case and the jury was instructed on self-defense, the trial court 

erred in excluding evidence that Tarver knew Demmons had shot a 

man over a woman, had shot at a motel, and was known to carry a 

gun. Tarver sought to introduce this evidence to show Tarver’s state 

of mind at the time of the shooting and why he was in fear for his 

life.

“A trial court’s decision whether to admit or exclude evidence 

is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Brinkley, 

316 Ga. 689, 690 (889 SE2d 787) (2023) (citation and punctuation 

4 One of Tarver’s friends testified that Tarver called him right after the 

shooting, and the friend then called 911 to report the shooting. Seven character 

witnesses also testified on Tarver’s behalf, including his mother. 
12

omitted). But if the trial court abuses its discretion in excluding 

evidence, we will reverse a conviction for a trial court’s evidentiary 

error only if it was harmful. See Morrell v. State, 313 Ga. 247, 261 

(2) (c) (869 SE2d 447) (2022) (“It is fundamental that harm as well 

as error must be shown for reversal.”); OCGA § 24-1-103 (a) (“Error 

shall not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 

evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected.”). It is 

well-settled that the test “for determining nonconstitutional 

harmless error is whether it is highly probable that the error did not 

contribute to the verdict.” Jivens v. State, 317 Ga. 859, 863 (2) (896 

SE2d 516) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Truett 

v. State, 311 Ga. 313, 318 (2) (857 SE2d 690) (2021).

Before trial, the State filed a motion to prohibit the defense 

from referring to Demmons’s “reputation . . . for violence and/or

specific acts of violence by [him],” and the trial court held a hearing 

on the motion on the first day of trial. At the hearing, the State 

argued that any character evidence regarding Demmons in the form 

of specific bad acts equated to propensity evidence under OCGA §§
13

24-4-404 and 24-4-4055 and that to admit the evidence Tarver 

would be required to make a prima facie showing that he acted in 

self-defense by shooting Demmons, citing Oliver v. State, 329 Ga. 

App. 377, 381 (765 SE2d 706) (2014) (holding as “well established 

under Georgia law,” and still in effect under the current Evidence 

Code, that before evidence of a victim’s general reputation for 

violence or his specific acts of violence can be admitted, “the 

defendant must, among other procedural and substantive burdens, 

make a prima facie showing that the victim was the aggressor, that 

the victim assaulted the defendant, and that the defendant 

5 OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) provides: 

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible 

to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 

conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 

purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 

absence of mistake or accident.

OCGA § 24-4-405 provides in relevant part:

(a) In all proceedings in which evidence of character or a trait of 

character of a person is admissible, proof shall be made by 

testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an 

opinion.

(b) In proceedings in which character or a trait of character of a person 

is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense or when an accused 

testifies to his or her own character, proof may also be made of specific 

instances of that person’s conduct . . . . 
14

responded with force only to defend himself or herself”) (citation and 

punctuation omitted).6 In response, Tarver’s counsel indicated that 

he did not intend to present any evidence of specific offenses. Rather, 

he planned to present evidence as “to what my client knew, what my 

client knew of this person, and prior difficulties they had had 

together.” After some further discussion, the trial court noted the 

parties’ agreement to the admission of prior difficulties between 

Tarver and Demmons and granted the State’s motion in limine as to 

evidence of Demmons’s prior acts of violence involving third parties.

However, during trial, Tarver’s counsel argued that the State had 

opened the door to testimony about Demmons’s bad acts by eliciting 

from Tarver on cross-examination that Demmons had called Tarver 

a “snitch,” which counsel argued should permit Tarver to testify 

about the conduct about which Demmons thought Tarver had 

6 Some members of the Court are doubtful that this prima facie 

requirement was carried over to the current Evidence Code. However, we need 

not address this issue given that we assume error on this ground and conclude 

that any error was harmless.
15

snitched.7 After reviewing the record, the trial court found that the 

State had not “opened the door” to more specific evidence and denied 

the objection. 

In his motion for new trial, Tarver contested the trial court’s 

decision to exclude evidence of his knowledge of Demmons’s prior 

violent acts toward third parties. At the motion for new trial 

hearing, Tarver testified that on the day of the shooting, he was 

aware that Demmons “had just shot a motel up” and he “just shot a 

guy over a lady,” without further detail. Tarver said that those were 

recent events at the time of the shooting, and his awareness of these 

events influenced his actions. Tarver said it made him “feel like, you 

know, that he would have shot me, too, because he was known for 

toting a gun.” The trial court denied Tarver’s motion on this ground,

finding that the minimal probative value of the evidence was 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 

issues, and misleading the jury under OCGA § 24-4-403.

7 The record is unclear as to the particular acts as to which Tarver 

contended the State opened the door.
16

Even assuming, without deciding, that the trial court erred in 

excluding this evidence at trial and that Tarver preserved this error 

for ordinary appellate review, any such error was harmless. Tarver’s 

counsel was allowed to elicit extensive evidence as to why Tarver

felt threatened by Demmons on the day of the shooting. Tarver 

testified that in the incident several months prior to the shooting, 

Demmons accused Tarver of telling the police something that got 

Demmons “locked up” for a “prior situation.” Tarver said that from 

the language Demmons used in making those accusations, he 

believed that Demmons wanted to hurt him. Tarver further testified 

that on the day of the shooting, Demmons asked Tarver why he 

wanted to challenge him when Tarver knew that Demmons was 

“chain gang bound.” Tarver testified that he believed this statement 

meant that Demmons wanted to hurt him and that Demmons did 

not care about the consequences because he had already been to 

prison. Additionally, Demmons had a 100-pound weight advantage 

over Tarver, and Tarver said he believed that Demmons knew that 

Tarver’s injuries put him at a disadvantage after Demmons said 
17

that he did not need a gun to beat Tarver. Also, Tucker and Williams 

each testified to hearing Demmons threatening Tarver just before 

the shooting. Therefore, evidence that Tarver was aware that

Demmons had shot another man over a woman, “shot a motel up,”

and was known to carry a gun added little to Tarver’s testimony 

about his prior difficulties with Demmons and evidence of 

Demmons’s threats on the day of the shooting. See Cook v. State, 312 

Ga. 299, 302 (2) (862 SE2d 510) (2021) (any error in exclusion of 

three instances of violence by victim against third parties to show 

that defendant had reason to fear victim was harmless in light of 

other evidence at trial, including evidence showing victim’s prior 

threats and violence toward defendant); Byers v. State, 311 Ga. 259, 

263 (1) (857 SE2d 447) (2021) (concluding that exclusion of 

testimony was harmless where it was essentially cumulative of 

other evidence); Nix v. State, 280 Ga. 141, 144-45 (5) (625 SE2d 746)

(2006) (the trial court’s error, if any, in excluding hearsay testimony 

of defendant’s mother, was harmless where the excluded testimony 

was largely cumulative of other evidence introduced at trial). 
18

Moreover, Tarver’s claim of self-defense was weak since it

depended solely on Tarver’s self-serving testimony that Demmons 

came at him. In contrast, there was strong evidence undercutting 

his defense. After Tarver and Demmons had their initial verbal 

altercation earlier in the summer, Demmons did not further 

confront Tarver or take any threatening action against him. In fact, 

the two had no further contact until Tarver confronted Demmons on 

August 27, armed with a loaded weapon. Tarver testified that he 

loaded his gun at the car wash, though he usually kept his gun 

unloaded, because he knew Demmons was there. Moreover, Tarver 

acknowledged that when he confronted Demmons about the earlier 

incident, Demmons did not want to discuss the matter, but Tarver 

persisted, leading Demmons to tell him to “get out of [his] face.” 

Tarver also admitted that Demmons never punched, pushed, or even 

touched him that day. And two eyewitnesses testified that Demmons 

was walking away from Tarver at the time Tarver shot him. This 

testimony was supported by evidence that Demmons was found face 

down after the shooting with ten gunshot wounds and had only one 
19

wound to the front of his body, which expert testimony explained 

was a “complex wound” where the bullet could have gone in and out 

of the body. Additionally, Tarver continued shooting after Demmons 

was on the ground and no longer posed a threat. 

Because the excluded evidence was largely cumulative and the 

evidence supporting a claim of self-defense was weak, we conclude 

that it is highly probable that the exclusion of the proffered evidence 

did not contribute to the verdict, and any error was harmless. See

Henderson v. State, 310 Ga. 708, 714 (3) (854 SE2d 523) (2021) (trial 

court’s exclusion of defendant’s testimony about a victim's threat 

was harmless, in part because that testimony “added little if 

anything” to defendant’s other testimony about “more explicit 

threats” from the victim and because “evidence of [defendant’]s guilt 

was very strong”); Beck v. State, 310 Ga. 491, 497-99 (3) (852 SE2d 

535) (2020) (concluding that it was highly probable that any error 

by the trial court in ruling that the defense could not introduce 

victim’s prior acts of violence (except any involving the defendant)

did not contribute to the verdict and was therefore harmless in light 
20

of other evidence at trial); Rowland v. State, 306 Ga. 59, 67 (4) (829 

SE2d 81) (2019) (given strong evidence of defendant’s guilt and the 

marginal and cumulative value of the excluded evidence, it was 

highly probable that any error in its exclusion did not contribute to 

the verdict).

3. Tarver also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion 

in not allowing him to play his video-recorded interview with police 

because it was not hearsay as it was not being admitted for the truth 

of the matter asserted.8 Tarver asserts that he sought to admit the 

video “to show the jury his tone of voice, the degree of emotion 

shown, his forthrightness rather than deflections and evasions when 

talking about the shooting.” As with the prior enumeration, we 

review the trial court’s denial of Tarver’s request to play the video 

of his interview with police for an abuse of discretion, see Brinkley, 

8 To the extent that Tarver’s reply brief addresses the trial court’s ruling 

that the video-recorded interview was not admissible as a prior consistent 

statement, we do not consider such an argument because it was raised for the 

first time on appeal in a reply brief. See Supreme Court Rule 19 (3) (“Reply 

briefs may not be used to expand the enumeration of errors.”).
21

316 Ga. at 690, and if we conclude that there is error, we then 

consider whether any error was harmful under the standard for nonconstitutional errors.See Morrell, 313 Ga. at 261 (2) (c).

When Tarver announced his intention to testify, defense 

counsel indicated that he planned to play Tarver’s recorded 

interview with police. The State moved in limine to exclude the 

recording on the grounds that it contained hearsay since it was being 

offered for the truth of the matters asserted, was not being offered 

by a party opponent, and would constitute improper bolstering. In 

response, Tarver’s counsel argued that it was not improper hearsay 

because he wanted the jury to see that Tarver was being cooperative 

in the wake of the shooting and had nothing to hide then or at trial. 

After the trial court took a recess to give the defense an opportunity 

to research the issue, Tarver’s counsel also asked that the recording 

be admitted as a past recorded recollection, which is not excluded by 

the hearsay rule even when the declarant is available as a witness. 

The trial court denied Tarver’s request to admit the recording, 

finding it clear “that it would be self-serving and hearsay even under 
22

the new rules.” In its order denying the motion for new trial on this 

ground, the trial court reaffirmed its conclusion that the statements 

were self-serving hearsay. 

Even assuming, without deciding, that the trial court abused 

its discretion in excluding the video-recorded interview for the 

purpose for which it was offered, any such error was harmless in 

light of the other evidence presented at trial that showed that 

Tarver was cooperative with police after the shooting. One police 

officer described Tarver as “cooperative as can be” and said that he 

told the officers where to locate his gun; another officer described 

Tarver as “very cooperative”; and a third police officer testified that 

Tarver told police where to find the gun, spoke with police willingly, 

volunteered to give up his clothes for a search without a warrant, 

and was “cooperative.” Tucker also testified that Tarver did not try 

to run, but instead directed Tucker to call 911, called 911 himself, 

put the gun in his car, and waited for police. And Tarver also 

testified to the actions he took to cooperate with police. We conclude 

that evidence of Tarver’s cooperation from the video-recorded police 
23

interview would be largely cumulative of the other evidence 

presented at trial describing Tarver’s interactions and cooperation 

with police, and therefore it is highly probable that the exclusion of 

the video did not contribute to the verdict. Accordingly, any error by 

the trial court was harmless.9 See Byers, 311 Ga. at 263 (1); Nix, 

280 Ga. at 144-45 (5). 

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

9 Tarver also enumerates as error that, to the extent that either of his 

first two enumerations of error was not properly preserved for appeal, he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to properly preserve the

claim. Defense counsel acknowledged at oral argument that this was a 

“backup” claim in the event either of the other two issues were not preserved 

and that it appeared from the briefing that the parties agreed the issues were 

preserved. Because we have assumed that the first claim was preserved for 

ordinary appellate review and because the second claim was clearly preserved, 

we conclude that no claim for ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground 

can stand. Therefore, we need not address Tarver’s third enumeration. 

In addition, Tarver does not argue that the errors we have assumed and 

determined to be individually harmless nevertheless cumulatively resulted in 

harm. However, from our review of the record we discern no cumulative 

prejudice warranting reversal. See State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 17 (1) (838 SE2d 

808) (2020) (“[E]ven in the evidentiary context, a defendant who wishes to take 

advantage of the [cumulative error rule] should explain to the reviewing court 

just how he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of multiple errors.”).