[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-11639

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

STEVEN CLAYTON THOMASON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, 

as Trustee for Home Equity Mortgage Loan AssetBacked Trust Series INABA 2006-A, Home Equity

Mortgage Loan asset-Backed Certificates Series

INABS 2006-A8,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-11639

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cv-00292-WKW-KFP

____________________

Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Steven Thomason, proceeding pro se, appeals following the 

district court’s dismissal of his civil complaint alleging Deutsche 

Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche Bank) illegally foreclosed on his property, in violation of Alabama law. Thomason 

raises several issues on appeal, which we address in turn. After review, we affirm the district court.

I. BACKGROUND 

In 2005, Thomason’s wife borrowed money from a lender 

to purchase property located in Montgomery, Alabama (the Property). She executed two promissory notes (the Notes) at closing. 

As security for the Notes, she and Thomason executed two separate mortgages to the lender’s nominee. The Thomasons defaulted 

on the Notes, and Thomason’s wife died in October 2009. In February 2011, the lender’s nominee transferred and assigned the first 

mortgage to Deutsche Bank as Trustee. Deutsche Bank, in turn, 

notified Thomason it had accelerated the unpaid balance of the 

debt and intended to seek nonjudicial foreclosure of the Property. 

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21-11639 Opinion of the Court 3

Before the foreclosure was scheduled to take place, Thomason filed actions against Deutsche Bank and other defendants to 

stop the foreclosure or to obtain damages for wrongful foreclosure 

and other improprieties. Thomason filed Thomason v. OneWest 

Bank, FSB, et al., No. 2:12-cv-00604-MHT-WC (Thomason I), a pro 

se complaint in the Middle District of Alabama alleging various 

mortgage-based claims under federal law. The district court disposed of Thomason I in stages, and eventually granted summary 

judgment to the defendants. As he was litigating Thomason I, 

Thomason filed Thomason v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC et al.,

No. 2:19-cv-00256-ECM-SMD (Thomason II), a pro se complaint in 

the Circuit Court of Montgomery County that was removed to federal court, alleging several state law claims relating to the mortgage. The district court also dismissed this case with prejudice. 

In 2020, Thomason filed the instant action, a pro se complaint against Deutsche Bank in the Circuit Court of Montgomery 

County. After the bank removed the case to federal court, he filed 

a counseled amended complaint against Deutsche Bank seeking, 

inter alia, a permanent injunction against foreclosure of the Property, and a claim for “wantonness.” The district court dismissed 

Thomason’s complaint because, among other reasons, Thomason 

I and Thomason II meant res judicata barred his claims. 

 

 

 

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II. DISCUSSION 

A. Removal

Thomason asserts the district court lacked removal jurisdiction because the parties were not completely diverse because 

Deutsche Bank’s attorneys were from Alabama, and the $75,000 

threshold was unsatisfied. A defendant may remove any civil action 

brought in a state court to a federal district court that has original 

jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal courts 

have diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction when the parties are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds 

$75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). National banking associations are

deemed citizens of the States in which they are “respectively located.” 28 U.S.C. § 1348. A national bank is “respectively located” 

in the State in which its main office is located, as set forth in its 

articles of association. Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 

307 (2006). 

The district court had diversity jurisdiction over the action

and thus did not err in removing this case to federal court. See 

Holston Invs., Inc. B.V.I. v. LanLogistics Corp., 677 F.3d 1068, 1070 

(11th Cir. 2012) (stating whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction, including diversity jurisdiction, is a question of law that we

review de novo). First, Thomason was a citizen of Alabama, and 

Deutsche Bank was a national bank association with its main office 

in California; thus the parties were diverse. Deutsche Bank’s attorneys did not affect the citizenship of the parties because they were 

not parties to the action. Second, the amount in controversy based 

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on the value of the Property ($114,200), the amount due on the 

mortgage ($145,529), and Thomason’s listed expenses ($117,000) 

totaled more than $75,000. Accordingly, the district court had jurisdiction and we affirm in this respect. 

B. Res Judicata

Thomason contends res judicata did not apply because 

(1) no court had addressed Deutsche Bank’s 2018 attempted foreclosure of the Property, (2) the district court in Thomason II improperly denied his claim, and (3) the bank’s foreclosure was prohibited under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act because he 

transferred title to his daughter who was called to active military 

duty in 2018.

Res judicata bars a plaintiff from raising a claim that has been 

previously litigated where “(1) there is a final judgment on the merits; (2) the decision was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the parties, or those in privity with them, are identical in 

both suits; and (4) the same cause of action is involved in both 

cases.” Griswold v. Cnty. of Hillsborough, 598 F.3d 1289, 1292 

(11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted). “If a case arises out of 

the same nucleus of operative facts, or is based upon the same factual predicate, as a former action, the two cases are really the same 

claim or cause of action for purposes of res judicata.” Baloco v. 

Drummond Co., Inc., 767 F.3d 1229, 1247 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted and alterations adopted). “In addition, res judicata applies not only to the precise legal theory presented in the 

prior case, but to all legal theories and claims arising out of the 

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nucleus of operative fact” that could have been raised in the prior 

case. Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

The district court did not err in dismissing Thomason’s 

complaint due to res judicata. See Jang v. United Techs. Corp., 206 

F.3d 1147, 1149 (11th Cir. 2000) (reviewing dismissal based on res 

judicata de novo). Thomason did not challenge the first three elements of res judicata, and the record shows these elements were 

met. First, the district court had jurisdiction in Thomason I and II. 

28 U.S.C. § 1331 (providing district courts have jurisdiction over 

civil actions arising under the laws of the United States); 12 U.S.C. 

§ 1819(b)(2)(A), (B) (stating all civil suits involving the FDIC are 

deemed to arise under the laws of the United States and it can remove a case in which it is a party to federal court). Second, 

Deutsche Bank was a party in all three actions. Griswold, 598 F.3d 

at 1292. Third, there were final judgments on the merits in the

previous cases. Id. 

Fourth, the causes of action were functionally the same because they arose from the same factual nucleus—all involved the 

same mortgages and subsequent default. See Baloco, 767 F.3d at 

1247. Thomason used these events to first allege “illegal foreclosure” under federal law, then to allege apparent state law claims of 

“interference with inheritance” and illegal foreclosure, and, in this 

case, sought an injunction and to raise a claim for wanton foreclosure. Despite his contention he could not have previously litigated 

the June 28, 2018, foreclosure notice, he filed Thomason II one 

month later, and res judicata bars claims that could have been 

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21-11639 Opinion of the Court 7

brought earlier but were not. Id. Moreover, Thomason moved to 

amend his complaint to add claims challenging the June 28, 2018, 

foreclosure notice, but the district court denied that motion on 

grounds of futility and Thomason did not appeal that denial. 

His argument the Thomason II district court wrongly failed 

to consider some of his arguments is unavailing because res judicata prevents relitigation of wrongly decided issues. See B & B 

Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 157 (2015) (“Issue preclusion prevents relitigation of wrong decisions just as

much as right ones.” (quotation marks omitted and alterations 

adopted)). Finally, the district court did not err in declining to consider Thomason’s Servicemembers Civil Relief Act claim, because 

he could not amend his complaint via a response to Deutsche 

Bank’s motion to dismiss. See Rosenberg v. Gould, 554 F.3d 962,

967 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Where a request for leave to file an amended 

complaint simply is imbedded within an opposition memorandum, 

the issue has not been raised properly.” (quotation marks omitted)). Thus, we affirm in this respect.1

1 The district court also dismissed Thomason’s case under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because (1) he provided no legal or factual support 

for his “interference-with-property-rights theory, (2) there was no statute of 

limitation for foreclosing on a mortgage under Alabama law, and (3) there was 

no tort action for wanton mortgage servicing under Alabama law. Even if we 

were to assume, arguendo, that res judicata did not apply, we would affirm 

the district court’s conclusion that Thomason’s complaint failed to state a 

claim upon which relief could be granted. 

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C. Injunction

Thomason also asks us to issue an injunction to prevent 

Deutsche Bank from foreclosing on the Property.

Thomason’s initial brief, liberally construed, asks us to grant 

him an injunction to prevent Deutsche Bank from foreclosing on 

the Property while his appeal is pending, which is permissible under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 

U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed.” (quotation marks omitted)). However, the record, as supplemented,2 shows Thomason’s request for injunctive relief is now 

moot because the Property was sold in September 2021 following 

a foreclosure. See Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities v. State of Fla. 

Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1217 (11th Cir. 

2000) (“When events subsequent to the commencement of a lawsuit create a situation in which the court can no longer give the 

2 After Thomason submitted his initial brief, Deutsche Bank moved us for 

leave to supplement the record with a foreclosure deed, recorded October 1, 

2021, reflecting a sale of the Property, because it shows that Thomason’s request for injunctive relief enjoining the foreclosure sale of the Property is now 

moot. We GRANT Deutsche Bank’s motion to supplement the record with 

the foreclosure deed for the Property because it helps us determine whether 

we should dismiss a portion of Thomason’s appeal ⸺ relating to his request 

for injunctive relief ⸺ for lack of jurisdiction. See Vital Pharms., Inc. v. Alfieri, 

23 F.4th 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2022) (stating we have deemed supplementation 

of the record appropriate where supplemental material contains facts that illuminate a mootness issue).

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21-11639 Opinion of the Court 9

plaintiff meaningful relief, the case is moot and must be dismissed.”). As we can no longer prevent the foreclosure of the Property, we dismiss Thomason’s request for injunctive relief as moot.

III. CONCLUSON 

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Thomason’s 

amended complaint and dismiss his request for injunctive relief. 

AFFIRMED in part, DISMISSED in part. 

 

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