alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EX-10.1



 Exhibit 10.1 

SECOND AMENDMENT TO 
 TENNECO INC.
CHANGE IN CONTROL 
 SEVERANCE BENEFIT PLAN FOR KEY EXECUTIVE 

(As Amended and Restated Effective as of December 12, 2007) 

WHEREAS, Tenneco Inc. (the “Company”) maintains the Tenneco Inc. Change in Control Severance Benefit Plan for Key Executives (as
amended and restated effective as of December 12, 2007) (the “Plan”); 
 WHEREAS, pursuant to the terms of the Plan, the
Board of Directors of the Company has the authority to amend the Plan, subject to certain restrictions that are not currently applicable; and 

WHEREAS, it is now desirable to amend the Plan to modify the provisions relating to tax gross-up payments. 

NOW, THEREFORE, the Plan is hereby amended, effective as of April 27, 2015 in the following particulars: 

1. By adding the following as the last sentence of Section 5(A) of the Plan: 

“The foregoing provisions of this Section 5(A) shall not apply to any Key Executive who first becomes a member of Executive Group I
on or after January 1, 2014.” 
 2. By adding the following as the last sentence of Section 5(B) of the Plan: 

“The foregoing provisions of this Section 5(B) shall not apply to any Key Executive who first becomes a member of Executive Group II
or III on or after January 1, 2014.” 
 3. By redesignating Sections 5(C), (D), (E) and (F), respectively, of the Plan as
Sections 5(D), (E), (F) and (G) thereof, respectively; by changing all cross references in the Plan to Sections 5(C), (D) (E) and (F), respectively, to cross references to Sections 5(D), (E), (F) and (G) thereof,
respectively, to reflect the redesignation of the foregoing Sections; and by adding the following new Section 5(C) to the Plan: 
  

	 	“C.	If the Key Executive is a member of Executive Group I, II or III immediately prior to the Change in Control and became a member of any of the applicable Executive Groups on or after January 1, 2014 and if any
portion of the Payments shall be subject to the Excise Tax, then the Payments shall be reduced by the Company to the extent necessary so that no portion of the Payments to the Key Executive is subject to the Excise Tax if such reduction would result
in the Key Executive retaining an amount, determined after application of the Excise Tax on the Payments, that is greater than the amount the Key Executive would retain if the Payments were made without such reduction. In no event shall a Key
Executive described in this Section 5(C) be entitled to a Gross-Up Payment.” 








 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused the Plan to be amended as set forth herein by its
authorized officer. 
  

			
	TENNECO INC.
		
	By:		 /s/ Gregg A. Bolt

		
	Name:		 Gregg A. Bolt




  
 2
**Exhibit 31.1**

**CERTIFICATION**

I, Robert F.X. Sillerman, certify that:

(1)          Ihave reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of CKX, Inc.

(2)          Basedon my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement ofa material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements weremade, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterlyreport;

(3)          Basedon my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects thefinancial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant asof, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

(4)          Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a)          Designedsuch disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such controls and proceduresto be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material informationrelating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is madeknown to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this quarterly report is being prepared;

(b)         Evaluatedthe effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the effectiveness ofthe disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered bythis report based on such evaluation; and

(c)          Disclosedin this quarterly report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscalquarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materiallyaffect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

(5)          Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a)          Allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and

(b)         Anyfraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.

| Date: August 8, 2006        |   |   |
|----------------------------------|--------|--------|
| /s/ ROBERT F.X. SILLERMAN        |   |   |
| Robert F.X.  Sillerman           |   |   |
| *Chief  Executive Officer and*   |   |   |
| *Chairman  of the Board*         |   |   |
| *(Principal  Executive Officer)* |   |   |

 

39

----
#### Mamolen v. Mamolen

*313
      *Nathan W. Stuart,*for plaintiffs.

*Sidney A. Simon,*for defendants.

March 14, 1956

Williams, P. J.,

On' March *7r*1947, Claribel Mamolen executed a mortgage to Robert and Eleanor G. Mamolen, his wife, which mortgage was recorded in the office of the Recorder of Deeds of Lycoming County on March 24, 1947.

On March 7, 1947, the property covered by this mortgage was conveyed to Hyman S. Mamolen.

On June 1, 1950, an agreement was made to convey the property covered in the mortgage to Paul Sherman Eck and Kathryn Gertrude Eck, his wife, and in 1953, another agreement reconveyed the property to Hyman S. Mamolen and to defendant, Fannie Sandy Mamolen, Hyman’s wife.

Plaintiffs, Robert Mamolen and Eleanor G. Mamolen, have begun foreclosure proceedings. An answer to these proceedings, and including new matter, has been filed by defendant, Fannie Sandy Mamolen. Plaintiffs now move for judgment on the pleadings.

Defendant claims that there was fraud in the original mortgage transaction, that the mortgage was false; and fraudulent in its conception and was given without any consideration, that the mortgage was executed: and delivered in the furtherance of a conspiracy between the mortgagor and the mortgagees to defraud'. Hyman S. Mamolen, or in the alternative to defraud, the mortgagors of Hyman S. Mamolen.

Defendant proceeds further, however, in her allegations of new matter, and declares that the legal title' was originally held in the name of the mortgagor,, Claribel Mamolen, daughter of Hyman S. Mamolen,, under an understanding that the equitable ownership was in Hyman S. Mamolen. She alleges that the original purpose of having the legal title in Claribel Mamolen was to have the real estate free of any debts of the said Hyman S. Mamolen.

*314According to defendant’s own pleadings the entire transaction was fraudulent. She was not married to Hyman S. Mamolen at that time, but her husband, according to her allegations, was a leading party in the fraud. Inasmuch as she takes under him, she cannot now take advantage of any fraud. A fraudulent grantor or his privies cannot enforce a promise of conveyance: Eaves v. Snyder, 368 Pa. 459. Nor can they dispute an alleged fraudulent mortgage.

She pleads further, however, that she was not advised of the existence of the mortgage and that as a result she invested her personal funds in the properties.

The mortgage in question was recorded and the record of the mortgage was constructive notice to her equally as effective as actual notice: Appeal of Stephen, 87 Pa. 202; Beckman v. Altoona Trust Co., 332 Pa. 545.

*Order*

And now, March 14, 1956, judgment is entered for plaintiffs in the amount of $9,477.30, with interest from August 3, 1955.
NO. 12-10-00240-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

ROBERT F. CALDWELL, § APPEAL FROM THE 87TH

APPELLANT

V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

ASSISTANT WARDEN EDDIE BAKER,

ET AL,

APELLEES § ANDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM

This appeal is being dismissed because Appellant, Robert F. Caldwell, has failed to comply 

with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3. Pursuant to rule 32.1, 

Caldwell’s docketing statement was due to have been filed at the time the appeal was perfected, i.e., 

July 1, 2010. See TEX. R. APP. P. 32.1. On July 28, 2010, this court received Caldwell’s notice of 

appeal from the trial court, and notified Caldwell that he should file a docketing statement 

immediately if he had not already done so. 

Because Caldwell did not file the docketing statement as requested in our July 28, 2010, 

letter, this court issued a second notice on August 12, 2010, advising Caldwell that the docketing 

statement was past due. The notice further provided that unless the docketing statement was filed 

on or before August 23, 2010, the appeal would be presented for dismissal in accordance with 

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3. By letter filed on August 16, 2010, Caldwell responded 

that docketing statements are for attorneys and, without completing it, returned the form we had 

furnished him. Because Caldwell has failed, after notice, to comply with rule 32.1, the appeal is 

dismissed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(c).

Opinion delivered August 18, 2010.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.

(PUBLISH)
§ 42.37 Initial decision. ( a ) The ALJ shall issue an initial decision based only on the record, which shall contain findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the amount of any penalties and assessments imposed.
( b ) The findings of fact shall include a finding on each of the following issues: ( 1 ) Whether the claims or statements identified in the complaint, or any portions thereof, violate § 42.3 of this part;
( 2 ) If the person is liable for penalties or assessments, the appropriate amount of the penalties or assessments considering any mitigating or aggravating factors that the ALJ finds in the case, such as those described in § 42.31 of this part.
( c ) The ALJ shall promptly serve the initial decision on all parties within 90 days after the time for submission of post-hearing briefs and reply briefs (if permitted) has expired. The ALJ shall at the same time serve all parties with a statement describing the right of any defendant determined to be liable for a civil penalty or assessment to file a motion for reconsideration with the ALJ or a notice of appeal with the Secretary. If the ALJ fails to meet the deadline contained in this paragraph, the ALJ shall notify the parties of the reason for the delay and shall set a new deadline.
( d ) Unless the initial decision of the ALJ is timely appealed to the Secretary, or a motion for reconsideration of the initial decision is timely filed, the initial decision shall constitute the final decision of the Secretary and shall be final and binding on the parties 30 days after it is issued by the ALJ.
(a)  A
        review of Toyota Motor Credit Corporation’s activities and of its performance under the Sale and Servicing Agreement, dated as of February 8, 2021, as amended (the “Sale and Servicing Agreement”), among Toyota Auto Finance Receivables LLC, as
        seller, Toyota Motor Credit Corporation, as servicer (in such capacity, the “Servicer”) and sponsor, and Toyota Auto Receivables 2021-A Owner Trust, as issuer, during the year ended December 31, 2023 has been made under my supervision.
  (b)  To


        the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Sale and Servicing Agreement in all material respects throughout the aforementioned period.
    /s/ James Schofield
41755.

#### EDDY v. WEBB.

Jordan, Judge.

This was a suit to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff when he was struck by an automobile operated by the defendant Eddy as he was allegedly walking across Boulevard in an unmarked crosswalk at the intersection of Gartrell Street and Boulevard in Atlanta. A mistrial was declared upon the jury being unable to reach a verdict and the defendant filed a motion for a judgment in his favor notwithstanding the mistrial in accordance with his previous motion for a directed verdict. This motion was denied and the appeal is from that judgment. *Held:*

From the evidence on the trial of this case, a finding was authorized that the plaintiff pedestrian was negligent in attempting to cross Boulevard at the intersection of Gartrell Street in the presence of the defendant’s oncoming vehicle and that the defendant motorist was negligent in failing to observe and take precautions to avoid striking the plaintiff. Under such circumstances, “it was a question for the jury to determine whose negligence was responsible for the injury. . .” *Eubanks v. Mullis, 51*Ga. App. 728 (181 SE 604); *O’Dowd v. Newnham,*13 Ga. App. 220 (80 SE 36); *Claxton v. Hooks,*68 Ga. App. 383 (23 SE2d 101); *Jackson v. Crimer,*69 Ga. App. 18 (24 SE2d 603); *DeGolian v. Faulkner,*74 Ga. App. 866 (41 SE2d 661); *Garmon v. Cassell,*78 Ga. App. 730 (52 *393SE2d 631); *Blanton v. Doughty,*107 Ga. App. 91, 95 (129 SE2d 376).

Argued January 11, 1966

Decided February 8, 1966

Rehearing denied March 29, 1966

*Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, C. B. Rogers, W. L. Spearman,*for appellant.

*George B. Hooks, William I. Aynes,*for appellee.

The trial court did not err-in denying the defendant’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the mistrial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Bell, P. J., concurs. Eberhardt, J., concurs in the judgment only.*
§ 21.412 Finality of decisions. ( a ) *Facility of original jurisdiction.* The decision of a VA facility in a given veteran's case: ( 1 ) Will be final and binding upon all field stations of VA as to conclusions based on evidence on file at that time; and
( 2 ) Will not be subject to revision on the same factual basis except by duly constituted appellate authorities or except as provided in §§ 21.410 and 21.414. (Authority: 38 U.S.C. 512(a), 7103)
( b ) *Adjudicative determinations.* Current determinations of line of duty, character of discharge, relationship, and other pertinent elements affecting eligibility for training and rehabilitation services or payment of subsistence allowance under Chapter 31, made by an adjudicative activity by application of the same criteria and based on the same facts, are binding upon all other adjudicative activities in the absence of clear and unmistakable error.
(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 512(a))
[49 FR 40814, Oct. 18, 1984, as amended at 84 FR 193, Jan. 18, 2019]
#### M. v. N.

*Garber & Garber,*for plaintiff.

*Clinton R. Weidner,*for defendant.

October 13, 1956.

Shughart, P. J.,

In a report filed on August 6, 1956, the master appointed to take the testimony and make the recommendation in the above captioned case, recommended that a decree in divorce be granted to plaintiff from defendant on the dual grounds of indignities to the person and adultery, and that the court forbid the marriage of defendant with a named corespondent.

Rule 133 of the local rules of court provide that when a master files his report in the office of the prothonotary, he shall give “notice ... to the parties of that fact and of the nature of the decree recom*757mended by him” in the same manner as notice of the hearing is given.

In the instant case that meant that the notice had to be given to defendant by registered mail.

The notice given in this instance notified defendant merely that the report had been filed “recommending that the court enter a decree a. v. m. as prayed for in the complaint”.

We feel that the provision for notice of the nature of the decree recommended, where the decree is on ground of adultery, requires that the notice sent to defendant not only state that a decree in divorce a. v. m. is recommended, but also the fact that the decree will prohibit marriage of defendant with the named corespondent.

In the instant case, defendant did not appear at the hearing and service of the complaint was accepted by counsel who appeared of record, and while defendant had notice of the hearing sent her by registered mail, as well as notice of the filing of the report, there is nothing in the record to indicate that she had any knowledge that the divorce was on the ground of adultery.

Since, in addition to the termination of the marital vows, a decree on the ground of adultery contains the prohibition of marriage with the corespondent, we feel that all safeguards should be taken to see that defendant is aware of this fact.

For this reason, the matter is referred back to the master with directions to send a notice as indicated in the foregoing opinion, after which the report will be refiled as provided by the rules of court.

And now, October 13, 1956, at 8:30 a.m. (E. S. T.), the above matter is referred back to the master for further proceedings in conformity to the foregoing opinion.
###### Editorial Note on Part 1

#### Editorial Notes:

1. In Patent and Trademark Office publications and usage the part number is omitted from the numbers of §§ 1.1 to 1.352 and the numbers to the right of the decimal point correspond with the respective rule numbers.

2. For nomenclature changes to part 1, see 68 FR 14335, Mar. 25, 2003; 87 FR 68904, Nov. 17, 2022.

#### § 1.435 The description.

(a) The application must meet the requirements as to the content and form of the description set forth in PCT Rules 5, 9, 10, and 11 and sections 204 and 208 of the Administrative Instructions.

(b) In international applications designating the United States the description must contain upon filing an indication of the best mode contemplated by the inventor for carrying out the claimed invention.

[43 FR 20466, May 11, 1978, as amended at 63 FR 29618, June 1, 1998]

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 2 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 6 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 7 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 1 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 3 pertaining to both patents and trademarks is placed in the grouping pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 4 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 5 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.
§ 4.100 Application of the general rating formula for diseases of the heart. ( a ) Whether or not cardiac hypertrophy or dilatation (documented by electrocardiogram, echocardiogram, or X-ray) is present and whether or not there is a need for continuous medication must be ascertained in all cases.
( b ) Even if the requirement for a 10% (based on the need for continuous medication) or 30% (based on the presence of cardiac hypertrophy or dilatation) evaluation is met, METs testing is required in all cases except: ( 1 ) When there is a medical contraindication.
( 2 ) When a 100% evaluation can be assigned on another basis.
(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 1155)
[71 FR 52460, Sept. 6, 2006, as amended at 86 FR 54093, Sept. 30, 2021; 86 FR 67654, Nov. 29, 2021]
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPI RES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

ROBIN RAY MARCHETTI, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D14-62 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ___________________________________ )

Opinion filed July 25, 2014.

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Nancy Moate Ley, Judge.

PER CURIAM.

The order striking Robin Ray Marchetti's motion for jail credi t as untimely

is reversed, as the motion was timely filed. 1 See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.801(b) ("For

sentences imposed prior to July 1, 2013, a motion under this ru le may be filed on or

1 When the postconviction court entered its order in November 201 3, the rule had not yet been amended to extend the filing limit for de fendants whose sentences became final before July 1, 2013. See In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 13 2 So. 3d 734 (Fla. 2013); see also Calderon v. State, 39 Fla. L. Weekly D967 (Fla. 2d DCA May 9, 2014).- 2 - before July 1, 2014."). Therefore, we remand for reconsiderati on of the motion.

Reversed and remanded.

NORTHCUTT, KHOUZAM, and BLACK, JJ., Concur.
Exhibit 32

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Cogenco International, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended December 31, 2004 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
David W. Brenman, President, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted
pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.


Date: August 11, 2005                         /s/ David W. Brenman
                                              ----------------------------------
                                              David W. Brenman, President
                                              Principal Executive Officer,
                                              Principal Accounting Officer,
                                              Principal Financial Officer and
                                              Director







                                       15
40914.

#### WRIGLEY et al. v. NOTTINGHAM.

Decided November 9, 1965.

*Claude Hambrick,*for plaintiffs in error.

*Grant, Spears & Duckworth, William H. Duckworth, Jr.,*contra.

Per Curiam.

The judgment of this court in *Wrigley v. Nottingham,*111 Ga. App. 404 (141 SE2d 859), having been reversed by the Supreme Court of Georgia in *Nottingham v. Wrigley,*221 Ga. 386 (144 SE2d 749), the judgment of this court is vacated. The judgment of this court must be conformed to that of the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is

*Affirmed.*

*Bell, P. J., Jordan and Eberhardt, JJ., concur.*