OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS.

EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS. C O R P O R A T I O N

RAND publications are available at 

www.rand.org

This product is part of the RAND 

Corporation monograph series. RAND 

monographs present major research 

findings that address the challenges 

facing the public and private sectors. 

All RAND monographs undergo rigorous 

peer review to ensure high standards 

for research quality and objectivity.

MG-1100-UCESRC

$24.00

This monograph assesses China’s aerospace capabilities and the extent to 

which China’s participation in commercial aerospace markets and supply 

chains is contributing to the improvement of those capabilities. It examines 

China’s commercial aviation manufacturing capabilities, its commercial and 

military capabilities in space, Chinese government efforts to encourage 

foreign participation in the development of China’s aerospace industry, 

transfers of foreign aerospace technology to China, the extent to which 

U.S. and other foreign aerospace firms depend on supplies from China, and 

the implications of these issues for U.S. security interests. 

China’s aerospace industry has advanced at an impressive rate over the 

past decade, partly due to the increasing participation of its aerospace 

industry in the global commercial aerospace market and the supply chains 

of the world’s leading aerospace firms. China’s current ability to meet 

demand with indigenous aircraft is limited, however, and much of the 

demand will be filled by imported aircraft. China’s space capabilities have 

improved rapidly, on the other hand, and it has developed and deployed 

an increasingly wide range of satellites. China’s growing civilian aerospace 

capabilities are unquestionably contributing to the development of its 

military aerospace capabilities, but whether the United States could 

significantly improve its security through alterations of its policy toward 

civil aerospace cooperation with China without having a significant 

negative effect on its own economic interests is unclear.
Roger Cliff, Chad J. R. Ohlandt, David Yang

Sponsored by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission

NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION

Ready for Takeoff

China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

Disclaimer: 

This research report was prepared at the request of the 

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission to 

support its deliberations. Posting of the Report to the Commission's website 

is intended to promote greater public understanding of the issues 

addressed by the Commission in its ongoing assessment of U.S.-China 

economic relations and their implications for U.S. security, as mandated 

by Public Law 106-398 and Public Law 108-7. However, it does not 

necessarily imply an endorsement by the Commission or 

any individual Commissioner of the views or conclusions expressed 

in this commissioned research report. 
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve 

policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND’s 

publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients 

and sponsors.

R® is a registered trademark.

© Copyright 2011 RAND Corporation

Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as 

long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for 

commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a 

non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under 

copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please 

visit the RAND permissions page (http://www.rand.org/publications/

permissions.html).

Published 2011 by the RAND Corporation

1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138

1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050

4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665

RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/

To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact 

Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; 

Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: order@rand.org

Library of Congress Control Number: 2011922033

ISBN: 978-0-8330-5180-6

Cover photo: A Chinese-made ARJ21 commercial aircraft is parked at the 8th China 

International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition (Zhuhai Airshow) in Zhuhai, 

southern coast of Guangdong province, China, November 15, 2010. 

(AP Photo/Kin Cheung)

The research described in this report was sponsored by the U.S.-China 

Economic and Security Review Commission and was conducted within the 

International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National 

Security Research Division. 
iii

Preface

China’s aerospace industry has advanced at an impressive rate over the 

past decade. While some of this progress can be attributed to rapidly 

growing governmental support for China’s aerospace sector, China’s 

aerospace capabilities have also benefited from the increasing participation of its aerospace industry in the global commercial aerospace 

market and the supply chains of the world’s leading aerospace firms. 

This monograph assesses China’s aerospace capabilities and the extent 

to which China’s participation in commercial aerospace markets and 

supply chains is contributing to the improvement of those capabilities. 

Specific areas assessed include China’s commercial aviation manufacturing capabilities, its commercial and military capabilities in space, 

efforts of the Chinese government to encourage foreign participation 

in the development of the aerospace industry, transfers of foreign aerospace technology to China, the extent to which U.S. and other foreign aerospace firms are dependent on supplies from China, and the 

implications of all of these issues for U.S. security interests. The study 

should be of interest to business analysts, policymakers, lawmakers, 

and anyone who wishes to learn about China’s market for commercial 

aviation, the capabilities of China’s aerospace manufacturing industry, the role foreign aerospace firms are playing in the development of 

China’s aerospace capabilities, and security implications for the United 

States.

This research was sponsored by the U.S-China Economic and 

Security Review Commission, which was established by Congress in 

2000 to monitor and report on the economic and national security 
iv Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

dimensions of U.S. trade and economic ties with the People’s Republic 

of China. 

This research was conducted within the International Security 

and Defense Policy Center of the RAND Corporation’s National Security Research Division (NSRD). NSRD conducts research and analysis 

on defense and national security topics for the U.S. and allied defense, 

foreign policy, homeland security, and intelligence communities and 

foundations and other nongovernmental organizations that support 

defense and national security analysis.

For more information on the International Security and Defense 

Policy Center, see http://www.rand.org/nsrd/about/ISDP.html or contact the director (contact information is provided on the web page).
v

Contents

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii

Chapter One

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Structure of the Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Chapter Two

China’s Commercial Aircraft Market. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Current Conditions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Projections of China’s Future Commercial Passenger Aircraft Market. . . . . 12

Factors Other Than GDP Growth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Domestic Versus International Traffic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Chapter Three

China’s Current Commercial Aircraft Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Commercial Passenger Aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Domestic Designs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Foreign Designs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Helicopters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Fixed-Wing General Aviation Aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
vi Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

Chapter Four

The Role of Foreign Firms in the Development of China’s 

Commercial Aviation Manufacturing Industry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Chinese Government Policies Toward Foreign Aviation 

Manufacturing Companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Joint Ventures and Cooperative R&D Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

U.S. Companies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Non-U.S. Companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Extent to Which China-Based Production Supplies U.S. Aerospace 

Firms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

U.S. Companies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Non-U.S. Companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Other Sources of Western Aerospace Technology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Chapter Five

China’s Space Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Launch Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Communications Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Weather Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

Civilian Earth-Observation Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Military Imagery Reconnaissance Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

Position, Navigation, and Timing Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Other Satellites. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

Chapter Six

Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

The Rate at Which China’s Aerospace Sector Has Developed. . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

Future Developments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

Potential to Contribute to China’s Military Capabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

Implications for U.S. Security Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
vii

Figures

2.1. RPK Flown by Major Airlines of Brazil, 

China, Japan, Germany, and the United States in 2007. . . . . . . . . 6

2.2. RPK Distribution of Chinese Airlines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

2.3. Domestic RPK Flown by Major U.S., Japanese, German, 

and Chinese Airlines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

2.4. International RPK Flown by Major U.S., Japanese, German, 

and Chinese Airlines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

2.5. Total RPK Flown by Major U.S., Japanese, German, and 

Chinese Airlines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

2.6. Boeing’s Market Outlook for 2010–2029. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

2.7. Normalized RPK Flown by Major Carriers

in Each Country in 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

2.8. Projections of the Growth of the Chinese Commercial Fleet 

Based on Alternative RPK/GDP Ratios and Average GDP 

Growth Rates Compared with Boeing’s Projection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

2.9. Spatial Pattern of Domestic Air Passenger Flows in 2005 . . . . . . 16

2.10. High-Speed Rail Network in China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

2.11. Travel Time by PDL from Beijing to Selected Cities. . . . . . . . . . . 20

2.12. International and Domestic RPK for Five Nations 

in 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

4.1. U.S. Aerospace Imports, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

4.2. U.S. Aerospace Imports, 2005–2009. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

4.3. U.S. Aerospace Exports, 2005–2009. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

ix

Tables

4.1. International Partners in the ARJ21 Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

4.2. Major International Partners in the C919 Program . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

4.3. Current Boeing Work Packages and Procurement at 

Chinese-Owned Enterprises. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

4.4. Current Airbus Work Packages and Procurement at 

Chinese-Owned Enterprises. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

xi

Summary

China’s aerospace industry has advanced at an impressive rate over the 

past decade. While some of this progress can be attributed to rapidly 

growing governmental support for China’s aerospace sector, China’s 

aerospace capabilities have also benefited from the increasing participation of its aerospace industry in the global commercial aerospace 

market and the supply chains of the world’s leading aerospace firms. 

This monograph assesses China’s aerospace capabilities and the extent 

to which China’s participation in commercial aerospace markets and 

supply chains is contributing to the improvement of those capabilities. 

Specific areas assessed include China’s commercial aviation manufacturing capabilities, its commercial and military capabilities in space, 

efforts of the Chinese government to encourage foreign participation 

in the development of China’s aerospace industry, transfers of foreign 

aerospace technology to China, the extent to which U.S. and other 

foreign aerospace firms are dependent on supplies from China, and the 

implications of all of these issues for U.S. security interests.

Chinese airlines, which today operate about 1,400 large commercial aircraft and regional jets, are projected to purchase roughly 4,000 

new jetliners over the next 20 years. Actual purchases could be more 

or less than this projection, depending on whether China’s economy 

grows at the expected rate and on the availability of alternative forms 

of transportation such as high-speed rail. Chinese air freight companies will likely purchase another 100 to 200 cargo aircraft, but many 

of them may be converted aging passenger planes. In September 2009, 

there were about 200 civil helicopters in China, and approximately 
xii Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

1,200 additional civil helicopters are expected to be purchased by 2018. 

China’s general aviation market may be set for an explosion of growth. 

As of late 2009, the nation’s severely restrictive airspace management 

regime had limited the number of fixed-wing general aviation aircraft 

in China to about 800 (compared with 230,000 in the United States). 

Reforms are under way, however, and the number of fixed-wing general aviation aircraft in China is expected to increase by 30 percent per 

year over the next five to 10 years, resulting in more than 10,000 new 

aircraft by 2020.

Except possibly in the case of helicopters, China’s current ability to meet demand with indigenous aircraft is limited. Its indigenous 

regional jet, the ARJ21, will begin deliveries in 2011, but the regional 

jet market in China is small. China’s indigenous large commercial aircraft, the C919, will not begin deliveries until the middle of the decade, 

at the earliest, and it will be a narrow-body aircraft that competes only 

with the Boeing 737 series and Airbus A320 series. All wide-body aircraft will be imported at least through 2020. Although Chinese airlines will apparently be required to buy at least some C919s, their preference, and that of their customers, will continue to be for Boeing and 

Airbus aircraft with proven safety and reliability records. If the C919 

can establish a comparable safety and reliability record, however, and 

can offer improved comfort and fuel efficiency, it is possible that, over 

time, it will begin to take market share away from Boeing and Airbus 

(provided, of course, that Boeing and Airbus do not bring to market 

even better aircraft in the meantime).

Chinese manufacturers already produce light utility helicopters 

and medium transport helicopters, and a medium utility helicopter 

and possibly a heavy transport helicopter are in development. Given 

China’s limited civil helicopter market, its domestic manufacturing 

capabilities may be sufficient to satisfy demand, although specialized 

types of helicopters may be imported. If the fixed-wing general aviation 

market in China grows as rapidly as projected, much of the demand 

will be filled by imported aircraft, as the variety of domestic offerings 

is extremely limited.

The Chinese government has attempted to leverage airliner purchases in exchange for arrangements that it hopes will lead to tech-
Summary xiii

nology transfers into China’s aviation manufacturing industry. In the 

ARJ21 regional jet and C919 airliner projects in particular, a condition for foreign aerospace firms to be selected as suppliers has often 

been that a local production facility be established. Partly as a result 

of these policies, U.S. and other foreign aerospace manufacturers are 

engaged in numerous joint ventures and other technology transfers 

with China’s aviation industry. In many cases, however, foreign aerospace manufacturers have established joint ventures in China not to sell 

products there but to acquire access to China’s low-cost, high-quality 

labor for manufacturing products that are sold throughout the world. 

As of today, only about 1 percent of U.S. aerospace imports come from 

China.

China’s space capabilities have improved rapidly in the past decade 

and a half. China’s Long March series have arguably become the world’s 

most reliable medium space launch vehicles. China has also developed 

and deployed a series of weather satellites; electro-optical reconnaissance 

satellites; position, navigation, and timing (PNT) satellites; oceansurveillance satellites; synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites; highcapacity communications satellites; and possibly signals-intelligence or 

electronic-intelligence satellites. China has also become the third country to put humans in space. Over the next decade, China’s surveillance 

and reconnaissance, communications, and weather satellite capabilities 

will undoubtedly improve further, and by 2020, China will likely have 

a fully deployed satellite PNT system comparable to the U.S. Global 

Positioning System (GPS).

There is no question that China’s growing civilian aerospace 

capabilities are contributing to the development of its military aerospace capabilities. Many aerospace systems are inherently dual-use or 

can provide a basis for the development of military systems. Moreover, 

many of the skills and technologies required to produce commercial 

or dual-use aerospace products are also applicable to purely military 

systems. And given that China and the United States have conflicting interests in East Asia and elsewhere, China’s growing aerospace 

capabilities increase its ability and possibly its propensity to use force 

in ways that negatively affect U.S. interests and would increase the 

costs—human and material—of resisting such force.
xiv Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

Foreign involvement in China’s civil aerospace sector has unquestionably contributed to its development and thus to the development 

of China’s military capabilities. However, it is difficult to quantify the 

extent to which international cooperation in the civilian aerospace 

sector is driving improvements in those capabilities. This makes the 

implications for U.S. security policy unclear. A complete cutoff of 

international cooperation in the civilian aerospace sector is impractical, as many countries would refuse to go along with such an embargo. 

A U.S.-only ban would likely slow the development of China’s military aerospace capability by only a small amount while handing business opportunities to European and Asian companies and aggravating 

relations with Beijing. Moreover, conflict or confrontation with China 

is not inevitable. Thus, whether the United States could significantly 

improve its security through alterations of its policy toward civil aerospace cooperation with China without having a significant negative 

effect on its own economic interests is unclear.
xv

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank John Dotson and the U.S.-China 

Economic and Security Review Commission for their flexibility and 

patience during the preparation of this monograph. We would also like 

to thank Michael Lostumbo, Associate Director of the International 

Security and Defense Policy Program at RAND, for his support and 

understanding; Tony Starkey of RAND Europe for advice and suggestions based on a study of the British aerospace industry he conducted; 

Larry Hanauer of RAND and Tai Ming Cheung of the University of 

California, San Diego, for their thoughtful and incisive reviews; and 

Christin Strifler, Jocelyn Lofstrom, and Janet DeLand of RAND for 

their assistance in the preparation of the monograph. 

xvii

Abbreviations

ABEC Airbus (Beijing) Engineering Centre

ACAE AVIC Commercial Aircraft Engines Co.

ACP Aviation Cooperation Program

APU auxiliary power unit

AVIC Aviation Industry Corporation of China

BCF Boeing Converted Freighter

BSAS Boeing Shanghai Aviation Service Co., Ltd.

CAAC Civil Aviation Administration of China

CAFUC Civil Aviation Flight University of China

CARERI China Aeronautical Radio Electronics Research 

Institute

CAS Chinese Academy of Sciences

CASC China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation

CASIC China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation

CAST Chinese Academy of Space Technology

CBERS China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite

CCD charge-coupled device

CETCA China Electronics Technology Avionics Co., Ltd.

COHC CITIC Offshore Helicopter Company
xviii Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

COMAC Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China, Ltd.

CRIAA China Research Institute of Aero Accessories

CZ Chang Zheng

DFH Dongfanghong

DMSP Defense Meteorology Satellite Program

EASA European Aviation Safety Agency

ECS environmental control system

ESA European Space Agency

EU European Union

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FACC Fischer Advanced Composite Components

FACRI Flight Automatic Control Research Institute

FALC Final Assembly Line China

FSW Fanhui Shi Weixing

GAP Goodrich Asia-Pacific Ltd.

GDP gross domestic product

GE General Electric

GEO geostationary orbit

GNI gross national income

GPS Global Positioning System

GSO geosynchronous orbit

HAECO Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering Co.

HAESL Hong Kong Aero Engine Services Ltd.

HAIG Harbin Aircraft Industries Group

HEAI Harbin Embraer Aircraft Industry

HRC high-resolution camera
Abbreviations xix

HTAC Honeywell TAECO Aerospace

HTSL-China Honeywell Technology Solutions Lab–China

JET Joint Engineering Team

LAMC Landing-gear Advanced Manufacturing Co., Ltd.

LEO low earth orbit

LETRI Leihua Electronic Technology Research Institute

MBA Master of Business Administration

MEMS microelectronic mechanical systems

MEO medium earth orbit

MOU memorandum of understanding

MRO maintenance, repair, and overhaul

NEIAS Nanjing Engineering Institute of Aircraft Systems

PDL passenger designated lines

PLA People’s Liberation Army

PNT position, navigation, and timing

PPP purchasing power parity

RMB Renminbi (official Chinese currency)

RPK revenue passenger-kilometers

R&D research and development

SAC Shenyang Aircraft Corporation

SAEC South Aero Engine Corporation

SAMC Shanghai Aircraft Manufacturing Co., Ltd.

SAMRI Shanghai Aero Measurement-Controlling Research 

Institute

SAR synthetic aperture radar

SLHC Sichuan Lantian Helicopter Company
xx Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

SSAMC Sichuan Services Aero Engine Maintenance Company, 

Ltd.

STAero Singapore Technologies Aerospace, Ltd.

TAECO Taikoo Aircraft Engineering Co., Ltd.

TCAS traffic collision avoidance system

WFI wide field imager

XAC Xi’an Aircraft Corporation

XAIC Xi’an Aircraft International Corporation

XRA XR Aero-components, Ltd.
1

Chapter One

Introduction

China’s aerospace industry has advanced at an impressive rate over the 

past decade. While some of this progress can be attributed to rapidly 

growing governmental support for China’s aerospace sector, China’s 

aerospace capabilities have also benefited from the increasing participation of its aerospace industry in the global commercial aerospace 

market and the supply chains of the world’s leading aerospace firms. 

This monograph assesses China’s aerospace capabilities and the degree 

to which China’s participation in commercial aerospace markets and 

supply chains is contributing to the improvement of those capabilities. Most major aviation manufacturers—Boeing, Airbus, General 

Electric (GE), Rolls-Royce, and Pratt & Whitney—have joint ventures 

in China or source components from China. China has also received 

technical assistance from Western companies in the development of 

airliners, avionics, satellites, and other systems. Although joint ventures and assistance from Western companies are generally confined 

to purely civilian technologies, this assistance may nonetheless be contributing to the development of China’s military aerospace capabilities.

This monograph assesses the growth of China’s aerospace capabilities and the extent to which China’s participation in commercial 

aerospace markets and supply chains is contributing to that growth. 

Specific areas assessed include China’s commercial aviation manufacturing capabilities, its commercial and military capabilities in space, 

efforts of the Chinese government to encourage foreign participation 

in the development of China’s aerospace industry, transfers of foreign 

aerospace technology to China, the extent to which U.S. and other 
2 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

foreign aerospace firms are dependent on supplies from China, and the 

implications of all of these issues for U.S. security interests.

Methodology

The study reported here was fundamentally empirical and inductive. 

Its primary task was to collect and synthesize publicly available information on China’s aerospace capabilities and the involvement of foreign aerospace firms in China. Much of the information used came 

from Western and Chinese aerospace industry trade publications and 

from the websites of foreign and Chinese companies.

In assessing the significance of the capabilities and technologies 

that China is acquiring, the authors drew on their knowledge of the 

aerospace industry, technology issues, Chinese military capabilities, 

and U.S. security concerns in East Asia acquired through their academic training, previous work experience, and nearly 20 years of combined experience at RAND.

Structure of the Report

Chapter Two examines China’s commercial aircraft market. It assesses 

the size of the current passenger aircraft market, summarizes projections of its future growth, and analyzes factors that are likely to affect 

that growth, such as the availability of high-speed rail transport. It also 

describes the markets for cargo aircraft, helicopters, and fixed-wing 

general aviation in China.

Chapter Three describes China’s current commercial aircraft production capabilities, including those for commercial passenger aircraft, 

helicopters, and fixed-wing general aviation aircraft. Chapter Four 

analyzes the role of foreign firms in the development of China’s aviation manufacturing industry. It summarizes the policies of the Chinese 

government toward foreign companies, describes U.S. and other foreign joint ventures and cooperative research and development (R&D) 
Introduction 3

activities in China, and documents the extent to which China-based 

production supplies U.S. aerospace firms.

Chapter Five describes China’s commercial and military space 

capabilities. These include launch vehicles, communications satellites, 

weather satellites, civilian earth-observation satellites, military imagery 

reconnaissance satellites, and position, navigation, and timing (PNT) 

satellites. It also assesses the national security implications of China’s 

military space capabilities.

Finally, Chapter Six assesses the rate at which China’s aerospace 

sector has developed, considers aerospace capabilities that China will 

likely develop in the future, analyzes the potential for China’s civilian aerospace capabilities to contribute to the development of military 

aerospace capabilities, and assesses the implications for U.S. security 

interests.

5

Chapter Two

China’s Commercial Aircraft Market

China is already the world’s second-largest national air travel market, 

trailing only the United States. This market, moreover, is likely to grow 

rapidly over the next two decades—an estimated 4,000 new passenger aircraft are expected to be purchased by Chinese airlines over this 

period. This represents approximately one-eighth of the total world 

demand during the next 20 years. The markets for cargo aircraft, general aviation, and helicopters in China, although significantly smaller 

than that for passenger aircraft, are also expected to grow rapidly in 

the coming years.

Current Conditions

In 2007, China’s major airlines1 booked more than 230 billion revenue 

passenger-kilometers (RPK), or almost 31 billion tonne-kilometers, 

flown. Passenger-kilometers and tonne-kilometers are standard measures in the aviation industry, where the number of passengers flown or 

the total weight carried (including passengers) is multiplied by the distance traveled. For comparison, China’s RPK is about 20 percent that of 

U.S. airlines, more than the traffic carried by either German or Japanese 

1 These airlines include Air China, Changan Airlines, China Cargo Airlines, China Eastern, China Southern, China Xinhua, and Hainan Airlines. The three government-created 

majors—Air China, China Eastern, and China Southern—account for about 85 percent of 

the Chinese airline traffic. Hainan Airlines accounts for roughly another 10 percent. 
6 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

airlines and about 6.7 percent of all world traffic in 2007 (International 

Air Transport Association, 2008). See Figure 2.1. 

To support that level of air transport, Chinese airlines used a fleet 

of roughly 1,350 large commercial aircraft and 60 regional jets in 2010 

(World Aerospace Database). The large commercial aircraft fleet comprises 55 percent Boeing airplanes and 43 percent Airbus airplanes. 

Most of the remaining 2 percent are McDonnell Douglas aircraft produced before McDonnell Douglas’s merger with Boeing. The Chinese 

commercial fleet is approximately 20 percent the size of the North 

American–based large commercial aircraft fleet and just over 7 percent 

of the world fleet.

China’s commercial aviation market is dominated by the “big 

three”—Air China, China Eastern, and China Southern. These airlines 

were created by the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) in 

2000 and 2001 to rationalize the air transport market (Chung, 2003). 

They are all effectively controlled by the central government. Hainan 

Airlines is the largest private startup airline. Figure 2.2 shows the RPK 

distribution of all Chinese airlines.

Figure 2.1

RPK Flown by Major Airlines of Brazil, China, Japan, Germany, and the 

United States in 2007

SOURCE: International Air Transport Association, 2008.

RAND MG1100-2.1

1,200

800

600

400

200

0

1,400

1,000

Brazil China Japan Germany United States

Air transport passenger-kilometers

flown (billions)
China’s Commercial Aircraft Market 7

Figure 2.2

RPK Distribution of Chinese Airlines

SOURCE: International Air Transport Association, 2008.

RAND MG1100-2.2

Air China

China Eastern

Airlines 

China Southern

Airlines 

Hainan Airlines

Other

airlines

24%

34%

9%

4%

29%

Figures 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 compare international, domestic, and 

total RPK of major airlines in the United States, Japan, and Germany 

with that of the three largest Chinese airlines. In 2007, China’s “big 

three” were in the top 10 airlines worldwide in domestic RPK, but 

Figure 2.3

Domestic RPK Flown by Major U.S., Japanese, German, and Chinese Airlines

SOURCE: International Air Transport Association, 2008.

RAND MG1100-2.3

300

200

150

100

50

0

350

250

Domestic RPK flown (billions)

American

Airlines

Delta and 

Northwest

Airlines

United and

Continental

Airlines

All

Nippon

Airways

Japan

Airlines

Lufthansa Air

China

China

Eastern

Airlines

China

Southern

Airlines
8 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

Figure 2.4

International RPK Flown by Major U.S., Japanese, German, and Chinese 

Airlines

SOURCE: International Air Transport Association, 2008.

RAND MG1100-2.4

300

200

150

100

50

0

350

250

International RPK flown (billions)

American

Airlines

Delta and 

Northwest

Airlines

United and

Continental

Airlines

All

Nippon

Airways

Japan

Airlines

Lufthansa Air

China

China

Eastern

Airlines

China

Southern

Airlines

Figure 2.5

Total RPK Flown by Major U.S., Japanese, German, and Chinese Airlines

SOURCE: International Air Transport Association, 2008.

RAND MG1100-2.5

300

200

150

100

50

0

350

250

Total RPK flown (billions)

American

Airlines

Delta and 

Northwest

Airlines

United and

Continental

Airlines

All

Nippon

Airways

Japan

Airlines

Lufthansa Air

China

China

Eastern

Airlines

China

Southern

Airlines

not in the top 20 for international RPK. In total RPK, they held the 

13th, 18th, and 21st positions (International Air Transport Association, 2008). This suggests that they are major world airlines, but their 
China’s Commercial Aircraft Market 9

size is heavily dependent on the domestic market, which is protected 

from foreign competition, as most domestic air markets are. In the 

international market, their relatively smaller share of traffic suggests 

that they are not yet competitive with other international air carriers.

The dedicated air freight market, like the passenger market, has 

above-average growth rates in Asia. However, air cargo accounted for 

less than 6 percent of departures worldwide and less than 8 percent of 

kilometers flown in 2007, according to the International Air Transport Association (2008). Boeing projects a demand for 2,490 freighters 

worldwide over the next 20 years (Boeing, 2010, p. 10), but more than 

two-thirds of those will be converted from aging passenger planes. 

Similarly, Airbus estimates a demand for 3,439 freighters but expects 

that 75 percent of the demand will be met with converted passenger 

planes, leaving only 800 to 1,000 purpose-built freight aircraft. Airbus 

projects the Asia-Pacific freighter fleet to account for 37 percent of the 

global freighter fleet by 2028 (Airbus, 2009, p. 153). If 37 percent of 

1,000 air freighters built over the next 20 years are sold in Asia, this 

will not significantly affect the total number of large commercial aircraft expected to be sold in China during that period. The total will 

probably be around 4,000 (see below), even if all 370 newly built freight 

aircraft are purchased by China.

The development of the rail and highway systems within China is 

likely to have minimal impact on future air freight trends. Air freight 

is the most expensive method for moving cargo, and it is generally only 

used when transit time is an issue or the cargo has a high-monetaryvalue density, e.g., fresh flowers or computer chips. Improvements in 

China’s rail and highway system are unlikely to result in a significant 

proportion of the relatively small amount of domestic freight that currently travels by air being shifted to ground transportation. In any case, 

most of China’s air freight traffic is international, and improvements 

in China’s domestic road and rail system are unlikely to reduce travel 

times by a significant enough amount for cargos that can be delivered 

by air in a day or two to instead be sent by ship, rail, or truck.

China’s general aviation sector is still in a relatively early stage 

of development. According to CAAC sources, as of the end of 2009, 

there were only 997 registered fixed- and rotary-wing general aviation 
10 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

aircraft, including law-enforcement helicopters, in the country. In contrast, at least 230,000 general aviation aircraft were registered in the 

United States (Cheng, 2010). At present, China simply has not developed an adequate physical or regulatory infrastructure for general aviation. As of the end of 2008, it had only 71 airports for general aviation, 

apart from the 160 airports used for scheduled flights (compared with 

more than 18,000 general aviation airports in the United States), and 

the country also had a serious shortage of general aviation pilots (Li 

and Wang, 2009, p. 52). In particular, China’s severely restrictive airspace management regime is widely considered to be a bottleneck to 

the development of the general aviation market. Low-altitude airspace 

is restricted in most of China, and most general aviation flights must 

secure prior clearance, a process that typically takes at least several days 

(Xin, 2006). However, as of October 2010, reforms were under way to 

lift the restriction on low-altitude airspace (below 1,000 meters), starting with Guangdong and the three Manchurian provinces on a trial 

basis (Wang and Xin, 2010)

Although airspace management reforms have been slower and 

more limited than many Chinese analysts had wished (Wang and Xin, 

2010), the analysts are hopeful that the reforms will help propel the 

“takeoff” of Chinese general aviation. According to CAAC projections, 

by the end of the 12th Five Year Plan (2015), China is expected to 

require between 10,000 and 12,000 general aviation aircraft of various types. During the next five to 10 years, the number is expected 

to increase by an average of 30 percent annually, and the value of the 

general aviation market is expected to reach more than 1 trillion Renminbi (RMB) (Meng, 2010). It should be noted, however, that such 

projections are often based on perceived potential market demand 

alone. They do not account for serious supply-side bottlenecks such as 

the shortage of general aviation airports and qualified pilots.

A particularly attractive segment of the general aviation market 

may be business aviation. According to industry data, as of the end of 

2009, there were 50,000 business aircraft in the world, 18,000 of them 

in the United States alone. Even a developing country such as Brazil 
China’s Commercial Aircraft Market 11

boasted 2,000 business aircraft, whereas China had only 30 in commercial operation at that time. At present, China has an import tariff 

of 4 percent and a value-added tax of 17 percent on business aircraft, 

but these have done little to dampen the rapid expansion in business 

aviation in recent years: Deer Jet (a subsidiary of Hainan Airlines), 

by far the largest charter aircraft company in China, with 84 percent 

of the charter market, has seen its operational volume increase by 21 

percent in 2008 and 32 percent in 2009, with a projected 60-percent 

increase in 2010 (Shi, 2010, p. 69). According to 2009 projections by 

Bombardier, between 2009 and 2018 the Chinese market will require 

at least 300 business aircraft, while more-optimistic projections put the 

figure at as high as 1,000 or more (Shi, 2010, pp. 67–68). Since China 

does not appear to have an indigenous business-aircraft development 

program, all of these aircraft will presumably have to be imported. 

As of September 2009, China had a total of 208 civil helicopters 

(including those in police and emergency service), more than half of 

which were light helicopters weighing 4 tons or less (Zhao and Ma, 

2009, p. 64). There were only 12 civilian maritime search and rescue 

helicopters in the country and, as of July 2008, fewer than 30 police 

helicopters spread across 13 police departments (“China’s Police Helicopter Starts,” 2008, p. 45). As of 2009, there were roughly 0.16 civil 

helicopters per million residents, compared with 59.41 for Australia, 

41.33 for the United States, 4.28 for Brazil, and a global average of 4.8 

(Zhao and Ma, 2009, p. 64; Zhang, 2008, p. 37).2 Most of China’s 

civil helicopters are imported—in 2007, only five of the 138 helicopters 

registered to civil general aviation companies were domestically produced (Zhang, 2008, p. 37). 

Assuming an average annual gross domestic product (GDP) 

growth rate of 8 percent, Chinese aviation officials project that the 

Chinese civil market will have a total requirement of 1,440 helicopters by 2018, requiring approximately 1,250 new deliveries. If these 

projections are correct, the Chinese market will account for nearly 10 

percent of the 12,700 civil helicopters projected for delivery worldwide 

between 2010 and 2017 (Xia, 2009, p. 58).

2 The figures for Australia, the United States, Brazil, and the global average are for 2006.
12 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

Projections of China’s Future Commercial Passenger 

Aircraft Market

Air transit growth is generally characterized by continuous steady 

growth punctuated by an occasional major setback, such as occurred in 

2002 following the 9/11 terrorist attacks or in 2009 following the world 

financial meltdown. Historically, a country’s air transport volume has 

grown faster than its GDP. This results from increases in GDP per 

capita, which correlate with growth in disposable income and the time 

cost of business travelers relative to air travel costs.

Boeing’s Current Market Outlook 2010–2029 predicts world GDP 

growth at 3.2 percent and RPK growth at 5.3 percent over the next 

20 years. This implies 3.3 percent growth in the world airliner fleet 

over the same time period (the number of airliners does not increase as 

fast as RPK because the average size of airplane used is also projected 

to increase). According to Boeing’s calculations, that translates into a 

demand for 30,900 new airplanes over the next 20 years, with more 

than one-third of those in the Asia-Pacific region, nearly doubling the 

size of the world’s airplane fleet, from 18,890 in 2010 to 36,300 in 

2029 (Boeing, 2010). See Figure 2.6. 

Boeing defines the Asia-Pacific region as China, India, Japan, 

Australia, and all of Southeast Asia. The anticipated demand of 10,320 

airplanes includes regional jets, but they will account for only 5 percent 

of the total, according to Boeing.3 Boeing predicts that Asia-Pacific passenger traffic will grow from approximately 0.8 trillion RPK to 3.4 trillion RPK, with more than one-third of that growth coming from Chinese domestic traffic.4 Boeing appears to anticipate that Chinese airlines 

will purchase 38 percent of the 10,320 aircraft, or about 3,900 new 

aircraft, over the next 20 years for their domestic market. Boeing thus 

expects Chinese airline demand for airplanes to be at least 12 percent 

3 Embraer, on the other hand, estimates that Chinese airlines alone will take delivery of 

950 regional aircraft over the next 20 years (Francis, 2010c).

4 Boeing predicts that Asia-Pacific passenger traffic will grow from 0.6 trillion RPK to 2.1 

trillion RPK, not counting Chinese domestic traffic, implying that domestic Chinese traffic 

will grow from 0.2 trillion RPK to 1.3 trillion RPK (Boeing, 2010, p. 5).
China’s Commercial Aircraft Market 13

Figure 2.6

Boeing’s Market Outlook for 2010–2029

SOURCE: Boeing, 2010. Used with permission.

RAND MG1100-2.6

New airplane deliveries by region

Delivery units

2%

34%

23%

23%

8%

7%

3%

Asia Pacific

North America

Europe

Middle East

Latin America

CIS

Africa

Total

10,320

7,200

7,190

2,340

2,180

960

710

30,900

Region

New

airplanes

of world demand and perhaps more, given their share of international 

traffic (Boeing, 2010).

Because Boeing hopes to sell airplanes and thus is likely to be 

optimistic in its projections, it is prudent to calculate an independent 

estimate of the size of China’s future aircraft market. Figure 2.7 shows 

RPK flown in Brazil, China, Japan, Germany, and the United States as 

a proportion of GDP in U.S. dollars, gross national income (GNI) in 

purchasing power parity (PPP), and population.

As shown, China’s RPK per unit of GDP at official exchange rates 

is greater than those of Brazil, Japan, and Germany and over 80 percent 

of the U.S. ratio. When the PPP value of China’s GNI is used, however, 

the Chinese ratio is significantly below those of the United States and 

Germany and roughly equivalent to those of Japan and Brazil. Thus, 

China’s unusually high RPK/GDP ratio may be in part an artifact of 

an undervalued RMB. Nonetheless, the significant difference between 

the U.S. and Japanese ratios also suggests a range of possibilities for 

the development of Chinese air transportation. The difference between 

the U.S. and Japanese air markets and the direction in which China is 

likely to trend will be explored below.
14 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

Figure 2.7

Normalized RPK Flown by Major Carriers in Each Country in 2007

SOURCE: International Air Transport Association, 2008; World Bank Data Book, 

undated.

RAND MG1100-2.7

80

40

30

20

10

0

90

70

60

50

4

2

2

1

1

0

5

4

3

3

Brazil China Japan

Total carriers

Germany United States

Normalized passenger-kilometers flown

(thousands of RPK per million of GDP/GNI)

RPK per capita (thousands)

Per million GDP (U.S. $)

Per million GNI (PPP)

Per capita

China’s future GDP growth is a much-debated issue. Many 

believe that China cannot indefinitely sustain its double-digit GDP 

growth rates or even its 8 percent GDP growth rate targets. We used a 

range of GDP growth rates (4, 6, 8, and 10 percent) over the next 20 

years to bound our projections. Combining those four growth rates 

with three RPK/GDP trends (U.S.-like, current China, and Japan-like) 

produces 12 projections for the growth of the Chinese carrier fleet. 

They are plotted in Figure 2.8, along with a linear extrapolation of 

Boeing’s 2029 projection. We assume that China’s current fleet is relatively new and that very few current planes require replacement in the 

next 20 years.

Boeing’s projection is equivalent to the current RPK/GDP ratio 

with an average 7 percent annual GDP growth for the next 20 years, 

or following a U.S.-like RPK/GDP trend with 6 percent GDP growth. 

Given the effects of compounding, 10 percent growth rates for 20 years 

and the current RPK/GDP ratio would result in fleet growth of almost
China’s Commercial Aircraft Market 15

Figure 2.8

Projections of the Growth of the Chinese Commercial Fleet Based on 

Alternative RPK/GDP Ratios and Average GDP Growth Rates Compared 

with Boeing’s Projection

RAND MG1100-2.8

10,000 

8,000 

6,000 

4,000 

2,000 

2020 2025

Year

2010 2015 2030

0 

Airplanes

12,000 U.S.-like RPK/GDP trend

with 10% GDP growth

U.S.-like RPK/GDP trend

with 8% GDP growth

U.S.-like RPK/GDP trend

with 6% GDP growth

U.S.-like RPK/GDP trend

with 4% GDP growth

Current RPK/GDP trend

with 10% GDP growth

Current RPK/GDP trend

with 8% GDP growth

Current RPK/GDP trend

with 6% GDP growth

Current RPK/GDP trend

with 4% GDP growth

Japan-like RPK/GDP trend

with 10% GDP growth

Japan-like RPK/GDP trend

with 8% GDP growth

Japan-like RPK/GDP trend

with 6% GDP growth

Japan-like RPK/GDP trend

with 4% GDP growth

Boeing 2010–2029

projection

8,000 airplanes, more than double Boeing’s projection. However, an 

average growth rate of only 5 percent of GDP at the current RPK/GDP 

ratio or 8 percent GDP growth but trending toward the Japanese RPK/

GDP ratio would cut the 20-year projection to about 2,000 airplanes, 

half of Boeing’s projection.

Factors Other Than GDP Growth

Wang and Jin (2007) assess major routes in China, using CAAC 2005 

data. Between 1980 and 2005, the number of airports in China almost 

doubled, from 77 to 142. Annual passenger traffic grew from 3.4 million to 138.2 million passengers, or from 3.96 billion RPK to 204.5 

billion RPK. In 2002, 62 percent of China’s population was within 

100 km of an airport, and 75 percent of China’s GDP was generated 

within 100 km of an airport. In general, eastern China was better covered percentagewise than western China, while central China lagged 
16 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

behind both. The bulk of Chinese domestic routes are between 400 

and 2,000 km in length, with concentrations around 600 km and 

1,100 km, driven primarily by the concentration of air traffic in the 

Beijing-Shanghai-Guangzhou regional triangle. See Figure 2.9.

Jin et al. (2004) and Wang and Jin (2007) describe historical 

domestic flight patterns in China. The following key insights are found 

in both:

• The bulk of domestic passenger routes are in the range of 400 to 

2,000 km.

• 50 percent of the total domestic travel is in a triangle connecting the greater metropolitan regions of Beijing, Shanghai, and 

Guangzhou.

Figure 2.9

Spatial Pattern of Domestic Air Passenger Flows in 2005 

NOTE: Each line represents a route with at least 100,000 passenger trips.

SOURCE: Wang and Jin, 2007. Used with permission.

RAND MG1100-2.9

Air passenger volume

Air passenger flow

5,000,000

2,500,000

100,677

50,000,000

25,000,000

12,500,000

0 200 400 600 km
China’s Commercial Aircraft Market 17

The concentration of relatively shorter routes (400 to 2,000 km) 

would normally suggest greater demand for regional jets, which typically have shorter ranges. However, on a per-seat basis, regional jets 

are more expensive to operate than larger airliners. If there is sufficient passenger traffic to fill the seats, large commercial aircraft are 

more cost-effective. That fact, combined with the extreme concentration of passenger traffic in three metropolitan regions and the limited 

numbers of gates and departure/landing slots, drives the calculus back 

toward fewer larger airplanes. It might be thought that the Chinese 

government’s focus on infrastructure projects and its ability to overrule 

red tape means that many new airports will be built, expanding the 

number of available landing slots. However, bureaucratic factors continue to complicate the expansion of airport infrastructure in China 

(Perrett, 2010a).

Another important issue is competition from rail and automotive 

transport. Traditional rail transport (less than 100 mph), in contrast to 

high-speed rail, is more cost-effective than air or automotive transport. 

India’s extensive rail system helps explain why 98 percent of India’s 

population has never flown (“Flight to Value,” 2009). As the standard 

of living rises, however, the time cost of travel starts to outweigh the 

economic-cost advantage. This does not necessarily make rail uncompetitive with air travel, but it requires investments in high-speed rail, 

which in turn requires higher population densities for economic viability. For example, in Japan, high-speed rail competes directly with air 

travel, but in the United States, where the population is much less concentrated, high-speed rail is cost-effective only in certain areas (e.g., the 

Boston-New York City-Washington corridor). Given that China’s population is highly concentrated and its governance structure is inclined 

toward funding major infrastructure projects, the development of 

high-speed rail that is competitive with domestic air travel, at least on 

shorter routes, seems likely (Perret, 2010a).

In fact, high-speed-rail plans in China are quite extensive. According to the Chinese government’s Medium- to Long-Term Railroad Network Development Plan (2008), China will construct approximately 
18 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

16,000 km2 of high-speed passenger designated lines (PDL) by 2020, 

with a targeted average speed of over 200 km/hr. These will include the 

eight PDL trunk lines in the so-called “four vertical, four horizontal 

(四纵四横)” national grid, in addition to shorter intercity commuter 

lines to be built in a number of major population centers.

The 4×4 national grid will consist of four north-south corridors 

and four east-west corridors. The north-south corridors will comprise the 

Beijing-Shanghai PDL, the Beijing-Wuhan-Guangzhou-ShenzhenHong Kong PDL, the Beijing-Shenyang-Harbin PDL, and the 

Hangzhou-Ningbo-Fuzhou-Shenzhen PDL (the Coastal PDL). The 

four east-west corridors will comprise the Xuzhou-ZhengzhouLanzhou PDL, the Shanghai-Nanchang-Changsha-Kunming PDL, 

the Qingdao-Shijiazhuang-Taiyuan PDL, and the Shanghai-NanjingWuhan-Chongqing-Chengdu PDL. These lines will total roughly 

13,000 km, with nearly 3,500 km already completed by mid-2010 (see 

Figure 2.10).

In addition, China plans to build approximately 3,800 km of 

high-speed intercity rail lines in about a dozen metropolitan areas, to 

add to the 500 km already in existence by mid-2010. These shorter 

commuter lines will average about 200 km each, with a design speed of 

around 250 km/hr. These lines can presumably offer residents of major 

metropolitan centers more options for airport access.

During the same period, the basic framework for the rail net in 

western China will also be completed, with the addition of 40,000 km 

of tracks. It is said that some of these new lines will be built to accommodate speeds of 200 to 250 km/hr for both passengers and freight. 

These are also considered high-speed rails, although they are not part 

of the primary PDL grid. 

If all of these projects are completed as planned, by 2020, China 

will have more than 18,000 km of high-speed rail lines with speeds 

of 200 km/hr or more, accounting for more than 50 percent of the 

global total. With the exception of several major cities in the West (e.g., 

Urumqi, Lhasa), all provincial capitals will be reachable from Beijing 

by rail in less than 8 hours (“High-Speed Rail”) (see Figure 2.11).
China’s Commercial Aircraft Market 19

Figure 2.10

High-Speed Rail Network in China

SOURCE: Ministry of Railways (China), Medium- to Long-Term Rail Net Planning

Map—2008 Revision.

RAND MG1100-2.10

Ürümqi

Hami

Jiayuguan

Xining

Lanzhou Zhengzhou Xuzhou

Bengbu

Shijiazhuang Tianjin

Beijing Dandong

Dalian

Quingdao

Nanjing

Hefei

Changchun

Qinhuangdao

Harbin

Shenyang

Taiyuan Jinan

Baoji Xi’an

Changsha Nanchang

Hong Kong

Yichang

Guilin

Guangzhou Shenzhen

Fuzhou

Wuhan

Huangshan

Ningbo Hangzhou

Shanghai

Wenzhou

Xiamen

Guiyang

Suining

Chongqing

Chengdu Lichuan

Kunming

Passenger dedicated line (PDL)

network in People’s Republic of China

Four north–south lines:

 Jingha PDL: Beijing–Harbin

 Jingha PDL: Beijing–Shanghai

 Jinggang PDL: Beijing–Hong Kong

 Southeast Coastal PDL: Shanghai–Shenzhen

Four east–west lines:

 Qingtai PDL: Qingdao–Taiyuan

 Xulan PDL: Xuzhou–Lanzhou

 Huhanrong PDL: Shanghai–Chengdu

 Hukun PDL: Shanghai–Kunming

Other major HSR lines not part of the PDL grid:

 Lanxin HSR: Lanzhour–Urumqi

 Rongguang HSR: Chengdu–Guangzhou

 Hefu HSR: Hefei–Fuzhou

 Taiyuan–Xi’an–Chengdu HSR

High-speed rail is widely expected to pose a serious challenge to 

the airline industry, at least for travel between China’s major coastal 

urban centers. As one analyst observes, the typical air travel time 

between Shanghai and Beijing, under normal weather conditions, is 

around 5 hours. This includes travel time to and from the airport, the 

time spent going through security checkpoints, boarding time, etc. On 

existing conventional trains, the trip would take 15 to 16 hours, but 

by express high-speed trains, it would take only 5 to 6 hours, roughly
20 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

Figure 2.11

Travel Time by PDL from Beijing to Selected Cities

SOURCE: China Central Television, undated.

RAND MG1100-2.11

equivalent to the typical air travel time (Zhao, 1999). Likewise, travel 

time on the newly completed Wuhan-Guangzhou PDL is just under 

3 hours, compared with a flight time of 1.5 hours for the 1,000-km 

trip. 

While high-speed rail travel may offer some advantages in convenience and comfort, it is unlikely to offer any cost savings for the average Chinese traveler. A coach-class ticket between Wuhan and Guangzhou on the new high-speed train, for example, cost RMB490 (about 

$72) as of August 2010 (“Ministry of Railways: High-Speed Train 

Fares Are Consistent with Market Conditions,” 2010).5 By compari5 Chinese railroad officials insist that these prices reflect actual market conditions and that 

traditional train fares were inexpensive only because they were heavily subsidized. See “Ministry of Railways: High-Speed Train Fares Are Consistent with Market Conditions,” 2010.
China’s Commercial Aircraft Market 21

son, economy-class air fares between Wuhan and Guangzhou range 

from RMB370 for late-night flights to RMB470 for the early evening 

hours.6 The expensive fares of the new trains have undoubtedly discouraged many travelers—recent media investigations discovered some 

trains running with only a single passenger in a car (“Ministry of Railways Responds: How 120% Occupancy Rates Are Calculated,” 2010). 

However, much of the cost of rail transit, including trains and tracks, 

consists of sunk costs. Fares on lines that fail to attract significant passenger traffic will probably be reduced to increase traffic and recoup 

some of the sunk costs. In contrast, almost 90 percent of air travel costs 

are variable, and even the 10 percent fixed cost for airplane ownership 

is not fully sunk, because airplanes can always be sold (Belobaba et al., 

2009, p. 115).

The ultimate impact of rail and expanding automotive transit systems on air traffic patterns is more complicated than simple competition between rail and air. Major hub airports located on a high-speed 

rail line might see shorter regional flights decrease as passengers use the 

rail line rather than the connecting regional jets to reach their ultimate 

destinations. On the other hand, airports not served by the high-speed 

rail will likely see additional growth in passenger traffic as local percapita earnings rise. 

Domestic Versus International Traffic

Another important dimension of the air transport market is domestic 

versus international traffic. Nations have complete regulatory power 

over domestic air traffic. Historically, domestic routes are flown only by 

domestic airlines, generally referred to as the Eighth and Ninth Freedoms under the Chicago Convention (Belobaba et al., 2009, p. 22). 

Even the Open Skies Agreement between the United States and the 

European Union (EU) applies only to international flights (Kanter and 

Clark, 2010). International route regulation is typically based on bilateral agreements and is structured with roughly equal landing rights, 

i.e., landing slots or airport access. As such, a country’s international 

traffic is divided roughly evenly between domestic and foreign airlines.

6 Fare information obtained via the Chinese travel reservation site 17u.cn.
22 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

As is the case with all nations, growth in Chinese domestic traffic will be completely absorbed by Chinese airlines, but international 

traffic growth will be split with foreign airlines. Figure 2.12 shows the 

distribution of international and domestic passenger traffic for Brazil, 

China, Japan, Germany, and the United States.

Very different patterns are evident in the figure. Germany’s airlines serve international travel almost exclusively; presumably, most 

domestic travel in Germany is by rail or automobile. Japanese airlines 

provide roughly equal international and domestic service, which makes 

sense, as their island chain stretches more than twice the length of 

Germany. The United States, being a much larger geographic area, 

has longer routes and a much lower population density. Although it 

has a well-developed highway system, it has minimal rail service and 

essentially no high-speed rail. Thus, U.S. airlines fly two-thirds of their 

miles on domestic routes and one-third on international routes.

China’s airlines deliver three-fourths of their service on domestic 

routes. China is a large geographic area similar in size to the United

Figure 2.12

International and Domestic RPK for Five Nations in 2007 

SOURCE: International Air Transport Association, 2008.

RAND MG1100-2.12

60

40

30

20

10

0

70

50

Passenger-kilometers flown per

million of GDP (thousands)

Brazil China Japan Germany United States

International

Domestic
China’s Commercial Aircraft Market 23

States, but its population density is both higher and much more concentrated, with more than 90 percent of the population living in the 

eastern half of the country. However, alternative transportation methods, rails and roads, are not as developed as those in Japan, Germany, 

or the United States, leaving Chinese citizens more dependent on air 

transport.

China’s continuing development of rails and roads is likely to 

increase their competitiveness with air transport, which will limit the 

growth of domestic air transport. On the other hand, given China’s 

vast expanses, rail travel is unlikely to replace air travel to the same 

extent that it has in Japan, and increasing per-capita income will likely 

result in more Chinese citizens traveling both domestically and abroad 

(especially if the Renminbi is allowed to strengthen). Thus, the net 

effect is that, in PPP terms, China’s RPK/GNI ratio will likely increase 

to a level somewhere between those of the United States and Japan; 

and over the next two decades, China’s air transportation market may 

continue to grow at a rate somewhat faster than the economy in PPP 

terms,7 but projections extrapolated from U.S. figures are likely to 

be overstated. In short, Boeing’s projection appears reasonable, if we 

assume an average Chinese real growth rate of 7 to 8 percent over the 

next two decades.

7 Although GDP growth is typically measured in nominal terms, the uncertainty surrounding China’s future exchange-rate policy makes projections in nominal terms inadvisable.

25

Chapter Three

China’s Current Commercial Aircraft Production

Essentially all aircraft manufactured in China, as well as major components such as engines and propellers, are produced by the Aviation 

Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) and Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China, Ltd. (COMAC) and their subsidiaries. AVIC was 

created in 1993 from portions of the former Ministry of Aerospace 

Industry (Medeiros et al., 2005, p. 157). In 1999, AVIC was split into 

two corporations, AVIC I and AVIC II, but, in 2008, they were recombined and COMAC was spun off as an independent corporation (Perrett, 2009, p. 313).

This chapter describes the current output of China’s commercial 

aircraft industry, as well as aircraft that are in development. It does not 

attempt to analyze the organizations, inputs, or processes involved in 

China’s production of commercial aircraft.

Commercial Passenger Aircraft

China currently produces two domestically designed commercial passenger aircraft: the MA60-series turboprop and the ARJ21 regional 

jet, which has not yet entered into service. China also performs final 

assembly on Airbus A320-series narrow-body airliners and produces 

the Embraer ERJ-145 regional jet under license.

Domestic Designs

MA60

The MA60 is a 60-seat turboprop airliner manufactured by the Xi’an 

Aircraft Corporation (XAC), an AVIC subsidiary. It traces its lineage 
26 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

back to the Soviet Antonov An-24 airliner. The An-24, a 52-seat turboprop plane, entered into service with the Soviet airline Aeroflot in 

1963. China subsequently purchased 40 of these aircraft and reverseengineered them, with production beginning in 1982 under the designator Yun-7 (Y-7). The MA60 is simply an updated version of the 

Y-7, the previous version of which since 2001 has not met the CAAC’s 

airworthiness requirements. The first prototype MA60 flew in March 

2000, and the aircraft was certified for production in December 

of that year. An upgrade of the Antonov-built aircraft, called the 

An-24RV-100, was unveiled in 2001, but the MA60 does not appear 

to be based on this upgrade. According to Chinese official statements, 

52 MA60 aircraft had been produced by September 2008, and as of 

March 2010, more than 150 orders had supposedly been placed, 50 

from foreign airlines and more than 100 from domestic airlines. However, as of the end of 2009, only four examples appeared to be in service 

domestically. The first 11 production versions, moreover, had apparently been withdrawn from service by 2006 due to “reliability problems and two runway overruns.” Production on an upgraded version 

(the MA60-100, sometimes called the MA600) began in 2008. XAC 

is said to have a production capacity of 12 to 15 of these aircraft a year 

(“XAC MA60”; “Antonov An-24”; “Xian (Antonov) Y-7”; “China Airlines Directory 2010,” 2010).

ARJ21

The ARJ21 is a 90-seat regional jet that has been in testing since 

November 2008. The manufacturer, COMAC, partnered with Bombardier and based the design on the McDonnell Douglas MD-90, a 

few of which were co-produced in China in the 1990s. All the major 

subsystems are sourced to North American companies, including GE, 

Rockwell Collins, and Honeywell. The wings, the remaining most 

technically challenging aspect of an airplane, were designed by the 

Antonov Aeronautical Scientific/Technical Complex of Ukraine.

As of October 2010, the ARJ21 reportedly had 257 orders, with 

the first deliveries to Chengdu Airlines expected in late 2011. Virtually all of these orders are from small domestic Chinese airlines—

Chengdu Airlines, Henan Airlines, Xiamen Airlines, Joy Air, and 
China’s Current Commercial Aircraft Production 27

Shanghai Airlines—and COMAC is actually the majority shareholder 

in Chengdu Airlines. There are questions, moreover, about how firm 

these “orders” are, as apparently some of them are actually letters of 

intent, and buyers reportedly face little or no penalty for cancellation. 

The Laotian national carrier, Laos Airlines, has ordered two ARJ21s, 

and the privately owned Indonesian mining company Merkukh Enterprises has reportedly signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) 

to purchase nine. Over the next 20 years, COMAC hopes to build 

850 ARJ21s, with production rates starting at 11 per year in 2010 

and growing to 30 per year by 2015 (Burchell, 2010; Francis, 2010a; 

Shirouzu, 2010; Yeo, 2010; Francis, 2010c).

C919

The COMAC 919 will be a single-aisle 130- to 170-seat narrow-body 

aircraft intended to compete with the Boeing 737 and Airbus A320. 

The project was launched in 2009 with the goal of initial production 

in 2014 and sales by 2020 (Butterworth-Hayes, 2010, p. 27). Orders 

from China’s “big three” airlines will be fewer than the several hundred 

units COMAC had initially hoped for. At the 2010 Airshow China in 

Zhuhai, COMAC announced that 100 C919s had been ordered, but 

this number was reached only by including nonbinding options. The 

“big three” each committed only to purchasing five C919s. Hainan 

Airlines ordered another 20, General Electric Commercial Aviation 

Services ordered 10, and the leasing subsidiary of China Development 

Bank ordered another 10. General Electric is one of the partners in 

CFM International, which will produce the engines for the C919, and 

China Development Bank is COMAC’s financier. China’s airlines have 

apparently argued that they should not take on more exposure to a program they regard as risky. Ultimate production goals for the C919 are 

150 aircraft per year, to meet one-third of China’s domestic demand 

and 10 percent of the international market. The program is reportedly 

heavily state-supported, and Chinese engineers are said be getting paid 

twice the going rate to work on it (Perrett, 2010b, p. 49; Perrett, 2010c, 

p. 20).
28 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

Foreign Designs

A320

In September 2008, Airbus Final Assembly Line China (FALC), a joint 

venture between Airbus and a Chinese consortium of the Tianjin Free 

Trade Zone and AVIC to perform final assembly of Airbus A320-series 

aircraft, opened in Tianjin. It delivered its first A320 in June 2009 and 

as of August 2010 had delivered a total of 20 A320s and five A319s. 

The production rate is expected to increase to four aircraft per month 

by 2012. Unit production cost at the new assembly line is reported to 

be higher than that in Europe at present, although costs will likely 

decrease over time, but the facility is intended to produce aircraft only 

for the Chinese market (Ma, 2009). Thus, Airbus clearly established it 

as a vehicle for increasing its share of the Chinese market rather than 

to create a manufacturing cost advantage for itself.

ERJ-145

Harbin Embraer Aircraft Industry Company (HEAI), a joint venture between Embraer SA of Brazil and the Harbin Aircraft Industrial 

Group (HAIG), an AVIC subsidiary, was created in 2003 and delivered 

its first ERJ-145, 50-seat regional jetliner, in February 2004. However, 

the venture is said to have struggled from the start. Chinese airlines 

have been slow to place orders, and the orders that were received were 

often repeatedly postponed for various reasons. At one point, reports 

surfaced suggesting that the assembly line was facing closure (Ionides, 

2006; Kirby, 2009). Despite a production capacity of 24 aircraft per 

year, the facility had delivered only 36 ERJ-145 aircraft as of August 

2010, all to Chinese airlines (Ionides, 2006; “Embraer: Green Aviation,” 2010; “HAIG–Harbin Aircraft Industries Group [Harbin Feiji 

Gongye Gongsi],” 2010).

Helicopters

All of China’s current, ongoing helicopter programs are either collaborative projects with Western partners or derivatives of Western helicopters. The most important partners of the Chinese helicopter industry 
China’s Current Commercial Aircraft Production 29

include U.S.-based Sikorsky Aircraft, French-based Eurocopter, Italian 

AgustaWestland, and French engine-maker Turbomeca. 

According to Wang Bin, the president of Avicopter, AVIC’s helicopter subsidiary and builder of all Chinese helicopters, Avicopter will 

establish a new helicopter industrial base in Tianjin, as the “dragon-head” 

for other helicopter manufacturing centers such as Harbin and Jingdezhen. Tianjin will host Avicopter’s top-level R&D facilities, as well as its 

sales and customer-support center. Existing manufacturing centers such 

as Changhe Aircraft in Jingdezhen and HAIG in Harbin will specialize 

in their respective areas of expertise. HAIG will specialize in compositecomponents manufacturing and assembly, and Changhe will specialize 

in digitized manufacturing and the drive train (Ma, 2009, pp. 23–24). 

Avicopter’s long-term ambition, according to Wang, is to establish 

a “unified, internationally competitive brand” for the Chinese helicopter industry. While establishing one’s own brand does not preclude 

international cooperation, it does imply that “collaborative projects 

must conform to the product priorities and development strategies of 

Avicopter, and that they must contribute to the development of [Avicopter’s] own brand.” In particular, Wang warns against weakening 

Avicopter’s branding strategy in the pursuit of short-term profits (Ma, 

2009, p. 25). These remarks may suggest that Avicopter products will 

generally receive priority in resource allocation, even if co-production 

programs such as HAIG’s Z-15/EC-175 project with Eurocopter may 

have more ready access to foreign markets.

Finally, it is worth noting that the production capacity of Chinese 

helicopter manufacturers remains rather limited at present. Changhe 

Aircraft—one of China’s two major centers of helicopter production—

has undergone steady expansion in recent years and expects to acquire 

the capacity to produce 30 light helicopters, 10 medium helicopters, 

and 15 heavy helicopters annually by 2012 (Yu, 2008, p. 67). For comparison, Bell Helicopter produces about 200 helicopters per year at its 

Mirabel plant alone (“About Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited,” 

2010). 

Current Chinese helicopter programs are described below.
30 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

Z-8

The Changhe Z-8 is a medium transport helicopter developed from 

the French SA 321 Super Frelon, acquired by the People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA) Navy in 1977–1978. Development of the Chinese copy 

of the SA 321 began in the late 1970s, but because of financial difficulties, first flight did not occur until December 1985. The model was not 

certified for design finalization until 1994. The Z-8 is identical to the 

Super Frelon in appearance, and the basic model is powered by three 

WZ-6 turboshafts (Chinese copies of the Turboméca 3C III), each 

rated at 1,512 hp (1,128 kW). Several dozen examples in at least six 

variants are serving in various branches of the PLA (“Zhi-8 Transport/

SAR Helicopter,” 2009).

Z-9

The Z-9 series has been built by HAIG since the early 1980s and is 

possibly the most produced helicopter in China, with more than 200 

aircraft delivered to both military and civilian customers. The original 

Z-9 was a license-built version of the Eurocopter AS365N Dauphin II 

twin-engine light utility helicopter. The Z-9B is an “indigenized” variant with 71.9 percent Chinese-made content. More than 150 Z-9Bs or 

its derivatives are believed to have been delivered to the PLA (“Zhi-9 

Utility Helicopter,” 2009).

Z-11

The Changhe Z-11 is a 2,000-kg-class lightweight utility helicopter 

modeled after the French AS 350B Squirrel, with certain structural 

modifications. Development began in 1991, and first flight took place 

in late 1994. The design was finalized in 2000. The Z-11 is powered by 

a domestically produced WZ-8D turboshaft rated at 510 kW. Several 

variants have been developed, most of which have been produced for 

the PLA (“Zhi-11 Utility Helicopter,” 2007).

HC120/EC120 Colibri

The HAIG HC120/EC120 Colibri is a lightweight, single-engine helicopter developed by an industrial partnership comprising Eurocopter, 
China’s Current Commercial Aircraft Production 31

HAIG, and Singapore Technologies Aerospace. Development began in 

1993, and first flight took place in 1997 (“HC120 Utility Helicopter,” 

2007).

Mi-171 Family

Sichuan Lantian Helicopter Co., Ltd., in Chengdu, Sichuan, a joint 

venture established in 2007 with Mil Moscow Helicopter Plant JSC, 

assembles Russian Mi-171-series helicopters, including the Mi-171, 

Mi-17V5, and Mi-17V7, from kits. The Mi-171 series is a multirole 

medium-lift helicopter capable of carrying about 4,000 kg of payload. 

Under the initial contract, 20 helicopters will be assembled. This was 

originally to have been accomplished in 2008, but the first two helicopters were not delivered until December 2009. In a second stage of 

the program, 60 more helicopters will be produced (“SLHC—Sichuan 

Lantian Helicopter Company,” 2010; Grevatt, 2009).

Z-15/EC-175

The HAIG Z-15/Eurocopter EC-175 is a 6-ton-class medium utility 

helicopter co-developed by HAIG and Eurocopter as a 50-50 joint venture. Development began in 2006, and the first prototype made its first 

flight in 2009. Two assembly lines will be built, one in China and one 

in France (“Zhi-15 [EC 175] Medium Helicopter,” 2008).

AC313

The Avicopter AC313 is a triple-engine, 13.8-ton civil transport helicopter developed from the Z-8 military helicopter, itself a 1980s derivative of the Aerospatiale SA321 Super Frelon. Powered by three Pratt 

& Whitney Canada PT6B-67A turboshafts, it is the largest helicopter developed in China to date. First flight took place in March 2010 

(Francis, 2010b). The AC313 makes extensive use of composite materials—roughly 50 percent by volume—and is equipped with a modern 

integrated avionics system (Peng, 2010, p. 15). Avicopter plans to certify the AC313 for the European and North American markets.
32 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

AC310

The Avicopter AC310 is a 1-ton, single-piston-engine light utility helicopter currently in development. No first flight has been reported (Wu, 

2009, p. 21).

AC301A

The Avicopter AC301A is a two-ton, single-engine helicopter derived 

from the Changhe Z-11, with structural optimizations, an indigenous 

rotor system, an improved engine, and modernized avionics. The model 

is currently in development, and no first flight has been reported (Wu, 

2009, p. 21).

Other

An unnamed heavy transport helicopter with an internal cargo capacity of 10 tons and an external carrying capacity of 13 tons is reportedly 

being designed. Development of this new helicopter is not expected to 

be completed until 2020 (Wu, 2009, p. 21).

Fixed-Wing General Aviation Aircraft

To date, developments in fixed-wing general aviation aircraft in China 

have been limited. China does not produce any business jets, and there 

is apparently no business jet program in development. As of late 2009, 

China had just under 800 fixed-wing general aviation aircraft, most of 

which appear to be light aircraft of foreign origin. For decades, fixedwing general aviation aircraft in China were limited to Shijiazhuang 

Y-5s (copies of the An-2 Colt biplane) and Y-11s (a high-wing twinpiston-engine utility aircraft). China’s first indigenously developed 

agricultural aircraft, the Hongdu N5A, did not make its first flight 

until 1989 (Qi, Xiao, and Xu, 2008, p. 18). Fixed-wing general aviation 

aircraft currently in production are described below.
China’s Current Commercial Aircraft Production 33

Y-5B

The Shijiazhuang Y-5B, made by AVIC subsidiary General Aviation 

Co., is an updated variant of the Y-5 biplane, equipped with newer avionics and a more powerful engine.

Y-12

The HAIG Y-12 is a domestically designed high-wing twin-engine 

turboprop utility aircraft with a maximum takeoff weight of approximately 5,300 kg. The engines are made by Pratt & Whitney Canada. 

As of October 2009, at least 145 had been built, most of which were 

exported to countries including Iran, Kenya, Sri Lanka, and Zambia 

(“HAI Y-12,” 2010).

N5

The Hongdu N5A is a single-seat agricultural aircraft with an effective 

payload of 900 kg. It is powered by a single Lycoming IO-720 piston 

engine and made its first flight in 1989. Only about 20 of these aircraft 

have been built. An improved version, the N5B, is powered by a Czech 

Walter M601F turboprop engine, which increases the plane’s payload 

to 1,500 kg. The N5B made its official first flight in July 2008 (“HAIC 

N-5,” 2010).

35

Chapter Four

The Role of Foreign Firms in the Development 

of China’s Commercial Aviation Manufacturing 

Industry

The aviation industry requires advanced, high-quality products that 

are produced at the minimum possible cost. Simply having cheap labor 

available is in most cases not sufficient to be competitive. The technologies for the most advanced products, such as turbine blades, composite materials, and complete integrated systems, are closely held by the 

companies that developed them. Designs and production technologies 

for other types of products may be more widely available or easier to 

develop, but here, the key is being able to produce them with sufficient 

precision, quality, and efficiency to be competitive.

Foreign firms have played an important role in the development 

of China’s capabilities in these areas. The most basic role is simply providing a market for the products of China’s aviation manufacturers. 

This gives them an opportunity to acquire the knowledge that comes 

from repeatedly manufacturing the same product (often referred to as 

“learning by doing”) and from being forced to continuously improve 

quality and cost-efficiency in order to remain competitive, while being 

reimbursed for the cost of acquiring these skills (i.e., by selling their 

products to the foreign firms). If the price received exceeds manufacturing and delivery costs, any remaining profits can be reinvested in 

acquiring the capability to produce new products or in improving the 

quality or production efficiency of existing products. In some cases, the 

foreign purchaser may also provide more direct assistance in manufacturing technology or quality control.
36 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

Manufacturing and R&D joint ventures provide additional 

opportunities for Chinese firms to learn. In a manufacturing joint venture, the foreign partner typically supplies the production design and 

management expertise, while the Chinese partner provides the facility and labor. Thus, the Chinese partner has an opportunity to learn 

how to efficiently produce a line of products it was previously unable 

to produce. The drawback of manufacturing joint ventures is that they 

are often effectively controlled by the foreign partner, which limits the 

Chinese partner’s ability to steer the venture toward product areas that 

are of interest to the Chinese parent (or to use the product to supply 

clients in China’s defense sector).

An R&D joint venture provides an opportunity for the Chinese 

partner to learn not only how to produce a specific line of products, 

but also how to design and develop entirely new lines of products. 

Thus, from the perspective of the Chinese partner, R&D joint ventures 

provide the greatest opportunity to assist the growth of its production 

capabilities.

Foreign firms can also assist the development of China’s aviation manufacturing capabilities by being acquired by Chinese aviation companies. The acquiring Chinese firm theoretically has access to 

all of the foreign firm’s manufacturing technology and R&D capabilities. However, transferring these capabilities to the Chinese parent may 

present practical challenges, including technology export restrictions 

in the home country of the foreign firm.

Many aviation technologies are inherently dual-use. Thus, to the 

extent to which foreign firms are contributing to the capability of Chinese companies to produce civilian aviation products, they are also 

contributing to China’s capability to produce military products. These 

military products could include whole systems, such as transport aircraft or utility helicopters, or important subsystems and components. 

In addition, although North American and European countries restrict 

the transfer of weapons technologies to China, the restrictions vary by 

country. This variability has enabled China to acquire from other countries technologies that the U.S. government would not have allowed 

American companies to transfer. Specific examples include Eurocopter’s assistance to China in developing the rotor system for a new heli-
The Role of Foreign Firms 37

copter that was later determined to have assisted in the development 

of a new attack helicopter, and Turbomecca’s collaboration with AVIC 

to develop a turboshaft engine for a military transport helicopter, thus 

avoiding a potential U.S. embargo on the Pratt & Whitney engine the 

helicopter was originally designed to use.

There is no question, therefore, that foreign involvement in China’s 

aviation manufacturing industry is contributing to the development of 

China’s military aerospace capabilities. There is also little doubt that 

this is a deliberate policy of the Chinese government. This is not to say 

that encouraging foreign involvement in China’s aviation manufacturing industry is simply a ruse to facilitate the development of China’s 

military aerospace industry. Rather, encouraging foreign involvement 

in China’s aviation manufacturing industry serves two equally important purposes for the Chinese government: (1) it facilitates the development of a highly valued commercial sector, as part of China’s economic 

development strategy, and (2) it aids the development of China’s military aerospace industry.

Chinese Government Policies Toward Foreign Aviation 

Manufacturing Companies

International aerospace sales historically have involved not just the participating firms, but also the governments of the countries in which 

they are based. Many airlines are owned and operated by governments, 

and national governments, even in nominally free-market countries 

such as the United States, see it as their responsibility to promote the 

overseas sales of their nations’ products, particularly high-value-added 

goods such as airliners. Deregulation and market competition have 

diminished the government’s role in aircraft sales but certainly have 

not eliminated it. 

Japan is a prime example of government influence on airplane 

sales. Since the 1970s, the Japanese government has subsidized three 

Japanese manufacturers—Mitsubishi, Fuji, and Kawasaki Heavy 

Industries—in taking on growing roles as major suppliers to Boeing, 

producing 15 percent of the 767, 22 percent of the 777, and 35 percent 
38 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

of the 787 (Newhouse, 2007, pp. 28, 171–172). This has involved the 

transfer of significant wing design experience and composite technology. Boeing has greatly benefited from the arrangement, with the dominant share of large commercial aircraft sales to Japan, access to lowcost capital, and risk-sharing with the three Japanese manufacturers 

(Newhouse, 2007, p. 61).

Airbus, itself, was predicated on the distribution of design and 

manufacturing efforts across companies from the four original national 

partners: France, Germany, Great Britain, and Spain (Morrison, 2010). 

Historically, national carriers in the same four countries purchased primarily Airbus planes, but aviation deregulation and low-cost carriers 

have diversified the EU market for large commercial aircraft. Further, 

work or technology distribution is difficult for Airbus, as it has to balance that with the interests of the four major partner nations (Karp, 

2007).

Recognizing that its aerospace industry is not yet capable of 

designing and producing large commercial aircraft that are competitive with modern Airbus and Boeing products, China’s government 

has allowed its airlines to import such aircraft since the 1980s. However, the Chinese government has also used the purchase of large 

commercial aircraft to pursue other goals. In the past, for example, 

the Chinese government has suggested that large orders for Boeing 

planes hinged on the renewal of Most Favored Nation trading status 

(Newhouse, 2007, pp. 182–183). More recently, Beijing has suggested 

that Boeing’s success in China may be jeopardized by political friction 

over Taiwan (Heim, 2005). In addition, China’s central government, 

with hopes of modernizing its aerospace industry, has attempted to 

leverage large commercial aircraft purchases in exchange for arrangements that it hopes will lead to technology transfer. Tempting airplane manufacturers with the huge potential market in China, the 

Chinese government has encouraged producers of large commercial 

aircraft to establish manufacturing and assembly joint ventures with 

state-owned aerospace corporations. Often, this has taken the form of 

domestic assembly or subcomponent production, e.g., the McDonnell 

Douglas MD-80/90 assembly agreements and past Boeing component 

contracts. The technology transfer associated with these arrangements, 
The Role of Foreign Firms 39

however, was limited to manufacturing and production methods. The 

same is true of the much-touted Airbus final assembly line recently 

opened in Tianjin. According to industry reports, all major parts are 

manufactured at Airbus’s plant in Hamburg and shipped to Tianjin 

only for final assembly (Francis, 2008). 

Since the late 1990s, therefore, the Chinese government has 

encouraged joint ventures with the hope of increasing technology 

transfer. These policies have been only partially successful, however. 

Most of the aviation joint ventures established in China have involved 

older systems and still consist primarily of assembly operations. Key 

technologies and components such as engines or avionics are manufactured in the West and imported into China for assembly. It should also 

be pointed out that while technology transfers of this type do help to 

elevate China’s commercial aerospace capabilities from a very low base, 

their direct impact on Chinese military capabilities is even more limited, as the most critical military aerospace technologies are unlikely 

to be transferred via commercial avenues. Stealth, for instance, is not 

directly relevant to commercial aviation, and the same is true for sensor 

fusion and networking multiple aircraft. Basic engine technology is 

common to both commercial and military aircraft, but design goals 

for affordable, highly efficient commercial turbofans are quite different 

from those for high-performance military engines.

Nonetheless, by their very nature, joint ventures offer a potential mechanism for evading U.S. export controls, and although the 

majority of joint ventures between Western aerospace corporations and 

Chinese entities to date have been in civilian areas with limited military relevance, the possibility clearly exists for technology transfers of a 

more military character. The Chinese certainly appear highly conscious 

of the military implications of various ventures. Thus, while projects 

of a predominantly civilian nature are generally handled on commercial terms, those of more significant dual-use value are conducted with 

greater attentiveness to China’s security objectives. For example, for 

its Z-15/EC-175 medium utility helicopter project with Eurocopter, 

China is currently working on replacing the aircraft’s original Pratt & 

Whitney engine with a domestically produced model jointly developed 
40 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

with Safran Turbomeca, reportedly as a hedge against possible U.S. 

sanctions once the helicopter enters PLA service (Morris, 2010).

In addition, the technology level of Western aerospace joint ventures in China has increased steadily over time. China has arguably 

taken a new approach with its ARJ21 regional jet and C919 airliner 

projects. While both programs involve significant outsourcing to U.S. 

and EU suppliers for advanced components such as engines and avionics, a condition for being selected as a supplier is often that a joint 

venture with a local partner be set up and local production facilities be 

established (Mecham and Anselmo, 2010). These new ventures may 

bring with them significantly newer technologies.

Although Western aerospace companies are generally tight-lipped 

about the details of their China strategies, and the specific contents 

of commercial agreements are rarely divulged, a correlation between 

major aircraft sales and local subcontracting clearly exists, suggesting that offset arrangements are indeed a major consideration in many 

deals. In this regard, the competition between Boeing and Airbus is the 

most visible and instructive. In 1995, Boeing held a commanding lead 

over Airbus in the Chinese market, accounting for roughly 60 percent 

of the Chinese commercial fleet and more than 80 percent of all new 

orders (“China and Boeing Partnership Delivering Value,” 1995), while 

Airbus held a mere 7 percent market share with only 29 planes sold 

(“Airbus in China,” 2010). By 2010, however, Airbus’s market share 

had risen to over 43 percent, while Boeing’s share had fallen to roughly 

55 percent (World Aerospace Database). In media interviews, industry 

experts rarely discuss the role of offsets in the competition between 

Boeing and Airbus, pointing instead to factors such as the lack of Chinese cultural and linguistic expertise at senior levels of Boeing management, Boeing’s sometimes short-sighted preoccupation with cost 

control, Boeing’s perceived complacency in customer relations, and 

even the entry-visa difficulties experienced by Chinese airline executives after the 9/11 attacks. For its part, Boeing management dismisses 

the Chinese complaints as routine disagreements between buyers and 

sellers and attributes Airbus’s success to its strategy of “flooding the 

market with surplus production at discount prices” (Heim, 2005). 
The Role of Foreign Firms 41

All of the factors discussed above probably play a role in success in 

the Chinese market, but the key appears to be an aggressive program 

of local production. For example, in 2005, a group of Chinese airlines 

contracted with Boeing to purchase up to 60 Boeing 787 Dreamliners, 

a deal worth $7.2 billion at nominal list prices (Gates, 2005). Later the 

same year, it was announced that Boeing had selected a number of Chinese manufacturers as suppliers to the 787 program, including several 

single-source contracts on some of the largest components awarded to 

a Chinese supplier to date. In all, Boeing sold a total of 117 aircraft to 

Chinese airlines that year, making 2005 Boeing’s most successful year 

in China to date (“Orders and Deliveries—User Defined Reports”).

That same year, however, Airbus secured an order for 150 A320 

airliners from China in a deal valued at close to $10 billion (“Airbus in 

China,” 2010). It was subsequently revealed that Airbus had reached 

an agreement with China to establish its first final assembly line outside of Europe in Tianjin, and Airbus was rewarded with a contract for 

another 150 A320s and 20 A350s in 2006. In 2007, French President 

Nicholas Sarkozy returned from a state visit to China with the largest Airbus order from China to date, a $17.4 billion contract for 110 

A320s and 50 wide-body A330s. Most recently, Chinese president Hu 

Jintao concluded another agreement with Airbus during his November 

2010 state visit to France, an order for 50 A320s, 42 A330s, and 10 

A350s valued at $14 billion, with half of the A320s to be assembled in 

China (Fouquet and Viscusi, 2010). By comparison, during the same 

period (2006–2010) Boeing sold a total of only 287 airliners in China 

(“Orders and Deliveries—User Defined Reports”). 

In conclusion, Chinese government leverage over large commercial aircraft sales has caused Boeing and Airbus to transfer older production and assembly technology to China, but no Chinese companies 

are yet Tier 1 suppliers to Boeing or Airbus. To increase technology 

transfer, COMAC is partnering and establishing joint ventures with 

many Western companies through the ARJ21 and C919 projects. 

However, those Western companies have a vested interest in maintaining control of their core intellectual property, which likely explains 

why most of the technologies planned for the C919 are, with a few 
42 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

exceptions, already currently deployed in modern airliners (Mecham 

and Anselmo, 2010).

It should also be pointed out that the interests of Chinese stateowned enterprises are not identical to those of the Chinese government. This is most obvious in the case of China’s state-owned airlines, 

which have resisted large-scale commitments to the ARJ21 and C919 

despite the central government’s desire to establish COMAC as one of 

the world’s leading manufacturers of regional jets and airliners. Similarly, AVIC has been pursuing its own jet transport projects, which 

would compete with those of COMAC.

Joint Ventures and Cooperative R&D Activities

Joint ventures with foreign enterprises came relatively late to the Chinese aviation industry. The first joint venture in this sector was established in 1996, when Pratt & Whitney partnered with the Chengdu 

Engine Group Company to establish a production facility in Chengdu 

to produce components for aircraft engines and industrial gas turbines. 

The initial investment was only $25.1 million. Since that time, however, foreign investment in the Chinese aviation sector has expanded 

rapidly, and today most major Western commercial aircraft manufacturers and aviation subsystems suppliers have established joint ventures 

in China. 

Joint ventures are frequently regarded as an effective vehicle for 

Western companies attempting to gain access to the Chinese market. 

Certainly, Chinese aviation industry leaders have made no secret of 

their desire to trade market access for technology, and joint ventures 

are their vehicle of choice for gaining access to advanced Western technologies. Naturally, partnerships in technological areas of particular 

concern to the Chinese have received the highest priority. One such 

area is aircraft engines: The earliest joint ventures in the aviation sector, 

spearheaded by Pratt & Whitney, were with engine component producers. Since then, both GE and Rolls-Royce have established joint 

ventures in China and greatly expanded local procurement. Another 

area is composite-materials manufacturing techniques. Both Boeing 
The Role of Foreign Firms 43

and Airbus have established joint ventures specializing in composite 

components, and Airbus has recently transferred the technology for 

manufacturing the entire composite wing of the A320 airliner to its 

joint-venture composite manufacturing center in Harbin.

It should be noted, however, that joint ventures per se do not 

guarantee effective market access. Those that do not provide access to 

coveted technologies or—even more problematically—are perceived to 

compete against domestic producers are not likely to receive preferential treatment and may indeed face severe obstacles. In this regard, 

the case of Embraer’s joint-venture production line in China can be 

instructive. Established in 2003, the venture is said to have struggled 

from the start. Chinese airlines were slow to place orders, and many 

of the orders that were received were repeatedly postponed for various 

reasons. Despite a production capacity of 24 aircraft per year, the facility had delivered only 36 ERJ-145 aircraft as of August 2010. Embraer’s 

lack of success is likely related to the anticipated arrival of COMAC’s 

ARJ21 regional jet, which has undoubtedly influenced the procurement decisions of Chinese airlines, as they expect to be required to 

place orders for the ARJ21.

It is also worth noting that Western aerospace companies have 

been generally cautious about transferring advanced technology to 

China or setting up joint ventures in critical areas. However, a turning 

point may have been have reached with the COMAC C919 project. 

Unlike the ARJ21 program, which has sourced directly from Western suppliers, COMAC management has made it explicitly clear that 

foreign bidders on the C919 program are expected to form joint ventures with Chinese partners, especially in high-technology areas such 

as advanced materials and flight control systems, where Chinese technology is lagging. In areas of less concern, the Chinese are content with 

traditional subcontracting or other work-share arrangements, although 

according to COMAC Deputy General Manager Wu Guanghui, local 

production is considered a minimum requirement for foreign suppliers 

to the C919 program (Zhang, 2010, p. 34).

In response, a whole spate of new joint ventures has been 

announced between Western aerospace suppliers and AVIC subsidiaries, the most notable of which is the joint venture between CFM 
44 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

(itself a joint venture between GE and Snecma of France) and AVIC 

Commercial Aircraft Engines Co. (ACAE) to assemble the LEAP-X1C 

engine in Shanghai. ACAE is said to have started building a $472 million R&D center in Shanghai and hopes to start building “homegrown 

engines” (presumably a locally produced version of the LEAP-X) for 

the C919 in 2016. Every C919 contract awarded to a foreign bidder 

has been awarded to a joint-venture entity. And a number of companies that had not established manufacturing joint ventures in China—

including Nexcelle, Goodrich, Parker Aerospace, Rockwell Collins, 

and Liebherr—have recently entered into joint-venture agreements in 

connection with their C919 bids. A summary of international partners 

in the ARJ21 and C919 programs is provided in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.

Detailed information regarding major current and prospective 

joint ventures and cooperative R&D activities between Chinese and 

foreign companies that we were able to identify is provided below.

U.S. Companies

Alcoa, Inc.

According to an October 2009 announcement, Alcoa and COMAC 

are “jointly exploring” technology solutions for the design and development of the C919. Through a technology cooperation agreement, 

the two companies are examining advanced aluminum structural concepts, designs, and alloys for the new aircraft (“Alcoa and COMAC 

Explore Leading Technology Solutions for C919, China’s Largest Passenger Aircraft,” 2009).

The Boeing Company

Boeing China, Inc., is based in Beijing. It includes representatives of 

Boeing organizations such as Government Affairs, Commercial Airplane Sales, Marketing, Business Development, Commercial Aviation Services, Alteon, Jeppesen, and Communications. As of October 

2009, there were 150 Boeing employees in China and more than 6,100 

employees at Boeing-related businesses (subsidiaries and joint ventures) 

(Fetters-Walp, 2009, p. 13).
The Role of Foreign Firms 45

Table 4.1

International Partners in the ARJ21 Program

ARJ21 Program Partners Contribution

U.S. Partners

Alcoa, Inc. Advanced alloys for airframes, wing and fuselage 

stringers, floor beams, seat tracks; fasteners and 

miscellaneous structural components

B/E Aerospace, Inc. Oxygen equipment

Eaton Corporation Flight-deck instrument panel and lighting controls

General Electric Propulsion (engines, nacelles, and accessories)

Goodrich Hella Aerospace Lighting equipment

Hamilton Sundstrand EPS/high-lift/auxiliary power unit (APU)

Honeywell International Flight control system integration and synthesis

Kidde Aerospace (Hamilton 

Sundstrand subsidiary)

Fire protection

MPC Products Corporation APU, door system

Parker Aerospace Fuel, hydraulic, and electrical flight controls

Rockwell Collins Integrated avionics system (Proline 21)

Rosemount, Inc. (Emerson 

subsidiary)

Windshield wiper and heater

Zodiac Air Cruisers Company Emergency evacuation system

Non-U.S. Partners

Antonov ASTC (Ukraine) Wing design, structural strength analysis

Avio-Diepen (Netherlands) Material management

CAE Inc. (Canada) Full flight simulator

Fisher Advanced Composite 

Components (Austria)

Cockpit, cabin interior, kitchens, restrooms

Liebherr Aerospace Toulouse 

(France)

Air management system

Liebherr Aerospace 

Lindenberg (Germany)

Landing-gear braking system

Meggitt Vibro-Meter SA 

(Switzerland)

Engine interface control unit, engine vibration 

monitoring system

Safran Sagem (France) Flight-deck control suite

Saint-Gobain Sully (France) Windshields and opening windows

Zodiac Evac Vacuum Systems, 

Shanghai

Water/waste

Zodiac Sicma Aero Seats 

(France)

Crew seating

SOURCE: AVIC I Commercial Aircraft Company, Ltd., undated.
46 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

Table 4.2

Major International Partners in the C919 Program

C919 Program Partners Contribution

U.S. Partners

Eaton Corporation Pipelines for fuel and hydraulic systems 

General Electric Propulsion (CFM International); engine nacelle, 

thrust reversers (Nexcelle); avionics system core 

processing and display; onboard maintenance and 

flight data recording

Goodrich Corporation Exterior lighting; landing gear and engine nacelle 

components

Hamilton Sundstrand Electric power generation and distribution; cockpit 

pilot controls (side sticks, pedals, etc.)

Honeywell International Flight control system; APU; wheels and tires, 

braking system; inertial reference and air data 

systems

Kidde Aerospace (Hamilton 

Sundstrand subsidiary)

Fire and overheat protection systems

Parker Aerospace Fuel and hydraulic systems

Rockwell Collins Communication and navigation systems; integrated 

surveillance system; cabin core system

Non-U.S. Partners

Fisher Advanced Composite 

Components (Austria)

Cockpit, cabin interior, kitchens, restrooms

Liebherr Aerospace 

Toulouse (France)

Air management system

Liebherr Aerospace 

Lindenberg (Germany)

Undercarriage system

SOURCE: Various media reports.

Boeing has the following joint ventures in China:

• 9-percent interest in Taikoo Aircraft Engineering Co., Ltd. 

(TAECO), Xiamen, an aircraft maintenance, conversion (passenger to freighter), and repair facility with more than 5,000 

employees. 

• 60-percent interest in Boeing Shanghai Aviation Service Co., 

Ltd. (BSAS), a joint venture with Shanghai Airlines (15 percent) 

and the Shanghai Airport Authority (25 percent). BSAS performs 

passenger-to-freighter conversions; upgrades to interiors, avionics, 

and entertainment systems; line maintenance; and heavy main-
The Role of Foreign Firms 47

tenance checks. Construction of the facility began in 2007 with 

an initial total investment of $85 million. The company has more 

than 120 employees. 

• 88-percent interest (expanded from 40 percent after Boeing bought 

out former joint-venture partner Hexcel and made additional 

investments) in Boeing Tianjin Composites Co., Ltd., Tianjin, a 

joint venture of Boeing and AVIC for secondary composite structures and interior parts for the full range of Boeing aircraft. First 

deliveries started in 2002. In 2008, Boeing invested an additional 

$21 million in facility expansion, doubling the size of the original 

plant and increasing its production capacity by 60 percent. The 

new plant will employ roughly 1,000 workers (“Boeing Tianjin 

Composite Materials Facility Undergoes Expansion,” 2008, p. 9).

In addition to the subcontracting and joint-venture activities 

described earlier, Boeing provides technical expertise and international 

operational experience in aviation safety, efficiency, reliability, and 

quality to Chinese airlines, regulatory authorities, and industry. This 

technology transfer helps ensure flight safety, reliability, and efficiency 

and the production of safe, high-quality airplane hardware. Boeing 

directly supports CAAC in its development of International Civil Aviation Organization–compliant aviation laws for China, civil aviation 

regulations, and various safety enhancement plans. Boeing works with 

CAAC on advanced air traffic systems to enhance the safety and efficiency of China’s air traffic system. Some specific projects include the 

development of a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)–style training center for flight and maintenance inspectors; the development of 

CAAC’s automatic dependent surveillance–broadcast (ADS-B, a cooperative surveillance technique for air traffic control) implementation 

plans; and a number of Required Navigation Performance demonstration flights into high-altitude airports in Tibet (“Dawn of a New Age,” 

2010).

In addition, Boeing has reportedly provided professional training 

worth several hundred million dollars to more than 37,000 Chinese 

aviation professionals since 1993, at no charge to China. An executive 

development program for senior CAAC and Chinese airline managers 
48 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

was launched in 1998 and is still ongoing. Annual senior executive 

development programs have also been conducted for Chinese aviation 

industry executives from AVIC. Other training programs supported by 

Boeing include the Boeing Masters of Business Administration (MBA) 

program for junior and mid-level officials from the Chinese aviation 

sector and a three-year internship program launched in 2008 for 60 

Boeing Fellows, half from the United States and half from China 

(“Boeing’s Investments in China,” 2010).

Boeing is also a leading participant in the U.S.–China Aviation 

Cooperation Program (ACP), a partnership of CAAC, the U.S. government, and various American aerospace firms launched in 2004. The 

program conducts executive development, energy conservation seminars, flight standards programs, and various other training programs 

for Chinese aviation sector personnel. Boeing has also established a 

number of training and technology development programs in partnership with several Chinese universities (“Boeing’s Investments in 

China,” 2010).

Eaton Corporation

Eaton has the following joint ventures in China:

• 49-percent interest in a new joint venture with Shanghai Aircraft Manufacturing Co., Ltd. (SAMC), a COMAC subsidiary, 

announced in July 2010 (“Eaton Corporation and Shanghai Aircraft Manufacturing Co., Ltd. Announce a Joint Venture,” 2010). 

The project will be based in Shanghai and will focus on the R&D, 

production, and support of fuel and hydraulic conveyance systems for the COMAC C919 program and the global civil aviation market in general. Total program value for the C919 project, 

including aftermarket opportunities, is estimated at $1.8 billion, 

based on an anticipated volume of 2,500 aircraft. The joint venture is the first for a COMAC enterprise with a foreign company.

• 51-percent interest in Eaton Electrical (ZhongShan) Co., a joint 

venture with MingYang Electrical Appliances Co., located in 

Zhongshan, Guangdong. Established in 2005, the joint venture 

produces medium-voltage switchgear, electrical automation, and 
The Role of Foreign Firms 49

protection products (“Eaton Signs Joint Venture Agreement with 

MingYang for Medium-Voltage Switchgear Components,” 2005).

• 55-percent interest in Eaton Senstar Automotive Fluid Connector 

(Shanghai) Co., a joint venture with Changzhou Senstar Automobile Air Conditioner Co., Ltd. Established in 2004, the venture produces various air-conditioning and power-steering components (“Eaton Plans Joint Venture with Changzhou Senstar 

Automobile Air Conditioner Co., Ltd. in China,” 2004).

• Unspecified interest in Shanghai Eaton Engine Components Co., 

a three-partner venture with Nittan Valves of Japan and Huamu 

Township near Shanghai. Formed in 1998, the firm produces 

engine valves and hydraulic lifters.

In addition, Eaton is engaged in various collaborative research 

projects with Chinese universities and research institutions. In 2008, 

Eaton established a global R&D center in Suzhou, one of its three 

global R&D centers. The Eaton Suzhou Center was initially staffed 

with 100 researchers, and the number was expected to increase by 40 

percent by 2010. The product design team was to engage in the R&D 

of vacuum circuit-breakers, medium-voltage components and systems, 

switchgears, uninterruptable power supplies, industrial control products, etc. (“Eaton Electrical Suzhou New Facility to Operate as Global 

R&D Center,” 2008).

GE Aviation

GE has the following joint ventures in China:

• 51-percent interest in GE Engine Services (Xiamen) Co., Ltd., 

a joint venture with a Chinese consortium led by China Eastern Airlines (30 percent) and Hainan Airlines (10 percent). The 

facility, which began operations in 2001, provides maintenance, 

repair, and overhaul (MRO) services for the CFM56 family of jet 

engines. The joint-venture structure is notable in that China Eastern provided no initial investment for its 30-percent share except 

an agreement to service its engines at the facility (“GE Engine 

Services Opens Engine Overhaul and Repair Facility in Xiamen, 
50 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

China,” 2001; “The Last Kilometer: GE Scrambles for the Chinese Market,” 2001). 

• 50-50 prospective joint venture between Nexcelle and AVIC Aircraft announced September 2009. Nexcelle is the nacelle jointventure company created by GE’s Middle River Aircraft Systems 

and Aircelle, a Safran group company, while AVIC Aircraft is 

engaged in the development of medium/large transport aircraft, 

small commercial aircraft, and landing-gear systems and nacelles 

in China. The new venture will design and manufacture engine 

nacelles and components for the COMAC C919 as well as other 

existing aircraft (“AVIC Aircraft and Nexcelle Announce Plans 

for a Nacelle Joint Venture in China,” 2009). 

• 50-percent interest in a prospective joint venture with AVIC Systems, announced in November 2009, to develop the integrated 

avionics system for the COMAC C919. The new avionics company will offer fully integrated, open-architecture avionics and 

services for future commercial aircraft programs. Although it will 

be headquartered in China, GE claims that the new venture will 

create about 200 jobs in the United States (“GE and AVIC Joint 

Venture Creates New Global Business Opportunities,” 2009). 

While many analysts consider the venture to be risky given GE’s 

lack of experience in the area, it is also regarded as a “huge deal 

[of the type] that has the potential to redefine the avionics market 

once every 15 to 20 years” (Layne, 2010). 

• Undetermined interest in a prospective joint venture between 

CFM and ACAE, announced in December 2009, to establish 

a final assembly line and engine test facility for the LEAP-X1C 

engine selected for the COMAC C919 airliner. ACAE and CFM 

have reportedly established a working team to evaluate the scope 

and feasibility of the project. This same team will formulate the 

business plan and develop the legal structure and operating agreement for the proposed joint venture (“CFM and ACAE Sign MOU 

for LEAP-X1C Assembly Line In China,” 2009). For CFM, the 

C919 contract is reportedly valued at $5 billion and may be worth 

up to $15 billion over the next 30 years (“CFM Picked to Power 

China’s Future Plane,” March 2010).
The Role of Foreign Firms 51

In addition, GE Aviation has been very active in training technicians from Chinese airlines on GE engine technology and line maintenance needs. In 1996, GE and CFM partner Snecma opened a 

$17 million aero engine maintenance training center in Guanghan, 

Sichuan, adjacent to the CAAC Civil Aviation Flying College. The 

training center was the first of its kind in China and the third such 

GE facility—the other training centers are in Cincinnati and MelunMontereau, France. The curriculum offered is reportedly identical to 

that at GE’s other training facilities (“Aero Engine Maintenance Training Center Opens in Guanghan,” 1996). By the end of the 2000s, GE 

was training hundreds of Chinese jet engine technicians annually. In 

2008, for instance, more than 500 flight-line mechanics and propulsion engineers from almost 20 Chinese operators received training in 

flight-line engine maintenance, engine removal and installation, and 

engine borescope procedures. The training occurred at the Guanghan 

facility and at GE’s Customer Technical Education Center in Cincinnati. It is said that Chinese airlines routinely send a dozen or more 

technicians at a time to spend at least two weeks at the Cincinnati facility (“GE Training Hundreds of Jet Engine Technicians from Chinese 

Airlines,” 2008).

Goodrich Corporation

Goodrich has the following joint ventures in China:

• 51-percent interest in Goodrich Asia-Pacific Limited, a Hong 

Kong–based joint venture launched in 1993 with the Hong Kong 

Aircraft Engineering Co. (HAECO), a subsidiary of the Swire 

Group. The company provides carbon-brake heat-sink refurbishment and wheels/brakes repair/overhaul services to commercial 

aircraft (“Goodrich Asia-Pacific Limited [GAP]”).

• 65-percent interest in Goodrich TAECO Aeronautical Systems 

(Xiamen) Co., Ltd., a Xiamen-based joint venture formed in 1994 

with the Taikoo Aircraft Engineering Co., itself a joint venture 

between HAECO, the Xiamen Aviation Industrial Park, and several airlines in the region. Goodrich TAECO is an MRO facility 

for engine and flight-control systems, electrical power generation, 
52 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

and other aerospace equipment (“Goodrich TAECO Aeronautical Systems”).

• 50-percent interest in each of two prospective joint ventures 

between the Xi’an Aircraft International Corporation (XAIC) and 

Goodrich Landing Gear and Goodrich Aerostructures, according 

to an August 2009 agreement. The joint-venture companies will 

support landing-gear and engine-nacelle components manufacturing for the COMAC C919 program and will also supply components for other aircraft (“Goodrich and China’s XAIC Agree to 

Form Joint Venture Companies,” 2009). 

Hamilton Sundstrand

Hamilton Sundstrand has the following aviation-related joint ventures 

in China:

• 65-percent interest in Qinling Aerospace, Ltd., a Xiamen-based 

joint venture with Shaanxi Aero-Electric Co. launched in 2000. 

The company provides overhaul and repair services for Hamilton Sundstrand power systems to Chinese airlines (“China 

Locations”).

• Unspecified interest (believed to be approximately 50 percent) in 

a prospective joint venture with AVIC Systems Co., announced 

in April 2010, to develop and manufacture the electrical system 

for the COMAC C919 program. Hamilton Sundstrand values 

the deal at more than $1 billion in revenue over the life of the 

program (“Aerospace Firm Wins C919 Deal,” 2010).

Honeywell Aerospace

Honeywell has the following joint ventures in China:

• 65-percent interest in Honeywell TAECO Aerospace (Xiamen) 

Co. (HTAC), a joint venture launched in December 1995 with 

HAECO and Taikoo Aircraft Engineering Co. The company 

provides MRO services for GTCP85- and GTCP331-APUs, 

APU accessories, pneumatic valves, and components such as heat 
The Role of Foreign Firms 53

exchangers and avionics equipment to airlines operating in China 

(“Honeywell TAECO Aerospace (Xiamen) Co., Ltd.”; “Review 

of Operations”).

• Unspecified interest in the CEA Honeywell Aircraft Wheels and 

Brakes Repair and Overhaul Co., a joint venture with China Eastern Airlines launched in December 1995. The company specializes in MRO services of aircraft wheels, brakes, and other related 

components, as well as carbon-brake refurbishment (“Aerospace”).

• Unspecified interest in CRIAA Honeywell (Nanjing) AeroAccessories Co., a joint venture launched in April 1997 with 

AVIC subsidiary China Research Institute of Aero Accessories 

(CRIAA) with an initial investment of $11.7 million. The company develops and produces commercial aircraft environmental 

control systems (ECS) for the domestic and export markets and 

produces aircraft parts for export, including Boeing 737 hightemperature-alloy heat-exchanger flanges and pressure-sensor 

bosses and aluminum duct assemblies for Boeing 737 and 757 

aircraft (“Aerospace”; “CRIAA Honeywell: We Compete Only 

Against Ourselves”).

• 50-percent interest in a prospective joint venture with AVIC subsidiary Flight Automatic Control Research Institute (FACRI) 

to supply the fly-by-wire control system for the COMAC C919, 

announced in July 2010. According to Chinese reports, the new 

venture will be based in Xi’an, with $32 million in registered 

capital and more than $100 million in initial development funds 

(Honeywell will invest $40 million). The company intends to 

supply the export market until the C919 enters production, after 

which it expects 60 percent of contracts to be domestic (“Honeywell to Supply Flight Control System for the C919 Large Airliner,” 2010). 

According to company statements, Honeywell’s Aerospace division is actively developing local sourcing and engineering projects with 

leading Chinese aerospace manufacturers and universities. Honeywell 

has collaborated for many years with the Shanghai-based China Aeronautical Radio Electronics Research Institute (CARERI) on air traffic 
54 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

control responder systems, traffic collision avoidance systems (TCAS), 

etc. (Liu, 2009, p. 61). Honeywell also maintains a number of wholly 

owned research facilities in China. These include the Honeywell Technology Solutions Lab–China (HTSL-China), which provides “worldclass software product development support, research and technology 

development, technical consulting and digitization services to Honeywell businesses worldwide” (“Honeywell Technology Solutions Lab”). 

The largest department in HTSL-China is the Aerospace Electronic 

Systems department, which employs 55 engineers, 30 percent of whom 

have more than 5 months’ training or work experience in the United 

States. In addition to developing products for Honeywell, the lab also 

“helps local customers in China on avionics products/system development/support by using Honeywell technologies” (“Honeywell Technology Solutions Lab”). Other Honeywell divisions such as Specialty 

Materials, Transportation, and Automation & Control also maintain 

specialized research facilities in China.

In November 2009, Honeywell opened its China Aerospace 

Academy in Shanghai to train aerospace engineers. The courses offered 

include Technology, Certification, Program Management, Six Sigma 

Management & Leadership Training, Air-Worthiness Training, and 

Total Quality Management (“Honeywell China Aerospace Academy 

Opens; Provides Training to Customers,” 2009).

Parker Aerospace

Parker Aerospace has the following joint venture in China:

• Unspecified interest in a prospective joint venture with the AVIC 

Systems Company to be based in Nanjing, announced in April 

2010. The new venture will support the development of the 

hydraulic and fuel systems for the C919. A significant portion of 

the systems’ component design, testing, manufacture, and integration will take place at the new facility. The program is expected 

to generate more than $2.5 billion in revenue over its life cycle for 

Parker (“Parker Aerospace, COMAC, and AVIC Systems Hold 

Contract Signing Ceremony for Fuel, Inerting, and Hydraulic 

Systems on New C919 Aircraft”).
The Role of Foreign Firms 55

Pratt & Whitney

Pratt & Whitney has the following joint ventures in China:

• 78.3-percent interest in Chengdu Aerotech Manufacturing 

Co., Ltd., a joint venture with a Chinese consortium led by the 

Chengdu Engine Group Company. With an initial investment 

of $25.1 million, it was the first Sino-foreign joint venture in the 

aviation industry when it was established in February 1996. The 

company produces components for commercial aircraft engines 

and industrial gas turbines. Currently it employs more than 200 

employees (“Chengdu Aerotech Manufacturing Co., Ltd.”).

• 20-percent interest in Xi’an Airfoil Technology Co., Ltd., a threepartner joint venture with the Xi’an Aero-Engine Group (51 percent) and Israeli-based Pratt & Whitney joint venture Blades 

Technology International (29 percent), established in 1997. The 

company produces compressor airfoils. With a production capacity of $60 million in annual sales, the company produces mainly 

for export (“Xi’an Airfoil Technology Co., Ltd.”).

• Pratt & Whitney (Canada) holds a 49-percent interest in Zhuzhou South Pratt & Whitney Aero-engine Co., Ltd., a joint venture with China National South Aero-Engine Co. in Zhuzhou, 

Hunan. The joint venture was launched in 1998 and manufactures components for turboprop aircraft engines. As of 2007, the 

company had 217 employees (“Zhuzhou South Pratt & Whitney 

Aero-engine Co., Ltd.,” 2007).

• 49-percent interest in the Shanghai Pratt & Whitney Aircraft 

Engine Maintenance Company, a CFM56 engine overhaul facility, with Shanghai-based China Eastern Airlines. Established in 

2006 with an initial investment of $99 million, it is said to be the 

largest (and Pratt & Whitney’s only) engine MRO facility in the 

Asia-Pacific region (“China Eastern and P&W Partner—Largest 

Aircraft Engine MRO Facility in Asia-Pacific Goes into Service,” 

2009).

Rockwell Collins

Rockwell Collins has the following joint ventures in China:
56 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

• Unspecified interest in a prospective joint venture with China 

Electronics Technology Avionics Co., Ltd (CETCA), announced 

in July 2010, to provide communications and navigation equipment for the COMAC C919 project. The prospective venture is 

expected to be based in Chengdu, Sichuan (“Rockwell Collins 

Selected to Provide Communication and Navigation Systems for 

COMAC C919,” 2010).

• Unspecified interest in a prospective joint venture with China 

Leihua Electronic Technology Research Institute (LETRI), 

announced in July 2010, to provide an integrated flight-data 

surveillance system for the COMAC C919 project. LETRI, a 

research division of AVIC, has previously worked with Rockwell Collins to assemble and test weather radar, radar antenna 

mounts, and TCAS equipment for inclusion in Rockwell Collins’ 

surveillance systems sold to airlines throughout the world. The 

prospective new venture is expected to be based in Wuxi, Jiangsu 

(“Rockwell Collins to Provide Integrated Surveillance System for 

COMAC C919,” 2010).

In connection with its successful bid to supply the C919’s cabin 

core system, Rockwell Collins will collaborate with the Shanghai Aero 

Measurement-Controlling Research Institute (SAMRI) in the design, 

development, and integration of the system. According to Rockwell 

statements, the new system will leverage innovations from the Rockwell Collins Venue Cabin Management System to develop a “nextgeneration backbone” for the C919’s cabin core system. SAMRI is a 

subsidiary of AVIC (“Rockwell Collins Selected to Provide Cabin Core 

System for COMAC C919,” 2010). 

Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation

Sikorsky’s industrial cooperation with China dates back to 1995, when 

a Chinese consortium led by the Changhe Aircraft Industries Corporation and the China Helicopter Research and Development Institute 

participated in Sikorsky’s Team S-92 project and undertook the design 

and manufacture of the S-92’s tail pylon and horizontal stabilizer. 

China’s role in the project is limited, and the project has not led to 
The Role of Foreign Firms 57

significant Sikorsky sales in China. As of 2008, China had purchased 

only one S-92A in the offshore oil support role, and between 1998 

and 2008, Sikorsky sold only 17 medium helicopters and 24 light helicopters in China (Zhang, 2008, p. 38; Zhao and Ma, 2009, p. 63). 

Nevertheless, it is claimed that the project helped the Chinese helicopter industry take a major step forward in modern manufacturing and 

industrial management techniques. After a decade of relatively slow 

development, Sikorsky’s Chinese presence received a major boost in 

June 2006, when Sikorsky signed an MOU with AVIC II for collaboration on the development and production of civil helicopters. Several 

subcontracts and joint ventures soon followed. 

In 2003, Sikorsky established a joint-venture subsidiary in Shanghai with a Chinese private-sector developer of light and ultralight helicopters. Initially, the company was engaged primarily in providing 

maintenance services and training classes to Sikorsky’s Chinese customers. In January 2008, the joint venture was reorganized, with AVIC 

joining as the lead Chinese partner through its subsidiaries Changhe 

Aircraft and Shanghai Xinsheng. The reorganized company had 

$6 million in registered capital, with Sikorsky holding a 49-percent 

stake. The company expanded its business to provide supply-chain 

management services, as well as post-sales customer support to both 

Sikorsky’s and Changhe’s civil fleet in China (“AVIC II Joins Shanghai 

Sikorsky,” 2008; Chen, 2008). 

Non-U.S. Companies

Airbus SAS

Airbus China opened its Beijing office in 1990. It now employs more 

than 270 people in China, the majority of whom are Chinese nationals, and operates a string of local customer-support offices to provide 

assistance to airlines. Airbus subsidiaries in China include the Hua-Ou 

Aviation Training Centre in Beijing; the nearby Hua-Ou Aviation 

Support Centre; the Airbus (Beijing) Engineering Centre (ABEC), 

where design work on new Airbus programs is conducted; and, newly 

established in October 2009, a logistics center in Tianjin to optimize 

supply-chain management for all of Airbus’s production facilities in 

China (“Airbus in China”).
58 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

Airbus has the following joint ventures in China:

• 70-percent interest in the Airbus (Beijing) Engineering Centre, 

a joint venture between Airbus and AVIC. Launched in 2006, 

ABEC’s engineers work on specific design packages for new Airbus 

programs, including the design and development of the Airbus 

A350 XWB. (China is allocated 5 percent of the design and manufacturing work on the A350 airframe, per a 2007 MOU.) By 

2009, the center employed some 200 Chinese engineers (“Industrial Cooperation and Technology Transfers”).

• 51-percent interest in Airbus FALC, Tianjin, a joint venture 

between Airbus and a Chinese consortium of the Tianjin Free 

Trade Zone and AVIC. The facility performs final assembly of 

A320-series aircraft (“Industrial Cooperation and Technology 

Transfers”).

• 20-percent interest in Hafei Airbus Composite Material Manufacturing Center, located in Harbin, a joint venture between 

Airbus and a Chinese consortium led by HAIG. The manufacturing center is intended to supply composite components for the 

A350 XWB project, as well as the A320 family. Construction 

began in June 2009, and the new plant delivered its first work 

package, a set of A320 elevators, in July 2010. The facility will 

supply elevators, rudders, and horizontal-tail-plane spars for the 

A320 and is also an exclusive supplier for A350 rudders, elevators, and maintenance doors. The facility expected to employ 100 

workers by the end of 2010 and 600 by 2016 (“Airbus Harbin JV 

Plant Delivers 1st Work Package,” 2010).

In addition, Airbus has provided technical training to thousands 

of maintenance engineers, pilots, and cabin crew (many of whom were 

from outside China) at its Beijing training center since 1998. Billed 

as “the most modern such facility in the country,” the training center 

contains two full simulators, one for the A320 family and one for the 

A330/A340 family (“Airbus in China”). 

Airbus has also experimented with other forms of industrial collaboration. For example, following the cancellation of the Airbus-AVIC 

AE31X program in 1998, Airbus invited Chinese participation in the 
The Role of Foreign Firms 59

design of the A318, a shortened derivative of the A319 developed as a 

low-cost alternative to the AE31X as Airbus’s entry in the regional jets 

category. Subsequently, a team of Chinese engineers participated in the 

development of the new aircraft (“Airbus in China”).

AgustaWestland

AgustaWestland is a relative latecomer to China, having delivered only 

about 25 helicopters to Chinese operators as of late 2009. Agusta’s 

industrial collaboration with China began in 1999, when Agusta was 

awarded a $30 million contract to design and develop the transmission system for the China Medium Helicopter program (“Agusta and 

Jiangxi Changhe Aviation Industries Signed a Joint Venture Agreement,” 2004).1 In 2004, Agusta formed a joint venture with Changhe 

Aircraft for the production and local support of the Agusta A109 helicopter. As of 2009, the joint-venture company, the Changhe Agusta 

Helicopter Co., Ltd., had the capacity for final assembly of the A109, as 

well as the ability to manufacture the fuselage and various other components. Agusta is reportedly considering introducing other models for 

final assembly in China (Zhao and Ma, 2009, p. 66).

Antonov Aeronautical Scientific/Technical Complex

Although Antonov ASTC, of Ukraine, has a long-standing relationship with the Chinese aviation industry, most of that collaboration 

has been focused on the development of military transports such as 

the turboprop Y-8. Antonov’s participation in the commercial aircraft 

sector has been more limited, although it provided key assistance 

in critical areas such as wing design, integral airframe construction 

strength analysis, and various wind-tunnel tests for the ARJ21 (“Building of the First ARJ-21 Designed with the Participation of Antonov Is 

Completed,” 2007). However, Antonov does not appear to be involved 

in the C919 project, based on available information. As of November 2010, Antonov does not have any known subcontracting or jointventure relationships with the Chinese aviation industry.

1 According to Jane’s, the program became the basis for the WZ-10 attack helicopter. See 

Endres, 2006.
60 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

Bombardier

Bombardier’s presence in China is concentrated primarily in its railtransportation division, which employs more than 3,500 people 

through three joint ventures and seven wholly foreign-owned enterprises. The company’s China operations are headquartered in Beijing, 

and its commercial aircraft and customer-services operations are based 

in Shanghai. Its business aircraft operations are based in Hong Kong 

(“Bombardier in China”).

During the 2007 Paris Air Show, Bombardier Aerospace signed a 

risk- and revenue-sharing agreement with AVIC to develop the ARJ21-

900, the 105-seat version of AVIC’s new regional jet (ButterworthHayes, 2010, p. 27). According to company statements, Bombardier 

will provide technical assistance in the development of the ARJ21 program. In 2008, Bombardier gave long-time subcontractor Shenyang 

Aircraft Co. design authority on major supplied parts of Bombardier’s 

new C-series regional jets. In addition, through its design informationtechnology system, Bombardier is linking its offices in Montreal to 

SAC’s Shenyang offices for online, live knowledge-sharing (“Bombardier in China: Local Partners and Suppliers”). 

Embraer SA

Embraer SA opened its first representative office in Beijing in May 2000. 

Over the next decade, the company established a spare-parts distribution center in Beijing and opened the first Embraer production facility 

outside of Brazil, a joint venture with HAIG in Harbin to produce the 

ERJ 145 family of aircraft. As of 2007, the company employed 230 

people in China at its various subsidiary units (“Embraer in China”).

Embraer has the following joint venture in China:

• 51-percent interest in Harbin Embraer Aircraft Industry (HEAI), 

a joint venture between Embraer and HAIG.

The Eurocopter Group

Eurocopter’s industrial collaboration with China dates back to 1980, 

when its predecessor Aérospatiale contracted with HAIG to produce the 
The Role of Foreign Firms 61

4-ton-class AS365N Dauphin II under license as the Z-9. The program proved highly successful, and HAIG became Eurocopter’s primary partner in China. At the same time, Eurocopter became a leading source of technology for the Chinese helicopter industry, receiving 

a $70 million to $80 million contract in 1997 to help develop the rotor 

system for a new Chinese medium helicopter, subsequently associated 

with the Z-10 attack helicopter (Endres, 2006). Over time, Eurocopter 

became the leading foreign helicopter maker in China, accounting for 

more than 40 percent of the Chinese civil helicopter fleet as of 2009. 

Eurocopter senior management acknowledges that the key to the company’s success lies in its willingness to collaborate on the basis of the 

latest available technology (Zhao and Ma, 2009, p. 65). 

To date, Eurocopter’s joint projects with HAIG include:

• Licensed production of the AS365N Dauphin II as the Z-9. The 

initial 1980 agreement provided for 48 sets of AS365N kits to be 

assembled in Harbin, and in 1993, a follow-on contract for 22 

additional sets was signed. In 1992, the Z-9B, an “indigenized” 

variant with 71.9 percent Chinese-made content, made its first 

flight. It is believed that the PLA subsequently took delivery of 

more than 150 Z-9Bs and its follow-on variants. Over time, the 

Z-9 became the most produced helicopter series in China, with 

over 200 units delivered to military and civilian customers so far. 

HAIG has also developed several improved variants of the Z-9, 

the latest of which is the H450, with an enhanced payload. The 

PLA is said to be interested in adopting this variant to replace its 

older Z-9s if the program is successful (“Zhi-9 Utility Helicopter,” 2009). 

• Joint development and co-production of the EC-120/HC-120 in 

a three-way partnership between Eurocopter, HAIG, and Singapore Technologies Aerospace, Ltd. (STAero), contracted since 

1993. The EC120 is a single-engine light helicopter with a maximum takeoff weight of approximately 1,700 kg. Its design is considered highly advanced, with extensive use of composite materials and a new-generation shrouded tail rotor. At the time of the 
62 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

project’s launch, it was the first Chinese risk-sharing partnership 

in a helicopter program (“HC-120 Helicopter”). 

Initially HAIG, which has a 24-percent stake in the program, produced the fuselage and fuel system for the machine, 

while Eurocopter (61 percent) was responsible for overall technological leadership and final assembly. In 2004, a second assembly 

line with the capacity to produce 20 aircraft per year was opened 

in Harbin, although HAIG continues to supply the fuselages on 

all EC120s produced. To date, more than 600 EC120s have been 

delivered to customers around the world (Zhao and Ma, 2009, 

p. 65). One operator is U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 

which has 15 of these aircraft. 

• Joint development of the EC175/Z-15 7-ton-class medium utility 

helicopter, contracted in 2006. The project is a 50-50 joint venture between Eurocopter and HAIG, with Eurocopter serving as 

the technical lead and systems integrator. Eurocopter has responsibility for the EC175’s main gearbox, tail rotor, avionics, doors, 

and transparencies, while HAIG is responsible for the airframe, 

tail and intermediate gearboxes, main rotor, fuel system, flight 

controls, and landing gears (Zhao and Ma, 2009, p. 65). The first 

prototype made its first flight in December 2009 (Dubois, 2010).

While all versions of the aircraft were originally expected to 

be powered by two Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6C-67E turboshafts, in early 2010, French engine-maker Turbomeca confirmed 

that it will collaborate with AVIC to develop a new turboshaft 

based on the Turbomeca Ardiden engine for the Chinese Z-15. 

AVIC will develop the compressor and the engine installation in 

Harbin, and Turbomeca will develop the hot section and controls. 

The new engine, identified as the WZ60, is said to offer 15 percent better fuel economy. But perhaps even more important for 

the Chinese, a Chinese engine would avoid potential U.S. embargoes on the Pratt & Whitney engine once the Z-15 enters Chinese 

military service (Morris, 2010).
The Role of Foreign Firms 63

In addition, since 2002, Eurocopter has been a partner (having 

a 34-percent interest) in the CITIC Offshore Helicopter Company 

(COHC) General Aviation Maintenance and Engineering Co., a 

Shenzhen-based MRO joint venture with COHC. The facility is said 

to be the largest helicopter MRO facility in China and the only such 

facility in China to receive European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) 

certification (Zhao and Ma, 2009, p. 65). 

Liebherr Aerospace, SAS

Liebherr has the following joint ventures in China:

• 50-percent interest in Liebherr Hangda Aerospace Technologies 

(Wuhan) Co., Ltd., a joint venture with the Wuhan Hangda Aero 

Science and Technology Development Co. The facility opened in 

2007 and provides maintenance service on all Liebherr Aerospace 

products, including heat exchangers installed on Airbus, Boeing, 

Bombardier, and Embraer aircraft, as well as future COMAC aircraft operating in China (“Liebherr-Aerospace Establishes Joint 

Venture with a Chinese Partner,” 2007). 

• Unspecified interest in a prospective joint venture with AVIC 

subsidiary Landing-gear Advanced Manufacturing Co., Ltd. 

(LAMC) in Changsha, Hunan, announced in July 2010. The 

joint venture will supply the landing-gear system for the COMAC 

C919, including the main landing gear and nose landing gear, 

extension and retraction system, nose-wheel steering system, and 

position and warning system (“Liebherr-Aerospace Selected for 

the New Chinese Aircraft Program C919,” 2010).

• A technology-cooperation and work-share agreement with AVIC 

subsidiary Nanjing Engineering Institute of Aircraft Systems 

(NEIAS), announced in July 2010, to supply the air management system of the COMAC C919. The package will include the 

bleed air system, the air-conditioning system, the air-distribution system, the cabin-pressure control system, the wing anti-ice 

system, and the avionics ventilation system. Liebherr hopes that 

the work-share partnership established with NEIAS can be used 
64 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

for future projects (“Liebherr-Aerospace Selected for the New 

Chinese Aircraft Program C919,” 2010).

Rolls-Royce Group PLC

Rolls-Royce has the following joint ventures in China:

• Unspecified interest in XR Aero-components, Ltd. (XRA) in 

Xi’an, a joint venture with the Xi’an Aero Engine Company, 

established in 1996. Rolls-Royce describes XRA as a “high-tech 

joint venture” specializing in the manufacture of turbine-nozzle 

guide vanes and low-pressure turbine blades for use in RollsRoyce engines on various Gulfstream, Bombardier, and Boeing 

aircraft. The facility has been in operation since 1998 (“Working 

Together,” 2009).

• Unspecified interest in Hong Kong Aero Engine Services Limited 

(HAESL) in Hong Kong (“Rolls-Royce in Hong Kong,” 2009).

Rolls-Royce’s technological partnership with the Chinese aviation 

industry dates back to the 1970s, when the company first transferred 

overhaul technology for its Spey 512 engine (used on Hawker Siddeley 

Trident civilian jetliners) to China and then, in 1975, granted a production license for the military-use Spey 202 to the Xi’an Aero-Engine 

Company, along with 50 complete engines. It took decades for China to 

master the production technology for the Spey, however, and in 2001, 

another 80 to 90 reconditioned British-made Speys were delivered to 

China. Actual production of the Spey 202 (designated the WS9 Qin 

Ling in China) in Xi’an apparently did not begin until about 1998. As 

of 2008, at least 110 XAC JH-7 fighter-bombers, the only aircraft in 

China that uses the Spey, were estimated to have been produced. Since 

each JH-7 is equipped with two engines, this would mean that at least 

80 Speys had been produced in China at that point, suggesting that the 

production technology has now been mastered (“Rolls-Royce China”; 

“History,” 2009; “Rolls-Royce Spey,” 2010; “XAE WS9 Qin Ling,” 

2010; “XAE—Xian Aero-Engine Corporation,” 2010).

Since the 1970s, Rolls-Royce has deepened its relationship with 

China. It has developed technical and managerial training programs 
The Role of Foreign Firms 65

with a range of Chinese organizations, including AVIC, CAAC, and 

several government ministries. In particular, Rolls-Royce collaborates 

with CAAC in operating a joint facility in Tianjin, established in 1997, 

for the training of technicians, engineers, and managers (“Rolls-Royce 

China”; “History,” 2009).

In addition, Rolls-Royce is involved in a number of research programs with Chinese universities and research institutes in the area of 

aerospace engine technology. These include the Joint Engineering Team 

(JET) program with AVIC and a more recent (February 2009) joint 

research project with the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) focusing on new manufacturing techniques and materials for low-pressure 

turbine blades. In July 2010, Rolls-Royce signed an MOU with HAIG 

regarding collaboration in composite-materials research (“Rolls-Royce: 

Procurement in China to Increase Three- to Four-fold over the Next 

Five-to-Eight Years,” 2010).

The Safran Group

Safran Turbomeca and AVIC II started working together in the 1980s, 

when Turbomeca granted the China National South Aero Engine Corporation (SAEC) a production license for the Arriel 1 engine for the 

Z-9 helicopter. Today, Turbomeca is the leading helicopter enginemaker in China, with 500 engines serving in both the civilian and 

military sectors, equipping roughly half of the Chinese helicopter fleet 

(“Turbomeca [Safran Group] Signs Agreement for Training Programs 

in China,” 2009). In 2005, Turbomeca secured a major contract for 

200 Arriel 2C turboshaft engines from AVIC II, along with a partial production license. In connection with the contract, a cooperation framework agreement was signed, providing for increased collaboration with the Chinese aerospace engine industry. Turbomeca’s 

first manufacturing joint venture in China was the Beijing Turbomeca 

Changkong Aero-Engine Control Equipment Co., Ltd., a partnership 

with AVIC subsidiary Beijing Changkong Machinery, established in 

2006. The facility assembles and tests fuel-control units and hydromechanical units of turboshaft engines for both Turbomeca and 

Beijing Changkong (“Signature Between Turbomeca and Beijing 

Changkong Machinery for a Joint Venture Company,” 2006). In late 
66 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

2009, Turbomeca formed another partnership with the Civil Aviation 

Flight University of China (CAFUC). The new venture will develop 

a Turbomeca maintenance training program in Chengdu to qualify 

advanced line-maintenance engineers (“Turbomeca [Safran Group] 

Signs Agreement for Training Programs in China,” 2009). In early 

2009, Turbomeca revealed that it was participating in a 50-50 joint 

venture with AVIC to develop a new-generation 1,500-kW turboshaft 

engine, to be manufactured primarily in China. The project was said 

to be the first joint development of an aerospace engine between China 

and a Western aerospace company (Zhang and Liu, 2009, p. 50). Subsequently, Turbomeca confirmed that it was co-developing a derivative 

of its Ardiden engine with China to power the Z-15/EC-175 medium 

helicopter. The Z-15 is expected to be dual-use, and the new engine 

would allow the Chinese to avoid potential U.S. embargoes on its original Pratt & Whitney engine. Turbomeca engines have already been 

licensed by the French government for military export (Morris, 2010). 

The Safran Group also has the following joint ventures in China:

• 51.8-percent interest in the Sichuan Services Aero Engine Maintenance Co., a Chengdu-based joint venture with the Air China 

Group, established in 1999. The facility offers a wide range of 

MRO services for CFM56-3, CFM56-5B, and CFM56-7 engines 

(“Worldwide—Sichuan Services Aero Engine Maintenance Company [SSAMC]”). 

• 85-percent interest in the Snecma Xinyi Airfoil Castings Co., 

Ltd., a Guiyang-based joint venture with the Guizhou Xinyi 

Machinery Factory, established in July 2006. The plant produces 

low-pressure turbine blades, nozzle guide vanes, and low-pressure 

turbine seals for the CFM56 family of commercial jet engines 

(“Worldwide—Snecma Xinyi Airfoil Castings”).
The Role of Foreign Firms 67

Extent to Which China-Based Production Supplies U.S. 

Aerospace Firms

The value of aerospace imports to the United States from China was 

about $421 million in 2009, about 1 percent of total U.S. aerospace 

imports. This made China the tenth most important aerospace supplier 

to the United States. See Figures 4.1 and 4.2. By contrast, aerospace 

exports to China from the United States totaled $5.314 billion in 2009, 

or 6.5 percent of U.S. aerospace exports. See Figure 4.3. The disparity between these figures should not be taken to imply that the United 

States is contributing more to China’s aviation industry than China is 

contributing to the U.S. aviation industry. The vast majority of aerospace exports from the United States to China appear to be complete 

aircraft sold directly to Chinese airlines. In 2009, Boeing sold 72 large 

commercial airplanes to Chinese airlines, including 61 737s, four 747s, 

and seven 777s (“Orders and Deliveries”). Boeing does not disclose the 

total amount paid for these aircraft, but according to Boeing’s website, 

737s cost between $60 million and $80 million, while both the 747 

and 777 cost more than $200 million each (“Commercial Airplanes 

—Jet Prices”). If the Chinese airlines paid $60 million for each 737 

and $200 million for each 747 or 777, the total amount would have 

been $5.86 billion, more than actual U.S. aerospace exports to China 

that year. Even if the Chinese airlines paid only 90 percent of these 

amounts, these sales would account for all but $40 million of U.S. 

aerospace exports to China in 2009. Most of the exports from China 

to the United States, by contrast, are inputs to final products that are 

completed in the United States. 

Aerospace imports from China grew at an average annual rate 

of 25 percent between 2005 and 2009, while total aerospace imports 

from all sources grew at an average annual rate of only about 6 percent, suggesting that China’s share of U.S. aerospace imports will likely 

increase rapidly in coming years. 
68 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

Figure 4.1

U.S. Aerospace Imports, 2009

SOURCE: International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce, 2010.

RAND MG1100-4.1

8,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0

9,000

7,000

6,000

5,000

Imports (millions of dollars)

France

Canada

United Kingdom

Germany

Japan

Italy

Israel

Brazil

Mexico

China

Korea

Singapore

Netherlands

Switzerland

Other

Most China-based production that supplies U.S. (and other Western) aerospace firms comes from either the joint ventures described 

above or the various subsidiaries of AVIC. According to figures 

released at AVIC’s 2009 company summit meeting, the total value of 

the company’s subcontract deliveries in 2008 reached $639 million, a 

35-percent year-on-year increase over 2007. More than half of that 

value came from engine subcontracts, which accounted for $330 million (“AVIC Aims to Deepen Reform in 2009,” 2009). 

To date, Boeing is by far the largest foreign customer of the 

Chinese aviation manufacturing industry. According to information 

released by Boeing, since the 1980s, Boeing has purchased more than 

$1.5 billion of aviation hardware and services from China, and it holds 

active contracts with Chinese suppliers valued at more than $2.5 billion. All of Boeing’s commercial aircraft lines now incorporate parts 
The Role of Foreign Firms 69

Figure 4.2

U.S. Aerospace Imports, 2005–2009

SOURCE: International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce, 2010.

RAND MG1100-4.2

20

15

10

5

0

40

35

30

25

2005 2006 2007

Year

2008 2009

Imports (billions of dollars)

Other

Korea

India

Singapore

UAE

Brazil

Canada

China

Germany

Japan

United

Kingdom

France

and assemblies built in China, although most of these parts are relatively minor. Boeing’s subcontract relationship with China received a 

major boost in 2005, after China contracted with Boeing for up to 

60 Boeing 787 Dreamliners, a deal worth $7.2 billion at list prices. 

Soon after, a number of Chinese firms were selected as exclusive, 

single-source suppliers for the 787, and Boeing also “introduced” its 

existing network of suppliers to Chinese firms, encouraging them to 

purchase from Chinese suppliers. To date, U.S.-based Boeing suppliers with Chinese subcontracting relationships include the Eaton Corp. 

(777 fuel-system components), GE (jet engine components and parts 

assembly), Goodrich (jet engine fan cowls, 787 nacelle components), 

Honeywell (cabin management systems, engine parts, and other avionics components for the 737 and 757), and Pratt & Whitney (engine 

components, such as compressor airfoils).
70 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

Figure 4.3

U.S. Aerospace Exports, 2005–2009

SOURCE: International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce, 2010.

RAND MG1100-4.3

40

30

20

10

0

90

80

60

50

2005 2006 2007

Year

2008 2009

70

Exports (billions of dollars)

Other

Korea

India

Singapore

UAE

Brazil

Canada

China

Germany

Japan

United

Kingdom

France

It is worth noting that many of these subcontracts are themselves 

correlated with the U.S. supplier’s success in penetrating the Chinese 

market. For example, while GE’s purchase of jet engine components in 

China reached $284 million in 2007, Chinese engine orders with GE 

reached more than $1 billion (list price) that year. In addition, some 

of the Chinese production subcontracts increase American exports in 

other sectors, and joint ventures with Chinese firms may create jobs 

in the United States. The aluminum alloys used for Xi’an Aircraft’s 

subcontract for 737 vertical-tail assemblies and Shanghai Aircraft’s 

subcontract for horizontal stabilizers, for instance, are sourced mainly 

from Alcoa’s production facilities in Indiana and Arizona. And GE’s 

new joint venture with AVIC Systems to produce avionics systems will 

reportedly create more than 200 jobs in the United States. 

Finally, although Boeing and many of its U.S.-based first-tier suppliers have established MRO service facilities in China, most of the 

customers who presently use these facilities are Chinese.
The Role of Foreign Firms 71

The major Western aviation-component production subcontracts 

and servicing agreements in China that we were able to identify are 

described below.

U.S. Companies

Alcoa, Inc.

Alcoa operates a wholly owned fastening-systems manufacturing facility in Suzhou (Alcoa Fastening Systems (Suzhou) Co., Ltd.), which 

began operations in 2006, as well as aerospace service and logistics 

facilities in Shanghai (“Alcoa in China”). 

Alcoa has been a long-term supplier of aluminum products to Chinese aircraft manufacturers for their Boeing subcontracts. These manufacturers include the XAC for Boeing 737 vertical-tail assemblies and 

the Shanghai Aircraft Manufacturing Factory for Boeing 737 horizontal-stabilizer assemblies. However, none of these contracts was sourced 

from Alcoa’s China facilities. Instead, the aluminum was produced at 

facilities in Indiana, Arizona, and South Korea (“Alcoa Expands Supplier Relationship with Shanghai Aircraft of China,” 2005). Similarly, 

although Alcoa materials are used extensively on the COMAC ARJ21, 

all of them are sourced from facilities outside of China. These materials 

include advanced heat-treated sheet and plate alloys used throughout the 

aircraft from Alcoa’s Davenport, Iowa, plant; extrusions made from proprietary alloys and process technologies for the wing and fuselage stringers and floor beams, sourced from Alcoa’s Lafayette, Indiana, Chandler, 

Arizona, and Changwon (South Korea) plants; and airfoil castings and 

structural components from Alcoa’s power and propulsion plants in 

Whitehall, Michigan, and Wichita Falls, Texas (“Alcoa Advanced 

Aerospace Alloys and Materials Used on China’s First Home-Produced 

Regional Jet, ARJ21-700,” 2008). 

The Boeing Company

According to information released by Boeing, since the 1980s, Boeing 

has purchased more than $1.5 billion of aviation hardware and services 

from China. Today, Boeing and Boeing suppliers have active supplier 

contracts with China’s aviation industry valued at over $2.5 billion, 

and Boeing claims to be the largest foreign customer of the Chinese 
72 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

aviation manufacturing industry. All of Boeing’s commercial aircraft 

lines now incorporate parts and assemblies built in China. However, 

Boeing does not release annual procurement numbers (“Boeing in 

China,” 2007).

Current Boeing work packages and procurement at Chinese enterprises include major parts (including some composite parts) on the 787 

Dreamliner, the 747-8, and in particular, the 737NG. China is also 

the first location for the 747-400 Boeing Converted Freighter (BCF) 

program, which converts older 747 passenger aircraft into freighters 

(“Boeing in China,” 2007). Boeing’s subcontracting relationships in 

China are summarized in Table 4.3.

In 2005, Boeing selected a number of Chinese manufacturers to 

be suppliers to the 787 program. These contracts marked several milestones in Boeing’s relationship with China: For the first time, Chinese 

firms were selected as exclusive, single-source suppliers for a major new 

airliner, and also for the first time, essential composite structures were 

subcontracted to Chinese suppliers. According to Boeing, the value of 

the 787 packages in China could reach several hundred million dollars 

over the lifetime of the program. In addition, Boeing for the first time 

“introduced” its global network of suppliers to Chinese firms, “encouraging them to engage with Chinese industry.” As a result, China has 

gained a “very significant, expanding role in the Boeing supplier network at all levels” (“Boeing’s Investments in China,” 2010).

Cytec Engineered Materials

Cytec Engineered Materials operates an aerospace composite-materials production facility in Shanghai to supply carbon fiber epoxy prepreg material for commercial transport programs throughout the AsiaPacific region (“Cytec Eyes Jumbo Jet Options,” 2009).

Eaton Corporation

Eaton began its operations in China in 1993 with a joint venture in 

Shandong to manufacture steering-control units and hydraulic motors, 

a venture that it subsequently acquired. Today, Eaton operates roughly 

30 production facilities in China, the majority of which are wholly 
The Role of Foreign Firms 73

Table 4.3Current Boeing Work Packages and Procurement at Chinese-Owned Enterprises

Product Group

Subcontractor 737 Series 747 Series 767 Series 777 Series 787 Series Misc.

Baoji Group Ltd., Shaanxi (since 2006)

Titanium ingot,

plate, and sheet 

Boeing Tianjin Composites Co., Tianjin (Boeing joint venture since 2002)

Composite panels and parts, including flight deck, closeout panels, dorsal fin, wing-to-body fairing, cover panels, wing fixed trailing edge, wing fixed leading edge, tail cone, interior panels 

Misc. composite panels, door liners, fixed trailing edge

Wing fixed trailing edges, dry bay barriers, empennage panels

Wing fixed trailing edges, dry bay barriers, flight-deck interior panels, empennage panels

Trailing edge panels for the vertical fin (2005), additional panels (2007), wingto-body fairing supplier assistance

Changhe Aircraft Industries Co., Jingdezhen, Jiangxi (since 2008) 

Components for 767-300 freighter conversion 

Chengdu Commercial Aircraft, Sichuan (since 2005)

Forward entry doors, overwing exit doors

747-8 ailerons and spoilers, single source (contracted 2007, first delivery 2009); 747-8 horizontal stabilizer parts and subassemblies (contracted 2007)

Composite rudder, single source (contracted 2005, first parts delivery 2006, first full rudder 2007)
74 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry Table 4.3—Continued Product Group Subcontractor 737 Series 747 Series 767 Series 777 Series 787 Series Misc.

HAIG, Harbin (since 2005)

Upper and lower panels for wingto-body fairings, single source (contracted 2005, first delivery 2007); vertical fin parts (contracted 2007); tier-III detailed parts (first delivery 2008)

Hong Yuan (HYFC), Sanyuan (since 1984)

Titanium forgings, 12 for each 747 

Shanghai Aviation Manufacturing Company (since 1995)

737NG horizontal stabilizers (contract 1995; more than 1,200 sets delivered)

Shaanxi Aircraft Industry Co., Hanzhong, Shaanxi (since 2008)

Components for 767-300 freighter conversion

Shenyang Commercial Aircraft Company, Liaoning (since 1996)

Aft fuselage subassemblies (1996/2001),expanded to include “Texas Star” (2004),expanded to full aft section 48 (2007)

Vertical-fin leading edge, single source (contracted in 2005, first delivery 2007)
The Role of Foreign Firms 75

Table 4.3—Continued

Product Group

Subcontractor 737 Series 747 Series 767 Series 777 Series 787 Series Misc.

Southwest Aluminum, Chongqing (since 1988)

Aluminum forgings, four for each 747 

Quick Electronics, Beijing (since 1997)

PC, print hardware, servers in support of Boeing IT Asia

Taikoo Aircraft Engineering Co., Xiamen (Boeing joint venture since 2004)

Parts, subassemblies, and touch labor for 747-400 BCF program

Xi’an Aircraft Industrial Co. (since 1995)

737NG vertical fin (contracted 1995; 1,000 delivered)

747-400 fixed trailing edge wing ribs, single source (contract 1996, more than 550 sets delivered),747-8 inboard flaps, single source (contract 2007, first delivery 2009),747-8 fixed trailing edge wing ribs (contracted 2007, initial delivery 2008),747 floor beams and subassemblies for BCF program (2004) 
76 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

owned, with about 10,000 employees and total sales approaching 

$1 billion in 2010. Eaton’s facilities in China make products for all 

of Eaton’s distinct businesses, from aerospace to automotive (“Eaton 

in China Fact Sheet”). Eaton is a components supplier to the Chinese 

aviation industry and supports other foreign first-tier suppliers on programs including the ARJ21, the MA60, and the Embraer ERJ145. In 

2010, Eaton announced a joint venture with AVIC to supply the fuel 

and hydraulic systems for the COMAC C919. 

Eaton has also developed extensive local sourcing relationships 

with Chinese suppliers. Most recently, Eaton signed a six-year supply 

agreement with AVIC subsidiary Shenyang Liming Aero-Engine 

Group to supply fuel-system components to be used on the Boeing 

777 as well as all Airbus aircraft (Liu, 2009, p. 64).

General Electric (including CFM International, Nexcelle)

General Electric has an extensive presence in China, with more than 

50 manufacturing and service facilities in the country employing 

some 13,000 employees. In 2009, GE’s total annual revenues in China 

exceeded $5.3 billion (“GE in China”). 

Over the past decade, GE Aviation has emerged as the leading jet 

engine supplier in China. As of 2008, there were about 2,000 GE and 

CFM engines in service, with an additional 1,000 on order valued at 

more than $5 billion (list price) (“GE Jet Engine Backlog Climbs to $5 

Billion in China,” 2008). As of September 2010, GE Aviation operated 

five facilities in China, including the CFM International Spares Service Center in Beijing (established in 1996), an on-wing support facility in Xiamen (established in 1998), an engine-overhaul joint venture 

also in Xiamen (established in 1999), the China Operations Center in 

Shanghai (established in 2006) to provide customer support, and a new 

200,000-sq-ft systems manufacturing facility in Suzhou (established in 

2009) to produce autoclaved composite parts, mechanical fabrications, 

structure assembly, and civil-aircraft actuation systems (“GE Expands 

with New Facility Opening in Suzhou,” 2009). 

GE Aviation maintains subcontracting relationships with Chinese 

manufacturers dating back to 1986. As of September 2010, its most 

important local supplier was the Xi’an Aero Engine Corp. (contracted 
The Role of Foreign Firms 77

since 1996), designated a manufacturing technology center to supply 

components for the CFM56-series jet engines (“CFM56 Sourcing and 

Spare Parts Programs Launched in China”). In September 2007, GE 

also contracted with AVIC subsidiary Shenyang Liming Aero Engine 

Group to supply components and undertake parts assembly and testing 

for the CF34-10A engines on the COMAC ARJ21 (“GE: We Believe 

in the Potential of the Chinese Market,” 2008, p. 17). In addition, 

GE procures various other aviation components from Chinese firms 

in Harbin, Shanghai, Sichuan, and Guizhou. In 2007, GE’s purchases 

of jet engine components in China reached $284 million, while Chinese engine orders that year were valued at more than $1 billion (list 

price) (“GE Jet Engine Backlog Climbs to $5 Billion in China,” 2008). 

In 2008, GE Aviation’s direct sourcing in China totaled $365 million 

(“GE Aviation’s Presence in China Continues to Grow,” 2008).

In fall 2009, GE Aviation concluded a number of MOUs with 

AVIC, establishing three joint ventures in connection with GE’s bid on 

the COMAC C919 program. These included a venture to supply engine 

nacelles and components (“AVIC Aircraft and Nexcelle Announce 

Plans for a Nacelle Joint Venture in China,” 2009), a venture to supply 

integrated avionics systems (“GE and AVIC Joint Venture Creates 

New Global Business Opportunities,” 2009), and a final assembly line 

for the CFM LEAP-X1C engines (“CFM and ACAE Sign MOU for 

LEAP-X1C Assembly Line In China,” 2009). GE was subsequently 

awarded the contracts for the propulsion system, engine nacelles, and 

avionics-core processing system of the C919 (“CFM Picked to Power 

China’s Future Plane,” 2010).

Goodrich Corporation

Goodrich launched its first facility in China in 1996, a joint-venture 

MRO facility with Xiamen TAECO to service engine and flightcontrol systems, actuation systems, and various other aviation systems 

and equipment. In June 2009, the company opened another facility 

in Tianjin to provide nacelle and thrust-reverser MRO services and to 

support engine buildup and podding work for the new Airbus A320 

assembly line in the same city. Later that year, Goodrich signed an 
78 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

agreement with XAIC to form two joint ventures to produce landinggear and engine-nacelle components (“2009 Press Releases”).

Since 2003, Goodrich has procured CF34 fan cowls from 

the Boeing Tianjin Composites Co. In 2008, it contracted with 

Hongdu Aviation in Nanchang to build parts kits for the 787 nacelle 

(Butterworth-Hayes, 2010, p. 27).

Hamilton Sundstrand

Hamilton Sundstrand launched its first production facility in China 

in 1994, establishing a joint venture in Shenzhen to produce rotaryscrew air compressors. In 2000, it established an additional joint venture in Xiamen to provide MRO services to Chinese airlines. The 

Hamilton-Sundstrand Industrial (Shanghai) Co., a wholly owned 

subsidiary, manufactures a range of Milton Roy metering pumps and 

employs more than 130 workers. Most recently, Hamilton Sundstrand 

announced a new joint venture with AVIC Systems Co. in April 2010 

to supply the electrical system for the COMAC C919 program (“China 

Locations”). 

Honeywell International

Honeywell International has an extensive presence in China, with 

about $600 million in total investments and more than 9,000 employees spread across more than 30 subsidiaries and local joint-venture 

companies. Honeywell’s Aerospace division supplies key components 

to several major Chinese aviation programs, including the APU systems for the MA60, the propulsion system for the Z-11, integrated avionics for the Y-12, and various components for the ARJ21 (Liu, 2009, 

p. 61). 

Honeywell Aerospace operates three joint-venture companies 

and one wholly owned subsidiary in China. These include a jointventure MRO facility in Shanghai to service wheels and brakes, 

a joint-venture facility in Xiamen to service APUs and other avionics equipment, a joint venture in Shanghai to produce environmental-control systems, and a wholly owned subsidiary (the Honeywell Aerospace Engine (Suzhou) Co.) to produce cabin-management 

systems and engine parts mainly for re-export back to the United 
The Role of Foreign Firms 79

States. In November 2008, Honeywell selected HAIG as subcontractor for the HTF7000 engine nacelles used on Embraer business jets 

(“Honeywell China—Aerospace”). More recently, in July 2010, Honeywell reached an agreement with AVIC subsidiary FACRI to form a 

50-50 joint venture to supply the flight-control system for the COMAC 

C919 (“Honeywell Selected to Provide Flight Control Fly-by-Wire 

System for COMAC’s C919 Airliner”).

Parker Hannifan

Parker Hannifan was one of the first foreign companies to establish a 

joint venture in China in the early 1980s. The company currently maintains several regional offices and 11 manufacturing facilities (including at least five joint ventures) in China, employing more than 3,000 

employees (“Parker China,” 2009). In April 2010, Parker announced 

a joint venture with AVIC Systems to supply the fuel and hydraulic 

systems for the COMAC C919 (“Parker Aerospace, COMAC, and 

AVIC Systems Hold Contract Signing Ceremony for Fuel, Inerting, 

and Hydraulic Systems on New C919 Aircraft”). Parker also procures machined components from the Jincheng Corp., the Shanghai 

Qi Yi Automotive Company, and Sichuan Golden Dragon Machines 

(Butterworth-Hayes, 2010, p. 27).

Pratt & Whitney

As noted earlier, Pratt & Whitney operates joint-venture production 

facilities in Chengdu, Xi’an, and Zhuzhou that supply various components for its commercial aircraft engines and industrial gas turbines. 

Primus International

Primus International operates a production facility in Suzhou for aircraft components (Butterworth-Hayes, 2010, p. 27).

Rockwell Collins

Although Rockwell Collins has supplied the Chinese market for more 

than 25 years and has provided a range of avionics equipment for Chinese aircraft, including the ARJ21, MA60, Y-8, Y-12, and K-8 military 
80 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

trainer, the company did not own any production facilities in China as 

of September 2010. In connection with its bids on the COMAC C919 

project, however, Rockwell Collins concluded two joint-venture agreements with Chinese companies in 2010 to supply the C919’s communication and navigation systems and integrated flight-data surveillance 

system (“Rockwell Collins to Provide Integrated Surveillance System 

for COMAC C919,” 2010). These new ventures will be based in China. 

In addition, Rockwell Collins won the bid for the C919’s cabin-core 

system and will collaborate with SAMRI in this effort (“Rockwell 

Collins Selected to Provide Cabin Core System for COMAC C919,” 

2010).

Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation

As of October 2010, Sikorsky had awarded subcontracts on its three 

largest commercial helicopter programs to the Changhe Aircraft Industries Corp. in Jingdezhen, Jiangxi. These include:

• Tail-rotor pylon and horizontal stabilizer on the S-92, contracted 

since 1995.

• Airframe components and assemblies for the Schweizer 300C/

CBi light helicopter, contracted since October 2006 (“Schweizer 

Selects Jiangxi Changhe Aircraft to Provide 300CBi Helicopter 

Airframes,” 2006).

• Airframe components for the S-76C++ medium helicopters, contracted since July 2007 (“Sikorsky Aircraft Selects Changhe to 

Supply S-76® Helicopter Airframes,” 2007).

Smiths Aerospace (GE Aviation subsidiary)

Smiths Aerospace operates a production facility in Suzhou to supply 

engine parts and flight-control components (“Smiths Opens Aerospace 

Components Facility in Suzhou,” 2004).

Spirit Aerospace

Spirit Aerospace procures Section 48 for Boeing 737s from Shenyang 

Aircraft Industrial Co.
The Role of Foreign Firms 81

The Timken Company

The Timken Company operates an aerospace precision-products manufacturing center in Chengdu, established in 2006. The facility employs 

200 workers and manufactures ball and cylindrical roller bearings up 

to 12 inches in diameter (“Timken to Launch Aerospace Manufacturing in China,” 2006). The company also designed a custom bearing 

solution for AVIC’s MA-60 turboprop liner. Timken has nearly 4,000 

employees in China, spread across various large-scale manufacturing 

facilities serving primarily the automotive and power-generation industries (“MA-60 Aircraft Land on Custom Timken Bearings,” 2008).

Vought

Vought procures 737 overwing exits and forward entry doors and 747-8 

horizontal-stabilizer parts and subassemblies from Chengdu Commercial Aircraft Co.

Non-U.S. Companies

Airbus SAS

Airbus’s subcontracting relationship with China began in 1985, soon 

after Airbus concluded its first sale in China—a contract for five Airbus 

A310s with the predecessor of today’s China Eastern Airlines. Airbus’s 

first Chinese subcontractor was XAC, which supplied electronic bay 

doors for the A300/310 family of aircraft (“Industrial Cooperation and 

Technology Transfers”; “Airbus in China”). 

Airbus’s presence in China has expanded rapidly in recent years. 

Following a December 2005 Chinese order for 150 A320 aircraft, 

Airbus procurement in China has increased by an average of some 42.5 

percent per year; the company’s annual procurement from China is 

expected to reach $200 million in 2010, nearly six times the 2005 level. 

(For unknown reasons, the English version of the company’s summary 

of its China presence gives the 2010 procurement figure as $120 million.) It is said that more than half of the Airbus fleet in service worldwide today contains Chinese components. Airbus also launched three 

joint ventures with Chinese aviation-industry partners, including a 

complete final assembly line for the A320 family of aircraft established 

in Tianjin in 2008 and a composite manufacturing center in Harbin. 
82 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

According to some reports, annual procurement is projected to reach 

$450 million by 2015 (“New Airbus’ Logistics Hub in Tianjin to Serve 

All Projects,” 2009).

Airbus’s subcontracting relationships in China are summarized 

in Table 4.4.

Bombardier Aerospace (Canada)

According to Bombardier statements, some components of Bombardier 

aircraft have been manufactured in China by subcontractors for more 

than 25 years (“Bombardier in China: Local Partners and Suppliers”). 

In recent years, Bombardier Aerospace has signed several additional 

subcontracting agreements with Chinese manufacturers for its Dash-8 

Q400 and C-Series aircraft (“Bombardier in China: Local Partners 

and Suppliers”).

Shenyang Aircraft Corp. (SAC) is Bombardier’s major subcontractor in China. The contracts include the following:

• Major components, including the empennage and aft and forward fuselage sections on the Dash-8 Q400, amounting to 12 

percent of the aircraft by weight, contracted since 2006.

• Fuselage, center wing box, and doors on the C-series regional jet, 

amounting to more than 10 percent of the work packages, contracted since 2008. According to Bombardier statements, the contract gave SAC design authority on major supplied parts, the first 

contract of this kind with a Chinese subcontractor in the industry. SAC is to be a risk-sharing partner in the design and manufacture of the contracted parts (Butterworth-Hayes, 2010, p. 27).

Fischer Advanced Composite Components (FACC)

FACC, acquired by XAIC in December 2009, procures interior composite panels from Boeing Tianjin Composites Co. (“Xi’an Aircraft 

Acquires Austrian Company FACC,” 2009).
The Role of Foreign Firms 83

Table 4.4Current Airbus Work Packages and Procurement at Chinese-Owned Enterprises

Product Group

Subcontractor A320 Family A330/340 Family A350 XWB A380 Misc.Airbus Final Assembly Line China, Tianjin(Airbus JV since 2008)

Final assembly of A320 family of aircraft (first delivery 2009)

Chengdu Commercial Aircraft, Sichuan 

Rear passenger door, nose-section components (first delivery 2004) 

Spoilers, droop panels (exclusive supplier for both)

Guizhou Aviation Industry Group

Maintenance jigs and tools

Hafei Airbus Composite Material Manufacturing Center (Airbus joint venture since 2009)

Elevators (first delivery 2010), rudders, horizontal tail-plane spars

Elevators, rudders, maintenance doors, belly fairing components (exclusive supplier for all items)

HAIG, Harbin Composite horizontal 

tail-plane spars, composite horizontal tailplane torque boxes

Wing-spar joints

Hong Yuan Aviation Forging and Casting (HYFC), Shaanxi

Titanium forgings

Shanghai Aviation Manufacturing Co.

Cargo door frames (contracted 2006)

Shenyang Aircraft Industrial Corp.

Emergency exit doors (single source), wing fixed leading edges, wing interspar ribs, skin plates

Cargo doors on freighter aircraft
84 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry Table 4.4—Continued Product Group Subcontractor A320 Family A330/340 Family A350 XWB A380 Misc. Xi’an Aircraft Industrial Co. Electronic bay doors, wing fixed trailing edges, wing boxes (contracted 2005, first delivery 2007), final wing assemblies (contracted 2009)

Electronic bay doors,brake blades, medium air ducts
The Role of Foreign Firms 85

Fokker Aerostructures (The Netherlands)

Since 2005, Fokker Aerostructures has procured components for the 

Gulfstream G450, G500, and G550 business jets from Shenyang Aircraft Co. (“Shenyang Aircraft Corporation and Fokker Aerospace 

Group to Work Together in Machining for Gulfstream Aircraft Components,” 2005).

Fokker-Elmo (The Netherlands)

Fokker-Elmo operates a facility in Langfang, Hebei Province, to supply 

99 different parts to the Boeing 737 program and 142 to the Boeing 

777 program (Butterworth-Hayes, 2010, p. 27).

Korean Aerospace Industries (Korea)

Korean Aerospace Industries procures parts for the vertical fin and the 

horizontal stabilizers on the 737 from Shanghai Aircraft Industries 

Corporation, Xi’an Aircraft Company, and Boeing Tianjin Composites Corporation. 

Messier-Dowty (Safran subsidiary in France)

Since 2002, Messier-Dowty has had a production facility in Suzhou 

that supplies medium landing-gear structural components to Boeing 

(including for the 787), Airbus (in particular, for the A320), Bombardier, Dassault, and Hawker Beechcraft (“Operations—Suzhou”). 

Rolls-Royce (U.K.)

Rolls-Royce’s joint-venture production facilities at Xi’an supply turbinenozzle guide vanes and low-pressure turbine blades for Rolls-Royce 

engines. Several Chinese-owned enterprises are also important suppliers to Rolls-Royce: Sichuan Chengfa Aero Science and Technology 

supplies rings, sheet metal, and fabrications; Beijing Aero Lever Precision supplies variable stator vane levers; Shenyang Liming Aero-Engine 

Group Corp. produces heat-shield rings for the BR700 series engines; 

and Xi’an Aero Engines Co. supplies other unspecified components. In 

July 2010, Rolls-Royce reportedly invested RMB4.3 billion to establish a new production plant in Shenyang to supply key components, 

including stub axles and engine valves for the company’s new Trent 
86 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

XWB engine (“Rolls-Royce: Procurement in China to Increase Threeto Four-fold over the Next Five-to-Eight Years,” 2010).

According to company executives, Rolls-Royce expects to expand 

procurement in China three- to four-fold over the next five to eight 

years, reaching approximately $1.2 billion annually from a current 

level of $250 million (“Rolls-Royce: Procurement in China to Increase 

Three- to Four-fold over the Next Five-to-Eight Years,” 2010).

Safran-Aviation

The Safran Group’s industrial cooperation with China dates back to 

the early 1980s, when Safran’s predecessor, Sagem, transferred autopilot technology to AVIC’s Lanzhou plant for the Z-9 helicopter. Smallscale local production of aerospace-engine parts began in 1990 (“Safran 

History in China”). In 2002, Safran component Messier-Dowty established a wholly owned manufacturing plant in Suzhou, initially specializing in medium structural components for Messier-Dowty’s business and regional jet programs. Since then, production has expanded to 

include work share on the A320 and the 787 (“Operations—Suzhou”). 

In late 2005, Safran component Snecma established a wholly owned 

production facility in Suzhou. The facility specializes in the production 

of turbine and compressor shafts, LP turbine guide vanes (second stage) 

and LP turbine rings (first stage), as well as the assembly of Module 13 

for the CFM56-5B and CFM56-7B engines (“Worldwide—Snecma 

Suzhou”). In 2008, the Messier-Dowty and the Snecma plants both 

moved into a new shared facility in Suzhou.

Other Sources of Western Aerospace Technology

In December 2009, AVIC subsidiary XAIC acquired a 91.25-percent 

share of FACC, for an undisclosed amount. FACC supplies the interior 

cabin components for the COMAC ARJ-21 and C919 airliners. This 

was the largest acquisition by a Chinese enterprise in central Europe 

and reportedly also the first Chinese acquisition of a European aerospace manufacturer. Xi’an plans to establish a composite-materials 

R&D center built around Fischer in Europe, while setting up produc-
The Role of Foreign Firms 87

tion facilities in China to take advantage of China’s low labor costs 

(“Xi’an Aircraft Acquires Austrian Company FACC,” 2009, p. 10).

Xi’an will reportedly inject at least €40 million ($58 million) in 

fresh equity into FACC. Prior to the acquisition, FACC almost doubled its net loss, to €19.6 million, in fiscal year 2008–2009 (“China’s 

XAC Buys Plane Parts Maker FACC,” 2009). 

There is also at least one instance of a Western aerospace company 

acquiring partial ownership of a company in China’s aerospace sector: 

EADS holds a 5-percent stake in AviChina, a Hong Kong–listed subsidiary of AVIC engaged in the international marketing of AVIC helicopters, trainers, and other light aircraft. However, this appears to be 

primarily a joint-venture marketing effort rather than a true crossholding relationship between AVIC and EADS. Currently, no other 

Western aerospace company appears to have acquired ownership stakes 

in any Chinese aerospace company, but the Chinese government has 

been pushing to increase the number of publicly listed aerospace companies in China, and such relationships may increase in the future. 

89

Chapter Five

China’s Space Capabilities

Like aviation technologies, many space technologies are inherently 

dual-use. The development of capabilities to produce civilian space systems, therefore, contributes to China’s capability to produce military 

space systems. Launch vehicles can be used to launch military as well 

as civilian satellites, and communications, weather, earth-observation, 

and navigation satellites can be used for military or civilian purposes. 

Military missiles, even ballistic missiles, generally use different types 

of rocket motors and launch methods than space launch vehicles, but 

certain components, such as guidance and control systems, may be 

similar.

Foreign involvement in China’s space industry is significantly 

less than in the aviation manufacturing industry. China is not closely 

integrated into the supply chains of foreign space companies, and the 

market for Chinese products and services such as space launches and 

satellites is small. Although China’s space launch vehicles were originally based on ballistic-missile technology transferred from the Soviet 

Union, China has advanced far beyond that technology through its own 

efforts, and foreign assistance has been limited. Chinese space companies have received technical assistance from foreign entities in some 

specific areas, such as Russian assistance in the area of manned spaceflight, Brazilian assistance in the development of earth-observation 

satellites, German assistance in the development of communications 

satellites, and U.S. assistance in launch-vehicle technology. In most 

cases, however, the advancement of China’s space technology has been 

the result of purely domestic efforts.
90 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

China has made significant progress in advancing its space capabilities over the past decade and is making concerted efforts to further 

expand them. All relevant metrics reveal an accelerating growth trend 

in the country’s civilian and military space program development. In 

83 known spacecraft launches between October 20, 1996, and June 

15, 2010, Chinese launch vehicles experienced only one failure—an 

incomplete burn of a third stage that resulted in an Indonesian communications satellite being put in the wrong orbit in August 2009 

(“Long March [Chang Zheng],” 2010). The 83 launches included three 

successful launches of manned spacecraft, the most recent of which, in 

September 2008, involved a spacewalk, and two lunar orbiters (“Shenzhou Series,” 2009; “Chang’e Series,” 2010).

China’s government is trying to promote China’s growth as a provider of commercial space products and services. In the 1990s, China 

emerged as a major provider of commercial launch services with its 

Chang Zheng (“Long March”) series of launch vehicles. From 1990 to 

1999, Chinese rockets launched nearly 30 satellites for customers based 

outside of mainland China. In the late 1990s, however, several Chang 

Zheng launches failed, and it was revealed that U.S. satellite companies had provided technical assistance to Chinese launch-vehiclemakers (who also make missiles for the Chinese military and for 

export), resulting in tightened U.S. restrictions on China launching 

satellites that contain U.S. technology. As a consequence, only a handful of launches have been conducted for customers based outside of 

mainland China since 1999 (“Long March [Chang Zheng],” 2010). 

Recently, however, China has developed a domestically designed communications satellite, the European company EADS Astrium has 

developed a communications satellite that contains no U.S. technology, and as noted above, Chinese launch vehicles have established a 

remarkable record for reliability since 1996. As a result, the appeal of 

Chinese space products and services in markets outside the United 

States is probably increasing. China’s 11th Five-Year Plan, which ended 

in 2010, called for the greater integration of market mechanisms into 

the space program to foster competition and to generate products and 

services that could earn China a larger share of the global commercial 

space-systems market (“Aerospace Development 11th 5-Year Plan”).
China’s Space Capabilities 91

A separate policy document, the “National Guidance for 

Medium- and Long-Term Plans for Science and Technology Development (2006–2020),” outlines further goals for the Chinese aerospace industry. Objectives listed in the document include developing 

nontoxic, pollution-free, high-performance, low-cost, powerful-thrust 

launch vehicles capable of carrying 25-ton payloads into low earth orbit 

(LEO) and 14-ton payloads into geostationary orbit (GEO)1; developing a 120-ton-thrust liquid-oxygen/kerosene engine and a 50-tonthrust hydrogen-oxygen engine; improving and developing remotesensing satellites and associated ground stations; further developing 

communications- and broadcast-satellite technologies; pushing toward 

commercialization of communications- and broadcast-satellite services; increasing the number and quality of space technology experiments; and developing a deep space telescope (“China’s Space Activities 

in 2006,” 2006).

China has maintained a relatively high launch tempo of about 

one launch every two months, on average, for the past decade and is 

steadily increasing its total number of orbiting operational satellites. At 

the end of 2002, China had nine satellites in orbit (Guo, 2002). Today, 

it has an estimated 55 operational satellites, not including communications satellites owned and operated out of Hong Kong. Additionally, 

since 2002, there have been five recoverable photoreconnaissance satellite missions, three manned missions (manned spaceflight program), 

and two lunar observation missions, and a commercial communications satellite was successfully built and launched for Venezuela (“UCS 

Satellite Database”; “Long March [Chang Zheng],” 2010; “Chang’e 

Series,” 2010).

Nonetheless, China’s space program has encountered significant technical problems, particularly with satellites. China’s domestically designed high-capacity communications satellite platform, called 

1 LEO is generally defined as the region from the lowest altitude at which an object can be 

maintained in orbit (about 160 km) up to about 2,000 km. GEO is an orbit in which the 

satellite orbits in the same plane as the earth’s equator and at an altitude such that it revolves 

around the earth at the same angular rate as the earth’s rotation (42,164 km). This results in 

the satellite appearing to hover over a fixed location on the earth’s equator, hence the term 

“geostationary.” Most communications satellites are in GEO.
92 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

Dongfanghong 4 (DFH-4), has experienced multiple failures. The 

Huanjing series of environmental and disaster-monitoring satellites 

and the Haiyang series of oceanographic satellites, although they have 

experienced no known failures, are being deployed more slowly than 

originally announced. Three out of 10 Beidou-series PNT satellites 

have also experienced technical problems. It is not clear whether these 

problems are due to underlying design issues, insufficient quality control in construction, or simple poor luck, but China’s space capabilities 

will probably not develop as quickly as outlined in the “National Guidance for Medium- and Long-Term Plans for Science and Technology 

Development (2006–2020).” Nonetheless, comparison with the successes of China’s space program suggests that any technical problems 

will be overcome eventually. The ultimate effect on U.S. national security will be the same, but that effect might not emerge as quickly as 

current plans would imply.

Despite some technical setbacks, Chinese satellites now provide 

increasingly sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and navigation 

capabilities that have significantly advanced China’s military capabilities. Though the capabilities of the satellites fall short of U.S. standards, they are more than sufficient for most military purposes. China’s 

commercial space prospects seem more limited given extensive foreign 

competition, but its space launch program has achieved a number of 

successes that make it potentially appealing to other countries interested in launching commercial satellites.

Launch Vehicles

All of China’s operational space launches have been performed by the 

Chang Zheng (CZ) family of rockets, although China is apparently 

developing a family of small solid-fuel launchers called Kaituozhe (Pioneer). The design of the CZ family was based on the Dongfeng series 

of ballistic missiles developed in the 1960s. The first CZ rockets were 

launched in 1969 (that rocket failed), 1970, and 1971 from Jiuquan 

Space Launch Center. There are currently three operational series of 

CZ missiles: CZ-2, CZ-3, and CZ-4. All use liquid-bipropellant-fueled 
China’s Space Capabilities 93

engines, and all can be launched from one of China’s three currently 

operational launch sites. The most powerful versions are capable of 

carrying at least 8,000 kg (the weight of the Shenzhou manned space 

modules) into LEO and more than 5,000 kg into GEO. As of June 

2010, there had been 125 launches of the CZ series (“Long March 

[Chang Zheng],” 2010; “Shenzhou Series,” 2009).

The next generation of CZ rockets, the CZ-5 series, is currently 

under development and is expected to enter service by 2014. The CZ-5 

is being manufactured in Tianjin and will be delivered by sea to the 

Wenchang Space Launch Center, which is currently under construction 

on Hainan Island. The CZ-5 will use nontoxic fuels and is intended to 

be able to lift 25-metric-ton payloads into LEO and 14-ton payloads 

into GEO (“Long March 5 [CZ-5] Series,” 2010). 

The Kaituozhe is a solid-fuel rocket based on the Dongfeng-21 

ballistic missile. Development of the launch vehicle began in 2000. 

Three versions—KT-1, KT-2, and KT-2A—are reportedly in development. The KT-1 is believed to have flown at least five times, but at least 

two of the test flights were failures (“Kaituozhe Series,” 2010). At one 

time, the launch vehicle’s manufacturer, China Aerospace Science and 

Industry Corporation (CASIC), was actively marketing the Kaituozhe, 

but as of October 2010, no reference to it could be found on CASIC’s 

website.

Satellites

Communications Satellites

Currently, about nine operational commercial communications satellites are owned and operated by organizations based in mainland China 

(another two or three are owned and operated by companies based in 

Hong Kong). Only two of these satellites, however, were manufactured 

by Chinese companies. China also operates two military communications satellites and one data-relay satellite, all of which were manufactured by Chinese companies (“UCS Satellite Database”).
94 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

Dongfanghong 3

Dongfanghong (“East is Red”) 3 (DFH 3) is a medium-capacity communications satellite built by the Chinese Academy of Space Technology (CAST), a subsidiary of China Aerospace Science and Technology 

Corporation (CASC), a state-owned company. The first DFH 3 was 

orbited in 1994 (“Long March [Chang Zheng],” 2010). Four satellites 

based on this design are currently in operation: ChinaSat 5C, a commercial communications satellite; Fenghuo and Shentong, military 

communications satellites; and Tianlian, a data-relay satellite.

ChinaSat 5C, formerly known as Sinosat 3 or Xinnuo 3, was 

launched on May 31, 2007. It is operated by China Satellite Communications Corporation (China Satcom), a subsidiary of CASC, and carries 10 C-band transponders that provide television services throughout China (“ChinaSat 5C”).

Fenghuo and Shentong are dedicated military communications 

satellites. Fenghuo, officially known as Zhongxing 22 or ChinaSat 22, was reportedly developed by CAST to support a theater-level 

command, control, communications, and intelligence network called 

Qudian. The first Fenghuo satellite, Fenghuo 1, was launched in January 2000. A replacement, Fenghuo 1A (Zhongxing 22A/ChinaSat 

22A), was launched in September 2006. The original Fenghuo appears 

to no longer be functional. Fenghuo 1A provides secure voice and 

data communications (“Feng Huo [Zhongxing 2X/ShenTong Series],” 

2010; “UCS Satellite Database”).

Shentong, officially known as Zhongxing 20 or ChinaSat 20, is 

described as a “strategic communications” satellite and was launched in 

November 2003. It is reportedly the first Chinese satellite to use multiple steerable Ku-band spot-beam antenna technology, which enables 

ground users to communicate at high data rates while on the move, and 

the first to use secured uplink transmission for satellite antenna control; it reportedly has China’s most powerful onboard data-processing 

capability (“Feng Huo [Zhongxing 2X/ShenTong Series],” 2010).

China launched its first data-relay satellite, Tianlian 1, in April 

2008, putting it into GEO at 77 degrees east. Tianlian is based on 

a DFH-3 bus. It was launched in preparation for the Shenzhou 7 

manned mission, which occurred in September 2008, and is reportedly 
China’s Space Capabilities 95

the first in a new network that will augment or replace China’s current 

ground-based space-tracking and telemetry stations and space-tracking ships. Tianlian is referred to as a “space station” for relaying data 

(“China Sets Up First Space Station for Spacecraft Data Relay,” 2008). 

China’s space-tracking ships and ground stations were able to cover 

only 12 percent of Shenzhou 7’s orbit, according to Zhang Jianqi, a top 

Chinese space official quoted by Xinhua (“China Blasts Off First Data 

Relay Satellite,” 2008). 

In addition to providing communications with manned spacecraft, data-relay satellites can also provide relay services for other satellites. Because of the curvature of the earth, a satellite in LEO at an 

altitude of 600 km, such as China’s Yaogan series of military reconnaissance satellites, can communicate only with ground sites within about 

2,800 km of its location. If there are no ground stations within that 

distance at the time the satellite collects an image, it must store the data 

until it comes within range of a ground station. For example, a Chinese 

reconnaissance satellite passing over Guam would have to store any 

images it collected until it passed within range of a Chinese ground 

station. A satellite in GEO, however, can communicate with a ground 

station or other satellite virtually anywhere on about one-third of the 

earth’s surface. Thus, a reconnaissance satellite in LEO could transmit 

images it collects up to a satellite in GEO, which could then immediately relay them back down to a ground station in China, where 

they could be processed (if the reconnaissance satellite was far away 

from China, more than one relay satellite might be needed). Tianlian 

1 is located off the southern tip of India and thus is not ideally positioned to act as a relay for Chinese satellites passing over the western 

Pacific region, but in the future, China will likely deploy additional 

relay satellites.

Dongfanghong 4

Dongfanghong 4 is a high-capacity communications satellite, also 

built by CAST. This design has experienced significant technical problems. The first example, SinoSat 2, was built for Sino Satellite Communications, a Chinese state-owned company now absorbed into China 

Satcom. Sinosat 2 was launched in October 2006, but its solar panels 
96 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

failed to deploy, and the satellite was a total loss. The second example, 

NigcomSat, was built for the Nigerian government and launched in 

May 2007. The drive on one of its solar arrays failed, and the satellite is apparently no longer operational. The third example, Venesat 1, 

was built for the Venezuelan government. It was launched in October 

2008 and is apparently operating normally. The fourth and most recent 

example, ChinaSat 6A (also called Sinosat 6), was launched on September 4, 2010, to act as a backup for ChinaSat 5C (described above). 

However, ChinaSat 6A suffered a leak in its helium-pressurization 

system that will likely shorten its operational life from a design goal 

of 15 years to at most 10 years (Covault, 2006; “NigComSat,” 2010; 

“UCS Satellite Database”; “Venesat (Simon Bolivar),” 2010; “Chinasat/

Zhongxing/STTW Series,” 2010; de Selding, 2010).

Weather Satellites

China launched its first weather satellite, Fengyun 1A, in 1988. Since 

that time, it has launched 10 additional Fengyun (“Wind and Cloud”) 

satellites of increasing capability. As of July 2010, five of these were 

apparently still operational: Fengyun 1D, 2C, 2D, 2E, and 3A.2

Fengyun 1D is in a polar LEO and has a 10-channel radiometer operating in the visible and infrared bands for observation of clouds, land 

surfaces, and oceans. Fengyun 2C, 2D, and 2E are in GEO and carry 

radiometers operating in five channels (“Fengyun Series,” 2010; “UCS 

Satellite Database”). 

Fengyun 3A, launched in May 2008, is the first of a new generation of polar weather satellites that is much more capable than the 

Fengyun 1 series. It carries a 10-channel scanning radiometer, infrared and microwave radiometers, a space environment monitor, and an 

earth-radiation scanning radiometer. It provides images with a spatial 

resolution of 250 m and temperature accuracy of 0.1°F. Two more satellites in the Fengyun 3 series were expected to be launched in 2008, 

but as of July 2010, only Fengyun 3A was in orbit. The reasons for the 

delay are unclear (“Fengyun Series,” 2010; “UCS Satellite Database”).

2 Fengyun 1C, which had already ceased functioning, was destroyed in a ground-launched 

antisatellite weapon test in January 2007.
China’s Space Capabilities 97

China is also developing a Fengyun 4 series GEO satellite to 

replace the Fengyun 2 series. Reportedly, there will be an optical 

series and a microwave series. The launch of the first optical satellite 

is expected in 2012, followed by two more in 2015, then two more in 

2019. The first of the microwave series is scheduled for 2015, followed 

by another in 2018 and a third in 2022 (“Fengyun Series,” 2010).

Weather satellites have both civilian and military utility. Knowing and predicting weather can be crucial to successful military operations. Indeed, China’s military reportedly plans to use the Fengyun 3 

satellites for military weather forecasting, and the United States still 

maintains its own Defense Meteorology Satellite Program satellites. 

Weather satellite data is increasingly a global public good, and China, 

as a member of the World Meteorological Organization, has access 

to data from other countries’ civilian weather satellites. Having its 

own weather satellites, however, provides China with a hedge against 

a cutoff of this information in the event of a confrontation with the 

United Sates or other countries (“Fengyun Series,” 2010; “Defense 

Meteorology Satellite Program [DMSP] Series,” 2009).

Civilian Earth-Observation Satellites

China operates three series of earth-observation satellites that are primarily or exclusively civilian in purpose. The oldest series is the ChinaBrazil Earth Resources Satellites (CBERS) series, jointly developed 

with Brazil. China also operates the Haiyang series of oceanographic 

satellites and the Huanjing series of environmental and disaster-monitoring satellites.

CBERS

The stated mission of the CBERS is to provide imagery of the earth’s 

surface for applications including agriculture, environmental protection, hydrological and ocean resources, forestry, and geology. Three 

CBERS have been launched since 1999. At the moment, apparently 

only the third, CBERS 2B, launched in September 2007, remains in 

operation, but at least two additional satellites are planned. The satellites have multisensor payloads with different spatial resolutions and 

image-collecting frequencies, including a wide field imager (WFI), 
98 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

a charge-coupled-device (CCD) camera, and a high-resolution panchromatic (i.e., black-and-white) camera (HRC).3 Brazil developed the 

WFI, while China developed the CCD camera and the HRC.4 The 

onboard WFI has a ground swath of 890 km at a spatial resolution 

of 260 m in two spectral bands. The CCD camera provides images 

of a 113-km-wide swath with 20-m spatial resolution in five spectral 

bands and is capable of taking stereoscopic images. The HRC provides 

images of a swath 27 km wide with a resolution of 2.7 m. Images from 

the WFI and CCD cameras are available to the public; images from 

the HRC are not (“China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellites [CBERS]/

Ziyuan Series,” 2009; “Zi Yuan CBERS [China-Brazil Earth Resources 

Satellite],”; “CBERS: China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite”).

Images with 20-m resolution, such as those provided by the CCD 

camera on CBERS 2B, are too coarse to be militarily useful, but images 

with 2.7-m resolution, such as those provided by the HRC, can be 

militarily useful. For example, 2.7-m resolution is sufficient to identify 

ship or aircraft types and thus would enable an analyst to determine 

whether a ship was an aircraft carrier or a cargo ship, or whether fighter 

aircraft were present at an airbase. Thus, it is interesting that images 

from the HRC, unlike those from the WFI and CCD camera, are not 

publicly available.

Huanjing

The Huanjing (“Environment”) series satellites are described as environmental and disaster-monitoring small satellites. Two of a planned 

11 had been launched as of July 2010. Both were launched atop a single 

launch vehicle in September 2008, and both are equipped with a CCD 

camera of 20-m resolution. Huanjing 1A also carries a multispectral 

(visible and infrared) radiometer with 100-m resolution. Huanjing 

1B carries an infrared camera with 150-m resolution. A third satellite, Huanjing 1C, which was expected to launch in 2010, carries an 

S-band (2–4 GHz) synthetic aperture radar (SAR) capable of seeing 

through clouds and at night with a resolution of 20 m. As noted above, 

3 See “Zi Yuan CBERS (China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite).” 

4 See “CBERS: China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite.”
China’s Space Capabilities 99

images of 20-m resolution have limited military utility. Thus, the current Huanjing satellites cannot make a significant contribution to China’s military capabilities (“UCS Satellite Database”; “Huanjing Series,” 

2010).

Haiyang

The Haiyang (“Oceans”) series satellites are officially ocean-observation 

satellites intended for monitoring of oceanic resources, port building, 

and environmental and pollution study. Currently, the second satellite 

in the series, Haiyang 1B, launched in April 2007, is operational. The 

first, Haiyang 1A, was launched in 2002 and is no longer operational. 

Haiyang 1B carries a 10-channel infrared scanner with resolution of 

1.1 km and a four-band CCD camera with maximum resolution of 

250 m. These satellites are controlled by the State Oceanic Administration and have little or no military utility, but reportedly a Haiyang 2 

series and Haiyang 3 series are under development. Instruments carried by the Haiyang 2 series will include an altimeter to measure sea 

surface height, which, depending on the capability of the instrument, 

could theoretically be used to attempt to detect the presence of submerged submarines. The Haiyang 3 series, the first of which is expected 

to be launched in 2012, will reportedly carry a radar that operates in 

the X-band (8–12 GHz) and is capable of obtaining images of land and 

ocean features (e.g., ships) with resolution as fine as 1 m. The Haiyang 

program appears to be behind schedule, however. The first satellite of 

the Haiyang 2 series (Haiyang 2A) was originally said to be planned 

for launch in 2009. As of July 2010, however, only Haiyang 1B was 

in orbit (“UCS Satellite Database”; “Haiyang Series,” 2010; Pollpeter, 

2008, p. 21). 

Military Imagery Reconnaissance Satellites

China has three series of military imagery satellites. The oldest are the 

Fanhui Shi Weixing (FSW) recoverable film satellites. These have been 

followed by the Ziyuan and, most recently, Yaogan series.
100 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

FSW

Five different models of FSW (“Recoverable Satellite”) satellites have 

been developed (corresponding to the military designators Jianbing 1, 

2, and 4). The first launch was attempted in 1974, but it failed. The 

first successful launch took place in 1975. Since that time, 21 additional missions have been flown, the most recent in 2005. The most 

recent missions lasted 18 to 27 days. Presumably, the advantage of the 

FSW satellites, even though China is now able to produce satellites 

with high-resolution CCD cameras, is that the shortness of the mission dictated by the limited quantity of film that can be carried allows 

the satellites to be flown in lower, quickly decaying orbits. For example, as noted above, the Yaogan series orbit above 600 km. The most 

recent series of FSW missions, by contrast, flew in orbits that varied 

between about 200 km and 320 km, or between 165 km and 550 km. 

Orbits this low cannot be maintained for long periods of time because 

of the atmospheric drag, but since the film in the cameras is apparently 

exhausted after 18 to 27 days, this is not a problem for the FSW series. 

And since resolution is a linear function of range, a satellite orbiting at 

300-km altitude can collect images with twice as high resolution as a 

satellite orbiting at 600-km altitude (“Fanhui Shi Weixing 3 [FSW-3]/

JianBing-4 Series,” 2010).

Ziyuan

Three satellites in the Ziyuan (“Resources”) series have been launched, 

the first in September 2000 and the last in November 2004. They are 

officially the Chinese domestic equivalent of the CBERS series and 

are said to be designed for civilian roles such as territorial surveying, 

environment monitoring, city planning, crop-yield assessment, disaster monitoring, and space-science experimentation. However, the Chinese government has never released any information concerning their 

design or the imaging systems they carry, and they are believed to in 

fact be military imagery reconnaissance satellites with the military 

designation JianBing-3. All three are believed to carry CCD cameras 

with approximately 3-m resolution and infrared multispectral scanners. They reportedly have design lives of two to four years, but as of 
China’s Space Capabilities 101

July 2010, all three were apparently still in operation (“UCS Satellite 

Database”; “ZiYuan-2/JianBing-3 Series,” 2010). 

Yaogan

Yaogan (“Remote Sensing”) is China’s most recent generation of imagery 

reconnaissance satellites. It appears to comprise at least two types—SAR 

satellites (military designator JianBing 5) and optical-reconnaissance 

satellites (military designator JianBing 6)—and possibly a third type, 

an ocean-surveillance satellite.

Ten Yaogan satellites have been launched to date. Yaogan 1, 

launched in April 2006, was China’s first SAR-equipped satellite. Since 

that time, three additional SAR satellites in the Yaogan series have been 

launched: Yaogan 3, 5, and 10. The satellites’ radar reportedly operates 

in the L-band (1–2 GHz) and has resolution as low as 5 m. Yaogan 1 

apparently broke up in February 2010, but Yaogan 3, 5, and 10 remain 

operational (“Yaogan Series,” 2010; “UCS Satellite Database”).

Yaogan 2, 4, 6, 7, and 8 are believed to be optical-reconnaissance 

satellites with resolution of possibly 0.8 m. Yaogan 2 was launched in 

May 2007, and all five of these satellites are apparently still operational 

(“Yaogan Series,” 2010; “UCS Satellite Database”).

Yaogan 9, launched in March 2010, may be an ocean-reconnaissance satellite. It consists of a main satellite and two subsatellites in 

nearly identical orbits. This conf﻿iguration resembles that of the U.S. 

Navy’s Naval Ocean Surveillance Satellite system. The satellites reportedly carry infrared sensors to detect ships and antennas to pick up electronic emissions. The use of three satellites would enable the location of 

an electronic emitter to be determined through triangulation (Parsons, 

2010, p. 14; “Yaogan Series,” 2010).

Position, Navigation, and Timing Satellites

The impetus for developing an indigenous PNT system was first military, then commercial. Many Chinese weapon systems use GPS to 

increase their accuracy, but Chinese military leaders, fearing that GPS 

could be degraded or shut down in a conflict, concluded that they 

needed their own independent PNT system (Pollpeter, 2007).
102 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

The Beidou (“Northern Dipper”)/Compass system is China’s 

indigenously developed PNT satellite system. It is intended to serve as 

an alternative to GPS, the Russian Glonass, and the European Galileo 

system. In 2000, China launched the first satellites of a first-generation 

PNT constellation using satellites in GEO. The system provided coverage only over East Asia, positioning accuracy was only about 100 m, 

and, because the system required two-way communication between 

the users and a central control station, the user equipment was bulkier 

and required greater power than the U.S. GPS system, in which the 

user equipment consists of passive receivers (“Beidou/Compass Series,” 

2010).

Although two of the original Beidou satellites remain operational 

(Beidou 1B and 1C), in 2007, China began deploying the first satellites of a second-generation system, called Compass or Beidou 2. This 

system, like GPS, will be a one-way passive system with global coverage. Unlike GPS, however, which includes only satellites in medium 

earth orbit (MEO), Compass will include satellites in a combination 

of MEO and geosynchronous orbit (GSO).5 The system will provide 

commercial customers with positioning accuracy to within 10 m and 

timing accuracy (needed for the synchronization of automated datalinks) to within 10 nanosec. Greater accuracy will be available to 

Chinese military users (“UCS Satellite Database”; “Beidou/Compass 

Series,” 2010).

By August 2010, four operational Beidou 2 satellites were in orbit 

(one in inclined GSO, two in GEO, and one in MEO). Twelve satellites are planned to be in orbit by 2012, providing a regional navigation 

system covering China and its neighboring areas. A complete system 

of 35 satellites is intended to be in place by 2020. These will include 

five satellites in GEO, 27 in MEO, and three in inclined GSO (“UCS 

Satellite Database”; “Beidou/Compass Series,” 2010).

The satellites appear to be experiencing technical problems. 

In February 2007, one of the four first-generation Beidou satellites 

5 GSO is an orbit in which the satellite is at an altitude (42,164 km) such that it revolves 

around the earth at the same angular rate as the earth’s rotation but is not necessarily in the 

same plane as the earth’s equator. Thus, GEO is a special type of GSO.
China’s Space Capabilities 103

(Beidou 1D) experienced an explosion while transiting to GEO, then 

it had trouble deploying its solar panels after reaching GEO. Finally, in 

February 2009, its orbit was raised by 130 km in an apparent attempt 

to place it in a “graveyard” orbit (an orbit in which nonfunctional satellites are placed, where they will not interfere with operational satellites). The first of the new generation of geostationary spacecraft 

(Beidou 2B/Compass G2) apparently lost control after being launched 

in April 2009. In April 2010, an analysis was published stating that 

there were frequent spikes in the signal from the first MEO Compass 

satellite, suggesting that there is a problem on the satellite. Thus, three 

out of nine Beidou satellites launched so far have experienced technical 

problems (“Beidou/Compass Series,” 2010).

Commercial applications of Beidou are also having trouble getting off the ground. A receiver unit for the first-generation Beidou 

system costs about $2,500, more than 10 times the cost of a GPS unit 

(Pollpeter, 2007). It is unclear how much a receiver for the secondgeneration system, which is not yet operational, will cost. In any case, 

since there is no charge to use the public GPS signal, Beidou seems 

unlikely to displace GPS in commercial applications, except perhaps 

in China. It is possible, however, that commercial navigation systems 

could eventually employ Beidou as a supplement to GPS signals.

Other Satellites

Shijian

The Shijian (“Prototype”) series is a long-running space-science and 

technology demonstrator program. The first satellite in the series, 

Shijian 1, launched in 1971, was the second satellite launched by China 

(the first, launched in 1970, was called Dongfanghong and carried only 

a radio transmitter). Currently, nine satellites in the series are operating: 

Shijian 6A, 6B, 6C, 6D, 6E, 6F, 7, 11-01, and 12. The Shijian 6 series 

was launched into LEO in three pairs between September 2004 and 

October 2008. According to the Chinese government, the Shijian 6 

mission is “exploration of space environment, radiation in space and 

their influence, parameters of physical environment of the space, and 

other related space experiments” (“Shijian Series,” 2010). However, 

few details about the satellites have been revealed by Chinese media, 
104 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

and the launch dates have been announced only 24 hours in advance. 

Some sources reportedly suspect that they are signals-intelligence or 

electronic-intelligence satellites (“UCS Satellite Database”; “Shijian 

Series,” 2010).

Shijian 7, launched in July 2005, is in an orbit that is similar, 

albeit somewhat lower, than that of the Shijian 6 series (555 km ×

570 km vs. 590 km × 605 km). Shijian 11-01, launched in November 

2009, is in a distinctly higher orbit (690 km × 705 km). As is the case 

with the Shijian 6 series, little information about Shijian 7 and Shijian 11-01 has been released, other than to say that they will monitor 

the space environment and/or conduct space-science and engineering 

experiments (“UCS Satellite Database”; “Shijian Series,” 2010).

Shijian 12 was launched, on similarly short notice, in June 2010. 

Over the following two months, it was maneuvered into an orbit nearly 

identical to that of Shijian 6F, and on August 19 it approached Shijian 6F so closely that it may have actually made contact with it, the 

first known instance in which a non-U.S. satellite has conducted such 

a rendezvous (the United States has conducted similar operations in 

the past). Such a capability has multiple potential applications, such 

as clearing space debris, inspecting and repairing satellites, or docking 

with a space station such as the Tiangong module that China plans to 

put up next year. Another possibility, however, would be to damage 

or interfere with an enemy satellite (“Shijian Series,” 2010; Courtland, 

2010).

Other recent satellites in the Shijian series are Shijian 5, launched 

in May 1999, and Shijian 8, launched in September 2006 (no information is available on a Shijian 9 or 10, if they exist). Shijian 5 was 

apparently a test of a modular minisatellite platform to be used for 

various applications, although objectives of the mission reportedly also 

included measurement of high-energy particles in near-earth space and 

a microgravity fluid-physics experiment. The satellite is no longer operational. Shijian 8 was officially a recoverable microgravity seed-growing 

mission (using the same recoverable capsule used by China’s FSW film 

reconnaissance satellites) designed to study the effects of radiation and 

microgravity on different varieties of fruit and vegetable seeds, fungi, 

and molecular biomaterials. No information is available on whether 
China’s Space Capabilities 105

the mission had additional purposes. The recoverable capsule returned 

to earth after 15 days, and the satellite reentered the atmosphere in 

November 2006 (“Shijian Series,” 2010)

Beijing 1 (DMC-4, Tsinghua-2)

Beijing 1 is an earth-mapping small satellite, built in cooperation with 

Surrey Satellite Company of England and launched in October 2005. 

It carries the China Mapping Telescope, with a resolution of about 4 m 

(“Europe’s Student-Built Satellite Rockets into Space,” 2005). Another 

imaging camera on board has resolution of 32 m. The satellite weighs 

150 kg. As of July 2010, it was apparently still in operation (“China 

DMC+4 Satellite Launched, Carries 4 m Resolution Camera,” 2005; 

“UCS Satellite Database”). 

Chuangxin

Chuangxin 1, launched in October 2003, is a mini “store and forward” 

communications satellite. It was developed by CAS, the Shanghai Academy of Space Technology (SAST, a subsidiary of CASC), and Shanghai 

Telecom. The project has been carried out jointly by researchers from 

the CAS Shanghai Institute of Microsystem Information Technology 

and the CAS Shanghai Institute of Technical Physics (“Small Satellite Launch Successful,” 2003). Chuangxin 1 was launched piggyback 

with CBERS-2 in 2003 and weighs less than 100 kg (“CBERS 2 and 

Chuangxin 1 to Be Launched on 21st or 22nd,” 2003). CAS claims 

that it will serve a range of functions by providing data communications for such sectors as traffic and transportation, environmental protection, oil and gas transportation, flood and drought control, detection of forest fires, and earthquake monitoring. As of July 2010, it was 

apparently still in operation (“UCS Satellite Database”; “Small Satellite 

Launch Successful,” 2003).

A second satellite in the series, Chuangxin 2, was launched in 

November 2008 and was apparently still in operation as of July 2010 

(“UCS Satellite Database”). Information on its nominal purpose was 

not available.
106 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

Shiyan

The Shiyan (“Test”) satellite (also called Tansuo or Experimental Satellite) is the first Chinese satellite capable of stereo earth-terrain mapping. Its applications are allegedly civilian in nature, but the test of its 

systems is said to be useful for military reconnaissance spacecraft under 

development. Shiyan 1, launched in April 2004, is relatively light at 

204 kg. No word was given about its development before launch. It is 

said to have a 10-m stereo resolution observation capacity, developed 

with input from Astrium. It was developed by CAS, the Research Institute of Space Technology, Xi’an Surveys and Designs Institute, Harbin 

Polytechnic University, and Changchun Photomechanical Institute. A 

second satellite in the series, Shiyan 2, launched in November 2004, 

is larger at 300 kg, and descriptions of its mission are vague. A third 

satellite, Shiyan 3, was launched in November 2008. Information on 

its nominal purpose is not available. As of July 2010, all three satellites were apparently still in operation (“China Launches Two New 

Satellites,” 2004; “Experimental Satellite #1 and Naxing #1 Sent into 

Space,” 2004; Hitchens, 2006, pp. 12–13; “UCS Satellite Database”).

Naxing

Naxing 1 is an experimental 25-kg “nanosatellite” launched piggyback 

with Shiyan 1 in April 2004 and said to be used to conduct “some 

high-tech experiments.” Little is known about its full functions. It is 

the world’s smallest satellite with three-axis stabilization. As of July 

2010, it was apparently still in operation (“Naxing 1”; Johnson-Freese, 

2005, p. 8; “UCS Satellite Database”).

Zheda Pixing

Zheda Pixing 1, a “picosatellite” developed by Zhejiang University 

and Shanghai Institute of Microsystems and Information Technology, 

CAS, was launched in May 2007. It has no moving parts and no attitude control and weighs only 2.5 kg. It is designed for microelectronic 

mechanical systems (MEMS) experiments for systems such as accelerometers, microgyros, and infrared sensors. Little else is publicized 

about its mission or specifications. As of July 2010, it was apparently 

still in operation (“UCS Satellite Database”).
China’s Space Capabilities 107

On September 22, 2010, two additional satellites in the series, 

Zheda Pixing 1B and Zheda Pixing 1C, were launched. They, too, are 

said to have been developed by Zhejiang University “for microelectronics studies to provide a testbed in near-earth space for MEMS devices, 

such as an accelerometer, micro-gyros and infrared sensors” (“Zheda 

Pixing 1B”).

Xiwang 1

Xiwang 1 (“Hope 1”) is a 50-kg Chinese amateur-radio satellite 

launched as a secondary payload with Yaogan 8 in December 2009 

(“Yaogan Series,” 2010).

Double Star

The Double Star (Tan Ce) dual satellites are part of a cooperative venture with the European Space Agency (ESA) to conduct space-science 

experiments. Their mission is to study the earth’s magnetic field and 

particle environment, operating in concert with ESA’s four Cluster 

spacecraft. Double Star 1 burnt up on reentry in 2007, but Double 

Star 2 was apparently still in orbit as of July 2010, although its mission was said to have been terminated (“Double Star [Tan Ce],” 2010; 

“UCS Satellite Database”).

Assessment

China’s space capabilities have made remarkable progress over the past 

two decades. Its satellite capabilities, in particular, have gone from 

rudimentary to near-state-of-the-art in some areas. Prior to 1988, the 

only satellites China had orbited other than experimental satellites were 

recoverable film reconnaissance satellites and low-capacity telecommunications satellites. Since that time, however, China has successively 

developed and deployed a series of weather satellites, medium-capacity 

communications satellites, electro-optical reconnaissance satellites, 

PNT satellites, ocean-surveillance satellites, SAR satellites, highcapacity communications satellites, and possibly signals-intelligence or 
108 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

electronic-intelligence satellites. The capacity and reliability of China’s 

space launch vehicles have increased as well.

The space capabilities China now possesses have the potential 

to significantly increase the effectiveness of its military operations. 

China’s seven optical reconnaissance satellites (eight, if CBERS 2B is 

counted) are in orbits that cause them to revisit locations every three 

to six days, meaning that one or two of them are likely to pass over a 

given location each day. These satellites have sufficient resolution to 

detect and identify types of ships, aircraft, and ground vehicles. One 

of China’s three SAR reconnaissance satellites, which are equally effective at night, is also likely to pass over a given location once or twice a 

day. These satellites likely have lower resolution than China’s opticalreconnaissance satellites, but they are not significantly affected by the 

presence of clouds and likely have sufficient resolution to at least determine the presence of aircraft at an airfield and distinguish broad types 

of ships (e.g., aircraft carriers from cargo ships). Finally, if the Shijian 

6 series and Yaogan 9 satellites are indeed electronic-intelligence satellites, then they can detect and identify radio-frequency emitters such as 

radio communications equipment and radar based on their frequency 

and waveforms.

These reconnaissance satellites could have several effects. Their 

ability to identify the locations, numbers, and types of enemy forces 

will reduce the ability of adversaries to achieve operational surprise 

against China, since China will be able to detect the massing of forces; 

it will also enable the Chinese military to more effectively conduct 

its own attacks. For example, China could use its satellites to determine the presence of aircraft on the ground at an airbase and launch a 

combined air and missile attack against them. The satellites could also 

enable China to determine the presence and locations of land-based air 

and missile defense systems (e.g., Patriot) and avoid or neutralize them 

before launching air and missile attacks on other targets. Similarly, 

China could use them to locate and attack mobile radio transmitters 

and command posts, reducing an adversary’s ability to command and 

communicate with its forces. Finally, in combination with other systems, such as over-the-horizon radar, reconnaissance satellites could be 

used to find and locate ships at sea, such as aircraft carriers, and then 
China’s Space Capabilities 109

attack them with a variety of weapons, including the anti-ship ballistic 

missile China is developing. Once an attack has been conducted, moreover, China’s satellites could be used to assess the effectiveness of the 

attack and whether additional attacks were needed. 

PNT satellites provide a number of important military capabilities. They can be used as the guidance systems for missiles, gravity 

bombs, and other types of weapons, enabling all-weather near-precision attacks. They can also be used to guide ships, aircraft, and ground 

vehicles, enabling precise navigation and maneuvers. Moreover, if Chinese vehicles are equipped with PNT satellite receivers and radio transmitters that rebroadcast their coordinates, that information could be 

used as the basis for an identification system. Knowing the locations 

of friendly units would allow the identity of tracks acquired by sensors 

such as radars to be more readily determined, enabling enemy units to 

be attacked more effectively and reducing the likelihood of attacks on 

friendly units. Finally, the precise timing signals broadcast by satellites 

in China’s second-generation Compass system can be used to synchronize automated data links, enabling high-volume exchanges of data. 

Although publicly available signals from the U.S. GPS system can 

also be used to support these functions, China’s Compass system will 

likely be able to provide higher-precision position and timing than the 

public GPS signals. Having its own PNT satellite system, moreover, 

ensures China against a cutoff of the U.S. public GPS signal, however 

unlikely that may be (as civilian commerce becomes increasingly reliant on GPS, the economic disruption caused by a shutoff would be 

significant). Finally, since the Compass system uses different frequencies than the GPS system, China’s military could jam GPS frequencies, 

thus denying the United States or other countries access to the GPS 

signal without obstructing its own ability to acquire PNT information.

China’s communications-satellite capabilities are considerably 

weaker than its reconnaissance and PNT capabilities. Currently, China 

has only two dedicated military communications satellites. By comparison, the U.S. military operates approximately 30 such satellites. Stateowned corporations based in mainland China control another six or 

seven communications satellites, which could potentially be commandeered for military purposes in the event of a crisis or conflict, but this 
110 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

would still provide China’s military with far less satellite communications capability than the U.S. military possesses. China has the advantage, however, that for the foreseeable future, the conflicts in which it 

is likely to become involved would not entail the deployment of significant forces outside of mainland China. Forces operating in China can 

rely primarily on buried fiber-optic cables, which have far higher communications capacity, for communications connectivity. Buried fiberoptic cables are virtually impossible to jam and are difficult or impossible to find from the air or space, and their above-ground equipment, 

such as gateways, is easy to hide. Communications satellites occupy 

known, fixed locations and thus can be jammed, and their tracking 

and control stations are fixed and easily identified and thus potentially 

subject to attack. Because fiber-optic cable can carry many times more 

data than a satellite can, the commercial world has seen a de-emphasis 

of satellites relative to terrestrial cables (including undersea cables) in 

recent years. Satellite communications would be important primarily 

to naval forces at sea and ground forces deployed outside of China’s 

borders (e.g., on Taiwan). Given the still-incomplete process of linking China’s forces together using digital information links, moreover, 

China’s limited communications-satellite capacity may be sufficient for 

the immediate future, and this capacity will likely grow over time.

As noted earlier in this chapter, knowing and predicting weather 

can be crucial to successful military operations, but having one’s own 

weather satellites is not necessarily critical to this capability. China 

could rely on data from other countries’ civilian weather satellites. 

Having its own weather satellites, however, provides China with a 

hedge against a cutoff of such data in the event of a confrontation with 

the United Sates or other countries.

In sum, China’s military satellite capabilities today are substantial 

and growing. China possesses at least 10 imagery reconnaissance satellites and possibly six or more electronic-intelligence satellites. Information in unclassified sources indicates that these numbers are similar to 

the numbers of comparable satellites the United States possesses. However, the capabilities of China’s satellites undoubtedly fall well short of 

those of the United States. For example, China’s best optical satellites 

are estimated to have resolution of about 0.8 m. By comparison, com-
China’s Space Capabilities 111

mercial satellite imagery with resolution of 0.41 m is now available, 

and U.S. intelligence satellites are believed to have even better resolution (Matthews, 2008). Nevertheless, the capabilities of China’s satellites are probably sufficient for most military purposes. As noted above, 

0.8-m resolution is more than sufficient to detect and identify by type 

ships, aircraft, and ground vehicles. Greater degrees of resolution are 

primarily of utility for intelligence-collection purposes, such as measuring the exact dimensions of a missile. Most militaries are more open 

and transparent than the Chinese military is (or the Soviet military 

was), however, and much of this type of information is available from 

open sources. Thus, the qualitative inferiority of China’s surveillance 

and reconnaissance satellites may not significantly impact their military utility, and China may have alternative means to compensate for 

their shortcomings as strategic intelligence-collection platforms. 

China’s capabilities in communications, PNT, and weather satellites are less robust than those in surveillance and reconnaissance. 

Moreover, China has experienced setbacks and delays in many of its 

satellite programs, most prominently the total loss of two out of four 

high-capacity communications satellites launched so far and the partial 

loss of a third. China’s weather-satellite program appears to be delayed, 

and several non-military programs have experienced delays as well.6 As 

argued above, however, probably none of these shortcomings are crucial. China probably needs significantly less satellite-communications 

capacity than the United States does, can use public GPS signals for 

PNT purposes, and can augment information collected by its own 

weather satellites with information collected by the satellites of other 

countries and made publicly available. Moreover, programs are under 

way to address many of these shortcomings in the next few years.

China’s commercial space prospects appear to be less promising 

in the near term. The only buyers of China’s communications satellites have been Nigeria and Venezuela, countries that may have chosen 

6 A solar space telescope was originally scheduled to be launched in 2008, and the third satellite in the Huanjing series was to have been launched in 2009, but as of July 2010, neither had 

been orbited, and several satellites scheduled to be launched in 2010 appeared to be behind 

schedule as well. See Bodeen, 2007; “China to Launch 10 Satellites in 2008,” 2008.
112 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

to buy from China for political or cost reasons rather than because of 

the capabilities of the satellites offered. And as a result of the failure of 

two of four examples of the DFH-4 platform on which these satellites 

were based, increased insurance premiums on future purchases of this 

type may erase much of the cost advantage. Nonetheless, Nigeria has 

reportedly ordered three more satellites based on the DFH-4 platform 

(“NigComSat,” 2010). If these satellites are successfully launched and 

operated in the next few years, China’s ability to sell such satellites to 

other countries may improve.

In the area of commercial imagery, China is not known to have 

offered for sale the high-resolution imagery provided by CBERS 2B or 

its Ziyuan or Yaogan series of imagery satellites. This may in part be 

to avoid revealing the capabilities of those satellites, but the Chinese 

government also does not accept the legitimacy of the satellites of other 

countries collecting intelligence information on China from space, 

and it claims that its own satellites do not image the territory of other 

countries (conversation with Chinese space official, April 2008). Thus, 

China might have difficulty offering satellite imagery for sale without 

contradicting its own government’s position. In any case, given that 

higher-resolution commercial imagery is already available from other 

sources, China’s satellites might have difficulty competing in the commercial imagery market.

Finally, once the Compass constellation of PNT satellites is complete, around 2020, it is possible that China could offer access to its 

high-precision signal on a subscription basis. Given that the public GPS 

signal is freely available, however, it is not clear how many individuals 

or organizations would be willing to pay for a higher-precision signal.

Thus, China’s strongest and most marketable space capability 

probably remains its space launch capability. As noted earlier in this 

chapter, China’s space-lift vehicles, although not as powerful as those 

of the United States, the ESA, or Russia, have compiled a remarkable 

record of success since 1996. However, because of restrictions the United 

States imposed in the late 1990s on China’s launching of satellites with 

U.S. technology content, since 1998 only three of those launches have 

been for foreign customers, and two of those were of NigComSat and 

Venesat, Chinese-made satellites. Palapa D1, launched in August 2009 
China’s Space Capabilities 113

for an Indonesian company, however, was built by Thales Alenia Space 

without using American components and thus was not subject to U.S. 

export restrictions (“Palapa Series,” 2010). It might represent the leading edge of a new wave of launches of commercial satellites without 

U.S. technology content, except that, ironically, the launch of Palapa 

D1 is the one known failure of a Chinese launch vehicle in the past 14 

years. Whether Chinese launch vehicles will become popular again for 

contract launches remains to be seen.

115

Chapter Six

Conclusions

China’s aerospace sector has advanced at a rapid, though not unanticipated, rate over the past decade and will continue to advance in future 

years. At present, however, it still lags behind the state of the art in 

virtually all areas. Nonetheless, the development of China’s civil aerospace sector is unquestionably contributing to the development of its 

military aerospace capabilities, increasing China’s ability and possibly 

its propensity to use force in ways that negatively affect U.S. interests 

and would increase the costs of resisting attempts to use such force.

The Rate at Which China’s Aerospace Sector Has 

Developed

Until the creation of COMAC in 2008, all of China’s civilian and military aerospace products were produced by China’s state-owned defense 

conglomerates. Even as China’s economy was opened up, beginning 

in the 1970s, these industries remained backward and inefficient, 

burdened by remaining part of the planned economy and starved for 

resources. A 2001 RAND study (Cliff, 2001, pp. 24–25), noted

The combat aircraft [produced in China] are mostly based 

on 1950s and 1960s Soviet technology . . . and other than 

co-assembly of McDonnell Douglas passenger aircraft . . . 

China’s capability for producing transport aircraft is limited to 

short-range and medium-range turboprops. Chinese helicopters 

in production are all based on European models.
116 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

The same study noted that “China has an impressive [space] 

launcher capability for a developing country” (emphasis added), but that 

“China’s satellite capabilities are less impressive than its launch capabilities” (Cliff, 2001, pp. 27–28).

China’s military modernization drive since the late 1990s, however, has resulted in important structural reforms and increased 

resources for its aerospace industries, and China’s aviation sector has 

become increasingly involved in supplying civilian aircraft components to major foreign manufacturers.1 Progress has been rapid. China 

is now able to produce modern military aircraft, highly reliable space 

launch vehicles, a wide range of military and civilian satellites, and an 

increasingly wide and sophisticated range of components for Western 

airframe and engine manufactures such as Boeing, Airbus, Eurocopter, 

Pratt & Whitney, GE, and Rolls-Royce.

Nonetheless, important capability gaps remain. Many of the subsystems on Chinese-built military and civilian aircraft, particularly 

turbofan and turboprop engines, must still be imported. Despite ambitions since the late 1990s to develop a domestically designed regional 

or large airliner, China does not have such an aircraft in operation. 

And while a regional jet, the ARJ21, is now in testing, it uses foreign 

engines and avionics, the wing was designed with Russian help, and 

only a small fraction of the aircraft was constructed from composite 

materials; thus, even before it reaches production, whether it can compete with existing Embraer or Bombardier regional jets is questionable. 

Similarly, while China has initiated efforts to develop a large commercial aircraft, the C919, actual production is still years away. And even 

then, all of the major subsystems, such as the engines and avionics, are 

likely to be foreign-designed. China has not demonstrated the ability to independently design and produce innovative and commercially 

competitive aerospace systems.

Relatively few studies of China’s aerospace industry as a whole 

have been published in the past decade, but the rate of progress noted 

above has generally been consistent with past assessments. The 2001 

1 For the definitive account of the changes in China’s defense industries during this period, 

see Cheung (2009), especially pp. 101–234. See also Mulvenon and Tyroler-Cooper, 2009.
Conclusions 117

RAND study stated that “China can expect to make significant technological progress in coming years but cannot possibly catch up to, 

much less ‘leapfrog,’ the United States or Japan [in commercial technology] in the foreseeable future” (Cliff, 2001, p. 58). Similarly, a 2005 

RAND study that examined only China’s military aviation capabilities 

(Medeiros et al., 2005, p. 201) noted that

Progress in China’s military-aviation industry is mixed and limitations persist. There remain important gaps in China’s militaryaviation R&D and production capabilities that will not soon be 

filled. . . . Any programs under way to fill these gaps are only in 

their very formative stages. 

The study concluded (p. 203) that

The technological gap between China’s military-aviation industry 

and that of the most advanced countries will likely continue to 

close in coming years, [but] China will certainly continue to lag 

behind these countries.

Thus, China’s aerospace manufacturing capabilities in 2011 

appear to be largely consistent with what would be expected based on 

the 2001 and 2005 RAND assessments. 

Future Developments

It seems likely that over the coming decade China will begin producing both a regional jet and a jetliner (the former being more certain 

than the latter). Whether these aircraft will be competitive outside of 

China, however, is less clear. Less of the ARJ21 will be made of composite materials than current Bombardier and Embraer aircraft, meaning that it will be heavier. In a market in which fuel efficiency is a key 

characteristic, it is not clear why airlines would choose to forgo brands 

with proven safety and reliability records to purchase an unproven and 

less-efficient aircraft. Nonetheless, it appears that China’s domestic 

airlines, encouraged by high tariffs for foreign-designed regional jets 
118 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

and possibly more direct pressure from the Chinese government, will 

purchase a certain number of ARJ21s, and some state-owned carriers 

in Third World countries may also purchase the ARJ21 in return for 

diplomatic or other considerations. Thus, COMAC may wind up selling enough ARJ21s to, if not actually turn a profit, at least justify the 

investment in a learning process that will enable its next generation of 

regional jets to be commercially competitive outside of China. Within 

China, however, given the tariffs on foreign-designed regional jets and 

the relatively small size of the Chinese regional jet market, the ARJ21 

is likely to dominate.

The story for the C919 is similar. The precise design of the aircraft has not yet been finalized, so how advanced it will be is unclear. 

However, its announced weight relative to its length and capacity suggests a design no more advanced than that of the 1980s-era A320. 

Moreover, initial deliveries are not expected before 2016, and Boeing 

and Airbus could easily develop and bring to market a more advanced 

narrow-body jetliner by then if the C919 appeared to threaten their 

market shares. Bombardier and Embraer are eyeing the narrow-body 

market as well, as are Russian and Japanese aviation manufacturers, 

so the narrow-body jetliner market in the coming decade is likely to 

be extremely competitive. Thus, the commercial success of the C919 

is far from assured, even though China undoubtedly has the capability to manufacture an aircraft in this class. As with the ARJ21, China’s domestic airlines will purchase a certain number of airframes but, 

unlike the case of the ARJ21, the majority of narrow-body jetliners sold 

in China could well be foreign-made, even after the C919 comes to 

market. And until China develops a wide-body jetliner, all such jetliners sold in China will be foreign-made. Again, as with the ARJ21, however, the C919 program may ultimately be valued not for the profits it 

produces but for the learning experience it provides, enabling China 

to acquire the skills needed to develop a commercially competitive aircraft in the future. 

The helicopters China produces under license from or has codeveloped with Eurocopter are unlikely to generate significant export 

sales, as each type also has production lines in France. However, the 

existence of domestic production capabilities for a growing range of 
Conclusions 119

helicopters may mean diminished sales in China for non-Chinese helicopter manufacturers. The huge potential demand for helicopters in 

the country, moreover, may mean that additional types will be developed over the coming decade, possibly purely domestic designs.

China’s fixed-wing general aviation manufacturing capabilities 

seem unlikely to develop rapidly in the near future. Current production capabilities are extremely limited, and the lack of a significant 

domestic market for fixed-wing general aviation has resulted in little 

immediate incentive to expand these capabilities. As of 2006, Dassault 

Falcon Jet Corporation expected China to acquire 300 new business 

jets by 2015 (Sun, 2006), but China does not currently produce any 

business jets, and none are under development.

If the development of the CZ-5 series of launch vehicles is successful, China’s space launch capabilities will improve significantly in 

the future. The CZ-5 series will roughly triple China’s lift capacity to 

both LEO and GEO. Also, a new generation of lighter launch vehicles, 

the CZ-6 and CZ-7 series, is under development and should increase 

the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of China’s space launch capabilities (Perrett, 2010d, pp. 22–23). The reliability problems that plagued 

China’s space launch vehicles in the 1990s seem to have been resolved, 

so the primary limitation on China’s competitiveness in the commercial space launch market today is U.S. export restrictions. The effect of 

these restrictions is likely to erode in coming years, however, as nonU.S. satellite companies develop an increasing range of satellites without U.S. technology content.

Near-term prospects for China’s satellite capabilities are less 

promising, given the problems that have plagued the DFH-4 platform. 

However, there is no reason to believe that these problems will not 

be resolved in the next few years, providing China with the basis for 

an improved military satellite-communications capability, as well as 

increasingly competitive commercial communications satellites. China’s surveillance- and reconnaissance-satellite capabilities can probably 

already satisfy the majority of military requirements and will undoubtedly improve further over the next decade, with greater resolution and 

the possible deployment of an X-band ocean-surveillance radar satellite. As these capabilities improve, China may acquire the option to 
120 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

enter the commercial satellite imagery market without compromising 

its military imagery satellite capabilities. China’s Compass PNT satellite system seems to be on schedule and, if so, will provide worldwide coverage by 2020. This will provide China with an alternative 

to relying on the U.S. GPS and Russian Glonass system for military 

purposes. Whether there will be a revenue-generating commercial 

market for the Compass system, given the availability of the free public 

GPS system, however, is questionable. Finally, China will continue to 

develop and deploy improved weather satellites in future years. Thus, 

by 2020, China will likely have a fully deployed PNT system, highcapacity civil and military communications satellites, high-resolution 

surveillance and reconnaissance satellites, and highly capable weather 

satellites.

Potential to Contribute to China’s Military Capabilities

Military and civilian aerospace technologies do not overlap in all areas. 

Many military-specific aerospace technologies, such as low-observable 

technology, low-bypass afterburning turbofan engines, electronic 

countermeasures, and signals-intelligence satellites, do not have civilian counterparts. Similarly, many civilian aerospace technologies do 

not have military applications. Nonetheless, there are areas of overlap, 

including computer-aided design and computer-aided manufacturing 

technologies, precision machining, composite materials, high-bypass 

turbofan engines, flight-control systems, space launch vehicles, communications satellites, and imagery satellites. Thus, foreign involvement in China’s civil aerospace sector unquestionably has the potential 

to contribute to the development of China’s military capabilities.

Even the manufacturing of components for Western aircraft and 

engines probably provides some contribution to the development of 

China’s military capabilities, to the extent to which Chinese enterprises 

also involved in military aviation production do so, even if no direct 

technology transfers are involved. The mere act of machining parts to 

the specifications of Western aerospace manufacturers provides training that is potentially applicable to the machining of parts for military 
Conclusions 121

aircraft, especially if representatives of those Western manufacturers 

are present onsite to provide training and guidance in quality control. 

And the revenues generated can be used to upgrade the facilities and 

machine tools of both civilian and military production lines.

Joint ventures can enable the direct transfer of manufacturing technology into China, as can the transfer of production licenses 

(depending on the amount of technical assistance provided with the 

transfer). Some platforms and technologies are inherently dual-use. 

The Eurocopter AS365N is a medium utility helicopter with numerous civilian applications. The license-produced Chinese version (Z-9), 

however, is used primarily by the Chinese military.

When foreign companies cooperate with Chinese enterprises in 

the development of new systems, the potential to contribute to the 

development of China’s military capabilities is even greater. As noted in 

Chapter Four, in 1997, Eurocopter received a contract to assist China 

in developing a new 6-ton transport helicopter. No new transport helicopter was developed as a result of that project, and it appears that 

China instead applied the technology acquired to the Z-10 attack helicopter, which is in the same weight class. Similarly, the knowledge 

Chinese companies acquire through foreign assistance in the development of the ARJ21 and C919 could in the future be applied to the 

development of military airframes. Indeed, aside from acting as troop 

transports or military cargo aircraft, the ARJ21 and C919 airframes 

themselves have the potential to form the basis for a variety of specialmission aircraft. Airborne early-warning aircraft have been built on 

the Embraer ERJ-145 airframe; the U.S. Air Force Airborne Warning 

and Control System (AWACS) aircraft and Joint Surveillance Target 

Attack Radar System (J-STARS) are built on the Boeing 707 airframe; 

and the U.S. Navy’s new P-8 maritime patrol aircraft is built on the 

Boeing 737 airframe.

Similar arguments apply in the space sector. The German company Daimler-Benz was reportedly involved in the development of the 

DFH-3 communications satellite platform (Cliff, 2001, p. 28), which 

is the platform used by China’s two military communications satellites. Similarly, collaboration with Brazil in the development of the 
122 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

CBERS satellites undoubtedly aided the development of China’s military reconnaissance satellites.

Implications for U.S. Security Interests

As noted earlier, there is no question that China’s growing civilian 

aerospace capabilities are contributing to the development of its military aerospace capabilities. Many aerospace systems are inherently 

dual-use—for example, commercial airliners can be used as military 

transports and as the basis for special-mission aircraft. High-bypass 

turbofan engines used on airliners share components of low-bypass turbofan engines used on high-performance aircraft (the General Electric 

F101, originally developed for the B-1B supersonic bomber, became 

the basis both for the F110 fighter engine used on the F-16 and for 

the CFM56, the best-selling airliner engine of all time (“General Electric F101,” 2010). Autonomous flight-control systems can improve the 

safety and performance of passenger aircraft but can also be used on 

military unmanned aerial vehicles. Space launch vehicles can be used 

for either military or commercial launches, and many satellite types, 

including communications, PNT, and weather satellites, have both 

military and commercial applications.

Many of the skills and technologies required to produce commercial or dual-use aerospace products are also applicable to purely 

military systems. These include computer-aided design and computeraided manufacturing, precision machining, and composite-material 

manufacturing.

There is also no question that China’s growing aerospace capabilities have implications for U.S. security interests. Beijing claims that the 

autonomous island of Taiwan is part of its territory and reserves the 

right to use force to bring about unification, but the United States has 

declared that any threat to Taiwan’s independence would be a threat 

to its own interests. Similarly, a Chinese attempt to assert control over 

territory it claims in the East China Sea and South China Sea would 

affect U.S. interests in the freedom of navigation and in the security of 

U.S. allies who also claim some or all of those territories. Thus, China’s 
Conclusions 123

growing aerospace capabilities increase its ability and possibly its propensity to use force in ways that negatively affect U.S. interests and 

would increase the costs—human and material—of resisting attempts 

to use such force.

However, it is difficult to quantify the extent to which improvements in China’s civilian aerospace capabilities in general, and international cooperation in the civilian aerospace sector in particular, are 

driving improvements in China’s military aerospace capabilities. China’s defense spending has quintupled in real terms since 1995, a greater 

than 12 percent annual growth rate. This means that vastly more 

resources are now available for the development of aerospace and other 

defense capabilities than were available just 15 years ago. Moreover, 

China’s military aerospace industry has benefited from direct technical 

assistance from Russian, Israeli, and other foreign firms and technical 

experts. With China being one of the world’s largest trading nations, 

China’s military aerospace industry can purchase state-of-the-art parts 

and technologies from throughout the world. The industry also has the 

ability to tap into expertise in firms outside of the aerospace sector and 

in Chinese universities, which themselves are increasingly integrated 

into the world scientific and engineering community. Finally, China is 

engaged in large-scale espionage efforts to acquire key aerospace and 

other military technologies.

The technologies being transferred to Chinese firms are in most 

instances not cutting-edge. Leading aerospace firms are generally 

reluctant to share their best technologies, because those technologies 

are the source of their competitive advantage. As an example, RollsRoyce is unwilling to share its technology for forging unitary turbine 

rings (known as bladed-rings, or “blings”) with its own wholly owned 

subsidiary in Indianapolis, preferring instead to keep this “crownjewel” technology at its facility in the United Kingdom.2 Out-of-date 

Western technologies, however, can still be new technologies to 

China, which, for example, has yet to master the technology for turbofan engines, which first entered production 50 years ago in the West 

(Younossi et al., 2002, pp. 9–24). But the nature of the aerospace 

2 Interview with Rolls-Royce representative, 2003.
124 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

technologies being transferred to China and the range of alternative 

technology sources available make the U.S. security policy implications opaque. Since it is difficult to quantify the degree to which international cooperation in civil aerospace is assisting the development 

of military aerospace capabilities in China, whether even a complete 

cutoff of such cooperation would substantially slow that development 

is equally unclear. A complete cutoff, moreover, would be impractical. 

Russia in particular is unlikely to go along with a U.S.-organized ban 

on cooperation in civil aerospace with China, and whether European 

and other Asian countries would do so is also questionable. A U.S.-only 

ban would likely slow the development of China’s military aerospace 

capability by only a small amount while handing business opportunities to European and Asian companies and aggravating relations with 

Beijing. At a minimum, a smart U.S. policy would limit restrictions to 

cooperation in technology areas that are not available from other countries or in which other countries that also possess those technologies are 

willing to coordinate with the United States in imposing restrictions.

China’s emergence as an aerospace power is perhaps inevitable but 

hardly an accomplished fact. It will be at least another decade before 

China has reached today’s state of the art, and by then, the state of the 

art will have moved further ahead in ways that are, by the nature of 

technological discovery, fundamentally unknowable in advance. U.S. 

and other Western companies are deeply involved in China’s aerospace 

development, and although this is unquestionably contributing to the 

development of China’s military aerospace capabilities—capabilities 

that one day might be used against the United States—those companies are reaping profits for their American shareholders and keeping 

Americans employed, even as they transfer lower-value-added production to China. They are also helping raise the standards of living of 

some of the one-fifth of the world’s population that lives in China, 

increasing their ability to buy American-made products. And war with 

China may never come. The policy choices here are far from black-andwhite, and it is unclear whether the United States could significantly 

improve its security through alterations of its policy toward civil aerospace cooperation with China without having a significant negative 

effect on U.S. economic interests.
125

Bibliography

“2009 Press Releases,” Goodrich website, undated. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://ir.goodrich.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=60759&p=irol-news&nyo=2

“About Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited,” Bell Helicopter website, 

undated. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.bellhelicopter.com/en/company

“Aero Engine Maintenance Training Center Opens in Guanghan,” GE Aviation 

website, November 4, 1996.

“Aerospace,” Honeywell China website, undated. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.honeywell.com/sites/china/aero.htm

“Aerospace Development 11th 5-Year Plan (航天发展“十一五”规划),” 

Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense 

(国防科工委).

“Aerospace Firm Wins C919 Deal,” China Daily Online, April 23, 2010. 

As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2010-04/23/content_9766984.htm

Aerospace Industries Association of America, Inc., Aerospace Facts & Figures 2009, 

57th ed., Arlington, VA: Aerospace Industries Association, 2010.

“Agusta and Jiangxi Changhe, Aviation Industries Signed a Joint Venture 

Agreement,” AgustaWestland website, February 11, 2004. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.agustawestland.com/node/3248 

“Airbus, Global Market Forecast 2009–2028,” 2009. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.airbus.com

“Airbus Harbin JV Plant Delivers 1st Work Package,” China Daily, July 3, 2010. 

As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2010-07/03/content_10054176.htm

“Airbus in China (空中客车在中国),” Airbus China website, last updated October 

2010. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.airbus.com.cn/corporate-information/airbus-in-china/
126 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

“Airbus in China,” Airbus SAS website, undated. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.airbus.com/en/worldwide/airbus-locations/airbus-in/airbus-in-china/ 

“Alcoa Advanced Aerospace Alloys and Materials Used on China’s First HomeProduced Regional Jet, ARJ21-700,” Alcoa, Inc., website, April 8, 2008. 

As of January 29, 2011: 

https://www.alcoa.com/china/en/news/releases/aerospace_jet.asp

“Alcoa and COMAC Explore Leading Technology Solutions for C919, China’s 

Largest Passenger Aircraft,” Alcoa, Inc., website, October 29, 2009. As of January 

29, 2011: 

https://www.alcoa.com/china/en/news/releases/COMAC_CN.asp

“Alcoa Expands Supplier Relationship with Shanghai Aircraft of China,” Alcoa, 

Inc., website, March 2, 2005. As of January 29, 2011: 

https://www.alcoa.com/china/en/news/releases/shanghai_aircraft.asp

“Alcoa in China,” Alcoa, Inc., website, undated. As of January 29, 2011: 

https://www.alcoa.com/china/en/info_page/home.asp

“Antonov An-24,” Jane’s Aircraft Upgrades, November 18, 2010.

“AVIC Aims to Deepen Reform in 2009,” International Aviation, February 2009, 

p. 18. 

“AVIC Aircraft and Nexcelle Announce Plans for a Nacelle Joint Venture in 

China,” GE Aviation website, September 23, 2009. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.geae.com/aboutgeae/presscenter/systems/systems_20090923.html

AVIC I Commercial Aircraft Co., Ltd. As of January 29, 2011:

http://www.acac.com.cn/friend.asp

“AVIC II Joins Shanghai Sikorsky,” Sikorsky Aircraft website, January 31, 2008. 

As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.sikorsky.com/About+Sikorsky/News 

“Beidou/Compass Series,” Jane’s Space Systems and Industry, August 18, 2010.

Belobaba, Peter, Amedeo Oni, and Cynthia Barnhart (eds.), The Global Airline 

Industry, United Kingdom: John Wiley and Sons Ltd., 2009.

Bodeen, Christopher, “China Plans First Astronomy Satellite,” Associated Press, 

March 12, 2007.

Boeing, Current Market Outlook 2010–2029, 2010. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.boeing.com/commercial/cmo/pdf/Boeing_Current_Market_

Outlook_2010_to_2029.pdf

“Boeing in China (波音与中国),” Boeing website, 2010. As of February 1, 2011:

http://www.boeingchina.com/ViewContent.do?id=35703
Bibliography 127

“Boeing’s Investments in China” (波音在中国的投资),” Boeing website, 2010. As 

of February 1, 2011:

http://www.boeingchina.com/ViewContent.do?id=37732&aContent=%E6%B3%

A2%E9%9F%B3%E4%B8%8E%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E7%AE%80%E

4%BB%8B

“Boeing Tianjin Composite Materials Facility Undergoes Expansion (波音天津复

材工厂扩建),” International Aviation, December 2008.

“Bombardier in China,” Bombardier, Inc., website, undated. As of January 29, 

2011: 

http://cn.bombardier.com/about_bombardier_in_country.html

“Bombardier in China: Local Partners and Suppliers,” Bombardier, Inc., website, 

undated. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://cn.bombardier.com/local_partners.htm

“Building of the First ARJ-21 Designed with the Participation of Antonov Is 

Completed,” Antonov ASTC, December 21, 2007. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.antonov.com/news/index.xml?news=antk-main/news_20071224.xml 

Burchell, Bill, “Tomorrow’s Regional Jets,” Overhaul & Maintenance, October 1, 

2010, p. 33.

Butterworth-Hayes, Philip, “China’s Short March to Aerospace Autonomy,” 

Aerospace America, February 2010, p. 27.

“CBERS: China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite,” Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas 

Espaciais (Brazil) website, undated. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.cbers.inpe.br/?hl=en&content=index

“CBERS 2 and Chuangxin 1 to Be Launched on 21st or 22nd (中巴资源卫星02

星和“创新1号”21日至22日发射),” China News, October 19, 2003. 

“CFM and ACAE Sign MOU for LEAP-X1C Assembly Line in China,” GE 

Aviation website, December 21, 2009. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.geae.com/aboutgeae/presscenter/cfm56/cfm56-x/cfm56-x_20091221.

html

“CFM Picked to Power China’s Future Plane,” China Business Focus, March 2010.

“CFM56 Sourcing and Spare Parts Programs Launched in China,” GE Aviation 

website, undated. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.geae.com/aboutgeae/presscenter/cfm56/cfm56-3/cfm56-3_19961104b.

html

“Chang’e Series,” Jane’s Space Systems and Industry, October 12, 2010.

Chen Shanshan, “Chinese and Foreign Helicopter Giants Unite, Changhe Joins 

Sikorsky (直升飞机中外巨头联手 昌河飞机入股西科斯基),” First Financial 

Daily, February 1, 2008. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://finance.qq.com/a/20080201/001443.htm
128 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

Cheng Jie (程婕), “Low-Altitude Airspace Will Be Gradually Opened, the Age 

of General Aviation Is at Hand (低空空域将逐步开放, 通航时代即将来临),” 

CAAC News, October 22, 2010. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.peoplerail.com/xinwen/20101022/n765635935.html

“Chengdu Aerotech Manufacturing Co., Ltd.,” EasyChinaSupply.com website, 

undated. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.easychinasupply.com/producttrade/last_pt_com/163847.html

Cheung, Tai Ming, Fortifying China: The Struggle to Build a Modern Defense 

Economy, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2009.

China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC). As of January 29, 

2011:

http://www.casic.com.cn

“China Air Transportation Development Report 2007/2008 (中国航空运输发展

报告 2007/2008),” Civil Aviation Administration of China website, August 2008. 

As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.caac.gov.cn/H1/H2/200808/t20080828_18587.html 

“China Airlines Directory 2010,” International Aviation, June 2010, p. 24.

“China and Boeing Partnership Delivering Value,” The Boeing Company, October 

12, 1995. 

“China Blasts Off First Data Relay Satellite,” Xinhua News Agency, April 26, 

2008.

“China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellites (CBERS)/Ziyuan Series,” Jane’s Space 

Systems and Industry, September 3, 2009.

ChinaCentral Television. As of January 29, 2011:

http://www.cctv.com/english/news/index.html

“China DMC+4 Satellite Launched, Carries 4 m Resolution Camera (中国DMC+4

号卫星升空 : 装备精度4米的照相机),” Xinhuanet, October 27, 2005. As of 

January 29, 2011:

http://www.newcssa.com/bbs/read.php?tid=5303

“China Eastern and P&W Partner—Largest Aircraft Engine MRO Facility in 

Asia-Pacific Goes into Service (东航与普惠携手 : 亚太最大飞机发动机维修中

心启用),” People’s Daily Online, September 28, 2009. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://caac.people.com.cn/GB/114176/10133575.html

“China Launches Two New Satellites,” Xinhuanet, April 19, 2004. As of January 

29, 2011: 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004- 04/19/content_1426357.htm

“China Locations,” Hamilton Sundstrand website, undated. As of January 29, 

2011: 

http://www.hamiltonsundstrand.com/About+Us/Locations
Bibliography 129

“China Sets Up First Space Station for Spacecraft Data Relay,” Xinhua News 

Agency, May 1, 2008.

“China to Launch 10 Satellites in 2008,” Xinhua (online), February 19, 2008.

“China’s Police Helicopter Starts,” International Aviation, July 2008, pp. 44–45.

“China’s Space Activities in 2006,” Information Office of the State Council of the 

People’s Republic of China, October 2006.

“China’s XAC Buys Plane Parts Maker FACC,” Thomson Reuters, October 4, 

2009. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5931LT20091004

“Chinasat/Zhongxing/STTW Series,” Jane’s Space Systems and Industry, May 5, 

2010.

“ChinaSat 5C (中星5C),” China Satellite Communications Corporation, undated. 

“Chinastar (Zhongwei),” Jane’s Space Systems and Industry, September 27, 2010.

Chung, Jae Ho, “The Political Economy of Industrial Restructuring in China: The 

Case of Aviation,” The China Journal, No. 50, 2003, pp. 61–82.

Cliff, Roger, The Military Potential of China’s Commercial Technology, Santa 

Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-1292-AF, 2001. As of January 29, 2011:

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1292.html

“Commercial Airplanes—Jet Prices,” Boeing website, undated. As of January 29, 

2011:

http://www.boeing.com/commercial/prices/

Courtland, Rachel, “Two Chinese Satellites Rendezvous in Orbit,” New Scientist, 

August 31, 2010. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn19379-two-chinese-satellites-rendezvousin-orbit.html?full=true&print=true

Covault, Craig “Sino Setback—Advanced Chinese Space Technology Initiative Is 

Off to a Disastrous Start,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 3, 2006.

“CRIAA Honeywell: We Compete Only Against Ourselves (凯信航空:只和自己

比),” Jinling Evening News. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2006-05-23/08349002481s.shtml

“Cytec Eyes Jumbo Jet Options,” Shanghai Daily, June 11, 2009. As of January 

29, 2011: 

http://www.huaxlee.com/biz/8313/cytec-eyes-jumbo-jet-options/ 

“Dawn of a New Age,” China Civil Aviation Report, September 2010. As of 

January 29, 2011: 

http://chinacivilaviation.com/article.asp?id=366 

“Defense Meteorology Satellite Program (DMSP) Series,” Jane’s Space Systems and 

Industry, November 19, 2009.
130 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

de Selding, Peter B., “China’s Sinosat-6 Hampered by Leak,” Space News, 

September 10, 2010. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/100910chinas-sinosat-6-hamperedleak.html

“Double Star (Tan Ce),” Jane’s Space Systems and Industry, October 8, 2010.

Dubois, Thierry, “EC 175 Begins Flight Test Program,” Aviation International 

News Online, January 1, 2010. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.ainonline.com/news/single-news-page/article/

ec-175-begins-flight-test-program-23219/

“Eaton Corporation and Shanghai Aircraft Manufacturing Co., Ltd. Announce a 

Joint Venture,” Manufacturing & Technology eJournal, July 12, 2010. As of January 

29, 2011: 

http://www.mfrtech.com/articles/3617.html

“Eaton Electrical Suzhou New Facility to Operate as Global R&D Center,” 

Suzhou Industrial Park Administrative Committee website, November 5, 2008. 

As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.sipac.gov.cn/english/2008y/200811/t20081106_34086.htm

“Eaton in China Fact Sheet,” Eaton Corporation website, undated. As of January 

29, 2011: 

http://www.eaton.com/EatonCom/OurCompany/AboutUs/

CorporateInformation/index.htm

“Eaton Plans Joint Venture with Changzhou Senstar Automobile Air Conditioner 

Co. Ltd., in China,” Business Wire, January 6, 2004.

“Eaton Signs Joint Venture Agreement with MingYang for Medium-Voltage 

Switchgear Components,” Business Wire, June 17, 2005. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.allbusiness.com/company-activities-management/companystrategy/5164959-1.html

“Embraer: Green Aviation (巴航工业:绿色飞行),” Business Watch Magazine, 

August 20, 2010. 

“Embraer in China,” Embraer SA website, undated. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.centrohistoricoembraer.com.br/en/embraer-china/default.htm

Endres, Gunter (ed.), “CHRDI Z-10,” Jane’s Helicopter Markets and Systems, 

London: Jane’s Information Group, 2006. 

“Europe’s Student-Built Satellite Rockets into Space,” Space.com, October 27, 

2005. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/051027_sseti_kosmos_launch.html

“Experimental Satellite #1 and Naxing #1 Sent into Space (“试验卫星一号”“纳

星一号”升空),” Guangming Daily, April 19, 2004. As of February 1, 2011: 

http://news.tsinghua.edu.cn/new/news.php?id=7415
Bibliography 131

“Fanhui Shi Weixing 3 (FSW-3)/JianBing-4 Series,” Jane’s Space Systems and 

Industry, June 17, 2010.

“Feng Huo (Zhongxing 2X/ShenTong Series),” Jane’s Space Systems and Industry, 

May 5, 2010.

“Fengyun Series,” Jane’s Space Systems and Industry, May 5, 2010.

Fetters-Walp, Eric, “Partners in Flight,” Boeing Frontiers, October 2009, p. 13.

“Flight to Value: India’s Struggling Airlines,” The Economist (U.S. edition), August 

8, 2009.

Fouquet, Helene, and Gregory Viscusi, “Airbus, Areva, Total Gain in $22.7 

Billion China Contract Haul,” Bloomberg.com, November 4, 2010. As of January 

29, 2011: 

http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-11-04/airbus-areva-total-gain-in-22-7-

billion-china-contract-haul.html

Francis, Leithen. “Airbus’ China Gamble,” Flight International, October 28, 2008. 

As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2008/10/28/317890/airbus-china-gamble.

html

———, “China Exporting ARJ21 and Other Aircraft to Indonesia,” Flight 

International, May 21, 2010a.

———, “China’s AC313 Helicopter Has First Flight and Secures Launch 

Customer,” Flight International, March 23, 2010b. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2010/03/23/339673/pictures-chinas-ac313-

helicopter-has-first-flight-and-secures-launch-customer.html 

———, “Waiting Game,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, November 22, 

2010c, p. 22.

Gates, Dominic, “Boeing to Fly High in China Deal Confirmed for 60 WideBody Jets,” Seattle Times, January 29, 2005.

“GE and AVIC Joint Venture Creates New Global Business Opportunities,” GE 

Aviation website, November 15, 2009. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.geae.com/aboutgeae/presscenter/systems/systems_20091115.html 

“GE Aviation’s Presence in China Continues to Grow,” GE Aviation website, 

November 4, 2008. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.geae.com/aboutgeae/presscenter/other/other_20081104.html

“GE Engine Services Opens Engine Overhaul and Repair Facility in Xiamen, 

China,” GE Aviation website, June 21, 2001. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.geae.com/aboutgeae/presscenter/services/services_20010621.html
132 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

“GE Expands with New Facility Opening in Suzhou,” GE Aviation website, 

March 4, 2009. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.geae.com/aboutgeae/presscenter/systems/systems_20090304.html

“GE in China (GE在中国),” General Electric China website, undated. As of 

January 29, 2011: 

http://www.ge.com/cn/company/businesses/factsheets/china.html

“GE Jet Engine Backlog Climbs to $5 Billion in China,” GE Aviation, January 21, 

2008. 

“GE Training Hundreds of Jet Engine Technicians from Chinese Airlines,” GE 

Aviation, April 23, 2008. 

“GE: We Believe in the Potential of the Chinese Market (GE:我们相信中国市场

的潜力),” International Aviation, January 2008, p. 17.

“General Electric F101,” Jane’s Aero-Engines, July 9, 2010.

“Goodrich and China’s XAIC Agree to Form Joint Venture Companies,” 

Goodrich Corporation website, August 12, 2009. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://ir.goodrich.com/phoenix.

zhtml?c=60759&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1319837&highlight=

“Goodrich Asia-Pacific Limited (GAP),” HAECO Group website, undated. As of 

January 29, 2011: 

http://www.haeco.com/about_haeco/pop_goodrich.html

“Goodrich TAECO Aeronautical Systems,” HAECO Group website, undated. As 

of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.haeco.com/about_haeco/pop_trw.html

Grevatt, Jon, “Chinese Defence Industry Continues to Depend on Foreign 

Technology, Says US Report,” Jane’s Defense Industry, August 17, 2010.

———, “Sino-Russian Helicopter Deal Imminent, Says Senior Official,” Jane’s 

Defense Industry, March 12, 2009.

Guo Duoxian, “China is now successfully operating nine satellites in orbit (中国

已有9颗应用卫星在太空中成功运行),” China Space News (online), September 3, 

2002, cited in Pollpeter, 2008, p. 6.

“HAI Y-12,” Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, May 26, 2010.

“HAIC N-5,” Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, April 14, 2010.

“HAIG—Harbin Aircraft Industries Group (Harbin Feiji Gongye Gongsi),” Jane’s 

All the World’s Aircraft, April 14, 2010.

“Haiyang Series,” Jane’s Space Systems and Industry, May 5, 2010.

“HC-120 Helicopter,” GlobalSecurity.org. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/hc-120.htm=
Bibliography 133

“HC120 Utility Helicopter,” Sinodefence.com, June 4, 2007. As of January 29, 

2011: 

http://www.sinodefence.com/airforce/helicopter/hc120.asp 

Heim, Kristi, “Boeing Stumbles in Race for China,” Seattle Times, June 20, 2005. 

Herrnstadt, Owen, “Offsets and the Lack of a Comprehensive U.S. Policy,” EPI 

Briefing Paper #201, April 17, 2008. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.sharedprosperity.org/bp201.html

“High-Speed Rail,” Baidu Encyclopedia. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://baike.baidu.com/view/3743.htm

“History,” Rolls-Royce website, 2009. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.rolls-royce.com/china/en/history/default.htm

Hitchens, Theresa, “International Satellite Innovation and Cooperation,” 

Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, April 18, 2006, pp. 12–13.

“Honeywell China—Aerospace,” Honeywell International website, undated. As of 

January 29, 2011: 

http://www.honeywell.com/sites/portal?smap=china&page=aero&theme=T4&c=n

“Honeywell China Aerospace Academy Opens; Provides Training to Customers,” 

Honeywell website, December 4, 2009. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://honeywellnow.com/2009/12/04/

honeywell-china-aerospace-academy-opens-provides-training-to-customers/

“Honeywell Selected to Provide Flight Control Fly-by-Wire System for COMAC’s 

C919 Airliner,” Honeywell International website, undated. As of January 29, 

2011: 

http://www51.honeywell.com/honeywell/news-events/press-releases-details/7.15.10

HoneywellSelectedforC919.html

“Honeywell TAECO Aerospace (Xiamen) Co., Ltd.,” Honeywell China website, 

undated. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.honeywell.com/sites/china/aero.htm 

“Honeywell Technology Solutions Lab,” Honeywell China website, undated. As 

of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.honeywell.com/sites/china/beijing.htm 

“Honeywell to Supply Flight Control System for the C919 Large Airliner (霍尼韦

尔公司成为C919大客飞控系统供应商),” Xinhua News Agency, July 16, 2010. As 

of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.sn.xinhuanet.com/2010-07/16/content_20352226.htm

“Huanjing series,” Jane’s Space Systems and Industry, May 5, 2010.

“Inauguration of Beijing Turbomeca Changkong Aero-Engine Control Equipment 

Co. Ltd.,” Safran Turbomeca website, March 27, 2008. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.turbomeca.com/francais/media-evenements/communiques-de-presse/

archives-2008/inauguration-de-la-societe-beijing.html
134 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

“Industrial Cooperation and Technology Transfers (工业合作与技术转让),” 

Airbus China website, undated. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.airbus.com.cn/industrial-co-operation/

International Air Transport Association, World Air Transport Statistics, 52nd ed., 

Montreal, 2008.

International Trade Administration (IATA), Department of Commerce, U.S. 

Aerospace Industry Statistics, visited October 20, 2010. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.trade.gov/mas/manufacturing/OAAI/aero_stats.asp

Ionides, Nicholas, “ERJ-145 Deal Earns Reprieve for Chinese Assembly Line,” 

Flight International, January 24, 2006.

Jin, Fengjun, Fahui Wang, and Yu Liu, “Geographic Patterns of Air Passenger 

Transport in China 1980–1998: Imprints of Economic Growth, Regional 

Inequality, and Network Development,” The Professional Geographer, Vol. 56, 

No. 4, 2004, pp. 471–487.

Johnson-Freese, Joan, “Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security 

Review Commission: China’s Military Modernization and Cross-Strait Balance,” 

September 15, 2005, p. 8.

“Kaituozhe Series,” Jane’s Space Systems and Industry, February 6, 2010.

Kanter, James, and Nicola Clark, “U.S. and E.U. Agree to Expand Open Skies 

Accord,” New York Times, March 25, 2010.

Karp, Aaron, “Airbus Details Power8: 10,000 Job Cuts, Three Plant Sales/

Closures, More,” ATW Online, March 1, 2007. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://atwonline.com/print/128204

Kirby, Mary, “Harbin Embraer in the Fray After No Deliveries in 4Q,” Air 

Transport Intelligence, January 15, 2009.

Layne, Rachel, “China’s COMAC Targets New Jet Controls With GE Venture 

Contract,” Bloomberg Businessweek, July 12, 2010. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-07-12/china-s-comac-targets-new-jetcontrols-with-ge-venture-contract.html 

Li Fangyong (李方勇) and Wang Bin (王斌), “China’s Helo Industry Speeds Up 

(中国直升机产业发展提速),” International Aviation, June 2009, pp. 48–54.

“Liebherr-Aerospace Establishes Joint Venture with a Chinese Partner,” LiebherrAerospace website, February 1, 2007. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.liebherr.com/en-GB/101315.wfw

“Liebherr-Aerospace Selected for the New Chinese Aircraft Program C919,” 

Liebherr-Aerospace website, July 19, 2010. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.airframer.com/news_story.html?release=9397

Liu Shengjun (刘胜君), “C919 Bid Will Bring a Series of New JVs (C919系统竞标

催生一批合资产业),” International Aviation, October 2009, p. 64.
Bibliography 135

Liu Yue (刘跃), “Honeywell Shows New Systems in China (霍尼韦尔路演展示新

设备),” International Aviation, August 2009, p. 61.

“Long March (Chang Zheng),” Jane’s Space Systems and Industry, October 8, 2010.

“Long March 5 (CZ-5) Series,” Jane’s Space Systems and Industry, October 5, 2010.

Ma Yuan (马援), “Avicopter Will Take Off from a New Base,” International 

Aviation, January 2009, pp. 23–25.

———, “First A320 Assembled in China Makes Maiden Flight (中国组装A320

首飞),” International Aviation, June 2009, p. 42.

“MA-60 Aircraft Land on Custom Timken Bearings,” Timken Company press 

release, June 11, 2008. 

Matthews, William, “GeoEye’s New Satellite Offers Unprecedentedly Sharp 

Images,” Defense News, October 20, 2008. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3778072

Mecham, Michael, and Joseph C. Anselmo, “A Big Bet on China for Suppliers,” 

Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 6, 2010.

Medeiros, Evan S., Roger Cliff, Keith Crane, and James C. Mulvenon, A New 

Direction for China’s Defense Industry, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 

MG-334-AF, 2005. As of January 29, 2011:

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG334.html

“Medium- to Long-Term Rail Net Planning Map—2008 Revision (中长期铁路

网规划图—2008年调整),” Ministry of Railways (China), November 2008. As of 

January 29, 2011: 

http://society.people.com.cn/GB/8217/141150/141642/8639983.html

Medium- to Long-Term Rail Network Development Plan (2008 Revision) (中长期

铁路网规划(2008 年调整)), Basic Industry Bureau (基础产业司), National 

Development and Reform Commission (中华人民共和国国家发展与改革委员会) 

website, undated. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://jtyss.ndrc.gov.cn/fzgh/W020090605632915547512.pdf

Meng Qingqian (孟庆乾), “Low-Altitude Airspace Will Be Gradually Opened 

to Flight, Facilitating the ‘Take-Off’ of General Aviation (低空空域飞行逐步开

放,助推通用航“腾飞),” Civil Aviation Resource Net of China (民航资源网), 

October 21, 2010. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://news.carnoc.com/list/172/172409.html 

“Ministry of Railways: High-Speed Train Fares Are Consistent with Market 

Conditions (铁道部:高铁票价符合市场),” China National Radio,August 12, 

2010. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://news.sohu.com/20100812/n274154886.shtml
136 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

“Ministry of Railways Responds: How 120% Occupancy Rates Are Calculated 

(铁道部回应 : 线路上座率120%如何统计),” China National Radio, August 12, 

2010. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://news.sohu.com/20100812/n274154886.shtml

Morris, John, “China to Develop Z-15 Engine with Turbomeca,” Aviation Week & 

Space Technology, February 22, 2010.

Morrison, Murdo, “EADS’s Complex Ownership Structure,” Flight International, 

July 20, 2010. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2010/07/20/344475/eadss-complexownership-structure.html

Mulvenon, James, and Rebecca Samm Tyroler-Cooper, China’s Defense Industry on 

the Path of Reform, Santa Monica, Calif.: Defense Group Inc., October 2009. 

“National Guidance for Medium- and Long-Term Plans for Science and 

Technology Development (2006–2020) (国家中长期科学和技术发展规

划纲要(2006–2020年)),” State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 

February 9, 2006. As of February 1, 2011:

http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-02/09/content_183787.htm

“Naxing 1,” National Space Science Data Center, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration website, undated. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/spacecraftDisplay.do?id=2004-012B

“New Airbus’ Logistics Hub in Tianjin to Serve All Projects,” People’s Daily 

Online, October 30, 2009. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/90861/6798498.html

Newhouse, John, Boeing Versus Airbus, New York: Vintage Books, 2007.

“NigComSat,” Jane’s Space Systems and Industry, May 5, 2010.

“Operations—Suzhou,” Messier-Dowty website, undated. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.messier-dowty.com/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=19

“Orders and Deliveries,” Boeing website, undated. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://active.boeing.com/commercial/orders/index.cfm

“Orders and Deliveries—User Defined Reports,” Boeing website, undated. As of 

January 29, 2011: 

http://active.boeing.com/commercial/orders/index.cfm?content=userdefinedselecti

on.cfm&pageid=m15527

“Palapa Series,” Jane’s Space Systems and Industry, July 13, 2010.
Bibliography 137

“Parker Aerospace, COMAC, and AVIC Systems Hold Contract Signing 

Ceremony for Fuel, Inerting, and Hydraulic Systems on New C919 Aircraft,” 

Parker Aerospace website, undated. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.parker.com/portal/site/PARKER/menuitem.31c35c58f54e63cb97b11b

10237ad1ca/?vgnextoid=b96c7eb6fadf7210VgnVCM10000048021dacRCRD&ide

c=a96c7eb6fadf7210VgnVCM10000048021dac____&vgnextfmt=NO

“Parker China,” Parker Hannifan website, 2009. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.parker.com/portal/site/PARKER/menuitem.b328859dc74718ca0

828f0499420d1ca/?vgnextoid=a2ab491cb63a0110VgnVCM10000048021da

cRCRD&vgnextfmt=default&temp=r&title=China&channelRequest=34caf

97c730a0110VgnVCM10000048021dacRCRD

Parsons, Ted, “China’s Yaogan-9 May Be Ocean Surveillance Satellite,” Jane’s 

Defense Weekly, March 17, 2010, p. 14.

Peng Jian, “China’s AC313 Helicopter Made First Flight,” International Aviation, 

April 2010, pp. 14–16.

Perrett, Bradley, “Chinese Advances,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 

January 26, 2009.

———, “Airport Postponed: Fourth Runway for Beijing Capital Back on Agenda 

as Second Airport Is Delayed,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, July 26, 

2010a.

———, “COMAC’s C919 Supplier Selection Is Past Due,” Aviation Week and 

Space Technology, June 28, 2010b, p. 49.

———, “Growing Pains,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, November 22, 

2010c, p. 20.

———, “Longer Marches,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 15, 

2010d, pp. 22–23.

Pollpeter, Kevin, Building for the Future: China’s Progress in Space Technology 

During the Tenth 5-Year Plan and the U.S. Response, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2008.

———, “To Be More Precise: The Beidou Satellite Navigation and Positioning 

System,” China Brief, Vol. 7, No. 10, May 2007.

Qi Lei, Xiao Weihua, and Xu Shan, “N5B, a New Agricultural Plane Soared,” 

International Aviation, August 2008, pp. 18–19.

“Review of Operations,” HAECO website, undated. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/20060329/00044/F107_c.pdf

“Rockwell Collins Selected to Provide Cabin Core System for COMAC C919,” 

Rockwell Collins website, September 21, 2010.
138 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

“Rockwell Collins Selected to Provide Communication and Navigation Systems 

for COMAC C919,” Rockwell Collins website, July 12, 2010. 

“Rockwell Collins to Provide Integrated Surveillance System for COMAC C919,” 

Rockwell Collins website, July 15, 2010. 

“Rolls-Royce China,” Rolls-Royce website, undated. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.rolls-royce.com/china/en/activities/default.htm

“Rolls-Royce in Hong Kong,” Rolls-Royce website, 2009. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.rolls-royce.com/china/en/activities/hong_kong.htm 

“Rolls-Royce: Procurement in China to Increase Three- to Four-fold over the Next 

Five-to-Eight Years (罗罗公司:未来5至8年在中国采购量将增3至4倍),” China 

News Service, August 31, 2010. As of January 29, 2011:

http://www.chinanews.com.cn/cj/2010/08-31/2503309.shtml

“Rolls-Royce Spey,” Jane’s Aero-Engines, April 1, 2010.

Royce, Douglas, “Civil Rotorcraft Market Looks Gloomy (民用旋翼机市场前景

不容乐观),” International Aviation, March 2010, p. 73.

“Safran History in China,” Safran Group website, undated. As of January 29, 

2011: 

http://www.safran.cn/spip.php?rubrique110&lang=en

“Schweizer Selects Jiangxi Changhe Aircraft to Provide 300CBi Helicopter 

Airframes,” Sikorsky Aircraft website, October 30, 2006. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.sikorsky.com/About+Sikorsky/News

“Shenyang Aircraft Corporation and Fokker Aerospace Group to Work Together 

in Machining for Gulfstream Aircraft Components,” Fokker Aerostructures 

website, November 22, 2005. 

“Shenzhou Series,” Jane’s Space Systems and Industry, June 17, 2009.

Shi, Jian (石坚), “China Business Aircraft Market Warming Up (风景这边独好—

从三亚“海天盛筵”活动看国内公务机市场),” International Aviation, May 2010, 

pp. 67–69.

“Shijian Series,” Jane’s Space Systems and Industry, August 23, 2010.

Shirouzu, Norihiko, “Real Orders for Chinese Commercial Jet?” Wall Street 

Journal, October 26, 2010.

“Signature Between Turbomeca and Beijing Changkong Machinery for a Joint 

Venture Company,” Turbomeca website, November 2, 2006. As of January 29, 

2011: 

http://www.turbomeca.com/francais/media-evenements/communiques-de-presse/

archives-2006/signature-d-une-joint-venture.html
Bibliography 139

“Sikorsky Aircraft Selects Changhe to Supply S-76® Helicopter Airframes,” 

Sikorsky Aircraft website, July 12, 2007. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.sikorsky.com/About+Sikorsky/News

“SLHC—Sichuan Lantian Helicopter Company,” Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 

February 25, 2010.

“Small Satellite Launch Successful,” Beijing: Chinese Academy of Sciences, 

October 22, 2003. As of January 29, 2011:

http://english.cas.cn/english/news/detailnewsb.asp?InfoNo=24708

“Smiths Opens Aerospace Components Facility in Suzhou,” Smiths Group 

website, April 29, 2004. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.smiths-group.com/press_release_details.aspx?releaseID=85

Sun, Mercy, “Private Jets in China’s Skies,” Beijing This Month, September 15, 

2006. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.btmbeijing.com/contents/en/business/2006-09/coverstory/privatejets

“The Last Kilometer: GE Scrambles for the Chinese Market (最后1公里: GE抢攻

中国市场),” People’s Daily Online, September 17, 2001. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/33/172/20010917/562388.html

“Timken to Launch Aerospace Manufacturing in China,” Timken Company 

website, November 8, 2006. 

“Turbomeca (Safran Group) Signs Agreement for Training Programs in China,” 

Turbomeca website, September 25, 2009. 

“UCS Satellite Database,” Union of Concerned Scientists website, undated. As of 

January 29, 2011: 

http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/

technical_issues/ucs-satellite-database.html

Ulman, Wayne A., “China’s Emergent Military Aerospace and Commercial 

Aviation Capabilities,” Testimony Before the U.S.–China Economic and Security 

Review Commission, May 20, 2010. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2010hearings/written_testimonies/10_05_20_

wrt/10_05_20_ulman_statement.php

“U.S. Aerospace Industry Statistics,” International Trade Administration, U.S. 

Department of Commerce website, undated. As of January 29, 2011--: 

http://www.trade.gov/mas/manufacturing/OAAI/aero_stats.asp

“Venesat (Simon Bolivar),” Jane’s Space Systems and Industry, May 3, 2010.

Wang, JiaoE, and FengJun Jin, “China’s Air Passenger Transport: An Analysis of 

Recent Trends,” Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 48, No. 4, 2007, 

pp. 469–480.
140 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

Wang, Qian, and Xin Dingding, “Golden Decade Takes Off for Aviation,” China 

Daily, October 16, 2010. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-10/16/content_11417648.htm 

“Working Together,” Rolls-Royce website, 2009. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.rolls-royce.com/china/en/partners/default.htm 

“World Aerospace Database,” Aviation Week Intelligence Network website, July 

20, 2010. 

“World Bank Data Book,” World Bank website, undated. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://data.worldbank.org/indicators

“Worldwide—Sichuan Services Aero Engine Maintenance Company (SSAMC),” 

Snecma website, undated. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.snecma.com/spip.php?rubrique283&lang=en

“Worldwide—Snecma Suzhou,” Snecma website, undated. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.snecma.com/spip.php?rubrique331&lang=en

“Worldwide—Snecma Xinyi Airfoil Castings,” Snecma website, undated. As of 

January 29, 2011: 

http://www.snecma.com/-xinyi-.html?lang=fr

Wu Ximing (吴希明), “Domestic Helicopters Should Play a Leading Role (让国产

直升机发挥指导作用),” International Aviation, December 2009, p. 21.

“XAC MA60,” Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, May 25, 2010.

“XAE WS9 Qin Ling,” Jane’s Aero-Engines, November 1, 2010.

“XAE—Xian Aero-Engine Corporation (China),” Jane’s Aero-Engines, January 26, 

2010.

Xia Qunlin (夏群林), “Forecast for Civil Helicopter Market (民用直升机市场分

析与预测),” International Aviation, June 2009, pp. 56–58.

“Xi’an Aircraft Acquires Austrian Company FACC (西飞收购奥地利FACC公司),” 

International Aviation, December 2009, p. 10.

“Xi’an Airfoil Technology Co., Ltd.,” Chinamet.com website, undated. As of 

January 29, 2011: 

http://www.chinamet.com/english/ecom/gold/index.jsp?supplier_id=2266

“Xian (Antonov) Y-7,” Jane’s Aircraft Upgrades, October 5, 2010.

Xin Dingding, “General Aviation Sector to Scale New Heights,” China Daily, 

March 16, 2006, p. 1.

“Yaogan Series,” Jane’s Space Systems and Industry, August 18, 2010.

Yeo, Ghim-Lay, “China Special: ARJ21 Update,” Flight International, November 

5, 2010.
Bibliography 141

Younossi, Obaid, Mark V. Arena, Richard M. Moore, Mark A. Lorell, Joanna 

Mason, and John C. Graser, Military Jet Engine Acquisition: Technology Basics 

and Cost-Estimating Methodology, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 

MR-1596-AF, 2002. As of January 29, 2011:

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1596.html

Yu Jianhua, “Changhe Aircraft Advances International Cooperation,” International 

Aviation, July 2008, pp. 66–67.

Zhang Guanglin, “China Needs a Strong Helicopter Industry,” International 

Aviation, July 2008, pp. 36–39.

Zhang Zhengguo (张正国), “C919 Finalizes Selection for Five Major Sub-Systems 

(C919 选定五大系统供应商),” International Aviation, May 2010.

Zhang Zhengguo and Liu Shengjun, “Safran Joins in Chinese Aviation Industry 

Development,” International Aviation, April 2009, pp. 49–50.

Zhao Fei, “Technical and Economic Advantages of High-Speed Rails (高速铁路

的技术经济优势),” Railway Knowledge, June 1999.

Zhao Xiuli and Ma Yuan, “International Helicopter Manufacturers in China,” 

International Aviation, September 2009, pp. 63–66.

“Zheda Pixing 1B,” National Space Science Data Center, National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration website, undated. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/spacecraftDisplay.do?id=2010-047B

“Zhi-8 Transport/SAR Helicopter,” Sinodefence.com, January 2, 2009. As of 

January 29, 2011: 

http://www.sinodefence.com/airforce/helicopter/z8.asp

“Zhi-9 Utility Helicopter,” Sinodefence.com, January 2, 2009. As of January 29, 

2011: 

http://www.sinodefence.com/airforce/helicopter/z9.asp 

“Zhi-11 Utility Helicopter,” Sinodefence.com, June 3, 2007. As of January 29, 

2011: 

http://www.sinodefence.com/airforce/helicopter/z11.asp 

“Zhi-15 (EC 175) Medium Helicopter,” Sinodefence.com, March 15, 2008. As of 

January 29, 2011: 

http://www.sinodefence.com/airforce/helicopter/z15.asp 

“Zhuzhou South Pratt & Whitney Aero-engine Co., Ltd.,” QiYeYi.com website, 

2007. As of January 29, 2011: 

http://www.qiyeyi.com/HuNan/Zhuzhou-South-Pratt-Whitney-Aero-engine2498-en.html
142 Ready for Takeoff: China’s Advancing Aerospace Industry

“Zi Yuan CBERS (China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite),” Globalsecurity.org. As of 

January 29, 2011: 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/zy-1.htm

“ZiYuan-2/JianBing-3 Series,” Jane’s Space Systems and Industry, June 17, 2010.