alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 31.1








I, Susan B. Sheffield, certify that:





1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of GM Financial Consumer Automobile Receivables Trust 2021-1  (the “Exchange Act periodic reports”);





2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;





3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;





4. Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statement required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicing agreements in all material respects; and





5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report.  Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.





In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties:  The Bank of New York Mellon.








By:/s/ Susan B. SheffieldName:Susan B. SheffieldTitle:Executive Vice President and Chief Financial OfficerDate:March 3, 2023
REGULATION II - PERMIT SYSTEM 

RULE 2. 7 Conditional Approval 

A. The Control Officer may issue an Authority to Construct or Permit to 

Operate subject to conditions which will bring the operation of any article, 

machine. equipment or other contrivance within the standards of these 

regulations, in which case the conditions shall be specified in writing. Commencing work under such an Authority to Construct or operation under such 

a Permit Operate shall be deemed acceptance of all the conditions so 

specified. The Control Officer shall issue an Authority to Construct or Permit to Operate with revised conditions upon receipt of a new application, if 

the applicant demonstrates that the article, machine. equipment or other 

contrivance can operate within the standards of these regulations. 

B. A person shall not operate equipment contrary to permit conditions specified 

on permits issued in accordance with the provisions of this Rule. 

MODOC COUNTY APCD 

January 15, 1989 

* • * * * 

RULE 2.7 

Page 1
# Official Journal C 500/10 D

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 500 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 6410 December 2021 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 500

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 6410 December 2021

---

| Contents | page |
| --- | --- |
| | II   Information |
| | INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2021/C 500/01 | Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union — Cases where the Commission raises no objections (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2021/C 500/02 | Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union — Cases where the Commission raises no objections | 12 |

Contents

page

II   Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2021/C 500/01

Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union — Cases where the Commission raises no objections (
  1
  )

1

1

2021/C 500/02

Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union — Cases where the Commission raises no objections

12

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| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance. |

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(1)   Text with EEA relevance.

1

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN
§ 21.5742 Entitlement. ( a ) *Educational assistance.* A veteran or servicemember shall be entitled to one standard academic year (or the equivalent) of educational assistance for each year of service following the first enlistment beginning after November 30, 1980 (up to a maximum of four years). If the veteran or servicemember completes two years of active duty in the term of enlistment, but fails to complete the enlistment or fails to complete four years of active duty in an enlistment of more than four years, his or her entitlement to educational assistance shall be calculated as follows: ( 1 ) VA shall determine the number of years, months and days in the veteran's qualifying period of service by subtracting the entry on duty date from the release from active duty date. Any deductible time under § 3.15 of this chapter (during the period of service on which eligibility is based) will be excluded from the calculation.
( 2 ) VA shall convert the number of years determined in paragraph (a)(1) of this section to months by multiplying them by 12.
( 3 ) VA shall convert the number of days determined in paragraph (a)(1) of this section to 0 months if there are 14 days or less, and to 1 month is there are more than 14 days.
( 4 ) VA shall determine the number of total months by adding the number of months determined in paragraph (a)(1) of this section (exclusive of years and days) to the number of months determined in paragraph (a)(2) of this section, and the number of months in paragraph (a)(3).
( 5 ) VA shall multiply the number of total months in paragraph (a)(4) of this section by 75. (Authority: 10 U.S.C. 2142(a)(2))
( b ) *Subsistence allowance.* A veteran or servicemember shall be entitled to nine months of subsistence allowance for each standard academic year of entitlement to educational assistance. For each period of entitlement to educational assistance which is shorter than a standard academic year, a veteran or servicemember will be entitled to one month of subsistence allowance for each month of entitlement to educational assistance. This entitlement shall not exceed nine months.
(Authority: 10 U.S.C. 2144)
[51 FR 27026, July 29, 1986, as amended at 51 FR 29471, Aug. 18, 1986]
1 United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 94-40933

Summary Calendar.

Alfredo HERNANDEZ-RAMOS, Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION, Respondent.

April 11, 1995.

Petition for Review of Transfer Treaty Determination of the United

States Parole Commission.

Before SMITH, EMILIO M. GARZA and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge:

Court-appointed counsel for Alfredo Hernandez-Ramos

(Hernandez) has filed a brief of the sort contemplated by Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967),

averring that there are no nonfrivolous issues to assert on appeal,

and moving the Court for permission to withdraw as Hernandez's

counsel. Although A nders was a direct appeal from a criminal

conviction, this Court has utilized the Anders format in a habeas

corpus case. S ee, Dinkins v. Alabama, 526 F.2d 1268, 1269 (5th

Cir.), c ert. denied, 429 U.S. 842, 97 S.Ct. 119, 50 L.Ed.2d 112

(1972). We likewise find that it is appropriate to apply the

principles enunciated in Anders to determine whether counsel should

be allowed to withdraw in a petition for review of Transfer Treaty

Determination of the United States Parole Commission.

Under Anders, a court-appointed attorney may withdraw if he

makes a conscientious examination of the case and finds the appeal2

wholly frivolous. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S.Ct. at 1400. To

comply with A nders, counsel must isolate "possibly important

issues" and "furnish the court with references to the record and

legal authorities to aid it in its appellate function." U nited

States v. Johnson, 527 F.2d 1328, 1329 (5th Cir.1976). After the

appellant is given an opportunity to respond, the court makes a

full examination of the record to determine whether the case is

frivolous. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S.Ct. at 1400.

Counsel here has fully complied with the Anders requirements.

Hernandez, although given the opportunity, did not file a response.

We have independently reviewed the brief and record and found no

nonfrivolous issue. Accordingly, it is ordered that counsel is

excused from further responsibilities herein, and the Petition for

Review of Transfer Treaty Determination is DISMISSED.
#### Stanley WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. S.W. ORNOSKI, Acting Warden, for California State Prison at San Quentin, Respondent.

No. 05-77034.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Dec. 12, 2005.

Verna J. Wefald, Esq., Attorney at Law, Pasadena, CA, for Petitioner.

Keith H. Borjon, Esq., Lisa J. Brault, DAG, James W. Bilderback, II, Esq., Los Angeles, CA, for Respondent.

Before HUG, T.G. NELSON and GOULD; Circuit Judges.

ORDER

Mr. Williams in 1981 was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1979 murders of Albert Lewis Owens, Tsai-Shai Yang, Yen-I Yang, and Yee-Chen Lin. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the convictions and sentence in 1988. *See People v. Williams,*44 Cal.3d 1127, 245 Cal. Rptr. 635, 751 P.2d 901 (1988). In 2004, we affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. *See Williams v. Woodford,*384 F.3d 567 (9th Cir.2004).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), Mr. Williams now files an application for leave to file a second or successive (SOS) petition in district court. In order to obtain leave to file an SOS petition in district court, section 2244(b)(3)(C) requires that Williams must make a prima facie showing to this Court that his petition would satisfy the requirements of section 2244(b).

Section 2244(b)(1) provides that: “A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.”

Section 2244(b)(2) requires dismissal of new claims in an SOS petition unless:

> (A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or

> (B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previous*1212ly through the exercise of due diligence; and

> (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

Williams does not assert that a “new rule of constitutional law” requires relief, so we do not address section 2244(b)(2)(A).'

The proposed petition which Mr. Williams seeks permission to file in the district court raises nine claims. To the extent that Mr. Williams’s claims are not subject to mandatory dismissal under section 2244(b)(1) because they were previously presented, Mr. Williams has not made a prima facie showing that his claims, whether viewed individually or in the aggregate, could meet the statutory requirements of both due diligence and clear and convincing evidence of actual innocence. Accordingly, the application for leave to file an SOS petition is denied. The request for stay of execution is denied.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-20183

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JOSE LUIS ESPINOSA-HERNANDEZ, also known as Jose Luis Espinosa 

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:06-CR-328-1

Before JOLLY, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

JoseLuis Espinosa-Hernandez appeals the sentence imposed following his

conviction of one charge of illegal reentry into the United States. He argues that

the district court erred by imposing a sentence that exceeded the pertinent

guidelines recommendation. Our review of the record, including the exhaustive

reasons given by the district court in support of its judgment, shows no

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 15, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-20183

2

reversible error in connection with Espinosa-Hernandez’s sentence. See United

States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 706-08 (5th Cir. 2006).

Espinosa-Hernandez also challenges the constitutionality of § 1326(b)’s

treatment of prior felony and aggravated felony convictions as sentencing factors

rather than elements of the offense that must be found by a jury. EspinosaHernandez’s constitutional challenge is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v.

United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998). Although he contends that AlmendarezTorres was incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would

overrule Almendarez-Torres in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466

(2000), we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the basis that

Almendarez-Torres remains binding. See UnitedStates v. Garza-Lopez, 410F.3d

268, 276 (5th Cir. 2005). Espinosa-Hernandez properly concedes that his

argument is foreclosed in light of Almendarez-Torres and circuit precedent, but

he raises it here to preserve it for further review. The judgment of the district

court is AFFIRMED.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Alpharma Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q/A for the period ending June 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Ingrid Wiik, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



Dated:   February 27, 2004





Ingrid Wiik
President and Chief Executive Officer







CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Alpharma Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q/A for the period ending June 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Matthew Farrell, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





Dated:   February 27, 2004





Matthew Farrell
Executive Vice President and 
Chief Financial Officer
§ 42.30 The hearing and burden of proof. ( a ) The ALJ shall conduct a hearing on the record in order to determine whether the defendant is liable for a civil penalty or assessment under § 42.3 of this part and, if so, the appropriate amount of any civil penalty or assessment considering any aggravating or mitigating factors.
( b ) The Department of Veterans Affairs shall prove defendant's liability and any aggravating factors by a preponderance of the evidence.
( c ) The defendant shall prove any affirmative defenses and any mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence.
( d ) The hearing shall be open to the public unless otherwise ordered by the ALJ for good cause shown.
#### Commonwealth v. Peart

*Richard S. Lowe,*for Commonwealth.

*Robert Trucksess,*for defendant.

*130February 7, 1956.

Corson, J.,

In the above entitled case defendant was charged with assault and battery and aggravated assault and battery. The prosecutor was Harry A. Hunsberger. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty and divided the costs equally between Hunsberger, as the prosecutor, and defendant. The verdict was returned on November 10, 1955, and sentence as to payment of the costs was deferred until November 18, and on that date continued to November 25, at which time the trial judge directed that each of the parties pay one-half of the costs of the proceeding. It turned out, however, that both Hunsberger and Peart had each paid their costs immediately after the verdict.

Nearly three weeks later the Commonwealth filed the present petition seeking-to set aside the verdict and have one-half the costs, which were placed upon Hunsberger, paid by the county. While the Commonwealth has cited ample authority (Guffy v. Commonwealth 2 Grant 65 (1853); Commonwealth v. Charters, 20 Pa. Superior Ct. 599 (1902); Commonwealth v. Cliver, 62 Montg. 134 (1946)) that it is within the power of the court to grant the prayer of a petition to set aside a verdict of the jury fixing costs, the question still remains as to whether or not, in this case, that power should be exercised.

There are two reasons why we feel that the rule should be discharged and the petition dismissed. The first reason is that the costs have been paid and the money is now in the county treasury. There is a serious doubt whether, in a proceeding of this kind, the court has the power to direct the county treasurer to pay money to an individual. The second reason is that the prompt payment of the costs by Hunsberger is rather convincing that his conscience may not have been entirely clear as to his part in what took place.

While it is true that the prosecution was brought *131after consultation with the district attorney, and certainly, if the facts were as narrated, the prosecution was justified, yet the jury certainly sensed a background of ill-will, if not hatred, between the parties that convinced the jury that Hunsberger was not as blameless as his testimony would have made it appear, Hunsberger’s prompt payment of the costs would seem to justify the jury’s findings.

And now, February 7, 1956, for the reasons given, the petition is dismissed and the rule discharged.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

ARROWHEAD ECD PROPERTIES, LLC

v.

ZONING HEARING BOARD OF WEST 

PIKELAND TOWNSHIP

v.

MARY PATRICIA BRANDOLINI

PETITION OF: ARROWHEAD ECD 

PROPERTIES, LLC

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 464 MAL 2023

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Commonwealth 

Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 5th day of March, 2024, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
§ 21.8014 Application. ( a ) *Filing an application.* To participate in a vocational training program, the child of a Vietnam veteran or veteran with covered service in Korea (or the child's parent or guardian, an authorized representative, or a Member of Congress acting on behalf of the child) must file an application. An application is a request for an evaluation of the feasibility of the child's achievement of a vocational goal and, if a CP or VRC determines that achievement of a vocational goal is feasible, for participation in a vocational training program. The application may be in any form, but it must: ( 1 ) Be in writing over the signature of the applicant or the person applying on the child's behalf;
( 2 ) Provide the child's full name, address, and VA claim number, if any, and the parent Vietnam veteran or veteran with covered service in Korea's full name and Social Security number or VA claim number, if any; and
( 3 ) Clearly identify the benefit sought. (Authority: 38 U.S.C. 1804(a), 1821, 1832, 5101)
( b ) *Time for filing.* For a child claiming eligibility based on having spina bifida, an application under this subpart may be filed at any time after September 30, 1997. For a child claiming eligibility based on a covered birth defect, an application under this subpart may be filed at any time after November 30, 2001. (The Office of Management and Budget has approved the information collection requirements in this section under control number 2900-0579)
(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 1804, 1811, 1811 note, 1812, 1814, 1831)
[67 FR 72565, Dec. 6, 2002, as amended at 76 FR 4250, Jan. 25, 2011]
###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 2 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 6 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 7 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 1 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Part 2

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 2 appear at 68 FR 14337, Mar. 25, 2003.

#### § 2.48 Office does not issue duplicate registrations.

If two applications on the same register would result in registrations that are exact duplicates, the Office will permit only one application to mature into registration, and will refuse registration in the other application.

[73 FR 67769, Nov. 17, 2008]

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 3 pertaining to both patents and trademarks is placed in the grouping pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 4 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 5 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 21-0463 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. JUSTIN DALLAS PETERSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

**GRANT** Pursuant to authority granted under Mont. R. App. P. 26(1), the Appellant is given an extension of time until April 6, 2022, to prepare, file, and serve the Appellant's opening brief.

Electronically signed by: Bowen Greenwood Clerk of the Supreme Court March 1 2022

03/01/2022
Case Number: DA 21-0463
## Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas

JUDGMENT

Carolyn Watson, Appellant

No. 06

- 14

- 00025

- CV v.

Good Shepherd Medical Center, Appellee Appeal from the County Court at Law #2 of Gregg County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 2013

- 19 58

- CCL2 ). Opinion delivered by Chief Justice Morriss, Justice Moseley and Justice
Carter* participating. Concurring Opinion by Justice Moseley. * Jack Carter, Retired, Sitting by Assignment.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find reversible error in the judgment of

the court below. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion

. We further order that the appell ee , Good Shepherd Medical Center , pay all costs of this

appeal.

RENDERED JANUARY 15, 2015
BY ORDER OF THE COURT JOSH R. MORRISS, III
CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST: Debra K. Autrey, Clerk