alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 4.1B


                            SECURITIES RESOLUTION NO.
                                       OF
                                  ALPHARMA INC.



       I,          , Secretary of Alpharma Inc. (the "Company"), do hereby
certify that the attached is a true and correct copy of Securities Resolution
No.      duly adopted by the of the Company pursuant to authorization delegated
to him by the             Committee of the Board of Directors of the company at
a meeting called and held on the day of          ; that a quorum of said Board
Committee was present at said meeting and voted throughout; and I do further
certify that said resolution has not been rescinded and remains in full force
and effect.

      IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the
corporate seal of ALPHARMA INC. this      day of            .



                                          By:_________________________________
                                                Name:
                                                Title:


[CORPORATE SEAL]
<PAGE>   2
                        [    ]% [    ] NOTES DUE [    ]

                        SECURITIES RESOLUTION NO. [    ]
                                       OF
                                  ALPHARMA INC.

      The actions described below are taken by the Board of Directors (the
"Board") of ALPHARMA INC. (the "Company"), or by an Officer or committee of
Officer or committee of Officers pursuant to Board delegation, in accordance
with resolutions adopted by the Board as of [ ], resolutions adopted by the
Committee of the Board as of [ ], and Section 2.02 of the Indenture dated as of
[ ] (the "Indenture") between the Company and [ ], Trustee. Terms used herein
and not defined have the same meaning given such terms in the Indenture.

      RESOLVED, that a new series of Debt Securities is authorized as follows:

      1.    The title of the series is [    ]% [     ] Notes due [     ]
            ("Notes").

      2.    The form of the Notes shall be substantially in the form of Exhibit
            1 hereto.

      3.    The Notes shall have the terms set forth in Exhibit 1.

      4.    The Notes shall be sold to the underwriter(s) named in the
            Prospectus Supplement dated [ ] on the following terms:

            Price to Public:
            Underwriting Discount:
            Closing Date:

      This Securities Resolution shall be effect as of [ ].
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-50263

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

DAVID AARON DIAZ,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 3:15-CR-708-1

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The attorney appointed to represent David Aaron Diaz has moved for 

leave to withdraw and has filed briefs in accordance with Anders v. California, 

386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). 

Diaz has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s briefs and the 

relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s 

assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 18, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 16-50263 Document: 00514122856 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/18/2017
No. 16-50263

2

Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is 

excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. 

See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

 Case: 16-50263 Document: 00514122856 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/18/2017
#### Harry Hirshman, Appellant, *v.*Morris Shidlovshy, Respondent.

Appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, borough of Manhattan, rendered in favor of the defendant, upon a trial had without a jury.

Carl L. Schurz, for appellant

Eurzman & Frankenheimer (Nathan Ottinger, of counsel), for respondent.

*Per Curiam.*

The only question, involved upon the appeal is one of fact. Upon the evidence the justice could have found either way, and having decided in favor of the defendant, we discover no reason for disturbing his conclusion.

Present: Beekmah, P. J., Giegerich and O’Gormas, JJ.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.
# Official Journal L 23/26 J

| | ISSN 1977-0677 |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | L 23 |
| | |
| English edition | Legislation | Volume 6126 January 2018 |

ISSN 1977-0677

Official Journal

of the European Union

L 23

English edition

Legislation

Volume 6126 January 2018

---

| Contents | | II   Non-legislative acts | page |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS |
| | * | Council Decision (EU) 2018/104 of 20 November 2017 on the signing, on behalf of the Union, and provisional application of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part | 1 |
| | * | Comprehensive and enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part | 4 |

Contents

II   Non-legislative acts

page

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

*

Council Decision (EU) 2018/104 of 20 November 2017 on the signing, on behalf of the Union, and provisional application of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part

1

*

Comprehensive and enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part

4

| EN | Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.
  The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk. |
| --- | --- |

EN

Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.

The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk.
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Mahin , ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2016-Ohio-7717.]

D ISCIPLINARY C OUNSEL v . M AHIN . [Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Mahin , ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2016-Ohio-7717.] (No. 2015-1641

— Submitted November 8, 2016

— Decided November 14, 2016.)
O N A PPLICATION FOR R EINSTATEMENT

.

____________________ {¶ 1} This cause came on for further c onsideration upon the filing of an application for reinstatement by res pondent, John Edward Mahin, Attorney Registration No. 0011253, last known busin ess address in Ci ncinnati, Ohio. {¶ 2} The court coming now to consid er its order of June 14, 2016, wherein the court, pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(12)(A)(3), suspended respondent from the practice of law for a period of two years with one year stayed on conditions and with credit for the time served under the interim felony suspension imposed on January 9, 2015, finds that re spondent has subs tantially complied
with that order and with the provisions of Gov.Bar R. V(24). {¶ 3} Therefore, it is ordered by this cour t that respondent is reinstated to the practice of law in the state of Ohio. It is further ordered that in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(21) and consistent with the opini on rendered herein on June 14, 2016, respondent shall serve two years of monitored probation. {¶ 4} It is further ordered that on or before 30 days from the date of this order relator shall file with the clerk of this court the name of the attorney who will serve as respondent’s monitor, in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(21)(A)(3).
It is further ordered that at the end of respondent’s probationa ry period, relator
shall file with the clerk of this court a report i ndicating whether respondent, during the probationary period, complied with the terms of the probation. {¶ 5} It is further ordered that at the end of the probationary period respondent may apply for te rmination of probation as provided in Gov.Bar R.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 V(21). It is further ordered that res pondent’s probation shall not be terminated until (1) respondent files an applica tion for terminati on of probation in compliance with Gov.Bar R. V(21)(D), (2) respondent complies with this and all other orders issued by this court, (3) respondent complies with the Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio, (4) relator files with the clerk of this court a report indicating that responde nt has complied with the terms of the probation, and (5) this court orders that the probation be terminated. {¶ 6} It is further ordered that the clerk of this court issue certified copies of this order as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(1) and that publication be made as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(D)(2). {¶ 7} For earlier case, see Disciplinary Counsel v. Mahin , 146 Ohio St.3d 312, 2016-Ohio-3336, 55 N.E.3d 1108.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and P FEIFER , O’D ONNELL , L ANZINGER , K ENNEDY , F RENCH , and O’N EILL , JJ., concur.

________________________
#### Feld Estate

*Maxwell Strawbridge,*for accountants.

September 17, 1956.

Taxis, P. J.,

The first and final account of Samuel S. Feldgoise and Abe H. Liebster, executors, was examined and audited by the court on September 10, 1956.

The estate being insolvent, the question is submitted whether the claim of a dentist for professional services to decedent, and for prophylaxis, drugs, dental bridge *321work (some of the latter of which' was completed and some remained incompleted at decedent’s death), and a visit to decedent in the hospital, all furnished decedent within six months of his death, has a preferential status under the provisions of section 622 of the Fiduciaries Act of April 18, 1949, P. L. 512, 20 PS §320.622.

That section provides, as to claims against the estate of an insolvent decedent: *“Classification and Order of Payment.*If the applicable assets of the estate are insufficient to pay all proper charges and claims in full, the personal representative, subject to any preference given by law to claims due the United States shall pay them in the following order, without priority as between claims of the same class: (1) The costs of administration; (2) The family exemption; (3) The costs of the decedent’s funeral and burial, and the costs of medicines furnished to him within six months of his death, of medical or nursing services performed for him within that time, and of services performed for him by any of his employes within that time; . . .”

Although a claim such as is here presented is not given a preference by specific language of the act, I am of the opinion that all of the items for which the claim is made would fall within a reasonable interpretation of: “medicines furnished to him within six months of his death, [and] of medical or nursing services performed for him within that time”.

In Silvius Estate, 3 Lack. L. N. 84, 88 (1894), it was said: “The object is to secure to a person in sickness such aids as may seem essential to his comfort or recovery, and his whole estate in case of death is pledged to their preferred payment. ... It is no strain, therefore, of the law to hold as' we do, that the medical attendance there spoken of includes all such immediate attendance on the sick as is directed to an alleviation or a recovery”.

*322The professional services of the dentist in this ease, and the materials furnished by him to decedent, are presumed to have been furnished for the purpose of contributing to decedent’s well-being, care and treatment, although perhaps only indirectly to the prolonging of his life.

The claim of Martin Entine, D.D.S., is therefore allowed and awarded in the full sum of $251 . . .

And now, September 17, 1956, this adjudication is confirmed nisi.
**EXHIBIT 35.1**

 

**SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT**

**New Holland Credit Company, LLC**

 

The undersigned, a duly authorized officer ofNew Holland Credit Company, LLC (“NHCC”), as Servicer pursuant to the Sale and Servicing Agreement dated as of March 1,2021 (as amended from time to time, the “Sale and Servicing Agreement”) by and among NHCC, CNH Capital Receivables LLC andCNH Equipment Trust 2021-A, does hereby certify that:

 

1.          NHCC is Servicer under the Sale and Servicing Agreement.

 

2.         The undersigned is duly authorized as required pursuant to the Sale and Servicing Agreement to execute and deliver this Certificate to the Indenture Trustee.

 

3.          This Certificate is delivered pursuant to Section 4.9(a) of the Sale and Servicing Agreement and Item 1123 of Regulation AB.

 

4.          A review of the Servicer’s activities during the period from the trust’s initial cut-off date, January 31, 2021, to and including December 31, 2021 and of its performance under the Sale and Servicing Agreement has been made under my supervision.

 

5.        To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Sale and Servicing Agreement in all material respects throughout the period from the trust’s initial cut-off date, January 31, 2021, to and including December 31, 2021.

 

6.          IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has duly executed this Certificate this 30th day of March, 2022.

 

 

 

 

March 30, 2022
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#### SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY v. THE UNITED STATES

[59 C. Cls. 36; 268 U. S. 263]

Judgment was rendered in favor of the United States in the court below. On appeal the judgment was *reversed,*the Supreme Court deciding:

1. Where a railroad, for transporting applicants for enlistment in the Army, discharged, retired, and furloughed soldiers, and civilian employees of the War Department, rendered its bills at land-grant rates, knowing that according to a ruling of the Comptroller of the Treasury such persons were to be regarded as “ troops of the United States ” for whose transportation only land-grant rates could be paid by disbursing .officers, and accepted payment of its bills on that basis without protest, *held*that, though the comptroller’s ruling was er*1029roneous, tlie railroad was bound by acquiescence not recover tbe difference between the amount received and the larger amount which it would have been lawfully entitled to charge under its tariff.

May 11, 1925.

2. But *aliter*where the bills, though rendered at land-grant rates, bore a short form of protest: “Amounts claimed in this bill accepted under protest ”; or a form more extended and explanatory ; since by these the Government officers were sufficiently notified that payment at the lower rates .would not be accepted in final settlement.

3. Where, however, the railroad tendered most of its bills with indorsed protests, but a considerable number during the same period without them, as to these latter it was bound by its acceptance of the land-grant rates.

Mr. Justice SaNford

delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court
CITY COURT OF NEW YORK, GENERAL TERM,

MARCH, 1900.

#### Marcus Braun, Respondent, *v.*W. Seward Webb, as President of the Wagner Palace Car Co., Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment entered upon a verdict of a jury and from an order denying a motion for a new trial.

Saunders, Webb & Worcester (Thorndike Saunders, of counsel), for appellant.

Morris Cukor, for respondent.

Conlan, J.

The plaintiff had purchased a ticket for 'a passage from Cleveland to Weehawlcen in one of the sleeping cars of the •defendant. Upon entering the train at the former place he exhibited his ticket for lower berth No. 10 on the car *Orneaba,,*and *795was placed by the conductor in charge of the defendant’s porter, who conducted him to the precise berth assigned to him by his ticket. It is the defendant’s contention that there had been a prior sale of this precise berth to another party, and the plaintiff was thus prevented from occupying the same and was, as he alleges, ejected from the car and compelled as a consequence to ride the entire distance and all night in the ordinary day coach. The plaintiff testified that he had been on the road for several days and nights, riding constantly, and was fatigued and required this special provision for rest.

The whole case is quite free from exception and the defendant appears to have been entirely satisfied with the charge of the trial justice, as no exception was taken thereto. The main objection of the defendant is that the damages are excessive.

The language of the court in its charge to the jury upon this point of the case is in part as follows: “‘I charge you that the plaintiff in this case is at least entitled to a verdict for nominal damages as against the defendant, and that the question for you to determine is whether he is entitled to more than nominal damages. It is for you, therefore, to say what damages the plaintiff is entitled to beyond nominal damages, if any.”

To this charge, as we have said, no exception was taken, and it is beyond our power to interfere to correct or change what was to the defendant upon the trial a satisfactory submission of the question to the jury.

This court has said in a former adjudication: “The amount of damages is particularly within the province of the jury, and unless they are so outrageous as to strike evéry one with the enormity and injustice of them, and so as to induce the court to believe that the jury must have acted through prejudice, partiality or corruption, the court on appeal will not interfere.” Swoboda v. Met. St. R. Co., 22 Misc. Rep. 9.

We are unable to find any such element in the case at bar, and we are unable to find in the record before us, or in the brief of counsel, any reason for disturbing the conclusions reached by the WW-

The judgment and order appealed from must be affirmed, with costs.

O’Dwyer, J., concurs.

Judgment and order affirmed, with costs.
1 The Honorable Patrick A. Conmy, United States District Judge for the District of North Dakota. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 01-1806

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * v. * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the Joseph Matthew Deveraux, also known * District of North Dakota. as Joe Deveraux, also known as * Joseph Miles Followstheroad, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: October 2, 2001 Filed: October 3, 2001

___________ Before HANSEN, FAGG, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. A jury found Joseph Deveraux guilty of three counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child under the age of twelve, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 2241(c), and five counts of sexual abuse of a minor between the ages of twelve and sixteen, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 2243(a). The district court 1 sentenced him to 235 months imprisonment and 3 years supervised release, and denied his-2- subsequent Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 motion for a new trial. Deveraux appeals the denial of his Rule 33 motion. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion, seeUnited States v. Zuazo , 243 F.3d 428, 431 (8th Cir. 2001) (standard of review), or in denying the motion without an evidentiary hearing. See United States v. Provost , 969 F.2d 617, 619-20 (8th Cir. 1992) (standard of review), cert. denied , 506 U.S. 1056 (1993). See United States v. Miner , 131 F.3d 1271, 1273-74 (8th Cir.1997) (stating that courts view recantations “with suspicion,” particularly in childsexual-abuse cases, “‘where recantation is a recurr ing phenomenon’ such as ‘when family members are involved and the child has feelings of guilt or the family members seek to influence the child to change her story’”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### John GALVAN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 18385.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

June 6, 1963.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 26, 1963.

*712Patrick Coleman, Hollywood, Cal., for appellant.

Francis C. Whelan, U. S. Atty., Thomas R. Sheridan, Asst. U. S. Atty., Chief, Criminal Section, and Phillip W. Johnson, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.

Before CHAMBERS and KOELSCH, Circuit Judges, and MacBRIDE, District Judge.

CHAMBERS, Circuit Judge.

Galvan has been convicted of “knowingly and unlawfully receiving, concealing and facilitating the concealment” of a bag of heroin and assaulting a narcotics officer with a deadly and dangerous weapon, to wit: a Cadillac automobile.

As to the assault with a Cadillac, there is little doubt that the officer had to move very quickly and that the car would have “run him down” if he hadn’t jumped. The jury could have thought Galvan was scared by the shotgun in the officer’s hands when he approached. But it did not have to do so. It could accept the officer’s story. We have no trouble with this count.

As to the first count on the narcotics, the government has no evidence to spare, but we deem it enough. After the approach by Officer Olexa, with other officers in the area where the arrest was made, Galvan accelerated his car. As he fled, Officer Olexa fired shots into the Cadillac’s tires. Galvan drove the car on through stop signs, dodged an attempted road block, knocked a garbage can over and bounced around over lawns of nearby residences. He and the car came to rest on Mrs. McCrea’s lawn. Galvan was arrested immediately. The date was April 12, 1962. No narcotics were found that evening, although a search was promptly made of the scene. The next morning Mr. McCrea found a bag of heroin at one of the front comers of his house. The McCreas thought, however, the contents were marshmallows. The heroin went into the garbage, the container into a trash can. The heroin was thereafter pulled out of the garbage truck by the officers. It is not questioned that the heroin in the garbage was the same stuff as found at the corner of the McCrea house.

 The jury was entitled to conclude that the circumstances were reliable and to believe that Galvan tossed the package out in his wild flight the night before. The package was found about nine feet from the nearest track of Galvan’s car. It was between a bush and a hydrant. Had the package been out in the open, it is likely it would have been soon discovered. Possibility of error always exists, but a full statement of the facts would lead the average person to think there was not much. (There was *713evidence in the record which justified the inference that Galvan might have had heroin in his car as he fled.)

In the foregoing narrative we have related what we regard as a skeleton of the facts that override appellant’s specifications as to sufficiency of the evidence. We have examined two other specifications, which we find without merit.

The judgment is affirmed.