NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

SHANE D., KASSANDRA D., Appellants,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, T.D., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 20-0245

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015JD201900028

The Honorable Megan McCoy, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Stavris Law Firm, PLLC, Scottsdale

By Alison Stavris

Counsel for Appellant Shane D.

Law Office of Michael & Casey, Phoenix

By Robert Casey

Counsel for Appellant Kassandra D.

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Tom Jose

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 3-16-2021
SHANE D., KASSANDRA D. v. DCS, T.D.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which 

Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Shane D. (“Father”) and Kassandra D. (“Mother”) 

(collectively “Parents”) appeal from their parental right’s termination for 

Connor, age ten.

1 For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS2 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Before moving to Arizona in December of 2017, Mother and 

Father lived in Nebraska, where they had been intermittently involved with

Nebraska Child Protective Services. Mother has been diagnosed with 

bipolar disorder and schizophrenia and has a history of attempting suicide. 

While in Nebraska, she was believed to be abusing prescription 

medications. Father was also suspected of substance abuse.

¶3 In February 2019, the Arizona Department of Child Safety 

(“DCS”) in Kingman received a report that Mother engaged in domestic 

violence against Father in front of Connor and his older half-brother. The 

report alleged Mother put a knife to Father’s throat during an argument. As 

a result, DCS offered in-home services to the family. Father, who worked as 

a long-haul truck driver and spent much of his time traveling for work, did 

not participate in the services.

¶4 In April 2019, DCS learned that Mother attempted suicide and 

was hospitalized. Connor was at school when the suicide attempt occurred, 

and DCS could not reach Father before Connor needed to be picked up from 

school. Because neither parent was available to care for Connor, DCS placed 

him with a family friend. When DCS was able to reach Father later that day, 

1 To protect the identity of the child, we refer to him by a pseudonym.

2 We view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences from it in 

the light most favorable to sustaining the court’s decision. Jordan C. v. 

ADES, 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 2009).
SHANE D., KASSANDRA D. v. DCS, T.D.

Decision of the Court

3

it informed him there had been a report that he was using drugs and asked 

Father to submit to drug testing. Father agreed to submit to testing and said 

he would retrieve Connor from the family friend’s house that evening.

Father did not pick up Connor nor submit to drug testing. On April 29, 

Connor was adjudicated dependent as to Mother and continued to live with 

the family friend.

¶5 In May 2019, after Father returned from work-related travel, 

he entered into a mediation agreement with DCS in which he agreed to 

engage actively in services. Father requested and was provided information 

identifying service providers. In exchange, DCS agreed to consider moving 

the children back with Father under a safety plan with in-home services.

Father was referred to several reunification services, including a 

community-based substance abuse treatment program, drug testing, and 

supervised visitation.

¶6 When Mother was released from the hospital, DCS referred 

her for reunification services. In May, Mother attended one supervised visit 

but missed her behavioral health appointment. She informed the provider 

she planned to visit another behavioral health clinic, but there is no record 

that she was seen at another clinic.

¶7 Mother and Father left Arizona together in June 2019 on a 

long-distance trucking job. Other than one supervised visit in June, Mother 

and Father stopped engaging in Kingman services. At a dependency review 

hearing in July, Father objected to DCS’s request to find that it had made 

reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for Connor’s removal. 

The court found Connor dependent as to Father and, over Father’s

objection, that DCS had made reasonable efforts. Connor remained in 

placement in Arizona until November of 2019.

¶8 On August 2, 2019, Mother called DCS and requested phone 

visitation with Connor. She explained that Father had kicked her out of the 

truck, and she was looking for shelter space. She provided her mother’s

phone number and address in Nebraska so DCS could set up the referral

for visitation. Mother received in-patient care in Nebraska for medication 

management over four days in early August 2019. Mother was seen for a 

psychological evaluation at a behavioral healthcare provider in Nebraska 

on August 28, 2019.

¶9 In September, DCS referred Father to services for video 

visitation with Connor after he made the request. By October, Father lived
SHANE D., KASSANDRA D. v. DCS, T.D.

Decision of the Court

4

in Nebraska, and DCS received conflicting reports about whether he was 

living with Mother or with his father, who also lived in the area.

¶10 Mother participated in video visits with Connor twice a week 

for September and October. By October, Mother reported that she 

participated in a domestic violence program and received one-on-one 

counseling. A DCS report from October 18 noted that Mother called DCS 

and asked about drug testing. DCS informed her that a hair follicle test 

would be appropriate if she could afford it. DCS reported that Mother was 

paying out of pocket for drug testing and other services, and she was unable 

to afford the cost of submitting regular test results. Mother told DCS she 

had difficulty finding treatment whenever she moved to a new state. DCS 

recommended she continue to receive medical care and participate in 

therapy. A DCS court report prepared October 21 suggested that Mother 

appeared to be functioning adequately to parent her child.

¶11 In October, Mother reported to a healthcare provider that she 

moved out of her mother’s home and into a motel so that Connor’s

placement with her mother would be approved. Mother also reported a 

history of domestic violence with Father and explained that they planned 

to participate in marriage counseling because Father had recently broken 

up with his girlfriend. At a dependency review hearing on October 30, 

counsel for Mother and Father reported on the status of their engagement 

in services and reported positively on their involvement and video 

visitation. Neither parent objected to the reasonableness of DCS’s efforts.

¶12 In November, the court ordered that Connor be placed with 

his maternal grandmother in Nebraska.3 Connor’s grandmother initially 

offered to supervise visits for Mother and Father, but after several visits,

she informed DCS she no longer wished to perform that role for safety 

3 We caution the juvenile court about continuing to exercise 

jurisdiction over a case once the parents and child no longer reside in 

Arizona. See A.R.S. § 25-1032(A) (court has continuing jurisdiction over the 

child until the court determines that the child and parents or person acting 

as a parent do not reside here); Monique B. v. Duncan, 245 Ariz. 371, 376, 

¶ 19 (App. 2018) (“Even after the parties move away from the original state, 

a determination by the original state that it no longer is exercising exclusive, 

continuing jurisdiction applies . . . only after an express judicial 

determination.”). Because neither Arizona nor Nebraska recognized that 

Nebraska was the more appropriate forum to adjudicate the severance, 

Arizona did not lose jurisdiction.
SHANE D., KASSANDRA D. v. DCS, T.D.

Decision of the Court

5

reasons and because she wanted to shield Connor from Mother and Father’s

continuing discord.

¶13 In December, Father was arrested in Idaho for possession of 

controlled substances. After his arrest, Father returned to Nebraska, where 

he began residing with Mother. In a January report, DCS noted that it was 

still waiting for a hair-follicle test from Mother, and Mother had suspended 

her one-on-one counseling sessions because they interfered with her 

employment.

¶14 In January, Connor was diagnosed with an intermittent 

explosive disorder, a disorder characterized by “recurrent behavioral 

outbursts representing a failure to control aggressive impulses[.]” The 

therapist who evaluated Connor noted that he had been subjected to 

emotional abuse when Father used Connor as a shield to prevent Mother 

from assaulting Father. Connor’s teachers reported that his progress was 

delayed compared to his peers.

¶15 During a phone call with DCS on January 10, Mother said that 

she was living with Father and that her participation in counseling and 

other services had lapsed. Mother seemed interested in treatment options 

for Father and asked the case manager if he would like to speak with Father, 

but the case manager declined. Father submitted three urine samples in 

January and each tested negative. At the review hearing on January 22, 

neither parent objected to the court’s finding that DCS was making 

reasonable efforts.

¶16 In February 2020, Mother called the police while she was

barricaded in a room away from Father in the home they shared to report

an incident of domestic violence. Mother subsequently moved into a 

domestic violence shelter, and Father moved in with his father. Parents 

were offered supervised visitation toward the end of February, but the 

visits were suspended due to their inappropriate behavior at the visits.

¶17 At a team decision-making meeting on March 6, Father 

reported that he had enrolled in substance-abuse treatment, was about to 

start domestic-violence classes, and had already submitted a hair follicle for 

drug testing. After the meeting, Mother obtained a substance-abuse 

evaluation and enrolled in a domestic-abuse program.

¶18 After an evidentiary hearing on April 8, the court changed the 

case plan from reunification to severance and adoption and ordered DCS to 

file a termination motion. A minute entry from the April 8 permanency 

hearing noted that the DCS case manager “addressed [the] concerns of the 
SHANE D., KASSANDRA D. v. DCS, T.D.

Decision of the Court

6

lack of guidance from the Department for the Parents to comply with 

services.” DCS moved to terminate Mother and Father’s rights based on 

neglect and nine months’ time-in-care. Also, DCS alleged Father was unfit

because of his chronic substance abuse and that Mother was unfit on the 

ground of mental illness.

¶19 On April 22, there was another domestic violence incident

between Mother and Father, which resulted in a visible injury to Father’s

face. In June, Father was charged with domestic assault for alleged acts on 

May 6, 2020. On June 6, Mother and Father signed a lease for an apartment

and lived together at the time of the trial.

¶20 The juvenile court conducted a contested severance hearing 

in July 2020. The court heard evidence about Mother’s behavioral-health 

status, Father’s substance abuse, the constant turmoil and domestic 

violence between Mother and Father, and their engagement in services 

throughout the case. At the hearing, Mother and Father challenged the 

adequacy of DCS’s reunification efforts. When asked whether DCS was 

obligated to offer services to Parents in Nebraska after they left Arizona, the 

case manager answered:

That’s on the parents. It’s a lot easier for them to be able to 

contact those services, make those appointments, and know 

what places to even go to in their given area. It would be just 

as difficult . . . to implement something in Phoenix, although 

I have a greater chance of obtaining resources . . . to assist 

them with that, I still don’t know what they offer in that area.

* * *

I don’t have the ability to coordinate with a psychologist or 

psychiatrist out of [Arizona]. I wouldn’t know who they 

could go to [in Nebraska]. Again, if we don’t have an address 

of where they reside, I wouldn’t even know where to begin to 

look for that type of professional to perform that evaluation. 

And it also would, there again, require mental health 

background, case notes, prior drug testing, other information 

relevant to be able to come to that informed decision that the 

evaluation would make.

¶21 After considering the evidence presented at trial, the court 

terminated Mother and Father’s parental rights after concluding that each 

ground for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence

and termination was in Connor’s best interests. Mother and Father 
SHANE D., KASSANDRA D. v. DCS, T.D.

Decision of the Court

7

appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A) and 

12-120.21(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶22 On appeal, Father argues it was error for the juvenile court to 

terminate his parental rights because the State failed to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that Father neglected Connor. Father also claims that

DCS failed to provide him with appropriate reunification services. Mother 

and Father both argue that the State failed to satisfy its obligation to make 

reasonable efforts to preserve the family relationship and prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that it was in Connor’s best interests to 

terminate their parental rights. DCS argues Mother and Father waived 

review of the adequacy of DCS’s efforts by failing to timely object. DCS also 

argues we can summarily affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights 

because she failed to challenge the neglect ground.

¶23 At the outset, we note that while Mother failed to challenge 

the neglect ground, she did challenge the reasonableness of DCS’s efforts 

and the court’s finding that termination was in Connor’s best interests. Each 

of these must be proven before the court may terminate a parent’s rights 

based on neglect under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2). See Mary Ellen C. v. ADES, 193 

Ariz. 185, 192, ¶¶ 33–34 (App. 1999); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 66(C). Therefore, we

cannot summarily affirm the termination of Mother’s rights on the neglect 

ground as urged by DCS.

¶24 Father only challenges the court’s findings concerning 

Connor’s best interests and DCS’s reunification efforts on the substance 

abuse and nine months’ time-in-care grounds. On all three grounds alleged 

against her, Mother challenges only the reasonableness of DCS’s

reunification efforts and that termination was in Connor’s best interests. 

Because they have not challenged the court’s other findings, they concede 

those findings’ accuracy on appeal. Britz v. Kinsvater, 87 Ariz. 385, 388 

(1960). “If clear and convincing evidence supports any one of the statutory 

grounds on which the juvenile court ordered severance, we need not 

address claims pertaining to the other grounds.” Jesus M. v. ADES, 203 Ariz. 

278, 280, ¶ 3 (App. 2002). Because we conclude that Mother and Father 

waived review of the adequacy of DCS’s efforts and reasonable evidence 

supported the court’s finding that termination was in Connor’s best 

interests, we do not address the remaining issue raised by Father that DCS 

failed to prove Father neglected Connor.
SHANE D., KASSANDRA D. v. DCS, T.D.

Decision of the Court

8

A. Mother and Father Waived Review of the Adequacy of the Services 

Provided to Them by Failing to Timely Object. 

¶25 DCS argues Mother and Father each waived the adequacy of

DCS’s reunification efforts because Father objected to its efforts only once

before trial while neglecting to engage in the services offered, and Mother 

did not object at all before trial. After reviewing the record, we conclude 

that Mother and Father each failed to timely bring the adequacy of DCS’s

efforts to provide services in Nebraska to the juvenile court’s attention and 

therefore waived review of the issue.

¶26 Before seeking to terminate a parent’s rights on the 

out-of-home placement grounds, DCS must make a diligent effort to 

provide appropriate reunification services. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8). To meet its 

obligation, DCS must “identify the conditions causing the child’s

out-of-home placement, provide services that have a reasonable prospect of 

success to remedy the circumstances as they arise throughout the 

time-in-care period, maintain consistent contact with the parent, and make 

reasonable efforts to assist the parent in areas where compliance proves 

difficult.” Donald W. v. DCS, 247 Ariz. 9, 23, ¶ 50 (App. 2019). Also, before 

the court may terminate parental rights, DCS is constitutionally obligated 

to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Mary Ellen C., 193 Ariz. at 

192, ¶ 33.

¶27 We have previously explained that “[i]n determining whether 

the grounds for termination have been satisfied, the juvenile court is in a 

much better position than this court to evaluate the effectiveness and 

impact of the services provided, as credibility determinations may be 

required to weigh the evidence presented.” Shawanee S. v. ADES, 234 Ariz. 

174, 178, ¶ 15 (App. 2014). The dependency process is designed to allow the 

court to review the parties’ progress in meeting the case plan’s goals. Id.

The State is required to present an updated case report at periodic reviews 

before the court, providing the parties an opportunity to address concerns 

so that unnecessary delays can be avoided. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 58(A), (C).

¶28 Delays are especially harmful when a child must deal with the 

uncertainty and insecurity of temporary placement for the case’s duration. 

Whether a case ultimately results in reunification or termination of parental 

rights, it is typically to the benefit of all that a case is resolved expeditiously. 

For this reason, it is essential that parents timely voice their concerns about 

services to the court. Shawanee S., 234 Ariz. at 178–79, ¶ 16.
SHANE D., KASSANDRA D. v. DCS, T.D.

Decision of the Court

9

¶29 A parent who does not object to the adequacy of the State’s

efforts to provide court-ordered services is precluded from challenging the 

services’ sufficiency on appeal. Shawanee S., 234 Ariz. at 178–79, ¶¶ 16–18. 

DCS is obligated both constitutionally and by statute to provide parents 

with reunification services before it moves to terminate their parental 

rights. Still, though this obligation extends even beyond Arizona’s borders,4

it “does not free a parent from the need to raise a timely objection if the 

parent believes services are inadequate.” Id. at 178, ¶ 13.

¶30 Here, Mother explained to DCS in August 2019 that she 

struggled to pay for services independently and had difficulty finding 

Nebraska service providers. But it does not appear that Mother ever 

brought the issue to the court’s attention despite ample opportunity to do 

so. Mother does not address the waiver issue on appeal, and our review of 

the record has not uncovered an instance in which Mother raised the matter

to the court before the trial.

¶31 Father objected once to the court’s finding of reasonable 

efforts at a review hearing in July 2019. However, at the time of that hearing, 

Father had only recently left Arizona where he had failed to engage in the 

services DCS had provided and was living out of his semi-truck, a situation 

that arguably makes referrals for most services futile. Because of Father’s

circumstances and actions at the time of the hearing, any legitimate 

concerns Father developed later were not raised by this objection.

¶32 DCS acknowledges that a minute entry from the April 8, 2020,

evidentiary hearing indicated that the case manager “address[ed] the

concerns of the lack of guidance from the Department for the Parents to 

comply with services.” But the court ultimately found that DCS’s efforts 

were reasonable, and neither parent objected to the court’s finding. Without 

a transcript of the hearing, we cannot conclude that Mother or Father 

brought the inadequacy of DCS’s services to the court’s attention based on 

this minute entry alone. See Bliss v. Treece, 134 Ariz. 516, 519 (1983). (“Where 

the record is incomplete, a reviewing court must assume any evidence not 

4 At the trial, the DCS case manager denied responsibility for referring 

and paying for reunification services in Nebraska. However, until another 

court assumes exclusive jurisdiction, or other enumerated circumstances 

exist, the obligation to provide such services persists and extends across 

state lines. See A.R.S. § 8-846 (enumerating circumstances under which DCS 

is not required to provide services); See Donald W., 247 Ariz. at 26–27, 

¶¶ 69-73 (DCS required to provide services to a parent living in California).
SHANE D., KASSANDRA D. v. DCS, T.D.

Decision of the Court

10

available on appeal supported the trial court’s action.”). By not timely 

bringing their concerns to the court’s attention, Mother and Father waived 

review of the adequacy of DCS’s efforts to provide reunification services to 

them in Nebraska.

B. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Court’s Finding that it was in 

Connor’s Best Interests to Terminate Mother and Father’s Parental 

Rights.

¶33 Mother and Father argue that DCS failed to present sufficient 

evidence that termination of their parental rights was in Connor’s best 

interests. Termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child’s best 

interests if the child will benefit from the termination or be harmed if the 

relationship continues. Shawanee S., 234 Ariz. at 179, ¶ 20. We will affirm a 

termination order supported by reasonable evidence. Jordan C., 223 Ariz. at 

93, ¶ 18.

¶34 Here, the court determined that termination of the 

parent-child relationship would serve the child’s best interests because it 

would further the adoption plan, which would provide Connor with 

permanency and stability. The court further explained that the 

relationship’s continuation would cause Connor “to linger in care for an 

indeterminate period” because his Parents could not care for him. The court

concluded that Parents’ instability had harmed Connor as they entered and 

exited his life according to their circumstances. Also, the parent-child 

relationship’s continuation would disrupt the appropriate attachment 

Connor was developing with his maternal grandmother. At the time of the 

severance hearing, the maternal grandmother served as Connor’s

placement and expressed a desire to adopt him.

¶35 The record supports the court’s findings. At the trial, the court 

heard testimony about several domestic violence acts between Mother and 

Father in the proceeding months. The court also heard from Connor’s

therapist that the emotional trauma of witnessing domestic violence 

between Mother and Father could lead Connor to experience anxiety, 

depression, and to display disobedience at home and in school. The 

therapist testified that because Connor was already showing 

developmental delays, he needed to live in a stable environment. He also 

testified that grandmother’s ability to remain a steady and consistent 

attachment figure in Connor’s life was vital to continue the positive trend 

towards catching up to his peers developmentally. On this record, the court 

did not abuse its discretion by determining that termination was in the 

child’s best interests. 
SHANE D., KASSANDRA D. v. DCS, T.D.

Decision of the Court

11

CONCLUSION

¶36 We affirm the court’s termination judgment.