United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted September 10, 2020

Decided November 20, 2020

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 20‐1416

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

CHARLES ST. CLAIR,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.   

No. 1:15CR25‐001

Holly A. Brady,

Judge.

O R D E R

After serving 33 months in prison for possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1), Charles St. Clair began his first term of supervised release. Eight months

later, the district court revoked his release after St. Clair admitted to violating several of

its conditions. The court sentenced him to one year in prison and one year of release.

Just a month into his second term of supervised release, St. Clair again began violating

the conditions of his supervision: As he later admitted, he failed to show up for four

random drug tests, did not report to his probation officer seven times, and was

convicted of possessing marijuana. At the revocation hearing, St. Clair waived his right

to appeal his sentence in exchange for the government’s promise to join him in making

a non‐binding recommendation of 9 months in prison, a recommendation in the middle

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 20‐1416    Page 2

of the guidelines range of 6 to 12 months. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a) (recommending

sentencing range for defendants who, like St. Clair, have criminal history category of IV

and are found to commit Grade C violations). Despite the joint recommendation, the

district court sentenced St. Clair to 15 months in prison with no further supervised

release.

St. Clair now appeals the sentence, but his appointed counsel asserts that the

appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967). A defendant who appeals a revocation order does not have an unqualified

constitutional right to counsel, so the Anders safeguards need not govern our review.

Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973). Even so, our practice is to apply them.

United States v. Wheeler, 814 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2016). Counsel’s brief explains the

nature of the case and addresses the issues that an appeal of this kind might involve,

and St. Clair has not responded to counsel’s motion. See CIR. R. 51(b). Because the

analysis appears thorough, we limit our review to the subjects that counsel discusses.

United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).   

   

Counsel first assures us that he consulted with St. Clair about contesting his

revocation and the admissions upon which it is based, and St. Clair responded that he

does not want to do so. See Wheeler, 814 F.3d at 857; United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667,

670–72 (7th Cir. 2002). Thus, counsel properly omitted any discussion of potential

challenges to the revocation itself. See Wheeler, 814 F.3d at 857.

Counsel next discusses whether St. Clair could reasonably dispute his sentence

but concludes that any such challenge would be foreclosed by his broad appeal waiver.

In the supervised‐release context, like others, waiver occurs when a defendant

knowingly and voluntarily relinquishes a known right. United States v. Hunt, 930 F.3d

921, 924 (7th Cir. 2019). As counsel explains, at the revocation hearing, where St. Clair

was represented by counsel, he twice confirmed that he intended to waive his right to

challenge “whatever the court rules” in exchange for the government’s non‐binding

recommendation of 9 months in prison. And he persisted in his desire to relinquish his

right to appeal even after the court warned him that it can “impose a term of

imprisonment of not more than two years” and that it “is not bound by . . . the

Government’s recommendation.” On that record, we agree with counsel that it would

be pointless to challenge St. Clair’s appeal waiver as not knowing or involuntary.

See Unites States v. Nelson, 931 F.3d 588, 591–92 (7th Cir. 2019) (upholding waiver as

knowing and voluntary where defendant was represented by counsel and stated that he

understood what rights he waived). Moreover, any argument to apply an exception to
No. 20‐1416    Page 3

the appeal waiver (for a sentence that is above the statutory maximum or based on

constitutionally prohibited factors) would be frivolous. See United States v. Campbell,

813 F.3d 1016, 1018 (7th Cir. 2016). St. Clair’s 15‐month sentence fell below the statutory

maximums of two years, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), and the court did not consider any

constitutionally impermissible factors at sentencing.

Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.