Summary

The Belgian dioxin crisis began in January 1999

when animal feed in Belgium was contaminated

with cancer-causing dioxin and polychlorinated

biphenyls (PCBs). Dioxin-contaminated feed was then

fed to chicken, swine, and other food animals, subsequently affecting a large array of agricultural industries and temporarily interrupting trade with the United

States and more than 30 other countries.2 This chapter

provides some analysis of agricultural exports and production effects of the crisis. It complements previous

chapters by providing an example of a food safety 

crisis that resulted from an isolated event involving a

persistent organic pollutant and that affected a wider

range of food sectors than most other food safety

issues. 

Belgium-Luxembourg exports were adversely affected

by the crisis in the short run. Export growth rates for

the decade prior to the crisis were positive for five key

agricultural categories (eggs, dairy products, swine

products, poultry products, and “other” meat products). However, the percentage change in the growth

rate between 1998 and 1999, representing the shortrun

effects of the crisis, dropped and became negative for

eggs, swine products, and dairy products, with the

largest decline for “other meat” products (-32.1 percent). Although the growth rate for poultry products

also fell dramatically, it remained positive at 2.3 percent during 1998-99.

The dioxin contamination originated in animal feeds,

yet other production sectors were far more affected in

percentage terms. This study use Belgium-Luxembourg

monthly production data from the Belgian Ministry of

Economic Affairs, National Institute of Statistics (NIS)

(1999). Poultry meat products, meat and meat products,

and slaughtering of cattle were especially hit hard by

the crisis, Other product categories such as fish and fish

products, actually benefited as buyers switched to products not implicated in the contamination. Feed production even increased slightly in July 1999 due to a

temporary slaughter ban that initially kept many animals

on the farms. 

Dioxin and/or PCB contamination in feed has occurred

in several countries since the Belgian dioxin crises,

though to a lesser extent. This crisis was a large-scale,

isolated event and did not represent an ongoing or

evolving food safety problem. One challenge illustrated by the 1999 crisis is the fine balance between

gathering sufficient information on such an event (e.g.,

source, cause, human and animal health risks) and the

timely and accurate release of information to the public and to trading partners. Overcoming this challenge

will be important for governments and implicated

industries in order to minimize damage to food markets and maintain consumer confidence in both the

food supply and in governments’ ability to handle food

safety crises.

Economic Research Service/USDA International Trade and Food Safety / AER-828 ● 125

Chapter 8

The Belgian Dioxin Crisis and 

Its Effects on Agricultural 

Production and Exports

Jean C. Buzby and Ram Chandran1

1 Authors are economists with the Food and Rural Economics

Division of the Economic Research Service.

2 The terms “swine” and “swine products” are used hereinafter

instead of “hogs” or “pork products” in order to be consistent with

the category names used in the Belgian data.
Introduction

The Belgian dioxin crisis exemplifies a food safety

crisis that: (1) arose from a large-scale, isolated contamination event as opposed to an ongoing or evolving problem, (2) involved a persistent organic

pollutant as opposed to other food safety hazards,

such as pathogens, (3) adversely affected multiple

agricultural sectors and countries importing from

these sectors, and (4) may have been the result of

some form of deliberate contamination. Shortly after

the Belgian government announced the crisis in late

May 1999, the media alleged that the contamination

was the result of the deliberate or accidental use of

motor oil or some other industrial oil in an animal

fat mixture (Lok and Powell, 2000). However, the

Belgian government has not provided an official

confirmation of the source of the contamination or

how it occurred (Lok and Powell, 2000). A more

recent and scientific article attributes the crisis to a

fat mixture made with mineral oil containing

PCBs—“most likely oil from discarded transformers

originating from a waste recycling center” (van

Larebeke et al., 2001). Because the public announcement of the crisis occurred at one point in time, it is

possible to compare Belgian food production and

trade before and after the crisis. However, this chapter is not meant to be a report of a comprehensive

economic analysis.

Background on Dioxin

Dioxin is a general term for hundreds of chemicals

that are highly persistent in the environment. Dioxins

are created as a byproduct of chemical processes.

Some are created from natural causes such as forest

fires and volcanic eruptions; dioxins can be found

throughout the natural world (in soil, water, and air,

for example). Accidental and uncontrolled fires at

landfills also add to dioxin levels. Exhaust emissions

and processes such as pulp and paper bleaching, incineration, and the manufacturing of steel, chemicals, and

paint also release dioxins and contaminate the environment (EC, July 20, 2001). Absorbed dioxins accumulate in body tissue and pose cancer and other human

health risks—in general, the higher up the food chain,

the greater the accumulation (WHO, 1999). Any dioxins released into the environment can accumulate over

time in human and animal fatty tissue (EC, July 20,

2001). Contamination with polychlorinated biphenyls

(PCBs) is often accompanied by dioxin contamination

so both are often evaluated together.3 The U.S. Food

and Drug Administration (FDA) website provides

extensive information on dioxins.4

Studies suggest that 80 percent (EC, July 20, 2001) to

95 percent (preliminary EPA estimate, 1994) of human

exposure to dioxin is through the food supply, primarily through the dietary intake of animal fats from

meat, poultry, and dairy products. At least in the

United States, human exposure has also occurred historically from industrial accidents and from working in

industries that produce dioxin as a byproduct, or

through drinking contaminated breast milk. Dioxin in

feed is thought to be the main contributing factor to

the dioxin level in food from animals and animal products, though animals can also be exposed through contaminated soil, air, and water (EC, July 20, 2001).

There is no international agreement on target levels for

several reasons, including analytical method difficulties, lack of data (e.g., typical levels), and the lack of a

clear distinction as to what level of dioxin is considered as “safe.” However, the World Health

Organization has elaborated a “tolerable daily dose.”

Consumers have only a limited ability to restrict their

exposure to foodborne dioxins (e.g., consuming lowfat dairy products and trimming fat from meat) and

therefore national governments have essential roles in

monitoring food safety and acting to protect public

health (WHO, 1999). In general, dioxin contamination

comes from either “background” contamination from

the sources previously described or from specific, isolated incidents, which are rare. In July 1997, U.S.

agencies found elevated levels of dioxin in some

chicken, eggs, farm-raised catfish, and animal feed

(FDA, March 13, 2003). A lengthy investigation

traced the source of this incident to feed produced

with “ball clay” from one Mississippi mine. The clay

was used as an anticaking agent in soybean meal and

has since been prohibited by FDA from use in any

animal feed.

126 ● International Trade and Food Safety / AER-828 Economic Research Service/USDA

3 PCBs are fluids that used to be used as transformers and insulators in some industrial settings in the United States. PCBs are

more readily measurable, though dioxins drive health concerns.

For simplicity, the term “dioxin” is sometimes used to cover both

dioxin-like PCBs and dioxins.

4 The Interagency Working Group on Dioxin (IWG) has developed

very detailed information about dioxins on their website and this

covers four topics: (1) general information about dioxins, (2)

overview of the draft EPA dioxin report, (3) food safety questions

and answers, and (4) risk assessment questions and answers.

www.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/dioxinqa.html
Governments move quickly to stop dioxin contamination

at the source if the source can be identified and removed.

Countries have different ways of dealing with contamination, though both the United States and European

Union have stringent laws for industrial sources that are

driven by what technology can control (Winters, 2002).

The European Commission (EC), the EU’s governing

body, recommends an overall strategy to reduce exposure to dioxins, including actions that reduce dioxin levels in the environment, animal feed, and food, with

emphasis given to the sources of major importance (typically fish oil and fish meal) (EC, July 20, 2001).

Although, in principle, a similar broad-based strategy is

followed in the United States, the EU has set regulatory

limits for dioxin in food whereas the U.S. doesn’t have

such limits because of concerns about lack of scientific

basis. Some countries seek dioxin testing certification

which is very expensive and only available from private

sources (FAS, 2003).

Efforts to reduce dioxins over the past two decades have

resulted in a downward trend in dioxin exposure for

Europeans (EC, July 20, 2001). Similarly, dioxin levels

in the U.S. environment have declined since the 1970s.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), State

governments, and industry are working together to

reduce the production of manmade dioxins (FDA,

July/Aug. 2000).

The Belgian Dioxin Crisis

The Belgian dioxin crisis began in January 1999,

quickly spread across national borders, and had serious

trade impacts. The crisis occurred when 60-80 tons of

fat used in animal feed in Belgium was contaminated

with almost 1 gram of cancer-causing dioxin and 40-

50 kilograms of PCBs (van Larebeke et al., 2001). The

contamination occurred when a fat smelting company

added dioxin-contaminated oil to a mixture of fats for

later use as a feed ingredient. This contaminated fat

was then purchased by at least 10 feed mills and was

used to make approximately 500 tons of contaminated

animal feed—versus over 28,000 tons/week average

production and use of feed in Belgium (van Larebeke

et al., 2001). The contaminated feed was distributed

mostly to poultry farms but also to rabbit, calf, pig,

and cow breeding and raising farms in Belgium, with

some distributed to Germany, France, and the

Netherlands (van Larebeke et al., 2001). In Belgium

alone, 746 pig farms, 445 poultry farms, 393 bovine

farms, and 237 dairy farms used feed from the 10 producers of contaminated feed (van Larebeke et al.,

2001). The following chronology of the crisis is abbreviated from a description in Lok and Powell (2000),

which was based primarily on a 1999 Belgian government website:

● January 18-19, 1999—Fat mixture was contaminated with dioxin at Verkest, a fat and oil processing plant.

● End of January 1999—Contaminated fat was supplied to feed manufacturers and used to make feed,

which was sold to broiler chicken, egg, pork, and

beef producers.

● During February 1999—An animal feed manufacturer, the Da Brabender firm, noticed problems

with hens used to produce 1-day old chicks.5

● March 3, 1999—Da Brabender notified their insurance company and this led to an investigation by Dr.

Destickere, a veterinarian [and head of the West

Flanders Inspectorate]. 

● Next 2 weeks in March 1999—Dr. Destickere concluded that the most likely source of the problem

was the fat in animal feed.

● March 18, 1999—Da Brabender sent a sample of

suspect animal feed produced in January 1999 for

analysis. 

● March 19, 1999—Da Brabender notified the

Belgian Ministry of Agriculture.

● A few days later—The Belgian government began

investigating and testing.

● April 21, 1999—Dr. Destickere reported his suspicions about dioxin as the source to the Belgian

Ministry of Agriculture.

● April 26, 1999—Test results found high dioxin

concentrations in feed and chicken fat samples.

● May 26, 1999—Test results found high dioxin levels in breeding eggs for hatching and in mother

hens on farms that purchased from suspect feed

manufacturers. This meant that there were high

levels of dioxin in eggs and chicken on the market

in April.

Economic Research Service/USDA International Trade and Food Safety / AER-828 ● 127

5 The media reported that the first signs of contamination detected

by poultry farmers included direct biological health effects such as

hens laying fewer eggs or not thriving, nervous system problems in

chicks, and a declining ratio of hatched eggs.
● May 27, 1999—The Belgian Ministry of

Agriculture notified the public and the European

Commission (EC) about the situation.

On May 28, 1999, Belgium banned the domestic sale

of all Belgian-produced chicken, meat, and eggs, withdrawing these products from retail stores (Ashraf,

1999). Later the Belgian government widened the list

of products potentially contaminated with dioxin

(FAS, June 7, 1999). As a result of the crisis, more

than 200 butcher shops closed temporarily in Belgium

and consumers rushed to buy organic eggs and other

products that were not suspect (FAS, June 7, 1999).

Lok and Powell (2000) detail the actions the Belgian

government took to mitigate and resolve the crisis.

On June 4, 1999, the U.S. Food and Drug

Administration (FDA) issued an import bulletin to

detain certain products at the port of entry. On June 11,

1999, FDA issued an import alert (No. 99-24) to detain

certain products at ports of entry until importers provided lab test results showing that shipments were free

of detectable levels of PCBs and/or dioxins (FDA, June

11, 1999). Products in this initial import alert included

eggs, products containing eggs, game meats from

Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, all animal feeds

and feed ingredients, and pet foods from all European

countries (FDA, June 11, 1999). This list was later

expanded to include milk-containing products such as

soups and cheese (FDA, June 23, 1999). The Food

Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) of the U.S.

Department of Agriculture (USDA) also issued import

alerts and took subsequent actions. The U.S. import

alerts from this crisis were canceled in early 2000 (personal communication with FDA on Sept. 21, 2000).

Within 2 to 3 weeks of the May 27 announcement,

more than 30 countries issued different combinations

of temporary consumer advisories, import bans, and

import alerts of potentially contaminated foods and

animals from Belgium, select EU countries, or the EU

as a whole (Lok and Powell, 2000).6 More products

were added to the lists of suspected products as the

crisis unfolded (e.g., chocolates) (Lok and Powell,

2000). Much later, the EU raised objections to the

emergency measures of nine of its trading partners

who maintained restrictions on animal products when

these actions were no longer justified in the view of

EU officials (see chapter 3). 

As dioxin risks are long-term health hazards and hard

to detect and attribute to specific causes, it will take

time to determine if international measures to mitigate

the crisis were successful in terms of protecting human

health: to date, no human illnesses have been linked to

this incident. Van Larebeke et al. (2001) estimate that

the stochastic incremental cancer risk associated with

the Belgian PCB and dioxin crisis varies between 44

and 8,316 cancer deaths in the Belgian population

(roughly 10 million). They caution that huge uncertainties exist with their estimates, such as the pathogenic potency of the PCBs and dioxin.

Estimated Economic Impacts

of the Belgium Dioxin Crisis

Ideally, an economic analysis of the Belgium dioxin

crisis would require careful evaluation of the: (1)

domestic products that are directly and indirectly

affected by the contamination, (2) agricultural sectors

providing these products to domestic and international

markets, and (3) shortrun and longrun effects of the

crisis. For example, costs from the crisis would

include costs from new regulations for feed ingredients. However, it would be difficult to estimate these

costs as BSE and foot and mouth disease also likely

contributed to such legislation (FAS, 2003). Because

of data availability and the more descriptive goals of

this chapter, we focus here almost exclusively on the

direct effects of the crisis on Belgian food production

and exports in select markets or sectors. 

Estimated Impact on Exports

To analyze the impact of the Belgian dioxin crisis on

Belgium-Luxembourg exports of agricultural products,

we aggregated data from the United Nations Statistics

Division on agricultural products into five product categories: dairy, swine, “other meat” (i.e., nonswine and

nonpoultry), and poultry products, and eggs (see

attachment A).

In general, Belgian exports of dairy products far

exceed other categories of Belgian agricultural

exports (table 8.1). Between 1990 and 1995, the

exports of dairy products grew steadily and then

showed a few years of declining exports. Part of the

128 ● International Trade and Food Safety / AER-828 Economic Research Service/USDA

6 For example, countries that took action included Australia,

Canada, Cyprus, Germany, Hong Kong, Portugal, Russia, Saudi

Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, and Thailand.
drop between 1998 and 1999 is likely due to the

Belgium dioxin crisis because many countries,

including the United States, banned the import of

milk products from Belgium. Exports of swine products and “other meat” products also dropped between

1998 and 1999. Poultry exports grew consistently

over this time period while egg product exports

changed little (fig. 8.1). 

To more closely analyze the short-run economic

effects of the Belgian dioxin crisis, we compared the

longrun growth of exports of eggs and poultry, swine,

other meat, and dairy products over the decade prior to

the 1999 crisis against the shortrun effects, as measured by the percent change in exports between 1998

and 1999 (table 8.2 and fig. 8.2). These data suggest

that the Belgium dioxin crisis had a shortrun economic

impact on the export market. The estimated growth

rates for the 10 years between 1989 and 1998 were

positive for all five product categories. However,

between 1998 and 1999, the growth rate dropped and

became negative for eggs, swine, and dairy products,

with the largest decline for other meat. The change in

poultry exports between 1998 and 1999 remained positive but dropped dramatically from its longrun growth

rate of 19.1 percent. 

Economic Research Service/USDA International Trade and Food Safety / AER-828 ● 129

Table 8.1—Belgium-Luxembourg world exports of key agricultural products, 1989-99

Product category 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

— Metric tons —

Dairy products 1,184 1,156 1,402 1,586 1,586 1,719 1,890 1,711 1,622 1,741 1,676

Swine products 391 382 459 482 540 562 604 630 635 685 588

Meat products1 176 198 234 239 271 259 262 281 333 308 209

Poultry products 68 81 98 123 149 160 188 218 293 328 335

Eggs 89 94 93 98 83 110 108 105 127 118 111

1 Here “meat” refers to meat other than swine and poultry.

Source: Computed from United Nations Statistics Division’s COMTRADE database, 2002.

Figure 8.1

Belgium-Luxembourg world exports of key 

agricultural products

1,000 metric tons

Dairy products

Poultry products

1989 91 93 95 97 99

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

1,800

2,000

Eggs

Swine products

Meat products

Source: Computed from United Nations Statistics Division's 

COMTRADE database, 2002.

Table 8.2—Comparison of the growth of BelgiumLuxembourg exports of key agricultural products

Product category Rate of growth Change of growth

(1989-99) (1998-99)

Percent

Eggs 3.1 -6.0

Meat products 6.5 -32.1

Swine products 6.4 -14.2

Dairy products 4.4 -3.7

Poultry products 19.1 2.3

Source: Computed from United Nations Statistics Division's 

COMTRADE database, 2002.

Figure 8.2

Comparison of the growth of BelgiumLuxembourg world exports of key agricultural 

products using percent rate of growth between 

1989-99 and 1998-99

Percent

Source: Computed from United Nations Statistics Division's 

COMTRADE database, 2002.

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

Meat

Dairy

Eggs

Poultry

Swine

Percent change of growth (1998-99)

Percent rate of growth (1989-98)
The Belgium Foreign Trade Bulletin (FGTB) reports

that “it is interesting to note that the statistical data for

September, October, November, and December show a

recovery in exports, so that it seems that the effects of

the dioxin crisis had become virtually nonexistent by

then.”7 Any estimation of the exact amount of the

long-run effect on exports will require more detailed

data for a longer time period for these industries and

other directly and indirectly affected industries.

Estimated Impacts on Production

The Belgian Ministry of Economic Affairs, National

Institute of Statistics (NIS) conducted a study on the

impact of the dioxin crisis on meat production (1999).

Data in this report were based on an index of production

per working day (1995=100). The NIS report (1999)

compared the change in production, processing, and preserving of key agricultural products in Belgium during

the first 9 months of 1999 with data for the first 9

months in 1998. Although the dioxin contamination

began in January 1999, the major impacts were felt in

June, immediately after the Belgium public, the EU, and

the rest of the world were notified of the crisis in late

May. Overall, when considering the relative importance

of the different subsectors, the dioxin crisis caused an

estimated decrease in total food industry production of

10 percent in June 1999, 2.5 percent in July and August,

and 1.5 percent in September (NIS, 1999). If construction is excluded, the net impact on the total food industry

was a decline of 1.2 percent, 0.3 percent, 0.3 percent,

and 0.2 percent respectively for the months June through

September (NIS, 1999). 

Here we take a closer look at 6 of the 15 agricultural

sub-sectors in the NIS report, those that were either

directly and adversely affected or profited from the 

crisis:8

1) Poultry meat products,

2) Meat and meat products,

3) Slaughtering of cattle,

4) Dairies and cheese making, and

5) Fish and fish products,

6) Prepared feeds for farm animals.

Monthly production indices (1998-99) for each of

these six product categories are provided in attachment

B. Table 8.3 presents the change in the production

index for each product category for the first 9 months

of 1999 from its corresponding index for the first 9

months of 1998. We developed figure 8.3 so that the

impacts from the crisis and patterns of change for

these six categories could be more easily identified

and compared.

In general, the three meat industry categories (poultry

meat production, meat and meat product production,

and slaughtering of cattle) were the subsectors hit hardest in terms of declines in monthly production/processing and preserving. Clearly, the sharpest production

declines occurred in June 1999, right after the public

announcement about the crisis in late May. An analysis

of the long-term effects of the crisis would require more

recent data. However, the worst impacts for all six categories seemed to be over in July 1999 with the different

subsectors gradually returning to pre-crisis levels over

subsequent months. 

Poultry meat products had the steepest drop in the data

series, 53.5 percent lower in 1999 than in 1998. This is

not surprising because the first bans resulting from the

crisis included the domestic sales of Belgian-produced

chicken meat and egg products and exports of Belgian

chicken products. Although one might expect a larger

drop for feed production, the amount of feed contaminated by dioxins was small compared with that produced and used each week in Belgium, and the feed that

was contaminated was distributed widely, mostly to

poultry producers. 

There were negative percent (index) changes during

the entire first 9 months of 1999 for the production,

processing, and preserving of meat and meat products.

This is consistent with the declining trend in the

demand for these products. During 1995-98, consumption of fresh meat in Belgium declined heavily, as it

did in most of the other EU countries (Verbeke and

Ward, 2001). In particular, the gradual long-term

decline in per capita beef consumption is likely caused

by long-term changes in the eating habits and demographics of EU consumers (EC, 1997; EC, 1998; see

chapter 4). However, the largest drop in Belgian production of meat and meat products was observed during June 1999 (-42.4 percent). The decreased cattle

slaughter was likely a function of several factors such

as temporary slaughter bans, which kept many animals

on the farms. 

130 ● International Trade and Food Safety / AER-828 Economic Research Service/USDA

7 Source: BFTB - Statistics / Annual Study Belgium’s Foreign Trade

in 1999. URL: www.obcebdbh.be/import_en/info-centerr/tradestatistics/annual-study/1999/as-sbreakdown_en.html

8 Other categories not covered here include a wide range of products

such as beverages, tobacco, cocoa, bread, condiments, and seasoning. 
In the production category “dairies and cheese making,” declines were more subtle and seemed to quickly

return to monthly decreases. The NIS report considers

this category one of the indirectly affected subsectors.

While several production categories showed marked

declines after the announcement, others, such as fish

and fish products, showed increased production and

profited from the dioxin problem. Monthly changes for

fish and fish products show some natural fluctuation,

perhaps due to seasonal changes or harvest factors.

However, the June 1999 index was 24.4 percent higher

than in June 1998. This likely reflects consumers’ belief

that these food products posed lower risks from dioxin

contamination, and consumers may have substituted fish

products for meat and swine products. In particular,

according to the U.S. Foreign Agricultural Service

(FAS), Belgian seafood consumption rose 50 percent in

June 1999 due to the crisis, with increased shellfish

sales offsetting a decreased market for other kinds of

seafood (FAS, June 13, 2001).

Another production category that appeared to benefit

from the crisis, at least in the short run, was prepared

feeds for farm animals. The July increase was likely due

to the temporary slaughter ban that kept many animals

on the farms, creating a greater demand for animal

feeds (NIS, 1999). Although the dioxin contamination

originated in animal feeds, other production sectors

were far more affected in percentage terms.

The Belgian swine industry suffered when test results

in June 1999 confirmed dioxin contamination of swine

on some farms (FAS, Aug. 1, 1999). Contaminated

swine farms were depopulated. On other farms, swine

facilities became overcrowded because of reduced

demand, adding unnecessary feed costs, limiting stable

space, and prohibiting fatteners from buying piglets

and starting new fattening cycles. Increased quantities

of pork were put into storage because of reduced markets. The Belgian pork sector received limited financial aid from the Belgian government for this crisis

and received no financial aid from the European

Commission (FAS, Aug. 1, 1999). 

Summary of Impacts 

The combination of slaughter bans, large price concessions, and reduced markets after the dioxin crisis posed

an economic burden on consumers, food producers, and

food exporters. On August 16, 2003, the EC approved a

Belgian aid agreement that would reimburse farmers 80

percent of market price of their losses (Lok and Powell,

2000). The Belgian government estimates that the dioxin

crisis cost €465 million ($493 million), with about €100

million ($106 million) attributed to the loss in the swine

sector (where 1999 €1.00= US$ 1.06) (FAS, Feb. 1,

Economic Research Service/USDA International Trade and Food Safety / AER-828 ● 131

Figure 8.3

Monthly change in Belgium-Luxembourg 

production/processing and preserving of 

agricultural products indices between 

1998 and 1999

% change

Jan. Mar. May July Sep.

-60

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

Meat and meat products

Fish and fish products

Poultry meat products

Slaughtering of cattle

Dairies and cheese making

Prepared feed for farm animals

Source: Belgium Ministry of Economic Affairs, National Institute 

of Statistics, 1999.

Table 8.3—Monthly change in Belgium-Luxembourg production/processing and preserving of agricultural

products indices between 1998 and 1999

Product category Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sep.

Percent

Poultry meat products 4.3 13.4 11.9 1.5 1.8 -53.5 -31.6 -22.1 -9.1

Meat and meat products -6.6 -5.7 -0.9 -7.0 -3.8 -42.4 -19.3 -19.7 -13.5

Slaughtering of cattle -7.0 -8.1 -5.6 -8.2 -5.4 -29.5 -9.8 -18.2 -17.6

Dairies and cheese making -3.4 -3.6 -3.0 -2.7 -2.9 -8.7 -2.0 -3.2 -9.1

Fish and fish products -1.1 9.6 16.8 -5.4 4.6 24.4 13.8 -9.5 15.1

Prepared feeds for farm animals 0.7 0.5 1.8 3.5 8.5 1.7 6.8 2.4 -6.1

Source: Belgium Ministry of Economic Affairs, National Institute of Statistics, 1999.
2001, pg. 18, 19).9 And as other EU countries were also

affected by export bans, the cost of this incident worldwide will likely be higher. 

The economic impact of the Belgian crisis was relatively small compared with the Belgium economy’s

GDP (1999) of $266 billion in 1999, but was important

for agriculture, which accounted for 1.4 percent of GDP

or $3.7 billion.10 In 2000, on the heels of the Belgian

dioxin crisis, Belgium confirmed its first case of bovine

spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). This BSE crisis cost

Belgium an additional €250 million (FAS, Feb. 1, 2001)

(chapter 4 provides more details on BSE).

These costs of the dioxin crisis are, however, offset to

some extent by gains obtained in industries and countries

that provided substitute products. In response to the

Belgian dioxin scare and the temporary removal of some

food products from Belgian supermarkets, Belgian consumers became more concerned about food safety and

many began consuming more produce, organic eggs, and

other organic products. The dioxin crisis also prompted

increased consumption of mutton, lamb, and horsemeat

(FAS, April 17, 2000). The clearest example of a Belgian

food industry that profited from the dioxin crisis is the

appreciably increased production of “fish and fish products” [includes shellfish] in June and July 1999 (NIS,

1999). And, in the German market, there appears to have

been temporarily increased demand for pork and slaughter hogs (FAS, Aug. 1, 1999). 

Although one might expect that food imports may have

helped reduce or mitigate some of the impacts of the

Belgian dioxin crisis on the domestic economy, United

Nations trade statistics for 1989-2001 show that meat

imports into Belgium-Luxembourg actually fell in 1999

from its 10-year high. The fall in meat imports in 1999

likely reflects, in part, the decreased demand for meat

following the crisis. For example, per capita consumption of beef and veal in Belgium also decreased in 1999,

probably partly due to the dioxin crisis (FAS, Feb. 1,

2001, p. 7).11

Public and Private 

Sector Response

As with the BSE crisis, the dioxin scare illustrates that a

food safety crisis can impose high financial and political

costs on industries and countries. The Public Health

Minister and the Agriculture Minister resigned after if

became clear that the Belgian government had known

about the dioxin crisis for weeks before announcing it

to the public and the EC (Ashraf, 1999). The Dutch

Minister of Agriculture also resigned after similar criticism (Lok and Powell, 2000). Public confidence in both

the food supply and the Belgian government was shaken

and, partly because of this, the ruling party was later

ousted in a national election (Lok and Powell, 2000).

In addition to mitigation actions, the dioxin crisis and

general concerns about dioxins resulted in several

responses by the public sector. First, the Belgian government created a new agency called the Federal

Agency for Safety of the Food Chain in response to

the lack of public communication and internal mechanisms that exasperated the crisis (FAS, Aug. 17, 2000).

This new agency has broad responsibilities that ensure

food safety from farm to table and once fully implemented, it will be placed under the Ministry of Public

Health (FAVV, 2002).12 Second, this new agency instituted a traceability and monitoring system to extend

the existing SANITEL system for the mandatory identification of cattle. A meat traceability component

extends the system to other animals and beyond the

slaughterhouse (BELLTRACE) and a monitoring component—Contaminant Surveillance System (CONSUM)—tests for chemical and microbiological

contamination of feedstuffs and all animal food products such as eggs, oils, fats, dairy, fishery, and derived

products (FAS, Nov. 5, 2001). The goal of this monitoring system is early detection of contamination.

Third, the Belgian government will execute certain

decisions taken by the EC concerning dioxins.

For example, the EC asked the EU’s Standing

Committee on Animal Agriculture and Nutrition

(SCAN) and the Scientific Committee on Food (SCF)

for scientific opinions about the contamination of feed

and food by dioxins and closely related PCBs. As a

132 ● International Trade and Food Safety / AER-828 Economic Research Service/USDA

9 Of this amount, €165 million was for the Ministry of Agriculture

and €300 million was for the Ministry of Public Health (FAS, Feb.

1, 2001). No further description was provided in the publication.

10 www.state.gov/www/background_notes/belgium_0006_

bgn.html, accesssed May 17, 2002.

11 Pork consumption also fell in 1999 due to the dioxin crisis

(FAS, Feb. 1, 2001, p. 14) and live pig exports increased considerably, particularly to Dutch slaughterhouses (FAS, Feb. 1, 2001,

p. 14). Another factor affecting pork production is EU legislation

against nitrate emissions (FAS, Feb. 1, 2001, p. 13).

12 Previously, food safety in Belgium was controlled by five agencies and is now covered instead by one new agency that falls under

the authority of the Ministry of Public Health. See FAS June 26,

2000 report for details on the agency’s seven assignments.
result, two reports were released in November 2000.

The SCF report established a temporary tolerable

weekly intake (TWI) for dioxins and dioxin-like PCBs

of 14 pg/kg body weight (EC, Nov. 22, 2000). These

were updated on May 30, 2001. Meanwhile, the SCAN

report’s main conclusion is that fish oil and fishmeal are

the most heavily contaminated feed materials, followed

by animal fat (EC, Nov. 6, 2000). The report recommended an emphasis on reducing the most contaminated materials. Both reports recommended an

integrated approach that would reduce dioxin contamination all along the food chain, a more systematic and

coordinated generation and collection of comparable

and reliable data, and a continuing reduction of emissions to the environment. 

Given these two reports and an earlier White Paper on

Food Safety that identified the need to set standards for

contaminants in feed and food (EC, Jan. 12, 2000), the

EC proposed a strategy to reduce dioxin in animal feed,

the environment, and food in July 2001 (EC, July 20,

2001). In October 2001, the EC adopted this strategy

(EC, Oct. 25, 2001). In essence, this strategy has two

parts. The first part identifies short to medium-term (5

years) and long-term (10 years) actions that combined

are intended to provide a comprehensive understanding

of the dioxin/PCB problem and existing trends to assist

future evaluation and policymaking. The second part

has three components: (1) maximum levels to set regulatory limits for dioxin in foods and feeds, (2) action

levels to serve as early warning indicators of undesirable dioxin levels so measures can be taken to eliminate the sources and pathways of contamination, and

(3) target levels to bring food and feed, over time,

down below the SCF’s recommended TWI of 14 pg/kg

body weight for dioxins. 

The U.S. government also monitors potential dietary

sources of dioxins. Since 1995, the FDA has tested several hundred samples a year, primarily fish and foods

sold at retail outlets (FDA, 2000). Meanwhile, EPA and

the FSIS test for dioxins in U.S. beef, pork, and poultry. In 1999, as part of the Total Diet Study, FDA

started dioxin monitoring in 200 of the most commonly

consumed foods in the United States (FDA, 2000). The

U.S. also began monitoring animal feeds that may contribute to the dioxin levels in some foods (FDA, 2000).

FDA’s monitoring program has been successful in identifying elevated levels of dioxin in some mineral components of animal feed and is taking action to stop

distribution of any contaminated product (for example,

see FDA, February 28, 2003).

Dioxin Crisis and Belgian Consumers

During the crisis, Belgian consumers switched to other

food products to avoid dioxin-contaminated products

either voluntarily or as a result of limited access to

foods in supermarkets and stores. Some apparently

crossed into England, France, or Germany in search of

untainted food. Meanwhile, some Belgian towns opened

dump sites so that local residents could leave suspect

foods for destruction (BBC news, June 5, 1999).

The dioxin crisis caused a high awareness and anxiety

about food safety in Belgium that served as background stress for consumer reaction to another scare,

this time over Coca-Cola (Nemery et al., 1999). Within

a month of the announcement about the dioxin crisis,

schoolchildren and others across Belgium began complaining about nausea, headaches, and other symptoms

that they believed were caused by drinking bottled

Coca-Cola. There were never any significant lab or

physical findings to support these claims and some

people believed that features of this outbreak pointed

to mass hysteria or mass sociogenic illness (Nemery et

al., 1999).13 There was intense media coverage about

the Coca-Cola scare on the tails of intense media coverage about the dioxin incident. 

Conclusion

The Belgian dioxin crisis illustrates that an international food safety crisis can have significant, shortterm impacts on the implicated industries and the

exporting country. The dioxin crisis affected a large

array of agricultural industries in Belgium (e.g., feed,

meat, poultry, cattle slaughter, dairy and cheese making) and interrupted trade with the United States and

more than 30 other countries (Lok and Powell, 2000).

The crisis also illustrates how consumers react to

crises in the short run, switching to nonsuspect products (e.g., organic eggs). More recent data and more

research are needed to clarify if there are longrun

impacts from the crisis, the extent of such impacts, and

whether the possibility that the contamination could

have been intentional (in some way) had any impact

on consumer food safety perceptions.

Economic Research Service/USDA International Trade and Food Safety / AER-828 ● 133

13 Mass sociogenic illness “can be defined as a constellation of

symptoms of an organic illness, but without identifiable cause,

which occurs among two or more persons who share beliefs

related to those symptoms” (Philen et al., 1989).
As a result of this crisis, Belgium took multiple

actions to minimize the spread of the contamination,

resolve the problem, and be better prepared for similar

crises (e.g., creation of a single federal agency to cover

food safety from farm to table). However, the monthlong period between when the government was first

notified of the problem and when it was publicly

announced was seen as irresponsible by many stakeholders and therefore, the Belgian government lost

credibility, trust, and authority and received little credit

for all the positive and proactive measures that were

taken (Lok and Powell, 2000). Despite the government’s explanation that the delay was to first confirm

whether the dioxin had entered the human food supply,

by the time of this explanation, criticism and discussion focused on the government instead of on those

responsible for the contamination or on the extant regulation, surveillance, and enforcement that allowed the

crisis to occur (Lok and Powell, 2000). 

In general, many factors come into play in the identification of a food safety crisis, including the existing

surveillance systems and the way that the contamination manifests itself in animals and humans (e.g.,

declining ratio of hatched eggs, time to develop acute

or chronic illness in humans). On the one hand, the

financial stakes of erroneously announcing a crisis can

be high, so regulators have some reason to be cautious

about prematurely alerting the public and trading partners about a potential crisis until there is sufficient,

accurate information on the source, extent, and risk

posed by the crisis. For example, the California

Strawberry Commission estimated that growers in the

central coast of California lost $16 million in revenue

to during June 1996 when their products were falsely

implicated as the cause of the Cyclospora outbreak

later attributed to Guatemalan raspberries (Mishen,

1996) (see chapter 5). On the other hand, a greater

time lag between the initial contamination and its

identification and control can extend and magnify the

impacts of a food safety crisis on production, trade,

and consumption. And, any public information lag

about a potential food safety crisis can be a point of

criticism used against governments. 

A persistent challenge in major food safety crises will

be the fine balance between gathering sufficient, accurate information on such an event (e.g., source, cause,

human and animal health risks) and the timely release

of information to the public and trading partners.

Overcoming this challenge will be important for governments and implicated industries to minimize damage to food markets and maintain consumer

confidence in both the food supply and in governments’ ability to handle food safety crises.

134 ● International Trade and Food Safety / AER-828 Economic Research Service/USDA
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