UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. SHEVEL M. FOY, Defendant - Appellant. No. 18-3083 (D.C. No. 2:07-CR -20168-JWL-4) (D. Kan.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before BACHARACH , MURPHY , and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Proceeding pro se, 1 Shevel Foy appeals the distri ct court’s order dismissing his “Motion for Appointment of Couns el and to Take Judicial Notice of Facts.” R. vol. 3, 33. For the reasons discussed bel ow, we dismiss Foy’s appeal as untimely. In 2009, a jury convicted Foy of various federal drug offenses . The district court imposed a 360-month prison sentence, and we affirmed in p art and reversed in

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel ha s determined unanimously that oral argument w ouldn’t materially assist in th e determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is th erefore ordered submitted without oral ar gument. This order and judgmen t isn’t binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res j udicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

1 Because Foy appears pro se, we lib erally construe his filings. See Gallagher v. Shelton , 587 F.3d 1063, 1067 (10th Cir. 2009). But we won’t act as his advocate. See id. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

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Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 part. See United States v. Foy (Foy I) , 641 F.3d 455, 470 (10t h Cir. 2011). Foy then filed a motion to reduce his se ntence based on Amendment 782 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The distric t court dismissed Foy’s motio n, and we affirmed. See United States v. Foy (Foy II) , 700 F. App’x 875, 877 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished). Nearly four and a half months lat er, Foy filed the underlying “ Motion for Appointment of Counsel and to Take Judicial Notice of Facts.” R . vol. 3, 33. On March 20, 2018, the district c ourt dismissed the motion, conclu ding that Foy failed to establish any basis for the di strict court’s jurisdiction. Foy designated the district court’s order in an April 16, 2018 notice of appeal, and now as ks us to reverse. But according to the government, we l ack jurisdiction to consider t his request because Foy’s notice of appeal was untimely. We agree. A defendant in a criminal case must file a notice of appeal wit hin 14 days after entry of the judgment or order being appealed. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i). This 14- day time limit isn’t jurisdictiona l. But it is an “inflexible c laim-processing rule[]” that “assure[s] relief” when—as happened here—“a party properly rais[es]” it. United
States v. Garduño , 506 F.3d 1287, 1291 (10th Cir. 2007) (first quoting Kontrick v. Ryan , 540 U.S. 443, 444 (2004); then quoting Eberhart v. United States , 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005)). The time for filing a notice of appeal begins to run upon entr y of the judgment or order being appealed. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i). For purposes of Rule 4(b)(1)(A)(i), “[a] judgment or o rder is entere d . . . when it is entered on the criminal3 docket.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(6); see also United States v. Mendoza , 698 F.3d 1303, 1308 (10th Cir. 2012) ( holding that judgement is entered on cri minal docket when it “is noted on the docket in a publicly accessible manner”). Here, the district court’s orde r denying Foy’s motion was enter ed on the publicly accessible docket on March 20, 2018. Consequently, Foy had 14 days—or until April 3, 2018—to file his n otice of appeal. But as the go vernment points out, Foy didn’t file his notice of appeal until April 16, 2018. Thus , the government argues we must dismiss Foy’s appeal as untimely. See Garduño , 506 F.3d at 1292 (“Because the government timely objected to [defendant’s] late notice of appeal, this court is bound to dismiss the appeal.”). In response, Foy asserts that his notice of appeal is timely un der the prisonmailbox rule. See Price v. Philpot , 420 F.3d 1158, 1163–64 (10th Cir. 2005) (explaining that pro se prisoner’ s notice of appeal is timely s o long as it is “given to prison officials for mailing prio r to the filing deadline, rega rdless of when the court itself receives th e document[]”); see also Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1) (stating that under certain circumstances, inmate’s n otice of appeal “is timely if it is deposited in the institution’s internal mail system on or before the last day fo r filing”). Here, “the last day for filing” Foy’s notice of appeal was Apri l 3, 2018. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1); see also Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(a)(i). But as even Foy concedes, he didn’t “deposit[]” his noti ce of appeal “in [his] institutio n’s internal mail system” until nearly a week later, on Ap ril 9, 2018. R. vol. 3, 45. Thu s, even with the benefit of the prison-mailbox rule, his notice of appeal is untimely. A ccordingly, we are4 “bound to dismiss the appeal.” Garduño , 506 F.3d at 1292. Foy’s “Motion for the Court[’]s Attention on Issues Presented” is denied.

Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz Circuit Judge