U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1

" ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 107TH CONGRESS

2d Session

REPORT

2002

107–454

Union Calendar No. 269

JUSTICE UNDONE: CLEMENCY DECISIONS

IN THE CLINTON WHITE HOUSE

SECOND REPORT

BY THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

Volume 1 of 3

together with

MINORITY AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS

Chapter 1—‘‘Take Jack’s Word’’: The Pardons of International Fugitives

Marc Rich and Pincus Green

Chapter 2—Roger Clinton’s Involvement in Lobbying for Grants of

Executive Clemency

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

JUSTICE UNDONE: CLEMENCY DECISIONS IN THE CLINTON WHITE HOUSE

VOLUME 1 OF 3

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1

78–264 PDF

" ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 107TH CONGRESS

2d Session

REPORT

2002

107–454

Union Calendar No. 269

JUSTICE UNDONE: CLEMENCY DECISIONS

IN THE CLINTON WHITE HOUSE

SECOND REPORT

BY THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

Volume 1 of 3

together with

MINORITY AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS

Chapter 1—‘‘Take Jack’s Word’’: The Pardons of International Fugitives

Marc Rich and Pincus Green

Chapter 2—Roger Clinton’s Involvement in Lobbying for Grants of

Executive Clemency

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

MAY 14, 2002.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the

State of the Union and ordered to be printed

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEPHEN HORN, California

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

BOB BARR, Georgia

DAN MILLER, Florida

DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

DAVE WELDON, Florida

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

C.L. ‘‘BUTCH’’ OTTER, Idaho

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, Tennessee

——— ———

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,

DC

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director

JAMES C. WILSON, Chief Counsel

ROBERT A. BRIGGS, Chief Clerk

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

DAVID A. KASS, Deputy Chief Counsel

M. SCOTT BILLINGSLEY, Counsel

PABLO E. CARRILLO, Counsel

JASON A. FOSTER, Counsel

HILARY J. FUNK, Counsel

MATTHEW J. RUPP, Counsel

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief Counsel

MICHAEL YEAGER, Minority Deputy Chief Counsel

MICHAEL YANG, Minority Counsel

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

Washington, DC, May 14, 2001.

Hon. J. DENNIS HASTERT,

Speaker of the House of Representatives,

Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: By direction of the Committee on Government Reform, I submit herewith the committee’s second report to

the 107th Congress. The committee’s report is based on a study

conducted by the full committee.

DAN BURTON,

Chairman.

(III)

DEDICATION

This report is dedicated to the memory of M. Scott Billingsley,

counsel for the House Committee on Government Reform from

1999–2001. Scott died unexpectedly on March 25, 2002, at the age

of 31.

During his time on the Committee staff, Scott was centrally involved in a number of important investigations. Scott made immeasurable contributions to the Committee’s work, not only

through his critical thinking and excellent writing, but also

through his professionalism and cheerful spirit, which made him a

pleasure to work with.

Scott devoted two years of his short life to the Committee on

Government Reform because he wanted to root out waste, fraud,

and abuse, and promote integrity in the federal government. Scott’s

final, and most important work for the Committee was on the investigation of President Clinton’s eleventh-hour clemency grants.

Scott played a key role investigating the pardons of Marc Rich and

Pincus Green and drafted much of the first chapter of this report.

Scott’s work on the Rich and Green pardons was typical of all of

his work for the Committee: excellent, accurate, and thorough.

Scott Billingsley certainly has a legacy that goes far beyond his

work on this Committee. He has left behind many individuals who

will miss him dearly. His memory will be cherished by his parents,

sister, fiance ́, family, and countless others whose lives he touched.

However, this report should serve as a small, but lasting, reminder

of Scott Billingsley’s work and his devotion to the pursuit of truth.

(V)

(VII)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Volume 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................................... 1

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 25

Chapter One—‘‘Take Jack’s Word’’: The Pardons of International

Fugitives Marc Rich and Pincus Green

FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE ....................................................................... 99

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 105

I. BACKGROUND OF MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN .......................... 107

A. Rich and Green’s Business Activities ........................................................ 107

1. How Rich and Green Became Wealthy ............................................... 107

2. Marc Rich’s History of Illegal and Improper Business Dealings ...... 108

a. Iran ................................................................................................. 110

b. South Africa ................................................................................... 110

c. The Soviet Union/Russia ............................................................... 111

d. Cuba ............................................................................................... 113

e. Libya ............................................................................................... 113

f. Iraq .................................................................................................. 113

g. Angola ............................................................................................ 114

h. Romania ......................................................................................... 114

i. Serbia .............................................................................................. 115

B. The Criminal Charges Against Marc Rich and Pincus Green ................ 115

1. The Investigation of Rich and Green .................................................. 115

2. The Indictment ..................................................................................... 120

3. Rich and Green Flee the Country ....................................................... 121

4. The Corporate Guilty Pleas ................................................................. 122

C. Attempts to Bring Rich and Green to Justice .......................................... 123

1. Attempts to Extradite Rich and Green ............................................... 123

2. Marc Rich and Pincus Green’s Attempts to Renounce Their Citizenship ................................................................................................ 123

3. U.S. Attempts to Apprehend Rich and Green .................................... 125

4. 1992 Congressional Hearings .............................................................. 127

5. Actions Taken by the U.S. Against Rich’s Business Interests ......... 128

a. U.S. Mint Contract Cancellation ................................................. 128

b. Suspension of Rich’s Grain Dealings ........................................... 129

c. Cuban Asset Forfeiture ................................................................. 130

II. ATTEMPTS TO SETTLE THE MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN

CASE .............................................................................................................. 131

A. Attempts to Settle in the 1980s ................................................................. 131

B. Marc Rich’s Humanitarian Activities in the 1980s and 1990s ................ 133

C. Rich Hires Jack Quinn ............................................................................... 135

D. Quinn’s Fee Arrangements ........................................................................ 137

1. Was Quinn Expecting Payment for His Work on the Pardon? ......... 137

2. Has Quinn Received Payments from Marc Rich Since the Pardon

Was Granted? ..................................................................................... 141

E. Quinn’s Attempts to Settle the Case ......................................................... 145

III. THE MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN PARDON PETITION ............... 149

A. Rich Contemplated a Pardon Early in 2000 ............................................. 149

B. The Preparation of the Pardon Petition .................................................... 154

C. The Misleading Legal Arguments in the Petition .................................... 156

1. The Indictment of Rich Was Not Flawed ........................................... 156

a. The Department of Energy Regulations Were Fair ................... 156

Page

VIII

C. The Misleading Legal Arguments in the Petition—Continued

1. The Indictment of Rich Was Not Flawed—Continued

b. Rich and Green Were Not Singled Out ....................................... 157

c. Rich and Green Did Trade with the Enemy ................................ 159

d. Rich and Green Did Evade Federal Taxes .................................. 160

2. The Prosecutors Were Not ‘‘Overzealous’’ .......................................... 162

a. The Prosecutors Negotiated with Rich and Green ..................... 162

b. The Rich Prosecution Was Not Tainted with Media Attention . 164

c. RICO Charges Were Fairly Brought ............................................ 165

D. The ‘‘Letters of Support’’ in the Petition ................................................... 167

1. Rich Paid a Number of Individuals Who Wrote in His Support ...... 167

2. Some Who Wrote Letters Were Misled About the Purpose .............. 170

3. Many of the Letters Were Misrepresented to the President ............ 171

IV. LOBBYING FOR THE MARC RICH PARDON ............................................ 173

A. The Marc Rich Lobbying Team .................................................................. 173

1. Denise Rich ........................................................................................... 173

a. Denise Rich’s Relationship with Marc Rich ................................ 173

b. Denise Rich’s Relationship with President Clinton .................... 175

c. Denise Rich’s Role in the Marc Rich Pardon Effort .................... 176

d. Denise Rich’s Motives ................................................................... 180

2. Beth Dozoretz ....................................................................................... 182

a. Beth Dozoretz’s Relationship with Bill Clinton .......................... 182

b. Beth Dozoretz’s Involvement in the Marc Rich Pardon Campaign ............................................................................................ 184

c. Jack Quinn’s Attempt to Keep Information About Dozoretz

from the Committee .................................................................... 187

3. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Other Israeli Leaders ....... 188

4. Elie Wiesel ............................................................................................ 192

5. King Juan Carlos ................................................................................. 195

6. Avner Azulay ........................................................................................ 196

7. Michael Steinhardt ............................................................................... 196

8. Gershon Kekst ...................................................................................... 197

9. Robert Fink ........................................................................................... 206

10. Kathleen Behan .................................................................................. 206

11. Peter Kadzik ....................................................................................... 206

B. Importance of Secrecy to the Marc Rich Team ......................................... 207

C. Jack Quinn and Eric Holder Cut the Justice Department Out of

the Process ................................................................................................. 208

D. The Filing of the Pardon Petition .............................................................. 214

1. December 11, 2000, Call from Ehud Barak ....................................... 215

2. Quinn Was Likely Legally Prohibited from Lobbying the White

House .................................................................................................. 216

E. The Lobbying Effort .................................................................................... 218

1. Quinn’s Contacts with Bruce Lindsey in Belfast ............................... 219

2. Peter Kadzik’s Lobbying Contacts with John Podesta ...................... 220

3. Further Contacts Between Jack Quinn and White House Staff ...... 223

4. Initial Discussions Between the White House and Justice Department .................................................................................................... 225

5. January 8, 2001, Call Between President Clinton and Ehud

Barak ................................................................................................... 226

6. ‘‘The HRC Option’’ ................................................................................ 227

F. The Final Days of the Marc Rich Lobbying Effort ................................... 230

1. Communications Between Peter Kadzik and John Podesta ............. 230

2. The January 16, 2001, White House Meeting Regarding Rich ........ 231

3. The Justice Department Receives Jack Quinn’s January 10 Letter 233

4. Final Lobbying Contacts Leading up to January 19, 2001 ............... 233

a. Jack Quinn’s January 18, 2001, Letter to the President ........... 235

b. Bruce Lindsey’s Contacts with SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt .. 236

G. January 19–20, 2001 .................................................................................. 238

1. The Call Between Prime Minister Barak and President Clinton .... 238

2. Eric Holder Weighs In ......................................................................... 240

3. The January 19 Meeting Between White House Staff and President Clinton ........................................................................................ 245

4. The President’s Call to Jack Quinn .................................................... 247

5. The White House Informs the Justice Department of the Decision 250

H. Aftermath of the Rich and Green Pardons ............................................... 254

1. Eric Holder’s Congratulatory Remarks .............................................. 254

Page

IX

H. Aftermath of the Rich and Green Pardons—Continued

2. The Rich Team’s Effort to Deal with the Press ................................. 255

3. President Clinton’s Column in The New York Times ....................... 258

V. FAILURE OF KEY PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN THE MARC RICH

AND PINCUS GREEN INVESTIGATION ................................................. 262

A. Marc Rich .................................................................................................... 262

B. Pincus Green ............................................................................................... 263

C. Jack Quinn .................................................................................................. 263

D. Denise Rich ................................................................................................. 264

E. Beth Dozoretz .............................................................................................. 264

F. Avner Azulay ............................................................................................... 265

G. Peter Kadzik ............................................................................................... 265

H. Terry McAuliffe ........................................................................................... 266

Chapter Two—Roger Clinton’s Involvement in Lobbying For Executive

Clemency

FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE ....................................................................... 709

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 715

I. ROGER CLINTON’S PATTERN OF TRADING ON HIS BROTHER’S

NAME ............................................................................................................ 717

A. Roger Clinton’s Foreign Travelers Checks and Other Questionable

Sources of Income ...................................................................................... 719

B. Roger Clinton’s Lobbying Regarding Cuban Travel Restrictions ............ 723

C. The Shakedown of John Katopodis ........................................................... 725

II. THE GAMBINO PAROLE AND PARDON EFFORTS ................................. 731

A. Rosario Gambino’s Involvement with Organized Crime .......................... 731

B. The U.S. Parole Commission’s Handling of Rosario Gambino’s Case .... 735

C. Roger Clinton’s Involvement with the Gambino Family ......................... 739

1. Clinton’s Contacts with the Parole Commission ................................ 743

a. Clinton’s Initial Approach to the Parole Commission ................ 743

b. Clinton’s Meetings with Parole Commission Staff ..................... 747

i. December 1997 Meeting ......................................................... 747

ii. Spring 1998 Contacts ............................................................ 751

iii. July 1998 Meeting ................................................................ 753

2. The FBI Investigation of Clinton’s Contacts with the Parole Commission ................................................................................................ 753

a. Clinton’s Continued Attempts to Contact the Commission ....... 755

b. The FBI’s Request to Have an Agent Pose Undercover ............. 758

c. The FBI’s Recording of Clinton’s Conversations with Thomas

Kowalski ...................................................................................... 760

3. Roger Clinton’s Apparent Attempt to Involve the White House

in the Parole Decision ........................................................................ 764

D. Roger Clinton’s Financial Relationship with the Gambinos ................... 765

E. The FBI’s Interview of Roger Clinton ....................................................... 766

1. Roger Clinton’s Statements Regarding His Brother’s Knowledge .... 767

2. Roger Clinton’s Statements Regarding Payment from the

Gambinos ............................................................................................ 768

3. Roger Clinton’s Statements Regarding the Rolex Watch .................. 771

F. The Efforts to Obtain Executive Clemency for Rosario Gambino ........... 773

III. THE LINCECUM PARDON OFFER .............................................................. 777

A. Garland Lincecum’s Account ...................................................................... 778

1. The Initial $35,000 Payment ............................................................... 778

2. The First Dallas Meeting ..................................................................... 779

3. Lincecum’s Attempts to Raise the Remaining Money ....................... 782

4. Lincecum’s Payment of $200,000 ........................................................ 785

5. The Division of Lincecum’s Money Among Clinton, Locke, and

Morton ................................................................................................. 786

6. Lincecum’s Attempts to Receive the Pardon ...................................... 787

B. Roger Clinton’s Reaction to the Allegations ............................................. 790

C. Dickey Morton’s and George Locke’s Reactions to the Allegations ......... 792

D. Analysis ....................................................................................................... 795

IV. OTHER PARDON CANDIDATES .................................................................. 799

A. Dan Lasater and George Locke ................................................................. 799

B. J.T. Lundy ................................................................................................... 802

C. Blume Loe .................................................................................................... 807

D. Rita Lavelle ................................................................................................. 809

Page

X

E. John Ballis ................................................................................................... 811

F. Stephen Griggs ............................................................................................ 815

G. Phillip Young .............................................................................................. 819

H. Joseph ‘‘Jay’’ McKernan ............................................................................. 822

I. Mitchell Wood ............................................................................................... 823

J. Mark St. Pe ́ .................................................................................................. 825

K. William D. McCord ..................................................................................... 826

V. FAILURE OF KEY PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN THE ROGER CLINTON INVESTIGATION ................................................................................ 827

A. Roger Clinton .............................................................................................. 827

B. Tommaso Gambino ..................................................................................... 828

C. Lisa Gambino .............................................................................................. 828

D. Victor Crawford and Kathy Vieth ............................................................. 828

E. George Locke ............................................................................................... 829

F. Dickey Morton ............................................................................................. 829

G. Richard Cayce ............................................................................................. 829

H. J.T. Lundy ................................................................................................... 829

I. Robert Lundy ................................................................................................ 829

J. Chief Carl Griggs ......................................................................................... 830

K. Blume Loe and Cynthia Goosen ................................................................ 830

L. Bruce Lindsey .............................................................................................. 830

M. Meridith Cabe ............................................................................................. 830

N. Department of Justice ................................................................................ 831

O. The White House ........................................................................................ 831

Volume 2

Chapter Three—Hugh Rodham’s Role in Lobbying for Grants of

Executive Clemency

FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE ....................................................................... 1261

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1267

I. THE CARLOS VIGNALI COMMUTATION ................................................... 1267

A. The Case Against Carlos Vignali ............................................................... 1267

B. Vignali’s Efforts to Obtain Executive Clemency ...................................... 1276

1. Initial Efforts to Reduce Vignali’s Sentence ...................................... 1276

a. Contacts with Prosecutors in Minnesota ..................................... 1276

b. Vignali’s Appeal ............................................................................. 1277

c. Letters to the White House and Justice Department ................. 1277

2. Vignali’s Clemency Petition ................................................................. 1280

3. Supporters of Vignali’s Clemency Petition ......................................... 1283

a. Letters of Support from Prominent California Politicians ........ 1284

i. Congressman Xavier Becerra ................................................. 1284

ii. Congressman Esteban Torres ............................................... 1286

iii. State Senator Richard Polanco ............................................ 1286

iv. Los Angeles County Supervisor Gloria Molina .................. 1287

v. Los Angeles City Councilmember Mike Hernandez ............ 1288

vi. Cardinal Roger Mahony ....................................................... 1289

b. Support from Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca .................. 1290

i. Sheriff Baca’s Relationship with the Vignalis ...................... 1290

ii. Sheriff Baca’s Involvement in the Vignali Clemency Effort ......................................................................................... 1292

iii. Conclusion ............................................................................. 1293

c. Support from U.S. Attorney Alejandro Mayorkas ....................... 1295

i. Mayorkas’ Initial Exposure to the Vignali Matter ............... 1296

ii. Mayorkas Calls the White House ......................................... 1297

iii. Conclusion ............................................................................. 1299

4. California Law Enforcement and Political Officials Supported

Vignali’s Clemency Petition Despite Serious Allegations Against

Horacio and Carlos Vignali ............................................................... 1301

a. There Were Extensive Allegations of Drug Trafficking Against

Both Horacio and Carlos Vignali ............................................... 1301

b. The Extensive Allegations Against Horacio and Carlos Vignali

Were Never Considered by Sheriff Baca, U.S. Attorney

Mayorkas, or the Clinton White House ..................................... 1304

C. The White House’s Review of the Vignali Clemency Request ................. 1307

1. Hugh Rodham’s Hiring ........................................................................ 1307

Page

XI

C. The White House’s Review of the Vignali Clemency Request—Continued

2. Hugh Rodham’s Initial Approach to the White House ...................... 1309

3. The Justice Department’s Input on the Vignali Case ....................... 1311

4. The Final Decision on the Vignali Commutation .............................. 1314

a. Contacts Between the White House and Interested Parties ..... 1314

b. Contacts Between the White House and Hugh Rodham ........... 1317

c. Hugh Rodham’s Invocation of First Lady Hillary Clinton ......... 1318

d. The President’s Decision to Grant the Commutation ................ 1319

5. The White House Has No Justification for the Vignali Commutation ...................................................................................................... 1320

D. The Aftermath of the Vignali Commutation ............................................ 1324

1. The Response of Hugh Rodham .......................................................... 1324

2. The Florida Bar’s ‘‘Investigation’’ of Hugh Rodham .......................... 1325

3. The Message Sent by the Vignali Commutation ............................... 1327

II. THE PARDON OF A. GLENN BRASWELL .................................................. 1328

A. Braswell’s History of Misconduct .............................................................. 1329

B. Consideration of the Braswell Pardon by the Clinton White House ...... 1332

III. HUGH RODHAM’S EFFORTS TO OBTAIN CLEMENCY FOR THE

LUMS ............................................................................................................. 1336

A. Background on Gene and Nora Lum ......................................................... 1336

B. Hugh Rodham Approaches the White House About the Possibility

of a Pardon for the Lums .......................................................................... 1337

IV. FAILURE OF KEY PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN THE HUGH

RODHAM INVESTIGATION ....................................................................... 1339

A. Hugh Rodham ............................................................................................. 1339

B. Horacio and Carlos Vignali ........................................................................ 1340

C. James Casso ................................................................................................ 1340

D. Glenn Braswell ........................................................................................... 1341

E. Kendall Coffey ............................................................................................. 1341

F. Gene and Nora Lum ................................................................................... 1341

G. Nicole Lum .................................................................................................. 1341

Chapter Four—Tony Rodham’s Role in Lobbying for Grants of Executive

Clemency

FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE ....................................................................... 1589

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1590

I. EDGAR AND VONNA JO GREGORY ........................................................... 1591

A. Background .................................................................................................. 1591

B. Tony Rodham’s Relationship with the Gregorys ...................................... 1592

C. Tony Rodham’s Efforts to Help the Gregorys Obtain Pardons ............... 1595

D. Deliberations by the Administration ......................................................... 1598

E. Conclusion ................................................................................................... 1600

II. FERNANDO FUENTES COBA ....................................................................... 1602

A. Background on Fernando Fuentes Coba ................................................... 1602

B. The Pardon Attorney Refuses to Process Fuentes’ Clemency Petition ... 1604

C. Tony Rodham’s Attempt to Become Involved in the Fuentes’ Clemency

Effort .......................................................................................................... 1605

D. Tony Rodham’s Representations to Mannerud Were Fraudulent .......... 1608

Chapter Five—The Grant of Clemency to Drug Money Launderer Harvey

Weinig

FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE ....................................................................... 1709

I. BACKGROUND ................................................................................................ 1712

A. Weinig and His Co-Conspirators ............................................................... 1712

B. The Money Laundering Operation ............................................................ 1713

C. Weinig and His Co-Conspirators Run Afoul of the Colombian Cocaine

Cartel .......................................................................................................... 1714

D. Weinig’s Prosecution and Sentencing ....................................................... 1718

II. WEINIG’S EFFORTS TO OBTAIN EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY .................. 1722

A. Weinig Hires Reid Weingarten to Lobby for Clemency ........................... 1722

B. Weinig’s Wife Seeks Support for His Clemency Petition ......................... 1725

C. Weinig’s Wife Obtains Support from Individuals with Ties to the

Administration ........................................................................................... 1726

Page

XII

III. THE WHITE HOUSE’S REVIEW OF WEINIG’S COMMUTATION REQUEST ........................................................................................................... 1729

A. The Justice Department’s Input in the Weinig Clemency Matter .......... 1729

1. The U.S. Attorney Strongly Objected to Commuting Weinig’s Sentence .................................................................................................... 1729

2. The Pardon Attorney Objected to Commuting Weinig’s Sentence ... 1730

B. The White House’s Deliberations .............................................................. 1732

C. The White House Had No Justification for the Weinig Commutation ... 1733

D. Aftermath of the Weinig Commutation .................................................... 1736

Volume 3

APPENDICES

Appendix I.—Committee correspondence .............................................................. 2079

Appendix II.—Committee subpoenas ..................................................................... 2577

Appendix III.—Marc Rich and Pincus Green pardon petition ............................. 2967

VIEWS

Minority views of Hon. Henry A. Waxman, Hon. Tom Lantos, Hon. Major

R. Owens, Hon. Edolphus Towns, Hon. Paul E. Kanjorski, Hon. Patsy

T. Mink, Hon. Bernard Sanders, Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton, Hon. Elijah

E. Cummings, Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich, Hon. Danny K. Davis, Hon. Thomas H. Allen, Hon. Janice D. Schakowsky, and Hon. Diane E. Watson ............ 3292

Additional views of Hon. Dan Burton .................................................................... 3389

Union Calendar No. 269

107TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session 107–454

JUSTICE UNDONE: CLEMENCY DECISIONS IN THE CLINTON

WHITE HOUSE

MAY 14, 2002.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of

the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. BURTON, from the Committee on Government Reform

submitted the following

SECOND REPORT

On March 14, 2002, the Committee on Government Reform approved and adopted a report entitled ‘‘Justice Undone: Clemency

Decisions in the Clinton White House.’’ The chairman was directed

to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE PARDONS OF MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN

Marc Rich and Pincus Green have a history of illegal and

corrupt business dealings contrary to the security interests

of the United States.

• Rich and Green have had extensive trade with terrorist states

and other enemies of the United States. Despite clear legal restrictions on such trade, Rich and Green have engaged in commodities trading with Iraq, Iran, Cuba, and other rogue states

which have sponsored terrorist acts. By engaging in these activities, Marc Rich and Pincus Green demonstrated contempt for

American laws, as well as the well-being of Americans who were

harmed or threatened by these states.

• The Central Intelligence Agency provided the following declassified information about Marc Rich to the Committee:

2

If President Clinton had checked with the CIA, he would

have learned that Marc Rich had been the subject of inquiries by various foreign government liaison services and

domestic government agencies regarding their ongoing investigations of criminal activity.

In addition, President Clinton would have received information worthy of his consideration in making his decision

on the pardon. This information cannot be declassified.

Marc Rich and Pincus Green were guilty of serious crimes

and showed contempt for the American justice system.

• Marc Rich and Pincus Green attempted to obstruct the criminal

investigation of them in every way imaginable, including attempting to smuggle subpoenaed documents out of the country.

Rich and Green’s tactics resulted in a record-setting contempt

fine against them, totaling $21 million. Despite these tactics,

the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York was

able to indict Marc Rich and Pincus Green on 51 counts of illegal activity, including tax evasion, mail fraud, wire fraud, and

racketeering. The evidence against them was overwhelming.

• Because of the strength of the case against them, Marc Rich and

Pincus Green fled the country rather than face trial. Rich’s own

lawyer told him that by fleeing the country, Rich had ‘‘spit on

the American flag’’ and that ‘‘whatever you get, you deserve.’’

For the 17 years leading up to his pardon, Marc Rich was one

of America’s 10 most wanted international fugitives. Although

Jack Quinn, Rich’s attorney, argued that Rich did not flee the

United States to avoid prosecution, Rich’s ex-wife refuted this

view, stating that Rich told her that ‘‘I’m having tax problems

with the government . . . and I think that we are going to have

to leave.’’

• In order to avoid extradition or apprehension by United States

law enforcement, Marc Rich and Pincus Green attempted to renounce their United States citizenship. While this attempt was

rejected by the United States, it demonstrated that Rich and

Green had no loyalty to the United States and viewed their citizenship as a liability to be discarded at will.

Rich and Green’s crimes were so serious that for seventeen

years, the U.S. government devoted considerable resources

to apprehending them and closing down their business activities.

• Rich and Green were such high-profile fugitives that on a number of occasions in the 1980s and 1990s, the United States Marshals Service attempted to arrest them in various foreign countries. A number of countries from the United Kingdom to Russia

attempted to assist the United States in these efforts. The pardons of Rich and Green have sent a message that individuals

can go from the FBI’s most wanted list to a Presidential pardon

3

if they spend money and have the proper connections. This message undermines U.S. efforts to apprehend fugitives abroad.

• Rich and Green were such high-profile fugitives that in 1991, the

Government Reform Committee, under Democratic leadership,

held a number of hearings, and issued two reports about the government’s efforts to apprehend Rich and Green. At that time,

Democrats and Republicans in Congress took the Bush Administration to task for not being aggressive enough in hunting down

Rich and Green, or shutting down their business interests in the

U.S.

• While Rich and Green were fugitives from justice, the American

government took a number of actions against their interests in

the U.S. The federal government seized Rich’s assets and shut

down his trade in metals and grain with the government.

The United States government repeatedly tried to reach a

plea agreement with Rich and Green.

• For a number of years after Rich and Green fled the country,

the U.S. government attempted to negotiate a plea bargain to

settle the case. The government made a number of concessions

in an attempt to reach a deal, but all offers were rebuffed by

Rich and Green, who would not agree to any deal that resulted

in jail time. While lobbying for a pardon, Jack Quinn and Rich’s

other lawyers claimed that the Justice Department had not even

negotiated with Rich, and therefore, that a pardon was justified.

Quinn and the other lawyers were misleading the White House

when they made these claims.

Jack Quinn misled the White House about the Rich case and

attempted to mislead the Committee and the public regarding his work for Marc Rich.

• Marc Rich hired Jack Quinn after a recommendation from Eric

Holder. After numerous failed attempts to have his case settled,

Marc Rich hired Jack Quinn to represent him. Quinn was hired

after a recommendation from Deputy Attorney General Eric

Holder. Gershon Kekst, who worked for Marc Rich on the pardon matter, asked Holder for a recommendation of how to settle

a criminal matter with the Justice Department. Holder recommended that he hire a Washington lawyer ‘‘who knows the

process, he comes to me, and we work it out.’’ Holder then explicitly recommended the hiring of Jack Quinn. While Holder

did not know that Kekst was referring to Marc Rich, it suggests

that Holder was favorably disposed to Jack Quinn, and would

be very receptive to arguments made by Quinn, no matter how

baseless they were.

• Marc Rich was going to pay Jack Quinn for his work on the pardon. After the Marc Rich pardon was granted, Jack Quinn

claimed that he was not being paid by Rich for his work on the

pardon and that he expected no future payment for his work on

the pardon. However, the Committee has uncovered evidence

4

that Robert Fink, a lawyer close to Marc Rich, had discussions

with Rich and Quinn about paying Quinn for his work on the

Rich pardon. Documents which Quinn and Fink withheld from

the Committee for over a year, and which were produced only

after a federal judge ordered them produced to a grand jury,

shed further light on the contemplated payment of Quinn. These

documents indicate that Quinn raised the question of his ‘‘status’’ with Rich and asked that Rich pay him a $50,000 per

month retainer. The Committee attempted to interview Quinn

about these documents, but Quinn refused to meet with Committee staff.

• Jack Quinn may have been attempting to receive money from

Marc Rich after the pardons were granted. At the Committee’s

February 8, 2001, hearing, Quinn pledged that ‘‘I will not bill

[Rich], and I will not accept any further compensation for work

done on the pardon.’’ This pledge surprised Rich’s lawyer, who

expected that Rich would be paying Quinn for his work. Indeed,

records just produced to the Committee indicate that Quinn

may have been attempting to negotiate some payment from

Marc Rich shortly after he pledged that he would not take additional money for his work. A March 5, 2001, e-mail from Quinn

to Rich states, ‘‘If you are agreeable, and I hope you are, I need

to fax to you in the next few days a new retainer agreement.’’

This e-mail raises the possibility that Quinn has been attempting to obtain payments from Rich, in possible violation of his

pledge to the Committee. The Committee attempted to interview

Quinn about this matter, but he refused.

• Jack Quinn’s work on the Rich pardon was in apparent violation

of Executive Order 12834. That executive order was enacted as

part of President Clinton’s promise to create ‘‘the most ethical

administration in history,’’ and it prohibited former executive

branch employees from lobbying their former executive branch

agencies within five years of their departure. Quinn has claimed

that his work on the Rich pardon came within an exception for

‘‘communicating . . . with regard to a . . . criminal . . . law enforcement inquiry, investigation or proceeding[.]’’ However, this

exception was clearly intended to apply to appearances before

courts, not lobbying the White House for a pardon. The ‘‘revolving door’’ lobbying ban was intended to apply exactly to cases

like this, where a former White House Counsel could come back

and lobby the President to take an action that had no constitutional limits on it, largely based on the President’s personal

trust for that former staffer.

• The pardon petition compiled by Jack Quinn and the other Marc

Rich lawyers was highly misleading. Most of the arguments

used by Jack Quinn to justify the Rich and Green pardons were

false and misleading. These arguments could have been completely refuted if anyone in the White House had sought out any

of the prosecutors familiar with the Rich case.

• The ‘‘letters of support’’ in the pardon petition were used in a

misleading manner. Another key element of the Rich pardon peVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tition was a number of letters of support for Rich and Green

from prominent Americans and Israelis. Rich and Green used

these letters to try to show that their humanitarian activities

justified their pardons. However, many of these letters were obtained under false pretenses, and the writers of the letters were

not told that they were being used to obtain a Presidential pardon. In addition, a number of individuals who wrote in support

of Rich and Green received large amounts of money from them.

Marc Rich and Pincus Green used a number of different individuals with close personal relationships with President

Clinton and his staff to lobby regarding the pardon.

• The role of Denise Rich. Denise Rich played a key role in obtaining the Rich and Green pardons. Denise Rich had a close relationship with President Clinton, which was based in part on her

role as a large-scale contributor to Democratic causes and the

Clinton library, and in part on her extensive personal contacts

with President Clinton. The $450,000 given by Denise Rich to

the Clinton Library was an early and large contribution. Denise

Rich used her relationship with President Clinton to lobby for

the Marc Rich pardon on a number of occasions. She has refused to cooperate with the Committee, invoking her Fifth

Amendment rights rather than answer questions about her role

in the pardon.

• The role of Beth Dozoretz. Beth Dozoretz, another close friend of

President Clinton, played a key role in obtaining the Rich pardon. Like Denise Rich, Beth Dozoretz had a relationship with

President Clinton built on personal ties and political fundraising. Dozoretz has raised and contributed millions of dollars for

the Democratic party and has pledged to raise an additional

million dollars for the Clinton library. Beth Dozoretz also has

close relationships with Denise Rich and Jack Quinn. Dozoretz

used her close relationship with President Clinton to lobby for

the Rich pardon. Because Dozoretz has invoked her Fifth

Amendment rights against self-incrimination, the Committee is

unable to conclude whether or not Dozoretz made any linkage

between contributions to the DNC or the Clinton library and the

granting of the Rich pardon.

• The role of Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Israeli Prime Minister

Ehud Barak spoke to President Clinton three times about the

Rich pardon. In his public statements about the Rich pardon,

President Clinton has pointed to these conversations with Prime

Minister Barak as one of the primary reasons he granted the

pardon. However an examination of the transcripts of the calls

shows that Barak did not make a particularly impassioned plea

for Rich. Therefore, it appears that the President may be attempting to use Prime Minister Barak’s interest in the Rich

matter as a cover for his own motivations for granting the Rich

pardon.

• Barak had met with Rich personally and told Clinton that the

Rich pardon ‘‘could be important . . . not just financially, but he

6

helped Mossad on more than one case.’’ Barak’s statement raises

the possibility that either Barak or Clinton acted on the Rich

matter because of some promise of future financial return.

Eric Holder and Jack Quinn worked together to cut the Justice Department out of the decisionmaking process. Holder’s

decision to support the pardon had a critical impact.

• Jack Quinn and Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder worked together to ensure that the Justice Department, especially the prosecutors of the Southern District of New York, did not have an opportunity to express an opinion on the Rich pardon before it was

granted. The evidence amassed by the Committee indicates that

Holder advised Quinn to file the Rich pardon petition with the

White House, and leave the Justice Department out of the process. One e-mail produced to the Committee suggests that Holder

told Quinn to ‘‘go straight to wh’’ and that the ‘‘timing is good.’’

The evidence also indicates that Holder failed to inform the

prosecutors under him that the Rich pardon was under consideration, despite the fact that he was aware of the pardon effort

for almost two months before it was granted.

• Eric Holder’s support of the Rich pardon played a critical role

in the success of the pardon effort. Holder informed the White

House that he was ‘‘neutral, leaning towards favorable’’ on the

Rich pardon, even though he knew that Rich was a fugitive

from justice and that Justice Department prosecutors viewed

Rich with such contempt that they would no longer meet with

his lawyers. Holder has failed to offer any credible justification

for his support of the Rich pardon, leading the Committee to believe that Holder had other motivations for his decision, which

he has failed to share with the Committee.

• Eric Holder was seeking Jack Quinn’s support to be appointed

as Attorney General in a potential Gore Administration, and this

may have affected Holder’s judgment in the Rich matter. On several occasions, Holder sought out Quinn’s endorsement to be appointed as Attorney General if Al Gore were to win the November 2000 election. Quinn was a Gore confidant whose endorsement would carry great weight. Holder’s initial help to Quinn in

the Rich matter predated the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush

v. Gore, and accordingly, Holder had some legitimate prospect of

being appointed Attorney General when he was helping Quinn

keep the Rich matter from the Justice Department’s scrutiny.

While Holder denies that his desire to be appointed Attorney

General had anything to do with his actions in the Rich matter,

it provides a much clearer and more believable motivation than

any offered by Holder to date.

President Clinton made his decision knowing almost nothing about the Rich case, making a number of mistaken assumptions, and reaching false conclusions.

• The White House never consulted with the prosecutors in the

Southern District of New York regarding the Rich case. As a reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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sult, the White House staff was never able to refute the false

and misleading arguments made in the Marc Rich pardon petition.

• Every White House staff member who was working on the Rich

pardon opposed it. However, because they failed to do the necessary background research on the Rich case, they were unable

to refute the arguments made by Jack Quinn.

• President Clinton was misled by Jack Quinn in their negotiations regarding the Rich pardon. Late in the evening of January

19, 2001, President Clinton and Jack Quinn had a telephone

discussion regarding the Rich pardon. During this conversation,

Quinn repeated his usual misleading arguments about the Rich

case. Quinn also offered to make his clients subject to civil liability for their actions. In furtherance of this offer, Quinn

agreed to waive all statute of limitations and other defenses,

which Rich and Green would have as a result of their fugitivity.

President Clinton has cited this waiver as a key factor in his decision to grant the pardons. However, if President Clinton or his

staff had done even cursory legal research, they would have understood that this was a hollow, meaningless deal. First, Quinn

agreed to waive defenses that Rich and Green did not have. It

is basic legal doctrine that fugitivity tolls the statute of limitations. Second, Rich and Green likely do not face any civil liability for their crimes, since those fines were already paid by their

companies. Third, Rich and Green had been willing to pay $100

million to settle their case for years. A fine, even a large one,

would have had no impact on Rich and Green, and it would

merely stand for the proposition that the U.S. justice system is

for sale.

• When the White House did finally provide the names of Marc

Rich and Pincus Green for a Justice Department background

check in the middle of the night on January 19, 2001, the check

turned up new, troubling information which was disregarded by

President Clinton. When the White House requested the Justice

Department to perform a computer background check on Rich

and Green prior to granting the pardons, the check came back

with information that they were wanted for ‘‘arms trading.’’ This

was new information for all of the White House staff, and it

raised serious questions among them as to whether the pardons

should be granted. However, the only step the White House took

to check on this allegation was to call Jack Quinn. Quinn predictably denied that his clients were involved in arms trading.

Faced with this conflicting information about Rich and Green,

President Clinton instructed his staff to ‘‘take Jack’s word’’ and

issue the pardons.

President Clinton has failed to offer a full accounting for

his decision to issue the Marc Rich and Pincus Green pardons.

• President Clinton has failed to answer any questions about the

Rich and Green pardons. The few statements that he has issued

8

have been misleading, incomplete, and raised more questions

than they answered. Given his complete failure to explain the

pardons, the Committee is left with serious unanswered questions regarding President Clinton’s motives.

ROGER CLINTON’S EFFORTS TO LOBBY FOR EXECUTIVE

CLEMENCY

Roger Clinton engaged in a systematic effort to trade on his

brother’s name during the Clinton Administration.

• President Clinton encouraged Roger Clinton to capitalize on

their relationship. At the beginning of his second term, President Clinton instructed Roger Clinton to use his connections to

the Administration to gain financial advantage. According to the

lawyer for former Arkansas State Senator George Locke: ‘‘Roger

related that Bill Clinton had instructed him that since this was

his last term in office, Roger should find a way to make a living

and use his relationship with the President to his advantage.’’ By suggesting that Roger Clinton exploit his name, Bill Clinton

encouraged the conduct described in this chapter. Roger Clinton

apparently took this advice to heart, telling one person from

whom he solicited money that he and the President ‘‘had only

four years to get things done’’ and that they did not care ‘‘about

ethics or what appearances were.’’

• Roger Clinton received substantial sums of money from foreign

governments solely because he was the President’s brother. When

the FBI interviewed him, Roger Clinton admitted that since the

beginning of the Clinton Administration, he had received substantial sums of money from foreign governments. Clinton told

the FBI that ‘‘he knows he receives these invitations [to make

paid appearances in foreign countries] strictly because he is the

First Brother of the President of the United States.’’ Clinton

also informed the FBI that in addition to receiving hundreds of

thousands of dollars for musical performances from foreign governments, he also received money for President Clinton from

foreign governments. Roger Clinton told the FBI that he had to

be instructed repeatedly by the President or White House staff

that the President was not permitted to receive cash from foreign governments.

• Roger Clinton received at least $335,000 in unexplained travelers

checks, many of which were purchased overseas and likely imported illegally. The Committee uncovered at least $335,000 in

travelers checks deposited in Roger Clinton’s bank account.

Most of these travelers checks originated overseas, largely from

Taiwan, South Korea, and Venezuela. The travelers checks were

not restrictively endorsed by the purchaser but were instead

given to Roger Clinton blank. This method of transferring large

sums of money to Roger Clinton appears designed to conceal the

fact that the funds originated overseas and probably violated

criminal statutes requiring reports of the importation of monetary instruments. Roger Clinton has refused to provide the

Committee with any explanation of why he received these funds.

9

These suspicious transactions require a complete and thorough

investigation by law enforcement authorities, especially in light

of his admissions to the FBI about receiving money from foreign

governments.

• Roger Clinton likely violated federal law by failing to register as

required under the Lobbying Disclosure Act. One company paid

Roger Clinton $30,000 to lobby President Clinton and others to

loosen government restrictions on travel to Cuba. Although his

activity appears to meet the criteria outlined in the statute for

those required to disclose their contacts with covered executive

branch officials, Roger Clinton did not register as a lobbyist and

did not disclose his paid lobbying contacts with his brother. His

failure to register, therefore, needs to be investigated carefully

and completely by the Department of Justice.

• Roger Clinton participated in a plot to obtain a $35,000 per

month contract in exchange for delivering a cabinet secretary to

a speaking event. The FBI briefly investigated Roger Clinton’s

involvement in a scheme with Arkansas lawyer Larry Wallace

to pressure John Katopodis, promoter of an Alabama airport

project. Clinton and Wallace attempted to obtain a $35,000 per

month contract in exchange for Clinton’s promise to ensure that

Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater would speak at a

conference sponsored by Katopodis’ organization of local governments. When Katopodis refused to pay and Slater subsequently

refused to acknowledge the invitation, Katopodis suspected that

Clinton and Wallace were to blame. Wallace had told him that

his project would remain at a standstill until Katopodis ‘‘showed

him the money.’’

Roger Clinton lobbied for the release from prison of Rosario

Gambino, a notorious heroin dealer and organized crime

figure.

• Rosario Gambino was a major drug trafficker. Rosario Gambino

has been convicted in the United States and Italy of heroin trafficking. Before being sentenced to 45 years in federal prison,

Gambino associated with known members of organized crime

both in Italy and the United States. His associates have described him as a member of the Sicilian Mafia. When his brothers were convicted of racketeering, murder, illegal gambling,

loan sharking, and heroin trafficking in 1994, witnesses described them as ‘‘the main link between Mafia heroin traffickers

in Sicily and the American Mafia.’’

• Roger Clinton received at least $50,000 from the Gambino family, and he expected to receive more if he succeeded in getting

Rosario Gambino out of prison. Tommaso ‘‘Tommy’’ Gambino,

the son of Rosario Gambino, approached Roger Clinton to help

win the release of Rosario Gambino from prison. Tommy

Gambino promised Roger Clinton a substantial financial reward

if he was successful. Even though he never was successful,

Tommy Gambino provided Roger Clinton with $50,000, a gold

Rolex watch, and an undisclosed amount of ‘‘expense money.’’

10

• Roger Clinton attempted to use his relationship to the President

to influence the decisionmaking of the United States Parole Commission (‘‘USPC’’). Roger Clinton lobbied the Parole Commission

to grant parole to Gambino. While lobbying Parole Commission

staff, Roger Clinton informed them that President Clinton was

aware of his efforts on behalf of Rosario Gambino and that the

President had suggested that he contact the Parole Commission

members directly. Although the Commission staff tried to insulate the Commissioners from undue influence, Roger Clinton

clearly attempted to use his relationship to the President to influence the Commission improperly and win Gambino’s release.

• The Chief of Staff of the Parole Commission hindered the FBI’s

investigation. In 1998, the FBI began investigating Roger Clinton’s contacts with the Parole Commission. However, it met resistance from Marie Ragghianti, the Chief of Staff of the Parole

Commission. Ragghianti, who had participated in meetings with

Roger Clinton on the Gambino case, objected to the FBI investigation and successfully halted an FBI plan to have an undercover agent meet with Clinton posing as a Parole Commission

staffer. She also attempted to keep the FBI from recording a

meeting between Roger Clinton and a Parole Commission staffer. Ragghianti’s efforts may have kept the FBI from reaching a

full understanding of Roger Clinton’s involvement in the

Gambino case.

• Roger Clinton lied to FBI agents investigating his contacts with

the Parole Commission and his relationship with the Gambino

family. When interviewed by the FBI in 1999, Roger Clinton

said that he had never represented to anyone at the Parole

Commission that the President was aware of his contacts with

the Commission on behalf of Rosario Gambino. This self-serving

claim is contradicted by contemporaneous, written memoranda

detailing Clinton’s contacts as well as by the vivid and credible

recollections of Parole Commission staff. Clinton also lied about

the purpose of a $50,000 check from the Gambinos, which he deposited on the day of the FBI’s interview. While it is unclear

whether he deposited the check before or after the interview,

Clinton told the agents that Tommy Gambino had offered to

loan him money for a down payment on his house. He repeated

this explanation to the media when news of the money became

public in 2001. However, after reviewing both Clinton’s and

Gambino’s bank records, the Committee has found no evidence

that Clinton used the $50,000 for a down payment or that he

ever repaid any of the money. Accordingly, his claim to the FBI

that the money was merely a loan is false. During his interview,

Clinton also told the FBI agents three separate and contradictory stories in response to questions about his receipt of a Rolex

watch from Tommy Gambino before finally producing a Rolex to

the agents and claiming he had bought it in Tijuana, Mexico.

• Roger Clinton apparently lobbied the White House to grant a

commutation to Rosario Gambino. In the last days of the Clinton Administration—after Roger Clinton had failed to win parole for Rosario Gambino and after he had received a Rolex

11

watch and $50,000 from the Gambino family—the White House

received a petition for commutation for Rosario Gambino. Documents indicate that the White House lawyer responsible for

clemency matters requested a criminal background check on

Gambino, which is normally done when some serious consideration is being given to a grant of clemency. The obvious and logical inference that explains how the Gambino petition garnered

that level of attention at the White House is that Roger Clinton

was pushing for it. Because key Clinton White House staff have

refused to answer questions about this matter, it is unknown

whether Roger Clinton hand-delivered the Gambino petition as

he did with others or whether he brought it to the attention of

the White House some other way. Although the President did

not ultimately grant clemency to Gambino, the circumstances

surrounding the consideration of his petition are nevertheless

suspect. The fact that granting clemency to a mobster and confirmed criminal like Gambino was considered at all is disturbing

enough, but the reason it was considered is even more offensive.

The Gambino family was apparently able to purchase access to

the parole and clemency processes with cash payments and expensive gifts to the brother of the President of the United

States. Moreover, despite an FBI investigation of the matter,

the Justice Department has, to date, been unwilling or unable

to prosecute Clinton for any of his activities.

Roger Clinton received a substantial portion of $225,000

that was swindled from the Lincecum family in Clinton’s

name with the promise of a pardon that never came.

• The Lincecum family paid $225,000 to obtain a pardon for Garland Lincecum. In 1998, Garland Lincecum, a convicted felon,

was informed that he could purchase a presidential pardon for

$300,000. Lincecum was told that Arkansas businessmen Dickey

Morton and George Locke, who had a close relationship with

Roger Clinton, could obtain the pardon. Lincecum borrowed

$225,000 from his mother and brother and claims that a business associate paid another $70,000 to Morton and Locke for his

pardon. The money he borrowed from his family constituted

their life savings and means of support in retirement.

• Roger Clinton received at least $43,500 in proceeds from the

Lincecums’ payments to Morton and Locke. Dickey Morton,

George Locke, and Roger Clinton divided the funds among

themselves with Roger Clinton receiving a total of $25,500 in

checks and $18,000 in cash. The Lincecums paid the checks to

a company called CLM, which they were told stands for Clinton,

Locke, and Morton. Dickey Morton then disbursed the funds

from the company’s bank account to Clinton, Locke, and himself.

Roger Clinton has falsely denied any relationship with CLM

while offering no explanation of why he received this substantial

share of an elderly woman’s retirement savings through CLM.

• Roger Clinton may have been involved in a scheme to defraud

the Lincecums. Garland Lincecum never received a pardon, and

there is no evidence that Dickey Morton, George Locke, or Roger

12

Clinton ever submitted Lincecum’s name to the Justice Department or White House for consideration for a pardon. Therefore,

it appears that the Lincecums were the victims of a scam perpetrated by Morton, Locke, and perhaps Roger Clinton as well.

Roger Clinton may have been involved in lobbying for as

many as 13 other pardons and commutations.

• Roger Clinton publicly admitted involvement in six clemency efforts, but the evidence connects him to many more. Roger Clinton

told the media that he had asked for pardons for approximately

six close friends and that he did so because of concern for them

and not for any personal gain. For example, Roger Clinton lobbied for pardons for George Locke and Dan Lasater, two associates from Arkansas who were convicted of drug offenses together with Clinton himself in the 1980s. However, the Committee has obtained evidence connecting Clinton to many more pardon seekers. Some of the cases involve people who were not his

personal friends and some involve solicitations or offers of

money and lucrative business opportunities in exchange for his

ability to place a clemency petition in front of the President.

• Roger Clinton was asked to lobby for a pardon for horse breeder

J.T. Lundy in exchange for secretly sharing profits in a lucrative

business venture. Lundy promised Clinton a share of a the profits from a Venezuelan coal deal in exchange for Clinton’s help

in obtaining a pardon for him. Lundy suggested a scheme

whereby the payments to Clinton could be concealed by placing

his share of the profits in Dan Lasater’s name. Lasater, who

owned a 20 percent interest in the venture, discussed the possibility of a pardon for Lundy with Roger Clinton.

• Roger Clinton delivered the pardon petition of former Reagan

EPA official Rita Lavelle to the White House. According to

Lavelle, an intermediary for Roger Clinton asked her for a

$30,000 fee for him to hand-carry her petition to the President.

Lavelle responded that she could not afford to pay any money,

but she said Clinton agreed to deliver the petition anyway. On

the last night of the Clinton presidency, Roger Clinton asked

Lavelle, ‘‘do you have $100,000 to get this through?’’ Being

bankrupt, however, Lavelle laughed at the question. She did not

pay Clinton any money and did not receive a pardon.

• Roger Clinton was asked to lobby for a pardon for Houston real

estate developer John Ballis, and Ballis’ petition was seriously

considered at the White House. After being convicted of S&L

fraud, Ballis married a former employee of Dan Lasater and

friend of Roger Clinton. Through his wife’s connection, Ballis

sought Roger Clinton’s help. Clinton first lobbied for Ballis before the U.S. Parole Commission, sometimes during the same

meetings in which he lobbied for mobster Rosario Gambino.

Ballis credited Clinton with helping him obtain early release

and sought his help in obtaining a presidential pardon to eliminate his parole supervision and restitution payments. While he

was not granted any form of clemency, the President reviewed

13

his petition, and a White House lawyer called Ballis’ lawyer two

nights before inauguration day to ask if Ballis would accept a

grant of clemency that left intact his obligation to pay restitution.

• Roger Clinton lobbied his brother to grant clemency to Steven

Griggs, the son of the chief of an unrecognized American Indian

tribe, who was in prison on drug charges. Like Ballis, Steven

Griggs was not a close friend of Roger Clinton’s but merely

someone who knew someone who knew him. Griggs also did not

receive clemency, but Roger Clinton helped ensure that Griggs’

petition was brought to the attention of the President even

though Griggs had been a fugitive for a year before being sentenced. Griggs argued in his petition that he had received an

unusually harsh sentence but failed to mention that he had fled

after his conviction. It is not clear what motivated Roger Clinton

to assist Griggs, but some evidence suggests that the tribe may

have planned to open a casino when and if it were to become

recognized by the federal government.

• According to his former lawyer, Arkansas restaurant operator

Phillip Young was approached with an offer to obtain a pardon

through Roger Clinton for $30,000. While Young denied to Committee staff that he was actually approached by anyone with

such a proposal, his denial is not as credible as his former attorney’s version of events.

Both the White House and the Justice Department hindered

the Committee’s investigation of Roger Clinton by improperly refusing to produce key documents.

• For months, the Bush White House prevented the National Archives from producing even non-deliberative, clemency-related

records from the Clinton administration. The Committee did not

learn that President Clinton had been considering a clemency

petition from notorious mobster Rosario Gambino until after Archives personnel ‘‘inadvertently’’ produced documents that President Bush’s Counsel had sought to withhold. The accidental production also included documents relating to three other previously unknown individuals who had sought clemency through

Roger Clinton. The Bush Administration did manage to retain

four additional deliberative Gambino documents from the files of

the Clinton White House, refusing to produce the records even

though they were not subject to any executive privilege claim.

• The Ashcroft Justice Department produced certain Gambino-related records, but inexplicably withheld others. After producing

sensitive documents such as U.S. Parole Commission files related to Rosario Gambino and a summary of an FBI interview with

Roger Clinton, the Justice Department ceased producing additional documents, claiming they were related to an ongoing

criminal investigation, even though the Clinton-Gambino matter

had reportedly been closed in 2000.

14

HUGH RODHAM’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE VIGNALI COMMUTATION

Vignali’s clemency petition was false and misleading.

• Carlos Vignali lied in his clemency petition. First, he continued

to maintain his innocence, despite overwhelming evidence of his

involvement in selling a substantial amount of cocaine across

state lines and a specific finding by the sentencing judge that

he lied at trial about his involvement in a large drug distribution network. Second, Vignali claimed that he was a first-time

offender, despite the fact that he had a prior criminal record. By

not accepting responsibility for his crime and lying about his

background, he should not have been eligible for executive clemency.

Vignali’s supporters provided letters of support which were

false and misleading.

• A key element of the campaign by Carlos Vignali and his father

Horacio Vignali, was a series of letters on Carlos’ behalf from

prominent Los Angeles politicians. A number of these letters

contained misleading statements calculated to create the impression that Carlos Vignali was innocent. The officials who

submitted letters included Representative Xavier Becerra, Representative Esteban Torres, State Assembly Speaker Robert

Hertzberg, State Assembly member Antonio Villaraigosa, State

Senator Richard Polanco, Los Angeles County Supervisor Gloria

Molina, Los Angeles City Councilmember Mike Hernandez, and

Cardinal Roger Mahony, Archbishop of Los Angeles.

Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca provided critical support for the Vignali commutation, which was inappropriate,

given his position.

• Sheriff Baca had a close relationship with Horacio Vignali

which was based on Vignali’s political and financial support for

Baca. Sheriff Baca has known Horacio Vignali since 1991, and

Vignali has been a key political supporter of Baca, giving him

at least $11,000 in contributions and raising between $60,000– $70,000 more.

• Sheriff Baca spoke with the White House in support of the

Vignali commutation. In January 2001, Baca received a telephone call from Hugh Rodham in which Rodham told Baca that

he would get a call from the White House about Horacio

Vignali. Shortly thereafter, Baca received a call from White

House staff and spoke in support of Horacio Vignali. Based on

Baca’s statements in this telephone call, White House staff

clearly and justifiably concluded that Baca supported the commutation of Carlos Vignali’s sentence.

• Sheriff Baca continues to claim, without any basis, that he did

not support the Vignali commutation. Rather than express regret for his role in the Vignali commutation, Sheriff Baca maintains that he opposed the Vignali commutation and did nothing

15

that could have been interpreted as support for the commutation. However, Sheriff Baca’s supposed opposition to the Vignali

commutation does not square with the fact that: (1) he drafted

a letter which he believed Horacio Vignali would use in the

clemency effort; and (2) when he was asked squarely by the

White House if the President should commute Vignali’s prison

sentence, he stated that it was ‘‘the President’s decision to

make,’’ rather than express his opposition. These facts, and others outlined in this report, indicate that Sheriff Baca wanted to

support the Vignali commutation, but was afraid of creating a

paper record which would clearly indicate his support.

• Sheriff Baca’s efforts on behalf of the Vignalis are even more inappropriate given that there were extensive allegations that

Horacio Vignali, Carlos’ father, was also involved in illegal drug

trafficking. It is inappropriate enough for a senior law enforcement official like Baca to support a grant of clemency for an unrepentant, large-scale drug dealer like Carlos Vignali. However,

when coupled with credible allegations indicating that Horacio

Vignali was a drug dealer, and in fact was the source of cocaine

supply for his son, Baca’s support of Horacio and Carlos Vignali

is even more inappropriate.

U.S. Attorney Alejandro Mayorkas provided critical support

for the Vignali commutation, which was inappropriate,

given his position.

• U.S. Attorney Alejandro Mayorkas called the White House in

support of the Vignali commutation. Mayorkas, the top federal

prosecutor in Los Angeles, was asked by Horacio Vignali to call

the White House in support of his son’s clemency petition.

Mayorkas then called the White House about the Vignali commutation. While Mayorkas does not recall the details of his conversation, he now concedes that his call conveyed support for

the Vignali commutation.

• Mayorkas supported the Vignali commutation despite his ignorance of the facts of the case and his knowledge that the prosecutors responsible for the Vignali case opposed clemency. Before he

called the White House, Mayorkas had spoken twice with Todd

Jones, the U.S. Attorney responsible for the Vignali case. Jones

told Mayorkas that Vignali was a ‘‘major player’’ in drug trafficking, that he was ‘‘bad news’’ and that Mayorkas should not

‘‘go there’’ when it came to Vignali. Despite these warnings from

a prosecutor who was intimately familiar with the Vignali case,

Mayorkas still called the White House in support of the Vignali

commutation.

• Mayorkas’ support for the Vignali commutation was inappropriate. Mayorkas knew little about the Vignali case. What he did

know indicated that Carlos Vignali was an unrepentant largescale criminal. These facts alone make his support for the commutation, as a senior federal prosecutor, totally inappropriate.

16

There are a number of allegations that both Horacio and

Carlos Vignali were involved in illegal drug trafficking.

• There are allegations that, in addition to his son, Horacio

Vignali was involved in illegal drug trafficking and that Carlos

Vignali was involved in drug trafficking far beyond the conduct

which led to his conviction in Minnesota. DEA reports documenting these allegations include the following statements:

‘‘[Horacio Vignali] negotiated with ATF agents to sell a

machine gun and stated to them that he had also smuggled heroin into the United States utilizing automobiles.’’

‘‘[Redacted] has also purchased cocaine from Carlos Vignali

Jr. of Los Angeles . . . Vignali’s father Carlos Vignali aka ‘‘pops’’ owns a body shop, at 1260 Figueroa and is the

source of supply for his son.’’

‘‘Carlos Horatio Vignali’s role in [George Torres’ drug dealing] organization is relatively unknown at this time. It is

believed that Vignali functions as a financial partner in

the organization.’’

• These DEA reports are corroborated by law enforcement personnel who indicate that they had received information indicating

that both Horacio and Carlos Vignali were involved in largescale drug trafficking. These charges have never been formally

made in court, or substantiated by physical evidence. However,

the mere existence of such allegations should have precluded

senior law enforcement and political officials from supporting a

commutation for Carlos Vignali on the strength of his father’s

reputation. However, it appears that no one checked with the

DEA prior to granting the commutation.

Hugh Rodham provided false and misleading information to

the White House in support of the Vignali commutation.

• Hugh Rodham was paid $204,200 for his work on the Vignali

commutation. It appears that in return for this money, he

worked part-time for two months gathering materials in support

of Vignali’s case and making telephone calls to White House

staff. It appears that Rodham’s payment in the Vignali matter was contingent upon his success, as he received the $200,000

payment on January 24, 2001, after President Clinton granted

clemency to Vignali.

• Rodham repeatedly provided false information during his communications with the White House. First, and most importantly,

Rodham told Bruce Lindsey that the trial attorney who prosecuted Vignali supported the commutation. This was completely

false. Second, Rodham told Lindsey that Vignali was a first-time

offender, when in fact, he had two prior convictions and two

other arrests. Rodham also told Lindsey that Vignali ‘‘did not

play a major role in the offense,’’ when in fact, Vignali was a

major source of cocaine for the Minnesota drug-dealing ring at

issue in his case.

17

Hugh Rodham told the White House that First Lady Hillary

Rodham Clinton was aware of his lobbying efforts and that

the Vignali commutation was ‘‘very important’’ to her.

• Hugh Rodham told White House staff that the Vignali commutation was ‘‘very important to him and the First Lady as well as

others.’’ This statement is confirmed by the independent recollection of the White House staffer who spoke to Rodham as well

as the note which she took contemporaneously. Rodham’s statement raises two possibilities: first, that the First Lady was

aware of, and approved of, Hugh Rodham’s lobbying efforts; or

second, that Hugh Rodham was lying to White House staff regarding the First Lady’s knowledge of his efforts.

The White House sought the opinion of powerful Los Angeles political figures, but failed to consult with the prosecutors or judge who understood the Vignali case.

• White House staff engaged in telephone conversations with a

number of outside individuals regarding the Vignali case—Hugh

Rodham, Lee Baca, and Alejandro Mayorkas, none of whom

knew very much about the Vignali case. It appears that key

White House staff gave great weight to the input provided by

Rodham, Baca, and Mayorkas, even though they knew little

about the case and had mixed motives.

• White House staff failed to reach out to the prosecutors who had

convicted Vignali, or the judge who sentenced him. White House

staff justified their failure to take this simple action by concluding that they knew that the prosecutors and judge would object,

so there was no need to speak to them. However, if the White

House had spoken to Todd Jones, Denise Reilly, Andrew Dunne,

or Judge David Doty, they would have learned that Carlos

Vignali: (1) was not a small-time drug dealer; (2) was unrepentant about his criminal activity; and (3) never cooperated with

law enforcement by telling them who supplied him cocaine.

The White House ignored the strenuous objections to the

Vignali commutation which were lodged by the Pardon Attorney.

• The Pardon Attorney provided the White House with a report

that contained his recommendation against granting the Vignali

commutation. This report contained a number of powerful arguments against the commutation, which were apparently ignored

by the White House. The existence of the Pardon Attorney’s report means that the White House cannot claim that it was totally unaware that Vignali’s arguments were completely false.

The White House knew that the Vignali clemency petition had

no merit, yet decided to grant the commutation anyway. President Clinton’s decision raises questions about why the Vignali

commutation was granted.

Rodham has apparently misled the public about returning

to the Vignalis those fees he received in connection with the

18

clemency and ignored former President and Senator Clinton’s request that he do so.

• On February 21, 2001, at the request of former President Clinton and Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, Rodham promised to

return to Horacio Vignali the legal fees he received in connection with the Vignali clemency. But, as of June 2001, Rodham

had apparently returned only about $50,000 of the money that

Horacio Vignali paid him. Rodham’s attorney has confirmed to

Committee staff that Rodham has not returned any additional

amounts and has no plans to return the remaining $154,000.

HUGH RODHAM’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE BRASWELL

PARDON

Glenn Braswell was under investigation by multiple federal

agencies and several state attorneys general when the pardon was granted.

• Over the past two decades, Braswell has created a dietary supplement empire using false advertising to mislead consumers.

After serving time in prison for mail fraud and tax evasion in

1983, Braswell has continued to defraud consumers about the

benefits of his herbal remedies. In addition to facing numerous

lawsuits, Braswell’s companies have been investigated by the

Internal Revenue Service, Federal Trade Commission, Food and

Drug Administration, and Better Business Bureau.

• Unsurprisingly, Braswell was under another criminal investigation by federal prosecutors for a massive tax evasion and

money-laundering scheme when he was pardoned. Braswell’s

petition bypassed the traditional route through the Justice Department and went directly to the White House. If the FBI had

conducted a background investigation instead of the White

House, Braswell’s petition would have been rejected quickly.

Braswell paid Hugh Rodham $230,000 for successfully obtaining the pardon.

• Braswell hired Rodham to support his pardon petition for

$230,000. For this price, Rodham claims he forwarded a letter

of support for Braswell to the White House Counsel’s Office, and

he made a follow-up inquiry. According to Rodham, these two

actions were the extent of his role in the Braswell pardon.

Rodham refunded the $230,000 to Braswell after facing widespread criticism from the media and members of both political

parties.

19

HUGH RODHAM’S EFFORTS TO LOBBY FOR CLEMENCY

FOR THE LUMS

Gene and Nora Lum, prominent Democratic contributors

and fundraisers, were convicted of making illegal conduit

contributions and tax offenses.

• In 1997, the Lums pleaded guilty to making $50,000 in illegal

conduit contributions to the DNC. They were sentenced to home

detention, confinement in a halfway house and a $30,000 fine.

In August 1998, Gene Lum pleaded guilty to tax fraud for filing

tax returns claiming more than $7.1 million in false deductions

and was sentenced to two years imprisonment.

The Lums attempted to obtain executive clemency through

Hugh Rodham.

• Hugh Rodham lobbied the White House as part of the Lums’ efforts but failed to secure them a grant of clemency. In December

2000, Nora Lum called one of her husband’s criminal attorneys

and asked him to send various documents to Hugh Rodham at

the White House. He did so. In early January 2001, Rodham

called Gene Lum’s attorney again and asked him to resend

those documents directly to, among others, Meredith Cabe, an

associate White House counsel responsible for clemency matters.

Subsequently, Rodham telephoned Cabe and discussed the merits of the Lums’ pardon request. Cabe then told White House

Counsel Beth Nolan and Deputy White House Counsel Bruce

Lindsey about her discussion with Rodham. Both told Cabe that

the Lums were not going to receive clemency.

The Lums and Hugh Rodham have refused to cooperate

with the Committee’s investigation.

• Gene and Nora Lum have refused to cooperate with the Committee’s investigation. The Lums’ daughter, Nicole (with whom

Hugh Rodham apparently had some sort of business relationship), has likewise declined to be interviewed by the Committee.

Hugh Rodham has also refused to cooperate with the Committee’s request for an interview. Therefore, the Committee is unable to obtain a full understanding of the Lums’ efforts to obtain

executive clemency and Rodham’s role in those efforts.

TONY RODHAM’S EFFORTS TO LOBBY FOR EXECUTIVE

CLEMENCY

Tony Rodham’s Role in the Case of Edgar and Vonna Jo

Gregory

• Tony Rodham lobbied President Clinton to grant pardons to

Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory while he was receiving substantial

sums of money from the Gregorys. Rodham received $244,769 in

salary from the Gregorys over two and a half years and also received another $79,000 in loans from the Gregorys. The Gregorys claim that they paid Rodham this large sum of money for

20

various consulting services that Rodham provided to the Gregorys. However, the Gregorys do not have any documentation reflecting work performed for them by Rodham.

• Given the fact that the Gregorys do not have any documentary

evidence reflecting the $244,769 of work performed for them by

Rodham, substantial questions are raised as to what Rodham

actually did for the Gregorys that was so valuable. The most valuable thing that Rodham did for the Gregorys was to obtain

presidential pardons. Therefore, there is a substantial question

as to whether the Gregorys paid Rodham for his efforts to obtain presidential pardons for them.

• If Rodham was paid to obtain presidential pardons for the Gregorys, it creates the strong appearance of impropriety. The prospect of financial benefit for Rodham would taint Rodham’s actions in lobbying for the pardon. Also, if President Clinton knew

about Rodham’s financial arrangement, it would taint his actions in granting the pardons.

• Compounding the appearance of impropriety in the Gregory case

is the fact that the pardons were opposed by the Justice Department, the prosecutors responsible for the case, and also the Gregorys’ sentencing judge. Apparently, the only people in the Clinton Administration who felt that the Gregorys deserved pardons

were President Clinton and Deputy White House Counsel Bruce

Lindsey, both of whom knew of Tony Rodham’s involvement in

the matter.

Tony Rodham’s Role in the Case of Fernando Fuentes Coba

• Tony Rodham offered to help Vivian Mannerud obtain a pardon

for her father, Fernando Fuentes Coba, in exchange for $50,000.

When Rodham learned in late 2000 that Mannerud was seeking

a pardon for her elderly father, he met with Mannerud and told

her that he could help obtain the pardon if she paid him a

$50,000 consulting fee. Rodham told Mannerud that he had successfully obtained pardons before and showed her the Gregorys’

pardon petition to support his claim.

• Rodham attempted to convince Mannerud to hire him by making

a number of false representations to her. Rodham told Mannerud

that he was close personal friends with the Pardon Attorney,

Roger Adams. Rodham also told Mannerud that he would use

the $50,000 to hire a law firm to handle her case and that Roger

Adams’ wife worked at the law firm, which would help her case

be treated favorably. All of these representations were completely false and were apparently made to mislead Mannerud as

to the purpose of the payment to Rodham.

• Mannerud rejected Rodham’s offer. Mannerud was concerned

that Rodham could not guarantee that he could obtain a pardon

in exchange for the $50,000. She was also concerned about becoming embroiled in a scandal. Therefore, she rejected Rodham’s

offer.

21

• After Mannerud rejected Rodham’s offer, an associate of Rodham

came back to Mannerud with another offer. According to

Mannerud, a month after she rejected Tony Rodham’s proposal,

Marilyn Parker, a mutual friend of Rodham’s and Mannerud’s

who attended the initial meeting between them, came back to

Mannerud and told her that Rodham now wanted only $30,000

to help her obtain a pardon for her father. Mannerud was still

concerned about the nature of Rodham’s proposal and rejected

it.

• The actions taken by Rodham and Parker may have been illegal.

Rodham, and maybe Parker as well, engaged in an effort to defraud Mannerud. While the effort was unsuccessful, it may have

constituted criminal conduct. The Committee recommends that

the Justice Department investigate these allegations.

PRESIDENT CLINTON’S GRANT OF CLEMENCY TO DRUG

MONEY LAUNDERER HARVEY WEINIG

Weinig was properly imprisoned for conspiring to launder

millions of dollars in drug money and concealing and furthering an extortion-by-kidnapping scheme.

• Weinig, a former Manhattan attorney, conspired to launder

about $19 million in drug proceeds through a Swiss bank for the

Cali cartel. Members of the money laundering organization, of

which Weinig was a part, boasted that they successfully

laundered more than $70 million for the cartel. In addition to

conducting banking transactions for the organization, Weinig

consulted with co-conspirators in furtherance of the organization’s activities and stored the drug proceeds in his New York

City apartment.

• Weinig and other co-conspirators at his law firm stole from the

Cali cartel about $2.5 million they were supposed to have

laundered. This theft exposed Weinig’s family to a risk of being

harmed by those drug dealers. In the course of investigating the

organization’s money laundering activities, authorities intervened when they learned that the drug dealers sent a hit man

to kill one of Weinig’s co-conspirators.

• Weinig learned that one of his co-conspirators kidnapped an individual as part of a scheme to extort money from the victim’s

family. Rather than report the kidnapping, Weinig made his office available as a meeting place where the ransom could be delivered and directed his associates at the firm to execute transfer agreements.

Weinig’s lawyer, a prominent Washington attorney with

close connections to the Clinton Administration, lobbied the

White House in support of Weinig’s clemency petition.

• Weinig’s wife, Alice Morey, retained Reid Weingarten, who was

close to the Clinton White House, to lobby for the commutation.

In April 2000, Weingarten filed a clemency petition on Weinig’s

22

behalf with the Justice Department and the White House.

Knowing that the Justice Department would advise the President to reject the Weinig commutation petition, Weingarten lobbied the White House directly, approaching White House Counsel Beth Nolan, Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey

and Chief of Staff John Podesta.

• Weingarten chose not to familiarize himself with the facts of

Weinig’s underlying conviction. Accordingly, he was unable to

convey to those he lobbied a full, accurate factual basis of the

merits of Weinig’s petition.

Two former Clinton Administration officials, David Dreyer

and Harold Ickes, lobbied the White House on Weinig’s behalf.

• Alice Morey enlisted the assistance of her cousin, former White

House Deputy Communications Director David Dreyer. Dreyer

repeatedly raised the Weinig commutation with John Podesta.

Ultimately, Podesta recommended that the President grant the

Weinig commutation. Dreyer has invoked his Fifth Amendment

rights rather than cooperate with the Committee’s investigation.

• Morey also obtained support for Weinig’s commutation from

former Deputy Chief of Staff Harold Ickes, whose children attended the same school as did her sons. Ickes discussed the

Weinig case with President Clinton twice and recommended the

commutation of Weinig’s sentence.

The Justice Department repeatedly and adamantly recommended against the commutation of Weinig’s sentence.

• On several occasions, U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White, whose office

convicted Weinig, objected to any reduction of Weinig’s sentence.

Ultimately, in a report to President Clinton, the Pardon Attorney and Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder voiced their

strong opposition to a commutation of Weinig’s sentence.

• Pardon Attorney Roger Adams submitted a report to the President advising against the Weinig commutation. Adams pointed

out that Weinig ‘‘was a well-respected lawyer who used his professional skills to assist in laundering millions of dollars that he

knew constituted the proceeds of a huge narcotics trafficking enterprise. He was involved in this activity for an extended period

of time, and he admits that he engaged in it purely out of

greed.’’ Adams also informed the President that Weinig ‘‘aided

and abetted the extortion of money from an individual he knew

had been kidnapped at the direction of a co-defendant in order

to coerce the production of a ransom.’’

After an apparently cursory review, the White House set

aside the Justice Department’s negative recommendation

and granted Weinig clemency.

• Support for Weinig’s petition from John Podesta and Beth Nolan

appears to have been critical. The Associate White House counVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
23

sels responsible for clemency matters did not support the petition. However, setting aside the negative recommendations of

not only the Justice Department but also staff at the White

House Counsel’s Office, Nolan and Lindsey, who were lobbied by

Weingarten, recommended Weinig’s clemency to President Clinton. John Podesta, who was lobbied by Weingarten and Dreyer,

also recommended to the President that Weinig’s sentence be

commuted.

The White House was unjustified in commuting Weinig’s

sentence.

• None of the arguments made by Weinig entitle him to executive

clemency. In his petition, Weinig stated three main reasons why

his sentence should have been commuted: (1) his sentence was

disproportionate and excessive; (2) his contributions to society

justified his early release from prison; and (3) one of his children was suffering emotional difficulties as a result of his imprisonment and needed him to return home. The first reason is

simply not true. Weinig’s sentence was comparable to those received by other co-conspirators who were directly responsible for

laundering large amounts of drug money and declined to cooperate with authorities. Weinig’s sentence was also comparable to

those received by co-defendants who participated in the extortion-by-kidnapping scheme, which Weinig concealed and facilitated. The other two reasons fail to distinguish Weinig from the

vast number of other similarly situated felons, who were properly sentenced but whose families have suffered because of their

imprisonment.

President Clinton’s commutation of Weinig’s sentence has

sent out the wrong message about the United States’ commitment to fighting drug trafficking.

• President Clinton’s decision conveyed an appearance of granting

special consideration to wealthy, politically well-connected criminals and their relatives. Pardon Attorney Roger Adams foresaw

the message sent by the Weinig commutation, warning President Clinton that ‘‘[t]o commute [Weinig’s] prison term to the

five years he proposes would denigrate the seriousness of his

criminal misconduct, undermine the government’s legitimate interest in encouraging prompt guilty pleas and truthful cooperation from criminal defendants, and could give the appearance of

granting special consideration to economically advantaged,

white-collar offenders.’’

• The Weinig commutation undermines the nation’s efforts to fight

the illegal drug trade. Complaints are frequently made that U.S.

drug laws punish low-level drug criminals too severely, yet do

not punish high-level drug distributors enough. When a largescale drug money launderer like Harvey Weinig receives executive clemency after serving five years of an eleven-year sentence, it sends the message that the U.S. is not serious about

prosecuting the high-level criminals who make the drug trade

possible.

24

• The Weinig commutation has eroded the United States’ moral

authority to press other countries to fight the drug trade within

their own borders. The Weinig commutation could harm the efforts of the U.S. government to extradite drug traffickers and

money launderers from Latin America. Newspapers in Latin

American countries have accused the U.S. of hypocrisy in the

Weinig case. For example, in Colombia’s leading daily, former

Colombian attorney general Gustavo De Greiff, in an op-ed entitled ‘‘The Morality of the Strongest,’’ labeled President Clinton’s

clemency decision ‘‘monstrous.’’

(25)

1 JAMES MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 9th ed. 1910). 2 ‘‘Pardon of Richard M. Nixon and Related Matters,’’ Hearing Before the House Comm. on the

Judiciary, 93rd Cong. (Oct. 17, 1974). 3 57 Fed. Reg. 62,145 (1992).

4 According to news reports, House Speaker Tom Foley, Chairman Les Aspin, and Senator

Daniel Patrick Moynihan told President Bush that they would not object to the Weinberger pardon. Senator Moynihan even urged President Bush to grant a pardon to Iran-Contra figure ElContinued

INTRODUCTION

A. Why the Committee Investigated These Matters

Unlike most other powers granted to the President by the Constitution, the power to grant executive clemency is virtually unchecked. Some have argued that because the power to grant clemency is unlimited, Congress has no oversight role over grants of executive clemency. The opposite is true. Because the President can

grant clemency to whomever he wants for whatever reasons, it is

critically important that certain grants of clemency be subject to

Congressional and public scrutiny. If this scrutiny were not applied

to grants of clemency, the power could easily be abused. As James

Madison observed:

A popular Government, without popular information, or

the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a Farce or

a Tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern

ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.1

While the grants of clemency issued by President Clinton will not,

and cannot, be overturned by the Committee’s investigation, this

report can serve a valuable purpose to inform the public about

President Clinton’s abuse of power in issuing grants of clemency to

so many undeserving individuals. The report can also serve as a reminder to future Presidents not to exercise their pardon power in

such a reckless and corrupting fashion.

Before President Clinton, when a President made controversial

grants of clemency, he often provided a full accounting of his reasons for the decision. For example, when President Ford pardoned

former President Nixon in 1974, President Ford made an unprecedented appearance before the House Judiciary Committee to explain his decision.2 When President George H.W. Bush pardoned

Caspar Weinberger for his involvement in the Iran-Contra matter,

he provided a full accounting of his decision in a public statement

and released a number of documents dispelling any concerns that

President Bush’s pardon was meant to cover up his own involvement in the Iran-Contra matter.3 President Bush even consulted

with prominent Democratic Members of Congress before issuing

the Weinberger pardon to see if they would object.4 However, PresiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
26

liot Abrams, a former Moynihan aide. See Marjorie Williams, Burden of Proof, WASH. POST

MAG., Apr. 11, 1993, at 6; Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Bush Faces Fallout on Iran-Contra

Pardons, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 30, 1992, at 25. 5See, e.g., Rivera Live (CNBC television broadcast, Feb. 15, 2001). 6Log of Documents Subject to Executive Privilege, noted in ‘‘The FALN and Macheteros Clemency: Misleading Explanations, A Reckless Decision, A Dangerous Message,’’ Hearing Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 106th Cong. 325–68 (Dec. 10, 1999). 7See generally ‘‘The FALN and Macheteros Clemency: Misleading Explanations, A Reckless

Decision, A Dangerous Message,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 106th Cong. (Dec.

10, 1999). 8 Id.

9Department of Justice Document Production DJ/PAO–MR–00009–23 (List of Pardon and

Commutation Grants, Jan. 20, 2001) (Exhibit 1). 10 Individuals convicted in the Whitewater investigation and receiving pardons on January 20,

2001, were: Susan H. McDougal; Robert W. Palmer; Stephen A. Smith; and Christopher V.

Wade. Individuals convicted in the investigation of former Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy and

receiving pardons on January 20, 2001, were: Richard Douglas; Alvarez Ferrouillet; John

Hemmingson; James H. Lake; Brook K. Mitchell, Sr.; and Jack L. Williams. Receiving a commutation for a conviction in the Espy case was Ronald Blackley. Individuals convicted in the

Cisneros investigation and receiving pardons on January 20, 2001, were: Henry Cisneros and

Linda Jones. In addition, Archibald Schaffer, a key defendant in the Espy investigation, received

a pardon shortly before the end of the Clinton Administration, on December 22, 2000.

dent Clinton issued a number of controversial pardons and

commutations and failed to ever provide a satisfactory accounting

for his decisions. Not only did he avoid consultation with Members

of Congress, but President Clinton also avoided consultation with

his own Justice Department and other knowledgeable agencies.

Moreover, President Clinton has declined to answer any questions

about his decisions, choosing instead to make occasional self-serving statements to friendly reporters.5

President Clinton’s abuse of the clemency power began with the

August 11, 1999, grants of clemency to 16 terrorists who were part

of the FALN and Macheteros terrorist network. When the Committee and the public understandably raised questions regarding these

grants of clemency, President Clinton did nothing to answer those

questions. Rather, he invoked executive privilege over 2,800 pages

of documents which would have showed why he made his decision.6

When President Clinton did attempt to offer an explanation for the

FALN clemency, it was factually inaccurate. Indeed, some documents indicated that the President made his decision for political

benefit.7 For example, one document said that the release of the 16

terrorists would ‘‘have a positive impact among strategic Puerto

Rican communities in the U.S. (read, voters).’’ Another document

stated: ‘‘[t]he Vice President’s Puerto Rican position would be

helped.’’ 8

In the final hours of his term, President Clinton issued 141 pardons and 36 commutations.9 While other Presidents had issued

controversial pardons and commutations, never before had a President made so many grants of clemency with so little justification.

To understand the wholesale nature of the President’s questionable

clemency grants, it is useful to recall that he granted clemency to

13 individuals convicted in connection with independent counsel investigations of the Clinton Administration.10 Strong arguments

could be made against all of these grants of clemency. The individuals who received these grants of clemency were convicted of serious crimes, and many of them played significant roles in major political scandals. For example, Susan McDougal was convicted of

mail fraud, misapplication of funds, and false statements, and then

was jailed on contempt of court charges for refusing to tell a grand

jury whether President Clinton had testified truthfully at her trial.

27

11 Reynolds received a commutation for his federal convictions for bank fraud, wire fraud, false

statements, and conspiracy to defraud. He also served time in prison for state convictions for

sexual misconduct, obstruction of justice, and solicitation of child pornography. He is currently

a registered sex offender in the state of Illinois. See Illinois Sex Offender Information (visited

Mar. 4, 2002) <http://samnet.isp.state.il.us> (listing Reynolds’ registration as a sex offender). 12 Borders was convicted for participating in a conspiracy to bribe federal judge Alcee

Hastings. Borders refused to testify at Hastings’ criminal trial or his impeachment hearings,

which resulted in Borders’ imprisonment for both contempt of court and contempt of Congress.

By granting clemency to Borders, President Clinton violated his own standards as drafted by

then-White House Counsel Jack Quinn. Quinn wrote that ‘‘offenses involving central involvement in political corruption’’ were among those President Clinton would not consider ‘‘under almost any circumstances.’’ Arnold & Porter Document Production A0556–57 (Executive Clemency

Policy, Jan. 26, 1996) (Exhibit 2). 13Deutch was accused of mishandling hundreds of highly classified documents, including information relating to covert actions, storing many on a home computer used to surf ‘‘high risk’’

sites on the internet, making the documents easily accessible to a hacker. Jerry Seper, Deutch

Planned Guilty Plea Before Clinton Pardoned Him, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2001, at A3. Less

than a day before receiving the pardon, Deutch had signed a plea agreement wherein he admitted a misdemeanor and agreed to pay a $5,000 fine. Vernon Loeb, Senate Committee Questions

Clinton’s Pardon of Deutch, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2001, at A2.

If Susan McDougal were not a close friend of the President, her

pardon would be troubling enough. She was a convicted felon who

defrauded a bank and defied the right of a grand jury to receive

honest testimony. Considering that McDougal was a close friend of

the President, who was jailed for contempt rather than testify

against him, there is the indelible appearance that the pardon was

a reward for McDougal’s silence. Yet the Committee did not investigate the McDougal pardon or any of the other 12 pardons and

commutations relating to independent counsel investigations. Neither did the Committee investigate the pardons and commutations

granted to former Congressman Mel Reynolds,11 William Borders,12 or CIA Director John Deutch,13 all of which were subject to

widespread criticism. Rather, the Committee limited its investigation to pardons and commutations where there was no credible explanation for the grant of clemency, and where there was an appearance of impropriety relating to inappropriate access or corruption. The fact that the Committee did not investigate pardons like

Susan McDougal’s speaks volumes about both the Committee’s exercise of restraint and the severity of the abuses in those cases the

Committee did investigate.

The Committee investigated two types of clemency grants. First

was the case of Marc Rich and Pincus Green, which raised substantial questions of direct corruption, primarily whether pardons were

issued in exchange for political and other financial contributions.

The second group of cases involved indirect corruption, where close

relatives of the President—namely Roger Clinton, Hugh Rodham,

and Tony Rodham—apparently traded on their relationships with

the President to lobby for pardons and commutations. These cases

raised serious concerns that Roger Clinton and the Rodhams used

their access to the White House to lobby for pardons, in some cases

successfully, and received large payments for their lobbying efforts.

The Committee had three main purposes in its clemency investigation. First, as discussed above, the Committee sought to let the

public know whether President Clinton had abused the clemency

power. By subjecting the President’s exercise of clemency to public

scrutiny, the Committee hopes to make it clear to future Presidents

that history will hold them accountable for clemency grants that

are abusive. Second, the Committee sought to determine whether

there are adequate safeguards in place to prevent individuals with

28

14 As a result of the Committee’s investigation into the Marc Rich and Pincus Green pardons,

the Committee voted out H.R. 577, the Presidential Library Disclosure Act, a bill which ensures

that contributions to presidential libraries are publicly disclosed. This bill was approved by the

House of Representatives in a 392 to 3 vote on February 5, 2002, and is awaiting action in the

Senate. 15 2 U.S.C. § 1602(8)(a) currently defines a ‘‘lobbying contact’’ as: . . any oral or written communication . . . to a covered executve branch official . . .

that is made on behalf of a client with regard to— (i) the formulation, modification, or adoption of Federal legislation (including legislative proposals);

(ii) the formulation, modification, or adoption of a Federal rule, regulation, Executive order, or any other program, policy, or position of the United States Government;

(iii) the administration or execution of a Federal program or policy (including the

negotiation, award, or administration of a Federal contract, grant, loan, permit, or

license);

or (iv) the nomination or confirmation of a person for a position subject to confirmation by the Senate. 16 2 U.S.C. § 1602(8)(b)(xii) currently contains an exception for ‘‘a communication that is . . .

made to an official in an agency with regard to . . . a judicial proceeding or a criminal or civil

law enforcement inquiry, investigation, or proceeding.’’ This exception could arguably exclude

lobbying for clemency from the statute’s disclosure requirements. But see In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 179 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y., Mar. 9, 2001) (holding that ‘‘the pardon process was not

adversarial’’ in the Marc Rich case, that his lawyers were ‘‘acting principally as lobbyists,’’ and

that they were, therefore, not entitled to withhold certain documents under the attorney-client

privilege).

close relationships with the President from trading on their access

to win pardons. A number of the most troubling pardons granted

by President Clinton were the result of lobbying from former White

House staff like Jack Quinn or close relatives like Hugh Rodham.

Third, the Committee examined whether there are adequate procedures in the pardon process to protect against abuse by the President. While the Justice Department has regulations governing its

handling of applications for clemency, the President is free to ignore those regulations, and President Clinton did ignore them in

the last month he was in office. The key lesson to be learned from

the facts detailed in this report is that more disclosure is likely to

remedy the problems in each of these three areas of concern. Public

scrutiny after-the-fact may provide some deterrence, but a more

open process before a grant of clemency is likely to be more effective. That is why the Committee moved legislation to require public

disclosure of contributions to entities like the Clinton Library,

given the potential effect of such contributions on policymaking decisions.14 Another example of potential legislation would be a clarification of the definition of ‘‘lobbying’’ under the Lobbying Disclosure Act.15 It could be amended to explicitly cover those who are

paid to contact executive branch officials on behalf of clemency

seekers.16 If Jack Quinn and Hugh Rodham had been required to

disclose their status publicly as paid lobbyists seeking clemency for

their clients, then Marc Rich and Carlos Vignali may not have been

pardoned. The public outcry could have occurred beforehand and

possibly prevented the damage done by these grants of clemency to

public confidence in the integrity of government. Even if such a

measure would not have prevented these particular grants of clemency, knowing who is paid to lobby for clemency would certainly assist future presidents in making appropriate decisions.

B. President Clinton Deviated From All Applicable Standards

In his rush to grant pardons and commutations in the waning

hours of his presidency, Bill Clinton ignored almost every applicaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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17 28 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2002). 18 28 C.F.R. § 1.3 (2002).

ble standard governing the exercise of the clemency power. There

were three obvious sources of guidance regarding the exercise of

the power. First, the Justice Department had published guidelines

regarding its handling of clemency petitions. While these guidelines

were not binding upon the President, they should have provided

guidance to the Justice Department and the President. At a minimum, they provide a mechanism to provide the President with relevant information. The Justice Department guidelines state first

that pardon petitions should not be filed until five years after the

petitioner is released from prison, or, if no prison time is served,

five years after the date of conviction.17 The guidelines also state

that commutation petitions should not be filed while there are

other forms of judicial or administrative relief, like appeals, still

available.18

The U.S. Attorney’s Manual also contains detailed standards applied to clemency petitions by the Pardon Attorney’s Office. The

Manual lists five standards applicable to the review of pardon petitions:

1. Post-conviction conduct, character, and reputation.

An individual’s demonstrated ability to lead a responsible

and productive life for a significant period after conviction

or release from confinement is strong evidence of rehabilitation and worthiness for pardon.

***

2. Seriousness and relative recentness of the offense.

When an offense is very serious (e.g., a violent crime,

major drug trafficking, breach of public trust, or white collar crime involving substantial sums of money), a suitable

length of time should have elapsed in order to avoid denigrating the seriousness of the offense or undermining the

deterrent effect of the conviction. In the case of a prominent individual or notorious crime, the likely effect of a

pardon on law enforcement interests or upon the general

public should be taken into account.

***

3. Acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and atonement.

The extent to which a petitioner has accepted responsibility for his or her criminal conduct and made restitution to

its victims are important considerations. A petitioner

should be genuinely desirous of forgiveness rather than

vindication. While the absence of expressions of remorse

should not preclude favorable consideration, a petitioner’s

attempts to minimize or rationalize culpability does not

advance the case for pardon.

30

19 U.S. Attorney’s Manual 1–2.112. 20 U.S. Attorney’s Manual 1–2.113.

***

4. The need for relief.

The purpose for which a pardon is sought may influence

disposition of the petition. A felony conviction may result

in a wide variety of legal disabilities under state or federal

law, some of which can provide persuasive grounds for recommending a pardon.

***

5. Official recommendations and reports.

The comments and recommendations of concerned and

knowledgeable officials, particularly the United States Attorney whose office prosecuted the case and the sentencing

judge, are carefully considered. The likely impact of favorable action in the district or nationally, particularly on

current law enforcement priorities, will always be relevant

to the President’s decision.19

The U.S. Attorney’s manual also contains standards for the consideration of commutation petitions:

Generally, commutation of sentence is an extraordinary

remedy that is rarely granted. Appropriate grounds for

considering commutation have traditionally included disparity or undue severity of sentence, critical illness or old

age, and meritorious service rendered to the government

by the petitioner, e.g., cooperation with investigative or

prosecutive efforts that has not been adequately rewarded

by other official action.20

A second source of guidance comes from a 1996 memorandum

from then-White House Counsel Jack Quinn to Deputy Attorney

General Jamie Gorelick and Pardon Attorney Margaret Colgate

Love. In this memorandum, Quinn issued a number of directives

from President Clinton regarding the exercise of his clemency authority. Quinn first stated that the ‘‘President intends to continue

to rely greatly on your joint recommendations regarding clemency

applications.’’ Quinn also stated that President Clinton had identified a number of factors in addition to those listed in the U.S. Attorney’s Manual, which he wanted considered as part of the review

of clemency petitions:

The following circumstances would weigh in favor of granting

clemency:

1. Indications that the crime for which clemency is sought

was truly abberational, i.e., a lone instance of criminal behavior in an otherwise exemplary life.

2. Cases committed long ago when the individual was very

young and which do not involve major crimes.

31

21 Arnold & Porter Document Production A0556–57 (Memorandum from Jack Quinn to Jamie

Gorelick (Jan. 26, 1996)) (Exhibit 2). 22The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast, Sept. 23, 1996). 23Letter from Sheryl Walter, Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 6, 2001) (Exhibit 3). 24The Committee has not attempted to discover every single case where clemency was granted

without a clemency petition being filed. However, it has been reported that a number of individuals who were convicted in connection with independent counsel investigations, for example,

Richard Douglas, Alvarez Ferrouillet, John Hemmingson, James H. Lake, Brook K. Mitchell, Sr.,

Jack L. Williams, Ronald Blackley, Henry Cisneros, and Linda Jones all received grants of clemency without having filed a petition with either the White House or the Justice Department.

See Weston Kosova, Running on Fumes: Pulling All-Nighters, Bill Clinton Spent His Last Days

Obsessing Over Details and Pardons, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 2001, at 30.

3. Cases not involving major crimes in which the individual has clearly turned his or her life around by making

sustained and significant contributions to the community

since being released from prison.

By contrast, in certain cases, even extraordinarily exemplary actions post-conviction may not merit the remedy of

executive clemency. These cases might include:

1. The commission of major crimes: There are categories of

crimes which are so serious that the President will not

consider granting a pardon for them under almost any circumstances. Such crimes would include large-scale drug

trafficking, sex offenses involving minors, offenses involving central involvement in political corruption, or violent

crimes such as murder or rape.

2. An extensive criminal history: Three or more separate

convictions should raise a substantial presumption against

granting a pardon with respect to any one of them. This

presumption would only be overcome by a truly exceptional rehabilitative history involving exemplary service to

the individual’s community or country.21

The final source of guidance regarding the exercise of the President’s clemency power is, of course, the President’s own personal

views. In 1996, President Clinton was asked if he was considering

a pardon for Susan McDougal and other Whitewater defendants.

He responded:

[M]y position would be that their cases should be handled

like others . . . there’s a regular process for that, and I

have regular meetings on that. And I review those cases

as they come up and after there’s an evaluation done by

the Justice Department, and that’s how I think it should

be handled.22

Therefore, the President suggested that the McDougal case, and

all others, would be handled according to the ‘‘regular process,’’ including screening by the Justice Department.

As to the President’s claim that he would follow the ‘‘regular

process,’’ he granted clemency to 30 individuals who had not even

filed clemency petitions with the Justice Department,23 and some

who had not filed any petition at all, not even with the White

House.24 The President also granted clemency to 14 individuals

who had their petitions previously denied and thus were not pendVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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25Letter from Sheryl Walter, Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 6, 2001) (Exhibit 3).

ing with the Justice Department.25 Even more important, in a

number of cases, President Clinton dramatically deviated from the

‘‘regular process’’ of seeking the Justice Department’s input.

Many of the President’s last-minute grants of clemency violated

all of these standards. Marc Rich and Pincus Green, for example,

fail all five Justice Department criteria for pardons. They did not

demonstrate responsible behavior after their indictment. Rather, by

all accounts, they have remained fugitives from justice and continued to engage in business relations with the enemies of the United

States. Their offenses were serious and notorious crimes for which,

according to the Justice Department, a suitable length of time

should pass between conviction and pardon. Yet Rich and Green

never even stood trial. Rich and Green did not demonstrate any responsibility, remorse, or atonement for their crimes. Rather, they

maintained that they were ‘‘singled out’’ and unfairly prosecuted.

Rich and Green had no real need for relief. They lived in luxury

and apparently sought the pardons only so that they could travel

freely around the world, without the fear of being apprehended by

the U.S. Marshals Service in countries that were cooperating with

U.S. efforts to apprehend them. Finally, there were no official recommendations or reports regarding the Rich and Green pardons,

since the White House circumvented the normal pardon review

process. If there had been such reports, however, it is safe to assume that the U.S. Attorney’s office would have strongly objected

to the Rich and Green pardons.

The other grants of clemency reviewed in this report also fail to

meet the applicable standards. Carlos Vignali satisfies none of the

appropriate grounds for commutation identified in Justice Department regulations, as his sentence was not disparate or unfair, and

he did not cooperate with law enforcement. As a large-scale drug

dealer, Vignali also was not eligible for clemency under the President’s own guidelines of 1996. Harvey Weinig similarly failed all

relevant standards, having been sentenced fairly and having never

cooperated with law enforcement. Weinig, as a large-scale money

launderer for the Cali Cartel, also was ineligible for clemency

under the President’s guidelines. Glenn Braswell clearly failed to

meet the standards for a pardon, as he was under active investigation for new criminal acts at the time he received a pardon. Edgar

and Vonna Jo Gregory similarly fell short of the applicable standard, having committed one of the largest bank frauds in Alabama

history. Moreover, prosecutors objected to the Gregory pardons.

C. Individuals Close to President Clinton Used Their Influence to Lobby for Undeserved Grants of Clemency

One of the most disturbing aspects of the closing month of President Clinton’s term in office is that a number of people close to the

President used their relationship with him to lobby for clemency

grants which ordinarily would not have been considered. While

there are certainly individuals who would seek to abuse their access in any administration, never have they been so successful as

in the Clinton Administration. Jack Quinn abused his relationship

33

26Department of Justice Document Production FBI–RC–00003 (Summary of Interview with

Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 4).

with the President to lobby for the pardons of Marc Rich and

Pincus Green. There can be little doubt that these pardons would

not have been issued if Jack Quinn had not exploited his position

as former White House Counsel. Hugh Rodham successfully lobbied

the President for grants of clemency to Carlos Vignali and Glenn

Braswell. Tony Rodham successfully lobbied the President to grant

pardons to Edgar and Vonna Jo Gregory. David Dreyer, a former

White House staffer, lobbied the President to grant a commutation

to his cousin, Cali cartel money launderer Harvey Weinig.

It is clear that none of these grants of clemency would have been

issued on the merits. Marc Rich and Pincus Green were fugitives

from justice, indicted for the largest tax evasion scheme in U.S.

history and for selling oil to Iran while Americans were being held

hostage. Carlos Vignali was the source of cocaine for a major drug

dealing ring. Glenn Braswell was an extremely successful con artist

who was actually under criminal investigation at the time he received his pardon from President Clinton. Edgar and Vonna Jo

Gregory had been convicted for the largest bank fraud in Alabama

history. Harvey Weinig laundered millions of dollars for the Cali

cartel and participated in a kidnapping, and was only caught when

he began to steal money from the Cali cartel. Only by capitalizing

on relationships between President Clinton and individuals close to

him were these petitioners able to obtain grants of clemency.

D. A Number of Potential Violations of Law Have Been Discovered by the Committee

In the course of its investigation, the Committee has learned of

a number of potential violations of law by Roger Clinton and Tony

Rodham. The Committee recommends that the Department of Justice review these matters in conjunction with the ongoing criminal

investigation being conducted by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York.

The Committee has uncovered a number of potential criminal

acts by Roger Clinton. First, Roger Clinton may have imported

more than $10,000 in monetary instruments into the United States

without properly disclosing it to the Customs Service. Clinton received substantial sums of money originating from overseas between 1998 and 2000. If Clinton imported this money into the

United States, then he was required to report it to proper authorities and apparently did not do so. Second, Roger Clinton appears

to have violated the Lobbying Disclosure Act. There is evidence

that Roger Clinton lobbied the President regarding travel restrictions to Cuba. Clinton did not register as a lobbyist, despite the

fact that he was likely required to do so. Third, Clinton lied to FBI

agents who interviewed him regarding his lobbying for Rosario

Gambino in 1999. When they interviewed Roger Clinton, he

claimed that ‘‘he did not represent to anyone on the Parole Commission that his brother was aware of his efforts to assist the

Gambino family.’’ 26 However, when Clinton lobbied the U.S. Parole

Commission, he had explicitly stated that his brother was ‘‘comVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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27 USPC Document Production 00894 (Memorandum from Michael A. Stover, General Counsel,

U.S. Parole Commission, to File (Jan. 31, 1996)) (Exhibit—5); Telephone Interview with Thomas

Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, U.S. Parole Commission (July 27, 2001). Roger Clinton

made it clear to Parole Commission staff on multiple occasions that President Clinton had specific knowledge that he was contacting the Parole Commission regarding Rosario Gambino. See

generally, Chapter Two: Roger Clinton’s Involvement in Lobbying for Executive Clemency, Section II.E.1., ‘‘Roger Clinton’s Statements Regarding his Brother’s Knowledge.’’ 28See generally, Chapter Two: Roger Clinton’s Involvement in Lobbying for Executive Clemency, Section II.E.2., ‘‘Roger Clinton’s Statements Regarding Payment from the Gambinos.’’ 29Department of Justice Document Production FBI–RC–00005–06 (Summary of Interview

with Roger Clinton, Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 4). 30The interviewing FBI agents apparently were not satisfied with Roger Clinton’s candor during the interview, as they took the unusual step of explaining to Clinton the penalties for making false statements during the course of the interview. Id. at FBI–RC–00006. See generally,

Chapter Two: Roger Clinton’s Involvement in Lobbying for Executive Clemency, Section II.E.3., ‘‘Roger Clinton’s Statements Regarding the Rolex Watch.’’

pletely aware’’ of his involvement.27 Roger Clinton also lied to the FBI about a $50,000 payment from the Gambino family.28 Although he deposited the payment the same day as the FBI interview, he did not disclose it to the agents explicitly or truthfully.

Rather he claimed that Rosario Gambino’s son had offered to loan

him money for a down payment on a house.29 Despite this claim

to the FBI, which Clinton repeated to the media in the summer of

2001, bank records indicate that Clinton neither used the $50,000

for a down payment nor did he ever repay any of the money. During the interview, Clinton also told three separate and contradictory stories when questioned about a Rolex watch he received from

the Gambinos.30

The Committee has also learned about Tony Rodham’s participation in a scheme to defraud Vivian Mannerud in connection with

Mannerud’s effort to obtain a commutation for her father, Fernando Fuentes Coba. Tony Rodham was introduced to Mannerud

by his business partner, Marilyn J. Parker. Together, Rodham and

Parker attempted to convince Mannerud to hire Rodham to help

her obtain a commutation for her father. In making his pitch to

Mannerud, Rodham made a number of false statements to

Mannerud, including the assertion that he was friendly with Pardon Attorney Roger Adams, and that he would hire a law firm at

which Adams’ wife was a partner. Rodham then asked Mannerud to pay him $50,000 to help with the Fernando Fuentes Coba commutation effort. After Mannerud refused, Marilyn Parker called

Mannerud to tell her that Rodham now only wanted $30,000 to

help with the Fuentes commutation. Mannerud declined both offers

for fear of being involved in some improper activity. The activity

by Rodham and Parker may amount to a criminal conspiracy to defraud Vivian Mannerud. Whether or not the conduct by Rodham

and Parker amounts to criminal activity depends greatly upon the

specific evidence that can be gathered by the Justice Department.

However, it is clear that this matter deserves thorough investigation by the Department of Justice.

E. The Message Sent by President Clinton’s Grants of Clemency

The way in which a President exercises the clemency power

speaks volumes about that President’s priorities. The clemency

grants reviewed in this report send a clear message, one that does

not speak well of President Clinton. While the clemency power is

vitally important and should be used by the President, it should

35

not be debased, particularly where large sums of money are flowing

to relatives of the President or to foundations in which he has a

significant interest.

First, President Clinton granted pardons and commutations to

individuals who never would have received clemency but for the

fact that they hired individuals close to the President to represent

them. Marc Rich, Pincus Green, Carlos Vignali, Glenn Braswell,

Edgar Gregory, and Vonna Jo Gregory were all extremely wealthy

and were able to hire Jack Quinn, Tony Rodham, and Hugh

Rodham to lobby the White House and short-circuit the normal

clemency review procedures. The average low-income criminal defendant does not have the money necessary to hire a White House

insider to lobby for his pardon. At best, he can fill out his clemency

application and watch it proceed through the normal Justice Department review process. By listening to the advice of highly-paid

White House insiders like Jack Quinn, Hugh Rodham, and Tony

Rodham, and by granting clemency to their clients, President Clinton has sent the message that he had two standards of justice—

one for the rich, and one for the poor. Representative Elijah

Cummings described some of his concerns about this issue at the

Committee’s February 8, 2001, hearing:

One of the things that concerns me about [the Rich] pardon is that I think anybody who is sitting in this audience

or anybody who is watching this at home, you know, when

the little guy, when the Department of Justice comes after

the little guy, the guys that I used to represent, they tear

their lives apart, I mean rip them apart. They can’t afford

the Mr. diGenovas, the great lawyers, as he is and others.

They do the best they can. They spend all of their money.

Their reputations are tarnished. Even if they’re found not

guilty, friends are brought in, FBI goes into their homes,

subpoenas are issued.

And when people look at Mr. Rich and others who apparently goes off to another country, they’ve got the money to

do so, and it appears as if they’re evading the process. The

little guys that I represent and the women, you know, they

really have a problem with that, because they sit here and

they say, wait a minute, you know, I’m sitting in jail for

20 years. And it does not even compare. I mean, I may

have done one-millionth of what was allegedly done here,

but I’m sitting in jail. And I didn’t have the money to go

off somewhere else. I didn’t have the money to do that. I

didn’t have the money to hire the big-time lawyers. So it

does concern me.

***

And it’s one thing to go to trial. It’s one thing to stay here

and face the music. It’s one thing to be found not guilty.

It’s a whole other thing, in my opinion, when somebody,

because they have the money, can go outside the country

and evade the system. I tell you it really concerns me beVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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31 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the Comm.

on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 164–65 (Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of the Honorable Elijah

Cummings). 32 Richard A. Serrano and Stephen Braun, Working the American System, L.A. TIMES, Apr.

29, 2001, at 10. 33Fox Special Report with Brit Hume (Fox News television broadcast, Feb. 27, 2001). 34 Nightline (ABC News television broadcast, Feb. 23, 2001). 35Fox Special Report with Brit Hume (Fox News television broadcast, Feb. 23, 2001). 36While conducting plainclothes surveillance in April 2001, Adams was shot at by a suspect

and escaped uninjured. David Chanen, Man Fires at Officer, But Nobody is Hurt, STAR TRIB.

(Minneapolis, MN), Apr. 20, 2001, at 9B.

cause my constituents have a major problem with that,

and I do, too.31

These concerns are shared by many on the Committee.

President Clinton’s pardons did not just send the message that

he believes in two standards of justice. By pardoning fugitives from

justice, President Clinton undermined the efforts of law enforcement officers everywhere. Since 1983, Assistant United States Attorneys and agents of the United States Marshals Service have

been trying to apprehend Marc Rich and Pincus Green. They listed

Rich as one of the most wanted fugitives in the world. They set up

sting operations to arrest Rich overseas. They have submitted arrest requests and extradition requests to a number of foreign countries. President Clinton’s pardon of wanted fugitives is a direct slap

in the face to the U.S. law enforcement officers who spent almost

two decades trying to apprehend Rich. The pardons also could

serve to undermine U.S. efforts to extradite fugitives in the future.

By commuting the sentences of Carlos Vignali and Harvey

Weinig, President Clinton undermined U.S. efforts to fight the flow

of illegal drugs into the country. Neither was a minor participant

in drug trafficking. Vignali supplied cocaine to the largest drugdealing ring in Minnesota history. Moreover, he never cooperated

with law enforcement and failed to reveal where he obtained his

cocaine. Harvey Weinig laundered millions of dollars for the Cali

cartel. Without individuals like Harvey Weinig, drug traffickers

would not be able to enjoy the proceeds from their drug sales. Despite the seriousness of their crimes, President Clinton commuted

the sentences of both Vignali and Weinig.

The message of these commutations was loud and clear. Tony

Adams, a narcotics detective in Minnesota, spoke eloquently to the

meaning of the Vignali commutation. Adams stated that he was

stunned to learn of the commutation: ‘‘It’s like, basically, you’ve

just been told that this kid, he’s untouchable.’’ 32 Adams observed

that the Vignali case ‘‘more or less tells us that America’s system

has been bought if you have money.’’ 33 He also observed that ‘‘politicians always get in front of this camera and say ‘‘We’re trying to

take dope off the streets. We’re trying to put dope dealers in jail.’’

Well, you just let one out, a big one.’’ 34 Finally, Adams suggested

that ‘‘the politicians in L.A. or Washington, D.C., should finish the

nine years that [Vignali] has left on his time, and I’m standing

right by that.’’ 35 Adams is certainly not alone in his criticism of the

Vignali commutation, but his comments are particularly noteworthy, coming from a detective who investigated the case, and

who routinely places his life on the line to protect the public from

drug traffickers.36

37

37See Colombian General Hits Clinton Commutation, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2001, at A13; Russell Crandall, The Americas: In the War on Drugs, Colombians Die, Americans Are Pardoned,

WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2001, at A15. 38Such records would include records provided to Rodham by third parties and documents

which Rodham provided to third parties.

The Weinig case has sent no less a destructive message to U.S.

law enforcement. In fact, the Weinig commutation has created a

great deal of consternation in Latin American nations from which

the U.S. is attempting to extradite drug kingpins. Many individuals

in these nations have argued that they should not extradite their

citizens to the U.S. for narcotics offenses because the U.S. clearly

is not serious about enforcing its narcotics laws, pointing specifically to the Weinig commutation.37 By pardoning a major money

launderer for the Cali cartel, President Clinton has made it harder

for the U.S. to extradite drug traffickers to the U.S. and harder to

fight the war on drugs.

F. Obstacles Faced by the Committee

The Committee conducted a thorough investigation, interviewing

dozens of witnesses. The majority of parties contacted by the Committee cooperated with the investigation. However, a number of

key individuals refused to cooperate, which in turn seriously hampered the Committee’s investigation.

1. Witnesses Who Have Not Cooperated with the Investigation

The Committee has faced a number of obstacles that have prevented it from discovering the full truth regarding the pardon and

commutations which it investigated. The greatest problem faced by

the Committee was that a number of key witnesses invoked their

Fifth Amendment rights or otherwise refused to cooperate with the

Committee’s investigation. A total of 26 witnesses either invoked

their Fifth Amendment rights or refused to be interviewed in the

course of the Committee’s investigation. Some of these witnesses,

like Marc Rich, Denise Rich, Beth Dozoretz, and Roger Clinton,

were critically important. The impact of the refusal of key witnesses to cooperate is discussed below in the relevant chapters regarding each part of the investigation.

Another significant problem the Committee has faced is the refusal of a number of parties to produce records subpoenaed or requested by the Committee. A number of document requests issued

by the Committee have not been complied with by their recipients,

either because of an invocation of Fifth Amendment rights or an

invocation of attorney-client privilege. In some cases, the invocation

of privilege has been spurious. For example, Hugh Rodham refused

to produce any records regarding the Vignali matter because of the

attorney-client privilege. Obviously, Rodham possesses records

which are not privileged, which he could provide to the Committee,

however, he simply declined to do so.38 This refusal adversely impacted the ability of the Committee to develop a full understanding

of Rodham’s work on the Vignali matter. The specific problems

faced by the Committee in each aspect of the pardon investigation

are discussed below in the relevant chapters regarding each pardon

and commutation.

38

39Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to former President William J. Clinton (Feb. 15, 2001) (Exhibit 6). 40Letter from David E. Kendall, Counsel for President Clinton, Williams & Connolly, to the

Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 27, 2001) (Exhibit 7). In addition to waiving any claim of privilege with respect to the testimony of his former staff, President

Clinton has not raised executive privilege with respect to any of the records the Committee has

requested from the National Archives. 41See 44 U.S.C. § 2204 (2002). 42 Notes of Telephone Conversation with Amy Krupsky, Associate General Counsel, National

Archives and Records Administration (May 1, 2001).

2. The White House

It is a matter of some concern that the Bush White House and

Justice Department failed to cooperate fully with the Committee’s

investigation. Early in its investigation of the Marc Rich pardon,

the Chairman requested that former President Clinton waive any

claim of executive privilege he might have over testimony and documents relating to the pardons and commutations he granted.39 On

February 27, 2001, former President Clinton’s attorney, David Kendall, sent the Chairman a letter in which he informed the Committee that ‘‘he will interpose no Executive Privilege objections to the

testimony of his former staff concerning these pardons, or to other

pardons and commutations he granted.’’ 40 Despite former President Clinton’s decision to waive executive privilege, the Committee

faced a number of problems receiving records relating to the pardons and commutations, both from the White House and the Justice Department.

Beginning on January 25, 2001, the Committee issued a series

of document requests to the National Archives and Records Administration (‘‘NARA’’), seeking records relating to pardons and

commutations issued or considered by former President Clinton.

Under the Presidential Records Act, once the responsive records

were located by NARA staff, they were provided to staff for former

President Clinton to be reviewed for executive privilege concerns.41

After President Clinton’s staff had reviewed them, the records were

reviewed by staff for President Bush, who independently has the

right to assert executive privilege over the records. The Committee’s first requests to NARA for records relating to Marc Rich and

Pincus Green were satisfied. However, shortly thereafter, the Committee began to have significant problems receiving the records it

had requested from NARA.

On March 8, 2001, the Committee issued a request to NARA for

records relating to the pardons and commutations of a number of

individuals—including Glenn Braswell, Carlos Vignali, Edgar and

Vonna Jo Gregory, and Eugene and Nora Lum—as well as records

relating to Roger Clinton’s involvement in lobbying for pardons.

The Committee’s request called for the records to be provided to

the Committee by March 22, 2001. At some point in April 2001,

NARA had gathered all of the responsive documents, and they had

been reviewed and cleared by the office of former President Clinton. However, they had not been provided to the Committee because of objections from the Bush White House Counsel’s Office.42

Committee staff spent the next month engaged in fruitless negotiations with the Bush White House regarding the production of

the requested records. Staff from the Bush White House explained

that they had concerns about producing the requested records, beVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
39

43The White House did not agree to provide records provided to the White House from third

parties until June 6, 2001. It is unclear why these types of records, which were clearly not privileged, were withheld from the Committee for so long. The delay in the production of these

records—which did not occur until three months after they were requested—imposed a substantial delay on the Committee’s investigation. 44Letter from Gary Stern, General Counsel, NARA, to Jim Wilson, General Counsel, Comm.

on Govt. Reform (June 21, 2001) (Exhibit 8).

cause the records went to the heart of the clemency review process,

which was part of a core Presidential power. During these negotiations, Committee staff pointed out that the White House had been

delaying the production of a wide variety of records from NARA,

including documents sent into the White House from individuals

seeking pardons, and that these records could not possibly raise

any privilege concerns. The White House agreed to provide these

types of non-deliberative records to the Committee.43

However, the White House was not nearly so accommodating

with respect to deliberative documents about the clemency process

that were generated inside of the Clinton Administration. White

House staff informed the Committee staff that the White House did

not plan to assert executive privilege over these records but would

simply decline to produce them and hope that the Committee understood the reasons why. Committee staff attempted to explain

that a number of these records were critically important to the

Committee’s investigation. For example, the report prepared by

Pardon Attorney Roger Adams regarding the Vignali commutation

was central to the Committee’s understanding of the Vignali matter. Committee staff also offered to reach a number of compromise

accommodations, which would satisfy the Committee’s needs to review the Adams memo, while still protecting the White House’s interests. All of these offers were rejected. The White House’s refusal

to reach any accommodation meant that the Committee was unable

to obtain a number of key documents regarding pardons and

commutations issued by President Clinton.

On June 7, 2001, shortly after the Committee’s offers to the

White House were rejected, the Committee received a production of

records from NARA. This production apparently included both deliberative and non-deliberative records responsive to the Committee’s March 8, 2001, request. Approximately two weeks later, Committee staff informed the White House that NARA had provided

the Committee with a number of records that the White House

may have intended to withhold from the Committee. Shortly thereafter, the Committee received a telephone call and then a letter

from the NARA General Counsel, Gary Stern, requesting the return of the documents. In his letter, Stern stated that ‘‘some of the

records that were provided to the Committee were inadvertently

produced. Accordingly, we now request the return of these records,

and any copies made thereof.’’ 44

However, for several reasons, the Committee decided not to return the records in response to Stern’s request. First, the records

were responsive to the Committee’s request and, therefore, should

have been produced in any event. Second, neither President Bush

nor President Clinton asserted any privilege over the documents.

In the absence of a valid claim of privilege, the Committee has a

right to receive documents responsive to its request. Third, even if

President Bush or President Clinton had asserted executive priviVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
40

45See NARA Document Production (Report to the President on Proposed Denial of Executive

Clemency for Carlos Anibal Vignali, Jr., Jan. 12, 2001) (Exhibit 9). 46See NARA Document Production (Note from Dawn Woolen, Administrative Assistant, to

Bruce Lindsey, Deputy Chief of Staff, the White House) (Exhibit 10). 47 Committee staff had been unable to reach Mrs. Gambino or determine the purpose of her

payment. The key document in the NARA production was a note apparently drafted by White

House staffer Meredith Cabe which referenced the fact that she was requesting an NCIC check

on Rosario Gambino. Given the fact that Rosario Gambino was a well-known organized crime

figure who was an exceedingly unlikely candidate for a legitimate grant of clemency, the Committee investigated this matter and determined that Anna Gambino was Rosario Gambino’s

daughter, and that the payment of $50,000 from Anna Gambino to Roger Clinton was part of

the Gambinos’ efforts to obtain a commutation for Rosario Gambino. 48See NARA Document Production (Report to the President on Proposed Denial of Executive

Clemency for Harvey Weinig) (Exhibit 11).

lege, the Committee might have determined to keep certain essential records produced by NARA on June 7, 2001. A number of these

records were critical to the Committee’s investigation and did not

raise legitimate executive privilege concerns. However, since neither the current nor the former President raised any such privilege, the Committee used these documents in its investigation and

in this report.

The documents that were ‘‘inadvertently’’ produced to the Committee were of central importance to the Committee’s investigation.

The following is a brief description of some of the records included

in that production:

• All White House records regarding the Vignali commutation:

These records included the report by Pardon Attorney Roger

Adams objecting to the Vignali commutation.45 This report was

of critical importance to the Committee, as it showed the extent

to which the Clinton White House was aware of Carlos Vignali’s

criminal activities. These records also included one White House

document indicating that Hugh Rodham had informed the

White House staff that the Vignali commutation was ‘‘very important’’ to First Lady Hillary Clinton.46

• Documents that led the Committee to uncover Roger Clinton’s efforts to obtain a commutation for organized crime figure Rosario

Gambino: Before receiving these records from NARA, the Committee was aware only of a payment of $50,000 from Anna

Gambino to Roger Clinton. Only after receiving these documents

did the Committee have reason to believe this payment might

be related to an effort to free Rosario Gambino from prison.47

• Documents showing three additional pardons that Roger Clinton

attempted to obtain: These documents indicated that representatives of Mark St. Pe ́ and Steven Griggs sent materials requesting pardons to Roger Clinton at the White House, and that

these materials were forwarded to the White House Counsel’s

office. Another document indicating that William McCord had

sent a petition was produced in the midst of other Roger Clinton-related material.

• Pardon Attorney Roger Adams’ report on the commutation of

drug money launderer Harvey Weinig: This report demonstrated

that the White House was fully aware of the extent of Weinig’s

criminal activities, including his role in a kidnapping.48

41

Given the importance of these records to the Committee’s investigation, and the absence of any claim of privilege over the documents, the Committee decided to use the records in its investigation and in this report. Given the apparent sensitivity of the

records to the White House, the Committee is using only those

records which are directly relevant to necessary subject matter covered in this report.

The Committee must emphasize that it is disappointed with the

way the Administration handled its requests for documents relating to the pardon matter. It is clear that if a large number of documents relating to the pardon had not been ‘‘inadvertently’’ produced by NARA personnel on June 7, the Committee would never

have received those records. Consequently, Members of Congress,

historians, and the public might never have known about many of

the significant abuses of public trust detailed in this report. Developments since June 2001 have made it clear that the Administration is engaged in a wide-ranging effort to expand executive privilege beyond its traditional boundaries and reduce Congressional

oversight of the White House and Justice Department. It is disappointing that the Bush Administration would attempt to withhold key documents from the Committee in an investigation like

this, where the Committee is looking into allegations of malfeasance at the highest levels of government. That the Bush Administration attempted to withhold these records even though former

President Clinton approved their release is especially discouraging.

3. The Justice Department

The recalcitrance of the Bush Administration in refusing to turn

over records in the pardon investigation also extended to the Justice Department. The Justice Department refused to provide a

number of records requested by the Committee in the course of its

investigation. Most of these documents related to the Committee’s

investigation of Roger Clinton, specifically relating to Roger Clinton’s efforts to obtain a commutation for Rosario Gambino. The

Committee requested from the Justice Department all records relating to any consideration of a grant of clemency for Rosario

Gambino, as well as all records relating to the Justice Department’s investigation of Roger Clinton’s efforts to obtain a grant of

clemency for Gambino. The Justice Department refused to comply

fully with either request.

With respect to the Committee’s request for records relating to

the Justice Department’s work on the Gambino commutation request, the Department refused to turn over any records or even

specify which records it was withholding. Apparently, the Justice

Department based its refusal on privilege concerns, presumably executive privilege, although Justice Department staff did not identify any specific privileges in explaining their decision.

With respect to the Committee’s request for records relating to

the investigation of Roger Clinton’s involvement in the Gambino

matter, the Justice Department initially provided records but then

abruptly stopped doing so. The Justice Department claimed that it

was entitled to withhold records because of its ongoing investigation of Roger Clinton. However, the records that the Committee

sought related to the Justice Department’s investigation of Roger

42

Clinton, which was conducted in 1998 and 1999, and then closed,

not its ongoing investigation from the Southern District of New

York. The Justice Department’s decision to withhold these records

significantly hindered the Committee’s investigation of the

Gambino matter. The withheld documents likely contain the Justice Department’s rationale for failing to pursue criminal charges

against Roger Clinton, as well as the answers to key factual questions such as whether the FBI was even aware of the $50,000 payment from the Gambinos before the Committee uncovered it in the

summer of 2001. Without a complete understanding of facts and

reasoning underlying the Justice Department’s decision to close the

Clinton-Gambino investigation, the Committee is unable to determine whether that decision was made in good faith or may have

been tainted by political considerations.

[Exhibits referred to follow:]

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CHAPTER ONE

‘‘TAKE JACK’S WORD’’: THE PARDONS OF

INTERNATIONAL FUGITIVES MARC RICH

AND PINCUS GREEN

FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE

Marc Rich and Pincus Green have a history of illegal and

corrupt business dealings contrary to the security interests

of the United States.

• Rich and Green have had extensive trade with terrorist states

and other enemies of the United States. Despite clear legal restrictions on such trade, Rich and Green have engaged in commodities trading with Iraq, Iran, Cuba, and other rogue states

that have sponsored terrorist acts. By engaging in these activities, Marc Rich and Pincus Green demonstrated contempt for

American laws, as well as the well-being of Americans who were

harmed or threatened by these states.

• The Central Intelligence Agency provided the following declassified information about Marc Rich to the Committee:

If President Clinton had checked with the CIA, he would

have learned that Marc Rich had been the subject of inquiries by various foreign government liaison services and

domestic government agencies regarding their ongoing investigations of criminal activity.

In addition, President Clinton would have received information worthy of his consideration in making his decision

on the pardon. This information cannot be declassified.

Marc Rich and Pincus Green were guilty of serious crimes

and showed contempt for the American justice system.

• Marc Rich and Pincus Green attempted to obstruct the criminal

investigation of them in every way imaginable, including attempting to smuggle subpoenaed documents out of the country.

Rich and Green’s tactics resulted in a record-setting contempt

fine against them, totaling $21 million. Despite these tactics,

the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York was

able to indict Marc Rich and Pincus Green on 51 counts of illegal activity, including tax evasion, mail fraud, wire fraud, and

racketeering. The evidence against them was overwhelming.

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• Because of the strength of the case against them, Marc Rich and

Pincus Green fled the country rather than face trial. Rich’s own

lawyer told him that by fleeing the country, Rich had ‘‘spit on

the American flag’’ and that ‘‘whatever you get, you deserve.’’

For the 17 years leading up to his pardon, Marc Rich was one

of America’s 10 most wanted international fugitives. Although

Jack Quinn, Rich’s attorney, argued that Rich did not flee the

United States to avoid prosecution, Rich’s ex-wife refuted this

view, stating that Rich told her that ‘‘I’m having tax problems

with the government . . . and I think that we are going to have

to leave.’’

• In order to avoid extradition or apprehension by United States

law enforcement, Marc Rich and Pincus Green attempted to renounce their United States citizenship. While this attempt was

rejected by the United States, it demonstrated that Rich and

Green had no loyalty to the United States, and viewed their citizenship as a liability to be discarded at will.

Rich and Green’s crimes were so serious that for seventeen

years, the U.S. government devoted considerable resources

to apprehending them and closing down their business activities.

• Rich and Green were such high-profile fugitives that on a number of occasions in the 1980s and 1990s, the United States Marshals Service attempted to arrest them in various foreign countries. A number of countries from the United Kingdom to Russia

attempted to assist the United States in these efforts. The pardons of Rich and Green have sent a message that individuals

can go from the FBI’s most wanted list to a Presidential pardon

if they spend money and have the proper connections. This message undermines U.S. efforts to apprehend fugitives abroad.

• Rich and Green were such high-profile fugitives that in 1991 the

Government Reform Committee, under Democratic leadership,

held a number of hearings and issued two reports about the government’s efforts to apprehend Rich and Green. At that time,

Democrats and Republicans in Congress took the Bush Administration to task for not being aggressive enough in hunting down

Rich and Green, or shutting down their business interests in the

U.S.

• While Rich and Green were fugitives from justice, the American

government took a number of actions against their interests in

the U.S. The federal government seized Rich’s assets and shut

down his trade in metals and grain with the government.

The United States government repeatedly tried to reach a

plea agreement with Rich and Green.

• For a number of years after Rich and Green fled the country,

the U.S. government attempted to negotiate a plea bargain to

settle the case. The government made a number of concessions

in an attempt to reach a deal, but all offers were rebuffed by

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Rich and Green, who would not agree to any deal that resulted

in jail time. While lobbying for a pardon, Jack Quinn and Rich’s

other lawyers claimed that the Justice Department had not even

negotiated with Rich, and therefore, that a pardon was justified.

Quinn and the other lawyers were misleading the White House

when they made these claims.

Jack Quinn misled the White House about the Rich case and

attempted to mislead the Committee and the public regarding his work for Marc Rich.

• Marc Rich hired Jack Quinn after a recommendation from Eric

Holder. After numerous failed attempts to have his case settled,

Marc Rich hired Jack Quinn to represent him. Quinn was hired

after a recommendation from Deputy Attorney General Eric

Holder. Gershon Kekst, who worked for Marc Rich on the pardon matter, asked Holder for a recommendation of how to settle

a criminal matter with the Justice Department. Holder recommended that he hire a Washington lawyer ‘‘who knows the

process, he comes to me, and we work it out.’’ Holder then explicitly recommended the hiring of Jack Quinn. While Holder

did not know that Kekst was referring to Marc Rich, it suggests

that Holder was favorably disposed to Jack Quinn, and would

be very receptive to arguments made by Quinn, no matter how

baseless they were.

• Marc Rich was going to pay Jack Quinn for his work on the pardon. After the Marc Rich pardon was granted, Jack Quinn

claimed that he was not being paid by Rich for his work on the

pardon, and that he expected no future payment for his work on

the pardon. However, the Committee has uncovered evidence

that Robert Fink, a lawyer close to Marc Rich, had discussions

with Rich and Quinn about paying Quinn for his work on the

Rich pardon. Documents which Quinn and Fink withheld from

the Committee for over a year, and which were produced only

after a federal judge ordered them produced to a grand jury,

shed further light on the contemplated payment of Quinn. These

documents indicate that Quinn raised the question of his ‘‘status’’ with Rich and asked that Rich pay him a $50,000 per

month retainer. The Committee attempted to interview Quinn

about these documents, but Quinn refused to meet with Committee staff.

• Jack Quinn may have been attempting to receive money from

Marc Rich after the pardons were granted. At the Committee’s

February 8, 2001, hearing, Quinn pledged that ‘‘I will not bill

[Rich], and I will not accept any further compensation for work

done on the pardon.’’ This pledge surprised Rich’s lawyer, who

expected that Rich would be paying Quinn for his work. Indeed,

records just produced to the Committee indicate that Quinn

may have been attempting to negotiate some payment from

Marc Rich shortly after he pledged that he would not take additional money for his work. A March 5, 2001, e-mail from Quinn

to Rich states ‘‘If you are agreeable, and I hope you are, I need

to fax to you in the next few days a new retainer agreement.’’

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This e-mail raises the possibility that Quinn has been attempting to obtain payments from Rich, in possible violation of his

pledge to the Committee. The Committee attempted to interview

Quinn about this matter, but he refused.

• Jack Quinn’s work on the Rich pardon was in apparent violation

of Executive Order 12834. That executive order was enacted as

part of President Clinton’s promise to create ‘‘the most ethical

administration in history,’’ and it prohibited former executive

branch employees from lobbying their former executive branch

agencies within five years of their departure. Quinn has claimed

that his work on the Rich pardon came within an exception for

‘‘communicating . . . with regard to a . . . criminal . . . law enforcement inquiry, investigation or proceeding[.]’’ However, this

exception was clearly intended to apply to appearances before

courts, not lobbying the White House for a pardon. The ‘‘revolving door’’ lobbying ban was intended to apply exactly to cases

like this, where a former White House Counsel could come back

and lobby the President to take an action that had no constitutional limits on it, largely based on the President’s personal

trust for that former staffer.

• The pardon petition compiled by Jack Quinn and the other Marc

Rich lawyers was highly misleading. Most of the arguments

used by Jack Quinn to justify the Rich and Green pardons were

false and misleading. These arguments could have been completely refuted if anyone in the White House had sought out any

of the prosecutors familiar with the Rich case.

• The ‘‘letters of support’’ in the pardon petition were used in a

misleading manner. Another key element of the Rich pardon petition was a number of letters of support for Rich and Green

from prominent Americans and Israelis. Rich and Green used

these letters to try to show that their humanitarian activities

justified their pardons. However, many of these letters were obtained under false pretenses, and the writers of the letters were

not told that they were being used to obtain a Presidential pardon. In addition, a number of individuals who wrote in support

of Rich and Green received large amounts of money from them.

Marc Rich and Pincus Green used a number of different individuals with close personal relationships with President

Clinton and his staff to lobby regarding the pardon.

• The role of Denise Rich. Denise Rich played a key role in obtaining the Rich and Green pardons. Denise Rich had a close relationship with President Clinton, which was based in part on her

role as a large-scale contributor to Democratic causes and the

Clinton library, and in part on her extensive personal contacts

with President Clinton. Denise Rich used this relationship with

President Clinton to lobby for the Marc Rich pardon on a number of occasions. Denise Rich has refused to cooperate with the

Committee, invoking her Fifth Amendment rights rather than

answer questions about her role in the pardon.

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• The role of Beth Dozoretz. Beth Dozoretz, another close friend of

President Clinton, played a key role in obtaining the Rich pardon. Like Denise Rich, Beth Dozoretz had a relationship with

President Clinton built on personal ties and political fundraising. Dozoretz has raised and contributed millions of dollars for

the Democratic party, and has pledged to raise an additional

million dollars for the Clinton library. Beth Dozoretz also has

close relationships with Denise Rich and Jack Quinn. Dozoretz

used her close relationship with President Clinton to lobby for

the Rich pardon. Because Dozoretz has invoked her Fifth

Amendment rights against self-incrimination, the Committee is

unable to conclude whether or not Dozoretz made any linkage

between contributions to the DNC or the Clinton library and the

granting of the Rich pardon.

• The role of Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Israeli Prime Minister

Ehud Barak spoke to President Clinton three times about the

Rich pardon. In his public statements about the Rich pardon,

President Clinton has pointed to these conversations with Prime

Minister Barak as one of the primary reasons he granted the

pardon. However an examination of the transcripts of the calls

shows that Barak did not make a particularly impassioned plea

for Rich. Therefore, it appears that the President may be attempting to use Prime Minister Barak’s interest in the Rich

matter as a cover for his own motivations for granting the Rich

pardon.

• Barak had met with Rich personally and told Clinton that the

Rich pardon ‘‘could be important . . . not just financially, but he

helped Mossad on more than one case.’’ Barak’s statement raises

the possibility that either Barak or Clinton acted on the Rich

matter because of some promise of future financial return.

Eric Holder and Jack Quinn worked together to cut the Justice Department out of the decisionmaking process. Holder’s

decision to support the pardon had a critical impact.

• Jack Quinn and Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder worked together to ensure that the Justice Department, especially the prosecutors of the Southern District of New York, did not have an opportunity to express an opinion on the Rich pardon before it was

granted. The evidence amassed by the Committee indicates that

Holder advised Quinn to file the Rich pardon petition with the

White House and leave the Justice Department out of the process. One e-mail produced to the Committee suggests that Holder

told Quinn to ‘‘go straight to wh,’’ and that the ‘‘timing is good.’’ The evidence also indicates that Holder failed to inform the

prosecutors under him that the Rich pardon was under consideration, despite the fact that he was aware of the pardon effort

for almost two months before it was granted.

• Eric Holder’s support of the Rich pardon played a critical role

in the success of the pardon effort. Holder informed the White

House that he was ‘‘neutral, leaning towards favorable’’ on the

Rich pardon, even though he knew that Rich was a fugitive

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from justice, and that Justice Department prosecutors viewed

Rich with such contempt that they would no longer meet with

his lawyers. Holder has failed to offer any credible justification

for his support of the Rich pardon, leading the Committee to believe that Holder had other motivations for his decision, which

he has failed to share with the Committee.

• Eric Holder was seeking Jack Quinn’s support to be appointed

as Attorney General in a potential Gore Administration, and this

may have affected Holder’s judgment in the Rich matter. On several occasions, Holder sought out Quinn’s endorsement to be appointed as Attorney General if Al Gore were to win the November 2000 election. Quinn was a Gore confidant whose endorsement would carry great weight. Holder’s initial help to Quinn in

the Rich matter predated the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush

v. Gore, and accordingly, Holder had some legitimate prospect of

being appointed Attorney General when he was helping Quinn

keep the Rich matter from the Justice Department’s scrutiny.

While Holder denies that his desire to be appointed Attorney

General had anything to do with his actions in the Rich matter,

it provides a much clearer and more believable motivation than

any offered by Holder to date.

President Clinton made his decision knowing almost nothing about the Rich case, making a number of mistaken assumptions and reaching false conclusions.

• The White House never consulted with the prosecutors in the

Southern District of New York regarding the Rich case. As a result, the White House staff was never able to refute the false

and misleading arguments made in the Marc Rich pardon petition.

• Every White House staff member who was working on the Rich

pardon opposed it. However, because they failed to do the necessary background research on the Rich case, they were unable

to refute the arguments made by Jack Quinn.

• President Clinton was misled by Jack Quinn in their negotiations regarding the Rich pardon. Late in the evening of January

19, 2001, President Clinton and Jack Quinn had a telephone

discussion regarding the Rich pardon. During this conversation,

Quinn repeated his usual misleading arguments about the Rich

case. Quinn also offered to make his clients subject to civil liability for their actions. In furtherance of this offer, Quinn

agreed to waive all statute of limitations and other defenses,

which Rich and Green would have as a result of their fugitivity.

President Clinton has cited this waiver as a key factor in his decision to grant the pardons. However, if President Clinton or his

staff had done even cursory legal research, they would have understood that this was a hollow, meaningless deal. First, Quinn

agreed to waive defenses that Rich and Green did not have. It

is basic legal doctrine that fugitivity tolls the statute of limitations. Second, Rich and Green likely do not face any civil liability for their crimes, since those fines were already paid by their

105

companies. Third, Rich and Green had been willing to pay $100

million to settle their case for years. A fine, even a large one,

would have had no impact on Rich and Green, and it would

merely stand for the proposition that the U.S. justice system is

for sale.

• When the White House did finally provide the names of Marc

Rich and Pincus Green for a Justice Department background

check in the middle of the night on January 19, 2001, the check

turned up new, troubling information which was disregarded by

President Clinton. When the White House requested the Justice

Department to perform a computer background check on Rich

and Green prior to granting the pardons, the check came back

with information that they were wanted for ‘‘arms trading.’’ This

was new information for all of the White House staff, and it

raised serious questions among them as to whether the pardons

should be granted. However, the only step the White House took

to check on this allegation was to call Jack Quinn. Quinn predictably denied that his clients were involved in arms trading.

Faced with this conflicting information about Rich and Green,

President Clinton instructed his staff to ‘‘take Jack’s word,’’ and

issue the pardons.

President Clinton has failed to offer a full accounting for

his decision to issue the Marc Rich and Pincus Green pardons.

• President Clinton has failed to answer any questions about the

Rich and Green pardons. The few statements that he has issued

have been misleading, incomplete, and raised more questions

than they answered. Given his complete failure to explain the

pardons, the Committee is left with serious unanswered questions regarding President Clinton’s motives.

INTRODUCTION

The pardons of Marc Rich and Pincus Green were the most controversial and most outrageous pardons issued by President Clinton, and likely, by any President. Rich and Green were fugitives

from justice, and were two of the largest tax cheats in U.S. history.

In addition, they had a long and disgraceful record of trading with

America’s enemies, helping prop up the Ayatollah Khomeini, Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi, and the Russian mafia, among

others. This track record has led even Marc Rich’s lawyers to call

him a ‘‘traitor’’ and observe that he has ‘‘spit on the American flag.’’

It is beyond any dispute that Marc Rich and Pincus Green did

not deserve pardons. Therefore, the inevitable question is why the

President granted them. Some believe that the Rich and Green pardons were the product of a pardon process that completely broke

down at the end of the Clinton Administration. These individuals

would argue that in his rush to create a legacy at the end of his

term, President Clinton short-circuited the normal clemency review

process, and granted pardons without conducting the due diligence

that was required. While this is hardly a charitable view of PresiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00121 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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dent Clinton, it is the most innocuous explanation that can be presented for the Rich and Green pardons.

There are a number of reasons to believe that the pardons were

not just the product of a sloppy process. After all, even though they

did not fully understand the scope of Rich and Green’s crimes, the

President and White House staff grasped the essentials of the Rich

case: Rich and Green were massive tax cheats, fugitives from justice, and had traded with the enemy. Yet, they received the pardons despite these damning facts. Therefore, the Committee has

looked at the motives of the key players in the Marc Rich and

Pincus Green pardon effort.

The evidence raises many questions regarding the motives of the

key players.

• Jack Quinn, for example, used his influence as a former White

House Counsel to lobby the President on Rich’s behalf. Quinn

repeatedly provided misinformation to the White House. At the

height of the public’s outcry about the Rich case, Quinn claimed

that he was representing Rich on a pro bono basis. However, the

evidence obtained by the Committee shows that Quinn was attempting to secure a lucrative payment from Rich, and may still

be trying to obtain payment from Rich.

• Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder provided critical support

for the Rich pardon. While Holder should have ensured that the

Justice Department’s views were represented in the pardon

process, Holder instead advised Jack Quinn on how to cut the

Justice Department out of the process. While all of the White

House staff was opposing the Rich and Green pardons, Eric

Holder provided critical support for it at the eleventh hour.

Holder may claim that his actions were the result of misjudgment, but Holder himself admitted that he was seeking Quinn’s

support to be nominated as Attorney General if Al Gore was

elected President. This created a conflict of interest for Holder.

• Denise Rich and Beth Dozoretz were both close friends of President Clinton and major contributors to the Democratic Party. In

addition, Denise Rich contributed $450,000 to the Clinton Library, and Dozoretz pledged to raise $1 million for the Clinton

Library. Both lobbied the President on the Rich pardon. Both

have also invoked their Fifth Amendment rights rather than

testify about their discussions with the President.

• President Clinton is ultimately responsible for the pardons, and

must ultimately provide an explanation of why he granted

them. He has, however, failed to provide any satisfactory rationale for his actions. He has failed to answer any serious questions, and instead, has offered only one self-serving, factually inaccurate newspaper column to justify the pardons. President

Clinton’s attempted explanations have raised more questions

than answers about his motivations for granting two of the most

unjustified pardons in U.S. history.

Regardless of the motivations for the Rich and Green pardons,

the nation must live with the consequences of them. The pardons

have sent two equally destructive messages. First, by granting the

pardons, President Clinton undermined the efforts of U.S. law enVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00122 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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1 Josh Getlin, Clinton Pardons a Billionaire Fugitive, and Questions Abound, L.A. TIMES, Jan.

24, 2001, at A1. 2 A. Craig Copetas, Court TV Chat Transcript (visited Mar. 10, 2002) http://www.courttv.com/

talk/chat—transcripts/2001/0220rich-copetas.html. It should be noted that estimates of Rich’s

personal fortune are probably lower than the actual amount because of Rich’s history of questionable accounting and tax evasion, including that for which he was indicted in 1983. 3 A. CRAIG COPETAS, METAL MEN: MARC RICH AND THE 10-BILLION-DOLLAR SCAM 65 (1985). 4 Id. at 96.

forcement to apprehend fugitives abroad. By pardoning a man who

evaded capture by the U.S. Marshals Service for almost two decades, President Clinton sent the message that indeed, crime can

pay, and that it may be worthwhile to remain a fugitive rather

than face charges. The pardon also could undermine U.S. efforts to

obtain extradition of fugitives from foreign countries. When a man

like Rich can go from the Justice Department’s most wanted to a

free man with a stroke of the pen, it is difficult for the U.S. to

credibly demand the extradition of wanted fugitives. Finally, the

pardons send the message that President Clinton did believe that

different rules applied to wealthy criminals. If he did not have the

money to hire Jack Quinn and his White House access, Marc Rich

never would have obtained a pardon. The President abused one of

his most important powers, meant to free the unjustly convicted or

provide forgiveness to those who have served their time and

changed their lives. Instead, he offered it up to wealthy fugitives

whose money had already enabled them to permanently escape

American justice. Few other abuses could so thoroughly undermine

public trust in government.

I. BACKGROUND OF MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN

A. Rich and Green’s Business Activities

1. How Rich and Green Became Wealthy

Marc Rich is one of the wealthiest people in the world. His network of business enterprises is estimated to generate upwards of

$30 billion annually.1 Rich’s personal net worth is estimated at between $1.5 and $8 billion.2 Along with his business partner Pincus

‘‘Pinky’’ Green, Rich has made this fortune principally through the

commodities trading business.

Rich began his career as a commodities trader in 1954 with the

New York office of the trading firm Philipp Brothers.3 Rich traded

in a wide variety of commodities, including precious metals.

Throughout his early career he was highly successful, amassing

huge profits for the firm. Over time, Rich also developed a niche

within the firm as a crude oil trader. He and Green revolutionized

international oil trading by creating the ‘‘spot market,’’ which is the

practice of purchasing oil from producers and immediately selling

it to refineries for a large profit.

After more than twenty years of trading for Philipp Brothers,

Rich decided that he could make more money on his own. In 1975,

while managing Philipp Brothers’ Madrid office, Rich called a

meeting of the firm’s European managers in Zug, Switzerland, during which he demanded an impossibly high bonus.4 When, as expected, Rich’s boss refused, Rich announced that he was leaving

the firm to start his own company. He left with Pincus Green, taking six other top traders from the firm, as well as files of informaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00123 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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5 Id. at 99. 6 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the Comm.

on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 98 (Feb. 8, 2001) (prepared testimony of Morris ‘‘Sandy’’ Weinberg,

Jr., and Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the S.D.N.Y., Department of

Justice). 7 A. CRAIG COPETAS, METAL MEN: MARC RICH AND THE 10-BILLION-DOLLAR SCAM 99 (1985). 8 Id. at 66. 9 Id. at 71. 10 Id. at 115. 11 Id. at 119. 12Shawn Tully, Why Marc Rich is Richer Than Ever, FORTUNE, Aug. 1, 1988, at 74. 13 A. CRAIG COPETAS, METAL MEN: MARC RICH AND THE 10-BILLION-DOLLAR SCAM 115 (1985).

tion on Philipp Brothers’ clients.5 Rich’s new firm was a success,

and Rich was well on his way to becoming a billionaire. By 1982,

Marc Rich + Co. A.G. had become the second largest commodities

firm in the world.6 However, as Rich’s biographer explained, the

initial financing for Rich’s new company was based largely on ‘‘a

promise from Iranian Senator Ali Rezai to help set up a series of

no-holds-barred oil deals that would, in part, lead to making Marc

Rich the most wanted white-collar fugitive in American history.’’ 7

2. Marc Rich’s History of Illegal and Improper Business Dealings

Even before he had departed Philipp Brothers, Marc Rich developed a reputation as a shrewd and unethical manipulator. As fellow Phillip Brothers’ trader Bill Spier explained, ‘‘What separated

our friendship was his belief that you could only make it bigger

and better than the next guy by buying people off. Marc was suave

and sophisticated and obsessed with power. He was always looking

to see who he could buy off.’’ 8 While at Philipp Brothers, Rich also

learned to deal with rogue political regimes in order to make a

profit. For example, in 1958, Rich was sent to Cuba, and continued

to work there after the fall of the Batista regime. As one former

associate explained, ‘‘Marc cut his teeth in Havana, and the experience shaped his character because it taught him that being illegal

was okay under certain conditions[.]’’ 9

Once he set up his own business enterprise, Rich’s questionable

practices appear to have expanded. His trading empire was based

largely on systematic bribes and kickbacks to corrupt local officials.

For example, in 1977, one of Rich’s traders claimed to have deposited $125,000 into the Swiss bank account of Reza Fallah, thenhead of the Iranian National Oil Company, in exchange for ‘‘services rendered’’ in securing a shipment of Iranian oil to Spain.10 In

1978, Rich and Green were caught diverting Nigerian oil shipments

to South Africa. When the Nigerians threatened to cut off relations

with Rich, he paid a $1 million bribe to the Nigerian transport

minister to get the contract back.11 Rich also reportedly paid

former Jamaican President Edward Seaga $45,000 to send the Jamaican track and field team to the 1984 Olympics. In return, Rich

signed a ten-year agreement to purchase most of the output of the

Jamaican Alcoa plant, which annually produced a significant portion of the world’s aluminum.12 One former Rich trader explained

the standard practices of Rich’s companies as follows: ‘‘[t]o go into

places like Iran and do honest business is naive. I’d figure 15 percent of your net in payoffs for every deal made.’’ 13

109

14 Id. at 125. 15 Id. 16 Id. 17 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the Comm.

on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 486 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of I. Lewis ‘‘Scooter’’ Libby).

As is explained in more detail below in the section discussing

Rich’s legal troubles in the United States, Rich also laundered

funds and hid his profits to protect them from the taxing authorities of various countries. For example, Rich routinely used Panamanian shell companies (Sociedades Ano ́nimas) to launder money

and to conceal profits from taxing authorities.14 As explained by

author Craig Copetas:

Panamanian corporate law is particularly helpful to a

trader whose operations extend outside the Central American nation and into several different countries. A Sociedad

Ano ́nima is never required to file financial reports or tax

returns and may maintain its books in any manner it desires in any part of the world. This permits a procedure

generally known as laundering, and for Marc Rich—an expert at sidestepping the politics of nations by acting as a

maverick middleman between producers and consumers— it was quite the bargain at $1,650 plus a $50 annual franchise tax.15

Rescor Incorporated, (a company that Rich used in his illegal oil

scam that led to his legal troubles in the United States) was one

such shell company. At one point, according to a former Rich shareholder, Rich had $800 million in cash concealed in his Panamanian

shell companies.16

Working with corrupt governments was not Marc Rich’s only

trademark. Much of Rich’s fortune was made dealing with countries that no one else would deal with. Rich shrewdly used his multinational status, and his familiarity with unscrupulous business

practices, to profit from embargoes and wars by trading with pariah nations. Rich’s pattern of dealing with America’s enemies, especially Iran, led even one of Rich’s own lawyers to admit that Rich

could be considered a traitor to his country:

Mr. WAXMAN. Do you agree with the statement that these

gentlemen [Rich and Green] were two traitors to their

country?

Mr. LIBBY. I can understand someone using those terms.

Mr. WAXMAN. Do you agree with them?

Mr. LIBBY. Their companies engaged in trades with Iran—

Mr. WAXMAN. Traitors not traders.

Mr. LIBBY. No, sir, I was trying to finish—during a period

when trades [sic] were held, and that was an act you could

consider an act of a traitor.

Mr. WAXMAN. That someone could consider, but you do not

consider it?

Mr. LIBBY. I could consider it. I do not condone it. I didn’t

advise it. I do not admire it.17

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18 A. CRAIG COPETAS, METAL MEN: MARC RICH AND THE 10-BILLION-DOLLAR SCAM 131 (1985). 19 Id. 20 Id. at 132. 21 Andrew Lycett, Spectrum: Plain Sailing Through the Sanctions Net, TIMES (London), Sept.

12, 1986. 22Shawn Tully, Why Marc Rich is Richer Than Ever, FORTUNE, Aug. 1, 1988, at 74.

The following section describes specific business relationships

that Rich maintained with regimes or countries with interests adverse to the United States. U.S. intelligence agencies have considerable information about Marc Rich, none of which was reviewed

by the White House prior to the pardons. Unfortunately, most of

the information remains classified. The CIA, however, did declassify the following statement:

If President Clinton had checked with the CIA, he would

have learned that Marc Rich had been the subject of inquiries by various foreign government liaison services and

domestic government agencies regarding their ongoing investigations of criminal activity.

In addition, President Clinton would have received information worthy of his consideration in making his decision

on the pardon. This information cannot be declassified.

As described below, though, the public record alone should have

been enough to eliminate any possibility of pardons for Marc Rich

and Pincus Green.

a. Iran

Marc Rich got his start in the oil trade through business dealings

with the Shah of Iran. After the Shah fell from power, many were

concerned by Ayatollah Khomeini’s violent rise to power. However,

Rich saw a new opportunity, and began trading with the Khomeini

regime. In the early days of the Iranian revolution, after the new

Iranian government seized 51 American hostages, the United

States imposed a strict trade embargo on Iran. Nevertheless, Rich

directed his staff to meet the new directors of the Iranian stateowned oil company.18 Shortly thereafter, Marc Rich and Pincus

Green reached a deal to purchase Iranian oil through his Swiss

company, Marc Rich + Co. A.G. Reportedly, Rich paid for much of

this purchase in small arms, automatic rifles, and hand-held rockets.19 One of Rich’s colleagues stated that because of this deal

‘‘Rich got more excited than I had ever seen him.’’ 20

b. South Africa

Rich’s companies also dealt extensively with the South African

government throughout the apartheid regime. Notwithstanding the

United Nations’ ban on oil sales to South Africa, throughout the

1980s Rich’s company was one of the three main traders of oil between the Middle East and South Africa.21 Where other companies

saw legal peril, Marc Rich saw profit, with South African companies willing to pay a premium of $8 per barrel of oil. According to

the Dutch-based Shipping Research Bureau, Rich supplied about 6

percent of all oil imports to South Africa between 1979 and 1986,

earning upwards of $1 billion from the transactions.22 And according to a former Rich shareholder, at the time of their indictment

111

23 A. CRAIG COPETAS, METAL MEN: MARC RICH AND THE 10-BILLION-DOLLAR SCAM 198 (1985). 24 Jim Hougan, King of the World (Marc Rich), PLAYBOY, Feb. 1, 1994, at 104. 25 Id. 26 A. CRAIG COPETAS, METAL MEN: MARC RICH AND THE 10-BILLION-DOLLAR SCAM 196–197

(1985). 27 Id. at 197. 28Michael Dobbs, Rich Made His Fortune by Breaking the Rules, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2001,

at A1.

in the United States, Rich and Green were trading Soviet and Iranian oil to the apartheid government in South Africa in exchange

for Namibian uranium, which Rich and Green in turn sold back to

the Soviet Union.23

At times, Rich’s deals with South Africa were so risky and profitable that Rich would scuttle the oil tanker at the conclusion of the

deal and fly the crew home. In one deal, a tanker was loaded with

oil from the Soviet Union, was diverted from its intended itinerary,

covered its name with tarpaulins, communicated only in code, and

then delivered its oil in secret to South Africa.24

c. The Soviet Union/Russia

The South African uranium transactions were not the only dealing Rich had with the Soviet Union. In fact, Rich and his companies dealt extensively with the Soviet Union and other Communist

countries. His oil trading with the Soviet Union provided Moscow

with the hard currency needed to purchase grain during the United

States’ grain embargo.25 Rich’s dealings with the Soviet Union

were so extensive and helpful to the Soviet Union that when he

was indicted in the United States in 1983, one Moscow newspaper

printed a front page, above-the-fold story defending Marc Rich and

attacking the United States.26 In fact, the Russian newspaper

Izvestia wrote the following in defense of Rich:

The United States thinks that all countries, big and small,

must subvert their national interests to American measures. . . . Under the pretext of nonpayment of taxes by the

Swiss branch of the Marc Rich firm, American authorities

have given an ultimatum: either Switzerland changes its

internal legislation or its companies will be deprived of admission to American markets. This action by the Reagan

Administration is an open threat, an attempt to interfere

into the internal affairs of Western European countries

through the threat of economic sanctions. The Americans

are living under the illusion of a Pax Americana.27

The fact that one of the leading propaganda organs of the Soviet

state would dedicate itself to the defense of a capitalist commodities trader like Marc Rich shows the importance Rich and his company had in providing hard currency to the Soviet regime.

Marc Rich’s influence has only grown in post-Communist Russia.

Rich took advantage of widespread privatization in Russia to acquire large supplies of industrial materials at bargain prices. As

explained in The Washington Post, ‘‘[a]fter the Soviet Union fell

apart in 1991, these relationships helped Rich become for a time

the single most important Western trader in Russia.’’ 28 There is

also evidence that Rich has developed deep ties with Russian orgaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00127 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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29 ROBERT I. FRIEDMAN, RED MAFIYA: HOW THE RUSSIAN MOB HAS INVADED AMERICA 51 (2000)

(indicating that Rich had a relationship with Russian gangster Marat Balagula, now serving

time in prison for gasoline price fixing). Rich is also suspected to have been involved in metals

trading going in and out of the Estonian port of Tallinn, where Russian copper, nickel and cobalt

are often exported. Tallinn is notorious for being controlled by the Russian mafia. Rich’s company has denied using the port of Tallinn. See Tony Glover, The EU’s Baltic Extension,

EUROBUSINESS, May 1, 1994. 30Matthew McAllester, Rich’s Suspect Ties/Sources: Clinton Could Have Learned Russian

Mob Links, NEWSDAY, Mar. 1, 2001, at A5. 31 Id. 32 Id. 33 Id. 34 Id. 35 Id. 36 Id. David Reuben, the Chairman of Trans-World has denied this account. See Letters, NEWSDAY, Mar. 7, 2001, at A39. 37The U.S. Connection in Caucasus, INTELLIGENCE NEWSLETTER, No. 401, Mar. 8, 2001. 38 Judi Hasson, Panel Offers Evidence of China Link Beijing Bank Wired Funds to L.A. Man

Prior to Donation, USA TODAY, July 11, 1997, at 6A. 39 Jerry Seper, Ukrainian Gained U.S. Entry Because of Spelling Mismatch, WASH. TIMES,

Dec. 13, 1997, at A4. 40Statement by Former CIA Director on Clinton Ties to Loutchansky, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Nov.

3, 1996.

nized crime, a powerful force in post-Communist Russia.29 According to press accounts, law enforcement agencies including the FBI

and the CIA had information indicating that Rich had financial ties

to the Russian mafia.30 According to one U.S. intelligence source

who spoke to the press, ‘‘Clinton would have found out about the

relationships if he had asked either the FBI or CIA, [but] [h]e

clearly never bothered to ask.’’ 31 Another source told the press that

‘‘[t]he FBI has tons of material on the Russian mafia and in particular the Rich-mafia connection.’’ 32

Reportedly, Rich has been linked specifically by U.S. law enforcement to Mikhail Chernoy, a former agent for Trans-World Metals.

Chernoy is a defendant in a civil case in the U.S. District Court

for the Southern District of New York. He is named as a controller

of two Russian aluminum companies by European companies who

claim that the defendants used bribery, money-laundering and extortion in order to illegally seize a large aluminum plant in Russia.33 Moreover, according to an investigative report commissioned

by the World Bank in 1998, Chernoy was arrested by the Swiss police in 1996 during an investigation of Russian gangs.34 As the report states, Mikhail’s brother Lev ‘‘is believed to be a major Russian mafia figure by most international police and intelligence organizations.’’ 35 The report further states that Marc Rich provided

the seed money necessary to start up Trans-World metals.36

Rich has also been linked to Grigori Loutchansky, a Georgianborn Israeli citizen who is considered to be a significant player in

Russian mob activities. According to press accounts, Loutchansky

worked with Rich in the early 1990s selling Russian oil and aluminum from formerly state-run enterprises.37 Loutchansky, who

was ‘‘accused of drug trafficking and smuggling nuclear weapons,’’ 38 is ‘‘listed in a 1995 State Department ‘watch list’ as a ‘suspected criminal,’ ’’ 39 and was involved in the 1996 campaign fundraising scandal. Time magazine has said that Loutchansky is ‘‘considered by many to be the most pernicious unindicted criminal in

the world,’’ 40 yet he dined with Clinton at a White House dinner

in 1993 and subsequently channeled money into Clinton’s camVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00128 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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41 Jerry Seper, Soloman Asks Again for Data on Meetings with Russian, WASH. TIMES, Feb.

11, 1997, at A4. 42Lee Davidson, Bennett Zeros in on Demo Donations, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City, UT),

July 11, 1997, at A1. 43 John J. Fialka and Jose de Cordoba, Cuba Speeds Nuclear Project; Marc Rich Is Said to

Assist, WALL ST. J. EUROPE, June 4, 1991, at 2. 44 Id. 45See id. 46Department of Treasury Document Production 000635 (Note to file C–17306 from the Compliance Programs Division) (Exhibit 1). 47Department of Treasury Document Production 000652 (Memorandum from R. Richard Newcomb, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury, to Ronald

K. Noble, Under Secretary for Enforcement, Department of the Treasury (Sept. 16, 1994)) (Exhibit 2). 48 A. CRAIG COPETAS, METAL MEN: MARC RICH AND THE 10-BILLION-DOLLAR SCAM 118 (1985). 49 Id. 50Strong Tanker Fixtures Seen as Indication of Undiminished Interest in Libyan Oil, PLATT’S

OILGRAM NEWS, July 16, 1986, at 1. 51 Id. 52See John Hooper, Oil Traders Get Rich in Global Game of Chess, THE GUARDIAN (London),

Aug. 7, 1990. See also Jim Hougan, King of the World (Marc Rich), PLAYBOY, Feb. 1, 1994, at

104.

paign.41 He was also invited to a fundraising dinner in July 1995

but was unable to attend when his visa was denied and invitation

withdrawn.42

d. Cuba

In this hemisphere, Rich continued to conduct business with

Communist Cuba, notwithstanding the U.S. embargo. Rich’s early

dealings with Fidel Castro as a trader for Philipp Brothers apparently paid off decades later when he started his own companies.

Marc Rich reportedly assisted Cuban efforts to escalate its nuclear

power program in 1991.43 Rich negotiated with Castro’s son to develop a uranium deposit in Western Cuba.44 The highly enriched

uranium could be used to fuel Cuba’s twin 440-megawatt nuclear

power reactors. In addition, U.S. officials were concerned about the

weapons potential of the enriched uranium used in the reactor.45

Also in 1991, Marc Rich & Co., Ltd. arranged a $3.9 million deal

for sugar and oil that were transferred through Cuba.46 Ultimately,

these transactions violated the Cuban Assets Control regulations,

and the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of

Treasury blocked nearly $3 million of funds from Rich’s Cuba

transactions.47

e. Libya

Marc Rich also apparently traded with Libya under Muammar

Qaddafi.48 Rich’s companies purchased oil from Libya beginning in

the 1970s.49 Yet even after the United States bombed Libya in

April of 1986 in response to the terrorist attacks originating in that

country, Rich reportedly continued to purchase crude oil from

Qaddafi’s regime.50 Rich continued to do business with Libya even

after U.S. oil companies completely withdrew from the country.51

Unlike the other American oil companies, Rich ignored the oil embargoes and executive orders of the Reagan Administration designed to punish the terrorist-sponsoring state.

f. Iraq

It has also been reported that Marc Rich attempted to violate the

UN embargo against Iraq during the Persian Gulf War.52 Other reports indicate that U.S. officials have been investigating charges

114

53Paul Klebnikov, How Rich Got Rich, FORBES, June 22, 1992, at 41. 54 Ian Rodger, Marc Rich Hopes for Resolution of Tax Case, FINANCIAL TIMES, (London), Mar.

12, 1993, at 26. 55 A. CRAIG COPETAS, METAL MEN: MARC RICH AND THE 10-BILLION-DOLLAR SCAM 115 (1985). 56 Romania: Life After Debt, INTERNATIONAL TRADE FINANCE, May 18, 1989. 57 Jim Hougan, King of the World (Marc Rich), PLAYBOY, Feb. 1, 1994, at 104. 58 Id. 59See Department of Agriculture Document Production (Minutes of Richo Grain Board Meeting, Jan. 6, 1987); Department of Agriculture Document Production (Listing of E.E.P. Awards

Made to Richco Grain, Sept. 27, 1989) (Exhibit 3). 60 Bruce Ingersoll, U.S. Suspends Grain Export Subsidies for Firm Linked to Fugitive Marc

Rich, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 1989, at sec. 3, p. 19.

that Rich lent money to Saddam Hussein’s government in exchange

for future deliveries of cheap oil.53 In a statement to The Financial

Times of London, Marc Rich acknowledged that he had communications with Iraq in September of 1991, but denied that it involved

oil trading.54 The fact that Rich would admit to having discussions

with Saddam Hussein’s government just months after the end of

the Gulf War is remarkable. Based on his pattern of shrewd, unethical, and illegal business dealings with other rogue regimes,

Rich’s claim to be interested only in humanitarian aid for Iraq completely lacks credibility.

g. Angola

In Angola, as in many other countries, Marc Rich and Pincus

Green became close to the dictators ruling the country. These relationships gave them exclusive rights to the country’s oil. When

other Western oil companies wanted Angolan oil, they had to turn

to Marc Rich and Pincus Green. This point was made with somewhat comedic effect when, in the late 1970s, a number of western

oil executives were called to a meeting with Angola’s oil agents. Expecting a group of communist officials, the executives ‘‘were visibly

stunned when the communist representative who walked into the

conference room turned out to be Pinky Green, greeting Exxon executives with a hearty ‘How ya doin’?’ ’’ 55

h. Romania

Marc Rich is reported to have traded several commodities, including oil, with the Romanian regime of Nicolae Ceausescu.56 At

the time, Rich reportedly had his own refineries based in Romania.57 Trade unionists in Romania have accused Rich of cashing in

on the fortunes that Ceausescu stole from the Romanian people.58

It also appears that, based on documents received by the Committee from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Marc Rich was trading grain with the Ceausescu regime in the late 1980s.59 As is discussed in detail below, these sales (in addition to sales to countries

like China, the Soviet Union, and Saudi Arabia) resulted in Rich’s

companies receiving $95 million from the Department of Agriculture through a program that provided surplus grain to companies selling subsidized grain abroad.60 This led to an investigation

by then-Congressman, and later Secretary of Agriculture, Dan

Glickman. Glickman’s investigation would eventually lead the first

Bush Administration to direct the Department of Agriculture to bar

Rich’s companies from receiving any new contracts.

115

61Department of Treasury Document Production 000652 (Memorandum from R. Richard Newcomb, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury, to Ronald

K. Noble, Under Secretary for Enforcement, Department of the Treasury (Sept. 16, 1994)) (Exhibit 2). 62Michael Dobbs, Rich Made His Fortune by Breaking the Rules, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2001,

at A1. 63 Roger Benedict, U.N. Oil Cutoff of Serbia Hinges on Russia, China (Security Council Vote),

OIL DAILY, June 1, 1992, at 1. 64 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the Comm.

on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 111 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). 65 Id. at 374. 66The Committee, however, does not take the position that it was ‘‘understandable’’ for Quinn

not to have known about Rich’s dealings with rogue states. While Quinn’s actions may be legally

permissible, one must think long and hard about the morality of Quinn’s actions. Given Rich’s

status as a fugitive, common sense and due diligence should have led Quinn to inquire further

into Rich’s past dealings. However, the power of money is often enough to promote willful igno- rance.

i. Serbia

One document from the Office of Foreign Assets Control produced to the Committee by the U.S. Department of Treasury indicates that Rich was also dealing with Serbia in violation of U.S.

and international sanctions.61 Press accounts indicate that Rich

violated the U.N. trade embargo by dealing with Belgrade in a variety of commodities, including copper and oil.62 According to an article in The Oil Daily, at the time of the U.N. embargo, Serbia reportedly had a deal in place with Marc Rich to process crude oil

in Romania.63

When asked at a Committee hearing about allegations relating

to Marc Rich’s transactions with rogue states, Rich’s lawyer Jack

Quinn responded ‘‘I don’t know the answer to that.’’ 64 When asked

about the White House’s knowledge and research of these activities, White House Counsel Beth Nolan told the Committee that she

never received an intelligence briefing and never explained Rich’s

shady dealings to the President.65 While it may be understandable

that Jack Quinn would not know—or at least not want to know— about Rich’s dealings with so many dictatorships and rogue regimes, it is inexcusable that the White House failed to take the

time to learn about these disturbing details.66

It is clear that Rich built his fortune doing business without

legal, ethical, or even moral restraints. He regularly dealt with corrupt officials, dictators and rogue regimes. U.S. and international

embargoes and sanctions were not barriers to Rich, merely hurdles

to be climbed over, under, or around. As is discussed in more detail

below, it is shameful and an embarrassment to the United States

that the Clinton Administration did not take adequate steps to determine the extent of Marc Rich’s illegal and unethical business activities before the President granted his pardon. This failure by the

Clinton Administration is especially troubling in light of the fact

that Marc Rich built his fortune by trading with so many enemies

of the United States.

B. The Criminal Charges Against Marc Rich and Pincus

Green

1. The Investigation of Rich and Green

Marc Rich’s illegal business practices in the United States came

under the scrutiny of the United States government in the early

1980s. In the fall of 1981, staff from the Fraud Section of the

116

67 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the Comm.

on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 97 (Feb. 8, 2001) (prepared testimony of Morris ‘‘Sandy’’ Weinberg,

Jr., and Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the S.D.N.Y., Department of

Justice). 68 Id. 69 Id. at 97–98. 70 Id. 71 Id. at 98. 72 Id. 73 Id. The eventual indictment accused Marc Rich’s companies of evading taxes on over $100

million in unreported income. 74 Id. at 104. 75 15 U.S.C. § 751, et seq. 76 Indictment, U.S. v. Marc Rich, Pincus Green et al. 8–9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1984) (S 83 Cr.

579) (Exhibit 4). 77 Id. at 6. As the indictment states, ‘‘Crude oil coming from a well at or below a designated

1972 level of production was labelled ‘old’; ‘new’ oil referred to crude oil discovered since 1973

or oil obtained from existing wells in excess of the 1972 level of production; ‘stripper’ oil referred

to crude oil produced from a well whose average daily production was less then [sic] ten barrels.’’

Criminal Division of the Department of Justice called Assistant

U.S. Attorney Morris ‘‘Sandy’’ Weinberg, Jr. of the Southern District of New York (‘‘SDNY’’).67 They told Weinberg of a lead they

had received concerning a crude oil reseller named Marc Rich

whose company had an office in New York City.68 As Weinberg and

his fellow former prosecutor Martin Auerbach explained to the

Committee during the first hearing on the Rich pardon, this initial

lead on Marc Rich was developed through oil reseller prosecutions

in Abilene, Texas.69 John Troland and David Ratliff of West Texas

Marketing—who had been prosecuted for illegal oil reselling—provided information about the offshore laundering of funds by Rich.70

In December of 1981, when Weinberg flew to Texas to investigate, he obtained a furlough for the principals of West Texas Marketing (‘‘WTM’’), who took him to their office.71 Upon reviewing

their records of WTM’s dealings with Marc Rich, Weinberg con- firmed that Rich earned $70 million in illegal oil resale profits in

1980 and 1981 and had funneled the money to his Swiss company

in order to evade federal income tax and federal energy oil control

regulations.72 As Weinberg testified to the Committee, it was then

apparent to him that he and his office had uncovered ‘‘the biggest

tax fraud in history.’’ 73 As he further testified:

The case against Mr. Rich and Mr. Green was very strong.

. . . Like any fraud case, the evidence was rife with false

documents, inflated invoices, sham transactions and off the

books deals. The conspirators kept track of the illegal profits in hand written journals in what was described as the

‘‘pot.’’ . . . [T]he evidence included meetings between coconspirators and Marc Rich regarding the pots and the

scheme to funnel the illegal profits out of the country to

off-shore accounts.74

The illegal scheme that Weinberg uncovered stemmed from Marc

Rich’s evasion of specific Department of Energy (‘‘DOE’’) regulations. In September of 1980, pursuant to the Emergency Petroleum

Allocation Act of 1973,75 the DOE promulgated regulations establishing the permissible average markup for oil reselling.76 The permissible price was different for different regulatory categories of

crude oil. The categories contemplated by the regulations included:

‘‘old’’ or ‘‘lower tier;’’ ‘‘new’’ or ‘‘upper tier;’’ and ‘‘stripper.’’ 77 Under

the regulations, every seller or reseller of domestic crude oil was

117

78 Id. at 7. 79 Id. at 8–9. 80 Id. at 9. 81 Id. at 10–11. 82 Id. at 11. 83 Id. The manipulation of the oil categories by oil resellers such as Marc Rich and his companies was referred to as ‘‘daisy chaining.’’ As is explained in the indictment:

During the period of price controls, in order to evade the regulations and produce

huge profits, controlled oil was on occasion sold through a series of oil resellers known

in the crude oil industry as a ‘‘daisy chain.’’ The defendant INTERNATIONAL frequently participated as the original reseller of controlled oil into a ‘‘daisy chain.’’ The

‘‘daisy chain’’ was utilized by the original reseller to make it extremely difficult to

trace the movement of controlled barrels and to facilitate alteration of the certifications on controlled barrels into stripper barrels (uncontrolled) which could then be

sold at the much higher world market price.

Id. at 7–8. 84 Id. at 11. 85 Id. at 11–12. 86 Id. at 12. 87 Id. at 12–13. 88 Id. at 13, 15. 89 Id. at 15–18.

required to certify to the purchaser the respective amounts and

prices of old oil, new oil, and stripper oil contained in the crude oil

that was being sold.78 The regulations prohibited markups of more

than 20 cents per barrel of oil for a reseller such as Marc Rich’s

company, Marc Rich + Co. International, Ltd. (‘‘International’’).79

International was also required to submit ERA–69 forms to the

DOE on a monthly basis that set forth the dollar amount of any

permissible average markup overcharges so that they could be immediately refunded to customers.80

Beginning in September of 1980, Marc Rich and Pincus Green

agreed with the principals of West Texas Marketing that when

International was limited to the 20 cents per barrel markup, the

huge profits from their crude oil transactions would be retained by

WTM rather than being reflected on the books of International.81

These profits were referred to as the ‘‘pot.’’ 82 As the indictment

against them would allege, to further conceal the scheme, Rich,

Green and the principals at WTM conspired to have WTM prepare

and mail invoices to International, which falsely indicated that

WTM had sold oil barrels to International ‘‘at the high world market price, when in truth and in fact . . . International was paying

a far lower price upon WTM’s agreement secretly to kickback to

[Rich and Green] the huge profits held by WTM for . . . International in the ‘pot.’ ’’ 83

The profits in these ‘‘pots’’ were moved out of the U.S. to foreign

bank accounts at the direction of Marc Rich and Pincus Green.84

This would occur through sham foreign loss transactions involving

Marc Rich + Co., A.G., (‘‘A.G.’’).85 From October 1980 through May 1981, Rich, Green, and their companies moved more than $23 million in income to offshore accounts from WTM ‘‘pots.’’ 86 These

fraudulent transactions were transmitted through telefaxes and

wire transfers.87

This scheme by Rich and Green was essentially repeated with another company, Listo Petroleum, for a total of $47 million.88 Rich

and Green also entered into false deduction transactions with

Charter Crude Oil Company, as well as ARCO.89 In the case of

Charter, at the direction of Marc Rich, International prepared

fraudulent invoices purporting that International had purchased

118

90 Id. at 16. 91 Id. 92 Id. at 17–18. 93 Id. at 18. 94 Id. at 44–45. The executive orders issued pursuant to the International Economic Emergency Powers Act of 1977 included Executive Orders No. 12,170, 12,205, and 12,211. 95 Id. at 45. 96 Id. 97 Id. at 46. 98 Id. at 47. 99 Id. at 47, 49. These charges were brought under 31 CFR §§ 535.206(a)(4), 535.208, 535.701,

and 50 USC § 1705, and 18 USC § 2. 100 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 99 (Feb. 8, 2001) (prepared testimony of Morris ‘‘Sandy’’

Weinberg, Jr., and Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). 101 Id.

foreign crude oil from A.G. at its fair market value and subsequently sold it to a Charter subsidiary at a substantial discount.90

As a result, International fraudulently reduced its amount of taxable income by more than $31 million dollars.91 In the ARCO case,

in the fall of 1980, Rich and Green’s company Rescor invoiced their other company, International, for nearly $3 million. The invoice

concerned a non-existent contract for the sale of foreign crude oil

to Rescor by International. The fraudulent invoice made it appear

that International had failed to provide oil to Rescor which subsequently had to purchase a similar quantity of oil from Arco at five

dollars per barrel above the original contract price.92 As a result,

International fraudulently reduced its amount of taxable income for

1980 by nearly $3 million.93

Finally, Weinberg uncovered evidence of Marc Rich and Pincus

Green trading with Iran during the American hostage crisis. In

1979 and 1980, President Carter issued several executive orders

and the Department of Treasury subsequently promulgated regulations that prohibited any American from trading with Iran without

a special license from the Department of Treasury.94 The regulations further required all individuals engaging in trade with Iran

to keep records to be available for examination by the Office of Foreign Assets Control.95 Nevertheless, on April 30, 1980, Marc Rich

+ Co., A.G. entered into a contract with the National Iranian Oil

Company (‘‘NIOC’’) for the purchase of crude and fuel oil from May

1, 1980 through September 30, 1980.96 As the indictment indicates,

from their offices in New York City, Rich and Green in turn sold

6,250,000 barrels of the Iranian oil to an oil company in Bermuda

for a total of more than $200 million. In order to conceal this

scheme, Rich and Green did not disclose to their banks in the

United States that the ultimate beneficiary of the U.S. dollars was

the NIOC.97 Rich and Green further devised a secret code for their

interoffice cable communications to disguise the participation of the

Iranian oil company.98 The scheme was completed through several

wire transactions and transmissions, and ultimately caused United

States dollars to be illegally transferred to Iran at the same time

that Iran was holding American hostages.99

In early 1982, the Southern District of New York began subpoenaing millions of documents from oil companies and crude oil resellers in the United States that had done business with Marc

Rich.100 Prosecutors also served subpoenas on Marc Rich’s companies in New York.101 The Southern District decided to subpoena

119

102 Id. 103 Id. 104 Id. 105 Id. 106 Id. at 100. 107 Id. 108 Id. 109 Id. 110 Id. 111 Id. at 101. 112 Id. When asked about this episode at the Committee’s hearing, Jack Quinn testified ‘‘what

I have been told is that those documents were going to Switzerland for the purpose of being

reviewed for privilege by the lawyers.’’ Id. at 113 (testimony of Jack Quinn). In response to this

claim, Martin Auerbach testified: ‘‘With respect to the documents that were being slipped out

of the country, the suggestion was never that those were being reviewed for attorney-client

privilege. It was simply that it would be more convenient for counsel to review them in Switzerland then [sic] to review them in New York. Now, we had tons and tons of documents delivered

to us. These two steamer trunks were slipping out. We didn’t get a call from them saying, you

know, we’ve got some people over in Zug with nothing better to do than to look at documents;

would you mind if we took them over there outside of the jurisdiction at the time when we’re

in contempt for refusing to produce documents from Switzerland?’’ Id. (testimony of Martin J.

Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). 113 Id. at 101 (prepared testimony of Morris ‘‘Sandy’’ Weinberg, Jr., and Martin J. Auerbach,

former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice).

Marc Rich + Co. A.G.—even though it was a Swiss company—because there were sufficient contacts through its American subsidiary to give them jurisdiction for enforcing document subpoenas.102

Rich, who had retained high-powered attorneys such as Edward

Bennett Williams, Peter Fleming, and former federal judge Marvin

Frankel, sought to quash the grand jury subpoenas.103 However,

United States District Judge Leonard Sand denied the Rich team’s

motion to quash and ordered A.G. to produce the documents from

Switzerland.104 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed

Judge Sand’s decision in May of 1983.105 When Marc Rich + Co.

A.G. refused to produce the documents, Judge Sand held the company in contempt and ordered a $50,000 per day fine in order to

compel production of the documents.106 Nevertheless, Rich and his

company refused to produce the documents or pay the fine.107

Rich’s behavior during the litigation soon became even more

confrontational and deceptive. As the Southern District of New

York was to learn, on June 29, 1983, Rich quietly sold off his company’s only American asset.108 Judge Sand called the sale a ‘‘ploy

to frustrate the implementation of the court’s order,’’ and thereby

ordered a freeze of A.G.’’s assets in the United States.109 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals also concluded that the sale was a

fraud.110 As a result of these rulings by the courts, Rich and his

lawyers agreed to negotiate a resolution of the contempt issue. A.G.

agreed to pay the more than $1 million in contempt fines that had

accumulated and to continue paying the contempt fines until all of

the documents had been produced from Switzerland.111

At first, Rich’s company appeared to be complying with the

agreement by producing hundreds of thousands of documents from

Switzerland. However, on August 9, 1983, four days after the

agreement, the Southern District received an anonymous tip that

subpoenaed documents were being secreted out of the U.S. by a

paralegal of the law firm Milgrim Thomajan & Lee.112 In responding to the tip, the Southern District seized two steamer trunks full

of subpoenaed documents from a Swiss Air flight.113 As a result of

this incident, Judge Sand ordered the production of every document

of the Marc Rich companies in the world that had been subpoeVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00135 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
120

114 Id. 115 Id. at 101–02. The Committee does not know Rich’s precise role in orchestrating this action

by the Swiss government. Rich’s power in that country makes it reasonable to assume that he

might have played a part in creating the condition that made his representations in the United

States possible. The Committee is not aware of the Swiss government penalizing Rich or taking

any other action against him. 116 Id. at 102. 117 Id. 118 EVAN THOMAS, THE MAN TO SEE: EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMS 415 (1991). 119 Id. at 416. 120 Id. 121 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 103 (Feb. 8, 2001) (prepared testimony of Morris ‘‘Sandy’’ Weinberg, Jr., and Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). 122 Id. 123See Indictment, U.S. v. Marc Rich, Pincus Green et al. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1984) (S 83 Cr.

579) (Exhibit 4). 124 Id. at 19–22. 125 Id. at 22. 126 Id. at 22–25. 127 Id. at 33–34. 128 Id. at 40–42.

naed.114 Rich and his legal team argued that the Swiss government

had already seized all of the remaining documents, thereby rendering compliance with the agreement they had reached impossible.115

Judge Sand nevertheless ruled that the contempt fines should continue.116 In total, Marc Rich + Co. A.G. paid over $21 million in

contempt fines over the course of the litigation.117

Rich’s attorneys made a number of attempts to settle the case before an indictment was issued. When Rich hired Edward Bennett

Williams to represent him, Williams assured him that he could settle the case if Rich paid a large fine, telling Rich ‘‘I can get rid of it for $30 million.’’ 118 Williams then went to Sandy Weinberg and

asked how much the government wanted to settle the case. When

Weinberg told Williams he was not interested, Williams asked

Weinberg what he had in mind.119 Weinberg responded ‘‘J-A-IL.’’ 120 Later, Williams would offer as much as $100 million to settle the Rich case.121 All of these offers were rejected.

2. The Indictment

In September of 1983, a federal grand jury in New York returned

a 51-count indictment against Marc Rich, Pincus Green, and their

companies.122 The original indictment was restructured into a 65-

count indictment in March of 1984.123 All of the first 42 counts

were charged against Marc Rich, Pincus Green, Clyde Meltzer,

A.G., and Marc Rich + Co, International Ltd. The superseding indictment was arranged to include in counts 1 through 23 the

scheme to defraud the IRS.124 These charges were brought pursuant to 18 USC § 1343, the federal statute prohibiting wire fraud.125

These charges related to the fraudulent transactions among WTM,

and Marc Rich’s companies discussed above. Counts 24 through 38

included the scheme to defraud the Department of Energy, and

were brought pursuant to 18 USC § 1341, prohibiting mail fraud.126

Count 39 and 40 were racketeering charges brought under the

RICO statute, 18 USC § 1962(c).127 Counts 41 and 42 included two

tax evasion counts for Marc Rich + Co. International’s 1980 and

1981 tax returns, covering an amount totaling over $100 million in

unreported income which was concealed by the efforts of Rich,

Green, Meltzer, and Rich’s two companies.128 As stated in the inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00136 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
121

129 Id. 130 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 102–03 (Feb. 8, 2001) (prepared testimony of Morris ‘‘Sandy’’ Weinberg, Jr., and Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the

S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). 131 U.S. v. Marc Rich, Pincus Green et al. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1984) (S 83 Cr. 579). See also

50 U.S.C. § 1705. 132 Cover letter to superseding indictment, U.S. v. Marc Rich, Pincus Green et al. (S.D.N.Y.

Mar. 6, 1984) (S 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 4). 133 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 103 (Feb. 8, 2001) (prepared testimony of Morris ‘‘Sandy’’

Weinberg, Jr., and Martin J. Auerbach, former Assistant U.S. Attorneys for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). It should be noted that by this point, Rich and Green had already renounced their U.S. citizenship and become citizens of Spain and perhaps Bolivia. 134 EVAN THOMAS, THE MAN TO SEE: EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMS 417 (1991). Rich denied

Davis’ account of this conversation, saying, ‘‘There is not a shred of truth in it.’’

dictment, International was able to evade more than $49 million in

taxes.129 These counts were also brought against Marc Rich and

Pincus Green personally. The tax and racketeering counts were approved and authorized by the Department of Justice.130 Counts 43

through 57 alleged that Rich defrauded the Department of Treasury for his transactions with the Iranians during the oil embargo

and the American hostage crisis. Finally, counts 57 through 65

charged Rich with ‘‘trading with the enemy’’ for Rich’s secret deals

with the Iranians.131 In the superseding indictment, these charges

were not leveled against the companies. As a letter accompanying

the indictment states, ‘‘[t]he primary focus of those counts has always been the activities of the American individuals, Marc Rich

and Pincus Green.’’ 132

3. Rich and Green Flee the Country

Even though their companies eventually pled guilty and paid

heavy fines, Rich and Green personally refused to face the U.S. justice system. Rich and Green were out of the country when their indictments were handed down. They refused to return to the United

States, even after warrants were issued for their arrest. As

Weinberg and Auerbach explained to the Committee, ‘‘[b]y the time

of the indictment, Marc Rich and Pincus Green had made it clear

that they would not return to the United States to face the charges.

Apparently, they had quietly left the United States in June 1983

at a time when their lawyers were attempting to negotiate a resolution of the case.’’ 133 Even Rich’s own lead attorney, Edward Bennett Williams, was shocked by Rich’s conduct:

Rich responded to the warrant for his arrest by refusing

to return from Switzerland. Williams was standing in the

office of Marvin Davis in Los Angeles when he heard the

news that his client was on the lam. According to Davis,

Williams shouted in the phone, ‘‘You know something,

Marc? You spit on the American flag. You spit on the jury

system. Whatever you get, you deserve. We could have gotten the minimum. Now you’re going to sink.’’ 134

Despite the outrage of their own lawyers, as well as the prosecutors, Rich and Green never returned to the country to face the

charges. They remained fugitives in Switzerland for more than seventeen years until they received their pardons from President Clinton.

122

135Transcript of Allocution, U.S. v. Marc Rich + Co., A.G. et al. 18–19 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1984)

(S 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 5). 136 Id. at 20. 137 Id. at 3. 138 Id. at 4. 139 Id. 140 Id. at 5.

4. The Corporate Guilty Pleas

Notwithstanding the fact that Rich and Green would not return

to face the charges against them, their companies entered plea negotiations with the government. A year after the indictment was

handed down, Marc Rich’s companies pled guilty to evading $50

million in taxes. In the allocution on October 11, 1984, Peter Fleming, counsel for Marc Rich + Co. International, Ltd. stated to the

court:

Beginning in September 1980 International generated millions of dollars of income from crude oil transactions which

International should have disclosed but intentionally did

not disclose to the Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Energy.

***

In connection with matters within the jurisdiction of agencies of the United States, specifically the Department of

Energy and the Internal Revenue Service, International

and A.G. knowingly and willfully made those documents

and the ERA 69s filed with the Department of Energy

which were false in that they failed to disclose material

facts regarding the actual income from those crude oil

transactions, in violation of Title 18, United States Code,

Section 1001, which is the charging statute of counts 1

through 38.

***

In addition, by knowingly and willfully failing to report at

least $50 million of taxable income generated from these

transactions for the years 1980 and 1981, International

committed income tax evasion for these years in violation

of Title 26, United States Code, Section 7201.135

Counsel for Marc Rich + Co. A.G. then stated to the court, ‘‘[a]s you

know, A.G. is charged only in counts 1 through 38 of this information, and A.G. adopts Mr. Fleming’s statements in connection with

those counts.’’ 136 As part of their guilty plea, A.G. and International (which by then had been renamed ‘‘Clarendon, Ltd.’’), also

agreed to pay the United States $150 million,137 and agreed to waive any right to recover the $21 million in fines they had already

paid the government.138 The total amount that the companies paid to the government for their crimes was $200 million.139 As thenUnited States Attorney Rudolph Giuliani explained in court, this

represented the largest amount of money ever recovered by the

United States in a criminal tax evasion case.140

123

141 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 106 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Martin J. Auerbach,

former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). 142 Unofficial translation of a note delivered on September 25, 1984, by the Office for Police

Matters to the Embassy of the United States. See ‘‘They Went Thataway: The Strange Case of

Marc Rich and Pincus Green,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Operations, 102d Cong. 3

(May 27, 1992). 143 Bo’az Ga’on, Rich as Korach, MA’ARIV WEEKEND MAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 1999 (Exhibit 6). 144Department of State Document Production (Government Memorandum from U.S. Embassy

in Madrid to U.S. Department of State, Aug. 25, 1983) (Exhibit 7).

The guilty pleas and fines paid by the companies controlled by

Marc Rich and Pincus Green clearly demonstrate the guilt of the

two principals. Based on the overwhelming evidence against them,

it is no wonder Rich and Green fled the country rather than face

trial. The evidence, including the admissions by Marc Rich’s companies, also explains why Martin Auerbach of the Southern District

of New York could confidently respond to Jack Quinn’s criticism at

the Committee’s hearing, stating, ‘‘Mr. Quinn has suggested to the

Committee and to the Nation that we had a legal house of cards.

Well, if we did, it was all aces.’’ 141

C. Attempts to Bring Rich and Green to Justice

1. Attempts to Extradite Rich and Green

After Rich and Green fled the country in anticipation of their indictment, the Southern District of New York made many attempts

to have foreign governments extradite the two fugitives in order to

bring them back to the country to stand trial on the numerous

charges against them. On July 20, 1984, the United States requested extradition of Rich and Green from Switzerland. That request was rejected by the Swiss government in September of 1984

on the basis that the offenses charged against Rich and Green were

‘‘fiscal violations’’ and violations of ‘‘provisions concerning currency,

trade policy and economic policy’’ 142 and that the government of

Switzerland did not recognize the charges against Rich and Green

as extraditable crimes. In June of 1994, the Justice Department attempted to extradite Rich and Green from Israel, but the Israeli

government also turned down the request. Israel’s Attorney General, Michael Ben-Ya’ir, told the U.S. Government that the extradition treaty between the two governments did not include fiscal offenses.143 And even though Rich had become a citizen of Spain,

prosecutors could not extradite him from that country because, like

Switzerland and Israel, Spain does not extradite its citizens for tax

evasion.

2. Marc Rich and Pincus Green’s Attempts to Renounce Their Citizenship

After fleeing the United States, Rich and Green attempted to renounce their U.S. citizenship for the specific purpose of avoiding

extradition on the charges against them. According to a U.S. government memorandum from the Embassy in Madrid, Rich expatriated himself on September 3, 1982, prior to his indictment, and became a naturalized Spaniard on February 11, 1983.144 As Rich explained in a letter to the U.S. Consul General in Zurich, ‘‘I was

naturalized under the laws of Spain, swore an oath of allegiance

to the King of Spain, and formally stated that I thereby renounced

124

145Department of State Document Production (Letter from Marc Rich to Ruth H. Van Heuven,

U.S. Consul General, Switzerland (Oct. 27, 1992)) (Exhibit 8). In this and other letters, Rich

claims that he became a citizen of Spain in July of 1982, earlier than the date indicated by the

U.S. government. Spanish government documents appear to confirm this. The Second Circuit

Court of Appeals also affirmed a district court ruling that Rich’s attempt to renounce his citizenship in Madrid had failed. The Second Circuit held:

The evidence strongly supports the district court’s finding that Rich had no intention

whatsoever to relinquish his American citizenship prior to commencement of this action. Despite mouthing words of renunciation before a Spanish official, he refused to

acknowledge such renunciation before the United States Consul in Madrid before this

action commenced. Instead, he brought a Swiss action as an American national, traveled on his American passport, and publicized himself in a commercial register as a

United States citizen.

Action S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., Inc., 951 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir. 1991). 146Department of State Document Production (Letter from the American Consul to Pincus

Green (Dec. 19, 1983)) (Exhibit 9). The State Department apparently believed that Rich and

Green entered Bolivia illegally because of the restrictions on their passports, which would have

jeopardized their claim of Bolivian citizenship. See U.S. Marshals Service Document Production

(Department of State Cable, Oct. 11, 1983) (Exhibit 10). 147Department of State Document Production (Letter from Dr. Emilio Perez Barrios, Sub-Secretary of Immigration, Bolivian Ministry of Interior, to the American Consul (Sept. 9, 1983))

(Exhibit 11). 148Department of Justice Document Production DOJ/SDNY–MR–00008–09 (Letter from W.

Lee Rawls, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, to

the Honorable Robert E. Wise, Jr., Chairman, Subcommittee on Govt. Information, Justice, and

Agriculture, Comm. on Govt. Operations (Nov. 21, 1991)) (Exhibit 12). 149Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green 1, 3 (Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III). 150Department of State Document Production (Letter from Julian L. Bartley, Consul, Embassy of the United States of America in Madrid, to Marc Rich (Mar. 25, 1983)) (Exhibit 13). 151 U.S. Marshals Service Document Production (State Department Cable, Sept. 29, 1983) (Exhibit 14). 152 U.S. Marshals Service Document Production (State Department Cable, Sept. 30, 1983) (Exhibit 15).

U.S. nationality.’’ 145 On May 27, 1983, Green, and perhaps Rich,

were naturalized as Bolivian citizens according to U.S. State Department cables.146 In the case of Green, a letter from the Ministry

of the Interior in Bolivia states that ‘‘the privilege of Bolivian nationality has been given to Pincus Green Bergstein, who previously

renounced his nationality of origin and complied with the required

procedures determined by current legal regulations.’’ 147 According

to a letter from the Department of Justice to Congressman Robert

Wise in November of 1991, Rich and Green also became citizens of

Israel in 1983.148 The pardon application submitted to the White

House by Jack Quinn also lists Green as a citizen of Switzerland,

although it does not list Rich as a Swiss citizen, and it appears

that Rich is, in fact, not a Swiss citizen.149

In 1983, the State Department informed the Southern District of

New York that Rich was seeking to renounce his U.S. citizenship.

The American embassy attempted to contact Rich to have him fill

out a questionnaire to determine his citizenship, but he never responded.150 Rich and Green also never responded to letters from

the American Consul in Bern, Switzerland, attempting to determine their citizenship. On September 29, 1993, the U.S. State Department revoked Rich’s American passports because of the ‘‘outstanding federal felony warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.’’ 151 The next

day, the State Department also revoked Pincus Green’s passport.152

The confusion over Marc Rich’s citizenship status also became an

issue of concern to the U.S. Treasury Department in November of

1991. A letter written by the Office of Foreign Assets Control

prompted the State Department to make a determination of Rich’s

125

153Department of Treasury Document Production 000660–61 (Letter from Carmen A.

DiPlacido, Director of the Office of Citizens Consular Services, Department of State, to Richard

Newcomb, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury (Apr.

14, 1992)) (Exhibit 16). 154 Id. 155 Id. 156Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Jan. 28, 2001). 157 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 167 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Morris ‘‘Sandy’’ Weinberg,

Jr., former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). 158See ‘‘They Went Thataway: The Strange Case of Marc Rich and Pincus Green,’’ Comm. on

Govt. Operations, 102d Cong. 10 (May 27, 1992) (quoting Letter from W. Lee Rawls, Assistant

Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, to the Honorable Robert

E. Wise, Jr., Chairman, Subcommittee on Govt. Information, Justice, and Agriculture, Comm.

on Govt. Operations (received Oct. 11, 1991)). 159 Interpol Document Production (Wanted International Criminal Request, Oct. 9, 1985) (Exhibit 17). The document itself lists Rich and Green as wanted for the indictments in the Southern District of New York for wire fraud, mail fraud, income tax evasion, racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, and trading with the enemy. 160 Interpol Document Production (Interpol International Red Notice, June 4, 1992) (Exhibit

18). 161 Craig Copetas, The Sovereign Republic of Marc Rich, REGARDIE’S, Feb. 1, 1990, at 46.

citizenship. In its response of April 14, 1992, the State Department

made a final determination that Marc Rich had failed to renounce

his citizenship, and was still a U.S. citizen.153 The conclusion was

based on the fact that the Department never approved Rich’s Certificate of Loss of Nationality.154 It was also based on the fact that

Rich did not demonstrate the requisite intent to lose his U.S. Citizenship—in part because he used his U.S. passport to travel to the

United States after he became a Spanish citizen.155

Despite the U.S. Government’s official finding that Rich is still

a U.S. citizen, Rich and his lawyers claim that he is not a U.S. citizen. When he appeared on television after the Rich pardon, Jack

Quinn stated ‘‘he is a U.S. citizen.’’ 156 However, when he appeared

before the Committee, Quinn stated that he ‘‘misspoke’’ when he

was on Meet the Press, and took the position that Rich had indeed

renounced his citizenship. Sandy Weinberg, testifying with Quinn,

observed:

I suppose when he [Marc Rich] heard on television from

Mr. Quinn that he was a citizen, I’m sure it did concern

him whether or not he had a problem over the last 20

years. I suspect that . . . Mr. Quinn got a call the next

day saying ‘‘no, I’m not a citizen’’ because I believe that

there are some very significant tax implications if he’s

been a citizen all these years.157

3. U.S. Attempts to Apprehend Rich and Green

Between 1984 and 1992, the Department of Justice submitted

five provisional arrest requests to various countries in an attempt

to apprehend Rich and Green.158 None of these attempts were successful. As early as October 9, 1985, Rich and Green were listed as

wanted international criminals by the U.S. National Central Bureau of Interpol.159 In 1987, Interpol issued an international ‘‘red

notice’’ (warrant) that requested the provisional arrest of Rich and

Green with the eventual goal of extradition.160 On several occasions, the FBI and the U.S. Marshals Service appeared ready to apprehend the two fugitives. One operation set up by the Marshals

Service to snare Rich, referred to as ‘‘the Otford Project,’’ was nearly successful.161 In the fall of 1987, a U.S. Marshal assigned to the

126

162 Id. 163 Id. 164 Id. 165 Id. 166 Id. 167 Interpol Document Production (Letter from Darrell W. Mills, Chief, Interpol-USNCB

(1991)) (Exhibit 19). 168Telephone Interview with Pertti Ruoho, Finnish Oil Trader (Feb. 22, 2001). See also Letter

from Darrell W. Mills, Chief, Interpol-USNCB (1991)) (Exhibit 19). 169 Interpol Document Production (Interpol-USNCB transmission, Sept. 1, 1992) (Exhibit 20). 170 Interpol Document Production (Interpol-USNCB transmission, 1992) (Exhibit 21). 171 Id. 172 Interpol Document Production (Fax from Donald S. Donovan, Assistant Chief, InterpolUSNCB, to Don Ward, Deputy Chief, U.S. Marshals Service (Feb. 21, 1992)) (Exhibit 22). 173 Interpol Document Production 000317 (Identifiers on Marc Rich, Nov. 19, 1991) (Exhibit

23).

project barely missed apprehending Rich in France after he canceled a meeting with an African oil minister.162 A few months

later, in November of 1987, the U.S. Marshals Service again came

close to capturing Rich. They were tipped off by a businessman

close to Rich that Rich would be taking a private plane to England

for a weekend party. The Marshals set the trap for Rich at the

Biggen Hill Airport in Kent. However, thick fog settled in over

England, and Rich’s plane turned back to Switzerland.163

In 1986, prior to the international arrest warrant being issued,

Rich had another brush with the law. Rich had been asked by his

wife Denise to visit her in London. After the visit, Rich was at

Heathrow airport to catch the return Swissair flight to Zurich. As

he approached the gate, Rich apparently noticed that the security

staff was conducting a complete search of luggage and identification.164 Rather than submit to the search, Rich apparently went to

a public telephone and left three checks payable to him for £1.6

million stuck between the pages of a telephone book.165 Free of the

checks that Rich thought would identify him to the British authorities, Rich then boarded the flight for Zurich.166

In September of 1991, the FBI and Interpol attempted to arrest

Rich in Finland.167 According to a Finnish businessman who

helped the FBI with the matter, Rich was tipped off that he would

be arrested at the Helsinki airport, and he therefore turned his

plane around before landing.168 Other failed attempts to arrest

Rich are indicated by several documents produced to the Committee. As an Interpol cable indicates, Rich was expected to be in Moscow both in May and September of 1992. Attempts were made at

the Justice Department in September of that year to ‘‘insure a provisional arrest warrant is in place should [Rich] appear in Moscow.’’ 169 In March of 1992, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, as well as the Office of International Affairs at

the Justice Department, made a request for Interpol to assist in apprehending Rich in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, based on information

that he would be meeting with the new republic’s prime minister.170 In fact, Interpol sent a senior officer directly to Dushanbe

carrying the United States’ provisional arrest request.171 A request

for the arrest of Rich was also made in anticipation of his arrival

in Czechoslovakia in February of 1992, when Rich was negotiating

the purchase of the Slovak Aluminum Company.172 Yet another

document indicates that provisional arrest warrants were also

issued for Marc Rich in France, Portugal, and Norway.173

127

174The Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture Subcommittee held three separate

Marc Rich hearings on December 4, 1991, February 18, 1992, and March 5, 1992, entitled ‘‘The

Strange Case of Marc Rich: Contracting with Tax Fugitives and At Large in the Alps.’’ 175 ‘‘They Went Thataway: The Strange Case of Marc Rich and Pincus Green,’’ Hearing Before

the Comm. on Govt. Operations, 102d Cong. (May 27, 1992). 176 ‘‘The Strange Case of Marc Rich: Contracting with Tax Fugitives and At Large in the

Alps,’’ Hearing Before the Govt. Information, Justice, and Agriculture Subcommittee of the

Comm. on Govt. Operations, 102d Cong. 7 (Dec. 4, 1991) (statement of the Honorable Mike

Synar).

It is difficult to believe that Marc Rich went from being an international fugitive, sought by teams of Marshals across the world, to

a free man with the simple stroke of a pen. The effort to apprehend

Marc Rich was the subject of intense law enforcement, diplomatic,

and Congressional interest. Beyond the obvious negative effects of

the Rich pardon, it also had a demoralizing effect on the individuals who tried for so long to track down Rich. In addition, it undermines U.S. authority to apprehend criminal fugitives. When the

United States government attempts to apprehend someone by utilizing Interpol and working with law enforcement in foreign countries, it is reasonable to assume that those persons being sought

should have to face trial in the United States. By granting pardons

to Rich and Green, international law enforcement efforts on behalf

of the United States were seriously undermined.

4. 1992 Congressional Hearings

The Marc Rich matter and the failure of the government to apprehend him was an issue of great interest to this Committee when

it was under a Democratic chairmanship in the early 1990s. In particular, Congressman Robert Wise held three days of hearings on

the matter when he served as chairman of the Subcommittee on

Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture of the Committee on Government Operations.174 The hearings, entitled ‘‘The

Strange Case of Marc Rich: Contracting with Tax Fugitives and At

Large in the Alps,’’ also resulted in two Committee reports. One of

those reports, entitled ‘‘They Went Thataway: The Strange Case of

Marc Rich and Pincus Green,’’ focused on the efforts of the United

States to apprehend the two fugitives.175

Congressman Wise and his Subcommittee criticized the Reagan

and Bush Administrations for failing to take adequate steps to apprehend Marc Rich. At a hearing on December 4, 1991, Congressman Mike Synar was particularly critical of the Department of Justice for failing to apprehend the fugitives:

It is unacceptable that the Justice Department has failed

to show up today. It is unacceptable that they have failed

to enforce the law in this very important matter, and as

the chairman pointed out, in the case of the No. 1 tax

abuser in our history. Can there be little wonder, can there

be little wonder why Americans have lost confidence with

respect to this government’s ability to enforce the laws?

And can there be little wonder why most Americans believe there are two sets of laws in this country, one for the

rich, no pun intended, and one for the rest of us? 176

The Committee reached similar conclusions in its 1992 reports on

the Rich matter, stating, for instance, that the U.S. government

128

177 ‘‘They Went Thataway: The Strange Case of Marc Rich and Pincus Green,’’ Hearing Before

the Comm. on Govt. Operations, 102d Cong. 37 (May 27, 1992). 178 Id. at 34. 179 ‘‘Coins, Contracting, and Chicanery: Treasury and Justice Departments Fail to Coordinate,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Operations, 102d Cong. (May 27, 1992). 180 Id. at 18. 181 Id. at 19. 182 ‘‘The Strange Case of Marc Rich: Contracting with Tax Fugitives and At Large in the

Alps,’’ Hearing Before the Govt. Information, Justice, and Agriculture Subcommittee of the

Comm. on Govt. Operations, 102d Cong. 58 (Dec. 4, 1991) (statement of Kenneth Gubin, Chief

Counsel, U.S. Mint).

‘‘lacked the political will to effect the return of these fugitives[.]’’ 177

The Subcommittee urged ‘‘that the Department of Justice rejuvenate its efforts to apprehend the fugitives Marc Rich and Pincus

Green and that it become a high profile matter for the U.S. Government.’’ The report continued to admonish, stating, ‘‘[t]he continuing failure to return these fugitives to the United States to

stand trial before their fellow citizens only furthers the idea ‘that

there are . . . two standards of justice in the United States . . .

one for accused criminals without money and there’s one for accused criminals with money.’ ’’ 178

The second report by the Subcommittee, ‘‘Coin, Contracting, and

Chicanery: Treasury and Justice Departments Fail to Coordinate,’’ focused on the failure of the U.S. government to keep Rich from receiving government contracts after he fled the U.S.179 The Subcommittee concluded that Rich’s Clarendon firm continued to provide the U.S. Mint with metals despite being debarred from government contracting.180 The Subcommittee also criticized the Justice

and Treasury Departments for failing to take any action against

Clarendon for over three years because of a series of missteps and

miscommunications.181

5. Actions Taken by the U.S. Against Rich’s Business

Interests

After they fled the country, several federal agencies took actions

against Rich and Green’s businesses. Notwithstanding their indictment and fugitive status, Rich and Green continued to contract

with several agencies within the U.S. government. Companies controlled by Rich and Green held contracts with the U.S. Mint as well

as the U.S. Department of Agriculture. These contracts continued

for several years until they were eventually reviewed by Congress

and relevant agencies. The Department of the Treasury also was

forced to block money destined for Rich and Green because of their

companies’ dealings with Cuba.

a. U.S. Mint Contract Cancellation

In the wake of Rich’s indictment, in 1985, one of his companies,

Clarendon, Ltd., was debarred from contracting with the federal

government by the Defense Logistics Agency. However, the debarment lasted only three years. Soon after that period, in July of

1988, Clarendon, Ltd. began contracting with the U.S. Mint to supply raw metal for producing coins. From 1989 through 1992,

Clarendon won numerous contracts to supply the mint with copper,

nickel, and zinc.182

Clarendon was able to secure the metal contracts because, from

mid-1988 on, the company was not listed on the GSA’s ‘‘Parties ExVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00144 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
129

183This scheme also led to a civil action against the company. See U.S. v. Clarendon, Ltd.

(D.D.C. Apr. 12, 1995) (CA 1:95CV00700). The charges were authorized under the signature of

Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder. 184 Rick Wartzman, Bid to End Pact to Clarendon Comes Amid Disputes Over Marc Rich’s Stake, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 1992, at B2a. 185 Id. 186Department of Agriculture Document Production (Letter from David P. Langlois, Partner,

Milgrim Thomajan & Lee, to Kenneth Gubin, Chief Counsel, U.S. Mint (Feb. 27, 1992)) (Exhibit

24). 187 Bruce Ingersoll, U.S. Suspends Grain Subsidies for Exporter, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 1989,

at sec. 3, p. 19. 188Department of Agriculture Document Production (Letter from R.E. Anderson, Jr., Vice

President of the Commodity Credit Corporation, Department of Agriculture, to Robert

Thomajan, Partner, Milgrim Thomajan & Lee (Sept. 29, 1989)) (Exhibit 25).

cluded from Procurement Programs’’ list. This was possible in part

because Marc Rich set up the management of the company so that

he was not the majority stockholder. By controlling 49 percent of

Clarendon’s stock, Rich could claim that he did not have control

over the company’s business decisions. This move, however, was

part of a scheme by Marc Rich in which he purchased back the remaining 51 percent of Clarendon through a wholly owned subsidiary of Marc Rich + Co., A.G.183 By the time Clarendon was reaping

the benefits of the new contract with the Mint, Marc Rich was in

full control of the company. The contracts were reported to be

worth up to $45.5 million to Marc Rich’s company.184 As discussed

above, this prompted congressional hearings and a subsequent report. Congressman Robert Wise of West Virginia, who chaired the

hearings, stated to the press, ‘‘[e]very time I reach into my pocket

for some change, I have to wonder if there’s a little bit of Marc Rich

in there.’’ 185 This attention by Congress eventually played a part

in ending Rich’s contracts with the U.S. Mint. In a letter on February 27, 1992, Rich’s lawyers announced that, ‘‘Clarendon does

not intend to participate in bid or contract opportunities with the

Mint in the foreseeable future.’’ 186

b. Suspension of Rich’s Grain Dealings

Between July of 1986 and September of 1989, one of Marc Rich’s

companies, Richco Grain Ltd., participated in the Commodity Credit Corporation’s Export Enhancement Program. The Department of

Agriculture used the program to sell American grain to overseas

customers at prices below U.S. market levels. The companies who

won the contracts received subsidies from the department in the

form of surplus grains. A tally by the Department showed that

Richco received $95 million worth of such U.S. grain through the

program.187 Rich made money through his sales of grain to China,

the Soviet Union, Romania, and Saudi Arabia.

After prompting from Congressman Dan Glickman and an investigation by the Inspector General, the Department of Agriculture

suspended Richco Grain Ltd. from participating in the program. A

letter written on September 29, 1989, by the Vice-President of the

Commodity Credit Corporation listed Rich and Green’s fugitivity

and indictment as reasons for the suspension.188 Notwithstanding

the suspension, Congressman Glickman continued to press the

Bush Administration on the matter. On March 4, 1992, Congressman Glickman wrote to President Bush to ask that the Department

of Agriculture permanently exclude Rich and Green from particiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00145 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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189Department of Agriculture Document Production (Letter from Dan Glickman, Chairman,

Subcommittee on Wheat, Soybeans, and Feed Grains, Committee on Agriculture, to President

George H.W. Bush (Mar. 4, 1992)) (Exhibit 26). 190Department of Agriculture Document Production (Letter from Allan V. Burman, Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, the White House, to Charles R. Hilty, Assistant Secretary for Administration, Department of Agriculture (Apr. 20, 1992)) (Exhibit 27). 191Department of Treasury Document Production 000022 (Memorandum from R. Richard

Newcomb, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of Treasury, to Peter

K. Nunez, Assistant Secretary of Enforcement of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of Treasury) (Exhibit 28). 192 Id. See 31 C.F.R. part 515. 193Department of Treasury Document Production (Letter from R. Richard Newcomb, Director

of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of Treasury, to Robert F. Fink, Partner,

Piper and Marbury (Dec. 27, 1995)) (Exhibit 29). 194 Id. 195Department of Treasury Document Production 000635 (Note from Compliance Programs

Division, Office of Foreign Assets Control) (Exhibit 1).

pating in the program by debarring them.189 The Bush Administration responded by referring Glickman’s letter to the Department of

Agriculture, requesting that the department ‘‘take action, if warranted, to see that no new contracts are awarded to Richco

Grain.’’ 190 It appears that no new contracts were awarded to Marc

Rich’s company.

It is troubling that a member of President Clinton’s own cabinet,

who, as a Member of Congress was justifiably concerned over Marc

Rich’s dealings with the Agriculture Department, was apparently

not consulted when the White House was considering the pardons.

As Secretary of Agriculture, Glickman could have provided insight

into the ways in which the fugitive from American justice continued to profit from the very government that had indicted him.

c. Cuban Asset Forfeiture

Marc Rich has also had Department of Treasury actions taken

against his companies because of his disregard for U.S. regulations

related to the embargo against Cuba. In late 1991, the Compliance

Programs Division of the Office of Foreign Assets Control blocked

more than $2.5 million relating to a $3.9 million deal for Cuban

sugar brokered by Marc Rich + Co., Ltd. in the United Kingdom.191

This transaction had run afoul of the Cuban Assets Control regulations.192 As R. Richard Newcomb, Director of the Office of Foreign

Assets Control explained to Rich attorney Robert Fink in a December 27, 1995, letter, these regulations prohibit transactions by persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction involving any property of Cuba or

Cuban nationals.193 According to Newcomb, Rich’s Cuban sugar

deal was clearly contemplated by the regulations and was therefore

illegal.194

In September of 1994, Marc Rich + Co., A.G. in Switzerland provoked a similar blocking of nearly $1 million in proceeds from an

oil deal with Venezuela going through Cuba. Internal notes of the

Compliance Programs Division indicate deep concern with attempts

by the Venezuelan state-run oil company to have the funds released. As the Compliance Division wrote in its internal notes, the

Venezuelan oil company ‘‘also stated that it ‘believes’ that Marc

Rich intended to resell the oil to Cuba, but that this particular

transfer did not relate to the sale of the oil to Cuba. If it did not

relate to Cuba, why did it reference Cuba?’’ 195 Ultimately, in February of 1995, the Department of Treasury unblocked the funds because, as it stated in one document, ‘‘Cuba does not have a direct

131

196Department of Treasury Document Production 000636 (License Request by J. Kerrigan,

Compliance Programs Division of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of Treasury

(Jan. 1, 1995)) (Exhibit 30). 197Marc Rich’s practice of hiring attorneys who are close to the parties investigating him has

continued to this day. In response to this Committee’s investigation, Rich and his attorneys have

hired an array of prominent Republicans, including the former personal attorneys to Chairman

Burton and the Committee’s former Chief Investigator. 198 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 438 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Lewis Libby, former counsel for Marc Rich, Dechert Price & Rhoads). 199 Id. Libby is currently Chief of Staff to Vice President Dick Cheney. 200 Id. 201 Id. 202 Id.

interest in the blocked transaction, which involves a Venezuelan

and a Swiss company[.]’’ 196

It does not appear that the Clinton Administration took into consideration the fact that Marc Rich and Pincus Green profited from

the United States while flouting its embargoes. Indeed, a review of

Rich and Green’s business relationships shows a complete disregard for the welfare of the United States and its citizens. Furthermore, Rich’s clever and illegal business schemes meant that

U.S. taxpayers’ money came out of agencies such as the U.S. Mint

and the Department of Agriculture and wound up in the pockets

of Rich and Green while they evaded the U.S. legal system, and

U.S. income taxation. This is one of the many reasons that Republicans and Democrats alike have been so critical of President Clinton’s decision to grant these men a pardon.

II. ATTEMPTS TO SETTLE THE MARC RICH AND PINCUS

GREEN CASE

A. Attempts to Settle in the 1980s

While living as fugitives in Switzerland, Marc Rich and Pincus

Green attempted to negotiate a settlement with the Southern District of New York. In addition to prominent lawyers such as Edward Bennett Williams, Rich and Green hired other well-known

and politically connected lawyers.197 In the Spring of 1985, they

hired President Richard Nixon’s attorney Leonard Garment.198

Around this same time, Garment hired Lewis ‘‘Scooter’’ Libby to

join his firm.199 Garment assigned Libby the task of assessing

whether or not there were legal defenses to the charges to which

Rich and Green’s companies had already pled guilty.200 As Libby

testified at the Committee’s March 1, 2001, hearing, he worked

with Robert Fink and other attorneys in an attempt to demonstrate

that Marc Rich’s companies ‘‘had properly reported their tax obligations and energy transactions and that these criminal charges

should be reexamined.’’ 201 Libby and the Rich legal team used

their analysis in an effort to negotiate a settlement with the Southern District on the outstanding indictment.202

It should be noted that Lewis Libby’s involvement in the Rich

matter—like that of Garment and former Reagan Justice Department official William Bradford Reynolds—was limited to settlement

negotiations and never included work on the pardon matter. Libby,

and to a lesser extent, Garment and Reynolds, have been mentioned by President Clinton and others as prominent Republicans

who supported the Rich pardon. This representation is inaccurate,

132

203 Id. 204 Id. On this occasion he also worked with Laurence Urgenson of Kirkland & Ellis. 205 Id. 206 Id. at 438–39. 207 Id. at 439. It appears that Rich’s lawyers considered approaching Libby to help with the

pardon effort, but were concerned that he would refuse them. On December 26, 2000, Robert

Fink sent the following e-mail to Jack Quinn and Michael Green:

Marc thought it made sense to call Scooter to see if he could be helpful, knowing he

might not be able to be helpful but that he would never do anything that hurt Marc.

I agreed and raised it with Mike Green. Mike is concerned that Scooter would want

to help but would feel he had to raise the matter with the ethics committee on the

transition and it would get caught up there, and we would effectively be bringing it

to the attention of a number of people who might not be helpful.

Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00398 (E-mail from Robert

Fink, Partner, Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe, to Jack Quinn and Michael Green, Partner,

Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky (Dec. 26, 2000)) (Exhibit 31). 208 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 268–69 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former

Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice). 209Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00697 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Feb. 10, 2000)) (Exhibit 32).

as Libby, Reynolds and Garment worked only on settlement negotiations, and did not work on the pardon. Libby’s efforts included

an attempt to negotiate a settlement with the Southern District of

New York in the late 1980s until he left to work at the Pentagon

in the first Bush Administration in 1989.203 When he returned to

private practice in 1993, Libby again attempted to achieve a settlement for Rich and Green.204 This attempt again failed by 1995.205

Libby’s final involvement in the Rich case was in 1999 and early

2000, when he briefed the newly-hired Jack Quinn on the legal

team’s previous efforts to reach a settlement with the Southern

District and helped prepare yet another request to the Southern

District.206 Libby was instructed to cease all work on behalf of Rich

and Green in the spring of 2000.207

Despite the fact that Rich and Green fled the country as a result

of their pending indictment, the Southern District of New York

continued to negotiate with lawyers like Fink, Libby and Garment

to try to achieve the return of Rich and Green to the United States.

In their appeals to President Clinton for a pardon, Rich’s lawyers

often claimed that the SDNY refused to negotiate with Rich. Nothing could be further from the truth. Despite the fact that Rich and

Green had fled the country, SDNY prosecutors continued to negotiate with Rich, even offering to reduce the charges against Rich

and Green in return for their surrender. For example, in the early

1990s, Otto Obermaier, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of

New York, traveled to Switzerland to meet with Rich and Green.

This was a highly unusual step for a United States Attorney to

make. In fact, Eric Holder testified at a Committee hearing that he

could think of no other instance in which a U.S. Attorney had traveled to a foreign country to negotiate with an indicted fugitive.208

Despite this accommodation, Rich and Green failed to reach an

agreement with the Southern District to return to the United

States to stand trial.

The SDNY also offered a number of other accommodations if

Rich would return to the U.S. to face the charges. For example,

prosecutors offered to agree in advance on bail, so that Rich would

not have to be incarcerated pending trial.209 They also offered to

have a full meeting with Rich’s attorneys, and conduct a complete

133

210 Id. 211 Id. 212 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 469 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink). 213Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00697 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Feb. 10, 2000)) (Exhibit 32). 214 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 469 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink). 215 Id. at 470.

review of the charges against Rich.210 Most importantly, they offered to drop the RICO charges against Rich and Green.211 Marc

Rich’s own lawyer, Robert Fink, confirmed that prosecutors offered

to drop the RICO charge as a result of negotiations.212 Fink wrote

about these negotiations in an e-mail he sent to Avner Azulay on

February 10, 2000, stating ‘‘I was told at one point that they would

drop the RICO charge if we wanted if Marc came in.’’ 213 Fink confirmed the substance of this e-mail at the Committee’s hearing:

Mr. LATOURETTE. Looking at [the February 10, 2000, email], or your recollection from the representation of Marc

Rich, is it accurate that at one point you were told that the

prosecuting authorities would drop the RICO charge if

Marc Rich returned to this country?

Mr. FINK. That was something that was discussed with me

in at least one meeting I had with the prosecutors.214

Given the fact that the SDNY had offered to drop the RICO

charges if Rich and Green returned to the U.S., it is interesting

that Quinn continued to cite the RICO charges as one reason the

pardon was necessary. Throughout the pardon petition, his contacts

with White House officials, and even his attempts to justify the

pardon after the fact, Quinn cited the RICO charges as a reason

Rich and Green fled the country rather than face trial. However,

the SDNY’s offer makes it clear that Quinn’s RICO argument, like

most of his other arguments, was false and misleading.

Finally, in addition to the offer to drop the RICO charges, prosecutors also offered another accommodation to Rich and Green. The

SDNY indicated it would agree to bail so that Rich and Green

would not have to be incarcerated while they stood trial. The only

condition of this offer was that they give up their passports.215

Even after the offers to drop RICO and allow bail was presented

to them, the two men still chose to remain fugitives and refused

to face the American judicial system.

B. Marc Rich’s Humanitarian Activities in the 1980s and

1990s

After he fled the United States, Marc Rich began to contribute

large sums of money to various humanitarian activities, mainly in

Israel and to Jewish communities in Europe and the United States.

Marc Rich’s contributions, beyond achieving their humanitarian

purposes, also served a useful purpose of making Rich a wellknown and respected figure in Israeli and Jewish political circles.

These contacts would prove useful both in Rich’s unsuccessful attempt to settle his indictment and in his successful campaign to

win a pardon.

134

216Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green 8 (Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III); LEON- ARD GARMENT, CRAZY RHYTHM 375 (1997). 217 Id. at 9; Jack Quinn Document Production (Background Memorandum to the Marc Rich

Case, Dec. 1997) at 5 (Exhibit 33). 218 Id. 219 Id. 220 Id. 221 Id. at 5–6. 222 Id. at 6. 223 Id. Itamar Rabinovich, now President of Tel Aviv University, wrote a letter of support for

the Rich pardon to President Clinton. 224 Id. 225 Id. 226 Id. 227 Id.

Rich also used his wealth to cultivate political contacts. In 1985,

after an Egyptian policeman shot and killed a number of Israeli

tourists at Ras Burka, Rich contributed $400,000 to a compensation fund which was established for the victims.216 More recently,

in 1995, Rich began to make offers of providing substantial sums

of money to help the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.217 According

to internal Marc Rich legal documents, Rich offered to help fund

the economic development of Palestinian territories as part of the

peace process.218 As part of his offer, Rich apparently told Israeli

officials that his ability to help was limited by his outstanding U.S.

indictment. Receptive Israeli officials then went to U.S. officials to

see what could be done to settle Rich’s case. According to an account of the negotiations prepared by Rich’s lawyers, the Israeli

government approached the Justice Department to discuss the Rich

case.219 Mark Richard, a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the

Criminal Division, informed the Israelis that while the Justice Department could not act directly on the Israeli request, the Justice

Department would ‘‘give serious consideration to a statement by

the State Department or the White House that the United States

had an interest in allowing Israel to obtain the active participation

of Rich in a Middle East Initiative.’’ 220

Following Mark Richard’s suggestion, the Israeli Foreign Ministry took the Rich case to the State Department. In July 1995, Uri

Savir, the Director General of the Foreign Ministry, presented Ambassador Dennis Ross with a briefing paper on the Rich case.221

Several months later, Ross informed Savir that the Rich case was

a ‘‘hot potato’’ and should not be pursued.222 Despite Ross’ rebuff,

then-Foreign Minister Shimon Peres instructed the Israeli Ambassador to the U.S., Itamar Rabinovich, to press the Rich matter with

the State Department.223 Peres himself also raised the Rich case

with Ross and the U.S. Ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk.224

While Ross did not respond to Peres, Indyk suggested that the Rich

case could be discussed at greater length by Israeli officials and the

State Department.225 Ambassador Rabinovich and his staff met

with a State Department official in October 1995 and discussed the

Rich case.226 In follow-up meetings with the State Department,

Israeli officials learned that they were not likely to win support

from the State Department for settling the Rich case.227 According

to the Israeli officials, State Department officials were concerned

about allegations that the Administration was interfering with law

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228 Id. 229 Id. at 7. 230 James Risen and Alison Leigh Cowan, U.S. Diplomats Turned Aside Israeli Push on Rich’s Behalf, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2001, at A1. 231Telephone Interview with Michael Steinhardt (Mar. 12, 2001). 232 As discussed in Section IV(A)(9) of the report, Kekst tried to disavow his role in helping

Marc Rich with negotiations and the pardon effort. It appears, however, that Kekst was deeply

involved in the pardon effort. 233 Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). To the best of

Kekst’s recollection, the Daimler Chrysler dinner took place in November of 1998. 234 Id.

ment that would follow if the public learned of a deal with Marc

Rich.228

According to the internal account prepared by the Marc Rich lawyers, Shimon Peres continued his efforts on behalf of Marc Rich

even after Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated and Peres became

Prime Minister.229 However, by 1996, as Israeli elections approached, Peres’ priorities shifted, and Israeli contacts with the

U.S. government on the Rich matter subsided until the pardon effort.

Other than the initial response from Mark Richard, it appears

that Justice Department and State Department officials were unified in their resistance to Israeli efforts to have the Rich case settled. The resistance of these government officials should be contrasted with the receptivity displayed by President Clinton and

Deputy Attorney General Holder for the much more drastic step of

pardoning Rich. Also noteworthy is the fact that this brief effort in

1995 appears to be the only time that Marc Rich’s name came up

in the context of the Middle East peace talks. To the extent that

Rich’s name came up, it appears to have been a minor matter that

never had any impact on the Middle East peace talks. Dennis Ross,

the Clinton Administration’s Middle East envoy, has stated that

Marc Rich ‘‘was not a factor in the Middle East talks.’’ 230 The fact

that Marc Rich was never a factor in the peace talks, either in

1995 or in 2000, suggests that President Clinton’s key justification

for the pardon—that it was important to Israel—is an after-the-fact

excuse that the President has put forward to cover up other motivations for the pardon.

C. Rich Hires Jack Quinn

After several years of failed negotiations with the Southern District of New York, Marc Rich and his team tried another approach

to resolve his case. Instead of dealing only with the federal prosecutors from New York, Rich began a process of going directly to the

Justice Department in Washington. Beginning sometime in 1997,

Michael Steinhardt, a prominent hedge-fund investor and friend of

Rich, recommended that Rich hire public relations consultant

Gershon Kekst to help with his case.231 Although Kekst was at

first reluctant to get involved, he eventually began working with

Rich to help resolve his legal troubles in the United States.232 It

was through Kekst’s efforts that Jack Quinn was hired to work on

the Marc Rich case.

Kekst explained that in late 1998, he attended a dinner celebrating the merger of Daimler Benz and Chrysler.233 At the dinner, he

was seated next to an individual he did not know, who explained

that he worked at ‘‘Main Justice.’’ 234 It turned out that this indiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00151 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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235 Id. 236 Id. 237 Id. 238 Id. 239 Id. 240 Id. 241 Id. 242 Id. 243 Id. 244 Id. 245 Id. 246 Id. 247 Id. 248 Id. At the Committee’s March 1, 2001, hearing, Fink testified that he asked Kekst to ‘‘rec- ommend someone who [he] called the white-haired man.’’ Fink testified that this expression referred to ‘‘someone who understood the entire political process.’’ ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of

International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong.

471 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink). 249 Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). 250 Alison Leigh Cowan and Raymond Bonner, Lawyer Tells of His Pursuit of Pardon for His

Client, and Conversation With Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2001, at A21. 251 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 216 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). 252 Id.

vidual was Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder.235 Kekst asked

this stranger to whom U.S. Attorneys are accountable.236 Holder

explained that they answer to Main Justice.237 Kekst had Marc

Rich in mind, but did not mention Rich’s name at the time.238

Kekst then asked Holder what someone should do if ‘‘they were improperly indicted by an overzealous prosecutor.’’ 239 Holder told

Kekst that a person in that situation should try to work it out and

resolve it.240 Holder further stated that, ‘‘lawyers know there is a

path back to DOJ, to me.’’ 241 Holder told Kekst that such a person

should ‘‘hire a lawyer who knows the process, he comes to me, and

we work it out.’’ 242 Kekst asked who such a lawyer would be, and

Holder pointed to an individual sitting at a nearby table and said,

‘‘there’s Jack Quinn. He’s a perfect example.’’ 243 According to

Kekst, Quinn was in attendance, but he did not discuss Marc Rich

or Eric Holder with Quinn at that dinner.244

Shortly after the Daimler Chrysler dinner, Kekst began to explore this new strategy. First, he worked to gather names of lawyers in addition to Jack Quinn who might be able to help Marc

Rich.245 By the time he met with Michael Steinhardt and Robert

Fink to discuss the Rich case several weeks later, Kekst recommended that Rich hire a senior Washington lawyer who could

intercede with the Justice Department in Washington.246 Kekst

then provided the names of three such lawyers who might be able

to help: Warren Christopher, Judah Best, and Jack Quinn.247

Kekst called each of the three to introduce them to Fink.248 According to Kekst, Warren Christopher said that taking the job would

be inappropriate since he had just come out of government.249 Fink

interviewed Best but did not like him enough to hire him for the

job. Rich, Fink, and Kekst eventually settled on Jack Quinn. As

Quinn explained to The New York Times, he traveled to Switzerland, studied the issues, and met with Marc Rich ‘‘not for hours,

but for days.’’ 250

Jack Quinn began working for Marc Rich in the spring of

1999.251 According to Quinn, he was hired at first, ‘‘not to go to the

White House, but to work with Main Justice and the Southern District of New York.’’ 252 It is noteworthy that Eric Holder’s recVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00152 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
137

253 Interview with Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 27, 2001). 254 Id. 255 Arnold & Porter Document Production A0507–10 (Letter from Kathleen Behan, Partner,

Arnold & Porter, to Marc Rich (July 21, 1999)) (Exhibit 34). 256 According to one magazine article about his departure from Arnold & Porter, Quinn brought $4.5 million in business to Arnold & Porter. The article continued:

But that’s small potatoes to what he can make on his own, because now Quinn is

not constrained by the hourly rate structure and will take equity stakes in start-up

companies in exchange for his services. That will give him the possibility of making

millions on one client when it goes public. Arnold & Porter, like almost all corporate

firms, does not allow equity participation with clients.

Kim Eisler, Old Political Opponents Join Forces for Lucrative Lobbying, WASHINGTONIAN, Feb.

2000, at 12. 257 Raymond Bonner and Alison Leigh Cowan, Notes Show Justice Official Knew of Pardon

Application, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2001, at A14.

ommendation to Gershon Kekst was the impetus for Marc Rich’s

hiring of Jack Quinn. Quinn had a warm relationship with Holder—Holder even solicited Quinn for support to have Holder nominated as Attorney General. This warm relationship appears to have

had a significant role in Holder’s support for the Rich pardon.

D. Quinn’s Fee Arrangements

Jack Quinn was a partner with the law firm of Arnold & Porter

when he began working for Marc Rich. Quinn also worked on the

Rich matter with Kathleen Behan, another Arnold & Porter partner. As Behan explained to Committee staff, although they were

not officially retained by Marc Rich until July of 1999, from February until July, Quinn and Behan were ‘‘engaged in a series of familiarization and preparatory efforts’’ to learn about the case ‘‘in

preparation for possible retention on the matter.’’ 253 Quinn and

Behan were officially retained after they met with Marc Rich in

Zug, Switzerland, in May of 1999 to discuss the representation.254

As the engagement letter explains, Quinn and Behan were hired

for a minimum rate of $55,000 per month for six months, totaling

$330,000, with an option to reconsider if their billable hours were

to ‘‘substantially exceed’’ $55,000 per month.255

1. Was Quinn Expecting Payment for His Work on the

Pardon?

In November 1999, just several months after he was hired by

Rich, Quinn left Arnold & Porter to form the lobbying firm of

Quinn and Gillespie.256 While Quinn brought Rich as a client to

the new firm, he did not sign a new retainer with Rich. Quinn continued to work for Rich at Quinn and Gillespie, both on negotiations with the Justice Department, and on lobbying for the pardon.

However, Quinn has taken the incredible position that he did not

expect to be paid for any of his work on the Rich case after he left

Arnold & Porter. In the first days of the uproar regarding the pardon, Quinn told The New York Times, ‘‘I have no understanding

with Marc Rich about future payments. If Marc Rich sent me a box

of Godiva chocolates tomorrow, it would be more than he is obligated to do.’’ 257 He expanded on this position at a Committee hearing:

Mr. BURTON. You left [Arnold & Porter], and I guess the

contract stayed with them; is that right? What happened?

They went on just to a fee-for-service with that law firm?

Mr. QUINN. Yes, sir.

138

258 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 242 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).

Mr. BURTON. And you have said that you didn’t receive

any fees from Mr. Rich. You said something about a box

of chocolates. It was all going to be voluntary if you got

that. That just seems very unusual to me. Don’t most attorneys have some kind of a contractual agreement when

they leave a law firm with a new client?

Mr. QUINN. Yeah. Let me try to explain this to you. The

fees you just reported were received by Arnold and Porter.

And, of course, as a partner, and because I had a contractual relationship with a firm, I benefited to some extent

from those fees. To another extent, the fees went to other

partners of the firm.

After leaving Arnold and Porter, I did consider and discuss

with Mr. Fink whether we should have a new arrangement. I came to the conclusion that, particularly because

of the fact that we were unsuccessful in achieving a resolution of this at the Southern District, and because I didn’t

think, frankly, there would be that much more additional

time in it, and because I believed that the earlier payments had been fair and reasonable, that I would see this

through to the end simply on the basis of the fees we had

been paid earlier.

Mr. BURTON. So you received nothing further from Mr.

Rich?

Mr. QUINN. I have not received any further fees from him

on this pardon matter.

Mr. BURTON. Have you received any fees from him for anything?

Mr. QUINN. No, sir.

Mr. BURTON. You’ve received no fees from Marc Rich or

his—how about any of his companies or friends or associates?

Mr. QUINN. No, sir.

Mr. BURTON. All that was received was from the—to the

law firm that you previously worked with?

Mr. QUINN. Right.

***

Mr. BURTON. Do you have any kind of understanding

where he is going to give you a lump sum of money or

funds down the road for the services you’ve rendered?

Mr. QUINN. No sir[.] 258

It is impossible to believe that Jack Quinn did his work on the

Rich pardon out of the goodness of his heart, on a pro bono basis.

139

259 In media accounts Quinn claimed that he spent 60–100 hours on the Rich pardon. These

claims simply are not credible. Kitty Behan, who was considerably less involved in the Rich pardon than Quinn spent 126 hours on the Rich pardon. Arnold & Porter Document Production

A0513–15, A1128 (Arnold & Porter billing records for Marc Rich (Jan. 16, 2001 and Feb. 23,

2001)) (Exhibit 35). It is likely that Quinn was underestimating his hours to the media to try

to support his claims that he was not expecting to be paid. 260See Arnold & Porter Document Production A0844 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Avner

Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Dec. 25, 2000)); Arnold & Porter Document Production

A0850 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Dec. 27,

2000)); Arnold & Porter Document Production A0861 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay,

Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Jan. 2, 2001)); Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00091 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation,

and Marc Rich (Dec. 28, 2000)); Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W

00097–98 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink (Dec. 31, 2000)) (Exhibit 36). 261 Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02847 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink (Feb.

3, 2000)) (Exhibit 37). 262Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00720–21 (E-mail from

Robert Fink to Marc Rich (Feb. 17, 2000)) (Exhibit 38).

Quinn apparently spent hundreds of hours 259 on the Rich matter,

calling and e-mailing his colleagues on the Rich legal team in the

middle of the night, on vacation, on Christmas Day, and New

Year’s Eve.260 While Quinn’s dedication to his client was admirable, it suggests that Quinn anticipated some satisfaction beyond

seeing Marc Rich and Pincus Green pardoned.

In addition to the common sense rejection of Quinn proceeding

on a pro bono basis, e-mails between Jack Quinn, Robert Fink, and

Marc Rich indicate that Rich was specifically contemplating entering into a large-dollar retainer agreement with Quinn after Quinn

left Arnold & Porter. These documents were withheld from the

Committee for over a year on the basis of a claim of attorney-client

privilege which was rejected by federal Judge Denny Chin. Once

provided to the Committee, the documents seriously undermined

Quinn’s claims that he never expected any payment from Rich. On

February 3, 2000, the day after the Southern District of New York

rejected Quinn’s request for a meeting to discuss the Rich case,

Quinn asked Fink about his status with Marc Rich, asking ‘‘not

that I’m concerned, but did marc decide to renew the retainer? I’ve

not heard anything.’’ 261 Two weeks later, Fink addressed Quinn’s

status in an e-mail to Marc Rich, suggesting that Quinn could still

be useful, despite his failure to date:

Separately, I have been thinking about your reaction to

Jack. When we meet [sic], he felt (and made it clear that

he believed this, but was not sure) that he could convince

Eric that it made sense to listen to the professors and that

he could convince Eric to encourage Mary Jo to do the

same. In this he was correct. Moreover, in the preparation

process, it became clear that Jack was not just a pretty

face but had thoughtful ideas and questions and was not

simply relying on his past contacts to make this happen.

So, I would not give up on him, at least not yet, as he is

still a knowledgeable guy who has a clear understanding

of relationships and what may be doable. While we may

get more than that, we should not have enlarged expectations.262

On February 29, 2000, Fink sent another message to Rich suggesting that he enter into a retainer agreement with Quinn while their

negotiations with the Justice Department were still pending:

140

263Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00722 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Marc Rich (Feb. 29, 2000)) (Exhibit 39). 264Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00731 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Marc Rich (June 6, 2000)) (Exhibit 40).

All in all, while he has been very busy and sometime hard

to get to, he has not separated himself from the matter

and has fully participated. He has not pushed me for the

retainer, though, and realizes that he does not have an

agreement with you. I think it makes sense to compensate

him for what he has done and may continue to do. Just

give it some more thought and we can come back to it

soon. We can wait, if you want, to see what Eric says, although it may pay to respond now, before Eric response

[sic] to the last message from Jack, so it does not look like

you were only willing to pay because of a positive response, as that was not the agreement. Even if we stop everything we are doing, and decide not to investigate the

pardon, etc., at this time, we should fold this down in a

friendly way.263

After the effort to settle the criminal case with the Justice Department failed, Fink continued to recommend that Rich enter into

a retainer agreement with Quinn, who was continuing to raise the

issue. On June 6, 2000, Fink sent the following e-mail to Rich:

Jack raised the question of his status. I told him that I felt

that you would feel that he had been compensated for the

past, even though the retainer had run out before he

stopped work, but that you would not want or expect him

to work without compensation going forward—indeed, you

appreciated that it was important to compensate people

who asked you to perform for you; although I thought you

would not want to get involved in another one of those six

month retainers.

Jack said he did not want to make a proposal that you

might find objectionable, but felt some clear arrangement

for the future was appropriate. I told him I hoped to see

you soon, and that I would raise it with you when I see

you and come back with a suggestion. He was happy with

that and we agreed to catch up with each other on this

issue in the beginning of July.264

At the beginning of July 2000, Fink e-mailed the figures for a proposed retainer agreement to Marc Rich:

Here is my proposal on Jack Quinn, consistent with your

advice to me.

Jack originally proposed a $50,000 per month retainer and

additional hourly charges for Kitty Behan. We settled at

$55,000 per month, including Kitty, which was a better

deal because at her hourly rate her billings would have

averaged over $10,000 per month. Moreover, we continued

to consult with Jack (and Kitty) after the retainer period

had ended so that the average blended rate for Jack was

well below $45,000. (OK, enough with making you feel better.)

141

265Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00732 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Marc Rich (July 7, 2000)) (Exhibit 41). 266 Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02973 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Gershon Kekst,

President, Kekst and Co. (Jan. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit 42). 267 Id.

At the moment the issue raised by you and Michael is how

to keep Jack on a ‘‘retainer’’ so that he is available for

questions that might arise and, more importantly, available in the Fall, if we want him to be. Since the Fall is

not far away, and you will know whether you want him to

gear up again within four months or so, I suggest that we

offer Jack $10,000 per month as a retainer to keep his

eyes, ears and brain open to events and thoughts that may

be helpful, with the understanding that if a decision is

made to proceed that we will renegotiate the monthly retainer to reflect the changed circumstances.

This arrangement could start mid-July or August 1st. He

has not pushed me for this and, indeed, we are the ones

who raised the idea of keeping him on a retainer. Still, if

we do go back to Jack and offer a package, we should not

schedule it to begin weeks after the proposal. So, if I were

to call him next week, I would want to suggest a July 15th

start date.265

Despite the clear and detailed indications that Rich and Quinn

were negotiating a lucrative retainer agreement, Quinn testified

that he never received any money from Marc Rich between the

time that he left Arnold & Porter and the time that the pardon was

granted. The Committee requested interviews with Jack Quinn and

Robert Fink so that they could provide further explanation regarding these e-mails. Both refused to participate in an interview.

2. Has Quinn Received Payments from Marc Rich

Since the Pardon Was Granted?

Because he spent so much time and effort on the Marc Rich pardon effort, and was successful, many believe that Quinn may have

expected some large payment from Rich after the pardon was

granted. Quinn has always denied these allegations. However,

among the documents withheld by Quinn, and which were forced

out by the decision of Judge Denny Chin in December 2001, were

documents which undermined Quinn’s denials. Shortly after the

pardon was granted, Quinn was asked by a reporter if he received

a fee for his work on the Rich matter. Rather than just saying ‘‘no,’’ it appears that Quinn did not know what to say. On January 23,

Quinn told Gershon Kekst that ‘‘Debra [sic] Orin wants to know if

I received a fee. My instinct is to either not respond or say that

I have never, in 25 yrs, thought it propoer [sic] to discuss a client

fee arrangement or even if there was one. What say you?’’ 266 Kekst

suggested a response that ‘‘[t]he privacy of my personal and professional relationships is inviolate and so I would not, as a lifelong

practice, discuss such a question. Suffice to say that in this case

my motivation was quite simple: an injustice needed to be corrected

and I determined to do what I could to help accomplish that.’’ 267

Quinn then fueled further speculation about his fee arrangement

when he told the press that he was handling the Rich pardon as

142

268 Alison Leigh Cowan and Raymond Bonner, Lawyer Tells of His Pursuit of Pardon for His

Client, and Conversation With Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2001, at A21. 269 Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02924 (E-mail from Marc Rich to Jack Quinn (Jan.

23, 2001)) (Exhibit 43). 270 Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02916 (E-mail from Marc Rich to Jack Quinn (Feb.

9, 2001)) (Exhibit 44). 271 Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02930 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Marc Rich (Feb.

9, 2001)) (Exhibit 45).

a ‘‘personal matter,’’ indicating he would not share the profits with

his partners at Quinn & Gillespie.268

E-mails between Marc Rich and Jack Quinn after January 20,

2001, suggest that Rich was seeking some way to show his thanks

to Quinn, perhaps alluding to a payment to Quinn. On January 23,

2001, Rich told Quinn that ‘‘As time goes by it’s sinking in more

and more and I once again want to thank you for all you’ve done.

I still want to thank you personally and properly on a separate occasion when we meet.’’ 269 After Quinn’s appearance before the

Committee, and on a number of television programs, Rich e-mailed

Quinn to congratulate him.270 Quinn responded with his own

thanks, and an assurance that he would continue to fight to point

out the flaws in Rich’s indictment.271

The most conclusive piece of evidence that Quinn fully intended

to be paid by Marc Rich for his work on the pardon came from Rich

lawyer Robert Fink at the Committee’s March 1 hearing. Fink confirmed that Rich fully intended to pay Quinn for his work. Fink’s

testimony also strongly suggests that Quinn was lying when he

stated that he had no expectation of being paid for his work on the

pardon:

COUNSEL. When Mr. Quinn began pursuing the pardon,

the prospect of a pardon, did you anticipate compensating

him for that work?

Mr. FINK. I anticipated that he would be compensated for

that work by Mr. Rich.

COUNSEL. And if you could, tell us what you were thinking.

Mr. FINK. Actually, I—I don’t know that I was thinking

anything other than he was entitled to some fair fee, the

exact parameters of which I did not have in mind. I believe

I told Mr. Quinn when we started to discuss the pardon

that we would find a fair fee arrangement for him consistent with whatever his fee arrangements were. I did not

know how he was handling his fee arrangements.

COUNSEL. Did you discuss with Mr. Rich compensating Mr.

Quinn?

Mr. FINK. Could you excuse me just one moment?

COUNSEL. Certainly.

[Mr. Fink confers with counsel.]

Mr. FINK. The answer is yes, I did. I communicated

thoughts I had to Mr. Rich, with which he did not disagree.

COUNSEL. And what did you communicate to him?

143

272 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 505–06 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink).

Mr. FINK. I actually communicated to him what I told to

Mr. Quinn.

COUNSEL. And what was that?

Mr. FINK. That we would come to a fair fee arrangement

that was consistent with his normal fee arrangements.

COUNSEL. So you had communicated to Mr. Quinn that

you would come to an arrangement with him to compensate him?

Mr. FINK. Yes.

COUNSEL. And when was that?

Mr. FINK. The precise date I do not know, but it was most

likely early November 2000.

COUNSEL. And when did you stop thinking that was going

to be the case?

Mr. FINK. I stopped thinking that was going to be the case

during the first hearings of this committee.

COUNSEL. When I was asking Mr. Quinn about his compensation?

Mr. FINK. I believe you were the questioner.

COUNSEL. I’m not quite sure where to go after that. But

you had not had a conversation with Mr. Quinn during

which you had discussed the prospect of him not being

compensated up until at least the time of our last hearing;

is that correct?

Mr. FINK. It was always my contemplation, I mean, not

that I reflected on this frequently, but if you had stopped

me at any point in time and said would you expect that

Mr. Quinn would be compensated for this work, I would

have thought that he would be.272

Fink’s testimony, in addition to the circumstantial evidence, establishes that Quinn expected to receive payment for his work on the

Rich pardon. It is likely that Quinn attempted to mislead the public and the Committee on this point to try to improve the public

perception of his actions in this case. That is, if Quinn could say

he did all of his work on the Rich pardon out of his belief in the

merits, rather than his belief in a large payday, it would show the

strength of the Rich case.

Knowing now that Quinn did do his work on the Rich pardon

with an expectation of payment, the question is—how large of a

payment would Quinn receive? Fink loosely characterized it as

‘‘consistent with his normal fee arrangements.’’ However, given the

enormous sums at Rich’s disposal, and the vast amounts Rich had

spent, unsuccessfully, to resolve his case, it is not unreasonable

that Rich would pay Quinn a large sum of money. However, at the

Committee’s February 8, 2001, hearing, Quinn pledged not to accept any future payment on the Rich case:

144

273 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 266 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).

COUNSEL. Mr. Quinn, the Chair asked you some questions

about compensation. Apart from your attorney’s fees, will

you accept any money from Mr. Rich in the future?

Mr. QUINN. Well, look, I don’t think it would be fair to ask

me to commit never to accept moneys from him. As I’ve

said to you, if I do work that justifies my billing him for

it, I will do so. I expect to be reimbursed for the expenses

I’m put to in connection with this. Those are the only moneys I anticipate receiving from him.

COUNSEL. But as far as your work done in pursuit of obtaining a pardon for him, you do not anticipate him—

you’re not going to ask him to pay you any money?

Mr. QUINN. That’s correct.

COUNSEL. You’re not going to accept any money if he did

offer it to you; is that correct?

Mr. QUINN. I only anticipate receiving from him moneys in

connection with work I may do.

COUNSEL. My question was, will you accept any money if

he offers it to you for the work you did in obtaining the

pardon?

Mr. QUINN. I have no idea what he might offer. It’s a hypothetical question. I don’t think I should be required to

say—

COUNSEL. It’s not a hypothetical question. It’s a very clear

question. If Mr. Rich offers to pay you money in the future

for work you did in pursuit of obtaining his pardon, will

you accept it or will you not accept it?

Mr. QUINN. I will not bill him, and I will not accept any

further compensation for work done on the pardon.273

However, in February 2002, as a result of Judge Chin’s decision

in the Southern District of New York, the Committee received a

number of documents which had been earlier withheld from the

Committee on the basis of attorney-client privilege. One of the emails provided to the Committee indicated that on March 5, 2001,

after the Committee’s second and final hearing on the Marc Rich

pardon, Quinn asked Rich to enter into a new retainer agreement

to pay Quinn. Quinn’s e-mail reads as follows:

Greetings. Quite a month we have had! If you are agreeable, and I hope you are, I need to fax to you in the next

few days a new retainer agreement. I cannot, under the

D.C. Bar rules continue to work without a written agreement, and I have been crafting one which I will forward

shortly. I hope that, in recent days, the public has begun

to see your pardon in a different light. I particularly

thought that our hearing last Thursday brought to the fore

145

274 Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02916 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Marc Rich (Mar.

5, 2001)) (Exhibit 44). 275 Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02974 (E-mail from Marc Rich to Jack Quinn (Mar.

6, 2001)) (Exhibit 46). 276Michael Isikoff, Secret E-Mail, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 10, 2002. 277Telephone Interview with Neal Katyal, Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law

Center (Mar. 26, 2001). 278 Id. 279 Id. 280 Id. Katyal further explained that Quinn already had an independent relationship with

Holder and would not have needed Katyal’s assistance in setting up any meetings between

them.

aspects not previously appreciated. About all this I hope

we shall speak soon. Best to you.274

Rich responded to Quinn by telling him: ‘‘[w]ith reference to your

email of March 5, please go ahead and send me the new retainer

agreement.’’ 275 Neither Quinn nor Robert Fink provided the Committee with a copy of any retainer agreement, or any further emails regarding payments from Rich to Quinn after March 5, 2001.

However, the March 5 e-mail raises the possibility that Quinn is

receiving payment from Rich, despite his express promise to the

contrary at the Committee’s February 8 hearing. The Committee

requested an interview with both Quinn and Fink to provide further explanation for these e-mail messages, but both declined to

participate. While Quinn has refused to provide an explanation to

the Committee, his spokesman has told the press that Quinn has

signed a new retainer with Rich to ‘‘cover new legal matters.’’ 276

The Committee will continue to investigate this matter to determine the nature of Quinn’s work for Rich and the amounts that

Quinn is being paid.

E. Quinn’s Attempts to Settle the Case

In October 1999, Quinn followed the advice offered by Eric Holder to Gershon Kekst and approached Main Justice in an effort to

settle the Rich case. He started by drafting a presentation for the

Justice Department. Quinn also hired Neal Katyal, a lawyer who

interned for Quinn when he was Counsel to Vice President Gore.277

Katyal had also worked as National Security Advisor to Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder. According to Katyal, he was hired

more as a consultant than as a lawyer.278 Katyal characterized the

presentation he helped prepare as more marketing than legal.279

Katyal helped draft documents that were presented to Eric Holder.

He denied contacting Holder directly, or using his access to Holder

to benefit the Rich lawyers. However, he did acknowledge that on

several occasions Jack Quinn told him, ‘‘you know, I want to talk

to Eric about this.’’ 280

Quinn had a number of contacts with Holder about settling the

Rich case. It appears that Quinn’s main request to Holder was that

he intercede with the Southern District of New York and have the

Southern District’s prosecutors meet with the members of the Marc

Rich legal team. On October 22, 1999, Quinn met with Holder for

the first time regarding the Rich case. Quinn reviewed a number

of points about the Rich case with Holder, and asked that Holder

intervene with the Southern District of New York, to encourage the

Southern District to meet with Marc Rich’s lawyers and reach a

146

281 Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn) (Exhibit 47). 282 Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn (Nov. 8, 1999)) (Exhibit 48). 283 Id. 284 Id. 285 Id. 286 Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn and Kathleen Behan, Partner,

Arnold & Porter, to Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Dec.

1, 1999)) (Exhibit 49). 287 Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn) (Exhibit 50). 288 Id. 289 Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney for the

S.D.N.Y., to Jack Quinn and Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 2, 2000)) (Exhibit

51). 290 Id.

settlement of the criminal case.281 On November 8, 1999, Holder

called Quinn and told him that he and other senior staff at the

Justice Department believed that the refusal of the Southern District to meet with Rich’s lawyers was ‘‘ridiculous.’’ 282 Holder recommended that Quinn send a letter requesting a meeting to U.S.

Attorney Mary Jo White, with copies to Holder and Assistant Attorneys General James Robinson and Loretta Collins Argrett.283

Holder told Quinn that once he got the letter, he would call White

and suggest that she should meet with Quinn.284 Holder also told

Quinn that he was assigning one of his top deputies, David

Margolis, to look at the Rich matter.285

After Holder spoke with Mary Jo White about a meeting with

Quinn and members of the Rich legal team, Quinn made a direct

appeal to Mary Jo White, writing her on December 1, 1999:

We would like to begin by asking that you or your representative, along with representatives of the Tax and

Criminal Divisions of the Department of Justice, meet

with Professors Wolfman and Ginsburg, and members of

our legal team, to personally evaluate their conclusions.

We urge this approach because the tax allegations underlie

so much of the indictment, and because the merits of our

tax position can be quickly evaluated. We believe that such

a meeting will advance a resolution of this matter. We further believe that we can persuade you that neither the law

nor the policies of the Department of Justice support the

RICO charges and that, in this regard, too, the indictment

as currently drafted should not stand.286

On January 18, 2000, Quinn spoke to Holder to see how Mary

Jo White had received his letter. Holder told Quinn that he had

spoken to White, and that she was reviewing the matter personally. Holder told Quinn that he would ‘‘do what he can,’’ 287 and

also provided encouragement to Quinn, telling him that White

‘‘didn’t sound like her guard was up.’’ 288 On February 2, 2000, the

Southern District responded to Quinn and Behan’s letter by turning down their request to meet in order to modify the indictment.289 As Mary Jo White further explained in her letter to

Quinn, ‘‘I have communicated with representatives of the Deputy

Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, and with the Acting Assistant Attorney General of the Tax

Division. They all concur that this is a matter within the discretion

of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New

York.’’ 290 White’s letter was a complete rejection of the overtures

147

291Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00697 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Feb. 10, 2001)) (Exhibit 32). 292 Id. 293Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00701 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Marc Rich (Feb. 17, 2001)) (Exhibit 52). 294 Jack Quinn Document Production (Memorandum entitled ‘‘Why DOJ Should Review the

Marc Rich Indictment’’ (Feb. 28, 2000)) (Exhibit 53). 295 Id. 296 Id. 297 Id.

made by Quinn and Holder, and was a significant setback for the

Marc Rich legal team. Robert Fink sent an e-mail to Avner Azulay

explaining that ‘‘[w]e received a negative response to our overture

from [Deputy U.S. Attorney] Shira[h Neiman]. She said her office

will not negotiate while Marc is away, and that the DoJ agrees. JQ

was surprised and disappointed that the DoJ had agreed even

though he had not heard from Eric.’’ 291 Azulay responded that ‘‘I

am not exactly surprised. I foresaw this answer from the moment

I read JQ’s ltr. I hate to say that ‘I told you so.’ I was surprised

by JQ’s optimistic report.’’ 292

After this rejection, Quinn turned his efforts to Eric Holder, asking him to review the Rich case, despite White’s refusal to do so.

Robert Fink laid out Quinn’s proposed plan of action in a February

17, 2000, e-mail to Marc Rich:

[Jack] agrees (subject to further discussion) with trying to

have Eric help us meet with the tax lawyers in Main Justice (and maybe the head of the criminal division) to see

if the professors can convince the chief government tax

lawyers that this was a bad tax case. He also agrees that

such a conclusion would be useful for many purposes including going back to the SDNY. Similarly, he agrees we

should make something of the fact that the office was dealing with fugitives (who surrendered this week) in connection with the Russian money laundering case, while insisting that they can’t deal with fugitives. Still, he wants to

give Eric a short list of what is wrong with the indictment

as he agreed to do that. He feels we can do both.293

On February 28, 2000, Quinn sent Holder a short memorandum

entitled ‘‘Why DOJ Should Review the Marc Rich Indictment.’’ 294

In this memorandum, Quinn stated that ‘‘[t]he refusal of the SDNY

to participate in a discussion of the Marc Rich case is sorely disappointing. That office (and DOJ) should not sit on a defective indictment.’’ 295 Quinn then explained why he believed that the

RICO, mail fraud, wire fraud, tax evasion, and energy charges

against Rich were faulty.296 Quinn also claimed that the SDNY

had recently negotiated with fugitive Russian money launderers,

despite their policy against negotiating with fugitives. Quinn also

stated that ‘‘[t]he DOJ website lists Marc Rich on its International

Fugitive page. This involves USG resources and is a potential embarrassment for DOJ.’’ 297 Quinn did not provide any explanation,

though, of why listing Rich as a fugitive would be an embarrassment for DOJ, given the fact that the Justice Department had been

trying to extradite or apprehend him for almost 20 years. Holder

apparently reviewed Quinn’s arguments, but failed to help Quinn.

148

298 Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink (Mar. 14, 2000))

(Exhibit 54). Quinn’s suggestion to ‘‘move on the GOI front’’ was rebuffed by Avner Azulay, who

stated that ‘‘there is no way the MOJ [Israeli Minister of Justice] is going to initiate a call to

EH—a minister calling a second level bureaucrat who has proved to be a weak link.’’ Piper

Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00728 (E-mail from Avner Azulay,

Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink (Mar. 18, 2000)) (Exhibit 55). 299 Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn) (Exhibit 56). In this conversation,

Holder also answered Quinn’s arguments regarding the SDNY’s negotiations with the fugitive

Russian money launderers, pointing out that they, unlike Rich, agreed to cooperate with the

government. 300 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 230 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). 301 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 231 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice).

Quinn spoke to Holder on March 14, 2000, and reported back to

Fink, Behan, and Kekst:

[W]e spoke briefly today. it started out badly—‘‘we’ve gone

as far as we can go, can’t figure out a way around Shira[h

Neiman], etc.’’—but I pushed back hard on the russian

money laundering culprits and the uneven treatment of

marc. he wants to talk further about that with his people,

said he’d call me back tomorrow. it’s time to move on the

GOI [Government of Israel] front.298

Holder did speak to Quinn almost a month later, on March 25,

2000, and told him that ‘‘we’re all sympathetic’’ and that the ‘‘equities [are] on your side.’’ 299 However, Holder apparently informed

Quinn that he could not force a meeting on the Rich case.

At the Committee’s February 8, 2001, hearing, Jack Quinn confirmed that Holder was sympathetic to his cause:

I certainly formed the impression that there was, as one

of my notes reflect, a view among some senior people in

Main Justice that the equities were on our side in some

senses.

Again, I’m not trying to overstate this. I’m not trying to

say that I believed that senior people at Main Justice

thought the indictment was meritless, but I did absolutely

believe that Main Justice thought that the Southern District was being unreasonable in being unwilling to talk to

us. I thought that there was a more sympathetic audience

at Main Justice.300

However, Eric Holder attempted to qualify his support of Jack

Quinn’s arguments:

With regard to question of equities and whether or not we

thought the Southern District was being unreasonable, I

think Mr. Quinn was just a little confused. What we were

talking about there was them being unreasonable and not

having the meeting. The equities were on their side, as

Mr. Quinn’s side, with regard to the meeting. No one at

Main Justice thought that, with regard to the substance,

the equities were on Mr. Quinn’s side.301

Even assuming, though, that Holder’s support was limited to his

request for a meeting with Mary Jo White, it is still unclear why

he thought the ‘‘equities were on Quinn’s side,’’ even with respect

to a meeting. The SDNY had a number of meetings and negotiaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00164 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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302See, e.g., ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before

the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 45 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). 303 Arnold & Porter Document Production (Privilege Log, Mar. 27, 2001) (Exhibit 57). The

privilege log notes that a memorandum regarding the pardon power was prepared on March 12,

1999, and withheld from the Committee on the basis of the attorney work product privilege.

tions with Rich’s attorneys, both before and after Rich’s flight from

the U.S. The SDNY had made a number of reasonable offers to settle the case, and U.S. Attorney Otto Obermaier and one of his senior aides even met with Rich in Switzerland. Rich’s lawyers, however, took an inflexible position that they would not agree to any

plea that required jail time. Given this position, the SDNY decided

further negotiations would not be productive. For Holder to characterize the SDNY’s position as ‘‘ridiculous,’’ suggests that Eric Holder supported Quinn’s efforts to settle the Rich case from the beginning.

III. THE MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN PARDON PETITION

A. Rich Contemplated a Pardon Early in 2000

Jack Quinn and others on the Marc Rich legal team have maintained that they did not decide to seek pardons for Rich and Green

until October 2000.302 However, there is extensive evidence that

Marc Rich and his lawyers were contemplating a pardon as early

as February 2000, while they were still attempting to settle Rich’s

criminal case with the Southern District of New York. It appears

that Rich and his legal team viewed the Presidential pardon effort

as a fall-back in case they were unable to settle the criminal case.

Moreover, it appears that although they were considering petitioning for a pardon as early as February 2000, Rich and his legal

team waited until November 2000 to submit their petition.

As discussed previously, on February 2, 2000, Mary Jo White,

the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, rejected

Jack Quinn’s offer to meet regarding the Marc Rich case. After

White’s rejection, Jack Quinn turned again to Deputy Attorney

General Eric Holder, and asked him to intervene and force a reconsideration of the Marc Rich indictment. By late March 2000, it became clear to Quinn that Holder was sympathetic to Quinn’s requests, but would not force the Southern District to meet with

Quinn. However, during the time that Quinn was discussing his request for a meeting with Eric Holder, the Marc Rich legal team

was already considering a Presidential pardon.

A privilege log submitted to the Committee by Arnold & Porter

suggests that attorneys working for Marc Rich had been researching Presidential pardons as early as March 1999.303 It appears,

though that serious consideration of a pardon began in February

2000, while Quinn was still attempting to settle the criminal case

through Eric Holder. February 9, 2000, Robert Fink sent an e-mail

to Jack Quinn and Kathleen Behan, which referred to the pardon

effort cryptically as the ‘‘second option:’’

I briefed Marc and he is awaiting word on your call. (I

have also sent Avner a briefed [sic] email letting him know

of the current status.) I also told Marc that I would discuss

with you and Kitty your views on the second option

150

304Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00695 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Jack Quinn and Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 9, 2000)) (Exhibit 58). 305Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 01202–03 (Notes of Robert

Fink, Feb. 14, 2000) (Exhibit 59). 306Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00722 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Marc Rich (Feb. 29, 2000)) (Exhibit 39). 307Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00729 (E-mail from Avner

Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink (Mar. 18, 2000)) (Exhibit 60).

(whether there is any reason to consider it, or whether

what happened here made it so unlikely that you did not

think it worthwhile, as I told him that you would not work

on it unless you thought there was some possibility of success). He was curious as to your thinking. I told him I

would also check on your thinking on what Avner was

doing. but let’s see what Eric says.304

On February 14, 2000, Fink had a telephone discussion with Quinn

regarding the efforts to settle Rich’s criminal case in New York.

Quinn apparently mentioned the possibility of seeking a Presidential pardon, as Fink’s notes of the call state in part, ‘‘Pardon—

mid to late Nov.’’ 305 Two weeks later, Robert Fink sent another email to Marc Rich explaining Quinn’s role in the negotiations with

the Justice Department, and his potential role in seeking a Presidential pardon. Fink concluded his e-mail to Rich by suggesting

that Rich enter into a retainer agreement with Quinn before they

heard back from Eric Holder:

I think it makes sense to compensate him for what he has

done and may continue to do. Just give it some more

thought and we can come back to it soon. We can wait, if

you want, to see what Eric says, although it may pay to

respond now, before Eric response [sic] to the last message

from Jack, so it does not look like you were only willing

to pay because of a positive response, as that was not the

agreement. Even if we stop everything we are doing, and

decide not to investigate the pardon, etc., at this time, we

should fold this down in a friendly way.306

On March 18, 2000, Avner Azulay sent Fink an e-mail which

again alluded to the possibility of seeking a pardon in November

2000. More importantly, this e-mail also raised the possibility of

capitalizing on Denise Rich’s relationship with President Clinton:

I had a long talk with JQ and Michael. I explained why

there is no way the MOJ [Israeli Minister of Justice] is

going to initiate a call to E[ric] H[older]—a minister calling a second level bureaucrat who has proved to be a weak

link. We are reverting to the idea discussed with Abe—

which is to send D[enise] R[ich] on a ‘‘personal’’ mission to

N01. with a well prepared script. IF it works we didin’t

[sic] lose the present opportunity—until nov—which shall

not repat [sic] itself. If it doesn’t—then probably Gershon’s

course of acion [sic] shall be the one left option [sic] to

start all over again.307

At the March 1, 2001, hearing on the Rich pardon, Jack Quinn and

Robert Fink were asked to explain their understanding of this communication. Fink stated that he understood ‘‘N01’’ to mean PresiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00166 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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308 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 515 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink). 309 Id. at 396 (testimony of Jack Quinn). 310 Id. at 515 (testimony of Robert Fink). 311 Id. at 396 (testimony of Jack Quinn). 312 Id. 313 Id. at 516 (testimony of Robert Fink). 314This also tends to suggest that while the attorneys were not working on a pardon effort

in March of 2000, the idea had already been discussed.

dent Clinton.308 However, neither of the two attorneys could provide a definitive answer as to whether Denise Rich actually undertook the ‘‘ ‘personal’ mission’’ to the President contemplated in the

e-mail. For example, Quinn provided the following response:

Now, I’m telling you, I did not speak to the President in

the year 2000 about the Marc Rich matter. I was not a recipient of this [e-mail]. I have no reason to believe that

anyone asked Denise Rich to speak to him about this matter, and I have no reason to believe that she did so. But

my firsthand knowledge of this is limited to the facts I’m

able to testify to.309

When asked what Denise Rich’s involvement was around this time,

Robert Fink provided an even more lawyerly response: ‘‘I have an

imperfect memory, so I’ll be careful. I believe as I sit here that

there was no involvement by Denise Rich in Mr. Rich’s problems

during that period of time. I have absolutely no recollection that

she became involved in any way.’’ 310

Furthermore, neither attorney could give a definitive answer as

to whether this ‘‘well prepared script’’ for Denise Rich related to

the pardon, or to negotiations with the Department of Justice. During questioning about the March 18, 2000, e-mail, Quinn testified

that it was possible that ‘‘every one of us involved in this thought

out loud with each other, is there any way to persuade the President to tell Justice, to tell the southern district to do something.’’ 311 Quinn continued, however, stating, ‘‘It’s also entirely

possible that Mr. Azulay, others, myself included, were involved in

a conversation where someone said you know we are going to try

to pardon one of these days.’’ 312 Robert Fink’s testimony, while

also not definitive, suggests that the script related to negotiations

with the Department of Justice. When asked about the last sentence of Azulay’s e-mail that discusses reverting to ‘‘Gershon’s

course of action’’ if Denise Rich’s script were to fail, Fink stated,

‘‘I suspect that he’s talking about an application for a pardon

here.’’ 313 Assuming Fink’s supposition is correct, then the script for

Denise would have related to Department of Justice negotiations.314

In June 2000, Robert Fink had further communications with

Marc Rich indicating that they were intentionally waiting until

after the November 2000 election to petition for a Presidential pardon:

Jack Quinn and I traded calls until today. He is well and

doing well. He has not forgotten you or what we set out

to do, but has pretty much concluded that there is nothing

to do until we get closer to (or even passed) [sic] the elecVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00167 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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315Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00731 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Marc Rich (June 6, 2000)) (Exhibit 40). 316Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00732 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Marc Rich (July 7, 2000)) (Exhibit 41). 317 Interview with Abraham Foxman, National Director, Anti-Defamation League (Mar. 19,

2001). 318 Id. Marc Rich has charged on a number of occasions that he was singled out for prosecution because he was Jewish. There is no support for Mr. Rich’s assertion. Mr. Rich’s decision

to play the race card emphasizes the extent to which he has failed to accept responsibility for

his crimes. Rather than recognizing the extent of his criminal acts, of which violation of Department of Energy regulations and the Tax Code were among the least, Rich has made baseless

accusations against federal prosecutors. 319 Id. 320 Id. 321 Id. According to Foxman, Rafiah is now a lobbyist for ‘‘commercial interests.’’ Id. Lobbying

registration materials from the FEC indicate that Rafiah’s main client is Elisra Electronic Systems Ltd., a company that develops and manufactures electronic warfare systems. Lobbying

Registration of Zvi Rafiah (visited Feb. 16, 2001) <http://www.tray.com/cgi-win/bna—mach.exe>

(Exhibit 61). 322 Id. 323 Id.

tion, or as he put it, the closing days of the current administration.315

In July 2000, Fink again e-mailed Rich suggesting that Rich sign

a retainer agreement with Quinn so that he would be available to

work in the Fall of 2000:

At the moment the issue raised by you and Michael is how

to keep Jack on a ‘‘retainer’’ so that he is available for

questions that might arise and, more importantly, available in the Fall, if we want him to be. Since the Fall is

not far away, and you will know whether you want him to

gear up again within four months or so, I suggest that we

offer Jack $10,000 per month as a retainer to keep his

eyes, ears and brain open to events and thoughts that may

be helpful, with the understanding that if a decision is

made to proceed that we will renegotiate the monthly retainer to reflect the changed circumstances.316

This documentary evidence is supported by the information provided by two witnesses who indicate that they were aware of pardon discussions well before the Fall of 2000. Abraham Foxman, the

National Director of the Anti-Defamation League, informed the

Committee that he recommended that Rich seek a Presidential pardon as early as February 2000. Foxman first met Marc Rich fifteen

years ago through mutual friend Max Maxin who was President of

B’nai B’rith.317 According to Foxman, Maxin asked Foxman to meet

with Rich ‘‘because Rich felt that there may have been anti-Semitism involved in his prosecution.’’ 318 According to Foxman, he met

Rich in Europe sometime in late 1998 or early 1999.319 Foxman

told Rich at that meeting that he did not see any evidence to support a charge of anti-Semitism.320 Later, in February of 2000,

Foxman was contacted by Zvi Rafiah, who was then congressional

liaison for the Israeli Embassy in Washington.321 Rafiah suggested

that Foxman go to Paris to meet with Avner Azulay, the former

Mossad agent who managed Marc Rich’s philanthropic organizations.322 At that meeting in Paris, Foxman allegedly told Azulay

that if the attorneys for Rich continued to be unsuccessful in their

negotiations with the prosecutors in New York, a pardon might be

a ‘‘long-shot’’ possibility to consider.323 Foxman told Azulay that, to

153

324 Id. 325 Id. 326 Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). 327 Id. 328 Id. 329 Id. 330 Id. 331 Id. 332Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00073 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Jack Quinn (Dec. 26, 2000)) (Exhibit 62). 333 Id. 334Telephone interview with William P. Barr (Mar. 10, 2002).

the best of his knowledge, Denise Rich ‘‘hated Marc Rich’s guts,’’

but that if someone could convince her to speak to the President,

‘‘then you have the beginning of a pardon situation.’’ 324 Foxman

later learned that, ‘‘as it turns out, that is what happened.’’ 325

Publicist Gershon Kekst claims that he mentioned the possibility

of a Presidential pardon to Rich’s lawyers as early as 1999. Kekst

had been hired by Rich to assist with strategy and public relations

relating to his criminal case.326 In 1999, the same time period in

which Kekst was looking for a Washington lawyer to represent

Rich, Kekst was giving general thought to the Rich case, including

his basic conclusion that a public relations campaign could not help

Rich. Seeking to conduct a ‘‘sanity check’’ on his conclusion, Kekst

turned to former Attorney General William P. Barr, the Senior Vice

President and General Counsel for Verizon Communications. Kekst

met Barr through public relations work he did for Verizon Communications.327 Kekst claimed that he was unaware at that time that

Barr had been U.S. Attorney General.328 However, Kekst was impressed with Barr’s legal acumen, and thought that he could offer

some insight into the Rich case. Kekst called Barr, and asked him

whether he thought that a public relations campaign would be useful in trying to resolve the Rich case.329 Kekst claims that Barr

told him that a public relations campaign was the worst thing he

could do. According to Kekst, Barr told Kekst that, assuming the

Rich case was a bad case, the most that Rich could do was wait

until the end of the Administration and seek a pardon from President Clinton.330 Kekst stated that before Barr’s suggestion, he had

never heard any discussion of Rich seeking a Presidential pardon.

Kekst also believes that Barr told him that even if the case against

Rich was not justified, as long as Mary Jo White was U.S. Attorney

and Rudolph Giuliani was Mayor, there was nothing to be done.331

The latter point appears to have been the main thing taken away

from the conversation by Kekst and those on the Rich team who

he informed about the conversation with Barr. In December 2000,

Robert Fink e-mailed Jack Quinn and reminded him that Kekst

had spoken to Barr in 1999, and that Barr believed ‘‘it paid to wait

for the new administration and the retiring of several of the thencurrent players.’’ 332 Fink then suggested that they ask Barr to assist with the pardon effort, but apparently, Quinn and Fink decided

not to include a prominent Republican in their efforts.333

For his part, Barr recalls that he told Kekst that political pressure would be a ‘‘waste of time.’’ 334 Barr explained to Kekst that

the Justice Department supported the Southern District of New

York prosecutors because it was a matter of significant principle

154

335 Id. 336 Id. 337 Id. 338Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, Memorandum in Support of Petition- ers’ Application for Pardon 4 (Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III).

for the Department.335 He also told Kekst that it was inconceivable

that any relief was possible as long as Rich remained a fugitive.336

In short, Barr believed that the White House would never do anything for Rich unless Rich were willing to surrender himself and

accept responsibility for what he had done.337

In the days immediately following the Rich pardon, Jack Quinn

and the other lawyers for Marc Rich emphasized that they did not

decide to seek a pardon for Rich until October 2000. What they did

not make clear, however, was that they were actively considering

a pardon much earlier. They decided to wait until the closing days

of the Clinton Administration to apply for the pardon. While the

reasons for the delay are not clear, there are two likely reasons:

first, by waiting until December to apply, opponents of the pardon

would have a limited amount of time to learn of and resist the pardon effort; second, the Clinton White House would have limited

time to conduct a detailed review of the petition and learn of its

numerous flaws.

B. The Preparation of the Pardon Petition

The centerpiece of Marc Rich’s effort to obtain a Presidential pardon was the pardon petition, which was put together by the Marc

Rich legal team in October and November 2000. The main attorneys involved in preparing the pardon petition were Jack Quinn;

Kathleen Behan; Robert Fink; Christopher Man, an associate at

Arnold & Porter; Michael Hepworth, Of Counsel at Piper Marbury

Rudnick & Wolfe; and G. Michael Green of Dickstein Shapiro

Morin & Oshinsky. These lawyers spent dozens, if not hundreds,

of hours compiling the petition.

The resulting document, which had a number of misrepresentations and factual inaccuracies, was a surprisingly poor effort, considering the amount of time and money that went into it. The argument section of the petition, the only portion that was actually

drafted anew in October and November 2000, totaled 31 doublespaced pages. The first 20 of those pages were dedicated to biographical sketches of Rich and Green. These pages attempted to

cast Rich and Green in a favorable, even likable light. These statements seem almost laughable given what the world knows now

about Marc Rich and Pincus Green:

Mr. Rich and Mr. Green have lived exemplary, indeed, remarkable lives. Although they have suffered terrible hardships as the result of their exile from the United States,

they have continued to work productively and contribute to

society.338

Although it is true that the work of Rich and Green assisted the

governments of countries like Iraq, Iran, and Libya, it is difficult

to argue that they contributed to the United States once they fled

their country and attempted to renounce their citizenship.

Included in the attempt to make Marc Rich seem like the victim

was a reference to the tragic death of his daughter Gabrielle while

155

339 Id. at 7 n.1. 340 Id. at 6. 341 Id. at 20.

Marc Rich was a fugitive from justice: ‘‘Because Gabrielle lived and

died in the United States, Mr. Rich felt the extra weight of being

unable to personally visit with her during her final months.’’ 339

This claim, which was repeated by Denise Rich in her appeals to

the President, made it sound as if the prosecutors in the Southern

District of New York denied Rich the opportunity to visit with his

dying daughter. Nothing could be further from the truth. Rich

knew that if he returned he would receive bail, and that he would

not be incarcerated unless convicted of the crimes he had been accused of committing. He was prevented from returning to visit his

dying daughter only if he refused to face the U.S. justice system.

Rich’s desire to both have his cake and eat it too, makes it difficult

to generate any sympathy for him in this matter. In fact, the only

possible conclusion is that Marc Rich placed his own needs over

those of his daughter.

The petition also made it sound as if Rich was providing the

world with an economic benefit through his dealings:

In building this business, Mr. Rich and Mr. Green made

substantial contributions to the world economy by increasing competition—and even breaking cartels—in the physical commodities industries.340

Of course, the petition did not mention that Marc Rich’s business

was built by supporting corrupt and dictatorial regimes across the

world, ranging from Communist Cuba to apartheid South Africa.

Nor did the petition mention that Rich’s deals with third world

countries meant that Rich himself gained monopolies over commodities that often paid developing nations less than fair-market prices

for their commodities. Nor did the petition point out that Rich provided opportunities to those regimes the United States was actively

attempting to penalize, including Iran during the period when 54

Americans were held hostage at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.

The petition also made the claim that Rich and Green’s lives

were exemplary, setting aside the 65-count indictment:

Other than the allegations for which clemency is sought,

Mr. Rich and Mr. Green never have been charged with a

crime. Indeed, Mr. Rich’s and Mr. Green’s lives both before

and after the accusations have been ones of hard-working,

resourceful businessmen who have become remarkably

successful and have devoted much time and money to philanthropy and statesmanship.341

Again, the pardon petition made no mention of other less-than-savory aspects of Marc Rich’s business dealings, for which he was

never prosecuted, but which remain of questionable legality and

morality, including supporting the Khomeini regime while it held

U.S. hostages, selling weapons and missile parts to Khomeini, and

trying to do business with Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War.

The petition then takes six pages to argue that the indictment

of Rich and Green was flawed and unfair, and the appropriate subject of a Presidential pardon. As described below, these arguments

156

342 Id. 343 Id. at 21.

were largely a rehash of the same arguments that Rich and his

lawyers had been making since the indictment was handed down.

The final four pages of the petition were used to explain that it was

permissible for the President to issue a pardon before a conviction.

Also attached to the petition were the ‘‘letters of support,’’ as well

as other attachments, including the tax analysis by Professors

Ginsburg and Wolfman, as well as other varied materials related

to negotiations with the Southern District of New York and the

President’s pardon power in general.

C. The Misleading Legal Arguments in the Petition

The pardon petition crafted by Jack Quinn and the other attorneys on the Rich legal team is filled with numerous misleading and

disingenuous legal arguments. Many commentators have stated

that Quinn was merely being a good lawyer providing zealous representation to Marc Rich. However, many of the points made by

Quinn and others go beyond zealous representation to the point of

deception. Quinn had a responsibility to be honest in the pardon

petition, and he failed. Normally, such dishonesty would not have

a tremendous effect, but when it was combined with the total failure of the Clinton White House to examine the Rich case, the result was disastrous.

1. The Indictment of Rich Was Not Flawed

The first charge leveled by Quinn and the Rich legal team is that

Rich and Green and their companies, Marc Rich + Co. A.G. (‘‘A.G.’’)

and Marc Rich + Co. International, Ltd. (‘‘International’’), were

subjected to an ‘‘unprecedented criminal investigation’’ and ‘‘a

unique indictment based on now-discarded and rejected theories.’’ 342 Notwithstanding the fact that this is an argument made

by almost all individuals and companies accused of white collar

crime, this claim is especially specious here.

a. The Department of Energy Regulations Were

Fair

In his pardon petition, Rich claimed to have been the victim of

overly complex and unfair Department of Energy regulations. One

element of this line of defense is that the regulations governing the

conduct for which Rich and Green were indicted were too confusing. According to the pardon petition, the Department of Energy

regulations limiting prices in oil reselling were ‘‘extremely complicated,’’ and were therefore rescinded in January 1981 because

they were ‘‘unworkable.’’ 343 Such an argument is completely disingenuous. Rich and Green were able to understand the regulations

well enough to exploit them for millions of dollars in profit. Regardless of whether they outlived their usefulness, they were deemed

appropriate at the time when the United States was seriously concerned about fuel shortages. More important, they were the law at

that time, and Rich and Green therefore had a duty to play by the

rules or face the consequences. Indeed, other companies were able

to obey the law and were not subject to prosecution.

157

344 Id. at 27. 345Transcript of Allocution, U.S. v. Marc Rich + Co., A.G. et al. 18–19 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1984)

(S 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 5). 346Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, Memorandum in Support of Petitioners’ Application for Pardon 22 (Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III).

347 Jack Quinn Document Production (Memorandum from Mark Ehlers to Scooter Libby 1 n.1

(June 10, 1988)) (Exhibit 63). 348 Id. at 1–2 n.2.

Quinn also argued that the Department of Energy indicated that

Rich and his company ‘‘properly . . . accounted for the transactions.’’ 344 This argument is irrelevant because Rich’s accounting

was not the central issue. Rather, Rich’s companies falsified reports

in order to hide profits over the legal limits in violation of law.

Marc Rich’s own companies admitted as much when they pled guilty and paid $200 million in taxes, penalties, and interest. As

the lawyers for Rich’s companies stated in federal court:

Beginning in September 1980 International generated millions of dollars of income from crude oil transactions which

International should have disclosed but intentionally did

not disclose to the Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Energy.

***

In connection with matters within the jurisdiction of agencies of the United States, specifically the Department of

Energy and the Internal Revenue Service, International

and A.G. knowingly and wilfully made those documents

and the ERA 69s filed with the Department of Energy

which were false in that they failed to disclose material

facts regarding the actual income from those crude oil

transactions[.] 345

This language from the allocution clearly demonstrates not only

that the Department of Energy in no way exonerated Rich and

Green’s activities, but also that Rich and Green and their companies clearly understood the nature of the supposedly complicated

regulations well enough to violate them ‘‘knowingly and wilfully.’’

Their arrangement with West Texas Marketing was clearly intended to contravene the regulations and perpetrate tax fraud

against the United States.

b. Rich and Green Were Not Singled Out

Another element of Quinn’s attack on the indictment is that Rich

and Green were unfairly singled out because ‘‘others engaging in

similar activity’’ were pursued only in civil regulatory actions.346

This argument is simply false, and a minimally competent lawyer

would have known that it was false. Even Rich’s own lawyers had

earlier determined this in their research, which was also in Jack

Quinn’s possession. According to a 1988 memo drafted by Rich’s

lawyers, there were 48 criminal cases nationwide brought against

crude oil resellers.347 In 14 cases, the defendants spent some time

in prison.348 Texas resellers John Troland and David Ratliff of

West Texas Marketing were prosecuted for ‘‘daisy chain’’ oil transactions and for falsely classifying different types of crude oil to

158

349Quinn made this argument before the Senate Judiciary Committee. See ‘‘President Clinton’s Eleventh Hour Pardons,’’ Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. 78

(Feb. 14, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). 350 Jack Quinn Document Production (Memorandum from Mark Ehlers to Scooter Libby 2–3

n.4 (June 10, 1988)) (Exhibit 63). 351 15 U.S.C. § 754 (1982 ed.) 352 U.S. v. Marc Rich, Pincus Green et al. 9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1984)(S 83 Cr. 579). 353Telephone Interview with Morris ‘‘Sandy’’ Weinberg, Jr., former Assistant U.S. Attorney

for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Feb. 7, 2001). 354Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, Memorandum in Support of Petitioners’ Application for Pardon 26 (Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III).

355See Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. Grand Jury Probing Shift of Oil Profits, WASH. POST, Oct. 18,

1982, at A1. See also Rich Associate Gets Probation, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 17, 1984. 356While these arguments were not made explicitly in the pardon petition, Rich made them

in the media, and Jack Quinn may have made them to President Clinton. See Section IV(G)(4).

skirt DOE regulations. It was while serving 10 months in prison

that they first alerted prosecutors to the activities of Rich and

Green.

Rich’s lawyers have also argued that, unlike Rich and Green, the

few violators who were pursued criminally were involved in ‘‘daisy

chaining’’ or miscertification (falsely labeling controlled oil as uncontrolled oil).349 However, Rich and Green were not alone in facing criminal penalties even though they were not accused of

miscertification. Oscar Wyatt, David Chalmers, and Sam Wilson,

Jr. pled guilty to a willful violation of the price control enforcement

provision that involved no accusation of miscertification.350 These

cases are consistent with the relevant statute, which distinguishes

between civil and criminal violations on the basis of whether the

conduct was willful—not whether it involved miscertification.351

More important, Rich and Green were also involved in illegal

conduct that was unique in the context of the commodity they were

trading. In September 1980, DOE clarified its oil reseller regulations to make it plain that resellers were not permitted to profit

more than $0.20 per barrel.352 Rich and Green made profits far in

excess of that limitation but created fraudulent invoices and filed

false reports to hide about $100 million in illegal profits from both

the DOE and the IRS. In other words, Rich and Green were engaged in classic criminal financial fraud. The grand jury in New

York had ample evidence from documents and witnesses that Rich

and Green were willfully violating the price controls and, as discussed above, their companies later pled guilty to doing so.353

Quinn further tried to advance the argument that Rich and

Green’s entire case was sui generis by stating in the petition that

similarly situated individuals and corporations such as ARCO were

never criminally charged.354 However, ARCO was not a similarly

situated corporation because it was never involved in attempting to

hide illegal profits as was Rich’s company. In fact, in looking at the

more analogous case of the corporations (West Texas Marketing

and Listo Petroleum) that helped Rich hide illegal profits, the executives of those companies were prosecuted. Two executives from

West Texas Marketing served 10 months in prison and one from

Listo pled guilty to felony charges of making false statements and

was sentenced to five years probation and fined $5,000.355

Beyond being completely false, the argument that Marc Rich was

‘‘singled out’’ for prosecution also draws upon the preposterous

claims, made by Marc Rich himself, that the prosecution was the

result of anti-Semitism.356 In an interview with the Israeli Ma’ariv

159

357 Bo’az Ga’on, Rich as Korach, MA’ARIV WEEKEND MAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 1999 (Exhibit 6). 358For a detailed discussion, see Section IV(G)(4) below. 359Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, Memorandum in Support of Petitioners’ Application for Pardon 22 (Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III).

360 Id. 361 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 110 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Morris ‘‘Sandy’’ Weinberg,

Jr., former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). 362 Id.

Weekend Magazine, Rich stated, ‘‘I’m convinced that the fact that

I was a foreigner and a relative newcomer on the oil-trading market and Jewish influenced the manner in which my case was handled.’’ 357 Rich has never provided any support for this outlandish

claim. Rich’s clumsy attempt to play the race card was rejected

even by associates like Abraham Foxman, who found no evidence

to support it. Rich’s attorneys did not make any overt reference to

anti-Semitism in the pardon petition, but did repeatedly claim that

Marc Rich had been ‘‘singled out’’ by prosecutors, never explaining

why they believed that to be the case. Furthermore, Quinn’s own

notes make it appear possible that he raised the specter of antiSemitism in his last-minute appeal to the President on January 19,

2001.358 It is unfortunate that the President found Rich’s arguments believable—when in fact, they were completely inaccurate—

a fact the President could have discovered with minimal due diligence.

c. Rich and Green Did Trade with the Enemy

The pardon petition claims that ‘‘the Iranian [trading with the

enemy] counts were added to the indictment to incite public opinion against the defendants.’’ 359 The petition further claims that

‘‘[t]he prosecutors quietly dropped the Iranian claims against the

companies, but never dealt with the claims against the individuals.’’ 360 By making this claim, Rich suggested that the charges

had no merit. In fact, the charges appear to have been accurate,

and were only dropped from the indictment for technical reasons.

The trading with the enemy charges against the Marc Rich companies were dropped because Clyde Meltzer—the Listo petroleum executive who, unlike Rich and Green, did not flee the United

States—was not involved in trading with Iran. Since Rich and

Green fled and were unavailable for trial, the only charges of conspiracy against the remaining defendants were unrelated to Iran.

The charges against Rich and Green personally for trading with

Iran during the hostage crisis were never dropped or dismissed.

They remained in effect at the time of the pardon.361 Indeed, there

is voluminous evidence that Rich and Green traded with Iran, in

addition to a number of other prominent enemies of the United

States. While a foreign company may have been allowed to trade

with Iran, Rich and Green were American citizens and it was illegal for them to engage in trade with Iran regardless of whether

they did so on foreign soil or through the use of a foreign corporation. In fact, the evidence showed that Rich and Green negotiated

the deals from the Manhattan offices of Marc Rich International,

an American firm.362 It was the height of irresponsibility for Marc

Rich and his lawyers to suggest that prosecutors charged Rich with

160

363 Id. at 111. 364Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, Memorandum in Support of Petition- ers’ Application for Pardon 23 (Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III).

365 Id. 366Letter from Professor Martin D. Ginsburg, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center,

to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 12, 2001) (Exhibit 64).

Ginsburg is also of Counsel at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson. Of the $66,199 received

by his firm on the Rich matter, $43,980 reflected work by Ginsburg personally. The remainder

reflects work by other attorneys assisting Ginsburg. Ginsburg billed his time at rates of $300

to $400 per hour. Id.

trading with the enemy only to ‘‘incite public opinion’’ against Rich

when Rich was, in fact, trading with Iran.

Jack Quinn, who signed the pardon petition, admitted in the

Committee’s February 8, 2001, hearing that Rich had indeed traded with Iran:

Mr. SHAYS. Did Mr. Rich trade with Iran when U.S. hostages were being held captive?

Mr. QUINN. I do not know the precise answer to that question. It is my belief that he traded with Iran. I can’t tell

you right now when that occurred.

Mr. SHAYS. Should it make any difference to you if it did?

Mr. QUINN. Again, I approached this as a lawyer concerned with the indictment that was before me and whether or not it should stand. I was not here to be a character

witness. I was here to take on four points—

Mr. SHAYS. It didn’t make any difference to you. Should it

have made a difference to the President of the United

States?

Mr. QUINN. It is something he well may have taken into

consideration, certainly.363

While Quinn admitted that he knew that Rich did indeed trade

with Iran, he failed to address how he could state in the pardon

petition that ‘‘the prosecutors quietly dropped the Iranian charges

against the companies, but never dealt with the claims against the

individuals.’’ Quinn likely failed to address this statement because

he knew the implication that the charges were ‘‘quietly’’ dropped

for lack of evidence is misleading.

d. Rich and Green Did Evade Federal Taxes

Quinn and the Rich legal team also attacked the core tax evasion

counts in the indictment against Rich and Green. As they argued

in the petition, ‘‘The tax treatment of the transactions in the indictment, however, is governed by a U.S.-Swiss tax treaty, which was

ignored by the prosecution. . . . The transactions in issue were

consistently reported in accordance with the tax treaty.’’ 364 In

making these arguments, Rich’s lawyers relied on what they called

the ‘‘independent’’ analyses of law professors Bernard Wolfman and

Martin Ginsburg.365 However, the language from the pardon application is misleading in its use of the word ‘‘independent.’’ First of

all, the professors were paid handsomely by Marc Rich for their

work on his behalf. Professor Ginsburg, husband of Supreme Court

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, was paid $66,199 for his work on the

Rich case.366 Professor Wolfman was paid $30,754 for his analyVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00176 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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367Letter from Bernard Wolfman, Professor, Harvard Law School, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 8, 2001) (Exhibit 65). 368 Id. 369 Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Bernard Wolfman, Professor, Harvard Law

School, to Gerard E. Lynch, Criminal Division Chief of the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the

S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Dec. 7, 1990)) (Exhibit 66). 370 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 106 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Martin J. Auerbach,

former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). 371Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, Memorandum in Support of Petition- ers’ Application for Pardon 24–25 (Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III).

sis.367 Wolfman was hired as a consultant by one of Rich’s firms,

and was paid between $250 and $300 per hour.368 Hence, the analysis was not ‘‘independent’’ of Marc Rich. Second, the professors did

not come to the same conclusion ‘‘independently’’ of each other, but

rather worked jointly. Third, they emphasized that their analysis

made ‘‘no independent verification of the facts,’’ and that they were

merely ‘‘accepting the statements thereof made to us by’’ Marc

Rich’s attorneys.369 As Rich prosecutor Martin Auerbach stated:

The transmittal letter that came with that analysis says it

all and betrays the problem, the fundamental flaw in the

pardon application as it was applied to Mr. Rich and Mr.

Green, and that is a complete absence of a knowledge of

the facts, the true facts of this case, the facts that led the

companies to plead guilty.

When that analysis was sent 10 years ago, the professors

who wrote it said, . . . quote, making no independent verification of the facts but accepting the statements thereof

made to us by Mr. Rich and Mr. Green’s lawyers.

And that is the problem. The President relied on the facts

as described to him by Mr. Rich and Mr. Green’s lawyers,

making no independent investigation.370

In the end the analysis by the two professors cannot, and does not,

attempt to explain the necessity for double accounting, phony invoices, and false reports to the Department of Energy. Nor do the

professors discuss the double accounting, phony invoices, and false

reports employed by Rich and Green to hide their illegal profits.

The only rational explanation for the artifices employed by Rich is

that he was fraudulently attempting to hide profits from the DOE

and the IRS. In the final analysis, it is hard to avoid the conclusion

that Professors Ginsburg and Wolfman sold their names to the

highest bidder, thereby turning their backs on the accounting and

legal considerations that were necessary for a meaningful professional opinion.

Quinn further attempted to justify the granting of a pardon by

explaining that Rich’s companies reached a settlement with the

government and ‘‘paid a total of approximately 200 million dollars

in back taxes, interest, fines and foregone tax deductions, an

amount far in excess of any taxes, penalties or interest which

might have been assessed in a civil tax proceeding.’’ 371 Far from

being a reason to grant a pardon, this fact only proves the point

that Rich and Green fled from justice because they were caught

red-handed and most likely would have gone to prison if they stood

trial in the United States. Marc Rich + Co., A.G. and Marc Rich

+ Co. International, Ltd. each pled guilty to making false stateVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00177 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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372The case against Rich and Green individually was just as strong as the case against the companies. As noted above, Edward Bennett Williams offered to have Rich pay $100 million to

settle the charges against him individually. Prosecutor Sandy Weinberg told Williams that the

government would not reach any settlement that did not result in jail time for Rich. See ‘‘The

Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the House Comm.

on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 176 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Morris ‘‘Sandy’’ Weinberg, Jr.,

former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). See also EVAN THOMAS, THE MAN TO SEE: EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMS 415–16 (1991). 373 Indictment, U.S. v. Marc Rich, Pincus Green et al. at 3–4 (Mar. 6, 1984) (S 83 Cr. 579)

(Exhibit 4). See Transcript of Allocution, U.S. v. Marc Rich + Co., A.G., Marc Rich Int’l, Ltd.

et al. at 11 (Oct. 11, 1984) (SS 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 5). 374 Indictment, U.S. v. Marc Rich, Pincus Green et al. at 3 (Mar. 6, 1984) (S 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 4). See Transcript of Allocution, U.S. v. Marc Rich + Co., A.G., Marc Rich Int’l, Ltd. et

al. at 11 (Oct. 11, 1984) (SS 83 Cr. 579) (Exhibit 5).

375 Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney for the

S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice, to Jack Quinn and Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter

(Feb. 2, 2000)) (Exhibit 51).

ments and evading about $48 million in taxes because the strength

of the case against them was overwhelming.372 Rich’s companies

pled guilty to a criminal scheme to conceal ‘‘in excess of $100 million in taxable income . . . most of which income was illegally generated through the defendants’ violations of federal energy laws

and regulations.’’ 373 Rich’s companies further admitted that they

had engaged in this criminal scheme ‘‘together with Marc Rich,

Pincus Green . . . and others . . . unlawfully, wilfully and

knowingly[.]’’ 374 That Rich’s companies paid these moneys and

made these admissions of guilt squarely contradicts Quinn’s claim

that the indictment was without merit.

2. The Prosecutors Were Not ‘‘Overzealous’’

A second theme in the pardon application is that the investigation and indictment of Rich and Green was flawed because the

prosecutors were overzealous and overly ambitious. Quinn attacked

not only Weinberg and Auerbach on this basis, but also Rudolph

Giuliani who was at the time the United States Attorney for the

Southern District of New York. As with the claims of the flawed

indictment, however, these claims were also misleading.

a. The Prosecutors Negotiated with Rich and

Green

The pardon petition claims that the federal prosecutors refused

to negotiate with Rich and Green. Quinn repeated this claim before

the Committee, as well as in the press. However, as is discussed

in detail above, Rich and Green were fugitives. The Southern District of New York had (and continues to have) a longstanding policy

of not negotiating with fugitives from justice. As was explained by

the SDNY in its February 2, 2000, letter to Quinn, negotiating with

fugitives ‘‘would give defendants an incentive to flee,’’ providing

them ‘‘the inappropriate leverage and luxury of remaining absent

unless and until the Government agrees to their terms.’’ 375 The

particular history of the office’s dealings with Rich counseled

against negotiations. As is discussed in detail above, Rich had a

history of acting in bad faith during the grand jury investigation.

From refusal to obey grand jury subpoenas to attempting to fly two

steamer trunks full of subpoenaed documents to Switzerland, Rich

showed that he was not the type of defendant with whom to negotiate.

163

376Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, Memorandum in Support of Petition- ers’ Application for Pardon 25 (Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III).

377 Id. 378 Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney for the

S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice, to Jack Quinn and Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter

(Feb. 2, 2000)) (Exhibit 51). 379Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, Memorandum in Support of Petitioners’ Application for Pardon 26 (Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III).

380 Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney for the

S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice, to Jack Quinn and Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter

(Feb. 2, 2000)) (Exhibit 51).

Yet even with such outrageous conduct, the Southern District of

New York made many good faith efforts to reach an accommodation

with Rich. During the investigation of Rich and his companies,

prosecutors undertook numerous negotiations with Rich’s lawyers,

which resulted in the guilty pleas by Rich’s companies. Even after

Rich fled the country, prosecutors attempted to negotiate terms for

Rich’s return. In the early 1990s, U.S. Attorney Otto Obermaier

and a top prosecutor in his office took the extraordinary step of flying to Switzerland and meeting with Marc Rich in an attempt to

negotiate a resolution to the case. Moreover, the Southern District

made numerous accommodations for Rich, including offering to

drop the RICO charges as well as allowing him and Green to stand

trial without spending any time in jail prior to trial. Despite these

efforts, Rich and Green refused to return to the United States to

stand trial. Rather, they would only return as part of a settlement

that guaranteed they would not serve jail time unless convicted. It

is therefore misleading for Quinn to simply state that the Southern

District of New York ‘‘takes the position that it will not even discuss the matter while Mr. Rich and Mr. Green continue to live outside of the United States.’’ 376 By itself, this statement fails to account for the numerous good faith efforts of the prosecutors in spite

of their well-founded reluctance to negotiate with fugitives.

Quinn also argued in the petition that the Southern District had

‘‘negotiated with numerous other absent defendants over the years,

and the Department of Justice has no such policy against such negotiations.’’ 377 However, as the Southern District noted in its February 2, 2000, letter to Quinn, Department of Justice policy places

the decision to negotiate with a fugitive within the discretion of the

office responsible for the prosecution.378 The Southern District of

New York was well within the reasonable exercise of its discretion

to require Rich to return to the United States before engaging in

further negotiation, especially given Marc Rich’s history of bad

faith behavior and brazen legal tactics.

Finally, Quinn argued that the Southern District refused to negotiate with his legal team by failing to agree to a meeting between

Professors Wolfman and Ginsburg and tax experts in the Department of Justice.379 This, too, is misleading. As the Southern District explained in the February 2, 2000, letter to Quinn, ‘‘in 1987,

an Assistant in this Office met with Mr. Rich’s counsel and listened

to the same presentation by Professor Martin D. Ginsburg referenced in your letter regarding the merits of the tax charges.’’ 380

Prosecutors had rejected the Wolfman/Ginsburg analysis because it

was based on an inaccurate and incomplete representation of the

facts of this case. Its legal conclusions were, therefore, irrelevant.

164

381Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, Memorandum in Support of Petitioners’ Application for Pardon 23 (Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III).

382Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Jan. 28, 2001). 383 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 341 (Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of the Honorable Henry

Waxman).

For the Southern District to meet with the professors again would

have been redundant and fruitless.

b. The Rich Prosecution Was Not Tainted with

Media Attention

Quinn and the Rich legal team further tried to discredit the prosecution by claiming that United States Attorney Rudolph Giuliani

was unfairly bringing the glare of the media to the case. According

to the pardon petition, Giuliani ‘‘aggressively’’ pursued Rich and

Green in court as well as in the press: ‘‘Not only did Mr. Giuliani

and other prosecutors from his office speak frequently to the media

in off and on record conversations, the office held formal press conferences where purported ‘evidence’ against Mr. Rich and Mr.

Green was showcased to the press.’’ 381 Responding to this charge,

Mayor Giuliani said on Meet the Press,

First of all, the indictment was actually just about put together before I even became United States Attorney. It’s

been pursued by at least three Democratic appointees, who

were United States attorney and the Justice Department,

that had him number six on the fugitive list, was President Clinton’s Democratic Justice Department. And the

United States attorney of the Southern District in New

York, an appointee of President Clinton, is as outraged as

I am by the pardon that was given here. . . . You’ve been

covering me a long time, right, running for office? Did you

ever hear me mention Marc Rich? So this was hardly used

by me in any way in any of my political campaigns. . . .

And the fact that he was a fugitive—it was not something

[about which I would] say, ‘‘Gee, look what a good job I did

as United States attorney.’’ So that’s kind of a silly thing

to [s]ay.382

Rudolph Giuliani was one of dozens of prosecutors, Republican

and Democrat, who worked on the Rich case. Robert Litt and Gerald Lynch were prominent Democrats who were also involved in

the case. It would be strange for Quinn also to accuse them of overcharging. Litt was one of Attorney General Janet Reno’s closest advisors, and Lynch, currently a professor at Columbia University

Law School, was appointed to the federal bench by President Clinton. The two main prosecutors who brought the Rich case, Morris

Weinberg and Martin Auerbach, were Democrats as well. The attempt to cast the Rich indictment as the result of partisan prosecutorial overreaching by Rudolph Giuliani is simply one more fabrication by Marc Rich’s legal team. This argument had no basis in reality, and likely was invented to appeal to President Clinton’s partisan instincts, as well as his dislike for aggressive prosecutors. As

many have observed, by the end of his term, President Clinton was

very sensitive to issues of prosecutorial overreaching, as a result of

his perceptions of the Independent Counsel investigations.383

165

384Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green, Memorandum in Support of Petition- ers’ Application for Pardon 22 (Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III).

385 Id. 386 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 161 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). 387 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 187 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Morris ‘‘Sandy’’ Weinberg,

Jr., former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice).

Quinn exploited these sentiments masterfully by fabricating claims

regarding prosecutorial conduct in the Rich case.

c. RICO Charges Were Fairly Brought

The pardon application also accuses the federal prosecutors of

unfairly bringing a racketeering charge against Rich and Green.

According to Quinn, RICO was misused because the underlying allegation involved tax fraud.384 The petition points to a Department

of Justice policy that was adopted in 1989, stating that, ‘‘[f]ollowing

the indictment, the United States government recognized the misuse of RICO in tax fraud cases and issued guidance in the United

States Attorney’s Manual explicitly stating that tax offenses are

not predicates for RICO offenses.’’ 385 Jack Quinn suggested at the

Committee’s February 8, 2001, hearing that the decision to bring

RICO charges against Marc Rich and Pincus Green was the key

factor that led to their flight from the United States:

It’s the position of my client that he remained outside the

United States because what Mr. Weinberg earlier described to you as, in essence, a simple tax evasion case was

also made into a RICO case. And he may choose to say it

was only one count in the indictment, but it was the

sledgehammer that brought about the current impasse.386

Quinn’s argument is flawed for a number of reasons. First, at the

time of the indictment, there was no policy against bringing RICO

charges predicated on tax offenses. To the contrary, the RICO

charges were brought consistent with Justice Department policy

and the RICO charges were reviewed and approved by the RICO

section of the Department of Justice—as were the tax charges by

the tax section.387 As prosecutor Sandy Weinberg observed:

If you’re away for 20 years and you’re fortunate enough to

be able to persuade two foreign States not to extradite you,

the gloss of time is always going to change the interpretation of the law. You can look at indictments that were

brought in 1980, and if you examine them in 2000, the

gloss of time is—you’re going to find that the courts interpret the laws different in 2000 than they did in 1980.

But you’ve got to look at the guts of what the case was

about and these people. And when you look at the guts of

what the case was about and the people, it doesn’t make

any difference whether or not we would bring a RICO

charge today. It is whether or not we would bring a criminal charge today and whether or not it is acceptable to be

pardoning folks who have done things like renouncing

their citizenship, becoming fugitives, not coming back and

making these arguments that they say are so clear. I mean

it—was it justified? And you can’t come in and say, well,

166

388 Id. at 156. 389 Coming in from the Cold, THE RECORDER, Mar. 28, 2001, at 5. 390 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 156 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Martin J. Auerbach,

former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). 391 Id. at 469 (testimony of Robert Fink). 392Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00697 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Feb. 10, 2000)) (Exhibit 32).

20 years have passed and, you know, the courts now interpret or the Justice Department interprets the RICO statute differently.388

Along similar lines, even former Clinton White House Counsel

Abner Mikva has stated:

Clearly, a defendant would rather negotiate the unfairness

of RICO charges from a comfortable abode in Switzerland

than from a hardback chair in the U.S. attorney’s office in

Manhattan. This is especially true when defendants have

been trying, unsuccessfully, to make the same ‘‘unfair’’

point about RICO for the last 30 years.389

Second, Quinn’s argument also fails to address the non-tax RICO

predicates in the case or the fact that there are money laundering

statutes available today that were not available in 1980. As prosecutor Martin Auerbach observed:

I’m afraid that the argument with respect to the change in

RICO policy is as disingenuous as I find the argument

with respect to fugitivity. While it is true that the Justice

Department changed its view with respect to tax counts as

a predicate for RICO, it has not changed its view with respect to mail and wire fraud as a predicate to RICO. And

as Mr. Quinn knows, as the indictment reflects, there are

both mail and wire fraud counts which are predicates for

RICO.

So I believe that the Justice Department might well approve this indictment today. And I, in fact, believe that,

were they to review this indictment today, and of course

they did review it before it was brought, there would be

money laundering charges in this case.390

Therefore, it is likely that if he was charged today, Rich would be

facing stiffer, not lighter penalties.

Third, and most importantly, Quinn conveniently ignored the

fact that the prosecutors tried to reach an accommodation with the

two fugitives by offering to drop the RICO charges. As Robert Fink

himself testified to the Committee, he was in discussions with prosecutors during which they offered to drop the RICO charges if Rich

and Green would simply stand trial in the United States.391 These

discussions are reflected in a February 10, 2000, e-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay: ‘‘[a]t those times the office [Southern

District of New York] offered to do a variety of things, none of

which are necessarily still on the table. First, I was told at one

point that they would drop the RICO charge if we wanted if Marc

came in.’’ 392 Given the willingness of the SDNY to drop the RICO

charges, Quinn’s claim that the RICO charge was ‘‘the sledgeVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00182 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
167

393 Arnold & Porter Document Production KB00037 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Kathleen

Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Dec. 29, 2000)) (Exhibit 67). 394 Interview with Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 27, 2001). 395Michael Isikoff, ‘‘I Made a Mistake’’; The ADL’s Abe Foxman Admits the Jewish Organization Received a $100,000 Grant from Marc Rich but Maintains He Wasn’t ‘‘Bought,’’ NEWSWEEK,

Mar. 23, 2001, at 2001 WL 24138340. 396 Id. 397 Id.

hammer that brought about the current impasse,’’ is completely inaccurate and misleading.

It appears that even Jack Quinn realized that the arguments in

the petition were deeply flawed. On December 29, 2000, he sent the

following e-mail to Kathleen Behan:

What do you think our chances really are for Marc? the

hardest question, i think, is ‘‘if you’re right about the

weakness of the govts case, why not go to ct and win?’’ the

answr, i guess is that we couldn’t have gotten a fair trial,

but that was 18 years ago. couldn’t he get one now? isn’t

that the way this shd go? these are tough questions, but

I guess we have decent answers.393

It is unclear what ‘‘decent answers’’ Quinn had to that argument

or to any of the multiple arguments against the Rich pardon.

D. The ‘‘Letters of Support’’ in the Petition

The legal arguments contained in the petition are not the only

problematic section of the Rich and Green pardon petition. The

‘‘letters of support’’ in the petition also raise several troubling

issues. Most of the letters were collected by Avner Azulay.394 Those

letters were a crucial part of the pardon petition, as they helped

create the impression that Marc Rich was a humanitarian who had

made a minor mistake but who had a positive impact on countless

lives. The significance and import of the letters presented to President Clinton was compromised by several factors, including: (1)

many of those who wrote the letters in support of the pardon were

either themselves, or their organizations, given money by Rich; (2)

many who wrote the letters were misled about the purpose of the

letter; and (3) their letters were misrepresented to the President.

Given these facts, the letters of support in the Rich pardon petition

represent just one more dishonest ploy in Marc Rich’s overall

scheme to obtain a pardon.

1. Rich Paid a Number of Individuals Who Wrote in

His Support

The letter written by Abraham Foxman is one of the most prominently displayed letters in the petition. As National Director of the

Anti-Defamation League (ADL), his support of clemency for Marc

Rich was of obvious importance to the application. However, the

ADL received $100,000 from Marc Rich shortly after Foxman became involved in the pardon effort.395 In fact, this money was received a few weeks after Foxman flew to Paris to meet with Rich

aide Avner Azulay.396 Moreover, Rich has given the ADL a total of $250,000 since he fled the country in 1983.397 Foxman has publicly

denied that Rich’s contributions to the ADL had anything to do

with his help in the pardon effort. He stated to a group of reportVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00183 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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398 Id. 399 Beth J. Harpaz, Jewish Group Says Rich Reps Sought Pardon Help for Money, ASSOCIATED

PRESS STATE AND LOCAL WIRE, Mar. 28, 2001. See also Brian Blomquist, Rich Tried to Tempt

Jewish Group, N.Y. POST, Mar. 29, 2001, at 14. 400 Beth J. Harpaz, Jewish Group Says Rich Reps Sought Pardon Help for Money, ASSOCIATED

PRESS STATE AND LOCAL WIRE, Mar. 28, 2001. 401 Id. 402 Id. 403 Beth J. Harpaz, Jews Divided Over Rich Pardon, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 29, 2001, at

2001 WL 17989287. 404Letter from Marlene E. Post, North American Chairperson, Birthright Israel, to President

William J. Clinton (Dec. 7, 2000) (Exhibit 68). The original letter was part of Rich and Green’s

pardon petition. 405 Brian Blomquist, Rich Tried to Tempt Jewish Group, N.Y. POST, Mar. 29, 2001, at 14.

ers, ‘‘I really find offensive the idea that Abe Foxman was bought for a check for $100,000. If he gave me nothing—or he gave me $10

million—I would have made the same decision, for which I now say

I made a mistake.’’ 398

Notwithstanding Foxman’s denial of a quid pro quo, the payment

to the ADL raises the general question of Marc Rich’s tactics in

drumming up support for his pardon application. The ADL was not

the only organization to which Marc Rich paid money or attempted

to pay money. In another instance, Marc Rich attempted to secure

the assistance of the American Jewish Congress (AJC) with the

promise of a large contribution. A week after Foxman’s admission,

Phil Baum, executive director of the AJC revealed that his organization had been approached by a representative of Marc Rich who

told them, ‘‘that if we were to speak favorably of Mr. Rich, we

would be the beneficiary of a gift.’’ 399 Baum denied that there was

any direct quid pro quo.400 However, Baum went on to state that,

‘‘there was an understanding communicated to us[.]’’ Baum further

stated, ‘‘It was not a contract. But these things are communicated

in more subtle ways. We had reason to hope or expect that if we

did this thing, we could probably be the recipient of Mr. Rich’s generous recognition of our importance.’’ 401 The AJC ultimately

turned down Rich’s request.402 Committee staff attempted to contact Baum to corroborate this account and learn other details of the

offer from the Rich team. Unfortunately, Baum failed to cooperate

with the Committee’s investigation, refusing on three separate occasions to return phone calls from Committee staff.

Another example of Rich’s efforts includes Birthright Israel, an

organization that pays for young American Jews to travel to Israel.

Marc Rich has pledged $5 million to Birthright Israel.403 The organization was founded by Michael Steinhardt, a longtime friend of

Rich’s who was heavily involved in the pardon effort. Steinhardt

wrote a letter that was included in the petition. In addition, Birthright Israel’s current North American Chairperson, Marlene Post,

also wrote a letter supporting Rich’s request for clemency.404 This

letter was prominently displayed in the petition. As with the public

statements of the ADL and the AJC, a spokesman for Birthright

Israel denied any quid pro quo relating to the $5 million pledge to

the organization and the organization’s support for the Rich pardon.405

Yet another person with a connection to Birthright Israel also

wrote a letter on behalf of Marc Rich. Rabbi Irving Greenberg,

Chairman of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Council, wrote

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406 Jacqueline Trescott, Holocaust Council Head Urged to Resign, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2001,

at C9. 407Telephone Interview with Andrew Levander, Partner, Swidler Berlin Shereff Friedman

(representing Rabbi Greenberg) (May 2, 2001). 408 Jacqueline Trescott, Holocaust Council Head Urged to Resign, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2001,

at C9. Kitty Dukakis also signed the letter. 409 Id. 410William A. Orme, Jr., Marc Rich Aided Israeli Official, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2001, at A21. 411Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00191 (E-mail from Avner

Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 22, 2001)) (Exhibit 69). 412 Elizabeth Olson, Pardon in U.S. for Marc Rich Creates Storm in Switzerland, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2001, at 11. The Doron Foundation has now been folded into the Marc Rich Foundation. 413 Id. 414 Id. 415 Id.

ency for Rich. Rabbi Greenberg is also President of the Jewish Life

Network, an organization that is a partner with Birthright

Israel.406 However, when Committee staff asked Greenberg’s lawyer about press accounts of Rich’s contributions, he stated that

Rich had never given any contributions to any organization or entity controlled or operated by Greenberg.407 Greenberg’s letter and

Rich’s contributions to Birthright Israel caused seventeen former

and current members of the Holocaust Museum Council to send a

letter demanding Greenberg’s resignation.408 Rabbi Greenberg

apologized for his letter on behalf of Rich, and ultimately, the

Council voted to keep him as Chairman.409

There are other cases of Rich contributing or attempting to contribute to individuals (and their organizations) who wrote letters on

his behalf. One prominent example is Jerusalem Mayor Ehud

Olmert, who wrote a letter to President Clinton on November 27,

2000, that was included in the petition. According to The New York

Times, Rich contributed $25,000 to Olmert’s first mayoral campaign in 1993.410 The Committee has not been able to determine

whether Rich made financial contributions to other foreign political

officials who supported his pardon. However, the Marc Rich team

was clearly concerned about inquiries along these lines. Shortly

after the pardon was granted, Avner Azulay sent an e-mail to others on the Rich team stating that:

Pse [sic] keep barak [sic] out of the media. We have

enough names on the list other than his. Important to

keep all politicians out of the story. Pse [sic] share with me

the inclusion of any one on the list. This is election time

here and has a potential of blowup. A newsweek reporter

here has already asked if there were any political contributions.411

Some of the other letter writers have also mentioned Rich’s generosity and philanthropy as the reason for agreeing to write their

letters. For example, several of the letter writers in Switzerland

have ties to the Doron Foundation, an organization of Rich’s that

gives awards of $63,000 to Swiss groups and individuals.412 Zurich

Mayor Josef Estermann was among that group.413 Estermann did

not return calls from Committee staff. He has, however, spoken on

the matter in his home country, saying, ‘‘I think every person has

a right to a pardon.’’ 414 To this, one Swiss paper responded, ‘‘Yes,

but does this right have to be one you can buy?’’ 415 Others with

connections to the Doron Foundation who wrote letters on Rich’s

behalf include: Pierre de Weck, of UBS Bank; Michael de Picciotto,

170

416Telephone Interview with Michael D. de Picciotto, Managing Director, Union Bancaire

Prive ́e, Geneva, Switzerland (Apr. 26, 2001). 417 Elizabeth Olson, Pardon in U.S. for Marc Rich Creates Storm in Switzerland, N.Y. TIMES,

Feb. 4, 2001, at 11. 418 Alison Leigh Cowan, Some Used in Pardon Effort Were Unaware of Purpose, N.Y. TIMES,

Jan. 26, 2001, at A15. 419 Elizabeth Olson, Pardon in U.S. for Marc Rich Creates Storm in Switzerland, N.Y. TIMES,

Feb. 4, 2001, at 11. 420 Id.

a director of Union Bancaire Prive ́e in Geneva; Kurt R. Bollinger,

of the Swiss Air Rescue Foundation; and Professor Verena Meyer

of Zurich University. Michael de Picciotto spoke with Committee

staff over the phone. When asked if Marc Rich or any of his associates had ever given anything of value to him or his company in exchange for his letter, de Picciotto responded, ‘‘an important man

like Mr. Rich does not need to do anything like this.’’ 416 The others

with connections to the Doron Foundation failed to return Committee calls. Kurt Bollinger, whose rescue service received an award

from Rich’s foundation in 1992 failed to return the Committee’s

calls.417

Committee staff contacted or attempted to contact almost all of

those whose letters were included in the section of the pardon petition entitled, ‘‘Letters Addressed to the Honorable President William J. Clinton Expressing Support for the Pardon of Mr. Marc

Rich.’’ While the Committee does not have sufficient evidence to

conclude that all of the letters were written on a quid pro quo

basis, it cannot completely rule out the possibility. This is largely

because a number of the letter writers and intended letter writers

failed to cooperate with the Committee by not returning phone

calls. Nevertheless, there does appear to be a pattern of receiving

contributions or pledges from Marc Rich among many of those who

wrote letters. The fact that a number of the most prominent letters

of support for the Rich pardon were tainted with allegations of

linkage to large financial contributions diminishes Rich’s claims to

have been a great humanitarian. Rather, it appears that many of

Rich’s humanitarian activities were just one part of a lengthy strategy to escape criminal prosecution in the U.S.

2. Some Who Wrote Letters Were Misled About the

Purpose

The significance and import of several of the letters is further

weakened by the lack of candor of the Rich team in soliciting them.

Rich’s own lawyer, Robert Fink, admitted that during the solicitation of the letters, ‘‘[n]ot everyone was necessarily told it was going

to be for a pardon.’’ 418 Professor Verena Meyer, who serves on the

board of the Doron Foundation, stated that she did not know that

her letter would be included in a pardon petition.419 She thought

the letters were ‘‘routine’’ and ‘‘assume[d] other members of the

foundation also wrote letters.’’ 420

Several others who wrote letters on behalf of Rich felt even more

deceived. Professor Jonathan Halevy, CEO of the Shaare Zedek

Medical Center in Jerusalem, wrote a letter on November 30, 2000,

acknowledging contributions from Marc Rich’s Doron Foundation.

Halevy was contacted by Avner Azulay and asked to write a letter

171

421 Alison Leigh Cowan, Some Used in Pardon Effort Were Unaware of Purpose, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2001, at A15. 422 Id. 423 Id. 424Letter from Anthony J. Cernera, President, Sacred Heart University, to Marc Rich (Nov.

27, 2000) (Exhibit 70). 425 Alison Leigh Cowan, Some Used in Pardon Effort Were Unaware of Purpose, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2001, at A15. In fact, when reached by The New York Times, only one of six letter writers were aware that their letters would be used as part of a pardon effort.

acknowledging the contribution.421 According to Halevy, Azulay

told him that the letter would be used in a ‘‘book in honor of Mr.

Rich and the foundation.’’ 422 When interviewed about his letter

being used in Rich’s pardon application, Halevy stated, ‘‘I’m

obliged, if I got a donation from someone, to confirm that I got it

in writing. But I think it would be very fair to tell me this was the

purpose.’’ 423 Anthony J. Cernera, President of Sacred Heart University, in Fairfield, Connecticut, was similarly misled about his

letter. Cernera wrote Rich to ‘‘express my deepest appreciation for

your on-going support for our program of Christian-Jewish understanding.’’ 424 When the director of public relations for the University discovered that Cernera’s letter was included in the pardon petition, he was astonished, responding, ‘‘Wow. So these letters were

used as part of the petition for his pardon?’’ 425

The fact that Avner Azulay and others on the Marc Rich team

misled individuals to obtain letters of support from them suggests

a level of dishonesty that calls into question all representations

made by the Rich pardon team. It also suggests that a number of

people affiliated with Marc Rich, many of whom received his

money, would not have written in his support if they had known

that their letter was being used to get a pardon.

3. Many of the Letters were Misrepresented to the

President

Finally, the letters included in the pardon petition are further

compromised by the way in which they were presented to President

Clinton. The second section of the petition containing these letters

was divided into two parts, one entitled ‘‘Letters Addressed to the

Honorable President William J. Clinton Expressing Support for the

Pardon of Mr. Marc Rich,’’ and another entitled ‘‘Letters Expressing Support for the Pardon of Marc Rich.’’ Both of these titles are

misleading.

All of the twenty-one letters in the first part of this section were

addressed to President Clinton. However, several of these letters

made no mention of Marc Rich’s request for a pardon or executive

clemency. Among the letters that included no reference to the pardon issue were those written by Nobel Laureate Camilio Jose Cela,

Chief Rabbi of France; Rene-Samuel Sirat, President of the Jewish

Community of Madrid; Issac Querub Caro; and President of the Association of Spanish Business Enterprises Fernando Fernandez

Tapias. These letters all refer to Rich’s philanthropic contributions

over the years. But none of them makes any reference to the pardon. It is therefore misleading for such letters to be included under

the cover page indicating that all of the writers are expressing

their support for a pardon.

The cover page for the second part of this section of the petition

is even more problematic. There are fifty-two letters included under

172

426 Compare Jack Quinn Document Production (Document entitled ‘‘List of Letters of Support

for Marc Rich and Foundation’’) (Exhibit 71), with Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus

Green, Document entitled ‘‘Letters Expressing Support for the Pardon of Mr. Marc Rich’’ (Dec.

11, 2000) (Exhibit 72). 427 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 172 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).

the title ‘‘Letters Expressing Support for the Pardon of Mr. Marc

Rich.’’ Not one of these letters makes any mention of the pardon

effort. Almost all of these letters were addressed to Marc Rich or

Avner Azulay, thanking them for the generosity of Marc Rich and

his foundations. Furthermore, based on the fact that most of these

letters were written in late November and early December of 2000,

it is clear that they were solicited by the Rich team for use in the

pardon. However, as discussed above, their use in the pardon application came as a surprise to many of the letter writers. It stands

to reason, therefore, that most of the writers were not informed of

the purpose of the letters, let alone that they would be sent to

President Clinton in such a misleading format.

There is also disturbing evidence that a more accurate title for

these letters was considered, but not used, in the application.

Among the materials produced for the Committee was an earlier

draft of the same document, containing the same list of names, but

with a different header reading ‘‘List of Letters of Support for Marc

Rich and Foundation.’’ 426 The existence of this more accurate title

makes it much less likely that the use of the inaccurate and misleading title was a mere oversight by the Rich team. Lawyers billing many hundreds of dollars an hour certainly should not make

such errors, and circumstantial evidence makes it appear that they

were simply trying to mislead. Given the rejection of an accurate

title, and the fact that it was replaced with an inaccurate title,

there can be no other reasonable conclusion. Moreover, when the

Committee confronted Jack Quinn about the misleading cover page

that was included in the pardon petition, he stated:

I don’t know who made that change. And I accept responsibility for anything filed in my name. I will tell you that,

for the most part, I was not involved in the effort to gather

these letters. I became aware after the petition had been

filed that some of these letters were simply sought as

testimonials to his charitable activities and that some of

the people from whom they were sought were not told in

advance that these letters were going to be used from a

pardon application. I very much regret that. And to the extent that, as a result, any of that was misunderstood or

was misleading, I certainly apologize for it.427

The deceptive tactics used by the Rich team in securing and presenting so many of the letters sent to President Clinton in the pardon application are disturbing. The Committee is also troubled by

the fact that the Clinton Administration failed to take the time to

review these letters and the misleading way in which they were

presented. However, in the context of the rush to grant last-minute

pardons, and all of the unfortunate decisions made during the pardon process, the dishonest use of these letters is not surprising.

The misleading presentation of the letters is consistent with the

173

misleading legal arguments that form the basis of the Rich and

Green pardon petition.

IV. LOBBYING FOR THE MARC RICH PARDON

A. The Marc Rich Lobbying Team

Marc Rich employed much more than Jack Quinn and a deceptive petition to obtain his Presidential pardon. Just as important

to the pardon effort was a carefully orchestrated lobbying campaign

that used a number of individuals with unique access to the Clinton White House. Rich employed private attorneys with personal

relationships with White House staff, personal friends of the President, and foreign leaders to press his case with the White House.

The key players in the lobbying effort included Denise Rich, Beth

Dozoretz, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, as well as other

Israeli leaders, King Juan Carlos of Spain, Michael Steinhardt,

Peter Kadzik, and a number of other individuals, all working for

the same goal, the pardon of Marc Rich and Pincus Green.

1. Denise Rich

Denise Rich was in many ways the key figure in the effort to obtain a pardon for Marc Rich. She enjoyed a close relationship with

President Clinton, which gave the Rich team the access they needed to make their case directly to the President. She used this access as much as she could, sending two letters to the President,

and making her case to him personally on at least three occasions.

Denise Rich’s involvement in the pardon effort has raised three serious questions: (1) why did Denise Rich agree to help Marc Rich;

(2) what were the nature of her communications with President

Clinton; and (3) did she in any way connect the pardon of Marc

Rich to contributions she had made or would make to the DNC or

Clinton Library? The Committee has not been able to find definitive answers to these critical questions, largely because Denise

Rich has invoked her Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination rather than cooperate with the Committee. To attempt to

understand Denise Rich’s role in helping to obtain Marc Rich’s pardon, the Committee has considered documents about the pardon effort, testimony provided by other individuals, and even Denise

Rich’s self-serving media appearances.

a. Denise Rich’s Relationship with Marc Rich

Denise Rich was wealthy before she married Marc Rich. She was

the daughter of Emil Eisenberg, who founded Desco Incorporated,

one of the largest shoe manufacturers in the United States. In

1966, at the age of 22, Denise married Marc Rich, whom she had

met six months earlier. Denise Rich was married to Marc Rich for

the next 25 years, having three children. In 1983, when Marc Rich

was indicted and fled the country, Denise and her children left the

United States with Marc Rich. Despite the fact that she accompanied her husband into exile, and remained with him there for

the next eight years, Denise Rich claims to have been ignorant of

the reasons for Rich’s indictment and flight:

174

428 20/20 (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 27, 2001). 429Some estimates list the amount as high as $900 million. See Debunking the Buzz Over

Denise, N.Y. POST, Feb. 1, 2001, at 10. 430 Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Denise Rich to President William J. Clinton

(Dec. 6, 2000)) (Exhibit 73).

QUESTION. In 1980, were you aware that your husband

was reportedly trading with Iran after we had an embargo

because of the hostages?

DENISE RICH. I really didn’t know much about that at all

because I was so involved in my life. It’s not like he would

come home and he would say, ‘‘Hey, I’m trading with the

enemy.’’ We didn’t talk about it.

***

QUESTION. How did you find out [about the indictment]

and what was your reaction?

DENISE RICH. All I really knew was that he spoke to me

and he said that ‘‘I’m having tax problems with the government. And—and I think that we are going to have to

leave.’’ And my response was, ‘‘I am his wife. These are my

children. I’m not going to split up the family.’’ And, so, I

did what I think any wife would do. I left the country.

QUESTION. Did you understand that by fleeing to Switzerland and refusing to return to this country, that your husband was considered one of the 10 most wanted fugitives

in America?

DENISE RICH. That had nothing to do with me because I

was . . .

QUESTION. Yes. It’s your husband, Denise. It’s the father

of your children.

DENISE RICH. Yes, he’s the father of my children . . .

QUESTION. He’s a fugitive.

DENISE RICH. . . . and he was my husband, but as far as

I knew, it was a tax situation. So I really never understood

anything else. And I really didn’t—that’s all that I

knew.428

While living in exile, Denise began her musical career, becoming

a successful songwriter. In approximately 1990, Denise discovered

that Marc Rich had taken up with a younger woman, model Gisela

Rossi. In 1991, Denise divorced Marc Rich. In the ensuing legal

battle, she received a substantial sum of money, which has never

been disclosed by Marc Rich, Denise Rich, or their representatives,

but is believed to be in the vicinity of $500 million.429 As a result

of the divorce, Denise and Marc Rich were reportedly on very poor

terms, rarely speaking.

In 1996, however, the Richs’ daughter Gabrielle died of AML leukemia. Denise Rich has often pointed to Gabrielle’s death as an important factor in her change of heart regarding her ex-husband.

First, she has claimed that Marc Rich was ‘‘cruelly denied the opportunity’’ 430 to return to the U.S. to visit her. She has also

175

431 20/20 (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 27, 2001). 432Lloyd Grove, The Reliable Source, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2001, at C3. 433 Elisabeth Bumiller, Tossed Into a Tempest Over a Pardon; Friends See Naivete, Critics a

Payoff in a Clinton Fund-Raiser’s Acts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2001, at B1.

claimed that the death of Gabrielle caused her to forgive her exhusband for his transgressions:

QUESTION. Here is what a lot of people don’t understand.

How do you go from almost hating your husband at the

time of the divorce to writing a letter pleading for his

clemency and his pardon? What changed in your mind?

DENISE RICH. My daughter died. And when you’ve lost a

child, there’s nothing more you can say. There are no more

questions. When you’ve lost a child, everything changes,

and I felt—I felt in my heart forgiveness.431

This explanation, however, fails to address one fundamental issue:

should Marc Rich have decided to spend time with his daughter,

he could easily have done so. Rather, he placed his legal jeopardy

ahead of his concerns for his family and elected to refrain from visiting her. Years later, it appears that he and his ex-wife would

cynically use the death of his daughter to gain sympathy for his

earlier transgressions.

b. Denise Rich’s Relationship with President

Clinton

After her divorce from Marc Rich, Denise Rich returned to New

York, where she purchased what is reportedly the largest penthouse on Fifth Avenue, a 28-room triplex filled with works of art

by Picasso, Miro, Dali, Calder, Warhol, and Chagall, as well as a

staff of 20 to serve her needs, including two cooks, a stylist, and

a ‘‘personal healer.’’ 432 Shortly after arriving in New York, Denise

Rich sought to establish herself as a leading figure in New York

social circles. Geraldo Rivera, a close friend of Denise Rich, observed that ‘‘[t]he people who think she wants to be a kind of Pamela Harriman person are not off the mark. . . . She wanted a

salon, she wanted a Gertrude Stein, Paris kind of scene, she wanted to watch the parade of contemporary popular cultural life march

through her living room.’’ 433

An important part of becoming a ‘‘kind of Pamela Harriman’’ was

to get involved in political fundraising. Denise Rich began making

large political contributions and holding lavish fundraisers shortly

after her return to the United States. Denise Rich and her daughters gave over $1.1 million to federal political causes between 1993

and 2000, all but $5,000 of that to Democrats. Denise Rich’s political contributions increased as the end of the Clinton Administration neared, with over $625,000 of her contributions coming between 1998 and 2000.

While she was giving and raising vast amounts of money for the

Democratic Party, Denise Rich developed a close relationship with

President Clinton:

When I met him there was so much charisma, and I saw

a lot of idealism, and eventually I had a very special relationship with the former President and the former First

176

434 20/20 (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 27, 2001). 435 Elisabeth Bumiller, Tossed Into a Tempest Over a Pardon; Friends See Naivete, Critics a

Payoff in a Clinton Fund-Raiser’s Acts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2001, at B1. 436See William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document Production WJCPF 0002 (Check

from Denise Rich to the Clinton Library for $250,000 (July 15, 1998)); William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document Production WJCPF 0008 (Check from Denise Rich to the Clinton

Library for $100,000 (Aug. 7, 1999)); William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document Production WJCPF 0031 (Check from Denise Rich to the Clinton Library for $100,000 (May 11,

2000)) (Exhibit 74). 437 Id. 438William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document Production WJCPF 0037 (Note from

Denise Rich to Beth Dozoretz, former finance chair, Democratic National Committee) (Exhibit

75). 439There are reports that Denise Rich may have also assisted the effort to obtain a pardon

for ex-boyfriend Niels Lauersen, a prominent New York gynecologist who was convicted of fraudulent billing practices. According to one account, though, Rich was approached to help with

Lauersen’s pardon effort, and was willing to help, until she was ‘‘reminded that she might be

spreading herself thin.’’ See James Barron with Alison Cowan and Shaila Dewan, A Second Pardon Front, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2001, at B2.

Lady because they were so compassionate to me when I

lost my daughter. And it—and it was as if he understood

and . . . could put himself in my shoes.434

This special personal relationship was also manifested in Denise

Rich’s political fundraising, where she became one of the Democratic Party’s largest and most reliable fundraisers. In fact, Denise

Rich held the fundraiser that was President Clinton’s first public

appearance after the publication of the Independent Counsel’s referral in 1998. It raised nearly $3 million.435

Denise Rich’s special relationship with President Clinton was

also manifested in her large contributions to the William J. Clinton

Presidential Foundation, the charitable foundation responsible for

building the Clinton Library. Between 1998 and 2000, Denise Rich

gave $450,000 to the Clinton Library.436 Among these contributions

was a $250,000 gift in July 1998, which was one of the earliest

large contributions to the Library, made during one of the darkest

times in the Clinton presidency.437 Because she and her friend

Beth Dozoretz have used the Fifth Amendment to avoid answering

the Committee’s questions, little is known about Denise Rich’s motivations for contributing to the Clinton Library. However, one document suggests that Denise Rich was seeking ‘‘help’’ from Dozoretz.

On a note accompanying her $100,000 library contribution, Denise

Rich wrote, ‘‘Dear Beth, Thanks for your help, Lots of love,

Denise.’’ 438 However, since both Rich and Dozoretz have refused to

testify on grounds that their testimony would incriminate them,

the Committee has not been able to develop an understanding of

this note.

As Denise Rich helped President Clinton with his charity, he

helped Denise Rich with hers. In 1998 and 2000, President Clinton

attended fundraising galas for the G&P Charitable Foundation,

which Denise Rich established to raise funds for cancer research.

c. Denise Rich’s Role in the Marc Rich Pardon

Effort

Little is known about when Denise Rich decided to assist the

Marc Rich pardon effort, or who asked her to help.439 Avner Azulay

has stated that he personally convinced her to write in support of

the pardon, telling her that ‘‘everyone in the world is supporting

177

440 Rich’s Israeli Aide: The Pardon Surprised Us. So Did the Furor, FORWARD, (Feb. 23, 2001),

at 1. 441There is some circumstantial evidence of reconciliation between Denise Rich and Marc Rich

somewhat earlier, at least in November 1999, when Denise Rich and her daughter Danielle traveled to Israel to attend the dedication of the Gabrielle Rich wing of the Tel Aviv Museum of

Art, which was funded by Marc Rich. A photograph of that event shows Denise and Danielle

Rich posing with one of Marc Rich’s closest aides, Avner Azulay. 442 Arnold & Porter Document Production A0567–69 (Agenda of Nov. 21, 2000, Meeting) (Exhibit 76). 443Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00021 (Billing Records for

Marc Rich, Dec. 19, 2000) (Exhibit 77).

this and you can’t just stand aside, it’s embarrassing.’’ 440 The first

documentary evidence of her support for the effort to resolve Marc

Rich’s criminal case appears in the March 2000 e-mail discussing

sending her on a ‘‘personal mission’’ to President Clinton.441 The

first specific references to her role in the late 2000 pardon effort

come in November 2000, in a meeting agenda prepared by attorney

Robert Fink. The agenda for that meeting, which included Jack

Quinn, includes an item ‘‘Maximizing use of D.R. and her

friends.’’ 442 It appears that the first conversation between Denise

Rich and the pardon team took place on December 4, 2000, when

she spoke to Robert Fink.443

The Rich legal team did maximize use of Denise Rich. They

started with a December 6, 2000, letter from Denise Rich to the

President. This letter was in many ways, the centerpiece of the

pardon petition. While it appears to have been a heartfelt plea, in

reality, it was drafted by Marc Rich’s lawyers. The letter combines

inaccurate charges about the indictment with emotional pleas

about Rich’s ‘‘exile:’’

I support his application with all my heart. The pain and

suffering caused by that unjust indictment battered more

than my husband—it struck his daughters and me. We

have lived with it for so many years. We live with it now.

There is no reason why it should have gone on so long.

Exile for seventeen years is enough. So much of what has

been said about Marc as a result of the indictment and

exile is just plain wrong, yet it has continued to damage

Marc and his family.

***

My husband and I could not return to the United Sates

[sic] because, while the charges were untrue, no one would

listen—all the prosecutors appeared to think about was

the prospect of imprisoning Marc for the rest of his life.

With a life sentence at stake, and press and media fueled

by the U.S. Attorney, we felt he had no choice but to remain out of the country.

Let no one think exile for life is a light burden. The world

we cared about was cut off from us. When our daughter

was dying from leukemia, Marc was cruelly denied the opportunity to see her by the prosecutors.

What was this exile for? The charges all relate to old energy regulations, where all of the other people and companies involved in the same kinds of transactions were never

178

444 Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Denise Rich to President William J. Clinton

(Dec. 6, 2000)) (Exhibit 73). 445Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00068 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter et al. (Dec. 19, 2000)) (Exhibit 78). 446Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00069 (E-mail from Jack

Quinn to Robert Fink et al. (Dec. 19, 2000)) (Exhibit 79). 447Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00397 (E-mail from Jack

Quinn to Robert Fink et al. (Dec. 19, 2000)) (Exhibit 80). 448 Alison Leigh Cowan, Documents Show a Complex Campaign to Win a Pardon, N.Y. TIMES,

Feb. 10, 2001, at A11.

charged with a crime. Only my husband was treated differently.444

This letter was placed prominently at the front of the stack of

testimonials in the Marc Rich pardon petition, and it was quoted

extensively in the petition itself. Of course, the arguments in the

letter were completely inaccurate.

After including the letter in the pardon petition, Denise Rich

took a number of other actions to lobby for the pardon. Another letter from her to President Clinton was prepared by Marc Rich’s lawyers on December 20, 2000. This letter was discussed among the

Marc Rich legal team, with Robert Fink suggesting the following

text: ‘‘Because I could not bear it were I to learn that you did not

see my letter and at least understand my special person[al] reasons

for being a supporter of a pardon, I am sending you an additional

copy, and an additional request that you wisely use your power to

pardon Marc.’’ 445 Jack Quinn thought that this language was ‘‘perfect,’’ 446 and suggested that Denise Rich should ‘‘hand it to him

[the President] in [a] sealed envelope and mention that she is

aware I intend to discuss the matter with him personally. She shd

simply ask him to read it later and let him know how strongly we

feel that we have the merits on our side.’’ 447 After Marc Rich’s lawyers had finalized the text of the letter, it was presented to Denise

Rich for her signature. Denise Rich did see the President on December 20, 2000, at a White House Christmas party. According to

one witness at the party, Rich wrested the President away from

Barbra Streisand to press her case about the pardon.448

Little is known about how many other contacts Denise Rich

might have had with President Clinton during the final month of

the Clinton Administration. There is evidence that she had at least

one, and maybe more, telephone calls with the President about the

pardon. E-mails between Jack Quinn and Robert Fink on January

16, 2001, indicate that they wanted Denise Rich to make ‘‘another

call,’’ indicating there had been other calls before this one. First,

Quinn wrote that:

I am advised that it would be useful if she [Denise] made

another call to P. I am in a fannie mae bd mtg, but would

like to set this in motion asap. Message shd be simple:

‘‘I’m not calling to argue the merits. Jack has done that,

and we believe a pardon is defensible and justified. I’m

calling to impress upon you that MR and our whole family

has paid a dear price over 18 yrs for a prosecution that

shd never have been brought and that singled out MR

while letting the oil companies he dealt with go scot free.

179

449Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00167 (E-mail from Jack

Quinn to Robert Fink et al. (Jan. 16, 2000)) (Exhibit 81). 450 Id. 451 Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02958 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Rosemary

Micciulli, Quinn Gillespie & Associates (Jan. 24, 2001)) (Exhibit 82). 452Michael Isikoff, Secret E-Mail, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 10, 2002). 453 National Archives and Records Administration Document Production (WAVES records

(1994–2000)).

Please know how important this is to me personally.’’ can

you or avner call her this morning? 449

Fink responded:

I called at 10:30 AM and she is still asleep (she was at her

Dad’s yesterday and it was a very full day) but I left a

message that I had to talk to her before a noon meeting.

I expect I will hear from her and I will give her the message.450

In the absence of cooperation from Denise Rich, however, it is

impossible to know exactly how many contacts Rich had with President Clinton, and what those contacts were about. An e-mail from

Jack Quinn to Robert Fink’s assistant shortly after the pardon

raises interesting questions. This document was withheld from the

Committee for over a year, and was produced only after a decision

from a federal district court judge requiring it to be turned over to

a grand jury. Quinn wrote the following in response to an e-mail

titled ‘‘One of the Reporters’ Requests:’’

Shd def confirm it didn’t. Is this the moment to say that

he asked DR for pol support? Or might DR have said

something stupid like that when they spoke. God knows,

I hope not.451

The Committee requested an interview with Jack Quinn after it received this e-mail, but he refused. Without further illumination

from Quinn, this e-mail’s meaning is not clear. One interpretation

suggests that a reporter may have called asking whether the President asked Denise Rich for ‘‘political support,’’ perhaps in the context of their discussions about the Rich pardon. It also suggests

that Quinn was fearful that Denise Rich might have said something like this to the press. Quinn’s question ‘‘is this the moment

to say that he asked DR for pol support,’’ raises a real question as

to whether President Clinton asked Denise Rich for ‘‘political support’’ in the midst of their discussions about the Rich pardon. While

Quinn has refused to answer questions from the Committee about

this e-mail, his spokesman has informed the press that the ‘‘he’’ in

the e-mail refers to former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani, not

President Clinton.452 While Quinn’s explanation is possible, it is

troubling that Quinn has refused to provide this explanation to the

Committee himself. Absent further information from Quinn, Denise

Rich, or President Clinton, the Committee can only speculate as to

the meaning of this e-mail.

It is clear that Denise Rich had frequent opportunities to press

the pardon case with President Clinton. Rich was scheduled to visit

the White House 19 times during the Clinton presidency, with six

of those visits scheduled between May 2000 and January 2001.453

In addition, Rich also called the White House on several occasions

180

454See, e.g., Verizon Document Production (Telephone calls from Denise Rich to the White

House (Dec. 9, 1999)); Qwest Document Production (Telephone call from Denise Rich to the

White House (Feb. 16, 2000)). 455 Alison Leigh Cowan, Rich Pardon Reportedly Followed Pledge to Charity of Former Wife,

N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2001, at A1. $500,000 of this sum would have been given by Marc Rich and

the other $500,000 would have been given by Pincus Green. 456See Department of the Treasury Form 990–PF, G&P Charitable Foundation, 1998; Department of Treasury Form 990–PF, G&P Charitable Foundation, 1999 (Exhibit 83). A copy of

G&P’s tax return for the year 2000 was unavailable because the Foundation may have received

a filing deadline extension.

near the end of the Clinton Administration.454 However, without

cooperation from Denise Rich or President Clinton, the Committee

is unable to know what was discussed during those telephone calls

or how many of those scheduled White House visits actually occurred.

d. Denise Rich’s Motives

Denise Rich’s involvement in the Marc Rich pardon effort raises

a number of serious questions: (1) why did Denise Rich agree to

help Marc Rich; (2) did Denise Rich’s extremely large political contributions play any role in the President’s decision to grant the pardon of Marc Rich; (3) were additional large contributions envisioned or hoped for; (4) what did the President and Denise Rich

discuss; and (5) was Denise Rich making her political contributions

with her own money? Due to Denise Rich’s decision to invoke her

Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination, the Committee

is not able to answer any of these questions definitively. However,

there are a number of factors suggesting that Denise Rich’s involvement in the Marc Rich pardon case is far more complicated

than she has suggested.

First, Denise Rich’s explanation for why she helped Marc Rich

obtain the pardon does not withstand full scrutiny. Denise Rich has

stated that she helped him because, after her daughter died, she

forgave Marc Rich for his transgressions. She also claimed that she

helped get the pardon so that her daughters could be with their father again. However, the Committee is unaware of Rich returning

to the United States since he has obtained the pardon. Moreover,

during Marc Rich’s self-imposed ‘‘exile,’’ his daughters were free to

visit him in Europe and Israel, as they often did. Since Denise

Rich’s explanations do not fully explain her involvement, it is fair

to consider other possible motivations. One comes from the fact

that Rich promised to give $1 million a year to the G&P Charitable

Foundation, at the precise time that he was trying to get Denise

Rich to help with the pardon effort.455 This sum would have represented a major influx of cash for the G&P Foundation, which

raised $2.4 million in 1998 and only $978,000 in 1999.456 Second,

the Committee has attempted to examine whether Denise Rich and

her daughters continue to receive financial support from Marc

Rich, or would receive enhanced financial support in the future,

other factors which could have influenced their decision to support

his pardon. While Denise Rich’s bank records do not indicate any

influx of money from Marc Rich, at least one document received by

the Committee suggests that Rich might have established a Swiss

bank account for his daughter Ilona. In a December 4, 2000, letter

from Robert Fink to Ilona Rich, Fink wrote ‘‘here are some banking

papers to set up the account with UBS for you that need your sigVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00196 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
181

457Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00259 (Letter from Robert

Fink to Ilona Rich (Dec. 4, 2000)) (Exhibit 84).

nature. Please execute where indicated and also return these to me

so I can send them back to Switzerland.’’ 457 While this reference

is certainly capable of multiple interpretations, it at least raises

the possibility that Marc Rich was providing untraceable funds to

his family through Swiss bank accounts. This could provide another explanation for their support for the pardon.

Similarly, the Committee is unable to reach any firm conclusions

regarding the nature of Denise Rich’s communications with the

President, and specifically whether Denise Rich’s political contributions and contributions to the Clinton Library played any role in

the pardon. Absent true cooperation from Denise Rich or President

Clinton, there is no way of knowing what they discussed, or what

they were thinking about the Marc Rich pardon. However, there

are a number of pieces of circumstantial evidence that raise the indelible appearance of impropriety in this case, which Denise Rich

and President Clinton have done nothing to refute. First, Denise

Rich made $1.1 million in political contributions to Democrats, including the Clintons, and the contributions increased dramatically

toward the end of the Clinton Administration. Denise Rich also

made $450,000 in contributions to the Clinton Library, including

one of the earliest large contributions to the Library. Although this

sum has been downplayed, it was in fact an appreciable percentage

of cash actually advanced to the Library. Given the difficulties generally experienced raising money after a President leaves office, the

individuals who are prepared to give large sums—particularly after

there are no more elections to finance—assume a particular importance. Second, Denise Rich used the relationship she had with the

President, which was built in large part of political contributions,

to lobby the President to grant the pardon. Third, Denise Rich and

Beth Dozoretz, the two people who were privy to the reasons for

Denise Rich’s political contributions and her discussions with the

President regarding the pardon, were so concerned about their potential criminal exposure that they invoked their Fifth Amendment

rights. Were there a benign explanation to the events prior to the

pardon, there is little conceivable reason to have invoked the Fifth

Amendment. Fourth, the President, Denise Rich, and Beth

Dozoretz have offered the weakest of justifications for their actions

in the Marc Rich pardon matter. Given these facts, there is an unmistakable appearance of impropriety.

The Committee had the opportunity to grant Denise Rich immunity against prosecution so that it could receive compelled testimony from her, but decided not to proceed with a grant of immunity for several reasons. First, there was no evidence that Denise

Rich intended to cooperate with the Committee. After the Committee received notice that the Justice Department had no objection to

a grant of immunity, Committee staff contacted counsel for Mrs.

Rich, to determine whether they would offer the Committee a proffer before the immunity vote. By receiving a proffer, the Committee

hoped to receive an understanding of what Mrs. Rich would testify

to if she received immunity. Counsel for Mrs. Rich were unwilling

to provide a proffer. By refusing to provide a proffer, counsel for

182

458Lloyd Grove, The A-List’s No. 1 Political Partiers; How Beth and Ron Dozoretz Made Washington Their Very Own, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 1999, at C1. 459 Id. The Dozoretzes had their critics, some of whom suggested that their friendship with

the Clintons was the result of a deliberate plan:

Starting from the very beginning, they were having dinners and soirees at their

apartment in Washington Harbour. . . . The whole program was geared to rising to

the top. She had a staff from the very first day. I mean, how many housewives have

staffs? She played golf with the president, and she took golf lessons so she could play

Mrs. Rich made it clear that they had no intent of cooperating with

the Committee’s investigation, and would make obtaining information from Denise Rich as difficult as possible.

Another factor that played a role in the Committee’s decision not

to grant immunity to Denise Rich were Mrs. Rich’s own public

statements about her role in the investigation. When Mrs. Rich appeared on the television program 20/20, to the extent she made any

statements addressing her role in the pardon, her statements were

difficult to believe. This appearance raised real questions as to

whether Denise Rich intended to provide honest and complete testimony to the Committee, even if she were immunized.

2. Beth Dozoretz

Together with Denise Rich and Jack Quinn, Beth Dozoretz

served a key role in lobbying for the pardon of Marc Rich. Like

Denise Rich, Dozoretz enjoyed a close personal relationship with

President Clinton that was a mixture of friendship and extremely

significant political fundraising. Like Denise Rich, Dozoretz took

advantage of this close relationship to press President Clinton

about the Rich pardon. Also, much like her friend Denise Rich,

Beth Dozoretz has invoked her Fifth Amendment rights rather

than testify before the Committee.

a. Beth Dozoretz’s Relationship with Bill

Clinton

In 1992, Beth Dozoretz attended the Democratic Convention in

New York City at the urging of her husband, Ron Dozoretz. Until

that point, Dozoretz had never been significantly involved in political events of any type. But at the Democratic convention, Dozoretz

had an epiphany of sorts, as Hillary Clinton passed by:

On her way to the podium she had to walk by where I was

sitting. . . . She was looking around, smiling, and I flattered myself to think that our eyes met. And I blurted

something out like, ‘‘I just think you’re fabulous!’’ And I

felt like she looked at me and said, ‘‘Thank you!’’ with her

big, beautiful smile.458

Beginning with the 1992 convention, Beth Dozoretz began to be

deeply involved in Democratic politics. She and her husband moved

to Washington from Norfolk, Virginia, in 1993. First at an apartment in Georgetown and then at an estate in Northwest Washington, the Dozoretzes began to host high-profile fundraising events.

Through these events, the Dozoretzes had frequent contact with

the Clintons, and struck up a warm relationship with both the

President and First Lady. During the course of the Clinton presidency, the Dozoretzes were close to the Clintons, vacationing with

them, and playing golf with them.459 Like Denise Rich, Beth

183

with him. Her husband obviously is very, very wealthy, and this is something they

set out to accomplish. And obviously they have.

Id.460 Id. President Clinton agreed, and he and Hillary Clinton attended a high-profile christening at the Dozoretz estate. The star-studded attendance list for the event also included Jack

Quinn. Annie Groer and Ann Gerhart, The Reliable Source, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1998, at C3. 461 It was through her fundraising work for the DNC that Beth Dozoretz became enmeshed

in her first White House scandal. In September 1997, Dozoretz testified before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs regarding a controversial White House fundraising coffee attended by John Huang and Pauline Kanchanalak. Two witnesses at the coffee testified that

Huang made an illegal appeal for political contributions at the White House coffee. Dozoretz,

who was also attending the coffee with a prospective donor, denied that Huang made the remarks. See ‘‘Investigation into Fundraising Activities During the 1996 Elections,’’ Hearings Before the Senate Governmental Affairs Special Investigations Comm., 105th Cong. (Sept. 16,

1997). 462William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document Production WJCPF 0002 (Check

from Denise Rich to the William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Library for $250,000 (July

15, 1998)) (Exhibit 74). 463William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document Production WJCPF 0004 (Letter

from Janine Werkman, Chief of Staff for Beth Dozoretz, to Nicole Seligman (July 17, 1998)) (Exhibit 85). 464William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document Production WJCPF 0037 (Note from

Denise Rich to Beth Dozoretz, former finance chair, Democratic National Committee) (Exhibit

75). 465William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document Production WJCPF 0048 (List of Potential Contributors to William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation) (Exhibit 86); Interview with

Peter O’Keefe, Fundraiser, William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation (Apr. 12, 2001).

Dozoretz remained close to the President throughout the Monica

Lewinsky scandal. In November 1998, the Dozoretzes asked the

President to serve as godfather to their infant daughter.460

In addition to the close personal relationship she maintained

with President Clinton, Beth Dozoretz also developed a fundraising

relationship with the President. In 1994, Dozoretz served as coChairman of the DNC’s large contributor program. By 1999,

Dozoretz had raised $5 million for various Democratic causes.461 As

a result, in early 1999 Dozoretz was appointed, with the President’s personal blessing, as Finance Chairman of the DNC, the

chief fundraiser for the Democratic Party. Dozoretz resigned her

post in September 1999, to allow new DNC Chairman Ed Rendell

to appoint his own Finance Chairman. However, even after she left

her position as Finance Chairman, Dozoretz continued to raise

funds for the Democratic Party, and maintain a warm relationship

with President Clinton.

In addition to raising funds for the DNC, Beth Dozoretz raised

money for President Clinton’s personal causes. For example, she

raised money for the President’s legal defense fund. She also raised

money for the Clinton Library. Dozoretz solicited Denise Rich for

her first contribution to the Clinton Library, a $250,000 contribution made in July 1998.462 Apparently, Rich gave the check to

Dozoretz, who sent it on to the lawyers for the Library.463 In connection with this, or one of Denise Rich’s other contributions to the

Clinton Library, Rich drafted a note to Dozoretz reading ‘‘Dear

Beth, Thanks for your help, Lots of love, Denise.’’ 464 Apparently,

Denise Rich was a person specifically targeted by Dozoretz to solicit

for the Clinton Library. Dozoretz gave Peter O’Keefe, the chief

fundraiser for the Clinton Library, a list of individuals Dozoretz intended to solicit, and Denise Rich was listed on this document.465

In addition to the substantial sums she raised from Denise Rich,

184

466This information was provided to the Committee in a briefing by David Kendall and Nicole

Seligman, counsel for the Clinton Foundation. See also William J. Clinton Presidential Foundation Document Production WJCPF 0024 (Letter from Skip Rutherford, President, William J.

Clinton Presidential Foundation, to Beth Dozoretz, former finance chair, Democratic National

Committee (Jan. 4, 2000)) (Exhibit 87). 467 ‘‘President Clinton’s Eleventh Hour Pardons,’’ Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. 69 (Feb. 14, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). 468 Id. 469 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 410–11 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). 470 Irving Sandorf, a former colleague of Dozoretz’s from the clothing industry, noted that ‘‘She

has a way of getting into you a little bit. She knows how to manipulate people. I don’t know

if you’d call them ‘people skills.’ It’s more like ‘I’ll use you, you use me’ skills.’’ See Lloyd Grove,

The A-List’s No. 1 Political Partiers; How Beth and Ron Dozoretz Made Washington Their Very

Own, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 1999, at C1. 471 Beth Dozoretz left telephone messages for Jack Quinn on: December 8, 2000; January 2,

2001, with the question, ‘‘[A]ny news on the matter?’’; January 8, 2001; an undated message

between January 8 and January 18, 2001; January 18, 2001; and January 19, 2001, leaving her

on May 23, 2000, Beth Dozoretz pledged to raise $1 million for the

Clinton Library.466

b. Beth Dozoretz’s Involvement in the Marc Rich

Pardon Campaign

Around Thanksgiving of 2000, Jack Quinn informed Beth

Dozoretz that he would be filing a pardon petition on behalf of

Marc Rich. Quinn was close friends with Dozoretz, and also knew

that she was close to Denise Rich. Quinn testified that he ‘‘encouraged her to help me be sure that the President himself was aware

of the fact that the application had been filed with the White

House Counsel’s office.’’ 467 According to Quinn, Dozoretz did talk

to the President, who told her that Quinn should make his case to

Bruce Lindsey and the other staff in the White House Counsel’s office.468 Quinn described his motivation for involving Dozoretz at

the Committee’s March 1 hearing:

I did so because she was a friend of mine, because she had

a relationship with Denise Rich, she was in much more

frequent communication with the President than I was. I

was motivated by two things principally; one, I was hopeful that she could let the President know that I had or was

going to file this so that he would be aware it was there;

and two, she was another person who I hoped might be in

a position to give me the kind of information that I have,

as a lawyer, thought would be useful to me to pursue their

efforts on behalf of my client vigorously. Now, I want to

also tell you have [sic] that in that conversation I had with

her again around Thanksgiving time, I cautioned her that

it would be very important to make sure that no such conversation was ever connected in any way with any kind of

fundraising activity. She reacted to that by kind of looking

at me like how could I even suggest that. She said to me,

of course I would never do that to him.469

It is apparent that Quinn turned to Dozoretz because of her access

to and influence with the President. Precisely how Dozoretz used

these skills is a mystery, because of Dozoretz’s invocation of her

Fifth Amendment rights.470

Over the course of the next two months, Beth Dozoretz and Jack

Quinn were in frequent contact about the Marc Rich pardon effort.471 Jack Quinn estimated that they spoke between five and ten

185

contact information for the rest of that day. Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone Messages from Beth Dozoretz, former finance chair, Democratic National Committee, to Jack Quinn)

(Exhibit 88). 472Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00162 (E-mail from Avner

Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 10, 2001)) (Exhibit 89). 473 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 246–48 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). 474Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00162 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Jack Quinn (Jan. 10, 2001)) (Exhibit 89). 475 Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 03027 (E-mail from April Moore, Secretary to Jack

Quinn, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 17, 2001)) (Exhibit 90). 476 Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 03028 (E-mail from April Moore, Secretary to Jack

Quinn, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 17, 2001)) (Exhibit 91). 477 Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 03029 (E-mail from April Moore, Secretary to Jack

Quinn, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 17, 2001)) (Exhibit 92). 478WAVES records from the White House indicate that both Dozoretz and Denise Rich visited

the White House on January 19, 2001. However, it appears that these records are spurious.

White House WAVES records usually show a scheduled time of entry for any scheduled visit

to the White House. However, only if a visitor actually shows up at the White House is an actual time of entry entered into the WAVES system. In this case, the WAVES records show actual times of entry for Rich and Dozoretz. The United States Secret Service, has explained, however, that a large group of individuals were scheduled to visit the White House at one time for

Continued

times about the Marc Rich pardon effort. The real question is, of

course, how many times Beth Dozoretz spoke to the President

about the Marc Rich pardon, and what they spoke about. Because

of the Fifth Amendment claims of Dozoretz and Denise Rich, the

Committee knows little about these communications. However, the

e-mail discussions of the Marc Rich legal team offer some insight

into the matter. On January 10, 2001, Avner Azulay e-mailed Jack

Quinn with the following message:

2. D[enise] R[ich] called from aspen. Her friend B—who is

with her—got a call today from potus—who said he was

impressed by J[ack] Q[uinn]’s last letter and that he wants

to do it and is doing all possible to turn around the WH

counsels. D[enise] R[ich] thinks he sounded very positive

but ‘‘that we have to keep praying.’’ There shall be no decision this wknd and the other candidate Milik [sic] is not

getting it.472

When questioned about this e-mail, Quinn confirmed that the ‘‘B’’ referred to by Azulay was indeed Beth Dozoretz.473 However,

Quinn could do little to explain the message, including why the

President would by trying to convince the staff of the need for the

pardon, rather than vice-versa. Robert Fink responded to this message with an e-mail stating, ‘‘I said it before, and I say it again, ‘nice letter.’ Keep on praying, and, oh, a few phone calls won’t

hurt.’’ 474

Dozoretz remained deeply involved in the Marc Rich pardon effort through the granting of the pardon. Three e-mail messages to

Jack Quinn make it appear that Dozoretz was urgently trying to

reach Quinn on January 17, 2001. At 12:13 p.m., Quinn’s assistant

informed him that ‘‘Beth Dozoretz wants you to call her on her cell

if you get a chance.’’ 475 At 1:38 p.m., Quinn’s assistant told him

that ‘‘Beth is very eager to talk to you. She called again and knows

that you are at the WH.’’ 476 A mere 24 minutes later, Quinn’s assistant sent Quinn an e-mail regarding ‘‘BETH’’ stating ‘‘[v]ery

sorry to bother you with this but she is insistent. Please call her—

she says that it is URGENT.’’ 477 On January 19, 2001, Dozoretz

traveled to Beverly Hills, California, with her husband.478 That

186

a party. Rather than hold up the group of individuals who were actually there, the Secret Service waved through the entire group. Therefore, the WAVES system shows erroneously that everyone who was scheduled for that event actually showed up. Hotel records as well as several

eyewitnesses confirm the fact that Dozoretz was in transit and in California on January 19. The

fact that the United States Secret Service had no idea of who was actually admitted to the

White House is obviously troubling. 479 Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone Message from Beth Dozoretz, former finance

chair, Democratic National Committee, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 19, 2001)) (Exhibit 88). 480 Jack Quinn Document Production (Quinn Gillespie telephone bill, Feb. 9, 2001) (Exhibit

93). 481Peninsula Hotel Document Production (Dozoretz Invoice from Peninsula Hotel, Jan. 21,

2001) (Exhibit 94). 482 Corky Siemaszko, Dem Aide Had Early Word of Pardons, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 26, 2001,

at 6. 483 Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone Message from Beth Dozoretz, former finance

chair, Democratic National Committee, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 25, 2001)) (Exhibit 95). 484 Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone Message from Beth Dozoretz, former finance

chair, Democratic National Committee, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 29, 2001)) (Exhibit 96). 485 Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone Message from Beth Dozoretz, former finance

chair, Democratic National Committee, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 31, 2001)) (Exhibit 97). 486 Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone Message from Beth Dozoretz, former finance

chair, Democratic National Committee, to Jack Quinn (Feb. 1, 2001)) (Exhibit 98).

day, she called Jack Quinn to let him know her contact information, both in her private jet, and at the Peninsula Hotel, where she

would be staying.479 At 10:48 p.m., Quinn called Dozoretz at the

Peninsula Hotel.480 Presumably, Quinn informed Dozoretz that he

believed Marc Rich was going to receive a pardon. Shortly after

that call, Dozoretz called the White House and spoke to President

Clinton.481 According to one press report, Dozoretz thanked President Clinton, but he was so busy that he did not initially understand why Dozoretz was thanking him.482

After the pardon was granted, Dozoretz continued her contacts

with Jack Quinn. Between January 23, 2001, and February 5,

2001, Dozoretz called Quinn at least nine times, leaving messages

of support such as (1) ‘‘NY Times was great today!’’ 483 (2) ‘‘You are

getting a reputation as the smartest lawyer in America;’’ 484 (3) ‘‘Hearing lots of good things about you especially hearing that you

are brilliant;’’ 485 and (4) ‘‘Just had important conversation she

would like to share with you.’’ 486

Beth Dozoretz’s efforts to help get Marc Rich’s pardon cast yet

additional doubt on the motives of President Clinton. Like Denise

Rich, Beth Dozoretz was a close personal friend of President Clinton. Also like Denise Rich, and a number of the President’s other

close friends, her friendship was closely intertwined with her fundraising relationship for the President and Democratic Party.

Dozoretz’s involvement in the Marc Rich pardon effort has the indelible appearance of impropriety. Whether or not criminal acts

were involved is unknown, and can only be discovered with facts

not available to the Committee—namely the truthful testimony of

Denise Rich and Beth Dozoretz. However, the appearance of impropriety is substantial:

• Beth Dozoretz was herself a major fundraiser for the DNC as

well as President Clinton’s personal causes, including his legal

defense fund and library. In addition, she was the primary solicitor for Denise Rich’s contributions to the Clinton Library.

Therefore, at a minimum, Beth Dozoretz’s endorsement of a pardon carried particular weight with the President.

• The one communication between Dozoretz and President Clinton of which the Committee is aware raises serious questions.

187

487Of course, there are questions regarding why Denise Rich and Jack Quinn were making

such great efforts to obtain the pardon. As described above, Rich has never adequately explained

her motivations, leading to speculation that her motivation may have been financial, not personal. Jack Quinn’s explanations have been even more suspect, as he has maintained that he

was not expecting any payment for his work on the Marc Rich pardon effort. As described above,

this suggestion is contradicted by common sense, as well as by Marc Rich’s primary U.S. lawyer,

Robert Fink. Fink confirms that Quinn’s motivation was likely financial, as he was going to receive handsome financial compensation for his efforts. Because Quinn and Rich have offered

weak reasons for their involvement in the Rich pardon effort, the motivations of individuals with

even less at stake, like Beth Dozoretz, must be subjected to even greater scrutiny.

According to the e-mail describing the call, President Clinton

told Dozoretz that he was ‘‘doing all possible to turn around the

WH counsels.’’ This upside-down construction suggests that the

President had made up his mind to grant the pardon, but was

hoping to convince the staff so as to improve appearances.

• No acceptable explanation has been made to the Committee of

why Beth Dozoretz agreed to become involved in the pardon effort. Obviously, Dozoretz is friendly with both Denise Rich and

Jack Quinn. It is possible that she agreed to help Rich and

Quinn as part of this friendship.487 However, given the substantial effort that Dozoretz made, and the excitement that she

showed at the President’s decision to grant the pardon, the possibility that Dozoretz had some other motivation should be considered.

• Rather than cooperate with the Committee’s investigators,

Dozoretz invoked her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

However, absent cooperation from Ms. Dozoretz, the Committee

is unable to answer these questions.

c. Jack Quinn’s Attempt to Keep Information

About Dozoretz from the Committee

It should be noted that Jack Quinn apparently tried to keep the

Committee from learning the true nature of Beth Dozoretz’s role in

the pardon effort. When Quinn was asked about the January 10,

2001, e-mail at the Committee’s February 8, 2001, hearing, the

Committee did not have any information regarding the role of

Dozoretz in the pardon effort. When he was asked about the e-mail,

Quinn did acknowledge that it referred to Beth Dozoretz, but he

was then quite reticent about explaining Dozoretz’s role:

Mr. BARR. Why would the President be sharing this information with the finance chair of the DNC? What do they

have to do with it?

Mr. QUINN. I was on the receiving end of this e-mail, and

I don’t know the answer to that. I was aware of this email.

Mr. BARR. Work with me, speculate a little bit, why would

the DNC finance chair be involved here?

Mr. QUINN. Well, I believe—my impression was that

Denise and Beth were—have been friends, and that, in

fact, they grew—

Mr. BARR. I suspect so.

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488 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 248 (Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of the Honorable Bob Barr

and testimony of Jack Quinn).

Mr. QUINN. That they grew up in the same town in Massachusetts up north.

***

Mr. QUINN. But let me be clear, I don’t know that he [the

President] called her about this.

***

Mr. BARR. Clearly it was about this.

Mr. QUINN. I believe that—my impression was that in the

course of the conversation they were having she asked him

what is happening with these two pardon applications, and

apparently was with Denise Rich at the time, which may

have motivated her to ask the President in the course of

the conversation, but I was not of the impression, I want

to be careful to say this accurately, that the call was

placed for the purpose of discussing the pardons.488

Quinn’s initial testimony on this point was misleading. When

Representative Barr asked why the President would be calling

Beth Dozoretz about the Rich pardon, Quinn answered ‘‘I don’t

know the answer to that.’’ When Representative Barr asked Quinn

to speculate about why Dozoretz was involved in this matter, the

best Quinn could offer was that Denise Rich and Beth Dozoretz

were friends, and had grown up in the same town in Massachusetts. Quinn neglected to mention the more salient point that he

had personally asked Dozoretz to become involved in the pardon effort. Therefore, he knew specifically why she was discussing the

Rich pardon with the President. However, at no time during the

Committee’s February 8 hearing did Quinn disclose the fact that he

had specifically asked Dozoretz to become involved in the pardon

effort, because of her close relationship with President Clinton. If

the House Government Reform Committee and Senate Judiciary

Committee had not held follow-up hearings on this matter, it is

likely that Quinn never would have told the truth about Dozoretz’s

involvement. The fact that Quinn tried to conceal this information

only adds to the appearance that Dozoretz’s role in the pardon was

improper.

3. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Other

Israeli Leaders

Key players in the lineup of individuals assisting the Marc Rich

pardon effort were Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and a number of other current and former Israeli officials who weighed in

with the Clinton Administration. President Clinton has made much

of the influence of Prime Minister Barak’s appeal in his decision

making. This claim can be debated. However, it cannot be debated

that the Marc Rich team made a substantial effort to get these

Israeli officials involved. However, much like some of the key

189

489See Petition for Pardon for Marc Rich and Pincus Green (Dec. 11, 2000) (Appendix III). 490Michael Dobbs, Pardon Smoothed Ties to Israel; Barak, Others Aided Rich’s Campaign,

WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2001, at A1. 491 Id. 492 Id. 493Letter from Ehud Barak, Prime Minister, Israel, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman,

Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 13, 2001) (Exhibit 99).

American players, it is difficult to gauge whether these officials

were involved because they believed in the Rich pardon, or because

they received financial support from Marc Rich.

After he fled the United States in 1983, Marc Rich began to

make large financial contributions to various charities in Israel, as

well as Jewish charities in Europe and the United States. Marc

Rich also made political contributions to Israeli political candidates. However, since Israeli law does not require the public disclosure of these contributions, the Committee is not able to determine to whom Rich has contributed. Communications among the

Marc Rich legal team make it clear that they were able to call upon

a number of prominent Israelis to weigh in on Rich’s behalf with

President Clinton.

Marc Rich’s pardon petition included a number of letters of support from prominent Israelis, including: Shlomo Ben-Ami, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Public Security; Itamar

Rabinovich, the former Israeli Ambassador to the United States;

Yaakov Neeman, the former Minister of Finance and former Minister of Justice; Ehud Olmert, the Mayor of Jerusalem; Isaac

Herzog, the Israeli Government Secretary; and Shabtai Shavit, the

former Director of the Mossad.489 A number of these officials received some sort of financial contributions from Marc Rich. Olmert

received a $25,000 political contribution from Rich in 1993.490 A

community development organization called Yedid, which was

linked to Shlomo Ben-Ami, received $100,000 from Rich.491

Herzog’s wife worked for the Rich Foundation.492

More important than the letters of support, though, were telephone calls to President Clinton from some of these Israeli leaders.

Most importantly, Marc Rich’s supporters were able to have Prime

Minister Ehud Barak raise the Marc Rich pardon with President

Clinton. Prime Minister Barak described the approach to him by

Avner Azulay as follows:

Few months ago [sic] I was approached by the chairman

of the Rich Foundation in Israel. The chairman, Mr.

Azoulay is a man I know [sic] for many years, who had

contributed a lot to the security of the State of Israel. The

Rich Foundation is well known and highly appreciated in

Israel for its philanthropic activities in the fields of

healthcare, education and culture.

Mr. Azoulay asked me to raise Mr. Rich case with President Clinton. I raised the subject with President Clinton

several times (probably three) in the course of routine telephone conversations during the last two or three months

of his presidency and made a personal recommendation to

him to consider the case.493

Avner Azulay’s efforts to enlist Israeli officials in the pardon effort were helped dramatically when, in early January 2001, Marc

190

494 Arnold & Porter Document Production A0865 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich

Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 4, 2001)) (Exhibit 100). 495 Arnold & Porter Document Production A0842 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich

Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 25, 2000)) (Exhibit 101). 496Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00071 (E-mail from Avner

Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter et al. (Dec. 19,

2000)) (Exhibit 102). 497Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00163–64 (E-mail from

Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 11, 2001)) (Exhibit 103).

While Burg’s letter did expressly advocate Rich’s pardon, it was criticized by Gershon Kekst and

Bob Fink. Kekst asked Quinn and Fink ‘‘is this a helpful letter?’’ Id. Fink responded, ‘‘I think

Potus will realize that it is intended to be helpful. Frankly, I am a little surprised Avner let

it go in this form, as we pulled one like it from the original petition. Maybe he did not see it

until after it had gone. I see no reason to rain on anyone’s parade.’’ Id.

Rich himself flew to Israel to attend a convention for Birthright

Israel, a recipient of Rich’s largesse. While Rich was in Israel, he

took the opportunity to meet senior Israeli political officials as well

as Jewish-American leaders. During this trip to Israel, Rich met

personally with Prime Minister Barak, and shortly after that meeting, Barak raised the Rich pardon with President Clinton a second

time. Azulay referred to Rich’s scheduled meetings in a January 4,

2001, e-mail to the Rich legal team:

As I have already mentioned—during this wknd [sic]

M[arc] R[ich] is scheduled to meet the P[rime] M[inister],

F[oreign] M[inister] & SH[imon] P[eres]—as well as a

main vector to E[lie] W[iesel].

If possible it would be very useful to ask the W[hite]

H[ouse] to hold the final decision (unless it is positive!)—

until the above have the opportunity to make/repeat their

personal appeals.494

It also appears that the Rich team attempted to have other

Israeli officials call the President or his staff. Former Israeli Prime

Minister Shimon Peres called President Clinton about the Marc

Rich matter on December 11, 2000,495 the day that the Rich petition was filed, and the same day that Prime Minister Barak spoke

to the President. On December 19, 2000, Avner Azulay suggested

that he ask Knesset Speaker Avraham Burg to call the President

on Marc Rich’s behalf.496 It is unclear whether Burg actually spoke

with President Clinton. Burg apparently did write a letter to President Clinton on January 9, 2001, advocating Rich’s pardon.497

Azulay also asked Israel Singer, Secretary General of the World

Jewish Congress, and Edgar Bronfman, President of the World

Jewish Congress, to raise the Marc Rich matter with the President:

Israel Singer & Edgar Bronfman (CEO & President of the

World Jewish Congress) are scheduled to meet potus on

Sunday evening in NY (the Israel Policy Forum—not adequate for a private talk) and on Wednesday for a private

se ́ance at the WH. In anticipation of Abraham Burg’s

meeting, I contacted Singer through Rabbi Rizkin. Burg

will give his support only if he knows that Singer and

Bronfman will . . [sic] I don’t know but suspect that this

has to do with JPoll.

Now Singer wants to be sure that the MRPG petition is on

the agenda of potus. I suggest you contact Israel Singer

the soonest possible—either to brief him and answer his

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498 Arnold & Porter Document Production A0866 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich

Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 5, 2001)) (Exhibit 104). 499Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00091 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Dec. 30, 2000)) (Exhibit 36). 500Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00094 (E-mail from Avner

Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink (Dec. 31, 2000)) (Exhibit 105). 501Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00162 (E-mail from Avner

Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 10, 2001)) (Exhibit 89). 502 Arnold & Porter Document Production A0865 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich

Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 4, 2001)) (Exhibit 100). 503Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00111 (E-mail from Jack

Quinn to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Jan. 3, 2001)) (Exhibit 106).

questions or arrange for a mtg with him before he meets

potus.498

In his desperation to find prominent Israeli supporters for the

Marc Rich petition, Jack Quinn even suggested that the deceased

widow of assassinated Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Leah,

call President Clinton. Robert Fink made this request to Avner

Azulay in an e-mail: ‘‘Oh one more thing. Jack asks if you could

get Leah Rabin to call the President; Jack said he was a real big

supporter of her husband.’’ 499 Azulay responded the following day: ‘‘Bob, having Leah Rabin call is not a bad idea. The problem is how

do we contact her? She died last November—on the 5th anniversary of her husband’s murder.’’ 500 In the end, the Rich team settled for the Rabins’ daughter, who met with Avner Azulay on January 10, 2001, and informed him that she would call President Clinton on Rich’s behalf.501

One of the tactics used by Azulay to enlist Israeli leaders was to

link the Rich pardon to the Jonathan Pollard matter. The Pollard

pardon had long been a priority for a number of Israeli officials,

and Azulay attempted to use the Pollard matter to Rich’s advantage:

I can also cfm [sic] the info on J[onathan] P[ollard]. It

seems that the topic was discussed in telecons with

potus—within the framework of the peace agreement. JP’s

freedom is considered as a public-political ‘‘sweet pill’’ which shall help swallow (or divert public attention from)

the more sour pills in the agreement with arafat [sic]. I am

sure potus is aware that JP is going to be big trouble with

the entire intelligence community and MR could go along

with it ‘‘less unnoticed’’. On the other hand if he says no

to JP—one more reason to say yes to MR.502

Jack Quinn made the same linkage between Rich and Pollard in

his appeals to the White House: ‘‘Lastly, I told her [Beth Nolan]

that, if they pardon JP, then pardoning MR is easy, but that, if

they do not pardon JP, then they should pardon MR. In the last

connection, she affirmed that they have heard from people in or

connected to the GOI [Government of Israel].’’ 503

It is difficult to gauge whether the efforts of the Marc Rich team

to link their fate to that of Jonathan Pollard helped their cause.

Jonathan Pollard certainly feels that the Rich pardon was granted

at his expense. Pollard made the following statement after the Rich

pardon:

I’ve become disillusioned. This is the hardest thing for me.

. . . But what has shaken me to my very bones is to fiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00207 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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504 Eran Tiffenbraun and Mody Kreitman, Expose: Using Pollard to Get Rich, Yediot Achronot,

Feb. 25, 2001 (Exhibit 107). 505 Arnold & Porter Document Production A0542 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich

Foundation, to Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter et al. (Nov. 15, 2000)) (Exhibit 108).

When asked about this document, Kekst said, ‘‘I would not have proposed Elie Wiesel as a moral

authority to anyone on any subject.’’ Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co.

(Mar. 15, 2001). Kekst said that he was asked, but refused, to request Wiesel’s help. As discussed below, Kekst has repeatedly denied that he made suggestions and recommendations even

when they are corroborated by contemporaneous e-mails. Kekst’s denials are not credible, and

appear to be part of an effort to understate his role in the Marc Rich pardon effort. 506Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00066 (E-mail from Avner

Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink and Marc Rich (Nov. 29, 2000)) (Exhibit 109).

nally realize, after 16 years, that I made a mistake. For 16

years I have been desperately waving the Israeli flag, crying out for help to the Israeli political establishment. But

since the Marc Rich campaign, I realize that I made a mistake. All those years I should have waved something else

to get their attention. I should have waved a dollar bill in

front of them and convinced them that I had a lot of

money. That is the depths to which we have sunk as a nation, that an agent has to bribe his own government to rescue him. That is how low we have sunk.

Esther and I are pinching pennies in order to stay alive.

Israel has never assisted us. But this Marc Rich fellow,

with all of his millions, he’s the one that everyone in Israel

is breaking their backs for.

***

Barak, the politicians, and all those who were involved,

were corrupted and debased by Marc Rich’s money. Every

one of them was corrupted at some level or another. The

corruption and the repulsiveness that characterized the

Rich pardon campaign is appalling.504

While Pollard clearly did not deserve a pardon of his own, his comments about the Rich pardon may be accurate.

4. Elie Wiesel

The Rich team also attempted to recruit prominent Holocaust

survivor and author Elie Wiesel to their cause. As a prominent

spokesman for Jewish causes and a close friend to President Clinton, Wiesel was a logical candidate for the Rich team to turn to.

It appears that Gershon Kekst initially identified Wiesel as a potential supporter of the Rich pardon. After a meeting with Kekst,

Avner Azulay informed Behan, Fink, and Marc Rich that Kekst

‘‘proposed Elie Wiesel as the ‘‘moral authority’’ to present the plea.

We discussed some ideas how to reach him—and that I shall do in

the next few days.’’ 505

It appears that Azulay followed Kekst’s recommendation, and attempted to enlist Wiesel. In an e-mail of November 29, 2000,

Azulay suggested that the Rich team might be obtaining a letter

of support from Wiesel: ‘‘We shall have a few days to get additional

letters in New York (Elie Wiesel, Abe Foxman and others). I assume by now you are getting letters from Switzerland and

Spain.’’ 506 When he was interviewed over the telephone by ComVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00208 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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507Telephone Interview with Elie Wiesel (Apr. 2, 2001). Yossi Ciecanover, a banker and

former high official in Israel, and Danny Karavan, who lived in both Paris and Israel, arranged

this meeting. Wiesel indicated that he was under the impression that Gershon Kekst asked

Yossi Ciecanover to contact Wiesel on behalf of Azulay. 508 Id. 509 Id. 510 Id. 511 Id. 512 Id. 513 Arnold & Porter Document Production A0831 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink et

al. (Dec. 21, 2000)) (Exhibit 110).

514 Id. 515 Arnold & Porter Document Production A0836 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich

Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 22, 2000)) (Exhibit 111). 516 Arnold & Porter Document Production A0845 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich

Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 25, 2000)) (Exhibit 112).

mittee staff, Wiesel confirmed that he was asked by Avner Azulay

to write a letter on behalf of Rich. At a November or December

2000 meeting at Wiesel’s home in New York City, Azulay showed

Wiesel other letters written on behalf of Marc Rich.507 According

to Wiesel, although he told Azulay that he was impressed by the

list of names, he said he could not write such a letter for someone

he did not know.508 Wiesel told Committee staff that he also told

Azulay that he did not believe Rich could legally receive a pardon

without standing trial.509 According to Wiesel, even though Azulay

assured him that Rich could receive a pardon, Wiesel told Azulay

that he could not write the letter because he had already written

a letter requesting a commutation of Jonathan Pollard’s sentence.

Wiesel felt that he could not make another request.510

According to Wiesel, Avner Azulay called him several days later

to see if he had changed his mind.511 Wiesel told him that he had

not.512 While this seemingly would have been the end of Wiesel’s

involvement in the Rich pardon campaign, there is evidence that

it was not. Several e-mails indicate that Wiesel may have lobbied

the White House. On December 21, 2000, Jack Quinn wrote to Robert Fink and Azulay, responding to Azulay’s question about ‘‘having

another VIP place an additional call’’ to President Clinton.513 As

Quinn wrote, ‘‘I think another call is fine, but it needs to come from

someone who can get POTUS personally on the line. Did Elie

Wiesel call?’’ 514 Azulay responded to Quinn’s inquiry by e-mailing,

‘‘I don’t know positively if he talked directly to potus and if he did

what was his reaction. All he told me was that ‘he was at the WH

the day potus traveled but he couldn’t give me any reaction.’ ’’ 515

Azulay then spoke with Wiesel again, and on December 25, 2000,

Azulay responded to Quinn in an e-mail with the subject line ‘‘elie

wiesel,’’ stating:

I talked to him today. He says that he brought up the topic

at the WH on Monday Dec 12th, he refused to disclose who

he met. He was told of the difficulties lying ahead in dealing with it (he would explain it only in a face to face meeting) and hopes that they can be surmounted[.] 516

On December 27, 2000, Azulay told Quinn, Kekst, Behan, Fink,

and Marc Rich that he was looking for some way to have Wiesel

express his opinion on the Rich pardon in a clear way to the President: ‘‘Elie Wiesel—I am still checking if there is a way to get from

194

517 Arnold & Porter Document Production A0851 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich

Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 27, 2000)) (Exhibit 113). 518 Arnold & Porter Document Production A0854 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich

Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 31, 2000)) (Exhibit 114). 519Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00104 (E-mail from Avner

Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink et al. (Jan. 2, 2001)) (Exhibit 115). 520Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00159 (E-mail from

Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink and Jack Quinn (Jan. 9, 2001)) (Exhibit 116). 521 Id. 522 Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). 523 Id.

him a straight forward support statement—direct call to potus.’’ 517

Azulay followed up with another e-mail on December 31, 2000,

stating that:

I was informed today that EW visited the WH last Dec

12th. He didn’t meet or speak directly with potus. EW had

a scheduled mtg [sic] with the ‘‘person responsible for the

pardons.’’ His original goal was to discuss Pollard—and at

the same time raised a question about the MRPG case. He

was told that the MRPG case can’t be defined as humanitarian because there was no trial, conviction or punishment to deal with[.]

I understand—although he didn’t disclose it that he talked

with a lawyer, the WH counsel. Perhaps BL.

This is not new to you. What the lawyers think or thought

at the time. However, I think it worthwhile mentioning

that EW’s mtg [sic] was held in the morniing [sic] hours

of Monday, Dec 12th—before xx [sic] before the formal petition was delivered in the afternoon hours. I hope that the

lawyers have a different view of the case by now?

It is clear that EW is reluctant to make a direct appeal to

potus—with the uncertainty that he is doing something

that doesn’t stand a chance. Therefore, it seems plausible

that if someone he respects will convince him that he is

doing the right thing it might still be possible.518

Despite the assurances that Wiesel had raised the Rich pardon

with White House staff, Azulay apparently continued his efforts to

have Wiesel raise it directly with the President. On January 2,

2001, he e-mailed Fink, Quinn, and Behan to tell them that

Knesset Speaker Avraham Burg was going to try to recruit Wiesel

to help with the Rich case.519

Other than the information that Azulay was able to get from

Wiesel, Gershon Kekst also told the rest of the Rich team that

Wiesel had weighed in with the White House on the Rich pardon.

In a January 9, 2001, e-mail, Kekst wrote that ‘‘[b]y the way,

please tell marc [sic] that I am ‘assured’ the call has been made

by elie [sic].’’ 520 Robert Fink responded that he would ‘‘tell Marc

about Elie.’’ 521 When he was interviewed by Committee staff,

Kekst explained that he discussed Wiesel’s involvement in the Rich

pardon effort with Yossi Ciecanover, a former senior Israeli government official.522 Ciecanover told Kekst that he had been asked by

Azulay to ask Wiesel to express support for the Rich pardon.523

195

524 Id. Associate White House Counsel Eric Angel also suggested that he heard that Wiesel

raised the Rich matter with President Clinton. However, after making this initial assertion,

Angel backtracked, and said that he was not certain if he recalled hearing this before the pardons were granted, or from media accounts after the fact. Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 28, 2001). 525Telephone Interview with Elie Wiesel (Apr. 2, 2001). 526 Id. 527 Id. 528 Id. 529 Arnold & Porter Document Production A0881 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich

Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit 117). 530 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 320 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former

Chief of Staff to the President, the White House). 531 Id. at 317.

Ciecanover said that Wiesel either ‘‘would call’’ or ‘‘did call’’ the

President.524

Elie Wiesel has denied any involvement in the Marc Rich pardon

effort, calling such allegations ‘‘pure fantasy.’’ 525 Wiesel acknowledged that he did visit the White House in December 2000 and

January 2001.526 However, Wiesel denied that he raised any Marc

Rich pardon issues with anyone at the White House on either of

those visits.527 He also denied that he ever raised any pardon

issues with anyone at the White House in any other form, other

than writing a letter on Jonathan Pollard’s behalf to the President.528 Given the lack of any first-hand evidence that Wiesel did

actually lobby the President on behalf of Marc Rich, the e-mails of

Kekst and Azulay most likely overstated involvement of Wiesel in

the Rich pardon effort.

5. King Juan Carlos

King Juan Carlos apparently made two contacts with the White

House over the Rich pardon. The first contact was a direct one,

when the King called President Clinton personally regarding the

Rich pardon. On January 13, 2001, Avner Azulay sent an e-mail to

the Rich legal team indicating that ‘‘we have a CFM [confirmation]

that the king of spain [sic] talked to potus. He reports a positive

conversation. No concrete sayings [sic].’’ 529 It is unclear why the

King took this action on Rich’s behalf. It is possible that the King

was motivated by Rich’s support of Madrid’s Jewish community,

but he has not offered any explanation for his actions.

Also in this same time frame, John Podesta heard of King Juan

Carlos’ interest in the Rich pardon. Podesta received a telephone

call from former Congressman John Brademas, President Emeritus

of New York University, who is a friend of King Juan Carlos.530

The King had informed Brademas that he had recently met with

the Israeli Foreign Minister, Shlomo Ben Ami, who had raised the

Marc Rich pardon with the King. The King in turn called

Brademas to see if Brademas could make the King’s interest in the

pardon known to the White House. Podesta told Brademas that

‘‘while it was the President’s decision, the White House Counsel’s

Office and I were firmly opposed and I did not believe that the pardon would be granted.’’ 531 While Podesta apparently braced the

King for the worst, the King’s interest in the Rich matter was

made known to the President, as well as Marc Rich’s supporters,

who have often mentioned his support for the pardon.

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532 Bo’az Ga’on, Rich as Korach, MA’ARIV WEEKEND MAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 1999 (Exhibit 6). 533 Id. 534Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Avner

Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Mar. 8, 2001) (Exhibit 118). 535Letter from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Mar. 15, 2001) (Exhibit 119).

6. Avner Azulay

Avner Azulay is a former high-ranking Mossad agent. He founded his own security consulting company after leaving the Mossad

in the early 1990s.532 Marc Rich retained his services and placed

him as the head of the Marc Rich Foundation and the Doron Foundation, based in Jerusalem.533 These Foundations handle all of

Rich’s philanthropic interests (they were recently merged and are

now referred to only as the Marc Rich Foundation). These foundations also paid significant amounts of money to many organizations

and persons who wrote letters on behalf of Marc Rich that were included in the pardon petition.

Azulay was a central figure in the pardon effort. His name appears on a large number of the e-mails produced to the Committee

that were sent among the Rich pardon team. Azulay played a key

role in securing many of the letters included in the petition. He

traveled throughout Israel, Europe, and the United States soliciting the letters for the pardon. Azulay also solicited many Jewish

leaders for their support of Rich. In this effort, Azulay contacted

Abraham Foxman, Elie Wiesel, and Rabbi Irving Greenberg, among

others. As would be revealed after the pardon was granted, however, not everyone who was approached by Azulay was told that

their letter would be used in the pardon effort.

The Committee first sought Avner Azulay’s cooperation in its investigation in a March 8, 2001, letter asking him to participate in

an interview with Committee staff.534 Azulay refused to meet with

staff, citing health reasons.535 Committee staff followed up with a

number of telephone calls to Azulay’s counsel to try to secure an

interview, but he made it clear that Azulay would not participate

in an interview, due to health concerns and concerns regarding the

ongoing criminal investigation by the Southern District of New

York. As a close advisor to Marc Rich and a key participant in the

pardon effort, Azulay has a great deal of valuable information that

he has decided to withhold from the Committee. His lack of cooperation appears to be part of a concerted effort by Marc Rich and

his closest advisers to keep critical information about the pardon

effort from the American people.

7. Michael Steinhardt

Michael Steinhardt is a prominent hedge fund investor who has

also been involved in Democratic politics, having served as the

Chair of the Democratic Leadership Council and the Progressive

Policy Institute. He first met President Clinton while serving in the

former position. Steinhardt mentioned this fact in his December 7,

2000, letter to President Clinton that was included in the pardon

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536Letter from Michael Steinhardt to President William J, Clinton (Dec. 7, 2000) (Exhibit

120). As Steinhardt mentioned in the letter to President Clinton, ‘‘I think you may remember

me as one of your earliest national supporters.’’ Steinhardt went on in the letter to explain his

decision to step away from the DLC in 1995 ‘‘when ideas and human judgments seemingly led

in different directions[.]’’ 537Letter from Michael Steinhardt to President William J. Clinton (Jan. 16, 2001) (Exhibit

121). 538Telephone Interview with Michael Steinhardt (Mar. 12, 2001). 539 Id. 540 Id. 541Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00171 (E-mail from Avner

Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 16, 2001)) (Exhibit 122). 542Telephone Interview with Michael Steinhardt (Mar. 12, 2001). 543 Id. 544 Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). 545Telephone Interview with Michael Steinhardt (Mar. 12, 2001). 546 Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001).

application.536 Steinhardt also wrote a follow-up letter to President

Clinton on Marc Rich’s behalf on January 16, 2001.537

Steinhardt has been an acquaintance of Marc Rich since the

1970s, and a close friend since 1996. Both Marc Rich and Denise

Rich’s father, Emil Eisenberg, had invested in Steinhardt’s fund.538

In 1997, Steinhardt made his first recommendation to Rich, which

was to hire public relations specialist Gershon Kekst to help him

with his case.539 Over the course of the last few years, Steinhardt

had numerous meetings and discussions with Rich, Azulay, Kekst,

Jack Quinn, and Robert Fink concerning the legal negotiations and

the pardon effort. Throughout that time, Steinhardt advised Rich

on his efforts to settle his criminal case. In the fall of 2000, when

the efforts to settle the case reached a dead-end, Steinhardt claims

that he conceived of the pardon option and recommended that Rich

seek a presidential pardon.540

Steinhardt was also involved in the effort to solicit Edgar

Bronfman, President of the World Jewish Congress, to assist in the

Rich lobbying effort. Around the same time that he faxed his follow-up letter to President Clinton, Steinhardt attempted to contact

Bronfman in Washington, D.C. In a January 16, 2001, e-mail to

Jack Quinn and copied to Robert Fink and Marc Rich, Avner

Azulay wrote, ‘‘Michael faxed the letter to potus as requested.

Edgar B. is in DC. Michael is trying to contact him to enlist his

support.’’ 541 When asked about this e-mail by Committee staff,

Steinhardt confirmed that he had tried to contact Bronfman to enlist his support in the pardon effort.542 However, Steinhardt explained that he did not contact Bronfman in time for him to

help.543

8. Gershon Kekst

Gershon Kekst is a prominent public relations specialist who

heads his own firm, Kekst and Company, which focuses on corporate communications. Kekst was hired by Marc Rich to assist

with strategy and public relations relating to his criminal case.544

Michael Steinhardt told Committee staff that he first recommended

Kekst to Marc Rich sometime in 1997.545 Kekst recalled this meeting, explaining to Committee staff that he met Steinhardt and two

of Marc Rich’s lawyers, including Robert Fink, at Steinhardt’s office.546 According to Kekst, he told the lawyers that he would probably not get involved because he did not believe a public relations

198

547 Id. 548 Id. 549 Id. 550 Id. 551 Id. 552 Id. 553 Id. 554 Id. 555 Id. 556Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00642–43 (E-mail from

Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst & Co., to Robert Fink (Oct. 13, 1999)) (Exhibit 123). 557Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00839 (Fax from Avner

Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink (Oct. 12, 1999)) (Exhibit 124). 558 Arnold & Porter Document Production A1011–12 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Marc Rich

et. al. (Jan. 26, 2000)) (Exhibit 125).

campaign would be helpful for Rich.547 Rich’s lawyers implored

Kekst to study the Rich case and to meet personally with Rich to

discuss working for him.548

A few months later, Kekst met with Marc Rich in Switzerland.549

According to Kekst, Rich told him that unless Kekst could guarantee that getting publicity would help resolve Rich’s problems, Rich

did not want to go through with it.550 Kekst said he left the meeting with the understanding that he would do no work on the Rich

case.551 When back in the United States, he again met with Fink

and Steinhardt.552 According to Kekst, he told them that they

should either let Marc Rich live in peace or get a lawyer in Washington who worked with DOJ to work on the case.553 As is discussed in a previous section, it was Kekst who recommended Jack

Quinn to the Rich team in late 1998.554 Nevertheless, Kekst claims

that he never worked on the Rich case and ‘‘turned down’’ work on

the case.555 In 1997 and 1998, Rich paid Kekst $75,000 for the time

he spent reviewing the case and traveling to Switzerland. However,

Kekst did not receive any payments from Rich after 1998 despite

the fact that he devoted considerable time to the Rich case.

Despite his claim that he repeatedly rebuffed the Rich team’s attempts to recruit him throughout the late 1990s, there is evidence

that Kekst was working with the team at least as early as 1999.

In responding to an October 13, 1999, e-mail from Robert Fink concerning press articles written about Rich, Kekst wrote, ‘‘I did not

like it because we had agreed that no publcity [sic] best serves us

for the time being. If someone wanted to change that position, I

would have liked to have known so I could argue a bit.’’ 556 It is

telling that at this point in 1999, Kekst was referring to ‘‘us’’ when

responding to Marc Rich’s lawyer. It is also telling that in a fax

sent the previous day from Azulay to Fink, Azulay suggests conferring with Kekst to get his opinion on the articles.557 This evidence

strongly indicates that Kekst was already part of the Rich team in

1999.

According to several e-mails produced to the Committee, Kekst

continued to be included in the strategy and planning of the Rich

team in 2000. In late January of 2000, Fink e-mailed Marc Rich

to inform him that Fink and Quinn would be meeting with Kekst

to discuss their negotiations with the Southern District of New

York.558 Furthermore, in a February 10, 2000, e-mail, Avner

Azulay described Kekst’s active role in strategy sessions involving

the Southern District. Discussing the rejection letter sent by Mary

Jo White’s deputy Shirah Neiman, Azulay wrote, ‘‘I note that

199

559Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00698 (E-mail from Avner

Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink (Feb. 10, 2000)) (Exhibit 126). 560Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00701 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Marc Rich and Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Feb. 17, 2000)) (Exhibit 52). 561Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00722 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Marc Rich (Feb. 29, 2000)) (Exhibit 39). 562Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00729 (E-mail from Avner

Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Robert Fink (Mar. 18, 2000)) (Exhibit 60). 563 Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). 564 Id. 565 Id. 566 Id.

Shirah’s ltr is dated feb [sic] 2. This means that she had already

issued the ltr when you JQ GK [sic] were discussing what to do

and how to approach her.’’ 559 After the rejection letter from the

SDNY, Kekst continued to consult on the next steps the Rich team

should take. As Robert Fink explained to Marc Rich on February

17, 2000, ‘‘I have only recently spoken to Jack, Gershon and Kitty

on this issue and all agree that we should try to approach the DoJ

tax lawyers even without the SDNY if necessary.’’ 560 On February

29, 2000, Fink sent Marc Rich an e-mail noting that:

Gershon has not billed for months. He has spoken to me

many time[s] and Avner at least one and meet [sic] with

me and Jack at least three times (Jack speaks to him

more) in the last two months and I know he speaks to Michael from time to time. He even did a draft outline of

what he thought our response should be to the Southern

District, which he, frankly, thought required a response.

No doubt he has some billable work for which we have not

been billed. He knows that you do not want him to work

for free, but has not billed or has just delayed it.561

As these e-mails demonstrate, Kekst was obviously much more involved in the pre-pardon efforts than he was willing to reveal to

the Committee.

Kekst’s claim not to be involved in the Rich pardon campaign is

also strongly contradicted by the documentary evidence received by

the Committee. As early as March of 2000, Kekst was mentioned

by the Rich team in their strategic planning. A March 18, 2000, email from Avner Azulay to Robert Fink discussing Denise Rich’s

‘‘personal mission’’ states, ‘‘IF it works we didin’t [sic] lose the

present opportunity—until nov—which shall not repat [sic] itself. If

it doesn’t—then probably Gershon’s course of acion [sic] shall be

the one left option to start all over again.’’ 562 When asked about

this e-mail, Kekst told Committee staff that he has no understanding of what this e-mail means.563 He said his entire awareness of

Denise Rich comes from watching C-SPAN.564 Kekst further stated

that he did not think he knew Denise Rich was involved.565 He

said he has never met Denise Rich and does not recall speaking to

Azulay around March 2000, the time of this e-mail.566 Kekst’s lack

of memory on this message is brought into question by the testimony of Jack Quinn and Robert Fink. When asked about the

March 18, 2000, e-mail, Quinn testified, ‘‘It’s also entirely possible

that Mr. Azulay, others, myself included, were involved in a conversation where someone said you know we are going to try to parVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00215 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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567 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 396 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). 568 Id. at 516 (testimony of Robert Fink). 569 Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). 570 Arnold & Porter Document Production A0541 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Kathleen Behan,

Partner, Arnold & Porter, and Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Nov. 15, 2000)) (Exhibit 127). 571 Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). 572 Id. 573 Id. 574 Id. 575 Id. 576 Id. 577 Id.

don one of these days.’’ 567 Perhaps most significantly, when Fink

was asked about this e-mail, he testified that he believed that

‘‘Gershon’s course of action’’ referred to the idea of a pardon application.568 This raises the distinct possibility that not only was

Kekst heavily involved in the pardon effort, but more importantly

that the idea to seek a pardon was his own. This may explain why

Kekst was not forthcoming when he was interviewed by Committee

staff.

Kekst again became heavily involved with the Rich team when

the pardon effort began in earnest. In November of 2000, Robert

Fink asked Kekst to meet with Avner Azulay.569 This meeting took

place on November 15, 2000.570 According to Kekst, he told Fink

that he had no interest in mounting a public relations campaign

and that it would only hurt Rich.571 Nevertheless, Kekst met with

Azulay. Azulay told Kekst about the plans for a pardon petition

and the need to get letters of support.572 Azulay asked for Kekst’s

help but, according to Kekst, he told Azulay ‘‘no.’’ 573 Kekst told

Committee staff that he knew before his conversation with Azulay

that Rich was seeking a pardon.574 From time to time Kekst received e-mail asking if he had changed his mind. According to

Kekst, he either clicked the delete button or would send a short

negative answer.575 Kekst asked the Rich team to let him know if

Jack Quinn changed his mind about a public relations campaign.576

Kekst thought that if Quinn thought a public relations campaign

was warranted, then he would reconsider.577

Kekst’s claim that he refused to help Azulay is undermined by

a November 15, 2000, e-mail from Avner Azulay to Kathleen

Behan, Robert Fink, and Marc Rich, the subject line of which

reads, ‘‘meeting with gershon kekst[.]’’ The e-mail begins with the

statement ‘‘GK supports the idea of presenting the request for a

P[ardon].’’ The e-mail also goes on to state the following:

Although chances are not high, no damage could result

thereof if plea is rejected. It could also generate a positive

effect on the DOJ even if case is not resolved.

-Media & public criticism can be countered by the fact that

for years DOJ and SD stonewalled and were never open to

find a solution that the interested parties offered. The

most recent rejection of JQ’s proposal for a review can be

used as an example.

-GK proposed Elie Wiesel as the ‘‘moral authority’’ to

present the plea. We discussed some ideas how to reach

him—and that I shall do in the next few days.

201

578 Arnold & Porter Document Production A0552–53 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director,

Rich Foundation, to Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter et al. (Nov. 15, 2000)) (Exhibit

128). 579 Id. at A0552. 580 Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). 581 Id. 582 Id. 583 Id. 584 Arnold & Porter Document Production A0564 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner Azulay,

Director, Rich Foundation, and Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Nov. 17, 2000)) (Exhibit 129). 585Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00403 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Jack Quinn (Jan. 5, 2001)) (Exhibit 130).

-I gave GK a copy of my updated long list of potential supporters (Bob—pse [sic] fax a copy to KittY [sic]), and reported on my contacts with DR’s friend. I expect to recieve

[sic] a priority list from these to work on.

-GK pointed out that Prof. Itamar Rabiinovitch [sic] is an

important supporter because he is highly respected in the

US and could help with additional names in the US—

which are lacking in my list.

-The time-table [sic] for implementing this project with a

dead line should be decided upon with JQ.

-I also raised the idea that ‘‘a task force’’ under his guidance and strategy should be established to make sure we

make good use of the time and means available. I understood from GK that he shall undertake this project.

-GK is meeting Bob on Thursday, shall contact JQ and decide on how to proceed.578

This e-mail was followed up by Azulay in an e-mail which reads,

‘‘-GK thinks it is better to present the plea in 2 consecutive steps

(MR first and PG later). It might be easier to obtain positive results, if any, for one single. If it succeeds then the second shall be

easier to obtain.’’ 579

These e-mails indicate that Kekst was heavily involved in the

pardon process. From holding meetings with the Rich team, to

going over lists of potential supporters, to recommending Elie

Wiesel to lobby the President, Kekst had a hand in many aspects

of the campaign. When asked about this first e-mail, however,

Kekst told Committee staff that the e-mail does not accurately reflect what he said at the meeting.580 Kekst stated that he does not

believe he advocated seeking a pardon or taking any particular option.581 He said he did not know how criticism could be countered,

and that is why he did not agree to assist in the first place.582 He

also stated, ‘‘To think you could counter the record, which was pretty awful, is outrageous to me. I would not have proposed Elie

Wiesel as a moral authority to anyone on any subject.’’ 583 However,

e-mails sent by Robert Fink strongly contradict Kekst’s claim concerning Wiesel. On November 17, 2000, Fink wrote to Azulay and

Behan that ‘‘Gershon made it clear that he thinks his proposed

moral authority, EW, is the most important person by far.’’ 584 On

January 5, 2001, Fink sent Quinn an e-mail stating that ‘‘Gershon

continues to believe, indeed, he is very consistent, that Elie Weisel

[sic] is the key. I will email Avner and ask where he is on that.’’ 585

202

586 Arnold & Porter Document Production A0567–0569 (Agenda of Nov. 21, 2000, Meeting)

(Exhibit 76). 587 Arnold & Porter Document Production A0570 (E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President,

Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink and Jack Quinn (Nov. 19, 2000)) (Exhibit 131). 588 Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). 589 Id. 590 Id. 591 Id. 592 Id.

The Committee is troubled by Kekst’s apparent dishonesty regarding his suggested use of Elie Wiesel in the pardon process.

Committee staff also asked Kekst about numerous other e-mails

also detailing his involvement in the Rich case. In one of the emails, Kekst personally responds to the Rich team about a meeting

agenda from November 21, 2000, concerning the pardon petition

and lobbying campaign. One of the bullets from the meeting agenda mentions ‘‘Maximizing use of Gershon.’’ 586 In response to the

meeting agenda, Kekst wrote the following, in all capital letters, to

Robert Fink:

ALL I CAN SAY IS THAT THE CASE MUST BE MADE

(FOLLOWING THE GUIDELINES MEMO) IN THE

CORE DOCUMENT. AS THERE IS NO MARGIN FOR

ERROR OR OMISSION, I MUST LEAVE THE DRAFTING TO THE EXPERTS (YOU, KITTY AND JACK). I

WOULD WANT A SHOT AT IT, THOUGH, BECAUSE

ONCE THAT DOCUMENT HAS PASSED THAT TEST, IT

SHOULD BE LOOKED AT FROM A PUBLIC AND PERSUASION TEST, AS WELL. SECOND, THE SUPPORTSPONSORSHIP OF AN ELIE WIESEL IS CRUCIAL:

AVNER SAID HE WOULD WORK ON THAT. A [sic] AND

THE LIST OF SUPPORTERS MUST NOT BE ALL RECIPIENTS OF PHILANTHROPY, JEWS AND ISRAELIS:

IT MUST INCLUDE POLITICAL AND BUSINESS LEADERS FROM AROUND THE WORKLD [sic], INCLUDING

THE U.S.A. I BELIEVE AVNER SAID HE WOULD

START ON THAT. (AS TO HOW TO USE GERSHON

BEST . . . . . GEE, LET ME KNOIW [sic] WHEN YOU

DECIDE !) BY THE WAY, I WILL ONLY HAVE ABOUT

AN HOUR (PERHAPS A FEW MINUTES LESS) BECAUSE I AM TO CATCH A PLANE THAT AFTERNOON.587

When asked about the meeting and this e-mail, Kekst told Committee staff that he was unaware of any meeting being planned.588

Committee staff then asked him about the specifics of his response.

Kekst stated that he wrote this e-mail as an ‘‘angry e-mail,’’ suggesting that he did not want to be involved.589 Asked why he said

he wanted ‘‘a shot at [the pardon petition] though because once the

document has passed that test, it should be looked at from a public

and persuasion test as well,’’ Kekst said ‘‘I don’t know.’’ 590 Later,

Kekst claimed that he was concerned because Azulay went so far

in enlisting Jewish organizations that it would have a negative

‘‘boomerang’’ effect on the Jewish people.591 So, Kekst said he may

have offered to review the petition as ‘‘one last shot to keep them

from doing that.’’ 592 Kekst stated that his offer to review the parVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00218 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
203

593 Id. 594 Id. 595Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production DSM0001 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Nov. 30, 2000)) (Exhibit 132). 596Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00076 (E-mail from

Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink (Dec. 26, 2000)) (Exhibit 133). 597Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00081 (E-mail from

Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink (Dec. 27, 2000)) (Exhibit 134). 598Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00083 (E-mail from

Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink (Dec. 27, 2000)) (Exhibit 135). 599Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00159 (E-mail from

Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink and Jack Quinn (Jan. 9, 2001)) (Exhibit 116).

don petition was limited solely to this aspect.593 Kekst claimed that

when he stated, ‘‘it should be looked at from a public and persuasion test as well,’’ he was referring to trying to limit any anti-Semitic backlash.594

The explanation by Kekst that he was only reluctantly involved,

and only offered advice because of fear of an anti-Semitic backlash

is belied by the fact that the Rich team included him in numerous

conference calls, and continued to include him in their e-mail loop.

Moreover, Kekst continued to respond to some of the messages. For

example, before the pardon application was submitted, Robert Fink

forwarded Kekst a copy of Avner Azulay’s work on the letters concerning Rich’s philanthropic activity that would be included in the

application.595

On December 26, 2000, Kekst responded to a Robert Fink e-mail,

which discussed contacting Hillary Rodham Clinton for her support

and having Denise Rich call the White House, by registering his

agreement with Fink’s recommendation.596 The following day,

Kekst responded to an e-mail from Robert Fink, reminding him of

his position on submitting two separate pardon applications for

Marc Rich and Pincus Green. Kekst responded, ‘‘As you will recall,

I always thought it best to de-link the two. But . . . .’’ 597 Finally,

on December 27, 2000, Kekst responded to an e-mail from Fink

concerning Senator Charles Schumer, stating, ‘‘Can quinn tell us

who is close enough to lean on schumer?? I am certainly willing to

call him, but have no real clout. Jack might be able to tell us quickly who the top contributors are . . . . . . maybe Bernard

Schwartz??’’ 598 As this series of e-mails makes clear, Kekst was far

from a passive bystander who was simply worried about anti-Semitism. He was actively making suggestions about tactics—including

the use of prominent political contributors to enlist the help of

elected officials in the pardon effort.

During the last few weeks of the Clinton Presidency, Kekst continued to advise the Rich team. When asked on January 9, 2001,

by Robert Fink about a potential press story on Rudy Giuliani’s

treatment of Marc Rich, Kekst responded:

Unless jack quinn changes his views about the risk-reward

ratio for publicity, I vote against it. The herald tribune, in

any event, is not the place for us to be. The publicity I was

referring to relates to the repair of marc’s name assuming

we fail, not to help make it happen (unless jack says it

would). By the way, please tell marc that I am ‘‘assured’’

the call has been made by elie.599

204

600Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00165 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Marc Rich and Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Jan. 11, 2001)) (Exhibit 136). 601Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00163–64 (E-mail from

Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink and Jack Quinn (Jan. 11, 2001)) (Exhibit 103). 602Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMRW 00168 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Marc Rich (Jan. 16, 2001)) (Exhibit 137). 603 Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co.,

to Jack Quinn and Robert Fink (Jan. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit 138). 604 Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). 605 Id. 606 Id. 607 Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co.,

to Robert Fink and Jack Quinn (Jan. 22, 2001)) (Exhibit 139). 608Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00191 (E-mail from Avner

Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 22, 2001)) (Exhibit 69).

Two days later, Fink wrote to Marc Rich, stating, ‘‘Meanwhile I

spoke to Gershon yesterday, and he said he would call first thing

this morning to specifically ask that EW call Potus and no one

else.’’ 600 That same day, January 11, 2001, Kekst received a copy

of a letter from the Speaker of the Israeli Knesset concerning Marc

Rich. Kekst questioned its effectiveness in asking Quinn and Fink,

‘‘[I]s this a helpful letter?’’ 601 On January 16, 2001, Robert Fink emailed Marc Rich about Kekst’s views on the pardon effort:

Gershon just called and said he is convinced this is still

possible and that this is a critical week, and suggests you

call Jack directly and encourage him to keep plugging

away, and thanking him for what he has done. Gershon is

also convinced that the no publicity route was correct.602

Even after the pardon was granted, Kekst continued to receive

and respond to e-mails from the Rich team. In a January 23, 2001,

e-mail that Kekst sent to Quinn and Fink, he stated ‘‘I spoke with

marc. He asked the question and I told him that he should not

speak with any reporters anywhere, , , , , , , [sic] if after his first

trip to America and that ‘trauma’ passes, he may be able to make ‘courtesy calls’ in Europe.’’ 603 By dealing directly with Marc Rich

concerning press inquiries, Kekst was clearly actively involved in

the pardon process until the end. When asked about this e-mail,

Kekst said that he spoke with Marc Rich twice after the pardon.604

The first, he claimed, was to say congratulations.605 The second

was to say that he should do nothing at all about the public relations strategy.606

A series of e-mails from January 22 and January 24, 2001, suggests, however, that Kekst was actively consulting with the Rich

team on post-pardon public relations strategy. On January 22,

Kekst made suggestions for a post-pardon letter from Marc Rich to

President Clinton. He wrote, ‘‘I think he needs to make reference

to the fact that the president’s opinion and action were based on

his having been willing to take the time and give consideration to

the best professional analysius [sic] of the matter which made clear

the need to ‘do justice’ at this point.’’ 607 That same day, Avner

Azulay wrote to Quinn, Fink, Behan, Green, Kekst, and Rich, stating, ‘‘I thought we agreed that all inquiries, interviews should be

channeled to gershon. Why is BF giving interviews? He shouldn’t

be dealing with this aspect.’’ 608 Furthermore, in a discussion about

an op-ed piece being solicited by the Rich team, a statement to

Robert Fink reads, ‘‘It is Gershon’s view that the New York Times

205

609 Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Roanne Kulakoff to Robert Fink (Jan. 24,

2001)) (Exhibit 140). 610 Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co.,

to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Jan. 24, 2001)) (Exhibit 141). 611 Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). 612 Id. 613 Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co.,

to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Jan. 25, 2001)) (Exhibit 142). 614 Interview with Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co. (Mar. 15, 2001). 615 Id.

is the first choice for placement. He suggests that Jack resubmit

this version for the Time’s consideration.’’ 609 In another e-mail of

January 24, 2001, Fink asked a question about a New York Times

reporter. In response, Kekst wrote, ‘‘I believe the paper is being

dealt with . . . . and has been[.]’’ 610 Asked about this e-mail by

Committee staff, Kekst said he was ignoring Azulay and did not

want to talk to him.611 Kekst said he believed Azulay had the ‘‘insane idea’’ that the Times reporter could help turn the public relations campaign around.612 Nevertheless, Kekst continued to advise

the Rich team and deal with members of the press. On January 25,

2001, when it was clear that the press was turning negative on the

Rich pardon, Kekst issued a warning to Azulay, Fink and Quinn.

He stated:

The reporter at the ny times is Allison cowan working with

Johnny apple. A senior, well-experienced team. They have

met with jack and I believe you should run this past him.

Unless there is strong evidence, they are not likely to fabricate a story. Is there any trace of evidence?? lenzner told

me that forbes believes milkin [sic] should have been pardoned and he wanted to do a piece contrasting the two and

showing that if mike did’nt [sic] deserve one certainly m.,r.

[sic] didn’t either. Talk with fink about him. PLEASE be

careful about letting so many people talk with reporters. . . . . .all that is being accomplished is that, however

‘‘well-intentioned’’ they stir the story and keep it cooking!!

We are a stage [sic] now at which the story is being kept

alive be [sic] wannabe heroes.613

Kekst’s claim not to be actively involved in the pardon effort is

simply not believable. It is troubling that, despite all of the evidence to the contrary, Kekst told the Committee that he ‘‘did not

work on the Marc Rich case.’’ 614 It would make no sense for Azulay

or others on the Rich team to waste time e-mailing each other

about suggestions that were not made or offers to help that were

fabricated. If Kekst were not involved, the Rich team would have

been engaged in a fruitless effort to include him in their deliberations. Kekst made far too many suggestions to the Rich team

throughout the pardon campaign for him to credibly assert that he

was not involved. Kekst even admitted to Committee staff that he

billed Marc Rich between $80,000 and $90,000—a large fee for

someone who was not involved in the process.615 It stands to reason that a person such as Kekst who needs to preserve his public

image for his own livelihood as a public relations consultant would

try to distance himself from the Marc Rich affair. Unfortunately,

Kekst did so at the expense of providing the Committee with candid information.

206

616 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 467 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink). 617See Section I(B)(1) above. 618Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production 00697 (E-mail from Robert Fink to

Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Feb. 10, 2000)) (Exhibit 32). 619 Arnold & Porter Document Production A0507–10 (Letter from Kathleen Behan, Partner,

Arnold & Porter, to Marc Rich (July 21, 1999)) (Exhibit 34). 620 Id. 621 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 432 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). 622Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production DSM0064–65 (Billing records

from Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky to Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001))

(Exhibit 143).

9. Robert Fink

Robert Fink has worked as an attorney for Marc Rich for two

decades, beginning in 1980.616 At that time, Fink was with the law

firm of Milgrim Thomajan and Lee. Fink’s former law firm was responsible for what the Southern District of New York referred to

as the ‘‘steamer trunk affair,’’ in which subpoenaed documents from

Marc Rich’s company were taken out of the country on a plane to

Switzerland.617 Fink continued to represent Rich when he moved

to his new law firm, Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe. Fink was involved throughout the 1980s and 1990s with the failed efforts to

reach an acceptable arrangement with the SDNY. It was Fink to

whom the SDNY communicated the offer to drop the RICO charge

in the indictment if Rich and Green would return to the United

States to face trial.618 Fink continued to work on the matter when

Jack Quinn and Kitty Behan were retained by Rich. He was one

of the most active and important members of the Rich pardon effort.

10. Kathleen Behan

Kathleen Behan is a partner at the law firm Arnold & Porter.

Jack Quinn recruited her to the Marc Rich case when he was also

at the firm. Behan was one of the three most active lawyers in the

pardon process, along with Quinn and Fink. Behan met Marc Rich

in 1999 when she and Quinn flew to Switzerland to discuss their

representation of Rich. Like Quinn, Behan was retained in July of

1999 to work for Marc Rich for a fee of at least $330,000 that included $55,000 per month for the first six months.619 Behan was

interviewed by Committee staff on February 27, 2001. Behan asserted attorney-client privilege or work product privilege in response to the majority of questions relating to her work on the pardon.620

11. Peter Kadzik

Peter Kadzik is a partner at Dickstein Shapiro Morin &

Oshinsky LLP. According to Jack Quinn, Kadzik was hired at the

suggestion of Michael Green, a fellow partner of Kadzik’s, because

he was ‘‘trusted by [White House Chief of Staff John] Podesta,’’ and

was considered to be a ‘‘useful person to convey [Marc Rich’s] arguments to Mr. Podesta.’’ 621 Kadzik’s effort on behalf of the Rich

team included seven contacts with the White House Chief of Staff

or his assistants between December 12, 2000, and the end of the

Clinton Administration.622 He also called the White House four out

of the final five days of the Administration to see what progress

207

623 Id. 624 Arnold & Porter Document Production A0569 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Jack Quinn et al. (Nov. 19, 2000)) (Exhibit 76). Fink sent the agenda for the November 21, 2000, meeting as

an e-mail attachment. 625 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 476 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink). 626Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00158 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., and Jack Quinn (Jan. 9, 2001)) (Exhibit 144). 627 Id. 628 Id. 629 Id. 630Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00159 (E-mail from

Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink and Jack Quinn (Jan. 9, 2001)) (Exhibit 116). 631 Id.

had been made on the Rich pardon.623 Based on the testimony of

Podesta before the Committee, it does not appear that Kadzik’s efforts were successful, as Podesta remained opposed to the Marc

Rich pardon until the end.

B. Importance of Secrecy to the Marc Rich Team

During the lobbying campaign for the pardon, the Rich team was

keenly aware that public knowledge of their efforts would hamper

their ability to secure a pardon. The most logical reason for their

concern was knowledge that sunshine regarding the Rich pardon

application would severely curtail their ability to misrepresent

facts about the history of Rich’s legal troubles. Perhaps more importantly, public attention probably would have resulted in the Administration consulting with the Central Intelligence Agency or the

National Security Agency. Such consultation would certainly have

had a negative impact on the Rich pardon petition.

Rich’s legal team was determined to keep their efforts secret

from the outset. An agenda for one of the first meetings regarding

the Rich pardon effort lists as a discussion item ‘‘A need for secrecy

and possibility/likelihood of potential leaks. (Kitty says people are

watching this closely.)’’ 624 Robert Fink defended this approach, testifying that ‘‘Marc Rich has been victimized by the press and publicity and that if the press learned about this that victimization

would continue.’’ 625

On January 9, 2001, Robert Fink sent an e-mail to Gershon

Kekst and Jack Quinn in which he discussed a negative story that

was being written about New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani.626

Fink mentioned that the story ‘‘led to a discussion [with Marc Rich]

on whether we seek any publicity about the pardon

application[.]’’ 627 As Fink continued, ‘‘I explained that we did not

want publicity now. He [Marc Rich] understands that is our view.

I look forward to hearing from you.’’ 628 Jack Quinn responded to

Fink’s e-mail the same day stating, ‘‘[I] think we’ve benefitted from

being under the press radar. [P]odesta said as much.’’ 629 Gershon

Kekst also responded to Fink’s message, stating, ‘‘Unless jack

quinn [sic] changes his views about the risk-reward ratio for publicity, I vote against it.’’ 630 To this, Fink responded, ‘‘I agree with

your views on publicity[.]’’ 631

The fears over the disclosure of the pardon effort concerned the

Rich team up until the very end of the Clinton Administration. On

January 19, 2001, Robert Fink e-mailed Avner Azulay, Mike Green,

and Kitty Behan, and informed them that the head of the SEC

208

632Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00180 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Jan. 19, 2001)) (Exhibit 145). 633 Id. 634 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 230–31 (Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of the Honorable Steven

LaTourette and testimony of Jack Quinn). 635For his part, Podesta stated that he did not recall telling Kadzik that Rich had benefited

from being ‘‘under the press radar.’’ See ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive

Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 432 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the President, the White House).

knew about the pardon efforts.632 As Fink stated in the message, ‘‘[w]e agree that is not good and that maybe the SDNY knows too,

but we have no information on it.’’ 633 In other words, the Rich

team recognized that knowledge of their efforts could produce an

outcry, especially if government officials who knew the details of

the criminal case became aware of the possibility of a pardon for

Rich and Green. Jack Quinn acknowledged as much at the Committee’s February 8, 2001, hearing:

Mr. LATOURETTE. [I]s there any plain reading of that email on January 19, 2001, other than you all were afraid

if the Southern District of New York caught wind of what

you were up to, the egg was going to hit the fan?

Mr. QUINN. My preference was that the White House counsel contact Main Justice and that, based on the course of

dealings we had earlier, that they would make a recommendation that would be helpful to us. I certainly knew

that if Main Justice deferred to the prosecutors in New

York, they were likely to have a negative recommendation.

But I thought that, based on our earlier dealings, they had

enough information.634

Not only did Quinn and the Rich team recognize the public relations problem posed by the Rich pardon campaign, but, according

to one e-mail, the White House Chief of Staff recognized this potential problem as well.635 As it turned out, the eventual pardon of

Marc Rich by President Clinton produced exactly the public outrage that the Rich team sought to avoid by keeping their lobbying

campaign secret. However, by the time this wide-ranging public

outrage was realized, Marc Rich already had his presidential pardon secured.

C. Jack Quinn and Eric Holder Cut the Justice Department

Out of the Process

By late November 2000, the Marc Rich pardon petition had been

prepared and was ready to be filed with the White House. Rather

than go immediately to the White House, Jack Quinn first turned

to Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder. Holder had worked with

Quinn during the previous year to try to force the Southern District of New York to sit down and meet with Quinn about settling

the charges against Rich. During that process, Holder became more

familiar with the Marc Rich case, to the extent he was aware of

the charges against Rich, and the fact that Rich was a fugitive

from justice. Despite these facts, Holder had a basically sympathetic view of the Rich case. Holder believed that the prosecutors

in New York should meet with Quinn, despite the fact that Rich

was a fugitive and that prosecutors from the SDNY had already

209

636See Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn, Nov. 8, 1999) (Exhibit 48). See

also ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 45 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). 637See Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn) (Exhibit 56). 638 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 198 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice). 639 Id. at 44 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). 640 Id. at 158.

had a number of unproductive negotiations with Rich’s lawyers. In

fact, Holder told Quinn the refusal of the prosecutors to meet was

‘‘ridiculous,’’ 636 that ‘‘we’re all sympathetic,’’ and the ‘‘equities [are]

on your side.’’ 637 By taking this position with Quinn, Holder had

already sent the message to Quinn that he had a favorable view

of the Marc Rich case, despite the firmly entrenched position that

his own agency had taken for the preceding seventeen years.

As Marc Rich’s lawyers prepared to file the pardon petition, Eric

Holder provided pivotal assistance to their effort. Holder encouraged Jack Quinn to seek the pardon and helped Quinn cut the Justice Department out of the process of reviewing Rich’s pardon petition. Ordinarily, the Justice Department has a key role in reviewing pardon petitions and providing a recommendation to the President as to whether each petition should be granted. However, Eric

Holder abdicated his responsibilities as the Deputy Attorney General and took actions that ensured the Justice Department would

have no meaningful input on the Rich and Green pardons. This

was the first of two actions taken by Holder at the Justice Department’s expense. After first succeeding in keeping the career prosecutors at the Justice Department from having any input in the

Rich pardon, Holder informed the White House on the last day of

the Clinton Administration that he was ‘‘neutral, leaning towards

favorable’’ on the Rich and Green pardons.638 Together, these actions had a dramatic impact on ensuring that the pardons were ultimately granted.

Knowing that Holder was favorably disposed to the Marc Rich

case, Quinn approached Holder and confided in him that he was

going to file the pardon petition with the White House. On November 21, 2000, Holder, Quinn, and representatives from the U.S.

Marshals Service met regarding a matter for another client of

Quinn’s. After this meeting was over, Quinn took Holder aside and

informed him that he would be filing a pardon petition on behalf

of Marc Rich directly with the White House. Quinn then stated

that ‘‘I hoped I could encourage the White House to seek his views

and he said I should do so.’’ 639 Quinn then asked Holder if Quinn

should send a letter to the White House encouraging the White

House Counsel to seek Holder’s views. Holder told Quinn ‘‘no, just

have him [sic] call me.’’ 640 It is also likely that at the November

21, 2000, meeting, Quinn and Holder discussed whether Holder

wanted to receive a copy of the pardon petition. When a senior Justice Department official informed The Washington Post that Holder

left the November 21 meeting expecting to receive a copy of the

pardon petition from Quinn, Quinn told the newspaper that:

I am astounded that he now takes that position. . . . I am

astounded because I specifically had a conversation [in November] with him [Holder] about the fact that I was going

210

641 James V. Grimaldi and Robert O’Harrow Jr., Recollections at Odds on Pardon, WASH.

POST, Jan. 26, 2001, at E1. 642 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 193 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice). 643 Id. at 212.

to submit it to the White House and I asked him if he

needed it in writing and he said he did not.641

While Quinn did not repeat this charge at the Committee’s hearings, his statement to the newspaper makes it fairly clear that he

offered to provide Holder with a copy of the pardon petition, and

that Holder decided he did not want one. This appears to be in

keeping with Holder’s apparent disinterest in learning about the

details of Marc Rich’s legal troubles. In the normal course of

events, one would expect Holder to have welcomed input from professional staff with experience in the pardon process. For some unknown reason, however, he eschewed such expertise.

For his part, Holder has testified that he does not recall any discussion of Marc Rich with Jack Quinn on November 21, 2000:

Mr. Quinn has recently stated after the meeting he told

me he was going to file a pardon request on behalf of Mr.

Rich at the White House. I have no memory of that conversation but do not question Mr. Quinn’s assertion. His

comment would have been a fairly unremarkable one,

given my belief that any pardon petition filed with the

White House ultimately would be sent to the Justice Department for review and consideration.642

***

What I assumed was going to happen in late November of

2000 was that after the petition had been filed, that the

White House would be reaching out to the Justice Department, and that we would have an opportunity at that point

to share with them as we do in pardon—that we generally

do in pardon requests, after all of the vetting had been

done, the opinion of the Justice Department.643

Holder’s defense is difficult to believe. First, his characterization of

Quinn’s comments as ‘‘unremarkable’’ is inconsistent with everything about the Rich case. Marc Rich was one of the most wanted

fugitives in the United States, and the largest tax cheat in the

country’s history at the time of his indictment. Holder knew that

his fugitive status meant that federal prosecutors wouldn’t even

meet with Rich’s lawyers. Yet, when Jack Quinn informed him that

he was seeking a presidential pardon, outside of the normal pardon

process, Holder claims that he did not take note of it and could not

even remember it two months later. Equally as unbelievable is

Holder’s claim that he did not want a copy of the pardon petition

because he was confident that the White House would send the

Justice Department a copy of the petition and seek out the Department’s opinion. The fact that Quinn was going directly to the White

House indicated that Quinn was trying to avoid the normal Justice

Department procedure by which pardon petitions were reviewed. It

211

also indicated that no serious vetting would be done on the Rich

petition.

For his part, Jack Quinn claimed that he was not trying to keep

any information from the Justice Department, but rather was filing

his petition with the White House merely to expedite consideration

of the pardon. Quinn claimed that he believed that the White

House would provide the Justice Department with a copy of the

pardon petition, and therefore, that he had no malign intent in failing to provide Holder with a copy of the petition in November, or

at any point during the application process:

COUNSEL. Why did you not send Mr. Holder the pardon application?

Mr. QUINN. I believed that a good deal of the material included in the pardon application consisted, at least in their

central parts, of the materials that I had provided to him

in October 1999 when he asked Mr. Margolis to take a

look at this matter. But you’re correct. I did not at that

time send him a copy of the full pardon petition.

COUNSEL. The question was, why did you not do that? Is

it because you thought he had all of the material from over

a year previous?

Mr. QUINN. Well, I thought he was sufficiently familiar

with the underlying case that, when he was asked, he

would be in a position to advise the White House.

***

COUNSEL. But you had not provided the extent of your ultimate argument to the President, so you didn’t feel that he

needed to see that?

Mr. QUINN. Well, again, I think, in fairness, you have to

say, if you look at the material I provided to him earlier

about the flaws in the indictment, you will see that it was

the same argument made in the pardon petition.

COUNSEL. Because you’re proud of your work, and you believe in your work, you want to provide it to people. It’s

not a matter of how much it costs, because that’s not the

issue. You would like to provide it to people so they can

see the extent of what you are representing in whatever

material you’re pursuing. And, generally, it seems when

you don’t provide material to people it’s because you don’t

want them to review it or you don’t want them to poke

holes in it or perhaps find a flaw. I mean, the courts require briefs. You have to provide them so they can see

your legal reasoning. In this case, were you concerned that

if you provided Mr. Holder your application that Mr. Holder might send it on to somebody who might actually read

it and look at it?

Mr. QUINN. Absolutely not. Again, I had provided these arguments to him at an earlier point.

212

644 Id. at 267–68 (testimony of Jack Quinn). 645 Jack Quinn Document Production (Memorandum entitled ‘‘Why DOJ Should Review the

Marc Rich Indictment,’’ Feb. 28, 2000) (Exhibit 53).

COUNSEL. You haven’t provided all of the arguments, all

the letters and all the other things in the tabs. You

couldn’t have provided them previously.

Mr. QUINN. Fair enough. The other point I was going to

make is, as I said earlier, I encouraged the White House

Counsel’s Office to reach out to him, and there’s no reason

in the world why they couldn’t have shared a copy of the

pardon petition when they did so.

COUNSEL. I understand, but I’ve not yet heard of a lawyer

who has decided to take a weak argument and leave it on

the table when he’s strengthened his argument. ....

[I]t’s hard for us to understand, even if it was the 11th

hour, why you simply wouldn’t put it in an envelope, messenger it over, let Mr. Holder take a look at it, take it

home, spend a couple of hours. He could think to himself,

maybe we want to talk to security people; maybe we want

to send it over to the FBI. It’s just—we still don’t understand. I guess what you said is you provided material the

previous year, and that was enough for Mr. Holder.

Mr. QUINN. Well, look, you can disagree with me on this.

I was not—I didn’t make that decision in an effort to hide

the pardon petition from anybody. I encouraged the White

House to reach out to the Justice Department and seek

their views. That’s my testimony.644

Quinn’s testimony is not convincing. As the questioning at the

hearing demonstrated, Quinn simply did not have any reasonable

justification for failing to send Holder a copy of the pardon petition.

Perhaps most important, Quinn knew that if the petition were provided to Holder, Holder would likely forward it to the staff of the

Pardon Attorney. Even more likely, the correspondence would be

copied to the Pardon Attorney as a matter of routine. These lawyers would review the case, which would have likely involved contacts with the attorneys at the Southern District of New York, FBI,

CIA, and NSA. If that had happened, Quinn’s arguments would

have been revealed as fraudulent, and this might have proven fatal

to the pardon effort.

Quinn’s claim that he had provided Holder with everything he

needed to know in 1999 simply is not true. In early 2000, Quinn

provided Holder with a two-page set of talking points that addressed solely why the Justice Department should review the Rich

indictment.645 It did not even begin to address the issues raised in

the 31-page pardon petition. Quinn could have no reason for wanting to keep the pardon petition from Holder other than his desire

to keep Rich’s quest for a pardon as confidential as possible.

The key point that must be taken away from November 21, 2000,

discussion between Holder and Quinn is that it took both of them

to keep the Rich pardon petition from the Justice Department. It

cannot be disputed that Holder should have recognized the significance of the fact that Quinn was applying for a pardon for Rich,

213

646 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 193–95 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former

Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice). 647 Arnold & Porter Document Production A0565 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Kathleen Behan,

Partner, Arnold & Porter et al. (Nov. 18, 2000)) (Exhibit 146).

and should have asked for a copy of the pardon petition to be forwarded to the Justice Department. Holder has not provided any coherent explanation of why he failed to do so. Similarly, Quinn

should have provided a copy of the pardon petition to Holder.

Quinn has claimed that he had nothing to hide, and frequently

asked the White House to include the Justice Department in the

pardon process. Quinn’s claims are misleading. Quinn clearly tried

to keep his pardon petition from the Justice Department, apparently out of the fear that it could fall into the wrong hands, namely

the prosecutors in New York, or anyone else who had knowledge

of Rich’s illegal activities or his subsequent actions in support of

countries like Iraq, Iran, and Libya.

The final question then is whether Holder’s failure to obtain the

Rich petition and involve the Justice Department in the pardon

process was the result of incompetence or a deliberate decision to

assist Jack Quinn. At the Committee’s hearing, Holder suggested

that it was the result of poor judgment, initially not recognizing the

seriousness of the Rich case, and then, by the time that he recognized that the pardon was being considered, being distracted by

other matters.646 However, it is difficult to believe that Holder’s

judgment would be so monumentally poor that he could not understand how he was being manipulated by Jack Quinn. Rather, the

preponderance of the evidence indicates that Eric Holder was deliberately assisting Quinn with the Rich petition, and deliberately cut

the rest of the Justice Department out of the process to help Quinn

obtain the pardon for Marc Rich. This conclusion is supported by

the following e-mail, which was sent by Quinn to Kitty Behan,

Gershon Kekst, and Robert Fink on November 18, 2000, three days

before Quinn’s meeting with Holder on November 21:

Subject: eric

spoke to him last evening. he says go straight to wh. also

says timing is good. we shd get in soon. will elab when we

speak.647

Assuming the ‘‘eric’’ referenced is Eric Holder, this e-mail contradicts the heart of Holder’s defense. Holder claims that he was

not focused on the Rich pardon until late in the process, at first on

January 6, when he spoke to Beth Nolan, and then, not really until

January 19, when he announced his position of ‘‘neutral, leaning

towards favorable.’’ He claims that he does not even recall the November 21, 2000, meeting, because it was an unremarkable request. And he claims that he did not ask for a copy of the petition

because he thought he would get everything in due course from the

White House. However, this e-mail indicates that Holder suggested

that Quinn file the petition directly with the White House and circumvent the Justice Department. It also suggests that Holder had

reason to know that the request was remarkable, as he suggested

to Quinn that he circumvent the Justice Department. Finally, it indicates that Holder was a willing participant in the plan to keep

214

648 In evaluating Holder’s motivations, one should keep in mind that the only reason Jack

Quinn was hired by Marc Rich was because of Eric Holder’s initial recommendation to Gershon

Kekst. Holder’s suggestion to Kekst that he hire a lawyer like Quinn, who could come to him

and solve the problem, was a self-fulfilling prophecy. 649 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 431 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the President, the White House). By contrast, Kathleen Behan, who was present when

Quinn called Nolan, told Committee Staff that she did not recall Quinn saying he was sending

over a pardon application. Behan stated, ‘‘It sounded like he didn’t need to explain to her what

it was. It was very cordial conversation.’’ Interview with Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold &

Porter (Feb. 27, 2001). 650 Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn to President William J. Clinton

(Dec. 11, 2000)) (Exhibit 147). 651 Id.

the Justice Department from knowing about and opposing the

Marc Rich pardon.

The final question is why Eric Holder would do such a thing. As

discussed below, Holder had been asking Quinn for his help in

being appointed Attorney General in a Gore Administration. At the

time when Holder made the decision to assist Quinn, there was

still a realistic possibility of Vice President Gore winning the election. As an influential friend of Vice President Gore, Jack Quinn

would be in a key position to assist Holder’s chances of becoming

Attorney General. While this may not have been Holder’s sole motivation in aiding Quinn, it was likely a powerful motivation for

Holder.648 Regardless of Holder’s motivations, his actions were unconscionable. One of Holder’s primary duties in the pardon process

was to make sure that the views of the Justice Department were

adequately represented in the pardon process. In addition, as a

Justice Department employee, he was bound by federal regulations

that required the Justice Department to review pardon petitions

before they were presented to the White House. Finally, as a simple matter of prudence, Holder should have ensured that he knew

something about the pardon before he took action that substantially assisted the chances that the pardon would be issued. By

helping Quinn circumvent the Justice Department, Holder ensured

that his own prosecutors would not be able to express their opinion

about the Rich case. In so doing, Holder disserved his own Department, as well as the statutes he was sworn to uphold.

D. The Filing of the Pardon Petition

On December 11, 2001, Jack Quinn called White House Counsel

Beth Nolan to inform her that he would be submitting a pardon application to the White House that day.649 Quinn personally delivered the application to the White House later that day.650 Accompanying the application was a letter from Quinn to President Clinton, briefly explaining Rich’s arguments.651 In that letter, Quinn

provided a brief summary of his arguments, claiming that a ‘‘grave

injustice’’ had been done, that Rich and Green’s attempts at settlement had been rebuffed, and that the charges against Rich and

Green were unjustified.

The filing of the pardon petition triggered a small wave of phone

calls and other attempts to lobby the President and top White

House officials on the Rich pardon. These contacts ranged from

calls from Prime Minister Ehud Barak to personal communications

between Jack Quinn and his former White House colleagues.

215

652Letter from Ehud Barak, Prime Minister, Israel, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman,

Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 13, 2001) (Exhibit 99). 653 Verbatim notes of transcript of telephone conversation between President William J. Clinton and Ehud Barak, Prime Minister, Israel (Dec. 11, 2000) (Exhibit 148).

1. December 11, 2000, Call from Ehud Barak

On December 11, 2000, the same day that the pardon application

was delivered to the White House, the Rich pardon became a topic

of discussion between President Clinton and Israeli Prime Minister

Ehud Barak. One can only speculate as to whether this was orchestrated or an extraordinary coincidence. Barak’s involvement in the

lobbying campaign was secured by Avner Azulay of the Rich Foundation. On May 13, 2001, Barak responded to a March 8, 2001, inquiry by the Committee concerning his involvement in the Rich

pardon. As he stated in his letter:

Few months ago [sic] I was approached by the chairman

of the Rich Foundation in Israel. The chairman, Mr.

Azoulay [sic] is a man I know [sic] for many years, who

had contributed a lot to the security of the State of Israel

for its philanthropic activities in the fields of healthcare,

education and culture.

Mr. Azoulay [sic] asked me to raise Mr. Rich case with

President Clinton. I raised the subject with President Clinton several times (probably three) in the course of routine

telephone conversations during the last two or three

months of his presidency and made a personal recommendation to him to consider the case.652

The first of these three telephone conversations between Barak

and Clinton concerning clemency for Marc Rich took place on December 11, 2000. The notes of the conversation taken by National

Security Council staff indicate Prime Minister Barak raised the

matter towards the end of the nineteen-minute conversation:

BARAK. Okay, thank you. One last remark. There is an

American Jewish businessman living in Switzerland and

making a lot of philanthropic contributions to Israeli institutions and activities like education, and he is a man

called Mark [sic] Rich. He violated certain rules of the

game in the United States and is living abroad. I just

wanted to let you know that here he is highly appreciated

for his support of so many philanthropic institutions and

funds, and that if I can, I would like to make my recommendation to consider his case.

CLINTON. I am going to take all of them up at the same

time. I know about that case because I know his ex-wife.

She wants to help him, too. If your ex-wife wants to help

you, that’s good.

BARAK. Oh. I know his new wife only, an Italian woman,

very young. Okay. So, Mr. President, thank you very

much. We will be in touch.653

As this exchange indicates, President Clinton may have already

heard of the Marc Rich matter because of some contact with Denise

Rich. It is unclear, however, when this contact occurred or in what

216

654See, e.g., Verizon Document Production (Telephone calls from Denise Rich to the White

House, Dec. 9, 1999); Qwest Document Production (Telephone call from Denise Rich to the

White House, Feb. 16, 2000). 655 NARA Document Production (White House record of attempted call between Dozoretz and

President Clinton). 656 Exec. Order No. 12,834; 58 Fed. Reg. 5,911 (1993) (Exhibit 149). 657 Id. 658 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 324 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the President, the White House). 659 Id.

context it occurred. It is also possible that President Clinton discussed with Denise Rich her ex-husband’s pardon over the phone.

Phone records reflect a number of telephone calls between Rich and

the White House.654 It may also be that the President discussed

the Marc Rich matter with Beth Dozoretz, who visited the White

House on numerous occasions and placed numerous phone calls

prior to Barak’s first phone call. In any event, it is clear from the

transcript of this conversation that President Clinton was already

aware of the Marc Rich pardon effort when he first spoke with

Prime Minister Barak.

There were additional lobbying contacts made with the White

House on the Marc Rich matter on December 11. That same day,

former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres contacted President

Clinton about the Marc Rich case. Presumably, this call, like the

call from Prime Minister Barak, was initiated by Avner Azulay.

Also on December 11, 2000, President Clinton attempted to call

Beth Dozoretz. 655 It is unclear, from available documentary evidence, whether Dozoretz successfully spoke with the President, or

what they spoke about. However, it is clear that Dozoretz and

President Clinton discussed Marc Rich at some point in the days

around when the petition was filed. In this conversation, President

Clinton told Dozoretz that Quinn should make his case to the

White House Counsel’s Office. Finally, as discussed above, on December 12, 2000, Elie Wiesel visited the White House and may

have raised the Rich pardon with a member of the White House

staff.

2. Quinn Was Likely Legally Prohibited from Lobbying

the White House

When Jack Quinn filed the Marc Rich pardon petition with the

White House and contacted White House staff regarding the pardon, he violated Executive Order 12834. On January 20, 1993, the

first day of the new administration, President Clinton signed into

law Executive Order 12834.656 The order prohibited persons who

had worked for the administration from lobbying the administration for a five-year period.657 In fact, Jack Quinn had a hand in

writing this regulation. Quinn had left the White House in February of 1997, and was therefore under the prohibition when he

submitted the pardon petition. Beth Nolan testified that when

Quinn brought the pardon application to the White House, she

raised the issue of his eligibility to represent someone before the

White House.658 According to Nolan, Quinn responded to her concerns by telling her that he ‘‘had obtained a legal opinion that it

was permissible for him to represent someone in a pardon application.’’ 659 Kathleen Behan also told Committee staff that Quinn told

217

660 Interview with Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Feb. 27, 2001). 661 Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter,

to Jack Quinn (Dec. 7, 2000)) (Exhibit 150). 662 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 324 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the President, the White House). 663 Exec. Order No. 12,834; 58 Fed. Reg. 5,911 (1993) (Exhibit 149). 664 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 153 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).

Nolan he could act ‘‘pursuant to the exception for representations

like this.’’ 660 In fact, Quinn does not appear to have obtained a

‘‘legal opinion.’’ Rather, it appears that he exchanged brief e-mails

with Kathleen Behan. Behan’s entire ‘‘legal opinion’’ appears to be

a two-sentence e-mail titled ‘‘Re: exec order 12834.’’ Behan stated,

‘‘Certainly the plain language you have cited would not preclude

your participation. I’d be happy to look at the whole order.’’ 661

Nolan also testified that she ‘‘asked one of [her] associate counsels

to look at the question independently and got the answer back that

Quinn’s work did meet the exception.’’ 662

Executive Order 12834 prohibits lobbying of the executive branch

agency for which the person was employed for a five-year period.

The exception to this rule referred to by Quinn reads as follows:

[T]he term ‘‘lobby’’ does not include: . . . (2) communicating or appearing with regard to a Judicial proceeding, or

a criminal or civil law enforcement inquiry, investigation

or proceeding (but not with regard to an administrative

proceeding) or with regard to an administrative proceeding

to the extent that such communications or appearances are

made after the commencement of and in connection with

the conduct or disposition of a Judicial proceeding[.] 663

Quinn testified to the Committee that he believed he was within

this exception when he lobbied the White House on behalf of Marc

Rich. In response to a question from Congressman LaTourette,

Quinn stated, ‘‘there was, as you’ve heard, an indictment pending

in the Southern District of New York, so there was a judicial proceeding that had been commenced.’’ 664

In contradiction of Quinn, ethics expert Stephen Gillers of New

York University law school says that Quinn has twisted this exception beyond its original intent. Gillers explains that the provision,

known as the ‘‘judicial exception,’’ is boilerplate for government

ethics regulations and laws. It is meant for former government employees who are advocates in court, acting as attorneys in the traditional sense. According to Gillers:

The problem with Quinn’s efforts to use that loophole is

that the president, in exercising his pardon power, is not

performing in a judicial capacity . . . . He is performing

in an executive capacity. And the pardon function does not

enjoy any of the safeguards that led to the creation of the

judicial exception. There is no judge, there is no adversary

process necessary and there is no sunshine. . . . I don’t

think any reasonable interpretation of the language, in

218

665 James V. Grimaldi, In Rich Pardon Case, Did Quinn Violate the Ethics Rule He Wrote?,

WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2001, at E4. 666 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, No. M11–189 (DC) (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 667 Id. at 41–42.

light of the history of this exception, can support his

claim[.] 665

Quinn’s claim that he was appearing with regard to a ‘‘judicial

proceeding’’ is not credible. Quinn was appearing to obtain a pardon, which is not a judicial power, but rather, is an executive

power. If Quinn had been lobbying the President to intervene and

force the Justice Department to drop criminal charges against

Rich, his argument might be more sound. Quinn’s claim was also

severely undercut by a ruling in Federal Court that he and his colleagues were acting principally as lobbyists in the Rich case, rather

than as attorneys.666 As Judge Chin held in that decision:

Although Quinn may be an excellent attorney, he was preceded by series of excellent attorneys; clearly, he was not

hired for his ability to formulate better legal arguments or

write better briefs. To the extent it contained legal arguments at all, the [pardon] Petition made the same arguments that Rich and his prior attorneys had been presenting, unsuccessfully, to the Southern District for almost 17

years. Rather, Quinn was hired because he was ‘‘Washington wise’’ and understood ‘‘the entire political process.’’ He

was hired because he could telephone the White House

and engage in a 20-minute conversation with the President. He was hired because he could write the President

a ‘‘personal note’’ that said ‘‘I believe in this cause with all

my heart,’’ and he would know that the President would

read the note and give it weight.

***

The public relations consultants and media experts here

were not helping the lawyers prepare for litigation. It was

the other way around, as the lawyers were being used

principally to put legal trappings on what was essentially

a lobbying and political effort.667

It should also be noted that Quinn’s position is diametrically opposed to Hugh Rodham’s view of his work lobbying for pardons.

Rodham received two large contingency fees for his work in lobbying for a pardon for Glenn Braswell and a commutation for Carlos

Vignali. Florida bar rules prohibit lawyers from receiving contingency fees in criminal matters. When questioned about this matter,

Rodham took the position that his contingency fees were permissible, because his appearance before the White House was a lobbying matter, not a criminal matter.

E. The Lobbying Effort

After the initial filing of the pardon petition, the Marc Rich legal

team began a coordinated campaign to lobby the White House on

the Rich and Green pardons. These contacts ranged from telephone

calls from Jack Quinn to Beth Nolan, to personal appeals made by

219

668 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 323 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Bruce Lindsey, former

Deputy Counsel to the President, the White House). 669 Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn to Bruce Lindsey, former Deputy Counsel to the President, the White House (Dec. 19, 2000)) (Exhibit 151).

Denise Rich and Beth Dozoretz to the President, to calls from other

lawyers to staff they knew at the White House. The apparent goal

of this campaign was to raise the Rich pardon as frequently as possible and keep it as prominent as possible in the White House,

without letting anyone outside of the White House know of the effort.

1. Quinn’s Contacts with Bruce Lindsey in Belfast

Immediately after submitting the pardon application, Jack Quinn

began to personally lobby the White House on behalf of Marc Rich.

On December 13, 2000, Jack Quinn traveled to Belfast, Northern

Ireland, with President Clinton’s delegation for the peace talks.

During this trip, Quinn took the opportunity to raise the Marc Rich

pardon with Bruce Lindsey, who was also on the trip. But the first

reaction by the Deputy White House Counsel was not positive: ‘‘Mr.

Quinn asked me if I had gotten his packet of material on Mr. Rich

and Mr. Green. I told him I had. He asked me what I thought. I

told him I thought they were fugitives.’’ 668 Apparently, Quinn disputed Lindsey’s assertion, but it is not clear what else they discussed about the Rich matter during the Belfast trip.

When Quinn returned to the United States, he sent a brief letter

to Lindsey to try to address Lindsey’s concerns. In his letter, Quinn

summarized some of the same arguments made in the pardon petition:

You expressed a concern that they [Rich and Green] are

fugitives; and I told you they are not. Here is why: Rich

and Green were in fact residing in Switzerland when they

were indicted in September 1983. They (understandably in

my mind) chose not to return to the US for a trial in light

of all that had happened to them; particularly the enormous and overwhelmingly adverse and prejudicial publicity generated, I am sure, by then U.S. Attorney Giuliani.

Their failure to return to New York was not a crime and

no one has ever accused them of a crime for failing to come

to the US for a trial. . . . Our review of the law in the

area (18 USC 1073) similarly confirms to us that their conduct is not proscribed by federal law.669

Quinn’s claims were absurd, and it appears that the White

House staff recognized that they were absurd. As described further

below, Rich and Green were fugitives, both in the practical and the

legal sense. Practically, they fled the country when they believed

that their indictment was imminent, and never returned, because

they knew they would be arrested. The federal government considered them fugitives, listing Rich as one of its ten most wanted

international fugitives, attempting to extradite Rich and Green,

and mounting complicated operations to apprehend them abroad.

In the legal sense, Rich and Green clearly violated the federal statute outlawing fugitivity, which prohibits ‘‘travel[ing] in . . . foreign

220

670 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (2000). This section states:

Whoever moves or travels in interstate or foreign commerce with intent either (1) to

avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction, under the laws of the

place from which he flees, for a crime, or an attempt to commit a crime, punishable

by death or which is a felony under the laws of the place from which the fugitive

flees, or (2) to avoid giving testimony in any criminal proceedings in such place in

which the commission of an offense punishable by death or which is a felony under

the laws of such place, is charged, or (3) to avoid service of, or contempt proceedings

for alleged disobedience of, lawful process requiring attendance and the giving of testimony or the production of documentary evidence before an agency of a State empowered by the law of such State to conduct investigations of alleged criminal activities,

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. For

the purposes of clause (3) of this paragraph, the term ‘‘State’’ includes a State of the

United States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States. Violations of this section may be prosecuted only in the

Federal judicial district in which the original crime was alleged to have been committed, or in which the person was held in custody or confinement, or in which an avoidance of service of process or a contempt referred to in clause (3) of the first paragraph

of this section is alleged to have been committed, and only upon formal approval in

writing by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney General, or an Assistant Attorney General of the United States, which function

of approving prosecutions may not be delegated. (Emphases added). 671Moreover, it appears that Quinn’s own associates believed that Rich was a fugitive. Shortly

after the pardon was granted, Jeff Connaughton, one of Quinn’s partners, sent him an e-mail

explaining that Quinn had to make the case that ‘‘President Clinton was right to pardon Rich

despite the fact that he’s a fugitive.’’ Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 03088 (E-mail from

Jeff Connaughton, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 27, 2001)) (Exhibit 152). 672 20/20 (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 27, 2001).

commerce with intent . . . to avoid prosecution.’’ 670 The fact that

Rich and Green were never charged with violating this statute has

more to do with the fact that they were already facing dozens of

felony counts, rather than any lack of evidence. It appears that

Quinn’s facile arguments had little impact on Lindsey as he, and

every other lawyer at the White House who considered the Marc

Rich matter, continued to believe that Rich was a fugitive.671

More important, should there have been any doubt about the

matter, Quinn had Denise Rich to tell him what really happened.

As she succinctly explained to the American people on April 27,

2001:

QUESTION. How did you find out [about the indictment]

and what was your reaction?

DENISE RICH. All I really knew was that he spoke to me

and he said that ‘‘I’m having tax problems with the government. And—and I think that we are going to have to

leave.’’ And my response was, ‘‘I am his wife. These are my

children. I’m not going to split up the family.’’ And, so, I

did what I think any wife would do. I left the country.672

There can be no clearer ‘‘cause and effect’’ explanation of what happened than this, and it is hard to argue that Denise Rich failed to

understand, at the time, why she and her children fled from the

United States. In short, Quinn’s after-the-fact rationalization is

nothing more than pure dishonesty.

2. Peter Kadzik’s Lobbying Contacts with John Podesta

Peter Kadzik is a partner at the law firm Dickstein Shapiro

Morin & Oshinsky LLP, the same firm as long-time Rich lawyers

Michael Green and I. Lewis Libby. Kadzik was recruited into Marc

Rich’s lobbying campaign because he was a long-time friend of

White House Chief of Staff John Podesta, dating back to law

221

673 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 445–46 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Peter Kadzik, Partner,

Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky). 674Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production DSM0059–0069 (Billing records

from Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky to Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001))

(Exhibit 143). 675 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 316 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former

Chief of Staff to the President, the White House). 676 Id. See also Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production DSM0005 (Letter

from Peter Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky, to John Podesta, former Chief

of Staff to the President, the White House (Dec. 15, 2000)) (Exhibit 153). 677 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 316 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former

Chief of Staff to the President, the White House). 678Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production DSM0059–0069 (Billing records

from Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky to Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001))

(Exhibit 143). 679 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 316 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former

Chief of Staff to the President, the White House). 680 Id.

school. Kadzik had also represented Podesta in connection with

Congressional and independent counsel investigations.673 Over the

course of his lobbying efforts for Marc Rich, Peter Kadzik had

seven contacts with either Podesta or administrative staff at the

White House.

On December 12, 2000, Peter Kadzik had his first telephone conversation with John Podesta relating to the Marc Rich pardon application.674 In his opening testimony before the Committee, Podesta explained his initial contact with Kadzik:

My first recollection of this matter is that some time in

mid-December 2000 I returned a call from Mr. Peter

Kadzik who has been a friend of mine since we attended

law school together in the mid-1970’s. I remember that Mr.

Kadzik told me that his firm represented Mr. Rich and Mr.

Green in connection with a criminal case and that Jack

Quinn was seeking a Presidential pardon from them.

At that point, I was unfamiliar with the Rich/Green case.

Mr. Kadzik asked me who would be reviewing pardon matters at the White House. I recalled that I told him that the

White House Counsel’s office was reviewing pardon applications.675

A few days after this initial contact, on December 15, 2000,

Kadzik sent Podesta a copy of Jack Quinn’s cover letter to the pardon application, which provided a summary of Marc Rich’s case.676

Podesta testified that he forwarded this on to the White House

Counsel’s Office.677 Kadzik next contacted Podesta on January 2,

2001.678 According to Podesta, Kadzik ‘‘asked, in light of the pardons that Mr. Clinton had issued around Christmas, whether any

more pardons were likely to be considered.’’ 679 Podesta told Kadzik

that President Clinton ‘‘was considering additional pardons and

commutations, but it was unlikely that one would be granted under

the circumstances he had briefly described unless the counsel’s office, having reviewed the case on the merits, believed that some

real injustice had been done.’’ 680 Apparently, Kadzik also informed

his partner Michael Green that the Rich case was pending, and

222

681Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production DSM0370 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Jack Quinn and Michael Green, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky (Jan. 2,

2001)) (Exhibit 154). 682Piper Marbury Document Production PMR&W 00108 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner

Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Jan. 3, 2001)) (Exhibit 155). Fink’s use of the term ‘‘rabbi’’ caused some confusion for Azulay, who responded ‘‘I don’t understand the comment about the

rabbi. Our book is full of rabbis. Could you get more specific?’’ Id. Fink then responded, ‘‘Yes,

by rabbi I meant someone inside who is in favor of the pardon and working for it to be granted.

Sorry about the lack of clarity, it is just common usage here.’’ Id. 683 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 317 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former

Chief of Staff to the President, the White House). See also Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky

Document Production DSM0059–0069 (Billing records of Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky

to Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit 143). 684 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 317 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former

Chief of Staff to the President, the White House). 685Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production DSM0059–0069 (Billing records

from Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky to Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001))

(Exhibit 143).

would be considered within the next week, but that they needed a

supporter in the Counsel’s Office. As Fink explained to Jack Quinn:

Mike spoke with his partner [Kadzik] today who spoke to

Podesta who said, in effect, that we are still in the running

but we are fourth and long. It seems that there are many

requests and only the ones being pushed by Beth or Bruce

are being followed, so we have to get one of them strongly

behind this. They have to become advocates.681

Fink sent a similar message to Avner Azulay:

I learned from Mike Green today that our case is still

pending and is part of a large group that may be considered at the end of the week. But his friend [Kadzik] told

him that we need a rabbi among the people in the counsel’s office (it seems that Mike’s friend [Kadzik] believes

we do not have one yet), so I have written Jack to ask him

to follow up with the two people there (Beth and Bruce),

both of whom received our papers, both of whom he knows

well and both of whom he has already discussed this matter [sic].682

On January 6, 2001, Kadzik met with Podesta in the White

House.683 At this meeting, Podesta conveyed the collective view of

the White House Counsel’s Office on the potential pardon of Marc

Rich and Pincus Green:

I told him that I, along with the entire White House staff

counsel, opposed it and that I did not think it would be

granted. At that point, I believed that the pardons would

not be granted in light of the uniform staff recommendation to the contrary and that little more needed to be done

on the matter.684

Notwithstanding Podesta’s negative views, and the discouraging

news on the White House’s consideration of the Rich pardon,

Kadzik placed one more call to Podesta on January 16, 2001.685 According to Podesta, Kadzik told him that ‘‘he had been informed

that the President had reviewed the submissions Mr. Quinn had

sent in and was impressed with them and was once again considerVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00238 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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686 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 317 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former

Chief of Staff to the President, the White House). 687 Id. 688Piper Marbury Document Production PMR&W 00106–07 (E-mail from Robert Fink to

Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Jan. 3, 2001)) (Exhibit 156). 689Piper Marbury Document Production PMR&W 00108 (E-mail from Robert Fink to Avner

Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Jan. 3, 2001)) (Exhibit 155). 690Piper Marbury Document Production PMR&W 00109 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert

Fink (Jan. 3, 2001)) (Exhibit 157). 691 Arnold & Porter Document Production A0864 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Avner Azulay,

Director, Rich Foundation (Jan. 3, 2001)) (Exhibit 158).

ing the pardon.’’ 686 Podesta told Kadzik that he still opposed the

pardon and did not believe it would be granted.687

Taking John Podesta’s testimony at face value, it does not appear

that the Rich team’s Kadzik approach was successful. Podesta, like

Bruce Lindsey and the other key staff, appears to have been steadfastly against the pardon. However, as is discussed in more detail

below, notwithstanding their strong opposition, White House staff

did not give their best efforts to dissuade President Clinton from

granting the Rich and Green pardons.

3. Further Contacts Between Jack Quinn and White

House Staff

After Peter Kadzik spoke to John Podesta, and learned that Rich

needed a ‘‘rabbi’’ among the White House staff to press the case for

a pardon, Robert Fink decided that they needed to press their case

as strongly as possible at both the staff level and with the President.688 Fink then apparently asked Jack Quinn to make another

call to the White House.689 Quinn agreed to make the call,690 and

spoke to Beth Nolan on January 3, 2001.691 He reported back to

Fink, Marc Rich, Avner Azulay, and Behan later on January 3:

I just got off the phone with Beth Nolan, the White House

Counsel. She told me that her office will do the next ‘‘reassessment’’ of our and other applications on Friday [January 5]. I impressed upon her that our case is ‘‘sui generis’’

only in that M[arc] R[ich] was indicted but did not stand

trial and then elaborated at some length on the circumstances of MR’s decision not to return—the facts that

Rudy was new, was trying to make a reputation, overcharged in the most gross way (and in ways that would not

stand today—RICO, mail/wire fraud, etc.) and that MR,

seeing the mountain of adverse publicity generated by the

US Atty’s ofc and the disproportionate charges, made the

choice anyone would make, i.e., not to return. She responded that this is still a tough case—that the perception

will nevertheless be that MR is in some ‘‘sense’’ a fugitive.

I explained why he is not. I told her that I want an opportunity to know, before a final decision, if there are things

we have not said or done that should be said or done. She

promised me that opportunity. I asked if she would see us

to review the matter in person and she said she would if

there was reason to think, after her reassessment, that

that would be fruitful. I told her, finallt [sic], that I intend

to have one more conversation with POTUS before this is

finalized in order to make the case to him, focusing in parVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00239 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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692 Id. 693 Interview with Cheryl Mills, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 19, 2001). 694 Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn to President William J. Clinton

(Jan. 5, 2001)) (Exhibit 159). 695Piper Marbury Document Production PMR&W 00153 (E-mail from April Moore, Secretary

to Jack Quinn, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Robert Fink and Kathleen Behan, Partner, Arnold & Porter (Jan. 5, 2001)) (Exhibit 160). 696 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 331 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). 697 Id. at 333. 698 Interview with Cheryl Mills, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 19, 2001).

ticular on his appreciation of what an overly-zealous prosecutor can do to make a fair trial, in court or in the court

of public opinion, impossible. Lastly, I told her that, if they

pardon J[onathan] P[ollard], then pardoning MR is easy,

but that, if they do not pardon JP, then they should pardon MR. In the last connection, she affirmed that they

have heard from people in or connected to the

G[overnment] O[f] I[srael].692

After this call, Jack Quinn also tried to bring another former

White House staffer into the Marc Rich pardon effort. Cheryl Mills

was the former Deputy Counsel to the President, and was now an

executive at Oxygen Media in New York. However, Mills was still

influential in the Clinton White House, and Quinn brought his arguments to her. At some point before January 5, 2001, Quinn apparently called Mills and discussed the Rich pardon with her.

Then, on January 5, 2001, Mills was in the White House for a

party for former White House Counsels.693 On January 5, Quinn

sent a new letter to the President outlining his key arguments on

the Rich pardon.694 He sent copies of this letter to Beth Nolan,

Bruce Lindsey, and Mills.695 Quinn explained that he sent the material to Mills because she was:

A person who, after some 7 years at the White House, was

enormously well regarded and trusted, well might at some

point be consulted on this. I had raised with her the fact

that I was pursuing the pardon as I did with others from

time to time to just bounce ideas off. But also I was hopeful, knowing of her relationship with Ms. Nolan and Mr.

Lindsey and the President, that as any good lawyer would,

that as this thing progressed, if it were progressing, that

I would get some sense of how people were reacting to different arguments in order that I might be in a position to

know better what concerns the folks advising the President might have so that I might address those concerns.696

Then, at the party for former White House Counsels later that day,

where the former counsels, including Abner Mikva, Lloyd Cutler,

and Bernard Nussbaum were filming a video for President Clinton,

Quinn raised the Rich pardon with Nolan again. At that time, Mills

told Quinn to ‘‘stop pestering’’ Nolan about the Rich pardon.697

While Mills had received information about the pardon from Quinn,

she was not familiar enough with the issue to discuss the merits

with Quinn.698

While Quinn apparently did not make much progress with Mills

at the January 5 party, he did lay important groundwork for the

225

699 Arnold & Porter Document Production A0844 (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Avner Azulay,

Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Dec. 25, 2000)) (Exhibit 36). 700 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 205 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice). See also id. at 354 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of

Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the President, the White House). 701 Id. at 205 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice).

last day of the Clinton Administration, when Cheryl Mills would be

the most supportive voice for the Rich pardon among White House

staff.

4. Initial Discussions Between the White House and

Justice Department

When he met with Eric Holder on November 21, 2000, Jack

Quinn had told Holder that he was going to urge the White House

to contact him about the Rich pardon. At the time, Holder had indicated that he looked forward to contact from the White House.

True to his word, Quinn did suggest that the White House contact

Holder. Quinn recognized that what Holder said to the White

House would be crucial to whether or not Rich received a pardon.

In an e-mail on Christmas 2000, Quinn told his colleagues that

‘‘[t]he greatest danger lies with the lawyers. I have worked them

hard and I am hopeful that E. Holder will be helpful to us. But we

can expect some outreach to NY.’’ 699 Apparently, Quinn underestimated just how helpful Holder would be, keeping the Rich pardon

completely to himself, and keeping his prosecutors in New York

from even knowing about the effort to pardon Rich, much less asking for their opinion.

During the first week of January, Beth Nolan met with Holder,

and asked for his opinion regarding a number of clemency matters.

During this conversation, Nolan brought up Marc Rich’s name.

Holder told Nolan that he was neutral.700 Later, at the Committee’s February 8 hearing, Holder explained that when he used the

term ‘‘neutral,’’ he was trying to convey that he ‘‘didn’t have the

basis to form an opinion.’’ 701 However, it is unclear why, if he was

trying to tell Nolan that he did not know enough about the Rich

case to have an opinion, Holder simply did not say that. In addition, it is strange that Holder would start out with a position of

‘‘neutral’’ on the Rich case, knowing what he did, namely, that Rich

was a fugitive from justice, that his had been one of the largest tax

cases in history, and that the prosecutors in New York would not

even meet with his lawyers. However, late on January 19, 2001,

Holder would revise his opinion of the Rich pardon from ‘‘neutral’’

to ‘‘neutral, leaning towards favorable,’’ on the basis of a third-hand

account of Prime Minister Barak’s call to President Clinton.

Holder’s default position of neutrality on the Marc Rich case is

especially peculiar in light of express Justice Department policy regarding grants of clemency to fugitives. In the case of Fernando

Fuentes Coba, Pardon Attorney Roger Adams rejected Fuentes’ petition for clemency because Fuentes was a fugitive from the United

States. Adams stated that:

Mr. [Fuentes] Coba is ineligible to apply for a presidential

pardon. Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 1.2 . . . ‘‘[n]o petition for

pardon should be filed until the expiration of a waiting peVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00241 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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702 Vivian Mannerud Document Production (Letter from Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, U.S.

Department of Justice, to Lonnie Anne Pera, Counsel to Vivian Mannerud, Zuckert Scoutt &

Rasenberger (Nov. 7, 2000)) (Exhibit 161). 703Piper Marbury Document Production PMR&W 00166 (E-mail from Avner Azulay, Director,

Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 12, 2001)) (Exhibit 162). 704 Id.

riod of at least five years after the date of the release of

the petitioner from confinement . . . .’’ Because Mr. Coba

has served none of his prison sentence, he fails to meet

this most basic eligibility requirement for pardon consideration. Moreover, the Department of Justice has consistently declined to accept pardon petitions from individuals,

such as Mr. Coba, who are fugitives, since the pardon process assumes the Government’s ability to implement either

of the President’s possible decisions regarding a petition— that is, a denial of clemency as well as a grant of clemency. Put another way, it is not reasonable to allow a person to ask that the President grant him a pardon which,

if granted, would have the effect of eliminating the term

of imprisonment to which he has been sentenced, while at

the same time insulating himself from having to serve the

sentence if the pardon is denied.702

The same principles should have applied to the Marc Rich pardon.

The fact that Eric Holder disregarded this policy, as well as every

other warning sign about the Rich case, raises further questions

about his motivations in the Rich case.

5. January 8, 2001, Call Between President Clinton

and Ehud Barak

The second week in January started with another call from

Prime Minister Barak on the Rich pardon. Towards the end of the

eighteen-minute call on January 8, 2001, Barak mentioned the

Marc Rich pardon for a second time. It appears that this second

conversation was prompted by a meeting between Marc Rich and

Prime Minister Barak. A January 12, 2001, e-mail from Avner

Azulay to Jack Quinn, Marc Rich, Robert Fink, and Kathleen

Behan included the subject line ‘‘telecons to potus.’’ 703 As Azulay

wrote, ‘‘Following mr’s mtg with the pm—the latter called potus

this week. Potus said he is very much aware of the case, ‘‘that he

is looking into it and that he saw 2 fat books which were prepared

by these people.’’ Potus sounded positive but maede [sic] no concrete promise.’’ 704 Azulay’s summary closely tracks the discussion

between the President and the Prime Minister as recorded by the

National Security Council staff:

PRIME MINISTER BARAK. Let me tell you last but not least

two names I want to mention. [Redacted] The second is

Mark [sic], the Jewish American.

PRESIDENT CLINTON. I know quite a few things about that.

I just got a long memo and am working on it. It’s best that

we not say much about that.

PRIME MINISTER BARAK. Okay. I understand. I’m not mentioning it in any place.

PRESIDENT CLINTON. I understand.

227

705 Verbatim notes of transcript of telephone conversation between President William J. Clinton and Ehud Barak, Prime Minister, Israel (Jan. 8, 2001) (Exhibit 148). 706Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00072 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 26, 2000)) (Exhibit 163).

PRIME MINISTER BARAK. I believe it could be important

[gap] not just financially, but he helped Mossad on more

than one case.

PRESIDENT CLINTON. It is a bizarre case, and I am working

on it.

PRIME MINISTER BARAK. Okay. I really appreciate it.705

Two facts about this telephone conversation stand out. First, it

appears that President Clinton told Prime Minister Barak to ‘‘not

say much’’ about the Rich matter. It is difficult to know exactly

what the President meant by this comment, but one interpretation

is that President Clinton did not want to discuss the Rich matter

with Barak when there were a number of staff on the line taking

notes about the conversation. Perhaps most important, if he was

leaning towards pardoning Rich, he probably understood that if

this became known, the public outcry would have made the pardon

politically untenable. Indeed, it is difficult to think of any other

reason why President Clinton would tell Prime Minister Barak to

‘‘not say much’’ about Rich.

Another critical element of the telephone call is Barak’s statement that ‘‘I believe it could be important [gap] not just financially,

but he helped Mossad on more than one case.’’ Read literally,

Barak’s statement suggests that the Rich pardon had future financial implications for Barak, and perhaps President Clinton as well.

It is also possible, though, that Prime Minister Barak was referring

to Rich’s past financial assistance to Israel. While the Committee

does not have enough information to confirm that Barak or Clinton

took action on behalf of Rich in exchange for future payment,

Barak’s comments raise this possibility.

6. ‘‘The HRC Option’’

The Marc Rich legal team used a number of approaches to influence President Clinton and his staff. One approach that was considered was for then-First Lady Hillary Clinton to become involved.

There is now, however, a uniform denial that she ever participated

in the Marc Rich pardon process.

Beginning in late December, the lawyers representing Rich had

a number of discussions in which they debated the merit of asking

Hillary Clinton for help with the Rich pardon. Apparently the first

discussions regarding Mrs. Clinton started around December 26,

2000, when Robert Fink sent the following e-mail to Quinn, with

copies to Marc Rich, Kitty Behan, and Avner Azulay: ‘‘Kitty and I

think the best person to call Hilary [sic] (if it makes sense to call

her at all) may well be Denise. She is in Aspen; let me know if you

need the number.’’ 706 Later that day, Fink e-mailed the same

group again:

Of all the options we discussed, the only one that seems

to have real potential for making a difference is the HRC

option and even that has peril if not handled correctly. I

228

707Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00075 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 26, 2000)) (Exhibit 164). 708Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00080 (E-mail from Avner

Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Dec. 27, 2000)) (Exhibit 165). 709Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00083 (E-mail from

Gershon Kekst, President, Kekst and Co., to Robert Fink (Dec. 27, 2000)) (Exhibit 135). 710Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00401 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Jack Quinn (Dec. 28, 2000)) (Exhibit 166). 711Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00087 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, and Marc Rich (Dec. 28, 2000)) (Exhibit 167).

assume, and am emphasizing that this is an assumption,

that we want Avner to speak to Abe [Foxman] about the

support this will get in NY to see if Abe could make the

necessary representation to HRC.707

The following day, December 27, 2000, Avner Azulay weighed in:

I have been advised that HRC shall feel more at ease if

she is joined by her elder senator of NY who also represents the jewish [sic] population. The private request

from DR shall not be sufficient. It seems that this shall be

a prerequisite from her formal position [sic].708

Robert Fink passed this recommendation on to Gershon Kekst, who

had been advising the Rich team with media relations. Kekst

seemed to be taken with the idea, and recommended asking Senator Schumer’s campaign contributors to ‘‘lean’’ on him:

Good point. Can [Q]uinn tell us who is close enough to

lean on [S]chumer?? I am certainly willing to call him, but

have no real clout. Jack might be able to tell us quickly

who the top contributors are . . . . . . maybe Bernard

Schwartz?? 709

Jack Quinn apparently signed onto the concept of involving the

First Lady in the Rich pardon effort. On December 28, 2000, Robert

Fink apparently contacted Quinn about the proposal, and sent the

following confirming e-mail to Quinn:

I understand I am to call DR and ask her to call HRC, but

I wanted to talk to you first to make sure that makes

sense and to determine what you thought DR should be

saying, not just what she should be asking.710

It appears that Robert Fink discussed the ‘‘HRC option’’ with

Denise Rich, and that Denise Rich did not react well to the idea.

He sent the following e-mail to Azulay and Marc Rich on December

28, describing his conversation with Denise Rich:

I spoke to DR who was adamantly against the proposal.

She is convinced it would be viewed badly by the recipient.

Nothing good will come of the overture even with a good

word from anyone in NY. She said she is convinced of this

and so is her friend who has advised DR not to discuss it

in front of HRC. I spoke to MR both before the call and

in the middle of this email and he now agrees we should

do nothing on this topic.711

From this e-mail, it appears that the proposal to lobby Hillary

Clinton was presented to Denise Rich, who in turn discussed it

with Beth Dozoretz. Dozoretz advised Rich not to lobby Hillary

229

712Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00097–98 (E-mail from

Jack Quinn to Robert Fink (Dec. 28, 2000)) (Exhibit 36). 713 Id. 714Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00089 (E-mail from Jack

Quinn to Robert Fink (Dec. 30, 2000)) (Exhibit 168). 715 Id. 716Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00097–98 (E-mail from

Jack Quinn to Robert Fink (Dec. 31, 2000)) (Exhibit 36). 717Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00102 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 2, 2001)) (Exhibit 169).

Clinton on the pardon, and Denise Rich rejected the plan. In turn,

Marc Rich decided not to press the matter any further. However,

Jack Quinn and Robert Fink still saw merit in the ‘‘HRC option,’’ and continued to pursue it. Quinn told Fink that he thought ‘‘the

friend [Dozoretz] is naı ̈ve to think this will not be discussed in

front of her [Hillary Clinton].’’ 712 Fink replied that ‘‘I cannot help

but think they are right. She has something to lose and little to

gain and may not want anything which will affect her new position.’’ 713 Quinn also stated, ‘‘I continue to think it most likely HRC

would be at least informed before anything positive happens, given

the possibility of a Giuliani/NY press reaction.’’ 714 Fink then replied to Quinn’s suggestion: ‘‘I will call Avner to see what he

thinks. . . . DR was very sure speaking to HRC was a mistake and

told me that Beth worned [sic] her not to raise the issue while HRC

was in ear shot. Still want to contact HRC?’’ 715 Quinn replied:

[I]t’s a tough call, no doubt. [I] just think HE will know

the calculation you mention and therefore she will become

aware it is pending. If this is right, do we want her to hear

about it first in that way or from someone (assuming we

have someone) who can put it to her in the context we

need? 716

By January 2, 2001, Fink was apparently convinced, and suggested to Quinn that he call Hillary Clinton:

Frankly, I think you are the best person at this point. You

signed the petition and the letter and know the case better

than anyone else who could call. DR is out and probably

could only make a personal appeal. You know of Abe

Foxman and of the Israeli connection and of all the giving

and the Brooklyn connection (Pinky). So my vote is that

you call her.717

But, it appears that by later on January 2 and on January 3, Marc

Rich and Avner Azulay had decided against an approach to Hillary

Clinton. First, around January 2, Marc Rich apparently spoke to

Denise Rich. Azulay reported that ‘‘her impression—from Beth is

that HRC shall try to be protective of her husband and stay out

of potential trouble.’’ The following day, January 3, Azulay e-mailed

Quinn, Fink, Behan and Rich, and stated that:

Looking from the sideline and hearing all this—I would

like to forward the idea that perhaps we should just leave

HRC alone. By initiating a call to her we are ‘‘saying in

a way that there is a problem here . . .’’, and in the process we might create a problem out of speculations on her

reaction. I don’t think we have any positive knowledge

that she is for or against, only assumptions. Potus should

230

718Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00109 (E-mail from Avner

Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan 3, 2001)) (Exhibit 157). 719 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 257 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). 720Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production DSM0064 (Billing records of

Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky to Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit

143). 721Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00169 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Jack Quinn et al. (Jan. 16, 2001)) (Exhibit 170).

deal with this himself—and if it does then intervene with

all the arguments etc.718

Apparently, Azulay’s suggestion settled the matter, as there was

no more discussion of the ‘‘HRC option.’’ At the Committee’s February 8 hearing, Jack Quinn testified that ‘‘I’m confident that I

never communicated with the First Lady about this, and I don’t believe that anyone else did.’’ 719 In addition, the Committee has received no documents suggesting that the First Lady was actually

contacted by anyone connected to Marc Rich or that the First Lady

offered any opinion on the Marc Rich pardon.

F. The Final Days of the Marc Rich Lobbying Effort

1. Communications Between Peter Kadzik and John

Podesta

As the end of the Clinton presidency approached, the Marc Rich

legal team increased the intensity of its lobbying efforts. Peter

Kadzik called the White House four out of the final five days of the

Administration to see what progress had been made on the Rich

pardon. On January 16, 2001, he spoke to his friend and sometime

client, White House Chief of Staff John Podesta. Kadzik asked Podesta what the status of the Rich pardon was, and what recommendation the White House staff would make. After a conversation with Podesta, Kadzik relayed the results of that conversation

to his partner at Dickstein Shapiro, Michael Green. The two calls

took Kadzik a total of thirty minutes.720 According to an e-mail

sent by Robert Fink to the rest of the Rich legal team:

[Kadzik partner] Mike Green called after speaking with

Peter [Kadzik] who spoke with Podesta: it seems that

while the staff are not supportive they are not in a veto

mode, and that your efforts with POTUS are being felt. It

sounds like you are making headway and should keep at

it as long as you can. We are definitely still in the

game.721

The e-mail message indicates that Podesta informed Kadzik that

he and the other key White House staff did not support the Rich

pardon, but at the same time, appeared to give Kadzik some encouragement, indicating that the President still might decide to

grant the Rich pardon. However, when questioned about these discussions at the Committee’s March 1, 2001, hearing, both Podesta

and Kadzik disowned the contents of the e-mail message. Podesta

described the conversation with Kadzik as follows:

He told me he had been informed that the President had

reviewed the submissions Mr. Quinn had sent in and was

impressed with them and was once again considering the

231

722 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 317 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former

Chief of Staff to the President, the White House). 723 Id. at 464–66 (testimony of Peter Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky). 724 Id. at 317 (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the President, the White

House).

pardon. I told him I was strongly opposed to the pardons

and that I did not believe they would be granted.722

Kadzik likewise indicated that the e-mail describing his conversation with Podesta was inaccurate:

Mr. LATOURETTE. [T]his e-mail in particular states that

Mike Green spoke with Peter, who I assume is you, who

spoke with Podesta; and that Podesta told Peter that while

the staff are not supportive they are not in the veto mode.

First of all, did Mr. Podesta communicate that to you on

January 16th?

Mr. KADZIK. No. . . . Again, he told me he was opposed to

it, that the staff was opposed to it, but no final decision

had been made and again the decision was the President’s.723

It is difficult to square the recollections of John Podesta and

Peter Kadzik with the contents of the Robert Fink e-mail message.

The e-mail message is consistent with the portrait of the White

House painted by a number of other contemporaneous e-mail messages—namely that the White House staff opposed the Rich pardon, but was not fully engaged on the issue, and that the President

was open to it. This is the message that the Marc Rich legal team

was getting from its contacts with the White House, despite the

after-the-fact characterizations from Podesta and Kadzik.

2. The January 16, 2001, White House Meeting Regarding Rich

White House staff had a number of contacts with Jack Quinn

and other lawyers representing Marc Rich regarding the Rich pardon in December 2000 and January 2001. Similarly, the President

had contacts with individuals advocating on Rich’s behalf during

those two months. However, the first time that the President sat

down with his staff to discuss the Rich pardon was January 16,

2001, just four days before the end of his Administration. The purpose of the January 16 meeting was for the President to discuss

other clemency matters with White House staff. According to John

Podesta, who was present at the meeting, President Clinton then

initiated discussion of Marc Rich:

[T]he President brought up the Rich case and told us that

he thought Mr. Quinn had made some meritorious points

in his submission. He clearly had digested the legal arguments presented by Mr. Quinn since he made a point of

noting the Justice Department had abandoned the legal

theory underlying the RICO count and mentioned the

Ginsburg/Wolfman tax analyses. The staff informed the

President that it was our view that the pardon should not

be granted.724

232

725 Id. at 325. 726 Id. at 324–25 (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the President, the White

House). 727 Id. at 325 (testimony of Bruce Lindsey, former Deputy Counsel to the President, the White

House).

Podesta interpreted the President’s reaction to the views of the

White House staff as meaning that ‘‘he accepted our judgment and

I didn’t think this was a particularly active matter.’’ 725 Beth

Nolan, who also attended the January 16 meeting, also remembered a fairly brief discussion:

I don’t recall that it was an extensive discussion. However,

we were going through a number of pardon applications,

and my memory is that it was a fairly brief discussion in

which he heard from all of us our opposition. I didn’t think

it was going anywhere. . . . I did not believe that the pardon was going anywhere. He was familiar with it. He was

sympathetic with it. And he was familiar with the issues,

but I did not have the sense . . . at that meeting or until

the 19th that he really was inclined to grant the pardon.726

While Beth Nolan interpreted the President’s comments as meaning that the Rich pardon was not ‘‘going anywhere,’’ Bruce Lindsey

did not reach the same conclusion, informing the Committee, ‘‘I

clearly left the meeting understanding that no decision had been

made. I don’t know if I knew what was in his mind.’’ 727

The account of the January 16, 2001, meeting appears to be an

attempt by senior White House staff to explain why they were

caught so unprepared when the President decided to grant the

Marc Rich pardon three days later. As became clear on that day,

White House staff knew little about the Rich case, and had not

made any attempt to gather the necessary information. The ignorance of the senior White House staff meant that they were unable

to provide any clear refutation of the arguments made by the Rich

legal team. As explained by Beth Nolan, John Podesta, and to a

lesser extent, Bruce Lindsey, they were caught unprepared because

they simply did not believe that the President was going forward

with the Rich pardon, based on the opposition that they expressed

at the January 16 meeting. This argument explains why White

House staff, while claiming to be opposed to the Rich pardon, did

so little to actually keep it from being granted.

However, the defense of the White House staff does not seem to

comport fully with reality. While the President listened to the

White House staff as they objected to the Rich pardon, he apparently did not say anything to indicate that he actually agreed with

White House staff. Rather, he clearly expressed that he was sympathetic to the Rich pardon. If the White House staff were serious

about opposing the Rich pardon, they would have done more than

simply express their opposition to the pardon. They would have

taken the time period between January 16 and January 20 to gather information about the Rich case, and present it to the President

as reasons why he should not grant the pardon. Unfortunately,

White House staff never took any such steps.

233

728The Justice Department’s Civil Division maintained offices at 901 E Street. While it is not

clear why Quinn sent the letter to 901 E Street, the most obvious explanation is that Quinn’s

secretary had sent materials to the Justice Department Civil Division offices at 901 E Street

in the past, and mistakenly assumed that Deputy Attorney General Holder had an office at 901

E Street as well. 729 ‘‘President Clinton’s Eleventh Hour Pardons,’’ Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 24 (Feb. 14, 2001) (testimony of Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice).

3. The Justice Department Receives Jack Quinn’s January 10 Letter

On January 17, 2001, the letter that Jack Quinn sent to Eric

Holder on January 10, 2001, finally arrived at the Justice Department. Quinn had intended to have the letter delivered to Holder by

messenger, but due to a secretarial error, the letter was sent to 901

E Street, in Washington, rather than the main Justice Department

headquarters building, where Holder maintained his office.728 The

January 10 letter from Quinn to Holder represented the only documentary information the Justice Department ever received regarding the Rich pardon. The cover letter from Quinn to Holder stated

‘‘I hope you can say you agree with this letter. Your saying positive

things, I’m told, would make this happen.’’ Attached to the letter

was a copy of Quinn’s January 5 letter to President Clinton, which

summarized the arguments made by Quinn in the Rich pardon petition.

Between January 10 and January 17, this letter made its way

from the Justice Department offices at 901 E Street to the Justice

Department Executive Secretariat, which is in charge of managing

the paper flow at Justice Department headquarters. Despite the

fact that the letter was addressed to the Deputy Attorney General,

because it obviously related to pardon matters, the letter was directed to Roger Adams, the Pardon Attorney. The Office of Pardon

Attorney received the letter during the afternoon of January 18,

and Adams saw it in his inbox on the morning of Friday, January

19.729 Adams drafted a short response to the Quinn letter, stating

that neither Marc Rich nor Pincus Green had filed a pardon petition with the Justice Department, and advising Quinn that petition

forms were available upon request from his office. Adams decided

not to send the letter out, and instead hold it until the following

Monday. Adams explained that he did not send the letter out because he recognized Jack Quinn’s name, and knew that Quinn had

substantial influence as a former White House Counsel, and acknowledged that he could not be certain of what was going on at

the White House. Rather than send out what amounted to a rejection letter for a person who might yet receive a pardon later that

day, Adams decided to hold the letter until after President Clinton

left office, when he could be certain that Rich was not going to receive a pardon. As it turned out, Adams’ fears were realized, and

he never did mail the rejection letter.

4. Final Lobbying Contacts Leading up to January 19,

2001

As the Clinton Administration entered its final days, the Rich

team increased its efforts. It was well known that the President

was considering granting a large batch of pardons as one of his

final acts as President. In fact, during his final visit to Arkansas

234

730 Andrew Goldstein, Countdown to a Pardon, TIME, Feb. 26, 2001, at 27. 731 Jack Quinn Document Production (Memorandum from Mark Ehlers to Scooter Libby (June

10, 1988) (Exhibit 63). 732 Id. 733 Id. 734Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production DSM0065 (Billing records of

Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky to Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit

143). 735See ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 466 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Peter Kadzik, Partner,

Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky). 736Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky Document Production DSM0065 (Billing records of

Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky to Robert Fink (Dec. 12, 2000, and Feb. 13, 2001)) (Exhibit

143). The billing entry on January 18 consists of two items, the call to the White House and

a redacted entry. The entries on January 19 and January 20 each consist of two items, calls

to the White House and Michael Green. Based on his descriptions of the calls to the White

as President on January 17, 2001, the President acknowledged

this, asking reporters, ‘‘You got anybody you want to pardon? Everybody in America either wants somebody pardoned or a national

monument.’’ 730

The Rich team increased the intensity of its lobbying campaign

in the final days. First, Jack Quinn faxed a memo to Beth Nolan

that purported to provide additional evidence that Rich had been

singled out for prosecution. In a note at the top of the memo,

Quinn wrote: ‘‘This is FYI further to the point that no one else was

prosecuted.’’ 731 In fact, the memo stands for the opposite point.

The memo, which was drafted by a lawyer on the Rich legal team

in 1988, provided a review of enforcement actions against individuals who had violated energy regulations. The memo concluded

that ‘‘[w]e have uncovered no case in which a jail sentence has been

imposed for a willful violation of the PAM regulations, the conduct

for which M[arc] R[ich] and P[incus] G[reen] have been indicted.’’ 732 Ironically, this memo, which was intended to provide

support for the Rich case, actually weakens it. A close reading of

the memo indicates that the Rich lawyers located 48 criminal cases

brought for violations of the energy regulations, 14 of which resulted in jail time.733 The Rich legal team distinguished those

cases on the thinnest of technical grounds, since those convictions

were for ‘‘miscertification’’ of oil, not a violation of the permissible

markup regulations. However, it is most likely that the memo had

no impact on the White House’s consideration of the Rich pardon,

either pro or con, since the White House staff took little time to

read the Rich pardon petition, much less extraneous information

pertaining to the case.

Attorney Peter Kadzik called the White House on each of the last

three days of the Clinton Administration, seeking information

about the status of the Rich pardon. On January 18, January 19,

and January 20, Kadzik called staff in John Podesta’s office to see

if the President had made any decisions on pardons. After the calls

on the 19th and 20th, he relayed what he had learned to his partner Michael Green, who was also working on the Rich pardon.734

Kadzik characterized these calls as ministerial in nature—simply

trying to determine whether any pardons had been granted, and if

so, whether a list of pardons was available—as opposed to his earlier direct contacts with his client John Podesta.735 Nevertheless,

Kadzik billed Marc Rich an hour for his work on January 18, half

an hour for his work on January 19, and half an hour for his work

on January 20.736

235

House, those calls should not have taken more then 6 minutes each, the minimum amount of

time that could be billed at Dickstein Shapiro. While it is possible that Kadzik spent 54 minutes

on other Marc Rich business on January 18, and 24 minutes speaking to Michael Green on January 19 and 20, the length of the periods of time billed during these days casts doubt either

on Kadzik’s description of the calls to the White House or the accuracy of his billing. 737 Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn to President William J. Clinton

(Jan. 18, 2001)) (Exhibit 171). 738 Id. 739 Id. 740 Id. 741 U.S. v. Lupino, 171 F. Supp 648 (D.C. Minn. 1958). 742 18 U.S.C. § 1073.

a. Jack Quinn’s January 18, 2001, Letter to the

President

Also on January 18, 2001, Jack Quinn submitted a letter to the

President ‘‘to clarify several points with regard to the petition’’ and

to ‘‘propose a solution to any concerns . . . regarding the setting

of an unwise precedent involving individuals living outside the jurisdiction of our American country.’’ 737 In this letter, Quinn again

attempted to refute the argument that Rich was a fugitive. To support his position, Quinn made three arguments, all of them spurious. First, Quinn claimed that ‘‘much of Mr. Rich and Mr. Green’s

professional lives have been spent abroad. . . . Thus, while they

did not return to the United States following the issuance of the

indictment, there is no question that this did not constitute a significant change in their international living circumstances.’’ 738 Second, Quinn claimed that Rich and Green ‘‘violated no laws in not

returning to the United States, and no violation of law with regard

to their purported ‘‘fugitivity’’ ever has been alleged.’’ 739 Third,

Quinn pointed out that Rich and Green ‘‘have lived not as fugitives,

but their residences and places of business always have been available to and known to the United States.’’ 740

Quinn’s first point, that Rich and Green spent a great deal of

time outside of the country prior to their indictment, was completely irrelevant. It is undisputed that Rich and Green refused to

return after their indictment. Legally and practically, the fact that

Rich and Green had houses in Switzerland prior to that indictment

was meaningless. They fled to those homes in anticipation of the

indictment and to avoid its consequences. That they managed to escape before rather than after the indictment is irrelevant.741

Quinn’s second assertion, that Rich and Green had not violated the

law by remaining outside of the United States, was completely

wrong. 18 U.S.C. § 1073, which outlaws fugitivity, states that:

Whoever moves or travels in interstate or foreign commerce with intent . . . to avoid prosecution . . . under the

laws of the place from which he flees, for a crime, or an

attempt to commit a crime . . . which is a felony under

the laws of the place from which the fugitive flees . . .

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than

five years, or both.742

This statute clearly proscribes the behavior of Marc Rich and

Pincus Green, namely, traveling in foreign commerce to avoid prosecution for a felony. The fact that Rich and Green were never

charged with violation of this statute has more to do with the fact

that they were already facing numerous felony charges than any

236

743See ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 123 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Morris ‘‘Sandy’’ Weinberg,

Jr., former assistant U.S. attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). 744 Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn to President William J. Clinton

(Jan. 18, 2001)) (Exhibit 171). 745 At the Committee’s hearing, Mr. Auerbach stated, ‘‘The civil liabilities in this case were

fully extinguished in 1984 when Marc Rich and Co. A.G. and Marc Rich and Co. International

Limited paid $150 million to the U.S. Government. The civil liabilities were corporate civil liabilities.’’ ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 108 (Feb. 8, 2001).

innocence on their part.743 Quinn’s final point, rather than dispelling the argument that Rich and Green were fugitives, only shows

the contempt with which they treated American laws. The fact that

Rich and Green both lived in palatial estates in Switzerland, at addresses known to American authorities, did not mean that they

were not fugitives. Swiss authorities refused to extradite Rich and

Green, and they were therefore able to live their lives in comfort,

rather than in hiding.

In addition to the facile and irrelevant arguments regarding his

clients’ status as fugitives, Quinn also made an offer to President

Clinton in the January 18 letter. Quinn stated that ‘‘[m]y clients

have authorized me to make it clear that they have always sought

to negotiate a civil resolution with the government, and would willingly accept a disposition that would subject them to civil proceedings with the Department of Energy (or other appropriate agencies).’’ 744 While this offer might have appeared dramatic to President Clinton, someone with any understanding of the Rich case

would have recognized that Rich and Green were not offering anything that they had not offered on any number of previous occasions. Throughout the Rich investigation, Rich’s lawyers had offered to pay many millions of dollars to settle the case, as long as

Rich was not required to serve jail time. This offer was repeatedly

rejected by prosecutors, who recognized that Rich’s crimes were of

such a scale that jail time was amply justified. In addition, someone with knowledge of the Rich case would have recognized another

serious flaw with Quinn’s January 18 offer. All civil liability for

Rich and Green was extinguished with the guilty pleas of the Rich

companies, and that the only penalties available against Rich in

2001 were criminal.745 Thus, Rich’s offer—to be subject to civil penalties that could not be applied against him—was an empty offer.

However, this letter, and the empty offer in it, had an impact at

the White House, as would be demonstrated the following day. It

does not appear that Quinn had any misgivings about what was

really at issue—Rich wanted to buy his way out of his legal predicament, and if this was not an option, he would not only eschew the

United States, but also work against vital U.S. interests. It is an

interesting commentary on Quinn that he appears to agree with

the thesis that rich people should be able to pay money to avoid

prison.

b. Bruce Lindsey’s Contacts with SEC

Chairman Arthur Levitt

In this same time period, Clinton aide Bruce Lindsey made an

apparent effort to gather information to use in opposition to the

Rich pardon. On the morning of January 17 or 18, Lindsey called

237

746Telephone Interview with Arthur Levitt (Feb. 20, 2001). 747 Id. 748 Id. 749 Id. 750 Id. 751 Id. 752 Id. 753 Id. 754 Id. 755Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production 00180 (E-mail from Robert Fink to

Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Jan. 19, 2001)) (Exhibit 145).

Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the SEC.746 Lindsey asked Levitt what

he knew about Pinky Green.747 Levitt told Lindsey that he had

never heard the name.748 Lindsey then told Levitt that Green was

Marc Rich’s business partner.749 Levitt told Lindsey that he would

find out what he could about the matter. Levitt consulted with his

staff, who informed him that the SEC had no information about

Rich and Green, because theirs had been an IRS and Commodities

and Futures Trading Commission matter, not an SEC matter.750

Levitt then left a message for Lindsey indicating that he was getting back to him about the Marc Rich matter. Lindsey called back

that afternoon, and Levitt told Lindsey that the Rich matter was

not in the SEC’s jurisdiction. However, Levitt then added that he

believed that pardons of Rich and Green would be a ‘‘real bad

idea.’’ 751 Lindsey agreed that Rich and Green were ‘‘fugitives’’ who

had ‘‘never set foot in the country’’ and that this ‘‘is not what pardons are intended for.’’ 752 Based on his contacts with Lindsey,

Levitt assumed that Lindsey was personally opposed to the pardons of Rich and Green, and that he was looking for further justification or reinforcement for his position.753 Levitt also assumed

that the pardons would not be granted, given Lindsey’s great influence in the White House.754

Shortly after the call between Lindsey and Levitt, the Marc Rich

team found out about the call. In the afternoon of January 19, Robert Fink e-mailed Avner Azulay, Mike Green, and Kitty Behan, and

informed them that:

I just spoke to Jack [Quinn]. He has not heard from the

President, but agreed to call him as soon as he gets to a

hard line phone (he was in the car). He said that the SEC

knows of the request and for some reason opposed it. But

not like they opposed Milken. He does not know how they

learned of it. (He found out when the head of the SEC

gave one of his partners a hard time about Marc yesterday.). We agree that is not good and that maybe the SDNY

knows too, but we have no information on it. No other pardons have been announced yet, as far as we know. Bob 755

The Fink e-mail again confirms that the Rich team was counting

on secrecy to achieve its objective. Fink’s message shows the concern with which the Rich team reacted any time that any government agency outside of the White House received word of the effort

to obtain the pardon. When questioned about this matter at the

Committee’s March 1, 2001, hearing, Fink stated that he was concerned not that certain government agencies would learn of the

pardon effort, but that he was concerned that the press would learn

of it, and that the press’ reaction ‘‘would not be helpful for a

238

756 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 509 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Robert Fink). 757 Neil A. Lewis, Transition in Washington: The President; Exiting Job, Clinton Accepts Immunity Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2001, at A1. 758Many, including Representative Waxman, have speculated that President Clinton was especially sensitive to ‘‘overzealous prosecutors’’ after making these admissions regarding his testimony in the Jones case. ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 341 (Mar. 1, 2001) (statement of the Honorable Henry Waxman). It is very possible that the President was motivated to issue a number

of controversial grants of clemency in Independent Counsel cases as a result of his feelings

about the Whitewater-Lewinsky investigation. 759 Verbatim notes of transcript of telephone conversation between President William J. Clinton and Ehud Barak, Prime Minister, Israel (Jan. 19, 2001) (Exhibit 148).

thoughtful review of the pardon application.’’ 756 However, Fink’s

assertion is not plausible. Fink’s contemporaneous e-mail specifically identifies the prosecutors in the Southern District of New

York, not the public or the press, as a subject of concern. Fink’s email, along with other evidence, shows that Rich’s lawyers were

trying to keep the pardon effort from the prosecutors in New York,

the people who knew the most about the Rich case and could do

the most to thwart the pardon effort.

Lindsey’s interaction with Arthur Levitt on the Rich and Green

pardons represents the only time that White House staff reached

out to anyone other than Rich’s lawyers and Eric Holder to gather

information about the Rich case. It was a half-hearted effort, as the

SEC was not involved in the Rich case, and had no information to

offer. Lindsey’s effort at outreach therefore demonstrated two important facts. First, it shows that Lindsey had little understanding

of the Rich case, as he did not even know where to turn to get information about Rich. If Lindsey had turned to the Southern District of New York, rather than the SEC, he would have obtained

voluminous information that refuted Quinn’s arguments. Second,

the Lindsey effort shows that there was a genuine rift between

President Clinton and his closest advisor on this issue—to the extent that Lindsey even felt the need to gather outside information

to bolster his case.

G. January 19–20, 2001

The final full day of the Clinton Presidency was obviously a busy

one. Early in the day, President Clinton reached an agreement

with the Office of Independent Counsel whereby the President admitted that ‘‘I acknowledge having knowingly violated Judge

Wright’s discovery orders in my deposition in [the Jones] case. I

tried to walk a line between acting lawfully and testifying falsely

but I now recognize that I did not fully accomplish this goal and

that certain of my responses to questions about Ms. Lewinsky were

false.’’ 757 After making these admissions, which the President reportedly considered difficult to make, the President began final consideration of a number of grants of clemency.758

1. The Call Between Prime Minister Barak and President Clinton

Also on the final day of his presidency, President Clinton made

a number of farewell telephone calls to world leaders. Among these

was a call to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Between 2:47 and

3:09 p.m., Clinton and Barak spoke.759 During that conversation,

239

760 Id. 761 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 317 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former

Chief of Staff to the President, the White House). 762 Id. at 431 (testimony of Bruce Lindsey, former Deputy Counsel to the President, the White

House).

it appears that President Clinton brought up that Marc Rich matter:

PRESIDENT CLINTON. [Redacted] I’m trying to do something

on clemency for Rich, but it is very difficult.

PRIME MINISTER BARAK. Might it move forward?

PRESIDENT CLINTON. I’m working on that but I’m not sure.

I’m glad you asked me about that. When I finish these

calls, I will go back into the meeting on that but I’m glad

you raised it. Here’s the only problem with Rich; there’s almost no precedent in American history. There’s nothing illegal about it but there’s no precedent. He was overseas

when he was indicted and never came home. The question

is not whether he should get it or not but whether he

should get it without coming back here. That’s the dilemma I’m working through. I’m working on it.

PRIME MINISTER BARAK. Okay.760

There are two important aspects of this call. First, the transcript

does not make it appear that Prime Minister Barak was tenaciously lobbying for the Rich pardon. The only comments he made

at this critical juncture were ‘‘Might it move forward?’’ and ‘‘Okay.’’

Neither can be seen as a forceful request. In fact, the transcript

raises the possibility that Prime Minister Barak, not President

Clinton, brought up the Marc Rich pardon during the telephone

call. Second, not in this call, or in any other call, did Prime Minister Barak claim that the Rich pardon would have any foreign policy benefits.

These facts undermine the suggestions made by the President

and his supporters which place great importance on the January

19 call by Prime Minister Barak. For example, in the Committee’s

March 1, 2001, hearing, John Podesta stated that ‘‘[w]hile the bulk

of that [January 19] call concerned the situation in the Middle

East, Prime Minister Barak raised the Rich matter at the end and

asked the President once again to consider the Rich pardon.’’ 761

Bruce Lindsey testified that ‘‘[i]n our meeting when he [the President] said Barak had raised it in his conversation that day he indicated that was, I think, the third time it had been raised by Mr.

Barak.’’ 762 If the notes of the call prepared by the White House are

correct, it appears that the President, not Prime Minister Barak,

raised the question of the Marc Rich pardon during the January 19

telephone call. James Carville, a longtime defender of President

Clinton, appeared on Meet the Press and stated that ‘‘Prime Minister Barak made enormous concessions to try to get a peace agreement. It was very important to him. And on the last day, he called

and said ‘look, I really would like for you to do this,’ and the President did it.’’ Again, Carville’s description of the January 19 call

was completely inaccurate and was either purposefully misleading

240

763 Rivera Live (CNBC television broadcast, Feb. 15, 2001). 764 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 376 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former

Chief of Staff to the President, the White House). 765 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 45 (Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of Jack Quinn). 766 Id. at 194 (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice). 767 Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn) (Exhibit 172). 768 In his hearing testimony, Holder stated that he did not recall whether he learned of

Barak’s support through Quinn or Nolan. However, Beth Nolan made it clear that Holder stated

that he had heard that Barak was interested in the pardon, and explained that this new information moved his position from ‘‘neutral’’ to ‘‘neutral leaning toward or neutral leaning favorable.’’ See ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 354 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the President, the White House). Given Nolan’s seemingly clear recollection that Holder

already knew about Barak’s support when she spoke to him on January 19, it is fair to conclude

that it was Quinn, rather than Nolan, who told Holder about the Barak call.

or the result of false information provided to him by President

Clinton or the President’s staff.

Most importantly, both on January 19, and during the controversy about the Rich pardon that followed, President Clinton repeatedly suggested that the calls from Prime Minister Barak ‘‘profoundly’’ influenced his decision making.763 This claim was echoed

by John Podesta at the Committee’s March 1 hearing:

I do know that Mr. Barak—as Mr. Lindsey said and raised

a couple of times—that was, as you properly point out, was

an emotional time. The peace process obviously wasn’t

coming to fruition. He had enormous respect for Mr.

Barak. I think Mr. Barak had asked him for several

things, if you will, that were intended to show support for

the State of Israel, not so much for Mr. Barak but for the

State of Israel, including, for example, the pardon of Jonathan Pollard.764

There is nothing in any of the discussions between Clinton and

Barak, especially the January 19 discussion, that supports President Clinton’s conclusion that the Rich pardon was especially important to Prime Minister Barak so that Barak’s calls should have

had a ‘‘profound’’ influence on the President. The actual transcripts

of the calls suggest that, at least on January 19, the Rich pardon

seemed to have a more prominent place in President Clinton’s

mind than in Prime Minister Barak’s mind.

2. Eric Holder Weighs In

At about 6:30 in the evening on January 19, 2001, Jack Quinn

called the office of Eric Holder. Quinn said that the Rich pardon

was receiving serious consideration at the White House and that

the White House would be calling Holder for his opinion before any

decision was made.765 Holder told Quinn that while he ‘‘had no

strong opposition based on [Quinn’s] recitation of the facts, law enforcement in New York would strongly oppose it.’’ 766 Quinn’s notes

of the conversation with Holder indicate that Holder told Quinn

that he had ‘‘no personal prob[lem]’’ with the Rich pardon, and that

his personal feeling was that he was ‘‘not strongly against’’ it, but

that the prosecutors in the Southern District would ‘‘howl.’’ 767 It

also appears that Quinn informed Holder that Prime Minister

Barak had expressed support for the Rich pardon.768 Holder was

told that Barak ‘‘had weighed in strongly on behalf of the pardon

241

769 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 194 (Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice). 770 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 348 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). 771 Id. at 354 (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the President, the White House). 772 Interview with Cheryl Mills, former Associate White House Counsel, in New York, NY

(Mar. 19, 2001). 773Department of Justice Document Production DOJ/ODAG–MR–00040 (Telephone log of Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder, Jan. 22, 2001) (Exhibit 173). 774 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 354 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the President, the White House).

request,’’ and this assertion ‘‘really struck’’ Holder.769 It appears

that Quinn learned of Barak’s call to President Clinton from

sources in Israel, likely Avner Azulay, rather than the White

House.770

Earlier that afternoon, Cheryl Mills arrived in Washington from

New York to visit the Clinton White House one last time. Mills

spent some of the afternoon in the West Wing office of White House

Counsel Beth Nolan. While Mills was in Nolan’s office, Jack Quinn

called for Nolan. Nolan told Mills that she was busy and couldn’t

take the call, and asked Mills to take it instead. Mills picked up

the line, and spoke with Quinn. Quinn told Mills that he had recently spoken with Eric Holder, and that Holder informed him that

his position on the Rich pardon was ‘‘neutral, leaning favorable.’’ Mills passed this information on to Nolan. Nolan understood Mills

to say that Quinn had told her that Holder ‘‘favored the pardon.’’ 771 Mills was surprised that Holder had taken such a positive

position on the Rich pardon, as she believed him generally to be

‘‘conservative’’ with respect to pardons, and believed that under

Holder the Justice Department ‘‘had not fulfilled its pardon function.’’ 772

After Mills told Nolan that Quinn said that Holder ‘‘favored the

pardon,’’ Nolan decided to call Holder herself to see if this was

true. She called Holder at about 6:40 p.m.,773 and described her

conversation with Holder as follows:

I had talked with him the first week in January about it,

and I did not have the impression that he was in favor of

it, so that’s what I said. I said, I’m hearing you’re in favor

of it. I didn’t think you were in favor of it.

He said that he was neutral, which I think is the language

he had used earlier in January about it. He—and I said,

well, I’m a little confused because I’m hearing that you’re

not just neutral. And he said that he, if—he had heard

that Mr. Barak was interested, that if that were the case,

while he couldn’t judge the foreign policy arguments, he

would find that very persuasive and that—and I finally

said, well, are you? I still don’t understand what neutral

means here. And he described it as neutral leaning toward

or neutral leaning favorable.774

The position that Holder took in support of the Rich pardon took

many by surprise. Obviously, Beth Nolan was surprised at Holder’s

position, especially when he had been neutral with respect to the

pardon just two weeks earlier. Cheryl Mills was surprised, given

what she considered Holder’s ‘‘conservative’’ perspective on parVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00257 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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775 Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 28, 2001). 776 Id. 777 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 201 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice).

dons. Other White House staff were surprised as well. After her

call with Holder, Beth Nolan informed Associate White House

Counsel Eric Angel that Holder was in favor of the Rich pardon.

Angel, like the rest of the staff, opposed the pardon and exclaimed,

‘‘Why the f**k would he say that?’’ 775 Nolan responded by shrugging her shoulders.776

Eric Holder’s support for the Rich pardon would have a significant impact in the President’s deliberations later that evening.

Coming from the nation’s second-ranking law enforcement official,

Holder’s support could easily counterbalance the objections to the

Rich pardon made by White House staff. Holder’s support also had

the illusory effect of giving the Justice Department’s blessing to the

Rich pardon, when in reality, not a single individual at the Justice

Department other than Eric Holder knew that the Rich pardon was

even being considered. No information about the Rich pardon had

been shared with the Justice Department through official channels.

Indeed, Holder had a central responsibility for ensuring that no one

else at the Justice Department knew that the pardon was even

under consideration. Moreover, despite the fact that he had been

on notice that Rich was seeking a pardon since November 2000,

and that the White House was actively considering it in early January 2001, Holder made no attempt to contact prosecutors in the

Southern District of New York to get their opinion regarding the

case.

One of the most serious questions before the Committee is why

Holder decided to support the Rich pardon, given the paucity of information that Holder had about the matter. Holder had never

seen any documents regarding the Rich pardon, and his sum total

of knowledge about the Rich case came from a page of talking

points provided to him by Jack Quinn in 2000, before the pardon

effort had even begun. Holder offered a number of excuses for his

decisionmaking, many of them conflicting, none of them convincing.

First, Holder claimed that he was really neutral, not in favor of,

the Rich pardon:

Neutral meaning I don’t have a basis to form an opinion

consistent with what I told him before. . . . I was neutral

because I didn’t have a basis to make a determination. I

have not seen anything on the pardon.

I’m now saying that I’m neutral consistent with what I

said before, leaning toward it if there were a foreign policy

benefit. I could not make the determination if there were

foreign policy benefit[s].777

Holder’s claims of ‘‘neutrality’’ are completely implausible. First,

everyone who had contact with Holder on this matter took Holder’s

words as being in support of the Rich pardon. Second, Holder had

to have known that when he was asked for his opinion regarding

a prosecution which had been brought by his agency, if he said that

243

778 Id. at 209–10 (statement of the Honorable Bob Barr and testimony of Eric Holder, former

Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice).

he was ‘‘neutral, leaning towards favorable,’’ it was tantamount to

supporting the pardon. Representative Barr pointed this fact out to

Holder in the Committee’s February 8 hearing:

Mr. BARR. [I]n one conversation, you were swayed from

let’s give you the benefit of the doubt that you didn’t know

anything about the case and it was unremarkable to you,

to understanding that it was important enough for a foreign leader to become personally involved in, and just

based on that information alone . . . not having heard

anything back from your prosecutors who identified this

case as one of the most significant in white collar crime

history, you all of a sudden become leaning toward favorably simply because some foreign leader, for whatever reason, [says] that he wants us to act favorably on this pardon?

Mr. HOLDER. What I said was that I was neutral leaning

toward. Neutral, meaning consistent with what I said before, which was I don’t have a basis to one way or the

other—

Mr. BARR. Is that your presumption as the second top official at Justice, that if somebody comes in and asks you

about a pardon that you don’t know anything about, that

your position is immediately neutral and therefore their

job is to move you toward favorable? I mean, wouldn’t your

position as a prosecutor be you stand by your prosecutors

and your initial position when you don’t know about a case

is to oppose it?

Mr. HOLDER. No. Without a basis to know whether—how

the decision should go, I think it would be incumbent

upon—

Mr. BARR. Don’t you presume that your prosecutors have

prepared good cases, and therefore you would operate from

the presumption as their superior at the Department of

Justice that you were going to stand by them and not take

a neutral position? 778

What Holder could not see, or would not admit to, even after it was

made clear by Representative Barr, was that when he refused to

support the work of the prosecutors in his own office, it amounted

to one of the largest expressions of support for the Rich pardon

that any independent party could muster.

Holder also attempted to argue that he was presumptively neutral on the Rich case because Rich was a fugitive, and Holder had

supported a pardon for another fugitive several years earlier.

I did not reflexively oppose it [the Rich pardon] because I

had previously supported a successful pardon request for

a fugitive, Preston King, who, in the context of a selective

244

779 Id. at 194 (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice). 780 Id. at 202. 781 Id. (testimony of Jack Quinn). 782 Id. (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice). 783 Id. at 203.

service case, had been discriminated against in the 1950’s

because of the color of his skin.779

Holder’s argument amounts to a claim that since he once supported

a pardon for a fugitive, he had to support all future pardon requests by fugitives. Holder’s bizarre argument actually treats

fugitivity as a bonus in the consideration of a pardon, rather than

a criminal act.

Mere incompetence cannot account for Eric Holder’s decisionmaking in the Marc Rich case. Holder knew about Jack Quinn’s efforts to obtain a pardon for Rich as early as November 2000, yet

he never mentioned the effort to prosecutors in New York or the

Pardon Attorney. Holder kept this information from them, even

though he knew that they would vehemently oppose any effort to

pardon Rich. Perhaps more important, he never made an effort to

educate himself about the facts of the case. These efforts to keep

prosecutors from finding out what was happening, in conjunction

with Holder’s complete inability to explain or defend his decisionmaking, make the concerns regarding Eric Holder’s motivations

even more serious.

During the Committee’s February 8 hearing, at least one potential motivation for Holder was revealed. Holder asked Jack Quinn

for his support to have Holder nominated as Attorney General in

a future Gore Administration.780 Quinn recalled such a discussion,

but claimed that it was in the fall, prior to the election, and prior

to the filing of the Rich pardon petition.781 However, Holder allowed that there might have been more than one discussion with

Quinn regarding his appointment as Attorney General.782 When

asked about this matter, Holder angrily denied that his efforts to

be appointed as Attorney General, and his solicitation of Quinn’s

support, had any effect on his decisionmaking:

My actions in this matter were in no way affected by my

desire to become Attorney General of the United States,

any desires I had to influence or seek to curry favor with

anybody. I did what I did in this case based only on the

facts that were before me, the law as I understood it and

consistent with my duties as Deputy Attorney General,

nothing more than that.783

Holder’s impassioned defense would be more believable if Holder’s

decisionmaking could be justified based on the facts that were in

front of him. However, given his complete inability to justify his decision to keep the Rich matter from the rest of the Justice Department and his position in favor of the Rich pardon when he knew

next to nothing about the case, the Committee must question Holder’s motivations.

245

784 Id. at 428 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the President, the

White House); Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the

White House (Mar. 16, 2001). 785During her tenure as Associate White House Counsel and then Deputy White House Counsel, Mills was one of the primary lawyers handling scandal-related matters at the Clinton White

House. 786 Interview with Cheryl Mills, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 19, 2001); See also ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 328 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the President, the White House). 787 Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001). Quinn’s phone records indicate that he called the President at 12:29 p.m. on

January 19 for a duration of two minutes. Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone bill of

Jack Quinn, Feb. 9, 2001) (Exhibit 174). It appears that Quinn did not actually speak to the

President, but rather left a message, which was returned in the evening. 788 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 347 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Bruce Lindsey, former

Deputy Counsel to the President, the White House). See also id. at 328.

3. The January 19 Meeting Between White House Staff

and President Clinton

After hearing from Deputy Attorney General Holder, Beth Nolan,

Bruce Lindsey, John Podesta, Meredith Cabe, Eric Angel, and

Cheryl Mills all went to an Oval Office meeting with President

Clinton to discuss the President’s last grants of clemency.784 This

meeting took place at approximately 7:00 p.m. The presence of

Cheryl Mills, who at this time was not a government employee, and

had not been for over a year, has raised two serious concerns. First,

Mills might have been exposed to information, that as a private citizen, she was not legally entitled to review. Certainly, if minimal

due diligence regarding the Rich pardon had been performed, Mills

would have been exposed to a considerable amount of highly classified information. Furthermore, even NCIC information on Rich and

Green would have been inappropriate to disseminate to a private

citizen like Mills. Second, at the time, Mills was a trustee of the

Clinton Library. As a trustee, Mills was responsible for supervising

the effort to construct the Library. However, Mills claimed that she

was unaware both of general fundraising efforts, and of Denise

Rich’s large contributions to the Library. The White House staff

present at the meeting explained that Mills was invited to the

meeting because of her substantial knowledge regarding the various independent counsel investigations of the Clinton Administration.785 The bulk of this meeting concerned pardons relating to various investigations by independent counsels, and Mills was asked

for her opinion on whether various individuals involved in these investigations should receive pardons.786

After a lengthy discussion regarding the Independent Counsel-related pardons, the President raised the issue of Marc Rich. President Clinton said that he had received a message from Jack

Quinn,787 and that he had also received a call from Prime Minister

Barak. Bruce Lindsey clearly recalled that the President stated

that ‘‘Prime Minister Barak had spoken to him that afternoon and

had asked him again—I don’t believe it was the first time that the

Prime Minister had raised the Marc Rich pardon—had asked him

again to consider it.’’ 788

Before the President raised the Marc Rich matter, everyone on

the White House staff thought it was a dead letter, and had not

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789 Id. at 344–45 (testimony of John Podesta, former Chief of Staff to the President, the White

House). 790 Id. at 110. See also Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the President,

the White House (Mar. 28, 2001). John Podesta was present for the portion of the meeting

where the independent counsel pardons were discussed, but left the meeting prior to the discussion of Marc Rich to tape a television appearance. 791 Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001). 792 Id. 793See ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 367 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of John Podesta, former

Chief of Staff to the President, the White House). 794 Interview with Cheryl Mills, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 19, 2001). 795 Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 28, 2001). 796 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 346 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the President, the White House). 797 Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 28, 2001).

ing.789 Nevertheless, once the President raised the matter, Nolan,

Lindsey, Cabe, and Angel all expressed their opposition to the Rich

pardon.790 Those present recall Lindsey giving a strong statement

of opposition, focusing on the fact that Rich and Pincus Green were

fugitives from justice who had never faced the charges against

them.791 The basic thrust of all of the arguments offered by the

staff focused on the fact that Rich and Green were fugitives. When

asked about the strength of the arguments made by Rich and

Green, Meredith Cabe stated that if their arguments were strong,

Rich and Green could obviously finance an excellent defense, and

they should make those arguments in court.792 During this discussion, Beth Nolan also expressed her opposition to the pardon. However, she also informed the President that Eric Holder was ‘‘leaning

toward’’ the granting of the pardon. A number of individuals involved in the decisionmaking process have identified Holder’s position as being a significant factor in the President’s decisionmaking.793

As the White House staff argued against the Rich pardon, Cheryl

Mills questioned their knowledge of the case. Mills pointed out that

the White House Counsel’s Office staff was not responding to the

substantive issues raised in the Marc Rich petition. Mills specifically pointed out that Bruce Lindsey was not the best person to

give an opinion on the Rich case since he had not even read the

petition.794 It appears that no one among the six individuals discussing the Rich pardon had even read through the 31-page petition. At this point, Mills outlined what she did know about the

case, based on her review of materials provided to her by Jack

Quinn. The President then asked her what she thought about the

arguments made by Quinn about Rich’s fugitive status in his January 18 letter. Mills stated that she did not find Quinn’s arguments

persuasive.795 She did say that the President should look at the selective prosecution argument which had been raised by Rich. According to Beth Nolan, Mills said that the White House should be

looking at the selective prosecution argument ‘‘seriously.’’ 796 But

then Mills told them ‘‘you know me, I don’t care about rich white

guys,’’ and then argued that American blacks were selectively prosecuted every day.797 Of the individuals present at the meeting, only

Mills made any statements that can be construed as anything other

247

798Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00406 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Jack Quinn (Jan. 19, 2001)) (Exhibit 175). 799 Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn) (Exhibit 176). 800 ‘‘President Clinton’s Eleventh Hour Pardons,’’ Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 70 (Feb. 14, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn). 801 Id.

than negative about the Rich petition. The President indicated he

was interested in the matter, but did not make any clear statements that he was going to issue the Rich pardon.

After this discussion, the President indicated that he had to return Quinn’s call. He did not indicate whether he had made up his

mind on the Rich pardon. It was clear, though, that the President

still had a strong interest in the matter.

4. The President’s Call to Jack Quinn

The President then tracked down Jack Quinn, who was having

dinner at the home of a friend. Clinton spoke to Quinn about the

Rich case. According to Quinn, this conversation lasted approximately twenty minutes. Before the call, Robert Fink e-mailed

Quinn the following suggestion: ‘‘I would say, Do it for me. I know

it is deserved.’’ 798 Also providing a suggestion as to the topics discussed between Quinn and President Clinton is a list of bullet

points apparently prepared by Quinn for the call:

• unusual • but not unworthy • never was a case • tax RICO fraud • stayed away—publicity • CTS/RUDY SAY OVERREACHED • will submit to some civil processes in ARCO • others similarly sit. • controversial/defensible • humanitarian record since that time

• Ken Starr

• Ira[n]-Contra

• inequity

• bias—rich Jew

• Israel 799

As has been discussed throughout this report, most of Quinn’s apparent arguments were completely false, ranging from the assertion that there ‘‘never was a case,’’ to the claim that other similarly

situated defendants were subject to civil penalties, to the preposterous claim that Rich was targeted because he was Jewish.

According to Quinn, ‘‘President Clinton had obviously read and

studied the pardon petition. He grasped the essence of my argument about this case being one that should have been handled civilly, not criminally, and he discussed with me whether the passage

of time would permit statute of limitations defenses in such a civil

proceeding.’’ 800 After President Clinton expressed this opinion,

Quinn told the President that he ‘‘would happily give him a letter

waiving those defenses, and he insisted that I provided one to him

within an hour.’’ 801 Quinn has testified that his discussion with

the President was limited to the law and the facts of the Rich case,

and at no time touched upon the financial contributions of Denise

248

802 Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Jack Quinn to President William J. Clinton

(Jan. 19, 2001)) (Exhibit 177). 803William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2001 (Exhibit

178). 804 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 4501–4507 (2001). 805 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 751–760(h) (2001), omitted pursuant to 15 U.S.C.A. § 760(g). 806 12 U.S.C.A. § 1904 (1976) omitted, pursuant to Pub.L. 91–151, Title II, § 211. 807 15 U.S.C.A. § 4504(a)(1). 808 15 U.S.C.A. § 4504(b)(1)(A).

Rich. After getting off the phone with the President, Quinn drafted

a short letter making the necessary waiver. The letter reads as follows:

I am writing to confirm that my clients, Marc Rich and

Pincus Green, waive any and all defenses which could be

raised to the lawful imposition of civil fines or penalties in

connection with the actions and transactions alleged in the

indictment against them pending in the Southern District

of New York. Specifically they will not raise the statute of

limitations or any other defenses which arose as a result

of their absense [sic].802

This letter was then faxed to the White House, where it was apparently provided to the President and the relevant White House staff.

It was after the telephone call with Jack Quinn that President

Clinton apparently decided to grant the pardons to Marc Rich and

Pincus Green. The President himself has pointed to this agreement

as a significant concession that he was able to obtain from Jack

Quinn and Marc Rich.803 That the assurances given by Jack Quinn

had any impact on President Clinton’s decisionmaking is deeply

troubling. The promise made by Quinn was an empty promise for

at least three reasons.

First, Quinn agreed to waive a defense that Marc Rich and

Pincus Green could not use in any event. Due to their absence from

the United States, Marc Rich and Pincus Green did not have a

statute of limitations defense to waive. The statute of limitations

provision of the Petroleum Overcharge Distribution and Restitution

Act of 1986 804 would apply to any civil enforcement action imposing civil penalties on Marc Rich and Pincus Green for violations of

the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973 805 and the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.806 The limitations provision provides that a civil enforcement action cannot be commenced after

the later of September 30, 1988, or six years after the date of the

violation.807 It appears that this provision would provide a defense

for Marc Rich and Pincus Green; however, immediately following

the limitations provision are exceptions tolling the limitations period. The first exception provides:

(1) In computing the periods established in subparagraphs

(A) and (B) of subsection (a)(1) of this section, there shall

be excluded any period—

(A) during which any person who is or may become the

subject of a civil enforcement action is outside the United

States, has absconded or concealed himself, or is not subject to legal process.808

Therefore, according to the plain meaning of the statute, the time

Marc Rich and Pincus Green were outside the United States tolled

249

809 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99–1012, at 234 (1986). 810 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 108 (Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of Martin Auerbach, former

assistant U.S. attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). 811 Jerry Seper, Pardoned Financier Gives ‘‘Empty Promise,’’ Ex-Prosecutor Says, WASH. TIMES,

Jan. 30, 2001, at A1. 812 Raymond Bonner and Alison Leigh Cowan, Notes Show Justice Official Knew of Pardon

Application, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2001, at A14. 813Department of Energy staff have informed the Committee that they are still reviewing the

Rich case.

the statute of limitations. Furthermore, a look at the legislative

history of this provision shows that Congress intended this result.

Congress enacted the limitations provision with the intent that all

alleged violations of the law would be pursued expeditiously but it

did not intend for those who violated the laws to escape prosecution.809 It is evident from the plain meaning of the statute, as well

as the legislative history, that Marc Rich and Pincus Green did not

have a statute of limitations defense to raise, but that, in fact, their

absence tolled the limitations period.

Second, it appears almost certain that Rich does not have any

civil liability relating to the charges against him in 1983. Martin

Auerbach, one of the main prosecutors responsible for investigating

Rich, opined that ‘‘[t]he civil liabilities in this case were fully extinguished in 1984 when Marc Rich and Co. A.G. and Marc Rich and

Co. International Limited paid $150 million to the U.S. Government. The civil liabilities were corporate civil liabilities.’’ 810 When

asked about Rich’s promise to pay civil liabilities, Sandy Weinberg

stated, ‘‘What civil penalties? The civil penalties already have been extracted, $200 million worth. They were corporate liabilities and

were already handled through plea agreements. This is about as

big an empty promise as can be made.’’ 811 Rich’s own lawyers

agree with the assessment of the prosecutors. Michael Green, one

of the main lawyers representing Rich, stated that ‘‘[w]e think he

[Marc Rich] owes no civil liabilities.’’ 812 Perhaps the most telling

sign is that over a year after the Rich pardon, the Department of

Energy has taken no action to collect civil penalties from Rich.813

Third, to the extent that civil penalties were available, Marc Rich had been willing to pay as much as $100 million to settle the case

against him, going back to the early 1980s. What Rich had feared

though, and was not willing to accept, was any time in jail. Rather

than representing a concession, the agreement between the President and Quinn represented exactly what Rich had been demanding all along.

It cannot be disputed that the deal the President reached with

Jack Quinn on January 19, 2001, was a hollow, meaningless deal.

The only remaining question is whether the President’s mistake

was the result of ignorance, part of his complete failure to conduct

any research about the Marc Rich case, or whether the President

knew it was an empty agreement and made it solely to provide

window dressing for his decision. Since this question goes to the

heart of whether or not President Clinton’s decision was corrupt,

it is difficult for the Committee to reach a conclusion on this question, absent additional information from individuals who have refused to cooperate with the Committee’s investigation. However, it

is difficult to understand why President Clinton would enter into

these kinds of negotiations with Jack Quinn, reach this kind of

250

814 ‘‘President Clinton’s Eleventh Hour Pardons,’’ Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 22–23 (Feb. 14, 2001) (testimony of Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice). 815 Id. at 23. 816 Id.; Interview with Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice (Feb. 27, 2001). 817 ‘‘President Clinton’s Eleventh Hour Pardons,’’ Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 23 (Feb. 14, 2001) (testimony of Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice).

agreement, and then use the agreement as a justification for granting the pardon without even checking with someone who understood the case to see if the agreement had substance. President

Clinton knew that his staff had not even read Quinn’s submissions

to the White House, much less spoken to parties outside the White

House about the Rich matter. Therefore, President Clinton, if he

was attempting to reach a reasonable decision in the Rich matter,

should have understood the need to turn to someone who understood the case to assist him in the matter. That he did not seek

such advice raises further questions about his decisionmaking, and

about his motive for issuing the Rich and Green pardons.

5. The White House Informs the Justice Department of

the Decision

President Clinton apparently made the decision to pardon Rich

and Green in the evening of January 19, 2001. After the President

made the decision, Bruce Lindsey and Beth Nolan were informed

of the decision. Nolan then asked Associate White House Counsel

Meredith Cabe to inform the Justice Department, and have the

Justice Department perform a National Crime Information Center

(‘‘NCIC’’) check on Rich and Green. It was standard procedure for

the Justice Department to perform this kind of check on an individual before they received a pardon, even under the dramatically

truncated background checks employed by the Clinton Administration in January 2001. The purpose of the NCIC check was to ensure that the individual receiving the pardon did not have any outstanding warrants or criminal charges.

Shortly after midnight on January 20, 2001, less than twelve

hours before the end of the Clinton Administration, Cabe telephoned Roger Adams, the Pardon Attorney, and informed him that

she would be faxing over a list of additional individuals to whom

President Clinton was considering granting pardons.814 When the

list arrived, Adams saw the names of Marc Rich and Pincus Green

on the list. This was the first time that Adams had heard of Rich

or Green being considered for pardons. Adams saw that the faxed

list did not contain any identifying information for Rich or Green,

so he called Cabe to ask for additional information.815 Cabe provided Adams with dates of birth and social security numbers for

Rich and Green. Cabe then informed Adams that she expected that

there would be little information on them, because they had been

‘‘living abroad’’ for several years.816

While the FBI conducted the NCIC check on Rich and Green, the

White House Counsel’s Office faxed further information on Rich,

consisting of several pages from Quinn’s pardon petition, to the

Pardon Attorney’s Office.817 Based on his review of these pages,

Roger Adams understood the full magnitude of the Rich and Green

case for the first time. He saw that they had been indicted 17 years

251

818 Id. 819 Id.; Interview with Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice (Feb. 27, 2001). 820 ‘‘President Clinton’s Eleventh Hour Pardons,’’ Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 23 (Feb. 14, 2001) (testimony of Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice). 821 Id. 822 Id. 823 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 194 (Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice). 824 ‘‘President Clinton’s Eleventh Hour Pardons,’’ Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 23–24 (Feb. 14, 2001) (testimony of Roger Adams, Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice).

earlier in New York, and had remained fugitives since then. A

member of Adams’ staff then began to conduct internet research on

Rich and Green.818 While Adams’s staff was attempting to gather

information about Rich and Green, the FBI faxed the results of the

NCIC check to Adams. The NCIC check revealed that Rich and

Green were fugitives wanted for mail and wire fraud, arms trading,

and tax evasion.819 Adams drafted a summary of the charges

against Rich and Green, and faxed the summary to the White

House shortly before 1:00 a.m. on January 20.820 At this point,

Adams was obviously concerned about the effort to pardon Rich

and Green, and called his superior at the Justice Department, Deputy Attorney General Holder, at home.821 Adams informed Holder

that President Clinton was considering granting pardons to Rich

and Green. Holder then informed Adams that he was aware of the

pending clemency requests from Rich and Green.822 According to

Holder, when he received this call from Roger Adams, it was the

first time that he actually thought that the Rich pardon was likely

to be granted.823

After his brief conversation with Holder, Adams received another

call from the White House Counsel’s office, which by this time had

received Adams’ summary of the charges against Rich and Green.

During this conversation, Adams told Meredith Cabe that in addition to the charges against Rich, there was a customs alert posted

for Rich and Green and that he believed this was significant. Apparently not trusting Adams’ summary, Cabe asked Adams to fax

over the original printout from the NCIC check that was performed

by the FBI. Adams faxed the printout over, as well as the articles

that his staff had been able to locate through their Internet

searches.824

What had caused such concern at the White House was the reference in the NCIC check to ‘‘arms trading.’’ No one at the White

House had ever heard that Rich or Green had been involved in

arms trading. Cabe and Eric Angel took the information about

arms trading to Beth Nolan. Nolan and Cheryl Mills were in

Nolan’s office. Bruce Lindsey had apparently left the White House

for the evening. Cabe gave Nolan and Mills the information, which

had been provided to her by the Pardon Attorney’s office. Nolan

compared the information in the NCIC printout to the Rich and

Green indictment, attempting to discern whether they had been

charged with arms trading in 1983, or whether this was new information. Cabe, Angel, Mills, and Nolan were unable to come to any

definitive answer as to whether the information about arms trading

was already known, or whether this was new information which

would complicate the effort to issue a pardon. At the time, they

252

825 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 374–75 (Mar. 1, 2001) (testimony of Beth Nolan, former

Counsel to the President, the White House). 826Department of Justice Document Production DOJ/SDNY–MR–00021–23 (NCIC Printouts

for Pincus Green and Marc Rich (Mar. 3, 1992, and Mar. 18, 1994)) (Exhibit 179). 827The Committee is not aware of any criminal charges that have been lodged against Rich

or Green for illegal arms trading. There are numerous reports, however, that Marc Rich is involved in trafficking weapons, included sophisticated missile guidance systems. This arms dealing activity may or may not be legal. See, e.g., A. CRAIG COPETAS, METAL MEN: MARC RICH AND

THE 10-BILLION-DOLLAR SCAM 131 (1985) (indicating that Rich paid for Iranian oil with small

arms, automatic rifles, and hand-held rockets); Jim Hougan, King of the World (Marc Rich),

PLAYBOY, Feb. 1, 1994, at 104 (indicating that Rich bought gas-fired gyroscopes from North

Korea and sold them to Iran). 828 Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 28, 2001). 829 Id. 830 Id. 831 Id. 832 Interview with Cheryl Mills, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 19, 2001); Interview with Eric Angel, former Associate Counsel to the President, the

White House (Mar. 28, 2001). 833 Id.

speculated that either this was a new charge for which Rich and

Green were wanted, unrelated to their 1983 indictment, or this was

the way that the NCIC database referred to the Trading with the

Enemy count which was part of their indictment.825 In short, however, they did not have an understanding of what the ‘‘arms trading’’ reference meant.

The meaning of the ‘‘arms trading’’ reference in the NCIC is not

entirely clear, since none of the charges in Rich and Green’s 1983

indictment related to arms trading. The NCIC printout itself, however, does not support the speculation by the White House staff

that the ‘‘arms trading’’ reference was just another term for trading

with the enemy. The printouts for Marc Rich from the NCIC database show separate entries for ‘‘trading with the enemy’’ and ‘‘arms

trading,’’ suggesting that they are separate offenses.826 Given the

fact that on its face the NCIC printout raises serious questions

about Rich being wanted for arms trading, President Clinton clearly should have made a serious inquiry to determine what the arms

trading entry meant before granting the Marc Rich pardon.827 Instead, he did not make a single inquiry of law enforcement.

To try to figure out a response to this new piece of information,

Nolan, Mills, Cabe, and Angel called Bruce Lindsey. Lindsey did

not have any insight regarding the arms trading information, but

reiterated his opposition to the Rich pardon, and stated that the

arms trading information was yet another reason not to issue the

pardon.828 Nolan then called Jack Quinn. Quinn expressed irritation to be receiving a call at 2:00 a.m.829 Quinn also was not immediately responsive to the concerns Nolan was raising.830 Quinn told

Nolan that he ‘‘would have known if [Rich] had been charged with

that.’’ Apparently Nolan, and Cheryl Mills as well, did not consider

that a satisfactory answer, and pressed Quinn for more information. Mills told Quinn that ‘‘you’ve got to work with us here.’’ 831

At that point, Quinn told Nolan and the others that he would check

back on this issue and call them back.832 Shortly thereafter, Quinn

called back and forcefully told Nolan and the others that he had

no knowledge about any arms trading charges against Rich.833 He

told them to look at the indictment against Rich, and that the inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00268 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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834 Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001).

dictment ‘‘was the only thing out there.’’ 834 Quinn’s answer was obviously non-responsive but no one appears to have taken any steps

to obtain a responsive answer.

At the Committee’s March 1 hearing, Nolan was asked why she

did not take any further steps to determine exactly what charges

were outstanding against Marc Rich. Nolan’s answer was less than

satisfactory:

Mr. BURTON. An intelligence agency tells you that there

was arms trading, a violation of law, and all these other

things had taken place which had not just been revealed

or checked; and you take the man’s word or the President

takes his word on the pardon of one of the most wanted

fugitives in the world who renounced his citizenship and

all the other things we talked about. You took his word

when Mr. Quinn was representing him. And Mr. Quinn

said in previous testimony the last time he was here, my

job wasn’t to tell all the facts that were against the pardon. My job was to point out all the reasons why there

should be a pardon.

You know as an attorney that’s what you do. You try to

make the best case for your client.

Why in the world would you go to Mr. Quinn when there

was a question of illegal activity and say, hey, what about

this? You know darn well he’s going to say, oh, that’s nothing. That was just a minor thing. That was probably not

arms trading. It was oil trading or something else. Why

would you take his word for it and why would the President take his word for it and then go ahead and grant the

pardon? I just don’t understand it. It eludes me. Would

you explain that to me?

***

Ms. NOLAN. This was 2:30 a.m. My eyes were officially

stuck together by then. I had my contact lenses in since

7 or 6 the morning before. I had been going on a couple

hours of sleep most nights that week, as had the President; and I think frankly, as Mr. Podesta said, because

this came up so late we did not do the kind of checks that

we would have if we would have had the time. . . . As Mr.

Lindsey indicated, he had indeed indicated that, understand Mr. Quinn is not your advisor, he is an advocate.

But I do think that the President viewed Mr. Quinn as

somebody who he truly did trust to give him correct information; and as far as we know that information was correct, not incorrect.

254

835 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 379 (Mar. 1, 2001). 836 Id. at 378, 429 (testimony of Beth Nolan, former Counsel to the President, the White

House).

***

Mr. BURTON. I’m running out of time here. Was Mr. Quinn

at the White House?

Ms. NOLAN. No.

Mr. BURTON. So you had the ability with your eyes stuck

together to get ahold of Mr. Quinn, but you didn’t try to

contact the Justice Department to ask them about it because it was 2:30 a.m.? And you can get a hold of the man

who is an advocate for pardoning one of the most wanted

fugitives in the world, but you don’t call the Justice Department or the intelligence agency at 2:30 a.m.? I don’t

understand that.835

After the final conversation with Quinn, at 2:30 a.m., Nolan

called President Clinton. Nolan told the President that they had

performed an NCIC check, which showed that Rich was a wanted

fugitive, and also revealed new information suggesting that Rich

was wanted for arms trading. Nolan then told the President that

the White House did not have any information showing that the

NCIC information was inaccurate, other than what Quinn had told

them:

I said all we have is Jack Quinn’s word that the arms

trading is not, in fact, an issue for Mr. Rich.

***

[T]hat’s when I said, you know, what we have is Jack

Quinn’s word; that’s all we have at this hour. And he said,

take Mr. Quinn’s word, or take Jack’s word.836

With that sentence—‘‘take Jack’s word’’—President Clinton decided

to grant the pardons of Marc Rich and Pincus Green. Nolan informed Cheryl Mills and Meredith Cabe, both of whom were in her

office, of the decision, and then went home for the evening. The actual master warrant granting pardons to Marc Rich, Pincus Green,

and 139 others was prepared at the Justice Department, and then

delivered to the White House on the morning of January 20. The

warrants were then signed by President Clinton.

H. Aftermath of the Rich and Green Pardons

1. Eric Holder’s Congratulatory Remarks

The first reaction of the Marc Rich legal team to the pardons was

one of happiness and self-congratulation. By Monday, January 22,

they had turned to more practical concerns, like having the travel

restrictions and arrest warrants for Rich and Green lifted. Jack

Quinn spoke with Eric Holder, who was now Acting Attorney General. Quinn asked Holder what steps needed to be taken to ensure

that Rich and Green were not arrested when they traveled. Holder

255

841 Id. Holder sent the resumes of the two aides, former Associate Deputy Attorney General

Bernard J. Delia and former Associate Deputy Attorney General Nicholas M. Gess, later that

day. Jack Quinn Document Production (Fax from Eric Holder, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, to Jack Quinn (dated Dec. 1, 2000, date stamped by fax machine Jan. 22, 2001))

(Exhibit 182). In addition, at least one of these aides, Nick Gess, called Quinn as early as January 2, 2001, presumably seeking a job. The telephone message reads, ‘‘Calling at Holder’s suggestion.’’ See Jack Quinn Document Production (Telephone Message from Nick Gess, Associate

Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 2, 2001)) (Exhibit 183). 837 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 194 (Feb. 8, 2001) (statement of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice). 838See Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink et al. (Jan.

22, 2001)) (Exhibit 180); Jack Quinn Document Production (Note of Jack Quinn) (Exhibit 181). 839 Id. 840 Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink et al. (Jan. 22,

2001)) (Exhibit 180). 842Lucy Howard, Susannah Meadows, Bret Begun and Katherine Stroup, Periscope, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 12, 2001, at 6. 843 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 215 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Eric Holder, former Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice).

told Quinn he needed to have detainers removed from computers,

as well as inform Interpol of the pardon.837 Apparently, Holder

thought that the Southern District of New York might resist the

pardon, and refuse to dismiss the indictment. In that case, Holder

counseled Quinn, Rich and Green to move to dismiss the indictment in court.838 According to Jack Quinn, who took notes of the

conversation, Holder said that Quinn ‘‘did a very good job.’’ 839

Holder also gave Quinn advice on how to handle the burgeoning

media requests regarding the pardon effort, telling Quinn that he

should ‘‘make public [their] commitment to waive defenses to civil

penalties at [DOE] and tthe [sic] support of [B]arak.’’ 840 Also in

this same conversation, Holder asked Quinn to consider hiring two

of his former aides at the Justice Department.841

Holder has offered evolving accounts of his congratulatory remarks to Jack Quinn. At first, Holder’s supporters informed the

press that his comments to Quinn were ‘‘sarcastic, not congratulatory.’’ 842 Then, when questioned about this matter at the Committee’s hearing, Holder denied making the comments at all.843 Given

the fact that Quinn took notes and sent an e-mail contemporaneously with the conversation with Holder, and that Holder has offered conflicting accounts of the conversation, it appears that Holder has not offered an honest explanation, and that he did indeed

make the congratulatory comments to Quinn. Such comments support the Committee’s conclusion that Eric Holder was sympathetic

to the Marc Rich pardon or was willing, through his own inaction,

to see the pardon granted so as not to interfere with his other interests. It is also worth noting that Holder, who had himself sought

Quinn’s support for his appointment as Attorney General if Vice

President Gore won the presidency, continued to seek Quinn’s support for finding employment for his underlings, even after the Rich

pardon had been granted.

2. The Rich Team’s Effort to Deal with the Press

After Holder’s congratulations, things began to go downhill for

the Marc Rich team. By the end of the day on Monday, January

22, it became clear that the pardons of Marc Rich and Pincus

Green were going to be a major news story. E-mails between Rich’s

representatives showed that they were having some difficulty dealVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00271 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
256

844Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00191 (E-mail from Robert

Fink to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation et al. (Jan. 22, 2001)) (Exhibit 69). 845 Id. 846Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe Document Production PMR&W 00195 (E-mail from Jack

Quinn to Robert Fink et al. (Jan. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit 184). 847 Id. 848 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 180 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Jack Quinn).

ing with this unforeseen consequence of the pardons. Rich lawyer

Robert Fink began by asking how he should deal with press calls:

I have been asked who lobbied the President in behalf of

Marc (and Pinky) and said it may be private and therefore

did not immediately respond. May I? Who should I say? I

have told everyone that Denise was in favor of the resolution of this case and was in favor of the pardon.844

Rich’s representative in Israel, Avner Azulay, was concerned about

the publicity:

Pse [sic] keep barak [sic] out of the media. We have

enough names on the list other than his. Important to

keep all politicians out of the story. Pse [sic] share with me

the inclusion of any one on the list. This is election time

here and has a potential of blowup. A newsweek reporter

here has already asked if there were any political contributions. Other than that I thought we agreed that all inquiries, interviews should be channeled to [G]ershon. Why is

B[ob] F[ink] giving interviews? He shouldn’t be dealing

with this aspect.845

Jack Quinn also made a case for further disclosure:

I have this very great concern: we are withholding our

very good and compelling petition from the press only to

protect the tax professors who don’t want to be too far out

front. The tail is wagging the dog. I think it is critical that

one of us sit down with some journalist and share the petition. I hope I’m not over-reacting, but thins [sic] is my best

judgment. I’d do it with the NY Times. In the next hour

or so. Is that possible? 846

Avner Azulay agreed with the need to make the tax professors’

opinion public:

You are right. Why do we have to worry so much about the

professors. They did a job and there is nothing wrong in

giving expert onions [sic]. A lot know about it, including

the doj and sdny. It is part of the petition. Why hide it? 847

The e-mails indicate that Professors Ginsburg and Wolfman expressed some hesitancy to have their work for Marc Rich publicly

disclosed. When asked if Professor Ginsburg was hesitant to be

linked to the Rich case because it might harm the reputation of his

wife, Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Quinn said Professor Ginsburg’s, and Professor Wolfman’s concerns were limited

to a fear of being ‘‘besieged with media requests.’’ 848 It appears

that the professors’ concerns were more serious than fear of dealing

with a barrage of press calls, and it stands to reason that they

were concerned about having their reputations tarnished by having

257

849 Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Anne McGuire, Associate, Quinn Gillespie

& Associates, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit 185). Shortly after her conversation with

O’Keefe, McGuire spoke to Terry McAuliffe and asked Quinn to ‘‘[c]all me as soon as you can.’’ Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Anne McGuire, Associate, Quinn Gillespie & Associates, to Jack Quinn (Jan. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit 186). The timing of McAuliffe’s call suggests

that it was related to Quinn’s response to the Rich matter. However, since McAuliffee has refused to participate in an interview with Committee staff, the Committee cannot know definitively what McAuliffe’s call was about. 850 Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Avner Azulay, Director, Rich

Foundation et al. (Jan. 23, 2001)) (Exhibit 187). 851 Jack Quinn Document Production (E-mail from Jack Quinn to Robert Fink et al. (Jan. 24,

2001)) (Exhibit 188).

the public know of their lucrative work for Marc Rich and Pincus

Green.

While they were deciding how to deal with the public, the Marc

Rich team was also receiving communications from former President Clinton. On January 23, Anne McGuire, an associate at Quinn

Gillespie, e-mailed Jack Quinn to let him know that she had heard

from Clinton Library fundraiser Peter O’Keefe:

Just got a weird call from Peter O’Keefe—was up in

Chappaqua for the last few days—he asked me to check

with you on whether or not you were going to go out and

start defending vigorously—said ‘‘we wanted to find out.’’

I am assuming he meant Terry [McAuliffe]—but I did not

go into it on the cell phone.849

It appears that Quinn spoke to former President Clinton on January 23 and 24, about how to handle the Rich issue in the press.

On January 23, Quinn e-mailed Avner Azulay and pointed out that

Clinton ‘‘himself is saying in his frustration about the press coverage that good people like the PM [Barak] supported this.’’ 850 The

following day, Quinn e-mailed the Marc Rich team and said that

he ‘‘spoke to BC. [He] thinks we shd offer op-ed to daily news.

[C]an anyone help?’’ 851

On January 26, 2001, Quinn did write an op-ed piece, which was

published by The Washington Post. The article was little more than

a rehash of the same inaccurate arguments that Quinn made to the

White House when he was seeking the pardon. Quinn’s main

claims were that: (1) companies which committed acts similar to

those of Rich and Green were not prosecuted for their actions; (2)

the prosecutors in the Southern District of New York refused to negotiate with Rich and Green; and (3) Quinn did not violate the Executive Order banning lobbying by officials who had left the White

House in the previous five years. As explained earlier in this report, all of these arguments were misleading.

Internal e-mails among the team defending Jack Quinn indicate

that they were particularly concerned about Quinn’s exposure for

his possible role in ‘‘coordinating’’ political activities and the effort

to obtain the Rich pardon. These e-mails also indicate that Quinn

was eager to place the blame for the Rich pardon onto others. The

day after the Committee’s February 8, 2001, hearing, Quinn associate Peter Mirijanian sent the following e-mail to Quinn and a number of his associates:

Where Jack remains exposed is in defending the optics of

the emails, contributions and the DNC piece (Beth Dzoretz

[sic]). We need to anticipate the worst in this regard—i.e.

258

852 Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02943 (E-mail from Peter Mirijanian, Quinn Gillespie

& Associates, to Scott Hynes, Quinn Gillespie & Associates et al. (Feb. 9, 2001)) (Exhibit 189). 853 Jack Quinn Document Production JQ 02946 (E-mail from Peter Mirijanian, Quinn Gillespie

& Associates, to Jack Quinn (Feb. 10, 2001)) (Exhibit 190). 854 Rivera Live (CNBC television broadcast, Feb. 15, 2001). 855 Id. 856 Id.

Fink refuses to testify, Denise is granted immunity and

Beth is brought before the committee. Since Jack has been

out front and center on this the impression will stick that,

yes, he knew of these activities and gave them his tacit approval.

Just like with Holder, if these other parties don’t come forward and instead duck their responsibility on these matters, we’ll have to do it for them. (Does that sound too ‘‘Sopranos-like’’?) 852

On February 10, 2001, Mirijanian advised Quinn against appearing on Meet the Press because of similar concerns:

My concern jack is that russert is going to get into a series

of questions involving denise’s political activities and you

will be the de facto defender of what she did. That will

only result in more press inquiries about your ‘‘coordinating’’ role—something we want to avoid.853

These e-mails suggest that Quinn and his defenders felt that they

were vulnerable to questions about Quinn’s coordination of the political activities of Denise Rich and Beth Dozoretz and the effort to

obtain Marc Rich’s pardon. The e-mails raise the possibility that

Denise Rich and Dozoretz might have had valuable information regarding these activities which they did not share with the Committee, due to the invocation of their Fifth Amendment rights.

3. President Clinton’s Column in The New York Times

For the first month of public outcry about the Marc Rich pardon,

President Clinton was largely silent. He made a few scattered comments about the matter, most notably a telephone call to Geraldo

Rivera. Through the call to Rivera, the public learned that the

President felt ‘‘blindsided by this. I have no infrastructure to deal

with this, no press person. I just wanted to go out there and do

what past presidents have done, but the Republicans had other

ideas for me.’’ 854 President Clinton also suggested that the outcry

over Marc Rich was hypocritical, because Republicans had worked

on the Rich case: ‘‘It’s terrible! I mean, he had three big-time Republican lawyers, including Dick Cheney’s chief of staff. Marc Rich

himself is a Republican.’’ 855 President Clinton also told Rivera

about the influence that Israeli support for Rich had played: ‘‘Now,

I’ll tell you what did influence me. Israel did influence me profoundly.’’ 856

On Sunday, February 18, former President Clinton attempted a

fuller defense by publishing a column in The New York Times. Unfortunately for the President, his attempt at defense only made

matters worse. The column largely parroted the arguments made

by Jack Quinn and the other Marc Rich lawyers. Therefore, it was

rife with false and misleading statements. The following is a sumVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00274 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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857William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2001, at sec.

4, p. 13 (Exhibit 178). 858 Id. 859 Id. 860 Jack Quinn Document Production (Letter from Bernard Wolfman, Professor, Harvard Law

School, to Gerard E. Lynch, Criminal Division Chief of the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the

S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice (Dec. 7, 1990)) (Exhibit 66). 861See Letter from Professor Martin D. Ginsburg, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 12, 2001) (Exhibit

Continued

mary of the arguments made by the President, and the problems

with each argument:

• ‘‘I understood that the other oil companies that had structured transactions like those on which Mr. Rich and Mr.

Green were indicted were instead sued civilly by the government.’’ 857

As explained earlier in this report, there were 48 criminal

prosecutions for violations of oil price control regulations by

crude oil resellers, and 14 of those individuals served time

in prison. In fact, John Troland and David Ratliff, resellers

of oil who played a small part in Marc Rich’s plan to avoid

U.S. oil regulations and tax laws, served 10 months in prison, and provided vital evidence against Marc Rich and

Pincus Green.

• ‘‘I was informed that, in 1985, in a related case against a

trading partner of Mr. Rich and Mr. Green, the Energy Department, which was responsible for enforcing the governing law, found that the manner in which the Rich/Green

companies had accounted for these transactions was proper.’’ 858

The so-called DOE finding was completely irrelevant to the

criminal charges against Rich and Green. Despite the finding about accounting methods in a related case, the Department of Energy never disputed that Rich’s companies falsified reports to hide illegal profits and then failed to pay

taxes on those illegal profits. Furthermore, the former

President neglected to mention that he made no effort, and

he was aware that his staff made no effort, to check with

Justice Department or Energy Department experts regarding this matter.

• ‘‘[T]wo highly regarded tax experts, Bernard Wolfman . . .

and Martin Ginsburg . . . reviewed the transactions in

question and concluded that the companies ‘were correct in

their U.S. income tax treatment of all the items in

question[.]’ ’’ 859

The tax analysis that was performed by Ginsburg and

Wolfman was performed only with facts provided to the professors by the Marc Rich legal team.860 The professors did

not gather facts independently, and therefore based their

analysis on an incorrect set of assumptions. In addition, the

President failed to disclose in his column that Marc Rich

paid Professors Ginsburg and Wolfman over $96,000 for

their work on the Rich case.861

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64); Letter from Bernard Wolfman, Professor, Harvard Law School, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 8, 2001) (Exhibit 65). 862William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2001, at sec.

4, p. 13 (Exhibit 178). 863 ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 91 (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony of Morris ‘‘Sandy’’ Weinberg,

Jr., former assistant U.S. attorney for the S.D.N.Y., Department of Justice). 864William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2001, at sec.

4, p. 13 (Exhibit 178). 865 Id.

• ‘‘[I]n order to settle the government’s case against them, the

two men’s companies had paid approximately $200 million

in fines, penalties and taxes, most of which might not even

have been warranted under the Wolfman/Ginsburg analysis

that the companies had followed the law and correctly reported their income.’’ 862

Rather than being an argument in support of the pardon,

the fact of the corporate guilty plea and the massive fines

shows that the case against Rich and Green was overwhelming. As prosecutor Sandy Weinberg observed, ‘‘if the

case is so weak, I mean what in the world were those lawyers [for Rich’s companies] thinking at that time .... They would have never pled guilty, they would have never

paid those fines. Whatever the reason for the pardon, Mr.

Chairman, and members of the committee, whatever the

reason, surely the reason was not the merits of the

case.’’ 863

• ‘‘[T]he Justice Department in 1989 rejected the use of racketeering statutes in tax cases like this one[.]’’ 864

The fact that the Justice Department stopped using the tax

charges as predicate offenses for bringing RICO charges is

irrelevant to the Rich pardon. While the Justice Department did stop using tax charges in this way, it continues

to allow mail and wire fraud as predicate offenses, and

therefore, RICO charges could still be brought against Rich

and Green under current legal theories. In addition, money

laundering statutes were not in place in 1983, and Rich

could have been charged under these statutes if he were

charged today. Finally, to look at the evolution of the law

over the seventeen years that Marc Rich was a fugitive

from justice, and argue that those changes merit a pardon

for Rich is to reward Rich for his flight from the country.

Indeed, sophisticated practitioners of money laundering—

which is one of the things that Rich and Green were

doing—would be in a far worse position if indicted today.

• ‘‘It was my understanding that Deputy Attorney General

Eric Holder’s position on the pardon application was ‘neutral, leaning for.’ ’’ 865

As explained throughout this report, Holder’s position on

the pardon is more of an indictment of Holder’s judgment

and reasoning than it is a justification for the pardon. Holder served the Justice Department and President poorly by

failing to gather any facts about the Rich case before reaching his decision about the pardon. He also created the indelVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00276 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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866 Id. 867 Editors’ Note, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2001, at A15. 868 Id. 869 Id. 870William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2001, at sec.

4, p. 13 (Exhibit 178).

ible impression that he did not have a pure motive in supporting Rich’s request while he was soliciting Jack Quinn’s

support for appointment as Attorney General. This point is

also an indictment of Jack Quinn, who worked very hard to

keep the Rich pardon matter away from anyone who would

be able to refute his spurious arguments.

• ‘‘[T]he case for the pardons was reviewed and advocated not

only by my former White House counsel Jack Quinn but

also by three distinguished Republican attorneys: Leonard

Garment, a former Nixon White House official; William

Bradford Reynolds, a former high-ranking official in the

Reagan Justice Department; and Lewis Libby, now Vice

President Cheney’s chief of staff.’’ 866

This was President Clinton’s most misleading assertion.

When President Clinton initially drafted this statement, it

said that ‘‘the applications were viewed and advocated’’ not

only by my former White House counsel Jack Quinn but

also by three distinguished Republicans[.]’’ 867 After some

initial copies of the newspaper were printed, the former

President’s spokesmen called The New York Times and

asked that the word ‘‘applications’’ be replaced with ‘‘the

case for the pardons.’’ 868 The pardon applications were

never reviewed by Garment, Reynolds, or Libby, so the initial form of the statement was blatantly untrue.869 However, even the improved statement was misleading. Garment, Reynolds and Libby had worked with Rich in the

1980s and early 1990s to try to reach a resolution of the

charges against Rich in New York. The arguments made by

Garment, Reynolds and Libby focused on the claim that the

SDNY was criminalizing what should have been a civil tax

case. They did not make, compile, or in any other way lay

the groundwork for, or make a case for a Presidential pardon. When former President Clinton stated that they ‘‘reviewed and advocated’’ ‘‘the case for the pardons,’’ he suggested that they were somehow involved in arguing that

Rich and Green should receive pardons. This was completely untrue.

• ‘‘[F]inally, and importantly, many present and former highranking Israeli officials of both major political parties and

leaders of Jewish communities in America and Europe

urged the pardon of Mr. Rich because of his contributions

and services to Israeli charitable causes, to the Mossad’s efforts to rescue and evacuate Jews from hostile countries,

and to the peace process through sponsorship of education

and health programs in Gaza and the West Bank.’’ 870

This argument would have been more sound if President

Clinton had been President of Israel, rather than President

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871 In a televised interview, Roger Clinton made the following statement about the Marc Rich

pardon:

Well, it was surprising, I can’t—but I’m not saying it was wrong. I have talked to

my brother about it, not in detail, but he has explained to me the reasons, the nonpersonal reasons—because I don’t need to know the personal ones—but he has explained to me how he was right in doing it, and he thought that he was right, specially based on all the people that had written him about it.

Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast, June 21, 2001). Roger Clinton’s reference to the

‘‘personal reasons’’ for President Clinton’s action is noteworthy. While Roger Clinton has limited

credibility, as the President’s brother, he would have reason to know whether President Clinton

had hidden motives for issuing the Marc Rich and Pincus Green pardons. However, it is unclear,

what, if any, ‘‘personal reasons’’ the President had for issuing the pardons.

of the United States. Indeed, President Clinton received

more pressure from the Israeli government, Israelis, and

Israeli sympathizers for a pardon for Jonathan Pollard than

for Marc Rich and Pincus Green. Presumably, President

Clinton was representing U.S. interests when he declined to

pardon Pollard. While it would certainly not have been inappropriate to take many concerns into consideration, one

would have expected President Clinton to continue to put

U.S. interests above all others when considering the Rich

and Green pardons.

There were a number of other problems with President

Clinton’s reliance on statements of support from Israeli and

Jewish officials. First, as discussed throughout this report,

it appears that Marc Rich carefully cultivated support by

making large financial contributions to political candidates

and charitable groups, in some cases making his financial

support contingent on their support for his pardon. In other

cases, individuals voicing support for Rich were misled, and

had no idea that their support would be used to obtain a

pardon. Finally, as explained previously, it appears that the

President has grossly exaggerated the extent to which

Prime Minister Barak pressed him to issue the Rich pardon. President Clinton even misinformed his staff on January 19 that Prime Minister Barak had raised the Marc Rich

issue, when in reality, it was President Clinton who raised

the Rich pardon with Barak.

Given the fact that every reason that the President offered for

the Rich pardon was either misleading or inaccurate, the President’s column added to the public furor over the pardons. Given the

President’s inability to provide any factually accurate or convincing

justification for the Rich pardon, the public, and the Committee,

are left wondering what the President’s true motivations were.871

V. FAILURE OF KEY PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN THE

MARC RICH AND PINCUS GREEN INVESTIGATION

The Committee’s investigation of the pardons of Marc Rich and

Pincus Green was hampered by a number of Fifth Amendment

claims and other refusals to cooperate with the Committee.

A. Marc Rich

On February 15, 2001, Chairman Burton directed a letter to

Marc Rich, asking him to testify before the Committee and waive

attorney-client privilege with respect to documents relating to his

efforts to obtain a pardon. On February 27, 2001, Laurence

263

872Letter from Laurence A. Urgenson, Counsel for Marc Rich, Kirkland & Ellis, to James C.

Wilson, Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 27, 2001) (within Appendix I). 873Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Pincus

Green (Aug. 27, 2001) (within Appendix I).

Urgenson, counsel for Mr. Rich, informed the Committee that because of the various criminal investigations into Mr. Rich’s activities, Rich would not waive his attorney-client privilege, or appear

before the Committee.872

B. Pincus Green

On August 27, 2001, Chairman Burton sent a letter to Pincus

Green, requesting that he participate in an interview with Committee staff.873 Green never responded to this request. Given that

Green apparently still lives outside of the United States, the Committee has not been able to serve him with a subpoena requiring

the production of documents or testimony.

C. Jack Quinn

Jack Quinn cooperated with the initial phase of the Committee’s

investigation, testifying at both the February 8, 2001, and March

1, 2001, hearings. Quinn also produced a number of documents to

the Committee regarding his work for Marc Rich and Pincus

Green. However, Quinn also withheld hundreds of pages from the

Committee, claiming that they were covered by the attorney-client

privilege. Quinn and three other law firms which had represented

Marc Rich also made similar arguments to try to withhold the documents from the grand jury investigating the Rich and Green pardons. In December 2001, Federal District Court Judge Denny Chin

overruled the claims of privilege by Quinn and the other lawyers,

and directed them to produce the subpoenaed records to the grand

jury. On December 17, 2001, Chairman Burton requested that

Quinn and three other law firms representing Rich to produce to

the Committee any documents they produced to the grand jury in

response to Judge Chin’s ruling.

On February 7, 2002, Quinn produced hundreds of pages of documents to the Committee which he had withheld for over a year.

The documents were highly significant, and raised serious questions about Quinn’s work on the Rich case, including whether

Quinn was going to receive money from Rich, contrary to assurances given by Quinn at the Committee’s February 8, 2001, hearing. On February 19, 2002, Chairman Burton asked Quinn to participate in a voluntary interview with Committee staff regarding

the documents he had turned over. On March 5, 2002, Quinn’s

counsel Victoria Toensing informed Committee staff that Quinn

would not participate in an interview with Committee staff. It is

disturbing that Quinn withheld documents from the Committee for

over a year, and then refused to answer questions about those documents when they were finally turned over to the Committee.

Quinn’s refusal to answer questions about these documents creates

an impression that Quinn is still attempting to conceal relevant information from the Committee about his work on the Marc Rich

case. In an attempt to obtain further information from Quinn, the

Committee issued a document subpoena to him on March 6, 2002.

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875 Notes of meeting with Carol Elder Bruce, Counsel for Denise Rich, Tighe Patton Armstrong

& Teasdale (Feb. 7, 2001). 874Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Carol Elder

Bruce, Counsel for Denise Rich, Tighe Patton Armstrong & Teasdale (Feb. 5, 2001) (within Appendix I). 876 Id. 877Letter from Carol Elder Bruce, Counsel for Denise Rich, Tighe Patton Armstrong & Teasdale, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 7, 2001) (within

Appendix I). 878Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Beth

Dozoretz, former Finance Chair, Democratic National Committee (Feb. 16, 2001) (within Appendix I). 879Letter from Thomas C. Green, Counsel for Beth Dozoretz, Sidley & Austin, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 26, 2001) (within Appendix I). 880Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Thomas C.

Green, Counsel for Beth Dozoretz, Sidley & Austin (Feb. 26, 2001) (within Appendix I). 881Letter from Thomas C. Green, Counsel for Beth Dozoretz, Sidley & Austin, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 27, 2001) (within Appendix I).

D. Denise Rich

On February 5, 2001, Chairman Burton submitted a list of written questions to Denise Rich regarding her efforts to win a pardon

for her ex-husband.874 Chairman Burton sent this letter in an attempt to obtain information from Mrs. Rich without calling her to

testify at a public hearing. On February 7, 2001, Committee staff

met with Carol Elder Bruce, counsel for Denise Rich. Bruce informed Committee staff that Rich would be invoking her Fifth

Amendment rights rather than answer the questions posed to her

by the Chairman. Bruce also informed the Committee staff that

Rich was ‘‘privy to a number of private conversations that might

be of interest’’ to the Committee.875 She further informed the Committee that Rich had given a large amount of money with respect

to the Clintons, including an ‘‘enormous sum’’ of money to the Clinton Library.876 However, Bruce denied that Rich had any intent to

bribe President Clinton. Later that day, Bruce sent a letter to

Chairman Burton in which she confirmed that ‘‘Ms. Rich is asserting her privilege under the Fifth Amendment of the United States

Constitution not to be a witness against herself and, accordingly,

will not be answering any questions of the Chairman or the Committee.’’ 877

E. Beth Dozoretz

After the Committee learned of Beth Dozoretz’s involvement in

the Rich pardon matter at its February 8, 2001, hearing, Committee staff attempted to interview Dozoretz. She refused to answer

calls from Committee staff, and accordingly, on February 16, 2001,

Chairman Burton sent a letter to Dozoretz requesting her to participate in an interview.878 On February 20, 2001, Tom Green,

counsel for Dozoretz, called Committee staff and stated that

Dozoretz declined to be interviewed. Accordingly, on February 23,

2001, Chairman Burton issued a subpoena to Dozoretz requiring

her to testify before a hearing of the Committee on March 1, 2001.

On February 26, 2001, Mr. Green wrote to the Chairman to inform

him that Dozoretz ‘‘has elected to invoke her constitutional privilege not to testify.’’ 879 When Chairman Burton informed Green

that he intended to call Dozoretz to invoke her Fifth Amendment

rights publicly,880 Green sent a letter requesting that Dozoretz be

excused from her appearance.881 However, the Chairman required

Dozoretz to testify for two main reasons: first, a letter from counsel

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882Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Avner

Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation (Mar. 8, 2001) (Exhibit 118). 883Letter from Avner Azulay, Director, Rich Foundation, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Mar. 15, 2001) (Exhibit 119). 884Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Peter

Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky (Feb. 26, 2001) (within Appendix I). 885Letter from Peter Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky, to the Honorable

Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 27, 2001) (within Appendix I).

stating that a client will invoke the Fifth Amendment if called is

not a satisfactory invocation of the Fifth Amendment; and second,

the Committee could not be certain that Dozoretz would actually

take the Fifth if called to testify, and accordingly had a responsibility to call her to determine whether or not she would actually invoke her Fifth Amendment rights. On March 1, 2001, Dozoretz appeared before the Committee and invoked her Fifth Amendment

rights rather than testify about her role in the Rich and Green pardons.

F. Avner Azulay

Avner Azulay was a key participant in the effort of Marc Rich

and Pincus Green to obtain a pardon. Since Azulay resides outside

of the United States, the Committee was not able to compel

Azulay’s testimony. However, on March 8, 2001, Chairman Burton

sent a letter to Azulay requesting that he participate in an interview with Committee staff.882 On March 15, 2001, Azulay responded by referring the Committee to his lawyer in New York,

Robert Morvillo.883 Committee staff then had a number of communications with Morvillo attempting to arrange an interview of

Azulay. The Committee was initially informed that Azulay was undergoing medical treatment, and was unable to participate in an

interview. However, over the course of the negotiations with

Morvillo, it became clear that Azulay had no intention of cooperating with the committee. In a final discussion on February 28, 2002,

Morvillo confirmed that Azulay would not participate in an interview with Committee staff. Given his key role in enlisting support

for the Rich and Green pardons among Israeli leaders, Azulay’s refusal to cooperate with the Committee’s investigation has had a

significant negative impact.

G. Peter Kadzik

The Committee only learned of Peter Kadzik’s role in lobbying

for the Rich and Green pardons after receiving records from his law

firm, Dickstein, Shapiro, Morin & Oshinsky, which reflected

Kadzik’s work on the matter. On Friday, February 23, 2001, Committee staff left a message with Kadzik’s attorney informing him

that Kadzik would be called to testify at the Committee’s March 1,

2001, hearing. On Monday, February 26, Chairman Burton sent a

letter to Kadzik formally notifying him that he would be called to

testify.884 At 7:40 p.m. on February 27, 2001, only 36 hours before

the March 1 hearing, and without so much as a telephone call from

Kadzik or his attorneys to Committee staff, Kadzik sent a response

to the Chairman, declining to testify because he was to be in California for a meeting.885 Upon receiving this information, Chairman

Burton issued a subpoena for Kadzik’s attendance at the hearVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00281 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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886Subpoena from House Comm. on Govt. Reform to Peter Kadzik, Partner, Dickstein Shapiro

Morin & Oshinsky (Feb. 27, 2001) (within Appendix II). 887Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Richard

Ben-Veniste, Counsel for Terry McAuliffe, Weil Gotshal & Manges (Feb. 16, 2001) (within Appendix I). 888Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Richard

Ben-Veniste, Counsel for Terry McAuliffe, Weil Gotshal & Manges (Mar. 22, 2001) (within Appendix I). 889Letter from Richard Ben-Veniste, Counsel for Terry McAuliffe, Weil Gotshal & Manges, to

James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Mar. 23, 2001) (within Appendix I). 890Letter from James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Richard BenVeniste, Counsel for Terry McAuliffe, Weil Gotshal & Manges (Mar. 30, 2001) (within Appendix

I).891Letter from Richard Ben-Veniste, Counsel for Terry McAuliffe, Weil Gotshal & Manges, to

James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Apr. 11, 2001) (within Appendix I).

ing.886 Despite the fact that Committee staff informed Kadzik’s attorneys that the Chairman would subpoena Kadzik to attend the

hearing, Kadzik boarded a plane for California on the morning of

February 28, 2001. Accordingly, the Committee provided the subpoena to the U.S. Marshals Service for service upon Kadzik. When

Kadzik exited his plane in San Francisco, he was served by a U.S.

Marshal. He then boarded the next plane for Washington, and arrived in time to testify at the Committee’s March 1, 2001, hearing.

While the Committee was able to serve Kadzik and receive testimony from him, his attempts to avoid compulsory process were unseemly. Kadzik declined to testify voluntarily. Then, when he was

informed that the Committee would issue a subpoena to compel his

attendance at the hearing, he left Washington, mistakenly assuming that the Committee would not be able to serve him.

H. Terry McAuliffe

In a letter dated February 16, 2001, Chairman Burton requested

Terry McAuliffe to participate in an interview with Committee staff

regarding the Rich and Green pardons, specifically regarding

Denise Rich’s contributions to the Clinton Library.887 Shortly

thereafter, Richard Ben-Veniste, McAuliffe’s attorney, contacted

Committee staff to state that he wanted to wait until the Committee reached an accommodation with the Clinton Library regarding

access to the Library’s information, before he decided whether to

make McAuliffe available. On March 22, 2001, Chairman Burton

informed Ben-Veniste that after obtaining information from the

Clinton Library, he still wanted McAuliffe to participate in an

interview with Committee staff.888 On March 23, 2001, BenVeniste responded to state that he wanted more information regarding what the Committee sought from McAuliffe.889 The Committee’s Chief Counsel provided this information in a letter dated

March 30, 2001.890 Nevertheless, on April 11, 2001, Ben-Veniste

sent a reply stating that ‘‘it does not appear that a personal interview with the staff is warranted at this time. Mr. McAuliffe wishes

you to know that his obligations as Chairman of the Democratic

National Committee to help elect a Democratic majority to the

House and Senate are fully occupying his time at the present.’’ 891

[Exhibits referred to follow:]

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(709)

CHAPTER TWO

ROGER CLINTON’S INVOLVEMENT IN

LOBBYING FOR EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY

FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE

Roger Clinton engaged in a systematic effort to trade on his

brother’s name during the Clinton Administration.

• President Clinton encouraged Roger Clinton to capitalize on

their relationship. At the beginning of his second term, President Clinton instructed Roger Clinton to use his connections to

the Administration to gain financial advantage. According to the

lawyer for former Arkansas State Senator George Locke: ‘‘Roger

related that Bill Clinton had instructed him that since this was

his last term in office, Roger should find a way to make a living

and use his relationship with the President to his advantage.’’

By suggesting that Roger Clinton exploit his name, Bill Clinton

encouraged the conduct described in this chapter. Roger Clinton

apparently took this advice to heart, telling one person from

whom he solicited money that he and the President ‘‘had only

four years to get things done’’ and that they did not care ‘‘about

ethics or what appearances were.’’

• Roger Clinton received substantial sums of money from foreign

governments solely because he was the President’s brother. When

the FBI interviewed him, Roger Clinton admitted that since the

beginning of the Clinton Administration, he had received substantial sums of money from foreign governments. Clinton told

the FBI that ‘‘he knows he receives these invitations [to make

paid appearances in foreign countries] strictly because he is the

First Brother of the President of the United States.’’ Clinton

also informed the FBI that in addition to receiving hundreds of

thousands of dollars for musical performances from foreign governments, he also received money for President Clinton from

foreign governments. Roger Clinton told the FBI that he had to

be instructed repeatedly by the President or White House staff

that the President was not permitted to receive cash from foreign governments.

• Roger Clinton received at least $335,000 in unexplained travelers

checks, many of which were purchased overseas and likely imported illegally. The Committee uncovered at least $335,000 in

travelers checks deposited in Roger Clinton’s bank account.

Most of these travelers checks originated overseas, largely from

Taiwan, South Korea, and Venezuela. The travelers checks were

710

not restrictively endorsed by the purchaser but were instead

given to Roger Clinton blank. This method of transferring large

sums of money to Roger Clinton appears designed to conceal the

fact that the funds originated overseas and probably violated

criminal statutes requiring reports of the importation of monetary instruments. Roger Clinton has refused to provide the

Committee with any explanation of why he received these funds.

These suspicious transactions require a complete and thorough

investigation by law enforcement authorities, especially in light

of his admissions to the FBI about receiving money from foreign

governments.

• Roger Clinton likely violated federal law by failing to register as

required under the Lobbying Disclosure Act. One company paid

Roger Clinton $30,000 to lobby President Clinton and others to

loosen government restrictions on travel to Cuba. Although his

activity appears to meet the criteria outlined in the statute for

those required to disclose their contacts with covered executive

branch officials, Roger Clinton did not register as a lobbyist and

did not disclose his paid lobbying contacts with his brother. His

failure to register, therefore, needs to be investigated carefully

and completely by the Department of Justice.

• Roger Clinton participated in a plot to obtain a $35,000 per

month contract in exchange for delivering a cabinet secretary to

a speaking event. The FBI briefly investigated Roger Clinton’s

involvement in a scheme with Arkansas lawyer Larry Wallace

to pressure John Katopodis, promoter of an Alabama airport

project. Clinton and Wallace attempted to obtain a $35,000 per

month contract in exchange for Clinton’s promise to ensure that

Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater would speak at a

conference sponsored by Katopodis’ organization of local governments. When Katopodis refused to pay and Slater subsequently

refused to acknowledge the invitation, Katopodis suspected that

Clinton and Wallace were to blame. Wallace had told him that

his project would remain at a standstill until Katopodis ‘‘showed

him the money.’’

Roger Clinton lobbied for the release from prison of Rosario

Gambino, a notorious heroin dealer and organized crime

figure.

• Rosario Gambino was a major drug trafficker. Rosario Gambino

has been convicted in the United States and Italy of heroin trafficking. Before being sentenced to 45 years in federal prison,

Gambino associated with known members of organized crime

both in Italy and the United States. His associates have described him as a member of the Sicilian Mafia. When his brothers were convicted of racketeering, murder, illegal gambling,

loan sharking, and heroin trafficking in 1994, witnesses described them as ‘‘the main link between Mafia heroin traffickers

in Sicily and the American Mafia.’’

• Roger Clinton received at least $50,000 from the Gambino family, and he expected to receive more if he succeeded in getting

711

Rosario Gambino out of prison. Tommaso ‘‘Tommy’’ Gambino,

the son of Rosario Gambino, approached Roger Clinton to help

win the release of Rosario Gambino from prison. Tommy

Gambino promised Roger Clinton a substantial financial reward

if he was successful. Even though he never was successful,

Tommy Gambino provided Roger Clinton with $50,000, a gold

Rolex watch, and an undisclosed amount of ‘‘expense money.’’

• Roger Clinton attempted to use his relationship to the President

to influence the decisionmaking of the United States Parole Commission (‘‘USPC’’). Roger Clinton lobbied the Parole Commission

to grant parole to Gambino. While lobbying Parole Commission

staff, Roger Clinton informed them that President Clinton was

aware of his efforts on behalf of Rosario Gambino and that the

President had suggested that he contact the Parole Commission

members directly. Although the Commission staff tried to insulate the Commissioners from undue influence, Roger Clinton

clearly attempted to use his relationship to the President to influence the Commission improperly and win Gambino’s release.

• The Chief of Staff of the Parole Commission hindered the FBI’s

investigation. In 1998, the FBI began investigating Roger Clinton’s contacts with the Parole Commission. However, it met resistance from Marie Ragghianti, the Chief of Staff of the Parole

Commission. Ragghianti, who had participated in meetings with

Roger Clinton on the Gambino case, objected to the FBI investigation and successfully halted an FBI plan to have an undercover agent meet with Clinton posing as a Parole Commission

staffer. She also attempted to keep the FBI from recording a

meeting between Roger Clinton and a Parole Commission staffer. Ragghianti’s efforts may have kept the FBI from reaching a

full understanding of Roger Clinton’s involvement in the

Gambino case.

• Roger Clinton lied to FBI agents investigating his contacts with

the Parole Commission and his relationship with the Gambino

family. When interviewed by the FBI in 1999, Roger Clinton

said that he had never represented to anyone at the Parole

Commission that the President was aware of his contacts with

the Commission on behalf of Rosario Gambino. This self-serving

claim is contradicted by contemporaneous, written memoranda

detailing Clinton’s contacts as well as by the vivid and credible

recollections of Parole Commission staff. Clinton also lied about

the purpose of a $50,000 check from the Gambinos, which he deposited on the day of the FBI’s interview. While it is unclear

whether he deposited the check before or after the interview,

Clinton told the agents that Tommy Gambino had offered to

loan him money for a down payment on his house. He repeated

this explanation to the media when news of the money became

public in 2001. However, after reviewing both Clinton’s and

Gambino’s bank records, the Committee has found no evidence

that Clinton used the $50,000 for a down payment or that he

ever repaid any of the money. Accordingly, his claim to the FBI

that the money was merely a loan is false. During his interview,

Clinton also told the FBI agents three separate and contradicVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00727 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tory stories in response to questions about his receipt of a Rolex

watch from Tommy Gambino before finally producing a Rolex to

the agents and claiming he had bought it in Tijuana, Mexico.

• Roger Clinton apparently lobbied the White House to grant a

commutation to Rosario Gambino. In the last days of the Clinton Administration—after Roger Clinton had failed to win parole for Rosario Gambino and after he had received a Rolex

watch and $50,000 from the Gambino family—the White House

received a petition for commutation for Rosario Gambino. Documents indicate that the White House lawyer responsible for

clemency matters requested a criminal background check on

Gambino, which is normally done when some serious consideration is being given to a grant of clemency. The obvious and logical inference that explains how the Gambino petition garnered

that level of attention at the White House is that Roger Clinton

was pushing for it. Because key Clinton White House staff have

refused to answer questions about this matter, it is unknown

whether Roger Clinton hand-delivered the Gambino petition as

he did with others or whether he brought it to the attention of

the White House some other way. Although the President did

not ultimately grant clemency to Gambino, the circumstances

surrounding the consideration of his petition are nevertheless

suspect. The fact that granting clemency to a mobster and confirmed criminal like Gambino was considered at all is disturbing

enough, but the reason it was considered is even more offensive.

The Gambino family was apparently able to purchase access to

the both the parole and clemency processes with cash payments

and expensive gifts to the brother of the President of the United

States. Moreover, despite an FBI investigation of the matter,

the Justice Department has, to date, been unwilling or unable

to prosecute Clinton for any of his activities.

Roger Clinton received a substantial portion of $225,000

that was swindled from the Lincecum family in Clinton’s

name with the promise of pardon that never came.

• The Lincecum family paid $225,000 to obtain a pardon for Garland Lincecum. In 1998, Garland Lincecum, a convicted felon,

was informed that he could purchase a presidential pardon for

$300,000. Lincecum was told that Arkansas businessmen Dickey

Morton and George Locke, who had a close relationship with

Roger Clinton, could obtain the pardon. Lincecum borrowed

$225,000 from his mother and brother and claims that a business associate paid another $70,000 to Morton and Locke for his

pardon. The money he borrowed from his family constituted

their life savings and means of support in retirement.

• Roger Clinton received at least $43,500 in proceeds from the

Lincecums’ payments to Morton and Locke. Dickey Morton,

George Locke, and Roger Clinton divided the funds among

themselves with Roger Clinton receiving a total of $25,500 in

checks and $18,000 in cash. The Lincecums paid the checks to

a company called CLM, which they were told stands for Clinton,

Locke, and Morton. Dickey Morton then disbursed the funds

713

from the company’s bank account to Clinton, Locke, and himself.

Roger Clinton has falsely denied any relationship with CLM

while offering no explanation of why he received this substantial

share of an elderly woman’s retirement savings through CLM.

• Roger Clinton may have been involved in a scheme to defraud

the Lincecums. Garland Lincecum never received a pardon, and

there is no evidence that Dickey Morton, George Locke, or Roger

Clinton ever submitted Lincecum’s name to the Justice Department or White House for consideration for a pardon. Therefore,

it appears that the Lincecums were the victims of a scam perpetrated by Morton, Locke, and perhaps Roger Clinton as well.

Roger Clinton may have been involved in lobbying for as

many as 13 other pardons and commutations.

• Roger Clinton publicly admitted involvement in six clemency efforts, but the evidence connects him to many more. Roger Clinton

told the media that he had asked for pardons for approximately

six close friends and that he did so because of concern for them

and not for any personal gain. For example, Roger Clinton lobbied for pardons for George Locke and Dan Lasater, two associates from Arkansas who were convicted of drug offenses together with Clinton himself in the 1980s. However, the Committee has obtained evidence connecting Clinton to many more pardon seekers. Some of the cases involve people who were not his

personal friends and some involve solicitations or offers of

money and lucrative business opportunities in exchange for his

ability to place a clemency petition in front of the President.

• Roger Clinton was asked to lobby for a pardon for horse breeder

J.T. Lundy in exchange for secretly sharing profits in a lucrative

business venture. Lundy promised Clinton a share of the profits

from a Venezuelan coal deal in exchange for Clinton’s help in

obtaining a pardon for him. Lundy suggested a scheme whereby

the payments to Clinton could be concealed by placing his share

of the profits in Dan Lasater’s name. Lasater, who owned a 20

percent interest in the venture, discussed the possibility of a

pardon for Lundy with Roger Clinton.

• Roger Clinton delivered the pardon petition of former Reagan

EPA official Rita Lavelle to the White House. According to

Lavelle, an intermediary for Roger Clinton asked her for a

$30,000 fee for him to hand-carry her petition to the President.

Lavelle responded that she could not afford to pay any money,

but she said Clinton agreed to deliver the petition anyway. On

the last night of the Clinton presidency, Roger Clinton asked

Lavelle ‘‘do you have $100,000 to get this through?’’ Being bankrupt, however, Lavelle laughed at the question. She did not pay

Clinton any money and did not receive a pardon.

• Roger Clinton was asked to lobby for a pardon for Houston real

estate developer John Ballis, and Ballis’ petition was seriously

considered at the White House. After being convicted of S&L

fraud, Ballis married a former employee of Dan Lasater and

714

friend of Roger Clinton. Through his wife’s connection, Ballis

sought Roger Clinton’s help. Clinton first lobbied for Ballis before the U.S. Parole Commission, sometimes during the same

meetings in which he lobbied for mobster Rosario Gambino.

Ballis credited Clinton with helping him obtain early release

and sought his help in obtaining a presidential pardon to eliminate his parole supervision and restitution payments. While he

was not granted any form of clemency, the President reviewed

his petition, and a White House lawyer called Ballis’ lawyer two

nights before inauguration day to ask if Ballis would accept a

grant of clemency that left intact his obligation to pay restitution.

• Roger Clinton lobbied his brother to grant clemency to Steven

Griggs, the son of the chief of an unrecognized American Indian

tribe, who was in prison on drug charges. Like Ballis, Steven

Griggs was not a close friend of Roger Clinton’s but merely

someone who knew someone who knew him. Griggs also did not

receive clemency, but Roger Clinton helped ensure that Griggs’

petition was brought to the attention of the President even

though Griggs had been a fugitive for a year before being sentenced. Griggs argued in his petition that he had received an

unusually harsh sentence but failed to mention that he had fled

after his conviction. It is not clear what motivated Roger Clinton

to assist Griggs, but some evidence suggests that the tribe may

have planned to open a casino when and if it were to become

recognized by the federal government.

• According to his former lawyer, Arkansas restaurant operator

Phillip Young was approached with an offer to obtain a pardon

through Roger Clinton for $30,000. While Young denied to Committee staff that he was actually approached by anyone with

such a proposal, his denial is not as credible as his former attorney’s version of events.

Both the White House and the Justice Department hindered

the Committee’s investigation of Roger Clinton by improperly refusing to produce key documents.

• For months, the Bush White House prevented the National Archives from producing even non-deliberative, clemency-related

records from the Clinton administration. The Committee did not

learn that President Clinton had been considering a clemency

petition from notorious mobster Rosario Gambino until after Archives personnel ‘‘inadvertently’’ produced documents that President Bush’s Counsel had sought to withhold. The accidental production also included documents relating to three other previously unknown individuals who had sought clemency through

Roger Clinton. The Bush Administration did manage to retain

four additional deliberative Gambino documents from the files of

the Clinton White House, refusing to produce the records even

though they were not subject to any executive privilege claim.

• The Ashcroft Justice Department produced certain Gambino-related records, but inexplicably withheld others. After producing

715

sensitive documents such as U.S. Parole Commission files related to Rosario Gambino and a summary of an FBI interview with

Roger Clinton, the Justice Department ceased producing additional documents, claiming they were related to an ongoing

criminal investigation, even though the Clinton-Gambino matter

had reportedly been closed in 2000.

INTRODUCTION

Unlike other presidential relatives discussed in this report, Roger

Clinton was fairly unsuccessful in actually obtaining clemency for

anyone but himself. Nevertheless, the Committee investigated his

activities because the substantial number of credible allegations of

influence peddling demanded further scrutiny. Even though Roger

Clinton was unable to deliver actual grants of clemency, he was

able to deliver the time and attention of the President and his senior staff. Roger Clinton’s ability to circumvent the normal process

was worth a great deal of money to those hoping for clemency, and

he exploited it for his personal gain. The damage done by this exploitation is even worse in light of evidence suggesting that President Clinton was aware of and even encouraged it. While investigating these matters, the Committee also discovered several potential violations of law and suspicious transactions, some of which

are not directly related to clemency requests. However, these nonclemency matters are detailed briefly in this chapter because they

provide evidence of a pattern of behavior by Roger Clinton that is

instructive when considering the evidence in the clemency-related

matters.

For a variety of reasons, including his 1985 conviction for cocaine

distribution, Roger Clinton was generally mocked and regarded

with derision during President Clinton’s two terms in office. When

Roger Clinton’s involvement in lobbying for presidential pardons

came to light, it was often treated with humor in the press and was

fodder for late-night talk show monologues. However, as the Committee investigated these allegations, it became clear that Clinton

was involved in serious and reckless misconduct constituting a systematic effort to cash in on his fame as the President’s brother.

Roger Clinton’s efforts to use his status as the President’s brother

to try to win clemency for an organized crime figure represents one

of the darkest examples of influence peddling ever reviewed by the

Committee. His other seamy business dealings, along with his frequent acceptance of large cash payments from foreign governments,

only compounds the disturbing appearance that access to the President was up for sale. That the President could have been completely unaware of these sordid dealings is implausible at best. Yet,

too often, public disclosure of this type of behavior has prompted

laughter rather than stern rebukes. To dismiss Roger Clinton’s activities as merely the comical bumbling of Bill Clinton’s less-gifted

half-brother, however, runs the risk of seriously undermining public confidence in the integrity of government.

At the end of 2000 and the beginning of 2001, Clinton attempted

to obtain grants of clemency for a number of individuals, many of

whom he barely knew. While he appears to have been motivated

by friendship in some instances, many of the others appear to be

motivated by the promise of financial reward. The Committee has

716

1 Richard Serrano and Stephen Braun, Roger Clinton Says He Promised Pardons, L.A. TIMES,

Feb. 24, 2001, at A1. 2 In attempting to obtain a copy of the list from the files of the former Administration, the

Committee requested from the National Archives, ‘‘All records relating to any requests for clemency made by Hugh Rodham or Roger Clinton on behalf of any individual.’’ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to John W. Carlin, Archivist of the

United States, National Archives and Records Administration (Mar. 8, 2001) (within Appendix

I). On March 14, 2001, the Committee also issued a subpoena to Roger Clinton seeking, inter

alia, ‘‘all records relating to any efforts made by you, or on your behalf, to assist in the obtaining

of any grant of executive clemency’’ (within Appendix II). 3The Committee sent Roger Clinton a letter requesting answers to a number of questions, including, ‘‘Please list all individuals on whose behalf you ever requested executive clemency.’’ Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Roger C. Clinton

(June 25, 2001) (within Appendix I). The reply from his lawyer refused to answer any of the

questions, stating, ‘‘Like anyone who values his own privacy and who respects the privacy of

those close to him, Mr. Clinton will not submit willingly to a general warrant.’’ Letter from Bart

H. Williams, Munger, Tolles & Olson, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt.

Reform (June 27, 2001) (within Appendix I). 4The eight individuals are Rosario Gambino, Steven Griggs, Dan Lasater, Rita Lavelle,

George Locke, Joseph McKernan, William McCord, and Mark St. Pe ́. Their cases are discussed

in more detail below. 5See, e.g., Lloyd Grove, The Reliable Source: First Paula Poundstone, then Ben Affleck, now

Roger Clinton, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2001.

collected evidence indicating that Roger Clinton was connected to

pardon or commutation requests for at least 15 different individuals, excluding himself: John Ballis, Rosario Gambino, Steven

Griggs, Dan Lasater, Rita Lavelle, Garland Lincecum, George

Locke, Blume Loe, J.T. Lundy, Joseph ‘‘Jay’’ McKernan, Jim

McClain, William McCord, Mark St. Pe ́, Mitchell Wood, and Phillip

Young. For his part, Roger Clinton has admitted only to leaving a

list of six pardon requests at the White House for his brother’s consideration.1 The Committee has been unable to obtain a copy of the

list 2 or confirm which names were on the list.3 Whether Roger

Clinton provided President Clinton with a list of six names is largely irrelevant, however, as the Committee has compiled evidence

clearly demonstrating that of the 15 cases with some connection to

Roger Clinton, he actually pressed for grants of clemency for at

least eight individuals.4

Although Roger Clinton failed to obtain the grants of clemency

for which lobbied, he did receive clemency for his own cocaine conviction. While the Committee did not investigate it directly, President Clinton’s grant of clemency to his brother now appears to be

one of his most egregious last-minute pardons. Roger Clinton was

involved in potentially illegal conduct and was under active investigation by the FBI at the time that he received his pardon. The

fact that he was involved in the type of conduct described in this

report should have disqualified him from receiving clemency. Moreover, the media widely reported in August 2001 that Roger Clinton

had entered rehabilitation for chronic cocaine abuse.5 Obviously, if

Roger Clinton was engaged in illegal cocaine use in January 2001,

it would indicate that he was neither rehabilitated nor remorseful

for his cocaine distribution crimes, making him an unsuitable candidate for a presidential pardon under President Clinton’s own

guidelines.

The focus of this chapter, though, is Roger Clinton’s involvement

in lobbying for others in their attempts to obtain executive clemency. The sheer number of people who attempted to purchase or

were solicited to purchase a pardon through Roger Clinton gives

credence to allegations that he was engaged in a systematic effort

to capitalize on his relationship to the President of the United

717

States. Moreover, the Committee’s investigation has revealed that

his attempts to sell his access to the President were not confined

to clemency-related matters. Indeed, Roger Clinton repeatedly

treated his relationship to President Clinton as a commodity to be

sold to the highest bidder. This disturbing pattern of behavior

began shortly after Bill Clinton became President and apparently

continued until Bill Clinton’s last day in office. Roger Clinton’s behavior was unseemly at best, but it is even more troubling is that

the President himself appears to have instigated and encouraged

this behavior.

I. ROGER CLINTON’S PATTERN OF TRADING ON HIS

BROTHER’S NAME

When the FBI interviewed Roger Clinton in conjunction with its

investigation of his relationship with the Gambino family, Clinton

made a number of startling admissions. He admitted that since

early in President Clinton’s term, foreign governments had paid

him hundreds of thousands of dollars. Clinton claimed that these

payments were for musical performances but acknowledged that he

knew he was receiving the money only because he was the President’s brother. Roger Clinton also admitted that foreign governments had given him gifts for President Clinton and that he had

kept some of those gifts for his own use. He informed the FBI that

early in President Clinton’s term, he received cash payments from

foreign governments, which he was to give to the President. White

House staff had to instruct him that the President could not accept

cash payments from foreign countries. Some of Clinton’s conduct is

explained in his interview with FBI investigators:

[Roger Clinton] has made a number of business trips to

foreign countries over the last few years. Clinton stated

that he is a musician and plays with a six piece band. He

has received invitations from Presidents and other foreign

government leaders from between 10–12 different countries. Clinton advised he knows he receives these invitations strictly because he is the First Brother of the President of the United States. Clinton advised that the President is aware of the invitations, in general, but may not

know each time he takes a trip. Clinton stated that when

he received an invitation to visit a country he is offered

money by the country to make the trip. He stated that he

would not accept the invitation unless he could earn the

money. He insists on performing with his band while visiting the country. He is a musician and wants to be recognized for his music. Clinton stated he receives a minimum

of $25,000 per performance when he travels. He may play

a few nights during a given trip. He likes to perform for

children during these trips and attempts to make those arrangements.

Clinton stated he has traveled to South Korea approximately six times. He has gone as the personal guest of

President Kim Dae Jong (phonetic). He has been paid as

much as $200,000 for performing on a trip. He has also

traveled to Japan, Argentina, and 8 to 10 other countries.

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6DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000007–8 (Summary of Interview with Roger Clinton,

Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1).

Clinton stated that the country extending the invitation

usually pays for him and his six piece band to fly to the

country and perform. The host country usually pays all

their expenses and provides a Presidential security detail

while they are there.

Clinton stated he has received payment for these performances in a number of ways. He has received payment by

check in United States dollars, cash in United States dollars and also in the currency of the host country. Clinton

stated in some instances the foreign government even provides extra funds to cover the costs of taxes that would be

assessed against the money. Clinton advised he did not

want to provide specific details on what exactly he is paid

for his performances because that is ‘‘personal.’’

Clinton stated that when he receives an invitation to a

country he always calls the National Security Council to

get the clearance to make the trip. He stated that they

usually say no at the very beginning, then he talks them

into agreeing to let him make the trip. Clinton stated that

he always provides the Security Council with an itinerary

whenever he makes one of these trips.

***

Clinton advised that while he visits foreign countries as

their guest he is often presented with all kinds of gifts. Examples he gave were vases, sheep skin rugs and many

more he could not remember. He also received gifts for the

President which he has sometimes kept. Clinton advised

that in his earliest trips, at the beginning of the Presidents

[sic] term, he would be offered money for the President

from some of the foreign government officials he was visiting. He stated years ago he did not know he could not accept money for the President. Clinton stated he was told

by either the President or his staff that he could not bring

money back from a foreign country for the President. He

advised he was told on a couple of occasions to send the

money back because the President was not allowed to accept money from a foreign country.

Clinton was asked if he reported the money he earned on

his foreign country visits as income on his United States

tax returns. He stated that yes he reported the income. He

was asked if he claimed the expenses on his tax returns

as well. Clinton stated that he only claimed the expenses

that he actually paid for on his tax returns. Clinton further advised that years ago he had some tax problems. At

one point he owed between $40,000 to $60,000 dollars [sic]

in taxes. He made arrangements with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to pay of [sic] the tax debt, and does not

want to have any more problems.6

719

7Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Counsel for Dickey Morton and George Locke, Hampton and

Larkowski, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I).

Roger Clinton’s statements to the FBI make it clear that from

the earliest days of his brother’s presidency, he used his fame and

proximity to power to make as much money as possible. Over the

next eight years, Roger Clinton accepted hundreds of thousands of

dollars from foreign governments in exchange for ‘‘musical performances.’’ Clearly, the payments made to Clinton far exceeded the actual value of his performances. Presumably, the foreign governments paying Roger Clinton were attempting to curry favor with

the Clinton Administration by paying large sums of money to the

President’s brother. Whether these governments found increased

favor or access with the Clinton Administration is unknown. However, this pattern of conduct clearly establishes that Roger Clinton

was attempting to use his position and access to cash in, without

regard to whether his actions were legally or ethically questionable.

Although Roger Clinton used his name to make money early in

the Clinton Administration, he apparently believed the potential to

exploit his relationship to the President was greater than he had

previously realized. Roger Clinton’s longtime friend and fellow convicted cocaine felon George Locke told the Committee through his

lawyer about a conversation in which Roger Clinton described his

determination to profit more effectively from his status as brother

of the President:

On the night of the reelection of Bill Clinton as president,

a special party was held at the Excelsior Hotel for VIP

guests. Roger Clinton invited George Locke to the party.

During the course of the evening, Roger had a conversation with George Locke. Roger Clinton advised that during

his brother’s first term in office, (although he had been invited to numerous social gatherings as a result of being

the president’s brother) Roger Clinton had never ‘‘capitalized’’ on his relationship to the president. Further, Roger

related that Bill Clinton had instructed him that since this

was his last term in office, Roger should find a way to

make a living and use his relationship with the President

to his advantage. Bill Clinton had stressed to Roger that

whatever business endeavors Roger was involved in, they

must be legitimate concerns and not to find himself involved in any illegal activity.7

It appears that Roger Clinton took at least part of Bill Clinton’s advice to heart. During the last term of the Clinton presidency, Roger

Clinton was involved in a number of efforts to use his brother’s

name to make large amounts of money. However, despite his brother’s advice to engage only in legitimate and legal business, Roger

Clinton’s activities may have violated the law and clearly raise substantial ethical questions.

A. Roger Clinton’s Foreign Travelers Checks and Other

Questionable Sources of Income

A review of Roger Clinton’s bank records shows that he received

money from a wide variety of sources, ranging from small amounts

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8The Committee sought any records indicating, inter alia, that Roger Clinton filed forms declaring the importation of more than $10,000 into the United States. Letter from the Honorable

Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to James F. Sloan, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Director, Department of Treasury (June 1, 2001) (within Appendix I). The one

document produced in response to this request appears to be unrelated to the travelers checks

deposited into Roger Clinton’s bank account. Letter from Albert R. Zarate, Senior Counsel, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt.

Reform (June 8, 2001) (within Appendix I). 9 31 U.S.C. § 5316 imposes an obligation on anyone who ‘‘transports . . . monetary instruments of more than $10,000’’ into the United States or who ‘‘receives monetary instruments of

more than $10,000 at one time transported into the United States’’ to file a report of the importation. Failure to file such a report can result in both civil penalties under 31 U.S.C. § 5321

and criminal penalties under § 5322. Monetary instruments subject to the reporting requirement

include travelers checks in any form, whether restrictively endorsed or not. U.S. v. Larson, 110

F.3d 620 (8th Cir. 1997).

for television and film appearances to large amounts for lobbying

his brother. However, one of the greatest influxes of money to

Roger Clinton during the Clinton Administration came in the form

of at least $335,000 in overseas travelers checks. These transactions present a number of troubling issues. Nevertheless, Roger

Clinton has provided no explanation of why he received these travelers checks.

• First, almost all of these travelers checks were purchased

by third parties overseas, largely in Taiwan, South Korea,

and Venezuela. Why Roger Clinton received these substantial sums of money from overseas is unknown.

• Second, the travelers checks were provided to Roger Clinton

blank. Clinton signed and countersigned all of the checks,

despite the fact that he did not purchase the checks. Usually, the individual who purchases travelers checks signs

them when they are purchased, so that they cannot be stolen or used by an unauthorized individual. The fact that the

buyer did not sign them and gave them to Clinton blank

suggests that the funds were intentionally provided to Clinton in a manner calculated to conceal their origin.

• Third, the travelers checks were purchased overseas and

then imported into the United States. If a total of $10,000

or more was imported at any one time, then the importation

should have been declared on customs forms. However,

Roger Clinton did not file any such forms with the Customs

Service.8 If Roger Clinton imported these travelers checks

into the United States from overseas without filing the required forms with the Customs Service, then he committed

a serious crime.9

The following is an accounting of the travelers checks received by

Roger Clinton, indicating the country of origin of the checks and

the name of the purchaser. Although the Committee has been able

to obtain the name of the individual purchasing the travelers

checks, it has been unable to obtain further information regarding

the purpose of the checks.

721

10This individual is likely the same person identified as ‘‘Suk Eun Chang’’ who purchased

$5,000 in travelers checks deposited by Roger Clinton on April 17, 2000. See also n.19 and accompanying text. 11See Letter from Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Roger Clinton (June

25, 2001) (within Appendix I); Letter from Bart H. Williams, Munger, Tolles & Olson, to the

Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (June 27, 2001) (within Appendix

I).

Date Deposited Type of Check Origin Purchaser Name Amount

November 30, 1998 American Express Unknown Chen Jianxing $1,000

December 1, 1998 American Express Taiwan Huang Xian Wen $15,000

December 8, 1998 American Express Taiwan Huang Xian Wen $23,000

December 15, 1998 Citicorp Taiwan Unknown $90,000

December 15, 1998 Unknown Unknown Unknown $29,000

December 15, 1998 Visa-Sumitomo Taiwan Lin Mei Guang $4,000

December 15, 1998 American Express Taiwan Huang Xian Wen $2,000

July 12, 1999 American Express Unknown Unknown $20,000

July 12, 1999 Citicorp South Korea Sook-Eun Jang 10 $5,000

November 30, 1999 Citicorp Taiwan Unknown $3,000

November 30, 1999 Citicorp Taiwan Unknown $10,000

November 30, 1999 Citicorp Taiwan Unknown $5,000

November 30, 1999 Visa Taiwan Unknown $1,000

November 30, 1999 Visa Taiwan Xu Jingsheng $3,000

November 30, 1999 Citicorp Venezuela Pedro Jose Garboza Matos $38,000

November 30, 1999 Unknown Unknown Unknown $40,000

February 22, 2000 American Express Taiwan Qu Guang Yin $7,000

March 24, 2000 Citicorp Venezuela Pedro Jose Garboza Matos $3,000

April 5, 2000 American Express Taiwan Mou Chuanxue $4,000

April 17,2000 American Express Taiwan Qu Guang Yin $13,000

April 17, 2000 American Express Unknown Suk Eun Chang $5,000

May 15, 2000 American Express Unknown Unknown $5,000

July 13, 2000 Citicorp South Korea Seung-Chul Ham $1,000

July 27, 2000 Citicorp South Korea Seung-Chul Ham $2,000

July 31, 2000 Citicorp South Korea Seung-Chul Ham $4,000

August 2, 2000 American Express Unknown Unknown $1,000

August 11, 2000 American Express Unknown Unknown $1,000

Total: $335,000

Roger Clinton therefore deposited in his bank accounts at least

$335,000 in travelers checks, most or all of which originated overseas. It is possible that Clinton was provided with even more funds

in travelers checks, which were not deposited in his bank accounts

but were spent instead. Roger Clinton has refused to answer any

questions about the travelers checks, including why they were paid

to him, who paid them to him, or whether he paid appropriate

taxes on them.11 Given the large amount of money involved and

the attempt to conceal its source, these circumstances give rise to

a reasonable suspicion that multiple laws may have been violated,

including those relating to declaring monetary instruments imported into the United States and reporting the income for tax purposes. Accordingly, the Committee believes this matter should be

investigated further by the Department of Justice, which would

have the ability to review Roger Clinton’s tax records and could potentially obtain sworn testimony from him.

In addition to the $335,000 in travelers checks, Roger Clinton

has also received funds from a number of other suspicious sources,

raising questions about the legality of his activities:

722

12See Telephone Interview with Gene Prescott, Owner, Biltmore Hotel (June 5, 2001). 13Telephone Interview with Daniel Ponce, Counsel for Gene Prescott (June 29, 2001). 14 Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 2). 15Telephone Interview with Edvard Akopyan (June 5, 2001). 16 Id. 17 Id. 18 Id. 19 Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 3). 20 Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 4).

• Cash: Roger Clinton deposited into his bank accounts $85,000 in

cash between February 1998 and February 2001. Clinton

claimed to the FBI that he received this cash while traveling to

foreign countries ostensibly for the purpose of performing with

his six-piece band. Like the transactions involving blank travelers checks, these large cash transactions give rise to reasonable

suspicions that the purpose of the payments was not legitimate.

In addition, the $85,000 figure represents only the money that

Clinton deposited into his account. It seems likely that Clinton

received more money and spent it, rather than depositing it.

However, as Clinton has refused to answer any questions from

the Committee, it is impossible to know exactly how much cash

he received, from whom, and for what purpose.

• Seaway II Florida and Tony Rodham: Seaway II Florida is a

company controlled by Florida businessman Gene Prescott.12

Prescott owns the Biltmore Hotel in Coral Gables, Florida, as

well as a number of other properties. Prescott also has a close

relationship with Hillary Clinton’s brother Tony Rodham and

has an interest in Rodham’s consulting business, Tony Rodham

and Associates. Between January and November 1998, Seaway

II Florida issued three checks to Roger Clinton totaling $20,000.

According to the lawyer for Seaway II Florida, Roger Clinton

was paid this money for referring business to Tony Rodham, although neither the attorney nor Prescott could recall the specific

referral.13 In addition, it appears that Tony Rodham attempted

to pay Roger Clinton $25,000 personally, in April 1998, but that

the check was returned for insufficient funds.14 Due to the refusal of Rodham and Clinton to cooperate with the Committee,

the purpose of the attempted $25,000 payment is not clear.

• Edvard Akopyan: Edvard Akopyan is a Glendale, California,

resident who paid $61,100 to Roger Clinton between August and

December 1999. Akopyan claims that he paid the money to Clinton because he was acting as a middleman in scheduling Clinton’s appearance at a musical concert in Kazakhstan.15 Akopyan

stated that Clinton made one appearance in Kazakhstan in the

summer of 1999 and a second in January 2000.16 Akopyan stated that the individual in Kazakhstan who provided the funds to

him for Clinton’s payment was named Darkhan Berdaleav.17

Akopyan also stated that Roger Clinton informed him that he

checked with the State Department before he traveled to

Kazakhstan to perform.18

• Suk Eun Chang: In December 1999, Suk Eun Chang provided

Roger Clinton with a cashier’s check for $70,000.19 The source

of the cashier’s check was apparently $193,000 deposited by

Chang into a bank in Los Angeles.20 Chang also provided

723

21Telephone Interview with Michael Zuccato, President, Cuba Travel Services (June 5, 2001). 22 Id. 23 Cuba Travel Services Document Production (Consulting Agreement) (Exhibit 5). 24 Id. 25 Bank of America Document Production (Checks from CTS and J. Perez Associates) (Exhibit

6).26Telephone Interview with Michael Zuccato (June 5, 2001). 27 Cuba Travel Services Document Production (Invoice from Odgie Music) (Exhibit 7). 28Telephone Interview with Michael Zuccato, President, Cuba Travel Services (June 5, 2001).

$10,000 in travelers checks to Clinton. However, the Committee

has been unable to locate Chang to ask him about the source

of this cash or the purpose of the payment to Clinton.

These questionable sources of income, together with the travelers

checks received by Roger Clinton, should be the subject of further

investigation by the Department of Justice. At a minimum, the

government should satisfy itself that the requisite taxes have been

paid.

B. Roger Clinton’s Lobbying Regarding Cuban Travel Restrictions

In the course of reviewing Roger Clinton’s bank records, the

Committee learned that during 2000, Roger Clinton was paid to

lobby President Clinton regarding the restrictions on travel to

Cuba. Roger Clinton’s receipt of substantial sums of money to lobby

his brother raises serious ethical and legal questions given Clinton’s failure to register as a lobbyist as required by federal law.

This arrangement also served as a precedent for Roger Clinton’s acceptance of money to lobby his brother for grants of clemency at

the end of President Clinton’s term.

In June 2000, a Los Angeles-based company called Cuba Travel

Services (‘‘CTS’’) hired Roger Clinton. Michael Zuccato, President of

CTS, is a personal friend of Roger Clinton’s.21 According to Zuccato,

Roger Clinton was hired to help CTS lift restrictions on travel to

Cuba.22 CTS specialized in arranging charter flights from Los Angeles to Cuba and would substantially benefit from a loosening of

legal restrictions on such travel. A CTS affiliate, J. Perez Associates, and Roger Clinton’s company, Odgie Music, signed a consulting agreement in which CTS retained Roger Clinton to ‘‘provide

counsel, advice and to promote [CTS] to entities necessary to conduct its import and export business.’’ 23 CTS agreed to pay Clinton $5,000 per month for these services.24 Over the next four months,

CTS and J. Perez Associates paid Roger Clinton a total of

$30,000.25 According to Zuccato, Roger Clinton was paid during

this period to present information to ‘‘his brother and other people.’’ 26 Indeed, one invoice from Odgie Music to J. Perez and Asso- ciates charges $5,000 for a trip made by Roger Clinton to Washington, D.C.27 Although Zuccato denied that Roger Clinton’s contacts

with ‘‘his brother and other people’’ constituted ‘‘lobbying,’’ 28 there

is no other accurate description for what Roger Clinton did. The

Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (‘‘the Act’’) defines the term ‘‘lobbying contact’’ as:

[A]ny oral or written communication . . . to a covered executive branch official . . . that is made on behalf of a client with regard to—(i) the formulation, modification, or

adoption of Federal legislation (including legislative proVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00739 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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29 2 U.S.C. § 1602(8)(a). A ‘‘covered executive branch official’’ includes the President. 2 U.S.C.

§ 1602(3)(a).

30The term ‘‘lobbying activity’’ is broadly defined as ‘‘lobbying contacts and efforts in support

of such contacts, including preparation and planning activities, research and other background

work that is intended, at the time it is performed, for use in contacts, and coordination with

the lobbying activities of others.’’ 2 U.S.C. § 1602(7). 31 2 U.S.C. § 1602(10). 32 2 U.S.C. § 1603(a)(1); 2 U.S.C. § 1602(a)(3)(A)(1); 2 U.S.C. § 1603(a)(3)(b). 33See Office of Public Records, United States Senate, ‘‘Lobby Filing Disclosure Program,’’

<http://sopr.senate.gov/> (U.S. Lobby Report Images for 2000). 34 A statement in the summary of the FBI’s interview with Roger Clinton suggests that at

some point, Roger discussed the Cuban trade embargo with President Clinton:

[Roger] Clinton recalled a conversation, the date or approximate time of which he

could not recall, he had with his brother, Bill Clinton, who told him the [Cuban] cigar

embargo would not be lifted while he was still President. President Clinton allegedly

said ‘‘The embargo will be eased for food and medicine because that is the direction

the world is going, but not for cigars, not during your life time [sic].’’

DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000004 (Summary of Interview with Roger Clinton, Oct.

1, 1999) (Exhibit 1). 35The penalty for such a violation is a fine of up to $50,000. 2 U.S.C. § 1606.

posals) [or] (ii) the formulation, modification, or adoption

of a Federal rule, regulation, Executive order, or any other

program, policy, or position of the United States

Government[.] 29

Any contact Roger Clinton had with the President about easing restrictions on travel to Cuba would certainly constitute a communication with regard to a modification of a policy or position of the

United States. If Roger Clinton’s lobbying activities 30 for Cuba

Travel Services constituted more than 20 percent of the total work

he did for the company, then he would be ‘‘a lobbyist’’ under the

provisions of the Act.31 As a lobbyist who earned more than $5,500

in a six-month period from a single client, Roger Clinton would

have an obligation to register with the Secretary of the Senate and

the Clerk of the House of Representatives.32 A search of those filings indicates that he did not do so.33

Because Roger Clinton declined to be interviewed by the Committee, the precise content of his discussions with President Clinton is

unknown.34 However, it is clear that he was paid $30,000 to lobby

the President to loosen travel restrictions to Cuba and that he told

his clients that he had, in fact, contacted his brother on their behalf. These circumstances warrant further investigation by law enforcement authorities to determine whether Roger Clinton violated

federal law by failing to register as a lobbyist.35 Apart from his

failure to register, Roger Clinton’s activity in this case was likely

legal. However, whether such activities should be legal is another

question. Even when properly disclosed, which these contacts were

not, paid lobbying of the President by close relatives is likely to decrease public confidence in the integrity of government. As a matter of prudence, the President should not have agreed to be lobbied

by family members who received payment. President Clinton implicitly admitted this principle when he asked his brother-in-law

Hugh Rodham to return money paid to lobby for the pardons of

Carlos Vignali and Glenn Braswell. The day after learning of the

payments, President Clinton issued a statement: ‘‘Neither Hillary

nor I had any knowledge of such payments. We are deeply disturbed by these reports and have insisted that Hugh return any

725

36 John Solomon, Clinton Kin Returns Pardon Fee, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 21, 2001. See generally Chapter Three, ‘‘Hugh Rodham’s Role in Lobbying for Grants of Executive Clemency,’’

Section I.D.1., ‘‘The Response from Hugh Rodham.’’ 37Telephone Interview with John Katopodis, Executive Director, Council of Cooperating Governments (Sept. 5, 2001). 38DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000011 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis,

May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8). 39DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000166 (Council of Cooperating Governments Brochure) (Exhibit 9) 40DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000020 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis,

May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). 41DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000091 (Symposium Schedule, June 27, 1997) (Exhibit

11). 42See DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000011 (Summary of Interview with John

Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8). 43DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000020 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis,

May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). 44 Id. 45See DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000011 (Summary of Interview with John

Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8). 46See DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000024 (Summary of Interview with John

Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). 47Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001).

moneys received.’’ 36 The payments to Roger Clinton to lobby his

brother on travel restrictions to Cuba should be equally disturbing

for exactly the same reasons.

C. The Shakedown of John Katopodis

The Committee investigated another episode in which Roger

Clinton tried to exploit his Administration contacts to enrich himself. Roger Clinton and a business associate, Larry Wallace, pressured the president of an association of local governments in Alabama, John Katopodis, to hire Clinton for his ability to contact

Transportation Secretary Rodney Slater and others in the Clinton

Administration. As described below, Wallace and Clinton apparently engaged in strong-arm tactics to try to force Clinton’s hiring.

In early 1996, John Katopodis, a Harvard-educated Fulbright

Scholar,37 was advocating the construction of a new international

airport for Alabama.38 Katopodis served as Executive Director of

the Council of Cooperating Governments, an association of city and

county governments dedicated to improving transportation in the

Southeast.39 As part of its efforts to publicize the airport project,

the Council was seeking a prominent guest speaker for its 1996

symposium.40 Local and state political figures, as well as federal

agency representatives, were planning to attend the symposium,41

and Katopodis sought the Secretary of Transportation as the ideal

guest speaker.42 Yet, attracting the Secretary of Transportation

proved to be no easy task. While discussing the airport project with

his colleague Dr. Frank Stuart, Katopodis was advised that Arkansas attorney Larry Wallace could be instrumental in arranging for

the Secretary’s visit.43 Katopodis eventually received an unsolicited

telephone call from Wallace.44 Mr. Wallace, a self-proclaimed power

broker from Little Rock, Arkansas, was well connected to the Clinton Administration.45 One of these connections included the White

House Chief of Staff at the time, Mack McLarty, Wallace’s former

law partner.46

Katopodis explained that he wanted Secretary of Transportation

Federico Pen ̃ a to speak at a symposium on Alabama’s aviation future.47 Wallace agreed to use his influence to help Katopodis draw

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48See DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000147 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to John

Katopodis (Sept. 24, 1996)) (Exhibit 12). 49Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001). 50See DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000147 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to John

Katopodis (Sept. 24, 1996)) (Exhibit 12); DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000200–01 (Fax

from Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 1, 1996)) (Exhibit 13); DOJ Document Production

FBI–RC–0000191 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 2, 1996)) (Exhibit 14); DOJ

Document Production FBI–RC–0000162 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 9,

1996)) (Exhibit 15); DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000146 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to

John Katopodis (Oct. 11, 1996)) (Exhibit 16); DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000169 (Fax

from Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 12, 1996)) (Exhibit 17); DOJ Document Production

FBI–RC–0000159 (Telephone message from Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis (Oct. 14, 1996))

(Exhibit 18); DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000168 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to John

Katopodis (Oct. 15, 1996)) (Exhibit 19). 51DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000146 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to John Katopodis

(Oct. 11, 1996)) (Exhibit 16). 52DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000200–01 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to John

Katopodis (Oct. 1, 1996)) (Exhibit 13). 53See DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000162 (Fax from Larry Wallace, to John

Katopodis (Oct. 9, 1996)) (Exhibit 15). 54See n.7 and accompanying text. 55See DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000020 (Summary of Interview with John

Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). 56Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001). 57See Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Partner, Hampton and Larkowski, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). 58See Telephone Interview with Larry Wallace (Aug. 27, 2001). 59DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000021 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis,

May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). 60See id.; DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000012 (Summary of Interview with John

Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8). 61 Id. 62See DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000021 (Summary of Interview with John

Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10).

the Secretary to the conference.48 Wallace informed Katopodis that

Rodney Slater would replace Pen ̃ a once President Clinton was reelected.49 Wallace contacted Katopodis at least eight times in late

September and early October of 1996.50 He advised Katopodis to

talk to Wallace’s ‘‘friend at the White House,’’ 51 Bob Nash, the Director of Presidential Personnel.52 All White House liaisons reported directly to Nash, and Wallace promised that the transportation liaison would have an answer for Katopodis soon.53

On November 5, 1996, Katopodis attended an election night

party hosted by Wallace in Little Rock. At the election night

party—the same party where Roger Clinton informed George Locke

that President Clinton had advised him to make the most of his

last four years in office 54—Wallace introduced Katopodis to individuals Wallace described as ‘‘financial heavy hitters’’ and ‘‘friends

of Bill.’’ 55 Among these individuals was a former state senator

whom Wallace introduced as ‘‘Roger Clinton’s mentor and closest

associate,’’ 56 likely George Locke.57 Roger Clinton had apparently

enlisted Locke’s assistance because Locke lobbied for Roger’s employment during the election night party.58 Locke was not the only

one trying to find Roger Clinton gainful employment. After the

party, Wallace and Katopodis continued to discuss the airport

issue.59 During one of these conversations, Wallace told Katopodis

that his close personal friend, President Clinton, was concerned

about his ‘‘baby brother’s’’ lack of employment and income.60 According to Wallace, the President tasked him with finding some

type of job for Roger.61 Wallace wanted to follow the President’s directive and asked Katopodis if they could meet in Washington to

discuss a possible contract for Roger.62 To lure him to the nation’s

capital, Wallace even offered Katopodis the opportunity to spend a

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63See id. Wallace extended this invitation before the Lincoln Bedroom scandal became public. 64 Id. 65See id. at FBI–RC–0000022. 66See Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001). 67See id. 68 Id. 69 Id. 70See DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000022 (Summary of Interview with John

Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). 71See id.; Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001). In this interview,

Katopodis stated that Wallace proposed a contract for Roger at $30,000 per month. See id. When

the FBI interviewed Katopodis in May 1997, soon after these events occurred, he stated that

Wallace proposed a contract for Roger at $35,000 per month. See DOJ Document Production

FBI–RC–0000022 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). 72See id. 73See Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001). 74DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000022 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis,

May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). 75See id.; Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001). 76DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000022 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis,

May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). 77See Bob Johnson, Former Birmingham Official Says FBI Probed Clinton’s Half-Brother Over

Job Query, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 22, 2001. 78See DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000035 (Roger Clinton Contact Information) (Exhibit 20). Roger Clinton was likely visiting his wife’s family who live in Farmer’s Branch, Texas. 79See DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000022 (Summary of Interview with John

Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). 80See id. at FBI–RC–0000023.

night in the Lincoln Bedroom of the White House.63 Katopodis declined the invitation.64

Katopodis wanted to define and formalize Clinton’s responsibilities before signing a contract for his services.65 Katopodis also

wanted to ensure that Clinton’s responsibilities passed ethical and

legal standards of conduct and could not be construed as influence

peddling.66 In fact, Katopodis offered to hire Wallace, instead of

Clinton, to avoid these concerns.67 Wallace stated that he could not

guarantee the Secretary’s appearance and would not be acting as

an attorney, but he did offer Clinton’s access ‘‘thrown in as a

bonus.’’ 68 Katopodis rejected this proposal because he wanted to

hire Wallace only in his capacity as an attorney.69 In future conversations, Wallace returned the focus of contract discussions to

finding Roger employment as the President directed.70

When Katopodis asked Wallace to place a figure on Roger Clinton’s services, Wallace suggested that $30,000–$35,000 per month

would be sufficient.71 Katopodis asserted that the Council of Cooperating Governments could not possibly afford to pay Clinton

such an inordinate amount.72 Moreover, Katopodis was understandably suspicious of this proposal because he had never spoken

with Roger Clinton 73 and was beginning to doubt whether Wallace

was actually as ‘‘connected’’ to the Clinton Administration as he

claimed.74 These doubts were dispelled, however, when Roger Clinton personally telephoned Katopodis.75 During the call, Clinton and Katopodis discussed the $35,000 per month contract.76 In return

for such a large fee, Clinton offered to ‘‘open a lot of doors’’ for the

Council.77 The President’s brother gave Katopodis his pager number and his telephone and fax numbers in Farmer’s Branch,

Texas.78 Clinton was aware of contract details that Wallace and

Katopodis had discussed, which convinced Katopodis of Wallace’s

close relationship with Clinton.79

Following their introductory conversation, Katopodis and Clinton

discussed a possible business relationship on several occasions.80

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81See id. 82Michael Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman, His Brother’s Keeper, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 2001, at

33.83DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000012 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis,

May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8). 84See Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Dec. 17, 2001). 85See DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000021 (Summary of Interview with John

Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). 86See DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000012 (Summary of Interview with John

Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8). 87DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000023 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis,

May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). 88See id. 89 Id. Katopodis recorded some of his telephone conversations with Roger Clinton once the situation became ‘‘stickier.’’ Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Sept. 5, 2001). Due to the

passage of several years, Katopodis cannot locate these tapes and believes that they may have

been turned over to the FBI. If the FBI has possession of these tapes, they should have been

provided to the Committee based on the Committee’s request to the FBI for ‘‘[a]ll records relating to any criminal investigation relating to the relationship between Roger Clinton, Arkansas

lawyer Larry Wallace, and Birmingham, Alabama, businessman John Katopodis.’’ Letter from

the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to the Honorable John Ashcroft,

Attorney General, Department of Justice (Mar. 14, 2001) (within Appendix I). 90See DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000012 (Summary of Interview with John

Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8). 91See id. 92See id. at FBI–RC–0000013.

Katopodis maintained that having the Secretary of Transportation

as a guest speaker was not worth hiring Clinton for $35,000 per

month.81 As Katopodis later told Newsweek, the $35,000-per-month

contract was ‘‘a pretty big consulting fee for someone who plays in

a rock band.’’ 82 Katopodis asked Clinton to create a list of tasks

with a reasonable amount of money assigned to each task before

the Council could make a financial commitment.83 The potential

conflict of interest between having the President’s brother lobby the

Secretary of Transportation for the Council concerned Katopodis.84

Another concern disturbing Katopodis was the relationship between Wallace and Clinton.85 Clinton clarified Wallace’s role by declaring that Wallace had no influence that did not ‘‘drive directly

through me.’’ 86 Clinton continued that he was tired of doing favors

without being recognized or compensated.87 Clinton then asked

Katopodis to meet him in Redondo Beach, California, because Clinton wanted to avoid further discussions over the telephone.88 The

conversation concluded with Clinton saying that he and his brother

had ‘‘only four years to get things done’’ and did not care about

‘‘ethics or what appearances were.’’ 89

A few minutes after this telephone call, Wallace contacted

Katopodis and expressed frustration over the difficulty in formalizing a contract between Clinton and the Council.90 Wallace reiterated his demand for a one-month’s payment to Clinton and informed Katopodis that the airport project would remain at a standstill until Katopodis ‘‘showed him the money.’’ 91 After Wallace’s

not-so-veiled threat to block Katopodis’ efforts with Secretary of

Transportation Rodney Slater, Katopodis made no progress on attracting the Secretary to the aviation seminar as Wallace promised.

While negotiating with Wallace and Clinton, Katopodis concurrently continued his individual efforts to have Secretary Slater

speak at the seminar.92 In a December 19, 1996, letter, Katopodis

congratulated Slater on his selection as Secretary, explained the

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93DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000076 (Letter from John Katopodis, to Rodney

Slater, Federal Highway Administrator, Department of Transportation (Dec. 19, 1996)) (Exhibit

21). 94See DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000041 (Letter from Rodney Slater, Federal Highway Administrator, Department of Transportation, to John Katopodis (Jan. 22, 1997)) (Exhibit

22). 95DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000104 (Fax from John Katopodis, to Peg Weathers,

Deputy Scheduler for Rodney Slater, Department of Transportation (Feb. 24, 1997)) (Exhibit 23). 96DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000089 (Letter from John Katopodis, to Eddie Carazo,

Scheduling Assistant for Rodney Slater, Department of Transportation (Apr. 11, 1997)) (Exhibit

24). 97See DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000023 (Summary of Interview with John

Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). 98See DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000089 (Letter from John Katopodis, to Eddie

Carazo, Scheduling Assistant for Rodney Slater, Department of Transportation (Apr. 11, 1997))

(Exhibit 24). 99See DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000090 (Letter from John Katopodis, to Vonnie

Robinson, Scheduler for Rodney Slater, Department of Transportation (Apr. 28, 1997)) (Exhibit

25). 100See DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000023 (Summary of Interview with John

Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). 101 Id. 102See DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000013 (Summary of Interview with John

Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8). 103See DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000023 (Summary of Interview with John

Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). 104 Id. at FBI–RC–0000024. 105 Id.

dress.93 The Secretary responded one month later to Katopodis’ congratulatory wishes without mentioning the conference.94 On

February 24, 1997, Katopodis sent a fax to the Secretary’s office reminding them of the invitation and requesting an answer.95

Katopodis then called the Secretary’s office several times to determine whether an answer was forthcoming.96 The Secretary refused

to give Katopodis an answer—not even a ‘‘no’’—for nearly four

months,97 so he tried a different strategy by establishing a deadline

for the Secretary’s response in a letter dated April 11, 1997.98 The

deadline passed without a word from the Secretary.

Upon hearing that the Secretary was considering a separate

speaking engagement in Birmingham, Katopodis faxed another letter on April 28, 1997, requesting to be included on the Secretary’s

schedule.99 The Council again received no response. On May 7,

1997, Katopodis called Slater’s scheduler, Vonnie Robinson, and expressed his suspicion that Clinton and Wallace had urged the Secretary’s office not to respond while contract discussions were ongoing.100 Robinson told Katopodis that this was not the case but did

acknowledge knowing who Roger Clinton and Wallace were.101

After speaking with Robinson, Katopodis received a brusque telephone call later that day from Catherine Grunden, Secretary

Slater’s Director of Scheduling and Advance.102 Grunden immediately launched into a monologue stating that the Secretary’s office disclaimed any connection with Roger Clinton or Larry Wallace.103 If Katopodis still was not satisfied, Grunden advised him

to turn over any allegations of wrongdoing to the proper authorities.104 Katopodis indicated his understanding and hung up.105 Following this unsolicited telephone call, Katopodis faxed Robinson a

letter on May 8, 1997, in which he wrote:

I can’t begin to tell you how disgusted I am with this

whole matter. If it is the normal policy of your office to not

respond to written requests from established organizations, then perhaps I am wrong in my assumptions about

730

106DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000088 (Letter from John Katopodis, to Vonnie Robinson, Scheduler for Secretary Rodney Slater, Department of Transportation (May 8, 1997)) (Exhibit 26). 107See DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000013 (Summary of Interview with John

Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8); DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000101 (Fax from

John Katopodis, to Ken Mullinax, Staff Assistant, Office of the Honorable Earl Hilliard (Apr.

16, 1997)) (Exhibit 27). 108See DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000013 (Summary of Interview with John

Katopodis, May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8). 109See id. 110DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000020 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis,

May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). 111Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Dec. 17, 2001). 112DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000013 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis,

May 21, 1997) (Exhibit 8). 113See id. at FBI–RC–0000011–13; DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–0000020–24 (Summary of Interview with John Katopodis, May 16, 1997) (Exhibit 10). 114See Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Dec. 17, 2001). 115 Id. 116See Michael Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman, His Brother’s Keeper, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 2001,

at 33. 117See Telephone Interview with John Katopodis (Dec. 17, 2001).

the lack of response being tied to an attempt at extortion.106

Grunden’s was not the only odd telephone call Katopodis received

while trying to schedule Secretary Slater’s appearance. On April

16, 1997, Katopodis reached out to his local Congressman, Representative Earl Hilliard, to ask for his advice and assistance in

solving this problem.107 On May 14, 1997, less than one week after

Katopodis’ letter to Robinson, Congressman Hilliard’s staff member

cryptically told Katopodis that the Congressman had received a call

‘‘from the highest level’’ concerning this matter.108 The staff member told Katopodis that he had ‘‘been bad again’’ and that he should

stop incriminating Roger Clinton and Larry Wallace.109 This conversation, in addition to Grunden’s telephone call and the Secretary’s absolute lack of response, reinforced Katopodis’ conclusion

that Clinton and Wallace were obstructing any progress on the airport project.

On May 16, 1997, the Federal Bureau of Investigation contacted

Katopodis regarding this matter.110 Agents from the FBI asked

Katopodis to wear a wire in a meeting with Wallace or Clinton.111

Katopodis declined to wear a wire because he had friends in both

political parties and feared a political backlash if he fully pursued

an investigation.112 Nevertheless, Katopodis participated in one

face-to-face meeting and two full telephone interviews with the

FBI,113 and provided FBI agents with all of his documents regarding Wallace and Clinton.114

Referring to the FBI’s handling of this information as an ‘‘investigation’’ may be a misnomer. Notwithstanding the facts that

Katopodis submitted to multiple interviews, possessed incriminating recordings of conversations with Roger Clinton, and provided

hundreds of pages of documentation supporting his allegations, the

Committee has been unable to obtain any evidence that the FBI

ever interviewed Larry Wallace or Roger Clinton regarding this incident. Katopodis described the FBI as not ‘‘follow[ing] up with any

sort of intensity.’’ 115 Without aggressive pursuit by the FBI, the investigation effectively died.116

The airport project met a similar fate. Katopodis severed his ties

with Clinton and Wallace in Spring 1997,117 but he continued as

731

118 USPC Document Production 00067 (Pre-sentence Report, U.S. v. Gambino (D.N.J. Nov. 20,

1984)) (Exhibit 28). 119 Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0096 (Hearing Transcript, USPC) (Exhibit 29). 120 USPC Document Production 00067 (Pre-sentence Report, U.S. v. Gambino (D.N.J. Nov. 20,

1984)) (Exhibit 28). 121 Id. 122 Id. at 00068. 123 Id. at 00038. 124 USPC Document Production 00075 (Progress Report, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Jan. 4,

2001) (Exhibit 30).

director for the Council of Cooperating Governments. Support for

the airport and its promotional symposium lost all momentum because of the delay in receiving a response from the Secretary. In

fact, the Secretary never responded to Katopodis’ series of invitations or pleas for an answer. Larry Wallace and Roger Clinton apparently ensured that no answer would be forthcoming as long as

Katopodis was unwilling to pay their price.

Roger Clinton’s dealings with John Katopodis served as a harbinger of things to come in 1998–2001. Clinton would use his status

as the President’s brother to obtain even larger payments, lobbying

for parole and pardons of convicted criminals, including a member

of the Gambino crime family. Moreover, Roger Clinton’s lobbying

efforts in these other areas would show no more subtlety than did

his crude dealings with Katopodis.

II. THE GAMBINO PAROLE AND PARDON EFFORTS

While Roger Clinton lobbied for executive clemency for a number

of unsavory and undeserving individuals, none was as unsavory as

Rosario Gambino. Gambino was a major organized crime figure

serving a 45-year prison sentence for heroin trafficking. It is difficult to believe that anyone, much less the brother of the President, would lobby for parole or clemency for an individual like

Gambino. Indeed, Roger Clinton’s involvement in this matter can

be explained only by the fact that he received $50,000 from the

Gambinos and was promised even more money.

A. Rosario Gambino’s Involvement with Organized Crime

At 20 years of age in 1962, Rosario ‘‘Sal’’ Gambino was arrested

on immigration charges and deported to Italy.118 At some point,

however, this son of a Sicilian butcher 119 returned to the United

States and, between the ages of 27 and 38, was arrested three

times on charges ranging from possession of a dangerous weapon

to assault and extortion.120 Then in 1980, he was arrested for conspiracy to import heroin after police in Milan, Italy, confiscated 91

pounds of heroin valued at $60 million destined for the United

States.121 Although acquitted in the United States, Gambino was

tried in absentia (with representation by counsel) in Italy, convicted, and sentenced to 20 years in prison.122

Without being extradited to serve any time in Italy, Gambino

was arrested yet again in the United States in March 1984 and

was convicted of conspiracy to distribute heroin, use of a communication facility to distribute heroin, and possession with intent to

distribute heroin.123 Following his conviction in October 1984,

Gambino was sentenced to 45 years in prison, which he has been

serving since December 6, 1984.124 Throughout his incarceration,

Gambino has failed to take responsibility for his crimes, has mainVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00747 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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125 U.S. v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 942 (1986). 126 Id. 127 Id. 128 Id. 129 Id. 130 Id. 131 Id. 132 Id. 133 Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0057–58 (Hearing Transcript, USPC) (Exhibit 31).

tained his innocence, and has vigorously pursued every possible avenue of appeal including arguments that he was entrapped, that he

was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of

counsel, and that he was the victim of racial discrimination. Yet,

his conviction, sentence, and denials of parole have withstood every

legal challenge.

In January 1984, two of Gambino’s relatives and co-conspirators,

Anthony Spatola and Antonio Gambino, were seeking to sell heroin. Unknown to them, the prospective buyer was an undercover

FBI agent. In intercepted phone conversations, Anthony Spatola

and Antonio Gambino discussed Rosario Gambino and the heroin

deal in code.125 They referred to the heroin as a ‘‘car’’ and to

Rosario as the ‘‘short guy.’’ 126 The intercepts made it plain that

Rosario Gambino was in a leadership role in the conspiracy. The

first transaction was completed in a room at Caesar’s Boardwalk

Regency Hotel in Atlantic City.127 A call was placed from the room

to Rosario Gambino’s residence and immediately after leaving the

hotel, the co-conspirators drove to his residence to pay him his proceeds from the deal.128 The undercover agent continued to communicate with Antonio Gambino in an attempt to negotiate a second

transaction.129 The FBI intercepted several additional phone calls

related to a second sale of heroin to the undercover agent and involving Rosario Gambino or referring to him in code, such as

‘‘Saruzzo’’ and ‘‘the short one.’’ 130 The undercover agent eventually

completed a second purchase of a half-kilogram of heroin for

$120,000.131 When Rosario Gambino was arrested in March 1984,

a search of his master bedroom uncovered two of the $100 bills the

agent had used to purchase the heroin.132

Throughout his attempts to obtain parole, Rosario Gambino has

claimed that authorities treated him unfairly merely because of his

infamous name. In his initial parole hearing, Gambino denied his

guilt and implied that he was a victim of either mistaken identity

or prejudice:

HEARING OFFICER. Now, what the government writes is

that you were involved in a large-scale heroin distribution

ring. You’ve told me that you didn’t have anything to do

with this whatsoever. What do you think caused the jury

to believe that you were involved with the other guys.

What do you think would cause the jury to convict you?

GAMBINO. Because number one is my name. Because see,

they [built] this name like [a] big building[.] I’m not, I’m

not the name they’re looking for.

HEARING OFFICER. Who they [sic] looking for?

GAMBINO. I don’t know. They looking [sic] for some big

name.133

733

134PENNSYLVANIA CRIME COMMISSION, A DECADE OF ORGANIZED CRIME 70–72 (1980), NEW

JERSEY STATE COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION, TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT 15 (1980). 135Division of Gaming Enforcement, New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety, ‘‘Exclusion List,’’ <http://www.state.nj.us/lps/ge/exclude2.htm> (exclusion ordered Oct. 30, 1987). 136 Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0092 (Hearing Transcript, USPC) (Exhibit 29). At

another hearing, Gambino made separate statement, which could be construed as a denial of

a relationship to Carlo Gambino:

HEARING OFFICER. Let’s put the cards on the table.

GAMBINO. Go ahead.

HEARING OFFICER. Carlo Gambino. What relationship are you to Carlo Gambino?

GAMBINO. No relationship. No because I refuse him to be my cousin or something like

that.

Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0057–58 (Hearing Transcript, USPC) (Exhibit 31). 137Selwyn Raab, Two Admit Importing Heroin for Mafia Crime Family, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,

1994. 138 Id. 139 Id. 140 Jim Barry, Roger and Me: Rosario Gambino, Beneficiary of Roger Clinton’s Lobbying Largesse, has Local Roots, PHILADELPHIA CITY PAPER, Sept. 6–13, 2001.

Prosecutors have maintained that Rosario Gambino is a relative of

the 1950s-era ‘‘boss of bosses,’’ Carlo Gambino, the man for whom

the Gambino crime family is named. Reports by special organized

crime task forces in two states, Pennsylvania and New Jersey,

linked Rosario Gambino to the Gambino crime family,134 and regulators banned him from Atlantic City casinos.135

Rosario Gambino’s representatives, however, have argued that he

is not related to members of the Gambino crime family and that

claims to the contrary were unsubstantiated. However, the transcript of one of Rosario Gambino’s parole hearings seems to indicate that Rosario Gambino himself believes his grandfather may

have been related to the 1950s mob boss:

HEARING OFFICER. Is there any family connection between

those people—between he and Carlo Gambino?

LAWYER. There is none.

HEARING OFFICER. I just want it for the record.

LAWYER. The report tries to make an unsubstantiated allegation of some tie on Mr. Gambino’s part to—

GAMBINO. Excuse me, there was a my grandfather, grandfather relative—I don’t know. Maybe, I don’t know.136

Regardless of whether or how closely Gambino is related to the notorious family whose name he shares, members of his immediate

family have admitted to being involved in organized criminal activity. Rosario’s brothers, Giovanni ‘‘John’’ Gambino and Giuseppe

‘‘Joe’’ Gambino pled guilty in January 1994 to charges of racketeering, murder, illegal gambling, loan sharking, and heroin trafficking.137 Witnesses had testified in court that John and Joe Gambino

were the ‘‘main link between Mafia heroin traffickers in Sicily and

the American Mafia.’’ 138 The media also described John Gambino

as a ‘‘capo’’ in John Gotti’s organization, the Gambino crime family.139

Not only were Rosario Gambino’s brothers known associates of

Gambino crime family members, but Rosario himself was as well.

He was a close friend with Philadelphia mob boss Angelo Bruno,

and police surveillance revealed that Bruno often met New York

underboss Paul Castellano at the Valentino’s supper club,140 which

734

141 USPC Document Production 00499 (Pre-hearing Assessment, Feb. 3, 1994) (Exhibit 32). 142 Jim Barry, Roger and Me: Rosario Gambino, Beneficiary of Roger Clinton’s Lobbying Largesse, Has Local Roots, PHILADELPHIA CITY PAPER, Sept. 6–13, 2001. 143 Id. 144 USPC Document Production 00758 (Letter from Edward S. Panzer, to Hearing Examiner

(Sept. 25, 1995)) (Exhibit 33). 145 Jim Barry, Roger and Me: Rosario Gambino, Beneficiary of Roger Clinton’s Lobbying Largesse, Has Local Roots, PHILADELPHIA CITY PAPER, Sept. 6–13, 2001. 146 USPC Document Production 00925 (Memorandum from Thomas C. Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, to Marie Ragghianti, Chief of Staff (Dec. 30. 1997)) (Exhibit 34). 147 Jim Barry, Roger and Me: Rosario Gambino, Beneficiary of Roger Clinton’s Lobbying Largesse, Has Local Roots, PHILADELPHIA CITY PAPER, Sept. 6–13, 2001. 148 Id. 149Spatola v. United States, 741 F. Supp. 362, 377 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). 150 NEW JERSEY STATE COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION, ORGANIZED CRIME IN BARS, PART II 1

(1995).

was owned by Rosario Gambino.141 Castellano later became boss of

the Gambino crime family, until John Gotti had him assassinated

and became boss in December 1985.142

In addition to his ties to the U.S. Mafia, Rosario Gambino is also

alleged to be an associate of well-known members of the Sicilian

Mafia:

When Tommaso Buscetta, a Sicilian Mafia boss from Palermo, needed to hide his ex-wife and daughter in America,

Rosario Gambino took the women in. A few years later,

Buscetta fled a violent mob war in Sicily and settled in

Brooklyn, where he often hung out with the Gambino

brothers as well as Carlo Gambino.143

A letter to the Parole Commission advocating Gambino’s release

also confirms Rosario Gambino’s association with Buscetta. The letter refers to statements by Buscetta that he knew Gambino and his

brothers but claimed that they were not a part of organized

crime.144 Parole Commission documents and news reports also

refer to Rosario Gambino’s role in the phony kidnapping of Michele

Sindona, an international banker and money launderer for the Sicilian Mafia.145 After being indicted in both the U.S. and Italy in 1979 for bank fraud involving more than $400 million,146 Sindona

disappeared and friends claimed he had been kidnapped.147 During

the sham kidnapping, Sindona flew to Sicily accompanied by

Rosario Gambino’s brother, Giovanni, and when he returned to the

U.S., Rosario Gambino met him at JFK airport.148 Giovanni

Gambino and Michele Sindona were arrested in Italy for aggravated extortion in connection with this incident.149

Moreover, a 1995 report issued by the New Jersey State Commission of Investigation refers to evidence that Rosario Gambino was

not merely a relative and associate of members of the Mafia. The

report details the testimony of Philip Leonetti, whom it describes

as ‘‘a former, high-ranking La Cosa Nostra member’’ and the ‘‘underboss and confidant to his uncle Nicodemo Scarfo, the boss of

the Southeastern Pennsylvania-South Jersey Family of La Cosa

Nostra, commonly referred to as the Scarfo Family.’’ 150 The report

also makes a distinction between being a member of La Cosa

Nostra (the American Mafia) and being a member of the Sicilian

Mafia:

Leonetti learned from Scarfo that John Gambino was a La

Cosa Nostra member in the Gambino Family. Gambino

and Leonetti were later introduced to each other as ‘‘amico

735

151 Id. 152 Jim Barry, Roger and Me: Rosario Gambino, Beneficiary of Roger Clinton’s Lobbying Largesse, Has Local Roots, PHILADELPHIA CITY PAPER, Sept. 6–13, 2001. Moreover, the body of an

execution-style murder victim was found in the trunk of a car belonging to Erasmo Gambino,

a cousin, co-conspirator, and fellow leader with Rosario Gambino in the heroin distribution ring

that led to his incarceration. The body was that of Pietro Inzerillo, Gambino’s cousin and partner in his pizzeria business. While Erasmo Gambino was never implicated in the murder and

a court found that it could not be considered as a factor in denying Erasmo’s parole request,

it is nevertheless worth noting as an example of the kind of activity surrounding Rosario

Gambino and his associates. See Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d 156, 162 (1998). 153 Jim Barry, Roger and Me: Rosario Gambino, Beneficiary of Roger Clinton’s Lobbying Largesse, Has Local Roots, PHILADELPHIA CITY PAPER, Sept. 6–13, 2001. 154 USPC Document Production 00486 (Initial Hearing Summary, Feb. 16, 1995) (Exhibit 35).

nostra’’ by Nicholas ‘‘Nick’’ Russo at a sit-down at an Atlantic City restaurant in approximately 1983. Russo was a

member of the Gambino Family who lived in the Trenton,

N.J., area. The words ‘‘amico nostra’’ mean ‘‘friend of

ours.’’ If a La Cosa Nostra member introduces two people

as ‘‘amico nostra,’’ it lets each know that the other is a La

Cosa Nostra member. The words are only used when introducing La Cosa Nostra members to each other. [Rosario

‘‘Sal’’] Gambino [however,] was a member of the Sicilian

Mafia.

Scarfo told Leonetti that sometime in the 1970s, he was introduced to Sal Gambino as ‘‘amico nostra’’ by [Philadelphia crime boss] Angelo Bruno. Because of the way that

Bruno introduced Sal Gambino to Scarfo, Scarfo and

Leonetti always thought that he was a member of La Cosa

Nostra. It wasn’t until January or February of 1986, when

Scarfo and Leonetti first met John Gotti after he became

the boss of the Gambino Family, that they found out that

Sal Gambino wasn’t a member of La Cosa Nostra. Gotti informed Scarfo and Leonetti that Gambino was a member

of the Sicilian Mafia, not La Cosa Nostra.151

Italian authorities also allege that Rosario Gambino and his brothers were members of the Sicilian Mafia, so-called ‘‘men of honor,’’ at the time he entered the United States.152 Given all these circumstances, prosecutors’ allegations against Gambino seem well

founded. Rosario Gambino appears to be more than merely associated with mobsters; the evidence suggests that he is himself a

‘‘made man.’’ As one New Jersey investigator put it, ‘‘[t]o call

Rosario Gambino a mob associate is like saying John Gotti was just

a street corner thug. Rosario and his brothers were some of the

most important Sicilian Mafiosi to ever operate in this country.’’ 153

B. The U.S. Parole Commission’s Handling of Rosario

Gambino’s Case

At Rosario Gambino’s initial parole hearing in February 1995,

the hearing officer recommended a release date of July 15, 1996.154

As Hearing Examiner Harry Dwyer explained at the time, however, this was merely a recommendation subject to review by the

U.S. Parole Commission:

I’m going to take it to 148 months, recommend that you

get a date of July 15[.] You’ve been in custody since March

16 of ’84. Twelve years and four months, 148 months, that

would be—July 15. I’m going to tell you, I do not believe

736

155 Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0068 (Hearing Transcript, USPC) (Exhibit 31). 156 USPC Document Production 00486 (Initial Hearing Summary, Feb. 16, 1995) (Exhibit 35). 157 USPC Document Production 00551 (Original Jurisdiction Appeal Summary) (Exhibit 36).

it’s going to come back any less than that. It could come

back more. They could disagree with me and push you way

down the road. So don’t pack your bags.155

Although Dwyer set a presumptive parole date, he noted that

Gambino had not taken full responsibility for his crimes:

After careful consideration of subject’s statements and information contained in the pre-sentence report this examiner believes that there is more credible evidence that subject did in fact engage in the activities as described in the

pre-sentence report and that subject’s statements [of denial] are self-serving. Thus, this examiner has concluded

by the preponderance of evidence that subject did in fact

engage in a Category eight offense behavior regarding the

extremely large scale heroin distribution.156

No other examiner or commissioner ever concurred with Dwyer’s

initial recommendation of a July 1996 release date, and even

Dwyer himself later repudiated it.157

After Acting Regional Commissioner Jasper Clay reviewed the

decision in March 1995, he referred it to the National Commissioners for original jurisdiction consideration and voted to require

that Gambino serve out his entire sentence. Clay’s decision memorandum cited as factors in his decision both Gambino’s connections

to organized crime and the leadership role he played in the heroin

conspiracy that landed him in jail:

Although he was not convicted of racketeering or continuing criminal enterprise, the New Jersey and Pennsylvania

crime commission reports indicate that Mr. Gambino is a

soldier and descendant in the Organized Crime Family of

the late mob boss, Carlo Gambino. The PSI further indicates that he, along with his brother, Giuseppe, owned and

operated pizza parlors in New York, Pennsylvania and

Southern New Jersey to facilitate a continuing criminal

enterprise[.]

The current conviction surrounds Mr. Gambino’s heroin

distribution activities between October 1983 and March

1984. The PSI indicates that our subject was the most culpable, holding a high managerial role in this scheme which

centered around six individuals, all of whom were related.

Mr. Gambino had the authority to determine who would be

actively involved in the heroin negotiations and transactions and how the profits would be divided among the

participants.

Specifically, he was involved in the arrangements to deliver 1⁄2 kilogram of heroin to undercover agents on two occasions. Also, 3 kilograms and later 2 kilograms of heroin

were made available during negotiations and subject and

737

158 USPC Document Production 00490 (Memorandum from Jasper R. Clay, Acting Regional

Commissioner, to National Commissioners (Mar. 13, 1995)) (Exhibit 37). 159 USPC Document Production 00480 (Continuation Order) (Exhibit 38).

his co-conspirators offered guarantees to supply 10 kilograms of heroin per month to the agents.158

In April 1995, the full Commission agreed with Clay and rejected

Dwyer’s initial recommendation, voting to continue Gambino’s case

until a 15-year reconsideration hearing in March 2010.159 Gambino

appealed the decision, arguing the Commission did not have

enough evidence of his reputed membership in organized crime to

legitimately consider it as a factor in denying his parole. Ultimately, the Commission based its final decision on Gambino’s actual conduct rather than on his associations.

It is not necessary for one to be a member of the specific group

known as La Cosa Nostra or the Sicilian Mafia to be an organized

crime figure of the type for whom early release would be inappropriate. Rather, it is enough that one demonstrate certain characteristics of a lifetime, career criminal who has the inclination and capacity to run a large-scale criminal enterprise upon release. Apart

from his relatives, associations, and Sicilian Mafia membership,

Rosario Gambino has himself engaged in behavior that invites

scrutiny from those charged with combating organized crime—behavior that led to his conviction and incarceration. In denying his

parole, officials at the U.S. Parole Commission relied on Gambino’s

own activities and leadership in the heroin trafficking scheme for

which he was convicted, noting that he exhibited the characteristics of an organized crime boss:

It would appear that Rosario Gambino certainly has more

extensive ties to organized criminals than his own circle of

codefendants, but his status as a member of ‘‘organized

crime’’ is not sufficiently clear to support a finding by the

Parole Commission. . . . [However,] the Commission was

persuaded that Rosario Gambino was, within his own circle, a traditional organized crime boss who operated

through a reputation for violence, through evident corruption of local police, and through subordinates with close

family ties of loyalty. . . . Gambino certainly has the background and behavioral characteristics of the career organized criminal, and it is reasonable to suppose that he

knows no other way to succeed in life than through his

‘‘family business.’’ His connections within the world of organized crime would probably still be extensive upon release, and Gambino shows nothing in his makeup that

would distinguish him from the familiar type of Mafioso

who is not deterred even by long imprisonment from continuing the only career he knows. In particular, as long as

Gambino continues to file appeals in which he denies his

leadership role, and portrays himself as a simple first offender, it will be difficult for the Commission to find any

basis for deciding that Gambino has the capacity to shake

738

160 USPC Document Production 00702–03 (Original Jurisdiction Appeal Summary) (Exhibit

39). 161 Id. at 00701–02. 162 USPC Document Production 00887 (Memorandum from Thomas C. Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, to Marie Ragghianti, Chief of Staff (Dec. 30, 1997)) (Exhibit 40). 163 USPC Document Production 00702 (Original Jurisdiction Appeal Summary) (Exhibit 39)). 164 Id. 165Gambino v. United States Parole Comm’n, 216 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2000).

off his past, and discover a law-abiding way to make living.160

There is no shortage of evidence to support the assertion that

Gambino exhibited the characteristics of an organized crime boss

by operating through a reputation for violence and corruption of

local police. When he was arrested, Gambino was in possession of

police surveillance documents relating to his own case, which the

Commission considered to be significant circumstantial evidence

that Gambino had a ‘‘a sophisticated ability to penetrate police operations.’’ 161 Furthermore, an investigation by the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms in 1980 produced evidence implicating

Rosario Gambino in two arsons:

[The arsons] appear related to efforts by Rosario and his

brother, Guiseppe Gambino, to take over a pizza franchise

in Cherry Hill, New Jersey. Rosario and his brother were

observed at the scene of a pizza restaurant following the

arson and shortly thereafter, the manager received a call

and [was] told to close the store and return to New York.

Two days later, the manager’s automobile was destroyed

by a firebomb. Two days later, the manager received a

telephone call and [was] threatened with death.162

The Commission also relied on evidence that his subordinate coconspirators deliberately promoted Rosario Gambino’s reputation

for violence to undercover police agents during the commission of

the crimes for which he was convicted.163

Although Rosario Gambino’s lawyers argued in court that denial

of his parole was motivated by prejudice based on his national origin, that claim was rejected by the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit. The statement that allegedly indicated the

bias was, ‘‘Gambino appears to come from an immigrant background in which family connections are simply exploited (as in the

current offense) to get around the law.’’ 164 However, the court

ruled that, ‘‘[Gambino’s] contention is devoid of merit. . . . The reference to Gambino’s ‘immigrant background’ in a Commission

memorandum is insufficient to establish a due process violation. In

sum, the Commission’s final decision was not tainted by ethnic

bias.’’ 165 The court also rejected Gambino’s argument that his due

process rights were violated when his offense severity rating was

set higher than that of his co-defendants:

Differences between Gambino’s offense severity rating and

his codefendants’ were justifiable in light of their differing

roles in the heroin distribution conspiracy. Holding

Gambino accountable for an amount of heroin greater than

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166 Id. 167Tommy Gambino, a resident of Los Angeles, should not be confused with the legendary

Carlo Gambino’s son, Thomas, a 72 year-old resident of New York. Through his lawyer, Michael

Rosen, Thomas Gambino was quick to make this clear in the days following the public revelations of Roger Clinton’s efforts on behalf of Tommy and Rosario. Rosen said, ‘‘my client had

nothing to do with the low-rent, trailer-park trash politicians who infested our country for the

past eight years.’’ Al Guart, Wiseguy Fires at ‘‘Trashy’’ Clintons, N.Y. POST, July 1, 2001. 168Telephone Interview with [name redacted], Detective, Los Angeles Police Department

(June 28, 2001) (identity withheld due to the sensitive nature of the detective’s work). Tommy

Gambino ‘‘is considered by Southern California organized crime investigators to be a rising star

in the Los Angeles underworld.’’ John L. Smith, LAS VEGAS REVIEW JOURNAL, June 29, 2001. ‘‘[T]he police and FBI . . . suspect young Gambino is a rising underboss in the Los Angeles La

Cosa Nostra scene.’’ John L. Smith, Pardons Scandal Could Mean Congressional Heat for

Gambino, LAS VEGAS REVIEW JOURNAL, July 5, 2001. See also John L. Smith, Will the Last Guy

Left in L.A. Mob Please Turn Out the Lights? LAS VEGAS REVIEW JOURNAL, Nov. 16, 1997 (indicating that Tommy Gambino was ‘‘sent West by father Rosario Gambino’’). 169Telephone Interview with [name redacted], Detective, Los Angeles Police Department

(June 28, 2001). 170 Id. 171 Arnold H. Lubasch, 2 Convicted of Racketeering in Mafia Construction Case, N.Y. TIMES,

July 18, 1987. 172 Id. 173 Alan Abrahamson, UCLA is Cleared after FBI Probe, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1999. Following

his release, Montemarano was the subject of an FBI investigation of point shaving by UCLA

football players. Id.

ported by evidence establishing his ability and willingness

to provide greater amounts.166

Despite Gambino’s claims to be a victim of prejudice because of his

last name, the evidence is clear that he was indeed involved in organized criminal activity, and it is certainly reasonable to conclude

that he was at least an associate, if not an outright member, of the

Mafia. All of which made the denial of his request for early release

the only conscientious, responsible course of action the U.S. Parole

Commission could have taken.

C. Roger Clinton’s Involvement in the Gambino Parole Effort

Tommaso ‘‘Tommy’’ Gambino is the 27-year old son of Rosario

Gambino and a personal friend of Roger Clinton.167 That the President’s brother lobbied for the release of Rosario Gambino is troubling enough, but that he came to do so through a personal relationship with Tommy Gambino is positively alarming. According to

Los Angeles law enforcement and press accounts, Tommy Gambino

is not only the son of a mobster, he is a reputed underboss in the

Los Angeles Mafia currently under investigation for his own criminal activity.168 While Tommy Gambino purportedly runs a company called Progressive Telecom that places pay phones in bars,

restaurants, and other businesses, his standard of living appears to

be well beyond his visible means of support.169 Like his father,

Tommy Gambino associates closely with known mobsters; his partner in the pay phone business is Dominick ‘‘Donnie Shacks’’

Montemarano.170 Montemarano was convicted in 1987 on racketeering, bribery, and extortion charges.171 The indictment described Montemarano as a captain in ‘‘the Colombo organized-crime

family of La Cosa Nostra.’’ 172 He served 11 years of an 18-year

sentence for his role in the scheme to obtain cash payments from

New York City concrete companies in exchange for major construction projects.173 In addition to Tommy Gambino’s business partnership with a known mobster, law enforcement also suspected that

740

174Telephone Interview with [name redacted], Detective, Los Angeles Police Department

(June 28, 2001). 175Marisa Taylor, Feds Link Ecstasy Case, Organized Crime; Escondido Wiretapping also

Points to Trafficking in Kosovo, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Oct. 25, 2001. 176 Id. 177DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–00001 (Summary of Interview with Roger Clinton, Oct.

1, 1999) (Exhibit 1). 178 Id. 179 Id.

he was involved in the distribution of the drug Ecstasy.174 In October 2001, the investigation of a lab capable of producing up to 1.5

million tablets of Ecstasy per month was linked to Tommy

Gambino:

Federal agents raided the lab Oct. 17 in an industrial

park. During the yearlong investigation, authorities say

they taped phone conversations between Derek Galanis

[one of the defendants accused of building the lab] and

Tommy Gambino, the son of a convicted drug trafficker.

Federal authorities contend his father, Rosario Gambino,

is an associate of the New York-based Gambino crime family.175

While Tommy Gambino was not among the 24 defendants charged,

prosecutors said that ‘‘members of the drug ring were attempting

to seek financing for the Ecstasy lab from the Gambino family.’’ 176

All these circumstances make Tommy Gambino’s friendship with

the brother of the President of the United States unseemly, to say

the least. That friendship began when the manager for 70s pop star

Gino Vanelli introduced Roger Clinton to Tommy Gambino sometime in the mid-1990s at a club in Beverly Hills.177 The purpose

of the introduction was so that Tommy could request Roger’s help

in obtaining his father’s release from prison.178 When FBI agents

interviewed him regarding the Gambino case, Roger described how

he was introduced to the matter:

The two most common questions he gets asked regularly

are, ‘‘What is it like to be the President’s brother? and Can

you help me get someone out of jail?’’ Clinton stated after

talking to Tommy Gambino he knew the reason for the introduction was to see if he could help Tommy Gambino get

his father released from prison.179

Despite the fact that Clinton was accustomed to requests to help

get convicts out of prison, he became particularly enamored with

the Gambino family. Clinton described to the FBI why he enthusiastically joined in the effort to secure Rosario Gambino’s release:

Clinton advised that after he began to spend time with

Tommy Gambino, he learned about the family and the efforts that they have made to get Tommy’s father, Rosario,

released from prison. They have hired very qualified attorneys and been through the appeal process. Clinton stated

that he identified with Tommy Gambino on a number of

levels and because of this, he became passionate about trying to help him get his father released.

Clinton stated that since Rosario Gambino has been in

prison, Tommy has had to grow up without a father. ClinVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00756 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 5601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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180 Id. at FBI–RC–00002. 181 Id.

ton advised that he, too, had grown up without a father,

and sympathized with that position. Tommy Gambino has

a close knit Italian family. Clinton stated that when he

grew up in Arkansas he and his brother grew up close to

an unnamed tight knit Italian family. He further stated

that he has is [sic] own prison experience which has given

him an insight to the prison system. Through his experience of being incarcerated, he claimed to have learned that

things are not always as they appear or as they are reported.

Clinton advised that Tommy Gambino provided him with

all the case files related to his father’s case. He has spent

hours reviewing all the files. Clinton stated that after his

full review of the case, he does not believe that Rosario

Gambino is being treated fairly. Rosario Gambino has

served three years longer than the maximum guidelines

for his offenses. He has been given release dates on two occasions and they have both been denied. The same person,

whose name he declined to provide, has denied the release,

and provided different reasons each time. Clinton further

advised that he believes Tommy Gambino’s father may be

treated differently than other people strictly because of

this name. Clinton advised that he too has experienced

that problem. He stated that the name can be both a positive or negative depending on the circumstances.180

When the Committee subpoenaed Clinton for all of his materials

relating to Gambino, he provided approximately 130 pages of documents, many of which were apparently provided to him by Tommy

Gambino. Most of these documents were transcripts and forms related to Rosario Gambino’s parole.

After he conducted his ‘‘full review’’ of the Gambino case files,

Roger Clinton decided to assist Gambino with his effort to obtain

parole. Clinton described his decision to help Gambino to the FBI

when they interviewed him in September 1999:

He [Clinton] told Tommy Gambino that he would not agree

to help the family unless they provided him with all the

information related to the case. Clinton told Tommy

Gambino that he did not want any information withheld

that might effect his decision to help the family. Gambino

told Clinton if there is any information withheld from you,

it was also being withheld from him (Tommy Gambino).

Clinton stated he really felt for the family and grew passionate about trying to help them. He further advised that

he told Tommy Gambino that by his providing assistance

and making contact with the U.S. Parole Commission to

seek assistance with this case, it could actually work

against him. Clinton stated his name will not necessarily

be an advantage when it comes to fighting this matter.

Gambino was willing to take the risk and have Clinton attempt to help.181

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182See n.145 and accompanying text. 183DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–00004 (Summary of Interview with Roger Clinton, Oct.

1, 1999) (Exhibit 1).

Given the assurances by Tommy Gambino to Roger Clinton—and

by Clinton to the FBI—that Clinton had been provided with all of

the relevant background information about Rosario Gambino, it is

fair to conclude that Clinton was aware of the extent and seriousness of Rosario Gambino’s criminal activity and mob ties, including: (1) Rosario Gambino’s conviction for dealing heroin; (2) his Italian conviction for conspiracy to distribute $60 million of heroin;

(3) his role in extortion and arson in southern New Jersey; and (4)

his involvement in a phony kidnapping to keep a Mafia money

launderer from U.S. authorities.182 Despite his knowledge of some

or all of these issues, Roger Clinton decided that he should lend his

support to getting Rosario Gambino out of prison.

By Roger Clinton’s own admission, he was frequently asked to

help get people out of prison. Accordingly, it should be asked why

he would decide to assist someone who was a member of organized

crime, whose involvement in large-scale heroin dealing was beyond

dispute, and who was reputed to be involved in a series of serious

and violent crimes? If his motives were pure, then surely Roger

could have chosen a more deserving case to champion from among

all those who approached him for help. Despite Roger Clinton’s efforts to convince the FBI that he assisted Gambino because he believed in the merits of his cause, and because he had known a

close-knit Italian family growing up in Arkansas, the primary motivation for Roger Clinton was clearly money. Clinton confirmed this

fact during his FBI interview:

Clinton was asked if he was ever given anything of value

for his assistance in this matter. He advised he had not received anything for this assistance. Clinton stated that

Tommy Gambino said if he (Clinton) could help get his father out of prison, ‘‘we will take care of you.’’ Clinton said

that he knows what that means. He stated ‘‘I’m not stupid,

I understand what the big picture is.’’ He again stated that

no specific compensation was discussed if he were to be

successful in obtaining Rosario Gambino’s release. Clinton

advised it was his understanding if he were successful, he

would be financially compensated. Clinton is not sure however, if he will be able to help Tommy Gambino and his

family.183

Clinton admitted that the ‘‘big picture’’ included the expectation

that the Gambinos would pay him for his work. What he did not

admit, however, was that the Gambinos actually did pay him significant amounts of money. As discussed below, Tommy Gambino

paid at least $50,000 to Roger Clinton during the time that Clinton

was trying to obtain parole or executive clemency for Rosario

Gambino. Clinton was also provided with an unspecified amount of

‘‘expense money,’’ as well as a gold Rolex, while he was working on

the Gambino matter. This payment, and the promise of additional

payments, likely had a great deal to do with Roger Clinton’s willingness to disregard the clear evidence that Rosario Gambino was

a career criminal and use his influence with the Clinton AdminisVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00758 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 5601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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184 USPC Document Production 00898 (Memorandum from Michael J. Gaines, Commissioner,

to Sharon Gervasoni, Designated Agency Ethics Officer (Jan. 30, 1996)) (Exhibit 41). 185 Id. 186 Id. 187 Id. 188 Id. 189 Id. 190 Id. 191 Id. 192 Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001).

tration to help get Gambino out of prison. Once Roger Clinton decided to help Gambino, the real question was whether his status

as the President’s brother would help convince the Parole Commission to release Gambino or whether the Parole Commission would

resent Clinton’s attempts to lobby them. In fact, some members

and staff on the Parole Commission attempted to assist Clinton,

while others resisted his attempts to win the release of a major

criminal.

1. Clinton’s Contacts with the Parole Commission

a. Clinton’s Initial Approach to the Parole

Commission

Roger Clinton’s lobbying on behalf of Rosario Gambino began in

earnest in January 1996. He first contacted the U.S. Parole Commission’s regional office in Kansas City, which had been the source

of the recommendation to deny early release.184 Apparently, Clinton spoke with Parole Commissioner Carol P. Getty and voiced his

support for the parole of Rosario Gambino. Clinton also apparently

told Getty that he planned on visiting her office in Kansas City on

January 17 or 18, 1996, and asked if he could meet with her or her

staff, and Getty agreed to a meeting between Clinton and her

staff.185 During this conversation, Clinton also mentioned that he

was aware that the Kansas City Regional Office of the Parole Commission, of which Getty was the head, was scheduled to be

closed.186 Getty was concerned that Roger Clinton had this information, as it apparently made it appear that Roger Clinton was

aware of some of the inner workings of the Parole Commission.187

After Clinton had spoken to Getty, on January 16, 1996, Getty

called Parole Commission headquarters in Maryland and spoke to

Commissioner Michael J. Gaines regarding the Clinton call.188

Getty related to Gaines the fact that Clinton had called about the

Gambino case. Getty told Gaines that she had scheduled a meeting

between Clinton and her staff to discuss the case. Getty also told

Gaines that she was concerned that Clinton was aware of the

planned closure of her regional Kansas City Parole Commission office and asked Gaines if he had spoken to Clinton about the closure.189 Gaines said he had not, to his knowledge, ever spoken with

Roger Clinton.190

Following his conversation with Getty, Gaines notified the White

House Counsel’s Office of Roger Clinton’s attempt to contact a

Commission member about a pending case.191 The Commission’s

General Counsel, Michael A. Stover said that he had suggested to

Gaines that he call the White House to ‘‘warn them about Roger

Clinton.’’ 192 When interviewed by Committee staff, Gaines said his

decision to contact the White House was ‘‘a spur of the moment deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00759 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 5601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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193Telephone Interview with Michael J. Gaines, former Chairman, USPC (Aug. 7, 2001). 194 Id. 195 Id. When asked about Gaines’ contact with the White House, Chief of Staff Marie

Ragghianti stated that Gaines told her about his conversation with someone at the White

House. According to Gaines, when he told White House staff about Roger Clinton’s contacts with

the Parole Commission, the staffer replied ‘‘for God’s sake, you can handle that one.’’ Interview

with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). 196 USPC Document Production 00898 (Memorandum from Michael J. Gaines, Commissioner,

to Sharon Gervasoni, Designated Agency Ethics Officer (Jan. 30, 1996)) (Exhibit 41). 197 Id. 198 USPC Document Production 00896 (Memorandum from Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, to File (Jan. 31, 1996)) (Exhibit 42). 199 Id; Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001) (indicating

that the message slip was attached to the last page of his January 31, 1996, memo to file at

00896). 200 USPC Document Production 00894 (Memorandum from Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, to File (Jan. 31, 1996)) (Exhibit 42). 201 Id. 202 Id.

cision’’ because of the appearance of impropriety.193 He contacted

someone in the Counsel’s office that he had known from Arkansas,

Trey Schroeder. Gaines said he wanted to ensure that someone at

the White House was aware that Roger Clinton had contacted the

regional office about an inmate’s case.194 Gaines told Schroeder

that he did not intend to speak to Clinton, and Schroeder replied,

‘‘okay, thanks,’’ and that was the end of the conversation.195

On January 17, 1996, Commissioner Getty again contacted Commissioner Gaines to inform him that Roger Clinton had contacted

Rosario Gambino’s hearing examiner, Sam Robertson.196 Clinton

told Robertson he would not come to the Kansas City office as he

had planned, but instead would contact the Parole Commission’s

main offices in Maryland.197 On January 30, 1996, he did so, leaving a message with a secretary for Commissioner Gaines.198 The

message slip read, ‘‘Roger Clinton, very important . . . ASAP, re:

brother recommended meeting.’’ 199 Because Commissioner Gaines

knew from Commissioner Getty that Roger Clinton was planning

to contact him about the Gambino case and because he knew that

any such contact would be improper, he consulted the General

Counsel Michael Stover.200 Stover volunteered to contact Roger

Clinton on behalf of Gaines to shield him from an inappropriate

contact and to advise Clinton that such a contact would be inappropriate.201

With the Parole Commission’s Deputy Designated Agency Ethics

Officer (‘‘DAEO’’) Sharon Gervasoni present, Stover returned Roger

Clinton’s phone call, describing it in detail in a memo dated the following day.202 According to Stover’s memo, Roger Clinton immediately invoked his brother, President Clinton, saying not only that

the President was aware of what Roger was doing but also that he

was assisting Roger with strategy on the best way to achieve his

objectives:

[Roger Clinton] began the conversation by informing me

that his brother ‘‘[]is completely aware of my involvement.’’

Roger Clinton stated that his brother had recommended to

him that he not meet with Commissioner Getty . . . because Commissioner Getty’s Kansas City Regional Office

was about to be closed. Roger Clinton informed me that his

brother suggested that he contact Commissioner Gaines

instead. (I knew about the previous contact with CommisVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00760 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 5601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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203 Id. 204DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–00001 (Summary of Interview with Roger Clinton, Oct.

1, 1999) (Exhibit 1). 205Kowalski recalled that on several occasions, Clinton made it clear that his brother knew

of his involvement in the Gambino matter. Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case

Operations Manager, USPC (July 27, 2001). 206 USPC Document Production 00894 (Memorandum from Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, to File (Jan. 31, 1996)) (Exhibit 42).

sioner Getty’s office, and that Roger Clinton is apparently

a friend of Rosario Gambino’s son Thomas, who also lives

in California.) 203

The parenthetical comment inserted by Stover makes clear that he

understood the context of the conversation related specifically to

the case of inmate Rosario Gambino. This is important because

when he was interviewed by the FBI regarding his efforts in the

Gambino matter, Roger Clinton told the FBI that ‘‘he did not represent to anyone on the Parole Commission that his brother was

aware of his efforts to assist the Gambino family or that the President was supporting his effort to assist in getting Rosario Gambino

released from prison.’’ 204 In light of Stover’s memo (as well as subsequent contacts with Case Operations Manager Tom Kowalski),205

Roger Clinton’s statement to the FBI appears to be false. If Roger

Clinton believed that his brother’s involvement would be illegal or

improper and might spark another scandal, then he would have

had a powerful motivation to lie to the FBI.

Stover’s record of the January 30, 1996, conversation with Clinton indicates that Stover clearly explained to Clinton the applicable

law and proper procedures for lobbying for parole:

I informed Roger Clinton that . . . the Privacy Act of 1974

prohibited Commissioners and staff of the U.S. Parole

Commission from discussing any case with a member of

the public without a signed waiver from the inmate in

question. . . . I further informed Roger Clinton that Commissioner Gaines could not meet with him because, even

if Roger Clinton were an authorized representative of the

inmate, he would have to appear before the hearing examiners at a regularly-scheduled parole hearing. . . . I explained the Commission’s procedures whereby hearing examiners make recommended decisions after hearing presentations on the record, and that Commissioners vote and

make their decisions without meeting with prisoners’ representatives. I explained that, in this respect, the Commission operates like a court of law.206

According to Stover’s memo, Roger Clinton reacted to Stover’s explanation by once again invoking the President’s authority in suggesting he meet with Commissioner Gaines:

Roger Clinton evinced his strong disappointment upon

learning that he could not meet with Commissioner Gaines

about this case. . . . I informed him that such a meeting

would not have been appropriate. Roger Clinton then

asked me how it could be that the President would be misinformed as to the law, and emphasized that the President

had suggested that he should meet with Commissioner

Gaines, ‘‘. . . a friend of ours from Arkansas.’’ Roger ClinVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00761 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 5601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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207 Id. at 00895. 208 Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001). 209 At this time, Adams was an Associate Deputy Attorney General, and was Stover’s primary

contact at Main Justice. He later became U.S. Pardon Attorney. Id. 210 Id. 211 Id.

ton professed his bewilderment as to how the President

would not be knowledgeable as to the law with regard to

the propriety of this suggested meeting. He stated that he

would have to inform his brother that his brother had been

wrong. I replied that it would be an honor for me to be advising the President of the United States, directly or indirectly, as to the law. Roger Clinton again stated that he

would have to report this information to his brother, who

would be ‘‘glad to know’’ what I had said. During this colloquy, however, Roger Clinton’s voice rose, and betrayed

the fact that he was upset with what I was saying.207

Stover and Gervasoni clearly believed that Clinton’s call was an attempt to exercise political influence:

Deputy DAEO and I are disturbed at the tactic employed

by Roger Clinton of repeatedly invoking his brother as

having allegedly recommended that he meet with Commissioner Gaines[.] The U.S. Parole Commission must not permit itself to be subjected to improper attempts to exercise

political influence over its procedures. (Roger Clinton did

not address himself to the merits of the case itself.) . . .

My preference is for the Commission to vote a decision

based only on the facts of the Gambino case, and without

reference to this episode.

Finally, I have discussed the situation with Commissioner

Gaines, who agrees that the Commission should be shielded, if at all possible, from the unwelcome intrusion of a

man who would appear to have nothing to contribute to

the Commission’s deliberations in the Gambino case but a

crude (and I hope unauthorized) effort to exercise political

influence.

When interviewed by Committee staff, Stover reiterated his strong

disapproval of Roger Clinton’s attempts to contact Commission

members and Commission staff, saying he ‘‘was concerned that

Roger had no business contacting the Commission’’ and that his

goal in advising Gaines on how to proceed was to keep Clinton ‘‘as

far away as possible from the Commission.’’ 208 Stover emphasized

that he took two steps in response to Clinton’s contact: (1) he suggested that Gaines call the White House ‘‘to warn them about

Roger Clinton;’’ and (2) he called the Deputy Attorney General’s office and spoke to Roger Adams about the matter.209 Stover explained that ‘‘an alarm bell goes off when the half-brother of the

President is helping an organized crime figure.’’ 210 He believes that

Adams discussed the matter with Deputy Attorney General Jamie

Gorelick.211

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212 In the middle of this lull in activity, Rosario Gambino signed a letter apparently intended

for President Clinton seeking his assistance. A copy of the letter was produced to the Committee

by Roger Clinton. The salutation of the January 9, 1997, letter is curiously blank, but the rest

reads in relevant part:

I am writing this letter to you as my last hope to get justice. I feel that the system

has been turned inside out in my case, and I now seek your help in the hope that

you can right the wrong that is being done to me. What I am asking for is that my

punishment be based on the crime that I did, and not on my name.

The reason I am asking for your help is because my son knows your brother, and

my son has told me that your brother is a good and honorable man; I know such

traits run in families, and I have heard that you are also such a man. Because of

the trust and respect that my son has for your family, he suggested that I write this

letter to you to explain my situation in more detail. So please let me take a few lines

to explain my case.

Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0046 (Letter from Rosario Gambino (Jan. 9, 1997)) (Exhibit 43). The letter continues to explain the detailed procedural history of the case and makes

false statements in the process. For example, Gambino claimed that after his December 1995

parole hearing, the examiner ‘‘made a finding that I was not connected to ‘Organized Crime.’ ’’

Id. at RCC0047. In truth, the examiner merely found that there was insufficient evidence for

the Commission to conclude, for the purpose of a parole decision, that Gambino was a member

of La Cosa Nostra. This finding of insufficient evidence in a particular proceeding is far different

from the blanket exoneration Gambino claimed he received. 213 Before her appointment, only the Commissioners were politically appointed. Interview with

Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001). 214 Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). As head of

the Tennessee Parole Board in the 1970s, Ragghianti had been responsible for initiating a federal investigation of Governor Ray Blanton, who was later convicted on other charges, and his

staff for soliciting money in exchange for clemency. Her story was told in a book by Peter Maas

and in a motion picture. Id. 215 Id. 216 Id. 217Telephone Interview with Michael J. Gaines, former Chairman, USPC (Aug. 7, 2001). 218 Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). 219 Id.

b. Clinton’s Meetings with Parole Commission

Staff

From February 1996 to November 1997, there was a pause in

Roger Clinton’s approaches to the Parole Commission. After Roger

Clinton had his hostile telephone discussion with Michael Stover in

January 1996, he did not approach the Parole Commission again

until December 1997. Due to Roger Clinton’s refusal to discuss the

Gambino matter with Committee staff, little is known about the

reasons for the nearly two-year hiatus.212

i. December 1997 Meeting

In December 1997, Chairman Michael Gaines informed his Chief

of Staff, Marie Ragghianti, that Roger Clinton had contacted him.

Ragghianti had come to the Commission as its first politically appointed staffer 213 around August 1997.214 According to Ragghianti,

Gaines called her into his office and said, ‘‘I have a problem. I hope

you can handle it for me.’’ 215 He explained to her that Roger Clinton was trying to meet with him but that he did not think it would

be appropriate to do so.216 Gaines also informed Ragghianti that

Clinton had tried to contact him about the same matter almost two

years earlier, in January 1996. Gaines asked Ragghianti to meet

with Clinton and treat him the way she would ‘‘anyone else.’’ 217

According to Ragghianti, Gaines’ instructions to her about meeting

with Roger Clinton were ‘‘as scrupulous as you could want.’’ 218 She

said that Gaines told her to be courteous because Roger was the

President’s brother, but to tell him that if Gaines spoke to him,

Gaines would have to recuse himself.219

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220 Id. 221Telephone Interview with Michael J. Gaines, former Chairman, USPC (Aug. 7, 2001). 222 Id. 223 Id. 224 Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). 225 Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001). 226 Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). 227 Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001). 228 Id. 229 Id. When interviewed by Committee staff, Gaines stated that he did not recall Stover advising against having the meeting with Clinton, or of any effort by Stover to prevent the meeting. Telephone Interview with Michael J. Gaines, former Chairman, USPC (Aug. 7, 2001). 230 Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001). Ragghianti,

however, denies that she received a copy of the memo before her meeting and denies having

read it until being shown a copy by Committee staff during her interview. She said she would

have remembered the memo because it ‘‘slams the Chairman.’’ Ragghianti said she could not

have forgotten ‘‘this ‘friend of ours’ business’’ and that the memo was, ‘‘pure Michael [Stover].’’ Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001).

It was Ragghianti’s understanding that Gaines believed it would

be inappropriate for him to meet Clinton and that he wanted her

to shield him from the inappropriate approach being made by Clinton.220 When asked by Committee staff why he referred the Clinton

matter to Ragghianti rather than, as before, to General Counsel

Stover, Gaines said that in 1996 he had not been the Chairman of

the Commission and Marie Ragghianti did not yet work for the

Commission.221 In 1997, he had become the Chairman, and as

such, Chief of Staff Marie Ragghianti answered directly to him.

Therefore, he subsequently asked her to handle such matters.222

Gaines was aware that the January 1996 telephone conversation

between Clinton and Stover did take place, as he requested that

Stover make the contact. However, he claims that he was not

aware until well after the call of what Clinton and Stover discussed

or that the call was quite hostile, likely because Stover was attempting to shield him from knowledge that could arguably require

his recusal from the Gambino case.223

After her meeting with Chairman Gaines, Ragghianti called

Roger Clinton and scheduled a meeting with him for December 23,

1997.224 Before the meeting occurred, General Counsel Michael

Stover learned that it had been scheduled from Tom Kowalski, the

Director of Case Operations at the Parole Commission.225

Ragghianti had asked Kowalski to join her in the meeting with

Clinton.226 Stover said he was not pleased upon learning that the

meeting was scheduled and that he called Chairman Gaines to see

if he knew the meeting was going to occur.227 Stover reiterated his

advice to Gaines that ‘‘as a matter of prudence that it was not a

good idea to meet with a man who had previously attempted to use

political influence in an improper way.’’ 228 According to Stover,

Gaines responded ‘‘in a peremptory tone that this discussion was

over’’ and that he believed that Roger Clinton deserved to be treated with the same courtesy as any other member of the public.229

Wanting to do everything possible to discourage the meeting without being insubordinate, Stover made a copy of his January 1996

memo that described his conversation with Roger Clinton and gave

it to Ragghianti.230

While Gaines asked Ragghianti to extend only common courtesy

to Clinton and treat him like any other member of the public, it

is clear that from the outset, Ragghianti treated Roger Clinton like

a celebrity and gave him access that she never would have afforded

749

231 Verizon Document Production (Roger Clinton Phone Bill, Jan 1, 1998, at 12–13; Mar. 1,

1998, at 16; Aug. 1, 1998). Ragghianti claims that she gave her home telephone number to Clinton because it was difficult to get in touch with him, given the time differential between the

east coast and west coast. 232 USPC Document Production 00889 (Memorandum from Thomas C. Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, to Michael J. Gaines, Chairman (Dec. 24, 1997)) (Exhibit 44). 233 Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). 234 Id. 235 Id. 236 Id. 237 Id. 238See generally Section IV.E., ‘‘John Ballis.’’ 239 Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). 240 Id. 241 Id. 242 Id. 243 USPC Document Production 00890 (Memorandum from Thomas C. Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, to Michael J. Gaines, Chairman (Dec. 24, 1997)) (Exhibit 44).

a member of the general public. She gave Roger Clinton her home

telephone number even before she met with him, and he placed at

least four calls to that home number.231 Ragghianti’s warm approach to Roger Clinton continued at the December 23, 1997, meeting. Clinton, Ragghianti, and Kowalski attended the meeting.232

Ragghianti said the meeting was cordial and that Clinton was personable and bright.233 Ragghianti said that Roger Clinton was ‘‘not

the yokel he is painted to be’’ and ‘‘was downright engaging.’’ 234

After the meeting, Ragghianti marveled at Roger’s charisma, telling Tom Kowalski, ‘‘this isn’t even the President. Imagine what the

President is like.’’ 235 Ragghianti explained that she had ‘‘connected’’ with Roger Clinton because her mother had died a few

years earlier and that Roger Clinton’s mother had also died recently.236 Ragghianti took Clinton to Tom Kowalski’s office, where

Clinton began referring to papers regarding specific cases he wanted to discuss.237 In addition to the Gambino case, Clinton also

wanted to discuss the cases of two other prisoners. For one, John

Ballis,238 he was seeking to obtain a furlough, and for the other,

whose name Ragghianti could not recall, he was seeking a pardon.239 Tom Kowalski explained that for a furlough, Roger needed

to speak to the warden of the prison in which Ballis was incarcerated and for a pardon, he needed to contact the Pardon Attorney’s

office.240

After the first two issues, Clinton turned to the Gambino matter.

In describing the denial of Gambino’s parole to Committee staff,

Ragghianti claimed that the Commission had ‘‘thrown the book’’ at

Gambino and that ‘‘intelligent people would be able to say that a

case could be made for less time.’’ 241 She said Clinton delivered a ‘‘heartfelt narrative’’ about how he had been in prison and knew

what it was like.242 The following day, Kowalski prepared a memo

summarizing Roger’s appeal on behalf of Gambino, whom Kowalski

described as a ‘‘notorious organized crime figure:’’ 243

[Roger Clinton] basically believes that the Commission has

been much too harsh in this case and that Rosario

Gambino is not an organized crime boss as the Commission has considered him to be. If anything, he believes that

he is only on the fringes of organized crime and he is being

discriminated against because his name happens to be

‘‘Gambino.’’ He used the Original Jurisdiction Appeal Summary by Michael Stover as his primary source of informaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00765 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 5601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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244 Id. 245 A handwritten note at this place on the memo dated September 17, 1998, nine months

after the memo was initially prepared, reads ‘‘I never discussed Tom’s summary at any time

with Mr. Clinton (nor did he ask me to).’’ USPC Document Production 00891 (Memorandum

from Marie Ragghianti, Chief of Staff, to File (Dec. 23, 1997)) (Exhibit 45). Even if Ragghianti

did not share the summary with Clinton, it is troubling that she considered doing so, as it would

have been a violation of Commission rules. 246 Id. 247Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (July 27,

2001).

tion. He specifically named Michael Stover as being discriminatory in his description of the prisoner and was particularly incensed by the statement in the summary which

states, ‘‘Gambino appears to come from an immigrant

background in which family connections are simply exploited (as in the current offense) to get around the law.’’

In discussing this case, he was actually quite animated

and argued rather emotionally about how the Commission

is being too harsh with the prisoner.

Ms. Ragghianti and I merely listened throughout the session since we did not have file [sic] nor did Mr. Clinton

have a signed release from the subject. He was advised

that the case would be reviewed and no further promises

were given.244

Marie Ragghianti also drafted a memo regarding the same meeting, and rather than being critical of Clinton’s approach,

Ragghianti appeared sympathetic:

Regarding Rosario Gambino, who apparently has been denied parole by this Commission, Mr. Clinton asked for any

possible reconsideration of the matter. He pointed out that

Gambino has served nearly 15 years, has at least 2 potential job opportunities, and also the support of a loving son,

Tommy (Mr. Clinton’s friend), and his wife and other children. We explained to him that the Commission takes a

hard line in matters perceived as related to organized

crime. Tom did offer to review the history of the case and

write a summary (which will be sent to me). At that time,

with the approval of the Commission or its legal department, I will notify Mr. Clinton of Tom’s summary, as (or

if) appropriate.245

Mr. Clinton was articulate. His questions and comments

were thoughtful and appropriate, which is to say that he

in no way came across as wishing to capitalize on his

name. Instead, he apologized for taking our time. He appeared to be a genuinely caring person, not only for the 3

individuals he was seeking advice for, but in general.246

While Ragghianti took the position that Clinton did not appear to

be capitalizing on his name, Tom Kowalski disagreed, noting that

Clinton ‘‘mentioned his brother’’ at virtually every meeting and

made it clear that he was operating ‘‘with his brother’s knowledge.’’ 247 Kowalski said Clinton frequently made references to his

plans to be in Washington and to stay at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, saying, ‘‘he threw it in your face that he was staying at the

751

248 Id. 249 Id. 250 Id. 251 Id. Kowalski’s recollections raise serious questions about Roger Clinton’s veracity when he

was interviewed by the FBI. See also n.205 and accompanying text. 252 Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). 253 Id. 254 USPC Document Production 00925–26 (Memorandum from Thomas C. Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, to Marie Ragghianti, Chief of Staff (Dec. 30. 1997)) (Exhibit 34). 255Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (July 27,

2001). 256 Id. 257 Id. 258 Id.

White House.’’ 248 Kowalski said that from the first meeting, Clinton made it clear that his brother knew of his involvement.249 Specifically, Kowalski said his impression was the President knew that

Roger was contacting the Parole Commission about the Gambino

case.250 Kowalski’s memory on this point was vivid. He explicitly

recalled his reaction, ‘‘I thought to myself, ‘Lord, Lord, Oh Lord,

why would the President want to get involved in the case of this

guy?’ ’’ 251

Ragghianti told Committee staff that she and Kowalski instructed Clinton that in the future, ‘‘the best way of doing this’’ would be to address his concerns to the Commission in writing

rather than through further meetings, although this admonition

was not recorded in either of the contemporaneous memos.252

Ragghianti thought that following her initial contact, Clinton

would not return seeking further meetings.253

After the December 1997 meeting, Ragghianti also asked

Kowalski to review the Gambino file. In case Ragghianti had any

doubts about the lack of merit in Clinton’s argument, Kowalski’s

December 30, 1997, memo summarizing the Gambino case should

have dispelled them. Kowalski found, in part, that: (1) Gambino

participated in a conspiracy which promised the delivery of 10 kilograms of heroin per month; (2) ‘‘Rosario Gambino’s criminal activities also extend to arson and extortion;’’ (3) Gambino participated

in harboring Michele Sindona while he was a fugitive; and (4)

‘‘[t]he Sentencing Memorandum and documents in the file clearly

depict the subject as an individual deeply involved in organized

criminal activity.’’ 254 Given these findings, it is disturbing that

Ragghianti continued to meet with Clinton and discuss the

Gambino case with him.

ii. Spring 1998 Contacts

Roger Clinton continued to remain in contact with Ragghianti

and Kowalski after the December 1997 meeting, making telephone

calls to both of them regarding the Gambino case. Kowalski recalls

that Gambino was scheduled for a parole review hearing and that

Clinton called because he was concerned that Gambino had been

moved from a prison in California to one in Arizona, which was further from Gambino’s family.255 Clinton asked Kowalski to find out

why Gambino was moved.256 Kowalski looked into the matter and

discovered that Gambino was moved because he had been ‘‘muscling,’’ or intimidating, other inmates at the prison.257 Kowalski did

not pass this information on to Clinton, but it did confirm his feelings regarding Rosario Gambino.258 Clinton apparently prepared

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259 Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0031 (Handwritten notes) (Exhibit 46). 260 Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0176 (Letter from Roger C. Clinton to Thomas C.

Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (Feb. 13, 1998)) (Exhibit 47). 261 Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0173 (Letter from Roger C. Clinton to Thomas C.

Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (Feb. 13, 1998)) (Exhibit 48). 262 Id. at RCC0175. 263 Alison Leigh Cowan, Roger Clinton’s Dogged Effort for Drug Trafficker, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.

26, 2001.

talking points for himself in anticipation of these telephone calls.

One set of notes, in Clinton’s handwriting, reads as follows and

provides a further suggestion as to the nature of Clinton’s calls to

Kowalski:

Questions for Tom Kowalski:

1) Possibility of re-transfer back to Terminal Island.

Should he before or after parole hearing?

2) If transfer back to Ca. is accepted, can Sam Robertson

still conduct the hearing or is it out of his jurisdiction?

(Harry Dwyer?)

3) What else can I do to serve as a reminder or as further

emphasis? (personal letter, etc.)

4) What is the state of the upcoming hearing at FCI-Phoenix? The last one was postponed because the Commission’s

counsel was reviewing the file. Sam Robertson wasn’t at

the last hearing that was postponed. Will he, in fact, conduct this hearing? 259

Clinton also sent two handwritten letters to Kowalski in February 1998, in advance of the review hearing. One stated in part:

We need someone to ‘‘step up to the plate’’ on this one. I

firmly feel that if everything in this case was the same and

the prisoner’s name was Rosario Stevens (only an example), then Mr. Stevens would have been released in July

1996.

I understand the scenario of decisions based on name recognition, be it positive or negative. This man deserves to

be released to return to his family after 14 years. He did

the crime and he has done the time. We all deserve a second chance! I am living proof of that. Please help us

achieve what is right! 260

In the other letter to Kowalski, Clinton made slightly more sophisticated arguments, analyzing the applicable sentencing provisions,

arguing that Gambino was eligible for release.261 In this letter,

Clinton denied that Gambino was a member of La Cosa Nostra and

claimed that the Gambino name was a common one:

As documented by copies of pages from the Sicilian phone

book, Gambino is a very popular name. A large majority

is unrelated to the Gambino crime family.262

Remembering an occasion when Clinton made the same argument

to Kowalski in person, Kowalski said: ‘‘I was very professional . . .

I didn’t laugh.’’ 263

In the spring of 1998, Clinton scheduled another meeting with

Ragghianti and Kowalski. Both Ragghianti and Kowalski recall

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264Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (July 27,

2001); Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). 265Telephone Interview with Michael J. Gaines, former Chairman, USPC (Aug. 7, 2001). 266 Id. 267 Id; Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (July 27,

2001); Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). 268 Verizon Document Production (Roger Clinton Phone Bill, July 1, 1998, at 10–11; Aug. 1,

1998, at 14–15); WorldCom Document Production (Roger Clinton Phone Bill, May 23, 1998, at

8–9).

269 Verizon Document Production (Roger Clinton Phone Bill, Aug. 1, 1998, at 14). 270Telephone Interview with Michael J. Gaines, former Chairman, USPC (Aug. 7, 2001). 271Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (July 27,

2001); Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). 272 Id. 273 USPC Document Production 00923 (Memorandum from Marie F. Ragghianti, Chief of

Staff, to File (Sept. 14, 1998)) (Exhibit 49). 274 Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). 275 Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001).

that Clinton basically repeated the same arguments that he had

made in December 1997, claiming that Gambino had been treated

unfairly by the Parole Commission and should be released.264 At

the end of this meeting, as Clinton, Kowalski, and Ragghianti were

saying their goodbyes in the lobby, Parole Commission Chairman

Michael Gaines walked through the lobby.265 Clinton apparently

recognized Gaines on sight, and eagerly introduced himself to him.

According to Gaines, Roger ‘‘acted like he knew who I was,’’ despite

the fact that he did not know Clinton.266 According to all of those

present, Gaines kept the conversation with Clinton short and limited to superficial matters.267

iii. July 1998 Meeting

After the spring 1998 meeting, Clinton continued to make telephone calls to Ragghianti and Kowalski to press his case. Between

May 1998 and July 1998, Clinton called Kowalski and Ragghianti

at least 11 times.268 He even called Ragghianti at home on at least

one occasion.269 In July, Clinton apparently asked for and received

another meeting with Kowalski and Ragghianti. While Clinton was

waiting for Kowalski at the Parole Commission offices, he had a

second fortuitous run-in with Chairman Gaines. Again, Gaines attempted to avoid any substantive discussion with Clinton and

ended the discussion as quickly as he could.270 The meeting between Clinton, Ragghianti, and Kowalski went much like the previous two meetings. Roger repeated his arguments that Rosario

Gambino had been treated unfairly and deserved to be released.

Neither Kowalski nor Ragghianti provided extensive substantive

comments about the case but simply tried to listen to Clinton’s concerns.271 At the conclusion of the meeting, Ragghianti and Clinton

looked over pictures of Clinton’s new baby, and then Ragghianti

saw Clinton to the elevators.272 Referring to the Gambino case,

Ragghianti told Clinton ‘‘the only thing worse than no hope is false

hope’’ and that she ‘‘did not want him to have false hope.’’ 273 Then,

as Clinton got onto the elevator, Ragghianti counseled him to pray

about the Gambino matter.274

2. The FBI Investigation of Clinton’s Contacts with the

Parole Commission

In late August 1998, the FBI sought to review Rosario Gambino’s

file at the Parole Commission.275 Michael Stover said that the

754

276 Id. 277 Id. 278 USPC Document Production 00922 (Memorandum from Marie F. Ragghianti, Chief of

Staff, to File (Sept. 14, 1998)) (Exhibit 49). FBI interview summaries relating to Ragghianti,

Kowalski, and Stover presumably exist, but the Justice Department has refused to produce

them to the Committee. After producing hundreds of pages regarding the Clinton-Gambino matter, the Justice Department stopped producing records in August 2001 because of its ‘‘ongoing

criminal investigation’’ into the Clinton-Gambino matter. 279 Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). 280 Id. There appears to be no support for Ragghianti’s view. Rather, it appears that Roger

Clinton was of investigative interest to the FBI well before this point. 281 Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001). 282 Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). 283 USPC Document Production 00923 (Memorandum from Marie F. Ragghianti, Chief of

Staff, to File (Sept. 14, 1998)) (Exhibit 49).

FBI’s original interest appeared to be in Rosario Gambino rather

than Roger Clinton.276 Stover provided the FBI with all of the documents relating to the Gambino case, including those relating to

Roger Clinton’s contacts with the Parole Commission.277 On September 11, 1998, Stover informed Ragghianti that the FBI had visited USPC offices to review the Gambino file. In the following days,

the agents returned to interview Stover, Ragghianti, and Kowalski

about their contacts with Roger Clinton.278 Ragghianti was ‘‘very

annoyed’’ that Stover had not told her earlier about the FBI’s interest in the Gambino file.279 Ragghianti told Committee staff that

her ‘‘private view’’ was that Stover had initiated the FBI’s investigation of Roger Clinton’s contacts with the Parole Commission.280

After the FBI began its investigation of Roger Clinton’s lobbying

for Gambino, Michael Stover learned that Marie Ragghianti and

Tom Kowalski had been maintaining contact with Roger Clinton

over the preceding eight months. While discussing the FBI’s interest in the Gambino matter with Stover, Tom Kowalski indicated

that he and Ragghianti had two additional meetings with Clinton,

as well as a number of telephone conversations after the December

1997 meeting.281 Stover knew only about the December 1997 meeting and was not happy to learn about the additional meetings, especially given the fact that he was not consulted about them before

they took place. Ragghianti defended her decision to keep Stover

from knowing about the meetings with Clinton on the basis that,

as Chief of Staff, she did not report to Stover.282 While Ragghianti

may have been above Stover in the hierarchy of the Parole Commission, her decision to engage in a series of contacts with Roger

Clinton without consulting her General Counsel is troubling and

suggests that she wanted to provide Roger Clinton with an extraordinary measure of access.

As the FBI conducted its investigation of Clinton’s contacts with

the Parole Commission, Ragghianti and Stover disputed the propriety of the series of contacts between Clinton and Commission staff

between December 1997 and July 1998. Ragghianti wrote of the

meetings in a memo drafted just after she learned the FBI was involved: ‘‘[a]fter his initial visit, Mr. Clinton called and came in 2

other times. I did not record additional memoranda on either of the

subsequent visits, because he did not offer additional information,

but seemed only to want to be heard.’’ 283 Rather than scrupulously

attempting to avoid any appearance of impropriety and follow Stover’s advice, Ragghianti continued her contacts with Roger Clinton

unapologetically and without informing Stover. Ragghianti told

755

284 Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). 285 Id. 286 Id. 287 USPC Document Production 00923 (Memorandum from Marie F. Ragghianti, Chief of

Staff, to File (Sept. 14, 1998)) (Exhibit 49). 288 Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). 289 Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001). 290 Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001).

Committee staff that there was ‘‘no question’’ in her mind about

the propriety of her meetings.284 She dismissed Stover’s concerns,

suggesting he was motivated by a feeling that ‘‘he had been ignored’’ and that ‘‘he didn’t like Roger Clinton.’’ 285

The split between Ragghianti and Stover over the propriety of

staff contacts with Clinton appears to be part of a broader animosity Ragghianti harbored for Stover, but it is unclear whether their

dispute over the Clinton contacts was a symptom of her antagonism or a catalyst for it. During her interview with Committee

staff, Ragghianti went out of her way to criticize Stover, describing

him as ‘‘a bull in a china shop’’ who ‘‘doesn’t have a fine touch in

extending common courtesy.’’ 286 Ragghianti similarly criticized Stover’s handling of the Roger Clinton matter. She wrote in a September 14, 1998, memo:

I think the record should show that I felt that Mr. Stover

had, in the past, been gratuitously rude to Mr. Clinton. My

personal philosophy was that Mr. Clinton deserved to be

treated at least courteously by this Commission, which is

why I agreed to see him. Nevertheless, it seemed appropriate that I should not visit with him alone, not only because of ‘‘appearances,’’ but because I did not really know

the intricate details of reading inmate files, nor the precise

legal constraints on what information might be appropriately shared with interested parties.287

When asked what her basis was for writing that Stover had been

‘‘gratuitously rude’’ to Clinton, Ragghianti said she could not recall

but that it might have come from Chairman Gaines and may have

been the reason Gaines asked her to handle the second Clinton

contact rather than Stover, whom he had asked to handle the

first.288 Stover said that Ragghianti had never discussed with him

his handling of the 1996 Clinton contact.289 Ragghianti complained

that Stover, ‘‘did not give Clinton the benefit of any doubt,’’ that

he viewed Clinton as ‘‘guilty until proven innocent,’’ and that Stover’s memo was ‘‘very heavy-handed.’’ 290 For his part, Stover did

not engage in any attacks on Ragghianti, but he did maintain that

it was unwise for Ragghianti to engage in a series of contacts with

Clinton about the Gambino case.

a. Clinton’s Continued Attempts to Contact

the Commission

In the fall of 1998, Roger Clinton was apparently unaware that

the FBI was looking into his contacts with the Parole Commission.

Following the initial FBI interviews of Parole Commission staff in

the fall of 1998, Roger Clinton continued calling Commission staff.

Ragghianti and Kowalski did not respond to most of these calls.

When they received these calls, they reported them to Michael StoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00771 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 5601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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291 USPC Document Production 00915 (Memorandum from Thomas C. Kowalski, Case Operations Administrator, to File (Oct. 2, 1998)) (Exhibit 50). 292 USPC Document Production 00868 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) (Exhibit 51). 293 Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). 294 U.S. Postal Service Document Production (Application for Delivery of Mail Through Agent,

June 2, 2001) (Exhibit 52). 295 USPC Document Production 00876 (Letter from Marie F. Ragghianti, Chief of Staff, to

Roger C. Clinton (Oct. 26, 1998)) (Exhibit 53). 296 Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001). 297 Id. 298 USPC Document Production 00868 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) (Exhibit 51).

ver. On the one occasion where Clinton did successfully reach Tom

Kowalski, Kowalski prepared a memo to the file summarizing the

conversation.291 Clinton also called seeking a meeting with Chairman Gaines, despite having been informed repeatedly that he could

not meet with members of the Parole Commission.292 Gaines,

Ragghianti, and Stover then met to discuss how to respond to Clinton’s request for a meeting with Gaines. They decided to send a letter to Clinton informing him that he could not meet with Gaines

and that he could no longer meet with staff. Stover prepared the

initial draft of the letter, and then Ragghianti ‘‘toned it down.’’ 293

Curiously, the letter was addressed to Roger Clinton at 1015

Gayley Avenue in Los Angeles, a commercial mailbox used by

Tommy and Anna Gambino.294 The letter, dated October 26, 1998,

stated:

The Chairman has asked me to express his sincere regrets

that he cannot accept your kind invitation to meet during

your trip to Washington this week. As I have mentioned

before, it is agency policy that members of the Commission

cannot engage in private meetings of any kind with parties

having an interest in parole proceedings. This is true even

if the meeting is sought for purely social reasons.

Similarly, our policy also restricts the ability of Commission staff from engaging in any continued series of calls or

discussions on official matters that are not in the context

of an agency proceeding. Should you have any further request, I encourage you to write us.295

The sentence regarding staff contacts appears to be at odds with

the practice of Ragghianti and Kowalski before the FBI began investigating. When asked about whether the policy against third

party-meetings as stated in the letter was in fact the practice of

Commission staff beforehand, Stover said, ‘‘Sometimes you state a

policy at the moment of its creation.’’ 296 He said he was trying

hard to set a useful policy for future precedent and that he saw

Ragghianti’s sending the letter with his language about staff contacts included as a victory on that issue.297 It is curious that before

the FBI began its investigation of Clinton and Gambino in September 1998, Ragghianti was strongly in favor of meeting with Clinton,

and then, once the FBI began its investigation, she suddenly

agreed with Michael Stover’s longstanding advice to stop meeting

with Clinton.

Despite the letter’s clear instructions to put future requests in

writing, Clinton immediately called Ragghianti upon receiving the

fax.298 In a voice mail message left for Ragghianti, Clinton said he

was embarrassed and hurt that anyone at the Commission might

757

299 Id. 300 Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). 301 Id. 302 USPC Document Production 00868 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) (Exhibit 51); USPC Document Production 00875 (Letter from Roger C. Clinton, to the U.S. Parole Commission (Nov.

17, 1998)) (Exhibit 54). 303To the extent Clinton’s letter suggested that his contacts with the Parole Commission were

limited to ‘‘written correspondence,’’ it is, of course, completely untrue. 304 USPC Document Production 00875 (Letter from Roger C. Clinton, to the U.S. Parole Commission (Nov. 17, 1998)) (Exhibit 54). 305 USPC Document Production 00868 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) (Exhibit 51). 306 USPC Document Production 00665 (Memorandum from John R. Simpson, Commissioner,

to National Commissioners (Jan. 13, 1999)) (Exhibit 55). 307 USPC Document Production 00817 (Notice of Action on Appeal, Apr. 14, 1999) (Exhibit 56).

have thought he was asking for something inappropriate and asked

Ragghianti to return his call, which she did not.299 Ragghianti described the message as ‘‘long, wordy, [and] slightly incoherent’’ and

quoted Clinton as saying, ‘‘I guess I went over the line. I didn’t

mean to do anything wrong.’’ 300 Ragghianti said she did not acknowledge the call in any way.301

In November 1998, Hearing Examiner Sam Robertson recommended reexamination of the Commission’s decision and a possible reduction of time to be served. Apparently unaware that Robertson’s recommendation was only preliminary advice and not a

final action on the case, Clinton sent ‘‘a lavish letter of gratitude’’

to the Commission on November 17, 1998.302 The letter states in

part:

There are certain situations in almost everyone’s life that

require standing up for what is right, regardless of the

possible consequences. . . . Over the past few years, and

for several reasons, this particular case became very personal with me. I felt it necessary to stand and fight for

what I thought was fair. I never asked for, never expected

and never received any preferential treatment. You simply

treated me with respect by allowing me, through written

correspondence,303 to express my passionate feelings regarding this case. The entire process was handled in a fair

and professional manner.

At the conclusion of the hearing on Friday, October 30th,

1998, a release date was given. It is to be January 15,

1999. I have marked that date on my calendar as a day

of celebration. I will celebrate in my own private way,

filled with satisfaction and pride. With your decision, I feel

that justice has now been served for everyone.

With the utmost respect, appreciation and gratitude, I

want to thank you from the bottom of my heart.304

Neither Ragghianti nor Kowalski acknowledged the letter in any

way.305 In January 1999, the Parole Commission overruled Robertson’s recommendation and set a new parole date of March 2007.306

In April 1999, the full Parole Commission denied Gambino’s final

appeal and left in place a parole date of March 2007.307 Parole

Commission Chairman Michael Gaines recused himself from this

decision, based on his involvement in the myriad meetings and discussions regarding Roger Clinton’s involvement in the Gambino

758

308 USPC Document Production 00820 (Memorandum from Michael J. Gaines, Chairman, to

File (Apr. 9, 1999)) (Exhibit 57). 309 USPC Document Production 00868 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) (Exhibit 51). 310 Id. 311 Id. 312 Id. at 00869. 313 Id. 314 Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001); Interview with

Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). 315 Id. 316 Id. See generally n.214. 317 Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). 318 Id. 319 Id. 320 Id. 321 Id.

case and the resulting FBI investigation of Clinton’s contacts with

the Commission.308

In mid-January 1999, the FBI again contacted the Commission

requesting access to the Gambino file.309 On Friday, January 22,

1999, FBI Agent Jackie Dalrymple went to the Parole Commission

Offices to review the file.310 While she was there, Roger Clinton

again attempted to contact Ragghianti and Kowalski, leaving messages on their voice mail.311 Ragghianti and Kowalski notified General Counsel Stover who suggested that Agent Dalrymple be notified.312 Dalrymple asked to hear the two voice mail messages and,

upon hearing them, asked Ragghianti and Kowalski not to delete

them for a few days.313 On Monday, January 25, 1999, Agent

Dalrymple returned and asked to tape record the two voice mail

messages. Stover advised Ragghianti to cooperate, and she did.314

When asked about the content of the messages, Ragghianti said

she could not recall precisely what her message said but that she

was surprised Clinton was calling yet again.315 Ragghianti said she ‘‘felt kind of bad’’ about allowing the FBI to tape the message, comparing it to how she felt years ago in Tennessee when ‘‘friends were

in trouble with the law’’ because of actions she had taken.316

Ragghianti recalled that Kowalski’s message was longer than hers

and that Clinton had said something on Kowalski’s message that ‘‘made it sound like they were in cahoots.’’ 317 Ragghianti recalled

that she said jokingly to Kowalski, ‘‘My God Tom, what do you two

have going?’’ 318 She believed Kowalski was embarrassed by the

message and that is why he ultimately cooperated with the FBI.319

There is no support for Ragghianti’s suggestion, but it is telling

that Ragghianti thought Kowalski would need some sort of secret

motivation to work with the FBI. Every indication is that Kowalski

worked with the FBI merely because he believed it is important to

cooperate with law enforcement when requested to do so.

b. The FBI’s Request to Have an Agent Pose

Undercover

After listening to Roger Clinton’s messages to Ragghianti and

Kowalski, the FBI decided to intensify its investigation of Clinton.

The FBI came to Ragghianti and suggested a plan whereby

Kowalski would set up a meeting with Clinton away from the Parole Commission headquarters, at a local restaurant.320 Kowalski

would then introduce Clinton to another Parole Commission staffer

who could help Clinton with the Gambino case.321 In reality, this

Parole Commission staffer would be an undercover FBI agent. This

759

322 Id. 323 Id. 324 Id. 325 Id. 326 Id.

agent would then be able to talk to Clinton about the Gambino case

and determine if Clinton was attempting to influence the Commission illegally. General Counsel Michael Stover had no objection to

the FBI plan.322 Marie Ragghianti, though, rejected this proposal

out of hand without consulting with Chairman Gaines or the rest

of the Parole Commission.323

Ragghianti’s basis for rejecting the FBI proposal was highly suspect. She felt that the Parole Commission ‘‘did not conduct its business in restaurants’’ and that it would make the Parole Commission look bad if someone overheard the discussion between Clinton

and the undercover FBI agent.324 She also felt that it was entrapment to allow the FBI to operate under Parole Commission auspices in order to obtain evidence against Roger Clinton.325

Ragghianti also was annoyed by Stover’s approval of the FBI plan.

She felt that he had ‘‘crossed over the line and lost legal objectivity’’ and ‘‘had no concern’’ for the Commission.326 However,

Ragghianti appears to be the one who ‘‘crossed over the line and

lost legal objectivity’’ in rejecting the FBI’s request. Her reason for

rejecting the request—that it did not reflect the way the Commission normally conducts business—misses the point. In order to be

successful, an FBI operation of this sort requires exactly the sort

of informal environment to which Ragghianti objected. The fact

that such a meeting would be less formal and less professional

than normal Commission business is exactly why the FBI wanted

to do it. If Clinton were so inclined, a relaxed environment would

make him feel comfortable enough to make candid admissions that

might yield evidence of illegality in the Gambino case. Ragghianti’s

reason for opposing the request, therefore, was essentially that it

was likely to be successful. Moreover, her characterization of the

FBI proposal as ‘‘entrapment’’ is without merit and represents a

judgment that she lacked both the expertise and the responsibility

to make. The FBI agents and their superiors are accountable for

entrapment issues in their investigations, not the Parole Commission Chief of Staff.

The real question is what was Marie Ragghianti’s actual motive

for rejecting the FBI request. Ragghianti had a reputation for ethical conduct prior to coming to the Commission. That she would

make such a decision is, therefore, surprising. However, she clearly

went out of her way to be accommodating to Roger Clinton. Whether Ragghianti was trying to curry favor with the Clinton Administration or whether she just genuinely liked Roger Clinton is unclear. But, for Ragghianti to ignore the advice of the Parole Commission General Counsel regarding such a sensitive legal matter

suggests, at best, that she was not objective in her handling of the

Clinton-Gambino matter. At worst, Ragghianti may have been trying to protect Roger Clinton.

The effect of Ragghianti’s decision certainly was to protect Clinton. Her decision to reject the undercover plan may have had a

crippling effect on the FBI investigation. As described below, the

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327 Interview with Judge Stephen Larson, former Assistant U.S. Attorney, Central District of

California (Aug. 16, 2001). 328 USPC Document Production 00869 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) (Exhibit 51). 329Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (July 27,

2001). 330 Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001); Interview

with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001). 331 USPC Document Production 00869 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) (Exhibit 51). 332Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (July 27,

2001). See n.214. 333 USPC Document Production 00869 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) (Exhibit 51). 334 Id. Stover said he was sick with the flu and a 102-degree temperature on this day, so it

was difficult for him to remember the details. He does recall staff from the Commission called

him at home and insisted that he ‘‘weigh in’’ on the matter. After reviewing Ragghianti’s meeting notes, Stover said he did not see anything in them that was inconsistent with his recollection. Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001).

FBI would continue with its attempts to determine the purpose of

Clinton’s contacts with the Parole Commission. Rather than having

an undercover FBI agent directly in contact with Clinton, though,

the FBI had to work through Tom Kowalski, who allowed the FBI

to place listening devices in his office. However, Kowalski, unlike

a trained FBI agent, was uncomfortable talking to Clinton while

his office was bugged. Law enforcement sources who helped investigate the Clinton-Gambino case have informed the Committee that

the undercover contacts with Clinton were exactly the thing that

the case was missing.327

c. The FBI’s Recording of Clinton’s Conversations

with Thomas Kowalski

After Ragghianti rejected the initial FBI proposal, Agent

Dalrymple proposed another possible approach to Roger Clinton. In

late January 1999, she suggested that Tom Kowalski page Roger

Clinton, and then when Clinton called back, the FBI would tape

their conversation.328 The FBI would provide Kowalski with suggested questions for Clinton to determine Clinton’s purpose in contacting the Parole Commission. Even though the FBI had significantly reduced the scope of its request, Ragghianti still opposed cooperation.329

Despite her opposition to the FBI’s request, Ragghianti took the

FBI request to other staff at the Parole Commission. According to

Ragghianti’s contemporaneous notes 330 of a meeting held later that

day, her initial reaction upon hearing of the request was to question whether any taping at the Commission’s headquarters in

Maryland would be illegal, ‘‘recalling the Linda Tripp debacle related to a similar tape recording.’’ 331 Ragghianti also referred to her

experiences in Tennessee, explaining that she had not cooperated

with an FBI request for her to allow them to make recordings of

her conversations.332 Deputy DAEO Sharon Gervasoni advised

Ragghianti and Kowalski that she would ordinarily urge that Clinton’s call be answered by another letter requesting that Clinton

send his inquiries in writing.333 Given the FBI’s request, however,

she recommended that General Counsel Stover, who was home on

sick leave, be contacted for his input about how to handle the situation.334 Stover told his colleagues that a similar situation had

arisen before and that the Commission employee was advised that

the decision of whether to record a conversation to assist the FBI

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335 USPC Document Production 00869 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) (Exhibit 51). 336 Id. 337 Id. 338 Id. at 00870. 339 Id. at 00867. 340 Id. at 00871. 341 Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). 342During the Parole Commission’s debate of this issue, Commissioner Simpson also expressed concerns that the Office of Independent Counsel was involved: ‘‘Commissioner Simpson

again stated that someone needs to ask Jackie Dalrymple what they’re investigating. There was

subsequent discussion regarding the fact that it appears at this time not to be related to Ken

Starr. Commissioner Simpson stated that we need to call [Eric] Holder if we believe it’s a Starr

matter.’’ USPC Document Production 00870 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) (Exhibit 51). However, Deputy DAEO Gervasoni ‘‘expressed doubts’’ about whether the Commission should contact Holder’s office. She said that her ‘‘impression of Holder is that he’s a ‘stickler,’ ‘by the book’

kind of person,’’ and that the Commission would need a ‘‘good reason to refuse cooperation’’ with

the FBI. Id. 343 Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). 344 Id. 345 Id.

tated by the Commission.335 Therefore, Stover advised that the

Commission precedent be followed and that Kowalski should make

the decision about whether and to what extent he wished to cooperate with the FBI.336 Ragghianti disagreed, inquiring as to ‘‘why

any USPC employee might be free to exercise that kind of decisionmaking in an issue so important to the functioning of the Commission.’’ 337 Because she disagreed with Stover on how to handle this

issue, Ragghianti took it to the Parole Commissioners for their decision.338

At 4:35 p.m. that day, Chairman Gaines convened a meeting

with Commissioner Reilly, Commissioner Simpson, Chief of Staff

Ragghianti, and Deputy DAEO Gervasoni to discuss the FBI’s request.339 Two main issues arose during this meeting. First, there

was discussion about whether Kowalski should be able to decide for

himself whether to cooperate with the FBI or whether that was a

decision for the Parole Commission to make. Second, there was extensive discussion about why the FBI was investigating Clinton

and whether the investigation was part of the Office of Independent Counsel investigation of President Clinton. The Commissioners

ended the meeting by reaching ‘‘the general consensus that no one

present should tell Mr. Kowalski what to do.’’ 340

However, because of the concerns that the Commissioners and

Ragghianti had about why the FBI was investigating Roger Clinton, Ragghianti followed up to determine the purpose of the Clinton

investigation. According to Ragghianti, she had fears that the FBI’s

investigation of Roger Clinton was a ‘‘witchhunt.’’ 341 These fears

appear to have been based partly on Ragghianti’s erroneous belief

that the FBI investigation was part of the Office of Independent

Counsel investigation of President Clinton.342 Ragghianti first

called Lynn Battaglia, the U.S. Attorney in Maryland.343 Agent

Dalrymple had told Ragghianti to call Battaglia if she had any concerns. Battaglia told Ragghianti that the investigation was ‘‘not a

wild goose chase,’’ that she knew Agent Dalrymple was a ‘‘good

agent,’’ and that this was not ‘‘a witch hunt.’’ 344 Some of

Ragghianti’s fears about the investigation were allayed by

Battaglia’s assurances.345 Battaglia’s familiarity with the case also

convinced Ragghianti that this investigation was being conducted

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346Michael Stover also discovered that the Roger Clinton investigation was not being conducted by Independent Counsel Starr. According to a memorandum prepared by Ragghianti,

‘‘Mr. Stover advised Ms. Ragghianti that he had been advised by Roger Adams [who was informed by the FBI when they visited his office] that the investigation was Ken Starr’s; however,

Mr. Stover stated that sometime later, he had received a call from an FBI asst. general counsel,

who said that the investigation had the attention of both the FBI Director & Gen’l Counsel.’’ USPC Document Production 00870 (Meeting Notes, Jan. 26, 1999) (Exhibit 51). Ragghianti also

said that Stover had told her on another occasion that he believed the investigation had been

initiated in a U.S. Attorney’s Office in California. Id. 347 Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001) 348 Id. 349 Id. 350 Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). 351 Id. 352 Id. 353 USPC Document Production 00866 (Memorandum from Thomas C. Kowalski, Case Operations Administrator, to File (Jan. 27, 1999)) (Exhibit 58). 354Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (July 27,

2001). 355 Id.

by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Maryland, not Independent Counsel Starr.346

However, Ragghianti still was not comfortable with Michael Stover’s conclusion that whether Tom Kowalski cooperated with the

FBI was a personal decision, not a Parole Commission decision.

Therefore, Ragghianti and Stover called the Deputy Attorney General’s office and discussed the matter with Kevin Ohlsen, the Chief

of Staff to the Deputy Attorney General, and David Margolis, an

Associate Deputy Attorney General.347 They called to see if ‘‘any

responsible person in Main Justice was aware’’ of the investigation.348 Ohlsen promised to look into it and later told Stover that

the ‘‘higher-ups knew about it.’’ 349 Ragghianti also recalls that

Ohlsen and Margolis informed them that the FBI’s proposed contacts with Roger Clinton were not ‘‘entrapment,’’ but on the other

hand, they stated that the Parole Commission did have a say in

whether Kowalski should cooperate with the FBI.350 But, according

to Ragghianti, by this point, the Commissioners did not want to

have any more meetings about the Gambino matter because they

were concerned that they would have to recuse themselves from a

decision on the Gambino case.351 Therefore, they allowed Kowalski

to decide for himself whether to cooperate with the FBI.352

According to Marie Ragghianti, the Parole Commission staff also

debated whether they should inform the White House regarding

the FBI’s investigation. According to Ragghianti, they debated this

point a ‘‘number of times’’ but decided not to inform the White

House. While it is comforting that Parole Commission decided not

to inform the White House about the investigation, it is slightly

troubling that such action was even seriously considered. Clearly,

the FBI was conducting a proper, authorized investigation that targeted the President’s brother and potentially involved the White

House. For the Parole Commission to inform the White House of

such an investigation would likely have hindered the legitimate

FBI inquiry.

Kowalski quickly agreed to cooperate with the FBI’s investigation.353 He went to an FBI office where there were facilities to

record a telephone call and placed one to Roger Clinton’s cell

phone.354 Kowalski left a voice mail for Clinton, but Clinton did not

call back.355 Kowalski could not recall for certain whether they

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356 Id. 357 Id. 358 Id. 359 Id. 360 Id. A transcript exists of this taped conversation between Clinton and Kowalski. Despite

specific requests from the Committee for the transcript, the Justice Department has refused to

produce it. Despite the fact that they have provided the Committee with hundreds of pages regarding Clinton’s involvement in the Gambino case, and the FBI’s investigation of Clinton’s role

in Gambino case, the Justice Department claims that the transcript, and a number of other documents cannot be provided to the Committee because of the Department’s ‘‘ongoing criminal investigation.’’ 361 Id. 362 Id. 363Other commission staff also had the impression that the FBI had ceased its investigation.

According to Michael Stover, ‘‘things were pretty tense at the Parole Commission about this,’’

before he went on vacation from late March to early April 1999. However, when he returned,

the issue appeared to be over because ‘‘the FBI had not heard what they wanted to hear Roger

say.’’ From Stover’s perspective, they had ‘‘dropped the matter.’’ Stover said he was not aware

of any other incidents in which conversations with Roger Clinton were recorded, and he was

also unaware of other contacts between Roger Clinton and Parole Commission personnel. Interview with Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, USPC (July 17, 2001)

were ever successful in recording a live telephone conversation with

Clinton but said they may have.356

Given their inability to obtain any useful evidence from a recorded telephone call, the FBI then arranged to record a meeting

between Kowalski and Clinton at the Parole Commission offices. In

Spring 1999, Clinton called Kowalski and told him that he was

coming into town for the White House Easter Egg hunt and arranged to come by the Parole Commission offices and meet with

Kowalski.357 The FBI wired Kowalski’s office with a microphone

under his desk and monitored the conversation from a car in front

of the building.358 Kowalski said the FBI had suggested questions

to ask Clinton such as, ‘‘Is there anything you want me to do,’’ and

‘‘Should I do anything further?’’ 359 Clinton and Kowalski had the

meeting, but Clinton did not provide any incriminating responses

to Kowalski’s questions.360 Kowalski said that after the meeting,

the agents came to his office and indicated they would have to close

the investigation.361 That was the last time Kowalski recalled having contact with the FBI regarding this matter.362 Indeed, it appears that the FBI’s interest in Clinton’s contacts with the Parole

Commission did come to an end with the taped meeting between

Clinton and Kowalski.363

Given the fact that the Committee has not been provided with

the transcript of the taped conversation between Clinton and

Kowalski, it is difficult to determine all of the reasons why the FBI

was not able to pursue the investigation of Clinton’s lobbying of the

Parole Commission. However, Kowalski made it clear that he was

not comfortable participating in the taped conversation with Clinton. Kowalski’s lack of comfort likely had some impact on Roger

Clinton, and if Clinton had been planning to make any illegal proposals, he was unlikely to do so in such a meeting. The failure of

the taped conversation with Kowalski makes Ragghianti’s decision

to reject the FBI undercover proposal even more significant. If the

FBI was able to have a trained, professional undercover agent discussing Gambino’s parole with Clinton, it might have made a significant difference in the FBI’s case. However, due to Ragghianti’s

refusal to cooperate with the FBI, it is impossible to know what

would have happened.

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364 In February 1998, Clinton was still in the middle of his series of meetings with Commission staff, and likely did not yet see the need to escalate matters to the White House. By February 2000, the Commission had rejected Gambino’s bid for parole, but it was likely still too

early for Clinton to be meeting with Lindsey regarding a pardon or commutation for Gambino.

Nothing in the notes suggests that Clinton was asking for executive clemency; rather, the discussion appeared to be limited to parole. In addition, Gambino’s commutation petition was not

filed with the White House until November 2000. NARA Document Production (Petition for

Commutation, Nov. 2000) (Exhibit 59). In February 1999, on the other hand, Clinton was still

trying to obtain meetings with Parole Commission staff, but their receptiveness had dropped off

considerably, since, unknown to Clinton, the FBI was investigating the matter. In January 1999,

the Commission overturned the preliminary decision in favor of Gambino, and was moving towards a final resolution of Gambino’s parole bid in April 1999. A final piece of evidence supporting the conclusion that the meeting took place in February 1999 is the fact that Bruce Lindsey

conducted legal research regarding the Gambino case in April 1999. NARA Document Production (Summary page from Lexis-Nexis Research, the White House, Apr. 5, 1999) (Exhibit 60).

This research may have been prompted by Clinton’s meeting with Lindsey. Accordingly, February 1999 is the likely time when Roger Clinton approached Lindsey and asked for his assistance with Gambino’s parole bid. 365 NARA Document Production (Handwritten Notes) (Exhibit 61). 366 Id. 367 Id. 368 Id. 369The contact took place in January 1996 when Commissioner Michael Gaines called Trey

Schroeder at the White House to let him know that Clinton was contacting the Commission

about Gambino. See n.195 and accompanying text.

3. Roger Clinton’s Apparent Attempt to Involve the

White House in the Parole Decision

One set of notes produced to the Committee by the National Archives indicates that Roger Clinton approached White House staff

regarding the Gambino case. Notes produced to the Committee

from the files of White House Deputy Counsel Bruce Lindsey indicate that Lindsey and Clinton met on February 19 of an unknown

year regarding the Gambino matter. While assigning a date to the

notes without Bruce Lindsey’s or Roger Clinton’s cooperation is

somewhat speculative, the facts suggest that the meeting most likely occurred in February 1999.364

Lindsey’s notes reflect that Roger Clinton explained the procedural history of Rosario Gambino’s criminal case and bid for parole.

Clinton apparently claimed that: (1) Gambino had only dealt one

kilogram of heroin; (2) Gambino’s codefendants were treated more

leniently than Gambino; and (3) there was no evidence that

Gambino was linked to organized crime.365 The first and third

claims are false. The second claim is true but, according to a federal appeals court, was justified in light of his leadership role in

the conspiracy. Clinton apparently made special reference to Parole

Commission General Counsel Michael Stover, who had rejected

Clinton’s previous entreaties to the Commission.366 Lindsey’s notes

state, ‘‘Michael Stover—counsel to Mike Gaines’’ and then have an

arrow pointing from Stover’s name to the word ‘‘improper,’’ which

is underlined.367 The notes also indicate that Clinton provided

Lindsey with a number of documents relating to the Gambino parole case.368

Assuming that the meeting took place on February 19, 1999, and

related to the Gambino parole effort rather than the Gambino

clemency effort, the question is what, if any, action did Lindsey or

other White House staff take as a result of the meeting with Roger

Clinton. Neither Parole Commission nor White House records reflect any contacts between the White House staff and the Parole

Commission regarding the Gambino case, other than the one previously described.369 However, Roger Clinton’s attempt to reach out

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370 USPC Document Production 00010 (Sentence Monitoring Computation Data, Mar. 19,

2001) (Exhibit 62). 371 American Express Document Production (Exhibit 63). 372 Alison Leigh Cowan, Roger Clinton’s Dogged Effort for Drug Trafficker, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.

26, 2001. The Committee requested records relating to this matter, including summaries of FBI

interviews with the Air Force intelligence officers. The Justice Department declined to produce

those records to the Committee because of its ongoing criminal investigation of Roger Clinton. 373 Alison Leigh Cowan, Roger Clinton’s Dogged Effort for Drug Trafficker, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.

26, 2001. 374 Id. 375 Id. 376 Id. 377 Id. 378The discovery of this check in Roger Clinton’s bank records is what led the Committee to

begin inquiries regarding Rosario Gambino. When the Committee received the original check

from Tommy Gambino in response to a subpoena, it became apparent that the check had been

filled out by three different individuals using three different pens. Anna Gambino apparently

signed the check, which was presumably blank; Tommy Gambino then apparently filled out the

amount of the check, $50,000; and then the ‘‘payable to’’ line was filled out in Roger Clinton’s handwriting, payable to Odgie Music. Tommy Gambino Document Production (Exhibit 64).

to Bruce Lindsey demonstrates that Clinton was intent on using

his influence at the White House improperly to influence the Parole

Commission’s handling of the Gambino case. While Clinton may

not have successfully enlisted Bruce Lindsey in his effort, it is disturbing that Clinton’s overtures received any consideration at the

Clinton White House at all, much less the lengthy meeting and follow-up research indicated by the documents in Lindsey’s file.

Despite Roger Clinton’s efforts, Rosario Gambino’s bid to obtain

parole failed. In April 1999, the Parole Commission denied

Gambino’s final appeal and set a parole date of March 2007.370

D. Roger Clinton’s Financial Relationship with the

Gambinos

Undeterred by his failure to win parole for Rosario Gambino,

Roger Clinton’s contacts with the Gambino family continued. Clinton’s relationship with Tommy Gambino included a March 1999

trip together from Los Angeles to Washington, D.C.371 It is unknown what Gambino and Clinton did in Washington or with

whom they met.

Clinton’s relationship with Gambino also had a significant financial dimension. In 1999, Roger Clinton was playing a game of pickup golf with three strangers at a public course in Los Angeles.372

Somewhere near the tenth hole, Tommy Gambino drove up in a

golf cart and had a brief conversation with Clinton, handed Clinton

a box, and left.373 Clinton told his golfing partners that the person

who had been talking to him was Tommy Gambino and that he

was ‘‘helping’’ Tommy Gambino’s father.374 Clinton then opened

the box Gambino had given him. In the box was a gold Rolex

watch.375 What Roger Clinton did not know was that two members

of his foursome were Air Force intelligence officers.376 They were

apparently troubled by Clinton’s relationship with Gambino and

the receipt of the Rolex and reported the incident to the FBI, which

was continuing its investigation.377

Later in 1999, Clinton received a $50,000 payment from the

Gambinos. On September 27, 1999, Anna Gambino, Tommy

Gambino’s sister, wrote a check to Roger Clinton’s company in the

amount of $50,000 dated September 29, 1999.378 The funds used to

pay Clinton appear to have originated with Lisa Gambino in Staten

Island, New York. Anna Gambino deposited three cashier’s checks

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379Fidelity Federal Document Production (Exhibit 65). 380Fidelity Federal Document Production (Exhibit 66). 381The Committee was, however, able to determine the source of the funds. The cashier’s

checks provided to Anna by Lisa Gambino were the proceeds of a $499,000 mortgage on her

home in Staten Island, New York. Staten Island Savings Bank Document Production (Exhibit

67). In the loan application documents, Lisa Gambino wrote a note in her own hand indicating

she was seeking the loan ‘‘for an investment.’’ Staten Island Savings Bank Document Production

(Exhibit 68). Given the refusal of Roger Clinton and Tommy Gambino to cooperate, however,

the Committee has also been unable to definitively determine the purpose of the $50,000 payment to Roger Clinton. However, as discussed below, Clinton suggested to the FBI and the

media that the money was a loan, which appears to be false. 382See Fidelity Federal Document Production. 383William K. Rashbaum, Concrete Case; Firm Allegedly Tied to Mob Helps Build Federal

Prison, NEWSDAY, Jan. 23, 1995. 384Selwyn Raab, Two Admit Importing Heroin for Mafia Crime Family, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,

1994. 385William K. Rashbaum, Concrete Case; Firm Allegedly Tied to Mob Helps Build Federal

Prison, NEWSDAY, Jan. 23, 1995. 386 Id. 387 Id. 388 Id.

from Lisa Gambino dated April 30, 1999, totaling $227,889.97 into

the account from which she later paid Roger Clinton’s company

$50,000.379 The bank records indicate that without this deposit,

there would have been insufficient funds to cover the check to Clinton.380 However, Lisa Gambino has refused to answer requests for

an interview. Accordingly, the Committee has been unable to determine the nature of the relationship between Lisa Gambino and

Anna Gambino or why Lisa Gambino paid Anna Gambino the

money.381

Other evidence connects Lisa and Anna Gambino to reputed organized crime figures. Both the accounts of Anna and Lisa

Gambino received frequent inflows of funds from Antonio Genovese,382 a New York businessman who was partners with Giovanni

Gambino in G&G Concrete Company.383 Giovanni ‘‘John’’ Gambino

is the brother of Rosario Gambino and was convicted of murder and

heroin distribution, together with his other brother, Giuseppe ‘‘Joe’’

Gambino.384 G&G Concrete played a central role in a 1995 dispute

between another New York construction firm, Nasso and Associates, and the city’s School Construction Authority (‘‘SCA’’). The disagreement was settled, but according to reports, Nasso had failed

to disclose that it received financing from G&G Concrete partner

Antonio Genovese.385 Both Genovese and John Gambino had

worked for Julius Nasso, the grandfather of the principal of Nasso

and Associates, before forming G&G Concrete.386 According to

news reports:

Testimony at the 1987 trial of Genovese mob boss Anthony

Salerno’s [sic] disclosed that the elder Nasso met with

then-Gambino boss Paul Castellano and others in an effort

to convince another firm to step aside and let Nasso take

the $26 million Javits Convention Center job.387

The controversy led to Nasso and Associates being prohibited from

bidding on New York City school projects.388

E. The FBI’s Interview of Roger Clinton

In the same time that Roger Clinton was receiving $50,000 and

a gold Rolex from the Gambinos, the FBI was continuing its investigation of his relationship with Tommy Gambino. The report of

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389 Interview with Judge Stephen Larson, former Assistant U.S. Attorney, Central District of

California (Aug. 16, 2001). 390 Although Henderson is the former head of the Justice Department’s Organized Crime

Strike Force in Los Angeles, he has represented individuals alleged to have ties to organized

crime, including Tommy Gambino, Louis Caruso, a ‘‘reputed soldier in the Los Angeles mob family,’’ and Ronald ‘‘The Cigar’’ Sacco, an alleged $1 billion per year bookie with reputed ties to

organized crime families. John L. Smith, Oddsmaker Going Back to Control Board to Clear His

Name, LAS VEGAS REVIEW JOURNAL, June 11, 1997; Seth Rosenfeld, Alleged Bookie Gets Huge

Bail, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Dec. 31, 1993. 391 Interview with Judge Stephen Larson, former Assistant U.S. Attorney, Central District of

California (Aug. 16, 2001). 392 Id. 393 Id. 394 Id. 395DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–00001 (Summary of Interview with Roger Clinton, Oct.

1, 1999) (Exhibit 1). 396 Id. at FBI–RC–00003.

Clinton’s receipt of the Rolex reinvigorated the investigation, leading to the interview of Clinton. At some point in 1999, the Justice

Department also issued a grand jury subpoena to Tommy

Gambino.389 Through his attorney, James Henderson,390 Gambino

informed the Justice Department that he planned on invoking his

Fifth Amendment rights.391 Accordingly, the Department did not

call Gambino to the grand jury.392 Instead, Gambino and his attorney participated in an interview with the Justice Department.393

However, reportedly, little resulted from the interview.394 Due to

the Justice Department’s decision to withhold documents selectively relating to the Clinton-Gambino investigation from the Committee, including the Tommy Gambino interview summary, it is not

clear exactly what Gambino was questioned about, whether he was

truthful, or whether he was interviewed before or after Roger Clinton.

On September 30, 1999, the same day that Roger Clinton deposited the $50,000 Gambino check, two FBI agents interviewed Clinton at his home in California.395 It is not clear what prompted the

FBI’s interview, and specifically, whether they were aware of the

$50,000 check. The FBI interview summary shows that Clinton attempted to mislead the FBI agents on several occasions and had

to change his story a number of times. Even with Clinton’s belated

efforts to correct his falsehoods, in the end he appears to have lied

to the FBI agents about multiple topics.

1. Roger Clinton’s Statements Regarding His Brother’s

Knowledge

Clinton’s first falsehood related to whether he discussed his efforts on behalf of Gambino with President Clinton:

Clinton stated he did not discuss his decision to assist the

Gambino family in this case with anyone. . . . Clinton

stated he did not tell his brother, the President of the

United States, specifically what he was working on. He believes, however, that the President knew he had some

business with the U.S. Parole Commission, but did not

know specifically what he was working on. He did not tell

his brother that he was working on the Rosario Gambino

case. He did not seek advise [sic] or referrals from the

President in his efforts to contact the Parole Commission

on behalf of Rosario Gambino.396

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397See n.251 and accompanying text. 398 USPC Document Production 00894 (Memorandum from Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, to File (Jan. 31, 1996)) (Exhibit 42). 399DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–00003 (Summary of Interview with Roger Clinton, Oct.

1, 1999) (Exhibit 1). 400Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (July 27,

2001). 401 USPC Document Production 00894 (Memorandum from Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, to File (Jan. 31, 1996)) (Exhibit 42). 402DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–00003 (Summary of Interview with Roger Clinton, Oct.

1, 1999) (Exhibit 1).

As discussed earlier, Clinton told Thomas Kowalski the opposite.

According to Kowalski, Clinton explicitly told him on several occasions that the President knew what Roger was doing for

Gambino.397 Michael Stover’s contemporaneous record of his conversation with Clinton in January 1996 is also far more consistent

with Kowalski’s recollection than with Clinton’s claims to the FBI:

[Roger Clinton] began the conversation by informing me

that his brother ‘‘[]is completely aware of my involvement.’’

Roger Clinton stated that his brother had recommended to

him that he not meet with Commissioner Getty . . . because Commissioner Getty’s Kansas City Regional Office

was about to be closed. Roger Clinton informed me that his

brother suggested that he contact Commissioner Gaines

instead.398

Clinton told Kowalski that the President knew of his efforts on

behalf of Gambino; then, he told the FBI that he never discussed

the matter with his brother. Clinton told Stover that the President

was actively advising him in his efforts to contact the Commission;

then, he told the FBI that his brother was not involved at all. If

he had said nothing further on the matter, the worst one could conclude would be that either Clinton was lying to Kowalski and Stover or he was lying to the FBI. However, Clinton went further by

telling the FBI ‘‘that he did not represent to anyone on the Parole

Commission that his brother was aware of his efforts to assist the

Gambino family or that the President was supporting his effort to

assist in getting Rosario Gambino released from prison.’’ 399 If

Kowalski is to be believed, then Clinton’s statement is false. According to Kowalski, Clinton did represent that his brother was

aware of his efforts to assist Gambino.400 Unlike Clinton’s statement to the FBI, Kowalski’s statement is not a self-serving denial

standing alone. Rather, Kowalski has no discernable motivation to

lie, and his recollection about Clinton’s representation of his brother’s knowledge is consistent with the contemporaneous, written

record of a conversation in which Clinton made very similar statements to Stover.401

2. Roger Clinton’s Statements Regarding Payment

from the Gambinos

Clinton told the FBI that his efforts on behalf of Rosario

Gambino were ‘‘above board.’’ 402 He told the agents that immediately after learning that Commission personnel were unable to

discuss particulars of the case with him without violating the Privacy Act, he ‘‘processed the proper paperwork to register as an offiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00784 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 5601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
769

403 Id. It appears that this statement was also untrue. The Parole Commission did not provide

the Committee with any such paperwork, and internal Parole Commission documents repeatedly

refer to the fact that Clinton had not filed the appropriate paperwork under the Privacy Act.

See, e.g., USPC Document Production 00879 (Memorandum from Sharon Gervasoni, DDAEO, to

Marie Ragghianti, Chief of Staff (Sept. 23, 1998)) (Exhibit 69). 404 Id. at FBI–RC–00004. 405The Roger Clinton FBI interview summary does not state what time of day on September

30 the interview was conducted. Similarly, Roger Clinton’s bank records do not indicate what

time of day Clinton deposited the $50,000 check from Gambino. In the absence of more documentation, it is difficult to be certain that Clinton had received the Gambino check at the time

of the FBI interview. However, considering the fact that the check was dated September 29, and

deposited September 30, it is distinctly possible that Clinton received the check before September 30. If Clinton had the check in his possession at the time of the FBI interview, his statements about payment from Gambino would have been explicitly false. 406 Id. at FBI–RC–00005–06.

cial representative of Rosario Gambino.’’ 403 The agents then began

to ask about compensation for Clinton’s assistance:

Clinton was asked if he was ever given anything of value

for his assistance in this matter. He advised he had not received anything for this assistance. Clinton stated that

Tommy Gambino said if he (Clinton) could help get his father released from prison, ‘‘we will take care of you.’’ Clinton said that he knows what that means. He stated ‘‘I’m

not stupid, I understand what the big picture is.’’ ... Clinton advised it was his understanding [that] if he were

successful, he would be financially compensated. . . . Clinton then stated that he had received two airline tickets to

Washington D.C. from Tommy Gambino and expenses for

the trips. Tommy Gambino put the airline tickets on his

credit card. Clinton also admitted to having received an

undisclosed amount of expenses, but did not provide any

information as to how the expense money was furnished to

him.404

The trip to Washington D.C. mentioned here appears to be a different trip than the one mentioned earlier, because the earlier trip

was paid for on Roger Clinton’s company credit card, not on

Gambino’s. Accordingly, Clinton and Gambino may have traveled

to Washington together on more than one occasion.

After Clinton initially denied that he had ever received anything

of value for his assistance to the Gambino family (other than the

airline tickets and expense money), the agents began questioning

him about any gifts he may have received from the Gambinos.

Clinton then partially addressed the $50,000 he had either just received or was about to receive from Gambino that day: 405

Clinton advised he is currently trying to buy a house in

the Torrance, California area and Tommy Gambino has offered to loan him an undisclosed amount of money for the

down payment. This loan is not compensation for his assistance to the Gambino’s [sic] in attempting to get Rosario

Gambino released from prison. The offer is for a loan

which must be repaid. It is not to give Clinton the money.

This offer was made regardless of the outcome with Clintons [sic] efforts to obtain Rosario Gambino’s release.406

Clinton’s explanation of the Gambino ‘‘loan offer’’ is misleading for

a number of reasons. First, if Clinton had received the $50,000

check from Anna Gambino at the time of the interview, his stateVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00785 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 5601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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407Telephone Interview with Gerard Guez, CEO, Tarrant Apparel Group (June 11, 2001). 408 Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 70). 409 Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 71). 410Property Transfer Record, Los Angeles County, CA (Doc. #:99–2032105). 411 Id; Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 72). 412 Alison Leigh Cowan, Pardon for Felon Considered After Kin Paid Roger Clinton, N.Y.

TIMES, June 28, 2001.

ments would clearly be misleading, as he would have received an

actual payment, not just an ‘‘offer.’’ Second, there is no evidence

that the payment from Gambino was a loan, or was ever intended

to be a loan. There is no record of repayment of the $50,000 in either Clinton’s or Gambino’s bank records.

Also undermining Clinton’s claims that the money from Gambino

was a loan are the other large payments Clinton received in this

same period, which were clearly intended to be loans and which

Clinton repaid in short order. For example, in the same time period, Clinton received and repaid a large loan from Gerard Guez,

CEO of the Tarrant Apparel Group. According to Guez, Clinton

said he needed money to buy a house and promised to repay Guez

from funds he would soon receive as payment for a performance in

Korea.407 On October 25, 1999, Guez wired $100,000 to Roger Clinton’s business checking account.408 Less than three months later,

Clinton had repaid the entire amount (with no interest) through

two checks from his personal checking account: one on December

17, 1999, for $50,000 and another on January 6, 2000, also for

$50,000.409 Clinton did purchase a home for $570,000 on September 27, 1999, with a down payment of $114,000.410 The deed transfer was recorded on October 29, 1999, four days after Guez wired

the funds and two days after Clinton withdrew $115,703 from his

account.411 The $100,000 from Guez appears to have been the primary source of funds for the down payment rather than the

$50,000 from Gambino. Even if Roger Clinton used some of the

money from Gambino ($15,703 at most) for the down payment,

there appears to be no record of his repaying any of it. This is in

contrast to the $100,000 from Guez, which Roger repaid in full

within three months. Accordingly, the claim that the payment from

Gambino was a loan for a down payment on his house is clearly

false.

There is also evidence that Clinton attempted to coach Tommy

Gambino and influence his potential testimony regarding this payment. When it became clear that the Committee was investigating

the $50,000 payment from Gambino, Roger Clinton reportedly

called Gambino and attempted to convince him that the payment

had been a loan. As The New York Times reported:

According to one person close to the Gambinos, Roger Clinton called Tommy Gambino on Monday [June 25, 2001] because questions were being raised about the 1999 payment.

‘‘Don’t you remember this is money you gave me for my

house for a loan?’’ this person quoted Roger Clinton as saying to Tommy Gambino.

Tommy Gambino, this person said, thought it best not to

reply on the chance that the phone was tapped.412

771

413DOJ Document Production FBI–RC–00004–05 (Summary of Interview with Roger Clinton,

Oct. 1, 1999) (Exhibit 1). 414 Id. at FBI–RC–00005.

3. Roger Clinton’s Statements Regarding the Rolex

Watch

Roger Clinton also attempted to mislead the interviewing FBI

agents regarding the gold Rolex that he received from Tommy

Gambino. Clinton first attempted to tell the agents that he never

received any gifts from Gambino and then altered his story several

times:

Clinton was asked if he had received any gifts from

Tommy Gambino while he was assisting the family with

the case, and Clinton initially responded ‘‘no.’’ After further inquiry, Clinton then advised ‘‘I was shown a Rolex

watch once, but it was not given to me.’’ Clinton explained

that the watch was on the wrist of Tommy Gambino who

asked Clinton if he ever had a Rolex.

Clinton related that he and Tommy Gambino were discussing watches and cigars at a coffee shop in Beverly Hills,

the name and location of which Clinton could not remember.

***

Clinton stated that after leaving the coffee shop, Tommy

Gambino took him to look at watches at an unnamed

‘‘pawn shop,’’ also in Beverly Hills, California where they

encountered actor and Hollywood celebrity George Hamilton. Clinton said Hamilton, who is ‘‘a friend of Tommy’s,’’ sells watches and cigars. Clinton said Hamilton had a

briefcase full of watches which he displayed to Clinton and

Gambino, but they left without buying a watch.413

So, Clinton’s initial response when asked specifically about the

watch was to deny that he had ever received one. That version of

events, however, did not withstand scrutiny for long:

Clinton subsequently reversed his earlier denials and admitted to having actually received a watch from Tommy

Gambino, who told him it was an ‘‘Italian custom’’ to give

such a gift as a token of appreciation. Clinton could not remember either when he was given the watch, or where he

was when he received it. Clinton claimed, however, he did

not keep it, but returned it to Gambino after he had

‘‘heard’’ the watch is a ‘‘fake.’’ Clinton could not remember

who told him the watch was an imitation, or when he had

learned it was a ‘‘fake.’’ 414

Thus, Clinton’s second story was that he did receive a watch from

Gambino but had returned it. Again, this story did not withstand

scrutiny and was withdrawn:

Clinton again amended his previous statement when

pressed for details regarding the watch’s return. Clinton

stated that even though it was supposed to be ‘‘a fake,’’ he

772

415 Id. 416 Id. at FBI–RC–00006. 417 Id.

did not return the watch because it was a gift of appreciation from the family. Clinton contended that he never wore

it because it was ‘‘too gaudy’’ with a thick gold band and

a blue face. Clinton said he was confused in that he did

not know the present location of the watch. Clinton stated

‘‘Tommy could have it,’’ or that he may actually still have

the watch. He stated ‘‘he really didn’t know.’’ Clinton advised ‘‘It could be in my flippin trunk for all I know, it

could be in my garage, or almost anywhere.’’ Clinton offered to locate the watch ‘‘if it is really important, but it’s

going to take a lot of effort, so don’t ask unless you really

need it.’’ Clinton was asked to look for the watch after the

interview and contact the interviewing agents if he located

it. Clinton agreed to do so.

Clinton asked if Tommy Gambino was in trouble and if he

was involved in something Clinton should know about. He

stated that as far a [sic] he knew, Tommy Gambino is very

clean.415

Hence, Clinton’s third version was that he had received the watch,

did not return it, and was unsure of its location. Despite all three

earlier claims, Clinton later produced a Rolex watch to the agents

and offered the following explanation of how he had obtained it:

Clinton stated that he does now own a silver Rolex watch.

He bought it from an unknown street vendor in front of a

‘‘rainbow’’ or ‘‘multicolored’’ hotel in Tijuana, Mexico. He

paid $250 dollars for the watch in cash and has no receipt

of the purchase. He could not provide either the name,

street address or approximate location of the hotel.416

At this point in the interview, the agents took the unusual step of

warning Clinton about the potential consequences of lying to the

FBI:

[T]he interviewing agents advised Clinton of the provisions

of Title 18, U.S. Code Section 1001 and the criminal exposure of making false statements to federal agents. Clinton

was informed it was a violation of law to provide false information to federal law enforcement officers and that he

could be prosecuted, fined and imprisoned for doing so.

Clinton was then asked, after being advised of Title 18,

U.S. Code Section 1001, would he care to change or otherwise amend any of his previous statements, and Clinton

replied ‘‘No,’’ he was comfortable with what he had said.417

Clinton’s bumbling efforts to mislead the interviewing FBI

agents should not distract from the central fact that Roger Clinton

was attempting to conceal from the FBI the true nature of his relationship with Tommy Gambino, reputed underboss of the Los Angeles Mafia, and his efforts to win the release of Rosario Gambino,

a convicted heroin trafficker and organized crime figure. Clinton’s

efforts on behalf of the Gambino family were not merely embarVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00788 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 5601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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418 NARA Document Production (Petition for Commutation, Nov. 2000) (Exhibit 59). 419 Id. 420 USPC Document Production 00664 (Memorandum from John R. Simpson, Commissioner,

to National Commissioners (Jan. 13, 1999)) (Exhibit 55).

rassing. His behavior was unconscionable and his attempts to conceal certain key aspects of his involvement from the FBI were illegal. Clinton was attempting to use his influence to affect the decision of the U.S Parole Commission; he was receiving money from

the Gambino family; and he may have been doing it with the full

knowledge of his brother, the President. For Roger Clinton to

refuse to cooperate fully and truthfully with the FBI in an investigation of these deeply disturbing issues only strengthens the conclusion that Clinton knew his activity was highly unethical and

quite possibly illegal.

F. The Efforts to Obtain Executive Clemency for Rosario

Gambino

In November 2000, Rosario Gambino requested that President

Clinton exercise his power of executive clemency and commute his

prison sentence. Gambino filed with the White House a two-page

commutation petition, as well as a twelve-page brief with a number

of attachments.418 Gambino’s brief in support of his commutation

request made a number of familiar arguments: (1) that Gambino

was given a higher ‘‘offense severity rating’’ than his co-conspirators; (2) that Gambino had been subjected to prejudice based on national origin; and (3) that Gambino had an ‘‘outstanding institutional record’’ and strong family support, which merited release

from prison.419

The arguments raised by Gambino were seriously flawed. As has

been noted before, a federal appeals court explicitly rejected the

first two. The Parole Commission repeatedly and properly found

that Gambino’s offense severity rating was correctly set at level

eight, the highest available to the Commission. This rating was

based on the courts’ and the Commission’s judgment that Gambino

was at the head of a major heroin distribution ring and had been

involved in other major organized criminal activities. Gambino’s argument focused on the claim that his co-defendants received a less

severe rating of level six while being equally involved in the heroin

distribution ring. This claim does not have great merit. First, there

was evidence that it was Rosario Gambino, rather than Erasmo

Gambino or Anthony Spatola, who headed the heroin distribution

ring. In addition, the Parole Commission also determined that

Erasmo Gambino may have incorrectly been granted a rating of

level six, and likely should have received a more severe rating. The

Commission found that it ‘‘need not give the ringleader of a major

heroin conspiracy a lower rating just because his subordinates have

been rated too low.’’ 420

It also appears that Gambino’s arguments of discrimination

based on national origin were completely spurious. The only evidence cited in support of Gambino’s claim was a Parole Commission memo stating that ‘‘Gambino appears to come from an immigrant background in which family connections are simply exploited

774

421 USPC Document Production 00890 (Memorandum from Thomas C. Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, to Michael J. Gaines, Chairman (Dec. 24, 1997)) (Exhibit 44). 422Gambino v. United States Parole Comm’n, 216 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2000). 423Telephone Interview with Thomas Kowalski, Case Operations Manager, USPC (July 27,

2001). 424See Arnold H. Lubasch, 2 Convicted of Racketeering in Mafia Construction Case, N.Y.

TIMES, July 18, 1987 (describing Montemarano’s conviction). 425Letter from Gary M. Stern, General Counsel, National Archives and Records Administration, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Aug. 2, 2001) (within

Appendix I).

(as in the current offense) to get around the law.’’ 421 This quote

simply provides no evidence of prejudice against Gambino. Indeed,

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals summarily rejected Gambino’s

claim of racial prejudice.422 The Court likely recognized that the

Commission memo stated a simple fact, namely that Gambino’s

background indicated that he did, in the current offense, employ

family loyalty as a tool to ensure the success of his criminal enterprise.

Gambino’s claim that he was a model prisoner was incorrect.

Gambino did have one official infraction in his prison record, and

the Committee also learned that Gambino was transferred from at

least one prison because he was ‘‘muscling’’ other prisoners.423

While these offenses may not be as serious as other inmates’ infractions, they are not the actions of a model prisoner. Finally,

Gambino argued brazenly that he had ‘‘strong family support’’ and

could be provided a job by his son Tommy upon release. Given the

allegations suggesting that Tommy Gambino is an organized crime

figure in his own right and that his business partner is convicted

mobster Dominick ‘‘Donnie Shacks’’ Montemarano,424 it is hardly

an argument for Rosario Gambino’s release that he would return

home and take a job in the ‘‘family business.’’ It is clear that the Gambino commutation petition was filed with

the White House and rejected at some point in January 2001. Beyond that, few facts about consideration of his petition are known.

The inability to discover this information is the result of two unfortunate decisions. First, former Deputy White House Counsel Bruce

Lindsey and former Associate White House Counsel Meredith Cabe

refused to be interviewed by Committee staff regarding their handling of the Gambino matter. Second, the Bush Administration

withheld from the Committee four deliberative documents regarding the Gambino commutation decision.425 Both of these decisions

are disturbing. Lindsey and Cabe would be able to shed light on

whether the President was receptive to his brother’s pleas and how

close the Gambino commutation came to being granted. It is difficult to understand why the Bush Administration would want to

withhold from the Committee key documents about the Gambino

matter. The documents have a direct bearing on an apparent attempt by the former President’s brother to sell his access to the

White House to an alleged member of the Sicilian Mafia. Documents like these, which have a direct bearing on a case involving

the sale of access to the clemency process by a presidential sibling,

should not be withheld from Congress. The decision of the Bush

Administration to withhold these documents has kept the Committee from determining how the Gambino commutation request was

handled at the White House. These documents likely would inform

the Committee whether the Gambino commutation was seriously

775

426 NARA Document Production (Typewritten Notes) (Exhibit 73). 427 Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate White House Counsel, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001). 428 NARA Document Production (Typewritten Notes) (Exhibit 73). 429The reference ‘‘NCIS’’ is apparently a typographical error by Cabe. Supporting this conclusion first is the fact that there is no relevant database called ‘‘NCIS.’’ Second, the preceding sentence references NCIC. Third, another document prepared by Cabe indicates that she was requesting an NCIC check on Gambino. 430 NARA Document Production (Typewritten Notes) (Exhibit 73).

considered, what position White House staff took on the matter,

and whether the President was receptive to the Gambino request.

The few documents received by the Committee suggest that the

Gambino commutation may have received serious consideration at

the White House. Two documents located in the files of Meredith

Cabe indicate that Cabe requested a National Crime Information

Center (‘‘NCIC’’) background check on Rosario Gambino.426 Cabe

was the primary attorney in the White House Counsel’s office handling clemency-related matters in the waning days of the Clinton

Administration.427 The two documents were printed from a computer diskette labeled, ‘‘pardon lists.’’ 428 One of the documents

reads as follows:

NCIC for Michael Mahoney?

NCIS [sic] 429 for Rosario Gambino, [date of birth redacted], no social security number, incarcerated at Terminal Island, CA

Please provide all information known regarding Kimberly

Johnson’s incident report for ‘‘threatening bodily harm’’

Ask DOJ to contact sentencing judge in Diana G. Nelson

case?

NCIC: Peter Ninemire, [date of birth redacted], [social security number deleted]: what happened if we commute entire federal sentence; is he remanded to state custody??? 430

The other document prepared by Cabe reads as follows:

1. NCIC Checks

Michael Mahoney,

Rosario Gambino, [date of birth redacted], no social security number, incarcerated at Terminal Island, CA

Peter Ninemire, [date of birth redacted], [social security

number deleted]:

John Bustamente, [date of birth redacted], [social security

number deleted]

2. Follow up questions

Kimberly Johnson: please provide all information known

regarding incident report for ‘‘threatening bodily harm’’

Diana G. Nelson: Please contact sentencing judge regarding position on commutation.

776

431 NARA Document Production (Typewritten Notes) (Exhibit 73). 432 Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate White House Counsel, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001). 433 Id. 434 NARA Document Production (Typewritten Notes) (Exhibit 73). 435See ‘‘Clemency Recipients’’ <http://www.usdoj.gov/pardon/recipients.htm> (Pardons Granted

by President Clinton and Commutations Granted by President Clinton). 436Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001); Telephone Interview with George

Locke (Mar. 27, 2001); Telephone Interview with Joseph ‘‘Jay’’ McKernan (Apr. 10, 2001). See

also Verizon Document Production (Roger Clinton Phone Bill, Feb. 1, 2001) at 8–9.

Peter Ninemire: can you determine what happened if we

commute entire federal sentence; is he remanded to state

custody??? 431

These documents suggest that Gambino may have been a serious

candidate for clemency. Cabe was interviewed by Committee staff

prior to the discovery of the Clinton-Gambino matter and explained

that she was responsible for obtaining NCIC checks on serious candidates for clemency.432 The purpose of such a background check

was to ensure that there was no further criminal activity on the

part of the petitioner that had not been disclosed on the petition.433

The fact that the White House was requesting a background check

on Gambino suggests that his name had passed some level of serious scrutiny, and the White House was considering the commutation. The other names listed with Gambino’s also suggest that the

commutation was being seriously considered. Gambino’s name is

listed with Michael Mahoney, Peter Ninemire, John Bustamente,

Kimberly Johnson, and Diana G. Nelson.434 Three of those five individuals received executive clemency.435 This fact indicates that

Cabe’s list was not some preliminary list of individuals whose

names had been received by the White House. Rather, since sixty

percent of those on the list with Gambino actually received executive clemency, the list appears to consist of individuals receiving serious consideration.

The Committee has not been able to determine exactly when the

President decided not to grant clemency to Rosario Gambino. However, Roger Clinton’s telephone records make it appear that he was

holding out hope for a commutation until the final moments of the

Clinton Administration. The very first call placed by Roger Clinton

after the expiration of his brother’s term as President on January

20, 2001, was to the cell phone of Tommy Gambino. It seems likely

that the call was to break the news to Tommy Gambino that his

father would not be receiving a commutation. Supporting this conclusion is the fact that Clinton also placed telephone calls to three

other individuals immediately after his call to Gambino, informing

them that they did not receive the pardons that Roger Clinton had

been attempting to get them. After he called Tommy Gambino,

Roger Clinton called Dan Lasater, George Locke, and Joseph ‘‘Jay’’

McKernan and informed them that the President had not granted

them pardons, despite Roger’s request.436

The Rosario Gambino case is one of the most disturbing matters

reviewed by the Committee as part of its clemency investigation.

The President’s brother worked to free a convicted heroin dealer

and member of organized crime from prison. The President’s brother engaged in these activities because of his friendship with

Tommy Gambino, himself a reputed senior organized crime memVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00792 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 5601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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437 Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). 438 Nixon Official Facing 5 Years for Fraud, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, Aug. 1, 1998. 439 Id. 440 Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). 441 ‘‘Warning to All Investors About Bogus ‘Prime Bank’ and Other Banking-Related Investment Schemes,’’ Securities and Exchange Commission, <http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/

primebank.shtml>. 442 Nixon Official Facing 5 Years for Fraud, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, Aug. 1, 1998. 443 Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). 444 Id. Lincecum’s prior conviction related to his role in finding investors for a fraudulent gold

refining process. Lincecum and two other individuals claimed to have a new process for refining

gold ore. Lincecum and his investors then used the ore, which authorities charged was worthless, as collateral to borrow $250,000 from a bank in Pennsylvania. Lincecum and his partners

were all convicted. Interview with Robert ‘‘R.V.’’ Wilson (Apr. 25, 2001). 445 Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). 446 Id.

ber. He also engaged in these efforts because of the promise of a

lucrative reward from the Gambino family, a reward that Clinton

received in part, even though he did not succeed in winning

Rosario Gambino’s release. Moreover, when questioned by the FBI,

Roger Clinton lied repeatedly in order to cover up the true nature

of his relationship with the Gambino family. This episode sets a

new low for presidential siblings.

III. THE LINCECUM PARDON OFFER

Among the first public reports of Roger Clinton’s pardon-related

activities was the story of Garland Lincecum. Garland Lincecum

has claimed that he and his family were bilked out of $235,000 by

Roger Clinton and two of his associates, Dickey Morton and George

Locke, who claimed that they could sell presidential pardons.437

Garland Lincecum was convicted in July 1998 along with three

co-defendants for wire fraud and mail fraud in connection with a

scheme to defraud investors of $8 million.438 Lincecum’s co-defendants were Valerie Miremadi, Anthony Miremadi, and Paul Eggers,

a former general counsel to the Treasury Department in the Nixon

Administration and candidate for the governorship of Texas.439 All

were convicted for their roles in the scheme. Lincecum was sentenced to 87 months in prison, which he began serving in April

1999.440 According to the government, the defendants had engaged

in a ‘‘prime bank’’ fraud, a common scheme described by the Securities and Exchange Commission as involving ‘‘the purported

issuance, trading, or use of so-called ‘prime’ bank, ‘prime’ European

bank or ‘prime’ world bank financial instruments, or other ‘high

yield investment programs[.]’ ’’ 441 Investors are told that ‘‘prime

banks’’ use their funds for short-term loans and that they will be

able to earn a return of 100 percent or more.442 Lincecum, however, maintains that little or no money was actually lost in this investment scheme and that all investors’ funds were treated with

care.443

Lincecum also had a prior conviction from 1982 for transporting

an individual across state lines in furtherance of a fraudulent

scheme.444 Lincecum served 40 months in prison on those charges

but maintains that he is innocent of any crime for his role in either

fraudulent scheme.445 He also believes that his co-defendants in

the 1998 trial received much lighter sentences than he did, despite

their more serious involvement in the investment plan.446

The other key actors in the Lincecum matter were George Locke

and Dickey Morton. George Locke was an Arkansas State Senator

778

447Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief

Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform 1 (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). 448Telephone Interview with George Locke, Partner, CLM, L.L.C. (Mar. 27, 2001). 449Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief

Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform 1 (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). 450Telephone Interview with George Locke, Partner, CLM, L.L.C. (Mar. 27, 2001). 451Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief

Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform 2 (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). 452 Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). 453 Id. 454 Id. Cayce had extensive business contacts with Morton and Locke prior to approaching

them about the Lincecum pardon. Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to

David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform 2–3 (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). According to George Locke, Cayce was attempting to enlist Roger Clinton’s support

for an entity called the Legacy Foundation. Telephone Interview with George Locke, Partner,

CLM, L.L.C. (Mar. 27, 2001). The Legacy Foundation claimed to be a charitable organization

selling tax-exempt charitable bonds. Id. Cayce and others involved in the Legacy Foundation

wanted to use the Clinton name to help sell the charitable bonds. Id. After the Securities and

Exchange Commission launched an investigation, the Legacy Foundation halted its plans to

issue the bonds. Cayce was trying to enlist Clinton, Morton, and Locke’s support for the Legacy

Foundation during the same time as Lincecum was trying to obtain his pardon. However, Morton and Locke have claimed that all of the money exchanged between Cayce, Lincecum, and

CLM related to the Legacy Foundation, not any attempt to sell pardons. Letter from Mark F.

Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt.

Reform (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). As discussed in the conclusion below, this claim

is not credible. 455 Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). 456 Id. 457 Id. 458 Id. 459 Id; Interview with Alberta Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 19, 2001).

from 1970 to 1983 but was convicted of cocaine distribution charges

in 1986.447 Locke’s conviction stemmed from drug dealing activities

he conducted in Arkansas in the 1980s together with Dan Lasater

and Roger Clinton.448 Locke was also a partner of Lasater’s in the

investment firm of Collins, Locke, and Lasater in Little Rock.449

Dickey Morton was a star running back for the University of Arkansas during the 1970s who then played briefly for the Pittsburgh

Steelers. In 1974, Morton married Sandra Clark, who was the

daughter of Jimmy Clark, Locke’s business partner.450 Locke and

Morton have been close since 1973 and have had a number of business ventures together.451

A. Garland Lincecum’s Account

1. The Initial $35,000 Payment

The first time that Garland Lincecum discussed a presidential

pardon with anyone was in August 1998 after he was convicted in

the prime bank fraud but before he was sentenced.452 Richard

Cayce, a longtime business associate, approached Lincecum.453

Cayce told Lincecum that he was involved in business with Roger

Clinton and two of his associates, Dickey Morton and George

Locke.454 Cayce said that Clinton, Morton, and Locke had the ability to obtain presidential pardons.455 Cayce told Lincecum that he

could obtain a pardon if Lincecum could pay Clinton, Morton, and

Locke $300,000.456 Lincecum told Cayce that he was interested in

this proposal, but that it would take him some time to come up

with the necessary funds.457 Cayce told Lincecum that if he was in- terested, he should come up with $25,000 to $35,000 immediately

to indicate that his interest was serious.458

Lincecum went to his mother, Alberta Lincecum, and borrowed

$35,000 from her.459 Alberta Lincecum confirmed that she provided $35,000 for Garland’s initial payment and also said that she overVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00794 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 5601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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460 Id. 461 Id. 462 Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). 463 Id. 464 Id. 465First National Bank of Crossett Document Production (Exhibit 74). 466 Records indicate that Dickey Morton was the registered agent for the company. Arkansas

Secretary of State Document Production (Articles of Organization) (Exhibit 75). Clinton’s and

Locke’s involvement in the company was confirmed by George Locke. Telephone Interview with

George Locke, Partner, CLM, L.L.C. (Mar. 27, 2001). 467Letter from Jay Ethington, Counsel for Richard Cayce, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 1, 2001) (within Appendix I). 468Letter from Jay Ethington, Counsel for Richard Cayce, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 1, 2001) (within Appendix I). 469Given that Molly Clinton is Roger Clinton’s wife, it is not clear who Morton was referring

to as ‘‘Mrs. Roger Clinton.’’

heard telephone conversations between Garland and other

unnamed individuals regarding his effort to buy a pardon. In her

interview with Committee staff, Alberta Lincecum stated that she

listened, on an extension, to a telephone conversation between Garland and other individuals where those unknown individuals told

Garland that he needed to come up with $100,000 for a pardon.460

Alberta Lincecum cashed a certificate of deposit and wrote a personal check to Garland for $35,000.461 Garland then signed the

check over to Richard Cayce.462 Cayce told Lincecum that he would

cash the check and deliver the cash personally to Roger Clinton.463

According to Lincecum, Cayce also offered to loan him $70,000 to

help pay for the pardon and to provide these funds directly to Morton.464 Bank records indicate that the MM Foundation, an organi- zation controlled by Cayce, wired $70,000 to CLM, L.L.C.,465 a company created by Clinton, Locke, and Morton.466

2. The First Dallas Meeting

After Garland Lincecum informed Cayce that he was interested in paying $300,000 for a pardon, Cayce informed Dickey Morton

that Lincecum was interested.467 Cayce told Morton that Lincecum

would want to meet with him personally to discuss the arrangements for the pardon.468 Morton sent the following remarkable fax

to Cayce (handwritten notations on the fax are indicated in parentheses):

RE: Political Meeting Agreement

Richard: The following is an understanding of the way this

meeting will occur on Tuesday August 12, 1998, along with

the compensation required to get you this meeting.

Please review and sign and fax back to my fax number by

this early afternoon if your group wants to consumate [sic]

this meeting.

1. Call an airline representative for reservations for Roger

Clinton, Mrs. Roger Clinton, and Molly Clinton 469 from

Los Angeles to Dallas, Friday the 7th of August 1998, for

a late direct flight first class. You pre-pay by your credit

card today August 7th 1998.

2. The 1/3 of cookies ($) that we discussed or 33,000 cookies ($) will be delivered by your representative or you,

cookies need to be ready to eat. A time and place will be

setup early Monday morning for exchange for the meeting

780

470Dickey Morton Document Production 001144 (Letter from Dickey Morton, to Richard Cayce

(Aug. 7, 1998)) (Exhibit 76). 471Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief

Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform 4 (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). In this proffer, Morton

also maintained that the 100,000 ‘‘cookies’’ in the letter referred to the ‘‘appearance fee’’ charged

by Roger Clinton for meeting with Cayce and Lincecum, not any payment for a pardon. 472 Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001); Letter from Jay

Ethington, Counsel for Richard Cayce, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt.

Reform (May 1, 2001) (within Appendix I). 473 Id; Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). 474 Id. 475Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Counsel for Dickey Morton and George Locke, Hampton

and Larkowski, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001)

(within Appendix I). 476 Id. 477 Between August 19, and August 25, 1998, Clinton made three separate deposits totaling

$12,500. Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 77).

to set up for Tuesday, place needs to a private meeting

place, as we do not need any auto graph [sic] seekers

there. Roger will send his representative to meet you.

3. The meeting will be set for Tuesday, as to time and

place, when you deliver cookies to Roger’s representative

on Monday morning the 11th of August.

4. The rest of cookies ($ money) can be delivered Tuesday

right before meeting.

By signing you accept conditions of meeting.

I am not the representative of Roger Clinton in this transaction, you will meet him in Dallas, Texas.

Best regards, Dickey Morton

($ cookies = money) 470

In his proffer to the Committee, Morton claimed that this letter

was written at the behest of Cayce:

Casey [sic] asked that a confirmation letter be sent to him

spelling out the agreement. Casey [sic] stated that the letter must be written in code since the Legacy Foundation

was at present, working covertly with the federal government. Casey [sic] told Morton not to mention money in the

letter.471

Cayce made the requested arrangements and met with Clinton,

Locke, Morton, and Lincecum in a Dallas hotel in approximately

August 1998.472

On the morning of the meeting, Cayce first met alone with Clinton, Locke, and Morton in a hotel room.473 Garland Lincecum was

not present at the meeting, but after the meeting, Cayce informed

Lincecum that Cayce provided to Roger Clinton the $35,000 in cash

that Lincecum had raised from his mother.474 Dickey Morton and

George Locke admitted, through their lawyer, to accepting $7,000

and $5,000 respectively at this meeting.475 They also confirmed

that Roger Clinton accepted $18,000 in cash as his share of the

payment.476 Bank records provide corroboration, indicating that

Roger Clinton made a series of large cash deposits into his bank

accounts around the same time frame.477

Cayce informed Lincecum that he discussed the pardon arrangements with Clinton, Locke, and Morton, and that they assured him

781

478 Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). 479Letter from Jay Ethington, Counsel for Richard Cayce, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 1, 2001) (within Appendix I); Interview with Garland

Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). 480 Id. 481 Id. 482 Id. 483 Id. 484 Id. 485 Id. 486 Id. 487 Id. 488 Id. The $100,000 that had been paid at this point consisted of the $70,000 wired by the M.M. Foundation plus the $30,000 to $35,000 delivered in cash. 489 Id. 490 Id. 491 Id. 492 Id. 493 Id. 494 Id.

that, through Clinton’s contacts, they would be able to obtain the

pardon.478 After the private meeting, Cayce, Locke, and Morton

came down to the hotel lobby, where they met with Garland

Lincecum.479 Roger Clinton did not participate in this meeting.

During this meeting, Garland Lincecum asked whether he would

definitely receive a pardon in exchange for his money.480 Morton

explained that he would receive a pardon, not merely that he and

Roger would make their ‘‘best efforts’’ to obtain a pardon.481 Garland said he would not have agreed to pay the money merely for

a promise of ‘‘best efforts.’’ 482 Morton stated that Roger Clinton

could obtain pardons in batches of six at a time.483 Concerned

about this arrangement, Lincecum asked if this was legal, and

Morton assured him that it was.484 Morton claimed that most pardon petitions were rejected because the applicants failed to fill out

the paperwork properly.485 He explained that he, Locke, and Roger

Clinton used a Washington, D.C., law firm to prepare the necessary

paperwork on the pardon and that Roger would then personally deliver the paperwork to his brother, the President.486 George Locke

told Lincecum that they had obtained pardons in this way previously but declined to name any of the individuals who had obtained pardons in this manner. Locke said that after Lincecum received his pardon, he would likewise accord the same confidentiality to Lincecum if ever asked about it.487 Morton confirmed during this meeting that he had already received $100,000 of the necessary $300,000 towards Lincecum’s pardon.488

Roger Clinton did not participate in this hotel lobby meeting.489

However, after the meeting, Cayce asked Lincecum if he had noticed an individual who had been watching the meeting from a second-story balcony overlooking the lobby.490 Lincecum stated that

he had, and Cayce told him that the individual was Roger Clinton.491 Lincecum asked Cayce ‘‘well, why didn’t the little bastard

come down?’’ 492 At this point, Cayce told Lincecum that he had

met with Clinton, Locke, and Morton earlier that morning and that

Roger Clinton told him he would help obtain the pardon.493

Lincecum believed the claims of Morton and Locke for a number

of reasons. First, he had heard from Cayce that they had the ability to obtain diplomatic passports.494 This suggested to Lincecum

that they had influence in the U.S. government. Second, Cayce confirmed for Lincecum that Roger Clinton was indeed working with

782

495 Id. 496 Id. 497 Id. 498Letter from Jay Ethington, Counsel for Richard Cayce, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 1, 2001) (within Appendix I). 499 Id. The two numbers may be reconcilable. If the Lincecums gave Cayce $35,000, he may have used $5,000 for airline tickets, hotel accommodations, and other expenses for Roger Clinton

and his companions on the trip to Dallas. According to Guy and Alberta Lincecum, their copy

of the $35,000 check that they gave to Richard Cayce was lost. Interview with Alberta Lincecum,

in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001); Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001).

The Committee was unsuccessful in its attempts to obtain records of the $35,000 directly from

the bank. However, the fact that a $30,000 cash payment occurred was corroborated by George

Locke and Dickey Morton, through their attorney, who explained that all three received cash

from Cayce, with Roger Clinton receiving $18,000, Morton receiving $7,000, and Locke receiving

$5,000. Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Counsel for Dickey Morton and George Locke, Hampton

and Larkowski, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001)

(within Appendix I). 500 Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). 501 Id. 502 Id.

Morton and Locke on these matters.495 Third, Lincecum trusted

Morton and Locke. Morton was a standout football player with the

University of Arkansas and had a reputation as a devoted family

man.496 Locke was a former Arkansas state senator who had been

close to Bill Clinton when he was Governor.497

In his proffer to the Committee, Cayce offers a slightly different

version of events with regard to the two initial payments. Cayce

claims that he, not Alberta Lincecum, was the source of the initial

cash payment.498 He also claims that he provided $30,000, rather than $35,000, in cash to Clinton, Locke, and Morton at the Dallas

meeting.499 According to Cayce, the cash from the Dallas meeting plus the $70,000 wire from the MM Foundation were intended to

pay for his attempt to purchase diplomatic passports and were unrelated to Lincecum’s attempt to obtain a pardon. While the differences between the accounts of Cayce and Lincecum are noteworthy, they are not highly significant. First, Cayce’s account cannot be given great weight, since Cayce has invoked his Fifth

Amendment rights and provided his information in the form of a

proffer. Second, while there are some differences between Cayce

and Lincecum, for the most part, Cayce supports Lincecum’s account. Cayce confirms that Morton and Locke offered to sell a pardon to Lincecum. Cayce also confirms that Roger Clinton was directly involved in the plot to sell a pardon to Lincecum. Cayce

merely disagrees on the amount of money that was paid by

Lincecum for the pardon. This difference does not undermine the

core of Lincecum’s allegations.

3. Lincecum’s Attempts to Raise the Remaining Money

Between August and November 1998, Garland Lincecum had a

number of contacts with Morton regarding the payment of the remaining $200,000 towards his pardon. Lincecum stated that Morton and Locke maintained a ‘‘soft pressure’’ on him that was very

effective in motivating Lincecum to find the money.500 According to

Lincecum, Morton had a ‘‘take it or leave it’’ attitude and often offered to return the money that Lincecum had already paid.501 In

Lincecum’s mind, Morton’s position only confirmed that the cashfor-pardon scheme was legitimate and that Morton was not swindling him.502 However, Lincecum still had some concerns about

paying all $300,000 up front before he received the pardon. At one

783

503 Id. 504 Id. 505 Id. 506 Id. 507 Id; Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). 508 Id; Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). 509 Id; Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). Guy Lincecum provided

hotel records to corroborate the account of his trip. Guy Lincecum Document Production (Exhibit

78). 510 Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). 511 Id. 512 Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). 513 Id. 514 Id. 515 Id. 516 Id. 517 Id.

point, he asked Morton if he could make arrangements to pay a

portion of the fee after he received the pardon.503 Lincecum even

offered to place part of the funds in escrow until he received the

pardon.504 Morton responded to these suggestions by telling

Lincecum that the pardon business was ‘‘strictly cash and

carry.’’ 505

During the fall of 1998, when he was still trying to come up with

the remaining $200,000, Lincecum was concerned that Morton,

Locke, and Clinton would sell off the remaining pardon slots available to Roger Clinton.506 Garland Lincecum could not travel to Arkansas himself because the court sentenced him but had not yet ordered him to report to prison. Accordingly, the court had ordered

Lincecum not to leave Texas.507 So, he sent his brother, Guy

Lincecum, to meet with Morton in Little Rock, Arkansas and handdeliver a letter from Garland to demonstrate his serious intention

to find the necessary funds for the pardon.508 Guy traveled to Little

Rock and met with Morton at a Holiday Inn.509 Guy delivered the

letter to Morton, Morton read it, and Morton then told Guy that

he was puzzled as to why Guy had traveled all the way to Little

Rock when he could have just mailed the letter.510 Guy told Morton

that he traveled to Little Rock because Garland wanted him to

know that he was serious about wanting the pardon.511

After his meeting with Morton and Locke, Garland Lincecum was

convinced that he wanted to obtain the pardon, but he was faced

with the obstacle of raising the outstanding $200,000. To raise

these funds, he initially turned to Jim McClain, a Dallas real estate developer he had done business with in the past.512 Lincecum

knew that McClain had a conviction in his past and might also be

interested in obtaining a pardon himself.513 Lincecum approached

McClain and explained the offer he had received from Morton and

Locke.514 McClain informed Lincecum that he was interested in obtaining a pardon and offered to pay $300,000 for his own pardon,

as well as loan Lincecum $200,000 for Lincecum’s pardon.515

McClain explained that he would be able to make the payment as

soon as a major real estate deal he was working on closed.516

Lincecum called Morton to check and see if they had a ‘‘slot’’ for

a pardon available for McClain. Lincecum remembers that when he

asked Morton this question, Morton told Lincecum to wait while he

purported to check with Roger Clinton on another telephone

line.517 Lincecum heard Morton’s side of the conversation as MorVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00799 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 5601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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518 Id. 519 Id. 520 Id. 521 Id. 522Telephone Interview with Jim McClain (Apr. 25, 2001). 523 Id. 524 Id. 525 Id. 526 Id. 527 Id. 528 Id. 529Dickey Morton Document Production 000044 (Letter from Dickey Morton, to Jim McClain

(Nov. 8, 1998)) (Exhibit 79).

ton purportedly confirmed with Roger Clinton that there was indeed a ‘‘slot’’ available for McClain.518

As Lincecum was receiving pressure from Morton to complete his

payment for the pardon, he wrote a check for $500,000 to Morton,

telling him to hold the check until he was able to get the necessary

funds from McClain.519 Lincecum hoped that the check would help

reserve his and McClain’s ‘‘slots’’ and keep Morton, Locke, and

Clinton from selling them to someone else.520 However, after waiting for several weeks, it became clear that McClain was having difficulty with his real estate deal and would not be able to provide

any funds, either for his own pardon or as a loan for Lincecum’s

pardon.521 Accordingly, this $500,000 check was never cashed.

When Committee staff interviewed McClain, he confirmed many

key aspects of Lincecum’s account. McClain confirmed that he had

a number of discussions with Lincecum about buying a pardon

through Morton, Locke, and Clinton.522 McClain stated that

Lincecum initially told him it would cost $500,000 to obtain a pardon.523 Then, after checking with Morton and Locke, Lincecum returned to McClain and told him that a pardon for past offenses

would cost $500,000 and a pardon for crimes currently under investigation was $1 million.524 McClain spoke to his lawyer about

Lincecum’s offer.525 The lawyer told McClain that he should not

discuss these matters any further unless he wanted to be indicted

again.526 At that point, McClain stopped discussing the matter

with Lincecum.527 McClain denies that he ever took any steps toward raising the money for the pardon and also denies that he had

any discussions with Morton, Locke, or Clinton regarding pardons.528 One document produced by one of Dickey Morton’s companies, however, undermines McClain’s claim. A November 9, 1998,

letter from Morton to McClain states:

We had an extremely good week, with President Bill coming down to visit with us this week. After the Senator and

I and Roger got together we all agreed to go forward. My

only question is are you wanting to do business or not,

since we have not heard from you and I left several messages on your voice mail and with your associate at Charter Financial. If so give me a call, if not, good luck.529

While it is not certain that Morton is referring to an offer to obtain

a pardon, the time frame is consistent with the period in which

Lincecum was discussing the pardon with McClain.

785

530 Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001); Interview with Guy

Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001); Interview with Alberta Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX

(Apr. 20, 2001). 531First National Bank of Crossett Document Production (Exhibit 80). 532 Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001); Interview with Guy

Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001); Interview with Alberta Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX

(Apr. 20, 2001). 533 Id; Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001); Interview with Guy

Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). 534 Interview with Alberta Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). 535 Id. 536 Id. 537 Id. 538 Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). 539 Edward Jones Investments Document Production (Fax from Bill Hayes, Investment Representative, to Dickey Morton (Dec. 16, 1998)) (Exhibit 81). 540 Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). 541 Id; Guy Lincecum Document Production (Southwest Airlines, Ticket Stub, Dec. 29, 1998)

(Holiday Inn, Bill, Dec. 28, 1998) (Exhibits 82, 78). 542 Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). 543 Id. 544First National Bank of Crossett Document Production (Exhibit 83).

4. Lincecum’s Payment of $200,000

After failing to raise funds for the pardon from any other source,

Lincecum approached his family and asked his mother and brother

to provide the necessary money.530 In November 1998, Alberta

Lincecum, Garland’s mother, cashed a number of certificates of deposit and on November 23, 1998, had a cashier’s check for $100,000

issued to CLM.531 Morton had told Lincecum that he should make

the check payable to CLM, which was the company formed by Clinton, Locke, and Morton.532 Alberta Lincecum provided the check to

Garland Lincecum, who then mailed the check to Morton, who on

November 25, 1998, deposited the check into the CLM account at

the First National Bank of Crossett in Arkansas.533 The $100,000

used by Alberta Lincecum to pay for her son’s pardon came from

her life savings.534 Her late husband had invested their savings in

CDs, which she used for her living expenses as they came due.535

Alberta is 85 years old and has significant health problems, which

cause her to need more than the approximately $900 per month

provided by her monthly social security benefits.536 As a result of

losing this money in the pardon scheme, Alberta is finding it difficult to make ends meet and is unable to travel or make any other

large expenditures.537

Approximately one month later, Guy Lincecum provided the remaining $100,000 for Garland’s pardon. Guy had a large amount

of funds in an account at Edward Jones Investment, which constituted his retirement savings.538 Before Guy cashed out the account, he had an investment representative send a letter to Dickey

Morton informing Morton that Guy had $100,000 available in his

account.539 After he was able to clear the funds from the account,

on December 22, 1998, he had a check issued by Edward Jones Investments to him.540 On December 29, 1998, Guy traveled to Little

Rock and hand-delivered the check to Morton.541 Guy signed the

check over to Morton and handed it to him.542 When Morton accepted the check, he told Guy that they were ‘‘paid in full’’ for Garland’s pardon.543 Shortly thereafter, on December 31, 1998, the

check was deposited into CLM’s account at the First National Bank

of Crossett.544 To withdraw the $100,000, Guy had to pay a signifiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00801 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 5601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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545 Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). 546 Id. 547 Id; Interview with Alberta Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). 548First National Bank of Crossett Document Production (Exhibit 84). 549 Id. 550 Id. 551First National Bank of Crossett Document Production (Exhibit 85). 552First National Bank of Crossett Document Production (Exhibit 86). 553See n.499.

cant amount in taxes.545 He also is unable to open a small business

that he was planning on running after he retired from his job.546

He now lives with his mother, helping care for her.547

5. The Division of Lincecum’s Money Among Clinton,

Locke, and Morton

Between August and December 1998, the CLM bank account at

the First National Bank of Crossett received $270,000 related to

the Lincecum pardon.548 In fact, apart from the $100 opening deposit on August 17, 1998, the Lincecum-related deposits were the

only deposits to the account until June 1999 when the balance had

dwindled to under $1,000.549 Bank records indicate that the

$270,000 was divided between Morton, Locke, and Clinton. Morton,

the only individual who had power to withdraw money from the

CLM account, signed checks totaling $67,000 from the CLM account for his company, Southern Belle Construction.550 Morton

issued two checks to George Locke totaling $65,000.551 Morton also

signed three checks to Roger Clinton totaling $25,500.552 The following table summarizes how the money provided by Lincecum and

Cayce was divided among Clinton, Locke, and Morton:

Funds Provided to CLM for the Pardon

Date Amount Source of Funds Use of Funds

8/98 $35,000 Alberta Lincecum Expenses and $30,000 in cash to CLM.553

8/19/98 $70,000 Richard Cayce Wire from the M.M. Foundation to CLM.

11/25/98 $100,000 Alberta Lincecum Deposited into the CLM bank account.

12/31/98 $100,000 Guy Lincecum Deposited into the CLM bank account.

787

554When the $18,000 provided to Roger Clinton in cash is added to the two checks, Roger

Clinton’s share of the Lincecum funds amounts to just over $43,500. See n.499. 555 Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). 556 Id. 557 Id. 558 Id. 559 Id. 560 Id. 561 Id.

Significant Activity in the CLM Account

Date Transaction Amount To/From

8/19/98 deposit - wire $70,000 MM Foundation (Dallas, TX)

8/21/98 debit -$4,000 Southern Belle Construction

8/25/98 debit -$52,000 George Locke

8/26/98 debit -$4,000 Southern Belle Construction

11/25/98 deposit $100,000 Alberta Lincecum

11/25/98 check #1014 -$20,000 Southern Belle Construction

12/01/98 check #1015 -$13,000 George Locke

12/10/98 check #1016 -$10,000 Roger Clinton

12/10/98 check #1017 -$5,500 Roger Clinton

12/10/98 check #1019 -$5,000 Southern Belle Construction

12/14/98 check #1020 -$5,100 Southern Belle Construction

12/21/98 check #1023 -$8,100 Southern Belle Construction

12/22/98 check #1026 -$8,000 Southern Belle Construction

12/28/98 check #1029 -$5,000 Southern Belle Construction

12/31/98 deposit $100,000 Guy Lincecum

1/7/99 check #1030 -$10,000 Roger Clinton

4/1/99 check #1062 -$8,300 Southern Belle Construction

Total to Roger Clinton: $25,500 554

Total to George Locke: $65,000

Total to Southern Belle: $67,000

The remainder of the funds in the CLM account was apparently

used for other small company transactions.

6. Lincecum’s Attempts to Receive the Pardon

As of December 1998, Lincecum had paid in full for his pardon

and expected that he would receive the pardon soon thereafter, before he was sent to prison.555 He had a number of telephone contacts with Morton and Locke between December 1998 and April

1999, when he reported to prison, attempting to determine the status of his pardon request.556 A number of times after paying for the

pardon, Garland asked Morton if he could meet with Roger Clinton

to discuss how his request was progressing.557 Each time Garland

asked, Morton told him that Roger was traveling or otherwise unavailable.558 As a result, neither Garland nor Guy Lincecum ever

met with or discussed the pardon matter with Roger Clinton.559

Garland also could not get a definitive answer from Morton on

where his pardon stood until shortly before he reported to prison

in April 1999. At that time, Morton told Garland that he would

have to serve some amount of prison time before they were able to

get the pardon.560 After Garland was sent to prison, his brother

Guy took over as the principal contact with Morton and Locke and

continued to press them on Garland’s pardon.

After Garland was sent to prison, Guy Lincecum frequently contacted Morton and Locke to inquire as to the status of Garland’s

pardon.561 After Garland had served several months in prison, the

Lincecums became very anxious that they receive the pardon as

788

562 Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). 563 Id. 564 Id. 565 Id. 566 Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). It should be noted that

a number of these individuals who had business dealings with Morton and Locke had extremely

negative experiences with them. McCaskill, Osborne, and Crockett all claim that they were

cheated out of substantial sums of money by Morton and Locke in their business dealings. 567 Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). 568 Id. 569 Id. 570 Id. 571 Id.

agreed. Most of these contacts between Guy Lincecum and Dickey

Morton took place over the telephone, and Morton provided a number of different excuses for the delay in receiving the pardon. Initially, Morton told Guy that Garland would have to serve at least

three months in prison.562 After that time had passed, in the fall

of 1999, Morton then informed Guy that the controversy over the

President’s grants of clemency to the FALN terrorists would delay

any grant of clemency to Garland.563

During the same period of time in 1999 and 2000 after Garland

had been sent to prison, Garland and Guy Lincecum attempted to

introduce friends and business associates to Morton, Locke, and

Clinton, believing that they offered valuable business opportunities.

The Lincecums believed that Morton, Locke, and Clinton, through

their political contacts, would be good partners for a variety of

business deals. Morton had informed the Lincecums that they had

contacts in China who could provide them with cheap cement and

drywall, which could be sold at a large profit in the United States,

as the U.S. was experiencing a shortage of those products.564 Morton told the Lincecums that they were also able to bring the cement and drywall into the U.S. without customs problems because

of Roger Clinton’s connections.565 As a result, Lincecum introduced

a number of business associates to Morton and Locke, including

Robert Wilson, Jim McCaskill, Rod Osborne, David Crockett, and

Harvey Greenwald.566

By the summer of 1999, Guy had grown frustrated with the failure to receive the pardon. As he arranged a meeting in Dallas to

discuss a deal to import cement, he planned on asking Morton

about the status of the pardon.567 In June 1999, Guy Lincecum,

Richard Cayce, and Harvey Greenwald met with Dickey Morton

and George Locke in a Dallas hotel to discuss a possible deal to import cement into the U.S. through Morton and Locke.568 After the

meeting, Guy Lincecum approached George Locke and asked him

about the status of Garland’s pardon. Locke told Guy that he had

reviewed Garland’s trial transcript and was convinced that Garland

had been wrongfully convicted.569 Locke then told Guy that the

pardon was ‘‘a done deal.’’ 570 Guy understood Locke’s comments to

mean that they had paid for the pardon in full and that Garland

would be receiving it shortly.571

However, Garland did not receive his pardon in the summer of

1999. Nonetheless, he continued to show some optimism that he

would receive it. In October 1999, Garland sent a letter to Dickey

Morton largely concerning business ventures he planned on pursuing with Morton. In this letter, Garland stated, ‘‘I am sure that

within 60 days of my release there will be four parties prepared to

789

572This letter was apparently drafted by Garland Lincecum in prison and then handed to his

brother Guy Lincecum, who mailed it to Morton. Dickey Morton Document Production 000321

(Letter from Guy Lincecum, to Dickey Morton (Oct. 26, 1999)) (Exhibit 87). 573Telephone Interview with R.V. Wilson (Apr. 25, 2001). 574 Id. 575 Id. 576 Id. 577 Id. 578 Id. 579 Id. 580 Id. 581 Id. 582 Id. 583 Id. 584 Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). 585 Id.

proceed on a similar item for themselves.’’ 572 This letter indicates

that Garland expected to be released from prison in a much shorter

time frame than his 87-month prison sentence suggested.

In addition to the efforts of Guy Lincecum, one of Garland’s

friends and business associates, R.V. Wilson, also attempted to obtain assurances from Clinton, Locke, and Morton that the pardon

would be issued. In June 1999, Wilson said he traveled twice from

his home in Mississippi to Arkansas to meet with Morton and

Locke, ostensibly about importing cement and drywall from

China.573 Wilson knew that Lincecum had paid $235,000 for a pardon and was being stalled, so Wilson brought up the issue during

a meal at the Southern Kitchen, a restaurant in Little Rock.574

Wilson said that when he raised the issue of Lincecum’s pardon,

Locke and Morton both looked ‘‘scared to death.’’ 575 Wilson said

Locke raised his hand and waved it in his face as if wiping something away and Dickey Morton began touching him.576 Wilson said

he then realized that Morton was patting him down to see if he

was wearing a wire because they thought the FBI had sent him.577

They said they would not discuss it.578

After the meal, Morton gave Wilson a ride to his hotel and while

in the car, without Locke present, Morton said that ‘‘the Senator’’

didn’t want those matters discussed in front of him in public.579

Wilson said, ‘‘I thought this was all legal,’’ to which Morton replied

that it was ‘‘100 percent legal’’ but that it was ‘‘politically sensitive.’’ 580 Morton said that while he was part of the company,

CLM, Roger Clinton and George Locke handled all the pardon matters.581 Then Morton refused to talk any more about it.582 Wilson

said he tried to obtain a meeting with Roger Clinton during his visits to Arkansas but was always told that Roger was on the golf

course or sleeping.583

However, through the fall of 1999, despite the efforts of Guy

Lincecum and R.V. Wilson, there was still no forward progress in

receiving the pardon. Accordingly, when Guy Lincecum next met

with Morton and Locke in person, he raised the issue again. Following another meeting about selling imported construction products, Guy Lincecum cornered Dickey Morton in the restroom of an

Applebee’s restaurant in Ardmore, Oklahoma, and confronted him

once again about his brother’s pardon.584 Guy asked, ‘‘Is this

legal?’’ 585 Morton said that it was and that the reason people fail

to obtain pardons is that their lawyers do not know how to fill out

790

586 Id. 587 Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). 588 Id. 589 Id. 590 Id. 591 Id. 592 Id. 593 Id. 594Telephone Interview with Jim McCaskill (May 2, 2001). 595 Interview with Guy Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 20, 2001). 596 Interview with Garland Lincecum, in Bastrop, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). 597 Id.

the forms properly.586 Morton assured Guy that CLM had two of

the best lawyers in the country working on Garland’s case, that

they would complete the forms, and that Roger would deliver them

to the President personally.587

At the meeting in Ardmore, Oklahoma, Guy had introduced Morton and Locke to Jim McCaskill, who wanted to sell cement for

CLM on commission.588 Morton had provided phone numbers for

McCaskill to call when he had buyers ready to place orders, but

during the winter of 1999–2000, McCaskill was having trouble contacting Morton, which was preventing him from completing any

sales.589 So, a second meeting was arranged in Oklahoma in late

spring 2000 to address the problems McCaskill was having in contacting Morton and Locke.590 McCaskill, Guy Lincecum, Morton,

and Locke met early in the morning at a fast food restaurant in

Broken Arrow, Oklahoma. In the parking lot as they were leaving,

Guy turned to Morton and asked again when Garland would be

pardoned and released from prison.591 Morton turned to Locke and

asked, ‘‘When is Garland scheduled to be released?’’ 592 Locke

pulled out a small book; he opened it, flipped through it, and said,

‘‘He is scheduled to be released in July, the third quarter.’’ 593 Jim

McCaskill who corroborated Guy Lincecum’s account to Committee

staff witnessed this exchange.594 Guy took Locke’s statement to be

a definitive assurance as to when the pardon would be received.

However, shortly after this meeting, Guy said that Locke and Morton stopped returning his phone calls.595

Despite the failure of Guy Lincecum and R.V. Wilson to obtain

assurances from Morton and Locke that Garland Lincecum would

be receiving a pardon, the Lincecums continued to be optimistic

that Garland would receive a pardon from President Clinton. Garland Lincecum informed Committee staff that he fully expected his

name would be included on the list of pardons issued on President

Clinton’s last day in office and that he had ‘‘done everything except

pack my bags.’’ 596 Obviously, when he learned that he had not received a pardon, he was deeply disappointed and felt that Morton,

Locke, and Clinton had cheated him.597

B. Roger Clinton’s Reaction to the Allegations

Despite repeated attempts to obtain Roger Clinton’s version of

events, he failed to cooperate with the Committee’s investigation.

He refused to be interviewed by Committee staff. His lawyer indicated that if called to testify before the Committee, Clinton would

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598Letter from Bart H. Williams, Munger, Tolles & Olson, to the Honorable Dan Burton,

Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (June 27, 2001) (within Appendix I). 599 Neil A. Lewis, Swindle Is Reported to Use the Name of Roger Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.

10, 2001, at A9. 600Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast, June 21, 2001).

tion. Finally, through his lawyer, Clinton also refused to answer

questions posed to him in writing.598

Despite his refusal to cooperate with the Committee, Roger Clinton did speak to the press. Shortly after the Lincecum allegations

became public, The New York Times reported that ‘‘Roger Clinton

said through a spokeswoman today that though he knew Mr. Locke

and Mr. Morton, he never heard of C.L.M. and had never authorized either man to use his name in any way.’’ 599 Bank records indicating that he deposited two large checks from CLM, however, directly contradict this denial. Later, in an appearance on Larry King

Live, Clinton was asked about the Lincecum allegations and stated

that ‘‘I can tell you that there is no truth to money for pardons.

There is zero truth to that, zero truth.’’ 600 He declined to offer any

details refuting the Lincecum allegations but generally suggested

that Morton and Locke may have swindled Lincecum without his

knowledge:

KING. So this guy is lying to Mr. Serrano of the L.A. Times

when he tells him he gave money and he was promised a

pardon.

CLINTON. No, sir, I’m not saying he is lying. I’m not saying

he’s lying.

KING. You just said there was no money changed hands

and he said—

CLINTON. I said there was no—let me clarify: there was no

money exchanged with me.

KING. You never got a penny.

CLINTON. And I never heard one word about a pardon.

***

CLINTON. Now there are some details that we can dress it

up with, but the bottom line is I didn’t do it. I don’t care

what this flipping guy says and his buddy [sic]. I don’t care

what they say. It doesn’t matter to me. But I’m not saying

they are lying about what they are saying, because they

are not saying that I took it. They are not saying that I

was there.

***

KING. Is it possible, Mark [Geragos, Roger Clinton’s lawyer], that someone in the middle here—is this possible— hypothetical scenario—someone that knows Roger and

knows these guys sets up a deal where he, this someone,

gets money, tells him I got Roger, I will get it to Roger.

They pay it as best they can and he says he will get it to

Roger. Roger is innocent and they are kind of innocent.

792

601 Id. 602Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Counsel for Dickey Morton and George Locke, Hampton

and Larkowski, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001)

(within Appendix I). A document produced to the Committee by American Gypsum and Cement

Products, one of Dickey Morton’s companies, suggests that Roger Clinton was a ‘‘member’’ of

that company as well. See Dickey Morton Document Production 000654 (Letter from Rod

Osborne, American Gypsum Cement Products, to Robert Hutchison, Hutchison Consulting Company (Feb. 17, 2000)) (Exhibit 88). 603First National Bank of Crossett Document Production (Exhibit 86). 604 Interview with Alberta Lincecum, in Roanoke, TX (Apr. 19, 2001). 605 In response to a document request from the Committee, Locke stated that he had no responsive records. Letter from George Locke, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm.

on Govt. Reform (Apr. 9, 2001) (within Appendix I). See also Letter from Marietta Alphin,

Hampton, Larkowski & Benca, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform

(May 3, 2001) (within Appendix I). By contrast, Morton provided extensive corporate records in

response to a subpoena. 606Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief

Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I).

CLINTON. Ding, ding, ding, ding, ding.

GERAGOS. Which is exactly what I said. When you’ve got

triple hearsay, and then you’ve got somebody saying I

pointed to a mezzanine over there, start to think about

what the quality of that accusation is.601

However, the explanation offered by Roger Clinton to Larry King

is not even remotely credible. While Clinton claimed that he never

heard of CLM, he actually had a one-third ownership interest in

the company, as well as other companies owned by Morton and

Locke.602 Furthermore, bank records clearly establish that Clinton

received a substantial portion of the funds that were bilked from

Lincecum’s mother and brother. Clinton received three checks from

CLM totaling $25,500 and deposited them into his bank account.603

As discussed earlier, the source of these funds was the retirement

savings of Guy and Alberta Lincecum.604 There are only two explanations offered for how Roger Clinton acquired a substantial share

of the life savings from a federal prisoner’s mother and brother: the

one offered by the Lincecums and the one offered by Locke and

Morton. Yet, Clinton denies both and offers no explanation of his

own, denying on national television that he even received the

money when it is well documented that he did.

C. Dickey Morton and George Locke’s Reactions to the Allegations

Dickey Morton and George Locke have not provided the Committee with an extensive account of the Lincecum matter. Committee

staff did conduct a telephone interview of George Locke shortly

after the Committee began its investigation of the Lincecum allegations. However, shortly after that interview, George Locke and

Dickey Morton hired a lawyer and decided not to cooperate with

the Committee’s investigation. Therefore, the Committee was unable to interview Morton at all, and it was unable to contact Locke

after the initial interview. Rather than cooperate with the Committee, Morton and Locke invoked their Fifth Amendment rights

against self-incrimination.605 However, Morton and Locke’s attorney did provide the Committee with a proffer of what Morton and

Locke would testify to if the Committee immunized them.606 Because the proffer was provided by the attorney and was not made

under penalty of perjury, it is of limited value. However, between

the Committee staff’s interview of George Locke and the proffer

793

607 Id. 608Telephone Interview with George Locke, Partner, CLM, L.L.C. (Mar. 27, 2001). 609 Id. 610 Id. 611 Id. 612 Id. 613 Id. 614 Id. 615 Id. 616 Id. 617 Id. 618Dickey Morton Document Production 001144 (Letter from Dickey Morton, to Richard Cayce

(Aug. 7, 1998)) (Exhibit 76). 619Telephone Interview with George Locke, Partner, CLM, L.L.C. (Mar. 27, 2001)

from Locke and Morton, the Committee is able to understand Morton and Locke’s response to the Lincecum allegations.

In short, Morton and Locke acknowledge that CLM received $200,000 from Lincecum and another $100,000 from Richard

Cayce. However, they deny that the money had any connection to

an effort to obtain a presidential pardon for Garland Lincecum.607

Rather, they claim that Cayce and Lincecum paid the $300,000 to

CLM as ‘‘appearance fees’’ charged to them by Roger Clinton. Morton and Locke claim that Cayce and Lincecum paid this money to

CLM because they wanted Clinton’s support for the plan to sell

tax-exempt bonds through Cayce’s Legacy Foundation.

Locke and Morton claim that Richard Cayce, who had a prior

business relationship with Morton, approached Morton with ‘‘an exotic plan’’ to make money by selling tax-exempt bonds through a

charitable organization, the Legacy Foundation.608 Locke said that

Cayce wanted to use the Clinton name to sell these bonds and specifically wanted to use Morton’s contacts with George Locke and

Roger Clinton to see if President Clinton would support the charity.609 Morton told Cayce that he knew Locke and agreed to take

the idea to Locke to see if Locke would ask Roger Clinton to

present it to the President.610

Locke told Committee staff that people had often approached

Roger Clinton asking him to talk to the President about a variety

of issues and that Roger always helped them.611 However, Locke

said that Roger was ‘‘always left out in the cold’’ afterwards.612

After a number of these unpleasant experiences, Roger Clinton decided that he would not assist anyone with their business unless

he received an ‘‘appearance fee’’ paid up front.613 According to

Locke, the fee guaranteed only a meeting with Roger Clinton to

present a request and nothing more.614 Locke informed Committee

staff that he and Dickey Morton used Roger Clinton’s name in their

business ventures, with Roger’s permission, and that they paid

Roger for the right to use his name.615 When asked how Roger

Clinton’s name was used, Locke stated that Morton used it ‘‘when

making contacts with buyers and sellers.’’ 616

When Locke contacted Roger Clinton about Cayce and the Legacy

Foundation, Roger agreed to meet with Cayce only if they paid him

such an appearance fee.617 Morton then arranged the meeting with

Cayce, sending the coded letter referring to the number of ‘‘cookies’’ required to meet with Roger Clinton.618 In his interview with Committee staff, Locke acknowledged meeting Cayce, Morton, and

Roger Clinton in Dallas in August 1998.619 Locke claimed that, at

this meeting, Cayce discussed two main topics: the plan to have

794

620Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief

Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). 621 Id. 622 Id. 623 Id. 624 Id. 625 Id. 626 Id. 627 Id. 628 Id. 629 Id. 630 Id. 631 Id.

Clinton endorse the Legacy Foundation and Cayce’s desire to obtain a U.S. diplomatic passport.620 The proffer from Morton and

Locke is similar to Locke’s account in the interview but provides

more detail. The proffer claims that Cayce met with Morton and

Locke on August 12, 1998, and provided them with $30,000 in

cash.621 Morton and Locke then met with Roger Clinton and divided the cash between them, with Roger receiving $18,000, Locke

receiving $5,000, and Morton receiving $7,000.622 Also according to

the proffer, on August 13, Cayce met with Clinton, Morton, and

Locke, and Cayce discussed his desire to have Clinton’s support for

the Legacy Foundation. The proffer also states that Cayce asked

about the possibility of obtaining a diplomatic passport through

Roger Clinton. The proffer also claims that Cayce inquired whether

Clinton could obtain pardons for two individuals, and while Morton

and Locke do not recall whom Cayce mentioned, they are certain

that it was not Lincecum.623 Locke and Morton maintain that the

additional $70,000 wired to CLM by the MM Foundation on August

19 represented the completion of the $100,000 appearance fee

charged to Cayce by Clinton, Locke, and Morton for the August 12

meeting.

Locke and Morton claim that in September and October 1998,

they had two meetings with Cayce in Las Vegas regarding the Legacy Foundation.624 Roger Clinton came with Morton and Locke to

each of these meetings, and accordingly, Cayce was charged

$100,000 for each meeting.625 However, Cayce did not pay, and

after the second meeting, Morton and Locke claim that they refused to provide Roger Clinton for any more meetings with Cayce

until they had paid $200,000 for the previous two meetings.626

Morton and Locke claim that they then met with Cayce and Garland Lincecum. They claim that Lincecum provided them with a

check for $600,000 and told them that the check would be good in

two weeks.627 Cayce informed Morton and Locke that the additional $400,000 represented an ‘‘investment’’ in CLM.628 Morton

and Locke claim that Cayce and Lincecum never made good on the

$600,000 check.629

In their proffer, Morton and Locke state that in November 1998,

CLM received a check from Lincecum for $100,000.630 Then, in December, CLM received another check from Lincecum. With these

two checks, Morton and Locke believed that Cayce and Lincecum

had paid for the two meetings Cayce had with Roger Clinton in Las

Vegas.631 Morton and Locke acknowledge that they divided this

795

632 In his interview, Locke claimed he received only ‘‘a small portion’’ of the payment, and

claimed that he could not recall exactly how much. Telephone Interview with George Locke,

Partner, CLM, L.L.C. (Mar. 27, 2001). When asked to estimate how much he received, Locke

said it was approximately $20,000 to $25,000. Id. Locke also said he was surprised to learn that CLM had received $200,000 from any source for any reason, an assertion which contradicts the

proffer provided by his lawyer. Id. In fact, Locke received $65,000 from CLM, or approximately

three times the amount he admitted to Committee staff. First National Bank of Crossett Document Production (Exhibit 85). According to Locke, he thought the money had come from Richard

Cayce, not from Garland Lincecum’s brother and mother. Telephone Interview with George

Locke, Partner, CLM, L.L.C. (Mar. 27, 2001). Locke told Committee staff that the purpose of

the payments had nothing to do with any effort to obtain a pardon. Id. 633Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief

Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). 634 Id. 635 Id. 636 Id. 637 Id. 638 Id. 639 Id. 640 Id.

money with Roger Clinton, providing him with more than $25,000

of the $200,000 they received.632

With two exceptions, Morton and Locke deny that they ever discussed pardons with Richard Cayce, Garland Lincecum, or Guy

Lincecum. The first time they did discuss pardons was at the first

meeting between Cayce, Morton, Locke, and Clinton when Cayce

asked whether they could help him obtain pardons for two

friends.633 Clinton, Morton, and Locke claim that they did nothing

to assist Cayce.634 Morton and Locke also admit to having discussed pardons on one other occasion.635 Morton and Locke acknowledge that they met with Guy Lincecum and Jim McCaskill in

March 2000 at a McDonald’s restaurant in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma, to discuss their business dealings.636 While Lincecum and

McCaskill claim that they had a detailed discussion about Garland

Lincecum’s efforts to buy a pardon through Clinton, Locke, and

Morton, Locke and Morton tell a different story. They claim that

Guy Lincecum informed them, for the first time, that Garland

Lincecum hoped to obtain a pardon.637 Locke offered his advice:

First you must hire an attorney. That attorney must make

application with the Department of Justice for a pardon.

Then it would be up to the president as to whether a pardon would be given. Lincecum asked if the president normally gives pardons. Locke informed Lincecum that usually at the end of his term most presidents’ [sic] give pardons.638

However, Locke and Morton deny that Guy Lincecum ever asked

for Roger Clinton’s help in obtaining a pardon.639 After this discussion, Morton and Locke say that they had no further communications with Guy Lincecum regarding the pardon.640 Other than

these two brief discussions, Morton and Locke deny any communications with Garland Lincecum, Guy Lincecum, or Richard Cayce

regarding presidential pardons. Obviously, there is a significant

conflict between the Lincecums’ account and that of Morton, Locke,

and—to the extent he has offered an account—Roger Clinton.

D. Analysis

The Committee is faced with two starkly different accounts of the

Lincecum matter. However, there are certain facts that are beyond

796

dispute. First, Richard Cayce provided Morton, Locke, and Clinton

with $30,000 or $35,000 in cash. Second, Cayce wired $70,000 to

CLM. Third, Garland Lincecum provided CLM with $200,000.

Fourth, the $300,000 in funds provided to CLM were divided between Clinton, Locke, and Morton, with Clinton receiving $25,500

in checks and as much as $18,000 in cash, Locke receiving $65,000

in checks and $5,000 in cash, and Morton receiving $67,000 in

checks and $7,000 in cash. Dickey Morton apparently used the remaining funds, approximately $112,500, to pursue other business

interests. It is also clear that no work was ever undertaken on the

Lincecum pardon. Neither the White House nor the Justice Department ever received a pardon petition for Lincecum or ever considered Lincecum for a pardon in any way. Moreover, there is no evidence that Morton and Locke even hired a Washington law firm to

prepare a pardon petition for Lincecum.

There are also a number of key facts in dispute, centering on the

purpose of the funds paid to CLM, with the Lincecums claiming

that the money was paid to secure a pardon for Garland Lincecum,

and Morton and Locke claiming that the money was paid for ‘‘appearance fees’’ to meet with Roger Clinton.

There is no single piece of evidence that proves the Lincecums’

account is true. However, collectively, the preponderance of the evidence supports the Lincecums’ account. In contrast, little evidence

supports the denials offered by George Locke and Dickey Morton,

and some evidence contradicts their claims. The following is a summary of the evidence that supports the Lincecums’ account.

• First, there are a number of witnesses who support the

Lincecums’ account. Garland and Guy Lincecum both gave

clear and detailed accounts of their conversations. In addition, Alberta Lincecum, Jim McCaskill, and R.V. Wilson all

claim that they observed or participated in discussions with

Morton and Locke regarding the Lincecums’ efforts to purchase a presidential pardon.

• Second, the denial offered by Locke and Morton is not convincing. Morton and Locke maintain that Garland Lincecum

had his mother and brother raid their savings so that he

could pay Roger Clinton $200,000 in ‘‘appearance fees’’ for

meetings regarding the Legacy Foundation. Given the fact

that the Lincecums appear to live under relatively modest

circumstances, it is difficult to believe that they would give

$200,000 of their money to pay for these meetings. Rather,

the Lincecums have offered the only convincing explanation

that has been offered about why they would surrender their

life savings—because they were attempting to obtain a pardon for Garland.

• Third, Garland Lincecum, Guy Lincecum, Alberta

Lincecum, and every witness who supported their account

cooperated with the Committee. On the other hand, Locke,

Morton, and Roger Clinton all refused to cooperate with the

Committee. The Lincecums, R.V. Wilson, Jim McClain, and

Jim McCaskill were all willing to step forward and say

what they knew, facing the potential of prosecution if they

were lying. Therefore, their story has much more credibility

797

641Dickey Morton Document Production 001144 (Letter from Dickey Morton, to Richard Cayce

(Aug. 7, 1998)) (Exhibit 76). 642Dickey Morton Document Production 000323 (Letter from Guy Lincecum, to Dickey Morton

(Oct. 26, 1999)) (Exhibit 87). 643While Roger Clinton’s receipt of a portion of the cash delivered by Richard Cayce is not

established with absolute certainty, two factors strongly support it. First, in their proffer, Locke

and Morton state that they gave Clinton $18,000 of the $30,000. Letter from Mark F. Hampton,

Hampton and Larkowski, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform

(May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). Second, Roger Clinton’s bank records indicate that he deposited $12,500 in late August 1998, after the meeting in Dallas. Bank of America Document

Production (Exhibit 77).

than any accounts offered by attorneys for Clinton, Locke,

or Morton, who have either taken the Fifth or made it clear

that they would take the Fifth.

• Fourth, the documentary evidence tends to support the

Lincecum account. For example, on August 7, 1998, Dickey

Morton sent Richard Cayce a letter demanding payment of

$100,000 in relation to a ‘‘political meeting’’—not a business

meeting.641 While this document does not explicitly refer to

a pardon, the phrase ‘‘political meeting’’ applies more accurately to an illicit pardon-for-cash discussion than to a legitimate business proposition. Another document that supports Lincecum’s account is an October 1999 letter to

Dickey Morton discussing a potential oil deal between Morton and some of Lincecum’s associates. In the letter,

Lincecum, writing from prison, states, ‘‘I am sure that within 60 days of my release there will be four parties prepared

to proceed on a similar item for themselves.’’ 642 It is not

clear whether the ‘‘item’’ referred to by Lincecum is a pardon, but it is clear that he anticipated a prompt release

when he wrote the letter. Given that Garland had served

only six of the 87 months required by his sentence when he

wrote the letter, it appears to be contemporaneous corroboration of Garland’s claim that he expected to receive a pardon after paying CLM. The letter supports Lincecum’s

claims because it establishes that his expectation significantly predates his public allegations about the paymentfor-pardon scheme.

While there is a preponderance of evidence showing that Garland

Lincecum attempted to purchase a presidential pardon through

Dickey Morton and George Locke, there is less evidence that shows

Roger Clinton was an active participant in the scheme. However,

the evidence against Roger Clinton is still substantial. There are

three main pieces of evidence that suggest Roger Clinton participated in the scheme to defraud the Lincecum family.

• First, Roger Clinton received at least $25,500 (or more likely $43,500, including the cash payment admitted by Locke

and Morton) from CLM.643 Yet, Roger Clinton claimed that

he ‘‘never heard of CLM’’ and never authorized Morton or

Locke to use his name in any way. Clinton’s denials do not

square with the indisputable fact that he received two

checks from CLM totaling $25,500. Considering Roger Clinton’s sporadic employment in this time frame, this was not

an insignificant amount of money likely to be forgotten. The

only two explanations that have been offered for these payVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00813 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 5601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
798

ments are that: (1) Roger Clinton was selling pardons or (2)

Roger Clinton was selling his name. Clinton denied both

but has offered no alternative.

• Second, in his proffer, Richard Cayce has claimed that he

discussed the Lincecum pardon with Clinton, Locke, and

Morton. Cayce maintains that Clinton, Locke, and Morton

all told him that they could arrange the pardon for

Lincecum, provided that he paid $200,000 to them. While

Cayce offers a clear and damning statement against Clinton, it cannot be given significant weight for the same reason that the proffer of Morton and Locke cannot be given

significant weight. Richard Cayce has invoked his Fifth

Amendment rights, and has made his statements through

his lawyer. On the other hand, Cayce told Lincecum in August 1998, shortly after the meeting with Clinton, Locke,

and Morton, that he had discussed the purchase of a pardon

with them and that they had agreed to do it. Therefore,

there is some contemporaneous corroboration of Cayce’s

proffer. Moreover, unlike Locke and Morton, Cayce does not

appear to have profited at the expense of the Lincecum family. His organization, the M.M. Foundation, actually lost

$70,000 to CLM. Hence, it is difficult to imagine a motive

for Cayce to lie to Lincecum in 1998 about whether he had

discussed a pardon with Clinton, Locke, and Morton.

• Third, Garland Lincecum has stated that he saw Roger

Clinton at the meeting in Dallas where he first arranged

the purchase of the pardon. Lincecum did not participate in

the meeting where the purchase of the pardon was discussed with Roger Clinton, but he did see Roger Clinton

watching his meeting with Cayce, Locke, and Morton from

a mezzanine in the hotel. Obviously, the mere fact that

Lincecum saw Roger Clinton at a hotel in Dallas while he

met with Cayce, Morton, and Locke regarding his pardon

does not prove that Clinton was involved. However, that

fact becomes significant when combined with the allegation

that Cayce met with Roger Clinton earlier that day and discussed the purchase of a pardon with Clinton.

Therefore, there is substantial evidence that Dickey Morton and

George Locke participated in a scheme to defraud Garland

Lincecum and his family of a significant sum of money by promising them that they could obtain a pardon in exchange for $300,000.

There is also evidence that Roger Clinton participated in this

scheme. Bank records establish conclusively that Clinton received,

at a minimum, $25,500 from Morton and Locke that they had obtained directly from the Lincecums, yet Clinton has offered no satisfactory explanation as to why he received this money. However,

the evidence against Roger Clinton in the Lincecum matter is

somewhat equivocal. A full understanding of his role in the

Lincecum matter could not be obtained without full and honest cooperation from Dickey Morton, George Locke, and most importantly, Roger Clinton. All three refused to provide the requisite

level of cooperation.

799

644Susan Schmidt, Clinton’s Brother Promised Pardons, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2001. 645Dan Lasater Document Production (Petition for Pardon, May 4, 2000) (Exhibit 89). 646 Id. 647 Id. 648 INVESTIGATION OF WHITEWATER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND RELATED MATTERS, S.

Rep. No. 104–280, at 361.

IV. OTHER PARDON CANDIDATES

In addition to Gambino and Lincecum, the Committee obtained

evidence connecting Roger Clinton to many other pardon seekers—

many more than the six, unnamed ‘‘close friends’’ for whom Clinton

has publicly admitted lobbying. While Clinton was unsuccessful in

actually obtaining a pardon for anyone but himself, he nonetheless

attempted to misuse his position and access to the President for

personal gain. It appears that President Clinton may have categorically decided to deny clemency petitions advocated by his brother.

Roger Clinton told the media that his brother’s rejection of his appeals caused ‘‘a serious rift’’ between him and his brother:

Saying he told his brother he would forgo a pardon for

himself if the president would grant clemency to his

friends, Roger Clinton added: ‘‘I cried about a couple of

days; I was in an emotional funk. I didn’t know how to

feel. It was so important to me that these people on the

list, that they get it and not me. I guess he didn’t think

so[.]’’ 644

Regardless of whether President Clinton’s clemency decisions involving his brother were categorical or based on the merits of each

individual case, the unusually large number of cases associated

with Roger Clinton merit further inquiry and explanation. Some of

the clemency-seekers discussed below were likely in the category of

‘‘close friends.’’ Others, however, had only met Roger Clinton, if at

all, after he began lobbying on their behalf. More importantly, several of the cases involve solicitations or promises of some form of

payment, such as cash or lucrative business interests, in exchange

for Clinton’s assistance.

A. Dan Lasater and George Locke

In the early 1980s, Dan Lasater was a Little Rock, Arkansas,

bond broker and partner in the firm Collins, Locke, and Lasater.

Lasater was a close associate of the Clintons, raising money for Bill

Clinton’s political campaigns and loaning money to pay Roger Clinton’s drug debts. George Locke was an Arkansas state senator and

business associate of Lasater’s. In December 1986, Dan Lasater

pled guilty in federal court to conspiracy to possess and distribute

cocaine and was sentenced to 30 months in prison.645 Roger Clinton and George Locke were also convicted for their involvement in

the Lasater cocaine distribution conspiracy.646 Clinton was sentenced to 24 months in prison and Locke was sentenced to 15

months.647

The Clintons have a long association with Lasater and Locke,

dating back years before the cocaine convictions. Bill Clinton met

with Dan Lasater, David Collins, and George Locke the day after

losing his re-election bid for Governor to Frank White in 1980.648

The purpose of the meeting was to secure Lasater’s support for his

800

649 Id. 650 Id. at 361–62. 651 Id. at 362. 652 Id. at 363–71. 653Dan Lasater Document Production (State of Arkansas Proclamation, Nov. 13, 1990) (Exhibit 90). 654Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). 655Dan Lasater Document Production (Petition for Pardon, May 4, 2000) (Exhibit 89). 656 Id.

bid to regain the governorship in 1982.649 Lasater subsequently became a major donor and fundraiser for Clinton’s political campaigns. At the request of then-Governor Bill Clinton, Lasater gave

Roger Clinton a job in 1983 on his horse farm in Ocala, Florida.650

When Roger Clinton could not pay debts to his drug dealer, Lasater

loaned him $8,000.651 In its final report, the Senate’s Special Committee on Whitewater detailed the troubling evidence that Governor Clinton’s office steered state bond business from the Arkansas Housing Development Agency and the Arkansas State Police

Commission to Lasater’s firm, providing it an unfair advantage

over other firms competing for the underwriting business.652 In

1990, Governor Clinton issued a conditional state pardon proclamation restoring all of Lasater’s rights, privileges, and immunities

under state law before his cocaine conviction, ‘‘including the right

to own and possess firearms provided, however, no such restoration

is effective until a federal removal of disabilities has been granted.’’ 653

Lasater filed a federal pardon application to the Justice Department on May 4, 2000.654 In the petition for clemency, Lasater

maintains, ‘‘I never sold cocaine, ever.’’ 655 Rather, Lasater says he

merely ‘‘shared my financial success’’ with friends by paying for

their dinners and drinks and drugs: ‘‘If we were in a social setting

and cocaine was available, anyone who wanted to could participate.

No one forced it on anyone.’’ 656 However, this account from the

clemency petition appears to have been somewhat sanitized. According to news reports, affidavits gathered by Julius ‘‘Doc’’ Delaughter, the State Police Investigator who conducted the

Lasater investigation, tell a more damning story:

The extent of Lasater’s alleged partying and coke distribution, and of his preying on teenage girls and young women,

is outlined in dozens of affidavits taken by Delaughter. In

one affidavit, Patricia Anne Smith alleges: ‘‘I was introduced to cocaine by Dan Lasater when I was 16 or 17

years old and a student at North Little Rock Old Main

High School. . . . I was a virgin until two months after I

met Dan Lasater. Lasater plied me with cocaine and gifts

for sexual favors.’’ She claimed he also arranged for her to

see a doctor and be put on birth-control pills.

Other young girls related similar stories. Lisa Ann Scott,

who was 19 when she first encountered Lasater and one

of his broker partners, George Locke, alleged she received

cocaine from both men from the middle of 1984 to the beginning of 1985: ‘‘The first time I met Dan Lasater and

George Locke was at George Locke’s apartment. On this

particular evening George Locke gave me approximately

ten snorts of cocaine. I received approximately eight to ten

801

657 Jamie Dettmer, Dan Lasater: A Friend of Bill’s, INSIGHT, Nov. 6, 1995. 658Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). 659Dan Lasater Document Production (Letter from Dan Lasater, to Roger Clinton (May, 8,

2000)) (Exhibit 91). 660Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). 661 Id. 662Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Hampton and Larkowski, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief

Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform 9 (May 18, 2001) (within Appendix I). 663 Id. 664 Id. 665 Id. 666 Id. 667 Interview with Eric Angel, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar. 28,

2001). 668 Id. 669 Id.

snorts from Dan Lasater.’’ Scott also detailed a trip to Las

Vegas that she took with other girls on Lasater’s jet where

cocaine was made available.657

Lasater told Committee staff that he discussed his pardon petition with Roger Clinton on several occasions.658 He also forwarded

a copy of his petition to Roger Clinton on May 8, 2000, four days

after filing it with the Justice Department.659 Lasater understood

that Roger would bring his petition to the President’s attention but

did not recall Roger saying anything about contacts with other

White House staff regarding the petition.660 He recalled Roger talking about his plan to give the President a list of people that Roger

wanted to receive pardons but did not know whether that actually

happened.661

George Locke also sought a pardon through Roger Clinton. Discussions about a pardon between Clinton and Locke began after

Bill Clinton’s reelection in 1996.662 Roger informed Locke that

‘‘when the time was right that he would ask ‘big brother’ if he

would consider giving Roger, Dan Lassiter [sic] and George Locke

a pardon[.]’’ 663 In December 2000, Locke prepared a pardon petition and sent it to Roger Clinton at the White House.664 Shortly

thereafter, Roger informed Locke that he was going to discuss the

pardon with the President.665 Both Locke and Lasater deny that

they paid any money to Roger Clinton to obtain his help lobbying

for the pardons. Rather, Locke believes that ‘‘Roger still felt responsible for the investigation and conviction of George Locke and Dan

Lassiter [sic] and was, in essence, attempting to set the record

straight between Locke, Lassiter [sic] and Clinton.’’ 666

The Committee has been unable to obtain detailed information

about the President’s reasons for denying the Locke and Lasater

pardons. The only information obtained by the Committee comes

from Associate White House Counsel Eric Angel, who stated that

President Clinton, Bruce Lindsey, and Beth Nolan discussed the

Lasater and Locke pardons.667 Angel stated that President Clinton

believed that Lasater and Locke deserved pardons on the merits of

their cases.668 However, according to Angel, the White House staff

opposed the Lasater and Locke pardons because they believed they

would be too controversial.669 Angel himself expressed concern to

the President that conservative publications had written about

Lasater and Locke and that they were the subject of ‘‘conspiracy

theories’’ and the ‘‘conservative conspiracy theorists’’ would ‘‘go

802

670 Id. 671Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). 672 Jacalyn Carfagno, Fabled Silks, Faded Glory; The Rise and Fall of the Legendary Calumet

Farm, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Mar. 29, 1992. 673 Id. 674 Id. (‘‘Calumet’s board learned that the farm had $400 in the bank and $40 million in debt

currently due. It was a steep plunge for a farm that had been transferred, debt-free, to a new

generation of owners less than a decade before’’). 675 Calumet Farm Executives Sent to Prison for Bribery, Fraud, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 20,

2000. 676 Id. During the financial downfall of Calumet Farms, its largest asset and most famous stallion, Alydar, died under suspicious circumstances. Prosecutors in Houston argued unsuccessfully

that Lundy was complicit in the death of Alydar, who was insured for $35 million. Janet Patton,

Closing the Book on Calumet Story: Farm’s Friends Hope Sentencing Spells the End, LEXINGTON

HERALD LEADER, Oct. 21, 2000. A U.S District Judge found, ‘‘There is some physical evidence,

and circumstances surrounding the event that are suspicious, but I cannot conclude he is responsible.’’ Id. However, Alydar’s groom, on duty when he was injured, was convicted of perjury

before a Houston grand jury investigating the incident. Calumet Farm Executives Sent to Prison

for Bribery, Fraud, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 20, 2000. 677Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001), 678 Josh Tyrangiel, Viveca Novak, and Michael Weisskopf, Brother, Where Art Thy Standards?

TIME, July 9, 2001. 679Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). 680 Id.

nuts’’ if the pardons were granted.670 Whether the President rejected the Lasater and Locke pardons for these reasons or others

is unknown.

It appears that Roger Clinton called Dan Lasater and George

Locke on January 20, 2001, immediately after President Clinton

left office. Roger Clinton told Lasater and Locke in these calls that

he had failed to obtain their pardons. According to Lasater, Roger

Clinton said he was embarrassed that his brother would not do

that favor for him.671

B. J.T. Lundy

In 1982, J.T. Lundy became President of Calumet Farms, the legendary horse-breeding farm that had dominated U.S. horseracing

for decades.672 Lundy gained control of the farm through his marriage to Calumet heiress Cindy Wright.673 Despite continued success at the track, by 1991, Calumet was bankrupt.674 Lundy was

convicted in February 2000 on charges of bank fraud and bribery;

he was sentenced in October 2000 to four and a half years in prison

and $20 million in restitution to the FDIC.675 The jury found that Lundy paid a $1.1 million bribe to a Houston bank in exchange for

$65 million in unsecured loans.676

Dan Lasater knew J.T. Lundy through their mutual involvement

in the horseracing business.677 Following his release from prison,

Lundy had employed Roger Clinton at Calumet farms.678 Lasater

indicated that he had discussed with Roger Clinton the possibility

of obtaining a pardon for Lundy and that he believed Lundy and

Clinton may have met to discuss a pardon as well.679 Documents

indicate that, in late 1999, J.T. Lundy and his son Robert had extensive contacts and discussions with Lasater and Clinton regarding several business deals.680 It appears that Lundy was offering

these business opportunities to Lasater and Clinton in return for

Clinton’s help in obtaining a pardon for Lundy before his case went

to trial. On September 14, 1999, J.T. Lundy wrote to Dan Lasater:

I absolutely give you my word that all things we have

given to you and everything we have told you is 100% true

and proven. You can use what has been told to you withVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00818 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 5601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
803

681 Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0006 (Letter from J.T. Lundy, to Dan Lasater

(Sept. 14, 1999)) (Exhibit 92). 682 Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0007 (Letter from Robert Lundy, to Dan Lasater

(Sept. 14, 1999)) (Exhibit 93).

out any worries or any concerns. I have been working on

these projects for several years and have put together the

whole structure. This is not hear say [sic] I am telling you.

***

We have every document, map, studies, mining plans and

everything to provide for you.

***

Once again I want to thank you for helping to save me.681

On the same day, Robert Lundy wrote to Lasater:

My Venezuelan partners Aura Diaz and Robert Korsakas

are scheduled to meet with British Petroleum on Sept. 20.

BP is being represented by an agent from Spain, BP has

a [sic] tentatively offered .38 cents USD a metric ton.

There are an [sic] estimated reserves of 107,000,000+.

(.38 X 107 million metric tons = $40,660,000) We have not

accepted this offer, we [sic] feel the concessions are worth

.30 to .55 cents per metric ton.

All of our information is from the Venezuelan Government’s geological reports of the coal in the Franja Nor Oriental coal region of Tachira State. Our concessions are located in this region. The concessions we have offered to BP

are Concession Las Mesas Escalante, #16, #17 and #18.682

On October 11, 1999, Robert Lundy wrote to Roger Clinton (and

provided a copy to Dan Lasater) the following letter:

I wish to find out when you and Dan [Lasater] will be able

to schedule a meeting in Florida. Dan said, he will work

with your schedule and will be available at your convenience.

***

I want to point out a couple of things to you. As you know,

Dan and J.T. have been doing deals together for more than

25 years. I am sure that Dan will tell you that J.T. has

never told him anything that is not 100% right.

Dan has told J.T., He [sic] agreed to put the stock in his

name for the group’s interest. This way there will be no

hassles or worries.

804

683 Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0010 (Letter from Robert Lundy, to Roger Clinton

(Oct. 11, 1999)) (Exhibit 94). 684 Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0011 (Letter from J.T. Lundy, to Roger Clinton

(Nov. 10, 1999)) (Exhibit 95).

***

If you recall when we met at the Dallas Airport, we talked

about racehorses. . . . J.T. really wants to get back into it

full time. . . . With the impute [sic] and directions from

everyone, we can all have a lot of fun and make money.

***

I know you understand the anxiety that J.T. is going

through. Please try to set up a meeting date as soon as

your schedule permits.683

Approximately one month later, on November 10, 1999, J.T. Lundy

wrote to Roger Clinton, indicating his growing concern as his trial

date grew nearer:

I am sorry to worry you and Dan continually, but I am

sure both of you know why I am so anxious, with the trial

date set for January 16, 2000.

Dan and I talk nearly everyday. . . . I wrote Dan a Fedex

letter, last Saturday, to explain my ideas of how we can

handle everything.

You and Dan can make final plans. We will go on and

transfer the stock share over to Dan now. This will allow

you and your group some time to see if anyone owes you

a favor that needs to be repaid. If you find that something

good develops, we will work and get the rest of the stock

for you at a reasonable price.

I have suggested a way that Dan can own your stock, and

there is no way any outsider can every [sic] know the true

owners. Also, no one can ever get their hands on any of

your money. And it is TAX FREE!

***

Robert will need your proxy so he will still have the 51%

majority vote, as he does now.

With your help, we can work out a way to postpone everything until between November 8, 2000; and January 19,

2001.684

On November 30, 1999, J.T. Lundy sent another letter to Roger

Clinton with almost the exact same wording but with a more frantic tone:

You will make a great deal of money. Dan can give you an

idea of the amounts you will get.

805

685 Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0012 (Letter from J.T. Lundy, to Roger Clinton

(Nov. 30, 1999)) (Exhibit 96) 686Lasater has also lied to federal authorities in the past. In 1986, a federal judge found that

he lied under oath in the course of the bankruptcy trial of his partner George Locke. INVESTIGA- TION OF WHITEWATER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND RELATED MATTERS, S. REP. NO. 104– 280, at 362. Moreover, the Senate Special Committee on Whitewater noted in its final report

that Lasater did not disclose the judge’s finding to the Committee. Instead Lasater falsely

claimed, ‘‘it has never been alleged that I committed any fraudulent act or lied in the course

of any investigation.’’ Id. 687Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). 688 Id. This remark is similar to what Dickey Morton told Garland Lincecum. See Section

III.A.6., ‘‘Lincecum’s Attempts to Receive the Pardon.’’ 689Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). 690 Id.

With you and Dan’s help, a way can be worked out to postpone everything until after the November 8 election, and

before the date you all leave office in 2001.

PLEASE get in touch with Dan soon. He has all the details of what you will received and he is willing to take

care of everything for you all. Time is getting short!

PLEASE HELP ME NOW! 685

These documents demonstrate that, as Lundy’s trial date neared,

he was more and more urgently seeking Lasater’s and Clinton’s

participation in the Venezuelan coal deal. They also demonstrate

that Lasater was intimately involved in the deal and that Lundy

clearly expected the deal to have some impact on his legal troubles.

Together with Lasater’s admission to Committee staff that he and

Lundy discussed obtaining a pardon for Lundy through Roger Clinton, the documents strongly suggest that Lundy was providing

Roger Clinton a sweetheart business deal in exchange for his help

in trying to obtain a pardon. First, the repeated reference to timing

‘‘everything’’ so as to occur after the presidential election but before

the end of the Clinton Administration suggests that whatever Roger’s part in the deal involved, it would be politically damaging if

discovered just before the election. It also suggests Roger’s part in

the deal would require some official, presidential act, which could

not occur after President Clinton left office. Second, the repeated

references to Lundy’s rapidly approaching trial date suggest that

Roger’s part in the deal would have some impact on Lundy’s legal

jeopardy. The most likely explanation is that Lundy was seeking

some form of executive clemency through Roger Clinton.

When questioned about these matters, Dan Lasater was less

than forthcoming.686 Lasater at first claimed that other than some

matters related to horseracing, he and Lundy did not have any

business dealings together.687 His denial directly contradicted the

extensive documentary evidence discussed above; Lasater was presumably unaware the Committee possessed those documents. Regarding pardon discussions, Lasater said he had asked Roger Clinton about a pardon for Lundy on one occasion but that Roger had

said he thought a pardon was not appropriate before someone had

gone to prison.688 Lasater did not recall any discussions of a commutation for Lundy and did not know when the meeting between

Lundy and Clinton occurred.689

When asked if Clinton was doing any business with Lundy,

Lasater said not to his knowledge, and ‘‘I don’t know how they

could have.’’ 690 When asked whether he had ever discussed holding

806

691 Id. 692 Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0010 (Letter from Robert Lundy, to Roger Clinton

(Oct. 11, 1999)) (Exhibit 94). 693Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). 694 Id. 695 Id. 696 Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0007 (Letter from Robert Lundy, to Dan Lasater

(Sept. 14, 1999)) (Exhibit 93); Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0011 (Letter from J.T.

Lundy, to Roger Clinton (Nov. 10, 1999)) (Exhibit 95). 697 Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0012 (Letter from J.T. Lundy, to Roger Clinton

(Nov. 30, 1999)) (Exhibit 96) 698Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). 699 Id. 700 Id. 701 Id. 702 Id.

Clinton’s interest in an investment, Lasater said he had not.691

Lasater’s denial directly contradicted the statement in Robert

Lundy’s letter to Roger: ‘‘Dan has told J.T., He [sic] agreed to put

the stock in his name for the group’s interest. This way there will

be no hassles or worries.’’ 692 After denying he had agreed to hold

stock for Clinton, Lasater said that Lundy was ‘‘really at his wits

end the nearer he got to actually going into prison.’’ 693 Lasater

said Lundy mentioned ‘‘some things’’ to him but that he did not

pass them on to Roger. Lasater said Lundy was ‘‘asking a question

out of desperation’’ and mentioned helping Roger with proceeds of

a coal deal in Venezuela.694 Lasater said Lundy did not mention

a number or an estimate of how much Roger could make and that

he just ‘‘blew it off.’’ 695 However, Lasater had in fact received a letter from Robert Lundy estimating the deal’s total worth at nearly $41 million, and J.T. Lundy had written to Roger (and sent a copy

to Lasater), saying: ‘‘You will make a great deal of money. Dan can

give you an idea of the amounts you will get.’’ 696

When confronted with questions about specific documents,

Lasater’s answers became less responsive and more vague. Committee staff asked about the letters to Roger Clinton from J.T.

Lundy and copied to Lasater stating, ‘‘With you and Dan’s help, a

way can be worked out to postpone everything until after the November 8 election, and before the date you all leave office in

2001.’’ 697 In response, Lasater claimed that he had merely invested

money and lost it. He stated that the ‘‘only thing’’ he did ‘‘on the

Venezuela coal deal’’ was to put in money.698 Lasater said that

Lundy thought the whole deal would make $10 million of which

Lasater owned 20 percent, but Lasater said he had made no

money.699 Lasater’s admission to owning 20 percent of the coal deal

contradicted his earlier claim to have no non-horse-related business

dealings with Lundy. Moreover, his admission came only after he

learned that Committee staff had reviewed documents related to

the deal. Lasater went on to deny that he ever discussed the coal

deal with Roger Clinton, repeating that he merely ‘‘blew it off.’’ 700

Given that Lasater invested his own money and owned 20 percent

of the venture, this statement presumably refers to the idea of involving Roger Clinton in the deal. Apparently still referring to Clinton’s involvement, Lasater went on to say that ‘‘it was too far out’’ and ‘‘you just don’t do those things.’’ 701 Then, Lasater declared: ‘‘there is nothing in the coal deal. I guarantee it.’’ 702

It is unclear whether Roger Clinton asked President Clinton to

grant executive clemency to J.T. Lundy. Regardless, Lundy did not

807

703 Bill Lodge, Manager of Lake Texoma Marina Convicted of Fraud, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 11, 1999. 704 Id. 705 Id. 706 Id. 707 Id. 708 Id. 709Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). When Loe’s wife spoke to the media,

she indicated that Loe had met Roger Clinton ‘‘in the late 1970’s when they were students at

University of Arkansas.’’ Alison Leigh Cowan, House Committee Asks Roger Clinton to Explain

Some Ties to Pardon Requests, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2001. 710 Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0002 (Letter from Blume Loe, to Roger Clinton

(May, 30, 2000)) (Exhibit 97).

receive clemency. It is also uncertain whether Roger Clinton received any financial benefits from Lundy. Clinton did receive tens

of thousands of dollars in travelers checks purchased in Venezuela

in 1999 and 2000, but it is not clear if any of those checks have

a connection to the Lundy matter.

C. Blume Loe

On August 10, 1999, Blume Loe was convicted on charges of tax

fraud.703 Loe was the manager of High Port Marina, a complex of

boat slips, restaurants, and other businesses on Lake Texoma at

the Texas-Oklahoma border.704 The lake is owned by the U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers and was leased by Loe’s family.705 At the

time of his conviction, Loe’s parents were already serving time in

prison on charges of mail fraud, wire fraud, and defrauding the

Corps of Engineers, which was entitled to a portion of gross sales

under the terms of the lease.706 Blume Loe failed to report

$450,000 of income on his tax returns and claimed that the money

was a series of loans from his mother.707 However, Loe was found

to have been a knowing participant in a scheme to hide the money

from the Corps of Engineers and the IRS.708

Blume Loe had worked for Dan Lasater in the 1980s as a salesman at his bond firm and presumably knew Roger Clinton through

their mutual association with Lasater.709 On May 30, 2000, Loe

wrote to Roger Clinton seeking his assistance in obtaining a pardon:

I thought I would be direct. Yes, this is me, and yes, this

is Blume Loe asking you to get with brother Bill, and get

me PARDONED.

As you know I was convicted on some tax charges. I never

believed your brother’s Government would get a conviction,

but they did. I was sentenced to prison, and I know you

know what that means. Seems now I am going through all

those things that I never believed I would have to do to get

this thing taken care of. For one, I am sitting in this

goddamn law library typing a letter like a prison writ-writer. If these guys around me knew what I was writing, or

who I was writing to, [G]od knows what would happen. So

anyway, it’s me, and I need your help.710

Loe had attempted to contact Clinton through some mutual friends,

David Burnett and David Crews. According to Dan Lasater, David

Crews’ sister, Lana Crews, had once been Roger Clinton’s

808

711Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). 712 Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0002 (Letter from Blume Loe, to Roger Clinton

(May, 30, 2000)) (Exhibit 97). 713Telephone Interview with David Crews (May 29, 2001). 714 Id. 715 Id. 716 Id. 717 Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0002–3 (Letter from Blume Loe, to Roger Clinton

(May, 30, 2000)) (Exhibit 97). 718Letter from David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Cynthia S.

Goosen, Cooper & Scully (May 14, 2001) (within Appendix I).

girlfriend.711 Loe’s letter describes his previous attempts to contact

Clinton:

I talked to Dave [Burnett], and we discussed how this

could get this done. Dave talked to David Cruse, [sic] and

David Cruse [sic] says he talked to you about this deal. I

hope all this happened like I was told, but if it did not I

would not be surprised. I learned in here that things are

not always like they have been told. However, whether you

have talked to anyone about me, to date, or not, I am now

reaching out to you personally.712

David Crews confirmed that David Burnett contacted him about

helping to secure Roger Clinton’s help in obtaining a pardon for

Blume Loe.713 Crews knew Roger Clinton and estimated that he

probably saw him once a year.714 However, Crews said he did not

want to approach Roger with ‘‘something like this.’’ 715 Crews denied that he did anything to assist Loe in his effort to obtain a pardon.716

Loe’s letter also refers to contacts between his lawyer and

Roger Clinton:

You will be receiving a package from my attorney on appeal about the pardon issue. Her name is Cindy Goosen,

and all the paperwork on my side should be in that package. She’s a good lawyer, and you can talk to her. She

knows what time it is. She ain’t no idiot, like my trial lawyer was. Talking to her is talking to me.

***

I also know that what I am requesting is extraordinary.

While I know that you are trying to get one, I hope yours

comes, if at all, at about the same time mine comes . . .

if you know what I mean. I would not be approaching you

with this if I was not desperate with no where else to turn.

I need your help on this.717

When Committee staff contacted Loe’s lawyer, Cynthia Goosen,

and attempted to arrange an interview, she first responded by

claiming that she could not discuss any matters related to Loe because of the attorney-client privilege.718 After being informed that

any contacts with Roger Clinton, whom she did not represent,

would not fall within the attorney-client privilege, Goosen then

claimed that ‘‘any work done pursuant to any attempt to obtain

clemency would have been protected by the attorney work product

privilege’’ and that ‘‘as to any related matters which may not fall

809

719Letter from Cynthia S. Goosen, Cooper & Scully, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel,

Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 22, 2001) (within Appendix I). 720Despite Loe’s refusal to speak to Committee staff, his wife’s comments on the matter were

reported in the press: ‘‘She said she and her husband may have discussed going to Roger Clinton

for help, ‘but we didn’t know how to contact him,’ said Ms. Loe. ‘I wouldn’t call us a dear friend,’ she said. ‘We haven’t talked to him in over 20 years.’ ’’ Alison Leigh Cowan, House Committee

Asks Roger Clinton to Explain Some Ties to Pardon Requests, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2001. 721 Rita Lavelle Document Production 005 (Petition for Pardon, Jan. 7, 2001) (Exhibit 98). 722 Id. at 005. 723Telephone Interview with Rita Lavelle (July 11, 2001). 724 Rita Lavelle Document Production 013 (Petition for Pardon, Jan. 7, 2001) (Exhibit 98). 725 Id. at 014. 726 Id.

strictly within the privilege, it is my policy as an attorney to treat

same as confidential and not to disclose same unless compelled to

do so by judicial process.’’ 719 The refusal of Blume Loe and his lawyer to cooperate with the Committee’s investigation limits what can

be known about Loe’s efforts to obtain a pardon.720 Likewise, because of Roger Clinton’s refusal to cooperate, it is unclear whether

Loe was one of the names Clinton submitted to his brother for consideration.

D. Rita Lavelle

Roger Clinton did not limit his pardon lobbying to personal

friends. He also agreed to assist Rita Lavelle, an Environmental

Protection Agency Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and

Emergency Response in the Reagan Administration. In 1983,

Lavelle was convicted of making false statements, obstructing a

Congressional Committee, perjury before a Senate Committee and

perjury before a House Committee.721 She was sentenced to six

months in prison, five years of probation, and a $10,000 fine.722

The charges against Lavelle stemmed from an investigation of allegations that she had continued to work on matters relating to a

Superfund clean-up site despite formerly being employed by one of

the alleged polluters of the site. Lavelle was convicted of lying

about precisely when Justice Department and EPA lawyers had advised her to recuse herself.

Lavelle has maintained her innocence, appealing her conviction

and attempting since the Reagan Administration to obtain executive clemency.723 She argues first that her former employer,

Aerojet, was not charged with dumping at the Superfund site in

question, Stringfellow, because ‘‘they never did.’’ 724 Secondly, she

contends that she was under no obligation to recuse herself but

that she had merely made ‘‘a personal promise’’ to the Senate Confirmation and Oversight Committee not to work on matters ‘‘directly involving’’ her former employer.725 And thirdly, she alleges

that her accusers had received campaign contributions or had other

connections with named Stringfellow dumpers who ‘‘would economically benefit by stalling and de-railing EPA’s cleanup

orders[.]’’ 726 She has also implied that political corruption tainted

the appellate review of her conviction:

Approximately three weeks after the Appellate Court

Hearing, Senators Metzenbaum and Kennedy asked me to

come to Kennedy’s Office. They were on the Judiciary

Committee and they wished me to testify against Ed

Meese who was nominated for the new Attorney General.

810

727 Id. 728Telephone Interview with Rita Lavelle (July 11, 2001). 729 Id. 730 Id. 731 Id. 732Telephone Interview with Michael Dodds (July 31, 2001). 733Telephone Interview with Rita Lavelle (July 11, 2001). 734 Id. 735Telephone Interview with Michael Dodds (July 31, 2001). 736Telephone Interview with Rita Lavelle (July 11, 2001). 737 Id. 738 Id.

Having worked for Mr. Meese and President Reagan since

the early days in California when Reagan was Governor,

it was obvious to them I could evoke some ‘‘tantalizing’’ memories. At first they were charming then they got down

to threats if I didn’t co-operate. Finally Kennedy told me

either I appear before his committee and testify against

Meese or I would lose the Appeal and go to Jail. My Irish

Pride and Catholic Optimism took over and after informing them there was only one innocent person in the room

and she was leaving, Kennedy screamed the prophetic

‘‘and she is going to jail.’’

Several months later (to be specific the Friday before the

Inauguration of Reagan for his second term) the Court

made a ‘‘small’’ announcement that they were denying the

Appeal with NO Comment. The three member Appellate

Court Hearing was now reduced to two Democrats who

had ‘‘No Comment.’’ The one Republican Member had accepted a Sabbatical to England and had not provided comment prior to leaving.727

Sometime in 2000, Lavelle decided to seek to obtain clemency

from the Clinton administration. She first approached a friend, Michael Dodds, who was a contract security provider who frequently

traveled with Roger Clinton overseas.728 Lavelle told Committee

staff that Dodds knew that she was having trouble finding work

because of her felony conviction and that he helped her contact

Roger Clinton to request that Roger hand-carry her pardon petition

to President Clinton.729 At one point, she spoke to Dodds and Clinton on the phone simultaneously about her request.730 Later,

Lavelle said that, through Michael Dodds, Roger Clinton asked for

‘‘$10,000 or $30,000’’ to hand carry the petition for her.731 Although

Dodds claimed that he ‘‘never supposed that [Clinton] might want

payment’’ and that Clinton merely thought Lavelle’s case was deserving, Lavelle’s memory on this point is clear.732 In fact, Lavelle

said that such a fee request ‘‘was to be expected’’ and that it ‘‘was

not a quid pro quo.’’ 733 Lavelle explained that she was bankrupt

and that, although she could not afford to pay, Roger Clinton ‘‘was

kind enough’’ to carry it without payment.734 Dodds denied the allegation that Clinton asked Lavelle for money.735

Clinton instructed Lavelle to send her petition to an address at

the White House Usher’s office. Lavelle did so.736 She also spoke

to Roger Clinton by phone about her pardon petition several

times.737 In the first contact after Clinton had agreed to deliver her

petition, he called to say that the President was ‘‘favorably disposed’’ to granting her clemency.738 But, on the Friday night before

811

739 Id. 740 Id. 741 Id. 742 Id. 743 Id. 744 Id. Lavelle also claims that Clinton then asked her, ‘‘Who do you know at Pepperdine?’’ Lavelle said she realized later that this was a reference to former Independent Counsel Kenneth

Starr’s aborted departure to become Dean of Pepperdine Law School. Lavelle understood Roger

Clinton to be probing to see if she could assist in obtaining a deal or if her pardon could become

part of a deal between President Clinton and the Office of Independent Counsel. The President

was engaged in last-minute negotiations that ultimately led to the agreement not to prosecute

that was announced hours before Clinton left office. Id. 745 Id. 746 Id. 747Steve McVicker, Bad Deal; John Ballis Was a Crook. But He Expected the Federal Government to Keep Its End of a Bargain, HOUSTON PRESS, Dec. 4, 1997. 748 Id. 749 Id; Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0016 (Letter from John Ballis, to Roger Clinton (Jan. 9, 1999)) (Exhibit 99). 750 Id.

the inauguration, Roger Clinton called again and asked Lavelle,

‘‘Do you have $100,000 to get this through?’’ 739 Lavelle said she interpreted the comment as a joke because she was bankrupt and

could not possibly raise $100,000 so quickly.740 Also, Clinton had

already told her that it was probably too late to get her petition

granted.741 Nevertheless, Roger Clinton did ask Lavelle if she had $100,000 in connection with the pardon effort. Clinton went on to

explain that ‘‘the President is under a lot of pressure’’ and asked ‘‘what can you do with the Bush team?’’ 742 Lavelle replied that she

was ‘‘close to the conservative elements.’’ 743 Roger told her that ‘‘political equity was more important than money at this point.’’ 744

Lavelle did not receive clemency on inauguration day and, much

as he apparently did with others for whom he had lobbied, Roger

Clinton called to tell her that he was upset and embarrassed that

his requests for pardons were not granted.745 Lavelle spoke to Clinton one more time after his brother was out of office, but she could

recall only that the conversation focused on his claim that he was

framed on a drunk driving charge that had recently received a lot

of press attention.746 Lavelle’s account provides a disturbingly cynical view of politics and the pardon process. It also illustrates that

Roger Clinton was willing to use his relationship and access to the

President to help not only dear friends, as he has claimed in the

press, but also any stranger who might possibly provide money or

‘‘political equity’’ beneficial to the Clintons.

E. John Ballis

In 1990, Houston real estate developer John Ballis pled guilty to paying a savings and loan president $371,000 in kickback money

($300,000 of which was provided in the form of a cash-stuffed duffel

bag delivered via helicopter) in exchange for $6.7 million in

loans.747 As part of the plea arrangement, Ballis provided authorities with details about the bribe and was given immunity from further prosecution arising out of the investigation.748 Ballis was sentenced to two years’ probation and 160 hours of community service.749 Shortly after completing his community service, however,

Ballis was indicted again for the crime to which he had earlier pled

guilty as well as obstruction of justice.750 Prosecutors had cancelled

the plea agreement on the grounds that Ballis had not met his obligation under the bargain to be complete and truthful in his debriefVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00827 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 5601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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751Steve McVicker, Bad Deal; John Ballis Was a Crook. But He Expected the Federal Government to Keep Its End of a Bargain, HOUSTON PRESS, Dec. 4, 1997. 752 Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0016 (Letter from John Ballis, to Roger Clinton

(Jan. 9, 1999)) (Exhibit 99). 753 Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0022 (Letter from Joni Anderson-Ballis, to President William J. Clinton, the White House (Nov. 21, 1994)) (Exhibit 100). 754George Wells, Former Reporter Appears, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Sept. 19, 1986.

Anderson-Ballis appeared as a witness before a grand jury investigating Dan Lasater for cocaine

distribution. Id. 755Telephone Interview with Joni Anderson-Ballis (June 12, 2001). 756 Id; Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0022 (Letter from Joni Anderson-Ballis, to

President William J. Clinton, the White House (Nov. 21, 1994)) (Exhibit 100). 757 Id. See also Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0025 (Letter from Joni AndersonBallis, to Bruce Lindsey, Special Counsel to the President, the White House (Nov. 21, 1994))

(Exhibit 101). 758Telephone Interview with Joni Anderson-Ballis (June 12, 2001).

ing.751 Ballis was tried, convicted, and sentenced to 12 and a half

years in prison.752

In 1989, Ballis married Joni Anderson.753 Anderson-Ballis had

been a reporter for KTHV television in Little Rock, Arkansas, as

well as an employee of Lasater and Co., a Little Rock-based securities company owned by Dan Lasater.754 Anderson-Ballis said she

knew Bill Clinton, Roger Clinton, Bruce Lindsey, and Virginia

Kelly (President Clinton’s mother) ‘‘fairly well.’’ 755 She said John

Ballis began seeking executive clemency soon after the revocation

of his plea agreement in 1994.756 Anderson-Ballis wrote to President Clinton seeking clemency for her husband in November 1994:

I have met with Bruce Lindsey on this matter. He can

show you the documents and fill you in on the details. He

can also tell you about Representative Jack Brooks’ interest and involvement in the case.

***

I’m aware the demands on your time are overwhelming

and if it were not for our friendship, you’d probably never

see this letter. However, friendship aside, this situation is

one that warrants your consideration.757

The request did receive attention early on, according to AndersonBallis. She met with Webster Hubbell about the issue when he was

Associate Attorney General and with Bruce Lindsey for two hours

once when President Clinton was in Houston to attend a fundraiser.758 She also wrote letters to Roger Clinton and Bruce

Lindsey. Her letter to Roger suggests he played an active role in

advocating for Ballis:

Roger the Dodger—

I can’t tell you how much your help means to me. I’m sure

you understand.

***

Please ask Bill if he got the letter and also get any advice

on how I should proceed with this. Mention to him that

Primetime Live is interested in doing a piece at this point

813

759 Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0021 (Letter from Joni Anderson-Ballis, to Roger

Clinton) (Exhibit 102). 760 Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0019 (Letter from the Honorable Lynn N.

Hughes, U.S. District Judge, District Court for the Southern District of Texas, to President William J. Clinton, the White House (Oct. 28, 1994)) (Exhibit 103). 761 Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0028 (Letter from Margaret Colgate Love, Pardon

Attorney, Department of Justice, to the Honorable Lynn N. Hughes, U.S. District Judge, District

Court for the Southern District of Texas (Jan. 6, 1995)) (Exhibit 104). 762 Interview with Marie Ragghianti, former Chief of Staff, USPC (July 27, 2001). 763 USPC Document Production 00889 (Exhibit 40). Other documents, however, indicate that

during his December meeting with Parole Commission staff, Clinton did more than merely ask

about a holiday furlough. Clinton also provided copies of correspondence from Lois Franco, a

criminal justice consultant apparently hired by Ballis. The correspondence consists of a fax from

Franco to Clinton detailing the procedural status of Ballis’ case and attached letter to the Commissioners arguing for Ballis’ early release. USPC Document Production 00961 (Exhibit 105).

The fax indicates that Ballis had instructed Franco to provide the information at Clinton’s request and thanks Clinton for his assistance. Id. at 00961–63. 764 Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0014–015 (Letter from John Ballis, to Roger Clinton (Jan. 15, 1998)) (Exhibit 106). 765 Id. at RCC0014.

(Rick Nelson is the contact there)—I’m sending them documents today.759

Despite Ballis’ connections, and even though the federal judge who

initially sentenced Ballis wrote a letter supporting a grant of clemency,760 no executive action was taken on Ballis’ case. One reason

cited at the time was that Ballis had not yet exhausted his judicial

appeals.761

Roger Clinton did not stop trying to help Ballis, however. In December 1997, when he was lobbying the U.S. Parole Commission

for the release of organized crime figure Rosario Gambino, he also

inquired about a furlough for John Ballis.762 According to Parole

Commission staffers Marie Ragghianti and Tom Kowalski, Roger

Clinton knew that Ballis had recently received a tentative release

decision from a Parole Commission hearing examiner and was

merely inquiring about the possibility of a furlough release for the

holidays. Ragghianti and Kowalski referred him to the warden of

Ballis’ prison on the furlough issue and emphasized that the hearing examiner’s decision was merely a recommendation and had to

be approved before becoming final.763

Clinton was successful, at least according to Ballis, in helping

him obtain a parole date of March 26, 1998, after serving 40

months of his 12-year prison term. Upon learning in January 1998

of the parole date, Ballis wrote a letter to Roger: 764

I finally got my copy of the Notice of Action—it was here

the whole time—they just couldn’t locate it—if you believe

that bullsh*t.

But anyway I thought you might like to see the result of

your help & work.

I can’t thank you enough. I sure hope your meeting w/ Disney went OK & that you have a good trip to Korea.765

While Ballis’ letter credits Clinton with helping him obtain his release, it is unclear exactly what, if anything, he did for Ballis before meeting with Parole Commission personnel in December 1997.

After Ballis was released from prison, Roger Clinton continued to

help him in his effort to obtain executive clemency. Oddly enough,

with all the help Clinton had given John Ballis through the years,

814

766 Roger Clinton Document Production RCC0016 (Letter from John Ballis, to Roger Clinton

(Jan. 9, 1999)) (Exhibit 99). 767Telephone Interview with Joni Anderson-Ballis (June 12, 2001). 768 Id. 769 Id. 770 Id. 771 NARA Document Production (Handwritten Note) (Exhibit 107).

they did not meet in person until 1999. Ballis wrote to Clinton in

January 1999:

It was so nice to finally get to meet you. I trust you had

a nice trip home and are getting ready to go to D.C. I

wanted to get you the information on my commutation request so you would be able to familiarize yourself with it

before your trip.

***

As you know, I have served my prison time and am currently in the half-way house until March 10, 1999. I will

remain under the jurisdiction of the justice system until

2004 when my sentence ends. I am also required to pay

fines and restitution in excess of 4 1⁄2 million dollars.

***

I could go on and on about the injustices in my case, but,

I’d rather put it all behind me and rebuild my life. I’m

hoping you can help me do this by assisting me in getting

Executive Clemency. This would eliminate future parole

supervision—which lasts until 2004—and do away with

the fine and restitution portion of my sentence.766

Joni Anderson-Ballis told Committee staff that she met with

Roger Clinton about her husband’s case about a week before the

end of the Clinton Administration.767 Clinton told her that he was

making a list of people that he planned to give to his brother and

ask that they be granted executive clemency.768 Clinton also told

her that he was trying to obtain a pardon for himself but did not

know whether he was going to receive one. Anderson-Ballis told

Clinton to tell the President to ‘‘please take another look at the

Ballis case.’’ 769 She also said that she doubted that Roger actually

asked the President to grant a pardon to her husband.770 However,

there is documentary evidence suggesting that Roger Clinton did

indeed present Ballis’ name to the President. The National Archives produced to the Committee a document with the name ‘‘John

Ballis’’ printed on it, and next to it, in President Clinton’s handwriting was the following note, ‘‘Meredith call him on this I think

there’s a different option than the one we discussed—BC.’’ 771 While

this document does not contain Roger Clinton’s name, it was produced to the Committee in the middle of a number of documents

relating to Roger Clinton, so it is possible that Roger provided

Ballis’ name to the President.

Although it is not certain whether Roger Clinton lobbied the

White House on the Ballis pardon, the Ballis case apparently did

receive serious consideration in the closing days of the Clinton AdVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:46 May 15, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00830 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 5601 C:\REPORTS\78264.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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772 NARA Document Production (Exhibits 108, 109, 110). 773 NARA Document Production (Exhibit 108). 774Telephone Interview with Joni Anderson-Ballis (June 12, 2001). 775 NARA Document Production (Exhibits 109, 110). 776 NARA Document Production (Exhibits 110). 777Telephone Interview with Joni Anderson-Ballis (June 12, 2001). 778 Id. 779 Id. 780 Id. 781 Id. 782 Id. 783 Id. 784 Id. 785Steven Griggs Document Production (Petition for Commutation, June 20, 2000) (Exhibit

111); Alison Leigh Cowan, Plea Mailed to Roger Clinton Was Flagged by President, N.Y. TIMES,

June 30, 2001.

ministration. Ballis’ name appears on three White House documents, in addition to the note from President Clinton to Meredith

Cabe: a table of cases being tracked by Associate White House

Counsel Meredith Cabe and two draft memos to the President.772

In the entry for Ballis, the Meredith Cabe table notes, ‘‘Atty. Don

Clark of Houston, dropped of [sic] papers personally; BRL?’’ 773 Joni

Anderson-Ballis said that Clark was the last lawyer they hired to

work on the case.774 According to the draft memos dated December

17 and December 20, 2000, White House Counsels Beth Nolan,

Bruce Lindsey, and Meredith Cabe all recommended to the President that he grant clemency to Ballis.775 The December 20, 2000,

memo recommends that the President, ‘‘Commute remaining period

of sentence of confinement (for which he is currently paroled), and

remit fine, leaving intact the obligation to pay restitution.’’ 776 Anderson-Ballis said that their attorney, Don Clark, had traveled to

Washington to meet with Administration officials regarding the

Ballis request and also that Clark received a call two nights before

the inauguration from Associate White House Counsel Eric

Angel.777 Apparently, Angel was pursuing the ‘‘different option’’

suggested by the President in his note to Meredith Cabe. Angel

asked Clark if there was any piece of the clemency request that

Ballis would accept such as having the probation commuted but the

restitution left intact.778 Clark replied that they would accept

whatever was granted but that they preferred to receive a ‘‘complete pardon.’’ 779 After the call from Angel, Ballis was optimistic

about the prospects, but in the end, he received no commutation.780

Anderson-Ballis said that she had not spoken to Roger Clinton

since the end of the Clinton Administration.781 Anderson-Ballis

stated that she was initially mad at Roger when no commutation

was granted but not any longer because she realized that ‘‘Bill

loves his brother, but he does not respect him.’’ 782 When asked if

Roger was paid for his work on the clemency request, AndersonBallis stated that he was not, and that anything that Roger did

was out of friendship.783 Anderson-Ballis stated that ‘‘Roger is a

good guy, but he is a lost soul.’’ 784

F. Steven Griggs

In 1992, Steven M. Griggs pled guilty in the Eastern District of

Missouri to conspiracy to manufacture and possess 100 grams or

more of methamphetamine.785 Before being sentenced, however, he

fled and remained a fugitive until being captured over a year

816

786 Id. 787Steven Griggs Document Production (Petition for Commutation, June 20, 2000) (Exhibit

111). 788 Id. 789 Id. 790 Alison Leigh Cowan, Plea Mailed to Roger Clinton Was Flagged by President, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2001; Telephone Interview with Daley McDaniel (July 9, 2001). 791 Id. 792 Alison Leigh Cowan, Plea Mailed to Roger Clinton Was Flagged by President, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2001. 793Telephone Interview with Daley McDaniel (July 9, 2001). 794 Id. 795 Id. 796 Id. 797 Id. 798 Id. 799 Id. 800 Id. 801 Id. 802 Alison Leigh Cowan, Plea Mailed to Roger Clinton Was Flagged by President, N.Y. TIMES,

June 30, 2001. 803Telephone Interview with Daley McDaniel (July 9, 2001).

later.786 Griggs was sentenced to over 24 years in prison and will

not be released until 2013.787

In June 2000, Griggs submitted a commutation petition to the

White House and Justice Department.788 Griggs’ request for a commutation was based on the argument that a 24-year prison sentence was too harsh for a first-time nonviolent offender, even one

engaged in large-scale methamphetamine manufacture.789 In an effort to ensure that the petition would be granted, Griggs’ father

sought Roger Clinton’s help through an old family friend. Griggs’

father is Chief Carl ‘‘Grey Owl’’ Griggs of the Northern Cherokee

Nation of Missouri and Arkansas, an American Indian tribe, which

is not recognized by the United States.790 The Clinton family friend

is Daley McDaniel, the owner of a moving company in Hot Springs,

Arkansas.791 McDaniel knew Chief Griggs because McDaniel had

been seeking admission into the tribe.792 McDaniel told Committee

staff that he also knew Roger Clinton very well, that he ‘‘helped

raise Roger.’’ 793 At one point, Roger Clinton had dated McDaniel’s

daughter.794 McDaniel described how he had suggested to Chief

Griggs that Roger might be able to help the Northern Cherokee

Nation obtain official recognition by the U.S. government.795

McDaniel said that, when Bill Clinton was governor of Arkansas,

McDaniel could leave a message and his call would always be returned within a few days.796 But, McDaniel did not enjoy the same

access to Bill Clinton after he became President.797 So, McDaniel

decided to try to use Roger Clinton to gain the President’s attention

on the Northern Cherokee Nation recognition issue.798

When McDaniel told Chief Griggs about his plans to obtain federal recognition for the tribe, Griggs raised the issue of his son’s

imprisonment.799 McDaniel could not recall whose idea it was initially, but together they decided to also enlist Roger’s help in getting Steven Griggs out of prison.800 According to McDaniel, the

Chief told him that his son was in prison for marijuana.801 Not

until after a New York Times article 802 on the Griggs case was

published did McDaniel learn that Steven Griggs was actually in

prison for methamphetamines and that Griggs had been a fugitive

for a year.803 McDaniel said he had not spoken to the Chief since

817

804 Id. 805 Id. 806 Id. 807 Id. 808 Id. 809 Id. 810 Id. 811 Id. 812 Id. 813 Id. 814 NARA Document Production (Exhibit 108). This table was located in a file identified as

belonging to Bruce Lindsey labeled ‘‘General Pardon File.’’ This document’s reference to Roger

Clinton raises questions about the veracity of Bruce Lindsey’s testimony before the Committee

at its March 1, 2001, hearing where Lindsey was asked, ‘‘were you aware at the time the pardons were being considered at the White House in January of this year that the President’s brother [Roger Clinton] was advocating on behalf of certain individuals?’’ Lindsey replied, ‘‘No,

sir, I don’t believe so.’’ ‘‘The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 106th Cong. 418–19 (Mar. 1, 2001). 815 Alison Leigh Cowan, Plea Mailed to Roger Clinton Was Flagged by President, N.Y. TIMES,

June 30, 2001. 816Telephone Interview with Daley McDaniel (July 9, 2001). 817 Id. 818 Id. 819 Id.

the article was printed and that he felt like the Chief had misled

him about the merits of his son’s case.804

About six months before the end of the Clinton Administration,

McDaniel called Roger Clinton to discuss the tribal recognition

issue and the Steven Griggs case.805 McDaniel told Roger that

Griggs was in prison for drug possession and ‘‘needed a pardon

from Bill.’’ 806 Roger said, ‘‘sure.’’ 807 McDaniel gave Roger the

Chief’s phone number and believes that Roger spoke with the Chief

two or three times by phone, beginning that evening.808 However,

McDaniel was never privy to their conversations, and he did not

believe Roger ever met the Chief in person.809 McDaniel said Roger

helped ‘‘by running messages back and forth to his brother.’’ 810

McDaniel and Chief Griggs sent faxes about the case to Roger who

would then forward them to the President.811 McDaniel also said

he had a lot of interaction with Associate White House Counsel

Meredith Cabe related to the Griggs case.812 Cabe even called him

on his cell phone to ask him questions about the case.813 Documents substantiate McDaniel’s account of Cabe’s involvement. One

of the tables used by Cabe to track pardon cases contains an entry

for Stephen M. Griggs and notes under the heading, ‘‘Referred/Contacted by’’ that ‘‘Daley McDaniel strongly supports; acc. to

McDaniel, Roger Clinton also supports[.]’’ 814

According to Gary Krupkin, attorney for the Griggs family, one

motive for Chief Griggs’ and McDaniel’s efforts seeking recognition

for the tribe was to be able to establish a casino under the tribe’s

auspices.815 Daley McDaniel said he never discussed any exchange

of money with Roger Clinton or Chief Griggs.816 McDaniel also denies that he discussed a potential casino with Clinton or Griggs.817

McDaniel did admit to one reference to a casino in discussions with

Roger Clinton. On December 25, 2000, McDaniel was speaking to

Roger Clinton about the Griggs commutation while Roger was in

the Oval Office.818 McDaniel said he heard the President in the

background saying: ‘‘Ask Daley if there are any casinos involved in

this thing. I don’t want any surprises.’’ 819 McDaniel told Roger

that there were no casinos involved and offered to have Chief

818

820 Id. 821 Id. 822 Id. 823 Id. 824 Id. 825 Id. 826 Id. 827 NARA Document Production (Envelope from Northern Cherokee Nation to Roger Clinton)

(Exhibit 112). 828Telephone Interview with Daley McDaniel (July 9, 2001). 829 Id. 830 Id. 831 Id. 832 NARA Document Production (Envelope from Northern Cherokee Nation to Roger Clinton)

(Exhibit 112). 833Telephone Interview with Daley McDaniel (July 9, 2001). 834 Id. 835 Id. 836 Id.

Griggs write a letter ‘‘saying there were no plans to build any casinos.’’ 820 Roger told McDaniel that no such letter was necessary.821

The following day, McDaniel spoke to Roger again. Roger called

and said ‘‘Big Brother wants you to send him everything about Steven.’’ 822 According to McDaniel, the President had instructed that

the materials be sent by overnight mail.823 McDaniel called Chief

Griggs who worked through the night to prepare and send a packet

about Steven Griggs’ accomplishments in prison.824 Roger Clinton

provided a new fax number and a new address, which McDaniel

said ‘‘had something to do with ushers.’’ Soon afterward, Roger

Clinton called McDaniel to say that the information packet had

been lost for a time but had now been found.825 Clinton told

McDaniel he was ‘‘heading to Big Brother’s office to deliver it.’’ 826

Again, documents substantiate this account. The National Archives

produced to the Committee a copy of an envelope sent by the

Northern Cherokee Nation to Roger Clinton at the White House.827

Clinton’s call led McDaniel and Griggs to believe ‘‘it was a done

deal.’’ 828 McDaniel said the prison put Griggs ‘‘in protective custody’’ just before the end of the administration, leading the family

to believe his sentence was going to be commuted.829 They thought

he was being protected from other inmates who might be jealous

of his being suddenly released.830 McDaniel said that, on the last

day of the administration, Griggs was ‘‘on pins and needles’’ expecting the pardon to come down.831 Indeed, Clinton had delivered the

packet to the President, and the President appears to have been favorably disposed to granting a commutation. The President wrote

a note to Associate White House Counsel Meredith Cabe on the

outside of the envelope containing the Griggs material, ‘‘Meredith,

looks like a case for commutation pls check out—BC.’’ 832 Despite

the apparent support from the President himself and despite the

assistance of Roger Clinton in moving Griggs’ last-minute petition

to the head of the line, Griggs did not receive clemency. Daley

McDaniel suspected that the President had learned something ‘‘at

the last minute’’ that stopped him from granting the pardon.833

McDaniel speculated that it might be the fact that Steven Griggs

had been a fugitive, which McDaniel himself did not learn until

later 834 and which had not been referenced in the petition. After

the announcement of who had received pardons, McDaniel called

Roger to find out what happened.835 Clinton told McDaniel that he

and his brother had ‘‘a bad argument.’’ 836 Roger told McDaniel

819

837 Id. 838Telephone Interview with Phillip Young (Apr. 26, 2001). 839Gene O’Daniel Document Production (Phillip Young’s Petition for Pardon, Nov. 13, 1998)

(Exhibit 113). 840 Id. 841 Id. 842Telephone Interview with Gene O’Daniel, former Counsel for Phillip Young (Mar. 29,

2001). 843 Id. 844 Id. 845 Id. 846 Id. 847 Id. Young mentioned to O’Daniel that there was a ‘‘Hollywood producer,’’ Harry Thomason,

who could help get a pardon, but O’Daniel did not think Young made any effort to contact

Thomason. Id. Dan Lasater also reported that he ‘‘was told that Patsy Thomason had helped

Jimmy Manning get a pardon’’ and that he had ‘‘heard that Sony Tucker of Hamburg, Arkansas,

was trying to get pardon with Patsy Thomason’s help.’’ Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater

(May 7, 2001). 848Telephone Interview with Gene O’Daniel, former Counsel for Phillip Young (Mar. 29,

2001). 849 Id. 850 Id.

that ‘‘it got rough’’ and that even the pardons for Roger’s personal

friends that he had wanted most were denied.837

Committee staff made numerous attempts to interview Chief

Griggs and Steven Griggs regarding these matters. After initially

indicating a willingness to allow Chief Griggs to be interviewed,

Griggs’ attorney then indicated that he could not allow the Chief

to participate in an interview. The attorney also indicated that if

Chief Griggs were subpoenaed to testify, he would invoke his Fifth

Amendment rights.

G. Phillip Young

Phillip Young along with his family operates Catfish Young’s, a

catering business and restaurant in North Little Rock, Arkansas.838 In 1992, Young pled guilty to illegally transporting federally

protected game fish across state lines.839 Young had bought approximately 4,000 crappie in Louisiana for use in his family restaurant.840 It was a felony offense, and he was sentenced to 10

months in prison.841 In November 1998, with the help of his attorney, Gene O’Daniel, Young began the process of applying for a pardon.842 Young brought O’Daniel copies of the Justice Department

pardon forms and asked him to help file a petition.843 O’Daniel said

he did not know what prompted Young to request a pardon, but he

filled out the forms and worked with the Pardon Attorney’s Office

to submit, correct, supplement, and finalize the application.844 It

was final and complete at some point in 1999.845

According to O’Daniel, Young asked him for a copy of his pardon

petition so that he could give it to Roger Clinton.846 Afterwards, in

early January 2001, he learned from Young that someone had offered to obtain a pardon for Young if Young would pay Roger Clinton $30,000. Young told O’Daniel that he had rejected this offer

and that the unnamed person had come back and offered to obtain

the pardon in exchange for a $15,000 payment to Roger Clinton.847

Young refused to tell O’Daniel who made the offer, and O’Daniel

told Young not to accept it.848 O’Daniel said he based his advice on

his previous experience with Roger Clinton.849 In 1985, O’Daniel

had represented Sam Andrews, Jr., who was convicted on cocaine

charges on the testimony of Roger Clinton.850 In the course of the

trial, O’Daniel had seen surveillance tapes of Roger that convinced

820

851 Id. 852Telephone Interview with Phillip Young (Apr. 26, 2001). 853Telephone Interview with Carey Young (Apr. 30, 2001). 854 Id. 855Telephone Interview with Phillip Young (Apr. 26, 2001). 856 Id. 857 Id. 858Telephone Interview with Carey Young (Apr. 30, 2001). 859Telephone Interview with Phillip Young (Apr. 26, 2001). 860 Id. 861 Id. 862 Id. 863 Id. 864 Id. 865Telephone Interview with Gene O’Daniel, former Counsel for Phillip Young (Mar. 29,

2001). 866Telephone Interview with Phillip Young (Apr. 26, 2001). 867 Id.

him that Roger Clinton was a ‘‘bullsh*tter’’ who could not be trusted to deliver a pardon.851

When interviewed by Committee staff, Phillip Young provided a

conflicting account. According to Young, in late 2000, his brother

Carey suggested that John Burkhalter, a friend of Carey’s, might

be able to help Young obtain a pardon because Burkhalter knew

Roger Clinton.852 Carey Young had met Burkhalter while in college

and had remained friends since.853 Carey Young knew that

Burkhalter was friends with Roger Clinton.854 Phillip Young said

that he and his brother Carey discussed between themselves

whether Clinton would charge a fee to help him obtain pardon.855

Phillip Young claims that, between themselves, they surmised that

Roger would want between $10,000 and $15,000.856 Carey Young

then approached Burkhalter about getting Clinton to work on

Young’s pardon.857 He called Burkhalter in October or November

2000 to determine whether Burkhalter would be willing to ask

Clinton to deliver a copy of the pardon petition directly to the

President.858

In the meantime, Phillip Young discussed the situation with his

lawyer, Gene O’Daniel.859 Without naming Burkhalter, Young told

O’Daniel he knew someone who knew Roger Clinton and that he

was considering asking Clinton to help with the pardon.860 Young

said that O’Daniel’s reaction was to advise against getting Roger

Clinton involved.861 While Carey Young was waiting to hear back

from Burkhalter, Young said O’Daniel called him repeatedly to ask

whether he had gone through with his plan to involve Clinton in

the pardon effort.862 Young told O’Daniel he had spoken with Clinton but decided not to use his help.863 Young told Committee staff,

however, that his claim to have spoken with Clinton was a lie fabricated merely to ‘‘get O’Daniel off of his back’’ and that he had not

actually spoken to Clinton.864 Given Young’s claim to have lied in

order to deflect questions from O’Daniel, it is odd that O’Daniel did

not even recall the supposed lie. Instead, O’Daniel said that he did

not know whether Young ever spoke directly to Roger.865 After he

told O’Daniel that he was not going to use Clinton, Young heard

back from Burkhalter.866 Burkhalter had spoken with Roger Clinton, who told him it was too late to help Young obtain a pardon.867

Carey Young confirmed this aspect of his brother’s story, saying he

had a total of two discussions with Burkhalter about the pardon:

one to ask him to contact Roger Clinton and one in which

821

868Telephone Interview with Carey Young (Apr. 30, 2001). 869 Id. 870Telephone Interview with John Burkhalter (May 8, 2001). 871Telephone Interview with Gene O’Daniel, former Counsel for Phillip Young (Mar. 29,

2001). 872 Id. 873Telephone Interview with Carey Young (Apr. 30, 2001). 874 Id. 875 Id. 876Telephone Interview with Gene O’Daniel, former Counsel for Phillip Young (Mar. 29,

2001). 877 Id. 878 Id. 879 Id.

Burkhalter reported Clinton’s answer that it was too late.868 Carey

Young also insisted that there was no mention of money during either of these conversations.869 John Burkhalter likewise said he

never discussed money with Roger Clinton, Carey Young, or Phillip

Young in connection with Clinton’s possible assistance.870

O’Daniel’s and Young’s accounts of their conversations about

Roger Clinton are fundamentally incompatible. While both agreed

that Young mentioned the possibility of enlisting Roger Clinton’s

help through an unnamed intermediary (presumably Burkhalter),

they disagreed about the crucial facts regarding discussions of a

fee. O’Daniel provided a more detailed account about an initial

price of $30,000, which was rejected and then discounted to

$15,000. Also O’Daniel clearly understood the price to have originated with either Roger Clinton or the intermediary rather than

with Young. O’Daniel was certain on this point because, he said,

Young told him that the intermediary had asked Roger whether he

could ‘‘guarantee’’ that if Young paid the money that he would get

the pardon.871 Roger reportedly said ‘‘no,’’ and then Young refused

to pay.872 In Young’s account, no amount of money was ever discussed with anyone other than in speculation with his brother.

Carey Young supports his brother’s account, saying that he and his

brother had conversations about whether they might have to pay

Roger Clinton a ‘‘lobbying fee.’’ 873 He said they did guess at some

numbers but could not recall the numbers.874 However, Carey

Young could not corroborate his brother’s version of the conversations with his attorney. When asked if his brother had ever discussed conversations with his lawyer, Young said he had not.875

O’Daniel’s understanding of what his client had said led him to

report the matter to the Office of the Pardon Attorney. He said he

felt an ethical obligation to inform the Justice Department and that

he was also trying to protect his client.876 He didn’t want Young

to get into more trouble or to have the application denied because

of Roger Clinton.877 Sometime in January 2001, O’Daniel called

Sam Morison in the Pardon Attorney’s Office and told him that

there were people trying to sell pardons and were using Roger Clinton’s name.878 Morison replied that he was aware that people were

trying to get around the Justice Department and go directly to the

White House.879

Phillip Young did receive a pardon from President Clinton. There

is no evidence, however, that Roger Clinton actually intervened in

the Young case. Rather, Associate White House Counsel Meredith

Cabe recalls that the Justice Department recommended denial of

822

880 Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001). 881 Joseph ‘‘Jay’’ McKernan Document Production (Petition for Pardon, July 10, 1998) (Exhibit

114). 882Telephone Interview with Joseph ‘‘Jay’’ McKernan (Apr. 10, 2001). 883 Id. 884 Id. 885 Id. 886 Id. 887 Id. 888 Id. 889 Interview with Meredith Cabe, former Associate Counsel to the President, the White House

(Mar. 16, 2001). 890Telephone Interview with Joseph ‘‘Jay’’ McKernan (Apr. 10, 2001). 891 Id. 892 Verizon Document Production (Roger Clinton Phone Bill, Feb. 1, 2001, at 9).

Young’s pardon request but that President Clinton granted it because it seemed like a minor offense.880

H. Joseph ‘‘Jay’’ McKernan

Joseph ‘‘Jay’’ McKernan was sentenced to three years imprisonment in July 1984 on charges of possession with intent to distribute four and a half pounds of cocaine.881 While in prison, McKernan met and became friends with Roger Clinton.882 McKernan

served one year of his three-year sentence and was paroled.883 He

had become such close friends with Clinton that, after being released, they continued to speak by phone on a weekly basis.884

McKernan even attended Clinton’s wedding.885

In 1995, McKernan received a Louisiana state pardon, and in

1998, petitioned for a federal pardon. McKernan argued that he deserved a pardon because he had turned his life around and his

criminal record negatively impacted his ability to become a lawyer

or own a firearm.

McKernan said he did not discuss his pardon application with

Roger Clinton when he filed it. Later though, he did discuss it with

Roger, and Roger said he would urge his brother to grant it. Although Clinton also told McKernan that he would ‘‘get Bill Clinton

to look at it,’’ McKernan said he did not give Roger Clinton a copy

of the petition.886 McKernan said he asked Roger Clinton about the

application on a number of occasions, and Roger told him the pardon would likely be granted at the end of the administration.887

McKernan said that Roger never gave him any assurance that the

pardon would be granted but said he thought that McKernan had

‘‘a good shot’’ because he was an ‘‘ideal candidate.’’ 888 On initial inspection, it does appear that McKernan fit the profile that President Clinton had outlined to the White House Counsel’s Office for

the type of cases that he most wanted to review for potential pardons: non-violent drug offenders ‘‘who had convictions from an

abuse problem and who had kicked the habit and had been clean

since then.’’ 889 Yet despite his friendship with Roger Clinton and

despite fitting the profile the President was interested in pardoning, McKernan’s petition was denied.

On the last day of the Clinton Administration, when the list of

those pardoned was released to the media, McKernan learned that

he did not receive a pardon.890 According to McKernan, he spoke

to Roger Clinton twice that day about whether he had received a

pardon.891 Phone records confirm that Roger Clinton placed two

calls to McKernan on January 20, 2001, each lasting 11 minutes.892

823

893 Id. 894 Id. 895Telephone Interview with Joseph ‘‘Jay’’ McKernan (Apr. 10, 2001). 896 Id. 897 Verizon Document Production (Roger Clinton Phone Bill, Feb. 1, 2001, at 9). 898Telephone Interview with Joseph ‘‘Jay’’ McKernan (Apr. 10, 2001). 899 Id. 900 Id. 901 Id. 902 Id. 903 Id. 904George Wells, More Sentenced in Lasater Case, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Dec. 23,

1986.

The records also indicate that, in between these two contacts with

McKernan, Clinton twice called former President Clinton’s number

in Chappaqua, New York.893 The first call to McKernan occurred

at 8:02 p.m.894 During this conversation, McKernan asked whether

he had received a pardon.895 Roger said that ‘‘it doesn’t look good’’

but that he would check.896 Immediately after ending the call to

McKernan, Roger Clinton called his brother’s number at 8:13 p.m.

for two minutes. Roger later called Bill Clinton’s number again at

11:06 p.m. for one minute. At 11:07 p.m., Roger called McKernan

for the second time.897 Roger told McKernan that McKernan’s pardon had been signed and that it was the only one among those

Roger had requested that was granted.898 According to McKernan,

Clinton said, ‘‘I don’t want to get your hopes up, but I was told that

yours was signed.’’ 899

The next business day, January 22, 2001, Richard Crane, McKernan’s lawyer, contacted Hope McGowan at the Pardon Attorney’s

Office and told her what Roger had said.900 He asked if there could

be some kind of clerical error or mistake that could have improperly kept McKernan’s name off the public list of pardons issued by

President Clinton.901 McGowan told Crane that Meredith Cabe was

the person handling pardons at the White House Counsel’s Office

and she would know for certain.902 Crane said his sense was that

McGowan ‘‘didn’t care enough about the issue to even write it

down,’’ and therefore, he was surprised to see his contact written

about in the newspapers.903 Contrary to what Roger Clinton had

told McKernan, the President had not granted his clemency request. Because Roger Clinton refused to cooperate with the Committee’s investigation, it is unclear why Roger Clinton believed that

President Clinton had granted the McKernan pardon. There is

strong circumstantial evidence, though, that the President himself

told Roger that he had granted the McKernan pardon. It is unclear

why the President would do this. The case of Mitchell Wood, as described below, offers one plausible theory.

I. Mitchell Wood

The Mitchell Wood story is the opposite of the Jay McKernan

story. While McKernan’s pardon was supposedly granted but never

actually issued, Wood’s pardon was issued unexpectedly. In December 1986, Mitchell Wood pled guilty and was sentenced to four

months in prison on cocaine charges resulting from the investigation of Dan Lasater, David Collins, George Locke, and Roger Clinton.904 Wood was an employee of the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission who said he had obtained cocaine from Lasater,

824

905 Id. 906 Id. 907 Id. 908Telephone Interview with Mitchell Wood (Apr. 4, 2001). 909Fax from Dave Blake, Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, to James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform 8 (Feb. 15, 2001) (within Appendix I). 910 Interview with Meredith Cabe, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar.

16, 2001). 911 Id. 912 Id. 913Telephone Interview with Mitchell Wood (Apr. 4, 2001). 914 Interview with Meredith Cabe, Associate Counsel to the President, the White House (Mar.

16, 2001). 915Telephone Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). 916Telephone Interview with George Locke (Mar. 27, 2001). 917 Id. 918 Brian Blomquist, Pardon Probe: Clinton Library Books Will Be Checked Out, N.Y. POST,

Feb. 10, 2001.

Collins, and Clinton, but never sold it.905 At his sentencing, Wood

told the judge that he had already ‘‘overcome a cocaine habit about

two and a half years ago. He also said he had nearly paid off heavy

debts he incurred because of his habit and had returned to normal

health.’’ 906 The sentencing judge said ‘‘he believed Wood ‘has

learned his lesson,’ but said that ‘some imprisonment’ should be

imposed ‘if fairness all around is to be achieved.’ ’’ 907

Wood informed the Committee that, after his imprisonment, he

underwent a major lifestyle change. Impressed by this change, his

friends, and even his probation officer, encouraged Wood to seek a

pardon.908 Wood applied for a pardon through the Justice Department in December 1995 but was denied by President Clinton on

December 28, 1998.909 It is unclear how or why the Wood case

came to be considered a second time despite having already been

rejected by the President once before. When interviewed by Committee staff, Meredith Cabe indicated that the Justice Department

had recommended against granting clemency to Wood but that his

‘‘was the type of case the President would want to consider.’’ 910

Cabe indicated that the President wanted to review the Wood case

despite the Justice Department’s negative recommendation.911

Cabe recalled that Wood’s conviction was ‘‘at the same time as

Roger Clinton’s’’ but was apparently unaware that Wood had admitted to actually receiving cocaine from Clinton.912

Wood stated that he never asked for help from Roger Clinton,

Dan Lasater, or George Locke in obtaining the pardon.913 Associate

White House Counsel Meredith Cabe stated that she had no indication that Clinton had lobbied for Wood’s pardon.914 Likewise, none

of the documents reviewed and none of the witnesses questioned in

the Committee’s investigation provide any indication that Roger

Clinton lobbied for Mitchell Wood’s pardon. Dan Lasater said he

had not seen Mitchell Wood in 10 to 15 years.915 According to

George Locke, who described himself as a close friend of Wood’s, he

‘‘thought that he had been denied and was surprised to hear the

news that he had been pardoned.’’ 916 Locke also said, however,

that he had never discussed Wood’s pardon request with Roger

Clinton.917 Wood himself was surprised and baffled that his petition was granted after having been previously denied. He said, ‘‘I

have no earthly idea how it happened. I didn’t know anybody. I’m

just blessed[.]’’ 918

825

919 NARA Document Production (Letter from Walter F. Wiggins, Jr., Counsel for Mark St. Pe ́, to Roger Clinton (Jan. 2, 2001)) (Exhibit 115). 920Telephone Interview with Walter F. Wiggins, Jr., Attorney for Mark St. Pe ́ (June 12, 2001). 921 Id. 922 Id. 923 Id. 924 Id. 925 Id. 926 Id. 927 Id.

The McKernan and Wood cases present a decidedly odd coincidence. The cases are similar in that both men knew Roger Clinton

around the time of his conviction and both were non-violent drug

offenders. Yet, McKernan received an unexpected denial after being

informed that the President had granted his petition, and Wood received an unexpected pardon after an initial denial. While no final

conclusion can be drawn from this coincidence, it suggests a possibility that perhaps there was some miscommunication about the

precise identity of Roger Clinton’s old friend with the non-violent

drug conviction. It is also possible that President Clinton granted

a pardon to Mitchell Wood when, in fact, he intended to grant a

pardon to Joseph McKernan. Without the complete cooperation of

Roger Clinton and officials from the Clinton Administration, however, the truth about what exactly happened in these two cases remains in question.

J. Mark St. Pe ́

On January 2, 2001, Mark St. Pe ́’s lawyer, Walter Wiggins,

transmitted a letter to Roger Clinton addressed to him at the

White House Usher’s Office. The letter states:

As we have discussed previously, the case of Mark St. Pe ́

is a sympathetic one for the reasons outlined exhaustively

in the materials transmitted herewith for your immediate

review and consideration. Please bring this case to the attention of your brother, Bill Clinton, the President of the

United States. This is truly an opportunity for you to have

a direct impact in the cause of justice for Mr. St. Pe ́.919

Wiggins told Committee staff he was both a ‘‘friend of a friend’’ of

Mark St. Pe ́ and a friend of Roger Clinton.920 According to Wiggins,

however, Clinton and St. Pe ́ did not know each other.921 Wiggins

said he submitted St. Pe ́’s clemency application to the Justice Department at the same time that he gave it to Roger Clinton, in January 2001.922 In addition to the clemency application, Wiggins had

been in contact with the U.S. Attorney in Little Rock in an attempt

to reduce St. Pe ́’s sentence (St. Pe ́ is from Louisiana but is currently imprisoned in Forrest City, Arkansas).923

Wiggins said he contacted Roger Clinton because he was exploring all possible avenues to obtain clemency for St. Pe ́.924 He said

he turned to Roger as an obvious way of getting attention for the

clemency petition.925 Wiggins had not heard that Roger was presenting other clemency petitions to the President but assumed that

Roger would have been doing so.926 Wiggins said that there was

absolutely no monetary inducement of any kind for Roger Clinton

to help St. Pe ́ and that Roger did whatever he did out of friendship

with Wiggins.927 Wiggins agreed to cooperate with the Committee

826

928 Id. 929 NARA Document Production (Envelope from Walter Wiggins to Roger Clinton) (Exhibit

116). 930 Id. 931 Julian E. Barnes, McCord Admits He Helped Run Gambling House, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT- GAZETTE, May 2, 1995. 932Telephone Interview with William D. McCord (Feb. 27, 2002). 933 Id. 934 NARA Document Production (McCord Petition Cover Page) (Exhibit 117). 935Telephone Interview with William D. McCord (Feb. 27, 2002). 936 Id. 937 Id. 938 Id.

and offered to send a copy of St. Pe ́’s clemency petition to the Committee.928 Wiggins did not, however, actually send any documents

despite several follow-up phone calls attempting to arrange for

their production to the Committee.

Wiggins sent a copy of St. Pe ́’s commutation petition to Roger

Clinton at the White House. While the Committee is unable to conclude definitively what happened in the St. Pe ́ case, it appears that

Roger Clinton provided materials on the St. Pe ́ case to President

Clinton. The National Archives produced to the Committee a copy

of the envelope Wiggins used to send the St. Pe ́ clemency petition

to Roger Clinton at the White House.929 Under the address, in

what appears to be the President’s handwriting, there is a note

stating ‘‘To M Cabe.’’ 930 This note, if it is indeed in the President’s

handwriting, would indicate that Roger Clinton provided the St. Pe ́

petition to President Clinton, who then provided it to Meredith

Cabe for review. However, what happened after that point is unknown. It is unclear how seriously the St. Pe ́ petition was considered. However, it was ultimately denied.

K. William D. McCord

When Dan Lasater was convicted on cocaine distribution charges,

his Little Rock bond company was taken over and renamed by William D. McCord.931 George Locke, co-conspirator in the Lasater cocaine distribution ring, is McCord’s father-in-law.932 In 1995,

McCord was convicted on federal gambling charges, pled guilty,

and received probation.933 The National Archives produced to the

Committee a handwritten cover page reading: ‘‘Meredith Cabe, William Doyne McCord, Petition for Pardon’’ in the midst of other

Roger Clinton- and clemency-related documents from the files of

the Clinton White House.934 However, the National Archives did

not produce an actual petition for clemency. Because of its placement in the files, this cover page suggests that the consideration

of McCord’s petition had some relationship to Roger Clinton. Moreover, the Committee received an uncorroborated allegation that

George Locke believed McCord had paid Roger Clinton $10,000 in

late 2000 or early 2001 in exchange for Clinton’s help with his

clemency petition. While Clinton’s bank records do indicate several

large cash deposits in that time frame, McCord denied that he paid

Roger Clinton any money.935

McCord sent a petition to the Justice Department’s Pardon Attorney in early 1999.936 He also sent one to the White House at some

point but could not recall when or to whom he directed it.937

McCord completed and filed the forms himself with some informal

help from his probation officer and a friend who is an attorney.938

827

939 Id. 940 Id. 941 Id. 942 Id. 943 Id. 944 Id. 945 Id. 946 Id. 947 Id. 948 Id. Locke made a similar request for a copy of Dan Lasater’s petition as well. Telephone

Interview with Dan Lasater (May 7, 2001). 949Telephone Interview with William D. McCord (Feb. 27, 2002). 950Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Roger C.

Clinton (Mar. 13, 2001) (within Appendix I).

McCord said he met Roger Clinton 25 years ago when he had a box

next to Clinton’s mother’s at the Oaklawn Park race track.939 However, now they are merely casual acquaintances.940

When asked about his most recent contacts with Roger Clinton,

McCord recalled that they had met by chance at a Hot Springs Golf

Tournament sometime after McCord had filed his clemency petition.941 Around the same time, McCord also had a drink with Clinton at a restaurant in Hot Springs.942 He was uncertain, but

McCord thought he may have discussed his pardon petition with

Clinton briefly during one of these meetings.943 McCord said that

he ‘‘may have’’ asked if Roger could help him but claimed that he

could not remember Clinton’s reply.944 He said Clinton ‘‘didn’t offer

any favors’’ and that he left with the impression that Clinton would

not be assisting him.945 Asked explicitly whether he had paid anyone any money in connection with seeking a pardon, McCord said,

‘‘no.’’ 946 He also said that no one asked for money for anything else

of value to help him obtain a pardon.947

McCord did admit to discussing his petition with George Locke,

who was also seeking a pardon. McCord said Locke asked him for

a copy of McCord’s application on more than one occasion, ostensibly so that Locke could use it to learn by comparison how to complete his own application.948 However, McCord maintained that he

did not ask for help from Locke because he knew that, after his

conviction, ‘‘Locke had lost all his contacts.’’ 949

V. FAILURE OF KEY PARTIES TO COOPERATE IN THE

ROGER CLINTON INVESTIGATION

A. Roger Clinton

Roger Clinton was at the center of a number of allegations investigated by the Committee. Early in the Committee’s investigation,

Chairman Burton requested that Roger Clinton participate in an

interview with Committee staff, but he declined.950 When Committee staff discussed with Clinton’s attorney, Bart Williams, the possibility that Clinton would be called to testify before the Committee, Williams stated that it was likely that Clinton would invoke

his Fifth Amendment rights if called to testify. Despite his unwillingness to speak to Committee staff, Roger Clinton used his access

to the media to deceive the public about matters the Committee

was investigating by appearing on Larry King Live and making

several false statements. Clinton did, however, comply with a number of document subpoenas served upon him by the Committee.

However, Clinton’s refusal to provide testimony to the Committee

828

951Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to David E.

Kendall, Counsel for Bill and Hillary Clinton, Williams & Connolly, Attachment #1 (July 30,

2001) (within Appendix I). 952 Id. at 1. 953 Id. 954Letter from David E. Kendall, Counsel for Bill and Hillary Clinton, Williams & Connolly,

to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Aug. 20, 2001) (within Appendix I). 955 Records indicate that shortly after the wire transfer, Roger Clinton paid his attorney only

$10,000 as a retainer, not $15,000. Bank of America Document Production (Exhibit 118).

voluntarily regarding his efforts to obtain pardons for his friends

and associates has hampered the Committee’s investigation.

Moreover, on March 23, 2001, while the Committee was attempting to obtain the cooperation of Roger Clinton, he received a wire

transfer of $15,000 from a Citibank account entitled ‘‘E.C. 934(A)

c/o Eric Hothem.’’ 951 Eric Hothem was an aide to First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton. When contacted about this transfer,

Hothem’s lawyer referred the Committee to the President’s lawyer,

David Kendall.952 The Chairman then sought from Mr. Kendall an

explanation of the account and the transfer.953 According to Kendall’s reply: ‘‘The account is a personal Citibank account of former

President and Senator Clinton. The transfer you inquire about was

a loan by President Clinton to his brother so that he might retain

counsel to represent him in the Committee’s and other investigations.’’ 954 It is unclear whether Roger Clinton has repaid or intends

to repay the money.955 The payment occurred at the height of public outcry and investigative activity regarding the pardons and at

a time when Roger Clinton was deciding whether to provide testimony to the Committee and to authorities in the Southern District

of New York. The media also reported that Roger Clinton had

fought bitterly with his brother about the denial of his clemency requests. It is unknown whether Roger Clinton’s acceptance of $15,000 for his legal fees from his brother made him any less likely

to provide testimony adverse to his brother to the Committee or to

law enforcement agencies.

B. Tommaso Gambino

When the Committee discovered that Tommaso Gambino had a

financial relationship with Roger Clinton, and that Clinton had

tried to obtain a commutation for his father, Rosario Gambino, the

Committee attempted to interview Tommaso Gambino. Gambino

refused to participate in an interview. Gambino did, however, comply with a document subpoena.

C. Lisa Gambino

Committee staff attempted to interview Lisa Gambino about her role in providing $227,889 to Anna Gambino, funds which were

used to provide at least $50,000 to Roger Clinton. Ms. Gambino refused to respond to repeated requests for an interview.

D. Victoria Crawford and Kathy Vieth

Victoria Crawford is Roger Clinton’s manager and bookkeeper.

Because Crawford managed Clinton’s money, and apparently his

travel as well, the Committee attempted to interview Crawford.

Crawford refused to participate in an interview. Then, the Committee issued subpoenas to Crawford and her company, Crawford

829

956Subpoena duces tecum to Victoria Crawford (Aug. 29, 2001) (within Appendix II); Subpoena

duces tecum to Crawford Management (Aug. 29, 2001) (within Appendix II). 957Letter from Bruce F. Black, Counsel for Vicki Crawford and Kathy Vieth, to David Kass,

Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Sept. 6, 2001) (within Appendix I). 958Letter from George Locke to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (received Apr. 9, 2001) (within Appendix I). 959Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Counsel for Dickey Morton and George Locke, Hampton

and Larkowski, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Apr. 3, 2001)

(within Appendix I). 960Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Dickey Morton (Mar. 14, 2001) (within Appendix I). 961Letter from Mark F. Hampton, Counsel for Dickey Morton and George Locke, Hampton

and Larkowski, to the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Apr. 3, 2001)

(within Appendix I). 962Letter from Jay Ethington, Counsel for Richard Cayce, to David Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 1, 2001) (within Appendix I).

Management.956 Upon receiving this subpoena, Crawford and her

partner, Kathy Vieth, invoked their Fifth Amendment rights rather

than comply with the Committee’s subpoena.957

E. George Locke

After learning of George Locke’s involvement in trying to obtain

pardons through Roger Clinton, Committee staff interviewed Locke.

Locke participated in an hour-long telephone interview on March

27, 2001. Locke also responded to a request for documents by informing the Committee that he had no responsive documents.958

However, after his interview with Committee staff, Locke retained

a lawyer (the same lawyer representing Dickey Morton) and invoked his Fifth Amendment rights rather than cooperate further

with the Committee.959

F. Dickey Morton

Shortly after interviewing George Locke, Committee staff attempted to interview Dickey Morton.960 Morton refused to participate in an interview and invoked his Fifth Amendment rights

against self-incrimination.961

G. Richard Cayce

When the Committee learned of Richard Cayce’s central role in

the Lincecum matter, Committee staff attempted to interview

Cayce. However, Cayce’s attorney, Jay Ethington, informed the

Committee that Cayce would not participate in a voluntary interview and would assert his Fifth Amendment rights if subpoenaed

to testify.962 Cayce did provide the Committee with a proffer detailing his potential testimony if he were immunized.

H. J.T. Lundy

Committee staff attempted to interview J.T. Lundy regarding his

efforts to obtain a pardon through Roger Clinton. Lundy is currently in federal prison, so Committee staff attempted to arrange

an interview through Lundy’s attorney, David McGee. Mr. McGee

informed Committee staff, though, that Mr. Lundy would invoke

his Fifth Amendment rights rather than cooperate with the Committee.

I. Robert Lundy

Committee staff also attempted to interview Robert Lundy, the

son of J.T. Lundy. Robert Lundy was also involved in the effort to

830

963Letter from David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Cynthia S.

Goosen, Cooper & Scully (May 14, 2001) (within Appendix I). 964Letter from Cynthia S. Goosen, Cooper & Scully, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel,

Comm. on Govt. Reform (May 22, 2001) (within Appendix I). 965Letter from David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to Cynthia S.

Goosen, Cooper & Scully (May 30, 2001) (within Appendix I).

obtain a pardon for J.T. Lundy. However, David McGee, who also

represented Robert Lundy, informed the Committee that Mr.

Lundy would invoke his Fifth Amendment rights rather than cooperate with the Committee.

J. Chief Carl Griggs

As part of its investigation of Roger Clinton’s efforts to obtain a

commutation for Steven Griggs, the Committee attempted to interview Chief Carl Griggs, Steven Griggs’ father. Chief Griggs’ attorney, Gary Krupkin, initially indicated a willingness to allow the

Chief to participate in an interview. However, when Committee

staff attempted to schedule the interview, Krupkin expressed concern about allowing the Chief to participate in an interview while

the criminal investigation of Roger Clinton was pending. Accordingly, Chief Griggs refused to participate in an interview with

Committee staff.

K. Blume Loe and Cynthia Goosen

When the Committee learned of Blume Loe’s request that Roger

Clinton help him obtain a pardon, the Committee attempted to arrange an interview of Loe and his attorney, Cynthia Goosen.963 According to documents obtained from Roger Clinton, Goosen may

have had contact with Roger Clinton about the Blume Loe pardon

request. However, Goosen refused to participate in an interview

with Committee staff, citing attorney-client privilege.964 Goosen

made this claim despite the fact that much of the information

sought by the Committee, for example, her contacts with Roger

Clinton, would not be covered by the attorney-client privilege.965

L. Bruce Lindsey

Bruce Lindsey testified at a Committee hearing on March 1,

2001, regarding the Marc Rich pardon. After the hearing, the Committee discovered that Roger Clinton had lobbied for parole and executive clemency for Rosario Gambino. It appears that Roger Clinton had contacts with Lindsey on the parole matter and perhaps

on the clemency request as well. Accordingly, the Committee asked

Lindsey to participate in an interview with Committee staff regarding his role in the Gambino matter. Through his attorney, William

Murphy, Lindsey informed the Committee that he would not participate in the requested interview.

M. Meredith Cabe

Meredith Cabe participated in a voluntary interview with Committee staff on March 16, 2001. However, after the interview, Committee staff learned of Roger Clinton’s role in the Gambino matter.

The evidence obtained by the Committee indicated that Cabe handled Gambino’s clemency request at the White House. Therefore,

Committee staff requested a new interview with Cabe. However,

the Committee was informed by Cabe’s attorney, William Murphy,

831

966See Letter from Gary M. Stern, General Counsel, National Archives and Records Administration, to David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Aug. 2, 2001) (within

Appendix I). 967 Id.

that Cabe would not participate in an interview with Committee

staff regarding the Gambino matter.

N. Department of Justice

The Department of Justice initially provided the Committee with

records regarding two investigative matters related to Roger Clinton: first, records relating to the FBI’s investigation of the effort to

force John Katopodis to hire Clinton; and second, records relating

to the FBI’s investigation of Roger Clinton’s relationship with the

Gambino family. However, after providing the Committee with

hundreds of pages relating to the Gambino matter, including sensitive Parole Commission files and the summary of Roger Clinton’s

interview with the FBI, the Justice Department suddenly stopped

producing Gambino records to the Committee. The only reason the

Justice Department gave for its decision was concern that Congressional access to the records would jeopardize the Department’s ongoing criminal investigation of Roger Clinton. However, the records

sought by the Committee related to the 1999 and 2000 investigation of Clinton and Gambino which was reportedly closed in 2000,

not the Southern District of New York’s investigation, which was

commenced in 2001. The refusal of the Justice Department to provide these records prevented the Committee from developing any

true understanding of the reasons for the Department’s failure to

pursue criminal charges against Roger Clinton.

O. The White House

Notwithstanding President Clinton’s decision to refrain from invoking a privilege, the Bush Administration refused to provide the

Committee with a number of key documents relating to the clemency process in the Clinton White House. As described previously,

the only documents provided to the Committee regarding the consideration of clemency requests at the Clinton White House were

produced by accident. Were it not for this inadvertent production,

the Committee would not have had access to any documents at all

from the Clinton White House related to the Gambino commutation

effort. Despite the accidental production, the Bush Administration

managed to withhold four additional Clinton White House records

related to the Gambino commutation request.966 According to the

National Archives, these four records contain internal White House

deliberations regarding the Gambino matter.967 These records

would potentially inform the Committee about how seriously the

Gambino commutation was considered and why it was ultimately

rejected. The Bush Administration’s decision to withhold these

records from the Committee is deeply troubling. In effect, it is

keeping Congress and the American public from learning the full

truth about the efforts of a major organized crime figure to obtain

executive clemency through the paid efforts of President Clinton’s

brother.

[Exhibits referred to follow:]

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