United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-20327

____________

Naeem Nizar Ali Momin, 

Plaintiff—Appellant, 

versus

Ur M. Jaddou, Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; 

Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security; Wallace L. Carroll, Houston Field Office Director US 

Citizenship and Immigration Services; Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney 

General, 

Defendants—Appellees. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:23-CV-157 

______________________________

Before Wiener, Haynes, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.

Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge: 

Appellant, a man who has lived in this country for the last thirty years, 

and who is both married to a U.S. citizen and the father of U.S. citizens, has 

spent the last seventeen years attempting to adjust his immigration status. In 

2021, the last of his three applications was denied, on the ground that the use 

of an incorrect birthdate had “permeated all facets” of Appellant’s life and 

constituted fraud rendering him ineligible for adjustment. Appellant sought 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 28, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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2

review in district court, which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and now appeals that decision. Because 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) poses a jurisdictional 

bar to our review under the law as it stands, we have no choice but to AFFIRM.

I.

A.

A noncitizen who is already in the United States may seek to adjust 

his immigration status to that of a lawful permanent resident, without leaving 

the country, under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). To do so, the noncitizen must file a 

Form I-485, or an Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust 

Status (“Form I-485”), with United States Citizen and Immigration Services 

(“USCIS”). 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(3)(ii). Upon receipt of the Form I-485, 

§ 1255(a) affords the Attorney General the discretion to adjust the noncitizen’s status, provided that he is “admissible.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). Circumstances under which noncitizens are inadmissible are defined in 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182. As relevant here, a noncitizen is considered inadmissible for the purposes of § 1255(a) if he, “by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, 

seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). 

A noncitizen considered inadmissible under § 1182 nonetheless has 

another avenue of recourse: He may apply for a waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)(1) by filing an Application for Waiver of 

Grounds of Inadmissibility (“Form I-601”), also with USCIS. See 8 C.F.R. 

§ 212.7(a)(1). “The Attorney General may, in the discretion of the Attorney 

General,” waive the noncitizen’s inadmissibility “if it is established to the 

satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to the 

United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to 

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3

the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien . . . .” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(i)(1).1 Without such a waiver, an inadmissible noncitizen remains ineligible for adjustment of status under § 1255(a).

The judicial review available for both determinations of adjustment of 

status under § 1255 and waiver of inadmissibility under § 1182 is described, 

and constrained, by statute:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . and regardless 

of whether the judgment, decision, or action is made in removal 

proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to review—

(i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under 

section . . . 1182(i) . . . or 1255 of this title, or 

(ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General 

or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for 

which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of 

Homeland Security . . . .

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). In addition, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)(2) also provides 

that “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action of the 

Attorney General regarding a waiver under paragraph [§ 1182(i)](1).”

The extent to which these jurisdictional limitations preclude judicial 

review is the central question in this matter.

B.

On April 24, 1994, Appellant Naeem Nizar Ali Momin (“Momin”) 

entered the United States from Pakistan on a tourist visa. Upon entry, he was 

questioned by Customs and Border Protection personnel and, as relevant for 

_____________________

1 Statutory references to the “Attorney General” also refer to the Secretary of 

Homeland Security, under whom USCIS is organized. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, 

Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.

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this appeal, he testified that his date of birth was November 20, 1975. Momin 

was given instructions to appear before an immigration judge (“IJ”) for exclusion proceedings. According to the USCIS, Momin failed to appear for 

that proceeding; he was ordered excluded in absentia on June 17, 1994.

Thirteen years later, in 2007, Momin made his first attempt at 

adjusting his status: His employer filed a Form I-140, an Immigrant Petition 

for Alien Worker, on his behalf. Momin also filed a Form I-485 and attached 

several supporting documents, including a birth certificate and passport. In 

the process of preparing this application, Momin first learned of the in

absentia order entered against him. According to Momin, he had appeared 

for his hearing as instructed, “but was informed that the hearing had been

rescheduled.” Nizarali v. Holder, 366 F. App’x 221, 222 (2d Cir. 2010). As a 

result, Momin moved to reopen his exclusion proceeding on November 20, 

2007, arguing that his failure to appear was solely due to the fact that he had 

never received notice of the rescheduled hearing. Id. The IJ denied the 

petition to reopen, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed 

that denial but the Second Circuit reversed and remanded. The Second 

Circuit credited Momin’s explanations and held that because “[t]here [wa]s 

nothing in the record to indicate that notice was sent by certified mail”—and 

Momin had submitted an affidavit of non-receipt—the BIA was “required to 

‘consider all of the petitioner’s evidence.’”2 Id.

USCIS denied Momin’s first application for adjustment of status in 

November 2014 because the sponsoring company could not show that it 

could pay the proffered wage. Though not a reason for the denial,3 the USCIS 

_____________________

2 Subsequent proceedings before the IJ are not apparent in the record.

3 The record does not contain the documents pertinent to the USCIS’ decision on 

Momin’s first application. However, this was not cited as a reason for that denial in the 

USCIS’s recapitulation of Momin’s procedural history in subsequent decision letters.

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later found it notable that both the Form I-140 and Form I-485 that Momin

submitted with this application indicated that his date of birth was December 

21, 1976, not the November 20, 1975 date that he testified to in his 1994

interview.

In 2000, Momin married a citizen, with whom he had two children, in 

2001 and 2005, respectively. Momin made his second application for 

adjustment of status on February 2, 2017, submitting a Form I-485 as the 

spouse derivative beneficiary of his wife.4 As support, he attached a new birth 

certificate but the same passport page used for his first Form I-485 (showing 

a birthdate of December 21, 1976). Before USCIS made a decision, Momin 

withdrew the application on February 25, 2019, on the advice of counsel. 

Before he withdrew, however, USCIS opened an investigation into Momin’s 

case. It determined, after “forensic analysis,” that the birth certificate 

submitted with Momin’s first (2007) Form I-485 application and the 

passport submitted with both of his Form I-485 applications were fraudulent 

documents. By contrast, the “forensic analysis” determined that the birth 

certificate submitted with his second Form I-485 application was authentic.

In 2019, Momin reapplied to adjust his status, again as the spouse 

derivative beneficiary of his wife. To his Form I-485, he attached several 

documents, including: (1) a copy of his birth certificate (the one USCIS 

determined was authentic, showing a birthdate of November 20, 1975); and 

(2) a copy of his passport (the one USCIS deemed fraudulent). In a July 23, 

2020 interview with USCIS, Momin testified that his date of birth was 

November 20, 1975; he also provided further supporting documentation for 

_____________________

4 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(e), noncitizens who are married to citizens may be eligible 

for adjustment.

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his application at that interview, including copies of birth certificates of his 

two children.

On August 17, 2020, USCIS issued a notice of intent to deny 

(“NOID”). It explained that Momin was inadmissible for having made 

misrepresentations: (1) “by presenting a known false passport” during his 

entry in April of 1994; (2) by submitting a fraudulent birth certificate and 

biographic page of a passport in his first Form I-485 application in 2007, both 

of which incorrectly listed a date of birth as December 21, 1976; (3) by using

that same passport page in his third Form I-485 application submitted in May 

2019; and (4) by answering “no” to questions asking “if you have ever 

submitted any fraudulent or counterfeit documents” or “if you have ever lied 

about, concealed, or misrepresented any information on an application” in 

his third Form I-485 application, submitted in May 2019.

Momin responded to the NOID, explaining that he intended to file a 

Form I-601 for waiver of inadmissibility. He also contested the allegation that 

the birth certificate was fraudulent, maintaining that it was a real document 

issued by the Pakistani Government. To this end, he submitted a letter from 

the Pakistani consulate purportedly verifying the authenticity of both 

passports and certificates and attesting that the incorrect birth date was an 

internal error by the Pakistani Government. In a December 23, 2020 letter, 

USCIS rejected this explanation because “forensic analysis” revealed that 

“the birth certificate that shows your birth [date] as December 21, 1976 is not 

a real document issued by the Pakistani Government with an incorrect date,” 

and further, that this conclusion “was corroborated by a government official 

in Pakistan.”

The letter from the Pakistani consulate also explained that Momin was 

issued a new passport (on January 9, 2019), prior to Momin’s third Form I485 application (submitted on May 23, 2019). USCIS therefore did not find 

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that the letter furnished a defense to the charge that Momin had knowingly 

submitted incorrect information with his 2019 Form I-485 application, as he 

could have submitted a copy of this new passport, rather than a copy of the 

one they had deemed to be fraudulent.

The December letter also stated that Momin had abandoned his 

application because there was no Form I-601 on file. This was news to 

Momin, who had submitted a Form I-601 and even provided a “courtesy 

copy” to USCIS, which USCIS itself acknowledged. So Momin initiated yet 

another lawsuit, this time in the Southern District of Texas. See Momin v. 

Jaddou, No. 4:21-cv-03363 (S.D. Tex. 2021). USCIS eventually 

acknowledged there had been an “error in processing” and that it had 

received the Form I-601.

USCIS denied Momin’s Form I-601 request for a waiver of 

inadmissibility on November 10, 2021. It stated that although Momin had 

presented sufficient evidence showing that he and his wife would suffer 

extreme hardship, that was “outweighed by the volume and length of time 

[Momin had] presented [him]self falsely within society.” The problem, 

USCIS explained, was the discrepancy in his date of birth—specifically, in 

his testimony to USCIS (throughout his various applications for adjustment 

of status); to the state of Georgia when his children were born (the birth 

certificates of both his children listed his date of birth as December 21, 1976); 

to his first employer; and to his physician. According to USCIS, this history 

of repeated use of the incorrect birthdate contradicted Momin’s proffered 

explanation and apology that he never intended to mislead, and the “false 

date of birth ha[d] permeated all facets of [Momin’s] life.” USCIS thus 

denied Momin’s Form I-601 application, rendering him ineligible to adjust 

his status.

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Momin sued USCIS and certain officials on January 17, 2023, seeking 

judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and a 

declaratory judgment that the denials of his waiver of inadmissibility and 

adjustment of status were arbitrary and capricious. The district court 

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It explained that “the 

decisions to find an alien to be inadmissible and deny an application for 

adjustment of status on that basis,” along with decisions to deny applications 

for waivers of inadmissibility, are “squarely within the discretion [of] 

USCIS.” This followed from “the plain language . . . preclud[ing] judicial 

review” in § 1252(a)(2)(B) and § 1182(i)(2)—and the Supreme Court’s 

instruction that this jurisdictional bar applies to “any judgment relating tothe 

granting of relief.” Patel v. Garland, 142 S. Ct. 1614, 1622 (2022). Momin 

timely appealed.

II.

We review dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Flores v. Garland, 72 F.4th 85, 88 (5th Cir. 2023).

Momin’s main argument is that the jurisdiction-stripping provision in 

8 U.S.C. § 1252 applies only to removal proceedings, to which he is not subject.5 Indeed, Momin had already been ordered excluded and was dealing 

with USCIS, not the BIA for his adjustment of status. For this reason, Momin 

argues that the district court’s application of Patel v. Garland to resolve his 

case was misplaced, as Patel also concerned removal proceedings and expressly refused to extend its ruling beyond the removal context. Moreover, 

Momin also argued that, as a noncitizen in exclusion proceedings, he cannot 

_____________________

5 Momin also argues that the district court incorrectly claimed that Momin’s suit 

is precluded from review because it was a direct challenge to a final order of removal, and 

in fact he challenges neither an order of removal nor his exclusion order. But the district 

court discusses neither final orders of removal nor exclusion in its jurisdictional analysis.

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seek review of his application by an IJ, and judicial review is therefore his only 

recourse.

A.

Upon a review of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and Patel, we cannot say the district court erred.

First, we look to the plain text of the statute. Such language is important because, against the backdrop of the “well-settled” and “strong presumption” “favoring judicial review of administrative action,” that presumption “can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence of congressional intent to preclude judicial review.” Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 

U.S. 221, 229 (2020) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Such 

evidence of intent may be found, as the Supreme Court has explained, in 

“specific language in a provision or evidence drawn from the statutory 

scheme as a whole.” Patel, 596 U.S. at 347 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

The specific language used in the statute lends credence to the argument that Congress intended to foreclose judicial review here. Contrary to 

Momin’s argument, the plain text of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) indicates that its jurisdictional bar is not limited to the removal context. That provision states:

“[R]egardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any judgment regarding 

the granting of relief under section . . . 1255.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) 

(emphasis added).

The conclusion that the jurisdictional bar in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) applies 

outside the removal context is reinforced by the broad language used by the 

Supreme Court to describe it. In Patel, the Court considered whether the provision “precludes judicial review of factual findings that underlie a denial of 

relief.” 596 U.S. at 331. In answering affirmatively, the Court held that 

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§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) strips jurisdiction from review of “any judgment regarding

the granting of relief” under § 1255. Id. (emphasis added). It explained that 

“judgment” in this context means “any authoritative decision,” which was 

a “broad definition” that “encompasses any and all decisions relating to the 

granting or denying of discretionary relief.” Id.at 337 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also id. at 338 (noting the 

provision “does not restrict itself to certain kinds of decisions”). Likewise,

“‘any’ has an expansive meaning,” and “‘regarding’ . . . generally has a 

broadening effect.” Id. at 338–39 (citations omitted). As a result, the Court 

concluded, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) “encompasses not just ‘the granting of relief’ 

but also any judgment relating to the granting of relief,” which “plainly includes factual findings.” Id. at 339.

In light of the plain text of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and the reasoning in 

Patel, every court of appeals to consider the question has held that the 

jurisdictional bar applies outside the removal context—including to USCIS 

denials of adjustment of status. See, e.g., Doe v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 

Sec., No. 22-11818, 2023 WL 2564856, at *3 (11th Cir. Mar. 20, 2023) (per 

curiam) (affirming absence of subject matter jurisdiction to review a USCIS 

denial of adjustment of status because “the plain text of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) 

indicates that ‘no court’ has jurisdiction in any judgment regarding the 

granting of relief under § 1255.”); Abuzeid v. Mayorkas, 62 F.4th 578, 583 

(D.C. Cir. 2023) (“Consideration of appellants’ APA claim [regarding a 

USCIS denial of adjustment of status] is foreclosed by a straightforward 

application of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Patel . . . .”); Britkovyy v. Mayorkas, 60 F.4th 1024, 1028 (7th Cir. 2023) 

(“The result is that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) operates to eliminate judicial review 

of the denial of an adjustment-of-status application by USCIS.”). We have 

also done so, in an unpublished opinion. See Mendoza v. Mayorkas, No. 23-

20043, 2023 WL 6518152, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct. 5, 2023) (unpublished).

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B.

The plain text, standing alone, thus resolves the question. But it is also 

highly relevant, though not dispositive, that both the majority and the dissent

understood that the holding in Patel would have implications beyond the 

removal context. It is true that the Patel majority explicitly stated that “[t]he 

reviewability of [USCIS denials of discretionary relief] is not before us, and 

we do not decide it”—but it mused, in the very next line, that “it is possible 

that Congress did, in fact, intend to close that door.” Patel, 596 at 345. 6

Likewise, Justice Gorsuch noted in his dissent that “individuals frequently 

seek to adjust their status . . . outside the removal context,” “[s]o under the 

majority’s construction,” those “individuals who could once secure judicial 

review to correct administrative errors . . . in district court . . . [would be] 

likely left with no avenue for judicial relief of any kind” Id. at 363 (Gorsuch, 

J., dissenting). Indeed, he feared that “[a]n agency may err about the facts, 

the law, or even the Constitution and nothing can be done about it.” Id. 7

_____________________

6 In its explanation that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)’s effect of “foreclosing judicial review 

unless and until removal proceedings are initiated” “would be consistent with Congress’ 

choice to reduce procedural protections in the context of discretionary relief,” Patel cites 

Lee v. USCIS, a Fourth Circuit case which itself held that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) precluded 

judicial review of adjustment decisions made by USCIS outside the removal context. Id. at 

346 (citing 592 F.3d 612, 620 (4th Cir. 2010)).

7 The recent decision in Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024) partially 

addresses this fear. Wilkinson held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), which restores 

jurisdiction for judicial review of “constitutional claims or questions of law . . . filed with 

an appropriate court of appeals,” applies to mixed questions of law and fact. 601 U.S. at 

217; see also id. at 222. On this basis, the Court held there was jurisdiction to review an IJ’s 

determination that a petitioner failed to satisfy the statutory eligibility standard for 

exceptional hardship under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), one of the four criteria that must be 

satisfied before the Attorney General may cancel that petitioner’s removal. See id. at 225.

Despite contentions to the contrary, Wilkinson does not support Momin’s 

position. In Wilkinson, the BIA’s determination could be appealed to the court of appeals, 

and qualified for review under § 1252(a)(2)(D). By contrast, Momin’s USCIS adjustment 

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Justice Gorsuch’s apprehension describes the very situation Momin 

faces. It is not lost on us that the government has made several errors in 

Momin’s case, which have created a byzantine gauntlet that has repeatedly 

required judicial correction to even run. In 1994, though Momin appeared for 

the hearing before the IJ as scheduled, he was ordered excluded—because 

the government had rescheduled the hearing and failed to provide him

requisite notice. In 2020, USCIS initially denied Momin’s adjustment of 

status application by claiming that he had never sent a Form I-601, which it 

had in fact received, because of the government’s “error in processing.” In 

both instances, judicial review was crucial for correcting governmental 

oversights.

Nor, we fear, are those the only errors that may be in need of 

correction. Take, for example, the explanations USCIS has given for its 

denials of Momin’s applications. USCIS’ letters all reference Momin’s 

attempted use of “a known false passport” during his entry in April of 1994

as evidence of his fraud. Yet at oral argument, Momin alleged “there was a 

formal finding in exclusion proceedings that stated Momin did not commit 

fraud upon entry, and that charge was removed from his charging 

_____________________

determination is not directly subject to review by a court of appeals. Moreover, Momin has 

not identified a specific question of law in need of correction—mixed or otherwise. And to 

the extent that Momin broadly challenges USCIS’s refusal to adjust his status, that would 

also run headlong into the provisions preventing judicial review of discretionary agency 

decisions—of which adjustment of status is one. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (“[N]o 

court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any other decision . . . which is specified . . . to be 

in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security.”); 8 

U.S.C. § 1182(i)(2) (“No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action of the 

Attorney General regarding a waiver under paragraph [§ 1182(i)](1).”); 5 U.S.C. 

§ 701(a)(2) (precluding review of “agency action . . . committed to agency discretion by 

law”); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(2)(A) (“[T]he Attorney General may adjust the status of 

the alien [if] . . . the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible.”)

(emphasis added)); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)(1) (the “Attorney General may, in the discretion of 

the Attorney General, waive” the inadmissibility of a noncitizen) (emphasis added)).

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document.” See Oral Argument at 7:38, Momin v. Jaddou, No. 23-20327

(Mar. 6, 2024), https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/OralArgRecordings/23/23-

20327_3-6-2024.mp3. Those proceedings are not contained in the record

before us, 8 though the government did not contest this allegation at 

argument. What is in the record inspires no more confidence, as USCIS has 

itself provided inconsistent statements. For example, in its November 10, 

2021 Denial for Momin’s Form I-601, USCIS stated the fraudulent birth 

certificate that Momin submitted with his 2007 Form I-485 application has a 

serial number of 30034, but its August 17, 2020 NOID, December 23, 2020 

Decision, and November 10, 2021 Superseding Decision letters state that the 

fraudulent birth certificate bears a serial number of 4938. As the birth 

certificate is a document that “was examined by forensic analysis and 

determined to be a fraudulent document,” and the entire basis for Momin’s 

inadmissibility, the particulars—such as the serial number—should matter.

“If men must turn square corners when they deal with the government, it 

cannot be too much to expect the government to turn square corners when it 

deals with them.” Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 172 (2021).

If this discrepancy begs the question how much a potential 

typographical error may matter, that very same question can be posed to the 

government. The government, in other words, appears to have committed 

typographical errors indistinguishable from the errors on which it relied to 

deny Momin’s waiver. According to USCIS, Momin’s violation of 8 U.S.C. 

_____________________

8 It is for this reason that Momin’s argument about estoppel also cannot be 

credited. Though Momin alleged in his brief that “[a]fter testimony the Judge did not 

sustain the INA 212(a)(6)(c)(i) fraud charge and the Defendants withdrew that charge on 

his Order to Show Cause, instead proceeding on INA 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) as an alien not have 

a valid entry document at time of application for admission,” the only record citation 

provided for that proposition concerns the administrative closure of the case, but not any 

fact finding by the IJ.

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§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i)—his “fraud or willful[] misrepresent[ation of] a material 

fact” that rendered him inadmissible—lies in the fact that a “false date of 

birth ha[d] permeated all facets of [Momin’s] life.” 9 But what’s in a 

birthdate? Or, more specifically, what’s in a typographical error concerning 

one’s birthdate when there are no allegations of benefit or consequence—

and, thus, no apparent significance? Tellingly, in oral argument, the 

government had no answer.

III.

That Momin has no recourse for what may be a series of mistakes by 

the government is cruel but legally compelled. As the law stands, 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) precludes judicial review of denials of applications for adjustment of status and waivers of inadmissibility. This case illustrates some 

of the pitfalls that follow. In the absence of judicial review to ensure that the 

government turns square corners, we are left only with the hope that USCIS 

will give any future application by Momin to reopen his case careful attention.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

_____________________

9 Both in his briefs and at oral argument, Momin maintained that the letter he 

submitted from the Pakistani consulate, which is available in the record, was valid. 

Conversely, as there is nothing further in the record to illuminate USCIS’s conclusion that 

this letter was fraudulent—no explanation of process or evidence of the communications 

between the governments on this issue—this also rests on the ipse dixit of our government.

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