United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

06-3124 

REGINALD CHENEY, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 

Respondent. 

Arthur B. Spitzer, American Civil Liberties Union of the National Capitol Area, of 

Washington, DC, argued for petitioner. 

Allison Kidd-Miller, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, 

United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for respondent. With 

her on the brief were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, David M. Cohen, 

Director, and Donald E. Kinner, Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief was 

Elizabeth C. Burke, Office of Chief Counsel, Drug Enforcement Administration, United 

States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC. 

Appealed from: United States Merit Systems Protection Board 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

 

06-3124 

REGINALD CHENEY, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 

 Respondent. 

 __________________________

 DECIDED: March 2, 2007 

 __________________________

Before SCHALL and GAJARSA, Circuit Judges, and MCKINNEY, Chief Judge.

*

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge SCHALL. Dissenting opinion filed by Chief 

Judge MCKINNEY. 

SCHALL, Circuit Judge. 

Reginald Cheney petitions for review of the final decision of the Merit Systems 

Protection Board (“Board”) that sustained the action of the Drug Enforcement 

Administration (“DEA” or “agency”) indefinitely suspending him from employment. 

Cheney v. Dep’t of Justice, CH0752050326-I-1 (M.S.P.B. Nov. 7, 2005) (“Final 

Decision”). Because we conclude that Mr. Cheney did not receive the statutory 

procedural protections to which he was entitled before his suspension, we reverse the 

 *

 Honorable Larry J. McKinney, Chief Judge of the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Indiana, sitting by designation.
decision of the Board and remand the case to the Board for computation of the back

pay to which Mr. Cheney is entitled by reason of his improper suspension. 

BACKGROUND 

I. 

At the time of his suspension, Mr. Cheney was a GS-14 criminal investigator and 

the Resident Agent in Charge (“RAC”) of DEA’s Cleveland office. Mr. Cheney had been

employed by DEA for approximately 18 years. His position, as do all positions within 

DEA, required a security clearance. 

The DEA is a component of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”). On July 27, 

2004, DOJ’s Office of Professional Responsibility (“OPR”) requested that Mr. Cheney 

be placed on limited duty because it was alleged that he had abused his authority. Mr. 

Cheney was informed on August 3, 2004, that OPR had requested that he be placed on 

limited duty because of an ongoing investigation. Subsequently, on September 1, 2004, 

Mr. Cheney was interviewed by two inspectors from OPR concerning “abuse of

authority.” The inspectors questioned Mr. Cheney about whether he had approached 

witnesses during the OPR investigation. As part of the interview process, Mr. Cheney 

signed a confidentiality agreement in which he agreed that, other than to retained 

counsel, he would not disclose that he had been interviewed or that OPR was 

conducting an investigation. 

On September 9, 2004, Mr. Cheney’s supervisor was notified that Mr. Cheney’s

security clearance had been suspended “based on allegations of derogatory personal 

conduct,” and would remain suspended “until the completion of an investigation into this

matter.” Thereafter, by letter dated September 22, 2004, John P. Gilbride, the Special 

06-3124 2
Agent in Charge of DEA’s Detroit Field Division (“SAC Gilbride”), informed Mr. Cheney

that he was proposing that Mr. Cheney be indefinitely suspended from employment 

because of the suspension of his security clearance. The letter stated: “The decision to 

suspend your security clearance is based on allegations of potentially derogatory 

personal conduct and possible violations of law and DEA Standards of Conduct. You 

have failed to comply with security regulations and you have demonstrated a pattern of 

dishonesty and/or rule violations.” The letter informed Mr. Cheney that he had ten days 

from the date he received the notice of proposed suspension to reply to it. The letter

further informed Mr. Cheney that as soon as possible after his answer was received, or

after the expiration of the ten-calendar day limit if he chose not to answer, he would be 

provided with a written decision regarding the proposed suspension. Mr. Cheney

received the notice of proposed suspension on September 27, 2004. 

On September 28 and 29, 2004, Mr. Cheney contacted the Chief of the 

Employee Relations Unit and SAC Gilbride, requesting additional information 

concerning the suspension of his security clearance. From the Employee Relations

Unit, Mr. Cheney sought “review of all material regarding the proposed action for 

indefinite suspension.” From SAC Gilbride, Mr. Cheney sought to obtain “the material”

on which the proposed indefinite suspension “was based.”1

 

 1 On September 29, 2004, HRM Consulting Inc. (“HRM”), a self-described 

“Human Resource Management Company which targets human capital performance 

issues,” wrote John Driscoll, Deputy Chief Inspector at DEA Headquarters in 

Washington, on Mr. Cheney’s behalf that Mr. Cheney had not been provided information 

about the allegations against him. On October 4, 2004, HRM wrote a letter on Mr. 

Cheney’s behalf that was copied to Mark S. Johnson, Deputy Chief Inspector of DEA’s

Office of Security Programs. The letter stated that Mr. Cheney had “not received any 

information which identifies the basis of allegations nor does he have substantive

factual information which supports the reasons of the investigation.” 

06-3124 3
Following his inquiry, on October 5, 2004, Mr. Cheney received a memorandum

dated October 1, 2004 from Mark S. Johnson, Deputy Chief Inspector of DEA’s Office of

Security Programs. The letter again notified Mr. Cheney that the suspension of his

security clearance was “based upon allegations of derogatory personal conduct.” The 

memorandum stated that the suspension would remain in effect until the investigation 

into the matter was completed and that Mr. Cheney could contact Mr. Johnson if he had 

any questions or required further information. 

Mr. Cheney requested a 30-day extension of time to respond to the notice of

suspension, and on October 7, 2004 he wrote Mr. Johnson, stating: 

On October 5, 2004, I received your letter dated October 1, 

2004, which stated that the decision to suspend my security

clearance was based upon allegation [sic] of derogatory 

personal conduct, and the suspension of my clearance 

would remain in effect until the completions [sic] of an 

investigation. However, I did not receive any facts, 

documentation or information relative to the allegations in 

this matter. Even though I have the right to respond, it is

difficult if not impossible to respond to an issue without

information. I am therefore, requesting all of the information 

and evidence relied upon to revoke my security clearance. 

On October 19, 2004, the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association (the 

“Association”), which at the time was representing Mr. Cheney, wrote Mr. Johnson and 

requested that the information that Mr. Cheney had sought in his letter of October 7 be

provided. In addition, between October 19 and 29, 2004, Mr. Cheney and his counsel 

wrote letters seeking to obtain the evidence underlying the agency’s reasons for 

suspending his security clearance. 

On November 8, 2004, the Association responded to the notice of proposed 

suspension on Mr. Cheney’s behalf, asserting that the DEA had not afforded Mr. 

06-3124 4
Cheney due process. The Association asserted that Mr. Cheney had never been given 

notice of the apparently derogatory information that formed the basis for the suspension 

of his security clearance. Specifically, the Association stated that “[n]either the 

proposing official nor the deciding official have been able to provide any materials to 

RAC Cheney other than the notice which suspended Mr. Cheney’s clearance” and that 

OPR and the Office of Security Programs had “yet to respond to requests for 

information as to the reasons for the suspension of RAC Cheney’s security clearance.”

In due course, DEA gave Mr. Cheney an extension of time through November 29, 2004 

to respond further to the proposed indefinite suspension. 

On November 17, 2004, Mr. Johnson sent Mr. Cheney a memorandum informing 

him that his security clearance was suspended. The memorandum provided the 

following information to Mr. Cheney about the reasons for his security clearance 

suspension: 

The decision to suspend your security clearance is based upon allegations

that you inappropriately queried or caused to be queried Law Enforcement 

Data Bases and abused the Administrative Subpoena process.

Additionally, it is believed that you are in violation of the confidentiality

agreement you entered into with the Office of Professional Responsibility 

during their investigation into these issues. 

On November 29, 2004, having submitted a written response through the 

Association on November 8, Mr. Cheney responded orally to the proposed indefinite 

suspension. That same day, in a handwritten “Disciplinary Action Summary” Kevin 

Michael Donnelly, the deciding official, concluded that Mr. Cheney should be suspended 

indefinitely from employment without pay. Mr. Donnelly wrote that although Mr. Cheney

had been “unable to review [the] underlying reasons for [the] security clearance 

suspension . . . minimal due process was followed in that [Mr. Cheney] was notified of 

06-3124 5
[his security clearance] suspension, was given . . . the reason for the suspension, and 

was given an opportunity to respond in writing and orally.” 

On December 3, 2004, Lawrence A. Berger, general counsel of the Association, 

called Mr. Johnson to appeal Mr. Cheney’s suspension. This phone call resulted in a 

letter, dated December 16, 2004, in which Mr. Johnson upheld the indefinite suspension 

of Mr. Cheney’s security clearance until “completion of [the] ongoing [OPR] case.” In 

his letter, Mr. Johnson stated that Mr. Cheney had received all the process that was due 

because he was “fully informed of the reason for [the] clearance suspension.” 

On January 4, 2005, HRM wrote a letter on Mr. Cheney’s behalf to Mr. Johnson.

In the letter, HRM stated that Mr. Cheney had authority to sign subpoenas and to cause 

the criminal databases to be queried as part of his duties to investigate criminal activity, 

and it suggested that this could occur thousands of times on a yearly basis. At the 

same time, HRM requested information about who had accessed the system so that Mr. 

Cheney could review this information because it could “identify the individual(s) who 

[had] inappropriately queried the database.” Finally, HRM asked that Mr. Cheney’s 

case be re-examined, that he be provided with “specificity and detail with regard to the 

allegations, and that HRM be permitted to examine the case file.” 

Therefore, on January 14, 2005, Mr. Cheney was formally notified of the 

agency’s final decision to suspend his employment indefinitely because of the 

suspension of his security clearance. Mr. Cheney also was informed of his right to 

appeal to the Board. 

06-3124 6
II. 

Mr. Cheney timely appealed his suspension to the Board. On May 25, 2005,

following a telephonic hearing, the administrative Judge (“AJ”) to whom the appeal was

assigned issued an initial decision sustaining DEA’s action suspending Mr. Cheney. 

Cheney v. Dep’t of Justice, CH0752050326-I-1 (M.S.P.B. May 25, 2005) (“Initial 

Decision”). Noting that “[t]he Board’s authority to review matters relating to security 

clearance determinations is limited,” id. at 4, the AJ explained nevertheless that “if an 

adverse action results from a decision to deny a security clearance, an employee is

entitled to the procedural protections set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 7513,” id. at 8. The AJ cited 

Lebray v. Department of the Navy, 62 M.S.P.R. 468, 473 (1994), and Kriner v.

Department of the Navy, 61 M.S.P.R. 526 (1994), and stated that 

where an indefinite suspension is based on the suspension of a security

clearance, the agency must provide the appellant with a meaningful 

opportunity to respond to the reasons for the indefinite suspension by

ensuring that either in the advance notice of the action, or in the earlier

access determination, the appellant was notified of the cause that led to 

the security clearance determination. 

Initial Decision at 5-6. The AJ also stated that in King v. Alston, 75 F.3d 657, 662 (Fed.

Cir. 1996), this court stated that “‘merely providing the employee with information that 

his access to classified information is being suspended, without more, does not provide 

the employee with sufficient information to make an informed reply.’” Initial Decision at 

9. 

Before the Board, Mr. Cheney challenged the DEA’s decision to suspend him on 

the ground that he had not been able to prepare a meaningful response because the

agency had given him only “a generalized vague notice of the reasons for suspending 

his security clearance.” Id. at 3. Mr. Cheney argued that it was not enough for the DEA 

06-3124 7
to describe his alleged misconduct as (1) derogatory personal conduct, (2) possible

violations of law and the DEA’s standards of conduct, (3) failure to comply with security

regulations, and (4) a pattern of dishonesty and rule violations. Id. Mr. Cheney

acknowledged that, in Mr. Johnson’s November 17, 2004 memorandum, the agency 

“expressed more particularly than it had before” its reasons for suspending his security

clearance. This further explication was not helpful, however, Mr. Cheney argued,

because “[s]till, there was no particularization of what the specific prohibited queries of

the Agency data base [sic] were and in what way the Appellant abused the

administrative subpoena process.” Mr. Cheney pointed out that, in his position as RAC 

of DEA’s Cleveland Office, he had reason to query the DEA databases “thousands of

times” over the course of his career and that he also had “frequent occasions” to utilize

the administrative subpoena process. Under these circumstances, Mr. Cheney

contended, he “could not meaningfully prepare an appeal since he did not know which 

queries or which subpoenas were allegedly inappropriate.” Thus, he argued that he 

was deprived of the procedural protections to which he was entitled under 5 U.S.C.

§ 7513(b). 

The AJ rejected Mr. Cheney’s arguments, stating first that “providing greater 

detail of the agency’s reasons for its decision could jeopardize the integrity of the 

investigation.” Initial Decision at 6. The AJ continued by stating that Mr. Cheney’s

argument that “he could not file a meaningful response to the proposal notice goes to 

the merits of the security-clearance determination, which, as the Supreme Court has 

clearly ruled, is not reviewable.” Id. at 7 (citing Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 

528-30 (1988)). The AJ concluded that because Mr. Cheney’s security clearance had

06-3124 8
already been suspended when his employment suspension was proposed, DEA had 

satisfied the notice requirement of section 7513(b) by informing Mr. Cheney that his

employment suspension was based on his security clearance suspension. Id. Having 

thus found the procedural requirements of section 7513(b) satisfied, the AJ affirmed Mr. 

Cheney’s indefinite suspension. Id. 

The Initial Decision became the final decision of the Board on November 7, 2005,

when the Board denied Mr. Cheney’s petition for review. Final Decision. This appeal 

followed. We have jurisdiction to review the Board’s final decision under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1295(a)(9). 

DISCUSSION 

I. 

Our scope of review in an appeal from a decision of the Board is limited. 

Specifically, we must affirm the Board’s decision unless we find it to be arbitrary, 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; obtained 

without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or

unsupported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); Kewley v. Dep’t of Health & 

Human Servs., 153 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 

The DEA suspended Mr. Cheney from employment under 5 U.S.C. § 7513,

which provides that “[u]nder regulations prescribed by the Office of Personnel

Management, an agency may take an action covered by [subchapter II of chapter 75].” 

The actions covered by subchapter II are listed in 5 U.S.C. § 7512, and one of the 

actions listed is a suspension of more than fourteen days. See Thomas v. Gen. Servs. 

Admin., 756 F.2d 86, 88 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (indefinite suspension is a covered action);

06-3124 9
5 C.F.R. § 752.401. When an employee is the subject of an action under section 7513,

he or she is entitled to 

(1) at least 30 days’ advance written notice, unless there is reasonable 

cause to believe the employee has committed a crime for which a 

sentence of imprisonment may be imposed, stating the specific reasons

for the proposed action;

(2) a reasonable time, but not less than 7 days, to answer orally and in 

writing and to furnish affidavits and other documentary evidence in support 

of the answer; 

(3) be represented by an attorney or other representative; and 

(4) a written decision and the specific reasons therefore at the earliest 

practicable date. 

5 U.S.C. § 7513(b). An employee may appeal an indefinite suspension to the Board.

Id. § 7513(d). In a section 7513 appeal, the provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 7701 apply to the 

proceedings before the Board, which include the right to a hearing for which a transcript 

must be kept and the right to be represented by an attorney. 

On appeal, Mr. Cheney renews the arguments he made before the Board. He 

states that although the Board summarized the law correctly, it failed to apply it

properly. He argues that due process entitled him to a statement of the “specific 

reasons” underlying the suspension of his security clearance and that without such a 

statement he was unable to make a meaningful and informed response to the proposed 

action. Relying chiefly on the decision of this court in King v. Alston, Mr. Cheney 

contends that the broad statement that he engaged in “derogatory personal conduct and

possible violations of law and DEA Standards of Conduct” and even the more specific 

statement that he “inappropriately queried or caused to be queried Law Enforcement 

Data Bases and abused the Administrative Subpoena process,” did not provide him with 

06-3124 10
the information he needed to make a meaningful and informed response to the charges

against him. 

The government responds by pointing to 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b). It argues that “[a]s 

the term ‘notice’ suggests, the employee need only receive enough information about

the underlying security clearance determination to permit the preparation of an informed 

reply to the proposed indefinite [employment] suspension.” The government asserts 

that the notice provided to Mr. Cheney allowed him “to focus his response on his

personal conduct, rather than acts he may have undertaken in his official capacity, and 

on the legality of that conduct.” Further, it argues, Mr. Cheney did make a meaningful

reply, including responding orally to the November 17, 2004 memorandum from Mr. 

Johnson. The government explains that by looking at the arguments Mr. Cheney made 

to the agency, it is clear that he did have enough information to make an informed reply. 

Finally, at oral argument, the government argued that all section 7513 and due process 

require is proving that Mr. Cheney’s position requires a security clearance, that he does

not have a security clearance, and that he was given notice of the proposed

employment suspension. 

We consider first the law pertinent to this case. 

II. 

In Department of the Navy v. Egan, the Supreme Court held that the Board has 

no authority to review the merits of a security clearance determination. 484 U.S. at 529.

In that case, Egan was hired by the Department of the Navy on the condition that he 

obtain a security clearance. Id. at 520. The Navy denied Egan his security clearance

because of criminal convictions and alcohol problems. Id. at 521. Due to his failure to

06-3124 11
receive the required security clearance, Egan was placed on administrative leave. Id. at 

522. Egan appealed the Navy’s refusal to grant him a security clearance to the Board,

which held that it could not review the merits of a security clearance determination. It 

therefore sustained the action of the Navy placing Egan on administrative leave 

because it concluded that the requirements of minimal due process had been satisfied.

Egan v. Dep’t of the Navy, 28 M.S.P.R. 509, 523 (1985). Egan appealed to this court, 

which held that the Board should treat a security clearance determination “as any other 

adverse action taken under section 7512” with the “same full process and standards

and scope of review, established by law and precedent.” Egan v. Dep’t of the Navy, 

802 F.2d 1563, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Following this court’s decision, the Supreme 

Court granted the government’s petition for a writ of certiorari and reversed. The Court 

held that the Federal Circuit had erred in concluding that the Board had jurisdiction to 

consider the merits of a security clearance determination. Egan, 484 U.S. at 530-31. 

The Court explained that 

An employee who is removed for “cause” under § 7513, when his required 

clearance is denied, is entitled to the several procedural protections 

specified in that statute. The Board then may determine whether such 

cause existed, whether in fact clearance was denied, and whether transfer 

to a nonsensitive position was feasible. Nothing in the Act, however,

directs or empowers the Board to go further. 

Id. at 530. 

Subsequent to Egan, we rendered our decision in King v. Alston. In that case, 

Alston’s security clearance was suspended because his employing agency determined 

that he “may suffer from a medical condition which requires further investigation and 

evaluation.” Alston, 75 F.3d at 659. A security clearance was a condition of Alston’s 

employment. Accordingly, when his security clearance was suspended, Alston was

06-3124 12
placed on enforced leave, an action that Alston appealed to the Board. The Board held 

that Alston’s due process rights were violated when the agency did not provide him with

an opportunity to reply to the agency’s notice concerning the suspension of his security

clearance. Alston v. Dep’t of the Navy, 48 M.S.P.R. 694, 699 (1991). OPM petitioned 

for reconsideration, and in a split decision, that Board reversed its earlier decision and 

held that Alston was not entitled to any notice of reasons because due process rights do 

not attach to the suspension of a security clearance. Alston v. Dep’t of the Navy, 58 

M.S.P.R. 158, 163 (1993). Finally, in another split decision, the Board again 

reconsidered and held that Alston was denied due process because he was never given 

reasons for his employment suspension with enough specificity to respond. Alston v.

Dep’t of the Navy, 62 M.S.P.R. 19, 24 (1994). OPM appealed to this court. Alston, 75 

F.3d at 660. 

We limited our review in Alston to whether “the agency provided Alston with the 

procedural protection guaranteed by 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b) when it placed him on enforced 

leave.”2 Id. at 662. We expressly noted that we were neither “reviewing the merits of 

the agency’s decision to suspend Alston’s access to classified information” nor “the 

procedures the agency followed in denying such access.” Id. We stated that 

 2 Under Executive Order 12968, § 5.2(a)(1), 60 Fed. Reg. 40245, 40252 

(1995), an employee whose security clearance is revoked—as opposed to suspended—

“shall be . . . provided as comprehensive and detailed a written explanation of the basis 

for that conclusion as the national security interests of the United States and other

applicable law permit.” 

06-3124 13
section 7513(b) entitles an employee to notice of the reasons for the 

suspension of his access to classified information when that is the reason 

for placing the employee on enforced leave pending a decision on the 

employee’s security clearance. Such notice provides the employee with 

an adequate opportunity to make a meaningful reply to the agency before 

being placed on enforced leave. Merely providing the employee with 

information that his access to classified information is being suspended,

without more, does not provide the employee with sufficient information to 

make an informed reply to the agency before being placed on enforced 

leave. 

Id. at 661-62. However, we concluded that Alston had received all of the process he 

was due because he was “able to focus his response on his medical status, rather than 

to have to guess whether the agency’s action was based on disloyalty, unreliability, or

other possible ground for suspension of access to classified information.” Id. at 662. 

We noted that Alston met with agency officials and offered medical evidence, which was 

considered before he was placed on enforced leave. Id. We therefore reversed the 

decision of the Board because we determined that Alston received all of the process he 

was due. Id. at 663. 

We decided another case growing out of the suspension of a security clearance 

in Hesse v. Department of State, 217 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In that case, Hesse’s 

security clearance was suspended, resulting in an indefinite suspension from 

employment. Id. at 1374. Hesse appealed his suspension to the Board, which upheld 

the suspension. Hesse v. Dep’t of State, 82 M.S.P.R. 489, 492-93 (1999). The Board 

explained that it could only inquire into whether the procedures required by section 7513 

had been met. Proceeding on that basis, the Board held that the requirements of the 

statute were met because “the agency here twice advised the appellant of the specific

reasons for his security clearance suspension and twice provided him an opportunity to 

respond to that action.” Id. at 491. Thereafter, Hesse petitioned this court for review. 

06-3124 14
We affirmed the decision of the Board. In so doing, we explained three principles that 

we drew from the Supreme Court’s decision in Egan: 

(1) there is no presumption that security clearance determinations will be 

subject to administrative or judicial review, as those determinations are 

committed to the broad discretion of the responsible Executive Branch 

agency; (2) unless Congress specifically provides otherwise, the Merit

Systems Protection Board is not authorized to review security clearance 

determinations or agency actions based on security clearance

determinations; and (3) when an agency action is challenged under the 

provisions of chapter 75 of title 5, the Board may determine whether a 

security clearance was denied, whether the security clearance was a 

requirement of the appellant's position, and whether the procedures set 

forth in section 7513 were followed, but the Board may not examine the 

underlying merits of the security clearance determination. 

Hesse, 217 F.3d at 1376. 

The teaching we glean from Egan, Alston, and Hesse is this: in a case involving 

a suspension resulting from the suspension of a security clearance, both the Board’s 

and this court’s review is limited. Neither the Board nor this court may review the 

underlying merits of an agency’s decision to suspend a security clearance. Egan, 484 

U.S. at 825-26; Hesse, 217 F.3d at 1376; Alston, 75 F.3d at 661-62. All the Board and 

this court may do is “determine whether a security clearance was denied, whether the 

security clearance was a requirement of the appellant’s position, and whether the 

procedures set forth in section 7513 were followed.” Hesse, 217 F.3d at 1376. Under

section 7513, the employee must receive “written notice . . . stating the specific

reasons” for the suspension of his or her security clearance “when that is the reason” for 

suspending the employee “pending a decision on the employee’s security clearance.” 

Alston, 75 F.3d at 661. The requirements of section 7513 are met if, as we stated in 

Alston, the notice “provides the employee with an adequate opportunity to make a

meaningful reply to the agency” before being suspended. Id. In other words, the 

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employee must be given enough information to enable him or her to make a meaningful 

response to the agency’s proposed suspension of the security clearance. “Merely 

providing the employee with information that his access to classified information is being

suspended, without more, does not provide the employee with sufficient information to 

make an informed reply to the agency” before being suspended. Id. at 662. 

III. 

Turning to the case before us, we hold that the procedural requirements of 

section 7513 were not met. The Board itself found that the DEA did not provide any 

specific information regarding the time frame of Mr. Cheney’s alleged misconduct, and 

“did not identify any specific queries of the data base [sic] nor did the agency describe 

the manner in which [Mr. Cheney] abused the administrative subpoena process.” [JA 7]

Initial Decision at 4. These findings by the Board are undisputed. 

In our view, the Board’s own findings demonstrate that the requirements of 

section 7513, as explained in Alston, were not met in this case. Indeed, at oral 

argument, counsel for the government forthrightly acknowledged that the reasons given 

to Mr. Cheney for the suspension of his security clearance were “vague.” First, the DEA 

told Mr. Cheney that his security clearance was being suspended “based on allegations

of potentially derogatory personal conduct and possible violations of law and DEA 

standards of conduct.” The notice of suspension also stated that Mr. Cheney had 

“failed to comply with security regulations” and that he had “demonstrated a pattern of

dishonesty and/or rule violations.” We fail to see how Mr. Cheney could have made a 

meaningful response to such broad and unspecific allegations when there was no 

indication of when his alleged conduct took place or what it involved. Nor do we think 

06-3124 16
that it was possible for Mr. Cheney to make a meaningful response based upon the 

information that he was given in Mr. Johnson’s memorandum of November 17, 2004. In 

his memorandum, Mr. Johnson stated that Mr. Cheney had “inappropriately queried or

caused to be queried Law Enforcement Data Bases,” had “abused the Administrative 

Subpoena process,” and had acted “in violation” of the confidentiality agreement into 

which he had entered with OPR during its investigation. In our view, the November 17 

memorandum was akin to informing Mr. Cheney that his security clearance was being 

suspended because he had robbed a bank, without telling him where the bank was and 

when he had robbed it, particularly in view of the fact that it is undisputed that Mr.

Cheney regularly had reason to cause the database to be queried. Mr. Cheney clearly

was not entitled to the detailed information that HRM requested. Egan clearly bars the 

kind of civil case discovery that HRM sought for Mr. Cheney. Mr. Cheney, however, 

was entitled to more information about the allegations against him than he received. 

The problem is that the limited information provided to Mr. Cheney put him in the 

position where, for all intents and purposes, he had to “guess” at the reason for his

security clearance suspension. See Alston, 75 F.3d at 662 (“[The employee] was . . . 

able to focus his response . . . rather than have to guess whether the agency’s action 

was based on disloyalty, unreliability, or other possible ground for suspension of access 

to classified information.” (emphasis added)). While Mr. Cheney was told, in general 

terms, the reasons for the suspension of his security clearance, he was not given the 

allegations that supposedly supported those reasons so that he could make a 

meaningful response to the proposed suspension. For example, he was not told what

the nature of his alleged derogatory personal conduct was. Neither was he told what

06-3124 17
laws and DEA standards of conduct he had violated, or when he had allegedly 

improperly caused the database to be queried. Thus, Mr. Cheney’s case is 

distinguishable from that of the employee in Alston. The employee in Alston was told

that his security clearance was being suspended because he “possibly suffered from a 

medical condition which requires further investigation and evaluation.” 75 F.3d at 659.

The employee thus knew that he had to focus on his own medical condition in order to 

respond to the agency’s action. However, Mr. Cheney, while he was told the general 

nature of the allegations against him, was not given the minimal information he needed 

to respond to those allegations. 

Finally, we do not agree with the government that acceptance of Mr. Cheney’s

arguments on appeal would amount to a holding that DEA had to prove that Mr. Cheney 

committed the acts under investigation before suspending him from his position. All we 

hold today is that DEA failed to provide Mr. Cheney with the information he needed to

make “a meaningful response” to the charges against him. Had DEA provided Mr.

Cheney with that information, considered his response to the charges against him, and 

then suspended his security clearance, Egan would have barred review of the agency’s

action. 

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that, in suspending Mr. Cheney, the DEA 

failed to meet the procedural requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 7513.3

 Mr. Cheney’s indefinite 

suspension was therefore improper, and he is entitled to recover back pay for the period 

of the improper suspension. See Gose v. U.S. Postal Serv., 451 F.3d 831, 840 (Fed.

 3 The Board’s conclusion that Mr. Cheney received the notice to which he 

was entitled under section 7513 because he was told that his employment suspension 

was based on his security clearance plainly is at odds with what we said in Alston. See

75 F.3d at 661-62. 

06-3124 18
Cir. 2006) (“Accordingly, Gose is to be immediately reinstated to his position, with back

pay and credit, for all purposes, for the period of his improper removal from the Postal

Service.”); McFarland v. Dep’t of the Navy, 62 M.S.P.R. 161, 165-66 (1994) (ordering 

back pay when the protections of section 7513 were not provided in suspending an 

employee). 

CONCLUSION 

The final decision of the Board sustaining Mr. Cheney’s indefinite suspension is

reversed. The case is remanded to the Board for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion. 

REVERSED and REMANDED 

06-3124 19
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

06-3124 

REGINALD CHENEY, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 

Respondent. 

MCKINNEY, Chief Judge, dissenting. 

 This case illustrates the tension that exists between security clearance 

determinations, which are not reviewable by the Board or the court, and adverse 

employment actions governed by 5 U.S.C. § 7513, a situation that implicates due 

process concerns. The issue before the court is whether Cheney received the statutory 

procedural protections mandated by § 7513, specifically whether Cheney received 

sufficient notice of the reasons for his proposed employment suspension so that he had 

a meaningful opportunity to respond to the proposal. Because I believe that application 

of the narrow standard of review to the circumstances of this case compels a conclusion 

that the minimal requirements of due process were satisfied, I respectfully dissent. 
I. BACKGROUND 

While the majority has noted many of the facts necessary for consideration of this

case, the following additional facts provide a more complete context for understanding 

the parties’ contentions: 

Shortly after Cheney was notified that he was being placed on limited duty 

because of an ongoing investigation, the local print and broadcast media ran stories 

about the allegations against Cheney, referencing in particular his use of the criminal 

database. Cheney complained about the media stories to the DOJ. After the media 

reported on the allegations against Cheney, two investigators from the Office of 

Professional Responsibility (“OPR”) interviewed Cheney.

After Cheney received the September 22, 2004, letter from his supervisor, John 

P. Gilbride (“Gilbride”), proposing an indefinite suspension from employment, Cheney

requested a thirty-day extension of time to respond to the notice of suspension of his

employment. Cheney was granted an extension until November 8, 2004, to submit his 

written response to the proposed employment suspension. 

On October 4, 2004, HRM Consulting, Inc. (“HRM”) wrote a letter on Cheney’s 

behalf that was copied to Johnson. In that letter, HRM expressed that Cheney “has not 

received any information which identifies the basis of allegations nor does he have 

substantive factual information which supports the reasons of the investigation.” HRM

requested that supporting documentation be provided to Cheney. 

Between October 19 and October 29, 2004, Cheney and his counsel wrote 

multiple letters attempting to obtain the evidence underlying the agency’s reasons for 

suspending Cheney’s security clearance. Specifically, those letters requested “detailed 

06-3124 2
information relative to the suspension of [Cheney’s] security clearance;” requested “the 

information and evidence relied upon to revoke [Cheney’s] security clearance; and 

inquired about the existence of “any material relied upon to propose the indefinite

suspension,” requesting copies of the same. 

On November 8, 2004, Cheney’s counsel submitted a written response to the 

proposed employment suspension on Cheney’s behalf. Counsel urged that the 

proposed indefinite suspension be rescinded because there was “a lack of a 

preponderant evidence showing that the indefinite suspension . . . will . . . promote the 

efficiency of the Drug Enforcement Administration.” Counsel further requested and 

reserved the right for Cheney to respond orally to the charges against him at a later 

date. Counsel then argued that Cheney had not been afforded “minimal due process” 

because Cheney had never been given notice of or been questioned about the 

“derogatory information” the agency had obtained that caused it to suspend Cheney’s

security clearance. Counsel noted the efforts by both Cheney and his office to 

determine “what scrap of information; what bit of evidence, has been utilized by the 

Agency to suspend” Cheney’s security clearance and the inability to obtain those 

“materials.” Counsel concluded his letter by repeating his request that the agency

rescind its proposed employment suspension. 

On January 4, 2005, HRM wrote a letter on Cheney’s behalf to the deciding 

official to express its disappointment with the deciding official’s conclusion that Cheney 

should be indefinitely suspended. HRM noted that Cheney had authority to sign 

subpoenas and to cause the criminal databases to be queried as part of his duties to

investigate criminal activity, and it posited that this could occur thousands of time on a 

06-3124 3
yearly basis. Acknowledging that it would be illegal to use the databases for anything 

other than law enforcement purposes, HRM denied that Cheney had ever conducted a 

database inquiry check, claiming that Cheney did not even have a password for 

accessing the system. Indeed, HRM suggested that the allegations against Cheney

could be the result of a disgruntled subordinate. Therefore, HRM requested detailed 

information about who had accessed the system so that Cheney could review this

information because it could “identify the individual(s) who [had] inappropriately queried

the database.” HRM asserted that the information should be provided to Cheney 

because “the ‘allegations’ are the basis for changing his condition of employment, [the] 

basis for his security clearance suspension, and [the] basis for security violations.” 

II. DISCUSSION 

As the majority correctly notes, the court’s scope of review is limited. Moreover,

precedent has clearly established that this court may not review the underlying merits of 

an agency’s decision to suspend a security clearance. Indeed, it is worth repeating that

no one has a “right” to a security clearance and that decisions regarding such matters 

involve “a sensitive and inherently discretionary judgment call” that is “committed by law 

to the appropriate agency of the Executive Branch.” Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484

U.S. 518, 527-28, 108 S. Ct. 818, 98 L. Ed. 2d 918 (1988). Thus, like the majority, I 

agree that this case turns on whether the procedures set forth in § 7513 were followed,

specifically the adequacy of the notice of the reasons that were provided to Cheney for 

his security clearance suspension. However, this is where the majority and I part 

company. 

06-3124 4
The majority states that the requirements of § 7513 are met if “the notice 

‘provides the employee with an adequate opportunity to make a meaningful reply to the 

agency’ before being suspended.” Slip Op. at 16 (quoting King v. Alston, 75 F.3d 657,

662 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). It seems to me that the quote is taken out of context. To quote 

more fully, the Alston court stated the following: 

[S]ection 7513(b) entitles an employee to notice of the reasons for the 

suspension of his access to classified information when that is the reason 

for placing the employee on enforced leave pending a decision on the 

employee’s security clearance. Such notice provides the employee with 

an adequate opportunity to make a meaningful reply to the agency before 

being placed on enforced leave. Merely providing the employee with 

information that his access to classified information is being suspended,

without more, does not provide the employee with sufficient information to 

make an informed reply to the agency before being placed on enforced 

leave. 

Alston, 75 F.3d at 661-62. Thus, the court in Alston noted the unique situation that 

occurs when security clearance suspensions are the basis for adverse employment

actions against an employee covered by § 7513: that employee is entitled to notice of

the reasons for the suspension of his access to classified information. But this

language does not explain the level of detail this notice must provide in cases involving 

security clearance suspensions, which is the precise question that this case involves. 

To understand how detailed the notice of the reasons must be in cases such as 

this, one need only look at the paragraph preceding the one quoted above from Alston. 

There, this court emphasized that a notice “is sufficient . . . when it apprises the 

employee of the nature of the charges ‘in sufficient detail to allow the employee to make

an informed reply.’” Id. at 661 (quoting Brook v. Corrado, 999 F.2d 523, 526 (Fed. Cir. 

1993) (internal citation omitted)). The facts of Alston shed additional light on this

question. As the majority notes, Alston’s security clearance, a condition of his

06-3124 5
employment, was suspended because the agency had concerns that he “may suffer

from a medical condition which requires further investigation and evaluation.” Alston, 75 

F.3d at 659. The agency did not identify any specific medical condition. Id. With his

security clearance suspended, Alston no longer had access to his work site and he was 

placed on administrative leave. Id. After reconsidering the case on two different 

occasions, the Board ultimately found that Alston had been denied meaningful due 

process and the procedural protections of § 7513 because it concluded that the agency

had not provided adequate notice of the reasons for the suspension. Id. The agency 

appealed. While this court agreed with the Board that an agency “must provide some

indication of the reasons” for its decision to suspend a security clearance, it 

nevertheless reversed the Board’s decision. Id. at 661. The court based its decision on 

the fact that the agency had informed Alston that his security clearance was being 

suspended based on his medical condition, which permitted Alston “to focus his 

response on his medical status.” Id. at 662. Moreover, Alston was permitted to respond 

to the agency by submitting medical evidence that the agency considered before it 

placed him on enforced leave. Id. Based on these circumstances, this court concluded 

that Alston had received sufficient procedural protection before being placed on leave. 

Id. at 663. 

In my opinion, the result in Alston dictates affirming the Board in Cheney’s case. 

By my count, Cheney received a total of seven different reasons for the security 

clearance suspension: 

1. “[A]llegations of potentially derogatory personal conduct” (Gilbride’s 

September 22, 2004, letter; Johnson’s October 1, 2004, 

memorandum); 

06-3124 6
2. “[P]ossible violations of law and DEA Standards of Conduct” 

(Gilbride’s September 22, 2004, letter); 

3. Failure “to comply with security regulations” (Gilbride’s September 

22, 2004, letter); 

4. A “demonstrated . . . pattern of dishonesty and/or rule violations” 

(Gilbride’s September 22, 2004, letter); 

5. Allegations that Cheney “inappropriately queried or caused to be 

queried Law Enforcement Data Bases [sic]” (Johnson’s November 

17, 2004, memorandum); 

6. Allegations that Cheney “abused the Administrative Subpoena 

process” (Johnson’s November 17, 2004, memorandum); and 

7. A belief that Cheney was “in violation of the confidentiality 

agreement [he] entered into with [OPR] during [its] investigation into

these issues” (Johnson’s November 17, 2004, memorandum). 

As Cheney’s counsel conceded at oral argument, the reasons given to Cheney for his

security clearance suspension were more specific than the reason given in Alston. 

Indeed, the first four reasons, when viewed in conjunction, informed Cheney that the 

suspension was not based on some work performance issue but rather on his personal 

conduct and noncompliance with rules and regulations. Moreover, the last three 

reasons provided Cheney with three concrete situations upon which he was invited to 

focus his response to the proposed employment action. 

Nonetheless, Cheney’s counsel argued that the context of this case shows that 

Cheney could not make an informed response absent more detailed information. I must 

disagree. The record clearly shows that Cheney was adequately aware of the 

allegations against him as he was able to formulate a meaningful response to the 

agency. Specifically, on January 4, 2005, HRM wrote to the agency on Cheney’s behalf 

regarding the allegations that he had abused the subpoena process and inappropriately 

06-3124 7
queried the criminal database. HRM essentially argued that Cheney had not abused his

authority with respect to either of these events, and it denied that Cheney had ever even 

conducted a database inquiry check because he did not have a password to access the 

system. This letter reveals that Cheney could, and did, focus on the allegations that he 

had abused the subpoena process and inappropriately queried the criminal databases

to render a response. Thus, the context of this case does not provide any reason to 

depart from the precedent established by Alston. 

It seems to me that the majority misses the mark. This is most evident from the 

use of an inapt analogy likening this case to an allegation that Cheney robbed a bank.

Slip Op. at 17.1 The majority would insist that Cheney be given more detailed 

information, such as dates of when his violations occurred, some notion of who his

accusers were, etc., notwithstanding the fact that security clearance matters are 

discretionary, can be highly sensitive, and there was an ongoing investigation that could 

have been jeopardized by revealing too many details. But this case is not a criminal 

matter requiring a bill of particulars; it is a civil matter, and Cheney only needed to be 

given enough information to enable him to focus his response. Indeed, the 

 1 The majority may have adopted this analogy from Cheney’s counsel, who 

at oral argument suggested that if Cheney was arrested for robbing a bank and later 

had his security clearance suspended for “robbing a bank,” he would know what the 

agency meant, and the world would scoff at his argument that he needed more detailed 

information. In contrast, counsel argued that if Cheney had not robbed a bank, he

would need more information. Counsel’s use of the analogy is itself flawed because, to

borrow from the criminal context, it suggests that the sufficiency of the notice would 

depend on an employee’s “guilt or innocence” of the allegations. 

06-3124 8
circumstances of this case show that he was not traversing through some billowing fog 

of confusion but was in fact aware of what the allegations were.2

Moreover, the majority’s position appears to disregard what Cheney was seeking 

from the agency by his requests for “additional information.” Slip Op. at 3. Cheney was

not seeking information to shed light on what the allegations were; he was seeking 

details—indeed, evidence—in order to defend himself on the merits of the security

clearance suspension, which are not reviewable. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 528-30. In 

fact, Cheney’s counsel made this point very clear in the November 8, 2004, written 

response when he indicated Cheney’s efforts to determine “what scrap of information; 

what bit of evidence, has been utilized by the Agency to suspend” Cheney’s security

clearance.3

 This is a far cry from saying that Cheney had no idea to what the agency 

was referring or that he could not formulate any response to the allegations against him. 

In sum, Cheney’s arguments that he needed more detailed information relate, not to the 

notice requirements, but to the merits of the security clearance determination, an 

argument that this court should not entertain.4

 

 2 A prime example of Cheney’s understanding is evinced by HRM’s focus 

on the database inquiries, the basis for the media reports about which Cheney 

complained to the DOJ. Specifically, HRM argued that Cheney had authority to cause 

the criminal database to be queried, that this could happen thousands of times on a 

yearly basis, and that Cheney had never conducted a database inquiry check because 

he did not have a password to access the system.

3 HRM made similar pleas for more detailed information on Cheney’s

behalf, pleas that the majority acknowledges were “civil case discovery” to which 

Cheney was not entitled. Slip Op. at 17. 

4 In fact, this is exactly the conclusion that the administrative judge reached 

in his Initial Decision that was affirmed by the Board. Moreover, this court has

previously rejected similar arguments for this very reason. See Parker v. Dep’t of the 

Navy, 86 F. App’x 415, 417-18 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 

06-3124 9
Furthermore, Johnson’s November 17, 2004, memorandum advised Cheney that 

the suspension was based in part on the agency’s belief that Cheney had breached the

confidentiality agreement he signed when he was interviewed by the two investigators 

from OPR. This reason for suspending Cheney’s security clearance was sufficient by 

itself to adequately apprise Cheney why he was being suspended. The reason does

not require much elaboration; put simply, one breaches a confidentiality agreement by

discussing the subject matter with an unauthorized individual. In this case, the record 

supports the agency’s concerns that Cheney had done just that. Specifically, HRM 

wrote letters to the agency on Cheney’s behalf discussing the allegations and 

requesting copies of the file materials, which suggests that Cheney discussed the 

matter with HRM. There is no evidence that HRM was Cheney’s retained counsel, and 

the terms of the confidentiality agreement forbade Cheney from speaking to anyone 

except retained counsel. Moreover, unlike the allegations for the database queries and 

abuse of the subpoena process, Cheney never complained that he needed more details 

such as a time period for this allegation. Indeed, this is clearly not a matter that he 

could claim might have occurred “thousands of times.” In short, this reason did not

require more explanation, and the fact that Cheney chose not to respond to it does not

mean that he was unable to do so. 

In deciding to reverse in this case, the majority departs from Alston and the 

standard of review therein because it requires more information than is necessary to 

satisfy due process concerns in the unique cases that involve security clearances. 

Such matters are left to the discretion of the agency, and a security clearance is

something to which Cheney has no right or entitlement. The majority therefore treads 

06-3124 10
into territory left to the agency’s discretion and its opinion is contrary to the principle that 

this court does not review the basis for or adequacy of security clearance

determinations. In doing so, the majority upsets the delicate balance between

according deference to the agency on security clearance determinations and satisfying 

due process concerns of the notice requirement under § 7513 that Egan and cases like 

Alston have struck in favor of the agency’s discretion. In contrast, an affirmance here 

respects that delicate balance, avoids unsavory results like potentially jeopardizing

investigations, and satisfies due process concerns in cases involving security 

clearances and the notice requirement under § 7513. 

III. CONCLUSION 

Based on the circumstances of this case, I would find that Cheney had sufficient

information to formulate a response. The reasons given for the security clearance 

suspension were certainly more specific than the reason provided in Alston. Further, 

just as in Alston, the facts reveal that Cheney was able to make a response to the 

allegations. Therefore, I believe that the final decision of the Board sustaining Cheney’s 

indefinite suspension should be affirmed. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent. 

06-3124 11