IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Suleman Chapman, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Pennsylvania Board of :

Probation and Parole, : No. 225 C.D. 2019

Respondent : Submitted: June 19, 2020

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: August 20, 2020

Suleman Chapman (Chapman) petitions for review from the January 

15, 2019 order of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Board)1 denying 

Chapman’s request for administrative relief that challenged the revocation of his 

parole and the recalculation of his maximum sentence date. Chapman is represented 

by Tyler A. Lindquist, Esq. (Counsel), who asserts that the appeal is without merit 

and seeks permission to withdraw as counsel. For the foregoing reasons, we grant 

Counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the order of the Board.

On August 7, 2006, the Board released Chapman on parole from a state 

correctional institution (SCI), where he was serving time on his original sentence of 

 

1 Subsequent to the filing of the petition for review, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation 

and Parole was renamed the Pennsylvania Parole Board. See Sections 15, 16, and 16.1 of the Act 

of December 18, 2019, P.L. 776, No. 115 (effective February 18, 2020); see also Sections 6101 

and 6111(a) of the Prisons and Parole Code, as amended, 61 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101, 6111(a).
2

15 to 30 years for aggravated assault, criminal conspiracy to commit burglary, 

burglary, and theft. Certified Record (C.R.) at 8. When he was paroled, Chapman 

had a maximum sentence date of April 16, 2021. Id. On August 5, 2010, the Board 

detained Chapman when the Swissvale Borough Police Department arrested him on 

new criminal charges. Id. at 22-31. On August 24, 2010, the Board released 

Chapman from its detainer because the criminal charges against him were 

withdrawn. Id. at 36. 

Over six years later, on February 7, 2017, the Board detained Chapman

again, when the Swissvale Borough Police Department arrested him on new criminal 

charges. Id. at 37-39. The Magisterial District Judge set Chapman’s bail at $75,000,

which Chapman did not post. Id. at 38-39. Subsequently, the Board issued Chapman 

a notice of charges to hold a detention hearing, but on February 14, 2017, Chapman 

waived his right to representation by counsel and to the detention hearing. Id. at 40-

42. On March 24, 2017, the Board notified Chapman that it decided to detain him 

pending disposition of his new criminal charges. Id. at 60. 

On December 19, 2017, Chapman was convicted of burglary, 

aggravated assault, terroristic threats and two counts of simple assault. Id. at 69, 74. 

Shortly thereafter, the Board issued Chapman a notice of charges and scheduled a 

revocation hearing for January 30, 2018, based on his new criminal convictions. Id. 

at 69. However, the Board did not conduct the revocation hearing because on 

January 5, 2018, Chapman waived his right to the hearing and his right to counsel,

and he admitted to the new criminal convictions. Id. at 70-71. On March 15, 2018, 

Chapman was sentenced to a period of 6 to 12 years’ confinement for his new 

convictions. Id. at 103-04. On March 22, 2018, the Board notified Chapman of its 

decision to recommit him as a convicted parole violator to serve 24 months’
3

backtime at an SCI, when available. Id. at 86. On May 15, 2018, after Chapman 

was returned to an SCI, the Board recommitted him to serve his backtime and 

recalculated his maximum sentence date to November 3, 2032. Id. at 108, 111-12.

Chapman challenged the Board’s March 22, 2018 and May 15, 2018 

decisions by timely filing administrative remedies forms.

2

 Id. at 113, 115. In his 

challenge of the March 22, 2018 decision recommitting him as a convicted parole 

violator, Chapman argued that the Board erred when it did not hold a revocation 

hearing and, in doing so, violated his constitutional rights. Id. at 113. Chapman 

further challenged the May 15, 2018 decision recalculating his maximum sentence 

date, arguing that the Board lacked authority to do so, violated his due process rights 

and his right to protection from double jeopardy, and erred when it did not credit 

him for time spent at liberty on parole. Id. at 115-122. 

On January 15, 2019, the Board issued a decision affirming the March 

22, 2018 and May 15, 2018 decisions. Id. at 151. The Board explained:

First, you signed a form waiving your right to a 

revocation hearing and admitting that you were convicted 

of [b]urglary, [a]ggravated [a]ssault, [t]erroristic [t]hreats, 

and 2 counts of [s]imple [a]ssault . . . in violation of your 

parole on January 5, 2018. The waiver/admission form 

you signed specifically indicates that you chose to take 

said action of you[r] own free will, without promise, threat 

or coercion. You also failed to withdraw the 

waiver/admission within the prescribed ten-day grace 

period. These facts demonstrate that you made the 

waiver/admission knowingly and voluntarily. In light of 

 

2 Chapman filed his administrative remedies forms on April 20, 2018, and June 6, 2018, 

respectively. C.R. at 113, 115. Chapman subsequently filed correspondence and additional

administrative remedies forms with the Board on October 26, 2018, and January 3, 2019. Id. at 

124, 128. See 37 Pa. Code § 73.1(b)(3) (providing that “[s]econd or subsequent petitions for 

administrative review and petitions for administrative review which are out of time under this part 

will not be received”).
4

your waiver, you cannot now claim that the Board failed 

to provide you with a timely revocation hearing. . . . 

Therefore, the Board acted within its discretion in 

revoking your parole without conducting a revocation 

hearing.

Next, the Board recalculated your maximum 

sentence date to November 3, 2032 based on your 

recommitment as a convicted parole violator. The 

decision to recommit you as a convicted parole violator 

gave the Board statutory authority to recalculate your 

sentence to reflect that you received no credit for the 

period you were at liberty on parole. . . . The Board denied 

you credit for time at liberty on parole in this instance. The 

Board advised you of this potential penalty on the parole 

conditions you signed on August 4, 2006. You also had 

constructive notice of this potential penalty via the statute. 

Additionally, the ability to challenge the recalculation 

decision after it is imposed satisfies your due process 

rights. Therefore, the Board’s recalculation of your 

maximum sentence date did not violate any constitutional 

provisions, including double jeopardy. . . .

Finally, the decision on whether to grant or deny a 

convicted parole violator credit for time at liberty on 

parole is purely a matter of discretion. The Prisons and 

Parole Code[3]authorizes the Board to grant or deny credit 

for time at liberty on parole for certain criminal offenses. 

. . . However, there are certain offenses that are excluded 

from this. You committed an offense that is barred from 

awarding credit. Specifically, you were found guilty of 

[b]urglary – [o]vernight [a]ccomodations; [p]erson, 

present, [b]odily [i]njury [c]rime which is an offense 

excluded from awarding [credit for] street time. . . . 

Id. at 150-51 (citations omitted). 

 

3 61 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-7123. 
5

On February 26, 2019, Chapman filed with this Court a pro se petition 

for review challenging the Board’s decision, along with an application to proceed in

forma pauperis.4 By order dated March 7, 2019, this Court appointed counsel to 

represent Chapman. On January 28, 2020, Counsel filed a motion to withdraw as 

counsel, which included a no-merit letter.

5

 In his motion, Counsel represented that 

he reviewed Chapman’s petition for review, researched the issues he raised, and,

based on his review, determined that all of Chapman’s claims are without merit. 

Motion ¶¶ 2-3.

In cases where counsel concludes that a petitioner’s appeal is meritless, 

counsel may be permitted to withdraw if he satisfies the following requirements: (i) 

he notifies the petitioner of the request to withdraw; (ii) he furnishes the petitioner 

with a copy of a no-merit letter; and (iii) he advises the petitioner of his right to retain 

new counsel and to raise any new points he might deem worthy of consideration. 

Miskovitch v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 77 A.3d 66, 69 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013); Hughes 

v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 977 A.2d 19, 22 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). The no-merit 

letter must detail: (i) the nature and extent of counsel’s review; (ii) each issue the 

petitioner wished to have raised; and (iii) counsel’s explanation as to why those 

issues are meritless. Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Zerby v. 

 

4 Our scope of review of the Board’s decision denying administrative relief is limited to 

determining whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether an 

error of law was committed, or whether constitutional rights have been violated. Fisher v. Pa. Bd. 

of Prob. & Parole, 62 A.3d 1073, 1075 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).

5 Counsel seeking to withdraw may file an Anders Brief or a no-merit letter. Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (explaining standards for withdrawal of appointed counsel). If 

the petitioner has a constitutional right to counsel, then counsel should file an Anders Brief. In 

cases where there is no constitutional right to counsel, i.e., an appeal from the Board’s decision to 

recalculate a parolee’s maximum sentence date, this Court only requires a no-merit letter 

explaining why the claim is meritless to support the motion to withdraw. Hughes v. Pa. Bd. of 

Prob. & Parole, 977 A.2d 19, 25-26 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).
6

Shanon, 964 A.2d 956, 961 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). The no-merit letter must include 

“substantial reasons for concluding that” a petitioner’s arguments are without merit. 

Zerby, 964 A.2d at 962. Once appointed counsel fully complies with these 

requirements to withdraw, the Court independently reviews the merits of the 

petitioner’s claims. Id. at 960. 

Here, Counsel met the technical requirements to withdraw. Counsel 

served Chapman with a copy of the motion to withdraw, which included the no-merit 

letter. See Certificate of Service filed 1/31/20. In the no-merit letter, Counsel 

advised Chapman that if the motion to withdraw as counsel is granted, “you are free 

to retain new counsel on your own, or proceed with this appeal pro se.” No-Merit 

Letter at 4. On February 25, 2020, Counsel filed a certificate of service with this 

Court certifying that he served a copy of this Court’s February 4, 2020 order on 

Chapman. See Certificate of Service filed 2/25/20. The February 4, 2020 order gave 

Chapman 30 days to obtain substitute counsel at his own expense, or to file a brief 

on his own behalf to support his petition for review. Cmwlth. Ct. Order dated 2/4/20. 

Upon review of the substance of the no-merit letter, Counsel summarizes the issues 

raised by Chapman on appeal and addresses each of the issues by providing 

references to the certified record and relevant law to support his conclusion that they 

lack merit. No-Merit Letter at 1-4. We conclude that Counsel provided substantial 

reasons to support his conclusion that Chapman’s arguments lack merit. We now 

independently review the merits of Chapman’s claims.6 

First, Chapman contends that the Board erred when it found that he 

waived his right to a revocation hearing and his right to be represented by counsel at 

 

6 Chapman did not file a brief or retain substitute counsel as allowed by this Court’s 

February 4, 2020 order. Subsequently, the Court ordered that Counsel’s motion to withdraw be 

submitted on briefs along with the merits of the petition for review. Cmwlth. Ct. Order dated 

6/17/20. 
7

that hearing because he was not “made aware of these important rights until he was 

granted access to the law libraries” at the SCI. No-Merit Letter at 1; Petition for 

Review (Petition) ¶¶ 6-8. Contrary to Chapman’s assertion, the certified record 

shows that the Board did, in fact, notify him of these rights and that he waived them. 

C.R. at 71. 

On January 5, 2018, Chapman signed a document entitled “Offender

Rights at Board Hearings,” which provided:

The board conducts several types of hearings. Offenders 

have specific rights at each hearing, which are given to 

them verbally and in writing. At all board hearings, 

offenders have the right to disclosure of evidence in 

support of the violations charged against them. Offenders 

have the right to speak, have voluntary witnesses appear 

on their behalf and present affidavits and other evidence. 

Offenders have the right to cross-examine adverse 

witnesses. Offenders have the right to be represented by 

counsel, if an offender cannot afford counsel one will be 

appointed. There is no penalty for requesting counsel. 

Offenders may request a continuance of the hearing for a 

good cause. The board will send notice of its 

determination either to the offender or to the counsel who 

represented the offender at the hearing. 

Id. at 70 (emphasis added). This document further explained Chapman’s revocation 

hearing rights by stating “[t]he [B]oard has scheduled a revocation hearing to 

determine whether you should be recommitted as a convicted violator because of the 

conviction(s) charged. You have a right to be heard by a panel.” Id. On the same 

day, Chapman signed a “Waiver of Revocation Hearing and Counsel/Admission 

Form,” which provided:

I have been advised of my rights to a parole revocation 

hearing and counsel at that hearing. I have also been 

advised that there is no penalty for requesting counsel, that 
8

free counsel is available if I cannot afford to retain 

counsel, and I have been provided the name and address 

of the local public defender. With full knowledge and 

understanding of these rights, I hereby waive my right to a 

parole revocation hearing and counsel at that hearing. I 

waive these rights of my own free will, without any 

promise, threat or coercion. 

Id. at 71 (emphasis added). On the same form, Chapman “knowingly, intelligently, 

and voluntarily” admitted that he was convicted of the new criminal charges. Id. at 

69, 71. The form further provided that Chapman had 10 calendar days to withdraw 

his admission. Id. at 71. Although Chapman indicated that he planned to appeal the 

“wrongful conviction[s],”7 he did not deny the convictions nor did he retract his 

admission within the 10-day period provided. Id. Given these facts, Chapman’s 

claim that he was deprived of his right to a revocation hearing and to counsel is 

without merit. 

Second, Chapman argues that the Board violated the United States and 

Pennsylvania Constitutions’ prohibition against double jeopardy when it affirmed 

the revocation of his parole because he cannot receive multiple punishments for the 

same offense. No-Merit Letter at 1; Petition ¶¶ 4, 9. However, the double jeopardy 

provisions of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions do not apply to 

parole revocation proceedings of the Board. Gundy v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 

478 A.2d 139, 141 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984). Moreover, in Gundy, this Court held that 

there is no basis to support the conclusion that the Pennsylvania Constitution affords 

more double jeopardy protection than that offered by the Fifth Amendment of the 

 

7 On his Waiver of Revocation Hearing and Counsel/Admission Form, Chapman contested 

his new convictions. C.R. at 71. Chapman noted on the form that he has been on parole since 

March 30, 2006, he has worked at least two jobs, he has “never had any issues,” and he “will be 

appealing [these] wrongful conviction[s].” Id.
9

United States Constitution. Id. at 142. Therefore, Chapman’s claim that the Board 

violated double jeopardy prohibitions when it revoked his parole is without merit. 

Finally, Chapman asserts that the Board erred when it failed to give him 

credit for “all time served while being detained on the new charges and under its 

warrant.” No-Merit Letter at 2; Petition ¶ 11. Chapman complains about the 

“significant restraints” placed on his “liberty” while on parole “because of his 

conviction and sentence,” and argues that these restraints8 are “enough to keep him 

in ‘custody’” and cites cases to support his proposition that parole is “in legal effect 

imprisonment.” Petition ¶ 11. Though Chapman’s argument is unclear, we agree 

with Counsel that Chapman appears to be raising this claim in an effort to obtain

credit for the time he spent at liberty on parole from 2006 until his revocation in 

2018. No-Merit Letter at 2.9 

Section 6138(a)(1)-(2) of the Prisons and Parole Code provides that if 

the Board orders recommitment as a convicted parole violator, the parolee shall be 

reentered to serve the “remainder of the term which the parolee would have been 

compelled to serve had the parole not been granted” and “shall be given no credit 

for the time at liberty on parole.” 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(1)-(2). The Board, however, 

may, in its discretion, award credit to a convicted parole violator for time spent at 

liberty on parole, unless the offender is convicted of certain offenses. 61 Pa.C.S. § 

6138(a)(2.1). These offenses include a crime committed during the period of parole 

 

8 For example, Chapman explains that the parole order confined him to a particular 

community, house and job at the “sufferance of his parole officer,” and that he could not drive 

without permission. Petition ¶ 10. 

9 To the extent Chapman is asserting that he is entitled to credit for time spent incarcerated 

on the Board’s detainer while awaiting sentencing on the new criminal charges, Chapman did not 

raise this issue before the Board and, therefore, it is waived. Reavis v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 

909 A.2d 28, 34 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (providing that “[f]ailure to raise an issue before the Board

results in a waiver and precludes this Court’s review”).
10

that is a crime of violence as defined in Section 9714(g) of the Sentencing Code, 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9714(g). Id. One such crime of violence expressly enumerated is burglary. 

See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(g) (defining “crime of violence” to include “burglary as 

defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)(1)”). Here, Chapman was convicted of several 

crimes, including the crime of burglary pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)(1)(i). C.R. 

at 90. Because Chapman was convicted of a crime of violence, the Board could not 

grant him credit for the time he spent at liberty on parole. Therefore, Chapman’s 

assertion lacks merit.10

Accordingly, we grant Counsel’s motion to withdraw as counsel and

affirm the order of the Board. 

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

 

10 Chapman also contends that the Board erred when it permitted the introduction of 

hearsay evidence and violated “the ethical obligations under the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Professional Conduct.” No-Merit Letter at 2; Petition ¶¶ 10-11. As noted by Counsel, Chapman 

fails to cite any facts or evidence to support his hearsay argument, No-Merit Letter at 2, and we 

find the same problem with the alleged rules violation. As such, we agree with Counsel that these

assertions lack merit. 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Suleman Chapman, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Pennsylvania Board of :

Probation and Parole, : No. 225 C.D. 2019

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 20th day of August, 2020, the motion to withdraw as 

counsel filed by Tyler A. Lindquist, Esquire, is GRANTED, and the January 15, 

2019 order of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole is AFFIRMED. 

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge