### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Ma y 10, 200 5 S es sio n
CHRIS TY MICH ELL E BERRY v . LEST ER STE PHEN BERRY

Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for K nox Coun ty No. 148677-2 Dar yl R. F ansler, Chancellor

No. E2004-01832-COA- R3-CV - F ILED MAY 31, 2005

This is a post divorce c hild custody case

. The trial court chang ed custody to the father base d upon the mother' s homosex uality and the eff

ect it would have on the child as he g rew older. We hold that the e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s a g a ins t th e tr ia l c ou rt ' s f ind ing that th e re ha d be e n a ma te ri a l c ha ng e in circ umstances to justify

a cha ng e of c ustody

in the absenc e of pro o f t h at the mother' s sexual

o r i e n t a t i o n h a d a f

f e c t e d o r w o u l d a f

f e c t t h e c h i l d ' s w e l l

- b e i n g i n a n y m e a n i n g f u l w a y. A c c o r d i n g l y, the trial court's de cision is rever sed.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cha nc e r y C our t R e ve r se d; Ca se Rem anded

S HAR ON G. LEE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J ., joined. C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., filed a se parate conc urring opinion.

Mo rn a Kathl e e n Re y no lds Mc Ha rg ue , K no xvill e, Ten nes se e , f or the Ap pe lla nt, Christ y

Mic he lle B e rr y.

J ohn Thomas J ones and Elizabeth K. B

. Meadow s, Knoxvi lle, Tenne ssee, for the Appellee , L ester S t e p h e n B e rr y.

OP IN ION

Th i s i s a d i s p u t e b e t w e e n t w o p ar e n t s o v e r c u s t o d y o f t h e i r e i g h t

- y e ar

- o l d s o n

. Chr ist y Mic he lle B e rry

a ndL e ste r S te ph e n B e rry we re marrie d on Nov e mbe r 23, 19 96 , one mon th af te r the ir son, Stephen, was born. After near ly four y ear s o f m arriag e, the pa rties sepa rate d and Ms. B erry filed for divorce . The pa

rties re ache d an amica

ble settlement of a ll issues, including custody and visitation, and wer e gra nted a divorce on the grounds of irr econc ilable diffe renc es on April 25, 2001. Th e pa rt ie s’ mari ta l di sso lut ion a g re e me nt p ro vid e d th a t th e pa rt ie s wo uld ha ve joi nt c us tod y of the ir son; designated Ms. Be rry as the primary residential pare nt; a nd g ave Mr. Be rry pare nting time on alternate wee kends, ce rtain holiday s and two we eks in the summer.-2-

Af te r the pa rt ie s’ se pa

ratio n, Mr . B e rry

liv e d w ith his mothe r, his c ou sin a ndthe n mo ve d in with his g irlfriend. After one or two months of living toge ther, he and his g irlfriend w ere marrie d on J une 23, 2001. At the time of the trial, they wer e residing in a three -bedr oom home with a new baby born of their

marria g e; a c hild of Mr. Be rry ’s new wife; and a child from one of Mr. B erry ’s prev i o u s relationships. After the divorce , Ms. Be rry

also beg an dating , but unlike Mr. Be rry , she dated individuals of her g ender

. Sometime a fter April 2001, Ms. B erry and the parties’ son lived wi t h M s

. B e rr y ’ s f

e m a l e p ar t n e r a n d h e r p ar t n e r ’ s s o n f o r ap p r o xi m a t e l y a y e ar a n d a ha lf . T his rela tionship ended and about five mont hs later, Ms. B erry beg an living w ith another fe male partner. This living ar

rang ement lasted f

o r ab o u t six months and ended, upon a dvice of counsel, a fter Mr

. B e rry fi le d f or a c ha ng e of

c us tod y . T he re la tio ns hip te rm inate d ab ou t on e mon th l a te r. At the tim e of trial, Ms. B erry

had a f emale f riend who visited re g ularly , but did not reside with her.

Mr . B e rry c la ims he didno t kn ow Ms. B e rry wa s g a y un til on e mon th a ft e r the div or c e . M s. B e rry c la ims sh e tol d h im s he wa s g a y be fo re the div or c e

. I n an y e ve nt, Mr . Be rry didno t be c ome
conce rned a

bout her sexual orientation until he underw ent a post divorce relig ious conversion.

On Octobe r 15, 2002, Mr. Be rry filed a petition f or a chang e of custody alleg ing that there had bee n a materia l c hang e of circ umstances and that it wa s in the child’s best interest for custody to be cha ng ed to Mr. B erry based on Ms. B erry ’s homosexualit y and multipl e partne rs. Ms. Be rry op po se d the c ha ng e of c us tod y

. Th e tr ia l c ou rt , a ft e r he ari ng the te sti mon y of the pa rt ie s a ndthe ir wi tne sse s o n Jun e 1, 20 04 , r ule d th a t th e re ha d b e e n a ma te ri a l cha ng e of c ir c ums ta nc e s and that it was in the be st interests of the c hild for custody to be cha ng ed to t he father. On June 30, 2004, the tr ia l c ou rt iss ue d a me mor a nd um o pin ion in w hic h th e c ou rt no te d th a t th e father’s grou nd s to support a cha ng e of custody wer e primarily based on the mother’s sexual pref ere nce, he r “ope nly

g ay lifesty le”, a nd the child’s exposure to that lifesty le. The tria l court found that, althoug h the child was well-a djusted and doing well in school, he would ha ve to cont en d with his mot her’ s openly g ay lifesty le as he g rew older. The trial court was conce rned over the mother ’s admission that she saw nothing wr ong with introducing three lovers into her c hild’s life in less than three y ear s and that she saw nothing morally

wrong with sharing her bedroom with her love rs. The tria l court found no evidenc e that the c hild had been a ffe cted by the mother’s “ openly

p romiscuous lifesty le,” but

“ [u]nd ou bta

bly he wi ll h a ve to de a l wi th h is m oth e r’ s se xua lit y a ndthe c on tr ov e rs y

a sso c ia te d w ith that sexualit y

as he matures.” Rely ing on a 1988 unreported dec ision of this court, Colli ns v. Collins , No. 87-238-I I , 1988 WL

30173, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXI S 123, (Tenn. Ct. App. W .S., filed Marc h 30, 1988, perm. a

pp. denied June 27, 1988), the trial c ourt found a material c hang e of c ircumstance had occurre d and that it was in the c hild’s best interest that the father a ssume the role of primary residential pa

rent. Ms. B erry

appea led.
The dispositive issue in this case is whether the mother’s post divorc e homosexualityand h e r e x e r c i s e o f

s a m e c o n s t i t u t e d a m a t e r i a l c h a n g e i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s t o w arr a n t a c h a n g e i n c u s t o d y. After car eful re view of the rec ord, we conclude that the evidenc e preponderates in favor of the trial court’s f inding that the c hild had not been a ffe cted by his mother’s sex ual orientation. We further conclude that the evide n ce p re p o n d erates ag ainst the trial court’s finding that the child will be adver sely aff ecte d by his mother’s sexual orientation as he g rows older. Be cause there is insufficient-3-

evidenc e that the mother’s homosex uality has had or

will have an e ffe ct on the child’s we ll-being in a meaning ful way , we hold tha t the re has not bee n a material chang e in circ umstances to wa rra nt
a c h a n g e i n c u s t o d y.

I n th is n on -j ury

c a se , o ur re vie w i s de novo upon the re cord of the proc eeding s below; but the re cord c omes to us with a presumption of correc tness as t o the trial court's f actua l determinations wh ic h w e mus t ho no r u nle ss the evid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s a g a ins t th os e fi nd ing s. Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 13 (d ); W right v. City of K

noxville, 89 8 S. W.2 d 1 77 , 1 81 (T e nn . 1 99 5) ; Union Carbide Corp. v. H u d d le ston, 8 5 4 S .W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn.1993). The trial court' s conclusions of law, how ever , are
acc orded no suc h presumption. Campbell v. Florida Stee l Corp., 919 S.W .2d 26, 35 (Tenn. 1996) ; Pre sle y v . B e nn e tt, 860 S.W .2d 857, 859 (Tenn.1993)

. Trial courts are vested with wide discre tion in matters involving c ustody of childre n. Edwards v. Edwards , 501 S.W .2d 283, 291 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 73 ). Ac c or din g ly , a

tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on re g ard ing c us tod y or vis itatio n s ho uldbe se t a sid e on ly when it “f alls outside the spectrum of ruling s that might re asonably result from a n application of the

corr ect l ega l standards to the e vidence found in the re cord.” Eldridge v. Eldridge , 42 S.W .3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 2001)

. We beg in our revie w by

rea ffirming the pre mis e that custody and visitation decisions are among the most important decisions that courts make. Steen v. Stee n , 61 S.W .3d 324, 327 (Tenn. Ct. App. 20 01); Adelsperge r v. Adelspe rger , 970 S.W .2d 482, 484 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). Pr omo tin g the c hil d’ s w e lf are by c re a tin g a n e nv ir on me n t

th at p r o m o t e s a

nu rtur ing re la tio ns hip wi th both pa rents is the chief purpose in custody decisions. Aaby v . Strange , 924 S.W .2d 623, 629 (Tenn. 1996).

Th e c ou rt s f

a vo r e xistin g c us tod y arr a ng e me nts sin c e c hil dr e n thr ive in s ta ble e nv ir on me nts

. Aaby v . Strange , 9 24 S.W. 2da t 62 7; Taylor v. Taylor , 849 S.W .2d 319, 332 (Tenn. 1993) ; Hoalcraft v. Smithson , 19 S.W .3d 822, 828 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). A custody decision, once made and implemented, is consider ed res judicata up on the fa c ts i n e xiste nc e or re a so na bly fo re se e able when the de cision was made

. Y ou ng v . S mi th , 19 3 Te nn

. 48 0, 48 5, 24 6 S. W.2 d 9 3, 95 (1 95 2) ; Steen v. Stee n , 6 1 S. W.3 d a t 32 7; Solima v. Solima , 7 S.W .3d 30, 32 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

I n case s where in a party

seeks to modify an ex isting custodyarr ang ement, the thre shold issue is w hether a materia l c hang e in c ircumstance s has occur red since the initial custody determination. We r e c og nize that th e c ir c ums ta nc e s o f c hil dr e n a ndthe ir pa re nts c ha ng e - c hil dr e n g ro w old e r, the ir needs c hang e, one or both parties re marry . But not all cha ng es in the circ umstances of the parties and the child war

rant a chang e in custod y

. T h er e are no ha rd and f ast rules for

when ther e has be en a
c ha ng e of c ir c ums ta nc e su ff

ic ie nt t o ju sti fy

a c ha ng e in c us tod y . A c ou rt ’s de c isi on wi th r e g ardto mod if ic a tio n o f c usto dy is contin g e nt u po n th e c ir c ums ta nc e s p re se nte d a ndthe c ou rt sh ou ld consider w hether :
1) the c hang e occ urre d afte r the e ntry of the orde r soug ht to be modified, and-4-

2) the c hang ed cir cumstance s were not rea sonably anticipated w hen the unde rly ing de cre e
was e ntere d, and

3 ) t h e c h a n g e i s o n e t h a ta f f e c t s t h e c h i l d ’ s w e l l

- b e i n g i n a m e a n i n g f

u l w a y.

Kendrick v . Shoemake , 90 S.W .3d 566, 570 (Tenn. 2002) ; Blair v. Badenhope , 7 7 S. W. 3d 137 (Tenn. 2002)

. The pa rty seeking to chang e an exis ting custody arr ang ement has the burden of proving that there has bee n a material chang e of c ircumstance s. I f the pe rson see king the ch an ge of custody cannot de monstrate that the c hild’s circumstanc es have chang ed in s ome m aterial way , the trial court should not reexamine the compar ative fitness of the pare nts, Caudill v. Foley , 21 S.W .3d 203, 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), or eng ag e in a “best interests of the child” analy sis. I n the abse nce of proof

o f a m a t e r i a l c h a n g e i n t h e c h i l d ’ s c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e t r i a l c o u r ts h o u l d n o tc h a n g e c u s t o d y. Hoalcraft v. Smithson , 19 S.W .3d at 828.

The trial c ourt found t hat Ms. Be rry beg an pursuing a “g ay lifesty le” after the divorce and that th is w a s n ot a nti c ipate d w he n th e div or c e de c re e wa s e nte re d. Th e tr ia l c ou rt fo un d th a t th e c hil d had not bee n aff

ecte d by his mother’s sexual conduct since the divorce

. We find that the evidenc e supports these finding s. The trial c ourt furthe r found that the mother ’s “ope nly promiscuous lifesty le” would ha ve an a dverse eff ect on the child in the future. We find that the evidenc e does not support this finding.
A par ent’s sexual orientation ca n be a f actor that the trial court should consider in making

a c us tod y decision , b ut i t do e s n ot c on tr ol the ou tc ome of the c a se abs e nt e vid e nc e of its a dv e rs e eff ect on the c hild. In re Parsons , 9 14 S.W. 2d88 9, 89 4 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 5) . H omo se xua lit y is

n o t a per se b ar

to c u s to d y

. T h e k e y

c o n s id e r a ti o n is w h e th e r a p ar e n t’ s s e xu a li ty

h a s a n e g a tive eff ect on a child’s welf

are

. In re Parsons , 914 S.W

. 2d at 894. This is in a ccor d with de cisions from other jurisdictions, see H.J.B. v . P.W ., 628 S o

. 2 d 7

53 ( Ala. Civ. App. 1993) ; S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (

Alaska 1985) ; T

a yl o r v. Taylor, 110 S.W .2d 731 ( Ark. 2003) ; Downey v. Muffley
, 767 N. E. 2d10 14 (Ind . Ct . A pp . 2 00 2) ; Lun din v . Lu nd in , 5 63 So. 2d 12 73 (L a

. Ct. Ap p. 19 90 ); Be zio v. Patenaude , 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Ma ss. 1980) ; Holl on v. Hollon , 784 So. 2d 943, 949 (Miss. 2001); Hassenstab v. Hasse nstab, 570 N.W .2d 368 ( Neb. Ct. App. 1997) ; M.P. v . S.P., 4 0 4 A

. 2 d 1 2 5 6 ( N

. J. Super. C t. App. Div. 1979); Guinan v. Guinan , 47 7 N. Y. S. 2d 83 0 (1 98 4) ; Conkel v. Conke l, 509 N. E. 2d 983 ( Ohio Ct. App. 1987) ; Stroman v

. W illiams , 3 5 3 S.E. 2d 704 (S.C. C t. App. 1987); Van Driel v. Van D riel , 525 N. W. 2d 37 (S.D . 1 99 4) ; In re M arriage of Cabalqui nto, 669 P.2d 886 (Wash. 1983), later appeal, 718 P.2d 7 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) ; See, also, B ruce Gill, Be st I nte re st of the Child? A Criti que of Judicially Sanc tioned Arguments De nying Child Cus tody to Gays and Lesbians , 68 Tenn. L . Rev. 361 (2001); Christopher Carnahan, Inscribing Lesbian and Gay Identities: How Judic ial Imaginations Intertwi ne with the Best Intere sts of C hildren , 1 1 Ca r d o zo Women’s L . J . 1 (2004); Jul ie Shapiro, Custody and Conduct: How the Law Fail s Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Chil dren, 71 I nd. L .J . 623 (1986).-5-

We find nothing in this rec ord to indicate that the m other’s sex ual orienta tion has aff ecte d the child’s we lfare in a meaning ful way . The e vidence clea rly supports the trial court’s finding that t h e c h i l d w a s w e l l

- a d

j u s t e d , d o i n g w e l l i n s c h o o l , a n d n o ta f f e c t e d b y h i s m o t h e r ’ s h o m o s e x u a l i t y. Mr. B erry ag ree d at trial that his son was a he althy , well-a djusted honor roll student. His testimony was supporte d by

the testimony

of other witnesses, including the child’s s chool g uidance counselor who testified that he w as a “ well-rounde d kid;” a child with no behavior issues; a child with good social skills; and a “fun kid” with a g ood sense of humor who intera cts well with others.

Th e tr ia l c ou rt

ba se d it s d e c isi on in p art

on the fu tur e e ff

e c t th e mothe r’ s sexua l c on du c t may have on the child and that he would have to “ contend with the mother’s g ay li fe s t y l e a s h e gre w older.” The trial c ourt re l i ed o n a 1988 decision in Colli ns v. Collins , N o

. 8 7

- 2 3 8

- I I , 1 9 8 8 WL 30173, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXI S 123, (Tenn. Ct. App. W.S., filed Marc h 30, 1988, perm. a pp. denied J une 27, 1988), in whic h the appe llate court affirmed the judg ment of the trial c ourt which c hang ed custody from a homosex ual m other to a heterosexual fathe r. Col lin s is an unreported dec ision and as such is persuasive authority rathe r t han contr olling authority

. Mc Con ne ll v . S tat e , 12 S.W .3d 795 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), Al lst ate In s. Co. v . W

att s , 8 1 1 S

. W

. 2 d 8 8 3 , 8 8 6 n

. 2 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 1 )

. In Colli ns the child testified that her mother slept in the same be d with her female pa rtner, kissed he r, hug g ed her and told her tha t she loved her . Be cause there was no such te stimonyin the case at bar , the ca ses
are fac tually distinguishable. Howeve r, we note that in Colli ns, the appe llate court found that the mother had done a “good job in raising her to be a norma l, well-adjusted c hild, and there has bee n
no pr oo f tha t th e Mo the r’ s li fe sty le ha s a dv e rs e ly a ff e c te d th e c hil d’ s g ro wth o r de ve lop me nt. Howeve r, if the c hild remains with her mother , she fac es a life tha t require s her to kee p the sec ret of her mother’s lifesty le, or fac e possible social ostrac ism and contempt.” Col lin s, 1988 Tenn. App. LEX I S 12 3 a t *6 -7 . So in t ha t r e sp e c t Col lin s is very simil ar to the case at ba r. I n explanation we

no te that Col lin s was de cided in 1988 prior to the Kendrick decision which clarified t he criteria for determining whe n there has been a material chang e of circumstance s; prior to this court’s de cision in In re M

.J.S., 44 S.W . 3d 41 (Tenn. Ct

. Ap p

. 2000) (a proposed a doptive pare nt’s alternative lif e sty le is n ot a

de te rm inativ e fa c tor

un le ss i t is sh ow n to ha ve a n ef fe c t on the c hil d) ; a ndpr ior to In re Parsons , 914 S.W .2d at 894 (a pare nt’s alternative lifesty le i s not a determinative fac tor in a custody case absent proof

of an e ffe ct on the child).

The trial c ourt’s finding of future harm was specula tive and presupposed t hat t he mother’ s homosex uality

would cause the child problems as he matured. There was no cre dible proof in the

rec ord to support a finding that the mother’ s sexual orientation would have a n adver se impact on the child as he g rew older. Further, this wa s not a proper matter of which the court c ould take judicial notice. Tenn. R. Evid. 201(b) only allows a court to ta ke judicial notice of adjudicative f acts “ either (1) g ener ally

known within the territoria l jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) c apable of ac curate and

rea dy deter mination by

resort to sourc es whose acc urac y cannot r easona

bly be questioned.” We do not f ind tha t homose x uality and its eff ects on c hildren as they

mature is of suc h a natur e that judicial notice is ap p r o p r iate

. T h e r e f o r e , w e h o ldth a t th e e v id e n c e p r e p o n d e r a te s a g a in s t th e tria l c o u rt’s finding that the child will be adve rsely aff ecte d in the future by

his mother’s sexual orientation.-6-

The trial court also based its de cision in pa rt on the mother’s sexual c onduct which the c ourt de sc ri be d a s “ pr omi sc uo us ” . A parent ’s se xua l c on du c t, b e it h e te ro se xua l or ho mos e xua l, i f pr a c tic e d in app ro pr ia te ly

or ind isc ri min a te ly , ca n ad ve rs e ly a ff e c t a c hil d’ s w e ll- be ing a ndin tho se
case s, a par ent’s sexual conduct c an be a determinative factor in custody determinations. I n Parker v. Parke r , 986 S.W .2d 557, 563 (Tenn. 1999) , the Tenne ssee S u p re m e C ourt ac knowledg ed that “sexual indiscretion does not, by itself, disqualify

a par ent from being awa

rded custody , but it may be a r eleva nt fac tor if it involves the neg lect of the child.” See a lso, Lockmiller v. Lock miller , No. E2002-02586-COA–R3-CV, 2003 WL 23094418, at *5, 2003 Tenn. A pp. LEXI S 953, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., f

iled Dec

. 30, 2004). The re cord be fore us offe rs no proof that Ms. Ber ry neg lected the part i es ’ ch i l d beca

use of se x ual indiscretion. B y all acc ounts, she was a

g ood mother who pr ov ide d h im w ith a

g oo d h ome , w a s in vo lve d in his sc ho ol a c tiv iti e s, a ndregul arl y att end e d h is athletic eve nts. There was n o i n d i cation that she had eve r eng ag ed in any inappropriate sexual conduct in the pr esenc e of the child. The trial c ourt was c oncerned bec ause she had bee n involved with three diff

ere nt women over

the cour se of thre e y ear s and desc ribed he r co nduct as “promiscuous” . Even a ssuming for the sake of arg ument that this was promiscuous conduc t, there still must be evidenc e of a n adver se ef fec t on the child befor e it wi l l be a suff icient re ason for

a chang e in custody

. Sm ith v . S mi th , No. 86-43-I I , 1986 Tenn. App. LEXI S 3116 (Tenn. Ct. App. M.S . f ile d J uly 9, 19 86 ) (a lth ou g h in th e thr e e y e ars sin c e the pa rt ie s’ div or c e , th e mothe r h a d s le pt w ith and date d approximately four differ ent men, the c hildren did not suffer any ill effec ts and the trial court’s de cision chang ing c ustody from the mother

to the fathe r wa s reve rsed.)

Whil e we have no doubt that the trial court’s ruling was well-intentioned wit h a ge n uine

c on c e rn fo r the be st int e re sts of the c hil d, we are c on str a ine d by ou r c on str uc tio n of the app lic able law and our

stated finding s to r espec tfully disag ree with suc h ruling

. After car efully revie wing the

rec ord in this case, we find no evidenc e that the child has been or will be jeopar dized by the mother’s sexual orientation. There fore we conclude that the pre pondera nce of the evidenc e does not support the trial court’s ruling that a material chang e in circ umstances ha d occur red. A ccor dingly , we
reve rse the tr ial court’s de cision and re mand to the trial court. The parties shall continue to ha ve joint custody ; the mother shall be the primary residential parent; and a ll other provisions of the permanent pare nting plan e x ecute d by the parties on April 25, 2001, shall continue to be in ef fec t. We note that be c a us e the c hil d h a s b e e n p ri mari ly re sid ing wi th the fathe r s inc e the tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on , th is order shall take e ffe ct five day s after its entry to allow the child time to adjust to this new pare nting

arr a ng e me nt.

Costs of this cause shall be taxed to the fa ther, L ester Stephe n Be rry and his surety

for whic h

e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f

n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ S H A R O N G

. LE E , J.