******************************************************

The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the

beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will

be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the

date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative

date for the beginning of all time periods for filing

postopinion motions and petitions for certification is

the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion.

In no event will any such motions be accepted before

the ‘‘officially released’’ date.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the

event of discrepancies between the electronic version

of an opinion and the print version appearing in the

Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the

latest print version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying

the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official

Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service

and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes

of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of

the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal

Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************
MICHAEL MISENTI v. COMMISSIONER

OF CORRECTION

(AC 37091)

DiPentima, C. J., and Gruendel and Keller, Js.*

Argued January 4—officially released May 17, 2016

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Tolland, Bright, J.)

Jeanne M. Zulick, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (petitioner).

Timothy F. Costello, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state’s attorney, and David M. Carlucci, assistant state’s attorney,

for the appellee (respondent).
Opinion

DiPENTIMA, C. J. The petitioner, Michael Misenti,

appeals from the judgment of the habeas court denying

his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the

petitioner claims that the court (1) abused its discretion

in denying certification to appeal from the determination that Richard Grabow, the petitioner’s trial counsel,

had notrendered ineffective assistance, and (2)improperly denied the motion to withdraw from the case filed

by the petitioner’s habeas counsel, David B. Rozwaski,

at the start of the habeas trial. We dismiss the petitioner’s appeal.

The court set forth the following factual findings and

procedural history in its memorandum of decision. In

November, 2013, while operating his computer, the petitioner visited an adult only website ‘‘through which he

sought customers for gay pornographic videos.’’

Through that website, he met and began communicating

with the victim, whom the petitioner believed to be an

adult but was, in fact, a fourteen year old male. The

petitioner made arrangements to meet the victim in

person for the purpose of selling him pornographic

videos.

The petitioner went to the victim’s home and provided him with a bag containing videos and a ‘‘sex toy.’’

The victim later told the police that the petitioner had

kissed him, had touched his buttocks and had placed

his mouth on the victim’s penis. Prior to his arrest or

being in custody, the petitioner admitted to the police

that he had kissed the victim. At the habeas trial, however, the petitioner denied that any physical contact

had occurred.

The petitioner was arrested and charged with attempt

to commit sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-71, sexual

assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-73a, use of a computer to entice a minor in

violation of General Statutes § 53a-90a, and risk of

injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-

21. The petitioner retained Grabow to represent him.

Grabow filed a broad discovery request and had

numerous discussions with prosecutors regarding a

plea agreement. Grabow also met with the petitioner

several times and explained the offers from the state.

He also explained the elements of the charges to the

petitioner, as well as the evidence that the state

intended to introduce at trial. Although the petitioner

maintained that he had not violated any criminal statute

because he had believed that the victim was at least

sixteen or seventeen years old, Grabow explained that

a mistake about the victim’s age was not a defense to

the charges of risk of injury and sexual assault in the

fourth degree.1

On September 8, 2004, the petitioner and Grabow
appeared for jury selection. At the outset, the criminal

trial court told the petitioner that he had to decide if

he was going to accept the state’s offer or proceed to

trial. The court further explained that once the jury

selection process began, ‘‘all bets are off on whatever

plea bargaining has occurred before today.’’ After some

brief discussion, it notified the parties that jury selection would start after a thirty minute recess.

After the recess, the court noted that parties had

reached an agreement. As noted by the habeas court,

‘‘[t]he petitioner agreed to accept the [state’s] offer so

long as he could do so through a plea of nolo contendere

and under the Alford doctrine.’’2 The state filed a substitute information charging the petitioner with risk of

injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (2) and sexual

assault in the fourth degree in violation of § 53a-73a. The

parties agreed that the petitioner would be sentenced to

ten years incarceration, execution suspended after six

months, ten years probation, no contact with the victim,

and sex offender registration and treatment.

The court then made the following statement to the

petitioner: ‘‘Mr. Misenti, you’ve entered a nolo plea.

That means you’re not agreeing to any of the facts stated

by the state’s attorney just now, all right? It also gives

you a certain amount of protection if there’s any civil

suits. But you know that, under those facts, I will be

making a finding of guilty under the charges as well the

facts, through you’re not admitting—or even denying, at

this time—to the point that you just don’t want to take

the chance of going to trial and taking the chance that

a jury might feel otherwise and the state might be able to

get a conviction; is that true?’’ The petitioner responded

that he was not guilty of these charges and that ‘‘[t]his

thing is taking a tremendous physical and emotional

toll on me, and I feel I cannot proceed with a trial.’’ He

further explained that he was not mentally or physically

capable of proceeding. The court then explained the

differences between a nolo contendere plea and a plea

made pursuant to the Alford doctrine.

The petitioner maintained that he did not believe that

he was guilty of the charges and that the only reason

that he could not proceed was the emotional and physical toll on him. The court replied that it would not

accept an Alford plea. Grabow indicated that the Alford

plea would be withdrawn. The court stated: ‘‘The nolo

does not require that requirement; so it’s a nolo plea,

forthe reasons stated by [the petitioner]. Allright. Okay.

So solely nolo. All right. Have you had enough time to

think aboutthis?’’ The petitionerresponded: ‘‘Notreally.

I would have liked more time, but my attorney told me

that I had to make a decision now.’’ The courtresponded

that it could not accept the nolo contendere plea if the

petitioner felt he did not have enough time to think

about it. The court agreed to Grabow’s suggestion of a

brief recess. During this second recess, the petitioner
went to his car and ingested Klonopin, his prescribed

antianxiety medicine. Grabow knew that the petitioner

was receiving treatment for mental health issues but

the petitioner did not inform him that he took Klonopin

during the recess.

After the proceeding resumed, Grabow indicated that

a written plea of nolo contendere had been filed. The

state then offered the following recitation of facts. The

victim and the petitioner had been in contact via an

online instant messaging system and then spoke on the

telephone. The petitioner arranged an in person meeting

at the victim’s home. ‘‘While in the house . . . [the

petitioner] and [victim] allegedly kissed, and the [petitioner] allegedly touched the [victim’s] buttocks; he

pulled away. He then was, allegedly, Your Honor,

according to the statement, allegedly put his mouth on

the [victim’s] penis. He then was told to leave, Your

Honor, by the [victim]. He did comply with that and

left . . . .’’

The petitioner informed the court that he did not

agree with the facts as stated by the prosecutor. The

court responded: ‘‘That’s the nolo plea. You’re not

admitting to those facts . . . .’’ The petitioner interrupted the court and stated that the charges were ‘‘absolutely false.’’ The court, after pointing out that a nolo

plea afforded certain protections in a possible civil

action, iterated that ‘‘[t]hat’s what the nolo plea is.

You’re not admitting anything . . . .’’ The court then

conducted a plea canvass where the petitioner acknowledged, inter alia, that he had enough time to consider

the plea, that he had spoken with his attorney, that

Grabow had explained the charges against him and the

potential penalties that he faced. The petitioner stated

that he understood everything that the court had said

and that no one had forced him to make the decision

to enter the nolo plea. The court accepted the plea as

made voluntarily, intelligently and with the effective

assistance of counsel.

In the following weeks, the petitioner changed his

mind and told Grabow that he wanted to withdraw

the plea. On October 13, 2004, Grabow wrote to the

petitioner to inform him that he would not file the

motion to withdraw until he spoke to the petitioner on

October 19, 2004. The petitioner ultimately decided that

he did not want the plea vacated, so Grabow did not

file the motion.

The sentencing hearing occurred on January 20, 2005.

At the outset, the prosecutor recommended a ten year

period of incarceration, execution fully suspended. The

prosecutor stated that on September 8, 2004, he had

recommended that the petitioner serve six months, but

as a result of further conversation with the victim, he

was now recommending a fully suspended sentence.

The court and the prosecutor also addressed the fact

that the victim had returned to the website and again
misrepresented his age and had made a reference that

he had ‘‘chickened out’’ in his meeting with the petitioner. The court agreed to impose the sentence as

recommended by the prosecutor.

In an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,

the petitioner alleged that Grabow has rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in a variety of ways,3 and

sought to have his conviction vacated and his plea withdrawn. On February 25, 2014, Attorney Rozwaski filed

a motion to withdraw his appearance as habeas counsel

pursuant to Practice Book § 3-10 (b).

The court held a trial on February 26, 2014, and, at

the outset, addressed Rozwaski’s motion. After hearing

from the petitioner and Rozwaski, the court denied

the motion to withdraw and declined to appoint new

counsel for the petitioner. After further discussion, the

petitioner elected to proceed withRozwaski as his attorney. During the habeas trial, Rozwaski called Grabow

and the petitioner as witnesses.

On July 2, 2014, the court issued a memorandum of

decision denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Relevant to this appeal, the court determined that

the claim that Grabow had failed to investigate and

discover that the victim was ‘‘still entering websites by

misrepresenting his age even after the petitioner was

arrested’’ was without merit. Specifically, the court

credited Grabow’s testimony that he knew on the morning of September 8, 2004, prior to the petitioner’s plea,

that the victim continued to engage in such conduct.

The court further observed that Grabow’s knowledge

of this conduct helped him to secure the plea offer that

the petitioner accepted. In regards to the claim that

Grabow had failed to explain the elements of the crimes

to which the petitioner pleaded guilty, or the factual

bases for those charges, the court credited Grabow’s

testimony to the contrary. The court also rejected the

claim that Grabow improperly had failed to file a motion

to withdraw the guilty plea, noting that although the

petitioner had asked Grabow to file such a motion,

there was evidence that the petitioner changed his mind

prior to sentencing and did not want such motion filed.

With respect to the petitioner’s claim that his plea had

been made while under the effects of Klonopin, the

court noted that there was no evidence that the petitioner had taken this medication, nor was there evidence regarding how quickly it took effect, and what

effect it had. ‘‘Given the short nature of the recess,

approximately twelve minutes, the court cannot just

assume that the petitioner was under its effects at the

time he entered his plea.’’ Finally, the court concluded

that the petitioner had failed to sustain his burden of

establishing that he would have insisted on going to

trial.

On July 10, 2014, the petitioner filed his petition for

certification to appeal the denial of his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. He set forth five specific grounds

as the bases for his appeal.4 The court denied the petition for certification on July 16, 2014. This appeal

followed.

I

The petitioner first claims that the habeas court

abused its discretion in denying certification to appeal

from the determination that Grabow had not rendered

ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the petitioner argues that Grabow was ineffective by failing to

(1) investigate the victim’s credibility and (2) move for

a continuance before the plea canvass and later to withdraw the petitioner’s plea because it was not made

knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. We conclude

that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying

certification to appeal the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

We begin by setting forth our standard of review

following the denial of certification to appeal from the

denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. ‘‘In

Simms v. Warden, 229 Conn. 178, 187, 640 A.2d 601

(1994), [our Supreme Court] concluded that . . . [General Statutes] § 52-470 (b) prevents a reviewing court

from hearing the merits of a habeas appeal following

the denial of certification to appeal unless the petitioner

establishes that the denial of certification constituted

an abuse of discretion by the habeas court. . . . This

standard requires the petitioner to demonstrate that the

issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a

court could resolve the issues [in a different manner];

orthatthe questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. . . . A petitioner who establishes an abuse of discretion through one of the factors

listed above must then demonstrate that the judgment

of the habeas court should be reversed on its merits.

. . . In determining whether the habeas court abused

its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request for

certification, we necessarily must considerthe merits of

the petitioner’s underlying claims to determine whether

the habeas court reasonably determined that the petitioner’s appeal was frivolous.’’ (Emphasis in original;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Turner v. Commissioner of Correction, 163 Conn. App. 556, 562–63,

A.3d (2016); see also Fine v. Commissioner of Correction, 163 Conn. App. 77, 80–81, A.3d , cert.

denied, 320 Conn. 925, A.3d (2016).

‘‘A criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to

adequate and effective assistance of counsel at all critical stages of criminal proceedings. . . . This right

arises under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to

the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of

the Connecticut constitution. . . . As enunciated in

Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct.

2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)], this court has stated: It

is axiomatic that the right to counsel is the right to the
effective assistance of counsel. . . . A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel consists of two components:

a performance prong and a prejudice prong. To satisfy

the performance prong . . . the petitioner must demonstrate that his attorney’s representation was not reasonably competent or within the range of competence

displayed by lawyers with ordinary training and skill

in the criminal law.’’(Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Ebron v. Commissioner of Correction, 307 Conn. 342,

351, 53 A.3d 983 (2012), cert. denied sub nom. Arnone

v. Ebron, U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 1726, 185 L. Ed. 2d

802 (2013); see also Thiersaint v. Commissioner of

Correction, 316 Conn. 89, 100–101, 111 A.3d 829 (2015).

‘‘Under . . . Hill [v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct.

366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985)] . . . which . . . modified

the prejudice prong of the Strickland test for claims

of ineffective assistance when the conviction resulted

from a guilty plea, the evidence must demonstrate that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

errors, [the petitioner] would not have pleaded guilty

and would have insisted on going to trial.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Patterson v. Commissioner

of Correction, 150 Conn. App. 30, 35, 89 A.3d 1018

(2014); see also Carraway v. Commissioner of Correction, 317 Conn. 594, 600 n.6, 119 A.3d 1153 (2015).

Finally, we note that ‘‘[t]he conclusions reached by

the trial court in its decision to dismiss [a] habeas petition are matters of law, subject to plenary review. . . .

[When] the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, [the reviewing court] must determine whether

they are legally and logically correct . . . and whether

they find support in the facts that appear in the record.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grant v. Commissioner of Correction, 121 Conn. App. 295, 298, 995 A.2d

641, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 920, 996 A.2d 1192 (2010).

We now address the specifics of the petitioner’s

appeal.5 First, the petitioner claims that Grabow was

ineffective by failing to investigate the victim’s credibility and his continued misrepresentation of his age in

order to access the website, especially given the comments of the prosecutor during the sentencing proceeding. Specifically, the petitioner contends that he was

not aware of this information regarding the victim and,

if he had been, he would have proceeded to trial. We

are not persuaded.

The habeas court made two credibility determinations relevant to this claim. First the court concluded

that Grabow ‘‘testified credibly that he knew on the

morning of September 8, 2004, before the petitioner

entered his plea, that the victim was still engaging in

such activity.’’ The court further concluded that the

petitioner’s contention that he was unaware of the victim’s ongoing activities until two years later was not

credible. ‘‘In fact, the transcript of the petitioner’s sentencing makes it clear that everyone present, including
the petitioner, knew that the victim was still visiting

such websites.’’

‘‘[T]his court does not retry the case or evaluate the

credibility of the witnesses. . . . Rather, we must defer

to the [trier of fact’s] assessment of the credibility of

the witnesses based on its firsthand observation of their

conduct, demeanor and attitude. . . . The habeas

judge, as the trier of facts, is the sole arbiter of the

credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to

their testimony.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Mincewicz v. Commissioner of Correction, 162 Conn.

App. 109, 112, 129 A.3d 791 (2015); see Brown v. Commissioner of Correction, 161 Conn. App. 770, 773, 129

A.3d 172 (2015), cert. denied, 320 Conn. 916, 131 A.3d

751 (2016); see also Couture v. Commissioner of Correction, 160 Conn. App. 757, 770, 126 A.3d 585 (axiomatic that appellate court cannot pass on credibility of

witnesses), cert. denied, 320 Conn. 911, 128 A.3d 954

(2015). We refrain from invading the province of the

habeas court to determine the credibility of Grabow

and the petitioner, and employ our customary deference

as a reviewing court. Accordingly, we conclude that the

petitioner’s claim ofineffective assistance forthe failure

to investigate the credibility of the victim fails and, thus,

that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying

certification to appeal this issue.

Second, the petitioner claims that Grabow was ineffective for failing to move for a continuance before the

plea canvass and subsequently for failing to move to

withdraw his plea. Specifically, the petitioner contends

that he did not understand the plea due to his ingestion

of Klonopin and Grabow’s failure to explain the charges

adequately. With respect to the latter, the court determined that Grabow testified credibly that he had fully

explained the elements of the crimes of which the petitioner pleaded, as well as the factual bases for the

charges. Later, the court noted that ‘‘[t]here is no question that [the petitioner] understood the proceedings

and what he was doing.’’ Deferring to the habeas court

on matters of credibility, we conclude that this argument must fail.

With respect to the petitioner’s claim that he did not

make a knowing, intelligent and voluntary plea as a

result of his ingestion of Klonopin during a recess in

the proceedings, the court rejected it for several reasons. First, there was no evidence that Grabow knew

that the petitioner had taken Klonopin during the

recess. Second, the petitionerfailed to present evidence

during the habeas trialregarding ‘‘how quickly Klonopin

becomes effective and what effects it has. Given the

short nature of the recess, approximately twelve

minutes, the court cannot just assume that the petitioner was under its effects at the time he entered his

plea.’’ Third, the court concluded that the record and

the evidence presented during the habeas trial estab-
lished that the petitioner was not impaired at the time

of the plea. Specifically, it found that the petitioner was

lucid and appeared to understand the court’s questions

during the canvass.

We agree with the habeas court that the petitioner’s

claim fails as a result of the absence of evidence regarding the time it takes for Klonopin to affect an individual.

It is not enough for the petitioner to allege that his plea

was not intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily made

due to his use of Klonopin. He was required to establish

that he actually was impaired by his use of that medication. See Hunnicutt v. Commissioner of Correction,

83 Conn. App. 199, 207, 848 A.2d 1229, cert. denied,

270 Conn. 914, 853 A.2d 527 (2004). As a result of this

evidentiary gap, we cannot conclude that Grabow was

ineffective for not requesting a continuance or moving

to withdraw the plea.

None of the claims regarding Grabow’s performance

is debatable among jurists of reason, could be resolved

in a different manner or deserve encouragement to proceed further. In other words, the habeas court did not

abuse its discretion in denying certification to appeal

from the denial of the petitioner’s claim that Grabow

provided ineffective assistance of counsel.

II

The petitioner also claims that the court improperly

denied Rozwaski’s motion to withdraw as habeas counsel. Specifically, he argues that the court abused its

discretion because there was a total lack of communication between himself and Rozwaski that prevented adequate representation. The respondent, the

Commissioner of Correction, counters that this claim

is not properly before this court because it was not

within the list of grounds for appeal attached to the

petition for certification to appeal. We agree with the

respondent.

As we noted previously, the petitioner set forth five

bases for grounds of his appeal from the decision of

the habeas court, all of which pertained to the conduct

of Grabow, not Rozwaski. See footnote 4 of this opinion.

Simply put, the claim regarding the denial of the motion

to withdraw filed by Rozwaski was not part of the

petition for certification to appeal. ‘‘We have stated that

when a petitioner does not raise a specific claim in the

petition for certification to appeal, we cannot conclude

that the court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification with respect to that claim.’’ Fine

v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 163 Conn. App.

82. Review of this claim would amount to an ambuscade

of the habeas judge. Tutson v. Commissioner of Correction, 144 Conn. App. 203, 216–17, 72 A.3d 1162, cert.

denied, 310 Conn. 928, 78 A.3d 145 (2013); Perry v.

Commissioner of Correction, 131 Conn. App. 792, 796,

28 A.3d 1015, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 913, 32 A.3d 966
(2011). Accordingly, we decline to consider it. Fine

v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 82; Tutson v.

Commissioner of Correction, supra, 216–17; Perry v.

Commissioner of Correction, supra, 797.

The appeal is dismissed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of

the date of oral argument.

1 Grabow did opine that the victim’s misrepresentation of his age could

help the petitioner’s case with respect to the charge of sexual assault in

the second degree.

2

‘‘Under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed.

2d 162 (1970), a criminal defendant is not required to admit his guilt . . .

but consents to being punished as if he were guilty to avoid the risk of

proceeding to trial. . . . A guilty plea under the Alford doctrine is a judicial

oxymoron in that the defendant does not admit guilt but acknowledges that

the state’s evidence against him is so strong that he is prepared to accept

the entry of a guilty plea nevertheless.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Celaj, 163 Conn. App. 716, 718–19 n.3, A.3d (2016).

3 Specifically, the petition alleged that Grabow was ineffective as follows:

‘‘[Grabow] . . . did not investigate the alleged victim’s statements as to

whether or not false information had been provided regarding the victim’s

activities . . . [Grabow] did not seek to suppress the petitioner’s statements

to the police when the petitioner maintained that he had been questioned

without being advised of his rights . . . [t]hat at the time of the petitioner’s

plea, the petitioner informed the court that he was not willing to proceed

and that due to mental health problems, emotional, physical and otherissues,

he did not want to go forward with the scheduled trial that day nor with

the proposed plea agreement, and that [Grabow] did not seek a continuance

for the petitioner . . . [Grabow] did not properly explain the factual basis

and the nature of and legal elements of the charges to the petitioner . . .

[Grabow] did not seek to withdraw the petitioner’s guilty pleas when the

petitioner stated to the court that he was insisting upon his innocence and

the court had improperly canvassed and accepted the petitioner’s pleas,

despite the petitioner’s insistence upon his innocence . . . [Grabow] did

not seek to determine if the medication that the petitioner was [taking] on

the date of his pleas impacted the petitioner’s ability to knowingly, voluntarily and with understanding enter into his guilty pleas and . . . [t]hat the

petitioner did not want to plead guilty and wanted to proceed to trial with

his case, but that [Grabow] did not seek to withdraw the petitioner’s guilty

pleas, nor to vacate the court’s findings after the pleas were improperly

accepted by the court.’’

4 Specifically, the petitioner’s grounds for certification to appeal stated:

‘‘Counsel for the petitioner . . . hereby submits the following grounds upon

which he proposes to seek certification to appeal.

‘‘1. Whether or not the habeas court erred in finding that trial counsel

was not deficient in his failure to conduct a sufficient investigation regarding

the victim’s statements to the police regarding his activities;

‘‘2. Whether or not the habeas court erred in finding that trial counsel

failed to seek a continuance when the petitioner informed him that he was

not prepared to go forward with either a plea nor the trial;

‘‘3. Whether or not the habeas court erred in finding that trial counsel

was not ineffective in explaining the factual and legal basis of the charges to

the petitioner so thatthe petitioner could make a knowing and voluntary plea;

‘‘4. Whether or not the habeas court erred in finding that trial counsel

had failed to move to withdraw the petitioner’s guilty pleas;

‘‘5. Whether or not the habeas court erred in finding that trial counsel’s

deficient performance was not prejudicial to the petitioner—particularly

when the petitioner insisted that he wanted to have a trial;

‘‘6. Whether or not the habeas court erred in denying the certification to

appeal; and

‘‘7. Such other errors as may become evident after a review of the transcripts and the trial record.’’

5 With respect to the petitioner’s claim regarding Grabow, the habeas

court concluded that the petitioner had failed to establish both the deficient

performance and the prejudice prongs of the Strickland/Hill test.