2020 IL App (1st) 171449-U

No. 1-17-1449 

Order filed January 14, 2020 

Second Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as 

precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

JEROME FLETCHER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Cook County. 

No. 16 CR 1982 

Honorable 

Vincent M. Gaughan, 

Judge, presiding. 

PRESIDING JUSTICE SMITH delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Pucinski and Coghlan concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The summary dismissal of defendant’s pro se postconviction petition is affirmed

where defendant failed to state an arguable claim of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel. 

¶ 2 Defendant Jerome Fletcher appeals the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for relief 

under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)). On 

appeal, defendant contends that his petition stated an arguable claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel in that his trial counsel failed to advise him that, if convicted of attempt first degree 
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murder with the personal discharge of a firearm that caused great bodily harm, he faced a 

minimum 31-year prison sentence due to a mandatory 25-year firearm enhancement, and this 

misapprehension of the law caused defendant to reject the State’s 15-year plea offer. For the 

following reasons, we affirm. 

¶ 3 Defendant was charged by indictment with five counts of attempt first degree murder 

(720 ILCS 5/8-4(a) (West 2014); 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West Supp. 2015)), one count of 

aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(e)(1) (West Supp. 2015)), and one count of aggravated 

discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 2014)), arising from the shooting of John 

Knuth on November 26, 2015. 

¶ 4 Prior to trial, defendant requested a pretrial conference pursuant to Illinois Supreme 

Court Rule 402 (eff. July 1, 2012). The record does not contain a transcript of the conference. At 

a subsequent pretrial hearing, the following colloquy occurred: 

“THE COURT: *** Mr. Fletcher, it is my understanding that you do not want to 

accept the negotiated settlement. 

THE DEFENDANT: No.” 

No details regarding the settlement offer were discussed, including the offense to which 

defendant would plead guilty and the length of the sentence. The court stated that it revoked the 

offer, and the cause proceeded to trial. 

¶ 5 The evidence at trial established that on November 26, 2015, Knuth went to defendant’s 

apartment, where they consumed alcohol. At some point, defendant and Knuth argued and Knuth 

observed defendant had a firearm. Knuth left the apartment and defendant followed him down 

the street. While walking behind Knuth, defendant stated, “[n]obody’s gonna beat my ass at my 
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house, I’m going to kill you, mother f***.” Knuth started to jog away and heard two gunshots. 

He felt that he was shot in his left upper thigh and fell to the ground. 

¶ 6 Following trial, the jury found defendant guilty of attempt first degree murder and 

aggravated battery, and that he personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great 

bodily harm to Knuth. 

¶ 7 Trial counsel filed an amended motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or 

alternatively, a new trial. In support of the motion, counsel argued, in relevant part, that the State 

failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant used a firearm, and therefore, the 

firearm enhancement should not apply. The trial court denied defendant’s motion. 

¶ 8 At sentencing, the State argued that “[t]he jury returned the verdicts with the firearm 

enhancement,” so the minimum sentence for attempt first degree murder with the personal 

discharge of a firearm that caused great bodily harm, a Class X offense, would be six years plus 

the 25-year mandatory enhancement, for a total of 31 years. In response, defense counsel 

maintained the range was 6 to 30 years because the State did not prove the firearm enhancement 

applied. In allocution, defendant said, “Your Honor, I’m sitting here, being judged for a crime I 

didn’t commit.” 

¶ 9 The trial court merged the verdicts into one count of attempt first degree murder with the 

personal discharge of a firearm that caused great bodily harm, and sentenced defendant to 61⁄2 

years on the merged count. It then imposed the mandatory 25-year sentencing enhancement for 

defendant’s personal discharge of a firearm, noting that “[t]here is no discretion on the 

enhancement.” Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the trial court denied. 
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¶ 10 On direct appeal, defendant claimed that (1) the trial court did not question the potential 

jurors as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012), (2) the evidence was 

insufficient to prove intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt, and (3) the evidence was 

insufficient to prove that he caused great bodily harm. We affirmed. People v. Fletcher, 2019 IL 

App (1st) 163041-U. 

¶ 11 While his direct appeal was pending, defendant filed a pro se petition for postconviction 

relief alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to improper advice during plea 

negotiations. Defendant claimed that trial counsel failed to accurately inform him of the possible 

penalties, or that his sentence would include a mandatory 25-year firearm enhancement.

Defendant asserted that trial counsel’s failings prejudiced him because he rejected the State’s 15-

year plea offer. Defendant attached his own affidavit to the petition in which he stated that had 

he known about the enhancement, he “likely would have accepted the State’s offer.” 

¶ 12 On February 3, 2017, the circuit court entered a written order that summarily dismissed 

defendant’s postconviction petition as “frivolous and patently without merit.” The judge who 

presided at defendant’s trial also presided during postconviction proceedings, and in his written 

order, did not question defendant’s assertion that the State had offered a 15-year sentence as part 

of its plea offer. However, the court stated that in claiming that counsel provided incomplete 

information about the maximum possible sentence, defendant failed to allege that he was given 

any erroneous information. Instead, the court followed People v. Miller, 393 Ill. App. 3d 629 

(2009), where the appellate court rejected the defendant’s argument that trial counsel was 

deficient for not informing him that he faced a mandatory firearm enhancement. The court 

further stated that defendant cannot show that he suffered prejudice because he could not have 
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avoided the 25-year firearm enhancement by pleading guilty and did not present “any evidence 

[of prejudice] beyond his own self-serving, conclusory arguments.” 

¶ 13 Defendant filed a combined motion for leave to amend his postconviction petition, or 

alternatively, for the circuit court to reconsider its summary dismissal. In the motion, defendant 

contended that his counsel provided “erroneous, misleading information” regarding the 

sentencing range, which caused him to reject an offer to plead guilty to a “reduced charge of 

aggravated battery” in exchange for a 15-year sentence. Defendant acknowledged he failed to 

include any supporting affidavits, records, or other evidence beyond his own affidavit, but asked 

the court to excuse his failure due to “the difficulty or impossibility” of obtaining an affidavit 

from his trial counsel. 

¶ 14 The circuit court denied defendant’s combined motion, ruling that the motion to amend 

was untimely and the motion to reconsider did not identify new evidence or substantive changes 

in the law that merited relief. 

¶ 15 Defendant appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief, 

arguing that his petition outlined a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in that his trial 

counsel failed to advise him that, if convicted of attempt murder with the personal discharge of a 

firearm that caused great bodily harm, he faced a minimum 31-year prison sentence due to a 

mandatory 25-year firearm enhancement, and this misapprehension of the law caused defendant 

to reject the State’s 15-year plea offer. 

¶ 16 The Act provides a three-stage mechanism for a defendant who alleges he suffered a 

substantial deprivation of his constitutional rights. People v. Johnson, 2018 IL 122227, ¶ 14. At 

the first stage, a defendant must meet the low threshold of pleading sufficient facts to state the 
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“gist” of a constitutional claim. People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2009). A circuit court may 

only dismiss a petition through a written order if it determines that the petition is “frivolous or 

patently without merit.” Id. at 10. A petition is frivolous or patently without merit when it “is 

based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or a fanciful factual allegation.” Id. at 16. “[A]n 

indisputably meritless legal theory is one that is completely contradicted by the record,” and 

“[f]anciful factual allegations include those that are fantastic or delusional.” People v. Thomas, 

2014 IL App (2d) 121001, ¶ 47. This court reviews a first-stage dismissal of a postconviction 

petition de novo. People v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348, 360 (2000). 

¶ 17 Both the United States and Illinois constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right 

to the effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8; 

see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984). This includes the “right to be 

reasonably informed with respect to the direct consequences of accepting or rejecting a plea 

offer.” (Emphasis in original and internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Hale, 2013 IL 

113140, ¶ 16. A defendant claiming ineffective assistance must show that (1) counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) but for counsel’s 

errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been 

different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. At the first stage of postconviction proceedings, a court 

may not summarily dismiss a petition alleging ineffective assistance that arguably satisfies these 

prongs. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 17. 

¶ 18 To establish prejudice in the plea bargain context, a defendant must show: 

“(1) [T]hat, but for his counsel’s deficient advice, he would have accepted the plea offer, 

(2) that the plea would have been entered without the prosecution cancelling it, (3) that 
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the trial court would have accepted the bargain, assuming that it had discretion under 

state law to accept or reject it, and (4) that the end result of the criminal process would 

have been more favorable by reason of a plea.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 

People v. Walker, 2018 IL App (1st) 160509, 31 (citing Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 

147 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 163-64 (2012); Hale, 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 19). 

“This showing of prejudice must encompass more than a defendant’s own subjective, selfserving testimony. [Citations.] Rather, there must be independent, objective confirmation that 

defendant’s rejection of the proffered plea was based upon counsel’s erroneous advice, and not 

on other considerations.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hale, 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 18. If an 

ineffective assistance claim can be disposed because a defendant suffered no prejudice, this court 

is not required to address whether counsel’s performance was deficient. People v. Salas, 2011 IL 

App (1st) 091880, ¶ 91. 

¶ 19 In Miller, the defendant filed a postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of 

counsel in that he would have accepted the State’s plea offer had he known about an applicable 

mandatory firearm enhancement. Miller, 393 Ill. App. 3d at 631. In support, the defendant 

attached two of his own affidavits, in which he stated counsel agreed to sign an affidavit but 

subsequently refused to do so, and one from his mother stating that she would have advised him 

to accept the plea offer had she known of the enhancement. Id. The circuit court summarily 

dismissed the petition. Id. On appeal, this court considered the defendant’s claims to be “broad” 

and “conclusory” (id. at 640), and found the “only reasonable inference to be drawn from his 

rejection” of the plea offer was that he “desired to pursue his constitutional right to trial” (id. at 
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637). Thus, the defendant failed to demonstrate that he would have acted differently but for his 

counsel’s advice. Id. at 640. 

¶ 20 In this case, as in Miller, defendant has not established prejudice from counsel’s allegedly 

deficient performance. Here, defendant was convicted of attempt first degree murder with the 

personal discharge of a firearm that caused great bodily harm. 720 ILCS 5/8-4(a) (West 2014); 

720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West Supp. 2015). Section 8-4(c)(1)(D) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 

ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1)(D) (West 2014)) provides that “an attempt to commit first degree murder 

during which the person personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily 

harm *** to another person is a Class X felony for which 25 years or up to a term of natural life 

shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court.” 

¶ 21 The record does not contain a transcript of the Rule 402 conference or any other 

discussion between the parties and the court regarding the proposed guilty plea and sentence. 

Notwithstanding, defendant attached only his own affidavit to his postconviction petition, which 

alleged that he would “likely” have accepted the State’s plea offer of 15 years had he been made 

aware of the mandatory firearm enhancement. However, at sentencing, defendant stated that he 

was tried for a crime he did not commit. 

¶ 22 This record conveys that rather than plead guilty in exchange for a 15-year sentence, 

defendant chose to maintain his innocence and proceed to trial. Because defendant’s conduct 

indicates he likely would not have accepted the plea offer, he suffered no arguable prejudice 

from counsel’s alleged failure to inform him of the mandatory enhancement. See Hale, 2013 IL 

113140, ¶ 28 (finding no prejudice where the defendant rejected the plea offer based not on 
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counsel’s alleged erroneous advice, but other considerations). Therefore, defendant’s ineffective 

assistance claim fails for lack of prejudice. See Salas, 2011 IL App (1st) 091880, ¶ 91. 

¶ 23 Nevertheless, defendant cites People v. Hall, 217 Ill. 2d 324 (2005), for his contention 

that “a pro se defendant is not expected to obtain an affidavit from counsel whose ineffectiveness 

he is alleging.” In that case, the defendant’s petition and his own affidavit specified that only he 

and his counsel were present during consultations where they discussed his guilty plea. Hall, 217 

Ill. 2d at 333. Based on the detail provided by the defendant regarding the consultations, the 

supreme court concluded that it could reasonably infer that the defendant could only have 

provided an affidavit from himself or from his attorney. Id. at 333-34. Accordingly, the court 

found that under these circumstances, the defendant’s own affidavit was sufficient

documentation to support his claim that his guilty plea was involuntary, even without an affidavit 

from counsel. Id. at 334. 

¶ 24 In contrast to Hall, here defendant’s petition does not provide sufficient factual detail to 

allow the reasonable inference that an affidavit from counsel was the only documentation he 

could have provided. Defendant’s petition asserts only that counsel never informed him of the 

mandatory firearm enhancement. His allegation does not explain when he met with counsel, who 

was present at said meetings, or what the discussions covered. Without this information, 

defendant’s petition amounts to a broad, conclusory claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Therefore, unlike in Hall, defendant’s failure to attach the necessary supporting documentation 

to his petition will not be excused. See id. at 333-34. 

¶ 25 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 26 Affirmed.