Filed 9/16/22 Marriage of Regalbuto CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re Marriage of SUSAN KAY 

REGALBUTO and MICHAEL 

REGALBUTO.

SUSAN KAY REGALBUTO,

Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL REGALBUTO,

Appellant.

 B310897

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 

 19STFL14890)

In re Marriage of LOTTE VAN 

DER VEER and MICHAEL 

REGALBUTO.

LOTTE VAN DER VEER,

Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL REGALBUTO,

Appellant.

 B310917

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. SD031662)
2

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles

County, Mark A. Juhas, Judge. Affirmed.

DLA Piper, Justin R. Sarno for Respondent Susan Kay 

Regalbuto.

Law Office of Herb Fox, Herb Fox and Law Office of Katy 

Graham, Katy Graham for Respondent Lotte Van Der Veer.

Linda T. Barney and The Law Office of Aaron Leetch, 

Aaron Leetch for Appellant.

——————————

Appellant Michael Regalbuto challenges orders requiring 

him to pay the attorney fees of respondent Lotte Van Der Veer

under Family Code sections 271 and 6344,

1 and the attorney fees 

of respondent Susan Kay Regalbuto under sections 2030 and 

6344. Lotte and Susan are Michael’s former spouses. They 

separately filed requests for attorney fees following a 

consolidated trial of their domestic violence restraining orders 

against Michael, both of which were granted.

2 Michael contends

the trial court abused its discretion in finding he had the ability 

to pay the $400,000 award to Lotte, due in annual installments of 

$80,000, and the $60,000 award to Susan, due in installments of 

$5,000 per quarter and a total of $20,000 per year. In particular, 

Michael claims it was improper for the trial court to consider 

financial contributions from Michael’s parents in determining his 

ability to pay. Michael also asserts that the fee award to Lotte 

1

All further undesignated section references are to the 

Family Code.

2

Although Lotte and Michael do not share a last name, 

Susan and Michael do. We refer to all parties by their first 

names in the interest of clarity and intend no disrespect. 
3

eliminates his ability to pay the fee award to Susan. We conclude 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the 

sums Michael received from his parents or in finding that 

Michael has the ability to pay both fee awards. We therefore 

affirm the trial court’s orders.

BACKGROUND

A. Parties

Lotte and Michael married in 2011 and divorced in 2013. 

They have one daughter, J., who was born in 2012. Michael and

Susan married in 2016 and they have one son, M., born in 2017. 

Michael and Susan separated in 2019 and Susan filed for divorce 

in December of that year.

B. Domestic violence restraining order trial

In November 2019, Lotte and Susan filed separate requests 

for domestic violence restraining orders (DVRO’s) against 

Michael. Lotte sought protection for herself as well as J., her 

current husband, and their daughter. Susan sought protection 

for herself and M. Michael subsequently filed a request for a 

DVRO against Susan, seeking protection for himself, M., and J. 

The trial court ordered Lotte’s DVRO petition consolidated 

with her divorce case and ordered the DVRO petition related to 

petitions filed by Susan and Michael. The court tried the three

DVRO petitions together. Following an 11-day trial, the trial 

court denied Michael’s request for a DVRO against Susan, noting 

that “there’s no question in my mind that [Michael] would be the 

primary aggressor,” and granted the restraining orders requested 

by Lotte and Susan. The court remarked that “the way a case is 

tried can be domestic violence,” and indicated Michael’s theory 

that the mothers were “conspiring together” against him rose to 

the level of abuse. The court further characterized the way the 
4

case was tried as “a control mechanism from dad’s side to try to 

control these two moms . . . because he desperately wants to run 

the show.”

C. Lotte’s request for attorney fees

In August 2020, Lotte filed a request for attorney fees and 

costs pursuant to sections 271 and 6344. She asked the court to 

award all of her fees and costs, totaling $462,520.35, citing

Michael’s “manifest wrongdoing.” 

Lotte argued Michael had the ability to pay these fees 

based on Susan’s testimony at the DVRO trial that Michael 

withdraws approximately $8,000 per month from the trust 

account of his father, Joseph Regalbuto, as well as Joseph’s trial 

testimony that he paid Michael’s attorney fees.3 Joseph had 

testified that he did not recall how much he had paid towards 

Michael’s fees in the matter, but it had been “a lot.” The trial 

court later observed it was “really quite apparent” that Joseph 

was paying his son’s attorney fees and that it was surprising that 

Joseph referred to Michael’s attorney as “our attorney.”

Michael asserted in response that Joseph had lent him a 

total of $138,141 over the past eight years (an average of 

$17,267.63 per year) but had since denied Michael further

informal loans. However, Joseph continued to pay an average of 

$2,000 a month towards Michael’s living expenses. Additionally, 

Michael’s mother, Rosemary Regalbuto, had provided Michael

with $98,752 in “formal loans” backed by promissory notes

between August and October of 2020. Michael’s other forms of 

3

Susan testified at trial that Michael had access to his 

parents’ trust account in the form of a credit card and checkbook. 

Further, they had used that account to pay for “everything,” 

including “gym memberships, travel, food, eating out.”
5

income up to that point in the year included $12,500 earned 

through his production company prior to the pandemic, $450 in 

weekly unemployment compensation, and a one-time stimulus 

payment of $2,900.

Michael declared that his personal expenses were $2,900 

per month, his cash flow was $3,950, and that, beginning in 

November 2020, he would owe his mother $1,957.11 per month

on the promissory notes. His cash flow would therefore be 

$907.11 short of covering his expenses and loan obligations.4 He 

also disclosed that he has child and spousal support obligations 

totaling $4,280 to Susan.

In her reply, Lotte contended that Michael was not

straightforward with the trial court regarding his income and 

assets. During his divorce proceedings with Lotte in 2013, 

Michael had claimed he had no interest in any real property. 

However, Lotte filed grant and quitclaim deeds with the court 

indicating Michael in fact held a 50 percent interest in the Santa 

Monica condominium where he was residing at the time. In 

2014, he transferred the 50 percent interest to his parents for no 

consideration.5

In the reply and at the hearing on November 2, 2020, 

Lotte’s counsel also asserted that Michael’s girlfriend had posted 

4 Michael’s declaration erroneously states that his cash flow 

is “$907.11 in excess of my $1,957.11 in debt obligations.” (Italics 

added.)

5

The interest in the condominium was originally

transferred to Michael in 2007 from the Regalbuto Living Trust, 

for which Joseph and Rosemary were identified as trustees. The 

2014 quitclaim deed indicated the transfer was a “bonafide gift” 

and the “grantor received nothing in return.”
6

on her blog about trips that she and Michael had taken together. 

Michael testified that he and his girlfriend had gone on vacation 

together and that he had paid $1,000 towards the trip.

6

The trial court issued its order on November 9, 2020. It

found that Michael has substantial loans from his mother that 

are documented by promissory notes, but observed that the notes 

all bear zero or 2 percent interest and Michael had not provided

“a declaration from either his father or his mother concerning 

these ‘loans.’ ” The court also found that Michael was able to 

“fully fund his litigation through his parents” and that Susan 

“testified that during their marriage the respondent had access to 

a trust from his father and he was able to remove approximately 

$8,000 per month,” though it acknowledged that Joseph denied 

this. The court further emphasized that Michael had, until 

recently, been living rent-free in his parents’ Santa Monica 

condominium.7 At trial, the court had found the fair market 

rental value of the condominium to be $5,000 per month. 

The court noted “the respondent’s financial picture is 

somewhat muddied,” referring to Susan’s testimony that in 2019, 

Pesto Productions, a company owned by Joseph, paid her 

$32,000, even though she had possibly done only one makeup job

6

The trial court sustained the objections of Michael’s 

counsel to the admission of the blog entries and considered only 

“those things that [Michael] agreed occurred.” The blog posts are 

not in the record on appeal, but we likewise disregard any 

representations made concerning their contents and consider only 

Michael’s testimony.

7

At the time of the hearing, Michael had obtained 

employment working on a film being produced out of state. He 

was “staying [in Philadelphia] through the production.”
7

for the company. Susan testified the payment “was a way to pay 

Michael and avoid being in a higher tax bracket” and “so that 

Lotte would never know how much money that he was really 

making to adjust support.” The trial court also cited evidence 

that Michael had transferred his ownership interest in the 

condominium to his parents during his divorce with Lotte, which 

was “not explained.”

The trial court stated that “[n]either party in this case can 

afford the fees that have been generated,” and the “fee award will 

no doubt work a financial hardship on the respondent,” but found 

the award would “not impose an unreasonable financial burden 

on the respondent and it financially impacts the appropriate 

party.” The court concluded, however, that Lotte “brought the 

DVRO request and as a result would have had some amount of 

fees in prosecuting the case” and therefore “does bear some 

responsibility for her fees.”

The trial court ordered Michael to pay Lotte $400,000 for 

her attorney fees, payable in annual installments of $80,000 per 

year, beginning December 31, 2020. If Michael missed a 

payment, the remaining balance “shall come due and payable 

forthwith.”

Michael did not make the $80,000 payment due on 

December 31, 2020. Lotte brought a contempt proceeding against 

Michael in connection with his failure to pay. The court 

dismissed the charge on the grounds that Lotte failed to prove 

Michael’s knowledge of the due date for the payment beyond a 

reasonable doubt since the clerk sent the order to the incorrect 

email address for Michael’s counsel. Michael also did not make 

the $80,000 payment due on December 31, 2021, though he and 
8

his counsel acknowledged the trial court’s fee order was a valid 

order.

8

8 We grant Lotte’s Request for Judicial Notice No. 1 with 

respect to exhibits E, F, and G, which reflect court records 

relating to her contempt proceeding against Michael in the trial 

court for failure to make the December 31, 2020 payment. (Evid. 

Code, § 452, subd. (d).) We deny her request with respect to 

exhibits A–D of her Request for Judicial Notice No. 1, which 

reflect emails from her bank reflecting deposits made by Michael. 

Even assuming that these records “are not reasonably subject to 

dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination 

by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy” (Evid. 

Code, § 452, subd. (h)), we can take judicial notice only of their 

existence and content, not the truth of any matters stated 

therein. Because these emails are relevant only for the truth of 

Lotte’s assertion that Michael failed to make the court-ordered 

fee payment, judicial notice is inappropriate. (See Lockley v. Law 

Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 

Cal.App.4th 875, 882.) We also deny Lotte’s Request for Judicial 

Notice No. 2, which requests that the court take judicial notice of 

the dockets in two criminal cases in which Michael was convicted 

of acts of violence. “[T]he appropriateness of a judicial notice 

request depends on a showing of substantive relevance, as well as 

procedural admissibility.” (Aquila, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 

148 Cal.App.4th 556, 575.) The only issues before us on appeal 

are (1) whether the appeal should be stayed or dismissed under 

the disentitlement doctrine because Michael failed to make 

payments ordered by the trial court and (2) whether there is 

substantial evidence to support the trial court finding that 

Michael is able to pay the fees awarded to Lotte and Susan. 

Michael’s prior convictions are not relevant to these questions. 

We grant Michael’s request for judicial notice of court records 

from the Regalbuto matter. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) 
9

D. Susan’s request for attorney fees

In October 2020, Susan filed a request for attorney fees and 

costs in the amount of $130,000. Susan asserted that fees were 

appropriate under section 6344 and sections 2030 and 2032. In 

accompanying declarations, Susan asserted that Michael has 

access to his parents’ “$3,300,000+ trust account,” from which he 

withdrew an average of $8,000 per month, whereas she had 

received her last unemployment check several months prior and 

intended to file for food stamps and welfare. Susan also stated

that Michael had failed to make child support and spousal 

support payments. Additionally, Susan attached an income and 

expense declaration from Michael that reported an average 

monthly income of $2,052 from his production company, whereas 

her income declaration reported an average monthly income of 

$416.66 as a freelance makeup artist, though she was 

unemployed as a result of the pandemic. Susan represented that 

she intended to begin a job as a homecare worker once she 

relocated to Oklahoma but did not disclose her anticipated 

income. 

In response, Michael argued Susan had failed to meet her 

affirmative burden of demonstrating that she cannot afford her 

own fees, citing the approximately $30,000 in loans she had 

obtained from her mother, Michael’s monthly child and spousal 

support payments to her totaling $4,280, and her claim that she 

would soon be employed as a homecare worker. Alternatively, 

Michael argued that, even if Susan could not afford her fees, he

also lacked the ability to pay. Michael challenged Susan’s 

testimony that he withdrew $8,000 a month from the family 

trust, but conceded that his father pays $2,000 towards his 

expenses each month. Michael further argued that the $400,000 
10

fee award in Lotte’s case eliminated his ability to make any 

contribution to Susan’s fees. 

Michael stated in a declaration that his sole sources of 

income that year were $12,500 earned through his production 

company prior to the pandemic, $450 in weekly unemployment 

compensation, and a one-time stimulus payment of $2,900. He 

represented that Joseph had refused to provide any more loans, 

but Rosemary had extended a total of $120,397 in loans backed 

by promissory notes. Michael stated his monthly expenses were 

now $2,385 per month, and that with a cash flow of $3,950, he 

was $392.11 short of meeting the $1,957.11 per month loan 

payment he owed to Rosemary, which would increase to 

$2,524.85 per month beginning in January 2021. Michael also 

submitted an updated income and expense declaration in which 

he stated that he made only an average of $1,130 per month 

through his production company. He also disclosed that he 

makes $500 child support payments to Lotte monthly.

Joseph and Rosemary also submitted declarations 

concerning the money they had provided to Michael. Joseph 

declared that, of the $138,141 he had loaned to Michael over 

roughly the past eight years, $50,000 was for the payment of

attorney fees ($14,500 in 2019 and $35,500 in 2020). He also 

stated he had informed Michael in July 2020 that, “despite what 

[Michael] claimed his needs were, [Joseph] would not be willing 

or able to loan him any further sums of money,” and he had not 

loaned Michael any money since that time. However, he was 

continuing to pay “an average of about $2,000” each month 

towards Michael’s expenses and he did not expect to be repaid for 

these contributions. Although Joseph represented that he 

expected to be paid back for the loans totaling $138,141 “at some 
11

point in the future,” he acknowledged that Michael had yet to 

repay any part of the loans and Joseph had “created no formal 

terms for him to do so as of this point.” 

Rosemary stated in her declaration that, “[s]ince July 1, 

2020, [she had] provided formal loans, evidenced by written 

promissory notes,” and identified the purpose for which each of 

the nine loans was made and the history of payments made on 

each note. Five of the notes, totaling approximately $82,000, 

were for the purpose of paying attorney fees, while the remaining 

loans were made for the purposes of covering Michael’s support 

payments and back-owed rent. Rosemary claimed she would 

allow Michael to be 30 days late on a payment before taking 

adverse action, but “[o]ther than this exception,” she would 

require Michael to make the monthly payments stated in the 

notes until they were repaid in full.

In reply, Susan argued that Michael had failed “to disclose

an honest accounting of his income and assets,” citing his 

transfer of his 50 percent interest in the Santa Monica 

condominium to his parents for no consideration, as well as the

payment of money from Joseph’s production company to Susan.9 

Susan also noted that Michael, while claiming an inability to pay, 

had taken a vacation with his new girlfriend.10

9

Susan attached the deed to the Santa Monica apartment 

to her declaration, but the court sustained Michael’s objections 

based on lack of foundation and hearsay. 

10 As in Lotte’s case, the trial court refused to admit 

Michael’s girlfriend’s blog entries in support of these assertions, 

sustaining Michael’s objection on hearsay grounds.
12

On December 14, 2020, the trial court issued its tentative 

ruling, in which it noted that “[m]any of the issues in the 

Regalbuto matter are identical to the issues in the Van der Veer 

matter.” The court explained that Susan sought fees under 

sections 6344 and 2030, both of which “rely at least in part, on 

the ability of [Michael] to pay and on [Susan’s] need for fees.” 

The court found that Susan’s counsel had failed to put forward 

the qualifications of each individual that billed in the case and 

therefore it could award a maximum of approximately $77,000 in 

fees and costs.

The court rejected Michael’s contentions that he “cannot 

pay any more fees, especially in light of the fact that he owes a 

significant sum to [Lotte]” and that a fee award in this matter 

would be “punitive.” Rather, the court found that Michael was 

able to fully fund the litigation through his parents while Susan 

was unable to do the same. The court cited Susan’s testimony 

that Michael was able to withdraw $8,000 from his father’s trust 

(though it once again recognized that Joseph had denied it), and

observed that Michael “was, until very recently (and may still 

be), living rent free in his parent[s’] Santa Monica condo.” The 

trial court found that Michael’s “financial picture remains 

somewhat muddied,” citing Susan’s testimony that she was paid 

a salary during her marriage to Michael “to avoid tax 

consequences and to hide income from [Lotte].” It also found 

that, “[w]hile it is a relatively minor sum, [Michael] apparently 

recently went to Mexico with his current girlfriend . . . while he 

has not paid his child support to [Susan],” and that Michael 

therefore “appears to have managed to maintain a lifestyle, while 

[Susan’s] life has been upended.” 
13

The trial court observed that Michael had sought a DVRO 

despite there being “absolutely no evidence that would have 

supported [his] filing,” and concluded that Michael “simply 

cannot drive [Susan] to financial ruin through his actions and 

trial strategy and then not pay for some or all of the fees.” The 

court found that, “[a]s was true in Van der Veer, neither party 

can afford the fees that have been generated,” and that the “fee 

award will no doubt work a financial hardship on [Michael],” but 

the “award will not impose an unreasonable financial burden on 

[Michael] and it financially impacts the appropriate party,” 

particularly as Susan “is virtually the sole financial and physical 

support for [M].” However, the court recognized that Susan 

brought the DVRO request and thus “does bear some 

responsibility for her fees,” though she was “entitled to fees for 

defending against [Michael’s] failed DVRO.” It ordered that 

Michael pay Susan $60,000 in fees and costs at the rate of 

$20,000 per year, beginning with $5,000 on March 31, 2021, and

with $5,000 due quarterly thereafter. If Michael failed to make a 

payment, the remaining balance would “come due and payable 

forthwith.”

At the hearing on Susan’s fee request, Michael requested a 

statement of decision. On December 28, 2020, Michael filed his 

“Objections to the Court[’]s Ruling of December 14, 2020 

(Believed to Be Intended To Be the Court’s Tentative Statement 

of Decision” and “Requests as to the Principal Controverted

Issues to Be Addressed by the Final Statement of Decision” under 

Code of Civil Procedure sections 632 and 634. Michael objected to 

the ruling on the grounds of omitted findings, including: 

(1) “specific income, assets, and other financial resources” the 

court found available to pay Susan’s fees as well as those 
14

awarded to Lotte; (2) the financial terms on which Michael “can 

borrow further sums from his parents in order to pay the courtordered attorney’s fees”; (3) whether the court found that “either 

of [Michael’s] parents have an obligation to provide [Michael] 

money to pay the Court-ordered fees to [Susan] when [Michael’s] 

own income, assets, and other financial resources at his disposal 

are insufficient to satisfy the Court-ordered payments”; and (4) 

“the evidentiary basis for the Court’s finding that [Susan] does 

not have the same ability to borrow from her mother that 

[Michael] has to borrow from his parents.” Michael’s “Requests 

as to the Principal Controverted Issues” likewise identified these 

as the “four principal issues that are material to the Court’s 

decision in its Ruling” and requested that it make findings with 

respect to these issues. Michael also challenged the court’s 

finding that Susan’s mother “does not have the same financial 

ability as [Michael’s] parents” as unsupported. He requested 

clarification of the “inherent conflict” between the court’s findings 

that neither party could afford the fees that had been generated 

and that the award would not impose an unreasonable burden on 

Michael.

The court thereafter confirmed that the December 14, 2020 

ruling was its “tentative ruling,” though it had originally 

intended it as the final order. The court provided the parties an 

additional opportunity to respond to the order before it would 

consider the matter submitted. 

In February 2021, the trial court adopted its tentative as 

the final ruling and statement of decision with some 

modifications. The court stated it was not obligated to identify 

assets for the payment of fees, though it noted that Michael “has 

been able to fund lengthy litigation, including an unnecessarily 
15

long DVRO trial, with two attorneys, through borrowing from his 

parents,” and that “the evidence before the court is that he 

receives money from a trust.” The court found “[i]t is clear that 

[Michael’s] parents have provided significant ongoing funding for 

the litigation,” but declined to make any “ ‘findings’ as to the 

terms of further loans as the court is unable to do so” and stated 

it was “not aware of any legal obligation [Michael’s] parents have 

to continue to pay their son’s attorney fees.” The court also 

stated that there was no evidence that Susan’s mother “has the 

financial ability to loan the significant attorney fee sums that 

[Michael’s] litigation occasioned.” It concluded “[t]he attorney 

fees in this matter are unreasonably high” and Michael’s “actions 

toward his children and now former spouses caused this 

expenditure.”

Michael timely appealed both orders. On our own motion, 

we consolidated the appeals for purposes of oral argument and 

decision. 

DISCUSSION

I. Disentitlement doctrine

Both Lotte and Susan argue that Michael’s appeals should 

be dismissed or stayed under the disentitlement doctrine for his 

failure to make payments ordered by the trial court. We decline 

to exercise our discretion to dismiss or stay the appeals on this 

ground. 

The disentitlement doctrine enables an appellate court to 

stay or dismiss the appeal of a party who has refused to obey the 

superior court’s legal orders. (Say & Say v. Castellano (1994) 22 

Cal.App.4th 88, 94.) “Dismissal is not ‘ “a penalty imposed as a 

punishment for criminal contempt. It is an exercise of a state 

court’s inherent power to use its processes to induce compliance” ’
16

with a presumptively valid order.” (Ibid., quoting Stone v. Bach

(1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 442, 446.) Thus, the disentitlement 

doctrine prevents a party from seeking assistance from the court 

while that party is in “an attitude of contempt to legal orders and 

processes of the courts of this state.” (MacPherson v. MacPherson

(1939) 13 Cal.2d 271, 277.) “The disentitlement doctrine ‘is 

particularly likely to be invoked where the appeal arises out of 

the very order (or orders) the party has disobeyed.’ ” (Ironridge 

Global IV, Ltd. v. ScripsAmerica, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 

259, 265.)

Although an appellate dismissal under the disentitlement 

doctrine typically comes on the heels of the trial court’s issuance 

of a contempt order, a formal adjudication of contempt is not a 

prerequisite. Rather, “[t]he principle permitting [an appellate] 

court to . . . dismiss an appeal . . . ‘is based upon fundamental 

equity and is not to be frustrated by technicalities,’ such as the 

absence of a formal citation and judgment of contempt.” (Alioto 

Fish Co. v. Alioto (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1669, 1683; accord,

Blumberg v. Minthorne (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1391 

[appellant violated two postjudgment orders and appeal was 

dismissed]; Gwartz v. Weilert (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 750, 757–

758 [“No formal judgment of contempt is required under the 

doctrine of disentitlement . . . . An appellate court may dismiss 

an appeal where the appellant has willfully disobeyed the lower 

court’s orders or engaged in obstructive tactics.”].) 

Lotte invokes the doctrine in connection with the fee order 

that is the subject of Michael’s appeal in her case. She argues the

appeal should be dismissed or stayed until Michael makes the 

$80,000 payment that was due December 31, 2020. Lotte’s 

contempt claim against Michael for his failure to make a 
17

payment on December 31, 2020 was dismissed. She did not bring

contempt proceedings against him in connection with his 

purported failure to make the payment due on December 31, 

2021. Susan argues that Michael’s appeal should be dismissed 

because he has failed to make child support payments, a separate 

order from the one Michael appeals in her case. Although the 

trial court’s order stated that Michael had failed to make 

payments in its order awarding fees to Susan, the record before 

us does not indicate whether Susan brought a contempt 

proceeding concerning Michael’s failure to pay child support. 

However, the absence of a formal contempt finding in both cases 

does not end our analysis. 

“Courts do not lightly apply the disentitlement doctrine. A 

party’s obstruction of, or failure to comply with, trial court orders 

must be willful.” (Findleton v. Coyote Valley Band of Pomo 

Indians (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 736, 756, accord, Tobin v. Casaus

(1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 588, 592 [“The right to an appeal must not 

be lightly forfeited, and where a doubt exists as to a litigant’s 

conduct being contumacious or willful, an appellate court will 

tolerate temporarily the acts which were disruptive of the judicial 

process.”].) We may have cause to doubt that Michael was 

unaware of his obligation to make a fee award payment at the 

time of the contempt proceeding, and Michael concedes that he 

did not make the full payment owed. We also recognize that “the 

merits [of the appeal] are irrelevant to the application of the 

disentitlement doctrine.” (Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. 

ScripsAmerica, Inc., supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 266, citing

Stone v. Bach, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d at p. 448.) However, we can

neither overlook that the crux of these appeals is Michael’s 

claimed inability to pay the fee awards, nor conclude without 
18

doubt that Michael’s failure to make the fee payments owed to 

Lotte was willful. 

With respect to the child support payments owed to Susan, 

Michael raises a factual dispute as to whether he was in violation 

of the child support order at the time he went on vacation with 

his girlfriend, as the trial court suggested in its order. He further 

argues there is no evidence in the record that he was delinquent 

in his payments after that point in time. On this ambiguous 

record, we decline to take the drastic step of depriving Michael of 

the right to an appeal. 

Further, the cases on which Lotte and Susan rely that 

dismissed an appeal under the disentitlement doctrine did not 

rely entirely upon nonpayment of a money judgment or order to 

pay money. These include, for example, United Grand Corp. v. 

Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, in which the 

appellant had been found in contempt of court for failing to pay 

sanctions and was also the subject of a bench warrant for his 

arrest due to his failure to report to jail (id. at pp. 166–167), and 

Stone v. Bach, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d 442, in which the appellant, 

after the dissolution of a partnership, failed to deposit 

partnership monies into a bank account or to directly pay onehalf to his former partner and was twice found to be in contempt 

of court, including for refusing to be sworn for examination as a 

judgment debtor. (Stone, at pp. 443–444.) While we do not 

condone Michael’s failure to fulfill court-ordered obligations, his

conduct in these cases has not yet been so extreme. 

We conclude this is not “ ‘one of the rare cases where 

applying this doctrine is appropriate due to [the appellant’s] 

flagrant[, repeated and continuous] violation of the [superior] 

court’s orders’ ” (Findleton, v. Coyote Valley Band of Pomo 
19

Indians, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 740, second and third 

alterations in original), and therefore proceed to the merits of the

appeals.

II. Award of fees to Lotte under section 271

Michael contends the trial court abused its discretion in 

awarding Lotte $400,000 for her attorney fees under section 271 

because it improperly “imput[ed] income to Michael on the 

assumption that Michael’s parents will provide him additional 

financial assistance to pay Lotte’s attorney’s fees.” We conclude 

that the court’s reliance on past financial contributions from 

Joseph and Rosemary was not inappropriate and that substantial 

evidence supports the court’s award of fees. We therefore find no 

abuse of discretion. 

A. Legal standard

Section 271, subdivision (a), provides that “the court may 

base an award of attorney’s fees and costs on the extent to which 

the conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the 

policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where 

possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging 

cooperation between the parties and attorneys.” Section 271 “is 

aimed at conduct that frustrates settlement of family law 

litigation. Expressed another way, section 271 vests family law 

courts with an additional means with which to enforce this state’s 

public policy of promoting settlement of family law litigation, 

while reducing its costs through mutual cooperation of clients 

and their counsel.” (In re Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 

Cal.App.4th 1295, 1318.)

A party moving for relief under section 271 need not “show 

harm as a prerequisite to an award of sanctions.” (In re Marriage 

of Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1480.) However, an 
20

award of sanctions under section 271 must be “tethered to 

attorney fees and costs.” (Menezes v. McDaniel (2019) 44 

Cal.App.5th 340, 351.) Although the statute plainly requires that 

the award be based upon attorney fees and costs related to a 

party’s conduct that frustrates the policy of promotion of 

settlement, “the party seeking sanctions pursuant to section 271 

need not establish with great precision an amount directly caused 

by the improper conduct. [Citation.] In part, this flexibility 

exists because the misconduct may increase attorney fees in ways 

that are indirect and difficult to prove.” (Sagonowsky v. Kekoa

(2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1155–1156.) 

Michael does not challenge the trial court’s determination 

that his conduct at the DVRO trial was sanctionable under 

section 271. Rather, Michael argues that he is unable to pay the 

$400,000 sanction imposed.

Any order that requires a party to pay attorney fees under 

the Family Code requires the court to “first determine that the 

party has or is reasonably likely to have the ability to pay.” 

(§ 270.) Section 271 requires the court to “take into consideration 

all evidence concerning the parties’ incomes, assets, and 

liabilities,” and prohibits the court from making an award “that 

imposes an unreasonable financial burden on the party against 

whom the sanction is imposed.” (§ 271, subd. (a).) In 

determining ability to pay, a past or present cash deficit is not 

controlling. (Rosenthal v. Rosenthal (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 289,

297–298.) It is the appellant’s burden to show that the sanctions 

created an unreasonable burden.

“Sanction orders under section 271 are . . . reviewed under 

the abuse of discretion standard. [Citation.] Applying the abuse 

of discretion standard, we consider de novo any questions of law 
21

raised on appeal, but will uphold any findings of fact supported 

by substantial evidence.” (In re Marriage of Smith (2015) 242 

Cal.App.4th 529, 532 (Smith).) “Discretion is abused when its 

exercise is arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious.” (In re Marriage of

Battenburg (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1343.) A trial court’s 

order awarding sanctions pursuant to section 271 “ ‘ “will be 

overturned only if, considering all the evidence viewed most 

favorably in support of its order, no judge could reasonably make 

the order.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Burgard (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 

74, 82.)

B. The trial court did not err in considering funds

from Michael’s parents

Michael contends the trial court abused its discretion in 

relying in part on past loans from his parents in determining his 

ability to pay under section 270 because they have no obligation 

to pay Lotte’s fees. We conclude the purported loans were 

relevant “evidence concerning the parties’ incomes, assets, and 

liabilities.” (§ 271, subd. (a).) The trial court did not err by 

considering the payments from Michael’s parents in determining 

whether he has an ability to pay.

Smith, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th 529, is instructive. Smith

addressed whether a court could consider funds paid on a

spouse’s behalf in determining the relative circumstances of the 

parties when awarding attorney fees under section 2030. In 

Smith, the trial court ordered the wife to pay the attorney fees of 

the husband and the husband’s current wife, in an amount 

exceeding $270,000, minus an unspecified offset to the husband. 

(Id. at p. 531.) The wife’s father had paid all of her attorney fees 

in the dissolution and child custody proceedings, which totaled 

“ ‘close to $400,000.’ ” The father testified that he intended to 
22

continue financing his daughter’s litigation. (Id. at p. 534.) The 

trial court considered the funds the father paid to the wife’s 

attorneys in deciding to award attorney fees and costs to the 

husband and his current wife. (Id. at pp. 531–532.) The Court of

Appeal affirmed the order, concluding the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in considering the father’s “regular,

substantial infusions of cash as part of its determination of the 

relative circumstances of the respective parties and their ability 

to maintain or defend the proceedings,” even though the 

payments “were characterized as ‘loans’ to [the wife] and 

memorialized in promissory notes.” (Id. at p. 534.)

In response to the wife’s argument that she did not have 

access to her father’s wealth for the purpose of paying anyone 

else’s attorney fees, the court reasoned that “[t]his circumstance . 

. . does not distinguish the funds [the wife] received from her 

father from any other source of income: ‘ “Few, if any, sources of 

income are certain to continue unchanged year in and year 

out. . . .” . . . [¶] . . . It is irrelevant that there is no legal 

obligation on the part of the donor to continue making the gifts

. . . .’ [Citation.]” (Smith, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 535.) The court 

therefore concluded that “[t]he trial court acted within its 

discretion by rejecting [the wife’s] plea of poverty for purposes of 

apportioning the overall cost of the litigation equitably between 

the parties.” (Id. at p. 535.; see also Kevin Q. v. Lauren W. (2011) 

195 Cal.App.4th 633, 647 [trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in considering a party’s receipt of regular, recurrent monetary 

gifts from her father in determining her need for attorney fees].)

This case similarly involves regular and substantial 

infusions of cash from Michael’s parents. Joseph has provided 

“informal loans” averaging $17,267.63 per year for eight years, 
23

though the actual amount paid in any given year was not 

disclosed in the record. Additionally, after Joseph purportedly 

denied Michael any further loans around July 2020, he obtained 

loans exceeding $98,000 from his mother, Rosemary, over a threemonth period in 2020. Though the Van der Veer record does not 

include an explanation of what portion of these payments went 

towards Michael’s fees, substantial evidence supports the 

conclusion that Michael’s parents have contributed significant 

sums for that purpose, including Joseph’s trial testimony and 

promissory notes specifically titled “attorney fees.”

We recognize that the wife’s father in Smith, supra, 242 

Cal.App.4th 529, 534, testified that he expected that “the ‘loans’

would be repaid, if at all, as an offset against [the wife’s]

inheritance,” and that there is no equivalent testimony from 

Michael’s parents in this case. However, the trial court appeared 

to discredit the evidence that the substantial amounts Michael 

received from his parents were not gifts, referring to them as 

“ ‘loans,’ ” and noting there were no declarations from Michael’s 

parents concerning the loans. Michael concedes that the trial 

judge’s use of quotations “impl[ied] that he was skeptical that 

these were legitimate loans.” This skepticism is not unfounded. 

Indeed, “[c]ourts are appropriately skeptical of transfers by the 

parents of one of the parties in a divorce case. ‘There is an 

incentive for both sides of the transfer, the parents making it and 

the litigant receiving it, to conform their testimony to the 

disadvantage of the other litigant. Transfers where the parents 

would never have sought repayment, if the marriage had 

remained intact, may be viewed from a different perspective 

when the marriage falls apart.’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of 

Williamson (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1313.) Though the 
24

appeal before us is not from spousal and child support orders, as 

in Williamson, there is a similar incentive here for Michael and 

his parents to conform their testimony to the disadvantage of 

Lotte and Susan. Viewing the record in the light most favorable 

to the order, we presume that the trial court viewed the loans

either as gifts or as unlikely to be enforced on the terms set forth 

in the promissory notes with Rosemary, similar to the loans in 

Smith. 

In re Marriage of Schulze (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 519 does 

not compel a different conclusion. In Schulze, the trial court 

ordered a noncustodial father to pay his former wife’s attorney 

fees in the amount of $7,500, “payable in full ‘forthwith.’ ” (Id. at 

p. 530.) The Court of Appeal concluded the amount of the award 

was appropriate given the relative circumstances of the parties, 

but the provision for full and immediate payment was based on 

an erroneous presumption that the father could obtain the money 

from his parents because they previously “had lent him about 

$8,000 to pay his own fees.” (Id. at p. 531.) In reversing the 

attorney fee award, the court noted that “[c]harity, once

extended, is still not an entitlement.” (Id. at p. 532.) However, 

Schulze involved a relatively small, one-time loan by the father’s 

parents. In contrast, a parent’s “regular, substantial infusions of 

cash” may properly be considered as part of the relative 

circumstances of the parties for the purpose of determining an 

attorney fee or cost award. (Smith, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 

534.)

Finally, Michael also argues that Smith is distinguishable 

because the court focused its analysis on whether it was 

appropriate to award fees under section 2030, rather than section 

271, and that the purpose of section 2030 “is distinct from the 
25

purpose of [section 271].” This is true. The court in Smith stated 

that “[m]uch of the reasoning above would, on its face, apply 

equally to a section 271 analysis,” but recognized “that section 

271 has a quite different purpose from that of section 2030, and 

somewhat different language,” and therefore left “the question of 

whether these differences make a difference for another day.” 

(Smith, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 536.) 

We find that the differences between awards under section 

2030 and section 271 do not alter the analysis under the 

circumstances of this case. “The purpose of section 2030 is to 

ensure parity. ‘The idea is that both sides should have the 

opportunity to retain counsel, not just (as is usually the case) 

only the party with greater financial strength.’ ” (In re Marriage 

of Cryer (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1056.) Section 271 

“advances the policy of the law ‘to promote settlement and to 

encourage cooperation which will reduce the cost of litigation.’ ” 

(In re Marriage of Petropoulos (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 161, 177.) 

The ability of a party to “ ‘litigate[ ] [the opposing party] out of 

the case,’ by taking advantage of their disparate financial 

circumstances” is as contrary to the purpose of encouraging 

cooperation under section 271 as it is to the purpose of section 

2030. (Smith, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 534.)11

11 Payment of an award under section 2030 may be ordered 

“from any type of property, whether community or separate, 

principal or income” (§ 2032, subd. (c)), whereas an award under 

section 271 “is payable only from the property or income of the 

party against whom the sanction is imposed, except that the 

award may be against the sanctioned party’s share of the 

community property.” (§ 271, subd. (c).) These differences have 

little salience here. 
26

C. Substantial evidence supported Michael’s 

ability to pay

Michael also contends the record lacks sufficient evidence 

to support the trial court’s determination that he had the ability 

to pay. He asks us to discredit “questionable” and 

“uncorroborated” evidence the trial court cited in its order. We 

will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court with 

respect to the credibility of evidence and conclude substantial 

evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Michael has an 

ability to pay.

The loans from Joseph and Rosemary, described above,

were not the only evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion 

that Michael has an ability to pay. Michael acknowledges that 

Joseph pays an average of $2,000 a month towards Michael’s 

expenses, notwithstanding his refusal to extend further loans. 

Michael also reported income from his production company, 

unemployment payments, and a stimulus payment, totaling 

approximately $17,000 as of October 2020.

The trial court also referenced the fact that Michael has 

been able to live “rent free in his parent[s’] Santa Monica condo” 

in the order. There was evidence that Michael has lived “on and 

off, for seven, eight years” in a Santa Monica condominium owned 

by his parents, for which he pays only the association fee of $540 

per month, though the trial court found that its fair market 

rental value was $5,000 per month. The trial court also cited 

Susan’s testimony that Michael was able to withdraw 

approximately $8,000 a month from his parents’ trust account to 

cover the couple’s expenses. In a declaration filed below, Michael 

denied that he had access to funds other than those specifically 

listed, though he did not directly address Susan’s claims 
27

regarding the trust. Joseph, on the other hand, affirmatively 

disputed that Michael had “access to any of [his] accounts” at the 

DVRO trial, as the trial court recognized in its order.12 Based on 

its conclusion, however, we presume the trial court ultimately 

found Susan’s testimony to be more credible. Such credibility 

determinations are the exclusive province of the trial court. 

(Hawkins v. City of Los Angeles (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 384, 393

[credibility is the exclusive province of the trier of fact].) 

Contrary to Michael’s suggestion, it was not an abuse of 

discretion for the trial court to base its finding that Michael is 

able to access these funds on Susan’s “uncorroborated” testimony. 

“[T]he testimony of a single witness is sufficient to uphold a 

judgment even if it is contradicted by other evidence, inconsistent 

or false as to other portions.” (People v. Leigh (1985) 168 

Cal.App.3d 217, 221.) 

Michael also contends there was insufficient evidence to 

support this finding because the trial court stated at the DVRO 

trial that Susan’s testimony on the $8,000 per month trust 

income was “not good solid evidence.” However, earlier in the 

same sentence, the trial court stated, “I think the evidence of 

$8,000 a month is probably by a preponderance I think it’s there 

. . . .” Michael does not argue that a higher burden of proof than 

preponderance of the evidence applied to the trial court’s 

determination of ability to pay, nor do we find any support for 

such a claim. (See Evid. Code, § 115 [“Except as otherwise 

provided by law, the burden of proof requires proof by a 

12 Joseph’s testimony was somewhat more equivocal with 

respect to whether Michael had ever written a check from the 

trust account. Joseph stated, “I have no idea. I doubt it. I don’t 

see how he could do that.”
28

preponderance of the evidence.”].) Further, “[w]e presume the 

trial court knew and properly applied the law absent evidence to 

the contrary.” (McDermott Will & Emery LLP v. Superior Court

(2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1083, 1103.) The “probably” or “I think” in 

the trial court’s statement at the DVRO trial does not

demonstrate that the trial court relied on evidence that did not 

meet the applicable burden of proof when deciding the fee order.

We also reject Michael’s contention that an award of this 

size could only be the result of passion or prejudice. We do not 

construe the trial court’s reference to Michael’s transfer of his

interest in the Santa Monica condominium to his parents during 

his divorce with Lotte as an indication that it “includ[ed] the 

value of Michael’s parents’ condominium as an asset from which 

Lotte’s $400,000 in attorney’s fees can be paid.” As we have 

noted, we presume the trial court applied the relevant law absent 

evidence to the contrary. Thus, we will not conclude that the 

court improperly found Michael was an owner of the 

condominium without the requisite clear and convincing proof

(Evid. Code, § 662), and we do not rely on the value of the 

condominium in concluding there was substantial evidence 

supporting the trial court’s ruling. It appears the trial court 

raised the transfer as evidence that led it to question the 

credibility of Michael’s representations regarding his finances. 

Indeed, immediately after referencing the transfer, the trial court 

observed that Michael’s financial picture was “somewhat 

muddied.”13

13 We similarly reject Michael’s contention that the order’s 

mention of Susan’s testimony that she received a payment of 

$32,000 from Joseph’s production company in 2019 as a means of 
29

We recognize that a $400,000 award, payable in 

installments of $80,000 per year, is substantial. The trial court 

itself stated that “[n]either party in this case can afford the fees 

that have been generated” and that “[t]his fee will no doubt work 

a financial hardship on the respondent.” However, the trial court 

was aware of and applied the relevant law, recognizing that an 

award of fees under section 271 must take into account “the 

ability of the respondent to pay.” Interpreting the court’s

observations in the light most favorable to the ruling, it is clear

that Michael would not be able to afford the expenses on his 

employment and unemployment income alone. Nevertheless, as 

discussed, the trial court was justified in taking into 

consideration the substantial funds provided by both his parents, 

Joseph’s regular contributions of $2,000 towards monthly 

Michael’s expenses, and Michael’s ability to withdraw $8,000 per 

month from the family trust. Although the trial court recognized 

that the award is burdensome, it determined the “award will not 

impose an unreasonable financial burden on the respondent.” We 

cannot conclude that, “ ‘ “considering all the evidence viewed

most favorably in support of [the] order, no judge could 

reasonably make the order.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Burgard, 

supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 82.)

Having concluded that the trial court’s award of fees to 

Lotte under section 271 was not an abuse of discretion, we need 

providing money to Michael without Lotte’s knowledge was 

“inflammatory but irrelevant surplusage.” As with the evidence 

of the condominium transfer, this testimony was evidence 

bearing on the credibility of Michael and his parents, and thus 

relevant to the court’s conclusion. Nor do we find any implication 

that the trial court assumed Michael would receive $32,000 on a 

yearly basis, as Michael suggests in his reply brief.
30

not decide whether an award of fees would also be proper under 

section 6344. (See Smith, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 536

[declining to decide whether fees were proper under § 271 where 

it had determined they were proper under § 2030]; Cahill v. San 

Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 [“[I]f a 

judgment is correct on any theory, the appellate court will affirm 

it regardless of the trial court’s reasoning.”].) 

II. Award of fees to Susan under sections 2030 and 6344

Michael challenges the trial court’s award of attorney fees 

to Susan under sections 2030 and 6344 on similar grounds as 

Lotte’s award under section 271, though he further argues that 

the fee award to Lotte eliminates his ability to pay Susan. We

conclude the trial court’s finding that Michael also had the ability 

to pay the fee award to Susan was supported by substantial 

evidence, and therefore affirm. 

A. Legal standard

Section 6344 authorizes a court to award fees to the 

prevailing party in a proceeding under the Domestic Violence 

Protection Act (DVPA, §§ 6200–6219). Section 6344, subdivision 

(b) provides: “In any action in which the petitioner is the 

prevailing party and cannot afford to pay for the attorney’s fees 

and costs, the court shall, if appropriate based on the parties’ 

respective abilities to pay, order that the respondent pay 

petitioner’s attorney’s fees and costs for commencing and 

maintaining the proceeding. Whether the respondent shall be 

ordered to pay attorney’s fees and costs for the prevailing 

petitioner, and what amount shall be paid, shall be determined 

based upon (1) the respective incomes and needs of the parties, 

and (2) any factors affecting the parties’ respective abilities to 

pay.” 
31

An award of fees may be made under section 2030 “[i]n a 

proceeding for dissolution of marriage, nullity of marriage, or 

legal separation of the parties.” (§ 2030, subd. (a).) However, an 

award of fees under section 2030 entails substantially similar 

considerations as an award under section 6344. “When a request 

for attorney’s fees and costs is made, the court shall make 

findings on whether an award of attorney’s fees and costs under 

this section is appropriate, whether there is a disparity in access 

to funds to retain counsel, and whether one party is able to pay 

for legal representation of both parties. If the findings 

demonstrate disparity in access and ability to pay, the court shall 

make an order awarding attorney’s fees and costs.” (§ 2030, 

subd. (a)(2); accord, In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 

Cal.App.5th 83, 112 [“award of ‘reasonably necessary’ fees and 

costs” to a party is mandatory if trial court finds disparity in 

access to funds to retain counsel and other party can pay both 

parties’ legal representation].) “Section 2030 is (and always has 

been) controlled and supplemented by section 2032. Under 

section 2032, ‘[t]he court may make an award of attorney’s fees 

and costs under Section 2030 . . . where the making of the award, 

and the amount of the award, are just and reasonable under the 

relative circumstances of the respective parties.’ ” (Kevin Q. v. 

Lauren W., supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 640.)14

Because both section 2030 (as supplemented by section 

2032) and section 6344 “require a comparative analysis of the 

14 An additional difference between section 2030 and 

section 6344 is that section 6344 requires a party be designated 

as the prevailing party while section 2030 does not. However, the 

record is clear that Susan is the prevailing party, and Michael 

does not challenge that determination.
32

parties’ circumstances and/or needs and serve the common 

purpose (shared by all the Fam. Code statutes that authorize 

attorney fee awards) of ensuring, ‘to the extent possible, that the 

litigating parties are on an equal footing in their ability to 

present their cases,’ ” we examine the propriety of the award 

under both statutes together. (Kevin Q. v. Lauren W., supra, 195 

Cal.App.4th at p. 643 [court did not err in relying on § 2032 for 

guidance with respect to other Fam. Code fee provisions that 

focus on “ ‘respective incomes and needs’ ” and “ ‘respective

abilities to pay’ ”].) Under both, we review an award of fees for 

abuse of discretion. (Loeffler v. Medina, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 1509 [§ 6344]; In re Marriage of Bendetti (2013) 214 

Cal.App.4th 863, 868 [§ 2030].)

We must also consider that the trial court issued a 

statement of decision, which may affect the scope of appellate 

review. “A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be 

correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are 

indulged in favor of its correctness. [Citations.] [¶] Sections 632 

and 634 [of the Code of Civil Procedure] (both as amended in 

1981) set forth the means by which to avoid application of these 

inferences in favor of the judgment. When the court announces 

its tentative decision, a party may, under section 632, request the 

court to issue a statement of decision explaining the basis of its 

determination, and shall specify the issues on which the party is 

requesting the statement; following such a request, the party 

may make proposals relating to the contents of the statement. 

Thereafter, under section 634, the party must state any objection 

he may have to the statement in order to avoid an implied finding 

on appeal in favor of the prevailing party. The section declares 

that if omissions or ambiguities in the statement are timely 
33

brought to the trial court’s attention, the appellate court will not 

imply findings in favor of the prevailing party. The clear 

implication of this provision, of course, is that if a party does not 

bring such deficiencies to the trial court’s attention, that party 

waives the right to claim on appeal that the statement was 

deficient in these regards, and hence the appellate court will 

imply findings to support the judgment.” (In re Marriage of 

Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133–1134, fns. omitted.) 

“Even where proper procedure under sections 632 and 634 

has been followed punctiliously, ‘[t]he trial court is not required 

to respond point by point to the issues posed in a request for 

statement of decision. The court’s statement of decision is 

sufficient if it fairly discloses the court’s determination as to the 

ultimate facts and material issues in the case.’ [Citations.] 

‘When this rule is applied, the term “ultimate fact” generally 

refers to a core fact, such as an essential element of a claim.’

[Citation.] ‘Ultimate facts are distinguished from evidentiary 

facts and from legal conclusions.’ [Citation.] Thus, a court is not 

expected to make findings with regard to ‘detailed evidentiary 

facts or to make minute findings as to individual items of 

evidence.’ ” (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 

983.)15 Where an issue was not identified as controverted under 

15 Michael requested a statement of decision at oral 

argument on December 10, 2020, though the trial court had yet to 

issue a tentative order. On December 28, 2020, Michael 

simultaneously filed a request identifying the principal 

controverted issues under Code of Civil Procedure section 632 

and filed objections under section 634, thus collapsing the two 

steps into one. However, as Susan has raised no objections to the 

process and the trial court had “the opportunity to clarify or 
34

Code of Civil Procedure section 632, the appellate court will 

imply findings in favor of the judgment and will consider whether 

substantial evidence supports those findings. (Id. at pp. 984–

985.)

B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

finding a disparity of access to funds

In comparing the parties’ access to funds, the trial court 

found that Michael “has been able to fully fund his litigation 

through his parents,” while Susan has left Los Angeles in part 

“due to the fees expended in prosecuting and defending [the]

DVRO litigation,” for which she borrowed money from her 

mother. The court further found that “[t]here is no evidence that 

[Susan’s] mother has the financial ability to loan the significant 

attorney fee sums that [Michael’s] litigation occasioned.” The 

court also noted that Michael “apparently recently went to 

Mexico with his current girlfriend,” which indicated to the court 

that Michael has “managed to maintain a lifestyle, while 

[Susan]’s life has been upended.” These findings are supported 

by the record. 

The record also indicates that, as of October 2020, Susan 

had received her last unemployment check several months prior 

and intended to file for food stamps and welfare. Additionally,

while Michael reported an average monthly income of $2,052

from his production company in July 2020 and of $1,130 in 

November 2020, Susan reported an average monthly income of

supplement its statement of decision before losing jurisdiction” 

(Thompson v. Asimos, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 983), we accept 

that the procedure was appropriately followed and will not imply 

findings as to the controverted issues specifically identified by 

Michael.
35

only $416.66 as a freelance makeup artist, though she was 

unemployed as a result of the pandemic. It is unclear what 

Susan will earn as a homecare worker when she relocates to 

Oklahoma.

“The fact that the party requesting an award of attorney’s 

fees and costs has resources from which the party could pay the 

party’s own attorney’s fees and costs is not itself a bar to an order 

that the other party pay part or all of the fees and costs 

requested. Financial resources are only one factor for the court to 

consider in determining how to apportion the overall cost of the 

litigation equitably between the parties under their relative 

circumstances.” (§ 2032, subd. (b).) Though Susan has received 

$29,500 from her mother in loans for living expenses and 

attorney fees, there is a clear disparity between the sum Susan 

obtained from her mother and the $236,893 Michael’s parents 

have provided him over a period of years. Nor is there any 

evidence in the record that Susan’s mother has regularly 

contributed to her expenses as Joseph and Rosemary have for 

Michael. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding

there was a disparity in the parties’ ability to pay,

notwithstanding the money Susan has received from her mother. 

C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

finding that Michael has the ability to pay under 

sections 2030 and 6344

Michael contends “[t]he simple math using the evidence in 

the record most favorable to Susan establishes Michael does not 

have the ability to pay this fee order along with the preceding one 

in favor of Lotte and the child and spousal support orders the 

same judge made in favor of Susan.” This is true only if the 

equation does not consider Michael’s parents’ payment of his 
36

attorney fees and other obligations. We conclude, as we did with 

respect to the award to Lotte, that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in considering these sums in awarding fees under 

sections 2030 and 6344. 

The record indicates that Michael’s financial situation at 

the time of the second fee order was largely the same as at the 

time of the first, with the notable exception of the $400,000 

award to Lotte, payable in installments of $80,000 per year.

Taken together with the trial court’s fee award to Susan, 

Michael’s yearly fee obligation is $100,000. Michael also has 

spousal and child support obligations to Susan and Lotte 

exceeding $50,000. When his monthly expenses of $2,385 are 

also taken into account, Michael’s yearly expenses exceed 

$180,000. Michael’s income from his parents’ trust, employment

income, unemployment payments, and the one-time stimulus 

payment, plus Joseph’s monthly contributions of $2,000, total

approximately $140,000.16 Thus, whether the purported loans 

16 Michael asserts that the $2,000 monthly payments from

Joseph should not be considered because they were not 

referenced in the trial court’s statement of decision. As discussed 

above, Michael identified as a controverted issue the “specific 

income, assets, and other financial resources” available for the 

payment of fees. The trial court stated that it was “not obligated 

to identify assets for the payment of the fees,” and generally 

described some of Michael’s resources, including financial 

contributions from his parents and trust income. We agree that 

the trial court was not required “to make findings with regard to 

‘detailed evidentiary facts or to make minute findings as to 

individual items of evidence.’ ” (Thompson v. Asimos, supra, 6 

Cal.App.5th at p. 983.) 
37

from Michael’s parents, which exceeded $150,000 in 2020, were 

properly considered as part of his ability to pay is central to our 

determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion in 

finding Michael was able to pay both awards. 

Though we concluded above that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in considering those payments in connection 

with the fee award to Lotte under section 270, Michael raises 

additional challenges in connection with the award to Susan.

Michael contends that attorney fees paid on his behalf by 

his parents cannot be counted as income because he is not free to 

use that money towards other expenses, such as the fee award. 

Michael cites M.S. v. O.S. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 548, in which 

the appellate court held the trial court “abused its discretion by 

including the tribe’s payment of [the support obligor’s] attorney 

fees in his gross annual income under section 4058, subdivision 

(a) for purposes of the guideline support calculation.” (Id. at 

p. 557.) However, even in the child support context, courts have 

rejected an “absolute rule” that “gifts are not income for purposes 

of calculating support payments.” (In re Marriage of Alter (2009) 

171 Cal.App.4th 718, 731.) 

Moreover, unlike in M.S. v. O.S., supra, 176 Cal.App.4th

548, where the obligor received no benefit from the tribe unless 

attorney fees were incurred (id. at p. 557), it appears that a 

considerable portion of the money Michael has received from his 

Michael further argues in his reply that it “would not make 

sense that Michael’s father paid him $2,000 a month for living 

expenses if Michael was also taking $8,000 from his parents’ 

trust.” Michael does not cite any authority for this position. 

Regardless, whether the income attributed to Michael is 

approximately $140,000 or approximately $120,000, as Michael

urges, the outcome is the same.
38

parents was not paid directly to his attorneys. According to 

Joseph’s declaration in the Regalbuto record, Joseph directly paid 

$50,000 to Michael’s lawyers, meaning that loans he provided to 

Michael totaling more than $88,000 were unrelated to attorney 

fees. Similarly, according to Rosemary’s declaration, four of the 

nine promissory notes, totaling approximately $37,000, were for 

purposes unrelated to attorney fees 

Further, Michael does not argue that a child support award 

under section 4058 has the same or a comparable purpose as an 

attorney fee award under section 2030. Indeed, though he relies 

on M.S. v. O.S., supra, 176 Cal.App.4th 548, Michael seeks to 

undermine the ruling in Smith, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th 529, on 

the ground that it relies in part on child support cases in 

reaching its conclusion. (See Smith, at pp. 534–535.) We 

acknowledge that the purposes underlying section 4058 and 

section 2030 are distinct. (See Anna M. v. Jeffrey E. (2017) 7 

Cal.App.5th 439, 451 [a “child support calculation . . . involves 

policy objectives different from those involved in a fee award”].) 

However, even if it relied on reasoning from the distinguishable 

context of child support awards, we agree with the court in Smith

that excluding substantial attorney fee payments made by 

Michael’s parents “from consideration would vitiate one of the 

primary purposes of section 2030 and section 2032, to prevent 

one party from being able to ‘litigate[] [the opposing party] out of 

the case,’ by taking advantage of their disparate financial 

circumstances. [Citation.]” (Smith, at p. 534.) 

Unlike in the Van der Veer matter, where Michael conceded 

that the trial court was skeptical about whether the loans were 

legitimate, Michael argues with respect to the award to Susan 

that the trial court affirmatively “found that the payment of 
39

Michael’s attorney fees by his parents were loans rather than 

gifts.” However, it is not clear that the trial court had shed its 

skepticism, though it did not refer to the loans from Joseph and 

Rosemary as “loans.” The trial court stated “[Michael] claims 

that all the money he received from his parents are loans,” but 

did not state that it accepted Michael’s characterization. Indeed, 

the court noted the informality of the purported loans from 

Joseph, and referenced the “very favorable rates” attached to the 

sums from Rosemary. The trial court also subsequently stated, 

“One thing is clear, [Michael] has had a constant source of fees 

from his parents, loans or no.” (Italics added.) This language 

suggests the trial court continued to doubt Michael’s

characterization of these funds, notwithstanding Joseph’s and 

Rosemary’s declarations. The record supported such doubts.

17

Viewing the court’s statements in the light most favorable to the

order, we conclude that the reasoning in Smith, supra, 242 

Cal.App.4th 529, applies equally to Susan’s fee award as to 

Lotte’s, particularly as the fee award to Susan was made under 

section 2030, the same code section under which the award was 

made in Smith.

17 For example, despite Michael’s disclosure in his October 

2020 declaration that he expected to be $900 short of the monthly 

loan payments due under the promissory notes beginning 

November 2020, Rosemary provided him with additional loans 

totaling $21,644 over the next month. In November 2020, 

Michael represented that, by January 2021, his loan obligations 

to his mother would reach $2,524.85, or nearly two-thirds of his 

monthly cash flow of $3,950. The trial court might fairly question 

why Rosemary would continue to extend loans under such 

circumstances if she had a genuine expectation of repayment 

under the terms of the promissory notes. 
40

Michael also argues that the payments made by his 

parents, other than Joseph’s monthly payments of $2,000, were 

not a recurrent payment of a fixed amount, and thus should not 

be considered income. He relies on In re Marriage of Williamson, 

supra, 226 Cal.App.4th 1303, a case concerning spousal and child 

support payments, in which the court found that payments the 

husband’s parents made to him were not income because, for the 

most part, they “were made upon request, depending upon the 

family’s need.” (Id. at p. 1314.) The court distinguished these

payments from the monthly payments of $6,000 made by the 

husband’s mother in In re Marriage of Alter, supra, 171 

Cal.App.4th 718. (Williamson, at p. 1314.) However, “more 

important[]” than this, in the Williamson court’s view, was that

“[the husband’s] parents are no longer making the advances,” 

citing testimony of the husband’s father. (Id. at p. 1315.) As we 

have noted, although Joseph declared he would not make any 

further loans, Rosemary has continued to provide Michael with 

large sums of money to cover his obligations and has not 

indicated she is unwilling to continue to do so. 

Further, there was no indication in Smith, supra, 242 

Cal.App.4th 529, that the payments made by the wife’s father 

were of a fixed amount. Rather, the court focused on the father’s 

testimony that “on a monthly or bimonthly basis, [he] regularly 

received a bill from [the wife’s] attorneys for her litigation 

expenses.” (Id. at p. 534.) The declarations from Joseph and 

Rosemary similarly reflect monthly and bimonthly payments of 

fees and of support obligations on Michael’s behalf. 

In sum, we conclude the trial court did not err in

considering Joseph’s and Rosemary’s payments as income to 

Michael or as a circumstance significantly increasing his ability 
41

to pay.18 We do not find that the trial court’s order was without 

basis in the record or was punishment for Michael’s conduct and 

the expense of the litigation, as Michael contends. We therefore

conclude there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

analysis of Michael’s ability to pay under sections 2030 and 6344. 

18 Though M.S. v. O.S., supra, 176 Cal.App.4th 548, is 

distinguishable on the grounds discussed above, we note that the 

appellate court in that case acknowledged that the tribe’s 

payment of the obligor’s attorney fees was a factor that could 

warrant an upward adjustment from the guideline amount, even 

if it could not be considered as income. (Id. at p. 557.)
42

DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed. Lotte and Susan are awarded 

their costs on appeal. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ADAMS, J.*

We concur:

EDMON, P. J. 

LAVIN, J. 

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.