IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

May 24, 2018 Session

LASONYA ROBERTSON ET AL. v. CLARKSVILLE-MONTGOMERY 

COUNTY SCHOOL SYSTEM ET AL.

 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County

No. 15-CV-1954 Ross H. Hicks, Judge

No. M2017-02492-COA-R3-CV

BRANDON O. GIBSON, J., dissenting.

I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion in this case.

The evidence presented at trial indicates that the school system’s “mopping 

policy” was actually part of a larger “Departmental Safety Program” directed toward all 

Clarksville-Montgomery County School System employees. For the “Custodial 

Department,” the program provided, “[w]hen mopping floors, cleaning up spills, or 

anytime the floor becomes wet for whatever reason, always put the wet floor signs out 

until the area is completely dry.” For “Professional Staff,” the program provided, 

“[a]lways pay close attention to wet floor signs or wet floor conditions to avoid slips and 

falls.” 

Ms. Robertson testified that she did not see the wet-floor signs. In order to fully 

understand the scene, the photographs submitted at trial are helpful.1

 

1

The photographs contained herein have been cropped from the originals contained in the appellate 

record.

06/28/2018
2

Ms. Robertson testified at trial that the photo above “appears that it was taken from the 

door of [her] classroom.” The photo below shows the same sign and a second sign a few 

feet to the right.
3

Ms. Robertson testified that the photo above could have been taken either from her door 

exhibits 

or from the classroom door next to hers. The photographs that follow were introduced as 

at trial, but they are still-shot photos taken from the hallway surveillance video, 

which was also introduced as an exhibit. 

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4

The video submitted as an exhibit shows that Ms. Robertson took three or four 

steps once she comes in view of the surveillance camera before she slips and falls to the 

floor. The custodian can be seen in the background mopping.
5

I agree with the majority that the school system’s custodian’s act of mopping was 

operational in nature. Our Supreme Court, in Limbaugh v. Coffee Medical Center, 59 

S.W.3d 73, 85 (Tenn. 2001), noted that

decisions that merely implement pre-existing policies and regulations are

considered to be operational in nature and require the decision-maker to act 

reasonably in implementing the established policy. If the policy, 

regulation, or other standard of procedure mandates specific conduct, then 

any employee reasonably complying with that direction will not abrogate 

the entity’s immunity if the action furthers the underlying policies of the 

regulation. . . . If such an employee does not act reasonably but pursues a 

course of conduct that violates mandatory regulation, the discretionary 

function exception will not apply because the action would be contrary to 

the entity’s established policy.

(Internal citations omitted.) The question becomes whether the custodians in this case 

acted reasonably. The majority concludes that the custodian, Mr. Mitchell, did not move

the wet-floor signs to indicate that a larger area had been mopped. Nor did another 

custodian, who knew Ms. Robertson was in her classroom, verbally warn Ms. Robertson 

of the mopping in the hallway.

However, reading the Limbaugh citation above fully, the Tennessee Supreme 

Court indicates that the opposite of “acting reasonably” is “pursu[ing] a course of 

conduct that violates mandatory regulation.” Limbaugh, 59 S.W.3d at 85. The regulation 

in this case requires the custodian to “always put the wet floor signs out until the area is 

completely dry.” As the photos included herein indicate, two wet floor signs were placed 

in the hallway. This action simply cannot be classified as a “course of conduct that 

violates mandatory regulation.” Limbaugh, at 85. I fail to see how the placement of two 

wet-floor signs, as depicted in the photographs above, is unreasonable. The trial court 

and the majority determined that the absence of a wet-floor sign on the right side of the 

hallway was not a reasonable implementation of the mopping policy. However, the 

policy does not require signs on every square foot of the hallway, nor should it. 

I also disagree with the majority’s decision to re-allocate fault among the parties. 

The trial court assigned 25% fault against Ms. Robertson, and the majority determines 

she had no fault in her injuries. I find this particularly curious since the majority 

apparently expects the school custodian to pepper the school hallway with wet-floor signs 

in order to reasonably comply with the “mopping policy,” yet the same safety program 

specifically requires professional staff to “pay close attention to wet floor signs.” The 

majority determines that Ms. Robertson “acted reasonably in walking out of her 

classroom to attend an afternoon meeting,” but it declines to note that she did not act 
6

reasonably in failing to see a wet-floor sign directly across the hallway from her 

classroom door and another a few feet away. Individuals have a duty to see what is in 

plain sight, including wet floor signs. See Easley v. Baker, No. M2003-02752-COAR3CV, 2005 WL 697525 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 24, 2005). If any re-allocation of fault 

should occur in this case, it should be that Ms. Robertson was more than fifty percent at 

fault.

 

 

_________________________________ 

BRANDON O. GIBSON, JUDGE