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REPORT OF SURVEY ON MIT FAILURES 

Background Information 

The Mechanical Integrity Test (MIT) has been identified as one of the most important 

parts of the Underground Injection Control (UIC) program since EPA began granting 

Class II primacy to states in 1982. The Class II UIC regulatory program for oilfieldrelated saltwater disposal (SWD) and enhanced recovery (EOR) wells depends upon the 

success of the MIT program to show that primacy state programs administered under 

Section 1425 of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) are as protective of Underground 

Sources of Drinking Water (USDWs) as are those Direct Implementation (DI) programs 

administered under Section 1422 of SDWA. EPA regulations promulgated under SDWA 

require that each Class II injection well be tested for mechanical integrity once each five 

years (20% of inventory per year) and that, at minimum, tests 25% of all wells must be 

witnessed. State UIC program peer reviews since 1990 have shown that most states view 

witnessing of tests as a top priority activity. Most states witness over 60% of the MITs 

and a few try to have an agency field inspector present during all MITs. All states, as well 

as EPA, have policy or a guideline prescribing the MIT pressure loss acceptable before 

the test is deemed a failure. All states and EPA (DI) require repairs or other appropriate

corrective action and subsequent retesting of the injection well before it can be used again 

for injection. Additionally some wells even require corrective measures prior to 

abandonment where routine plugging methods will not reduce the threat to USDWs. 

In 1986-7, a committee of oil and gas directors worked with EPA’s Office of Surface 

Water and Ground Water (formerly the Office of Drinking Water) to come up with a 

definition of Significant Non-Compliance (SNC) that most everyone, at least at that time 

understood. One of the points of agreement was that if the MIT failure was corrected 

within 90 days of the test, the result did not show up on the 7520 Form as a SNC. At that 

time, while all parties acknowledged that, in the empirical sense, a MI failure meant a 

violation had occurred; there were two types of well failure; ones that posed no potential 

or actual threat to USDWs and those that did. In the intervening years, few of the 

personnel at both the state and federal levels who were involved with the original SNC 

definition are still accessible to serve as a resource to the current program managers in 

providing interpretations and definition of what is or what is not a SNC. The attitude by 

some state UIC program administrators toward the seriousness of a violation has also 

become more purist. The six criteria that comprise the SNC definition are on the back of 

the EPA Form 7520-2B. 

 
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REASONS FOR CURRENT STUDY

Within the last three years, EPA has developed a set of Program Activity Measurements 

(PAMS) to use as a guide to show measures of progress within the UIC program. 

Primacy states, through the Ground Water Protection Council (GWPC) were able to 

provide nominal input to the shaping of the PAMS to afford more realistic articulation of 

the data submitted to EPA on 7520-2B forms and other reporting measures requested 

periodically by EPA. Parallel and subsequent to the development of National PAMS, 

EPA has an ongoing initiative to develop a National UIC Database, which appears to go 

beyond the amount of information traditionally required on the 7520 Forms. EPA 

spokespersons who explained the need for such a database indicated that the 7520 

information has not been used or collated into a report since the mid-1990s. EPA has 

endeavored to work with the Risk Based Data Management System (RBDMS) 

Workgroup within GWPC to tailor their effort toward a compatible system and these 

discussions have been somewhat positive. , Ongoing discussions have revealed that an 

opportunity for wide misinterpretations of MIT violations are possible when the EPA 

Office of Ground Water and Drinking Water shares this data with the Office of 

Compliance and Enforcement (OECA) and other program or administrative divisions 

within EPA. PAM SDW-14 (FY2006) asks for the number of wells maintaining MI 

versus the wells in the inventory while the report wants the number of failures. 

PAM 17 (FY2005); SDW-12, FY 2006 wants UIC program violations for each well 

class. 

Therefore, one purpose of this study was to provide a three-year snapshot of reported 

MIT failures for Class II wells in comparison to the number of wells tested. Another 

objective was to determine how primacy states characterized MIT failures in terms of 

how they are channeled through the violation>non-compliance>SNC>formal 

enforcement chain. 

 STUDY METHODOLOGY

A questionnaire was sent to seventeen primacy states, two DI states and two EPA 

Regional UIC offices. The questionnaire covered the gamut of issues that might arise 

from the time a MIT failure occurs, or is discovered through a scheduled test to the 

ultimate resolution of that failure by compliance interaction between the operator and the 

Class II regulatory authority. The survey explored how states with primacy programs are 

addressing the conduct of MITs and what subsequent actions are taken when test failure 

has been found. The survey assumed all programs were operating under ongoing 

State/EPA Agreements and that all those programs had submitted original program 

descriptions, which were approved by EPA before primacy was awarded to the state. One 

objective of this study was to establish if variations in interpretation of key components 

of the MIT violation/SNC definitions by states and/or EPA existed. Those unfamiliar 

with the “demonstration of equal effectiveness” caveat in the Class II Section 1425 

programs might have difficulty in visualizing how USDWs are being protected when the 

route from a discovery of an MIT failure to enforcement reaction by the regulatory 
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agency may vary somewhat from state to state. However, it is important to remember 

that each state acquired primacy via a separate application process and that the 

measure of equal effectiveness is, therefore, determined on a state-by-state and 

application-by-application basis. 

RESULTS OF SURVEY

Number of MITs Conducted and Percentage of Failures

Question 1: During the Federal Fiscal Year (FFY) period 2003-2005 (3 years ending 

October 1, 2005, how many MIT’s were conducted on Class II wells? Please give the 

number for each year.

Table I lists the number of MIT's reported by 17 primacy states. It should be noted that 

the bulk of injection wells in Ohio are under continuous positive annulus pressuremonitoring program and are not tested on a five-year cycle. Some states, such as 

California test all wells, except steamflood wells, more frequently than five years, which 

skews a five-year periodicity number but does constitute an MIT for each occasion a test 

is required from the operator. In Colorado, Montana, Utah and Wyoming, wells located 

on Bureau of Land Management (BLM) are, by mutual agreement, tested for MI by the 

state. Indian Lands in those and other states are under EPA’s Direct Implementation (DI) 

program and are not included in this report. 

Question 2(a): Of those wells tested during an official state or DI (five-year test), 

how many failures (number or percentage acceptable) of MI occurred?

The second part of Table I lists numbers and percentages of MIT failures. The reported 

failure rate for UIC wells in most states is less than 10% for a given year. A couple of 

states that use a 5% permissible pressure loss (Louisiana) or no pressure loss tolerance 

(Texas) have a higher percentage of failure. Texas, however, does not begin the test until 

stabilization within the well has been reached. Other factors that might account for 

variations of failures from year to year are the age of the selected injection wells in the 

year of the test, the addition of wells back onto the schedule that were on Temporary 

Abandonment status during poorer economic times, the scheduling of larger than normal 

numbers of wells in a given year for various reasons, or the testing of wells belonging to 

operators who pretest prior to the scheduled test and the pretest failure is not counted into 

the yearly failure numbers.

Analysis: The figure reported by states for this three-year period shows that MITs are 

being conducted on a scheduled basis and that a certain percentage of those tests fail. The 

numbers of failures that actually become a threat to USDWs or represent external 

integrity failure represent a small percentage of the total wells that failed a test. The 

three-year glimpse represents about 60% of the wells that should be on the Class II 

inventory for a given state. Injection wells that are tested more that once during the fiveyear period should show up as a number in excess of the total state inventory. Wells that 

are on an alternate program such as Ohio’s continuous annulus monitoring for what they 
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term “Conventional Class II” would have to be accounted for separately in terms of the 

five-year cycle as would the failures that are reported. The results in Table I do not depict 

a pattern of overall improvement or decline in well integrity. The only way to develop 

some understanding of program progress on MI, i.e., a decline in the percentage of failure 

would be to account for the number of failures per year/ tests conducted for the first fiveyear cycle and then compare each successive year with the corresponding year in the first 

(original) cycle. States that received primacy after 1988 would have to compare results 

with EPA’s figures from the DI program. States in this category such as Indiana, 

Mississippi and Montana generally adopted the same pressure loss differential for testing 

as used by EPA; consequently, the pressure loss policy would be a constant.

Reported Loss of External Integrity

Question 2 (b) How many MI failures involved external breaches of integrity or 

other potential threats to USDWs?

Responses to this question indicated that states were either confused by the term 

“external breaches of integrity” or did not understand that the study was calling for both 

situations where Part I MI failure may have created flow outside the wellbore and Part II 

MI tests showed that vertical communication had developed. Eight states (Alabama, 

Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming) reported no 

such failures. Three states (Illinois, Montana and Texas) indicated they didn’t track this 

information. The remaining states reported as follows:

Kansas 2003-13 (<0.1%) 2004-21 (<0.1%) 2005-45 (1.6%)

Louisiana two failures over a three-year period

Nebraska 2003-1 (1%) 2004-3 (2.3%) 2005-6 (3.7%)

New Mexico 2003-3 (0.3%) 2004-0 2005-1 (<0.1%)

North Dakota 2003-9 (2.6%) 2004-13 (4.4%) 2005-9 (3.5%)

Ohio four in a three-year period

Oklahoma 25% estimate of all failures (2003-1.2%, 2004-1.3%, 2005- 1.3%) 

No analysis of this information was made because the results are so mixed and may be 

incomplete. One conclusion, which can be drawn, is that external failures represent a 

small percentage of the total number of failures discovered through the MIT program. 

MIT FAILURE: VIOLATION OR NOT?

Question 3(a) Does the agency consider any failed MIT a violation?

Question 3(b) Does the agency consider a failed MIT a non-significant or significant 

non-compliance event?

Question 3(c) Does the agency considers a failed MIT a significant non-compliance 

only if the failure threatens or actually contaminates a USDW?
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Table II lists the state responses for Questions 3(a) through 3(c). Eleven states consider 

all MIT failures a violation regardless of seriousness or significance, however; only five 

consider all failures to be matters of significant non-compliance (SNCs). Three of those 

states: Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio are in EPA Region V; the other two are Kansas and 

Louisiana. Four states do not consider an MIT failure a violation. Illinois do not consider 

an MIT failure a violation unless resolution of the problem extends past 90 days but still 

counts all failures, as SNCs. Oklahoma does not call an MIT failure a violation unless it 

was not reported to the Oklahoma Corporation Commission. Texas uses a set of 

administrative criteria to determine whether a violation has occurred. Every state except 

Kansas believes that a SNC has automatically occurred if the failure threatens or 

contaminates a USDW. Kansas indicated some situations arise where a threat would not 

necessarily count as a SNC.

Analysis: By purest definition, any injection well operating without mechanical integrity 

is a violation of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) and regulations promulgated 

hereunder. This is because, by logical extension, any injection well without MI could 

potentially result in an endangerment of an USDW. This empirical tenet applies whether 

the well is in a primacy program under Section 1425 or under an EPA DI state or entity. 

The purpose of the five-year MI cycle is to ensure USDWs will be protected. A practical 

viewpoint is that once an operator runs an MIT under a state or DI program schedule and 

fails the test, the zeal and alacrity demonstrated by the operator to bring the well back 

into compliance (return to MI or proper plugging and abandonment) determines the 

seriousness of the “violation”. A well may come into a non-compliance status at any 

time between tests, and unless the loss of integrity is so apparent that the operator should 

have known from general well performance or gain or loss of pressure, the return to 

compliance generally overshadows the violation. Table II indicates primacy state views 

range from fairly liberal to strict. 
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TABLE I

Number of MITs Run (FFYs 2003-2005); Percentage of Failed MITs

State Conducted MITs Number/% Failed

2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005

Alabama 63 72 89 4/6.4% 6/8.3% 12/13.5%

Alaska 300 431 440 29/9.7% 35/8.1% 64/14.5%

Arkansas 110 147 168 6/5.4% 16/10.9% 11/6.4%

California 10,084 11,469 11,336 77/0.8% 80/0.7% 106/0.9%

Colorado 271 194 212 14/5.2% 16/6.0% 28/13.2%

Illinois 1,579 1,214 1,312 91/5.7% 73/6.1% 61/4.6%

Indiana 469 252 224 49/10.4% 12/4.7% 13/5.8%

Kansas 2,425 2,497 2,762 149/6.1% 166/6.6% 226/8.1%

Louisiana 1,107 1,319 1,195 168/15.2% 197/14.9 181/15.2%

Montana 288 221 358 *34/12% 27/12% 43/12% 

Nebraska 88 130 160 7/8.0% \ 18/14% 22/14%

New Mexico 938 601 1,607 98/10.4% 61/10.1% 272/16.9%

North Dakota 342 295 256 38/11.1% 18/6.1% 17/6.6%

Ohio ** 42 43 42 total of 43 failures in three years (18 per year for 

280 wells/ 6%) 

Oklahoma 2,855 3,384 2,537 135/4.7% 186/5.4% 139/5.4%

Texas 13,102 14,070 15,996 1,451/11.1% 2,782/19.8% 2,151/13.4%

Utah * 123 123 123 8/7.5% reported for each year

West Virginia 60 60 60 1 0 0

Wyoming 591 599 533 61/10.3% 58/9.6% 48/9.0%

TOTAL_______________________________________________________________________________

* Montana projects failure rate of 12% for each year; Utah 7.5 % for each year
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** Ohio uses continuous monitoring of the annulus as its means for maintaining mechanical integrity 

on its conventional Class II injection wells
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Definition of Significant Non-Compliance (SNC)

Question 4(a): Please give us your definition of what “Significant Non-Compliance” 

(SNC) is insofar as it applies to the MIT portion of the UIC program.

This question was included in the survey because it was desirable to determine if most 

states were using the same definition when applying it to the UIC program in general, and 

in particular to the MIT program element. The definition 2 b. provided on the back of 

EPA Form 7520-2B states:

“Mechanical Integrity- Well operation without mechanical integrity which 

causes the movement of fluid outside the authorized zone- if injection of such 

fluids may have the potential for endangering a USDW.”

Table III show that most states conform fairly close to the above definition and interpret a 

SNC to include a failure that threatens to cause contamination or has caused 

contamination to a USDW. About half the states use the entire six parts of the definition 

on EPA Form 7520-2B. Even though the definition of a SNC is printed out clearly on the 

back of EPA Form 7520-2B, some newer Class II program directors are unclear as to 

what all a SNC definition encompasses. Some EPA Regions appear to have adopted a 

sterner, less flexible approach for primacy states in their region.

Question 4(b) Using this definition, how many SNCs were reported to EPA on Form 

7520 or other reporting vehicle for the above three-year period?

Question 4(c) How many SNCs were recorded for FFY 2005?

Ten states reported no SNCs for the three-year study period. Those that did report SNCs 

provided the following information:

State 2003 2004 2005 Comments

Alaska three over total period 

Illinois 299 61 246

Kansas * 24 22 36

New Mexico three for two year period 1

Nebraska 3 0 0

Ohio 22 for two-year period 20

Oklahoma 53 for two-year period 0

Texas 994 966 1,101

* Kansas broke down the FFY2005 statistic as follows: Unauthorized injection – 6, 29 for failure to repair 

in a timely manner and 1 for falsification of information provided to agency. Oklahoma and Texas use the 

same criteria to count SNCs. 
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TABLE II

MIT Failure Versus Violation: Non-Significant or Significant?

State Violation (all MIT Failures) All SNCs Threat to 

USDW 

(only)

Alabama Yes No Yes

Alaska No (generally no USDWs) No Yes

Arkansas Yes No Yes

California No (generally) No Yes

Colorado Yes No Yes

Illinois No (unless 90 days non resolution) Yes Yes

Indiana Yes Yes No

Kansas Yes (by regulation) Yes Yes and No

Louisiana Yes Yes No

Montana Yes No Yes

Nebraska Yes No Yes

New Mexico Yes No Yes

North Dakota Yes No Yes

Ohio Yes Yes Yes 

Oklahoma No (unless not reported) No Yes

Texas No (unless of six criteria violated) No Yes

Utah Yes (but depends upon geology) No Yes

West Virginia No No Yes

Wyoming No No Yes
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TABLE III

STATE RESPONSE-DEFINITION OF SNC for MITs

Alabama Loss of MI threatens to contaminate or contaminates USDW

Alaska Threatens to contaminate USDW; failure to notify agency of failed pre-test; failure to do 

test on schedule; falsification of records

Arkansas Loss of MI threatens to contaminate or contaminates USDW

California Loss of MI threatens to contaminate or contaminates USDW; also applies the six 

definitions of SNC on EPA Form 7520-2B

Colorado Potential or actual threat to USDW

Illinois Uses definition of SNC from EPA form 7520-2B

Indiana Uses definition on EPA Form 7520-2B

Kansas Potential or actual threat to USDW, also broad definition on EPA Form 7520-2B. Not 

repaired in a timely manner

Louisiana All failures are SNC Violations; only those that are threats to USDWs are serious

Montana Potential or actual contamination of USDW

Nebraska Formal enforcement due to failure to correct MIT failure in timely manner.

New Mexico Potential threat to USDW

North Dakota Loss of MI threatens or contaminates aquifer

Ohio Uses definition on EPA Form 7520-2B

Oklahoma Uses same definition as Kansas and Texas 

Texas Uses same definition as Kansas and Oklahoma and failure to repair well in six months

Utah If failure leads to a contaminated aquifer

West Virginia Not correcting an MIT failure

Wyoming Loss of MI resulting in USDW contamination threat
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Scheduling of MITs and Pre-Testing Policy

Question 5(a) How far prior to a state/EPA -scheduled test is the operator notified of 

the upcoming date?

Table IV presents responses from states regarding the amount of lead-time given an 

operator for a state scheduled MIT. The advance notification serves two primary 

purposes: the operator is given a directive as to the amount of time available to set up the 

test and the state is able to plan its test-witnessing workload. Most states give the operator 

advance notice ranging from a week to around 90 days. Colorado, Illinois, Montana, and 

Ohio (for Class II Annular Disposal wells only) notify operators at the beginning of a 

year of MITs to be run during the year. California and Alaska put the onus on the 

operator to maintain a well’s MIT schedule and to notify the state agency when the test is 

to be run with enough time ahead to allow a state inspector opportunity to witness. 

Kansas gives their District Offices an annual schedule of MITs to be conducted during 

the year and the operators receive 30- day notices from the District office.

Question 5(b) If an operator conducts an MIT prior to the scheduled test, is this an 

acceptable action or a violation of state regulations?

Question 5 (c) What is your agency policy? 

Question 6 (a) Does a violation occur if the operator, in conducting the pretest under 

(5) above, finds an MIT failure, subsequently repairs it so that no failure occurs 

during the official test, but doesn’t report the corrective work prior to the official 

test?

Question 6(b) Does the state have a requirement, not necessarily related to UIC, 

which requires reporting of work done on a well?

Responses to Questions 5(b) through 6(b) are also summarized in Table IV. Most state 

regulations or policies do not prohibit an operator from conducting an MIT (pre-test) 

before the official state scheduled test; however, several states consider a pre-test failure 

to be a reportable violation. Kansas, for example, considers a pre-test MIT failure to be a 

reportable event and failure to report is the violation. Texas tries to discourage nonreporting of pre-test MIT failures. Several states consider corrective action taken as a 

result of a MI pre-test to be a form of workover and, therefore a required reported event. 

Most states allow pre-test through unwritten agency policy; however, the procedure for 

an operator to follow once a failed is discovered is clearly defined in written policy or 

regulation. Arkansas requires any pre-test to be witnessed; otherwise it does not qualify 

as a valid test. 
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TABLE IV

PRIMACY STATE POLICIES ON MIT SCHEDULING AND PRETESTING

Alabama Two weeks ahead, one year for operators with many wells. Pre-testing may be 

acceptable if operator gives prior notice to agency. State/EPA Agreement (SEA) requires 

witnessing of Part I of all SWDs and 75% of EOR wells. Charting of unwitnessed tests 

may be required.

Alaska Operators set test schedule and notify AOGCC 24 hours prior to test. Pre-testing is 

acceptable and is encouraged. Pre-testing allowed by policy.

Arkansas Minimum of 10 days before; allowance made for testing well in same area. By policy, 

agency staff must witness all MITs; consequently a pre-test by the operator would not be 

accepted if unwitnessed. 

California Operators maintain frequency of tests and agency send delinquency notice if a test is 30-

days overdue. Pre-testing acceptable, however all MIT results have to be submitted to 

agency. Pre-testing is not a common practice

Colorado Operator received ten-day notice of MIT. COGC does not accept pre-tests and considers 

any MIT official. Operators of unwitnessed tests must submit pressure chart. 

Illinois Operators notified at beginning of each year of MITs to be conducted. Pre-testing 

acceptable, however, the next 5-year clock starts from the test. Operator required to file a 

new Completion Report for a workover. Pre-test failure not a violation.

Kansas Variable schedule but operator usually notified 30 days prior to test by District Office. 

D.O receives an annually list of wells to be tested. No violation to pre-test, however, by 

regulation any MIT failure on pre-test is considered a violation if not reported.

Louisiana 30-90 days prior to test. Operators encouraged to pre-test by agency policy.

Montana Operators notified at beginning of year of all wells to be MITed. Acceptable for operators 

to pre-test by agency policy.

Nebraska Approximately 30 days. Pre-testing acceptable but agency policy required test to be 

witnessed to be valid.

New Mexico Notification of operator 14-30 days prior to scheduled MIT. Pre-tests generally 

acceptable but generally occurs on well workovers where retests are required prior to 

reinjection.

North Dakota Notification generally a few days in advance but can require “surprise” MITs. Pre-tests 

are acceptable and failure not a violation. Test reported as workover activity

Ohio Operators of annular disposal wells are notified of impending test in October of the year 

previous to when the five-year MIT is due. Pre-tests are acceptable, but failure to conduct 

an MIT is reported as violation. If operators do not conduct an MIT, the AD authorization 

is revoked and the wells revert back to a normal producing well. They are, however, 

considered “temporarily abandoned” AD wells and can re-test and pass MI and get 

authorized. Workover reports are required. All MITS are witnessed by Division 

representatives.
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Oklahoma Notification of operators done quarterly for MITs to be done during that quarter. Pre-test 

is acceptable if OCC District Office received prior notification. OCC rules allow MITs 

done out of schedule. No workover reports are required.

Texas Operators of wells on annual MITs are notified 90 days in advance and wells on a fiveyear clock are notified 6 months prior to test. Pre-tests are acceptable, but TRRC staff 

Tries to “discourage” non-reporting of failures. Such unscheduled MITs are entered as a 

failure. Workover reports are required.

Utah Notification of operator two weeks prior to MIT. Pre-test acceptable but witnessing still 

required. Pre-test failure may count as a violation. Workover reports required.

West Virginia Sixty days, but operators want up to 6 months if they agency inspectors will be 

witnessing. Pre-test acceptable but no policy. Failure could be a violation unless the 

operator shuts down well. Workover report required by regulation.

Wyoming Notification of MIT at least three weeks before test. Pre-tests are acceptable by policy, 

and failures not counted as a violation. Workover reports required by regulation.

 
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 Allowable Pressure Decline During State Scheduled MI Tests



Question 7 (a): What percentage of pressure loss on a Class II well MIT is 

acceptable to the State/EPA? 

Table V shows the reported permissible loss for each surveyed state and other states 

where recent information was available. The percentage of permissible loss varies widely 

across states; however, those states that received primacy in the 1982-1984 period 

generally allowed a larger percentage loss per unit time. Texas and Utah allow no 

pressure loss once the well is stabilized. 

Question 7 (b): Is this percentage determined by state statute; regulation, or agency 

policy?

Most states reported that the permissible loss was guided by agency policy. One state, 

Kansas, uses historical experience to partially guide the policy. Only one state (Ohio) had 

the test limits established by state statute and five (Alabama, Alaska, Montana, Indiana 

and Oklahoma) by regulation. Alabama additionally uses Oil and Gas Board field orders 

to address certain sensitive areas where less permissible losses of pressure should be 

allowed. States within EPA Region V (Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio) tolerate only losses of 

5% or less (3% in the case of Indiana). EPA Regions did not respond to the questionnaire 

with numerical answers, however, past information indicates that EPA Regions require 

no greater MI loss than 5 30 minutes in some DI states and 3% in others. 

Question 7 (c): What tests (i.e.) temperature, sonar, etc.) are used, other than a onetime inspection of cement records, to determine continual external MI?

Most states surveyed (12 of 17) allow the operator to use the Radioactive Tracer Surveys 

(RATS) to demonstrate external MI. A slightly lesser number (10) allow the use of 

temperature logs. A few states allow the use of spinner surveys, noise logs, oxygenactivation (OA) logs, casing inspection logs and cement bond logs. Only California 

indicated that the operator had to run RATS or other approved test on Class II disposal 

wells every year and on EOR water injectors every two years. The primacy states of 

Region V (Illinois, Indiana and Ohio) indicated that cement records were the only test of 

external MI used. West Virginia uses an open annular valve to determine MI. 
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TABLE V

Permissible Pressure Loss During State Required MIT

State Permitted Loss Basis for Requirement

Alabama 10%/30min@ 1500 psi max State regulation

10%/30min@ 300 psi (Pollard Field) O&G Board Field Order

0%/ 30min@ 500psi (Citronelle Field ER wells) O&G Board Field Order

Alaska 10%/30 min after pressure stabilized Regulation 20 AAC 25.412 (c)

Arkansas 10%/30 min Policy

California 10%/10min@ 200psi (both water &gas inj.) Policy

Colorado 10 %/15 min Policy & Primacy Program 

Illinois 5%/30min@ 300psi State regulation

Indiana 3%/30 min State regulation

Kansas 15%/30 min (less for annular MITs) Policy, Historical Experience

Louisiana 5%/30 min Policy

Mississippi 3%/30min State/EPA Primacy agreement 

Montana 5%/15 min Regulation

Nebraska 10%/30 min Policy

New Mexico 10%/30 min Policy

North Dakota 10%/30 min Policy

Oklahoma 10%/30 min OCC Regulations

Ohio 5%/ 15 min; Annular Disp 1%/ hour State Statute

Texas 0%/30 min after stabilization Policy

Utah 0%/30 min Policy

West Virginia 5%/20 min Policy

Wyoming 10%/15 min Policy
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Number and Nature of Contamination Cases

Question 10: How many contamination instances have been discovered through MI 

testing during the FFY 2003-5 period and what was the nature of the failure(s)?

Out of seventeen reporting states, only Louisiana reported contamination from a hole 

in the casing of an annular injection well. Recent peer or STRONGER reviews of 

three other states reported no pollution incidents involving injection wells. One state, 

Texas, does not break out failures in terms of “contamination cases” or method of 

contamination causation. 

Criteria: Escalation of Violations From Compliance to Formal Enforcement

Question 8 When or under what circumstances does a MI failure occurrence go 

from an instance of non-compliance to a subject of formal enforcement action? 

Please provide examples of formal enforcement actions (Orders) that have actually

been used to get a Class II well back into compliance.

Question 11: What criteria are used by the state to determine whether an MIT 

violation escalates from a matter of compliance to one of formal enforcement?

Table VI contains responses from primacy states regarding the normal evolutionary 

processes available when a MIT failure (non-compliance event) cannot be resolved 

without invoking some type of formal enforcement measure. Most responding states did 

not provide actual examples of formal enforcement actions that had been issued for MIT 

violations. Table VI also shows that states allow anywhere from 30 days to 270 days 

(average about 90 days) for the operator to satisfactorily resolve an MIT failure. Small 

additional amounts of time are permitted if the operator has encountered “unexpected 

circumstances” and the agency has not determined the delay to be a stall tactic. Ohio does 

issue Administrative Orders if the failure is not corrected within 48 hours. Utah gives the 

operator fifteen days to resolve the failure or submit a remediation plan. Ten states give 

the operator up to 90 days to repair or plug a well and abandon it under state regulations. 

This is coincidentally the time allotted for non-compliance without entering the matter on 

a 7520 form as a SNC. Some states use fines and penalties to “encourage” the operator 

back into compliance. Some states do not specify a length of time for a return to 

compliance, but correspondence with the operator would generally contain a deadline for 

the expected return to compliance.

Discussion: Most states have an Administrative Procedures Act that governs the 

protocol for an agency to follow once the need for an enforcement action has been 

determined. This would include the content of enforcement orders; hearing and appeal 

opportunity afforded the operator and the determination of standing of various parties. 

All Class II primacy states have entered into an Enforcement Agreement with EPA, 

which covers the content of any Administrative Procedures Act and any interagency and 

intra-agency policies that exist. When any UIC compliance matter is not resolved in a 
18

prescribed amount of time or when contamination of water and/or environmental 

resources is sufficient to require corrective action on the part of the operator, each state 

agency selects the enforcement tool most effective to correct the situation. The primacy 

states, as this study shows, use a wide range of enforcement measures to effect correction 

of a failed MIT when the operator either chooses to or cannot comply with the initial 

directives of the agency.

 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1) This survey represents only a three-year snapshot of MI testing in a majority of 

the primacy states. MIT testing in many of these primacy states is in the fifth 

cycle of the five-year testing program. Were a different period, or a longer period 

selected, the failure rates may have been about the same or could have varied 

somewhat depending upon the population of wells being tested. Historical 

comparison of past cycles with the same groups of wells may provide a clearer 

picture of what the MIT failure percentages represent. However, care should be 

taken when making abstract comparisons for each year. Depressions in the oil 

industry during the period 1986 through 2003 caused many injection wells to be 

placed on an idle well or temporary abandonment program and as economic 

fortunes improved many of these wells were MITed and returned to a cycle. In 

some cases, perhaps frequently, these wells ended up in a different testing group 

than the original scheduled group. The abstract number of MIT failure versus 

the number of wells tested may indicate program performance, but may also 

lead a reviewer of the information to visualize a positive or negative program 

performance trend when none exists.

2) Most primacy states have regulations, policies or other methods to resolve MIT 

failures within a reasonable amount of time (generally 90 days or less). This study 

had no vehicle of indicating or judging whether or not Class II primacy states 

judicially and effectively resolve MIT failures in accordance within the times 

established by policy, however, EPA Regional UIC staff probably do have this 

information since they perform annual audits on each state program and prepare a 

report documenting their findings. Any deficiencies in how a state resolves MIT 

failures should be noted in an audit report with any expectations for correction. 

This study indicated the percentage of MIT failures over any given period of 

time and in a given state setting, which may have a potential to affect ground 

water reserves, is very small.

3) Most of the states surveyed use definition of a SNC on the back of the EPA 7520-

2B form. Only one of the six-part definition of a SNC relates directly to the 

conduct of MITs, however, a few states assume that if the operator fails to obtain 

a permit for an injection well or falsifies any information submitted to the state, 

including data from the MIT, that action is tantamount to a non-demonstration of 

well integrity. 
19

4) Most states believe that a failed MIT is automatically a violation, a few states 

believe the actual violation occurs when the operator discoversa failure either 

through pre-test or official state ordered test and does not take corrective action 

and in the case of a pre-test, fails to notify the state agency of the work done to 

repair the problem. In many cases, neither the operator nor the state knows the 

extent of MIT failure until the well is tested, because the day-to-day performance 

may not indicate a failure has occurred. The term “violation” may range from 

academic to practical definitions, depending upon the viewpoint of the state, or 

perhaps by the terms of the primacy agreement with EPA.

5) The information gained through this study demonstrates the dangers, which may 

exist if EPA or any UIC Class II regulatory state furnishes abstract MIT failure 

data to the public, stakeholder groups or to federal and state policy makers. EPA 

is currently building a National Data Base that will be accessible to those outside 

the program and mechanical integrity of the injection wells is the crucial element 

of demonstrating protection of USDWs. A true picture of ground water protection 

may not occur if all MIT failure are viewed with equal seriousness; i.e., a gross 

comparison of the number of failures to the number of tests.

6) A group of Class II representatives within GWPC should continue to work with 

EPA to determine whether or not past state-federal data transfer management 

problems have originated through the wrong selection of data elements to 

properly describe the UIC Class II program performance or from lack of 

consistent management of the data after submission by the state. The Class II UIC 

program is over twenty years old and EPA is still struggling with developing a 

database that articulates the true picture of long-term program success. 
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 TABLE VI

 CRITERIA FOR ESCALATION- COMPLIANCE TO ENFORCEMENT 

Alabama Failure to shut in well when MI was lost, failure to restore MI within 90 days as required 

by State/EPA UIC Enforcement Agreement; reactivation prior to reauthorization.

Alaska Deterrent to similar behavior and protect MI; past compliance history, seriousness of the 

incident, potential for significant harm, benefit derived by the operator. Failure to repair, 

retest or plug well, contamination of USDW.

Arkansas If well is not successfully repaired and retested within 90 days, “Authority” to inject is 

cancelled and a NOV is issued. The same 90- day criteria apply to a well that wasn’t 

tested according to state schedule.

California A formal enforcement action if health, life, property or natural resources are threatened. 

Failure to comply with Division of Oil, Gas, and Geothermal Resources (DOGGR) 

requirements, permit revocation and civil penalties for unauthorized injection. Formal 

orders are rarely issued.

Colorado Failure to comply with Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (COGGC) 

requirements and deadlines. NOV s are issued giving 6 months to repair, If no action, an 

Administrative Order of Consent is issued with fines, compliance schedules and possibly 

bond claim. 

Illinois If well is not repaired or plugged within 90 days of failure discovery

Indiana Formal Notice of Violation (NOV) giving sixty days to repair and retest the well or plug 

it. Repeat violators can be issued an order banning them from producing in the state.

Kansas If well not repaired or plugged within time period prescribed by KCC, monetary fines up 

to $10,000 per day can issued or loss of operator license. Generally, 90 days are given to 

repair, retest and /or plug the well. The state can plug the well with its own funds and 

seek reimbursement from the operator. 

Louisiana NOV at time of failure; 90 days to repair or plug; operator could receive a compliance 

order that includes civil penalties or an revocation of authority to transport oil or gas.

Mississippi Has 90 days to repair or plug well with MIT failure. Permit is suspended until action is 

taken. Show Cause hearing before Board is taken if operator fails to comply with 90 

days. Board may revoke permit.

Montana If too much time has elapsed and the well have not returned to compliance. The MBOGC 

gives the operator 180 days to repair or plug. Failure to comply will result in the Board 

giving one month to comply plus fines. 

Nebraska No action taken by operator at the end of required time (90 days). Failure to respond to 

agency request.

New Mexico Any SNC or failed MIT not repaired within 90 days. Failure to comply results in Shut-In 

Order.

North Dakota Seriousness of violation; Threat to USDW, not correcting problem within 270 days. 
21

Ohio All failed MITs are issued Administrative Orders unless repair and retest is immediate 

(usually within 48 hours) Further enforcement action is taken if the operator fails to 

repair and retest the well.

Oklahoma No response by operator to written notice from OCC; then agency proceeds with formal 

enforcement action. OCC policy is to allow 30-90 days for compliance.

Texas If operator is out of compliance for 6 months; i.e. fails to repair or plug the well; a 30-day 

severance letter is enforcement action. 

Utah Fifteen days to remediate fail well or submit a remediation plan. If not corrected, formal 

action by Board or informal meeting with operator. 

West Virginia Gives 180 days to repair or plug; if operator fails to comply with Board requests, they are 

fined and given a 30 days extension to correct problem.

Wyoming If operator does not repair and retest well or plug within 90 days or fails to perform MIT. 

Can levy fines up to $5,000 per day, invoke civil penalties and order the operator to 

submit a schedule for remedial work.