alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
41660.

#### WOODWARD v. POWELL et al.

*80Argued January 10, 1966

Decided February 8, 1966.

*Lucio L. Russo1, Russo & Russo, Ed B. Flowers,*for appellant.

*Reed, Flournoy & Tate, Berl T. Tate,*for appellees.

Jordan, Judge.

This was a suit by the plaintiff to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained by her during the course of her employment because of the failure of the defendant employers to provide her with a safe place to work. The trial court sustained the defendants’ general demurrers and dismissed the petition without giving the plaintiff leave to amend and the appeal is from that judgment.

Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant conceded in his oral argument before this court that the petition did not state a cause of action and was subject to general demurrer since there were no facts alleged therein in support of the conclusion of the pleader that the defendants had implied or constructive knowledge of the alleged danger incident to the plaintiff’s employment. See in this connection, *Elrod v. Ogles,*78 Ga. App. 376, 382 (50 SE2d 791).

It is strongly contended by counsel for the plaintiff, however, that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition without giving the plaintiff leave to amend. This contention is based upon the fact that the plaintiff had served written interrogatories upon the defendants on the day preceding the ruling on the defendants’ general demurrers, and it is argued on behalf of the plaintiff that she should have been given the opportunity to amend her petition after securing answers to these interrogatories based upon the information thus obtained.

This court in *Higgins v. Otis Elevator Co.,*69 Ga. App. 584, 589 (26 SE2d 380), held as follows: “Where a judge takes demurrers under advisement and where the right to amend is requested of the court before judgment such right should be *81given before dismissal of the action or pleadings if there is enough to amend by.” The record in this case does not disclose that the plaintiff requested a delay in the consideration by the court of the defendants’ general demurrers until answers .to the interrogatories were received or that the plaintiff requested leave to amend before the entry of a judgment of dismissal; and it is well settled that in the absence of such request, the plaintiff, after the dismissal of the case, has no right to amend or to a re-instatement of the case in order to permit her to amend, although the trial court may in its discretion allow the case to be reopened during the same term of court. *Bowen v. Wyeth,*119 Ga. 687 (3) (46 SE 823); *Ripley v. Eady & Mayfield,*106 Ga. 422 (2) (32 SE 343); *Lamar, Taylor & Riley Drug Co. v. First Nat. Bank,*127 Ga. 448, 452 (56 SE 486); *Owens v. Rutherford,*200 Ga. 143, 152 (36 SE2d 309).

The trial court did not err in dismissing the petition without leave to amend and in subsequently denying the plaintiff’s motion to amend the judgment of dismissal so as to allow time for amendment.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Bell, P. J., and Eberhardt, J., concur.*
Exhibit
15.1







Consent
of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm



The Board of Directors

Triterras Fintech Pte. Ltd



We
consent to use of our report dated August 28, 2020, with respect to the statement of financial position of Triterras Fintech Pte.
Ltd. as of February 29, 2020 and February 28, 2019, the related statemens of comprehensive income, changes in equity and cash
flows for the year ended February 29, 2020 and the period from November 1, 2018 (date of incorporation) to February 28, 2019,
and the related notes, incorporated by reference herein and to the reference to our firm under the heading “Statement by
Experts” in the shell company report on Form 20-F.





|/s/ KPMG LLP | 
|------------ | 



KPMG
LLP

Singapore

November
16, 2020
#### William Neely, Respondent, *v.*Christopher Munnich, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term,

May, 1899.)

Attachment — Final judgment for the defendant precludes Mm from continuing a reference ordered on a motion to vacate.

Where, in an action for an attachment, the defendant makes an offer of judgment and it is accepted and final judgment is entered and that judgment is paid, a reference, directed upon a motion to vacate the attachment falls with the judgment; and the defendant cannot continue the reference merely for thé purpose of repelling .'imputations which have been cast upon him by the moving affidavits, used on granting the attachment.

Appeal by the defendant from an order made by the General Term of the City Court of New York, affirming an order made by a justice at Special Term, vacating an order of reference.

Hastings *&*Gleason (Martin Saxe, of counsel) for appellant.

Abraham A. Joseph, for respondent.

MacLean, J.

Upon the hearing of a motion to vacate the attachment issued in the above-entitled action, the justice ordered a reference to take proofs and report thereon. Before any hearing was had on such reference, the defendant answered and made an offer of judgment, which was accepted, and thereupon final judgment was rendered in the action in favor of the plaintiff, which judgment was fully paid. This annulled the attachment (Code *508Giv. Pro., § 3343, subd. 12), and it thereupon Lócame "the duty-of the sheriff to deliver over mpon demand to the defendant^ or to the person entitled thereto, all the attached personal• property re-mainipg in his hands (§ 709), and to "file in the clerF.S' office the. "warrant with the return of his proceedings- -thereon (§ 712).' Upoh the annulment of the warrant, the motion to vacate it-must needs fail,, and together with it.the incidental reference,, which was properly vacated. The defendant claims 'tó "he aggrieved, because the reference ceasing, he cannot, by a report in his favor, he relieved from the imputations cast upon him in the affidavits upon which the ■ attachment was granted. Whatever might be the outcome in his behalf of the reference, the defendant cannot complain, because he brought about the situation voluntarily by paying the judgment, to save further costs. The order appealed from should he affirmed, with costs to the respondent..

Ebeedman, P. J., and Leventbitt, J., concur.

Order, affirmed, with costs to the respondent.
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

* * T he pa ne l una ni m ous l yc onc l ude s thi s c a s e i s s ui t abl e f orde c i s i on w ith o u t o r a l ar g u m e n t. See F ed. R . A pp . P . 34 (a )( 2). P D M / R es ear ch NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON

UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T MAT T HE W L OU I S J OH NS ON , P la in tif

f - A p p e llan t, v. D A R R , C orre ct i on alO ff i ce r, D ef

endant- A pp el l ee . N o. 09- 55490 D . C. N o . 3 : 0 8 - c v - 0 0 0 8 0 - D M SP OR ME MOR AN DU M *

A pp ea l fr om the U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt f o rth e S o u th e rn D is tr ic t o f C a lif o rn ia D a naM . S abr aw , D i s tr i c tJudge , P r e s i di ng S ubm i tt e d F e bruary16, 2010 ** B efo re: F E RN A N D E Z , G O U L D , an dM . S M IT H , C i rcu i tJu d g es. M a tthe w L oui s J ohns on, aC a l i f orni as t a t e pr i s one r , appe a l s pr o s e f r om the d is tr ic t c o u rt’s ju d g m e n t d is m is s in g h is 4 2 U .S .C . § 1 9 8 3 a c tio n f o rf a ilu r e to 

# FI LED MA R 03 2010 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALSP D M / Res ea r ch 09- 55490 2 e xhaus ta dm i ni s tr a t i ve r e m e di e s pur s uantt o the P r i s on L i t i ga t i on R e f orm A c t , 42 U . S . C . § 1 99 7e(a ). W e have j uri sdi ct i on pu rs uantt o 2 8 U . S . C . § 1 29 1. W e r evi ew de no vo the di stri ctcourt ’ s di sm i ss alfor f ai l ure t o exh aust , and revi ew for c l ear e rr o rits f a c tu a l d e te rm in a tio n s . W y at t v . T e rhune , 31 5 F . 3d 11 08 , 11 17 (9th C i r. 2003) . W e a f

f i rm i n pa rt , va c a t e i n part , a nd r e m and. T he di s tr i c tc ourtpr ope r l ydi s m i s s e d the a c t i on be c aus e J ohns on di d not c o m p le te th e p r is o n g r ie v a n c e p r o c e s s p r io rto f ilin g s u it. Se e W

oodf ord v . N go , 5 4 8 U .S . 8 1 , 9 3 - 9 5 ( 2 0 0 6 ) ( h o ld in g th a t “p r o p e re x h au s tio n ” u n d e r§ 1 9 9 7 e ( a ) is m andat ory and re qu i re s a dh er ence t o adm i ni strat i ve procedural rul es ). H ow ever , w e vac at e the j ud gm entand rem and for the l i m i t ed pu rpose of e nt er i ng di sm i ss al w ith o u t p r e

ju d ic e . Se e W

y a tt , 315 F . 3d a t1120 ( pr ovi di ng tha tdi s m i s s a l s f or f a ilu r e to e x h au s t a d m in is tr a tiv e r e m e d ie s a r e w ith o u t p r e ju d ic e ) . John son’ s r em ai ni ng cont ent i on s are un pers uasi ve. C o n tr a ryto ap p e lle e ’s c o n te n tio n , th e d is tr ic t c o u rt d idn o t ab u s e its d is c r e tio n b yc o n c lu d in g J o h n s o n ’s a c tio n w a s n o t f r iv o lo u s . See D enton v. H erna ndez , 504 U . S . 25, 33 ( 1992) ( r e vi e w i ng f orabus e of

di s c r e t i on fr i vo l ou snes s det erm i nat i on s und er28 U . S . C . § 1 91 5(e) (2)) . E a c h p a rtys h a ll b e a rits o w n c o s ts o n ap p e a l. AF F I RME D i n p a r t , V AC AT E D i n p a r t , a n d RE MAND E D.
# U n i ted S t a te s Cou r t o f Appe a l s F OR T HE D IS TRICT OF C OLUM BIA C IRCUI T

___ ___ ___ ___ 

## No. 23-7155 September Term, 2023 1: 23-cv -025 92-UNA Filed O n: March 22 , 20 24 Dmt MacT ruon g, also kn own as Dr. Mac T ruon g, App ellant
v . John V. Salierno , Esq., e t al.,

App ellees
ON A PPE A L FROM THE UNITED STA TES DIS TRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BEFORE: Hend erson , Millett, a nd W alker, Circuit Ju dges J U D G M E N T T his ap pea l was co nside red o n th e reco rd f rom the United Sta tes District Cou rt for th e District of

Colum bia a nd on the brief f iled b y ap pellan t. S ee Fed. R. Ap p. P

. 34(a )(2); D.C. Cir. Rule 34 (j). It is ORDERED A ND A DJUDGED tha t th e d istrict court’s o rder f iled Oct obe r 11, 202 3 b e a f

f irmed . T he district cou rt prop erly dism issed t he com plainton the ground tha t it was f rivolou s. S ee 28 U.S.C. § 19 15(e )(2)(B)( i); Neitz ke v. W illiams, 4 90 U.S. 319 , 32 5 (19 89) (“[A] com plaint

. . . is f rivolou s w here it lacks a n a rg uab le ba sis eithe r in law or in fact.”). A ppe llant h as n ot sh own any error in th e d istrict court’s co nclusion tha t the re is no priv ate rig ht o f actio n u nde r the crimina l statu tes h e cite d o r und er th e Uniform Code of

Military Justice . S ee Crosby v . Catre t, 3 08 F. Ap p’x 453, 453 (D.C. Cir. 200 9) (statin g that the re is no priv ate rig ht o f actio n u nde r 18 U.S.C. § 24 1); se e also L ee v . Unite d S tate s Agency for In t’l Dev., 859 F.3d 74 , 77 -78 (D.C. Cir. 20 17) (“[T]h e e x press p rov ision o f a crim inal p ena lty

. . . in a ba re crimina l statu te, w ith n o oth er sta tuto ry

ba sis for inferring that a civil cau se o f actio n e x ists, is insu f

f icient t o imp ly Congress int end ed to cre ate a co ncom itantciv il reme dy.”)(clean ed up). Moreover, ap pellan t ha s no t sho w n th at t he court erred in dism issing the co mp laint with prejud ice. S ee Firestone v. Firesto ne, 76 F.3d 12 05, 12 09 (D.C. Cir. 1996 ) (per curiam ) (“A dismissa l w ith p rejudice is warrante d . . . when a trial co urt d ete rmine s tha t th e

# U n i ted S t a te s Cou r t o f Appe a l s F OR T HE D IS TRICT OF C OLUM BIA C IRCUI T

___ ___ ___ ___ 

## No. 23-7155 September Term, 2023 allegation of

oth er facts co nsisten t wi th t he challen ged ple adin g could n ot p ossibly cure the de f iciency.”)(clean ed up). Pursua nt t o D.C. Circuit Ru le 36 , th is dispo sition will no t be pu blished . T he Clerk is directe d to w ithho ld issua nce of the m and ate he rein u ntil seven d ays af ter reso lution of an y tim ely petition for rehe aring or pe tition for rehe aring en ban c. S ee Fed. R. Ap p. P. 4 1(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41

. Per Curiam
FOR THE COURT: Mark J. La nger, Clerk BY: /s/ Michael C. McGrail Depu ty Cl erk

Page 2
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 00-40874

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

GALVINO DOMINGUEZ-TREVINO

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-00-CR-173-1

--------------------

February 15, 2001

Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Galvino Dominguez-Trevino pleaded guilty to being illegally

present in the United States after having been previously

deported. His sentence was enhanced because his prior

deportation occurred following an aggravated felony conviction. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b). He argues that, under Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362 (2000), the indictment in his case

was deficient because it failed to allege that his prior

deportation followed a conviction for an aggravated felony under

§ 1326(b).
No. 00-40874

-2-

Dominguez-Trevino’s argument is without merit given the

Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Almendarez-Torres,

523 U.S. 224 (1998). The Court in Apprendi did not overrule its

holding in Almendarez-Torres. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-

63; United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2000),

petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Jan. 26, 2001)(No. 00-8299).

AFFIRMED.
Poday 

Pickering 

Parraguirre 

, J. 

Gibbons 

Saitta 

existed for filing the underlying complaint, we conclude that petitioner has 

demonstrated that our intervention is warranted. See Smith v. Eighth 

Judicial Dist. Court, 107 Nev. 674, 677, 679, 818 P.2d 849, 851, 853 

(1991); Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 

844 (2004). Accordingly, we 

ORDER the petition GRANTED AND DIRECT THE CLERK 

OF THIS COURT TO ISSUE A WRIT OF MANDAMUS instructing the 

district court to vacate its September 11, 2012, order and its September 6, 

2013, judgment to the extent that those orders imposed sanctions against 

petitioner. 

A-44-% , C.J. 

Hardesty 

cc: Hon. David A. Hardy, District Judge 

Kenneth Dale Sisco 

Robison Belaustegui Sharp & Low 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 2 

(0) 1947A
§ 4.75 General considerations for evaluating visual impairment. ( a ) *Visual impairment.* The evaluation of visual impairment is based on impairment of visual acuity (excluding developmental errors of refraction), visual field, and muscle function.
( b ) *Examination for visual impairment.* The examination must be conducted by a licensed optometrist or by a licensed ophthalmologist. The examiner must identify the disease, injury, or other pathologic process responsible for any visual impairment found. Examinations of visual fields or muscle function will be conducted only when there is a medical indication of disease or injury that may be associated with visual field defect or impaired muscle function. Unless medically contraindicated, the fundus must be examined with the claimant's pupils dilated.
( c ) *Service-connected visual impairment of only one eye.* Subject to the provisions of 38 CFR 3.383(a), if visual impairment of only one eye is service-connected, the visual acuity of the other eye will be considered to be 20/40 for purposes of evaluating the service-connected visual impairment.
( d ) *Maximum evaluation for visual impairment of one eye.* The evaluation for visual impairment of one eye must not exceed 30 percent unless there is anatomical loss of the eye. Combine the evaluation for visual impairment of one eye with evaluations for other disabilities of the same eye that are not based on visual impairment (e.g., disfigurement under diagnostic code 7800).
( e ) *Anatomical loss of one eye with inability to wear a prosthesis.* When the claimant has anatomical loss of one eye and is unable to wear a prosthesis, increase the evaluation for visual acuity under diagnostic code 6063 by 10 percent, but the maximum evaluation for visual impairment of both eyes must not exceed 100 percent. A 10-percent increase under this paragraph precludes an evaluation under diagnostic code 7800 based on gross distortion or asymmetry of the eye but not an evaluation under diagnostic code 7800 based on other characteristics of disfigurement.
( f ) *Special monthly compensation.* When evaluating visual impairment, refer to 38 CFR 3.350 to determine whether the claimant may be entitled to special monthly compensation. Footnotes in the schedule indicate levels of visual impairment that potentially establish entitlement to special monthly compensation; however, other levels of visual impairment combined with disabilities of other body systems may also establish entitlement.
(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 1114 and 1155)
[73 FR 66549, Nov. 10, 2008]
#### § 1.653 Delegation of authority.

The General Counsel, Deputy General Counsel or Assistant General Counsel for Professional Staff Group IV is authorized to act for the Secretary of Veterans Affairs in matters concerning patents and inventions, unless otherwise required by law. The determination of rights to an invention as between the Government and the employee where there is no cooperative research and development agreement shall be made by the General Counsel, Deputy General Counsel or the Assistant General Counsel for Professional Staff Group IV, in accordance with 37 CFR part 500.

[62 FR 14822, Mar. 28, 1997]
#### Percy Thompson, Respondent, *v.*The Mayor and Council of Sea Isle City, Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiff.

Charles De H. Brower, for. appellant.

Kenneson, Crain *&*Ailing (Asa A. Ailing, of counsel), for respondent.

McCarthy, J.

We do not think that there is anything in the question of jurisdiction. It is admitted, I take from an examination of this case, that the plaintiff was a broker in the ordinary " sense, and that the party to whom these bonds were offered for sale and who accepted the same were able, competent and willing to purchase.

The only question here is, what was the plaintiff in law to do in this transaction, in' order that he might be entitled to his commission.

We think the employment being admitted that, upon the pro- ' duction of a person or party ready, willing and able to buy at the terms and arrangements as specified by the vendor, is enough to entitle the broker to his commission even if the sale is not consummated, provided this, does not occur thereafter by reason of any act of the broker.

While the case is not. as clearly presented as it might be, we-think it is sufficient, the question being disposed of to affirm this judgment. It is,-therefore, • affirmed, with costs.

Conlan. and O’Dwyer, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.
§ 21.5136 Benefit payments—secondary school program. ( a ) *Restrictions on payments.* ( 1 ) The Department of Veterans Affairs may authorize benefits to qualified enlisted servicepersons for a course, courses or program of education leading to a secondary school diploma or an equivalency certificate without charge to entitlement. Payments may be made only if: ( i ) The individual has contributed to the fund for at least 1 month, and
( ii ) The training is received while the individual is serving: ( A ) The last 6 months of his or her first enlistment after December 31, 1976; or
( B ) At any time after completing his or her first enlistment.
( 2 ) An individual who is not on active duty must have been an enlisted serviceperson while he or she was on active duty in order to receive benefits while enrolled in a course, courses or program of education leading to a secondary school diploma or an equivalency certificate. (Authority: 38 U.S.C. 3231(b))
( b ) *Monthly rate.* An individual pursuing a course, courses or a program of education leading to a secondary school diploma or an equivalency certificate will receive one of two monthly rates. ( 1 ) Unless the individual notifies the Department of Veterans Affairs to the contrary, the monthly rate of his or her educational assistance allowance will be based upon his or her tuition and fees. The Department of Veterans Affairs will make no charge against the entitlement of the individual who is receiving benefits at this monthly rate. The monthly rate will be the rate of tuition and fees being charged to the individual for the course, not to exceed: ( i ) $376 for full-time training.
( ii ) $283 for three-quarter time training.
( iii ) $188 for half-time training.
( iv ) $94 for quarter-time training.
( 2 ) The individual may elect to receive educational assistance allowance at the monthly rate provided in § 21.5138. The Department of Veterans Affairs will make an appropriate charge against the individual's entitlement if such an election is made. (Authority: 38 U.S.C. 3241, 3491)
( c ) *Method of payment.* ( 1 ) If the individual's educational assistance allowance is based upon the rate as determined in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, payment shall be made in a lump sum for the term, quarter or semester at the beginning of the month in which training begins.
( 2 ) If the individual elects to have his or her educational assistance allowance computed as provided in § 21.5138, payment will be made in the same manner as for any other residence training.
(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 3241)
[47 FR 51746, Nov. 17, 1982, as amended at 50 FR 19933, May 13, 1985]
Editorial Note on Part 36
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 36 appear at 61 FR 7217, Feb. 27, 1996, and 86 FR 51275, Sept. 15, 2021.

§ 36.4803 General requirements of the COVID-19 Veterans Assistance Partial Claim Payment program. The following general requirements must be met before the Secretary will allow for participation in the COVID-19 Veterans Assistance Partial Claim Payment program: ( a ) The loan for which a partial claim payment is requested must be a guaranteed loan that was either— ( 1 ) Current or less than 30 days past due on March 1, 2020; or
( 2 ) Made on or after March 1, 2020;
( b ) The veteran on whose behalf VA will pay a partial claim payment both received a COVID-19 forbearance and missed at least one scheduled monthly payment;
( c ) There remains unpaid at least one scheduled monthly payment that the veteran did not make while under a COVID-19 forbearance;
( d ) The veteran indicates that the veteran can resume making scheduled monthly payments, on time and in full, and that the veteran occupies, as the veteran's residence, the property securing the guaranteed loan for which the partial claim payment is requested; and
( e ) The veteran executes, in a timely manner, all loan documents necessary to establish an obligation to repay the Secretary for the partial claim payment.
(The Office of Management and Budget has approved the information collection requirements in this section under control number 2900-0889) (Authority: 38 U.S.C. 3703(c), 3720, 3732)
[86 FR 28708, May 28, 2021, as amended at 86 FR 46983, Aug. 23, 2021]
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack, Chief Justice

David F. Viviano,

Chief Justice Pro Tem

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 September 29, 2020

s0921

Order 

Clerk

September 29, 2020

160082

DENNIS PATRICK BIRD, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v SC: 160082

COA: 348319

GUS HARRISON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

WARDEN,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 18, 2019 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded 

that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.