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to press.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 22-BG-457

IN RE DANA A. PAUL, RESPONDENT.

A Member of the Bar

of the District of Columbia

(Bar Registration No. 490142)

On Report and Recommendation

of the Board on Professional Responsibility

(Disciplinary Docket No. 2019-D199)

(Board Docket No. 19-BD-63)

(Submitted January 24, 2023 Decided April 20, 2023)

Dana A. Paul, pro se.

Hamilton P. Fox and Myles V. Lynk were on the brief for the Office of 

Disciplinary Counsel. 

Before HOWARD and ALIKHAN, Associate Judges, and FISHER, Senior Judge.

ALIKHAN, Associate Judge: After respondent Dana A. Paul disclosed client 

confidences in a disciplinary complaint that he filed against his former client, N.E., 

the District of Columbia Office of Disciplinary Counsel investigated him for 

violating multiple District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct. The Board

on Professional Responsibility concluded that he had violated D.C. R. Prof. 

Conduct 1.6(a) and recommended that we impose a 90-day suspension. Before this 
2

court, Mr. Paul argues that D.C. Bar R. XI, § 19(a) immunizes him from disciplinary 

action stemming from his complaint, that his disclosures do not fall under Rule 1.6’s 

protections and were necessary to defend himself against an earlier disciplinary 

action that N.E. had filed against him, and that the Board’s recommended 90-day 

suspension was unwarranted. We disagree that he is immune from discipline, 

conclude that he violated Rule 1.6(a), and order a 30-day suspension.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

A. Factual Background

The Hearing Committee and the Board made the following findings of fact, 

most of which are undisputed. In 2014 and 2015, Mr. Paul, a member of the D.C. 

Bar, represented N.E. and her husband in a matter in a Maryland court. He

represented them again in 2017 when they sued their realtor and others, also in a 

Maryland court, alleging a “botched” real estate deal.

Mr. Paul and his clients began to disagree about the case, and, a few months

later, he resigned. In April 2018, N.E. and her husband reported Mr. Paul to the 

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland and the District of Columbia Office 

of Disciplinary Counsel. They alleged that he had improperly retained an expert 

witness, had failed to communicate with N.E. and her husband, had not prepared 

them for depositions, and had entered unauthorized stipulations on their behalf. 
3

In May 2018, Mr. Paul responded to both complaints. In his response to 

N.E.’s complaint in the District and at Disciplinary Counsel’s request, Mr. Paul 

submitted his entire client file for N.E. Three months later, while Disciplinary 

Counsel was investigating N.E.’s complaint against Mr. Paul, he filed a disciplinary 

complaint against N.E., who is also a member of the D.C. Bar. Mr. Paul included 

the case number of the matter against him in his disciplinary complaint, and he

disclosed information that N.E. had shared with him when he was her attorney. The 

Office of Disciplinary Counsel eventually dismissed N.E.’s complaint against 

Mr. Paul and requested that N.E. respond to Mr. Paul’s complaint against her. After 

N.E. responded, Mr. Paul replied, noting: “I am only filing this grievance because 

of the grievance [N.E.] filed against me.” In his reply, Mr. Paul included additional

information that he had learned during his 2017 representation of N.E. and her 

husband. 

B. Procedural History 

In June 2022, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel instituted disciplinary 

proceedings against Mr. Paul, alleging that he had violated D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.6 

and 8.4(d). First, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel alleged that in his response to 

N.E.’s grievance, his disciplinary complaint against N.E., and his reply to N.E.’s 

response, Mr. Paul had disclosed client confidences or secrets, which had been

unnecessary to establish a defense to the disciplinary charge against him and 
4

therefore violated Rule 1.6. Second, it alleged that Mr. Paul’s retaliatory disciplinary

complaint against N.E. seriously interfered with the administration of justice in 

violation of Rule 8.4(d).

After a hearing in March 2020, an Ad Hoc Hearing Committee concluded that 

Mr. Paul had violated both rules and recommended that he receive a 90-day 

suspension. As to Rule 1.6, the Hearing Committee determined that Mr. Paul had

knowingly revealed N.E.’s confidences when he intentionally gave private

information about her—information he only knew because he had represented her—

to Disciplinary Counsel. It reached this conclusion only with respect to Mr. Paul’s 

disciplinary complaint against N.E. and his subsequent reply in that matter, finding 

that those disclosures were offensive (rather than defensive) in nature and not 

reasonably necessary for Mr. Paul to defend himself against N.E.’s accusations. The 

Hearing Committee did not find a Rule 1.6 violation with regard to the disclosures 

that Mr. Paul had made in response to N.E.’s complaint against him, concluding that 

those were necessary for him to defend himself. See D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.6(e)(3) 

(allowing reasonable disclosures to defend against a disciplinary action). 

As to Rule 8.4(d), the Hearing Committee concluded that Mr. Paul’s retaliatory

complaint seriously interfered with the administration of justice because it was 

improper, bore directly on the judicial process, and affected the process “in more 
5

than a de minimis way.” In re Hopkins, 677 A.2d 55, 61 (D.C. 1996). The Hearing 

Committee recommended a 90-day suspension after considering (1) the seriousness 

of Mr. Paul’s conduct; (2) prejudice to the client; (3) whether the conduct involved 

dishonesty; (4) violation of other disciplinary rules; (5) Mr. Paul’s disciplinary 

history; (6) whether Mr. Paul had acknowledged his wrongful conduct; and 

(7) mitigating circumstances. See In re Daniel, 11 A.3d 291, 300 (D.C. 2011). 

Mr. Paul filed exceptions to each of these conclusions. In June 2022, the 

Board issued its report and recommendation. The Board agreed with the Hearing 

Committee’s conclusion that Mr. Paul had violated Rule 1.6 when he disclosed 

N.E.’s confidences in his complaint against N.E. and his subsequent reply in that 

matter. The Board also determined that D.C. Bar. R. XI, § 19(a) did not provide Mr. 

Paul absolute immunity from attorney discipline—as opposed to civil liability—for 

complaints submitted to Disciplinary Counsel, because such immunity was not 

consistent with the plain text of the rule, and because a contrary reading would 

conflict with other D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct. Finally, the Board 

concluded that Mr. Paul had not violated Rule 8.4(d) because his conduct did not 

impact the judicial system “in more than a de minimis way.” In re Hopkins, 677 

A.2d at 61.
6

Despite finding fewer violations than the Hearing Committee, the Board 

adopted the Hearing Committee’s recommendation of a 90-day suspension. In so 

doing, it explained that Mr. Paul’s disciplinary complaint against N.E. was retaliatory

and egregious and thus warranted a 90-day suspension even without a finding that 

Mr. Paul had violated Rule 8.4(d). 

Mr. Paul took exception to several of the Board’s conclusions and its 

recommended sanction, and he filed a brief in this court. The Office of Disciplinary 

Counsel did not file exceptions, but it filed a brief supporting the Board’s report and 

recommendation.

II. Discussion

We “accept the findings of fact made by the Board unless they are 

unsupported by substantial evidence of record, and [we] adopt the recommended 

disposition of the Board unless to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent 

dispositions for comparable conduct or would otherwise be unwarranted.” D.C. Bar 

R. XI, § 9(h)(1). We review the Board’s legal determinations de novo. In re Samad, 

51 A.3d 486, 495 (D.C. 2012) (per curiam).

Before this court, Mr. Paul argues that (1) D.C. Bar R. XI, § 19(a) immunizes 

him from disciplinary action stemming from the complaint he filed against N.E.; 

(2) he did not disclose information protected by Rule 1.6 and, even if he did, such 
7

disclosure was necessary to defend himself against the earlier disciplinary action 

N.E. had filed against him; and (3) a 90-day suspension was unwarranted. We take 

each in turn. 

A. Immunity Conferred by D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 19(a)

In the District of Columbia, an individual may submit allegations of an 

attorney’s misconduct to the Board or to the D.C. Office of Disciplinary Counsel. 

D.C. Bar R. XI, § 6(a)(2), 8(a).1

 These allegations may come through formal 

complaints or other sources, id. § 6(a)(2), and they may come from other lawyers, 

see D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 8.3. 

All complaints submitted to Disciplinary Counsel or the Board are “absolutely 

privileged, and no claim or action predicated thereon may be instituted or 

maintained.” D.C. Bar R. XI, § 19(a). Additionally, “[m]embers of the Board, its 

employees,” and other similarly situated individuals are “immune from disciplinary 

 

1 This court has disciplinary jurisdiction over, among others, “members of the 

District of Columbia Bar, all persons appearing or participating pro hac vice in any 

proceeding . . . , and all persons who have been suspended or disbarred.” D.C. Bar 

R. XI, § 1(a). 
8

complaint . . . and from civil suit for any conduct in the course of their official 

duties.” Id.

2

Mr. Paul argues that Section 19(a)’s proviso that disciplinary complaints are 

“absolutely privileged, and [that] no claim or action predicated thereon may be 

instituted or maintained” means that an attorney who submits a disciplinary 

complaint is immune from both litigation and disciplinary action related to the 

complaint. In contrast, the Board concluded, and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel 

argues, that this language immunizes attorneys who file complaints only from suit

but not from disciplinary action. This is so, they reason, because the next sentence 

of Section 19(a) provides immunity from both civil suit and disciplinary action, but

only to a select group of people: “[m]embers of the Board, its employees,” and other 

 

2 In full, D.C. Bar R. XI, § 19(a) reads: 

Immunity. Complaints submitted to the Board or 

Disciplinary Counsel shall be absolutely privileged, and 

no claim or action predicated thereon may be instituted or 

maintained. Members of the Board, its employees, 

members of Hearing Committees, Disciplinary Counsel, 

and all assistants and employees of Disciplinary Counsel, 

all persons engaged in counseling, evaluating or 

monitoring other attorneys pursuant to a Board or Court 

order or a diversion agreement, and all assistants or 

employees of persons engaged in such counseling, 

evaluating or monitoring shall be immune from 

disciplinary complaint under this rule and from civil suit 

for any conduct in the course of their official duties.
9

similarly situated individuals. Thus, in their view, an attorney who commits 

misconduct in pursuing a disciplinary complaint against another attorney may not 

be sued, but he could face disciplinary action for his misdeeds.

We conclude that the Board has the better argument. We begin with the text 

of the provision: “Complaints submitted to the Board or Disciplinary Counsel shall 

be absolutely privileged, and no claim or action predicated thereon may be instituted 

or maintained.” D.C. Bar R. XI, § 19(a) (emphases added). “In interpreting a statute 

or rule, we are mindful of the maxim that we must look first to its language; if the 

words are clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to its plain meaning.” In re 

Greenspan, 910 A.2d 324, 335 (D.C. 2006) (brackets omitted) (quoting McPherson 

v. United States, 692 A.2d 1342, 1344 (D.C. 1997)). “Like the rule for statutory 

construction, ‘words of a [rule] should be construed according to their ordinary sense 

and with the meaning commonly attributed to them.’” Id. (alteration in original) 

(quoting Washington v. United States, 884 A.2d 1080, 1096 (D.C. 2005)). 

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “absolute privilege” as “[a] privilege that 

immunizes an actor from suit, no matter how wrongful the action might be, and even 

though it is done with an improper motive.” Absolute Privilege, Black’s Law 

Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added); see In re Spikes, 881 A.2d 1118, 1124

(D.C. 2005) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary to interpret “absolute[] privilege[]”
10

in Section 19(a)). The ordinary meaning of “absolutely privileged,” then, is an 

immunity from litigation—from “suit”—not from consequences outside the 

courtroom. This is consistent with how we have construed this term previously. See 

In re Nace, 490 A.2d 1120, 1124 (D.C. 1985) (explaining that immunity under D.C. 

Bar R. XI, § 19(a) meant that an individual “could not maintain any action against 

[a would-be defendant] on a claimed right under District of Columbia law in the 

Superior Court of the District of Columbia”). It is also consistent with how our sister 

jurisdictions treat “absolute privilege” in analogous circumstances. See, e.g., Att’y 

Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Frost, 85 A.3d 264, 278 n.14 (Md. 2014) (“Absolute 

privilege is a broad defense to tort claims, including tort claims related to statements 

made in connection to pending [disciplinary] actions . . . ; however, we confirm that 

it is not a defense to claims of unprofessional conduct.” (citation omitted)).

3

 

3 See also, e.g., Loigman v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Middletown, 889 A.2d 

426, 438 (N.J. 2006) (“The litigation privilege does not immunize an attorney from 

disciplinary sanctions . . . .”); Krouse v. Bower, 20 P.3d 895, 901 n.1 (Utah 2001) 

(“We note here that although an attorney is normally absolutely immune from civil 

liability for defamatory statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding, the 

privilege does not prevent professional discipline against the attorney for such 

conduct in deserving circumstances.”); Kirschstein v. Haynes, 788 P.2d 941, 950 

(Okla. 1990) (explaining that the absolute privilege for statements made in the 

course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings “would not protect an attorney from 

suffering professional discipline because of unethical conduct”); Selby v. Burgess, 

712 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Ark. 1986) (noting that although absolute privilege 

“prohibit[s] an attorney from being subject to litigation” based on defamatory 

communications made during judicial proceedings, “it will not make him immune 
11

The rule’s context confirms the natural reading of its text. See Util. Air Regul. 

Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 321 (2014) (“[R]easonable statutory interpretation must 

account for both ‘the specific context in which . . . language is used’ and ‘the broader 

context of the statute as a whole.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Robinson 

v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)); Webb v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 204 

A.3d 843, 849 (D.C. 2019) (“Statutory construction generally demands reading a 

statute in its entirety, and a ‘statute should be interpreted as a harmonious whole.’”

(quoting Stevens v. D.C. Dep’t of Health, 150 A.3d 307, 316 (D.C. 2016))). 

Specifically, the second sentence of Section 19(a) confers a broader immunity than 

the first, directing that Board members and similarly situated individuals “shall be 

immune from disciplinary complaint under this rule and from civil suit for any 

conduct in the course of their official duties.” D.C. Bar R. XI, § 19(a) (emphasis 

added). The inclusion of immunity from disciplinary complaint, in addition to 

immunity from civil suit, for this set of individuals in Section 19(a)’s second 

sentence is strong evidence that the first sentence does not provide a similar 

immunity to attorney-complainants like Mr. Paul. That is because, “[w]here 

[drafters] include[] particular language in one section of a statute but omit[] it in 

 

from professional discipline . . . when it is appropriate” (citation omitted)); Theiss v. 

Scherer, 396 F.2d 646, 649-50 (6th Cir. 1968) (implying that an attorney could be 

“subject to disciplinary action by the court and by his bar association” for statements 

he made during a judicial proceeding despite “[t]he rule of absolute privilege”).
12

another . . . , it is generally presumed that [they] act[] intentionally and purposely in 

the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of D.C. v. Joint Rev.

Comm. on Educ. in Radiologic Tech., 114 A.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. 2015) (fifth 

alteration in original) (quoting Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 

(1993)); see Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 139 S. Ct. 1048, 1058 (2019) (“Congress 

generally acts intentionally when it uses particular language in one section of a 

statute but omits it in another.” (quoting Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 574 

U.S. 383, 391 (2015))). This presumption operates with as much force in 

interpreting a rule as it does in interpreting a statute. See In re R.F.H., 354 A.2d 844, 

845 n.2 (D.C. 1976) (“Regulations generally are construed by the same rules of 

statutory construction as are statutes.”).

Other strong contextual indicators are found in the D.C. Rules of Professional 

Conduct, several provisions of which specifically contemplate that attorneys may be 

disciplined for actions they take before the Office of Disciplinary Counsel or the 

Board. For example, Rule 8.3 allows a lawyer to report another lawyer’s misconduct, 

but not if doing so requires disclosing information that is otherwise protected by 

Rule 1.6 (like the information at issue here). D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 8.3(c). An 

attorney also violates the rules if he “[s]eek[s] . . . disciplinary charges solely to 

obtain an advantage in a civil matter.” D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(g). To provide a 

third example, Rule 1.6 provides attorneys with a limited right to disclose a client’s 
13

confidences or secrets if necessary to defend himself against accusations of 

wrongdoing. D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.6(e)(3). But a lawyer violates that rule if the 

disclosure is “greater than the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary to vindicate 

[his] innocence.” Id., cmt. 25. If the first sentence of Section 19(a) conferred 

immunity from disciplinary action, it would render these rules nugatory. Cf. Thomas 

v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 547 A.2d 1034, 1037 (D.C. 1988) (“A basic principle 

is that each provision of the statute should be construed so as to give effect to all of 

the statute’s provisions, not rendering any provision superfluous.”). 

Given the clarity of the text and context, we need not resort to additional tools 

of statutory interpretation. See In re Greenspan, 910 A.2d at 335-36. We do, 

however, pause to respond to Mr. Paul’s arguments. First, Mr. Paul argues that 

“absolute[] privilege means the same thing as absolute immunity.” That is true as 

far as it goes, but it does not answer the question: absolute immunity from what? 

For the reasons above, we conclude that it is absolute immunity from suit, not from 

disciplinary action. To the extent Mr. Paul is arguing that the absolute immunity

conferred in the first sentence of Section 19(a) operates like the absolute immunity 

afforded to judicial officers or prosecutors, we note that such immunity similarly is 

an immunity from civil suit and not from attorney discipline. See Imbler v. 

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428-29 (1976) (explaining that “the immunity of 

prosecutors from liability in suits under [42 U.S.C. §] 1983 does not leave the public 
14

powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs,” including through 

“professional discipline by an association of his peers”); see also, e.g., Beck v. 

Phillips, 685 N.W.2d 637, 643 n.2 (Iowa 2004) (“Prosecutors are not completely 

beyond reproach even when absolute immunity attaches. The doctrine does not 

foreclose professional discipline or criminal punishment.”); Chicopee Lions Club v.

Dist. Att’y for Hampden Dist., 485 N.E.2d 673, 678 (Mass. 1985) (“[A]bsolute 

immunity from civil suit does not render the public entirely powerless to deter 

prosecutorial misconduct: elections and bar discipline proceedings are available 

mechanisms which may serve to check an overzealous district attorney.”).

Next, Mr. Paul contends that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel “has never 

charged an attorney for filing a grievance against another attorney” and claims this 

is evidence that Section 19(a) confers immunity from disciplinary action for 

attorney-complainants. Even if this were true (Mr. Paul’s citation does not support 

his claim), this court—which has the final word on attorney discipline—has certainly 

suggested that it is possible. In re Howard, 940 A.2d 130, 131 n.1 (D.C. 2007) (per 

curiam) (issuing reciprocal discipline and noting that a respondent’s improper threats 

to report opposing counsel to disciplinary authorities would have violated 

Rule 8.4(g) if they had occurred in the District). That this situation may be rare does 

not mean that Section 19(a) forecloses it.
15

Finally, Mr. Paul argues that without immunity from disciplinary action, 

attorneys will not “report ethical misconduct [for] fear that the [Office of 

Disciplinary Counsel] will charge them for filing a grievance in the future.” This 

overstates the issue. Attorneys are encouraged to report professional misconduct 

where they “know[] that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of

Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, 

trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 8.3(a). 

But the rule “does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by 

Rule 1.6 or other law.” D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 8.3(c). And, more generally, such a 

report cannot be “solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.” D.C. R. Prof. 

Conduct 8.4(g). As the comments to Rule 8.3 explain, “[a] measure of judgment 

is . . . required in complying with the [rule].” D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 8.3, cmt. 3. We 

trust that attorneys will exercise that judgment by not violating the Rules of 

Professional Conduct in the course of filing a disciplinary complaint against another 

attorney. And if the attorney does violate the rules, we see no policy justification 

for relieving him of the consequences of his actions.

Accordingly, we hold that Section 19(a) does not immunize an attorneycomplainant from professional discipline if he violates the Rules of Professional 

Conduct in the course of filing or pursuing his disciplinary complaint against another 

attorney.
16

B. Protection Under D.C. Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(e)(3)

Mr. Paul next argues that he did not violate Rule 1.6 because the information 

he disclosed was not N.E.’s confidence or secret, D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.6(a), (b), 

and because his disclosures were “reasonably necessary to establish a defense to 

a . . . disciplinary charge . . . against [him],” D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.6(e)(3). We 

disagree. Rule 1.6 explicitly prohibits the disclosure of a client’s “secret,” which is 

defined as information, “the disclosure of which would be embarrassing” or 

“detrimental” to the client. D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.6(b). Mr. Paul shared

information that he alleged illustrated N.E.’s criminal and civil liability—something 

that would certainly be detrimental to her and therefore fall squarely within 

Rule 1.6’s definition of a “secret.” 

In considering his second argument, the Hearing Committee and the Board 

differentiated between the disclosures Mr. Paul had made in the course of responding 

to N.E.’s complaint about him and those in the course of pursuing his own complaint 

against N.E., concluding that the former were protected by Rule 1.6(e)(3) but the 

latter were not.

We agree with that differentiation. Mr. Paul’s disciplinary complaint against 

N.E. and his reply to N.E.’s response to his complaint were part of an offensive 

action against N.E. and not necessary to defending against the complaint she had 
17

filed against him. Indeed, by the time Mr. Paul submitted these materials, he had 

already responded to the allegations in N.E.’s complaint. In his disciplinary 

complaint, however, he went on to argue that N.E. “[wa]s not mentally competent 

to be a member” of the D.C. Bar and “should [not] be allowed to practice law.” 

Mr. Paul attached to his complaint documents that N.E. had sent him when he 

represented her, which he alleged proved her criminal conduct and provided a civil 

cause of action against her. He also stated that he “filed the grievance against her,” 

because she “is dishonest.” His complaint is plainly read as one that is offensive in 

nature and not necessary to or connected with his own defense. Accordingly, his 

disclosures related to his disciplinary complaint against N.E. are not protected by 

Rule 1.6(e)(3). 

C. Sanction

The Board agreed with the Hearing Committee’s recommendation that 

Mr. Paul receive a 90-day suspension. While the Board’s recommended sanction 

comes to us with a “strong presumption in favor of its imposition,” In re Hallmark, 

831 A.2d 366, 371 (D.C. 2003), the ultimate responsibility of “imposing sanctions 

rests with this court in the first instance,” In re Godette, 919 A.2d 1157, 1164 

(D.C. 2007) (quoting In re Temple, 629 A.2d 1203, 1207 (D.C. 1993)). In so doing, 

we must ensure that we do not “foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions 
18

for comparable conduct” and that the sanction is not “otherwise . . . unwarranted.” 

D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(h)(1). 

We conclude that a 90-day suspension is outside the range of discipline for

conduct comparable to that of Mr. Paul’s. In prior cases where attorneys violated

Rule 1.6, we have imposed public censures or informal admonitions. In re Ponds, 

876 A.2d 636, 637 (D.C. 2005) (imposing a public censure for improperly disclosing 

confidential information in a motion to withdraw as counsel); In re Gonzalez, 773 

A.2d 1026, 1027, 1032 (D.C. 2001) (imposing an informal admonition when the 

respondent revealed secret information about a client in his motion to withdraw and 

did not take steps to minimize the possibility of harm); In re Tun, 286 A.3d 538, 540

(D.C. 2022) (noting that the respondent had received an informal admonition for 

improperly disclosing a client’s confidences in an earlier disciplinary proceeding); 

In re Osemene, 277 A.3d 1271, 1271-72 (D.C. 2022) (per curiam) (publicly censuring

the respondent for violating Rules 1.5(b) and 1.6(a)). 

A 90-day suspension is significantly more serious, and the cases cited by the 

Hearing Committee—In re Koeck, 178 A.3d 463 (D.C. 2018) (per curiam), and In 

re Rosen, 470 A.2d 292 (D.C. 1983)—do not persuade us that it is appropriate here. 

In In re Koeck, the respondent received a 60-day suspension with a fitness 

requirement. 178 A.3d at 464. The respondent had committed “four separate rule 

violations” and disseminated private information to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for 
19

the Northern District of Illinois, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, and 

the government of Brazil. Id. at 463. In In re Rosen, we issued a six-month 

suspension after considering the respondent’s violation of Rule 1.6 along with other 

serious violations including an intentional failure to carry out client objectives. 470 

A.2d at 301-02. In both of those cases, the conduct at issue was more egregious than 

that at issue here. 

We do agree, however, with the Board’s determination that the retaliatory 

nature of Mr. Paul’s complaint is particularly problematic and therefore warrants a 

suspension of some length.

4 See In re Martin, 67 A.3d 1032, 1053 (D.C. 2013) 

(considering “(1) the seriousness of the conduct, (2) prejudice to the client, 

(3) whether the conduct involved dishonesty, (4) violation of other disciplinary 

rules, (5) the attorney’s disciplinary history, (6) whether the attorney has 

acknowledged his or her wrongful conduct, and (7) mitigating circumstances” as 

non-exhaustive factors in determining the appropriate sanction for attorney 

misconduct). Mr. Paul wrote to Disciplinary Counsel that he “only fil[ed] this 

Grievance because of the Grievance [N.E. had] filed against” him. He now denies 

that his complaint was retaliatory and maintains that he filed it only because N.E. is 

 

4 We also note that Mr. Paul has a disciplinary history in Maryland. Att’y 

Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Paul, 31 A.3d 512 (Md. 2011); Att’y Grievance 

Comm’n of Md. v. Paul, 187 A.3d 625 (Md. 2018). 
20

a “menace to the legal profession.” But the language of his complaint and its 

timing—only three months after N.E.’s complaint against him—suggest to us that 

the greatest impetus for Mr. Paul’s complaint was his frustration with N.E. for filing 

a complaint against him. We adopt the Board’s finding on this point, consider the 

complaint to be retaliatory and serious conduct, and conclude that a 30-day 

suspension is appropriate. 

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Paul is suspended from the practice of law in 

the District of Columbia for 30 days. For purposes of reinstatement, his suspension 

will not begin to run until he files an affidavit that fully complies with the 

requirements of D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g).

So ordered.