IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2021 ND 18

State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee

v.

James Glenn Watson, Defendant and Appellant

No. 20200109

Appeal from the District Court of Stark County, Southwest Judicial District, 

the Honorable William A. Herauf, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by VandeWalle, Justice, in which Justices Crothers, 

McEvers, and Tufte joined. Chief Justice Jensen filed a dissenting opinion.

Amy G. Pikovsky, Assistant State’s Attorney, Dickinson, ND, for plaintiff and 

appellee; submitted on brief.

Kiara C. Kraus-Parr, Grand Forks, ND, for defendant and appellant.

FILED 

IN THE OFFICE OF THE 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

FEBRUARY 18, 2021 

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
1

State v. Watson

No. 20200109

VandeWalle, Justice.

[¶1] James Watson appealed from an order denying his motion to withdraw 

his guilty plea to the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child. Watson 

argues the district court failed to properly analyze his understanding of the 

terms of the plea agreement and the court did not make factual findings or 

legal conclusions to support its decision. We affirm.

I

[¶2] Watson was charged with continuous sexual abuse of a child in Golden 

Valley County, gross sexual imposition in Hettinger County, and continuous 

sexual abuse of a child in Stark County. All three cases involved the same 

victim. A jury convicted Watson of continuous sexual abuse of a child in the

Golden Valley County case. He entered Alford conditional guilty pleas to the 

charge of continuous sexual abuse of a child in the Stark County case and to 

an amended charge of sexual assault in the Hettinger County case. 

[¶3] Watson appealed from the criminal judgments in all three cases, arguing 

his statutory speedy trial right was violated in each case. See State v. Watson, 

2019 ND 164, ¶ 1, 930 N.W.2d 145. This Court reversed the judgment in the 

Golden Valley County case, holding Watson’s speedy trial right was violated. 

Id. at ¶ 41. However, we affirmed the judgments in the Hettinger and Stark 

County cases, holding the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting 

the motions for continuances. Id. at ¶ 34.

[¶4] After the appeal, Watson moved to withdraw his guilty plea in the Stark 

County case. He claimed that he pled guilty contingent on the fact that he was 

convicted in the Golden Valley County case and that he should be allowed to 

withdraw his guilty plea in the Stark County case because his conviction in 

Golden Valley County was overturned on appeal. The State opposed the 

motion, arguing there was no basis to withdraw the plea. After a hearing, the 

district court denied Watson’s motion. The court found no manifest injustice 

and denied Watson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
2

II

[¶5] Watson argues the district court abused its discretion in denying his 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He contends the court did not make 

findings about his understanding of the terms of his plea agreement and the 

court’s failure to properly analyze his understanding of the terms of the 

agreement is an abuse of discretion. 

[¶6] Rule 11(d) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure governs a 

defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea and provides different standards 

for withdrawing the plea depending on when the motion to withdraw is made.

See State v. Yost, 2018 ND 157, ¶ 6, 914 N.W.2d 508. “Unless the defendant 

proves that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice, the 

defendant may not withdraw a plea of guilty after the court has imposed 

sentence.” N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(2). The defendant has the burden to prove a 

manifest injustice exists. Dodge v. State, 2020 ND 100, ¶ 13, 942 N.W.2d 478. 

[¶7] “The [district] court has discretion in finding whether a manifest 

injustice necessitating the withdrawal of a guilty plea exists, and we review 

the court’s decision for abuse of discretion.” Dodge, 2020 ND 100, ¶ 13 (quoting 

State v. Howard, 2011 ND 117, ¶ 3, 798 N.W.2d 675). A court abuses its 

discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious manner, or 

it misinterprets or misapplies the law. Kremer v. State, 2020 ND 132, ¶ 5, 945 

N.W.2d 279. An abuse of discretion occurs when the court’s legal discretion is 

not exercised in the interest of justice. Dodge, at ¶ 13. We are reluctant to order 

a guilty plea be withdrawn without evidence the defendant did not understand 

the nature of the agreement or sentencing recommendation. State v. Craig, 

2020 ND 80, ¶ 10, 941 N.W.2d 539.

[¶8] Rule 11(a)(2), N.D.R.Crim.P., governs conditional guilty pleas and 

states:

With the consent of the court and the prosecuting attorney, a 

defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, reserving in 

writing the right to have an appellate court review an adverse 

determination of a specified pretrial motion. The defendant, any 

defendant’s attorney, and the prosecuting attorney must consent 
3

in writing to a conditional plea filed with the court. If the court 

accepts the conditional plea, it must enter an order. The resulting 

judgment must specify it is conditional. A defendant who prevails 

on appeal must be allowed to withdraw the plea.

[¶9] Whether the motion was made under Rule 11(a)(2) or Rule 11(d) is 

critical to proper resolution of Watson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 

Watson moved to withdraw his guilty plea in the Stark County case after he 

was sentenced and the judgment was affirmed on appeal, arguing:

Watson plead guilty following his conviction in Golden Valley 

County on similar charges. His reason for pleading guilty was 

contingent on the fact that he was convicted in Golden Valley 

County. He also wanted to save the State, as well as his family the 

stigma of going through another trial. He also was led to believe 

that pleading guilty on this charge really wouldn’t matter because 

any sentence that he would receive would run concurrently and in 

conjunction with any sentence that he would receive in the Golden 

Valley County case. In fact, sentencing for all three county cases 

was held on the same date of March 13, 2018. Because Golden 

Valley County case 17-2017-CR-34 was eventually overturned by 

the North Dakota Supreme Court, Watson should be allowed to 

withdraw his guilty pleas in Stark County (Case No. 45-2017-CR00596) and Hettinger County (Case No. 21-2017-CR-00030).

At a hearing on the motion, Watson testified he pled guilty in the Stark County 

case so his sentence would run concurrent with his sentence in Golden Valley 

County, and he believed the guilty pleas would be withdrawn if the Golden 

Valley County case was overturned on appeal because everything was 

contingent on the Golden Valley County conviction.

[¶10] The district court denied Watson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

The court made oral findings during the hearing on the motion and also issued 

a written order. The oral and written findings are not inconsistent and we may 

consider both the court’s oral and written findings in support of its decision. 

See Clarke v. Taylor, 2019 ND 251, ¶ 9, 934 N.W.2d 414. At the close of the 

hearing, the court concluded as follows: “I don’t find that there’s any manifest 

injustice and he did not prevail on the appeal which is, on these particular 
4

cases, the Court’s decision on it was upheld; therefore, I am denying the 

Motion.” The court’s subsequent written order stated the plea in the Stark 

County case was an Alford plea and the only condition on the guilty plea 

disclosed or evident to the court was the appeal related to the speedy trial 

request in this case. The written order concluded:

The only issue or condition for the appeal disclosed, or evident to 

the Court, was the issues surrounding the speedy trial request for 

this County. No specific condition was disclosed to this Court in 

this case, that it was conditioned on whether the Defendant was 

successful on any grounds of an appeal in another county.

[¶11] Watson argues, and the dissent agrees, that the district court erred by 

denying the motion under Rule 11(a)(2) instead of determining whether there 

was a manifest injustice under Rule 11(d). To the extent there may be 

ambiguity in the legal basis for the district court’s decision, we may consider 

the context in which the district court expressed its decision and in particular 

the arguments that were presented to it that led to its decision. See Caster v. 

State, 2019 ND 187, ¶¶ 6-7, 931 N.W.2d 223. Here, we believe the transcript of 

the hearing provides sufficient context to show that the district court denied 

the motion because it found no manifest injustice under Rule 11(d).

[¶12] At the hearing on the motion to withdraw Watson’s plea of guilty, 

Watson’s attorney and both State’s Attorneys argued manifest injustice under 

Rule 11(d). Watson’s attorney argued:

Now, as we’ve stated this -- Defendant has a burden of proving

withdrawal is necessary to conduct a manifest injustice. We 

believe that there is, and has been, a manifest injustice occurred 

in the fact that -- the one case that he did go to trial on was 

overturned by the North Dakota Supreme Court.

The Stark County State’s Attorney responded:

So I don't believe there’s any manifest injustice. In fact, I believe 

the record is quite clear and any belief that this defendant had, 

based on what we’re hearing today, is mistaken and was never 

considered by me, that I can recall.
5

The Hettinger County State’s Attorney responded:

North Dakota rule of Criminal Procedure 11 only allows a 

withdrawal of a plea before the court accepts it for this new and 

improved reason: after the Court imposes sentence, then he has to 

show a manifest injustice, and simply making a trial decision, a 

tactical decision, doesn’t qualify as manifest injustice if it turns out 

that was a bad decision because one of the conditions is reversed.

He went on to argue the motion was untimely under Rule 11(d)(3) 

because the state would be prejudiced by the delay:

[I]t has been seven years since the events occurred in Hettinger

County, as I read the Felony Information that was filed. Based on

Marcy’s Law, I have a juvenile victim that is most likely an adult. 

I have no idea where she is. And it’s a manifest injustice to the 

victim, under Marcy’s Law, that this had no finality. Waiting all of 

this time to raise the issue when there now is no evidence to 

support it, other than Mr. Watson’s uncorroborated statements, is 

just patently manifestly unjust to the State and to the victim.

[¶13] The circumstances of Watson’s change of plea hearings in the Hettinger 

County and Stark County cases were known to the district court judge and 

support the court’s finding of no manifest injustice. Both change of plea 

hearings were held before the same district court judge on March 13, 2018.

During the Hettinger County change of plea hearing, Watson’s attorney 

informed the court that there was a plea agreement, the court asked what the 

agreement was, and the following exchange occurred:

MR. McCABE: The agreement is, I believe that the State is going 

to move to amend the charge down to GSI amended — or excuse 

me — from a GSI down to — amended to corruption of minors 

pursuant to 12.1-20-05, which is a C felony. This is going to — my 

client’s going to be pleading guilty under an Alford plea, which is 

also a conditional plea, meaning that he reserves — he’s going to 

reserve his right to appeal the decision. I believe it’s a December 

9th decision of the Court.

And he is going — we’re going to leave sentencing open until 

we continue the one on the Golden Valley matter; correct?
6

MS. PIKOVSKY: I think though —

MR. McCABE: I mean, everything’s going to run concurrent.

THE COURT: So it’s going to run concurrent with Golden Valley?

MR. McCABE: Golden Valley. And a PSI will be requested, and 

they’re going to combine all three PSIs into one.

[The State clarified it was going to amend the charge to sexual 

assault, a class C felony.]

. . . 

THE COURT: All right. All right.

Mr. Watson, you understand that you’re going to enter into an 

Alford plea?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I do.

THE COURT: Do you understand what that is?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I do.

THE COURT: So you’re basically saying or agreeing that there is 

enough evidence by the State that a jury could find you guilty.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

The change of plea hearing for the Stark County case immediately followed the 

Hettinger County hearing and included the following exchange:

THE COURT: This is case No. 2017-CR-596. All right. Mr. 

Henning, Mr. McCabe, what are we doing on this charge?

MR. McCABE: Your Honor, this is basically going to be the same 

thing, except my client will be pleading – again, entering an Alford 

plea to the charge of continuous sexual abuse of a minor, and it 

remains as a AA felony, and it’s going to be contingent and 

pursuant to the order that the Court put in reserving his right to 

appeal. We are also going to reserve sentencing until the PSI comes 

in, and it’s going to be concurrent with Golden Valley County. 

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Henning, is that the proposed resolution?

MR. HENNING: Yeah.

. . . 

THE COURT: All right. All right. Mr. Watson, do you understand 

you’re going to be entering an Alford plea to the charge of 

continuous sexual abuse of a child?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I do.

THE COURT: All right. And you told me before you understand 

what that is?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
7

THE COURT: Okay. Then based upon an Alford plea basis to the 

charge of continuous sexual abuse of a child, how do you plead?

THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.

THE COURT: All right. And you agree then that there’s enough 

facts there that the jury could find you guilty.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

. . . 

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Watson, you got any questions?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 

[¶14] Rule 11(b)(2), N.D.R.Crim.P., requires the district court to “inquire 

whether the defendant’s willingness to plead guilty results from discussion 

between the prosecuting attorney and the defendant or the defendant’s 

attorney.” The purpose of this requirement is for the court to ascertain whether 

the plea is the result of negotiations so the court can “inquire further about the 

negotiation process to assess the defendant’s understanding of the terms of any 

resulting agreements.” Abdi v. State, 2000 ND 64, ¶ 21, 608 N.W.2d 292.

[¶15] During the change of plea hearings, Watson’s attorney indicated the

guilty plea in Stark County was the same as the guilty plea in Hettinger 

County, except for the offense charged, and the plea was a conditional guilty 

plea reserving the right to appeal. In the Hettinger County case Watson’s 

attorney stated the plea was conditional and Watson was reserving his right 

to appeal the district court’s decision. Watson’s attorney was clear in 

referencing the Golden Valley County case for purposes of stating the 

sentences in the three cases would be concurrent. However, the Golden Valley 

County case was not mentioned in either change of plea hearing when Watson’s 

attorney informed the court of the terms of the conditional nature of the pleas.

The district court asked Watson if he understood the plea, and he indicated he 

did. The court also asked Watson if he had any questions at the end of the 

change of plea hearing, and Watson indicated he did not.

[¶16] In Watson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea he argued he pled guilty 

in the Stark County case because he was convicted in Golden Valley County, 

he believed that pleading guilty would not matter because any sentence he 

received would run concurrently with any sentence he would receive in the 

Golden Valley County case, and therefore he should be allowed to withdraw 
8

the guilty plea because the jury conviction was overturned on appeal. Watson 

agreed there was sufficient evidence to convict him of the charged offense when 

he pled guilty. Watson’s appeal in the Stark County case was not successful. 

The district court did not err when it concluded a manifest injustice did not 

exist simply because Watson changed his mind about pleading guilty after his 

conviction was reversed in the related case.

[¶17] Watson failed to establish a manifest injustice would occur if he was not 

allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court sufficiently explained 

its decision and did not act in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious 

manner. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow 

Watson to withdraw his guilty plea.

III

[¶18] We affirm the order denying Watson’s motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea.

[¶19] Gerald W. VandeWalle

Daniel J. Crothers

Lisa Fair McEvers

Jerod E. Tufte

Jensen, Chief Justice, dissenting.

[¶20] Our prior cases and the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure do 

not require a defendant to have previously entered a conditional guilty plea 

under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2) in order to file a motion to withdraw their guilty 

plea pursuant to N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(d). I agree with the majority opinion and 

its application of N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(d), and its recognition that the district 

court was required to determine if allowing Watson to withdraw his guilty plea 

would correct a manifest injustice. However, because the court’s written order 

denying Watson’s request to withdraw his guilty plea does not include any 

reference whether there has been a manifest injustice, and the oral ruling by 

the court at the end of the hearing references manifest injustice a single time

and only coupled with a finding that Watson’s motion should be denied because 
9

his original plea was not conditional under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2), I would 

reverse and remand for the court to consider Watson’s request to withdraw his 

guilty plea under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(d). The district court, not this Court, 

should be tasked with the initial determination of whether a withdrawal of 

Watson’s guilty plea will prevent a manifest injustice.

I

[¶21] In this case, Watson was charged with continuous sexual abuse of a 

minor in Stark County. Watson was also charged with continuous sexual abuse 

of a child in Golden Valley County and gross sexual imposition in Hettinger 

County. The same victim was alleged in each of the cases. Watson was 

convicted of gross sexual imposition in the Golden Valley County case and 

subsequently entered guilty pleas in this case and in the Hettinger County 

case.

[¶22] Watson appealed all three judgments asserting his right to a speedy trial 

had been violated in each of the cases. Watson entered conditional guilty pleas 

pursuant to N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2) in Hettinger County and Stark County, 

preserving his right to pursue an appeal asserting he was denied a speedy trial. 

The conditional guilty pleas were case specific without cross-reference to what 

would happen if an appeal was successful in one case but not the others.

[¶23] This Court affirmed the judgments in Hettinger County and Stark 

County, the cases in which Watson had entered guilty pleas. This Court 

reversed the judgment in the Golden Valley County case after determining 

Watson’s right to a speedy trial had been violated.

[¶24] Following the reversal of the Golden Valley County judgment, Watson 

filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in this case pursuant to 

N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(d). The basis for his motion was the following assertion as 

reflected in his brief to the district court:

Because Watson plead guilty to the Stark County and Hettinger 

County cases solely based on his conviction in the Golden Valley 

case, which was overturned by the North Dakota Supreme Court, 

he respectfully is requesting from this Court that he be allowed to 
10

withdraw his guilty pleas in the Stark County case (Case No. 45-

2017-CR-00596) and the Hettinger County case (Case No. 21-2017-

CR-00030).

At the hearing for his motion to withdraw, in response to the question of why 

he changed his plea in this case, Watson responded as follows: “I changed my 

plea so that the sentences would run concurrent.”

[¶25] The State responded to Watson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, 

asserting Watson had failed to condition his guilty plea on the success of the 

Golden Valley County case as required by N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2). The district 

court denied the motion to withdraw after finding Watson failed to make the 

success of the Golden Valley County appeal a condition of his guilty plea in this 

case. The entire analysis within the court’s written order was limited to two 

sentences which read as follows:

The only issue or condition for the appeal disclosed, or evident to 

the Court, was the issues surrounding the speedy trial request for 

this County. No specific condition was disclosed to this Court in 

this case, that it was conditioned on whether the Defendant was 

successful on any grounds of an appeal in another county.

[¶26] The majority opinion, in paragraph 9, correctly recognizes that 

“[w]hether the motion was made under Rule 11(a)(2) or Rule 11(d) is critical to 

the proper resolution of Watson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.” I agree 

with the majority opinion and the recognition that this case must be resolved 

through the application of Rule 11(d) for a determination of whether allowing 

Watson to withdraw his guilty plea is necessary to prevent a manifest injustice 

and should not be analyzed under Rule 11(a)(2) for a determination of whether 

Watson’s earlier plea of guilty was a conditional guilty plea. Where I depart 

from the majority opinion is the conclusion the district court correctly applied 

Rule 11(d). I firmly believe the court improperly denied Watson’s motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea based upon a determination Watson had failed to 

properly preserve the right to withdraw his guilty plea under Rule 11(2)(a).

[¶27] The majority opinion acknowledges that the key determination to be 

made by the district court was whether it would be a manifest injustice not to 
11

allow Watson to withdraw his guilty plea. The phrase “manifest injustice” does 

not appear in the court’s written order, not even once, and there is no analysis 

of manifest injustice in the court’s written order. The entire analysis is the two 

sentence block quote from the order aforementioned in paragraph 6 of this 

separate.

[¶28] The majority opinion quickly abandons any further discussion of the 

written order and instead turns to the oral discussion provided at the end of 

the hearing. The majority opinion ignores several aspects of the written order 

which indicated the district court only considered whether the prior plea was 

conditional under Rule 11(a)(2), a standard the majority opinion rejects at the 

beginning of paragraph 9 of the majority opinion. The written order begins 

with the phrase the “only issue or condition for the appeal disclosed . . . .” The 

written order is not vague, it is clearly a discussion of whether the prior plea 

was conditional, a conclusion it was not, and a determination that because the 

plea was not conditional the motion to withdraw should be denied. The word 

condition (or conditional) is used three times in the two substantive sentences 

of the written order. To reach the conclusion the court applied the correct law 

as reached by the majority, the written order has to be ignored.

[¶29] In the oral discussion provided by the district court at the end of the 

hearing on Watson’s motion to withdraw, the court used the phrase “manifest 

injustice” a single time. The context is important. The use of the phrase comes 

at the end of the court’s determination “it does appear it’s—as the language 

says, it’s going to be contingent and pursuant to the Order that the Court put 

in reserving his right to appeal.” The phrase appears in the following sentence: 

“I don’t find that there’s any manifest injustice and he did not prevail on the 

appeal which is, on these particular cases, the Court’s decision on it was 

upheld; therefore, I am denying the Motion.” The court’s single reference to 

manifest injustice is coupled with the court’s contemporaneous determination 

that Watson had failed to make his prior plea contingent and his conditional 

guilty plea was limited to the speedy trial request in this case. It is also 

interesting to note the court’s initial observation about these cases:
12

To me, it was all treated as one case up until the end. I didn’t know 

that it was going to be split out until the pre-trial, which was on 

the 12th of December. At that time, despite what may have been 

briefed, all counties were there. It’s clearly in the notes that 

everybody was there.

That is consistent with the issue Watson raised in his motion. He asserts he 

would not have plead guilty but for the offer of a concurrent sentence to the 

companion case where the judgment has been vacated.

[¶30] The operative question is not whether Watson entered a conditional 

guilty plea under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2), because he is not required to 

preserve issues to subsequently file a motion to withdraw under N.D.R.Crim.P. 

11(d)(3). The operative question is whether there has been a manifest injustice 

supporting Watson’s withdrawal of his guilty plea when he gave the plea 

because his sentence would be concurrent with a case that has now been 

reversed and vacated. The written order indicates the district court was 

focused on whether the prior plea was conditional without a single reference to 

“manifest injustice” and the oral findings reference “manifest injustice” a 

single time, and only coupled with the court’s determination the prior plea was 

not properly conditional. These circumstances compel this case to be remanded 

to the court for a determination of whether it would be a manifest injustice to 

deny the withdrawal of a guilty plea when the plea was entered to obtain a 

concurrent sentence with a sentence that was subsequently vacated. We do not 

know how the court would answer that question.

II

[¶31] Paragraph 12 of the majority opinion provides several quotations to 

arguments made during the hearing by Watson’s counsel and the State 

referencing Rule 11(d)(3). The majority opinion extrapolates from this the 

conclusion that the district court must have made its determination by 

applying Rule 11(d) and not Rule 11(a)(2). The majority opinion sets a 

dangerous precedent for this Court. When there is an apparent misapplication 

of law in a court’s written order (three references to condition or conditional 

without any references to manifest injustice) and at best, ambiguous support 
13

in the court’s oral findings, this Court will now assume the correct law was 

applied by the court if the correct law was argued by the parties. It is now a 

disadvantage for a litigant to have argued the correct law when the issue on 

appeal is whether the district court applied the correct law.

[¶32] In paragraphs 13-16, the majority engages in something the district 

court did not do—its own analysis of why there is not a manifest injustice. 

Those paragraphs do a detailed analysis of the change of plea hearing. It is the 

district court’s obligation to provide a finding on manifest injustice, subject to 

an abuse of discretion standard of review by this Court. This Court should not 

engage in its own analysis of how the denial of the motion can be justified and 

then conclude there has not been an abuse of discretion. The court’s written 

order does not even mention “manifest injustice” and the order comes nowhere 

close to the analysis in paragraphs 13-16. Even if we were to go beyond the 

written order, the oral findings of the court do not contain any of the arguments 

and conclusions asserted within paragraphs 13-16 of the majority opinion. The 

rationale and conclusions within paragraphs 13-16 are exclusively those of the 

majority opinion, not the district court.

[¶33] In this case, the district court’s written order did not contain the phrase 

“manifest injustice.” The two sentence explanation of the court, quoted in 

paragraph 6 above, unambiguously reveals the court improperly imposed the 

requirement that Watson had previously entered a conditional guilty plea 

under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2), and denied the motion because the conditional 

guilty plea did not include a tie to the Golden Valley County case and he did 

not prevail on appeal in this case.

[¶34] The district court must consider whether the entry of a guilty plea in this 

case for the purpose of receiving a concurrent sentence in a companion case 

results in a manifest injustice if the conviction in the companion case is 

vacated. While the absence of a tie between the different appeals is certainly a 

fact to be considered, the absence of a conditional guilty plea is but one possible 

factor for the court to consider.
14

III

[¶35] A court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, 

or capricious manner, or it misinterprets or misapplies the law. Kremer v. 

State, 2020 ND 132, ¶ 5, 945 N.W.2d 279. Here, the district court’s written 

order is devoid of even a reference to the central issue, whether there was a 

manifest injustice as the result of Watson pleading guilty to receive a sentence 

concurrent to a jury conviction in a companion case that was subsequently 

reversed and vacated. The single reference to “manifest injustice” by the court 

in the transcript is the conclusion that a failure to preserve the issue through 

N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2), conditional guilty plea is not a manifest injustice. The 

court denied the motion because Watson failed to enter a conditional guilty 

plea. Because a conditional guilty plea is not a prerequisite to a subsequent 

request to withdraw a guilty plea, and the written order is devoid of any 

mention of the central legal issue, I would hold that the district court abused 

its discretion and remand this case. Upon remand, the district court should 

determine whether the denial of Watson’s request to withdraw his guilty plea 

would result in a manifest injustice when it was entered to receive a sentence 

concurrent with a sentence that has now been vacated. We do not know 

whether the court will answer that question in the affirmative or the negative.

[¶36] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.