SUMMARY

March 21, 2019

2019COA44

No. 17CA2160, Whiting-Turner v. Guarantee Co. of N. Am. USA 

— Construction Law — Suretyship and Guaranty —

Performance Bonds; Contracts — Condition Precedent

For the first time in Colorado, a division of the court of appeals 

applies to surety bonds cases the contract law principles governing

a party’s satisfaction of conditions precedent. In addition, the 

division considers the proper calculation of the “Balance of the 

Contract Price,” which is a key term in the standard form of surety 

bond used throughout the construction industry. The division 

affirms the trial court’s finding that the general contractor satisfied 

the conditions precedent in the surety bond and thus triggered the 

surety’s obligation to perform. 

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2019COA44

Court of Appeals No. 17CA2160

City and County of Denver District Court No. 14CV34166

Honorable Andrew P. McCallin, Judge

Whiting-Turner Contracting Company,

Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Guarantee Company of North America USA,

Third-Party Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II

Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY

Dailey and Furman, JJ., concur

Announced March 21, 2019

Husch Blackwell LLP, Jeffrey D. Whitney, Jeffrey M. Van der Veer, Denver, 

Colorado, for Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee

Woods & Aitken LLP, Kory D. George, Colin P. Baumchen, Denver, Colorado, 

for Third-Party Defendant-Appellant
1

¶ 1 Performance bonds, like other forms of surety bonds, are 

critical to managing the risk inherent in construction projects. If a 

subcontractor fails to complete its work at a construction site, the 

surety that underwrote the performance bond assumes 

responsibility for the subcontractor’s obligations. Without 

performance bonds, a construction project could come to a halt if a 

single subcontractor walked off the job.

¶ 2 Performance bonds specify the actions that will trigger the 

surety’s obligations. In this appeal, a surety, Guarantee Company 

of North America USA (GCNA), and a general contractor, WhitingTurner Contracting Company, dispute whether Whiting-Turner

triggered GCNA’s obligations under a performance bond after a 

subcontractor, Klempco Construction (2013) Inc., stopped work at 

Whiting-Turner’s construction project. The parties’ disagreement 

centers on whether Whiting-Turner paid GCNA the “Balance of the 

Contract Price,” a key term in the performance bond, thereby 

satisfying one of the bond’s conditions precedent. 

¶ 3 Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in 

favor of Whiting-Turner and against GCNA. The trial court found 
2

that Whiting-Turner had complied with the condition precedent set 

forth in section 3.3 of the performance bond and that GCNA had 

failed to perform its obligations under the bond.

¶ 4 On appeal, GCNA contends that the trial court applied the 

wrong legal standard in determining whether Whiting-Turner 

complied with section 3.3 of the performance bond, erred in finding 

that GCNA had waived its argument regarding Whiting-Turner’s 

compliance with section 3.3, erroneously found that Whiting-Turner 

satisfied the condition precedent in section 3.3, awarded duplicative 

damages to Whiting-Turner, and improperly awarded attorney fees 

to Whiting-Turner. 

¶ 5 We affirm.

I. Whiting-Turner’s Disputes with Klempco and GCNA

A. Klempco Signs a Subcontract for Work at Whiting-Turner’s 

Project

¶ 6 Whiting-Turner served as the general contractor for an office 

building construction project in Denver (the Project). WhitingTurner and Klempco entered into an agreement (the Subcontract)

for Klempco’s construction of an anchor system at the Project’s 

underground parking garage. The anchor system was necessary to 
3

keep the sides of the excavated site from collapsing during the 

initial phases of construction. Klempco’s work included the 

installation of sprayed concrete, known as shotcrete, to support the 

anchoring system. Whiting-Turner and Klempco agreed to a 

Subcontract price of $1,785,783.00. 

B. GCNA Provides a Performance Bond and a Payment Bond

¶ 7 Whiting-Turner required Klempco to furnish a performance 

bond and a payment bond. (A surety that underwrites a payment 

bond is obligated to pay the sub-subcontractors if the 

subcontractor fails to do so.) Klempco obtained the bonds from 

GCNA. The bonds, which followed American Institute of Architects 

form A312, incorporated the Subcontract by reference. See 4A 

Philip L. Bruner & Patrick J. O’Connor, Jr., Bruner & O’Connor on 

Construction Law § 12:16, Westlaw (database updated June 2018)

(explaining that the A312 surety bond is a standard form in the 

construction industry).

¶ 8 Section 3 of the performance bond specified the three 

conditions precedent that Whiting-Turner would need to satisfy to 

trigger GCNA’s obligations as surety:
4

• provide notice to Klempco and GCNA that WhitingTurner was considering declaring Klempco in default 

(section 3.1);

• declare Klempco in default, terminate the Subcontract, 

and notify GCNA of these actions (section 3.2); and

• “pay the Balance of the Contract Price in accordance 

with the terms of the [Subcontract] to [GCNA] or to a 

contractor selected to perform the [Subcontract]” 

(section 3.3). 

¶ 9 The performance bond defined “Balance of the Contract Price” 

as “[t]he total amount payable by [Whiting-Turner] to [Klempco] 

under the [Subcontract] after all proper adjustments have been 

made, . . . reduced by all valid and proper payments made to or on 

behalf of [Klempco] under the [Subcontract].” (Emphases added.)

C. Klempco Stops Work at the Project

¶ 10 Klempco fell behind schedule almost immediately and stopped 

paying its sub-subcontractors. Klempco subsequently directed

Whiting-Turner to assume responsibility for the shotcrete 
5

installation and to work directly with two of Klempco’s subsubcontractors. 

¶ 11 Whiting-Turner sent Klempco and GCNA a letter declaring 

Klempco in default under the Subcontract. In the letter, WhitingTurner stated that Klempco was incapable of completing its work at 

the Project and “is apparently unable to complete payments to its 

sub-subcontractors for previously completed work, and by its own 

admissions is unable to cure such default.” Whiting-Turner 

requested a meeting with Klempco representatives “to discuss the 

details of Klempco’s request that Whiting-Turner take over its 

work.” Whiting-Turner asked GCNA to attend the meeting “to 

advise Whiting-Turner on how [GCNA] wishes for Whiting-Turner to 

proceed in connection with the completion of Klempco’s work and 

payment of its vendors.” 

¶ 12 Representatives of Whiting-Turner, Klempco, and GCNA met

on April 30, 2014, to discuss, among other issues, Klempco’s 

request that Whiting-Turner take over the shotcrete work and pay 

Klempco’s sub-subcontractors directly. At the meeting, WhitingTurner and Klempco amended the Subcontract to reduce Klempco’s 
6

payment by $553,707.00 — the price of the shotcrete work. 

Whiting-Turner, Klempco, and GCNA agreed that the shotcrete subsubcontractor would invoice Whiting-Turner directly. 

¶ 13 Two days later, Klempco notified Whiting-Turner that, because 

Whiting-Turner had declared Klempco in default and was refusing 

to pay Klempco, Klempco would demobilize from the Project.

Whiting-Turner asked GCNA how Whiting-Turner should proceed in 

light of Klempco’s decision to leave the Project. GCNA did not 

respond. 

D. Whiting-Turner Terminates Klempco’s Subcontract

¶ 14 Whiting-Turner terminated the Subcontract after Klempco

failed to cure its default. GCNA did not respond to WhitingTurner’s repeated demands that, in light of the termination of the 

Subcontract, GCNA honor its obligations under the performance

bond and advise Whiting-Turner how GCNA intended to proceed.

¶ 15 On June 24, 2014, Whiting-Turner provided GCNA with its 

calculation of the “Balance of the Contract Price.” Whiting-Turner 

said that it had paid $1,064,919.00 of the “Balance of the Contract 

Price” to Klempco and its sub-subcontractors, leaving a balance of 
7

$720,819.00. Whiting-Turner deducted certain expenses from this 

balance:

• $256,897.90 for Whiting-Turner’s payments to five 

unpaid sub-subcontractors who had recorded, or were 

threatening to record, mechanic’s liens against the 

Project; and

• $553,707.00 for the shotcrete work for which WhitingTurner had assumed responsibility.

These adjustments resulted in a negative “Balance of the Contract 

Price.” 

E. The Trial Court Enters Judgment Against Klempco and GCNA

¶ 16 Klempco filed suit against Whiting-Turner claiming, among 

other allegations, that Whiting-Turner had breached the 

Subcontract by failing to pay sums due to Klempco. WhitingTurner asserted a counterclaim for breach of the Subcontract.

Whiting-Turner also filed third-party claims against GCNA for 

breach of the performance bond and the payment bond. 

¶ 17 GCNA argued that Whiting-Turner had failed to comply with 

the condition precedent set forth in section 3.3 of the performance 
8

bond and, therefore, never trigged GCNA’s obligations under the 

bond. Specifically, GCNA asserted that Whiting-Turner 

miscalculated the “Balance of the Contract Price” and, 

consequently, failed to pay the correct sum to GCNA pursuant to 

section 3.3.

¶ 18 The case proceeded to a bench trial. In its findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, the trial court found that Klempco had breached

the Subcontract. In addition, the trial court found that WhitingTurner had complied with the condition precedent set forth in 

section 3.3 of the performance bond. The trial court further found 

that GCNA had breached the performance bond and the payment 

bond. The trial court held that GCNA was jointly and severally 

liable with Klempco for Whiting-Turner’s damages. 

¶ 19 Alternatively, the trial court found that GCNA had waived its 

arguments regarding Whiting-Turner’s compliance with section 3.3 

by failing to respond to Whiting-Turner’s repeated requests for 

guidance after Klempco stopped performing under the Subcontract.

¶ 20 The trial court found that, as a consequence of GCNA’s breach

of the performance bond, Whiting-Turner had incurred $798,248.93 
9

in damages, including $124,146.95 in prejudgment interest. The 

trial court calculated Whiting-Turner’s damages by first determining 

how much Whiting-Turner had paid the sub-subcontractors to 

complete the work specified in the Subcontract. The trial court 

subtracted from this number the sum that Whiting-Turner had 

agreed to pay Klempco in the original Subcontract.

¶ 21 The trial court later revised its damage calculations to reflect

two adjustments to the $798,248.93 figure: (1) a reduction of 

$3,322.90 for unrecoverable overhead and (2) additional 

prejudgment interest in the amount of $37,334.21. The trial court 

awarded Whiting-Turner $832,260.24 in damages against Klempco 

and GCNA, jointly and severally.

¶ 22 Whiting-Turner moved for an award of attorney fees and costs

against Klempco and GCNA under the Subcontract; Colorado’s 

mechanic’s lien statute, section 38-22-128, C.R.S. 2018; and the 

performance and payment bonds. GCNA opposed Whiting-Turner’s 

request for attorney fees and argued, in the alternative, that GCNA 

was liable only for those fees attributable to Whiting-Turner’s 

claims against GCNA. GCNA contended that it was not liable for 
10

Whiting-Turner’s fees attributable to its defenses to Klempco’s 

claims, Whiting-Turner’s claims against Klempco, or WhitingTurner’s claim against GCNA for breach of the payment bond. 

¶ 23 The trial court found that it could not apportion WhitingTurner’s fees among the various claims and defenses litigated in the 

case, however, because “all of the claims of both parties ar[o]se out 

of the same operative facts.” The trial court held Klempco and 

GCNA jointly and severally liable to Whiting-Turner for $504,785.27 

in attorney fees and costs and $18,990.14 in interest. 

¶ 24 GCNA appeals the trial court’s post-trial rulings on damages 

and attorney fees. (The trial court subsequently increased the 

amount of attorney fees awarded to Whiting-Turner. GCNA did not 

file an amended notice of appeal to obtain review of this decision, 

however. We therefore address the two appealed orders only. See

Baldwin v. Bright Mortg. Co., 757 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Colo. 1988)

(holding that attorney fees award is separately appealable from 

judgment on the merits).)
11

II. The Record Does Not Indicate that the Trial Court Applied an 

Incorrect Legal Standard in Analyzing Whether Whiting-Turner 

Complied with Section 3.3 of the Performance Bond

¶ 25 GCNA contends that the trial court erred in finding that 

Whiting-Turner was required only to substantially comply, rather 

than strictly comply, with the condition precedent set forth in 

section 3.3 of the performance bond. GCNA asks us to hold that 

contractors must strictly comply with the conditions precedent in a 

performance bond and, therefore, reverse the trial court’s finding 

that Whiting-Turner complied with section 3.3.

¶ 26 The record does not support GCNA’s contention, however. 

Because the trial court did not find that Whiting-Turner only 

substantially complied with section 3.3, we need not address in this 

context the proper legal standard for determining whether a 

contractor satisfied a condition precedent in a performance bond. 

See Zingone v. Zingone, 136 Colo. 39, 43, 314 P.2d 304, 306 (1957) 

(holding that appellate court may not consider a party’s version of 

what transpired in the lower court that does not appear in the 

record).
12

¶ 27 GCNA’s argument regarding the substantial compliance 

standard rests on a single sentence in the trial court’s discussion of 

Whiting-Turner’s compliance with the notice provision in the

payment bond. The trial court said that “only substantial 

performance with bond notice requirements is required . . . .” 

¶ 28 This is a correct statement regarding the standard for 

compliance with the notice provision in a surety bond. Brighton 

Sch. Dist. 27J v. Transamerica Premier Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 328, 334 

(Colo. App. 1996), aff’d, 940 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1997). But this case 

does not concern Whiting-Turner’s compliance with a notice 

requirement.

¶ 29 GCNA does not point to anything in the record demonstrating 

that the trial court found that Whiting-Turner was required only to 

substantially comply with the condition precedent in section 3.3 of 

the performance bond. Moreover, GCNA does not contend that the 

trial court found that Whiting-Turner only substantially complied, 

and did not strictly comply, with section 3.3.

¶ 30 We therefore decline to address this argument.
13

III. We Need Not Address GCNA’s Waiver Argument

¶ 31 GCNA contends that the trial court erred in finding that GCNA 

waived its argument that Whiting-Turner failed to satisfy the 

condition precedent set forth in section 3.3. The trial court inserted 

a single sentence regarding waiver in the midst of its extensive 

discussion of Whiting-Turner’s compliance with section 3.3, 

however.

¶ 32 The trial court’s ruling in favor of Whiting-Turner rested not 

only on waiver but also on the trial court’s thorough analysis of the 

merits of Whiting-Turner’s claims. The trial court’s reference to 

waiver therefore reflected, at most, an alternative basis for its 

findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

¶ 33 We need not address whether GCNA waived its arguments 

concerning Whiting-Turner’s compliance with section 3.3 because, 

as we explain in Part IV below, we agree with the trial court that 

Whiting-Turner properly triggered GCNA’s obligations under the 

performance bond. See Archuleta v. Gomez, 140 P.3d 281, 285 

(Colo. App. 2006) (declining to address the trial court’s alternative 

ruling when the record supported the trial court’s findings and 
14

verdict on the claim). We therefore now turn to the merits of 

GCNA’s argument regarding section 3.3.

IV. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Finding that Whiting-Turner 

Satisfied the Condition Precedent Set Forth in Section 3.3 of

the Performance Bond

¶ 34 GCNA contends that the trial court erred in finding that

Whiting-Turner satisfied the condition precedent in section 3.3 of 

the performance bond. GCNA asserts that Whiting-Turner did not 

comply with section 3.3 because it miscalculated the “Balance of 

the Contract Price” and did not pay the correct amount to GCNA. 

GCNA specifically argues that Whiting-Turner improperly reduced 

the “Balance of the Contract Price” by

• the amount of Whiting-Turner’s anticipated payments to 

five unpaid sub-subcontractors that had recorded, or 

were threatening to record, mechanic’s liens against the 

Project;

• the $553,707.00 reduction in the “Balance of the 

Contract Price” to which Whiting-Turner and Klempco 

agreed at the April 30 meeting (which GCNA also 

attended); and
15

• a back charge of $30,702.00.

Lastly, GCNA asserts that we should adopt the reasoning of an 

unpublished New York state trial court decision that, according to 

GCNA, supports its position that Whiting-Turner failed to comply 

with section 3.3.

¶ 35 The record supports the trial court’s finding that WhitingTurner satisfied the condition precedent in section 3.3 of the 

performance bond.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 36 We review de novo questions of law, such as the interpretation 

of a provision in a surety bond. See Brighton Sch. Dist. 27J, 923 

P.2d at 333. We review a court’s findings of fact for clear error. Id. 

A factual finding is clearly erroneous if nothing in the record 

supports it. Loveland Essential Grp., LLC v. Grommon Farms, Inc., 

251 P.3d 1109, 1117 (Colo. App. 2010). 
16

B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Finding that Whiting-Turner 

Correctly Calculated the “Balance of the Contract Price”

1. Whiting-Turner Properly Deducted from the “Balance of the 

Contract Price” Its Payments to the Five Unpaid SubSubcontractors

¶ 37 GCNA contends that the trial court erred in finding that 

Whiting-Turner properly reduced the “Balance of the Contract 

Price” by the $256,897.90 that Whiting-Turner paid to the five 

unpaid sub-subcontractors. We disagree.

¶ 38 The Subcontract authorized Whiting-Turner to pay Klempco’s 

unpaid sub-subcontractors and to subtract those payments from 

the “Balance of the Contract Price.” Under the Subcontract, 

Klempco was required to “. . . take any and all necessary actions to 

keep the Project free and clear of all claims for liens . . . .” If 

Klempco failed to take the “necessary actions,” Whiting-Turner

could “take all actions which it deems reasonable or necessary to 

protect the Project from liens and claims and the costs of any such 

actions . . . shall be deducted from amounts payable by [WhitingTurner] to [Klempco]” under the Subcontract. 

¶ 39 Despite this language, GCNA asserts that the “Balance of the 

Contract Price” became fixed in place as of the moment Whiting-
17

Turner terminated the Subcontract. Therefore, according to GCNA, 

Whiting-Turner’s post-termination payments to Klempco’s unpaid 

sub-subcontractors, who were clamoring for payment and 

threatening to record liens against the Project, could not reduce the 

“Balance of the Contract Price.” 

¶ 40 No language in either section 3.3 or the Subcontract barred 

Whiting-Turner from reducing the “Balance of the Contract Price” 

by the amount of its post-termination payments to unpaid subsubcontractors, however. The five sub-subcontractors had already 

completed their work on the Project and had either recorded or were 

threatening to record liens against the Project. Thus, WhitingTurner paid Klempco’s sub-subcontractors “to protect the Project 

from liens and claims . . . .” 

¶ 41 GCNA cites to several cases to support its assertion that none 

of Whiting-Turner’s payments postdating the termination of the 

Subcontract properly reduced the “Balance of the Contract Price.” 

These cases do not assist GCNA, however. They hold that, when a 

general contractor hires a replacement subcontractor without the 

surety’s consent, the general contractor has failed to satisfy the 
18

conditions precedent in the performance bond. Under those 

circumstances, the general contractor cannot reduce the “Balance 

of the Contract Price” by the amount of its payments to replacement 

subcontractors. See LaSalle Grp., Inc. v. JST Props., L.L.C., No. 10-

14380, 2011 WL 3268099, at *6 (E.D. Mich. July 29, 2011) (“[T]he 

hiring of a replacement contractor fails to satisfy the requirement of 

paragraph 3.3 [of a form A312 bond].”) (emphasis added); Enter. 

Capital, Inc. v. San-Gra Corp., 284 F. Supp. 2d 166, 177 (D. Mass. 

2003) (explaining that the “notice requirement in the Construction 

Contract exists precisely to provide the surety an opportunity to 

protect itself against loss by participating in the selection of the 

successor contractor”) (emphasis added); Sch. Bd. v. TIG Premier Ins. 

Co., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1354 (N.D. Fla. 2000) (obligee “could not 

contract with another party . . . prior to giving [the surety] notice”) 

(emphasis added); Solai & Cameron, Inc. v. Plainfield Cmty. Consol. 

Sch. Dist. No. 202, 871 N.E.2d 944, 954 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) 

(“[R]eplacement is a form of mitigation available only to [the surety] 

under the provisions of [the performance bond].”) (emphasis added). 
19

¶ 42 None of the sub-subcontractors Whiting-Turner paid was a 

replacement contractor. Klempco had selected all five of the subcontractors. Accordingly, we conclude that the $256,897.90 

Whiting-Turner paid to the five unpaid sub-subcontractors after the 

termination of the Subcontract properly reduced the “Balance of the 

Contract Price.” (GCNA also contends that the trial court 

improperly reduced the “Balance of the Contract Price” by

$99,901.65 that Whiting-Turner paid to sub-subcontractors. The 

record reflects, however, that these payments were included within

the $256,897.90 Whiting-Turner paid to the five subsubcontractors.) 

2. Whiting-Turner Properly Subtracted from the “Balance of the 

Contract Price” the $553,707.00 Reduction in Its Payment to 

Klempco

¶ 43 GCNA also contends that the trial court improperly reduced 

the “Balance of the Contract Price” by the $553,707.00 reduction in 

the price payable to Klempco under the Subcontract for the 

shotcrete work. We conclude that the trial court did not err by 

reducing the “Balance of the Contract Price” by this amount.
20

¶ 44 The trial court found that, at their April 30 meeting with 

GCNA, Whiting-Turner and Klempco agreed to reduce the amount 

payable to Klempco by the $553,707.00 specified in the 

Subcontract for the shotcrete work. Whiting-Turner advised GCNA 

and Klempco in letters dated May 2, 2014, and May 9, 2014, that it 

intended to incur the expense of completing the shotcrete work. 

When Whiting-Turner asked GCNA in a May 2, 2014, email if it was 

acceptable for Whiting-Turner to pay for the shotcrete work directly, 

GCNA responded “Yes.” GCNA therefore at least tacitly consented 

to reduction of the “Balance of the Contract Price” by $553,707.00.

¶ 45 Whiting-Turner and Klempco had the right to amend their 

agreement memorialized in the Subcontract, and did so when they 

reduced Klempco’s payment by $553,707.00. Accordingly, we 

conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that WhitingTurner properly reduced the “Balance of the Contract Price” by the 

$553,707.00 reduction in the Subcontract price.

3. Whiting-Turner Correctly Subtracted the Back Charge from 

the “Balance of the Contract Price”

¶ 46 GCNA lastly contends that the trial court improperly reduced 

the “Balance of the Contract Price” by a back charge of $30,702.00 
21

because the trial court disallowed the amount of the back charge as 

an item of damages. (GCNA fails to acknowledge that the trial court 

adjusted the amount of the back charge to $5,915.00.) We 

disagree. 

¶ 47 As GCNA notes, the trial court reduced Whiting-Turner’s 

damages by the amount of the back charge. GCNA provides no 

explanation, beyond a one-sentence, conclusory statement, to 

support the proposition that, because Whiting-Turner could not 

recover the amount of the back charge as a component of its 

damages, the payment could not also reduce the “Balance of the 

Contract Price.” We decline to address an undeveloped argument 

without legal support. See Holley v. Huang, 284 P.3d 81, 87 (Colo. 

App. 2011) (declining to address “bald assertions of error” 

unsupported by legal authority).

4. The New York Trial Court Decision on Which GCNA Relies 

Does Not Support GCNA’s Argument that Whiting-Turner 

Failed to Satisfy the Condition Precedent in Section 3.3

¶ 48 We are not persuaded that the New York unpublished trial 

court decision cited by GCNA supports its argument that WhitingTurner failed to comply with the condition precedent in section 3.3.
22

¶ 49 In East 49th Street Development II, LLC v. Prestige Air & 

Design, LLC, 938 N.Y.S.2d 226, 2011 WL 4599708 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 

Oct. 6, 2011) (unpublished table decision), the contractor failed to 

tender the balance of the contract price to the surety, even though 

the balance of the contract price was positive, in violation of section 

3.3 of the form A312 performance bond. Id. at *9. The East 49th 

Street court explained that an offer to pay the contract balance, 

even if the balance was negative, was sufficient to satisfy section 

3.3 of the performance bond. Id. at *10. 

¶ 50 Unlike the contractors in East 49th Street, Whiting-Turner 

acknowledged in its June 24, 2014, letter that it was required to 

pay GCNA the remainder of the “Balance of the Contract Price.” 

Based on Whiting-Turner’s tender of the “Balance of the Contract 

Price” to GCNA — albeit a negative balance — the trial court

correctly found that Whiting-Turner had satisfied section 3.3 of the 

performance bond. 

¶ 51 The law supports this conclusion. See U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. 

Braspetro Oil Servs. Co., 369 F.3d 34, 59 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he 

relevant inquiry is whether the Obligees actually agreed to pay the 
23

Balance of the Contract Price — not, as the Sureties urge, whether 

the Obligees agreed with the Sureties’ assessment of what the 

respective Balances were at the time of the declarations of 

default.”). Accordingly, East 49th Street does not support GCNA’s 

argument that Whiting-Turner failed to comply with section 3.3. 

V. The Trial Court Did Not Award Duplicative Damages to 

Whiting-Turner

¶ 52 GCNA contends that “Whiting-Turner essentially ‘tripledipp[ed]’ in that it sought the very same dollars in three ways” by (1) 

reducing the “Balance of the Contract Price” payable to GCNA; (2) 

seeking payment of the same amount under the performance bond;

and (3) attempting to recover this sum under the payment bond. 

¶ 53 The record does not reflect that the trial court awarded

Whiting-Turner any duplicative damages, however. The trial court 

reduced the amount of the judgment to permit Whiting-Turner to 

recover only under the performance bond. In doing so, the trial 

court correctly subtracted from the judgment the sum that WhitingTurner would have been required to pay Klempco had Klempco not 

breached the Subcontract. 
24

¶ 54 Therefore, the trial court’s judgment did not reflect “triple 

dipping.” GCNA appears to acknowledge this fact in both its 

opening and reply brief. Accordingly, we disagree with GCNA that 

the trial court awarded duplicative damages to Whiting-Turner.

VI. The Trial Court Properly Awarded Whiting-Turner Its Attorney 

Fees 

¶ 55 GCNA lastly contends that the trial court erroneously awarded 

attorney fees to Whiting-Turner under the performance bond. 

GCNA asserts that, because Whiting-Turner did not satisfy the 

condition precedent in section 3.3, Whiting-Turner could not 

recover attorney fees. Alternatively, GCNA argues that the trial 

court improperly failed to segregate the fees awardable to WhitingTurner for its claim against GCNA from the fees attributable to 

Whiting-Turner’s other claims and defenses. We disagree with both 

contentions.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 56 When awarding attorney fees and costs under a contractual

fee-shifting provision, “[t]he determination of which party prevailed 

is committed to the discretion of the trial court and is subject to an 

abuse of discretion standard of review on appeal.” Dennis I. Spencer 
25

Contractor, Inc. v. City of Aurora, 884 P.2d 326, 328 n.6 (Colo. 1994)

(citing Smith v. Freeman, 921 F.2d 1120, 1122 (10th Cir. 1990)). 

A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly 

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it is based on an 

erroneous view of the law. Zeke Coffee, Inc. v. Pappas-Alstad P’ship, 

2015 COA 104, ¶ 12, 370 P.3d 261, 265. We will not disturb such 

a decision if it is supported by the record. Double Oak Constr., 

L.L.C. v. Cornerstone Dev. Int’l, L.L.C., 97 P.3d 140, 151 (Colo. App. 

2003).

B. The Law Governing Attorney Fees

¶ 57 “[I]f the parties agree, in a contract clause known as a feeshifting provision, . . . the prevailing party will be entitled to recover 

its attorney fees and costs.” S. Colo. Orthopaedic Clinic Sports Med. 

& Arthritis Surgeons, P.C. v. Weinstein, 2014 COA 171, ¶ 10, 343 

P.3d 1044, 1047. 

¶ 58 A party can recover all of its attorney fees for a lawsuit 

containing “multiple claims ‘involv[ing] a common core of facts’ or 

‘based on related legal theories,’ [when] counsel’s efforts on an 

individual claim [cannot] be distinguished from work on the whole 
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of the litigation . . . .” Rocky Mountain Festivals, Inc. v. Parsons 

Corp., 242 P.3d 1067, 1073 (Colo. 2010) (quoting Hensley v. 

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983)). However, when the party 

“presented ‘distinctly different claims for relief that [were] based on 

different facts and legal theories,’” the party may recover only those 

legal fees attributable to the claims on which the party prevailed. 

Id. (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435). 

C. Discussion

1. The Trial Court Properly Awarded Attorney Fees to WhitingTurner Under the Performance Bond

¶ 59 Because Whiting-Turner complied with section 3.3, we agree 

with the trial court that Whiting-Turner had the right to recover 

attorney fees under the performance bond. The performance bond

bound Klempco and GCNA, “jointly and severally, . . . to [WhitingTurner] for the performance of the [Subcontract], which is 

incorporated herein by reference.” The Subcontract required 

Klempco to pay “[t]he amount of completion costs, as well as any 

other costs, damages, or expenses, including [Whiting-Turner’s] 

legal fees and expense[s], incurred as a result of [Klempco’s]

default . . . .” The Subcontract also required Klempco to indemnify 
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Whiting-Turner “against any and all claims, suits, liens, judgments, 

damages, losses and expenses, including, but not limited to, 

attorney’s fees, arising in whole or in part and in any manner for 

the acts or omissions of [Klempco] . . . in the performance of the 

[Subcontract] . . . .”

¶ 60 The language of the Subcontract demonstrates that Klempco 

and Whiting-Turner intended that Klempco would pay any legal fees 

that Whiting-Turner incurred as a consequence of Klempco’s 

default. See Powder Horn Constructors, Inc. v. City of Florence, 754 

P.2d 356, 365 (Colo. 1988) (language of the contract determines 

intent (citing Gen. Ins. Co. of Am. v. City of Colorado Springs, 638 

P.2d 752, 757 (Colo. 1981))). Because the performance bond 

provided that GCNA was jointly and severally liable with Klempco 

for all sums that Klempco owed Whiting-Turner under the 

Subcontract, GCNA was liable to Whiting-Turner for the attorney 

fees that Klempco owed to Whiting-Turner. We therefore conclude 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney 

fees to Whiting-Turner under the performance bond. 
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2. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Not Segregating the Fees 

Awarded to Whiting-Turner

¶ 61 GCNA challenges the lack of segregation between WhitingTurner’s fees attributable to Whiting-Turner’s claims against GCNA

arising under the performance bond and Whiting-Turner’s fees 

relating to the other claims and defenses in the case. The trial 

court found, however, “that it is improper[ ] to segregate out 

Whiting-Turner defense costs against Klempco versus the cost and 

fees that [Whiting-Turner] incurred in bringing its claims against 

Klempco for completion of the [P]roject.” The trial court explained 

that “all of the claims of both parties arise out of the same operative 

facts . . . .” (Emphasis added.) 

¶ 62 To prosecute its claim for breach of the performance bond, 

Whiting-Turner had to prove its compliance with each of the three 

conditions precedent set forth in the performance bond: (1) 

notification to Klempco and GCNA that Whiting-Turner was 

considering declaring Klempco in default; (2) notification to GCNA 

that Whiting-Turner had declared a default and terminated the 

Subcontract; and (3) payment of the “Balance of the Contract Price” 

to GCNA or a designated replacement subcontractor. Whiting-
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Turner therefore could not prove its claim under the performance 

bond unless it established, among other facts, that it had properly 

declared Klempco in default and terminated the Subcontract.

¶ 63 All the claims in the case, including Whiting-Turner’s claim 

under the performance bond, therefore “involv[ed] a common core of 

facts.” Rocky Mountain Festivals, Inc., 242 P.3d at 1073 (quoting 

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435). We discern no error in the trial court’s 

finding that Whiting-Turner’s attorney fees could not be 

apportioned amongst Whiting-Turner’s claims against GCNA, claims 

against Klempco, and defenses to Klempco’s claims, as all such 

claims and defenses were intertwined. The trial court thus correctly 

held that, under the performance bond, GCNA was liable to 

Whiting-Turner for all of Whiting-Turner’s attorney fees incurred in 

the litigation. 

¶ 64 For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in awarding Whiting-Turner its attorney fees 

incurred in this litigation or in calculating the amount of such fees.

VII. Conclusion

¶ 65 The judgment is affirmed.
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JUDGE DAILEY and JUDGE FURMAN concur.