### The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District 1 

### Judge for the Eastern and Western Districts of Missouri, sitting by designation. United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_______________ No. 96-2925

_______________ KAREN KAMPA, * * Appellant, * * v. * Appeal from the United * States District Court for * the District of Minnesota. WHITE CONSOLIDATED * INDUSTRIES, INC., * * Appellee. *

__________________________ Submitted: March 12, 1997 Filed: June 6, 1997

__________________________ Before WOLLMAN and BEAM, Circuit Judges, and LAUGHREY, District 1 Judge.

______________________ LAUGHREY, District Judge. Appellant Karen Kampa appeals from the district court’s order d enying her a jury trial on her claim brought under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

### -2- I.

InApril 1995, Kampa filed suit against her employer, Whit e Consolidated Industri es, Inc. (WCI), alleging, in part, discrimination on the basis of her gend er in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the MHRA, Minn. Stat. § 363.01 et seq. Both parties made timely demands for a jury trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 38. Shortly before trial, WCI moved to strike Kampa’s jur y demand and to revoke its own jury demand. The district court granted WCI’ s motions. The court determined that the events giving rise to Kampa’ s gen der discrimination claim occurred prior to the effective date of th e Civil R ights Act of 1991, and accordingly, Kampa had no right to a jur y trial on her claim brought under Title VII. See Landgraf v. USI Fil m Prod s. , 511 U.S. 244, 280-86 (1994). The court also determined tha t because the MHRA specifically provided that claims brought under the Act
were to be decided by a judge sitting without a jury, Kampa’s MHRA claim would be decided by the court.
Kampa mov ed for reconsideration of the district court’s order based upon our decision in Gipson v. KAS Snacktime Co. , 83 F.3d 225, 230-31 (8th Cir. 1996), wherein we held that the Seventh Amendment guaranteed a jury trial to a plaintiff seeking damages in federal court under the Missouri Human Rights Act. The district court found Gipsonwas distinguishable, bu t certified for immediate appeal the question of whether Kampa had a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial on her MHRA claim. We subsequently grante d Kampa’s petition for interlocutory appeal.

The i ssue of whether a party is entitled to a jury trial under th e SeventhAmendment is a question of law. Accordingly, our review is d e novo. Ackerman v. No rthwest Airlines, Inc. , 54 F.3d 1389, 1393 (8th Cir. 1995).

### -3- II.
The init ial question presented to the Court is whether the Sevent h Amendment right to a jury trial extends to a cla im brought pursuant to the MHRA. The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial in “suits at comm on law” filed in federal court. Tull v. United States , 481 U.S
. 412, 4 17 (1987). Such suits include those in which legal rights an d remedies, as distinguished from equitable rights and remedies, are to be determined. Curtis v. Loether , 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974). Since the merge r of the c ourts of law and equity, the Seventh Amendment right to a jur y trial has been carefully preserved. “Maintenance of the jury as a fact

finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in ou r historyand jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jurytrial should be scrutinized with the utmost care.” Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover , 359 U.S. 500, 501 (1959)(quoting Dimick v. Schiedt , 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)).

Inher Complaint, Kampa seeks compensatory and punitive damages , reinstatement, costs and attorneys’ fees, which are all remedies authorize d by the MHRA. Although we recognize that not every award of monetary relie f constitutes a legal remedy, federal law has consistently held that money damage s are generally characterized as a legal remedy. Chauffeurs , Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry , 494 U.S. 558, 570 (1990). Furt hermore, “[r]emedies [that are] intended to punish culpabl e individuals, as opposed to those intended simply to extract compensation
or resto re the status quo, were issued by courts of law, not courts o f equity. ” Tull , 481 U.S. at 422 (citing Curtis , 415 U.S. at 197). Base d upon the rights and r emedies at issue in this case, the Seventh Amendment guarantees Kampa a ri ght to a jury trial on her MHRA claim. Gallagher v. Wilton Enters., Inc. , 962 F.2d 120, 122-23 (1st Cir. 1992); Chauffeurs , 49 4 U.S. at 570.

### -4- Ou r conclusion is buttressed by our recent decision in Gipson i n which we s tated that “[t]he Seventh Amendment right to [a] jury tria l extends to statutory causes of action, so long as the statute allows, and the plaintiff seeks, at least in part a legal remedy.” 83 F.3d at 23 1 (citing Curtis , 415 U.S. at 194). In Gipson , we found that the Sevent h Amendment right to a jury trial attached because the Missouri Human Rights Act provided for actual and punitive damages.
Our conclusion is not altered becaus e the MHRA specifically provides that “[a]ny action brought pursuant to this chapter shall be heard an d determined by a judge sitting without a jury.” Minn. Stat. § 363.14, subd
. 2. Nor are we persuaded by WCI’s argument that the legislature intended to create an equitable remedy by prohibiting a jury trial and making the award of compensatory money damages discretionary. The right to a jur y trial i n federal court is clearly a question of federal law. Simler v
. Conner , 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963). Federal law c ontrols the issue, even in cases such as this, where the federal court is enforcing a state-created right and “even when a state statute or state constitution would preclude a jury trial in state court.” Gipson , 83 F.3d a t 230 (citing Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc. , 356 U.S. 525, 538-39 (1958); Herron v . Southern Pac. Co. , 283 U.S. 91 (1931)). Accordi ngly, federal law controls even i f the Minnesota legislature intended to create only equitabl e remedies. The MHRA permits actual and punitive damages and pursuant t o federal law those are legal remedies. The only remaining issue is whether the Seventh Amendment guarantee must be b alanced against the mandate of the Erie doctrine, an issue no t addressed in Gipson . The Erie doctrine establishes that the federal court s in diversity cases mu st apply state substantive law but are free to apply federal procedural law.

### -5-

Guaranty T rust Co. of N.Y. v. York , 326 U.S. 99 (1945). Later case s refining the Erie doctrine have held that the federal court should apply the law of the state, rather than federal law, i f the right in question is bound up with the sub stantive claim created by state law. Byrd , 356 U.S. at 535 (citing Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap , 308 U.S. 208 (1939)).
There is no clear evidence that Minn esota’s prohibition against jury trials was bound up in the substantive rights created by the MHRA. More importantly, we are n ot persuaded that the Erie doctrine plays as central
a role in this case as WCI advocates. In Hanna v. Plumer , 380 U.S. 460, 469 -70 (1965), the Supreme Court held that where an arguably procedura l right is at stake, and the issue is addressed by a Federal Rule of Civil Proc edure, the Erie analysis is irrelevant. Several years later, i n Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. , 487 U.S. 22, 27 n.6 (1988), the Supreme Court went one step f urther and stated that the aims of the Erie doctrine are immaterial and should not be considered wher e either a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or a federal statute addresses an arguably procedural poin t indispute. Necessarily, the Erie analysis must be equally inapplicable when there is a constitutional provision on point which is arguabl y procedural. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the district court.

A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.