alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
## COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH NO. 02 - 16 - 00202 - CR NO. 02 - 16 - 00203 - CR NO. 02 - 16 - 00204 - CR
JORDAN BAJONERO
- PALMA APPELLANT V. THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

---------- FROM THE 362ND DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY TRIAL COURT NO S . F
- 2014
- 2221
- D, F
- 2014
- 2222
- D, F
- 2014
- 2223
- D

---------- 

### MEMORANDU M OPINION 1

---------- On October 16, 2015, appellant Jordan Bajonero
- Palma pleaded guilty to and was convicted of possession of a con trolled substance, committed on Mar ch 23, 2014; aggravated robbery, committed on April 7, 2014; and two counts of aggravat ed robbery , both committed on April 6, 2014 . The trial court assessed

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.2

his punishment at concurrent sente nces of two years, twenty
- five years , and twenty
- five years, resp ectively. In each case, the trial court certified that Appellant had the right to app eal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25 .2(a)(2). Appellant did not file a motion for new trial in the trial court, but did file pro se notices of appeal from the trial court’s judgments on April 25, 2016. On June 3 and July 21, 2016, we notified Appellant that we did not believe we had jurisdiction over his appeals because the notices of appe al had not been filed timely

. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a). We warned Appellant that we would dismiss his appeals for want of jurisdiction unless he or any other party respond ed showing grounds to continue the appeals. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.3. Appellant responded that his notices wer e untimely because his attorney “said he was going to file a notice of appeal” but “did not.” Our appellate jurisdiction is triggered through a timely filed notice of appeal. Olivo v. State , 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). If a notice of appeal is not timely filed under Rule 26.2, we do not have jurisdiction to address the merits of the appeal and may take no action

— including gran ting an out
- of
- time appeal

— other than dismissal. Slaton v. State , 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)

. Rule 26.2(a) requires that a notice of appeal be filed within thirty days after the date the trial court imposes sentence. Te x. R. App. P. 26.2 (a). Appellant did not file his notices of appeal within thirty days of the trial court’s imposition of sentences ; thus , we have no jurisdiction over his appeals and dismiss them. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f).3 /s/ Lee Gabriel LEE GABRIEL JUSTICE PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C .J.; GABRIEL and SUDDERTH, JJ. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) DELIVERED: August 18, 2016
#### § 1.936 Mutual releases of the debtor and VA.

In all appropriate instances, a compromise that is accepted by VA shall be implemented by means of a mutual release, in which the debtor is released from further non-tax liability on the compromised debt in consideration of payment in full of the compromise amount, and VA and its officials, past and present, are released and discharged from any and all claims and causes of action that the debtor may have arising from the same transaction. In the event a mutual release is not executed when a debt is compromised, unless prohibited by law, the debtor is still deemed to have waived any and all claims and causes of action against VA and its officials related to the transaction giving rise to the compromised debt.

(Authority: 31 U.S.C. 3711; 38 U.S.C. 501, 3720)

[69 FR 62198, Oct. 25, 2004]
#### § 21.9630 Suspension or discontinuance of payments.

VA may suspend or discontinue payment of educational assistance in accordance with §§ 21.4210 through 21.4216.

(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 3034(a), 3323(a), 3690)
**Exhibit 32**
 
 **Statement of Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer under 18 U.S.C. § 1350**
 
 
 
 I, Henry C. Pao, the chief executive officer and chief financial officer of Supertex, Inc., a California corporation (the "Company"), certify pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code, that to my knowledge:
  
 (i)
the Quarterly Report of the Company on Form 10-Q for the period ending October 2, 2004 (the "Report"), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), whichever is applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and 
 (ii)
the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. 
 
 
 Date: November 11, 2004
/s/ Henry C. Pao____Henry C. Pao, Ph.D.Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
 
  The material contained in this Exhibit 32 is not deemed "filed" with the SEC and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, whether made before or after the date hereof and irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.
# C_2020349EN.01000801.xml

| 20.10.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 349/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.10.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 349/8

---

Euro exchange rates (1)

19 October 2020

(2020/C 349/05)

1 euro =

| | Currency | Exchange rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US dollar | 1,1785 |
| JPY | Japanese yen | 124,11 |
| DKK | Danish krone | 7,4410 |
| GBP | Pound sterling | 0,90588 |
| SEK | Swedish krona | 10,3578 |
| CHF | Swiss franc | 1,0724 |
| ISK | Iceland króna | 163,40 |
| NOK | Norwegian krone | 10,9470 |
| BGN | Bulgarian lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Czech koruna | 27,346 |
| HUF | Hungarian forint | 365,05 |
| PLN | Polish zloty | 4,5723 |
| RON | Romanian leu | 4,8768 |
| TRY | Turkish lira | 9,3057 |
| AUD | Australian dollar | 1,6575 |
| CAD | Canadian dollar | 1,5523 |
| HKD | Hong Kong dollar | 9,1334 |
| NZD | New Zealand dollar | 1,7751 |
| SGD | Singapore dollar | 1,5990 |
| KRW | South Korean won | 1 341,33 |
| ZAR | South African rand | 19,3806 |
| CNY | Chinese yuan renminbi | 7,8767 |
| HRK | Croatian kuna | 7,5825 |
| IDR | Indonesian rupiah | 17 347,64 |
| MYR | Malaysian ringgit | 4,8819 |
| PHP | Philippine peso | 57,231 |
| RUB | Russian rouble | 91,4401 |
| THB | Thai baht | 36,746 |
| BRL | Brazilian real | 6,6139 |
| MXN | Mexican peso | 24,8118 |
| INR | Indian rupee | 86,3945 |

Currency

Exchange rate

USD

US dollar

1,1785

JPY

Japanese yen

124,11

DKK

Danish krone

7,4410

GBP

Pound sterling

0,90588

SEK

Swedish krona

10,3578

CHF

Swiss franc

1,0724

ISK

Iceland króna

163,40

NOK

Norwegian krone

10,9470

BGN

Bulgarian lev

1,9558

CZK

Czech koruna

27,346

HUF

Hungarian forint

365,05

PLN

Polish zloty

4,5723

RON

Romanian leu

4,8768

TRY

Turkish lira

9,3057

AUD

Australian dollar

1,6575

CAD

Canadian dollar

1,5523

HKD

Hong Kong dollar

9,1334

NZD

New Zealand dollar

1,7751

SGD

Singapore dollar

1,5990

KRW

South Korean won

1 341,33

ZAR

South African rand

19,3806

CNY

Chinese yuan renminbi

7,8767

HRK

Croatian kuna

7,5825

IDR

Indonesian rupiah

17 347,64

MYR

Malaysian ringgit

4,8819

PHP

Philippine peso

57,231

RUB

Russian rouble

91,4401

THB

Thai baht

36,746

BRL

Brazilian real

6,6139

MXN

Mexican peso

24,8118

INR

Indian rupee

86,3945

---

(1)  Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.

---
#### Mary Kennedy, Appellant, *v.*James Fay, Respondent.

Appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment dismissing the complaint, rendered by the Municipal Court of the city of New York, borough of Manhattan, upon a trial had before the court and a jury.

Cornelius J. Earley, for appellant.

Weeks, Battle & Marshall (Frank O. Mebane and H. Snowden Marshall, of counsel), for respondent.

*Per Curiam.*

The action is to recover damages for personal injuries claimed to have been received by the plaintiff from the fall of plaster in premises where she resided with her husband, who was in possession under a lease from the defendant.

When the plaintiff rested, the defendant moved for a dlamlpsal of the complaint, which motion was granted, and the plaintiff, by her appeal, challenges the correctness of the ruling. The record fails to disclose any proof whatever that the defendant agreed to repair the demised premises. Hence, he was under no legal obligation to repair the same or keep them in a habitable condition. Schick v. Fleischhauer, 26 App. Div. 210. Even if he had made such an agreement and failed to make the repairs, the defendant would not be liable for the injuries which the plaintiff says she sustained in consequence of the fall of the ceiling. Wynne v. Haight, 27 App. Div. 7, 9. Moreover, as the plaintiff wholly failed to show that the defendant knew or had reason to know that the ceiling was dangerous or unsafe at the time of the letting of the demised premises to her husband, and failed to disclose that fact, or that the defendant at any time had any knowledge, either actual or construct*777ive, as to the condition of the ceiling, the ruling of the justice should be upheld. Franz v. Mulligan, 18 Misc. Rep. 411.

It follows from these views that the judgment must be affirmed, with costs.

Present: Beekman, P. J., Giegebioh and O’Gobman, JJ.

Judgment affirmed, with costs,
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

DOMINIC O. ROACH,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 387 MAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

DOMINIC O. ROACH,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 388 MAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 29th day of December, 2020

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED

.
§ 17.98 Mental health services. ( a ) Following the death of a veteran, bereavement counseling involving services defined in 38 U.S.C. 1783, may be furnished to persons who were receiving mental health services in connection with treatment of the veteran under 38 U.S.C. 1710, 1712A, 1717, or 1781, prior to the veteran's death, but may only be furnished in instances where the veteran's death had been unexpected or occurred while the veteran was participating in a VA hospice or similar program. Bereavement counseling may be provided only to assist individuals with the emotional and psychological stress accompanying the veteran's death, and only for a limited period of time, as determined by the Medical Center Director, but not to exceed 60 days. The Medical Center Director may approve a longer period of time when medically indicated.
( b ) For purposes of paragraph (a) of this section, an unexpected death is one which occurs when in the course of an illness the provider of care did not or could not have anticipated the timing of the death. Ordinarily, the provider of care can anticipate the patient's death and can inform the patient and family of the immediacy and certainty of death. If that has not taken place, a death can be described as unexpected.
(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 1783)
[53 FR 7186, Mar. 7, 1988. Redesignated and amended at 61 FR 21965, 21967, May 13, 1996; 79 FR 54616, Sept. 12, 2014]
EXHIBIT
4.02                                           Form of Class B Stock Certificate


                              CLASS B COMMON STOCK

                             IEG ENERGY GROUP, INC.
                                NUMBER OF SHARES

              INCORPORATED UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
        AUTHORIZED CLASS B COMMON STOCK, 100,000 SHARES, $.0001 PAR VALUE


THIS CERTIFIES THAT ___________________
Is the recordholder of  ________________

FULLY PAID AND NON-ASSESSABLE SHARES OF CLASS B COMMON STOCK OF $.0001 PAR VALUE
EACH OF

                                         IEG ENERGY GROUP, INC.

Dated:

_______________                          __________________
SECRETARY                                  PRESIDENT


<PAGE>
41815.

#### GOWEN v. BELL et al.

Hall, Judge.

The plaintiff in this garnishment action appeals from a judgment granting the garnishee’s motion to quash'the summons of garnishment. The plaintiff’s affidavit and bond for garnishment were made and the summons issued and served on the garnishee on July 18, 1965, citing the garnishee to appear and answer on the first Monday in October 1965. *325On the appearance day directed by the summons the garnishee filed his motion to quash, on the ground that the summons was defective, not amendable, and void because the law (Ga. L. 1962, pp. 717, 718; *Code Ann.*§ 46-105) provides that when affidavit and bond for garnishment are given it shall be the duty of the authorized officer to issue a summons “directed to the garnishee and requiring him to appear . . . not sooner than 30 days and not later than 45 days of the service of such summons. . .”

“No technical or formal objections shall invalidate any process; but if the same shall substantially conform to the requisites of this Code, and the defendant has had notice of the pendency of the cause, all other objections shall be disregarded: Provided, a legal cause of action as required by this Code is set forth.” *Code*§ 81-220.

“A summons of garnishment is the process that brings the garnishee into court, and in this respect is like process in an ordinary suit, its purpose being to give notice to the garnishee of the plaintiff-s claim upon the defendant’s property in the garnishee’s possession or upon the garnishee’s indebtedness to the defendant.” *Gainesville Feed &c. Co. v. Waters,*87 Ga. App. 354, 356 (73 SE2d 771).

In *Hearn v. Adamson,*64 Ga. 608, the Supreme Court held that it was proper to grant a default judgment against a garnishee who attempted to answer a summons of garnishment after the expiration of time provided by law. Though the summons may have been misleading in calling upon the garnishee to answer at the next term of court, the court stated, “When the garnishee was served with the summons, the law made it his duty to answer it within ten days from the date of such service, and it was not necessary to state in the summons that he should answer within ten days. The mandate of the law was sufficient for that purpose, of which he was bound to take notice, and be governed by it.”

In the present case the time provided by law for answering the summons of garnishment had expired when the garnishee filed his motion to quash. Ga. L. 1962, pp. 717, 718 *(Code Ann.*§ 46-105). The trial court erred in granting the motion. *Hearn v. Adamson,*64 Ga. 608, supra; *Williams v. Buchanan & Bro.,*75 Ga. 789; *Williford v. Marshall,*175 Ga. 683 (165 SE 588). Cf. *Welch v. Singleton,*95 Ga. 519 (20 SE 496); *Mutual Benefit Health &c. Assn. v. White,*48 Ga. App. 146 (172 SE *326*92); Progressive Finance Co. v. Longleaf Lumber Co.,*108 Ga. App. 555 (134 SE2d 63).

Argued February 8, 1966

Decided March 16, 1966.

*Leon A. Wilson, II,*for appellant.

*Carroll Bussell, Francis Houston, Harold Guinn,*for appellee.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Nichols, P. J., and Deen, J. concur.*
###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 2 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 6 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 7 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 1 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 3 pertaining to both patents and trademarks is placed in the grouping pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 4 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 5 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

#### § 42.200 Procedure; pendency.

(a) A post-grant review is a trial subject to the procedures set forth in subpart A of this part.

(b) In a post-grant review proceeding, a claim of a patent, or a claim proposed in a motion to amend under § 42.221, shall be construed using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. Any prior claim construction determination concerning a term of the claim in a civil action, or a proceeding before the International Trade Commission, that is timely made of record in the post-grant review proceeding will be considered.

(c) A post-grant review proceeding shall be administered such that pendency before the Board after institution is normally no more than one year. The time can be extended by up to six months for good cause by the Chief Administrative Patent Judge, or adjusted by the Board in the case of joinder.

(d) Interferences commenced before September 16, 2012, shall proceed under part 41 of this chapter except as the Chief Administrative Patent Judge, acting on behalf of the Director, may otherwise order in the interests-of-justice.

[77 FR 48729, Aug. 14, 2012, as amended at 81 FR 18766, Apr. 1, 2016; 83 FR 51358, Oct. 11, 2018]
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

CORRECTED JUDGMENT RENDERED

AUGUST 26, 2015

NO. 03

- 14

- 00080

- CV

Gattis Electric, Inc., Appellant

v.
Theresa Marie Mann, Individually and as Guardian of the Person and Estate of James Lawhon, Appell ee

APPEAL FROM THE 126TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE, JUSTICES GOODWIN AND BOURLAND

AFFIRMED

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE GOODWIN

This is an appeal from the judgment signed by the tr i a l court on December 20, 2013. Having

reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments, the C ourt holds that there was no reversible error

in the trial court’s judgment . Therefore, the C ourt affirms the trial court’s judgment

. Gattis

Electric, Inc. shall pay all costs relating to this appeal, both in this Court and in the court below.

It is further ordered that Theresa Marie Mann, Individually and as Guardian of the Person and

Estate of James Lawhon, recover from the supersede as bond filed by Gattis Electric, Inc., and its

surety, Western Surety Company, the amount of the judgment rendered above, including all costs

and interest during the pendency of this appeal, as determined by the court below, up to but notin excess of the supersedeas amount of $584,625.00, after payment of which the surety is

released from further liability.
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15

- 41535 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.

JORGE VALENTINO LOZANO RAMIREZ
,
Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 4:14

- CR

- 179

- 1

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: *
The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Jorge Valentino
Lozano Ramirez has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in
accordance with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States
v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Lozano Ramire z has filed a response.
The record is not sufficiently developed to allow us to make a fair evaluation of
Lozano Ramirez’s claim of ine ffective assistance of counsel; we therefore

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED October 18, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 15-41535 Document: 00513723335 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/18/2016No. 15

- 41535

2 decline to consider the claim without prejudice to collateral review. See United States v. Isgar , 739 F.3d 829, 841 (5th Cir. 2014 )

. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein, as well as Lozano Ramirez’s response. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents n o nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, the motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS
DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR

. R . 42.2. Case: 15-41535 Document: 00513723335 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/18/2016
CONFORMED COPY

 

AMENDMENT NO. 5 TO THE

CREDIT AGREEMENT

	Dated as of August 3, 2004

AMENDMENT NO. 5 TO THE CREDIT AGREEMENT among ALPHARMA INC., a Delaware corporation ("***Holdings*"), the banks, financial institutions and other lenders party hereto, and BANK OF AMERICA, as administrative agent and collateral agent (the "***Administrative Agent*"), as parties to the Credit Agreement referred to below.**PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS:
- Alpharma Operating Corporation, a Delaware corporation (the " *Company*"), Alpharma USPD Inc., a Maryland corporation (together with the Company and the Subsidiary Borrowers party thereto, the "***Borrowers*"), Holdings, the Lender Parties and the Administrative Agent have entered into a Credit Agreement dated as of October 5, 2001, as amended by Amendment No. 1 dated as of December 16, 2002, Amendment No. 2 dated as of April 3, 2003, Amendment No. 3 dated as of December 18, 2003 and Amendment No. 4 dated as of April 19, 2004 (as further amended, supplemented or otherwise modified from time to time, the "***Credit Agreement*").  Capitalized terms not otherwise defined in this Amendment have the same meanings as specified in the Credit Agreement.Holdings and the Required Lenders have agreed to amend the Credit Agreement as hereinafter set forth.
Amendments to Credit Agreement

.  The Credit Agreement is, effective as of the date hereof and subject to the satisfaction of the conditions precedent set forth in Section 4, hereby amended as follows:
The definition of "Consolidated EBITDA" in Article I is amended by inserting after clause "(o)" therein the following new clause to read as follows:

	"*plus* (p) all cash restructuring charges up to a maximum aggregate amount of $30,000,000 incurred from July 1, 2004 through December 31, 2004 in connection with initiatives designed primarily to reduce selling, general and administrative expenses in worldwide operations". 
The table in Section 5.04(a) is amended in full to read as follows:

**Measurement Period **Ratio
December 31, 2001 to September 30, 2002**************
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED APRIL 25, 2024

NO. 03-22-00290-CV

Evaristo Gabriel Vazquez, Appellant

v.

Jessica Lynn Bailey, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 207TH DISTRICT COURT OF HAYS COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE BYRNE, JUSTICES SMITH AND THEOFANIS

AFFIRMED -- OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE BYRNE

This is an appeal from the order signed by the trial court on April 19, 2022. Having reviewed the 

record and the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was no reversible error in the trial 

court’s order. Therefore, the Court affirms the trial court’s order. The appellant shall pay all 

costs relating to this appeal, both in this Court and in the court below.