alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED June 29, 2004 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-30643 Summary Calendar

DOLAN FRANKLIN, Petitioner-Appellant,

versus BURL CAIN, WARDEN, LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY, Respondent-Appellee.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 01-CV-2637-C

-------------------- Before Jones, Benavides, and Clement, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Dolan Franklin, Louisiana prisoner # 93892, convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. The district court granted a certificate of appealability (COA) for the issue whether Franklin’s attorneys were ”ineffective for failing to properly develop and present evidence regarding petitioner’s competency to proceed to trial and his sanity at the time of the offense.”No. 03-30643 -2- Franklin argues that his trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to present to the trial court in support of his motion for the appointment of a sanity commission evidence of (1) a one-day hospitalization in a San Francisco psychiatric unit 17 months before his killing of the victim and (2) a suicide attempt while in prison following his arrest for that offense. Franklin contends that, had his attorneys provided such information to the trial court, the trial court would have appointed a sanity commission. The State argues that Franklin did not exhaust this issue because he raised it only in his state postconviction pleading filed in the state appellate court but not in his petition filed in the Louisiana Supreme Court. Given that the substance of Franklin’s appeal is without merit, we need not determine whether review of the ineffective assistance claim is barred based upon a failure to exhaust. We nevertheless note that a review of Franklin’s state postconviction petitions reveals that he exhausted the claim. See Bledsue v. Johnson , 188 F.3d 250, 255 (5th Cir. 1999). In light of the testimony of Franklin and his attorneys at the district court’s evidentiary hearing and the reports not submitted to the trial court, Franklin has not shown that his attorneys were ineffective in not presenting the reports to the trial court or that he was prejudiced by the reports not being submitted. See Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984); State v. Martin , 769 So. 2d 1168. 1169 (La. 2000).

AFFIRMED.
Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas

JUDGMENT

Carolyn Watson, Appellant

No. 06-14-00025-CV v.

Good Shepherd Medical Center, Appellee

Appeal from the County Court at Law #2 of 

Gregg County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 2013-

1958-CCL2). Opinion delivered by Chief 

Justice Morriss, Justice Moseley and Justice 

Carter* participating. Concurring Opinion 

by Justice Moseley. *Jack Carter, Retired, 

Sitting by Assignment.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find reversible error in the judgment of 

the court below. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

We further order that the appellee, Good Shepherd Medical Center, pay all costs of this 

appeal.

RENDERED JANUARY 15, 2015

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:

Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
§ 6.21 Guardian: definition and authority. ( a ) *Definition.* For the purpose of this section, the term *guardian* includes any fiduciary certified by the appropriate Veterans Service Center Manager under § 13.55 of this title to receive benefits in a fiduciary capacity for an insured or beneficiary.
( b ) *Authority.* For the purpose of this part, a guardian of an insured or beneficiary shall have authority to: Apply for conversion of a policy or change of plan; reinstate a policy; withdraw dividends held on deposit or credit; select or change a dividend option; obtain a policy loan; cash surrender a policy; authorize a deduction from benefits or allotment from military retired pay to pay premiums; apply for and receive payment of the proceeds on a matured policy; select or change the premium payment option; apply for waiver of premiums; select or change the settlement option for beneficiaries; assign a beneficiary's interest as provided under section 1953 of title 38 U.S.C.
(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 1944)
[56 FR 9627, Mar. 7, 1991. Redesignated at 61 FR 29025, June 7, 1996, as amended at 71 FR 28586, May 17, 2006]
#### Eugene Neusberger, Landlord-Respondent, *v.*Levy Brodejefsky, Sued as Jacob Brodejefsky, Impleaded, etc., Undertenant-Appellant.

Appear by the under-tenant from a final order in summary proceedings awarding the delivery of the possession of certain premises to the petitioner, made by one of the justices of the Municipal Court of the city of Rew York, sitting in the borough of Manhattan.

Joseph Wilkenfeld, for appellant.

Ro appearance for respondent.

*Per Curiam.*

The appellant is a party to summary proceedings instituted to recover the possession of certain real property situate in the borough of Manhattan, upon the ground that the tenant’s term therein has expired. The petition alleges that the appellant is an under-tenant, and as such continued in possession of the demised premises after the expiration of such term, without ' the permission of the landlord thereof. Hence he' had the right to file an answer and to defend the proceedings. Code Civ. Pro., § 2244; People ex rel. Jacks v. Callahan, 8 Week. Dig. 298. The appellant filed an answer denying the allegations of the petition respecting the hiring of the premises by the tenant, and that the latter’s term therein has expired. Thus there devolved upon the landlord the burden of proving the averments so controverted, which he wholly failed to do. The return fails to disclose any proof whatever in support of such allegations, or of an admission thereof on the part of the appellant during the course of the trial.

There being a total failure of proof with respect to material allegations of the petition, the final order must be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.

Present: Beekman, P. J., Giegerioh and O’Gorman, JJ.

Order reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event.
#### The Acme Electric Lamp Co., Respondent, v. The Kingston Carriage Co., Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment entered upon a verdict at a Trial Term, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial.

Kellogg, Rose & Smith (Abram J. Rose and Alfred C. Pette, of counsel), for appellant, ^ • , ,

Henry B. Twombly, for respondent.

Conlan, J.

The action was brought by the plaintiff to recover the value of certain goods delivered to the defendant under a written contract, which were to be furnished from time to time, with the proviso that such goods, as failed to do what was represented by the plaintiff, might be returned by the defendant.

Under the terms of this agreement the plaintiff- delivered to *824the defendant in December, 1896, certain goods of the alleged value of $200.25, and the defendant claiming a breach of this provision of the contract above referred to, undertook at some time thereafter to return the goods so delivered, and one of the questions which was submitted to the jury was whether such rer turn was made within a reasonable time after the alleged defects were discovered and pointed out, and the jury determined that issue in favor of the plaintiff.

With the submission of this question to the jury, we think, the entire case was disposed of, and as it was the province of the jury to determine this issue, the court on appeal will not interfere to disturb the finding.

Judgment and order appealed from affirmed.

Fitzsimoits, Oh. J., concurs.

Judgment and order affirmed.
AAM-12-361-E May 24, 2012

Exemption No. 10540 Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2012-0518

Mr. James Hobbs MauiScape Helicopter Tours dba

Airborne Aviation

P.O. Box 71 Lihue Lihue, Hawaii 96766

Dear Mr. Hobbs:

This letter is to inform you that we have granted your request for exemption. It transmits our decision, explains its basis, and gives you the conditions and limitations of the exemption, including the date it ends.

The Basis for Our Decision

By letter dated April 25, 2012, you petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on behalf of MauiScape Helicopter Tours dba Ai rborne Aviation (Airborne) for an exemption from part 120 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) to the extent necessary to allow Airborne to cover its safety-sensitive employees under one drug and alcohol testing

program.

The FAA has determined that good cause exists for not publishing a summary of the petition

in the Federal Register because the requested exemption would not set a precedent, and any delay in acting on this petition would be detrimental to Airborne.

The FAA has issued a grant of exemption in circumstances similar in all material respects to those presented in your petition. In Grant of Exemption No. 9703 (copy enclosed), the FAA found that Solid Edge’s § 91.147 air tour operations were closely connected to its part 135 operations. The FAA also found that combining the petitioner’s two drug and alcohol testing programs into one would be in the public interest and would maintain an equivalent level of2

safety to that provided by the current regulations. Thus, the FAA concluded it was unnecessary to burden the petitioner by requiring it to conduct two separate testing programs.

Having reviewed your reasons for requesting an exemption, I find that—

 they are similar in all material respects to relief previously requested in the enclosed Grant of Exemption No. 9703;

 the reasons stated by the FAA for granting the enclosed Grant of Exemption No. 9703 also apply to the situation you present; and

 a grant of exemption is in the public interest.

Our Decision

Under the authority contained in 49 U.S.C. 40113 and 44701, which the FAA Administrator has delegated to me, I hereby grant MauiScape Helicopter Tours dba Airborne Aviation anexemption from 14 CFR part 120 to the extent necessary to allow Airborne to cover its safetysensitive employees under one drug and alcohol testing program, subject to the conditions and

limitations described below.

Conditions and Limitations

1. Employees of Airborne are subject to the drug and alcohol regulations at all times while conducting operations under part 135 or part 91.

2. The drug and alcohol program must be implemented under the same auspices of the Airborne part 135 operation, not under part 91.

This exemption terminates on June 30, 2014, unless sooner superseded or rescinded.

Sincerely,

/s/
James R. Fraser, M.D. Deputy Federal Air Surgeon

Enclosure
#### § 11.89 Notification of veteran.

When a note is redeemed notification will be sent to the veteran at his last known address, advising him that the Department of Veterans Affairs holds his note, and outlining the conditions governing repayment.
EXHIBIT 99.1
                   CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                    18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                     AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
         SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



     In  connection  with the Quarterly  Report of Research
Frontiers Incorporated (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the
quarter ended June 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Robert
L. Saxe, Chairman of the Board and Chief  Executive Officer of the
Company, certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.   The Report fully complies with the  requirements of Section
     13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of
     1934; and

2.   The information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all
     material respects, the financial condition and results of
     operations of the Company.


/s/ Robert L. Saxe
    Robert L. Saxe
    Chairman of the Board
    and Chief Executive Officer
    August 13, 2003
§ 21.8080 Requirement for an individualized written plan of vocational rehabilitation. ( a ) *General.* A CP or VRC will work in consultation with each child for whom a vocational goal is feasible to develop an individualized written plan of vocational rehabilitation services and assistance to meet the child's vocational training needs. The CP or VRC will develop this individualized written plan of vocational rehabilitation in a manner comparable to the rules governing the development of an individualized written rehabilitation plan (IWRP) for a veteran for 38 U.S.C. chapter 31 purposes, as §§ 21.80, 21.84, 21.88, 21.90, 21.92, 21.94 (a) through (d), and 21.96 provide. (Authority: 38 U.S.C. 1804(b), 1814)
( b ) *Selecting the type of training to include in the individualized written plan of vocational rehabilitation.* If training is necessary, the CP or VRC will explore a range of possibilities, to include paid and unpaid on-job training, institutional training, and a combination of on-job and institutional training to accomplish the goals of the program. Generally, an eligible child's program should include on-job training, or a combination of on-job and institutional training, when this training: ( 1 ) Is available;
( 2 ) Is as suitable as using only institutional training for accomplishing the goals of the program; and
( 3 ) Will meet the child's vocational training program needs.
(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 1804(b), (c), 1814)
Motion Granted and Order filed August 7, 2018. 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-17-00726-CV

____________

LAURA MARCIA JONES, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS INDEPENDENT 

EXECUTOR FOR THE ESTATE OF BYFORD ATHAL JONES, 

DECEASED, Appellant

V.

AQUINAS OIL & GAS, L.L.C., Appellee

On Appeal from the Probate Court No 4

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 422,684-401

ORDER

The court abated this appeal on May 22, 2018 to allow the parties to engage 

in settlement discussions. On July 23, 2018, the parties filed a joint motion to 

extend the abatement period to allow continued settlement negotiations. The 

motion is granted. Accordingly, we issue the following order. 

The appeal remains abated, treated as a closed case, and removed from this 
court’s active docket until September 6, 2018. The appeal will be reinstated on 

this court’s active docket at that time, or when the parties file a motion to dismiss 

the appeal or other dispositive motion. The court will also consider an appropriate 

motion to reinstate the appeal filed by either party, or the court may reinstate the 

appeal on its own motion.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Jamison, Wise, and Jewell.
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2375 Introduced in House (IH)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2375

    To provide wage parity for certain prevailing rate employees in 
              Southeastern Massachusetts and Rhode Island.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 17, 2007

Mr. Frank of Massachusetts (for himself, Mr. McGovern, Mr. Kennedy, and 
Mr. Langevin) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
              Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To provide wage parity for certain prevailing rate employees in 
              Southeastern Massachusetts and Rhode Island.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Southeastern Massachusetts and Rhode 
Island Federal Worker Fairness Act of 2007''.

SEC. 2. WAGE PARITY FOR CERTAIN PREVAILING RATE EMPLOYEES IN 
              SOUTHEASTERN MASSACHUSETTS AND RHODE ISLAND.

    (a) In General.--For purposes of determining the rate of pay for 
any prevailing rate employee working in the Narragansett Bay, Rhode 
Island Wage Area, the wage schedule and rates to be used shall be the 
same as if such employee were instead working in the Boston, 
Massachusetts Wage Area.
    (b) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
            (1) the term ``prevailing rate employee'' has the meaning 
        given such term by section 5342 of title 5, United States Code; 
        and
            (2) the term ``wage area'' refers to a wage area under 
        section 5343 of title 5, United States Code.
    (c) Regulations.--The Office of Personnel Management may prescribe 
any regulations necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE.

    This Act shall apply with respect to pay periods beginning on or 
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED FEBRUARY 21, 2013

NO. 03-12-00528-CV

City of New Braunfels, Texas, Appellant

v.

Stop The Ordinances Please; W. W. GAF, Inc. d/b/a Rockin “R” River Rides;

Texas Tubes; Tourist Associated Businesses of Comal County; Union River LLC d/b/a 

Landa River Trips; Chuck’s Tubes; Waterpark Management, Inc.; Tri-City Distributors, 

LP; et al., Appellees

APPEAL FROM 207TH DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES PURYEAR, PEMBERTON AND FIELD

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART --

OPINION BY JUSTICE PEMBERTON

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the record of the court below, and the same being 

considered, because it is the opinion of this Court that there was no error in the district court’s 

order EXCEPT for the portion of the district court’s order denying the City’s plea to the 

jurisdiction as to Stone Randall Williams: IT IS THEREFORE considered, adjudged and 

ordered that that the portion of the district court’s order denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction 

as to Stone Randall Williams is reversed and his claims are remanded so the district court may 

afford him a reasonable opportunity to amend his pleadings. We otherwise affirm the district 
2

court’s order. It is FURTHER ordered that the appellant pay all costs relating to this appeal, 

both in this Court and the court below; and that this decision be certified below for observance.
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 21 (Tuesday, February 3, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 5914]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-2327]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS


Sunshine Act Notice

AGENCY: United States Commission on Civil Rights.

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date and Time: Wednesday, February 11, 2009; 11 a.m. e.s.t.

Place: Via Teleconference, Public Dial In--1-800-597-7623, Conference 
ID<greek-i> 83711892.

Meeting Agenda

I. Approval of Agenda
II. Program Planning
    <bullet> FY 2009 Statutory Report
III. Future Agenda Items
IV. Adjourn

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lenore Ostrowsky, Acting Chief, Public 
Affairs Unit (202) 376-8582.

    Dated: January 30, 2009.
David Blackwood,
General Counsel.
[FR Doc. E9-2327 Filed 1-30-09; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 6335-01-P
#### § 18b.75 Review by the Secretary.

Within 20 days after an initial decision becomes a final decision pursuant to § 18b.73(a), or within 20 days of the mailing of a final decision referred to in § 18b.73(b), as the case may be, a party may request the Secretary to review the final decision. The Secretary may grant or deny such request, in whole or in part, or serve notice of intent to review the decision in whole or in part upon motion. If the Secretary grants the requested review, or serves notice of intent to review upon motion, each party to the decision shall have 20 days following notice of the Secretary's proposed action within which to file exceptions to the decision and supporting briefs and memoranda, or briefs and memoranda in support of the decision. Failure of a party to request review under this section shall not be deemed a failure to exhaust administrative remedies for the purpose of obtaining judicial review.

[35 FR 10760, July 2, 1970, as amended at 51 FR 10387, Mar. 26, 1986]
#### McCoy v. Tax Claim Bureau

*Milton S. Margolis,*for petitioner.

*Theodore 0. Rogers,*for Tax Claim Bureau.

April 2, 1956.

Windle, P. J.,

These objections and exceptions to a tax sale are presented in the form of a petition to set aside and declare void a sale by the Tax Claim Bureau of Chester County of a certain messuage and lot of land in Valley Township in this *747county owned by petitioner prior to and at the time of said sale. While not approving the practice and procedure they will be disposed of on their merits.

The reasons assigned by petitioner for the relief sought are that notice of the filing with the bureau of delinquent taxes for the year 1953 was not sent petitioner until August 10, 1954, contrary to the appropriate provisions of the Real Estate Tax Sale Law of 1947 and that taxes on said property paid by petitioner for the year 1954 should have been applied to the delinquent taxes of 1953. Neither reason can be sustained.

The Real Estate Tax Sale Law of July 7,1947, P. L. 1368, 72 PS §5860.101, provides at section 308, as amended, that the Tax Claim Bureau give notice to the taxpayer not later than the thirty-first day of July of each year that a return has been made to it by a taxing district that taxes on his property are unpaid. Section 311 of said act, as amended, provides that on the first day of January next following said notice if the amount of the tax claim referred to in said notice has not been paid or exceptions filed thereto, the claim shall become valid. And section 607 of said statute governing the confirmation of tax sales, at subparagraph *(d)*provides:

> “Any objections or exceptions to such a sale may question the regularity or legality of the proceedings of the bureau in respect to such sale, but may not raise the legality of the taxes on which the sale was held, or of the return thereof to the bureau, or the claim entered therefor.” . . .

Upon consideration of the above provisions of the act it is clear that petitioner’s first reason above stated may not be sustained. He is, on exceptions to the sale, seeking to attack the validity of the claim which is expressly prohibited by the above last quoted excerpt from the statute.

*748Nor is the second reason in any better case. We see no merit in it, but if there were it is a reason which should have been advanced in an attack on the validity of the claim if said payment of 1954 taxes was made before said claim became valid, and is, therefore, not now available to attack the validity of the sale. If said payment was not made until after that time it could not affect said validity.

Exceptions overruled.

Petitions denied.

Counsel for the Tax Claim Bureau of Chester County will present an appropriate decree for confirmation absolute of the tax sale here in question.