IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs April 12, 2016

IN RE: A-RIVER CITY BAIL BOND, INC.

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. (No Number Assigned) Lee V. Coffee, Presiding Judge 

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No. W2015-01578-CCA-R3-CD – Filed December 12, 2016

___________________________________

The appellant, A-River City Bail Bond, Inc., appeals its suspension from writing bonds in 

the Thirtieth Judicial District due to its failure to comply with the local rules. The 

appellant argues that a local rule requiring the posting of at least $75,000 in cash or 

certificate of deposit with the Criminal Court Clerk does not apply to it and that the trial 

court failed to provide it with procedural due process when suspending its ability to write 

bonds. Based upon the record and the parties‟ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial 

court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

THOMAS T. WOODALL, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ALAN E. GLENN

and ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JJ., joined.

Ricky E. Wilkins and Sharon H. Loy, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, A-River 

City Bail Bond, Inc..

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; James E. Gaylord, Senior 

Counsel; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Thomas D. Henderson, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts and Procedural History

This appeal arises out of the appellant‟s failure to comply with the requirements of 

the Local Rules of Practice and Procedure for Bail Bond Companies, effective March 1, 

2015, found under Rule 7 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure for the Criminal Court 

of Tennessee for the Thirtieth Judicial District (“Local Rule 7”). After the enactment of 
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these rules, the appellant received a letter dated March 16, 2015, stating, “In accordance 

with the New Local Rules the Judges of Criminal Court have put in place, these rules will 

go into effect Monday, March 23, 2015. If you are not in compliance on this day, you 

will be suspended from writing bonds in Shelby County.” On March 23, 2015, the trial 

court entered an order suspending the appellant and several other bonding companies 

from writing bonds “[d]ue to the non-compliance of the New Local Rules for Bail Bond 

Companies that were effective March 1, 2015[.]” The appellant filed a written answer 

and motion to set aside the order on March 27, 2015. 

In the appellant‟s written answer and motion to set aside the order, it argued that 

the order suspending the company for non-compliance with the new local rules did not 

identify which rule it failed to comply with. The appellant asserted, however, that it 

believed the suspension occurred because it did not post the $75,000 deposit required by 

Local Rule 7.03(A). According to the appellant, as written, the rule does not require 

those bonding companies already approved to write bonds in Shelby County to comply 

with the requirement. The appellant further contended the order suspending its ability to 

write bonds was constitutionally inadequate to satisfy due process concerns and violated 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-125. Finally, the appellant argued the order 

and amended local rules violated its liberty and property interests protected by the due 

process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 

Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. Due to the alleged 

failure of the trial court to put the bonding company on notice of the precise local rule 

with which it failed to comply, the appellant then raised all of the provisions of the 

recently-amended local rules it contended were unlawful or invalid.

The trial court initially postponed hearing the appellant‟s motion due to the fact 

that Memphis Bonding Company, Inc. v. Criminal Court of Tennessee 30th District, et al., 

490 S.W.3d 458 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) was pending before the Court of Appeals at the 

time. The trial court and all criminal court judges in the Thirtieth Judicial District were 

named defendants to the lawsuit, which sought injunctive relief and a declaration as to 

the constitutionality and validity of Local Rule 7. Our review of the transcript from the 

eventual hearing of the appellant‟s motion reveals that, despite the pendency of the Court 

of Appeals matter, after confirming with its counsel in Memphis Bonding Company, Inc. 

v. Criminal Court of Tennessee 30th District, et al. that the hearing could proceed, the 

trial court set the appellant‟s motion for hearing on May 19, 2015. May 19 was a 

mutually convenient date for the trial court and parties. We note that in an opinion dated 

November 25, 2015, the Court of Appeals held chancery court does not have subject 

matter jurisdiction to entertain an action for declaratory or injunctive relief regarding the 

validity of local rules in criminal court, and the case was remanded for dismissal of the 

complaint. Memphis Bonding Co., Inc., 490 S.W.3d at 467. 
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The trial court, sitting en banc, heard the appellant‟s motion on May 19, 2015, as 

scheduled. During this hearing, the trial court confirmed that it suspended the appellant‟s 

ability to write bonds due to its failure to post a minimum of $75,000 in cash or 

certificate of deposit with the Criminal Court Clerk, stating:

[The appellant] should have actual notice because I made it clear that the 

only reason any of those companies were being ordered to cease doing 

business in Shelby County was because of the failure to comply with the 

rule of having collateral on file . . . It had nothing to do with violations of 

any other local rules.

The trial court went on to state that in conversations with the appellant‟s attorney held 

prior to the hearing, counsel had been told “the only reason that this bonding company 

[is] being suspended [is] because of his failure to post that collateral with the Clerk‟s 

Office[.]” The trial court then recounted the history behind the amendments to Local 

Rule 7 and again addressed the notice given to the appellant, stating:

This started in 2012 when Judge Craft was the Administrative Judge. 

It had been brought to the attention of the Criminal Court judges that some 

of the bonding companies felt that they were at a disadvantage, some of the 

bonding companies felt that some of the rules that were being applied were 

not being applied fairly, not being applied equally, and they asked the 

judges to please do something about trying to make sure that all bonding 

companies had a level, had an equal playing field.

. . .

So when Judge Craft was the Administrative Judge, he asked me to 

take a look at it, asked me to rewrite a proposed revision of Rule 7.

I started this process in 2012, completed this process on January 1, 

2013, and drafted amendments to the rule that indicated that those rules 

were effective on January 1, 2013. So this is how long these rules have 

been in this universe. This is not something anyone can say, “I am 

surprised by these rules and I ha[d] no idea this was coming.”

We submitted those rules for – proposed rule for comments in April, 

May of 2013, got back many, many, many comments[.] 

. . .
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And this order was filed on November 21st, 2014. Under Tennessee 

Supreme Court rules, these rules could have been effective in thirty days, 

but, again, because of some concerns by some of my fellow Criminal Court 

judges, they did not want these rules effective in thirty days. They 

extended it with an effective date of March 1st, 2015.

The first full Monday in 2015 – and . . . I don‟t know whether or not 

[the appellant] was here. I believe he was here. On or about January 5, 

2015, at the request of certain bonding companies and folks that 

represented those bonding companies, that said, “Judge Coffee, can we 

have a meeting with you so you can explain what these rules mean, when 

they are effective, what is required of bonding companies,” and those 

questions were all addressed.

We answered – I answered those questions, and I had a courtroom 

full of folks, probably forty-five people here, including at least three 

lawyers. . . and I answered questions from bonding companies, from 

lawyers and other folks, and I made it crystal clear that these rules are 

effective on March 1st, 2015.

And there were some questions as to whether or not all bonding 

companies had to have on file with the Clerk‟s Office seventy-five 

thousand dollars ($75,000), including those pre-existing bonding 

companies, and I referred them to and they should have had in their 

possession because these were filed in November, effective March the 1st, 

and made it clear to everyone at this meeting that, under 7.04(F), and it‟s 

stated, restated, in these rules twice that . . . [b]onding companies approved 

before the effective dates of these rules shall be in compliance with this rule 

by the effective date of March 1st, 2015.

. . .

So these bonding companies have been on notice for over two years 

that these rules were changing. They‟ve been on notice for over two years, 

what was expected of them. The seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000) is 

an amount that has been consistent. It is an amount that, frankly, I believe 

is probably not sufficient to protect the citizens and to protect the 

administration of justice, but it is an amount that my fellow judges said, 

“Let‟s set this amount at seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000).”

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court orally denied the appellant‟s 

motion and directed it to file a petition for reinstatement after complying with Rule 7.03 
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and paying the $100 reinstatement fee. The trial court then drafted a written order 

documenting its ruling and circulated it to the other criminal court judges for signature. 

On July 20, 2015, the trial court entered its order finding that the adoption of Local Rule 

7 was a proper exercise of its authority due to the trial court‟s inherent authority to 

regulate the bondsmen who write bonds before them. According to the trial court, this 

authority includes the power to issue reasonable orders governing a bondsman‟s conduct

in the writing of bail bonds. The trial court ruled that the appellant received actual notice 

of the local rule‟s mandates, including the requirement that it post a minimum $75,000 

bond with the court clerk. The trial court found that actual notice occurred at the meeting 

held on January 5, 2015, where the requirements of Local Rule 7 were discussed. The 

trial court then analyzed each subpart of the local rule and found none of the 

requirements to be in contravention with state law, arbitrary, or unconstitutional. In 

explanation of its findings, the trial court stated:

Given our responsibility to keep sacrosanct the Shelby County judicial 

system and all of those who come to it for redress and justice, this Court 

finds that [the appellant] shall remain suspended and prohibited from the 

privilege of writing bonds in Shelby County. [The appellant] has willfully 

refused to comply with Rule 7 which was effective March 1, 2015. This is 

the only bonding company which has failed to comply with this Rule. This 

willful land [sic] blatant failure has persisted for over two (2) years. [The 

appellant] is requesting that this company be given special treatment when 

all other companies, which chose to continue in the bail bonding industry, 

have satisfied their obligations as mandated by Rule 7 as amended.

As a result, the trial court denied the appellant‟s motion for reinstatement and ordered 

that, pursuant to Rule 7.10, the appellant “shall remain suspended unless the company 

complies with all the requirements of Rule 7 and is reinstated upon Order from the 

Court.” The trial court further ordered the appellant to pay a $100 reinstatement fee and 

costs. 

The appellant timely filed its notice of appeal on August 13, 2015, and argues: (1) 

the order suspending it violates Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-125, the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Tennessee Constitution; (2) the 

trial court‟s two-month delay in hearing the appellant‟s motion to set aside the order of 

suspension and subsequent two-month delay in entering an order denying relief violated 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-125, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, and the Tennessee Constitution; (3) Local Rule 7.03, as written, only 

pertains to persons or companies “filing a petition for approval to open a professional bail 

bond company in Shelby County;” (4) Local Rule 7.06(C) violates the First Amendment 

to the United States Constitution and is unconstitutionally vague; (5) Local Rule 7.06(D) 
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is unconstitutional; (6) Local Rule 7.07(C) contradicts Tennessee Code Annotated section 

39-11-7154 and, as such, is invalid; (7) Local Rule 7.07(D) contradicts Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 40-11-315, is arbitrary, and unconstitutional; and (8) Local Rule 

7.08(B) improperly and unnecessarily results in a significant additional cost to bail bond 

companies in Shelby County and is void for vagueness. The State contends that Local 

Rule 7.03 requires all bonding companies doing business in Shelby County to deposit 

$75,000 with the Criminal Court Clerk as security for the bonds written; the appellant 

received adequate notice and opportunity to be heard concerning its suspension for failure 

to post required security; and the appellant‟s remaining claims are not justiciable. We 

agree with the State. 

II. Law and Analysis

A. Justiciability

At the outset, we conclude the trial court suspended the appellant‟s ability to write 

bonds because it failed to comply with the requirement of Local Rule 7.03 that bonding

companies post a minimum of $75,000 in cash or certificate of deposit with the Criminal 

Court Clerk as security. Based on our review of the record, the additional requirements 

imposed by Local Rule 7 had no bearing on the trial court‟s decision to suspend the 

appellant. Moreover, due to the appellant‟s suspension for failing to comply with Local 

Rule 7.03, this Court does not know whether the appellant has or intends to comply with 

Local Rules 7.06, 7.07, and 7.08, nor what actions will be taken by the trial court if the 

appellant does not comply with the requirements of these subparts to Local Rule 7. The 

questions raised by the appellant regarding the constitutionality and validity of Local 

Rules 7.06, 7.07, and 7.08 are not justiciable and will not be considered by this Court. 

See, e.g., State v. Rodgers, 235 S.W.3d 92, 97 (Tenn. 2007) (“Courts may not issue 

advisory rulings.”); State v. Rogers, 703 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985) (“An 

appellate court will not pass on lawsuits when there is no justiciable controversy 

presented, or render advisory opinions on questions which are premature and contingent 

and may never arise in the future.”) The appellant is not entitled to relief based on the 

alleged illegality and invalidity of Local Rules 7.06, 7.07, and 7.08.

B. Applicability of Local Rule 7.03

The trial court has the authority to suspend or revoke a bondsman‟s authority to 

act as a bonding agent, and this Court reviews the suspension or revocation under a de 

novo standard of review. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-125(d); In re: Cox, 389 S.W.3d 794, 

798 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012). The trial court has full authority to determine who should 

be allowed to make bonds in its courts. Gilbreath v. Ferguson, 260 S.W.2d 276, 278

(Tenn. 1953). It is within the inherent power of the trial court to administer their affairs, 
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including the right to impose reasonable regulations regarding bail bonds. In re Hitt, 910 

S.W.2d 900, 904 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). “So long as these regulations [governing 

bondsman] are not capricious, arbitrary or solely without basis of right, then these acts 

may be properly supervised by the court in its ministerial capacity.” Taylor v. Waddey, 

334 S.W.2d 733, 736 (Tenn. 1960)). The statutory requirements for bondsmen “do[] not 

by any stretch of the imagination attempt to cover the whole field of what is necessary for

a bondsman before he is allowed to make bonds in the various courts.” Id. Therefore, 

the legislature‟s enactment of statutes addressing bail bondsmen and their regulation does 

not interfere with the trial court‟s inherent powers of regulation in addition to the statutes. 

In re Hitt, 910 S.W.2d at 904.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-125(a) provides that a professional 

bondsmen‟s approval to write bonds may be withheld, withdrawn, or suspended if, after 

investigation, it appears that the bondsman:

(1) Has been guilty of violating any of the laws of this state relating to bail 

bonds;

(2) Has a final judgment of forfeiture entered against the bondsman which 

remains unsatisfied;

(3) Is guilty of professional misconduct as described in § 40-11-126; or

(4) If applying for approval as a professional bondsman, has been convicted 

in any state of the United States of two (2) or more misdemeanors which 

are equivalent to Tennessee Class A or Class B misdemeanors; provided, 

however, that the misdemeanor convictions shall have occurred within five

(5) years of the date the application for approval is filed.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-125(a). If a bondsman‟s ability to write bonds is withheld, 

withdrawn, or suspended due to a violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-

125(a), then the trial court must provide the bondsman written notice and a hearing in 

accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-125(b), which states:

(b) Any court withholding, withdrawing or suspending a bondsman or other 

surety under this section shall notify the bondsman in writing of the action 

taken, accompanied by a copy of the charges resulting in the court‟s action. 

If, within twenty (20) days after notice, the bail bondsman or surety files a 

written answer denying the charges or setting forth extenuating 

circumstances, the court shall call a hearing within a reasonable time for the 

purpose of taking testimony and evidence on any issues of fact made by the 
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charges and answer. The court shall give notice to the bail bondsman, or to 

the insurer represented by the bondsman, of the time and place of the 

hearing. The parties shall have the right to produce witnesses, and to 

appear personally with or without representation by counsel. If, upon a 

hearing, the court determines that the bail bondsman is guilty as alleged in 

the charges, the court shall thereupon withhold, withdraw or suspend the 

bondsman from the approved list, or suspend the bondsman for a definite 

period of time to be fixed in the order of suspension.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-125(b). 

In addition, Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 18 authorizes the judges in each 

judicial district to adopt and publish local rules. These rules cannot be “inconsistent with 

the statutory law, the Rules of the Supreme Court, the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the 

Rules of Civil Procedure, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Rules of Juvenile 

Procedure, and the Rules of Evidence.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 18(a); see In re Int’l Fid. Ins. 

Co., 989 S.W.2d 726, 729 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). The Criminal Court of Shelby 

County has adopted local rules, including Local Rule 7, titled “Local Rules of Practice 

and Procedure for Bail Bond Companies” and amended effective March 1, 2015. 

Local Rule 7 governs the practice and conduct of bail bondsmen writing bonds in 

and transacting business before the Criminal Court of Shelby County, the General 

Sessions Criminal Court of Shelby County, and all other courts of record in Shelby 

County exercising criminal court jurisdiction. Shelby County Criminal Court Local Rule 

7.01. Local Rule 7.03 requires bail bond companies to post a minimum of $75,000 with 

the Criminal Court Clerk in cash or certificate of deposit, stating:

7.03 Collateral

A. From the effective date of these rules, any person or company filing 

a petition for approval to open a professional bail bond company in 

Shelby County is required to post a minimum of Seventy-Five 

Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00) in cash with the Criminal Court 

Clerk as security for bonds written.

B. Said funds may also be deposited in a Certificate of Deposit in the 

sum of not less than Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00) in 

the joint names of said bonding company and the Criminal Court 

Clerk of Shelby County, Tennessee.
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C. No real property collateral will be accepted by the Clerk, other than 

that property presently serving as collateral as of November 1, 2014.

D. The bonding company must obtain prior written approval from the 

Court before the bonding company will be allowed to post any 

additional security exceeding the minimum cash deposit to increase 

its bonding capacity.

E. Any bonding company approved by the Court may write total bonds 

in an amount equal to ten (10) times the amount of cash security 

posted with the Criminal Court Clerk. No bonding company shall be 

allowed to write any one single or blanket bond with any one (1) 

surety in excess of twenty (20) present of its available bonding 

capacity as determined by the Criminal Court Clerk on a weekly 

basis.

F. Collateral posted as security with the Clerk may not be withdrawn or 

applied to satisfy a forfeiture judgment except upon notice to the 

District Attorney General and an Order of the Court. 

Shelby County Criminal Court Local Rule 7.01. Bonding companies approved prior to 

the effective date of the amended local rules were to be in compliance by March 1, 2015. 

Shelby County Criminal Court Local Rule 7.11 states as follows:

7.11 AMENDMENTS

Bonding companies approved before the effective dates of these 

Rules shall be in compliance with this Rule by the effective date 

of March 1, 2015. These Rules may be amended from time to 

time by the Criminal Court Judges. Upon amendment, the 

Criminal Court Clerk shall notify all approved bonding 

companies in Shelby County, by certified mail, return receipt 

requested, or by personal delivery with a signed receipt for the 

same. Upon receipt of notice, all bonding companies shall 

comply with any said amendments.

We agree with the following assertions made by the State in its brief:

Trial courts have inherent power to administer their affairs, “including 

the right to impose reasonable regulations regarding the making of 

bonds.” Hull v. State, 543 S.W.2d 611, 612 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
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1976)(citing Taylor v. Waddey, 334 S.W.2d 733 (1960)). In Taylor v. 

Waddey, the Tennessee Supreme Court considered the inherent authority 

of a court to regulate the actions of bondsmen writing criminal bonds 

before the court. The court concluded that such regulation was 

permissible:

So long as the court in the conduct of its business makes 

requirements of this kind and these requirements are 

reasonable ones, and reasonable regulations, they clearly 

come within the reasonable police power and inherent power 

of these courts. . . . so long as these regulations of the 

applicant are not capricious, arbitrary or solely without basis 

of right, then these acts may be properly supervised by the 

court in its ministerial capacity as here. 

Taylor, 334 S.W.2d at 736. A trial court is given wide discretion in its 

regulation of bail bondsmen, and its actions will not be overturned 

absent a showing that they were arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. In re A

Way Out Bonding, No. M2012-00423-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 2325276, 

at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 28, 2013), no perm. app. filed; In re Int’l

Fid. Ins. Co., 989 S.W.2d 726, 729 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998); In re Hitt, 

910 S.W.2d 900, 904 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). 

In the present matter, the appellant argues the plain language of Local Rule 7.03 

only requires bail bond companies submitting applications March 1, 2015, or later, to 

post $75,000 in cash or certificate of deposit with the Criminal Court Clerk. The State 

disagrees and argues that pursuant to Local Rule 7.11, the requirement applies to all 

bonding companies practicing before courts in Shelby County with criminal jurisdiction. 

We agree with the State. 

“[T]he promulgation of the local rules is somewhat analogous to the legislative 

actions and the interpretation and construction of the rules as guided by the rules 

concerning statutory construction.” May v. Woodlawn Memorial Park, Inc., No. M2001-

02945-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 31059223, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). When 

interpreting a statute or rule, we look first to the plain language of the rule, giving the 

words their ordinary and plain meaning. See generally Mills v. Fulmarque, 360 S.W.3d 

362, 368 (Tenn. 2012). When the meaning of a statute is clear, “[courts] apply the plain 

meaning without complicating the task” and enforce the statute as written. Lind v. 

Beaman Dodge, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 889, 895 (Tenn. 2011). “[S]tatues „in pari materia‟ –

those relating to the same subject or having common purpose – are to be construed 

together, and the construction of one such statute, if doubtful, may be aided by 
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considering the words and legislative intent indicated by the language of another statute.” 

Graham v. Caples, 325 S.W.3d 578, 582 (Tenn. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). 

Courts must adopt the most “reasonable construction which avoids statutory conflict and 

provides for harmonious operation of the laws.” Carver v. Citizen Utils. Co., 954 S.W.2d 

34, 35 (Tenn. 1997).

After considering Local Rule 7 in its entirety, we conclude the requirement that 

bonding companies in Shelby County post a minimum of $75,000 in cash or certificate of 

deposit with the Criminal Court Clerk applies to all bonding companies practicing before 

courts of record in Shelby County with criminal jurisdiction and not only to those filing 

petitions March 1, 2015, or later. While the language of Local Rule 7.03, a subpart to 

Local Rule 7, could have been more clearly written, Local Rule 7.11 plainly states that 

“[b]onding companies approved before the effective dates of [this Rule] shall be in 

compliance with this Rule by the effective date of March 1, 2015.” In order to be in 

compliance with all requirements of Local Rule 7, bonding companies must post a 

minimum of $75,000 cash or certificate of deposit with the Criminal Court Clerk.

Because this requirement applies to all bonding companies practicing in Shelby County, 

not only those petitioning the trial court for approval before March 1, 2015, and later, this 

local rule is not arbitrary or capricious and, as a regulation of the bondsmen practicing 

before it, is appropriately within the province of the trial court. The appellant is not 

entitled to relief on this issue.

C. Due Process 

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 

States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution embody similar 

procedural protections and guarantees. See Doe v. Norris, 751 S.W.2d 834, 838 (Tenn.

1988). Both prevent the government from infringing upon significant property or liberty 

interests without first providing notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful 

time and in a meaning manner. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 

(1985); Cooper v. Williamson County Bd. of Educ., 803 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Tenn. 1990), 

cert. denied, 500 U.S. 916 (1991). Several factors must be established, however, before 

these procedural safeguards are required. See State v. AAA Aaron’s Action Agency Bail 

Bonds, Inc., 993 S.W.2d 81, 85 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

 

1. Protected Interest

First, before due process safeguards are required, the allegedly aggrieved party 

must possess a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. Board of Regents of 

State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-78 (1972). The right to engage in a chosen 

business, occupation, or profession without unreasonable governmental interference or 
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deprivation thereof is both a liberty and property interest, protected by the due process 

clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and article I, section 8 of the Tennessee 

Constitution. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543; see also Livesay 

v. Tennessee Board of Examiners in Watchmaking, 322 S.W.2d 209 (1959). The bail 

bonds industry is a business, albeit one that is closely regulated by the criminal courts. 

State v. AAA Aaron’s Action Agency Bail Bonds, Inc., 993 S.W.2d at 85. Thus, once the 

court approves a petition to engage in the bail bonds business, pursuing it becomes a 

right, and the deprivation of that right is a judicial act that must meet the due process of 

law. Id.

Additionally, in order for due process rights to apply, there must be a deprivation 

of the protected business interest by the government. See Rowe v. Board of Educ. of City 

of Chattanooga, 938 S.W.2d 351, 354 (Tenn. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1128 (1997) 

(citation omitted). In the present matter, the trial court suspended the appellant‟s right to 

write bail bonds. When doing so, it deprived the appellant of its right to engage in 

business and earn a livelihood. Accordingly, the appellant was entitled to notice and a 

hearing.

After this Court determines that due process applies, it must weigh the interests of 

the business and the government to determine what process is due and whether a 

deprivation has occurred. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 240 

(1988); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 569-570. The 

constitutional guarantees to due process are flexible standards based on the concepts of 

fairness and reasonableness. State v. AAA Aaron’s Action Agency Bail Bonds, Inc., 993 

S.W.2d at 86. With the concepts of fairness and reasonableness in mind, we analyze the 

notice and hearing requirements separately below.

2. Notice

Due process requires “notice reasonably calculated under all the circumstances, to 

apprise interested parties” of the claims of the opposing parties. McClellan v. Board of 

Regents of State University, 921 S.W.2d 684, 688 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Mullane v. 

Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). The purpose of due 

process requirements is to notify the individual in advance in order to allow adequate 

preparation and reduce surprise. Id. (citing Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division v. 

Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978)). The notice must clearly inform the recipient of the charges 

and cannot be ambiguous or obscure. See Turk v. Franklin Special School Dist., 640 

S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tenn. 1982). To comport with these notions of fair play, the means 

employed should equal or exceed that which one desirous of actually informing the 

opposite party would employ. Id. (citations omitted). We have previously held that “[i]f 

a trial court suspends a bondsman from making bonds, the bondsman has a right to 
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receive notice of the action taken and a copy of the charges that brought about the 

suspension.” Id. at 84. 

In the case at bar, the appellant appeals the trial court‟s July 20, 2015 order 

denying its motion to set aside the March 23, 2015 order suspending the appellant‟s 

ability to write bonds “[d]ue to the non-compliance of the New Local Rules for Bail 

Bond Companies that were effective March 1, 2015[.]” According to the trial court, the 

local rules with which the appellant failed to comply were filed and available for review 

on November 21, 2014. The trial court then held a meeting on January 5, 2015. Local 

bail bondsmen were invited to and did attend this meeting. During the meeting, the 

attendees received copies of the amended local rules, and the trial court answered any 

questions the bail bondsmen had regarding the new rules. In addition, the trial court 

clarified that the requirement that each bail bonding company post $75,000 in cash or 

certificate of deposit with the court clerk applied to all bonding companies, including 

those approved prior to March 1, 2015. The appellant then received a letter dated March 

6, 2015, notifying it that the new local rules would go into effect on Monday, March 23, 

2015, and “[i]f you are not in compliance on this day, you will be suspended from writing 

bonds in Shelby County.” 

After the appellant failed to comply with Local Rule 7.03, the trial court 

suspended its ability to write bonds in Shelby County. While the trial court‟s order 

simply says the appellant was suspended “[d]ue to the non-compliance of the New Local 

Rules for Bail Bond Companies that were effective March 1, 2015[,]” in its motion to set 

aside the order filed March 27, 2015, the appellant states, “A-River City believes, 

however, that its authority to write bonds in Shelby County was suspended because it did 

not post Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00) in cash with the Criminal Court 

Clerk as security for bonds written which it believes the Shelby County Criminal Courts 

have interpreted amended [Local Rule] 7.03(A) to require.” Then, during the hearing on 

May 19, 2015, the appellant reiterated its belief that the trial court suspended its ability to 

write bonds due to its non-compliance with Local Rule 7.03. In response, the trial court 

confirmed this to be the reason for the suspension and recounted its prior conversations 

with the appellant‟s counsel where, prior to the hearing, the trial court informed him that 

the reason for the suspension was the appellant‟s failure to post a minimum of $75,000 in 

cash or certificate of deposit with the Criminal Court Clerk.

In light of the appellant‟s articulation of the suspected reason for the suspension in 

its March 27, 2015 motion, the March 23, 2015 order sufficiently apprised the appellant 

of the charges against it. The constitutional guarantees of due process are flexible 

standards based on the concepts of fairness and reasonableness. Here, the appellant was 

given enough notice to enable it to assert why the suspension occurred and then defend 

its failure to comply with Local Rule 7.03 in both its motion to set aside the order of 
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suspension and at the hearing of the motion on May 19, 2015. Any purported 

shortcomings in the March 16, 2015 letter and subsequent March 23, 2015 order were 

remedied by the trial court‟s subsequent verbal communication with the appellant‟s 

lawyer where, prior to the hearing, it notified counsel for the appellant that the reason for 

the suspension was the appellant‟s failure to comply with Local Rule 7.03. Thus, notice 

was constitutionally adequate.

3. Opportunity to be Heard

Not only does due process guarantee a person to notice, it also provides the 

opportunity to be heard. The opportunity to present a written or in-person argument 

opposing a proposed action, however, is not a fundamental due process requirement. 

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546 (citation omitted). Procedural due 

process does not necessarily require a prior hearing. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. 

Mallen, 486 U.S. at 240; State ex rel. Hayes v. Civil Service Com’n of Metropolitan 

Government of Nashville and Davidson County, No. 01-A-01-9002-CH00061, 1990 WL 

165073 at *4-5 (Tenn. App. at Nashville, Oct. 31, 1990). Instead, due process requires 

the provision of a hearing “at a meaningful time.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 

470 U.S. at 547. A post-decision hearing will suffice as long as it is held within a 

reasonable time in light of the issues and interests at stake. Id. (citations omitted).

While post-decision hearings are often sufficient, the timeliness in which one is held is of 

constitutional concern. Civil Service Comm’n of Metropolitan Government of Nashville 

and Davidson County, 1990 WL 165073 at *4 (citing Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc.,

481 U.S. 252, 267 (1987). While there is a point at which an unjustified delay in 

completing a post-deprivation proceeding would become a constitutional violation, the 

significance of such a delay cannot be evaluated in a vacuum. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. 

v. Mallen, 486 U.S. at 242. There is no precise method by which to determine whether a 

delay in holding a hearing rises to the level of a constitutional violation. State v. AAA 

Aaron’s Action Agency Bail Bonds, Inc., 993 S.W.2d at 86. Instead, the importance of 

the private interest and the harm to this interest occasioned by the delay; the 

government‟s interest and its reason for the delay; and the likelihood that the pre-hearing 

decision is erroneous are examined and weighed against each other. Federal Deposit Ins. 

Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. at 242.

In the case at hand, not only was the appellant entitled to constitutional due 

process protection, but after the appellant filed an answer within twenty days of the 

March 23, 2015 order, both Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-125(b) and Local 

Rule 7.10 mandated a hearing. The appellant received this hearing on May 19, 2015. 

The appellant argues this hearing came too late, and the trial court deprived it of due 

process by failing to hold the hearing within a reasonable amount of time after the 

suspension, failing to enter its post-hearing order within a reasonable amount of time
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after the hearing, and failing to lift appellant‟s suspension after it submitted a $75,000 

certificate of deposit with the Criminal Court Clerk. We are not persuaded by these 

arguments.

The record is void of documentation that the appellant complied with the July 20, 

2015 order. The appellant has not provided any support for its assertion that it complied 

with Local Rule 7.03 and subsequently requested a lift of the suspension that the trial 

court denied. This issue is not properly before this Court on appeal, and the appellant is 

not entitled to relief on this basis. 

Moreover, other than referencing a general denial of its source of livelihood, the 

appellant has not presented any evidence from which this Court can weigh the interests 

involved, so we cannot conduct a thorough balancing of the competing interests. See 

State v. AAA Aaron’s Action Agency Bail Bonds, Inc., 993 S.W.2d at 87 (holding that 

even though the appellant bonding company was denied its source of livelihood, without 

evidence from which the court can weigh the interests involved, it cannot conclude a

delay of sixteen days constituted an unreasonable delay). “„[I]nherent in any 

bureaucracy, . . . is a certain amount of inefficiency and delay, and the mere allegation of 

delay without an explanation of why the delay is unreasonable does not support a claim 

for due process.‟” Id. (quoting Slugocki v. United States By and Through Dept. of Labor, 

988 F.Supp. 1443, 1447 (S.D. Fla.1997)). The trial court attributed the hearing delay to 

uncertainty regarding the propriety of hearing a challenge to Local Rule 7 while Memphis 

Bonding Company, Inc. v. Criminal Court of Tennessee 30th District, et al. was pending 

in the Court of Appeals. After the trial court received reassurance from its counsel in 

Memphis Bonding Company, Inc. v. Criminal Court of Tennessee 30th District, et al.that 

the hearing could proceed, the trial court worked with its own schedule, as well as that of 

the parties, to find a mutually convenient hearing date. As of the date of the hearing, the 

appellant had not posted the requisite $75,000 with the Criminal Court Clerk. By the 

appellant‟s own admission, it knew the trial court suspended its ability to write bonds due 

to its failure to make the payment, yet during the fifty-three days that lapsed between 

filing its motion to set aside the order of suspension and the hearing of the motion, the 

appellant did not take any steps to comply with Local Rule 7.03 and seek reinstatement at 

the hearing. Likewise, the trial court denied the appellant‟s motion at the hearing on May 

19, 2015, yet in the sixty-one days that lapsed between the hearing and the trial court‟s 

entry of the per curiam order denying the appellant‟s motion to set aside the order of 

suspension, the appellant made no apparent attempts to comply with Local Rule 7.03. 

After considering the record as a whole, rather than the delays in isolation, we cannot 

conclude the fifty-three day hearing delay and sixty-one day delay in entering an order 

constituted unreasonable delay. The appellant was afforded appropriate due process 

protections and is not entitled to relief on this issue.
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CONCLUSION

Based upon the record, the parties‟ briefs, and the foregoing analysis, we affirm 

the judgment of the trial court.

 

____________________________________________

THOMAS T. WOODALL, PRESIDING JUDGE