EASA AD No.: 2010-0016R1 

EASA Form 110 Page 1/3 

EASA AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE 

AD No.: 2010-0016R1

Date: 09 February 2010 

Note: This Airworthiness Directive (AD) is issued by EASA, acting in accordance with 

Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 on behalf of the European Community, its Member States 

and of the European third countries that participate in the activities of EASA under Article 

66 of that Regulation.

This AD is issued in accordance with EC 1702/2003, Part 21A.3B. In accordance with EC 2042/2003 Annex I, Part M.A.301, 

the continuing airworthiness of an aircraft shall be ensured by accomplishing any applicable ADs. Consequently, no person 

may operate an aircraft to which an Airworthiness Directive applies, except in accordance with the requirements of that 

Airworthiness Directive unless otherwise specified by the Agency [EC 2042/2003 Annex I, Part M.A.303] or agreed with the 

Authority of the State of Registry [EC 216/2008, Article 14(4) exemption]. 

Type Approval Holder’s Name : 

AIRBUS

Type/Model designation(s) : 

A330 and A340 aeroplanes 

TCDS Number : EASA.A.004, EASA.A.015 

Foreign AD : Not applicable 

Revision : This AD revises EASA AD 2010-0016 dated 27 January 2010 

ATA 34 Navigation – Thales Avionics Angle of Attack (AoA) Probe – 

Inspection / Replacement 

Manufacturer(s): Airbus (formerly Airbus Industrie) 

Applicability: Airbus A330-201, A330-202, A330-203, A330-223, A330-243, A330-301, 

A330-302, A330-303, A330-321, A330-322, A330-323, A330-341, A330-

342 and A330-343 aeroplanes models, all manufacturer serial numbers, if 

equipped with Thales Avionics AoA probe having part number (P/N) 

C16291AA. 

Airbus A340-211, A340-212, A340-213, A340-311, A340-312, A340-313, 

A340-541, A340-542, A340-642 and A340-643 aeroplanes models, all 

manufacturer serial numbers, if equipped with Thales Avionics AoA probe 

having P/N C16291AA. 

Reason: During Airbus Final Assembly Line reception flight tests, AoA data from 

two different aeroplanes were found inaccurate. Inaccuracy was confirmed 

by flight data analysis. 

Investigation conducted by Thales on the removed probes revealed oil 

residue between the stator and the rotor parts of the AoA vane position 

resolvers. This oil residue was due to incorrect cleaning of the machining 

oil during the manufacturing process of the AoA resolvers. At low 

temperatures, this oil residue becomes viscous (typically in cruise) causing 

lag of AoA vane movement. 

Such condition could lead to discrepant AoA measurement. If not 

corrected, and if two or three AoA probes were simultaneously affected 

and provided wrong indications of the AoA to a similar extent, it could lead 
EASA AD No.: 2010-0016R1 

EASA Form 110 Page 2/3 

to a late activation of the angle of attack protection, which in combination 

with flight at high angle of attack would constitute an unsafe condition. 

Therefore, this AD requires a one time inspection of the Thales Avionics 

AoA probe P/N C16291AA in order to identify the suspect parts and to 

remove them from service. 

This AD revision is issued to specify that the identification of the affected 

AoA probes is also possible in accordance with aeroplane maintenance 

records data analysis. 

Effective Date: 10 February 2010 

Required action(s) 

and Compliance 

Time(s): 

Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously: 

(1) No later than 30 April 2010, perform a detailed visual inspection of 

Thales Avionics AoA probe P/N C16291AA for Serial Number (S/N) 

identification, in accordance with the instructions of Airbus Service 

Bulletin (SB) A330-34-3232 or SB A340-34-4239 or SB A340-34-5072, 

as applicable, depending on the aeroplane type. 

(2) For aeroplanes on which Airbus modification 53368 (Back Up Speed 

Scale) has been embodied in production or Airbus SB A330-34-3213 

or SB A340-34-4213 or SB A340-34-5060, as applicable, depending on 

the aeroplane type, has been embodied in service:

If the identified S/N corresponds to a suspect AoA probe in accordance 

with the list provided in Thales SB C16291A-34-007 Revision 01, no 

later than 30 April 2010, replace the affected AoA probe with a 

serviceable one in accordance with one of the four options and 

associated instructions defined in SB A330-34-3232 or SB 

A340-34-4239 or SB A340-34-5072, as applicable, depending on the 

aeroplane type. 

(3) For aeroplanes on which Airbus modification 53368 ((Back Up Speed 

Scale) has NOT been embodied in production or Airbus SB A330-34-

3213 or SB A340-34-4213 or SB A340-34-5060, as applicable, 

depending on the aeroplane type, has NOT been embodied in service:

If the identified S/N corresponds to a suspect AoA probe in 

accordance with the list provided in Thales SB C16291A-34-007 

Revision 01, no later than 30 April 2011, replace the affected AoA 

probe with a serviceable one in accordance with one of the four 

options and associated instructions defined in SB A330-34-3232 or SB 

A340-34-4239 or SB A340-34-5072, as applicable, depending on the 

aeroplane type. 

(4) From the effective date of this AD, do not install a Thales Avionics AoA 

probe having P/N C16291AA on an aeroplane that is identified as a 

suspect AoA probe in accordance with the list provided in Thales SB 

C16291A-34-007 Revision 01 unless it is fitted with an inspection label 

stating that Thales SB C16291A-34-007 Revision 01 has been 

accomplished. 

(5) A review of aeroplane maintenance records is acceptable in lieu of the 

inspection required by paragraph (1) of this AD if the S/N of the 

installed AoA probe can be conclusively identified from that review. 

Ref. Publications: Airbus Service Bulletin A330-34-3232 at original issue; 

Airbus Service Bulletin A340-34-4239 at original issue; 

Airbus Service Bulletin A340-34-5072 at original issue. 

The use of later approved revisions of these documents is acceptable for 

compliance with the requirements of this AD. 
EASA AD No.: 2010-0016R1 

EASA Form 110 Page 3/3 

Thales Service Bulletin C16291A-34-007 Revision 01 dated 03 December 

2009. 

Remarks: 1. If requested and appropriately substantiated, EASA can approve 

Alternative Methods of Compliance for this AD. 

2. The required actions and the risk allowance have granted the 

issuance of a Final AD with Request for Comments, postponing the 

public consultation process after publication. 

3. Enquiries regarding this AD should be referred to the Airworthiness 

Directives, Safety Management & Research Section, Certification 

Directorate, EASA. E-mail: ADs@easa.europa.eu . 

4. For any questions concerning the technical content of the 

requirements in this AD, please contact: AIRBUS – Airworthiness 

Office – EAL; E-mail: airworthiness.A330-A340@airbus.com .