IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 19-2014

Filed March 3, 2021

DOREEN DENISE MOWERY,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

THE CITY OF CARTER LAKE, IOWA, a Municipality, GERALD WALTRIP,

JOHN “PAT” PATERSON, MARY SCHOMER, FRANK CORCORAN, and

RONALD CUMBERLEDGE, Individuals,

Defendants-Appellants.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Timothy

O’Grady, Judge.

The defendants appeal an adverse judgment in this action by a former

employee for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and retaliatory discharge in

violation of public policy. AFFIRMED ON CONDITION AND CASE REMANDED.

Robert M. Livingston and Kristopher K. Madsen of Stuart Tinley Law Firm,

LLP, Council Bluffs, for appellants.

Marc A. Humphrey of Humphrey Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.

Heard by Bower, C.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ.
2

BOWER, Chief Judge.

Former city clerk Doreen Mowery sued the City of Carter Lake, Gerald 

“Jerry” Waltrip, John “Pat” Paterson, Mary Schomer, Frank Corcoran, and Ronald 

Cumberledge (collectively “the defendants”) for breach of contract, promissory 

estoppel, and retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy. The defendants

appeal an adverse jury verdict, contending the district court erred in failing to direct 

a verdict in their favor on each claim or, in the alternative, to order remittitur of 

duplicate damages awarded by the jury. 

The defendants assert that, assuming there was a contract which provided 

for severance if Mowery’s employment was “terminated” during the five-year term, 

“this case is a case where [Mowery] was not reappointed [as city clerk]. She wasn’t 

terminated. She wasn’t fired. She wasn’t discharged.” The jury rejected the 

defendants’ argument, finding specifically the failure to reappoint Mowery was a 

violation of public policy and Mowery’s refusal “to pay dual compensation to 

Councilwoman Mary Schomer” was ”a determining factor for her termination on 

January 18, 2016.” There is substantial evidence to support the jury’s findings and 

conclusions. However, the jury awarded duplicative damages for back pay. We 

affirm on all issues except remittitur, and we conditionally affirm the trial court’s 

denial of the defendants’ motion for new trial. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

Pursuant to Carter Lake City Ordinance 20.01, “At its first meeting in 

January following the regular city election the [city] council shall appoint by majority 

vote a city clerk to serve for a term of two years.” Compensation is “as established 

by resolution of the council.” 
3

Mowery was appointed city clerk in 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, and 1986. 

Waltrip was elected as mayor in 1986. Waltrip and Mowery had a very contentious 

relationship. Mowery resigned her position in 1988 due to Waltrip’s treatment of 

her. Waltrip remained mayor through 1993.

In 2002, Mowery was approached by Carter Lake’s city clerk to help with 

getting the city’s financial books in order and board meeting minutes completed, 

which had not been kept current for about two years. Mowery was working for an 

accounting firm at the time. The city arranged to pay the accounting firm for 

Mowery’s time during the two months it took her to complete the tasks.

While she was helping the city, then-Mayor Emil Hauser asked Mowery to 

return to Carter Lake as city clerk. Mowery did not want to leave her wellcompensated employment with the accounting firm to return to the city clerk 

position unless given some assurances against arbitrary removal. The mayor told 

her to write up “what it would take” for her to return. Mowery provided a list, which 

included, in part, a “[five]-year contract with a [six]-week severance package to 

include full pay, reimbursement for unused vacation and sick pay, and complete 

benefits (health, dental, vision, life)”; an annual salary with a 2% pay increase 

annually on January 1 for the term of the contract; three weeks of vacation starting 

January 2003; funds to attend professional organizations; and a list of priorities 

and expectations from the mayor and council. The mayor and council approved, 
4

and Mowery returned as city clerk on June 3, 2002, and was reappointed in 2004 

and 2006.1 

On January 11, 2007, the city council approved a “Letter of Understanding–

Compensation” signed by then-Mayor Russell Kramer and Mowery. The 2007 

letter of understanding provided, in part:

1. Employee was hired to serve as the City Clerk, effective 

June 3, 2002.

2. Employee is an employee-at-will, serving at the pleasure of 

the Mayor and City Council, as set out in the Code of Iowa and City 

Ordinances. This is not a contract for employment.

3. The position of City Clerk is a salaried position, ineligible 

for overtime and comp time . . . [setting out salary and annual 

increases through January 1, 2012].

4. Additional benefits are as follows: [setting out vacation, 

administrative leave, holidays and sick leave, health insurance, and 

life insurance].

5. Employee will be evaluated on an annual basis at the same 

time as the other City Department Heads.

6. If the Employee’s services are terminated by the Employer, 

the Employee will be granted a [four]-month severance package to 

include full pay, reimbursement for unused vacation and sick pay, 

and complete benefits of health, dental, vision, and life insurance.

7. Employer agrees to budget funds for attendance at 

[professional organizations.]

8. This Letter of Understanding contains all the terms of 

employment between the parties. Any changes must be in writing to 

be effective.

Mowery and the mayor signed the letter of understanding on February 9. Mowery 

was appointed in 2008, 2010, and 2012.

On May 21, 2012, the city council approved a new “Letter of Understanding–

Compensation,” which was signed by Mayor Kramer and Mowery. The following 

terms were included:

 

1 Mowery’s list of requirements was admitted into evidence, but no city records of 

the written agreement reached or the city council minutes approving the agreement 

were presented. Mowery was not yet city clerk when the agreement was reached.
5

1. Employee was appointed to serve as the City Clerk, 

effective upon mutual agreement of compensation package and by 

council approval on June 3, 2002.

2. Employee is an employee-at-will, serving at the pleasure of 

the Mayor and City Council, as set out in the Code of Iowa and City 

Ordinances. This is not a contract for employment.

3. The position of City Clerk is a salaried position, ineligible 

for overtime and comp time. The current salary for the position is 

$68,500.00 annually. Pay increases will be conditioned upon 

continuing employment, and satisfactory reviews, of the Employer. 

Pay increases will be given effective January 1 of each year and will 

be negotiated with the council prior to January 1 of each year.

4. Additional benefits are as follows:

a. [Two hundred] hours of vacation annually (effective on 

January 1 of each year) with no carryover of unused hours. Upon 

retirement or resignation the employee will be paid for any unused 

vacation time.

b. [Eighty] hours of annual administrative leave, with no 

carryover of unused administrative leave, effective on January 1 of 

each year.

c. Holiday leave will be granted as set out in the Employee 

Handbook.

d. Employee shall earn four hundred eighty (480) hours of sick 

leave per year with no carryover of unused hours, beginning in the 

tenth year of employment and every year thereafter.

e. Upon retirement or resignation the employee will be paid 

for any unused sick time. . . . 

. . . .

5. A performance evaluation will be conducted by the Mayor 

and Council on an annual basis at the same time as the other City 

Department heads.

6. If the Employee’s services are terminated by the Employer, 

during the five-year term of this agreement, the Employee will be 

granted [twelve] months’ severance pay. Severance package to 

include full pay, reimbursement for unused vacation and sick pay and 

complete benefits of health, dental, vision and life insurance.

. . . .

8. This Letter of Understanding contains all of the terms of 

employment between the parties. Any changes must be in writing to 

be effective.

9. The term of this Letter of Understanding is for a five year 

period beginning June 3, 2012 and ending June 2, 2017.

In the fall of 2013, Waltrip was again elected mayor of Carter Lake. Prior to 

Waltrip taking office in January 2014, a woman who worked on his election 
6

campaign dropped several boxes at the city clerk’s counter with the comment, 

“These are for Doreen so she can pack up her stuff.” However, Mowery was 

reappointed in 2014 and continued to serve as city clerk. Cumberledge was a 

member of the council at the time and voted “no” on Mowery’s appointment. 

Mowery and Waltrip’s working relationship remained difficult. Waltrip did not 

approve of the council’s use of letters of understanding. He was vocal about his 

belief that Mowery had “too much authority.” The minutes from a December 16, 

2014 council meeting note: “Council member [Ed] Aldmeyer stated that since the 

mayor has taken office, he believes he has been bullying the city clerk. He also 

thinks the mayor has a target on the clerk’s position and her since before he took 

office.” 

In November 2015, three new members were elected to the city council—

Schomer, Corcoran, and Paterson. They would join incumbent council members 

Cumberledge and Barbara Melonis. At the time of her election, Schomer was 

employed as a librarian in the Carter Lake Library and was paid by the city. 

Mowery’s duties as city clerk included being the city treasurer “responsible 

for the safe custody of all funds of the City in the manner provided by law” and the 

“accurate account of all disbursements, money or property, specifying date, to 

whom, and from what fund paid.”2 Mowery received a comment from a citizen 

concerned whether Schomer could be paid as both a city council member and as

a librarian.3 Mowery informed the person the city had done it before but referred 

 

2 Carter Lake Municipal Code §§ 21.01, .03(1), (4). 

3

Iowa Code section 372.13(8) (2015) provides in part: “Except as provided in 

section 362.5, an elected city officer is not entitled to receive any other 
7

the person to the city attorney, the league of municipalities, and the attorney 

general. Mowery then received a call from the league of municipalities, which

Mowery directed to City Attorney Joe Thornton and asked him to “take care of the 

matter.” 

On November 10, 2015, Thornton wrote a memorandum addressed to the 

mayor and city council, which states, in part:

Applying the above principles to the facts discussed, I have 

concluded that Iowa Code [section] 372.13(8) is applicable to these 

circumstances if Mary Schomer continues to be employed at the 

Library while she is serving as a member of the City Council of the 

City of Carter Lake, Iowa.

Mary Schomer is an employee of the City of Carter Lake and 

was elected as a member of the City Council. While Mary Schomer 

is hired by the Board of Trustees of the Library and not by the City 

Council, she is still a “city employee” and therefore subject to the 

restrictions of Iowa Code [section] 372.13(8).

As such, under Iowa Code [section] 372.13(8), she is 

prohibited from receiving any other compensation (other than the 

compensation she would receive as a member of the City Council) 

from city employment which would include the compensation she 

would receive as an employee at the Library during her tenure in 

office.

While nothing prohibits Mary Schomer from continuing her 

employment at the Library while she is serving as a member of the 

City Council, she cannot receive any wages or salary from that 

employment while she is serving as a member of the City Council.

Mowery advised Schomer and Waltrip of this information and provided 

Thornton’s memorandum to the city council members prior to the January 2016 

meeting. Mowery informed the mayor and city council she would not be paying 

Schomer in both capacities as she was not willing to violate Iowa law.

 

compensation for any other city office or city employment during that officer’s 

tenure in office, but may be reimbursed for actual expenses incurred.” 
8

Schomer came to city hall in early January and Mowery asked her what they 

were going to do. Mowery told Schomer that if Schomer had a written statement 

from an attorney, Mowery would consider it and “try to make the correct decision.” 

Mowery did not receive anything from Schomer. 

On January 4, 2016, Waltrip confronted Mowery and demanded that she 

issue checks to Schomer in both of her capacities. Mowery informed him she could

not legally do so unless given authority contrary to Thornton’s. Waltrip “point[ed]

his finger and scream[ed] at [Mowery] as he was saying, You will pay her or we 

will take care of you on January 18th.” And then he left the office. 

On January 18, 2016, the city council met for the first time following the 

election, Thornton and Mowery were in attendance. As city clerk, Mowery kept the 

minutes of council meetings. Cumberledge moved to appoint Michael O’Bradovich 

as city attorney, and Paterson seconded the motion. Per the minutes of the 

meeting, Melonis “questioned why Joe Thornton was not being re-appointed. 

Council member Cumberledge replied that he believed it was time for a change.” 

Cumberledge and the three new members voted in favor, Melonis voted against. 

Melonis then made a motion to reappoint Mowery as city clerk. There was 

no second to the motion. Cumberledge then moved to not reappoint Mowery, the 

motion was seconded by Paterson, and the motion was passed on the votes of 

Cumberledge, Paterson, Corcoran, and Schomer. Mowery asked the city council

if there was a reason for the denial of the reappointment and “[c]ouncil member 

Cumberledge replied that he would not comment due to possible litigation.” No 

city clerk was appointed.
9

Waltrip asked for a brief recess4 and when the meeting reconvened, Waltrip 

asked Cumberledge to take the minutes of the remainder of the meeting.5 

At the conclusion of agenda items, the minutes indicate:

[Melonis] commented that the Mayor like[d] longevity in asking for

reappointment of a long time planning board member but yet we 

have released a long time city clerk and attorney. She was surprised 

about the [city] attorney’s release and now has found out there was 

a meeting that she was intentionally or by oversight not privy to. . . . 

She then read a statement that she intended to speak about earlier 

about council member’s Schomer’s dual positions with the city. She 

cited a couple of Iowa laws and believes the Iowa law is being 

violated and wants no part of the city’s payment or compensation to 

someone who will allow themselves to receive dual compensation.

Mowery stated that as clerk she would do whatever was asked of her “as 

long as it wasn’t illegal or immoral. She then read a statement of all that transpired 

in the days and months after the election regarding the issue with council member 

Schomer.” 

Schomer stated she would have her attorney come to the next meeting. 

Paterson stated “it is not up to the city. If people want to complain they need to 

take it to the election commission or the state. The city council cannot do anything 

about it.” 

Mowery received a letter from deputy city clerk Ruehle dated February 22, 

2016, and check in the amount of $10,035.09. The cover letter stated: “Enclosed 

is paperwork terminating your employment with the City of Carter Lake. Please 

find your final check, information on COBRA insurance and a certified check.” 

 

4 During the recess, Waltrip was observed in the hallway demanding Mowery leave 

the building. A security officer stepped in and stated Mowery had a right to attend 

the public meeting.

5 The deputy clerk Lisa Ruehle was in the meeting room at this time but was not 

asked to step in and take minutes. 
10

Mowery did not endorse the check believing she was entitled to receive 

$106,285.61 under the severance package that had been approved by the city 

council in May 2012.

Mowery filed this suit against the defendants, asserting breach of contract, 

promissory estoppel, and retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy. 

The defendants sought summary judgment on the ground there had been 

no termination or discharge. The court denied the defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment, noting: (1) “the existence and terms of a contract, and whether the 

contract was breached, are ordinarily questions of fact”; (2) equitable estoppel can 

be applied to municipalities “where the interests of justice, morality and common 

fairness clearly dictate that course” and because “a jury could reasonably find that 

the city council had modified the terms and conditions of [Mowery’s] appointment 

and that she may have been terminated rather than denied reappointment,” the 

issue was “a jury issue and not an issue for summary judgment”; and (3) “there is 

a clearly defined public policy that protects employees when they refuse to 

participate in illegal activities, which would be undermined by a discharge from

employment” and there were disputed issues whether Mowery was retaliated 

against or simply not reappointed that “depend entirely on credibility and weight of 

the evidence.” 

The case was tried to a jury in September 2019. Paterson, Kramer, Waltrip, 

Cumberledge, Ruehle, Melonis, Corcoran, Greg Mowery, Doreen Mowery, and 

O’Bradovich all testified. Schomer died prior to trial.

Paterson testified that he and Waltrip started discussing letters of 

understanding in 2013 when Waltrip had decided to run for mayor. Paterson and 
11

his wife wrote a letter to the Iowa Attorney General in 2014 asking about the legality 

of such letters of understanding and suggesting they were made in closed 

sessions. The attorney general’s office directed the Patersons to the Iowa Public 

Information Office, which responded it was without jurisdiction if the event about 

which the complaint was made had occurred more than sixty days ago, and 

directed them to the Pottawattamie County Attorney’s office. Paterson did not 

follow up. Paterson, however, did send copies of letters of understanding to his 

personal attorney and asked of their legality. Eventually, Paterson published 

Mowery’s letter of understanding in the local newsletter.

Paterson also testified he and Waltrip met with Waltrip’s personal attorney 

and former Carter Lake city attorney O’Bradovich in either 2013 or 2014. They 

discussed the legality of the letters of understanding. They discussed 

O’Bradovich’s interest in becoming the city attorney for Carter Lake again. 

Paterson decided to run for city council in 2015 and was encouraged to do 

so by Waltrip. Paterson testified that in December 2015, there were telephone 

discussions between him, Corcoran, Cumberledge, and Schomer concerning 

Mowery and agreed “all [were] on the same page that [we] did not want to reappoint 

Doreen Mowery as city clerk.” Paterson also testified he learned of the dual 

compensation issue concerning Mary Schomer after talking to someone in the 

“League of Cities” but claimed it was not part of his decision with respect to 

Mowery. He stated he did not want to appoint Mowery because of her 

abrasiveness and other conduct he had heard about from others.

Former Mayor Kramer testified he had signed Mowery’s 2012 letter of 

understanding, which was approved by the city council on May 21, 2012. Kramer 
12

testified the purpose of the letter of understanding was to provide Mowery 

protection and benefits because city department heads could not belong to a 

union. He testified the letter of understanding covered “anything . . . not for just 

cause. If . . . she had made a gross mistake or negligent of duty, then they would 

say, you know, this doesn’t hold true.” Kramer testified “all the department heads” 

had letters of understanding because “they wanted some kind of protections that 

the union people were getting that they weren’t getting.” Kramer also testified 

about Waltrip’s dislike of the letters of understanding and about the contentious 

relationship between Waltrip and Mowery.

Waltrip testified he did not like the letters of understanding and wanted to 

do away with them. He acknowledged he had met with Paterson, who shared a 

his dislike of the letters of understanding. Waltrip also stated he had encouraged 

Paterson, Corcoran, and Schomer to run for city council in 2015. Waltrip testified 

he believed Schomer should be paid in both capacities and he told Mowery to do 

so. He denied having any involvement in Mowery’s non-reappointment.

Melonis testified she voted in favor of the 2012 letter of understanding: 

Q. All right. What did you understand that document’s

purpose to be as a member of the council? A. As a member of the 

council, I believed it to be as long as Doreen was performing to the 

expectations of the council and the mayor that she would not be 

unjustly terminated at the whim of one of the public officials.

Q. And that if that happened, she would have a severance

package? A. Yes.

Melonis was asked about the January 18, 2016 council meeting. This 

exchange occurred:

Q. Okay. Did you have any idea that [Mowery] was not going 

to be reappointed by reason of their votes? A. No, and I was 

absolutely shocked when it happened.
13

. . . .

Q. All right. I want to ask you some questions about the issue 

involving Mary Schomer. She likewise was elected in November of 

2015 to begin serving a four-year term as council member on 

January 1 of 2016? A. Correct.

. . . .

Q. . . . So let’s go back to the election. Her election to the

council by reason of her other employment at the city library created 

a legal issue for the—the city council members, correct? A. Very few 

thought so.

Q. Okay. Did you think so? A. I did think so.

Q And what was your opinion? A. The opinion is that state 

law says you cannot receive dual compensation.

Q. Did you undertake to research that yourself? A. Yes, I did.

Q. And based upon your research did you make that

conclusion? A. I did.

Q. Leading up to that January 18th, 2016, council meeting,

had you been provided a written opinion from city attorney Joe

Thornton on that issue? A. Yes.

Q. And did you read that opinion? A. Yes.

Q. And do you remember what Mr. Thornton’s conclusion was

on the issue of whether Mary Schomer could be paid in both

capacities? A. His was the same as mine, it was not allowable. 

Q. So as long as she served as a council member by reason

of her election she was not capable of receiving pay by reason of her 

position as a member of the library staff? A. She would have to give 

up one of the compensations, she could not be dually compensated.

. . . .

Q. All right, and what did you learn from Doreen in that

conversation, to the best of your recollection? A. Doreen’s opinion 

was the same as mine, that she was not—it was not allowable by law 

for the dual compensation and she was not going to write the check.

Q. Did she voice that opinion to all members of the city

council? A. Yes.

At the time of trial, Cumberledge was serving as the mayor of Carter Lake. 

He testified he and the 2016 incoming council members Paterson, Corcoran, and 

Schomer had phone calls or met one-on-one prior to the January 2016 meeting 

and discussed various items, including to not reappoint Mowery.6 Cumberledge 

expressed dissatisfaction with Mowery’s job performance and salary and did not 

 

6 Cumberledge had voted “no” on Mowery’s 2014 appointment. 
14

believe the council was bound by the 2012 letter of understanding, stating his belief 

it should be tied to the term of the appointment. 

Mowery and her husband both testified about the events leading up to the 

January 2016 council meeting and the effect of the loss of job had on her 

vocationally, monetarily, and emotionally. Mowery testified she learned Corcoran, 

Cumberledge, Paterson, and O’Bradovich had met at the Carter Lake library in 

mid-November. Mowery prepared a statement prior to the January 2016 council 

meeting. 

On cross-examination, Mowery acknowledged the city clerk is an appointed 

position and she testified the letter of understanding was not a contract of 

employment. She “considered the agreement to cover my severance package in 

the event that I was no longer working for the City of Carter Lake due to no

improper actions upon my part.” Mowery testified, “I promised I would come and 

do my best job, and they promised to pay me a severance package if something 

happened that I had no control over.”

Mowery stated: 

I believe 100 percent with all my heart that they got rid of me because 

I refused to violate the law and pay Mary Schomer. There is nothing 

that anyone will ever say that will convince me any differently of that 

because had they had all these other reasons that they’ve given, they 

would have told me at the council meeting when I asked. They would 

have communicated that with me. They chose to hide that after the 

fact is my belief.

Mowery acknowledged Waltrip did not have a vote on her reappointment “but he 

certainly influenced [the council members.]”

The defendants called O’Bradovich to testify. O’Bradovich testified he first 

saw the letters of understanding in 2015 when Waltrip and Paterson brought them 
15

to him. He offered them his impression that the agreements were “void as against 

public policy” as they were for longer than the term of appointment. He opined a 

letter of understanding was not an employment agreement. “I also pointed out to 

them that the city clerk is an employee at will but serves at the pleasure of the city 

council, not the mayor and the city council.” 

The jury found in Mowery’s favor on all theories presented. On the breachof-contract claim, the jury answered interrogatories finding: (1) the letter of 

understanding was a contract between Mowery and Carter Lake; (2) Carter Lake 

breached the contract with Mowery; and (3) the city’s breach caused damage to 

Mowery. The jury awarded no damages on this claim. 

On the promissory estoppel claim, the jury specifically found: (1) there was 

“a clear and definite promise made to Doreen Mowery in the Letters of 

Understanding”; (2) Carter Lake understood “Mowery was seeking an assurance 

upon which she could rely and without which she would not act”; (3) Mowery

reasonably relied on the promises made to her in the letter of understanding;

(4) Carter Lake broke the promises made to Mowery in the letter of understanding; 

and (5) Mowery suffered damages caused by the city breaking its promises to her 

in the Letter of Understanding. The jury awarded damages in the amount of 

$106,285.61, which included $73,424 for back pay.

On her claim of discharge in violation of public policy, the jury found: (1) the 

failure to reappoint Mowery was a violation of public policy and (2) Mowery’s 

refusal “to pay dual compensation to Councilwoman Mary Schomer” was ”a 

determining factor for her termination on January 18, 2016.” The jury awarded 
16

back pay from January 18, 2015, to the time of trial in the amount of $65,000 and 

$100,000 for past mental pain and suffering. 

The defendants filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 

(JNOV) or, in the alternative, for remittitur, asserting the damages awarded were 

duplicative. The court ruled:

Defendants argued that Plaintiff was not terminated or discharged, 

but was simply not reappointed. Defendants asserted that because 

city clerks are appointed by the city council for two year terms under 

the ordinance, the failure to reappoint Plaintiff is not actionable. 

Defendants assert that the Letter of Understanding relied upon by 

Plaintiff is not a contract. Defendants assert that even if the Letter of 

Understanding is a contract, it is void as against public policy 

because it attempts to bind future city councils to a term for the clerk 

beyond that permitted in the ordinance. Defendants claim that even 

if the Letter of Understanding is a contract it was not breached by the 

council’s failure to reappoint Plaintiff. Defendants assert that 

promissory estoppel must fail because the promises Plaintiff relied 

upon were contained in the Letter of Understanding. Defendants rely 

on Westphal v. the City of Council Bluffs, 275 N.W.2d 439 (Iowa 

1978), for the proposition that without an underlying legal right for 

Plaintiff to hold the office of clerk, an action for damages may not be 

used to protest the proceedings used to end her tenure. Plaintiff 

resisted the motion for [JNOV].

The jury is the fact finder. When considering a motion for 

[JNOV], the jury’s findings are viewed in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party. The jury found that the Letter of Understanding 

was a contract that provided a severance package to Plaintiff if she 

lost her position as clerk. The council failed to reappoint Plaintiff to 

the position as city clerk during the period of time covered by the 

Letter of Understanding, activating the severance package contained 

in the Letter of Understanding. The Letter of Understanding was not 

void as against public policy. The jury found that Plaintiff reasonably 

relied on the promises contained in the Letter of Understanding. The 

jury followed the instructions by not awarding damages for both 

breach of contract and promissory estoppel, even though it found 

that Plaintiff had proven both theories of recovery.

The jury found that Plaintiff’s refusal to pay Mary Schomer two 

salaries contrary to legal advice she received was a significant factor 

in her discharge/termination/nonreappointment. The jury found that 

Plaintiff’s discharge/termination/nonreappointment was in violation 

of public policy and awarded damages for the time period from her 

non-reappointment through the time of trial. The damages awarded 
17

by the jury for termination in violation of public policy are supported 

by substantial evidence.

This case presents different issues than Westphal. Westphal

did not have the benefit of a Letter of Understanding or other contract 

providing severance for nonreappointment within a specified period 

of time. Westphal did not present evidence that his nonreappointment was a violation of any public policy. In this case 

Plaintiff presented evidence on those issues and the jury made 

findings of fact. The jury did not award duplicate damages. The 

Motion for [JNOV] is overruled. The motion for remittitur is overruled.

The defendants now appeal, essentially raising the same arguments they 

did in the district court.

II. Scope and Standards of Review.

“Parties are entitled to have their legal theories submitted to the jury if they 

are supported by the pleadings and substantial evidence in the record.” Beyer v. 

Todd, 601 N.W.2d 35, 38 (Iowa 1999). “In weighing the sufficiency of the evidence, 

we give it the most favorable construction possible in favor of the party urging 

submission.” Hoekstra v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 382 N.W.2d 100, 107–08 

(Iowa 1986). “A motion for [JNOV] should be granted if there is not substantial 

evidence to support the elements of the plaintiff’s claim.” Thornton v. Am. 

Interstate Ins. Co., 940 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2020). “Evidence is substantial when a 

reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach a conclusion.” Johnson v. 

Dodgen, 451 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Iowa 1990). 

“Where damages are not supported by the evidence, the court may ‘order 

a remittitur as a condition to avoiding a new trial.’” Thornton, 940 N.W.2d at 8

(quoting Jasper v. H. Nizam, Inc., 764 N.W.2d 751, 777 (Iowa 2009)). “When 

ordering remittitur, the court ‘award should be reduced “to the maximum amount 

proved” under the record.’” Id. (citation omitted).
18

III. Discussion. 

The defendants insist Mowery’s non-reappointment cannot possibly be 

found to be a termination or discharge and, therefore, each claim necessarily fails. 

A. Discharge in violation of public policy. Iowa law recognizes a “publicpolicy exception to the at-will employment doctrine” which “limits an employer’s 

discretion to discharge an at-will employee when the discharge would undermine 

a clearly defined and well-recognized public policy of the state.” See Berry v. 

Liberty Holdings, Inc., 803 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Iowa 2011). The defendants do not 

contest that requiring an employee to perform an illegal act is contrary to public 

policy. See Jasper, 764 N.W.2d at 767–68 (noting “[w]e have recognized the tort 

of wrongful discharge . . . protects the refusal by an employee to engage in activity 

that is violative of public policy”).

The defendants assert, “It is undisputed, however, that Plaintiff was not 

discharged (or terminated).” This is a serious mischaracterization of the parties’ 

positions. Whether Mowery was terminated and therefore able to claim the 

protection of the public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine was a 

central issue in the case.

Citing Westphal, the defendants argue: “[Mowery’s] wrongful discharge 

claim comes down to the question of whether dismissal or termination can be 

shown by a refusal to reappoint. Under Iowa law, appointment is required before

termination can be considered. In other words, a failure to reappoint does not 

amount to termination.” We disagree that the cited authority supports the

proposition as characterized.
19

In Westphal, the city clerk had been reappointed a number of times and had 

“prepared a resolution for reappointment for 1972 and presented it to the council, 

but for some reason no action was taken on it.” 275 N.W.2d at 441. The relevant 

municipal ordinance provided: 

The City Clerk shall be elected by the City Council on the first 

Monday in April of each even numbered year, or as soon as 

practicable thereafter, and he shall hold office for the term of two 

years from the first Monday in April and until his successor has been 

elected and qualified. 

Id. However, he continued to perform his duties and receive a salary in 1972, 

1973, 1974, 1975, and 1976—despite no formal appointment in any of those years. 

Id. In 1976, the “council appropriated and paid his salary as a part of its budget, 

and on August 2, 1976, provided a five percent salary raise for him.” Id.

A municipal election was to be held on October 18, 1976. Id. 

Approximately a week before the election, Councilman Lewis 

“discovered” the dormant [municipal] ordinance requiring election of 

a clerk. He met with two other councilmen just prior to the regularly 

scheduled council meeting and discussed the matter. The election 

of a clerk was not on the agenda for that meeting, but was brought 

up by Lewis after a motion for adjournment. The council voted, [three 

to two], to appoint Westphal’s deputy as clerk. This lawsuit followed.

Id. 

The clerk sued the city for lost compensation, claiming he had been 

removed from office in a manner contrary to Iowa Code section 372.15 (governing 

removal of appointees to city offices).

7

 Id. To fall within the protections of section 

 

7

Iowa Code section 372.15 provides:

Except as otherwise provided by state or city law, all persons 

appointed to city office may be removed by the officer or body making 

the appointment, but every such removal shall be by written order. 

The order shall give the reasons, be filed in the office of the city clerk, 

and a copy shall be sent by certified mail to the person removed who, 
20

372.15, the clerk argued he was entitled to remain in his position until 1978 based 

on the theory that despite no formal appointment, the council had ratified or 

confirmed his appointment by its actions. Id. at 443. 

The supreme court rejected the clerk’s claim, noting the appointment of a 

public officer requires “an open, unequivocal act evidencing it” and must be “made 

in strict compliance with the statute or constitution granting the power to appoint.” 

Id. The supreme court found that the clerk was properly initially appointed to office,

and during the years he had acted as city clerk but had not been formally appointed 

to the office his status was that of a holdover appointee. Id. at 444. As a holdover 

appointee, he could be removed from office without the notice and hearing 

protections set forth in Iowa Code section 372.15. Id. at 445. The court noted: 

“Under our view of this case, he was not removed within the meaning of that 

section; he was simply not reappointed.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Relying on this sentence, the defendants argue that Mowery cannot show 

she was terminated or discharged. However, they fail to acknowledge the 

sentence immediately following: “His status as a holdover clerk was terminated.” 

Id. (emphasis added).

We observe Mowery might well be considered to have been a holdover 

clerk. Iowa Code section 69.1A provides: “Except when otherwise provided, every 

officer elected or appointed for a fixed term shall hold office until a successor is 

 

upon request filed with the clerk within thirty days of the date of 

mailing the copy, shall be granted a public hearing before the council 

on all issues connected with the removal. The hearing shall be held 

within thirty days of the date the request is filed, unless the person

removed requests a later date.

The provision was enacted in 1975 and remains in effect unchanged.
21

elected and qualified, unless the officer resigns, or is removed or suspended, as 

provided by law.” (Emphasis added.) Here, Carter Lake City Ordinance 20.01

provides, “At its first meeting in January following the regular city election the [city] 

council shall appoint by majority vote a city clerk to serve for a term of two years.” 

(Emphasis added.) Contrary to that mandate, the city council did not appoint a city 

clerk at the January 2016 meeting. Nor did Mowery resign. The paperwork sent 

to her by Carter Lake noted her employment was terminated and was 

accompanied by the council’s calculation of Mowery’s severance under the 

employee handbook. 

In any event, with respect to her claim of wrongful discharge, Instruction 17 

provided: 

In order to establish a case of wrongful discharge in violation of public

policy, Plaintiff will have to show that she was “discharged” or 

“terminated” from her employment. Appointment to a position is 

required before termination can be considered. A failure to reappoint 

does not amount to a termination, unless the failure to reappoint is a 

violation of Public Policy, as defined in Instruction No. 18.

Instruction 18 in turn states:

For Plaintiff to recover for Wrongful Discharge from her employment 

in violation of Public Policy, she must prove all of the following 

propositions:

1. She was an employee of the City of Carter Lake, Iowa.

2. The City of Carter Lake discharged Plaintiff from her 

employment with the City of Carter Lake.

3. Plaintiff’s refusal to violate Iowa Code section 372.13(8) 

with regard to dual compensation of Councilwoman Schomer was 

the determining factor for her termination.

4. The termination caused damage to Plaintiff.

5. The nature and extent of the damage.

While the defendants generally objected to any instruction on wrongful 

discharge, they do not assert instructional error as an issue on appeal or provide 
22

any authority in support of such a claim; consequently any error is waived. See 

Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g) (requiring an argument section for “each issue raised 

on appeal” and noting “[f]ailure to cite authority in support of an issue may be 

deemed waiver of that issue”). The instructions provide the law of the case for 

purposes of our review. State v. Canal, 773 N.W.2d 528, 530 (Iowa 2009). 

Mowery and Melonis both testified Mowery was not reappointed due to her

refusal to pay Schomer in a dual capacity. The jury found Mowery was terminated. 

And the jury specifically found Mowery’s refusal “to pay dual compensation to 

Councilwoman Mary Schomer” was “a determining factor for her termination on 

January 18, 2016.” The jury awarded as damages on this wrongful-discharge 

claim back pay in the amount of $65,000 and past mental pain and suffering in the 

amount of $100,000.

At oral argument, counsel for the defendants argued there is no remedy for 

a wrongfully-discharged municipal employee. We cannot agree. Our supreme 

court has recently discussed the wrongful-discharge doctrine, stating, “Our 

reasoning for adopting the wrongful-discharge claim focused on the need to 

provide a remedy for conduct that violated legislatively declared public policy.” 

Ferguson v. Exide Techs., Inc., 936 N.W.2d 429, 431–32 (Iowa 2019) (emphasis 

added). 

We have explored and reaffirmed the doctrine in many cases 

since Springer. In Borschel v. City of Perry, we explained that there 

were three primary situations when an action for wrongful discharge 

in violation of public policy was available. Those situations included 

“retaliation for performing an important and socially desirable act, 

exercising a statutory right, or refusing to commit an unlawful act.” 

We observed that “[s]uch policies may be expressed in the 

constitution and the statutes of the state.” 
23

Id. at 432 (citations omitted). 

In Jasper, the supreme court reiterated public policy could be expressed in 

statutes, but noted:

The use of statutes as a source of public policy also helps provide 

the essential notice to employers and employees of conduct that can 

lead to dismissal, as well as conduct that can lead to tort liability. The 

public-policy exception was adopted merely to place a limitation on 

an employer’s discretion to discharge an employee when the public 

policy is so clear and well-defined that it should be understood and 

accepted in our society as a benchmark. Our reliance on statutes as 

a source of this limitation has been a way to ensure that the tort 

continues to serve its objectives.

While we have justifiably relied on statutes, we have not 

closed the door to using other sources as a means to derive public 

policy to support the tort. We have repeatedly observed that our 

constitution is a proper source of public policy. Moreover, we have 

recognized that other jurisdictions have used administrative 

regulations as a source of public policy, yet we have not had the 

occasion to decide the issue until today. 

764 N.W.2d at 763. Noting that “administrative regulations ultimately adopted are 

necessarily tied to the broad directives of the legislature and effectuate the intent 

of the enabling legislation,” “have the force and effect of a statute,” and “are 

required to be consistent with the underlying broader statutory enactment,” the 

court concluded “the justification for relying on statutes as a source of public policy 

can equally apply to administrative regulations.” Id. at 764. 

In analyzing whether the particular administrative regulations concerning 

staff ratios in childcare facilities encompassed such a public policy, the court 

stated, “a policy sought to be derived from an enactment must affect a public 

interest so that the tort advances general social policies, not internal employment 

policies or individual interests.” Id. at 766.
24

Pursuant to Carter Lake’s municipal code, Mowery had duties as city clerk 

and city treasurer to be “responsible for the safe custody of all funds of the City in 

the manner provided by law” and provide the “accurate account of all 

disbursements, money or property, specifying date, to whom, and from what fund 

paid.” Carter Lake Municipal Code §§ 21.01, .03(1), .03(4). These ordinances are 

consistent with the government’s fundamental duty and authority to protect the 

public fisc. See generally Endress v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 944 N.W.2d 71, 

94 (Iowa 2020) (McDonald, J., dissenting in part) (noting the government’s general 

duty and authority to protect the fisc is “fundamental to the sound operation of 

government”). We believe these ordinances support a clear public policy and 

provide a basis for allowing a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public 

policy. 

Mowery was informed by the city attorney that Schomer could not receive 

dual compensation under Iowa Code section 372.13(8). To require Mowery to pay 

Schomer dual compensation would violate that fundamental governmental duty to 

protect the municipality’s funds and Mowery’s statutory duties as the custodian of 

those municipal funds. Mowery informed the city council of the problem. The city 

council then terminated Mowery’s employment, as well as that of the city attorney

who issued the legal opinion relied upon by Mowery.

The jury findings are binding if supported by substantial evidence. See Iowa 

R. App. P. 6.904(3)(a). There was substantial evidence presented that Mowery’s 

refusal to pay Schomer in her dual capacities as librarian and city council member 

was a determining factor in the council’s decision to not reappoint Mowery, which 

under the jury instruction amounted to a termination. While there was evidence to 
25

the contrary as well, it is the jury’s duty to resolve factual questions, and the jury is 

free to believe or disbelieve the witnesses’ testimony. Est. of Hagedorn v. 

Peterson, 690 N.W.2d 84, 88 (Iowa 2004) (“[T]he credibility of witnesses is 

peculiarly the responsibility of the fact finder to assess.”). 

The court did not err in denying the defendants’ motion for JNOV on the 

claim of discharge in violation of public policy. 

B. Breach of Contract. The defendants make a three-fold attack on 

Mowery’s breach-of-contract claim. First, they assert the letter of understanding is 

not a contract by its own terms. Second, they contend the letter of understanding 

is void as against public policy. Third, because Mowery was not “terminated” there 

was no breach of contract. We have already addressed the third claim above and 

have concluded there is substantial evidence from which the jury could find 

Mowery was terminated. We turn to the other challenges.

1. Contract. The defendants state, “[T]here can be no breach of contract 

claim because, by its own terms, the Letter of Understanding was not a contract.” 

Thus, they maintain a breach-of-contract claim fails “as a matter of law.” This

argument is circular and omits crucial terminology in the letter of understanding. 

There is no doubt the letter of understanding clearly states it is not a contract 

for employment. But Mowery does not claim it is; rather, she asserted the letter of 

understanding was a contract which set forth the terms of a severance package to 

be paid to her if she lost her position of city clerk without just cause. She testified 

she “considered the agreement to cover my severance package in the event that I 

was no longer working for the City of Carter Lake due to no improper actions upon 

my part.” Mowery testified, “I promised I would come and do my best job, and they 
26

promised to pay me a severance package if something happened that I had no 

control over.” Kramer testified the purpose of the 2012 letter of understanding was 

to provide Mowery protection and benefits should she be terminated for “anything 

. . . not for just cause.” 

Whether a contract existed was a question of fact for the jury. See 

Davenport Bank & Tr. Co. v. State Cent. Bank, 485 N.W.2d 476, 479–80 (Iowa 

1992). The jury was instructed:8

To establish her claim for breach of contract, the Plaintiff must prove 

all of the following propositions:

1. The parties were capable of contracting.

2. The existence of a contract.

3. The consideration.

4. The terms of the contract.

5. The Plaintiff has done what the contract requires.

6. The Defendants breached the contract.

7. The amount of damages caused by Defendants’ breach of 

the contract.

 

8 Further clarification of the nature of Mowery’s claim is included in Instruction 

No. 21:

Plaintiff claims that the Letter of Understanding which was entered 

into with the City of Carter Lake and approved by the Carter Lake 

City Council on May 21, 2012 was legally binding on the City of 

Carter Lake through Promissory Estoppel. For Plaintiff to establish 

her claim of Promissory Estoppel, she must prove all of the following 

elements:

1. A clear and definite promise.

2. The promise was made with the promisor’s clear 

understanding that the promisee was seeking an assurance upon 

which the promisee could rely without which she would not act.

3. The promise acted to her substantial detriment in 

reasonable reliance on the promise.

4. Injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the 

promise.

If Plaintiff has proven all of these propositions, then the Letter 

of Understanding becomes legally enforceable and you may use the 

Letter of Understanding to determine the monetary value of Plaintiff’s 

severance package. 

(Emphasis added.)
27

The jury specifically found the letter of understanding was a contract 

between Mowery and Carter Lake; Carter Lake breached the contract with 

Mowery; and the city’s breach caused damage to Mowery. We find no reason to 

disturb the jury’s findings.

2. Void as against public policy. The defendants next assert the letter of 

understanding, if a contract, is void as against public policy. They state, “The Iowa 

Supreme Court has continually held that a contract which contemplates the 

payment of more or less salary than that specified by law is against public policy.” 

The defendants cite to two cases: Du Bois v. City of Oskaloosa, 294 N.W. 302, 

304 (Iowa 1940), and Miller v. Marshall County, 641 N.W.2d 742, 751 (Iowa 2002). 

We find neither case provides authority for the defendants’ claim. 

In Du Bois, “the amount of compensation and the time or times for payment 

thereof for a public officer [we]re not determined from the contract of employment 

but solely from the legislative provisions applicable to the payment of such 

compensation.” 294 N.W. at 303. Consequently, the supreme court found the

city’s attempt to pay a city health officer less than the statutorily-mandated salary 

was void. Id. at 304 (noting “[i]t is a general principle that a municipal contract 

entered into in violation of a mandatory statute, or a contract in opposition to public 

policy, is not merely voidable but void”). 

At issue in Miller were explicit limits on the county’s authority to enter into a 

lease and lease-purchase agreements under Iowa Code 331.301 (1993). See 641 

N.W.2d at 746. The supreme court ruled: 

The principal amount of the payments in the ten-year lease 

agreement between the Board and Miller exceeded the $500,000 

limit on Marshall County’s authority to enter into lease agreements. 
28

Because the Board failed to follow the requisite statutory procedures 

triggered by the lease terms, the Board did not have the authority to 

enter into the contract with Miller. Consequently, the contract was 

void and unenforceable.

Id. at 751 (citation omitted).

In Mowery’s case, Carter Lake Municipal Code section 20.01 provides: “The 

Clerk shall receive such compensation as established by resolution of the Council.” 

That city ordinance refers to Iowa Code section 372.13(3), which in turn states: 

“The council shall appoint a city clerk to maintain city records and perform other 

duties prescribed by state or city law.” Iowa Code section 372.13(4) states, in part, 

“[e]xcept as otherwise provided by state or city law, the council may appoint city 

officers and employees, and prescribe their powers, duties, compensation and 

terms.” The city council had the authority to set Mowery’s compensation and did 

so. The types of statutory limits on municipal authority addressed in Du Bois and 

Miller are not present here. Because the defendants have provided no authority 

for their claim the contract is contrary to public policy, the claim fails. 

C. Promissory Estoppel. The defendants challenge the court’s denial of 

JNOV of the promissory estoppel findings on two grounds. First, “The promises 

made in the Letter of Understanding were only applicable if Plaintiff was 

‘terminated’. . . Plaintiff was not in fact ‘terminated.’” Second, they contend the 

exceptional circumstances necessary to invoke promissory estoppel against a 

government agency do not exist here. We refer back to our discussion finding 

substantial evidence supporting the jury’s finding Mowery was “terminated.” 

Our supreme court has identified four elements of promissory estoppel:

(1) a clear and definite promise; (2) the promise was made with the 

promisor’s clear understanding that the promisee was seeking an 
29

assurance upon which the promisee could rely and without which 

[the promisee] would not act; (3) the promisee acted to [the 

promisee’s] substantial detriment in reasonable reliance on the 

promise; and (4) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the 

promise.

Kunde v. Est. of Bowman, 920 N.W.2d 803, 810 (Iowa 2018) (quoting Schoff v. 

Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 604 N.W.2d 43, 49 (Iowa 1999)). A claim of promissory 

estoppel focuses on the elements of “a promise and reliance, rather than 

agreement and consideration.” Id.

“We have consistently held equitable estoppel will not lie against a

government agency except in exceptional circumstances.” We have

explained that “[a] person seeking to invoke the doctrine of equitable

estoppel against a government body ‘bears a heavy burden, 

particularly when the government acts in a sovereign or 

governmental role rather than a proprietary role.’” The “exceptional

circumstances” under which equitable estoppel will lie against the

government include instances when, “in addition to the traditional

elements of estoppel, the party raising the estoppel proves

affirmative misconduct or wrongful conduct by the government or a

government agent.” 

Fennelly v. A-1 Mach. & Tool Co., 728 N.W.2d 163, 180 (Iowa 2006) (citations 

omitted).

Mowery observes that in denying the defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment, the court determined the question of whether exceptional circumstances 

existed presented a jury question.9 The defendants contend there are no 

exceptional circumstances here to justify submitting the estoppel claim to the jury, 

 

9 The district court wrote “no Iowa cases clearly illustrate the ‘exceptional 

circumstances’ required to apply equitable estoppel to municipalities.” 

Chamberlain, L.L.C. v. City of Ames, No. 06-1487, 2007 WL 4322186, at *4 (Iowa 

Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2007). However, the court observed equitable estoppel will be 

applied “where the interests of justice, morality, and common fairness clearly 

dictate that course.” 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver § 140 (2018). 
30

citing Bailiff v. Adams County Conference Board, 650 N.W.2d 621, 626–27 (Iowa 

2002). We find Bailiff distinguishable. There, “the conference board was clearly 

acting in its governmental role in compliance with the statutory duties assigned to 

it.” Bailiff, 650 N.W.2d at 626–27 (emphasis added). Here, however, the jury found 

the defendants were acting contrary to public policy. 

Our supreme court has observed, “[T]here is nothing about the 

employment-at-will relationship itself that precludes reliance on a theory of 

promissory estoppel.” Schoff, 604 N.W.2d at 49. The jury made specific findings 

that the defendants wrongfully discharged Mowery and her failure to “to pay dual

compensation to Councilwoman Mary Schomer” was ”a determining factor for her

termination.” Moreover, the jury specifically found: (1) there was “a clear and 

definite promise made to Doreen Mowery in the Letters of Understanding”; 

(2) Carter Lake understood “Mowery was seeking an assurance upon which she 

could rely and without which she would not act”; (3) Mowery reasonably relied on

the promises made to her in the letter of understanding; (4) Carter Lake broke the 

promises made to Mowery in the letter of understanding; and (5) Mowery suffered

damages caused by the city breaking its promises to her in the letter of 

understanding. We affirm the court’s denial of the defendants’ JNOV motion.

D. Remittitur. Finally, the defendants maintain the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying their motion for remittitur, claiming the jury has awarded 

duplicative damages. They contend the trial court should have reduced Mowery’s 

damages by the $73,424.00, which the jury awarded for back pay, under the theory 

the promissory estoppel claim was duplicative of the past lost wages the jury

awarded for the claim of wrongful discharge. 
31

In her appellate brief, Mowery argues the jury’s award “flows from the 

argument that was consistently championed by these defendants throughout the 

trial: The City Clerk position is an appointed position and the term of the 

appointment is for two years.”

On this record, the jury found that Mowery was wrongfully 

discharged in violation of public policy on January 18, 2016. Were it 

not for that wrongful conduct, she would have remained the City 

Clerk for another two years, until the first council meeting in January 

2018. The severance package compensated her for her losses 

during the first year of what would have been another two-year city 

clerk appointment. The jury decided to award her another $65,000 

in lost wages for that second year following her wrongful 

termination. The jury likely did not match the severance package in 

its award for past lost wages under the retaliatory discharge claim 

because Mowery testified that she had earnings in various substitute 

employment opportunities that she pursued during those two years 

and the jury could have reasonabl[y] given credit to the Defendants 

by reason of Mowery’s mitigation of damages. 

This claim on appeal is contrary to Mowery’s position at trial. During 

closing argument, Mowery’s counsel stated:

And the measure of damages for the promissory estoppel theory is 

set forth in Instruction Number 22, and it’s just the severance

package. It’s the severance package that is set forth in Paragraph 6 

of this agreement (indicating), this agreement. She’ll be granted 

[twelve] months’ severance pay, severance package to include full 

pay, reimbursement for unused vacation and sick pay, complete 

benefits of health, dental, vision and life insurance. That’s set forth 

in Instruction Number 22. That’s the measure of damages for the 

promissory estoppel theory.

Exhibit 42 is Mowery’s calculation of what was owed under the severance 

package. Mowery testified she worked 8.5 hours on January 18, 2016, and 
32

calculated her current hourly rate of pay was $35.30.

10

 She testified under the 

compensation package her wages for one year were $73,424.

In Jasper, the supreme court observed:

Wrongful discharge of employment in violation of public policy 

is an intentional tort in Iowa. The legal remedy provided for victims 

of the tort covers the complete injury, including economic loss such 

as wages and out-of-pocket expenses, as well as emotional harm. 

Emotional harm is a personal injury, and economic loss constitutes 

property damage. Thus, both personal injury and property damage 

are recoverable.

764 N.W.2d at 769–70 (internal citations omitted). 

“A remittitur may be appropriate when . . . the jury’s damage award was not 

justified by the evidence before it.” WSH Props., L.L.C. v. Daniels, 761 N.W.2d 

45, 52 (Iowa 2008). The jury awarded damages for promissory estoppel as 

provided in the letter of understanding, which included $73,424 in “back pay for 

twelve months.” Additionally, for wrongful discharge the jury awarded $65,000 in

“back pay from January 18, 2016 to present.” There is no evidentiary basis for 

back pay damages in excess of the $73,424. A remittitur is appropriate.

IV. Disposition.

We affirm on all issues except remittitur, and we conditionally affirm the trial 

court’s denial of the defendants’ motion for new trial. If, within fifteen days of the 

issuance of procedendo, the plaintiff files with the clerk of the district court a 

remittitur of all of the judgment in excess of $206,285.61, the judgment of the 

district court shall be affirmed; if the plaintiff does not file a remittitur, the district 

 

10 This appears to be the rate of pay she used to calculate her wages: the product 

of $35.30 per hour, forty hours per week, and fifty-two weeks in a year, equaling 

annual pay of $73,424. Under her 2012 compensation package, Mowery’s annual 

salary was $68,500 but contemplated pay increases annually. 
33

court shall set the case for a new trial. See WSH Props., L.L.C., 761 N.W.2d at 

53.

AFFIRMED ON CONDITION AND CASE REMANDED.