### IN THE CO URT OF CR IMINAL APPEALS OF T ENN ESSEE
AT NASHVILL E

Ass ig ne d o n B rie fs Marc h 1 9, 2 00 8

STATE OF TENNESS EE v . DEMETRY FIT Z GERALD CONL EY

Appeal f rom the Circ uit Courts for Marshall Coun ty and Li ncoln Coun ty Nos. 17437, 17438 and S 0700004, S0700062 Robert Cr igler, Judge

No. M2007- 01667-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Jul y 9, 2009

J A M E S C U R W O O D W I T T , J R ., J

., dissenting.

I respe ctfully depar

t from the majority ’s deter mi n ation that Tenne ssee Code
Annotated section 40-35-501( a)( 3)’s mandate for rele ase of a defe ndant opera tes upon the ag g reg ate

sentenc ing f

rom two or more counties.

The L incoln County eff

ective sentenc e of t wo y ea rs was to be serve d via split
confine ment of 3 6 5 d ay s i n j ail followed by probation for a y ear

. See T.C.A. § 40-35-306( a) (“A
defe ndant rec eiving probation may b e re q u i red to serve a portion of the sentenc e in continuous
confine ment for up to one (1) y ear in the local jail or workhouse, with probation for a period of time

up to and including the statutory maxi mum time for the class of the conviction off en s e. ”)

. Code
section 40-35-501( a)( 3), howeve r, provides that “inmates with felony sentenc es of two (2) y ear s or less shall be have the rema inder of their orig inal sentenc e suspended upon re ac h i n g t h eir rele ase elig ibilit y date.” Id. § 40-35-501( a)( 3) (cla use one). Thus, had the defe ndant been sentenc ed to the Depa rtment of Correc tion (TDOC), the confine ment on the L incoln County ag g reg ate sentenc e

wo uld end upon service of 30 perc ent or 7.2 months. As a result, the trial court could not have imposed a period of incar cer ation on the split confine ment in ex ce s s o f 7

. 2 m onths. See State v. Sutton

, 166 S.W .3d 686, 690 (Tenn. 2005); see also, e.g. , State v. Gary M. Carter

, No.
M2006-02341-CCA-R3-C D (T enn. Crim. App., Nashville, Fe b. 21, 2008); State v. Krist i Dance
Oake s , No. E2006-01795-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxvi lle, Sept. 27, 2007); State v. Henry Marshall, Jr.

, No. W1999-01159-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., J ackson, J an. 26, 2001).

The Marsha ll Co u n t y effective sentenc e of six y ear s essentially resulted from the

consec utive alig nment of four 18-month Marsha ll County sentenc es. Although eac h such Marsha ll County convicti o n re s ulted in an eff ective sentenc e of two y ear s or less, the Marsha ll County

ag g reg ate sentenc e of six y ear s was not subject to the rele ase mandate of Code section 40-35- 501(a) (3)
– clause one – as quoted above beca use that subsection also provides that the “re lease shallnot occur for sentenc es of two (2) y ear s or less when the sentenc es are part of a consec utive sentenc e

whose term is g rea ter than two (2) y ear s.” Id

. (cla use two). Thus, fo r t h e aggre g ate Marsha ll County sentenc e of six y ear s, the trial court was empower ed to impose pursuant to Code section 40- 35-306(a ) a sentenc e of split confine ment requiring the continuous service of 365 day s, or essentially 12 months, in j ail followed by a community

corr ections plac ement.

Apply ing clause one of Code section 4 0 -35-502( a)( 3) to the two-y ear L incoln County
eff ective sentenc e separ ately from the Marsha ll County eff ective sentenc e, the defe ndant’s total
rele ase elig ibilit y in all of his case s would be 19.2 months (7.2 months for the L incoln County case s and 365 day s for the Marsha ll County case s). Thus, the trial court would not have been empower ed

to impose two 365-day periods of incar cer ation had it trea ted the two-y ear L incoln County sentenc e

as sepa rate from the six-y ear

Marsha ll Count y

sentenc es.

I f the trial court was empower ed to ag g reg ate the L incoln County and Marsha ll County eff

ective sentence s for purposes of apply ing Code section 40 -3 5 -5 0 1

, then t he majority is

corr ect that the defe ndant would no longe r be subject to au t o m at i c release upon the service of 30

perc ent of the two- y ear

L incoln County sentenc e. See T.C.A. § 40-35-501( a)( 3). Howeve r, eve n 1

if the eff ective sentenc es could be ag g reg ated i n t h e manner proposed by the majority for the application of clause two of Code section 40-35-501( a)( 3), the trial court would still not have been

empower ed to impose two 365-day periods of inc arc era tion. Code section 40-35-306 states that a
defe ndant “may

be re quired to ser

ve a portion of the sentenc e in c ontinuous c onfinement for up to

one (1) y ear .” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the g rea test period of incar cer ation that the trial court could
have imposed on the ag g reg ate eig ht-y ear sentenc e was 365 day s. No t h i n g i n our statutory

senten ci n g s ch eme would permit the trial court to ag g reg ate the Marsha ll and L incoln County

sentenc es for purposes of a v o id in g th e d e te r

mi n a te r e le ase provision in Code section 40-35-501( a)( 3)
and then trea t t h e s entences from eac h county separ ately for purposes of imposing two separ ate periods of split confine ment. The rec ord establishes that the trial court intended to do exactly that.

Fur thermore

, I believe that, in the prese nt c ase, the trial court’s authority to impose

two separ ate, max i m u m p er i o ds of continuous split confine ment was limit ed by the orig in of the
blocks of case s from two counties. As a prac tical matter, the imposit ion of two 365-day confine ment

terms was fac ilitated by L incoln and Marsha ll Counties’ inclusion in the same judicial district. See
id. § 16-2-506 (17)( A) (“The sevente enth judicial district consists of the counties of Be dford,

L incoln, Marsha ll, and Moore.” ). This, in my view, does not mean that the judge of the circ uit court in L incoln County had the power to sentenc e the defe ndant outside the bounds of Code section 40- 35-501(a )(3) just beca

use he also presided over the court in Marsha ll County wher e the other block
of convic tions was pending

.

The problem of articulating the sentenc e rendere d by a court of a particula r county

at any point in time with the sentenc e rende red by a court in a differ ent county at a differ ent time is
introduced into our polity by Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c) (2)( a), w hich empowe rs

A s t r a i g h t 3 0

- p e r c e n t r e l e a s e c a l c u l a t i o n o n t h e t o t a l e f f e c t i v e s e n t e n c e o f e i g h t y e a r s w o u l d b e 2 8

. 8 m o n t h s

. 1

-2-a court to deter mine whether a newly imposed sentenc e will ru n co n s ec u tively to or concur rently
wit h s en tence s imposed by “other courts of Tenne ssee.” See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(c) (2)( A). I n resolving the articula tion problem in the prese nt case , I am g uided by the statutory clues that speak

to the issue of split confine ment sentenc es. As I have noted, “[a] defe ndant rec eiving probation may be require d to serve a portion of the sentenc e in continuous confine ment for up to one (1) y ear in the
local jail or workhouse.” T.C.A. § 40-35-306( a). A simil ar focus upon the up-to-one- y ear term for split confine ment is found in Code section 40-35-31 4 (a ). I n m andating the service of cer tain

sentenc es i n the local jail or w orkhouse, that se ction say s that “if the se ntence is eig ht (8) y ear s or less and combined with periodic o r split confine ment not to exceed one (1) y ear , the court shall desig nate the place of confine ment as a local jail or workhouse.” Id. § 40-35-314( a). Thus, in the

prese nt c ase, the split confinements in both counties wer e loca l confineme nts a nd not a place ment i n t h e d ep artment of corr ection. Cf. Shorts v. Bartholomew

, 278 S.W .3d 268,

___, slip op. at 12 (Tenn. Fe b. 20, 2009) (obser ving that beca

use split confine ment sentenc es “ar e limit ed to continuous
confine ment of no more than one y ear in a county

jail or workhouse

, followed by probation,” “the
TDOC does not bec ome involved”)

.

I n this situation, I do n o t believe that the second clause in Code section 40-35-
501 (a )(3) counter s the provision in the first clause of that section which limit s the confine ment service time for a sentenc e of two y ear s or less to the rele ase elig ibilit y time provided in the g ener al
law. As noted above, the second clause in Code section 40-35-501( a)( 3) provides that the automatic
rele ase mandated by the first clause “shall not occur for sentenc es of two (2) y ear s or less when the

sentenc es are part of a consec utive sentenc e whose term is g rea ter that two (2) y ear s.” T.C.A. § 40- 35-501(a )(3)

. The provision does sug g est that, at least for simult aneous sentenc ing in multipl e case s befor e one court, the time-period desig nations are meant to apply to the ag g reg ate of such

sentenc ing. Howeve r, as I have also noted above, a court utiliz ing split confine ment could confine
the multipl e offe nder in its court to only one ag g reg ate term of up to one y ear

. For ex ampl e, in a hy pothesis wher e the L incoln County two -y ear eff ective sentence with a y ear of confinement was imposed prior to the imposit ion of a consec utive, six -y ear eff ective, split-confinement sentenc e in
Marsha ll County

, I would strug g le to see how the later imposit ion could retroa ctively ch an g e the

-3-leg al bounds of t he prior sentenc ing in L incoln County

. I f it could not, then I do not see how the 2

result could be dif

fer ent bec ause the sentenc es we re simultaneously imposed.

For that rea son, I would have applied the first clause of Code section 40-35-501( a)( 3)

to limit deter

minately the confine ment time of the L incoln County eff ective sentenc e to 7.2 months.

____________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE

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