The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District 1

Judge for the Eastern and Western Districts of Missouri, sitting

by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 96-2925

_______________

KAREN KAMPA, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United 

* States District Court for 

* the District of Minnesota.

WHITE CONSOLIDATED *

INDUSTRIES, INC., *

*

Appellee. *

__________________________

Submitted: March 12, 1997

 Filed: June 6, 1997

__________________________

Before WOLLMAN and BEAM, Circuit Judges, and LAUGHREY, District 1

Judge. 

______________________

LAUGHREY, District Judge. 

Appellant Karen Kampa appeals from the district court’s order denying

her a jury trial on her claim brought under the Minnesota Human Rights Act

(MHRA). We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
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I.

In April 1995, Kampa filed suit against her employer, White

Consolidated Industries, Inc. (WCI), alleging, in part, discrimination on

the basis of her gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the MHRA, Minn. Stat. § 363.01 et

seq. Both parties made timely demands for a jury trial pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 38. Shortly before trial, WCI moved to strike Kampa’s jury

demand and to revoke its own jury demand. The district court granted WCI’s

motions. The court determined that the events giving rise to Kampa’s

gender discrimination claim occurred prior to the effective date of the

Civil Rights Act of 1991, and accordingly, Kampa had no right to a jury

trial on her claim brought under Title VII. See Landgraf v. USI Film

Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280-86 (1994). The court also determined that

because the MHRA specifically provided that claims brought under the Act

were to be decided by a judge sitting without a jury, Kampa’s MHRA claim

would be decided by the court. 

Kampa moved for reconsideration of the district court’s order based

upon our decision in Gipson v. KAS Snacktime Co., 83 F.3d 225, 230-31 (8th

Cir. 1996), wherein we held that the Seventh Amendment guaranteed a jury

trial to a plaintiff seeking damages in federal court under the Missouri

Human Rights Act. The district court found Gipson was distinguishable, but

certified for immediate appeal the question of whether Kampa had a Seventh

Amendment right to a jury trial on her MHRA claim. We subsequently granted

Kampa’s petition for interlocutory appeal. 

The issue of whether a party is entitled to a jury trial under the

Seventh Amendment is a question of law. Accordingly, our review is de

novo. Ackerman v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 54 F.3d 1389, 1393 (8th Cir.

1995). 
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II.

The initial question presented to the Court is whether the Seventh

Amendment right to a jury trial extends to a claim brought pursuant to the

MHRA. The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial in “suits

at common law” filed in federal court. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S.

412, 417 (1987). Such suits include those in which legal rights and

remedies, as distinguished from equitable rights and remedies, are to be

determined. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974). Since the merger

of the courts of law and equity, the Seventh Amendment right to a jury

trial has been carefully preserved. “Maintenance of the jury as a factfinding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our

history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a

jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care.” Beacon Theatres,

Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501 (1959)(quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293

U.S. 474, 486 (1935)).

In her Complaint, Kampa seeks compensatory and punitive damages,

reinstatement, costs and attorneys’ fees, which are all remedies authorized

by the MHRA. Although we recognize that not every award of monetary relief

constitutes a legal remedy, federal law has consistently held that money

damages are generally characterized as a legal remedy. Chauffeurs,

Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570 (1990).

Furthermore, “[r]emedies [that are] intended to punish culpable

individuals, as opposed to those intended simply to extract compensation

or restore the status quo, were issued by courts of law, not courts of

equity.” Tull, 481 U.S. at 422 (citing Curtis, 415 U.S. at 197). Based

upon the rights and remedies at issue in this case, the Seventh Amendment

guarantees Kampa a right to a jury trial on her MHRA claim. Gallagher v.

Wilton Enters., Inc., 962 F.2d 120, 122-23 (1st Cir. 1992); Chauffeurs, 494

U.S. at 570.
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Our conclusion is buttressed by our recent decision in Gipson in

which we stated that “[t]he Seventh Amendment right to [a] jury trial

extends to statutory causes of action, so long as the statute allows, and

the plaintiff seeks, at least in part a legal remedy.” 83 F.3d at 231

(citing Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194). In Gipson, we found that the Seventh

Amendment right to a jury trial attached because the Missouri Human Rights

Act provided for actual and punitive damages.

Our conclusion is not altered because the MHRA specifically provides

that “[a]ny action brought pursuant to this chapter shall be heard and

determined by a judge sitting without a jury.” Minn. Stat. § 363.14, subd.

2. Nor are we persuaded by WCI’s argument that the legislature intended

to create an equitable remedy by prohibiting a jury trial and making the

award of compensatory money damages discretionary. The right to a jury

trial in federal court is clearly a question of federal law. Simler v.

Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963). Federal law controls the issue, even in

cases such as this, where the federal court is enforcing a state-created

right and “even when a state statute or state constitution would preclude

a jury trial in state court.” Gipson, 83 F.3d at 230 (citing Byrd v. Blue

Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538-39 (1958); Herron v.

Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931)). Accordingly, federal law controls

even if the Minnesota legislature intended to create only equitable

remedies. The MHRA permits actual and punitive damages and pursuant to

federal law those are legal remedies.

The only remaining issue is whether the Seventh Amendment guarantee

must be balanced against the mandate of the Erie doctrine, an issue not

addressed in Gipson. The Erie doctrine establishes that the federal courts

in diversity cases must apply state substantive law but are free to apply

federal procedural law. 
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Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). Later cases

refining the Erie doctrine have held that the federal court should apply

the law of the state, rather than federal law, if the right in question is

bound up with the substantive claim created by state law. Byrd, 356 U.S.

at 535 (citing Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939)).

There is no clear evidence that Minnesota’s prohibition against jury

trials was bound up in the substantive rights created by the MHRA. More

importantly, we are not persuaded that the Erie doctrine plays as central

a role in this case as WCI advocates. In Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,

469-70 (1965), the Supreme Court held that where an arguably procedural

right is at stake, and the issue is addressed by a Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure, the Erie analysis is irrelevant. Several years later, in

Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 n.6 (1988), the Supreme

Court went one step further and stated that the aims of the Erie doctrine

are immaterial and should not be considered where either a Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure or a federal statute addresses an arguably procedural point

in dispute. Necessarily, the Erie analysis must be equally inapplicable

when there is a constitutional provision on point which is arguably

procedural. 

Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the district court.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.