alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Judge Motz did not participate in consideration of this

case. The opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 46(d).

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-1637

IKECHUKWU AFI IBRAHIM,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

WAL-MART STORES, INCORPORATED,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News. Henry C. Morgan, Jr., District

Judge. (CA-98-72-4)

Submitted: December 16, 1999 Decided: December 27, 1999

Before MURNAGHAN and MOTZ,* Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ikechukwu Afi Ibrahim, Appellant Pro Se. Daryl Eugene Webb, Jr.,

Kimberly W. Daniel, MAYS & VALENTINE, Richmond, Virginia, for

Appellee.
* Although the district court’s order is marked as “filed” on

April 7, 1999, the district court’s records show that it was

entered on the docket sheet on April 8, 1999. It is the date the

order was entered on the docket sheet that we take as the effective

date of the district court’s decision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58 and

79(a); Wilson v. Murray, 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1986).

2

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Ikechukwi Afi Ibrahim appeals from the district court’s order

granting summary judgment to Wal-Mart on Ibrahim’s claims alleging

employment discrimination. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly,

we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See Ibrahim v.

Wal-Mart, Inc., No. CA-98-72-4 (E.D. Va. Apr. 8, 1999).*

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

ED RICARDO DESTIN,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D17-2339 

[October 4, 2018]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm 

Beach County; Cheryl Caracuzzo, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2016-CF006511-AXXX-MB.

Ron D. Herman of Herman Law, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melanie Dale 

Surber, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

GERBER, C.J., LEVINE and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur. 

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Denied and Opinion Filed December 21, 2018 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-18-01518-CV 

IN RE TEXAS HEALTH MANAGEMENT, LLC, Relator 

Original Proceeding from the 219th Judicial District Court 

Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 219-00125-2018 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Francis, Evans, and Schenck 

Opinion by Justice Francis 

In this original proceeding, relator seeks a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to 

strike the real party in interest’s motion for sanctions and motion for entry of final judgment, which 

are set for hearing in the trial court on January 18, 2019. To be entitled to mandamus relief, a 

relator must show both that the trial court has clearly abused its discretion and that relator has no 

adequate appellate remedy. In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. 

proceeding). 

“Due to the extraordinary nature of the remedy, the right to mandamus relief generally 

requires a predicate request for action by the respondent, and the respondent’s erroneous refusal 

to act.” In re Coppola, 535 S.W.3d 506, 510 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding) (citing In re Perritt, 

992 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding)). Here, relator complains of no action by the 

trial court for this Court to review for an abuse of discretion, and the record includes nothing to 

show that relator asked the trial court for the relief it now seeks from this Court. Relator has not 
 –2– 

argued or shown that the facts of this case present one of the “rare occasions” in which the 

predicate-request requirement should be relaxed. See id. Based on the record before us, we 

conclude relator has not shown it is entitled to mandamus relief. Accordingly, we deny relator’s 

petition for writ of mandamus. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a) (the court must deny the petition if the 

court determines relator is not entitled to the relief sought).

181518F.P05 

/Molly Francis/ 

MOLLY FRANCIS 

JUSTICE
Editorial Note on Part 3
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 3 appear at 61 FR 7216, Feb. 27, 1996; 62 FR 35970, July 3, 1997; 62 FR 47532, Sept. 9, 1997; and 67 FR 46868, July 17, 2002.

§ 3.326 Examinations. For purposes of this section, the term examination includes periods of hospital observation when required by VA. ( a ) Where there is a claim for disability compensation or pension but medical evidence accompanying the claim is not adequate for rating purposes, a Department of Veterans Affairs examination will be authorized. This paragraph applies to original and supplemental claims as well as claims for increase submitted by a veteran, surviving spouse, parent, or child. Individuals for whom an examination has been scheduled are required to report for the examination.
( b ) Provided that it is otherwise adequate for rating purposes, any hospital report, or any examination report, from any government or private institution may be accepted for rating a claim without further examination. However, monetary benefits to a former prisoner of war will not be denied unless the claimant has been offered a complete physical examination conducted at a Department of Veterans Affairs hospital or outpatient clinic.
( c ) Provided that it is otherwise adequate for rating purposes, a statement from a private physician may be accepted for rating a claim without further examination. (Authority: 38 U.S.C. 5107(a))


Cross Reference:
Failure to report for VA examination. See § 3.655. [60 FR 52864, Oct. 11, 1995, as amended at 66 FR 45632, Aug. 29, 2001; 84 FR 170, Jan. 18, 2019]
#### § 1.943 Exception to termination.

When a significant enforcement policy is involved, or recovery of a judgment is a prerequisite to the imposition of administrative sanctions, VA may refer debts for litigation even though termination of collection activity may otherwise be appropriate.

(Authority: 31 U.S.C. 3711; 38 U.S.C. 501)

[69 FR 62200, Oct. 25, 2004]
Order entered January 17, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-12-01160-CR

MARLON LALL, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 439th Judicial District Court

Rockwall County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2-12-33

ORDER

The Court ORDERS the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine why appellant’s 

brief has not been filed. In this regard, the trial court shall make appropriate findings and 

recommendations and determine whether appellant desires to prosecute the appeal, whether 

appellant is indigent, or if not indigent, whether retained counsel has abandoned the appeal. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(b). If the trial court cannot obtain appellant’s presence at the hearing, the 

trial court shall conduct the hearing in appellant’s absence. See Meza v. State, 742 S.W.2d 708 

(Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.) (per curiam). If appellant is indigent, the trial court is 

ORDERED to take such measures as may be necessary to assure effective representation, which 

may include appointment of new counsel.
We ORDER the trial court to transmit a record of the proceedings, which shall include 

written findings and recommendations, to this Court within THIRTY DAYS of the date of this 

order.

This appeal is ABATED to allow the trial court to comply with the above order. The 

appeal shall be reinstated thirty days from the date of this order or when the findings are 

received, whichever is earlier.

/s/ LANA MYERS 

JUSTICE
#### § 23.550 Sex as a bona fide occupational qualification.

A recipient may take action otherwise prohibited by §§ 23.500 through 23.550 provided it is shown that sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for that action, such that consideration of sex with regard to such action is essential to successful operation of the employment function concerned. A recipient shall not take action pursuant to this section that is based upon alleged comparative employment characteristics or stereotyped characterizations of one or the other sex, or upon preference based on sex of the recipient, employees, students, or other persons, but nothing contained in this section shall prevent a recipient from considering an employee's sex in relation to employment in a locker room or toilet facility used only by members of one sex.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

[Hamilton Circuit Court,

November Term, 1889.]

Swing, Cox and Smith, JJ.

#### *GEORGE DROTT v. VILLAGE OF RIVERSIDE.

1. Passage of Resolution May be Shown by Parol.

When a resolution was passed by a village council to appoint a superintendent for the erection of a public building, but *by*accident it was omitted from the minutes, it is competent for the superintendent in a suit for his salary to prove by oral testimony that the resolution had been passed, but omitted from the minutes.

9. No Liability for Services, Unless Certificate of Money in Treasury.

Such superintendent cannot recover for services unless a certificate be issued by the village clerk previous to the alleged contract, that the required money is in the village treasury.

*566Error' to the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton county.

N. Bird, for plaintiff in error.

D. Thew Wright, for defendant in error.

*

 This decision is approved by the circuit court in Holmes v. Avondale, 5 Ohio Circ. Dec., 188, 189.

Cox, J.

Plaintiff sued for a balance of $276 for work and labor in connection with the building of a handsome new town hall in the defendant village.

The first defense set up by the village was that the plaintiff had been fully paid. The court finds that the testimony does not establish this claim of the village.

The second defense was that no ordinance or resolution was ever adopted fey the village council employing plaintiff to take charge of the building of the hall, as required by sec. 1693, Rev. Stat. There is nothing in the minutes to show that any such resolution was ever adopted, but plaintiff offered to prove by oral testimony that such a resolution was presented to council, and was passed by it. 'The trial judge refused to admit such testimony. The reviewing court holds that plaintiff was entitled to prove, if he could, that there had been an omission from die minutes, and the ruling below was therefore error.

The last defense set up by the village was that no certificate was ever issued fey the clerk of the village previous to the making of the alleged contract with the plaintiff, certifying that the money which would be required under the contract, was in the village treasury. Under Bond v. The Village of Madisonville, 1 Ohio Circ. Dec., 581 (s. c., 2 C. C. R., 449), this defense, which is planted apon the Worthington law, is impregnable. “We are compelled to affirm the judgment' below by the absolute character of the law. Otherwise we should have reversed it, as we are satisfied from the testimony that the plaihtiff has rendered valuable service to the village, for which he should be paid if the law would permit.”
Exhibit
32.1


CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the quarterly report of Bel Fuse Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2010 filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "Report"), I, Daniel Bernstein, President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my
knowledge:





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the consolidated financial condition of the Company as of the dates presented
and consolidated results of operations of the Company for the periods
presented.





Dated:
August 6, 2010


By:
            /s/ Daniel
      BernsteinDaniel
      Bernstein, President andChief
      Executive Officer
§ 20.1411 Rule 1411. Relationship to other statutes. ( a ) The “benefit of the doubt” rule of 38 U.S.C. 5107(b) does not apply to the Board's decision, on a motion under this subpart, as to whether there was clear and unmistakable error in a prior Board decision.
( b ) For legacy appeals as defined in § 19.2 of this chapter, a motion under this subpart is not a claim subject to reopening under 38 U.S.C. 5108 (prior to the effective date described in Rule 4, paragraph (a) (§ 20.4(a) of this part) (relating to reopening claims on the grounds of new and material evidence).
( c ) A motion under this subpart is not an application for benefits subject to any duty associated with 38 U.S.C. 5103(a) (relating to applications for benefits).
( d ) A motion under this subpart is not a claim for benefits subject to the requirements and duties associated with 38 U.S.C. 5103A (imposing a duty to assist).
(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 501(a))
[57 FR 4109, Feb. 3, 1992, as amended at 84 FR 193, Jan. 18, 2019]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

CHRIS D. MATTHEWS

, 1

Petitioner

- Below,

Appellant,

v.

NOELLE HARRIS

- MATTHEWS,

Respondent

- Below,

Appellee. §

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§ No. 277, 2020

Court Below: Family Court

of the State of Delaware

File No. CN01

- 10303

Petition No. 19

- 06252

Submitted: June 23, 2021

Decided: July 15 , 2021

Before VAUGHN

, TRAYNOR

, and MONTGOMERY

- REEVES , Justices.

O R D E R

This 15 th day July 2021, the Court having considered this matter after oral

argument and on the briefs filed by the parties has determined that the final judgment

of the Family Court should be affirmed on the basis of and for the reasons assigned

by the Family Court in its orde r dated July 27, 2020.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of the

Family Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s / James T. Vaughn, Jr.

Justice

1 The Court previously assigned a pseudonym to the Appellant under Supreme Court Rule 7(d).
<PAGE>

MYLEX CORPORATION                                                  EXHIBIT 11.1
EARNINGS (LOSS) PER SHARE COMPUTATION
THREE and NINE MONTHS ENDED September 27, 1997 and September 30, 1996

The basis for computing net income (loss)  per common share is described in
Note A to the financial statements, beginning on page 6 of the Company's
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the three and nine months ended September 27,
1997 and September 30, 1996.

The computation of earnings (loss) per share is as follows:



EARNINGS PER SHARE                                         THREE MONTHS ENDED
(in $000's except for per share data)
                                                         SEPT 27        SEPT 30
                                                          1997           1996
                                                        ----------    ----------

NET EARNINGS (LOSS)                                     $ (1,074)      $  4,518

WEIGHTED AVERAGE NUMBER OF COMMON SHARES
 OUTSTANDING DURING THE PERIOD                            20,166         20,571

NUMBER OF COMMON SHARE EQUIVALENTS RESULTING
 FROM STOCK OPTIONS AND WARRANTS, COMPUTED
 USING THE TREASURY STOCK METHOD AND THE
 AVERAGE STOCK PRICE                                           -            868
                                                        --------       --------

NUMBER OF COMMON AND COMMON SHARES
 EQUIVALENTS USED IN COMPUTATION                          20,166         21,439
                                                        --------       --------

PRIMARY EARNINGS (LOSS) PER SHARE                       $  (0.05)      $   0.21
                                                        --------       --------



                                                            NINE MONTHS ENDED
(in $000's except for per share data)
                                                         SEPT 27        SEPT 30
                                                          1997           1996
                                                        ----------    ----------

NET EARNINGS (LOSS)                                     $ (5,281)     $  14,242

WEIGHTED AVERAGE NUMBER OF COMMON SHARES
 OUTSTANDING DURING THE PERIOD                            20,552         20,152

NUMBER OF COMMON SHARE EQUIVALENTS RESULTING
 FROM STOCK OPTIONS AND WARRANTS, COMPUTED
 USING THE TREASURY STOCK METHOD AND THE
 AVERAGE STOCK PRICE                                           -          1,441
                                                        --------       --------

NUMBER OF COMMON AND COMMON SHARES
 EQUIVALENTS USED IN COMPUTATION                          20,552         21,593
                                                        --------       --------

PRIMARY EARNINGS (LOSS) PER SHARE                       $  (0.26)      $   0.66
                                                        --------       --------
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

November 29, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

132132 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 132132 

 COA: 271343 

Macomb CC: 2005-000845-FH 

ROY DWIGHT COOKE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 15, 2006 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

p1120 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

November 29, 2006 

 Clerk
Exhibit 21.1

Subsidiaries of Leslie’s, Inc.

|                                    |                           |
|------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Name                               | Jurisdiction of Formation |
| Leslie’s Poolmart, Inc.      | Delaware                  |
| RAM Chemical & Supply, Inc.    | Texas                     |
| LPM Manufacturing, Inc.            | California                |
| Cortz, Inc.                        | Illinois                  |
| Pool Parts, Inc.                   | Delaware                  |
| SPP Holding Corporation            | Delaware                  |
| Hot Tub Works, LLC                 | Delaware                  |
| Horizon Spa & Pool Parts, Inc. | Delaware                  |
###### Editorial Note on [Part 3](/current/title-38/part-3?toc=1)

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 3 appear at [61 FR 7216](https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/61-FR-7216), Feb. 27, 1996; [62 FR 35970](https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/62-FR-35970), July 3, 1997; [62 FR 47532](https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/62-FR-47532), Sept. 9, 1997; and [67 FR 46868](https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/67-FR-46868), July 17, 2002.

#### § 3.214 Court decisions; unremarried surviving spouses.

Effective July 15, 1958, a decision rendered by a Federal court in an action to which the United States was a party holding that a surviving spouse of a veteran has not remarried will be followed in determining eligibility for pension, compensation or dependency and indemnity compensation.

Cross References:

Abandoned claims. See [§ 3.158](/on/2024-09-18/title-38/section-3.158). Change in status of dependents. See [§ 3.651](/on/2024-09-18/title-38/section-3.651). Dependency, income and estate. See [§ 3.660](/on/2024-09-18/title-38/section-3.660). Evidence of dependents and age. See [§ 3.204](/on/2024-09-18/title-38/section-3.204).

[[31 FR 2782](https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/31-FR-2782), Feb. 16, 1966, as amended at [52 FR 19349](https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/52-FR-19349), May 22, 1987]
8820 EAST PINE STREET  TULSA, OKLAHOMA 74158-2833

PHONE: 1-918-836-6886  TOLL FREE: 1-800-331-1204 

August 18, 2014

Dear Sir or Madam,

The Spartan College of Aeronautics and Technology in Tulsa Oklahoma, Air Agency Certificate 

Number DF2S766K, is seeking an exemption from FAR 61.138 specific to its training of foreign air 

carrier contract students. These students are already employed by foreign air carriers and will not be 

serving as flight officers for a US Domestic Carrier. Further, our interest in this matter is solely for 

the authorization to take the Airline Transport Pilot Knowledge Test. No applicant will be testing 

for an Airline Transport Pilot Certificate as part of their course or training with Spartan. 

As a control measure for the proposed exemption, Spartan would agree to:

1) The Testing center Administrator will stamp the original test result with a red ink stamp that reads 

“Not Valid for the FAA ATP Flight Test”.

2) A copy of the test results will be provided to the applicant with the original being maintained with 

the students records for inspections as required by the FAA.

3) A written notification of each applicant taking the Airlines Transport Pilot Knowledge Test under 

this exemption would be made to the FAA’s Airman Records Division.

We would be happy to discuss any additional requirements that may be necessary to ensure that this 

proposed exemption works for all parties and that the ATP Knowledge Test Results could not be 

used for the ATP Practical Flight Test.

Please feel free to contact me with any questions.

Best Regards,

Ryan

Ryan Goertzen

President

Spartan College of Aeronautics and Technology

8820 E. Pine St.

Tulsa, OK 74158-2833

Office: (+1)918.831.5227

Cell: (+1)918.576.9981

ryan.goertzen@spartan.edu
#### De Youngs, a Corporation, Respondent, *v.*Charles E. Brown, Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, seventh district, borough of Manhattan.

*775Burr & De Lacy, for appellant. ,;

Jeroloman *&*Arrowsmith, for respondent.

*Per Guriam.*

The precise questions raised on this appeal were decided hy the Appellate Division of the Pirst Department, in the case of Conant v. Jones, 50 App. Div. 336. Por the reasons stated in the opinion in that case the judgment appealed from must be affirmed, with costs to the respondent.

Present: Beekmah, P. J.,- Giegebich and O’Gobman, JJ.

Judgment affirmed, with costs to respondent.
#### COLE V. THE STATE.

(Decided June 13, 1912.)

Appeal from Bullock Circuit Court.

Heard before Hon. Mike Sollie.

*674Rainer & Andrews, for appellant. R. C. Brigkell, Attorney General, and W. L. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Pelham, J.

Bill of exceptions stricken because violative Rule 82, C. C. Practice, and cause affirmed.