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Filed 3/9/22 P. v. Rebosio CA4/2 Opinion following rehearing

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. DOMINIC DANIEL REBOSIO, et al., Defendants and Appellants. E074494 (Super. Ct. No s . FVI18002727 & FVI18002728) OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Eric M. Nakata, Judge. Affirmed with directions. Daniel J. Kessler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, Dominic Daniel Rebosio.
Scott S. Furs tman, for Defendant and Appellant, Robert Gysbert DeJager, Jr. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Donald W. Ostertag and James H. Flaherty III, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 I

. INTRODUCTION Defendant and appellant, Dominic Daniel Rebosio caused a fatal automobile accident . C odefendant Robert Gybsbert DeJager, Jr. assisted Rebosio in fleeing from the accident scene. Rebosio and DeJager (defendants) were tried together but separately appeal the judgmen t. They join in each other’s arguments on appeal , to the extent they apply. Rebosio appeals from judgment entered following jury convictions for gross vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (c)(1); count 1) and hit and run resulting in death (Veh . Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(2); count 2). In a bifurcated trial, the jury also found true allegations that Rebosio had a prior conviction for a serious felony (Pen. Code, § 667, subd (a)(1)) and a prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667 & 1170.12). The court sentenced Rebosio to 19 years in prison. Rebosio contends the trial court erred in allowing expert testimony that he violated the Vehicle Code and drove negligently, in disregard for the safety of others. Rebosio further argues that the jury instru ction on gross vehicular manslaughter was inadequate because it did not instruct on all of the elements of the underlying speeding infraction . In addition, Rebosio argues the trial court violated his constitutional right to due process by giving CALCRIM N o. 315 on eyewitness identification evidence. DeJager appeals his conviction for hit and run resulting in death , as an aider and abettor (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(2); count 2). The trial court sentenced him to3

three years in prison. DeJager contends there was insufficient evidence to support his hit and run conviction . He further argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing evidence that (1) Rebosio stole the black Mustang he was driving during the accident, and (2) a Las Ve gas police officer pulled over DeJager in his grey Mustang about two hours after the accident. Both defendant s also argue there was cumulative error. After we issued a decision in this case affirming the judgment, Rebosio filed a petition for rehearing, raising a new sentencing issue regarding applying Senate Bill No. 567 (2021

- 2022 Reg. Sess.) (hereinafter “ S.B. 567 ” ) to his sentence . We granted the

r ehearing petition, vacated our decision, and permitted the parties to submit supplemental briefing regarding the impact of S.B. 567 on Rebosio’s sentence. Rebosio contends that because the facts underlying the trial court’s decision to impose an upper ter m sentence

on count 1 were not stipulated to by Rebosio or found true beyond a reasonable doubt by

a jury or bench trial, his sentence should be vacated. We agree. We therefore reject defendants’ contentions , with the exception that we agree S.B. 567 re quires vacating Rebosio’s sentence and remand ing the case for resentencing Rebosio consistent with S.B. 567

. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed as to both Rebosio and DeJager

. II

. FACTS
I n September 2018, R.D. posted on Craig’s List an advertisement offering to sell
his black Mustang. Rebosio responded and arrangements were made for him to test drive4

the car . When Rebosio test dr ove the black Mustang on September 7, 2018, he disappeared with the car. R.D. re ported the car stolen. On September 15, 2018, at 12:38 a.m., Rebosio and DeJager stopped at an am pm M inimart in Boron, California . Footage from the m inimart’s surveillance camera shows
Rebosio at the gas pumps, exiting the stolen black Mustang . The camera footage also shows DeJager getting out of a grey Mustang at the gas pumps, and Rebosio and DeJager entering the minimart together

. The camera footage ends with the black Mustang and grey Mustang driving away and entering State Route 58 (SR

- 5 8), eastbound.
E.B. testified that about 1:00 a.m. on September 15, 2018, he was driving a
tractor

- trailer eastbound on SR

- 58. As he entered the construction zone, the highway narrowed to two lanes, with one lane in each direction and a double yellow line dividing the eastbound and westbound lanes. When E.B. looked in his rear view mirror, he saw a black Mustang approaching, driving “very, very, fast.” E.B. slowed to 40 or 50 miles per hour as the black Mustang crossed into westbound oncoming traffic and sped past E.B. ’s truck , and started to pass the tractor

- trailer in front of E.B., which was forced to pull onto the dirt shoulder to avoid a collision

. E.B. saw the black Mustang veer out of the westbound lane to avoid the oncoming traffic and pull back into the eastbound lane . As it did so, the black Mustang hit the back of a silver car traveling eastbound , and push ed the

car across the highway, underneath the rear wheels of a westbound oncoming t ractor

trailer

. After the black Mustang hit the silver c ar, the Mustang rolled and came to rest in the dirt.5

As E.B. drove into a dirt lot and got out of his truck, a second Mustang drove up, spun around in the dirt lot, and stopped

. E.B. saw someone run over to the second Mustang and get in the passenger seat. The second Mustang then sped away. E.B. thought the person who got in the second Mustang was the driver of the black Mustang because E.B. saw that person standing next to the blac k Mustang after the collision. E.B. checked on the person in the silver car. The person was deceased.
K.B. testified that when the collision occurred, he was driving an “18 wheeler , a freight liner with a 48

- foot trailer.” He was driving westbound thr ough the desert, on the
SR

- 58, about 1:00 a.m. There were a couple of tractor

- trailers ahead of him and a car behind him. K.B. noticed two tractor

- trailers approaching him in the eastbound lane. As
K.B. entered the construction zone, he slowed down. He suddenly saw a Ford Fusion sliding sideways toward him, crossing into the westbound lane. The car crashed into his truck. K.B. continued driving as straight as possible to avoid swinging into oncoming traffic . He hit the construction retaining wall on the shoulder of the highway and then h is truck came to rest.6

D.N. testified that while driving westbound on the SR

- 58, he saw a Mustang , which was travelling eastbound, “dart out into oncoming traffic. And it whipped back and hit the back of” the Fusion. The collision caused the Fusion to spin out into the westbound path of the tractor

- trailer in front of D.N. The Fusion hit the front of the truck, spun, and then hit t he side of the truck. The Mustang also spun, hit the truck, hit the Fusion again, and then came to rest. All of the vehicles involved in the accident stopped

. D.N. got out of his car to provide assistance. The driver of the black Mustang asked others for a flashlight and asked D.N. for a ride to his brother’s car. D.N. refused and told him he needed to wait there. D.N. told the Mustang driver that the California Highway Patrol (CHP) had been called. As D.N. walked over to the tru cks that were involved in the accident, he heard someone yell, “The guy is getting in another car and leaving.” D.N. saw a second Mustang drive away.
J.S. testified that as he was driving a large rental truck on SR

- 58 , h e saw a black car suddenly cut sid eways and smash underneath one of the approaching trucks. J.S. stopped to avoid hitting the car. J.S. saw the driver of the black car get out of his car and stagger toward him. The man had blood on him. Then J.S. heard someone yell, “He y , he’s getting away or getting into another car.” J.S. saw another car similar to the black wrecked car “vanishing into the distance.” J.S. later identified Rebosio as the driver of the black car and identified him in court.7

R.S. testified that he and DeJager were friends. DeJager invited him to go with him to Las Vegas. DeJager picked up R.S. in a grey Mustang at R.S. ’s home in Gilroy. Rebosio met them at R.S. ’s home in a black Mustang. R.S. rode with DeJager and Rebosio drove alone in the b lack Mustang. During the drive, R.S. saw Rebosio, who was driving in front of DeJager, cross over the double yellow lines on the highway to pass a vehicle

. R.S. then saw a crash and lots of swerving headlights. DeJager drove past the accident scene but when he and R.S. did not see Rebosio ahead of them , DeJager turned around and drove back to the accident scene to look for Rebosio. R.S. saw two cars that were “totaled.” It appeared that Rebosio’s black Mustang had crashed into another car.
R.S. saw Re bosio walking around the area. He appeared to be hurt. DeJager pulled into a dirt lot and Rebosio got in the car . He was angry and yelling . Rebosio told DeJager to get going . T hey drove straight to Las Vegas. CHP Officer Vargas testified that o n Sept ember 15, 2018, about 1:20 a.m., he responded to the scene of a traffic accident located on SR

- 58, in an unincorporated desert area of San Bernardino County

. The accident occurred in a highway construction zone. There were two lanes divided by double yel low lines, and a cement barricade (k

- rail) on the north side of the westbound traffic lane. The posted speed limit was 55 miles per hour. At the accident scene, Officer Vargas saw a black Mustang facing southbound in the eastbound lane . A tractor

- trailer was rammed up against the k

- rail on the north shoulder, adjacent to the westbound lane . A silver Fusion was in the westbound lane.8

The three vehicles sustained severe damage. Both the front and rear of the black Mustang were damaged. O fficer Vargas could not locate the driver of the black Mustang. Officer Vargas noticed the airbag had deployed and had blood on it. Officer Vargas found the driver of the silver Fusion inside the car, deceased. After investigating the accident scene and interviewing witnesses, Officer Vargas concluded the driver of the black Mustang caused the collision by traveling east in the westbound lane, making a lane change back into the eastbound lane, and striking the rear of the Fusion. This propelled the Fusio n into the westbound lane where it collided with a

tractor

- trailer traveling westbound. The Mustang then collided with the rear wheels of the tractor

- trailer, pushing the tractor

- trailer into the cement k

- rail. Officer Vargas ran the black Mustang’s vehic le identification number ( VIN ) and discovered the car had been reported stolen. The owner of the stolen car provided Officer Vargas with the phone number Rebosio had given him when arranging to see the car. Officer Vargas dialed the phone number and the cell phone found in the black Mustang
rang. Officer Vargas determined that Rebosio was the registered owner of that phone number. CHP Sergeant Berns , an accident reconstruction specialist, testified that h e downloaded the data from the black Mustang’s air bag restraint control module (RCM) , which senses collision severity and determines whether to deploy the airbag. Sergeant Berns determined from the data that within seconds before activation of the RCM, the black Mustang accelerated to 106.7 miles per hou r, before decelerating to zero miles per9

hour. Sergeant Berns determined that the black Mustang first collided with the Fusion and the n collided with the rear of the tractor

- trailer. Sergeant Berns further concluded based on the RCM data that , while driv ing eastbound, the black Mustang crossed over the double yellow line into the westbound lane, passed other commercial vehicles, and then moved back into the eastbound lane for a brief moment. Because the black Mustang could not sufficiently slow down, the Mustang struck the car in front of it, the Fusion. On September 15, 2018, at 3:30 a.m., Las Vegas P olice Officer Rohr pulled over a grey Mustang for street racing. At trial, Officer Rohr identified DeJager as the driver and Rebosio as a passenge r. Officer Rohr testified that R.S. w as also a passenger. Rebosio told Officer Rohr his name was Anthony Pederson and said his injuries were from falling down. Officer Rohr cited DeJager for not carrying proof of car insurance and released him and his p assengers. On September 18, 2018, CHP investigators interviewed Rebosio in San Francisco

. Rebosio said his injuries on his knees and chest were from his girlfriend. Rebosio denied having been in a car accident or having been in Southern California.
III

. REBOSIO’S APPEAL
A. E xpert Witness Testimony Rebosio contends the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Sergeant Berns to provide expert testimony stating that Rebosio violated the Vehicle Code and drove negligently, in disregard for the safety of others. Rebosio argues the jury did not need10

Sergeant Berns’s assistance in deciding whether Rebosio acted with gross negligence.
T herefore Sergeant Berns’s testimony invade d the province of the jury and constituted an improper statement of guilt. We disagree.

1. Factual Background Sergeant Berns testified that, as an expert witness in traffic accident reconstruction , he assisted in investigating the subject vehicle accident

. Sergeant Berns testified about the physics of the collision and the information he obtained from the black Mustang’s RCM

. The prosecutor asked Sergeant Berns if driving over double yellow lines into oncoming traffic constitute d a Vehicle Code violation. Sergeant Berns answered, “yes , ” and stated the applicable code section was Vehicle Code section 21650. Sergeant Bern s also stated that driving at 105 miles per hour was a violation of the Vehicle Code. The prosecutor then posed the following hypothetical: “I would like you to assume that there is a black Ford Mustang that is driving on a

two

- lane highway that is heavily traveled. I would like you to also assume that it is 1:00 a.m. in the morning; that the speed limit on this highway is 55 miles per hour. And that this vehicle is traveling

– this b lack Mustang is traveling eastbound. I would like you to assume that this black Must ang crosses over a solid double yellow line into westbound traffic; that it passes

— ”11

Rebosio objected to the hypothetical on the ground it was not based on facts in evidence . The court overruled Rebosio’s objection. T he prosecutor continued with the hypothetical: “I would like you to also assume that the Mustang crosses over into oncoming traffic; that the Mustang passes other vehicles. And that the Mustang’s speed is determined to be up to 106 miles an hour. Once the Mustang passes the other vehic les, it changes lanes back into eastbound traffic; that when the Mustang does so, it impacts the rear of a Ford Fusion that is also traveling in eastbound lanes. That because of this impact, the Ford Fusion is forced into westbound lanes into oncoming tra ffic and into an oncoming tractor

- trailer combination vehicle killing the driver of the Ford Fusion. ” After stating this hypothetical, t he prosecutor asked Sergeant Bern s whether, in his opinion, the driver of the black Mustang “is driving with the regard for the safety of others?” Rebosio’s attorney objected on the ground the hypothetical was improper because it called for an improper conclusion and called for speculation as to the driver’s mindset, which was beyond Sergeant Berns’s expertise. The court overruled the objection. Sergeant Berns testified: “Yes

. I see a lack of regard for the safety of others.”
He explained that “ [r] oadways are designed with safety in mind. The fact that there is double yellow lines, the fact that there’s posted speed l imits. In this case you mentioned it was nighttime. Driving conditions, regardless of the vehicle speed that the Mustang was passing, that Mustang did cross over the double yellow lines which is a violation of the law, accelerated to a high rate of speed

. . . . [G]oing over 100 miles an hour anywhere in the state is against the law. And when you’re passing that length of12

combination of vehicles, it’s not prudent. And then when you merge back into the other lane and you rear end another vehicle because your speed is so great, again, that is a poor choice all the way around. And it was in my opinion negligent. ” Rebosio’s attorney again objected on the ground Sergeant Berns provided improper opinion beyond his expertise and called for speculation as to th e driver’s mindset. The court overruled the objection. During a jury recess, Rebosio’s attorney moved for a mistrial on the grounds Sergeant Berns’s opinion was improper expert testimony because it encompassed the state of mind of the driver, which was b eyond the expertise of the expert and encompassed an ultimate issue which was for the jury to decide

. The court denied the motion for mistrial, concluding that the prosecutor was not asking Sergeant Berns about the driver’s state of mind.

2

. Applicable Law

“ While lay witnesses are allowed to testify only about matters within their personal knowledge (Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a)), expert witnesses are given greater latitude. ‘ A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he has special kno wledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the subject to which his testimony relates. ’ (Evid. Code, § 720, subd. (a).) An expert may express an opinion on ‘ a subject that is sufficiently beyond common exp erience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact. ’ ( Evid. Code , § 801, subd. (a).) In addition to matters within their own personal knowledge, experts may relate information acquired through their training and experience , even though that information may have been13

derived from conversations with others, lectures, study of learned treatises, etc. ” ( People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 675 ( Sanchez ) ; accord, Evid. Code , § 801, subd. ( b ) .) Evidence Code section 802 “allows an expert to ‘state on direct examination the reasons for his opinion and the matter (including, in the case of an expert, his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education) upon which it is based .’” ( Sanchez , supra , 63 Cal.4th at pp. 67 8

- 679 .) “ An expert ’ s testimony as to information generally accepted in the expert ’ s area, or supported by his own experience, may usually be admitted to provide specialized context the jury will need to resolve an issue. ” ( Id . at
p. 675 .) “[A] n expert has tr aditionally been precluded from relating case - specific facts about which the expert has no independent knowledge.

. . . An expert may then testify about more generalized information to help jurors understand the significance of those

case - specific facts. An expert is also allowed to give an opinion about what those facts may mean.” ( Id . at p. 67 6.) The “ distinction between generally accepted background information and the supplying of case

- specific facts is honored by the use of hypo thetical questions. ‘ Using this technique, other witnesses supplied admissible evidence of the facts, the attorney asked the expert witness to hypothetically assume the truth of those facts, and the expert testified to an opinion based on the assumed fact s. . . . ’ [Citations.] An examiner may ask an expert to assume a certain set of case

- specific facts for which there is independent competent evidence, then ask the expert what conclusions the expert would draw from those assumed facts. If no competent e vidence of a case

- specific fact has been, or will14

be, admitted, the expert cannot be asked to assume it. The expert is permitted to give his opinion because the significance of certain facts may not be clear to a lay juror lacking the expert ’ s specialized knowledge and experience. ” ( Sanchez , supra , 63 Cal.4th at pp. 67 6

- 677 ; see People v. Vang (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1038, 1045 .) It is not improper for hypothetical facts to mirror those in the case or for hypothetical questions to reflect the facts of the case. “It is required, not prohibited, that hypothetical questions be based on the evidence. The questioner is not required to disguise the fact the questions are based on that evidence.” ( People v. Vang , supra , (2011) 52 Cal.4th at p. 1041 .) “The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to admit or exclude expert testimony

. . . , and its decision as to whether ex pert testimony meets the standard for admissibility is subject to review for abuse of discretion.” ( People v. McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 426. )

3. Analysis Citing People v. Anh The Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 36 ( Duong ) , Rebosio argues the trial court erred by overruling his objection to Sergeant Be r ns’s expert testimony responding to hypothetical questions. Rebosio argues the hypothetical was improper because it elicited testimony about his state of mind. He al so argues the testimony was improper because it invaded the province of the jury to decide whether he acted with gross negligence, in “disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act.” (CALCRIM No. 592.)15

Penal Code, s ection 192, in relevant part defines vehicular manslaughter as “ the unlawful killing of a human being without malice , ” by “ driving a vehicle in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, and with gross negligence. ” (Pen. Code, § 192 (c)(1).) The trial court i nstructed the jury that, “To prove that the defendant is guilty of gross vehicular manslaughter, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant, Dominic Rebosio, drove a vehicle; [¶] 2. While driving that vehicle, the defendant, Dominic Rebosio, comm itted an infraction; [¶] 3. The defendant, Dominic Rebosio, committed the infractions with gross negligence; [¶] AND [¶] 4. The defendant, Dominic Rebosio’s, grossly negligent conduct caused the death of another person.” The People alleged as to ele ment 2 that Rebosio committed the infractions of crossing over double yellow lines (Veh. Code, § 21460, subd. (a)), speeding (Veh. Code, § 22349, subd. (b)), and making an unsafe lane change (Veh. Code, § 21658, subd. ( a ))

. T he trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitt ing Sergeant Berns’s hypothetical testimony on gross negligence. Sergeant Berns did not provide any testimony regarding Rebosio’s actual state of mind and did not testify that Rebosio committed V ehic le Code infractions

. T he crime of vehicular manslaughter does not require a finding the driver had a specific intent to harm or a finding as to the driver’s
actual state of mind. T he focus i s on the conduct of a “reasonable person” and whether the defendant ’s m anner of driving reflect s a disregard for human life or indifference to16

the consequences of that act

. ( People v. Jones (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1173, 1182 ; Pen. Code, § 192 , subd. (c)(1) .) “Gross negligence is the exercise of so slight a degree of care as to raise a presumption of conscious indifference to the consequences. [Citation.] ‘The state of mind of a person who acts with conscious indifference[] to the consequences is simply, “I
d on ’ t care what happens.”’ [Citation.] The test is objective: whether a reasonable person in the defendant ’ s position would have been aware of the risk involved. [Citation.]” ( People v. Bennett (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1032, 1036 ; see People v. Nicolas (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1165 , 1171 ( Nicolas ) .) T he determination of whether Rebosio acted with gross negligence required a determination of whether the way he acted was so different from how an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation. ( CA LCRIM No. 592.) Rebosio acknowledges that “[t] estimony in the form of an opinion that is otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces the ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” (Evid. Code, § 805.) Rebosio, however, argues t hat Sergeant Berns’s hypothetical testimony wa s inadmissible because it invade d the purview of the jury to weigh the evidence and make findings on guilt. But Sergeant Berns did not provide any hypothetical opinion testimony on Rebosio’s guilt or conduct. He only testified that the driver in the hypothetical was negligent and his driving demonstrated a lack of regard for the safety of others. Sergeant Berns testified that, b ased on the assumed hypothetical facts given , “Yes

. I see a lack of rega rd for the safety of others,”17

and “[G]oing over 100 miles an hour anywhere in the state is against the law. And when you’re passing that length of combination of vehicles, it’s not prudent. And then when you merge back into the other lane and you rear en d another vehicle because your speed is so great, again, that is a poor choice all the way around. And it was in my opinion negligent.”

“ A n expert may then testify about more generalized information to help jurors understand the significance of those case - specific facts.” ( Sanchez , supra , 63 Cal.4th at p. 675.) Furthermore, “[T]he jury need [not] be wholly ignorant of the subject matter of the expert opinion in order for it to be admissible. [Citation.]

. . . Rather, expert opinion testimony “‘ will b e excluded only when it would add nothing at all to the jury’s common fund of information, i.e., when the ‘ subject of inquiry is one of such common knowledge that men of ordinary education could reach a conclusion as intelligently as the witness ’” [citatio n].’ ” ( People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 60 , internal quotes omitted.) Sergeant Berns’s expert testimony was proper because it assisted the jury in determining whether Rebosio’s driving was grossly negligent , that is, whether it was so different from how an ordinarily careful person would have drive n . ( CALCRIM No. 592. ) Rebosio’s attorney argued during closing argument that the accident was caused by Rebosio driving at an excessive speed and therefore the accident was not caused by Reb osio acting with gross negligence, because “[e]verybody speeds. We all live in the High Desert. How many times does the freeway say construction zone, slow down. We all keep going. The whole freeway keeps moving. In some places you don’t even get in18

t he fast lane unless you’re doing 85 or you get run over. Everybody speeds. [¶] Now, we’re talking about [SR

- ] 58 late at night. Is speeding in and of itself grossly negligent? No. It’s ordinary negligence. We all do it. What they’re proving is ordi nary negligence, not gross negligence on the part of the driver of the black Mustang.” Sergeant Berns’s testimony assisted the jury in determining whether Rebosio’s driving at the time of the accident was typical or grossly negligen t

. Rebosio ’s reliance o n Duong for the proposition it wa s improper for Sergeant
Berns to state his opinion regarding Rebosio ’s state of mind is misplaced. In Duong , the d efendant was convicted of first degree murder and second degree murder with a multiple murder special circumstance and various gun use enhancements . The Duong defendant was sentenced to death. The California Supreme Court held in part that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the defense expert ’ s proposed opinion testimony about the defendant ’ s state of mind under Penal Code section 29

. 1 ( Duong , supra , 10 Cal.5th at p. 60.)

1 Penal Code section 29 states: “In the guilt phase of a criminal action, any expert testifying about a defendant ’ s mental illness, mental disorder, or mental defect shall not testify as to whether the defendant had or did not have the required mental states, which include, but are not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, or malice aforethought, for the crimes charged. The question as to whether the defendant had or did not have the required mental states shall be decided by the trier of fact.” ( Ibid

. , italics added.)19

The Duong court reasoned that the trial court properly concluded the expert’s proposed opinion about the defendant ’ s state of mind should be excluded because “ ‘ [a] consistent line of authority in California as well as other jurisdictions holds a witness cannot express an opinion concerning the guilt or innocence of the defendant. .

. . [T]he reason for employing this rule is not because guilt is the “ ultimate issue of fact ” to be decided by the jury. Opinion testimony often goes to the ultimate issue in the case. [Citation.] Rather, opinions on guilt or innocence are inadmissible because they are of no assistance to the trier of fact. To put it ano ther way, the trier of fact is as competent as the witness to weigh the evidence and draw a conclusion on the issue of guilt. ’ [Citation.] ” ( Duong , supra , 10 Cal.5th at p. 60.) Duong is inapposite because the court did not hold that an expert could not testify regarding gross negligence. The Duong court held the expert opinion evidence was inadmissible , not because it was state of mind opinion evidence, but because the expert’s testimony amount ed to a n opinion on the guilt of the defendant. ( Duong , supra , 10 Cal.5th at p. 60.) Sergeant Berns did not provide expert opinion on Rebosio ’s guilt . He responded to a hypothetical. Sergeant Berns did not mention Rebosio or any specific facts regarding the su bject accident. T he hypothetical was based on facts Sergeant Berns was told to assume . In addition, t he cou r t instructed the jury that it was required independently to determine the actual underlying facts based on the evidence presented at trial and the jury was not required to rely on Sergeant Berns’s expert opinions. (CALCRIM No. 332.) The20

jury was instructed that “You may disre gard any opinion that you find unbelievable, unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence.” The court further instructed the jury that “It is up to you to decide whether an assumed fact has been proved. If you conclude that an assumed fact is not true, c onsider the effect of the expert’s reliance on that fact in evaluating the expert’s opinion.” It is presumed the jury followed th e s e instruction s. ( People v. Davis (2005) 10 Cal.4th 463, 542

. ) Rebosio also c it es Nicolas , supra , 8 Cal.App.5th 1165, for the proposition Sergeant Berns provided improper opinion testimony regarding Rebosio’s mental state , which was beyond the scope of Sergeant Berns’s expertise. In Nicolas , the jury found the defendant guilty of vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence. The court i n Nicolas stated that “[g] ross vehicular manslaughter has been characterized as a general intent crime. [Citation.] But the crime more precisely entails the confluence of two d ifferent mental states: general intent in the driving of the vehicle, and gross negligence while committing a traffic violation (in this case ‘ Speeding ’ )

. . . . ” ( Id . at p. 1173.) Rebosio concludes based on this language that Sergeant Berns’s testimony that the driver in the hypothetical was acting with “gross negligence,” “ imprudently, ” and in disregard “ for the safety of others ” was testimony regarding the driver’s mental state, which was beyond Sergeant Berns’s area of expertise. Rebosio’s r eliance on Nicolas for this proposition is misplaced. W hile Nicolas characterizes gross negligence as a state of mind, Nicolas does not discuss or conclude that expert opinion testimony on the element of gross negligence is improper. The21

Nicolas court in dicat ed that “ g ross negligence , ” which is synonymous with the term

“ criminal negligence,” does not require a finding as to what the driver was thinking or the driver’s actual or specific intent or mental state. ( S ee People v. Sargent , supra , 19 Cal.4th at p. 1215 ; Nicolas , supra , 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 1173 [ “C riminal negligence is a separate mental state that is distinct from either general or specific intent. ” ] .) The trial court instructed the jury in the instant case that “ Gross negligence involves more than ordinary carelessness, inattention, or mistake in judgment. A person acts with gross negligence when: [¶] 1. He acts in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death or great bodily injury; [¶] AND [¶] 2. A rea sonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk

. [¶] In other words, a person acts with gross negligence when the way he acts is so different from how an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his act amounts to disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act.” (Italics added ; CALCRIM No. 592 .) Thus, evidence of Rebosio’s actual mental state was not required to establish gross negligence . Only evidence of his driving conduct and the circumstances of the accident were required

. Sergeant Berns’s hypothetical testimony did not address the hypothetical driver’s actual mental state nor did Sergeant Berns testify as to Rebosio ’s mental state

. We therefore reject Re bosio’s contention Sergeant Berns’s testimony was improper because it encompassed Rebosio’s state of mind.22

Based on Sergeant Berns’s knowledge and experience as a CHP officer enforcing
V ehicle C ode violations , and his extensive training and experience in accident reconstruction , t he trial court reasonably f oun d that Sergeant Berns’s expertise enabled him to provide hypothetical testimony assist ing the jury in determining whether Rebosio acted with gross negligence, in a way “ so different from how an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his act amounts to disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act.” ( CALCRIM No. 592.) The trial court therefore did not abuse its dis cretion in allowing Sergeant Berns’s expert opinion testimony in response to the hypothetical questions

. B. CALCRIM No. 595 Rebosio contends the trial court violated his due process right s by failing to instruct the jury on all of the elements of gross vehicular manslaughter. We disagree. “‘It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, a trial court must instruct on general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence’” and “‘necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.’” ( People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176, 1189; see People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 73.) The trial court instructed on all general principles regarding gross vehicular manslaughter by giving CALCRIM No. 592, which state d that to find gross vehicular manslaughter the jury must find that Rebosio drove a vehicle ; while doing so, he committed an infraction with gross negligence ; and his grossly negligent conduct caused the death of another person. The court further instructed that the People alleged in the23

I nformation that Rebosio committed the infractions of crossing over double yellow lines (Veh. Code, § 21460, subd. (a)), speeding ( Ve h. Code, § 22349, subd. (b) ), and making

an unsafe lane change (Veh. Code, § 21658, subd. (a)). The court also instructed the jury : “You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed at least one infraction and you all agree on which

. . . infraction the defendant committed.”
The court further instructed the jury on the elements of each of the alleged infractions. As to the speeding infraction, the court instructed: “ To pr ove that the defendant , Dominic Rebosio, committed a violation of the maximum speed law, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant drove a vehicle on a highway; [¶] AND [¶] 2. The defendant drove faster than 55 mph. [¶] The term highway describes any area publicly maintained and open to the public for purposes of vehicular travel and includes a

street. ” Rebosio asserts that the court erred in failing to inform the jurors they had to find two additional speeding infraction element s: (1) the re was driving on a “two

- lane undivided highway ,” with “not more than one through lane of travel in each direction” (Veh. Code, § 22349 , subd. ( b)(1)) , and (2) that there be reasonable highway signing of the 55 miles

- per - hour speed limit (Veh. Code, § 22349, subd. ( c ))

. The trial court was not required to instruct on these additional facts sua sponte because they are particular facts relating to the elements of the speeding infraction. Instruction on such facts constitute a pinpoint instruction, which the trial court i s not24

required to give sua sponte. ( People v. Middleton (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 19, 30; see People v. Garvin (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 484, 489.) Rebosio argues instruction on the additional two factors is required b ased on the language in Vehicle Code section 22349, which states in relevant part : “ (b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person may drive a vehicle upon a two

lane, undivided highway at a speed greater than 55 miles per hour unless that highway, or portion thereof, has been posted for a higher speed by the Department of Transportation or appropriate local agency upon the basis of an engineering and traffic survey. For purposes of this subdivision, the following apply: [¶] (1) A two

- lane, undivided highway is a highway with not more than one through lane of travel in each direction

. [¶] (2) Passing lanes may not be considered when determining the number of through lanes. [¶] (c) It is the intent of the Legislature that there be reasonable signing on affected two

lane, undivided highways described in subdivision (b) in continuing the 55 miles

- per hour speed limit, including placing signs at county boundaries to the extent possi ble, and at other appropriate locations. ” Although the jury was not instructed that a violation of Vehicle Code section 22349, subdivision (b) requires the highway to be two lane s, any error in omitting instruction on this was not prejudicial error because it was undisputed that the highway

was a two

- lane highway

. Furthermore, Rebosio did not object to the jury instruction given or request a pinpoint instruction clarifying the type of highway required. “A defendant who believes that an instruction requires clarification must request it.” ( People25

v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 584.) Therefore, Rebosio forfeited his objection that the instruction failed to state that the jury must find the highway had only two lanes. ( People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1011

- 1012.) Rebosio likewise forfeited his objection that the court failed to instruct that reasonable sign ing of the s peed limit was required. ( Ibid .) In addition, the existence of reasonable signing was not an element of the speeding infraction under Vehicle Code section 22349, subdivision ( b ). Vehicle Code section 22349 merely states that “ [i]t is the intent of the Legislature that there be reasonable signing.” (Veh

. Code , § 22349 , subd. (c) .) Any instruction on signing would be a pinpoint instruction, which the trial court was not required to give sua sponte. ( People v. Coddington , supra , 23 Cal.4th at p. 584.) Furthermore, omission of the speed

- limit signing requirement was not prejudicial

error. It is not reasonably probable that the trial outcome would have been more favorable to Rebosio had the trial court instructed the jury that a violation of Vehicle Code section 22349, subdivision ( b ) required a finding that there must be reasonable speed

- limit signing

. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 ; People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 209.) O mission of such an instruction was harmless because it is undisputed Rebosio was driving over 100 miles per hour, which was far in excess of the 55 mile s per hour speed limit.26

C. Jury Instruction on Eyewitness Identification Certainty Rebosio contends the trial cou rt violated his state and federal constitutional due process rights by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 315 . He argues the instruction improperly directs the jury to consider witness certainty when evaluating eyewitness identification. We conclude that under People v. Lemcke (2021) 11 Cal.5th 644 ( Lemcke ) the instruction did not violate his due process rights

. During closing argument, Rebosio argued the prosecution failed to prove that he was the driver of the black Mustang at the time of the accident. Rebosio maintained that
R.S. , not Rebosio, was the driver. W itnesses , including J.S. and E.B. , described the driver as wearing shorts . O nly R.S. was wearing shorts. Rebosio was wearing long pants. In addition, J.S. was the only witness at the crash scene who identified Rebosio as the driver. Using CALCRIM No. 315, t he trial court instructed the jury regarding evaluating eyewitness testimony. The instruction listed 1 5 factors to be considered, including , “ H ow certain was the witness when he or she made an identification ? ” After the trial in this case in 2019 , t he California Supreme Court held in Lemcke , supra , 11 Cal.5th 644 at pages 64 6

- 647 , that although the eyewitness certainty factor included in CALCRIM No. 315 is generally an unreliable indicator of accuracy , the model instruction did not violate the defendant’s due process rights. The Lemcke court stated that, “ When considered in the context of the trial record as a whole, listing the witness ’ s level of certainty as one of 15 factors the jury should consider when evaluating27

identification testimony did not render [the defendant’s] trial fundamentally unfair. ” ( Lemcke , supra , at p. 646 .) The Lemcke court noted that the defendant was permitted to call an eyewitness identification expert

. In Lemcke , t he expert testified th at there generally was not a close correlation between witness certainty and identification accuracy . T he Lemcke trial court instruct ed the jury that it was required to consider the expert’s testimon y ; the prosecution retained the burden of proof to prove the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator beyond a
reasonable doubt ; and witnesses sometimes make honest mistakes. ( Lemck e , supra , at
p p . 647 , 658, 660 .)
T he Lemcke court acknowledge d that , “[c] ontrary to widespread lay belief, there is now near unanimity in the empirical research that ‘ eyewitness confidence is generally an unreliable indicator of accuracy. ’ ” ( Lemcke , supra , 11 Cal. 5th at p. 647 .) The Lemcke

court stat ed that , although giving CALCRIM No. 315 d oes not violate a defendant’s due process rights and there was no reversible error, the court intended to refer “ the matter to the Judicial Council and its Advisory Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions to evaluate whether or how the instruction might be modified to avoid juror confusion regarding the correlation between certainty and accuracy. ” The California Supreme
Court in Lemcke added that, “ Acting pursuant to our supervisory powers, we further direct that until the Judic ial Council has completed its evaluation, trial courts should omit the certainty factor from CALCRIM No. 315 unless the defendant requests otherwise. ” ( Lemcke , supra , at p p . 647

- 648 .)28

The People argue Rebosio forfeited his objection to CALCRIM No. 315 because he did not raise it in the trial court. Regardless of whether Rebosio forfeit ed his objection, we reject it under Lemcke , supra , 11 Cal.5th 644

. ( Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) U nder Lemcke , supra , 11 Cal.5th 644 , Rebosio’s due process rights were not violated by the court instructing on the witness certainty factor

. As the Supreme Court explained in Lemcke , the certainty

- of

identification factor in CALCRIM No. 315 does not equate witness certainty of identification with accuracy and does not require the jury to presume an identification i s accurate just because a witness expresse s certainty. ( See Lemcke , supra , at p. 657 .) T he witness certainty factor was just one of 1 5 factors the court listed for the jury to consider when evaluating the credibility and accuracy of the eyewitnesses’ identification testimony. In addition, in determining whether there was reversible error in instructing on identification certainty , we must consider the jury instructions as a whole

. ( Lemcke , supra , 11 Cal.5th at p . 658

. ) Here, the jury was instruct ed that Rebosio was presumed innocent and the People had the burden of proving each element of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt (CALCRIM No. 220; Lemcke , supra , at p. 658 ). The jury was also instructed that “ [ t ] he People ha ve the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that it

was [ Rebosio ] who committed the crime. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty. ” ( CALCRIM No. 315 ; see Lemcke , supra , at p. 658 .)
T he jury was further instructed it “alone , must judge the credibility or believability of the29

witnesses” and that “[p]eople sometimes honestly

. . . make mistakes about what they remember.” (CALCRIM No. 226; see Lemcke , supra , at p. 658 .) Rebosio acknowledges in his appellant’s reply brief (ARB) that after he filed his appellant’s opening brief , the California Supreme Court in Lemcke decided the issue he raised concerning CALCRIM No. 315

. Rebosio recognizes in his ARB that Lemcke hold s that “the giving of the CALCRIM No. 315 instruction with the certainty language did not result in a denial of due process for the defendant in Lemcke .” Rebosio did not

a ttempt to distinguish Lemcke from the instant case or argue that the holding does not apply here. He therefore forfeited any such arguments

. ( People v. Niles (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 749, 758.)
W e conclude that , like the defendant in Lemcke , Rebosio “failed to establish that the trial court ’ s decision to include the certainty factor in CALCRIM No. 315 violated his due process rights or otherwise constituted error under the circumstances presented here.” ( Lemcke , supra , 11 Cal.5th at p. 669 .)
IV

. RESENTENCING UNDER S.B. 567 Rebosio contends his sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing in accordance with S.B. 567. We agree.
On December 12, 2019, a jury found Rebosio guilty of vehicular manslaughter (count 1 ) , and hit and run driving resulting in death or serious injury (count 2 )

. During a30

subsequent bifurcated trial, t he trial court found that Rebosio had suffered a prior conviction for residential burglary constitu ting a strike and a serious felony. On January 9, 2020, the trial court sentenced Rebosio to an upper term of six years, doubled as a result of the strike, for the vehicular manslaughter conviction. The trial court said that it imposed the upper

- term be cause:

“ 1. This is a crime involving great violence and great bodily harm.

“ (b), factors affecting the defendant is that he has engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society.

“ (b)(2) the defendant ’ s prior convictions as an adult a re becoming numerous and of increasing seriousness. The Court points to a prior 10851 and a prior strike of first degree burglary.

“ The Court looks at (b)(5), the defendant ’ s prior performance on probation was unsatisfactory.

. . (b)(3) also applies. Th e victim in this case was particularly vulnerable. He was placed in a position where he couldn ’ t do anything. There ’ s nothing that the victim could have done to save his own life or anyone else ’ s. ” The trial court did not find any factors in mitigation. After defendants appealed the judgment and we issued a decision in this case, Rebosio filed a petition for rehearing requesting resentencing based on S

. B

. 567 , amending Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b), effective January 1, 2022. We granted the petition and permitted the parties to submit supplemental briefing regarding the impact of S.B. 567

.31

Penal Code s ection 1170 , as amended by S.B. 567, provide s in subdivision (b)(2) that “[t] he court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle te rm only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.”
Penal Code s ection 1170 , as amended, thus ma d e the middle term the presumptive

term. A trial court may now only impose an upper term when circumstances in aggravation exi st, and the facts underlying the aggravating circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury or the court acting as the factfinder. ( Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(1), (2), added by Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) The trial judge may, however, rely on certified records of a defendant ’ s prior convictions when considering these enhancements to a sentence without submitting the issue of a prior conviction to a jury. ( Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(3).) The parties agree S.B. 567 applies retroactively to this case because the judg ment was not final as of January 1, 2022 , when S.B. 567 took effect

. (See In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 746

- 748.) But the People argue that this court should not remand t he case for resentencing because the trial court found as an aggravating factor that Rebosio suffered a prior conviction for residential burglary, which was a serious felony and a strike. The trial court, however, also imposed the upper term based on othe r aggravating factors, which were not based on jury or bench

- trial findings or stipulated findings. Such32

additional findings included that t he charged crime involved “great violence and great bodily harm,” the crime demonstrated Rebosio “engaged in violen t conduct that indicates a serious danger to society,” his “prior convictions as an adult are becoming numerous and of increasing seriousness,” Rebosio’s “performance on probation was unsatisfactory,” and the victim “was particularly vulnerable.” Although S.B. 567 permits a trial court to impose an aggravated sentence based on a defendant’s prior convictions evidenced by certified records of conviction, here, the trial court’s aggravated findings included, not only Rebosio’s prior conviction for
residential burglary, but also various other aggravating factors that were not tried, found true beyond a reasonable doubt , or stipulated to by the defendant , as required under S.B. 567

. Therefore, Rebosio is entitled to reversal of his sentence a nd re sentencing upo n remand, in accordance with Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b), as amended by
S.B. 567.
V. DEJAGER’S APPEAL
A. Sufficiency of Evidence of Aiding and Abetting DeJager contends there was insufficient evidence he aided and abetted Rebosio in committing the offense of hit and run resulting in death, in violation of Vehicle Code section 20001, subd ivision (b)(2)

. We disagree.33

1. Applicable Law Under Penal Code section 31, “All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, .

. . whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, .

. . are principals in any crime so committed.” “ Thus, a person who aids and abets a crime is guilty of that crime even if someone else committed some or all of the criminal acts.” ( People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 111 7.) An aider and abettor ’ s guilt for the intended crime “ is based on a combination of the direct perpetrator ’ s acts and the aider and abettor ’ s ow n acts and ow n mental state. ” ( Ibid .)

“ [A] person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she, acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator;

. . . (2) the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, [ and ] (3) by ac t or advice aids, promotes, encourages, or instigates, the commission of the crime.” ( People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 561; accord, People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 630.) DeJager was tried for committing the crime of hit and run resulting in death , as an aider and abettor , in violation of Vehicle Code section 20001

. Subdivision (a) of section 20001 provides: “The driver of a vehicle involved in any accident resulting in injury to a person, other than himself or herself, .

. . shall immedi ately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident and shall fulfill the requirements of Sections 20003.

. . .” Section 20003 requires the driver to stop and provide certain personal information to the other driver and34

to police officers at the scene of the accident. In addition, the driver is required to render reasonable assistance to any person who is injured. ( Veh. Code, § 20003.) “[I]n order to convict a driver of a vehicle of felony hit

- and

- run driving it is essential that the driver knows that an accident has occurred [citations], knows that he was involved in the accident [citations], and knowingly leaves the scene of the accident either with knowledge that the accident resulted in injury or with knowledge that the accident was of such a n ature that one would reasonably anticipate that the accident resulted in injury to another [citations].” ( People v. Hamilton (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 124, 132.)

“ In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record in the light most favor able to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] Reversal on this ground is

unwar ranted unless it appears ‘ that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction]. ’ ” ( People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331 ; see People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357 .) If the circumstances

reason ably justify the trier of fact ’ s findings, th is court’s conclusion that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment. ( People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 96 1.)35

2. Analysis DeJager does not dispute that Rebosio was the driver of the black Mustang, that Rebosio knew that an accident had occurred , that Rebosio was involved in the accident, and that he knew that the accident resulted in injury to others or knew that it was probable that it resulted in injury. However, DeJager argues there was insufficient evidence he aided and abetted Rebosio in committing the hit and run offense because it was completed before DeJager arrived at the accident scene

. DeJager asserts that the hit and run offense was completed when Rebosio walked away from the accident scene before DeJager arrived. There is substantial evidence to the contrary. Evidence that the hit and run crime offense was incomplete when DeJager arrived

at the accident scene include s testimony Rebosio had not yet le ft or fled from the accident

scene. CHP Officer Varga s testi fied that the collision occurred on Highway 58, in the middle of “open desert. ” Officer Vargas further stated that at the scene of the accident, it was dark. There was no lighting other than the patrol vehicle lights. This evidence demonstrate d it was not reasonably feasible for Rebosio to leave the accident scene without the assistance of someone with a vehicle.
R.S. , who was DeJager ’s friend and a passenger in DeJager ’s car, testified that DeJager picked up Rebosio in the middle of the accident scene. When DeJager arrived at the scene, he and DeJager saw Rebosio’s damaged car and anothe r car that had crashed , and then saw Rebosio “walking around like he was hurt from the accident.” He was limping. J.S. testified he noticed Rebosio was bloody, staggering, and mumbling near the36

black Mustang

. J.S. then saw Rebosio suddenly, amid the “ch aos,” get into a car, which drove away. As Rebosio was leaving in DeJager ’s car, J.S. heard other witnesses yell, “Hey, he’s getting away.” D.N. , who saw the vehicle collision and stopped to provide assistance, testified that right after the accident Rebosio got out of the black Mustang , asked others for a flashlight, and then immediately asked D.N. to “give him a ride to another waiting car.” D. N. refused and told Rebosio to wait for the CHP to arrive. D.N.

t hen saw DeJager pull up in his grey Mustang , Rebosio got in , and t hey drove straight to Las Vegas. This evidence as a whole support s a reasonable finding that the hit and run offense

was n ot completed until Rebosio fled in DeJager ’s car. Up until that point, Rebosio
remained at the accident site . It would have been extremely difficult and unlikely he would have left on his own because it was 1:20 a.m. , it was dark, the accident scene was in the middle of the desert, Rebosio was limping, he was alone, and his car was not operating . N o one offered him a ride, until DeJager arrived and assisted Rebosio in fleeing from the accident scene. DeJager alternat ively argues there was insufficient evidence he aided and abetted Rebosio in committing the hit and run offense because there was no evidence DeJager committed the requisite actus reus of encourag ing or otherwise persuad ing Rebosio to leave the accident sc ene. We disagree.
P roof of aider and abettor liability requires proof of “ conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the crime. ” ( People v. Perez (2005) 3537

Cal.4th 1219, 1225 ; see People v. McCoy , supra , 25 Cal.4th at p. 1117 .) The actus reus of an aider and abettor can be established by evidence of an act or advice that “ aids, promotes, encourages, or instigates, the commission of the crime.” ( People v. Beeman , supra , 35 Cal.3d at p. 561; accord, People v. P rettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 259 ; People v. Johnson , supra , 62 Cal.4th at p. 630.) Here, there was substantial evidence of DeJager assisting Rebosio in committing the hit and run offense by picking him up at the accident scene and immediately dr iving off with Rebosio to Las Vegas

. In People v. Holford (1965) 63 Cal.2d 74, the court discussed aiding and abetting liability . T he defendant in Holford caused a vehicle collision and was convic ted of hit and run . H is passenger encouraged the Holford defendant to leave the accident scene

. The court in Holford concluded that the passenger was a principal and accomplice in the commission of the hit and run offense because he “encouraged the defen dant to leave the scene of the accident” and he had “acquired the same knowledge concerning the nature of the accident as did defendant.” ( Id

. at p. 81.) DeJager argues Holford is distinguishable because DeJager was neither the driver nor passenger in the vehicle involved in the accident and there was no evidence he took any affirmative action to encourage or persuade Rebosio to leave the accident scene. Even though the Holford facts are distinguishable, Holford is instructive in explaining aider and abettor principles applicable in the instant case. In Holford , the court explained that “ Penal Code section 31 provides that those ‘ concerned in the commission of a crime ’ constitute principals ‘ whether they directly commit the act constituting the offens e, or aid38

and abet in its commission, or, not being present, have advised and encouraged its commission. .

. . ’ The person who advises and encourages the commission of the crime while present at its perpetration surely falls within the definition of a pri ncipal. ” ( Holford , supra , 63 Cal.2d at p. 81.) This includes “ a passenger who advises and encourages the driver to leave the scene of the accident, knowing that someone has been injured. ” ( Holford , supra , 63 Cal.2d at p. 82.) Here, unlike in Holford , su pra , 63 Cal.2d 74 , DeJager was not the driver of the black Mustang that caused the deadly automobile collision and was not present during the collision. H e arrived during the immediate aftermath, during which he assisted Rebosio in unlawfully fle eing from the accident scene

. DeJager argues there is no evidence he said anything advising or encouraging Rebosio to flee from the accident scene. Even if there was no evidence of this , evidence of DeJager ’s actions was more than suffici ent to support DeJager ’s hit and run conviction based on aiding and abetting. There was evidence DeJager assisted Rebosio by picking him up at the accident scene right after the collision and dr iving him directly to Las Vegas, knowing that Rebosio was inv olved in the accident and therefore should have remained at the scene to assist the injured , provide his personal information, and report the accident to law enforcement

. W e therefore conclude there was substantial evidence to support DeJager ’s conviction as an aider and abettor of Rebosio ’s hit and run offense

.39

B. Admissibility of Evidence of the Las Vegas Stop and Car Theft DeJager contends the trial court abused its discretion by allowing evidence of the Las Vegas traffic stop and evidence of Rebosio ’s theft of the black Mustang. We disagree. The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether evidence is relevan t

. ( People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 63 4.) Even if the evidence is relevant, the trial court has the discretion to exclude it under Evidence Code section 352 . Th is statute provides that “[t] he court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability th at its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. ” (Evid. Code, § 352.) A trial court ’ s discretionary evidentiary ruling under this stat ute shall not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a showing of a manifest miscarriage of justice. ( People v. Williams , supra , at pp. 63 4

- 635 .)

1. Evidence of the Las Vegas Traffic Stop DeJager filed a motion in limine requ esting the court to exclude evidence of the Las Vegas traffic stop. T he trial court denied the motion, rul ing the traffic stop evidence was admissible. The court found that under Evidence Code section 352, the probative value of the traffic stop evidence outweighed its prej udice. The traffic stop evidence included evidence that Officer Rohr pulled over DeJager in Las Vegas at 3:30 a.m. , a little over two hours after the deadly accident involving Rebosio’s black Mustang. DeJager ’s grey Mustang appeared to be street racing on Las40

Vegas Boulevard. During the traffic stop, Officer Rohr smelled marijuana and alcohol in the car. Rebosio and R.S. were passengers in DeJager ’s grey Mustang. Officer Rohr noticed Rebosio had blood on him. Rebosio gave Officer Rohr a false name and said his injuries were from falling down

. Officer Rohr cited DeJager for not carrying proof of car insurance and then released him and his two passengers. The trial court admitted the traffic stop evidence over DeJager ’s objection, finding that the traffic stop evidence was relevant, admissible evidence. The Las Vegas traffic stop evidence was relevant to show that, even though Rebosio was legally required to report his involvement in the deadly accident and had an additional the opportunity to do so during the Las Vegas traffic stop, he intended to conceal his involvement . The evidence was also relevant to show DeJager assisted Rebosio in fleeing from the accident scene in violation of Vehicle Code sections 20001 and 20003. The traffic stop evidence further demonstrate s Rebosio ’s consciousness of guilt and DeJager ’s guilt , based on aiding and abetting Rebosio in committing the hit and run offense . The evidence show s that Rebosio attempted to avoid law enforcement discover ing his involvement in the accident by giving Officer Rohr a false name and lying to the officer about how he was injur ed

. T here is also evidence that Officer Rohr interviewed DeJager and Rebosio separately and they both came up with the same false story and same false name for Rebosio. This suggests DeJager and Rebosio planned beforehand what they would say if stopped by law enforcement.41

DeJager argues that even if the evidence of the traffic stop was relevant, it should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352 because its highly prejudicial effect far outweighed any probative value

. We disagree. The traffic stop evidence of
R e bosio fleeing the accident scene in DeJager ’s car, DeJager driving straight to Las Vegas, Rebosio not disclosing to Officer Rohr that he had recently been in the acci dent, and Rebosio giving Officer Rohr a false name and lying about how he received his injuries was highly probative

. T he probative value of the traffic stop evide n ce outweigh ed any prejudice, which was minimal

. F urthermore, any error in allowing the traffic stop evidence does not constitute prejudicial error. It is not reasonably probable the defendants would have reached a more favorable outcome had the traffic stop evidence been excluded. ( People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 671; People v.
Wat son , supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 .)
2. Evidence of Theft of the Black Mustang
Over DeJager ’s objection, the trial court permitted evidence that Rebosio stole the black Mustang he was driving during the accident

. The court instructed the jury that it could only consider the evidence if the prosecution proved that Rebosio committed the vehicle theft. The jury was instructed that, i f the prosecution did not meet its burden of proving the offense, the jury must disregard the evidence. If the jury found Rebosio committed the vehicle theft, the jury could consider the evidence for the limited purposed of deciding whether (1) Rebosio was the person who committed the charged offenses of gross vehicular manslaughter and hit and run resulting in death or (2) Rebosio had a42

motive to commit the hit and run offense. The court further instructed the jury not to consider the evidence for any other purpose and not to conclude from the evidence that Rebosio has a bad character or is disposed to commit crime. The tri al court also instructed that if the jury concluded Rebosio committed the vehicle theft, that conclusion was only one factor to consider along with the other evidence and was not sufficient alone to prove either of the charged offenses. (CALCRIM No. 375.) DeJager contends that evidence that Rebosio stole the black Mustang 2 should have been excluded under Evidence section 352 because it was highly prejudicial and of little probative value. DeJager argues that the fact that the black Mustang was a stolen v ehicle was irrelevant to the charges of gross vehicular manslaughter and hit and run resulting in death. DeJager asserts that the evidence was prejudicial because it indicated that Rebosio was of bad character because he was a car thief , and DeJager was a lso of bad character, by his association with Rebosio. Although the vehicle theft evidence disclosed that Rebosio was a vehicle thief , it was relevant to the charges. It support s a finding that Rebosio was the driver of the black Mustang involved in the a ccident. DeJager argues that the evidence was unnecessary to establish this fact. However, Rebosio disputed that he was the driver of the black

2 DeJager stat es in his motion in limine and appellant’s opening brief (AOB) that the stolen vehicle driven by Rebosio was grey. This appears to be stated in error. Substantial evidence establishes that the stolen vehicle Rebosio was driving was a black Mustang. DeJa ger drove a grey Mustang.43

Mustang. During closing argument, his attorney argued the prosecution had failed to prove that he was the dri ver of the black Mustang at the time of the accident. Rebosio maintained that the evidence supported a finding that R.S. , not Rebosio, was the driver. The vehicle theft evidence also was relevant to Rebosio’s motive to commit the hit and
run offense. Th e jury could reasonably infer from the evidence that Rebosio fled the accident scene to avoid being apprehended for the theft of the black Mustang. In addition , any prejudice from allowing the evidence was minimized by the trial court instructing the jury to consider the evidence only for the limited purpose of determining motive and intent, and only if the jury found that the prosecution had proven that Rebosio had committed the vehicle theft. It is pr esumed the jury followed th ese instruction s . ( People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 487; People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852.)
V I

. CUMULATIVE ERROR Rebosio and DeJager contend that, even if the asserted errors were not individually prejudicia l, their cumulative effect constitutes reversible prejudicial error. We disagree. A predicate to a claim of cumulative error is a finding of multiple errors, which when considered collectively, are prejudicial. ( People v Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 499; People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 911.) Because we conclude there was no error, we reject defendants’ contention there was cumulative error. ( People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1235

- 1236.)44 VI I

. DISPOSITION Rebosio’s sentence is vacated and this case is remanded for resentencing of Rebosio consistent with S.B. 567

. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed as to both Rebosio and DeJager

. Following Rebosio’s resentencing, the trial court shall forward an amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON J.
We concur:

McKINSTER Acting P. J.

MILLER J.