MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2020 ME	140

Docket: Ken-20-138

Argued:	 October	6,	2020

Decided: December	22,	2020

Panel: MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HUMPHREY,	HORTON,	and	CONNORS,	JJ.

PAT	DOE1

v.

CHRISTOPHER	HILLS-PETTITT

HUMPHREY,	J.

[¶1]	 Pat	 Doe appeals	 from	 a	 judgment	 entered	 in	 the	 District	 Court	

(Augusta,	Nale,	J.)	dismissing	with	prejudice	a	complaint for	protection	 from	

abuse that	 she	 brought	 on	 behalf	 of	 her	 three minor	 children	 against	 their	

father, Christopher	Hills-Pettitt.		Doe contends	that	the	court	erred	or	abused	

its	discretion	in	dismissing	her	complaint	with	prejudice instead	of	granting	her	

oral	 motion	 to	 voluntarily	 dismiss	 the	 complaint	 without	 prejudice. We	

conclude,	 contrary	 to	 the	 court’s	 determination, that	 due	 process	 did	 not	

 1 In	accordance	with	the	Violence	Against	Women	Act,	18	U.S.C.S.	§	2265(d)(3)	(LEXIS	through	

Pub.	L.	No.	116-214),	we	have	employed	the	pseudonym	“Pat	Doe”	for	the	plaintiff.		The	individual	

who	filed	the	complaint	and	initially	appeared	on	behalf	of	the	children	died	during	the	course	of	this	

appeal,	and	we	granted	a	request	to	allow	the	trial	court	to	order	the	substitution	of	a	person	who	is	

now	responsible	for	the	children.		See	19-A	M.R.S.	§	4005(1)	(2020);	22 M.R.S.	§	4002(9)	(2020). On	

November	23,	2020,	the	trial	court	ordered	that	substitution,	and	we	employ	the	pseudonym	“Pat	

Doe”	interchangeably	to	refer	to	both	individuals	who	have	appeared	as	plaintiffs	in	this	case.
2

require	the	court	to	dismiss	the	matter	with	prejudice and	we	therefore	vacate	

the	judgment	and	remand	for	further	proceedings consistent	with	this	opinion.		

I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]	 	 On	 February	 19,	 2020,	 pursuant	 to	 19-A	 M.R.S.	 §§	 4001-4014	

(2020),	 Doe filed	 a	 complaint	 for	 protection	 from	 abuse	 on	 behalf	 of the

children, alleging that	Christopher	was	sexually	abusing	two	of	them.		The	court	

granted	 a	 temporary	 order	 for	 protection	 from	 abuse	 and	 scheduled	 a	 final	

hearing	for	March	9,	2020.	 See	19-A	M.R.S.	§ 4006.		

[¶3]		After	the	court	entered	 the	 temporary	 order and	before	 the	 final	

hearing,	Christopher	was	arrested	and	charged	with	unlawful	sexual	contact.		

See 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 255-A	 (2020).	 Christopher’s	 bail	 conditions	 prohibited	

contact	 between	 Christopher	 and	 the	 children.2	 	 Both	 parties	 and	 their	

attorneys	 attended	 the	 March	 9	 hearing, but	Doe did	 not	 bring	 the	 children	

whose	reports	served as	the	basis	of	the	complaint.		At	the	outset,	Doe orally	

moved	to	dismiss	the	complaint	without	prejudice,	citing	the	need to	spare	the

children	 the	 trauma	 of	 testifying given	 that Christopher’s	 bail	 conditions	

protected them	by	prohibiting any	contact	between	him	and the children.		The	

 2		Pursuant	to	M.R.	Evid.	201,	we	take	judicial	notice	of	the	bail	conditions, which prohibit	any	

contact	between	Christopher	and	the	children.		See,	e.g., Guardianship	of	Jewel	M.,	2010	ME	80,	¶	24,	

2	A.3d	301	(noting	that	a	court	may	take	judicial	notice	of	docket	records	in	other	cases).		
3

court	 responded	 that	 it	 was	 going to	 either	 hold	 a final	 hearing	 that	 day	 or	

dismiss	the complaint	with	prejudice.		The	court	allowed	the	parties	to	confer

briefly	before	Doe renewed	her	oral	request.		The	court	denied	Doe’s	motion

and	entered	an	order	dismissing	the	case	with	prejudice.		

[¶4]		On	March	13,	2020,	pursuant	to	M.R.	Civ.	P.	52(a),	Doe moved	for	

further	 findings	 of	 fact	 and	 conclusions	 of	 law,	 arguing that	 the	 court	 was	

required	 to	allow	 the	voluntary	dismissal	of	 the	complaint	without	prejudice	

pursuant	 to	 M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 41(a)(1),	 and	 further	 requesting	 that	 the	 court	 find	

additional facts	to	support its	decision	to	dismiss	the	complaint	with	prejudice.		

In	an	order	denying	that	motion,	the	court	stated	that	Christopher	“was	entitled	

to	have	the	matter	adjudicated	on	the	day	the	trial	was	scheduled.		[Doe]	did	

not	request	a	continuance.		The	court	did	not	intend	this	dismissal	to	act	as	a	

sanction	upon	[Doe] but	a	rendering	of	due	process.”		Doe timely	appealed.		See	

19-A	M.R.S.	§	104	(2020);	M.R.	App.	P.	2A,	2B(c)(1),	(2)(B).		

II.		DISCUSSION

A. M.R.	Civ.	P. 41(a)(1)—Voluntary	Dismissal	by	Plaintiff

[¶5]		Doe argues	that	the	court	misapplied	M.R.	Civ.	P.	41(a)(1)	when	it	

dismissed	her	complaint	with	prejudice.		We	review	the	court’s	interpretation	
4

of	the	Maine	Rules	of	Civil	Procedure3 de	novo	“and	look	to	the	plain	language	

of	the	rules	to	determine	their	meaning.”		Kline	v.	Burdin,	2017	ME	194,	¶	7,	170	

A.3d	282 (quotation	marks	omitted).		

[¶6]	 	 Rule	 41(a)(1)4 provides	 that	 a plaintiff	 may	 dismiss	 an action

without	a	court	order by	filing	either	a	notice	of	dismissal—if	the	defendant	has	

not	served	an	answer	or	a	motion	for	summary	judgment5—or	a	stipulation	of	

dismissal	signed	by	all	of	the	parties.	 “Unless	otherwise	stated	in	the	notice	of	

dismissal	or	stipulation,	the	dismissal	is	without	prejudice.” M.R.	Civ.	P.	41(a)(1)

(emphasis	added).		Thus,	the	plain	language	of	the	Rule	permits a	plaintiff	to	

specify	whether	or	not	the	dismissal	is	with	prejudice. See	e.g.,	In	re	Kaleb	D.,	

 3	 	 Pursuant	 to	 19-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 4010(1) (2020),	 the	 Maine	 Rules	 of	 Civil	 Procedure	 apply	 to	 all	

proceedings	brought	under	the	chapter	governing	complaints	 for	protection	 from	abuse.		See	also	

Shaw	v.	Packard,	2005	ME	122,	¶	9,	886	A.2d	1287.		

4		Rule	41(a)(1)	was	amended	in	1989	to	allow	a	plaintiff	to	dismiss	an	action	voluntarily	only	

before	 the	defendant	served	an	answer	or	a	motion	 for	summary	judgment.		M.R.	Civ.	P.	41(a)(1)	

Advisory	Committee’s	Notes	1989.

5 Maine’s	protection	from	abuse	law	does	not	affirmatively	require	a	defendant	to	file	an	answer	

or	 permit	 the	 defendant	 to	 file	 a	 motion	 for	 summary	 judgment.	 See	 19-A	M.R.S.	 §§	 4001-4014	

(2020).		Similarly,	the	Judicial Branch’s	Guide	to	Protection	from	Abuse	and	Harassment	Cases	notes	

that	the	defendant	is	not	required	to	submit	a	written	response	to	the	plaintiff’s	complaint.		Maine	

Judicial	Branch, Administrative	Office	of	the	Courts, A	Guide	to	Protection	from	Abuse	&	Harassment	

Cases 10	(June	2018), https://www.courts.maine.gov/help/guides/pa-ph-guide.pdf.		Importation	of	

summary	judgment	practice	would	entirely	defeat	the	purpose	of	what	is	supposed	to	be	a	system	

that	allows	“victims	of	domestic	abuse	to	obtain	expeditious	and	effective	protection	against	further	

abuse	 so	 that	 the	 lives	 of	 the	 nonabusing	 family	 or	 household	 members	 are	 as	 secure	 and	

uninterrupted	as	possible.”		19-A	M.R.S.	§	4001(2).		We	have	already	noted	that	Rule	56(a)	does	not	

authorize	the	use	of	summary	judgment	process	in	family	law	matters,	Higgins	v.	Wood,	2018	ME	88,	

¶	 8,	 189	 A.3d	 724,	 and	 take	 this	 opportunity	 to	 instruct	 litigants	 and	 the	 District	 Court	that	 the	

process	is	not	authorized	in	actions	for	protection	from	abuse	or	harassment.		
5

2001	ME	55,	¶	3	n.4,	769	A.2d	179 (“Because	there	was	no	stipulation	among	

the	 parties	 indicating	 otherwise	 and	 because	 the	 dismissal	 was	 silent	 as	 to	

whether	 it	 was	 with	 or	 without	 prejudice,	 the	 dismissal	 in	 this	 case	 did	 not	

operate	as	an	adjudication	on	the	merits.”).		

[¶7]	 	However,	to	 avail	 herself	 of	 Rule	 41(a)(1),	 a	 plaintiff	 must	file a	

written notice	of	the	dismissal	with	the	court	or	a	stipulation	of	dismissalsigned

by	all	parties.		See	M.R.	Civ.	P.	41	Advisory	Committee’s	Notes	1989	(stating	that	

the	1989	amendment	adopts	the	language	of	Federal	Rule	41(a)(1));	8	James	

W.	Moore et	al., Moore’s	Federal	Practice	§	41.33(4)(a)	(3d	ed.	2007) (noting	

that	 oral	 notice	 is	 insufficient	 for	 a	 plaintiff	 to	 voluntarily	 dismiss	 an	 action	

pursuant	 to	 Fed. R.	 Civ.	 P.	 41(a)(1)).	 	 Here,	the	 defendant	 did	 not	 serve	 an	

answer	or	a	motion	 for	summary	judgment	and	Doe orally	moved	 to	dismiss	

her	complaint.		Thus,	in	the	absence	of	a	written notice or	signed	stipulation,	

Doe	could	not	implement	 the	provisions	of	Rule	41(a)(1)	that	allowed	her to	

specify	that	the	dismissal	was without	prejudice.	

B. M.R.	Civ.	P.	41(a)(2)—Voluntary	Dismissal	by	Order	of	the	Court

[¶8]	 	 Next,	 we	 examine whether	 the	 court	 abused	 its	 discretion	 in	

dismissing	the	case	with	prejudice.		M.R.	Civ.	P. 41(a)(2) provides	that	a	court	

may dismiss	 a	 case	 “upon	 such	 terms	 and	 conditions	 as	 the	 court	 deems	
6

proper,” and	we	have	recognized	that	this	language	grants	a	court	“discretion	

to	dismiss	a	case	with	or	without	prejudice,” Green	Tree	Servicing,	LLC	v.	Cope,	

2017	ME	68,	¶	16,	158	A.3d	931.		Thus,	unlike	Rule	41(a)(1),	which	allows	the	

plaintiff	 to	 decide	 whether	 the	 dismissal	 is	 with	 or	 without	 prejudice,	 Rule	

41(a)(2)	gives	this	discretion	to	the	court.		We	review	a	court’s	dismissal	with	

prejudice	for	an	abuse	of	discretion.		U.S.	Bank	Nat’l	Ass’n v.	Curit,	2016	ME	17,	

¶	10,	131	A.3d	903.		In	doing	so,	we	evaluate	“(1)	whether	the	court’s	factual	

findings	are	supported	by	the	record	according	to	the	clear	error	standard,	(2)	

whether	 the	 court	 understood	 the	 law	 applicable	 to	 the	 exercise	 of	 its	

discretion,	 and	 (3)	 whether	 the	 court’s	 weighing	 of	 the	 applicable	 facts	 and	

choices	was	within	the	bounds	of	reasonableness.”		Green	Tree	Servicing, LLC,

2017	 ME	 68,	 ¶	 12,	 158	 A.3d	 931.	 	 Here,	 because	 the	 court	 concluded	 that	

Christopher’s	due	process	rights precluded	it	from	exercising	its	discretion,

6 we	

begin	by	addressing	the	court’s	understanding	of	the	law, which	requires	us	to	

determine “the	parameters	of	the	court’s	authority—a	matter	that	we	review	

de	novo.”		Id.;	see	also	State	v.	Mason,	408 A.2d	1269,	1272	(Me.	1979)	(noting	

that	where “the	presiding	Justice	does	not	exercise	judicial	discretion	when	he	

 6		The	court	was	unequivocal	that	it	did	not	intend	the	dismissal	with	prejudice	“to	act	as	a	sanction	

upon	[Doe].”		Instead,	the	court	reasoned	that	due	process	required it	to	dismiss	the	complaint	with	

prejudice	because	Christopher	“was	entitled	to	have	the	matter	adjudicated	on	the	day	the	trial	was	

scheduled.”		
7

is	authorized	to	do	so,	his	ruling	is	based	upon	a	misconception	of	the	applicable	

law”).		

1. Procedural	Due	Process

[¶9]		Doe argues	that	the	court	erred	in	concluding	that	if	no	hearing	was	

held	on	March	9,	2020,	due	process	required	the court	to	dismiss	the complaint	

with	 prejudice.	 	 Christopher	 contends that	 because	 19-A	 M.R.S.	 § 4006(1)	

requires	a	hearing	within	twenty-one	days	after the	filing	of	the	complaint,	due	

process	dictates	that	the	matter	either be	adjudicated	on	that	exact date or	be	

dismissed	with	prejudice.		

[¶10]		We	review	this	issue	of	procedural	due	process	de	novo.		State	v.	

Jones,	2012	ME	126,	¶	35,	55	A.3d	432.		The	due	process	clause	of	the	Maine	

Constitution	echoes	its	federal	counterpart:“No	person	shall	be	deprived	of	life,	

liberty	or	property	without	due	process	of	law.”		Me.	Const.	art.	 I,	§	6-A;	U.S.	

Const.	 amend.	 XIV,	 §	 1;	see	 also	 Green	 v.	 Comm’r	 of	 Mental	 Health	 &	 Mental	

Retardation,	2000	ME	92,	¶	21	n.4,	750	A.2d	1265.		

[¶11]		In	determining whether	a	person	has	been	deprived	of	a	protected	

interest	without	due	process	of	law,	we	employ	two	steps.		“First,	we	determine	

if	the	government	has	deprived	a	claimant	of	life,	liberty,	or	property	interests.		

Second,	 if	 such	 deprivation	 occurred,	 we	 then	 determine	 what	 process,	
8

pursuant	to	the	Fourteenth	Amendment,	is	due	utilizing	the	factors	in	Mathews	

v.	Eldridge,	424	U.S.	319,	96	S.	Ct.	893,	47	L.	Ed.	2d	18	(1976).”		DaimlerChrysler	

Corp.	v.	Exec.	Dir.,	Me.	Revenue	Serv.,	2007	ME	62,	¶	26,	922	A.2d	465 (citation	

omitted).		Those	factors	are	as	follows:

First,	the	private	interest	that	will	be	affected	by	the	official	action;	

second,	 the	 risk	 of	 an	 erroneous	 deprivation	 of	 such	 interest	

through	 the	 procedures	 used,	 and	 the	 probable	 value,	 if	 any,	 of

additional	 or	 substitute	 procedural	 safeguards;	 and	 finally,	 the	

Government’s	 interest,	 including	 the	 function	 involved	 and	 the	

fiscal	and	administrative	burdens	that	the	additional	or	substitute	

procedural	requirement	would	entail.

In	re	A.M.,	2012	ME	118,	¶	15,	55	A.3d	463	(quoting	Mathews,	424	U.S.	at	335).		

[¶12]		Pursuant	to	this	framework,	we	must	first	determine	whether	any	

of	Christopher’s constitutionally	protected interests would have	been affected	

had	the	court	dismissed	Doe’s complaint	without, rather	than	with, prejudice.		

A	 parent’s right to	 make	 decisions	 concerning	 the	 care	 and	 custody	 of	 his

children	 is	 a	 fundamental	 liberty	 interest	 that	 is undoubtedly	 at	 stake in	 an	

action	like	 this	 for protection	 from	abuse. See	Rideout	v.	Riendeau, 2000	ME	

198,	¶ 18,	761	A.2d	291. However,	that interest	is not	implicated	by	a court’s	

dismissal of	an	action	 for protection	from	abuse	because	a	dismissal	with	 or	

without	prejudice	can	actually	restore	the parental	rights of	the	defendant by	

terminating	the	court’s	temporary	protection	order.		See	19-A	M.R.S.	§	4006(2).		
9

In	 short,	a dismissal	without	 prejudice	would	not	deprive	Christopher	 of	his	

parental	 rights	 without	 due	 process	 of	 law. Neither	 the	 trial	 court	 nor	

Christopher	identified	any	legal	authority	to	support	the	proposition	that there	

is	 a	 protected	 liberty	 interest	 in	 being	 shielded	 from	 future	 litigation	 on a	

complaint	 for	 protection	 from	 abuse	 when	the	 plaintiff	 seeks	to	 dismiss	 an	

initial	complaint.7 Because,	in	 the	context	 of	 this	case,	 there	is	no	protected	

interest	that	inoculates	Christopher	from	a	future	civil	complaint	arising	from	

facts	 that	 have	 not previously been	 developed	 at	 trial,	 there	 can	 be no	

procedural	due	process	violation.8		See DaimlerChrysler	Corp.,	2007	ME	62,	¶ 26,	

922	A.2d	465.

 7 To	the	extent	that	we	have	opined	on	the	procedural	safeguards	surrounding	a	dismissal	with	

prejudice, we	 have	 focused	 on	 the	importance	 of	 the	 court	 or	 the	 opposing	 party	 providing	 “the	

plaintiff with	adequate	notice	that	such	a	result	will	be	considered.”		Green	Tree	Servicing,	LLC v.	Cope,	

2017	ME	68,	¶	20,	158	A.3d	931	(emphasis	added).

8		Even	if	we	were	to	conclude	that	Christopher	had	a	protected	interest	in	not	being	subjected	to	

future	litigation	about	Doe’s	allegations,	we	note	that	“the	State	has	a	compelling	interest	in	limiting,	

restricting,	or	even	terminating	a	parent’s	rights	when	harm	to	the	child	will	result	from	the	absence	

of	such	governmental	interference,”	In	re	Children	of	Bethmarie	R.,	2018	ME	96,	¶	23,	189	A.3d	252	

(quoting	Pitts	v.	Moore,	2014	ME	59,	¶	14,	90	A.3d	1169),	and	that	“[t]he	Due	Process	Clause	is	not	an	

impenetrable	wall	behind	which	parents	may	shield	their	children;	rather,	it	provides	heightened	

protection	against	state	intervention	in	parents’	fundamental	right	to	make	decisions	concerning	the	

care,	custody,	and	control	of	their	children,”	Rideout v.	Riendeau,	2000	ME	198,	¶	19,	761	A.2d	291.

Moreover,	contrary	to the	court’s conclusion that	Christopher’s	due	process	rights	entitled	him	to	

have	the	complaint	“adjudicated	on	the	day	the	trial	was	scheduled,”	it	is	well	settled	that	there	is	no	

due	process property	 right	in	a	procedure	itself.		See	Gregory	v.	Town	 of	Pittsfield,	479 A.2d 1304,	

1308	 (Me.	 1984)	 (holding	 that	 the	 failure	 to	 follow	 statutorily	 prescribed	 procedures	 was	 not	 a	

violation	of	due	process	because	there	is	“no	property	interest	in	statutory	procedures	themselves”);

Botting	v.	Dep’t	of	Behav.	&	Dev.	Servs.,	2003	ME	152,	¶	23,	838	A.2d	1168	(holding	that	“[t]he	interest	

in	procedure	itself	is	not	an	interest	protected	by	the	Fourteenth	Amendment”).		As	we	have	held,	in	

an	action	 for	protection	 from	abuse,	“the	court	has	 the	discretion,	 for	good	cause,	 to	schedule	 the	
10

[¶13]		Furthermore,	Christopher’s	contention	that	his	due	process	rights	

are	“inextricably	tied” to	a hearing,	see 19-A	M.R.S.	§	4006(1), is	accurate	but	

misapplied.		See	Sparks v.	Sparks,	2013	ME	41,	¶	28,	65	A.3d	1223.		Christopher	

would still	be	afforded	an	opportunity	to	be	heard	and	present	evidence	if	Doe

files	 a	 second	 complaint, and	 we	 have	 held	 that,	 if	 followed	 correctly,	 the	

procedures	 in	 actions	 for	 protection	 from	 abuse	 adequately	 protect	 a	

defendant’s	 procedural	 due	 process	 rights.	 	 See id.	 at	 ¶	 29	 (holding	 that	

“[b]ecause	 the	 father	was	actually	present	at	and	participated	in	 the	hearing	

and	 was	 able	 to	 present	 evidence	 concerning	 a	 possible	 award	 of	 parental	

rights	to	[the	mother],	he	received	ample	due	process”).		We	conclude	that	the	

court	erred	as	a	matter	of	law	when	it	determined	that	due	process	and	19-A	

M.R.S.	§	4006(1)	required	it	to	either	hold the	March	9	hearing	as	scheduled or

dismiss	the	complaint	with	prejudice and	that,	pursuant	to	M.R.	Civ.	P.	41(a)(2),

the	 court	 retained	 the	 authority	 and	 discretion	 to	 dismiss	 Doe’s	 complaint	

without	prejudice.

9		

 

hearing	for	a	date	later	than	twenty-one	days	after	the	filing	of	the	complaint,	even	over	the	objection	

of	one	of	the	parties.”		Connolly	v.	Connolly,	2006	ME	17,	¶	5,	892	A.2d	465	(citing	to	Shaw	v.	Packard,	

2005	ME	122,	¶	11,	886	A.2d	1287);	see	also Hayes	v.	Hayes,	2009	ME	31,	¶	6,	967	A.2d	725.

9		To	the	extent	that	Christopher	argues	that	allowing	the	court	to	dismiss	Doe’s	complaint	without	

prejudice	would	permit	other	plaintiffs	to	misuse	the	statutes	governing	actions	for	protection	from	

abuse	through	multiple	refilings	and	dismissals,	we	note	that	M.R.	Civ.	P	41(a)(1)	allows	only	one	

voluntary	dismissal	before	the	second	dismissal	acts	as	an	adjudication	on	the	merits.		See	M.R.	Civ. P.	

41(a)(1)	(“[A]	notice	of	dismissal	operates	as	an	adjudication	upon	the	merits	when	filed	by	a	plaintiff	
11

2. Court’s Exercise	of	Discretion

[¶14]	 	Because	 the	 court	 erred	 by	 concluding	that	 it	 did	 not	 have	 the	

discretion	to	grant	Doe’s	motion,	we	vacate	the	order	dismissing	the	complaint	

with	 prejudice	 and	 remand	 for	 further	 proceedings	 consistent	 with	 this	

opinion.	C.f.	Green	Tree	Servicing,	LLC,	2017	ME	68,	¶	23,	158	A.3d	931 (vacating	

the	 order	 and	 remanding	 the	 case	 for	 further	 proceedings	 because	 the	

plaintiff’s	 lack	 of	 standing	 did	 not	 preclude	 the	 court	 from	 exercising	 its	

discretion	pursuant	to	M.R.	Civ.	P.	41(a)(2));	see	also	State	v.	Mason,	408	A.2d	

1269,	 1273	(Me.	 1979)	(vacating	 the	 judgment	 and	 remanding	 the	 case	 for	

further	 proceedings	 because	 the	 defendant	 was	 entitled	 “to	 have	 the	 trial	

Justice	exercise	his	discretion	under	Rule	16(d)”).

[¶15]		On	remand,	the	court	should	consider	that	pursuant	to	19-A	M.R.S.	

§	 4001(2),	 courts	 must	 liberally	 construe	 the	 statutes	 governing	 protection	

from	 abuse	 to	 protect	 victims	 of	 domestic	 abuse	 by	 “allow[ing]	 family	 and	

household	members	who	are	victims	of	domestic	abuse	to	obtain	expeditious	

and	 effective	 protection	 against	 further	 abuse	 so	 that	 the	 lives	 of	 the	

 

who	has	once	dismissed	in	any	court	of	this	state	or	any	other	state	or	the	United	States	an	action	

based	 on	or	including	 the	 same	 claim.”).	 	 Finally,	 should	 plaintiffs	misuse the	 statutes	 governing	

actions	 for	protection	 from	abuse,	courts	retain	the	discretion	pursuant	to	M.R.	Civ.	P.	41(a)(2)	to	

dismiss	such	vexatious	actions	with	prejudice	“as	a	sanction	for	misconduct.”		Green	Tree	Servicing,	

LLC,	2017	ME	68,	¶	18,	158	A.3d	931.
12

nonabusing	family	or	household	members	are	as	secure	and	uninterrupted	as	

possible.”	 	 See	 also	 19-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 4001(4)	 (stating	 that	 one	 of	 the	 chapter’s	

purposes	is	to	prevent	domestic	abuse	by	“expand[ing]	the	power	of	the	justice	

system	to	respond	effectively	to	situations	of	domestic	abuse”); State	v.	Blum,	

2018	ME	78,	¶	10,	187	A.3d	566 (noting	that	the	directive	and	stated	purposes	

of	 section	 4001	 “guide	 our	 interpretation”	 of	 the	 protection	 from	 abuse	

chapter);	State	v. Falcone,	2000	ME	196,	¶	7,	760	A.2d	1046,	(rejecting	a	narrow	

interpretation	 of	 the	 word	 “residence”	 because	 it	 would	 “contravene[]	 the	

express	statutory	purpose	of	protecting	the	victim”).

[¶16]	 	Moreover,	because	 the	 court	incorrectly	 believed	 that	it	 had	 no	

choice	but	to	order	a	dismissal	with	prejudice,	it	failed	to	consider	the	merits	of	

Doe’s	 motion	 and	 put	 the	 safeguards	 of	 Maine’s	 statutes	 providing	 for	

protection	from	abuse,	see	19-A	M.R.S.	§	4001,	beyond	the	children’s	reach.		On	

remand,	 the	 court	 should	 also	 consider	 that	 the	 purpose	 of	 Doe’s	 motion	to	

dismiss	the	complaint	without	prejudice	was	to	spare	her	children	the	trauma	

of	testifying	about	what	they	allegedly	endured	and	to	guard	against	the	reality	

that,	 should	 the	 children	 lose	 the	 interim	 protections	 afforded	 to	 them	 by	

Christopher’s	 bail	 conditions,	 there	 might	 then	 be	 a	 pressing	 need	 to	 file	 a	

second	 complaint	 grounded	in	 the	 same	 allegations	 as	 the	 first.	 	Finally,	the	
13

court	should	consider	that	nothing	in	the	record	suggests	that	Doe’s	motion	was	

made	in	bad	faith	or	to	delay	the	proceedings.

The	entry	is:

Judgment	 of	 dismissal	 with	 prejudice	 vacated.		

Remanded	 to	 the	 District	 Court	 for	 further	

proceedings	consistent	with	this	opinion.		

Jade	Richards,	Esq.,	Pine	Tree	Legal	Assistance,	Augusta, and	Melissa	L.	Martin,	

Esq. (orally),	Pine	Tree	Legal	Assistance,	Portland,	for	appellant	Pat	Doe

Ashley	T.	Perry,	Esq. (orally),	Sanders,	Hanstein	&	Carey,	P.A.,	Farmington,	for	

appellee	Christopher	Hills-Pettitt

Augusta	District	Court	docket	number	PA-2020-72

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY