Filed 1/26/22 Save Our Rural Town v. County of L.A. CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

SAVE OUR RURAL TOWN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et 

al.,

Defendants and 

Respondents.

 B309992

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No.20STCP00419)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, James C. Chalfant, Judge. Affirmed.

Jackson Tidus, Alene M. Taber for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Starr Coleman, 

Assistant County Counsel, Keever Rhodes Muir, Deputy County 

Counsel; The Sohagi Law Group, Margaret M. Sohagi, Nicole H. 

Gordon, and Paige E. Samblanet for Defendants and 

Respondents.
2

Save Our Rural Town (SORT) appeals from the trial court 

judgment denying its writ petition. The trial court found that the 

OurCounty environmental strategy plan adopted by Los Angeles 

County was not a project under the California Environmental 

Quality Act (CEQA) and therefore did not yet require a formal 

environmental review. We too conclude that OurCounty is 

merely aspirational and insufficiently concrete to amount to a 

project under CEQA, and therefore affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 2016, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors 

established a Chief Sustainability Office “to create a vision for 

making our communities healthier, more equitable, economically 

stronger, more resilient, and more sustainable.”1 The CSO also

was “tasked with developing, implementing, and updating a new 

Countywide Sustainability Plan.” Its formal efforts to create 

such a plan, including stakeholder workshops, presentations to 

“business, civic, and community organizations across the region,”

“expos” in each of the county’s supervisorial regions, and

circulation of a “discussion draft,” began in late 2017 and 

continued through mid-2019.2

1 We will refer to respondent County of Los Angeles as “the 

County,” to its Board of Supervisors as “the Board,” and to the 

Chief Sustainability Office as “the CSO.”

2 SORT asserts there was “no real outreach, no workshops, 

and no community meetings held in most of the County’s 

unincorporated area,” despite providing a record citation to a 

CSO outreach email specifically directed to the Antelope Valley 

Association of Rural Town Councils (which itself expressed 

concern over the alleged lack of outreach). The administrative 

record also indicates that the CSO met with various town 
3

The CSO received more than 6,000 comments during this 

process, including letters from the Acton Town Council and the 

Association of Rural Town Councils that questioned its 

compliance with CEQA. The Board also received a letter from 

SORT, which describes itself as “a grassroots unincorporated 

association . . . that works to protect rural communities from 

significant environmental impacts.” SORT urged the Board “to 

defer approval until a legally sufficient environmental document 

can be prepared.” In a memo transmitting the final draft of 

OurCounty to the Board, the CSO stated that County Counsel

had advised that OurCounty, “as a strategic guidance document, 

is not a project under CEQA.” The transmittal memo also stated, 

“When implementing an action under the OurCounty Plan, we 

will return to the Board for review and appropriate CEQA 

findings, as may be required.” 

During the August 2019 Board meeting at which the plan 

was considered, the CSO reiterated that “by design, the plan is 

more akin to a high level strategic plan.” The CSO assured the 

Board that it “fully expect[ed] and commit[ed] to assessing the 

actions as they are developed by county departments to 

determine the potential costs and benefits,” and that “all of those 

items will come back before this board for approval.” After 

hearing these remarks, and those of approximately 70 other 

commenters, the Board unanimously adopted OurCounty. 

councils, including the Acton Town Council, and extended the 

public comment period for residents and organizations located in 

the Santa Clarita and Antelope Valleys at the request of Fifth 

District Supervisor Kathryn Barger, who later thanked the CSO 

for “reach[ing] out to rural areas in the town councils in my 

District.” Regardless, the extent of the County’s outreach efforts 

is not relevant to the substance of this appeal. 
4

OurCounty contains 12 “broad, aspirational, and crosscutting goals” that “describe our shared vision for a sustainable 

Los Angeles County, including “[b]uildings and infrastructure 

that support human health and resilience,” “[t]hriving 

ecosystems, habitats, and biodiversity,” and a “fossil fuel-free LA 

County.”3 The goals, defined by the plan as “[b]road, aspirational 

statement[s] of what we want to achieve,” are supported by 37 

“strategies,” defined as “[l]ong-range approach or approaches that 

we take to achieve a goal,” and 159 “actions,” defined as 

“[s]pecific policy, program[s], or tool[s] we use to support a 

strategy.” The plan identifies short-, medium-, and long-term 

“targets” and “implementation horizons” for strategies and 

actions, respectively, and also identifies “lead” and “partner” 

county entities that will “oversee[ ] implementation of the action 

within their jurisdiction.” 

3 The other nine goals are “[r]esilient and healthy 

community environments where residents thrive in place”; 

“[e]quitable and sustainable land use and development without 

displacement”; “[a] prosperous LA County that provides 

opportunities for all residents and businesses and supports the 

transition to a green economy”; “[a]ccessible parks, beaches, 

recreational waters, public lands, and public spaces that create 

opportunities for respite, recreation, ecological discovery, and 

cultural activities”; “[a] convenient, safe, clean, and affordable 

transportation system that enhances mobility while reducing car 

dependency”; “[s]ustainable production and consumption of 

resources”; “[i]nclusive, transparent, and accountable governance 

that facilitates participation in sustainability efforts, especially 

by disempowered communities”; and “[a] commitment to realize 

OurCounty sustainability goals through creative, equitable, and 

coordinated funding and partnerships.” All 12 goals are equally 

speculative, for the reasons stated in this opinion. 
5

By way of example, Goal 2, “Buildings and infrastructure 

that support human health and resilience,” is supported by four 

strategies, one of which is to “integrate climate adaptation and 

resilience into planning, building, infrastructure, and community 

development decisions.” The short-term targets for this strategy 

are to “[c]onvert 10% of heat-trapping surfaces to cool or green 

surfaces” and “[r]educe by 15% the number of heat-stress 

emergency department visits per 100,000 residents” by 2025.

Medium- and long-term targets include achieving more 

aggressive conversion and reduction by 2035 and 2045. One of 

the four actions associated with this strategy is to “[d]evelop a 

comprehensive heat island mitigation strategy and 

implementation plan that addresses cool pavements and roofs, 

pavement reduction, and urban greening.” The Department of 

Health is identified as the “lead” county entity on this “short 

term” action, and four other departments are named as partners. 

The other goals, strategies, actions, and targets are largely 

similar in nature and scope.

OurCounty expressly provides that, “[a]s a strategic plan,” 

it “does not supersede land use plans that have been adopted by 

the Regional Planning Commission and Board of Supervisors, 

including the County’s General Plan and various community, 

neighborhood, and area plans.” The CSO also advised 

commenters that “the plan will not be legally enforceable,” and 

“was not intended to be a new policy document with 

enforceability that acted as an ordinance, general plan or have 

land use and zoning designation/regulation authority.” However, 

when it approved the plan, the Board directed the County’s Chief 

Executive Office to include goals related to implementing the 

plan in department heads’ annual “Management Appraisal 
6

Performance Plan[s]” and work with the CSO to “develop a multiyear funding plan” to implement OurCounty. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

SORT filed a verified petition for writ of mandate and 

complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in January 2020. 

It alleged the County violated CEQA by failing to prepare an 

environmental impact report (EIR) or consider the environmental 

factors of OurCounty, particularly “the potentially significant 

environmental impacts on rural communities that were raised by 

the public in connection to the Plan’s renewable energy Goals, 

Strategies, and Actions.” 

After receiving written briefing and hearing oral argument, 

the trial court issued a detailed written ruling denying the 

petition in December 2020. The trial court found that although 

“SORT’s list of environmental impacts is legitimate, and the 

listed impacts probably must be considered for any specific 

project, there is no causal connection between the Sustainability 

Plan and the environmental harms SORT alleges.” It concluded 

that OurCounty did not mandate, require, or commit the County 

to any specific action, and therefore was not a CEQA “project” 

capable of causing either direct or indirect physical change to the 

environment. 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review 

“In reviewing an agency’s compliance with CEQA in the 

course of its legislative or quasi-legislative actions, the courts’ 

inquiry ‘shall extend only to whether there was a prejudicial 

abuse of discretion.’ (Pub. Resources Code, § 21168.5.) Such an 

abuse is established ‘if the agency has not proceeded in a manner 

required by law or if the determination or decision is not 
7

supported by substantial evidence.’ [Citations.]” (Vineyard Area 

Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova

(2007) 40 Cal.4th 412, 426-427, footnotes omitted.) Our review of 

the administrative record for legal error and substantial evidence 

is the same as the trial court’s: we review the County’s action, not 

the trial court’s decision. (Id. at p. 427.) “[I]n that sense 

appellate judicial review under CEQA is de novo.” (Ibid.) 

II. CEQA Framework

CEQA is a comprehensive legislative scheme designed to 

protect the environment. It requires public agencies charged 

with regulating activities that affect the environment “to give 

prime consideration to preventing environmental damage when 

carrying out their duties.” (Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & 

Game Commission (1997) 16 Cal.4th 105, 112.) CEQA “is to be 

interpreted ‘to afford the fullest possible protection to the 

environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory 

language.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Relevant to this interpretation are 

administrative regulations known as the “CEQA Guidelines,” 

codified in title 14, section 15000 et seq. of the California Code of 

Regulations. (See Pub. Resources Code, § 21083; CEQA 

Guidelines, § 15000.)4

CEQA and the CEQA Guidelines “establish a three-tier 

process to ensure that public agencies inform their decisions with 

environmental considerations.” (Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano 

County Airport Land Use Commission (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372, 379-

380 (Muzzy Ranch).) The first tier requires the agency to 

“determine whether the proposed activity is subject to CEQA at 

all.” (Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. v. City of San 

4 All further section references are to the Public Resources 

Code.
8

Diego (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1171, 1185 (UMMP).) “In practice, this 

requires the agency to conduct a preliminary review to determine 

whether the proposed activity constitutes a ‘project’ for purposes 

of CEQA.” (Ibid.) An activity that is not a “project” as defined in 

section 21065 and CEQA Guidelines section 15378 is not subject 

to CEQA. (Id. at p. 1186; Muzzy Ranch, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 

380; CEQA Guidelines, § 15060, subd. (c)(3).) Only if an activity 

is found to be a project does the agency move beyond the first 

analytical tier to consider whether exemptions apply (second tier) 

and, if not, undertake an environmental review (third tier). 

(UMMP, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1185.) 

The threshold question of whether OurCounty is a “project” 

as defined by—and is thus subject to—CEQA is the 

determinative issue in this appeal. It is a legal question that we 

decide de novo by considering undisputed evidence in the 

appellate record. (UMMP, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1198.)5

As relevant here, section 21065, subdivision (a) defines a 

“project” as an “activity directly undertaken by any public 

agency” that “may cause either a direct physical change in the 

5 Inaccurately citing Muzzy Ranch, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 

370 for a quotation that appears in Sierra Club v. County of 

Sonoma (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1318, SORT further asserts 

that we should apply the “fair argument standard” to determine 

“whether a project may cause significant environmental impacts.” 

The fair argument standard, used to evaluate an agency’s 

decision to issue a negative declaration rather than an EIR, 

comes into play only after an activity is determined to be a 

project. (See Save the Agoura Cornell Knoll v. City of Agoura 

Hills (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 665, 675-676.) Accordingly, it is 

inapplicable here, as is SORT’s alternative argument that the 

standard was satisfied. 
9

environment, or a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical 

change in the environment.” (§ 21065, subd. (a).)

The CEQA Guidelines similarly specify that “project” 

means “the whole of an action, which has a potential for resulting 

in either a direct physical change in the environment, or a 

reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the 

environment.” (CEQA Guidelines, § 15378, subd. (a).) “A direct 

physical change in the environment is a physical change in the 

environment which is caused by and immediately related to the 

project,” such as “the dust, noise, and traffic of heavy equipment 

that would result from construction of a sewage treatment plant 

and possible odors from operation of the plant.” (CEQA 

Guidelines, § 15064, subd. (d)(1).) “An indirect physical change 

in the environment is a physical change in the environment 

which is not immediately related to the project, but which is 

caused indirectly by the project,” such as, in the sewage 

treatment plant example, an increase in air pollution caused by 

increased population itself attributable to increased sewage 

treatment capacity. (Id. § 15064, subd. (d)(2).) Indirect physical 

changes are not reasonably foreseeable if they are speculative or 

unlikely to occur. (Id. § 15064, subd. (d)(3).) 

The Supreme Court has synthesized these definitional 

standards into a test: “a proposed activity is a CEQA project if, 

by its general nature, the activity is capable of causing a direct or 

reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the 

environment. This determination is made without considering 

whether, under the specific circumstances in which the proposed 

activity will be carried out, these potential effects will actually 

occur. Consistent with this standard, a ‘reasonably foreseeable’ 

indirect physical change is one that the activity is capable, at 
10

least in theory, of causing. [Citation.] Conversely, an indirect 

effect is not reasonably foreseeable if there is no causal 

connection between the proposed activity and the suggested 

environmental change or if the postulated causal mechanism 

connecting the activity and the effect is so attenuated as to be 

‘speculative.’” (UMMP, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1197.)

The necessary causal connection may be established where 

the activity is “an essential step leading to ultimate 

environmental impact,” such as the approval of a school district’s 

request to secede from its current district and unify with another. 

(Fullerton Joint Union High School v. State Board of Education

(1982) 32 Cal.3d 779, 785, 797 (Fullerton).) Such connection may 

be lacking, however, “in the absence of any concrete development 

proposals,” where unspecified plans are enabled but not 

compelled. (Friends of the Sierra Railroad v. Tuolumne Park & 

Recreation District (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 643, 658-659 (Sierra 

Railroad).) The ultimate goal is to ensure that an EIR is 

prepared early enough so that it can “serve its intended function 

of informing and guiding decision makers,” but is not required 

“before the project is well enough defined to allow for meaningful 

environmental evaluation.” (Save Tara v. City of West Hollywood

(2008) 45 Cal.4th 116, 130.) 

III. Analysis

SORT contends the trial court erred by ignoring the Muzzy 

Ranch “categorical” approach and focusing instead on whether 

OurCounty gave rise to any reasonably foreseeable, nonspeculative indirect physical changes to the environment. SORT 

also argues that the requisite indirect environmental effects 

exist, that the County committed to implementing OurCounty,

and that the trial court’s findings that the County did not qualify 
11

for certain CEQA exemptions somehow shows that it did not 

conduct the required preliminary review before determining that 

OurCounty was not a CEQA project.

Before examining Muzzy Ranch, we first note that the 

“categorical” approach it announced was later tempered in 

UMMP, which clarified that the categorization of an activity was 

not enough by itself to determine whether it amounted to a 

project. Instead, the individual substance of a proposed activity 

had to be considered as part of the “relatively abstract and 

preliminary nature” of that determination. (UMMP, supra, 7 

Cal.5th at pp. 1194, 1197-1198.) We therefore examine Muzzy 

Ranch with that standard in mind.

In Muzzy Ranch, the Supreme Court considered whether 

the Travis Air Force Base Land Use Compatibility Plan (TALUP) 

adopted by the Solano County Airport Land Use Commission was 

a CEQA project. (See Muzzy Ranch, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 378.) 

The TALUP set forth land use compatibility policies for

development near Travis Air Force Base and was intended “‘to 

ensure that future land uses in the surrounding area will be 

compatible with the realistically foreseeable, ultimate potential 

aircraft activity at the base.’” (Id. at p. 378.) To that end, the 

TALUP explicitly barred amendment of existing general plans, 

zoning regulations, and land use designations to allow more 

housing in the covered area. (Id. at pp. 378-379.) The 

Commission adopted the TALUP without conducting an 

environmental review because it concluded the TALUP was too 

speculative and non-binding to be a CEQA project. (Id. at pp. 

378, 382.) 

The Supreme Court disagreed. It explained that whether 

an activity is a CEQA project “is a categorical question” that 
12

turns on whether an activity is “the sort of activity that may 

cause a direct physical change or a reasonably foreseeable 

indirect physical change in the environment.” (Muzzy Ranch, 

supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 381-382.) The TALUP was not 

“categorically outside the concern of CEQA” because “a 

government agency may reasonably anticipate that its placing a 

ban on development in one area of a jurisdiction may have the 

consequence, notwithstanding existing zoning or land use 

planning, of displacing development to other areas of the 

jurisdiction.” (Id. at p. 383.)

As it had in Fullerton, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 795-796, the 

court rejected the notion that an activity requiring further 

governmental decisions cannot be a CEQA project and reiterated 

that an activity that is “an essential step leading to potential 

environmental impacts” may be a project. (Muzzy Ranch, supra, 

41 Cal.4th at p. 383.) The court also rejected the Commission’s 

assertion that the TALUP could not be a project because it was 

merely advisory. It observed that the TALUP “speaks in 

mandatory terms,” “carries significant, binding regulatory 

consequences for local government in Solano County,” and can 

“trump the land use planning authority that affected jurisdictions 

might otherwise exercise through general and specific plans or 

zoning.” (Id. at pp. 384-385.) 

The crucial distinction between Muzzy Ranch and this case 

is that the TALUP was mandatory and OurCounty plainly is not.

Unlike the TALUP, which required affected jurisdictions to 

comply with its provisions and “trumped” local land use planning 

authority, OurCounty by its terms is “aspirational” and “does not 

supersede land use plans.” Nor is it akin to a binding, modern

“general plan” that governs fundamental land use decisions and 
13

is therefore subject to CEQA, as SORT suggests. (See City of 

Santa Ana v. City of Garden Grove (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 521, 

531-533.) To the contrary, OurCounty is more analogous to

advisory general plans predating 1971 legislative reform of the 

concept: it is “generally permissive in nature with a ‘relatively 

broad, amorphous scope and content,” at bottom “‘an idealistic 

statement of policy which might or might not be carried out.’” 

(Id. at pp. 531-532.) 

Sierra Railroad, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th 643, is instructive. 

There, the court determined that a transfer of land containing a 

historic railroad right-of-way was not a CEQA project even 

though “some development of the property surrounding the 

historical resource was reasonably foreseeable.” (Sierra 

Railroad, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 647.) The court reasoned 

that although the land transfer potentially set in motion future 

environmental effects, “[n]o planning process has taken place and 

no building is expected to go forward in the near future that could 

cause an impact on the historical resource.” (Id. at p. 659.) Thus, 

“in the absence of any concrete development proposals,” review of 

conceivable environmental impacts “would have been 

premature.” (Id. at p. 647.)

Similarly, in Bridges v. Mt. San Jacinto Community College 

District (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 104, 123-124, a college’s agreement 

to purchase property from a park district was not a CEQA project 

because “nothing in the purchase agreement commits the college 

to a definite course of development and there were no 

development plans in existence when it signed the agreement.” 

Here, although it is reasonably foreseeable that the goals, 

strategies, and actions enumerated in OurCounty may in the long 

run have some impact on the environment, the plan is at this 
14

stage merely nascent and its eventual effects highly speculative. 

For instance, using the action exemplar above, “a comprehensive 

heat mitigation strategy and implementation plan that addresses 

cool pavements and roofs, pavement reduction, and urban 

greening” may take any number of forms and call for numerous

activities in different areas of the county, each of which would 

potentially have a multitude of direct and indirect environmental 

effects. Without knowing more about the ultimate form heat 

mitigation and pavement reduction may take, any environmental 

assessment of this action would be premature. None of the 

numerous OurCounty strategies and actions SORT highlights is 

any more definite. 

SORT contends OurCounty became sufficiently concrete 

when the Board mandated the development of a funding plan for,

and employment goals related to, OurCounty. We disagree. The 

“Management Appraisal Performance Plan” goals for department 

heads to which SORT points as evidence of OurCounty’s 

mandatory nature predate the adoption of OurCounty, and the 

Board did not specify the types of “goals related to implementing 

the plan” that would be expected going forward. Likewise, a 

directive to develop a funding plan, and even the identification of 

possible funding sources for certain tasks, is insufficient to 

establish a causal connection between OurCounty and any 

reasonably foreseeable indirect physical impacts. 

We find equally unpersuasive SORT’s reliance on Plastic 

Pipe & Fittings Association v. California Building Standards 

Commission (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1390 (Plastic Pipe) and 

California Unions for Reliable Energy v. Mojave Desert Air 

Quality Management District (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1225 

(Reliable Energy).
15

In Plastic Pipe, a pipefitters’ association challenged a 

determination by the California Building Standards Commission 

that regulations concerning certain plastic piping were a “project” 

that required environmental review. (See Plastic Pipe, supra, 

124 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1398-1401.) The appellate court rejected 

the association’s argument that there was no causal link between 

the regulations and a physical change in the environment, 

concluding it was reasonably foreseeable, albeit uncertain, that 

the regulated piping would be used in future construction 

projects. (Id. at p. 1413.)

SORT contends Plastic Pipe is analogous, because 

OurCounty commits the county to increasing its usage of 

renewable energy, one way of doing that is by building large-scale 

solar energy plants in rural areas of the county, and such plants 

will undoubtedly result in a cavalcade of physical changes to the 

environment. This comparison is inapt. Approval of a specific 

type of pipe renders its imminent future use reasonably 

foreseeable, but a general goal of increasing the use of renewable 

power sources does not similarly commit the County to building 

solar farms, let alone in any specific location. 

Similarly, in Reliable Energy, an air quality management 

district adopted a rule concerning road paving, which it 

acknowledged was a project but contended was exempt from 

CEQA review because there was no potential that it would create 

any adverse environmental impacts. (Reliable Energy, supra, 178 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1234.) The court held there was insufficient 

evidence to support this finding (see id. at p. 1247); as more 

relevant here, it observed that the rule was likely to increase 

road paving such that indirect environmental effects were 

reasonably foreseeable. (See id. at p. 1244.) As the court noted, 
16

the district “intended at least some actual road paving to occur.” 

(Ibid.) Here, it is unclear what the County intends to occur, 

beyond a general shift toward more sustainability. Nothing in 

the plan encourages or incentivizes any specific activity, and it

therefore lacks the causal connection to environmental change 

present in Plastic Pipe and Reliable Energy.

SORT also emphasizes that our Supreme Court has held 

that agencies “‘cannot argue’ that approval of a regulation is not 

a project ‘merely because further decisions must be made’ before 

the activities directly causing environmental change will occur.” 

(UMMP, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1200.) 

We agree that the need for future decisions to be made 

“before a land use measure’s actual environmental impacts can 

be determined with precision does not necessarily prevent the 

measure from qualifying as a project.” (Muzzy Ranch, supra, 41 

Cal.4th at p. 383, emphasis added.) It may in some instances, 

however, where the “postulated causal mechanism connecting the 

activity and the effect is so attenuated as to be ‘speculative.’” 

(UMMP, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1197.)

That is the case here, where nothing but speculation 

connects the high-level strategies and aspirational actions in

OurCounty and SORT’s assertions that solar power plants will be 

sited in rural areas, causing wildfires; that preserving and 

enhancing open space necessarily “will reduce the total developed 

area in County by 229 square miles”; or that planting more trees 

(of unspecified types and in unspecified locations) will result in 

“more emissions of biogenic volatile compounds affecting ozone 

formation.” The County’s commitment to moving ahead with this 
17

aspirational plan does not somehow make it tangible enough to 

constitute a project.6

Finally, we turn briefly to the exemption issue raised by 

SORT. The trial court rejected the County’s argument that the 

OurCounty plan qualified for certain exemptions from the CEQA 

environmental review process. The trial court found that the 

County had not relied on one exemption when adopting 

OurCounty and had not raised it as an affirmative defense. As to 

the other, the trial court found that although the County raised 

the issue in its answer, it had not considered any environmental 

factors, as required by the CEQA guidelines.7

Determining whether any exemptions apply that would 

eliminate the need for a formal environmental review is part of 

CEQA’s second-tier analysis and comes into play only after a 

proposed activity is found to be a project. (UMMP, supra, 7 

Cal.5th at p. 1185.) As a result, the exemption issue, and the 

trial court’s findings, are irrelevant to the issue here: whether 

under the first tier of a CEQA analysis a proposed activity 

constitutes a project.8 For all of the reasons above, OurCounty is 

6 Of course, once the County formulates activities pursuant 

to the OurCounty plan that amount to projects under CEQA, 

those projects will require environmental review unless any 

exemptions apply.

7 The first was the so-called “common sense exemption,” 

which applies when a project can have no potential 

environmental effects. (CEQA Guidelines, § 15061(b)(3).) The 

second applies to projects that involve only planning or feasibility 

studies. (CEQA Guidelines, § 15262.)

8 As for the County’s supposed failure to conduct a 

preliminary review before determining that OurCounty was not a 

project (CEQA Guidelines, § 15378), we note the following: First, 
18

not a project. The County accordingly did not prejudicially abuse 

its discretion by reaching that conclusion, and the trial court 

properly denied the writ of mandamus. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Respondent 

County of Los Angeles is awarded its costs of appeal. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MICON, J.

⁕

WILLHITE, ACTING P.J.

CURREY, J.

neither CEQA nor the CEQA Guidelines specify the nature of 

such a preliminary review, which is preliminary in nature, 

relatively abstract, and occurs before any formal inquiry into 

actual environmental impacts. (UMMP, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 

1194, 1197-1198.) Second, the record shows that County Counsel 

determined that OurCounty was not a project under CEQA, 

supporting a conclusion that the requisite review occurred. 

Third, even if that review did not occur, nothing in CEQA or the 

CEQA Guidelines provides a penalty for such a failure, and we do 

not believe any remedy exists where we have determined as a 

matter of law that OurCounty is not a project.

⁕

Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief 

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.