Judge Lynch is recused from this case and did not participate in *

the vote.

 Of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. **

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 07-2159

ALAN S. NOONAN,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

STAPLES, INC.,

Defendant, Appellee.

Before

Before

Lynch, Chief Judge,*

Torruella, Boudin, Wallace, Lipez, and Howard, **

Circuit Judges.

ORDER OF COURT

Entered: March 18, 2009

Staples's petition for rehearing en banc, construed also as a

petition for panel rehearing, challenges the constitutionality of

the Massachusetts General Laws ch. 231, § 92, as construed in the

panel's rehearing opinion. Since its initial brief, Staples has

argued under the premise that the term "actual malice" in § 92

means "malevolent intent." Yet, Staples did not then challenge the

constitutionality of such a construction. Thus, the rehearing

opinion found that it need not consider the issue. See Rehearing
-2-

Opinion at p. 17, n.7. 

Staples now contends that it raised the issue in its initial

brief. But that brief simply acknowledged that the statute was not

constitutional as applied to a matter of public concern. Staples

did not timely argue that the present matter was a matter of public

concern or that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to a

matter of private concern. That Staples did not timely raise the

issue is also made clear by the fact that it has not, until now,

filed the notice required for a challenge to the constitutionality

of a state statute. See Fed. R. App. P. 44(b). The issue is

waived, and the fact that the issue raises constitutional concerns

does not save the waiver. See, e.g., Rosado-Quiñones v. Toledo,

528 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2008) (deeming waived the "question of law

about whether there is added First Amendment protection for public

employees' filing of lawsuits against their employers on matters in

which the public has no interest"); Pérez-Acevedo v. Rivero-Cubano,

520 F.3d 26, 29 n.7 (1st Cir. 2008); see also Ins. Corp. of Ir. v.

Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982)

("Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first

of all an individual [due process] right, it can, like other such

rights, be waived.").

Further, Staples has not shown that the constitutional issue

is so clear that the panel should have acted sua sponte to strike

down a state statute, without the required notice to the state

attorney general. Staples still does not cite a case for the

proposition that the First Amendment does not permit liability for

true statements concerning matters of private concern. The

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") case relied upon by

Staples did not hold that truth is an absolute defense in private

concern cases, but rather that a private figure may recover for a

negligently made defamatory falsehood in a case of public concern.

Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161, 164 (Mass.

1975). And the Supreme Court has stated that as to matters of

private concern, the First Amendment does "not necessarily force

any change in at least some of the features of the common-law

landscape." Phila. Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986);

see also Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 761

(1985) ("In light of the reduced constitutional value of speech

involving no matters of public concern, we hold that the state

interest adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive

damages -- even absent a showing of 'actual malice.'"). In fact,

were the issue as clear-cut as Staples suggests, the SJC would not

likely have limited its own invalidation of § 92 to matters of

public concern. Shaari v. Harvard Student Agencies, 691 N.E.2d

925, 929 (Mass. 1998) ("To apply this statute to the defendants'

truthful defamatory statement concerning a matter of public
-3-

concern, even if the statement is malicious, violates the First

Amendment." (emphasis added)). Thus, whether § 92 is a "feature[]

of the common-law landscape" left unchanged for matters of private

concern is an issue on which we now take no position.

Nor it is appropriate to now certify the question to the SJC.

We have answered the question of state law regarding the proper

interpretation of the statute, and Staples has not challenged that

matter on rehearing. The question of the constitutionality of that

state law under the First Amendment is a federal question, which we

could answer without certification. Though Staples suggests that

§ 92 may violate the Massachusetts Constitution, it presents no

argumentation whatsoever relating specifically to that contention.

Further, Staples should not be allowed to escape the consequences

of waiver through certification.

The petition for rehearing having been denied by the panel of

judges who decided the case, and the petition for rehearing en banc

having been submitted to the active judges of this court and a

majority of the judges not having voted that the case be heard en

banc, it is ordered that the petition for rehearing and the

petition for rehearing en banc be denied. The alternative request

for certification to the SJC is also denied.

By the Court:

/s/ Richard Cushing Donovan, Clerk

cc: Hon. Morris E. Lasker, Ms. Sarah Thornton, Clerk, United States

District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Ms. Wendy

Sibbison, Mr. Daniel Gelb, Mr. Richard Gelb, Ms. Ariel Cudkowicz,

Ms. Pratt, Mr. Robert Messinger, Ms. Stamenia Tzouganatos, Ms. Gail

Gelb, Ms. Jennifer Serafyn, & Ms. Krista Pratt.