alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 21.22 Nonduplication—Federal programs. ( a ) *Allowances.* A service-disabled veteran who is eligible for benefits under Chapter 31, may not receive a subsistence allowance or elect payment of an allowance at the educational assistance rate under Chapter 30 pursuant to § 21.264 if the veteran: ( 1 ) Is on active duty and is pursuing a course of education which is being paid for by the Armed Forces (or by the Department of Health and Human Services in the case of the Public Health Service), or
( 2 ) Is attending a course of education or training paid for under Chapter 41, Title 5 U.S.C. and whose full salary is being paid to such veteran while so training. (Authority: 38 U.S.C. 3681; Pub. L. 98-525)
( b ) *Services which may be authorized.* A service-disabled veteran who is in one of the two categories defined in paragraph (a) of this section is entitled to receive all benefits, other than an allowance, to which he or she is otherwise entitled under Chapter 31, including: ( 1 ) Payment of any tuition and fees not paid for by the Armed Forces.
( 2 ) The cost of special services, such as reader services, tutorial assistance, and special equipment during the period of such training.
(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 3681)
[49 FR 40814, Oct. 18, 1984, as amended at 54 FR 4283, Jan. 30, 1989; 57 FR 57108, Dec. 3, 1992]
§ 88.19 Decertification. ( a ) The decertification of a WTC Health Program member's certified WTC-related health condition or health condition medically associated with a WTC-related health condition may be initiated by the WTC Health Program in the following circumstances: ( 1 ) The WTC Health Program finds that the member's exposure is inadequate or is otherwise not covered;
( 2 ) The WTC Health Program finds that the member's certified WTC-related health condition was certified in error or erroneously considered to have been aggravated, contributed to, or caused by exposure to airborne toxins, any other hazard, or any other adverse condition resulting from the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, pursuant to § 88.17(a); or
( 3 ) The WTC Health Program finds that the member's health condition was erroneously determined to be medically associated with a WTC-related health condition, pursuant to § 88.17(b).
( b ) A WTC Health Program member will be notified in writing by the WTC Health Program of a decertification decision, provided an explanation, as appropriate, for the decision, and provided information on how to appeal the decision. A WTC Health Program member whose WTC-related health condition or health condition medically associated with a WTC-related health condition is decertified may appeal the decertification decision in accordance with § 88.21 of this part.
#### NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE IN ST. LOUIS, Appellant, v. GERMAN AMERICAN BANK et al., Respondents.

St. Louis Court of Appeals.

Argued and Submitted March 14, 1910.

Opinion Filed April 5, 1910.

BILLS AND NOTES:. National Bank of Commerce v. Mechanics’ American National Bank et al., *ante,*followed.

Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit *Court.*— Eon. *Matt. G. Reynolds,*Judge.

Affirmed.

*Geo. L. Edwards*and *Edward D’Aroy*for appellant.

*Johnson, Routs, Marlatt & Ratees*for respondents.

*Ecl/jj. G. Kehr*for respondent St. Louis Brewing Association.

*Geo. R. Locktoood*for respondent bank.

*22REYNOLDS, P. J.

As stated in the opinion in the case of National Bank of Commerce in St. Louis v. Mechanics American National Bank et al., No. 12019, the facts in this case, with difference in names and number of checks and amount, are practically the same as in that. For the reasons therein stated the judgment in this case is affirmed.

All concur.
###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 2 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 6 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 7 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 1 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 3 pertaining to both patents and trademarks is placed in the grouping pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 4 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 5 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

#### § 42.64 Objection; motion to exclude.

(a) *Deposition evidence.* An objection to the admissibility of deposition evidence must be made during the deposition. Evidence to cure the objection must be provided during the deposition, unless the parties to the deposition stipulate otherwise on the deposition record.

(b) *Other evidence.* For evidence other than deposition evidence:

(1) *Objection.* Any objection to evidence submitted during a preliminary proceeding must be filed within ten business days of the institution of the trial. Once a trial has been instituted, any objection must be filed within five business days of service of evidence to which the objection is directed. The objection must identify the grounds for the objection with sufficient particularity to allow correction in the form of supplemental evidence.

(2) *Supplemental evidence.* The party relying on evidence to which an objection is timely served may respond to the objection by serving supplemental evidence within ten business days of service of the objection.

(c) *Motion to exclude.* A motion to exclude evidence must be filed to preserve any objection. The motion must identify the objections in the record in order and must explain the objections. The motion may be filed without prior authorization from the Board.

[77 FR 48669, Aug. 14, 2012, as amended at 80 FR 28565, May 19, 2015]
§ 21.6515 Formulation of rehabilitation plan. ( a ) *Formulation of plan.* Following an evaluation, the Counseling Psychologist (CP) or Vocational Rehabilitation Counselor (VRC) will formulate an IWRP (individualized written rehabilitation plan) or an IEAP (individualized employment assistance plan) for each participating qualified veteran for whom achievement of a vocational goal is reasonably feasible. These plans shall be prepared in accordance with § 21.84 (IWRP) or § 21.88 (IEAP).
( b ) *Existing plan.* If the veteran already has undertaken a rehabilitation program under Chapter 31, a new plan shall not be developed unless circumstances indicate that the existing plan should be modified or replaced.
(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 1163(c); Pub. L. 100-687).
[51 FR 19333, May 29, 1986. Redesignated at 53 FR 4397, Feb. 16, 1988, and amended at 55 FR 17272, Apr. 24, 1990; 81 FR 26132, May 2, 2016]
41600.

#### ALEXANDER, Executrix v. FONTENOT et al.

Hall, Judge.

This appeal follows a judgment of the superior court sustaining a motion to dismiss an appeal from a judgment of the court of ordinary sustaining a motion to dismiss an application for the appointment of an administrator of an estate. *Held:*

1. The appellant’s first enumeration of error is that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the appellant to amend her application for the appointment of an administrator of the estate of Rosemary Fontenot Buchanan, deceased, by adding immediately after her name “Eloise Alexander” the word “as” in the first line of her application so that such application would read “Eloise Alexander, as Executrix of the Last Will and Testament of Ella Buchanan Cooper.” The record in this court shows no order or entry by the trial court refusing to allow such an amendment, and the trial court has certified to the Court of Appeals, in accordance with the Appellate Practice Act of 1965, as amended, Ga. L. 1965, pp. 240, 243, that such an amendment was not tendered and that the trial court did not refuse to allow such amendment. The first enumeration of error, therefore, is without merit. *Clark v. Ganson,*144 Ga. 544 (2) (87 SE 670).

2. The second enumeration of error is that the trial court erred in sustaining the appellee’s motion to dismiss the appeal from the court of ordinary to the superior court. The ground of this motion to dismiss was that the party who brought the appeal was not a party to the cause in the court of ordinary. The petition to the court of ordinary, praying that *37the “Clerk of the Superior Court of Walker County be appointed as administrator of the estate of Rosemary Fontenot Buchanan, deceased,” was made by “Eloise Alexander, Executrix of the Last Will and Testament of Ella Buchanan Cooper.” The appeal to the superior court was brought by “Eloise Alexander, as Executrix of the Last Will and Testament of Ella Buchanan Cooper, deceased.” Previous decisions support the appellee’s contention that the party in the court of ordinary and the party appealing to the superior court were not the same. *Stewart v. Stewart,*106 Ga. App. 211 (126 SE2d 716); *Compton v. Weekes,*107 Ga. App. 283 (129 SE2d 824).

Submitted November 4, 1965

Decided January 25, 1966.

*Frank M. Gleason,*for appellant.

*Shaw, Stolz & Fletcher, George P. Shaw,*for appellees.

It has been held that any amendment that would have been proper in a proceeding in the court of ordinary may be allowed on an appeal from that court to the superior court. *Wofford v. Vandiver,*72 Ga. App. 623, 627 (34 SE2d 679); *Smith v. Goodwin,*84 Ga. App. 319, 321 (66 SE2d 169). However, in the present case the appellant did not tender an amendment to the superior court. The trial court did not err, therefore, in sustaining the motion to dismiss the appeal.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Bell, P. J., and Frankum, J., concur.*
#### § 18b.21 Signature of documents.

The signature of a party, authorized officer, employee, or attorney constitutes a certificate that one of them has read the document, that to the best of that person's knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay. If a document is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this section, it may be stricken as sham and false and the proceeding may proceed as though the document had not been filed. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.

[35 FR 10760, July 2, 1970, as amended at 51 FR 10386, Mar. 26, 1986]
----

Action brought on 2 October 2006 — Di Bucci v Commission

(Case F-118/06)

(2006/C 294/133)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Vittorio Di Bucci (Brussels, Belgium) (represented by: M. van der Woude, lawyer)

Defendant: Commission of the European Communities

Form of order sought

Pleas in law and main arguments

The applicant, an official assigned to the Legal Service who has regularly obtained one of the highest assessments, in terms of merit points (MP), in his grade and in his department, invokes firstly infringement of Article 45 of the Staff Regulations and of the General Provisions for implementing that article, which require merit to be the determining factor for the awarding of Directorate-General (DG) priority points and for promotion. The non-promotion of the applicant is the result, first, of the unlawful conduct which he has already challenged in Cases F-98/05 (1) and T-312/04 (2); second, of the criteria for awarding DG priority points within the Legal Service, which give priority to the most senior officials in the grade, irrespective of their merit; third, of certain flaws in the awarding of points, in particular by the Promotion Committee, to other officials.

The applicant further alleges that the contested measures also infringe the principle of equal treatment and the principle that officials should have reasonable career prospects, include a manifest error of assessment and constitute a misuse of powers. Finally, they are marred by several procedural or formal defects.

Finally, the applicant pleads the illegality of the abovementioned General Provisions, arguing as follows:

----

(1)OJ C 10 of 14.1.2006, p. 24 (case initially registered before the Court of First Instance of the European Communities under number T-381/05 and transferred to the Civil Service Tribunal of the European Communities by order of 15.12.2005).

(2)OJ C 262 of 23.10.2004, p. 45.

----
PUBLIC LAW 107–101—DEC. 21, 2001 115 STAT. 973

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—S.J. Res. 26:

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 147 (2001):

Nov. 29, considered and passed Senate.

Dec. 11, considered and passed House.

Æ

Public Law 107–101

107th Congress

Joint Resolution

Providing for the appointment of Patricia Q. Stonesifer as a citizen regent of

the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States of America in Congress assembled, That, in accordance

with section 5581 of the Revised Statutes of the United States

(20 U.S.C. 43), the vacancy on the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution, in the class other than Members of Congress,

occurring by reason of the expiration of the term of Dr. Homer

Neal of Michigan on December 7, 2001, is filled by the appointment

of Patricia Q. Stonesifer of Washington. The appointment is for

a term of 6 years and shall take effect on December 8, 2001.

Approved December 21, 2001.

Effective date.

Dec. 21, 2001

[S.J. Res. 26]
# C_2020191EN.01000401.xml

| 8.6.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 191/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.6.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 191/4

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht Köln (Germany) lodged on 23 January 2020 — Biofa AG v Sikma D. Vertriebs GmbH und Co. KG

(Case C-29/20)

(2020/C 191/05)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberlandesgericht Köln

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Biofa AG

Defendant: Sikma D. Vertriebs GmbH und Co. KG

Question referred

Where an active substance is approved in an implementing regulation adopted pursuant to Article 9(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012, (1) can it be taken as given in court proceedings in a Member State that the substance on which the approval is based is intended within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 to act by any means other than mere physical or mechanical action, or is it for the adjudicating national court to establish in fact whether the preconditions for the application of Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 are fulfilled even after an implementing regulation has been adopted?

---

(1)  Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 concerning the making available on the market and use of biocidal products (OJ 2012 L 167, p. 1).

---
#### Dictograph Products, Inc. v. Hurwitz, etc.

*Floyd M. Kocher,*for plaintiff.

*Sidney A. Simon,*for defendant.

January 16, 1956.

Williams, P. J.,

Plaintiff sues for goods itemized and made a part of its complaint. Plaintiff claims the goods were sold to defendant, defendant failing to pay for them.

An answer and counterclaim was filed by defendant. Plaintiff now moves for judgment on the pleadings.

*96Defendant makes a general denial in his answer that the merchandise was sold and shipped to him, then alleges that certain goods and merchandise were delivered to him but that part of this merchandise was returned to plaintiff.

Defendant’s answer is insufficient. Defendant should be specific. If he received goods which were listed in the statement of claim, he should say so. If he failed to receive these goods, he should describe what goods he did not receive. He should also be particular as to what merchandise was returned, if any.

The statement of claim alleges that the goods were accepted and retained and that they were of approved quality. Defendant denies that the goods were of approved quality and alleges they were of defective quality. We are of opinion that he should be more specific as to defects.

Plaintiff also complains about the counterclaim. Defendant’s counterclaim is to the effect that he was a franchise dealer of plaintiff and that certain of plaintiff’s products were defective, causing defendant to lose because of service calls and rewiring in attempt to cure the defects. Defendant also claims cancellation of orders because of such defects. We are of the opinion that defendant should be more specific in his counterclaim. The claim does not have to disclose the testimony that is going to be introduced. It should, however, give information sufficient for the opposing party to prepare a defense and in this counterclaim we feel that no such information is given.

*Order of Court*

And now, January 16, 1956, the motion of plaintiff to strike is granted, defendant, however, to have 20 days in which to amend its affidavit of defense and counterclaim.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 17, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-50850

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

VICTOR HUGO MARTINEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 6:03-CR-257-5

--------------------

Before KING, Chief Judge, and DeMOSS and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Victor Hugo

Martinez raises arguments that are foreclosed by United States v.

Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464, 465-66 (5th Cir. 2004), petition for cert.

filed (U.S. July 14, 2004) (No. 04-5263), which held that Blakely

v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), does not apply to the

United States Sentencing Guidelines. The Government’s motion for

summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district

court is AFFIRMED.
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

JAMES FREDERICK SCHOOLER,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 2D2023-1126

May 15, 2024

Appeal from the County Court for Pasco County; Anne Wansboro, Judge.

James Frederick Schooler, pro se. 

Samuel B. Boundy and Jessica L. Rodriguez, Assistant County

Attorneys, New Port Richey, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

SLEET, C.J., and LaROSE and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
#### § 1.659 Relationship to incentive awards program.

Procedures set out in the regulations concerning inventions by employees of the Department of Veterans Affairs are not affected by the submission or proposed submission of an employee suggestion or idea on an item which may be patentable. Consideration of an item for a determination of ownership rights and also for an incentive award will proceed simultaneously, usually on separate correspondence. An employee suggestion or copies and extracts of the file may be forwarded to the General Counsel by the reviewing or awarding authority, or by the facility head, for an ownership determination where the employee idea or suggestion involves an invention. The employee shall be directed to submit a disclosure of invention in accordance with these regulations if such has not been previously submitted.

[31 FR 5291, Apr. 2, 1966, as amended at 61 FR 29659, June 12, 1996]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN RE:

APPOINTMENT TO DOMESTIC

RELATIONS PROCEDURAL RULES

COMMITTEE :

:

:

:

: No. 689

CIVIL PROCEDURAL RULES DOCKET

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 5 th day of March , 2019, Joseph P. Martone, Esquire, Erie County,

is hereby appointed as a member of the Domestic Relations Procedural Rules Committee

for a term of five years, commencing April 1, 2019.
#### § 17.1006 Decisionmakers.

The Chief of the Health Administration Service or an equivalent official at the VA medical facility of jurisdiction will make all determinations regarding payment or reimbursement under 38 U.S.C. 1725, except that the designated VA clinician at the VA medical facility of jurisdiction will make determinations regarding § 17.1002(b), (c), and (d). Any decision denying a benefit must be in writing and inform the claimant of VA appeal rights.

(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 1725)

[66 FR 36470, July 12, 2001, as amended at 76 FR 79072, Dec. 21, 2011; 87 FR 43748, July 22, 2022]
#### Dawkins Petition

*96
      *B. Bernstein,*for petitioner.

*Tompkins & McNally, J. A. Peace,*for guardian.

April 30, 1956.

Box, P. J.,

This is a petition filed under the Act of April 11, 1866, P. L. 780, sec. 1, 50 PS §795.

Petitioner’s husband was declared incompetent by this court and a guardian was appointed by decree dated September 24, 1945. The instant petition, alleging two parcels of real estate bought with petitioner’s own money and standing in her name, seeks to have the properties divested of the incompetent’s right of curtesy so that they may be sold.

The act undoubtedly gives this right, but it clearly indicates, as does Gannon’s Estate, 27 Dist. R. 590 (1918), that a specific sale must be intended. The incompetent is our ward and we have responsibilities for him, some of them mentioned in the Act of 1866. We do not conceive that act to give us the power to order a general sale to any one and at any time and at any price. We should be presented with a specific agreement of sale and something by way of appraisement to satisfy us that the sale is proper and that the rights of the incompetent can be adequately protected. Testimony as to the present state of the incompetent’s estate and its adequacy for his support should also be given.

Since the petition merely avers a general desire to sell, we dismiss it without prejudice to renew it in accordance with this opinion.