J-S20022-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

LAUREN PATRICIA DALY

Appellant No. 1510 EDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 17, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No: CP-23-CR-0003801-2013

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JULY 29, 2020

Appellant, Lauren Patricia Daly, appeals from an order denying her 

petition for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 9541-9546. Upon review, we affirm.

The following evidence was adduced during trial:

Prior to her arrest, [Appellant] was a pediatrician who worked for 

the A.I. DuPont Hospital for Children in Wilmington, Delaware. In 

1999, she met and became romantically involved with Margaret

Grover, a nurse. They moved in together and decided to raise a 

family. [Grover] became pregnant by artificial insemination and

gave birth to [E.D.] [Appellant] then adopted [E.D.] [Appellant]

became pregnant by artificial insemination and gave birth to 

[M.D.] Grover then adopted [M.D.]

The relationship between [Appellant] and Grover was marred by 

violence. Each accused the other of physical assaults. After an 

incident in April 2011, they separated, and each child departed 

with his /her respective natural mother. 

Each parent sought and was granted custodial time with the 

other’s natural child, and the arrangement was embodied in an 
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order of the Court dated May 27, 2013. [Appellant] was also 

ordered to pay child support for [E.D.], who, in 2013, attended 

the Haverford School. 

Despite the presence of an order, disputes nevertheless 

materialized, animosities flared and confrontations—verbal and 

physical—came to pass. Each introduced evidence of the other’s

violent acts. Of note is Grover’s allegation that during a drop-off 

of [M.D.] on the evening of Mother’s Day, 2013, [Appellant] first 

stood in front of Grover’s car in a menacing posture and refused

to move. [Appellant] then walked toward Grover and attempted 

to open the car door. Sensing danger, Grover drove away and, 

the next day, contacted her attorney. [Appellant], on the other 

hand, asserted that she was the victim and that Grover attempted 

to use the car as a lethal weapon. 

The parties and their lawyers hammered out an agreement that 

was memorialized in a series of letters. The substance of that 

agreement was that all drop-offs and pickups of either child would 

be “curbside.” During any exchange, [Appellant], Grover and the 

“significant other” of each would have no contact and would 

remain at least 100 feet away from each other. 

At trial, Grover testified that on May 27, 2013, at the end of 

Memorial Day weekend, she transported [M.D.] to [Appellant]’s 

house. As she approached, she spotted Donna Helgenberg, 

[Appellant]’s then current “significant other,” outside in the 

garden. Sensing trouble, Grover drove away, removed a phone 

and a can of mace from the back of the car, and drove to the front 

of [Appellant]’s house with [E.D.] in the front passenger’s seat 

and [M.D.] in the back seat. While exiting the car, [M.D.] dropped 

her backpack and swim suit onto the ground. Grover turned 

around and looked to the rear to assess the situation, but when 

she turned forward, she saw that [Appellant] had suddenly 

emerged and was standing at the front of her car. [Appellant]

struck the grill of Grover’s car. She then pulled out a gun, pointed 

it at the windshield and shot three bullets, which struck Grover’s 

face, chest and abdomen. After firing the third bullet from the 9 

mm automatic, the gun jammed and could fire no more without 

clearing the jammed bullet casing. Grover telephoned 911,

reported the incident and then drove to Riddle Hospital. 

The State Police responded to the scene and spoke with Donna 

Helgenberg. Trooper Wiley transported Donna Helgenberg and 
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[M.D.] to the barracks and attempted to interview both. At the 

scene, other troopers spoke with [Appellant], who advised them 

of the location of the gun. While attempting to secure it, one 

Trooper noted that it was jammed, or “stove-piped,” as a ballistics 

expert later explained. 

Troopers Kirby and O’Donnell took [Appellant] to the barracks. 

After being advised of her rights, [Appellant] gave a recorded 

statement in which she asserted that she purchased a gun to 

protect herself from Grover’s repeated attempts at her life. She 

admitted that she shot three bullets at Grover’s car, but she 

asserted that she did so because she was afraid that Grover was 

“going to try to run [her] over” and to “try to kill [her] again.”

[Appellant] predicted that Grover would announce that she “won 

the lottery” and would look “like a victim.” [Appellant] will go to 

jail, and Grover will get the kids. 

The State Police transported Grover’s car, a 2011 Volvo, to the 

barracks, where Corporal Elias and others conducted a bullet 

trajectory analysis. They found three bullet holes and impact sites 

in the car. They set up trajectory rods showing the paths of the 

bullets from the outside to the inside of the car. Elias then went 

to the scene of the incident and, after further inspection, 

concluded that the evidence was consistent with a five foot three 

inch shooter standing directly in front of the car and firing the first 

shot and with the same person placing her arms on the hood, 

leaning forward, extending her arms, and firing the next two 

shots. The evidence was more consistent with a static car and 

shooter rather than a scenario involving a moving car and/or

shooter. 

The police then obtained search warrants, first of [Appellant]’s 

person and then of her house. A strip search revealed no injuries 

on her person. While searching her house, they found in her 

belongings a document entitled “Here’s the Plan” dated March 7, 

2013 that set forth an elaborate plot to alter the custody 

arrangements of the children. 

The author, presumably [Appellant], sought to have Peg Grover 

“lose[] her mind” by proposing that each vacate her respective 

parental rights over the natural child of the other. If Grover were 

to refuse, then [Appellant] would commence a custody battle 

punctuated by “fucking” with [E.D.], encouraging that he be 

expelled from the Haverford School, proving that he was 
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dangerous, trashing Grover’s character and proving that [M.D.]

did not want to spend time with Grover. The plan contemplated 

a scorched earth policy in which she would hit a “mouse with [a]

sledgehammer!”

. . . 

The case proceeded to trial, during which the prosecution argued 

that [Appellant] intended to kill both Grover and [E.D.] In support 

of that, the ADA presented evidence showing that [Appellant]

advised many, including school staff, that he was the “next Jeffrey 

Dahmer” and a future serial killer. [Appellant] rarely saw or even 

contacted him. [Appellant] referred to him as “Satan’s spawn”

and a “nasty little boy.”

[Appellant] frequently proposed to Grover that they mutually 

vacate their parental rights. The prosecution argued that the 

attempted murder was a scheme designed to rid herself of the 

obligation of paying expensive private school tuition, child support 

and the like. Rather than follow through on the “plan” outlined in 

the March 7, 2013 memorandum—which would have necessitated 

paying large sums of money for lawyers, psychologists, teachers, 

and custody evaluators—[Appellant] decided to take matters into 

her own hands and kill Grover and [E.D.] Her self-defense 

argument would prevail, and she would be rid of the complications 

and expenses of shared custody of [M.D.], the surviving child.

In response to the prosecution’s portrayal of her as a meanspirited manipulative woman who had no interest in [E.D.], 

[Appellant]’s counsel attempted to show that she was, in fact, a 

caring mother who was herself the victim of Grover’s efforts to 

distance herself from her son. Her attorney played in open court 

voicemail messages from [Appellant], who expressed the desire

to speak with [E.D.] Grover agreed that [Appellant] had

difficulties with [E.D.]’s misbehavior, including physical attacks 

upon his sister, [M.D.] Grover admitted that [Appellant] sought 

to have [E.D.] placed at the Westtown School or at the Hill School, 

both expensive private schools, and did not seek to be relieved of

the duty of paying private school tuition. In his cross-examination 

of James Greytok, the Haverford middle school principal, [counsel] 

elicited testimony that [Appellant] expressed concern for [E.D.]’s 

welfare. He suggested that she did not believe that Haverford was 

equipped to handle [E.D.]
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Later in the trial, the prosecution called Corporal Elias, a ballistics 

expert, who, as previously noted, testified that the physical 

evidence was more consistent with a static car and shooter rather 

than a scenario involving a moving car and/or shooter. The 

Commonwealth also called Corporal Shawn Haines, an accident 

reconstruction expert. He interviewed Grover and listened to 

[Appellant]’s recorded statement. He and several troopers 

returned to the incident scene and attempted to reconstruct the

incident. His findings were consistent with Grover’s account of the 

incident; the only way he could reproduce tire marks similar to 

those found at the scene was to accelerate and steer to the left. 

They were also consistent with ballistics evidence given by 

Trooper Elias.

The defense did not call a ballistic expert. Rather, it called Roger 

Rozsas, an accident reconstruction expert with no expertise in 

ballistics. He took measurements at the scene, watched the State 

Police reenactments and took exception with the findings of 

Corporals Haines and Elias. Although he acknowledged the

physical evidence, he disputed their conclusions. The essence of 

his testimony was that the physical evidence was consistent with 

[Appellant]’s statement to the police that the vehicle was moving

toward her when she fired the gun. 

[Appellant] did not testify at trial. She called various character 

witnesses: a Detective from the Haverford Township police 

department, who authenticated some incident reports; a State

Trooper, who also testified as to some records; and a second state 

Trooper, Philip Rhyn, who testified that after being taken into 

custody, [Appellant] insisted that she fired the gun because 

Grover had attempted to run her over with a car. [Appellant] also 

discussed various family issues with him.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/8/15, at 1-8 (internal citations omitted).

During trial, the court granted Appellant’s motion for judgment of 

acquittal on the charge that she attempted to murder E.D. At the conclusion 

of the two-week trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of all charges involving 

Grover, including attempted murder, aggravated assault, possession of an 

instrument of crime, reckless endangerment and endangering the welfare of 
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a child.1 The jury found Appellant not guilty of aggravated assault against 

E.D. On September 9, 2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an 

aggregate of 273—624 months’ imprisonment. 

Appellant filed timely post-sentence motions, which the trial court 

denied, and a timely notice of direct appeal. On November 3, 2016, this Court 

affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence. Appellant filed a timely application 

for reargument, which this Court denied, and a timely petition for allowance 

of appeal in the Supreme Court. On June 20, 2017, the Supreme Court denied 

the petition for allowance of appeal. Appellant did not appeal to the United 

States Supreme Court, so her judgment of sentence became final for PCRA 

purposes on September 18, 2017. 

On September 4, 2018, Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition. On 

February 7, 2018, the PCRA court filed a notice of intent to dismiss Appellant’s 

petition without a hearing. On April 17, 2018, the PCRA court entered an 

order dismissing the PCRA petition. On May 15, 2019, Appellant filed a timely 

appeal to this Court from the order of dismissal. Both Appellant and the PCRA 

court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issues in this appeal:

I. The trial court, in the jury’s presence, made an important factual 

determination that was crucial to [Appellant]’s self-defense claim. 

Trial counsel objected to the ultimate determination itself rather 

than the judicial finding of fact during a jury trial. Did the PCRA 

court err by dismissing, without a hearing, a claim that trial 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901, 2702, 4304, 907, and 2705, respectively. 
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counsel was ineffective for not asserting the legally correct and 

meritorious objection, and for finding such a claim was previously 

litigated?

II. A witness testified about arguably improper actions taken by 

[Appellant]’s father and paramour after she was arrested. Did the 

PCRA court err by dismissing, without a hearing, a claim that trial 

counsel was ineffective for not objecting to this irrelevant and 

prejudicial evidence? 

III. Numerous witnesses testified that [Appellant] held animosity 

towards her son, but the trial court granted a judgment of 

acquittal on a charge that she tried to kill him due to lack of intent. 

Did the PCRA court err by dismissing, without a hearing, 

[Appellant]’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not 

moving to strike the testimony concerning the animosity towards 

her son because it was not relevant and prejudicial?

IV. Where [Appellant] pleaded numerous claims presenting 

material issues of fact, did the proffered cumulative prejudice 

warrant an evidentiary hearing?

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

In her first argument, Appellant contends that defense counsel provided 

ineffective assistance by failing to object to the jury instruction that she and 

Grover had an “agreement” concerning curb-side drop-offs of their children. 

Appellant argues that she had a valid self-defense argument because she was 

“lawfully on her property,” Appellant’s Brief at 18, and believed that Grover 

was trying to run her over with her car. Id. at 7, 18. The trial court negated 

this argument by instructing the jury that she had an agreement with Grover 

not to be present during custody exchanges. Appellant’s Brief at 13. Defense 

counsel, Appellant concludes, crippled her self-defense argument by failing to 
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object to this instruction. No relief is due, although we deny relief for a 

different reason than the Commonwealth suggests.

The attorneys for Appellant and Grover exchanged three letters two 

weeks before the shooting, during child custody proceedings. In the first letter 

dated May 15, 2013, Appellant’s attorney stated, “[T]here is to be no physical 

contact between Peg [the victim] . . . and [Appellant] . . . pick-up and dropoff is to be curbside and the noncustodial parent may attend events and 

activities provided she remains at least 100 feet away from the custodial 

parent at all times.” N.T., 6/23/14, at 96-97. On May 16, 2013, Grover’s 

attorney authored a letter stating that “[a]ny exchanges of the child not at 

camp or school shall be curbside with one parent and significant other 

remaining in the car and the other parent and significant other remaining in 

the house . . . [M.D.] is old enough to walk from the car to the house 

unassisted.” Id. at 97. On May 17, 2013, Appellant’s attorney wrote, 

“[Appellant] is in agreement that there be no physical contact between 

[Appellant] and Peg and that non-school related pick-up and drop-offs be 

curbside.” Id. The trial court read these letters to the jury and instructed, 

“This exchange of letters signifying the agreement of the clients in my opinion 

is an agreement that pick-up and drop-off will be curbside with respect to the 

child [M.D.] and that there will be no contact between [Appellant] and 

[Grover] during that exchange.” Id. Subsequently, during closing 

instructions, the court stated that Appellant could not claim self-defense
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if . . . she knew that she could avoid the necessity of using deadly 

force with complete safety by complying with a demand that she 

abstain from any action that she had no duty to make and failing 

to do so. This pertains to the agreement that was reached 

between the parties and the lawyers that the transfer of the child, 

[M.D.], would take place curbside. In other words, the agreement 

that [Appellant] would stay inside the home . . . I’m going to read 

that to you again, just so there’s no mistaking what the provisions 

are. [Appellant] knew that she could avoid the necessity of using 

deadly force with complete safety by complying with a demand 

that she abstain from any action she had no duty to make and 

failing to do so by coming out of the house and coming to the 

proximity of this automobile during the transfer of the child. If 

the Commonwealth proves [this] beyond a reasonable doubt, the 

actions of [Appellant] are not justified.

N.T., 7/7/14, at 144-45.

On direct appeal, Appellant argued that “the trial court erred in 

accepting the Commonwealth’s argument that an exchange of letters between 

the respective domestic relations counsel for the appellant and her spouse

constituted a Court Order, or enforceable agreement.” Commonwealth v. 

Daly, No. 2029 EDA 2015 (Pa. Super.), Appellant’s Brief at 55. The court’s 

decision to instruct the jury that Appellant and Grover entered an agreement, 

Appellant continues, prejudiced Appellant by “eviscerat[ing] [her] self-defense 

claim.” Id. at 60. In its opinion on direct appeal, however, the trial court 

concluded that a letter by Appellant’s attorney “did, in fact, memorialize an 

agreement by [Appellant] that she and Grover would have no contact during 

the non-school drop-offs and pickups, all of which were to be conducted 

‘curbside.’” Trial Court Opinion, 10/8/15, at 21. This Court concurred, stating, 

“We agree with the sound reasoning of the trial court, as set forth in its 
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Opinion, and affirm on this basis.” Daly, 2016 WL 6519019, at *5 (Pa. Super. 

2016) (memorandum).

Appellant argues strenuously that defense counsel was ineffective for 

failing to object to the jury instructions that Appellant had a no-contact 

agreement with Grover. According to Appellant, the jury, in its role as 

factfinder, had sole authority to decide whether an agreement existed, but the 

court usurped the jury’s authority by making this finding itself. Absent this 

improper act, Appellant claims, she “could have argued to the jury that her 

presence on her own property, in conjunction with her belief that she was 

being attacked with a deadly weapon, obviated any requirement that she 

retreat from the situation before taking action to protect herself.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 20. Significantly, she states no fewer than ten times that she was on 

her own property. Id. at 15-21.

To obtain relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant 

must prove that: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel 

lacked a reasonable basis for his actions or failure to act; and (3) the petitioner 

was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance such that there is a 

reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been 

different absent counsel’s error or omission. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 

A.2d 973, 975 (Pa. 1987). Counsel is presumed to have rendered effective 

assistance, and a PCRA petitioner asserting otherwise bears the burden of 

proof. Commonwealth v. Isaac, 205 A.3d 358, 362 (Pa. Super. 2019).
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When reviewing a PCRA order, we examine whether the record supports 

the PCRA court’s factual findings and whether its legal conclusions are free 

from error. Commonwealth v. Hannibal, 156 A.3d 197, 206 (Pa. 2016). 

We view the PCRA court’s findings and evidence of record in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party. Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 

131 (Pa. 2012). The petitioner has the burden of persuading us that the PCRA 

court erred and that such error requires relief. Commonwealth v. 

Wholaver, 177 A.3d 136, 144-45 (Pa. 2018).

The Commonwealth argues that Appellant cannot obtain relief because 

her objection to the jury instruction was previously litigated2 on direct appeal 

and has simply been repackaged as a claim of ineffective assistance. We 

disagree. Our Supreme Court has stated that

ineffectiveness claims are distinct from those claims that are 

raised on direct appeal. The former claims challenge the adequacy 

of representation rather than the conviction of the defendant. 

Accordingly, [] a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffectiveness raises 

a distinct legal ground for purposes of state PCRA review under 

[Section] 9544(a)(2). Ultimately, the claim may fail on the 

arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on 

direct appeal, but a Sixth Amendment claim raises a distinct issue 

for purposes of the PCRA and must be treated as such. 

[Accordingly, a] PCRA court should recognize ineffectiveness 

claims as distinct issues and review them under the three-prong 

ineffectiveness standard [].

____________________________________________

2 An issue has been “previously litigated” when either “the highest appellate 

court in which the petitioner could have had review as a matter of right has 

ruled on the merits of the issue,” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(a)(2), or “it has been 

raised and decided in a proceeding collaterally attacking the conviction or 

sentence.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(a)(3).
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Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (Pa. 2005) (internal citations 

and quotations omitted). Collins prohibits us from holding that Appellant’s 

argument is barred as previously litigated.

Nevertheless, Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance falls short due 

to lack of arguable merit. As both the trial court and this Court reasoned on 

direct appeal, the plain language of the letters between Appellant’s counsel 

and Grover’s counsel establishes that Appellant entered an agreement with 

Grover not to be present during certain pickups and drop-offs, including the 

incident in which Appellant shot Grover. 

Even assuming that the jury should have decided whether an agreement 

existed instead of the trial court, Appellant’s argument fails for a different 

reason. Appellant contends she had no duty to retreat because she was on 

her own property. The evidence demonstrates, however, that Appellant was 

on the street at the time of the shooting. Grover was in her own car parked 

curbside on a public street. N.T. 6⁄23⁄14, at 109, 125-26, 152, 291-93 

(testimony of Grover). An eyewitness, Helgenberg, observed Appellant 

“standing in the middle of the street.” N.T. 6⁄25⁄14, at 176. Trooper Tsung, 

who responded to the shooting, found shell casing in the road. N.T. 6/24/14, 

at 58, 61; see also id. at 121 (Trooper Rose’s testimony that shell casings
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were found in the street).3 Appellant fails to point to any evidence that the 

street was part of her property. Nor does she argue that she had the right to 

stand her ground outside her property boundaries. Absent evidence that she 

was on her own property, her self-defense argument collapses.

For these reasons, the PCRA court properly rejected this claim of 

ineffective assistance. 

Next, Appellant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing 

to object to the testimony of child advocate Lisa Kane Brown, guardian ad 

litem for E.D. and M.D., during domestic proceedings between Appellant and 

Grover. N.T., 6/30/14, at 100-23. Brown’s testimony, Appellant wrote,

mostly concerned the conduct of Helgenberg and Charles Brian Daly, 

Appellant’s father, after Appellant’s arrest. The conduct of these persons, 

Appellant continues, was inadmissible and prejudicial because it “had nothing 

to do with tending to prove [Appellant’s] guilt or innocence of the charged 

crimes,” and the Commonwealth introduced this testimony only to establish 

____________________________________________

3 Appellant cites to testimony by Trooper Rose page 109 for the proposition 

that the shooting occurred in a “shared driveway.” Appellant’s Brief at 20

(citing N.T., 6/24/14, at 109). Trooper Rose responded to the crime scene 

following the 911 call; he was not a witness to this crime. More importantly, 

at no point in his testimony did he claim that the shooting occurred in a shared 

driveway. He uttered the words “shared driveway” to describing his position 

and the positioning of the other troopers when they first arrived on the scene 

after the shooting. Id. at 107-12. The police were in the shared driveway 

while they devised a plan as to how to apprehend Appellant, whom they 

presumed was armed. Trooper Rose did not testify that Appellant shot Grover 

in the shared driveway. 
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that Appellant associated with unsavory individuals such as her father and 

Helgenberg. Appellant’s Brief at 24. No relief is due.

Some of Brown’s testimony concerned subjects other than Helgenberg 

or Appellant’s father, such as Brown’s role as child advocate, statements that 

M.D. made to her, and statements Appellant made to M.D. N.T., 6/30/14, at 

100-05. Appellant does not accuse defense counsel of ineffectiveness during 

this portion of Brown’s testimony.

The remainder of Brown’s direct testimony concerns Helgenberg’s and 

Appellant’s father’s conduct following Appellant’s arrest. Id. at 105-16. 

Brown testified that (1) after Appellant’s arrest, the court ordered her to 

refrain from any contact with M.D., (2) Helgenberg at first was permitted to 

have contact with M.D. but later was ordered to stay away from M.D., (3) 

Helgenberg and Appellant’s father attempted to circumvent these directives 

by plotting to have M.D. give Appellant’s father letters to give to Appellant in 

jail, and (4) Helgenberg also attempted to stay in touch with M.D. by becoming 

the coach of her softball team. Id. Defense counsel did not provide ineffective 

assistance during this testimony; to the contrary, he raised multiple hearsay 

and relevance objections. Id. at 108, 109, 111, 113, 115 (hearsay 

objections); 110 (relevance objection). Furthermore, this testimony did not 

prejudice Appellant. The overwhelming bulk of the evidence presented by the 

Commonwealth related to Appellant’s motive for shooting Grover, her 

formulation of the plan to shoot Grover and the execution of this plan. The 
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Commonwealth’s closing argument focused on the evidence relating to 

Appellant, not evidence relating to Helgenberg or Appellant’s father. N.T., 

9/9/14, at 64-100 (closing). Brown’s brief testimony concerning Helgenberg 

and Appellant’s father does not undermine our confidence in the outcome of 

this case.

Next, Appellant claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to 

move to strike all references to her relationship with E.D. after the trial court 

granted her motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of attempting to 

murder E.D. Appellant argues that “during its case-in-chief, the 

Commonwealth painted [Appellant] as an uncaring mother who sufficiently 

hated [E.D.] so much that she tried to kill him.” Appellant’s Brief at 27. 

Appellant continues that because “the prejudice of such evidence is readily 

apparent,” defense counsel should have moved to strike this evidence after 

the judgment of acquittal on the charge of attempting to murder E.D. Id. We 

agree with the Commonwealth that this argument lacks merit. The 

Commonwealth correctly points out that despite the judgment of acquittal on 

the murder charge, the charge of aggravated assault against E.D. remained 

intact. Commonwealth’s Brief at 23. Furthermore, under the relevant 

subsection of the aggravated assault statute, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1), 

because E.D. was not injured, “the Commonwealth needed to prove that 

Appellant intentionally or knowingly attempted to cause serious bodily injury 

to E.D.” Id. Thus, as the Commonwealth observes, “evidence of [Appellant’s] 
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vitriol toward [E.D.] was relevant to prove that she was intentionally 

attempting to cause him serious bodily injury.” Id.

Finally, Appellant argues that she is entitled to relief based on the 

cumulative prejudice caused by defense counsel’s errors. There is no basis 

for a cumulative error argument, because none of Appellant’s claims have 

merit. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 321 (Pa. 2011) (“no number 

of failed claims may collectively warrant relief if they fail to do so 

individually”). 

For these reasons, the PCRA court properly denied Appellant’s PCRA 

petition.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/29/2020