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THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 6, 2001

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota

BARBARA BOXER, California

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

BILL NELSON, Florida

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia

JESSE HELMS, North Carolina

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon

BILL FRIST, Tennessee

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming

EDWIN K. HALL, Staff Director

PATRICIA A. MCNERNEY, Republican Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared statement . 3

Gailani, Fatima, Advisor, National Islamic Front of Afghanistan ...................... 48

Gouttierre, Thomas E., Dean of International Studies and Director of the

Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska, Omaha, NE ........... 37

Haass, Hon. Richard N., Director of Policy Planning Staff and U.S. Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan, Department of State, Washington,

DC .......................................................................................................................... 13

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 16

Responses to additional questions for the record ........................................... 58

Helms, Hon. Jesse, U.S. Senator from North Carolina, prepared statement ..... 5

Rocca, Hon. Christina, Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC .......................................................................... 6

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10

Wellstone, Hon. Paul, U.S. Senator from Minnesota, prepared statement ........ 25

(III)

(1)

THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 6, 2001

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:38 a.m. in room

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,

(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Wellstone, Boxer, Helms, Lugar, Hagel,

Chafee, Allen and Enzi.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. I say to the witnesses, both panels, that the Senate schedule is obviously going to

intervene and interfere, as it usually does here.

We have two very distinguished panels of witnesses, the first

representing the administration and then a second panel. We are

going to, I am told, although I never believe it until it happens,

have two to three successive votes beginning at 11 o’clock, which

if that were the case we would have to recess for probably 20 minutes in order to be able to get those votes in. But sometimes they

announce that and it does not occur, as I know Richard and Christina know, having worked here and know this place.

Let me begin by thanking my colleague Senator Wellstone for

suggesting and pushing we have this hearing. Our timing apparently—as my father used to always say, still says, better to be

lucky than good. We were a little worried, Richard, I was a little

worried, calling you up here while things were still in train might

confuse things. But I am glad it worked out.

The past few weeks have been eventful indeed. The success of

the war effort in Afghanistan has caused some considerable celebration, has silenced some skeptics, at least temporarily—you

never totally silence them—and has been celebration, not just here,

but in Kabul and also throughout the region.

I want to applaud the administration, our coalition partners, and

above all the men and women we have out there who are still as

we speak fighting and some dying.

Yesterday we received a stark reminder just how tough this is—

I know my friend from Nebraska knows firsthand what it is like—

when three Americans were killed and 19 were wounded. Pray God

that will be the end of that, but it is not likely that will be the case

in my view. So our thoughts and prayers are with the families of

the wounded and killed.

But it also reminds us that this war is not over. Not only—we

keep talking about a second stage here, that we are preoccupied

with what we are going to do, if we do anything, in Iraq or Somalia

2

or anywhere else in the world. I think there is a second or third

stage in Afghanistan yet to go. The next stage in Afghanistan is

to complete our mission of wiping out al-Qaeda in that country, as

well as capturing and-or killing Osama bin Laden, and our military

has got a very hefty order and hefty job cut out for them there.

But then we have to get to what we want to talk about in this

hearing, and that is once Kandahar, which it appears as though reports are may be ready to surrender the Taliban and once, God

willing, we succeed in our mission regarding al-Qaeda and bin

Laden, what then?

I have been impressed from the outset by my discussions with

the President of the United States, my personal and private discussions with him, how he has, as long ago as the day or 2 days after

our campaign started in Afghanistan, had already begun the process with the two people in front of us of trying to figure out what

we do after the fact. So this is not something that the administration is just thinking about as we sit here now, and I give the President great credit for that, and his willingness to talk about, although we do not use the word, the phrase, any more, ‘‘nationbuilding,’’ talk about putting in place a situation, a circumstance

that there can be some stability in a country that has been ravaged

by war and drought and famine for a long time and to put their

neighbors at ease that there is a prospect for this occurring, for if

we do not we are in real trouble.

We have to facilitate the creation of the regime—Mr. Chairman— that adequately represents all the Afghans, women as well as men,

Pashtuns and Tajiks and Uzbeks and Hazaras. They all have to be

part of the deal, and we have to help lay that foundation so the

Afghan Government does not slide back into warlordism and anarchy that existed in the past. As I said, we have to do it in a way

that calms down the neighbors, who do not have the same interests

as one another do.

Now, I am going to forego the rest of my statement and just suggest that the news out of Bonn seems—it exceeded my expectations, the decisions they reached, and it stretches slightly my faith

that we will be able to do it on the ground. I imagine the news was

not greeted with enthusiasm in Kabul, but who knows.

So what we are going to want to talk about is where you are

now, where the administration thinks we have arrived in terms of

a new government, and also a question that cannot remain unanswered very long, is what sort of security framework are we prepared to try to help put in place. For I for one think one is urgently

needed. I do not think there is any other substantive steps, whether political or humanitarian, that are going to be likely to be able

to be taken on the ground without a robust, combat-ready force

able and fully authorized to establish safety and stability in Afghanistan.

The headlines in all the major papers today are full of stories relating not only to the success in Bonn, but also to the desperate

circumstance for refugees, displaced persons in Afghanistan, particularly northern Afghanistan, discussion about whether or not

the Friendship Bridge will be opened and, if it is, is there safe passage. The bottom line of all this is it seems to me that—and this

is what I want to talk about today—is there is little prospect of

3

meeting the next stage of needs in Afghanistan without a security

force on the ground.

Turkey has indicated again—the Secretary has indicated to us

previously—Turkey has indicated again today that they are ready

to send forces. I am told that Indonesia and Bangladesh may as

well be prepared to do that. Or it may be a UN-approved coalition

of the willing drawn partly from NATO countries.

Our first panel has been following and affecting developments

both in Afghanistan and in Bonn, where negotiations appear to

have yielded fruit. I look forward to their report on the progress toward establishing both a lasting political agreement and a truly effective security framework. Only in a secure environment can we

make real progress toward reconstructing Afghanistan.

When I say reconstructing, I know folks back home in my state

think we are talking about rebuilding some—this is not, we are not

rebuilding Sarajevo or Sofia. We are trying to do—our goal from

my discussions with the President, and I assume it is the same, are

to be in a position where there is education in the schools for girls

and boys alike, where we are going to be digging wells and irrigation canals and paving roads, establishing medical clinics, and

clearing up the most heavily land-mined country on earth. We are

not building palaces or large and great parliamentary buildings.

We are just trying to get this place back to the point where there

is a prospect of the ability to govern, and you need to be able to

communicate to govern.

All this, though, is going to take a lot of money, according to the

Secretary General. He indicates the cost will be more than $10 billion over 5 to 10 years, and I have heard similar estimates from

officials at the World Bank and a variety of private NGO’s and

some within the administration.

Now, President Bush has been clear on the need for American

leadership here. There is a task, though, that is not only ours. It

is a task for the world community. But the United States has been

leading. I expect it will continue to lead, and I would suggest it has

to lead or this is not going to get done.

The world’s attention is now focused on Afghanistan, but it will

not be for long. If the President’s pledge is to carry real weight, it

needs to be fleshed out right away. How much money is the United

States willing to commit, for what programs, and where will the

funds come from?

I for one am committed to helping the President keep the promise he so generously and wisely made. The future of Afghanistan

is and must be in the hands of the Afghan people themselves. But

we must do all we can to lead the world to assist Afghanistan in

the task of rebuilding their country, their society, and their lives,

so that we do not end up on the short end of the failure that occurs

in Afghanistan if it were to occur again.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

The past few weeks have been eventful ones, indeed. The success of the war effort

in Afghanistan is a cause for celebration and has silenced some skeptics—at least

temporarily, as you never totally silence them—not just in Kabul or Washington,

but all through the region. I applaud the Administration, our coalition partners, and

4

above all—the brave men and women of the military who are still, as we speak,

fighting—and some, dying.

Yesterday we received a stark reminder of just how tough this is: Three American

soldiers were killed, and 19 were wounded, in combat near Kandahar. I pray that

it will be the end of that, and our thoughts and prayers are with the families of

the wounded and killed.

It also reminds us that this war is far from over. We keep talking about a second

stage, and we’re preoccupied with what we’re going to do—if we do anything—in

Iraq or Somalia or anywhere else in the world. But I think there’s a second and

third stage yet to come in Afghanistan. The next stage is to complete our mission

of wiping out al-Qaeda and capturing or killing Osama bin Laden. And then, we

have to get to what we’re here to discuss today in this hearing.

I’ve been impressed from the outset in my private discussions with the President

of the United States how he—as long ago as two days after the campaign started

in Afghanistan, he had already begun the process, along with two of our witnesses

today, to figure out what we were going to do after the fact. So this is not just something that the Administration is thinking about as we sit here now—and I give the

President great credit for that, and his willingness for us to put in place a circumstance allowing some stability in a country that has been ravaged by war and

drought and famine for a long time, and put its neighbors at ease. For if we don’t

we are in real trouble.

We must facilitate the creation of a regime that adequately represents ALL Afghans—women as well as men, Pashtuns and Hazaras as well as Tajiks and

Uzbeks. We must help lay the foundations of a stable government, so that Afghanistan does not slide back into the warlordism and anarchy of the past.

The news out of Bonn exceeded my expectations, and stretched slightly my faith

that we will be able to bring about stability on the ground. What we will want to

talk about today is where the Administration thinks we have arrived in terms of

a new government in Afghanistan, and what sort of security framework we are prepared to help put in place—for I, for one, think such a framework is urgently needed.

All the major papers today are full of stories relating not only to the success in

Bonn, but also to the desperate circumstance for refugees and displaced persons

within Afghanistan, particularly in the north. The bottom line of all this is there

is little prospect of meeting the next stage of needs in Afghanistan without a multinational security force on the ground. Turkey indicated again today that they are

willing to send forces, and Indonesia and Bangladesh may be willing, as well. Or

it may be comprised of a United Nations ‘‘coalition of the willing’’ drawn partly from

NATO countries.

Our first panel has been following developments both in Afghanistan and in Bonn,

where negotiations appear to have yielded fruit. I look forward to their report on

progress towards establishing both a lasting political agreement and a truly effective security framework.

Only in a secure environment can we make real progress toward reconstructing

Afghanistan. We are not rebuilding Sarajevo or Sofia. Our goal is to be in a position

where there is education for girls and boys alike, where we’re going to be digging

wells and irrigation canals, paving roads, establishing medical clinics, and clearing

up the most heavily land-mined country on earth. We’re not building palaces or

great parliamentary buildings, we’re just trying to get this place back to the point

where there’s a prospect of the ability to govern.

All of this, though, is going to take a lot of money. According to U.N. Secretary

General Kofi Annan, it will cost more than $10 billion, over the course of perhaps

5-10 years. I’ve heard similar estimates from officials in the World Bank, a variety

of private NGOs, and the same within the U.S. Administration.

President Bush has been clear on the need for American leadership here. This is

a task for the world community—but the United States has been leading, it will continue to lead, and I would suggest that it has to lead, or this is not going to get

done.

The world’s attention is now focused on Afghanistan—but it won’t be for long. If

the President’s pledge is to carry real weight, it needs to be fleshed out right away.

How much money is the U.S. willing to commit? For what programs? And where

will the funds come from?

I, for one, am committed to helping the President keep the promise he so generously—and wisely—made.

The future of Afghanistan is, and must be, in the hands of the Afghan people

themselves. But we must do all we can to lead the world to assist the Afghans in

the task of rebuilding their country, their society, and their lives.

5

The CHAIRMAN. I yield to my friend Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. All of us appreciate

your scheduling this significant hearing. We hold a lot of hearings

that could be postponed, but this one need not be postponed, it

must not be.

Before we begin our consideration of the political questions before us today, I sort of feel obliged to express our appreciation to

our military and homeland defense forces. They are serving the

American people well and I am proud of them and I know everybody in this room is. From the Capitol Police on the corner of First

and C to the Marines outside of Kandahar, they are giving heart

and soul to their country and America’s values.

This has been going on a long time in this country and I suppose

as long as this country exists it will be going on from time to time.

Now, we are here today, as you have indicated yourself, Mr.

Chairman, to discuss the political future of Afghanistan or, perhaps

more realistically, the political future of Afghanistan—question

mark, is it going to continue. Now, one of the reasons Osama bin

Laden is in Afghanistan today is because the United States—and

let us be candid about it—the United States walked away from victory after the fall of the Soviet occupation. The massacres and

counter-massacres that followed the Soviet departure made the

Taliban look appealing to the Afghan people.

Now that victory is in hand again, we are back to status quo

ante bellum: the same players, same power vacuum, same rivalries.

The Bush administration and the United Nations knocked heads to

force the factions to agree. This was in Germany this week when

they got together. But how are we going to continue to make them

agree? Who is going to do it?

Some have suggested we need a peacekeeping force in Afghanistan, to which there is a one-word answer and it is pronounced ‘‘Somalia.’’ Anti-Taliban warlords are already fighting each other for

control of the liberated areas of Afghanistan. The Russians wasted

no time landing a contingent in Kabul, or ‘‘KOB-ble,’’ as some pronounce it. The Iranians as usual will be up to no good, and the

Pakistanis have interests that may or may not necessarily coincide

with us in Afghanistan.

So these two folks and the others to follow you are the experts,

and I personally appreciate your being here and I appreciate you

being willing to testify.

Now, how can we enfranchise the Afghans and disenfranchise

the busybodies in the region who made such a mess of the place?

That is to be determined. How do we use all the goodwill we have

won by freeing the people of Afghanistan without being trapped in

another fruitless nation-building nightmare? Boy, you sure do have

your work cut out for you, and I look forward to hearing what you

are going to do.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Helms follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JESSE HELMS

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your scheduling this significant hearing.

Before we begin our consideration of the political questions before us today, I feel

obliged to express our appreciation to our military and homeland defense forces.

They are serving the American people well during this time of crisis.

6

I’m proud of the men and women serving our country. From the Capitol police

on the corner of First and C to the Marines outside Kandahar, they are giving heart

and soul for their country and America’s values.

We are here today to discuss the political future of Afghanistan, or, perhaps more

realistically, the ‘‘political future of Afghanistan—question mark.’’

One of the reasons Osama bin Laden is in Afghanistan today is because the

United States walked away from victory after the fall of the Soviet occupation. The

massacres and counter-massacres that followed the Soviet departure made the

Taliban look appealing to the Afghan people.

Now that victory is at hand again, we’re back to status quo ante bellum—same

players, same power vacuum, same rivalries.

The Bush Administration and the United Nations knocked heads to force the factions to agree in Germany this week. But how are we going to make them continue

to agree? Who’s going to do it?

Some have suggested we need a peacekeeping force in Afghanistan, to which there

is a one-word answer: Somalia.

Anti-Taliban warlords are already fighting each other for control in liberated

areas of Afghanistan. The Russians wasted no time landing a contingent in Kabul;

the Iranians, as usual, will be up to no good. And the Pakistanis have interests that

may not necessarily coincide with ours in Afghanistan.

You folks are the experts: How can we enfranchise the Afghans and disenfranchise the busybodies in the region who have made such a mess of the place? How

do we use all the goodwill we have won by freeing the people of Afghanistan without

being trapped in another fruitless ‘‘nation-building’’ nightmare?

You have your work cut out for you, and I look forward to hearing your observations.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, if you will excuse the attempt at

humor here, I was telling Richard, who you and I know, all of us

know very well, have known for a long time, have great respect for,

I said: Congratulations. I said: You have got your work cut out for

you. I said: It reminds me of that story of the guy who jumps off

the ninetieth floor of a building and the guy on the fiftieth floor

sees him going by and yells out and says: How are you doing? He

says, he responds back: So far, so good.

But I have more optimism. Richard, it was a joke, only a joke.

With that, let us move on to our witnesses. We have two very

distinguished witnesses from the administration: Ambassador Richard M. Haass, Director of Policy and Planning Staff of the Department of State; and Christina Rocca, who is the Assistant Secretary

for South Asian Affairs of the Department of State, who is an old

hand around here, and we are delighted to have her back.

I might note parenthetically that I personally appreciate the access and cooperation I have had when I have had questions, and

particularly you I have been bugging, Christina, since it is your

area of the world, and I appreciate it very much. You have been

very helpful.

However you would like to proceed, however you would like to do

it, please.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTINA ROCCA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF

STATE, WASHINGTON DC

Ms. ROCCA. I will go first. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HELMS. Move your microphone so we can hear you.

Thank you.

Ms. ROCCA. Is that better? There we go.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee: It is my

privilege to appear before you today with Ambassador Haass to disVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:43 Mar 12, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 77065 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
7

cuss the political situation in post-Taliban Afghanistan. I will be

brief and restrict my remarks to providing an overall perspective

on the political situation, as well as the current state of our provision of humanitarian assistance. Ambassador Haass will cover reconstruction and security matters.

Mr. Chairman, as we speak American troops are in combat on

Afghan soil and the United States is engaged in three closely

linked efforts: to isolate and destroy UBL’s al-Qaeda organization

and its affiliates, both in Afghanistan and elsewhere; to decapitate

the Taliban regime that harbored al-Qaeda and other terrorist

groups; and to assist the people of Afghanistan to restore freedom,

prosperity, and good governance to their country.

The elimination of bin Laden and his associates from Afghanistan will be followed by a longer, internationally supported process

that aims to rebuild and bring lasting stability to the war-torn

country to prevent it from being safe haven for terrorists in the future. Ousting the Taliban leadership and helping the Afghan people form a broad-based representative government are high priorities in this process.

These tasks will not be easy, as you have said, and we recognize

that, especially given the ethnic and regional divisions within Afghanistan that Senator Helms referred to. It is not for us, however,

to choose who rules Afghanistan. It is not for us to choose who

rules Afghanistan, but we will assist those who seek a peaceful nation free of terrorism.

Well before September 11, the United States had been working

with the United Nations, with a number of other governments, and

with the Afghan factions and with Afghan groups outside their

home country to develop a process of national reconciliation

through a traditional Afghan grand council, or Loya Jirga. Together with our partners in this initiative, we developed a set of

guiding principles for a successor government that continue to have

meaning. It should be broad-based and representative of Afghan’s

diverse ethnic and religious groups. It should preserve the unity

and territorial integrity of the country. It should protect the human

rights of all its citizens, including women. It should not pose a

threat to any of its neighbors or near neighbors, and it must not

harbor international terrorists or export illegal drugs.

I am pleased to be able to report today that Afghanistan’s future

is looking brighter than it has in many years. December 5 marked

the conclusion of the U.N. talks in Bonn, which succeeded in pulling together Afghan groups with widely differing views and agendas and coming up with a framework for an interim government

in Afghanistan, as well as a place for the long-term future of that

country. We recognize that there is much hard work still to be

done.

The international community is reviewing ways to support the

Interim Authority and the process leading to establishment of a

permanent, multi-ethnic, broad-based, gender-inclusive government. There are meetings this week in Berlin separate from the

Bonn talks and later this month in Brussels and these will focus

attention on this important issue.

Afghanistan’s neighbors also play a critical role in helping support this process. They are front line states for terrorism, narcotics,

8

and refugee problems emanating from Afghanistan and their role

in backing the transition will be very important.

During this time of crisis, we have been most grateful for the

support we have been receiving from the countries in South and

Central Asia. Many have become key partners and joined a wider

coalition of nations committed to stopping terrorism in its tracks.

Pakistan has taken on a crucial role in support of our war in Afghanistan. One should not underestimate the serious political risks

President Musharraf took in doing so. His bold position at such a

critical juncture in international history will be remembered and

recognized for a long time to come.

India’s immediate and generous offers of cooperation also have

been greatly appreciated by this administration. India has also suffered from Taliban-inspired terrorism and we recognize not only its

offers of support to the coalition, but also their generous plans to

provide humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people.

Tajikistan has provided staging areas for humanitarian and

other operations which serve as crucial launching points for humanitarian assistance deliveries into Afghanistan. Turkmenistan

has set up a humanitarian depot and the U.N. is flying in food

shipments for further delivery to Afghanistan. Iran has been helpful by allowing the use of its port Bandar a Abbas for transshipment of wheat to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan

for onward delivery to Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan has also made

staging areas available for humanitarian assistance.

Finally, Uzbekistan has provided staging areas for humanitarian

and other assistance and they are working on opening the Termez

Bridge. U.S. forces are inspecting the bridge and, if sound, it could

be used to deliver much-needed humanitarian assistance to the region of Mazar-e Sharif and we are optimistic that it will be open

very soon.

Mr. Chairman, each of these states is well aware that it has everything to gain from a secure, prosperous, and stable nation on its

borders.

In the long run, we expect that the outcome of the Afghan political discussions will be a central authority of some sort in Kabul

with control over specific issues of national concern, complemented

by a decentralized administrative system which delegates some decisionmaking authority and control of resources to regional centers.

This is likely the only politically viable solution in a country

marked by regional and ethnic tensions, which unfortunately have

increased during the 20-plus years of conflict.

We plan to continue to provide directly to the Afghan people

through the U.N. and accredited NGO’s, and at some point it will

be realistic to discuss the possibility of providing multilateral assistance to a representative Afghan Government and to local governments and councils. This type of economic assistance will give

local governments and councils a stake in the rebuilding and economic wellbeing of the nation as a whole.

Targeting assistance will also assist in reintegrating women into

Afghan economic and political life. Under the Taliban, women and

girls in Afghanistan were the victims of serious and systematic

abuses. The Taliban’s unacceptable treatment of women will leave

a mark on Afghanistan’s long-term development. The U.N. reports

9

that female literacy is approximately 4 percent versus 30 percent

of males. The Taliban has also significantly reduced women’s access to health care, with resultant negative lasting consequences

for maternal and child health.

We are pleased that the Bonn talks included Afghan women and

that the Interim Authority will include several women, including a

vice chairman who will handle women’s affairs and the minister of

public health. This is an important step for Afghan women and one

that we strongly support.

In the past, women were a vital part of Afghan society. Having

them back playing important roles in Afghanistan’s public life, in

government, schools and hospitals will help to rebuild Afghan society.

Obviously, some of our goals for a stable, secure Afghanistan will

be reached more quickly than others. In the mean time, we also remain focused on the severe humanitarian crisis facing us in Afghanistan and we must continue to provide the Afghan people with

basic necessities. Let me provide you with a brief snapshot of

where we now stand with regard to humanitarian assistance.

I know you have heard this before, but we believe it bears repeating that prior to September 11 the United States was the

world’s single largest donor of assistance to the Afghan people, and

the complex humanitarian crisis currently gripping Afghanistan

started several years ago, coincident with the rise to power of the

Taliban.

On October 4, President Bush announced that the United States

would make available an additional $320 million for humanitarian

programs, underscoring the message that the United States would

come to the aid of the Afghan people. On November 20, Secretary

Powell and Secretary O’Neill launched the international planning

effort for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Afghanistan. As

the Secretary stated, our message to the Afghan people is that we

will not leave them in the lurch.

The humanitarian situation remains very serious, though. There

is still considerable insecurity in many parts of the country, which

inhibits the ability of the humanitarian agencies to do their work.

In particular, no food convoys have entered Afghanistan through

the important Quetta-Kandahar corridor for the past 3 weeks and

the international relief agencies have not had access to some

60,000 internally displaced Afghans under Taliban control in Spin

Boldak.

In the north, the critical logistics hub at Mazar-e Sharif is not

open due to the insecurity in the area. Concerns over security have

also delayed the opening of the essential land supply route from

Uzbekistan, which I mentioned earlier, but which we do hope will

be resolved soon.

Finally, winter is descending. The U.N. assessment is that between 5 and 7.5 million people are extremely vulnerable and in

need of international assistance. The relief community, led by

USAID and the World Food Program [WFP], has done an outstanding job getting food and other supplies into the country under

very difficult circumstances. WFP reports that it achieved its overall target of 52,000 metric tons of food in November and it set the

ambitious goal of moving 100,000 tons in December. In November

10

UNICEF completed its polio vaccination campaign for 5 million

children.

UNHCR has continued to work with Pakistan to allow refugees

to enter and to be accommodated in new camps where they can receive international protection and assistance. The numbers arriving

in Pakistan have been relatively small, some 135,000 since September 11, and with the success of the opposition forces there are

already spontaneous refugee return movements occurring, especially from Iran.

Against this backdrop, there are a vigorous assessment and planning actions under way for the rapid expansion of humanitarian

assistance where and when security permits. The U.N. has reestablished its presence in Kabul, Herat, and Faizabad and convoys are

able to reach those locations. The international donor community

is reviewing the integrated U.N. relief strategy for the winter at a

meeting this week in Berlin that I mentioned earlier. Donor

pledges, some $800 million in total, will cover the requirements

presented in the U.N. plan.

In 2 weeks in Brussels, the steering group for the reconstruction

will meet to set the course and start the resource mobilization effort, endeavoring to integrate planning for recovery and rehabilitation work with the existing humanitarian strategy. This effort will

also aim to establish the interface between the Afghan Interim Authority and the U.N. and international financial institutions.

The road to peace and prosperity in Afghanistan will be long and

difficult. We must all work toward this goal, not only for Afghanistan but for the region and the rest of the world.

Thank you for your attention.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Rocca follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTINA ROCCA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SOUTH

ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Committee, it is my privilege to appear before you with Mr. Haass to discuss the political situation in Post-Taliban Afghanistan. I will be brief, and restrict my remarks to providing an overall perspective on the political situation as well as the current state of our provision of humanitarian assistance. Mr. Haass will cover reconstruction and security matters.

Mr. Chairman, as we speak, American troops are in combat on Afghan soil and

the U.S. is engaged in three closely linked efforts: to isolate and destroy UBL’s alQaeda organization and its affiliates, both in Afghanistan and elsewhere; to decapitate the Taliban regime that harbored al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, and to

assist the people of Afghanistan restore freedom, prosperity and good governance to

their country.

The elimination of Bin Laden and his associates from Afghanistan will be followed

by a longer internationally-supported process that aims to rebuild and bring lasting

stability to the war-torn country to prevent it from being a safehaven for terrorists.

Ousting the Taliban leadership and helping the Afghan people form a broad-based,

representative government are high priorities in this process. These tasks will not

be easy, especially given the ethnic and regional divisions within Afghanistan. It is

not for us to choose who rules Afghanistan, but we will assist those who seek a

peaceful nation free of terrorism.

Well before September 11, the United States had been working with the United

Nations, with a number of other governments, with the Afghan factions, and with

Afghan groups outside their home country to develop a process of national reconciliation through a traditional Afghan Grand Council, or Loya Jirga. Together with our

partners in the initiative, we developed a set of guiding principles for a successor

government that continue to have meaning:

• It should be broad-based and representative of Afghanistan’s diverse ethnic and

religious groups.

11

• It should preserve the unity and territorial integrity of the country.

• It should protect the human rights of all its citizens including women.

• It should not pose a threat to any of its neighbors or near neighbors.

• It must not harbor international terrorists or export illegal drugs.

I’m pleased to be able to report that today, Afghanistan’s future is looking brighter than it has in many years. December 5th marked the conclusion of the U.N. talks

in Bonn which succeeded in pulling together Afghan groups with widely differing

views and agendas and coming up with a framework for an interim government in

Afghanistan, as well as a plan for the long term future of that country.

• On December 22, the Interim Authority will begin handling the day-to-day conduct of the affairs of state for the next six months. All armed groups shall come

under the command and control of the Interim Authority.

• The Interim Authority will consist of an Interim Administration presided over

by a Chairman and includes five Vice Chairmen and 23 other members, a Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga,

and a Supreme Court of Afghanistan. Its membership will reflect the ethnic, geographic and religious composition of Afghanistan and women.

• The Interim Authority will cooperate with the international community in the

fight against terrorism, drugs and organized crime and will maintain peaceful

and friendly relations with neighboring countries.

• All actions taken by the Interim Authority shall be consistent with the relevant

Security Council resolutions, particularly concerning counterterrorism.

• An Emergency Loya Jirga will be convened within six months by former exKing Zahir Shah. The Loya Jirga will decide on a Transitional Authority to lead

Afghanistan until election of a fully representative government.

• A Constitutional Loya Jirga will convene to adopt a new constitution within

eighteen months of the establishment of the Transitional Authority. The international community is reviewing ways to support the Interim Authority and the

process leading to establishment of a permanent multi-ethnic, broad-based, gender-inclusive government. There are meetings this week in Berlin, separate

from the Bonn talks, and later this month in Brussels that will focus attention

on this important issue. One of the challenges will be security. While the Afghan delegations in Bonn recognize that the responsibility for providing security

and law and order throughout the country resides with the Afghans themselves,

they have asked the international community to help establish and train new

Afghan security and armed forces.

Afghanistan’s neighbors play a critical role in helping to support this process.

They are frontline states for terrorism, narcotics and refugee problems emanating

from Afghanistan. Their role in backing the transition will be very important.

During this time of crisis, we have been most grateful for the support we are receiving from the countries in South and Central Asia. Many have become key partners and join a wider coalition of nations committed to stopping terrorism in its

tracks. Pakistan has taken on a crucial role in support of our war in Afghanistan.

One should not underestimate the serious political risks President Musharraf is taking to do this. His bold position at such a critical juncture in international history

will be remembered and recognized for a long time to come.

India’s immediate and generous offers of cooperation also have been greatly appreciated by this Administration. India has also suffered from Taliban-inspired terrorism and we recognize not only its offers of support to the coalition, but also their

generous plans to provide humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people.

Tajikistan has provided staging areas for humanitarian and other operations,

which serve as crucial launching points for humanitarian assistance deliveries into

Afghanistan.

Turkmenistan has set up a humanitarian depot, and the UN is flying in food shipments for further delivery to Afghanistan.

Iran has been helpful by allowing the use of its port Bandar a Abbas for transshipment of wheat to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan for onward delivery

to Afghanistan.

Kyrgyzstan has also made staging areas available for humanitarian assistance.

Russia’s EMERCOM (emergency relief organization) is transporting wheat shipments overland from Kyrgyzstan directly into Afghanistan.

The Uzbeks have provided staging areas for humanitarian and other assistance

and are working to open the Termez bridge. U.S. forces are inspecting the bridge

and if sound, it could be used to deliver much-needed humanitarian assistance to

the region of Mazar-e Sharif. We are optimistic that the Uzbek government will

open the bridge soon.

12

Regionally, the U.S. is cooperating with the UNDCP (United Nations Drug Control Programme) and Afghanistan’s neighbors to build national and regional capacities to counter the Afghan drug trade. As much as half of the quantity of illicit

drugs produced in Afghanistan are consumed in Afghanistan and its neighboring

states.

Mr. Chairman, each one of these states is well aware that it has everything to

gain from a secure, prosperous, and stable nation on its borders.

In the long run, we expect that the outcome of Afghan political discussions will

be a central authority in Kabul with control over specific issues of national concern

complemented by a decentralized administrative system which delegates some decision-making authority and control of resources to regional centers, likely the only

politically viable solution in a country marked by regional and ethnic tensions which

unfortunately have increased during twenty plus years of conflict. We plan to continue to provide aid directly to the Afghan people through the UN and accredited

NGOs. At some point soon it will be realistic to discuss the possibility of providing

multilateral assistance to a representative Afghan government and to local governments and councils. This type of economic assistance will give local governments

and councils a stake in the rebuilding and economic well-being of the nation as a

whole.

Targeting assistance will also assist in reintegrating women into the Afghan economy and political life. Under the Taliban, women and girls in Afghanistan were the

victims of serious and systemic abuses. As the Taliban solidified their political

power base, they intensified their control of women using the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of Vice (PVSV) to enforce their radical beliefs.

Under the rule of the Taliban, the humanitarian situation for all Afghan people, and

particularly the most vulnerable of them—women and children—continued to deteriorate.

Prior to the Taliban, a limited but growing number of Afghan women, particularly

in urban areas, worked outside the home in nontraditional roles. There were female

lawyers, government officials and doctors in Kabul. Following the Taliban takeover

of Kabul in 1996, they began to enforce a series of ultra-conservative social strictures, many of which had a severe impact upon women and diminished their status

in society. Taliban rules restricted women’s basic rights—freedom of expression,

movement and participation in society. The impact of Taliban restrictions on women

affected economic and social conditions, most of all in urban areas which had significant numbers of educated and professional women. The Taliban also eliminated opportunities for girls’ education. This practice will leave a mark on Afghanistan’s long-term development—the U.N. reports that female literacy is approximately 4

percent versus 30 percent for males. The Taliban also significantly reduced women’s access to health care with resultant negative lasting consequences for maternal and

child health.

We are pleased that the Bonn talks included Afghan women and that the Interim

Authority will include several women, including a Vice Chairman who will handle

women’s affairs and a minister of public health. This is an important step for Afghan women. In the past, women were a vital part of Afghan society; having them

back playing important roles in Afghanistan’s public life, in government, schools and

hospitals, will help to rebuild Afghan society.

Obviously, some of our goals for a stable, secure Afghanistan will be reached more

quickly than others. In the meantime we must also remain focused on the severe

humanitarian crisis facing us in Afghanistan and we must continue to provide the

Afghan people with basic necessities.

Let me provide you with a snapshot of where we now stand with regard to humanitarian assistance. I know you have heard this before, but we believe it bears

repeating, that prior to September 11, the United States was the world’s single largest donor of assistance to the Afghan people. And the complex humanitarian crisis

currently gripping Afghanistan started several years ago, coincident with the rise

to power of the Taliban.

On October 4, President Bush announced that the United States would make

available an additional $320 million for humanitarian programs, underscoring the

message that the United Sates would come to the aid of the Afghan people. On November 20, Secretary Powell and Secretary O’Neill launched the international planning effort for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Afghanistan. As the Secretary

stated, our message to the Afghan people is that we will not leave them in the

lurch.

The humanitarian situation remains very serious. There is still considerable insecurity in many parts of the country, which inhibits the ability of the humanitarian

agencies to do their work. In particular, no food convoys have entered Afghanistan

through the important Quetta-Kandahar corridor for the past three weeks, and

13

international relief agencies have not had access to some 60,000 internally displaced

Afghans under Taliban control at Spin Boldak. In the North, the critical logistics

hub at Mazar-e Sharif is not open due to insecurity in the area. Concerns over security have also delayed the opening of the essential land supply route into Afghanistan from Uzbekistan, which would utilize the Friendship Bridge at Termez.

And winter is descending. The UN assessment is that between 5 and 7.5 million

people are extremely vulnerable and in need of international assistance. The relief

community, led by USAID and the World Food Program, has done an outstanding

job getting food and other supplies into the country under very difficult circumstances. WFP reports that it achieved its overall target of 52,000 metric tons

of food in November and has set an ambitious goal of moving 100,000 tons during

December. In November, UNICEF completed its polio vaccination campaign for 5

million children. UNHCR has continued to work with Pakistan to allow refugees to

enter and to be accommodated in new camps where they can receive international

protection and assistance. The numbers arriving in Pakistan have been relatively

small—some 135,000 since September 11. And with the success of the opposition

forces there are already spontaneous refugee return movements occurring, especially

from Iran.

Against this backdrop, there are vigorous assessment and planning actions underway for the rapid expansion of humanitarian assistance when and where security

permits. The UN has reestablished its presence in Kabul, Herat, and Faizabad, and

convoys are able to reach those locations. The international donor community is reviewing the integrated UN relief strategy for the winter at a meeting this week in

Berlin. Donor pledges—some $800 million in total—will cover the requirements presented in the UN plan. In two weeks, in Brussels, the Steering Group for the reconstruction effort will meet to set the course and start the resource mobilization effort,

endeavoring to integrate planning for recovery and rehabilitation work with the existing humanitarian strategy. This effort will also aim to establish the interface between the Afghan interim authority and the UN and international financial institutions.

The road to peace and prosperity in Afghanistan will be long and difficult. We

must all work toward this goal not only for Afghanistan but for the region and the

rest of the world.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD N. HAASS, DIRECTOR OF POLICY PLANNING STAFF AND U.S. COORDINATOR FOR THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Ambassador HAASS. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to

have this opportunity to testify before the Committee on Foreign

Relations in my capacity as U.S. Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan. In the interest of time, what I suggest is I simply summarize my prepared remarks and we can put the longer statement,

if you would like, in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be placed in the record.

Ambassador HAASS. Our aims in Afghanistan are well known.

We seek an Afghanistan that is free of terrorists, that no longer is

a source of poppy, and that allows its citizens to return home and

live normal lives in which opportunity comes to replace misery.

Today we can all take considerable satisfaction in how much

progress we have made toward the realization of these goals. I say

this fully aware of all that remains to be done.

Moreover, it is difficult to exaggerate the difficulties still before

us. Still, Mr. Chairman, I view the future with some confidence.

This stems first and foremost from the great success of the coalition’s military operations.

14

The second reason for guarded optimism is the behavior of the

Afghans themselves. What we have witnessed recently could not be

more different from what took place when the Mujaheddin defeated

the Soviets in 1989. Today Northern Alliance soldiers are acting

with discipline. Reprisals and atrocities appear to be notably absent. Moreover, we have seen at Bonn a remarkable demonstration

of Afghans coming together to forge a common political future.

The third reason for my relatively upbeat assessment today is

the behavior of Afghanistan’s neighbors and others with influence.

Countries appear to understand that restraint is necessary if a stable Afghanistan will materialize. We are seeing less of the historic

‘‘great game’’ and more cooperation for the greater good.

The fourth and final reason for my optimism today is the attitude of the international community. In 1989, in the wake of the

Soviet military withdrawal, much of the international community

decided to limit their involvement in Afghanistan out of respect for

the strong Afghan tradition of independence from foreigners. This

time around, the help will be there.

Future success, though, will depend on translating this potential

situation into actual accomplishments. As you have just heard, Assistant Secretary Rocca focused on the political and diplomatic and

humanitarian questions. What I would like to do is turn to questions of reconstruction and security.

Beginning with reconstruction, the challenge is to move as expeditiously as possible along the humanitarian continuum from relief

and recovery to actual reconstruction projects. Already, a number

of international meetings have been convened toward these ends

and a conference at which donors will pledge assistance is to gather

in Tokyo in January.

These meetings will take place under the co-chairmanship of a

steering committee consisting of the United States, Japan, the European Union, and Saudi Arabia. The nature and scale of the effort

will be determined not simply by the generosity of the donor countries, but also by Afghanistan’s needs and its absorptive capacity.

The necessary detailed asssessments are being conducted right now

by the U.N. Development Program, the World Bank, and the Asian

Development Bank.

Although the planning for Afghanistan’s recovery and reconstruction is necessarily in its early stages, a good many of the principles

which will inform it can already be articulated. First, the effort will

be comprehensive, ranging from so-called quick impact projects to

longer term and larger undertakings. In this, resettlement of refugees and the internally displaced will be an ongoing priority.

Second, a second priority will be to discourage the production of

poppy. This will likely require a focus on alternative economic development as well as eradication and border control.

Another priority, one already mentioned by my colleague, will be

improving the situation of and prospects for girls and women. To

deny them a role, a significant role, in Afghanistan’s future would

be equivalent to drawing a line down the middle of the country and

simply ignoring all the people on one side of that line.

Recovery and reconstruction must be done with, not to, the Afghans. This requires involving women in the planning and developVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:43 Mar 12, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 77065 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
15

ment of the project, involving the Afghan diaspora, and involving

elements of civil society who have remained in the country.

Reconstruction needs to be an Afghan mainly, but not an Afghan

only, endeavor. Afghanistan’s neighbors are more likely to support

and cooperate with international efforts to promote Afghanistan’s

stability if they participate in and benefit from the process.

Last, recovery and reconstruction will require a sustained, generous effort by the international community. We are clearly looking

at a total of many billions of dollars over many years. It is both

right and necessary that the United States be prepared to do its

share. The administration looks forward to consulting with this

committee and with the Congress as our planning on the scope and

scale of what we do becomes more refined.

Let me turn now to the military and security front. The immediate challenge is to continue to prosecute the war successfully

against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Again, this is something that

will be accomplished by the U.S.-led coalition together with Afghans themselves.

Let me turn now more specifically to security arrangements. The

agreement just signed in Bonn calls for an international security

force to help Afghans provide near-term security in Kabul and the

surrounding areas. The signatories to the agreement also ask the

international community to help train a pan-Afghan security force.

There are, though, a number of questions still to be determined

about an international security force, including its mandate, its

size, its capability, its composition, command arrangements, and

the precise area of deployment. These and related issues are being

discussed among U.S. officials, the Afghan Interim Authority once

it is formed, the United Nations, and potential troop contributors.

One thing, though, is critical. Such a force must do nothing that

would in any way inhibit the coalition from carrying out the primary objectives of ridding Afghanistan of terror.

Mr. Chairman, let me end my remarks with just a few principles.

First, despite the optimism that you have heard, we do not harbor

unrealistic goals of perfection for Afghanistan. But we do believe it

is both desirable and necessary to work with Afghans and others

in the international community to make Afghanistan viable.

Second, the role of the international community is and will remain critical, yet it must remain limited. This is not Cambodia, it

is not East Timor. Afghanistan is not to be a U.N. or international

trusteeship. Many of the details of the future of Afghan society,

economy, and its political system must be devised and implemented

by Afghans themselves. They will have the principal and final say

about how to blend the traditional and the modern, the central and

the local, the national and the tribal.

Third, we need to be clear about our time horizons. The U.S.-coalition effort will not be ended until its mission is complete. Then,

however, coalition forces will be prepared to depart. This is as it

should be. But we should not be thinking about exit strategies

when it comes to assisting the Afghans with their political, economic, and security challenges. An engagement strategy is what is

needed.

Fourth, we need to be prepared for tactical setbacks. Attacks by

individuals or small groups of terrorists or Taliban sympathizers

16

could continue for months or even years. Some disagreement and

even infighting among the Afghans themselves is to be expected.

Not everyone is going to endorse the emerging order. Eradicating

drugs will be an ongoing challenge, as will persuading Afghans to

give up their arms. Yet, these and other challenges should not preclude what has the potential to be a strategic trajectory of progress.

Last, it is important we keep in mind just why it is we are involved in Afghanistan. We want and need to succeed because we

do not want to contemplate having again to deal with the consequences of a failed pariah country. At the same time, history and

conscience argue for doing a great deal to give the people of Afghanistan a new lease on life. What we have now is a historical

rarity, a second chance to do right by ourselves and by others.

American foreign policy at its best combines the strategic and the

moral. Afghanistan is an opportunity to demonstrate just this.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions and comments.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Haass follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMB. RICHARD N. HAASS, DIRECTOR OF POLICY PLANNING

STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND U.S. COORDINATOR FOR THE FUTURE OF AF- GHANISTAN

Mr. Chairman: I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify before the Committee on Foreign Relations in my capacity as U.S. Coordinator for the Future of

Afghanistan.

Our aims in Afghanistan are well known to the American people and this Committee. We seek to bring about an Afghanistan that is free of terrorists, that no

longer is a source of poppy, and that allows its citizens—including an estimated five

million refugees and an unknown number of internally displaced persons—to return

to their homes and live normal lives in which opportunity comes to replace misery.

Today, nearly three months after the horrendous attacks of September 11, and

some two months after coalition military operations in Afghanistan commenced, we

can all take considerable satisfaction in how much progress we have made towards

the realization of these goals.

I say this fully aware of all that remains to be done. Moreover, it is difficult to

exaggerate the difficulties still before us. Afghanistan and its people have experienced more than two decades of occupation and war. An entire generation has

grown up knowing little but violence. Economic mismanagement and drought have

added to the hardship. As already noted, millions of Afghans are either refugees or

displaced. Millions of Afghans, including most girls, have been denied the chance

to go to school. When you add to this the political and religious intolerance that was

at the core of Taliban rule, you have a picture of suffering that is extraordinary.

Still, I view the future with some confidence. This stems first and foremost from

the great success of the coalition’s military operations. The Taliban regime no longer

exists; its remnants along with those of its al-Qaeda backers are reduced to a last

stand in Kandahar and to hiding in caves. This military victory is the basis for all

else that we may try to accomplish in Afghanistan.

A second reason for guarded optimism is the behavior of the Afghans themselves.

What we have witnessed recently could not be more different from what took place

when the Mujahadeen defeated the Soviets in 1989. Then, civil war and reprisals

were the norm; the ultimate result was the Taliban. Today, Northern Alliance soldiers are acting with discipline; reprisals and atrocities appear to be notably absent.

Moreover, we have seen at Bonn a remarkable demonstration of Afghans of all

stripes—insiders and exiles, northerners and southerners, Pashtuns and Tajiks and

Hazaras and Uzbeks, men and women—coming together to forge a common political

future. There is no better proof than the ‘‘Agreement on Provisional Arrangements

in Afghanistan pending the Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions’’

just reached in Bonn.

A third reason for my relatively upbeat assessment is the behavior of Afghanistan’s neighbors and others with influence. Again, the contrast with the past is telling. One reason for Afghanistan’s trials and turmoil during the last decade was the

competition between and among outsiders for influence on the inside. This time,

countries appear to understand that restraint is necessary if a stable Afghanistan—

one that denies sanctuary to terrorists, one that doesn’t export drugs, one that can

17

take back refugees, one willing to live in peace with its neighbors—will materialize.

This, too, was demonstrated at Bonn. We are seeing less of the historic ‘‘great game’’ and more cooperation for the greater good.

A fourth and final reason for my optimism today is the attitude of the international community. In 1989, in the wake of the Soviet military withdrawal, much

of the international community, including ourselves, decided to limit their involvement in Afghanistan. The reasons were not arbitrary; to the contrary, one motivation was to respect the strong Afghan tradition of independence from foreigners. Yet

Afghanistan clearly needed help to deal with its political, economic and securitymilitary challenges. This time around, the help will be there.

Future success, though, will depend on translating this potential into accomplishments. This will require continued, sustained effort in three areas: the political/diplomatic, the humanitarian/economic, and the military/security.

THE POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC FRONT

The U.S. Government has for some time sought to promote a viable, broad-based,

and representative Afghan political alternative to the Taliban. We knew that helping to create such an alternative was both desirable—it would help persuade Afghans to shift their allegiances away from the Taliban—and necessary, as the world

needed an Afghan partner to work with on matters ranging from relief and recovery

to reconstruction and security.

Towards this end, we have been active diplomatically. Much of this has been done

in collaboration with and support of the United Nations. U.S. officials (including

Ambassador James Dobbins, who led our delegation in Bonn) have promoted our

aims in Afghanistan at meetings of the 6 plus 2, the Geneva initiative, in multilateral fora, and in countless bilateral meetings with Afghan parties, other governments, and representatives of international organizations. Diplomacy has made a

difference.

Much of this effort culminated over the past ten days in Bonn. The results of the

Bonn meeting of the representatives of what were the four principal Afghan opposition groups are impressive by any yardstick. A broad based, representative government is in sight. Assisted by the able chairmanship of Lakhdar Brahimi, the Special

Representative of the UN Secretary General for Afghanistan, the delegates agreed

to a political road map charting Afghanistan’s political course for the next two to

three years and beyond. At the start of this road map is the creation of an Interim

Authority, a 30 person institution (to be chaired by Hamid Karzai) that will on December 22 come to be the sovereign representative of Afghanistan. This body will

provide a partner for the entire international community as it endeavors to enhance

Afghanistan’s security and provide humanitarian and economic assistance for the

country’s recovery and rehabilitation. What will follow within six months will be the

convening (by former King Zahir Shah) of an emergency ‘‘Loya Jirga,’’ a large council of many of Afghanistan’s key citizens. This gathering will lead in turn to a transitional administration and a second Loya Jirga to decide constitutional matters. At

the end of the process a legitimate Afghan government is to emerge through processes designed to give the Afghan people a real voice and vote.

RELIEF, RECOVERY, AND RECONSTRUCTION

As just noted, prospects for political progress are predicated in significant part on

an improving humanitarian and economic context. This has been the case for some

time. Indeed, the international community, with the United States in the lead, has

provided generous amounts of relief to the people of Afghanistan over the past several years. The liberation of the country’s north, the area of most severe humanitarian crisis, has eased the plight of the people, and further improvements in the

security situation there will have dramatic impact. Although we still have a great

deal to accomplish, it is now possible to envision an end to the era when relief dominated efforts by the international community toward Afghanistan.

By definition, relief is just that—a stop gap. The challenge is to move as expeditiously as possible along the humanitarian continuum to recovery and reconstruction projects. Already, a number of international meetings have been convened toward these ends, including a meeting of senior officials convened in Washington on

November 20 by the United States and Japan. A second meeting of senior officials

is scheduled for mid-December in Brussels, and a conference at which donors will

pledge assistance is to gather in Tokyo in January. These meetings will take place

under the co-chairmanship of a steering group consisting of the United States,

Japan, the European Union, and Saudi Arabia.

The nature and scale of the effort will be determined not just by the generosity

of the donor countries but also by Afghanistan’s needs and absorptive capacity. The

18

necessary detailed assessments are being conducted by the United Nations Development Program, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank.

Although the planning for Afghanistan’s recovery and reconstruction is necessarily in its early stages, a good many of the principles which will inform it can

already be anticipated.

• The effort will be comprehensive, ranging from so-called quick impact projects

(demining, local road rehabilitation, provision of seeds, renovation of water supplies, reopening schools, etc.) to longer term and larger undertakings in the

areas of agriculture, household and light industry, infrastructure modernization, education, and health. Resettlement of refugees and the internally displaced will be an ongoing priority.

• Another priority will be to discourage the production of poppy. This will likely

require focus on alternative economic development as well as eradication and

border controls.

• Also a priority will be improving the situation of and prospects for girls and

women. Not only do girls and women constitute an estimated 55-60% of the

country’s population, but they were denied educational and employment opportunity in the Taliban era. To deny them a significant role in Afghanistan’s future would be equivalent to drawing a line down the middle of the country and

ignoring all those on one side of the line.

• Recovery and reconstruction must be done with and not to Afghans. This requires involving not only women in the planning and implementation of these

efforts but involving also the Afghan diaspora in addition to elements of civil

society who have remained in the country.

• Reconstruction will be an Afghan mainly but not an Afghan only endeavor. Afghanistan is more likely to improve if the immediate region also fares well economically. In addition, Afghanistan’s neighbors are more likely to support and

cooperate with international efforts to promote Afghanistan’s stability if they

participate in and benefit from the process.

• Last, recovery and reconstruction will require a sustained, generous effort by

the international community. We are clearly looking at a total of many billions

of dollars over many years. It is both right and necessary that the United States

be prepared to do its share. The Administration looks forward to consulting

with this Committee and the Congress as our planning on the scope and scale

of what we will do becomes more refined.

THE MILITARY AND SECURITY FRONT

The immediate military challenge is to continue to prosecute the war against alQaeda and the Taliban. This entails bringing about the liberation of Kandahar, the

last remaining Taliban stronghold, and then rooting out al-Qaeda and Taliban forces

wherever they may be hiding. Again, this will be something accomplished by the

U.S.-led coalition in conjunction with Afghans.

Security arrangements also need to be made and implemented for liberated areas,

especially Kabul. The agreement signed in Bonn calls for an international security

force to help Afghans provide near-term security in Kabul and the surrounding

areas. The signatories to the agreement have also asked the international community to help train a pan-Afghan security force. The United States military involvement in Afghanistan will continue to be focused on our primary objective of destroying al-Qaeda and routing out the Taliban.

There are a number of questions still to be determined about an international security force, including its mandate; size; capability; composition; command arrangements; and precise area of deployment. These and related issues will be discussed

among U.S. officials, the Afghan Interim Administration, the UN, and troop contributors. One thing is critical, however, it must do nothing that would in any way inhibit the coalition from carrying out the primary objective of ridding Afghanistan

of terrorism.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

Mr. Chairman, as already stated, the United States and the international community face considerable challenges before we can be sure we have made Afghanistan

a country free of terrorists and drugs. It will take time and resources to help Afghans create a society in which the citizens of Afghanistan can return home to a

life of security, economic opportunity, and greater freedom. We do not harbor unrealistic goals of perfection, but we do believe it is both desirable and necessary to

work with Afghans and others in the international community to make Afghanistan

a viable society.

19

The role of the international community is and will remain critical. Yet it must

remain limited. This is not East Timor. Afghanistan is not to be a UN or international trusteeship. Indeed, many of the details of a future Afghan society, economy, and political system must be devised and implemented by Afghans themselves.

They will have the principal and final say about how to blend the traditional and

the modern, the central and the local, the national and the tribal.

We need to be clear about our time horizons. The U.S.-led coalition effort will not

be ended until its mission is completed. Then, however, coalition forces will be prepared to depart. This is as it should be. But we should not be thinking about exit

strategies when it comes to assisting the Afghans with their political, economic, and

security challenges. An engagement strategy is what is needed.

We need to be prepared for tactical setbacks. Progress will not always be linear.

Attacks by individuals or small groups of terrorists or Taliban sympathizers could

continue for months or years to come. Some disagreement and even infighting

among the Afghans is to be expected; not everyone is likely to endorse the emerging

order. Eradicating drugs will be an ongoing challenge, as will persuading Afghans

to give up their arms. Yet these and other tactical challenges should not preclude

what should be a strategic trajectory of progress.

Last, we must keep in mind why we are involved in Afghanistan. We want and

need to succeed, in part because we do not want to contemplate having again to deal

with the consequences of a failed, pariah Afghanistan. At the same time, history

and conscience argue for doing a great deal to give the people of Afghanistan a new

lease on life.

What we now have is an historical rarity—a second chance—to do right by ourselves and others. American foreign policy at its best combines the strategic and the

moral. Afghanistan is a chance to demonstrate just this.

Thank you. I look forward to your comments and questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

I have been told, ladies and gentlemen, the votes have been postponed until 11:40 and it may be only one vote then, so we may be

able to move this. In order to accommodate that, why do we not

have the first round 5 minutes, and let me begin with you, Mr. Ambassador.

The Secretary General asked to meet with Senator Helms and

myself, Senator Lott, and some others in my office last week to discuss, among other things, the security side of this arrangement.

Let me say as a preface, I am fully aware, and I think my colleague

will sustain that I stated flatly to the Secretary General that any

security force that was put in place would not, could not, and

would not be allowed to in any way interfere with our actions relative to prosecuting our efforts against al-Qaeda and Mr. bin

Laden, no matter what it took.

I indicated to him, I think Senator Helms will recall, that I could

not speak for everyone, I know everyone in the room agreed, but

I thought I spoke for a vast majority of Democrats as well as Republicans in that regard.

But, having said that, it seems as though you have a bit of a dilemma here. The pressure—‘‘pressure,’’ wrong word. The concern

from the Defense Department and other places, legitimately, of

having a multilateral force in place that we could end up stumbling

over or having to coordinate with relative to al-Qaeda and bin

Laden is a reasonable concern. But it seems—and this is an observation, may not be accurate—it seems to have slowed up what—

let me put it another way.

If we already had bin Laden in custody and al-Qaeda had been

eliminated, I would be dumbfounded if we would not have by now

already had a security force in place. So it seems to me that the

security force being put in place, which is obviously necessary—in

20

today’s New York Times in section B, there is a schematic map of

the area still controlled by or impacted on by the Taliban.

Obviously, Mazar is an area where—I did not think the reason

why we were not using the Friendship Bridge was the lack of its

capacity to sustain vehicles crossing it, although that is a concern,

but the lack of the capacity to sustain the safety of those folks once

they cross the bridge.

So there is this competing dilemma here. When we spoke at some

length with Kofi Annan, he indicated that there were three alternatives that he had discussed. One was a blue-helmeted operation;

the second was a total indigenous force; and the third was a coalition of the willing led by the United States, not having anything

to do with blue helmets.

He thought that the second of the two—I do not think I am putting words in his mouth; I think that what he said—the second of

the two is the only real alternative. When we asked him about Turkey and Bangladesh and other Islamic nations, he said that his

clear view was that they were willing, and smaller countries—and

Turkey has a serious military capability—and smaller countries

were willing to participate as long as, he said, some of the big guys

were there, primarily us, but also the Brits, the French, the Germans, and they have offered.

So that is a long preface to a relatively short question. How do

you—talk to us about this timing element, if that is any part of

getting security on the ground to get the aid in place, because specifically the discussion about why Pashtun leaders were not willing

to go to Kabul, in addition to not wanting to walk into the circumstance where they would have their fate settled politically because it would not be done at Bonn, there was a security concern

as well.

So talk to me about this relationship and what kind of security

force you are envisioning or thinking about. My time is up.

Ambassador HAASS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have been

weighing a lot of these same tradeoffs ourselves, as you might expect, over the past few months. One of the key things in the timing, in addition to obviously having the military situation reach a

point where you could even contemplate a role for an international

security force, was also having an Interim Authority to work with.

We needed a representative, legitimate Afghan partner to discuss

this, and that will be in place, we expect, by December 22. Indeed,

we needed something like Bonn to actually produce someone to talk

to in the intervening period.

The general options are as you suggest. A blue-helmeted force

seems out of the question for the foreseeable future. Blue-helmeted

forces are there for peacekeeping. At the moment there is no peace

to keep.

The CHAIRMAN. We are talking about a force for enforcement, are

we not, as well as peacekeeping?

Ambassador HAASS. I think we are talking about something more

than a traditional peacekeeping force here. I think we have to be

realistic. But again, how much more and where I think are important questions. I think there is a spectrum here, that we have to

be careful about where it is we feel comfortable with ourselves

going and where we want to put certain limits.

21

But I think again everyone understands that this is not appropriate for a traditional U.N. blue-helmeted force, which tends to

work in a consensual environment, usually has very little capability, and so forth. Everyone understands that is not called for.

An indigenous force, a so-called pan-Afghan force, is envisioned

by the Bonn agreement. It is everyone’s goal ultimately. The problem is we just cannot get from here to there as quickly as we would

like to. You simply do not have the political basis and the coalition

and the experience.

So what we therefore need is a gap-filler essentially between

where we are now and when a pan-Afghan force could assume the

role of security in Afghanistan. I think there you are looking at

some sort of an international security force, as it is called in the

Bonn agreement. It is endorsed by the United Nations, but it does

not report to the United Nations, an important distinction.

We obviously have to work out questions of command arrangements, coming back to the first principle that nothing it does could

in any way hobble or interfere with the operations of the coalition.

We have got to still look at questions of its geographic coverage,

whether it is simply limited to Kabul or it goes beyond. There is

obviously questions of composition. I take your point that it will

need some capable questions.

But these are exactly the questions we are wrestling with. These

are not unilateral for us to decide. It is something that we are

working out with potential troop contributors, with the United Nations, and with the Afghans themselves, because if you read the

Bonn agreement carefully, if this force came into Kabul it would be

preceded by the withdrawal from Kabul of all Afghan forces. So

this is very much a friendly, if you will, transition from the existing

situation to something else.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope we do not discuss it too much and I hope

we do not rely too much on their input and I hope we exert our

influence very firmly and soon, because our experience in similar

circumstances has been when we do not it does not work well.

But I thank you very much. I yield to the chairman.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, do I not recognize you? Have I not seen you

on the Senate floor a time or two with a fellow named Brownback?

Ms. ROCCA. I believe that is correct, Senator.

Senator HELMS. We miss you.

Ms. ROCCA. Thank you.

Senator HELMS. I hope you are enjoying your work.

Last week the United States Ambassador to Pakistan toured a

Pakistani textile factory and while there she said—and let me

quote her: ‘‘The patriotic thing to do if you are an American is to

buy Pakistani products, because the stronger the partner we have

here in Pakistan is a stronger partner against terror in Afghanistan.’’ I have got the article here where she said that.

Now, perhaps she is unaware that there are two sides to that

story. Like old Shoeless Joe used to say, ‘‘it ain’t necessarily so.’’ The United States textile and apparel industry last year lost more

than 60,000 jobs, including, if you will forgive me, 20,000 in North

Carolina. These are people whose children serve in our police forces

and our military and they pay taxes and so forth, but they are not

22

qualified to take the jobs that are made possible by Research Triangle Park further east in North Carolina, and they are out of

work because, simply said, there is nothing else for them to do.

I hope that the statement by Ms. Chamberlain does not represent the view of this administration and I am going to make inquiry of the President about it.

Do you have any view on that?

Ms. ROCCA. Senator, I believe Ambassador Chamberlain’s comments were made in the context of our efforts to show support to

General Musharraf and to recognize the sacrifices that Pakistan

has been enduring as a result of the war. This is a war which we

would have much greater difficulty winning without Musharraf’s

strong and bold support and it is in that context that she made

those comments.

That said, obviously we appreciate the situation in the U.S. textile industry and we are committed to working with the Congress

to ensure that our support for Pakistan is done in a manner which

will minimize the impact on the textile and apparel industry.

The CHAIRMAN. I think she just forgot you are still here.

Senator HELMS. Well, I hear that and I do not mean to offend

you, but that is the same song and dance I hear from the administration all the time. They do not give—and not only this administration; prior administrations.

These people do not have anything to do, and they have been

hard-working people whose jobs were ripped away from them by

the close of textile mills.

Now, let me see. I want to ask you something, sir. Without second-guessing the parties on their choices for the interim government of Afghanistan—you cannot hear me?

Ambassador HAASS. I am sorry?

Senator HELMS. I am not going to second-guess anybody regarding the choices for the interim government of Afghanistan and I do

not think you are, either. But I do wonder whether any of the individuals involved have the nationwide stature inside Afghanistan to

keep the government together. I want to know how you assess the

prospects for stability there.

Ambassador HAASS. You are asking, Senator, one of the most

basic questions and it is something I come out I suppose with

guarded optimism. Depending on the day, I either emphasize the

word ‘‘guarded’’ or I emphasize the word ‘‘optimism.’’ I am not

going to stand up here or sit here and be a Pollyanna and say it

is going to be smooth sailing. It is not.

But the reasons that I do have some optimism is that I do see

the Afghans themselves showing that they have learned from their

mistakes of the past. The fact that something like Bonn could happen is in itself an accomplishment. The fact that we have not seen

the sort of reprisals in cities that are liberated that we saw in the

early nineties I think shows some progress. The fact that the

neighboring countries and others who have significant influence essentially worked behind the scenes at Bonn to make it happen at

least suggests that they understand that if they try to get maximal

influence for themselves everyone else is going to do the same and

no one is going to benefit.

23

The fact that the international community is willing to put lots

of resources this time around and not walk away, as you yourself

referred to in your statement. So again, I am not going to predict

an easy road. I am not even going to predict success. But I do think

there are some reasons to think that there is probably the best

chance in modern history to set Afghanistan on a relatively stable

and successful path that you or I have ever seen. That, as a policymaker, it gives us something to work with and it obviously gives

us, I think, a challenge that is not so ambitious that it is simply

unrealistic.

Senator HELMS. Very quickly, you heard the chairman discuss

Kofi Annan’s coming to his office and we talked. Do you believe

that a U.N. force is going to be necessary there?

Ambassador HAASS. Sir, I do not believe a U.N. force, if you

mean a force that reports to the United Nations, is desirable. I do

think, though, we will need an international security force.

Senator HELMS. Comprised of whom?

Ambassador HAASS. Pardon me?

Senator HELMS. Comprised of whom?

Ambassador HAASS. I think we need some capable countries,

some serious countries. We are looking at them. It could be several

countries in Europe. Members of NATO have expressed an interest

or a willingness in participating or even leading such a force. Several Arab or Islamic countries could also be a part of such a force.

It would have to be done in a way, again, that no way would

interfere with what General Franks and the coalition are doing. It

could possibly even report to the coalition so you did not have a

separate line of command arrangements, something you said. I

think any such force has to go in with its eyes wide open. Afghanistan is probably going to suffer from a significant degree of lawlessness, as well as pockets of foreign Taliban and al-Qaeda resistance,

for some time to come. So any such force needs to have the capability so it can more than hold its own in that kind of a stressful

environment.

Senator HELMS. We better plan on what you are saying.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, you should be optimistic and the

reason to be optimistic is look at Afghanistan on the 5th of September and look at it on the 5th of December. That is enough of

a reason. You should take some pride as well in the work you have

done.

Our subcommittee chairman for this area, Senator Wellstone.

Senator WELLSTONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank both of

you. We much appreciate your work.

I would ask unanimous consent that my full statement be included in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Senator WELLSTONE. And I am not going to read it.

Let me just try to get both questions out to both of you and then

each of you respond. I want to go back to Senator Biden’s map. The

headline also here in the New York Times is ‘‘Refugees Are Dying

as Aid Goes Unused.’’ There are six million Afghans that are at

risk in the north because the humanitarian assistance is not reaching them.

24

I wanted to, I guess, be critical in the question that I am going

to put to you. It seems to me that we can dither around with a lot

more sort of meetings and discussions and we can at least target

the supply routes which are actually critical to delivering the humanitarian aid. We are not talking about blue helmet. I think Senator Biden is saying the same thing. It can be a multinational force

with the blessing of the U.N.

I guess between the banditry and the snow—actually, some of us

have raised this question going back to October, and I think for

months actually we have been focused on this. So I guess I want

to—and I know that the administration to a certain extent has

been pushing back on this idea. But I just want to say to you, I

do not think we have much more time, and in fact I do not think

time is neutral at all and if we do not get this done then it is going

to be too late.

So I want to try and maybe have more discussion with you on

this, because it is not as if this has not been the question we have

been raising over and over again.

Then the second point that I want to mention is this whole question of reconstruction. We were talking earlier, Mr. Chairman, both

to Richard and Christina and I was saying that I am glad that we

have an opportunity to talk about political and economic reconstruction. But it has been a decade of neglect, and I think the

United States in partnership with the international community has

got to be willing to make a multi-year, multi-national, multi-billion

dollar effort to rebuild Afghanistan.

I think Senator Biden mentioned this. We have promised that we

would lead the way. The United Nations—according to the United Nations, the bill for reconstruction will be in excess of $10 billion,

and other estimates say $12 to $15 billion. So far we have pledged

$320 million and that is for humanitarian relief, and we have made

no specific commitment so far for reconstruction and recovery.

I would be interested in, how much money do you see the United

States contributing to the world effort for Afghan reconstruction?

Those are the two questions.

Ambassador HAASS. Senator, on the question of security, if you

read the Bonn agreement, the annex that is devoted to the international security force, I think the first sentence is relevant here.

Let me just quote it: ‘‘The participants in the U.N. talks on Afghanistan recognize that the responsibility for providing security and

law and order throughout the country resides with the Afghans

themselves.’’ That is key.

If there is an international security force, again I think you are

looking at it either possibly just in Kabul, conceivably it might go

to one or two other population centers. But we are not talking

about occupying Afghanistan. We have got a country here the size

of Texas and that sort of occupation is a recipe for trouble. It would

not do the international security force or the Afghans any good.

The bulk of the security has to come from essentially Afghan

forces reporting to the central government as part of this new national army that is going to be built. As Christina said in her testimony, this is one of the ways in which there is going to have to

be a balance between what is done at the capital and what is done

in a decentralized fashion around the rest of the country.

25

But there is no way that an international security force can provide point defense for every aid convoy or every international worker in every square inch of Afghan territory. That would simply

spread it too thin. That is where training the Afghans and hopefully getting them up to a level of professional competence has a

real potential to make a difference. That is also where consent in

Afghanistan is going to make a difference. We are hoping that the

Afghan forces are not challenged to a degree where lawlessness becomes the rule rather than the exception.

Just very quickly on the reconstruction area, the numbers are

necessarily vague about the scale of the effort. People are throwing

around a lot of numbers. I would not put a whole lot of stock in

them yet. Until you do a serious needs assessment, until you really

look at the question of sequencing, of absorptive capacity and so

forth, I do not think the numbers are terribly meaningful and specific, though you are essentially right, we are talking about a large

amount of money over multiple years.

The United States will do its share. What exactly that share is

is obviously going to depend upon the whole, and we are just not

at the point yet where we are prepared to say this many dollars

in this package of legislation. But it is something that we are beginning to refine and it is something we will do with the Congress

as we get farther along.

Senator WELLSTONE. In 20 seconds: I did not say that we could

put together a force that would provide security for every single

truck on the ground. I said earlier that we can target the supply

routes that were critical. Frankly, I do not think right now we can

rely on Northern Alliance or Afghan forces to do this, and we do

not have a lot of time.

So I cannot quite understand your pushing back on the idea of

some kind of international force coming in and targeting the actual

supply routes which we know are critical. Otherwise, you have got

around six million people—and I will go back to the headline today,

which I do not think is melodramatic: ‘‘Refugees Dying As Aid Goes

Unused.’’ That is really what I am talking about. I do not think we

have met that challenge. I do not know why.

Ms. ROCCA. Senator, just very briefly, I will just add to what my

colleague here said that we are of, taking into account what Ambassador Haass said about not being able to provide the security

in the manner in which one would—which would make the assistance, the humanitarian assistance, efficient, we are very much

aware of the problem. We are working very closely with the WFP

to find ways. There are people on the ground working for WFP who

have experience in these matters and who are working very hard

to find ways around the problems, and we are working closely with

them.

[The prepared statement of Senator Wellstone follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL WELLSTONE

I want to thank all of you for participating in today’s hearing as I know many

of you have been involved in a week of difficult but extraordinarily important negotiations in Bonn, Germany. I am grateful to you for being here today to share your

perspective on that process and what lies ahead for Afghanistan.

The agreement reached in Bonn yesterday offers the best hope for 25 million Afghans who have suffered enough. They deserve a rest from endless suffering and

26

war. They also deserve generous reconstruction assistance from the international

community and a decent government at home.

The causes of the Afghan tragedy include nearly all the horrors that stalk failed

states: meddling and invasion by neighboring states, internecine warfare leading to

a takeover by brutal fanatics, the oppression for the majority of the population—

women—and finally the Taliban’s fateful decision to host international terrorists.

The cures for Afghanistan’s agony are less obvious, but one is clear. The rival political and ethnic groups must take the historic opportunity that emerged yesterday

in Bonn and make a genuine commitment to the peaceful sharing of power and to

establishing a government broad and effective enough to meet the basic needs of the

people. The same small-minded factionalism that originally left the country vulnerable to backward mullahs, greedy warlords, and predatory neighbors continues to

pose a threat to the country now.

Two others things are clear: The United States and its coalition partners must

dither no longer and send in a multinational force to ensure humanitarian access

in Afghanistan. Six million Afghans are at risk in the north because humanitarian

assistance is not reaching them.

From the beginning of this conflict, I have said that the military effort will not

be successful unless the humanitarian effort restores order and meets basic survival

needs. This effort cannot wait for all hostilities to cease. Nor can the millions of Afghans wait, whose very survival are at risk.

Taliban units may be largely defeated and dispersed, but there is no area in Afghanistan that is entirely secure. The main supply routes for humanitarian assistance are blocked by local banditry or the onset of winter. Consequently, we need

an immediate deployment of a multinational force with a mandate to increase humanitarian access to vulnerable Afghans.

Second, we must move quickly and decisively on a long-term commitment to the

reconstruction of Afghanistan. The people of Afghanistan have endured 23 years of

war and misery, and the conflict has threatened international stability, and placed

enormous burdens on their limited means. The Bush Administration has said that

it will not let Afghanistan descend into chaos. But talk is not enough—it must act

with the commitment of significant resources. We must show Afghans that our commitments are not hollow. We must show them that we are not going to give up on

them this time, and turn our backs on them as we did before. We must show genuine solidarity and real generosity now.

It is time to reverse more than a decade of neglect. The United States, in partnership with the international community must be willing to make a multi-year, multinational and multi-billion dollar effort to rebuild Afghanistan.

Our reconstruction effort must focus on education, particularly girls’ education,

which has proven to give the greatest return to each assistance dollar. Creation of

secular schools will also break the stranglehold of extremism, and allow both boys

and girls to make positive contributions to the development of their society. It must

also focus on rebuilding basic infrastructure—repairing shattered bridges and roads,

removing land mines, reconstructing irrigation systems and drilling wells. We must

also rebuild the shattered health infrastructure by establishing basic hospitals and

village clinics.

The Afghans have been through enough hell. They deserve to live in a society

where they can feed their children, live in safety and participate fully in their country’s development regardless of gender, religious belief or ethnicity.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. As they say in this business, I associate myself

with the remarks of my friend from Wisconsin, and I suspect Chancellor Schroeder would, too.

Senator WELLSTONE. Minnesota.

The CHAIRMAN. Minnesota. I beg your pardon.

Senator WELLSTONE. This has been going on for 11 years.

The CHAIRMAN. I am the Senator from Maryland. I yield to the

Senator from Wisconsin—no, to Senator Lugar from Indiana.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Haass, some historians who have tried to describe

governance in Afghanistan have suggested that at best there was

only a small central government, but largely a government of tribes

or entities that loosely got together in various ways. I mention that

27

simply because clearly the work that you and others are doing is

remarkable in the Bonn conference, in thinking through some central government and some way it might relate to each of the various forces that came together in Bonn and some that did not.

I am just wondering, as you take a look in the intermediate term,

quite apart from the long term, essentially Afghanistan’s fate will

probably be more of a function of its proximity to Russia and Pakistan and Iran, maybe to some extent Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, in

other words their neighbors. All of these states share a desire for

a friendly, stable, or at least non-hostile situation there, and have

been prepared in the past to take steps to try to ensure that that

was the case through injection of their own influence.

Now, it is being suggested, not necessarily by yourself or the administration, that the United States has a role here militarily, and

likewise we certainly are working very hard in a humanitarian

way, but we affirm that we are not nation-builders. We do not want

Americans on the ground there in any sense of permanence as a

security force or a governance force.

You are testifying that other nations who are volunteering for

this process want to know that large countries—like the United

States—are going to be there. But I just think that at some point

the critical issue will be what role does the United States really see

for the situation, because otherwise despite our best protestations

now, we will drift away in terms of our influence on the situation,

and others who are the neighbors will in fact take control.

This may not lead to a situation that is as catastrophic as the

Taliban, but we could meet 10 years from now and say we made

a bad mistake. We won the war, but we left, not as abruptly perhaps as before, but we were out the door even as the war was ending.

I just wonder the extent to which you and your colleagues are

trying to think this through as to how the United States has any

influence in addition to the neighbors. The Russians already by

coming back in have indicated they certainly understand their situation, and I wonder whether we understand ours.

Ambassador HAASS. I think we do. There is a dilemma here. It

is the typical Goldilocks case. We want to do enough, but not too

much. We want to do enough to basically realize our goals in Afghanistan, to put it crudely, so we do not have to do what we have

just done again in several years. On the other hand, we do not

want to get involved in the sort of intrusive nation-building which

would be resented by Afghans or resisted by them ultimately, and

we should not get involved in activities to the exclusion of other

members of the international community.

For example, the reconstruction effort; it should not be a mostly

U.S. effort. There is every good reason in the world why the bulk

of the resources ought to come from other countries. The United

States has clearly carried out the bulk of the coalition effort. In

that phase, the United States has done the lion’s share of the

world’s work.

I would see us staying involved politically and diplomatically,

supporting the efforts of Lochdar Brahimi, the Secretary General’s

Special Representative, doing what we can do in various fora,

working with the six immediate neighbors of Afghanistan, working

28

with the Russians, the Indians, and others with influence to try to

create a context in which we can hopefully mute the internal competition and jockeying.

On the question of a security force, again I think the bulk of the

contributors will come from capable countries on the outside.

Again, several European countries have indicated their willingness

to do that. The United States will consider taking on a modest role

to help enable such a force, to facilitate it.

Senator LUGAR. Let me just interrupt for a second before my

time is up. Will such indirect leadership work, as opposed to our

simply saying, these things do not work, without us taking control

and managing it?

Ambassador HAASS. Maybe it is a question of language, but we

have been accused of many things here and indirectness is not normally one of them. On the other hand, though, we do not want to

make this an American enterprise, because it is not. It is first of

all for the Afghans themselves. Second of all, the U.N. has a key

role, as you know. Third, the six neighbors have a key role, as do

some other countries which have historical involvement there.

The United States is doing an enormous lot. As Christina mentioned, we have taken the lead on the humanitarian side. We have

obviously done the lead on the coalition effort, military effort

against al-Qaeda and against the Taliban. We are one of the cochairs of the reconstruction effort and will contribute to that generously, I would expect. We were one of the prime movers behind the

success at Bonn and we are going to stay involved diplomatically.

And we will consider what, if any, role we could usefully take within the context of an international security force, keeping in mind

again that the bulk of the security effort will have to be Afghan

and that this force is essentially a gap-filler.

So I would say that is quite a sizable role, Senator. But at the

risk of sounding contradictory, it is sizable, yet still limited. I think

that is the constant challenge here, to avoid doing too little and too

much.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Thank you for coming this morning and for sharing your

thoughts with us. Thank you, also, for allowing us to pursue some

of these issues. I want to pick up from where Senator Lugar left

off regarding the role of nations now engaged in Afghanistan. If I

recall, in both of your testimonies this morning, you referenced

Iran. Senator Lugar talked about the roles of Russia and Iran, and

other neighbors.

I would like to get your sense in a little more detail, specifically,

on what Iran has been doing, or not doing, to assist the United

States and our coalition.

Ambassador HAASS. Senator Hagel, Iran, as you know, is one of

the six bordering countries on Afghanistan. It has played a large

role in several areas of this, of this question. One is diplomatic. It

is a member of the so-called Six Plus Two Group, which is the

United States, Russia, and the six immediate neighbors. We had

several meetings in New York of this group quite recently.

29

Iran was one of the countries that sent observers to Bonn, was

one of the countries that worked behind the scene. We have also

exchanged messages through the Swiss with the Iranians about

steps that they could take.

I would simply say that by and large the Iranian role diplomatically has been quite constructive, that they have a lot of influence

with the Northern Alliance or United Front and to the best of our

knowledge they have used that influence constructively in trying to

bring about the sort of compromise that we saw at Bonn.

Second, as Christina referenced, the Iranians have helped in the

humanitarian area. They are host to an awful lot of refugees. They

have facilitated humanitarian assistance. As I think Secretary of

State Powell has mentioned, the Iranians have suggested their

willingness to help if, for example, U.S. pilots ever got into trouble

over their territory.

So I am not saying we see everything eye to eye here. On the

other hand, I do think the pattern of Iranian behavior here I think

deserves to be labeled constructive.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Madam Secretary.

Ms. ROCCA. He covered it comprehensively. I do not really have

much to add other than the fact that they have been playing a very

positive role in this endeavor.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

I also would appreciate your take on the Russians. The Russians

now have a military presence in Afghanistan. From what I understand, it came somewhat as a surprise to us. I am also interested

in your take on the Russians’ diplomatic efforts in Iran. Mr. Ambassador?

Ambassador HAASS. Senator, I just spent a few days in Moscow

this past week consulting with the Russians about their role in Afghanistan. I would say diplomatically that for the most part we are

pulling in the same direction. It was not always agreement on some

of the tactics, about the role, say, of some of the individuals or

groups. But again, I think the bottom line was good and the goals

that we set out, that Assistant Secretary Rocca articulated, about

what it is we all want in Afghanistan, those are shared.

They too, from what we can see, have used their influence behind

the scenes both at Bonn and elsewhere to help. So, while we have

not always agreed 100 percent on every tactic, again I think it is

impressive. It is yet another reminder that the cold war is quite

distant, that the United States and Russia have found ways to cooperate when their strategic interests are essentially aligned.

I think the Russians also want to demonstrate through their

modest troop presence in Kabul that they still have a special role

there, that they still have some influence there. But I would not

see it as much more than that. I do not see it as a threat or something to the natural evolution of a more positive security situation

there.

Senator HAGEL. Do you believe the appearance of Russian troops

in Afghanistan was just a breakdown in communication between

our two countries? Or was it intended to be a surprise, or how do

you read it?

30

Ambassador HAASS. Senator, I just do not know all the details,

the tick-tock of exactly what happened just before the Russian

troops arrived. If you would like, I can look into that and get back

to you on that.

[The following information was subsequently supplied:]

CENTCOM personnel, who were coordinating air drops within Afghanistan, confirmed that they had last minute notification, which they passed on to CENTCOM

headquarters in Tampa, that the Russian planes were inbound to Bagram, Afghanistan. Acting Russian MFA Director for Third Asia Gleb Ivanschentsev confirmed to

Embassy Moscow officials on November 27, 2001 that twelve IL–76 aircraft landed

in Bagram, on November 26, carrying a load of 200 tons of humanitarian supplies

and equipment. Ivanschentsev said that a few dozen Russian troops wre ingaged in

the humanitarian flights, providing logistical support to EMERCOM (the Russian

emergency management organizations, similar to FEMA) personnel in Russian diplomatic and humanitarian efforts, including the establishment of a hospital and humanitarian ‘‘base’’ in Kabul.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Madam Secretary.

Ms. ROCCA. It is our understanding that it was just sort of a disconnect, which they quickly reassured us that the contents of those

planes were humanitarian assistance and we got back on track

afterwards.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. If I may follow that, when I was out of the room

taking a call it may have been answered. If it has—but there were

Russian press reports indicating it was about Chechnyan rebels,

that the reason they had forces in there was to be able to determine whether among the al-Qaeda-related and Taliban-related

forces there were Chechnyans who were on their list, and that is

why they were in place.

Ambassador HAASS. Well, based on what we know, there are

clearly Chechens in Afghanistan and there are al-Qaeda in

Chechnya. Whether that was specifically part of the Russian function, I have seen no evidence linking that, because, as Assistant

Secretary Rocca said, the rationale that we have seen was totally

related to the humanitarian.

The CHAIRMAN. I know that was the rationale offered. I just wondered if you had any evidence to respond.

Ambassador HAASS. I have seen no behavior that would suggest,

for example, in order to have determined, for example, that there

were Chechens there, it would have required a different sort of behavior than we have seen.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not questioning it. This was a Russian

press report, a Russian press report.

Senator Chafee.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I was amused when we sat down and somebody made a comment

about reconstruction. The Senator, my seatmate here, said: ‘‘Reconstruction is a bad word in Virginia.’’ This is 140 years after the

Civil War. So the goal of having the Northern Alliance and exTaliban living in peace shows the formidable task in front of us.

I do have a question following up on Senator Hagel and Senator

Lugar’s line of questioning. Assistant Secretary Rocca, you gave us

a geographic tour of the area, going through Pakistan, Tajikistan,

Turkmenistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan. Although the PeoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:43 Mar 12, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 77065 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
31

ple’s Republic of China does have only a remote, not a very lengthy

border with Afghanistan, what is it’s role? Have the Chinese been

involved? Were they at Bonn? Or is the U.S.-Sino relationship still

influenced by the incident with our airplane, and there is not really

any involvement from the People’s Republic of China?

Ms. ROCCA. No, Senator. I actually met with the Chinese Foreign

Minister, Vice Foreign Minister, just last week and we had a long

discussion about Afghanistan. Primarily their view is the same as

ours. They have the same goals that we do. They also want to see

a broad-based, broadly representative government, and a country

that is at peace and that no longer exports drugs or terrorism.

The narcotics aspect and the terrorist aspects are obviously very

high on their agenda, as it is on all the surrounding countries.

They have a large humanitarian program which they have been actually implementing. They have been sending things through Pakistan into northern Afghanistan. So they are active in providing humanitarian assistance, and they are supportive overall of what we

are trying to achieve and what the international community is trying to achieve there.

They were not in Bonn as far as I know.

Senator CHAFEE. What do you make of them not being in Bonn?

Ms. ROCCA. The representatives in Bonn were essentially, the

foreign representatives, were the surrounding countries, the Six

Plus Two countries, as well as the countries that had played host

to various exile groups of Afghans.

Senator CHAFEE. They are one of the six.

Ambassador HAASS. I would not make much of it. The Chinese

played an active role in the Six Plus Two. They have also got a lot

of influence through the U.N. Security Council. They obviously also

consult particularly closely with the Pakistanis, who were in Bonn.

So I would not make anything of it.

Senator CHAFEE. I’m wondering what they are thinking in Beijing, what are they thinking about this whole situation?

Ambassador HAASS. I think for the Chinese the interests are not

simply about Afghanistan, I agree entirely with what Assistant

Secretary Rocca said, but it is also about what this means for the

U.S.-Chinese relationship. We have had consultations with the Foreign Minister and others since September 11 and the President

was in Shanghai subsequent to September 11, and essentially looking at ways in which counterterrorism cooperation could potentially

increase.

I think the Chinese are essentially, like a lot of other countries,

trying to figure out what this means, not simply what we are doing

in Afghanistan, but what we might do beyond that, and what that

might mean from their national interests as they see them. I think

that, if you will, along with the narrow consideration of Afghanistan—I think they are really looking at where American foreign

policy is going and again what consequences it might have for

China.

Ms. ROCCA. If I could just add to that to bring in also, they also

have a terrorism concern, an indigenous terrorism concern, some of

which emanated from Afghanistan. So they have a very clear interest in essentially meeting the same—supporting the goals that we

are all trying to achieve there.

32

Senator WELLSTONE [presiding]. Senator Allen.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I first want to commend you all. In particular, I want to commend President Bush, the secretariats of Defense and secretariats

of State for everything you have done in this effort. The military

has done a great job. The help from the Uzbeks, also enlightened

Pakistani leaders, all have helped our just cause.

This war is not over, but in the midst of it I also want to commend the American people for their generosity and caring in trying

to get humanitarian aid into an area where obviously outsiders

have not been welcome at all. So while there may be some difficulties, which we all hate waste, we are trying to help people, and I

think people ought to look at our heart and our will and our desire

to help out in humanitarian aid. I know that you and all of us want

that to be done. But I want to commend the intent and also recognize how difficult that is in this particular situation while a war

is still going on.

This war on terrorism is far from over. Indeed, the war is going

very well in Afghanistan, but Osama bin Laden has not been captured in any way whatsoever. Al-Qaeda still exists. The leaders of

the Taliban, those repressive leaders, are still involved.

Now, beside all that, here is our goals. I was looking—I always

like to have guiding principles or goals, and what we want to do

is to help the many diverse people in Afghanistan constitute a representative confederation or federation. We have to advocate certain principles or precepts that are the foundation of it and really

for successful self-government.

When you look at—you have to ensure certain rights and a structure. I was just thinking, with all this tragedy there is a brighter

future. You both talked about it. This is actually positive in the

long run for Afghanistan. The idea of setting up new governments

is something we did years ago, and once again we need modern day

James Madisons or George Masons involved in constituting these

governments.

But note all the new governments that have been set up in say

the last 10 years: Poland; the Czech Republic, they split with the

Slovaks amicably; Hungary, Romania, Moldova, Bulgaria, Croatia,

Slovenia, the Baltics, Armenia, Georgia, the Ukraine, and Belarus.

Now we have a new opportunity for a better and brighter future.

I think that the key is to allow all the people from all the regions,

the diverse groups, to have their own representatives.

In Secretary Rocca’s statement on page 2, talking about the key,

I agree with you completely. No. 1, it should be broad-based and

representative of Afghans’ diverse ethnic and religious groups. It

should preserve the unity of territorial integrity of the country and

should protect the human rights of all its citizens, including

women.

I agree with what you said, Ambassador Haass, and with your

sentiments that the Afghan people should be controlling their own

destiny. Those are basic principles for us, but need to be applied

to this situation, the diverse situation in Afghanistan.

Now, with all of these, all the groups and factions involved in the

agreements in Bonn, (a), how do you believe or where do you see

the sincerity and the commitment to these sort of principles out of

33

these various factions? And (b), what commitments to human

rights practices is this interim government taking? And what role

will women—this will be a key thing. This is not just ethnic; it is

also gender equality.

I think it is good that there are two women given positions in

this interim cabinet. But beyond that, where do you see the commitment and sincerity of this interim government for these principles, as well as in particular the rights and opportunities for

women, because I think in the long run that is going to be key. Beyond the security will also be the education of a population so that

it can seize the opportunities of the world and actually live a more

prosperous life with better human rights.

Ms. ROCCA. Senator, these are very good questions and with Afghanistan’s past the answers are not necessarily clear if one is

going to take the past as a guide. However, as Ambassador Haass

said in his statement as well, they are getting a second chance.

What we took out of, what we read into the spirit of the Bonn

agreement is that there is a real yearning for peace and stability

and rehabilitation among the Afghan people, and that the representatives in Bonn were representing that feeling.

The Bonn agreement has a few things in it which I would just

like to read to you because they are quite remarkable, and the fact

that these people, that this group is signing onto this I think is a

very good sign: ‘‘The Interim Authority shall, with the assistance

of the United Nations, establish an independent human rights commission, whose responsibilities will include human rights monitoring, investigation of violations of human rights, and development of domestic human rights institutions. The Interim Authority

may, with the assistance of the United Nations, also establish any

other commissions to review matters not covered in this agreement

along these lines.

‘‘The members of the Interim Authority shall abide by a code of

conduct elaborated in accordance with international standards.

Failure by a member of the Interim Authority to abide by the provisions of the code of conduct shall lead to his or her suspension

from that body. The decision to suspend a member shall be taken

by two-thirds majority of the membership of the Interim Authority

on the proposal of its chairman or any of its vice chairmen.’’

These are remarkable statements and, as I said, it indicates

where they want to go and what the intent is. We are optimistic

that they will take advantage of this second chance. They are certainly speaking along—the Foreign Minister, so-called, of the

Northern Alliance has said on numerous occasions and was actually saying at the beginning of the Bonn conference: We are getting

another opportunity; this is our chance not to fail; we failed in the

past. That spirit is pervasive right now.

On the issue of women’s rights, there were two women at the

conference. One of the ministries is going to be run by a woman.

There is actually going to be—instead of the Ministry of Vice and

Virtue, which was engaged in repressing women, we have got a

ministry for women that is going to be run by a woman. I think

that also indicates commitment, as does the fact that one of the

vice chairmen of the Interim Authority will be a woman.

34

These are all very good signs. We intend to work with the U.N.

to keep them to these commitments and to remind the international community and remind the Afghans that this is what they

signed up to and this is extremely important for the future and the

rebuilding of Afghanistan.

There is also talk—and I will let you, Richard, expand on

this——

Senator HELMS. I am sorry, we are going to have to close this

down because we are way overtime on the vote over on the floor.

Let me thank both of you for your testimony today.

Senator WELLSTONE. Mr. Chairman, if you want, Senator Biden

said that he would come right back. I can stay while we start the

next witness, just to keep it going.

Senator HELMS. Well, the vote is almost over now.

Senator WELLSTONE. Then there will be a brief break and then

we will hear from the second panel.

Senator HELMS. So what you are asking is to be kept open?

Senator WELLSTONE. We can start——

Senator HELMS. Is that satisfactory to you two?

Senator WELLSTONE. Well, let us just take a break. Let us just

go vote.

Ambassador HAASS. Do you want us to remain or do you want

to go to your second panel?

Senator WELLSTONE. Second panel. Is that all right with you,

second panel?

Senator HELMS. I do not understand the answer. Will your schedule permit you to stay further? Now, we have a second panel who

have been waiting.

Ambassador HAASS. We are at your mercy, sir.

Senator HELMS. I think I shall let the chairman decide this. I

know what I would do if I were chairman still, but we got jeopardized several weeks ago and I am no longer the chairman.

We will stand in recess and Senator Biden I am sure will be back

in a few minutes.

[Recess from 11:59 a.m. to 12:03 p.m.]

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. I apologize for

the confusion. I just wanted to ask one more question of the witnesses. I will not hold them long and I will not hold the second

panel, on which at least one member has a time constraint, on the

second panel.

The one question I have is, there have been reports—and for either one of you to answer. There have been newspaper reports and

other reports that Chancellor Schroeder, as we all know, took a political chance and survived a vote of no confidence in terms of his

commitment to participation in our effort in Afghanistan, including

the use of German forces, which was unprecedented since World

War Two.

There are further reports that he and-or his government was

somewhat miffed, once that decision had been made, essentially

being told: No, not now; maybe later we can use your help in terms

of forces. I know for a fact our French friends, which is not unusual, were a little miffed about our unwillingness to have them

participate with their ground forces.

35

Can you tell me a little bit about both those issues? Is there contemplation on our part to take advantage of the German offer, and

what is the status of the French commitment with regard to committing forces on the ground for a security force?

Ambassador HAASS. Senator Biden, I just returned yesterday

from India, but en route there my first stop was in Berlin, where

I had consultations with the German Government last week about

this and other questions relating to Afghanistan. You are right,

there has been a lot of debate. I think there are people within the

German Government who look favorably on the possibility of their

contributing forces.

At least to me, I did not pick up any sense that they were miffed.

When the question was up, I simply said our thinking has not

reached the point of determining exactly what we think is going to

be necessary in terms of size, composition, mandate, and the like.

We first needed an Afghan partner to work with.

But we have made it clear, in answer to your second question as

well, to lots of countries that we welcome our allies——

The CHAIRMAN. You say we need an Afghan partner to work

with. We went in without an Afghan partner. We agreed to provide

humanitarian aid. Had things not progressed as they have, we

would still be trying to get humanitarian aid into areas notwithstanding the fact that we had no Afghan partner of any consequence to do it, would we not?

Ambassador HAASS. It is a different situation, though. The situation on the ground has obviously progressed far. But more important, politically we do not have the luxury now of simply thinking

about prosecuting the war, though that is our priority. We also are

looking toward the future, and we want to set up a pattern of relationship with the Afghans where, among other things, an international security force is not resisted, it is not seen as a hostile

force, where they cooperate with us on facilitating humanitarian

supplies reaching people, where the reconstruction effort does not

waste money and essentially lubricates our efforts to keep national

consensus and keep a modicum of stability.

So I think at this point it is important to work with the Afghans

because we do not want, now that they themselves see that they

have largely, with the coalition’s help, rid themselves of the

Taliban and the large foreign dimension of the Taliban, we do not

want Afghan nationalism in any way to literally or figuratively

train its guns on the United States or any other member of the

international community.

Just very quickly to answer, complete the answer on the other

part of it, we have made it clear all along that we look forward to

military contributions to the coalition as this process evolves. The

countries you are talking about—Germany, France, Britain, Turkey—these are exactly the kinds of countries who would clearly

have the capacity and may well have the willingness to contribute

capable forces to an international security force.

Again, I have not detected that people are miffed for the most

part. It is just simply that we could not get ahead of ourselves with

that force, given the situation on the ground and the evolution of

the political situation.

36

The CHAIRMAN. As I said, I do not want my last question to be

read as my being critical of your effort, because I think you have

done a good job. I hope, from my perspective, if we reach the point,

which you have been able to avoid, that we reached 7 days ago and

you have overcome, where the former President sitting in Kabul

nixed a security force being put in place, that we would tell him:

You have no choice, you have no choice. Because if we decide to do

this by consensus we will not only be, in my humble opinion—I realize the Balkans are different than Afghanistan, but I would suggest that there is a bit of a lesson to be learned between the differences how we moved in Bosnia and how we moved in Kosovo,

and I hope—at any rate.

Ambassador HAASS. Could I say one thing on that, Senator? I do

not think anyone what watched what the U.S. team at Bonn led

by Jim Dobbins did would describe it as passive.

The CHAIRMAN. No, it was not there. No, no, no, no, no. That is

why I said you succeeded, except the guys there do not have the

rifles. The guys there have the political capability so far. Now, they

may very well—this may all translate. I am not suggesting that—

I said at the outset, I think you did a first-rate job.

All I am saying to you, if you get to the point, if it gets to the

point where that political consensus that was arrived at in Bonn

falls apart because the guys with the rifles back on the ground conclude they do not like the deal, they should understand they are

at the other end of our bullets next time. This should not be something done, in my humble opinion, other than firmly. And you have

been very firm. I just, I had a moment of brief concern when the

response by the former President about the presence of the security

force was mixed and, although I had hope and some expectation

you would be able to resolve that in Bonn, I was—I am just saying,

had you not been able to resolve it and it had to be resolved, there

is no possibility in my view—unsolicited advice and take it for what

it is worth, which is not much. There is no possibility of our longterm goals being able to prevail in Afghanistan without there being

security forces on the ground in control of access for aid as well as

access to localities. That is the only point I wish to make.

Ambassador HAASS. I agree. But it is our goal that the bulk of

that security function as soon as possible be carried out by Afghans

themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. That is where you and I have—that is where I

think you are being mildly Pollyannaish and I am not as optimistic

as you. I hope we both agree—but I do not disagree with the

premise that the day comes that it is an Afghan force, just like I

look forward to that unified military in Bosnia that I am still waiting for, I will herald the moment and the day.

At any rate, I thank you both very much. Christine, if you want

to add anything, but the question has been answered. I thank you

very much.

Ambassador HAASS. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Thomas Gouttierre, the dean of International Studies and director of the Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska in Omaha, Nebraska; as well as Ms.

Gailani, an advisor to the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan,

from Providence, Rhode Island. I welcome you both here.

37

I find I have to tell the Senator from Nebraska I am increasingly

relying upon Nebraska, the University of Nebraska, these days. As

the chairman of the Criminal Law Subcommittee yesterday, I had

a professor, a colleague of yours from the University of Nebraska,

who did a first-rate study and the only intensive study, 5-year

study on the efficacy of the crime bill and the COPS bill, and was

thorough, and now here I am seeking Nebraska’s input again.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. This is good.

The CHAIRMAN. This is good for me. I do not know about Nebraska, but it is good for me.

I welcome you both. I am told one of you has a time constraint.

I think you, sir?

STATEMENT OF THOMAS E. GOUTTIERRE, DEAN OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AND DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR

AFGHANISTAN STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA,

OMAHA, NE

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. It is I.

The CHAIRMAN. Dean, well, why do you not, with the permission

of Ms. Gailani, proceed first.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. Thank you for your comments about Nebraska.

I know you are talking about my colleague at the University of Nebraska at Omaha, Sam Walker. He is a very outstanding fellow.

I am pleased to be back. I have rarely had a Senate hearing like

this, and I have been attending these and giving presentations on

Afghanistan since the early seventies, where there have been so

many people in agreement on so many things. That is very heartening. I do not say this in any way lightly because I think it really

means very good things for both the United States and Afghanistan.

The CHAIRMAN. There is an old expression attributed to Samuel

Johnson: ‘‘There is nothing like a hanging to focus one’s attention.’’

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. That is true, exactly, and that is what happened.

I am just going to therefore make some comments which I think

will be in many ways a reiteration of some of the statements made

by your first panel and some of the comments that were picked up

by Members of the Senate as well. First of all, let me just reiterate

that, and I agree with what you have said, we need to be as forthright and forthcoming with the reconstruction campaign as we

have been with prosecuting the military campaign of this war on

terrorism. The United States has to be the leader and it must be

perceived as so.

In response to one comment talking about the possibility of being

intrusive, I think that Afghans are not so concerned about the

United States being intrusive at this stage. Let me be very clear

in saying that. Afghans are more concerned about us meeting their

expectations, and we have not in the past decade.

The Afghans do see us as their friends and supporters. Afghans

are not xenophobic. I think this is one of the myths that exists

about Afghans. Afghans just do not like to have people invading

their territory, raping their women, or stealing their property. If

you are good friends with them— you cannot find more loyal and

38

devoted friends, people who are very excellent in being able to deal

on an equal level with other people.

So I feel this is not only Afghanistan’s window of opportunity;

this is also the United States’ window of opportunity. We have a

real shot at advancing our whole position, our U.S. foreign policy

interests in the region, in the Muslim world, and around the world.

I certainly do not think this will be as expensive as what we will

need to spend if we do try to do it on the cheap and fail. We have

had experiences in Afghanistan in doing that.

We need to recognize that this is a sound investment in our own

future. I agree with Senator Wellstone in his comments on that.

Our share needs to be the share of one setting the appropriate and

effective example.

There is a historical precedent with the United States working

like this in Afghanistan, dealing with Afghans in this type of development. I think that is something that should give us again a lot

of encouragement. When I lived there in the sixties and seventies,

the United States was very, very much involved with other nations

in helping the Afghans develop. The development that occurred

then went on after the last Loya Jirga. You know, we are talking

now about convening another jirga. That one constructed the liberal, as it is called, or the progressive constitution of Afghanistan

which went into effect in 1964.

During that period there was a lot of development going on in

Afghanistan. It was still a poor country, but women were essentially not wearing veils, girls were going to school like boys, there

were women who were ministers of cabinet and members of parliament, and Afghanistan essentially was trying to move itself from

being an absolute monarchy to a constitutional parliamentary monarchy.

So Afghans harken back to those things. That is why the former

King, Zahir Shah, remains such a symbol of hope for most Afghans.

It is very important that we remember that there is this historical

precedent. We are not dealing with a situation where we have to

begin from nowhere.

There is the problem, of course, that so much of Afghanistan has

been destroyed. In the sixties and seventies we were building upon

development efforts that had been begun in the forties and fifties,

as well. Now Afghanistan is going to be much more difficult to rebuild, to develop, and to reconstruct.

There is one thing that we need to remember about insulating

Afghans from the meddling of their neighbors. They all have their

own agendas. It is important, as Ambassador Haass mentioned,

that we work with them, the so-called Group of Six Plus Two, because, if we have them working with us, it is probably more advantageous than having them working against us.

I was the U.S. member of the United Nations Special Mission to

Afghanistan (UNSMA) in 1996 and 1997 when that same Six Plus

Two was really a formula for disaster. So I think it really requires

a very, very active role by the United States, kind of serving as a

safeguard, because each of these six has its own agenda and they

have been famous and successful in meddling——

The CHAIRMAN. They are not the same agenda.

39

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. Not the same agenda, and it is not the agenda

of the Afghans.

I think one of the things that is very heartening from the Bonn

meetings is that without these other six meddling, in a sense, the

Afghans, some of whom had difficulty getting together in the past

because of the meddling, were able to do things that nobody really

expected to happen quite so quickly. We do not need any more

Wahabi or Daeobandi fifth column movements or others like that

in Afghanistan.

Our role is going to be very, very important in that regard, and

I appreciate what you just said in the very last comments you had

because I think that was suggestive of that particular role. So Six

Plus Two perhaps has a role, but it needs to be very, very clearly

different from when Pakistan could sabotage it, as it did, and when

others could follow thereafter in doing the same thing. We need

again to try to insulate the Afghans from the meddling that has

often proceeded from that.

Concerning the security forces, one of the things we keep hearing

is that they need to be solely Muslim. Any Afghan with whom I

have talked said that should not be the case. They really seek the

best possible peacekeeping forces, and I agree with Richard Haass.

I also agree with you that it will probably require perhaps an introduction maybe of monitors, if not necessarily helmets, and that

they might lend credibility to any internal forces. I think it would

be advisable if it could be a combination of some international and

some internal, although I do not know exactly how that could be

or should be composed at this stage.

Now, I would like to just say a few things about what type of reconstruction. There needs to be an emphasis on community-based

programs of basic health, basic education, basic infrastructure reconstruction, basic manpower training for men and women, and

also literacy. I envision places where Afghans can gather together

in a kind of one-stop shop in their villages and regions to engage,

while they may be going after some of their other needs, in some

of the constructive citizen education efforts that the Afghans are

going to need in setting up dialogs.

Remember, it has been 28 years since the Afghan’s have had a

representative form of government, 28 years since the King was

overthrown by his cousin in a revenge coup. So it is going to be difficult. They have had 28 years of regional power lords trying to exercise their control. So we need to help them find ways to have a

dialog for reconstruction, and I think this might all be done

through these community-based efforts. If you see pictures of Afghanistan, a country which I remember as very, very scenic, very

beautiful, it is seen as a country today that looks very destitute because it has been so rubblized, and also has experienced 4 years

of drought in addition to 23 years straight of warfare.

Finally, I would like to address how much will it cost. Whether

it is $10 billion or $20 billion, I think it will be a bargain for us.

It will be a bargain for us in terms of our interests in that part

of the world, it will be a bargain for us in terms of our interests

in the Muslim world, and it will be a bargain around the whole

world as the world takes a look to see how we do sustain our promVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:43 Mar 12, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 77065 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
40

ises and commitments. I think we are very much on display in this

particular thing.

So if I may, I beg your forgiveness here. I want to add one thing

that I think is a very appropriate element to closing this out. Afghans are always referred to as warriors. They are successful warriors, but they like to think of themselves as poet-warriors. My favorite poem from one of the great Persian poets, whose name—— The CHAIRMAN. You are talking about the Irish or the Afghans?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. No, this is not the Irish, but they are alike.

They are alike in the love of poetic expression.

This is from the Gulistan of Shaykh Muslihudin Sadi. I am going

to read it in Persian, in honor of my Afghan friends, many of whom

have died, or who are now struggling, and then I will translate it.

This will display how Afghans treasure friends and what we mean

to them as their friends. It is short. It goes:

[Reads in Persian.]

The CHAIRMAN. You do not have to translate. I got it.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. Oh, good. I know you guys from Wisconsin do

very well on that.

The CHAIRMAN. We do, we do.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. I followed your earlier exchange.

The CHAIRMAN. It is the cheese.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. Yes, right. Boy, you are full of that today.

The CHAIRMAN. You are about to be cutoff if you make another

comment like that.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. ‘‘One day at bath, a piece of perfumed clay was

passed to me from the hand of a friend. I asked the clay: Are you

musk or ambergris, because your delightful scent intoxicates me?

It answered: I am but a worthless piece of clay that has sat for a

period with a rose. The perfection of that companion left its traces

on me, who remains that same piece of earth that I was.’’ This is how Afghans express how important to them friendship

is and what friendship can do to them. They see us right now as

the rose. I think we can be also the clay and see them as the rose.

Let us hope that we truly do what we have promised to do, so that

we can see Afghanistan become what I think we all want it to become in our interest as well as in their own.

I thank you very much for having me here before your committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if you do not mind, since he has to leave,

could we postpone, and I am going to yield to my friend from Nebraska to be able to question the dean.

Did you go to the University of Nebraska?

Senator HAGEL. Yes.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. The campus in Omaha, where I work.

The CHAIRMAN. Now is your chance. Now is your chance to get

back.

Senator WELLSTONE. Would the Senator from Nebraska give me

just 10 seconds, since I did not realize we had the votes and, I want

to apologize to both of you, I have to leave in a couple minutes, and

I will read what you said and get back to you. I apologize.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thanks for pointing out my academic career, not one to be emulated.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it was by me, though. It was by me.

41

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. Chuck, we are proud of you.

Senator HAGEL. Tom, thank you very much. I have always believed in your judgment and solid understanding of life and your

insightful appreciation for what we are doing here, and I am very

proud of you and all at the University of Nebraska at Omaha who

have contributed to a better understanding of this issue all over

this country.

This is a complicated issue, as you know, and your colleague Ambassador Tomsen, who you know, Mr. Chairman, who came to the

University of Nebraska at Omaha from his last post as our Ambassador to Armenia, distinguished foreign service career, and he

along with Mr. Gouttierre has really developed a clear perspective

on this issue.

I might add as well, you have not hesitated to point out where

in your opinion we have drifted a bit as we have worked our way

along through this treacherous path. One that I want to get to here

in a question, you may have seen a story in the Omaha World Herald today which quotes you and Ambassador Tomsen in AP reports

and stories, of your strong support of the result so far of the Bonn

meetings and the outcome last night in what now is in place and

what will play out here for at least the next few months.

If I have missed some of this in the first part of your testimony,

Tom, because of the vote, I apologize. But I would be interested in

getting maybe a little deeper sense from you of how you think the

process plays out from here. I know you are very supportive of the

individuals, Mr. Karzai who has been selected to lead this effort.

Anything that you would like to embroider around on this specific

area would be helpful.

Thank you.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. Thank you, Chuck, Senator Hagel. I appreciate

that. You are right, I am enthusiastic. I am enthusiastic because

I know so many of these people, know them to be very quality people. One of them, for example, the proposed Minister of Finance,

has U.S. graduate degrees in finance and economics, and has had

experience working at the World Bank. He and his sister helped to

teach me Persian when I was a Peace Corps trainee back in the

early 1960’s.

Hamid Karzai, the Prime Minister, or Chairman of the interim

government, is an individual I have known for 15 years. He is a

very sophisticated, moderate nationalist and an individual who I

know is dedicated to bringing all the parts of Afghanistan together.

He does not see himself just as a regionalist. That bodes well for

Afghanistan.

I could go down the list. Some of them are connected even now

with the University of Nebraska at Omaha and some have worked

with us on USAID, State Department-funded projects during the

war with the Soviet Union. So I have a lot of respect for them, because most of them are professionals, they are technocrats, in addition to their political connections.

I am particularly pleased with the nomination and the appointment of Sima Samar, the woman who is the Minister of Womens

Affairs, the Deputy Chairman. I have known her for many years.

She is an exceedingly courageous woman who has worked against

incredible odds to hold education programs for Afghan women in

42

the country as well as in refugee camps. We have been proud from

the University of Nebraska at Omaha to work with her.

I could go on and I will not do that. What I will do is say this.

I appreciate what you said, Senator, about the role that the United

States might take in a situation like you were describing with

Ustad Rabbani, who has been the President in the past. I have

known him since 1969. His interests are more regional and religious than national. What Ambassador Haass indicated Ambassador Dobbins and others were doing in Bonn as well as Afghan

members of his own group, cautioning him to step back, is very important.

Again, let me reiterate what I said here before. The Afghans

right now see us as their friend. They count on friends very heavily. They do not see us as intrusive. They see us as those who have

helped them to rid themselves of the terrorists and the Pakistani

volunteers and the Pakistani military, which they did not want in

their country.

I think it is very important that we remember that, and we need

to avoid disappointing our friends. Remember, in the last two big

wars, the cold war and the war on terrorism, the big wars, the Afghans were our allies. They lost over a million in the last big battle

of the cold war. Who won that war? We did. Who lost it? The Soviet

Union. Who were the victims? One million Afghans dead, one and

a half million Afghans severely wounded, 7 million Afghan refugees.

We have talked here in this meeting today about the fact that

we kind of dumped them in the nineties. Now again, they are our

allies in this war, the first campaign in this war on terrorism. They

are our friends. Let us show them how Americans can also be

friends. Let us uphold the ideal of that poem that I read, just as

I know the Afghans will, given the chance.

Thank you for that question.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Professor Gouttierre.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. Tom.

The CHAIRMAN. You are a real sophisticated guy and you know

what is significant in Afghanistan and I know you must have a

sense of what is going on politically here. There is a debate that—

I cannot say with certainty. I can tell you, after 29 years being

here, there is a debate within the administration, among the Members of Congress, as to what our role really should be when it gets

down to the detail.

Everybody is going to say, you said there is great agreement, and

there is. It is interesting, and I am really pleased the President

early on—I cannot remember whether Chuck was with me or not,

but a couple of us were down with the President and he asked

what should be done, and one of my colleagues had said to me in

a different context: You know, he said—and I repeated it. I said:

Mr. President, when World War Two started, we were getting beaten and Roosevelt had the foresight to assemble a group of men in

the basement of the White House and say: Tell me what we do,

how we reconstruct Europe.

43

People said: Wait a minute; we have not even—I mean, we are

still getting beaten in battle after battle, and you are asking us to

put together a plan for the reconstruction of Europe.

I said: Mr. President, that is what you should be doing now, put

together a plan for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. He not only

welcomed it, he had indicated he had already been thinking about

it and he had begun it.

Without identifying the party, after one long meeting with the

President asking me very pointed questions, not because of my particular prowess here but just because I guess I represent sort of the

leadership of the other side of the political equation here on the

foreign policy equation, asking me and us finding ourselves very

much in agreement, and as I went out a very prominent member

of the White House followed me down the hall and said: Are you

going to stop and talk to the stakeout, the press where they wait

for us when we walk outside. I said: I do not have to.

He said: No, we want you, to show that we are talking, it is bipartisan; but I hope you will not mention nation-building. I said:

You mean what the President talked to me about for the last hour

and 20 minutes? He said: Yes, yes, that is what I mean. I said: No,

I will not mention nation-building.

The point is there is a real struggle here to define how you cut

the political knot the President faces. Like Democrats face on the

center-left, there is one faced on the center-right now. That is: OK,

we are not going to nation-build because Clinton did that and we

spent 8 years beating the living bejeezus out of him for doing that,

so we are not going to do that, but we have got to be in there with

both feet or we know nothing is going to happen.

So this is going to get tricky. This is going to get tricky. One of

the things that I want to ask you, just a broad question. I am going

to make a statement and then you tell me whether—take off from

the statement any way you feel that is appropriate.

I cannot envision any realistic prospect of us meeting the goal

which you have heard articulated by Democrats, Republicans, administration and Senate, which is that we want a stable Afghanistan where all the ethnic groups are represented, where women,

who represent close to 60 percent of the population, over 55 percent

of the population, where women—and I can see someone saying 65.

Well, I know it is over 50 and I hear 55, 60, now 65. Anyone for

70? But a super-majority of the population.

We all say these things, and you say the Afghan people are our

friends and care about us and like us and look for us to lead. My

experience with being deeply involved in another part of the world

where there were deep divisions based upon originally tribal backgrounds, although with a patina of more sophisticated, only the

patina, though, of more sophisticated institutions, is that they are

fully aware that in the near term they are not likely to be able to

resolve the really hard questions, and they want somebody they

trust coming in and in effect laying down the law when they cannot

agree.

Second, it appears to me that the Six Plus Two is not a workable

solution. Ask my friend right here who spent time in Afghanistan

during that period that you were there realizing it does not work—

44

it did not work. Let me put it this way: It did not work, not likely

to work.

So I guess my question is—and we all say we want and need to

deal with the six-plus million people who may be seriously physically injured and-or die as a consequence of not getting enough nutrition. All the goals are the same. Everybody states they have the

same goal. Is there any way the near-term and long-term goal in

your view can be met without very specific U.S. leadership?

In a speech written for me by the gentleman behind me on my immediate right, before the administration asked for the $320 million in aid, I went to the floor and suggested we commit a billion

dollars right then and there to show our good faith, to actually deliver it, to deal with taking up the immediate need, which we did

not know would not last all winter, to take care of the entire ticket,

which we could afford to do. That in my view would then generate

genuine response from other countries.

I will conclude by saying this: I cannot think of any time that

I have been in this committee where on matters relating to the

aftermath or the ongoing physical conflict in a country where anything has been resolved without U.S. leadership. I cannot think of

one, not a single one. That leadership has been that we usually

have forces on the ground. We want to run the show; you usually

have to have somebody with an American flag on his arm on the

ground. When it talks about aid, we have to come with the first

down payment. When it talks about political stability, we have to

be the one in there doing it.

Talk to me for a moment about what is the U.S. role, not in this

broad generic sense about, well, we have to lead. Give me some insight as to how much of the nitty-gritty are we responsible for putting together in these various political, economic, emergency aid as

well as rebuilding as well as dealing with the physical security.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. I can tell you are not going to hear me disagreeing with the thrust of your statement. I think one of the

things we need to do when we look at Afghanistan is to set aside

this cliche which the phrase ‘‘nation-building’’ has become. It is

like, ‘‘is this going to become another Vietnam?’’ Let us throw these

things out.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with you.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. It is silly, stupid posturing.

But we cannot escape the fact that we are going to have to help

the Afghans rebuild their nation. That does not mean we have to

be nation-building. They have to build their nation, but we have to

help them rebuild their nation. It has to be very, very aggressive

action.

I am apprehensive about the conference in Tokyo in January. I

think it is a good thing, but every time we go to those conferences

we get together and we say: Now, what are we going to do? As soon

as we say that, the United States is first saying, and the Afghans

will know it, we are trying to do it on the cheap and we are not

trying to do it in the same forthright way that we conducted the

military campaign.

It is good that it is co-chaired by the United States, Japan, EU,

and Saudi Arabia. But we need to go in and say: Hey guys, we are

putting down $10 billion and we need to rebuild or help rebuild,

45

reconstruct Afghanistan. If we do not do it that way, you are right,

I do not think it will get done. Again, $10 billion, $20 billion, it is a sound investment in terms

of our foreign policy interests in that part of the world and

throughout the Muslim world. It is also a sound investment in the

kind of global world we want for our children and grandchildren.

Let us face it, we cannot have it if there is instability in Afghanistan that spreads into Pakistan and Central Asia and continues on

in the Persian Gulf.

So not to go on, but just to confirm what I said earlier, I am not

going to disagree with your thrust. I believe it firmly. The Afghans

are not concerned right now that we are trying to impose America

upon them. They are concerned that we do 1989 again and we kind

of drop them.

They want us to be their friends—— The CHAIRMAN. Everyone I have spoken to, except occasionally

my collective staff, I got the same response you said here today:

They are not looking for an all-Muslim force.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. No, they are not.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, I am getting the opposite.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. Just the opposite. They want the opposite and

they will tell you that. I am sure Fatima will say the same thing.

The Afghans want the best peacekeeping force for the future of Afghanistan. They want the friendship that we have provided in the

past.

I lived there 10 years. I never heard an anti-American statement

ever in those 10 years. I coached basketball teams and I was successful and I did not even have players yelling at me in opposition

in that regard. The Afghans understand what a good friend can be.

They are hoping and dreaming and praying that we have learned

ourselves from our mistakes this last 10, 12 years, and that we see

this as our window of opportunity, as well as their window of opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN. Knowing how seriously Nebraska takes its sports

teams, I will not ask you whether you were there to recruit.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. Well, I would recruit for the Afghan national

basketball team, which I would like to coach once again, and also

the University of Nebraska at Omaha hockey team, which is a division one hockey team and is ranked nationally right now.

The CHAIRMAN. I know, I know, I know, I know.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. You opened the door.

The CHAIRMAN. I know, I know. And I am not even from Colorado.

Look, let me ask one last question and then yield the rest of the

time to my friend from Rhode Island. Our next witness is from a

respected—is respected in her own right, but from a very respected

family as well, and a Sufi family. The Wahabis and others have

been the more radical, represented the radical elements.

Tell me a little bit about, which we have not talked much about,

how much of the division that exists between and within Pashtun

and the other three major ethnic groups is a reflection as much of

a division based upon Islam as much as it is geography? How much

of a role is this going to play as this gets played out in Afghanistan?

46

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. I remember Islam when I was living in Afghanistan as essentially a positive force. What was the case in Afghanistan, although nobody would officially admit to it, is that there was

a kind of separation of church and state at that time, that the real

state was led by the khans and that the church, led by the mullahs

in a sense, was really in that traditional arrangement subservient

to the secular state. I think it was a healthy arrangement. That is

because it was not an extreme period. Extreme periods tend to

bring people moving more to fundamentalists.

You have talked about Fatima Gailani’s extended family and one

of those moderate traditional leaders is from that family and takes

a look in a moderate, constructive, progressive way for the role of

women and others.

The CHAIRMAN. But how much does that represent? What I am

trying to get at is——

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. I am getting to that, and that is this. There is

a difference in Afghanistan in that not all Muslims are Sunni.

There is probably more than most Sunnis would admit in the Shia

sect, probably somewhere in excess of 20 percent. One cannot really

know right because past censuses are not valid at the moment.

But in any case, it will be very necessary for the Afghans, when

they draw up their future, to draw it up in such a way that that

minority Shia population does not feel that, because there has been

a decision to take a Hanafi or Sharia form that is based on the beliefs of the Sunni majority, that they are again going to be discriminated against, as they were in the past. That is an issue.

Right now the most important and significant, the immediate future issue, is the impact over the last 20 years of extreme crises

in Afghanistan, which has tended to move people toward a more

conservative, actually more fundamentalist form of Islam in Afghanistan. If Afghans see opportunity, if we help Afghanistan, Afghan citizens, to feel that there is hope to work among themselves,

they are very practical people. I always found them, though good

Muslims, not to be extreme when I lived there.

In a traditional form of society and government, they would naturally evolve again to a more practical approach to Islam than this

extremist stuff we have seen. To a degree, we have seen some of

that discredited by the last 10 years in Afghanistan, particularly

the last 5 years, with the intrusion of Osama bin Laden and the

Arabs who were trying to enforce extremism through this Ministry

to Promote Virtue and Extinguish Vice. Afghans are aware of these

things.

But again, we are talking more about the urban Afghan who

came into play with this than the rural Afghans. In many ways,

they continue to go on in some ways with their lives as they have

for decades and centuries. It is the urban areas in Afghanistan that

really do drive the reconstruction and the development of that

country.

In Afghanistan, you have heard about all these, the Pashtuns,

the Farsiwans, Tajiks, the Aimq and the Hazaras, et cetera, the

Uzbeks. The one population that nobody talks about, and it is my

favorite population, is the Kabuli Afghan. This is the Afghan who

came, no matter what the ethnic group, to Kabul decades ago and

47

they became Kabulized. They became intermarried. They became

Afghanistan’s melting pot.

That is what was bringing progressive life, a progressive form of

life, reform, development, education in Afghanistan. It was not imposed. It was offered as a resource. People came to Kabul for that.

We have to help the Afghans to be able to reconstruct that resource. I think that is very, very important.

Like other Kabuli Afghans, Fatima’s family will say that it descends from a lineage that goes back to the Prophet Mohamed.

Others will say they are Pashtuns from Kandahar. But many of

them have never lived there. They have lived in Kabul and for all

intents and purposes, like the King, who speaks Persian, not

Pashto—he is a Pashtun—they have been Kabulized. That was the

driving force for Afghanistan’s development and it was a driving

force to bring a melting pot of Afghans together. That is what we

have to hope returns as part of the whole reconstruction process.

The CHAIRMAN. Some would argue that was a driving force for

the splintering of Afghanistan as well, though, is it not?

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. Well, that is another story. One has to harken

back to the politics of the sixties and the seventies. The splintering

began when a member of the royal family staged a coup in revenge

because he had been bounced out 10 years earlier.

The CHAIRMAN. I am trespassing on your time.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. You do not want to go back through that kind

of history.

The CHAIRMAN. No, I do, but I am going to ask you to maybe

come back at some point so we can go into more detail on this aspect of Afghanistan, so we educate this body more. People here

have one vision of Afghanistan. The idea that women held office,

that women had responsible positions, that women were totally integrated, that women were educated and went to the university is

something that is sort of counterintuitive to Americans now because of all that they have been exposed to.

So when we say we want to reconstruct and we want women in

society, I have Delawareans say to me: Well, wait a minute; let us

not go overboard here. They should be, but look, I am not sending

my son over there for you to reconstruct and modernize a country.

And I say: No, no, no, no; all I am trying to do is get Afghanistan

in a sense back to where it was in the sixties and early seventies,

and they will take care of it from there themselves. And people go:

What? You mean to tell me—so we have an education process

under way.

But now I have gone way beyond my time and I have trespassed

on our next witness, but, most importantly at the moment, on my

colleague’s time. So the rest of the time is yours and then we will

excuse you, dean.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. Thank you.

Senator CHAFEE. So what is the status, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. The status is you have as much time as you

want to question the dean, who is going to then go catch a plane,

and then we are going to hear from—— Mr. GOUTTIERRE. No, he is going to go to another hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if I knew that I would not dismiss you——

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. In the Rayburn Building.

48

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Because no other hearing could possibly be as important as this hearing.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. That is true. That is why I stayed.

The CHAIRMAN. Fire away.

Senator CHAFEE. I have heard and admired your testimony and

I look forward to hearing from the Rhode Islander next.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. I would like to close with a statement relating

to the women of Afghanistan, and I know that Fatima will make

important statements about the status of Afghan women. I was the

first male to coach an Afghan girls basketball team and to set up

and organize a girls high school basketball league.

As the head of the Fulbright Foundation in Afghanistan, I was

the first one to be successful in persuading the Afghans to send Afghan girls on AFS programs. During the war with the Soviets, we

had teacher training programs for women even when we were

being threatened and the women were being threatened by the

Arabs and others in Pakistan in the refugee camps. I could not

agree more with those who have said that the education, the training, the equality for women in Afghanistan is key, very, very key,

and I believe that from the bottom of my heart.

I have lived with these people since 1964 and I feel women are

the ones who have been the most severe victims of these last 28

years of improper rule in Afghanistan. So maybe I will conclude

with that and thank you very much for the time you have given

me today.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you were going to say that you coached

Ms. Gailani and she could play in the WBA. I thought you were

going to tell me that.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. I did not coach her.

Ms. GAILANI. But my classmate was with you.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. That is right, Fatima. That is right, Fowziah

Usman. By the way, she was 6 foot 1 and she was a center on my

team, and I will tell you they were hell on wheels, and they learned

how to play basketball from their brothers.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for your commitment and sticking

with it, and we will continue to rely on you as a resource.

Mr. GOUTTIERRE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Gailani, I thank you very much for your indulgence and I am very interested and anxious to hear your testimony. We have as much time as you have.

STATEMENT OF FATIMA GAILANI, ADVISOR, NATIONAL

ISLAMIC FRONT OF AFGHANISTAN

Ms. GAILANI. Thank you. Thank you very much for inviting me

here. I would like to start by saying that the people of Afghanistan

are really sorry and hurt the way the Americans were hurt by the

September 11 incident, the same way we are hurting when our

country is bombed by our own friends.

The only way that will console us on what happened in September is that we achieve something in Afghanistan and get rid of

the terrorists forever and an explanation for the people of Afghanistan, those who were directly bombed and hurt and lost loved ones

that here it was necessary, but here I give you peace and stability,

a normal life.

49

Twenty-three years of war in Afghanistan brought lots and lots

of misery upon our country. From the underground irrigation systems to schools, hospitals, roads, everything, everything, our forests, national forests were destroyed. Also, women’s situation in Afghanistan. They became corpses all of a sudden, slowly but all of

a sudden during the Taliban.

The conference in Bonn did open a window for women. It was

good—although I heard two people, but there were five women

present in that meeting, three in the capacity of delegates and two

in the capacity of advisors, and I was one of the advisors.

This conference gave us hope, especially the opening speeches.

When Mr. Qanooni started his speech I thought, my God, we do not

have any problem; maybe in 3 days time we will pack up and go

home, because he was so flexible. He claimed that there was nothing they wanted, all they wanted is peace and stability and forming

an interim government which will be really broad-based.

When the negotiations started, I was a bit scared, because first

we had a problem over the presence or not presence of peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan. We had a good 2 days spent on that.

With the exception of the delegation of the Northern Alliance, the

three other delegates, they were absolutely firm upon it that without peacekeeping forces, an independent force, in Afghanistan, the

government cannot work. I want to add upon that that women

could not have a normal life, because we had experiences even with

Northern Alliance.

Then negotiating, we had meetings room to room and without a

visa, without an airplane, from Peshawahr we were going to Cyprus, from Cyprus to Rome. These were the rooms, our offices. One

was called Peshawahr, the other Cyprus, and Northern Alliance,

and Rome. So we were just in a matter of a few steps entering from

Rome to Cyprus, from Cyprus to Peshawahr.

We solved lots of problems. Then we were told by the Ambassador Brahimi that we had to come up with a list of government.

He emphasized that these people would have to be competent, educated, and also, if possible, not belong to any of the political organizations. If a competent person happened to be one of the organizations, that is fine, but otherwise we should try not to have them

there.

The result was—I am telling you the truth—I was a bit shocked.

Seventeen seats went to the Northern Alliance out of 30. I had

hoped maybe five very important posts and then ten altogether.

But 17? So it would have been better if we had had the meeting

which had happened in Rome, the Northern Alliance, and the office

of the ex-King, 50 then, 50 that. It would have been even better.

Why should you bother with us being there and not even offer

anything, which we deserved, because the only mistake we have

done is that we put our arms down when the war against the Soviet Union finished and we did not participate in the civil war.

During the civil war when you define the government——

The CHAIRMAN. Would you define for the record what you mean

by ‘‘we’’?

Ms. GAILANI. The majority of the people who did not participate

in the civil war. We were not with the Mujaheddin—we were not

with the Taliban, we were not with the Northern Alliance. We were

50

the Mujaheddin or people who were civilian refugees who did not

take sides.

Some of our very strong Mujaheddin preferred to put down their

forces and accept what was coming from the initiative of the

United Nations, something very similar to what we have today.

But then unfortunately some of our friends had a coup and we

know what happened.

Well, anyway, I have criticism upon this list. I wish it was better

than that. I wish the Northern Alliance had introduced a few

women. We have two women in this government, one introduced by

Rome, the wonderful lady that Dr. Gouttierre talked about, and the

other one, who is also a surgeon, who was introduced by us, who

is also a very remarkable and capable woman. But no women from

the Northern Alliance, although they had 17 seats. Our organization, the Peshawahr Group so it is called, out of three seats we

gave one to a woman.

But in spite of all that, I still have hope. I really have hope that

this government will succeed. Mr. Qarooni is a very capable person.

Also, I know a few other people from the Northern Alliance. We

were colleagues during the jihad, and I have every faith that they

will be very successful in their job.

Also, Mr. Karzai, whom I have never worked with, but I have

heard that he has a strong personality and indeed he is a Pashtun

who does not want to belong only to his own part of Afghanistan,

but he wants to be shared by everyone.

Now we come to the situation of women. This is the only opportunity we have to take women back where they used to be, as the

Senator said. We want to go back to the democracy time. I am the

generation of the democracy time. When I was at school, I was 100

percent sure that every door will be open for me, any opportunity,

any seat, as long as I train myself and I educate myself to be worthy of that seat. I had taken it for granted, and you know that I

was mistaken.

This time we want guarantees for peace in my country, but above

all support for women and eventually a democracy. The subject of

democracy was not mentioned by any of the panelists. I strongly

believe that the Afghan people can have democracy. We always say

that the Afghan people have their own mind. If you have a strong

mind, then democracy is the answer.

I believe that 10 years of democracy in Afghanistan did work. I

remember that my parents were reading newspapers and magazines, Western magazines and newspapers, commenting that, how

wonderfully these people go to the ballot boxes, as if they have

done it all their life. Because this is a want of any human being,

of course they wanted to go to the ballot boxes.

When we have democracy, I have no fear for women’s status and

I have no fear for ethnic, religious minorities in Afghanistan, because no matter how extremist one person is, his idea will be worth

only one vote.

Now, what provisions should we have for women in the future?

As much as I am grateful for lots of women activists in the West

to support us, they were the only ones who raised their voice when

the governments had forgotten us or they did not have time for us,

51

but I am also cautious that the Western feminism cannot work in

Afghanistan.

Even if—I am a secularist. When I go, which eventually I want

to be in the parliament hopefully. When I go and ask people to vote

for me, if I tell them that I have a secular ideology, these women

will not vote for me, let alone men.

But during the democracy of Afghanistan from 1963 to 1973, we

proved that an Islamic constitution can give these opportunities for

women to have equal right of education, equal right of work with

the same pay for the same job, and equal opportunity of political

participation. I remember I was maybe 9 or 10 that they were

working upon how could they pay equal pay for men and women,

and I remember a jurist said that when the wife of the Prophet,

who was a cobbler, was making shoes, were her shoes made by her

half price of a shoe that was made by a man? Of course they said

no. Then they said, then why a teacher should take half price or

a female doctor or so on?

So at that time in France women were fighting for having equal

pay. We had it. When we had women in the senate, in Switzerland

women could not vote. We do not want or ask for stars. We want

what we had and we want what we deserve.

I strongly believe that some of our women who are financed or

whatever by the Western sort of feminism should be a little bit

cautious, the American friends and the Afghan friends, because the

situation is so delicate. If we harm this process even a little bit,

it could create big problems. I believe that I have enough evidence

in Islam that we could support all these rights for women from the

Islamic way.

Yes, the Bonn process was not perfect—I close by this—but I accept it and I would like to see this as an opening door for all of

us. I do not believe that—some people say women were as tokens

there. They were strong women and they were committed. One

thing that we had no problem in Bonn, it was women’s issues.

Maybe only 10 minutes spent on it, because they all agreed, which

is very good.

So I say it again: Do not forget us, because if you forget us we

will have another problem and that problem will harm lots of people outside Afghanistan’s boundaries. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Out of courtesy to my friend from Rhode Island, maybe I will let

him begin, since you are in Rhode Island these days.

Senator CHAFEE. First of all, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for

choosing such a distinguished witness, a woman who brings a compelling perspective and ability to comment on recent events in Afghanistan and how that nation can prosper in the future. So thank

you.

I am curious about the rise of fundamentalism across the Islamic

world not just in Afghanistan with the Taliban. What do you believe are the root causes of Islamic fundamentalism?

Ms. GAILANI. In Afghanistan it is a totally different matter. I was

a student in Iran when the Iranian Islamist revolution started. I

believe that, I strongly believe that, lack of having healthy political

parties in our country pushes us to underground politics. At that

time it used to be Islam and communism and now it is just Islam.

52

We are educated, whether if it is in Arab countries, in Afghanistan, or anywhere. The way that we are educated really is Western

education. When you learn all that, then you need to express it.

When you express it, you need parties to express upon. So if you

do not have these opportunities, then you go to extremism.

I remember during—before democracy in Afghanistan, there

were two underground parties, the Islamists and the Communists.

They were really working hard. They were trying to recruit people

from big families, influential rich families. This is exactly what the

Islamists are doing now in the Muslim world. This is exactly what

is happening.

I remember that I was sent by my father to come here 18 years

ago to show our worry about recruiting these non-Afghans in jihad.

Most of these people were quite rich, well off people. I tried so hard

to convince people here that we do not need foreign fighters, we

have enough fighters; we just need defensive weapons.

I think in the other countries it is really lack of expressing their

politics. In Afghanistan what we see with the Taliban, it is an imported product. Afghanistan became a nest for all kinds of nasty

people, and some of our Arab friends did not help that very much,

because they would say to these naughty boys: Take this toy, go

and play in my neighbor’s yard; leave me have my siesta. That

other yard was our country.

In Afghanistan the war between the rivalry of Wahabism and

Shi’ism was fought. The supremacy—the rivalry between the regional supremacy of Iran and Pakistan was fought. Any war anyone had in that region was fought inside Afghanistan. The same

thing, the Taliban or al-Qaeda or whatever came in Afghanistan,

not because the people of Afghanistan wanted it. It became as a

nest for these people.

Senator CHAFEE. I suppose that question could be answered in

weeks and months.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think it is a pretty good answer. I know

you do, too.

Senator CHAFEE. A complex question. You mentioned the rise of

Western influence, and you spoke about the delicate balance and

possible resentment of Western influence in the country. Whether

that will galvanize further fundamentalism is, in my view, one of

the challenges for the West.

Ms. GAILANI. I do not have a fear from that at all. Actually,

again we are lucky that we did have the experience of those 10

years of democracy. I heard it from one of our quite hard-liner

Muslim Mujaheddin leaders—by the way, I studied during the civil

war—I had the choice between having a nervous breakdown or

studying something else, so I studied Islamic jurisprudence. When

he heard that I was studying this, he said: That is wonderful, but

I tell you one thing, that the constitution that we had in Afghanistan, it was the best mixture of Islam and modernity. It was created by the best jurists we had in Afghanistan plus a French expert in law and a very big share from Al-Azar University from

Egypt.

The person who was behind that constitution, Mohamed Musa

Shafiq, was a jurist, happened to be the last Prime Minister of the

ex-King and he proved to be the most modern and the most proVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:43 Mar 12, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 77065 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
53

gressive Prime Minister we had. Professor Gouttierre has written

a beautiful chapter in a book about him, that because he was successful, because democracy was working, because Islam and modernity showed such a strong bond, the coup happened in Afghanistan,

first with the front, President Daoud, and then a Communist coup.

So I have no fear of any other backlash. Just give us democracy

and you will see that we will show you wonders.

Senator CHAFEE. I applaud your confidence in democracy, I really

do.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I applaud your courage. I will be brief. You

state the conundrum, Islam and modernity. You talk about them,

as everyone else does, as if they have to learn to live with one another and they are not one and the same, that Islam has had difficulty absorbing modernity, becoming modern, and democracy is

associated with modernity, with modern.

The thing that I always find, the conundrum I always find myself when I listen to Islamic experts like my friend Jonah Blank behind me, who is a former Harvard professor of anthropology and

a student of Islam and a professor, is that on its face, that conundrum, that democracy is not in the eyes of those what do not understand, or maybe understand, Islam is inconsistent with Islam.

It has been something that has not been embraced very many

places.

So the concern I think raised by Senator Chafee as I read it is

a concern that I have. There are three things which you seem to

have said today. One is that all agree that there must be a society

in Afghanistan at least open enough to accommodate different

views and political outlets for people’s views, extreme or otherwise,

and that it must embrace women in terms of being full participants, but it must not do it the Western way, it must do it the

Islam way.

My question to you is is not democracy per se the Western way,

or is it consistent with Islam? Because one of the things that—as

a Christian and a Catholic, I went to a religious school. When you

misbehave in school, the religious teachers, the nuns, would make

you stay after school and be disciplined. The way you were disciplined was writing on the blackboard a number of times something you were supposed to absorb.

Senator CHAFEE. Did that ever happen to you?

The CHAIRMAN. It happened to me quite often, quite often.

One of the things that I used to have to write, I can recall writing it 500 times while I could hear everyone else out on the playground playing baseball while I was writing this, it went like this.

It said: The road to hell is paved with good intentions, because I

would find myself saying, why did you speak up in class, Mr.

Biden, and I would say: Well, sister, I was trying to settle that argument behind me. And she would say: You may have had a good

intention, but you are paving your own road to hell here, not literally but figuratively.

We have good intentions right now. The women on this committee, the women in this body, who are very much part of Western

feminism, have very good intentions to help women in Afghanistan.

One of the hardest things that is going to occur I think is us figuring out how we help without interfering.

54

How much of an impact on the deliberations in Bonn that resulted in all agreeing that women would have a place in the new

government was a consequence of a dicta coming from this administration saying: By the way, there is no alternative here; you must

include women. How much of it was a consequence of that versus

just a spontaneity among the players?

Because, as you know much better than I, it was not only the

Taliban that has mistreated women. The Northern Alliance when

it held power, many elements of that coalition treated women with

alarming brutality. Some groups imposed restrictions hardly less

extreme than the Taliban, and rapes and sexual slavery and so on.

So how much of it was a consequence of a Western power imposing a dicta on all of you assembled and how much of it was just

pure spontaneity, love and generosity?

Ms. GAILANI. It all came by force, and I am happy it did. During

the time of jihad, I was the only woman in the Afghan politics, not

because other women did not know and could not achieve better

than I did, but only because I had a religious family behind me and

a father what wanted to show that it was all right. Because he was

a religious leader, he was not questioned.

We tried so hard, we tried so hard to bring more women in the

politics of the Mujaheddin. We did not succeed because at that

time, if you remember, in spite of our struggle, the trend was that

help whoever has the biggest beard and the biggest turban. That

was the fancy of the Western countries, especially here, unfortunately.

We were totally marginalized, only because in the eye of the

Western countries, especially here, we looked Western. They forgot

that they have friends in Afghanistan, strong friends. They looked

for higher people and those higher people happened to be the most

radical of the Islamists we saw in the country.

I still do not know why you have done that, and I am happy that

it has stopped and you helped us to stop it. Yes, the situation of

women in Bonn was forced upon all of us. We welcomed it. Our organization could not bring any women because we had only 3 seats

and we had 15 organizations and parties and Mujaheddin tribesmen under the umbrella that my father has now and we did not

know how to push a woman. So I virtually pushed myself in this

conference as an advisor.

Those people that had 11 seats, the King brought 2, which was

very good, and the North brought only 1.

The CHAIRMAN. There’s another Western expression that seems

appropriate here: Be careful what you wish for, for you may get it.

I am not being facetious when I say that. In a democratic Afghanistan, do you believe that women will be represented? I know they

represent more than a majority of the population. Do you think

that the participation of women, who I would think after 20-some

years might be understandably less courageous than you and understandably more reluctant to engage in what we saw on the television, whether it is true or not—and let me make it clear to you,

I do not profess to be an expert on your country. I am chairman

of this committee, the most vaunted position in foreign policy in

our government other than in the administration.

55

I have spent my academic and my political career mastering

strategic doctrine and U.S.-Soviet relations and ‘‘the Middle East’’

as it relates to the Palestinian-Israeli struggle and Europe generally, et cetera. But I do not profess to have an expertise.

But what I observed on the international broadcasts were when

the Taliban was driven out of Kabul men flocking to barber shops

in resistance to shave off their beards, but none of that happening

in rural areas; women still wearing burkas in rural areas, whereas

in Kabul women defiantly demonstrating that—it is like there is a

mantra in a child’s fable, ‘‘Ding-dong, the witch is dead.’’ Everybody

can come out now. Well, ding-dong, the Taliban has gone, I can

take off my burka.

But that did not happen other places. So I guess what I am asking you is—and I realize it is asking you to be a bit of a fortuneteller—is how long do you think it will take and what circumstances have to exist to provide an environment where, even if

there is a democracy, women will feel the confidence to come forward without fear of being raped, molested, beaten, subjected to indignities, and-or just shunned?

Ms. GAILANI. I challenged once a representative of the Taliban on

radio BBC that I am going to study Islamic jurisprudence, and I

did it. Now, Senator, I challenge you that in a democratic Afghanistan, you choose the area, I will go and compete in an election with

any man, against any man you choose.

The CHAIRMAN. Hey, I will manage your campaign. I am for you,

kid. I am with you. I can tell you are a winner. I do not have any

doubt about that. But all kidding aside, how do you get women?

Ms. GAILANI. I am not kidding. I am very serious about that.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you are.

Ms. GAILANI. In the past in Afghanistan, we had four women in

the first parliament. Only one was from Kabul. The three others,

they were nominated from their own villages, from provinces, and

they won.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not doubt that. All I am saying is that you

have had more than 2 decades of misery and subjugation and brutality that women have been the victims of.

Ms. GAILANI. We had brutality not only upon women. We had

brutality, period.

The CHAIRMAN. I know that. But I am just focusing on that for

the moment.

Ms. GAILANI. This is an artificial environment that in Afghanistan today we live. This is an artificial Afghanistan you see. As I

said earlier, every battle was imported in Afghanistan by those

people who were greedy to find some money and brought these

things.

I assure you, if we pave the way, which I said paving the way

has to be from the Islamic point of view—we should have a radio.

We should have a radio with programs that women should know

about their rights. Men should know—men are ignorant. It is not

just because women are ignorant.

The CHAIRMAN. All of us.

Ms. GAILANI. In Afghanistan.

The CHAIRMAN. No, here as well occasionally.

56

Ms. GAILANI. Men are ignorant of the rights of their wives, sisters, and brothers, as much as they are ignorant of their own rights

within Islam. So we need these, whether you call it propaganda,

whether you call it enlightenment, whatever you call it, whatever

you like. I do not care, as long as we have these programs that will

talk to the nation, talk to the people, to tell them that as a Muslim

how could they live a democratic life and how as a Muslim they

could give opportunity to the women because this is an order from

God.

The CHAIRMAN. To use your phrase, I would love to have an opportunity, when you have the opportunity, to spend some time with

you and my staff and some of my colleagues in an informal setting

in my office to discuss just that.

I will end where I began my questioning with the professor,

where I ended my questioning with him. I asked him how much,

as you recall, 20 minutes ago I asked him, how much of the divisions that exist on public policy within Afghanistan are reflective

of adoptions of different versions of Islam as opposed to their tribal

lineage, and how do they intersect.

I have tried my best, and I have a long way to go, through Jonah

Blank and others on my staff who are scholars on and relating to

Islam, as well as those who are practitioners, to educate myself

more about Islam. As my mother would say, a little bit of knowledge is a dangerous thing. I have a little bit of knowledge and I

suspect maybe a little bit more than a little bit of knowledge.

But there are such interesting parallels between the bitter and

bloody and divisive fights that exist within Christendom among

Christians over the interpretation of the Bible, that I see from the

historical perspective the same thing occurring from the fourth caliph on within your religion.

So what I need to be educated more about, and I hope there are

members of this administration who I have respect for what they

are attempting to do, attempt to school themselves on how much

of a part the different readings of the Koran which result in different sects, whether it is Sunni or Shia, whether it is Sufi, whatever iteration of Islam is the most predominant, because, as you

point out, you are able to, capable of, and willing to debate any

member of the Taliban, who is probably Wahabi or some other

version of Islam different than your version of Islam, on what the

Prophet meant when he spoke and what he wrote down.

We call that in the West, as you know, a religious debate. There

is a famous American jurist named Oliver Wendell Holmes who

said the following. He said: ‘‘Prejudice is like the pupil of the eye;

the more light you shine upon it, the more tightly it closes.’’

I have found as a student of Western religions—and I mean that

seriously; theology is my avocation—that there are very few debates about religion that are resolved based on logic. They should

be resolved based on logic. I will conclude with one example. Even

within Protestant sects of Christendom, there are wide variations,

not resulting in jihad, but wide—even the definition of what is

meant by ‘‘jihad’’ is disagreed among you—wide differences between, let us say, Episcopalians and Pentecostals on how you read

certain, the same paragraph from the same Bible.

57

There are disagreements about whether or not the way to read

the Bible is with an educated person translating it, in effect, for

you or take it literally. I am always reminded of a phrase in the

Christian Bible talking about, and it goes something like this: It

is as difficult for a rich man to get to heaven as it is for a camel

to get through the eye of a needle.

There are very deeply devout, honorable, decent fundamentalist

Christians who believe that is literal, the Bible said that. Most

educated theologians point out to you that there is a gate in the

wall of Jerusalem, referred to as the ‘Eye of the Needle,’’ that camels had to get down on their knees to be able to get through, and

the reference in the Bible refers to that a rich man has greater obligations than a poor man because he has been given more, and to

those who have been given much much is expected in Christendom,

and so the interpretation is that a rich man better not just enjoy

his riches himself, he should make them available to his fellow

man, otherwise he will have difficulty getting to heaven. But taken

literally, it means a rich man can never get to heaven, because no

man can get through the eye of a needle.

You have the same kinds of divisions within Islam in terms of

interpretations of parts of the Koran. So it gives me hope that you

are pursuing equity and democracy within your country. It gives

me pause and concern to think that you must do it through Islam,

not because I am critical of Islam, but because those kinds of in

effect religious debates are seldom if ever resolved.

It took Western Europe 500 years of bloodshed to finally resolve

that they could live together. That is part of my concern, and I

need to be educated and maybe you would help educate me.

Ms. GAILANI. Senator, I did not mean that we should give them

theology education and come to the philosophy of Islam. In Afghanistan we have Sunni Hanafis and Shia Jafadis and Ismailis. The

Ismailis, as we know, they are open to all sorts of democracy and

modernization and all.

In the fiq, in the jurisprudence the majority of people have in Afghanistan and the Jafadi jurisprudence, we are very close. We are

not that far away. The translation or interpretation of Koran, there

are very few places that people differ, very few. But those things

that we need inside Afghanistan today to open these three doors

for women—education, education is the first order of God to Prophet, to read, learn the knowledge of pen, writing. Not Wahabi nor

Shia, Sunni, whoever, could argue that.

The CHAIRMAN. But they do. They say you should not be educated. Am I not correct?

Ms. GAILANI. They say it because they count on the ignorance of

people and they proved that they could do it so far.

Incidentally, I will tell you that the last debate I had with

Taliban, again on BBC, or maybe Voice of America, he asked me

very politely, with all my religious titles, that, would you disagree

that the honor of a woman should come before education? I said:

It is not up to you or up to me to decide which comes first, which

comes second; I have no courage to talk on God’s word, which says

the first thing comes, before praying, before Ramadhan, before anything. I said: Would you have the courage to say such a thing? The

poor man was quiet. How could he say that, no, I have a better way

58

than God has? So he had to be quiet, because they count upon

women’s silence.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe you should manage my next campaign.

You are very good. You are very good.

Ms. GAILANI. So these are the things. When it comes to work, I

would say the wife of the Prophet was working as a teacher, one

of them, cobbler, or whatever; was he doing something bad? Did

the Prophet allow her to do something which was not honorable?

Could they say anything against it? They cannot.

When we come to the question of voting and being elected, Isaiah

was a politician. The Prophet or any of the caliphs, when they took

the power, they had to ask men and women for consent. We have

evidence in the Koran.

So if we could guarantee these three things, I will tell you, Senator, that upon that I will build a lot.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am confident you will, and I would argue

that the honor of a woman cannot be met without allowing her to

be educated.

But having said that, you are obviously very educated, very sophisticated, and very charming. We appreciate the fact you have

taken the time to be here. We have learned from you. I have

learned from you, and we will call on you again if you would be

willing.

Thank you, and I wish you all the good luck in the world. Just

remember, some day when you are Prime Minister and you are told

by your secretary that there is a guy named Biden in the outer office with his granddaughter who wishes to meet the Prime Minister, you will not say, ‘‘Joe who?’’

We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:32 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF HON. RICHARD N. HAASS TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. How much money do you anticipate the United States contributing to

the world effort for Afghan reconstruction?

Answer. Afghan reconstruction will require a sustained, generous effort by the

international community. The United States should contribute to the reconstruction

effort at a level that will allow us to have influence over the process, but that also

recognizes the substantial contributions we have made as the leading donor of humanitarian assistance and in prosecuting the war against terrorism. We will not

know the full magnitude of the needs until the World Bank, UNDP and ADB report

on the status of needs assessment missions they are conducting, the preliminary results of which will be available for a conference in Tokyo in January 2002. Even

then, we will need to carefully scrutinize these numbers to ensure that the estimates are realistic and that the absorptive capacity exists to effectively use foreign

aid. Nonetheless, we expect that the significant needs for Afghan reconstruction will

be upwards of $1 billion a year for five-to-ten years. We calculate that we will need

to contribute meaningfully to this effort in order to have sufficient weight to guide

the process in ways that serve our interests.

Question. Where do you anticipate money for Afghan assistance coming from? Will

any funds come from a supplemental appropriation requests, or will they be taken

from existing allocations?

Answer. We believe existing resources will be sufficient to allow the United States

to contribute in response to the most immediate assistance needs at a level that

maintains our credibility, encourages contributions by other countries, and ensures

59

ourselves a seat at the table as decisions are made regarding reconstruction. For

the longer term, we will need to await both the results of the full needs assessment

and the scale of support from other donors before determining what resources we

are prepared to make available to support the reconstruction effort. The Administration intends to engage the Congress on issues related to funding these longer-term

requirements for Afghanistan’s reconstruction.

Question. Without a supplemental request, any dollar spent on Afghan relief

means one less dollar for some other country. Which countries or programs might

face reductions in order to fund the President’s pledge?

Answer. Afghanistan’s reconstruction is fully consistent with the strategic interests and humanitarian values of the United States. This reconstruction effort should

not and need not undercut our other priorities, relating to counterterrorism or

American foreign policy more broadly.

Question. Are we still fully committed, whether directly or through our allies, to

establishing security for the distribution of humanitarian aid?

Answer. The Bonn Agreement calls upon the international community to deploy

an international force to Kabul to ‘‘assist in the maintenance of security in Kabul

and its surrounding areas. Such a force could, as appropriate, be expanded to other

urban centers and other areas.’’ Thus, the mission of the international security assistance force (ISAF) will be first and foremost to help maintain security in Kabul

and environs. The Bonn Agreement recognizes that the responsibility for providing

security and law and order throughout the country resides with the Afghans themselves; we expect that the ISAF will work with the Afghans to take primary responsibility for establishing security for the distribution of humanitarian aid.

Question. What is the U.S. Government position on deployment of an international security assistance force in Afghanistan? What role do you see U.S. forces

playing in any international security unit?

Answer. The United States strongly supports the deployment of an international

security assistance force (ISAF) in accordance with the Bonn Agreement. We are

working with the British, the UN and Afghans to establish and deploy such a force.

The United States will support the ISAF by providing lift, logistics, C3I, and access

to Bagram until the Kabul airport can be readied.

Question. What sort of timescale do you envision for a security force deployment?

Are we talking weeks or months? Is there a risk that if we delay too long, the facts

on the ground might already preclude any serious international role?

Answer. The ISAF will have an initial presence in Kabul by the time the Interim

Administration is established on December 22. It will take a few weeks beyond that

date before it can come up to full strength, but will do so as quickly as possible.

Question. How would you describe Russia’s actions over the past few weeks?

We’ve seen the introduction of between 90 and 200 Russian troops to Kabul—is this

a positive development? Is Russia playing a constructive role, or is it taking positions that could complicate the formation of a stable government?

Answer. Russia is playing a constructive role in Afghanistan and is supporting the

formation of a stable government there. To the best of our knowledge, the small

Russian military presence in Afghanistan is related to humanitarian assistance and

not military operations. This includes the airlifting of humanitarian equipment on

military cargo planes. The Russians are engaged, as are many countries, in the provision of humanitarian assistance including medical supplies and facilities. We welcome Russian humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan.

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