Docket No . 102468.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

THE PE OP LE O F TH E S TAT E OF I L LIN OI S, Appe llee, v.

JO SEP H H

A US CH IL D, A

pp el l an t.
Opinion filed June 7, 2007.

JUSTICE KA

RMEIER deli

vered t he j udgm

en t of th e c our t, w i th op inion. Chi ef Justice Thomas and Justices F

reema n, Fi tzgerald, Ki

lb ride, Gar man, a nd Bu rk e co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion.

OPINI ON

Fo llowing a

jury trial i n th e K an e C oun ty ci rc ui t cou rt, d ef en da n t, Joseph Ha us child , w as co nvict ed o f, inter alia , home i

nvasi on, armed robb ery and attem

pted f i rst deg ree m urder. Defe

ndan t appealed

and t he appella

te court origi

nal ly reversed h

is convi ctions f or armed robb ery and h om e inva sio n, su bst it ut ed a c o nvic t io n fo rsimp le robb ery an d re man de d f orresent encing. Fo llowing a g ra nt of t he St ate ’s petition f

or rehearin

g, the a ppel l ate court affi rmed defendant’s
co nvictio ns and rem

anded for resentenc in

g on the armed

ro bber y and
attem pte d m urder c onv

i cti ons. 3 64 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 20 2. Thi

s court al lowed de f en da n t’s pe ti ti on f or l ea v e to appea l. 210 Il

l. 2d R. 315. Fo r t he r eas ons that f

oll ow, we a f f i rm in par t and r ever se in pa rt t he j udgm en t of th e a pp el l ate cou rt.-2- BACK GROUND On Augu st 14, 200 1, defend ant and codefen dant, Ethan

Ward en, broke i n to a r es id en ce o cc up ied by T ho mas Wr ig ht an d h is fa mily. Defend ant and W arden

were ea ch arm

ed wi th a han dgun. The two
me n en t er ed t he mas t er be dr o o m, awakened W righ t and hi s wi fe, and dem anded a s af e. W ri gh t str ug gl ed wi th on e o f the defend ant s, a nd b oth defen dants fired t heir w eap ons . T wo sho t s hit Wr ight , c aus ing li fe-threateni

ng woundsto hi s ches

t and abdom

en, as wel l a s serious wounds t o his r ight ar m and left leg. The defen dant and W

arden then fled t he sc ene c ar rying a lo ckbo x. On Septem be r 14 , 20 01, de f

en da nt wasi nd i cte d f oratt empted fi

rst degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8–4(a), 9–1(a)(1) (West 2000)); armed
r o bb ery (720 ILCS 5/18–2(a)(4) (West 2000)); home i nvasi on (720 ILCS 5/12–11(a)(3) (West 2000)); home i n vasion (720 I LCS 5/12– 11(a)( 5) (West 200 0)); aggravated battery wi

th a fi rearm (720 ILCS 5/12–4. 2(a)( 1) (West 2000)); and cri mi nal da mag e to prop er

ty (720 ILCS 5/21– 1(1)(d) (We st 2000 )). Foll owing a jury trial , in whi ch
an ac cou nta bi l i ty i ns tructi on wasgi

ve n, de f en da nt wasf oun d gu i l ty of attempted murder, armed robb ery an d home in vasi on. The verdi

ct f orm f or hom e i nv asi on req ui re d the jury

to ma ke a specifi

c fac tual finding regar di ng a si ngl e of f en se of hom e i nv asi on, an d the j ury in dic ated that defend ant was guilty in that he “personal

ly dis charged
a fire ar m du ring t he o ff

ense .” See 720 ILCS 5/12–1 1(a)( 4) (West 2000)

. On

Ma y 28, 200 3, th

e tri al cou rt me rged the aggravated ba ttery wit h a fi rearm conv

iction i nto t he attempted

m urder c onv

i cti on and se n ten ce d d ef en da n t to 35 yea r s’ impr iso nme nt fo rho me invasion, 18 years ’ i

m pri sonm en t for attem

pted m urder, an d 12 years’ impriso nment for arme d robbery , each to be serv

ed consecutiv

el y, as we ll as a 2-y ea r con cu rrent te rm of i m prison men t f orcrim in al dam age to propert y, f

or a cumulative

sentence of

65 yea rs ’ i m pri son men t. While t he sentence

for hom e i nvasi on in cl uded a 20- year e nhance ment based on t he jur y’s finding tha t defend ant di sch arged a f i rearm dur ing t he co mm issi

on of the o ff

ense (720 ILCS 5/12 –11(a)( 4), ( c) (West 2000) ), t he

tri al cou rt re f us ed to en ha nc e d ef en da nt’ s s en ten ce s f or armed robbery whi le armed with a f

i rearm and attem

pted m urder, finding that t he pen

al tiesfor t hos e o ffenses vio late d t he pr opor ti on ate pena lt ie s claus e of

the Il l i noi s Consti

tution (Ill . Cons

t. 1970, a rt. I, §11) under

t he ho ldings o f this co ur t in People v. Walden , 199 Ill . 2d-3- 392 (2002), an d People v. Morgan , 203 Il l . 2d 470

(2003 ),
r es pe ct ive ly. In an opi nion fi le d on October 5, 2005, t he appe l l ate court aff irm ed defen dant’s conv

ictions f or crim in al dam age to pr op er t y and attempted m

urder, b ut ba sed on a cross-c omp ari s on analy sis, determi ned th at t he pena lties impo sed for t he ho me invasion a nd armed robb ery off enses violated the propor tionate penal tiescl au se of t he I llino is C o nst it ut io n ( I ll . Cons t. 197 0, ar t . I , § 11) , a nd t hat t he penal tieswer e no t seve ra ble fro m the substantive off enses. Thu s, t he courtreversed defendant’s convi ctions of th os e t wo offense s and vacated t he se nt en ce s im

pos ed t hereo n. Ho wever, at d efendant’s
re qu est, the court suppl anted hi s convi ction of arm

ed ro bber y with a
con vi cti on of s i m pl e robb ery

and reman

ded the cause for resentenc in g. One day la ter, Oct ober

6, 20 05 , t his co ur t fil

ed it s de cision in People
v. Sharpe , 2 16 I ll . 2d

481 (20 05) , ab an

don i ng cros s- com

pa ri son an alys is in

propo rtionate penal

ties cl ause cases . The State t her efo re fi le d a pe t itio n for re hear ing in thi s ca se, b ase d o n Sharpe . T he appe l l ate cou rt gra n ted th e p eti ti on, withdrew i

ts Octo ber 5, 2005, op inion, and f

il ed a new opi nion i

n which it affi rmed defendant’s
co nvictio ns fo rho me i

nv asi on, attem pted m urder, ar med r obbe ry, a nd crim in al dam age to pro perty, but vacated hi s sen ten ces f or armed robb ery and attem

pted m urder and rem

an de d f or re sente

nc i ng on those convictions. 364 Ill. A pp. 3d 202. In i ts opi ni on af ter reheari ng, th e app el l ate court ag re ed wi th b oth t he St at e a nd de fen da nt t ha t he wa s a ct ua lly cha r ge d w it h, and convi cted of, arme d robbery

pursuan t t o s ubse ct ion ( a) (2 ) o f the armed robbery statut e (720 ILCS 5/1 8–2(a)(2) (West 2000)), as opp ose d to subsection (a)(4) (720 ILCS 5 /18–2(a) (4) (West 2000) ),
as stated in the i

ndictmen t. 364 Ill. A

pp. 3d at 211

. The panel al so he ld th at: (1) the penal

ty f or armed r o bbe ry wa s no t un co nst it ut io na lly di sprop orti

on ate to the penalty f

or ar med v

iolen ce base d on t he i den ti ca l -e l em en ts test (364 I ll . App. 3d at 213-17); and (2) i n l i gh t of Sharpe , defen

dant’s sen

tences f or armed robbery

and attempted
m urder, which t he tri al

cou rt h ad ref us ed to en ha nc e a s v i ol ati ve of t he pr o po r t io na t e p en alt ie s cl ause, should be vacated and rem anded to t he t r ial c o ur t fo rr es en t en cin g in ac co r da nc e w it h t he st at ut o r ily
ma ndated en ha nc eme nt s ( 36 4 I ll. A pp

. 3d at 22 3- 25 )

. Ad dit io na lly, t he appe llat e c o ur t affir med de fen da nt ’s 35

- yea rse nt en ce fo rho me-4- invasion, fi

ndi ng i t was no t excessi

ve. 364 Ill. A

pp. 3d at 220-22. Fin ally, t he pa ne l re

jec t ed de fen da nt ’s cla im, ma de fo rt he firs t t ime in his answer to the St ate’s p et itio n for re hear ing, t hat co nsec ut ive sentence s were n

ot req ui red f orea ch o f his home

in vasi on, att em pted murder and arm ed rob bery con v i cti on s, an d i n str uc ted th e tr i al cou rt,
on reman d, to orde r th e s en ten ce s f or ea ch of the three off

enses to run consecutiv

el y. 364 Il l. A pp. 3d at 225, 227- 29.

AN AL YSIS On app eal t o t hi s cour t, defendan t raises the f

oll owing three issues: (1) whether

his con vi cti on f or arm ed rob bery mus t be reduced to a conviction f

or simpl e robbery, because the penal ty f or t hat offense is dis pr o po rt io nat e t o t he p ena lt y for an o ffe nse in volv in g ide ntica l elem ents, i.e. , ar

med vi ol en cebase d on

robbe ry; ( 2) wh et he rhis exist ingsen

tenc es f or arm ed rob bery and attem

pted m urder were authori zed by

the la w in eff ect at t he tim

e of sen tenci ng such that th ose se nt en ce s a r e n o t vo id a nd no ne w s en t en cin g h ea r ing is required; and (3 ) w het her his 65- year a ggr ega t e co nsec ut ivesentence is ex ce ss ive an d u nfa irlyharsh when compared to the 12-year sen tence im posedo n his c o de fe n da

n t, wh o wa s a l l owe d to p l ead g

ui l ty to reduced charges in

exchan ge for his testim

ony agai nstde f en da n t. We ch oos e to a dd re ss de f en da n t’s se con d c on ten ti on f i rs t. Effect iveJanuary

1, 2000, our le gis la

ture enacted Public

Act 91–404, the

sta ted pur pos e of whi ch is “t o de t er t he us e o f fir ea r ms in t he c o mmissio n o f a fe lo ny o ffens e. ” P ub. Act 91 –4 04 , § 5, eff. Jan uary 1, 2000 ( codi f

i ed at 72 0 ILC S 5/33 A– 1(b )(1) (W est 200 0)). To acc omp l i sh

thi s pur pose, the legi slature in

creased the pe na l ti esf or ce r t ain fel onies, including attempted murder and arm ed robbery, when t he off ender possesse s or use s a firea rm du ring t he co mmi ssio n of t he off ense. See 720 IL CS 5/8–4( c)(1) , 18–2 ( West 2000). These addi tional penal tiesarecomm

only referred to as the “15/20/25-to-lif e”
sen te ncing pro visi

ons. 364 Ill. App. 3d at 209 ; People v. Gueva ra , 21 6 Ill . 2d 533, 536 (2005). Defe ndan t contends that t he appel la t e court erredin va ca t ing his sentence s f or armed robbery

whi le armed wi th a fi rearm and attempted murder as vo i d a nd rem an di ng f or resentenci ng, where the tri al cou rt h ad prop erl y ref us ed to enh an ce those off en ses und er People v. Walden , 199 Il l . 2d 392(2002 ), overruled by People v. Sharpe , 21 6 I ll. 2d 481 (2005), and People v.1 Weno te tha t cour ts of ten use t he terms “ forf

eit,” “wa ive,” a nd “pro ce du raldefault” interc hangeablyin criminal c as es. F orpur poses of this opinion, we h

enceforth use the term “forfeited” to mean issues tha t could have be en rais e d, but

w ere no t, an d a re there fo re ba rr ed. See Blair , 215 Ill. 2d at 443-4 4.
-5- Morgan , 203 Ill . 2d 470 ( 20 03 ) , o ve rrul ed by People v. Sharpe , 216 I ll. 2d 481 (2005), wh ic h were bi nd i ng pre ce de nt a

t the ti me of defend ant ’s sente

nc i ng . W he the r a j udg men t i s v oi d i s a que sti on of la wwhi ch we review de novo . See People v. Rodriguez , 355 Ill . App. 3d 290, 293-94 ( 2005); see also Ford Motor Credit Co . v. Spe rry , 214 Il l . 2d 371 , 378-7 9 (200 5). I nit ially we no t e t hat , a s de fendant ad m i ts , his ans wer t o t he St ate ’s re hear ing

pet ition did not c hall

enge t he St ate ’s clai

m that these sentence s we r e v o id, r at he rhe wa s p r o ce ed in g “o n th e a ss um ption that the s en

tenc es w erevoid , in t he co nt ext of d iscuss ing whet her t he appr opri ate

remedy was to remand f

o r a n ew sente nc i ng he ari ng or simp ly t o a dd t he 15 -year enh ance ment to the ex i sti ng s en tenc e.” Defend ant now acknowledges that this is sue “b oil s down

to whether Sharpeshoul d be

appl i ed retroa cti

ve l y ” an d, i f so, whethe

r Sharpe
ren ders the existi ng n onen ha nc ed s en tenc es v oid

. The S tate argues that defendant’s failu r e t o r ais e t his a r gu men t at an y t ime p r io rt o his fi li ngsi n th i s court h av e c au se d i ts forfe iture, ci

ting People v. Enoch , 122 Ill . 2d 176 , 18 6 (1 988 ). Se e al so People v. Blair , 215 Ill . 2d 427, 443-44 (2005) (issues tha t co uld have be en

rai sed , but we

re not, are “f orfe i ted”); Peop le v. Ro

gers , 197 Il

l . 2d 216 , 221 (2 001) (s am e). De f en da n t, however, urges us to foll ow In re C.R.H. , 163 Ill . 2d 263, 274 (1 99 4) , w

h er ei n th i s c our t i n te rp reted t he rule of wai

ver 1 as an ad moni ti on to the part ies an

d not a li mi tat ion on the juri sd ictio n o f
re viewing court s, particularly where n ecessary to “provide a

j ust
resu l t.” T his cou rt has n ote d i n t he pa st t hat a cha llenge t o t he
con sti tuti on al i ty of a statute may

be rai sedat an

y tim e. People v. McCarty , 22 3 I ll. 2d 1 09, 123 (20 06) ; In re J. W. , 20 4 I ll. 2d 50, 61- 62 (2 003 ). In McCart

y , 223 I l l . 2d

at 1 23, the

de f en da nt d i d n ot for feit his st at ut or y inter pr et at ion ar gument f or f ai l ur e to ra ise it in a postt rial moti on or i n h i s p eti ti on f or l ea v e to appe al

wh erehi s rel ated pr o po r t io nate pen

al tie s an d due proces s con sti

tution al chal l engeswere-6- no t su b j ec t to f orf ei tur e. Th us , here, we

f i n d th at def en da n t has no t forfe ited hi s clai m, as it in volves a det er minatio n of w het her app lyi ng Sharperetro activel

y i n order to resentence h

im under the en

han ced pen al ty st at ut e w o uld be a

due process vi

olation. Def

endan t also urges thi s court t o ad dr es s t his is su e fo rr ea so ns o f jud icia l ec o no my, a s it is presented i

n an ot her cas e cu

rre n tl y pen di n g b ef oreth i s c our

t, People v. Harvey , 366 Il l . Ap

p. 3d 11 9 (200 6), appeal allow ed , 221 I ll. 2d 65 4 ( 20 06 ) (ta

b l e) . W h i l e w e f i n d i t un n ec es sa ry to address t his “j udic ia l eco nomy” r at ionale fo r e vading fo rfeit ur e, ou r r eview o f the app ellate co ur t ’s r eas oning in Harvey doe s rev ea l i t to be inst ru ct ive i n exa m i ni ng th e i ssues ra

i sed i n the ca se a

t bar. In Harvey , t he defen

dant was cha rge d i

n i nd i ctm en t No. 00–CR–12069 wi

th 11 f el ony cou nts , con sisti ng of 3 c oun ts of attempted murder, 4 counts of arm ed robbery

an d 4 c oun

ts of aggravated

b atte ry wi th a f i rea rm, an d w i th 1 cou nt of arm ed rob bery in in dictment No. 00–CR–12146. Foll owing a co ns olidated bench t r ial, t he d efe nd

an t wa s c onv

i cte d of two of the cou nts i n No. 00– CR–120 69, and wi

th arm ed rob bery whi l e arm

ed wi th a f i rearm (720 ILCS 5/18–2(a)(2) (West 2000)), in No. 00 –CR –12146. On ap pe al, defen

dant rais ed several

argu men ts co ncer ning his co nvictio ns and sente nc esi n No. 00 –C R– 120 69. Th e Sta

te, i n i ts m oti on for leave to fi le addi tional authority, argued

for the first

time that defendant’s 18-year sentence for arme d ro bber y while armed w ith a f i rea rm i n No. 00–CR–12146 did not con f orm to the statut oril

y m andated m

in im um sentence of 21 y ears’ i mprisonm ent and was the

refore v oid . I n his response to the State’ s m otion , the def

endan t conten ded, inter al

ia , that Sharpedid n

ot appl y retroactivel

y to hi s sen

tence and, ev en if Sharpedi d a pp l y re tr oactivel

y, t he pe na lt y fo rar med r o bbe ry wh ile armed wi th a f i re ar m i s u n con sti tuti on al l y di sprop orti

on at e t o t he pen al ty for arme d violen

ce ar me d wi

th a f i rearm

. Harvey , 36 6 I ll. App. 3 d a

t 13 0. Th e p an

el h el d th at Sharpeap plie d r et r o ac t ive ly t o casespend ingon d ir ec t r ev iew at t he t ime o f t ha t de cis io n’ s e nt ry. Howev er, i t al so f ound th at be caus e the

def endan t’s a rmed rob bery wh ile ar med wit h a f

i re ar m se n ten ce v i ol ate d th

e p rop orti

on ate penal tiescl au se un der the i den ti ca l -e l em en ts te st, h is 18-year s entence, i m pos ed i n ac cord w i

th th e statu te asi t ex i ste d pr i orto the adoption of Pu blic A ct 91 –4 04 , sho uld stan d. Harvey , 366 Ill . App. 3d at 134.-7- U nt il t his co ur t ’s r ece nt dec ision in Sharpe , Il l i noi s court s recogniz ed three ways i

n wh ic h a defendant’s se

n ten ce cou l d v i ol ate t he propo rtionate penal

ties cl ause: (1) if

it i s cruel , degradin g, o r so wh o lly dispr op or t ionat e t o t he o ffense co mmi t t ed a s t o s ho ck t he moral senseo f t he co mmun it y; ( 2) if it i s g rea ter th an the sente nc e f or an off ense wi th iden tical el em en ts; or (3 ) if it is gr eat er t han t he sentence f or a si m i l ar o ff en se t ha t po se s a gr ea t er t hr ea t t o pu blic
saf ety (cross -com

parison)

. Sharpe , 216 Ill . 2d at 487, quo t ing People
v. Moss , 206 Ill. 2d 5 03, 522 (20 03) ; Harvey , 366 Ill . App. 3d at 131. Sim il ar t o t he fact s pr ese nt in Harvey , a t t he t ime defenda nt he r ein
was sentence d in

2003, th e a

rm ed rob b er y sta tute provided that arm

ed robb ery co mm itted while “armed wi

th a fi rearm” (720 ILCS 5/18–2(a)(2) (West 2000 )), “isa Class X f elony f or whi ch 15 y ears sha ll be add ed

to th e te rm of i m pri son men t i m pos ed b y th e c our t” (7 20 I LCS 5/ 18– 2( b) ( West 200 2) ). Ho weve r, in People v. Walden , 199 I ll. 2d 39 2, 39 7 ( 20 02 ) , o ve rrul ed by People v. Sharpe , 21 6 I ll. 2d 481 (20 05) , thi s c ourt h

el d that p urs

ua nt to th e c ros s- com

pa ri son test, the statutory

15-y ear m andatory en ha nc em en t for arm ed rob bery wh ile armed wi

th a fi rearm v iolated the propo rtionate penal tiesclause of the Illino is C o ns t it ut io n a nd wa s “ un en fo r ce ab le. ” C o ns eq ue nt ly, t he trial cou rtsin the inst ant cas e and in Harvey found that they

la cked t he au thor i ty , pu rs ua nt to Walde n , to i

m pos e the 1 5-y

ea r “ add on pe na lt y” to the defendants’ Class Xse nt en ce s fo rar med r o bbe ry wh ile armed wit h a fire ar m. 364 Ill. App. 3d at 210 ; Harvey , 366 Ill . App. 3d at 131 . Ac co rd ingly, follow ing defend ant ’s co nvictio n and
se nt encing heari

ng, the trial

court herei

n i mposed a 12-y

ear ter m , whi ch was wit hin “

‘the r egular un-e nhanced sentencing pro visi ons’ ” f ort he Cla ss X o ffe ns e o f a r med r o bbe ry. 364 Ill . App. 3d at 210-11; 720 ILCS 5/18–2(b) (West 2000); 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1( a)(3 ) (West 2000) ; cf

. People v. Harvey , 1 96 Ill . 2d 444, 448 (2001) (if a tri al courti m pos es a sen

t ence gr eat er t han t hat per mitt ed by st at ut e, t he
ex ces s porti on of

the s en tenc e i s void

). S imila r ly, the attempted murder statute pr ovide d, at th e ti me of defendant’s sent encing, t hat “a n at tempt to comm

it f irst degree murder wh ile ar me d with a

fi rearm is a Cl

ass X f el ony f or which 15 years sh al l b e add ed

to the t er m of impriso nment impo sed by the court.” 720 ILC S 5 /8 –4( c) (1 )( B) ( West 200 0) . H ow ever , in People
v. Morgan , 203 Ill . 2d 470, 491-92 (2003) , o ve r r ule d b y People v.-8- Sharpe , 21 6 Il

l . 2d 481 (20 05) , thi s c ourt, u si ng a c ros s- com

pa ri son anal ysi s, struck down the 1 5-y ear e nh ancem en t for a tt empted fi

rst degree murder wh

ere “a f irearm was i n def enda nt’s possessi

on,” as
un con sti tution a lly di sproportionate to se cond degre e m

urder. A cc o r di ng ly, und

er Morgan , the trial

court herei

n f ound that it wa s prohib ited

fro m im po sing t he enha nced po rt ion o f the pena lty, a nd there f ore sentence d defen

dant to a nonenhan

ced t erm of 18 y

ears’ i m pri son men t, wit hin the 6- t o 30- year range f or t he Class Xf

el ony of attempted murder. 364 Ill. A pp. 3d at 207 -08, 2 23; 720 ILCS 5/8–4 (c)(1) (W

est 200 0); 7 30 IL CS 5/5 –8–1( a)(3) (W est 200 0). As in Peo ple v. Harvey , 366 Ill . App. 3d 119 (2006), t hi s co ur t de ci ded Sharpe , w hich expr essly ove rr uled t he de cisions in Walden and Morgan , while

defen dant’s case

was pend ingon di

rect rev i ew. In Sharpe , this court stated: “After muc h r efle ct io n, we ha ve co nc lu d ed that crosscom pa ri son anal ys is has proved

t o be no t hing bu t pr o ble mat ic and unwo rk able, and t hat it ne ed s to b e abandoned. Those
casest hat use d su ch an a nalysis to invalidate a pe na lt y are overruled, and t his co ur t will no l on ger u se th e p rop orti

on ate penal tiescl au se to judge a pe na l ty i n r el ati on to th e p en al ty f or an off ense wi th dif feren t elem ents.” Sharpe , 216 Ill . 2d at 519. Thus, Sharpeeff

ectivel y “ revi ved” t he constitutional

ity of the 15-y

ear add on p enalt y for a rmed ro bber y whi le ar med wit h a firea rm and attempted murder wh

ile ar me d with a

fi rearm. See Harvey , 36 6 I ll. App. 3d at 1 31. Put another way, because cr oss -com pa ri son pr opor ti on ate penal ties rev ie w was no longe

r part o f our jurisprudence

follow ing Sharpe , the Walden and Morgan dec isions no longe rsupported a fin

din g that t he 15- year s ent encing e nhance ment for arme d robbery

whi le armed with a fi rearm an d attempted murder wh ile armed wi

th a fi rearm v iolated the propo rtionate penal tiesclause of t he Ill in ois Constitution. See 364 Ill . App. 3d at 213, ci ting Sharpe , 216 Ill. 2d a t 5 16- 23; People v. Gue vara , 216 Ill . 2d 533, 544-45 (2005 ). Th e q

ue sti on whi ch we m ust now an swe

r i s wh ethe r Sharpe sho uld be ap plied r et ro act ively to defend an t’s case, whi ch was pend ing when o ur dec ision in Sharpewas rendered. T he Sta te a rgue s th at Sharpe , which an

nounced a

ne w constitutional

ru le, is t o be applie d retro activel y s o t hat de fen da nt is
now elig ible t o be sentenc ed as m andated by

the statut ory 15-y

ear-9- sentence en ha nc em en t for b oth arm

ed rob bery whi lea rmed wit h a f i rearm (720 ILCS 5 /18–2(a) (2) (West 2000)), and attempted murder wh ile arm ed wi th a f i rearm (720 IL CS 5/8 –4(c)( 1)(B) (W est 200 0)). Defend ant contends that apply in g Sharpere tros

pe cti v el y to v ac ate
nonen han ced sentence s tha

t we re v al i d un de r th e p riorca se law wo uld
v i ol ate du e p r o ce ss by mak ing t he law les s fa vo r ab le to h i m th an it pr ev io us ly wa s, an d b y de nying him his r igh t t o no t ice an d fa ir warni ng. We a gree with the State. We ini tial ly observe that the i ssue of the State’s right to ap pea l d ef endant’s sentence

is not before us be cause def endan t, either
o r igin ally or o n rehea

rin g, appeale d hi s arm

ed robbery

and attempted murder conv i cti ons, a n d S up r eme Co ur t Ru le 6 15 ( b) sp ec ifica lly gr an ts t his cou rt th e a uthori ty to “ modif y the j udg men t or ord er f

rom wh ich t he ap pe al is t ak en

. ” 1 34 I ll. 2d R . 61 5(b)(1 ); se e al so People
v. Dixon , 91 Ill. 2d 3 46, 352 -54 (19 82) ; People v. Scott , 69 Ill . 2d 85, 88 ( 19 77 )

. I t is well e stablis hed that j udic ia

l opini ons ann ounci ng ne w con sti tution a l ru l es appl i ca b l e to c ri m i n al ca se s a rere troacti

v e to those cases pen

din g on direct revi

ew at the tim

e the new rul

e i s ann ounced. People v. Ford , 19 8 Ill. 2d 68, 72- 73 ( 200 1); P eople v. Erickson , 117 Ill . 2d 271, 288 (1 987 ), citing Griffith v. Kentucky , 479 U.S. 314, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649, 10 7 S . C t. 708 (19 87) ; Harvey , 36 6 I ll. App. 3d a t 132 . As t he Su pr eme Co ur t not ed in Griffith , the f ai l ur e to ap ply a new co nst itu t ional r ule t o c riminal cases p ending o n d irect review, ev

en wh en th at rule i s a “ ‘ clear b reak’ [f rom] the p ast,” violates t he ba sic nor

m s of constituti

onal adj udication. Griffith , 479 U.S. at 322, 328, 93 L. E d. 2d at 658 , 661, 1 07 S. Ct. at 713, 716. Under this reasoni ng, we findt hat t he r ule anno unce d in Sharpei s of constitutional

di men si on (see People v. Gersch , 135 Ill . 2d 384, 393- 95 (1990) (disti

ngui shi ng a n ew rule of la wt ha t is s t at ut o ry in o r igin from one that is c o nst it ut io na lly bas ed ) ) an d, t he r efo r e a pp lica ble to defendant’s case. See Harvey , 336 Ill . App. 3d at 1 32. Thi s c onc l

us i on is con sistent w

i th ou r de ci si on in Guevara which, in a

ca se pe nd i ng on direct app eal at t he t ime Sharpe wa s d ec ide d, ap plie d t he ho ldin g in Sharpe , overturnin

g Moss , to re verse a

nd remand a tr ial

cou rt ’s dis mi ssal of the de f en da nt’ s i nd i ctm en t f or home i nv as i on b as ed

on Moss

. Guevara , 21 6 Il

l . 2d at 5 39, 544 -45 , se e al so Harvey , 36 6 I ll. App. 3d at 132 ; Peo

ple v. James , 362 Ill . App. 3d 1202, 1206-07 (2006) ( fi nd

i ng tha t de f en da nt’ s r eq ue st to re duc e h

i s s en ten cef or-10- h ome i nv asi on by 15 y ears be caus e the

mandatory

15-y ea r enhanc ement vi

ol ate d the p ropor

ti on a te penal

ties cl ause was foreclosedby Guevara , even though h e was sen tenced prior to t hat de ci si on and wh il e Moss had arguab ly

in val ida ted the e nha

n ced
sen tenc i ng provi sion f

or that of f en se). Defend ant ar gue s t hat des pit e o ur hold ing in Guevara , Sharpe
ca nn ot be appl ie d retr oact iv

ely to hi s case because Sharpemakes t he la wles s fa vo r ab le t o him t han it w as a t t he tim e of hi s sen tenci ng. He ci tes Bouie v. City

of Columbia , 378 U.S. 347, 12 L. Ed. 2d 894, 84 S. Ct

. 16 97 ( 19 64 ) , wh er e t he Un it ed St at es Su pr eme Court hel d that Sou th Ca rol i n a c oul d n ot retroacti

vel y a p pl y a j udi ci al de ci si on inter pr et ing

a cr im inal tr esp ass s t at ut e in a wa y that expa nded t he scope o f t he st at ut e. De fen da nt cla ims that although appl yi ng Sharpe
r et r o ac t ive ly

would not expan

d the reach of the

armed r obb er y and attempted m

urd er stat utes by

appl yi ng i t t o conduct t hat had pr ev io us ly

bee n law fu l, it would i

ncrease the pe

nal ty range f or each offens e b ey

ond what could h

ave b een i mposed wh

en def endan t was sentence d. We find defend ant ’s r eliance o n Bouieunpersuasi ve. As de fendant
c on cedes, unl

ike Bouie , his c o nd uc t wa s p r o hibit ed by law at all
r ele va nt po int s in t ime. Ad di t io na lly, when d efenda nt co mmi t t ed t he armed robb ery and attempted m

urderin 2001, the enhan

ced senten

ces f orthose offen

ses had no t yet be en fo un d u nc o nst it ut io na l. While it is
co rrect to say

that a defen

dant has a c

hoic e under wh

ic h sen tenci n g sc he me he wi shes

to be se nten ced, i.e. , t he law in

effect at t he t ime the offens e wa s c om

m i tted or th at i n ef f ec t at th e ti me of se n te nc in g (People v. Hollins , 51 Ill . 2d 68, 71 (19 72) ; People v. Malin , 35 9 I ll. App. 3d 257 , 261 (2 005)), here, it was n ot the le gis la

ture which chan ged the en ha nc ed sente nc i ng sche m e d uri ng the pe nd en cy of defen dant’s case , but t his co ur t , in Walden and Morgan , wh ich he ld
a port ion of

that sentenci

ng sch em e unconsti

tut iona l, an d then
overr ul ed itse lf i n Sharpe

. T hu s, we find t ha t t he “ne w r ule ” in Sharpe , ann

ounced whi

le defen dan t’s c ase was pen

din g on direct ap pe al, does not aff

ord defendan

t t he sam e “ch oiceof sen

tenci ng l aw” ap plic ab le where

a s tatutor y ch an geoccurs dur i ng the pros ecution of a defe ndan t’s case. We are s i m i l arl y unp ers uaded b y de fen da nt ’s ar gu men t t ha t his due process righ

ts to notice an

d fai r warni ng ba r appli cation of the 15--11- ye ar fi rearm enhan

cemen ts. Wh il e defe ndan t contends th at Sharpe ’s restricted in terp retat ion of the propo rtionat e penalti es clause was a sudden an d ra dical depa rture f rom pri orla w, we find t hat des pit e t he pr o po r t io na lit y atta

cks to the 15/20/ 25-t o-lif

e sentence enhan

cemen ts, t he sta tutes at i ss uerem ai ne d i nta ct a nd de f en da nt wasthe

ref ore on noticet ha t his c o nd uc t migh t fall w it hin their s cope. See Harvey , 366 I ll. A pp. 3d a t 133 ; s eealso Rogers v. Tennessee , 532 U.S. 451, 462- 67, 149 L. Ed. 2d 697, 708-11, 121 S. Ct. 1693, 1700-03 (2001) (Tenness ee Supreme C ourt did n ot vi olate due proces s in j ud icia lly abo lishi ng t he comm

on la w “y ear and a day

rule” in murde r c ase s and app lyi ng that ruli

ng to case of def

en dant wh ich o cc ur r ed wh en rule
was st ill i n e f f ec t, b ec au se

ab ol i ti on of rule was nei ther “une xpected”
nor “i nde f en si bl e” i n l i ght of prior court deci

sions) . Furth

erm ore , de fe ndant has no t sug ges t ed t hat his pur po rt ed r eliance o n t he
un con sti tuti on al i ty of the sente nc i ng en ha nc em en ts f orarm ed rob bery and attempted murder

had a ny eff ect on hi s deci si ons rel ating to plea bargai ni ng, wh eth er to tak e a b en ch or a j ur y trial, or w

h at t r ia l strategies to em

ploy . See Harvey , 3 66 I ll. App. 3d a t 133 . We there f ore f i n d th at def enda nt is not dep rived of d ue p ro ces s by applic ation of the Sharpedec ision. Having n ow dete

rm i n ed th at Sharpe ’s h ol di

n g p er tai n s to defendant’s ca se , w e m us t answ er

th e r em ai n i n g q ue sti o n, i.e. , whether Sharperenders def endan t’s exi stin g nonen han ced sentence s void. A s en

tenc e i s void

i f i t fa i l s to conf

orm to statutory requiremen

ts. People v. Arna , 168 Ill . 2d 107, 113 (1995). Here, al thoughat the ti

me of def endan t’s sentenci

ng Walden and Morgan had r en de r ed t he 15

- yea ren ha nc ed pe na lt ie s f or hi s arm

ed rob bery and at t empt ed mur der co nvictio ns unconsti tut iona l, we find tha t t he
ove rr ulingof

those cases duri

ng the pen

dency of def endan t’s appeal hasma de the none nh anced s en tenc es i m posed by the tri al court st at ut o r ily no nc o nfo r ming an d t hu s vo id. Se e 3 64 I ll. App. 3d at 223;
see also People

v. Garci a , 17 9 I l l . 2d

55 , 73 (1 99 7) (tr ial cou rt ’s impo sit io n of c oncu

rren t sen tenc es i n c ertai n i nstanc es w

here co nsec ut ivesentence s were ma ndated rendered def

endan ts’ sentence s voi d). Th u s, co nt r ar y t o de fen da nt ’s co nt en t io n in t his c o ur t , bu t in
acc or d wit h his arg ument ado pt ed byt he ap pellat e co ur t , w e believe t he proper re medy in this inst ance is to re mand the cause to the tr ia

l courtfor a new

sentenci ng he arin g. 364 Ill . App. 3d at 223-24, citing2 A ca tego ry I wea pon is a ha ndgu n, sa wed-of f s hot gun , s aw ed-of

f r ifle, any oth er fi rearm small e

no ugh to be conce aled up on a per son,
-12- Arna , 168 I ll. 2 d a t 11 2- 13 ( it wa s w it hin appe l l ate cou rt’ s a uth ori ty to rem and cau se to tri al cou

rt f or d ete rm i n ati on of appr opri ate sentence s t o be impose d co nsec ut ively where impo sitio n of c onc ur re nt sentence s di d n o t co nfo r m t o st at ut o ry re qui rem en t and wasvoi d). T his proc ed

ure wi l l prov i dethe tri al cou rt an oppor tuni ty to determi ne, wi th i n th e statu tory se n ten ci n g r an ge , the lengt h of t he sentence for each of f ense wh i l e c on si deri n g d ef en da n t’s se n ten ce i n i ts t o t alit y. Peo

ple e x re l. Wal

ler v . M cK oski , 195 Ill . 2d 393, 401-02 (2001) (w he re trial

court ’s j udgme

nt vacated as v

oid an d reman ded f orr es en t en cin g w it hsent ence s t o r un co nsec ut ively, “[i]t re mains wit hin the d is cret ion o f the circu it co ur t t o d et er mine, wit hin the per missibl

e st at ut or y sent encing range[citations ], the len gth of each sentence to be i mposed”); see also Guevara , 216 Ill . 2d at 545, 547 (reversal of tri al cou rt’ s j udg men t an d re man d f orfurther proceedi

ngs required where trial

court had di smi sse d home in vasi on count as unconsti tut iona l due to pr opor tionate p e nal ties v iolation wh

ic h was overturnedon

ap pe al)

. Ac co r din gly, we ho ld that defenda

nt’s 18-y ear sentence fo rat t emp t ed mur de rwh ile a r med wit h a fir earm m ust be vacated and the caus e re m ande d to the trial court to im

pose a sentence withi n the Cl ass X range , enhan

ced by the 15-yea

r mandatory

penal ty set f orth i n 72 0 ILC S 5/8–

4(c)(1 )(B) (W

est 200 0). Al thoughour de cisio n o n t he r et ro ac t ivit y of Sharpeal so makes defend ant el

i gi bl e f or amandat or y 15- year e nhance ment of his arm ed robb ery wh i l e a rm ed wi th a f i rea rm con vi cti on (720 ILCS 5/18– 2(a)(2 ), (b) (W

est 200 0)), our dis

positi on of thi s i ssue requi res con si de rati on of defendan

t’s f i rs t con ten ti on : th at s en ten ci n g h i m to
an enhanc ed t er m violat es t he p ro po rt ionat e pe nalties claus e o f the I llino is Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I , §11). Defendan t contends that t he app ellate co ur t er re d in re ject inghi s propor tionate penal ties cla u se chal

l enge to his arm

ed rob bery whi l e arm

ed wi th a f i rearm con vi cti on because, under the identical elem ents tes t, hi s c onv

i cti on f orar med r o bbe ry wh ile a r med wit h a fi rearm i s si gni f i can tly more sev erethan t he se nt ence for t he eq uivalent off ense of armed v iolence predi cated on robb ery wi th a c ategory

I or category

II weapon (720 ILCS 5/18–

2(a)(2 ), 33A

–2(a) (We st 2000 )). 2 Defe ndan t argues thatse miautomatic firearm o r machi ne gun. 720 ILCS 5/33A–1(c)(2) ( W es t 2000). The pa rt ies do not disp ute t he fact tha t the firear m defendant used in the com mi ss ion of the ar med robber y involved he rein was a ca tegory I weapon.
-13- t he appropri aterel

i ef f orth i s v i ol ati on of th e p rop orti

on ate penal ties clause is a reversal

of his convi

ction f or armed robbery

whi le armed wi th a fir ea r m, a re duc

ti on of the offense to t he lesser-incl uded offense of si mpl e robbery, and rem

and of the c ause f

or sentenci

ng on th e reduced charge. As t his co ur t st at ed in Sharpe : “Allst at ut es c ar ry a st ro ng pr esu mpt ion o f co ns t it ut io na lit y. [C i tation .] To overcom

e th i s pre su m pti on , the p ar

ty challenging the stat ute must clearly establi sh that it vio late s t he
co nst itu t ion. [Cit at ion. ] We general ly defer to the l egi slature in the sentencing arena b ecause t he leg isla t ur e is inst it ut io na lly better eq ui ppe d to ga

uge the serious ne ss

of various off

enses and to fas hion sentence s ac co r di ng ly. [Citation.]” Sharpe , 216 Ill . 2d at 487. The prop orti on ate penal

ties cl ause provi des that “[a]ll pe nal ties sha ll be de t er mined bot h acc or ding t o t he seriousness of the offense and wit h t he objec t ive of r est or ing t he off ender to use f

ul ci tiz en sh i p.” I ll. Co nst . 1 970 , a rt . I , § 11. “In ana ly zi ng a proport iona

te penal ties chal le nge, our ultim

ate inq ui r y i s whe t her t he legislat ur e has set t he sentence i n ac cord w i

th t he se rio usne ss o f the off

ense.” Guevara , 216 I ll. 2d at 54 3. As t he co nst it ut io na lit y o f a s t at ut e is pu r ely a m atte r of law, we r eview t he qu est ion de novo

. Sharpe , 216 Ill . 2d at 486-87. “The ide nt ic al e le men

ts te st i s a

n a ppr opri atef orm of pr opor ti on al i ty review.” Harvey , 36 6 Ill. App. 3d at 133 ; s ee also Guevara , 216 Ill. 2d at 544 . I n People v. Chris ty , 1 39 Ill . 2d 172 (1990 ), this

court exam

in ed the defe ndan t’s cl ai m that hi s sen tence f or armed violence pr edica t ed o n kidnap ingwit h a ca t eg o ry I weap on, a Class X felo ny punishable by 6 t o 3 0 year s’ impriso nmen t, w as unco nst it ut io na lly

dis propo rtionate to the penal ty f or aggravated kidn api ng, a Class

I felo ny punishable by

4 to 1 5 y ea rs ’ i m pri son men t, because t he element s o f the off enses were ide ntica l. Thi s court agreed, finding that because the el

em ents were identic al

and arm ed vi olen ce-14- was punishe d mo re seve re ly, the defend ant was en t it led t o ha ve his
co nv i cti onf

or ar med vi ol en ceva ca ted an d the c au se

rem an de d f or s ent encing on the

off en se wi th the l ess er pen

al ty, a ggra v ate d ki dna pi ng. Chris ty , 139 Ill . 2d at 174, 181. In Pe ople v. Lew

is , 175 Ill . 2d 412 (1996), t he def endan t was charged with a rmed robb ery an

d armed v

iolence predica

ted on robb ery comm itted with a c ategory I weapon. At the tim e Lew is was deci ded, pri

ort o t he ena ct ment of Pu

bl i c A ct 91–4 04, arm

ed rob bery was a Class X o ffense pu nishable by 6 to 30 yea rs’ impriso nment, and armed violence pr edica t ed o n ro bber y with a ca teg ory I we ap on was pu nish ab le by

15 to 30 y

ears ’ i m pri sonm en t. Lew is , 175 Ill . 2d at 418. In t he t rial co ur t , t he de fendant argued that t he penal

ty for the offense of arm ed v i ole nc e pred i cated on ro b b er y v i ol ate d th

e p rop orti on ate penal tiescla us e b ec au se it wa s u n con sti tuti on al l y di sprop orti

on ate to t he pe nalt y fo r t he o ffen se o f ar med r o bbe ry un de ran ide nt ica lel em en ts t est . T he trial

court agreed and dism

is sed the arm

ed vi olen ce charge. Lew

is , 17 5 I ll. 2 d a t 41 4- 15

. T his co urt affi rmed the tri al
cou rt ’s f i n di n g th at th e tw o of f ense s h ad i den ti ca l el em en ts a n d i ts dis mi ssal of the ch

arge of arm ed v i ole nc e pred i cated on ro bb ery , re aso ningt hat t he ap plicat ion o f the armed violen ce statut e vi

olated the proportion

ate pen al tie s cl aus e. Lew is , 175 Ill . 2d at 415-24. The appe l l ate court

h er ein , wh en fac ed wit h t he sa me pr opor ti on ate p enal ties, identic al -elem

ents chal le nge, f ound that because the Lewis cou

rt d ete rm i n ed th at the penal

ty f or armed vi olen ce pr edica t ed o n ro bb er y wa s u

n con sti tu t io na ll y d i sprop orti

on ate to the penal

ty f or armed robbery

, the offe n se o f armed vi ole nc e “ cea sed

to exi st” af

ter Lew is , so t hat it co uld no t be used as a b as i s to con

du ct a pr opor ti on ate pe na lt ies an alys is. 36 4 I ll. App. 3 d a

t 21 7. Th us , the c our

t re j ec ted de f en da n t’s pr opor ti on ate penal ties argum

ent. 364 Ill . App. 3d at 217. Contra ry to the appella

te court ’s concl

usi on, we h o ld t hat t he
com pa ri son of armed robbery whi le armed wi th a fi rearm an d armed violen ce predica ted on robbery

is permi ssi ble. Whi le Lew is , 175 Ill . 2d at 423, found the sen

tenci ng sch em e for arm ed violen ce predi catedon armed robbery to be un constitutional

as penal izin g the sam e conduct
more severel

y tha n di d the armed robb ery s

tatut e, and t heref

ore un av aila ble t o p ro sec ut or s, t hat pr ohibit ion wa s er adica t ed by t he legisl atu re’s en ac t men t o f Pu blic Act 91–404. I n o t he rwo r ds , Pu blic-15- Act 91–40 4 “rev i

ve d”the of f en se of arm ed vi ol en cepre dica

ted on robb ery when i t am en de d the s en

ten cef orcertain a

rmed robb eries

to add the 15/20/ 25-t o-lif

e pro vi sions, creating m

ore severe penal

tiesf or those off enses than f or armed vi

olen ce pred ic ated on robbery. See Harvey , 366 Ill . App. 3d at 127. Therefore, we agree w ith t he appe l l ate co ur t in Harvey

that, because the pena

lty for arme d

robb ery wh ile armed

with a f irearm (720 ILCS 5/18–2( a)(2) , (b) (West 2000) ) is now greater t han

the penal

ty f or ar me d v

i ol en cepre dica

ted on robb ery wi th a c ategory

I or c atego ry II weapon (72 0 ILCS 5/33A –2(a), 33A– 3( a) (Wes t 200 0) ), t he hold ing in Lew is ca nn ot be used as a basis t o p re clude co mpar ison o f the “revi ved” arm ed violen ce off ense t o armed robbe

ry wh i l e a rm ed wi th a f i rea rm f or purposes of proport iona

li ty revi ew. See Harvey , 366 Il

l . Ap p. 3 d a t 127. We als o r eje ct t he St at e’ s c laim t ha t be ca us e t he leg isla t ur e, in
enac t ing Publ ic Act 91–404, excl

uded arme d ro b b er

y as a p re di ca te offense of arm

ed violen ce, it i s i nappropriate to co mpa

re the off enses using the ide

ntica l-el em ents test. Although i

t is true that Publi

c Act 91 –4 04 ex pr es sly

excl uded armed robbery as a predicate o ff ensef or ar med vio lenc e, t he o ffens e o f robbery was not excl uded (720 ILCS 5/33A–2(a) (We st 2000 )). The arm ed vi olen ce statut e i

ncl udes, as an element of the off

ense, t he co mmiss io n o f ce r t ain felonies, including robber y, “w

hi l e arm ed wi th a dangerous

weap on.” 7 20 IL C S 5/33A–2(a) (West 2000). It t heref ore foll ows that every ch

ar ge of armed vio len ce pr ed ica t ed o n r o bbe ry wo uld als o be a n armed rob be ry. T hu s, be ca us e t he ar med vio len ce st at ut e u na mbig uo us ly al lowsrob

b er y to serve as a predicate offense, and those robb eries a re inhe r en t ly co mmi tt ed whi

le armed, we m

ust enf orce the stat ute as enacted and may no t dep ar t fro m the lang uag e by cre at ing exceptions, li mi tat ions, or co ndit ions not

expresse d by

the le gis la

ture. See People
v. Harvey , 366 Ill . App. 3d at 128, citin

g People v. Woodard , 17 5 I ll. 2d 435 , 443 (1 997). Ac co r di ng ly, we m

ust now com

pare s ection 18–

2(a)(2 ) of

th e armed robber y s tatut e wi

th section 33A

–2(a) of the arme d violen ce statut e, as t hey exist t od ay, t o d et er mine whether these two off

enses have ide ntica l e le me nts but di sparate sentences . In this case, defend ant
was convi cted of armed robb ery wh

il e arme dwi

th a f i rearm. A pe rs on com m i ts tha t of f ense when he “ tak esprop erty

*** f rom the pe rs on or-16- presence of another by the use of fo rc e o r by t hre at ening t he immi nent
us e of force” (720 ILCS 5/18–1(a) (Wes t 200 0)) , an d he “ ca rri eson orab out hi s *** pers on or i s other w is e arme d with a

fi rearm” (720 ILCS 5/18–2(a) (2) (W es t 200 0)) . A pe rs on c om

m i ts th e of f en se of armed vi ole nc e pred i cated on ro bbe r y when, “while armed wit h a dangerous we apon , h e commi ts [r obbery (720 ILCS 5/18–1 (West 2000) )].” 720 ILCS 5/33A–2(a) (West 2000). A person i s consi dered to be “ arm ed wi th a da ng erou s w ea

pon ” i n th e c onte xt of the armed violen ce statut e “wh

en h e or she carri es on or about his or h er p ers on ori s other wi se a rmed wi th a C ategory

I, Categ ory

II, or Category

III weap on.”720 ILC S 3 3A–1 (c )( 1) (Wes t 200 0) . C learly, t he statutory el em en ts o f t hes e o ff

ense s are i dentic al , and proport iona te penal ties
an alys is is therefore appropriate. See Harvey , 366 Ill . App. 3d at 128, 133-34. Giv en t hat we hav e d et er mined t he e lemen t s o f armed robb ery wh ile armed

wit h a f i rearm and arm ed v i ole nc e pred i cated on robb ery wi th a ca tegory I or category

II we ap on

are identical, “comm

on sense and so und lo gic wo uld se emingly dictat e t hat t heir p enalt ies be i den tic al .” Chris ty , 13 9 I ll. 2d at 181. However, the penalties f or t hese off enses are not iden

tical. A v iolation of section 18–2(a )(2) is a Class X f el on y , w h i ch ca rri es a 6 to 30 y

ea r ter m , wi th a man da tory “ add-on pe na lt y” of 15 y

ears, ma kin g the possible

sentence f orarm ed rob bery w hile arm

ed wi th a f i rearm 21 to 45 y

ears (720 IL CS 5/1 8–2(a

)(2), (b) (West 200 0)) , wh

i l e a vi ol ati on of secti on 33A–2(a) of the arm ed violence statut e is a Cl

ass Xfelony pu nishable by a se nt ence ra nging fr om 15 t o 30 yea r s ( 72 0 I LC S 5 /3 3A –3 ( a) ( We st 20 00 ) )

. T hu s, in accordance wit h ou r ho ldings in Ch risty and Lew

is , w e find defendant’s sent ence for ar med r obbe ry whi l e arm

ed wi th a f i rearm (720 ILCS 5/18–2(b) (West 2000)) vi olates the propo rti

on ate penal tiescl ause bec ause the pe nal ty f or that of f en se is m ore sev ere than the penal ty f or t he i dentic al off ense of armed vi olen ce predi cated
o n robbery with a category I or cat egory II weapon (720 I LC S 5/33A –3(a), ( a–5) (W

est 200 0)). Furth er, we a gr ee w ith t he ap pellat e co ur t in Harvey , 366 Ill . App. 3d at 130, t hat al

thoughthe Stat e is no t re quir ed t o p ro cee d o n a le sser offense when t her e is evide nce s ufficient to convi ct of a greater offense (se e People v. Cummings , 351 Ill . App. 3d 343, 347-48 (2004 )), it i s i

mpe rmissi ble to all ow t he con sti

tutiona l proh i bi ti on-17- agains t di sprop orti

on ate pen al ti es f or ide ntica l c rim es to be relax

ed wh eret he St at e d ec id es to proceed only with the c

rim e carryi ng a greater pena lty. T he co ur t in Lew is rejected an

ar gument b y

th e S tate that t he t r ial c o ur t , in d is miss in g the armed v iolence ch

arge as vio lating the pr opo rt ionate p enalties clause, usur ped t he St ate ’s di screti on i n ev al ua ti n g th e ev i den ce

an d d ec i di n g w h at of f ense s to charge. Lew

is , 175 Ill. 2d at 422 . T he co ur t cite d t he fo llowing lan gu ag e fr o m Chris ty :

“ ‘G en era l l y , prose cu

tori al di screti on i s a va l ua bl e a sp ec t of t he cri m i na l j ustice sy stem . [Ci

tation .] In th

e pre sent case, howe ver, pr os ecu t or ial discre t ion will effect ively null ify t he aggravated

kidn appi ng statute, as skil

le d Stat e’ s At t o rne ys will usually

seek the more s evere sen tence and, theref

ore, chargedefen

dants wi th armed vi olen ce rather than aggravated kidn appi ng. An ine ffec t ive ag gr av at ed kid na pp ing st at ut e is not what the l egi sl ature in

tended when it enac t ed bo t h t he armed vi ole nc e statute a

nd a ggrav ated ki dna ppi ng s tatutes.’ Chris ty , 139 Ill . 2d at 180.” Lew is , 175 Ill . 2d at 417. The Lew is co ur t went on to say t hat t he St at e’s a rg ument
m is co nstrues the nature of the def endan t’s chal le nge to the armed violen ce statute. Lew

is , 1 75 Il l . 2d at 4 22. Th e d ef

en da nt d i d n ot al le ge impro per use of p ro sec ut or ial discre t ion, ra t her , he argued t he Sta te had n o author ity, discretionary or otherwi se , to char ge t he offense b ec au se

i t v i ol ate d th

e p rop orti on ate penal ties cl ause. Lew is , 175 Ill . 2d at 422. T heref ore, here, whi

le the Stat e was not required to charge def

endan t with the “ le sser off

ense” of armed v iolence predica ted on robber

y wit h a ca t ego ry I o r c at ego ry II wea po n, because t he evide nce a t t rial clear ly esta blished, a nd de fend ant does not contes t, hi s gui l t of arm ed rob bery wh i l e a rm ed wi th a fi rearm, we must det er mine the appr opri ate sentence for thi s l atter off

ense gi ven t he pr op or t ionat e pe nalties violat ion. Al though Sharpeapplie s retro ac ti vel y to defen

dant’s case , because we ha ve fo und that t he current sen tenci ng statute for armed robb ery wh i l e a rm ed wi th a f i re ar m v i ol ate s th

e p rop orti

on ate penal tiescl ause of the Il

li nois Constitution, the trial

court is preclude d
on re sent encing from

usi ng thi s statut ory sch

em e. See Harvey , 36 6 I ll. App. 3d at 134. H owev er, de fen da nt wa s o r igin ally s en t en ce d w hile Walden wa s sti l l

good l aw , i

nv al i da ti ng the en ha nc ed pe na l ty f or armed r o bbe ry wh ile a r med wit h a fire ar m as un co nst it ut io na lly-18- di sprop orti

on ate under a cross-comparison anal ys is . Thus, the t rial courth er ei

n ch ose to im po se a term of

im prisonm ent in accordance wi th t he arm ed rob bery statute as

i t existed b ef

ore its a mendment by Publ ic Act 91–404, which added the 15-yea

rse n ten ce en h an cemen t. 364 Ill . App. 3d

at 210. Prior t o bei

ng am ended b y Pub li c Act 91–404, armed ro bber y was a C lass X felo ny puni shabl e by 6 to 30 years’ impriso nment (720 ILCS 5/18–2( b) (West 1998) ; 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(3) (West 19 98 )), an d th e tr i al cou rt s en ten ce d d ef en da n t, wit hin t his r an ge , t o a 1 2- yea rt er m. We agree wi

th the trial co ur t ’s r ea so ning an d t he r efo r e h o ld th at, when a n amende d se nt encing s t at ut e has been fo und t o vio late t he pr op or t iona t e pe na

l ti escl au se , th e p rope

r remed y i s to re man d f or re sent encing in

accordance wi

th the s t at ut e as it exist ed p rio r t o t he
am en dm en t. See People v. Pizano , 347 Ill . App. 3d 128, 136 (2004) (proper r eme dy w her e a s t at ut or y amendment is found t o ha ve violated propo rtionate penal

ties cl ause i s to remand the ca

use f or a new sent encing he ar ing

un der the statu

te i n e f f ec t be f ore th e adopti on of the am en dm en t); se e al so People v. Gersch , 135 Ill . 2d 384, 390 (1990) (“The ef

fect of en act in g a n u nc ons ti tutiona l am en dm en t to a sta tute is to leave t he law in for ce a s it w as be for e t he ad op t ion o f the
am endm en t”). T hu s, wh ile t he 12

- yea rt er m o r ig ina lly im po se d on defend ant i s a proper one , we remand, a s ea rl i er n oted , i n ord er to al l owt he t r ial c o ur t t o r ee va lua t e d efe nd an t ’s se nt en ce in ligh t o f his
cum ula tive s entence an

d to then resen

tence him within the ran

gef or ar me d robbery as i t exis ted prior to bei

ng am ended b y Pub li c A c t 91–404, eff

. Janua ry 1, 20 00. In li

ght of thi s holdin

g, we reject defen dant’s cl ai m that his arm ed rob bery whi l e arm

ed wi th a f i rearm conv i cti on sh oul d be reduc ed to “s i

m pl e robb ery .” Fin ally, we address def

endan t’s co ntention that hi

s 65-year con se cu ti v e a gg re ga te se nt en ce is excess iv

e and un fai rly harsh when compared to that o f h

is c ode f en da nt, W ard en . W e n ote that, u

pon re hear ingin

t he ap pe llat e c o ur t , de fen da nt ar gu ed o nly t ha t his ho me i nv as i on sentence was ex cessi

ve as com

pared to Warden, and that because we hav

e now v a ca

ted de f en da n t’s se n ten ce s f or b oth attempted murder wh

il e arme d with a

fi rearm an d arm ed rob bery wh ile ar med wi th a firea rm, t he 65-year cum ula tive s entence n

o longer exi sts. However, because on re man d th e tr i al cou rt w i l l b e r eq ui re d to3 The minimum cumulat ive sentence which the tr ial cou rt could impose on remand is62 y

ea rs’ i m pris on men t, i.e. , the existin g conc urrent 35 - and 2- ye ar resp ective terms for home invasion a nd crimin al da mage to pr opert y, plus new cons ecu tiv e minimum t erms of 2 1 yea rs ’ imp ri son men t for at temp ted murder while

ar med with a

firea rm and 6 years ’ impris onment for
ar med robbery. See

720 ILCS 5/8–4(c)(1)(B ) (We st 2000) ; 720 ILCS 5/18–2(b) (West 2000); 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(3) (West 1998).
-19- im pose a co nsec ut iveag gre ga te s en ten ceof simi lar o r g re at er lengt h, 3 we choose to addr ess the i ssue. See In re C.R.H. , 163 Ill . 2d at 274. Absent an ab us e of di screti on b y th e tr i al cou rt, sente nc esmay not be al tered on revi ew. People v. Stacey , 193 Il l . 2d 203 , 2 09-1 0 (2000 ). “[A] se

ntence wit hin sta t ut or y li

mits will be dee med exc essive and the resul

t o f an abuse of dis cretion by

the trial court wh er e th e sentence is greatly at varian ce with the s

piri t and purpose of the la

w, orman i f estl y di sprop orti

on ate to th e n atu re of the off

ense.” Stacey , 193 Ill . 2d at 210. Here, defendant cont ends that t he appropr iateness of hi s sen ten ce ca nnot be m

eani ngf ull y de termi ned wi thout
co nsider ingthe 12-yea

r aggreg ate con

se cu ti v e s en ten ce gi v en to Ward en. Warden , however, though charged wi th the sam e off enses as de f en da n t, made an agreem

ent with the St ate t o t estify agains t defend ant i

n excha nge f or the opportun

i ty to en ter a ple a of gui l ty to reduced charges. Defend ant concedes that, general ly , one who proceeds to trial
ca nn ot co mpa r e h is sent ence t o t he se nt ence impose d o n a co defend ant who ent er ed a ne go tia ted gui l ty p l ea. People v. Caballero , 17 9 I ll. 2d 205, 2 17 (1997 ). He ar gues, nevertheles s, that t hi s general

rule “ shoul d not b e app l i ed b l i ndl y or me chan

i cal l y .” In Caballero , 179 Ill . 2d at 218, this c ou rt re fused t o c omp ar e o ne defendant’s postt rial

sen t enc e to anot her def

endan t’s negotiated sentence beca use “dispo sitio nal co nces sions a repr ope rl y gr an ted to defen dan ts who plead guilt y when t he inte re st of t he pu blic in the effect ivead

m i ni stra ti on of cr imi nal just ice wo uld t her eby

be serv ed.” Here, as in Caballero , 179 Ill . 2dat 218 , by plead ing gu ilty, War den: “(1) ac kn o wle dg ed his g uilt an d s ho we d w illi ngness t o as su me re sp on si b i l i ty f or h i s c on du ct; (2) made a pub li c trial unnec essa ry; and (3 ) g ave c oo per at ion which r esu lted in the succ es sf ul pros ecution

of another off ender engaged in equally seri ous or more serious cri mi nal cond uct.”-20- Defend ant contends that a “defendant should not lose h i s r i gh t to chal le nget he fair ne ss o f his se nt en ce in compariso n to a co defendant’s sentence simp ly because the Stat e m

ade a strategic deci si on, accepted by the t rial co ur t , t o bo os t its c ase aga inst t he defend ant by using it s bar gaining pow er to s ecure the tes ti mony of t he co de fen da nt

. ” W hile
we ag re e t hat War de n wa s p lac ed in a d iffe ren t pos i ti on f rom defend ant beca use “the Stat e put him in that positi on,” we al so agree wi th t he Stat e t ha t t his r es ult o cc ur s inevery case i nvol vi ng a negotiated

plea agree men t ba se d up on a

prom i se to t est ify

in a cod efendant’s ca se

. T hu s, giv en t his court ’s cl early stated beli

ef in the p ubl ic ben

efi t o btain ed through the Stat e’s ab il ity to negotiate such ple a agreements ( Caballero , 179 Ill . 2d at 218), we fi nd that the trial courtin this case di

d not abuse it s discr et ion in faili ng t o c omp ar e t he reduced sentence im posedon c od efenda nt Ward en, with the s entence de fen da nt r ec eiv ed fo llo win g a jur y t r ial.

CONCLUSION Based upon the foregoin

g, we af f i rm th at p orti on of th e a pp el l ate
cou rt ’s judg ment w hi ch va ca tesde f en da nt’ s n one nh an ce d s en ten cef or attempted murder

an d di re cts the ci rcuit court, on reman

d, to conduct
a ne w s en t en cin g h ea r ing wh er ein t he 15

- ye ar pe nalty manda t ed by 720 ILCS 5/8–4(c)(1)(B) (West 2000), is added to the base term

of between 6 and 30 years f

or t hi s Clas s Xoff

ense. We fur t her affirm the appe l l ate cou rt ’s jud gme

nt vacati ng def endan t’s sentence

for arme d
r o bbe ry, but reverse the appel la te cour t’s dire ct ive on r emand, and in struct the c i

rcui t court to re se

n ten ce de f en da n t to a term of b etween 6 and 30 y

ears, in a ccordance wi

th section 18–2 (720 ILCS 5/18–2 (West 1 998) ), as it exi

sted prior to bei

ng am ended b y Pub li c Act 91–404 (P ub. Ac t 91– 404 , e ff. Janu ar y 1, 2 000 ). We affirm the
re mai n der of th e a pp el l ate cou rt’ s j udgm

en t.
Appella te court judg ment af firmed i n part and rev erse d in part; cause remanded.