IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-1917

Filed February 25, 2015

IN THE INTEREST OF E.S.R. AND E.R.,

Minor Children,

E.R., Father,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Winnebago County, Karen K. Salic, 

District Associate Judge.

The father appeals the juvenile court’s termination of his parental rights to 

his children, E.S.R. and E.R. AFFIRMED.

Jane M. Wright, Forest City, for appellant father.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant 

Attorney General, Adam D. Sauer, County Attorney, and Andrew Olson, 

Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.

Theodore Hovda, Garner, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor 

children.

Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and McDonald, JJ.
2

VOGEL, P.J.

The father appeals the juvenile court’s termination of his parental rights to 

his children, E.S.R. and E.R. He asserts the State failed to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence grounds to terminate his parental rights under Iowa Code 

section 232.116(1)(f) and (h) (2013), and claims that he should have been

granted an additional six months to work towards reunification. He further argues 

termination was not in the children’s best interest, nor did the State undertake

reasonable efforts to prevent termination. We conclude that the father’s 

untreated mental health issues, combined with his extensive and violent criminal 

history, established grounds to terminate his rights under paragraphs (f) and (h). 

Furthermore, given he was already granted one six-month extension of time in 

order to work towards reunification, additional time is not warranted. The juvenile 

court also properly found termination was in the children’s best interests, and

reasonable efforts were made on the part of the State. Therefore, we affirm the 

termination of the father’s parental rights.

E.S.R., born April 2010, and E.R., born December 2011, first came to the 

attention of the Department of Human Services (DHS) due to the mother’s 

methamphetamine use. The children were removed from the home on January 

10, 2013, and placed with the maternal grandmother.1 The children were 

adjudicated in need of assistance on March 8, 2013.

 

1

Three other children, who share the same mother as E.S.R. and E.S., were also 

removed from the home; however, they are not part of this appeal. Additionally, at the 

time of the termination hearing, the children had been removed from the grandmother’s 

home and placed in foster care.
3

E.S.R. and E.R. had little to no contact with the father prior to their 

removal, as the father was incarcerated from June 2011 until August 31, 2013.

This incarceration was due to the father’s conviction for domestic abuse assault 

causing injury—in May of 2011, he beat the mother with a vacuum cleaner and a 

stroller until each item broke, causing the mother to suffer several broken bones 

and lacerations. Although E.S.R. was present during the assault, she was an 

infant and sleeping upstairs, and the mother was pregnant with E.R. 

The father was also convicted of domestic abuse in 2010 and was the 

perpetrator of a founded child abuse report for denial of critical care. In this 

instance, he beat the mother and another woman with his fists and a lawn chair 

and both suffered injuries. He also chased around one of the mother’s other 

children in a threatening manner, before being stopped by a neighbor. 

Additionally, the juvenile court noted the father had other prior contact with DHS: 

In 2005 he was identified as the perpetrator of two incidents of 

physical abuse. In 2007 he was identified as the perpetrator of 

Denial of Critical Care (supervision) . . . and of physical abuse . . . . 

In 2009 he was identified as the perpetrator of physical and sexual 

abuse, and three counts of Denial of Critical Care.

The father’s other criminal convictions include possession of marijuana, third or 

subsequent offense; possession of drug paraphernalia; public intoxication;

interference with official acts causing bodily injury; false report to law 

enforcement; and operating while intoxicated.

Two months following his release from prison, in October 2013, the father 

contacted DHS. He explained the delay in contacting the agency was allegedly 

due to a no contact order in place for the protection of the mother and the 

children. A supervised visit was arranged and the father visited the children on 
4

October 25, 2013. Because he was in prison when E.R. was born, this was the 

first time the father had seen her. The father participated in approximately 

twenty-three visits over the course of these proceedings, though he never 

progressed to non-supervised or overnight visitation. During his time with the 

children, the DHS worker reported he parented them appropriately, and it was 

evident he and the children developed a bond; however, the DHS worker had 

concerns with regard to how he would act when alone with the children, given his 

lack of patience and untreated mental health issues.

The father has several mental health issues that remain largely 

unaddressed. He was diagnosed with borderline personality disorder, 

schizophrenia spectrum disorder (due to his unusual thoughts, perceptions, and 

likely hallucinations and delusions), and a learning disorder. In a psychological 

evaluation dated January 29, 2014, the psychologist also noted the father had 

several symptoms of bipolar disorder, but was short of meeting the full diagnostic 

criteria. Though the father participated in some mental health classes while in 

prison, such as an anger management course, he did not follow through with

receiving consistent counseling; nor did he regularly take medication to combat 

his disorders, asserting his doctor took him off the medications. 

Despite these mental health problems, the father has pursued 

employment following his release from prison. He became employed at a 

construction company in January 2014, and shortly before the termination 

hearing, secured a different job working in a hog confinement. DHS workers 

testified the father failed to maintain contact with the agency such that the 

father’s employment could be consistently verified.
5

The father has also moved a number of times since his release from 

prison. At the termination hearing, he testified he had moved into the mother’s 

trailer three weeks prior, and that she had moved to Texas to live with her father.2 

Additionally, because the father repeatedly refused DHS’s requests that he 

provide his address, he did not receive various family team meeting notes and 

family safety, risk, and permanency (FSRP) reports over the course of these 

proceedings. Even as recent as the July 21, 2014 permanency review hearing, 

the father refused to reveal where he was living. Just prior to the termination 

hearing, he provided DHS with an address.

In November 2013, almost one year before the termination hearing, the 

matter came on for a permanency review hearing. At the father’s request, he

was granted an additional six months to work towards reunification. However, 

the father made only minimal progress, and the State filed a petition on July 18, 

2014 requesting the juvenile court terminate his parental rights to E.S.R. and 

E.R. A termination hearing was held on October 28, 2014, and the juvenile court, 

after finding the father had “squandered the past six months,” issued an order 

terminating the father’s rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) with respect 

to E.S.R., and paragraph (h) with respect to E.R.3 The father appeals.4

 

2 A DHS worker testified the mother and father were very secretive about their 

relationship and that they had a stillborn child in the spring of 2014. The juvenile court

noted: “Both [the father and the mother] have engaged in deception, elusiveness and at 

times out-right dishonesty throughout this case. It is very difficult to find them credible 

about their progress since they have been so dishonest about everything else.”

3 The State initially filed the petition requesting the father’s rights to both children be 

terminated under paragraph (f), but then moved to amend the petition to substitute

paragraph (h) for E.R. The juvenile court granted the motion in its termination order. 

Though it cited paragraph (f) as the grounds to terminate the father’s rights to E.R. in its 

final conclusions of law, in its analysis and findings of fact, the court concluded the 

father’s rights to E.R. should be terminated under paragraph (h). Thus, while the father 
6

We review termination proceedings de novo. In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 

64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). The grounds for termination must be proved by clear 

and convincing evidence. Id. Our primary concern is the child’s best interest. Id. 

To terminate the father’s rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f), the 

State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the child is four years of 

age or older, has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance (CINA), has 

been removed from the home for the last twelve consecutive months, and cannot 

be returned to the father’s custody. To terminate the father’s rights to E.R. under 

paragraph (h), the State was required to show E.R. was three years old or 

younger, adjudicated CINA, removed from the home for at least six of the last 

twelve months, and there is clear and convincing evidence she cannot be 

returned to the father’s care. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h).

Upon review of the record, we agree with the juvenile court the children 

cannot be returned to the father’s care within the meaning of paragraphs (f) and 

(h). The father has a significant and violent criminal history, in addition to 

concerning mental health issues that remain untreated, and, for the most part, 

unacknowledged by the father. It is particularly telling that in the twenty-two 

months in which the case was pending, the father could not progress beyond 

supervised visits. Furthermore, the DHS worker noted concerns with the father’s 

failure to acknowledge the impact of his abusive history, as well as questioned 

 

contends on appeal that the wrong code section was used, it is clear when viewing the 

totality of the order that the court terminated the father’s rights to E.R. under the proper 

paragraph, that is, (h).

4 The juvenile court also terminated the mother’s parental rights to these children. The 

mother filed a notice of appeal but, due to the lateness of the petition, her appeal was 

dismissed pursuant to Iowa Rule of Court 6.201(1)(b).
7

his ability to appropriately parent the children if left alone. While we commend 

the father for finding employment and making some effort to improve his life, he 

has been unable to identify and address safety issues that impact the children. 

He also has not been open to engaging in most of the recommended services 

that would aid in reunification. With unresolved issues inhibiting even 

unsupervised visits, it is clear from this record the children would suffer harm if 

returned to his care. 

Furthermore, granting the father an additional six months to work towards 

reunification will not serve to correct the situation. As the juvenile court noted:

[The father] has a very long record of child abuse and violence 

against women. He continues to minimize his actions and has 

resisted all efforts to ensure that he has the skills necessary to not 

harm a child or woman in the future. His patience wears thin with 

the children during even a short supervised visit. As [the DHS 

worker] noted, batterers are unreceptive to change, and without 

constant and meaningful work, it is unlikely [the father] will respond 

any differently to frustration, lack of control and stress any 

differently than he has in the past.

The record reflects the court’s assessment, and we further note that when 

judging the future actions of a parent, his past conduct is instructive. See In re 

J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006). The father has not made any 

meaningful progress since his release from prison with regard to addressing his 

mental health issues and past violent behavior. This fact persisted throughout 

the course of these proceedings, despite the numerous opportunities to receive 

counseling and other mental health support services offered through DHS. 

Consequently, we agree with the juvenile court the children cannot be returned to 

the father’s care, and, given the father’s lack of progress, additional time would 

not serve to correct the situation.
8

Termination of the father’s rights is also in the children’s best interests. 

Though they do share a bond with the father, and the father parents them 

appropriately during supervised visits, we agree with juvenile court’s assessment 

that the father’s “choices and his lack of participation throughout the life of the 

CINA cases have prevented him from being a constant presence in [the 

children’s] lives, let alone a father.” We also note the importance of the DHS 

worker’s testimony that the father’s actions—such as his violent criminal history 

and lack of mental health treatment—indicate it is better if he is not the children’s 

caregiver. Therefore, termination is in the children’s best interests, and the 

parent-child bond consideration does not preclude termination. See Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(2), (3).

The father further contends reasonable efforts by DHS were not 

implemented, and therefore the juvenile court erred in terminating his parental 

rights. Specifically, he cites the fact he did not receive the FSRP reports and 

provider notes until late in the case, and that no case plan was ever provided to 

him. However, as the July 28, 2014 DHS meeting notes indicated, the father did 

not provide DHS with his address until just two months before the termination 

hearing. Therefore, the documents could not be mailed to him—except to his 

last known address, which was outdated information—though they were filed with 

the court upon completion or in time for the review hearings. With regard to the 

case permanency plan, the court stated that the plan was merely captioned 

differently, and so the father “argues form over function, which is not important to 

any consideration necessary in this matter.” Given these facts, we do not agree 
9

with the father’s assertion that reasonable efforts were not offered such that the 

juvenile court erred in terminating his rights.

After reviewing the father’s arguments, we affirm the juvenile court’s order 

terminating the father’s parental rights to E.S.R. and E.R. pursuant to Iowa Code 

section 232.116(1)(f) and (h), respectively.

AFFIRMED.