COURT OF APPEALS 

DECISION 

DATED AND FILED

August 13, 2019 

Sheila T. Reiff 

Clerk of Court of Appeals 

 

NOTICE 

 This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2018AP1650-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2015CF61

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS 

DISTRICT I 

STATE OF WISCONSIN, 

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, 

 V. 

ANTWON LAUREL JONES, 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 APPEAL from a judgment and orders of the circuit court for 

Milwaukee County: ELLEN R. BROSTROM and JEFFREY A. WAGNER, 

Judges. Affirmed. 

 Before Kessler, Brennan and Kloppenburg, JJ. 

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2018AP1650-CR 

2 

¶1 PER CURIAM. Antwon Jones appeals his convictions, entered on a 

jury’s verdict, of two counts of felony murder and one count of felon in possession 

of a firearm. Jones argues that trial counsel was ineffective in advising him 

regarding a plea offer he rejected because counsel failed to inform him that the 

State could pursue lesser included offenses at trial. In addition, Jones argues that 

counsel was ineffective in several respects at trial. Jones also argues that the 

evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on the felon in possession of a 

firearm charge. We reject all of Jones’s arguments and affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

¶2 Jones was alleged to have participated in an armed robbery of a man 

named Michael Taylor that resulted in the shooting deaths of both Taylor and 

Jones’s accomplice Jeffrey White. Jones was also shot in the incident. The State 

charged Jones with two counts of felony murder, with armed robbery as the 

underlying felony, and one count of felon in possession of a firearm. 

¶3 The State offered Jones a plea deal under which Jones would plead 

guilty to two reduced charges of felony murder, with attempted armed robbery, 

party to a crime, as the underlying felony, and the State would dismiss and read in 

the felon in possession of a firearm charge. Jones rejected the offer and proceeded 

to trial on the original charges. 

¶4 After the close of evidence, the circuit court granted the State’s 

request for a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of felony murder, with 

attempted armed robbery, party to a crime, as the underlying felony, the same as 

the reduced charges in the State’s plea offer. The jury found Jones guilty of the 

lesser included offense on both felony murder charges. It also found Jones guilty 

of the felon in possession of a firearm charge. 
No. 2018AP1650-CR 

3 

¶5 Jones filed a postconviction motion claiming that trial counsel was 

ineffective and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on the 

felon in possession of a firearm charge. The circuit court denied Jones’s motion 

without an evidentiary hearing, and also denied Jones’s motion for 

reconsideration.1

¶6 We reference additional facts as needed in the discussion section 

below. 

DISCUSSION 

A. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 

¶7 We begin with Jones’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. 

In reviewing whether the circuit court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing 

on those claims, we examine whether the postconviction motion “on its face 

alleges sufficient material facts that, if true, would entitle the defendant to relief.” 

State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶9, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433. This presents 

a question of law that we review de novo. Id. “If the motion raises such facts, the 

circuit court must hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id. However, the court need not 

hold a hearing “if the motion does not raise facts sufficient to entitle the movant to 

relief, or presents only conclusory allegations, or if the record conclusively 

demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief.” Id. 

 

1

 The Honorable Ellen R. Brostrom presided over trial and entered the judgment of 

conviction. The Honorable Jeffrey A. Wagner entered the orders denying the motion for 

postconviction relief and the motion for reconsideration. 
No. 2018AP1650-CR 

4 

¶8 Applying these standards here, we conclude for the reasons that 

follow that the circuit court properly rejected each of Jones’s ineffective assistance 

claims without an evidentiary hearing. 

¶9 To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must

establish both (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) that the 

deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 687 (1984). We need not address both components of the inquiry if the 

defendant makes an insufficient showing on one. See id. at 697. 

¶10 As to deficient performance, the defendant must show that 

“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id.

at 688. The court “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls 

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. 

¶11 As to prejudice, the defendant must show that “there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “It is not 

enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on 

the outcome.” Id. at 693. 

1. Whether Trial Counsel Was Ineffective When Jones Rejected the Plea Offer 

¶12 Jones first contends that trial counsel was ineffective in advising him 

on the State’s plea offer because counsel failed to inform him that the State could 

pursue lesser included offenses at trial. Jones alleged in his postconviction motion 

that, because counsel failed to provide this information, Jones incorrectly believed 

that the State would need to prove a completed armed robbery at a trial. Jones 
No. 2018AP1650-CR 

5 

further alleged that, had he understood that the State could pursue the lesser 

included offense of felony murder based on attempted armed robbery, he would 

have accepted the State’s plea offer instead of going to trial. 

¶13 We conclude that, regardless of any possible prejudice, Jones fails to 

establish that counsel’s alleged failure to provide lesser included offense 

information was deficient performance. Jones’s allegations assume that, when 

counsel advises a defendant on a plea offer, counsel necessarily has the duty to 

inform the defendant that the State might pursue lesser included offenses at a trial. 

However, Jones provides no legal authority stating this proposition. Absent such 

authority, we decline to adopt a general rule as to counsel’s duties in this respect. 

See Strickland at 690 (“[A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must 

judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the 

particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.”). 

¶14 We are uncertain if Jones means to make an alternative argument 

that, given the particular circumstances here, no reasonable counsel would have 

failed to inform Jones that the State could pursue certain lesser included offenses 

at trial. If Jones means to make that argument, we conclude that it is insufficiently 

developed to overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was 

reasonable. 

2. Whether Trial Counsel Was Ineffective at Trial 

¶15 We turn to Jones’s contention that trial counsel was ineffective at 

trial. Jones argues that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to object to 

certain testimony as hearsay; (2) conducting inadequate cross-examination of two 

of the State’s witnesses; (3) failing to sufficiently challenge text message evidence 

the State used to incriminate Jones; and (4) failing to adequately challenge the 
No. 2018AP1650-CR 

6 

State’s theory that Jones possessed a firearm. Before discussing these arguments, 

we provide additional facts from the trial as context. 

¶16 Jones’s counsel, understandably, did not dispute Jones’s presence 

during the shooting at Taylor’s residence. Jones’s presence at the scene was 

established by DNA evidence. This included evidence showing that Jones was a 

source of DNA from blood found at the scene, and that Taylor was the source of 

DNA from blood found on one of Jones’s shoes. Additionally, an eyewitness in 

the vicinity of Taylor’s residence testified that he saw a man he identified as Jones 

running out of the residence shortly after he heard gunshots. 

¶17 Thus, rather than dispute Jones’s presence during the shooting, 

counsel argued that the State failed to prove that Jones had any intent or 

knowledge of a plan to commit a robbery. Counsel asserted that Jones went to 

Taylor’s residence only to purchase drugs. In addition, counsel argued that the 

State failed to prove that Jones shot Taylor or otherwise possessed a firearm. No 

guns used in the shooting were recovered by police. 

a. Lack of Hearsay Objection 

¶18 We turn to Jones’s argument that trial counsel was ineffective by 

failing to object to hearsay. One of the State’s witnesses, Ivori Winston, testified 

that she heard there was a large amount of money, $10,000 or $15,000, at Taylor’s 

house on the day he died. Jones argues that counsel should have objected to this 

testimony. He asserts that it was hearsay that was essential to the State’s case as 

“the main evidence produced supporting the idea that sufficient money existed in 

the house to make the house a potential target for armed robbery.” In essence, 

Jones argues that this testimony was highly prejudicial because, without it, there 
No. 2018AP1650-CR 

7 

was little proof that Jones was attempting to rob Taylor when Taylor and White 

were shot and killed. 

¶19 We will assume, without deciding, that trial counsel should have 

objected to this testimony as hearsay, and that the testimony should have been 

excluded as such. Regardless, we conclude that the record conclusively

demonstrates that Jones cannot establish prejudice because there is no reasonable 

probability that the jury’s verdicts would have been different in the absence of this 

testimony. 

¶20 To begin, this testimony was not, as Jones asserts, “the main 

evidence produced supporting the idea that sufficient money existed in the house 

to make the house a potential target for armed robbery.” A witness named Q.S., 

who was dating Taylor and frequently spent the night with him, testified that 

Taylor sold drugs and that she had seen him handle $5,000 in his home. In 

addition, a police detective testified that Taylor’s residence contained seventyeight pills, including Oxycodone and Percocet pills, as well as $679 in cash on the 

day of the shooting. The detective also testified that drug houses often contain 

large amounts of cash and are targets of robberies. 

¶21 Further, Jones’s argument that the hearsay testimony resulted in 

prejudice ignores other significant evidence supporting the State’s theory that 

Jones and White were attempting to commit an armed robbery of Taylor. We 

need not and do not exhaustively list all of this evidence but will summarize some 

of it. 

¶22 First, the jury heard evidence indicating that Jones and White sought 

to conceal their identities. When police found White’s body, he was dressed in 

black, and he was wearing gloves, a black knit cap covering the upper portion of 
No. 2018AP1650-CR 

8 

his face, and a scarf covering the lower portion of his face. Other evidence, 

including testimony from the eyewitness who saw Jones run out of Taylor’s 

residence, indicated that Jones was dressed similarly in all black. 

¶23 Second, the jury heard testimony from a police detective that “flexi 

cuffs” were found in White’s sweatshirt pocket, and that the detective had seen 

flexi cuffs used to bind victims’ hands in home invasion robberies. The detective 

also testified that, based on what he saw at the scene, he believed that White was 

at Taylor’s residence to commit a robbery. 

¶24 Third, the jury was presented with evidence that, when considered 

with all of the other circumstances, provided reason to think that Jones, White, and 

another accomplice, White’s brother Bobby, had all worked together to plan and 

commit a robbery at Taylor’s residence. This included evidence that Jones, White, 

and Bobby were seen together one or two days before the shooting; that Bobby 

had been inside Taylor’s residence on previous occasions; that, on the morning of 

the shooting, Bobby made sure that a friend of his who lived with Taylor was not 

at home; and that Jones and Bobby exchanged several calls and a series of text 

messages around the time of the shooting. The text messages read: 

[Jones to Bobby:] “come on.” 

[Bobby to Jones:] “okay.” 

[Jones to Bobby:] “wtf.” 

[Bobby to Jones:] “it’s over. He won’t come back. I 

mean he won’t come period back. 

We on PC.” 

[Jones to Bobby:] “come on, ... where you at.” 

[Bobby to Jones:] “he won’t come period back.” 

[Jones to Bobby:] “so now what?” 
No. 2018AP1650-CR 

9 

[Bobby to Jones:] “wait.” 

[Bobby to Jones:] “where you at?” 

[Bobby to Jones:] “Dis Bob, Dis Bob, pick up.” 

¶25 Fourth, the jury heard evidence indicating that Jones and White 

brought a firearm to Taylor’s residence. This included expert and lay testimony 

establishing that Taylor kept a Glock type of gun in his residence; that two 

different types of guns were used in the shooting; and that one of those two gun 

types matched the Glock type that Taylor kept in his residence. 

b. Cross-Examination of Witnesses 

¶26 Jones contends that trial counsel was ineffective by conducting an 

inadequate cross-examination of Ivori Winston and Q.S. In addition to the 

testimony already described, Q.S. provided context for the shooting because she 

was present in Taylor’s residence at the time. She testified that she was sleeping 

in a bedroom when she awoke to loud “knocking” or “hammering” noises that she 

eventually realized were gunshots, and that she did not leave the bedroom until the 

police arrived. 

¶27 Regardless whether trial counsel was deficient in cross-examining 

Winston and Q.S., we conclude that Jones fails to sufficiently allege prejudice 

resulting from counsel’s cross-examination of these witnesses. Jones’s 

postconviction motion lacks allegations as to what Winston’s or Q.S.’s answers 

would have been if counsel had asked additional questions. Absent such 

allegations, Jones has not sufficiently alleged a reasonable probability that 

additional questioning would have led to a different outcome. Rather, Jones

simply speculates as to the possible effects that additional questioning of Winston 
No. 2018AP1650-CR 

10 

or Q.S. might have had on the jury. “[M]ere speculation is insufficient” to show 

prejudice. State v. Adams, 221 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 584 N.W.2d 695 (Ct. App. 1998). 

c. Challenge to Text Messages 

¶28 Jones claims that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to 

sufficiently challenge the series of text messages between Jones and Bobby. This 

claim has two parts. 

¶29 Jones first claims that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to point 

out how vague the text messages were. We disagree and conclude that the record 

conclusively demonstrates that counsel was not deficient in this respect. Counsel 

reasonably challenged the vagueness of the text messages’ content by pointing out, 

through cross-examination and closing arguments, that the messages made no 

apparent reference to a gun, drugs, a robbery, or other associated terms. 

¶30 The second part of Jones’s claim is that trial counsel was ineffective 

by failing to present information as to the “true context” of the text messages. As 

to this part of Jones’s claim, we conclude that Jones fails to sufficiently allege 

both deficient performance and prejudice because his postconviction motion does 

not state what the “true context” was or how its disclosure would have affected the 

outcome at trial. 

d. Challenge to State’s Theory that Jones Possessed a Firearm 

¶31 Jones claims that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to 

adequately challenge the State’s theory that Jones possessed a firearm. This claim 

has three parts. We address each in turn but first note that at trial the State argued 

that the evidence showed that Jones, not White, wielded the gun used to shoot 

Taylor, and that Jones removed both that gun and Taylor’s gun from the scene. 
No. 2018AP1650-CR 

11 

¶32 Jones first argues that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to 

“aggressively present[] or argue[]” that the State lacked direct evidence to support 

its theory. We disagree and conclude that Jones cannot establish deficient 

performance on this basis because the record conclusively shows that counsel 

reasonably challenged the lack of direct evidence. Counsel pointed out this 

potential weakness in the State’s case during opening statements, crossexamination of multiple witnesses, and closing arguments. 

¶33 Jones next argues that trial counsel failed to take advantage of 

ballistics evidence relating to how and where Jones was shot. Jones alleged in his 

postconviction motion that counsel ineffectively failed to argue to the jury that this 

evidence “likely eliminated” Jones as a shooter. However, Jones did not allege 

facts explaining why this evidence likely eliminated him as a shooter. Thus, Jones 

has failed to sufficiently allege deficient performance or prejudice as to the 

ballistics evidence. 

¶34 Third and finally, Jones faults trial counsel for failing to present 

evidence or argue that Q.S. removed the guns from the scene. As to this 

argument, we conclude that, regardless whether counsel performed deficiently, 

Jones fails to sufficiently allege prejudice. Jones’s postconviction motion lacks 

specific allegations as to how counsel might have plausibly shown that Q.S. 

removed the guns. Rather, as with Jones’s claim that counsel was ineffective in 
No. 2018AP1650-CR 

12 

cross-examining Q.S., Jones merely speculates as to what further questioning 

might have accomplished.2 

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

¶35 We turn to Jones’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to 

support conviction on the felon in possession of a firearm charge. The elements of 

this offense are: (1) that the defendant has been convicted of a felony, and (2) that 

the defendant possessed a firearm. State v. Black, 2001 WI 31, ¶18, 242 Wis. 2d 

126, 624 N.W.2d 363. Jones challenges the sufficiency of the evidence only as to 

the possession element. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient. 

¶36 “[I]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

conviction, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trier 

of fact unless the evidence, viewed most favorably to the state and the conviction, 

is so lacking in probative value and force that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, 

could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Poellinger, 153 

Wis. 2d 493, 507, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990). “If any possibility exists that the trier 

of fact could have drawn the appropriate inferences from the evidence adduced at 

trial to find the requisite guilt, an appellate court may not overturn a verdict even if 

it believes that the trier of fact should not have found guilt based on the evidence 

before it.” Id.

 

2

 Jones’s postconviction motion contains similarly speculative allegations regarding 

counsel’s investigation of an alternative explanation for how the guns might have been removed 

from the scene. Jones alleged that counsel failed to investigate a witness who claimed to have 

seen a number of men around a car parked at the rear of Taylor’s home “earlier that day”; that 

counsel did not attempt to locate this witness or determine whether the time period when the car 

was there correlated with the shooting; and that the men around the car could have been involved 

in helping Q.S. remove guns from the scene. Because these allegations merely speculate that 

further investigation might have produced exculpatory evidence, we address them no further. 
No. 2018AP1650-CR 

13 

¶37 Applying these standards here, we conclude that the jury could 

reasonably infer that Jones possessed a firearm. First, a police detective testified 

that White was unlikely to have shot Taylor because the gloves White was 

wearing were so thick that he could not have fit his finger into the trigger guard of 

a gun. Second, as already discussed, there was the evidence showing that two 

guns were used in the shooting and that the police recovered no guns from the 

scene, meaning that someone who left the scene—most logically Jones—must 

have removed them. Third, the eyewitness who saw Jones running out of Taylor’s 

residence testified that Jones was “holding something at his waist” that the 

eyewitness could not identify. 

¶38 Jones argues that the evidence was insufficient because there was no 

direct evidence of possession. Direct evidence was not necessary. “It is well 

established that a finding of guilt may rest upon evidence that is entirely 

circumstantial.” Id. at 501. 

 By the Court.—Judgment and orders affirmed. 

 This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE

809.23(1)(b)5.