COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Coleman and Elder 

Argued by teleconference 

ERIC BLANE LEE 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2566-97-3 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 NOVEMBER 10, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG 

Richard S. Miller, Judge 

 Joseph A. Sanzone for appellant. 

 Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Eric Blane Lee (appellant) was convicted in a bench trial of 

possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-248 and possession of a firearm while in possession of 

cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-308.4(A). On appeal he 

contends the evidence was insufficient to convict him of 

possession with intent to distribute cocaine. We find no error 

and affirm. 

 I. 

 Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible 

therefrom. See Juares v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 154, 156, 493 

S.E.2d 677, 678 (1997). The evidence presented at trial 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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established that on January 11, 1997, the Lynchburg Police 

Department executed a search warrant at 607 Madison Street in 

Lynchburg. Officer J.T. Lloyd was one of the first officers 

present at the scene. Upon entering the residence, Lloyd went 

upstairs and into a bedroom where he found appellant and a woman 

named Sherry Wright sitting on the bed with a "glass plate" 

between the two. As Lloyd entered the room, appellant and Wright 

rolled off the bed onto the floor. The two individuals were then 

secured by officers. 

 Appellant was advised by Officer J.L. Hise that the police 

had a warrant to search the residence for cocaine. As Hise 

grabbed appellant's left hand to place him in handcuffs, 

appellant told the officer, "I have an automatic in my back 

pocket." A small handgun was removed from appellant's rear 

pocket, and a digital pager was found on his waistband. 

 Appellant was taken downstairs and detained while the police 

searched the house. The glass plate, which had been on the bed 

when officers first entered the bedroom, was on the floor. "It 

had residue on it . . . and there were several chunks of an 

off-white substance lying on the floor." Police seized 

approximately 6.75 grams of cocaine in plain view on the floor 

and on a dresser. The following items were also found in the 

bedroom: a box of plastic sandwich bags, digital scales "with 

white residue" on them, a small dormitory-size refrigerator, and 

a box of baking soda. In the freezer of the refrigerator, police 
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found "a chunk of off-white substance . . . in a shot glass 

submerged in water." 

 Appellant was advised of his Miranda rights and he gave a 

statement to the police. He stated that there was some money "in 

a blue bag in a window in the upstairs bedroom," and upon a 

search of the bedroom, police found $723.04 in cash where 

appellant said it would be located. Appellant also admitted that 

a .22 caliber rifle was in the house on the main level. When 

questioned about the narcotics, appellant told the officers that 

when the police entered the bedroom he was getting ready to smoke 

some of the cocaine. He stated that the drugs on the glass plate 

were all he had. 

 Ms. Wright, the woman sitting on the bed with appellant when 

police entered the room, also made a statement to Officer Hise. 

She indicated that her home address was 607 Madison Street, the 

same address as appellant's. She also stated that she was 

cutting up some cocaine when the police entered the house and 

that she was planning on selling it. 

 At trial, Investigator Wayne Duff was qualified as an expert 

in the field of narcotics distribution in the City of Lynchburg. 

 Duff testified that indicia of distribution include the 

following: possession of a firearm; use of a pager; presence of 

plastic sandwich bags, digital scales, and baking soda; and large 

amounts of hidden cash. Duff also stated that 6.75 grams of 

cocaine was an amount more consistent with distribution because 
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"[i]t's very rare to find almost a quarter of an ounce of crack 

cocaine on a smoker [user]." 

 At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's case, appellant 

moved to strike the evidence, which was denied by the trial 

court. Appellant presented no further evidence and following 

arguments by both parties the trial court found appellant guilty 

of both charges. 

 II. 

 On appeal, "[w]e may not disturb the trial court's judgment 

unless it is `plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.'" 

Barlow v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 421, 429, 494 S.E.2d 901, 

904 (1998) (citation omitted). In addition, "the inferences to 

be drawn from proven facts are matters solely for the fact 

finder's determination." Marshall v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 

627, 633, 496 S.E.2d 120, 123 (1998). 

 Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to 

establish the required intent to distribute narcotics. He argues 

that other than the amount of cocaine he was preparing to smoke 

when the police officers arrived, the remaining cocaine and drug 

paraphernalia found during the search of his residence belonged 

to Wright. Accordingly, appellant argues, there was not 

sufficient evidence to support his conviction. We disagree. 

 It is well established that "[b]ecause direct proof of 

intent is often impossible, it must be shown by circumstantial 

evidence. Circumstantial proof of a defendant's intent includes 
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the quantity of the drug discovered, the packaging of the drugs, 

and the presence or absence of drug paraphernalia." White v. 

Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 662, 668, 492 S.E.2d 451, 454 (1997) 

(en banc) (citing Servis v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507, 524, 

371 S.E.2d 156, 165 (1988)). 

 In the instant case, many recognized indicia of intent to 

distribute were tied to appellant. The police seized from 

appellant's residence approximately 6.75 grams of cocaine, an 

amount which Investigator Duff testified was inconsistent with an 

individual's personal use. Plastic sandwich bags and digital 

scales were also found. Empty plastic sandwich bags and the 

possession of an electronic scale can provide a sufficient basis 

to support an inference of distribution of narcotics. See Shears 

v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 394, 402, 477 S.E.2d 309, 313 

(1996); White, 25 Va. App. at 668, 492 S.E.2d at 454. 

 Additionally, the police found a digital pager and a handgun 

on appellant, both of which have been routinely classified as 

tools of the drug trade. See White, 25 Va. App. at 668, 492 

S.E.2d at 454 (citing Wilkins v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 293, 

296, 443 S.E.2d 440, 442 (1994)); Glasco v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. 

App. 763, 775, 497 S.E.2d 150, 156 (1998) (citing Dixon v. 

Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 554, 557, 399 S.E.2d 831, 833 (1991)). 

 Evidence of large amounts of cash is some evidence of 

involvement in drug transactions. See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 

12 Va. App. 150, 153, 402 S.E.2d 502, 504 (1991). In this case, 
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appellant knew of the presence of cash in the house and told the 

police officers exactly where it was located. In view of 

appellant's possession of cocaine, the drug paraphernalia, and 

the large sum of money, we find the record sufficient to support 

the trial court's finding that appellant possessed cocaine with 

the intent to distribute. 

 Nevertheless, appellant contends that Wright's statement to 

police that she owned and intended to sell the cocaine was 

sufficient evidence to exonerate appellant of the distribution 

charge. This argument is without merit. In her statement Wright 

admits to her own culpability; she does not exonerate appellant 

nor does she address his involvement in the distribution of 

cocaine in their home.1

 The trial court, as the trier of fact, 

was free to reject any or all parts of Wright's statements to the 

extent they were related to appellant's case. See Woodard v. 

 

 1Wright did not testify in appellant's trial and her 

statements came to light through the following testimony: 

 Q. Investigator Hise, you also arrested Ms. 

Wright that day? 

 A. Yes, sir. 

 Q. What address did she give you? 

 A. I believe she gave me the same address. 

 Yes, sir. She gave me the same 

address, 607 Madison Street. 

 Q. And I believe she made a statement, 

didn't you say she was cutting up the 

cocaine when the police arrived? 

 A. Yes, sir. I believe I testified to that 

earlier. 

 Q. And she said that she was planning on 

selling some of it? 

 A. Yes, sir. 
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Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 405, 408-09, 499 S.E.2d 557, 559 

(1998). 

 Additionally, assuming Ms. Wright's admission of ownership 

of the drugs was considered by the trial court, it is well 

settled that possession need not be exclusive. It can also be 

joint. See Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 751, 755, 433 

S.E.2d 27, 29 (1993) ("Possession need not be exclusive and, in 

fact, may be joint possession with others."). Finding no error, 

we affirm. 

 Affirmed.