Filed 1/11/24 Arnold v. Medal CA2/7

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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

ROLAND ARNOLD,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ERICK JASON MEDAL,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B323743

 (Los Angeles County Super.

 Ct. No. BQ048027)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Christine Byrd, Judge. Affirmed.

Erick Jason Medal, in pro. per., for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

Roland Arnold, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________
2

Roland Arnold sought a domestic violence restraining order

against Erick Jason Medal, whom Arnold once dated, alleging 

that Medal persistently harassed him for a decade. The trial 

court issued a restraining order and later renewed the 

restraining order. Medal moved to terminate or modify the 

restraining order, and the trial court denied Medal’s motion. On 

appeal, Medal contends the trial court applied an incorrect legal 

standard in denying his motion. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 9, 2015, Arnold filed a request for a domestic 

violence restraining order against Medal. In a declaration in 

support of his request, Arnold stated that he and Medal had 

dated on and off for several years until 2005. After they broke up 

Medal subjected Arnold to 10 years of threats and abuse online 

and by telephone, including by making threats against Arnold 

and Arnold’s family, and engaging in “constant intimidation and 

surveillance.” In 2014, Arnold obtained a restraining order 

against Medal. After the first restraining order expired, in 

March 2015, Medal again approached Arnold and harassed him 

outside his apartment. This caused Arnold to believe he needed a 

restraining order to protect himself.

The trial court issued a temporary restraining order on 

March 9, 2015, and on March 30, 2015, it issued a one-year 

restraining order pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention 

Act, Family Code section 6200 et seq. The March 30 order

required, among other things, that Medal stay at least 100 yards 

away from Arnold and Arnold’s home and refrain from harassing, 

threatening, following, stalking, keeping under surveillance, 
3

impersonating, or contacting Arnold.

1

 In April 2016, the court 

renewed the restraining order for an additional five years.

In March 2021, Arnold filed a request to renew the 

restraining order permanently. He alleged that Medal continued 

to harass him and that he had violated the restraining order, 

including by following Arnold, attempting to contact Arnold 

online and by telephone, attempting to hack Arnold’s online 

accounts, and having individuals sit outside Arnold’s home to 

watch and take photos of him. Arnold stated a criminal case had 

been filed against Medal and in 2017, as a result of a guilty plea, 

the criminal court had ordered Medal to pay a fine, complete 

36 months of probation, perform community service, and 

complete a 52-week domestic violence class. 

On April 26, 2021, the trial court granted Arnold’s request

and ordered that the restraining order remain in effect 

permanently. In August 2021, Medal, represented by counsel, 

moved to set aside the renewed restraining order. After hearing 

testimony on the issue, the court denied Medal’s motion. 

1 We augment the record on our own motion to include

Arnold’s March 9, 2015 request for domestic violence restraining 

order against Medal; the March 9, 2015 temporary restraining 

order against Medal; the March 30, 2015 restraining order 

against Medal; the April 2016 order to renew the domestic 

violence restraining order; Arnold’s March 11, 2021 request to 

renew the restraining order permanently; the court’s April 26, 

2021 order to renew the domestic violence restraining order

permanently; Medal’s August 23, 2021 notice of motion and 

motion to set aside the permanent restraining order; and Medal’s 

June 21, 2022 motion to terminate or modify the permanent 

restraining order. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)
4

In June 2022, Medal filed a motion to terminate or modify 

the permanent restraining order. Relying on Loeffler v. Medina

(2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495 (Loeffler), Medal contended that his 

motion to terminate was governed by Code of Civil Procedure 

section 533,2 which provides that a court may terminate an 

injunction “upon a showing that there has been a material 

change in the facts upon which the injunction or temporary 

restraining order was granted, that the law upon which the 

injunction or temporary restraining order was granted has 

changed, or that the ends of justice would be served by the 

modification or dissolution of the injunction or temporary 

restraining order.” 

Medal argued there had been a material change in facts 

and justice would be served by terminating or modifying the 

restraining order. Medal supported his argument with a variety 

of assertions, including that he had no communication with 

Arnold outside of court for five years; he had moved and did not 

live near Arnold; there was no allegation of violence or in-person 

contact; he had completed 10 days of community service, 

52 weeks of domestic violence courses, and 36 months of 

probation; his criminal conviction for violating the restraining 

order had been set aside and dismissed pursuant to Penal Code 

section 1203.4;3and, although he had been a substitute dance 

2

Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise 

stated.

3

Penal Code section 1203.4 provides in part for a court to 

allow a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty and for the court to 

dismiss the accusations or information against the defendant 
5

teacher prior to the restraining order, he could not secure 

employment as a teacher because of the restraining order. 

Medal’s motion was called for hearing on August 31, 2022, 

with Medal, Medal’s attorney, and Arnold present. After hearing 

the testimony of Arnold and the arguments presented by Arnold 

and Medal’s counsel, the trial court denied the motion. The court 

stated that there was no material change of facts or law and it 

would not be in the interest of justice to grant the relief Medal 

requested. Medal filed a timely notice of appeal.4 

DISCUSSION

Medal contends that the trial court applied an incorrect 

standard in ruling on his motion to terminate the restraining 

order. Although Medal argued in the trial court that Loeffler, 

supra, 174 Cal.App.4th 1495 compelled the court to apply the 

section 533 standard to his motion to terminate the domestic 

violence restraining order,

5 Medal argues the opposite on appeal. 

Specifically, he contends that the court erred by applying the 

section 533 standard, that Loeffler, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th 1495 

is wrongly decided to the extent that it limits the court’s 

discretion to consider only the section 533 factors, and that the 

when, among other grounds, the defendant “has fulfilled the 

conditions of probation for the entire period of probation.”

4 On November 14, 2023, Arnold filed a California Rules of 

Court, rule 8.224 application for transmittal of exhibits. Because 

Arnold’s application refers to exhibits not necessary for 

disposition of this appeal, we deny it.

5 A domestic violence restraining order is “‘a type of 

injunction.’” (In re Marriage of Carlisle (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 

244, 255; accord, Ashby v. Ashby (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 491, 511.)
6

court should instead have applied the standard articulated in 

Yost v. Forestiere (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 509 (Yost), which permits 

a court examining a motion to terminate a civil harassment 

restraining order to consider factors beyond those set forth in 

section 533. 

Any error in the standard applied by the trial court was 

invited by Medal, and Medal forfeited his contention that a 

different standard applies by failing to raise that argument in the 

trial court. (See, e.g., Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 

383, 403 [“‘[w]here a party by his conduct induces the commission 

of error, he is estopped from asserting it as a ground for reversal’ 

on appeal”]; Hood v. Gonzales (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 57, 70 

[same]; see also, e.g., Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club (2017) 

18 Cal.App.5th 908, 944 [“‘[a] party may not for the first time on 

appeal change its theory of relief’”]; Kaufman & Broad 

Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2006) 

136 Cal.App.4th 212, 226 [“CalFarm failed to raise this argument 

in the trial court and thus forfeits that argument here”].)

 Even if Medal had not forfeited the argument, and even if 

he is correct that Yost, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at page 527

requires a court to consider grounds outside the section 533 

criteria “on a case-by-case basis,” he fails to show that the trial 

court applied a standard that is contrary to Yost. 

Medal argues that under Yost the court’s discretion 

whether to terminate a restraining order “includes, but is not 

limited to, the three grounds articulated in . . . section [533].”

True, but in Yost, the appellant had “argued below that a trial 

court’s discretion to modify a civil harassment restraining order 

is not limited to the grounds set forth in section 533,” and the 

trial court had rejected that contention and refused to consider 
7

the additional grounds for termination proposed by the appellant.

(Yost, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 524, 528-529.) The court of 

appeal reversed, holding that the trial court inappropriately 

limited its consideration of arguments that bear on the 

appropriateness of the continued restraining order. (Id. at 

pp. 528-529.) Here, in contrast, Medal did not argue to the trial 

court that it must consider factors outside of section 533 (he 

argued precisely the contrary), and the court did not refuse to 

consider any contention raised by Medal. The court affirmed that 

it had read the papers and heard Medal’s argument, and it 

addressed each such argument, finding that “there is no material 

change of facts or the law, and that it would not be in the interest 

of justice to terminate or to shorten the length of the restraining 

order.” Medal argues that it was error for the court to refuse to 

consider other factors. But Medal has not shown that the trial 

court refused to consider any factor. 

Medal asserts that the trial court’s decision “reflects an 

unawareness or misunderstanding of the full scope of its 

discretion.” He contends the trial court demonstrated this lack of 

awareness when, after his counsel requested clarity about the 

meaning of the term “permanent” as it pertains to the restraining 

order, the court stated that “permanent” means “lifetime.” Medal 

cites no authority and makes no argument explaining why this is 

error, or how it affected the outcome. Family Code section 6345, 

subdivision (a), provides that domestic violence restraining 

orders may be renewed “permanently.” Even permanently 

renewed domestic violence restraining orders are subject to 

termination or modification under Family Code section 6345. 

There is no indication in the record that the trial court believed it 
8

lacked discretion to modify or terminate the permanent 

restraining order when it denied Medal’s motion.

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s August 31, 2022, order is affirmed. Arnold 

is to recover his costs on appeal.

EVENSON, J.

We concur:

FEUER, Acting P. J.

MARTINEZ, J. 



Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by 

the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.