United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit ____________ 

No. 22-40104

____________ 

Michael L. Mark, 

Plaintiff—Appellant, 

versus

Lee Ann Spears; Kevin R. Wheat; Balden O. Polk; Vickie 

Barrow; Jonathan Clark; Gina Bentley; Jennifer Smith; 

Billy Horton; Lanette Linthicum; LeAnn IronsRodriguez; Michael Greer; Texas Department of 

Criminal Justice, 

Defendants—Appellees.

______________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Texas 

USDC No. 6:18-CV-309

______________________________ 

Before Duncan and Wilson, Circuit Judges, and Mazzant*, District 

Judge.

Per Curiam:**

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael L. Mark, a pro se prisoner, filed a civil suit 

against Defendants-Appellees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of 

*

 District Judge of the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by designation. 

** This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. 

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

August 17, 2023 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 

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2 

his constitutional rights. The district court dismissed Mark’s constitutional 

claims related to events that occurred in 2014, 2015, and 2016 with prejudice 

because it determined that those claims were time barred. The district court 

later dismissed Mark’s remaining claims for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief could be granted. 

Mark timely appealed and argues that the district court erred because 

he is entitled to equitable tolling on his claims and because he stated plausible 

claims for relief. We hold that the district court did not err and AFFIRM the 

district court’s judgment. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On June 21, 2018, Plaintiff-Appellant Michael L. Mark, an inmate 

confined to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) and 

housed in the Powledge Unit in Protective Safe Keeping, filed the present 

suit against Lee Ann Spears, Kevin R. Wheat, Balden O. Polk, Vickie Barrow, 

Jonathan Clark, Gina Bentley, Jennifer Smith, Billy Horton, Lanette 

Linthicum, LeAnn Irons-Rodriguez, Michael Greer, and the TDCJ 

(collectively, “Appellees”).1

 Mark alleges that each of the Appellees 

individually violated his constitutional rights and, as a whole, conspired to 

retaliate against and harass Mark in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2

 More 

specifically, Mark alleges that Appellees (1) denied him access to legal 

materials, documents, and storage containers, (2) accused him of being a 

1

 “Under the prison mailbox rule, a prisoner’s pleading is deemed to have been 

filed on the date that the pro se prisoner submits the pleading to prison authorities for 

mailing.” Stoot v. Cain, 570 F.3d 669, 671 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Causey v. Cain, 450 F.3d 

601, 604 (5th Cir. 2006); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270–71 (1988)). In this case, the 

date that Mark submitted his pleading to prison authorities was June 21, 2018. Thus, the 

date Mark is considered to have filed his complaint is June 21, 2018. 

2

 After a preliminary review of Mark’s complaint, the magistrate judge ordered 

Mark to file an amended complaint fixing deficiencies pointed out by the magistrate judge 

in his pleadings. Mark filed an amended complaint but added few, if any, additional facts. 

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“snitch” in front of other inmates and officers, (3) impeded his access to the 

courts by interfering with his legal mail, (4) retaliated against him for filing 

administrative grievances, (5) acted with deliberate indifference to his 

request to have an outside dentist fix his teeth, and (6) subjected him to 

excessive strip searches. 

In the lower court, Appellees filed three motions to dismiss. Relevant 

here, Appellees argued that Mark is time barred from pursuing claims that 

arose prior to June 21, 2016, because they are barred by the two-year statute 

of limitations. Appellees further argued that Mark cannot utilize the doctrine 

of equitable tolling to revive his time-barred claims. The magistrate judge 

agreed that all of Mark’s claims were barred by the relevant statute of 

limitations and recommended that the district court dismiss Mark’s claims. 

Mark objected to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, 

pointing out that his complaint also contained allegations that arose in 2017 

and 2018. After reviewing the report and recommendation and Mark’s 

objections, the district court determined that the magistrate judge was 

correct insofar as she recommended dismissal of Mark’s time-barred claims. 

However, the district court limited the dismissal to those claims that arose in 

2014, 2015, and 2016. Accordingly, the district court partially adopted the 

report and recommendation, dismissing Mark’s claims that accrued more 

than two years before he filed the present lawsuit. 

Later, Appellees Barrow and Smith filed a motion for summary 

judgment, arguing that Mark’s claims against them should be dismissed 

because Mark did not exhaust his administrative remedies. The magistrate 

judge disagreed. However, the magistrate judge nonetheless recommended 

dismissal of Mark’s remaining claims because he failed to state a claim upon 

which relief could be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). After 

dismissing the remaining claims, the district court entered a final judgment, 

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dismissing Mark’s lawsuit with prejudice as time barred and because he failed 

to state a claim. 

On appeal, Mark argues that the district court erred when it dismissed 

his claims. As to the dismissal of his time-barred claims, Mark argues that we 

should reverse the district court because it should have applied equitable 

tolling principles. And, as to his other claims, Mark argues that we should 

reverse the district court’s dismissal because he alleged facts in his amended 

complaint that sufficiently stated plausible claims for relief. 

We conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing any of 

Mark’s claims. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

We review the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo, 

accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing those facts in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiffs. Spiller v. City of Tex. City, Police Dep’t, 130 

F.3d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1997); Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 

2009). We also review dismissal of a complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) de 

novo under the same standard applied to dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6). 

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). The 

plaintiff must allege facts that suggest liability and are more than consistent 

with unlawful conduct. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007). 

“A motion to dismiss may be granted on a statute of limitations defense 

where it is evident from the pleadings that the action is time barred, and the 

pleadings fail to raise some basis for tolling.” Taylor v. Bailey Tool Mfg. Co., 

744 F.3d 944, 946 (5th Cir. 2014). 

III. ANALYSIS 

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In his appeal, Mark argues that the district court erred in dismissing 

his claims because (1) his claims should not be time barred, and (2) he did not 

fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted for his remaining 

claims. We address both arguments in turn. 

A. Section 1983 Statute of Limitations and Equitable Tolling 

Section 1983 does not prescribe a statute of limitations. Instead, 

“[t]he statute of limitations for a suit brought under § 1983 is determined by 

the general statute of limitations governing personal injuries in the forum 

state.” Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001); see also 

Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249–50 (1989) (“[W]here state law provides 

multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, courts considering 

§ 1983 claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal 

injury actions.”). As such, Texas’s two-year statute of limitations for 

personal injury claims applies in this case. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

§ 16.003(a); Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 576. When the claim accrues, however, is 

governed by federal law. Burrell v. Newsome, 883 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1989) 

(“While the limitations period is determined by reference to state law, the 

standard governing the accrual of a cause of action under section 1983 is 

determined by federal law.”). Under Fifth Circuit law, the limitations period 

begins to run when the plaintiff “knows or has reason to know of the injury 

which is the basis of the action.” Id. (citations omitted). 

In some instances, “[t]he doctrine of equitable tolling preserves a 

plaintiff’s claims when strict application of the statute of limitations would 

be inequitable.” Lambert v. United States, 44 F.3d 296, 298 (5th Cir. 1995) 

(citing Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965)). The plaintiff 

bears the burden of establishing that equitable tolling applies. Rotella v. 

Pederson, 144 F.3d 892 (5th Cir. 1998). As we pointed out in Lambert, 

equitable tolling may apply in the following circumstances: 

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[A] claimant has received inadequate notice; or where a motion 

for appointment of counsel is pending and equity would justify 

tolling the statutory period until the motion is acted upon; or 

where the court has led the plaintiff to believe that she has done 

everything required of her. 

Lambert, 44 F.3d at 299 (quoting Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 

U.S. 147, 151 (1984)); see also Ramirez v. City of San Antonio, 312 F.3d 178, 

183 (5th Cir. 2002) (“We have found that equitable tolling may be 

appropriate when ‘the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about the 

cause of action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his 

rights.’” (quoting Teemac v. Henderson, 298 F.3d 452, 457 (5th Cir. 2002)). 

“Traditional equitable principles preclude a court from invoking equitable 

tolling, however, when the party seeking relief has an adequate legal or 

statutory remedy to avoid the consequences of the statute of limitations.” 

Lambert, 44 F.3d at 299. For example, equitable tolling generally does not 

apply when a plaintiff’s initial suit is dismissed without prejudice. Id. Instead, 

the plaintiff is left in the same position as if the first suit had never been filed. 

Id. That is, a plaintiff’s claims are not tolled for statute of limitation purposes 

until he or she refiles the lawsuit. 

Mark filed his complaint in the present action on June 21, 2018. As 

such, the two-year statute of limitations bars Mark from bringing claims 

related to injuries that he knew of or had reason to know of before June 21, 

2016. Mark does not dispute that the statute of limitations on those claims 

has run. Rather, on appeal, Mark complains that the district court erred when 

it did not apply the doctrine of equitable tolling such that he may bring claims 

that accrued before June 21, 2016. Mark’s argument is twofold. 

First, Mark argues that the Appellees conspired to or actually did 

interfere with his access to the courts, legal materials, and communications 

with attorneys and legal organizations. Courts “do not apply the doctrine of 

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equitable tolling based solely on a plaintiff’s subjective impressions” though. 

Ramirez, 312 F.3d at 184. Rather, courts “examine ‘whether the defendant’s 

conduct, innocent or not, reasonably induced the plaintiff not to file suit 

within the limitations period.’” Id. (cleaned up). A defendant’s affirmative 

acts must mislead the plaintiff before a court may apply the doctrine of 

equitable tolling. Id. Mark’s general allegations that the Appellees misled 

him, standing alone, are insufficient to support equitable tolling. See id. 

(holding that equitable tolling did not apply where a plaintiff provided little 

to no detail about how he was misled). Indeed, Mark offers nothing more than 

conclusory allegations. Mark did not produce sufficient evidence to 

demonstrate that he was misled by Appellees; thus, Mark’s first argument is 

unavailing. 

Second, Mark argues that the severance order in a previous case 

provides grounds for equitable tolling. Mark’s argument, however, is based 

on a misunderstanding of what occurred in that case. See generally Mark v. 

Spears, 722 F. App’x 362 (5th Cir. 2018). Mark contends that he was actively 

disputing an order of the district court and, instead of responding to Mark’s 

dispute, the district court simply dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice. 

That is not what transpired. Rather, the district court dismissed Mark’s first 

suit without prejudice because the magistrate judge repeatedly ordered Mark 

to file an amended complaint and he failed to do so. Id. Equitable tolling is 

inapplicable under these circumstances. Lambert, 44 F.3d at 300 (affirming a 

district court’s decision not to apply equitable tolling after a plaintiff’s case 

was dismissed without prejudice because the plaintiff had express legal 

remedies available that would have allowed him or her to avoid dismissal); see 

also Williams v. Cook, No. 00-41271, 2001 WL 822777, at *1 (5th Cir. June 29, 

2001) (affirming a district court’s refusal to apply equitable tolling after a pro 

se litigant’s first lawsuit was dismissed without prejudice). 

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Strict application of the statute of limitations would not be inequitable 

in this case. To be sure, this is not a case where Mark had inadequate notice 

or where Mark was led to believe by the district court that he had done 

everything required of him. See Lambert, 44 F.3d at 299. Nor is this a case 

where some kind of affirmative misconduct by Appellees lulled Mark into 

inaction. See id. On the contrary, here, as in Lambert, Mark’s actions caused 

the district court to dismiss his first case and Mark had legal remedies 

available to him to remedy the dismissal. 

Many of Mark’s claims fall outside the statute of limitations period. 

Mark’s claims that he was denied dental care and called a “snitch” accrued 

in 2014, some of his claims that he was denied legal storage, mail, and 

dictionaries accrued in 2015, some of his claims that he was not given case 

citations accrued in May 2016, and Mark’s claim regarding excessive strip 

searches accrued in the beginning of June 2016. Thus, all of Mark’s claims 

regarding his dental care, being called a “snitch,” and the excessive strip 

searches fall outside the statute of limitations. Mark’s claims that he was 

denied legal storage, mail, dictionaries, and case citations that accrued before 

June 21, 2016, also fall outside the statute of limitations. It is evident from the 

pleadings that these claims are time barred, and the pleadings fail to raise any 

basis for tolling. Accordingly, it was proper for the district court to grant the 

motions to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. 

B. Failure to State a Claim 

Turning to Mark’s remaining claims, we further determine that the 

district court did not err in dismissing Mark’s timely claims for failing to state 

a claim upon which relief could be granted. 

A prisoner’s complaint against a governmental entity or an officer or 

employee of a governmental entity may be dismissed for failing to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). “A 

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complaint lacks an arguable basis in fact if, after providing the plaintiff the 

opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are 

clearly baseless.” Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998). 

To start, we note that the magistrate judge pointed out deficiencies in 

Mark’s complaint and gave him the opportunity to amend his complaint and 

to fix those deficiencies. Mark nonetheless failed to allege additional facts 

that would support his claims. Thus, for the following reasons, we agree that 

the claims raised in Mark’s amended complaint lack an arguable basis in fact. 

1. Access to the Courts 

Mark claims that Appellees impeded his right to access the courts in 

2017 and 2018 by preventing him from completing his legal research, 

purposely delaying or denying his requests for legal citations and books, 

opening or mishandling his legal mail without him present, and denying his 

outgoing mail to legal organizations. The magistrate judge determined, and 

the district court agreed, that Mark neither pleaded nor demonstrated actual 

injury or harm arising from these allegations because he did not identify or 

demonstrate how his status as a litigant was prejudiced. We agree with the 

lower court that Mark did not allege that he suffered any actual harm or injury 

because of the Appellees’ actions. 

Prisoners undoubtedly have a right of access to the courts. Brewer v. 

Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 820 (5th Cir. 1993). This right encompasses a 

prisoner’s ability “to prepare and transmit a necessary legal document to a 

court.” Id. at 821. To prevail on an access-to-the-courts claim, however, a 

prisoner must show an actual injury. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349–51 

(1996). Such an injury is shown when the prisoner demonstrates that the 

policies or actions of prison officials have hindered his ability to file a 

nonfrivolous legal claim. Smith v. Collin Cnty. Jail, 548 F. App’x 132, 133 (5th 

Cir. 2013) (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 414–22 (2002); Lewis, 

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518 U.S. at 351). Furthermore, insofar as a plaintiff alleges that his right to 

access the courts was impeded because of mail tampering, the plaintiff must 

show that his or her position as a litigant was prejudiced because of the mail 

tampering. Walker v. Navarro Cnty. Jail, 4 F.3d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 1993). 

Mark argues that the harm he suffered because he was denied access 

to the courts is obvious. However, Mark wholly fails to state how he was 

harmed. Mark does not specify what materials he was denied or how any 

denial impacted his ability to pursue his claims. And, while Mark alleges that 

his correspondence with legal organizations was interfered with, Mark does 

not identify any way in which his legal position suffered or any way in which 

he was prejudiced. Indeed, Mark was not prevented from filing a § 1983 

lawsuit against the Appellees because of their alleged actions. On the 

contrary, he was able to file two lawsuits. Simply put, Mark must do more 

than make a conclusory statement that he was harmed. See, e.g., Panda 

Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 868 (5th Cir. 2001) 

(noting that a plaintiff may not rely on conclusory statements to survive a 

motion to dismiss). Accordingly, under these circumstances, Mark has not 

shown that the district court erred when it dismissed his claims that he was 

denied access to the courts. 

2. Retaliation 

Mark further argues that the district court erred when it dismissed his 

First Amendment retaliation claim against Greer. Mark claims that Greer 

retaliated against him in violation of his First Amendment rights because, 

after Mark verbally reported Greer for failing to change the water coolers, 

Greer coughed up phlegm and spit it into Mark’s food. In other words, Mark 

alleges that Greer retaliated against him by causing him to miss a meal. 

“Under the First Amendment, a prison official may not harass or retaliate 

against an inmate ‘for . . . complaining to a supervisor about a guard’s 

misconduct.’” DeMarco v. Davis, 914 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting 

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Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1995)). “To prevail on a claim of 

retaliation, a prisoner must establish (1) a specific constitutional right, (2) the 

defendant’s intent to retaliate against the prisoner for his or her exercise of 

that right, (3) a retaliatory adverse act, and (4) causation.” Id. (internal 

citations omitted). As to the third prong, the retaliatory act must be more 

than de minimis. Bibbs v. Early, 541 F.3d 267, 270 (5th Cir. 2008). 

“Retaliation against a prisoner is actionable only if it is capable of deterring a 

person of ordinary firmness from further exercising his constitutional 

rights.” Id.; Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682, 686 (5th Cir. 2006). And, as to 

the fourth prong, the prisoner must prove that “but for the retaliatory motive 

the complained of incident . . . would not have occurred.” McDonald v. 

Steward, 132 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 

F.3d 299, 310 (5th Cir. 1997)). 

Importantly, courts are required to carefully scrutinize First 

Amendment retaliation claims. Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166. Mere conclusory 

allegations are insufficient. Id. Instead, an inmate must “allege a chronology 

of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred.” Id. (internal 

citations omitted). 

We agree with Mark that the phlegm incident, which we accept as true 

at the pleading stage, is reprehensible. Mark did not establish in his pleadings, 

however, that Greer’s actions, even if motivated by retaliatory intent, rise to 

the level of First Amendment retaliation because (1) Greer’s retaliatory act 

was de minimis, and (2) Mark did not sufficiently allege that but for Greer’s 

retaliatory motive the phlegm incident would not have occurred. 

Taking these issues in reverse order, we start with the issues of intent 

and causation. Mark alleges in his amended complaint that “Greer’s direct 

retaliation was to cough up phlegm and mucus onto plaintiff’s breakfast tray” 

with the intent to “cause serious harm, sickness, or worse.” These 

allegations are insufficient to support that Greer had retaliatory intent or that 

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Greer’s allegedly retaliatory intent was causally connected to the phlegm 

incident. Mark alleges that Greer was ordered to start changing the water 

coolers after Mark’s report. However, Mark alleges no facts that Greer was 

aware that a prisoner reported him for failing to change the water coolers or, 

more importantly, that Greer was specifically aware that Mark reported him 

for failing to change the water coolers. An essential element of a retaliation 

claim is the ability to show causation, i.e., that the complained-of phlegm 

incident would not have occurred absent the retaliatory motive. See Johnson 

v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 310 (5th Cir. 1997); Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166. 

Mark’s failure to allege any facts indicating that Greer was even aware of the 

verbal report provides, at best, a weak connection between any retaliatory 

motive and the retaliatory act. Mark was given the opportunity to amend his 

pleadings and provide additional facts but did not. Without more, Mark’s 

pleadings are insufficient to support the essential elements of a First 

Amendment retaliation claim. 

Now we turn to Greer’s retaliatory act. Mark’s claim that Greer 

committed a First Amendment retaliatory act against him when he deprived 

him of a meal must be viewed through the lens of the Eighth Amendment. 

The Eighth Amendment requires that inmates be provided “‘well-balanced 

meal[s], containing sufficient nutritional value to preserve health.’” Green v. 

Ferrell, 801 F.2d 765, 770 (5th Cir. 1986) (footnote omitted) (quoting Smith 

v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373, 380 (5th Cir. 1977)); see also Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 

1322, 1327 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (“To comply with the Constitution, 

inmates must receive ‘reasonably adequate’ food.”). “The deprivation of 

food constitutes cruel and unusual punishment only if it denies a prisoner the 

‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Talib, 138 F.3d at 214 n.3 

(quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)) (internal quotations 

omitted). “Whether the deprivation of food falls below this threshold 

depends on the amount and duration of the deprivation.” Id. “The Eighth 

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Amendment does not require that prisoners receive three meals a day; rather, 

the Eighth Amendment requires that jails provide inmates with well-balanced 

meals, containing sufficient nutritional value to preserve health.” Grissom v. 

Patterson, No. 91-7137, 1993 WL 560256, at *4 (5th Cir. Dec. 27, 1993) 

(cleaned up) (citing Green, 801 F.2d at 770; Smith v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373, 

380 (5th Cir. 1977)). 

With these Eighth Amendment principles in mind, Greer’s retaliatory 

act—depriving Mark of a meal by spitting in it—is a de minimis act for First 

Amendment retaliation purposes because he only missed a single meal. See 

Green, 801 F.2d at 770–71 (holding that only providing prisoners two meals a 

day does not violate the Eighth Amendment); see also Talib, 138 F.3d at 214 

n.3 (holding that it is doubtful a prisoner was denied the “minimal measure 

of life’s necessities” when he missed fifty meals over the course of five 

months). 

While Mark undeniably exercised his First Amendment right to file 

grievances, he nonetheless fails to allege a chronology of events from which 

retaliation may be plausibly inferred. As such, the district court did not err in 

dismissing Mark’s retaliation claim against Greer for failure to state a claim. 

3. Failure to Respond to Grievances 

Mark argues that the district court erred when it dismissed his claim 

that prison officials failed to respond to his grievances. However, “any 

alleged due process violation arising from the alleged failure to investigate [an 

inmate’s] grievances is indisputably meritless . . . .” Geiger v. Jowers, 404 

F.3d 371 374 (5th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the district court did not err in 

dismissing Mark’s claim that prison officials failed to adequately respond to 

his grievances. 

4. Conspiracy to Retaliate 

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Next, Mark argues that the district court erred when it dismissed his 

conspiracy claims. Mark claims that Appellees conspired to retaliate against 

him when they interfered with his legal mail and right to access the courts. 

And, generally, Mark claims that there was a system-wide conspiracy to 

deny, deprive, harass, and retaliate against Mark for exposing alleged wrongs 

done to him. To establish a conspiracy under § 1983, “a prisoner must allege 

an actual violation of a right protected under § 1983 and that the defendants 

acted in concert with specific intent to violate that right.” McKinney v. 

McDuffie, 789 F. App’x 413, 416 (5th Cir. 2019) (internal citations omitted). 

Plaintiffs who assert conspiracy claims under civil rights statutes must plead 

the operative facts upon which their claim is based.” Young v. Biggers, 938 

F.2d 565, 569 (5th Cir. 1991). “‘Bald allegations’ of a conspiracy are not 

enough.” McKinney, 789 F. App’x at 416 (quoting Young, 938, F.2d at 569). 

Mark’s general conspiracy claim fails because Mark offers nothing 

more than conclusory, unsupported statements. As we just discussed, bald 

allegations of a conspiracy are insufficient to support a claim. See id. Thus, 

the district court did not err when it dismissed Mark’s conspiracy claims. 

 As to Mark’s more specific claims that Appellees conspired to 

interfere with his legal mail and his right to access the courts, Mark’s claims 

fail for the same reasons that Mark’s non-conspiratorial legal mail and access 

claims fail. Mark does not allege facts that would support Mark suffered any 

injury or was harmed by the Appellees’ actions. Therefore, the district court 

did not err in dismissing these claims either. 

5. Supervisory Liability 

Mark further argues that the district court erred by dismissing his 

claims of supervisory liability. Mark contends that Spears, Smith, Barrow, 

Polk, Clark, Horton, and Linthicum are supervisory officials that breached 

their duties under state law when they acted with deliberate indifference 

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toward a resulting constitutional injury. “Section 1983 does not create 

supervisory or respondeat superior liability.” Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 

742 (5th Cir. 2002). “Rather, a plaintiff must show either [that] the 

supervisor personally was involved in the constitutional violation or that 

there is a ‘sufficient causal connection’ between the supervisor’s conduct 

and the constitutional violation.” Evett v. Deep E. Tex. Reg’l Narcotics 

Trafficking Task Force, 330 F.3d 681, 689 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Thompkins 

v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987)). “In order to establish supervisor 

liability for constitutional violations committed by subordinate employees, 

plaintiffs must show that the supervisor acted, or failed to act, with deliberate 

indifference to violations of others’ constitutional rights committed by their 

subordinates.” Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up) 

(quoting Gates v. Texas Dep’t of Prot. & Reg. Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 435 (5th 

Cir. 2008)). 

Mark does not sufficiently allege a supervisory retaliation claim. Mark 

fails to allege any plausible claims regarding the constitutional violations 

allegedly committed by Appellees. As such, Mark does not demonstrate a 

cognizable claim of supervisory liability under § 1983 and the district court 

did not err in dismissing Mark’s supervisory liability claims. See id. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED. 

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