alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IIB 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2546 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 26, 2007 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

AN ACT 

To designate the Department of Veterans Affairs Medical 

Center in Asheville, North Carolina, as the ‘‘Charles 

George Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


bajohnson on PROD1PC77 with BILLS
2 

HR 2546 RFS

1 SECTION 1. DESIGNATION OF CHARLES GEORGE DEPART2 MENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS MEDICAL CEN3 TER. 

4 (a) DESIGNATION.—The Department of Veterans Af5 fairs Medical Center located at 1100 Tunnel Road, Ashe6 ville, North Carolina, shall after the date of the enactment 

7 of this Act be known and designated as the ‘‘Charles 

8 George Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center’’. 

9 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in any law, regula10 tion, map, document, record, or other paper of the United 

11 States to the medical center referred to in subsection (a) 

12 shall be considered to be a reference to the Charles George 

13 Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center. 

Passed the House of Representatives June 25, 2007. 

Attest: LORRAINE C. MILLER, 

Clerk. 


bajohnson on PROD1PC77 with BILLS
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

**296 CA 10-01693**  PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, CARNI, SCONIERS, AND GREEN, JJ.

JOANN RIPKA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V ORDER
ROBBIE RIPKA, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

HANCOCK & ESTABROOK, LLP, SYRACUSE (ALAN J. PIERCE OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.
MACHT, BRENIZER & GINGOLD, P.C., SYRACUSE (JON W. BRENIZER OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

Appeal from an amended judgment of the Supreme Court, Oswego County (James W. McCarthy, A.J.), entered October 26, 2009 in a divorce action. The amended judgment amended the equitable distribution of the marital assets of the parties.
It is hereby ORDERED that the amended judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Entered: March 25, 2011 Patricia L. Morgan Clerk of the Court
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR . R.

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-31038

Summary Calendar

 

DAVID WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

GLOBAL MOVIBLE OFFSHORE, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 95-CV-1689-D

- - - - - - - - - -

July 17, 1997

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

David Williams appeals the district court’s denial of his

motion for a continuance made on the day of trial, award of

damages, and assessment of 10% fault against Williams.

We review the district court’s denial of a motion to

continue trial for abuse of discretion, and will reverse the

district court only if its ruling was arbitrary and clearly

unreasonable. Dorsey v. Scott Wetzel Services, Inc., 84 F.3d
No. 96-31038

- 2 -

170, 171 (5th Cir. 1996); Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Avenell,

66 F.3d 715, 721 (5th Cir. 1995). The medical testimony of the

various doctors was not so unclear as to Williams’ diagnosis and

prognosis that the district court abused its discretion in

denying the continuance for want of additional evidence.

We review the district court’s award of damages and

assessment of 10% comparative fault against Williams for clear

error. Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 82 F.3d 615, 620 (5th Cir.

1996); Avondale Industries, Inc. v. International Marine

Carriers, Inc., 15 F.3d 489, 492 (5th Cir. 1994). Clear error

exists when, “the reviewing court upon examination of the entire

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a

mistake has been committed.” Justiss Oil Co. v. Kerr-McGee

Refining Corp. 75 F.3d 1057, 1062 (5th Cir. 1996). 

The evidence indicates that Williams was improved five

months following the accident, that he suffered from low grade

reflex sympathetic dystrophy, and that he should recover fully

within a reasonable amount of time. The district court’s award

of two years of lost wages and $25,000 in general damages was not

clear error.

The district court did not commit clear error in

apportioning 10% fault to Williams for not positioning himself in

such a way to better alert him to the one ton basket’s movement,

a risk known to him. Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107

F.3d 331, 338-39 (5th Cir. 1997).
No. 96-31038

- 3 -

AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

PDM/Research

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MATTHEW LOUIS JOHNSON,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

DARR, Correctional Officer,

 Defendant - Appellee.

No. 09-55490

D.C. No. 3:08-cv-00080-DMSPOR

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Dana M. Sabraw, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 16, 2010**

Before: FERNANDEZ, GOULD, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Matthew Louis Johnson, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the

district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to

FILED

MAR 03 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
PDM/Research 2 09-55490

exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review

de novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust, and review for clear

error its factual determinations. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir.

2003). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

The district court properly dismissed the action because Johnson did not

complete the prison grievance process prior to filing suit. See Woodford v. Ngo,

548 U.S. 81, 93-95 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is

mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules). However,

we vacate the judgment and remand for the limited purpose of entering dismissal

without prejudice. See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 (providing that dismissals for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies are without prejudice). 

Johnson’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

Contrary to appellee’s contention, the district court did not abuse its

discretion by concluding Johnson’s action was not frivolous. See Denton v.

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (reviewing for abuse of discretion

frivolousness determinations under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)).

Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.
§ 20.1409 Rule 1409. Finality and appeal. ( a ) A decision on a motion filed by a party or initiated by the Board pursuant to this subpart will be stamped with the date of mailing on the face of the decision, and is final on such date. The party and his or her representative, if any, will be provided with copies of the decision.
( b ) For purposes of this section, a dismissal without prejudice under Rule 1404(a)(§ 20.1404(a) of this part), Rule 1404(b)(§ 20.1404(b)), or Rule 1404(f)(§ 20.1404(f)), or a referral under Rule 1405, paragraph (d) (§ 20.1405(d) of this part) is not a final decision of the Board.
( c ) Once there is a final decision on a motion under this subpart relating to a prior Board decision on an issue, that prior Board decision on that issue is no longer subject to revision on the grounds of clear and unmistakable error. Subsequent motions relating to that prior Board decision on that issue shall be dismissed with prejudice.
( d ) Chapter 72 of title 38, United States Code (relating to judicial review), applies with respect to final decisions on motions filed by a party or initiated by the Board pursuant to this subpart.
(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 501(a); Pub. L. 105-111)
[64 FR 2139, Jan. 13, 1999, as amended at 66 FR 35903, July 10, 2001; 84 FR 193, Jan. 18, 2019]
Exhibit 10(b)




	CONSENT OF SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP




	We hereby consent to the reference to our firm included in
      the prospectus and statement of additional information of Merrill Lynch
      Equity Dividend Fund filed as part of Post-Effective Amendment No. 21 to
      the Registration Statement (File No. 33-14517) and to the use of our opinion
      of counsel, incorporated by reference to Exhibit 10(b) to Post-Effective
      Amendment No. 20 to the Registration Statement on Form N-1A (File No. 33-14517).





	 	/s/ Shearman & Sterling LLP
      

    
	 	 Shearman & Sterling LLP




	New York, New York  

      November 24, 2003
#### Rudolph Hanke, Respondent, *v.*Cigar Makers International Union of America, Local Union, No. 10, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term,

May, 1899.)

Action against unincorporated association — How brought — Service.

Where an action to recover a death benefit of an unincorporated association is not brought against all of its members, it must, under section 1919 of the Code of Civil Procedure, be brought against the president or treasurer.

In no event can it be brought against the association as a corporation, nor is service of the summons upon the secretary sufficient.

Appeal-from a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, in the Second District Municipal Court, borough of Manhattan.

August P. Wagener, for appellant.

Otto Kempner, for respondent.

Freedman, P. J.

This action was brought to recover the sum of $200, claimed by the plaintiff to be due him, from the defendant as a death benefit accruing by reason of the death of the plaintiff’s wife, while a member of the defendant association. The pleadings were' oral. Tfye defendant offered no testimony upon the trial, and at the close of the plaintiff’s case made a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground, among others, that the defendant having been shown to be a voluntary unincorporated association, the action should have been brought against the president or treasurer thereof, as required by section 1919 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The motion was denied. The fact being as stated, and it having been further shown that the association had a president and treas-. urer, the objection was well taken, as long as the action was not instituted against all the members of the association, under section ,1923 of the Code. In no event was the action well brought against the association as a corporation, nor was service of the summons upon the secretary sufficient. It is not necessary to discuss the other'.point raised on the appeal.

The judgment should be reversed, with costs to appellant.

MacLeaw and Levewtritt, JJ., concur.

Judgment reversed, with costs to appellant.
I 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2430 

To amend the Department of Education Organization Act and the Carl 

D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Act of 2006 to redesignate 

the Office of Vocational and Adult Education. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 22, 2007 

Mr. CASTLE (for himself and Mr. MCKEON) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Education and Labor 

A BILL 

To amend the Department of Education Organization Act 

and the Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education 

Act of 2006 to redesignate the Office of Vocational and 

Adult Education. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. REDESIGNATION OF THE OFFICE OF VOCA4 TIONAL AND ADULT EDUCATION. 

5 (a) AMENDMENTS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF EDU6 CATION ORGANIZATION ACT.—The Department of Edu7 cation Organization Act (20 U.S.C. 3401 et seq.) is 

8 amended— 

mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with BILLS

2 

•HR 2430 IH

1 (1) in the table of contents in section 1, by 

2 amending the item relating to section 206 to read as 

3 follows: 

‘‘Sec. 206. Office of Career, Technical, and Adult Education.’’; 

4 (2) in section 202 (20 U.S.C. 3412)— 

5 (A) in subsection (b)(1)(C), by striking 

6 ‘‘Vocational and Adult Education’’ and insert7 ing ‘‘Career, Technical, and Adult Education’’; 

8 and 

9 (B) in subsection (h), by striking ‘‘Voca10 tional and Adult Education’’ both places it ap11 pears and inserting ‘‘Career, Technical, and 

12 Adult Education’’; 

13 (3) in section 206 (20 U.S.C. 3416)— 

14 (A) in the section heading, by striking 

15 ‘‘VOCATIONAL AND ADULT EDUCATION’’ and in16 serting ‘‘CAREER, TECHNICAL, AND ADULT

17 EDUCATION’’; 

18 (B) by striking ‘‘Vocational and Adult 

19 Education’’ both places it appears and inserting 

20 ‘‘Career, Technical, and Adult Education’’; and 

21 (C) by striking ‘‘vocational and adult edu22 cation’’ both places it appears and inserting 

23 ‘‘career, technical, and adult education’’; 

mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with BILLS

3 

•HR 2430 IH

1 (4) in section 212(d)(6) (20 U.S.C. 3423a), by 

2 striking ‘‘vocational education’’ and inserting ‘‘ca3 reer and technical education’’; and 

4 (5) in section 217(e) (20 U.S.C. 3424), by 

5 striking ‘‘vocational education’’ both places it ap6 pears and inserting ‘‘career and technical edu7 cation’’. 

8 (b) AMENDMENT TO THE CARL D. PERKINS CAREER

9 AND TECHNICAL EDUCATION ACT OF 2006.—Section 

10 114(b)(1) of the Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical 

11 Education Act of 2006 (20 U.S.C. 2324(b)(1)) is amended 

12 by striking ‘‘Vocational and Adult Education’’ and insert13 ing ‘‘Career, Technical, and Adult Education’’. 

Æ 

mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with BILLS
#### Commonwealth v. Bixler

*David R. Eaby,*for petitioner.

*A. E. McCollough,*contra.

November 18, 1955.

Wissler, P. J., Burkholder, J.,

This matter is before the court upon petition of *370Leon. H. Bixler for review in accordance with the Act of June 3, 1953, P. L. 270, sec. 1, 34 PS §1311.315, paragraph 6, of an order of the Pennsylvania Game Commission dated July 8, 1955, denying him the right to hunt or trap within this Commonwealth, with or without a license, for a period of one year, beginning 9-1-55 and ending 8-31-56, and that he be required to furnish satisfactory proof to the commission that all required bills have been satisfactorily adjusted before such license shall be restored.

On August 26, 1955, this court fixed October 7, 1955, at 2:30 p.m., in courtroom no. 1, as the time and place of hearing on the petition, and a hearing was duly held that day.

By section 1311.315, paragraph 6, a hearing on a petition for review of such revocation is heard de novo by a judge or judges of the court without a jury. It therefore becomes the duty of the court to determine anew from the testimony taken whether petitioner should be denied the right to hunt or trap within this Commonwealth, with or without a license, for a period of one year, and be required to furnish satisfactory proof to the commission that all required bills have been satisfactorily adjusted before such license shall be restored. It should be noted that the power conferred upon the commission to revoke any hunter’s license is an administrative and not a judicial function: Bureau of Highway Safety v. Wright, 355 Pa. 307. According to the evidence there were four hunters in the party of Russell Unger Neff who was shot and three hunters in the party of Leon H. Bixler, petitioner. All of them, as well as the two representatives of the game commission who investigated the case, testified. Their testimony in some respects was conflicting and in many instances was not clear. Nevertheless, considering all of it, the court finds as a fact that Russell Unger Neff was injured by the discharge *371of a firearm on October 30, 1954, in East Cocalico Township, Lancaster County, fired by Leon H. Bixler, petitioner, in a careless and negligent manner, while engaged in hunting, and that the payment of hospital and medical services required by Russell Unger Neff have not been satisfactorily adjusted.

Considering all the evidence on this appeal and all the circumstances, the court feels that the Pennsylvania Game Commission was justified in revoking petitioner’s hunting license for a period of one year, and requiring him to furnish satisfactory proof to the commission that all required bills have been satisfactorily adjusted before such license shall be restored.

And now, November 18, 1955, the petition of Leon H. Bixler for an appeal from revocation of his hunting license is dismissed.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Alpharma Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10Q/A for the period ending September, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), each of the undersigned, in the capacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1)	The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)	The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



Dated:   May 5, 2005

/s/ Ingrid Wiik
Ingrid Wiik
President and Chief Executive Officer

Dated:  May 5, 2005

/s/ Matthew Farrell
Matthew Farrell 
 Chief Financial Officer
#### William Strom, Appellant, *v.*Herbert Dongan, Respondent.

Appeal from a judgment in favor of defendant, rendered in the Municipal Court of the city of New York, tenth district, borough of Manhattan.

Butler, Notman, Joline & Mynderse, for appellant.

Rose & Putzel, for respondent.

*Per Curiam.*

We think that the proper construction of the written contract between the parties called for the filing with the building department of plans which were reasonably free from objection and acceptable to the department. It will be observed that the plaintiff was bound by the very terms of the contract to obtain from the department a permit for the construction of the building. This, it is apparent, he could not do, unless the plans for construction were acceptable; so that there is internal evidence, within the four corners of the written agreement, which, disregarding the oral evidence that was admitted upon the subject, supports the construction which the court below has adopted.

As the plaintiff has not as yet complied with the condition, as we construe the agreement, upon which his right to the first installment of Ms compensation depends, it follows that the judgment dismissing his complaint must be affirmed.

Present: Beekmar, P. J., Giegeeioh and O’Goemar, JJ.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.
null

325.42294
### THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13

- 15

- 00299

- CR

Kristin Nichole Bowling

v. The State of Texas

On Appeal from the 105th District Court of Kleberg County , Texas Trial Cause No. 14

- AC

- 0465

JUDGMENT THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered th is cause on appeal, concludes the appeal should be dismissed as moot

. The Court orders the appeal DISMISSED AS MOOT in accordance with its opinion

. We further order this decision certified below for observance. September 1 7 , 2015
I 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2253 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to reduce the rate of the 

tentative minimum tax for noncorporate taxpayers to 24 percent. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 9, 2007 

Mr. ROYCE (for himself and Mr. CANTOR) introduced the following bill; which 

was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to reduce 

the rate of the tentative minimum tax for noncorporate 

taxpayers to 24 percent. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘AMT Rate Reduction 

5 Act of 2007’’. 

6 SEC. 2. REDUCTION IN RATE OF TENTATIVE MINIMUM TAX 

7 FOR NONCORPORATE TAXPAYERS. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—Clause (i) of section 55(b)(1)(A) 

9 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to noncor10 porate taxpayers) is amended to read as follows: 


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2 

HR 2253 IH

1 ‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—In the case of a 

2 taxpayer other than a corporation, the ten3 tative minimum tax for the taxable year 

4 is— 

5 ‘‘(I) 24 percent of the taxable ex6 cess, reduced by 

7 ‘‘(II) the alternative minimum 

8 tax foreign tax credit for the taxable 

9 year.’’. 

10 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Subparagraph (A) 

11 of section 55(b)(1) of such Code is amended by striking 

12 clause (iii). 

13 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

14 this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after 

15 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


pwalker on PROD1PC71 with BILLS
Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U. S. C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Sentex Sensing Technology, Inc., (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending February 28, 2006 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
William R. Sprow, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U. S. C. (S) 1350, as adopted pursuant to (S) 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that:

      1)    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      2)    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.


/s/ William R. Sprow
-----------------------
William R. Sprow
Chief Financial Officer
April 21, 2006
§ 47.2 Reporting to State Licensing Boards. It is the policy of VA to report to State Licensing Boards any currently employed licensed health care professional or separated licensed health care professional whose clinical practice during VA employment so significantly failed to meet generally accepted standards of clinical practice as to raise reasonable concern for the safety of patients. The following are examples of actions that meet the criteria for reporting: ( a ) Significant deficiencies in clinical practice such as lack of diagnostic or treatment capability; errors in transcribing, administering or documenting medication; inability to perform clinical procedures considered basic to the performance of one's occupation; performing procedures not included in one's clinical privileges in other than emergency situations;
( b ) Patient neglect or abandonment;
( c ) Mental health impairment sufficient to cause the individual to behave inappropriately in the patient care environment;
( d ) Physical health impairment sufficient to cause the individual to provide unsafe patient care;
( e ) Substance abuse when it affects the individual's ability to perform appropriately as a health care provider or in the patient care environment;
( f ) Falsification of credentials;
( g ) Falsification of medical records or prescriptions;
( h ) Theft of drugs;
( i ) Inappropriate dispensing of drugs;
( j ) Unethical behavior or moral turpitude;
( k ) Mental, physical, sexual, or verbal abuse of a patient (examples of patient abuse include intentional omission of care, willful violation of a patient's privacy, willful physical injury, intimidation, harassment, or ridicule); and
( l ) Violation of research ethics.
(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 501; 7401-7405; Section 204(b) of Pub. L. 99-166, 99 Stat. 952-953; Pub. L. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3743)
[63 FR 23665, Apr. 30, 1998]