### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON O ct obe r 21, 200 8 S es sio n
HAR RY W. LOF TON v. N ELD A JOA N L OFT ON

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court forShelb y County No. CT-007083-03 Jam es F. Russell, Judge

No. W2007-01733-C OA-R3-C V - Filed Dec ember 30, 2008

This is a divorce c ase te rminating a 40 y ear marria g e. Husband/Appe llant appea ls the trial court’s d i v i s i o no f

m ar i t a l p r o p e r t y , aw ar d o f a l i m o n y in f

utu ro , a nd awa rd of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s to Wife/Appellee. In addition, Husband/Appellant c ontends that t he trial c ourt err ed in g ranting Wife/Appellee’ s motions t o re- open proof , and in d e ny

in g H u s b a n d /A p p e ll a nt’ s mo tion f

or summary judgme nt. We affirm a s modified here in.

Tenn. R. App . P. 3; Judgment of the C ircuit Court A ffirm ed

J. S TE VE N S TA FF O RD , J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D A VI D R. F ARMER , J., and H OL LY M. K I RBY , J., joined.

C. Suzanne La nders, Me mphis, TN, for Appe llant Vicki J. Singh, Memphis, TN, for Appellant Marga ret A. Reid, Me mphis, TN, for Appe llant William M. Monroe, Memphis, TN, for Appellee

OP IN ION Appellant Ha

rry W. L ofton and Appe llee Nelda J oan L ofton wer e marrie d on November 20, 19 64 . T wo c hil dr e n we re bo rn to the marr ia g e ; on e of the c hil dr e n die d in 19 93 , and the oth e r c hil d i s n o w a nadu l t

. T h e p a r t i e s s ep ar at edo no r ab o u tDe ce mb er 1 5 , 2 0 0 3

. M s

. L o ft o nh as a h i gh school educ ation, and wa s 59 y ear s old at the time of the orig inal hear ing in this ca se. Mr. L ofton has two y ear s of colleg e educa tion a nd was 60 y ear s old at the time of the he aring . Mr. L ofton is the
ow ne r o f a

Natio nw ide ins ur anc e a g e nc y and ha s bee n in the ins ur anc e bu sin e ss f or ov e r 2 5 y e a rs

. Ms. L of ton is a lic e ns e d ins ur anc e a g e nt, bu t sh e ha s n ot w or ke d o uts ide the ho me fo r o ve r 1 6 y e a rs

. On or a bout Dece mber 19, 2003, Mr. L ofton filed a complaint for divorc e ag ainst Ms. L ofton alleg ing g rounds of inappr opriate ma rital conduc t and i rr ec o n ci lable diffe renc es. The c ase w asA l t ho ug h bo t h part i es s ub m i t t ed propo s ed order s i n t hi s c as e, f r om t he r ecor d, i t appear s t hat t he part i es 1 ul t i m at el y cou l d no t agr ee on t he l angu age of t he f i nal order of di vo r ce. -2- assig ned to Division I X of the C ircuit Court at S helby County

. On J anuar y 9, 2004, Ms. L ofton filed her a nswer a nd counter -complaint for divorce , citing gr ounds of inappropr iate mar ital conduct and irrec oncilable diff

ere nces. In her c ounter-c omplaint, Ms. L ofton asser ts, in p ertinent pa

rt, that “[m] any of the mar ital assets are liquid assets and are subject to being hidden or spent. F urther, [Mr. L ofton] is able and capa

ble of hiding and conver

ting the marital proper

ty thus de pri v i n g [ t h e trial court] of its lawful jurisdiction over said a ssets.” On F ebrua ry 17, 2004, Mr. L ofton answe red the counter -complaint for

divorce , admitting inappr opriate ma rital conduc t on his part. I n his answer , Mr . L of ton do e s n ot d e ny

Ms. L of ton ’s a lle g a tio n c on cern ing the mari ta l a sse ts. F oll ow ingMs. L ofton’s substituti on of counse l, a conse nt order on pe nd e ntelit e support was filed on May 13, 2004,
w h er ei n M r. L o ft o n wa s o rd er ed t o p ay $ 2 , 0 0 0

. 0 0 p er m o n t h as t em p o ra ry s p o u s al s u p p o r t

. In
a dd iti on , M r. L of

ton wa s o rd e re d to pa

y the mor tg a g e and uti lit ie s o n th e mari ta l ho me a nd to maintain Ms. L ofton’s hea lthcare insurance

. The matter

was re fer red f or mediation, and the trial was sc heduled f or Fe b ru ar y 2 1 , 2005. Ultimately , the mediation did not tak e place and the matter was tra nsfer red to Division I Iof the circ uit court for tria l.

The in it ia l h e ar in g in th e c a s e w a s h e ld o n F e b r u ar y 2 1 thr o u g h F e b r

u ar y 2 3 , 2 0 0 5 . The parties we re instruc ted to return to c ourt on Marc h 3 , 2 0 0 5 fo r t h e ruling. On that da y , the cour

t
e xpre sse d c on c e rn

tha t Mr . L of ton wa s r e c e ivi nginc ome fr om t he sa le of se c ur iti e s in

a dd iti on to the income f

rom his insurance business and sug g ested that the proof be re- opened. Ms. L ofton then
ma de an o ra l mo tio n to re op e n th e pr oo f, wh ic h mo tio n w a s g ra nte d b y or de r o f A

pr il 8 , 2 00 5. Th is order was lat e r

v a c a te d b y c o n s e n t o r d e r

o f A p r il 1 9 , 2 0 0 5

. O nA p r il 2 2 , 2 0 0 5 , th e tr ia l c ourt
announce d its ruling; howeve r, no final or der on the divorce was e ntere d at that time. 1

On J une 16, 2005, Ms. L ofton fil ed a s ec o n d motion to re-open the pr oof. Ms. L ofton’s mot ion w a s p r e m i s e d

o nt h e f a c tt h a tM r

. L o f

t o nh a d p u r c h a s e d

a h o u s e v a l u e d

a ta p p r oxima te ly $400,000.00 (the “ Woodbrook Circle House” ), pay ing $40,000.00 dow n. I n support of her motion, Ms. L ofton argued that, beca use no final decr ee of divorce had bee n enter ed, the house purcha sed by Mr. L ofton was a m ar i t al asset. More over, Ms. L ofton soug ht a hea ring on the source of the down- p ay me n t m a d e b y

M r

. L o f to n , an d th e in c o me n e c e s s ar

y to s u p p o rt t h e p u r c h a s e

. T h e tr ia l
co u rt gra n t edM s

. L o ft o n ’s m o t i o n t o re -o p en p ro o f b y o rd er o f J u l y 2 8 , 2 0 0 5

. P ri o r t o t h e h ea ri n g, the par ties stipulated to t h e ad m i s s ion of the settlement stateme nt, loan application, commitment letter, a nd the down-pa

y ment chec k that wer e ex ecute d in relation to Mr. L ofton’s purchase of the Woodbrook Circle House. On June 6, 2006, the trial court enter ed an “O rder Nar rowing Scope of Proof,” whi ch p u rp o rts to limi t the scope of the proof to the “ issue of the mea ns by which [Mr. L ofton] purchased [the Woodbrook Circle House ].”

On J anuar

y 26, 2007, Mr. L ofton filed a motion for (partial) summar y judgme nt reg arding the purc hase of

the Woodbrook Circle House. On M arc h 9, 2007, the court hear d arguments on the-3-

motion for summary

ju d gm en t and by

order of April 10, 2007 denie d the motion. A subsequent motion to rehear

and a motion for a

Tenn. R. App. P. 9 interlocutory appea l were also denied.
On May 8, 9, and 10, 2007, limit ed proof was heard. The trial court a nnounced its ruling on May 10, 2007. The F inal Dec ree of Divorc e wa s entere d on J uly 5, 2007. The Fi n al Dec ree incorpora tes, by ref ere nce, the trial court’ s April 22, 2005 and May 10, 2007 finding s, which we re made f rom the benc h.

Mr . L of ton a pp e a ls a nd ra ise s se ve ra l iss ue s fo r re vie w. We re state tho se iss ue s a s f oll ow s:

I . The trial court err ed in g ranting Wife’s motions to re- open proof

. I I . T he tr ial c ourt

de mon str a te d b ia s to wa

rd Hu sb and a mou nti ngto
reve rsible er

ror. I I I . I f t he tr ia l c ourt di d no t err in re -o pe nin g pr oo f, the n it e rr e d in failing to enforc e the na rrowingorder an d / o r in failing to gr ant Hu sb and ’s mot ion

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. I V. The tria l court er

red in its classifica t i o n and distribution of
m ar i t a l p r o p e rt y. V. The tria l court abuse d its discretion in the amount of the alimony in f utu ro awa rded to Wife. VI

.. The trial court abused i ts discretion in awarding Wife attorney ’s fee s in the amount of $55,106.

Be cause this case wa s tried by the cour t sitt ing w ithout a jury , we revie w the ca se de novo up on the re c or d w itha

pr e su mpt ion

of c or re c tne ss o f t

he fi nd ing s o f f

a c t by the tr ia l c ourt . U nle ss the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst the finding s, we must aff irm, absent er

ror of law. See Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) . F ur

the rm or e , w he n the re so lut ion of the iss ue s in a c a se de pe nd s u

po n th e tr uth fu lne ss of witnesses, the trial judg e who ha s the opportunity to observe the witnesses and the ir manner and demea nor while testifying is in a f ar be tter position than this C ourt to decide those issues. See Mc Cal e b v . Sa turn Cor

p ., 91 0 S. W.2 d 4 12 , 4 15 (T e nn .1 99 5) ; Whit aker v. Whi taker , 957 S.W .2d 834, 837 (Tenn. Ct. App.1997). T he we ight, f aith, and cr edit to be g iven to any witness' testimony lies in the first instance w ith the trier of f act, a nd the cr edibility

acc orded w ill be give n g reat weig ht by the appe llate cour

t. See id. ; se eals o W

alt on v . Young , 950 S.W .2d 956, 959 (Tenn.1997)

.
F irst Mot ion to Re-open P roof

The trial court g rante d two motions to re- open proof in this case

. The first motion to re-open pr oo f w a s ma de by

Ms. L oft on a t th e Marc h 3 , 2 00 5 h e ari ng . B e c a us e the tr ia l c ourt

ult imate ly
vacated its d ec i s ion to re-ope n proof r eg ardingMr. L ofton’s sec urities license, Mr . L ofton’s objectio n s ee m s to stem from the trial cour t’s alleg ed bias towa

rd him rather

than from the r eopening of the proof

. There fore , we will discuss the alleg ed bias be fore continuing with our review of the sec ond motion to re-open pr oof.-4- Bias

I t is undisput ed that no motion for re cusal wa s filed by Mr. L ofton in this case. We have previously held that motions to rec use “must be filed promptly afte r the fa cts forming the basis for the motion become known

... and the fa ilure to seek r ecusa l in a timely manner results in a wa iver of a p ar t y 's ri g ht to question a judge ' s impartiality .” Davis v. State De pt. of Em ploym ent Sec. , 23 S.W .3d 304, 313 (Tenn. Ct. App.1999) (citations omitted). Be cause Mr. L ofton did not file a motion fo r re cu s al , we wo u l d u s u al l y h o l d t h at h e ha s wa i v ed s u ch ri gh t i n co n j u n ct i o n wi t h t h e h e ar i n gs befor e the trial court. Howeve r, even in the absenc e of a motion to rec use, if the appar ent bias of a trial c ou rt i s s u fficiently eg reg ious, then it may , nonetheless, r equire su a s po nterec usal or, at least, trans fer

to another judg e upon re mand. I n Radebaugh v. Radebaugh , No. M 2 0 0 5 -0 2727-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL3044155 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2006), this Court d et er m i n edt h at t h e j u d ge's co m m en t s we re s u ff i ci en t l y b i as ed t o wa rr an t t ra n s fe r t o an o t h er j u d ge on rema nd. I n Radebaugh , we rec og nized that lit iga nts are e ntitled to the “cold neutra lity of an impartial court” and have a rig ht to have their c ases he ard by fair a nd impa rt ial judge s. Kin ard v. Kina rd , 9 8 6 S

. W

. 2 d

2 2 0 , 2 2 7 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Leighton v. Henderson , 414 S.W .2d 419, 421 (1967)) . To that end, a judge should recuse himself or her self if ther e is any doubt reg arding the judg e' s ability

to preside impar

tially , or if the judg e' s impartiality can r easona

bly be questioned. S ee S t a te v. H ines , 9 1 9 S. W. 2 d

5 7 3 , 5 7 8 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 5 )

. U n d e r Ca n o n3 o f th e Co d e o f

Ju d ic ia l Conduct, a judge is r equire d to r ecuse himself or herse lf when “the judge has a p er s o n al b i as or pr e jud ic e c on c e rn ing a pa

rt y or a pa rt y ' s la wy e r, or pe rs on a l kn ow le dg e of

dis pu te d e vid e nti ary

fa c ts
conce rning the proc eeding .” Te nn. R. Sup. C t. 10, Canon 3(E)( 1)(a ). However, not a ll bias and/or prejudice constitutes g rounds for rec usal and/or rehe aring

. As discussed by this Court in Caudi ll v. Foley , 21 S.W .3d 203, 215 (Tenn. Ct. App.1999):

Bia s and pre

judice ar e only

i m p ro per w hen they

are persona l. A fee ling of ill will or, conver sely , favor itism toward one of the pa rties to a sui t a

r e w h a t c o n s ti tute d is qu a li f y in g b ia s o r

p r e ju d ic e

. F or example, where a judge stated that he “could not sta nd” a cer tain law
e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e r a nd wou ld no t a c c e pt c a se s in iti a te d b y him , it
was found that his personal fe eling s and intense dislike of the of fice r wer e improper. Howeve r, neither bias nor pre

judice re fer

to the
a tti tud e tha

t a jud g e may

ho ld a bo ut t he su bje c t matte r o f a

laws uit

. That a judg e has a g ener al opinion about a leg al or socia l matter that
re l at es t o t h e c as e b ef

o re h i m o r h er

d o es n o td i s qu al i fy

t h e j u d ge f r o m p r e s i d i n g o v e r

t h e c a s e

. D e s p i t e e ar l i e r f i c t i o n s t o t h e c o n t r ar

y, it is now understood that judges a re not without opinions when they hear and dec ide ca ses. J udg es do have v al u es , which ca nnot be mag ically shed whe n they

take the be nch. The fac t that a judg e may have pu bli c ly e xpre sse d v ie ws a

bo ut a pa rt ic ula r m a tte r p ri or

to i ts arising in court should not automatically amount to the sort of bias or pr e jud ic e that r e qu ir e s r e c us a l.A t t he M ar ch 3, 200 5 he ar i ng, t he t r i al c our t s pec i f i ca l l y s ugges t ed t hat “ t he pr oof c oul d be r eope ned and 2
fur t her t r i al pr oce edi ngs he l d. Fol l ow i ng t hi s s t at em ent , c ou n sel f or M s

. Lof t on m ade a n or al m ot i on t o r eope n t he pr oof , w hi ch m ot i on w as gr ant ed.
-5- Id . at 215 (c iting Jeffre y M. Shaman et al., Judicial Conduct and Ethics § 4

. 04, at 101-02 (2d ed.1995) ( footnotes omitted).

Mr. L ofton asser

ts that the trial court “ appar ently misjudged H usband ea

rly in the divorce pr oc e e din g s, ann ounci ngits dis tr us t of Hu sb a nd , a nd re ite rate d th e se c re dib ili ty ‘c on c e rn s’ repe atedly throug hout the s ubsequent li tigation.” Specifica lly , Mr. L ofton cites t he March 3, 2005 hear ing a s proof of the trial court’s alleg ed prejudice toward hi m. The trial court conve ned on Mar ch 3, 20 05 purp or

te dly to a nn ounc e its ru lin g ; ho we ve r, on tha t da te , th e c ourt

a sk e d th e pa

rt ie s’ attorney s into chambers a nd reve al ed t h at his courtroom c lerk ha d asked f or, and be en g iven, Mr. L ofton’s business car d afte r the Fe bruar y trial. The court expressed conc ern that the business car d stated “se curities off

ered ,” and that this t erm “ raised a very red f lag ...beca use it signa led the possibili ty that this is y et another business enter prise out the re that was not mentioned in the proof of this case .” Mr. L ofton contends that, rathe r than sug g esting a re- opening of proof , the trial cour

t should ha v e “t aken judicia l notice that the selling of ca sh value life insura nce policie s were investable a ssets and re quired a Series 6 license.” We note t hat t he trial c ourt specif ically stated 2 its reason for

bring ing up the business car d:

The J udicial Code of Ethics r equire s trial judge s to make disclosures about any

thing that mig ht, in any stretch of

the im agi n at i on, be int e rp re te d a s a ff

e c tin g the jud g e ’s a

bil ity to b e fa ir and imp art ia l.

Ho we ve r, the tr ia l c ourt

str e sse d th a t th e bu sin e ss c ard inc ide nt w ou ld h a ve no be ari ng on its a bil ity to be impartial in the ca se:

Ihave e x plained to t he lawy ers and am now explaining t o the par ties that th is d e ve lop me nt d oe s n ot i n a ny wa y a ff e c t my a bil ity to be fa ir and impartial in y our ca se. Following this statement, the trial court a sked the attorney s “whe ther or not...we have a ny problem that we ne ed to visit about further.” Neither party soug ht furth er d i s cu s s i o n on the business ca rd matter. F rom the t rial court’s comments and actions, we find nothing on which to ba se a f inding of bias toward Mr

. L o fton. I n fac t, due to the ultimate decision not to take fur ther proof

on Mr. L ofton’s sec urities license, w e ca nnot conclude that Mr. L ofton was ha rmed in any

way from the tria l
c ourt ’ s d i s c l o s u r e t h a t i t h a d s e e n t h e b u s i n e s s c ar d

. W h e n an n o u n c i n g i t s r u l i n g t h e c o u rta g a in stated: Note this and n o t e this well. The f indings of f

act whic h are made today will include no ref

ere nce to infor

mation on business cards or any information from tele phone dire ctories. No issue is de cided based upon a

ny such fa cts. Those fa cts merely formed the basis of-6- the motion to reopen the pr oof and w ere t h e b as i s upon which the Court gr anted that motion and nothing more.

Fr om our revie w of the f

ull recor d, we c onclude that the tr ial court wa s g ood to its word.

At the Fe bruar

y 2005 hear ing, Ms. L ofton’s expert Will iam Vanc e, a f orensic CPA, indicate d that Mr . L of

ton mig ht b e us inghis a sso c ia tio n wi th his da ug hte r, Ms. L of

ton -We lle s to hid e bu sin e ss a sse ts. Al tho ug h M r. Va nc e c on c e de d th a t he c ou ld f ind no e mpi ri c a l e vid e nce to c on c lus ive ly support his suspicions (in part, beca use he w as denied acc ess t o the“books and rec ords of the L oftonWelle s Age n cy ”), he testified that there wer e “oddities” in the acc ounting pr actice s of the L ofton I nsura n ce Agenc y , and that ther e wa s “ce rtainly the ability

to manipulate income.” Mr. Vanc e’s t es t i m ony g ave the trial court y et another rea son to suspect that Mr. L ofton was be ing le ss than honest with the court–“ The Court shar es the suspicions expressed by the witness Wil liam Vance as to the appar ent...less than ar ms leng th...nature of

the business relationship between the L oftonWelles Ag ency

and the Har

ry L ofton Ag ency .” We have revie wed the e ntire re cord in this case and conclude that the trial cour t’s suspicions conce rning Mr. L ofton’ s in c o me a n d b u s ine ss dealing s were well founde d. The fa ct that the trial c ourt expressed conc ern a rising f rom the evide nce doe s not, by itself, lead us to conc lude t hat t he trial court held such personal bias toward Mr . L ofton as to war rant
rec usal. At the clo s e o f all proof , the trial cour

t specifica lly

stated that “H arr

y L ofton has bee n dece itful with his wife, he has been dece itful with the Court, and it would appea r he ha s even be en dece itful with his own attor n ey s

. ” While the court’s state ment g oes to Mr. L ofton’s per sonal activities, in light of the r ecor d as a w hole, we be lieve that the trial cour t’s assessment of Mr . L ofton has a r easona

ble basis. The f

act that the c ourt points out Mr. L ofton’s deceit, howeve r, g oes more to the iss u e o f h i s cr edibi lity as a w itness rather

than any persona l bias toward Mr. L ofton. Throug hout the entire proce eding s, the trial cour t was simply

seekingto discern the sa lient fac ts from the c on fl ic tin g te sti mony , a ta sk ma de mor e dif

fi c ult by Mr . L of ton ’s la c k of

c and or . F ro m th e fu ll
rec ord, we cannot c onclude that e ither the proc eeding s befor e the tria l court, or the c omments made by Judg e Rus se ll, de mon str a te su c h e g re g iou s bia s to wa rd Mr . L of ton a s to wa rr ant a re -t ri a l of thi s case

. Second Motion to Re- open proof

Al tho ug h M r. L of

ton imp lie s th a t the de lay in e ntr y of a fi na l or de r o f d ivo rc e wa s th e fa ult of the tr ia l c ourt

–“ [f]o llo wi ngthe or a l r

uli ngof the Court on Ap ri l 22 , 2 00 5 th e Court a pp e a re d to have dugin its proverbial hee ls rather than proc eed to f

inalize the d i v o rc e”

– t he re cord doe s not support this alleg ation. Rather, it appear s that the delay in the entry

of an or der in this case was due to the parties’ inability

to ag ree upon the wo rd i n g of that orde r. Howe ver, the re is nothing in the
rec ord fr om which to conclude that either pa rty was e ng agi n g i n a tactica l decision to postpone adjudication of the case . Reg ardle ss of the re ason for the delay , it is undisputed that, following the trial court’ s announce ment of its ruling in Apr il 2005 ( b u t p ri o r t o entry of the fina l order) , Mr. L of ton pr oc e e de d to purc ha se the Woo db ro ok Cir c le Hous e. B a se d o n th e e vid e nc e ini tia lly prese nted, this purcha s e with its corresponding$40,000.00 down pay ment raised c oncer

ns about Mr. L of ton ’s purp or

te d f ina nc ia l c on dit ion . B e c a

us e of thi s c on c e rn , M s. L of

ton m ov ed th e court

to-7-

reope n the proof, w hich motion was gra n t ed

. M r. L ofton asser ts that allowing the proof to be r eopened w as an e rror

. As stated by our Supreme Cour t i n Sim pson v. Fron tier Com m uni ty Credit Union , 810 S.W .2d 147 (Tenn.1991) :

Permitting additi onal proof, after a par ty has announc ed that pr oo f i s c los e d, is w ith in the dis c re tio n of the tr ia l c ourt , a nd un le ss it a pp e ars that it s a c tio n in

that r e g ard has permitte d in jus tic e , it s exercise of

discretion will not be disturbed on appe al...

I t is withi n the discre tion of t he trial judge to de cide whe ther to reope n the proof f

or further evidence, and t he decision of the trial judge there on will not be set aside unless ther e i s a showing that an injusti ce ha s been done

. Id . at 149 (interna l citations omit ted).

The trial c ourt was c oncer ned that Mr. L o ft o n h ad not been forthrig ht about his financial
c on dit ion

. Th e e vid e nc e of fe re d a t the ini tia l he ari ngra ise d a qu e sti on a bo ut h is a bil ity to p ur c ha se a $400,000.00 home. Mr. L ofton’s purc hase, in fa ct, see ms to soli dify the trial cour

t’s conce rns re g ar d i n g h i s c r e d i b i l i t y

. C o n s e qu e n t l y , w e ar e u n a b l e t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u rte rr e d in g ra nti ngMs. L of

ton ’s mot ion

to r e -o pe n th e pr oo f t o a dd re ss t he so ur c e of

fu nd s u til ize d to purc ha se the Woodbrook Circle House.

After the trial court g rante d Ms. L ofton’s sec ond motion to re-open pr oof, Mr. L ofton made
an ora l motion t o narr ow the scope of that proof to the means by which he purc hased the Woodbrook Circle House . A transc ript of the hea ring on Mr. L ofton’s m otion to narr ow t he scope of proof is not contained in the r ecor d. Howeve r, at the he aringon Mr. L ofton’s motion to seek interlocutory appea l, the trial court c larified its re asons for r e-ope ning the proof:

May be ther e is a misunders t anding about what tra nspired with the g ranting of the motion to reopen pr oof. T h at motion was g rante d based on ne wly

discovere d evidenc e, base d on that newly discovere d
e v i d e n c e m ay

i mp a c to na l l o f

t h e i s s u e s t h a th a v e b e e nd e c i d e d

. It is not my intention to rec eive evidence that has alre ady been r ece ived. We can r ece ive whate ver the eviden ce i s , and then you lawy ers c an argue how that impac ts on decisions already made. The y

cover every t h i n g fr o m s p o u s al s u

p p o rt , d i s t ri b u t i o no f p ro p er t y , distribution of debt, a nd perha ps even c redibility

of at lea st one witness, which may impact on how those other issues were decide d.-8-

The trial c ourt corr ectly deter mined that any new evidence conce rning Mr. L ofton’s financ ial condition would bear upon any prior dec ision it made r eg ardingthe marital e state. These decisions
nece ssarily

include the divisio n o f m ar i tal proper ty and debt, a s well as spousal support. The trial
c ourt ’s pr ima

ry ob je c tiv e in t

his c a se wa s to a sc e rt a in a n a c c ur a te pic tur e of Mr . L of ton ’s fi na nc e s. I f Mr. L ofton’s financ ial situation was shown to be other than what was initially repr esente d to the court, then justice a

nd equity dictate that the tr ial court should r evisit its pre vious rulings c oncer ning the distribution of marital proper ty and spousal support. We have revie wed the tr anscr ipt of the pr oc e e din g s c on du c te d f

oll ow ingthe re -o pe nin g of pr oo f and have c on c lud e d that the tr ia l c ourt did not err in a llowing a dditional evidence to be submitted by the par ties.

Sum m ar y J udgm e nt

Mr. L ofton filed a motion for summar y judgme nt after Ms. L ofton filed her second motion to r e -o pe n p ro of

. A s g ro un ds fo r h is m oti on , M r. L of ton argue s th a t no dis pu te d ma te ri a l fa c ts e xist
a s to the c ir c ums tanc e s su rr ound ing his purc ha se of the Woo db ro ok

Cir c le Ho us e , a

nd that th e re is
no ne e d to take fu

rt he r pr oo f re g ard ing thi s tra ns a c tio n. Mr . L of

ton c on te nd s th a t he is e nti tle d to summary judgme nt beca

use the Woodbrook Circle House wa s p urcha sed with assets that we re awa rded to him in the division of marital proper ty , which bec ame his sepa rate proper

ty

.
I t is well settled that a motion for summary judgme nt sho u l d b e gra n t ed when the movant demonstrates that there a

re no g enuine issues of material fa ct and that the movingparty is entitled to a judg ment as a matter of law

. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. The party moving for su m m ary judgme nt bear s the burden of demonstrating that no g enuine issue of materia l fac t exi sts. Se eBai n v . W e lls , 936 S.W .2d 618, 622 (Tenn.1997) . On a motion for summary judgme nt, the court must take the str on g e st l e g iti ma te vie w o f e vid e nc e in fa vo r o f t he no nmo vin g pa

rt y , a llo w a ll r e a so na

ble infere nces in f

avor of that party , and disca

rd all counte rvailing evidenc e. See id. I n By rd v . Ha ll , 847 S.W .2d 208 (Tenn.1993) , our Supreme Court state d:

Once it is shown by

the moving pa

rty that t h er e i s n o g enuine issue of mater ial fac t, the nonmoving pa rty must then demonstrate, by aff idavits or discovery

materia l, that the re is a

g enuine, mate rial fa ct dispute to warr ant a tria l. I n this reg ard, Rule 56.05 provides that the nonmoving party cannot simply rely upon his ple ading s but must set forth spec ific fac ts showing that ther e is a g enuine issue of materia l fa c t f or tr ia l.

Id . at 211 (c itations omi tted).
Summary judgme nt is only

appropr iate whe n the fac ts a nd the leg al conclusions draw n from th e f a c ts r e a s o n a

b ly p e r mi t o n ly o n e c o n c lu s io n. Se e Ca r v e l l v . B o t t o ms , 900 S.W .2d 23, 26 (T e nn .1 99 5) . B e c a

us e on ly qu e st io ns of law are inv olv e d, the re is n o p re su mpt ion of c or re c tne ss reg ardinga trial c ourt' s g rant or denial of summary judgme nt. Se eBai

n , 926 S.W .2d at 622.-9-

Th e re fo re , o ur

re vie w of the tr ia l c ourt ' s g ra nt of su mma ry jud g me nt i s de novo on the re cord be fore this Court. S ee Wa rre n v . Es tat eof Kir k , 954 S.W .2d 722, 723 (Tenn.1997)

. When denying the motion for summ ary judgme nt, the t rial court made the f ollowing r eleva

nt state me nts :

Be fore the Court is Mr. L ofton’s motion for summary judgme nt. As
we a ll k n o w, summary

judgme nt contemplates that ther e is no g e nu ine iss ue a s to any

ma te ri a l f

a c t, a nd that ba sed up on

the fa c ts that are no t in

dis pu te , th e mov ing pa

rt y is en tit le d to judg me nt a s a matter of la

w. T h i s is a divorce case for g oodness sake . This poor Judg e is a wa re of no a uth or ity wh a tso e ve r that summa ry jud g me nt i s e ve r ap p r o p r i a t e i na

d i v o r c e c a s e

. I f

t h e r e i s , Ii n v i t e s o m e o n e to show it to m e

. T h e Co u rt w e ll kn o w s an d b e li e v e s th a t th e r e is no authority that a sum mary judgme nt is appropriate to where a ca se has been tried, dec ided, and motion to reope n the proof ha s been g rante d. Wit h all due re spect, the motion must be denied.

I n s up po rt

of his mot ion , M r. L of

ton e xec ute d a

n a ff ida vit , in wh ic h h e state d th a t he pa id $3,000 ear

nest money

toward the purcha se of the Woodbrook Ci rcle House. Ms. L ofton responde d by a sse rt ingthat th e re “ is a ma te ri a l is su e of

fa c t in that H us band ma de fa lse state me nts in h is application for

a loan, a nd the value of

the equity

is marital proper

ty and shoul d be divided betwe en the par ties acc ording [l y ]....” The par ties also disputed: (1) whe ther the Woodbrook Circle H o use wa s marital prope rty , (2) whe ther Mr. L ofton or his pa ramour pa id the ear

nest money , (3) the va lue of the Woodbrook Circle House, a nd (4) the me ans by

which Mr. L ofton purcha sed same. Be cause a dispute of mater ial fac t exi sted, we c onclude that the trial court did not err in denying Mr . L ofton’s mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt.

Division of Marital P ropert y

I n it s Ma y 10 , 2 00 7 ru lin g the tr ia l c ourt no te s nume ro us dis c re pa nc ie s b e tw e e n th e inc ome and expenses alleg ed by Mr. L ofton in h i s i n itial Rul e 14(d) aff idavit and the new

evidenc e surrounding the purc hase of the Woodbrook Circle House. T he trial c ourt specifi ca lly notes that these discr epanc ies “c onfirm much of t h e C ourt’s ea rlier suspicions [concer

ning Mr . L ofton’s
cre dibilit y ].”

W h e nm a k i n g i t s d i v i s i o no f p r o p e rt y, t h e t r i a l c o u rtm u s tf i r s tc l a s s i f

y t h e p r o p e rt y. Te nn e sse e re c og nize s tw o d ist inc t ty pes o r c la sse s o f p ro pe rt

y : “ mari ta l pr op e rt

y ” and “ se pa rate proper ty .” The distinction is important beca use Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121( a) “ provides only for the divis ion of marital prope rty .” See also Batson v. Batson , 7 69 S.W. 2d 84 9, 85 6 ( Te nn . Ct

. App.1988). Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-4- 1 2 1 (b )( 1 ) define s “marital pr operty ,” in re levant par t, as fo llo ws :-10- (A ) “ M ar i t a l p r o p e rt y ” m e an s a l l r e a l an d p e r s o n a l p r o p e rt y , b oth tang ible and intang ible, acquir ed by either or both spouses during the
course of the mar

riag e up to the date of the fina l divorce hear ing a nd owned by either or both spouses as of the date of filing of a complaint fo r d ivor ce, e xce pt i n th e c a se of fr a ud ule nt c on ve y anc e in anticipation of filing , and including any proper ty to which a r ight wa s acquir ed up to the date of the final divorce hear ing, a nd valued a s of a date as nea

r as r easona

bly possible to the f

inal divorce hear ing da

te. I n the ca se of a

complaint for leg al sepa

ration, the c ourt may

make a final disposition of the marital proper ty either at the time of ente ring an orde r of leg al sepa

ration or at the time of enter ing a fina l divorce decr ee, if any

. I f the marital proper ty is divided as part of the orde r of le g a l s e p ar a t i o n , an y p r o p e rt y a c qu i r e d b y a s p o u s e t h e r e a f t e r i s deeme d separ ate pr operty of that spouse. All marital pr operty shall be valued a s of a date as near as poss ible to the date of entry of the orde r f i n a l l y d i v i d i n g t h e m ar i t a l p r o p e rt y.
Se pa rate pr op e rt

y is d e fi ne d a s: (A) A ll r e a l a

n d p e r s o n a l p r o p e rty

o w n e d b y a s p o u s e b e fore marria g e, including , but not li mited to, assets held in individual retire ment acc oun t s (IRAs) a s that term is defined in the I nterna l Revenue Code of 1986, as a mended; (B ) Proper

ty acquir ed in exchang e for proper ty acq u i re d befor e the marria g e; (C ) I nc ome fr om a

nd a pp re c ia ti on

of pr op e rt y ow ne d b y

a sp ou se befor e mar

riag e except when char acte rized as marital pr operty under subdivision (b)(1); (D ) P ro pe rt

y a c qu ir e d b y

a sp ou se a t any

tim e by g if t, b e qu e st, de vis e or de sc e nt; (E ) P a in a nd su ff e ri ng awa rd s, vic tim of

c ri me c omp e ns a tio n a

wa rd s, future me dical expenses, and f uture lost wag es; and (F ) Proper

ty acquir ed by

a spouse a fter an orde r of leg al sepa ration
w h e r e t h e c o u rth a s m a d e a f i n a l d i s p o s i t i o no f

p r o p e rt y. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 4-121(b) (2).

I n light of the se def

initions , we conclude that the trial cour t corre ctly

classified the Woodbrook Circle House a s marital property beca use Mr. L ofton purcha sed (or at least ac quired a rig ht to purchase ) this property prior t o t h e fi n al hear ing he ld in this case . After classify ing the proper ty , the t ri al co u rt must then divide the marital prope rty equitably betwee n the par

ties. Trial courts ar e af

forde d g reat discretion when classify ing and di viding property , and their de cisions are entitled to gr eat we ight on a ppeal. Sul

livan v. Sul

livan , 107 S.W .3d 507, 512 (Tenn. Ct. App.2002).-11-

Dividing a

marital estate is not a mecha nical proc ess; the g oal is to fashion an e quitable re medy by consideringthe non-e x clusive fa ctors set for th in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4- 121(c) (2005): (1) The duration of the ma rriag e; (2 ) T h e a g e , p h y s i c a l an d m e n t a l h e a l t h , v o c a t i o n a l s k i lls , f ina nc ia e l m li p a l b o i y li a ti b e i s li a ty n , d e f a i r n a in c g i a c l a p na e c e i d t s y , o e f s e ta t c e h , of the pa rt ie s; (3) The tang ible or intang ible contribution by one (1) party t o the
e d u c a t i o n , t r a i n i n g o r

i n c r e a s e d

e ar n i n g p o w e r

o f t h e o t h e r p art y; (4) The relative ability

of ea ch party for f

uture a cquisitions of capital assets and inc ome; (5) The contribution of ea ch party to the acquisition, prese rvation,
a p p r e c i a t i o n , d e p r e c i a t i o no r d i s s i p at i o n

o f t h e m ar i t a l o r

s e p ara te proper ty , i n cl u d i ng the contribution of a pa rty to the marria g e as ho me make r, wa g e e arn e r o r p are nt, wi th t he c on tr ibutio n o f a

party as homemake r or wa g e ea rner to be g iven the same weig ht if eac h party has fulfilled its role; ( 6 ) T h e v a l u e o f

t h e s e p ar a t e p r o p e rt y o f

e a c h p art y; (7) The estate of

eac h party

at the time of the ma

rriag e; (8) The economic c ircumstance s of each party at t he time the division of prope rty

is to become e ffe ctive; (9) The tax consequence s t o ea ch party , costs associate d with the
re a so na bly fo re se e a ble sa le of

the asset , a

nd oth e r r e a so na

bly fo re se e a ble e xpe ns e s a sso c ia te d w iththe a sse t; (10) The amount of social security benef its available to eac h spouse; and (11) Such other

fac t ors as a

re ne cessa

ry to consider the e quities be tw e e n th e pa

rt ie s.
The divi sion of m arital property is rooted in equity , and a division of mar ital property is not rende red ine quitable mere ly beca use it is not pre cisely

equal, Cohen v. Coh en , 937 S.W .2d 823, 832 (T e nn .1 99 6) ; Elli

s v . El lis , 748 S.W .2d 424, 427 (Tenn.1988) or bec ause e ach pa rty does not rec eive a shar e or por

tion of eac h marital asse t. Cohen , 937 S.W .2d at 83 3 (c i t i n g Br ow n v . Br own , 913 S.W .2d 163, 168 (Tenn. Ct. App.1994))

. Th e tr ia l c ourt

div ide d th e mari ta l pr op e rt y , in re le va nt p art , a s f

oll ow s:
A. I tems awa

rded to Wife:

1. The mar ital residenc e at 3 6 1 5 Davieshire Cove; and 2. The ne t sales proc eeds f rom the sale of the re al proper ty located in Ar

kansas; and-12- 3. The ba lance in all acc ounts held with the Trustmark B ank; and 4. The Oppe nheimer F und; and 5. The Ga

rthmore F und; and 6. The Nationwide SEP/ I RA; and 7. The cash value of the life insura nce policy

insuring Wife’s life in the approx imate amount of $80,000.00; and 8. The 2002 Cadillac D eville; and 9. One c emeter

y plot in Memorial Park; and 10 . F if ty pe rc e nt ( 50 %) of

the DC I C ne t of

taxes.

B. Items awa

rded to Husba

nd:

1. Re sid e nc e loc a te d at 10 18 3 Wood br oo k Ci rc le tog e the r w ith the ho us e ho ld furn iture and fu rn ish ing s; and 2. L ofton I nsuranc e Ag ency , its fix tures and f urniture, its a sse ts ( inc lud ingthe Natio nw ide Fe de ra l Cr e dit Un ion c he c kin g and

savin g s a c c ounts ), and its liabiliti es (includingthe Capital Acc ess loan); a nd 3. The cash value of t he S econd To Die li fe insura nce po lic y ins ur ingthe part ies’ li ve s in the a pp ro xima te amount of $600,000.00; and 4. The re maining c ash value of the life insura nce policy insuring H usband ’s life in the amount of approximately

$350,000.00; and 5. The 2003 Cadillac E scala de a nd the 1997 Nissan Pathfinder; and 6. One c emeter

y plot in Memorial Park; and 7. Th e sa le p roc e e ds fr om t he sa le of a ll p e rs on a lty located in the A rkansa s proper ty ; and 8. O n e h u n dr e d p e r c e n t ( 1 0 0 % ) o f th e E E net of taxes; and 9. F if ty pe rc e nt ( 50 %) of

the DC I C ne t of

ta xes.

I n a d d it io n , an d “ [a ]s f

u rth e r d is tr ib u ti o n o f [m ar it a l] p r o p e rty an d f o r th e p r e s e r

v a ti o n of the marital re sidence as an a sset of the mar ital estate,” Mr. L ofton was order ed to continue pay ing
a ll e xpe ns e s and up ke e p ass oc ia te d with the mari ta l re sid e nc e (w hic h pro pe rt y wa s awa rd e d to Ms. L ofton). Mr. L ofton was also order ed to procur e a life i nsuranc e poli cy insuring his life in the fa ce amount of $700,000.00, naming Ms. L ofton as the be nefic iary there of.-13-

Havingdeter

mined that the W oodbrook C ircle House i s a marital a sset, and conside ring the value of that proper

ty , we c annot conc lude that the divi s i o n o f marital pr operty in this case wa s inequitable. This was a

40 y ear marria g e. Ms. L ofton has not bee n employ ed outside the home f or ov e r 1 6 y e ars . Furt

he rm or e , the pr oo f ind ic a te s tha t Ms. L of ton su ff e rs fr om num e ro us he a lthiss ue s, which make it impos sible for he r to work

. C o nverse ly , Mr. L ofton is in good he alth, and has the means to ea

rn a substantial living . This Court was fac ed with a simil ar situation in the ver y rec ent
case of Hil

l v . Hi ll , No. M2007-00049-COA- R3-CV, 2008 WL 5100925 (Te n n

. C t

. App. Dec . 3, 2008). In Hil

l , the par ties had bee n marri ed fo r 2 5 y ear s. Although the trial court’ s division of marital prope rty

was fa r fr om equal, this Court affirme d t h e d ecision of the trial court on the fo llo wi ngg ro un ds :

I nt h e c as e b e f o r e u s , b as edo nt h e du ra t i o no f t h e m arri age combined with a ll the economic fac tors and the r elative situations of th e p arti e s , w e c an n o t s ay th a t t h e tr ia l c o u rt’ s d is tr ib u ti o nw a s n ot equitable or

rea sonable. Wi fe is for ty -six y ear s old and has not
wo rk e d outs ide the ho me in t we nty y e ars . Sh e re ma ins de e ply involved in the upbri n g ing of five minor childre n, the y oung est of wh om w a s f

i v e y e ar s o l d a t t h e t i m e o f t r i a l

. A l t h o u g h s h e h a s a nurs ingde g re e , it wo uld

take a larg e inv e stm e nt o f m on e y and tim e befor e her

cer tification could be r estored. I n contra st, Husband has ha d a succe ssful car eer in sales and h as ad m i t t edt o ea rn i n g o v er 1 4 , 0 0 0 p er

m o n t h

. T h er e i s t h u s a h u ge a c qu ir e d a i s s s c e r t e s p a a n d c y e a b r e n t w in e c e o n m H e u

. s A b s an th d e ’ s t r a i n a l dc W ou i r f t e ’ o s b a se b r i v li e ty d , t o H us ba nd wi ll p ro ba

bly be able to bring the value of his 401(k) ac count up re latively quickly , but there is ver

y lit tle po ssi bil ity

that Wif e wi ll b e a

ble to e sta

bli shor fu nd a re tir e me nt a c c ount.

Id . at *7.

Simi larly , Ms. L ofton’s ability to seek e mploy

ment outside t h e h o m e is limit ed due to he r e du c a tio n, e xpe ri e nc e , a

nd he a lth iss ue s. I n c on tr a st, Mr . L of ton ha s e njo y e d a

su c c e ssf ul c are e r i n the insuranc e fie ld, has consisten t l y i n cre ased his income, a nd has expressed no intent to re tire. Fr om the totality

of the c ircumstance s, we c onclude that the tr ial court did not abuse its discre tion in dividing the mar ital property

.
Alim ony in f utur o
T h e t r i a l c o u rto r d e r e d

t h e f o l l o w i n g a s a l i m o n y in f

utu ro :
6. Alim ony in Fut

uro . A s a l i m o n y in f

utu ro p u rsuant to T.C.A. Section3 6 -5 -1 0 1 (d )( 1 )( E ), Hu s b an d i s h er eb y o rd er edt o p ay

al i m ony in f utu ro for the be nefit of Wife: A. $2,970.00 per

month pay able dire ctly

to Wi fe; a

nd-14- B. The cost of Wife’s health insuranc e cove rag e with bene fits that
are n o t less than the cove rag e Wife had in plac e on Apr il 22, 2005, via COBRA, H I PPA and bey ond; and C. A ll o f Wi fe ’s re a so na ble and ne c e ssa ry he a lth care expe ns e s, including but not limit ed to me dical, dental, optical, ps y ch o logic al counseling , presc ription medications, and phy sical thera py , that are not cover ed by

insurance , including a

ny such expenses incurr ed and uninsured by

virtue of a

lapse in Wife’s hea lth care cover ag e. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5-121(h) (3)( i) outlines the fac tors to be consider ed by the trial cour

t in a wa rd inga lim on y : (i) I n deter

mining whe ther the g ranting of an or der f or pay ment of support and maintenance to a party is appropr iate, and in determining the nature , amount, leng th of term, and ma nner of pay ment, the cour

t sh a ll c on sid e r a ll r e le va

nt f a c tor s, inc lud ing : (1) The relative ear

ning c apac ity , obligations, needs, and f inancial
re so ur c e s o f e a c h p art

y , in c lud inginc ome fr om p e ns ion , pro fi t sh ari ngor re tir e me nt p lans and

a ll o the r s ourc e s; (2) The relative educa

tion and training of each pa rty , the ability

and opportunity

of each party to secure such educ ation and tra ining, a nd the ne c e ssi ty

of a pa rt y to s e c ur e fu

rt he r e du c a tio n a

nd tr a ini ngto imp ro ve su c h p art

y ' s e arn ing s c a

pa c ity to a re a so na ble le ve l; (3 ) T he duratio n o f t

he marr ia g e ; (4 ) T he a g e and

me nta l c on dit ion

of e a c h p art y ; (5) The phy sical conditi on of each party , including, but not limi ted to, phy sical di sability or i ncapa city due to a c hronic de bilitating disease ; ( 6 ) T h e e xte n t to w h ic h it w o u ld b e u n d e s ir a b le f o r a p arty to seek employ ment outside the hom e, because such par ty will be custodian of a min or c hil d o f t he marr ia g e ; (7 ) T he se pa

rate a sse ts of e a c h p art

y , b oth re a l and pe rs on a l, t ang ibl e and int ang ibl e ; (8) The provisions made with regar d t o the marital prope rty , as de fi ne d in § 3 6- 4- 12 1; (9) T h e s ta

n d ar d o f li v in g o f th e p arti e s e s ta b li s h e d d u r ing the
marr ia g e ; (10) The extent to which each par ty has made such tang ible and intang ible contributions to the m arr iag e as mone tary and homemake r c on tr ibutio ns , a

nd tang ibl e and

int ang ibl e c on tr ibutio ns by a pa rt y to t h e e d u c a t i o n , t r a i n i n g o r

i n c r e a s e d e ar n i n g p o w e r o f

t h e o t h e r p art y; (1 1) Th e re la tiv e fa

ult of the pa rt ie s, in case s w he re the c ourt , in its discretion, dee ms it appropriate to do so; and-15- ( 1 2 ) S u c h o t h e r

f a c t o r s , i n c l u d i n g t h e t a x c o n s e qu e n c e s t o e a c hp art y, as ar e nec essar

y to consider the e quities betwee n the par ties.

Of these fac tors, need a

nd the ability

to pay are the cr itical fac tors to be consider ed. Loyd v

. Loyd, 8 60 S.W. 2d

40 9 ( Te nn . Ct . App .1 99 3) . In T e nn e sse e , o ur c ourt s “ re c og nize [ ] se ve ra l se pa rate
c l a s s e s o f s p o u s a l s u

p p o rt , i n c l u d i n g l o n g
- t e r

m s p o u s a l s u

p p o rt( a l i m o n y i n f

u t ur o ) , a l i m o n y in solido , reha

bilitative spousal support, and transitional spousal support.” Riggs v. Riggs , 250 S.W .3d 45 3, 45 6 ( Te nn . Ct . App .2 00 7) (f oo tno te s o mit te d) . T enn

. Code Ann. § 3 6- 5- 12 1( d) (2 ) r e fl e c ts a statutory pref ere nce f avoringreha

bilitative spousal support and transitional spous al s u p p o rt over long- term spousal support. Id. Ho we v er , t h i s s t at u t o ry p re fe re n ce d o es n o ten t i re l y d i s p l ace the other fo rm s o f s po us a l su

pp or t w he n th e fa c ts o f the c a se wa rr ant lon g -t e rm or mor e op e n- e nd e d s up po rt

. Id

. (c i t i n g Aaron v. Aaron , 909 S.W .2d 408, 410 (Tenn.1995) ).

T h e t r i a l c o u rtaw ar d e d

a l i m o n y in f

utu ro , w hic h is de fi ne d a s: [A] pa y me nt o f s up po rt and

ma int e na nc e on a lon g te rm ba sis or un til death or remarr i age of the re cipient. Such alimony may be aw arde d when the c ourt finds that there is relative e conomic disadva ntag e and that r e h a b il it a ti o nis n o t f

e a s ib le , me an in g th a t t

h e d is a d v an ta g ed spouse is unable to ac hieve, with re asonabl e effort, an e arning capa city that will permit the spou s e's standard of living af ter the divorce to be rea sonably compar able to the standa rd of living enjoy ed during the marr iag e, or to the post-divorc e standa rd of living expected to be ava ilable to the other spouse , considering the re levant statutory fa c tor s and

the e qu iti e s b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5-121(f )(1)

. Th e fa c tor s o utl ine d at T e nn . Co de Ann. § 3 6- 5- 12 1( h) (3 )( i) , a pp ly wh e the r t he court

is
m a k i n g ana w ar d

o f a l i m o n y in futuro o r

a l i m o n y in solido

. Hou

ghl and v . Ho ughl and, 844 S.W .2d 6 1 9 , 6 2 1 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 2 ) ( ci t i n g Fi s h erv. Fish er , 648 S.W .2d 244, 246-47 (Te nn.1983)). Ult imately , an aw ard of

alimony , and the ty

pe ther eof, is within the sound discre tion of the trial court. Rai ns v . Ra ins , 58 Tenn. App. 214, 428 S.W.2d 650 (Tenn. Ct. App.1968).

Th e statut or

y fa c tor s w e ig h h e a vil y in Ms. L of ton ’s fa vo r. As dis c us se d in

de ta il a bo ve , M s. L ofton suffe rs from a

my riad of medical issues, she is una ble to w ork outside the home, she ha s no me ans of futur e inc ome , a

nd ha s a ne e d fo r he a lth ins ur anc e to c ov e r he r c on sid e ra ble me dic a l bi lls

. B e c a us e Mr . L of

ton a dmi tte d to hav ing an af fa ir duri ng the c ours e of the marr ia g e , the de mis e of thi s union r ests larg ely on his shoulder s. More importantly , howeve r, Mr. L ofton has the a bility to pay alimony and Ms. L ofton definitely has a need for future s upport. That beingsaid, we c onclude that the tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r r e quir ingMr . L of ton to p ay a ll o f M s. L of

ton ’s un ins ur e d me dic a l c os ts (pre sumably

until her death) to be to expansive. Although Mr. L ofton’s earning s are considera ble, a lac k or lap s e o f h ealth insuranc e for Ms. L ofton could be f

inancially disastrous for him. At theW e not e t hat ne i t her pa r t y ha s r eque s t ed at t or ney’ s f ee s f or t hi s a ppea l

. H ow eve r , f r om t he t ot al i t y of

t he 3

c irc u m sta n c e s, we co ncl ud e t hat i t wo ul d be eq ui t ab l e a n d r e a so n a b le for each p art y t o be ar hi s o r her res p ect i ve
e x p e n se s a risin g fro m this a p p e a l.
-16- time of the hea

ring , Mr. L ofton was 60 y ear s old and Ms. L ofton was 59. I n light of this fact, and the possible financ ial impact to Mr

. L ofton, we find that Mr. L ofton should pa y all of Ms. L ofton’s
un ins ur e d me dic a l e xpe ns e s u nt il su c h ti me a s sh e is e lig ibl e fo r M e dic are . A t th a t ti me , h is
o b l i g a t i o nt o p ay t h e u n i n s u r e d m e d i c a l e x p e n s e s s h a l l c e a s e

. W e a f f i r m t h e aw ar d

o f a l i m o n y in futur o in a ll o the r r e sp e c ts.

Attor ney’s F ees
A naw ar d o f a t t o r

n e y' s f e e s i na d i v o r c e c a s e c o n s t i tu t e s a l i m o n y in solido

. See Herrera v

. He rre ra , 944 S. W

. 2 d 3 7 9 , 3 90 (Tenn. Ct. App.1996). T enn. Code Ann. § 36- 5-121(d) (5) ( 2005) p r o v i d e s : “ A l i m o n y in solido may be aw arde d in lieu of or in addition to any other a limony

awa rd, in or der to pr ovide support, including attorney fee s, where appropr iate.” T he Court re views alimony decisions under

an abuse of discre tio n

standard . Garfinkel v. Garfinkel , 945 S.W .2d 744, 748 (Tenn. Ct. App.1996). As with any awa rd of alimony , a trial court should c onsider the rele vant fac tors set out at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121( h)(3) (i), with the most important fac tors being the nee d of the economica lly

disadvantag ed spouse a

nd the obligor

spous e's abili ty

to pay

. Riggs v. Riggs , 250 S.W .3d 453, 457 (Tenn. Ct. App.2007). The trial court awarde d Ms. L ofton the full amount of he r attorney ’s fe es, totaling $55,106.25. Reviewing this award in ligh t of the consider ations set out above, w e conc lude that the aw ard of attorney ’s fe es and c osts in thi s ca s e wa s equitable a nd
n e c e s s ar y. 3

F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , we mod if y the tr ia l court ’s or de r to r e qu ir e Mr . L of ton to p a y a ll of Ms. L ofton’s uninsured me dical expenses until such time as she is elig ible for Me dicar e. At that tim e , h is o bli g a tio n to pa

y the se un ins ur e d me dic a l c os ts s ha ll c e a se

. Th e or de r of the tr ia l c ourt is
a f f ir me d in all o th e r

r e s p e c ts

. Co s ts o f

th is a p p e a l a r e a s s e s s e d

a g a in s t t h e A p p e ll an t, H ar

r y W. L o f t o nan d h i s s u r e t y.



### ___________________________________ J. S T E V E N S T A FF O RD , J.