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[House Report 107-397]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

107th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                     107-397

======================================================================

 
                      CHILD CUSTODY PROTECTION ACT

                                _______
                                

 April 11, 2002.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Sensenbrenner, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            DISSENTING VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 476]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the 
bill (H.R. 476) to amend title 18, United States Code, to 
prohibit taking minors across State lines in circumvention of 
laws requiring the involvement of parents in abortion 
decisions, having considered the same, reports favorably 
thereon without amendment and recommends that the bill do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
Purpose and Summary..............................................     2
Background and Need for the Legislation..........................     2
Hearings.........................................................    25
Committee Consideration..........................................    25
Vote of the Committee............................................    25
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................    28
Performance Goals and Objectives.................................    28
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................    28
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................    28
Constitutional Authority Statement...............................    29
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion.......................    30
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............    31
Markup Transcript................................................    33
Dissenting Views.................................................    73

                          Purpose and Summary

    H.R. 476, the ``Child Custody Protection Act''(CCPA), has 
two primary purposes. The first is to protect the health and 
safety of young girls by preventing valid and constitutional 
State parental involvement laws from being circumvented. The 
second is to protect the rights of parents to be involved in 
the medical decisions of their minor daughters.
    To achieve these purposes, H.R. 476 makes it a Federal 
offense to knowingly transport a minor across a State line, 
with the intent that she obtain an abortion, in circumvention 
of a State's parental consent or parental notification law. 
Violation of the Act is a Class One misdemeanor, carrying a 
fine of up to $100,000 and incarceration of up to 1 year.
    H.R. 476, introduced by Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, 
will strengthen the effectiveness of State laws designed to 
protect children from the health and safety risks associated 
with abortion. In many cases, only a girl's parents know of her 
prior psychological and medical history, including allergies to 
medication and anesthesia. Also, parents are usually the only 
people who can provide authorization for post-abortion medical 
procedures or the release of pertinent data from family 
physicians. When a pregnant girl is taken to have an abortion 
without her parents' knowledge, none of these precautions can 
be taken. Thus, when parents are not involved, the risks to the 
minor girl's health significantly increase. H.R. 476, is 
designed to effectuate State laws which safeguard minor girls' 
physical and emotional health by ensuring parental involvement 
in their abortion decisions.
    H.R. 476 does not supercede, override, or in any way alter 
existing State parental involvement laws. Nor does the Act 
impose any parental notice or consent requirement on any State. 
H.R. 476 addresses the interstate transportation of minors in 
order to circumvent valid, existing State laws, and uses 
Congress' authority to regulate interstate activity to protect 
those laws from evasion.

                Background and Need for the Legislation

    There is widespread agreement among abortion rights 
advocates and pro-life advocates that it is the parents of a 
pregnant minor who are best suited to provide her counsel, 
guidance, and support as she decides whether to continue her 
pregnancy or to undergo an abortion. Organizations such as 
Planned Parenthood, the National Abortion and Reproductive 
Rights Action League, and the National Abortion Federation all 
advise pregnant minors to consult their parents before 
proceeding with an abortion.\1\ In addition, the American 
Medical Association urges physicians to ``strongly encourage 
minors to discuss their pregnancy with their parents'' and to 
``explain how parental involvement can be helpful and that 
parents are generally very understanding and supportive.'' \2\ 
The AMA continues: ``If a minor expresses concerns about 
parental involvement, the physician should ensure that the 
minor's reluctance is not based on any misperceptions about the 
likely consequences of parental involvement.'' \3\
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    \1\ ``Few would deny that most teenagers, especially younger ones, 
would benefit from adult guidance when faced with an unwanted 
pregnancy. Few would deny that such guidance ideally should come from 
the teenager's parents.'' Planned Parenthood Federation of America, 
Inc., Fact Sheets: Teenagers, Abortion, and Government Intrusion Laws, 
at http://www.plannedparenthood.org/library/ABORTION/laws.html (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2002); ``Responsible parents should be involved when 
their young daughters face a crisis pregnancy.'' National Abortion and 
Reproductive Rights Action League, Minors' Issues: Reproductive Choice 
Issues, at http://www.naral.org/issues/issues--minors.html (last 
visited Aug. 30, 2001); ``Ordinarily it's a good idea for teens to 
involve their parents. . . .'' National Abortion Federation, Having An 
Abortion? Your Guide to Good Care, at http://www.prochoice.org/
default6.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2001).
    \2\ Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical 
Association, Mandatory Parental Consent to Abortion, 269 JAMA 82, 83 
(1993) (opposing laws mandating parental involvement on the basis that 
such laws may expose minors to physical harm, or compromise ``the 
minor's need for privacy on matters of sexual intimacy.'')
    \3\ Id.
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    A total of 43 States have enacted some form of a parental 
involvement statute.\4\ The implementation of seven of these 43 
State statutes has been enjoined by courts as violating either 
Federal or State constitutional protections.\5\ Another nine of 
these 43 State statutes are written merely to encourage the 
pregnant minor to consult with her parents, another relative, 
or another third party designated by statute before she decides 
to undergo an abortion but do not require the minor to obtain 
either consent or notice prior to obtaining an abortion.\6\ The 
remaining 27 States require a parent to either be notified of a 
minor daughter's intention to undergo an abortion or to consent 
to the performance of an abortion on a minor daughter (subject 
to judicial bypass procedures).
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    \4\ See Ala. Code Sec. Sec. 26-21-1 to -8 (1992 & Supp. 1999); 
Alaska Stat. Sec. Sec. 18.16.010-030 (Michie 1998); Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. Sec. 36-2152 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999); Ark. Code Ann. 
Sec. Sec. 20-16-801 to -808 (Michie 2000); Cal. Health & Safety Code 
Sec. 123450 (West 1996 & Supp. 1999); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
Sec. Sec. 12-37.5-101 to -108 (West Supp. 1999); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
Sec. 19(a)-601 (West 1997); Del. Code Ann. tit. 24, Sec. Sec. 1780-
1789B (1997); Fla. Stat. Ann. Sec. 390.01115 (West Supp. 2000); Ga. 
Code Ann. Sec. Sec. 15-11-110 to -118 (Harrison 1998); Idaho Code 
Sec. 18-609(6) (1997); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 70/1-70/99 (West 1999); 
Ind. Code Ann. Sec. Sec. 16-18-2-267, 16-34-2-4 (West 1997); Iowa Code 
Ann. Sec. Sec. 135L.1-8 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000); Kan. Stat. Ann. 
Sec. 65-6705 (1992 & Supp. 1999); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. Sec. 311.732 
(Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. Sec. 40:1299.35.5 (West 
1992 & Supp. 2000); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, Sec. 1597-A (West 1992 
& Supp. 1999); Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. Sec. 20-103 (1996); Mass. 
Ann. Laws ch. 112, Sec. 12s (Law. Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 2000); Mich. 
Stat. Ann. Sec. Sec. 25.248 (101)-(109) (Law. Co-op. 1999 & Supp. 
2000); Minn. Stat. Ann. Sec. 144.343 (West 1998); Miss. Code Ann. 
Sec. Sec. 41-41-51 to -63 (1993 & Supp. 1998); Mo. Ann. Stat. 
Sec. Sec. 188.015, 188.028 (West 1996 & Supp. 2000); Mont. Code Ann. 
Sec. Sec. 50-20-201 to -215 (1999); Neb. Rev. Stat. Sec. Sec. 71-6901 
to -6909 (1996); Nev. Rev. Stat. Sec. Sec. 442.255-.257 (2000); N.J. 
Stat. Ann. Sec. Sec. 9:17A-1 to -1.12 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000); N.M. 
Stat. Ann. Sec. Sec. 30-5-1 to -3 (Michie 2000); N.C. Gen. Stat. 
Sec. Sec. 90-21.6 to .10 (1999); N.D. Cent. Code Sec. Sec. 14-02.1 to 
03.1 (1997); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Sec. 2919.12 (Anderson 1996); 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. Sec. 3206 (West 1983 & Supp. 2000); R.I. Gen. Laws 
Sec. 23-4.7-6 (1996); S.C. Code Ann. Sec. Sec. 44-41-30 to -37 (Law. 
Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1999); S.D. Codified Laws Sec. 34-23A-7 (Michie 
1994 & Supp. 1999); Tenn. Code Ann. Sec. 37-10-301 to -304 (1996 & 
Supp. 1999); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. Sec. 33.001-.004 (Vernon Supp. 2000); 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 76-7-304 (1999); Va. Code Ann. Sec. 16.1-241(D) 
(Michie 1999 & Supp. 2000); W. Va. Code Sec. Sec. 16-2F-1 to -8 (1998); 
Wis. Stat. Ann. Sec. 48.375 (West 1997); Wyo. Stat. Ann. Sec. 35-6-118 
(Michie 1999).
    \5\ See Planned Parenthood of Rocky Mountain Services Corp. v. 
Owens, 107 F. Supp.2d 1271 (D. Colo. 2000) (medical emergency exception 
in parental notice statute impermissibly narrow); Glick v. McKay, 616 
F. Supp. 322, 327 (D. Nev. 1985) (enjoining Nevada's parental notice 
statute for its failure to ensure that bypass petitions are reviewed 
``with sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an 
abortion to be obtained''), aff'd, 937 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1991); 
American Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 800 (Cal. 1997) 
(parental consent statute violated State constitutional right to 
privacy); Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 
620 (N.J. 2000) (parental notification law with judicial waiver 
violates State constitution); Zbaraz v. Ryan, No. 84 C 771 (Ill. 
Supreme Ct. refused to issue rules implementing Ill. Stat.); Wicklund 
v. State, No. ADV-97-671 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Feb. 25, 1999) (parental 
notification law violated State constitution) available at http://
www.mtbizlaw.com/1stjd99/WICKLUND--2--11.htm. The New Mexico statute 
was ruled unconstitutional by the State attorney general. N.M. Ag. Op. 
90-19, 1990 WL 509-590. Four States are currently involved in 
litigation challenging their parental involvement statutes. An Arizona 
Federal district court upheld the constitutionality of Arizona's 
parental consent law on August 8, 2001. See Planned Parenthood of S. 
Ariz. v. Lawall, No. CV00-386-TUC-RCC (D. Ariz. Filed Aug. 9, 2001). 
According to news reports, however, enforcement of the law was stayed 
on September 13, 2001, pending an appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. See Court Stays ``Parental Consent'' Abortion Law, Associated 
Press, Sept. 15, 2001. The Alaska Supreme Court has reversed a trial 
court determination that the parental consent law violates the State 
constitution, and returned the case to the trial court in order to 
allow the State an opportunity to establish that the law serves a 
compelling State interest by narrowly tailored means. See State v. 
Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 2001 WL 1448754 at *10 (Alaska 2001). A 
Florida intermediate appellate court has upheld the Florida parental 
notification law as constitutional. State v. N. Fla. Women's Health and 
Counseling Service, Nos. 1D00-1983, 1D00-2106, 2001 WL 111037 (Fla. 
App. 1 Dist., 2001). The Florida Supreme Court has agreed to review 
this ruling. See N. Fla. Women's Health & counseling Service v. State, 
2001 WL 402634 (Fla. 2001). A Federal court upheld the consent 
provisions of Idaho's parental involvement law but struck as 
unconstitutional two of its provisions, one of which required a minor 
girl to pursue a judicial bypass in either her home county or the 
county within which the abortion is to be performed and another 
requiring doctors to notify a minor girl's parents within 24 hours of 
performing an emergency abortion on her without having obtained 
parental consent. See Mark Warbis, Federal Judge Upholds Law But 
Strikes Down Some Elements, Associated Press, Dec. 20, 2001.
    \6\ See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. Sec. 19(a)-601 (stating that the 
abortion provider need only discuss the possibility of parental 
involvement); Del. Code Ann. tit. 24, Sec. 1783(a) (allowing notice to 
a licensed mental health professional not associated with an abortion 
provider); Kan. Stat. Ann. Sec. 65-6705(j) (allowing a physician to 
bypass parental notice in cases where the physician determines that an 
emergency exists that threatens the ``well-being'' of the minor); Me. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, Sec. 1597-A(2) (allowing a minor to give 
informed consent after counseling by the abortion provider); Md. Code 
Ann., Health-Gen. Sec. 20-103(c) (allowing a physician to determine 
that parental notice is not in the minor's best interest); Ohio Rev. 
Code Ann. Sec. 2919.12 (stating that notice may be given to a brother, 
sister, step-parent, or grandparent if certain qualifications are met); 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 76-7-304 (stating that a physician need notify only 
if possible); W. Va. Code Sec. 16-2F-1 (stating physician not 
affiliated with an abortion provider may waive the notice requirement); 
Wis. Stat. Ann. Sec. 48-375 (stating that the notice may be given to 
any adult family member).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite widespread support for parental involvement laws 
and clear public policy considerations justifying such laws, 
however, there exists substantial evidence that they are 
frequently circumvented by adults who transport minors to 
abortion providers in States that do not have parental 
notification or consent laws.\7\ The purpose of the CCPA is to 
curb the interstate circumvention of these laws, thereby 
protecting the rights of parents and the interests of 
vulnerable minors. The CCPA is not a Federal parental 
involvement law; it merely ensures that these State laws are 
not evaded through interstate activity. As such, it reinforces 
the policy decisions of those States that have chosen to enact 
constitutionally-sound parental involvement laws. Parental 
involvement in the abortion decisions of minor girls will lead 
to improved medical care for minors seeking abortions and 
provide increased protection for young girls against sexual 
exploitation by adult men. The Supreme Court has observed that, 
``[t]he medical, emotional, and psychological consequences of 
an abortion are serious and can be lasting; this is 
particularly so when the patient is immature'' \8\ and ``[i]t 
seems unlikely that [the minor] will obtain adequate counsel 
and support from the attending physician at an abortion clinic, 
where abortions for pregnant minors frequently take place.'' 
\9\ Thus, Federal legislation is warranted due to the scope of 
the practice of avoiding such laws by transporting minors 
across State lines and the profound physical and psychological 
risks of an abortion to a minor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ An October 3, 2000, nationwide poll conducted by Zogby 
International found that 66 percent of those surveyed believed that 
doctors should be ``legally required to notify the parents of a girl 
under the legal age who requests an abortion.'' Zogby International, 
``Associated Television News Announces Bush Overwhelms Gore on 
Presidential Campaign's Major Public Policy Issues'', Oct. 8, 2000, PR 
Newswire 13:17:00. A Kaiser Family Foundation/MTV Survey of 603 people 
ages 18-24 found that 68% favored laws requiring parental consent prior 
to performance of an abortion on girls under 18. Kaiser Family 
Foundation New National Survey of 18- to 24-year-olds on Hot Button 
Political Issues, U.S. Newswire, Oct. 10, 2000, 2000 WL 26849324. A CBS 
News/NY Times Poll, released Jan. 15, 1998, found that 78% of those 
polled favor requiring parental consent before a girl under 18 years of 
age could have an abortion. Parental notification laws receive even 
greater support. A 1992 national poll by the Wirthlin Group found that 
80 percent of Americans support requiring parental notification before 
an abortion is performed on a girl under age 18.
    \8\ H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981).
    \9\ Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 (1976).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At hearings during the 105th, 106th, and 107th Congresses, 
the Subcommittee on the Constitution heard testimony from two 
mothers whose daughters were secretly taken for abortions, with 
devastating consequences. Eileen Roberts testified that her 13-
year-old daughter was encouraged by a boyfriend, with the 
assistance of his adult friend, to obtain a secret 
abortion.\10\ The adult friend drove Ms. Roberts' daughter to 
an abortion clinic 45 miles away from her home and paid for 
their daughter to receive the abortion.\11\ After 2 weeks of 
observing their daughter's depression, Ms. Roberts and her 
husband learned that the young girl had an abortion from a 
questionnaire they found under her pillow, which their daughter 
had failed to return to the abortion clinic.\12\
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    \10\ See Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 476 Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
107th Cong. (Sept. 6, 2001) (statement of Eileen Roberts).
    \11\ See id. While Ms. Roberts' daughter was not taken to another 
State, her story is illustrative of the harms involved when a child is 
secretly taken away from her parents for an abortion. After this 
experience, Ms. Roberts formed an organization called Mothers Against 
Minor Abortions (MAMA). Ms. Roberts testified: ``I speak today for 
those parents I know around the country, whose daughters have been 
taken out of State for their abortions.'' Id.
    \12\ See id.
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    Ms. Roberts' daughter was then hospitalized as a result of 
the depression, and a physical examination revealed that the 
abortion had been incompletely performed and required surgery 
to repair the damage done by the abortionist.\13\ The hospital 
called Ms. Roberts and told her that they could not do 
reparative surgery without a signed consent form.\14\ The 
following year, Ms. Robert's daughter developed an infection 
and was diagnosed with having pelvic inflammatory disease, 
which again required a 2-day hospitalization for antibiotic 
therapy and a signed consent form.\15\ Ms. Roberts and her 
family were responsible for over $27,000 in medical costs all 
of which resulted from this one secret abortion.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ See id.
    \14\ See id.
    \15\ See id.
    \16\ See id.
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    Joyce Farley, the mother of a minor girl, reported how her 
12-year-old daughter was provided alcohol, raped, and then 
taken out of State by the rapist's mother for an abortion.\17\ 
In the words of Joyce Farley, the abortion was arranged to 
destroy evidence--evidence that her 12-year-old daughter had 
been raped.\18\ On August 31, 1995, her daughter, who had just 
turned 13, underwent a dangerous medical procedure without 
anyone present who knew her past medical history (as shown by 
the false medical history that was given to the 
abortionist).\19\ Following the abortion, the mother of the 
rapist dropped off the child in another town 30 miles from the 
child's home.\20\ The child returned to her home with severe 
pain and bleeding which revealed complications from an 
incomplete abortion.\21\ When Joyce Farley contacted the 
original clinic that performed the abortion, the clinic told 
her that the bleeding was normal and to increase her daughter's 
Naprosyn, a medication given to her for pain, every hour if 
needed.\22\ Fortunately, Ms. Farley, being a nurse, knew this 
advice was wrong and could be harmful, but her daughter would 
not have known this.\23\ Because of her mother's intervention, 
Ms. Farley's daughter ultimately received further medical care 
and a second procedure to complete the abortion.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ See Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 3682 Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
105th Cong., (May 21, 1998) (statement of Joyce Farley).
    \18\ See id.
    \19\ See id.
    \20\ See id.
    \21\ See id.
    \22\ See id.
    \23\ See id.
    \24\ See id.
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               The Prevalence of This Interstate Activity

    There is no serious dispute regarding the fact that the 
transportation of minors across State lines in order to obtain 
abortions is both a widespread and frequent practice. Even 
groups opposed to this bill acknowledge that large numbers of 
minors are transported across State lines to obtain abortions, 
in many cases by adults other than their parents. In 1995, 
Kathryn Kolbert, then an attorney with the Center for 
Reproductive Law and Policy (a national pro-abortion legal 
defense organization), asserted that thousands of adults are 
helping minors cross State lines to get abortions in States 
whose parental involvement requirements are less stringent or 
non-existent: ``There are thousands of minors who cross State 
lines for an abortion every year and who need the assistance of 
adults to do that.''\25\ Just last August, New Jersey's Star-
Ledger reported that Laurie Lowenstein, Executive Director of 
Right to Choose, an abortion rights advocacy group, stated that 
she would quit her job to shuttle pregnant young girls to 
States without parental notification laws if New Jersey enacted 
a parental notification law.\26\ Only Congress, with its 
constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce, can 
curb such flagrant disregard of State laws.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Labor of Love is Deemed Criminal, The National Law Journal, 
Nov. 11, 1996, at A8.
    \26\ Jeff Whelan, McGreevey Reveals Latest Abortion Stance, The 
Star-Ledger, Aug. 30, 2001, available at http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/
index.ssf?elections/ledger/1440ef7.html (last visited on Aug. 30, 
2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pennsylvania
    Since Pennsylvania's current parental consent law took 
effect in March 1994, news reports have repeatedly maintained 
that many Pennsylvania teenagers are going out of State to New 
Jersey and New York to obtain abortions. In fact, in 1995 the 
New York Times reported that ``Planned Parenthood in 
Philadelphia has a list of clinics, from New York to Baltimore, 
to which they will refer teenagers, according to the 
organization's executive director, Joan Coombs.'' \27\ 
Moreover, the Times gave accounts of clinics that had seen an 
increase in patients from Pennsylvania.\28\ One clinic, in 
Cherry Hill, New Jersey, reported seeing a threefold increase 
in Pennsylvania teenagers coming for abortions.\29\ Likewise, a 
clinic in Queens, New York reported that it was not unusual to 
see Pennsylvania teenagers as patients in 1995, though earlier 
it had been rare.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ Teen-Agers Cross State Lines in Abortion Exodus, N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 18, 1995, at B6.
    \28\ See id.
    \29\ See id.
    \30\ See id.
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    In the period just prior to the Pennsylvania law taking 
effect, efforts were underway to make it easier for teenagers 
to go out of State for abortions. For instance, Newsday 
reported that ``[c]ounselors and activists are meeting to plot 
strategy and printing maps with directions to clinics in New 
York, New Jersey, Delaware and Washington, D.C., where 
teenagers can still get abortions without parental consent. . . 
. `We will definitely be encouraging teenagers to go out of 
State,' said Shawn Towey, director of the Greater Philadelphia 
Woman's Medical Fund, a nonprofit organization that gives money 
to women who can't afford to pay for their abortions.'' \31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ Charles V. Zehren, New Restrictive Abortion Law, Newsday, Feb. 
22, 1994.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, some abortion clinics in nearby States, such as 
New Jersey and Maryland, use the lack of parental involvement 
requirements in their own States as a ``selling point'' in 
advertising directed at minors in Pennsylvania. For example, 
the March 1999-February 2000 Yellow Pages for Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania contain advertisements from three New Jersey 
abortionists declaring ``No Parental Consent Required.'' \32\ A 
Rockville, Maryland abortionist ran a similar advertisement in 
the May 1998-April 1999 Yellow Pages for Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania. Such advertisements have appeared in telephone 
directories for Wilkes-Barre and Dallas, Scranton, Clarks 
Summit, and Carbondale, Bethlehem, Allentown, York, and Erie.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ Copies of these advertisements are attached.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Missouri
    In 1997, a study in the American Journal of Public Health 
reported that a leading abortion provider in Missouri refers 
minors out of State for abortions if the girls do not want to 
involve their parents. Reproductive Health Services, which 
performs over half of the abortions performed in Missouri, 
refers minors to the Hope Clinic for Women in Granite City, 
Illinois. Research reveals that based on the available data the 
odds of a minor traveling out of State for an abortion 
increased by over 50 percent when Missouri's parental consent 
law went into effect. Furthermore, compared to older women, 
underage girls were significantly more likely to travel out of 
State to have their abortions.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ See Charlotte Ellertson, Ph.D., Mandatory Parental Involvement 
in Minors' Abortions: Effects of the Laws in Minnesota, Missouri, and 
Indiana, American Journal of Public Health, Aug., 1997, at 1371.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A 1999 St. Louis Post-Dispatch news report confirms that 
the Hope Clinic in Illinois continues to attract underage girls 
seeking abortions without parental involvement.\34\ A clinic 
counselor estimates that she sees two girls each week seeking 
to avoid their home State's parental involvement law. One 
recent example was a 16-year-old girl from Missouri who had 
called abortion clinics in St. Louis and learned that parental 
consent was required before a minor could obtain an abortion. 
According to the report, the Hope Clinic performed 3,200 
abortions on out-of-State women last year, and the clinic's 
executive director estimates that that number is 45% of the 
total abortions performed at the clinic. The executive director 
also estimates that 13% of the clinic's clients are minors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ See Illinois May Tighten Rules on Abortions For Teens; 
Parental Consent is Not Required Abortion Bill Targets as Teen Haven 
For Abortion, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 25, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Massachusetts
    Massachusetts has also seen an increase in out-of-State 
abortions performed on its teenage residents since the State's 
parental consent law went into effect in April 1981, according 
to a published study and anecdotal information.\35\ A 1986 
study published in the American Journal of Public Health found 
that in the 4 months prior to implementation of the parental 
consent law, an average of 29 Massachusetts minors obtained 
out-of-State abortions each month (in Rhode Island, New 
Hampshire, Connecticut, and New York--data for Maine was not 
available).\36\ After the parental consent law was implemented, 
however, the average jumped to between 90 and 95 out-of-State 
abortions per month (using data from the five States of Rhode 
Island, New Hampshire, Connecticut, New York, and Maine)--
representing one-third of the abortions obtained by 
Massachusetts' minors.\37\
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    \35\ The Massachusetts law was changed in 1997 to require the 
consent of one parent (or judicial authorization), rather than both 
parents as previously required.
    \36\ See Virginia G. Cartoof & Lorraine V. Klerman, Parental 
Consent for Abortion: Impact of the Massachusetts Law, American Journal 
of Public Health, April 1986, at 397.
    \37\ See id. at 398.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The study noted that due to what the authors described as 
``astute marketing,'' one abortion clinic in New Hampshire was 
able to nearly double the monthly average of abortions 
performed on Massachusetts minors (from 14 in 1981 to 27 in 
1982). The abortionist ``began advertising in the 1982 Yellow 
Pages of metropolitan areas along the northern Massachusetts 
border, stating `consent for minors not required.' '' \38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ Id. at 399.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In April 1991, the Planned Parenthood League of 
Massachusetts estimated that approximately
    1,200 Massachusetts minor girls travel out of State for 
abortions each year, the majority of them to New Hampshire. 
Planned Parenthood said that surveys of New Hampshire clinics 
revealed an average of 100 appointments per month by 
Massachusetts minors.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ See M.A.J. McKenna, Mass. abortion laws push teens over 
border, Boston Herald, April 7, 1991, at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mississippi
    A 1995 study of the effect of Mississippi's parental 
consent law revealed that Mississippi has also experienced an 
increase in the number of minors traveling out of State for 
abortion. The study, published in Family Planning Perspectives, 
compared data for the 5 months before the parental consent law 
took effect in June 1993, with data for the 6 months after it 
took effect, and found that ``[a]mong Mississippi residents 
having an abortion in the State, the ratio of minors to older 
women decreased by 13%. . . . However, this decline was largely 
offset by a 32% increase in the ratio of minors to older women 
among Mississippi residents traveling to other States for 
abortion services.'' \40\ Based on the available data, the 
study suggests that the Mississippi parental consent law 
appeared to have ``little or no effect on the abortion rate 
among minors but a large increase in the proportion of minors 
who travel to other States to have abortions, along with a 
decrease in minors coming from other States to Mississippi.'' 
\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ Stanley K. Henshaw, The Impact of Requirements for Parental 
Consent on Minors' Abortions in Mississippi, Family Planning 
Perspectives, June, 1995, at 121.
    \41\ Id. at 122.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Virginia
    Grace S. Sparks, executive director of the Virginia League 
of Planned Parenthood, predicted in February 1997 that if 
Virginia were to pass a parental notification law, teenagers 
would travel out of State for abortions. ``In every State where 
they've passed parental notification, . . . there's been an 
increase in out-of-State abortions,'' she said, adding, ``I 
suspect that that's what will happen in Virginia, that 
teenagers who cannot tell their parents . . . will go out of 
State and have abortions. . . .'' \42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ Lisa A. Singh, Those Are the People Who Are Being Hurt, Style 
Weekly, Feb. 11, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Virginia's parental notification law took effect on July 1, 
1997. According to a recent article in The Washington Post, 
initial reports indicate that abortions performed on Virginia 
minors dropped 20 percent during the first 5 months that the 
law was in effect (from 903 abortions during the same time 
period in 1996 to approximately 700 abortions in 1997).\43\ The 
article suggests, however, that Virginia teenagers are 
traveling to the District of Columbia in order to obtain an 
abortion without involving their parent. In fact, the National 
Abortion Federation (NAF), which runs a toll-free national 
abortion hotline, said that calls from Virginia teenagers 
seeking information on how to obtain an abortion out-of-State 
were the largest source of teenage callers seeking out-of-State 
abortions, at seven to 10 calls per day. NAF hotline operator 
Amy Schriefer has gone so far as to talk a Richmond area 
teenage girl through the route (involving a Greyhound bus and 
the Metro's Red Line) to obtain an abortion in the District of 
Columbia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ Ellen Nakashima, Fewer Teens Receiving Abortions In Virginia, 
The Washington Post, March 3, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

               The Federal Role in Protecting Minors From

             Interstate Transportation in Circumvention of

                    State Parental Involvement Laws

    With respect to State laws requiring parental or judicial 
involvement in minors' abortion decisions, Federal legislation 
is warranted due to the scope of the practice of avoiding such 
laws by transporting minors across State lines and the profound 
physical and psychological risks of an abortion to a minor. The 
Supreme Court has observed that, ``[t]he medical, emotional, 
and psychological consequences of an abortion are serious and 
can be lasting; this is particularly so when the patient is 
immature,'' \44\ and ``[i]t seems unlikely that [the minor] 
will obtain adequate counsel and support from the attending 
physician at an abortion clinic, where abortions for pregnant 
minors frequently take place.'' \45\ Parental involvement in 
such a decision will lead to improved medical care for minors 
seeking abortions and provide increased protection for young 
girls against sexual exploitation by adult men.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\ H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981).
    \45\ Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 (1976).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Improved Medical Care of Minor Girls
    The medical care that minors seeking abortions receive is 
improved when their parents are involved in three ways. First, 
parental involvement allows parents to assist their daughter in 
the selection of a competent abortion provider. With all 
medical procedures, one of the most reliable means of 
guaranteeing patient safety is the professional competence of 
the physician performing the procedure. In Bellotti v. Baird, 
the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that parents 
posses a much greater ability to evaluate and select competent 
healthcare providers than their minor children often do:
    In this case, however, we are concerned only with minors 
who, according to the record, range in age from children of 
twelve years to 17-year-old teenagers. Even the later are less 
likely than adults to know or be able to recognize ethical, 
qualified physicians, or to have the means to engage such 
professionals. Many minors who bypass their parents probably 
will resort to an abortion clinic, without being able to 
distinguish the competent and ethical from those that are 
incompetent or unethical.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 at 641 n.21 (1979) (Bellotti 
II).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Court's concern for that ability of minors to 
distinguish between competent and ethical abortion providers is 
particularly well justified in States where non-physicians are 
allowed, by statute, to perform abortions. The National 
Abortion Federation recommends that patients seeking an 
abortion confirm that the abortion will be performed by a 
licensed physician in good standing with the State Board of 
Medical Examiners, and that he or she have admitting privileges 
at a local hospital not more than twenty minutes away from the 
location where the abortion is to occur.\47\ A well-informed 
parent seeking to guide her child is more likely to inquire 
into the qualifications of the person performing the abortion, 
and the availability of a physician with local admitting 
privileges, than an emotionally vulnerable young girl faced 
with pregnancy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ See National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League, 
Minors' Issues: Reproductive Choice Issues, at http://www.naral.org/
issues/issues--minors.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, parental involvement will insure that parents have 
the opportunity to provide additional medical history and 
information to abortion providers prior to performance of the 
abortion.

        The medical, emotional, and psychological consequences 
        of an abortion are serious and can be lasting; this is 
        particularly so when the patient is immature. An 
        adequate medical and psychological case history is 
        important to the physician. Parents can provide such 
        information for their daughter as well as any pertinent 
        family medical history, refer the physician to other 
        sources of medical history, such as family physicians, 
        and authorize family physicians to give relevant 
        data.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 at 411 (1981). Accord Ohio v. 
Akron Ctr. For Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 518-19 (1990).

Take, for example, the story of Sandra, a 14-year-old girl who 
committed suicide shortly after obtaining an abortion.\49\ 
Sandra's mother, who learned of her daughter's abortion only 
after her suicide, sued the abortion provider at which Sandra's 
abortion was performed, asserting that her daughter's death was 
due to the failure of the abortion provider to obtain a 
psychiatric history or monitor Sandra's mental health.\50\ The 
court concluded that Sandra was not insane at the time she 
committed suicide and, therefore, her actions broke the chain 
of causation required for recovery.\51\ Yet, evidence was 
presented that Sandra had a history of psychological illness, 
and that her behavior was noticeably different after the 
abortion.\52\ If Sandra's mother had been aware of her 
daughter's abortion, she would have had the opportunity to 
notify the abortion provider of Sandra's psychological history 
and steps could have been taken to minimize the psychological 
effect of the abortion on Sandra's already fragile mental 
state.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ See Edison v. Reproductive Health Services, 863 S.W.2d 621 
(Mo. App. E.D. 1993).
    \50\ See id. at 624.
    \51\ See id. at 628.
    \52\ See Edison v. Reproductive Health Services, 863 S.W.2d 621 
(Mo. App. E.D. 1993).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A more complete and thus more accurate medical history of 
the patient will enable abortion providers to disclose not only 
medical risks that ordinarily accompany abortions but also 
those risks that may be specific to the pregnant minor. 
Parental involvement will provide an adult with the opportunity 
to advise and assist the girl in giving her informed consent to 
the procedure.
    The third way in which parental involvement will improve 
medical treatment of pregnant minors is by insuring that 
parents have adequate knowledge to recognize and respond to any 
post-abortion complications that may develop.\53\ Although it 
is often claimed that abortion is one of the safest surgical 
procedures performed today, the actual rate of many of the 
complications associated with it are simply unknown: ``The 
abortion reporting systems of some countries and States in the 
United States include entries about complications, but these 
systems are generally considered to underreport infections and 
other problems that appear some time after the procedure was 
performed.'' \54\ Furthermore, women typically have no pre-
existing relationship with an abortion provider,\55\ which 
likely accounts for the fact that only about one-third return 
to the provider for their post-operative exam.\56\ Teenagers 
are even less likely to return for follow-up appointments.\57\ 
This failure to return for post-operative exams precludes 
discovery of post-abortion complications by abortion providers 
and subsequent reporting of these complications. Other 
healthcare providers may be reluctant to report any 
complications from fear of compromising the secrecy that often 
surrounds abortions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \53\ See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. For Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 
519 (1990).
    \54\ Stanley K. Henshaw, Unintended Pregnancy and Abortion: A 
Public Health Perspective in A Clinician's Guide to Medical and 
Surgical Abortions, 20 (Maureen Paul et al., eds. 1999).
    \55\ See State of Florida Department of Health v. North Florida 
Women's Health and Counseling Service, 2001 WL 111037 at n. 2 (Fla. 
App. 1 Dist., Feb 9, 2001):

      [E]vidence at trial showed, the physician-patient 
      relationship is often attenuated in the abortion context, 
      almost to the point of non-existence. Cf. Planned 
      Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 
      L.Ed.2d 788 (1976) (``It seems unlikely that [the minor] 
      will obtain adequate counsel and support from the attending 
      physician at an abortion clinic, where abortions for 
      pregnant minors frequently take place. ''). Abortion 
      patients ordinarily see their physicians only once or 
      twice, very briefly. Most of their interaction is with the 
      clinic's staff. Physicians performing abortions often 
      perform several in the space of a single hour. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ Stanley K. Henshaw, Unintended Pregnancy and Abortion: A 
Public Health Perspective in A Clinician's Guide to Medical and 
Surgical Abortions, 20 (Maureen Paul et al., eds. 1999). Cf. Richard S. 
Moon, Why I Don't Do Abortions Anymore, Medical Economics 61(Mar. 4, 
1985).
    \57\ Parental Notification of Abortion: Hearings on H. 218 Before 
the House Comm. on Health and Welfare, 2001-2002 Legis. (Vt. 
2001)(Nancy Mosher, President and CEO of Planned Parenthood of Northern 
New England on April 16, 2001)(estimating that two-third of Vermont 
women keep their follow up appointments, although Ateenagers are 
notorious for `no-showing').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is significant that at least one American court has held 
that a perforated uterus is a ``normal risk'' associated with 
abortion.\58\ Untreated, a perforated uterus may result in an 
infection, complicated by fever, endometritis, and 
parametritis. According to one study, ``[t]he risk of death 
from post-abortion sepsis [infection] is highest for young 
women, those who are unmarried, and those who undergo 
procedures that do not directly evacuate the contents of the 
uterus. . . . A delay in treatment allows the infection to 
progress to bacteremia, pelvic abscess, septic pelvic 
thrombophlebitis, disseminated intravascular coagulophy, septic 
shock, renal failure, and death.'' \59\ Evidence about these 
dangers presented at trial persuaded a Florida appellate court 
to uphold that State's parental notification law:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \58\ Reynier v. Delta Women's Clinic, 359 So.2d 733 (La. Ct. App. 
1978). ``All the medical testimony was to the effect that a perforated 
uterus was a normal risk, but the statistics given by the experts 
indicated that it was an infrequent occurrence and it was rare for a 
major blood vessel to be damaged.'' Id. at 738. Frequent injuries from 
incomplete abortions are discussed in Swate v. Schiffers, 975 S.W.2d 
70, 26 Media L. Rep. 2258 (Tex.App.-San Antonio, 1998) (abortionist 
unsuccessful claim of libel against journalist for reports based in 
part upon one disciplinary order that doctor had failed to complete 
abortions performed on several patients, and that he had failed to 
repair lacerations which occurred during abortion procedures) Cf. 
Sherman v. District of Columbia Bd. of Medicine, 557 A.2d 943, 944 
(D.C. 1989) (``Dr. Sherman placed his patients' lives at risk by using 
unsterile instruments in surgical procedures and by intentionally doing 
incomplete abortions (using septic instruments) to increase his fees by 
making later surgical procedures necessary. His practices made very 
serious infections (and perhaps death) virtually certain to occur. Dr. 
Sherman does not challenge our findings that his misconduct was willful 
nor that he risked serious infections in his patients for money.'').
    \59\ Phillip G. Stubblefield and David A. Grimes, Current Concepts: 
Septic Abortions, New Eng. J. Med. 310 (Aug. 4, 1994).

        The State proved that appropriate aftercare is critical 
        in avoiding or responding to post-abortion 
        complications. Abortion is ordinarily an invasive 
        surgical procedure attended by many of the risks 
        accompanying surgical procedures generally. If post-
        abortion nausea, tenderness, swelling, bleeding, or 
        cramping persists or suddenly worsens, a minor (like an 
        adult) may need medical attention. A guardian unaware 
        that her ward or a parent unaware that his minor 
        daughter has undergone an abortion will be at a serious 
        disadvantage in caring for her if complications 
        develop. An adult who has been kept in the dark cannot, 
        moreover, assist the minor in following the abortion 
        provider's instructions for post-surgical care. Failure 
        to follow such instructions can increase the risk of 
        complications. As the plaintiffs' medical experts 
        conceded, the risks are significant in the best of 
        circumstances. While abortion is less risky than some 
        surgical procedures, abortion complications can result 
        in serious injury, infertility, and even death.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \60\ State of Florida Department of Health v. North Florida Women's 
Health and Counseling Service, 2001 WL 111037 at *6 (Fla. App. 1 Dist., 
Feb 9, 2001).

    Young adolescent girls are particularly at risk of certain 
detrimental medical consequences from an abortion. For 
instance, there is a greater risk of cervical injury associated 
with suction-curettage abortions (at 12 weeks' gestation or 
earlier) performed on girls 17 or younger.\61\ Cervical injury 
is of serious concern because it may predispose the young girl 
to adverse outcomes in future pregnancies. Girls 17 or younger 
also face a two and a half times greater risk of acquiring 
endometriosis following an abortion than do women 20-29 years 
old.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \61\ See Willard Cates, Jr., M.D., M.P.H., Kenneth F. Schulz, 
M.B.A. & David A. Grimes, M.D., The Risks Associated With Teenage 
Abortion, New Eng. J. of Med., Sept. 15, 1983, at 621-624.
    \62\ See Burkman et al., Morbidity Risk Among Young Adolescents 
Undergoing Elective Abortion, Contraception, vol. 30 (1984), at 99-105.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The particular risks faced by minors upon whom abortions 
are performed were articulated by Dr. Bruce A. Lucero, an 
abortionist who performed some 45,000 abortions over the course 
of his career. Dr. Lucero, who supported the CCPA in 1998, 
wrote an op-ed for The New York Times about his own experience 
with minor girls seeking abortions. ``In almost all cases,'' 
Dr. Lucero wrote, ``the only reason that a teenage girl doesn't 
want to tell her parents about her pregnancy is that she feels 
ashamed and doesn't want to let her parents down.'' \63\ 
However, according to Dr. Lucero, ``parents are usually the 
ones who can best help their teenager consider her options. And 
whatever the girl's decision, parents can provide the necessary 
emotional support and financial assistance.'' \64\ Moreover, 
Dr. Lucero explained that ``patients who receive abortions at 
out-of-State clinics frequently do not return for follow-up 
care, which can lead to dangerous complications. And a teenager 
who has an abortion across State lines without her parents' 
knowledge is even more unlikely to tell them that she is having 
complications.'' \65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \63\ Bruce A. Lucero, M.D., Parental Guidance Needed, N.Y. Times, 
July 12, 1998, section 4, at 1.
    \64\ Id.
    \65\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite these benefits of better informed selection of 
abortion providers, improved medical histories, and appropriate 
post-operative care, opponents of H.R. 476 argue that mandatory 
parental involvement results in girls delaying their decisions 
to obtain abortions, thus increasing the risks attendant to the 
procedure.\66\ There is little evidence, however, that parental 
involvement laws actually result in medically significant 
delays in obtaining abortions. A study of Minnesota's parental 
notification law found that, ``Regardless [of the reason], the 
claim that the law caused more minors to obtain late abortions 
is unsubstantiated. In fact, the reverse is true. For ages 15-
17 the number of late abortions per 1,000 women decreased 
following the enactment of the law. Therefore, an increased 
medical hazard due to a rising number of late abortions was not 
realized.'' \67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \66\ Parental Notification of Abortion: Hearings on H. 218 Before 
the House Comm. on Judiciary, 2001-2002 Legis. (Vt. 2001)(Lori Burris, 
representative of Vermont Academy of Pediatrics)
    \67\ Rogers, James L., Boruch, Robert F., Stoms, George B. & 
DeMoya, Dorothy, Impact of the Minnesota Parental Notification Law on 
Abortion and Birth, 81 Amer. J. Pub. Health 294, 297 (Mar. 1991). Cf. 
Ellertson, Charlotte, Mandatory Parental Involvement in Minors' 
Abortions: Effects of the Laws in Minnesota, Missouri, and Indiana, 87 
Amer. J. Pub. Health 1367, 1372 (Aug. 1997) (``Evidence concerning 
delay is mixed.''). See also id. at 1374 (``During periods of the laws' 
enforcement in Minnesota and Indiana, the two states with gestational 
age at abortion, in-state abortions for minors were probably delayed 
into the second month of pregnancy, although probably not into the 
second trimester.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Without the knowledge that their daughters have had 
abortions, parents are incapable of insuring that their 
children obtain routine post-operative care or of providing an 
adequate medical history to physicians called upon to treat any 
complications that may arise. The first omission may allow 
complications such as infection, perforation, or depression, to 
continue untreated. The second omission may be lethal. When 
parents do not know that their daughter had an abortion, 
ignorance prevents swift and appropriate intervention by 
emergency room professionals responding to a life-threatening 
condition.
Increased Protection from Sexual Assault
    In addition to improving the medical care received by young 
girls dealing with an unplanned pregnancy, parental involvement 
will provide increased protection against sexual exploitation 
of minors by adult men. National studies reveal that ``[a]lmost 
two thirds of adolescent mothers have partners older than 20 
years of age.'' \68\ In a study of over 46,000 pregnancies by 
school-age girls in California, researchers found that ``71%, 
or over 33,000, were fathered by adult post-high-school men 
whose mean age was 22.6 years, an average of 5 years older than 
the mothers. . . . Even among junior high school mothers aged 
15 or younger, most births are fathered by adult men 6-7 years 
their senior. Men aged 25 or older father more births among 
California school-age girls than do boys under age 18.'' \69\ 
Other studies have found that most teenage pregnancies are the 
result of predatory practices by men who are substantially 
older.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \68\ American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Adolescence, 
Adolescent Pregnancy--Current Trends and Issues: 1998, 103 Pediatrics 
516, 519 (1999).
    \69\ Mike A. Males, Adult Involvement in Teenage Childbearing and 
STD, 346 Lancet 64 (July 8,1995) (emphasis added).
    \70\ See id. (citing HP Boyer and D. Fine, Sexual Abuse as a Factor 
in Adolescent Pregnancy and Child Maltreatment, 24 Fam. Plan. 
Perspectives 4 (1992)); See also HP Gershenson, et al. The Prevalence 
of Coercive Experience Among Teenage Mothers, 24 J. Interpersonal 
Violence. 4 (1989), and American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on 
Adolescence, Adolescent Pregnancy B Current Trends and Issues: 1998, 
103 Pediatrics 516, 516 (1999) (``Younger teenagers are especially 
vulnerable to coercive and nonconsensual sex. Involuntary sexual 
activity has been reported in 74% of sexually active girls younger than 
14 years and 60% of those younger than 15 years.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A 1989 study of coercive sexual experiences among teenage 
mothers found that of the pregnant teens who had had unwanted 
sexual experiences, only eighteen percent of the perpetrators 
were within the victim's age group. Another eighteen percent 
were three to 5 years older than the victim. Seventeen percent 
were six to 10 years older, and forty percent were more than 10 
years older than their victims.\71\ Another study reports that 
58 percent of the time it is the girl's boyfriend who 
accompanies her for an abortion when her parents have not been 
told about the pregnancy.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \71\ See Gershenson at 4.
    \72\ See Stanley Henshaw & Kathryn Post, Parental Involvement in 
Minors' Abortion Decisions, Family Planning Perspectives, Sept./Oct. 
1992, at 206.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Experience suggests that sexual predators recognize the 
advantage of their victims obtaining an abortion.\73\ Not only 
does an abortion eliminate a critical piece of evidence of the 
criminal conduct,\74\ it allows the abuse to continue 
undetected.\75\ Parental involvement laws insure that parents 
have the opportunity to protect their daughters from those who 
would victimize them further.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \73\ On June 14, 2000 a 36-year-old Omaha man who impersonated the 
father of his teenage victim in order to assist her in obtaining an 
abortion was sentenced to 1\1/2\ to 2 years in prison for felony child 
abuse. See Angie Brunkow, Man Who Said He Was Girl's Dad Sentenced, 
Omaha World-Herald (June 14, 2000) at 20. A similar attempt to hide the 
consequences of statutory rape is reflected in the testimony of Joyce 
Farley before the United States House of Representatives, Committee on 
the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution. See Child Custody 
Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 3682 Before the Subcomm. On 
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Congress, May 
21, 1998 (statement of Joyce Farley).
    \74\ See Commonwealth v. Sasville, 616 N.E.2d 476 (Mass. 1993) 
(destruction of aborted fetus precluded prosecution for forcible rape 
of a child under the age of sixteen). Compare Smith v. Com., 432 S.E.2d 
2 (Va. App. 1993) (prosecution for rape of 14-year-old girl), with 
Hampton v. State, 1987 WL. 28223 (Ark. App. 1987) (prosecution for 
incest), and State v. Khong, 502 N.E.2d 602 (Ohio App. 1985) 
(prosecutor subject to contempt order for failure to comply with 
discovery orders).
    \75\ Dee Dee Alonzo testified before the Texas Senate Human 
Services Committee in support of Senate Bill 30, the bill enacting the 
Texas Parental Notification Act. At age sixteen, she was seduced by her 
high school teacher. When she became pregnant, he persuaded her to have 
a secret abortion. She went to the clinic alone, obtained the abortion 
her seducer had paid for, and returned to continue the abusive 
relationship for another year. Ms. Alonzo testified ``No matter what 
their reaction would have been, they were my parents and they were 
adults, and they did love me, it would not have been a secret and the 
man would have been exposed.'' Testimony of Dee Dee Alonzo, Hearing on 
Tex. S.B. 30 Before the Senate Human Servs. Comm., 76th Leg., R.S. 4-5 
(Mar. 10, 1999) (tapes available from the Senate Staff Servs. Office 
and content is from private transcripts of those tapes). A similar 
incident involved another high school student impregnated by her 
teacher. This is revealed in the settlement related to injuries she 
suffered during the abortion of her pregnancy. See Clement v. Riston, 
No.B-131,033, settlement reported in Jury Verdict Research, Research, 
LRP Pub. No. 65904 available on Lexis-Nexis; cf. Patterson v. Planned 
Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 447 (Tex. 1998) (Gonzales, J., concurring) 
(describing the sexual abuse of a young girl that resulted in two 
pregnancies and two secret abortions).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In short, the physical and psychological risks of abortions 
to minors are great, and laws requiring parental involvement in 
such abortions (subject to judicial bypass procedures) reduce 
that risk. The widespread practice of avoiding such laws 
through interstate commerce may be prevented only through 
Federal legislation.

                        Constitutional Analysis

Constitutional Authority for the Child Custody Protection Act
    H.R. 476 is a regulation of commerce among the several 
States. Commerce, as that term is used in the Constitution, 
includes travel whether or not that travel is for reasons of 
business.\76\ To transport another person across State lines is 
to engage in commerce among the States. There is thus no need 
to address the scope of Congress' power to regulate activity 
that is not, but that affects, commerce among the States.\77\ 
Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, Congress can adopt 
rules concerning interstate commerce, such as this one, for 
reasons related primarily to local activity rather than 
commerce itself.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \76\ See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
    \77\ See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
295 U.S. 495 (1935); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995).
    \78\ See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The interstate transportation of minors for the purpose of 
securing an abortion is, therefore, clearly a form of 
interstate commerce which the Constitution expressly empowers 
Congress to regulate.\79\ H.R. 476 only regulates conduct which 
involves interstate movement, activity which the national 
Government alone is expressly authorized by the Constitution to 
address.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \79\ U.S. Const., art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federalism and the Child Custody Protection Act
    The Federal Government has long exercised its interstate 
commerce authority to prohibit interstate activity harmful to 
minors and their families. In 1910, Congress used its Commerce 
Clause power to enact the Mann Act,\80\ which prohibits the 
interstate transportation of women or minors for purposes of 
``prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral 
purpose.'' The Supreme Court upheld the enactment of this law 
as a constitutional exercise of Congress' power over 
transportation among the several States. The Court reasoned 
that if men and women employ interstate transportation to 
facilitate a wrong, then their right to interstate travel can 
be restricted.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \80\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2421.
    \81\ See Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The United States Constitution created a Federal Government 
with limited and enumerated powers. All other powers are, as 
stated in the Tenth Amendment, ``reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.'' \82\ According to Professor 
Stephen Presser of the Northwestern University School of 
Law,\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \82\ U.S. Const. amend. X.
    \83\ Professor Presser testified before the Subcommittee on the 
Constitution in support of the Child Custody Protection Act (then H.R. 
3682) during the 105th Congress, and submitted a written statement in 
support of the Act (then H.R. 1218) during the 106th Congress.

        [t]he Constitution created a Federal Government with 
        limited and enumerated powers, and much of the genius 
        of the document was the means employed for ensuring 
        that the Federal Government did not overwhelm the State 
        and local governments. The system of checks and 
        balances, whereby the three branches of the Federal 
        Government restrained each other, was an important 
        aspect of this plan, but equally important was the 
        basic notion that the Federal Government was not to 
        intrude on the domestic matters which had traditionally 
        been the prerogative of State and local 
        governments.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \84\ See Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1218 Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
106th Congress, May 27, 1999 (statement of Professor Stephen B. 
Presser, Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law).

    H.R. 476 respects this division of authority between the 
Federal Government and the States in that it does not attempt 
to regulate or impose policy on the individual States. Rather, 
H.R. 476 is predicated on the validity of State law and derives 
its substantive application from State law. According to 
Professor Presser, ``[b]y imposing penalties on anyone who 
seeks to deny a minor or her family the protections of a 
State's parental consent/judicial bypass provisions with regard 
to abortion, as H.R. 476 would do, the Congress would simply be 
reinforcing our Federalism scheme, and ensuring that each 
State's policy aims regarding this controversial issue are not 
frustrated.'' \85\ Professor Lino A. Graglia of the University 
of Texas Law School also testified that H.R. 476 ``furthers the 
principle of federalism'' in that it seeks to ``reinforce or 
make effective'' State policies that are being transgressed or 
evaded.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \85\ Id.
    \86\ See Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1218 Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
106th Congress, May 27, 1999 (statement of Professor Lino A. Graglia, 
Professor of Law, University of Texas Law School).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    H.R. 476 does not supercede, override, or alter existing 
State laws regarding minors' abortions. Rather, H.R. 476 uses 
Congress' authority to regulate interstate activity to protect 
State laws from evasion. As Professor Presser stated:

        [t]he political processes of each State exist to 
        resolve these difficult questions through the exercise 
        of popular sovereignty, the bedrock of our entire 
        Constitutional system. Not for nothing are the first 
        three words of the Constitution ``We the people,'' and 
        unless the Constitution itself expressly denies the 
        people any discretion over a particular area it is 
        their right, indeed, it is their duty to govern 
        themselves regarding that issue through the legislative 
        process. This is the most important right in the 
        Constitution, the right of self government, for which 
        our system of dual sovereignty exists. This Bill is an 
        important step in reinforcing Federalism and in 
        reinforcing self-government. It deserves to be 
        enacted.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \87\ See Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1218 Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
106th Congress, May 27, 1999 (statement of Professor Stephen B. 
Presser, Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law).

In short, H.R. 476 does not encroach on State powers, but 
rather reinforces State powers.
    H.R. 476 is not unlike the Mann Act which, before being 
amended in 1986, made it a crime to transport a woman across 
State lines ``for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or 
for any other immoral purpose.'' \88\ That statute was upheld 
as applied to the transportation of a person to Nevada for 
purposes of engaging in prostitution, even though prostitution 
was legal in Nevada.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \88\ 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2421 (1970). As amended, the statute 
prohibits the knowing transportation of any individual across State 
lines ``with the intent that such individual engage in prostitution, or 
in any sexual activity for which the person can be charged with a 
criminal offense, or attempts to do so. . . .'' 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2421 
(West Supp. 1999).
    \89\ See United States v. Pelton, 578 F.2d 701 (8th Cir. 1978).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A similar provision prohibited the persuading, inducing, 
enticing, or coercion of a minor girl ``to go from one place to 
another by common carrier . . . with the intent that she be 
induced or coerced to engage in prostitution, debauchery or 
other immoral practice.'' \90\ This provision would presumably 
have prohibited an individual from causing a 15 year old minor 
to travel from a State in which the minimum age for consensual 
sex was 16 to a State in which the minimum was 14, in order to 
have sex with her.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \90\ 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2423 (1970).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Opponents of H.R. 476 respond to this argument by noting 
that a violation of the Mann Act is not keyed to the underlying 
State law. But that distinction is of no significance. The Mann 
Act flatly prohibited the interstate transportation of women 
for ``prostitution'' or for ``any other immoral purpose.'' In 
the exercise of its commerce power, Congress could similarly 
prohibit the interstate transportation of minors for abortions 
without obtaining parental notice or consent, whether or not 
parental notice or consent is required by State law.\91\ 
Instead, H.R. 476 respects the laws of the various States by 
only prohibiting the interstate transportation of young girls 
in order to avoid the laws of States that have chosen to 
require parental involvement in the abortion decisions of 
minors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \91\ See Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 323 (1913) (noting, 
in upholding the constitutionality of the Mann Act, ``that Congress has 
power over transportation `among the several States;' that the power is 
complete in itself, and that Congress, as an incident to it, may adopt 
not only means necessary but convenient to its exercise, and the means 
may have the quality of police regulations'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, it is important to note that the Mann Act 
prohibited the interstate transportation of women for ``immoral 
purposes,'' and the Supreme Court upheld convictions under this 
provision for those who only transported women across State 
lines as ``mistresses'' and ``concubines.'' \92\ In upholding 
the law as a valid exercise of Congress' commerce power, the 
Court stated that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \92\ See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 483 (1917).

        [t]he transportation of passengers in interstate 
        commerce, it has long been settled, is within the 
        regulatory power of Congress, under the commerce clause 
        of the Constitution, and the authority of Congress to 
        keep the channels of interstate commerce free from 
        immoral and injurious uses has been frequently 
        sustained, and is no longer open to question.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \93\ Id. at 491.

    Just as it was appropriate for Congress to use its 
constitutional authority to keep the channels of interstate 
commerce free from ``immoral'' conduct, so it is also 
appropriate for Congress to exercise that authority to keep the 
channels of interstate commerce free from those who transport 
minors across State lines in order to circumvent State parental 
involvement laws.
    The Mann Act is also not the only example of Federal laws 
that prohibit interstate activities that might be legal in the 
State to which the activity is directed. Indeed, as long ago as 
1876, Congress ``made it a crime to deposit in the mails any 
letters or circulars concerning lotteries, whether illegal or 
chartered by State legislatures.'' \94\ A statute to this 
effect is still in force.\95\ Congress later prohibited the 
transportation of lottery tickets in interstate commerce, 
whether or not lotteries are legal in the State to which the 
tickets are transported.\96\ That provision was upheld by the 
Supreme Court in Champion v. Ames \97\ and is still in effect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \94\ United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 421 
(1993).
    \95\ See 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1302 (prohibiting the mailing of lottery 
tickets or letters, circulars, and other materials regarding a 
lottery).
    \96\ See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1301.
    \97\ 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Right to Travel and the Child Custody Protection Act
    CCPA's opponents argue that it violates the rights of 
States to enact and enforce their own laws governing conduct 
within their territorial boundaries. The simple response to 
this argument is that CCPA does not attempt to regulate conduct 
occurring solely within the territorial boundaries of a State. 
CCPA regulates interstate commerce, and Congress has the 
exclusive authority to regulate such activity. Moreover, rather 
than exercising Congress' commerce power to its full extent 
(i.e., by prohibiting the transportation of minors in 
interstate commerce for the purpose of obtaining an abortion 
without parental notice or consent), CCPA will reinforce the 
choices of States that have chosen to require parental 
involvement in the abortion decision of minors. The laws of 
States that do not require such involvement are not affected by 
CCPA.
    Opponents also argue that CCPA violates the rights of 
residents of each of the United States and of the District of 
Columbia to travel to and from any State of the Union for 
lawful purposes. Those opposed to CCPA on these grounds argue 
that its result is to hold a pregnant minor ``hostage'' to the 
laws of her home State. As an initial matter, it does not 
appear that the Supreme Court has ever held that Congress' 
power to regulate interstate commerce is limited by the ``right 
to travel.'' Even assuming, however, that Congress' authority 
under the Commerce Clause is limited by the right to travel 
doctrine, the Supreme Court has recognized that the right to 
travel is ``not absolute,'' and is not violated so long as 
there is a ``substantial reason for the discrimination beyond 
the mere fact that they are citizens of other States.'' \98\ 
Congress obviously has a substantial interest in protecting the 
health and well-being of minor girls, and in protecting the 
rights of parents to raise their children.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \98\ Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 (1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Protecting the health and well-being of minor girls and the 
rights of parents to raise their children are substantial, 
indeed compelling, reasons for restricting minors from 
obtaining an abortion without parental involvement. First, 
young adolescent girls who undergo abortions face a significant 
chance of suffering from long-term physical and psychological 
complications. These risks are not shared by older teenage 
girls who have undergone an abortion. Second, 
``[c]onstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized 
that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to 
direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure 
of our society,'' and that ``[p]roperly understood, then, the 
tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our 
tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of 
the basic presuppositions of the latter.'' \99\ Thus, ``[u]nder 
the Constitution, the State can properly conclude that parents 
. . . who have [the] primary responsibility for children's 
well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid 
discharge of that responsibility.'' \100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \99\ Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (Bellotti II).
    \100\ Id. at 639.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Third, the fundamental rights of minors, including the 
right to travel, are not equal to those of adults. Although the 
Court has previously concluded that the fundamental rights of a 
child are ``virtually coextensive with that of an adult,'' 
\101\ it also has recognized that ``[t]hese rulings have not 
been made on the uncritical assumption that the constitutional 
rights of children are indistinguishable from those of 
adults.'' \102\ Thus, ``the State is entitled to adjust its 
legal system to account for children's vulnerability and their 
needs for `concern, . . . sympathy, and . . . paternal 
attention.' '' \103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \101\ Id. at 634
    \102\ Id. at 635.
    \103\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Based upon this reasoning the Court has allowed States to 
enact laws that ``account for children's vulnerability'' and 
that protect the unique role of parents:

        [T]he Court has held that the States validly may limit 
        the freedom of children to choose for themselves in the 
        making of important, affirmative choices with 
        potentially serious consequences. These rulings have 
        been grounded in the recognition that, during the 
        formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors 
        often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to 
        recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental 
        to them.\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \104\ Id.

    Thus, ``[l]egal restrictions on minors, especially those 
supportive of the parental role may be important to the child's 
chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual 
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding.'' 
\105\ Therefore, a State may properly subject minors to more 
stringent limitations than are permissible with respect to 
adults. Examples include laws that prohibit the sale of 
cigarettes and alcoholic beverages to minors, laws that 
prohibit the sale of firearms and deadly weapons to minors 
without parental consent, and laws that prohibit third parties 
from exposing minors to certain types of literature. Equally, 
Congress may restrict the right of minors to travel across 
State lines to a greater extent than it may adults.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \105\ Id. at 638-39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Roe v. Wade and the Child Custody Protection Act
    In Roe v. Wade,\106\ a majority of the Supreme Court found 
that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which 
provides that no State shall deprive any person of ``life, 
liberty, or property'' without due process of law, includes 
within it a ``substantive'' component which bars a State from 
prohibiting abortions under some circumstances. This 
substantive component of the Due Process Clause, also described 
in that case as including a ``right to privacy,'' was construed 
to forbid virtually all State prohibitions on abortion during 
the first trimester of pregnancy.\107\ In Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey,\108\ the scope of permissible State regulation of 
abortion and the standards to be applied in evaluating the 
constitutionality of the regulation were significantly changed. 
Instead of declaring that the right to seek an abortion was a 
``fundamental right'' requiring a ``compelling State interest'' 
in order to be regulated, the new holding was that State 
regulation of abortion was permissible so long as such 
regulation did not place an ``undue burden'' on a woman's 
exercise of her constitutional rights with regard to 
abortion.\109\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \106\ 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
    \107\ See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 985 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting).
    \108\ 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
    \109\ For the articulation of the ``undue burden'' standard in 
Casey, see id. at 874-880. While the ``undue burden'' standard as 
expressed in Casey appeared only to be the views of the three-person 
plurality, Justice Scalia predicted that ``undue burden'' would 
henceforward be the relevant standard, see id. at 984-995 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). It now appears that the lower Federal courts understand 
that the ``undue burden'' standard is the correct one to be applied in 
abortion cases, see, e.g., Manning v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254, 260 (4th Cir. 
1997) (``The trend does appear to be a move away from the strict 
scrutiny standard toward the so-called `undue burden' standard of 
review.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    H.R. 476 does not place an undue burden upon a woman's 
right to abortion because it does not raise any questions 
concerning the permissible regulation of abortion that are 
independent of the State laws that it is designed to 
effectuate. To the extent that a State rule is inconsistent 
with the Court's doctrine, that rule is ineffective and H.R. 
476 would not make it effective. Therefore, it is unnecessary 
to ask whether, for example, the ``life exception'' in 
Subsection (b) of H.R. 476 is an adequate exception to a rule 
regulating abortion or whether the inability to circumvent a 
State law is an ``undue burden.'' Because constitutional limits 
on the States' regulatory authority are in effect incorporated 
into Subsection (a) of the Act, Subsection (b) is in addition 
to any exceptions required by the Court's doctrine.
Constitutionality of Parental Involvement Laws
    Following the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade,\110\ many 
States enacted parental consent or notification statutes 
requiring minors to notify or seek the consent of their parents 
before undergoing an abortion. Parental consent laws generally 
require one or both parents to give actual consent to the 
minor's decision to have an abortion. Parental notification 
laws typically require the physician, or in some statutes 
another health care provider, to notify one or both of the 
parents of the minor female at some time prior to the abortion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \110\ 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Court first considered parental involvement in a minor 
daughter's abortion in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri 
v. Danforth.\111\ The Missouri statute gave a minor girl's 
parent an absolute veto over her decision to have an abortion. 
The majority, led by Justice Blackmun, concluded that such a 
veto power was unconstitutional.\112\ The majority noted, 
however, that the Court ``long has recognized that the State 
has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of 
children than of adults'' and ``emphasized'' that its holding 
in the case ``does not suggest that every minor, regardless of 
age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of 
her pregnancy.'' \113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \111\ 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
    \112\ Id. at 74.
    \113\ Id. at 74, 75.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Court next addressed State parental involvement laws in 
Bellotti v. Baird,\114\ remanding a parental consent statute 
that was unclear as to whether the parents had authority to 
veto the abortion and as to the availability of a judicial 
bypass procedure.\115\ The statute returned to the Supreme 
Court in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II).\116\ The statute in 
Bellotti II required a minor to obtain the consent of her 
parents or circumvent this requirement through a judicial 
bypass proceeding that did not take into account whether the 
minor was sufficiently mature to make an informed decision 
regarding the abortion. The Supreme Court invalidated the 
statute without a majority opinion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \114\ 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
    \115\ In doing so the Court recongized minors bear ``unquestionably 
greater risks of inability to give an informed consent.'' Id. at 147.
    \116\ 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Justice Powell's plurality opinion held that a State could 
limit the ability of a minor girl to obtain an abortion by 
requiring notification or consent of a parent if, but only if, 
the State established a procedure where the minor girl could 
bypass the consent or notification requirement.\117\ Thus, 
Justice Powell stated, ``constitutional interpretation has 
consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in 
their own household to direct the rearing of their children is 
basic in the structure of our society,'' and that ``[p]roperly 
understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not 
inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty; rather, 
the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the latter.'' 
\118\ This has become the de facto constitutional standard for 
parental consent and notification laws. In upholding parental 
involvement laws, the plurality found three reasons why the 
constitutional rights of minors were not identical to the 
constitutional rights of adults: ``The peculiar vulnerability 
of children; their inability to make decisions in an informed, 
mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child 
rearing.'' \119\ Thus, the plurality sought to design 
guidelines for a judicial bypass proceeding that allowed States 
to address these interests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \117\ See id. at 651.
    \118\ Belloti II, 443 U.S. at 638.
    \119\ Id. at 634.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In H.L. v. Matheson,\120\ a minor girl challenged the 
constitutional validity of a State statute that required a 
physician to give notice to the parents of a minor girl 
whenever possible before performing an abortion on her. By a 
vote of six to three, the statute was found to be 
constitutional. The Court held that a State could require 
notification of the parents of a minor girl because the 
notification ``furthers a constitutionally permissible end by 
encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and 
advice of her parents in making the very important decision 
whether or not to bear a child.'' \121\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \120\ 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
    \121\ Id. at 409.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri, 
Inc. v. Ashcroft,\122\ the Court found a State law to be 
constitutional which required a minor to obtain the consent of 
one of her parents before obtaining an abortion or, in the 
alternative, to obtain the consent of a juvenile court judge. 
While there was no majority opinion, this case marked the first 
time the Court directly upheld a parental consent requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \122\ 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,\123\ the 
Supreme Court upheld a statute that required a physician to 
give notice to one of the minor's parents or, under some 
circumstances, another relative, before performing an abortion 
on the minor. The statute permitted the physician and the minor 
to avoid the requirement by a judicial bypass. Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the majority, held that the bypass proceeding did 
not unconstitutionally impair a minor's rights by the creation 
of unnecessary delay.\124\ The Court established in this case 
that it will not invalidate State procedures so long as they 
seem to be reasonably designed to provide the minor with an 
expedited process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \123\ 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
    \124\ See id. at 514-515.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In Hodgson v. Minnesota,\125\ the Court invalidated a State 
statute that required notification of both parents prior to a 
minor girl's abortion without the option of a judicial bypass. 
The Court, however, upheld statutory requirements that both 
parents be notified of the abortion and a 48 hour waiting 
period between notification and the performance of the 
abortion, if such requirements were accompanied by a judicial 
bypass procedure that met constitutional standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \125\ 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Judicial Bypass Procedures
    In Bellotti v. Baird,\126\ the United States Supreme Court 
set forth the basic test by which judicial bypass proceedings 
pursuant to a parental notice or consent statute must be 
reviewed. Bypass procedures must allow the minor to show that 
she possesses maturity and information to make the decision, in 
consultation with her physician, without regard to her parents' 
wishes; or that even if she cannot make the decision by 
herself, that the ``desired abortion would be in her best 
interests''\127\; be confidential; and be conducted ``with 
expedition to allow the minor an effective opportunity to 
obtain the abortion.'' \128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \126\ 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II).
    \127\ Id. at 644.
    \128\ Id. Factors that may be considered in determining 
``immaturity'' include work and personal experience, appreciation of 
the gravity of the procedure, and judgment. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 
497 U.S. 417 (1990). Under the ``best interests'' analysis judges often 
consider medical risks to the minor as a result of the time, place or 
type of procedure to be performed, medical risks particular to the 
girl, evidence of physicial, sexual, or emotional abuse by parents or 
guardians, and abortion alternatives such as marriage, adoption, and 
single motherhood.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Some critics of H.R. 476 argue that it will remove the only 
viable option available to minors who feel that they cannot 
tell their parents that they wish to obtain abortions. This 
argument ignores, however, the available judicial bypass 
procedures which all valid parental involvement statutes 
contain. Opponents of H.R. 476 also argue that judicial bypass 
procedures are too complicated and intrusive to be an effective 
option for most young girls. Yet, in actuality, judicial bypass 
proceedings are quite simple and bypasses are easily 
obtained.\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \129\ A survey of Massachusetts cases filed between 1981 and 1983 
found that every minor that sought judicial authorization to bypass 
parental consent received it. See Robert H. Mnookin, Bellotti v. Baird, 
A Hard Case in In the Interest of Children: Advocacy, Law Reform, and 
Public Policy 149 at 239 (Robert H. Mnookin ed., 1985). A subsequent 
study found that orders were refused to only 1 of 477 girls seeking 
judicial authorization from Massachusetts courts between December 1981 
and June 1985. See Susanne Yates & Anita J. Pliner, Judging Maturity in 
the Courts: the Massachusetts Consent Statute, 78 Am. J. Pub. Health 
646, 647 (1988). The average hearing lasted only 12.12 minutes, and 
``more than 92 percent of the hearings [were] less than or equal to 20 
minutes.'' Id. at 648. Based upon a review of bypass petitions filed in 
Minnesota from August 1, 1981, to March 1, 1986, a Federal trial court 
determined that of the 3,573 bypass petitions filed, six were 
withdrawn, nine were denied, and 3,558 were granted. See Hodgson v. 
State of Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 765 (D. Minn. 1986). Similar ease 
in obtaining judicial approval as an alternative to parental 
involvement is suggested by a recent report on the newly enacted 
Virginia statute requiring parental notification. Out of 18 requests 
for judicial bypass, ``all but one of the requests were granted 
eventually.'' Ellen Nakashima, Fewer Teens Receiving Abortion in 
Virginia: Notification Law to Get Court Test, Washington Post (March 3, 
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Critics of H.R. 476 also claim that the measure endangers 
the health of young girls who are forced to travel out of State 
to obtain abortions because the judges in their home States 
either refuse to hear judicial bypass petitions or deny them 
arbitrarily. In support of this argument, the critics cite 
cases like that of Ms. Billie Lominick, who testified before 
the Constitution Subcommittee regarding her experience with 
South Carolina's judicial bypass procedures. According to Ms. 
Lominick, who assisted her grandson's girlfriend in obtaining 
an out-of-State abortion, only two judges in the whole State of 
South Carolina would even hear a judicial bypass petition, and 
one of those judges, according to Ms. Lominick, would only hear 
petitions from girls residing in his county.\130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \130\  See Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1218 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 106th Cong. (May 27, 1999) (statement of Billie Lominick).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This argument overlooks the fact that H.R. 476 merely 
provides assistance in the enforcement of constitutional State 
parental notice and consent laws. If there are only two judges 
in an entire State willing to hear judicial bypass proceedings, 
that State's parental involvement laws are likely 
unconstitutional under Supreme Court precedent which requires 
the State to provide a minor the opportunity to seek a judicial 
bypass with ``sufficient expedition to provide an effective 
opportunity for an abortion to be obtained.'' \131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \131\ Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644 (1979) (plurality 
opinion).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This fact is illustrated by the First Circuit's decision in 
Planned Parenthood League v. Bellotti.\132\ In that case the 
court held that the plaintiffs could successfully challenge the 
State's judicial bypass procedures if they could present 
``proof of `a systemic failure to provide a judicial bypass 
option in the most expeditious, practical manner.` '' \133\ The 
court of appeals remanded the case to the lower court so that 
the plaintiffs' could present evidence that, among other 
things, judges were `` `defacto unavailable' to hear minors' 
abortion petitions,'' \134\ and many judges were avoided ``for 
reasons of hostility.'' \135\ The Sixth Circuit has also 
recognized that a constitutional challenge may be brought for a 
State's systemic failure to provide an expeditious judicial 
bypass.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \132\ 868 F.2d 459 (1st Cir. 1989).
    \133\ Id. at 469 (quoting Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F.Supp. 756, 
777 (1986)).
    \134\ Id. at 463.
    \135\ Id. at 461 n.6.
    \136\  See Cleveland Surgi-Center, Inc. v. Jones, 2 F.3d 686, 690 
(6th Cir. 1993).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Not only must States provide access to judges who are 
willing to hear judicial bypass petitions, States must also 
ensure that the judges who do hear bypass petitions render 
their decisions in an expedited fashion. For example, in 
Planned Parenthood of Southern Arizona v. Lawall,\137\ the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck down an Arizona 
parental consent statute on the grounds that its judicial 
bypass provision lacked specific time limits, and was therefore 
in violation of the Bellotti II expediency requirement. The 
court reached this conclusion even though the Arizona statute 
stated that such proceedings were to be given priority, and 
required that ``the court shall reach the decision [on a bypass 
request] promptly and without delay to serve the best interests 
of a pregnant minor.'' \138\ The court's rationale in adopting 
a strict interpretation of the Supreme Court's timeliness 
requirement was that ``[o]pen-ended bypass provisions engender 
substantial possibilities of delay for minors seeking 
abortions.'' \139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \137\ 1999 WL 371565 (9th Cir. June 9, 1999).
    \138\ Id. at *4.
    \139\ Id. at *8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Fifth Circuit employed essentially identical reasoning 
in striking down a Louisiana judicial bypass procedure having 
indefinite time limits.\140\ The court found that ``not only do 
[the bypass procedures] fail to provide any specific time 
within which a minor's application will be decided, but they 
give no assurances (assurances required by Bellotti II) that 
the proceedings will conclude expeditiously.'' \141\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \140\ See Causeway Medical Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096 (5th Cir. 
1997).
    \141\ Id. at 1110-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As these cases illustrate, judicial bypass procedures must 
be readily accessible and efficient in order to pass 
constitutional muster. H.R. 476 will only assist in the 
enforcement of parental involvement laws which meet the 
relevant constitutional criteria.
    This line of cases makes clear that a State may require the 
consent or notification of one or both of a minor's parents if 
the State provides for a constitutionally sound judicial bypass 
procedure. The Child Custody Protection Act is designed to 
preserve the application of such State laws, supplemented by a 
penalty section to provide a uniform penalty for those 
individuals circumventing laws by crossing State lines. Because 
the Act derives its substantive content entirely from State 
law, the Act will only be enforceable when a prosecutor can 
show that a constitutionally sound State parental consent or 
notification law exists. Thus, the CCPA itself does not 
independently implicate any constitutional issues associated 
with parental notification or consent statutes.

                                Hearings

    The Committee's Subcommittee on the Constitution held a 
hearing on H.R. 476 on September 6, 2001. Testimony was 
received from the following witnesses: Ms. Eileen Roberts, 
Mothers Against Minors' Abortions, Inc.; Professor John C. 
Harrison, Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of 
Law; Rev. Katherine Ragsdale, Vicar, St. David's Episcopal 
Church; and Ms. Teresa S. Collett, Professor of Law, South 
Texas College of Law. Additional material was submitted by 
Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL); Mr. Laurence H. Tribe, 
Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Unviersity and 
Mr. Peter J. Rubin, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown 
University; Bill and Karen Bell; and the Center for 
Reproductive Law and Policy.

                        Committee Consideration

    On February 7, 2002, the Subcommittee on the Constitution 
met in open session and ordered favorably reported the bill 
H.R. 476, by a voice vote, a quorum being present. On March 20, 
2002, the Committee met in open session and ordered favorably 
reported the bill H.R.476 without amendment by a recorded vote 
of 19 to 6, a quorum being present.

                         Vote of the Committee

    1. An amendment was offered by Mrs. Waters to prohibit 
subsection (a) of the Act from applying ``if the pregnancy is 
the result of sexual contact with a parent or any other person 
who has permanent or temporary care or custody or 
responsibility for supervision of the minor, or by any 
household or family member.'' The amendment was defeated by a 
rollcall vote of 12 to 16.

                                                   ROLLCALL NO. 1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Ayes            Nays           Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde........................................................
Mr. Gekas.......................................................                              X
Mr. Coble.......................................................                              X
Mr. Smith (Texas)...............................................                              X
Mr. Gallegly....................................................
Mr. Goodlatte...................................................                              X
Mr. Bryant......................................................                              X
Mr. Chabot......................................................                              X
Mr. Barr........................................................                              X
Mr. Jenkins.....................................................                              X
Mr. Cannon......................................................
Mr. Graham......................................................
Mr. Bachus......................................................                              X
Mr. Hostettler..................................................                              X
Mr. Green.......................................................                              X
Mr. Keller......................................................                              X
Mr. Issa........................................................                              X
Ms. Hart........................................................                              X
Mr. Flake.......................................................
Mr. Pence.......................................................                              X
Mr. Conyers.....................................................              X
Mr. Frank.......................................................              X
Mr. Berman......................................................              X
Mr. Boucher.....................................................
Mr. Nadler......................................................              X
Mr. Scott.......................................................              X
Mr. Watt........................................................              X
Ms. Lofgren.....................................................              X
Ms. Jackson Lee.................................................              X
Ms. Waters......................................................              X
Mr. Meehan......................................................
Mr. Delahunt....................................................
Mr. Wexler......................................................
Ms. Baldwin.....................................................              X
Mr. Weiner......................................................              X
Mr. Schiff......................................................              X
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman.....................................                              X
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................................             12              16
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. An amendment was offered by Mr. Nadler prohibiting H.R. 
476 from applying ``with respect to conduct by a grandparent or 
adult sibling of the minor.'' The amendment was defeated by a 
rollcall vote of 11 to 16.

                                                   ROLLCALL NO. 2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Ayes            Nays           Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde........................................................
Mr. Gekas.......................................................                              X
Mr. Coble.......................................................                              X
Mr. Smith (Texas)...............................................                              X
Mr. Gallegly....................................................
Mr. Goodlatte...................................................                              X
Mr. Bryant......................................................
Mr. Chabot......................................................                              X
Mr. Barr........................................................                              X
Mr. Jenkins.....................................................                              X
Mr. Cannon......................................................
Mr. Graham......................................................                              X
Mr. Bachus......................................................                              X
Mr. Hostettler..................................................                              X
Mr. Green.......................................................                              X
Mr. Keller......................................................                              X
Mr. Issa........................................................                              X
Ms. Hart........................................................                              X
Mr. Flake.......................................................
Mr. Pence.......................................................                              X
Mr. Conyers.....................................................              X
Mr. Frank.......................................................              X
Mr. Berman......................................................              X
Mr. Boucher.....................................................
Mr. Nadler......................................................              X
Mr. Scott.......................................................              X
Mr. Watt........................................................              X
Ms. Lofgren.....................................................
Ms. Jackson Lee.................................................              X
Ms. Waters......................................................              X
Mr. Meehan......................................................
Mr. Delahunt....................................................
Mr. Wexler......................................................
Ms. Baldwin.....................................................              X
Mr. Weiner......................................................              X
Mr. Schiff......................................................              X
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman.....................................                              X
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................................             11              16
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    3. Motion to reconsider the previous question on H.R. 476 
was defeated by a rollcall vote of 7 to 16.

                                                   ROLLCALL NO. 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Ayes            Nays           Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde........................................................                              X
Mr. Gekas.......................................................                              X
Mr. Coble.......................................................                              X
Mr. Smith (Texas)...............................................                              X
Mr. Gallegly....................................................                              X
Mr. Goodlatte...................................................
Mr. Bryant......................................................
Mr. Chabot......................................................                              X
Mr. Barr........................................................                              X
Mr. Jenkins.....................................................                              X
Mr. Cannon......................................................                              X
Mr. Graham......................................................                              X
Mr. Bachus......................................................
Mr. Hostettler..................................................                              X
Mr. Green.......................................................                              X
Mr. Keller......................................................                              X
Mr. Issa........................................................                              X
Ms. Hart........................................................                              X
Mr. Flake.......................................................
Mr. Pence.......................................................
Mr. Conyers.....................................................
Mr. Frank.......................................................
Mr. Berman......................................................
Mr. Boucher.....................................................
Mr. Nadler......................................................              X
Mr. Scott.......................................................              X
Mr. Watt........................................................              X
Ms. Lofgren.....................................................
Ms. Jackson Lee.................................................              X
Ms. Waters......................................................              X
Mr. Meehan......................................................
Mr. Delahunt....................................................
Mr. Wexler......................................................
Ms. Baldwin.....................................................              X
Mr. Weiner......................................................
Mr. Schiff......................................................              X
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman.....................................                              X
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................................              7              16
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    4. Final Passage. The motion to report favorably the bill 
H.R. 476 was agreed to by a rollcall vote of 19 to 6.

                                                   ROLLCALL NO. 4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Ayes            Nays           Present
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde........................................................              X
Mr. Gekas.......................................................              X
Mr. Coble.......................................................              X
Mr. Smith (Texas)...............................................              X
Mr. Gallegly....................................................              X
Mr. Goodlatte...................................................              X
Mr. Bryant......................................................
Mr. Chabot......................................................              X
Mr. Barr........................................................              X
Mr. Jenkins.....................................................              X
Mr. Cannon......................................................              X
Mr. Graham......................................................              X
Mr. Bachus......................................................              X
Mr. Hostettler..................................................              X
Mr. Green.......................................................              X
Mr. Keller......................................................              X
Mr. Issa........................................................              X
Ms. Hart........................................................              X
Mr. Flake.......................................................
Mr. Pence.......................................................              X
Mr. Conyers.....................................................
Mr. Frank.......................................................
Mr. Berman......................................................
Mr. Boucher.....................................................
Mr. Nadler......................................................                              X
Mr. Scott.......................................................                              X
Mr. Watt........................................................                              X
Ms. Lofgren.....................................................
Ms. Jackson Lee.................................................                                              X
Ms. Waters......................................................                              X
Mr. Meehan......................................................
Mr. Delahunt....................................................
Mr. Wexler......................................................
Ms. Baldwin.....................................................                              X
Mr. Weiner......................................................
Mr. Schiff......................................................                              X
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman.....................................              X
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................................             19               6               1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the 
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on 
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the 
descriptive portions of this report.

                    Performance Goals and Objectives

    H.R. 476 does not authorize funding. Therefore, clause 3(c) 
of rule XIII of the Rules of the House is inapplicable.

               New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

    Clause 3(c)(2) of House rule XIII is inapplicable because 
this legislation does not provide new budgetary authority or 
increased tax expenditures.

               Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with 
respect to the bill, H.R. 476, the following estimate and 
comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget 
Office under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 
1974:

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                    Washington, DC, March 22, 2002.
Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman,
Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 476, the Child 
Custody Protection Act.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Mark 
Grabowicz, who can be reached at 226-2860.
            Sincerely,
                                  Dan L. Crippen, Director.

Enclosure

cc:
        Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
        Ranking Member
H.R. 476--Child Custody Protection Act.
    CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 476 would not result 
in any significant cost to the Federal Government. Because 
enactment of H.R. 476 could affect direct spending and 
receipts, pay-as-you-go procedures would apply to the bill. 
However, CBO estimates that any impact on direct spending and 
receipts would not be significant. H.R. 476 contains no 
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would impose no costs on 
State, local, or tribal governments.
    H.R. 476 would make it a Federal crime to transport a minor 
across state lines, under certain circumstances, to obtain an 
abortion without parental notification. Violators would be 
subject to imprisonment and fines. As a result, the Federal 
Government would be able to pursue cases that it otherwise 
would not be able to prosecute. CBO expects that any increase 
in Federal costs for law enforcement, court proceedings, or 
prison operations would not be significant, however, because of 
the small number of cases likely to be involved. Any such 
additional costs would be subject to the availability of 
appropriated funds.
    Because those prosecuted and convicted under H.R. 476 could 
be subject to criminal fines, the Federal Government might 
collect additional fines if the bill is enacted. Collections of 
such fines are recorded in the budget as governmental receipts 
(revenues), which are deposited in the Crime Victims Fund and 
later spent. CBO expects that any additional receipts and 
direct spending would be negligible.
    The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Mark Grabowicz, 
who can be reached at 226-2860. This estimate was approved by 
Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget 
Analysis.

                   Constitutional Authority Statement

    Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for 
this legislation in article I, section 8, clause 3 of the 
Constitution.

               Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion

    H.R. 476 amends title 18 of the United States Code by 
adding sec. 2401 to criminalize the transportation of minors to 
avoid certain laws relating to abortion.
    Section 1. Short Title
    This section states that the short title of this bill is 
the ``Child Custody Protection Act.''
    Section 2. Transportation of minors in circumvention of 
certain laws relating to abortion. Section 2(a) amends title 18 
of the United States Code by inserting after chapter 117 the 
following:
    Chapter 117A--Transportation of minors in circumvention of 
certain laws relating to abortion.
    Subsection (a) of this section makes the knowing 
transportation across a State line of a person under 18 years 
of age with the intent that she obtain an abortion, in 
abridgement of a parent's right of involvement according to 
State law, a violation of this statute and a chargeable 
offense.
    Subsection (a), paragraph (1), imposes a maximum of 1 year 
imprisonment or a fine, or both.
    Subsection (a), paragraph (2) specifies the criteria for a 
violation of the parental right under this statute as follows: 
an abortion must be performed on a minor in a State other than 
the minor's residence and without the parental consent or 
notification, or the judicial authorization, that would have 
been required had the abortion been performed in the minor's 
State of residence.
    Subsection (b), paragraph (1) specifies that subsection (a) 
does not apply if the abortion is necessary to save the life of 
the minor.
    Subsection (b), paragraph (2) clarifies that neither the 
minor being transported nor her parents may be prosecuted or 
sued for a violation of this bill.
    Subsection (c) provides an affirmative defense to 
prosecution or civil action based on violation of the bill 
where the defendant reasonably believed, based on information 
obtained directly from the girl's parent or other compelling 
facts, that the requirements of the girl's State of residence 
regarding parental involvement or judicial authorization in 
abortions had been satisfied.
    Subsection (d) establishes a civil cause of action for a 
parent who suffers legal harm from a violation of subsection 
(a).
    Subsection (e) sets forth definitions of certain terms in 
this bill.
    Subsection (e)(1)(A) defines ``a law requiring parental 
involvement in a minor's abortion decision'' to be a law 
requiring either ``the notification to, or consent of, a parent 
of that minor'' or ``proceedings in a State court.''
    Subsection (e)(1)(B) stipulates that a law conforming to 
the definition in (e)(1)(A) cannot provide notification to or 
consent of any person or entity other than a ``parent'' as 
defined in the subsequent section.
    Subsection (e)(2) defines ``parent'' to mean a parent or 
guardian, or a legal custodian, or a person standing in loco 
parentis (if that person has ``care and control'' of the minor 
and is a person with whom the minor ``regularly resides'') and 
who is designated by the applicable State parental involvement 
law as the person to whom notification, or from whom consent, 
is required.
    Subsection (e)(3) defines ``minor'' to mean a person not 
older than the maximum age requiring parental notification or 
consent, or proceedings in a State court, under the parental 
involvement law of the State where the minor resides.
    Subsection (e)(4) defines ``State'' to include the District 
of Columbia ``and any commonwealth, possession, or other 
territory of the United States.''
    Section 2(b) is a clerical amendment to insert the new 
chapter in the table of chapters for part I of title 18.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

    In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (new matter is 
printed in italics and existing law in which no change is 
proposed is shown in roman):

                      TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
                             PART I--CRIMES

Chap.                                                               Sec.
1.     General provisions.........................................     1
     * * * * * * *
117.    Transportation for illegal sexual activity and related 
              crimes..............................................  2421
117A.   Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws 
              relating to abortion................................  2431
     * * * * * * *

CHAPTER 117A--TRANSPORTATION OF MINORS IN CIRCUMVENTION OF CERTAIN LAWS 
                          RELATING TO ABORTION

Sec.
2431. Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws relating 
          to abortion.

Sec. 2431. Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws 
                    relating to abortion

    (a) Offense.--
            (1) Generally.--Except as provided in subsection 
        (b), whoever knowingly transports an individual who has 
        not attained the age of 18 years across a State line, 
        with the intent that such individual obtain an 
        abortion, and thereby in fact abridges the right of a 
        parent under a law requiring parental involvement in a 
        minor's abortion decision, in force in the State where 
        the individual resides, shall be fined under this title 
        or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
            (2) Definition.--For the purposes of this 
        subsection, an abridgement of the right of a parent 
        occurs if an abortion is performed on the individual, 
        in a State other than the State where the individual 
        resides, without the parental consent or notification, 
        or the judicial authorization, that would have been 
        required by that law had the abortion been performed in 
        the State where the individual resides.
    (b) Exceptions.--(1) The prohibition of subsection (a) does 
not apply if the abortion was necessary to save the life of the 
minor because her life was endangered by a physical disorder, 
physical injury, or physical illness, including a life 
endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the 
pregnancy itself.
    (2) An individual transported in violation of this section, 
and any parent of that individual, may not be prosecuted or 
sued for a violation of this section, a conspiracy to violate 
this section, or an offense under section 2 or 3 based on a 
violation of this section.
    (c) Affirmative Defense.--It is an affirmative defense to a 
prosecution for an offense, or to a civil action, based on a 
violation of this section that the defendant reasonably 
believed, based on information the defendant obtained directly 
from a parent of the individual or other compelling facts, that 
before the individual obtained the abortion, the parental 
consent or notification, or judicial authorization took place 
that would have been required by the law requiring parental 
involvement in a minor's abortion decision, had the abortion 
been performed in the State where the individual resides.
    (d) Civil Action.--Any parent who suffers legal harm from a 
violation of subsection (a) may obtain appropriate relief in a 
civil action.
    (e) Definitions.--For the purposes of this section--
            (1) a law requiring parental involvement in a 
        minor's abortion decision is a law--
                    (A) requiring, before an abortion is 
                performed on a minor, either--
                            (i) the notification to, or consent 
                        of, a parent of that minor; or
                            (ii) proceedings in a State court; 
                        and
                    (B) that does not provide as an alternative 
                to the requirements described in subparagraph 
                (A) notification to or consent of any person or 
                entity who is not described in that 
                subparagraph;
            (2) the term ``parent'' means--
                    (A) a parent or guardian;
                    (B) a legal custodian; or
                    (C) a person standing in loco parentis who 
                has care and control of the minor, and with 
                whom the minor regularly resides,
        who is designated by the law requiring parental 
        involvement in the minor's abortion decision as a 
        person to whom notification, or from whom consent, is 
        required;
            (3) the term ``minor'' means an individual who is 
        not older than the maximum age requiring parental 
        notification or consent, or proceedings in a State 
        court, under the law requiring parental involvement in 
        a minor's abortion decision; and
            (4) the term ``State'' includes the District of 
        Columbia and any commonwealth, possession, or other 
        territory of the United States.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                           Markup Transcript

                            BUSINESS MEETING

                       WEDNESDAY, MARCH 20, 2002

                  House of Representatives,
                                Committee on the Judiciary,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:50 a.m., in 
Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. F. James 
Sensenbrenner, Jr. [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The Committee will be in order.
    [Intervening business.]
    Now, the main event on the schedule today is the markup on 
the bill H.R. 476, and the Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
Ohio, Mr. Chabot, to make a motion.
    [The bill, H.R. 476, follows:]
    
    
    Mr. Chabot. I thank the Chairman for yielding.
    There is no serious dispute regarding the fact that minors 
are routinely transported across State lines.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Will the gentleman from Ohio move 
to report the bill favorably? And then you'll be recognized.
    Mr. Chabot. I do so move, yes.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Okay, and the gentleman is now 
recognized for 5 minutes in support of his motion.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
    There is no serious dispute regarding the fact that minors 
are routinely transported across State lines for the purpose of 
obtaining an abortion in circumvention of parental involvement 
laws.
    One prominent abortion rights advocated stated that 
thousands of adults are helping minors cross State lines to get 
abortions in States whose parental involvement requirements are 
less stringent or nonexistent.
    As recently as last August, another abortion rights 
advocate voiced her willingness to help pregnant young girls 
residing in New Jersey to cross State lines in order to obtain 
an abortion should the State's Legislature pass a parental 
involvement statute.
    Thus, H.R. 476, the ``Child Custody Protection Act,'' would 
make it a Federal offense to knowingly transport a minor across 
a State line with the intent that she obtain an abortion in 
circumvention of a State's parental consent or notification 
statute.
    H.R. 476 is a regulation of interstate commerce that seeks 
to protect the health and safety of young girls and parents' 
rights to be involved in the medical decisions of a minor 
daughter by preventing validly enacted and constitutionally 
sound State parental involvement laws from being circumvented.
    As such, it falls well within Congress's constitutional 
authority to regulate the transportation of individuals in 
interstate commerce. There is a solid body of case law that 
remains unaffected by recent Supreme Court rulings, limiting 
the reach of Congress' commerce clause authority, which 
confirms that the authority of Congress to regulate the 
transportation of individuals in interstate commerce is no 
longer in question.
    For example, the Mann Act, which flatly prohibited the 
interstate transportation of women for prostitution of for any 
other immoral purpose was upheld by the Supreme Court, which 
stated that, under the commerce clause, ``Congress has power 
over transportation among the several States,'' and 
characterized this power as being complete in itself, and 
concluded that incident to this power, Congress may adopt not 
only means necessary but also means convenient to its exercise, 
even if it has ``the quality of police regulation.''
    Application of the Mann Act has been upheld relative to the 
transportation of a person to Nevada, even though prostitution 
in Nevada is legal.
    Federal prohibitions on the transportation of lottery 
tickets in interstate commerce and placing letters or circulars 
concerning lotteries in the mail have also been upheld, 
regardless of whether or not lotteries are legal in the State 
to which the tickets or letters are transported.
    Rather than exercising its full authority under the 
commerce clause by simply prohibiting the interstate 
transportation of minors for abortions without obtaining 
parental notice or consent, H.R. 476 respects the rights of the 
various States to make these often controversial policy 
decisions for themselves and ensures that each State's policy 
aims regarding the issue are not frustrated.
    Nothing in H.R. 476 affects the ability of minors residing 
in States that have chosen not to enact a parental involvement 
law or where an parental involvement is currently not enforced 
from obtaining an abortion without the knowledge of their 
parents.
    At the heart of the debate surrounding the Child Custody 
Protection Act is a disagreement about whether common-sense 
legislation should be enacted in order to preserve the health 
of pregnant young girls and support parents in the exercise of 
their most basic right.
    This debate has already been held in almost all of this 
Nations' State legislatures, 43 of which have reasonably 
concluded that parents should be involved in their minor 
daughter's decision whether or not to obtain abortion.
    In upholding the constitutionality of parental notice and 
consent statutes, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized 
that during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, 
minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to 
recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them. 
This is especially true for young girls seeking an abortion as 
they face particular physical and psychological risks 
associated with the procedure.
    Parental involvement laws have been enacted after informed 
political debate, and Congress is well within its authority to 
ensure that the channels of interstate commerce are not used to 
frustrate the policy goals of these laws.
    I urge my colleagues to approve the legislation, which has 
been approved twice by this Committee and twice by the Members 
of the House. The futures of our daughters demand nothing less.
    I yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Nadler, is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Today's bill is, thankfully, we all know, not going 
anywhere. This is the third Congress in a row where you've 
considered it, the third Congress in which, we can be certain, 
that it will receive no consideration in the Senate, regardless 
of the party in charge.
    It's the third Congress in a row in which this House is 
simply posturing for the anti-choice extremists.
    If passed, however, the big hand of Government, meddling 
into the most sensitive and often tragic family situations, 
could do real harm. So, while irritating, this is no laughing 
matter.
    Exporting the ill-considered laws of some States to others, 
whose citizens see these difficult matters in very different 
terms, is not an appropriate role for the Federal Government. 
Were it not for the fact that the consequences of this ill-
advised and unconstitutional proposal could cost lives and 
destroy families, I would be tempted to throw up my hands and 
say it's not worth wasting the time debating the bill. But we 
cannot do that. The stakes are too high.
    No matter how many times we have to repeat this, I know 
that both you and I and our colleagues on this Committee feel 
too strongly about what is at stake here. The lives and futures 
of young women facing some of life's most difficult situations 
is a pressing responsibility of this Committee, and so I join 
my colleagues here today to speak for these young women.
    This is a bad bill and should be rejected. Our oath to be 
faithful to the Constitution demands it. Our respect for the 
rights of the people of each of the several States demands it. 
And most of all, the fates of the young women whose lives would 
be irreparably harmed by this legislation demand it.
    We can and have had honest disagreements about the wisdom 
of parental consent and notification laws. Many of the Members 
of this Committee have previously served in our respective 
State legislatures and have debated this issue as a matter of 
State law. We're not going to settle that difference of opinion 
here today.
    What we can settle, however, is the question of whether the 
people of one State should be allowed to set the policy 
affecting families, abused young people, and the proper role of 
the State when circumstances are less than ideal, for other 
States. That is where this bill clearly fails.
    In New York, for example, we have rejected this policy, the 
policy of parental consent, not because we believe that 
families should not deal with such issues together in a loving 
environment, but because we recognize that the law must not 
ignore the fact that the most difficult situations of those 
young women who do not have safe, loving families to assist 
them in such trying times.
    There is absolutely no reason why a clergy person, such as 
the priest who testified at our hearing, who assists a young 
woman who goes from Pennsylvania to a doctor a few minutes away 
in New York, should face Federal charges. Nor should a 
grandmother who assists a young woman who has been sexually 
assaulted by a stepfather spend time in the Federal 
penitentiary.
    While the majority of young women do these make these 
decisions, and should, in conjunction with their parents, there 
are cases where they simply cannot.
    While the Supreme Court has required that State laws 
providing for parental consent include a judicial bypass, we 
all know there are judges out there who will impose their own 
private religious views on the young women who appear before 
them and who routinely refuse to grant court permission in any 
case, no matter how desperate.
    Reality, my colleagues, is regrettably messier than the 
rhetoric in the Congress.
    We have decided this issue for ourselves in New York, and 
other States have decided it both ways. The Federal Government 
has no business prosecuting people for doing what New York has 
decided is appropriate and legal in our State. The Federal 
Government should not seek to allow a State to hold its 
citizens hostage and to say, ``We will prevent you from going 
to another State to do what is legal in that State, because we 
don't approve of it in this State.''
    It seems to me that we hear a lot of rhetoric about 
Government being at the local level, or the nearest level that 
is practical, from the other side of the aisle. We hear a lot 
of rhetoric about the States being able to decide things for 
themselves. And in this area, they have. And some States have 
decided to require parental consent or notification laws, and 
other States have decided not to do so. To empower--to recruit 
the Federal Government to extend the long hand of one State to 
imprison its citizens in another State is simply wrong.
    The State laws should govern in the State where they are. 
And who the heck is the Federal Government to say that we so 
disapprove, we are so morally disapproving of the law of the 
State of New York, that we will criminally prosecute anybody 
who helps someone go to New York to take advantage of its law? 
That is an insult to the 20 or 25, whatever number, States that 
have chosen not to require such laws.
    The Federal Government should not impose its will in such 
cases, and to do so is not only an insult to those States, but 
to every--any conceivable concept of federalism.
    Thank you very much.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired.
    All Members may put opening statements in the record at 
this point.
    Are there amendments?
    The gentlewoman from California----
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman from California--
ladies first.
    The gentlewoman from California had her hand up.
    Ms. Waters. This is the first time I've known ladies to be 
first in this Committee, but I'll take it. [Laughter.]
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. A new broom sweeps the floor----
    Ms. Waters. I have an amendment at the desk.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 476, offered by Ms. Waters. 
Page 3, after line 19, insert the following: Paragraph (3), the 
prohibition of subsection (a) does not apply if the pregnancy 
is the result of sexual contact with a parent or any other 
person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or 
responsibility for supervision of the minor, or by any 
household or family member.
    [The amendment follows:]
    
    
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Waters. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Chairman and Members, this is a bill we have seen the 
past three Congresses, even though it's riddled with problems.
    First, I sincerely believe it would pose a risk to young 
women's health. Second, it is unconstitutional on several 
levels. Third, it will harm not help communications between 
pregnant teens and their parents.
    I'm going to get right to the meat of this matter. This 
bill, for example, fails to take into account the very tragic 
and very real situation of a young girl who has been the victim 
of sexual contact by a parent, stepparent or other relative or 
household member. We should all be able to agree that young 
girl in that situation has the right to chose an abortion. 
That's exactly what my amendment would do.
    Sadly, some pregnancies result from unwanted sexual 
contact. Adding to that horror is the fact that many families 
are unable or unwilling to deal with the realties of the 
situation. A mother may chose not to believe that the child's 
father or stepfather could have done such a horrible thing. She 
may even share the child's confidences with the very person who 
committed the deed, thus potentially putting the child at great 
risk.
    Many of you may know of the tragic case of Spring Adams, a 
13-year-old 6th grader from Idaho. She was shot to death by her 
father after he learned that she was planning to terminate a 
pregnancy caused by his acts of incest.
    My amendment addresses this problem. It provides that the 
prohibitions of H.R. 476 would not apply when the minor child's 
pregnancy resulted from sexual contact with a parent, 
stepparent, custodian or any household or family member. We 
cannot demand that such a child share her situation with that 
person.
    When the child turns, instead, to a grandparent or adult 
sibling or boyfriend, we should let her do so. Otherwise, we 
will find young girls impregnated by relatives or household 
members seeking to deal with it in anyway they can, whether 
they do so by traveling alone to another State for the 
procedure or take care of it through a self-induced or illegal 
back-alley abortion.
    I would urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
    Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Does the gentlewoman yield back?
    Ms. Waters. I yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. 
Chabot.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I rise in opposition to this amendment. In situations 
involving incest, it's extremely important that minors who are 
being abused in this manner bring the abuse to the attention of 
the authorities as soon as possible.
    This amendment would encourage minors not to pursue a 
confidential judicial bypass hearing during which the abuse may 
be reported to the court or to seek the assistance of 
authorities in some other way. In fact, it would encourage the 
minors to seek out-of-State abortions and return to the very 
environment in which the incest occurred.
    For that reason, I strongly oppose this amendment and yield 
back the balance of my time.
    Mr. Conyers. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. 
Conyers.
    Mr. Conyers. I rise to support the Waters amendment.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Conyers. Members of the Committee, this amendment makes 
it easier for women who have been impregnated as a result of 
sexual contact by someone in the family system or someone 
they've confided in, and it does so by prohibiting prosecutions 
in cases where a young woman is so impregnated.
    Today, a household may be comprised of all kinds of 
combinations of parents, single parents, stepparents, older 
siblings. So, under those kinds of circumstances, there's a, I 
imagine, a feeling of desperation and isolation that could 
easily develop.
    So where abuse already exists, confronting a parent is not 
a really serious option. Our studies have all shown that 
abusive and dysfunctional families have a higher incidence of 
violence when some kind of pregnancy like this occurs. And many 
can't bear the thought of informing their mother their 
pregnancy was caused by a father, boyfriend, stepfather or 
something like that. They know that means they'll be leaving 
the house soon.
    And so going out of State becomes an even more important 
option. And when that option is taken away, they can sometimes 
move for dangerous alternatives.
    I think the common-sense way to improve this bill, even 
with its constitutional problems, is to support the Waters 
amendment.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Alabama, Mr. 
Bachus.
    Mr. Bachus. I think this a very important amendment, 
because I think we all agree that thousands of young women are 
being transported across State lines every day to get abortions 
without their parents' knowledge or consent.
    Now, if--and I'll accept the fact that many of these women 
are being impregnated by a stepfather or by, say, a brother or 
stepbrother in the home. And it would seem that those are very 
cases where it is absolutely mandatory that we not allow this 
to go on, because if their stepfather's impregnating them, and 
I think we all agree that's happening in hundreds of cases, 
probably every day in this country, they go across State lines, 
they obtain an abortion, the courts don't find out about it. 
The young girl comes back, she goes right back into that 
environment again, she gets pregnant again, she's abused again.
    To me, it's very important, in a case like that, that we 
would say: Go to the court, bring this to the attention of the 
court, prosecute this person.
    If fact, I think by offering this amendment, Ms. Waters is 
actually--actually, she's actually turned a light on in my mind 
for another absolutely critical reason to pass this 
legislation, and that's the fact that we have--and these are 
people that I think mean well. They, number one, they--I don't 
agree with them, but they believe that abortion is a legitimate 
alternative. But, number two, they're transporting young girls 
who have been abused by their stepparents or in an abusive 
family situation across the State line, thinking that's in 
their best interests, but nothing is being done what's 
happening at home.
    Ms. Waters. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Bachus. They ought to end up--that's the very cases 
that ought to--don't we agree that when a young woman----
    Ms. Waters. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Bachus.--is being sexually abused and has had 
intercourse with the stepfather or by--even by her own blood 
father, that that is the very case we ought to carry into court 
and end that foolishness, as opposed to dragging that poor girl 
across State lines, having her get an abortion, bring her back.
    And in many cases, we know that these young girls are 
having two and three and four abortions. They come back and----
    Ms. Waters. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Bachus.--they end up sterile. They don't have any 
ability to have children, all because somebody, some do-gooder, 
decided to intervene, and take what appeared to them to be an 
easy way out.
    Ms. Waters. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Bachus. That, to me, is the ultimate in child abuse.
    Ms. Waters. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Bachus. And I think my time has expired.
    But I think you mean--you meant well by this amendment. But 
I think you're going to cover up----
    Ms. Waters. You still have time. Will you yield, sir?
    Mr. Bachus.--a lot of tragic cases.
    Ms. Waters. Will you yield?
    Mr. Bachus. This is the very case we absolutely ought to 
require court intervention in.
    Ms. Waters. If the gentleman will yield----
    Mr. Bachus. I don't know if you'll accept an amendment 
saying that this absolutely has to go to court.
    Ms. Waters. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Bachus. I'll yield.
    Ms. Waters. Thank you very much.
    I know that, you know, you get a little emotional about 
this, and your reference to just thousands of girls going 
across the border every day, I think you may be exaggerating it 
a little bit.
    But I want to make the distinction between bringing it to 
the attention of the courts and the judicial bypass.
    Yes, many of these girls will bring it to the attention of 
the courts for purposes of prosecution. However, it does not 
mean that that automatically means they get a judicial bypass. 
These are two separate kinds of court actions.
    And so what they would have to have is, they would have to 
have, as it was mentioned earlier, when there was a discussion 
about the judicial bypass, that could or could not be granted 
by a judge. That's one separate action, as opposed to the----
    Mr. Bachus. But we ought to absolutely require, in a case 
like this, that it go to court. You know, if you have an 
amendment that says, when this happens, when someone, that 
there's a question or a charge or even an indication that a 
stepfather or a brother or even the blood father of a young 
girl has committed--has violated our--the laws against rape and 
incest which are in our county, that they ought to absolutely 
go to court.
    That is the very case that ought----
    Ms. Waters. It's already--you are describing----
    Mr. Bachus.--to be brought before the court in every case.
    Ms. Waters. What you're describing is already----
    Mr. Bachus. And I think you mean--I mean, I really believe 
that you mean well by this. I understand this. And I believe 
that the people--I totally disagree with them--but I think when 
they're taking these young girls--and, I mean, there's plenty 
of testimony. We all agree that these young women are going 
across State lines----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The question is----
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Weiner. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Nadler.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, let me say a couple 
things about this amendment.
    First of all, I think it is wrong to keep using the phrase 
``transporting someone across State lines.'' She is going 
across State lines voluntarily, perhaps desperately. The person 
accompanying her may be a friend, a grandmother, a clergyman, 
helping her. This is not the same as someone transporting 
someone. If she were 5 years old, that might be a different 
question.
    Secondly, on this amendment, the absurdity of not having an 
amendment like this is evident if you think about the following 
situation. This says that it does not apply, the prohibition 
does not apply, if the pregnancy is the result of sexual 
contact with a parent or any other person who has permanent 
temporary care or custody. So imagine that the father or the 
stepfather who has custody or whatever rapes the girl, rapes 
the young woman, the 16- or 17-year-old young woman. She has to 
get his written permission--his. Maybe there's no mother 
present.
    She has to get the permission of the rapist, under this 
bill----
    Mr. Chabot. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Nadler. I will not yield.
    Mr. Chabot. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Nadler. I will not yield.
    Mr. Chabot. Okay.
    Mr. Nadler. Go to court. We know of any number of cases, 
we've had witnesses, where the judges simply never grant 
permission. There are plenty of anti-choice judges in this 
country who won't grant permission. So those don't operate 
necessarily. They might in some places.
    The judicial bypass in some place may operate, in other 
places won't.
    And, by the way, you may have a young girl who was raped by 
her stepfather or by her father. He doesn't know she's 
pregnant. If she serves him with a notice of complaint to 
appear in court or he finds about a court hearing, he knows 
she's impregnated, she might fear being murdered.
    So there are real problems with this. What I'm saying is, 
under--this amendment simply says--and this will tell us. There 
are two possible motives for supporting this bill: one, a 
sincere concern for these young women; two, a hatred for 
abortion no matter what and using any smokescreen as an excuse 
to make it difficult for women to exercise their constitutional 
right to have an abortion if they choose.
    If the motivation is the first, then I can't see how 
anybody can vote against this amendment, because this says that 
she doesn't have to get the permission of the rapist. If the 
motivation is the second, and we don't care about victims of 
rape, as long as they don't get abortions, then you vote 
against the amendment. It's very clear.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Barr. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. 
Barr.
    Mr. Barr. Mr. Chairman, I have no idea of what the 
gentleman that just spoke is talking about.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes to try to tell us.
    Mr. Barr. Thank you.
    Maybe the Chairman, the distinguished Chairman of the 
Subcommittee, can enlighten us, because the bill does not say 
what the gentleman--nor does the amendment say what the 
gentleman from New York just said.
    And I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
    Mr. Chabot. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
    It's inaccurate to say that the young girl would have to 
get the authorization or approval of the rapist. That's the 
whole purpose of the judicial bypass procedure. And under the 
best-interest analysis during a judicial bypass procedure, 
judges consider evidence or history of physical or sexual or 
emotional abuse, so that parental notification would not be in 
the minor's best interests under those circumstance.
    So it absolutely inaccurate to say that the young girl 
would have to get the authorization of the rapist. It's just 
wrong.
    I yield back the balance of my time.
    Ms. Waters. Would the gentleman yield?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The time belongs to the gentleman 
from Georgia, Mr. Barr.
    Mr. Barr. I yield back the balance of my time.
    Mr. Weiner. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Weiner.
    Mr. Weiner. Mr. Chairman, I won't take a full 5 minutes, 
but if we're going to correct or try to clarify statements, my 
good friend from Alabama is waving the amendment and saying 
this is the reason we have to pass the bill, because no one is 
going to get prosecuted unless we pass the bill.
    There's nothing in this amendment that says that someone 
who's guilty of raping their daughter will not be prosecuted. 
It doesn't say that at all. It doesn't say that the cops can't 
investigate it, can't say that a district attorney can't 
prosecute, can't say that someone won't go to jail.
    And I would caution the gentleman from Alabama and others, 
you know, the pronoun ``they'' was thrown around a great deal, 
the ``thousands'' being transported. You know, what this comes 
down to, and I would urge us to kind of keep this in mind, 
these are individual cases--complex, difficult, gut-wrenching 
individual cases.
    This is not Mayberry. This isn't going to be--you know, I, 
of course, would like a dynamic where a young woman who becomes 
pregnant and an unwanted pregnancy sits down with mom and pop 
and Auntie May, and they sit down and have a freshly baked 
cherry pie, and they talk about the difficult fix they're in.
    But sometimes in these circumstances a person chooses to 
turn to their member of clergy, to their rabbi or priest, and 
say, ``You know what? I have a difficult problem here. I'm 
afraid to go to the cops. I'm afraid to go to my local 
physician who knows my aunt, who knows my mother.''
    These are complicated things. And so States come up with 
laws on ways to try to deal with these complicated things. The 
Supreme Court of the United States has wrestled with this and 
say, ``You know what? Let's not do anything that gets in, in an 
unreasonable way, gets in the way of a woman exercising her 
right to protect her health.''
    I mean, that's what--we're talking about individual cases 
here. And, yes, in the best case scenario and every case 
scenario, if someone is guilty of incest, you get on the phone, 
you call the cops, you have them arrested, you throw them in 
jail, they never see the light of day again. Of course.
    Does the gentleman from Alabama really believe that that's 
the way it is in the real world, that in every single case 
where a woman is guilty of sexual--sexual abuse, even if it's 
her boyfriend or her husband, that she says, ``Okay, I'll call 
up the cops over here, and then I'm going to go exercise my 
right to a judicial bypass hearing.''
    I mean, come on. Is there a confused 16-year-old girl who 
has just been raped by her father or who has been abused by her 
boyfriend who works in the same school with her uncle who knows 
somebody, is there a confused person in the world whose first 
instinct is, ``Well, I've got my right to judicial bypass, 
because the Chairman of the Subcommittee referred to me to 
section 9 of the bill that has passed seven times and is never 
going to become law.'' No.
    I mean, these are complicated cases of individual people in 
agony and in pain. None of us want there to be any abortions. 
Every one of us wants, in these cases, us to have a family 
structure just like the one you envision, that someone turns to 
their mother or father, they talk it out, they come up with 
some kind of an alternative, and everyone lives happily ever 
after.
    But I think that the laws of the States and the 
constitutional decisions have been: ``You know what? These are 
difficult judgment calls, and we've come down in this country 
on the side of giving a woman the right to protect herself, and 
sometimes it's messy.''
    These aren't thousands of people being transported. It's 
not people being piled on a train, going down the tracks to go 
get these services. These are individual people in difficult, 
agonizing, individual circumstances.
    It's not ``they'' who are doing it. It's not the do-gooder 
that's doing it. These are individual priests, rabbis, 
counselors, school math teachers, friends, neighbors, 
boyfriends, who are there at a time of the greatest need for 
these young girls and offering them help. Sometimes that help 
is just giving them a ride a few miles down the road to go to a 
doctor, a physician, who offers them advice and may ultimately 
offer them the choice of having an abortion.
    Do we want to put those people in jail? Those are 
individual people. Are they really--is our country better 
putting those people in jail?
    I yield back.
    Mr. Coble. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. For what purpose does the gentleman 
from North Carolina, Mr. Coble, seek recognition?
    Mr. Coble. Move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Coble. Mr. Chairman, I yield time to the gentleman from 
Alabama.
    Mr. Bachus. Thank you. I'd like to respond to the gentleman 
from New York. You know, what his argument was and the argument 
I'm hearing from the other side is, really, the first thing it 
is, it's an inconsistent argument, because we just heard that 
we didn't need to take this to the court or the police because 
this young girl may actually be killed if the father finds out 
that----
    Ms. Waters. Who said that?
    Mr. Bachus. Someone on the top row said, if she reports it, 
she might be killed. That was exactly what they said.
    And the argument is, you know, if they find out, they may 
be further abused.
    And I've also heard that I think that we all live in 
Mayberry. Well, let me say this: I authored the domestic 
violence statute that was passed in Alabama in 1982 that four 
other States adopted. So, you know, I wasn't living in Mayberry 
in 1982, when I was in the State Senate, nor am I now.
    I think, again, that what--if you say that this will not--
that this has nothing to do with people being found out, this 
amendment, you know, it doesn't say anywhere in the words that 
it does that. But what it does, it allows boyfriends, as you 
say, it allows neighbors, it allows preachers, it allows some 
of the groups that we see in the audience today, whose 
organizations take these young women across State lines without 
the knowledge of the father. The stepfather has impregnated 
them----
    Ms. Waters. What groups? What groups? What groups?
    Mr. Bachus. It's in the testimony here, groups that provide 
that.
    Ms. Waters. Will the gentleman yield? What group are you 
talking about?
    Mr. Bachus. Well----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The time belongs to the gentleman 
from North Carolina.
    Ms. Waters. The gentleman should be able identify the group 
he's talking about.
    Mr. Bachus. And what you've got here is----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The time belongs to the gentleman 
from North Carolina.
    Mr. Bachus.--if a boyfriend--if a boyfriend or a neighbor 
takes these young women who have been impregnated by a 
stepfather or a brother or even their own father, takes them 
across State lines and has an abortion, instead of going to the 
court, yes, you're covering that up.
    And when that young woman goes back, she doesn't go back to 
Mayberry. She goes back to Hell Street, where she was when here 
stepfather or her brother or her uncle impregnated her in that 
home, and where they may be--where the mother may be covering 
up for the stepfather.
    And because she goes across State lines and has an 
abortion, her real father, because like you said, in America 
today, we have a lot of divorces, we have a lot of second and 
third marriages. And in a lot of case, the father may be living 
in another State; his daughter is living with the stepfather; a 
stepbrother may impregnate the girl; and that father never 
receives any notice, because some neighbor or some boyfriend or 
some preacher, you said, decides that what ought to be done is 
she ought to be quietly taken across State lines where she has 
an abortion, as if that takes care of the situation.
    She's then going to be quietly brought back, quietly placed 
in that home again. The court is never going to find out about 
this.
    It's high time that every one of these cases went to the 
courts. And this idea that, when they go to the courts, that 
this guy that impregnated this 15-year-old is going to get made 
and get offended and come after somebody, well, I'll tell you 
what, I think, you know, I think he'll find about that the--
that we'll be coming after him as opposed to coming after this 
young girl.
    Mr. Coble. Let me reclaim my time and yield back.
    Mr. Bachus. And we had this argument in domestic violence 
cases. You know, in several States, it wasn't--you know, you 
didn't have to report. If you beat up your wife, it didn't have 
to be reported----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Did I hear the gentleman from North 
Carolina try----
    Mr. Bachus.--because they were afraid she'd go back and get 
beat up again.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner.--to reclaim his time?
    Mr. Coble. I'm reclaiming and yielding back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is on the Waters 
amendment.
    Those in favor will say aye.
    Opposed, no.
    The noes appear to have it.
    Ms. Waters. rollcall.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And a rollcall is requested.
    Those in favor of adoption of the Waters amendment will, as 
your names are called, answer aye. Those opposed, no. And the 
clerk will call the roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Gekas?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
    Mr. Coble. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no.
    Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, no.
    Mr. Gallegly?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Bryant?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no.
    Mr. Barr?
    Mr. Barr. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Barr, no.
    Mr. Jenkins?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Cannon?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Graham?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus?
    Mr. Bachus. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, no.
    Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no.
    Mr. Green?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no.
    Mr. Issa?
    Mr. Issa. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Issa, no.
    Ms. Hart?
    Ms. Hart. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Hart, no.
    Mr. Flake?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers?
    Mr. Conyers. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye.
    Mr. Frank?
    Mr. Frank. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Frank, aye.
    Mr. Berman?
    Mr. Berman. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Berman, aye.
    Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye.
    Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, aye.
    Mr. Watt?
    Mr. Watt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt, aye.
    Ms. Lofgren?
    Ms. Lofgren. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren, aye.
    Ms. Jackson Lee?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye.
    Ms. Waters?
    Ms. Waters. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye.
    Mr. Meehan?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Delahunt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Baldwin?
    Ms. Baldwin. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Baldwin, aye.
    Mr. Weiner?
    Mr. Weiner. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, aye.
    Mr. Schiff?
    Mr. Schiff. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, aye.
    Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Are there additional Members who 
wish to cast or change their vote?
    The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Bryant.
    Mr. Bryant. I vote no.
    The Clerk. Mr. Bryant, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, 
Mr. Gekas.
    Mr. Gekas. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gekas, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The other gentleman from Tennessee, 
Mr. Jenkins.
    Mr. Jenkins. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. 
Green.
    Mr. Green. Mr. Green votes nay.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. 
Pence.
    Mr. Pence. Mr. Pence votes no.
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Other--the gentleman from Virginia, 
Mr. Goodlatte.
    Mr. Goodlatte. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Other Members who wish to cast or 
change their votes?
    If not, the clerk will report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 12 ayes and 16 nays.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The amendment is not agreed to.
    Are there further amendments?
    The gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler.
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk--
--
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    Mr. Nadler.--that is designated as amendment 1.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Nadler 1.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 476, offered by Mr. Nadler. 
Page 3, after line 19, insert the following: (3) The 
prohibition of subsection (a) does not apply with respect to 
conduct by a grandparent or adult sibling of the minor.
    [The amendment follows:]
    
    
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, under this bill, if a young girl is 
impregnated by her stepfather, and the girl's mother, as is 
sometimes the case, refuses to deal with the horrific reality 
of the situation, or perhaps the girl's mother is no longer 
alive or isn't present, an adult sibling or a grandparent who 
takes the girl across the river from one State to another to 
secure appropriate counseling and medical assistance, which may 
include an abortion, would face Federal time and could be sued 
by the spouse of the perpetrator, even if, in the words of the 
psychiatric profession, the plaintiff was an enabler.
    That is an absurd and pernicious outcome. It virtually 
guarantees that those adults most able to provide the young 
woman with assistance, loving members of her close family, 
could be sent to the Federal penitentiary.
    It's hard to believe that my colleagues, whatever their 
view about abortion or the importance of family involvement, 
would intend this to be the law, but this is precisely what the 
bill says. It should not.
    This amendment would simply exclude from the penalties of 
this bill a very small, close group of family members to 
provide the loving assistance that the proponents of the bill 
claim to support.
    It makes sense and would make an otherwise heartless bill 
just a little bit more humane.
    Mr. Chairman, especially in the situation where a young 
girl was raped by perhaps the custodial father or stepfather, 
it's hard to understand--and cannot, obviously, appeal to him 
for permission, and may not trust the court--indeed, it may a 
county where the judge has never granted a judicial bypass or 
announced that he wouldn't grant a judicial bypass ever, as 
some have.
    It's hard to see how you can object to a grandparent or 
brother or a sister of the person who wants the abortion from 
accompanying her across a State line.
    Now, again, either the motivation of this bill is to 
encourage--is because of concern with the welfare of the 
minor--if it is, then this amendment should face no hesitation 
in being adopted. If the motivation of this bill is, as I 
suspect it is, simply an attempt to make it as hard as 
possible--one of a number of bills to make it as difficult as 
possible for as many women as possible to exercise their 
constitutional right of choice, to do everything we can within 
the Constitution, within the Supreme Court interpretation of 
the Constitution, to undermine the constitutional right of the 
choice, then you'll vote against the amendment.
    But especially where the rape or where the pregnancy was 
caused by a rape within the family, and so the whole question 
of a loving consultation doesn't exist--and, again, the 
gentlemen--some people will say, ``Well, the judicial bypass 
exists for that.'' In some places, it does. But it takes 
willful ignorance--willful ignorance--not to notice the fact 
that, in many places, there is no real judicial bypass 
available.
    Some States, by the way, have very limited judicial 
bypasses.
    In any event, it's hard to see how you can say that a 
grandparent or brother or sister of the minor is indulging in 
some--in transporting--it sounds like you're saying they're 
indulging in some illicit, shameful activity, when they're 
really helping their family member in a loving way to do 
something that they believe they really have to do.
    So I hope people will vote for this amendment, period.
    Thank you. I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. 
Chabot.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I move to strike the 
last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I rise in opposition to the amendment. Those who want to 
add these exceptions have a fundamental problem with the 
underlying State law that only allows parents to grant consent 
for the medical procedure that's in question here.
    The inclusion of these people is a matter for each 
individual State legislature, not the Congress. The Child 
Custody Protection Act's purpose is to enforce State laws as 
they are. Grandparents and adult siblings don't have the 
authority now to authorize a medical procedure for a minor 
child.
    Thus, we would be carving out an exemption to the 
fundamental rights of parents, for which another family member 
seeks to transport their pregnant minor daughter out of State 
in order for her to obtain an abortion in circumvention of her 
home State's parental involvement law.
    If these individuals are truly interested in the best 
interests of the pregnant young girl, they will encourage and 
support her as she takes the difficult step to either inform 
her parents or guardians about her pregnancy or to pursue a 
judicial bypass. It's certainly not in the best interests of a 
pregnant young girl for anyone to assist her in evading the 
laws of her home State and to secretly transport her miles away 
from those who love her most in order to undergo a surgical 
procedure that may have serious medical consequences to her.
    For those reasons, I oppose this amendment. I yield back my 
time.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Nadler. Will the gentleman yield?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Nadler. Will the gentleman yield for a question?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Nadler. Will the gentleman yield for a question?
    Mr. Chabot. I've already yielded back my time.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Okay, the gentlewoman from Texas, 
Ms. Jackson Lee, is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    I think what should be recognized is the fact that we are 
hundreds or maybe thousands of miles from any young girl's 
home, and we are here in the United States Congress, acting 
upon a law that will impact them.
    I rise to support the gentleman's amendment, because I 
believe if we can intervene in a child's life who has the 
necessity of dealing with the legal system, then we can 
likewise intervene and expand the counselors and comforting 
individuals that may be able to assist that particular child; 
that, in fact, what we want is in the best interest for that 
child and the best interest for those who would rise to be 
supportive.
    We don't want them being carried away and imprisoned. And 
if that be the case, that we are allowing States to proceed 
accordingly--not by this legislation, this is Federal 
legislation that is interfering with States' rights, if you 
will.
    And, therefore, I would argue that we can equally provide 
extra comfort, an extra measure of comfort, by listing those 
who are in good stead, comforting persons to the child, in this 
instance, grandparent or sibling--and I will have additional 
amendment--of the minor, people who they can rely upon in times 
of trouble.
    This makes this a more humane bill. It makes it more 
reasonable. And it's certainly not contradictory to our already 
intrusive legislative position that we take today.
    I yield back. I yield to the gentleman for a question. Mr. 
Nadler, I yield.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you.
    I wanted to make one comment, and then ask if Mr. Chabot 
would answer a question.
    The comment I'll make, I was struck by----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman from Texas has to 
remain in the room, because the time belongs to her.
    The gentleman may proceed.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you.
    It struck me, when Mr. Chabot said that limiting the 
amendment--passing this amendment would violate the State's 
right of the State which has the parental consent law.
    It seems to me what this bill is, is really akin to the 
Fugitive Slave Act of the 1850's where you're enabling one 
State in the South, which had slavery, to reach over into 
another State, New York or Massachusetts, and say, ``We want 
our slave back. That person is a slave here, and Massachusetts 
cannot grant him or her freedom, because we're going to grab it 
back. And the Federal Government is going to enforce that.''
    What you're saying here, with this bill, is that the minor 
belongs to the State and that if she goes to another State, the 
Federal Government is going to yank her back so she can't take 
advantage of the law of the State which she believes is more 
appropriate to her.
    And anybody who helps her is going to go to jail because 
that State has the right over her because she came from that 
State, and how dare she try and how dare anybody help her try 
to go to another State, because the State owns her.
    That's what this bill is really about.
    But let me ask Mr. Chabot the following question: What 
would you say, in light of your comment to a moment ago, to a 
situation in which there is a one-parent family--the mother is 
dead; the father is the only parent--there's a daughter and a 
son, let's say. Let's say the father rapes the daughter. Let's 
say the local judge has never granted a judicial bypass. Let's 
say he's announced that, because he's an anti-choice candidate; 
let's say he announced in the last election that he'll never 
grant a judicial bypass. There are such judges.
    So you're faced with a situation--she's faced with a 
situation that she can't go to her father who impregnated her. 
She can't go to the judge who has announced he will never grant 
a judicial bypass. Her brother said--she says to her brother, 
``Help me go to the neighboring State where I can get an 
abortion.'' If we don't pass this amendment, what do you say to 
that situation, sir?
    Mr. Chabot. Will the gentlelady yield?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I'm happy to yield.
    Mr. Chabot. I thank the gentlelady for yielding.
    The gentleman has set up a hypothetical situation which, in 
real life, I don't think would happen.
    Mr. Nadler. It has happened.
    Mr. Chabot. That would be unconstitutional relative to that 
judge's handling of that situation.
    The judicial bypass procedure is there to protect young 
girls under difficult circumstances.
    And I would argue that, again----
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Reclaiming my time.
    Mr. Chabot.--the whole purpose of this legislation is----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The time belongs to the gentlewoman 
from Texas.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Reclaiming my time. Reclaiming my time, I 
yield to the gentleman from New York.
    Mr. Nadler. Thank you.
    You say the situation couldn't exist; it has existed in 
certain situations. The judge may be acting unconstitutionally; 
by the time that gets to the Supreme Court, they baby is 3 
years old. Pregnancies don't last for 9 or 10 years, during 
which this can be litigated through several levels of appeal.
    The answer is, without this amendment, the bill puts that 
young girl at the total mercy of a particular judge, who in 
many cases, as we know to be the case, will never grant a 
judicial bypass. We know that that's an illusory remedy, in 
most cases. And talking about it as if it's always a remedy is 
simply ignoring the fact.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
    The question is on the amendment by the gentleman from New 
York, Mr. Nadler.
    Those in favor will say aye.
    Opposed, no.
    The noes appear to have it. The noes have it.
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the gentleman from New York 
wants a rollcall, correct?
    Mr. Nadler. Yes, indeed.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Those in favor of the Nadler 
amendment will, as your names are called, answer aye. Those 
opposed, no. And the clerk will call the roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Gekas?
    Mr. Gekas. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gekas, no.
    Mr. Coble?
    Mr. Coble. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no.
    Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, no.
    Mr. Gallegly?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Bryant?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no.
    Mr. Barr?
    Mr. Barr. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Barr, no.
    Mr. Jenkins?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Cannon?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Graham?
    Mr. Graham. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Graham, no.
    Mr. Bachus?
    Mr. Bachus. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, no.
    Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no.
    Mr. Green?
    Mr. Green. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, no.
    Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no.
    Mr. Issa?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Hart?
    Ms. Hart. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Hart, no.
    Mr. Flake?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence?
    Mr. Pence. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence, no.
    Mr. Conyers?
    Mr. Conyers. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers, aye.
    Mr. Frank?
    Mr. Frank. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Frank, aye.
    Mr. Berman?
    Mr. Berman. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Berman, aye.
    Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye.
    Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, aye.
    Mr. Watt?
    Mr. Watt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt, aye.
    Ms. Lofgren?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye.
    Ms. Waters?
    Ms. Waters. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye.
    Mr. Meehan?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Delahunt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Baldwin?
    Ms. Baldwin. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Baldwin, aye.
    Mr. Weiner?
    Mr. Weiner. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Weiner, aye.
    Mr. Schiff?
    Mr. Schiff. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, aye.
    Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Any Members who wish to cast or 
change their vote?
    The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Jenkins.
    Mr. Jenkins. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from California, Mr. 
Issa.
    Mr. Issa. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Issa, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Further Members who wish to cast or 
change their vote?
    If not, the clerk will report.
    The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Goodlatte.
    Mr. Goodlatte. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will try again to report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 11 ayes and 16 nays.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the amendment is not agreed to.
    Before the recognizing the person to offer the next 
amendment, let me give a scheduling heads-up. It is the 
intention of the Chair to recess the Committee as soon as the 
bell rings for the next vote. There will then be an hour's 
debate on the rule, and the Committee will reconvene 
immediately after the vote on the rule on the budget. So it 
will be an hour's debate on the rule for a lunch hour or 
whatever, and we'll come back after the next series of votes 
and finish this bill.
    However, the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Coble, 
would like to ask Members of the Courts Subcommittee to stay at 
the beginning of this recess for a quick markup on legislation. 
So when the bell rings, the Chair is going to ask everybody to 
speed it up, so the Coble Subcommittee can markup and get their 
bill reported out.
    And then we'll come back after the vote on the rule for the 
budget.
    Are there further amendments?
    Mr. Frank. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Amendment----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Massachusetts, 
Mr. Frank.
    Mr. Frank. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Frank. Very briefly.
    But I was very struck by the comments from the gentleman 
from Ohio, and I want to acknowledge what appears to be a 
consensus that I had not previously thought existed, namely 
that judicial bypass for a minor is an important constitutional 
principle.
    I had previously thought that there was, on the part of 
those who would like to make abortion illegal, opposition to 
the existence of judicial bypass. My recollection is that many 
of the statutes passed did not allow a judicial bypass, and 
that was something that many people felt was forced on them by 
the courts.
    So I am particularly struck to hear how often the judicial 
bypass procedure is invoked in this debate as a saving grace. 
And I want to say that while some of my colleagues may have 
come late to the notion of defending the existence of judicial 
bypass, better late than never.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Are there further amendments?
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 
Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report the 
amendment.
    The Clerk. Amendment to H.R. 476, offered by Mr. Scott. 
Page 3, after line 14, insert the following: (2) The 
prohibition----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without objection, the amendment is 
considered as read.
    [The amendment follows:]
    
    
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the gentleman from Virginia is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, this is the taxicab exemption.
    The bill criminalizes anyone who knowingly transports an 
individual across State lines in order to have an abortion. The 
way the bill is written, this would include taxicab drivers, 
limo drivers, the person who sells train tickets or anything 
else. It also takes--all it takes for--is an individual in 
question to mention that she is crossing State lines on the 
mode of transportation in order to have an abortion, and the 
operator of that mode of transportation will be required to 
ensure that she's complied--she's in compliance with her home 
State's parental notification laws or risk prosecution.
    Please note that the bill specifically requires intent for 
the transportation and abortion but does not require knowledge 
of compliance with the State's parental consent and 
notification laws. The bill says that you knowingly transport 
with the intent to obtain an abortion when in fact the parental 
consent and notification laws are not complied with.
    And so, if a teenager in Virginia calls a taxi and asks to 
go to an abortion clinic in Maryland, and acknowledges during 
the trip what she intends to do, the taxicab driver, the 
dispatcher, maybe the taxicab company, are all criminally 
liable under the bill.
    This amendment would exempt the application of the bill to 
those who are in the business of providing public or private 
transportation, such as taxicabs, regardless of what 
information the riders tell them. Those folks have enough to 
worry about, without making them criminally liable for 
transporting an individual who intends to get an abortion.
    Now, Mr. Chairman, it's important to note that the bill 
does not prohibit a teenager from driving herself across State 
lines to evade parental consent laws. It only prohibits someone 
from transporting her or accompanying her--whatever 
``transport'' means; it's not defined in the bill.
    So I would hope that we will not criminalize the taxicab 
driver for answering a call and taking someone to where they 
want to go.
    I yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. 
Chabot.
    Mr. Chabot. I move to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    This amendment is totally unnecessary, because taxicab 
drivers are not liable under H.R. 476. Subsection (a)(1) allows 
for the conviction of an individual who knowingly transports a 
minor across State line ``with the intent that such individual 
obtain an abortion.''
    Although a taxicab driver may have the knowledge that the 
minor that he or she is transporting will obtain an abortion as 
soon as she arrives at her destination, his or her intent is 
not that the minor obtain an abortion. Rather, it's to 
transport the minor to her destination of choice, whether it's 
an abortion clinic or a shopping mall. In other words, the 
taxicab driver's reason for transporting the minor is to 
receive the fare, not to ensure that she obtains an abortion.
    Thus, a taxicab driver does not have the requisite intent 
necessary for prosecution under 476, so the amendment is 
totally unnecessary.
    And I yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Pursuant to the Chair's prior 
announcement, the Committee is recessed until immediately after 
the vote on the rule on the budget.
    [Recess.]
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The Committee be in order.
    When the Committee recessed, the bill H.R. 476, a motion to 
report favorably had been made. The bill was open for amendment 
at any point. And pending was an amendment by the gentleman 
Virginia, Mr. Scott, relative to taxi drivers.
    Is there further discussion? If not, those in favor of the 
Scott amendment will say aye.
    Opposed, nay.
    The aye does not have it, and the amendment is not agreed 
to.
    Are there further amendments to the bill?
    If there are no further amendments, without objection, the 
previous question on the bill is ordered. And we will await for 
19 folks to appear, and we will then have a vote on reporting 
the bill out favorably. Without objection, so ordered.
    Those here, please don't leave. And would the staff on both 
sides get the dragnet out, please?
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Virginia.
    Mr. Scott. It appears that there's still a vote going on. I 
would hope that we would delay the final gavel until well after 
the rollcall is closed on the floor.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will be instructed to 
call the roll slowly.
    Can she do that?
    Mr. Hyde. Mr. Chairman, that's a motion to adjourn that's 
pending now, carrying forth the motion, and one that's brought 
with substance.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. That's not a motion to adjourn. 
It's----
    Mr. Scott. It's a motion to table.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. It's a motion to table.
    Mr. Scott. A motion to table the motion to reconsider.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Yes. Also quite important.
    Mr. Scott. Equally important.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Yes.
    Mark?
    Mr. Green. I'm not going to leave. [Laughter.]
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Okay. Short leash time.
    Mr. Green. I'll be out here.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman from Texas.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I have an amendment at the desk.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The previous question has already 
been ordered on amendments, so the question is on reporting the 
bill favorably.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I'd like to strike the last word.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    We have been going through this bill. It's a very important 
bill. You indicated that we would start this Committee after 
the vote. The vote is not even closed. We came quickly over 
here, and I just raise a personal protest for the openness and 
bipartisanship of this Committee.
    I indicated by call to the Committee that I was en route, 
on the Democratic side, coming through door, which I did. And I 
can't imagine how, in a manner of seconds, the previous 
question has been called, and I'm walking through the door.
    This is important legislation. Constitutional issues are 
being raised. And I would hope that there would be a 
possibility of a Member being able to submit an amendment that 
she believes would add to the clarification of the 
constitutional issue----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
    Ms. Jackson Lee.--and the importance of the issue.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The Chair will state that he called 
the Committee to order. There was a vote on the Scott 
amendment. A working quorum was present; a working quorum of 13 
was present. The Chair then called for other amendments; there 
were no other amendments that were offered. And the Chair then 
asked unanimous consent that the previous question be ordered, 
and there was no objection. And the previous question was 
ordered pursuant to the unanimous consent agreement.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. A reporting quorum is now present.
    Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The Committee now returns to the 
pending, unfinished business upon which the previous question--
--
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner.--was ordered on H.R. 476.
    The question is on the motion to report favorably the bill 
H.R.----
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner.--476.
    For what purpose does the gentleman from North Carolina 
seek recognition?
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman, I move to reconsider the vote on 
the previous question.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The question is, shall the motion 
ordering the previous question be reconsidered?
    Those in favor will say aye.
    Opposed, no.
    In the opinion of the Chair, the noes have it. The noes 
have it, and the motion----
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman, I ask for a recorded vote on that.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The recorded vote is ordered.
    The question is on reconsidering ordering the previous 
question.
    Those in favor will, as your names are called, answer aye. 
Those opposed, no. And the clerk will call the role.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    Mr. Hyde. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde, no.
    Mr. Gekas?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble?
    Mr. Coble. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, no.
    Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, no.
    Mr. Gallegly?
    Mr. Gallegly. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly, no.
    Mr. Goodlatte?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Bryant?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, no.
    Mr. Barr?
    Mr. Barr. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Barr, no.
    Mr. Jenkins?
    Mr. Jenkins. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, no.
    Mr. Cannon?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Graham?
    Mr. Graham. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Graham, no.
    Mr. Bachus?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, no.
    Mr. Green?
    Mr. Green. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, no.
    Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, no.
    Mr. Issa?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Hart?
    Ms. Hart. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Hart, no.
    Mr. Flake?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Conyers?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Frank?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Berman?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. What is this? Yes.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, aye.
    Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Scott. Yes.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, aye.
    Mr. Watt?
    Mr. Watt. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt, aye.
    Ms. Lofgren?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye.
    Ms. Waters?
    Ms. Waters. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, aye.
    Mr. Meehan?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Delahunt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Baldwin?
    Ms. Baldwin. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Baldwin, aye.
    Mr. Weiner?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff?
    Mr. Schiff. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, aye.
    Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Are there additional Members who 
wish to record or change their vote?
    The gentleman from California, Mr. Issa.
    Mr. Issa. No, Mr. Chairman.
    The Clerk. Mr. Issa, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Other Members who wish to record or 
change their vote? If there are none, the clerk will report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are seven ayes and 14----
    Mr. Cannon. Mr. Chairman, how am I recorded?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Utah, Mr. 
Cannon.
    Mr. Cannon. No.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, 
Mr. Gekas.
    Mr. Gekas. No.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The clerk will report again.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are seven ayes and 16 nays.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the motion to reconsider----
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner.--is not agreed to.
    The question is----
    Mr. Watt. Parliamentary inquiry.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. State your parliamentary inquiry.
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman, my parliamentary inquiry is this: 
When the Chair says that the Committee is going to reconvene 
after a vote, would it be proper for the Chair to reconvene 
before the vote has closed on the floor, exactly what happened 
this case, because I came----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The Chair will respond that Members 
had an opportunity to record their votes and to come back.
    Mr. Watt. I--I----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. There were enough Members on both 
sides of the aisle coming back to provide a working quorum. The 
Chair did not start the Committee up until we had a working 
quorum.
    The question is now on the motion to report the bill 
favorably.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman from Texas.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just, with all due respect, could 
I--could we get an annunciation of the what the Chairman said? 
The question of Mr. Watt was, the end of a vote, is it not the 
closing of the vote, as opposed to in the midst of the vote. My 
understanding was----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The Chair will----
    Ms. Jackson Lee.--we would reconvene----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner.--respond this way: The Chair has 
been on this Committee for almost 24 years----
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes, sir.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner.--under three Chairman before 
myself. When the Chair has requested the Members to return 
immediately after a vote, the lights don't have to go off up on 
the clock. As soon as a reporting--or, a working quorum is 
present, the Committee has resumed its sitting.
    And there was an amendment that was disposed of. The Chair 
then said--called for further amendments; there were no further 
amendments that were offered. The Chair then said, there being 
no further amendments, without objection, the previous question 
is ordered; there was no objection to ordering the previous 
question. So there then was a motion to reconsider ordering the 
previous question; that was just not agreed to.
    So, under the rules, the question is now on whether or not 
to----
    Ms. Waters. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner.--report the bill favorably.
    Ms. Waters. Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman from California.
    Ms. Waters. Mr. Chairman, I just heard your explanation for 
why you proceeded with the work of the Committee and cut off 
the opportunity for amendments. And certainly, you have the 
gavel and you can do that. However----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. That's not a parliamentary inquiry.
    The Chair has stated that he asked unanimous consent for 
ordering the previous question, and that has been the standard 
procedure for as long as I have been around, when we are done 
with amendments, and the Chair calls for amendments, and nobody 
seeks to offer an amendment.
    The gentlewoman from California's statement is not a 
parliamentary inquiry.
    Ms. Waters. Well, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Again, there were--there were 
bipartisan representations present, or people present. Any 
Member could have objected to ordering the previous question, 
in which case the previous question was not ordered.
    The previous question is ordered, that brings immediately 
to the vote, the question of reporting the bill favorably.
    Those in favor will say aye.
    Ms. Waters. Mr. Chairman, whether you recognize me or not--
--
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Those opposed will say----
    Ms. Waters.--it's an abuse of power.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Those opposed will say no.
    Ms. Waters. Simply an abuse of power. That's all it is.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The ayes appear--the Chair just 
follows the rules and, you know----
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, I ask for a recorded vote.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The ayes appear to have it. The 
ayes have it----
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, I ask for a recorded vote.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Without--a recorded vote is 
ordered.
    Those in favor of reporting the bill favorably will vote 
aye. Those opposed will vote no. And the clerk will call the 
roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde?
    Mr. Hyde. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hyde, aye.
    Mr. Gekas?
    Mr. Gekas. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gekas, aye.
    Mr. Coble?
    Mr. Coble. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Coble, aye.
    Mr. Smith?
    Mr. Smith. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Smith, aye.
    Mr. Gallegly?
    Mr. Gallegly. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Gallegly, aye.
    Mr. Goodlatte?
    Mr. Goodlatte. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Goodlatte, aye.
    Mr. Bryant?
    Mr. Chabot?
    Mr. Chabot. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chabot, aye.
    Mr. Barr?
    Mr. Barr. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Barr, aye.
    Mr. Jenkins?
    Mr. Jenkins. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Jenkins, aye.
    Mr. Cannon?
    Mr. Cannon. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Cannon, aye.
    Mr. Graham?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus?
    Mr. Bachus. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Bachus, aye.
    Mr. Hostettler?
    Mr. Hostettler. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Hostettler, aye.
    Mr. Green?
    Mr. Green. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Green, aye.
    Mr. Keller?
    Mr. Keller. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Keller, aye.
    Mr. Issa?
    Mr. Issa. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Issa, aye.
    Ms. Hart?
    Ms. Hart. Aye.
    The Clerk. Ms. Hart, aye.
    Mr. Flake?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence?
    Mr. Pence. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Pence, aye.
    Mr. Conyers?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Frank?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Berman?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Boucher?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler?
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, I am going to vote on this under 
protest, because of the deliberate----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The--the----
    Mr. Nadler.--to bring this Committee into session before--
--
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York--the 
gentleman from New York----
    Mr. Nadler.--before--before Members came back, before the 
vote was concluded on the floor----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York will 
cast vote----
    Mr. Nadler.--when the Chairman knew there were two 
amendments----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner.--and not debate.
    Mr. Nadler.--when the Chair knew there were two amendments 
to be----
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The Clerk will continue call the 
roll.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott?
    Mr. Nadler.--to be introduced.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt?
    Mr. Nadler. It is an outrage that the minority is denied 
its two amendments.
    The Clerk. Ms. Lofgren?
    Mr. Nadler. And if that's the practice in this Committee--
--
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee?
    Mr. Nadler.--it's going to be unpleasant in the few 
meetings.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I am to be recorded as present and in 
protest. I will not vote on this bill, because there has been 
no opportunity for us to debate this bill fully.
    Present and not--and in protest.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters?
    Ms. Waters. And I don't care what the Chairman says. He's 
abusing power, and he's used his gavel in a manner that I don't 
expect him to use it in.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman----
    Ms. Waters. I don't like it.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner.--from California will----
    Ms. Waters. This side of the aisle does not like it.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner.--cast a vote and----
    Ms. Waters. And we're not going to put up with this.
    If you want us to be disruptive, we know how to do that.
    And I vote no on the bill.
    The Clerk. Ms. Waters, no.
    Mr. Meehan?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Delahunt?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Wexler?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Ms. Baldwin?
    Ms. Baldwin. No.
    The Clerk. Ms. Baldwin, no.
    Mr. Weiner?
    [No response.]
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff?
    Mr. Schiff. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Schiff, no.
    Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, aye.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Are there additional Members in the 
room who wish to cast or change their vote?
    The gentleman from South Carolina?
    Mr. Graham. Aye.
    The Clerk. Mr. Graham, aye.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Nadler.
    Mr. Nadler. Mr. Chairman, how am I recorded?
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler is not recorded.
    Mr. Nadler. You're sure I'm not recorded?
    The Clerk. No, you're not recorded, sir.
    Mr. Nadler. Then I'll vote no under protest.
    The Clerk. Mr. Nadler, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 
Scott.
    Mr. Scott. No.
    The Clerk. Mr. Scott, no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentleman from North Carolina, 
Mr. Watt.
    Mr. Watt. Mr. Chairman, I'm not sure my name was ever 
called, but if it was, I intended to vote no.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. How is Mr. Watt recorded?
    The Clerk. I don't have a vote for Mr. Watt.
    Mr. Watt. I just said, I intended to vote no.
    The Clerk. Mr. Watt, no.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. How am I recorded, Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. The gentlewoman from Texas?
    The Clerk. Ms. Jackson Lee is a present----
    Ms. Jackson Lee. In protest.
    The Clerk.--under protest.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. Are there further Members who wish 
to cast or change their votes?
    If not, the clerk will report.
    The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, there are 19 ayes and six nays.
    Chairman Sensenbrenner. And the motion to report favorably 
is agreed to.
    All Members will be given 2 days, as provided by House 
rules, in which to submit additional dissenting, supplemental, 
or minority views.
    There being no further business to come before the meeting 
of the Committee, the Committee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 3:54 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
                            Dissenting Views

    We strongly dissent from H.R. 476. This legislation will 
increase health risks to young women who choose to have an 
abortion, is anti-family, and is very likely unconstitutional. 
Additionally, the legislation is opposed by a wide variety of 
groups that remain committed to reducing teenage pregnancy and 
protecting a woman's right to choose, such as Planned 
Parenthood, the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights 
Action League, and the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, 
as well as leading organizations of medical professionals 
concerned with the welfare of pregnant teens.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ American Civil Liberties Union, Memorandum to Interested 
Persons Regarding the Teen Endangerment Act (August 30, 2001); American 
Academy of Pediatrics, American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, American Medical Women's Associan, Society for 
Adolescent Medicine, Letter to Members of the House of Representatives, 
(April 2, 2001); National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action 
League, The ``Child Custody Protection Act'' Threatens Young Women's 
Health, (January 21, 2002); American Medical Association, Council on 
Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Report H; House of Delegates Meeting, 
(June 1992); American Public Health Association, The Adolescent Right 
to Confidential Care When Considering Abortion, Policy Statement; Vol. 
97, No. 5, (May 1996); National Abortion Federation, Oppose H.R. 476, 
the ``Child Custody Protection Act,'' (2001); Center for Reproductive 
Law and Policy, The Child Custody Protection Act (CCPA): Creating Chaos 
and Punishing Adolescents, (September 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The ``Child Custody Protection Act'' would provide civil 
and criminal penalties for any individual who ``knowingly 
transport[s] an individual who has not attained the age of 18 
years across a State line, with the intent that such individual 
obtain an abortion, and thereby in fact abridges the right of a 
parent under a law requiring parental involvement in a minor's 
abortion decision, in force in a State where the individual 
resides. . . .'' \2\ The proposed law would not require that 
the defendant know that the State's parental involvement law 
has not been satisfied, or that the defendant intended to aid 
in its circumvention. Moreover, the legislation contains no 
exceptions for any close adult relative other than the parents 
or guardians of the minor. It could conceivably provide prison 
time for a grandparent, adult sibling, or clergy person and 
make that individual subject to a civil action by a parent who 
had raped and impregnated the minor. Furthermore, it would 
violate fundamental principles of Federalism by applying 
criminal and civil sanctions based on the law of one State for 
legal actions taken in a second State. There is no requirement 
whatsoever that the minor be taken by force or coercion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ H.R. 476, Sec. 2(a), creating a new 18 U.S.C. 2431(a)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This is the third Congress in a row that the House has 
considered this legislation, despite the failure on the part of 
any of its proponents to demonstrate that young women are being 
taken against their wills to other States, or are being coerced 
into having abortions.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ H.R. 476, 107th Cong. (Feb. 6, 2001), no Senate counterpart; 
H.R. 1218, 106th Cong. (March 23, 1999), Passed House 270-159 (Roll no 
26), placed on Senate Legislative Calendar, No. 203, no further 
consideration, S. 661, 106th Cong. (March 18, 1999), referred to 
Judiciary Committee, no further action; H.R. 3682, 105th Cong. (April 
1, 1998), Passed House 276-150 (Roll No. 280), Placed on Senate 
Legislative Calendar No 559, no further action. S.1654, 105th Cong. 
(February 12, 1998), Cloture not invoked in Senate Vote 54-45 (Roll No. 
282). The House has never made any amendments in order during floor 
consideration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Contrary to its stated intent, instead of simply 
facilitating State-required parental consent and notification 
laws, H.R. 476 will dramatically increase the dangers young 
women will face in dealing with unintended pregnancies. In 
fact, the bill contains no prohibitions whatsoever against 
women traveling across State lines alone to exercise their 
constitutional right to choose. It will only make it more 
difficult for them to seek the assistance and guidance of 
trusted adults such as grandparents, older siblings, aunts, 
uncles, or clergy. To the extent young women continue to seek 
the involvement of close family members when they cannot 
confide in their parents--where, for example, a parent has 
raped a young woman or where there is a history of child 
abuse--this bill will criminalize the actions of those caring 
adults whom the young woman is most likely to depend upon for 
support. Consequently, this bill encourages young women to act 
in isolation, putting them at greater risk of physical and 
psychological harm.
    Further, because the bill violates the principles of 
federalism, restricts a young woman's right to travel, and 
compels States to treat non-residents differently than 
residents, it raises very serious constitutional issues.
    Finally, we strongly object to the Majority's abuse of 
power to disenfranchise Members of the Minority by calling the 
Committee back into session while a vote on the floor was still 
open, and moving to a final vote on the bill before many 
Members had returned from the floor. The Majority had been well 
advised prior to the vote that only two more amendments would 
be offered and that, in an effort to promote comity and 
conclude consideration of this bill in a non-dilatory fashion, 
none of the Minority's other amendments would be offered. 
Furthermore, in an effort to avoid repetitive debate, the 
Minority offered no amendments at Subcommittee, holding all 
such debate for full Committee. In view of our past experience 
that no amendments have been made in order when the full House 
considered this bill in the last two Congresses, the actions of 
the Majority are tantamount to an unjustified and indefensible 
denial of the right of Members of the Committee to be heard and 
to speak for the citizens they represent. Many of us expressed 
at the time our concern that such an abuse of power was a poor 
response to the efforts of the Minority to work cooperatively 
with the Majority.
    For these and the other reasons set forth herein, we 
dissent from H.R. 476.

                 I. H.R. 476 Will Endanger Young Women

    Although an abortion is generally very safe, it is still 
far preferable and safer to permit a trusted friend or family 
member to drive a woman home from this surgical procedure.\4\ 
Moreover, responsible health care providers do not provide 
these services unless they are confident that the patient has 
someone who will accompany them and assist them following the 
procedure. Under this bill, teenagers who are unable to satisfy 
a State parental involvement law--either because they cannot 
tell one parent (or in some States, both parents) about their 
pregnancy or because they have no fair chance of obtaining a 
judicial bypass--will be forced to travel alone across State 
lines to obtain an abortion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Many teenagers seeking an abortion must travel out of State to 
obtain the procedure, either because the closest facility is located in 
a neighboring State or because there is no in-State provider available. 
In fact, currently 86% of counties--home to 32% of women of 
childbearing age--lack an abortion provider. See Stanley K. Henshaw, 
``Abortion Services in the United States, 1995 and 1996,'' Family 
Planning Perspectives, Vol. 30, No. 6, 262, 266 (Nov/Dec 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As much as we would prefer the active and supportive 
involvement of parents in their children's major decisions, it 
is not always realistic to expect young women to seek parental 
involvement willingly in the sensitive area of abortion. And 
where a child is unwilling or unable to seek parental consent, 
the results can be tragic. The testimony of Bill and Mary Bell 
before the Constitution Subcommittee is telling in this 
regard.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ See Hearing on H.R. 3682 ``The Child Custody Protection Act'' 
before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2d Sess., Serial 102, at 17 (May 28, 1998) 
(statement of Bill and Mary Bell, submitted for the record). See also 
Position Paper from The National Abortion Federation, ``The True 
Victims of S. 1645/H.R. 3682 The Teen Endangerment Act'' (June 1998) 
(describing the case of Keishawn, an 11-year-old from Maryland, who was 
impregnated by her stepfather, and sought an abortion with the 
assistance of her aunt, Vicky Simpson, who was awaiting an order 
granting her custody of Keishawn. Upon learning of the pregnancy, 
Keishawn's doctors in Maryland recommended that Keishawn have 
anesthesia during the abortion procedure, but none of the hospitals in 
Maryland would allow the abortion to be provided at their facility. As 
a result, Keishawn's aunt sought the attention of a specialist 
practicing in a neighboring State, who agreed to provide the abortion. 
Under H.R. 476, Vicki could have been federally prosecuted for helping 
her young niece cope with this pregnancy resulting from incest).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Bells were the parents of a daughter who died receiving 
an illegal abortion because she did not want her parents to 
know about her pregnancy, notwithstanding Indiana's parental 
notice law. A Planned Parenthood counselor in Indiana informed 
Becky that she would have to notify her parents or petition a 
judge in order to get an abortion. Becky responded that she did 
not want to tell her parents because she did not want to hurt 
them. She also replied that if she could not tell her parents, 
with whom she was very close, she would not feel comfortable 
asking a judge she did not even know. Instead of traveling 110 
miles away to Kentucky, Becky opted to undergo an illegal 
abortion close to her home. Tragically, Becky developed serious 
complications from her illegal abortion that caused her death. 
It is unlikely that H.R. 476 could have changed this outcome or 
would have convinced Becky to confide in her parents about her 
pregnancy. Regrettably, healthy family communication simply 
cannot be legislated.
    Moreover, many young women justifiably fear that they would 
be physically or emotionally abused if forced to disclose their 
pregnancy to their parents. Nearly one-third of minors who 
choose not to consult with their parents have experienced 
violence in their family or feared violence or being forced to 
leave home.\6\ Enacting this legislation and forcing young 
women in these circumstances to notify their parents of their 
pregnancies will only exacerbate the dangerous cycle of 
violence in dysfunctional families. This is the lesson of 
Spring Adams, an Idaho teenager who was shot to death by her 
father after he learned she was planning to terminate a 
pregnancy caused by his acts of incest.\7\ It is clear that 
when a young woman believes that she cannot involve her parents 
in her decision to terminate a pregnancy, the law cannot 
mandate healthy, open family communication.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ See Henshaw at 196.
    \7\ See Maggie Boule, ``An American Tragedy,'' Sunday Oregonian, 
Aug. 27, 1989.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We are well aware of proponents' claims that the bill 
protects minors who cannot obtain parental consent because they 
have the option to appear before judges and bypass any parental 
involvement laws. While bypass may have some theoretical 
benefits, in many cases it is difficult if not impossible for 
troubled young women to obtain. Some teenagers live in regions 
where the local judges consistently refuse to grant bypasses, 
regardless of the facts involved. For example, one study found 
that a number of judges in Massachusetts either refuse to 
handle abortion petitions or focus inappropriately on the 
morality of abortion.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ See Patricia Donovan, ``Judging Teenagers: How Minors Fare When 
They Seek Court-Authorized Abortions,'' Family Planning Perspectives, 
vol. 15, no. 6 (Nov./Dec. 1983): 259. See also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 
487 U.S. 417, 476 (1990) (finding that in Minnesota, many judges refuse 
even to hear bypass proceedings); In re T.W., 551 So.2d 1186, 1190 
(Fla. 1989) (describing how a judge in Florida, after denying a bypass 
petition to a teenage girl who was in high school, participated in 
extracurricular activities, worked 20 hours a week, and baby-sat 
regularly for her mother, suggested that he, as a representative of the 
court, had standing to represent the State's interest when the minor 
appealed the denial).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Others may live in small communities where the judge may be 
a friend of the young woman's parents, a family member, or even 
the parent of a friend. Still others may live in regions where 
the relevant courts are not open in the evenings or on 
weekends, when minors could seek a bypass without missing 
school or arousing suspicion.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ The courts in Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Rhode Island are 
not open in the evenings or on weekends. See Patricia Donovan, supra 
note 8, at 259.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The difficulties in obtaining a judicial bypass were 
clearly illustrated by Ms. Billie Lominick during her testimony 
before the Subcommittee on the Constitution. Ms. Lominick was a 
63-year-old grandmother who helped a pregnant minor from a 
physically and sexually abusive household cross State lines to 
obtain an abortion. Ms. Lominick testified that her assistance 
was essential because the minor was unable to find any judge in 
her home State of South Carolina who would hear her judicial 
bypass petition.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ See Hearing on H.R. 1218 ``The Child Custody Protection Act'' 
before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 1st Sess., Serial 16, at 23 (May 27, 1999) 
(statement of Billie Lominick).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, reliance on the judicial bypass system as an 
effective alternative to parental consent understates the 
intimidating effect of seeking a court-sanctioned abortion. 
Many minors fear that the judicial bypass procedure lacks the 
necessary confidentiality. The American Medical Association has 
noted that ``because the need for privacy may be compelling, 
minors may be driven to desperate measures to maintain the 
confidentiality of their pregnancies. . . . The desire to 
maintain secrecy has been one of the leading reasons for 
illegal abortion deaths since . . . 1973.'' \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, AMA, ``Mandatory 
Parental Consent to Abortion,'' JAMA, vol. 269, no. 1 (Jan. 6, 1993): 
83
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Many young women, faced with the prospect of embarrassment 
and social stigma would resort to drastic measures rather than 
undergo the humiliation of revealing intimate details of their 
lives to a series of strangers in a formal, legal process. 
Young women's concerns about confidentiality are especially 
acute in rural areas. For example, in one case a minor 
discovered that her bypass hearing would be conducted by her 
former Sunday school teacher.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ See Memphis Planned Parenthood v. Sundquist, No. 3:89-0520, 
slip op. at 13 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 26, 1997); See also Tamar Lewin, 
``Parental Consent to Abortion: How Enforcement Can Vary,'' N.Y. Times, 
May 29, 1992, p. A1 (describing how a judge in Toledo, Ohio denied 
permission to a 17\1/2\-year-old woman, an ``A'' student who planned to 
attend college and who testified she was not financially or emotionally 
prepared for college and motherhood at the same time, stating that the 
girl had ``not had enough hard knocks in her life'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Subcommittee heard testimony from the Rev. Katherine 
Ragsdale, an Episcopal Priest and Vicar of St. David's 
Episcopal Church, who discussed the case of a 15-year-old girl 
who had been raped and had become pregnant. The girl could not 
go to her father who would have thrown her out of the house, 
and she had no other family to whom she could turn. Of course, 
even if she did, this legislation would place those other 
relatives in legal jeopardy. Although they did not cross State 
lines, Rev. Ragsdale drove the young woman rather than allowing 
her to trave several hours alone by bus to and from the 
procedure. Rev. Ragsdale movingly described the pastoral 
counseling that she provided to the young woman during the 
drive. This bill would make criminals of clergy who provided 
this sort of pastoral care and guidance. Rev. Ragsdale's 
observations are worth repeating:

        ``Mr. Chairman, you talked about all the reasons it is 
        important for a girl to have parental involvement 
        before a medical procedure; and you are absolutely 
        right. And if I thought that this bill would accomplish 
        parental involvement, if I thought it would eliminate 
        the kind of pain Ms. Roberts spoke about, this panel 
        would be even more on balance than it is because I 
        would be on the other side, but it won't do that. This 
        bill isn't about resolving problems. This bill is about 
        punishing people. And while I understand that even the 
        best of us have punitive impulses from time to time, we 
        have no business codifying them. They are venal. They 
        are beneath the dignity of any member of the human 
        family.'' \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the 
House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 476, at 11 (107th Congress, 
September 6, 2001)(Testimony of Rev. Katherine Ragsdale).

    The argument has been made by proponents of H.R. 476 that 
in these situations, when judicial bypasses are not functioning 
properly, a young woman could seek--and undoubtedly obtain--
relief in Federal court. This argument ignores the facts. In 
Cleveland Surgi-Center v. Jones,\14\ Planned Parenthood and 
other abortion providers in the Akron area brought suit 
alleging that Ohio's judicial bypass procedure produced a 
series of factually incorrect and arbitrary results.\15\ 
Despite the arbitrary nature of the decisions by the juvenile 
courts in Ohio, the Federal court stated that it was a court of 
``limited jurisdiction'' that could not review the decisions of 
State courts.\16\ The court dismissed the case ``because both 
[the Court of Appeals] and the District Court are without 
jurisdiction to provide plaintiffs with the relief that they 
seek, namely the review of arbitrary State court decisions.'' 
\17\ Accordingly, it is not always the case that judicial 
bypass procedures are meaningful and effective, nor is it the 
case that, when they are not, the Federal courts will provide 
relief.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ 2 F.3d 686 (6th Cir. 1993).
    \15\ For example, a nearly 18-year-old minor petitioned for a 
waiver because she did not wish to discuss the matter with her parents. 
The juvenile court found that her reluctance to discuss the issue with 
her parents was, itself, evidence that she was not mature enough to 
make the decision as to whether to have an abortion. This example 
demonstrates that, at least for this judge, any minor who sought a 
bypass rather than discuss the matter with her parent could never 
obtain one--thereby defeating a central purpose of a judicial bypass.
    \16\ See Cleveland Surgi-Center, 2 F.3d at 691.
    \17\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      II. H.R. 476 is Anti-Family

    H.R. 476 is hostile to the well-being of families. Despite 
proponents' belief that H.R. 476 would enforce parents' right 
to counsel their daughters, the reality is that it is 
impossible to legislate complex family relationships. Studies 
reveal that more than half of all young women who do not 
involve a parent in a decision to terminate a pregnancy choose 
to involve another trusted adult, who is very often a 
relative.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ See Henshaw, at 207.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although the bill excepts parents from criminal and civil 
liability, even non-parent adults who are helping to raise a 
child will be swept in by the bill's prohibitions. This is 
because the exception is excessively narrow and refers only to 
a parent or guardian; a legal custodian; or a person designated 
by a State's parental involvement law as a person to whom 
notification, or from whom consent, is required. The Majority 
rejected an amendment by Mr. Nadler that would have excepted a 
grandparent or adult sibling from the bill's penalties. An 
amendment offered by Mr. Scott would have exempted an innocent 
common carrier who may have transported the minor was similarly 
rejected.\19\ The Majority also defeated an amendment offered 
by Ms. Waters that would have granted an exception where a 
parent or any other person who has permanent or temporary care 
or custody or responsibility for the supervision of the minor, 
or any other household member had caused the pregnancy. The 
absence of such an exception locks victims of incest into 
requiring consent from the incestuous parent. Other amendments 
the Minority had prepared could not be offered because of the 
Chairman's action to cut off debate described above.
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    \19\ H.R. 476, proposed 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2431(e)(2). Of the 33 States 
with parental involvement laws (not including the 10 States whose laws 
have been enjoined by the courts or are otherwise not enforceable), 23 
have laws that fit H.R. 476's definition of who may assist a minor. 
Nine States have a broader definition of parental involvement. Only 
Illinois and South Carolina openly allow consent or notice to a 
grandparent. See ``The Child Custody Protection Act: Creating Chaos and 
Punishing Adolescents,'' Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, 1 
(August 2001); ``Who Decides? A State-By-State Review of Abortion And 
Reproductive Rights,'' National Abortion Rights Action League, pp. 154-
5, (1998). Ohio allows notice to a grandparent, step-parent or adult 
sibling under certain circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The bill also illogically allows for civil actions between 
family members by authorizing lawsuits to be brought by parents 
suffering `legal harm'' against any person assisting a minor in 
obtaining an abortion across State lines. The legislation is so 
broad that even a person who committed rape or incest towards 
his own daughter is permitted to bring a lawsuit seeking 
compensation under H.R. 476.
    H.R. 476 does nothing to help build open, trusting 
relationships between family members. The net result will be 
the exact opposite of the sponsors' intent--weakening family 
communications and creating suspicion and mistrust among close 
family members.

                III. H.R. 476 is Dangerously Over Broad

    Supporters of this bill claim to be targeting predatory 
individuals who force and coerce a minor into obtaining an 
abortion. However, the net cast by this bill is far broader and 
more problematic. The legislation includes a criminal penalty 
against persons who ``knowingly transport an individual who has 
not attained the age of 18 years across a State line, with the 
intent that such individual obtain an abortion.'' \20\ In other 
words, this law makes it a federal crime to assist a pregnant 
minor to obtain a lawful abortion without requiring any 
intention to avoid State parental consent laws. Anyone simply 
transporting a minor--a bus driver, taxi driver, family member 
or friend--could be jailed for up to a year or fined or both. 
The same applies to emergency medical personnel who may be 
aware they are taking a minor across State lines to obtain an 
abortion but would have no choice if a medical emergency were 
occurring.
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    \20\ H.R. 476, proposed 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2431(a)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The supporters of this bill inaccurately compare it to the 
Mann Act, which prohibits the transport of ``any individual 
under the age of 18 years in interstate or foreign commerce, or 
in any Territory or Possession of the U.S., with intent that 
such individual engage in prostitution, or in a sexual activity 
for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense . . 
.'' \21\
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    \21\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2421.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Mann Act, like most other criminal laws, contains a 
mens rea component, that requires that criminally liable 
individuals have an intention to break the law. A person 
convicted of possessing stolen property, for example, must know 
or have reason to know that the property they possess is 
stolen. H.R. 476 has no such intent requirement and, therefore, 
imposes strict criminal liability for anyone in violation.\22\ 
Where the Mann Act purports to guard against corruption of 
minors, a laudable but not constitutionally-protected purpose, 
H.R. 476 imposes significant restrictions on a 
constitutionally-protected right to an abortion. Thus, it seems 
to us that the analogy is at best weak. Moreover, the Mann Act 
requires that the minor be transported across State lines for 
the purpose of engaging in an act that is illegal, while this 
legislation would impose civil and criminal liability for the 
act of taking a minor across State lines to engage in an 
activity which is legal in that second State, and 
constitutionally protected. The analogy is simply inapplicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ The affirmative defense available in H.R. 476 does not address 
this problem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For example, a nurse at a clinic providing directions to a 
minor or her driver could be convicted as an accessory under 
this legislation. A doctor who procures a ride home for a minor 
and the person accompanying her because of car troubles coupled 
with the minor's expressed fear of calling her parents for 
assistance could be convicted as an accessory after the fact. A 
sibling of the minor who merely agrees to transport a minor 
across State lines without any knowledge of any intent to evade 
the resident State's parental consent or notification laws 
could be thrown in jail and convicted of a conspiracy to 
violate this statute.
    The civil liability provisions of this bill create a 
blanket Federal cause of action for a parent who suffers 
``legal harm'' as a result of his or her child being 
transported across State lines, and would further chill family 
and doctor/patient relations. Agency law principles would 
enable an aggrieved parent to sue medical facilities, doctors, 
nurses, taxi drivers, relatives, ministers, and anyone else 
providing assistance to a minor being transported across State 
lines to obtain an abortion. Not only would the civil liability 
provision subject virtually everyone assisting a minor to civil 
lawsuits, it would subject everyone else the minor comes in 
contact with to the rules of discovery.

                IV. H.R. 476 Is Likely Unconstitutional

    By imposing substantial new obstacles and dangers in the 
path of a minor seeking an abortion, H.R. 476 also raises a 
number of serious constitutional concerns. First, if enacted, 
H.R. 476 could violate the rights of States to enact and 
enforce their own laws governing conduct within their 
territorial boundaries, as well as the rights of residents of 
different States to travel to and from any State of the Union 
for lawful purposes. As Professors Laurence Tribe of Harvard 
Law School and Peter Rubin of Georgetown University Law Center 
explained, ``[H.R. 476] amounts to a statutory attempt to force 
this most vulnerable class of young women to carry the 
restrictive laws of their home States strapped to their backs, 
bearing the great weight of those laws like the bars of a 
prison that follows them wherever they go (unless they are 
willing to go alone).'' \23\
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    \23\ Memorandum to the Comm. on the Judiciary from Laurence H. 
Tribe, Ralph S. Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard 
University and Peter J. Rubin, Visiting Associate Professor of Law, 
Georgetown University, at 2 (September 2, 2001).
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    One of the fundamental principles of our Federal system is 
that a State may not project its laws into other States. 
Crossing the border into another State, which every citizen has 
a right to do, permits the traveler temporarily to shed her 
home State's laws regulating primary conduct in favor of the 
laws of the State that she is visiting. H.R. 476 undermines 
this principle, and, in essence states that individuals may 
indeed be bound by the laws of their home States even as they 
traverse the nation by traveling to other States with very 
different laws.
    Proponents of H.R. 476 attempt to respond to this claim by 
stating that the legislation actually strengthens federalism, 
by allowing States to enforce their laws more effectively. 
However, we have seen no effort by the Majority to empower 
States to enforce their own gun, gambling, sales tax, or fraud 
laws against residents who cross State lines to take advantage 
of the laws of other States. Furthermore, this legislation 
would actually undermine fundamental principles of federalism 
by nullifying the policies set by the laws the majority of 
States in this country that have chosen not to require parental 
notification and consent in these cases, or that have parental 
involvement laws less restrictive than the ones incorporated 
into H.R. 476. Instead we face another shortsighted effort to 
politicize a tragic family dilemma, while doing nothing to 
respond to the underlying problem of teen pregnancies or 
dysfunctional families.
    The Supreme Court has clearly and consistently held that 
States cannot prohibit the lawful out-of-State conduct of their 
citizens, nor may they impose criminal sanctions on this 
behavior, as H.R. 476 does.\24\ The Court reaffirmed this 
principle in its landmark right to travel decision, Saenz v. 
Roe.\25\ In its decision, the Court held that, even with 
congressional approval, California's attempt to impose on 
recently-arrived residents the welfare laws of their former 
States of residence was an unconstitutional penalty upon their 
right to interstate travel.\26\ The decision also reaffirmed 
that the constitutional right to travel under the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Sec. 2, provides a similar 
type of protection to a non-resident who enters a State with 
the intent eventually to return to her home State.\27\ This 
principle applies to minors' rights to seek an abortion on non-
discriminatory terms as well as to welfare benefits. In Saenz, 
the Court specifically referred to Doe v. Bolton,\28\ which 
held that, under Article IV of the Constitution, a State may 
not restrict the ability of visiting non-residents to obtain 
abortions on the same terms and conditions under which they are 
made available by law to State residents: ``[T]he Privileges 
and Immunities Clause, Const. Art. IV, Sec. 2, protects persons 
. . . who enter [a State] seeking the medical services that are 
available there.'' \29\ It also is clear that such protections 
will flow to minors given that Planned Parenthood v. Danforth 
\30\ held that pregnant minors have a constitutional right to 
choose whether to terminate a pregnancy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 n.13 (1989) 
(quoting Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (plurality 
opinion), (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977) ``[T]he 
limits on a State's power to enact substantive legislation are similar 
to the limits on the jurisdiction of State courts. In either case, `any 
attempt directly' to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons 
or property would offend sister States and exceed the inherent limit of 
the State's power.'')).
    \25\ 119 S. Ct. 1518, 1525-1527 (1999) (describing the various 
components of the right to travel and their constitutional 
derivations).
    \26\ See id. at 1526-1527.
    \27\ See id.
    \28\ 410 U.S. 179.
    \29\ Id. at 200.
    \30\ 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
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    Finally, we would note that, in addition to these clear-cut 
constitutional problems, others have observed that the bill may 
well violate other constitutional requirements. For example, 
the ACLU, Professor Tribe and others have opined that the bill 
also contains an inadequate life exception and lacks any health 
exception, in possible abrogation of Roe v. Wade and its 
progeny.\31\ Additionally, the bill may impose an ``undue 
burden'' on the right to choose an abortion.\32\ The Center for 
Reproductive Law & Policy also has written that H.R. 476 
violates the First Amendment's right to associate as well as 
the Equal Protection Principle of the Fifth Amendment.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ The ACLU points to Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
880 (1992) (holding that all abortion regulations must contain a valid 
medical emergency exception ``for the essential holding of Roe forbids 
a State from interfering with a woman's choice to undergo an abortion 
procedure if continuing her pregnancy would constitute a threat to her 
health). H.R. 476 only provides an exception to its penalties when the 
abortion is `necessary to save the life of a minor because her life was 
endangered by a physical disorder, physical injury, or physical 
illness, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or 
arising from pregnancy itself.' '' See also Letter from Laurence H. 
Tribe to Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee at 1 (June 23, 1998) 
(hereinafter Tribe Letter).
    \32\ See Tribe Letter.
    \33\ See Statement of the Center for Reproductive Law & Policy In 
Opposition to the ``Child Custody Protection Act,'' H.R. 1218, June 21, 
1999 (stating that H.R. 1218 violates the First Amendment Right to 
Associate by criminalizing the association between a minor and another 
person for the purpose of effectuating the minor's right to choose 
abortion and arguing that H.R. 1218 violates the Equal Protection 
Principle of the Fifth Amendment by impermissibly classifying among 
minors being transported across State lines as well as among 
individuals transporting them).
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                               Conclusion

    H.R. 476 does nothing to make abortion less necessary, only 
more dangerous. It will not accomplish its policy purposes of 
encouraging parental involvement and takes the wrong approach 
to the problem of teenage pregnancy. It does nothing to 
increase teen awareness of the dangers of premarital sex. The 
bill preys on the problems of dysfunctional families where 
children cannot confide in their parents or fear physical harm 
when they do. The bill does nothing to stop a teenager from 
actually obtaining an out-of-State abortion, other than making 
the trip more dangerous.
    We are disappointed that the Majority has held steadfast in 
its efforts to isolate children in this way. Because H.R. 476 
is a burdensome attack on the rights and well-being of young 
women, we dissent from this legislation.

                                   John Conyers, Jr.
                                   Barney Frank.
                                   Howard L. Berman.
                                   Jerrold Nadler.
                                   Robert C. Scott.
                                   Melvin L. Watt.
                                   Sheila Jackson Lee.
                                   Martin T. Meehan.
                                   William D. Delahunt.
                                   Robert Wexler.
                                   Tammy Baldwin.
                                   Anthony D. Weiner.

                                  
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