1

Filed 5/19/11

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, )

)

Plaintiff and Respondent, )

) S065720

v. )

)

SEAN VENYETTE VINES, )

) Sacramento County

Defendant and Appellant. ) Super. Ct. No. 94F08352

____________________________________)

A Sacramento County jury convicted defendant Sean Venyette Vines of the 

first degree murder of Ronald Lee (Pen. Code, § 187; all further statutory 

references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated) and found true a 

special circumstance allegation that defendant murdered Lee while engaged in the 

commission of a robbery (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(i), now subd. (a)(17)(A)). 

It also convicted defendant of eight counts of robbery (§ 211), five counts of 

assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), four counts of kidnapping to 

commit robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)), four counts of false imprisonment (§ 236), and 

two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)). As to 

19 of the counts, the jury found true allegations that defendant personally used a 

firearm during the commission of the crimes. (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).) The trial 

court found true two prior conviction allegations, one within the meaning of 

sections 667 and 1170.12, and one within the meaning of section 667.5, 

subdivision (b).
2

The jury set the penalty for defendant‟s murder conviction at death, and the 

trial court sentenced him accordingly. This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. 

(b).)

I. GUILT PHASE

A. Facts

1. Introduction

On September 17, 1994, someone robbed the McDonald‟s restaurant on 

Watt Avenue in Sacramento. Eleven days later, on September 28,1 another 

McDonald‟s restaurant, on Florin Road in Sacramento, was robbed and employee 

Ronald Lee was killed by a gunshot to the back of his head. Defendant was 

employed at the Watt Avenue restaurant on the date it was robbed and previously 

had worked at the Florin Road restaurant.

2. Watt Avenue Robbery

a. Prosecution case

In September 1994, defendant and William Deon Proby worked at the Watt 

Avenue McDonald‟s restaurant. Two or three weeks before the robbery, while 

working the closing shift, defendant asked one of the managers, Charles Ruby, Jr., 

about procedures in the event of a robbery. Ruby told him that employees and 

managers were supposed to give the robbers the money without resistance. 

Defendant chuckled and replied, “We are going to get robbed.”

On September 17, the day of the Watt Avenue robbery, defendant was 

scheduled to work the closing shift at the restaurant, but called in to say he would 

be unable to come to work. Manager Stanly Zaharko and employees John 

 

1 Unless otherwise specified, all dates refer to 1994.
3

Burreson, Michael Baumann, and Leticia Aguilar worked the closing shift that 

evening. Only Zaharko had access to the safe.

The restaurant was scheduled to close at midnight. About 11:45 p.m., 

Baumann saw someone enter the restaurant and go into the bathroom. Although 

he got only a quick glimpse of the side of the person‟s face, Baumann was certain 

it was defendant. 

Just after midnight, Zaharko closed the restaurant and began to lock the 

doors and make sure that no one other than the employees was still on the 

premises. Checking the men‟s restroom, Zaharko saw that someone was in a stall. 

He realized it was not an employee when he saw all the employees in the front 

counter and grill area of the restaurant a few moments later. About 12:15 a.m., 

Zaharko headed toward the restroom to tell the person to leave. As he rounded the 

corner of the lobby, he saw a man walking out of the restroom with a gun in his 

hand. The man was a dark-skinned African-American between the ages of 18 and 

25, about six feet tall and weighing about 200 pounds.2 He was wearing faded 

jeans, a green jacket with a hood over his head, and a green scarf wrapped around 

his face. 

Believing the restaurant was being robbed, Zaharko raised his hands. The 

robber raised his gun and pointed it at Zaharko. The robber approached to within 

three feet of Zaharko, who, still facing the robber, walked backward to the counter 

area where the safe was located. Although he was not absolutely certain, Zaharko 

believed the robber was defendant. 

 

2 Defendant, who is African-American, stands six feet three inches tall and 

was 21 years old at the time of the offenses.
4

When they reached the safe, defendant, using an unnaturally low, gravelly 

voice, ordered Zaharko to open it. He had the gun pointed at the back of 

Zaharko‟s head. After Zaharko opened the safe, defendant ordered him to hand 

over the keys. Zaharko complied by placing both the store keys and his personal 

keys on top of the safe. Defendant then directed Zaharko to the back of the 

restaurant, where the other employees were standing beside a sink. Still disguising 

his voice, defendant told all the employees to go downstairs. As they proceeded 

single file down the basement stairway, which was not visible from the customer 

side of the front counter, defendant kept his gun pointed at them. Aguilar 

recognized defendant, with whom she had worked as many as a dozen times, most 

recently the preceding day, as the robber. Defendant instructed them to enter the 

walk-in freezer. Before doing so, Baumann turned to face defendant, thinking of 

trying to take his gun. Baumann recognized defendant and, after looking into the 

robber‟s eyes, was even surer it was defendant.3 Once the employees were inside 

the freezer, defendant slammed the freezer door and locked it; although the 

freezer‟s lock was inoperable, a metal bar had been fabricated to connect with an 

eyelet mounted on the wall to permit locking the freezer. Defendant had several 

times previously locked the freezer using this prefabricated latch. 

After waiting about 10 minutes, Zaharko and the other employees used an 

ax that was stored in the freezer to break through the door and escape. In the 

course of escaping, Zaharko injured his hand. One of the employees called 911, 

and they waited in the basement until the police arrived. 

 

3 Although at one point in his direct examination Baumann indicated he did 

not recognize defendant as the robber, he later testified he had not been truthful in 

that part of his testimony because he feared losing his family. He affirmed his 

certainty that defendant was the robber. 
5

Upstairs, Zaharko saw that the safe had been ransacked. About $2,000 had 

been stolen, and Zaharko‟s canvas attaché bag and Dodge Dakota truck, which he 

drove to work every day and routinely parked in the same spot, also were missing. 

About a month before the robbery, Zaharko had given defendant a ride home from 

work in the truck. Zaharko told the officers he believed defendant was the robber 

and described him as a dark-complected Black male, about 21 years old, six feet 

tall, and weighing 210 pounds. 

Vera Penilton, Proby‟s girlfriend, testified that after the robbery defendant 

and Proby picked her up at her mother‟s house and drove to the Rodeway Inn on 

Watt Avenue. She brought her newborn baby with her. Defendant and Proby 

were driving a truck, and Penilton saw a nametag bearing the name “Stanly” on 

the floor of the vehicle. Defendant and Proby previously had told her they 

planned to rob the McDonald‟s restaurant where they worked, and now told her 

about the robbery. Defendant said he committed the robbery by himself because 

Proby got scared and waited in the car. Defendant described waiting in the 

bathroom before robbing the restaurant and locking the employees in the freezer. 

He also told Penilton he hated his manager, Zaharko, and was going to shoot him, 

but did not do so. As he said this, he was laughing. Penilton saw that defendant 

and Proby had “a lot of money” and defendant had a small silver handgun. 

At some point, defendant and Proby tried to clean the truck and wipe off 

any fingerprints. They threw some things from the truck into a trash can behind a 

restaurant and tried to burn the truck. Finally, they left the truck near a Denny‟s 

restaurant in the Target shopping center on Mack Road. 

Defendant had taken the cellular phone that was in Zaharko‟s truck. 

Between 4:53 and 4:57 a.m. on September 18, the phone was used to call Ulanda 

Johnson‟s home telephone and pager numbers and Sonya Williams‟s home 

telephone number. Defendant had relationships with both women. 
6

That same night, defendant picked up Sonya Williams at her home and 

brought her to the Rodeway Inn, where they met Proby and Penilton. Along the 

way, Williams noticed defendant had a small silver gun on his lap. He told her 

“he did what he said he was going to do or what he talked about,” and showed her 

a wad of bills. (Two to three weeks earlier, defendant had told Williams that he 

and Proby were going to rob the McDonald‟s restaurant where he worked.) 

Defendant elaborated that he had committed the robbery with Proby; the two men 

had shared the proceeds, with $900 going to defendant and $700 to Proby; and 

they had used Proby‟s car. Defendant told Williams that during the robbery he 

came out of the bathroom, put a gun to a man‟s face, put everyone in the freezer, 

and took the money. When Williams asked defendant something to the effect of 

“What if you had killed those people that were in the freezer?” he calmly replied, 

“So?”4 After they checked into the motel, with defendant presenting his 

identification, Williams counted the wad of bills defendant had shown her earlier;

it totaled about $260 in $5 and $1 bills. 

 

4 On September 30, Detective Danny Minter of the Sacramento County 

Sheriff‟s Department interviewed Williams regarding the Watt Avenue robbery. 

Detective John Cabrera of the Sacramento Police Department, who was 

investigating the Florin Road robbery murder, was also present. During the 

interview, Williams recounted many statements defendant had made to her about 

the Watt Avenue robbery as they drove to the Rodeway Inn. At trial, Williams 

claimed she could not remember many of the details of that conversation, or 

denied defendant had ever made such statements. The trial court allowed the 

prosecution to play excerpts of the videotaped interview to impeach Williams with 

her prior inconsistent statements. Even after seeing those excerpts, however, 

Williams often claimed not to remember making the earlier statements. Detective 

Minter also testified regarding statements Williams had made during the interview 

that were inconsistent with her trial testimony. On cross-examination, Williams 

asserted she had made up all of the statements she had attributed to defendant 

concerning the robbery because she was angry at him. 
7

Defendant and Williams stayed at the Rodeway Inn for three nights. When 

they checked out on September 20, defendant paid the bill in cash. 

The day after the robbery, defendant went to the Watt Avenue restaurant to 

work the closing shift. Charles Ruby, Jr., who had learned of the robbery, told 

Lisa Lee, the general manager of the restaurant, about his earlier conversation with 

defendant in which defendant had predicted they would be robbed. Lee later said, 

loudly enough for defendant to hear, that the police had an idea about who had 

robbed the restaurant and would be coming back that night to talk to some people. 

Defendant dropped a basket of fries and became very nervous. After that night, 

defendant never worked at the restaurant again. 

That same day, Zaharko‟s truck was found at the Target shopping center on 

Mack Road. Defendant had worked at the Denny‟s restaurant at the same 

shopping center while employed at the McDonald‟s restaurant on Florin Road. 

When he got the truck back, Zaharko noticed that some items, including his 

cellular phone, were missing, and he found a bullet behind the driver‟s seat that 

proved to be a .25-caliber ACP (automatic cartridge for pistol). 

Sean Gilbert worked with defendant and Proby at the Watt Avenue 

McDonald‟s. A week or two before the robbery, defendant told Gilbert he owned 

a rifle or shotgun. Not more than a week before the robbery, Proby showed 

Gilbert a chrome-colored .25-caliber semiautomatic handgun. 

The day after the robbery, Gilbert saw defendant at work with a new Starter 

brand team jacket and a new Walkman. A couple of days after the robbery, Ruby 

saw defendant with what appeared to be a new red leather team jacket and a new 

portable compact disc player. 
8

b. Defense case

The defense presented the testimony of several witnesses in an effort to cast 

doubt on the eyewitness identifications. John Burreson, who was working at the 

Watt Avenue McDonald‟s at the time of the robbery, testified that defendant walks 

with a limp and he did not notice the robber doing so. Burreson did not recognize 

defendant as being the robber, but acknowledged he never looked at the robber‟s 

face and only saw him take three or four steps. In an interview with a police 

officer on the night of the robbery, Michael Baumann indicated he thought 

defendant was the robber, but did not say he was sure. In a later interview with 

Detective Minter, however, Baumann positively identified defendant as the robber. 

In a March 1995 interview, Baumann told defense investigator Marilyn Mobert 

that the robber “kind of looked like” defendant and, when Mobert showed him a 

photo of Vera Penilton‟s cousin, Anthony Edwards, Baumann indicated that 

Edwards‟s nose, mouth, and complexion were similar to the robber‟s.5

3. Florin Road Robbery and Murder

a. Prosecution case

After the Watt Avenue robbery, defendant told Proby and Penilton he 

wanted to “do another lick,” i.e., commit another robbery. During September 

1994, the month in which the two robberies occurred, Ulanda Johnson testified 

defendant and Proby were good friends and saw each other every day; she teased 

defendant that Proby was his “girlfriend.” 

 

5 Neither Zaharko, Baumann, Aguilar, nor Burreson, who were all shown the 

photo of Edwards, ever identified him as the robber. 
9

On September 27 or 28,6 defendant accompanied one of Johnson‟s friends, 

Deborah Allen, to a residence on Hillsdale Boulevard in Sacramento so she could 

retrieve some of her property. Allen testified defendant was holding a small silver 

gun. 

Defendant and Proby were seen together on September 28, both before and 

after the Florin Road robbery, at Penilton‟s and Johnson‟s residences. Defendant 

was carrying his black backpack when he left Johnson‟s house that evening. 

Jeffrey Hickey was the manager in charge of the closing shift at the Florin 

Road McDonald‟s on September 28. Also working that shift were Ronald Lee, 

Pravinesh Singh, and Jerome Williams. Previously, from October 1993 to April 

1994, defendant had worked at the same restaurant. Hickey, Lee, and defendant 

had worked the same shift together about a dozen times. 

The restaurant was scheduled to close at 11:00 p.m. About 10:40 p.m., 

Hickey entered the men‟s restroom, propped open the door, and began to scrub 

graffiti off the wall. A loud aluminum fan made it difficult to hear what was going 

on elsewhere in the restaurant. While Hickey was cleaning the wall, an AfricanAmerican man standing about Hickey‟s own height (5 feet 101⁄2 inches tall), 

weighing about 165 pounds, and wearing a baseball cap and a scarf over the lower 

portion of his face, whom Hickey later identified as Proby, came into Hickey‟s 

view in the doorway. Pointing what appeared to be a sawed-off rifle at Hickey, 

Proby told him to lie down on the floor, and Hickey complied. Proby left the 

bathroom and headed toward the main area of the restaurant, but returned after 

about two minutes and asked Hickey if he could open the safe. Still pointing the 

 

6 Deborah Allen told the police during one interview that this incident 

occurred on September 27 and in a later interview that it occurred on 

September 28. Johnson testified it occurred on September 28. 
10

gun at Hickey, Proby followed him to the restaurant‟s office. Ronald Lee lay on 

the floor just outside the office doorway. The other employees were in the stock 

room just past the office. A second man, whom Hickey described as being about 

six feet two inches tall and weighing 185 to 200 pounds, was standing against a 

salad preparation table just outside the office and holding what appeared to be a 

small semiautomatic handgun. Although Hickey deliberately refrained from 

looking at the second man‟s face in order to avoid giving the impression he was 

looking for identifying features, he perceived that the second man‟s physical 

characteristics were consistent with defendant‟s. While Hickey was opening the 

safe, the second man told him three times to hurry up, in an unnaturally low voice, 

as if he were trying to sound gruff. After opening the safe, Hickey left the office 

and lay on the floor facing the back of the restaurant, where the employees were. 

The second robber put his foot on Hickey‟s head to stop him from looking at the 

employees. Hickey heard cash drawers being removed from the safe. The second 

robber reached into Hickey‟s back pocket, removed his wallet, and after a few 

seconds placed it on Hickey‟s back. After two or three minutes, Hickey heard the 

robbers leave the restaurant. After about two more minutes, Hickey got up, 

checked on the other employees, and called the police. Singh and Williams got 

up, but Lee still lay on the floor. Hickey then noticed that Lee had a wound on the 

back of his head. An ambulance later came to take Lee away. 

Hickey ascertained that the robbers had taken about $550 in cash and a steel 

box containing some gift certificates. 

After the robbery, about 11:30 p.m., defendant and Proby went to Ulanda 

Johnson‟s house, where Johnson noticed defendant was wearing his black 

backpack on his right shoulder. The next morning, the backpack, containing a 

gun, was on Johnson‟s living room floor. 
11

Also late in the evening after the robbery, defendant and Proby went to 

Vera Penilton‟s house, entered her bedroom, and shut the door. Penilton stood 

outside the door, listening to their conversation. She heard Proby talking about 

how they had robbed another McDonald‟s, and heard defendant say he had killed 

his friend. Penilton entered the bedroom, and defendant told her he had shot his 

friend in the back of the head because the boy had said his name. In defendant‟s 

backpack were a metal box containing gift certificates and some rolls of coins. 

On September 29, the day after the Florin Road robbery murder, defendant 

made a deposit of $212, consisting of $5 and $1 bills, into his share account at the 

Safe Federal Credit Union. Less than 20 minutes later, Proby opened an account 

at the same credit union. 

Later that day, defendant and Penilton were riding in Proby‟s car while 

Proby drove. A police car with flashing lights came up behind them, and officers 

inside tried to get Proby to stop. At defendant‟s urging, Proby continued to drive, 

running several red lights. Finally, having driven into the parking lot at Ulanda 

Johnson‟s apartment building, defendant and Proby jumped out of the moving car, 

which crashed into a police car and came to a stop. Defendant and Proby were 

arrested. 

Penilton was taken to the police station and interviewed. Initially, she 

testified, she did not tell the officers the whole truth because she was afraid. She 

did, however, tell them about the conversation she had overheard between 

defendant and Proby in her bedroom and that defendant had told her he had killed 

a boy. Penilton allowed the officers to search her room. They seized money, gift 

certificates, and the metal box. During a second search, officers seized the phone 

defendant had taken in the Watt Avenue robbery. Penilton agreed to speak with 

the officers a second time because she felt bad she had not previously told them 
12

the truth. During the second interview, she told them what she knew about the 

robberies. 

The cause of Lee‟s death was determined to be a wound to the back right 

side of his head from a copper-jacketed .25-caliber ACP bullet designed to operate 

in a semiautomatic weapon. A live cartridge of the same type of ammunition was 

recovered from Zaharko‟s truck. 

b. Defense case

Pravinesh Singh was cleaning the kitchen at the time of the robbery and 

saw only one of the robbers, whom he described as being a dark-complected 

African-American male about five feet eight inches tall, wearing black clothing 

and a green ski mask. The robber, who Singh testified was not defendant, held a 

small silver handgun with which he motioned nervously to Singh to get onto the 

floor. Singh complied, lying facedown toward a storage room and away from the 

robber. Singh saw Ronald Lee walking toward the safe and standing near the 

office door. Singh heard a voice coming from the office, angrily demanding the 

safe be opened, and then heard a gunshot and a “dropping” sound, like someone 

falling down. He did not hear Lee say anything to the robber. 

B. Discussion

1. Jury Selection Issues

a. Asserted Batson/Wheeler error

Defendant contends the judgment must be reversed because the prosecutor 

peremptorily challenged a prospective juror on the basis of race and the trial court 

erred in overruling defendant‟s objection to the challenge, in violation of 

defendant‟s constitutional rights to a trial by a jury drawn from a representative 

cross-section of the community, to equal protection of the law, and to a 

fundamentally fair and reliable trial. (Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 89; 
13

People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 276-277.)7 For the reasons that follow, 

we disagree.

“ „Both the state and federal Constitutions prohibit the use of peremptory 

challenges to remove prospective jurors based solely on group bias.‟ ” (People v. 

Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 936.) Recently, “the United States Supreme Court 

reaffirmed that Batson states the procedure and standard to be employed by trial 

courts when challenges such as defendant‟s are made. „First, the defendant must 

make out a prima facie case “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts 

gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” [Citations.] Second, once 

the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the “burden shifts to the State to 

explain adequately the racial exclusion” by offering permissible race-neutral 

justifications for the strikes. [Citations.] Third, “if a race-neutral explanation is 

tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike 

has proved purposeful racial discrimination.” [Citation.]‟ ” (People v. Cornwell

(2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 66-67; see also People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 173.)

“ „ “[A] defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson‟s first step by 

producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that 

discrimination has occurred.” [Citation.] [¶] In determining whether the 

defendant ultimately has carried his burden of proving purposeful racial 

discrimination, “the trial court „must make “a sincere and reasoned attempt to 

evaluate the prosecutor‟s explanation in light of the circumstances of the case as 

then known, his knowledge of trial techniques, and his observations of the manner 

in which the prosecutor has examined members of the venire and has exercised 

 

7 Although at trial defendant cited only Wheeler in support of his objection, 

this sufficed to preserve his Batson claim for appeal. (People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 

Cal.4th 93, 117-118.)
14

challenges for cause or peremptorily . . . .” [Citation.]‟ ” (People v. Reynoso

(2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 919.) “[T]he trial court is not required to make specific or 

detailed comments for the record to justify every instance in which a prosecutor‟s 

race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge is being accepted by the 

court as genuine.” ‟ ” (People v. Stanley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 936.) 

“Review of a trial court‟s denial of a Wheeler/Batson motion is deferential, 

examining only whether substantial evidence supports its conclusions. [Citation.] 

„We review a trial court‟s determination regarding the sufficiency of a 

prosecutor‟s justifications for exercising peremptory challenges “ „with great 

restraint.‟ ” [Citation.] We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges 

in a constitutional manner and give great deference to the trial court‟s ability to 

distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses. [Citation.] So long as the trial 

court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory 

justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal. 

[Citation.]‟ ” (People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 613-614.)

Defendant‟s contention relates to the excusal of M.H, an African-American 

male prospective juror. In response to defendant‟s objection to the prosecutor‟s 

challenge to M.H., the trial court asked the prosecutor to state his reasons for the 

challenge on the record, impliedly finding defendant had made a prima facie 

showing of discrimination.8 (People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 716.) 

Turning first to M.H.‟s questionnaire responses, the prosecutor explained he 

challenged M.H. because M.H. wrote that the O.J. Simpson trial “restore[d]” his 

 

8 At the same time, defendant objected to the prosecutor‟s challenge to 

another African-American prospective juror, B.H. After reviewing B.H.‟s jury 

questionnaire, the trial court stated it was satisfied B.H. was not excused on the 

basis of race, and defendant does not challenge that ruling here. 
15

“faith” in the justice system, whereas the prosecutor believed the Simpson trial 

was a “travesty.” The prosecutor also was concerned that M.H. “disagreed 

strongly” with the proposition that if the prosecution brings someone to trial, that 

person is probably guilty; the prosecutor reasoned he could “live with” a juror who 

“disagreed somewhat” with that proposition, but a response as extreme as M.H.‟s 

was problematic, in the prosecutor‟s view. The prosecutor also noted that M.H. 

believed it was better to let some guilty people go free rather than risk convicting 

an innocent person, whereas the prosecutor preferred a jury composed of people 

“oriented the other way.” The prosecutor cited M.H.‟s views on the death penalty, 

specifically his statement (as paraphrased by the prosecutor) that he would only 

impose it if he were required to do so; because a death sentence is never 

mandatory, the prosecutor reasoned M.H. would not impose it: “And he is of the 

frame of mind, I feel someone is going to have to force him or require him to do it, 

and I don‟t believe on this type of a decision I want someone with that frame of 

mind, because it is a major decision in someone‟s life, and I think they have to feel 

comfortable about it, and I don‟t feel he felt comfortable about it.” Finally, the 

prosecutor cited M.H.‟s questionnaire response that he originally felt the death 

penalty was imposed unfairly against African-Americans, and now was unsure; 

the prosecutor “didn‟t feel that he would have the strength to [impose the death 

penalty], even if he felt that it was right.” The trial court denied the motion 

without comment. 

Defendant argues the trial court failed to make a sincere and reasoned 

attempt to evaluate the prosecutor‟s stated reasons for the excusal. As noted, the

trial court is not required to explain on the record its ruling on a Batson/Wheeler

motion. (People v. Reynoso, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 919.) “When the prosecutor‟s 

stated reasons are both inherently plausible and supported by the record, the trial 

court need not question the prosecutor or make detailed findings.” (People v. 
16

Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 386.) Citing Silva, at page 385, defendant contends 

such an explanation was necessary in this case because the record contradicts the 

prosecutor‟s stated reasons for the challenge. To the contrary, we believe a fair 

reading of the record supports those reasons, along with the trial court‟s ruling.

Of the reasons the prosecutor gave for excusing M.H., defendant here 

focuses primarily on one: the prosecutor‟s assertion that M.H. said he would 

impose the death penalty only if required to do so. Defendant argues that, contrary 

to the prosecutor‟s explanation, M.H. did not indicate he would impose the death 

penalty only if required to do so, but rather said, “if I were required to impose it I 

would,” after a fair trial. M.H.‟s entire response to the relevant question asking 

him to briefly describe his opinions on the death penalty was that the “death 

penalty should only be applied under certain circumstances, only after fair trail 

[sic] if I were required to impose it I would.” This answer is reasonably 

susceptible of the interpretation the prosecutor placed on it. As the Attorney 

General argues, M.H. identified only two circumstances in which he would vote 

for death: after a fair trial and if he were required to do so. Defendant‟s trial 

presumably would be fair, but in no event would M.H. be required to vote for the 

death penalty. The prosecutor therefore could reasonably be concerned that M.H. 

would not be a favorable juror for the prosecution. “[A] prospective juror‟s 

scruples regarding the death penalty „are reasonably related to trial strategy 

[citation] and are a legitimate race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory 

challenge.‟ ” (People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 448-449.) That M.H. 

stated on voir dire that he could consider both penalties, and thus demonstrated he 

was not subject to removal for cause (see Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 

424 [a juror in a capital case may be excused if his or her views would “ „prevent 

or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with 

his instructions and his oath‟ ”]), did not preclude the prosecutor from exercising a 
17

peremptory challenge when M.H.‟s questionnaire responses indicated a degree of 

reluctance to impose the death penalty with which the prosecutor was 

uncomfortable. (See Cowan, at pp. 448-451 [discussing prospective jurors‟ oral 

and written comments in upholding excusals]; People v. Semien (2008) 162

Cal.App.4th 701, 708.)9

The prosecutor‟s interpretation of M.H.‟s response to the question seeking 

his views on the death penalty, moreover, must be understood in light of his 

responses to questions No. 80 and 90.b, where he espoused, respectively, the 

views that the criminal justice system treats some individuals unfairly based on 

race and that, in the past and possibly in the present day, the death penalty has 

been imposed unfairly against members of minority groups. Given M.H.‟s 

expressed concerns regarding the fairness of the criminal justice system, together 

with his statement that he could return a death verdict only after a “fair trial,” the 

prosecutor could reasonably have concluded that M.H. would be an unfavorable 

juror from the prosecution‟s standpoint.

Defendant contends a comparative analysis of the questionnaire responses 

given by Juror No. 7 demonstrates that the prosecutor‟s stated reasons for 

excusing M.H. were mere pretexts for racial discrimination, in that Juror No. 7, a 

White juror whom the prosecutor did not challenge, gave responses similar to 

those given by M.H. We grant defendant‟s request that we conduct such an 

analysis, even though he failed to make the corresponding argument below. (See 

 

9 The prosecutor asserted he had excused other prospective jurors who 

expressed their views on the death penalty in similar terms. Defendant claims the 

assertion was false. As the Attorney General observes, however, the prosecutor in 

fact challenged for cause two prospective jurors who said they could not impose 

the death penalty. 
18

People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 607.) We disagree, however, that it 

dictates a finding of Batson/Wheeler error in this case.

Defendant first contends that both M.H. and Juror No. 7 expressed similar 

views of the O.J. Simpson trial, which the prosecutor cited in M.H.‟s case as a 

basis for excusal. Not so. In response to question No. 65.b (“How, if at all, did 

the O.J. Simpson trial affect your view of the courts and the criminal justice 

system?”), M.H. stated the Simpson trial “restored” his “faith.” Juror No. 7‟s 

answer to the same question was: “It raised my concerns on jury selection and 

impact of televising a trial.” In response to question No. 64 (“During the past 

year, have you followed newspaper or television reports for any particular criminal 

case?” and “What opinions, if any, did you form about the criminal justice system 

as a result?”), Juror No. 7 reported following the O.J. Simpson and “Terry 

McVie”10 cases and observed, “The court system still works.” In response to the 

same question, M.H. denied following media reports for any particular court case. 

Plainly, Juror No. 7‟s response to the question specifically dealing with the 

Simpson case was dissimilar to M.H.‟s, and his response to the more general 

question about recent criminal cases did not necessarily constitute an endorsement 

of the result in the Simpson case. 

Defendant correctly points out that, in their questionnaires, both M.H. and 

Juror No. 7 “disagreed strongly” that if the prosecution brings someone to trial, 

that person is probably guilty, and that Juror No. 7 agreed even more strongly than 

 

10 Sic, evidently Timothy McVeigh, who, at the time of jury selection in this 

case, had recently been tried and sentenced to death for the bombing of the Alfred 

P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, which caused the deaths of 168 

people, including 19 young children. McVeigh‟s coconspirator was Terry 

Nichols. (See U.S. v. McVeigh (10th Cir. 1998) 153 F.3d 1166, 1176-1177.)
19

M.H. with the proposition that it is better for society to let some guilty people go 

free than risk convicting an innocent person. As defendant further observes, M.H. 

and Juror No. 7 shared certain personal characteristics, including academic 

background, occupation, place of residence, and a preference for science fiction 

movies. But the two men differed significantly in age and life experience: Juror 

No. 7 was 51 years old, had been in the military, had a spouse who was employed, 

and had raised a child to adulthood. He was a supervisor at his place of 

employment, with the power to hire and fire. M.H. was 34 years old, with a 

spouse who was not employed and an infant child; he had no supervisory 

experience or responsibility. The prosecutor reasonably could have taken such life 

experiences into account in selecting jurors. Juror No. 7‟s daughter had worked in 

a fast-food restaurant (such as the scenes of the crimes here) and another relative 

had been the victim of a crime, which might have tended to make him more 

sympathetic to the prosecution in this case; M.H. had no relatives with fast-food 

experience and knew no one who had been victimized. 

With respect to views concerning the death penalty, which evidently was a 

topic of primary importance to the prosecutor, the questionnaires of the two men 

revealed differences the prosecutor could have found significant: M.H. expressed 

uncertainty whether the death penalty is imposed too often and whether it is 

imposed unfairly against African-Americans or any minority group; Juror No. 7 

believed the death penalty is imposed neither too seldom nor too often, but “About 

right,” and expressed no uncertainty whether it is imposed unfairly against 

minorities. 

In sum, significant differences in life experiences and attitudes concerning 

the death penalty existed between M.H. and Juror No. 7, differences the prosecutor 

could reasonably have taken into account in deciding to peremptorily challenge 

M.H. and not to challenge Juror No. 7. Defendant‟s argument therefore fails.
20

b. Excusals based on views concerning the death penalty

Defendant contends the trial court erred by excusing Prospective Juror O.A. 

due to her expressed views concerning the death penalty, thereby violating his 

right to an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

United States Constitution. “The high court has established the legal standard for 

excusing jurors due to their views on the death penalty, first in Witherspoon v. 

Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770], and then in 

Wainwright v. Witt[, supra,] 469 U.S. 412 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844]. In 

Witt, the Supreme Court explained that a prospective juror may be excused in a 

capital case if „the juror‟s views would “prevent or substantially impair the 

performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his 

oath.” ‟ (Id. at p. 424.) We apply the same standard under the state Constitution.” 

(People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 192.) 

“ „There is no requirement that a prospective juror‟s bias against the death 

penalty be proven with unmistakable clarity. [Citations.] Rather, it is sufficient 

that the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror 

would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law in the case before the 

juror.‟ [Citation.] „Assessing the qualifications of jurors challenged for cause is a 

matter falling within the broad discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] The trial 

court must determine whether the prospective juror will be “unable to faithfully 

and impartially apply the law in the case.” [Citation.] A juror will often give 

conflicting or confusing answers regarding his or her impartiality or capacity to 

serve, and the trial court must weigh the juror‟s responses in deciding whether to 

remove the juror for cause. The trial court‟s resolution of these factual matters is 

binding on the appellate court if supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] 

“[W]here equivocal or conflicting responses are elicited regarding a prospective 

juror‟s ability to impose the death penalty, the trial court‟s determination as to his 
21

true state of mind is binding on an appellate court.” ‟ ” (People v. Gray, supra, 37 

Cal.4th at pp. 192-193.) 

In her questionnaire, when she was asked to describe her opinions about the 

death penalty, O.A. wrote: “I could not agree on a death penalty. I could agree 

with life in prison.” She indicated she felt the death penalty was imposed “Too 

often,” that it served no purpose, and there was no type of case in which she 

thought it ought to be imposed. She indicated she would automatically refuse to 

vote for the death penalty and that she would automatically always vote for life in 

prison without the possibility of parole. 

Her answers during individual voir dire were less certain than those 

expressed in her questionnaire, but nonetheless expressed at least a distinct 

predisposition to favor life over death. In response to the trial court‟s question 

whether or not she could consider both penalties, she responded: “No, I don‟t 

think that I can.” When the trial court immediately followed this answer by 

inquiring if she was predisposed to one penalty, O.A. stated: “Yes. [¶] . . . 

[¶] Life imprisonment.” 

In response to further questioning by the trial court, however, O.A. 

indicated she thought she “would probably follow the court‟s instructions.” In 

response to the trial court‟s question whether, after she had heard all the evidence, 

arguments, and court‟s instructions she concluded death was the appropriate 

penalty, she would vote for death, she stated: “Probably. I think so, yes.” O.A. 

then explained, “I think [the] reason I am hedging more is because I feel that—

I would have a difficult time doing it, but I would follow the court‟s instruction.” 

After the trial court again asked “if you felt that [death] would be the appropriate 

penalty, despite it being difficult and despite maybe you not liking it, you would 

vote [for] the death penalty, is that true, ma‟am?” O.A. responded, “Yes. [¶] . . . 

[¶] That‟s true.” 
22

After a few additional questions from the prosecutor and the trial court, 

O.A. explained that, based on her personal beliefs, which derived in part from 

religion, she believed the death penalty was “not right” and that therefore she 

could not make the decision to impose death. Defense counsel did not ask O.A. 

any questions. The prosecutor challenged O.A. for cause, defense counsel 

submitted the matter without argument, and the trial court excused her. In light of 

O.A.‟s answers to the jury questionnaire, as well as her equivocal answers on voir 

dire, we defer to the trial court‟s implicit determination regarding her state of mind 

and conclude substantial evidence supports the court‟s ruling the juror‟s views on 

the death penalty would “ „prevent or substantially impair the performance of [her] 

duties as a juror in accordance with [her] instructions and [her] oath.‟ ” 

(Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424; People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 

758, 779.) 

Defendant next contends the trial court applied disparate standards in 

evaluating “pro-life” Prospective Juror O.A. and “pro-death” Prospective Juror 

B.S., claiming B.S. “testified unequivocally that he believed the death penalty 

should be „automatically‟ imposed on anyone who intentionally killed another 

person.” This unequal treatment, defendant claims, violated his rights to a fair and 

impartial jury and to due process. 

Defendant‟s characterization of B.S.‟s view on automatic imposition of the 

death penalty is misleading. B.S. indicated that despite his religious belief in “an 

eye for an eye,” he could set aside that belief and follow the law and the court‟s 

instructions. O.A. did not make such a clear statement. Further, unlike O.A., B.S. 

indicated without equivocation that he could consider and impose both penalties. 

In light of the clear differences in the expressed views of these two prospective 

jurors on their ability to impose the death penalty, we reject defendant‟s claim that 

the trial court applied disparate standards in evaluating their answers.
23

2. Denial of Severance Motion 

On July 7, 1997, shortly before trial began, defendant moved to sever the 

Watt Avenue charges from the Florin Road charges. Although he conceded all of 

the alleged offenses were of the same class, and hence permissibly joined under 

section 954, he argued the evidence of each set of offenses was inadmissible in the 

trial of the other, and their joinder would prejudice him while effecting no 

substantial judicial economy. The trial court denied the motion without comment. 

On appeal, defendant contends the trial court‟s ruling constituted error under state 

law and denied him due process of law. For the reasons discussed below, we 

conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise violate 

defendant‟s rights by denying the severance motion.

Section 954 provides in relevant part: “An accusatory pleading may charge 

two or more different offenses connected together in their commission, . . . or two 

or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, under separate 

counts, . . . provided, that the court in which a case is triable, in the interests of 

justice and for good cause shown, may in its discretion order that the different 

offenses or counts set forth in the accusatory pleading be tried separately or 

divided into two or more groups and each of said groups tried separately.” 

Because the Watt Avenue and Florin Road charges alleged offenses of the same 

class, “the statutory requirements for joinder were satisfied,” and defendant “can 

predicate error in denying the motion only on a clear showing of potential 

prejudice. [Citation.] We review the trial court‟s ruling on the severance motion 

for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1030; see People 

v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 773-774.)

“ „ “ „The burden is on the party seeking severance to clearly establish that 

there is a substantial danger of prejudice requiring that the charges be separately 

tried.‟ [Citation.] [¶] „The determination of prejudice is necessarily dependent on 
24

the particular circumstances of each individual case, but certain criteria have 

emerged to provide guidance in ruling upon and reviewing a motion to sever trial.‟ 

[Citation.] Refusal to sever may be an abuse of discretion where: (1) evidence on 

the crimes to be jointly tried would not be cross-admissible in separate trials; 

(2) certain of the charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury against the 

defendant; (3) a „weak‟ case has been joined with a „strong‟ case, or with another 

„weak‟ case, so that the „spillover‟ effect of aggregate evidence on several charges 

might well alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and (4) any one of the 

charges carries the death penalty or joinder of them turns the matter into a capital 

case. [Citations.]” ‟ ” (People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1030, quoting 

People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1315; see also People v. Soper, supra, 

45 Cal.4th at pp. 774-775.)

“Our determination whether defendant was prejudiced by joinder requires 

us first to examine whether evidence on each of the joined charges would have 

been admissible, under Evidence Code section 1101, in separate trials on the 

others. If so, any inference of prejudice is dispelled. (People v. Bradford, supra, 

15 Cal.4th at pp. 1315-1316.) Conversely, however, the absence of crossadmissibility does not, by itself, demonstrate prejudice. (Id. at p. 1316.)” (People 

v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1030.)

Defendant contends none of the evidence of each set of offenses would 

properly have been admitted in a separate trial of the other set of offenses. 

Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), he notes, generally prohibits the 

admission of evidence of a person‟s conduct on a specific occasion to prove he 

acted in character on another occasion. Although subdivision (b) of that statute 

makes evidence of a prior bad act admissible if relevant to prove a fact in issue 

other than character (such as his motive, identity, opportunity, intent, plan, or 
25

knowledge), defendant contends the evidence in this case was not admissible 

under subdivision (b).

We have said that “[i]n determining whether evidence of uncharged 

misconduct is relevant to demonstrate a common design or plan, it is useful to 

distinguish the nature and degree of similarity (between uncharged misconduct 

and the charged offense) required in order to establish a common design or plan, 

from the degree of similarity necessary to prove intent or identity. [¶] The least 

degree of similarity (between the uncharged act and the charged offense) is 

required in order to prove intent. [Citation.] „[T]he recurrence of a similar result 

. . . tends (increasingly with each instance) to negative accident or inadvertence or 

self-defense or good faith or other innocent mental state, and tends to establish . . . 

the presence of the normal, i.e., criminal, intent accompanying such an act . . . .‟ 

[Citation.] In order to be admissible to prove intent, the uncharged misconduct

must be sufficiently similar to support the inference that the defendant „ “probably 

harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance.” [Citations.]‟ [Citation.] [¶] A 

greater degree of similarity is required in order to prove the existence of a 

common design or plan. . . . [¶] To establish the existence of a common design or 

plan, the common features must indicate the existence of a plan rather than a series 

of similar spontaneous acts, but the plan thus revealed need not be distinctive or 

unusual. . . . [¶] The greatest degree of similarity is required for evidence of 

uncharged misconduct to be relevant to prove identity. For identity to be 

established, the uncharged misconduct and the charged offense must share 

common features that are sufficiently distinctive so as to support the inference that 

the same person committed both acts. [Citation.] „The pattern and characteristics 

of the crimes must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.‟ ” 

(People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402-403, fn. omitted.)
26

We have also said “ „[o]ther-crimes evidence is admissible to prove the 

defendant‟s identity as the perpetrator of another alleged offense on the basis of 

similarity “when the marks common to the charged and uncharged offenses, 

considered singly or in combination, logically operate to set the charged and 

uncharged offenses apart from other crimes of the same general variety and, in so 

doing, tend to suggest that the perpetrator of the uncharged offenses was the 

perpetrator of the charged offenses.” [Citation.]‟ [Citation.] The inference of 

identity, moreover, need not depend on one or more unique or nearly unique 

common features; features of substantial but lesser distinctiveness may yield a 

distinctive combination when considered together.” (People v. Miller (1990) 50 

Cal.3d 954, 987.)11

Defendant relies on certain language in Ewoldt in arguing that the evidence 

of the Watt Avenue and Florin Road offenses was not cross-admissible. We said 

in that case: “[I]n most prosecutions for crimes such as burglary and robbery, it is 

beyond dispute that the charged offense was committed by someone; the primary 

issue to be determined is whether the defendant was the perpetrator of that crime. 

Thus, in such circumstances, evidence that the defendant committed uncharged 

offenses that were sufficiently similar to the charged offense to demonstrate a 

common design or plan (but not sufficiently distinctive to establish identity) 

ordinarily would be inadmissible. Although such evidence is relevant to 

demonstrate that, assuming the defendant was present at the scene of the crime, 

the defendant engaged in the conduct alleged to constitute the charged offense, if it 

 

11 Defendant contends People v. Miller, supra, 50 Cal.3d 954, was superseded 

on this point by People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at page 403. Not so. (See ibid. 

[citing Miller with approval]; People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 736-737 

[same].)
27

is beyond dispute that the alleged crime occurred, such evidence would be merely 

cumulative and the prejudicial effect of the evidence of uncharged acts would 

outweigh its probative value.” (People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 406.) 

Defendant reasons the identity of the perpetrator of the Watt Avenue and Florin 

Road robberies was the primary issue at trial, and argues the evidence here lacks 

common features of sufficient distinctiveness to establish his identity as the 

robber.

We disagree the similarities in the crimes were insufficient to establish 

identity. Although there may be nothing particularly distinctive about an armed 

robbery of a McDonald‟s restaurant at closing time, per se, in this case certain 

common features of the Watt Avenue and Florin Road robberies before the trial 

court at the time it made its ruling sufficed to demonstrate defendant‟s identity as 

the perpetrator. These included: (1) defendant‟s contemporaneous or former 

employment at both restaurants and his consequent knowledge of their layout and 

operations; (2) the involvement in both robberies of defendant‟s friend, Proby, 

who also had worked at one of the restaurants; (3) the perpetrator‟s use, in both 

robberies, of a disguised and unnaturally gruff or gravelly voice; (4) the 

perpetrators‟ use of scarves to cover the lower portion of their faces in both 

robberies; (5) the circumstance that defendant was seen with Proby before and 

after the Florin Road robbery, and after the Watt Avenue robbery; (6) the 

discovery of items taken in both robberies at the home of Proby‟s girlfriend, Vera 

Penilton; (7) the circumstance that the same type of ammunition used to kill 

Ronald Lee in the Florin Road robbery was found in Stanly Zaharko‟s truck, 

which had been taken in the Watt Avenue robbery; and (8) defendant‟s admissions 

to witnesses regarding his involvement in both robberies. In the aggregate, these 

common features support a reasonable inference that defendant committed both 

sets of offenses. (See People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1004.) The 
28

evidence of each robbery therefore would have been cross-admissible in a separate 

trial of the other, and defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice from the joinder of 

the two sets of offenses. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

defendant‟s severance motion, and joint trial of the Watt Avenue and Florin Road 

offenses did not result in fundamental unfairness and did not deprive defendant of 

due process.

Defendant further contends that, even assuming some evidence of each 

robbery would have been cross-admissible on the question of identity, the 

evidence should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352 and the 

federal due process guarantee because evidence of the murder of Ronald Lee at the 

Florin Road restaurant was irrelevant to the Watt Avenue robbery counts. This 

argument, in essence, merely reframes the contention that the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying defendant‟s severance motion and lacks merit for the reasons 

discussed above.

3. Evidentiary Issues

a. Exclusion of third party culpability evidence

Defendant contends the trial court violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, 

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and also erred 

under state law by improperly forcing him to choose between competing 

constitutional rights in ruling on the admissibility of proffered evidence of third 

party culpability. 

The proffered evidence fell into two categories. As to the first, defendant 

moved for admission of a portion of an out-of-court statement by Proby to police 

concerning the Florin Road crimes. In the statement, while Proby admitted that he 

and defendant entered the restaurant and committed the robbery and that defendant 

shot Ronald Lee, Proby also said a man named “Blackie” supplied one of the guns 
29

they used and served as the getaway driver. The trial court ruled that if the 

defense sought to introduce the portion of the statement describing Blackie‟s 

involvement, the entirety of the statement, including the portion in which Proby 

stated he and defendant entered the restaurant and defendant was the shooter, 

would be admitted. Given the ruling, defendant declined to introduce Proby‟s 

statement and no portion of it was admitted at trial.

The second category of evidence concerned Anthony Edwards, Vera 

Penilton‟s cousin. The defense sought to introduce Edwards‟s prior acts of 

violence, including his convictions for assault with a firearm and spousal abuse. 

The prosecutor argued that the absence of any direct or circumstantial evidence 

linking Edwards to the charged crimes rendered the proffered evidence 

inadmissible. The trial court agreed, denying the defense motion “without 

prejudice” to the presentation of additional evidence of Edwards‟s involvement in 

the crimes. Defendant did not renew his motion, and no evidence of Edwards‟s 

prior acts of violence was admitted at trial.

Defendant challenges both rulings on appeal. As will appear, we conclude 

the trial court‟s rulings were consistent with applicable evidentiary and 

constitutional principles. 

i. Proceedings in the trial court

Before trial, the prosecutor filed a motion to exclude third party culpability 

evidence. At a hearing on the issue, the prosecutor objected to the admission into 

evidence of any references to “Blackie.” The court made a preliminary order 

precluding the defense from bringing up evidence of third party culpability “unless 

he has a witness that can prove that.” 

Thereafter, defendant filed a motion to admit third party culpability 

evidence, supported by an offer of proof. Of particular significance, he offered to 
30

prove that in a statement made on October 3, 1994, Proby told law enforcement 

officers a third person, “Blackie,” was involved in the Florin Road robbery murder 

and that Blackie, a friend of Proby‟s from the neighborhood whose true identity 

Vera Penilton would know, supplied a sawed-off rifle and drove the getaway car. 

Proby also allegedly gave a description of Blackie to police that more closely 

matched the description of the Florin Road shooter given by two of the percipient 

witnesses than it did defendant, in that Proby described Blackie as a Black male, 

thin and dark-complected, five feet nine inches to five feet 10 inches tall, whereas 

defendant is six feet three inches tall. Defendant further offered to prove that 

Penilton told a defense investigator she had a cousin named Anthony Renard 

Edwards, nicknamed “Black Black” due to his dark complexion, and that Edwards 

would sometimes go places with Proby in Proby‟s car and had done so several 

times during the month of the Florin Road offenses. Finally, defendant offered to 

prove that Edwards, who had been released on parole in Sacramento in July 1994, 

had an extensive record of assaultive behavior and use of weapons. 

The prosecutor argued that if the portion of Proby‟s statement relating to 

Blackie‟s involvement were admitted, then the portion describing defendant‟s role 

in the crimes likewise should be admitted. The prosecutor explained that 

surveillance video footage in the Florin Road robbery murder showed only two 

robbers, and eyewitnesses spoke of seeing only two robbers; thus, he implied, the 

jury would be misled if it heard only the part of Proby‟s statement that described 

his and Blackie‟s roles in the offense. The prosecutor also opposed the admission 

of evidence of Edwards‟s criminal history, arguing that its dissimilarity to the 
31

Florin Road offenses12 and the absence of any direct or circumstantial evidence 

linking Edwards to those offenses rendered it irrelevant, and that it constituted 

improper character evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a). 

The trial court denied defendant‟s motions to limit the use of Proby‟s 

statement and to permit evidence of Edwards‟s violent conduct. Proby asserted 

his privilege against self-incrimination and did not testify at defendant‟s trial, and 

no part of his statement was introduced into evidence.

ii. Analysis

In People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, this court articulated the standard 

California courts apply in determining the admissibility of third party culpability 

evidence. We said: “To be admissible, the third-party evidence need not show 

„substantial proof of a probability‟ that the third person committed the act; it need 

only be capable of raising a reasonable doubt of defendant‟s guilt. At the same 

time, we do not require that any evidence, however remote, must be admitted to 

show a third party‟s possible culpability. As this court observed in [People v.] 

Mendez [(1924) 193 Cal. 39, 51], evidence of mere motive or opportunity to 

commit the crime in another person, without more, will not suffice to raise a 

reasonable doubt about a defendant‟s guilt: there must be direct or circumstantial 

evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the crime.” (Id. at 

p. 833.)

 

12 The prosecutor represented that Edwards‟s rap sheet reflected no 

convictions for robbery or for using a firearm in any incident. Although Edwards 

had suffered convictions for assault with a deadly weapon (one 1986 

misdemeanor, two 1989 misdemeanors, and a 1991 felony) and for spousal abuse, 

the prosecutor argued nothing suggested that any of Edwards‟s past offenses 

shared any similarities with the crimes charged in this case. 
32

Nothing in Proby‟s statement, considered as a whole, tended to raise a 

reasonable doubt about defendant‟s guilt. Proby told the police that he and 

defendant went into the Florin Road McDonald‟s to commit robbery and that 

defendant shot the victim. The circumstance that, according to Proby‟s statement, 

another person also played a role in the crime by supplying a gun and waiting for 

defendant and Proby in the getaway car in no way negated or diminished 

defendant‟s culpability as the actual shooter.

We may properly look at Proby‟s statement as a whole because, as the trial 

court concluded, the prosecution was entitled under Evidence Code section 356 to 

introduce the portion of the statement describing defendant‟s participation in the 

offense if the defense introduced the portion describing Blackie‟s participation.13 

“The purpose of [Evidence Code section 356] is to prevent the use of selected 

aspects of a conversation, act, declaration, or writing, so as to create a misleading 

impression on the subjects addressed.” (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 

156.) Here, in view of the eyewitness and surveillance footage evidence 

suggesting two men committed the Florin Road robbery, for defendant to 

introduce the portion of Proby‟s statement mentioning only Proby and Blackie 

would have conveyed the misleading impression that only Proby and Blackie 

participated in the robbery, when Proby actually told the detective that defendant 

too participated. This case exemplifies the policy underlying the code section. 

Defendant wanted to rely on a part of Proby‟s statement to imply that Blackie was 

 

13 Evidence Code section 356 provides: “Where part of an act, declaration, 

conversation, or writing is given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same 

subject may be inquired into by an adverse party; . . . and when a detached act, 

declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence, any other act, 

declaration, conversation, or writing which is necessary to make it understood may 

also be given in evidence.”
33

the shooter, which was contrary to what Proby actually said elsewhere in his 

statement. The rule of completeness exists to prevent such a misuse of evidence. 

The trial court therefore correctly concluded that Evidence Code section 356 

permitted the prosecution to introduce other portions of Proby‟s statement making 

that fact clear.

Application of Evidence Code section 356 hinges on the requirement that 

the two portions of a statement be “on the same subject.” As he did at trial, 

defendant contends that section 356 is inapplicable because the portion of Proby‟s 

statement addressing Blackie‟s role in the Florin Road crimes constituted a 

different subject than defendant‟s own role in those same crimes. We are 

unpersuaded. “ „In applying Evidence Code section 356 the courts do not draw 

narrow lines around the exact subject of inquiry.‟ ” (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 

Cal.4th 929, 959.) As the Attorney General argues, both portions of the statement 

were part of Proby‟s description of what happened during the Florin Road robbery 

murder, including who was involved in the offenses and what each person‟s role 

was that night, and the introduction of one portion without the other would have 

left a misleading impression in jurors‟ minds.

Nor, as defendant argues, would the confrontation clause of the Sixth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution have precluded the admission, under 

the hearsay exception embodied in Evidence Code section 356, of the portion of 

Proby‟s statement that implicated defendant. In interpreting the requirements of 

the confrontation clause, the United States Supreme Court in Crawford recognized 

the continuing validity of exceptions, like the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing, 

that derive from equitable considerations rather than an improper judicial 

determination of reliability. (Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 62.) 

“The Roberts test [Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66, overruled in Crawford] 

allows a jury to hear evidence, untested by the adversary process, based on a mere 
34

judicial determination of reliability. It thus replaces the constitutionally prescribed 

method of assessing reliability with a wholly foreign one. In this respect, it is very 

different from exceptions to the Confrontation Clause that make no claim to be a 

surrogate means of assessing reliability. For example, the rule of forfeiture by 

wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially 

equitable grounds; it does not purport to be an alternative means of determining 

reliability.” (Crawford, at p. 62.) We conclude the rule of completeness also falls 

within this category.

Other courts have reached the same conclusion. In People v. Parrish

(2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 263, for example, the Court of Appeal rejected a similar 

confrontation clause argument in upholding, under Evidence Code section 356, the 

admission of certain portions of an accomplice‟s out-of-court statement to police 

implicating the defendant after the defendant introduced other portions of the same 

statement. (Parrish, at pp. 271-276.) The Parrish court reasoned: “Crawford did 

not renounce all exceptions to the confrontation clause, only those that replace the 

constitutionally prescribed method of assessing reliability—cross-examination—

with a judicial determination of reliability . . . .” (Id. at p. 272.) Parrish

“conclud[ed], by analogy to the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing, that statements 

otherwise admissible under [Evidence Code] section 356 are generally not made 

inadmissible by Crawford. This is because, like forfeiture by wrongdoing, section 

356 is not an exception to the hearsay rule that purports to assess the reliability of 

testimony. The statute is founded on the equitable notion that a party who elects 

to introduce a part of a conversation is precluded from objecting on confrontation 

clause grounds to introduction by the opposing party of other parts of the 

conversation which are necessary to make the entirety of the conversation 

understood. . . . As Crawford forbids only the admissibility of evidence under 

statutes purporting to substitute another method for [the] confrontation clause test 
35

of reliability, evidence admissible under section 356 does not offend Crawford.” 

(Parrish, at pp. 272-273; see also State v. Prasertphong (2005) 210 Ariz. 496 [114 

P.3d 828, 834]; State v. Selalla (2008) 2008 S.D. 3 [744 N.W.2d 802, 818] [a 

defendant may not seek to use the hearsay exception for declarations against penal 

interest as a shield, to introduce exculpatory parts of an unavailable declarant‟s 

statement, while simultaneously using the confrontation clause as a sword to 

exclude the parts that inculpate the defendant]; U.S. v. Moussaoui (4th Cir. 2004) 

382 F.3d 453, 481-482.)

We find unavailing defendant‟s efforts to analogize this case to the BrutonRichardson-Gray line of cases.14

 Here, unlike in those cases, the prosecution did 

not initially seek to introduce the portion of the statement implicating defendant, 

but only sought to use it to correct what would have been an inevitably misleading 

implication that Proby and Blackie, not defendant, were the two Florin Road 

robbers, once defendant announced his intention to introduce the “Blackie” 

portion of the statement. Nothing in the Bruton-Richardson-Gray line of cases 

speaks to this situation.

 

14 See Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123, 135-136 (a nontestifying 

codefendant‟s extrajudicial statement incriminating a defendant, which when 

admitted against the codefendant is inadmissible hearsay as to the defendant, is so 

prejudicial that limiting instructions are deemed ineffective); Richardson v. Marsh

(1987) 481 U.S. 200, 211 (the admission of a nontestifying codefendant‟s 

confession against the codefendant does not violate the defendant‟s confrontation 

right if the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant‟s name but 

any reference to his existence); Gray v. Maryland (1998) 523 U.S. 185, 188, 192 

(redactions that simply replace a name with a blank space, a word such as 

“deleted,” a symbol, or other obvious indication of alteration leave statements that 

so closely resemble the unredacted statements prohibited by Bruton as to fall 

within the same class). 
36

Defendant further asserts that, even if the portions of Proby‟s statement 

incriminating him were admissible under Evidence Code section 356, they 

nevertheless should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352 because 

it would be an abuse of the trial court‟s discretion to admit out-of-court statements 

incriminating a criminal defendant in derogation of the basic right of crossexamination. Defendant did not make this argument below, but even assuming he 

had preserved it for appeal, it lacks merit. As we have explained, the trial court‟s 

ruling did not abridge defendant‟s confrontation right, and fairness is served, not 

thwarted, by the admission of portions of a statement needed to make other 

portions not misleading. Defendant‟s argument, moreover, misapprehends the 

scope of the trial court‟s authority under Evidence Code section 352. That 

provision permits the exclusion of relevant evidence in certain limited 

circumstances; it does not confer plenary authority to exclude the parts of a 

relevant statement that are inconvenient for the defense.

Defendant also contends that the portion of Proby‟s statement incriminating 

Blackie was admissible as a matter of federal due process by analogy to Chambers 

v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284. In that case, the defendant sought to present 

evidence that a third party, McDonald, had confessed to several other persons that 

he had committed the crime of which the defendant was accused. When the 

defendant called McDonald as a witness, he repudiated his earlier confession, and 

Mississippi‟s rules of evidence precluded the defendant from cross-examining him 

with the confession or presenting witnesses who would have discredited 

McDonald‟s repudiation and demonstrated his complicity in the crime. (Id. at 

pp. 291-294.) The United States Supreme Court held that due process requires 

state courts to admit reliable evidence that is critical to the defense in criminal 

cases. (Id. at p. 302.) Here, of course, assuming Proby‟s statement concerning 

Blackie was reliable, defendant was not precluded from presenting it. Rather, 
37

defendant elected not to introduce it in the face of the trial court‟s ruling, which 

we have concluded was proper, that if he did so, the prosecution would be entitled 

to introduce other portions of the statement that incriminated defendant.

Lastly, defendant argues the trial court erred in excluding evidence of 

Anthony Edwards‟s convictions and prior assaultive conduct. Defendant 

acknowledges this court‟s holding, in People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 373, 

that evidence of an individual‟s prior acts of violence, without more, shows only 

criminal propensity and is inadmissible to establish third party culpability. (See 

Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a) [character evidence is inadmissible to prove a 

person‟s conduct on a specific occasion].) Defendant argues, however, that the 

evidence of Edwards‟s convictions and prior acts of violence should be taken in 

the context of his offer of proof and that the evidence demonstrates more than 

mere criminal propensity. But no evidence of substance in this record connects 

Edwards to the charged offenses. The rule in Lewis therefore applies, and 

defendant‟s contention must be rejected.

b. Admission of statement attributed to defendant by 

prosecution witness Sonya Williams

Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence 

Code section 352 and violated his rights under the United States Constitution by 

admitting, over a defense objection, excerpts from a videotape containing 

statements that prosecution witness Sonya Williams attributed to defendant 

concerning his role in the Watt Avenue robbery. 

The issue arose in the following context: Williams (who, the trial court 

observed, did not “appear to be a particularly friendly witness [for] the People”) 

testified that defendant had informed her, in advance, of his plan to rob the Watt 

Avenue McDonald‟s where he worked. After the robbery, Williams testified, 

defendant told her he had done what he previously said he was going to do 
38

(alluding to the robbery), showed her a gun and cash, and thereafter said nothing 

further about the robbery or his role in it. To rebut the assertion that defendant 

had said nothing more about the robbery, the prosecutor sought to play excerpts of 

a tape-recorded interview of Williams by Detectives Minter and Cabrera in which 

Williams described other details of the robbery that defendant had recounted to 

her. Among those excerpts, the prosecutor sought to play the portion of the 

interview in which Williams told the detectives how she had asked defendant 

(about the people he had forced into the freezer), “What if they would have died?” 

and defendant had responded, “They just would have died.” Defense counsel 

objected on the grounds of improper impeachment, lack of relevance, and 

Evidence Code section 352. After a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the 

trial court overruled the objection, and the excerpt was played for the jury. 

On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in 

admitting the interview excerpts. He argues the evidence had no probative value 

for impeachment purposes because Williams had not testified to anything she had 

discussed with defendant concerning leaving people in the freezer. He also 

asserts, contrary to the prosecutor‟s argument at trial, that the evidence was 

irrelevant to show defendant‟s intent in falsely imprisoning the victims, because 

only the perpetrator‟s identity, not his intent, was at issue. Finally, he contends, 

the evidence tended uniquely to evoke an emotional bias against him and thus was 

unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352.
39

We agree with defendant that he has preserved the issue, including its due 

process aspects, for review.15 We disagree, however, that the trial court abused its 

discretion in admitting the evidence.

Contrary to defendant‟s argument, the evidence possessed probative value 

as a means of impeaching Williams‟s repeated assertions that defendant failed to 

reveal to her any of the details of the robbery. In turn, the presentation of 

defendant‟s statements to Williams regarding the details of the crime bolstered the 

other evidence establishing his identity as the robber. The evidence also was 

relevant to the false imprisonment charge because it showed defendant‟s 

knowledge that his actions had violated the victims‟ liberty. (§§ 236 [false 

imprisonment is the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another], 237, 

subd. (a) [false imprisonment that is effected by violence, menace, fraud, or deceit 

is a felony].) Even if defendant focused his efforts at trial on disputing his identity 

as the perpetrator, the prosecution was required to prove its case, including the 

intent elements of the charged crimes. (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 28.) 

The probative value of the evidence thus was substantial, and the trial court acted 

within its discretion in concluding such value outweighed the possibility of undue 

prejudice stemming from admission of the statement. In any event, even were we 

to conclude otherwise, reversal would not be required in view of the 

overwhelming evidence of defendant‟s guilt of the Watt Avenue crimes. Given 

the testimony of Stanly Zaharko, Michael Baumann, and Leticia Aguilar 

describing how defendant had forced them at gunpoint to enter the freezer and 

 

15 Before trial, defendant sought, the prosecution did not oppose, and the trial 

court made an order that “all defense counsel‟s objections at trial be deemed 

objections under the Constitutions of both the State of California and the United 

States.” 
40

locked them inside, the admission of defendant‟s callous statement to Sonya 

Williams could not, by any standard, have affected the verdict.16

c. Admission of a letter from defendant to prosecution 

witness Sean Gilbert 

Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a letter 

he wrote to prosecution witness Sean Gilbert17 while Gilbert was incarcerated in 

the Sacramento County jail on charges unrelated to those at issue in this case. The 

letter accused Gilbert of making false statements that tended to inculpate 

defendant and included several passages in which defendant directly or impliedly 

threatened Gilbert with violence as a result. Gilbert considered the letter a threat 

and turned it over to an officer, who gave it to the prosecution. Defense counsel 

unsuccessfully objected to the admission of the letter under Evidence Code section 

352 and because, in his view, the letter did not contain admissions or threats and, 

hence, lacked relevance. Defendant here renews his challenge to the admission of 

the letter under state law and on federal due process grounds.18

Defendant implicitly acknowledges the general rule that evidence of threats 

is admissible as showing consciousness of guilt, but in essence claims that his 

 

16 Defendant argues the admission of the interview excerpts prejudiced him at 

the penalty phase as well as the guilt phase. Given the totality of the evidence in 

this case, we disagree.

17 Gilbert worked with defendant at the Watt Avenue McDonald‟s. He 

testified that, in separate conversations a week or two before the robbery of that 

restaurant, defendant spoke about how tranquilizer guns would not kill but only 

knock out a victim, and told Gilbert he possessed a gun (a rifle or a shotgun). 

Gilbert also testified he saw a .25-caliber semiautomatic handgun at Deon Proby‟s 

house. The day after the robbery, Gilbert testified, defendant came to work with a 

new Walkman and wearing a new Starter jacket. 

18 See ante, at page 39, footnote 15.
41

letter falls outside the rule because, in accusing Gilbert of lying, it reflects 

consciousness not of guilt, but of innocence. As decisions of this state have long 

recognized (e.g., People v. Chin Hane (1895) 108 Cal. 597, 603; People v. Rosoto

(1962) 58 Cal.2d 304, 350; People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 945; People 

v. Slocum (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 867, 887), a threat made by a defendant against a 

prospective prosecution witness, with the apparent intention of intimidating the 

witness, is properly admitted because an accused‟s efforts to suppress evidence 

against himself indicate a consciousness of guilt. (Slocum, at p. 887.) This 

principle fully applies in this case, regardless of the circumstance that the letter 

accused Gilbert of lying instead of acknowledging the veracity of his statement to 

police. Furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the 

probative value of the letter outweighed any potential for prejudice under 

Evidence Code section 352. 

Defendant also suggests the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the 

letter because it included a threat against nonwitness Anthony Motley that was 

irrelevant and constituted improper evidence of a propensity for violence. He 

further contends the redaction (omitting gang references) misled the jury to think 

he was “mad as hell” at Gilbert because of Gilbert‟s statement to police, when in 

fact the phrase referred to Gilbert‟s behavior toward one of defendant‟s girlfriends. 

Defendant forfeited these contentions by failing to raise them below. Had he 

preserved them, we would find any error harmless. As to the portion of the letter 

concerning Motley, the jury would have been aware of the irrelevance of the threat 

to any issue in this case, and would already have drawn any inferences regarding a 

propensity for violence on defendant‟s part from the threat to Gilbert that was 

properly before the jury. As to the allegedly misleading redaction, the jury already 

would have inferred, from defendant‟s threat to beat Gilbert for making a 

statement to police, that he was angry at Gilbert, and we are confident the 
42

exclusion of evidence of an additional basis for that anger, even if error under state 

law, would not have made a difference in the outcome of the case. (People v. 

Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) Nor did admission of the letter prejudice 

defendant‟s right to a fair trial in violation of the federal due process guarantee.

d. Restriction on defendant’s attempt to demonstrate that 

Watt Avenue eyewitnesses identified him as part of a 

“consensus” 

Defendant contends the trial court violated state evidentiary law and his 

constitutional right to present a defense to the Watt Avenue charges by precluding 

him from introducing two pieces of evidence that supported his effort to show the 

eyewitness identifications were unreliable: (1) evidence that Leticia Aguilar had a 

conversation with Watt Avenue store manager Lisa Lee in which Lee encouraged 

Aguilar to identify defendant as the robber, and (2) evidence that before Detective 

Minter interviewed Michael Baumann, he learned employees were talking among 

themselves and repeating rumors about the robbery. Defendant‟s contention lacks 

merit.

The two instances of claimed error arose in the following contexts: 

(1) In response to a question asked by defense counsel on direct 

examination, defense investigator Marilyn Mobert acknowledged she interviewed 

Watt Avenue McDonald‟s employee and eyewitness Leticia Aguilar, who told 

Mobert she had had a conversation with store manager Lisa Lee. The prosecutor 

objected on grounds the question was leading and called for hearsay. When 

defense counsel asserted he was not offering the testimony for its truth, the 

prosecutor inquired as to its relevance. The court then in effect invited defense 

counsel to establish a foundation for the admission of the testimony, whereupon 

defense counsel asked Mobert: “During the—did Ms. Lee tell Ms. Aguilar—

according to Ms. Aguilar, did Ms. Lee—.” The prosecutor objected again on 
43

hearsay grounds, and the court sustained the objection. Defense counsel moved on 

to another topic. 

(2) During defense cross-examination of Detective Minter, defense counsel 

asked Minter whether, during the course of the investigation, he returned to the 

Watt Avenue restaurant. Minter said he did. Defense counsel asked whether 

Minter “talked to a lot of people at the McDonald‟s, a lot of the employees?” 

Minter agreed he had talked to “several.” Defense counsel asked: “And did you 

learn in your interviews with those people that—the day after the robbery, couple 

of days after the robbery, I mean, there were rumors flying all over the place, 

right?” The prosecutor said: “I am going to object to rumors.” The court 

sustained the objection. Defense counsel asked: “People were talking, employees 

were talking among themselves about what happened?” The prosecutor again 

objected, the court sustained the objection, and defense counsel moved on to 

another topic. 

Defendant mounts a twofold challenge to the court‟s rulings. First, he 

urges that the court erred in sustaining the prosecutor‟s hearsay objections because 

the testimony was offered not for the truth of the matters asserted,19 but rather to 

show that the eyewitnesses‟ identifications of defendant as the robber were tainted 

by suggestions made by manager Lisa Lee or fellow employees. Second, he 

contends the rulings deprived him of his right, under the Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, to a meaningful 

opportunity to present a defense. (See Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 

690; Washington v. Texas (1967) 388 U.S. 14, 19.) 

 

19 See Evidence Code, section 1200, subdivision (a) (“ „Hearsay evidence‟ is 

evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at 

the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.”).
44

On appeal, we may not reverse a judgment for the erroneous exclusion of 

evidence unless “[t]he substance, purpose, and relevance of the excluded evidence 

was made known to the court by the questions asked, an offer of proof, or by any 

other means.” (Evid. Code, § 354.) As the Attorney General observes, defendant 

made no offer of proof or attempted otherwise to advise the court of the substance 

and purpose of the testimony he sought to elicit. He thus does not show 

entitlement to relief. We reach the same conclusion regarding defendant‟s 

constitutional claims. The ordinary application of state evidentiary law does not, 

as a general matter, implicate the United States Constitution. (People v. Kraft, 

supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 1035-1036.) Here, the trial court‟s ruling did not 

foreclose defendant from presenting a defense, but “merely rejected certain 

evidence concerning the defense.” (People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at 

p. 1325.) The trial court‟s rulings, therefore, did not infringe defendant‟s 

constitutional rights.

e. Sufficiency of evidence of kidnapping

Defendant contends his four convictions for kidnapping to commit robbery 

in connection with the Watt Avenue crimes should be reversed because there was 

insufficient evidence of asportation. We disagree. 

“On appeal, an appellate court deciding whether sufficient evidence 

supports a verdict must determine whether the record contains substantial 

evidence—which we repeatedly have described as evidence that is reasonable, 

credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable jury could find the accused 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Hovarter, supra, 44 Cal.4th at 

pp. 996-997, italics omitted; see generally Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 

307, 324.) We presume in support of the judgment “the existence of every fact the 
45

trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Kraft, supra, 23 

Cal.4th at p. 1053.)

At the time of the crimes,20 kidnapping for robbery, or aggravated 

kidnapping, required movement of the victim that (1) was not merely incidental to 

the commission of the robbery, and (2) substantially increased the risk of harm 

over and above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery itself. (§ 209, 

subd. (b); In re Earley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 122, 127; People v. Daniels (1969) 71 

Cal.2d 1119, 1139; cf. People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141, 1149-1155 

[discussing asportation element of kidnapping for the purpose of rape].) These 

two elements are not mutually exclusive but are interrelated. (People v. Rayford

(1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 12; see also People v. Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 232-

233.) 

With regard to the first prong, the jury considers the “scope and nature” of 

the movement, which includes the actual distance a victim is moved. (People v. 

Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 233; People v. Rayford, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 12; 

People v. Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1131, fn. 5.) There is, however, no 

minimum distance a defendant must move a victim to satisfy the first prong. 

(Daniels, at pp. 1128-1129; Rayford, at p. 12; Martinez, at p. 233.) 

 

20 At the time of defendant‟s crimes, aggravated kidnapping, codified in 

section 209, subdivision (b), was defined as kidnapping to commit robbery. In 

1997, the Legislature revised the statute to define aggravated kidnapping as 

kidnapping to commit robbery or certain sex offenses, and modified the 

asportation standard by eliminating the requirement that the movement of the 

victim “substantially” increase the risk of harm to the victim. (People v. Martinez

(1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 232 & fn. 4; § 209, subd. (b)(1); Stats. 1997, ch. 817, § 2, 

p. 5519.) 
46

“ „The second prong of the Daniels test refers to whether the movement 

subjects the victim to a substantial increase in risk of harm above and beyond that 

inherent in [the underlying crime]. [Citations.] This includes consideration of 

such factors as the decreased likelihood of detection, the danger inherent in a 

victim‟s foreseeable attempts to escape, and the attacker‟s enhanced opportunity to 

commit additional crimes. [Citations.] The fact that these dangers do not in fact 

materialize does not, of course, mean that the risk of harm was not increased.‟ ” 

(People v. Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 233, quoting People v. Rayford, supra, 

9 Cal.4th at pp. 13-14.) 

Here, the evidence adduced at trial reveals that when defendant first 

encountered McDonald‟s manager Stanly Zaharko, he took Zaharko at gunpoint 

past the front counter area of the closed restaurant, back through the cooking area, 

until they reached the restaurant‟s safe. From there, defendant walked Zaharko 

from the safe into the back of the restaurant, encountering the three other 

employees. Defendant then instructed the four to head downstairs to the 

basement.21 There, defendant ordered them into the freezer, where the 

temperature was approximately 20 degrees. Once everyone was inside, defendant 

shut and locked the door. After waiting approximately 10 minutes to allow the 

robber time to take whatever he wanted and leave, Zaharko used a fire ax located 

inside the freezer to break through the door. Zaharko estimated defendant forcibly 

moved him “in the neighborhood of a hundred and fifty feet, two hundred feet,” 

and that the other three employees were moved “about eighty or ninety feet.” 

 

21 The interior stairwell was “completely out of sight” of a person ordering 

food inside the restaurant. An exterior stairwell, which also led down to the 

basement, was visible at a close distance outside the back of the restaurant. 
47

As in Daniels, defendant‟s forcible movement of the victims was limited to 

movement inside the premises of the Watt Avenue McDonald‟s (People v. 

Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at pp. 1126, 1140), but unlike in Daniels, the movement 

here took Zaharko—and ultimately the other victims—from the front of the store, 

down a hidden stairway, and into a locked freezer. Under these circumstances, we 

cannot say the “scope and nature” of this movement was “merely incidental” to 

the commission of the robbery. Additionally, the movement subjected the victims 

to a substantially increased risk of harm because of the low temperature in the 

freezer, the decreased likelihood of detection, and the danger inherent in the 

victims‟ foreseeable attempts to escape such an environment. 

On this record, then, we conclude sufficient evidence of asportation 

supports defendant‟s convictions of aggravated kidnapping. 

4. Asserted Prosecutorial Misconduct

a. Comment on Baumann’s fear of testifying

Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing 

argument by mentioning a fact not in evidence: that prosecution witness Michael 

Baumann had risked his life by testifying against defendant. As we explain, the 

contention was forfeited for appellate purposes by defendant‟s failure to object 

below, and lacks merit in any event because the jury would have understood that 

the prosecutor‟s remark, in context, was a proper comment on Baumann‟s 

testimony.

Baumann, who, as noted, was present at the Watt Avenue McDonald‟s 

restaurant at the time of the robbery murder, testified that one of his relatives had 

worked with defendant at the Florin Road McDonald‟s restaurant. Baumann had 

refused to identify the relative to the police and while on the witness stand, and 

confirmed that he was afraid to testify in court because defendant knew where his 
48

family lived. The trial court instructed the jury this evidence was offered only to 

show the witness‟s state of mind, and not to show that defendant “either directly or 

indirectly threatened this witness and/or any of his family members.” In response 

to a question by the prosecutor, Baumann acknowledged that defendant had not 

directly threatened him. The prosecutor asked, “What does it mean to you if you 

testify against somebody?” Baumann replied, “You could die.” Defense counsel 

objected and asked that the answer be struck. The trial court declined to do so, but 

again admonished the jury that the testimony was relevant only on the issue of the 

witness‟s state of mind. When the prosecutor began to ask another question along 

the same lines, the trial court sustained the objection and directed the prosecutor to 

inquire into another topic. 

In closing argument, the prosecutor discussed Baumann‟s apparent fear of 

testifying and his identification of defendant as the perpetrator of the Florin Road 

crimes: “He knows what he saw, and he was scared to death to say it and you saw 

it. Michael Baumann was the one, if you remember before lunch, basically saying 

I don‟t know who did it. Sean doesn‟t know anybody that worked with my 

relatives at Florin Road, and then after lunch when he realized that this is just not 

going to work, I have been subpoenaed, I‟m here, I‟m going to get it out. And he 

told the truth, and that‟s what he told Detective Minter, also, because he has to sit 

here and look at Mr. Vines face-to-face, and he did it. And he is a person of a 

strong character. [¶] We submit Michael Baumann is somewhat of your quiet 

hero. He is in a tough jam, but he came up on it. And he said you know what, 

after lunch he said I saw Sean coming in the side door. I know it was him.” 

Defense counsel, during closing argument, reminded the jury of the trial 

court‟s admonition: “[Y]ou must keep in mind that there is absolutely no evidence 

and there is no argument from the prosecution and the Court . . . called it an 

admonishment when we went through this bit, but there is no evidence that Mr. 
49

Vines has done anything directly, indirectly or otherwise to cause Mr. Baumann 

fear of anything. The Court made that very clear to you.” 

In his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor returned to this topic: “[Defense 

counsel] talks about Mr. Baumann and his fear and says what did he really have to 

be afraid of? Just look at his face, look at his anguish. That‟s why we call people 

live so you can see them. That‟s why we don‟t want hearsay. You can see them, 

size them up, look at them and you can tell all over his face he is scared to death to 

sit in front of this man and say these things. [¶] For one thing, he has a pretty 

good reason to be afraid of him. He put a gun right to his face. That‟s a real good 

reason to be afraid of him. No evidence he directly threatened him. I’m not 

saying that, but he put a gun to his face, and he was a squeeze away from killing 

him. That‟s good reason to be afraid. And he put him in the freezer, and he 

knows where his family lives. And he cares about his family, and he doesn‟t want 

his family to get hurt.” (Italics added.) Moments later in the argument, the 

prosecutor said: “And when Mike Baumann has to come in here like any other 

witness, look at this man and put a gun to his head and shot Ron Lee in the back of 

the head and have to say he is the one, that takes a lot of courage. It would be real 

easy for him to say I don‟t know who it was, and he is off the hook. He puts 

himself into jeopardy and risk by saying it is him. He gets nothing out of it.” 

(Italics added.)

Defendant contends the prosecutor‟s statement, “He [Baumann] puts 

himself into jeopardy and risk by saying it is him,” constituted misconduct. 

Defendant forfeited this contention by failing to object at trial. (People v. Abilez

(2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 493.) Contrary to defendant‟s assertion on appeal, the 

prosecutor‟s remark was not inherently prejudicial, hence defendant‟s failure to 

object may not be excused on the ground that to have done so would have been 

futile. Even were we to overlook this forfeiture and address the merits of the 
50

claim, no error occurred. “ „The applicable federal and state standards regarding 

prosecutorial misconduct are well established. “ „A prosecutor‟s . . . intemperate 

behavior violates the federal Constitution when it comprises a pattern of conduct 

“so egregious that it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction 

a denial of due process.” ‟ ” [Citations.] Conduct by a prosecutor that does not 

render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state 

law only if it involves “ „ “the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to 

attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.” ‟ ” [Citation.]‟ ” (People v. Hill

(1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819; see People v. Stanley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 951; 

accord, Abilez, at p. 494.) The prosecutor here cannot be said to have infected the 

trial with unfairness or used deceptive or reprehensible methods. Both counsel 

told the jury—and Baumann acknowledged—that despite Baumann‟s fear of 

retaliation, there was no evidence defendant had threatened him or his family, and 

the court specifically admonished the jury that Baumann‟s testimony was not 

offered to show that defendant, directly or indirectly, threatened him. The jury 

therefore would have understood the challenged remark as referring only to 

Baumann‟s state of mind as he testified—that he believed he put himself “into 

jeopardy and risk” by testifying against defendant—and that this circumstance 

bolstered the credibility of his testimony. Defendant‟s contention therefore must 

be rejected.

b. Asserted presentation of false testimony by Penilton 

A prosecutor‟s presentation of knowingly false testimony (Mooney v. 

Holohan (1935) 294 U.S. 103, 112), or the failure to correct such testimony after it 

has been elicited (Napue v. Illinois (1959) 360 U.S. 264, 265-272), violates a 

defendant‟s right to due process of law under the United States Constitution. (See 

also People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 829; In re Jackson (1992) 
51

3 Cal.4th 578, 595.) Defendant claims the prosecutor violated these rules when he 

presented the testimony of Vera Penilton, who denied that separately tried 

coperpetrator William Deon Proby was the father of any of her children. 

According to defendant, this assertedly false denial was relevant to Penilton‟s 

credibility in that it reflected both her bias arising from her relationship with Proby 

and her untrustworthiness, as shown by her willingness to commit perjury. As we 

explain, no due process violation occurred.

i. Facts

Sonya Williams, the first prosecution witness at the guilt phase, testified 

that she met defendant in April 1994 and they became intimately involved 

sometime thereafter. Williams testified that sometime in September 1994 

defendant telephoned her, told her he was going to meet Proby and Penilton at a 

hotel, and asked if Williams would “hang out” with them. She agreed. Defendant 

and Penilton thereafter arrived in a car to pick up Williams. At the time, Williams 

had never met Proby or Penilton. 

In a videotaped interview with police conducted shortly after defendant and 

Proby were arrested, Williams told detectives that after he picked her up, 

defendant dropped her and Penilton off and went to pick up Proby from work. 

During this time, Penilton told Williams “she just had a baby by, um Deon 

[Proby]. And she thinks [she‟s] pregnant again . . . .” 

At trial, on direct examination, prosecution witness Penilton testified she 

first met Proby in April 1994, when she was four months pregnant with her first 

child. Penilton denied Proby was the father of that child, who was born in August. 

Later, on redirect examination, Penilton denied Proby was the father of any of her 

three children. 
52

Penilton testified that, several hours after the robbery, she heard defendant 

admit to killing Ronald Lee. 

ii. Discussion

According to defendant, Penilton‟s testimony that Proby was not the father 

of any of her children “was, as the prosecutor well knew, false” because it “was 

contradicted by a direct admission Penilton made, before Proby was arrested, to 

another key prosecution witness, Sonya Williams.” Defendant claims the 

circumstances under which Penilton disclosed Proby‟s paternity to Williams 

provide substantial assurances of its trustworthiness because it was a freely made 

statement, and Penilton had no reason to lie and no advantage to gain by falsely 

representing to Williams that Proby was the father of her newborn. This 

assertedly leads to the “inescapable conclusion” that Penilton lied when she 

testified about when she met Proby and that Proby was not the father of her 

children. 

Unlike defendant, we do not find this conclusion inescapable. Mere 

inconsistencies between a witness‟s testimony and her prior statements do not 

prove the falsity of the testimony. (See People v. Anderson (1962) 209 

Cal.App.2d 598, 600.) On this record, we cannot know whether Penilton lied in 

her testimony or in her statement to Williams or, indeed, whether it was Williams 

whose statement was false or mistaken. Defendant therefore fails to establish that 

the prosecutor presented false testimony or failed to correct such testimony. 

Accordingly, no due process violation occurred.

5. Issues Related to Counsel

a. Ineffective assistance of counsel—failure to impeach 

Penilton 

In a contention closely related to the immediately preceding due process 

claim, defendant asserts he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective 
53

assistance of counsel due to trial counsel‟s failure to impeach Vera Penilton with 

Sonya Williams‟s statement to police.22 Defendant notes that counsel 

“unquestionably had access to the proof of [Penilton‟s] prior admission to Sonya 

Williams that she had just had a baby by Proby, because it was contained in a 

court exhibit, memorialized in both a videotape and a written transcript, other 

portions of which came before the jury. Yet . . . trial counsel unaccountably failed 

to impeach Penilton with her prior statement to Williams.” 

“The law governing defendant‟s claim is settled. „A criminal defendant is 

guaranteed the right to the assistance of counsel by both the state and federal 

Constitutions. [Citations.] “Construed in light of its purpose, the right entitles the 

defendant not to some bare assistance but rather to effective assistance.” ‟ (People 

v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 575 [280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290], quoting 

People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215 [233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839], 

italics in original.) It is defendant‟s burden to demonstrate the inadequacy of trial 

counsel. [Citation.] We have summarized defendant‟s burden as follows: „ “In 

order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must first show 

 

22 Elsewhere in his opening brief, defendant advances a general claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel based on the assumption that trial counsel‟s 

various trial objections failed to preserve his rights under the state and federal 

Constitutions. 

New constitutional arguments that “do not invoke facts or legal standards 

different from those the trial court itself was asked to apply, but merely assert that 

the trial court‟s act or omission, insofar as wrong for the reasons actually 

presented to that court, had the additional legal consequence of violating the 

Constitution. . . . are not forfeited on appeal.” (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 

412, 441, fn. 17.) Boyer therefore allows us to reach the merits of defendant‟s 

substantive claims of error, making it unnecessary to address the merits of his 

general ineffective assistance of counsel claim to the extent it implicates the 

failure to raise the constitutional “gloss” on his claims of error. 
54

counsel‟s performance was „deficient‟ because his „representation fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness . . . under prevailing professional norms.‟ 

[Citations.] Second, he must also show prejudice flowing from counsel‟s 

performance or lack thereof. [Citation.] Prejudice is shown when there is a 

„reasonable probability that, but for counsel‟s unprofessional errors, the result of 

the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.‟ ” ‟ [Citation.] 

[¶] Reviewing courts defer to counsel‟s reasonable tactical decisions in examining 

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel [citation], and there is a „strong 

presumption that counsel‟s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance.‟ [Citation.] Defendant‟s burden is difficult to carry on 

direct appeal, as we have observed: „ “Reviewing courts will reverse convictions 

[on direct appeal] on the ground of inadequate counsel only if the record on appeal 

affirmatively discloses that counsel had no rational tactical purpose for [his or her] 

act or omission.” ‟ [Citation.]” (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 436-437.) 

If the record on appeal “ „ “sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in 

the manner challenged[,] . . . unless counsel was asked for an explanation and 

failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation,” 

the claim on appeal must be rejected,‟ ” and the “claim of ineffective assistance in 

such a case is more appropriately decided in a habeas corpus proceeding.” 

(People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267.)

As noted above, on this record, we cannot determine whether Penilton was 

lying when she made her statement to Williams, or when she testified at 

defendant‟s trial, or if it was Williams‟s statement that was false. Nor does the 

record reveal why counsel failed to introduce Williams‟s statement to police to 

impeach Penilton. To conclude definitively that counsel was remiss in failing to 

impeach Penilton would, on this record, be difficult. But even assuming for the 
55

sake of argument that trial counsel rendered deficient performance, defendant‟s 

claim would still fail for lack of prejudice. 

As defendant acknowledges, although trial counsel did not impeach 

Penilton with Sonya Williams‟s statement to police, he undermined Penilton‟s 

credibility by relying on evidence of her convictions of six petty thefts. But 

perhaps more importantly in light of defendant‟s present complaint, trial counsel 

elicited from Penilton that she and Proby were boyfriend and girlfriend, that they 

were “pretty close,” that she and Proby shared a bedroom in her house where 

Proby kept some of his clothes, and that they slept together “every night.” In other 

words, counsel probed her possible motivations for protecting Proby. Given that 

the jury heard of Penilton‟s convictions and the extent of her intimate relationship 

with Proby, and that the evidence of defendant‟s guilt was strong, we see no 

reasonable probability that, had trial counsel impeached Penilton on an additional 

collateral matter, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 693-694.)

b. Denial of Marsden motion 

Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant 

his motion made pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 to relieve his 

attorney and appoint new counsel, thereby violating his Sixth Amendment right to 

the effective assistance of counsel. We disagree. 

After the completion of the guilt phase, but before the commencement of 

the penalty phase, defendant sent a letter to the trial court expressing displeasure 

with defense counsel for his cross-examination of particular witnesses, and for 

“not call[ing] 2 witnesses that would‟ve helped me in the [W]att [A]ve[nue] case.” 

On September 16, 1997, outside the presence of the jury, the trial court 

inquired into the meaning of the letter. Defense counsel explained that defendant 
56

wished to move for a mistrial based on the “inadequacy” of the proceedings, and 

asked the court to appoint counsel to investigate defendant‟s claim. The court 

denied the defense motion, but decided to treat defendant‟s letter as a Marsden

motion and immediately thereafter conducted a Marsden hearing. 

During the closed hearing, defendant reiterated that his dissatisfaction with 

defense counsel stemmed from his failure to call two defense witnesses and his 

failure to ask on cross-examination certain questions of prosecution witnesses. 

After listening to defendant‟s complaints, the trial court asked counsel for a 

response. 

Regarding defendant‟s charge that he had failed to call two witnesses, 

counsel explained that he had sought out one witness, Jerome Williams,23 but had 

not been able to locate and subpoena him. Regarding the second witness, Tina 

Villanueva, who was to be an alibi witness, counsel explained that had he 

presented Villanueva, “two things would have been happening. That would have 

been perjury, which I am not inclined to do for anybody, and the District Attorney 

had a copy of the letter from [defendant] to . . . Villanueva [in which defendant 

„[told] her that she was his alibi witness‟], and would have buried him even more 

than he was.” 

Regarding defendant‟s charge that counsel failed to cross-examine 

prosecution witnesses with particular questions, counsel explained, “They were 

 

23 Jerome Williams was defendant‟s coworker at the Florin Road McDonald‟s 

and an eyewitness to those crimes. Williams was interviewed by Sacramento 

Police Detective Richard Overton about three hours after the Florin Road crimes. 

Williams described one of the gunmen as “approximately five foot seven, 140 to 

160 pounds.” Defendant is six feet three inches tall. 
57

issues which I felt at the time were either better left alone or not further explored 

. . . .” 

After hearing from both defendant and defense counsel, the trial court 

denied the Marsden motion. 

“ „Defendants in capital cases often express dissatisfaction with their 

appointed counsel, affording us ample opportunity to address the contours of the 

rule set forth in Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118. The rule is well settled. “ „When a 

defendant seeks to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute another attorney, 

and asserts inadequate representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to 

explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney‟s 

inadequate performance. [Citation.] A defendant is entitled to relief if the record 

clearly shows that the first appointed attorney is not providing adequate 

representation [citation] or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in 

such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result.‟ ” 

[Citation.] The decision whether to grant a requested substitution is within the 

discretion of the trial court; appellate courts will not find an abuse of that 

discretion unless the failure to remove appointed counsel and appoint replacement 

counsel would “substantially impair” the defendant‟s right to effective assistance 

of counsel.‟ ” (People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 487-488.) 

Here, the record demonstrates the court allowed defendant to explain the 

reasons for his dissatisfaction with counsel and permitted counsel to respond. 

Counsel had adequate explanations for all of defendant‟s complaints, including an 

unwillingness to suborn perjury by calling Tina Villanueva. (In re Branch (1969) 

70 Cal.2d 200, 210 [an attorney owes the client no duty to present untruthful 

testimony]; see also People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1217.) With respect to 

defendant‟s complaint that counsel failed to ask particular questions on crossexamination, counsel‟s explanation at the closed hearing indicates it was a tactical 
58

decision to prevent the introduction of or further emphasis on testimony unhelpful 

or damaging to defendant. And, with respect to defendant‟s charge that counsel 

failed to call Jerome Williams, counsel‟s reason for not doing so—that he could 

not locate him—was a sufficient response to defendant‟s complaint. Because the 

record does not clearly show counsel‟s performance was inadequate, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in refusing to relieve counsel. (People v. Abilez, supra, 

41 Cal.4th at p. 488.)

Defendant further faults the trial court for failing to conduct a “meaningful 

inquiry” into the matter because the court “asked not a single follow-up question 

regarding trial counsel‟s failure to present Jerome Williams‟ exculpatory evidence, 

and completely failed to explore whether this evidence could have been 

presented.” But contrary to defendant‟s suggestion, and as the Attorney General 

correctly notes, the trial court had no way of knowing the exculpatory nature of 

Williams‟s statement to police and consequently cannot be faulted for conducting 

an inadequate inquiry. First, at the Marsden hearing, when Williams‟s name was 

initially revealed, trial counsel explained that he had attempted to locate Williams 

to no avail, a response that was sufficient to end the inquiry immediately. Second, 

because a magistrate had presided over defendant‟s preliminary hearing where the 

detective testified as to Williams‟s exculpatory statement—rather than the trial 

judge hearing defendant‟s Marsden motion—the trial court had no basis to query 

further into the matter. Under these circumstances, then, we cannot characterize 

the trial court‟s inquiry into defendant‟s complaint as deficient. 

c. Ineffective assistance of counsel—failure to introduce 

evidence of Jerome Williams’s description of the robber

Defendant asserts trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective 

assistance in failing to introduce evidence of Jerome Williams‟s description of the 

Florin Road robber. Defendant notes: “Jerome Williams was the Florin Road 
59

employee and eyewitness who, in the hours immediately after the robberyhomicide, told a detective that the robber with the silver gun was „approximately 

five foot seven, a hundred and forty to one hundred sixty pounds.‟ ” This 

description tended to be exculpatory because defendant stands six feet three inches 

tall. According to defendant, Williams‟s statement to the detective was admissible 

under the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule, codified in 

Evidence Code section 1240, and defense counsel therefore was ineffective for 

failing to introduce it. 

As noted above, in order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

defendant must show both that counsel‟s performance fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel‟s unprofessional errors, the result of 

the proceeding would have been different. (People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at 

p. 436.) We review deferentially counsel‟s reasonable tactical decisions. (Ibid.)

At the threshold, we observe that it was not clear Williams‟s statements 

were admissible. At defendant‟s preliminary hearing, the prosecution called 

Sacramento Police Detective Richard Overton. On cross-examination by 

defendant‟s counsel, Overton testified he interviewed Jerome Williams, one of the 

Florin Road McDonald‟s employees, about 1:20 a.m. on September 29, 1994. The 

robbery had occurred several hours earlier, just before 11:00 p.m. Williams told 

Overton he had seen a single robber and, as indicated above, described his height 

and weight as inconsistent with defendant‟s. 

When asked to describe Williams‟s demeanor during the interview, 

Overton characterized him as “[u]pset, frightened, sad, concerned.” 

In arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce 

Overton‟s statement, defendant relies first on Evidence Code section 1240, which 

provides: “Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if 
60

the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or 

event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) Was made spontaneously while the 

declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception.” 

Defendant also relies on People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 541, where we 

addressed that statute and said: “ „When the statements in question were made and 

whether they were delivered directly or in response to a question are important 

factors to be considered on the issue of spontaneity. [Citations.] But as we 

emphasized in People v. Washington, “Neither lapse of time between the event 

and the declarations nor the fact that the declarations were elicited by questioning 

deprives the statements of spontaneity if it nevertheless appears that they were 

made under the stress of excitement and while the reflective powers were still in 

abeyance.” ‟ (People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 319 [246 Cal.Rptr. 886, 753 

P.2d 1082], quoting People v. Washington (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1170, 1176 [81 

Cal.Rptr. 5, 459 P.2d 259], italics added in Poggi.)” We further explained: 

“ „ The crucial element in determining whether a declaration is sufficiently reliable 

to be admissible under this exception to the hearsay rule is . . . the mental state of 

the speaker. The nature of the utterance—how long it was made after the startling 

incident and whether the speaker blurted it out, for example—may be important, 

but solely as an indicator of the mental state of the declarant. . . . [U]ltimately 

each fact pattern must be considered on its own merits, and the trial court is vested 

with reasonable discretion in the matter.‟ ” (Ibid.)

Here, the adjectives Overton used in describing Williams‟s demeanor 

during the interview—“[u]pset, frightened, sad, concerned”—along with the 

relatively short period of time that had elapsed between Williams‟s observation of 

the robber and his interview with Overton, suggest Williams‟s statement to 

Overton may have been admissible under Evidence Code section 1240. (See, e.g., 
61

People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 893-894 [a statement made 18 hours after an 

event was held spontaneous under Evid. Code, § 1240].) 

We need not decide whether the statement would have been properly 

admitted, however, because defendant‟s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 

fails for lack of prejudice. (In re Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 974, 1019-1020; 

Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697.) Contrary to defendant‟s 

argument, ample evidence connected him to the Florin Road crimes. On direct 

examination, prosecution witness and Florin Road McDonald‟s manager Jeffrey 

Hickey positively identified Proby as one of the two gunmen and described Proby 

as roughly five feet 101⁄2 inches tall. Hickey described the second gunman as 

weighing between 185 and 200 pounds and as being approximately six feet two 

inches tall. Hickey also testified that from his experience working with defendant, 

the physical features of the second gunman, including height, weight, build, skin 

color, and age, were consistent with those of defendant. 

Towards the end of his direct testimony, Hickey stated that the “only 

difference” he noticed between the second gunman and defendant was that the 

voice used by the second gunman did not appear to be his natural voice. Earlier in 

his testimony, Hickey described the second gunman‟s voice as “gruff” and that he 

“sounded like he was trying to sound mean to make me hurry up [in opening the 

restaurant safe], to make me worry.” 

Although Hickey ultimately failed to positively identify defendant as the 

second masked gunman, he nevertheless testified that the second gunman‟s 

physical features, including his height, weight, build, skin color, and age, were 

consistent with defendant‟s. Further, as noted above, prosecution witness Vera 

Penilton testified that several hours after the robbery, she heard defendant admit to 

killing Ronald Lee. On this evidence, then, we see no reasonable probability that, 

had trial counsel introduced Williams‟s description of one of the gunmen to 
62

Detective Overton under Evidence Code section 1240, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. (People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 436.) As a 

result, we reject defendant‟s claim that trial counsel was constitutionally 

ineffective.

6. Instructional Issues

a. Refusal to instruct that immunized testimony of a 

prosecution witness should be viewed with distrust 

Vera Penilton, the only witness to definitively connect defendant to the 

Florin Road crimes, testified at trial under a grant of use immunity, and the jury 

was so informed. Defendant asked the court to instruct the jury to view her 

testimony with distrust. The court refused to do so, but instead instructed the jury 

it could consider “anything that has a tendency to prove or disprove the 

truthfulness of the testimony of the witness,” including “[w]hether the witness is 

testifying under a grant of immunity.” Defendant argues the trial court erred in 

refusing his requested cautionary instruction.

Defendant relies on certain language in People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 

957 (Hunter), but that case does not bear the weight defendant seeks to place on it. 

In Hunter, we rejected the contention that a trial court erred in refusing to give a 

cautionary instruction where witnesses testified under grants of transactional 

immunity.24 Hunter began by stating the general rule that, except where 

additional evidence is required by statute, the direct evidence of one witness who 

 

24 “Use immunity protects a witness only against the actual use of his 

compelled testimony, as well as the use of evidence derived therefrom. 

Transactional immunity protects the witness against all later prosecutions relating 

to matters about which he testifies.” (Hunter, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 973, fn. 4; see 

Kastigar v. United States (1972) 406 U.S. 441, 449-453, 460.)
63

is entitled to full credit is sufficient for proof of any fact. (Evid. Code, § 411; 

Hunter, at p. 977.) Hunter noted that the Penal Code sets forth certain exceptions 

in criminal cases, including the corroboration requirement for accomplice

testimony (§ 1111), but emphasized that no California authority had recognized a 

similar exception for immunized testimony, notwithstanding the existence of a 

contrary rule in the federal courts (Hunter, at p. 977). Hunter did, as defendant 

observes, distinguish use immunity from transactional immunity in rejecting a 

requirement of a cautionary instruction. “Under federal law the prosecutor cannot 

grant transactional immunity. [Citations.] Thus, the government remains free to 

prosecute the witness after he testifies, as long as the prosecution is not based on 

the witness‟s testimony. The grant of immunity therefore does not totally 

eliminate the witness‟s incentive to testify falsely. [Citation.] California law, 

however, provides that a witness ordered to testify over a claim of selfincrimination shall be given transactional immunity. (§ 1324; Daly v. Superior 

Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 132, 146 [137 Cal.Rptr. 14, 560 P.2d 1193]; [citation].) 

The prosecution‟s leverage over the witness is thereby sharply diminished, as is 

the witness‟s motive to falsify. Thus, to paraphrase [People v.] Alcala [(1984) 

36 Cal.3d 604, 623 (rejecting the contention the jury must be instructed to distrust 

in-custody informant testimony)], „whatever consideration [an immunized witness] 

may expect for testifying, the direct, compelling motive to lie is absent.‟ 

(36 Cal.3d at p. 624.)” (Hunter, at pp. 977-978.)

That Hunter held a cautionary instruction is not required when a witness 

testifies under a grant of transactional immunity is clear. Equally clear, however, 

is that Hunter did not confront the situation before us in this case, involving a 

witness testifying with use immunity, and its remarks concerning the latter 

situation are therefore dicta. 
64

Defendant points out that, since Hunter, the Legislature has amended 

section 1324 to provide for use immunity in addition to transactional immunity. 

Hunter‟s discussion of the difference between the two types of immunity, he 

argues, dictates that a cautionary instruction be given on request when a witness, 

like Penilton, testifies under a grant of use immunity, which, unlike transactional 

immunity, does not “totally eliminate the witness‟s incentive to testify falsely.” 

(Hunter, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 978.) Similar instructions, he notes, are required in 

connection with the testimony of accomplices (see People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 

Cal.4th 558) and in-custody informants (§ 1127a). Because a witness who is 

given only use immunity may still be prosecuted for the underlying crimes, in 

defendant‟s view the witness still has a compelling motive to lie, and the jury must 

be instructed to distrust the witness‟s testimony.

We are not persuaded. The general rule, of course, is that the jury decides 

all questions of fact, including the credibility of a witness. (Evid. Code, § 312.) 

And, as noted, except where additional evidence is required by statute, the direct 

evidence of one witness who is entitled to full credit is sufficient for proof of any 

fact. (Evid. Code, § 411.) A cautionary instruction, by obligating the jury to view 

with skepticism the testimony of an immunized witness, impinges on the jury‟s 

otherwise unfettered power to determine the witness‟s credibility. To be sure, 

with respect to narrow categories of evidence, such as the testimony of 

accomplices, which must be corroborated (§ 1111), and in-custody informants 

(§ 1127a), the Legislature has imposed limits on the general rules because the 

witness is deemed to have a particularly compelling motive to lie. The Legislature 

has not, however, seen fit to do so with respect to immunized testimony, even after 

Hunter. We therefore see no compelling reason to depart from the generally 

applicable rule that the instructions need not direct the jury to view a particular 

type of evidence with distrust.
65

The Court of Appeal, in People v. Hampton (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 710, 

721-724, employed similar reasoning in rejecting a claim of error in the refusal to 

instruct that the testimony of an immunized witness should be viewed with 

distrust. Hampton noted that no authority requires California courts to follow the 

federal instructional rule and that the difference between the federal and former 

state statute was but one of the bases on which we rested our decision in Hunter, 

supra, 49 Cal.3d 957.25 (Hampton, at p. 723.) Citing an earlier Court of Appeal 

decision that reached the same conclusion (People v. Echevarria (1992) 11 

Cal.App.4th 444), Hampton recognized “ „the logic behind the concept that an 

immunized witness‟s testimony may not be as trustworthy as a nonimmunized 

witness‟s testimony,‟ ” but nevertheless concluded “ „it is a better practice to 

include factors such as immunized testimony to the list of considerations 

contained in CALJIC No. 2.20 rather than telling the jurors which witnesses they 

should or should not trust because, as they are specifically instructed, they “are the 

sole judges of the believability of a witness and the weight to be given the 

testimony of each witness.” ‟ ” (Hampton, at p. 723; see also Echevarria, at 

p. 450 [“It is equally logical that a convicted felon‟s testimony may not be as 

trustworthy as a nonfelon‟s, or that a person with an established bias, interest, or 

other motive, may not be as trustworthy as someone without such interests or 

motives. All of these factors are „amplified‟ within CALJIC No. 2.20, and this 

trial court‟s inclusion of an immunized witness‟s testimony in that list of 

 

25 The witness in Hampton testified that she understood her grant of immunity 

to mean she “could not be prosecuted for whatever she might say in court or for 

any of these events” (People v. Hampton, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 714), 

arguably describing both use and transactional immunity (id. at p. 723). The 

Hampton court reasoned that the rationale of Hunter, rather than the federal rule, 

should apply in either event. (Hampton, at p. 723.)
66

amplifications was entirely appropriate.”].) The trial court did so here and did not 

err in refusing to instruct the jury to distrust Penilton‟s testimony.

b. Challenges to CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 2.21.2, 2.22, 2.27 and 

8.83 

Defendant contends several standard CALJIC instructions given during the 

guilt phase of his trial impermissibly diluted the requirement that guilt be proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby violating his constitutional rights to due 

process and trial by jury. Specifically, defendant takes issue with CALJIC Nos.

2.01 and 8.83, both of which address the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence,26

as well as CALJIC Nos. 2.21.2 [witness willfully false],27 2.22 [weighing 

conflicting testimony],28 and 2.27 [sufficiency of testimony of one witness].29)

30

 

 

26 As given at defendant‟s trial, CALJIC No. 2.01, which was virtually 

identical to the version of CALJIC No. 8.83 also given at defendant‟s trial, read in 

part as follows: “Also, if the circumstantial evidence as to any particular count 

permits two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the defendant‟s guilt 

and the other to his innocence, you must adopt that interpretation that points to the 

defendant‟s innocence, and reject that interpretation that points to his guilt. [¶] If, 

on the other hand, one interpretation of this evidence appears to you to be 

reasonable and the other interpretation to be unreasonable, you must accept the 

reasonable interpretation and reject the unreasonable.” The language defendant 

finds objectionable is in italics. 

27 As given at defendant‟s trial, CALJIC No. 2.21.2 read as follows, with the 

language defendant finds objectionable in italics: “A witness, who is willfully 

false in one material part of his or her testimony, is to be distrusted in others. You 

may reject the whole testimony of a witness who willfully has testified falsely as 

to a material point, unless, from all the evidence, you believe the probability of 

truth favors his or her testimony in other particulars.” 

28 As given at defendant‟s trial, CALJIC No. 2.22 read as follows, with the 

language defendant finds objectionable in italics: “You are not bound to decide an 

issue of fact in accordance with the testimony of a number of witnesses, which 

does not convince you, as against the testimony of a lesser number or other 

evidence, which appeals to your mind with more convincing force. You may not 

disregard the testimony of the greater number of witnesses merely from caprice, 

(footnote continued on next page)
67

As defendant acknowledges, we have previously considered and rejected 

the argument that these instructions improperly dilute the constitutional 

requirement that guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Jennings

(1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 386 [rejecting the defendant‟s challenge to CALJIC No. 

2.01, noting: “The plain meaning of these instructions merely informs the jury to 

reject unreasonable interpretations of the evidence and to give the defendant the 

benefit of any reasonable doubt. No reasonable juror would have interpreted these 

instructions to permit a criminal conviction where the evidence shows defendant 

was „apparently‟ guilty, yet not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”]; People v. 

Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1058-1059 [rejecting challenges to CALJIC Nos. 

2.01, 2.21.2, 2.22, 2.27 & 8.83].) 

Defendant advances no persuasive reason to reconsider our prior rejection 

of challenges to these instructions, and we decline to do so. 

7. Assertedly Prejudicial “Spillover” Effect of Errors 

Defendant contends his convictions for the Watt Avenue crimes should be 

reversed because of a “spillover” effect from the asserted errors and failures of 

 

(footnote continued from previous page)

whim or prejudice, or from a desire to favor one side against the other. You must 

not decide an issue by the simple process of counting the number of witnesses who 

have testified on the opposing sides. The final test is not in the relative number of 

witnesses, but in the convincing force of the evidence.” 

29 As given at defendant‟s trial, CALJIC No. 2.27 read as follows: “You 

should give the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness whatever weight you 

think it deserves. Testimony by one witness which you believe concerning any 

fact whose testimony about that fact does not require corroboration is sufficient for 

the proof of that fact. You should carefully review all the evidence upon which 

the proof of that fact depends.” 

30 Despite defendant‟s failure to object to these instructions, we may consider 

his challenges to them on appeal. (§ 1259.) 
68

counsel regarding the Florin Road crimes. Because we have determined that no 

prejudicial error occurred with respect to the Florin Road crimes, we necessarily 

reject this claim as well. 

II. PENALTY PHASE

A. Facts

1. Prosecution Case in Aggravation

The prosecution presented victim impact testimony, described in further 

detail below, by relatives of Ronald Lee and the mother of his child. The 

prosecution also introduced evidence that defendant had previously been 

convicted of burglary and residential burglary. 

2. Defense Case in Mitigation

Several of defendant‟s family members, a friend, and a high school teacher 

testified on defendant‟s behalf.

Defendant‟s uncle, Renee Vines, described him as a jokester and a playful 

kid who did not display temper. The Watts neighborhood of Los Angeles, where 

defendant grew up in part, was “one of the roughest areas,” and one would have to 

be streetwise to survive there. Renee Vines considered that for defendant to finish 

high school and never get into serious trouble in Watts meant “he did a very good 

job.” Kevin Vines, another of defendant‟s uncles, testified defendant never joined 

a gang because he “didn‟t have the heart” and “wasn‟t cut out for it.” Roger 

Vines, defendant‟s father, described him as a mild kid who was not a fighter and 

who was like a big brother to many other children. Once, defendant‟s jaw was 

broken by some kids who wanted him to join a gang. 

Sonia Evette Pearson, defendant‟s mother, testified she was 15 years old 

when defendant was born and that she married Roger Vines when defendant was 

three or four years old. Their relationship had its ups and downs. Roger would 
69

discipline defendant by beating him, which Sonia disagreed with. Roger treated 

defendant‟s sister, Myeisha, more gently and appeared to slight defendant by 

comparison. When her marriage to Roger ended, Sonia moved with the children 

to Los Angeles, while Roger stayed in Sacramento. One summer, in the course of 

a child support dispute, Roger did not return the children after a visit. Lacking the 

income from his support payments, Sonia was forced to move to an apartment in 

the housing projects in Watts. Eventually she retrieved the children from 

Sacramento and they continued to live in the projects until she could afford other 

housing. The adjustment to their new living situation was difficult for the 

children, and the projects were dangerous. 

Sonia concluded by telling the jury that defendant was not a fighter, he was 

good with people, especially kids, and he was important to her. 

Ann Diver-Stamnes, Ph.D., a professor of secondary teacher education at 

Humboldt State University at the time of trial, was a teacher at Jordan High 

School when defendant was a student there. She described the school as rundown, 

dirty, poorly maintained, and unsafe. Many of the students there, including 

defendant (and contrary to popular stereotypes), however, were caring and 

altruistic individuals. She described defendant, who was enrolled in her peer 

counseling class, as a warm and caring young man with a strong sense of humor 

who did “stellar” work in her class and was not affiliated with a gang. 

B. Asserted Error in Admission of Victim Impact Evidence 

Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting, over his objection, a 

videotape depicting Ronald Lee singing and dancing, activities at which he was 

accomplished and in which he took great pleasure. Defendant further contends the 

trial court abused its discretion in permitting four witnesses to testify regarding the 

impact of Lee‟s murder on them, although with but one minor exception he made 
70

no objection to their testimony at trial. The asserted errors in admitting this 

evidence, defendant argues, deprived him of the due process of law. As we shall 

explain, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Admission of victim impact evidence at the penalty phase of a capital trial 

is permissible under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

(Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808), and such evidence is admissible as a 

circumstance of the offense under section 190.3, factor (a) (People v. Brown, 

supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 573), provided it does not invite a purely irrational response 

from the jury (People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1056). Victim 

impact evidence is “designed to show . . . each victim‟s „uniqueness as an 

individual human being.‟ ” (Payne, at p. 823, italics omitted.)

We have held that courts should be cautious about admitting videotapes 

featuring the victim, noting that “[p]articularly if the presentation lasts beyond a 

few moments, or emphasizes the childhood of an adult victim, or is accompanied 

by stirring music, the medium itself may assist in creating an emotional impact 

upon the jury that goes beyond what the jury might experience by viewing still 

photographs of the victim or listening to the victim‟s bereaved parents. . . . In 

order to combat this strong possibility, courts must strictly analyze evidence of 

this type and, if such evidence is admitted, courts must monitor the jurors‟ 

reactions to ensure that the proceedings do not become injected with a legally 

impermissible level of emotion.” (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 

1289.) “The determination whether and to what extent to admit a videotape of the 

victim‟s life at the penalty phase of a capital case is within the sound discretion of 

the trial court.” (People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 801 (conc. opn. of 

Werdegar, J.); see also People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 579 [admission of 

a brief “ „home movie‟ ” videotape depicting the victim during a family holiday 
71

celebration and a family trip did not constitute an abuse of the trial court‟s 

discretion].)

In the five-minute videotape, which the trial court viewed before admitting 

and which we too have viewed, Ronald Lee is seen singing, dancing, and rapping 

in three musical numbers with relatives, including his cousin Littell Williams, Jr.; 

in a fourth number, Lee and several other young people perform before a crowd in 

a high school auditorium. The videotape is of “home movie” quality, without 

added music, narration or visual techniques, or staged or contrived elements; it is 

not a tribute or eulogy, and there is nothing particularly dramatic or emotional 

about the performances. (See People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 785.) The 

videotape depicts Lee at an age only about two years younger than he was at the 

time of his death at age 20, and thus presumably very nearly as he was when 

defendant shot him. The depiction of Lee‟s singing and dancing was relevant to 

show what he was like. (People v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 798.) We agree 

with the trial court that the videotape contained “nothing inflammatory that would 

divert the jury from [its] proper function,” and nothing in the record suggests the 

jury in fact reacted emotionally to the playing of the videotape. We therefore 

conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it.

Defendant also contends the testimony of the four witnesses—Andrea 

Clayton, Diane Williams, Littell Williams, Sr., and Littell Williams, Jr.—

regarding the effect of Ronald Lee‟s murder on them exceeded the proper scope of 

victim impact evidence under state and federal law and was so prejudicial as to 

require reversal of the death judgment.

Andrea Clayton, the mother of Ronald Lee‟s child, testified she met Lee 

when she was 15 years old and, although they were no longer boyfriend and 

girlfriend at the time of his death, they had agreed to be supportive of each other. 

At the time of trial, their son was three years old, and Clayton had told him mean 
72

people had shot his daddy, who was in heaven with Jesus now. She wondered 

how their relationship would be and what their family would be like if Lee had 

lived. She missed Lee‟s companionship and everything about him. 

Diane Williams, Lee‟s legal guardian and the mother figure in his life, 

testified Lee was a “joy,” a well-mannered, friendly, and helpful boy. She 

described the shock of learning of Lee‟s death, the difficulty she had in coming to 

terms with it, and the emptiness it left in their family. 

Littell Williams, Sr., Lee‟s mother‟s uncle, knew Lee all his life. Lee was a 

good, helpful, ambitious young man with a lovely voice. Williams, Sr., missed 

Lee‟s presence, particularly at the church they both attended. 

Littell Williams, Jr., Lee‟s cousin, testified he and Lee grew up together 

and were like brothers. They had a strong bond and did everything together; 

Williams, Jr., confided in Lee in a way he could not do with anyone else. They 

had formed a singing group and made a recording under a contract with a Los 

Angeles company. Williams, Jr., described the shock of learning of Lee‟s death 

and his difficulty in accepting it. Lee‟s death had taken a toll on Williams, Jr., and 

his family, and holidays were never the same afterward. 

As noted, “[u]nless it invites a purely irrational response, evidence of the 

effect of a capital murder on the loved ones of the victim and the community is 

relevant and admissible under section 190.3, factor (a) as a circumstance of the 

crime. [Citation.] The federal Constitution bars victim impact evidence only if it 

is so unduly prejudicial as to render the trial fundamentally unfair.” (People v. 

Brady, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 574; see also People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 

203, 258.) Here, as in Burney, the witnesses‟ testimony was brief, amounting to 

fewer than 40 pages of reporter‟s transcript, and, as far as we can discern from the 

record, was delivered without excessive emotion. The victim impact evidence in 

this case was “typical of this type of evidence that we routinely have allowed, and 
73

came within the limits established for such evidence.” (Burney, at p. 258.) Its 

admission, therefore, was proper under state law and did not violate defendant‟s 

federal constitutional rights.

C. Challenges to the Constitutionality of California’s Death Penalty 

Law 

1. Challenge to Prosecutor’s Discretion Based on Bush v. Gore

Defendant argues that the death penalty in California violates the California 

Constitution and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution because it is imposed arbitrarily and capriciously depending on the 

county in which the case is prosecuted. 

We have repeatedly rejected substantially similar claims, concluding over 

20 years ago that “prosecutorial discretion to select those eligible cases in which 

the death penalty will actually be sought does not . . . offend principles of equal 

protection, due process, or cruel and/or unusual punishment.” (People v. Keenan 

(1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 505; see also People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 

43.) 

Defendant, however, urges this court to reexamine our decisions in prior 

cases in light of the United States Supreme Court‟s voting rights decision in Bush 

v. Gore (2000) 531 U.S. 98, which, he asserts, requires uniformity among 

California‟s 58 counties for prosecutorial standards for seeking the death penalty. 

But as the high court explained, its consideration of the equal protection challenge 

to Florida‟s voting recount process was “limited to the present circumstances, for 

the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many 

complexities.” (Id. at p. 109, italics added.) That case, therefore, does not warrant 

our revisiting our prior holdings on the instant issue. (People v. Bennett (2009) 45 

Cal.4th 577, 629, fn. 19.)
74

2. Delay in Appointment of Counsel 

Defendant contends the delay in appointing appellate counsel—from the 

judgment in November 1997 to May 2003—violated his constitutional rights. 

Specifically, defendant claims a violation of his due process right to a speedy 

appeal and his right to equal protection. 

We previously have considered and rejected identical claims. (People v. 

Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 942; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 775-

776; People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 708-709.) In support of his argument, 

defendant relies on federal authority in noncapital cases, but as we have explained, 

“[n]one of those decisions address the unique demands of appellate representation 

in capital cases.” (Holt, at p. 709.) Additionally, “defendant fails to demonstrate 

that the delay inherent in the procedures by which California recruits, screens, and 

appoints attorneys to represent capital defendants on appeal, is not necessary to 

ensure that competent representation is available for indigent capital appellants.” 

(Ibid.) Defendant has identified no persuasive reason to reconsider our prior 

holdings, and we decline to do so.

3. General Challenges to the Constitutionality of California’s 

Death Penalty Law 

Defendant contends that “[m]any features of this state‟s capital sentencing 

scheme, alone or in combination with each other, violate the United States 

Constitution.” He concedes we have rejected these claims in previous decisions, 

but argues we should reconsider them. Having found no reason to do so, we reject 

these claims and list them here to ensure a future court will consider them fully 

exhausted. Accordingly, we conclude the death penalty law is not 

unconstitutional: 

— In assertedly failing to “genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible 

for the death penalty” generally, or more specifically because the special 
75

circumstances are so numerous or so broad (People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at 

p. 533);

— Due to the asserted overbreadth of section 190.3, factor (a), which 

permits the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime as an aggravating 

factor (People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 533);

— In failing to require the jury to find the aggravating factors were proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating 

factors beyond a reasonable doubt, or that death is the appropriate penalty beyond 

a reasonable doubt (People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 533), nor is this 

conclusion called into question by the United States Supreme Court‟s decisions in 

Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 

584 (People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 214; see also Cunningham v. 

California (2007) 549 U.S. 270);

— In failing to require jury unanimity with respect to aggravating factors 

(People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 533);

— In failing to impose a burden of proof on either party, even if only proof 

by a preponderance of the evidence, or, alternatively, in failing to instruct the jury 

on the absence of a burden of proof (People v. Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 509; 

People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 533);

— In failing to require the jury to return written findings (People v. Abilez,

supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 533);

— In failing to require intercase proportionality review (People v. Abilez,

supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 534);

— In failing to specify which factors are aggravating and which are 

mitigating (People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 534);

— In prefacing several factors with the phrase “whether or not” (People v. 

Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 534); 
76

— In “treating noncapital sentencing differently from capital sentencing 

(People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1067 [„The statutory scheme 

does not deny capital defendants the equal protection of the laws or any other 

constitutional right insofar as it does not contain disparate sentence review (i.e., 

comparative or intercase proportionality review)‟]; People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 

Cal.4th 547, 590 [36 Cal.Rptr.3d 340, 123 P.3d 614] [„capital and noncapital 

defendants are not similarly situated and therefore may be treated differently 

without violating constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the laws or due 

process of law‟])” (People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 534-535);

— In failing to comply with “International Norms of Humanity and 

Decency” (People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 535); and

— In light of the abolition of capital punishment in Western Europe 

(People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 535).

4. Delay in Execution After Lengthy Confinement 

Finally, defendant contends the delay in his execution—he has been on 

death row for over 13 years—constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the 

federal and state Constitutions, “international law, covenants, treaties and norms.” 

(See, e.g., Lackey v. Texas (1995) 514 U.S. 1045 (mem. of Stevens, J., on denial of 

cert.).) “As explained in People v. Anderson [(2001)] 25 Cal.4th [543,] 606, „we 

have consistently concluded, both before and since Lackey, that delay inherent in 

the automatic appeal process is not a basis for concluding that either the death 

penalty itself, or the process leading to its execution, is cruel and unusual 

punishment.‟ ” (People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 404.) Defendant 

advances no persuasive reason to reexamine this conclusion. 
77

Further, any reliance on international law or extraterritorial decisional law 

has no bearing on the validity of a death sentence that satisfies federal and state 

constitutional mandates. (People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 404.)

D. Cumulative Effect of Asserted Errors

Defendant argues that the cumulative effect of the guilt and penalty phase 

errors requires reversal of his conviction and death sentence even if no single error 

compels reversal. Whether considered singly or in combination, any error or 

assumed error was nonprejudicial.

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

WERDEGAR, J.

WE CONCUR:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

KENNARD, J.

BAXTER, J.

CHIN, J.

CORRIGAN, J.

ASHMANN-GERST, J.*

 

* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, 

Division Two, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Vines

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal XXX

Original Proceeding

Review Granted

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S065720

Date Filed: May 19, 2011

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Sacramento

Judge: James L. Long

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Gilbert Gaynor, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer and Kamala G. Harris, Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Patrick J. Whalen and Michael Dolida, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Gilbert Gaynor

Law Office of Gilbert Gaynor

P.O. Box 41159

Santa Barbara, CA 93140-1159

(805) 962-5842

Michael Dolida

Deputy Attorney General

1300 I Street, Suite 125

Sacramento, CA 94244-2550

(916) 445-8538