alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Kenneth DOHERTY, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 18459.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

June 11, 1963.

J. Stacey Sullivan, Jr., San Diego, Cal., for appellant.

Francis C. Whelan, U. S. Atty., Thomas R. Sheridan, Asst. U. S. Atty., Chief, Crim. Section, and Russell R. Hermann, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.

Before HAMLEY, KOELSCH and BROWNING, Circuit Judges.

HAMLEY, Circuit Judge.

Kenneth Doherty, having waived a jury, was tried by the court, and convicted, of knowingly importing into the United States from Mexico, contrary to law with intent to defraud the United States approximately four pounds, two ounces of marihuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 176a. He appeals from the judgment and sentence thereupon entered contending that the finding of guilt is not supported by substantial evidence.

On November 22, 1960, Doherty was a passenger in an automobile owned and operated by Eugene P. Knight, on a trip from San Diego, California to Tijuana, Mexico, and return. When they re-entered the United States at about 11:00 P.M. that night at the San Ysidro Customs Port the vehicle and men were searched. No marihuana was found on the person of either man but two bricks of marihuana were found wrapped on a shelf underneath the hood of the vehicle. Knight pleaded guilty to a charge of smuggling this marihuana into the United States.

To convict Doherty on the charge lodged against him the Government had the burden of proving that Doherty had knowledge of Knight’s illegal activity on the day in question and participated therein. See Gonzales v. United States, 9 Cir., 301 F.2d 31, 32.

Both Doherty and Knight testified that Doherty went along with Knight just for the ride, believing that Knight’s purpose in going to Tijuana was to have work done on his car at an upholstery shop. They both testified that Doherty at no time had knowledge that Knight obtained marihuana in Tijuana, or that Knight had secreted marihuana in the car.

The trial court was not required to accept their testimony. It was still necessary, however, for the Government to produce direct or circumstantial evidence of sufficient substance to warrant a finding of knowledge and participation by Doherty. 'About all that was shown was that Doherty, who had previously been convicted of possessing narcotics, had 'known Knight about five years; that Knight had been'a marihuana “pusher” in Utah and had once been convicted of armed robbery; and that at the time of the search Doherty had in his possession *720identification papers belonging to one Neal.1

This evidence may give rise to a suspicion and speculation concerning Doherty’s knowledge of, and participation in, Knight’s smuggling activity on November 22, 1960, but this is not enough.

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to dismiss the count of the indictment under which this conviction was obtained.

1

. Doherty pleaded guilty to a charge of illegal entry into the United States on the day in question, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1407 and was sentenced to prison for three years.
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2250 Introduced in House (IH)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2250

     To prevent inappropriate litigation against the United States.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 9, 2007

Mr. McCaul of Texas (for himself, Mr. Brady of Texas, Mr. Gohmert, and 
   Mr. Poe) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
     To prevent inappropriate litigation against the United States.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON USE OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS.

    None of the sums appropriated in any Act of Congress, whether 
enacted before or after the enactment of this Act, shall be used or 
made available to pay any claim against the United States by Osvaldo 
Aldrete-Davila arising out of the conduct of Ignacio Ramos, Jose Alonso 
Compean, or any other person engaging in duties as an employee of the 
Government on February 17, 2005.

SEC. 2. NONWAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the United States does 
not consent to the commencement or maintenance of any civil action 
against the United States by Osvaldo Aldrete-Davila arising out of the 
conduct of Ignacio Ramos or Jose Alonso Compean, or any other person 
engaging in duties as an employee of the Government on February 17, 
2005.
                                 <all>
```
###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 2 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 6 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 7 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 1 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Part 2

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 2 appear at 68 FR 14337, Mar. 25, 2003.

#### § 2.130 New matter suggested by the trademark examining attorney.

If, while an inter partes proceeding involving an application under section 1 or 44 of the Act is pending, facts appear which, in the opinion of the examining attorney, render the mark in the application unregistrable, the examining attorney should request that the Board remand the application. The Board may suspend the proceeding and remand the application to the trademark examining attorney for an ex parte determination of the question of registrability. A copy of the trademark examining attorney's final action will be furnished to the parties to the inter partes proceeding following the final determination of registrability by the trademark examining attorney or the Board on appeal. The Board will consider the application for such further inter partes action as may be appropriate.

[81 FR 69985, Oct. 7, 2016]

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 3 pertaining to both patents and trademarks is placed in the grouping pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 4 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 5 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, September 26, 2018. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, September 26, 2018 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A19I0036. RALPH WILKES et al. v. SUNTRUST BANK et al. . Upon consideration of the Application for Interlocutory Appeal, it is ordered that it be hereby DENIED.
LC NUMBERS: 2015CV260577
§ 17.70 Written decision following a hearing. ( a ) The hearing official shall issue a written decision within 20 days of the completion of the hearing. An oral hearing shall be considered completed when the hearing ceases to receive in person testimony. A paper hearing shall be considered complete on the date by which written statements must be submitted to the hearing official in order to be considered as part of the record.
( b ) The hearing official's determination of a community residential care facility's noncompliance with VA standards shall be based on the preponderance of the evidence.
( c ) The written decision shall include: ( 1 ) A statement of the facts;
( 2 ) A determination whether the community residential care facility complies with the standards set forth in § 17.63 of this part; and
( 3 ) A determination of the time period, if any, the community residential care facility shall have to remedy any noncompliance with VA standards before revocation of VA approval occurs.
( d ) The hearing official's determination of any time period under paragraph (c)(3) of this section shall consider the safety and health of the residents of the community residential care facility and the length of time since the community residential care facility received notice of the noncompliance.
[54 FR 20842, May 15, 1989. Redesignated and amended at 61 FR 21965, 21967, May 13, 1996]
RE: Case No. 14-1012

COA #: 12-14-00215-CV

STYLE: IN RE MICHAEL KENNEDY

FILE COPY

DATE: 1/16/2015

TC#: 87-11917

Today the Supreme Court of Texas denied the

petition for writ of injunction in the above-referenced

case.

MS. CATHY S. LUSK

CLERK, TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS

1517 WEST FRONT, SUITE 354

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§ 93.108 Confidentiality. ( a ) Disclosure of the identity of respondents and complainants in research misconduct proceedings is limited, to the extent possible, to those who need to know, consistent with a thorough, competent, objective and fair research misconduct proceeding, and as allowed by law. Provided, however, that: ( 1 ) The institution must disclose the identity of respondents and complainants to ORI pursuant to an ORI review of research misconduct proceedings under § 93.403.
( 2 ) Under § 93.517(g), HHS administrative hearings must be open to the public.
( b ) Except as may otherwise be prescribed by applicable law, confidentiality must be maintained for any records or evidence from which research subjects might be identified. Disclosure is limited to those who have a need to know to carry out a research misconduct proceeding.
§ 17.60 Extensions of community nursing home care beyond six months. Directors of health care facilities may authorize, for any veteran whose hospitalization was not primarily for a service-connected disability, an extension of nursing care in a public or private nursing home care facility at VA expense beyond six months when the need for nursing home care continues to exist and ( a ) Arrangements for payment of such care through a public assistance program (such as Medicaid) for which the veteran has applied, have been delayed due to unforeseen eligibility problems which can reasonably be expected to be resolved within the extension period, or
( b ) The veteran has made specific arrangements for private payment for such care, and ( 1 ) Such arrangements cannot be effectuated as planned because of unforseen, unavoidable difficulties, such as a temporary obstacle to liquidation of property, and
( 2 ) Such difficulties can reasonably be expected to be resolved within the extension period; or
( c ) The veteran is terminally ill and life expectancy has been medically determined to be less than six months.
( d ) In no case may an extension under paragraph (a) or (b) of this section exceed 45 days.
(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 501, 1720(a))
[53 FR 13121, Apr. 21, 1988. Redesignated at 61 FR 21965, May 13, 1996]
§ 23.115 Assurance required. ( a ) *General.* Either at the application stage or the award stage, Federal agencies must ensure that applications for Federal financial assistance or awards of Federal financial assistance contain, be accompanied by, or be covered by a specifically identified assurance from the applicant or recipient, satisfactory to the designated agency official, that each education program or activity operated by the applicant or recipient and to which these Title IX regulations apply will be operated in compliance with these Title IX regulations. An assurance of compliance with these Title IX regulations shall not be satisfactory to the designated agency official if the applicant or recipient to whom such assurance applies fails to commit itself to take whatever remedial action is necessary in accordance with § 23.110(a) to eliminate existing discrimination on the basis of sex or to eliminate the effects of past discrimination whether occurring prior to or subsequent to the submission to the designated agency official of such assurance.
( b ) *Duration of obligation.* ( 1 ) In the case of Federal financial assistance extended to provide real property or structures thereon, such assurance shall obligate the recipient or, in the case of a subsequent transfer, the transferee, for the period during which the real property or structures are used to provide an education program or activity.
( 2 ) In the case of Federal financial assistance extended to provide personal property, such assurance shall obligate the recipient for the period during which it retains ownership or possession of the property.
( 3 ) In all other cases such assurance shall obligate the recipient for the period during which Federal financial assistance is extended.
( c ) *Form.* ( 1 ) The assurances required by paragraph (a) of this section, which may be included as part of a document that addresses other assurances or obligations, shall include that the applicant or recipient will comply with all applicable Federal statutes relating to nondiscrimination. These include but are not limited to: Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, as amended (20 U.S.C. 1681-1683, 1685-1688).
( 2 ) The designated agency official will specify the extent to which such assurances will be required of the applicant's or recipient's subgrantees, contractors, subcontractors, transferees, or successors in interest.
#### § 21.258 Cost limitations on approval of self-employment plans.

A self-employment plan with an estimated or actual cost of less than $25,000 may be approved by the Veteran Readiness and Employment (VR&E) Officer with jurisdiction. Any self-employment plan with an estimated or actual cost of $25,000 or more must be approved by the Executive Director, VR&E Service.

(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 3104)

[75 FR 3170, Jan. 20, 2010, as amended at 87 FR 8743, Feb. 16, 2022]
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 184 (Thursday, September 24, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 48759]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-23032]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


Office of the Director, National Institutes of Health; Amended 
Notice of Meeting

    Notice is hereby given of a change in the meeting of the NIH 
Scientific Review Board, September 24, 2009, 8 a.m. to 3 p.m., National 
Institutes of Health, Building 60, Chapel and Lecture Hall, 9000 
Rockville Pike, Bethesda, MD 20892 which was published in the Federal 
Register on September 14, 2009, 74 FR 46998.
    The notice is being amended to cancel the September 24, 2009, 
Deliberating Organizational Changes and Effectiveness Working Group 
forum. Please see the Scientific Management Review Board Web site for 
the schedule of upcoming meetings at: http://smrb.od.nih.qov. For 
further information contact Dr. Lyric Jorgenson, Office of Science 
Policy, Office of the Director, National Institutes of Health, Building 
1, Room 218, MSC 0166, 9000 Rockville Pike, Bethesda, MD 20892.

    Dated: September 16, 2009.
Amy Patterson,
Director, Office of Biotechnology Activities.
[FR Doc. E9-23032 Filed 9-23-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-M
41426, 41427.

#### FAUST v. THE STATE (two cases). BELLEW v. THE STATE (two cases).

41428, 41429.

Decided April 28, 1966.

Pannell, Judge.

In accordance with the opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia, 222 Ga. 27, the judgments of affirmance in the above cases are hereby vacated and the judgment of .reversal .hereby entered in each case.

*Judgments reversed.*

*Felton, C. J., Nichols, P. J., Bell, P. J., Frankum, Jordan, Hall, Eberhardt and Deen, JJ., concur.*

*540
      *Rupert A. Brown,*for appellants.

*Preston M. Almand, Solicitor,*for appellee.
#### Louis E. Wolff, Appellant, *v.*Lorenz Zeller, as Assignee, etc., Respondent.

(City Court of New York, General Term,

May, 1899.)

Replevin — A demand is necessary, where the possession is lawful.

Where a general assignee has become possessed, under his. assignment, of chattels alleged to have been obtaind by his assignor ■ ' thrbugh fraud, the possession thereof by the assignee is lawful and a demand and a refusal upon his part must be shown in order, to make ■ his possession tortious and support an action against him for the recovery of the chattels. <

*647Appeal from a judgment against the plaintiff, entered upon the decision of the trial judge, dismissing the complaint herein.

Emanuel Eschwege, for appellant.

Edward Miehling, for respondent.

Schuchman, J.

The action is brought to recover certain chattels of the value of $414.80, which plaintiff claims were delivered to the defendant’s assignor, Joseph Herrmann, on the face and strength of certain representations made by said Joseph Herrmann to one Silverman (plaintiff’s assignor) as to his (Herrmann’s) financial condition, which representations were made on January 11/1898, and the said chattels were delivered to said Herrmann on January 12, 1898. .

On June 2, 1898, the said Joseph Herrmann made a general assignment for the benefit of his-creditors to the defendant herein. Plaintiff claims that prior to said assignment, and by reason of the fraud of the said Joseph Herrmann, the. contract of sale for the aforesaid chattels was duly rescinded. .

There is no proof of a valid rescission or abandonment of the contract of sale of the chattels by Silverman to Herrmann. The vendee, Herrmann, remained in possession of the chattels, and the vendee, Silverman, held and continued to hold the notes of the vendee, given for the purchase thereof. Murray v. Harway, 56 N. Y. 337.

By the assignment, the defendant assignee, as aforesaid, became lawfully possessed of the chattels, and to make his possession a tortious one, a demand and refusal was necessary before suit could he brought against him to recover the chattels. There was no proof of a demand of the chattels on the assignee before bringing the action. Goodwin v. Wertheimer, 99 N. Y. 149.

Judgment appealed from affirmed, with costs.

Fitzsimons, Ch. J., and O’Dwyeb, J., concur.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.
41804.

#### NIAGARA FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY v. POWELL.

Argued February 7, 1966

Decided March 11, 1966.

*312
      *Troutman, Sams, Schroder ■& Lockerman, Robert L. Pennington, John D. McLanahan, Gerald P. Thurmond,*for appellant.

*W. D. Ballard, Troy R. Thigpen,*for appellee.

Felton, Chief Judge.

1. A one-year contractual limitation upon the filing of such an action as is here involved has been held valid by the Supreme Court and this court. *Springfield Fire &c. Ins. Co. v. Carter,*110 Ga. App. 382 (1, 3) (138 SE2d 590); *Aiken v. Northwestern Mutual Ins. Co.,*106 Ga. App. 220 (126 SE2d 630) and cit.

2. Where an action is brought on a policy containing a one-year contractual limitation upon the filing of an action on the policy the petition must allege either a waiver of the provision or an estoppel against the insurer to rely on the provision of the policy limiting the time for filing the action. *Neese v. Milwaukee Mechanics’ Ins. Co.,*84 Ga. App. 473 (66 SE2d 172); *Delta Ins. Co. v. Wood,*99 Ga. App. 58 (107 SE2d 693).

3. In the absence of allegations in the petition that the insurer had done anything which could be construed as a waiver of the time for filing the action or to show an estoppel against the insurer to assert the limitation, the petition was subject to the general demurrer.. *General Ins. Co. of America v. Lee Chocolate Co.,*97 Ga. App. 588 (103 SE2d 632); Stanley *v. Sterling Mutual Life Ins. Co.,*12 Ga. App. 475 (77 SE 664); *Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland,*47 Ga, App. 12 (1691 SE 514). There is no contention that there was an agreement for an appraisal or arbitration. See also *Underwriters Agency v. Sutherlin,*55 Ga. 266, 267 and *Gibraltar Fire*
      *313
      *& Marine Ins. Co. v. Lanier,*64 Ga. App. 269 (13 SE2d 27). Cases such as *Cordell v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,*54 Ga. App. 178 (187 SE 292) are not applicable here because in those cases the limitation of action was not dated from the time of loss but from the expiration of the time within which a proof of loss was required to be filed.

The court erred in overruling the general demurrer to the petition.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Frankum and Pannell, JJ., concur.*
§ 17.647 Failure to comply with terms and conditions of participation. ( a ) *Participant fails to satisfy obligated service.* A participant of the PREL who fails to satisfy the period of obligated service will be liable to the United States, in lieu of such obligated service, for the full amount of benefit they expected to receive in the agreement, pro-rated for completed service days.
( b ) *Repayment period.* The participant will pay the amount of damages that the United States is entitled to recover under this section in full to the United States no later than 1 year after the date of the breach of the agreement.
Editorial Note on Part 84
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 84 appear at 69 FR 18803, Apr. 9, 2004.

§ 84.117 Gas mask containers; minimum requirements. ( a ) Gas masks shall be equipped with a substantial, durable container bearing markings which show the applicant's name, the type and commercial designation of mask it contains and all appropriate approval labels.
( b ) Containers for gas masks shall be designed and constructed to permit easy removal of the mask.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

September 15, 2020

No. 04-19-00798-CV

Stephen W. MABERY and Damon Thorpe,

Appellants

v.

MORANI RIVER RANCH HOLDINGS LP, MORANI GP LLC, Morani River Ranch LLC, 

Kevin L. Reid and Stewards of Wildlife Conservation Inc.,

Appellees

From the 166th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2018CI03565

Honorable Antonia Arteaga, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

The Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to file Appellant’s Reply Brief is hereby 

GRANTED. Time is extended until October 5, 2020.

_________________________________

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 15th day of September, 2020.

___________________________________

MICHAEL A. CRUZ, 

Clerk of Court
#### § 18.441 Application.

Sections 18.441 through 18.447 apply to postsecondary education programs or activities that receive Federal financial assistance from the Department of Veterans Affairs and to recipients that operate or receive or benefit from Federal financial assistance for the operation of such programs or activities.

[45 FR 63268, Sept. 24, 1980, as amended at 68 FR 51370, Aug. 26, 2003]