rkey: 

Thwarted 

Ambition 

Simon V. Mayal
without popular information or the means of 

acquiring it, 

is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or 

perhaps both. 

Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; 

And a people who mean to be their own 

Go vernors, 

must arm themselves with the power which 

knowledge gives. 

JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRY 

August 4, 1822 
Turkey: 

Thwarted Ambitio

Simon V. Mayall 

McNair Paper 56 

January 1997 

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Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC. 20402-9328 

ISSN 1071-7552 
The Origins and Legacy of Ottoman Greatness ...... 

The Ottomans and the West .................... 

The Ottomans and the European Balance of Power .

The Development of Turkish Nationalism ....... 

World War One and Defeat ................. 

The War of Independence and the National Pact .... 

Conclusion ................................ 

. THE STATE FOUNDATIONS OF TURKISH 

SECURITY POLICY ......................... 

Geopolitical Foundations .................... 

Ethnic Foundations ......................... 

Ideological Foundations .................... 

State, Society and the Formulation of 

Foreign Policy .......................... 

The Civil Service ........................... 

The Army ................................. 

The Role of the Army in Security Policy .......... 

Foreign Policy and Public Opinion ............. 

The 1980 Intervention and the 1982 Constitution ..

A New Era ............................... 

. THE EXERCISE OF TURKISH 

FOREIGN POLICY: Ataturk to Ozal ............ 

Foreign Policy Imperatives .................... 

International Acceptance ................... 

Turkey and the Second World War ............ 

Turkey Moves West ..................... 

Turkey and the Cold War .................... 

Turkey Reassesses its Role .................... 

Security Policy Stability ..................... 

iii 
Regional Initiatives .......................... 6

Conclusion ................................ 6

. THWARTED AMBITION? ..................... 

Internal Politics ............................ 

The Economy ............................ 

Refah Alters the Equation .................... 

The Armed Forces .......................... 

The Defense Budget ......................... 

Refah and the Military ....................... 

The Kurdish Issue ........................... 8

. BRIDGE OR BARRIER? ....................... 

Turkey's Relations with the West ............... 

Turkey's Relations with the East ................ 

Conclusion ............................... 10

8. FACING THE FUTURE ...................... 10

ABOUT THE AUTHOR ......................... 11 

iv 
Z~ 
Thwarted Ambition 

le 

Introduction 

At the end of the Cold War every country was forced to 

examine the fundamental assumptions that had formed t

security policies for the last 45 years. Among the "victors

the Cold War, few countries were faced with a more dispa

set of new circumstances than Turkey. Unlike the United S

and Western Europe, "victory" for Turkey had a 

ambivalent quality. Almost overnight Turkey moved from b

the buttressing flank of one strategic region, to the epicente

a new one. 

In a bipolar world Turkey had had the luxury o

uncomplicated security policy in which, broadly speakin

aligned with the West, opposed the Soviet Union, and igno

the rest. In the new security environment, Turk

geographical position and its military strength now made 

European, Balkan, Middle Eastern, Near Eastern, Caucas

Mediterranean, Aegean, and Black Sea power. Sharing bor

with Greece, Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia, Iran, Iraq, and S

Turkey's control of the Bosphorus Straits and the Dardene

also made it a Black Sea neighbor of Russia, the Ukra

Romania and Moldova. Turkey's ethnic roots lay in Ce

Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans, influencing its intere

concerns, and sympathies. Its Muslim identity demande
Turkey should leave its former passive and hesitant policie

and engage in an active foreign policy. ''1 Between 1991 an

1993, Turkey seemed to embrace Ozal's vision, embarking o

a broad range of diplomatic activity in Central Asia, the Tran

Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Black Sea area. Thes

ambitions were supported by a wide range of Turkish publ

opinion, and by many observers in the West, 2 particularly 

the United States. ~ None of the immediate and demandin

post-Cold War issues of Bosnia, the Middle East Peace Proces

Iraqi sanctions, Operation Provide Comfort, Trans-Caucasu

separatism, Russian activities in the "Near Abroad," CFE flan

issues, NATO enlargement, Cyprus, Central Asia, and energ

pipelines could be discussed without reference to Turkey

Enthusiasm and concern colored assessments of how Turke

would address these new challenges and opportunities. Man

of these assessments were flawed by poor understanding of th

dynamics of the Turkish state, society, and economy, or b

lack of knowledge about the consistent elements in Turkis

foreign policy. 

In his history of the First World War, Churchill wrote, 

can recall no great sphere of policy about which the Britis

Government was less completely informed than the Turkish. 

He wrote this in 1929, some 6 years after the Treaty 

Lausanne had formally recognized the new Republic of Turke

Written with the benefit of hindsight, his commen

encompassed not only the causes and consequences of th

disastrous Gallipoli campaign, but the whole conduct 

British policy toward the late Ottoman Empire and th

foundations of modern Turkey. The British were not alone 

misunderstanding Turkey. Throughout the West, lack 

comprehension was compounded by historical antipathy

2 
Kuwait. To many it seemed the natural response of a N

ally to U.S. calls for assistance. In fact the active respon

the Turkish Government was one of the most signif

watersheds in Turkish security policy since the decisio

enter the Korean War and to join NATO. While O

decision, in both style and substance, created bitter divi

in the Turkish political elite, it was barely noticed in the W

but did reflect the particular nature of Turkish state 

society. 

Geopolitics is "the relation of international political p

to the geographical setting. "5 While geography itself doe

determine specific political behavior, it nonetheless de

territory, resources, and neighbors, and thereby condit

shapes, and influences a country's security policy cho

Historically, any ruler of Anatolia has to be a Janus, lo

both East and West, and thereby drawn into the affa

significantly different areas of political and cultural influe

It is this feature that makes Turkey sui generis and ther

such a difficult country to classify. Hence, while Mu

Kemal (hereafter called Ataturk) G espoused a nation

secular, Western-oriented destiny, Turkey's position an

nature of its society could never make this an unconte

decision. 

However, these choices were accepted as "nat

policy" in Turkey until well into the Cold War and were 

challenged or criticized. Ataturk had entrusted this "nat

mission" to elites in the military and civil se

establishment, and security policy was seen as a 

monopoly over which politics and public opinion had 

influence. Much of this acceptance was based on succe

over 70 years of existence as a state, Turkey survive

3 
benefits were clear. 

This success was based on a firm set of security prioritie

a hardheaded assessment of the realistic limits and potent

of Turkish power, and the ability of the state to pursue th

policy single mindedly. The Turkish state inherited from t

Ottomans an ability to distinguish between "permanen

policy, taken as the foundation of all its actions and activitie

and "temporary" policy, followed for a period in accordan

with the circumstances. 7 The consistent policy aspects we

not always discerned by those watching events in Turkey, a

attention was more often captured by the milita

interventions, the often fractured state of Turkish politics, or 

Turco-Greek confrontation, particularly over Cyprus. Therefo

the full significance of Ozal's statement in March t991 w

missed. 

From the 1950s to the 1990s, Turkey underwent ma

socioeconomic change. This domestic dynamism led 

debate over the Western orientation of security policy, b

control of security policy by the elite ensured that it remain

consistent with Ataturk's aspirations. However, the end of t

Cold War, the removal of a direct Russian threat, ambivalen

over the Gulf War, and the opening of new horizo

exacerbated divisions. As the implications of the New Wor

Order became clearer, so time and again Turkish opini

perceived Western foreign policy priorities running counter 

its interests. Where these interests and priorities coincide

Turkey often found its ambitions thwarted by its geographic

position or economic potential. What it felt to be a geostrateg

position of continuing or growing importance, others now s

as one of potential liability. In an era of reduced threat, crit

of Turkey had the luxury to question its political culture, t

4 

............................................... ........................
acceded to the European Union (EU) Customs Union; in 

same month the Islamist Refah (Welfare or Prosperity) 

achieved its most significant electoral successes. In July 

the attempt to balance competing images of Turkey's pla

the world was seen in the Refah-True Path Party (

coalition government, which brought together the vet

Islamist leader Necmitten Erbakan, with the Western

military-supported secularist, Tansu Ciller. 

It is the aim of this paper to assess Turkey's post-Cold 

security policy to the present day, based on an examinatio

the foundations and exercise of both Turkey's defense 

foreign policies. From this, the paper will assess how 

Turkey's security policy has changed since the end of the 

War, and the implications for its relationship with the W

Notes 

1. Philip Robins, Turkish Policy in the Gulf Crisis--Adven

or Dynamic?, in Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects, ed. Cle

H. Dodd (Wistow, Eothen Press, 1992), 70. 

2. In this paper the term "West" is used to refer to both 

geographic concept of the West, the countries of North Americ

those European countries in NATO and the EU, and to that gro

countries bound by a broadly recognizable set of historical, cu

and religious ties. 

3. The enthusiasm of this time, regarding the future reg

role of Turkey, is illustrated in Paul B. Henze, Turkey: Towar

Twenty-First Century, in Turkey's New Geopolitics (Bo

Westview Press, 1993), 1-35. Another study is Turkey's Stra

Position at the Crossroads of World Affairs (Carlisle, PA: Str

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1993). Like a number o

studies it provides a good overview of Turkey's options in dif

regions, but under-estimates the constraints on Turkey's a

imposed by geography, economics, and internal structures. 

5 
Ataturk, Father of the Turks, and henceforth signed himself Kem

Ataturk. Lord Kinross, Ataturk: The Rebirth of a Nation (Lond

Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1993), 473-474. 

7. Memorandum by Ahmed Atif, the Reis Effendi, to the div

1798, quoted in Ferenc Vali, Bridg, e Across the Bosporos (Baltim

and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 42. 

6 

...............................
Historical Influences on 

Modern Turkey 

The Origins and Legacy of Ottoman Greatn

The death of Suleyman the Magnificent in 1566 saw 

Ottoman Empire at the apogee of its vigor and territ

stretching from the Danube to Yemen, from Albania to 

Northern shores of the Black Sea, and from Algeria to Bagh

By the middle of the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire was 

dominant Islamic state and the major Europ

Mediterranean, Middle Eastern, and Persian Gulf power. 

In 1055, the Seljuk Turks--Turkoman nomads and mili

adventurers from Central Asia--forced the Abbasid Calip

Baghdad to recognize them as the protectors of orthodox S

Islam and their leader as Sultan. Expansionists, they advan

into Eastern Anatolia and in 1071 won a decisive victory 

the Byzantines at Manzikert, establishing an Islamic prese

in Anatolia that has lasted over 1,000 years. The Se

brought with them the Turkoman tribe from which sprang 

Ottoman dynasty and empire. From 1299, Osman, 

Ottoman founder, began a policy of territorial expansion a

expense of the Byzantines, and over the next two centu

Osman's successors consolidated their state, wearing down 

residual Byzantine power. In three campaigns the Ottom

state transformed itself into an empire. In 1453, Su

Mehmet II, "the Conqueror," took Constantinople (here

called Istanbul), thereby giving the Ottomans a strategic 

from which to dominate the Black Sea and the Ea
py 

the Mamluks and, with the capture of Cairo in 1517, acquire

most of the classical heartland of Arab Islam. This succes

established the Ottomans as supreme within the community 

Islam (the Ummah). Selim arrogated to himself the title 

Caliph and assumed responsibility for protection of the Ho

Cities of Mecca and Medina. In turn, his son, Suleyman th

Magnificent, added to this empire Hungary, Transylvania

Tripoli, Algiers, Iraq, Rhodes, Eastern Anatolia, part of Georgia

the most important Aegean Islands, and Belgrade, from whic

base he besieged Vienna. In addition he turned the Empi

into a formidable naval power. 

This pre-eminent position lasted for over 200 years, unt

Ottoman power began to decline in the middle of the 18t

century as the internal structures of the empire prove

impervious to necessary reform, and the growing milita

strength of the European powers led to permanent territoria

losses. The empire finally collapsed in 191 8 but the memo

of imperial greatness remained a significant element in th

psychology and actions of the Republic of Turkey and of th

former territories of the Empire. Despite antagonism betwee

modern Turkey and former subjects, the climax of Ottoma

power would be recognized by Muslims as the last time Isla

dealt with the West on equal terms. 

The Ottomans and the West 

There was contact between the Ottomans and the West fro

the start, and the Islamic basis of Ottoman power defined th

relationship with Western Europe as one of antagonism an

conflict. However, defeat in the Russian Wars of 1 768-1774

leading to the first permanent loss of Muslim-held territory

8 
pg y gy

represented compromise of historical proportions, becau

close identification between the "West" and Christianity 

accommodation extremely difficult. The strains set up be

those who advocated the adoption of European technique

those who viewed any dismantling of the Islamic or

heresy should not be underestimated. However, the Sulta

also Caliph and therefore, unlike in Iran, the re

establishment (the ulema) had less influence and contro

temporal issues. 

At the same time, the French Revolution introduce

major influences with lasting impact on the developm

modern Turkey: secularism, the conscious separation o

and religion; and nationalism, the concept of the identifi

of the state with a recognizably homogenous ethnic 

Secularism had little impact until Ataturk, but natio

acted almost immediately on the non-Muslim ethnic gro

Ottoman society. It was first seized on by the Greeks and 

Christian minorities, but even Muslim Albanians soon 

their own state, and ultimately the Arab subject peoples 

sense of nationalism above loyalty to the Sultan-Caliph

disillusioning process of desertion was in time matche

process of growing nationalism among the ethnic T

groups in the empire. 

Military reforms were designed to be stand-alone mea

aimed at restoring the military balance on the Ot

borders. Inevitably they brought in their wake foreign ad

new educational methods, language requirements, perm

diplomatic missions in great power capitals, loans

commercial agreements. In addition this led to 

development of a new elite, "the French Knowers," pro

the Ottoman state with their eyes and ears on the Wes

9 
y py y 

European reforms. Although such "Westerners" did not open

question the Islamic foundation of society, their policies furthe

reduced the institutional significance of the ulema. 

To add to the Ottoman problems, reform did not com

cheap. Military reorganization was financed by loans, as wer

many other reform activities. This, allied to the historica

granting of tax exemptions to European traders and tradin

communities, the "capitulations, "2 further hamstrung Ottoma

attempts to raise revenue or balance the budget. In 1876 th

Ottoman Government failed on debt repayments an

surrendered financial independence. The Europeans set up th

humiliating Public Debt Administration that gave de

repayment priority over all other Ottoman expenditures at 

time when the empire was struggling for its existence. Th

aggressive statism and attempts at autarky under Ataturk an

his successors had their origins in these bitter econom

humiliations. 

The Ottomans and the European 

Balance of Power 

It is unlikely that the Ottomans could have reversed declin

whatever reform measures they undertook. That it took un

the defeat of World War I finally to shatter the structure wa

largely because of the European balance of power politic

While the Great Powers had lost their own fear of th

Ottomans, each saw any progressive weakening as part of 

zero-sum game with tile other empires. This equation lay at th

heart of what was referred to as "the Eastern Question." Th

Ottomans also played the game. Referring to Ottoman securi

policy, Ahmed Atif wrote, "The permanent policy of the Empi

10 
policy of the Republic of Turkey. It was defensive and reac

it identified Russia as the primary threat, and it looke

alliances, regional arrangements, and balances of powe

support. It reflected a recognition that the Ottomans 

moved from "Great Power" to "Small Power" status, in o

words "a state (or empire) that recognizes it cannot o

security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and th

must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institut

processes or developments of their own. "4 Hence, although 

developing democracies of Britain and France 

antagonistic to the Ottomans, as Muslims and autocrats, 

equal antipathy to Russia and Austria-Hungary, combined 

their imperial responsibilities and ambitions, gave the

vested interest in supporting the Ottomans against unila

expansion in the region. At the Paris Peace Conferenc

1856, which ended the Crimean War, the Ottomans 

therefore admitted as participants, in a grud

acknowledgment of the "European" dimension of their po

This was the high water mark of European accommoda

with the Ottomans. The 1878 Congress of Berlin, called 

again to limit Russian expansion at Ottoman expense, did 

include them, and they received support only by agreein

further territorial concessions. This Great Power consensu

not last long. As Ottoman power in the Balkans collap

even real-politick support for the Ottomans evaporated, 

replaced by a sense of moral outrage at the atrocities 

marked this period, s A belief grew that the Ottomans were 

doomed, and that the best option was to move into the 

advantageous position to profit from it. 

11 
regeneration of the state. These were Ottomanism, 6 Turkism

and Islamism. The first would disintegrate in the face 

aggressive nationalism. A narrowly defined version of th

second would triumph with Ataturk's success in forging a ne

state out of imperial disaster. Islamism was discarded b

Ataturk, but it could not be eradicated and sustained itself 

the present day as an alternative to the state's constitutional

avowed secularism. 

The term "Turk" carried derogatory overtones for bo

Europeans and the educated Ottoman elite. However, in th

tribulations of the 19th century many people looked to th

ethnic origins of imperial greatness and drew lessons from th

militant nationalism among Ottoman subject people

Therefore the concept of Turkism began to gather appeal. A

first the concept of "Turkism" was identified more general

with Pan-Turkism, a union of all Turkish and Turkic people

not only throughout the empire but also in the Caucasu

Central Asia, and across to Western China. This brand 

Turkism reached its high-water mark in 1921-1 922, with Env

Pasha's attempts to rally the Turkic peoples of Central As

against Soviet attempts to re-establish Russian hegemony in th

region. His death effectively ended realistic hopes for Pa

Turkism for nearly 70 years. The collapse of the Soviet Unio

in 1991 revived it, providing a potent new focus for Turkis

security policy in the post Cold War era. 

Ultimately, the more effective brand of Turkism was that 

a narrower Turkish nationalism that concentrated on Anatol

as the Turkish and Ottoman heartland. It was to be adopted b

Ataturk as one of the defining pillars of what came to b

known as Kemalism, and it gained enormous strength from th

prodigious efforts of Anatolian Turks during the War 

Independence. In the face of defeat by Europe and rejection b

12 
emphasize this new loyalty, although the strains this w

raise in the Kurdish areas of Southeast Anatolia would 

that such an ideology was not strong enough to offse

demands of an ethnic solidarity based on language 

culture. 

The most effective spokesman of this ideology was Me

Ziya Gokalp. 8 He was an ardent supporter of political 

that emphasized the supremacy of the state over the indivi

and he believed passionately that the ethnic "nation" wa

natural political and social unit. In Gokalp's definition

"nation" were those people who spoke the same language

the same education, and were united in their religious, 

and aesthetic ideals. ~ Ataturk would adopt a very s

definition, but as a staunch advocate of secularism, he w

drop the element of religion. Gokalp's thinking 

encapsulated in his slogan: "We belong to the Turkish n

the Muslim religious community, and the Euro

civilization. "1° 

In this he drew a bold distinction between "civilizat

a rational system of knowledge, science, and technology

"culture," the set of values, habits and conditions curren

community. His role model was Japan, which ha

successfully embraced Western "civilization" during the 

century that in 1905 its navy annihilated the Russia

Tsushima. The acceptance of Japan by the European po

as "one of us" was evidence to Gokalp and Ataturk that 

Christian countries could enter the circle of We

civilization and that religion was not necessarily a 

condition of acceptance. In his poem Esnaf Destam he 

13 
World War One And Defeat 

In 1914 the Ottomans entered World War One on the side 

the Central Powers. Like other powers faced with seeming

intractable internal and external problems, they saw the

solution in military decision. They were defeated. 12 Howeve

three features of the struggle need mentioning for their lon

term influence on modern Turkey's relations with the outsid

world. First was the Allied process of "expansionist booking

in-advance, "13 which culminated in the 1920 Treaty of Sevre

This confirmed the Turkish impression of ingrained, vindictiv

Western hostility, fueling resistance in the War 

Independence, and leaving a smouldering resentment an

suspicion of the West, despite Ataturk's hopes. Second, despi

enormous losses, the Ottomans' German-trained army operate

much more effectively than the Allies expected. Despi

defeat, the Turkish Army and some of its leaders, notab

Ataturk, emerged from the conflict with professional pride an

reputation intact. 

Third, in operations against the Russians, the Ottoma

Government adopted a policy of securing its rear areas b

wholesale expulsion of the pro-Russian Armenians. Whethe

as a result of a deliberate policy of genocide, as claimed by th

Armenians, or local ill-discipline and poor administration 

appalling weather conditions, as claimed by the Turk

probably over a million Armenians died. Christian sympath

for these events fueled a substantial, long-lasting body of an

Turkish feeling in the West. TM 

On 31 October 1918 the Sultan signed an unconditiona

surrender. The Ottomans thought they were signing on th

14 
comprehensive postwar settlement for the Ottoman Empire 

so complex that the terms of a settlement were only fina

in the 1920 Treaty of Sevres. Stripped of its empire, it 

intended that an Ottoman state and government remain 

that it would be severely circumscribed. The Straits wer

under the jurisdiction of an international commission, 1~ G

was given Thrace, in addition to sharing Anatolia with 

and France. In addition, the Treaty recognized an indepen

Armenian state and a semi-autonomous Kurdish state in Ea

Anatolia. 

The War of Independence and the 

National Pact 

Before the ink was dry on the paper, the terms of the settle

had been overtaken by events. Occupation had a prof

effect on the Turkish population of Anatolia, many of w

had already suffered dispossession from former areas o

Ottoman Empire. In disgust at the Istanbul Governm

craven submission to Allied will, societies for "the defen

rights" sprang up to contest the occupation and divisio

Turkish soil, particularly by the hated Greeks. Tile move

had its focus, inspiration and leadership in the perso

Ataturk. Churchill's judgment on Ataturk should be quot

full to give some measure of the moment and the man: 

Loaded with follies, stained with crimes, rotted wit

misgovernment, shattered by battle, worn down by lon

disastrous wars, his empire falling to pieces around him, th

Turk was still alive. In his breast was beating the heart of 

race that had challenged the world, and for centuries ha

contended victoriously against all comers. In his hands wa

once again the equipment of a modern army, and at his hea

a Captain, who with all that is learned of him, ranks amon

15 
men ... who would not see it settled so; and at their bivouac 

fires at this moment sat, in the rags of a refugee, the August 

Spirit of Fair Play. TM 

Ataturk not only led military operations against the occupier

but also sought to harness the new, but ardent, nationalism t

an organization that could replace Istanbul as the legitimat

representative of that new, politically distinct body, "th

Turkish People." In April 1920, 4 months before Sevres wa

even signed, Ataturk was elected President of the new Gran

National Assembly (GNA) in Ankara. In January 1921 the GNA 

adopted a constitution that contained the National Pact. 17 Th

Pact acknowledged the loss of the Balkans and renounce

outright any territorial claims to former Arab provinces, bu

affirmed the right of full Turkish sovereignty over thos

remaining portions of the Empire inhabited by Turkis

majorities. It has remained the basis of Turkish foreign polic

ever si nce. 

In 1921 the Turks and the new Soviet Russian Governmen

crushed the nascent Armenian state. Ataturk now smashed th

Greeks at the battle of Sakarya and by September 1922 ha

ejected the Greeks from Anatolia. Ataturk was prepared to g

to war with Britain to enforce the demands of the National Pa

but Britain's heart did not lie in further conflict. The partie

agreed to renegotiate the Treaty of Sevres, and this wa

achieved with the Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923). With th

exception of Mosul in Northern Iraq, the Province of Hata

(containing Antioch and the port of Iskendrum), and th

placing of the Bosphorus and Dardenelles Straits unde

international supervision, Turkish sovereignty was recognize

over all areas claimed in the National Pact. 

16 
gyy g

independent, nation-state of the Republic of Turkey. 18 Tu

therefore began its existence stripped of an empire, 

conscious of imperial greatness and now defined by a st

national identity based on the military reversal of Great P

impositions and the rallying cry of "Turk." The Otto

tradition of the closest identification of the military with 

state continued, giving the armed forces a pre-eminent ro

society. In time, not only would they remain defenders o

Republic, they would also arrogate to themselves 

guardianship of Kemalism, Ataturk's legacy to Turkey. 

Turkey's relationship with the outside world was t

characterized by a prickly, aggressive defensiveness. Howe

despite the revisionist nature of his struggle against 

European powers, Ataturk was determined to align Turkey 

the West. The relationship would remain ambiguous for a 

time. Ataturk saw the future of national development in 

adoption of Western practices, yet the Turkish people w

aware of strong European and Christian antipathy. The div

between the reformist, Western-oriented, secular elite, and 

Islamic, conservative rural majority remained. Relations 

Turkey's Balkan and Armenian neighbors ranged from di

to loathing, although the entry of transiently friendly S

Russia into the equation did much to balance this. 

"mandate" status of the new Arab states did not allow the

deal with Turkey as equals until after World War Two, 

although they shared an Ottoman and an Islamic heritage

former master-vassal relationship and ethnic differe

continued to color their relationship. Most significantly, t

who had contributed least to the foundation of the 

Republic, the Istanbul establishment, were the 

enthusiastic supporters of Ataturk's aspirations, while t

who had done most, the Anatolian peasantry, accepted t

17 
struggle for independence gave him a primacy in the new 

Republic that was broadly unchallenged. Secure within th

boundaries of the new state, he set about one of the mos

dramatic transformations of civil society yet seen. 

Notes 

1. A most comprehensive study of the origins and history of th

Ottomans is in Stanford I. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of th

Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 2 vols. (Gateshead: Cambridg

University Press, 1977; reprinted 1994). 

2. An idea of the extensive nature of the privileges can be see

in Shaw, History of Ottoman Empire, vol.1, 97-98 and 163-164. 

3. Quoted in quoted in Ferenc Vail, Bridge Across the Bosporo

(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 42

4. Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New Yor

and London: Columbia University Press, 1968), 29. 

5. These were what Gladstone referred to as the "Bulgaria

Horrors" when he called oil Britain to eject "the unspeakable Turk

•. one and all, bag and baggage" from Europe. Speech in Parliamen

7 May 1877. 

6. Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (London an

New York: Routledge, 1993), 34, and Erik I. Zurcher, Turkey, 

Modem History (London and New York: I.B. Taurus, 1993), 133. Als

Shaw, History of Ottoman Fmpire, 127-128 and 288-289. 

7. Shaw, History of Ottoman Empire, 260-263, and William 

Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder: Westvie

Press, 1994), 130-131. 

8. Ziya Gokalp's (1876-1924) background, career and writing

are covered in Shaw, History of Ottoman Empire. His importance la

in giving Turkish nationalism an intellectual framework. Th

contemporary relevance of his thought comes through clearly in h

own book Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilisation (London

Allen and Unwin, 1959). 

18 
History of the Ottoman Empire, vol. 2, 310328, gives a g

summary of the Ottoman struggle. Lord Kinross, Ataturk: The Re

of a Nation (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1993), 473-

covers Ataturk's achievements during the World War. 

13. Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1

1971 (London: 1981), P6. 

14. The conflicting arguments in this highly emotive issue ar

out well in Gwynne Dyer, Turkish "Falsifiers" and Arme

"Deceivers": Historiography and the Armenian Massacres, Mi

Eastern Studies 12, 1976. Despite attempts by the newly indepen

Republic of Armenia to reach a modus vivendi with its Tu

neighbor, the Armenian Diaspora, who are very influentia

America, keep the historical enmity alive. Every year they attem

get 24 April designated as Genocide Day. This is an intense irrita

for the Turks, who refuse to accept responsibility for events that 

place under the Ottomans. Shaw, who has publicly disputed 

Armenian figures, was on the "hit list" of ASALA, the Arme

terrorist group. 

15. In 1915 the Straits had been offered to Russia to encou

it to remain in the War. Fortunately, in 1917 Lenin sanctimonio

renounced all agreements with the Allies. The most comprehen

survey of the place of the Straits in international politics is prob

Ferenc A. Vali, The Turkish Straits and NATO (Stanford: Ho

Institution Studies, 1972). 

16. Quoted in Kinross, Ataturk, 1 84. 

17. The National Pact was issued on 17 February 1920 by th

Ottoman Parliament. It represented the nationalists' belief that i

"the maximum of sacrifice.., to achieve a just and lasting pe

Shaw, History of Ottoman Empire, 347-348. 

18. On 1 November 1922 the Grand National Assembly (G

separated the Sultanate and the Caliphate, abolishing the former

3 March 1924 the GNA abolished the Caliphate. This marke

formal end of the Ottoman Empire, almost 640 years from Osm

foundation of the dynasty. 

19 
The State Foundations of 

Turkish Security Policy 

Geopolitical Foundations 

Despite the changed world of 1923, the Republic of Tur

could not dissociate itself from its Ottoman heritage. N

Turkey inherited the geographical essentials of the Empire, 

most important feature being control of the Straits. This v

sea passage remained the only access for the Soviet Union 

warm waters in winter, and despite the provisions 

international supervision, Ataturk's war had ensured 

Turkey continued to command both sides of the channel. T

alone guaranteed that modern Turkey could not be dismis

as a Middle Eastern country. 

The small area oF the Straits and European Thrace was b

strategically and psychologically important, but also v

vulnerable to attack. However, the Anatolian part of Tur

was highly defensible. On three sides there were seas 

Black, Aegean, and Mediterranean), and in the east protec

was offered by the mountains of the Kurdish region and 

Armenian highlands. The border with the Soviet Union n

ran along the foot of high mountains inside Turkey. Only 

border with Syria was less defensible, but this lay away f

Turkey's political capital, transferred, for strategic and cultu

reasons, from Istanbul to Ankara.' 

Secure in its Anatolian heartland, it would often be 

water-related issues that would be the focus of Turk

security concerns. These included continuing competition 

21 
Ethnic Foundations 

The disruption of the war had been massive. Most non-Musli

were gone, with the Greek population reduced from 

million to 120,000, and the Armenian from 1.3 million 

100,000. Two and one-half million Turks had died, leaving 

population of about 13.3 million in Thrace and Anatolia. 2 T

majority of this population had Islam in common, but ethn

religious and linguistic homogeneity did not exist. T

population was of mixed descent, a fact recognized by Atatu

in seeking to bind them together with his concept of "Turk" 

a citizen. Despite the emphasis on Turkish nationalism, only 

small proportion of the population was actually related to t

original Seljuks, most being "Anatolians" descended from t

peoples who had inhabited Asia Minor from prehistoric time

and others assimilated over the centuries under the Ottoman

In addition there were the immigration influxes from t

Balkans, Caucasus, and Middle East. Ethnic minorities 

longer had such political significance, but there were t

important sources of potential upheaval, the Kurds 3 and 

Alewites (or Alevis). 4 

Ideological Foundations 

Under the Eastern Roman Empire and the Byzantines, t

scope of "Europe" was not seen as ending on the Northe

shore of the Bosphorus. Toynbee wrote, "The historian cann

lay a finger on any period .... in which there was any significa

cultural diversity between the "Asiatic" and "Europea

occupants of the all but contiguous banks of a Bosphorus a

a Hellespont. "s It was Islam that destroyed this geographic

definition, introducing a religio-ideological division t

22 
nature of Turkish society, modern Turkey, too, would be 

position to "flow into European civilization." 

The experience of state-building has an important bea

on the political culture of a country. In defining states, R

Berki drew a useful distinction between transcendentalism

"statist orientation," and instrumentalism, or "socie

orientation. "7 In transcendentalism, the community has prio

over the members; its "interest" is greater than the aggregate 

the interests of the members; the association is based 

uniformity; the law is seen as the expression of the collect

will of the membership; politics is understood primarily 

terms of leadership and education. Transcendental

connotes the high ideals of duty, service and sublimation 

energy to a higher cause. 

In instrumentalism, association does not necessarily h

a moral dimension, only common interests; law is concei

of in terms of rational agreement among members; politic

seen in terms of the reconciliation of interests. Instrumental

connotes freedom, diversity, and plurality. 

Berki therefore categorizes most Western states 

"moderate instrumental" polities, while Turkey has been for 

most part a "moderate transcendental" polity. This distinct

helps explain why Turkey views itself tile way it does, and h

it formulates and exercises its security policy. It also help

explain why Turkey has difficulties satisfying the requireme

of democratic government, as the West defines the term. 

Ataturk founded the Republic on the basis of a sin

overriding national mission: the elevation of the Tur

people to the level of contemporary civilization, identified 

that of the West. The goals were national security based 

territorial integrity and full sovereignty, and the modernizat

of society. This orientation to the West was a consci
West represented success and that only by achieving tho

standards would Turkey be accepted as an equal. Initially, t

Western orientation remained philosophical and technica

designed to gain acceptance and to modernize, but after Wor

War Two the relationship took on strong military and secur

dimensions. 

The challenge was to balance the demands of the religiou

ethnic, and cultural aspects of society, with the ideologic

commitment to Western "civilization," while at the same tim

defending against external threats. This meant that the intern

organization, and the external foreign policy of Turkey, wou

be bound together inextricably from the outset. Under t

Ottomans the maxim had been "no power without an arm

and no army without power." Under Ataturk, domestic polic

in the broadest sense, would aim at securing and achieving t

national mission, while security policy would ensure t

external and internal conditions under which domestic poli

could succeed. 

In a transcendental polity, it falls to the leader to ident

the path of progress and determine the policies to achieve th

Therefore, "Ataturk took up a non-existent, hypothetical enti

the Turkish nation, and breathed life into it .... Whenever 

rationale was invoked for his moves, the reason given was th

of the "requirements of contemporary civilization. "8 Refor

were imposed from above, and modern Turkey develop

under the tutelage of Ataturk and a small, determined eli

Ideological guidance came from the implementation of t

principles embodied in the "Six Arrows" of Kemalism, adopte

by the Republican Peoples Party (CHP) 9 in 1931 and endors

within the Constitution in 1937.1° These principles we

nationalism, secularism, republicanism, populism, statism, a

24 
separation of state and religion, denying a leading ro

Islam, thereby seeking to make religion the disestablish

private affair it was in much of the West. Republicanism 

directed against the re-establishment of the Sultan and Ca

attracting the applause of some European republica

although dismaying many Muslims both within and out

Turkey. Populism contained elements of Ottoman

embracing the equality of all citizens, and suggestive 

democratic form of government. Statism meant concentra

of the economy in government hands--a reaction agains

foreign economic domination in the Ottoman era, but 

implying development, and economic and technolog

assimilation with the West. Reformism implied the dyna

transformation of the Turkish state and society, in line 

Ataturk's ideological commitment to the West. 

State, Society, and the Formulation 

of Foreign Policy 

The Ottoman Empire had been a militant entity 

institutionalized a strong state tradition that encourage

"recognition of the state's absolute right to legislate on pu

matters. "1~ Unlike Western European states where functio

horizontal divisions developed in society, with economic 

social classes developing common identities and m

Ottoman society was more apt to cleave vertically. When 

center was weak the periphery would not act as organ

classes seeking to share state power, but as individuals str

to increase personal power and wealth. What had develo

was a division of society between the elite (the leadership 

the wealthy), intermediaries (the civil and mil

bureaucracies), and the masses (largely peasants). This poli

25 
y p

the highest level. Vociferous expressions of public opinio

often served to disguise the lack of influence ov

decisionmaking, particularly in the arena of defense a

foreign policy. ~2 The emphasis on statism for econom

development, and a cultural suspicion and distrust 

businessmen and entrepreneurs, continually hampered t

growth of a politically significant economic middle class, a

hence development of the economy itself. In this environme

the position and role of the bureaucratic elites of the ci

service and the army were enormously important. ~3 This el

was not homogenous. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MF

continued to bear a strong intellectual and social resemblanc

to their Ottoman forebears, the military were more oft

intelligent lower middle class or peasants, whose educati

and status came from being in the military. Their attachment 

the national mission was absolute: the civil service fro

conviction, the military because Ataturk had charged the

with it. 

The Civil Service 

Under the Ottomans the civil service bureaucracy, initia

dependent totally on the Sultan, developed an independen

as the Sultans became weaker. This had become particula

marked during the Tanzimat reform era, when the bureaucra

elite began to see themselves as servants of an autonomo

"state" and not the Sultan, and sought to initiate a

implement reform and foreign policy, by the light of their ow

priorities. This reformist tendency among this small educate

elite was reinforced by adoption of the so-called "cast-iro

theory of Islam, which Ataturk also subscribed to, where

26 
yg

early years where "Experience in statecraft, respect for 

state, the importance of the state in Turkish culture, have 

been specific, steadying factors in the history of the Turk

Republic, endowing it with a degree of political gravit

absent from most new countries. "is This psychology w

particularly strong in the professional diplomatic corps of 

MFA, who had embraced Ataturk's foreign policy assumptio

wholeheartedly and subscribed fully to the national missi

Ataturk's political priorities did not challenge the position 

the civil service, and the dramatic social revolution disguis

the slow growth of civil society, lurkish society remai

authoritarian, traditional and elitist, with political po

concentrated at the top. 

The Army 

The war had been a national struggle, and the army had gain

heroic status as defender of the nation. Ataturk, by his p

eminence, crucially secured the loyalty of the army to him

and the Republic. The constitution of 1924 made the Chie

the Turkish General Staff (TGS) directly responsible to 

president and vested supreme command of the armed forces 

the GNA, "as represented by the person of the President of 

Republic. ''1~ However, with victory secure the army was lef

an ambiguous position. On the one hand Ataturk wanted 

keep the military out of the political system, while on the ot

he continued to look to the army as the ultimate guardian 

his achievements. In 1923 the Assembly passed a law 

military men must resign from the army before standing 

election. Later the Military Penal Code made it an offense 

27 
pgy 

ideals .... The Turkish nation considers its army to be 

guardian of its ideals. ''~7 A vital function of the army was to 

one of the regime's most important agents for the spread of 

ideas of modernization and secular nationalism, especia

among conscripts. This indoctrination in a radical reform

consciousness was reinforced by the system of milita

education, a system many of Turkey's elite went through. 

1935 the Army Internal Service Law formally spelled out t

the "duty of the armed forces is to protect and defend 

Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic, as determined 

the Constitution." This was interpreted as an imposition 

law to defend Turkey against internal as well as exter

threats, further institutionalizing the belief that 

achievement of the national mission was dependent on 

inseparability of domestic and foreign policy. The military th

had at its core the same transcendental aspect as the sta

developing an identity and mission inspired by 

achievements of Ataturk and dedicated to their maintenance

The Army was fortunate not to face major exter

challenges to Turkey in the early years. Until well into 

Second World War the Army was an under-resource

outdated, and questionably effective organization, suited o

to internal security. Its equipment was 80 percent German fro

the previous war, the rest being donated by the Russians 

taken from the Greeks. Partly re-equipped by the Allies towa

the end of World War Two, the real drive for modernizati

did not begin until 1947, under the Truman Doctrine. Gene

Pendleton, who led the U.S. Military Aid Mission in Anka

over this period, said, "From the late 1940s to the mid-195

we built up the Turkish Army from scratch. "~9 The to

dependence of Turkey on U.S. arms continued until the 197

28 
nature of the armed forces it had developed. Under the mili

government of 1980-1983, the TGS initiated the RE

(Reorganization-Modernization) project. 

The Role of the Army in Security Policy 

While Turkey remained a single-party state there 

coincidence of interest among the army, the state, and 

government. In 1946 President Inonu consulted the mili

over the decision to allow the establishment of opposi

parties, assuring them that a multiparty system would pose 

threat to Ataturk's reforms and that the military would cont

to be the custodian of the state. In the postwar period 

military fully supported the foreign policy objectives 

President Bayar, who was deeply hostile to the Soviet Un

viewed neutralism as immoral, and followed Inonu's lea

aligning Turkey firmly with the West militarily 

economically. They also supported the development 

particularly strong links with the United States. In strat

matters, as in defense procurement, most decisions were le

U.S. and NATO planners. The Democratic Party 

government of 1950-1960, which broke the monopoly of 

Ataturkist CHP, was also broadly supportive of these for

policy objectives. However, in domestic issues Prime Min

Menderes polarized politics, trying to use popular suppo

an increasingly radical manner to outflank the state trad

represented by the bureaucratic elite. In 1960 the military 

impelled to intervene on the basis of a "sense of nati

mission." Turan explained the pattern of military interven

in this instance and those of 1971 and 1980: 

In each of the instances in which the Turkish Armed Force

have assumed political power, their intervention has been 

29 
warning signals to go unheeded. Then the military assumes 

political power directly and indirectly, a~ 

The direct result of the 1960 intervention was a n

constitution that formalized the military role in the formulati

of security policy. Although the 1961 Constitution gave 

GNA responsibility for foreign affairs, in reality power came 

rest in the National Security Council (NSC), which was set 

specifically to ensure agreement between the politicians a

the military on security issues, before they entered the pub

domain. It was headed by the President and contained 

Chief of TGS and all the Service Chiefs. It was charged w

preparing national security plans and programs, coordinati

national security activities, and "offering information" to t

Council of Ministers. There are no recorded instances of N

decisions ever being overturned. In the "Coup 

Memorandum" of 1971, the NSC role was further strengthen

and empowered to "advise" the Council. The memorandu

itself held the GNA and the government responsible 

dragging the country into anarchy and unrest and claimed t

the public had lost hope of reaching tile level of contempora

civilization set as a goal for Turks by Ataturk. 2~ 

Throughout this period the army remained unpoliticiz

and autonomous, while increasingly seeing its mission as 

guardian of the national interest. I his ambiguous role me

that since 1961 "politics has always been under the scrutiny 

the military; it (Turkey) has not been a completely autonomo

liberal democracy. "= The Chief of TGS was appointed direc

by the president and reported to the prime minister, not 

minister of defense. In the NSC, certain key decisions requir

not just consultation with the military but their conse

Questions of peace and war, such as intervention in Cypr

30 
In 1974, for the first time, TGS drew up a Natio

Military Strategic Concept." They carried out the th

assessment entirely on their own, based on intelligence f

their own sources. The civilian ministries of the MFA and 

minister of defense (MOD) had almost no say in 

assessment, on the National Strategic Goals falling out from 

or the Force Goals that TGS then set. In addition, the mili

resisted supervision of their budget. TGS, with t

responsibility for national and internal security, drew up t

requirements and submitted them to the MOD. He prese

them to the Defense Commission of the GNA, and the G

was expected to vote them through. The 1982 Constitu

strengthened this position. 

Foreign Policy and Public Opinion 

Despite the continuing strength of the state tradition, 

period 1961 to 1980 was one of great social and econo

change in Turkey. The 1961 Constitution had been designe

put the military and bureaucratic elite back in a positio

primacy with regard to politics, but equally it contained 

liberal provisions regarding the press and media. Until 1

foreign policy had been accepted as a "national poli

determined by the president and the "elite." In spite of s

vocal minorities, the unanimous support of the "nation

security matters was assumed. A Turkish proverb captures 

minimal effect of public opinion on policy: "The dog barks 

the caravan moves on." From this period the presidents w

less powerful or charismatic. There was increa

liberalization of the domestic political system, w

coincided with a relaxation in international tension, while 

real and emotional issues regarding Cyprus at last bro

31 
support for orientation to the West, but the move of forei

policy issues into the domestic, public arena marked a ne

departure. 

The 1980 Intervention and 

the 1982 Constitution 

Ataturk had intended Kemalism to be a framework with

which Turkey would identify the way towards the nation

mission, led and guided by the elite. After his deat

"guardianship" of Kemalism became the touchstone of powe

and therefore Kemalism moved from being a technique to 

ideology. The key issue had now become preservation 

Ataturk's reforms and not consolidation of democracy 

Turkey. The decreasing usefulness of certain aspects 

Kemalism meant that "part of the current malaise in Turki

political culture is due to the fact that the Kemalist paradig

is exhausted.., and that no successor has been accepted. 

Writing after the 1980 military intervention Tachau was mo

specific: 

the legitimating formula (of Kemalism) . . . came under 

considerable strain. Of the main tenets . . . two remained 

unchallenged (republicanism and nationalism) . . . two 

became controversial (secularism and populism) and two 

became the subject of heated debate and fundamental 

disagreement (reformism and statism). 24 

Narrow nationalism was soon to be challenged as we

Throughout the 1970s Turkish politics polarized again, th

time over the issues of Cyprus and the European Communit

education and economic policies, and martial law a

corruption. By 1 980 there were economic breakdown, ci

32 
The aim of the operation is to safeguard the integrity of the 

country.., to re-establish the existence and authority of the 

state, and to eliminate the factors that hinder the smooth 

working of the democratic order. 25 

Shortly after, General Evren publicly reiterated the milita

perception of itself as the most patriotic institution in soc

I have stated that the Turkish Armed Forces would neve

allow the Turkish Republic,.. to be taken over by traitors.. 

• . The sole raison d'etre of the Turkish Armed Forces is to 

defend the country as an indivisible whole against its interna

as well as its external enemies, and to see that this country 

will always be secure. 2° 

Under the 1982 Constitution, the Council of Ministers was 

obliged to consider "with priority, the decisions of the N

concerning necessary measures for the protection 

independence of the State, the unity and indivisibility of 

country, and the peace and security of society. ''27 Of eq

interest was the military's attempt to undercut the Islamist

extending the state's competence in religious affairs, whil

the same time banning any declared Islamic parties. Tu

Ozal, the architect of economic reform under the mili

regime, swept up much of the Islamic vote under the banne

his broadly based Motherland Party (ANAP). 

A New Era 

The 1982 Constitution was backed by an overwhelm

majority in a referendum, as was General Evren's electio

33 
internal security challenges, and momentous historical chang

in global geopolitics. Assessments of how Turkey would act 

a new environment were often flawed by a lack 

understanding of the internal dynamics of Turkey, as discuss

above, and sometimes by a dismissal of its previous consiste

position on many international issues, the subject of the ne

chapter. 

Notes 

1. Ferenc Vail, Bridge Across the Bosporos, ch. 2 (Baltimore a

London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 43-48, gives a use

geographical tour of Turkey. 

2. Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey, A Modern History (London and N

York: I.B. Taurus, 1993), 170-172. 

3. Kurdish people are divided between Turkey, Iran, Iraq a

Syria, which creates complicated security problems for Turkey. Th

are a majority in much of Southeast Turkey, and assimilated in la

numbers throughout the Republic. Total numbers are unknown, 

are thought to comprise 10 to 15 percent of the Turkish populatio

Those in the tribal areas have never been comfortable under 

Kemalist centralized state administration, and there were revolts 

1925, 1930, and 1937. 

4. The Alewites are Shia Muslims, comprising about a quar

of both Turks and Kurds. They have always been leading support

of the Kemalist secular state, and they are antagonistic to orthod

Sunni Islam, as represented by Islamist parties. 

5. Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History, abridgement of vo

XVll-XX (New York: 1956), 239. 

6. Jacob Burckhardt, On History and Historians (New Yo

1958), 213. 

7. R.N. Berki, State and Society: An Antithesis of Mode

Political Thought, in State and Society in Contemporary Europe, e

lack Hayward and R.N. Berki (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979), 2

34 
10. A great deal has been written on Kernalisnl or Ataturk

full description of the "Six Arrows," their interpretation

implications is in Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, llistory 

Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey . 2 vols. (Gateshead, Cam

University Press, 1977; reprinted 1994), 375-395. 

11. Halil Inalcik, "Turkey between Europe and the Middle 

Foreiffn Policy 7 (1980), 7. 

12. Metin Tamkoc, The Warrior Diplomats (Salt Lake 

University of Utah Press, 1976), 103-111. Tamkoc's book 

extensively with the characters of the first six presidents of T

demonstrating how they reserved to themselves foreign 

decisions, and how the political culture of Turkey reinforce

tendency. 

13. Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (Hul: 

Press, 1985), 64. This book gives an extremely interestin

credible insight into the enduring nature of the division betwee

and politics in Turkey, and the unique position of the Turkish m

in the democratic process. 

14. Heper, State Tradition, 45. 

15. Andrew Mango, "The State of Turkey," Middle 

Studies, 13 (1977), 265. 

16. In this he was given crucial help by Fevzi Cakmak, wh

the post of Chief of TGS for nearly 23 years. William Hale, 

Politics and the ,Military (London and New York: Routledge, 

70. 

1 7. See Heper, State Tradition, 53, and Hale, Military, 81

1 8. Mehmet Ali Birand, Shirts of Steel, An Anatomy of the 

Armed Forces (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 19

particularly good at describing the philosophy and culture 

Turkish military. It provides a keen insight into how Turkey's 

forces, particularly the 35,000 strong officer corps, view Atatu

state, the military, politics, and civilians. 

19. Quoted in Birand, Shirts of Steel, 196. 

20. Quoted in Heper, State Tradition, 83. 

21. Ibid., 96. 

35 
25. Quoted in Heper, State Tradition, 131. 

26. Ibid., 132. 

27. Ibid., 126, taken from Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution

28. The preamble to the 1982 Constitution states 

"determination to safeguard ... the Republic of Turkey, and to ensu

it attains the standards of contemporary civilization. T

determination that no protection shall be afforded to thoughts 

opinions contrary to Turkish national interests, the principle of t

existence of Turkey as an indivisible entity, .. and that as required 

the principle of secularism, there shall be nc~ interference whatsoev

of sacred religious feelings in state affairs and politics." Dodd, Cri

of Turkish Democracy, 154-155. 

36 
f 

Foreign Policy: 

Ataturk to Ozal 

Churchill said of the Soviet Union, "1 cannot foreca

you the action of Russia. It is a riddle, wrapped in a my

inside an enigma." The most perceptive part of this state

and the most often neglected, was his coda, "but perhaps 

is a key. That key is Russian national interest. "~ Ata

Turkey had an equally focused foreign policy, intimatel

to the national mission of achieving the level of contemp

civilization, and the parallel goals of security 

modernization. Like the Ottomans, he drew a distin

between the core policy and the day-to-day pursuit o

policy, He also recognized the small power status 

Republic and the need for an international aspect t

national security policy. Turkey's permanent policy was o

alignment with the West, while the temporary policy was 

up of any actions required to sustain national security. 

Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany, outside observers fo

difficult to evaluate the new Turkish Republic or interp

actions objectively. However, the key to Turkey's a

could be found, set out quite unambiguously, in the Na

Pact, and in Ataturk's public announcements. The se

imperatives of Turkey were clear, concise, and a good 

more benign than those of the majority of new postwar 

From 1923, other than a determination to revise det

the Lausanne Treaty, the policy rejected expansion 

aggression. It specifically eschewed any romantic notio

37 
gy gpy

Under the Ottomans tile key elements in maintaining t

Sultan's authority and legitimacy were martial succes

territorial acquisition, and the distribution of wealth 

supporters. By 1918 empire, war and alliances had all ende

in catastrophe. After 1923, Ataturk based the legitimacy of t

Republic on the defense of a strictly defined status quo, 

which national security was paramount. 

Foreign Policy Imperatives 

in 1927 Ataturk addressed the GNA over a period of 6 day

setting out the history, background, and achievements of t

new state, and laying down the tenets of Kemalist, an

therefore Turkish, foreign policy. 2 The pursuit of nation

security was encapsulated in simple watchwords: "Friendsh

with every nation"; "Turkey has no perpetual enemies"; a

most significantly, "Peace at home, peace in the world. "3 

addition he stated "the State should pursue an exclusive

national policy .... When I speak of national policy I mean 

in this sense: to work within our national boundaries for t

real happiness and welfare of our nation and country by, abo

all, relying on our own strength in order to retain o

existence" [emphasis added]. 4 

He was equally unambiguous about his assumptions 

"full sovereignty," stating: "We refer to full sovereignty as.

complete independence and freedom of action in politica

economic, judicial, military, and cultural fields. Lack 

sovereignty in any one of these connotes . . . a total lack 

sovereignty of nation and country. "s Strict interpretation 

these statements would be used by nationalist hardliners in t

post-Ataturk era to denounce NATO membership, foreign a

38 
py 

introspection and ethnocentricity. It fostered a minds

could view the world only from a Turkish perspective. 

Turks their break with the Ottoman legacy, and their disa

of territorial ambition, made the continuing antagon

neighbors frustrating and angering. Turks saw conspiraci

threats everywhere, both to their external security, and 

unity and integrity of the state. This attitude had justif

but ignored the fact that other countries too had leg

concerns. Turkey was, and is, a lone wolf. Until the co

of the Soviet Union released the Turkic Republics of the 

Caucasus and Central Asia, Turkey had no natu

instinctive friends or allies. The reality of Turkey's positio

its perception of the outside world neatly fitted th

aphorism, "just because you are paranoid, doesn't mea

are not after you." 

International Acceptance 

What Ataturk set out was a status quo, nationalis

neutralist foreign policy. It was to be driven by the 

secular, political imperatives as those of the foreign poli

the West. He had no ethnic pan-Turkic ambitions, no 

brotherhood romanticism, and no political internati

aspirations. However, not only was Turkey faced w

antagonism of neighboring states but there were deep a

European misgivings about the re-emergence of the "T

a power in the region. Ataturk recognized the strength o

antipathies, and also the environment within which 

attempting to consolidate the state. Turkey was 

exhausted, under-resourced, and distrusted. The 

recovery and development was peace, and peace wo

achieved by basing security policy on four pillars: the de

39 
g

were international outcasts, wracked by problems o

revolutionary transformation. In 1925 the Treaty of Friendshi

and Neutrality confirmed the agreement of 1921. In 192

Turkey reached an accommodation with Britain over the Mosu

region of Iraq and the Kirkut oilfields2 In 1 930 Ataturk and th

formidable Greek Prime Minister, Venizelos, concluded 

Turco-Greek treaty, overcoming historical hatred, th

experiences of the most recent war, and the distaste of bot

publics. Ataturk clearly identified the strategic unity of th

Aegean and the damage in institutionalizing Turkish-Gree

enmity. His authority gave him the ability to dismiss domest

misgivings and Turkish-Greek relations would remain correc

if not warm, until the 1960s. In 1932 Ataturk took Turkey int

the League of Nations, effectively ending its isolation and re

affirming the traditional Ottoman desire for internationa

acceptance within a formal, legal framework. 

Ataturk foresaw that the days of empire were numbered

From 1921 he had said "l_et us recognize our own limits" an

"Turkey does not desire an inch of foreign territory, but it wi

not give up an inch of what it holds. "7 Domestic developmen

was not fast enough to shape Turkey in the democratic imag

of the West but, in return for recognition and respect fo

Turkey's territorial integrity, Ataturk offered the West a zone o

stability in a volatile area. This has remained a consisten

theme to the present day. For Turks, the advantages to th

West o[ their responsible, conservative foreign policy in th

vitally important area was never sufficiently recognized. 

Turkey could not remain immune from globa

developments. Ataturk's priorities did not change, but th

temporary policy had to be responsive to political reality. 

1 934, in conversation with General Douglas MacArthur, h

40 
the conflict. The options were all poor. The W

democracies were weak and unprepared, a natural T

affinity to Germany was negated by the ideological po

Nazism, and a full alliance with Russia was out 

question. Turkey had nothing to gain from a wa

threatened the unconsolidated foundations of the 

Republic. In a burst of what has been describ

"pactomania," Ataturk sought to create a degree of re

stability. In 1934 he concluded a Balkan Pact, and in 1

settled relations in the East with the Saadabad Pact. Nei

these could be considered more than weak nonaggr

treaties and pious expressions of goodwill, but the

significance in giving Turkey a reputation for re

leadership, and further advertising the pacific intentions 

Republic. 

Of greater significance was the 1936 Mo

Convention, which returned full control of the Str

Turkey. Once again Ataturk submitted his claims with fu

justification. This contrasted with the Germans, 

unilaterally reoccupied the Rhinelands, and with the It

who invaded Abyssinia. Turkey's claims were accepted 

Lausanne signatories. ~ In 1939 Turkey at last achieved th

revision of the Lausanne Treaty, when France ceded to 

the Syrian province of Hatay. Ataturk did not live to se

having died in November 1938, handing uncontested 

on to his close military and political colleague, Ismet I

Turkey and the Second World War 

The record of Turkey's involvement in World War T

covered quickly, but it illustrates the consistent fundam

of Turkish security policy, even in a dramatically ch

41 
Russians, this stance was neither craven nor cynical. There is 

no doubt that both official and majority Turkish opinion was 

firm in desiring an allied victory, but Turkey had to accept the 

realities of its geographical and political position, its weak 

economy, and its antiquated armed forces. Germany at first 

attempted to play on 19th century and First World War 

sentiment. Later, after its successes in Russia and North Africa, 

it tried to tempt l-urkey into the war with pan-Turkic prospects 

in Central Asia and the Trans-Caucasus. 1~ Mindful of Ataturk's 

warning against "grandiose dreams that are not in our power 

to achieve, "1~ Inonu communicated to Hitler that "Turkey had 

enough to do in fully developing its own territory, and had not 

the slightest interest in any acquisition of territory. '']:~ 

Conversely, in the face of German fears that Turkey may 

openly side with the Allies, even allowing Russian bases, he 

said "1 told that obstinate Lord Curzon (at Lausanne) that every 

Turk would stake his life rather than again make concessions 

to a foreign power, and this view is more deeply ingrained 

than ever in my people in their political maturity. ''~4 

However, by 1943, as the German potential to invade 

Turkey was removed, Inonu was able to maneuver Turkey 

closer and closer to the Allies. It was obvious that the Allies 

would drive the new postwar agenda, and Turkey needed to be 

in a position to benefit from this. On 23 February 1945 Turkey 

declared war on Germany, thereby ensuring itself a seat in the 

new U.N. organization. 

Turkey Moves West 

By late 1944 Turkey was already concerned about two issues 

of critical importance to itself: the role of the Straits in tile 

postwar world, and the role of the Balkans and the Northern 

42 
stage of great power rivalry by renouncing the 1925 tre

They wanted a new agreement that reflected the new regi

and global situation more accurately. Turkey was not 

strong position to refuse, but at this stage the Russians gro

overplayed their hand. Russia was already signaling 

intentions in Iran, Greece, and across Eastern Europe w

they announced the price of renewed Russo-Turkish acc

the retrocession of two provinces of Eastern Tur

establishment of Soviet bases in the Straits, and revision of 

Montreux Convention. The Soviets coyly implied tha

complete reorientation of Turkish foreign policy would obv

the need for these specific demands. The West saw clearly 

the Soviet intention was not merely to gain control of a 

waterway, but also to induce a change in Turkey's inte

regime with the aim of ending its Western orientation. 

Crises in all the northern tier countries forced the Un

States to reformulate its policy in an area in which it 

previously had little interest. In July 1946, in the wak

Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri, the 

Missouri made a port visit to Istanbul. 1S An Amer

nmmorandum of October 1946 described Turkey as the m

important strategic factor in the Eastern Mediterranean and 

Middle East. It also noted that it was a broadly united coun

firm in its opposition to Russia, but that its mil

requirements were becoming a dangerous drain on 

economy. It recommended that Turkey be given economic 

military support. ~ 

In March 1947 Truman put to the Senate and House a 

for a $400 million appropriation to aid Greece and Tur

This was the first significant action in what became know

the Truman Doctrine, and it would have profound effects 

how the United States, and consequently its allies, wo
Turkey and the Cold War 

Soviet actions clearly constituted a mortal threat to Turkey

integrity and demanded a commitment to the West beyon

ideology. Without this, it is conceivable Turkey may ha

adhered to a neutralist policy, seeking friendly relations 

every direction. Full participation in the complicate

developing political, military, and economic system of Atlant

and European integration would now safeguard its nation

security. 

Despite recognition of Turkey's importance, and t

commitments of the l ruman Doctrine, the Western powe

were reluctant to extend the relationship formally. Turk

gained admission to the Council of F_urope and t

Organization for European Economic Co-operation, but t

debate over its membership of the all important North Atlant

Treaty Organization (NATO) highlighted again t

ambivalence of the West to Turkey's credentials as 

"European" country. In discussions that would reflect simil

debates at the close of the Cold War, America and 

Furopean allies were reluctant to be drawn into bindin

security guarantees with a country bordering the volat

Middle East. As the 1990 Gulf War gave Ozal a golde

opportunity to demonstrate Turkey's continuing importance, 

the 1950 Korean War gave the new DP government the chan

to demonstrate its solidarity with the West, the United Nation

and particularly with NATO's strongest member, the Unite

States. 

In 1952, Turkey, along with Greece, acceded to NATO

In 1953 it concluded a Balkan Defense Treaty with Greece a

Yugoslavia, and in 1955 the Baghdad Pact with Britain, Ira

Pakistan and Iran, although not America. In 1958, with t

defection of Iraq, this was renamed the Central Trea

44 
security, significant military assistance, internati

acceptance, entry to the coveted Western "clubs," foreign 

and economic support. Relations with the United State

particular, were intensified to an extraordinary degree. 

In many ways it was too good to last. Foreign policy 

always been national policy, and the stature of Ataturk 

Inonu ensured that official policy represented the unanim

will of the nation. Given rurkey's obsession with nat

integrity and security, a one-party state facing an obv

threat had little difficulty in formulating foreign po

However the relaxing of the Soviet threat after Stalin's d

economic mismanagement, and the increasingly volatile n

of domestic politics drew foreign policy into the dom

arena. In 1960 the military intervened to depose the Mend

government. TM Officially the foreign policy line of Tu

remained unchanged, and the military leaders issued 

fol lowing message: 

We are addressing ourselves to our All ies, friends, neighbors

and the entire world: Our aim is to remain completely loya

to the UN Charter and to the principles of human rights; th

principle of peace at home and in the world set by the grea

Ataturk is our flag. We are loyal to all our alliances an

undertakings. We believe in NATO and CENTO and we ar

faithful to them. 19 

The 1960 revolution opened a new era in domestic pol

and out of this political upheaval the changing character o

Turkish nation-state, and a dynamic international scene, c

not fail to affect Turkish foreign policy. 

45 
but vocal opponents of Turkey's foreign policy orientatio

These included the pro-lslamists with their desire for clos

relations with Muslim countries, the ultranationalis

demanding the full sovereignty set out by Ataturk, and leftis

drawn politically to communism, or economically to 

command economy. Governments had to acknowledge the

groups, particularly when they portrayed themselves as mo

Ataturkist than the government. However, as noted in the la

chapter, a change of government in itself had little impact 

the orientation of foreign policy. A civil servant liken

national security objectives and governments to a watch a

the wearer; it didn't matter whose wrist it was on, it would s

tell the same tirnefl 1 Therefore the debates looked noisy to t

outside world, but the hold of the state over issues of nation

security was hardly loosened. External events continued 

have far greater effect on foreign policy decisions than t

oscillations of domestic politics. What was important were t

changes of attitude that took place within the elite. 

There had been a wedge driven into the Turco-America

relationship during the Cuban missile crisis, but the catalyst f

a major reassessment of the relationship came in 1964 with t

growing tension in Cyprus and mounting violence by t

Greek Cypriots against the Turkish minority. For the first tim

public opinion was brought to bear on a foreign policy issu

In this situation the Turks considered military intervention. 

response, President Johnson wrote expressing "grave concer

and significantly adding "NATO Allies have not had a chan

to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turk

against the Soviet Union iF Turkey takes a step which results 

Soviet intervention." In addition he spelt out the bilater

agreement whereby Turkey agreed not to use "milita

assistance for purposes other than those for which su

46 
It heightened a Turkish sense of insecurity by calling 

question their assumption of support from an organization 

had loyally supported. It highlighted their dependency on 

Americans and exposed to them how internationally iso

they were if their security concerns did not coincide to

with those of the West. 23 When the Johnson letter itself 

public in 1966, presumably with official blessing, it playe

all the traditional fears of exclusion from the Europ

Christian club and excited violent anti-American feelings. 

this time the Turkish public began to "weigh a nat

friendship or animosity to Turkey by its stand on the Cy

issue. "24 This animosity was fueled by Turkey's int

sensitivity over sovereignty, unavoidable cultural differen

a realization of growing dependency that bore compariso

the "capitulations," and a damaged image of America du

the Vietnam War. The Turkish Government used the le

the Johnson letter to renegotiate the complete range of fo

and informal bilateral agreements, bringing them toge

under a single Co-operation Agreement Concerning 

Defense in 1969. 2S This was further rationalized unde

Defense and Economic Co-operation Agreement (DECA

1 980. 

This had all taken place during a period when cou

productive Soviet antagonism had shifted to peaceful, if w

co-existence. Turkey looked around to find that its image 

faithful, servile follower of the West had led to the West ta

it for granted and other states dismissing it as an age

Western "imperialism." In this spirit Turkey attempte

reduce further its tensions with Russia and to re-establis

Islamic credentials through the Third World, particularly i

Middle East. 

47 
Turkey, the ethnic, historical and geopolitical divisions prove

stronger than any common religious heritage. The Republic

secular nature, Western orientation, anti-Communist traditio

pro-Israeli stance, and traditional antipathy to adventuris

severely constrained any active or dynamic policy an

undermined a leadership role. Any potential leadership ro

was in its turn resisted by Russia, the Arab League, and Iran, a

with a vested interest in limiting Turkey's influence in th

region. Despite this, Turkey sought rapprochement wit

Muslim countries, joining the Organization of Islam

Conference (OIC) in 1976. In 1977 Iraq began building its o

pipeline from Kirkut to Iskenderum} 6 

The Coup by Memorandum of 1971 had had no effect o

foreign policy, but Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 wa

a definite departure from Turkey's traditionally conservativ

approach and greatly complicated external relations for itse

and for its allies. Turkey's actions in Cyprus were used b

Turkey's enemies and critics as evidence of the continuin

aggressive and expansionist nature of the "Turk." Examinatio

of Turkey's security policy and the facts of the Cyprus episod

do not bear this out. Turkey strove hard to get the internation

community to stand by its responsibilities, but failed. It ha

never made a claim to Cyprus but justified its actions on th

grounds of defense of the Turkish Cypriot minority and a cle

breach, by the Greeks, of the London Treaty, which ha

established an independent Cyprus. The cool but workab

Turco-Greek relations established in 1930 had been damage

severely by the 1964 Cyprus crisis, but they were no

shattered by the events of 1974. Despite the obviou

advantages that lay in avoiding confrontation, Cyprus was 

catalyst for opening a Pandora's Box of bilateral issues ov

which to disagree. These included borders, ethnic minoritie

48 
issues, but in the meantime, Greece, which was alread

member, used this as another stick to beat Turkey. 27 The 19

disturbance exacerbated every one of these issues and brou

Turkey under the scrutiny of Western public opinion. Desp

the acknowledged importance of its strategic position, and 

consistently conservative foreign policy, Turkey found 

actions in Cyprus provided an issue around which its enem

notably orchestrated by the Greek and Armenian Diaspo

could mobilize. In this process they garnered a broad spectr

of opinion, critical of authoritarian regimes in general 

focusing on Turkey's human rights and democratic track rec

in particular. The weight of this opinion in America led 

U.S. Congress to suspend all military aid and weapons sale

Turkey until 1 979. 

It was at this stage that the luxury of mutual recriminatio

became inappropriate and dangerous. In early 1979 the Sha

regime in Iran collapsed, and in December the Russ

invaded Afghanistan, opening the "second Cold War." In 1

Iraq invaded Iran. The northern tier looked fragile again, 

Turkey looked indispensable. However, these dram

external events coincided with the rising political polarizat

and violence within Turkey. Although America concluded 

DECA Agreement, and commentators announced that Turke

"flirtation with Russia and the nonaligned world . . .[a

multi-dimensional diplomacy.., had been abandoned, "28 

American administration doubted if Turkey could play 

regional role assigned to it, under the existing governme

Against this background the military intervened in Septem

1980. 

49 
therefore demanded an alignment with the West on a par wi

that of the 1950s. In many ways, the period of the early to mi

1980s suited Turkey's foreign policy makers well. T

certainties of the Cold War remained, placing comfortin

limitations on its own actions, and useful ones on those of 

neighbors, including Greece. Deep worries over the Russi

invasion of Afghanistan were replaced by a realization th

Russia had committed itself to a debilitating, unwinnable wa

further reducing a direct Soviet threat to Turkey. A confide

America under President Reagan redefined the Cold War 

moral, ideological terms, while daring Russia to match it in 

new high technology arms race. As part of this, the America

financial and arms commitment to Turkey had been restore

although the politics of the Southern Region required a retu

to the evenhandedness of the Truman era, and Greece an

Turkey now received aid at a 7:10 ratio. The acrimony over th

deployment of Pershing 2 and Cruise missiles was buried, an

NATO confidence returned, based on a restored belief th

d@tente with the Soviets was better pursued from a position 

strength. Turkey's position within this key institution remaine

important. The Iran-lraq War ground on, but the worryin

prospect of an outright victory for either side receded. Tw

regional competitors were weakening themselves, and Turk

had the opportunity to benefit from trade with both. On th

basis of restored domestic and external stability, the milita

opted to return to barracks, accepting the 1983 election victo

of Turgut Ozal's Motherland party. 

50 
3. Lord Kinross, Ataturk: The Rebirth of a Nation (L

Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1993), 458. 

4. Ataturk, A Speech, 242. 

5. Turkkaya Ataov, Turkish Foreign Policy 1939-1945 (A

Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Ankara, 1965

6. The Turkish claim to Mosul was debatable on ethnic gr

but itwas part of the National Pact. The British government ce

knew of the potential of the Kirkut oil fields, but Ataturk was un

to jeopardize Turkey's broader relationship with the West ov

matter. Mosul went to Iraq. 

7. Kinross, Ataturk, 458. 

8. Ibid., 463. 

9. Full accounts of the complexity of the Montreux Conv

are in Ferenc Vail, Bridge Across the Bosporos, ch. 2 (Baltimo

London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 187-190, and 

A. Vail, The Turkish Straits and NATO (Stanford: Hoover Ins

Studies, 1972), 40-57. 

10. Full accounts of Turkey's foreign policy in World Wa

are in Ataov, Turkish Foreign Policy 1939-1945, and E

Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy 19.39-194~, Small State Dipl

and Great Power Reality (Princeton: Princeton University 

1973). 

11. The Turkish foreign minister's reply to this generous G

offer was "1 must have Scotland as well." Ataov, Turkish F

Policy, 101. 

12. Ibid., 97. 

13. Ibid. 

14. Ibid., 99. 

15. In his enthusiasm the mayor of Istanbul opened the 

brothels to the U.S. sailors for free, an event that is still remem

with a little embarrassment in Turkey. 

1 6. Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in th

Fast, Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turke

Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 375. 

51 
the Foreign Minister. 

19. Vali, Brid~e, 40. 

20. Samuel Johnson, quoted in Nuri Even, "Turkey, NATO, a

Europe--a Deteriorating Relationship," Atlantic Papers 34, Decemb

1977, 54. 

21. Heper, State Tradition, 82. 

22. Quoted in Vali, Bridge, 130. 

23. In a 1965 opinion poll the question "who is our best friend

gave the United States 18 percent, Germany 24 percent, and "w

have none" 25 percent. America even achieved 8 percent as "t

greatest enemy", although Greece and Russia topped this section wi

42 percent and 34 percent respectively. America's role 

international affairs attracted 66 percent negative reactions, howev

Turkey's membership of NATO was endorsed by 78 percent. N

overmuch should be read into these figures but they illustrate t

ambivalence in Turkey's officially declared attachment tu the We

(Vali, Bridge, 107-112). 

24. Metin Toker, Milliyet ,11 October 1967, cited in Met

Tamkoc, The Warrior Diplomats (Salt Lake City: University of Ut

Press, 1976), 284. 

25. Turkey and the United States had entered into some 55 

lateral agreements of various binding natures. The sensitivity of som

of these arrangements to the government, MFA, and military was su

that many were not even put to the GNA. 

26. Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East (London: Chatha

House Papers, 1991 ), 114-117. 

27. Full details of Turco-Greek bi-lateral issues, too much 

cover in this paper, are in Suha Bolukbasi, The Turco-Greek Dispu

in, Dodd, ed, Turkish Foreign Policy, 27-54. It is a Turkish account b

objective. 

28. "Reoccidentation," The Economist, 5 April t980. 

52 
The Mold Breaks 

Between 1989 and 1992 the global geopolitical mold b

There were encouraging signs of reduced East-West te

under Gorbachev, but few saw this new d~tente as pres

the complete collapse of the Cold War structure. In Nove

1989 the Berlin Wall fell, leading to the unificatio

Germany the following year. In August 1990 Iraq inv

Kuwait, and the real end of the Cold War was marke

Russian support for U.S.-sponsored U.N. resolutions aga

former Soviet client-state. In December 1991 the Soviet U

itself was dissolved, and a new hybrid, the Commonwea

Independent States (CIS) appeared. 

A revolution in world affairs had taken place, 

sanguinary than the revolutions of 1 918 and 1945, but eq

significant. The implications for Turkish foreign policy m

were dramatic, challenging, and worrying. At a stroke

strategic center of gravity moved from Germany to Turkey

the extinction of the East-West axis of confrontation a

immediately put Turkey into the neglected category again

conventional view that judged strategic importance i

context of the Cold War was initially apt to discount Turk

the new calculations. Yet few states were more di

affected by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and almo

state had such direct and diverse interests in the 

environment, than Turkey. 

Suddenly, the whole area of Turkey's historical ethnic 

opened up, with the emergence of independent states 

Trans-Caucasus and Central Asia. The whole area of f

Ottoman domination was open, as both Middle Easter

53 
j

Kazakhstan, and Kirghizstan, and also such historically esote

groups as Uighur Chinese, the Tartars and Chechens of Russ

Abkhazians from Georgia, the Moldovan Gagauz, and Bosni

Muslims. 1 

The Challenge 

The Chinese have no single character for the word "crisis." 

consists of a diagram that conveys the twin concepts 

"danger" and "opportunity." By this definition, the increasing

benign global environment from 1985 on rapidly began 

constitute a "crisis" for the cautious, conservative Kemal

elite. Turkey faced the reality of being at the epicenter of 

volatile region, without constraints, where local animositi

and ambitions readily flared into war. To the south, Sadda

Hussein, the Iraqi leader, having at last concluded his 8-ye

conflict with Iran, was turning his eyes to the oil-rich state 

Kuwait. To the northeast, the ethnically Armenian province 

Nagorno-Karabakh was attempting to secede from rurk

Azerbaijan. To the northwest, the artificial state of Yugoslav

was beginning to splinter under the pressures of nationalis

and Serbian aggression. 

The new situation clearly demanded imaginative respons

to a range of new challenges, but the excitement of the popu

press, and the prospect of an enhanced regional role we

viewed with caution by the MFA and military, who sought 

adhere to a traditional policy. Intervention in Cyprus had l

to a costly, long-term commitment that had caused consta

friction in both domestic and foreign affairs, and the state el

were very wary of unilateral action, or anything that smack

of adventurism. It is against this background that t

54 
dangerous adventurist or a visionary, committed to mo

Turkey from a transcendentalist to an instrumentalist 

while re-orientating Turkey's foreign policy to mee

challenges of the post-Cold War era. What is not in dou

that from 1983 to his death in 1993, Ozal was the 

dominant figure in Turkish politics since Inonu, and the 

radical since Ataturk himself. He was by nature a controve

figure. Half Kurdish, he had also been a member of the ba

National Salvation Party, forerunner of the Refah Party. 

was an engineer and an economic technocrat. He serve

the Turkish State Planning Organization and with the W

Bank. In 1979 he had been undersecretary to Prime Min

Demirel, and he was retained by General Evren to be De

Prime Minister responsible for economic affairs after the 

Coup. 

From his election success in 1983, Ozal set abou

ordering the main tenets of Turkish security policy. He wa

to use the new environment to break from the stifling obse

with territorial security, which perpetuated the dominan

state over society, and base national security and a s

regional role on successful economic development. Becau

the continuing dominance of the military both in externa

internal affairs, this development was slow, but it gath

momentum after Ozal's election success of 1987. 

cumulative effects of introducing free-market econo

privatization, export-promotion, a fully convertible curr

and a development philosophy of "build, operate, tran

were dramatic and had important political and s

consequences. Ozal understood that a country's econ

strength is universally recognized as the single most impo

indicator of the power and capability to support a s

foreign policy objectives. On this basis independent m

55 
y p

"raise Turkey to the level of contemporary civilisation" ha

always been undermined by a bald assumption that streng

was synonymous with military force and autarky. Give

Turkey's traditional interest in Japan's status in the world

Ozal's reforms belatedly acknowledged why Japan, a milita

dwarf, sat firmly among the advanced nations, while Turke

was only seen as important in security terms. 

There are those who claim that Ozal anticipated th

collapse of the Soviet Union well ahead of the traditional

cautious military and MFA. 4 While continuing to disclaim an

Turkish territorial ambitions, Ozal thought that circumstance

would soon allow Turkey to reposition itself and to project 

interests into the three regions of which it was part. Ozal als

anticipated the enhanced position of the United States as th

sole remaining superpower, whose new global strategy wou

require the support of regional allies. Turkey's critic

geostrategic position made it ideally suited to be one of thos

allies, and to benefit from offering that support. The EU wa

important to Ozal for the major export market it represented

and he shared with the Turkish elite the symbolic importanc

of joining the premier politico-economic European "club." 

1987 he submitted an application for full membership. ~ H

was aware of the strict economic criteria for membership (soo

to be strengthened under the 1992 Maastricht Agreement), an

while he may have had no real expectation of ear

acceptance, he raised domestic expectations that were to lea

to disappointment and frustration, z 

Whatever Ozal's intentions, until 1990 Turkish foreig

policy was dynamic but not yet revolutionary. If one accep

the fundamental consistency of Turkish security policy, 

represented another chapter in the requirement of Turkey

56 
regional role. The important difference was Ozal's recog

of the need to adjust Turkey's domestic political, socia

economic arrangements if Turkey was to be able to profi

new opportunities. 

The Gulf War 

In October 1989 Ozal was elected President, while 

remained in power. In December, Mesut Yilmaz, the fo

minister, convened a meeting of Turkey's Eur

ambassadors to assess Turkey's foreign policy after the 

the Berlin Wall. The meeting concluded that Turkey's int

were best served by remaining in NATO; closer ties 

Russia, East Europe and the former Soviet Republics m

formed; and in the future, security threats would 

primarily from the South (Iraq or Syria) and the West (Gr

Overall, Turkey's strategic value to the West was reduce

by no means eliminatedfl 

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 

heaven-sent opportunity for Ozal. He had identifie

international trends but there had been little chan

capitalize on them. Although he was to be accus

subordinating Turkey's foreign policy to the United Stat

decision to whole-heartedly support the coalition was 

visionary and pragmatic. The decision to cut the K

Yurmurtalik pipeline on 6 August 1990 indicate

unequivocal choice to put all of Turkey's weight on the s

the Western alliance. In this he was encouraged to e

significant compensation at the successful conclusion 

crisis, while he used Saddam's aggression as the opportun

confront one of Turkey's most serious potential se

problemsfl 

57 
least setting aside, key assumptions of foreign policy from t

National Pact onwards: noninterference in inter-Arab dispute

compartmentalization of Western policy and Middle E

policy; and maintenance of correct bilateral relations with 

states in the region. On 12 August 1990 Ozal sought extensiv

war powers from the GNA, declaring "it is impossible 

pursue a hesitant policy of waiting for others to ma

decisions first. "1° On 2 March 1991, emboldened by t

overwhelming success of the coalition, and the appare

vindication of his actions, he said, "It is my conviction th

Turkey should leave its former passive and hesitant policie

and engage in an active foreign policy. "11 In the course of t

crisis Ozal speculated on providing troops to the coalitio

opening a second front, and even seizing the Kirkut oil-field

in the event of a complete collapse of Iraqi central authority

Directly or indirectly he precipitated the resignations of t

Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense, and t

Chief of TGS. His actions were criticized in the press and 

the GNA, where Demirel, leader of the center-right True Pa

Party (DYP), spoke of "Turkish blood shed in those deserts f

400 years." Some criticism was political, some only reflecte

disquiet about the timing of Ozal's initiatives, but much w

the result of a tradition of keeping a low profile in internation

affairs. 

The World Unfolds 

The stated Coalition aim of throwing Iraq out of Kuwait h

been achieved, but no one had a clear idea of what shou

now determine events in Iraq itself. The West had demonize

Saddam, but he had widespread popular support in the Musli

world, and few countries in the region, including Turke

58 
zones, and Operation Provide Comfort, which created 

facto Kurdish autonomous state on Iraq's border with Tu

This added significant complications to Turkey's actions 

own Kurdish area. 

In December 1991 the Soviet Union formally dissolved 

Turkey was confronted with the requirement to address a 

of new bilateral arrangements. Ozal was not the only one 

carried away by the prospects this offered to Turkey. 

were enthusiasts both at home and abroad, particularly 

Bush administration. The United States, scarred by the Ir

Revolution of 1979 and confronted with rising Is

fundamentalism in other areas of national interest, 

democratic, secular Turkey as the ideal vehicle to spea

Western influence into the new Turkic republics. Ozal ag

Turkey would reinforce its ethnic, religious, linguistic 

historical ties, with technical, financial, and educat

support; in helping these countries, Turkey would be he

itself. In addition it would be staking a claim to the ma

energy potential of Central Asia and Azerbaijan. This 

would not simply be access to oil and gas, but it would 

include the whole issue of pipeline development, refinem

shipment, and transit rights. 

One should not be dismissive of the challenge this v

presented to Turkey, nor of the enthusiasm and ambition

underlay the vision. Every country was now faced wit

problems of new embassies, new or enlarged internat

fora, new legal complications, business opportunities, an

interpretation of new regional balances. Turkey appear

have more to gain than most and seemed well placed to 

advantage of new opportunities. There were also dan

Countries also had to determine responses to new conflicts 

59 
gog beaaooe pess, bougceasg

outspoken public opinion to bear on government and the sta

In the face of this multifaceted challenge, Kemal Kiris

identifies two distinct categories of Turkish foreign poli

activity. The first included initiatives to manage conflict 

areas bordering Turkey and sought to mobilize t

international community to support multilateral actions th

coincided with Turkish objectives, lhat primary objective, 

ever, was to ensure that regional conflict did not escalate to 

level that threatened Turkish security. The second concentrate

on long-term efforts to secure a stable international order to a

as a brake on the volatile tendencies of the region. 13 Th

demonstrated the continuity of the "small power" approach 

foreign affairs, drawing on international support, and backe

by strict adherence to legalism, the rejection of the use of for

to alter boundaries, and the eschewing of unilateral action

The cases of Armenia-Azerbaijan and the Bosnia confl

illustrate the finely tuned efforts to balance domestic calls f

intervention with an attempt to mobilize the internation

community in support of Turkish interests. The renewe

primacy of this type of policy reflected the altered balance 

political power in Turkey, where the DYP success in the 199

elections brought about a new, conservative policy maki

coalition that undermined the dynamic aspirations of Ozal. 

Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh 

The dissolution of the Soviet Union confronted Turkey wi

particular problems in the Trans-Caucasus. In an area 

historical competition among Turkey, Russia, and Iran, loc

instability gave Russia an almost immediate pretext for ne

involvement. Turkey was faced with Russian meddling in t

6O 
provoking a Russian response, while its actual ability to 

was extremely limited because it did not possess a com

border. In 1992 and 1993 there were strident calls for m

intervention, including statements from President Ozal hi

However, Demirel, supported by the army, made it clea

"Turkey would not act alone militarily" and argued 

"foreign policy decisions cannot go along with street 

excitement. ''~4 Instead, Turkey closed the border with Ar

and embarked on an energetic round of diplomatic ac

These actions resulted in support for the Turco-Azeri po

and the acceptance of a cease-fire in the area 

negotiations took place. Despite this diplomatic succe

"traditional" Turkish policy, it was seen by both Turkish 

opinion and international opinion as an early indication 

limitations of both Turkish ambition and influence. 

The War in Bosnia 

From its earliest stages Turkey was worried about gr

violence in former Yugoslavia. Concern was not just f

Bosnians, but encompassed the whole Balkans with its pl

of ethnic, religious and historical connections, is From th

public opinion called for action, and both the T

Government and the West were accused of disinter

inadequate response. Public disillusion with the W

particular became more pronounced the longer the c

went on. 

The government and the policy makers were well aw

the complexity of the issues involved and the difficult

military intervention. Initial official response was theref

more than active support for U.N. and NATO actio

61 
Turkic pressure group, this time calling for an internationa

Gulf War-style operation in the area, and offering troops for 

peace-enforcement action. While this was rejected, in 199

Turkey at last felt it had enough support for the deployment o

1,500 troops, and a similar force joined the Implementatio

Force (IFOR) that supervised the 1995/96 Dayton Peac

Agreement. 

The lack of decisiveness by Western governments 

limiting or halting the violence in Bosnia was particular

difficult for the Turkish government with a foot in both camps

In Western circles the Turks were seen as being too close t

the problem, and in Muslim circles they were seen either as 

cats-paw of the West, or as incapable of providing th

leadership role they aspired to. In the face of th

disappointment, they tried to use the OIC to mobilize suppo

for lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims. Failure t

get U.N. support for this initiative further raised the level 

domestic criticism of the government. However, despite this

Turkey refused to be drawn into unilateral actions that woul

not be supported by the international community. Underlyin

Turkish actions in both Azerbaijan and Bosnia was a secula

determination not to allow these conflicts to be portrayed a

ones of religion, or to "plunge Turkey into such trouble that w

would be unable to disentangle ourselves for 20 years . . . 

would turn the matter into a Muslim-Christian conflict. ''16 

The Turkic Republics of Central Asia 

It was in Central Asia that Turkey saw it might ga

unequivocal benefits. The rediscovery of Turkic links fro

West China to the Balkans was the greatest novelty that th

end of the Cold War brought to Turkey. Turkish and Wester

62 
,y g 

the Turk. "17 In March 1991 Ozal had pointedly visited 

and AImati during a visit to the Soviet Union. Even before 

full independence, Turkey had discussed the possibi

providing military training, actively advocated the adopt

the Turkish (Latin) alphabet and script, and established 

for a satellite link to Central Asia that would carry T

broadcasts. By spring 1992 the leaders of all six former 

Muslim states had made official visits to Ankara. In May 

Demirel made a week-long visit to Central Asia, accomp

by a massive contingent of businessmen and po

economic, and cultural specialists. During this visit D

spoke of the possibility of establishing a Union of T

States. Thus, by the time of the first Turkic Summit in A

in November 1992, Turkey had made a bold bid for lead

and influence in the region, in the widest range of fields

Regional Initiatives 

The Black Sea Economic Co-operation Zone (BSE

In 1990 Ozal initiated moves toward the regional integ

of the countries surrounding the Black Sea. Initially 

included only Turkey, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria

Romania, but the disintegration of the Soviet Union incr

the number of participating states to nine, and the 

declaration was signed on 25 June 1992 by eleven cou

(including Greece and Albania). The aim was to "

favourable conditions and establish institutional arrange

among the Black Sea countries for the developmen

diversification of their economic relations by making 

advantages arising from geographic proximity an

complementary nature of their economies. "1~ Typical 
of integration into the Western economy. In line with th

Ataturk 1930s Balkan Pact, the Turks also saw BSECZ as 

vehicle for regional leadership, and another institution fo

promoting peace and stability in the region. 

Water Pipelines for Peace 

Water issues had always been a source of contention between 

Turkey, who owned the head-waters of the Euphrates an

Tigris rivers, and Iraq and Syria, who relied on those waters fo

their irrigation. The ambitious and costly Southeast Anatolia

Project (GAP) depended on the building of 22 dams i

Southeast Turkey, including the giant Ataturk Dam. Althoug

Turkey declared it would never use water as a politica

weapon, it had the powerful capability to cut off the flow o

the Euphrates and had occasionally "controlled" the flow whe

filling reservoirs. Ozal could see the animosity this created

and in another of his creative departures, he suggested th

construction of two water "peace pipelines" that would carr

Anatolian water to Syria, Jordan and Israel, and to Saudi Arabi

and the Gulf. In addition, he discussed with Syria th

possibility of joint projects, including drinking water an

electricity. This was unlikely to satisfy Syria, which continued 

to enlist Arab League support on water rights and which ha

never been reconciled to the loss of Hatay. In addition Syri

had begun to use the increasingly violent Kurdish issue i

Turkey as leverage on this issue. 

Conclusion 

Between 1990 and 1993 circumstances seemed to hold out 

golden opportunity for Turkey to expand its influence and t

carve out an important and unique regional role. Ozal ha

64 
small power, which by definition (Rothstein's) implies th

general it is in the position of responding to what happe

the external environment rather than shaping 

environment. "19 His aim had been to engage in a more a

foreign policy in order to create a sphere of autonomous a

that would both free Turkey from serving Western interests

at the same time increase its importance to the West. O

actions in the Gulf crisis challenged the basic principl

Turkish foreign policy, and in both substance and sty

conduct of foreign policy broke new ground. Across the re

in the Middle East, the Balkans, and the former Soviet U

he had launched initiatives and had set out a visionary 

dynamic role for Turkey. 

If this chapter has concentrated on Ozal it is because 

so dramatically drove the domestic and foreign policy age

of Turkey at a time when the traditional political establish

was mesmerized by the dynamism of the new environmen

April 1993 Ozal embarked on an intensive tour of Central 

On 1 7 April, just after his return, he died. Diplomatic ac

did not cease, engagement across a broad landscap

interests continued; yet, internally and externally it began 

recognized that the moment for Turkey to become a reg

"power" seemed to have passed. Why? 

Notes 

1. The Azeris are Turkic but Shiites, the Chechens and Bo

are Muslims but not Turkic, the Gagauz are Turkic but Christia

2. Under this model foreign investors financed, bui

operated a factory until they had recovered their investme

made an agreed profit. The business then was transferred to T

control. 

65 
anecdote that in 1988 Ozal told the Manager of Turkish Airlines 

look at Kazakhstan as a future base of Far East operations. Soil Oze

"Of Not Being a Lone Wolf: Geography, Domestic Plays, and Turkis

Foreign Policy in the Middle East," in Powder Keg in the Middle Eas

The Struggle for GuffSecurity, eds, Geoffrey Kemp and Janice Gros

Stein (London: Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 1995), 1 67. 

5. Between 1983 and 1993 trade between Turkey and the E

more than quadrupled to reach $20.2 billion. Sixty percent of foreig

investrnent (1993, $4.6 billion) comes from member countries of th

EU (Germany has the largest individual share), ahead of the Unite

States (15 percent) and Japan (5 percent). Figures from the Assemb

of Western European Union, The Eastern Mediterranean, Docume

1465, 24 May 1995, 44. 

6. In 1978 Ecevit had rejected an offer to apply for fu

membership of the EEC, claiming that Turkey still needed a period 

autarky for rapid industrialisation. 

7. In support of Turkey's application Ozal published a book 

1991 entitled, Turkey in Europe, and Europe in Turkey (Nicosia: 

Rustem and Brother, 1991 ). 

8. Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West," Foreign Affairs 70, no. 

(1991): 36. 

9. Ozel, Lone Wolf, 170. 

10. Philip Robins, Turkish Policy in the Guff Crisis-Adventurist 

Dynamic? in Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects, ed. Clement H

Dodd (Wistow: Eothen Press, 1992), 72. 

11. Ibid., 70. 

12. While Ozal followed Ataturk's strictures against territoria

ambition he had already told the United States in 1986 that if "lra

defeats Iraq and Iraq collapses, Turkey will claim back the Mosu

region." Kuniholm, Turkey and the West, 44. 

13. Kemal Kirisci, New Patterns of Turkish Foreign Polic

Behaviour in Turkey: Economic, Political and Foreign Challenges f

the 1990% ed. C. Karatus (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), 4. 

14. Turkish Daily News, 14 April 1993. 

66 
Armenia, in Middle East International 426 (29 May 1992). 

17. Graham E. Fuller, "Turkey's New Eastern Orientatio

Turkey's New Geopolitics, 67. 

18. Quoted in I. F. Brown, "Turkey: Back to the Balkans

Turkey's New Geopolitics, 156. 

19. Duygu Sezer, "Turkey and the Western Alliance," 

Political and Socio-Economic Transformation of Turkey, eds

Eralp, Muharrem Tunay, and Birol Yesilada (Westport, CT: Pr

1993), 216. 

67 
It was said of Margaret Thatcher, "She was more ambi

for the British people than they were for themselves." 

sense the same could have been said about Ozal. Despit

high-flown language of the popular press and the 

acclamation of the masses for Turkey's new aspirations, 

who actually wielded state power and who determined 

speed at which ideas were translated into policy did not 

his enthusiasm, and indeed viewed it as dangerous

politician can act totally independently of his country's his

culture, and domestic politics. In Turkey this combin

proved formidable in blunting many of Ozal's initiativ

both internal and foreign affairs. In addition, no country ca

long act without regard for its geographical position an

resources. In assessing Turkey's post-Cold War security po

the assertion, "The less you know about Turkey the 

ambitious you are for her, ''1 has validity. It should n

viewed, however, as merely a negative statement. Ambi

do not need to be realistic to be sincerely held, but the

need to be realistic to be achievable. Despite the erosion o

Kemalist paradigm in many aspects, the state elite still ret

their monopoly over security issues. Turkish ambition 

therefore limited by the elite's continuing adherence t

self-imposed foreign policy constraints of Ataturk, but al

the hard facts of Turkey's geographical position, an

economic strength. External enthusiasts often overlooke

first, internal enthusiasts under-estimated the second. 
as the foreign minister, allied with the military to dominate th

NSC. Having broken the old consensus during the Gulf Wa

Ozal did not have the time or the opportunity to reshape th

internal structures of Turkey to provide a solid basis of suppo

for his new vision. Demirel himself represented the archetyp

Turkish politician: prepared to play to the crowd in the pursu

of political power, yet mainstream and conservative. He ha

an insular political vision and an understandable aversion 

boldness. He had twice been ousted by the military an

understood and accepted the limits that the political structu

imposed on his actions. Ozal also understood the inseparab

linkage between domestic and foreign policy, but sought 

weaken that bond and reduce the limitations. He ha

deliberately concentrated on economic reform, and h

extraordinary success had slowly enabled him to challenge th

military's primacy in the state, allowing him to increase th

areas of competence of the civil government. In 1987 he fe

confident enough to recommend changes to the 198

Constitution, and in 1991 had taken the unprecedented step 

rejecting the army's nomination for Chief of TGS an

appointing his own nominee. Gradually he took the lead in 

growing number of decisions in the security and foreign affa

field, although this competence was never complete

However, Ozal failed to convince the elite that Turkey

aspiration to "regional power" status required a radic

reordering of domestic politics. Nor, despite popular acclaim

was he able to appeal over their heads to the electorate for th

mandate. 

This is not to say that without Ozal Turkish foreign polic

would have been quiescent. The new environment made 

static position impossible, and public opinion demande

activity; therefore, the DYP government was very active 

70 
y g

international interests continued through the Ciller govern

era. It was given further impetus by Turkey's move to joi

European Customs Union in 1995, thereby completing th

year process begun with the 1963 Ankara Agreem

However, the mainstream elements of Turkish political lif

not share Ozal's grandiose vision of a dynamic, multifa

regional role. Their aim remained to keep a We

orientation as the "permanent" policy of the Republic, wh

a new "temporary" policy they would seek to "manage

changed international environment in a manner that di

endanger Turkish security, nor left them without allies. 

aspirations were therefore more realistic and consistent 

the traditional bases of Turkish goals, if less exciting 

Ozal's. Set against the earlier rhetoric, from 1993 onw

Turkey's wide-ranging foreign policy activity seeme

generate fewer and fewer results, leading to the accusatio

merely assessment, that Turkish foreign policy had som

"failed. "2 This was unfair. Between 1989 and 1996 there 

eight different governments and twelve MFAs. It is a trib

the professionalism of the MFA civil service that Tu

foreign policy did not oscillate wildly through this perio

that Turkey survived this completely new phase of its h

without incurring great risks, or making great mistakes. 

The Economy 

The parlous state of the economy had been a prime cau

the political polarization of politics in the 1970s, an

subsequent intervention by the military. Statism had 

tempered under the Menderes regime of the 1950s but 

not seriously challenged until Ozal. Turkey's elite had a

been military men and civil servants, and their gra

71 
Turkish terms he was strikingly successful. By 1991 the averag

growth through the decade had been nearly 8 percent, pe

capita gross national product (GNP) had doubled from $1,30

to $2,600, and purchasing power parity had also doubled. Th

agriculture share of GNP fell from 22 to 16 percent. In 198

exports totalled $2.9 billion, with agricultural produc

constituting 57 percent. In 1991 exports were worth $13.

billion, with the agricultural share falling to 19.7 percent. I

the same period imports rose from $7.9 to $21 billion, an

energy accounted for nearly 20 percent of this total. Tourism

remittances from workers abroad, and Turkish contractin

work, particularly in construction, all contributed to th

growing Turkish economy. Within Turkey extensiv

infrastructure works were begun, including the enormous GA

project. 

In absolute terms the figures were impressive, but i

relative terms they were not good enough to give Turkey th

room for the maneuver it needed in its two most importan

areas of foreign policy concern: as a regional power and as 

candidate for EU membership. Turkey's economic success wa

hampered by persistent high inflation, slowness i

privatization, widening budget deficits, and mounting externa

debt. In December 1989 the European Commission decline

to open negotiations on Ozal's 1987 application for full E

membership. They cited Turkey's low- level economi

development (half the per capita GDP of the EU's poores

countries), high population growth (2.5 percent per annum, 1 

times the EU average!), the long-term foreign debt ($38 billion

the world's seventh largest), low tax revenue and high stat

expenditure (over twice the EU average), a state secto

continuing to account for 40 percent of manufacturing outpu

72 
European output of a variety of important products, 

benefit to anyone. Not the least problem was the prosp

granting free movement of Turkish labor at a time 

immigration had emerged as a controversial issue 

Europe) 

In addition, despite the clear economic advanta

privatization and reduction of the state sector, Ozal

market economic philosophy was challenged at home. 

in the face of those with an ideological or financial s

statism. In a country where a job with "the govern

however lowly or poorly paid, gave status and security

was suspicion of the harsh realities of the private 

Reforms also created a very obviously wealthy class, 

ostentation inflamed a traditional Turkish low rega

businessmen. Combined with mass migration of 

conservative peasants from the country to the cities, 

prejudices created Further social tension. A thrivin

dynamic private sector did grow, but despite Ozal's re

the state was not in a position to profit from this dyna

Partly this resulted from tax evasion and inefficient re

collection, and partly it was the continued squande

revenue on the remaining large, unproductive state 

Even under Ozal the financial and fiscal discipline v

success of the economic reform program was weakened 

pressures of domestic politics. 

The situation was exacerbated by the Gulf War a

three-way embargo on Iraq, Armenia, and Serbia. Oz

gambled that a firm, early commitment to the U.S. co

would be properly rewarded; it was not. The closure of 

pipeline, along with the loss of Middle East trad

estimated to have cost Turkey $9 billion in lost revenue 

end of 1991. By the end of 1995 estimated losses we
consequences of their cooperative role. 

The death of Ozal in April 1993 removed much of the 

remaining impetus behind government reform of the Turkish 

public sector. Demirel, and his DYP successor Tansu Ciller

never had the same ideological commitment to privatization, 

or were prepared to impose the necessary discipline on the 

economy. In 1995 Ciller compounded the problems when she 

responded to public sector disturbances by raising wages and 

reducing retirement ages. By the general election of Decembe

1995 Turkey was living beyond its means, and the distortions 

in its economy continued to be structural and endemic. The 

government and state economic enterprises were all operating 

under deficits that could no longer be financed by taxes. The 

Central Bank was printing money, which was fueling an 

inflation rate of over 100 percent, and the government was 

being forced to borrow money at increasing rates of interest

This in turn siphoned off resources from the private, productive 

sector. The obvious economic solutions of further, fas

privatization and a complete overhaul of the social security 

system both carried political and social costs that the weak 

DYP government and the shaky DYP ANAP coalition of 1996 

were simply not prepared to address, 4 nor were the Kemalist 

Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), on whose support the 

coalition depended. Almost the first action of the Refah-DYP 

government was to raise civil service salaries by 50 percent, 

with little indication how this would be financed. Therefore 

economic weakness continued to have its effect on Turkey's 

foreign policy aspirations. Not only did it undermine 

acceptance in Western economic institutions, but Turkey 

increasingly found that it thwarted attempts to exert regiona

influence. The appeal of ethnic and religious solidarity in 

Central Asia simply could not compete with the financial clou

74 
Economic change and weakness also influenced dom

politics. From the initiation of multiparty politics in 1946 

had always been Islamists in the political system, 

represented in the wing of a mainstream party or, whe

officially banned by the military, as a party in their own 

In 1987 Ozal had amended the 1982 Constitution to li

ban on certain political individuals (Demirel and Erb

among them) and permit a revived Islamist party to form

Refah Party. Islamists had always opposed the s

adherence to a Western orientation but, except in coa

through the fractious period of the 1970s, and on the iss

Cyprus, their influence on foreign policy had been min

From 1992 onward their voice was increasingly heard, 

expounding their own vision of Turkey's foreign p

orientation or berating the government's perceived fo

policy failures. Refah supporters could discern the econ

advantages of links to the West, and some respected 

political institutions of the West, but they were 

influenced by historical, cultural, philosophical and reli

differences. 

In addition to its religious followers, Refah gathered 

from those who saw themselves as disenfranchise

traditional politics, concerned at the consequence

economic reform, or scornful of corruption and ostenta

wealth. Sponsored and subsidized by other Islamic coun

they used the natural organizational advantages of religio

took these into the political arena. In many ways their po

was analogous to that of the Euro-Communists in Italy 

1970s. They sought to provide good, competent, unco

local government which contrasted with the "pork b

politics of the mainstream secular parties. In March 

Z5 
broadly controlled by the state. By 1994, the secul

establishment at last were forced to accept that the country

politics had changed. 

In 1994 the Refah appeal was based on domestic issu

and advocating "Just Order." But they also had a we

developed foreign policy that reflected their Islam

consciousness and fed on Turkish sympathies for Musli

"victims" in Bosnia and Chechenya. Refah claimed to believ

that the international system was run by the United States an

Israel to the detriment of the Ummah. This axis aimed 

maintain global domination by thwarting the ability of t

Ummah to exercise their potential, which was now eve

greater with the collapse of communism. Therefore, the U

approach to Islam was to suppress those countries where it w

an active, independent force (Libya, Iran, Sudan), and 

restrict Islamic influence in those countries where t

governing forces were compliant with U.S. interests (Turke

Egypt, Jordan). Refah believed that the importation of Weste

institutions and mores ran counter to Islamic tradition and th

the Kemalist elite were not secular in a Western sense, b

actively antireligious and therefore perverted Turkish socie

by not allowing free expression of Islamic thought in Musli

Turkey. l he solution was to redress the balance in Turkey 

developing an Islamic orientation in society. At the same tim

greater social, political, and economic cooperation should ta

place among the Ummah, and this co-ordination would requ

the creation of international Islamic institutions to paral

those in the West. 6 

While Erbakan moderated his demands when faced wi

the prospect of sharing coalition power after Refah success 

the December 1995 elections, he was on record as advocatin

an Islamic United Nations, EU, and NATO. In addition, Ref

76 
a surprisingly broad appeal in Turkish society since 

program appealed to the deep-rooted, historical T

suspicion of foreigners, experience of economic humil

and resistance to a subordinate position vis-a-vis the 

Despite this, the Refah leadership claimed to accep

Turkey was part of Europe and that they had no inten

isolating Turkey from the West, although they saw no c

of Turkey joining the EU. Nor did they intend to take T

out of NATO, which they recognized as important for T

security and a bulwark against Communists, Leftist

Marxists. 8 

Refah declared themselves to be the only party in T

that genuinely supported a civil society that was dominan

the state ideology. They wanted to amend the Constitu

curtail the influence of the military in the NSC a

subordinate the Chief of TGS to the MOD, "as in other W

democratic countries." Refah totally opposed the M

Leninist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), but they recogn

separate Kurdish identity that must be incorporated 

Turkey. Although they criticized the way the m

conducted operations in the Southeast, they, too, had co

over threats to the unity and integrity of the country. 

with the Cyprus problem, only the Kurdish issue, a

related problem of PKK terrorism, could produce an u

community of interest between the Army and an Islamic 

The Armed Forces 

The military's place and role in Turkish society had 

enshrined by Ataturk and reinforced by their intervention

domestic politics. For the majority of Turks, the milita

successfully defended Turkey against external threa

77 
resumption of U.S. aid. In the period 1985-1990 modernizatio

costs were nearly $1 5 billion, of which about $5 billion cam

from the United States and Germany. This is not a large sum b

Western standards, but by 1986 the defense budget wa

estimated to be taking more than 25 percent of the nation

budget, when U.S. and German aid was included. 9 

The end of the Cold War came as a mixed blessing for th

military. With their MFA colleagues they were concerned 

Turkey's downgraded strategic position and wary of Ozal

plans for an expanded regional role. For nearly 70 years th

Army had adopted a defensive posture. 1° They appreciate

that a direct military and ideological threat to the "West," 

which it was a part, had been lifted, but this now place

Turkey firmly in one of the least stable areas of the world. 

line with the 1989 foreign policy assessment, the military ha

negotiated an opt-out in the Conventional Forces in Europ

(CFE) Agreement that excluded its troops in the Southeast o

the borders of Iraq and Syria. Its threat perception and the w

against the PKK denied Turkey the opportunity to benefit fro

any "peace dividend." Indeed TGS saw the performance of th

coalition forces in the Gulf War as demanding a further maj

restructuring and modernization program. Contingenc

planning in 1990 for a move on the Kirkut oil fields ha

revealed how inflexible their organization was, and ho

deficient they were in equipment for operational mobility an

logistic support. 

In the 1995 Turkish Defense Statement, the preamb

rehearsed the facts of the new security environment b

concluded by stating: "Under these circumstances, it wou

not be an overstatement to claim that the major facto

affecting Turkey's defence policy and doctrine have remaine

78 
Peace in the World. The principles were: 

• To preserve and secure the independence, integrit

the democratic (and secular) regime of the Repub

Turkey 

• To take all precautionary measures to prevent 

and war 

• To participate actively in collective defense and p

keeping activities 

• To contribute to decreasing international tensio

to ensure just and permanent peace. 

To carry out these policy objectives the Turkish Armed 

had developed four pillars of defense strategy: 

• Deterrence: in the form of participation in coll

defense (primarily NATO) 

• Restructuring: re-equipment and organizational c

to ensure mobility and flexibility of response t

multiple threats that exist to the country (interna

external). 

• Crisis Response: The Turkish Armed Forces wou

ready and prepared to respond, both regionally 

globally, to any threat to peace. 

• Forward Defense: Turkey perceived no buffer zon

saw increased risks and threats since the end of the 

War, and therefore retained a policy of forward def

In broad terms, in 1996 the Turkish Armed Forces we

predominant military force in the Balkans, Trans-Caucasu

the Middle East. They could field over a million 

approximately 3,400 tanks, and more than 360 modern, 

line aircraft. 12 The "upside" of the CFE agreement wa

between 1991 and 1993 TGS were able to take full adva

of the NATO "cascade" program, receiving nearly $8 

worth of U.S. and German equipment, including nearly 

79 
Despite these capabilities, the military had little stake in a

ambitious foreign policy which might threaten nationa

security or isolate it in the region. The requirement fo

alliances was vital, given Turkey's security concerns on it

borders. However, within this well-defined defensive role

there was increasing talk of the requirement to be able t

conduct a 21/2 war strategy. 13 In line with the 1989 MFA 

assessment this was predicated on Syria and Greece supportin

each other to take advantage of Turkey's problems in th

Southeast. The military would therefore have to fight on tw

fronts while containing an insurgency. The military trainin

agreement between Greece and Syria in March 1995 seeme

to support these fears. Turkey's response was to intensif

military contacts with Israel, a move clearly aimed at Syria an

provoking criticism throughout the Arab world. 

The Defense Budget 

Broadly speaking, TGS always received the budget allocation 

they requested, but the total allocation for defense remained 

secret, figures were difficult to interpret, and there was no fu

transparency of defense spending. In the 1990s, according t

official figures, defense normally accounted for 12 percent o

the national budget, 2 percent of GNP, and 4.5 percent o

GDP. TM Inflation, and the costs of the war in the Southeas

further distorted a proper assessment of the figures, but som

estimates suggest that by 1996 total "security" costs were a

high as 35 percent of all government spending. The armed 

forces were financed from three main sources: the defens

budget; foreign aid, including "cascade" equipment an

remaining Gulf War reimbursements; and the Defens

Industries Support Fund for the Under Secretary for Defens

80 
54 percent for training, equipment and running costs, and 

rest for investment and transfer expenses. 

By 1995, along with the PKK problem in the Southeast

military's overriding concern was the economy. Ram

inflation drastically reduced the purchasing power of thos

state incomes and began to cause great dissatisfaction am

the professional officer and NCO corps. TM Ciller's 

austerity package meant that, for the first time, the Trea

scrutinized aspects of the defense budget and trim

procurement funds from $3.25 to $2.25 billion. Def

projects had to be cancelled or deferred, while the rising 

of combating the PKK took a larger and larger proportion o

budget, delaying the modernization and re-struct

program. In the broader picture the military could see 

inflation, economic failure, and political corruption 

contributing to the rise in support for the Refah Party, 

openly challenged the Western-oriented, secular bas

Turkish society, and therefore challenged the military. 

Refah and the Military 

In December 1995 Refah took 21.38 percent of the po

vote in the general election, making them the single la

party in the GNA, with 158 seats. 17 In the same month 

Army pointedly and publicly dismissed 50 officers 

sergeants for overzealous religious observance. At the 

time, as had been seen after Refah's local government suc

many officers began to wear Ataturk lapel badges. The of

reaction to the military's reaction to the election result 

"we are watching." President Demirel asked Erbakan 

Refah, as the largest party, to form a government. His fa

came as little surprise to "Turkey-watchers," but Febr

when the prospect of an ANAP-Refah coalition was poss

81 
and published an opinion poll that concluded that the majorit

(59.5 percent) wanted an ANAP-DYP coalition. 19 Th

assumption was that the military had no ambition to interven

in politics again, but did not want to be put in a position wher

they might have to do so. The intended message was clear. Th

Islamists must be kept out of power until the secula

mainstream could pull itself together. Therefore the discree

hand of the military was seen in the deal whereby Ciller an

Yilmaz put aside personal animosity to form a coalition. Eve

then Army-lslamist tension did not go away, and in Marc

1996, when the Gendarmerie issued a circular bannin

soldiers from using the mosques in the barracks, Refa

spokesmen accused the military of being anti-religious. Thi

provoked a quick and harsh response from TGS, and Erbakan

anxious for power and fully aware of the military's sentiments

was equally quick to distance himself from the remarks and t

forbid his party to make further statements concerning th

Army. 2° 

The collapse of the ANAP-DYP coalition in June 1996 wa

a grave disappointment to the military, and to all those who 

had voted for secular parties. Given the personal animositie

of all the secular party leaders, it began to appear that an

government would have to include Refah in coalition. Opinion 

was divided on the Army's reaction. Turkish national paper

claimed that: 

• The military's stance on Refah was softening, with 

senior officer saying "It is time they came to power, if the

do not come to power now.., they will do so at the nex

election, and with an explosive increase in votes." 

• A Refah government would lead to a military coup. 

• Another military source had said "the Army's attitude 

will depend on the way Refah act. "2~ 

82 
and Interior portfolios and had changed his position on 

security issues. Turkey would remain in NATO and 

Customs Union, Operation Provide Comfort would 

extended (under new arrangements), the details of the T

Israeli military agreement would be "considered," an

military's attitude to the Kurdish issue would be respecte

The Kurdish Issue 

The founding principles of the Turkish Republic barre

political expression of four ideologies: Islamism, commu

liberalism, and Kurdish nationalism. By 1990 three of 

bans were largely meaningless, but that on Kurdish nation

remained. Discriminated against as an ethnic group fro

foundation of the Republic, Kurdish tribal organization 

cultural identity never sat well with the centralised, n

state secularism of the new Republic. In the 1970s and 

there was a worrying resurgence of traditional Kurdish u

in Southeast Anatolia. The collapse of the Turkish econo

the 1970s had been particularly harshly felt in the Ku

areas, and in the general anarchy that prevailed, Ku

separatist violence also grew. This was seen by the militar

simply as a challenge to state authority, but also a direc

real threat to the integrity of the unitary Turkish state, w

defense they were constitutionally charged with. Be

1980 and 1983, the military government was partic

heavy handed in the suppression of the Kurds in the Sout

The PKK were officially founded in 1978, but in 

Abdullah Ocalan re-launched a guerrilla campaign comm

to achieving a separate Kurdish state and was support

their actions against the Turkish state by Syria, Iraq, Ira

the Soviet Union. 2~ Funding came from a variety of so

83 
annual cost to the state of $4 to $7 billion. Up to 3,0

villages had been destroyed or evacuated, perhaps 20,0

people killed, and up to a million people emigrated to t

cities, further exacerbating urban social problems. The Kurd

issue, initially viewed by the army as a straightforwa

domestic security matter, became the focus of all Turke

internal and external concerns. It challenged the roots 

Turkish identity and security, the role of the state in socie

the nature of its democracy, the economic health a

development of Turkey, its relations with the West from 

human rights angle, and the rest of the region from a secur

perspective. 

This terrorism, and the state's response to it, has h

extremely damaging consequences for the fabric of Turk

society. The war has been fought with utmost brutality, a

the calculated atrocities of the PKK have provoked a simila

violent response from the security forces. Any element 

"hearts and minds" in the military campaign has been diffic

to discern. The barbarism of the PKK has been beyond dou

but there has been widespread evidence of security for

involvement in killings and torturing, and by 1995 fe

members of the security forces had been punished for hum

rights abuses. 24 The equal culpability of both sides was n

seen in the West, where a broad coalition of anti-Turki

lobbies has used the Kurdish issue to castigate Turkey, there

undermining other foreign policy ambitions. 

The costs of the war have distorted both the national a

the defense budgets, but there were other significant costs. T

war fueled enmity between Turks and Turks of Kurdish orig

in other parts of Turkey, who had lived side by side 

decades. Tourism revenues fell, and the broader problems 

84 
Kurdish support groups in the West as confirmation of their 

suspicion that the "West" was sympathetic to a sepa

Kurdish state. 25 External attitudes to the Kurdish issue bega

replace Cyprus as the touchstone of whether a country 

"friendly" to Turkey or not. This Sevres-phobic approach, 

its obsession with territorial integrity, accounted for the stra

coalition of Kemalists, nationalists, Islamists, Social Democ

and the Army over this issue. 

Despite the determination to treat the Kurdish issue 

military problem, TGS and the NSC must have discerned 

Turkish security and diplomatic power was being seve

undermined by the disproportionate allocation of resource

the struggle in the Southeast. From 1993 the mil

operations in the region were prosecuted much m

effectively, and the Army gained enormous experienc

counterinsurgency operations. Ponderous by mo

standards, Operation Steel, launched against the PKK bas

Northern Iraq in March-April 1995, was businesslike, 

coordinated, and effective. However, the failure to launch 

parallel program of social, economic or cultural initiat

showed a continuing disregard of the underlying nonmil

dimensions of the problem. The Turkish state, with wide pu

support, continued with the assumption that "the Ku

problem for Turkey was in essence that of an estran

minority operating beyond the frontier, under the patronag

Turkey's hostile Middle Eastern neighbors. "26 

Between 1990 and 1993 there was a chance o

accommodation with the Kurds, if not the PKK. Ozal's poli

predominance gave him the authority to challenge 

accepted norms. The fiction of "Mountain Turks" 

discarded, and the problem was increasingly referred to as 

Kurdish issue" in the media. In 1990 Ozal rescinded 

~5 
of March 1992 were the scene of violent clashes that left 

dead and 341 wounded. The military demanded the right to 

free hand again and the DYP government gave it to the

Nineteen ninety-two was the bloodiest year of the insurgenc

with up to 4,000 deaths and a major intervention by t

Turkish army into Iraq. 27 In this they were supported by t

local Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), who were supplied a

protected by TGS under the auspices of Operation Provi

Comfort. 28 Thus, the Kurdish issue and the aftermath of t

Gulf War became inextricably entangled. ~ The opportunity 

take advantage of Ocalan's unilateral cease-fire in March ] 9

was lost when Ozal died in April of the same year. 

Ozal inspires speculative theories. Some have suggest

that he accepted the inevitability of some degree of autonom

for the Kurds. Combined with a collapse of central authority 

Iraq, he could contemplate a Kurdish state carved out of t

four countries their ethnic homeland covered. Such a scena

held less terror for him than for the Kemalists, for he s

Turkey being the dominant influence over any new Kurdi

state, perhaps even to the extent of gaining control over t

still coveted Mosul region. 3° If his vision was not that dramat

Ozal was still confident no Kurdish state could be form

against Turkey's will. 31 Whether he could ever have gain

acceptance of a radical solution on these lines is problemat

On his death, Turkish politics returned to their mo

conventional pattern, and Tansu Ciller established a clo

relationship with General Dogan Gures, the flew Chief of TG

While such matters can only be taken on assumption 

lurkish politics, there was no doubt that a free hand in t

Southeast was the price of full military support of the D

administration. Gures' infusion of new tactics, more soldier

improved command and control, and better equipme

86 
with any restrictions on their use. 32 

. 

January 

6. 

1996. 

7. 

8. 

Notcs 

1. Quoted by Anthony Cordesman, Senior Analyst, C

Washington, 21 February 1996. 

2. The Russian Naval Attach6 said that "by watching the Tu

foreign policy I have at last understood the Olympic principle; it'

the winning that counts, but the taking part in as many spor

possible." Captain Mikail Popov, Ankara, 8 December 1995. 

3. Jan O. Lesser, "Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West 

the Cold War," in Turkey's New Geopolitics, 104-107. 

4. Interview with George Zaidan, Southeast Europe Reg

Director, World Bank, 22 February 1996. 

Phil ip Robins, Polilical Islam: The Rise of the Welfare P

1995, 2. 

Interview with Ali Sarikaya, Refah Party HQ, Istanbul, 5 

Turkish Daily News, 6 January 1996. 

Interview with Dr Abdullah Gul, Deputy Chairman, R

Istanbul, 8 April 1996. 

9. Mehmet Ali Birand, Shirts of Steel, An Anatomy of the Tu

Armed Forces (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991), 202. 

10. Although successful, the 1974 intervention in Cy

revealed many weaknesses in the Turkish military's grasp of mod

joint, offensive operations. 

11. Taken from a draft copy of the 1995 Turkish Def

Statement, Part One, New Security Environment, 3. 

12. Figures taken from 1995 IISS Strategic Balance. 

13. Sukru Elekdag, "2 1/2 War Strategy," in Perceptions, Jo

oflnternationalAffairs 1, no. 1 (March-May 1996): 33-57. This a

reflects a growing conviction that, in the final analysis, most o

threats facing Turkey will have to be met by Turkey on its own. 

14. 1995 (draft) Defense Statement, 83-86. 

87 
officers and NCOs and is authorized to engage in all types 

industrial and commercial activity. It owns buildings, real estate a

companies. Unofficially its assets are believed to be measured 

billions of dollars. Proceeds fund a range of military welfare projec

16. Between January and June 1994, real wages in Turkey fell 

over 30 percent, particularly hitting the purchasing power of those 

the public sector. Asaf Akat, "Turkey at the Crossroads," in Priv

View, The Quarterly Review of TUSIAD I, no. 1 (Winter 1996) 24-2

1 7. Ciller's DYP took 19.18 percent of the vote with 135 sea

Yilmaz's ANAP 19.65 percent but only 132 seats, and Ecevit's D

gained 14.64 percent of the vote and 76 seats. 

18. Turkish Probe, 9 February 1996, 5. 

19. Ibid., 6. 

20. Hurriyet, 28 March 1996, and Probe, no. 172 (29 Mar

1996): 1 7. 

21. Milliyet, SABAH, and Cumhuriyet, quoted in Turkish Da

News, 10 June 1996. 

22. Syria provides bases for the PKK in the Bekaa Valley an

despite denials, Ocalan has a flat in Damascus. Syria, Iraq and Ir

have all exploited the PKK at various stages to put pressure on t

Turkish government, often over the issue of water rights. T

Armenian terror group ASALA certainly had links with the PKK

recent months Turkey has also accused Greece of harboring the PK

23. There are 400,000 Turks of Kurdish origin in German

60,000 in France, and 10,000 in Sweden. They form an importa

anti-Turkish lobby in Western Europe. 

24. MFA figures claim 1194 cases and 15 convictions in 199

and 962 cases and 20 convictions in 1995. "Turkey Survey," in T

Economist, 8 June 1996, 14. 

25. The issue of MED-TV, a satellite broadcasting compan

based in the United Kingdom and dedicated to Kurdish "cultura

affairs, has caused major difficulties between Britain and Turkey. O

Turk said "Just wait until we are transmitting "IRA-TV" to you, and s

how you like it!" 

88 
Since the Saadabad Pact of 1937 the Turks and Iraqis h

agreement that let them both deal with their Kurdish minorit

1985 they agreed a "hot pursuit" policy that suited Saddarn H

who was then at war with Iran. In 1988 Saddarn's crushin

Kurdish uprising led to a massive influx of Kurds into Sou

Turkey. It was to prevent a repetition of this that underlay T

support for the "Safe Havens" proposal, which led to Ope

Provide Comfort. In the nature of Kurdish tribal politics, this No

Iraqi area was divided between the competing factions of the K

Democratic Party (KDP), led by Masoud Barzani, and the Pa

Union of Kurdistan (PUK) under lalal Talebani. 

30. Interview with Cenghiz Candar 1 April 1996. 

31. Soli Ozel, "Of Not Being a Lone Wolf: Geography, Do

Plays, and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East," in Powd

in the Middle East: The Struggle for Guff Security, eds, Geoffrey 

and Janice Gross Stein (London: Lanham, Rowman and Litt

1995), 18O. 

32. Interview with General Dogan Gures, Ankara, 8 April 

Gures stood as a DYP deputy in the December 1995 elections. 

was speculation that, if Ciller had led the ANAP-DYP coalit

would have brought Gures in as the MOD. This may have been 

with the aim of beginning a process under which the military a

to a civilian chief. In the vote of confidence for the Refa

coalition Gures absented himself. While many presidents have 

military men, there seems to be a general dislike among army o

that General Gures had gone into electoral politics. 

89 
In March 1996 the ANAP-DYP coalition government 

Mesut Yilmaz set out its foreign policy priorities. The pro

represented a broad, center-right foreign policy agenda

preamble declared that Turkey was an inalienable p

Europe, but also a Middle Eastern and Asian state. As s

provided an area of stability between the Balkans an

Caucasus. The list of objectives, which must be assumed 

in some order of priority, read: 

• Resolution of the EU membership issue 

• Greater weight to economic relations with the U

States 

• Increased cooperation with Russia 

• Greater engagement in Central Asia and Azerb

including measures to resolve the situations rega

Nagorno-Karabakh and Chechenya 

• Relations with Islamic and Middle East states 

• A warning to all states supporting terrorism in T

• The question of Iraq and the status of Ope

Provide Comfort 

• Bosnia 

• A declared intention to be active in interna

organizations. 

In a special section, the program listed Greece, Cyprus

Human Rights, pointedly stating that human rights issues 

being pursued for their own sake, not because of the pres

of Western governments. 2 There was no mention of the K

issue in any section of the government program. 

The last formal statement of foreign policy objective

been in 1991, under Demirel's DYP government. While 

91 
py p

its foreign policy environment. This confidence lasted un

about 1993. The 1996 program lacked this confidenc

exuding a more traditional, passive, and defensive note. It wa

minimalist and less pro-active. Not only did it reflect th

internal, structural limitations on an active Turkish foreig

policy, but it also acknowledged the realities of Turkey

geopolitical position which militated against its achieveme

of a dynamic, forward-leaning policy. 

Turkey's Relations With the West 

Turkey and the United States 

The Republican administrations of both Reagan and Bush ha

been sympathetic to Turkey, particularly in the wake of th

Iranian revolution. Tile United States recognized Turkey's ro

as a regional stabilizer long before the collapse of the Sovi

Union. Despite the ups and downs of this relationshi

Turkey's support was important in an area where U.

commitments were complicated by the clash between 

dependency on Arab oil and its policy of supporting Israe

The active role of Turkey in the Gulf War had enhanced th

position. Both Ozal and Bush had agreed that Turkey could a

as the new role model for the Trans-Caucasus and Central Asi

Not only would this assist both countries, but it might limit 

revival of Russian influence in these areas and counter th

radical Islamic influence of Iran. In the Middle East, Turke

would develop its relations with Egypt and Israel in support 

the Peace Process, and in addition to hosting Operatio

Provide Comfort, they would assist the U.S. policy of dua

containment of Iran and Iraq. The quid-pro-quo would be LJ

92 
fruition, but instead, Clinton won the presidency. Demo

control of both the executive and legislature was unfort

for Turkey. Not only was Clinton's administration comm

to concentrating on domestic issues, particularly the econ

but it was significantly influenced by anti-Turkish 

groups) Turkey had by this stage adopted a forward reg

position and felt exposed, as the military and MFA had f

it would be. Turkish public opinion felt betrayed. In

rhetoric and promises had been based on an assumpt

U.S. financial and political support. They now appeared 

left with only the downsides of their multidirectional po

The United States remained the most important T

bilateral relationship, but new irritations compou

traditional ambivalence. Those who wanted to sustain 

vitally important axis were hampered by the domestic p

of both countries. The United States was prepared to 

underwriting the Turkish military, but Congress demande

no military assistance should go to Turkey without s

attached regarding human rights and limitations on w

equipment could be used. The Turkish Governmen

military still wanted this aid, but publicizing this assis

and the accompanying caveats drew criticism tha

government was once again compromising Tu

sovereignty, and placing it in a position of subservience 

United States. U.S. policy and public opinion dema

the dual-containment of Iran and Iraq and the maintenan

Operation Provide Comfort. The benefits for Turkey wer

obvious. Cost, compromised sovereignty, distorted rel

with Arab neighbors, and the Sevres-phobia of an assa

Turkey's territorial integrity were all accusations thrown 

government as these policies continued. 
restrictions on the "flanks," being oversensitive to Russi

support for the Serbs in the Balkan conflict, turning a blind e

to Russian activities in the "near abroad," and a mut

response to the brutal suppression of the Chechen revolt. 

each of these issues Turkey felt increasingly it was bei

ignored, sidelined, or simply not informed in advance abo

decisions that would affect it. 

On other issues of importance to Turkey, the U

policymakers could only deliver so much, despite th

diplomatic efforts. They put their weight behind Turkey

successful accession to the Customs Union in December 199

but they could not get any movement on Turkey's applicatio

for full membership of the EU. Additionally, the Clinto

administration had little success in getting concessions fro

the PASOK government of Greece over any of the bilater

Turco-Greek problems, including Cyprus. 

Turkey and Europe 

In December 1989 the European Council of Ministers receiv

the "Opinion" of the European Commission on Turkey's 19

application for full membership of the EU. It coincided almo

exactly with the fall of the Berlin Wall. The "Opinion" said th

accession should not be even considered until 1993; fall-o

from events in Eastern Europe must be assessed; the EU mu

press ahead first with its own integration; and Turkey

economy must continue to develop. In addition, wh

acknowledging advances, it highlighted the need for Turk

to address the issues of human rights and Cyprus. ~ T

"Opinion" was poorly received by the Turkish publ

particularly when the Commission declined to tie themselve

to any accession timescale whatsoever. Whatever his motive

94 
ppg

of Turkey to bridge the economic gap, the uncertainties 

the impact of its entry, and real uncertainties about the 

of the EU. 6 

In 1992 feelings were further exacerbated when 

Maastricht Treaty gave the European Parliament (EP

powers. Accession to the Customs Union was now depe

on their vote, and the broad socialist grouping in the EP 

agitating over human rights abuses in Turkey. Allied 

continuing Greek veto on the release of EU funds to Tu

and the rising violence against Turkish workers in Germ

traditional Turkish sensitivities were inflamed. At the 

time, former Eastern-bloc countries began to appe

potential candidates for membership ahead of Turkey, 

increasing demands on EU funding Turkey had hop

benefit from. In this environment, accession to the Cu

Union in 1995 could only look like a consolation prize. W

the EP grudgingly voted to allow Turkey into the Cu

Union on 13 December 1995, any electoral advantage th

DYP government may have garnered from this succes

already been dissipated. 

Of equal import for the pro-West elite were concerns 

the development of a European Security and Defense Id

(ESDI), which threatened to exclude Turkey. The We

European Union (WEU) had always been the body assum

take this forward and, under the KohI-Mitterrand axi

vision was that WEU would be the military arm of th

Because only full members of the EU were eligible for 

membership, Greece could become a member while T

despite recognition of its greater strategic importance, 

accorded only associate membership. Many Turks d

understand the WEU, but its rules and stated aspirations 

95 
y g 

memberships However, it stated realistically, "Being a secur

and defence organisation, WEU, while sharing the views of t

Council of Europe and the European Union as regards hum

rights and democracy in Turkey, has an obligation to consid

Turkey's role in the region from a slightly different angle. "8 

1947 only a direct threat from the Soviets had convinc

NATO to accept Turkey as a member. A WEU assessment 

Turkish interests and potential threats could only provoke 

similar debate if Turkey's full membership was discussed. T

balance between the perception of Turkey as an asset o

liability might be close. 

At the NATO ministerial meeting in June 1996, a politic

arrangement was at last agreed whereby the Europe

members accepted that under certain circumstances the WE

could be drawn into the NATO Combined Joint Task Fo

(CJTF) concept. This made Turkey's associate membership 

the WEU easier to accept. 

Turkey's Relations with the East 

Turkey and Russia 

In May 1992 Turkey and Russia concluded a treaty on bilate

relations that was heralded as the beginning of a new era 

relations between the two states. Agreement had been reach

on the outline for a settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh, and 

was said that Russia acknowledged Turkey's legitimate intere

in the Trans-Caucasus and Central Asia on the grounds 

political, economic, cultural, and religious ties to both are

The honeymoon did not last long. Given the range 

incompatible and conflicting interests across the region, it w

improbable that relations could remain long undisturbed. 

96 
coordinated air defense, joint control of border guards

where appropriate, training and troop basing agreements

Initially Russia had been concerned about the thre

Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia. Given the Mu

nature of the republics, the Russians saw Turkish penetr

as less threatening than Iranian. By 1993 this sanguine Ru

approach was being dispelled. In September, Yeltsin wro

Demirel expressing anxiety about growing Turkish influe

and making guarded reference to a likely Russian respons

sending this letter "Yeltsin sent a shock wave through Tu

• . . He reportedly declared that force ceilings establishe

the CFE treaty for the North Caucasus districts were fa

short of responding to Russia's needs, adding that they f

the risk of non-implementation. ''9 Gradually, both the Rus

and the United States saw the limitations on I urkey carv

dominant position in the area, and also the limitation

Iranian religious influence• In addition, the nature of the T

republics militated against Turkish influence. Onl

Azerbaijan was the language really similar, and elsew

history had weakened the cement of ethnic ties. Leaders o

republics soon began to play down the leading role of Tu

and sought to enhance their own position as indepen

regional players• Russia was recognized as a far more effe

"ally" than Turkey against China or Iran, and as a far gr

"threat" or "influence" than anyone. Their major transport 

still followed routes laid down under the Soviets. Their a

forces remained almost fully equipped with Russian weap

and therefore spares and ammunition would continue to 

to come from Russia. In addition, all the senior officers 

been in the Red Army and remained very heavily influence

their military upbringing• Lastly, but by no means of 

97 
In the Trans-Caucasus the rivalry was more pronounce

Here, Russia, Turkey, and Iran had contiguous frontiers, and 

long history of competition and conflict, and all three saw it 

an area of the greatest strategic importance. Once again t

reality was that Russia held the strongest cards. Turk

traditionally had good relations with Georgia but was forced 

watch as Russia used the Abkhazian and South Osseti

revolts as a cover to force a troop-basing agreement 

President Shevednadze. In Armenia the Russians to

advantage of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and traditional p

Russian, anti-Turkish attitudes to conclude a similar agreeme

By 1995 Turkey once again faced Russian troops across 

northeast borders. 

The situation in Azerbaijan was more complicated. Desp

Turkish suspicions that the Russians had engineered t

removal of the pro-Turkish President Elchibey in 199

President Aliev proved to be extremely robust in refusing 

accept Russian troops back on Azeri soil. His position w

weakened by the fact that realization of Azeri oil potential, a

resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, were bo

dependent on Russia. Turkey's potential to influence eve

was critically weakened by lack of a common border w

Azerbaijan. 

The Geopolitics of Oil 

Almost all assessments support the contention that oil w

continue to be the motor of the world's economy until w

into the next century, and that gas will be an equa

significant energy source. The republics of the former Sov

Union, including Russia itself, possess enormous reserves 

both. The oil reserves under the Caspian Sea and in the Cent

98 
became increasingly strong as the potential became k

investment increased, and Russia aspired to a leading re

role again. Access to Caspian and Central Asian oil 

keep world oil prices down, reduce dependency on 

East oil, and boost the prosperity of the new republics a

that of countries who could offer transit routes. It was as

that Azerbaijan could generate $2 billion a year in oil re

while Georgia could expect $500 million annually from 

rights. Independent and self-sufficient states, bolstered 

revenues, would deny Russia the chance to establish a d

sphere of influence in these regions. 11 No one had a 

direct stake in development on these lines than Turke

had few indigenous energy resources and rising 

demands, u 

Geography was against both the West and Turkey in 

the rules of the game. At an early stage Russia identif

leverage it could exert. The Trans-Caucasus was the g

to the West for Central Asia; therefore, by controlling G

and Armenia it had important conrol over energy exp

the early confusion of the Russian Federation, the R

military had taken almost independent action to re-es

their hold in Georgia and Armenia. The Russian interven

Chechenya in December 1994 was partly to ensure co

the Baku-Tikhoretsk pipeline and to seize the Groz

refinery with its processing capacity of 12 million tons 

Russia waited for the Azeris to realize that no oil deal 

done in the face of their opposition or without giving it a 

stake in the $6 billion oil deal between Azerbaijan 

international consortium. 

On a blank map, the most advantageous pipeline rou

Turkey would be from Azerbaijan, through Armenia, an

99 
swiftly recognized the realities of their geography. Russia

plans saw Azerbaijani oil coming north to Novorossiysk, or t

the Georgian port of Sopsa, and then out through th

Bosphorus; and Central Asian oil simply going north to Russ

and then west. They made some reference to a Sopsa-Ceyhan 

link, but in May 1996 Turkey withdrew its offer to rehabilitate 

the pipelines to Sopsa and appeared to have acknowledged th

difficulties of getting the Ceyhan link accepted. 13 

Turkey was not in a position to dictate terms, and it held 

no strong cards to use as leverage against the hard facts of it

geographic position. All it could do was object, on safety and 

environmental grounds, to increased use of the Bosphorus b

oil tankers. In reality, assuming there is a pipeline out o

Russia, the Black Sea countries, including Turkey, could 

probably absorb the majority of the oil in domesti

consumption, with minimal increase in traffic through th

Straits. 

While this was going on, Iran also began to flex it

economic muscle in the area. Iran had increasingly recognized 

the minimal impact that its Shiite brand of Islam had had i

Central Asia and the penalties of provoking Russia, while sti

embargoed by the United States. TM In the face of a critica

domestic economic situation, Iran's moderates saw greate

advantage in seeking to get economic benefits out of it

common border with Turkmenistan and its Caspian links with 

Kazakhstan. While Turkey was forced to put its faith in ethni

and linguistic ties, Iran could focus on a more pragmatic policy 

that concentrated on developing trade and infrastructure links

In May 1996 Iran opened a $216 million rail-link across th

Turkmen border, which re-opened transport ties from the Gu

into the Russian hinterland, and on to Southeast Asia. Although 

100 
p gggp

giving these landlocked oilfields access to world m

without going through Russia. At the same time 

succeeded in obtaining a 10 percent share in a $4 

project to develop the Shakh-Deniz oilfield in the Cas

Turkey and the Middle East 

Turkey had enhanced its Middle East credentials after i

off full diplomatic relations with Israel in the wake of 

1982 invasion of Lebanon. However, as key players 

Arab world re-engaged with Israel in the 1990s, so 

renewed its relationship. On the one hand this gave it le

against Iran and Syria, while on the other it offered sup

U.S. policy in the region and gave Turkey a chance fo

involvement. While the Middle East Peace Process was 

swing this policy brought advantages, to the extent tha

began to fear Turkey might usurp its leadership role 

region. As the Peace Process faltered in early 1996, T

support for Israel began to become a liability again, and 

seen and portrayed as anti-Arab. The coincidence of De

visit to Tel Aviv and the signing of a new Turco-lsraeli m

accord, almost at the same time as Israel's Operation 

of Wrath in Southern Lebanon, could not have bee

poorly timed. The military and the secular parties s

arrangement in bald political and security terms, but 

whose political rhetoric included rabid anti-Semitism

opposed to a Middle East policy whose cornerston

alliance with the only non-Muslim country in the reg

Turkish political terms this attitude was not as significa

appeared. The majority of Turks were contemptuous 

Arabs and still bore memories of the "betrayal" of th

World War. They did not feel they owed the Arab 

101 
establishing a de facto Kurdish state in the region. 

Conclusion 

Turkey does not share a single border with a friendly country

Allied to its self-denying ordinance over unilateral action an

its economic limitations, this severely limits its scope fo

maneuver. None of the major players in the Balkans, Trans

Caucasus, Middle East or Central Asia has any interest i

advancing Turkey's ambitions to play a more significan

regional role, and most have a vested interest in thwarting i

Turkey's friends and allies can do little to advance its position

and the state of Turkish politics in 1995/96 undermined it

pretentions to be a role model for the new Turkic republics

Antagonism with Greece complicates its relations with th

organizations it most desires to join. Potential clashes with it

southern neighbors force many in the West to questio

whether Turkey brings more liabilities than assets to th

security equation. Turkey's anomalous situation, and it

developing sense of isolation, are compounded by th

enthusiasm with which the West seems to seize on bot

Samuel Huntington's article "Clash of Civilisations? "16 and th

NATO Secretary General's speech of 1995 putting forwar

Islam as a new threat in the post-Cold War era. With its Janu

face, Turkey looks both East and West and finds little rea

comfort in either direction. 

102 
3. Owing to Greek lobbying, the United States delayed re

three frigates for which Turkey had paid $130 million, or to co

an order for 10 Cobra helicopters. 

4. Interview with Professor Hasan Koni, Head of the 

Institute, Ankara, 7 December 1995. 

5. Micheal Cendrowicz, "The European Communi

Turkey; Looking Backwards, Looking Forward," in Turkish 

Policy: New Prospects, ed. Clement H. Dodd (Wistow: Eothe

1992), 17. 

6. The U.N. Development Program measures 

elements--life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rate, and G

capita---to produce a composite "Human Development Index

ranking. In 1985 Turkey was ranked 110 out of 130. Paul K

Preparing for the 21st Century (London: Harper Collins, 199

7. Assembly of Western European Union, Defense Com

The Eastern Mediterranean, Document 1465, 24 May 1995. 

8. Ibid., 9. 

9. Duygu Sezer, Turkey's Political and Security Intere

Policies in the New Geostrategic Environment of the Expanded 

East (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1994), 8

10. In Kazakhstan this Russian minority is 38 percent 

population, and concentrated in the Northwest, close to the 

border and among the major oil and gas fields. 

11. The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder, The New 

Game:" Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Washing

January 1996. This paper, largely written for a Republican au

convincingly spells out the dangers of allowing Russia to re-e

hegemony in these critical oil-producing areas, but is less 

setting out a realistic agenda to reverse their current success

12. Turkey estimates that it will have to raise its 

production from 70 million to 270 million kilowatt hours by 2

reach this capacity Turkey will have to spend $2 billion per ye

even then Turkey's energy sources will still only provide 38 

of Turkey's requirements. Turkish Probe, 26 Apr 1996. 

103 
104 
g 

It is Turkey's perception that it is an important countr

Turkey is an important country. In fashioning th

republic, Ataturk inherited an Ottoman tradition of state 

and a security policy based on fear of Russia and alig

with the West. Ataturk turned this alignment with the We

the foundation of all Turkish policy. The "national m

would be buttressed by any actions that secured the ter

integrity and unity of Turkey. In his slogans "Happy th

who calls himself Turk" and "Peace at home, peace 

World," Ataturk encapsulated a vision of society that cou

accept domestic division, but would not pursue e

expansionism. This vision was passed for safekeeping 

military and civil service establishment. Consensu

"national policy" served Turkey well. Faced with im

challenges in three eras of dramatic global change, the 

of Turkey's leaders consistently to identify the national 

allowed it to adapt to new circumstances, taking it t

new statehood, World War, global superpower confron

and the New World Order without any of the disaste

befell other countries. 

But in the foundations of the Turkish state, Ataturk c

potential divisions in Turkish society. These divisions we

addressed by his successors, and they became institution

by the state elites, either with a vested interest in main

their position, or unable to see how to alter society w

undermining its cohesion. Ataturk made nationalism a d

aspect of the ideology of the state, although Turkey 

multi-ethnic and multicultural society. To a large ext

succeeded in assimilating the many different ethnic 

105 
While the state elites maintained their secular purity throug

major socioeconomic change, elements of more traditiona

Turkish society became increasingly unhappy with what the

perceived to be an antireligious bias. Democracy led to th

undermining of the "right" of the establishment to dictate th

social identity of the country, and its external orientation. 

Ataturk had laid down a Western-oriented policy, an

through the Cold War necessity marched in step wit

inclination, overcoming the periods of frustration an

ambivalence. The foreign policy objectives of all Turkis

governments and all political parties remained broadly similar

and while the depth and intensity of Turkey's association wit

the West may have been questioned, the fact of it was no

This alignment was heavily subsidized by the West. However

the strong aspiration to be part of the West was not matched b

the necessary political, economic and social advances. Th

economy remained autarkic and nationalist, and thes

endemic structural problems in the economy increasingl

hampered Turkey's integration into the Western economy an

stunted the development of a recogniZable middle class. Poo

economic development meant poor social development and

consequently, weak political development. All of thi

contributed to the continuing dominance of the state over civ

society, exemplified by the continuity of security polic

through 54 governments in 73 years ~ and the "paternalistic

interventions of the military. 

The Ozal period highlighted the dilemma. On one sid

were the few pluralists who saw that Turkey would not b

accepted by the West on sentiment alone, and that genuin

alignment would come only with modernization and fu

democracy. On the other side were both the establishment

106 
Turkey a national "winner" but created many ind

"losers." Many objected to the corruption and ostentati

economic advance spawned, and in a democracy, th

important electoral implications. In the 1990s thi

increasingly successfully exploited by Refah. 

The end of the Cold War was the end of easy cons

The lifting of a sense of common threat binding Turkey a

West revealed both the domestic and international div

Ataturk had set a "national mission" but this was by no 

the natural orientation of the country. Under new interna

pressures and the lack of encouragement, the conc

security policy as a "national policy" was increa

challenged, or at least questioned. The 1995 and 

political maneuverings revealed Turkey's continuing 

for a sense of unity and common culture. The Turkish p

landscape was now dominated by three competing cu

Kurdish nationalism, Islamism, and Kemalist nationalism

division had its roots in the inability of Turkey to dev

genuinely pluralistic society that could accommodate di

interpretations of Turkey's destiny. Kurdish natio

claimed the problem lay in the state's rigid interpreta

Turkish nationalism; Islamists saw the root of the prob

Ataturk's reforms, which deliberately aimed at d

Turkey's Islamic identity. Kemalists saw the crisis as ste

from foreign forces seeking to divide Turkey, and fro

antisecular and antinational policies of the first two gro

Because the internal and external policies of Turk

always been so closely interlinked, these competing vis

Turkish society inevitably threatened the consensus on f

policy. Although Turkey acceded to the Customs Un

1995, remained an active member of NATO, and freq

107 
West, which coincided with the outright rejection professed b

the increasingly politically significant Islamists. As traced 

this paper, whatever other aspects of Kemalism had bee

eroded, the state elites had maintained Ataturk's Wester

orientation whatever the political hue of the government, an

whatever the temperature of public opinion. In the main

Turkish foreign policy had always displayed caution, an

regard for the good opinion of the international community

Only over Cyprus had they sidelined the principles of Kemalis

foreign policy and backed unilateral, aggressive action. Fro

the end of the Cold War, observers noted that not only wa

there a growing division between state and electorate over th

direction of Turkish foreign policy, but even within the sta

this consistent pro-West foreign policy line was bein

questioned. A 1995 book on foreign affairs opened with th

words: 

The imperialist Western powers, and the rich Christian 

countries, have always united against the threat from the East, 

the Eastern peoples, the Ottoman Empire, and the Turks... 

• Turkey is a country that has to live together with the Middle 

Eastern countries, however much it integrates with Western 

countries and Europe. In short it cannot be detached from the 

Middle East. 

The significance was that this came not from Islamis

nationalist, or Marxist writings but from a book published b

TGS, the organization that was such a bulwark of Ataturk

drive for acceptance by the West. ~ There was evidence that th

establishment might be losing the authority, and now the wil

to continue imposing the Kemalist line. 

108 
television in 1995, General Evren, the former presiden

"The Western powers have never given up their ambit

• the young generations will see that the great powers wi

the (Kurdish) Southeast away from us. "~ In the West, th

that senior military and political figures in Turkey cou

believe that there was a conspiracy to dismember their c

was greeted with incredulity• However, although 

difficult to discern any advantage the West could gai

weakening Turkey, it was still a sincerely held Turkish op

found at all levels of society. Such suspicions were fe

traditional belief that, despite all its efforts, the Wes

antipathetic to Turkey, or simply self-serving. 

In the West there was agreement that Turkey 

significant regional player and that many issues concerni

West had a strong Turkish dimension. However, asses

on its future varied• The spectrum of opinion ranged 

Turkey as a secular, democratic, industrialized member 

West, to Turkey as an Islamized neutralist state, to Turkey 

by internal violence or involved in regional conflict, 

worryingly against Greece. What the West was less c

about was how significantly to reinforce Ataturk's o

instinct for alignment with the advanced nations. Desp

West's best intentions the options for assistance were l

or constrained by geopolitical realities. Even without 

constraints, the inability, or refusal, of Turkey to adj

domestic structures to the requirements of a genuine plu

society, made it difficult to accept it as an equal. 

In Turkey, this attitude, allied to public frustration 

inability of Turkey to achieve some of its maximalist amb

contributed to an exasperating lack of mutual understa

and an inevitable weakening of sympathy for the Wes

109 
g y p

minimalist foreign policy, despite external provocation an

periodic political instability. This trend was not helped by th

inability of the center-right political parties (ANAP and DYP) t

put aside personal animosities in the face of an Islamis

challenge to the state. The cynicism, corruption, and shor

termism of the political maneuverings after the 1995 election

were damaging to all the secular parties. It also undermined i

own, and the West's, hopes that Turkey would provide th

example of a Muslim, secular, and democratic society to othe

states in the region. 

When all this has been said, there was an inertia built int

alignment with the West that even Refah recognized, as it

early government policy pronouncements made clea

However unsatisfactory it felt the current relationship with th

West to be, there was simply no market that could replac

Europe and the United States, or which offered such potentia

The Turkish people's acceptance of Ataturk's "nationa

mission" lay not only in the attachment to his memory an

legacy, but also in the obvious results of modern developmen

When Turks looked at other countries in the region only Israe

impressed them. Additionally there was no substitute for th

security that membership of NATO offered, particularly whil

the future of Russia remained uncertain. The NATO-WEU 

accord on security arrangements lessened Turkey's concern

over an European security identity that excluded its an

Turkey's relationship with the West would also be easier if th

EU were now also to develop on the principle of broade

rather than deeper, integration. Domestically there was 

vibrant private sector economy, and there was general publi

support for secularism, or a secularism that more openl

acknowledged the Muslim nature of society. Turkey was no

IIO 
understandably caused major concerns among Turkey's 

The United States had been particularly scarred over Ira

all the West had developed a suspicion and fear of I

fundamentalism, deepened by events in Algeria. W

reaction to an Erbakan government was like that of the T

military: wait and see. At this stage Refah had little optio

to be responsible. They had broken the taboos of 73 ye

secularism, the military had not intervened, the stock m

and currency had not collapsed, and there had been a gu

response from abroad. However, any chance of 

achieving anything radical depended on a future, 

emphatic election success, and that depended on conv

critics and sceptics, at home and abroad, that they w

serious, responsible, democratic party of government. 

could not yet achieve the two-thirds majority in the 

required to change the constitution nor, against the m

bloc, would they gain control of the NSC. 

While the establishment, and particularly the armed f

still adhered to secularism and Kemalist foreign 

principles, they limited the ability of politicians or pu

drive Turkey into adventurism, or radically to alter Tu

foreign policy orientation. However, the move of Islamis

mainstream Turkish politics called into question many 

assumptions, and a Turkish government, even a co

government, that was not psychologically aligned wi

West complicated Western security calculations in the 

Domestically, even some secularists thought the Refah s

may prove to have a healthy dimension. Refah woul

have to match their actions to their words. They would h

operate within the economic and geo-political limitati

Turkey. They would have to make the compromise

111 
development, yet one that was vulnerable, uneasy, watched 

a dubious military, and likely to splinter easily. 

Erbakan initially adopted many of the existing poli

stances on security issues, accepting a division 

responsibility that left the security portfolios with the DY

Refah needed U.S. support over many issues, and their soc

program was unattainable without the continuing assistance 

the IMF and World Bank. The rhetoric over Customs Unio

the European Union, and NATO may be new, but Islam

pronouncements would probably be accompanied 

secularists being despatched to put Western minds at rest, a

delegations sent to the military to reassure them that Kemal

principles were not being threatened. In a more encouragin

move, during his visit to Southeast Asia in August 199

Erbakan echoed Gokalp's enthusiasm for Japan when he, to

portrayed that country as a modern role model for Turke

Even closer to home was his endorsement of Malaysia as 

Muslim country that was also a confident player in the glob

economy. 

The continuing firm, if reluctant support for the U.S. poli

of dual-containment in the region was inevitably going 

come under pressure. Turkish policy seemed likely to mov

closer to other Muslim countries and further from the Israel

The early suspension of the Turkish-Israeli military agreemen

the enthusiasm for renewed trade with Iraq, and th

multibillion dollar oil deal with Iran were early indications 

this new shift in orientation. However, Erbakan exerte

significant party discipline to ensure that a revised format f

Operation Provide Comfort was voted for by Refah deputies 

the GNA. In addition, Erbakan was a Turk and a nationalist. 

was fair to assume that if there was no reciprocal movement o

112 
interests. 7~ Ciller's credentials had already been establ

during the Kardak confrontation of early 1996, and 

coalition was united in a vigorous response to renewed G

agitation in Cyprus in August 1996. Against strong Tu

military and public concern Refah might in time suppo

softening of the cultural impositions in Kurdish areas, bu

dared not yet hint at anything that might imply, or encou

autonomy or separatism. 

What the long-term implications of this new po

landscape will be for the West depends on how sur

establishment's hand remains on the levers of state pow

Turkish society, a Western orientation is still broadly supp

by the 79 percent of the electorate who did not vote for 

in 1995. But, perversely, the establishment simultane

advocate, pursue, yet undermine this orientation. Until 

adjustments are made in the economy, a number of iss

the constitutional position on human rights, the role o

security forces in society, the Kurdish problem, the iss

democratic pluralism in the broadest sense, the relatio

with the West--can never develop fully. Refah have cer

further complicated the situation. Maybe this is inevit

given the nature of Turkey. Currently it is difficult 

optimistic about developments in Turkey, given the la

political power or authority in civil society, and the la

vision in the state. 

Refah may push too forcefully against the constrain

Turkish politics and provoke a response by the military. I

do not provoke the military directly, their Islamic conserv

may yet push the Alewites into violent opposition, givin

Army a reason to intervene on a "law and order" basis. 

pursuit of domestic consensus the coalition may run a

113 
difficult situation and give enormous encouragement both 

Turkey's enemies and all those who would wish to detac

Turkey from the West. 

The best outcome for the West would be that th

pragmatists in Refah recognize the advantages of alignme

with the West, while accepting the current, broad limitation

on their actions. In such a case political "froth" will cover th

fact that little has changed. However things do need to chang

Erbakan's public espousal of such countries as Japan an

Malaysia give some hope that even the Islamists recognize th

Turkey is sui generis and must find a workable compromis

between its material ambitions, its legitimate secur

concerns, and its Muslim identity. "Peace in the World" is ve

much in Turkey's interests, and the West must do all it can 

shape circumstances to help it. "Peace at Home" lies mo

directly in Turkey's own hands. 

Ultimately there is a need for Turkey to help itself, thereb

allowing the West to help Turkey. There is the most importa

mutual interest in this. The West cannot afford to "lose" suc

a valuable country, in such an important region, at such 

critical period. A proud, important country like Turkey, wi

enormous potential, must not be allowed or encouraged 

"reject" the West, thereby turning from its legitimate an

historical goal of "achieving the level of contempora

civilization." The old joke that "the situation is critical, but 

is not serious" used to reflect an underlying stability in Turke

and the self-adjusting nature of the relationship between sta

and society. The danger is that in this new environment th

situation in Turkey becomes both critical and serious. 

114 
2. Given that the CHP had a monopoly of power from 

1946, and continued in power until 1950, there have now b

governments in 47 years. 

3. M. Hakan Yavaz, "Turkey's "Imagined Enemies": Ku

Islamists," in The World Today 52, no. 4 (April 1996): 99. 

4. In a 1995 independent poll, 50 percent of Turks said t

their place was in Europe, while the rest were equally 

between the "Islamic" and "Turkic" worlds. To the question "

nations are the best friends of Turkey?" 30 percent now sa

"Turkey has no friends", while 25 percent saw the United S

their greatest enemy, and 23 percent gave Greece this ac

Japan now featured as the most favoured nation, replacing the 

preference for Germany. In the 1995 elections Refah and th

parties with the strongest anti West and anti European credentia

well in the elections. Although diametrically opposed on soc

religious policies, their combined vote represented 37 percen

electorate (Sahin Alpay, in The Independent, 22 May 1996, 2

5. Ibid. 

6. Ibid. 

7. Interview with Sami Kohen, foreign affairs editor of M

Istanbul, 5 July 1996. 

8. Interview with Soli Ozel, Bogazici University, Istan

luly 1996. 

1 1.5 
Lieutenant Colonel S. V. Mayall is currently Comman

Officer of the Queen's Dragoon Guards of the British A

He is a veteran of the Persian Gulf War and has serv

Military Assistant to the Deputy Supreme Allied Comma

Europe. Lieutenant Colonel Mayall received an M.A. 

Oxford and attended the Army Staff College. From 1995-1 

he was a Defence Fellow of St. Antony's College, Oxford

117 
ground forces in Europe under Eisenhower, when he was kill

combat in Normandy, 25 July I944. 

The following is a complete listing of published McNair Pa

For information on availability of specific titles, contact 

Distribution Manager, Publications Directorate & NDU Press

McNair, Washington, DC 20"~19-5066 (telephone: comme

202/685-4379; DSN 325-4379). 

1. Joseph P. Lorenz, Egypt and the New Arab Coalition, Feb

1989. 

2. John E. Endicott, Grand Strategy and the Pacific Region, 

1989. 

3. Eugene V. Rostow, President, Prime Minister, or Cons6tu

Monarch? October 1989. 

4. Howard G. DeWolf, SDI and Arms Control, November 19

5. Martin C. Libicki, What Makes Industries Strategic, Nove

1989. 

6. Melvin A. Goodman, Gorbachev and Soviet Policy in the 

World, February 1990. 

7. John Van Oudenaren, "The Tradition of Change in Soviet Fo

Policy," and Francis Conte, "Two Schools of Soviet Diplom

in Understanding Soviet Foreign Policy, April 1990. 

8. Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, A Strategic Vie

Insurgencies: Insights from El Salvador, May 1990. 

9. Steven R. Linke, Managing Crises in Defense Induslry: 

PEPCON and Avtex Cases, June 1990. 

10. Christine M. Helms, Arabism and Islam: Stateless Nations 

Nationless States, September 1990. 

11. Ralph A. Cossa, Iran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns, July 1

12. Ewan Jamieson, Friend orally? A Question for New Zealand, 

1991. 

13. Richard J. Dunn III, From Gettysburg to the Guff and Bey

Coping with Revolutionary Technological Change in 

Warfare, March 1992. 

14. Ted Greenwood, U.S. and NATO Force Structure and M

Operations in the Mediterranean, June 1993. 
Charter Be Raised From the Dead? July 1993 

20. William T. Iohnsen and Thomas DurelI-Young; Jeffrey Simo

Daniel N. Nelson; William C. Bodie, and James McCarth

European Security Toward the Year 2000, August 1993. 

21. Edwin R. Carlisle, ed., Developing Battlefield Technologies in t

1990s, August 1993. 

22. Patrick Clawson, How Has Saddam Hussein Survived? Econom

Sanctions, 1990-93, August 1993. 

23. Jeffrey Simon, Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Divorce," Visegr

Cohesion, and European Fault Lines, October 1993. 

24. Eugene V. Rostow, The Future of Palestine, November 1993. 

25. William H. Lewis, John MackinJay, John G. Ruggie, and Sir Bria

Urquhart, Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead? November 1993. 

26. Edward Marks and William Lewis, Triage for Failing State

January 1994. 

27. Gregory D. Foster, In Search of a Post-Cold War Secur

Structure, February 1994. 

28. Martin C. Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Arm

Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon, March 1994. 

29. Patrick Clawson, ed., Iran's Strategic Intentions and Capabilitie

April 1994. 

30. James W. Morrison, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An Assessment o

Russian Ultra-Nationalist, April 1994. 

31. Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, Redefining the U.

Japan Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program, Novemb

1994. 

32. Scott W. Conrad, Moving the Force: Desert Storm and Beyon

December 1994. 

33. John N. Petrie, American Neutrality in the 20th Century: T

Impossible Dream, January 1995. 

34. James H. Brusstar and Ellen Jones, The Russian Military's Role 

Politics, January 1995. 

35. S. Nelson Drew, NATO from Berlin to Bosnia: Trans-Atlan

Security in Transition, January 1995. 

36. Karl W. Eikenberry, Explaining and Influencing Chinese Arm

Transfers, February 1995. 
Security Alignments in Europe, April 1995. 

41. Barry R. Schneider, Radical Responses to Radical Regime

Evaluating Preemptive Counter-Proliferation, May 1995. 

42. John Jaworsky, Ukraine: Stability and Instability, July 1995. 

43. Ronald Tiersky, The Mitterrand Legacy and the Future of Frenc

Security Policy, August 1995. 

44. John A. Cope, International Military Education and Training: A

Assessment, October 1995. 

45. Elli Lieberman, Deterrence Theory: Success or Failure in Arab

Israeli Wars? October 1995. 

46. Stanley R. Sloan, NATO's Future: Beyond Collective Defens

December 1995. 

47. M. E. Ahrari, The New Great Game in Muslim Central Asi

January 1996. 

48. Mark J. Roberts, Khomeini's Incorporation of the Irania

Miilitary, January 1996. 

49. Steven Philip Kramer and Irene Kyriakopoulos, Trouble 

Paradise? Europe in the 21st Century, March 1996. 

50. Alan L. Gropman, Mobilizing U.S. Industry in World War I1: My

and Reality, August 1996. 

51. Ralph A. Cossa, The Major Powers in Northeast Asian Securit

September 1996. 

52. Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War, Octob

1996. 

53. Donna Lee Van Cot/, Defiant Again: Indigenous Peoples an

Latin American Security, October 1996. 

54. Ivelaw L. Griffith, Caribbean Security on the Eve of the 21

Century, September 1996. 

55. Roman Popadiuk, American-Ukrainian Nuclear Relation

November 1996. 
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