IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Anthonee Patterson, :

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

Kenneth Shelton, individually and :

in his capacity as President of the :

Board Of Trustees, of the Church :

of the Lord Jesus Christ of the : No. 2147 C.D. 2014

Apostolic Faith, Inc. : Submitted: July 2, 2015

BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE McGINLEY FILED: December 18, 2015

Anthonee Patterson (Patterson) appeals from the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) which granted Bishop Kenneth 

Shelton’s (Shelton) motion to dismiss on the trial court’s determination that it 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This procedural and factual history is recounted in this Court’s 

memorandum opinion in the case of Patterson v. Shelton, (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 2396 

C.D. 2011, filed March 6, 2013), slip opinion, appeal denied, 78 A.3d 1092 (Pa. 

2013).

This marks the [fifth] time this Court has been called 

upon to review action by the [trial court] in the 

underlying tangle of controversies involving a religious 

schism which has spanned over two decades. In all, 
2

seven lawsuits were instituted by various parties against a 

church, its corporate trustee and various officials in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Court of 

Common Pleas of Delaware County, and United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.1

The key players involved in the present offshoot of the 

controversy are: (1) the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ 

of the Apostolic Faith (the “Church”), an

unincorporated association, founded in 1919; (2) the 

“Trustees of the General Assembly of the Church of the 

Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc.”, (the 

“Corporate Trustee”), a Pennsylvania nonprofit 

corporation formed in 1947 to act as the trustee and 

hold property in trust for the Church2; (3) Patterson, a 

life-long member, elder, and minister of the Church; and 

(4) Shelton, the current “Bishop” and/or “Overseer” of 

the Church and “President” of the Corporate Trustee.

The dispute began in 1991 when then-Bishop S. 

McDowall Shelton, died, leaving vacancies in the offices 

of “Overseer” of the Church and “President” of the 

Corporate Trustee. Immediately upon Bishop S. 

McDowall Shelton’s death, Shelton and his “faction” 

took control of the accounts, trusts and properties of the 

 

 

1

These lawsuits are recounted in more detail in this Court’s previous opinion in Church of 

the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc. v. Shelton, (Pa. Cmwlth. Nos. 376 C.D. 2000 

and 559 C.D. 2000, filed April 10, 2001). See also Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the 

Apostolic Faith, Inc., et al, v. Roddy Shelton, II, 740 A.2d 751 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999), for an 

insightful history of this complex and protracted dispute. See also Joseph Askew v. Trustees of 

the General Assembly of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc., 644 

F.Supp. 2d 584 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (“Askew I”) and Joseph Askew v. Trustees of the General 

Assembly of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc., 776 F.Supp. 2d 25 

(E.D. Pa. 2011) (“Askew II”).

2

 The Corporate Trustee’s Charter provided that the purpose for which it was formed was 

to “take, receive, have and hold and manage real and personal property in trust for the uses and 

purposes specified by the General Assembly of the Church” and that said purposes did “not 

contemplate pecuniary gain or profit incidental or otherwise to its members.” Charter, June 27, 

1947, at 1; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 266a.
3

Church and Corporate Trustee. After extensive litigation 

initiated by two other dissident factions of the Church 

congregation[3]over the leadership of the Church and 

Corporate Trustee, the trial court ultimately determined, 

and this Court later affirmed, that Shelton and his Board 

of Trustees were in control.4

[II. Patterson’s Prior Appeal To This Court]

On July 24, 1995, Patterson, as life-long member, elder 

and minister of the Church, commenced an action in 

equity against Shelton, in Shelton’s individual capacity 

and as the President of the Board of Trustees of the 

Corporate Trustee.

5

 Patterson alleged that since taking 

control of the Church and Corporate Trustee in 1991, 

Shelton and his Board of Trustees have misappropriated 

funds, “looted the Church’s assets,” paid themselves 

salaries in contravention of Church By-Laws, and funded 

private expenditures, lavish vacations, lingerie, cars, 

homes and other personal incidentals with assets which 

were donated and designated for Church religious and 

charitable missions.

6

Patterson requested, inter alia: (1) the appointment of a 

receiver to take control of the assets of the Church held 

 

3

 Patterson was the leader of one such faction. 

4

See Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc. v. Shelton, (Pa. 

Cmwlth. Nos. 376 C.D. 2000 and 559 C.D. 2000, filed April 10, 2001).

5

Erik Shelton was also named as a Defendant but on November 30, 2005, he was 

voluntarily dismissed from the lawsuit.

6

Specifically, Patterson alleged that Shelton took physical possession of cash offerings 

designated for the Church from churches throughout the Eastern United States and converted 

them to his own use; converted $111,537 from the Gresham Trust, a fund held for the benefit of 

Church members in need of social services; converted $111,533 from a Church account held at 

Fidelity National Bank; converted $10,585 from the Church’s “Bus Rally Money Account;” 

converted $64,000 from a Church account at Commonwealth Federal and Loan which was 

dedicated for youth studies; and converted $8,000 from two accounts at Mid Atlantic Bank 

donated by Church members for the purpose of financially assisting the Church’s international 

missions. Complaint, ¶¶12(a)-(f) at 5-7; R.R. at 127a-129a.
4

by the Corporate Trustee; (2) an order requiring Shelton 

to issue annual financial reports for the years 1991, 1992, 

1993, and 1994; and (3) an accounting. 

The parties engaged in discovery. Patterson retained

James A. Stavros, CPA (Stavros), a forensic financial 

investigator, to analyze the finances and expenditures of 

the Church and the Corporate Trustee. Stavros authored 

a report which detailed his findings that Shelton and his 

Board of Trustees withdrew hundreds of thousands of 

dollars from Church accounts with no accounting of 

where the funds went and that they expended Church 

funds on a significant amount of “personal” items and 

expenditures that appeared to be outside the normal 

course of business and outside Church laws and 

customs.

7

 He concluded that Church accounts had 

declined by nearly $1 million under Shelton’s control.

8

In January 2006, the parties agreed to submit to binding 

arbitration. The Arbitrator concluded that the credible 

evidence established that Shelton had engaged in various 

acts of fraud, mismanagement, conspiracy, breach of 

fiduciary responsibilities, [and] violations of By-laws and 

the Articles of Incorporation in seizing corporate funds 

and assets and depleting bank accounts designated for 

Church-related purposes. The Arbitrator concluded that 

Shelton had diverted Church funds and assets to himself 

and others for his and their benefit. The Arbitrator 

appointed a receiver and directed Shelton to account for 

all Church funds removed by him or those acting with 

him. 

Shelton filed a motion to vacate the award which the trial 

court denied. On appeal, this Court overturned the 

arbitration award because the arbitrator went beyond the 

 

7

This included vacations all over the world including, but not limited to: Cannes, France, 

Disney World, Switzerland, and purchases from stores such as Victoria’s Secret. 

8

Shelton did not retain a financial expert to counter Patterson’s report.
5

scope of his authority in fashioning relief. See Shelton v. 

Patterson, 942 A.2d 967 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). This Court 

remanded the matter to the trial court to determine 

whether Patterson was entitled to relief under the 

[Nonprofit Corporation Law of 1988, 15 Pa. C.S. §§ 

5101-5997] NCL.

On remand, Shelton moved for summary judgment on the 

ground that Patterson lacked “statutory standing” under 

Section 5782 of the NCL, 15 Pa.C.S. §5782. Shelton 

argued that only an officer, director, or member of a 

nonprofit corporation has “statutory standing” to enforce 

a right of a nonprofit corporation through a derivative 

action. Section 5782 of the NCL, 15 Pa. C.S. § 5782, 

which is contained in Subchapter F governing “derivative 

actions,” provides:

Actions against directors, members of an other body 

and officers

(a) General rule – Except as provided in subsection (b), 

in any action or proceeding brought to enforce a 

secondary right on the part of one or more members 

of a nonprofit corporation against any present or 

former officer, director or member of an other body of 

the corporation because the corporation refuses to 

enforce rights that may properly be asserted by it, each 

plaintiff must aver and it must be made to appear that 

each plaintiff was a member of the corporation at the 

time of the transaction of which he complains. 

(Emphasis added.)

15 Pa. C.S. § 5782. 

Shelton pointed to the Corporate Trustee’s Articles of 

Incorporation which limited its membership in the 

nonprofit corporation to its Board of Trustees. Shelton 

asserted that because Patterson was never a member of 

the Board of Trustees he was never a “member” of the 

Corporate Trustee, and thus, he had no “statutory 

standing” to bring claims that are derivative of the 

Corporate Trustee’s rights. 
6

The trial court agreed that under Section 5782 of the 

NCL, Patterson could only bring suit if he was a member 

of the Corporate Trustee at the time of the alleged events 

outlined in the Complaint. The trial court looked to 

Article IX of the Articles of Incorporation which states: 

“membership in the corporation [Corporate Trustee] shall 

consist of those persons serving as members of the Board 

of Trustees.” The trial court concluded that because 

Patterson had never been a member of the Board of 

Trustees he was not a member of the Corporate Trustee. 

The trial court reasoned that because the NCL created the 

cause of action and designated who may sue; standing 

was a jurisdictional prerequisite to any action. Grom v. 

Burgoon, 672 A.2d 823 (Pa. Super. 1996). The trial 

court “finding no possible way to affirm that [Patterson] 

has standing” granted the motion for summary judgment 

and dismissed the case. Trial Court Opinion, January 25, 

2012, at 3.

Patterson, slip opinion at 1-6.

III. This Court’s Analysis And Disposition Of Patterson’s Prior Appeal

[This Court rationalized in Patterson]:

An example of derivative claims previously asserted 

against the Corporate Trustee and Shelton (and others) is 

found in the related case commenced by Joseph Askew 

(Askew) in the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 2009. See footnote 1 

In Askew I, Askew, who claimed to be a member of the 

Church, brought an eight-count complaint against 

Shelton, the Corporate Trustee and the other managers of 

the Corporate Trustee (collectively “Defendants”). In 

Count II, Askew alleged breach of fiduciary duty owed 

to the Corporate Trustee. In Count IV, Askew alleged 

that the Board of Trustees failed to present the members 

of the Corporate Trustee with an annual report containing 

specific financial information under Section 5553 of the 
7

NCL. In Count V, Askew sought the removal of Shelton 

as President of the Corporate Trustee. 

Defendants moved to dismiss these counts because 

Askew lacked standing under the NCL to bring 

derivative claims. 

The [United States] District Court agreed that these 

claims were derivative because any alleged failure to 

satisfy a supposed duty of loyalty and care owed to the 

Corporate Trustee would “injure[] only that 

corporation.” Askew I, 644 F.Supp. 2d at 590. The 

United States District Court determined Count IV was 

also a derivative claim because that section guarantees a 

nonprofit corporation “the right to self-knowledge” and 

that “[a]ny right that Section 5553 may confer is a right 

of the corporation, and a claim to encore [sic] this 

section necessarily falls within the ambit of Section 

5782.” Askew I, 644 F.Supp 2d at 590 (Emphasis 

added.) As for Count V, the [United States] District 

Court found that under Section 5726 of the NCL, a court 

is only empowered to remove a director “upon petition of 

any member or director” of the nonprofit corporation. Id.

. . . . 

The [United States] District [C]ourt concluded that since

Askew was not a member or director of the Corporate 

Trustee, he did not have “statutory standing” to seek 

these kinds of relief. 

Even though the [United States] District Court found that 

Counts II, IV and V were derivative claims, the [United 

States] District Court explained that Askew’s claims in 

Counts I and VI for breach of fiduciary duty to the 

Church and unjust enrichment for misappropriation of 

Church funds were not derivative of the Corporate 

Trustee’s rights. Therefore, they were not claims “that 

only the Corporation’s [Corporate Trustee] members 

directors or officers can bring.” Askew I, 644 F.Supp. at 

590.

. . . . 
8

Similarly, in Askew I, the [United States] District Court 

determined, and this Court concurs, that the members of 

a Church’s congregation suffer injury when the Church’s 

assets, which were held in trust, are misused. Askew I, 

644 F.Supp. 2d at 591. The [United States] District 

Court clarified that only through Askew's membership in 

the Church was he qualified to bring an action on behalf 

of the Church under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23.1 (governing 

standing to bring derivative actions on behalf of

unincorporated associations).[9]

Here, there is no question that Patterson was a member of 

the Church when he instituted the action.[10] As a 

member of the Church congregation, Patterson was part 

of the beneficiary class for which the Corporate Trustee 

held the Church’s assets in trust. As such, he has

standing to bring this action to enforce his own rights and 

the rights commonly held by all beneficiaries to obtain 

restoration to the Church of its full losses. Thus, the 

action should not have been dismissed due to lack of 

standing under the NCL. 

As noted, the Church is an unincorporated association. 

This Court notes that its conclusion that Patterson has 

standing is also wholly consistent with principles 

governing standing to sue on behalf of an unincorporated 

association. See Pa.R.C.P. No. 2152 (action by 

unincorporated association must be brought in name of 

member as trustee ad litem).

[11]

 

9

In Askew II, the District Court went on to find that Askew was not a “member” of the 

Church because he was expelled through the procedures in Article XIII of the Church’s ByLaws. 

 

10 Shelton argues that Patterson was not a member of the Church congregation because he 

“abandoned” the Church. However, the record demonstrates that the Church never took any 

action to remove Patterson. Article XIII of the Church By-laws provided a method for the 

expulsion or suspension of members. The Church could have used those procedures to remove 

Patterson who Shelton alleges abandoned the Church, but it did not do so.

11 To hold otherwise would, as a practical matter, insulate these most serious allegations 

from judicial review.
9

Patterson, slip opinion at 9-10 and 16-17.

This court reversed the order of the trial court and remanded to the 

trial court to conduct a trial on the remaining factual and legal issues raised in 

Patterson’s complaint. 

IV. Patterson’s Present Appeal

On July 15, 2014, the trial court commenced a non-jury trial. 

Patterson offered the following proof regarding Rita Bolognese’s (Bolognese)

testimony, a senior paralegal and records custodian for BNY Mellon. “She will 

testify to bank records which we have in our possession, that they’re authentic, and 

that from there, certain transactions we will be questioning with other witnesses 

once we’ve established that they are true and correct copies of those records.” 

Trial Transcript, July 15, 2014, (T.T. 7/15/14) at 29; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 

694a. The trial court responded “[s]o your argument is that she is going to testify 

about these records . . . [a]nd I assume it’s the operative time of 91 to 94?” T.T. 

7/15/14 at 30; R.R. at 695a. Patterson’s attorney12 responded “[t]hat’s correct.” 

T.T. 7/15/14 at 30; R.R. at 695a. 

Bolognese recounted that she was authorized to serve as records 

custodian for the bank. T.T. 7/15/14 at 34; R.R. at 699a. Bolognese was provided 

with an affidavit from Susan McGivern, her supervisor, as to the scope of what she 

could testify to as custodian of records for BNY Mellon. T.T. 7/15/14 at 35-36; 

R.R. at 700a-71a. Following a lunch break, the trial court stated that “[t]his case 

 

12 In order to avoid confusion between Bishop Kenneth Shelton and Fincourt B. Shelton, 

this Court will refer to Fincourt B. Shelton as Patterson’s attorney.
10

has a real problem in that plaintiff’s attorney [Patterson] has not produced all of the 

records recently to the defendant [Shelton]. This is a 20-year-old case. This case is 

going slowly.” T.T. 7/15/14 at 40-41; R.R. 705a-06a. The trial court adjourned 

for the day and ordered the parties “to provide to the other side copies of every 

single document that party intends to introduce into evidence, as well as a list of 

every single witness that attorney intends to call in this case. Failure to provide 

copies of the document today to opposing counsel will result in my precluding the 

document from being introduced into evidence.” T.T. 7/15/14 at 41; R.R. at 706a. 

On July 16, 2014, before the commencement of Bolognese’s 

testimony, the trial court issued the following order, “I’m denying the motion to 

deem the admissions admitted for a variety of reasons, including the fact that . . . 

[y]ou [Patterson’s attorney] did not include in this motion even what the request 

for admissions of the third set were, you included the second set.” Trial Transcript, 

July 16, 2014, (T.T. 7/16/14) at 12; R.R. at 720a. At that time, Bolognese again 

took the stand and stated that “[w]hen we [took] over the bank [Mellon PSFS], we 

took over the records of PSFS . . . [a]nd in course of . . . changing over the 

accounts, we had possession of the PSFS documents.” T.T. 7/16/14 at 23; R.R. at 

23a. In response to the trial court’s query, Bolognese admitted that she was unable 

to testify that “this document was prepared in the course of business of PSFS.” 

T.T. 7/16/14 at 24; R.R. at 732a. 

On cross-examination, defense counsel, Danielle Banks (Banks) asked 

the following question:

Q: So with regard to this particular document - -

A: Right.
11

Q: This particular document was not - - you don’t have 

knowledge yourself that it was kept in the normal course, 

correct?

A: No.

Q: And did someone else tell you that it was kept, in the 

normal course?

A: Well, it would be someone from legal support that 

would tell me. Someone did tell me, yes.

T.T. 7/16/14 at 41-42; R.R. at 749a-50a.

At the conclusion of Bolognese’s testimony, the trial court ruled:

And everyone is in agreement that the testimony from 

Mrs. Bolognese would be that she does not have any 

direct knowledge regarding how these documents were 

made or whether the record was made at or near the time 

or from information transmitted by someone with 

knowledge. So based on her inability to provide that 

testimony, I’m sustaining the objection to any questions 

or the introduction into evidence of those documents. 

(Emphasis added.)

T.T. 7/16/14 at 76-77; R.R. at 784a-85a.

Joseph Sweeny (Sweeny), an employee of Firstrust Bank, testified 

that he was familiar with financial transactions at Firstrust Bank. Sweeny stated 

that the withdrawal process for removal of funds from an account “would be where 

an individual or individuals would sign a withdrawal order and it would be 

processed at the teller station and they would either get cash or a check.” T.T. at 

86; R.R. at 794a.
12

On cross-examination, Sweeny testified that he had personal 

knowledge concerning Exhibit B “because my initials are on there.” T.T. 7/16/14 

at 90; R.R. at 798a. 

The trial court ruled that “I’m going to allow the document [Exhibit 9 

was ‘copies of two withdrawals, two different account numbers’] to be introduced 

into evidence. It’s not relevant for him to read what’s in there. It’s already into 

evidence.” T.T. 7/16/14 at 93-95; R.R. at 801a-03a. At the conclusion of 

Sweeny’s testimony, the trial court directed Patterson’s attorney to proceed with 

his next witness. Patterson’s attorney was unable to call his next witness because 

none of his witnesses responded to the subpoenas. The trial court adjourned for 

the day and stated that “[s]o what we’re going to do tomorrow, we’ll start court at 

10:15 . . . [a]nd Mr. Shelton you’ll tell us who your next witnesses are.” T.T. 

7/16/14 at 121-22; R.R. at 829a-30a. 

On July 17, 2014, Patterson’s attorney called Bishop Kenneth Shelton 

to the stand. At that time, Banks stated to the trial court that “I have two objections 

. . . [o]ne a procedural argument, and one a Constitutional one.” Trial Transcript, 

July 17, 2014, (T.T. 7/17/14) at 3; R.R. at 832a. More specifically, Banks stated 

that Pa. R.C.P. No. 234.2 “says the notice shall be served reasonably in advance of 

the date upon which attendance is required.” T.T. 7/17/14 at 4; R.R. at 832a. 

“And here, Your Honor, when we have posed a subject matter jurisdiction

challenge to the Bishop being here - - this is not just any trial. This is about a 

church and the goings-on in the church.” T.T. 7/17/14 at 4-5; R.R. at 832a-33a. 

The trial court responded that “[a]s an initial matter, I need to make a decision 

whether or not I have subject matter jurisdiction in this case . . . .” (Emphasis 

added.) T.T. 7/17/14 at 25; R.R. at 838a. Again, the trial court adjourned and 
13

reiterated “let me just say this one more time. We’ll get an e-mail from 

[Patterson’s attorney] by 7:00 tonight whether or not he’ll be calling any factual 

witnesses to establish subject matter jurisdiction.” (Emphasis added.) T.T. 

7/17/14 at 33; R.R. at 840a.

On July 28, 2014, the trial court entertained arguments concerning 

two motions, the “first with the defendant’s [Shelton’s] motion to strike the portion 

of the caption that identifies the plaintiff [Patterson] in the capacity as the 

corporate trustee . . . .” Trial Transcript, July 28, 2014, (7/28/14) at 3, R.R. at 

847a. After argument, the trial court ordered that “I will grant the motion to strike 

the caption. The plaintiff [Patterson] did not ask leave of court, and it could 

potentially make a difference. However, I will grant leave to amend the caption at 

this point.” T.T. 7/28/14 at 21; R.R. at 852a. The trial court then addressed “the 

motion for subject matter jurisdiction.” T.T. 7/28/14 at 22; R.R. at 852a. After 

argument, the trial court stated “I’m going to defer my decision on this issue . . . 

[a]t this point, I’m still struggling, and I think I’m struggling because I don’t have 

that much evidence, at which point I’ll let counsel know that I want to hear further 

argument on this issue.” T.T. 7/28/14 at 55; R.R. at 860a. 

On July 29, 2014, the trial court continued to hear argument on 

whether it had subject matter jurisdiction. Patterson argued:

I think there’s more than enough here for you to find that 

there’s a neutral principle, that you can look at the bank 

records, that you can look at what the title on the account 

is, and if it says bus rally and you find that three or four 

trustees personally went to the bank, took it out as cash, 

whatever and however they did it, and the records reflect 

that, then you would have to, I think, come to the 

decision that not only did Kenneth Shelton, but those 
14

trustees serving under him were all involved in 

misappropriation of church funds during those years.

Trial Transcript, July 29, 2014, (T.T. 7/29/14) at 20; R.R. at 891a. 

Banks responded:

I want to make sure also that the record is clear . . . . It is 

Article 18, wherein the bylaws specifically say . . . ‘[t]he 

tithes and offerings of whatever kind, nature or collection 

by any elder, local minister, or any officer or member is 

the property of the general elder, who is the general 

overseer, and that all tithes and love offerings are the 

personal property of the general overseer.’. . . .

Here, Your Honor, even without the bylaws, the Court 

wouldn’t have jurisdiction. With the bylaws there can be 

no question, the Court has no jurisdiction. Under these 

bylaws, Bishop Shelton as the general overseer is the 

church’s highest adjudicatory body. I submit to you that 

by denying the allegations, he has spoken to them and 

that is the end of this matter.

T.T. 7/29/14 at 27; R.R. at 893a. 

The trial court concluded:

Based upon the arguments, based upon the case, I am 

granting the motion to dismiss. I do not have subject 

matter jurisdiction. In order for me to make a 

determination in this case, I would have to interpret 

religious doctrine of [sic] this court and the First 

Amendment prohibits me from doing so.

T.T. 7/29/14 at 40; R.R. at 896a. 
15

V. Issues

Before this Court, Patterson essentially argues13: 1) that the trial court 

failed to follow this Court’s express directive and conduct a trial on the merits; 2) 

that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it determined it lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction to address Patterson’s claim of mismanagement and diversion 

of Church assets and funds by Shelton; 3) that the trial court erred when it denied 

admission of various financial records and documents as business records under 

Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 803 (Exception to the Rule against Hearsay); 4) 

that the trial court erred when it denied Patterson’s motion in limine “to deem 

[Patterson’s] request as admitted based upon [Shelton’s] inadequate answers”; and 

5) that the present matter should be remanded back to the trial court.14 Brief of 

Appellant, Statement of Questions Presented at 5-6.

 

13 This Court’s review is limited to a determination of whether the trial court abused its 

discretion or erred as a matter of law. Mid Valley Taxpayers v. Mid Valley School, 416 A.2d 

590 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980). Furthermore, the decision of the trial court will stand “if there exists 

sufficient evidence to justify the findings and logically sound, reasonable inferences and 

conclusions derived therefrom.” Groff v. Borough of Sellersville, 314 A.2d 328, 330 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1984). 

14 The trial court made the following rulings on the evidentiary motions presented by both 

parties:

Evidentiary Motions

1.The court denied the Plaintiff’s [Patterson’s] Motion in Limine to 

Deem as Admitted Plaintiff’s Requests for Admissions.

2. The court granted the Defendant’s [Shelton’s] Motion in Limine 

to preclude any evidence regarding expenditures beyond the time 

period of 1991-1994.

3. The court granted Defendant’s [Shelton’s] Motion in Limine to 

Preclude any Evidence Regarding the Vacated Arbitration in this 

Matter.

4. The court deferred until trial its decision in the Defendant’s 

[Shelton’s] Motion in Limine to Preclude the Presentation of 

Testimony by Plaintiff’s [Patterson’s] Expert. The court now 

dismisses without prejudice the motion because it is moot.

5. The court deferred until trial its decision in Defendant’s 

[Shelton’s] Motion in Limine to Preclude Irrelevant Witness 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
16

The issue of subject matter jurisdiction was raised and argued before 

the trial court and ably disposed of in the opinion of the Honorable Alice Beck 

Dubow, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia First District of 

Pennsylvania Civil Trial Division. Therefore, this Court shall affirm on the basis 

 

(continued...)

Testimony. The court now dismisses without prejudice the motion 

because it is moot.

6. The court deferred until trial its decision in the Plaintiff’s 

[Patterson’s] Motion in Limine Seeking an Adverse Inference 

against Defendant’s [Shelton’s] Due to Spoliation of Evidence. 

The court now dismisses without prejudice the motion because it is 

moot.

7. The court denies without prejudice the Plaintiff’s [Patterson’s] 

Motion for Reconsideration it [sic] ruling on the Records of 

Regularly Conducted Business Exception to the Hearsay Rule as 

moot.

Motions Regarding The Caption

8. The court granted Defendant’s [Shelton’s] Motion to Strike the 

Plaintiff’s [Patterson’s] Unilateral Caption Change and struck the 

portion of the Caption that refers to the Defendant [Shelton] as the 

President of the Board of trustees of the General Assembly of the 

Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apolistic [sic] Faith, Inc.

9. The court granted Plaintiff’s [Patterson’s] Motion for Leave to 

Amend the Caption to include the Defendant [Shelton] in his 

capacity as the President of the Board of Trustees of the General 

Assembly of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apolistic 

[sic] Faith, Inc.

Motions Regarding Subpoenas

10. All subpoenas served for these proceedings and any findings of 

contempt are hereby vacated.

11. The court dismisses without prejudice the Motion to Quash the 

subpoena duces tecum of Nathaniel Shelton-Bailey as moot.

Order of the Trial Court, July 31, 2014, at 1-2.
17

of Judge Dubow’s opinion.15 Patterson v. Shelton, (July Term, 1995, No. 2945), 

filed November 10, 2014.

____________________________

BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge

 

 

15 Because the trial court properly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, 

Patterson’s remaining arguments are moot. 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Anthonee Patterson, :

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

Kenneth Shelton, individually and :

in his capacity as President of the :

Board Of Trustees, of the Church :

of the Lord Jesus Christ of the : No. 2147 C.D. 2014

Apostolic Faith, Inc. :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 18th day of December, 2015, the order of the Court 

of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in the above-captioned matter is 

affirmed. 

____________________________

BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge