This opinion is subject to revision before final

publication in the Pacific Reporter

2021 UT 5

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ALEXIE KAMOE,

Appellant,

v.

HONORABLE STEVAN RIDGE,

Appellee.

No. 20190111

Heard October 9, 2020

Filed January 28, 2021

On Direct Appeal

Fourth District, American Fork

The Honorable Robert C. Lunnen

No. 180100218

Attorneys:

Douglas J. Thompson, Provo, for appellant

Carl R. Hollan and David O. Leavitt, Provo, for appellee

JUSTICE HIMONAS authored the opinion of the Court, in which

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE,

JUSTICE PEARCE, and JUSTICE PETERSEN joined.

JUSTICE HIMONAS, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 The Utah County Attorney‘s office charged Alexie Kamoe 

in justice court with three separate criminal counts. Pursuant to a 

negotiated plea bargain, Kamoe pled guilty to a single count of 

Impaired Driving. Following sentencing, she appealed her 

conviction to district court but withdrew the appeal after that court 

denied her motion to suppress blood-test evidence. Back in justice 

court, Kamoe asked to have her original conviction, sentence, and 

commitment (collectively, the ―Judgment‖) reinstated. The court 
KAMOE v. HON. RIDGE

Opinion of the Court

2

refused at the request of the prosecutor, who wanted her to face 

trial on the initial three counts. In response, Kamoe filed in the 

district court a petition for extraordinary relief in which she asked

that court to reinstate the original Judgment. When that petition 

was denied, she appealed to this court.

¶2 The issue in this case is straightforward enough: Does an 

appeal from a negotiated plea in justice court under Utah Code 

section 78A-7-118(3) vacate that court‘s Judgment? As we explain 

below, it doesn‘t. Under the plain language of the statute, a

Judgment resulting from a negotiated plea in justice court persists, 

although it may be stayed pending the defendant‘s appeal to 

district court.

¶3 Having determined that both the justice court and the 

district court misread subsection 118(3) and, therefore, erred in

refusing to reinstate Kamoe‘s Judgment, we exercise our discretion 

under rule 65B(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and grant 

Kamoe the relief she seeks. Accordingly, we reverse the district 

court‘s denial of Kamoe‘s petition for extraordinary relief and 

remand to the justice court with instructions to restore the original 

Judgment.

BACKGROUND

¶4 Utah County Sheriff‘s Department deputies found Kamoe 

driving on a closed road. They alleged that a search of her vehicle 

revealed marijuana and open containers of alcohol and that a 

subsequent blood test revealed the presence of THC, THC 

metabolite, and cocaine metabolite in her system.

¶5 The Utah County Attorney‘s office charged Kamoe in the

Utah County Justice Court with three counts: (1) Driving with a 

Measurable Controlled Substance in the Body, (2) Possession or Use

of Marijuana, and (3) Failure to Obey a Traffic Control Device.

Kamoe made a motion to suppress the blood-test evidence, which 

the court denied. She then, with the aid of counsel, negotiated with 

the prosecutor a plea bargain that contemplated the dismissal of

Counts 2 and 3 and the amendment of Count 1 to a single count of 

Impaired Driving, a charge that is available only as part of a 

negotiated plea. See UTAH CODE § 41-6a-502.5(1)(b). That same day, 

the justice court sentenced Kamoe to 180 days in jail but suspended 

the sentence and instead ordered that she spend two days in jail, 

pay a $1,420 fine, and complete an alcohol/substance-abuse 

evaluation and comply with any recommended treatment.

¶6 Kamoe appealed her conviction in the justice court to the 

district court. The justice court stayed her sentence pending the 
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Opinion of the Court

3

disposition of her appeal pursuant to Utah Code section 

78A-7-118(2).1In district court, Kamoe again moved to suppress the 

blood-test evidence, and the motion was again denied. She then 

filed a motion to withdraw her appeal and requested a remand to 

the justice court under rule 38(f)(6) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 

Procedure. The district court granted the motion.

¶7 Back in justice court, Kamoe requested that the stay on her 

negotiated sentence be lifted and the Judgment be reinstated. The 

prosecutor objected, claiming that, under Utah Code section 

78A-7-118(3), her original Judgment was voided upon her appeal.

And this time around, the prosecutor was unwilling to offer the 

same deal—Kamoe would either plead guilty to, or face trial on, the 

original three counts. The justice court agreed with the prosecutor‘s 

interpretation of subsection 118(3) and denied Kamoe‘s request for 

reinstatement.

¶8 Kamoe responded by filing in district court a petition for 

extraordinary relief under rule 65B(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 

Procedure, alleging that the justice court had ―exceed[ed] its 

jurisdiction or abused its discretion‖ by misinterpreting subsection 

118(3) and not allowing the Judgment to be reinstated. After 

briefing and oral argument, the district court denied Kamoe‘s 

petition. She then appealed the denial of the petition to the court of 

appeals, which certified the case to this court. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(b).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶9 When considering the appeal of a petition for 

extraordinary relief, the reviewing court ―may‖ grant relief ―where 

an inferior court . . . has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its 

discretion.‖ UTAH R. CIV. P. 65B(d)(2)(A). Absent special 

circumstances not present here, ―the abuse-of-discretion standard 

of review‖ will typically ―include review to ensure that no mistakes 

of law affected a lower court‘s use of its discretion,‖

2 and ―the 

__________________________________________________________

1 As we point out below, infra ¶¶ 28–32, it would be a legal 

impossibility for the justice court to have stayed the Judgment if it 

were void.

2 ―There may be situations in which a court has misinterpreted a 

statute defining the scope of its discretionary power but that 

misinterpretation does not result in a technical abuse of discretion.‖ 

State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ¶ 17 n.5, 127 P.3d 682. For example, a 

court may mistakenly believe through an erroneous interpretation 

(continued . . .)
KAMOE v. HON. RIDGE

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4

proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law.‖ State v. 

Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ¶¶ 14, 17, 127 P.3d 682 (footnote omitted); see 

also State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991) (―[T]rial courts 

do not have discretion to misapply the law.‖). Therefore, we review 

the justice court‘s interpretation of subsection 118(3) for correctness.

¶10 Still, a showing that an inferior court abused its discretion 

under rule 65B(d)(2) only gets a petitioner a foot in the door. As we 

have explained, a lower court‘s abuse of discretion establishes 

―adequate grounds for relief,‖ but a reviewing court ―may 

nevertheless withhold relief.‖ Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ¶ 24. Following a 

showing of abuse of discretion, ―[a] court faced with a petition for 

extraordinary relief will consider multiple factors when 

determining whether or not to grant the relief requested in the 

petition.‖ Id. (listing, as examples, factors such as ―the 

egregiousness of the alleged error, the significance of the legal issue 

presented by the petition, [and] the severity of the consequences 

occasioned by the alleged error‖). In short, ―[t]he question of 

whether to grant a petition for extraordinary relief lies within the 

sound discretion of this court.‖ Snow, Christensen & Martineau v. 

Lindberg, 2013 UT 15, ¶ 22, 299 P.3d 1058 (citing Barrett, 2005 UT 88, 

¶ 24).

ANALYSIS

¶11 This case concerns the effect of an appeal from a 

negotiated plea in justice court on the defendant‘s Judgment. Utah 

Code section 78A-7-118(3) provides:

If an appeal under Subsection (1) is of a plea entered 

pursuant to negotiation with the prosecutor, and the 

defendant did not reserve the right to appeal as part 

of the plea negotiation, the negotiation is voided by 

the appeal.

And subsection (1) states in relevant part: ―In a criminal case, a 

defendant is entitled to a trial de novo in the district court only if 

 

of a statute that it can pursue one of two possible courses of action 

given the case at bar, when in fact it may only properly pursue one 

of those courses. See id. If the court nonetheless chooses the correct 

course of action, it has committed an error of law by 

misinterpreting the statute but has not yet exceeded its discretion 

under that statute. See id. ―In such a situation, corrective appellate 

action may be warranted to enable the lower court to exercise its 

discretion with the proper legal boundaries in mind.‖ Id.
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Opinion of the Court

5

the defendant files a notice of appeal within 28 days of:

(a) sentencing . . . .‖ UTAH CODE § 78A-7-118(1). The State argues 

that the final clause of subsection 118(3) voids upon appeal not just 

the pre-plea agreement but also the conviction, sentence, and 

commitment, i.e., the Judgment. Kamoe responds that the 

―negotiation‖ voided by appeal does not implicate everything 

attendant the Judgment; rather, the provision makes clear that, 

absent an agreement to the contrary, the prosecutor and defendant 

are not bound in district court by their plea negotiations in justice 

court or the outcome of those negotiations.

¶12 Thus, in Kamoe‘s view, when a defendant appeals a 

Judgment based upon a plea in justice court but ―d[oes] not reserve 

the right to appeal as part of the plea negotiation,‖ the Judgment 

remains in place unless it is supplanted by a new judgment in the 

district court. But there, neither the district court nor the prosecutor 

are bound by the same plea deal as offered below. The prosecutor 

has the right to take the plea deal off the table and try the defendant 

on all the original charges.

¶13 We agree. The plain language of subsection 118(3), read in 

light of the whole statute, demonstrates that ―negotiation‖ means 

the pre-plea agreement between the prosecutor and defendant and 

does not include the Judgment. Further, the State‘s interpretation of 

subsection 118(3) cannot be read in harmony with the statute as a 

whole, as it would create a chasm in the statutory structure 

governing justice court jurisdiction.

¶14 Finding that the district court abused its discretion in 

misapplying subsection 118(3), we employ our ample discretion to 

grant Kamoe the relief she seeks under the standard of review 

articulated in State v. Barrett. 2005 UT 88, ¶ 24, 127 P.3d 682; see 

supra ¶ 10.

I. UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF SUBSECTION 118(3),

AN APPEAL FROM A NEGOTIATED PLEA IN JUSTICE

COURT PRESERVES THE ASSOCIATED JUDGMENT

¶15 Our object in interpreting a statute is to determine the 

intent of the legislature. Castro v. Lemus, 2019 UT 71, ¶ 17, 456 P.3d 

750. To do so, we first look to ―the plain language of the statute‖ 

and seek to interpret it ―in harmony with other statutes in the same 

chapter and related chapters.‖ Id. (citations omitted). ―If, after 

conducting this plain language review we are left with competing 

reasonable interpretations, there is statutory ambiguity.‖ Bryner v. 

Cardon Outreach, LLC, 2018 UT 52, ¶ 10, 428 P.3d 1096 (citing Marion 

Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 15, 267 P.3d 

863 (stating that statutory language is ambiguous if ―its terms 
KAMOE v. HON. RIDGE

Opinion of the Court

6

remain susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations after 

we have conducted a plain language analysis‖)). ―However,  ̳a 

statute susceptible to competing interpretations may nevertheless 

be unambiguous if the text of the act as a whole, in light of related 

statutory provisions, makes all but one of those meanings 

implausible.‘‖ Bryner, 2018 UT 52, ¶ 10 (quoting Utah Pub. Emps. 

Ass’n v. State, 2006 UT 9, ¶ 60, 131 P.3d 208 (Parrish, J., concurring)).

¶16 After applying these core interpretive norms, we see no 

ambiguity here. True, the parties offer differing possible

interpretations of subsection 118(3). But ―only one interpretation

is plausible given the text of the act as a whole.‖ Bryner, 2018 UT 52, 

¶ 11. Only Kamoe‘s ―interpretation makes sense on its face under 

the ordinary meaning of the words as used in the 

statute and harmonizes [all of] the language . . . of the statute.‖ Id.

―[F]inding no ambiguity, we determine the statute‘s meaning by its 

plain language.‖ Id.

A. Under the Plain Language of Subsection 118(3), “Negotiation”

Means the Pre-Plea Agreement between the Prosecutor

and Defendant

¶17 Our analysis begins with the disputed word: 

―negotiation.‖ In ordinary usage, ―negotiation‖ typically means a 

bargaining process of sorts.3 And while that process may yield a

binding agreement, it is a strain to say that a ―negotiation‖ itself 

could be ―voided.‖ Therefore, ―negotiation,‖ as used here, must 

mean more than just the pre-plea discussions between the parties.

So while the parties agree that ―negotiation‖ includes more than 

just the underlying discussions, they disagree on how much more.

¶18 The State argues that ― ̳negotiation‘ encompasses the plea, 

sentence, and judgment‖ because the statute would otherwise be 

meaningless. Kamoe responds, in essence, that ―negotiation‖ 

encompasses the pre-plea agreement between the prosecutor and 

defendant, meaning on appeal for a trial de novo in district court, 

―the defendant would not be obliged to plea[d] guilty as she had 

previously negotiated to do, and the prosecutor would not be 

__________________________________________________________

3 See, e.g., Negotiation, BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) 

(―A consensual bargaining process in which the parties attempt to 

reach agreement on a disputed or potentially disputed matter.‖); 

Negotiate, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/negotiate (last visited Jan. 20, 2021) (―to 

confer with another so as to arrive at the settlement of some 

matter‖).
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Opinion of the Court

7

obliged to dismiss or reduce charges or recommend a lenient 

sentence as he previously negotiated to do.‖

¶19 Because, taken in isolation, both interpretations strike us 

as reasonable, the term ―negotiation‖ seems ambiguous. But when 

we read ―negotiation‖ in harmony with the entire text of subsection 

118(3) and the whole statute, only Kamoe‘s interpretation makes 

any sense. The text of subsection 118(3) speaks of ―a plea entered 

pursuant to negotiation with the prosecutor.‖ This language 

supports Kamoe‘s interpretation in two ways. First, the phrase 

―pursuant to‖ indicates that the ―plea‖ follows, but does not 

include, the ―negotiation.‖ Second, the phrase ―negotiation with the 

prosecutor‖ implies that ―negotiation‖ is merely what occurs 

between the defendant and the prosecutor. And the prosecutor, of 

course, has no authority over the final Judgment, which is solely 

within the purview of the court.

¶20 This interpretation is consistent with practice. A criminal 

defendant and prosecutor often engage in pre-plea discussions. 

These discussions may yield an agreement whereby the prosecutor

promises to dismiss or reduce certain charges or recommend a 

lighter sentence, and the defendant promises to plead guilty. The 

State conserves judicial resources, the defendant gets a reduced 

penalty, and both parties receive a predictable outcome. While this 

pre-plea agreement may not be memorialized in writing, it is still 

essentially a contract. The actual plea, made to the judge, is entered 

―pursuant to‖ this agreement. But the agreement only binds the 

prosecutor and defendant—the judge may reject the plea in whole 

or in part. See UTAH R. CRIM. P. 11(i)(1)–(3).

¶21 An examination of the whole statute solidifies this 

interpretation. The legislature clearly knew how to use the terms 

―plea,‖ ―judgment,‖ and ―sentence,‖ and how to differentiate those 

things from a ―negotiation.‖ For example, a defendant may appeal 

within twenty-eight days of ―sentencing,‖ UTAH CODE

§ 78A-7-118(1)(a), or a ―plea of guilty.‖ Id. at 118(1)(b). Upon filing 

an appeal, ―any term of a sentence‖ shall be stayed pending 

resolution in district court. Id. at 118(2). And a prosecutor is entitled 

to a hearing de novo in the district court if he files an appeal within 

twenty-eight days of a ―final judgment of dismissal,‖ id. 

at 118(5)(a), or ―an order arresting judgment.‖ Id. at 118(5)(b). In 

contrast, the word ―negotiation‖ appears only in subsection 118(3), 

indicating the legislature intended it to have a specific meaning 

independent from a ―plea,‖ ―judgment,‖ or ―sentence.‖

¶22 The State attempts to bolster its interpretation of 

subsection 118(3) by pointing to the middle clause of the statute. 
KAMOE v. HON. RIDGE

Opinion of the Court

8

That clause specifies the ―negotiation is voided‖ only if ―the 

defendant did not reserve the right to appeal as part of the plea 

negotiation.‖ In the State‘s view, the default state under subsection 

118(3) is that the Judgment is voided on appeal. The State argues 

the middle clause allows a defendant to ―retain the benefits of the 

negotiated plea‖ by ―specifically preserving those benefits as part 

of the negotiated plea.‖ And, in the State‘s view, those ―benefits‖ 

are the Judgment. By this logic, Kamoe‘s interpretation ―seeks to 

render this code section meaningless by obviating the need to 

reserve [the Judgment] on appeal.‖ In contrast, the default state 

under Kamoe‘s interpretation is that the Judgment is preserved on 

appeal. So, if we accept Kamoe‘s interpretation, we must also 

interpret the ―right to appeal‖ referenced in the middle clause to 

mean something more than a right to preserve the Judgment. See 

Turner v. Staker & Parson Cos., 2012 UT 30, ¶ 12, 284 P.3d 600 

(―Wherever possible, we give effect to every word of a statute, 

avoiding  ̳[a]ny interpretation which renders parts or words in a 

statute inoperative or superfluous.‘‖ (alteration in original) (citation 

omitted)).

¶23 Reading the middle clause of subsection 118(3) against the 

backdrop of relevant case law helps illuminate the legislature‘s 

intent. See, e.g., Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, ¶ 39, 158 P.3d 532 (―We 

presume the Legislature is aware of our case law . . . .‖). We view 

the clause ―and the defendant did not reserve the right to appeal as 

part of the plea negotiation‖ as a statutory recognition of a Sery 

plea. A Sery plea is a conditional plea in which a defendant pleads 

guilty (or no contest) but reserves the right to appeal the trial 

court‘s denial of a motion to suppress certain evidence.4 See State v. 

Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 937–39 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). If the appellate 

court reverses the denial of that motion, the defendant‘s plea is 

withdrawn. Id. In other words, a Sery plea is essentially an appeal 

of limited scope, rather than a trial de novo.

__________________________________________________________

4 Utah courts have always required under Sery that a defendant 

bears the burden of establishing on the record his conditional plea. 

See State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (―A 

defendant seeking appellate review pursuant to a conditional plea 

bears the burden of demonstrating that the conditional nature of 

the plea is unambiguously established in the trial court record. 

Defendant must show that the prosecutor consented to the 

conditional plea and that the trial judge approved the plea.‖ 

(citations omitted)). The plain language of subsection 118(3) 

suggests no different result.
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Opinion of the Court

9

¶24 With Sery in mind, the plain language and purpose of 

subsection 118(3) become even more clear. The statute essentially 

does two things. First, it makes statutory the concept of a Sery plea

for justice courts. Second, it differentiates this type of conditional 

plea from a standard (non-Sery) plea and makes clear that an appeal 

from a standard plea is not limited to any particular issue that may 

have been the focus of pre-plea negotiations. The district court will 

start fresh with a trial de novo, and the prosecutor and defendant 

will not be bound by their previous agreement.

¶25 An example helps to illustrate subsection 118(3)‘s 

function. Imagine a defendant is charged with multiple counts of

possession of controlled substances but, pursuant to negotiation 

with the prosecutor, pleads guilty to a single count of possession.

However, she expressly conditions her plea, with the consent of the 

prosecutor, on the result of a subsequent motion to suppress certain

evidence on appeal in district court.

5 Her appeal of the single 

possession count proceeds ―de novo‖ in district court, and she

moves to suppress the evidence. If the district court grants the 

motion, it will almost certainly result in the case being dismissed. 

But if the district court denies the motion to suppress, the 

defendant can either again plead guilty to the single count 

(effectively preserving the negotiated plea made below) or proceed 

to trial on that single count.

6

¶26 Now, imagine that same defendant does not make a 

conditional plea. She is sentenced and appeals under 

subsection 118(1)(a). The case proceeds ―de novo‖ in district court

on the original possession counts. Under subsection 118(3), the 

__________________________________________________________

5

It is quite possible that the prosecutor may require the 

defendant to waive her right to a trial de novo pursuant to the 

conditional plea. Because this scenario is not properly before the 

court and is irrelevant to the outcome here, we do not opine on the 

procedural result if the district court were to grant the motion to 

suppress on conditional appeal under this scenario.

6 Under these circumstances, the defendant‘s right to proceed to 

trial in the district court stems from the ―de novo‖ nature of an 

appeal from justice court. Conversely, in the setting of a conditional 

appeal from a plea made in district court, if the appellate court 

denies the motion to suppress, ―[t]he defendant stands guilty and 

the proceedings come to an end.‖ Sery, 758 P.2d at 939 (quoting 

Comment, Conditioned Guilty Pleas: Post–Guilty Plea Appeal of 

Nonjurisdictional Issues, 26 UCLA L. REV. 360, 378 (1978)).
KAMOE v. HON. RIDGE

Opinion of the Court

10

prosecutor in district court is not obligated to make the same (or 

any) offer as was made in justice court. Regardless of the district 

court‘s ruling on the motion to suppress, the defendant can either 

proceed toward an unknown outcome7 or withdraw the appeal 

prior to entering a guilty plea or the commencement of a trial (and 

live with the justice court‘s final Judgment). UTAH R. CRIM. P. 

38(f)(6). This latter option is exactly what Kamoe did here.8

¶27 Challenging the rule 65B motion in district court, the State 

asserted that the legislature could not possibly have intended to 

allow Kamoe to ―have her cake by entering a plea and securing a 

__________________________________________________________

7

If a defendant is tried and convicted in justice court and 

appeals to district court, the district court cannot impose a greater 

sentence than that of the justice court. See UTAH CODE § 76-3-405(1); 

Wisden v. Dist. Ct. of Sevier Cnty., 694 P.2d 605, 606 (Utah 1984) (per 

curiam) (holding that Utah Code section 76-3-405(1) applies to 

appeals from justice court convictions). However, this limitation 

―does not apply when: . . . a defendant enters into a plea agreement 

with the prosecution and later successfully moves to invalidate his 

conviction.‖ UTAH CODE § 76-3-405(2)(b). In Vorher v. Henriod, we

held that this exception for guilty pleas applies to appeals from 

convictions based on guilty pleas in justice court, even though such 

appeals ―do[] not involve setting aside justice court judgments on 

direct review.‖ 2013 UT 10, ¶ 12, 297 P.3d 614 (citation omitted). 

This is all to say that a district court can impose on appeal a greater 

sentence than that imposed by the justice court if the latter was the 

result of a guilty plea.

8 We mention here that the parties disagree over whether 

Kamoe waived her right to appeal as part of her plea bargain. Based 

on the record before us, all we can say for sure is that the plea 

negotiation was never memorialized and the Judgment of the 

justice court says nothing about Kamoe waiving her right to appeal. 

Without more, we cannot say that Kamoe knowingly and 

intentionally waived her constitutional right to appeal. See, e.g.,

United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 815 (10th Cir. 2000) (―There is a 

presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights, and for a 

waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was 

an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or 

privilege.‖ (quoting Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966)). To be 

clear, while the State bears the burden of showing that a criminal 

defendant waived her general right to appeal, the defendant bears 

the burden of establishing on the record a conditional appeal. See 

supra ¶ 23, n.4.
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Opinion of the Court

11

negotiated conviction, and eat it, too, by filing an appeal and

attempting to secure her rights in another Court.‖ Yet, again, ―[t]he 

best evidence of the legislature‘s intent is the  ̳plain language of the 

statute itself.‘‖ State v. Ogden, 2018 UT 8, ¶ 31, 416 P.3d 1132

(citation omitted). And here, the plain language of subsection 118(3) 

demonstrates that ―negotiation‖ means only the pre-plea agreement

between the prosecutor and defendant and does not include the

associated Judgment.

9

B. The State’s Position Creates a Significant Gap in the Statutory 

Structure Governing Jurisdiction of Justice Court Cases

¶28 Having ascertained the meaning of ―negotiation‖ within 

subsection 118(3), we now explain how only Kamoe‘s interpretation 

of subsection 118(3) harmonizes the jurisdictional provisions of the 

whole statute. We begin by showing how the Utah Code carefully 

constructs a statutory framework governing the original 

jurisdiction of justice courts and appellate jurisdiction of district 

courts. We then explain how the State‘s position punches a major 

hole in this framework. Simply put: If Kamoe‘s ―appeal‖ of her 

negotiated plea ―voided‖ her Judgment under subsection 118(3), 

from what did she appeal? And when she withdrew her appeal, 

under what authority did the justice court reassume jurisdiction of 

a case for which it had already entered a final Judgment that was 

subsequently vacated? Under the State‘s reading, Kamoe could 

simply appeal her Judgment, withdraw that appeal, and walk away

scot-free.

10

¶29 The original jurisdiction of justice courts and appellate 

jurisdiction of district courts over cases originating in justice courts 

are dictated by statute. Subject to a few exceptions, ―a justice court 

has original jurisdiction over class B and C misdemeanors, violation 

of ordinances, and infractions committed within the justice court‘s 

territorial jurisdiction.‖ UTAH CODE § 78A-7-106(1). Meanwhile, 

―[t]he district court has appellate jurisdiction over judgments and 

__________________________________________________________

9 ―Courts are bound by the plain language of the statute.‖ Aris 

Vision Inst., Inc. v. Wasatch Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 2006 UT 45, ¶ 17, 143 

P.3d 278. The legislature, of course, is not. If the legislature did not 

intend our interpretation of subsection 118(3), we invite it to amend 

the statutory language.

10 From the ―Old English scotfreo, [meaning]  ̳exempt from royal 

tax.‘‖ Scot-free, Online Etymology Dictionary, etymonline.com (last 

visited Jan. 20, 2021).
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Opinion of the Court

12

orders of the justice court as outlined in Section 78A-7-118.‖ Id. 

§ 78A-5-102(6) (emphases added).

¶30 Utah Code section 78A-7-118, in turn, establishes the ―trial 

de novo‖ system of appeals from justice court. ―Because justice 

courts are courts not of record, the appeals process from a justice 

court decision is unique.‖ Bernat v. Allphin, 2005 UT 1, ¶ 8, 106 P.3d 

707. A criminal defendant who is convicted or pleads guilty in 

justice court is entitled to a ―trial de novo‖ in district court if she 

files a ―notice of appeal‖ within twenty-eight days of ―sentencing‖ 

or ―a plea of guilty or no contest in the justice court that is held in 

abeyance.‖ UTAH CODE § 78A-7-118(1). ―Upon filing a proper notice 

of appeal, any term of a sentence imposed by the justice court shall 

be stayed as provided for in Section 77-20-10 [of the Utah Code of 

Criminal Procedure] and the Rules of Criminal Procedure.‖ Id. at 

118(2). And on appeal, ―[t]he district court shall retain jurisdiction 

over the case on trial de novo.‖ Id. at 118(7). Once the district court 

enters a judgment, it replaces that of the justice court and becomes 

the final decision of the case. See id. at 118(8); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 

38(f)(4). However, ―[a] defendant, at a point prior to entering a plea 

admitting guilt or a no contest plea, or prior to commencement of 

trial, may choose to withdraw the appeal and have the case 

remanded to the justice court.‖ UTAH R. CRIM. P. 38(f)(6). Thus, the 

statute, supplemented by the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 

dictates how jurisdiction is passed both to the district court on 

appeal and back to the justice court on remand if the appeal is 

withdrawn.

¶31 The State‘s reading of subsection 118(3) is antithetical to 

this jurisdictional system. By its account, Kamoe‘s appeal of her 

negotiated plea vacated the Judgment of the justice court. But this 

cannot be. If the State were correct, there would be no ―judgment‖ 

over which the district court could assume ―appellate jurisdiction,‖ 

and a court that ―lacks appellate jurisdiction . . .  ̳retains only the 

authority to dismiss the action.‘‖ Hayes v. Intermountain 

GeoEnvironmental Servs. Inc., 2018 UT App 223, ¶ 5, 437 P.3d 650 

(quoting Ramsay v. Kane Cnty. Hum. Res. Special Serv. Dist., 2014 UT 

5, ¶ 17, 322 P.3d 1163). Further, under the State‘s logic, when 

Kamoe appealed and the justice court stayed her sentence as 

required under subsection 118(2), it somehow stayed a sentence 

that no longer existed. These existential dilemmas demonstrate how

an ―appeal‖ for a trial de novo in district court depends on the

continued existence of the justice court‘s final Judgment.

¶32 The State‘s position divests not only the district court of 

―appellate jurisdiction‖ to hear Kamoe‘s appeal, but also the justice 
Cite as: 2021 UT 5

Opinion of the Court

13

court of jurisdiction to hear her ―remand‖ upon withdrawal of that

appeal. By the State‘s logic, Kamoe‘s Judgment was voided when 

she filed her appeal. So, when she withdrew the appeal—as she had

every right to do under rule 38(f)(6)—the justice court would have 

had no jurisdiction to assume a ―remand‖ of a case for which it had 

already entered a Judgment that was subsequently vacated. As a 

result, Kamoe could simply walk away. If the State wishes to 

continue its case against Kamoe, by its rationale, it would 

presumably need to file a new information and start over,11

assuming it could even do so without running afoul of 

constitutional protections against double jeopardy.

12

¶33 In sum, the State‘s interpretation of subsection 118(3) 

cannot be read ―in harmony with other statutes‖ controlling the 

jurisdiction of cases originating in justice court. The State‘s position 

would create not just a crack but a gaping hole in the jurisdictional 

structure of the justice court system through which entire cases 

could fall. Kamoe‘s interpretation, on the other hand, not only is

consistent with the statutory framework, but also squares with how 

__________________________________________________________

11 And this time, the prosecutor would need to ensure that he 

engaged in no ―negotiation‖ with Kamoe which could potentially 

trigger subsection 118(3). Otherwise, she could simply plead guilty, 

appeal, and withdraw, perpetuating an absurd game of 

jurisdictional hide-and-seek.

12 Under both article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution and 

the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, no person 

shall be ―twice put in jeopardy‖ for the same offense. ―The Utah 

Supreme Court has observed that it is well settled  ̳that jeopardy 

attaches when a court accepts a guilty plea.‘‖ State v. Horrocks, 2001 

UT App 4, ¶ 14, 17 P.3d 1145 (quoting State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 

1302 (Utah 1986)); see also Kay, 717 P.2d at 1304 (applying the same 

analysis to both constitutional provisions), overruled on other grounds 

by State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Utah 1991). Nonetheless, Kay 

implied that jeopardy may not attach to a guilty plea when one 

party ―unilaterally withdraw[s] from the agreement without a 

showing that facts analogous to those warranting a mistrial exist.‖ 

See Kay, 717 P.2d at 1302–06 (analyzing certain exceptions to double 

jeopardy recognized in United States v. Cruz, 709 F.2d 111 (1st Cir.

1983)).

While the issue of double jeopardy was a focus of the district 

court‘s rule 65B hearing, it is not raised or significantly briefed on 

appeal. As such, we need not decide this issue today since the 

State‘s position fails on other grounds.
KAMOE v. HON. RIDGE

Opinion of the Court

14

the system works in practice: A Judgment entered by a justice court 

persists on appeal until vacated or replaced by the district court.

¶34 We therefore find that only Kamoe‘s reading of subsection 

118(3) ―makes sense on its face under the ordinary meaning of the 

words as used in the statute and harmonizes [all of] the language

. . . of the statute.‖ As such, we hold that an appeal under 

subsection 118(3) does not void the Judgment of the justice court.

II. RELIEF UNDER RULE 65B IS WARRANTED

¶35 So far, Kamoe has shown that the justice court committed 

a legal error when it misapplied subsection 118(3) and denied her 

motion to reinstate the original Judgment. As such, we find that the 

justice court abused its discretion. See supra ¶ 9; State v. Petersen, 810 

P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991) (―[T]rial courts do not have discretion to 

misapply the law.‖). Therefore, Kamoe has established ―adequate 

grounds for relief‖ pursuant to her rule 65B motion, but this court 

still has discretion to grant that relief or not. State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 

88, ¶ 24, 127 P.3d 682.

¶36 In Barrett, we listed some examples of factors to consider 

when deciding a rule 65B(d)(2) motion. Id. ¶ 24. While these factors 

may certainly aid the rule 65B calculus, we have previously warned 

against inflexible reliance on a non-exhaustive list of common-law 

factors designed to merely facilitate a court‘s analysis. See, e.g., State 

v. Ring, 2018 UT 19, ¶ 23, 424 P.3d 845 (explaining that ―[i]t is 

always error‖ for a court to ―rely inflexibly upon each‖ factor 

outlined in State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295–96 (Utah 1988), 

abrogated on other grounds by State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 

1997), when interpreting rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence,

rather than the language of the rule itself). Instead, the thrust of the 

Barrett analysis is that appellate courts have broad discretion to 

consider all circumstances related to the rule 65B(d)(2) motion.

¶37 Here, each party makes apocalyptic predictions regarding 

the other‘s interpretation of subsection 118(3) and the implications 

of granting or denying Kamoe‘s petition. The State argues that 

every criminal defendant would want to ―test the waters‖ in district 

court after making a plea in justice court, which ―would up-end the 

justice court system and overload the district courts.‖ Kamoe 

argues the opposite—that the State‘s position will disincentivize 

justice court defendants from making pleas, instead encouraging 

them ―to take every case to trial knowing it is their only way to 

appeal and knowing that no matter what happens at the trial, they 

will get a complete do-over.‖ While this court cannot forecast the 

future, we can say that both positions are likely overstated, as 

evidenced by the fact that this issue has been raised so 
Cite as: 2021 UT 5

Opinion of the Court

15

infrequently.13 Presumably, most criminal defendants desire either 

the finality of a guilty plea or the opportunity to defend their case 

in a court of record.

¶38 With little more than unsubstantiated predictions of 

catastrophe in both directions, we cannot abdicate our 

―responsibility to correctly interpret the law governing the issues 

before us.‖ In re E.H., 2006 UT 36, ¶ 18, 137 P.3d 809. Here, that 

means correcting the lower courts‘ erroneous interpretation of

subsection 118(3) and granting Kamoe the relief she seeks.

CONCLUSION

¶39 Under Utah Code section 78A-7-118(3), a criminal 

defendant‘s appeal of a guilty plea made in justice court does not 

void that court‘s conviction, sentence, and commitment. To hold 

otherwise would oppose the plain language of the statute and 

create a significant jurisdictional gap in the justice court system. 

Therefore, we reverse the district court‘s denial of Kamoe‘s petition 

for extraordinary relief and remand the case to justice court with 

instructions to reinstate her original Judgment.

__________________________________________________________

13 For example, Kamoe‘s counsel told the district court that he

has ―done hundreds of de novo appeals‖ and has ―never seen it 

before.‖