GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Briefing Report to Congressional 

Committees

June 1999 COMBATING 

TERRORISM

Analysis of Federal 

Counterterrorist 

Exercises

GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-282723 Letter

June 25, 1999

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Christopher Shays

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,

 Veterans’ Affairs, and International Relations

Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives

Terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and interests domestically and 

abroad highlight the need for effective U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. 

U.S. policy and implementing guidelines call for robust, tailored, and 

rapidly deployable interagency teams to conduct well-coordinated and 

highly integrated operations. Federal agencies enhance their ability to 

respond to terrorist incidents by conducting exercises that train key 

personnel and test response plans. We recently briefed your staffs on our 

analysis of federal counterterrorist exercise data that we had gathered in 

producing our February 1999 classified report to you. This report 

summarizes the contents of those briefings. Our objective was to determine 

the numbers, types, scenarios, and participants involved in federal 

counterterrorism exercises conducted from June 1995 to June 1998.

Background Presidential directives assign leadership and supporting roles to various 

federal agencies. Federal agencies’ activities to combat terrorism include 

responding to a terrorist crisis and managing the consequences after a 

terrorist attack. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39, issued in June 

1995, required key federal agencies to ensure that their counterterrorist 

capabilities are well exercised. Counterterrorism exercises include 

tabletop exercises, in which agency officials discuss scenarios around a 

table or other similar setting, and field exercises, where agency leadership 

and operational units actually deploy to practice their skills and

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coordination in a realistic field setting. One of the highest priorities in the 

federal government is to prepare for terrorist attacks involving weapons of 

mass destruction (WMD).1

Results in Brief Federal agencies conducted 201 counterterrorism exercises in the 3 years 

following PDD 39. The number of exercises per year more than tripled over 

the 3-year period, with the largest increase in the last year. Agencies used a 

variety of types of exercises and scenarios during this period. More than 

half of the exercises were field exercises (where command and response 

personnel actually deployed with their equipment), and the rest were 

tabletop exercises (where personnel discussed a particular scenario). Very 

few of the exercises included no-notice deployments of personnel and 

equipment. Over one-half of the exercises dealt with managing the 

immediate crisis resulting from a terrorist incident, including stopping a 

terrorist attack, while the others dealt with managing the consequences of 

the incident, such as caring for the injured. Until recently, very few 

exercises dealt with the likely situation of both crisis and consequence 

management occurring simultaneously. More than two-thirds of the 

exercises had WMD scenarios, while the others had more traditional and 

more likely terrorist scenarios involving conventional arms and explosives. 

Over half of the WMD exercises used scenarios that used chemical agents.

There was a variety of participants in these exercises. More than two-thirds 

of the exercises included more than one federal agency and almost one-half 

of them included three or more federal agencies. Some exercises also 

included participants of organizations other than federal agencies. For 

example, one-third of the exercises included state and/or local government 

participants, almost one-tenth of them had nongovernmental participants, 

and a few had foreign government participants. Federal agencies played 

various roles in these exercises, depending on their roles and their level of 

participation.

1

For the purpose of this report, we define WMD as chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons or agents. 

Within the federal government, there is disagreement as to the precise definition, especially whether 

large conventional explosives should be included.

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This report contains no recommendations. However, in our February 1999 

classified report on interagency counterterrorist operations, we made five 

recommendations to several agencies to improve counterterrorist 

exercises.2

Agency Comments We received oral comments from the Department of State, the Department 

of Defense (DOD), the U.S. Secret Service (USSS), the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 

the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Energy (DOE), the 

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

and Firearms (ATF). In general, these agencies stated that the report was 

an accurate reflection of federal counterterrorist exercises conducted in 

the period we reviewed. Many of these agencies provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

The FBI commented that the report was an accurate empirical survey of 

federal counterterrorist exercises. However, the FBI believed that 

clarification would be beneficial in four areas: tabletop exercises, state and 

local participation in exercises, no-notice exercises, and our methodology 

to collect and analyze exercises led by federal agencies. The FBI said that 

tabletop exercises can sometimes take months to prepare for and that it 

was sometimes difficult to get state and local officials to participate in 

federal exercises. We changed the text to reflect these comments.

Regarding no-notice exercises, the FBI noted some of the difficulties 

involved in conducting these type of exercises in a domestic scenario. 

According to the FBI, no-notice exercises, especially those broad in scope, 

can be disruptive to an agency’s normal functions and daily responsibilities. 

It noted that the FBI’s ability to dedicate resources and personnel to 

no-notice exercises is limited by its primary mission to investigate 

violations of federal law. According to the FBI, the primary goal of the 

exercise program should be to train the participants in the crisis 

management process, not to test how fast they can respond to a no-notice 

exercise. PDD 39 and the guidelines and plans that implement it call for 

robust rapidly deployable interagency teams. Thus, we believe that it is also 

2

For an unclassified summary of this report, see Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to 

Improve Counterterrorist Operations (GAO/NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999). This summary, however, does 

not contain our recommendations because they were classified.

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important to test how fast federal teams can respond to a no-notice event. 

Such exercises could lead to improvements in recall and deployment 

procedures to ensure that state and local first responders receive federal 

assistance as soon as possible. Along these lines, the Senate Committee on 

Appropriations recently directed the Attorney General to conduct 

no-notice exercises with domestic scenarios that include the participation 

of all key personnel who would participate in the consequence 

management of a major terrorist event involving the use of a chemical, 

biological, or cyber weapon.

Regarding our methodology, the FBI commented that the number of 

FBI-sponsored exercises identified in our report was incomplete because 

we focused on national level exercises. The data included in the report was 

based on information that the FBI and other agencies provided to us during 

our review. We provided our list of exercises to FBI and other agencies to 

review for completeness and accuracy. To the extent the agencies, such as 

FBI, were not aware of counterterrorist exercises that their field offices led 

or participated in, we may not have included such exercises in our analysis. 

FBI also commented that our methodology consisted of a simple tally of 

conducted exercises rather than a more in-depth analysis of exercise 

scope, objectives, and number and type of participants. We did perform 

such an analysis in our February 1999 classified report, which included five 

recommendations to several agencies (including FBI) to improve 

counterterrorist exercises.

Scope and 

Methodology

We focused our analysis on federal counterterrorism exercises in the 3-year 

period following the issuance of PDD 39. To gather data on exercises, we 

obtained documents and interviewed officials at the Department of State, 

DOD, USSS, FBI, FEMA, HHS, EPA, DOE, VA, and ATF. We compiled a list 

of 201 counterterrorism exercises that were conducted from June 1995 to 

June 1998. To ensure the accuracy of our list of exercises, appropriate 

federal agencies reviewed it for completeness and accuracy. We also 

observed interagency meetings, planning sessions, and exercises. We 

performed our analysis in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards between March 1999 and May 1999 on data we gathered 

in 1997 and 1998.

This report is organized into three briefing sections. Section I includes 

background information. Section II presents our analysis of all federal 

counterterrorist exercises, including their number, type, focus, scenarios, 

and participants. Section III presents similar information on individual 

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agencies. For the four agencies that led most of the exercises, our data is 

presented in terms of the exercises that they led. For the other six agencies 

that participated in many exercises, but led relatively few, the data is 

presented in terms of the exercises in which they participated.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days after its 

issuance date. At that time we will send copies to appropriate 

congressional committees, the federal agencies discussed in this report, 

and to the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director of the Office of Management and 

Budget. We also will make copies available to other interested parties upon 

request.

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at 

(202) 512-5140. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix I.

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, National Security

 Preparedness Issues

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Contents

Letter 1

Briefing Section I

Background

Policy and Strategy on Combating Terrorism 8

Counterterrorist Roles and Responsibilities 10

Purpose and Types of Exercises 12

Briefing Section II

Federal Exercises

Overall

Counterterrorist Exercises From June 1995 to June 1998 14

Counterterrorist Exercises Field and Tabletop 16

Counterterrorist Exercises With Notice and No Notice 18

Counterterrorist Exercises Crisis and/or Consequence Management 20

Counterterrorist Exercises Conventional and WMD 22

Counterterrorist Exercises Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear 24

Counterterrorist Exercises Federal Agencies Participating 26

Counterterrorist Exercises by Types of Participants 28

Counterterrorist Exercises State and Local Participation 30

Briefing Section III

Individual Agencies

Exercises

Counterterrorist Exercises by Lead Agency 32

Counterterrorist Exercises Participation and Leadership by Agency 34

Department of Defense Counterterrorist Exercises 36

U.S. Secret Service Counterterrorist Exercises 38

Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterterrorist Exercises 40

Federal Emergency Management Agency Counterterrorist Exercises 42

Department of Health and Human Services Counterterrorist Exercises 44

Environmental Protection Agency Counterterrorist Exercises 46

Department of Energy Counterterrorist Exercises 48

Department of State Counterterrorist Exercises 50

Department of Veterans Affairs Counterterrorist Exercises 52

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Counterterrorist Exercises 54

Appendix I

Major Contributors to

This Report

56

Related GAO Products 59
Contents

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Abbreviations

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms

DEST Domestic Emergency Support Team

DOD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FEST Foreign Emergency Support Team

HHS Department of Health and Human Services

PDD Presidential Decision Directive

USSS U.S. Secret Service

VA Department of Veterans Affairs

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Briefing Section I

Background onISnBigefctri

Policy and Strategy on Combating

Terrorism

• Presidential directives establish policy and

strategy.

• Strategy includes prevention, crisis

management, and consequence

management.

• Priority is to prevent and respond to

terrorist attacks involving weapons of

mass destruction.
Briefing Section I

Background

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

In 1986, the President formalized U.S. policy to combat terrorism by signing 

National Security Decision Directive 207, which primarily focused on 

terrorist incidents overseas. After the bombing of a federal building in 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, the President issued Presidential Decision 

Directive (PDD) 39 in June 1995, which enumerated responsibilities for 

federal agencies in combating terrorism, including domestic incidents. In 

May 1998, the President issued PDD 62 that reaffirmed PDD 39 and further 

articulated responsibilities for specific agencies. Federal agencies drafted 

agency and interagency guidance to implement these directives.

These PDDs divide activities to combat terrorism into three elements: 

preventing and deterring terrorism, responding to a terrorist crisis, and 

managing the consequences after a terrorist attack.1

 Crisis management 

includes efforts to stop a terrorist attack, arrest terrorists, and gather 

evidence for criminal prosecution. Consequence management includes 

efforts to provide medical treatment and emergency services, evacuate 

people from dangerous areas, and restore government services. When 

terrorist attacks occur without adequate threat warning, crisis 

management and consequence management will be concurrent activities.

One of the highest priorities in the federal government is to prevent and 

prepare for terrorist attacks that use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 

These attacks include terrorist use of nuclear, biological, or chemical 

weapons or agents to cause mass casualties. The President (via PDD 39 and 

PDD 62) and the Congress (via legislation and committee reports) have 

emphasized the importance of preparedness against this type of threat.

1

Activities to prevent and deter terrorism were not included in the scope of this report.
Briefing Section I

Background

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Counterterrorist Roles and

Responsibilities

State leads crisis management and consequence

management overseas.

FBI leads domestic crisis management.

FEMA leads domestic consequence management.

Supporting roles are assigned to other key agencies

(e.g., DOD, DOE, EPA, and HHS).
Briefing Section I

Background

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

PDDs 39 and 62 assigned or reaffirmed lead and support roles to various 

federal agencies and established interagency support teams. The 

Department of State is the lead agency for both crisis management and 

consequence management for terrorist incidents overseas. The State 

Department would lead an interagency Foreign Emergency Support Team 

(FEST) to provide advice and support to U.S. ambassadors, Washington 

decision-makers, and host governments. For domestic terrorist incidents, 

the leadership of crisis management and consequence management is 

divided. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead federal 

agency for domestic crisis management and would lead an interagency 

Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) to provide advice and support 

to FBI on-scene commanders. The Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) is the lead agency for consequence management of 

domestic terrorist incidents. Other federal agencies such as the 

Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Energy (DOE), the 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of Health 

and Human Services (HHS) are designated as support agencies that would 

assist the lead agencies in crisis and consequence management. Depending 

on the nature of the terrorist attack, these support agencies could be part 

of the interagency FEST or DEST. Briefing section III provides more 

detailed information on the lead and supporting roles of specific agencies.2

2

In addition to briefing section III, our earlier report provides detailed information on the roles and 

responsibilities of lead and support agencies. See Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to

Implement National Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).
Briefing Section I

Background

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

PDD 39 required key federal agencies to maintain well-exercised 

counterterrorist capabilities. Exercises test and validate policies and 

procedures, test the effectiveness of response capabilities, and increase the 

confidence and skill levels of personnel. Because a federal counterterrorist 

response is inherently interagency, agencies also exercise together. These 

interagency exercises enhance coordination among agencies and help them 

work together. They also allow personnel to become familiar with other 

agencies’ procedures and identify those areas needing further 

coordination. In the absence of actual operations, exercises are an 

Purpose and Types of Exercises

• PDD-39 directed key agencies to

exercise their capabilities.

• Exercises train agency personnel and

test their response plans.

• Interagency exercises enhance

coordination and ability to work together.

• Agencies use both field and tabletop

exercises.
Briefing Section I

Background

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

important indicator of the preparedness of federal agencies to deal with a 

variety of terrorist incidents.

Exercises fall into two general categories, tabletop and field exercises.3

Tabletop exercises are performed around a table, a classroom, or a 

simulated command post as the players progress through a scenario or 

series of scenarios and discuss how their agency or unit might react to 

different situations. Tabletop exercises are used to emphasize higher level 

policy and procedural issues and frequently include more senior level 

agency officials. Tabletop exercises are limited to discussions only; there is 

no actual deployment of operational or tactical personnel or equipment. 

Thus, tabletop exercises do not test the government’s ability to actually use 

and coordinate personnel and assets in a realistic setting. However, they 

are a relatively inexpensive and expeditious way to identify and resolve 

problems in policies and procedures. Given the relatively few logistical 

requirements, agencies can plan and conduct tabletop exercises within a 

few weeks or months.

Field exercises are performed in the field under simulated operational 

conditions. Such exercises focus on performing tasks at the operational 

and tactical levels and typically include tactics, techniques, and procedures 

that would be used in a real incident. Field exercises test agency and 

interagency capabilities to actually deploy personnel and their equipment 

and coordinate them as they perform their tasks in a realistic setting. Field 

exercises are generally more expensive than tabletop exercises because 

they involve more players, increased transportation and other travel 

expenses, and added wear and tear on equipment. Depending on their 

scope, field exercises may require up to a year of advance planning to 

prepare detailed objectives, identify essential tasks, script the scenario, 

develop an evaluation plan, and schedule transportation and other logistic 

support.

3

Different agencies use slightly different nomenclature to categorize types of exercises. Our definition 

of tabletop exercises includes “seminar” exercises, “command post” exercises, and “functional 

exercises.” Our definition of field exercises includes “full field” exercises, “full-up” exercises, and 

“muddy boots” exercises.
Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Briefing Section II

Federal Exercises Overall nSoBnIigefctri

3 2

5 3

116

June 1995 - June 1996 June 1996 - June 1997 June 1997 - June 1998

Counterterrorist Exercises

From June 1995 to June 1998
Briefing Section II

Federal Exercises Overall

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Federal agencies sponsored a large number of counterterrorism exercises 

in the 3-year period following the issuance of PDD 39. In total, federal 

agencies sponsored 201 counterterrorism exercises to improve their 

preparedness for counterterrorist operations. Most of the exercises 

responded to a domestic terrorist attack and were conducted in the United 

States, while some addressed international attacks and were conducted 

overseas. The number of exercises increased from 32 to 116—an increase 

of 263 percent—over this 3-year period.

The 1996 Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, commonly 

known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act, required DOD to enhance 

domestic preparedness by providing local emergency response personnel 

with training and advice. DOD’s program to accomplish this, known as the 

Domestic Preparedness Program, had some impact on the overall increase 

in exercises. There were 26 Domestic Preparedness Program exercises 

conducted in the third year, which is 13 percent of all the exercises done 

over the 3-year period. While we did not collect data beyond June 1998, 

DOD has continued to sponsor these types of exercises in conjunction with 

local governments and other federal agencies. We reported earlier on this 

program.1

1

See Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and

Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998) and Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments

Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998).
Briefing Section II

Federal Exercises Overall

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

23

37

56

9

16

60

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

June 1995 - June 1996 June 1996 - June 1997 June 1997 - June 1998

Field Exercises Tabletop Exercises

Counterterrorist Exercises

Field and Tabletop
Briefing Section II

Federal Exercises Overall

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

As discussed earlier, exercises are categorized as tabletop or field 

exercises. We found that federal agencies conducted a mixture of tabletop 

and field exercises. Of the total 201 exercises in the 3-year period, 

116 (58 percent) were field exercises and 85 (42 percent) were tabletop 

exercises. Although field exercises exceeded tabletop exercises overall, the 

number of tabletop exercises increased at a much faster rate (567 percent 

versus 143 percent).

One factor in the increase in tabletop exercises was DOD’s implementation 

of the Domestic Preparedness Program in the third year. This trend may 

reverse somewhat in future years as program exercises shift from tabletop 

to field exercises. Some agencies, such as FEMA, relied mostly on tabletop 

exercises, and others, such as the U.S. Secret Service (USSS), held mostly 

field exercises. DOD, FEMA, and FBI led the most tabletop exercises 

during this period and DOD, USSS, and FBI led the most field exercises.
Briefing Section II

Federal Exercises Overall

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

No Notice - 4

With Notice - 197

Counterterrorist Exercises

With Notice and No Notice
Briefing Section II

Federal Exercises Overall

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Very few of the counterterrorism exercises were conducted without 

advance notice to the participants. Such exercises, known as “no-notice” 

exercises, provide the highest degree of challenge and realism to federal 

counterterrorism teams. Only four (2 percent of the total) exercises had 

no-notice field deployments of federal personnel and equipment. All of the 

no-notice exercises had international scenarios and were sponsored by 

DOD or DOE. They included rapid deployments of command elements and 

tactical units to locations worldwide and included the FEST to practice 

supporting the ambassador at a post in a terrorist situation.
Briefing Section II

Federal Exercises Overall

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

30

38

55

2

13

28

0

2

33

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

June 1995 - June 1996 June 1996 - June 1997 June 1997 - June 1998

Crisis Management Consequence Management Both

Counterterrorist Exercises

Crisis and/or Consequence Management
Briefing Section II

Federal Exercises Overall

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Counterterrorist exercises generally focus on either crisis management or 

consequence management. While the number of both types of exercises 

increased, consequence management exercises rose dramatically. Crisis 

management exercises increased from 30 to 55 (83 percent), while 

consequence management exercises rose from 2 to 28 (1,400 percent) over 

the 3-year period. Initially, very few exercises focused on both crisis and 

consequence management as there were none in the first year and only two 

in the second year. In a major terrorist incident without adequate threat 

warning, crisis management and consequence management would need to 

occur simultaneously. By the third year, however, there were 33 exercises 

that included both crisis management and consequence management. Of 

these 33, most of them (26 exercises) were tabletop exercises sponsored by 

DOD under the Domestic Preparedness Program.

Crisis management exercises include both international and domestic 

scenarios. Each year, DOD and DOE sponsor several international 

interagency field exercises. The State Department uses these exercises to 

practice its leadership role in international terrorist incidents. Domestic 

crisis management exercises are led by law enforcement agencies and 

primarily provide training to prepare for crisis response. The FBI and the 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) have crisis management 

exercise programs that periodically test crisis response teams and include 

field office personnel. The USSS conducts many field exercises related to 

its mission to protect the President and other key officials and to ensure 

continuity of operations at the White House.

Consequence management exercises generally had domestic scenarios.2

FEMA sponsored a series of interagency tabletop exercises that focused on 

interagency and intergovernmental issues. Other federal agencies, such as 

DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), have also sponsored 

consequence management exercises.

2

While there have been some DOD and State Department sponsored consequence management 

exercises with international scenarios, we did not include them in our review.
Briefing Section II

Federal Exercises Overall

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

9

21

32

23

32

84

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

June 1995 - June 1996 June 1996 - June 1997 June 1997 - June 1998

Conventional WMD

Counterterrorist Exercises

Conventional and WMD
Briefing Section II

Federal Exercises Overall

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Federal counterterrorist exercises included both conventional and WMD 

scenarios to prepare their personnel for a wide variety of possible 

situations. Exercises with both conventional and WMD scenarios increased 

more than 250 percent over the 3-year period. The ratio of conventional 

scenarios to WMD scenarios was roughly the same (about 2.5) in the third 

year as in the first year.3

 DOD, FEMA, FBI, and USSS led the most exercises 

that included WMD scenarios. All of the 26 Domestic Preparedness 

Program exercises that were conducted in the third year had WMD 

scenarios.

Although the number of exercises with WMD is more than double those 

with conventional scenarios, conventional terrorist incidents are more 

likely to occur. According to intelligence agencies, conventional explosives 

and firearms continue to be the weapons of choice for terrorists. Terrorists 

are less likely to use WMD agents, in part, because they are more difficult 

to obtain, develop, and weaponize or otherwise disseminate. However, the 

likelihood that terrorists may use chemical and biological materials may 

increase over the next decade, according to intelligence agencies. DOD led 

the most WMD exercises (89 exercises), and a high percentage (92 percent) 

of the exercises that it led had WMD scenarios. DOD officials said that they 

need to train against the most challenging threat (i.e., WMD) and that such 

training also prepares their personnel for less challenging conventional 

threats. Another factor in the relatively high number of exercises with 

WMD scenarios is the strong emphasis on WMD voiced by the President 

(in PDDs) and the Congress (in legislation and committee reports).

3

To some extent the number of WMD scenarios is overstated because we classified exercises that had 

both WMD and conventional scenarios as WMD exercises.
Briefing Section II

Federal Exercises Overall

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

WMD - 139 Chemical - 59 Biological - 18 Nuclear - 21 Multiple WMD -

41

Counterterrorist Exercises

Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear
Briefing Section II

Federal Exercises Overall

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Federal agencies had scenarios that used all three types of WMD 

(chemical, biological, and nuclear) in their counterterrorism exercieses 

during the 3-year period. Chemical agents, such as sarin, were the most 

common and were included in 59 (42 percent) of the WMD exercises. All of 

the 26 Domestic Preparedness Program exercises included chemical 

agents. Biological agents, such as anthrax, were less common and were 

included in 18 (13 percent) of the WMD exercises. Nuclear threats 

(including radiological), such as uranium bombs and plutonium, were 

included in 21 (15 percent) of the exercises.

In addition, of the 139 WMD exercises, 41 (29 percent) including more 

than 1 type of WMD in the scenario.4 An example of a multiple WMD 

scenario was a DOD exercise where terrorists teams were at two locations, 

one team with a chemical weapon and one team with a biological weapon. 

While DOD officials acknowledged that such a multiple WMD scenario was 

not likely, they said each individual team in the exercise focused on its 

individual target, so the training they received at the tactical level was the 

same as in a single WMD scenario.

4

To some extent the number of multiple WMD scenarios is overstated because we included exercises in 

that category if the data indicated they were WMD, but we could not determine the exact type of agent 

in the scenario.
Briefing Section II

Federal Exercises Overall

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

61

46

94

One Agency - 61

Two Agencies - 46

Three or More Agencies - 94

Counterterrorist Exercises

Federal Agencies Participating
Briefing Section II

Federal Exercises Overall

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

The number of federal agencies participating in exercises ranged from 

a single agency to many agencies. Of the 201 exercises, 61 exercises 

(30 percent) only included the agencies that led them. There were 

140 exercises (70 percent) that were interagency exercises—they involved 

at least 2 federal departments or independent agencies.5

 Ninety-six

(47 percent of the total) exercises were major interagency exercises 

because they included three or more departments or independent agencies. 

DOD, FEMA, FBI, and USSS led the most major interagency exercises 

during this period.

5

For the purpose of this report, we define "interagency" as involving more than one federal department 

or independent agency. For example, DOD-led exercises that included both Army and Navy 

participation, or FBI-led exercises that included other Department of Justice participants (e.g., the 

Bureau of Prisons) were not considered interagency exercises.
Briefing Section II

Federal Exercises Overall

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Counterterrorist Exercises

By Types of Participants

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Total Exercises -

201

State and / or Local

- 69

Non-government -

18

Foreign - 4
Briefing Section II

Federal Exercises Overall

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

In some of the 201 exercises, federal agencies gained experience working 

with state and local authorities, nongovernmental organizations, and 

foreign governments. Of the 201 exercises, 69 (34 percent) had state and/or 

local government participation, such as police and fire departments. In 

addition, 18 (9 percent) of the total exercises included nongovernmental or 

other private organizations. Examples of such organizations include 

disaster relief charities (e.g., the Red Cross), private firms (e.g., hospitals, 

airlines, and oil companies), and organizations set up for special events 

(e.g., the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games). Four of the exercises 

(2 percent) included foreign government participation and simulated 

federal agency integration in international incidents. DOD led most of the 

exercises with state and local participation because of the 

intergovernmental nature of the Domestic Preparedness Program 

exercises. After DOD, FBI and FEMA led more exercises with state and 

local participation than the other agencies.
Briefing Section II

Federal Exercises Overall

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Counterterrorist Exercises

State and Local Participation

Federal, State and / or Local

WMD Versus Conventional

9

60

Conventional WMD

Federal, State and / or Local

Field and Tabletop

20

49

Field Tabletop
Briefing Section II

Federal Exercises Overall

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Federal counterterrorist exercises that included state and/or local 

participation tended to be tabletop exercises with WMD scenarios. Of the 

total 69 exercises, 49 (71 percent) were tabletops and 60 (87 percent) had 

WMD scenarios. The 26 Domestic Preparedness Program exercises (which 

were all tabletops using WMD scenarios) accounted for 26 (38 percent) of 

the 69 exercises that included state and/or local participation.

According to the FBI, field exercises offer hands-on training that cannot be 

replicated by tabletop exercises and valuable opportunities to test 

interactions among federal, state, and local agencies. For this reason, the 

FBI views participation by state and local agencies in federally sponsored 

field exercises as a top priority as it continues to plan and execute 

counterterrorist exercises. However, staffing and budget considerations or 

restrictive union contracts sometimes hinder state and local participation 

in federal exercises, according to the FBI. The FBI noted that it is not 

budgeted to pay state or local overtime for participation in FBI-led 

exercises, and until this budget problem is resolved, there will never be 

extensive state and local participation in FBI-led exercises. The FBI stated 

that the Department of Justice’s Office of Justice Programs may be able to 

provide funding for state and local participation in federally sponsored 

field exercises.
Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Briefing Section III

Individual Agencies Exercises noBSIigefcrti

DOD - 97

FBI - 24

FEMA - 16 USSS - 46 HHS - 3

EPA - 1

DOE - 5

State - 1

VA - 4

ATF - 4

Other - 3

Other

Counterterrorist Exercises

By Lead Agency
Briefing Section III

Individual Agencies Exercises

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Federal counterterrorist exercises were generally led by one agency. The 

lead agency was responsible for planning the exercise, setting the 

objectives, scripting the scenario, coordinating the logistics, and evaluating 

the results. Thus, the lead agency usually expended the bulk of the 

personnel and resources to conduct an exercise. This is especially the case 

in field exercises, which are more resource intensive than tabletop 

exercises. The role of agencies that just participated varied by exercise and 

by agency. Some participating agencies were very involved in exercise 

planning and provided substantial resources to exercises led by other 

agencies. For example, in some field exercises, participating agencies 

attended numerous planning sessions and deployed several personnel and 

substantial equipment to the exercise location. In contrast, in some 

tabletop exercises, some participating agencies contributed one or two 

personnel just for the day of the exercise.

Four agencies led more than 90 percent of the counterterrorist exercises. 

These four agencies, and the number (and percentage) of federal exercises 

that they led, were DOD with 97 (48 percent), USSS with 46 (23 percent), 

the FBI with 24 (12 percent), and FEMA with 16 (8 percent). No other 

single agency led more than five (2 percent) of the total exercises over the 

3-year period. For the few cases when more than one agency led an 

exercise, we counted all sponsoring agencies as a lead agency; thus, the 

total in our briefing slide (204) slightly exceeds the 201 exercises 

conducted during this period.

 (and
Briefing Section III

Individual Agencies Exercises

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

143

99

76

68 65

47

36

24

12 10

97

24

16

3

46

1 5 1 4 4

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

DOD FBI FEMA HHS USSS EPA DOE State VA ATF

Participated in Exercise

Led Exercise

Counterterrorist Exercises

Participation and Leadership by Agency
Briefing Section III

Individual Agencies Exercises

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Some agencies (e.g., DOD, USSS, FBI, and FEMA) not only led many 

exercises but also participated in many exercises led by other agencies. 

Other agencies we reviewed led 5 or fewer exercises but participated in at 

least 10 exercises in the 3-year period. These agencies generally exercise 

their personnel and equipment through their participation in other 

agencies’ exercises. For example, State Department officials told us that 

they leverage DOD-sponsored exercises to exercise their counterterrorism 

responsibilities, including their lead agency status. As discussed earlier, 

because some exercises were sponsored by more than one agency, the 

number of exercises that agencies led (204) slightly exceeded the 

201 exercises conducted in this period.

Additional information on agencies leading and participating in exercises is 

provided by the individual agencies in the remainder of this section. For the 

agencies that led the most exercises (DOD, USSS, FBI, and FEMA), the 

data is displayed by exercises that each agency led. These agencies are 

presented in descending order of the number of exercises they led. For the 

other agencies, the data is displayed by exercises in which they 

participated. These agencies are presented in descending order of the 

number of exercises they participated in.
Briefing Section III

Individual Agencies Exercises

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Department of Defense

Counterterrorist Exercises

Breakdown of DOD-Led Exercises by

Number of Participating Agencies

35

62

One or Two Three or More

Type of Scenarios for Exercises

That DOD Led

8

89

Conventional WMD

Type of Exercises That DOD Led

44

53

Field Exercises Tabletop Exercises

DOD Leadership and Participation in Exercises

97

46

Exercises Led Participated Only
Briefing Section III

Individual Agencies Exercises

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

DOD is not a lead federal agency for response to terrorist incidents, but it 

provides significant and unique capabilities to support other agencies in 

conducting their responsibilities. DOD works with the State Department to 

support its international crisis management role. DOD also supports the 

domestic lead agencies, FBI and FEMA, and other agencies for domestic 

crisis and consequence management. This support includes not only 

tactical units but also logistics and technical units trained to deal with all 

types of WMD. Examples of response units include the Army’s Technical 

Escort Unit and the Marine Corps’ Chemical and Biological Incident 

Response Force.

During this period, DOD participated in a wide variety of counterterrorist 

exercises and sponsored major exercises with interagency participation. 

DOD participated in the most exercises with a total of 143, and it led 

97 (68 percent) of these exercises. Of the DOD-led exercises, 

53 (55 percent) were tabletop and 44 (45 percent) were field exercises. 

Most included WMD scenarios, primarily chemical weapons, and 

62 (66 percent) of the DOD-led exercises included 3 or more federal 

agencies, many of which included State, FBI, DOE, HHS, and EPA. DOD 

also sponsored the four exercises that included foreign government 

participants, as well as three of the four no-notice exercises.

DOD sponsored a variety of major interagency tabletop exercises and field 

exercises. DOD sponsored the Domestic Preparedness Program exercises 

carried out in major U.S. cities. This program also included major federal, 

state, and local field exercises in Denver in 1997 and Philadelphia in 1998. 

DOD also established the Interagency Terrorism Response Awareness 

Program, which includes tabletop exercises that bring together senior 

agency officials within the counterterrorism community to coordinate 

policy issues. DOD schedules several interagency field exercises, including 

the Eligible Receiver series, which are sponsored by the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Ellipse series, which are field exercises 

conducted by one of the geographic theatre commanders. These major 

exercises usually include participation by other federal agencies. For 

example, in June of 1998, DOD conducted a weeklong WMD crisis 

management exercise, which included FBI, State, FEMA, DOE, and HHS.
Briefing Section III

Individual Agencies Exercises

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

U.S. Secret Service

Counterterrorist Exercises

Breakdown of USSS-Led Exercises by

Number of Participating Agencies 

40

6

One or Two Three or More

Type of Scenarios for Exercises That

 USSS Led

36

10

Conventional WMD

Type of Exercises That USSS Led

41

5

Field Exercises Tabletop Exercises

USSS Leadership and Participation in Exercises

46

19

Exercises Led Participated Only
Briefing Section III

Individual Agencies Exercises

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Among other responsibilities, USSS provides protection to the President 

and other key officials. USSS conducted exercises for its special agents 

related to its protective mission. These exercises generally involved 

continuity of operations at the White House or protecting the President and 

other officials. Some of these exercises practiced the USSS role in 

providing security at certain special events, such as national political 

conventions, presidential inaugurations, and state of the union addresses.

USSS generally led field exercises with conventional scenarios that had few 

other federal agencies participating. USSS participated in a total of 

65 exercises and led 46 (71 percent) of these exercises. Forty-one 

(89 percent) of the exercises led by USSS were field exercises and the other 

5 (11 percent) were tabletop exercises. Of the 46 exercises that USSS led, 

40 (87 percent) of them had only the USSS or the USSS and 1 other agency 

participating and 6 (13 percent) of them had 3 or more federal agencies. Of 

the exercises it led, 36 (78 percent) had conventional scenarios and 10 

(22 percent) had some type of WMD threat in their scenarios.

USSS-led exercises involve protecting the President and other officials 

from attacks and are held at a variety of locations, including the White 

House complex. These exercises include some other federal agencies, such 

as DOD (the White House Military Office), FEMA, and the U.S. Capitol 

Police. The exercises that practice defense against attacks on the President 

and other officials, such as during motorcades, are held at the USSS 

training center and involve some other agencies as participants or 

observers. Exercises have been performed with other agencies before 

some special events, such as the Presidential Inauguration in 1997 and the 

Summit of the Eight in Denver in 1997.
Briefing Section III

Individual Agencies Exercises

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Counterterrorist Exercises

Breakdown of FBI-Led Exercises by

Number of Participating Agencies

18

6

One or Two Three or More

Type of Scenarios for Exercises That FBI 

Led

11

13

Conventional WMD

Type of Exercises That FBI Led

17

7

Field Exercises Tabletop Exercises

FBI Leadership and Participation in Exercises

24

75

Exercises Led Participated Only
Briefing Section III

Individual Agencies Exercises

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

The Department of Justice, including the FBI, has many responsibilities 

related to terrorism, including conducting criminal investigations, arresting 

individuals who commit terrorist acts, and prosecuting them. The FBI has 

been designated as the lead federal agency responsible for domestic 

terrorism crisis management, including responding to terrorist incidents. 

The FBI has a variety of operational capabilities that it can deploy to 

respond to a crisis. Its Critical Incident Response Group can deploy 

additional resources to assist field offices in responding and is also 

responsible for sponsoring FBI crisis management exercises. The FBI also 

can establish a Joint Operations Center to provide for interagency 

participation in managing a crisis. The FBI can also deploy an interagency 

DEST to advise and assist the FBI special agent in charge.

The FBI’s crisis management field exercises provide training in response 

capabilities to FBI field personnel. The FBI participated in 99 exercises 

during the 3-year period and led 24 (24 percent) of these exercises. Even 

though many FBI-led exercises focus on training for FBI response units, 

the FBI also led some exercises with participation by several other federal 

agencies. Of the 24 exercises that the FBI-led, 6 (25 percent) had 3 or more 

federal agencies participating. The other 18 exercises (75 percent) included 

only the FBI or the FBI and one other federal agency, as well as some other 

Justice Department organizations. The exercises also included some state 

and local organizations. FBI-led exercises included 17 (71 percent) field 

exercises and 7 (29 percent) tabletop exercises. FBI’s crisis management 

exercises had a variety of scenarios and terrorist threats. Thirteen of the 

scenarios (54 percent) were WMD and the other 11 (46 percent) were 

conventional.

The FBI’s exercises were primarily crisis management field training 

exercises that focused on training FBI’s operational response units, such as 

Special Weapons and Tactics teams, and evaluating their response plans. 

FBI’s field training exercises are often held at locations where actual crises 

could occur and include participants from FBI’s field offices. These 

exercises test command and control by establishing command posts and 

tactical operations centers and include support, such as equipment, 

communications, and logistics. The FBI exercises had a variety of 

scenarios, including hostage barricades, aircraft hijackings, terrorist 

attacks, conventional bombing attacks, threat of WMD, kidnappings, and 

prison disturbances. The FBI was also a significant player in some 

exercises that it did not lead. For example, it played a major role in a June 

1998 DOD-sponsored exercise and established a Joint Operations Center 

with representatives from other agencies, such as DOE, FEMA, and HHS.
Briefing Section III

Individual Agencies Exercises

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Counterterrorist Exercises

Breakdown of FEMA-Led Exercises by

Number of Participating Agencies

5

11

One or Two Three or More

Type of Scenarios for Exercises That FEMA

Led

1

15

Conventional WMD

Type of Exercises That FEMA Led

0

16

Field Exercises Tabletop Exercises

FEMA Leadership and Participation in Exercises

16

60

Exercises Led Participated Only
Briefing Section III

Individual Agencies Exercises

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

FEMA is the lead agency for coordinating the federal response to manage 

the consequences of a domestic terrorist attack. FEMA has various 

emergency response responsibilities for disasters, including maintaining 

the Federal Response Plan, which includes a counterterrorism annex. 

FEMA, using the Federal Response Plan, would coordinate the federal 

efforts to support state and local governments. The Stafford Act1

 provides 

FEMA with authority to assign missions to any federal agency in the event 

of a disaster or an emergency declared by the President, including acts of 

terrorism.

FEMA’s counterterrorism exercises focused on its consequence 

management role, and FEMA also participated in crisis management field 

exercises led by other agencies. The exercises that FEMA led have 

generally been interagency tabletops centered on a variety of WMD threats 

and scenarios. Of the 76 exercises that FEMA participated in, 

16 (21 percent) were led by FEMA. Many of the exercises were interagency 

with 11 of the 16 exercises that FEMA led (or 69 percent) having three or 

more federal agencies participating. The other five exercises (31 percent) 

included only FEMA or FEMA and one other federal agency. The 

16 exercises that FEMA led were all tabletop exercises. FEMA’s 

consequence management exercises were almost all (94 percent) WMD and 

had a variety of scenarios and terrorist threats.

The exercises led by FEMA included some major interagency exercises 

with WMD scenarios. The Ill Wind series of tabletop exercises, which 

began in September 1996, focused on preparing emergency management 

personnel to deal with the consequences of terrorism incidents. The 

scenarios of the exercises involved the use of WMD in the Washington, 

D.C., area. The FBI and several other agencies provided briefings, and there 

were participants from many other agencies. More recently, FEMA held 

consequence management seminars and tabletop exercises for its 

personnel in each of its 10 regions to highlight terrorism issues, and they 

included FBI regional participants. The regions chose the scenarios and 

seven included chemical agents and three included nuclear threats. FEMA 

also participated in major field exercises led by DOD and FBI to practice 

planning for consequence management.

1

42 U.S.C. section 5121 et seq.
Briefing Section III

Individual Agencies Exercises

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Department of Health and Human Services

Counterterrorist Exercises

Breakdown of Number of Agencies

Participating in Exercises Including HHS

3

65

One or Two Three or More

Type of Scenarios for Exercises

That HHS Participated In

2

66

Conventional WMD

Type of Exercises That HHS

Participated In

13

55

Field Exercises Tabletop Exercises

HHS Leadership and Participation in Exercises

3

65

Exercises Led Participated Only
Briefing Section III

Individual Agencies Exercises

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

HHS has a support role, related primarily to consequence management, to 

provide the health and medical response to a terrorist incident. HHS can 

provide a number of services in a terrorist incident, including threat 

assessment, consultation, agent identification, epidemiological 

investigation, hazard detection and reduction, triage, treatment, 

decontamination, pubic health support, medical support, pharmaceutical 

support, overflow hospital capacity, mental health services, and mortuary 

services. The Office of Emergency Preparedness coordinates the overall 

HHS support. HHS could activate a number of specialized resources that 

include the National Disaster Medical System, Disaster Medical Assistance 

Teams, National Medical Response Teams, and Disaster Mortuary Teams. 

For biological agents, HHS can help identify the agent and conduct 

epidemiological investigations through its network of laboratories.

HHS generally participated in tabletop exercises with WMD scenarios that 

included several federal agencies. HHS led 3 (4 percent) of the 68 exercises 

it participated in. Of these three HHS-led exercises, two (66 percent) were 

field exercises, two (66 percent) involved three or more federal agencies, 

and all had WMD scenarios. Of the 68 exercises that it participated in, 

13 (19 percent) were field exercises, 65 (96 percent) involved three or more 

agencies, and 66 (97 percent) had WMD scenarios.

An example of an exercise sponsored by HHS (also cosponsored by DOD 

and VA) was “Consequence Management 98”, which was conducted in April 

1998. This exercise included five HHS Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, 

focused on the medical aspects of a WMD attack, and included training to 

develop a field medical unit, perform triage, decontaminate patients, and 

provide additional treatment. The exercise had over 600 participants who 

practiced their clinical skills in an emergency field setting. HHS officials 

also stressed the importance of major special events (e.g., inaugurations 

and sporting events) in exercising their staff’s capabilities.
Briefing Section III

Individual Agencies Exercises

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Environmental Protection Agency

Counterterrorist Exercises

Breakdown of Number of Agencies

Participating in Exercises Including EPA

1

46

One or Two Three or More

Type of Scenarios for Exercises That 

EPA Participated In

0

47

Conventional WMD

Type of Exercises That EPA

Participated In

4

43

Field Exercises Tabletop Exercises

EPA Leadership and Participation in Exercises

1

46

Exercises Led Participated Only
Briefing Section III

Individual Agencies Exercises

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

EPA is a support agency for both crisis management and consequence 

management in terrorist incidents involving WMD. EPA provides expertise 

and technical support for identification of contaminants, collection and 

analysis of samples, monitoring of contaminants, on-site safety, and 

decontamination. EPA also issues permits for the custody, transportation, 

and transfer of hazardous chemical. The Office of the Emergency and 

Deputy Emergency Coordinator would coordinate overall EPA support in 

chemical and nuclear terrorist incidents. Examples of EPA resources 

include an Environmental Response Team, a Radiological Emergency 

Response Team, the Environmental Radiation Ambient Monitoring System, 

and the National Enforcement Investigations Center.

EPA generally participated in tabletop exercises with WMD scenarios that 

included several federal agencies. EPA led 1 (2 percent) of the 47 exercises 

in which it participated. The one EPA-led exercise was a tabletop exercise 

that only involved EPA and used a WMD scenario. Of the total 47 exercises 

that EPA participated in, 4 (6 percent) were field exercises, 46 (98 percent) 

involved three or more agencies, and all had WMD scenarios.

The exercise that EPA sponsored was “Olympic Sparkler” in April 1996. 

This EPA-only tabletop exercise used a scenario where terrorists dispersed 

radioactive material at the Atlanta Olympics. The purpose of the exercise 

was to test EPA plans and procedures to respond to a terrorist incident 

involving radiation dispersal among a civilian population.
Briefing Section III

Individual Agencies Exercises

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Department of Energy

Counterterrorist Exercises

Breakdown of Number of Agencies Participating in Exercises 

Including DOE

6

30

One or Two Three or More

Type of Scenarios for Exercises

That DOE Participated In

3

33

Conventional WMD

Type of Exercises That DOE

 Participated In

13

23

Field Exercises Tabletop Exercises

DOE Leadership and Participation in Exercises

5

31

Exercises Led Participated Only
Briefing Section III

Individual Agencies Exercises

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

DOE is a support agency in WMD incidents for both crisis management and 

consequence management, providing support and technical assistance 

related to nuclear devices and radiological events. Specifically, DOE can 

provide threat assessments, search operations, diagnostic and device 

assessments, containment relocation and storage of special nuclear 

material, and post-incident cleanup. DOE’s Office of Emergency Response 

generally provides coordination of the Department’s support. In the event 

of a nuclear terrorist threat or incident, DOE could activate and/or deploy 

several teams, including a Nuclear Incident Team, the Nuclear/Radiological 

Advisory Team, the Nuclear Emergency Search Team, the Federal 

Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center, Accident Response 

Group, the Aerial Measuring System, the Radiological Assistance Program, 

Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability, and the Radiation Emergency 

Assistance Center and Training Site. These response teams are composed 

of DOE employees and contractors who work at DOE facilities as weapon 

designers, engineers, and physicists.

DOE generally participated in a mixture of field and tabletop exercises with 

WMD scenarios that included several federal agencies. DOE led 

5 (14 percent) of the 36 exercises it participated in. Of the five DOE-led 

exercises, three (60 percent) were field exercises, three (60 percent) 

involved three or more federal agencies, and all had WMD scenarios. Of the 

total 36 exercises that DOE participated in, 13 (33 percent) were field 

exercises, 30 (83 percent) involved three or more agencies, and 

30 (83 percent) had WMD scenarios.

The exercises that DOE led were generally deployments (including one 

no-notice deployment) of DOE’s rapid response capabilities and included 

personnel and equipment from other agencies as well. Most of them were 

field exercises that focused on crisis management. Given DOE’s role, most 

of the exercises that DOE led or participated in had nuclear or radiological 

scenarios.
Briefing Section III

Individual Agencies Exercises

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Department of State

Counterterrorist Exercises

Breakdown of Number of Agencies Participating in Exercises 

Including State

1

23

One or Two Three or More

Type of Scenarios for Exercises That 

State Participated In

6

18

Conventional WMD

Type of Exercises That State

Participated In

15

9

Field Exercises Tabletop Exercises

State Leadership and Participation

in Exercises

1

23

Exercises Led Participated Only
Briefing Section III

Individual Agencies Exercises

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

The State Department is the lead agency for international terrorist 

incidents for both crisis management and consequence management. The 

State Department, through its Office of the Coordinator for 

Counterterrorism, leads a FEST to provide advice and support to U.S. 

ambassadors, Washington decision-makers, and host governments. The 

FEST is an interagency team tailored to the specific terrorist incident that 

could deploy at the request of the ambassador and with the permission of 

the host country. The Department determines the composition of the FEST, 

which could include FBI, DOD, DOE, HHS, or EPA if the incident involved 

WMD. For consequence management, a Consequence Management 

Advisory Team would deploy with the FEST to assess the need for 

follow-on assets that would assist a host government in planning for and 

managing the consequences of a WMD incident overseas.

The State Department generally participated in field exercises with WMD 

scenarios that included several federal agencies. The State Department 

sponsored 1 (4 percent) of the 24 exercises that it participated in. This was 

a field exercise with participation by several federal agencies that used a 

conventional scenario. Of the total 24 exercises that State participated in, 

15 (63 percent) were field exercises, 23 (96 percent) involved three or more 

agencies, and 18 (75 percent) had WMD scenarios. In general, the State 

Department uses DOD- and DOE-led exercises to practice its leadership 

role in international incidents. These exercises test rapid and no-notice 

deployments of command elements and tactical units to locations 

worldwide and frequently test the FEST so deployments can be practiced 

by the full cadre of interagency players.

The one exercise that the State Department sponsored—also cosponsored 

by DOD—was a bilateral exercise with another friendly nation. This was a 

field exercise where personnel and equipment deployed to a foreign 

country and worked with embassy personnel to practice dealing with a 

conventional hostage barricade situation.
Briefing Section III

Individual Agencies Exercises

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Department of Veterans Affairs

Counterterrorist Exercises

Breakdown of Number of Agencies Participatiing in Exercises 

Including VA

3

9

One or Two Three or More

Type of Scenarios for Exercises That

 VA Participated In

2

10

Conventional WMD

Type of Exercises That VA

Participated In

6 6

Field Exercises Tabletop Exercises

VA Leadership and Participation in Exercises

4

8

Exercises Led Participated Only
Briefing Section III

Individual Agencies Exercises

Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

VA is a support agency that could provide health and medical support for 

consequence management. VA works with HHS and DOD to maintain the 

National Medical Disaster System, a combination of private and 

government hospitals that could provide health and medical support in a 

terrorist incident involving mass casualties. Under PDD 62, VA works with 

HHS to ensure that adequate stockpiles of antidotes and other necessary 

pharmaceuticals are available for terrorist attacks nationwide. HHS, in 

consultation with VA, will determine the makeup and size of the 

pharmaceutical caches for such emergencies.2

 In a terrorist attack, VA 

could activate its Response Support Unit to manage the agency’s overall 

response and provide support to other agencies, such as FEMA under the 

Federal Response Plan. VA also has two response teams, the Emergency 

Medical Response Team and the Medical Emergency Radiological 

Response Team. The later team consists of physicians and nuclear 

physicists that could supplement any federal response to a terrorist threat 

involving nuclear material.

VA generally participated in a mixture of field and tabletop exercises with 

WMD scenarios that included several federal agencies. VA led 

4 (33 percent) of the 12 exercises it participated in. Of these four exercises, 

all were field exercises, two (50 percent) involved three or more federal 

agencies, and all had WMD scenarios. Of the total 12 exercises that VA 

participated in, 6 (50 percent) were field exercises, 9 (75 percent) involved 

3 or more agencies, and 10 (83 percent) had WMD scenarios.

An example of a VA-sponsored exercise was “Radex North” conducted in 

March 1997. VA sponsored this exercise in conjunction with the state of 

Minnesota, which simulated a terrorist attack on a federal building with 

explosives laced with radioactive material, and the subsequent 

decontamination and treatment of hundreds of casualties. One of the 

exercise’s objectives was to test the concept of operations for the VA’s 

Medical Emergency Radiological Response Team. The exercise had 500 

participants and attempted to fully integrate the federal medical response 

into the state and local responses, including local hospitals. VA officials 

noted that they participated in numerous other disaster-related exercises 

(which were outside the scope of our review) to improve the Department’s 

consequence management capabilities.

2

VA is not involved in the development of the national stockpile of pharmaceuticals and vaccines. The 

Pharmaceutical caches referred to in PDD 62 are for medical response teams.
Briefing Section III

Individual Agencies Exercises

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms

Counterterrorist Exercises

Breakdown of Number of Agencies Participating in Exercises 

Including ATF

7

3

One or Two Three or More

Type of Scenarios for Exercises That

ATF Participated In

7

3

Conventional WMD

Type of Exercises That ATF

Participated In

9

1

Field Exercises Tabletop Exercises

ATF Leadership and Participation in Exercises

4

6

Exercises Led Participated Only
Briefing Section III

Individual Agencies Exercises

Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

ATF has a crisis response role and investigation jurisdiction related to 

incidents involving conventional bombings. ATF has a Critical Incident 

Management Response Team that is a standardized deployable command 

organizational structure for managing responses to incidents, which 

include acts of terrorism. ATF also has teams that respond and deploy to 

the crisis site. For example, there are Special Response Teams that provide 

crisis response.

ATF leads exercises that test the crisis response capabilities of its Special 

Response Teams. ATF participated in 10 exercises during the 3-year period, 

including 4 exercises (40 percent) that it led. Of the 10 exercises that ATF 

participated in, 9 (90 percent) were field exercises. Seven (70 percent) of 

the 10 exercises that ATF participated in had less than three federal 

agencies participating in them and had conventional scenarios, including 

all of the exercises led by ATF; the other three (30 percent) had some type 

of WMD in their scenario. ATF also participated in six other exercises led 

by other agencies, including three that had three or more federal agencies 

participating.

During this period, ATF led field exercises for its regional personnel that 

included the Special Response Teams in each of the five ATF regions. These 

exercises focused on developing ATF’s internal crisis response capabilities, 

lasted up to 1 week, and included both classroom training and field 

exercises. The exercises also included ATF tactical operations centers, 

response teams, hostage negotiators, communications, and logistics. The 

exercises had scenarios that generally included domestic antigovernment 

groups and hostage situations. These exercises included conventional 

firearms and explosives, not WMD. ATF officials said they have completed 

field exercises in all ATF regions and are conducting tabletop exercises in 

their 23 field divisions to update their staff on their new Critical Incident 

Management System.
Page 56 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Appendix I

Major Contributors to This Report ApeInxdi

Carol R. Schuster

Stephen L. Caldwell

Davi M. D’Agostino

Alan M. Byroade 

Lee Purdy
Page 57 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism
Page 58 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism
Page 59 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Related GAO Products

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs

(GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181, June 9, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response

Equipment and Sustainment Costs (GAO/NSIAD-99-151, June 9, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear

(GAO/NSIAD-99-110, May 21, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorist

Operations (GAO/NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999).

Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Efforts to Reduce Russian Arsenals

May Cost More and Accomplish Less Than Expected

(GAO/NSIAD-99-76, Apr. 13, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public

Health Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, Mar. 16, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat

Terrorism (GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107, Mar. 11, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: FBI's Use of Federal Funds for CounterterrorismRelated Activities (FYs 1995-98) (GAO/GGD-99-7, Nov. 20, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness

Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici

Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues

(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize

and Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires

Better Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997).

Combating Terrorism: Efforts to Protect U.S. Forces in Turkey and the

Middle East (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44, Oct. 28, 1997).
Related GAO Products

Page 60 GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR Combating Terrorism

Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National

Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).

Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces

Overseas (GAO/NSIAD-97-207, July 21, 1997).

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