J-S09025-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

LOUIS HILL 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1225 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 4, 2021,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0000493-2008.

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED MAY 6, 2022

Louis Hill appeals pro se from the order denying his third petition 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) as untimely filed. 42 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We affirm.

The pertinent facts and procedural history are as follows: On September

24, 2009, a jury found Hill guilty of attempted murder and related charges. 

On November 18, 2009, the trial court sentenced Hill to an aggregate term of 

231⁄2 - 47 years of imprisonment. On February 28, 2011, this Court affirmed 

his judgment of sentence, and on July 7, 2011, our Supreme Court denied 

Hill’s petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Hill, 24 A.3d 468 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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(Pa. Super. 2011) (non-precedential decision), appeal denied, 24 A.3d 362 

(Pa. 2011). Hill did not seek further review.

On August 8, 2011, Hill filed a timely PCRA petition. The PCRA court 

appointed counsel who later filed a motion to withdraw and a “no-merit” letter 

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). 

Thereafter, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 907 notice of its intent to 

dismiss Hill’s petition without a hearing and granted PCRA counsel’s motion to 

withdraw. Hill filed a response. By order entered November 20, 2012, the 

PCRA court denied Hill’s PCRA petition.

Hill filed an appeal to this Court. On September 8, 2014, this Court 

affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief, and on December 17, 2014, our 

Supreme Court denied Hill’s petition for allowance of appeal. 

Commonwealth v. Hill, 107 A.3d 220 (Pa. Super. 2014) (non-precedential 

decision), appeal denied, 105 A.3d 735 (Pa. 2014).

Hill filed a second pro se PCRA petition on July 13, 2016. The PCRA 

court appointed counsel who later filed a motion to withdraw and a “no-merit” 

letter pursuant to Turner/Finley, supra. Thereafter, the PCRA court issued 

a Pa.R.A.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Hill’s petition without a hearing 

and granted PCRA counsel’s motion to withdraw. Hill filed a response. By 
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order entered in February 2017, the PCRA court denied Hill’s PCRA petition.

1

He did not file an appeal.

On May 9, 2019, Hill filed the pro se PCRA petition at issue, his third. 

Once again, the PCRA court appointed counsel, and on December 30, 2020, 

PCRA counsel filed a motion to withdraw and a “no-merit” letter pursuant to 

Turner/Finley, supra. Thereafter, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 907 

notice of its intent to dismiss Hill’s petition without a hearing and granted 

PCRA counsel’s motion to withdraw. Hill filed a response. By order entered 

on June 4, 2021, the PCRA court denied Hill’s PCRA petition. This appeal 

followed. Both Hill and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Hill raises the following issues:

1. Did [the] PCRA court err when it accepted [PCRA 

counsel’s] “no merit” letter (Finley/Turner) and granted 

the attached “motion to withdraw as counsel” [and PCRA 

counsel’s] failure to amend the [PCRA] petition under 

[sic] [Hill’s] request?

2. Did [the] PCRA court err when it deemed [Hill’s] petition 

for post-conviction relief without merit and dismissed 

[the] petition without a hearing?

Hill’s Brief at 4 (excess capitalization omitted).

Before addressing these issues, we must first determine whether the

record supports the PCRA court’s conclusions that his third PCRA petition was 

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1 Although the order denying this petition does not appear in the certified 

record, no one disputes its disposition. 
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untimely filed, and that he failed to establish a time-bar exception. See PCRA 

Court Opinion, 7/22/21, at unnumbered 3. 

The timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. 

Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or 

subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment 

becomes final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an 

exception to the time for filing the petition is met.

The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as 

follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the 

claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional 

right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). Moreover, exceptions to the PCRA’s 

time bar must be pled in the petition and may not be raised for the first time 

on appeal. Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 

2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing issues not raised before the 

lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).

Finally, if a PCRA petition is untimely and the petitioner has not pled and 

proven an exception “neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction 

over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal 

authority to address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. 

Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).
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Here, Hill’s judgment of sentence became final on October 5, 2011, 

ninety days after our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of 

appeal, and the time for filing a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme 

Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); U.S.Sup.Ct. Rule 13. 

Therefore, Hill had until October 5, 2012 to file a timely petition. Because Hill 

filed his third PCRA petition in 2019, it is patently untimely unless he has 

satisfied his burden of pleading and proving that one of the enumerated 

exceptions applies. See Hernandez, supra.

The PCRA court determined that Hill had failed to plead and prove an 

exception to the PCRA’s time bar. In his Turner/Finley letter, PCRA counsel 

informed the court of the following:

[I]n his [third PCRA petition], [Hill] states that “Victim 

[Blandford] made known that he was going to place blame 

of his shooting on me [Hill]. If the victim later admits he 

lied at trial, this perhaps would constitute after-discovered 

evidence of the quality that would justify a new trial. An 

untimely Petition under the [PCRA] will be considered if the 

claimant avers and proves that the “. . . facts upon which 

the claim is predicated were unknown to petitioner and 

could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due 

diligence[.]” In that regard, [Hill] provided me with the 

name of two persons with knowledge of his claims, referred 

to above as Witness #1 and Witness #2. I spoke with 

Witness #1 on December 23 and on December 28, 2020, 

and I spoke with Witness #2 on December 28, 2020. As a 

result of these conversations, I was unable to obtain 

evidence that would support [Hill’s] claim.

Turner/Finley Letter, 12/30/21, at 7 (citations omitted). Thus, as PCRA 

counsel admitted that he was unable to prove and plead time-bar exception, 
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the PCRA court correctly found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the claims 

Hill raised in his petition.

On appeal, Hill essentially claims PCRA counsel was ineffective for not 

properly investigating and presenting the newly discovered fact exception to 

the time bar. In Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), our 

Supreme Court set new precedent regarding the preservation of such a claim 

and held that “a PCRA petitioner may, after a PCRA court denies relief, and 

after obtaining new counsel or acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA counsel’s 

ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even if on appeal.” Bradley, 

261 A.3d at 401 (footnote omitted). Here, because Hill raised his claims in 

his appellate brief, they are properly before us. 

In Bradley, the Court also acknowledged that in certain cases when a 

layered claim of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness is first raised on appeal a 

remand may be warranted:

In some instances, the record before the appellate court 

will be sufficient to allow for disposition of any newly-raised 

ineffectiveness claims. However, in other cases, the 

appellate court may need to remand to the PCRA court for 

further development of the record and for the PCRA court to 

consider such claims as an initial matter. Consistent with 

our prior case law, to advance a request for a remand, a 

petition would be required to provide more than mere 

boilerplate assertions of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness; 

however, where there are material facts at issue concerning 

claims challenging counsel’s stewardship and relief if not 

plainly unavailable as a matter of law, the remand should 

be afforded.

Bradley, 261 A.3d at 402 (citations and footnote omitted). As more fully 

explained below, we need not remand the instant appeal.
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Hill asserts that he could establish the newly discovered fact exception 

to the PCRA’s time bar. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). As this Court has 

previously summarized:

The newly-discovered fact exception has two 

components, which must be alleged and proved. Namely, 

the petitioner must establish that: 1) the facts upon which 

the claim was predicated were unknown and 2) could not 

have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence. If 

the petitioner alleges and proves these two components, 

then the PCRA Court has jurisdiction over the claim under 

this subsection.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 500 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation 

omitted).

Here, PCRA counsel correctly cited the components of a newly 

discovered fact exception, and, after interviewing witnesses who were 

identified by Hill, he opined that he would be unable to plead and prove that 

exception to the time bar. In his brief, Hill asserts that “(Witness #3), on 

their own accord, provided to [PCRA counsel] a[n] official written statement 

and affidavit providing new eye-witness testimony” about the incident. Hill’s 

Brief at 12. According to Hill, PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to 

“amend [his] petition and/or include this witness and the accompanying 

statement and affidavit in his [Turner/Finley] letter to the PCRA [court].” 

Id.

Hill does not identify this third witness or proffer any information from 

the witness’ statement or affidavit. Moreover, our review of Hill’s response to 

the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice refutes his assertion that he informed the 
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court regarding Witness #3. Id. at 14. Therefore, because Hill has provided 

no basis to disturb the PCRA court’s conclusions that his third PCRA petition 

was untimely, and that he was unable to establish a time-bar exception, Hill’s 

claim of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness fails. Thus, we affirm the PCRA court’s 

order denying Hill post-conviction relief.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/6/2022