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ASSESSING CHINA’S ROLE AND INFLUENCE

IN AFRICA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

AND HUMAN RIGHTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 29, 2012

Serial No. 112–138

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Donald Y. Yamamoto, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 

African Affairs, U.S. Department of State ......................................................... 7

Ms. Carolyn Bartholomew, Commissioner, United States-China Economic and 

Security Review Commission .............................................................................. 29

J. Peter Pham, Ph.D., director, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center, Atlantic 

Council .................................................................................................................. 49

Mr. Stephen Hayes, president and chief executive officer, The Corporate 

Council on Africa .................................................................................................. 65

The Honorable David H. Shinn, adjunct professor, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University .............................................. 72

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Donald Y. Yamamoto: Prepared statement .................................................... 9

Ms. Carolyn Bartholomew: Prepared statement ................................................... 33

J. Peter Pham, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 53

Mr. Stephen Hayes: Prepared statement .............................................................. 67

The Honorable David H. Shinn: Prepared statement ........................................... 75

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 98

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 99

The Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Missouri: Prepared statement ......................................................................... 100

(1)

ASSESSING CHINA’S ROLE AND INFLUENCE 

IN AFRICA 

THURSDAY, MARCH 29, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,

AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittee will come to order. And good afternoon to everyone. 

Today’s hearing focuses on U.S. policy regarding China’s evolving 

role in Africa. China has become America’s premier economic competitor in Africa, providing loans and making investments far beyond what the United States is currently prepared to provide. 

China has been engaged with African governments since the 

1950s and has always portrayed itself as a fellow developing nation 

that was interested in solidarity with the prospective development 

partners. In reality, the Chinese Government always had plans to 

gain the support they hoped to create among the newly independent African governments. The stadiums, other buildings, and 

roads constructed by the Chinese were intended to build support 

for China among the African bloc of developing nations in its competition with the then-Soviet Union. 

Later, the goal was building support for the People’s Republic of 

China, replacing Taiwan as the sole China in the United Nations. 

Now they no longer have to compete with the Soviet Union, and 

they have their seat on the U.N. Security Council, from where they 

protect dictators such as Omar al-Bashir and Robert Mugabe. 

So what is their aim in their African policy now? Is China a development partner for Africa? In 2005, the China Development Bank created a $1 billion Africa 

Trade and Investment Fund, but the trade and investment initiatives funded cannot take place without the significant involvement 

of Chinese suppliers. It is difficult to quantify Chinese development 

aid to Africa because they refuse to disclose how much aid and investment goes to specific countries, although we do know that Chinese investment in Africa is estimated to exceed $10 billion. Because the loan details are not open to public scrutiny, it is feared 

that these loans may pose a danger to the debt sustainability of African governments. 

2

Is China an economic competitor to African countries? Many believe that China is engaged in a short-term resource grab which 

takes little account of local needs and concerns, whether developmental, environmental, or with respect to issues like human rights. 

Coupled with Chinese manufacturing and trade efficiency, this approach suggests that African development gains are being challenged, if not undermined, by Chinese competitiveness. 

China, which has increasingly attempted to lock up much of the 

supply of strategic minerals from African countries, is now the 

leading producer of what are known as rare earth elements or rare 

earth metals, which are used in various technological devices, such 

as superconductors, electronic polishers, refining catalysts, and hybrid car components. As time goes on, these minerals will increase 

in importance in the 21st-century economy. 

South Africa used to be the world’s leading source for these minerals, but its production is dwarfed by what China produces, which 

now represents 95 percent of rare earth supplies. Chinese production often releases toxic waste into the general water supply, and 

that would tend to discourage increased South African production 

absent what could be expensive environmental safeguards. 

Is China the new colonizer of Africa? Some would say that label 

is an exaggeration. However, China exports small businesses and 

labor to Africa. There are an estimated 800 Chinese corporations 

doing business in Africa and 750,000 Chinese working or living for 

extended periods in African countries. When their original assignments are completed, these Chinese workers become entrepreneurs, 

selling subsidized Chinese products to out-compete their African 

counterparts. 

I would note parenthetically that Greg Simpkins and I, when we 

were in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on one trip en route 

to Goma to visit healthcare facilities there, as well as the U.N. deployment, I was quite dismayed at a project where there were large 

numbers of Chinese laborers who seemingly were under a lock-andkey-type of situation. I actually asked a number of questions 

whether or not those individuals might be gulag labor, people 

brought from the laogai to this particular heavily intensive—it was 

a building project, in order to do the work. No one knew. No one 

could have contact with those individuals. It was very, very strange 

and bizarre, and they had no contact with the locals. 

An increasing number of Africans are skeptical of Chinese behavior in their countries. For example, the issue of Chinese business 

practices became an issue in the 2011 elections in Zambia. Some 

Zambians felt the Chinese were worse than the British colonialists 

in their behavior toward workers. Following the election there, incoming President Michael Sata said to the Chinese investors, ‘‘We 

welcome your investment, but as we welcome your investment, 

your investment should benefit Zambians, not the Chinese.’’

One of the most prevalent charges against China’s involvement 

in Africa is that they don’t support international conditionality on 

aid to African countries. Therefore, Chinese involvement is seen as 

undermining the concept of tied aid that is intended to promote 

good governance models. 

Chinese officials counter that they prefer not to interfere in the 

internal affairs of African governments. And, of course, who can 

3

blame them, with one of the most egregious human rights policies 

within their own country to defend? They are in perhaps no position to lecture African governments. But that also, then sends an 

example that some, like in Sudan and elsewhere, might want to follow, and that would be a further disaster. 

While much of the rest of the international community regards 

Sudan as having committed genocide or at least crimes against humanity in its Darfur region—we certainly do, my distinguished 

ranking member and I, and most, if not all, of us in Congress—

China, a major economic partner with the government in Khartoum, refused at first to join in sanctions against Sudan. China abstained from the vote in September 2004 when the U.N. Security 

Council passed Resolution 1564 condemning the mass killing of civilians in the Darfur region, even though the measure stopped 

short of imposing oil sanctions. China even threatened to veto any 

further move to impose sanctions. It took concerted international 

pressure prior to the 2008 Beijing Olympics to force China to move 

closer to the international position of pressing Sudan to end its 

human rights abuses. 

In a 2006 background report entitled, ‘‘China’s Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States,’’ The Heritage Foundation 

stated that China has provided weapons that have prolonged African conflicts or entrenched dictatorships. In 2003, several Hong 

Kong firms were accused of smuggling illegal arms, including Chinese-made AK–47s, machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenade 

launchers, into Liberia and neighboring Sierra Leone and Cote 

d’Ivoire, where rebels and mercenaries were involved in civil wars. 

‘‘In 2004,’’ the report continued, ‘‘China sold Zimbabwe fighter aircraft and military vehicles for $200 million despite the U.S. and 

EU arms embargo against Zimbabwe. China has also provided a 

military-strength radio-jamming device, which the Harare government used to block broadcasts of anti-government reports from 

independent media outlets during the 2005 parliamentary election 

campaign.’’

So what really are China’s goals for its African engagement? We 

hope to at least begin to understand this. 

And I would point out to my colleagues, as I know so well, that 

this is a hearing that is in a series of hearings over the last several 

years looking at China’s influence, bad or good, in Africa. 

I yield to my good friend and colleague, Ms. Bass, the ranking 

member of the subcommittee. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Chairman Smith, once again for calling 

this important hearing to examine China’s economic and political 

impact in Africa. 

In part of your opening statement, you described or raised the 

question as to whether or not China should be viewed as a new colonial power within the continent of Africa, and I am very much 

concerned about that as well, especially with regard to labor, given 

the need for employment on the continent. And then you raised 

today even the question as to who those laborers are who are Chinese. And so I think you raise very critical questions. 

I hope that our discussion today will shed light on areas of common interest between the United States and China in Africa that 

could provide the basis for enhanced bilateral and multilateral coVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:35 May 31, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\032912\73538 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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operation, particularly on important conflict-mediation priorities in 

Sudan and South Sudan, as well as Somalia. And I am very interested to learn about China’s expanded economic reach in Africa and 

the impact on U.S. trade and investment. 

I have initiated dialogue with some African ambassadors here in 

DC, and one of the key discussion points that are of interest to myself as well as the ambassadors is getting additional U.S. companies to do business in Africa, on the continent, highlighting China’s 

multi-million-dollar investment projects as if to say to us that this 

is what American businesses are missing out on. One ambassador 

told me he wanted to attract the movie industry to his country, as 

well as the green vehicle industry. And given that I represent Hollywood, I naturally have that same kind of interest. 

My goal for this hearing is also to examine meaningful policy options to ensure the U.S. Government, our businesses, particularly 

small- and medium-size enterprises, are not missing out on valuable opportunities in Africa. 

Chairman Smith, the legislation that you and Representative 

Bobby Rush introduced last week is one such policy option that I 

hope to join you on. I want to thank you, Representative Rush, 

Senators Durbin and Coons for initiating this legislation. The legislation is also an important vehicle for promoting U.S. minorityowned enterprises, particularly businesses that are owned by African Americans in the U.S. 

We should remember that as we seek to promote U.S. trade and 

direct investment in Africa, we are also creating opportunities for 

African growth so that the African middle class can help create societies that are no longer dependent on foreign aid. I look forward 

to hearing from our distinguished witnesses how the United States 

can achieve these objectives. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Ranking Member Bass. Thank you very 

much. 

I yield to the vice chairman of our subcommittee, Mr. 

Fortenberry. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening 

this hearing, which is a continuation of an important debate that 

we held last year during the State Department authorization. 

To the United States, Africa is becoming a lost continent. She is 

becoming lost to us diplomatically and economically to other international players who do not have the same regard for human 

rights as we do. This is clearly the case with China. 

Over the last several years, China has become the world’s largest 

investor in Africa. Direct investment in Africa rose by 87 percent 

last year.One million Chinese nationals are now doing business in 

Africa, and around 300,000 live in South Africa. Bilateral trade 

deals have been signed between China and 50 African countries, 

and direct Chinese investments in Africa have been projected to 

rise by another 70 percent in the coming months. 

As has been noted, China even bankrolled and built the seat of 

African diplomacy, the lavish new African Union headquarters in 

Addis Ababa. This is ‘‘China’s gift to Africa,’’ according to Hu 

Jintao, though another nickname has stuck: Africa’s Hall of Shame. 

5

China is aggressively dominating the most high-conflict areas of 

Africa, exploiting natural-resource-rich regions for its own mercantilistic agenda, even as African Union Commission Chairman 

Jean Ping opined for the adoring Chinese press, ‘‘African people 

will never forget China’s important role in promoting peace, stability, and development within Africa.’’

All three of these claims are extremely suspect. In terms of development, is the goal of China’s natural-resource exploitation Africa development? I ask this as the Associated Press reports that 

PetroChina, the state-owned oil firm that exists for the sole function of fueling China, has overtaken Exxon as the world’s largest 

publicly trade oil producer. China’s Minmetals Resources also announced today that it would be rapidly expanding copper mining in 

central and southern Africa this year. China’s Guangdong Nuclear 

Power Corporation has aggressively taken control of uranium 

mines across the continent, and it is nearing a multi-billion-dollar 

deal on the world’s second-largest uranium mine in Namibia. 

Opportunities are booming for China in Africa, clearly. But will 

they benefit Africa? 

And what about China’s role in promoting peace and stability? 

Recently, China’s relationship with Northern Sudan has given the 

international community particular concern. China shares a deep 

and profound friendship, according to China’s foreign ministry 

spokesman, with Sudanese war criminal Omar al-Bashir. What is 

this friendship? 

China has been Sudan’s biggest arms supplier. China continues 

to be criticized by human rights observers for supplying weapons 

in violation of a U.N. weapons embargo over Sudan. China also imported nearly 70 percent of Sudan’s oil and was the largest shareholder of the two biggest oil corporations in Sudan. Serious questions remain over Chinese complicity in Darfur, in which many innocent people died at the hands of Chinese weapons and planes. 

With the prevalence of geopolitical conflict in this area of the 

world, we must have a firm understanding of China’s rapid expansion in natural-resource-rich areas that are in high conflict on the 

continent. I am pleased to note that the Foreign Affairs Committee 

unanimously passed an amendment to the State Department authorization last year to quantify and help do just that. 

But on a broader human rights scale, we need to have a very 

honest discussion here about Chinese industrial virtues. In a new 

interview with The Wall Street Journal, China’s special envoy for 

African affairs discussed how China deals with ‘‘differences in corporate culture and the degree of openness to the outside world,’’ 

noting that, as it does business, Chinese companies always take domestic business practices with them. 

Let’s talk about those domestic business practices for a moment: 

Fertility monitors on factory floors invasively examining female 

employees for pregnancy and reporting pregnant women to the Chinese family planning police, who drag offending women away for 

violating this and for forced abortions. There are tragically high 

suicide rates for workers in China who view suicide as their only 

means of collective bargaining against dire and oppressive labor 

violations that happen—you saw an example of this earlier in 

China this years. 

6

Are these the domestic business practices that China is taking to 

Africa? This question is extremely pertinent, with news reports 

that South Africa, a country that still has its sea legs when it 

comes to human rights protections, has been sending government 

officials to Chinese Communist Party training schools to learn their 

business practices. 

China has a choice: It can join the responsible community of nations to aid and do business with Africa in an ethical fashion or 

stand by its ‘‘friendship’’ with despots and tyrants as countless 

more lives are lost across the continent. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing 

today, and I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Fortenberry, very much. Very eloquent statement. 

I yield to Congresswoman Jackson Lee and thank her for joining 

us today. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I realize, I think 

there is a vote on, and I will be judicious. And thank you for your 

kindness. 

And it is a delight to be here with our new ranking member on 

the subcommittee, Congresswoman Karen Bass, who I count already as one of my dear friends. 

And I would say, since this is the first time, Congresswoman and 

Congressman Smith, that I have been at this table since the loss 

of our dear champion, I know that he is looking well at these hearings that you are holding. The two of you are two champions on 

human rights, and I join you in that as a member of the Human 

Rights Caucus. 

And I will simply say these points to the Secretary. This is not 

about spoiled grapes. This is not about being selfish on the part of 

the United States or this subcommittee, I know. It is truly about 

friendship with the continent, with Africa, not missing the opportunities for collaboration, and having a country that is vested in the 

principles of democracy, like the United States, to be able to befriend those who desire our friendship. We have no burden of enslaving Africans in terms of, when I say that, in colonization. We 

have a history of slavery but not in colonization. 

I say these points. I have seen firsthand the businesses of China 

come to the continent and use Chinese workers and not the indigenous workers, not training them, not making them managers, not 

helping them enhance and build the economy on the continent. I 

have seen the byproduct of these construction projects that have 

deteriorated in a matter of years. 

And, finally, I have firsthand knowledge on the issue of Darfur, 

when we asked collectively for China to join us in sanctioning the 

leadership in Khartoum, asked them to join us in declaring genocide in Darfur, and they refused time after time after time. 

We cannot have this imbalance in the treatment of the continent 

by any of our friends. And we certainly can’t be blocked from a nation that has the democratic principles that we have of doing business, of building upon human rights, and helping Africa build its 

economy. 

I think this is an important hearing, and I yield back. 

7

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, the distinguished gentlelady 

from Texas. 

Ambassador Yamamoto, we do have a vote on the floor. We will 

have a very brief recess. The members will return, and we look forward to your testimony. And I apologize for the delay. 

We stand in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittee will resume its sitting. And, again, 

I apologize for the delay. 

I would like to welcome to the witness table and thank him for 

a return visit to our subcommittee, Ambassador Yamamoto, Donald 

Yamamoto, who is no stranger to this committee and to the full 

committee, having testified before us on several occasions last year 

and once already this year. He has served since 2009 as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of African Affairs 

at the Department of State. His prior assignments include serving 

as U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia from November 2006 to July 2009 

and as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of African Affairs from 2003 to 2006. 

Ambassador Yamamoto, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DONALD Y. YAMAMOTO, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Thank you very much. Chairman Smith 

and Ranking Member Bass, and the honorable members of this 

committee, it is a distinct honor to appear before you once again 

on this very important issue. 

And on behalf of my colleagues, Congresswoman Karen Bass, as 

the ranking member, we welcome you and we congratulate you on 

your new appointment. And your commitment and dedication will 

surely inspire us as we focus on our work. 

I also want to take this time to really express my deep personal 

sorrow to you, Mr. Chairman, and to the members on the loss of 

Donald Payne, who was a defender of truth, an advocate of just 

and honorable causes, and, above all, a man of great courage, wisdom, and dedication. And it is really with appreciation and gratitude that I was able to know and to learn from Representative 

Payne—indeed, a true friend for all of us. 

Mr. Chairman, is China a competitor or a partner? A positive influence or a detractor to development in Africa? Or, more important, can China work with us on shared objectives? 

China is an important part of Africa’s future. And like Africa’s 

other major partners—and that is the European Union, India, 

Japan, Korea, Brazil, Turkey, the United States, and other countries—the United States seeks to shape a more cooperative and 

productive relationship while eliminating that which undercuts Africa’s development and our interests. 

China’s interest in Africa reflects its needs for access to resources 

and markets, its desire to promote cohesive South-South relations, 

and a desire to demonstrate leadership in the developing world. 

China has emerged as a leader in trade and investment in Africa, 

and its activities in Africa offer important opportunities for the conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:35 May 31, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\032912\73538 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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tinent, though there are major interests where our interests do not 

align, as you and others noted, Chairman Smith. 

Secretary Clinton, in a major speech in March, stated that, ‘‘We 

are a country that welcomes others’ success, because we believe 

that it is good for everyone when people anywhere are able to work 

their way to better lives. If China’s rise means that we have an increasingly capable and engaged partner, that would be good news 

for us.’’

We hold regional dialogues on Africa with China, as well as with 

other countries and organizations. Assistant Secretary Johnnie 

Carson led our talks in Beijing in November 2011, focusing on political and security issues, highlighting challenges, noting successes, and underscoring future cooperation. 

In 2010, China-Africa trade stood at about $127 billion and provided $2 billion in foreign assistance to Africa in 2009. Yet China 

also provided concessionary funding for infrastructure projects. 

While important, it poses challenges for Africa on repayment of 

loans. China’s foreign direct investment flows to Africa have quadrupled, from about $2 billion in 2000 to now almost $9 billion in 

2009. 

On the downside, China undermines international efforts to promote good governance, revenue transparency, and responsible natural resource management. Corrupt activities by Chinese firms result in poor-quality goods and services. We are pushing China to 

accede to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Chinese foreign assistance is a trade tool favoring Chinese businesspeople in project 

bidding and undercutting transparency and fairness. Chinese labor 

practices and lack of technology transfer and advance training also 

does not help Africa. 

On the positive side, its infrastructure development has helped 

stimulate progress in health, agriculture, and water sectors. Politically, China shares common views on Sudan, worked with us in 

supporting AMISOM with $4 million of needed equipment, and expanded the peacekeeping footprint to 1,500 troops. We are working 

cooperatively with China on eradicating malaria, polio, and other 

endemic diseases. In Gabon and elsewhere, we work with China on 

improving health care and training healthcare workers and providing medical equipment. 

We will continue to dialogue with China and seek areas of cooperation that will lead to greater prosperity, political openness, 

and hope for Africa’s people and future generations. 

Mr. Chairman, I welcome your questions. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yamamoto follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask you, you know, I made reference to 

it in my opening comments about the use of gulag labor or the potential use of it on the continent of Africa. Have we, from a human 

rights perspective, have our Embassies investigated or looked into 

that as something that could be of concern? Because, again, if they 

are bringing over Falun Gong and underground and persecuted 

Christians and others, Buddhists, I mean, that would raise serious 

red flags. 

And if you could speak to the issue of importing Chinese laborers 

to do work that otherwise could be done and accomplished by indigenous Africans. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I note that in your second panel you have experts, Ambassador 

Shinn and Peter Pham and others, who have researched this area 

quite extensively. And, actually, we refer to their research, as well. 

We have asked our Embassies to look at the whole context of 

trade, not just with China but with all the countries that are dealing in Africa, to see areas of cooperation and also areas where we 

need to work with in order to moderate excesses or to correct behaviors or problems. We looked at labor, and we have talked to 

leaders throughout Africa on these issues. 

You know, the issue that comes in is that we still need to do 

more research. We need to still look at and examine the issues 

more carefully. 

I think in some countries, like Ethiopia, they have made restrictions on labor. In some areas where they have had Chinese labor, 

especially in the Congo where they are doing predominantly a lot 

of the work, we are looking to see how that impacts on local communities. 

What we want to do, essentially, is to see how we can elevate 

and raise the quality and technology and technical level of African 

workers. And if you look at how the United States handles it, how 

we do training programs, how we look at areas where we can make 

a difference, those are the same things that we have been discussing with the Chinese that they need to do, not only at the 

basic, low-level technical factors, but also much more advanced 

technology transfers. 

And I think the record is still out. We are still investigating. But 

those are areas that, you are absolutely correct, we need to discuss 

much more with the Chinese, and we are, in our dialogues. 

Mr. SMITH. Can I just ask you—I happen to be a pro-labor Republican. I get endorsed by the AFL–CIO because I believe passionately in the right to collective bargaining and other core elements 

of unionized labor. 

China is the quintessential example of an anti-labor country. I 

am chairing a hearing in a few days on the exploitation of labor 

as an unfair trading practice. I, frankly, have been very disappointed that the administration, under the USTR, has not initiated a complaint or at least an investigation against China. We did 

so when Bush was President, and I even was a signatory to the request. It was denied. But it has not happened under the Obama 

administration either. 

And it is a fact that laborers in China get 10 to 50 cents per 

hour. There are no OSHA regulations at all. If there is any kind 

19

of compliance with best practices when it comes to occupational 

safety and health, it usually is something that is being imported 

by a U.S. corporation. And some do it and do it very well, but, by 

and large, it does not happen. 

There are problems with arrearage. If you do engage in collective 

bargaining in China, you are arrested, you are incarcerated, you 

are tortured. And I have actually had, right where you sit, Mr. Ambassador, Chinese political labor activists who then, the lucky ones, 

in the sense that they are out of prison and they have been expelled—not lucky from that point of view—telling their story of 

how they are trying desperately to form at least some kind of labor 

organization that is compliant with ILO standards. 

Now, the reason for raising all of this—and I will be having that 

hearing shortly as chairman of the China Commission—that practice, or that worst practice, is being exported to Africa as part of 

their labor practices. You know, we are all concerned about the bad 

governance model that China, you know, then provides by way of 

example and other ways to African countries. But now even on 

labor practices they are egregious violators of ILO conventions. 

And I am wondering what your take on that is, if you could, and 

what can be done to combat that. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, the conditions in China, even though I was a human 

rights officer back in 1989 in China and really looked at a lot of 

those issues that you have raised, I think I would rather defer to 

my colleagues who are specialists in China to say the conditions 

there. 

In Africa, we——

Mr. SMITH. But I am talking about the exporting of that mindset 

that obviously follows with investment and with, obviously, people 

who will now be doing business in China, setting up shop in China, 

sans labor unions or anything that even comes close to it. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Right. And we are looking into that. 

You know, statistics and information is very hard to come by, but 

we have looked at what China is doing in Africa, and we have 

looked at projects. In other words, a couple years ago, there were 

30 major projects by China taking place in Africa. That has risen 

to about 35 last year. And so we are looking at how China looks 

at programs and projects, how they implement projects, and are 

they abiding by standards. 

One of the things that we have been pushing the Chinese on in 

our discussions has been their accession to the anti-bribery and 

better business practices of the OECD. But more important is basic 

labor practices. Because, as you cited, Mr. Chairman, in your opening statement, Michael Sata in Zambia, who had complaints about 

Chinese labor, well, he is now the leader of Zambia through a free, 

democratic, open election, and he is addressing those issues. 

Again, I have spoken personally to some of the leaders in Africa, 

and they, too, are looking at Chinese labor very carefully and making decisions on how to monitor, regulate those issues. And so I 

think we would defer to those leaders and to work with them. But 

on our own side, we are also looking at how China does labor 

issues. 

20

For us, too—I just want to do a sidenote—for us is that we are 

trying to push the Chinese much more on transparency, openness, 

looking at how they do the bidding process. As you know, as I said 

in my opening statement, they have about $2 billion in investments. And, of course, that and their aid goes to help Chinese businesses. Why can’t they be much more transparent and open? And 

those are things that we are working on with the Chinese to address through our dialogues. 

But you do raise a very good question, Mr. Chairman, and it is 

an issue that we are focused on. 

Mr. SMITH. Could you get back to us as to——

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Yes, I will. 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. What exactly we are doing relative to 

ILO standards as it relates to unions and collective bargaining, the 

absolute absence of it in the PRC itself, and whether or not that 

is having an influence on Chinese businesses and their practices as 

they emerge and evolve. 

Let me ask you just a couple of final questions and then go to 

Ms. Bass. 

With regards to infrastructure, China’s investment is very heavily tilted toward infrastructure projects. I remember on one trip, 

again, to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I talked to a member of their Parliament who is a farmer. And I remember he said, 

‘‘I can grow anything, but I can’t get it to market.’’ But he also said 

the Chinese have come in, gotten huge road and building projects, 

but always with the caveat that anything on the right and on the 

left that happens to be a mineral or something that can be exploited becomes theirs. And he said, you know, we are giving away 

the minerals and the wood and the other wealth of Africa to the 

PRC. He was very upset with it. 

And I am wondering, you know—the Millennium Challenge Account has been an excellent way of trying to help infrastructure. 

You know, we have good governance that goes along with that, and 

other criteria. The Chinese say, ‘‘We want this, and we want that,’’ 

and they take it. You know, could you speak to that issue? 

Secondly, the larger issue of the exploitation of minerals, oil, and 

gas. We know that Bashir—and I have met with him. I argued 

with that man. He ought to be at The Hague for crimes against humanity and genocide. But, you know, all he was concerned about 

was lifting the embargo, when I talked to him. That was all he 

cared about, rather than the loss of life. But he gives oil in exchange for weapons. That is a terrible, terrible exchange between 

Beijing and Khartoum. 

On the issue of child limitation—and Mr. Fortenberry, I think, 

was alluding to it, in part. Part of the Chinese model is to enforce 

the one-child-per-couple policy at the factory level. They monitor 

women’s menstrual cycles. Women are forcibly aborted. They 

incentivize the catching of a woman who might have a pregnancy 

that has not been agreed to by the government. They are only allowed one; brothers and sisters are illegal in China. 

And why do I bring all this up? Because they have had that since 

1979, and China is on the precipice of imploding in the near future 

because they are graying and because they are missing girls. The 

estimates are approximately 100 million missing girls. Forty milVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:35 May 31, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\032912\73538 HFA PsN: SHIRL
21

lion to fifty million men can’t find wives because they have been 

killed by sex-selection abortions. 

That said, it is being exported, or at least that mindset, to Africa. 

The Chinese State Family Planning Commission and the UNFPA 

invited the health ministers of all sub-Saharan African countries 

for a week in Beijing about 3 years ago to tell them, if you want 

economic growth, you need child limitation. Paul Kagame said, 

‘‘Oh, we need a three-child-per-couple policy, we want to follow the 

Chinese model,’’ which means that women are forcibly aborted or 

at least coerced in some way not to have children. So children, or 

the lack of children, are the impediment to economic prosperity. 

Many came back talking that; not all of them, thankfully, have 

implemented that. But it goes back to a book that was written by 

Margaret Sanger called ‘‘Child Limitation.’’ It is actually called 

that. I read it. And it posits that, if you want economic growth, get 

rid of the kids. 

And, you know, in China, with a graying society—and we have 

all the numbers; I actually had a hearing on it—they are in trouble 

by 2020, 2030, as they have this huge bulge of senior citizens and 

no workers. And they are all males because the women have been 

executed through forced abortion. 

That is coming along with the bad governance model and the economic policies of China. Do you see that? Is anybody looking at 

that, Mr. Ambassador? Because, again, there needs to be warning 

bells about what that will do to the women of Africa as well as 

their babies. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Thank you very much. 

On trade and investment, you know, if we look at the content of 

trade, you are absolutely correct. If you look at it, 70 percent of 

China’s trade or, actually, imports out of Africa are in natural resources. And the issue comes in, are those in conflict minerals? Are 

those in illegal logging? Is it those issues that we are monitoring? 

But the question that comes in, I think, for China is, can they 

be a responsible trading partner with Africa? Can they in their 

trade help elevate and develop Africa? And that is the bottom line 

that has consumed and become the underlying guidelines and goals 

in our discussions with the Chinese, that is how do you make trade 

in Africa help promote prosperity, help education, help health care, 

et cetera, in the continent. 

Going to the child labor, I think the issue is that we are looking 

at a whole wide range of human rights issues, from our child soldier issues, trafficking in persons, looking at the status of women, 

LGBT issues, et cetera. And one of the things is, if child labor or 

the one-child policy is being exported to Africa, that is an area that 

we probably would need to focus on more. 

But one thing that we have discussed with the Chinese in our 

discussions is, how do you get development? Development is not 

limiting children. Development is through the respect of women. By 

raising the status of women, we have found that development in 

Africa exponentially increases, far greater than anything we can 

do. And look at the population growth rates in Africa and other 

areas. I don’t think that the one-child policy has held or been influenced throughout Africa. 

22

But the area for development and the one area that we have discussed is that by raising the status of women, raising educational 

and healthcare issues, mitigating conflict, we are going to have better development. And those are areas that, in many respects, the 

Chinese do agree with. 

On health care, they have been cooperating with the United 

States in funding healthcare programs. We have been doing it in 

Liberia, in Ghana. We are doing it in Ethiopia, Gabon. We are 

looking at also economic cooperation on how to do development in 

Angola and Mozambique and other places. 

So those are things that we are trying to work on. But on your 

question, we will pay a lot more closer attention and look at it, and 

we will give you a report back. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Bass? 

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Ambassador. I actually have several questions I want to ask you. And you have been deferring some questions to later panels, so, you know, you should tell me in terms of 

the category, are questions related to governance okay and the 

other trade and business issues to the other panel? That was a 

question for you. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. On governance, well, on areas where we 

have differences is on good governance and transparency. The basic 

fundamental pillar of our policy has been articulated by President 

Obama in Ghana 2 years ago, and that is good governance and 

democratic values. Holding governments accountable to the people 

is important because that underscores that they will be stable, and 

in stability they will have better economic development. 

Ms. BASS. So my question was, because you made reference to—

and I just wanted to know if you could give me some specific examples—you made reference to China undermining good governance 

in Africa. And I was wondering if you could give me specific examples and specific countries. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. When we say ‘‘undermine,’’ the issue 

that comes in is that they do not share a lot of the areas that we 

have advocated. 

For instance, in the vote on Sudan that the chairman raised, one 

of the issues that he had raised was the sale of arms, which was 

declared illegal under the U.N. investigation, that the arms flows 

into Sudan had been illegal, and those are areas that we have been 

discussing with the Chinese. 

The other areas, too, that we have discussed in private with the 

Chinese has been the issue of declaring countries that are in coup 

status and working with those countries to say that this is a detriment not only to the country but also to the regional states. And 

I look at Libya as one example, where we had worked with the Africans to pass legislation on Libyan issues. 

The other areas, too, that China has raised for us is concerns 

that they have raised on whether or not imposing sanctions on specific countries for specific human rights violations is necessary or 

appropriate. 

One of the differences that we have with the Chinese—and let 

me give you one example. During our discussions, the Chinese have 

told us, ‘‘Well, you know, you, the United States, looks at a specific 

regime. You need to look at a country over a long-term basis, for 

23

50 years or 100 years.’’ Our response has always been, we do. But 

in order to make——

Ms. BASS. Who says that, that we need to look at it over 50 

years? The Chinese say that? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Our Chinese colleagues. They say, look 

at the country——

Ms. BASS. Some of the countries are——

Ambassador YAMAMOTO [continuing]. Look at a country or, let’s 

say, Zimbabwe or Sudan over a 50- or 100-year process. Our response is that we do, but that process starts now. Because if we 

can’t get countries to respect not only the human rights issues but, 

more important, the rule of law, then what is that going to mean 

50 years or 100 years from now? And so those are the questions 

and issues that we are discussing. 

And in that context, let me just say that our discussions with 

China on Africa have been very cooperative. And we have made a 

lot of progress in looking for areas where we can work together cooperatively to make a difference in the lives of the people in Africa. 

Ms. BASS. So let me give you an example that I heard, and 

maybe you can tell me if there is any legitimacy to it. And that is 

when a company goes in, when there is an initiative, an infrastructure project or some other project like that when the Chinese go 

in, where you might have a country that is trying to deal with their 

governance issues, and the Chinese will go in and just bribe everybody. And then, you know, the issues related to the workforce or 

whatever then get bypassed. So when the African nation tries to 

push back, if the Chinese are there handing out, you know, currency, then they bypass even their attempts for good governance. 

So is that true, or is that just rumors? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. You know, I mean, obviously, if we look 

at specific issues—but, you know, to say that, let’s say, Chinese 

firms or whatever are singularly the only companies that would engage in, let’s say, nontransparent practices is probably not completely accurate, because other countries——

Ms. BASS. I didn’t say the only country. We were just talking 

about China today. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. And, sure, certainly, in some instances, 

and I would look for examples, maybe telecom, energy sectors, sure, 

that is possible. 

Let me just tell you, Madam Representative, is that one of the 

areas that we have asked our ambassadors to look at, to really look 

at how to expand trade investment is, what is one of the main 

problems in Africa today? And that is interstate trade is at less 

than 10 percent. And why is that? Because not only of internal 

problems within the countries of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, but also because of internal problems. 

We have asked and looked at opening the sectors in telecom, energy, banking, financial services, and energy sectors. By opening 

them up and being more transparent, you will not have—or you 

have less likelihood of having—the issues of bribery or nonproductive business practices. And holding all companies which are engaged in those countries in bidding processes to accede to the 

OECD anti-bribery practices, that is important. 

24

The other area, too, is, between states, is that, were a country 

to increase its wealth, if we can decrease these tariff and non-tariff 

barriers, we can increase interstate trade and therefore wealth. In 

that context, too, is that it becomes more transparent in our processes. And so that also becomes a barrier to bribery and becomes 

a check on it. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. And, actually, I need to say that a vote 

has been called, so maybe we can—I have additional questions, but 

they could wait until after. 

Mr. SMITH. I yield to Vice Chairman Fortenberry. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ambassador, you are probably not going to like the characterization of what I am interpreting as a good summary of what 

you said, but basically the Chinese take the stuff and we beg them 

to help the people in Africa. 

When I was on a House Democracy—we used to call it—Partnership Commission trip to Liberia, we flew into the airport there, 

which was a staging base for our troops before the invasion of 

North Africa in World War II. We were going down the road in the 

beautiful, lush, tropical African scenes. And on the outskirts of 

Monrovia rises this large, shiny, brand-new soccer stadium, a gift 

of the Chinese Government to the people of Liberia. 

Now, here we are in Liberia with military assistance, helping 

them rebuild their basic governing structures to protect the President and provide some stability in the wake of their horrific civil 

war. We provide U.S. tax dollars to help integrate child soldiers 

back into normalcy in society. We have microfinancing programs to 

help women entrepreneurs. And the Chinese are building soccer 

stadiums for the explicit purpose, not of humanitarian help or good 

governance structures, but to have access to their mineral resources and then access to their market for the sale of goods. I 

mean, that is the motive there. And the way they get there is 

through connivance and other practices that our companies hopefully never engage in. 

The Chinese have lax labor standards, they have lax environmental standards, they manipulate their currency. And, consequently, we have a huge trade imbalance with them. In fact, I 

asked a gentleman from Liberia one time, why do you do so much 

trading with the Chinese? And he said, we are waiting for you. 

In other words, American companies are at a disadvantage because we are not going to play by those same rules. We are at a 

disadvantage because we ship so much manufacturing over there, 

and the Chinese can produce things supposedly cheaper without 

worrying about these essential externalities that we do in our own 

country. 

So there is the root of the problem, I believe. But I think what 

we need to do is explore what the answer is. I mean, I understand 

your position. You are trying to dialogue with them; you are an important diplomatic figure in our Government, and that is your job. 

But when we are investing in Africa, again, for the benefits of cultural and economic exchange to America, the purposes of humanitarian help and relief, and potentially our own national security 

through developing good governance structures for international 

25

stability, as you suggest, this is being undermined by Chinese business practices. 

Other than the dialogue—I am not discounting your role in trying to develop the relationships to move them toward more acceptable positions—what can American policy do to stop this unfair 

overrun of the continent of Africa by people who aren’t invested in 

the wellbeing of Africans? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. I think I can answer that probably in 

two ways. The first is that, when we see wrong, we call it. If there 

is an area that is against democracy or inhumane, we raise it. And 

I think our positions, let’s say, in five coups in the last 2 years 

have kind of underscored our position on dedication to good governance and democracy. Our position in pointing to countries that 

have violated the arms embargoes to Sudan have done that. 

But second is, in the case of Liberia, I don’t think a soccer stadium would probably sway a Johnson Sirleaf at all or to get her 

resources, a Harvard-educated person. And her government has 

been doing the right thing on anti-drug confiscations, working on 

governance and democracy issues, working on development. 

And in our discussions not only with her but also of other countries—and there are over 20 countries in Africa that are democratic-leaning—I think the fundamental objective of these leaders 

is to look at how to improve accountability, democratic values, commitment to human rights. 

Yes, China is engaged in resources, but how do you limit or 

eliminate the excesses? How do you guarantee that it be will be 

transparent and in accordance with the values that you have expressed, Mr. Congressman, that you are so passionate and dedicated to? And we share those values. We believe, as you do, that 

these are issues that we have to keep very close track of, and when 

we do see problems, we highlight them. 

I think in our dialogue with the Chinese, now entering our sixth 

year, in some cases it has been very heated when we have raised 

these issues. In other areas, we have looked at potential for making 

the lives of Africans more——

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Let me follow up right quick before we have 

to go. Are there some trade practices or business constraints that 

we could re-examine that, again, would put us on a better competing field for African commerce? Which should carry with it the 

set of cultural mores and values that you would think, and I believe, most African people do want. But when you have proximity 

to leaders in China who are pursuing mercantilistic ends only, it 

is easy to—well, it seems easier to buy off the system and integrate 

without having the broader humanitarian goals in mind that can 

come from the benefit of sustainable production and appropriate 

environmental stewardship of natural resources. 

I think that that is a deeper policy question, and I think it is important for us, if we can’t do it in the next 30 seconds, that we have 

to think through, because that is a way to reintegrate an American 

presence appropriately that would benefit us as well as Africans 

and bring along with it a new vision of the ideals that make us free 

and give us opportunity that I think most Africans long for. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Uh-huh. Well, I think we can come back 

after the vote, but——

26

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Yeah, I will just pause there. Thank you. 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Okay. 

Mr. SMITH. We will stand in brief recess. 

And I would ask you, when we come back, if you could, if there 

is any policy that would be the equivalent to the Foreign Corrupt 

Practices Act, which, not only do we take into consideration the environmental degradation that our investments might have and all 

the other important human rights and humanitarian concerns, 

but—you know, it used to be that businessmen from the United 

States bought off people. Well, now if they do, they can be held to 

account and go to prison for it. 

We actually are crafting our Global Online Freedom Act to some 

extent on the idea of accountability, and we just marked it up in 

our subcommittee just a few days ago, on the idea that American 

businesses should be shining lights overseas, at least on some 

issues like foreign corrupt practices or whether or not we are aiding and abetting dictatorships with our technological capabilities 

that IT companies certainly have. 

So we will—I again apologize to our distinguished panelists. We 

do have another vote, and Ms. Bass said she had some additional 

questions for Ambassador Yamamoto. So we stand in recess for just 

a few minutes. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. SMITH. While we are waiting for Ms. Bass to come back and 

ask questions, I would ask you, if I could, Mr. Ambassador—and 

say to our distinguished witnesses, that was the last vote, so we 

won’t be interrupted anymore by House business. 

The administration has, as we all know, Mr. Ambassador, especially the State Department, expressed interest in enhancing U.S.-

African trade under AGOA. How do you see the increasing Chinese 

investment in Africa affecting the U.S. ability to expand trade? 

And, as you know, mention was made earlier, I, along with 

Bobby Rush, Congresswoman Bass, and Mr. Fortenberry, introduced legislation called the ‘‘Increasing American Jobs Through 

Greater Exports to Africa Act of 2012.’’ And it is a very comprehensive bill. It seeks to significantly boost our ability—American businesses’ ability, particularly small- and moderate-size, to actually 

sell their products in Africa, believing that that creates that twoway street that we all want to happen. 

Have you been able to take a look at that legislation? It has been 

introduced on the Senate side by Senator Durbin and a bipartisan 

coalition. They are identical bills; they are companion bills. Your 

thoughts on that legislation and on the first part of the question 

about AGOA? 

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. First, on AGOA, as you know, AGOA 

will expire in 2015, and one of the major aspects that we are trying 

to get extended would be the third-country fiber, for the textile purpose, because it expires this August and we want to extend it at 

least through 2015. 

That will help as far as promoting exports by textile-producing 

countries in Africa, but, more important, it hopefully will help expand capacity and capability in those countries where we are trying to focus. And the countries that really benefit: Of course Mauritius and Lesotho, Rwanda, and other countries. And so those are 

27

countries that I think the Africans are pretty unified on trying to 

get us to extend the third-country fiber legislation for support. 

As far as the Chinese trade affecting AGOA, I think one of the 

things that—we can answer in a couple of ways—is, number one, 

their focus on infrastructure development, on roads and other infrastructure projects helps, actually, on promoting trade and development. 

The other area, too—and I think this will go back to Congressman Fortenberry’s comments, and we can comment when he returns—is that hopefully we can get more American companies to 

operate and trade in Africa. I think that, in many ways, is the best 

solution for putting all the trade in perspective, expanding American values and openness and transparency and also good practices. 

One example is Boeing aircraft. Great company. They have been 

able to expand sales of airplanes on the continent. For instance, 

Ethiopia, a very poor country, just bought something like $4 billion 

in Boeing aircraft. That means they just preserved or created something like 30,000 American jobs, as well as jobs in other countries, 

that help produce the 787 and the 777 long-range. 

And so those are very good, but it also extends not only a quality 

of product, quality of service, but also good, open, transparent, good 

business practices. And I think if we can increase that—and I 

know, you, Mr. Chairman, have been so dedicated to expanding 

American trade. 

On the legislation itself, we have read it. We would welcome—

let me defer to our experts in the administration to look at the legislation to see how we can respond and to comment on it. But I 

agree with your premise that we need to expand commercial trade 

relations. And your next panel has Mr. Steve Hayes of CCA, who 

has a very good, objective view about how to expand American 

business presence on the continent. 

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that. 

I know Ms. Bass had some additional questions, so I—no? 

If you could get back to us on that earlier line of questioning 

with regard to the child limitation initiatives and China’s, I would 

call it, complicity in that mindset which renders children to be expendable. 

Again, and I would reiterate because I think it bears underscoring, it was the UNFPA and China that invited all of the health 

ministers to Beijing to discuss the alleged blessings of limiting children to one or two or three as a path toward economic growth. 

And, again, the evidence about China itself is that it is a matter 

of when, and not if, that a sinkhole is established because of too 

few workers caring for too many graying Chinese families or people. And then, of course, the terrible missing daughters that has occurred as a result of the one-child-per-couple policy. It is very predictable. But if you can get back to us on that one, as well. 

I think I am going to have to move to our next panel out of deference, so I apologize to Ms. Bass, but——

Ambassador YAMAMOTO. Can I just respond to one of the questions that——

Mr. SMITH. Yes. Please. 

28

Ambassador YAMAMOTO [continuing]. And then I kind of will 

close it. It is a response to the questions by Congressman 

Fortenberry and, of course, you and Congresswoman Karen Bass. 

The area is, as I think Representative Fortenberry said at the 

end of his questioning, is how do you expand, you know, good governance, but more important is U.S. practice. And I think one of 

the answers has to be increasing the U.S. business presence on the 

continent. 

Right now it has been very difficult to attract American businesses to come to Africa to trade. But I think the more we get, the 

more that you will see the good business practices and also expand 

American values and business practices. The area that we are looking at, too, is how you do this. We have been trying to expand 

American Chambers of Commerce. We are now up to eight. That 

is an increase out of four when we first came 3 years ago. And we 

thank the American Chambers. We also thank Steve Hayes at CCA 

for really helping to promote a lot of innovative approaches to bring 

American practices to Africa. 

The second thing, too, is to expand greater, you know, dedication 

to good governance and democratic values. I think Secretary Clinton, has made it a point in her speech recently on increasing engagement, building trust, expanding relationships, but also to work 

with China on areas where we have differences to eliminate those 

practices. 

And one of the things that Congresswoman Karen Bass has said 

is, give examples where governance has been on trial. And we don’t 

have specifics, but anecdotal. And I will give you one example is 

my frequent trips to the Congo, where we did see Chinese businesses taking resources out of the Congo. Was that through illegal 

means? Was that through legal means? 

And the area comes in is that, where we have countries which 

are democratically elected, have commitments to democracy and 

human rights—and there are over 20 countries in Africa—those 

countries are really the best guide to stop any illegal practices by 

other countries or by companies or organizations. And so I kind of 

think what Congresswoman Bass was trying to get at is that those 

are things that we are trying to work on and to try to expand. 

And so where areas like the Congo, which has promising capacity 

and capability, by building that capacity, by building capability, by 

building democratic institutions, that becomes the greatest deterrent toward those bad practices. 

And, finally, it is to hold China and other are countries to abide 

by international agreements and have them accede to things like 

the OECD. 

So thank you, Congressman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. And we look 

forward to the written submissions and answers, as you say, to 

questions posed. 

[The information referred to follows:]

29

Mr. SMITH. I would like to welcome our second panel—so thank 

you again, Mr. Ambassador. 

Ms. Carolyn Bartholomew, who is with the United States-China 

Economic and Security Review Commission, long-serving member 

on that commission. She has held numerous senior staff positions 

in the United States Congress, working in leadership offices and 

the intelligence committee in the House. 

She has particular expertise on U.S.-China relations and was a 

member of the first Presidential delegation to Africa to investigate 

the impact of HIV/AIDS on children, as well as the Council on Foreign Relations Congressional Staff Roundtable on Asian Political 

and Security Issues. She also serves on the board of directors for 

several non-profit organizations, including the Polaris Project, a 

project that I know so well, works on the issue of human trafficking. 

She has testified before this committee before, in 2005 to be 

exact. And we welcome her back. 

STATEMENT OF MS. CAROLYN BARTHOLOMEW, COMMISSIONER, UNITED STATES-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY 

REVIEW COMMISSION 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And 

it is an honor to actually speak after Ambassador Yamamoto, who 

is one of the unsung heroes of the U.S. Embassy during Tiananmen 

Square. So thank you very much for inviting me today to speak. 

Like others before me, I want to express my condolences on the 

loss of Congressman Payne. Like you, Mr. Chairman, his leadership has touched millions of lives, many of whom will never know 

that he has improved their lives, but his loss is deeply felt. 


73538f.eps
30

The U.S.-China Commission was established by the Congress in 

2000 to advise Congress on the national security implications of the 

U.S.-China economic relationship. We monitor, among other things, 

the implications for the United States of China’s increasing global 

presence. Over the years, we have looked at various aspects of China’s role in Africa, including our research report on 88 Queensway. 

While I will reference some of the Commission’s work, the views 

I express today are my own. 

In 2005, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, I testified before this subcommittee and expressed concern about the nature and implications of China’s approach to its economic and diplomatic relations 

in Africa. In the ensuing years, as China’s footprint in Africa has 

grown, so, too, have my concerns. 

We should expect that China, like many other countries, would 

have a number of interests in engaging African countries. What is 

troubling, however, is the way China does business in Africa, the 

impact it is having, and the precedent it may be setting. 

China’s no-strings-attached assistance undermines global efforts 

to make foreign aid more effective and sustainable. President Hu 

Jintao in 2004 explicitly stated, and I quote, ‘‘Providing African 

countries with aid without any political strings within our ability 

is an important part of China’s policy toward Africa.’’

The Chinese Government does expect beneficiaries to meet some 

of its own standards, such as diplomatic loyalty on issues relating 

to Taiwan and Tibet. And as someone, like you, Mr. Chairman, who 

has spent decades focused on human rights in China and Tibet, I 

find it particularly chilling that China’s official paper, ‘‘China’s African Policy,’’ published in 2006, pledges to boost military aid and 

fight crime by assisting judicial and police forces in Africa. Something for us to be concerned about. 

China actually does expect something in return for its assistance: 

Primarily, access to the natural resources it seeks. 

OECD guidelines and the establishment of new foreign aid mechanisms, like the Millennium Challenge Corporation, are designed 

to promote transparency, accountability, and good governance and 

to promote basic human rights. Much of China’s investment in Africa can only be accomplished in violation of those principles. The 

dealmaking is often done between corrupt government officials, 

where the public has no access to information about those deals. 

The Chinese Government’s support for its state-owned and stateconnected enterprises, its deep pockets, and its willingness to bring 

to the table a wide range of incentives has created barriers for U.S. 

participation in countries across the continent. 

Mr. Chairman, I was pleased to hear you express support for the 

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. I know that is one of the things that 

people like to point to as hindering U.S. business practices or U.S. 

business participation, but I think it is an important standard that 

we set, and I would be very disappointed if we lowered the bar on 

those issues. 

China’s economic goals are clear. Through its series of 5-year 

plans, now in its 12th iteration, the Chinese Government lays out 

its plans, identifying national champions which are the pillars of 

its economic growth and sectors in which it intends to focus all of 

31

its efforts. Its foreign aligns with these plans and is heavily focused 

on infrastructure development. 

Vast swathes of the Chinese economy and the businesses in key 

sectors are either state-owned enterprises or state-controlled companies, including defense, communications, transportation and utilities, natural resources such as oil, mineral, and metal, and construction trade, and other industrial products. 

The Chinese Government supports its companies by employing 

its varied and deep resources—infrastructure development, arms 

sales, telecommunications, among others—to land business deals in 

Africa, which allow it to acquire natural resources. 

Among the incentives China uses to sweeten the pot and close a 

deal are arms sales. In my written testimony, I list a number of 

the countries where China has sold arms. China is also the largest 

provider of arms to both Sudan and Zimbabwe. According to news 

reports, China provided 20,000 AK–47 assault rifles and 21,000 

handcuffs to Zimbabwe in the period leading up to its election. So 

that information is also included in my testimony. 

One of the challenges is it is very difficult to know just how 

much money China is providing to African countries and the mechanisms through which that assistance is being provided—aid, tied 

aid, concessionary loans, loans, foreign direct investment. And it is 

also difficult to know who the players are. The Chinese Government does consider its foreign aid spending a state secret. And in 

terms of the players, there are just lots of questions about who they 

are representing and whose interests they are serving. 

In 2009, three of our commission staff, of whom we are very 

proud, embarked on a research project to investigate whether investments in Africa by Chinese companies were state-directed and 

made for strategic purposes or commercially oriented and profitdriven. They focused on Angola, both because, at the time, of its 

recent emergence from three decades of civil war and because of its 

wealth of natural resources. 

Our staff discovered a consortium of over 30 companies controlled by a handful of Chinese investors nominally located in Hong 

Kong. For simplicity’s sake, we have labeled it the ‘‘88 Queensway 

Group’’ because that is their corporate address. But the group’s origins are imprecise, the source of its startup capital is unknown, 

and its power structure and relationship to the Chinese state remain unclear. The group’s companies are often classified as private, 

but there is evidence that several of its key personnel have ties to 

Chinese state-owned enterprises and government agencies, including possibly China’s intelligence apparatus. 

The 88 Queensway Group companies conduct public-works-for-resources deals in countries around the world, including Angola, 

Guinea, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, also in Venezuela and Indonesia. 88 

Queensway may also be active in Cote d’Ivoire, Mozambique, Nigeria, North Korea, and Russia. And just for the record, closer to 

home, the consortium actually has bought buildings in the United 

States, including the JPMorgan Chase building on Wall Street. 

The lack of transparency and public accountability surrounding 

the 88 Queensway Group should be a major concern to the U.S. 

The deals it makes in developing countries are shrouded in secrecy 

and conducted at the highest level of government. 

32

One thing the 88 Queensway research demonstrated is the increasingly complicated set of actors involved in China’s ‘‘going out’’ 

strategy. In our 2011 reporting cycle, the Commission examined 

the many actors in China’s foreign policy. In terms of China’s policies toward Africa, there is a tangled web of players. The Ministry 

of Foreign Affairs has the official responsibility of overseeing policies, but the Ministry of Commerce has the most influence. The 

Ministry of Commerce guides investment, manages foreign aid 

projects, and handles economic cooperation. MOFCOM is also responsible for screening Chinese companies, most of whom are large 

state-owned enterprises, bidding for concessional loans to finance 

projects. 

As China’s state-owned enterprises stretch their wings on the 

global stage, the tension between investing for profit and investing 

for other purposes will only become more difficult for the central 

government to manage. If you all have not seen it, this past Saturday there was a fascinating article in The Washington Post about 

Sudan and how China is trying to manage its relationship both 

with Sudan and the new nation of South Sudan. Certainly, the participation of CNPC, the Chinese National Petroleum Company, is 

a part of that. 

No discussion of China and Africa—and some of have you made 

reference to this today—would be complete without mentioning the 

new African Union headquarters in Addis. The $200 million building was fully funded by the Chinese Government, designed by Chinese architects, built of material mostly imported from China, built 

primarily by Chinese laborers, and will be maintained by Chinese 

workers. It is very difficult not to think of all of the lost opportunities in the way this project was carried out. 

But there is hope. While many African leaders like China’s nostrings-attached investment policies, those policies may not be as 

popular with African people. Public skepticism of China’s increasing presence has resulted in the growth of opposition movements 

in some countries. There are regular reports of local discontent 

with Chinese projects. Zambia has been mentioned. The Commission, actually its staff, did a research paper on Chinese foreign aid 

and documents some of the complaints about Chinese laborers displacing local workers, lax safety regulations, frequent workplace 

accidents—the list goes on and on. 

So I encourage the subcommittee to work with the administration, the development community, and the U.S. private sector to recommit the U.S. to a strong presence in Africa. If we do not do so, 

we will continue to lose ground to the Chinese economically and 

diplomatically, and we will be doing a disservice to the vast majority of Africa’s people, whose natural resources are being exploited 

while their entrepreneurial talent is still untapped, and whose aspirations for good governance and basic human rights are still 

unmet. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify today. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Ms. Bartholomew, for your 

leadership over the years, working on all issues related to human 

rights and democracy-building in Tibet as well as mainland China. 

It has always been an honor to work with you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bartholomew follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. I have just a few questions. 

You know, we know that the Chinese Government, when it provides any kind of aid, including economic aid or at least cooperation, extracts a very serious price. 

I remember working with the Human Rights Commission and 

then the Human Rights Council, but especially the Commission, on 

issues related to China. And many ambassadors, including African 

ambassadors, would tell me that it put at risk their foreign aid in 

the building of a new stadium, for example, and things of that 

kind, to take a human rights position that is principled against 

Beijing. 

China has managed to turn all but four African countries against 

the recognition of Taiwan. 

You know, money buys a whole lot of influence. And I am wondering if you could just elaborate, if you will, on how this distorts 

the work of the Human Rights Council current-day, other treaty 

bodies at the U.N., when money is flowing their way, to go silent 

or take a walk when those crucial votes occur. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Yeah, Mr. Smith, that is a really important 

thing that we are seeing. It is very tempting for us to say China 

is only engaged in Africa because of the natural resources that it 

is seeking. That it is a major priority. But it is, as it is advancing 

on the global stage, working to increase its you own power, particularly in multilateral organizations. 

And, you know, unfortunately, a lot of times, money talks. What 

we are seeing in Africa, though, is it is sort of a layer of the elite 

who are benefiting from these resources that are done, but they are 

also the people who often either are in power or have access to 

power. So the Chinese are building a wellspring of support for their 

positions on issues relating, certainly, to condemnation, potential 

condemnation, of their own human rights abuses. 

But you can watch them struggling now as they are trying to balance some of the competing issues and also with more attention. 

The more they are engaged, the more attention that is being focused on them. So I think it was really public pressure on them 

about Sudan that forced them to start reconsidering their position 

in Sudan. And, obviously, right now, with what is going on in 

Syria, the position that they have taken with Russia on Syria, it 

does not play well on the global stage. 

So I think what we really have to do is, we are going to have 

to count on transparency and access to information, both for people 

in Africa and elsewhere around the world, so they see what the 

Chinese Government is doing when these votes are coming up. 

They can, I believe, be swayed, but they are also struggling—Ambassador Shinn and I were talking just during the break earlier. 

You know, they are really struggling with, kind of, who is in charge 

of Chinese foreign policy and what does it mean when a stateowned enterprise goes out there, allies itself with unsavory characters in a country, and how does that fold back. 

So I think it is something—you know, again, the temptation is 

always to say, well, you know, we really shouldn’t be pushing, or 

money matters more than anything else. But this country, our 

country, has really been a beacon of freedom on all of these issues, 

43

and I think it is important for us to work together and figure out 

ways to counteract these diplomatic initiatives. 

Mr. SMITH. You know, Dr. Peter Pham makes an important 

point, pointing out the contrast of President Obama’s less than 24 

hours on the ground in sub-Saharan Africa since taking office. He 

points out that, in general, American interests seem to have 

pushed Africa to the margins of its foreign policy interests, whether 

economic or political, except, you know, when it comes to things 

like al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab, as well. 

How do you respond to that? I mean, 24 hours on the subcontinent seems to me precious little time for an American President. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Yes, well, I would hope that the administration would be able to dedicate more time both to issues in Africa 

and other places in the world. I think they have been struggling, 

frankly, with an awful lot of issues that have come up along the 

way that they have had to deal with. 

But, you know, Africa has not received the attention that it has 

needed from a number of administrations. I think when we pay attention to it, we often pay attention to it for humanitarian crises—

which are important. I will commend President Bush for the work 

that he did on global AIDS. I will commend you, Mr. Chairman, for 

the work on global AIDS. But it isn’t just a continent of humanitarian crises. And, frankly, if we ever want to get control of the humanitarian crises, we have to deal with some of the underlying 

issues. 

So I would hope that the Obama administration would be able 

to dedicate more time to dealing with Africa, and would encourage 

any administration to really learn about the potential. There is a 

vast, untapped potential with the African people that we all stand 

to benefit from, not only economically but just—when I think of 

children who don’t get access to education, I think of that lost potential. It might be somebody who could find a cure for cancer or 

another Shakespeare. So this is something that everybody needs to 

be engaging more on. 

Mr. SMITH. If you could, and you might just want to take this 

back or respond to it, but I would hope that the Commission would 

take a look at the devastating and absolutely corrosive impacts of 

the one-child-per-couple policy and its possible extension, in a twoor three-child configuration, to the Africa continent. We know that 

the Philippines is looking and may even adopt an UNFPA-inspired 

two-child-per-couple policy. Vietnam already has it. 

Valerie Hudson testified at a hearing that I chaired on September 22nd—and she wrote a book called ‘‘Bare Branches: The Security Implication of Asia’s Surplus Male Population.’’ She pointed 

out in her testimony that the projected 2.5 young to elderly, 1.6 by 

2050, and the missing girls I mentioned earlier, approximately 100 

million missing girls because of sex-selection abortions. And she 

talks about these bare branches, the fact that many of these men 

will never find wives. And that model is being pushed by bad governance models and perhaps by the economic equation or partnership in sub-Saharan Africa. 

And there are many African leaders who are ultimately talking 

about a child-limitation policy, perhaps not realizing that China is 

44

about to go off the cliff. And it is maybe a decade or two away; it 

is going to happen——

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Yeah, they certainly——

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. Based on a demographic problem that 

they have crafted themselves, with the U.N. Population Fund. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Yes. Mr. Chairman, I actually wasn’t aware 

of the potential application of this in Africa, but we will certainly 

ask the Commission staff——

Mr. SMITH. Please take a look at that. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW [continuing]. To seek out more information 

on that. 

Mr. SMITH. Because with those child limitations comes coercion. 

It starts off with disincentives. That is what China always does. It 

provides huge, draconian fines on women who have children who 

have not been authorized, up to 10 times the salary of the mother 

and father. And there are no children—no, I should say, unwed 

mothers who give birth to children, it just doesn’t happen, it is illegal, unless they have the child on the run. 

Well, that kind of model is being sent to Africa. Remember, they 

invited everyone to the health ministry in Beijing for a week, and 

they crafted it as a way of promoting economic growth. And, you 

know, there is a surface appeal to that that fades and evaporates 

very quickly under scrutiny. So if you could take a good look at 

that at your commission. 

And let me ask finally, in regards to the issue of—and you mentioned the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. As Ambassador Shinn 

points out, there are persistent reports, which are very difficult to 

prove, that Chinese companies are prepared to pay bribes. How 

good or not good are we at trying to look into that issue, to raise 

that issue? 

I know Ambassador Yamamoto talked about transparency. It 

doesn’t exist. But how hard are we pushing it to find out whether 

or not those bribes are being paid? Because, you know, when suitcases of money show up, it is a lot harder for our businesses to 

compete. But he does point out, ‘‘While this probably ensures consummation of a deal in a few cases, the far more important reason 

for the success of Chinese companies is direct assistance provided 

by the government to finance projects or sales.’’

And as we were talking about that new place that has been constructed in Addis, Ms. Bass leaned over and said, you know, ‘‘How 

many listening devices are there?’’ And that is a very, very important point. 

And I would add to that, since just 2 days ago we marked up the 

Global Online Freedom Act, my bill that tries to combat the misuse 

of IT companies and the Internet and would mean that Baidu and 

others who list on the U.S. Stock Exchange have to open up to the 

SEC their due diligence, or lack of it, with regards to human 

rights. 

I have been in those Internet cafes in Beijing. They censor everything you say, everything, is monitored by the cyber police. Now, 

if Africa is now picking up that same bad governance model, which 

is also a company model, I think we are in trouble. And I would 

suggest, as we are talking, that anything that goes on in that 

building will be surveilled ad nauseam by Beijing. 

45

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. I actually have thought about that, myself, 

as I have read that. And, in fact, that building is supposed to——

Mr. SMITH. Like TOPHAT, remember——

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW [continuing]. Is supposed to be maintained——

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. The Embassy in Russia? 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Right. The building is supposed to be being 

maintained by Chinese technicians. So if we have any questions 

about that. 

One of the things that I found interesting, associated with the 

African Union headquarters, is there is a debate going on even 

among African leaders. There are some, like President Meles 

Zenawi, who, I am sorry to say, has gone so far as to suggest that 

adoption of China’s state-led economic model is the preferable 

model, and that the AU chairman and the President of Equatorial 

Guinea was quoted as saying that the new headquarters was a reflection of the new Africa. 

But, fortunately, there are other people, who have had to stay 

anonymous—an anonymous delegate to the AU said, ‘‘This should 

be a symbol of Africans pulling themselves up, but instead it looks 

like China is doing it for us.’’ And there was a Nigerian scholar 

who did a blog posting, who wrote, ‘‘It is an insult to the African 

Union and to every African that in 2012 a building as symbolic as 

the AU headquarters is designed, built, and maintained by a foreign country.’’

So there are diverging voices. I think it is really important that 

the subcommittee work with the administration to bolster support 

for the voices of people who want to see a different future unfold. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Bass? 

Ms. BASS. Yes. Thank you very much for your presentation. 

And in the same vein in which the chairman was talking, I did 

want to go right to those questions. So I wanted to know, if you 

were aware, how extensive is the sale by China to African countries of Internet filtering, cell phone interception, radio jamming 

technologies. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. I think, Congresswoman Bass, I am going to 

have to get back to you on the specifics on that. 

But as you were mentioning the security issues on the African 

Union headquarters, China’s telecommunications companies are 

really starting to consolidate their power over the telecommunications system in Africa, including Huawei, about which there are 

serious questions about at what level we would allow them to be 

participating. 

In terms of Chinese Internet filtering, we will get back to you on 

that——

Ms. BASS. Okay. Alright. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW [continuing]. The purchase of that equipment. 

Ms. BASS. I appreciate that. 

And since I came in during your presentation, you might have 

mentioned some of these other points. So if you have, you know, 

sorry about that. 

But I know that periodically there are exchanges with African 

leaders and the Chinese Communist Party, going to China. And I 

46

wanted to know if you might have some comment about that, in 

terms of the effect of such exchanges on political parties or political 

behavior in various African countries, like you said, were going to 

adopt a Chinese economic model, so——

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Right, right. Well, yes, I think that one of 

the things that the Chinese Government has done is it has really 

curried favor with some of the countries with which we have had 

some pretty serious disagreements in Africa, Sudan and Zimbabwe 

among them. When the Chinese Government welcomes these leaders, some of whom are really international pariahs, and welcomed 

them along with everybody else, it gives them some international 

standing, which I think they then exploit to their own advantage. 

But there are any number of ways that the Chinese are supporting these countries. Arms sales to Robert Mugabe, for example, 

in violation of sanctions. 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. I think that exchanges are a good thing. 

What I would love to see would be for the United States to do the 

kind of welcome of a bunch of African leaders coming here, seeing 

the United States and having that same kind of exchange. I don’t 

think——

Ms. BASS. Maybe that is something the chairman and I can work 

on. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. No, there you go. Maybe you guys could do 

it. And I don’t know if you have exchanges with parliamentarians 

from Africa, but I think that that would be an excellent thing to 

do. 

The Chinese Government is very good at making people feel welcome. And, in fact, it is very good at not raising the kinds of issues 

that we know that we would raise if we were here. My former boss, 

Ms. Pelosi, used to always say she was the skunk at the garden 

party when she would meet with foreign leaders because she would 

be raising concerns about human rights abuses. 

So I believe that we would continue to do that. I believe that the 

Chinese Government is not doing that. But I think we need to step 

up our game in terms of reaching out and hosting delegations. 

Ms. BASS. And let me just say that I sure appreciated some of 

your beginning comments when you said that, you know, our orientation toward the entire continent—I mean, aside from the fact 

that some people view it as a country, but—is from the humanitarian perspective and not looking at the assets that are actually 

in the country. 

And I remember the President’s visit and actually when he went 

to Ghana and all of that, and it was very exciting to see that visit 

take place. And I certainly hope that he is able to go back again. 

But I really think we need to change our orientation in terms of 

how we view the continent. So I just want to tell you that I really 

appreciated your comments in that regard. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Thank you. 

Ms. BASS. But maybe you can comment about humanitarian aid 

from another perspective, and that is, how does China weigh in 

when there is a humanitarian crisis such as, you know, we are experiencing right now? And how do they measure up compared to 

the United States? 

47

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. I think if we use Somalia as the most recent 

example, through, I would say, international pressure, the Chinese 

have stepped up some, but not anywhere near as much as they 

should step up or as they could step up. 

I have a tendency to look at another piece of it, though, which 

is, some of these crises they have been involved in helping to fuel, 

directly or indirectly. They have, for example, sold weapons both to 

Ethiopia and to Eritrea. They will sell on both sides if there is a 

reason to sell on both sides. 

I think one of the real challenges that you are going to see with 

China, if it is willing to be the proverbial responsible stakeholder, 

is going to be in Sudan, which is, you know, the dispute that is 

going on between Sudan and South Sudan, with South Sudan holding the oil resources. China has been a major investor in the oil 

sector in Sudan, and they bet on Bashir coming out on top on that. 

So it will be very interesting to see whether they step up to take 

responsibility to try to get a peaceful and lasting resolution to the 

conflict that is going on there. 

So I think time will tell. I think they can contribute a whole lot 

more. I think that they need to learn to contribute to a humanitarian response as part of the global effort in any humanitarian response, not separate from it. So although this isn’t humanitarian, 

anti-piracy, the counter-piracy, they are doing part of what is going 

on in the waters off of Somalia, but they are kind of doing their 

own thing as they are doing it. So it would be good to see them 

working together to contribute more on these humanitarian crises. 

Ms. BASS. And when you say that where they have stepped up, 

they stepped up because of international pressure, what type of 

international pressure do they respond to? 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Well, that is a good question. 

Ms. BASS. Is it the United Nations? Is it a Bono concert? Is it 

a—what do they——

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. You know, that is a good question. 

Ms. BASS. A viral video? 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. I think it is a combination of things. 

You know, Sudan again is a good example. You know, there was 

an international campaign, really, about Darfur. Our chairman 

here was a part of it. I am sure out in California you were a part 

of it. And it was multifaceted. 

Ms. BASS. But that wasn’t directed at China. That was directed 

at the world. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. No, no, it wasn’t directed to China, but there 

was a point at which people did start directing things at China because they were clearly selling arms, there were reports of Chinese 

military on the ground. 

Ms. BASS. That is right. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. There was a story about that. Mia Farrow 

did a press conference, I think, right around——

Mr. SMITH. Right here. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Yeah, and she did a press conference. 

So we happened to be in Beijing at that time. You know, you are 

in hotels, and everybody says, well, it is not censored. Ha. So we 

were in a hotel, and one of my colleagues, who was in the Army 

and was stationed earlier in his career in Beijing, happened to 

48

have the TV on first thing in the morning on CNN. And, lo and 

behold, Mia Farrow is talking about Sudan and China. And it got 

clicked off. And then, you know, the news cycle comes up an hour 

later; story never shows up. So some censor had fallen asleep. 

But there are these examples of these international campaigns 

that pull together—young people are a very important part of it. 

The faith-based community is a very important part of it. And, 

again, I think as China engages more elsewhere in the world, it is 

going to have to learn how to deal with those things and participate. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Great. Thanks. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you so much. 

Mr. SMITH. You actually called it. As you recall, Frank Wolf and 

I went over right before the Olympics, and all of us collectively 

were calling it the ‘‘Genocide Olympics.’’

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Yes. 

Mr. SMITH. Just one very quick question: What place does Africa 

have in China’s global military strategy? 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Global military strategy? I know that they 

are doing some peacekeeping operations, I think. I might be like 

Ambassador Yamamoto and defer to one of our colleagues on the 

next panel to talk about the specifics of that. They are engaging 

more in peacekeeping operations than they have in the past. 

A little bit of military-to-military exchanges. I think we need to 

keep an eye on where they are doing those military-to-military exchanges. 

And then we heard the other day, not so much military-specific, 

but as we are looking at other issues related to China, China’s interest in the sea lanes of communication. It is also about keeping 

access, free access, to that coast of Africa for them to get the oil 

and the other resources that they are getting. So another issue I 

would say to keep an eye on. 

And we can get back to you with more information on that. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

Ms. BARTHOLOMEW. Great. Thanks so much for asking me to testify. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

I would like to invite our third and final panel, beginning with 

Dr. Peter Pham, who is the director of the Michael S. Ansari Africa 

Center at the Atlantic Council in Washington. He is the incumbent 

vice president of the Association for the Study of the Middle East 

and Africa, an academic organization which represents more than 

1,000 scholars, and is editor-in-chief of the organization’s Journal 

of the Middle East and Africa. 

Dr. Pham was the winner of the 2008 Nelson Mandela International Prize for African Security and Development. He has authored half a dozen book chapters concerning Somali piracy, terrorism, and stabilizing fragile states, as well as more than 80 articles in various journals. 

Finally, he testified before our committee on Somalia last July, 

so we welcome him back. 

We will then here from Mr. Stephen Hayes, who is the president 

and the CEO of the Corporate Council of Africa, an organization 

49

that has engaged in almost all of the political/economic issues affecting commerce between Africa and the United States. In his 12-

year tenure at CCA, he has built it to be a highly respected nonprofit organization and has won numerous awards for his work. 

Mr. Hayes has spent most of his life working in the international 

non-profit sector, volunteering in refugee camps, working at the 

World Alliance of YMCAs, as well as the world’s largest student exchange organization, and helping to found the Infant Formula 

Campaign. 

Mr. Hayes testified before this committee on the African Growth 

and Opportunity Act back in 2005, so we welcome him back as 

well. 

And then Dr. David Shinn, who has been a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University since 2001. Prior to that, he served for 37 years in the U.S. 

Foreign Service and held the following positions, among others: 

Desk officer for Somalia and Djibouti, political officer at the Embassy in Kenya, and deputy director of the Somali Task Force. In 

addition, he served as the State Department coordinator for Somalia during the international intervention in the early 1990s, director of East African Affairs, and then Ambassador to Ethiopia. 

Dr. Shinn also testified before the committee on Somalia last 

July, so we welcome him back as well. 

Three very distinguished individuals. 

We will begin with Dr. Pham. 

STATEMENT OF J. PETER PHAM, PH.D., DIRECTOR, MICHAEL S. 

ANSARI AFRICA CENTER, ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

Mr. PHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much for 

the opportunity to come before you today and speak on the important topic of China’s role and influence in Africa, their impact on 

both Africans and Americans, and the resulting implications for 

U.S. policy toward Africa. 

With your permission, I will present a summary of my analyses 

of these questions, and ask that my prepared statement be entered 

into the record. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, Dr. Pham. 

Mr. PHAM. Let me begin by adding my voice to the countless others, both here and in Africa, in regretting the passing of Congressman Payne. Although we did not always see eye to eye, there was 

no questioning the depth of his commitment to Africa as well as his 

extraordinary humanity, which I had personal opportunity to experience firsthand. 

Mr. Chairman, notwithstanding the bad news of ongoing conflicts, lingering authoritarian tendencies, and some very regrettable 

backsliding, as evidenced by the coup d’etat in Mali last week, 

there is a great deal of good news out of Africa that perhaps doesn’t 

receive the attention, including the fact that Africa is home to six 

of the world’s fastest-growing economies over the past decade, the 

fact that the continent as a whole has grown at a faster rate than 

East Asia, including Japan, in 8 of the past 10 years. This trend 

persists notwithstanding the fragile global economy. In fact, Africa 

is expected to grow faster this year than any region or country in 

the world, apart from China and India. 

50

If the initial and, to a certain extent, at least for now, main driver for Africa’s growth is demand from abroad for its primary commodities, there are four other factors which have contributed to Africa’s increasingly dynamic economic prospects. 

First, demographics mean that Africa is not only one of the most 

populous regions on the planet but one of the youngest. By 2050, 

one in four workers on the planet will be an African. 

Second, Africa’s population is not only growing, it is also rapidly 

urbanizing, thus adding further impetus to positive economic 

growth, given the clear and mutually reinforcing relationship between urbanization and economic growth. 

Third, Africa has embraced recent technology innovations, using 

them to leapfrog traditional stages of development. 

Fourth, Africa’s financial services sector has grown rapidly in response to its changing economic landscape. And while resources 

have been a big factor in Chinese engagement of investments in Africa, there has been a noticeable shift, in line with the changes in 

the continent’s economic landscape. In fact, of the $9.3 billion 

worth of Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa in 2010—almost 14 times what it was just 10 years earlier—the largest chunk, 

42.3 percent, went to services, and another 22 went to manufacturing, and only 29.2 percent went to the extractive industries. 

Trade is booming between African countries and China, with 

some 12.5 percent of all African exports going to China—15 times 

what it was in 2001. According to a report published by the State 

Council in China, despite the slump in 2009 attributed to the international financial crisis, the volume of bilateral trade between 

China and Africa was such that China surpassed the U.S. that 

year as the continent’s biggest trading partner. 

The Government of China has encouraged and vigorously supported Chinese firms in expanding their investments in Africa. 

China has signed trade agreements with 45 African countries, bilateral agreements regarding the promotion and protection of investment with 33, and accords to avoid double taxation with 11. 

The government has also set up the China-Africa Development 

Fund, a stock equity fund that gives special support to Chinese enterprises when they invest in Africa. And recently they tripled the 

capitalization of that entity. 

China has not failed to recognize the opportunities, both diplomatic and commercial, in the significant infrastructure being built 

out throughout Africa in transportation, communications, power, 

water, health care, and other sectors. 

So embedded have Chinese companies become in African infrastructure development that, prior to the publication of new guidelines prohibiting the awarding of U.S. contracts to governmentowned enterprises from the Millennium Challenge Corporation, a 

Chinese state-owned engineering and construction company, 

SINOHYDRO, was awarded two of the largest projects in the MCC 

compact in Mali: $71 million for improvements to the airport and 

$46 million for expansion of irrigation canals in the Niger River. 

It should be noted that increased trade with China is a doubleedged sword for African countries when it comes to imports. On the 

one hand, it makes relatively affordable goods available, which 

clearly benefits African consumers. On the other hand, Chinese 

51

manufacturers tend not to establish many links with local firms, 

preferring instead to turn to reliable, cost-competitive, established 

suppliers back in China. This, in turn, necessitates further imports. 

This may be the most direct and deleterious impact of China’s 

trade and economic growth on many African countries, the 

hollowing out, adversely affecting Africa’s medium- and long-term 

development prospects. 

Paralleling China’s emerging states in Africa are its expanding 

political and security interests, which we can discuss later. Beijing 

has a consistent policy of not imposing explicit political 

conditionalities on its aid recipients. This philosophy of noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations fits well with the 

policy preferences of many African heads of state or government. 

On the other hand, in addition to the explicit requirement that its 

African partners break their links with Taiwan, there may be implicit assumptions that aid recipients support Chinese positions in 

various international forums. 

Overall, however, China makes few, if any, demands in terms of 

democratic norms and is certainly less inquisitive about how African leaders actually use agreed-upon credits—a stance which conflicts with the pro-democracy, good governance ethos that we and 

our traditional European partners promote. 

A relatively new area of Chinese engagement in Africa has been 

the security sector where China’s involvement has hitherto been 

limited to arms sales to various governments, some quite questionable. 

After having long taken a dim view of international peacekeeping 

missions, China has embraced it. As of the end of February of this 

year, the PRC has deployed 1,894 military and civilian personnel 

on 11 U.N. missions. What is most interesting is the majority of 

Chinese peacekeepers are deployed in Africa, currently 1,505 PLA 

personnel. Three-fourths of those assigned to peacekeeping are involved in seven African missions, in the process, accruing for the 

PLA significant tactical, operational, and strategic knowledge of 

the continent. 

Moreover, since January, 2009, vessels from the Chinese People’s 

Liberation Army-Navy have been operating almost continuously in 

the Gulf of Aden and other waters off Somalia as part of the international naval deployment to counter Somalian piracy. 

While by all accounts, the Navy deployment has cooperated correctly with other coalition forces, a strategy paper prepared by the 

central committee of the Chinese Communist Party in December 

2010 forthrightly acknowledged ‘‘China can make use of the situation to expand its military presence in Africa.’’

In discussing China’s role in Africa, especially its assertion of 

vital and strategic interests, it is worth bearing in mind that while 

Chinese engagements have received the most attention, it is clear 

that other rising or emerging powers, above all, the other BRIC 

countries—India, Brazil and Russia—are also busy renewing old 

ties and forging new links with Africa, relations which will undoubtedly alter the strategic context of the continent. 

While the African Growth and Opportunity Act of 2000 and its 

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tries to qualify for trade benefits, the foreign direct investment 

flows from the U.S. to Africa remain negligible, and most of it directed to the petroleum or other extractive industries. 

On the security front, even before the current fiscal austerity, it 

was questionable whether the U.S.-Africa command had the resources adequate to achieving its missions of supporting U.S. Government objectives through the delivery and sustainment of effective security cooperation programs that assist African nations to 

build up their own security capacity to enable them to better provide for their own defense. 

In summary, what can be done in the U.S. is not simply to cede 

Africa economically, diplomatically and strategically to China and 

other countries. 

First and foremost, we should not forget the Africans. An all too 

pervasive temptation is to conduct business as if Africans were 

merely passive spectators rather than the principals in their own 

affairs. We need, in particular, to be sensitive to what democratic 

states, their leaders, and people are saying. 

Secondly, the United States needs to develop a national strategy 

for Africa. 

Third, we need to establish a coordinating mechanism to implement that strategy. 

Fourth, and I am sure my friend, Mr. Hayes, will speak to this, 

we need to engage and empower the private sector. 

There is a great reason to be cautiously optimistic about Africa’s 

prospects. If the growing interest of China, India and other countries signals anything, it is that the continent is not only a place 

where aid and humanitarian sentiments drive engagement, but 

where, increasingly, the emergence of business opportunities and 

the potential therein for mutual benefit form the basis of true partnerships. 

In order to seize this golden movement, the United States needs 

to develop a comprehensive, proactive strategy to promote the development and prosperity of our African partners as well as to advance long-term American interests—economic, political and security. To say nothing of countering any baneful influences from any 

other external actors. 

Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much for your testimony and you excellent recommendations. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pham follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Mr. Hayes, you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF MR. STEPHEN HAYES, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, THE CORPORATE COUNCIL ON AFRICA 

Mr. HAYES. Mr. Chairman, as you know also, I would like to express condolences on the loss of Don Payne. He and I were friends 

since 1968, so it was a particularly painful loss. I hope you and others will continue the tradition of being the spokespersons for Africa, as well as the U.S.-Africa relationship. 

My experience with China is based on leadership exchanges before CCA as well as a recent program with China, which included 

Dr. Shinn. What I would like to address particularly is the trade 

business situation of course. 

I think the situation as it regards China and Africa is more complex than commonly portrayed in the press. While there is an overall game plan directed by the Chinese Government, primarily 

through use of its state-owned enterprises, there is also a large and 

growing private sector separate from the government that has also 

been encouraged to invest abroad. 

The major projects in infrastructure, energy, and mine extraction 

which dominate China’s investment in Africa are financed through 

Chinese Government institutions, such as the ex-im bank of China. 

And in this way, China is able to mobilize financing, a workforce, 

and a coherent plan for projects in Africa in a much faster way 

than our system can allow. It will be very difficult to compete with 

China at this level. 

The effect of China’s engagement in Africa has been largely positive in that China has developed essential infrastructure in some 

nations, provided jobs in its textile plants in Africa, and has stirred 

global interest in Africa more than any other time in history. So 

at the same time, there are also the deleterious effects to its investments, environmental controls are often lacking, and the Chinese 

private sector engagement at the small scale has displaced African 

marketplaces. Counterfeit goods flood Africa and it is difficult for 

African companies to compete with such entities. There may be a 

growing backlash against this. 

While it may be incorrect to say that the investment in Africa 

by Chinese private sector companies is totally unrelated to the 

overall plan for Africa by the Chinese Government, the private sector companies do have some of the same challenges as U.S. private 

sector companies. They do not have the same access to financing 

that state-owned enterprises have. They are not always to able to 

muster their own homegrown workforces, as can the Chinese Government and its enterprises, and they are often negotiating with 

African governments from a bottom-up arrangement while the 

state-owned enterprises is direct entities of the Chinese Government, negotiate directly with the African Government leadership. 

Ironically, the smaller, private sector companies often find themselves losing in competition to the Chinese state-owned enterprises. 

I think that the collective approach by the Chinese Government 

also allows them to provide a far more diverse package in their 

deals made with African governments. For instance, a deal for oil 

may also include the construction of government buildings for the 

host government as well as other infrastructure projects. For U.S. 

66

companies to do this would require many companies coming together and putting such a bid together. The Chinese Government 

simply has to make the deal necessary with some of the stateowned enterprises to implement the contract. Construction can be 

done in a faster rate than could be done by U.S. companies, even 

if they were able to match the deal. 

Furthermore, Chinese companies are unencumbered by regulations of their own government in dealing with the individual countries, such as the policy of noninterference in internal affairs that 

allows companies to avoid issues of sanctions and other laws to 

which U.S. companies are bound. 

I think we can compete with China, however. But I think we 

have to do it through links with the private sector. I think we link 

with the African private sector, the key to democratic growth, to 

developing a middle class, to development in Africa, going back, is 

to develop the middle class. To do that, the private sector has to 

flourish. 

Where we can compete is linking our private sectors with the African private sectors. And in some cases, I will also say where it 

is to our advantage, and I also think it helps us in China, we can 

link to the Chinese private sector interested in investing in Africa. 

I think you will hear from Dr. Shinn and others, too, that some 

in the private sector in China are interested in working with the 

United States. So I don’t put China in a total monolith. I think 

there is far more diversity there, and we need to recognize that in 

terms of the economic systems. 

So I think our linkages and our advantages can, in fact, be by 

linking with the private sector, building the private sector, and 

that is the strength of the United States in terms of economic development. And in the long term, the private sector and a growing 

middle class will lead to stronger democratic traditions as well. 

So our strategy would be, let’s start working with the building 

the middle class and the private sector in Africa. 

I think there are also threats to Africa that we also need to address, although the purview is China today. I think the European 

partnership agreements that are being thrust upon the Africans go 

back to colonialism at its worse, and also will have the effect of 

keeping U.S. businesses out of Africa. So I think we need to also 

look at that. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Hayes. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hayes follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Ambassador Shinn. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAVID H. SHINN, ADJUNCT 

PROFESSOR, ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 

Ambassador SHINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ms. Bass for 

inviting me here today. I also pay my respects to Congressman 

Payne. 

I would like to begin by talking about U.S. China economic competition in Africa. 

I think the most important difference between the United States 

and China is the very structure of the American and the Chinese 

Governments and the way their respective systems engage in Africa. American commercial activity, trade, investment, and bidding 

on contracts in Africa are conducted by private companies with limited involvement by the U.S. Government. 

The situation concerning the relationship between the Chinese 

companies and the Government of China is significantly different. 

While most Chinese companies operating in Africa are private, they 

tend to be small- and medium-sized and account for a relatively 

small percentage of the dollar value of trade, investments and the 

winning of contracts in Africa. Most of the large Chinese companies 

operating in Africa are state-owned enterprises, or SOEs. All of the 

SOEs receive extensive support from the Government of China in 

the form of financing and establishing contacts with African governments. The links between the Government of China and private 

companies are less clear. For example, Mindray is a smaller publicly owned medical and technology company that is listed on the 

New York Stock Exchange. It has no government ownership. Several of its leaders told the CCA delegation in China in February 

that it receives no financing and very little support from the government. 

On the other hand, you have a company like Bosai Mineral 

Groups Company Limited which has a single mining project in 

Ghana. Bosai is a wholly private company. Bosai officials told us 

in February that the company relies heavily on government support, especially financing. The very nature of the different U.S. 

Governmental and economic systems gives a huge advantage to 

Chinese SOEs. While private Chinese companies may not have a 

significant advantage over American companies, even some of them 

seem to have easier access to government financing than is usually 

possible for American counterparts. It is also important to acknowledge that since the mid 1990s, Chinese companies have been more 

aggressive in Africa than have their Western competitors. In addition, they are usually willing to accept a lower profit margin, and, 

in some cases, to bid below cost in order to break into the market. 

In the past 5 years, Chinese banks have also significantly increased their engagement in Africa where there has been a real 

lapse by American counterparts. 

The price of American products and services is almost always 

higher, sometimes significantly so. In much of Africa, lower price 

tends to win out over higher quality. 

I want to turn to the natural resources question. While China 

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terials is, in my view, at the top of the list. China imports just 

under one-third of its oil from Africa. China also imports significant quantities of cobalt, copper, manganese, bauxite, iron ore, et 

cetera, from Africa. We are often quick, however, to criticize China 

for a trade relationship with Africa that relies overwhelmingly on 

the imports of raw materials. We need to be careful in making this 

argument. In 2010, the United States imported from the 54 African 

countries more oil than did China by a rather considerable margin. 

We were asked to look at the question of land grabs, or as I really prefer to call it, land leasing. There has been a considerable 

amount of inaccurate and exaggerated reporting on so-called land 

grabs in Africa. These deals are, in fact, long-term leases, albeit 

sometimes up to 50 years. China is often cited as being at the center of these deals. The most thorough research on this topic has 

been done by the Oakland Institute, an independent policy think 

tank in Oakland, California. My written testimony summarizes the 

conclusions, and I won’t take the time to go over them here, but 

I urge that the committee take a look at what we know so far, at 

least in the seven countries where the Oakland Institute has done 

a study. And they have effectively found that China is a minor 

player in all of this. 

In fact, in 2008, China’s National Development and Reform Commission announced a 20-year food security strategy that explicitly 

stated foreign land acquisitions would not be part of China’s strategy, and I give in my written testimony some of the reasons why 

there is this misperception out there that China is deeply involved 

in it. 

Let me turn to the promotion of democracy and human rights. 

U.S. support for democratization and the amelioration of human 

rights abuses in Africa are the topics of sharpest American and 

Chinese policy disagreements without any real competitors. 

The approaches of China and the United States are philosophically different, and they are not likely to be bridged in the foreseeable future. China accepts whatever government is in power irrespective of the manner in which it obtained power or how it rules 

once it is in power. China is not prepared to pressure African governments to democratize. Because of its own system of government, 

which is not along the lines of Western liberal democracy, it sees 

no point in urging African governments to follow such a course. 

At the same time, China does not hold itself out to African countries as a model to follow, contrary to common belief and media accounts. Nor will China support U.S. and Western efforts to encourage better human rights practices in Africa. African countries can 

depend on China to avoid raising controversial human rights issues 

in the U.N. Human Rights Council, and on occasion, to even support them when they are criticized by Western countries. And this 

practice works in reverse. 

And finally, a couple of issues on which I think there is actually 

room for China and the United States to collaborate to our mutual 

advantage. These are sensitive political issues, but both the United 

States and China have an interest in political stability in Africa. 

Both countries support all six U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa, as Dr. Pham discussed. U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa are strong candidates, in my view, for expanded cooperation beVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:35 May 31, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\032912\73538 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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tween the United States and China. Both the United States and 

China have been supportive of the transitional Federal Government in Somalia and in combating al-Shabaab, and both countries 

want to see the establishment of a national government that has 

widespread support of the Somali people and control of the entire 

country. 

Finally, both the United States and China have an interest in 

ensuring peace in Sudan and South Sudan and the full implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement that led to the creation of South Sudan. China has an added interest, a multi-billion 

dollar investment in oil infrastructure and the fact that it obtains 

about 6 percent of its imported oil from Sudan and South Sudan. 

The disputes between Sudan and South Sudan are complex and involve far more than oil. They have the potential to cause a major 

new conflict between the two countries. This is not in the interest 

of either the United States or China. The United States has considerable influence in South Sudan but little influence in the north; 

whereas China has significant influence in the north and less in 

the south. 

In my view, this is an area where there could be greater collaboration than there already has been. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shinn follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Dr. Pham, in your testimony, you talk about China’s 

outreach to Africa, including government to government level. And 

in the last academic year, some 5,700 African students received 

scholarships from the PRC Government to pursue university level 

training. Can you elaborate very briefly, because we have had that 

for years. It is not enough, we all agree. What language do they 

teach these university students in? And how does that selection 

occur and what countries frankly are most likely to see students 

going from Africa to China? 

Mr. PHAM. The students are from, the last time I looked, from 

50 countries. So they are really from all over. Many of them are 

picked, they are officially nominated by educational authorities in 

some cases in their countries. Others are picked by a nominally 

competitive processes through either the Embassies or the Confucius centers China has put up around Africa. 

What I have discovered over the years anecdotally, and I don’t 

have the data to quantify this, but anecdotally, the perhaps disproportionate number of children, grandchildren, nieces, nephews 

of people of a certain influence in government who receive these 

scholarships, so there is a little bit of that to it. 

Mr. SMITH. A little or a lot? Do you have any breakout? 

Mr. PHAM. There is no data because they are not very transparent. It is more anecdotal, conversational. I will talk to a minister and he will have a daughter in school in London, a son in 

school here, and the nephew is in Beijing studying something. 

But as to the education they receive, it fully varies, just as Chinese universities vary. Some get first-rate education at some of the 

leading institutions in Beijing and Shanghai. Some have received 

pieces of paper that I am not sure will do them much good coming 

home with. The number is high, but one has to really break that 

down into the quality of the education they do receive. 

Mr. SMITH. Is there any evidence of indoctrination into the Chinese model of governance? I mean, Moscow University was the 

place people were sent, from Cuba or anywhere else, to receive that 

political training. Is that a component of this, in whole or in part? 

Mr. PHAM. Not formally. But there are some who attend, for example, training institutes for the governing elites. To cite one clear 

example, actually an infamous one, Joseph Kabila, the presumptively re-elected president of the ironically named Democratic Republic of the Congo, is an alumnus of the National Defense University in Beijing, and the curriculum there very clearly includes indoctrination. So at that level, certainly it exists. Others come home 

as admirers of the Chinese system. And others, quite frankly, I 

have met some who have turned against it. But some become admirers. And then there is the follow-up. I think that is important. 

Chinese Embassies, many of them do carry on follow-up. 

We have many people pass through our schools, and we rely 

more on the soft power, the affection they may develop for our culture, our people, et cetera. We don’t keep tabs and files on them 

at the Embassies and follow up on them perhaps as meticulously. 

Mr. SMITH. What language? 

Mr. PHAM. Primarily in Chinese. In a few cases they provide initial training in other languages until they get up to speed. In fact, 

I met one alumnus of a Chinese university who probably would 

84

have trouble reading a menu. I am not sure what she did for 3 

years in China. She came back with very limited—they didn’t really give her enough language instruction. So she spent her 3 years 

there, came home and had a piece of paper, but not much else. In 

fact, when I met her, she was actually enrolled in another course 

back at home to continue her education. She had been sent off to 

a provincial boondock somewhere. 

Mr. SMITH. You mentioned the last academic year. Is this something that is ratcheting up as a way to influence the next generation of leadership in Africa? 

Mr. PHAM. I think they are. The premise seems to be that they 

are ratcheting up. They promised at the last forum on China AfroCooperation that they would train during the period between the 

two 5,000, but they had 5,000 awarded last year, so they are well 

ahead of what they promised. So it seems to be. Now, there is going 

to be another ministerial-level meeting of that forum this year, so 

that will be interesting. That is usually when they parade out the 

numbers. It will be interesting to garner some of that. 

Mr. SMITH. If any of you would like to touch on any of these 

issues, but you mentioned the targeting of U.N. peacekeeping missions as a way, and it may be for good reasons, but it also may 

have a more sinister motive. 1,550 PLA personnel, I am wondering 

how well-integrated they are to the other African Union peacekeepers. We all know that they are predominantly Africans. That 

has been the new and very positive trend. Do they keep to themselves? Are they part of the command structure that suggests that 

they are integrating? 

And the targeting of the AU itself, if any of you who would like 

to touch on this, as a central place to have significant influence for 

less amount of exertion, the building of the building and all of the 

other things that they are doing seems to get an enormous amount 

of positive impact at the U.N. and everywhere else where the Chinese are trying to exercise their clout and muscle. 

Mr. PHAM. On the peacekeeping, on the one hand, the U.N. 

peacekeeping as you know, Mr. Chairman, is always an exercise in 

trying to get bodies and units out. So the Chinese have adapted, 

I think, a very interesting strategy in that regard. They provide 

units, unlike some other countries, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 

that provide large numbers of troops, units to man everything from 

guard posts to roadblocks, the Chinese provide very specific units. 

In Liberia, for example, the first peacekeeping operation, they 

sent an engineering battalion. The same in Darfur, an engineering 

battalion. Other places, Liberia also, a small cell that managed the 

port of Buchanan. So they send very specially trained units that 

are hard to come by; so force commanders usually welcome them. 

But that also permits them to maintain unit coherence. There are 

a few Chinese officers that are billeted out in other commands that 

they maintain, but they usually are consistent units. 

I will give you an example. Up country Liberia in Zwedru where 

the engineering battalion built the so-called Friendship Road which 

the United States paid 20 percent of the bill for, but there is no 

indication on the sign other than it was built by Chinese peacekeepers, I would observe. The engineering battalion kept itself 

billeted separate from the rest of the African peacekeeping force, 

85

the Ethiopians, et cetera. The Chinese had their own facilities and 

their own mess hall, and all of that. So there is a logic to it. 

Interestingly, 2 years ago, the Ministry of Defense created for the 

first time a separate distinct office to handle peacekeeping. It is not 

exclusively African in focus, but it manages all of their peacekeeping. What we seem to have concluded is roughly half a dozen 

units in China provide all of the peacekeeping personnel. So what 

happens over time, because the Chinese military career is a little 

different than our track where people move from unit to unit, you 

tend to stay with the same unit unless you are promoted upwards. 

So over time, you have certain officers who have had two, three, 

even four tours in Africa. So they acquire a knowledge that is quite 

formidable. 

Ambassador SHINN. Mr. Chairman, if I may add to that, in terms 

of the peacekeeping side of your question, there have been a number of reports, rather thorough reports on Chinese peacekeeping in 

Africa, and all of those that I have seen have given the Chinese 

quite high remarks, particularly on the professionalism of their activities. 

There was one fascinating report that was actually done by an 

American colonel who was working alongside the Chinese in a very 

small operation in the Western Sahara. He made the argument, 

rather persuasively, I thought, that the Chinese are also learning 

an enormous amount about Africa by having these folks engaged 

there. He suggested that it will not be very many years before the 

Chinese will have a better understanding of sort of the strategic 

situation in Africa than the Americans have because they will have 

had so much engagement on the continent. An interesting argument by an American colonel, an active duty colonel. 

If I could just make a quick reference to your question about targeting the African Union, although I might use a different word 

than ‘‘targeting,’’ it is certainly clear that China is working very 

hard to develop very good relations with the African Union, and it 

is not just the question of spending $200 million in order to build 

the conference center there. They have been providing some budgetary support and they have been helping with some of the African 

Union missions around the continent financially. But it has gone 

beyond that. They are also working very closely with ECOWAS in 

west Africa and with SADC in southern Africa and with NEPAD, 

which is the cross-continent economic organization. They are getting involved everywhere, and it is really quite astounding to see 

how engaged they have been across the continent on virtually every 

issue. Sometimes, quite frankly, filling a bit of a void left by the 

West. 

Mr. SMITH. When you say you don’t want to use the word ‘‘targeting,’’ is there something other than self-interest? Is there a 

sense of selflessness on the part of the Chinese? 

Ambassador SHINN. There certainly is self-interest involved. 

Mr. SMITH. Is it a nefarious one? 

Ambassador SHINN. That is where I wasn’t quite sure where you 

were using the word ‘‘targeting.’’ I am not sure it is necessarily nefarious. It is self-interest, yes. Absolutely. Nefarious, not necessarily. Unless you consider nefarious to mean increasing their 

86

economic links to the continent, their economic involvement on the 

continent. But China wouldn’t be the only country doing that. 

Mr. SMITH. But again, in terms of governance, what is it that you 

think that they convey to emerging democracies? And when we talk 

about they don’t take a position on human rights and the like with 

regards to Zimbabwe or Sudan, it is an open secret that they 

breached the arms embargo, and did it with impunity, which 

meant that Africans in the Blue Nile region and elsewhere were 

being slaughtered with AK–47s, that the Chinese Government 

made available in exchange for oil? And the same would go with 

Zimbabwe. As a matter of fact, we all applauded robustly when the 

South Africans and others refused to allow transshipment of munitions en route to Zimbabwe that could have caused huge amounts 

of death. 

I don’t mind if the evidence suggests it, suggesting a more nefarious—I mean, it is a dictatorship with gulags galore on its own soil, 

that being China I am talking about. 

Ambassador SHINN. My reference is very narrow, though. Targeting the African Union, I think that is a little bit different than 

these other issues that you just raised. And I would argue that the 

United States, in that sense, tries to target the African Union. 

Mr. SMITH. But it is all about whether or not it is for enlightened 

self-interest and for the benefit of those in those countries. 

PEPFAR, our malaria programs, as you know so well, as you all 

know so well, what was the purpose? To help people. Simple, and 

end of sentence. 

What is the Chinese game plan here? I see it when I talk to African ambassadors, like I said earlier, who take a walk. I am not 

going to embarrass them by naming them, but who take a walk on 

human rights issues vis-a`-vis Sudan and elsewhere, and especially 

with regards to China itself because of money that flowed to their 

country. That is outrageous, in my opinion. 

Ambassador SHINN. I think that the Chinese goals are very 

mixed on some of these things. Some would fall in the nefarious 

category, like providing arms to Sudan when Sudan is under sanctions. That clearly is nefarious. But some of the other activity I 

would not describe as nefarious. 

Mr. PHAM. Mr. Chairman, before coming to this hearing, I hosted 

an luncheon for an African head of state who you brought up earlier, and I actually posed to him the question of what would he say 

if he were in my seat here. If you permit me, this is a quote from 

him: ‘‘Why can’t we find a formula where America makes investments with Africa without complicated packaging? We are tired of 

people asking questions which no answers will ever satisfy them.’’

That, I think, encapsulates what you are driving at. That China 

may be doing it for self-interested commercial reasons, but it does 

give an out for certain people who prefer not to have questions 

raised. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Hayes. 

Mr. HAYES. I think, Mr. Chairman, yes, of course there are the 

nefarious reasons. But I think there is also a certain pragmatism 

to them. The Chinese take seriously regional institutions. They 

take seriously AU, ECOWAS. They take seriously, not only for 

their own self-interest, and you can argue economic self-interest as 

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well, that they see that the regional institutions provide larger 

markets, they provide infrastructure that has to be linked, if they 

are to be successful for whatever reasons. So they do take seriously 

what I think we should have been doing. There is no reason the 

United States couldn’t have been doing some of this. 

I have also suggested to the administration that given the burning down of the COMESA building recently, that the United States 

ought to build, with the private sector, ought to rebuild the 

COMESA building as a model building with all of the green technologies you want as a model for the country rather than leaving 

it to the Chinese to do that as well. There is no reason we couldn’t 

do that with leadership. 

Mr. SMITH. I would ask any of you who would like to answer, 

since China itself has among the worst records ever on labor rights, 

are they having any impact on labor rights in Africa? ILO standards which are universally recognized? 

Ambassador SHINN. If you are asking it from a negative point of 

view? 

Mr. SMITH. Or positive. Probably nothing, but——

Ambassador SHINN. I would be a little hard-pressed to identify 

the positive side of that, I am afraid. 

There have clearly been cases, and Zambia is the one that is 

most often cited in the copper mines, where the impact has been 

negative. That is very well documented and I don’t even think Chinese officials would argue with you on that one. 

There are other cases where they have been very lax in abiding 

by local African labor regulations. Either the minimum wage or 

amount of hours you work per week or whatever the case may be. 

And they haven’t been good at that. 

I think China has slowly been learning that it has to pay closer 

attention to what the African regulations are when they hire Africans and when they therefore impact their labor situation. And 

they learn it the hard way, by having protests appear or having 

people complain in the media. But they are slowly learning that 

they can’t do business necessarily like they did it back home and 

get away with it all the time. So maybe that is slightly positive, 

I am not sure. But there is not a lot of positive on that one. 

Mr. HAYES. I would agree that the general effects have been negative. It is hard, because it is not a transparent system and the 

governments themselves in Africa often are not transparent with 

all of the information, it is very hard to get facts. But clearly, there 

is a growing resentment among the working force in Africa. That 

clearly swayed the election in Zambia as a backlash on labor practices. There is a growing feeling, how much of it is anecdotal, how 

much of it is real, but clearly the labor forces, I mean, you are displacing labor forces by bringing in Chinese workers. You are keeping the indigenous workforce from jobs. So that clearly is. 

Again, I think the governments themselves in Africa also have 

to share blame for allowing that to happen as part of the negotiating for those contracts. 

Mr. SMITH. Do any of you know or have any sense as to whether 

or not any of those workers that are being brought in are from the 

laogai, from the gulag system? 

88

And, finally, before we go to Ms. Bass, on the spying issue, how 

robust do you think the PLA is in spying on the African nations, 

starting with the AU? 

Mr. PHAM. On bringing in workers from laogai, certainly that 

was the case during the 1960s and 1970s in some of the construction, the TanZam Railroad and other areas. More recently, I have 

not encountered any verifiable instances. 

But what we do have, we have discussed the abuse of African 

works, the abuse of Chinese workers, many of whom in some parts 

of Africa are coming from very poor, backward, if you will, or less 

developed provinces who this is their mechanism to escape to get 

somewhere. So they are willing to work at standards that even 

back in China would be questionable in order to get out. And then 

afterwards after their contracts have been met, then they start out 

small and become traders. 

Mr. SMITH. Would any of them rise to the level of labor trafficking? 

Mr. PHAM. I think it is something that——

Mr. SMITH. Can they leave on their own volition? Is their passport taken away from them once they are in country? 

Mr. PHAM. I think it is of their own volition getting there. Once 

they are there, you see some of the conditions, you really wonder. 

And, you know, as a scholar, I don’t have the ability to conduct the 

type of interview I think that someone in authority, whether in Africa or internationally, might be able to—it is certainly something 

I think that should be researched. Exit interviews of people who 

have left. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Ambassador SHINN. I would just add, Mr. Chairman, that in 

2007, my colleague and I who have finished this book on China-Africa relations that is coming out in June, traveled to seven countries in Africa. And we specifically set out to try to put to bed two 

rumors or two common reports. One was that China was using 

prison labor in its—a lot of its labor force on its construction 

projects. And the other was there were sort of undercover PLA personnel who were guarding some of these facilities. My colleague 

speaks fluent Mandarin, so he was able to interact with a lot of 

Chinese that we encountered, too, in their own language. We tried 

as hard as we could to get to the bottom of that. 

Inevitably, the response that we got, particularly from our African sources, was that of course there is prison labor being used out 

there. Then our next question was, what proof of that do you have? 

Every single time that is where it stopped. They said, well, we 

don’t have any proof. We just know it is true. We couldn’t get a 

shred of proof on it. Frankly, we concluded that there probably 

was, prior to 2007 in Sudan, some indication not necessarily of 

prison labor, but of some undercover military personnel who were 

guarding facilities when China was building oil infrastructure. But 

beyond that, we couldn’t get any solid evidence at all on it. That 

doesn’t mean it didn’t happen. It just means we couldn’t get it. 

Mr. SMITH. The Chinese workers with whom you interviewed, did 

you get any indication of how many and whether or not they were 

at liberty to discuss details? 

89

Ambassador SHINN. My colleague—I couldn’t speak with them 

because I don’t speak Mandarin, but my colleague did, and he 

made a special point of chatting them up whenever he ran into 

them. He certainly never ran into any of them that came from this 

background. They were just basically unskilled or semi-skilled laborers who were trying to make a few more dollars than they 

would make if they were working back in China. And they were all 

going home after the end of their contracts. But these were just 

very, very ordinary Chinese folks. We obviously didn’t see everyone. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. About how many? Just for the record? 

Ambassador SHINN. That he talked with? 

Mr. SMITH. Yeah. 

Ambassador SHINN. Oh, probably a couple dozen scattered 

around Africa. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you. Ms. Bass. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. I just have a few questions. I appreciated 

your questions. And you covered many of the areas that I was interested in. But I want to kind of follow up on a few of the areas 

that you were talking about. I want to talk about the quality of the 

work that is done in Africa. And this is general, but maybe you can 

cite a few examples. You know, as I sit and I listen and read about 

how the Chinese don’t follow any standards or regulations, so then 

what does that say about the quality of the work that is done? And 

have there been—I mean, because you know, work has been done 

for many years, you mentioned the Tan-Zam, but, you know, over 

the last couple of decades are the various African countries running 

into problems with some of the work, some of the infrastructure 

projects? And I am asking my questions generally, I am sorry, not 

directed to anyone. 

Mr. HAYES. I would like to take that on two counts. When we 

were in China about, you know, last month, some very good private 

enterprise companies, Mindray, for instance, and one of the companies that made the appliances, they admitted, they said our quality 

is not the same quality as Western quality yet. We are working to 

get to that level. And so we market our products at a lower level. 

We don’t market the richer consumer. We market the middle and 

lower levels. 

So, you know, by their own admission, the quality is not as good. 

Again, anecdotal, because I haven’t bought Chinese products in Africa, but again, what we are told time after time is the quality is 

far less. One of the African ambassadors said, you know, we can 

repair—the Chinese can build a road and we can repair it eight 

times for what it would cost a U.S. company—cost us to pay a U.S. 

company to do it. My answer is, do you really want to repair it 

eight times? 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. HAYES. But nevertheless, yeah, there is a general admission, 

at least my experience from China as well as throughout Africa, 

the quality is less. But let’s keep in mind in the 1960s that we had 

the same view of Japanese products. 

Ms. BASS. Oh, okay. I didn’t know that. 

Mr. HAYES. I am an older guy. But, you know, we made fun of 

Japanese products as cheap, inferior. They were. But it didn’t take 

90

too long to move up the ladder. And I think the Chinese, you can 

expect some of that too. We visited a car factory in China. It is 

clear that the product is cheaper, it is not the same quality, but 

it is going to be affordable to some that couldn’t afford it otherwise. 

Ms. BASS. You know, there is quality and there is quality because, you know, you can buy a Mercedes and you know, you can 

buy a Hyundai. And we have different levels of quality here too. 

I wasn’t so much—I mean, I would assume, I guess it might not 

be the same quality as the U.S., but that doesn’t mean it is not 

safe. And in specific regard to the safety of buildings or the safety 

of roads. That is kind of what I was referring to, you know what 

I mean. And maybe what you were saying about repairing the 

roads might be an example. 

Mr. HAYES. I think the roads are not as safe, as well-built. 

Again, unfortunately, you know, I am not a road tester. I can only 

go anecdotal and what I am told. But even by some leaders of countries that the roads wash out too easily. We have to go back. But 

again, we are also told that they are beginning to improve the quality in certain countries as well. There was high praise for the Chinese roads built in Ethiopia. There was far less praise for the Chinese roads built in the Republic of Congo. 

Ms. BASS. You know, it is like when you hear there is an earthquake in Central or South America and it is—well, I come from Los 

Angeles, so I am used to earthquakes. You know, there might be 

a 6.0 earthquake and there is devastation, and there certainly isn’t 

devastation in California from that. So that is kind of what I meant 

in terms of the building, you know, quality. It doesn’t have to be 

our quality, but it can certainly be safe. 

I wanted to also talk to you about the workforce and what you 

were describing, Ambassador Shinn, that you weren’t able to document that folks were prisoners. And then Dr. Pham described them 

as being people perhaps from the countryside and less skilled, but 

they weren’t necessarily prisoners. So the chairman mentioned did 

they have to surrender their passport? I mean, are they kind of like 

indentured servants? I heard the contracts, you know, are they easily able to go home once their contract is finished? Are they paid 

throughout? Or do they have to work many months and then they 

get a paycheck? What are some of the conditions that they face? 

Mr. PHAM. Obviously, Congresswoman, it varies considerably 

from the enterprise, whether it is a state-owned enterprise, a private contractor, what scale of enterprise. But a few general traits, 

the contracts generally pay for—usually they run 2 to 3 years. 

These workers, overwhelmingly male, will go over for 3 years. That 

will include their passage over and their passage home. If they 

were to leave—now, having no evidence of passport confiscations or 

anything else, however, what I do know is if they were to leave before then they would be liable, they would have to pay their own 

way home. But then if you look at what they are being paid and 

what they are trying to save up, it is not coercion, but it is of a 

different kind. It is the same with the—so they would lose everything they would have earned if one looks at what it costs to travel 

to and from Africa. They are not necessarily—I don’t think—no evidence whatsoever that they are locked in at night. But on the other 

91

hand, many of these people are in countries where they do not 

speak the language and they really don’t speak English. 

I once ran across several of them in Swaziland, who amusingly 

enough, they spoke their dialect, they even didn’t speak standard 

Mandarin, didn’t speak any English, and we couldn’t really communicate. They spoke a smattering of Swazi phrases. So if you are one 

of those poor gentlemen, you are not going to be able to get very 

far. So there is no coercion, but where are you going to go with a 

smattering of Swazi? And that is not coercion, but you are not 

quite free. 

Ms. BASS. So on another note, thinking of those African students 

that are in China, and wanting to know how they are treated, I remember years ago back when Yugoslavia existed visiting Yugoslavia and encountering African students there who were essentially segregated. I mean, they were locked down. They weren’t 

able to do anything. They couldn’t socialize in the general community. And so what happens to African students when they are in 

China? You told me they weren’t taught very much. 

Mr. HAYES. You know, I have pretty high ties, as Dr. Shinn can 

tell you, in China. And the people that I talk to say, yes, the African students are fairly isolated. There is a strong prejudice. And 

it is a problem that they haven’t resolved. As I said, I feel like I 

am going through puberty with this voice. The more liberal and 

open in China will tell you that there are major problems, that 

there is distrust. It is like in my work in and out of the Soviet 

Union in the 1980s at Patrice Lumumba University, there was a 

strong anti-black feeling by the Russians. 

In fact, I had one African diplomat tell me he insisted his son 

go to Patrice Lumumba University so he would come back and hate 

Communism. There is a very strong bias. I mean, you are looking 

at a Chinese society that is 95 percent Han. 

Ms. BASS. 95 percent——

Mr. HAYES. 95 percent Han cultural. So it is an extraordinarily 

homogenous society given the size of the country. 

Ambassador SHINN. Congresswoman Bass, if I could just address 

quickly both the quality safety question and the workforce question, these are issues that we spent a lot of time trying to get to 

the bottom of. On the quality issue, it is interesting. There is an 

element of you get what you pay for. In other words, if you want 

a road built by a Chinese company, it is the African Government 

that will set out the specs for the road. Sometimes the African Government wants a cheap road. The Chinese are perfectly happy to 

accommodate. You want a cheap road, you get a cheap road. 

In one case, it was pointed out in Angola they wanted a cheap 

road because they wanted it really fast because elections were coming up and they wanted to show the public that they were doing 

something for them. So we don’t care about the quality, but just 

get the road done so we will get the votes of that part of the country. That may sound familiar sometimes in our own country. 

Ms. BASS. I thought it did. 

Ambassador SHINN. Now, on the other hand, you can get a good 

road from the Chinese. If the specs are high enough, and you are 

willing to pay for it, they will build you a good road. It is probably 

almost as good as what the Germans and the Americans would do. 

92

On the question of safety, this has been a troublesome area, and 

one that the Chinese themselves are aware of and they would like 

to stop. Because they don’t want bad publicity on unsafe products, 

like we have had in the United States, like they have had in China. 

I mean it has been an embarrassment in China. And when it comes 

to pharmaceuticals, for example, and it is not just China or Chinese products that have done this, it is Indian and probably Pakistani and Indonesian and others, where you get adulterated pharmaceutical products that don’t do what they are supposed to do. 

They are manufactured by private companies and they cause a lot 

of problem when they are not doing the right thing. 

Finally, on the quality issue, there have been some environmental issues that have been caused by Chinese projects in Africa, 

normally on the negative side. China, again, has learned, or is 

learning its lesson on these. They have run into civil society 

blowbacks of we don’t like this project because you are tearing up 

a national park, or you are polluting water, or something or other. 

And they have learned that this is not good, smart politics. So they 

are trying to improve their record on the environmental side. They 

are not there yet. But at least they understand that this doesn’t 

make for good relations. 

On the workforce question and the nature of contracts, et cetera, 

I would agree with what Peter said. Some of the contracts are as 

little as 1 year, not 2 years, or 1 year renewable. What happens 

with most of these workers is that they are hired en masse and 

brought in a large group to wherever the project is in Africa. They 

are housed on a compound, so they are living with their Chinese 

counterparts in part because that is where they get food that they 

like and are satisfied with, and because they can speak the same 

language to someone. Because they speak nothing but some dialect 

of Chinese. 

They can’t interact with anyone out in the general public. There 

also have been some issues of on-the-job cultural tension, shall I 

say, between the Chinese workers and the African workers where 

you can almost tell through hand motions and whatnot that they 

really don’t like each other that much. But I have never encountered anything like withholding passports or that sort of thing. On 

the other hand——

Mr. SMITH. Would you yield on that point? 

Mr. SHINN. I am sorry? 

Mr. SMITH. When you say you haven’t encountered it, if you don’t 

mind yielding——

Ambassador SHINN. Sure. 

Mr. SMITH. What kind of hard questions, what kind of human 

rights reporting has been done to ensure that? I have asked that 

question of our TIP office, I have asked it of various desk officers. 

Who is actually investigating to ensure that when you talk about 

labor trafficking? I mean who has that access? Where is the reporting? I mean, anecdotally, I am very slow, as we all ought to be, to 

make a decision, and I wrote the Trafficking Victims Protection 

Act. I took 2 years to get that passed against a great deal of opposition. Finally, it passed, and then it was overwhelming once we got 

to a critical mass in the House and the Senate. 

93

I mention all of that because without good reporting on the 

ground and methodical, you know, I am afraid—I mean, I asked 

our people in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have you had 

any access to those individuals who are working on that huge 

building being constructed by a Chinese company? They said no. 

Ambassador SHINN. Mr. Chairman, you have looked into this 

more than I have. I don’t have the answer to the question. And it 

may be that no one has looked at it. My only comment is that I 

am just personally not aware of cases where they have withheld 

passports. But I was going to add that there have been cases where 

there have been difficulties with significant numbers of Chinese laborers on the ground, either a result of a local protest over some 

local problem that has arisen. One recent occasion was at a cement 

plant in Ethiopia. There was another occasion a couple of years ago 

in Equatorial Guinea when the Chinese actually protested against 

the Government of Equatorial Guinea. The way the Chinese Government dealt with both of those was simply immediately to send 

all of those people home. They were on the next plane out of there, 

and that was the end of their involvement. 

So that would indicate certainly a considerable amount of control 

over the workforce. But I just haven’t run into any case of on the 

passport issue. I don’t know. 

Ms. BASS. So switching subjects here, I wanted to especially 

speak with Mr. Hayes about this. I have a major interest in our 

private sector getting involved with the private sector in Africa. 

And I wanted you to speak more to that, and perhaps be specific 

where there are certain countries. And I didn’t mean that to the 

exclusion of the other two panelists, but you had made reference 

to that in your comments. And you know, which countries do you 

think? Which industries? Which areas of the economy? Looking for 

some guidance. 

Mr. HAYES. Thank you. I would like to take that. Basically, the 

private sector is poorly developed throughout Africa. Historically, 

you know, most of them operate under a socialist system which the 

private sector was pretty well repressed. However, there is a growing private sector in Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Ghana for sure, 

interestingly Ethiopia. I think those are your—and in Zambia. 

There are several countries, as a matter of fact. And there also are 

companies now that did not exist 20 years ago that could buy out 

U.S. companies. 

Ms. BASS. Really? Give me an example of that. 

Mr. HAYES. Dangote in Nigeria. There are billion-dollar companies who have made their earnings legitimately. 

Ms. BASS. What do they do? 

Mr. HAYES. Concrete, all kinds of other things. And South African companies as well. There are major CEOs emerging, and they 

have a strong private sector. But there is also middle class starting 

to grow. These are the partners that we need to be linking with 

and linking our private sectors. It is going to be very hard in the 

long term to do business in Africa without having private sector 

partners. 

Ms. BASS. African private sector partners? 

Mr. HAYES. African private sector partners. Countries are demanding that more and more, partly as social responsibility and all 

94

that, but also, you know, they are saying, look, if you recall going 

to help us develop and you are going to come in here and do contracts, then help our private sector develop as well. 

Now, in some countries they are naming the partners, which 

doesn’t work very well. But in other countries we have the freedom 

to find the right partners. And those countries I mentioned are I 

think the right countries. We ought to be linking with those, helping the middle class develop. And really our development work 

ought to be largely, I think, building a viable private sector. The 

stronger the private sector, the stronger the middle class, and the 

stronger push for democracy and related issues. Without a strong 

middle class, you have a very rich element and a lot of poor. And 

it is going to be very hard for any type of stability. So we ought 

to—in fact, our strategy at the Corporate Council, and we just finished our board meeting today——

Ms. BASS. I was going to ask you about that. 

Mr. HAYES [continuing]. Is one, let’s find those companies and 

bring them onto the board of the Corporate Council on Africa. Let’s 

start making those links. Now, we do have staff people in those 

countries. They are diasporan who came over here, worked with 

CCA, wanted to go back, so in Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, and Kenya, we have staff on the ground that can help us locate who are the legitimate private sector starting to develop. It is 

not done by the Embassies, it is done by indigenous people who 

have worked with us and know that. I think it is a step. You know, 

we are a small organization, but, you know, we are also fairly influential within the scope of things. 

Ms. BASS. Small organization with 200 companies? 

Mr. HAYES. Well, we have got 25 staff. We have 25 staff. And let 

me put a plug in, 13 nationalities represented on that staff. I think 

we are one of the most integrated small organizations in town. I 

am very proud of that. In fact, two of my interns from two countries are behind me. But in any case, I think that is where we 

ought to put our efforts. We can’t compete with the state-owned enterprises. It is a stacked competition. They are working with the 

people at the top. If we are serious about the changes in Africa that 

need to happen we need to work with the people that are building 

the middle. 

Ms. BASS. So you did the infant formula campaign, huh? 

Mr. HAYES. Yeah, I was of the four principal founders. And that 

can be documented. We started in 1976. Dick Fernandez, who was 

the chaplain at Yale University at the time was also one of the 

founders, Leo Marguiles. And anyway, we got the—when the victory celebration was in 1983, the person we hired, Doug Johnson 

out of Minnesota got front page in The New York Times signing 

the peace agreement with Nestle. And then at the celebration, I 

was given a little plaque, which I still have and I am very proud 

of, that said you started the whole thing. I didn’t realize that I had 

raised all the budget for—that was sort of a gift; it wasn’t much 

money—but raised the budget for the first 2 years entirely. And I 

never knew that until that day. 

Ms. BASS. I remember that campaign very well. 

Mr. HAYES. It is the only successful worldwide citizens campaign 

still. 

95

Ms. BASS. I remember it well. 

Mr. PHAM. Ms. Bass, if I could just add just two points to what 

Mr. Hayes has just said. I am in complete agreement that there are 

two parts that the U.S. could help with Africa. We talked a lot 

about infrastructure development. Infrastructure development isn’t 

just roads. We don’t have many American construction companies 

pushing it out there. But infrastructure telecoms, which this week 

we are concluding—actually, it concluded already today—in Addis 

Ababa was a telecoms conference about the future of Ethiopian 

telecommunications. I haven’t seen the up-to-date registration list, 

but I saw the one that was updated as of Monday morning, there 

wasn’t a U.S. company attending. So at the big level. But also we 

need to get U.S. companies out there at the low level. The African 

middle class is defined by the African Development Bank is $4 to 

$20 a day. 

Ms. BASS. The middle class? 

Mr. PHAM. That is the middle class. That is the growing middle 

class. At $4 to $20, many American companies simply—and this is 

why they turn to Chinese goods of varying quality—don’t have 

products that they can easily access at $4 to $20 a day. 

Mr. HAYES. On that, I was going to say I am glad he said, I 

would have been shocked if we had telecom companies there. The 

U.S. telecom industry has given up on Africa. Motorola withdrew. 

We do not——

Ms. BASS. Why? 

Mr. HAYES. They were undercut on pricing. The Chinese goods, 

ZTE, it is not only ZTE, the South African companies, MTN and 

others. We have withdrawn from that area. There are areas of the 

power sector that we can compete. There isn’t a country, including 

South Africa, in Africa that is meeting its current power needs. 

Ms. BASS. What about solar? I mean if you think of the continent——

Mr. HAYES. We have that, but interestingly, China is also starting to sell solar. But we do have, Brazzaville, the streets of 

Brazzaville are lit by solar lighting from a Florida company. So 

there are areas to compete. But the problem on that, and Dr. 

Shinn, David referred to that earlier, is that financing is very hard 

to get in the United States. Financing is a lot easier for not just 

China, almost anybody else. Our banks will not step up to finance 

on Africa. 

We have had a contentious relationship with Ex-Im. I am far 

more sympathetic to EX–IM than I was. As a result of that back 

and forth, we have had some very good dialogues. Ex-Im can’t 

guarantee loans if no American bank is going to step up. And they 

are not stepping up. And that is really putting us to a significant 

disadvantage. To echo I think what Peter said, we need a national 

policy, we need national leadership that says Africa is in our highest interests. And I believe it is. I think it is—right now I think 

it is the most important continent to our future. And yet we are 

not engaged to the extent that we need to be engaged in Africa. 

The private sector needs to be far more engaged. Yes, that is a lot 

of 200 companies, but it should be far more. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. Did you have any comment, Ambassador? 

96

Ambassador SHINN. The only item that I would add on the banking question, and I alluded to it in my opening remarks, and it is 

in more detail in my written testimony, but just to underscore the 

point, American banking is doing less today in Africa than it was 

doing 30, 40 years ago. It has basically abdicated. And who has 

been stepping in in the last 6, 7 years? China. China is all over 

the banking sector now. It had almost nothing there 6 years ago. 

It bought 20 percent of Standard Bank of South Africa for $5.5 billion. It has bought various smaller percentages of European banks 

like Barclays that have wide exposure in Africa. It is setting up its 

own banking offices in a select number of African countries, particularly in southern Africa, where you have more wealth. China 

has figured this out. We haven’t gotten our heads around it. 

Ms. BASS. It is kind of amazing to me, too, because for all the 

complaining we do about China, for us just to hand over the continent to them is really kind of, you know, the responsibility is on 

us. And you were talking a few minutes ago about the environment. You know, we have a lot to be proud of, but some of our environmental track record in Africa is not too glorious. But anyway, 

I appreciate your comments. I really would like to continue to follow up with the three of you on these different issues, and especially around U.S. investment. And maybe how we in our country 

here in DC on a bipartisan level, I mean, in thinking about the private sector involvement, I mean I know that is a concern of my colleague on the other side of the aisle and how do we get more of 

our companies to have a direct business relationship in Africa. So 

thank you very much for your time and your testimony. 

Mr. SMITH. And I think our bill is a start. I hope that all of you 

will take a look at it and hopefully endorse it. Thank you. I hope 

you will come back. I know we kept you late. But thank you for 

your outstanding recommendations and very incisive commentary. 

It really does help this committee do a better job, and hopefully, 

by extension, the Congress. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:28 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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