NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

_____________

No. 11-1855

_____________

PAUL M. ST. JOHN,

 Appellant

v.

POSTMASTER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

_____________

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

District Court No. 2-09-cv-04196

District Judge: The Honorable Michael M. Baylson

 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

March 27, 2012

Before: FUENTES, SMITH, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges

(Filed: April 2, 2012)

 

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 OPINION

_____________________ 

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Paul M. St. John filed a civil action in the United States District Court for 

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging that his employer, the United States 
2

Postal Service (USPS), retaliated against him because of testimony he provided at 

an administrative hearing on an earlier charge of national origin discrimination. St. 

John is of Scottish heritage. This action, according to St. John‟s complaint, 

violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-3 and 

2000e-16, as amended. After the close of discovery, the USPS successfully moved 

for summary judgment. This timely appeal followed.1 

St. John, who was born in Scotland, has been employed by the USPS as a 

City Carrier at the post office in Elkins Park, Pennsylvania, since May of 2003. 

On November 3, 2004, St. John filed a complaint with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that he had been discriminated against 

based on his national origin when management, particularly his supervisor James 

McGinn, did not pay him for eight hours of sick leave. In addition, St. John 

alleged that he had been discriminated against when his supervisor placed him on 

“leave without pay” status for a 40-hour period. On March 15, 2007, during an 

EEOC hearing, St. John was asked how his employer‟s actions affected him. St. 

John responded that he “could have throttled [McGinn]” and shortly thereafter 

 

1

 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We exercise final 

order jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of an order granting 

summary judgment is plenary. See Carrasca v. Pomeroy, 313 F.3d 828, 832 (3d 

Cir. 2002). 
3

stated that he “could kill [McGinn].”

2

Due to concerns about workplace violence, the USPS has instituted a zerotolerance policy regarding any violence or threats of violence. The USPS‟s 

counsel at the EEOC hearing viewed St. John‟s statements about his current 

supervisor as a violation of the zero-tolerance policy. In accord with that policy, 

she notified the human resources manager, who convened a “Threat Assessment 

Team” to determine whether action should be taken against St. John because of his 

potentially threatening remarks. 

On March 20, 2007, several USPS managers held a “Threat Assessment 

Meeting” to discuss St. John‟s EEOC hearing testimony. On March 21, 2007, 

Postal Inspector Shawn Dougherty questioned St. John about his testimony in the 

presence of his union representative Christopher Lanetti. During the interview, 

both St. John and Lanetti informed Dougherty of complaints St. John had made the 

week before against McGinn regarding falsification of employees‟ “clock rings.”3

 

2 The EEOC Administrative Judge decided on June 22, 2007, that St. John was not 

discriminated against based on his national origin when he was denied sick time or 

charged for 40 hours of leave without pay. St. John did not appeal that 

determination.

3

“Clock rings” refers to each time a worker uses his time card to punch in or out of 

work. St. John alleged that employees were not being paid for their actual time 

worked because someone was falsifying the employee records.
4

At the conclusion of the interview, St. John gave Dougherty a written statement in 

which he acknowledged that he was aware of the USPS‟s zero-tolerance policy 

regarding threats of violence, and further indicated that he was upset when he 

testified before the EEOC. St. John called his choice of words “regretful,” but said 

that his “statements were taken completely out of context” and that he “only meant

to emphasize [his] feelings and not [his] intentions.” 

Dougherty allowed St. John to return to his mail route, leading St. John and 

Lanetti to believe the investigation was over. About five hours later, management 

approached St. John on his route and directed him to return to the office. Upon his 

return, St. John was met by the Officer-in-Charge and the Postmaster. St. John 

requested the presence of his union representative. When Lanetti arrived, St. John 

was informed that he was being placed on emergency placement leave (EPL). He 

was directed to clean out his locker and his mail truck in the presence of his 

supervisor. 

Shortly thereafter, the Manager of Post Office Operations advised the 

Officer-in-Charge that Dougherty had determined that St. John was not a threat and 

had permitted St. John to return to service. Within fifteen minutes of being placed 

on EPL and before St. John left the building, St. John was advised by management 

that the EPL had been rescinded and that he could return to work. 

A month later, St. John filed a charge of retaliation with the EEOC. The 
5

EEOC initially dismissed the complaint, finding that St. John had not established a 

prima facie case of retaliation because he had not suffered an adverse action, and 

that the USPS had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.

St. John appealed to the EEOC Office of Federal Operations (OFO), which 

reversed the decision. Pursuant to the OFO‟s order, the USPS conducted an 

investigation and determined that St. John was entitled to compensatory damages 

of $300. Unsatisfied with the nominal damages, St. John initiated a civil action 

against the United States Postmaster General pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c), 

seeking “de novo consideration” of his retaliation claim. See Morris v. Rumsfeld, 

420 F.3d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 2005). 

After discovery concluded, the USPS filed a motion for summary judgment. 

The District Court granted the motion, concluding that St. John had failed to 

demonstrate the required element of having sustained a materially adverse action. 

In addition, the Court determined that St. John had failed to demonstrate that 

USPS‟s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for placing him on EPL was a pretext 

for retaliation. St. John appealed, challenging the District Court‟s determination 

that he failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation and that he did not 

show that USPS‟s reason was a pretext for retaliation.

We will assume for purposes of this appeal that St. John adduced sufficient 
6

evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

4

 As a result, the burden

of production shifted to USPS to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 

for its actions. Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920 n.2 (3d Cir. 1997) 

(citing, inter alia, Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994)). The USPS

met its burden, citing its zero-tolerance policy and St. John‟s threatening 

comments. Thus, St. John had the burden of demonstrating that this reason was a 

pretext for retaliation. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764-65. We agree with the District 

Court that St. John has not adduced evidence that would permit a reasonable 

factfinder to cast doubt on the USPS‟s reason. Accordingly, we will affirm the 

judgment of the District Court.

 

4

 Title VII‟s antiretaliation provision proscribes discriminating against a protected 

individual because he opposed a practice forbidden by Title VII or participated in a 

Title VII proceeding. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). In Burlington Northern & Santa 

Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 59 (2006), the Supreme Court declared that 

“[n]o one doubts that the term „discriminate against‟ [in the antiretaliation 

provision] refers to distinctions or differences in treatment that injure protected 

individuals.” In light of the zero-tolerance policy at the heart of this appeal, we are 

skeptical that St. John established that he was treated differently than any other 

USPS employee who uttered a potentially threatening statement. The USPS did 

not raise this issue, however, in challenging whether St. John sufficiently 

demonstrated a materially adverse action, and we need not address it in resolving 

this appeal.