alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
42081.

#### WEBB, Executrix v. THE WARREN COMPANY, INC.

Argued June 9, 1966

Decided June 21, 1966.

*851*Rdenfield, Reyman & Sizemore, Robert G. Young,*for appellant.

*Sutherland, Asbill-& Brennan, Barrett K. Hawkes,*for appellee.

Jordan, Judge.

Contrary to the allegations of the petition *852that the decedent was given the option of remaining in the employment of the defendant company or of voluntarily retiring in consideration of the receipt of the stated retirement income, the letter of September 6, 1963, which was attached to the petition as an exhibit, clearly shows that the decedent was given no choice in the matter but that his employment was involuntarily terminated by the action of the defendant company’s executive committee and that in consideration of his past relationship with the company he was awarded the stated retirement income. Since the contradictory allegations of the petition must yield to the attached exhibit *(Harris v. Ackerman, 88*Ga. App. 128 (1) (76 SE2d 132)), and since it was not shown in the petition that the decedent could not be summarily discharged by the defendant company without incurring liability therefor, it necessarily follows that the proffered retirement income was merely a gratuitous promise, made without consideration and having no binding effect on the defendant company. *Davis & Co. v. Morgan,*117 Ga. 504 (43 SE 732); *Bell v. Johnson,*24 Ga. App. 541 (101 SE 709); *Renney v. Kimberly,*211 Ga. 396 (86 SE2d 217).

Furthermore, even if the defendant’s promise to pay the stated retirement income had been supported by a valuable consideration, it is our opinion that the defendant’s obligation was owed to the decedent personally and would have been extinguished by his death. The agreement as set forth in the letter of September 6, 1963, clearly contemplated that the payment of retirement income was to be made during the lifetime of the decedent since it was provided that after the expiration of two years consideration would be given to further retirement income, the possibility of future re-employment was discussed, and specific arrangements were made for the benefit of the decedent’s widow in the event of his death. These factors clearly distinguish this case from that of Ulmann v. Sunset-McKee Co., 221 F2d 128, cited by the plaintiff in support of her contention that the decedent’s right to the sum of $12,000 as retirement income was absolute and vested before his death.

The amended petition did not state a cause of action and the trial court did not err in dismissing the petition on general demurrer.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Bell, P. J.., and Bberhardt, J., concur.*
**OFFICE OF**  **THE AITORNEY**  **GENERAL OF**  **TEXAS AUSTtN** Iioaarab1e.B. 1p. Shiteaara, Neroh 80, 1040, page 9 i

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**. .**  **.*****Iionorabl% B.**  **Y.** iChitsacre, Maroh 20, 1940, Page 3

AFPROVEDMAR 23, 1940 (JzAd-4.w ATTOFL;GY

Gli2ERAS

OF TnA‘XAS
```

[Senate Hearing 106-983]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                             S. Hr. 106-983
 
                    REAUTHORIZATION OF THE MAGNUSON-STEVENS
                    FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT
============================================================================

                              FIELD HEARING

                                before the

                  SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANS AND FISHERIES

                                  of the

                          COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                       SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                        one hundred sixth congress

                               first session

                                  -------

                             September 25, 1999

                                  -------

Printed for the sue of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
71-950FTP                   WASHINGTON : 2002
_____________________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov  Phone: toll free (886) 512-1800; DC 
(202) 512-1800  Fax: (202) 512-2250  Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 
20402-0001


```
SLANDER.

[Hamilton Circuit Court,

November Term, 1885.]

Williams, C. J., Smith and Swing, JJ.

(Chief Justice Williams taking the place of Judge Cox.)

#### Tedtman v. Hancock.

. Words That Constitute Prima Facie Actionabee Seander.

To say to, and of another in a public discourse spoken in the presence and hearing of others: “You are a fraud. You do not pay your debts. You are a *thief*and a fraud, ” is *prima facie*actionable slander.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton county.

Williams, C. J.

The action below was for slander. Tedtman was plaintiff and Hancock defendant. The amended petition was in the usual form; the slanderous words which it is therein averred were spoken by the defendant of and concerning the plaintiff being: “You (meáning the plaintiff) are a fraud. You do not pay your debts. You are a thief and a fraud.”

The court below sustained a demurrer to this petition and no further leave to amend being asked, gave judgment for the defendant. This is the error assigned in this court.

It is claimed in behalf of the defendant in error that, although to call a man a “thief,” is *per se*actionable; yet if it appear, taking the whole discourse together, and the rircumstances under which it was spoken, the words were not intended to impute a crime and were not so understood by the hearers, they were not actionable.

This is substantially the rule of Brown v. Myers, 40 O. S., 99.

A “thief” is defined by Bouvier to be “one who has been guilty of larceny. ”

Simply to call a man a “thief” is *prima facie*actionable, as it imputes felony. Where the word “thief” is used, the law will preserve the intent to impute a crime, unless the contrary intent is shown. Addison on Torts, 956.

Where such contrary intent does not appear on the face of the petition, it is not demurrable; but it becomes a.question of fact for the jury under proper defence, whether from the accompanying language and surrounding circumstances, the defendant did intend to impute actual theft, or with what meaning the words were sploken and understood; and if it so appear that the words were used as mere terms of abuse and not as an imputation of a crime, there is no cause of action.

*130Nat C. McLean, for plaintiff in error.

Archer & McNeil, for defendant in error.

In the amended petition in this case the words: “Your are a thief and a fraud” constitute an independent sentence. The context does not give to the word “thief” any other than its usual meaning. The sentence quoted is not limited or qualified in its meaning by the preceeding ones, so as to make it equivalent to, “You area thief and a fraud *because*you do not pay your debts.” It does not therefore appear on the face of the petition that the word “thief” was used in any other than its ordinary sense of imputing the crime of larceny. The petition stated a good cause of action, and it follows the court of common pleas erred in sustaining the demurrer. The judgment of the common pleas is reversed and the cause remanded, with instructions to overrule the demurrer, and for further proceedings according to law.
Exhibit 31.1








I, Susan B. Sheffield, certify that:





1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2020-3  (the “Exchange Act periodic reports”);





2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;





3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;





4. Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statement required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicing agreements in all material respects; and





5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report.  Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.





In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties:  The Bank of New York Mellon.








By:/s/ Susan B. SheffieldName:Susan B. SheffieldTitle:Executive Vice President and Chief Financial OfficerDate:March 4, 2024
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-50782 

Summary Calendar

__________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ET AL.,

 Plaintiffs,

R.D. PLUNKETT; JAN C. PLUNKETT,

 Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

FALLS COUNTY ET AL.,

 Defendants,

LARRY PAMPLIN ET AL.,

 Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. W-94-CV-85

- - - - - - - - - -

June 10, 1996

Before SMITH, BENAVIDES and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

R.D. Plunkett and Jan Plunkett appeal the district court's

partial dismissal of their action, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et. seq., for failure to state a claim

and the court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
No. 95-50782

-2-

remaining defendant. We have conducted a de novo review of the

record and affirm the partial dismissal for essentially the same

reasons set forth by the district court. United States v. Falls

County, No. W-94-CA-085 (W.D. Tex. June 9, 1995). We have

conducted a de novo review of the record and affirm the summary

judgment for essentially the same reasons set forth by the

district court. United States v. Falls County, No. W-94-CA-085

(W.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 1995).

AFFIRMED.
I 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2288 

To amend title 49, United States Code, to establish a civil penalty for 

failure of certain employers to collect or make reasonable efforts to 

collect an airport security badge from an employee on the date of termination of employment, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 10, 2007 

Mr. KIRK (for himself and Mr. LIPINSKI) introduced the following bill; which 

was referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

A BILL 

To amend title 49, United States Code, to establish a civil 

penalty for failure of certain employers to collect or 

make reasonable efforts to collect an airport security 

badge from an employee on the date of termination of 

employment, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Airport Badge Security 

5 Act’’. 


jlentini on PROD1PC65 with BILLS
2 

•HR 2288 IH

1 SEC. 2. FAILURE TO COLLECT AIRPORT SECURITY BADGES. 

2 Section 46301(a) of title 49, United States Code, is 

3 amended by adding at the end the following: 

4 ‘‘(6) FAILURE TO COLLECT AIRPORT SECURITY

5 BADGES.—Notwithstanding paragraph (1), any em6 ployer (other than a governmental entity or airport 

7 operator) who employs an employee to whom an air8 port security badge or other identifier used to obtain 

9 access to a secure area of an airport is issued before, 

10 on, or after the date of enactment of this paragraph 

11 and who does not collect or make reasonable efforts 

12 to collect such badge from the employee on the date 

13 that the employment of the employee is terminated 

14 and does not notify the operator of the airport of 

15 such termination within 24 hours of the date of such 

16 termination shall be liable to the Government for a 

17 civil penalty not to exceed $10,000.’’. 

Æ 


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C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE

F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER ON A PPELLANT ’ S

M OTION FOR EN B ANC R ECONSIDERATION

Appellate case name: Talawrence Donyea Tennell v. The State of Texas

Appellate case number: 01

- 17

- 00571

- CR

Trial court case number: 15

- 01993

- CRF

- 85

Trial court: 85th District Court of Brazos County

Date motion filed: September 14 , 2018

Party filing motion: Appellant, Talawrence Donyea Tennell

T he motion for en banc reconsideration is DENIED as moot because the C ourt withdrew

i ts August 30, 2018 memorandum opinion and judgment and issued a memorandum opinion and

judgment dated December 31, 2018.

PER CURIAM

En banc court consists of: Chief Justice Radack, and Justices Keyes, Higley, Lloyd, Kelly,

Goodman, Landau, Hightower, an d Countiss.

Date: January 29 , 201 9
§ 232.3 Bad-faith conduct. ( a ) *General.* The Board shall award costs and attorneys' fees as part of a determination where it is established that a *participant* engaged in *bad-faith conduct,* unless such an award would be inconsistent with the interests of justice.
( b ) *Allegations of bad-faith conduct* — ( 1 ) *On the Board's initiative.* On its own, and prior to a *final determination,* the Board may order a *participant* to show cause why certain conduct does not constitute *bad-faith conduct.* Within 14 days, the *participant* accused of *bad-faith conduct* shall file a response to this order, which shall follow the procedures set forth in § 220.5(a)(2).
( 2 ) *On a party's initiative.* A party that in good faith believes that a *participant* has engaged in *bad-faith conduct* may file a request for a conference with the Board describing the alleged bad-faith conduct and attaching any relevant exhibits. Requests for a conference concerning allegations of *bad-faith conduct* and any responses thereto shall follow the procedures set forth in § 220.5(a)(2) of this subchapter.
( c ) *Establishing bad-faith conduct.* After the response of an accused *participant* has been filed under paragraph (b) of this section, or the time to file such a response has passed, the Board shall either make a determination that no *bad-faith conduct* occurred or schedule a conference concerning the allegations.
( d ) *Determining the award.* A determination as to any award of attorneys' fees and costs due to *bad-faith conduct* shall be made as part of the *final determination.* In determining whether to award attorneys' fees and costs due to *bad-faith conduct,* and the amount of any such award, the Board shall consider the requests and responses submitted, any arguments on the issue, and the accused *participant's* behavior in other Board proceedings. Such an award shall be limited to an amount of not more than $5,000, unless— ( 1 ) The adversely affected party appeared *pro se* in the proceeding, in which case the award shall be limited to costs in an amount of not more than $2,500; or
( 2 ) Extraordinary circumstances are present, such as a demonstrated pattern or practice of *bad-faith conduct,* in which case the Board may award costs and attorneys' fees in excess of the limitations in this section.
[87 FR 30090, May 17, 2022; 87 FR 36061, as amended at June 15, 2022]
II 

Calendar No. 145 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2080 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 9, 2007 

Received; read the first time 

MAY 10, 2007 

Read the second time and placed on the calendar 

AN ACT 

To amend the District of Columbia Home Rule Act to conform the District charter to revisions made by the Council of the District of Columbia relating to public education. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. CONFORMING DISTRICT CHARTER TO COUNCIL 

4 AMENDMENTS RELATING TO PUBLIC EDU5 CATION. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—The District of Columbia Home 

7 Rule Act is amended— 


ccoleman on PRODPC74 with BILLS
2 

HR 2080 PCS

1 (1) by striking section 452 (sec. 1–204.52, D.C. 

2 Official Code); and 

3 (2) by striking section 495 (sec. 1–204.95, D.C. 

4 Official Code). 

5 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents 

6 of such Act is amended by striking the item relating to 

7 section 452 and the item relating to section 495. 

Passed the House of Representatives May 8, 2007. 

Attest: LORRAINE C. MILLER, 

Clerk. 


ccoleman on PRODPC74 with BILLS

ccoleman on PRODPC74 with BILLS
Calendar No. 145 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2080 

AN ACT 

To amend the District of Columbia Home Rule Act 

ing to public education. by the Council of the District of Columbia relatto conform the District charter to revisions made 

MAY 10, 2007 

Read the second time and placed on the calendar 


ccoleman on PRODPC74 with BILLS
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-6516

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

DONNA LAMYRTLE COLLINGTON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Richard L. Voorhees, Chief

District Judge. (CR-90-231-A, CA-95-117-1)

Submitted: January 22, 1998 Decided: February 3, 1998

Before WIDENER, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Donna Lamyrtle Collington, Appellant Pro Se. Kenneth Davis Bell,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina,

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court's order denying her

motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994) (current version at 28

U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997)). We have reviewed the

record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district

court. United States v. Collington, Nos. CR-90-231-A; CA-95-117-1

(W.D.N.C. Mar. 17, 1997). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. ___, 65

U.S.L.W. 4557 (U.S. June 23, 1997) (No. 96-6298). We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
§ 14.518 Litigation involving beneficiaries in custody of Department of Veterans Affairs employees acting in official capacity. ( a ) *Service of process generally.* An employee, at a field facility, served with a writ of habeas corpus involving a beneficiary of the Department of Veterans Affairs in the employee's custody will immediately notify the Regional Counsel of the region in addition to taking such steps as in his or her judgment are necessary for self protection.
( b ) *Habeas corpus writs.* ( 1 ) If a Director of a Department of Veterans Affairs hospital concerned advises that, according, to current medical opinion, hospitalization is necessary for the veteran's safety or the safety of others, the Regional Counsel will vigorously oppose the writ at the trial court level. If the writ is granted, no further action will be taken unless so instructed by the General Counsel.
( 2 ) If the medical opinion is that hospitalization is not required for the veteran's safety or the safety of others but continued treatment is clearly indicated in the veteran's interest, the Regional Counsel will assure that the court issuing the writ is so informed and will abide by the court's decision.
( 3 ) If the medical opinion is that there is no danger of self injury to the veteran or others and the need for continued treatment is not clearly demonstrated, the Regional Counsel will advise the Director of the hospital concerned that the veteran should be released and will notify the veteran's attorney of the planned discharge. These cases will be handled informally to the extent practicable.
( 4 ) Involuntary confinement of mentally ill patients in Department of Veterans Affairs installations is predicated upon the law of the State in which the installation is located. In the event the writ is filed in Federal Court, the Regional Counsel will cooperate with the U.S. Attorney to the end that the case is removed to the appropriate State court.
[42 FR 41411, Aug. 17, 1977, as amended at 61 FR 7216, Feb. 27, 1996]