NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHETWYN EVERARD ARCHER, Petitioner,

v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent. No. 09-73951 Agency No. A098-800-904
MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted July 22, 2015 ** Pasadena, California Before: PREGERSON and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges and WHALEY, *** Senior District Judge. Chetwyn Archer, a citizen of the United Kingdom, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision denying his motion to reopen his 

# FILED
JUL 24 2015 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Robert H. Whaley, Se nior District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.removal proceedings and a ffirming his final order of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we grant the petition. 1. The BIA properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Archer’s attempt to collaterally attack th e criminal conviction forming the basis of his removability. “[T]he [BIA] cannot en tertain a collateral attack on a judgment of conviction, unless that judgment is void on its face.” Matter of RodriguezCarrillo , 22 I. & N. Dec. 1031, 1034 (B.I.A. 1999). There is nothing in the record to suggest that Archer has successfully ch allenged the validity of his plea in state court, which is the proper venue for raising such a claim. See Contreras v. Shiltgen , 122 F.3d 30, 33 (9th Cir. 1997), aff’d on reh’g , 151 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that the validity of a state c ourt conviction “can only be tested in an action against the state”). 2. The BIA concluded that Archer’s guilty plea to California Penal Code § 166(c)(1) subjects him to removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). Though the government argues that this is the corr ect result under the modified categorical approach, the BIA’s opinion does not explain how it reached this conclusion. “In order for the court to exercise our lim ited authority, there must be a reasoned explanation by the BIA of the basis for its decision.” Franco-Rosendo v. Gonzales , 454 F.3d 965, 966 (9th Cir. 2006). In the absence of such an explanation, remand
2is appropriate to allow the BIA to provide its analysis. See, e.g., Arredondo v. Holder , 623 F.3d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 2010) (remanding when the BIA “fail[ed] to engage in a substantive analysis” of a crime’s immigration consequences). Moreover, since the BIA lastconsidered this case, Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), and Matter of Chairez-Castrejon, 26 I. & N. Dec. 349 (BIA 2014), have explained the proper applica tion of the categorical and modified categorical approaches. “In light of th ese significant intervening developments, we remand for the BIA to reconsider whether” Archer’s conviction for California Penal Code § 166(c)(1) makes him re movable under INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(ii). Pannu v. Holder , 639 F.3d 1225, 1229 (9th Cir. 2011). 1 PETITION GRANTED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this disposition.

1 Although Archer did not raise this argument before the BIA or before this court, the government fully briefed the modified categorical approach issue. Therefore, it “suffers no prejudice from [A rcher]’s failure to properly raise the issue.” Singh v. Ashcroft , 361 F.3d 1152, 1157 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004). 3