[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-10528

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JARVIS LOCKETT, 

a.k.a. J-Rock, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 5:21-cr-00003-TES-CHW-1

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10528

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Before JORDAN, GRANT, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Jarvis Lockett pleaded guilty after being caught dealing 

cocaine and participating in a dog fighting ring. His sentence was 

enhanced because a firearm was found at the home where he dealt 

the drugs, and the district court varied upward based on its 

conclusion that the applicable Guidelines range did not adequately 

reflect the seriousness of Lockett’s misconduct. Because the 

district court did not err in either of those determinations, we 

affirm Lockett’s sentence. 

I.

Lockett was indicted along with ten co-defendants for his 

participation in a criminal organization based out of Roberta, 

Georgia that was involved in both cocaine distribution and dog 

fighting. He pleaded guilty to one count of distribution of cocaine 

and one count of conspiracy to participate in an animal fighting 

venture. In exchange, the remaining counts against him were 

dismissed. The plea agreement also included a stipulation of facts 

that Lockett agreed the government could prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt.1 

1 Our statement of the facts derives primarily from this stipulation, as well as 

the parts of the presentence investigation report to which Lockett did not 

object. See United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2006) (“It is the 

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22-10528 Opinion of the Court 3

The evidence showed that Lockett purchased some 

$250,000 worth of cocaine and cocaine base (also known as crack 

cocaine) from his co-conspirators for the purpose of distribution. 

Operating out of his mother’s house, Lockett sold both forms of 

the drug to a confidential informant. Lockett’s cell phone records 

revealed that he texted several of his co-conspirators that his 

customers were upset by the low quality of the cocaine that he was 

selling them. He also said, referring to the possibility of being 

arrested on drug charges: “Man feds can kiss my a**, I kill the feds 

before them b es lock me up for something talking about 

talking to a b** **. Hell yea they gotta die boy, imma kill me some 

b****es.” When law enforcement executed a search warrant at

Lockett’s mother’s house, they found over $2,500 in cash and 

plastic bags containing cocaine and cocaine base in a bedroom. 

They found several more bags of narcotics outside the residence. 

Agents also found two guns belonging to Lockett’s stepfather and 

one unclaimed handgun in another bedroom. In total, Lockett is 

accountable for over 900 grams of cocaine and cocaine base. 

Lockett also played a leadership role in the gang’s 

dogfighting operations. He organized and attended several dog 

fights, brought his own dogs to fight, acted as a referee for at least 

two dog fights, and discussed killing several dogs. This dog fighting 

ring involved over 150 animals. When law enforcement searched 

Lockett’s mother’s house, they found fourteen dogs that had 

law of this circuit that a failure to object to allegations of fact in a PSI admits 

those facts for sentencing purposes.”). 

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scarring consistent with dog fighting, as well as break sticks, photos 

of dogs fighting, blood-stained carpet and walls, and a dog fighting 

pit. When law enforcement searched Lockett’s home, they found 

a pit bull with extreme injuries that had been crudely stapled shut

rather than stitched. The dog died two days later. Agents also 

found still more evidence of dog fighting, such as medicine, a scale, 

veterinary paperwork, breeding certificates, and several bags of 

cash. 

The Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation 

Report (PSI) to aid the district court in sentencing. For the drug 

distribution offense, the PSI calculated a base offense level of 24 

under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1(a)(5) (Nov. 2021). It 

increased this base offense by two levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. 

§ 2D1.1(b)(1), which provides for a two-level increase if a firearm 

was possessed. This left an adjusted offense level of 26. For the 

dog fighting, the base offense level is 16 under U.S.S.G. 

§ 2E3.1(a)(1). Because Lockett was an organizer or leader of this 

exceptionally large animal-fighting ring, the PSI applied a four-level 

increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). So his adjusted offense 

level for conspiracy to participate in an animal fighting venture was 

20. 

Next, the PSI applied the grouping rules for multiple 

offenses and calculated a combined adjusted offense level of 27. 

U.S.S.G. §§ 3D1.1(a), 3D1.4. The PSI then reduced that by two 

levels because Lockett had accepted responsibility, and by one 

more level because of Lockett’s guilty plea. U.S.S.G. §§ 3E1.1(a), 

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(b). His total final offense level was thus 24. This, combined with 

a criminal history category of III, resulted in a Guideline 

imprisonment range of 63 to 78 months. The statutory maximum 

for the drug charge is 240 months, and the maximum for the dog 

fighting is 60 months. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C); 18 U.S.C. § 49. 

Lockett objected to the application of the two-level enhancement 

for possessing a firearm in connection with the offense. 

At sentencing, the district court overruled Lockett’s 

objection, finding that it was not “clearly improbable” that the 

unclaimed gun found at Lockett’s mother’s house was connected 

to the drug distribution Lockett was conducting there. The court 

then used its discretion to vary upward from the Guideline range 

of 63 to 78 months and instead sentenced Lockett to 120 months 

on count two and 60 months on count nine, to be served 

concurrently. The district court explained its reasons: (1) that 

Lockett was the “mastermind” of the dog fighting, which was 

“heinous” and “awful”; (2) that he was “very involved in the 

distribution of drugs,” and that this was bad for the community; (3) 

that Lockett used his mother’s house for the drug distribution; (4) 

that Lockett said he was going to kill the federal agents before being 

caught; (5) the “extent of the $250,000 of drugs”; and (6) the 

sentences given to co-defendants and ensuring that “there is no 

disparity” between them. 

Lockett appealed, arguing first that the application of the 

two-level enhancement was in error, and second that his aboveGuidelines sentence is substantively unreasonable. 

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II.

“We review the district court’s findings of fact under 

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for clear error, and the application of the 

Sentencing Guidelines to those facts de novo.” United States v. Gallo, 

195 F.3d 1278, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999). “We review the substantive 

reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion.” United States 

v. Hayes, 762 F.3d 1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014). In conducting this 

review, “we will reverse a sentence as substantively unreasonable 

only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the 

District Court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the 

factors by arriving at a sentence outside the range of reasonable 

sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Alberts, 

859 F.3d 979, 985 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted). 

III.

A.

The district court did not procedurally err when it imposed 

an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), which provides for 

a two-level increase in a defendant’s base offense level if he 

possessed a dangerous weapon. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). This 

enhancement “reflects the increased danger of violence when drug 

traffickers possess weapons.” Id. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.11(A). The 

commentary to the Guidelines explains that the enhancement 

should be applied “if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly 

improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” Id. 

Our cases have held that the enhancement should apply so 

long as the government can “establish by a preponderance of the 

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evidence that the firearm was present at the site of the charged 

conduct.” United States v. Carrasquillo, 4 F.4th 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 

2021) (quotation omitted). In short, the mere presence of a firearm 

at the location of the alleged crime is all that is required for the 

government to meet its initial burden. Id. After that, the burden 

shifts to the defendant to show that “a connection between the 

weapon and the offense was clearly improbable.” Id. (quotation 

omitted). 

The government met that initial burden, and Lockett failed 

to rebut it. The district court concluded that it was more likely 

than not that two of the three guns at Lockett’s mother’s house 

belonged to Lockett’s stepfather, but that the third gun was 

unclaimed. So there was at least one unclaimed firearm present at 

the home where it is undisputed that Lockett repeatedly sold drugs. 

On the basis of those facts, we agree with the district court that it 

is not clearly improbable that this gun was possessed in connection 

with the drug offense. 

B.

Lockett’s sentence of 120 months imprisonment is not 

substantively unreasonable. Lockett bears the burden of 

demonstrating that this sentence is unreasonable “in light of the 

record and the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Gonzales, 550 F.3d 

1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). Section 3553(a) sets out factors that a 

sentencing court must consider, including (but not limited to): “the 

nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 

characteristics of the defendant”; the need for the sentence “to 

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reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the 

law, and to provide just punishment for the offense”; the need for 

the sentence to afford adequate deterrence and to protect the 

public from further crimes; the kinds of sentences available and the 

sentencing range; and “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence 

disparities among defendants” charged with similar conduct. 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a). A sentence that is “well below the statutory 

maximum” is an indicator that the sentence is reasonable. United 

States v. Taylor, 997 F.3d 1348, 1355 (11th Cir. 2021). 

Lockett argues that the district court abused its discretion 

because it gave significant weight to an improper factor. 

Specifically, he contends that the district court based the upward 

variance primarily on the dog fighting charges, which carry a 

statutory maximum of 60 months. But a closer look at the record 

reveals that this premise is faulty. 

The district court explained that “this is one of those times” 

where the Guideline range “substantially understates the 

seriousness of the offense.” True, “one of the things” that the 

district court considered was Lockett’s “mastermind” role in the 

dog fighting, which the court described as “heinous” and “awful.” 

But the court also took into account many other factors relating to 

the drug charges. The court considered (1) that Lockett was “very 

involved in the distribution of drugs,” which is harmful to the 

community; (2) that Lockett used his mother’s house to distribute 

drugs; (3) that Lockett said he would “kill the feds” before he would 

go to prison; (4) the magnitude of the drugs Lockett distributed; 

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and (5) the need to ensure that Lockett’s sentence was consistent 

with the sentences imposed on his co-defendants. Taking all of 

those factors together, the court used its discretion to vary upward 

and sentence Lockett to 120 months imprisonment, which is still 

well below the statutory maximum for the drug charge. 

On this record, Lockett’s contention that the court “said 

little about the drug charges in imposing the sentence,” is simply 

implausible. Five of the six reasons given for the upward variance 

were unrelated to the dog fighting charge. We are not convinced 

that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in 

imposing this sentence, nor that the sentence is outside the range 

of reasonableness dictated by the facts of the case. See Alberts, 859 

F.3d at 985.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court 

is AFFIRMED.

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