99–006

107TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session 107–397

CHILD CUSTODY PROTECTION ACT

APRIL 11, 2002.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of

the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. SENSENBRENNER, from the Committee on the Judiciary,

submitted the following

R E P O R T

together with

DISSENTING VIEWS

[To accompany H.R. 476]

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill

(H.R. 476) to amend title 18, United States Code, to prohibit taking

minors across State lines in circumvention of laws requiring the involvement of parents in abortion decisions, having considered the

same, reports favorably thereon without amendment and recommends that the bill do pass.

CONTENTS

Page

Purpose and Summary ............................................................................................ 2

Background and Need for the Legislation ............................................................. 2

Hearings ................................................................................................................... 25

Committee Consideration ........................................................................................ 25

Vote of the Committee ............................................................................................. 25

Committee Oversight Findings ............................................................................... 28

Performance Goals and Objectives ......................................................................... 28

New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures ...................................................... 28

Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate .......................................................... 28

Constitutional Authority Statement ...................................................................... 29

Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion .......................................................... 30

Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported ..................................... 31

Markup Transcript .................................................................................................. 33

Dissenting Views ..................................................................................................... 73

2

1 ‘‘Few would deny that most teenagers, especially younger ones, would benefit from adult

guidance when faced with an unwanted pregnancy. Few would deny that such guidance ideally

should come from the teenager’s parents.’’ Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., Fact

Sheets: Teenagers, Abortion, and Government Intrusion Laws, at http://

www.plannedparenthood.org/library/ABORTION/laws.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2002); ‘‘Responsible parents should be involved when their young daughters face a crisis pregnancy.’’ National

Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League, Minors’ Issues: Reproductive Choice Issues, at

http://www.naral.org/issues/issues—minors.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2001); ‘‘Ordinarily it’s a good idea for teens to involve their parents....’’ National Abortion Federation, Having An

Abortion? Your Guide to Good Care, at http://www.prochoice.org/default6.htm (last visited Aug.

30, 2001).

PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

H.R. 476, the ‘‘Child Custody Protection Act’’(CCPA), has two primary purposes. The first is to protect the health and safety of

young girls by preventing valid and constitutional State parental

involvement laws from being circumvented. The second is to protect

the rights of parents to be involved in the medical decisions of their

minor daughters.

To achieve these purposes, H.R. 476 makes it a Federal offense

to knowingly transport a minor across a State line, with the intent

that she obtain an abortion, in circumvention of a State’s parental

consent or parental notification law. Violation of the Act is a Class

One misdemeanor, carrying a fine of up to $100,000 and incarceration of up to 1 year.

H.R. 476, introduced by Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,

will strengthen the effectiveness of State laws designed to protect

children from the health and safety risks associated with abortion.

In many cases, only a girl’s parents know of her prior psychological

and medical history, including allergies to medication and anesthesia. Also, parents are usually the only people who can provide

authorization for post-abortion medical procedures or the release of

pertinent data from family physicians. When a pregnant girl is

taken to have an abortion without her parents’ knowledge, none of

these precautions can be taken. Thus, when parents are not involved, the risks to the minor girl’s health significantly increase.

H.R. 476, is designed to effectuate State laws which safeguard

minor girls’ physical and emotional health by ensuring parental involvement in their abortion decisions.

H.R. 476 does not supercede, override, or in any way alter existing State parental involvement laws. Nor does the Act impose any

parental notice or consent requirement on any State. H.R. 476 addresses the interstate transportation of minors in order to circumvent valid, existing State laws, and uses Congress’ authority to

regulate interstate activity to protect those laws from evasion.

BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR THE LEGISLATION

There is widespread agreement among abortion rights advocates

and pro-life advocates that it is the parents of a pregnant minor

who are best suited to provide her counsel, guidance, and support

as she decides whether to continue her pregnancy or to undergo an

abortion. Organizations such as Planned Parenthood, the National

Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League, and the National

Abortion Federation all advise pregnant minors to consult their

parents before proceeding with an abortion.1 In addition, the American Medical Association urges physicians to ‘‘strongly encourage

minors to discuss their pregnancy with their parents’’ and to ‘‘exVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:53 Apr 11, 2002 Jkt 099006 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR397.XXX pfrm04 PsN: HR397
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2 Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Mandatory Parental

Consent to Abortion, 269 JAMA 82, 83 (1993) (opposing laws mandating parental involvement

on the basis that such laws may expose minors to physical harm, or compromise ‘‘the minor’s need for privacy on matters of sexual intimacy.’’) 3 Id.

4See Ala. Code §§ 26–21–1 to –8 (1992 & Supp. 1999); Alaska Stat. §§ 18.16.010–030 (Michie

1998); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36–2152 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 20–16–801

to –808 (Michie 2000); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 123450 (West 1996 & Supp. 1999); Colo.

Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 12–37.5–101 to –108 (West Supp. 1999); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 19(a)–601

(West 1997); Del. Code Ann. tit. 24, §§ 1780–1789B (1997); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 390.01115 (West

Supp. 2000); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 15–11–110 to –118 (Harrison 1998); Idaho Code § 18–609(6)

(1997); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 70/1–70/99 (West 1999); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 16–18–2–267, 16–34–2– 4 (West 1997); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 135L.1–8 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65– 6705 (1992 & Supp. 1999); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 311.732 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998); La. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35.5 (West 1992 & Supp. 2000); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1597–A (West

1992 & Supp. 1999); Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. § 20–103 (1996); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 112,

§ 12s (Law. Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 2000); Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 25.248 (101)–(109) (Law. Co-op. 1999

& Supp. 2000); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 144.343 (West 1998); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 41–41–51 to –63

(1993 & Supp. 1998); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 188.015, 188.028 (West 1996 & Supp. 2000); Mont. Code

Ann. §§ 50–20–201 to –215 (1999); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 71–6901 to –6909 (1996); Nev. Rev. Stat.

§§ 442.255–.257 (2000); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 9:17A–1 to –1.12 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000); N.M.

Stat. Ann. §§ 30–5–1 to –3 (Michie 2000); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 90–21.6 to .10 (1999); N.D. Cent.

Code §§ 14–02.1 to 03.1 (1997); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.12 (Anderson 1996); 18 Pa. Cons.

Stat. Ann. § 3206 (West 1983 & Supp. 2000); R.I. Gen. Laws § 23–4.7–6 (1996); S.C. Code Ann.

§§ 44–41–30 to –37 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1999); S.D. Codified Laws § 34–23A–7 (Michie

1994 & Supp. 1999); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37–10–301 to –304 (1996 & Supp. 1999); Tex. Fam. Code

Ann. § 33.001–.004 (Vernon Supp. 2000); Utah Code Ann. § 76–7–304 (1999); Va. Code Ann.

§ 16.1–241(D) (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2000); W. Va. Code §§ 16–2F–1 to –8 (1998); Wis. Stat. Ann.

§ 48.375 (West 1997); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35–6–118 (Michie 1999). 5See Planned Parenthood of Rocky Mountain Services Corp. v. Owens, 107 F. Supp.2d 1271

(D. Colo. 2000) (medical emergency exception in parental notice statute impermissibly narrow);

Glick v. McKay, 616 F. Supp. 322, 327 (D. Nev. 1985) (enjoining Nevada’s parental notice statute for its failure to ensure that bypass petitions are reviewed ‘‘with sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained’’), aff’d, 937 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1991);

American Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 800 (Cal. 1997) (parental consent statute

violated State constitutional right to privacy); Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620 (N.J. 2000) (parental notification law with judicial waiver violates State

constitution); Zbaraz v. Ryan, No. 84 C 771 (Ill. Supreme Ct. refused to issue rules implementing Ill. Stat.); Wicklund v. State, No. ADV–97–671 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Feb. 25, 1999) (parental

notification law violated State constitution) available at http://www.mtbizlaw.com/1stjd99/

WICKLUND—2—11.htm. The New Mexico statute was ruled unconstitutional by the State attorney general. N.M. Ag. Op. 90–19, 1990 WL 509–590. Four States are currently involved in

litigation challenging their parental involvement statutes. An Arizona Federal district court

upheld the constitutionality of Arizona’s parental consent law on August 8, 2001. See Planned

Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, No. CV00–386–TUC–RCC (D. Ariz. Filed Aug. 9, 2001). According to news reports, however, enforcement of the law was stayed on September 13, 2001, pending an appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Court Stays ‘‘Parental Consent’’ Abortion Law, Associated Press, Sept. 15, 2001. The Alaska Supreme Court has reversed a trial court

determination that the parental consent law violates the State constitution, and returned the

case to the trial court in order to allow the State an opportunity to establish that the law serves

a compelling State interest by narrowly tailored means. See State v. Planned Parenthood of

Alaska, 2001 WL 1448754 at *10 (Alaska 2001). A Florida intermediate appellate court has

upheld the Florida parental notification law as constitutional. State v. N. Fla. Women’s Health

and Counseling Service, Nos. 1D00–1983, 1D00–2106, 2001 WL 111037 (Fla. App. 1 Dist., 2001).

The Florida Supreme Court has agreed to review this ruling. See N. Fla. Women’s Health &

counseling Service v. State, 2001 WL 402634 (Fla. 2001). A Federal court upheld the consent

provisions of Idaho’s parental involvement law but struck as unconstitutional two of its provisions, one of which required a minor girl to pursue a judicial bypass in either her home county

or the county within which the abortion is to be performed and another requiring doctors to

notify a minor girl’s parents within 24 hours of performing an emergency abortion on her without having obtained parental consent. See Mark Warbis, Federal Judge Upholds Law But

Strikes Down Some Elements, Associated Press, Dec. 20, 2001.

plain how parental involvement can be helpful and that parents

are generally very understanding and supportive.’’ 2 The AMA continues: ‘‘If a minor expresses concerns about parental involvement,

the physician should ensure that the minor’s reluctance is not

based on any misperceptions about the likely consequences of parental involvement.’’ 3

A total of 43 States have enacted some form of a parental involvement statute.4 The implementation of seven of these 43 State

statutes has been enjoined by courts as violating either Federal or

State constitutional protections.5 Another nine of these 43 State

statutes are written merely to encourage the pregnant minor to

4

6See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 19(a)–601 (stating that the abortion provider need only discuss

the possibility of parental involvement); Del. Code Ann. tit. 24, § 1783(a) (allowing notice to a

licensed mental health professional not associated with an abortion provider); Kan. Stat. Ann.

§ 65–6705(j) (allowing a physician to bypass parental notice in cases where the physician determines that an emergency exists that threatens the ‘‘well-being’’ of the minor); Me. Rev. Stat.

Ann. tit. 22, § 1597–A(2) (allowing a minor to give informed consent after counseling by the abortion provider); Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. § 20–103(c) (allowing a physician to determine that

parental notice is not in the minor’s best interest); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.12 (stating that

notice may be given to a brother, sister, step-parent, or grandparent if certain qualifications are

met); Utah Code Ann. § 76–7–304 (stating that a physician need notify only if possible); W. Va.

Code § 16–2F–1 (stating physician not affiliated with an abortion provider may waive the notice

requirement); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48–375 (stating that the notice may be given to any adult family

member). 7 An October 3, 2000, nationwide poll conducted by Zogby International found that 66 percent

of those surveyed believed that doctors should be ‘‘legally required to notify the parents of a

girl under the legal age who requests an abortion.’’ Zogby International, ‘‘Associated Television

News Announces Bush Overwhelms Gore on Presidential Campaign’s Major Public Policy

Issues’’, Oct. 8, 2000, PR Newswire 13:17:00. A Kaiser Family Foundation/MTV Survey of 603

people ages 18–24 found that 68% favored laws requiring parental consent prior to performance

of an abortion on girls under 18. Kaiser Family Foundation New National Survey of 18- to 24-

year-olds on Hot Button Political Issues, U.S. Newswire, Oct. 10, 2000, 2000 WL 26849324. A

CBS News/NY Times Poll, released Jan. 15, 1998, found that 78% of those polled favor requiring

parental consent before a girl under 18 years of age could have an abortion. Parental notification laws receive even greater support. A 1992 national poll by the Wirthlin Group found that

80 percent of Americans support requiring parental notification before an abortion is performed

on a girl under age 18. 8 H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981). 9Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 (1976).

consult with her parents, another relative, or another third party

designated by statute before she decides to undergo an abortion but

do not require the minor to obtain either consent or notice prior to

obtaining an abortion.6 The remaining 27 States require a parent

to either be notified of a minor daughter’s intention to undergo an

abortion or to consent to the performance of an abortion on a minor

daughter (subject to judicial bypass procedures).

Despite widespread support for parental involvement laws and

clear public policy considerations justifying such laws, however,

there exists substantial evidence that they are frequently circumvented by adults who transport minors to abortion providers in

States that do not have parental notification or consent laws.7 The

purpose of the CCPA is to curb the interstate circumvention of

these laws, thereby protecting the rights of parents and the interests of vulnerable minors. The CCPA is not a Federal parental involvement law; it merely ensures that these State laws are not

evaded through interstate activity. As such, it reinforces the policy

decisions of those States that have chosen to enact constitutionallysound parental involvement laws. Parental involvement in the

abortion decisions of minor girls will lead to improved medical care

for minors seeking abortions and provide increased protection for

young girls against sexual exploitation by adult men. The Supreme

Court has observed that, ‘‘[t]he medical, emotional, and psychological consequences of an abortion are serious and can be lasting;

this is particularly so when the patient is immature’’ 8 and ‘‘[i]t

seems unlikely that [the minor] will obtain adequate counsel and

support from the attending physician at an abortion clinic, where

abortions for pregnant minors frequently take place.’’ 9 Thus, Federal legislation is warranted due to the scope of the practice of

avoiding such laws by transporting minors across State lines and

the profound physical and psychological risks of an abortion to a

minor.

At hearings during the 105th, 106th, and 107th Congresses, the

Subcommittee on the Constitution heard testimony from two mothVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:53 Apr 11, 2002 Jkt 099006 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR397.XXX pfrm04 PsN: HR397
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10See Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 476 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (Sept. 6, 2001) (statement of Eileen

Roberts). 11See id. While Ms. Roberts’ daughter was not taken to another State, her story is illustrative

of the harms involved when a child is secretly taken away from her parents for an abortion.

After this experience, Ms. Roberts formed an organization called Mothers Against Minor Abortions (MAMA). Ms. Roberts testified: ‘‘I speak today for those parents I know around the country, whose daughters have been taken out of State for their abortions.’’ Id. 12See id. 13See id. 14See id. 15See id. 16See id. 17See Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 3682 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., (May 21, 1998) (statement of Joyce

Farley). 18See id. 19See id. 20See id. 21See id. 22See id.

ers whose daughters were secretly taken for abortions, with devastating consequences. Eileen Roberts testified that her 13-year-old

daughter was encouraged by a boyfriend, with the assistance of his

adult friend, to obtain a secret abortion.10 The adult friend drove

Ms. Roberts’ daughter to an abortion clinic 45 miles away from her

home and paid for their daughter to receive the abortion.11 After

2 weeks of observing their daughter’s depression, Ms. Roberts and

her husband learned that the young girl had an abortion from a

questionnaire they found under her pillow, which their daughter

had failed to return to the abortion clinic.12

Ms. Roberts’ daughter was then hospitalized as a result of the

depression, and a physical examination revealed that the abortion

had been incompletely performed and required surgery to repair

the damage done by the abortionist.13 The hospital called Ms. Roberts and told her that they could not do reparative surgery without

a signed consent form.14 The following year, Ms. Robert’s daughter

developed an infection and was diagnosed with having pelvic inflammatory disease, which again required a 2-day hospitalization

for antibiotic therapy and a signed consent form.15 Ms. Roberts and

her family were responsible for over $27,000 in medical costs all of

which resulted from this one secret abortion.16

Joyce Farley, the mother of a minor girl, reported how her 12-

year-old daughter was provided alcohol, raped, and then taken out

of State by the rapist’s mother for an abortion.17 In the words of

Joyce Farley, the abortion was arranged to destroy evidence—evidence that her 12-year-old daughter had been raped.18 On August

31, 1995, her daughter, who had just turned 13, underwent a dangerous medical procedure without anyone present who knew her

past medical history (as shown by the false medical history that

was given to the abortionist).19 Following the abortion, the mother

of the rapist dropped off the child in another town 30 miles from

the child’s home.20 The child returned to her home with severe

pain and bleeding which revealed complications from an incomplete

abortion.21 When Joyce Farley contacted the original clinic that

performed the abortion, the clinic told her that the bleeding was

normal and to increase her daughter’s Naprosyn, a medication

given to her for pain, every hour if needed.22 Fortunately, Ms. Farley, being a nurse, knew this advice was wrong and could be harmVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:53 Apr 11, 2002 Jkt 099006 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR397.XXX pfrm04 PsN: HR397
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23See id. 24See id. 25Labor of Love is Deemed Criminal, The National Law Journal, Nov. 11, 1996, at A8. 26 Jeff Whelan, McGreevey Reveals Latest Abortion Stance, The Star-Ledger, Aug. 30, 2001,

available at http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/index.ssf?elections/ledger/1440ef7.html (last visited

on Aug. 30, 2001). 27Teen-Agers Cross State Lines in Abortion Exodus, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1995, at B6. 28See id. 29See id. 30See id.

ful, but her daughter would not have known this.23 Because of her

mother’s intervention, Ms. Farley’s daughter ultimately received

further medical care and a second procedure to complete the abortion.24

THE PREVALENCE OF THIS INTERSTATE ACTIVITY

There is no serious dispute regarding the fact that the transportation of minors across State lines in order to obtain abortions is

both a widespread and frequent practice. Even groups opposed to

this bill acknowledge that large numbers of minors are transported

across State lines to obtain abortions, in many cases by adults

other than their parents. In 1995, Kathryn Kolbert, then an attorney with the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy (a national

pro-abortion legal defense organization), asserted that thousands of

adults are helping minors cross State lines to get abortions in

States whose parental involvement requirements are less stringent

or non-existent: ‘‘There are thousands of minors who cross State

lines for an abortion every year and who need the assistance of

adults to do that.’’25 Just last August, New Jersey’s Star-Ledger reported that Laurie Lowenstein, Executive Director of Right to

Choose, an abortion rights advocacy group, stated that she would

quit her job to shuttle pregnant young girls to States without parental notification laws if New Jersey enacted a parental notification law.26 Only Congress, with its constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce, can curb such flagrant disregard of State

laws.

Pennsylvania

Since Pennsylvania’s current parental consent law took effect in

March 1994, news reports have repeatedly maintained that many

Pennsylvania teenagers are going out of State to New Jersey and

New York to obtain abortions. In fact, in 1995 the New York Times

reported that ‘‘Planned Parenthood in Philadelphia has a list of

clinics, from New York to Baltimore, to which they will refer teenagers, according to the organization’s executive director, Joan

Coombs.’’ 27 Moreover, the Times gave accounts of clinics that had

seen an increase in patients from Pennsylvania.28 One clinic, in

Cherry Hill, New Jersey, reported seeing a threefold increase in

Pennsylvania teenagers coming for abortions.29 Likewise, a clinic in

Queens, New York reported that it was not unusual to see Pennsylvania teenagers as patients in 1995, though earlier it had been

rare.30

In the period just prior to the Pennsylvania law taking effect, efforts were underway to make it easier for teenagers to go out of

State for abortions. For instance, Newsday reported that ‘‘[c]ounselors and activists are meeting to plot strategy and printing

maps with directions to clinics in New York, New Jersey, Delaware

7

31 Charles V. Zehren, New Restrictive Abortion Law, Newsday, Feb. 22, 1994. 32 Copies of these advertisements are attached. 33See Charlotte Ellertson, Ph.D., Mandatory Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions: Effects of the Laws in Minnesota, Missouri, and Indiana, American Journal of Public Health, Aug.,

1997, at 1371. 34See Illinois May Tighten Rules on Abortions For Teens; Parental Consent is Not Required

Abortion Bill Targets as Teen Haven For Abortion, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 25, 1999.

and Washington, D.C., where teenagers can still get abortions

without parental consent. . . . ‘We will definitely be encouraging

teenagers to go out of State,’ said Shawn Towey, director of the

Greater Philadelphia Woman’s Medical Fund, a nonprofit organization that gives money to women who can’t afford to pay for their

abortions.’’ 31

Moreover, some abortion clinics in nearby States, such as New

Jersey and Maryland, use the lack of parental involvement requirements in their own States as a ‘‘selling point’’ in advertising directed at minors in Pennsylvania. For example, the March 1999-

February 2000 Yellow Pages for Philadelphia, Pennsylvania contain advertisements from three New Jersey abortionists declaring

‘‘No Parental Consent Required.’’ 32 A Rockville, Maryland abortionist ran a similar advertisement in the May 1998-April 1999

Yellow Pages for Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Such advertisements

have appeared in telephone directories for Wilkes-Barre and Dallas, Scranton, Clarks Summit, and Carbondale, Bethlehem, Allentown, York, and Erie.

Missouri

In 1997, a study in the American Journal of Public Health reported that a leading abortion provider in Missouri refers minors

out of State for abortions if the girls do not want to involve their

parents. Reproductive Health Services, which performs over half of

the abortions performed in Missouri, refers minors to the Hope

Clinic for Women in Granite City, Illinois. Research reveals that

based on the available data the odds of a minor traveling out of

State for an abortion increased by over 50 percent when Missouri’s

parental consent law went into effect. Furthermore, compared to

older women, underage girls were significantly more likely to travel

out of State to have their abortions.33

A 1999 St. Louis Post-Dispatch news report confirms that the

Hope Clinic in Illinois continues to attract underage girls seeking

abortions without parental involvement.34 A clinic counselor estimates that she sees two girls each week seeking to avoid their

home State’s parental involvement law. One recent example was a

16-year-old girl from Missouri who had called abortion clinics in St.

Louis and learned that parental consent was required before a

minor could obtain an abortion. According to the report, the Hope

Clinic performed 3,200 abortions on out-of-State women last year,

and the clinic’s executive director estimates that that number is

45% of the total abortions performed at the clinic. The executive director also estimates that 13% of the clinic’s clients are minors.

Massachusetts

Massachusetts has also seen an increase in out-of-State abortions

performed on its teenage residents since the State’s parental consent law went into effect in April 1981, according to a published

8

35The Massachusetts law was changed in 1997 to require the consent of one parent (or judicial authorization), rather than both parents as previously required. 36See Virginia G. Cartoof & Lorraine V. Klerman, Parental Consent for Abortion: Impact of

the Massachusetts Law, American Journal of Public Health, April 1986, at 397. 37See id. at 398. 38 Id. at 399. 39See M.A.J. McKenna, Mass. abortion laws push teens over border, Boston Herald, April 7,

1991, at A1. 40Stanley K. Henshaw, The Impact of Requirements for Parental Consent on Minors’ Abortions

in Mississippi, Family Planning Perspectives, June, 1995, at 121. 41 Id. at 122.

study and anecdotal information.35 A 1986 study published in the

American Journal of Public Health found that in the 4 months

prior to implementation of the parental consent law, an average of

29 Massachusetts minors obtained out-of-State abortions each

month (in Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and New

York—data for Maine was not available).36 After the parental consent law was implemented, however, the average jumped to between 90 and 95 out-of-State abortions per month (using data from

the five States of Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Connecticut, New

York, and Maine)—representing one-third of the abortions obtained

by Massachusetts’ minors.37

The study noted that due to what the authors described as ‘‘astute marketing,’’ one abortion clinic in New Hampshire was able to

nearly double the monthly average of abortions performed on Massachusetts minors (from 14 in 1981 to 27 in 1982). The abortionist

‘‘began advertising in the 1982 Yellow Pages of metropolitan areas

along the northern Massachusetts border, stating ‘consent for minors not required.’ ’’ 38

In April 1991, the Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts

estimated that approximately

1,200 Massachusetts minor girls travel out of State for abortions

each year, the majority of them to New Hampshire. Planned Parenthood said that surveys of New Hampshire clinics revealed an

average of 100 appointments per month by Massachusetts minors.39

Mississippi

A 1995 study of the effect of Mississippi’s parental consent law

revealed that Mississippi has also experienced an increase in the

number of minors traveling out of State for abortion. The study,

published in Family Planning Perspectives, compared data for the

5 months before the parental consent law took effect in June 1993,

with data for the 6 months after it took effect, and found that

‘‘[a]mong Mississippi residents having an abortion in the State, the

ratio of minors to older women decreased by 13%. . . . However,

this decline was largely offset by a 32% increase in the ratio of minors to older women among Mississippi residents traveling to other

States for abortion services.’’ 40 Based on the available data, the

study suggests that the Mississippi parental consent law appeared

to have ‘‘little or no effect on the abortion rate among minors but

a large increase in the proportion of minors who travel to other

States to have abortions, along with a decrease in minors coming

from other States to Mississippi.’’ 41

9

42Lisa A. Singh, Those Are the People Who Are Being Hurt, Style Weekly, Feb. 11, 1997. 43 Ellen Nakashima, Fewer Teens Receiving Abortions In Virginia, The Washington Post,

March 3, 1998. 44 H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981). 45Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 (1976).

Virginia

Grace S. Sparks, executive director of the Virginia League of

Planned Parenthood, predicted in February 1997 that if Virginia

were to pass a parental notification law, teenagers would travel out

of State for abortions. ‘‘In every State where they’ve passed parental notification, . . . there’s been an increase in out-of-State abortions,’’ she said, adding, ‘‘I suspect that that’s what will happen in

Virginia, that teenagers who cannot tell their parents . . . will go

out of State and have abortions....’’ 42

Virginia’s parental notification law took effect on July 1, 1997.

According to a recent article in The Washington Post, initial reports

indicate that abortions performed on Virginia minors dropped 20

percent during the first 5 months that the law was in effect (from

903 abortions during the same time period in 1996 to approximately 700 abortions in 1997).43 The article suggests, however,

that Virginia teenagers are traveling to the District of Columbia in

order to obtain an abortion without involving their parent. In fact,

the National Abortion Federation (NAF), which runs a toll-free national abortion hotline, said that calls from Virginia teenagers

seeking information on how to obtain an abortion out-of-State were

the largest source of teenage callers seeking out-of-State abortions,

at seven to 10 calls per day. NAF hotline operator Amy Schriefer

has gone so far as to talk a Richmond area teenage girl through

the route (involving a Greyhound bus and the Metro’s Red Line) to

obtain an abortion in the District of Columbia.

THE FEDERAL ROLE IN PROTECTING MINORS FROM

INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION IN CIRCUMVENTION OF

STATE PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT LAWS

With respect to State laws requiring parental or judicial involvement in minors’ abortion decisions, Federal legislation is warranted

due to the scope of the practice of avoiding such laws by transporting minors across State lines and the profound physical and

psychological risks of an abortion to a minor. The Supreme Court

has observed that, ‘‘[t]he medical, emotional, and psychological consequences of an abortion are serious and can be lasting; this is particularly so when the patient is immature,’’ 44 and ‘‘[i]t seems unlikely that [the minor] will obtain adequate counsel and support

from the attending physician at an abortion clinic, where abortions

for pregnant minors frequently take place.’’ 45 Parental involvement

in such a decision will lead to improved medical care for minors

seeking abortions and provide increased protection for young girls

against sexual exploitation by adult men.

Improved Medical Care of Minor Girls

The medical care that minors seeking abortions receive is improved when their parents are involved in three ways. First, parental involvement allows parents to assist their daughter in the selection of a competent abortion provider. With all medical procedures,

one of the most reliable means of guaranteeing patient safety is the

10

46 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 at 641 n.21 (1979) (Bellotti II). 47See National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League, Minors’ Issues: Reproductive

Choice Issues, at http://www.naral.org/issues/issues—minors.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2001). 48 H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 at 411 (1981). Accord Ohio v. Akron Ctr. For Reproductive

Health, 497 U.S. 502, 518–19 (1990). 49See Edison v. Reproductive Health Services, 863 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993). 50See id. at 624. 51See id. at 628.

professional competence of the physician performing the procedure.

In Bellotti v. Baird, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that parents posses a much greater ability to evaluate and

select competent healthcare providers than their minor children

often do:

In this case, however, we are concerned only with minors who,

according to the record, range in age from children of twelve years

to 17-year-old teenagers. Even the later are less likely than adults

to know or be able to recognize ethical, qualified physicians, or to

have the means to engage such professionals. Many minors who bypass their parents probably will resort to an abortion clinic, without being able to distinguish the competent and ethical from those

that are incompetent or unethical.46

The Court’s concern for that ability of minors to distinguish between competent and ethical abortion providers is particularly well

justified in States where non-physicians are allowed, by statute, to

perform abortions. The National Abortion Federation recommends

that patients seeking an abortion confirm that the abortion will be

performed by a licensed physician in good standing with the State

Board of Medical Examiners, and that he or she have admitting

privileges at a local hospital not more than twenty minutes away

from the location where the abortion is to occur.47 A well-informed

parent seeking to guide her child is more likely to inquire into the

qualifications of the person performing the abortion, and the availability of a physician with local admitting privileges, than an emotionally vulnerable young girl faced with pregnancy.

Second, parental involvement will insure that parents have the

opportunity to provide additional medical history and information

to abortion providers prior to performance of the abortion.

The medical, emotional, and psychological consequences of

an abortion are serious and can be lasting; this is particularly so when the patient is immature. An adequate medical and psychological case history is important to the physician. Parents can provide such information for their

daughter as well as any pertinent family medical history,

refer the physician to other sources of medical history,

such as family physicians, and authorize family physicians

to give relevant data.48

Take, for example, the story of Sandra, a 14-year-old girl who committed suicide shortly after obtaining an abortion.49 Sandra’s mother, who learned of her daughter’s abortion only after her suicide,

sued the abortion provider at which Sandra’s abortion was performed, asserting that her daughter’s death was due to the failure

of the abortion provider to obtain a psychiatric history or monitor

Sandra’s mental health.50 The court concluded that Sandra was not

insane at the time she committed suicide and, therefore, her actions broke the chain of causation required for recovery.51 Yet, eviVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:53 Apr 11, 2002 Jkt 099006 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR397.XXX pfrm04 PsN: HR397
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52See Edison v. Reproductive Health Services, 863 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993). 53See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. For Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 519 (1990). 54Stanley K. Henshaw, Unintended Pregnancy and Abortion: A Public Health Perspective in

A Clinician’s Guide to Medical and Surgical Abortions, 20 (Maureen Paul et al., eds. 1999). 55See State of Florida Department of Health v. North Florida Women’s Health and Counseling

Service, 2001 WL 111037 at n. 2 (Fla. App. 1 Dist., Feb 9, 2001):

[E]vidence at trial showed, the physician-patient relationship is often attenuated in the

abortion context, almost to the point of non-existence. Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976) (‘‘It seems unlikely that

[the minor] will obtain adequate counsel and support from the attending physician at

an abortion clinic, where abortions for pregnant minors frequently take place. ’’). Abortion patients ordinarily see their physicians only once or twice, very briefly. Most of

their interaction is with the clinic’s staff. Physicians performing abortions often perform

several in the space of a single hour. Id. 56Stanley K. Henshaw, Unintended Pregnancy and Abortion: A Public Health Perspective in

A Clinician’s Guide to Medical and Surgical Abortions, 20 (Maureen Paul et al., eds. 1999). Cf.

Richard S. Moon, Why I Don’t Do Abortions Anymore, Medical Economics 61(Mar. 4, 1985). 57Parental Notification of Abortion: Hearings on H. 218 Before the House Comm. on Health

and Welfare, 2001–2002 Legis. (Vt. 2001)(Nancy Mosher, President and CEO of Planned Parenthood of Northern New England on April 16, 2001)(estimating that two-third of Vermont women

keep their follow up appointments, although Ateenagers are notorious for ‘no-showing’). 58Reynier v. Delta Women’s Clinic, 359 So.2d 733 (La. Ct. App. 1978). ‘‘All the medical testimony was to the effect that a perforated uterus was a normal risk, but the statistics given by

the experts indicated that it was an infrequent occurrence and it was rare for a major blood

vessel to be damaged.’’ Id. at 738. Frequent injuries from incomplete abortions are discussed

in Swate v. Schiffers, 975 S.W.2d 70, 26 Media L. Rep. 2258 (Tex.App.-San Antonio, 1998) (aborContinued

dence was presented that Sandra had a history of psychological illness, and that her behavior was noticeably different after the abortion.52 If Sandra’s mother had been aware of her daughter’s abortion, she would have had the opportunity to notify the abortion provider of Sandra’s psychological history and steps could have been

taken to minimize the psychological effect of the abortion on

Sandra’s already fragile mental state.

A more complete and thus more accurate medical history of the

patient will enable abortion providers to disclose not only medical

risks that ordinarily accompany abortions but also those risks that

may be specific to the pregnant minor. Parental involvement will

provide an adult with the opportunity to advise and assist the girl

in giving her informed consent to the procedure.

The third way in which parental involvement will improve medical treatment of pregnant minors is by insuring that parents have

adequate knowledge to recognize and respond to any post-abortion

complications that may develop.53 Although it is often claimed that

abortion is one of the safest surgical procedures performed today,

the actual rate of many of the complications associated with it are

simply unknown: ‘‘The abortion reporting systems of some countries and States in the United States include entries about complications, but these systems are generally considered to underreport infections and other problems that appear some time after

the procedure was performed.’’ 54 Furthermore, women typically

have no pre-existing relationship with an abortion provider,55

which likely accounts for the fact that only about one-third return

to the provider for their post-operative exam.56 Teenagers are even

less likely to return for follow-up appointments.57 This failure to

return for post-operative exams precludes discovery of post-abortion

complications by abortion providers and subsequent reporting of

these complications. Other healthcare providers may be reluctant

to report any complications from fear of compromising the secrecy

that often surrounds abortions.

It is significant that at least one American court has held that

a perforated uterus is a ‘‘normal risk’’ associated with abortion.58

12

tionist unsuccessful claim of libel against journalist for reports based in part upon one disciplinary order that doctor had failed to complete abortions performed on several patients, and that

he had failed to repair lacerations which occurred during abortion procedures) Cf. Sherman v. District of Columbia Bd. of Medicine, 557 A.2d 943, 944 (D.C. 1989) (‘‘Dr. Sherman placed his

patients’ lives at risk by using unsterile instruments in surgical procedures and by intentionally

doing incomplete abortions (using septic instruments) to increase his fees by making later surgical procedures necessary. His practices made very serious infections (and perhaps death) virtually certain to occur. Dr. Sherman does not challenge our findings that his misconduct was

willful nor that he risked serious infections in his patients for money.’’). 59Phillip G. Stubblefield and David A. Grimes, Current Concepts: Septic Abortions, New Eng.

J. Med. 310 (Aug. 4, 1994). 60State of Florida Department of Health v. North Florida Women’s Health and Counseling

Service, 2001 WL 111037 at *6 (Fla. App. 1 Dist., Feb 9, 2001). 61See Willard Cates, Jr., M.D., M.P.H., Kenneth F. Schulz, M.B.A. & David A. Grimes, M.D.,

The Risks Associated With Teenage Abortion, New Eng. J. of Med., Sept. 15, 1983, at 621–624. 62See Burkman et al., Morbidity Risk Among Young Adolescents Undergoing Elective Abortion,

Contraception, vol. 30 (1984), at 99–105.

Untreated, a perforated uterus may result in an infection, complicated by fever, endometritis, and parametritis. According to one

study, ‘‘[t]he risk of death from post-abortion sepsis [infection] is

highest for young women, those who are unmarried, and those who

undergo procedures that do not directly evacuate the contents of

the uterus. . . . A delay in treatment allows the infection to

progress to bacteremia, pelvic abscess, septic pelvic thrombophlebitis, disseminated intravascular coagulophy, septic shock,

renal failure, and death.’’ 59 Evidence about these dangers presented at trial persuaded a Florida appellate court to uphold that

State’s parental notification law:

The State proved that appropriate aftercare is critical in

avoiding or responding to post-abortion complications.

Abortion is ordinarily an invasive surgical procedure attended by many of the risks accompanying surgical procedures generally. If post-abortion nausea, tenderness, swelling, bleeding, or cramping persists or suddenly worsens, a

minor (like an adult) may need medical attention. A guardian unaware that her ward or a parent unaware that his

minor daughter has undergone an abortion will be at a serious disadvantage in caring for her if complications develop. An adult who has been kept in the dark cannot,

moreover, assist the minor in following the abortion provider’s instructions for post-surgical care. Failure to follow

such instructions can increase the risk of complications. As

the plaintiffs’ medical experts conceded, the risks are significant in the best of circumstances. While abortion is less

risky than some surgical procedures, abortion complications can result in serious injury, infertility, and even

death.60

Young adolescent girls are particularly at risk of certain detrimental medical consequences from an abortion. For instance, there

is a greater risk of cervical injury associated with suction-curettage

abortions (at 12 weeks’ gestation or earlier) performed on girls 17

or younger.61 Cervical injury is of serious concern because it may

predispose the young girl to adverse outcomes in future pregnancies. Girls 17 or younger also face a two and a half times greater risk of acquiring endometriosis following an abortion than do

women 20–29 years old.62

The particular risks faced by minors upon whom abortions are

performed were articulated by Dr. Bruce A. Lucero, an abortionist

13

63 Bruce A. Lucero, M.D., Parental Guidance Needed, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1998, section 4, at

1. 64 Id. 65 Id. 66Parental Notification of Abortion: Hearings on H. 218 Before the House Comm. on Judiciary, 2001–2002 Legis. (Vt. 2001)(Lori Burris, representative of Vermont Academy of Pediatrics) 67 Rogers, James L., Boruch, Robert F., Stoms, George B. & DeMoya, Dorothy, Impact of the

Minnesota Parental Notification Law on Abortion and Birth, 81 Amer. J. Pub. Health 294, 297

(Mar. 1991). Cf. Ellertson, Charlotte, Mandatory Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions: Effects of the Laws in Minnesota, Missouri, and Indiana, 87 Amer. J. Pub. Health 1367, 1372 (Aug.

1997) (‘‘Evidence concerning delay is mixed.’’). See also id. at 1374 (‘‘During periods of the laws’ enforcement in Minnesota and Indiana, the two states with gestational age at abortion, in-state

abortions for minors were probably delayed into the second month of pregnancy, although probably not into the second trimester.’’).

who performed some 45,000 abortions over the course of his career.

Dr. Lucero, who supported the CCPA in 1998, wrote an op-ed for

The New York Times about his own experience with minor girls

seeking abortions. ‘‘In almost all cases,’’ Dr. Lucero wrote, ‘‘the only

reason that a teenage girl doesn’t want to tell her parents about

her pregnancy is that she feels ashamed and doesn’t want to let

her parents down.’’ 63 However, according to Dr. Lucero, ‘‘parents

are usually the ones who can best help their teenager consider her

options. And whatever the girl’s decision, parents can provide the

necessary emotional support and financial assistance.’’ 64 Moreover,

Dr. Lucero explained that ‘‘patients who receive abortions at outof-State clinics frequently do not return for follow-up care, which

can lead to dangerous complications. And a teenager who has an

abortion across State lines without her parents’ knowledge is even

more unlikely to tell them that she is having complications.’’ 65

Despite these benefits of better informed selection of abortion

providers, improved medical histories, and appropriate post-operative care, opponents of H.R. 476 argue that mandatory parental involvement results in girls delaying their decisions to obtain abortions, thus increasing the risks attendant to the procedure.66 There

is little evidence, however, that parental involvement laws actually

result in medically significant delays in obtaining abortions. A

study of Minnesota’s parental notification law found that, ‘‘Regardless [of the reason], the claim that the law caused more minors to

obtain late abortions is unsubstantiated. In fact, the reverse is

true. For ages 15–17 the number of late abortions per 1,000 women

decreased following the enactment of the law. Therefore, an increased medical hazard due to a rising number of late abortions

was not realized.’’ 67

Without the knowledge that their daughters have had abortions,

parents are incapable of insuring that their children obtain routine

post-operative care or of providing an adequate medical history to

physicians called upon to treat any complications that may arise.

The first omission may allow complications such as infection, perforation, or depression, to continue untreated. The second omission

may be lethal. When parents do not know that their daughter had

an abortion, ignorance prevents swift and appropriate intervention

by emergency room professionals responding to a life-threatening

condition.

Increased Protection from Sexual Assault

In addition to improving the medical care received by young girls

dealing with an unplanned pregnancy, parental involvement will

provide increased protection against sexual exploitation of minors

14

68 American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Adolescence, Adolescent Pregnancy—Current

Trends and Issues: 1998, 103 Pediatrics 516, 519 (1999). 69Mike A. Males, Adult Involvement in Teenage Childbearing and STD, 346 Lancet 64 (July

8,1995) (emphasis added). 70See id. (citing HP Boyer and D. Fine, Sexual Abuse as a Factor in Adolescent Pregnancy

and Child Maltreatment, 24 Fam. Plan. Perspectives 4 (1992)); See also HP Gershenson, et al.

The Prevalence of Coercive Experience Among Teenage Mothers, 24 J. Interpersonal Violence. 4

(1989), and American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Adolescence, Adolescent Pregnancy

B Current Trends and Issues: 1998, 103 Pediatrics 516, 516 (1999) (‘‘Younger teenagers are especially vulnerable to coercive and nonconsensual sex. Involuntary sexual activity has been reported in 74% of sexually active girls younger than 14 years and 60% of those younger than

15 years.’’). 71See Gershenson at 4. 72See Stanley Henshaw & Kathryn Post, Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortion Decisions, Family Planning Perspectives, Sept./Oct. 1992, at 206. 73On June 14, 2000 a 36-year-old Omaha man who impersonated the father of his teenage

victim in order to assist her in obtaining an abortion was sentenced to 11⁄2 to 2 years in prison

for felony child abuse. See Angie Brunkow, Man Who Said He Was Girl’s Dad Sentenced, Omaha

World-Herald (June 14, 2000) at 20. A similar attempt to hide the consequences of statutory

rape is reflected in the testimony of Joyce Farley before the United States House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution. See Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 3682 Before the Subcomm. On Constitution of the House Comm. on

the Judiciary, 105th Congress, May 21, 1998 (statement of Joyce Farley). 74See Commonwealth v. Sasville, 616 N.E.2d 476 (Mass. 1993) (destruction of aborted fetus

precluded prosecution for forcible rape of a child under the age of sixteen). Compare Smith v. Com., 432 S.E.2d 2 (Va. App. 1993) (prosecution for rape of 14-year-old girl), with Hampton v.

State, 1987 WL. 28223 (Ark. App. 1987) (prosecution for incest), and State v. Khong, 502 N.E.2d

602 (Ohio App. 1985) (prosecutor subject to contempt order for failure to comply with discovery

orders). 75Dee Dee Alonzo testified before the Texas Senate Human Services Committee in support

of Senate Bill 30, the bill enacting the Texas Parental Notification Act. At age sixteen, she was

seduced by her high school teacher. When she became pregnant, he persuaded her to have a

secret abortion. She went to the clinic alone, obtained the abortion her seducer had paid for,

and returned to continue the abusive relationship for another year. Ms. Alonzo testified ‘‘No

matter what their reaction would have been, they were my parents and they were adults, and

they did love me, it would not have been a secret and the man would have been exposed.’’ Testimony of Dee Dee Alonzo, Hearing on Tex. S.B. 30 Before the Senate Human Servs. Comm., 76th

Leg., R.S. 4–5 (Mar. 10, 1999) (tapes available from the Senate Staff Servs. Office and content

is from private transcripts of those tapes). A similar incident involved another high school student impregnated by her teacher. This is revealed in the settlement related to injuries she suffered during the abortion of her pregnancy. See Clement v. Riston, No.B–131,033, settlement reported in Jury Verdict Research, Research, LRP Pub. No. 65904 available on Lexis-Nexis; cf.

by adult men. National studies reveal that ‘‘[a]lmost two thirds of

adolescent mothers have partners older than 20 years of age.’’ 68 In

a study of over 46,000 pregnancies by school-age girls in California,

researchers found that ‘‘71%, or over 33,000, were fathered by adult

post-high-school men whose mean age was 22.6 years, an average

of 5 years older than the mothers. . . . Even among junior high

school mothers aged 15 or younger, most births are fathered by

adult men 6–7 years their senior. Men aged 25 or older father more

births among California school-age girls than do boys under age

18.’’ 69 Other studies have found that most teenage pregnancies are

the result of predatory practices by men who are substantially

older.70

A 1989 study of coercive sexual experiences among teenage mothers found that of the pregnant teens who had had unwanted sexual

experiences, only eighteen percent of the perpetrators were within

the victim’s age group. Another eighteen percent were three to 5

years older than the victim. Seventeen percent were six to 10 years

older, and forty percent were more than 10 years older than their

victims.71 Another study reports that 58 percent of the time it is

the girl’s boyfriend who accompanies her for an abortion when her

parents have not been told about the pregnancy.72

Experience suggests that sexual predators recognize the advantage of their victims obtaining an abortion.73 Not only does an

abortion eliminate a critical piece of evidence of the criminal conduct,74 it allows the abuse to continue undetected.75 Parental inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:53 Apr 11, 2002 Jkt 099006 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR397.XXX pfrm04 PsN: HR397
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Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 447 (Tex. 1998) (Gonzales, J., concurring) (describing the sexual abuse of a young girl that resulted in two pregnancies and two secret abortions). 76See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). 77See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Wickard v.

Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); United States v.

Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 78See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 79 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 80 18 U.S.C. § 2421. 81See Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913).

volvement laws insure that parents have the opportunity to protect

their daughters from those who would victimize them further.

In short, the physical and psychological risks of abortions to minors are great, and laws requiring parental involvement in such

abortions (subject to judicial bypass procedures) reduce that risk.

The widespread practice of avoiding such laws through interstate

commerce may be prevented only through Federal legislation.

CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

Constitutional Authority for the Child Custody Protection Act

H.R. 476 is a regulation of commerce among the several States.

Commerce, as that term is used in the Constitution, includes travel

whether or not that travel is for reasons of business.76 To transport

another person across State lines is to engage in commerce among

the States. There is thus no need to address the scope of Congress’

power to regulate activity that is not, but that affects, commerce

among the States.77 Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence,

Congress can adopt rules concerning interstate commerce, such as

this one, for reasons related primarily to local activity rather than

commerce itself.78

The interstate transportation of minors for the purpose of securing an abortion is, therefore, clearly a form of interstate commerce

which the Constitution expressly empowers Congress to regulate.79

H.R. 476 only regulates conduct which involves interstate movement, activity which the national Government alone is expressly

authorized by the Constitution to address.

Federalism and the Child Custody Protection Act

The Federal Government has long exercised its interstate commerce authority to prohibit interstate activity harmful to minors

and their families. In 1910, Congress used its Commerce Clause

power to enact the Mann Act,80 which prohibits the interstate

transportation of women or minors for purposes of ‘‘prostitution or

debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose.’’ The Supreme Court

upheld the enactment of this law as a constitutional exercise of

Congress’ power over transportation among the several States. The

Court reasoned that if men and women employ interstate transportation to facilitate a wrong, then their right to interstate travel can

be restricted.81

The United States Constitution created a Federal Government

with limited and enumerated powers. All other powers are, as stated in the Tenth Amendment, ‘‘reserved to the States respectively,

16

82 U.S. Const. amend. X. 83Professor Presser testified before the Subcommittee on the Constitution in support of the

Child Custody Protection Act (then H.R. 3682) during the 105th Congress, and submitted a written statement in support of the Act (then H.R. 1218) during the 106th Congress. 84See Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1218 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Congress, May 27, 1999 (statement of Professor Stephen B. Presser, Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law). 85 Id. 86See Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1218 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Congress, May 27, 1999 (statement of Professor Lino A. Graglia, Professor of Law, University of Texas Law School).

or to the people.’’ 82 According to Professor Stephen Presser of the

Northwestern University School of Law,83

[t]he Constitution created a Federal Government with limited and enumerated powers, and much of the genius of

the document was the means employed for ensuring that

the Federal Government did not overwhelm the State and

local governments. The system of checks and balances,

whereby the three branches of the Federal Government restrained each other, was an important aspect of this plan,

but equally important was the basic notion that the Federal Government was not to intrude on the domestic matters which had traditionally been the prerogative of State

and local governments.84

H.R. 476 respects this division of authority between the Federal

Government and the States in that it does not attempt to regulate

or impose policy on the individual States. Rather, H.R. 476 is

predicated on the validity of State law and derives its substantive

application from State law. According to Professor Presser, ‘‘[b]y

imposing penalties on anyone who seeks to deny a minor or her

family the protections of a State’s parental consent/judicial bypass

provisions with regard to abortion, as H.R. 476 would do, the Congress would simply be reinforcing our Federalism scheme, and ensuring that each State’s policy aims regarding this controversial

issue are not frustrated.’’ 85 Professor Lino A. Graglia of the University of Texas Law School also testified that H.R. 476 ‘‘furthers

the principle of federalism’’ in that it seeks to ‘‘reinforce or make

effective’’ State policies that are being transgressed or evaded.86

H.R. 476 does not supercede, override, or alter existing State

laws regarding minors’ abortions. Rather, H.R. 476 uses Congress’

authority to regulate interstate activity to protect State laws from

evasion. As Professor Presser stated:

[t]he political processes of each State exist to resolve these

difficult questions through the exercise of popular sovereignty, the bedrock of our entire Constitutional system.

Not for nothing are the first three words of the Constitution ‘‘We the people,’’ and unless the Constitution itself expressly denies the people any discretion over a particular

area it is their right, indeed, it is their duty to govern

themselves regarding that issue through the legislative

process. This is the most important right in the Constitution, the right of self government, for which our system of

dual sovereignty exists. This Bill is an important step in

17

87See Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1218 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Congress, May 27, 1999 (statement of Professor Stephen B. Presser, Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law). 88 18 U.S.C.A. § 2421 (1970). As amended, the statute prohibits the knowing transportation

of any individual across State lines ‘‘with the intent that such individual engage in prostitution,

or in any sexual activity for which the person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so....’’ 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (West Supp. 1999). 89See United States v. Pelton, 578 F.2d 701 (8th Cir. 1978). 90 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423 (1970). 91See Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 323 (1913) (noting, in upholding the constitutionality of the Mann Act, ‘‘that Congress has power over transportation ‘among the several

States;’ that the power is complete in itself, and that Congress, as an incident to it, may adopt

not only means necessary but convenient to its exercise, and the means may have the quality

of police regulations’’). 92See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 483 (1917).

reinforcing Federalism and in reinforcing self-government.

It deserves to be enacted.87

In short, H.R. 476 does not encroach on State powers, but rather

reinforces State powers.

H.R. 476 is not unlike the Mann Act which, before being amended in 1986, made it a crime to transport a woman across State

lines ‘‘for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any

other immoral purpose.’’ 88 That statute was upheld as applied to

the transportation of a person to Nevada for purposes of engaging

in prostitution, even though prostitution was legal in Nevada.89

A similar provision prohibited the persuading, inducing, enticing,

or coercion of a minor girl ‘‘to go from one place to another by common carrier . . . with the intent that she be induced or coerced to

engage in prostitution, debauchery or other immoral practice.’’ 90

This provision would presumably have prohibited an individual

from causing a 15 year old minor to travel from a State in which

the minimum age for consensual sex was 16 to a State in which

the minimum was 14, in order to have sex with her.

Opponents of H.R. 476 respond to this argument by noting that

a violation of the Mann Act is not keyed to the underlying State

law. But that distinction is of no significance. The Mann Act flatly

prohibited the interstate transportation of women for ‘‘prostitution’’

or for ‘‘any other immoral purpose.’’ In the exercise of its commerce

power, Congress could similarly prohibit the interstate transportation of minors for abortions without obtaining parental notice or

consent, whether or not parental notice or consent is required by

State law.91 Instead, H.R. 476 respects the laws of the various

States by only prohibiting the interstate transportation of young

girls in order to avoid the laws of States that have chosen to require parental involvement in the abortion decisions of minors.

Moreover, it is important to note that the Mann Act prohibited

the interstate transportation of women for ‘‘immoral purposes,’’ and

the Supreme Court upheld convictions under this provision for

those who only transported women across State lines as ‘‘mistresses’’ and ‘‘concubines.’’ 92 In upholding the law as a valid exercise of Congress’ commerce power, the Court stated that:

[t]he transportation of passengers in interstate commerce,

it has long been settled, is within the regulatory power of

Congress, under the commerce clause of the Constitution,

and the authority of Congress to keep the channels of

interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses

18

93 Id. at 491. 94 United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 421 (1993). 95See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1302 (prohibiting the mailing of lottery tickets or letters, circulars, and

other materials regarding a lottery). 96See 18 U.S.C. § 1301. 97 188 U.S. 321 (1903). 98Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 (1999).

has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to

question.93

Just as it was appropriate for Congress to use its constitutional

authority to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from

‘‘immoral’’ conduct, so it is also appropriate for Congress to exercise

that authority to keep the channels of interstate commerce free

from those who transport minors across State lines in order to circumvent State parental involvement laws.

The Mann Act is also not the only example of Federal laws that

prohibit interstate activities that might be legal in the State to

which the activity is directed. Indeed, as long ago as 1876, Congress ‘‘made it a crime to deposit in the mails any letters or circulars concerning lotteries, whether illegal or chartered by State legislatures.’’ 94 A statute to this effect is still in force.95 Congress

later prohibited the transportation of lottery tickets in interstate

commerce, whether or not lotteries are legal in the State to which

the tickets are transported.96 That provision was upheld by the Supreme Court in Champion v. Ames 97 and is still in effect.

The Right to Travel and the Child Custody Protection Act

CCPA’s opponents argue that it violates the rights of States to

enact and enforce their own laws governing conduct within their

territorial boundaries. The simple response to this argument is that

CCPA does not attempt to regulate conduct occurring solely within

the territorial boundaries of a State. CCPA regulates interstate

commerce, and Congress has the exclusive authority to regulate

such activity. Moreover, rather than exercising Congress’ commerce

power to its full extent (i.e., by prohibiting the transportation of

minors in interstate commerce for the purpose of obtaining an

abortion without parental notice or consent), CCPA will reinforce

the choices of States that have chosen to require parental involvement in the abortion decision of minors. The laws of States that do

not require such involvement are not affected by CCPA.

Opponents also argue that CCPA violates the rights of residents

of each of the United States and of the District of Columbia to travel to and from any State of the Union for lawful purposes. Those

opposed to CCPA on these grounds argue that its result is to hold

a pregnant minor ‘‘hostage’’ to the laws of her home State. As an

initial matter, it does not appear that the Supreme Court has ever

held that Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce is limited by the ‘‘right to travel.’’ Even assuming, however, that Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause is limited by the right

to travel doctrine, the Supreme Court has recognized that the right

to travel is ‘‘not absolute,’’ and is not violated so long as there is

a ‘‘substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact

that they are citizens of other States.’’ 98 Congress obviously has a

substantial interest in protecting the health and well-being of

19

99 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (Bellotti II). 100 Id. at 639. 101 Id. at 634 102 Id. at 635. 103 Id. 104 Id. 105 Id. at 638–39.

minor girls, and in protecting the rights of parents to raise their

children.

Protecting the health and well-being of minor girls and the rights

of parents to raise their children are substantial, indeed compelling, reasons for restricting minors from obtaining an abortion

without parental involvement. First, young adolescent girls who

undergo abortions face a significant chance of suffering from longterm physical and psychological complications. These risks are not

shared by older teenage girls who have undergone an abortion. Second, ‘‘[c]onstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized

that the parents’ claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society,’’ and that ‘‘[p]roperly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the

latter.’’ 99 Thus, ‘‘[u]nder the Constitution, the State can properly

conclude that parents . . . who have [the] primary responsibility

for children’s well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility.’’ 100

Third, the fundamental rights of minors, including the right to

travel, are not equal to those of adults. Although the Court has

previously concluded that the fundamental rights of a child are

‘‘virtually coextensive with that of an adult,’’ 101 it also has recognized that ‘‘[t]hese rulings have not been made on the uncritical assumption that the constitutional rights of children are indistinguishable from those of adults.’’ 102 Thus, ‘‘the State is entitled to

adjust its legal system to account for children’s vulnerability and

their needs for ‘concern, . . . sympathy, and . . . paternal attention.’ ’’ 103

Based upon this reasoning the Court has allowed States to enact

laws that ‘‘account for children’s vulnerability’’ and that protect the

unique role of parents:

[T]he Court has held that the States validly may limit the

freedom of children to choose for themselves in the making

of important, affirmative choices with potentially serious

consequences. These rulings have been grounded in the

recognition that, during the formative years of childhood

and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that

could be detrimental to them.104

Thus, ‘‘[l]egal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive

of the parental role may be important to the child’s chances for the

full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free

society meaningful and rewarding.’’ 105 Therefore, a State may

properly subject minors to more stringent limitations than are permissible with respect to adults. Examples include laws that prohibit the sale of cigarettes and alcoholic beverages to minors, laws

that prohibit the sale of firearms and deadly weapons to minors

20

106 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 107See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 985 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 108 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 109For the articulation of the ‘‘undue burden’’ standard in Casey, see id. at 874–880. While

the ‘‘undue burden’’ standard as expressed in Casey appeared only to be the views of the threeperson plurality, Justice Scalia predicted that ‘‘undue burden’’ would henceforward be the relevant standard, see id. at 984–995 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It now appears that the lower Federal

courts understand that the ‘‘undue burden’’ standard is the correct one to be applied in abortion

cases, see, e.g., Manning v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254, 260 (4th Cir. 1997) (‘‘The trend does appear

to be a move away from the strict scrutiny standard toward the so-called ‘undue burden’ standard of review.’’). 110 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

without parental consent, and laws that prohibit third parties from

exposing minors to certain types of literature. Equally, Congress

may restrict the right of minors to travel across State lines to a

greater extent than it may adults.

Roe v. Wade and the Child Custody Protection Act

In Roe v. Wade,106 a majority of the Supreme Court found that

the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which provides

that no State shall deprive any person of ‘‘life, liberty, or property’’

without due process of law, includes within it a ‘‘substantive’’ component which bars a State from prohibiting abortions under some

circumstances. This substantive component of the Due Process

Clause, also described in that case as including a ‘‘right to privacy,’’

was construed to forbid virtually all State prohibitions on abortion

during the first trimester of pregnancy.107 In Planned Parenthood

v. Casey,108 the scope of permissible State regulation of abortion

and the standards to be applied in evaluating the constitutionality

of the regulation were significantly changed. Instead of declaring

that the right to seek an abortion was a ‘‘fundamental right’’ requiring a ‘‘compelling State interest’’ in order to be regulated, the

new holding was that State regulation of abortion was permissible

so long as such regulation did not place an ‘‘undue burden’’ on a

woman’s exercise of her constitutional rights with regard to abortion.109

H.R. 476 does not place an undue burden upon a woman’s right

to abortion because it does not raise any questions concerning the

permissible regulation of abortion that are independent of the State

laws that it is designed to effectuate. To the extent that a State

rule is inconsistent with the Court’s doctrine, that rule is ineffective and H.R. 476 would not make it effective. Therefore, it is unnecessary to ask whether, for example, the ‘‘life exception’’ in Subsection (b) of H.R. 476 is an adequate exception to a rule regulating

abortion or whether the inability to circumvent a State law is an

‘‘undue burden.’’ Because constitutional limits on the States’ regulatory authority are in effect incorporated into Subsection (a) of the

Act, Subsection (b) is in addition to any exceptions required by the

Court’s doctrine.

Constitutionality of Parental Involvement Laws

Following the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade,110 many States

enacted parental consent or notification statutes requiring minors

to notify or seek the consent of their parents before undergoing an

abortion. Parental consent laws generally require one or both parents to give actual consent to the minor’s decision to have an abortion. Parental notification laws typically require the physician, or

21

111 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 112 Id. at 74. 113 Id. at 74, 75. 114 428 U.S. 132 (1976). 115 In doing so the Court recongized minors bear ‘‘unquestionably greater risks of inability to

give an informed consent.’’ Id. at 147. 116 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 117See id. at 651. 118 Belloti II, 443 U.S. at 638. 119 Id. at 634.

in some statutes another health care provider, to notify one or both

of the parents of the minor female at some time prior to the abortion.

The Court first considered parental involvement in a minor

daughter’s abortion in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.

Danforth.111 The Missouri statute gave a minor girl’s parent an absolute veto over her decision to have an abortion. The majority, led

by Justice Blackmun, concluded that such a veto power was unconstitutional.112 The majority noted, however, that the Court ‘‘long

has recognized that the State has somewhat broader authority to

regulate the activities of children than of adults’’ and ‘‘emphasized’’

that its holding in the case ‘‘does not suggest that every minor, regardless of age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her pregnancy.’’ 113

The Court next addressed State parental involvement laws in

Bellotti v. Baird,114 remanding a parental consent statute that was

unclear as to whether the parents had authority to veto the abortion and as to the availability of a judicial bypass procedure.115 The

statute returned to the Supreme Court in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti

II).116 The statute in Bellotti II required a minor to obtain the consent of her parents or circumvent this requirement through a judicial bypass proceeding that did not take into account whether the

minor was sufficiently mature to make an informed decision regarding the abortion. The Supreme Court invalidated the statute

without a majority opinion.

Justice Powell’s plurality opinion held that a State could limit

the ability of a minor girl to obtain an abortion by requiring notification or consent of a parent if, but only if, the State established

a procedure where the minor girl could bypass the consent or notification requirement.117 Thus, Justice Powell stated, ‘‘constitutional

interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents’ claim

to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their

children is basic in the structure of our society,’’ and that

‘‘[p]roperly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is

not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty; rather, the

former is one of the basic presuppositions of the latter.’’ 118 This

has become the de facto constitutional standard for parental consent and notification laws. In upholding parental involvement laws,

the plurality found three reasons why the constitutional rights of

minors were not identical to the constitutional rights of adults:

‘‘The peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the

parental role in child rearing.’’ 119 Thus, the plurality sought to design guidelines for a judicial bypass proceeding that allowed States

to address these interests.

22

120 450 U.S. 398 (1981). 121 Id. at 409. 122 462 U.S. 476 (1983). 123 497 U.S. 502 (1990). 124See id. at 514–515. 125 497 U.S. 417 (1990). 126 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II). 127 Id. at 644.

In H.L. v. Matheson,120 a minor girl challenged the constitutional

validity of a State statute that required a physician to give notice

to the parents of a minor girl whenever possible before performing

an abortion on her. By a vote of six to three, the statute was found

to be constitutional. The Court held that a State could require notification of the parents of a minor girl because the notification ‘‘furthers a constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her parents in

making the very important decision whether or not to bear a

child.’’ 121

In Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc.

v. Ashcroft,122 the Court found a State law to be constitutional

which required a minor to obtain the consent of one of her parents

before obtaining an abortion or, in the alternative, to obtain the

consent of a juvenile court judge. While there was no majority opinion, this case marked the first time the Court directly upheld a parental consent requirement.

In Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,123 the Supreme

Court upheld a statute that required a physician to give notice to

one of the minor’s parents or, under some circumstances, another

relative, before performing an abortion on the minor. The statute

permitted the physician and the minor to avoid the requirement by

a judicial bypass. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, held

that the bypass proceeding did not unconstitutionally impair a minor’s rights by the creation of unnecessary delay.124 The Court established in this case that it will not invalidate State procedures

so long as they seem to be reasonably designed to provide the

minor with an expedited process.

In Hodgson v. Minnesota,125 the Court invalidated a State statute that required notification of both parents prior to a minor girl’s

abortion without the option of a judicial bypass. The Court, however, upheld statutory requirements that both parents be notified

of the abortion and a 48 hour waiting period between notification

and the performance of the abortion, if such requirements were accompanied by a judicial bypass procedure that met constitutional

standards.

Judicial Bypass Procedures

In Bellotti v. Baird,126 the United States Supreme Court set

forth the basic test by which judicial bypass proceedings pursuant

to a parental notice or consent statute must be reviewed. Bypass

procedures must allow the minor to show that she possesses maturity and information to make the decision, in consultation with her

physician, without regard to her parents’ wishes; or that even if

she cannot make the decision by herself, that the ‘‘desired abortion

would be in her best interests’’127; be confidential; and be conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:53 Apr 11, 2002 Jkt 099006 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR397.XXX pfrm04 PsN: HR397
23

128 Id. Factors that may be considered in determining ‘‘immaturity’’ include work and personal

experience, appreciation of the gravity of the procedure, and judgment. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990). Under the ‘‘best interests’’ analysis judges often consider medical

risks to the minor as a result of the time, place or type of procedure to be performed, medical

risks particular to the girl, evidence of physicial, sexual, or emotional abuse by parents or

guardians, and abortion alternatives such as marriage, adoption, and single motherhood. 129 A survey of Massachusetts cases filed between 1981 and 1983 found that every minor that

sought judicial authorization to bypass parental consent received it. See Robert H. Mnookin,

Bellotti v. Baird, A Hard Case in In the Interest of Children: Advocacy, Law Reform, and Public

Policy 149 at 239 (Robert H. Mnookin ed., 1985). A subsequent study found that orders were

refused to only 1 of 477 girls seeking judicial authorization from Massachusetts courts between

December 1981 and June 1985. See Susanne Yates & Anita J. Pliner, Judging Maturity in the

Courts: the Massachusetts Consent Statute, 78 Am. J. Pub. Health 646, 647 (1988). The average

hearing lasted only 12.12 minutes, and ‘‘more than 92 percent of the hearings [were] less than

or equal to 20 minutes.’’ Id. at 648. Based upon a review of bypass petitions filed in Minnesota

from August 1, 1981, to March 1, 1986, a Federal trial court determined that of the 3,573 bypass

petitions filed, six were withdrawn, nine were denied, and 3,558 were granted. See Hodgson v. State of Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 765 (D. Minn. 1986). Similar ease in obtaining judicial

approval as an alternative to parental involvement is suggested by a recent report on the newly

enacted Virginia statute requiring parental notification. Out of 18 requests for judicial bypass,

‘‘all but one of the requests were granted eventually.’’ Ellen Nakashima, Fewer Teens Receiving

Abortion in Virginia: Notification Law to Get Court Test, Washington Post (March 3, 1998). 130 See Child Custody Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 1218 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (May 27, 1999) (statement of Billie

Lominick). 131 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644 (1979) (plurality opinion). 132 868 F.2d 459 (1st Cir. 1989).

ducted ‘‘with expedition to allow the minor an effective opportunity

to obtain the abortion.’’ 128

Some critics of H.R. 476 argue that it will remove the only viable

option available to minors who feel that they cannot tell their parents that they wish to obtain abortions. This argument ignores,

however, the available judicial bypass procedures which all valid

parental involvement statutes contain. Opponents of H.R. 476 also

argue that judicial bypass procedures are too complicated and intrusive to be an effective option for most young girls. Yet, in actuality, judicial bypass proceedings are quite simple and bypasses are

easily obtained.129

Critics of H.R. 476 also claim that the measure endangers the

health of young girls who are forced to travel out of State to obtain

abortions because the judges in their home States either refuse to

hear judicial bypass petitions or deny them arbitrarily. In support

of this argument, the critics cite cases like that of Ms. Billie

Lominick, who testified before the Constitution Subcommittee regarding her experience with South Carolina’s judicial bypass procedures. According to Ms. Lominick, who assisted her grandson’s

girlfriend in obtaining an out-of-State abortion, only two judges in

the whole State of South Carolina would even hear a judicial bypass petition, and one of those judges, according to Ms. Lominick,

would only hear petitions from girls residing in his county.130

This argument overlooks the fact that H.R. 476 merely provides

assistance in the enforcement of constitutional State parental notice and consent laws. If there are only two judges in an entire

State willing to hear judicial bypass proceedings, that State’s parental involvement laws are likely unconstitutional under Supreme

Court precedent which requires the State to provide a minor the

opportunity to seek a judicial bypass with ‘‘sufficient expedition to

provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained.’’ 131

This fact is illustrated by the First Circuit’s decision in Planned

Parenthood League v. Bellotti.132 In that case the court held that

the plaintiffs could successfully challenge the State’s judicial bypass procedures if they could present ‘‘proof of ‘a systemic failure

24

133 Id. at 469 (quoting Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F.Supp. 756, 777 (1986)). 134 Id. at 463. 135 Id. at 461 n.6. 136 See Cleveland Surgi-Center, Inc. v. Jones, 2 F.3d 686, 690 (6th Cir. 1993). 137 1999 WL 371565 (9th Cir. June 9, 1999). 138 Id. at *4. 139 Id. at *8. 140See Causeway Medical Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096 (5th Cir. 1997). 141 Id. at 1110–11.

to provide a judicial bypass option in the most expeditious, practical manner.‘ ’’ 133 The court of appeals remanded the case to the

lower court so that the plaintiffs’ could present evidence that,

among other things, judges were ‘‘ ‘defacto unavailable’ to hear minors’ abortion petitions,’’ 134 and many judges were avoided ‘‘for

reasons of hostility.’’ 135 The Sixth Circuit has also recognized that

a constitutional challenge may be brought for a State’s systemic

failure to provide an expeditious judicial bypass.136

Not only must States provide access to judges who are willing to

hear judicial bypass petitions, States must also ensure that the

judges who do hear bypass petitions render their decisions in an

expedited fashion. For example, in Planned Parenthood of Southern

Arizona v. Lawall,137 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

struck down an Arizona parental consent statute on the grounds

that its judicial bypass provision lacked specific time limits, and

was therefore in violation of the Bellotti II expediency requirement.

The court reached this conclusion even though the Arizona statute

stated that such proceedings were to be given priority, and required that ‘‘the court shall reach the decision [on a bypass request] promptly and without delay to serve the best interests of a

pregnant minor.’’ 138 The court’s rationale in adopting a strict interpretation of the Supreme Court’s timeliness requirement was that

‘‘[o]pen-ended bypass provisions engender substantial possibilities

of delay for minors seeking abortions.’’ 139

The Fifth Circuit employed essentially identical reasoning in

striking down a Louisiana judicial bypass procedure having indefinite time limits.140 The court found that ‘‘not only do [the bypass

procedures] fail to provide any specific time within which a minor’s

application will be decided, but they give no assurances (assurances

required by Bellotti II) that the proceedings will conclude expeditiously.’’ 141

As these cases illustrate, judicial bypass procedures must be

readily accessible and efficient in order to pass constitutional muster. H.R. 476 will only assist in the enforcement of parental involvement laws which meet the relevant constitutional criteria.

This line of cases makes clear that a State may require the consent or notification of one or both of a minor’s parents if the State

provides for a constitutionally sound judicial bypass procedure. The

Child Custody Protection Act is designed to preserve the application of such State laws, supplemented by a penalty section to provide a uniform penalty for those individuals circumventing laws by

crossing State lines. Because the Act derives its substantive content entirely from State law, the Act will only be enforceable when

a prosecutor can show that a constitutionally sound State parental

consent or notification law exists. Thus, the CCPA itself does not

independently implicate any constitutional issues associated with

parental notification or consent statutes.

25

HEARINGS

The Committee’s Subcommittee on the Constitution held a hearing on H.R. 476 on September 6, 2001. Testimony was received

from the following witnesses: Ms. Eileen Roberts, Mothers Against

Minors’ Abortions, Inc.; Professor John C. Harrison, Professor of

Law, University of Virginia School of Law; Rev. Katherine

Ragsdale, Vicar, St. David’s Episcopal Church; and Ms. Teresa S.

Collett, Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. Additional

material was submitted by Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL);

Mr. Laurence H. Tribe, Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Unviersity and Mr. Peter J. Rubin, Associate Professor of

Law, Georgetown University; Bill and Karen Bell; and the Center

for Reproductive Law and Policy.

COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

On February 7, 2002, the Subcommittee on the Constitution met

in open session and ordered favorably reported the bill H.R. 476,

by a voice vote, a quorum being present. On March 20, 2002, the

Committee met in open session and ordered favorably reported the

bill H.R.476 without amendment by a recorded vote of 19 to 6, a

quorum being present.

VOTE OF THE COMMITTEE

1. An amendment was offered by Mrs. Waters to prohibit subsection (a) of the Act from applying ‘‘if the pregnancy is the result

of sexual contact with a parent or any other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for supervision of the minor, or by any household or family member.’’ The

amendment was defeated by a rollcall vote of 12 to 16.

ROLLCALL NO. 1

Ayes Nays Present

Mr. Hyde ............................................................................................................

Mr. Gekas .......................................................................................................... X

Mr. Coble ........................................................................................................... X

Mr. Smith (Texas) ............................................................................................. X

Mr. Gallegly .......................................................................................................

Mr. Goodlatte .................................................................................................... X

Mr. Bryant ......................................................................................................... X

Mr. Chabot ........................................................................................................ X

Mr. Barr ............................................................................................................. X

Mr. Jenkins ........................................................................................................ X

Mr. Cannon .......................................................................................................

Mr. Graham .......................................................................................................

Mr. Bachus ........................................................................................................ X

Mr. Hostettler .................................................................................................... X

Mr. Green .......................................................................................................... X

Mr. Keller ........................................................................................................... X

Mr. Issa ............................................................................................................. X

Ms. Hart ............................................................................................................ X

Mr. Flake ...........................................................................................................

Mr. Pence .......................................................................................................... X

Mr. Conyers ....................................................................................................... X

Mr. Frank ........................................................................................................... X

Mr. Berman ....................................................................................................... X

Mr. Boucher .......................................................................................................

Mr. Nadler ......................................................................................................... X

Mr. Scott ........................................................................................................... X

26

ROLLCALL NO. 1—Continued

Ayes Nays Present

Mr. Watt ............................................................................................................ X

Ms. Lofgren ....................................................................................................... X

Ms. Jackson Lee ................................................................................................ X

Ms. Waters ........................................................................................................ X

Mr. Meehan .......................................................................................................

Mr. Delahunt .....................................................................................................

Mr. Wexler .........................................................................................................

Ms. Baldwin ...................................................................................................... X

Mr. Weiner ......................................................................................................... X

Mr. Schiff .......................................................................................................... X

Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman .......................................................................... X

Total ................................................................................................ 12 16

2. An amendment was offered by Mr. Nadler prohibiting H.R.

476 from applying ‘‘with respect to conduct by a grandparent or

adult sibling of the minor.’’ The amendment was defeated by a rollcall vote of 11 to 16.

ROLLCALL NO. 2

Ayes Nays Present

Mr. Hyde ............................................................................................................

Mr. Gekas .......................................................................................................... X

Mr. Coble ........................................................................................................... X

Mr. Smith (Texas) ............................................................................................. X

Mr. Gallegly .......................................................................................................

Mr. Goodlatte .................................................................................................... X

Mr. Bryant .........................................................................................................

Mr. Chabot ........................................................................................................ X

Mr. Barr ............................................................................................................. X

Mr. Jenkins ........................................................................................................ X

Mr. Cannon .......................................................................................................

Mr. Graham ....................................................................................................... X

Mr. Bachus ........................................................................................................ X

Mr. Hostettler .................................................................................................... X

Mr. Green .......................................................................................................... X

Mr. Keller ........................................................................................................... X

Mr. Issa ............................................................................................................. X

Ms. Hart ............................................................................................................ X

Mr. Flake ...........................................................................................................

Mr. Pence .......................................................................................................... X

Mr. Conyers ....................................................................................................... X

Mr. Frank ........................................................................................................... X

Mr. Berman ....................................................................................................... X

Mr. Boucher .......................................................................................................

Mr. Nadler ......................................................................................................... X

Mr. Scott ........................................................................................................... X

Mr. Watt ............................................................................................................ X

Ms. Lofgren .......................................................................................................

Ms. Jackson Lee ................................................................................................ X

Ms. Waters ........................................................................................................ X

Mr. Meehan .......................................................................................................

Mr. Delahunt .....................................................................................................

Mr. Wexler .........................................................................................................

Ms. Baldwin ...................................................................................................... X

Mr. Weiner ......................................................................................................... X

Mr. Schiff .......................................................................................................... X

Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman .......................................................................... X

Total ................................................................................................ 11 16

27

3. Motion to reconsider the previous question on H.R. 476 was

defeated by a rollcall vote of 7 to 16.

ROLLCALL NO. 3

Ayes Nays Present

Mr. Hyde ............................................................................................................ X

Mr. Gekas .......................................................................................................... X

Mr. Coble ........................................................................................................... X

Mr. Smith (Texas) ............................................................................................. X

Mr. Gallegly ....................................................................................................... X

Mr. Goodlatte ....................................................................................................

Mr. Bryant .........................................................................................................

Mr. Chabot ........................................................................................................ X

Mr. Barr ............................................................................................................. X

Mr. Jenkins ........................................................................................................ X

Mr. Cannon ....................................................................................................... X

Mr. Graham ....................................................................................................... X

Mr. Bachus ........................................................................................................

Mr. Hostettler .................................................................................................... X

Mr. Green .......................................................................................................... X

Mr. Keller ........................................................................................................... X

Mr. Issa ............................................................................................................. X

Ms. Hart ............................................................................................................ X

Mr. Flake ...........................................................................................................

Mr. Pence ..........................................................................................................

Mr. Conyers .......................................................................................................

Mr. Frank ...........................................................................................................

Mr. Berman .......................................................................................................

Mr. Boucher .......................................................................................................

Mr. Nadler ......................................................................................................... X

Mr. Scott ........................................................................................................... X

Mr. Watt ............................................................................................................ X

Ms. Lofgren .......................................................................................................

Ms. Jackson Lee ................................................................................................ X

Ms. Waters ........................................................................................................ X

Mr. Meehan .......................................................................................................

Mr. Delahunt .....................................................................................................

Mr. Wexler .........................................................................................................

Ms. Baldwin ...................................................................................................... X

Mr. Weiner .........................................................................................................

Mr. Schiff .......................................................................................................... X

Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman .......................................................................... X

Total ................................................................................................ 7 16

4. Final Passage. The motion to report favorably the bill H.R. 476

was agreed to by a rollcall vote of 19 to 6.

ROLLCALL NO. 4

Ayes Nays Present

Mr. Hyde ............................................................................................................ X

Mr. Gekas .......................................................................................................... X

Mr. Coble ........................................................................................................... X

Mr. Smith (Texas) ............................................................................................. X

Mr. Gallegly ....................................................................................................... X

Mr. Goodlatte .................................................................................................... X

Mr. Bryant .........................................................................................................

Mr. Chabot ........................................................................................................ X

Mr. Barr ............................................................................................................. X

Mr. Jenkins ........................................................................................................ X

Mr. Cannon ....................................................................................................... X

Mr. Graham ....................................................................................................... X

Mr. Bachus ........................................................................................................ X

Mr. Hostettler .................................................................................................... X

28

ROLLCALL NO. 4—Continued

Ayes Nays Present

Mr. Green .......................................................................................................... X

Mr. Keller ........................................................................................................... X

Mr. Issa ............................................................................................................. X

Ms. Hart ............................................................................................................ X

Mr. Flake ...........................................................................................................

Mr. Pence .......................................................................................................... X

Mr. Conyers .......................................................................................................

Mr. Frank ...........................................................................................................

Mr. Berman .......................................................................................................

Mr. Boucher .......................................................................................................

Mr. Nadler ......................................................................................................... X

Mr. Scott ........................................................................................................... X

Mr. Watt ............................................................................................................ X

Ms. Lofgren .......................................................................................................

Ms. Jackson Lee ................................................................................................ X

Ms. Waters ........................................................................................................ X

Mr. Meehan .......................................................................................................

Mr. Delahunt .....................................................................................................

Mr. Wexler .........................................................................................................

Ms. Baldwin ...................................................................................................... X

Mr. Weiner .........................................................................................................

Mr. Schiff .......................................................................................................... X

Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman .......................................................................... X

Total ................................................................................................ 19 6 1

COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the

House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the findings

and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.

PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

H.R. 476 does not authorize funding. Therefore, clause 3(c) of

rule XIII of the Rules of the House is inapplicable.

NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY AND TAX EXPENDITURES

Clause 3(c)(2) of House rule XIII is inapplicable because this legislation does not provide new budgetary authority or increased tax

expenditures.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the

House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with respect to

the bill, H.R. 476, the following estimate and comparison prepared

by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section

402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974:

29

U.S. CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, Washington, DC, March 22, 2002.

Hon. F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., Chairman,

Committee on the Judiciary,

House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 476, the Child Custody

Protection Act.

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Mark Grabowicz, who

can be reached at 226–2860.

Sincerely,

DAN L. CRIPPEN, Director.

Enclosure

cc: Honorable John Conyers, Jr.

Ranking Member

H.R. 476—Child Custody Protection Act.

CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 476 would not result in

any significant cost to the Federal Government. Because enactment

of H.R. 476 could affect direct spending and receipts, pay-as-yougo procedures would apply to the bill. However, CBO estimates

that any impact on direct spending and receipts would not be significant. H.R. 476 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector

mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and

would impose no costs on State, local, or tribal governments.

H.R. 476 would make it a Federal crime to transport a minor

across state lines, under certain circumstances, to obtain an abortion without parental notification. Violators would be subject to imprisonment and fines. As a result, the Federal Government would

be able to pursue cases that it otherwise would not be able to prosecute. CBO expects that any increase in Federal costs for law enforcement, court proceedings, or prison operations would not be significant, however, because of the small number of cases likely to be

involved. Any such additional costs would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds.

Because those prosecuted and convicted under H.R. 476 could be

subject to criminal fines, the Federal Government might collect additional fines if the bill is enacted. Collections of such fines are recorded in the budget as governmental receipts (revenues), which

are deposited in the Crime Victims Fund and later spent. CBO expects that any additional receipts and direct spending would be

negligible.

The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Mark Grabowicz, who

can be reached at 226–2860. This estimate was approved by Peter

H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENT

Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House

of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for this legislation in article I, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution.

30

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

H.R. 476 amends title 18 of the United States Code by adding

sec. 2401 to criminalize the transportation of minors to avoid certain laws relating to abortion.

Section 1. Short Title

This section states that the short title of this bill is the ‘‘Child

Custody Protection Act.’’

Section 2. Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain

laws relating to abortion. Section 2(a) amends title 18 of the United

States Code by inserting after chapter 117 the following:

Chapter 117A—Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws relating to abortion.

Subsection (a) of this section makes the knowing transportation

across a State line of a person under 18 years of age with the intent that she obtain an abortion, in abridgement of a parent’s right

of involvement according to State law, a violation of this statute

and a chargeable offense.

Subsection (a), paragraph (1), imposes a maximum of 1 year imprisonment or a fine, or both.

Subsection (a), paragraph (2) specifies the criteria for a violation

of the parental right under this statute as follows: an abortion

must be performed on a minor in a State other than the minor’s

residence and without the parental consent or notification, or the

judicial authorization, that would have been required had the abortion been performed in the minor’s State of residence.

Subsection (b), paragraph (1) specifies that subsection (a) does

not apply if the abortion is necessary to save the life of the minor.

Subsection (b), paragraph (2) clarifies that neither the minor

being transported nor her parents may be prosecuted or sued for

a violation of this bill.

Subsection (c) provides an affirmative defense to prosecution or

civil action based on violation of the bill where the defendant reasonably believed, based on information obtained directly from the

girl’s parent or other compelling facts, that the requirements of the

girl’s State of residence regarding parental involvement or judicial

authorization in abortions had been satisfied.

Subsection (d) establishes a civil cause of action for a parent who

suffers legal harm from a violation of subsection (a).

Subsection (e) sets forth definitions of certain terms in this bill.

Subsection (e)(1)(A) defines ‘‘a law requiring parental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision’’ to be a law requiring either

‘‘the notification to, or consent of, a parent of that minor’’ or ‘‘proceedings in a State court.’’

Subsection (e)(1)(B) stipulates that a law conforming to the definition in (e)(1)(A) cannot provide notification to or consent of any

person or entity other than a ‘‘parent’’ as defined in the subsequent

section.

Subsection (e)(2) defines ‘‘parent’’ to mean a parent or guardian,

or a legal custodian, or a person standing in loco parentis (if that

person has ‘‘care and control’’ of the minor and is a person with

whom the minor ‘‘regularly resides’’) and who is designated by the

applicable State parental involvement law as the person to whom

notification, or from whom consent, is required.

31

Subsection (e)(3) defines ‘‘minor’’ to mean a person not older than

the maximum age requiring parental notification or consent, or

proceedings in a State court, under the parental involvement law

of the State where the minor resides.

Subsection (e)(4) defines ‘‘State’’ to include the District of Columbia ‘‘and any commonwealth, possession, or other territory of the

United States.’’ Section 2(b) is a clerical amendment to insert the new chapter

in the table of chapters for part I of title 18.

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the

House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill,

as reported, are shown as follows (new matter is printed in italics

and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in

roman):

TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE

* * * * * * *

PART I—CRIMES

Chap. Sec.

1. General provisions ................................................................................. 1

* * * * * * *

117. Transportation for illegal sexual activity and related crimes 2421

117A. Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws

relating to abortion ........................................................... 2431

* * * * * * *

CHAPTER 117A—TRANSPORTATION OF MINORS IN CIRCUMVENTION OF CERTAIN LAWS RELATING TO ABORTION

Sec.

2431. Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws relating to abortion.

§ 2431. Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain

laws relating to abortion

(a) OFFENSE.—

(1) GENERALLY.—Except as provided in subsection (b), whoever knowingly transports an individual who has not attained

the age of 18 years across a State line, with the intent that such

individual obtain an abortion, and thereby in fact abridges the

right of a parent under a law requiring parental involvement

in a minor’s abortion decision, in force in the State where the

individual resides, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned

not more than one year, or both.

(2) DEFINITION.—For the purposes of this subsection, an

abridgement of the right of a parent occurs if an abortion is

performed on the individual, in a State other than the State

where the individual resides, without the parental consent or

notification, or the judicial authorization, that would have been

32

required by that law had the abortion been performed in the

State where the individual resides.

(b) EXCEPTIONS.—(1) The prohibition of subsection (a) does not

apply if the abortion was necessary to save the life of the minor because her life was endangered by a physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, including a life endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself.

(2) An individual transported in violation of this section, and

any parent of that individual, may not be prosecuted or sued for a

violation of this section, a conspiracy to violate this section, or an

offense under section 2 or 3 based on a violation of this section.

(c) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.—It is an affirmative defense to a

prosecution for an offense, or to a civil action, based on a violation

of this section that the defendant reasonably believed, based on information the defendant obtained directly from a parent of the individual or other compelling facts, that before the individual obtained

the abortion, the parental consent or notification, or judicial authorization took place that would have been required by the law requiring parental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision, had the

abortion been performed in the State where the individual resides.

(d) CIVIL ACTION.—Any parent who suffers legal harm from a

violation of subsection (a) may obtain appropriate relief in a civil

action.

(e) DEFINITIONS.—For the purposes of this section—

(1) a law requiring parental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision is a law—

(A) requiring, before an abortion is performed on a

minor, either—

(i) the notification to, or consent of, a parent of

that minor; or

(ii) proceedings in a State court; and

(B) that does not provide as an alternative to the requirements described in subparagraph (A) notification to or

consent of any person or entity who is not described in that

subparagraph;

(2) the term ‘‘parent’’ means—

(A) a parent or guardian;

(B) a legal custodian; or

(C) a person standing in loco parentis who has care

and control of the minor, and with whom the minor regularly resides,

who is designated by the law requiring parental involvement in

the minor’s abortion decision as a person to whom notification,

or from whom consent, is required;

(3) the term ‘‘minor’’ means an individual who is not older

than the maximum age requiring parental notification or consent, or proceedings in a State court, under the law requiring

parental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision; and

(4) the term ‘‘State’’ includes the District of Columbia and

any commonwealth, possession, or other territory of the United

States.

* * * * * * *

33

MARKUP TRANSCRIPT

BUSINESS MEETING

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 20, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:50 a.m., in Room

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The Committee will be in order.

[Intervening business.]

Now, the main event on the schedule today is the markup on the

bill H.R. 476, and the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio,

Mr. Chabot, to make a motion.

[The bill, H.R. 476, follows:]

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35

36

37

38

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the Chairman for yielding.

There is no serious dispute regarding the fact that minors are

routinely transported across State lines.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Will the gentleman from Ohio move

to report the bill favorably? And then you’ll be recognized.

Mr. CHABOT. I do so move, yes.

39

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Okay, and the gentleman is now recognized for 5 minutes in support of his motion.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you.

There is no serious dispute regarding the fact that minors are

routinely transported across State lines for the purpose of obtaining an abortion in circumvention of parental involvement laws.

One prominent abortion rights advocated stated that thousands

of adults are helping minors cross State lines to get abortions in

States whose parental involvement requirements are less stringent

or nonexistent.

As recently as last August, another abortion rights advocate

voiced her willingness to help pregnant young girls residing in New

Jersey to cross State lines in order to obtain an abortion should the

State’s Legislature pass a parental involvement statute.

Thus, H.R. 476, the ‘‘Child Custody Protection Act,’’ would make

it a Federal offense to knowingly transport a minor across a State

line with the intent that she obtain an abortion in circumvention

of a State’s parental consent or notification statute.

H.R. 476 is a regulation of interstate commerce that seeks to protect the health and safety of young girls and parents’ rights to be

involved in the medical decisions of a minor daughter by preventing validly enacted and constitutionally sound State parental

involvement laws from being circumvented.

As such, it falls well within Congress’s constitutional authority

to regulate the transportation of individuals in interstate commerce. There is a solid body of case law that remains unaffected

by recent Supreme Court rulings, limiting the reach of Congress’ commerce clause authority, which confirms that the authority of

Congress to regulate the transportation of individuals in interstate

commerce is no longer in question.

For example, the Mann Act, which flatly prohibited the interstate transportation of women for prostitution of for any other immoral purpose was upheld by the Supreme Court, which stated

that, under the commerce clause, ‘‘Congress has power over transportation among the several States,’’ and characterized this power

as being complete in itself, and concluded that incident to this

power, Congress may adopt not only means necessary but also

means convenient to its exercise, even if it has ‘‘the quality of police regulation.’’

Application of the Mann Act has been upheld relative to the

transportation of a person to Nevada, even though prostitution in

Nevada is legal.

Federal prohibitions on the transportation of lottery tickets in

interstate commerce and placing letters or circulars concerning lotteries in the mail have also been upheld, regardless of whether or

not lotteries are legal in the State to which the tickets or letters

are transported.

Rather than exercising its full authority under the commerce

clause by simply prohibiting the interstate transportation of minors

for abortions without obtaining parental notice or consent, H.R. 476

respects the rights of the various States to make these often controversial policy decisions for themselves and ensures that each

State’s policy aims regarding the issue are not frustrated.

Nothing in H.R. 476 affects the ability of minors residing in

States that have chosen not to enact a parental involvement law

40

or where an parental involvement is currently not enforced from

obtaining an abortion without the knowledge of their parents.

At the heart of the debate surrounding the Child Custody Protection Act is a disagreement about whether common-sense legislation

should be enacted in order to preserve the health of pregnant

young girls and support parents in the exercise of their most basic

right.

This debate has already been held in almost all of this Nations’

State legislatures, 43 of which have reasonably concluded that parents should be involved in their minor daughter’s decision whether

or not to obtain abortion.

In upholding the constitutionality of parental notice and consent

statutes, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized that during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often

lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and

avoid choices that could be detrimental to them. This is especially

true for young girls seeking an abortion as they face particular

physical and psychological risks associated with the procedure.

Parental involvement laws have been enacted after informed political debate, and Congress is well within its authority to ensure

that the channels of interstate commerce are not used to frustrate

the policy goals of these laws.

I urge my colleagues to approve the legislation, which has been

approved twice by this Committee and twice by the Members of the

House. The futures of our daughters demand nothing less.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from New York, Mr.

Nadler, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Today’s bill is, thankfully, we all know, not going anywhere. This

is the third Congress in a row where you’ve considered it, the third

Congress in which, we can be certain, that it will receive no consideration in the Senate, regardless of the party in charge.

It’s the third Congress in a row in which this House is simply

posturing for the anti-choice extremists.

If passed, however, the big hand of Government, meddling into

the most sensitive and often tragic family situations, could do real

harm. So, while irritating, this is no laughing matter.

Exporting the ill-considered laws of some States to others, whose

citizens see these difficult matters in very different terms, is not

an appropriate role for the Federal Government. Were it not for the

fact that the consequences of this ill-advised and unconstitutional

proposal could cost lives and destroy families, I would be tempted

to throw up my hands and say it’s not worth wasting the time debating the bill. But we cannot do that. The stakes are too high.

No matter how many times we have to repeat this, I know that

both you and I and our colleagues on this Committee feel too

strongly about what is at stake here. The lives and futures of

young women facing some of life’s most difficult situations is a

pressing responsibility of this Committee, and so I join my colleagues here today to speak for these young women.

This is a bad bill and should be rejected. Our oath to be faithful

to the Constitution demands it. Our respect for the rights of the

people of each of the several States demands it. And most of all,

41

the fates of the young women whose lives would be irreparably

harmed by this legislation demand it.

We can and have had honest disagreements about the wisdom of

parental consent and notification laws. Many of the Members of

this Committee have previously served in our respective State legislatures and have debated this issue as a matter of State law.

We’re not going to settle that difference of opinion here today.

What we can settle, however, is the question of whether the people of one State should be allowed to set the policy affecting families, abused young people, and the proper role of the State when

circumstances are less than ideal, for other States. That is where

this bill clearly fails.

In New York, for example, we have rejected this policy, the policy

of parental consent, not because we believe that families should not

deal with such issues together in a loving environment, but because we recognize that the law must not ignore the fact that the

most difficult situations of those young women who do not have

safe, loving families to assist them in such trying times.

There is absolutely no reason why a clergy person, such as the

priest who testified at our hearing, who assists a young woman

who goes from Pennsylvania to a doctor a few minutes away in

New York, should face Federal charges. Nor should a grandmother

who assists a young woman who has been sexually assaulted by a

stepfather spend time in the Federal penitentiary.

While the majority of young women do these make these decisions, and should, in conjunction with their parents, there are

cases where they simply cannot.

While the Supreme Court has required that State laws providing

for parental consent include a judicial bypass, we all know there

are judges out there who will impose their own private religious

views on the young women who appear before them and who routinely refuse to grant court permission in any case, no matter how

desperate.

Reality, my colleagues, is regrettably messier than the rhetoric

in the Congress.

We have decided this issue for ourselves in New York, and other

States have decided it both ways. The Federal Government has no

business prosecuting people for doing what New York has decided

is appropriate and legal in our State. The Federal Government

should not seek to allow a State to hold its citizens hostage and to

say, ‘‘We will prevent you from going to another State to do what

is legal in that State, because we don’t approve of it in this State.’’

It seems to me that we hear a lot of rhetoric about Government

being at the local level, or the nearest level that is practical, from

the other side of the aisle. We hear a lot of rhetoric about the

States being able to decide things for themselves. And in this area,

they have. And some States have decided to require parental consent or notification laws, and other States have decided not to do

so. To empower—to recruit the Federal Government to extend the

long hand of one State to imprison its citizens in another State is

simply wrong.

The State laws should govern in the State where they are. And

who the heck is the Federal Government to say that we so disapprove, we are so morally disapproving of the law of the State of

New York, that we will criminally prosecute anybody who helps

42

someone go to New York to take advantage of its law? That is an

insult to the 20 or 25, whatever number, States that have chosen

not to require such laws.

The Federal Government should not impose its will in such

cases, and to do so is not only an insult to those States, but to

every—any conceivable concept of federalism.

Thank you very much.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

All Members may put opening statements in the record at this

point.

Are there amendments?

The gentlewoman from California——

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman from California—

ladies first.

The gentlewoman from California had her hand up.

Ms. WATERS. This is the first time I’ve known ladies to be first

in this Committee, but I’ll take it. [Laughter.]

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. A new broom sweeps the floor——

Ms. WATERS. I have an amendment at the desk.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report the amendment.

The CLERK. Amendment to H.R. 476, offered by Ms. Waters.

Page 3, after line 19, insert the following: Paragraph (3), the prohibition of subsection (a) does not apply if the pregnancy is the result

of sexual contact with a parent or any other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for supervision of the minor, or by any household or family member.

[The amendment follows:]

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman is recognized for 5

minutes.

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much.

43

Mr. Chairman and Members, this is a bill we have seen the past

three Congresses, even though it’s riddled with problems.

First, I sincerely believe it would pose a risk to young women’s

health. Second, it is unconstitutional on several levels. Third, it

will harm not help communications between pregnant teens and

their parents.

I’m going to get right to the meat of this matter. This bill, for

example, fails to take into account the very tragic and very real situation of a young girl who has been the victim of sexual contact

by a parent, stepparent or other relative or household member. We

should all be able to agree that young girl in that situation has the

right to chose an abortion. That’s exactly what my amendment

would do.

Sadly, some pregnancies result from unwanted sexual contact.

Adding to that horror is the fact that many families are unable or

unwilling to deal with the realties of the situation. A mother may

chose not to believe that the child’s father or stepfather could have

done such a horrible thing. She may even share the child’s confidences with the very person who committed the deed, thus potentially putting the child at great risk.

Many of you may know of the tragic case of Spring Adams, a 13-

year-old 6th grader from Idaho. She was shot to death by her father after he learned that she was planning to terminate a pregnancy caused by his acts of incest.

My amendment addresses this problem. It provides that the prohibitions of H.R. 476 would not apply when the minor child’s pregnancy resulted from sexual contact with a parent, stepparent, custodian or any household or family member. We cannot demand that

such a child share her situation with that person.

When the child turns, instead, to a grandparent or adult sibling

or boyfriend, we should let her do so. Otherwise, we will find young

girls impregnated by relatives or household members seeking to

deal with it in anyway they can, whether they do so by traveling

alone to another State for the procedure or take care of it through

a self-induced or illegal back-alley abortion.

I would urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Does the gentlewoman yield back?

Ms. WATERS. I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr.

Chabot.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Move to strike the last word.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman is recognized for 5

minutes.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I rise in opposition to this amendment. In situations involving incest, it’s extremely important that minors who are being abused in

this manner bring the abuse to the attention of the authorities as

soon as possible.

This amendment would encourage minors not to pursue a confidential judicial bypass hearing during which the abuse may be reported to the court or to seek the assistance of authorities in some

other way. In fact, it would encourage the minors to seek out-ofVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:53 Apr 11, 2002 Jkt 099006 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR397.XXX pfrm04 PsN: HR397
44

State abortions and return to the very environment in which the

incest occurred.

For that reason, I strongly oppose this amendment and yield

back the balance of my time.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr.

Conyers.

Mr. CONYERS. I rise to support the Waters amendment.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman is recognized for 5

minutes.

Mr. CONYERS. Members of the Committee, this amendment

makes it easier for women who have been impregnated as a result

of sexual contact by someone in the family system or someone

they’ve confided in, and it does so by prohibiting prosecutions in

cases where a young woman is so impregnated.

Today, a household may be comprised of all kinds of combinations of parents, single parents, stepparents, older siblings. So,

under those kinds of circumstances, there’s a, I imagine, a feeling

of desperation and isolation that could easily develop.

So where abuse already exists, confronting a parent is not a really serious option. Our studies have all shown that abusive and dysfunctional families have a higher incidence of violence when some

kind of pregnancy like this occurs. And many can’t bear the

thought of informing their mother their pregnancy was caused by

a father, boyfriend, stepfather or something like that. They know

that means they’ll be leaving the house soon.

And so going out of State becomes an even more important option. And when that option is taken away, they can sometimes

move for dangerous alternatives.

I think the common-sense way to improve this bill, even with its

constitutional problems, is to support the Waters amendment.

I yield back.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Alabama, Mr.

Bachus.

Mr. BACHUS. I think this a very important amendment, because

I think we all agree that thousands of young women are being

transported across State lines every day to get abortions without

their parents’ knowledge or consent.

Now, if—and I’ll accept the fact that many of these women are

being impregnated by a stepfather or by, say, a brother or stepbrother in the home. And it would seem that those are very cases

where it is absolutely mandatory that we not allow this to go on,

because if their stepfather’s impregnating them, and I think we all

agree that’s happening in hundreds of cases, probably every day in

this country, they go across State lines, they obtain an abortion,

the courts don’t find out about it. The young girl comes back, she

goes right back into that environment again, she gets pregnant

again, she’s abused again.

To me, it’s very important, in a case like that, that we would say:

Go to the court, bring this to the attention of the court, prosecute

this person.

If fact, I think by offering this amendment, Ms. Waters is actually—actually, she’s actually turned a light on in my mind for another absolutely critical reason to pass this legislation, and that’s

the fact that we have—and these are people that I think mean

45

well. They, number one, they—I don’t agree with them, but they

believe that abortion is a legitimate alternative. But, number two,

they’re transporting young girls who have been abused by their

stepparents or in an abusive family situation across the State line,

thinking that’s in their best interests, but nothing is being done

what’s happening at home.

Ms. WATERS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BACHUS. They ought to end up—that’s the very cases that

ought to—don’t we agree that when a young woman—— Ms. WATERS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BACHUS.—is being sexually abused and has had intercourse

with the stepfather or by—even by her own blood father, that that

is the very case we ought to carry into court and end that foolishness, as opposed to dragging that poor girl across State lines, having her get an abortion, bring her back.

And in many cases, we know that these young girls are having

two and three and four abortions. They come back and—— Ms. WATERS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BACHUS.—they end up sterile. They don’t have any ability to

have children, all because somebody, some do-gooder, decided to intervene, and take what appeared to them to be an easy way out.

Ms. WATERS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BACHUS. That, to me, is the ultimate in child abuse.

Ms. WATERS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BACHUS. And I think my time has expired.

But I think you mean—you meant well by this amendment. But

I think you’re going to cover up—— Ms. WATERS. You still have time. Will you yield, sir?

Mr. BACHUS.—a lot of tragic cases.

Ms. WATERS. Will you yield?

Mr. BACHUS. This is the very case we absolutely ought to require

court intervention in.

Ms. WATERS. If the gentleman will yield—— Mr. BACHUS. I don’t know if you’ll accept an amendment saying

that this absolutely has to go to court.

Ms. WATERS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BACHUS. I’ll yield.

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much.

I know that, you know, you get a little emotional about this, and

your reference to just thousands of girls going across the border

every day, I think you may be exaggerating it a little bit.

But I want to make the distinction between bringing it to the attention of the courts and the judicial bypass.

Yes, many of these girls will bring it to the attention of the

courts for purposes of prosecution. However, it does not mean that

that automatically means they get a judicial bypass. These are two

separate kinds of court actions.

And so what they would have to have is, they would have to

have, as it was mentioned earlier, when there was a discussion

about the judicial bypass, that could or could not be granted by a

judge. That’s one separate action, as opposed to the——

Mr. BACHUS. But we ought to absolutely require, in a case like

this, that it go to court. You know, if you have an amendment that

says, when this happens, when someone, that there’s a question or

a charge or even an indication that a stepfather or a brother or

46

even the blood father of a young girl has committed—has violated

our—the laws against rape and incest which are in our county,

that they ought to absolutely go to court.

That is the very case that ought—— Ms. WATERS. It’s already—you are describing—— Mr. BACHUS.—to be brought before the court in every case.

Ms. WATERS. What you’re describing is already—— Mr. BACHUS. And I think you mean—I mean, I really believe that

you mean well by this. I understand this. And I believe that the

people—I totally disagree with them—but I think when they’re taking these young girls—and, I mean, there’s plenty of testimony. We

all agree that these young women are going across State lines—— Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The question is—— Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. WEINER. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from New York, Mr.

Nadler.

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, let me say a couple

things about this amendment.

First of all, I think it is wrong to keep using the phrase ‘‘transporting someone across State lines.’’ She is going across State lines

voluntarily, perhaps desperately. The person accompanying her

may be a friend, a grandmother, a clergyman, helping her. This is

not the same as someone transporting someone. If she were 5 years

old, that might be a different question.

Secondly, on this amendment, the absurdity of not having an

amendment like this is evident if you think about the following situation. This says that it does not apply, the prohibition does not

apply, if the pregnancy is the result of sexual contact with a parent

or any other person who has permanent temporary care or custody.

So imagine that the father or the stepfather who has custody or

whatever rapes the girl, rapes the young woman, the 16- or 17-

year-old young woman. She has to get his written permission—his.

Maybe there’s no mother present.

She has to get the permission of the rapist, under this bill——

Mr. CHABOT. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. NADLER. I will not yield.

Mr. CHABOT. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. NADLER. I will not yield.

Mr. CHABOT. Okay.

Mr. NADLER. Go to court. We know of any number of cases, we’ve

had witnesses, where the judges simply never grant permission.

There are plenty of anti-choice judges in this country who won’t

grant permission. So those don’t operate necessarily. They might in

some places.

The judicial bypass in some place may operate, in other places

won’t.

And, by the way, you may have a young girl who was raped by

her stepfather or by her father. He doesn’t know she’s pregnant. If

she serves him with a notice of complaint to appear in court or he

finds about a court hearing, he knows she’s impregnated, she might

fear being murdered.

So there are real problems with this. What I’m saying is, under— this amendment simply says—and this will tell us. There are two

47

possible motives for supporting this bill: one, a sincere concern for

these young women; two, a hatred for abortion no matter what and

using any smokescreen as an excuse to make it difficult for women

to exercise their constitutional right to have an abortion if they

choose.

If the motivation is the first, then I can’t see how anybody can

vote against this amendment, because this says that she doesn’t

have to get the permission of the rapist. If the motivation is the

second, and we don’t care about victims of rape, as long as they

don’t get abortions, then you vote against the amendment. It’s very

clear.

I yield back.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr.

Barr.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Chairman, I have no idea of what the gentleman

that just spoke is talking about.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman is recognized for 5

minutes to try to tell us.

Mr. BARR. Thank you.

Maybe the Chairman, the distinguished Chairman of the Subcommittee, can enlighten us, because the bill does not say what the

gentleman—nor does the amendment say what the gentleman from

New York just said.

And I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

It’s inaccurate to say that the young girl would have to get the

authorization or approval of the rapist. That’s the whole purpose

of the judicial bypass procedure. And under the best-interest analysis during a judicial bypass procedure, judges consider evidence or

history of physical or sexual or emotional abuse, so that parental

notification would not be in the minor’s best interests under those

circumstance.

So it absolutely inaccurate to say that the young girl would have

to get the authorization of the rapist. It’s just wrong.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Ms. WATERS. Would the gentleman yield?

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The time belongs to the gentleman

from Georgia, Mr. Barr.

Mr. BARR. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. WEINER. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from New York, Mr.

Weiner.

Mr. WEINER. Mr. Chairman, I won’t take a full 5 minutes, but

if we’re going to correct or try to clarify statements, my good friend

from Alabama is waving the amendment and saying this is the reason we have to pass the bill, because no one is going to get prosecuted unless we pass the bill.

There’s nothing in this amendment that says that someone who’s

guilty of raping their daughter will not be prosecuted. It doesn’t

say that at all. It doesn’t say that the cops can’t investigate it, can’t

say that a district attorney can’t prosecute, can’t say that someone

won’t go to jail.

And I would caution the gentleman from Alabama and others,

you know, the pronoun ‘‘they’’ was thrown around a great deal, the

48

‘‘thousands’’ being transported. You know, what this comes down

to, and I would urge us to kind of keep this in mind, these are individual cases—complex, difficult, gut-wrenching individual cases.

This is not Mayberry. This isn’t going to be—you know, I, of

course, would like a dynamic where a young woman who becomes

pregnant and an unwanted pregnancy sits down with mom and pop

and Auntie May, and they sit down and have a freshly baked cherry pie, and they talk about the difficult fix they’re in.

But sometimes in these circumstances a person chooses to turn

to their member of clergy, to their rabbi or priest, and say, ‘‘You

know what? I have a difficult problem here. I’m afraid to go to the

cops. I’m afraid to go to my local physician who knows my aunt,

who knows my mother.’’ These are complicated things. And so States come up with laws

on ways to try to deal with these complicated things. The Supreme

Court of the United States has wrestled with this and say, ‘‘You

know what? Let’s not do anything that gets in, in an unreasonable

way, gets in the way of a woman exercising her right to protect her

health.’’ I mean, that’s what—we’re talking about individual cases here.

And, yes, in the best case scenario and every case scenario, if someone is guilty of incest, you get on the phone, you call the cops, you

have them arrested, you throw them in jail, they never see the

light of day again. Of course.

Does the gentleman from Alabama really believe that that’s the

way it is in the real world, that in every single case where a

woman is guilty of sexual—sexual abuse, even if it’s her boyfriend

or her husband, that she says, ‘‘Okay, I’ll call up the cops over

here, and then I’m going to go exercise my right to a judicial bypass hearing.’’ I mean, come on. Is there a confused 16-year-old girl who has

just been raped by her father or who has been abused by her boyfriend who works in the same school with her uncle who knows

somebody, is there a confused person in the world whose first instinct is, ‘‘Well, I’ve got my right to judicial bypass, because the

Chairman of the Subcommittee referred to me to section 9 of the

bill that has passed seven times and is never going to become law.’’

No.

I mean, these are complicated cases of individual people in agony

and in pain. None of us want there to be any abortions. Every one

of us wants, in these cases, us to have a family structure just like

the one you envision, that someone turns to their mother or father,

they talk it out, they come up with some kind of an alternative,

and everyone lives happily ever after.

But I think that the laws of the States and the constitutional decisions have been: ‘‘You know what? These are difficult judgment

calls, and we’ve come down in this country on the side of giving a

woman the right to protect herself, and sometimes it’s messy.’’

These aren’t thousands of people being transported. It’s not people being piled on a train, going down the tracks to go get these

services. These are individual people in difficult, agonizing, individual circumstances.

It’s not ‘‘they’’ who are doing it. It’s not the do-gooder that’s doing

it. These are individual priests, rabbis, counselors, school math

teachers, friends, neighbors, boyfriends, who are there at a time of

49

the greatest need for these young girls and offering them help.

Sometimes that help is just giving them a ride a few miles down

the road to go to a doctor, a physician, who offers them advice and

may ultimately offer them the choice of having an abortion.

Do we want to put those people in jail? Those are individual people. Are they really—is our country better putting those people in

jail?

I yield back.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. For what purpose does the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Coble, seek recognition?

Mr. COBLE. Move to strike the last word.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman is recognized for 5

minutes.

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Chairman, I yield time to the gentleman from

Alabama.

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. I’d like to respond to the gentleman

from New York. You know, what his argument was and the argument I’m hearing from the other side is, really, the first thing it

is, it’s an inconsistent argument, because we just heard that we

didn’t need to take this to the court or the police because this

young girl may actually be killed if the father finds out that—— Ms. WATERS. Who said that?

Mr. BACHUS. Someone on the top row said, if she reports it, she

might be killed. That was exactly what they said.

And the argument is, you know, if they find out, they may be further abused.

And I’ve also heard that I think that we all live in Mayberry.

Well, let me say this: I authored the domestic violence statute that

was passed in Alabama in 1982 that four other States adopted. So,

you know, I wasn’t living in Mayberry in 1982, when I was in the

State Senate, nor am I now.

I think, again, that what—if you say that this will not—that this

has nothing to do with people being found out, this amendment,

you know, it doesn’t say anywhere in the words that it does that.

But what it does, it allows boyfriends, as you say, it allows neighbors, it allows preachers, it allows some of the groups that we see

in the audience today, whose organizations take these young

women across State lines without the knowledge of the father. The

stepfather has impregnated them——

Ms. WATERS. What groups? What groups? What groups?

Mr. BACHUS. It’s in the testimony here, groups that provide that.

Ms. WATERS. Will the gentleman yield? What group are you talking about?

Mr. BACHUS. Well——

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The time belongs to the gentleman

from North Carolina.

Ms. WATERS. The gentleman should be able identify the group

he’s talking about.

Mr. BACHUS. And what you’ve got here is—— Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The time belongs to the gentleman

from North Carolina.

Mr. BACHUS.—if a boyfriend—if a boyfriend or a neighbor takes

these young women who have been impregnated by a stepfather or

a brother or even their own father, takes them across State lines

50

and has an abortion, instead of going to the court, yes, you’re covering that up.

And when that young woman goes back, she doesn’t go back to

Mayberry. She goes back to Hell Street, where she was when here

stepfather or her brother or her uncle impregnated her in that

home, and where they may be—where the mother may be covering

up for the stepfather.

And because she goes across State lines and has an abortion, her

real father, because like you said, in America today, we have a lot

of divorces, we have a lot of second and third marriages. And in

a lot of case, the father may be living in another State; his daughter is living with the stepfather; a stepbrother may impregnate the

girl; and that father never receives any notice, because some neighbor or some boyfriend or some preacher, you said, decides that

what ought to be done is she ought to be quietly taken across State

lines where she has an abortion, as if that takes care of the situation.

She’s then going to be quietly brought back, quietly placed in

that home again. The court is never going to find out about this.

It’s high time that every one of these cases went to the courts.

And this idea that, when they go to the courts, that this guy that

impregnated this 15-year-old is going to get made and get offended

and come after somebody, well, I’ll tell you what, I think, you

know, I think he’ll find about that the—that we’ll be coming after

him as opposed to coming after this young girl.

Mr. COBLE. Let me reclaim my time and yield back.

Mr. BACHUS. And we had this argument in domestic violence

cases. You know, in several States, it wasn’t—you know, you didn’t

have to report. If you beat up your wife, it didn’t have to be

reported—— Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Did I hear the gentleman from

North Carolina try—— Mr. BACHUS.—because they were afraid she’d go back and get

beat up again.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER.—to reclaim his time?

Mr. COBLE. I’m reclaiming and yielding back.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The question is on the Waters

amendment.

Those in favor will say aye.

Opposed, no.

The noes appear to have it.

Ms. WATERS. rollcall.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And a rollcall is requested.

Those in favor of adoption of the Waters amendment will, as

your names are called, answer aye. Those opposed, no. And the

clerk will call the roll.

The CLERK. Mr. Hyde?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Gekas?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Coble?

Mr. COBLE. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Coble, no.

Mr. Smith?

Mr. SMITH. No.

51

The CLERK. Mr. Smith, no.

Mr. Gallegly?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Goodlatte?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Bryant?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Chabot?

Mr. CHABOT. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Chabot, no.

Mr. Barr?

Mr. BARR. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Barr, no.

Mr. Jenkins?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Cannon?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Graham?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Bachus?

Mr. BACHUS. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Bachus, no.

Mr. Hostettler?

Mr. HOSTETTLER. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Hostettler, no.

Mr. Green?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Keller?

Mr. KELLER. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Keller, no.

Mr. Issa?

Mr. ISSA. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Issa, no.

Ms. Hart?

Ms. HART. No.

The CLERK. Ms. Hart, no.

Mr. Flake?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Pence?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Conyers?

Mr. CONYERS. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Conyers, aye.

Mr. Frank?

Mr. FRANK. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Frank, aye.

Mr. Berman?

Mr. BERMAN. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Berman, aye.

Mr. Boucher?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Nadler?

Mr. NADLER. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Nadler, aye.

Mr. Scott?

52

Mr. SCOTT. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Scott, aye.

Mr. Watt?

Mr. WATT. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Watt, aye.

Ms. Lofgren?

Ms. LOFGREN. Aye.

The CLERK. Ms. Lofgren, aye.

Ms. Jackson Lee?

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Aye.

The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye.

Ms. Waters?

Ms. WATERS. Aye.

The CLERK. Ms. Waters, aye.

Mr. Meehan?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Delahunt?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Wexler?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Ms. Baldwin?

Ms. BALDWIN. Aye.

The CLERK. Ms. Baldwin, aye.

Mr. Weiner?

Mr. WEINER. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Weiner, aye.

Mr. Schiff?

Mr. SCHIFF. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Schiff, aye.

Mr. Chairman?

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, no.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Are there additional Members who

wish to cast or change their vote?

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Bryant.

Mr. BRYANT. I vote no.

The CLERK. Mr. Bryant, no.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Pennsylvania,

Mr. Gekas.

Mr. GEKAS. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Gekas, no.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The other gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Jenkins.

Mr. JENKINS. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Jenkins, no.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr.

Green.

Mr. GREEN. Mr. Green votes nay.

The CLERK. Mr. Green, no.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr.

Pence.

Mr. PENCE. Mr. Pence votes no.

The CLERK. Mr. Pence, no.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Other—the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Goodlatte.

53

Mr. GOODLATTE. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Goodlatte, no.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Other Members who wish to cast or

change their votes?

If not, the clerk will report.

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, there are 12 ayes and 16 nays.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The amendment is not agreed to.

Are there further amendments?

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler.

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the

desk——

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report the amendment.

Mr. NADLER.—that is designated as amendment 1.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Nadler 1.

The CLERK. Amendment to H.R. 476, offered by Mr. Nadler. Page

3, after line 19, insert the following: (3) The prohibition of subsection (a) does not apply with respect to conduct by a grandparent

or adult sibling of the minor.

[The amendment follows:]

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman is recognized for 5

minutes.

Mr. NADLER. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, under this bill, if a young girl is impregnated by

her stepfather, and the girl’s mother, as is sometimes the case, refuses to deal with the horrific reality of the situation, or perhaps

the girl’s mother is no longer alive or isn’t present, an adult sibling

or a grandparent who takes the girl across the river from one State

to another to secure appropriate counseling and medical assistance,

which may include an abortion, would face Federal time and could

be sued by the spouse of the perpetrator, even if, in the words of

the psychiatric profession, the plaintiff was an enabler.

That is an absurd and pernicious outcome. It virtually guarantees that those adults most able to provide the young woman with

assistance, loving members of her close family, could be sent to the

Federal penitentiary.

54

It’s hard to believe that my colleagues, whatever their view about

abortion or the importance of family involvement, would intend

this to be the law, but this is precisely what the bill says. It should

not.

This amendment would simply exclude from the penalties of this

bill a very small, close group of family members to provide the loving assistance that the proponents of the bill claim to support.

It makes sense and would make an otherwise heartless bill just

a little bit more humane.

Mr. Chairman, especially in the situation where a young girl was

raped by perhaps the custodial father or stepfather, it’s hard to understand—and cannot, obviously, appeal to him for permission, and

may not trust the court—indeed, it may a county where the judge

has never granted a judicial bypass or announced that he wouldn’t

grant a judicial bypass ever, as some have.

It’s hard to see how you can object to a grandparent or brother

or a sister of the person who wants the abortion from accompanying her across a State line.

Now, again, either the motivation of this bill is to encourage— is because of concern with the welfare of the minor—if it is, then

this amendment should face no hesitation in being adopted. If the

motivation of this bill is, as I suspect it is, simply an attempt to

make it as hard as possible—one of a number of bills to make it

as difficult as possible for as many women as possible to exercise

their constitutional right of choice, to do everything we can within

the Constitution, within the Supreme Court interpretation of the

Constitution, to undermine the constitutional right of the choice,

then you’ll vote against the amendment.

But especially where the rape or where the pregnancy was

caused by a rape within the family, and so the whole question of

a loving consultation doesn’t exist—and, again, the gentlemen— some people will say, ‘‘Well, the judicial bypass exists for that.’’ In

some places, it does. But it takes willful ignorance—willful ignorance—not to notice the fact that, in many places, there is no real

judicial bypass available.

Some States, by the way, have very limited judicial bypasses.

In any event, it’s hard to see how you can say that a grandparent

or brother or sister of the minor is indulging in some—in transporting—it sounds like you’re saying they’re indulging in some illicit, shameful activity, when they’re really helping their family

member in a loving way to do something that they believe they

really have to do.

So I hope people will vote for this amendment, period.

Thank you. I yield back.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr.

Chabot.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I move to strike the last

word.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman is recognized for 5

minutes.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I rise in opposition to the amendment. Those who want to add

these exceptions have a fundamental problem with the underlying

State law that only allows parents to grant consent for the medical

procedure that’s in question here.

55

The inclusion of these people is a matter for each individual

State legislature, not the Congress. The Child Custody Protection

Act’s purpose is to enforce State laws as they are. Grandparents

and adult siblings don’t have the authority now to authorize a medical procedure for a minor child.

Thus, we would be carving out an exemption to the fundamental

rights of parents, for which another family member seeks to transport their pregnant minor daughter out of State in order for her

to obtain an abortion in circumvention of her home State’s parental

involvement law.

If these individuals are truly interested in the best interests of

the pregnant young girl, they will encourage and support her as

she takes the difficult step to either inform her parents or guardians about her pregnancy or to pursue a judicial bypass. It’s certainly not in the best interests of a pregnant young girl for anyone

to assist her in evading the laws of her home State and to secretly

transport her miles away from those who love her most in order

to undergo a surgical procedure that may have serious medical consequences to her.

For those reasons, I oppose this amendment. I yield back my

time.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. NADLER. Will the gentleman yield?

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. NADLER. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. NADLER. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. CHABOT. I’ve already yielded back my time.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Okay, the gentlewoman from Texas,

Ms. Jackson Lee, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I think what should be recognized is the fact that we are hundreds or maybe thousands of miles from any young girl’s home, and

we are here in the United States Congress, acting upon a law that

will impact them.

I rise to support the gentleman’s amendment, because I believe

if we can intervene in a child’s life who has the necessity of dealing

with the legal system, then we can likewise intervene and expand

the counselors and comforting individuals that may be able to assist that particular child; that, in fact, what we want is in the best

interest for that child and the best interest for those who would

rise to be supportive.

We don’t want them being carried away and imprisoned. And if

that be the case, that we are allowing States to proceed accordingly—not by this legislation, this is Federal legislation that is

interfering with States’ rights, if you will.

And, therefore, I would argue that we can equally provide extra

comfort, an extra measure of comfort, by listing those who are in

good stead, comforting persons to the child, in this instance, grandparent or sibling—and I will have additional amendment—of the

minor, people who they can rely upon in times of trouble.

This makes this a more humane bill. It makes it more reasonable. And it’s certainly not contradictory to our already intrusive

legislative position that we take today.

56

I yield back. I yield to the gentleman for a question. Mr. Nadler,

I yield.

Mr. NADLER. Thank you.

I wanted to make one comment, and then ask if Mr. Chabot

would answer a question.

The comment I’ll make, I was struck by—— Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman from Texas has to

remain in the room, because the time belongs to her.

The gentleman may proceed.

Mr. NADLER. Thank you.

It struck me, when Mr. Chabot said that limiting the amendment—passing this amendment would violate the State’s right of

the State which has the parental consent law.

It seems to me what this bill is, is really akin to the Fugitive

Slave Act of the 1850’s where you’re enabling one State in the

South, which had slavery, to reach over into another State, New

York or Massachusetts, and say, ‘‘We want our slave back. That

person is a slave here, and Massachusetts cannot grant him or her

freedom, because we’re going to grab it back. And the Federal Government is going to enforce that.’’ What you’re saying here, with this bill, is that the minor belongs

to the State and that if she goes to another State, the Federal Government is going to yank her back so she can’t take advantage of

the law of the State which she believes is more appropriate to her.

And anybody who helps her is going to go to jail because that

State has the right over her because she came from that State, and

how dare she try and how dare anybody help her try to go to another State, because the State owns her.

That’s what this bill is really about.

But let me ask Mr. Chabot the following question: What would

you say, in light of your comment to a moment ago, to a situation

in which there is a one-parent family—the mother is dead; the father is the only parent—there’s a daughter and a son, let’s say.

Let’s say the father rapes the daughter. Let’s say the local judge

has never granted a judicial bypass. Let’s say he’s announced that,

because he’s an anti-choice candidate; let’s say he announced in the

last election that he’ll never grant a judicial bypass. There are such

judges.

So you’re faced with a situation—she’s faced with a situation

that she can’t go to her father who impregnated her. She can’t go

to the judge who has announced he will never grant a judicial bypass. Her brother said—she says to her brother, ‘‘Help me go to the

neighboring State where I can get an abortion.’’ If we don’t pass

this amendment, what do you say to that situation, sir?

Mr. CHABOT. Will the gentlelady yield?

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I’m happy to yield.

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentlelady for yielding.

The gentleman has set up a hypothetical situation which, in real

life, I don’t think would happen.

Mr. NADLER. It has happened.

Mr. CHABOT. That would be unconstitutional relative to that

judge’s handling of that situation.

The judicial bypass procedure is there to protect young girls

under difficult circumstances.

And I would argue that, again——

57

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Reclaiming my time.

Mr. CHABOT.—the whole purpose of this legislation is—— Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The time belongs to the gentlewoman from Texas.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Reclaiming my time. Reclaiming my time, I

yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. NADLER. Thank you.

You say the situation couldn’t exist; it has existed in certain situations. The judge may be acting unconstitutionally; by the time

that gets to the Supreme Court, they baby is 3 years old. Pregnancies don’t last for 9 or 10 years, during which this can be litigated through several levels of appeal.

The answer is, without this amendment, the bill puts that young

girl at the total mercy of a particular judge, who in many cases,

as we know to be the case, will never grant a judicial bypass. We

know that that’s an illusory remedy, in most cases. And talking

about it as if it’s always a remedy is simply ignoring the fact.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman’s time has expired.

The question is on the amendment by the gentleman from New

York, Mr. Nadler.

Those in favor will say aye.

Opposed, no.

The noes appear to have it. The noes have it.

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the gentleman from New York

wants a rollcall, correct?

Mr. NADLER. Yes, indeed.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Those in favor of the Nadler amendment will, as your names are called, answer aye. Those opposed,

no. And the clerk will call the roll.

The CLERK. Mr. Hyde?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Gekas?

Mr. GEKAS. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Gekas, no.

Mr. Coble?

Mr. COBLE. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Coble, no.

Mr. Smith?

Mr. SMITH. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Smith, no.

Mr. Gallegly?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Goodlatte?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Bryant?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Chabot?

Mr. CHABOT. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Chabot, no.

Mr. Barr?

Mr. BARR. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Barr, no.

Mr. Jenkins?

58

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Cannon?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Graham?

Mr. GRAHAM. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Graham, no.

Mr. Bachus?

Mr. BACHUS. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Bachus, no.

Mr. Hostettler?

Mr. HOSTETTLER. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Hostettler, no.

Mr. Green?

Mr. GREEN. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Green, no.

Mr. Keller?

Mr. KELLER. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Keller, no.

Mr. Issa?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Ms. Hart?

Ms. HART. No.

The CLERK. Ms. Hart, no.

Mr. Flake?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Pence?

Mr. PENCE. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Pence, no.

Mr. Conyers?

Mr. CONYERS. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Conyers, aye.

Mr. Frank?

Mr. FRANK. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Frank, aye.

Mr. Berman?

Mr. BERMAN. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Berman, aye.

Mr. Boucher?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Nadler?

Mr. NADLER. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Nadler, aye.

Mr. Scott?

Mr. SCOTT. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Scott, aye.

Mr. Watt?

Mr. WATT. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Watt, aye.

Ms. Lofgren?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee?

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Aye.

The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye.

Ms. Waters?

Ms. WATERS. Aye.

59

The CLERK. Ms. Waters, aye.

Mr. Meehan?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Delahunt?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Wexler?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Ms. Baldwin?

Ms. BALDWIN. Aye.

The CLERK. Ms. Baldwin, aye.

Mr. Weiner?

Mr. WEINER. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Weiner, aye.

Mr. Schiff?

Mr. SCHIFF. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Schiff, aye.

Mr. Chairman?

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, no.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Any Members who wish to cast or

change their vote?

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Jenkins.

Mr. JENKINS. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Jenkins, no.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from California, Mr.

Issa.

Mr. ISSA. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Issa, no.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members who wish to cast

or change their vote?

If not, the clerk will report.

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Goodlatte.

Mr. GOODLATTE. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Goodlatte, no.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will try again to report.

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, there are 11 ayes and 16 nays.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the amendment is not agreed

to.

Before the recognizing the person to offer the next amendment,

let me give a scheduling heads-up. It is the intention of the Chair

to recess the Committee as soon as the bell rings for the next vote.

There will then be an hour’s debate on the rule, and the Committee

will reconvene immediately after the vote on the rule on the budget. So it will be an hour’s debate on the rule for a lunch hour or

whatever, and we’ll come back after the next series of votes and

finish this bill.

However, the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Coble, would

like to ask Members of the Courts Subcommittee to stay at the beginning of this recess for a quick markup on legislation. So when

the bell rings, the Chair is going to ask everybody to speed it up,

so the Coble Subcommittee can markup and get their bill reported

out.

And then we’ll come back after the vote on the rule for the budget.

Are there further amendments?

60

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman?

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Amendment——

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Massachusetts,

Mr. Frank.

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman is recognized for 5

minutes.

Mr. FRANK. Very briefly.

But I was very struck by the comments from the gentleman from

Ohio, and I want to acknowledge what appears to be a consensus

that I had not previously thought existed, namely that judicial bypass for a minor is an important constitutional principle.

I had previously thought that there was, on the part of those who

would like to make abortion illegal, opposition to the existence of

judicial bypass. My recollection is that many of the statutes passed

did not allow a judicial bypass, and that was something that many

people felt was forced on them by the courts.

So I am particularly struck to hear how often the judicial bypass

procedure is invoked in this debate as a saving grace. And I want

to say that while some of my colleagues may have come late to the

notion of defending the existence of judicial bypass, better late than

never.

I yield back.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Are there further amendments?

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr.

Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report the amendment.

The CLERK. Amendment to H.R. 476, offered by Mr. Scott. Page

3, after line 14, insert the following: (2) The prohibition——

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the amendment is

considered as read.

[The amendment follows:]

61

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the gentleman from Virginia is

recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, this is the taxicab exemption.

The bill criminalizes anyone who knowingly transports an individual across State lines in order to have an abortion. The way the

bill is written, this would include taxicab drivers, limo drivers, the

person who sells train tickets or anything else. It also takes—all

it takes for—is an individual in question to mention that she is

crossing State lines on the mode of transportation in order to have

an abortion, and the operator of that mode of transportation will

be required to ensure that she’s complied—she’s in compliance with

her home State’s parental notification laws or risk prosecution.

Please note that the bill specifically requires intent for the transportation and abortion but does not require knowledge of compliance with the State’s parental consent and notification laws. The

bill says that you knowingly transport with the intent to obtain an

abortion when in fact the parental consent and notification laws

are not complied with.

And so, if a teenager in Virginia calls a taxi and asks to go to

an abortion clinic in Maryland, and acknowledges during the trip

what she intends to do, the taxicab driver, the dispatcher, maybe

the taxicab company, are all criminally liable under the bill.

This amendment would exempt the application of the bill to

those who are in the business of providing public or private transportation, such as taxicabs, regardless of what information the riders tell them. Those folks have enough to worry about, without

62

making them criminally liable for transporting an individual who

intends to get an abortion.

Now, Mr. Chairman, it’s important to note that the bill does not

prohibit a teenager from driving herself across State lines to evade

parental consent laws. It only prohibits someone from transporting

her or accompanying her—whatever ‘‘transport’’ means; it’s not defined in the bill.

So I would hope that we will not criminalize the taxicab driver

for answering a call and taking someone to where they want to go.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr.

Chabot.

Mr. CHABOT. I move to strike the last word.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman is recognized for 5

minutes.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This amendment is totally unnecessary, because taxicab drivers

are not liable under H.R. 476. Subsection (a)(1) allows for the conviction of an individual who knowingly transports a minor across

State line ‘‘with the intent that such individual obtain an abortion.’’

Although a taxicab driver may have the knowledge that the

minor that he or she is transporting will obtain an abortion as soon

as she arrives at her destination, his or her intent is not that the

minor obtain an abortion. Rather, it’s to transport the minor to her

destination of choice, whether it’s an abortion clinic or a shopping

mall. In other words, the taxicab driver’s reason for transporting

the minor is to receive the fare, not to ensure that she obtains an

abortion.

Thus, a taxicab driver does not have the requisite intent necessary for prosecution under 476, so the amendment is totally unnecessary.

And I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Pursuant to the Chair’s prior announcement, the Committee is recessed until immediately after the

vote on the rule on the budget.

[Recess.]

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The Committee be in order.

When the Committee recessed, the bill H.R. 476, a motion to report favorably had been made. The bill was open for amendment

at any point. And pending was an amendment by the gentleman

Virginia, Mr. Scott, relative to taxi drivers.

Is there further discussion? If not, those in favor of the Scott

amendment will say aye.

Opposed, nay.

The aye does not have it, and the amendment is not agreed to.

Are there further amendments to the bill?

If there are no further amendments, without objection, the previous question on the bill is ordered. And we will await for 19 folks

to appear, and we will then have a vote on reporting the bill out

favorably. Without objection, so ordered.

Those here, please don’t leave. And would the staff on both sides

get the dragnet out, please?

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Virginia.

63

Mr. SCOTT. It appears that there’s still a vote going on. I would

hope that we would delay the final gavel until well after the rollcall

is closed on the floor.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will be instructed to call

the roll slowly.

Can she do that?

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, that’s a motion to adjourn that’s pending now, carrying forth the motion, and one that’s brought with

substance.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. That’s not a motion to adjourn.

It’s——

Mr. SCOTT. It’s a motion to table.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. It’s a motion to table.

Mr. SCOTT. A motion to table the motion to reconsider.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Yes. Also quite important.

Mr. SCOTT. Equally important.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Yes.

Mark?

Mr. GREEN. I’m not going to leave. [Laughter.]

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Okay. Short leash time.

Mr. GREEN. I’ll be out here.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman from Texas.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I have an amendment at the desk.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The previous question has already

been ordered on amendments, so the question is on reporting the

bill favorably.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I’d like to strike the last word.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman is recognized for 5

minutes.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

We have been going through this bill. It’s a very important bill.

You indicated that we would start this Committee after the vote.

The vote is not even closed. We came quickly over here, and I just

raise a personal protest for the openness and bipartisanship of this

Committee.

I indicated by call to the Committee that I was en route, on the

Democratic side, coming through door, which I did. And I can’t

imagine how, in a manner of seconds, the previous question has

been called, and I’m walking through the door.

This is important legislation. Constitutional issues are being

raised. And I would hope that there would be a possibility of a

Member being able to submit an amendment that she believes

would add to the clarification of the constitutional issue——

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. No.

Ms. JACKSON LEE.—and the importance of the issue.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The Chair will state that he called

the Committee to order. There was a vote on the Scott amendment.

A working quorum was present; a working quorum of 13 was

present. The Chair then called for other amendments; there were

no other amendments that were offered. And the Chair then asked

unanimous consent that the previous question be ordered, and

there was no objection. And the previous question was ordered pursuant to the unanimous consent agreement.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman?

64

Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. A reporting quorum is now present.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The Committee now returns to the

pending, unfinished business upon which the previous question—— Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman SENSENBRENNER.—was ordered on H.R. 476.

The question is on the motion to report favorably the bill

H.R.—— Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman SENSENBRENNER.—476.

For what purpose does the gentleman from North Carolina seek

recognition?

Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, I move to reconsider the vote on the

previous question.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The question is, shall the motion ordering the previous question be reconsidered?

Those in favor will say aye.

Opposed, no.

In the opinion of the Chair, the noes have it. The noes have it,

and the motion—— Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, I ask for a recorded vote on that.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The recorded vote is ordered.

The question is on reconsidering ordering the previous question.

Those in favor will, as your names are called, answer aye. Those

opposed, no. And the clerk will call the role.

The CLERK. Mr. Hyde?

Mr. HYDE. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Hyde, no.

Mr. Gekas?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Coble?

Mr. COBLE. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Coble, no.

Mr. Smith?

Mr. SMITH. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Smith, no.

Mr. Gallegly?

Mr. GALLEGLY. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Gallegly, no.

Mr. Goodlatte?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Bryant?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Chabot?

Mr. CHABOT. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Chabot, no.

Mr. Barr?

Mr. BARR. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Barr, no.

Mr. Jenkins?

Mr. JENKINS. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Jenkins, no.

65

Mr. Cannon?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Graham?

Mr. GRAHAM. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Graham, no.

Mr. Bachus?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Hostettler?

Mr. HOSTETTLER. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Hostettler, no.

Mr. Green?

Mr. GREEN. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Green, no.

Mr. Keller?

Mr. KELLER. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Keller, no.

Mr. Issa?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Ms. Hart?

Ms. HART. No.

The CLERK. Ms. Hart, no.

Mr. Flake?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Pence?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Conyers?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Frank?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Berman?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Boucher?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Nadler?

Mr. NADLER. What is this? Yes.

The CLERK. Mr. Nadler, aye.

Mr. Scott?

Mr. SCOTT. Yes.

The CLERK. Mr. Scott, aye.

Mr. Watt?

Mr. WATT. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Watt, aye.

Ms. Lofgren?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee?

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Aye.

The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye.

Ms. Waters?

Ms. WATERS. Aye.

The CLERK. Ms. Waters, aye.

Mr. Meehan?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Delahunt?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Wexler?

66

[No response.]

The CLERK. Ms. Baldwin?

Ms. BALDWIN. Aye.

The CLERK. Ms. Baldwin, aye.

Mr. Weiner?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Schiff?

Mr. SCHIFF. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Schiff, aye.

Mr. Chairman?

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, no.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Are there additional Members who

wish to record or change their vote?

The gentleman from California, Mr. Issa.

Mr. ISSA. No, Mr. Chairman.

The CLERK. Mr. Issa, no.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Other Members who wish to record

or change their vote? If there are none, the clerk will report.

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, there are seven ayes and 14—— Mr. CANNON. Mr. Chairman, how am I recorded?

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Utah, Mr. Cannon.

Mr. CANNON. No.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Pennsylvania,

Mr. Gekas.

Mr. GEKAS. No.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report again.

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, there are seven ayes and 16 nays.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the motion to reconsider—— Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman SENSENBRENNER.—is not agreed to.

The question is—— Mr. WATT. Parliamentary inquiry.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. State your parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, my parliamentary inquiry is this:

When the Chair says that the Committee is going to reconvene

after a vote, would it be proper for the Chair to reconvene before

the vote has closed on the floor, exactly what happened this case,

because I came—— Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The Chair will respond that Members had an opportunity to record their votes and to come back.

Mr. WATT. I—I——

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. There were enough Members on

both sides of the aisle coming back to provide a working quorum.

The Chair did not start the Committee up until we had a working

quorum.

The question is now on the motion to report the bill favorably.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman from Texas.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me just, with all due respect, could I—

could we get an annunciation of the what the Chairman said? The

question of Mr. Watt was, the end of a vote, is it not the closing

67

of the vote, as opposed to in the midst of the vote. My understanding was—— Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The Chair will—— Ms. JACKSON LEE.—we would reconvene—— Chairman SENSENBRENNER.—respond this way: The Chair has

been on this Committee for almost 24 years—— Ms. JACKSON LEE. Yes, sir.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER.—under three Chairman before myself. When the Chair has requested the Members to return immediately after a vote, the lights don’t have to go off up on the clock.

As soon as a reporting—or, a working quorum is present, the Committee has resumed its sitting.

And there was an amendment that was disposed of. The Chair

then said—called for further amendments; there were no further

amendments that were offered. The Chair then said, there being no

further amendments, without objection, the previous question is ordered; there was no objection to ordering the previous question. So

there then was a motion to reconsider ordering the previous question; that was just not agreed to.

So, under the rules, the question is now on whether or not to—— Ms. WATERS. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER.—report the bill favorably.

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman from California.

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I just heard your explanation for

why you proceeded with the work of the Committee and cut off the

opportunity for amendments. And certainly, you have the gavel and

you can do that. However—— Chairman SENSENBRENNER. That’s not a parliamentary inquiry.

The Chair has stated that he asked unanimous consent for ordering the previous question, and that has been the standard procedure for as long as I have been around, when we are done with

amendments, and the Chair calls for amendments, and nobody

seeks to offer an amendment.

The gentlewoman from California’s statement is not a parliamentary inquiry.

Ms. WATERS. Well, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Again, there were—there were bipartisan representations present, or people present. Any Member

could have objected to ordering the previous question, in which

case the previous question was not ordered.

The previous question is ordered, that brings immediately to the

vote, the question of reporting the bill favorably.

Those in favor will say aye.

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, whether you recognize me or

not——

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Those opposed will say——

Ms. WATERS.—it’s an abuse of power.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Those opposed will say no.

Ms. WATERS. Simply an abuse of power. That’s all it is.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The ayes appear—the Chair just follows the rules and, you know——

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I ask for a recorded vote.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The ayes appear to have it. The ayes

have it——

68

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I ask for a recorded vote.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without—a recorded vote is ordered.

Those in favor of reporting the bill favorably will vote aye. Those

opposed will vote no. And the clerk will call the roll.

The CLERK. Mr. Hyde?

Mr. HYDE. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Hyde, aye.

Mr. Gekas?

Mr. GEKAS. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Gekas, aye.

Mr. Coble?

Mr. COBLE. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Coble, aye.

Mr. Smith?

Mr. SMITH. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Smith, aye.

Mr. Gallegly?

Mr. GALLEGLY. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Gallegly, aye.

Mr. Goodlatte?

Mr. GOODLATTE. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Goodlatte, aye.

Mr. Bryant?

Mr. Chabot?

Mr. CHABOT. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Chabot, aye.

Mr. Barr?

Mr. BARR. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Barr, aye.

Mr. Jenkins?

Mr. JENKINS. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Jenkins, aye.

Mr. Cannon?

Mr. CANNON. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Cannon, aye.

Mr. Graham?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Bachus?

Mr. BACHUS. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Bachus, aye.

Mr. Hostettler?

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Hostettler, aye.

Mr. Green?

Mr. GREEN. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Green, aye.

Mr. Keller?

Mr. KELLER. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Keller, aye.

Mr. Issa?

Mr. ISSA. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Issa, aye.

Ms. Hart?

Ms. HART. Aye.

The CLERK. Ms. Hart, aye.

69

Mr. Flake?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Pence?

Mr. PENCE. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Pence, aye.

Mr. Conyers?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Frank?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Berman?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Boucher?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Nadler?

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I am going to vote on this under

protest, because of the deliberate—— Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The—the—— Mr. NADLER.—to bring this Committee into session before—— Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from New York—the

gentleman from New York—— Mr. NADLER.—before—before Members came back, before the

vote was concluded on the floor—— Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from New York will

cast vote—— Mr. NADLER.—when the Chairman knew there were two

amendments—— Chairman SENSENBRENNER.—and not debate.

Mr. NADLER.—when the Chair knew there were two amendments

to be—— Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The Clerk will continue call the roll.

The CLERK. Mr. Scott?

Mr. NADLER.—to be introduced.

The CLERK. Mr. Watt?

Mr. NADLER. It is an outrage that the minority is denied its two

amendments.

The CLERK. Ms. Lofgren?

Mr. NADLER. And if that’s the practice in this Committee—— The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee?

Mr. NADLER.—it’s going to be unpleasant in the few meetings.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I am to be recorded as present and in protest.

I will not vote on this bill, because there has been no opportunity

for us to debate this bill fully.

Present and not—and in protest.

The CLERK. Ms. Waters?

Ms. WATERS. And I don’t care what the Chairman says. He’s

abusing power, and he’s used his gavel in a manner that I don’t

expect him to use it in.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman——

Ms. WATERS. I don’t like it.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER.—from California will—— Ms. WATERS. This side of the aisle does not like it.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER.—cast a vote and—— Ms. WATERS. And we’re not going to put up with this.

If you want us to be disruptive, we know how to do that.

And I vote no on the bill.

70

The CLERK. Ms. Waters, no.

Mr. Meehan?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Delahunt?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Wexler?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Ms. Baldwin?

Ms. BALDWIN. No.

The CLERK. Ms. Baldwin, no.

Mr. Weiner?

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Schiff?

Mr. SCHIFF. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Schiff, no.

Mr. Chairman?

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, aye.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Are there additional Members in the

room who wish to cast or change their vote?

The gentleman from South Carolina?

Mr. GRAHAM. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Graham, aye.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from New York, Mr.

Nadler.

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, how am I recorded?

The CLERK. Mr. Nadler is not recorded.

Mr. NADLER. You’re sure I’m not recorded?

The CLERK. No, you’re not recorded, sir.

Mr. NADLER. Then I’ll vote no under protest.

The CLERK. Mr. Nadler, no.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr.

Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Scott, no.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from North Carolina,

Mr. Watt.

Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, I’m not sure my name was ever called,

but if it was, I intended to vote no.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. How is Mr. Watt recorded?

The CLERK. I don’t have a vote for Mr. Watt.

Mr. WATT. I just said, I intended to vote no.

The CLERK. Mr. Watt, no.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. How am I recorded, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman from Texas?

The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee is a present——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. In protest.

The CLERK.—under protest.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Are there further Members who

wish to cast or change their votes?

If not, the clerk will report.

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, there are 19 ayes and six nays.

Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the motion to report favorably

is agreed to.

71

All Members will be given 2 days, as provided by House rules,

in which to submit additional dissenting, supplemental, or minority

views.

There being no further business to come before the meeting of

the Committee, the Committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:54 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

(73)

1 American Civil Liberties Union, Memorandum to Interested Persons Regarding the Teen

Endangerment Act (August 30, 2001); American Academy of Pediatrics, American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, American Medical Women’s Associan, Society for Adolescent Medicine, Letter to Members of the House of Representatives, (April 2, 2001); National Abortion and

Reproductive Rights Action League, The ‘‘Child Custody Protection Act’’ Threatens Young Wom- en’s Health, (January 21, 2002); American Medical Association, Council on Ethical and Judicial

Affairs, Report H; House of Delegates Meeting, (June 1992); American Public Health Association,

The Adolescent Right to Confidential Care When Considering Abortion, Policy Statement; Vol.

97, No. 5, (May 1996); National Abortion Federation, Oppose H.R. 476, the ‘‘Child Custody Protection Act,’’ (2001); Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, The Child Custody Protection Act

(CCPA): Creating Chaos and Punishing Adolescents, (September 2001). 2 H.R. 476, Sec. 2(a), creating a new 18 U.S.C. 2431(a)(1).

3 H.R. 476, 107th Cong. (Feb. 6, 2001), no Senate counterpart; H.R. 1218, 106th Cong. (March

23, 1999), Passed House 270–159 (Roll no 26), placed on Senate Legislative Calendar, No. 203,

no further consideration, S. 661, 106th Cong. (March 18, 1999), referred to Judiciary Committee,

no further action; H.R. 3682, 105th Cong. (April 1, 1998), Passed House 276–150 (Roll No. 280),

Continued

DISSENTING VIEWS

We strongly dissent from H.R. 476. This legislation will increase

health risks to young women who choose to have an abortion, is

anti-family, and is very likely unconstitutional. Additionally, the

legislation is opposed by a wide variety of groups that remain committed to reducing teenage pregnancy and protecting a woman’s

right to choose, such as Planned Parenthood, the National Abortion

and Reproductive Rights Action League, and the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, as well as leading organizations of medical

professionals concerned with the welfare of pregnant teens.1

The ‘‘Child Custody Protection Act’’ would provide civil and

criminal penalties for any individual who ‘‘knowingly transport[s]

an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years across a

State line, with the intent that such individual obtain an abortion,

and thereby in fact abridges the right of a parent under a law requiring parental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision, in

force in a State where the individual resides....’’ 2 The proposed

law would not require that the defendant know that the State’s parental involvement law has not been satisfied, or that the defendant intended to aid in its circumvention. Moreover, the legislation

contains no exceptions for any close adult relative other than the

parents or guardians of the minor. It could conceivably provide

prison time for a grandparent, adult sibling, or clergy person and

make that individual subject to a civil action by a parent who had

raped and impregnated the minor. Furthermore, it would violate

fundamental principles of Federalism by applying criminal and

civil sanctions based on the law of one State for legal actions taken

in a second State. There is no requirement whatsoever that the

minor be taken by force or coercion.

This is the third Congress in a row that the House has considered this legislation, despite the failure on the part of any of its

proponents to demonstrate that young women are being taken

against their wills to other States, or are being coerced into having

abortions.3

74

Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar No 559, no further action. S.1654, 105th Cong. (February

12, 1998), Cloture not invoked in Senate Vote 54–45 (Roll No. 282). The House has never made

any amendments in order during floor consideration. 4Many teenagers seeking an abortion must travel out of State to obtain the procedure, either

because the closest facility is located in a neighboring State or because there is no in-State provider available. In fact, currently 86% of counties—home to 32% of women of childbearing age—

lack an abortion provider. See Stanley K. Henshaw, ‘‘Abortion Services in the United States,

1995 and 1996,’’ Family Planning Perspectives, Vol. 30, No. 6, 262, 266 (Nov/Dec 1998).

Contrary to its stated intent, instead of simply facilitating Staterequired parental consent and notification laws, H.R. 476 will dramatically increase the dangers young women will face in dealing

with unintended pregnancies. In fact, the bill contains no prohibitions whatsoever against women traveling across State lines alone

to exercise their constitutional right to choose. It will only make it

more difficult for them to seek the assistance and guidance of

trusted adults such as grandparents, older siblings, aunts, uncles,

or clergy. To the extent young women continue to seek the involvement of close family members when they cannot confide in their

parents—where, for example, a parent has raped a young woman

or where there is a history of child abuse—this bill will criminalize

the actions of those caring adults whom the young woman is most

likely to depend upon for support. Consequently, this bill encourages young women to act in isolation, putting them at greater risk

of physical and psychological harm.

Further, because the bill violates the principles of federalism, restricts a young woman’s right to travel, and compels States to treat

non-residents differently than residents, it raises very serious constitutional issues.

Finally, we strongly object to the Majority’s abuse of power to

disenfranchise Members of the Minority by calling the Committee

back into session while a vote on the floor was still open, and moving to a final vote on the bill before many Members had returned

from the floor. The Majority had been well advised prior to the vote

that only two more amendments would be offered and that, in an

effort to promote comity and conclude consideration of this bill in

a non-dilatory fashion, none of the Minority’s other amendments

would be offered. Furthermore, in an effort to avoid repetitive debate, the Minority offered no amendments at Subcommittee, holding all such debate for full Committee. In view of our past experience that no amendments have been made in order when the full

House considered this bill in the last two Congresses, the actions

of the Majority are tantamount to an unjustified and indefensible

denial of the right of Members of the Committee to be heard and

to speak for the citizens they represent. Many of us expressed at

the time our concern that such an abuse of power was a poor response to the efforts of the Minority to work cooperatively with the

Majority.

For these and the other reasons set forth herein, we dissent from

H.R. 476.

I. H.R. 476 WILL ENDANGER YOUNG WOMEN

Although an abortion is generally very safe, it is still far preferable and safer to permit a trusted friend or family member to

drive a woman home from this surgical procedure.4 Moreover, responsible health care providers do not provide these services unless

75

5See Hearing on H.R. 3682 ‘‘The Child Custody Protection Act’’ before the Subcomm. on the

Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2d Sess., Serial 102, at 17 (May

28, 1998) (statement of Bill and Mary Bell, submitted for the record). See also Position Paper

from The National Abortion Federation, ‘‘The True Victims of S. 1645/H.R. 3682 The Teen

Endangerment Act’’ (June 1998) (describing the case of Keishawn, an 11-year-old from Maryland, who was impregnated by her stepfather, and sought an abortion with the assistance of

her aunt, Vicky Simpson, who was awaiting an order granting her custody of Keishawn. Upon

learning of the pregnancy, Keishawn’s doctors in Maryland recommended that Keishawn have

anesthesia during the abortion procedure, but none of the hospitals in Maryland would allow

the abortion to be provided at their facility. As a result, Keishawn’s aunt sought the attention

of a specialist practicing in a neighboring State, who agreed to provide the abortion. Under H.R.

476, Vicki could have been federally prosecuted for helping her young niece cope with this pregnancy resulting from incest). 6See Henshaw at 196. 7See Maggie Boule, ‘‘An American Tragedy,’’ Sunday Oregonian, Aug. 27, 1989.

they are confident that the patient has someone who will accompany them and assist them following the procedure. Under this

bill, teenagers who are unable to satisfy a State parental involvement law—either because they cannot tell one parent (or in some

States, both parents) about their pregnancy or because they have

no fair chance of obtaining a judicial bypass—will be forced to travel alone across State lines to obtain an abortion.

As much as we would prefer the active and supportive involvement of parents in their children’s major decisions, it is not always

realistic to expect young women to seek parental involvement willingly in the sensitive area of abortion. And where a child is unwilling or unable to seek parental consent, the results can be tragic.

The testimony of Bill and Mary Bell before the Constitution Subcommittee is telling in this regard.5

The Bells were the parents of a daughter who died receiving an

illegal abortion because she did not want her parents to know

about her pregnancy, notwithstanding Indiana’s parental notice

law. A Planned Parenthood counselor in Indiana informed Becky

that she would have to notify her parents or petition a judge in

order to get an abortion. Becky responded that she did not want

to tell her parents because she did not want to hurt them. She also

replied that if she could not tell her parents, with whom she was

very close, she would not feel comfortable asking a judge she did

not even know. Instead of traveling 110 miles away to Kentucky,

Becky opted to undergo an illegal abortion close to her home. Tragically, Becky developed serious complications from her illegal abortion that caused her death. It is unlikely that H.R. 476 could have

changed this outcome or would have convinced Becky to confide in

her parents about her pregnancy. Regrettably, healthy family communication simply cannot be legislated.

Moreover, many young women justifiably fear that they would be

physically or emotionally abused if forced to disclose their pregnancy to their parents. Nearly one-third of minors who choose not

to consult with their parents have experienced violence in their

family or feared violence or being forced to leave home.6 Enacting

this legislation and forcing young women in these circumstances to

notify their parents of their pregnancies will only exacerbate the

dangerous cycle of violence in dysfunctional families. This is the

lesson of Spring Adams, an Idaho teenager who was shot to death

by her father after he learned she was planning to terminate a

pregnancy caused by his acts of incest.7 It is clear that when a

young woman believes that she cannot involve her parents in her

76

8See Patricia Donovan, ‘‘Judging Teenagers: How Minors Fare When They Seek Court-Authorized Abortions,’’ Family Planning Perspectives, vol. 15, no. 6 (Nov./Dec. 1983): 259. See also

Hodgson v. Minnesota, 487 U.S. 417, 476 (1990) (finding that in Minnesota, many judges refuse

even to hear bypass proceedings); In re T.W., 551 So.2d 1186, 1190 (Fla. 1989) (describing how

a judge in Florida, after denying a bypass petition to a teenage girl who was in high school,

participated in extracurricular activities, worked 20 hours a week, and baby-sat regularly for

her mother, suggested that he, as a representative of the court, had standing to represent the

State’s interest when the minor appealed the denial). 9The courts in Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Rhode Island are not open in the evenings or

on weekends. See Patricia Donovan, supra note 8, at 259. 10See Hearing on H.R. 1218 ‘‘The Child Custody Protection Act’’ before the Subcomm. on the

Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 1st Sess., Serial 16, at 23 (May

27, 1999) (statement of Billie Lominick). 11See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, AMA, ‘‘Mandatory Parental Consent to Abortion,’’ JAMA, vol. 269, no. 1 (Jan. 6, 1993): 83

decision to terminate a pregnancy, the law cannot mandate

healthy, open family communication.

We are well aware of proponents’ claims that the bill protects minors who cannot obtain parental consent because they have the option to appear before judges and bypass any parental involvement

laws. While bypass may have some theoretical benefits, in many

cases it is difficult if not impossible for troubled young women to

obtain. Some teenagers live in regions where the local judges consistently refuse to grant bypasses, regardless of the facts involved.

For example, one study found that a number of judges in Massachusetts either refuse to handle abortion petitions or focus inappropriately on the morality of abortion.8

Others may live in small communities where the judge may be

a friend of the young woman’s parents, a family member, or even

the parent of a friend. Still others may live in regions where the

relevant courts are not open in the evenings or on weekends, when

minors could seek a bypass without missing school or arousing suspicion.9

The difficulties in obtaining a judicial bypass were clearly illustrated by Ms. Billie Lominick during her testimony before the Subcommittee on the Constitution. Ms. Lominick was a 63-year-old

grandmother who helped a pregnant minor from a physically and

sexually abusive household cross State lines to obtain an abortion.

Ms. Lominick testified that her assistance was essential because

the minor was unable to find any judge in her home State of South

Carolina who would hear her judicial bypass petition.10

Moreover, reliance on the judicial bypass system as an effective

alternative to parental consent understates the intimidating effect

of seeking a court-sanctioned abortion. Many minors fear that the

judicial bypass procedure lacks the necessary confidentiality. The

American Medical Association has noted that ‘‘because the need for

privacy may be compelling, minors may be driven to desperate

measures to maintain the confidentiality of their pregnancies....

The desire to maintain secrecy has been one of the leading reasons

for illegal abortion deaths since . . . 1973.’’ 11

Many young women, faced with the prospect of embarrassment

and social stigma would resort to drastic measures rather than undergo the humiliation of revealing intimate details of their lives to

a series of strangers in a formal, legal process. Young women’s concerns about confidentiality are especially acute in rural areas. For

77

12See Memphis Planned Parenthood v. Sundquist, No. 3:89–0520, slip op. at 13 (M.D. Tenn.

Aug. 26, 1997); See also Tamar Lewin, ‘‘Parental Consent to Abortion: How Enforcement Can

Vary,’’ N.Y. Times, May 29, 1992, p. A1 (describing how a judge in Toledo, Ohio denied permission to a 171⁄2-year-old woman, an ‘‘A’’ student who planned to attend college and who testified

she was not financially or emotionally prepared for college and motherhood at the same time,

stating that the girl had ‘‘not had enough hard knocks in her life’’). 13 Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 476, at 11 (107th Congress, September 6, 2001)(Testimony of Rev. Katherine

Ragsdale). 14 2 F.3d 686 (6th Cir. 1993). 15For example, a nearly 18-year-old minor petitioned for a waiver because she did not wish

to discuss the matter with her parents. The juvenile court found that her reluctance to discuss

the issue with her parents was, itself, evidence that she was not mature enough to make the

decision as to whether to have an abortion. This example demonstrates that, at least for this

judge, any minor who sought a bypass rather than discuss the matter with her parent could

never obtain one—thereby defeating a central purpose of a judicial bypass. 16See Cleveland Surgi-Center, 2 F.3d at 691.

example, in one case a minor discovered that her bypass hearing

would be conducted by her former Sunday school teacher.12

The Subcommittee heard testimony from the Rev. Katherine

Ragsdale, an Episcopal Priest and Vicar of St. David’s Episcopal

Church, who discussed the case of a 15-year-old girl who had been

raped and had become pregnant. The girl could not go to her father

who would have thrown her out of the house, and she had no other

family to whom she could turn. Of course, even if she did, this legislation would place those other relatives in legal jeopardy. Although they did not cross State lines, Rev. Ragsdale drove the

young woman rather than allowing her to trave several hours alone

by bus to and from the procedure. Rev. Ragsdale movingly described the pastoral counseling that she provided to the young

woman during the drive. This bill would make criminals of clergy

who provided this sort of pastoral care and guidance. Rev. Ragsdale’s observations are worth repeating:

‘‘Mr. Chairman, you talked about all the reasons it is important for a girl to have parental involvement before a medical

procedure; and you are absolutely right. And if I thought that

this bill would accomplish parental involvement, if I thought it

would eliminate the kind of pain Ms. Roberts spoke about, this

panel would be even more on balance than it is because I

would be on the other side, but it won’t do that. This bill isn’t

about resolving problems. This bill is about punishing people.

And while I understand that even the best of us have punitive

impulses from time to time, we have no business codifying

them. They are venal. They are beneath the dignity of any

member of the human family.’’ 13

The argument has been made by proponents of H.R. 476 that in

these situations, when judicial bypasses are not functioning properly, a young woman could seek—and undoubtedly obtain—relief in

Federal court. This argument ignores the facts. In Cleveland SurgiCenter v. Jones,14 Planned Parenthood and other abortion providers in the Akron area brought suit alleging that Ohio’s judicial

bypass procedure produced a series of factually incorrect and arbitrary results.15 Despite the arbitrary nature of the decisions by the

juvenile courts in Ohio, the Federal court stated that it was a court

of ‘‘limited jurisdiction’’ that could not review the decisions of State

courts.16 The court dismissed the case ‘‘because both [the Court of

Appeals] and the District Court are without jurisdiction to provide

78

17 Id. 18See Henshaw, at 207. 19 H.R. 476, proposed 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2431(e)(2). Of the 33 States with parental involvement

laws (not including the 10 States whose laws have been enjoined by the courts or are otherwise

not enforceable), 23 have laws that fit H.R. 476’s definition of who may assist a minor. Nine

States have a broader definition of parental involvement. Only Illinois and South Carolina openly allow consent or notice to a grandparent. See ‘‘The Child Custody Protection Act: Creating

Chaos and Punishing Adolescents,’’ Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, 1 (August 2001);

‘‘Who Decides? A State-By-State Review of Abortion And Reproductive Rights,’’ National Abortion Rights Action League, pp. 154-5, (1998). Ohio allows notice to a grandparent, step-parent

or adult sibling under certain circumstances.

plaintiffs with the relief that they seek, namely the review of arbitrary State court decisions.’’ 17 Accordingly, it is not always the case

that judicial bypass procedures are meaningful and effective, nor is

it the case that, when they are not, the Federal courts will provide

relief.

II. H.R. 476 IS ANTI-FAMILY

H.R. 476 is hostile to the well-being of families. Despite proponents’ belief that H.R. 476 would enforce parents’ right to counsel their daughters, the reality is that it is impossible to legislate

complex family relationships. Studies reveal that more than half of

all young women who do not involve a parent in a decision to terminate a pregnancy choose to involve another trusted adult, who

is very often a relative.18

Although the bill excepts parents from criminal and civil liability, even non-parent adults who are helping to raise a child will be

swept in by the bill’s prohibitions. This is because the exception is

excessively narrow and refers only to a parent or guardian; a legal

custodian; or a person designated by a State’s parental involvement

law as a person to whom notification, or from whom consent, is required. The Majority rejected an amendment by Mr. Nadler that

would have excepted a grandparent or adult sibling from the bill’s

penalties. An amendment offered by Mr. Scott would have exempted an innocent common carrier who may have transported the

minor was similarly rejected.19 The Majority also defeated an

amendment offered by Ms. Waters that would have granted an exception where a parent or any other person who has permanent or

temporary care or custody or responsibility for the supervision of

the minor, or any other household member had caused the pregnancy. The absence of such an exception locks victims of incest into

requiring consent from the incestuous parent. Other amendments

the Minority had prepared could not be offered because of the

Chairman’s action to cut off debate described above.

The bill also illogically allows for civil actions between family

members by authorizing lawsuits to be brought by parents suffering ‘legal harm’’ against any person assisting a minor in obtaining an abortion across State lines. The legislation is so broad that

even a person who committed rape or incest towards his own

daughter is permitted to bring a lawsuit seeking compensation

under H.R. 476.

H.R. 476 does nothing to help build open, trusting relationships

between family members. The net result will be the exact opposite

of the sponsors’ intent—weakening family communications and creating suspicion and mistrust among close family members.

79

20 H.R. 476, proposed 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2431(a)(1). 21 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2421. 22The affirmative defense available in H.R. 476 does not address this problem.

III. H.R. 476 IS DANGEROUSLY OVER BROAD

Supporters of this bill claim to be targeting predatory individuals

who force and coerce a minor into obtaining an abortion. However,

the net cast by this bill is far broader and more problematic. The

legislation includes a criminal penalty against persons who ‘‘knowingly transport an individual who has not attained the age of 18

years across a State line, with the intent that such individual obtain an abortion.’’ 20 In other words, this law makes it a federal

crime to assist a pregnant minor to obtain a lawful abortion without requiring any intention to avoid State parental consent laws.

Anyone simply transporting a minor—a bus driver, taxi driver,

family member or friend—could be jailed for up to a year or fined

or both. The same applies to emergency medical personnel who

may be aware they are taking a minor across State lines to obtain

an abortion but would have no choice if a medical emergency were

occurring.

The supporters of this bill inaccurately compare it to the Mann

Act, which prohibits the transport of ‘‘any individual under the age

of 18 years in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory

or Possession of the U.S., with intent that such individual engage

in prostitution, or in a sexual activity for which any person can be

charged with a criminal offense...’’ 21

The Mann Act, like most other criminal laws, contains a mens

rea component, that requires that criminally liable individuals

have an intention to break the law. A person convicted of possessing stolen property, for example, must know or have reason to

know that the property they possess is stolen. H.R. 476 has no such

intent requirement and, therefore, imposes strict criminal liability

for anyone in violation.22 Where the Mann Act purports to guard

against corruption of minors, a laudable but not constitutionallyprotected purpose, H.R. 476 imposes significant restrictions on a

constitutionally-protected right to an abortion. Thus, it seems to us

that the analogy is at best weak. Moreover, the Mann Act requires

that the minor be transported across State lines for the purpose of

engaging in an act that is illegal, while this legislation would impose civil and criminal liability for the act of taking a minor across

State lines to engage in an activity which is legal in that second

State, and constitutionally protected. The analogy is simply inapplicable.

For example, a nurse at a clinic providing directions to a minor

or her driver could be convicted as an accessory under this legislation. A doctor who procures a ride home for a minor and the person

accompanying her because of car troubles coupled with the minor’s

expressed fear of calling her parents for assistance could be convicted as an accessory after the fact. A sibling of the minor who

merely agrees to transport a minor across State lines without any

knowledge of any intent to evade the resident State’s parental consent or notification laws could be thrown in jail and convicted of

a conspiracy to violate this statute.

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23Memorandum to the Comm. on the Judiciary from Laurence H. Tribe, Ralph S. Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard University and Peter J. Rubin, Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University, at 2 (September 2, 2001).

The civil liability provisions of this bill create a blanket Federal

cause of action for a parent who suffers ‘‘legal harm’’ as a result

of his or her child being transported across State lines, and would

further chill family and doctor/patient relations. Agency law principles would enable an aggrieved parent to sue medical facilities,

doctors, nurses, taxi drivers, relatives, ministers, and anyone else

providing assistance to a minor being transported across State

lines to obtain an abortion. Not only would the civil liability provision subject virtually everyone assisting a minor to civil lawsuits,

it would subject everyone else the minor comes in contact with to

the rules of discovery.

IV. H.R. 476 IS LIKELY UNCONSTITUTIONAL

By imposing substantial new obstacles and dangers in the path

of a minor seeking an abortion, H.R. 476 also raises a number of

serious constitutional concerns. First, if enacted, H.R. 476 could

violate the rights of States to enact and enforce their own laws governing conduct within their territorial boundaries, as well as the

rights of residents of different States to travel to and from any

State of the Union for lawful purposes. As Professors Laurence

Tribe of Harvard Law School and Peter Rubin of Georgetown University Law Center explained, ‘‘[H.R. 476] amounts to a statutory

attempt to force this most vulnerable class of young women to

carry the restrictive laws of their home States strapped to their

backs, bearing the great weight of those laws like the bars of a

prison that follows them wherever they go (unless they are willing

to go alone).’’ 23

One of the fundamental principles of our Federal system is that

a State may not project its laws into other States. Crossing the border into another State, which every citizen has a right to do, permits the traveler temporarily to shed her home State’s laws regulating primary conduct in favor of the laws of the State that she

is visiting. H.R. 476 undermines this principle, and, in essence

states that individuals may indeed be bound by the laws of their

home States even as they traverse the nation by traveling to other

States with very different laws.

Proponents of H.R. 476 attempt to respond to this claim by stating that the legislation actually strengthens federalism, by allowing

States to enforce their laws more effectively. However, we have

seen no effort by the Majority to empower States to enforce their

own gun, gambling, sales tax, or fraud laws against residents who

cross State lines to take advantage of the laws of other States. Furthermore, this legislation would actually undermine fundamental

principles of federalism by nullifying the policies set by the laws

the majority of States in this country that have chosen not to require parental notification and consent in these cases, or that have

parental involvement laws less restrictive than the ones incorporated into H.R. 476. Instead we face another shortsighted effort

to politicize a tragic family dilemma, while doing nothing to respond to the underlying problem of teen pregnancies or dysfunctional families.

81

24See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 n.13 (1989) (quoting Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (plurality opinion), (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197

(1977) ‘‘[T]he limits on a State’s power to enact substantive legislation are similar to the limits

on the jurisdiction of State courts. In either case, ‘any attempt directly’ to assert extraterritorial

jurisdiction over persons or property would offend sister States and exceed the inherent limit

of the State’s power.’’)). 25 119 S. Ct. 1518, 1525-1527 (1999) (describing the various components of the right to travel

and their constitutional derivations). 26See id. at 1526-1527. 27See id. 28 410 U.S. 179. 29 Id. at 200. 30 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). 31The ACLU points to Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 880 (1992) (holding that

all abortion regulations must contain a valid medical emergency exception ‘‘for the essential

holding of Roe forbids a State from interfering with a woman’s choice to undergo an abortion

procedure if continuing her pregnancy would constitute a threat to her health). H.R. 476 only

provides an exception to its penalties when the abortion is ‘necessary to save the life of a minor

because her life was endangered by a physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising from pregnancy itself.’ ’’ See

also Letter from Laurence H. Tribe to Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee at 1 (June

23, 1998) (hereinafter Tribe Letter). 32See Tribe Letter. 33See Statement of the Center for Reproductive Law & Policy In Opposition to the ‘‘Child Custody Protection Act,’’ H.R. 1218, June 21, 1999 (stating that H.R. 1218 violates the First Amendment Right to Associate by criminalizing the association between a minor and another person

Continued

The Supreme Court has clearly and consistently held that States

cannot prohibit the lawful out-of-State conduct of their citizens, nor

may they impose criminal sanctions on this behavior, as H.R. 476

does.24 The Court reaffirmed this principle in its landmark right to

travel decision, Saenz v. Roe.25 In its decision, the Court held that,

even with congressional approval, California’s attempt to impose on

recently-arrived residents the welfare laws of their former States

of residence was an unconstitutional penalty upon their right to

interstate travel.26 The decision also reaffirmed that the constitutional right to travel under the Privileges and Immunities Clause

of Article IV, Sec. 2, provides a similar type of protection to a nonresident who enters a State with the intent eventually to return to

her home State.27 This principle applies to minors’ rights to seek

an abortion on non-discriminatory terms as well as to welfare benefits. In Saenz, the Court specifically referred to Doe v. Bolton,28

which held that, under Article IV of the Constitution, a State may

not restrict the ability of visiting non-residents to obtain abortions

on the same terms and conditions under which they are made

available by law to State residents: ‘‘[T]he Privileges and Immunities Clause, Const. Art. IV, Sec. 2, protects persons . . . who enter

[a State] seeking the medical services that are available there.’’ 29

It also is clear that such protections will flow to minors given that

Planned Parenthood v. Danforth 30 held that pregnant minors have

a constitutional right to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy.

Finally, we would note that, in addition to these clear-cut constitutional problems, others have observed that the bill may well

violate other constitutional requirements. For example, the ACLU,

Professor Tribe and others have opined that the bill also contains

an inadequate life exception and lacks any health exception, in possible abrogation of Roe v. Wade and its progeny.31 Additionally, the

bill may impose an ‘‘undue burden’’ on the right to choose an abortion.32 The Center for Reproductive Law & Policy also has written

that H.R. 476 violates the First Amendment’s right to associate as

well as the Equal Protection Principle of the Fifth Amendment.33

82

for the purpose of effectuating the minor’s right to choose abortion and arguing that H.R. 1218

violates the Equal Protection Principle of the Fifth Amendment by impermissibly classifying

among minors being transported across State lines as well as among individuals transporting

them).

CONCLUSION

H.R. 476 does nothing to make abortion less necessary, only

more dangerous. It will not accomplish its policy purposes of encouraging parental involvement and takes the wrong approach to

the problem of teenage pregnancy. It does nothing to increase teen

awareness of the dangers of premarital sex. The bill preys on the

problems of dysfunctional families where children cannot confide in

their parents or fear physical harm when they do. The bill does

nothing to stop a teenager from actually obtaining an out-of-State

abortion, other than making the trip more dangerous.

We are disappointed that the Majority has held steadfast in its

efforts to isolate children in this way. Because H.R. 476 is a burdensome attack on the rights and well-being of young women, we

dissent from this legislation.

JOHN CONYERS, JR. BARNEY FRANK. HOWARD L. BERMAN. JERROLD NADLER. ROBERT C. SCOTT. MELVIN L. WATT. SHEILA JACKSON LEE. MARTIN T. MEEHAN. WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT. ROBERT WEXLER. TAMMY BALDWIN.

ANTHONY D. WEINER.

Æ