* This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 11/12/96 TENTH CIRCUIT

_____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. JUDITH NELL IVERSON, Defendant-Appellant. No. 95-4185 (D.C. No. 95-CR-46) (D. Utah)

_____________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

_____________________ Before BRORBY, EBEL and HENRY , Circuit Judges.

_____________________ After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-2-

A jury convicted Ms. Judith Nell Iverson, defendant -appellant, on six counts of filing false claims with the Internal Rev enue Service, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287. The district court sentenced Ms. Ive rson to twelve months imprisonment and three years supervised release. A s a condition of her supervised release, Ms. Iverson is required to "payall back taxes owed." Additionally, Ms. Iverson must pay a $300 special a ssessment, $4,275.21 in restitution and a $20,000 fine. Ms. Iverson appeal s only the payment of back taxes condition placed on the supervised release po rtion of her sentence. We affirm.
On appeal, Ms. Iverson argues (1) the district court had no authority to impose a payment of back taxes condition on her sup ervised release; (2) if the court had authority to impose such a condition, the court impermissibly delegated its authority to the probation office; and (3) the payment of back taxes condition is "too vague to be enforced." Because Ms. Iverson had opportunity but did not object to this condition of supervised release at s entencing, our review is for plain
error. See United States v. Ballard, 16 F.3d 1110, 1114 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2762; United States v. Brewer , 983 F.2d 181, 183 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 913 (1993).-3-

District courts have broad discretion when imposing conditions of supervised release. United States v. Edgin , 92 F.3d 1044, 1048 (10th Cir. 1996). However, by statute, the conditions imposed must 1) be reasonably related to "the nature and circumstances of the offense and the his tory and characteristics of the defendant," 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); 2) involve no g reater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary given the needs "to af ford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct," id. § 3553(a)(2)(B), "to protect the public from furth er crimes of the defendant," id. § 3553(a)(2)(C), and "to provide the defendant wit h needed educational or vocational training, medical care, o r other correctional treatment in the most effective manner," id. § 3553(a)(2)(D); and 3) be consistent with any pertinent Sentencing Commission policy. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). In other words, the conditions of supervised release must be reason ably related to protecting the public and rehabilitating the defendant. See United States v. Jordan , 890 F.2d 247, 255 (10th Cir. 1989).
Having reviewed the parties' briefs and the record in this case, we conclude the district court acted well within the law and it s authorized discretion in ordering Ms. Iverson to pay back taxes as a conditi on of her supervised release. The special condition at issue is not just reasonab ly related, but is directly related to Ms. Iverson's conviction for making multiple fra udulent claims to the Internal-4-

Revenue Service for tax refunds. Such tax payments will prevent Ms. Iverson from deriving any benefit from past tax evasion and protect the public coffers. Moreover, the obligation to pay back taxes should d eter Ms. Iverson from making future fraudulent claims and from ignoring federal tax obligations as she has in the past. The payment of back taxes condition in n o way jeopardizes Ms. Iverson's liberty, nor does she contend that the sp ecial condition conflicts with any pertinent Sentencing Commission policy. The di strict court therefore was fully authorized to impose the payment of back taxe s condition.
Relying on principles applicable to restitution ord ers, Ms. Iverson contends that even if the district court was authorized to i mpose the payment of back taxes condition, such condition is an impermissible deleg ation of the court's authority, and is unenforceable due to its vagueness. We disa gree. In its judgment and commitment order, the district court unambiguously mandated that "[a]s a special condition of supervised release, the defendant is t o pay all back taxes owed." This statement is entirely consistent with the dist rict court judge's oral statement during sentencing that Ms. Iverson would be require d to "take care of all back taxes that she owes." Moreover, nothing in the rec ord indicates the district court either delegated the calculation of taxes to be pai d to the probation office, or left Ms. Iverson exposed to uncertain tax liability. Rather, the district court simply-5-

ordered Ms. Iverson to obey the tax laws by filing returns for any years she failed to properly do so. The amount of Ms. Iverson's taxliability is controlled and limited by the internal revenue laws, and will be d etermined by the Internal Revenue Service once she files the necessary return s. The restitution cases Ms. Iverson cites are inapposite under these circumstan ces. See United States v. Serhant , 740 F.2d 548, 555-56 (7th Cir. 1984).
For these reasons, the special condition imposed onMs. Iverson to "pay all back taxes owed" prior to her becoming eligible forsupervised release does not constitute plain error. The judgment of the distri ct court is AFFIRMED
.

Entered for the Court: WADE BRORBY United States Circuit Judge