Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

People v. Webb, 2020 IL App (1st) 180110

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

COREY WEBB, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. First District, First Division 

No. 1-18-0110

Filed June 1, 2020

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 10-CR-1705001; 

the Hon. Thomas R. Davy and the Hon. Williams B. Raines, Judges, 

presiding.

Judgment Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.

Counsel on

Appeal

Catharine D. O’Daniel, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, 

Christine Cook, and Clare Wesolik Connolly, Assistant State’s 

Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE GRIFFIN delivered the judgment of the court, 

with opinion.

Justice Pierce concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Hyman dissented, with opinion.
- 2 -

OPINION

¶ 1 Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of unlawful possession of a weapon by 

a street gang member and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. He appeals those convictions, 

arguing that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to quash arrest and suppress 

evidence, that the State did not prove that he was a member of a street gang, and that the trial 

court erred when it limited the trial testimony about the Independent Police Review Authority’s 

investigation surrounding defendant’s arrest. We hold that the trial court did not err when it 

denied defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence and did not abuse its 

discretion when it limited the scope of the testimony about the investigation into the police 

officers’ conduct in making the arrest. We, however, hold that the evidence was insufficient to 

prove defendant’s membership in a street gang. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, 

and remand for resentencing.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On September 10, 2010, at approximately 11:30 p.m., Chicago police officers were on 

patrol when they saw a large gathering of 30 to 40 people gathered in the street and on the 

sidewalk making a lot of noise. Officer Dennis Huberts and his partner arrived at the scene on 

the east side of the crowd, and two other officers arrived at the scene on the opposite side of 

the crowd. The four officers exited their vehicles with plans to disperse the crowd with the 

officers converging on the crowd from different directions. 

¶ 4 The crowd was beginning to disperse, primarily toward the north and the west, when 

Officer Huberts saw defendant begin running eastward toward him and his partner. Officer 

Huberts observed defendant looking over his shoulder at the other set of police officers as he 

fled. Officer Huberts also saw that defendant was clutching something near his waistband as 

he was running. Officer Huberts announced his office and told defendant to stop. Defendant 

did not comply.

¶ 5 Officer Huberts chased defendant and put his hands on defendant’s shoulders to try to stop 

him. Defendant continued to run and pull away from Officer Huberts, so Officer Huberts 

performed an “emergency takedown,” grabbing defendant near his collar area and pulling him 

to the ground. While on the ground, defendant was resisting Officer Huberts’s attempts to 

detain him, and defendant continued to stiffen his body and would not remove his hands from 

his waist area while Officer Huberts attempted to gain control over defendant on the ground. 

Officer Huberts struck defendant in the head multiple times in an attempt to secure defendant’s 

compliance. After striking defendant, Officer Huberts and his partner were able to get control 

of defendant’s arms and hands, and Officer Huberts went to the area that defendant had been 

holding and felt a weapon in defendant’s waistband. Once defendant’s hands were under 

control of the officers, Officer Huberts went and retrieved a Desert Eagle 9-millimeter handgun 

from the center of defendant’s waistband. The officers then handcuffed defendant. All of the 

events took place in a matter of seconds.

¶ 6 Defendant was arrested and eventually charged with unlawful possession of a weapon by 

a street gang member and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. While at the police station, 

defendant told the officers that he is a member of the Black P. Stones and that he had been a 

member of that gang for as long as he could remember. Defendant further stated that he got 

the gun from one of his fellow gang members. An assistant state’s attorney memorialized 
- 3 -

defendant’s statement and authorized the charges against him. After being at the police station 

for a period, defendant was transported by ambulance to the hospital. He underwent surgery 

for a broken jaw.

¶ 7 As the case against defendant progressed, defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and 

suppress evidence. In that motion, defendant argued that he was doing nothing wrong or illegal 

before the police officers ran up to him and threw him on the ground. Defendant stated that the 

officers began to punch and kick him and that they then searched him. He argued that any 

statement he allegedly made or any evidence uncovered during the search should be suppressed 

as being the product of an unlawful search and seizure. The trial court denied defendant’s 

motion.

¶ 8 At trial, the police officers’ testimony was consistent with the narrative set forth above. 

However, defendant himself and two other eyewitnesses testified in defendant’s defense. All 

three of these witnesses testified that the officers essentially targeted defendant and searched 

him for no reason. These witnesses also testified that the officers treated defendant harshly, 

including that they kicked him in the face, resulting in defendant ending up on the ground, 

spitting up blood. These witnesses testified that defendant was doing nothing wrong and that 

the officers just came at him for no reason. They testified that defendant did not have a weapon.

¶ 9 The jury found defendant guilty of both unlawful possession of a weapon by a street gang 

member and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. The trial court sentenced defendant to five 

years’ imprisonment. He now appeals his convictions.

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 Defendant argues that (1) his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence should have 

been granted, (2) the evidence was insufficient to prove that the Black P. Stones meet the 

statutory definition of a “streetgang,” (3) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a 

directed finding as to whether there was sufficient evidence that the Black P. Stones met the 

statutory definition of a streetgang, and (4) the trial court improperly limited the testimony 

about the Independent Police Review Authority’s investigation launched into the 

circumstances surrounding defendant’s arrest, namely that the officers used excessive force in 

arresting defendant. We agree with defendant on points two and three and we reject his 

arguments on points one and four.

¶ 12 A. Motion to Quash Arrest and Suppress Evidence

¶ 13 Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to quash arrest and 

suppress evidence. Defendant contends that his fourth amendment rights were violated where 

the officers on scene did not see him do anything illegal or improper before they violently 

detained him. Under the circumstances, defendant maintains that when he was tackled and 

restrained by the officers it constituted an impermissible arrest, not a lawful Terry stop, because 

the officers restrained him with physical force before they had made any observations that 

could constitute probable cause or even a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

¶ 14 Before a police officer may arrest an individual, the officer must have probable cause that 

the person committed or is committing a crime. People v. Sledge, 92 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 1058 

(1981). In contrast, a police officer may briefly detain an individual and perform a protective 
- 4 -

pat down when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal 

activity and for purposes of officer safety. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968).

¶ 15 Officer Huberts testified that he saw defendant running from the crowd and clutching his 

waistband. Defendant was running toward Officer Huberts and his partner. Officer Huberts 

believed that the manner in which defendant was grabbing near his waistband was indicative 

of defendant having a gun concealed in that area. The officers’ testimony portrayed the scene 

as somewhat chaotic, with a large group of individuals creating a noise disturbance and then 

scattering to disperse when the police arrived. The officers encountered defendant in a highcrime area at approximately 11:30 at night. Defendant fled from one set of officers, but that 

meant that he was running toward Officer Huberts and his partner while he was fixated on his 

waistband, leading the officers to suspect that defendant was armed while running in their 

direction. The officers reasonably perceived an officer safety issue.

¶ 16 The officers had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity 

when he ran from the crowd, grabbing near his waist, in a manner that suggested he was 

carrying a weapon. The officers provided, both at trial and at the hearing on the motion to 

suppress evidence, a reasonable basis upon which they believed defendant was armed. 

Defendant was acting far different than the others in the crowd that were dispersing, and his 

nervous and evasive behavior culminated in flight. In the officers’ experience, defendant’s 

fixation on his waistband area in a manner suggesting he had a weapon concealed there as he 

fled indicated that he was armed. The officers in this case had seen dozens of people carrying 

weapons in the past who conducted themselves as defendant did here. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 

27 (“in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight 

must be given *** to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the 

facts in light of his experience”). 

¶ 17 When the officers attempted to detain defendant in furtherance of the above-established 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, defendant resisted their attempts to effectuate a Terry

stop. He continued to run from Officer Huberts after Officer Huberts announced his office and 

told defendant to stop. Then, when Officer Huberts put his hands on defendant’s shoulders to 

try to stop him, defendant tried to pull away. It was at that point that Officer Huberts elevated 

the level of force, by tackling defendant, to a level that would ordinarily only be permissible 

for an arrest.

¶ 18 There are two inferences that can be drawn regarding the reason that defendant was 

grabbing near his waist. One, that he was wearing baggy pants and was grabbing near his waist 

to hold up his pants as he ran or, two, that he was grabbing near his waist because he had a 

firearm concealed there. Our standard of review requires us to draw that inference in the State’s 

favor. Moreover, there is no statement anywhere in the record that defendant was grabbing in 

his waist area to keep his pants from falling down as he ran. To the contrary, defendant and the 

witnesses who testified on his behalf testified that he never even ran from the police. The jury 

disbelieved them. Any leap to the idea that defendant could have been holding his pants up to 

stop them from falling down is in derogation of our role on appeal and is not supported by the 

evidence in any way.

¶ 19 Before the police have acquired a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, an individual 

has the right to avoid an encounter with police. People v. Timmsen, 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 10. 

However, when officers have acquired a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and attempt 

to detain a suspect under Terry, that suspect is no longer free to leave or voluntarily terminate 
- 5 -

an encounter with the police. People v. Maxey, 2011 IL App (1st) 100011, ¶ 60 (under Terry,

a police officer is specifically permitted to briefly detain an individual to investigate the 

possibility of criminal behavior absent probable cause, and during the course of a Terry stop, 

a person is “no more free to leave than if he were placed under a full arrest” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). A defendant is required to submit to the Terry stop, so long as it is lawful at 

its inception, i.e., that the officers indeed had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 

sufficient to support the brief detention at its outset. If a defendant fails to submit to a lawful 

attempt at effectuating a Terry stop, the officers have the right to take steps to force compliance 

with their directives in order to effectuate a Terry investigative stop in a safe and effective 

manner. See People v. Johnson, 387 Ill. App. 3d 780, 791 (2009); People v. Eyler, 2019 IL 

App (4th) 170064, ¶ 23. 

¶ 20 Here, when Officer Huberts had acquired a level of knowledge sufficient to constitute a 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, he told defendant to stop, but defendant did not heed 

the instructions. Instead, defendant continued his flight. A person is not seized for purposes of 

the fourth amendment when the person does not yield to the officer’s show of authority. 

California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625-26 (1991). When Officer Huberts tried to force 

defendant to stop by putting his hands on defendant’s shoulders, defendant still refused to 

submit to the officer’s then-legal authority to force compliance. Because of defendant’s 

continued noncompliance, Officer Huberts was entitled to take further steps to detain defendant 

involuntarily. While an officer would surely not have authority to tackle an individual that was 

submitting to a Terry stop as directed, defendant’s refusal to submit to a lawful Terry stop 

made the circumstances such that Officer Huberts was entitled to take steps to force 

defendant’s compliance with the officers’ commands. The officers had reasonable suspicion 

of criminal activity to support a Terry stop, and when defendant failed to comply, the officer’s 

actions in tackling defendant and restraining him did not violate his fourth amendment rights.1

The trial court did not err when it denied defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress 

evidence.

¶ 21 B. Sufficiency of the Evidence as to Defendant’s

Membership in a Street Gang

¶ 22 Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for unlawful 

possession of a firearm by a street gang member because the State failed to prove the essential 

elements of that offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The fourteenth amendment to the United 

States Constitution requires that the government prove each element of a crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt before a person may be convicted of a crime. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 

363-64 (1970). On appeal, we must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255, 272 (2008). 

While we give great deference to a fact finder when we review for the sufficiency of the 

evidence, our constitutional responsibility requires that we scrutinize the evidence and 

1

After this case was set for oral argument, defendant filed a motion seeking leave to cite additional 

authority. In particular, defendant referred us to our decision in People v. Horton, 2019 IL App (1st) 

142019-B, and asked us to consider that opinion in resolving this appeal. We granted defendant leave 

to cite the additional authority and have taken Horton into account in arriving at this decision. 
- 6 -

determine whether the State proved enough at trial to meet its constitutional burden. People v. 

Hernandez, 312 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 1037 (2000).

¶ 23 To prove that a defendant committed the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a 

street gang member, the State must prove that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm in 

public and without a valid Firearm Owner’s Identification Card and that he is a member of a 

street gang. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.8(a)(1) (West 2010). For purposes of that offense, “streetgang” 

or “gang” has the meaning ascribed to it in section 10 of the Illinois Streetgang Terrorism 

Omnibus Prevention Act (740 ILCS 147/10 (West 2010)). The Illinois Streetgang Terrorism 

Omnibus Prevention Act defines “streetgang” as “any combination, confederation, alliance, 

network, conspiracy, understanding, or other similar conjoining, in law or in fact, of 3 or more 

persons with an established hierarchy that, through its membership or through the agency of 

any member engages in a course or pattern of criminal activity.” 740 ILCS 147/10 (West 2010).

¶ 24 Defendant contends that the State failed to prove at his trial that the Black P. Stones is a 

“streetgang” under the requisite definition. Defendant moved for a directed finding on this 

issue at the close of the State’s case-in-chief and he argues on appeal that his motion should 

have been granted. The parties both refer us to People v. Murray, 2019 IL 123289, ¶¶ 36, 51,2

in which the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the applicable statutes and held that the State 

was required to introduce specific evidence about the course or pattern of criminal activity to 

prove that the defendant was a member of a street gang. 

¶ 25 The State concedes that the outcome in this case is controlled by Murray. Accordingly, the 

State acknowledges that we should grant defendant the same relief the supreme court granted 

in that case: reversing defendant’s conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a street 

gang member. See Murray, 2019 IL 123289, ¶ 53. We agree that the proper result is a reversal 

of defendant’s conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang member.

¶ 26 C. Admissibility of Evidence Concerning the Independent

Police Review Authority Investigation

¶ 27 Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it granted the State’s motion in limine

prohibiting defendant from eliciting testimony about an Independent Police Review Authority 

(IPRA) investigation into the circumstances surrounding defendant’s arrest. Defendant 

contends that the trial court’s limitation on trial testimony about the IPRA investigation 

infringed on his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. Defendant argues 

that evidence about the IPRA investigation was relevant to his defense and that it should have 

been admitted for the purpose of showing the officers’ bias as well as their motive to testify 

falsely at trial.

¶ 28 In ruling on the State’s motion in limine to forbid defendant from introducing evidence 

about the IPRA investigation, the trial court ruled that defendant was entitled to introduce all 

the evidence that made up the substance of the IPRA investigation but that he could not elicit 

testimony about the fact that an IPRA investigation had, in fact, been conducted. Defendant 

really raises two separate arguments concerning the IPRA investigation. First, he argues that 

the trial court incorrectly ruled on the State’s motion in limine on the issue. Second, defendant 

argues that while his counsel was cross-examining the officers about the arrest, the trial court 

2

At the time defendant filed his brief, the Illinois Supreme Court had not yet filed the opinion in 

Murray. However, before the State filed its response brief, the supreme court had decided the case.
- 7 -

improperly sustained objections in which his counsel intended to impeach the officers by using 

their testimony from the IPRA hearing.

¶ 29 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting evidence about the IPRA 

investigation in the manner in which it did. Defendant was fully entitled to and did introduce 

evidence about the circumstances surrounding the detention and arrest, including that he 

suffered a broken jaw and required surgery. Defendant was permitted to elicit testimony to 

support his contention that the officers used excessive force, and defendant was able to present 

his defense that the gun was planted by the officers. Defendant testified in his own defense on 

the substance of these matters as well. All that defendant was prohibited from exploring at trial 

was the fact that an IPRA investigation had taken place. The trial court even ruled that 

defendant could elicit evidence that the officers had testified about the events in a certain way 

at a “prior hearing,” just that the defense could not use the term “IPRA.” The trial court 

expressly ruled that defendant could use the officers’ testimony from the IPRA hearing for 

impeachment purposes. 

¶ 30 Even though the IPRA investigation was concluded with a favorable ruling for the officers, 

the trial court was entitled to find in its discretion that testimony about the IPRA case would 

distract from the actual issue that the jury was present to decide—whether defendant 

unlawfully possessed a weapon. See People v. Sykes, 224 Ill. App. 3d 369, 375 (1991). The 

trial court indicated that if it were to allow defendant to introduce the fact that and IPRA 

investigation was opened into the circumstances surrounding defendant’s arrest, it would also 

allow the State to introduce the fact that the investigation was concluded and it was resolved 

in the officers’ favor. Defendant objected to the trial court allowing evidence of the decision 

in the IPRA case to be introduced at trial. So the trial court crafted an evidentiary ruling that 

allowed both sides to achieve most of their ends but left both somewhat unsatisfied. The fact 

that the IPRA investigation had concluded and was resolved favorably for the officers

undercuts defendant’s contention that the existence of an IPRA investigation would have 

motivated the officers to testify in a certain way at trial. In the end, defendant was allowed to 

present, and the jury was allowed to hear, all of the substance from the IPRA investigation; 

defendant was simply prohibited from referring to the existence of any official investigation. 

The jury heard about the alleged police misconduct, including about the injury inflicted on 

defendant and about the officers allegedly fabricating the evidence that defendant was in 

possession of a gun in order to cover up their own wrongdoing. The trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in ruling on the motion in limine at issue. 

¶ 31 A separate issue is defendant’s contention that the trial court improperly sustained the 

State’s objections when defendant attempted to impeach the officers with statements that they 

had made during the IPRA hearing. Defendant argues that the testimony that Officer Huberts 

gave at the IPRA hearing was inconsistent with the testimony he gave at trial and during the 

hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, particularly about the timing in which 

defendant complained about the injury to his jaw that he sustained when the officers detained 

him. 

¶ 32 At trial, Officer Huberts testified that defendant did not complain about being in pain before 

or during his interrogation or the time at which he made inculpatory statements to the officers. 

Officer Huberts testified that it was only after defendant made inculpatory statements and had 

been placed in lockup that the officers noticed he was injured. However, during the IPRA 

hearing, Officer Huberts testified that defendant stated that his jaw was “messed up” while the 
- 8 -

officers were processing defendant. Defendant argues that the inconsistency in the timing that 

Officer Huberts had attested to was relevant and should have been allowed to impeach the 

officers’ trial testimony. 

¶ 33 The evidence that defendant argues should have been permitted was the statements he 

claims that he made to officers about his injury. Defendant is arguing that he should have been 

able to introduce his own postarrest, out-of-court statements to the officer. A defendant cannot 

introduce, through another witness, his own prior statements in an attempt to prove the truth 

of a matter that is the subjects of those statements. People v. Woods, 292 Ill. App. 3d 172, 178 

(1997); see also People v. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414, 452 (1992) (out of court, self-serving 

statements by an accused are inadmissible hearsay).

¶ 34 Defendant testified at trial and was fully entitled to testify about what he told the officers 

or to explore the issue about when the officers knew or should have known about his injuries. 

Defendant was not, however, entitled to introduce, through the officers, statements he allegedly 

made with the intended purpose being to prove when the officers might have known about his 

injuries. The prior consistent statements that defendant claims he should have been entitled to 

introduce to the jury would have had the purpose of improperly bolstering his trial testimony 

without falling into any hearsay exception. See People v. House, 377 Ill. App. 3d 9, 19 (2007) 

(proof of a prior consistent statement made by a witness is inadmissible hearsay, which may 

not be used to bolster a witness’s testimony). The trial court did not abuse its discretion when 

it sustained the State’s objection to defendant’s line of questioning about what defendant said 

to the officers regarding his injuries. Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court’s 

rulings on these evidentiary issues entitle him to any relief. See People v. Short, 2014 IL App 

(1st) 121262, ¶¶ 102-05.

¶ 35 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 36 Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for resentencing.

¶ 37 Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.

¶ 38 JUSTICE HYMAN, dissenting:

¶ 39 One fact—the officers’ order to disperse—sets this case apart. This is not the traditional 

case arising under Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000), because Webb’s flight followed 

the order to disperse and so was not unprovoked. This doctrinal wrinkle aside, the majority’s 

decision ultimately runs afoul of the fourth amendment’s superseding mandate: 

reasonableness. See People v. Timmsen, 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9 (“touchstone of the fourth 

amendment is *** reasonableness” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In my view, it is 

patently unreasonable for police officers to induce flight by ordering a large group to disperse 

and then rely on that same flight as part of their justification to detain someone. Although 

fourth amendment doctrine does not have a word for it, in other areas of criminal law, we call 

it entrapment—to induce someone to do something for which there is no evidence he or she 

would have otherwise done and to later hold that behavior against them. See 720 ILCS 5/7-12 

(West 2018) (defining defense of entrapment). I consider this practice incompatible with basic 

fourth amendment principles.
- 9 -

¶ 40 Moreover, the majority’s reasoning has unworkable practical implications. Confronted 

with a similar order to leave, what is a person to do? Move too slowly and be accused of 

disobeying the order? Move too quickly and come under suspicion? The fourth amendment 

does not require ordinary people to calibrate their behavior to such a minute degree. I 

respectfully dissent. 

¶ 41 As an initial matter, I find it important to make explicit the point at which the officers 

seized Webb. We must decide that moment because we evaluate only the information the 

officers had before that moment when determining the seizure’s lawfulness. E.g., People v. 

Close, 238 Ill. 2d 497, 514 (2010) (Burke, J., dissenting) (first step in determining whether 

seizure was reasonable is “ ‘whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception’ ” 

(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968))). I read the majority opinion to tacitly find 

that the officers had conducted a Terry stop from the moment they placed hands on Webb. See 

supra ¶ 20 (“putting his hands on [Webb]’s shoulders” was a “lawful Terry stop”). The State 

concedes as much. I would make express what the majority implies: when officers touched 

Webb, he was seized for the purposes of the fourth amendment and we look only to Webb’s 

behavior before then to determine whether officers had the authority to touch him.

¶ 42 An officer seizes a person for fourth amendment purposes when the officer makes a 

sufficient show of authority indicating to a reasonable person that compliance is required and 

the person under suspicion submits to that authority. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 

621, 628-29 (1991). Importantly, Webb’s resistance after the officers initially grabbed him did 

not defeat their initial seizure of him. When Hodari D. spoke of compliance with an officer’s 

show of authority, the United States Supreme Court’s primary concern was a suspect who 

completely frees themselves from the officer’s control. The court spoke of an arrestee defeating 

an officer’s seizure by “escap[ing]” or “br[eaking] away” and entering a “period of fugitivity.” 

Id. at 625. The Illinois Supreme Court has thought of this issue in a similar way—the question 

is not whether a suspect was cooperative, the question is whether the suspect completely 

defeats the seizure and interrupts the causal chain between the seizure and discovery of 

contraband. See People v. Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶ 44 (“defendant’s flight *** 

interrupt[ed] the causal connection between” his seizure and the discovery of a gun). 

¶ 43 Nothing broke the link between the officers’ initial touching of Webb and applying further 

force that finally brought him under submission. This means that the officers’ actions must 

have been justified at the moment of the initial touching. In other words, Webb’s later 

resistance cannot be used as part of the calculus for determining reasonable suspicion because 

it took place after he had been seized. 

¶ 44 And unlike the majority, I disagree that the officers had enough information to justify 

Webb’s seizure. The majority takes Webb’s flight coupled with his holding his saggy pants as 

sufficient ground on which to detain him. I disagree with this analysis on its own terms. We 

have held a person’s flight insufficient to warrant reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 

In re D.L., 2018 IL App (1st) 171764, ¶ 28 (“Although [u]nprovoked flight in the face of a 

potential encounter with police may raise enough suspicion to justify the ensuing pursuit and 

investigatory stop *** [citation], there is no bright-line rule authorizing the temporary 

detention of anyone who flees at the mere sight of the police [citation].” (Emphasis and internal 

quotation marks omitted.)). We also have explained that a defendant putting his hands in the 

pockets of his saggy pants not to be indicative of criminal activity. In re Rafeal E., 2014 IL 

App (1st) 133027, ¶ 30 (“Putting something in one’s pockets, in this case, one’s hands, is not 
- 10 -

a hallmark of criminal activity.”). I see no reasoned basis on which to distinguish a defendant 

who puts his hands in his pockets with one who holds up his saggy pants. See People v. White, 

2020 IL App (1st) 171814, ¶ 37 (Hyman, J., specially concurring) (describing as “unworkable” 

any per se distinction between walking, jogging, or running from police officer).

¶ 45 That said, accepting the suspicion aroused by flight as a given, the officers’ order to 

disperse dramatically alters the analysis. In each case the State cites where flight was a factor 

in the analysis of reasonable suspicion, including Wardlow, the defendant fled from police 

officers without any evidence of provocation. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-25 (“[h]eadlong 

flight” when “unprovoked” is the “consummate act of evasion”); see also People v. Salgado, 

2019 IL App (1st) 171377, ¶ 3 (defendant and companion “immediately broke apart and 

walked in different directions” on mere sight of a police car); People v. Johnson, 2019 IL App 

(1st) 161104, ¶ 3 (defendant “ ‘walk[ed] briskly *** as if to avoid’ ” police officers on mere 

sight of the officers’ SUV in alley). Here, Webb’s fleeing was not an “act of evasion” but, 

rather the opposite, an act of compliance. Contra Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-25. 

¶ 46 I also reject the State’s argument that interpreting Webb’s flight as compliance with the 

officers’ orders requires probing his “subjective state of mind.” We use “commonsense 

judgments and inferences about human behavior” when determining what constitutes 

suspicious behavior. Id. at 125. Notions of common sense inform us that a group ordered by 

police to disperse will comply. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 627 (“policemen do not [give 

commands] expecting to be ignored”). It goes without saying that members of the group may 

disperse at varying speeds. Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly used common sense to 

acknowledge the risk that “police officers can create reasonable suspicion or even probable 

cause where there was none by coercively infringing upon the individual’s right to be let alone, 

and waiting for an arguably suspicious reaction.” State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶ 45, 294 Wis. 

2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729; see also id. ¶ 45 n.15 (citing 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 

§ 9.4(d), at 461-62 (4th ed. 2004), citing Commonwealth v. Thibeau, 429 N.E.2d 1009 (Mass. 

1981)). The officers’ behavior here manifests that risk.

¶ 47 For similar reasons, I would reject one of the trial court’s factual findings as against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. E.g., People v. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 25 (reciting 

standard of review). The trial court found, “someone coming in the officer’s direction holding 

their waistband is certainly justification which would be described as if not bizarre behavior 

*** certainly behavior that would justify a further inquiry for officer safety.” The evidence 

does not support the trial court’s conclusion. Testimony shows that officers came up to the 

group from all sides. As far as the record reveals, any direction Webb could have gone would 

have required him to move toward an officer. I do not find Webb’s behavior “bizarre” or, under 

the circumstances, an indication of dangerousness. 

¶ 48 Perhaps more important than the trial court’s unsupported factual premise is its 

misstatement of the law. Officers cannot support their decision to stop someone based on a 

belief that the person poses a danger—that is the standard for a frisk, not a stop. See United 

States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 698 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (distinguishing between the 

requirements for Terry stop and a Terry frisk (citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326-

27 (2009))). Only suspicion that a defendant committed, was committing, or was about to 

commit a crime can support a stop. Id. The trial court’s invocation of the officers’ fear for their 

safety as a reason to stop Webb misapplies fourth amendment law.
- 11 -

¶ 49 Here, that distinction makes a difference. The officers did not suggest that Webb’s saggy 

pants made them suspicious that he was committing a crime, only that he may be armed. Of 

course, in Illinois, suspicion that a person is armed, without more information, does not 

constitute suspicion of criminal activity. See People v. Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 32 (finding 

criminal offense of carrying gun outside home to be facially unconstitutional). 

¶ 50 So what is left? It appears to me the officers believed holding up saggy or baggy pants was 

evidence of criminal activity. But that is not particularized suspicion, which the fourth 

amendment requires. E.g., People v. Gaytan, 2015 IL 116223, ¶ 20 (“officers must have ‘a 

particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped’ was violating 

the law” (emphasis added) (quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396 (2014))). 

Indeed, it is nothing but a hunch based on a common mode of dress.

¶ 51 I cannot agree that a style choice with a varied history should ever be a basis for suspicion 

of criminal activity. See Gene Demby, Sagging Pants and the Long History of “Dangerous” 

Street Fashion, NPR (Sept. 11, 2014, 8:18 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/

2014/09/11/347143588/sagging-pants-and-the-long-history-of-dangerous-street-fashion [https://

perma.cc/9RWE-RD35]. Though not in the record, I worry that saggy pants, a male fashion 

statement, may be celebrated (see Brooke Bobb, Could You Love a Man in the Baggy Pants 

That Took Over the Runways This Season?, Vogue (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.vogue.com/

article/fall-2019-menswear-baggy-pants-trend [https://perma.cc/TS5N-TRH5]), yet used as a 

proxy for suspected criminality. See Shahid Abdul-Karim, For Some, Sagging Pants Carry 

Greater Meaning, Wash. Times (July 13, 2014), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/

2014/jul/13/for-some-sagging-pants-carry-greater-meaning [https://perma.cc/LP99-9FJT] 

(noting “ ‘[s]kateboarders and hipsters’ ” can wear saggy pants without attracting ire of police). 

I acknowledge the officers’ experience finding weapons on individuals who grabbed their 

waist while wearing saggy pants (supra ¶ 16), but the officers’ suspicion must have been based 

on facts particularized to Webb. Nothing in the record points to a particularized suspicion—

for example, an unusual bulge, a glint of metal, or a report of someone with a gun.

¶ 52 As a final side note, I agree with the majority’s decision not to spend much time analyzing 

People v. Horton, 2019 IL App (1st) 142019-B. See supra ¶ 20 n.1. It is too different to help: 

Horton did not involve any police directives, let alone an order to disperse. 

¶ 53 In sum, the primary fact the officers relied on to detain Webb—his flight toward them—

was entirely the result of the officers’ own actions. I cannot agree that it is reasonable under 

the fourth amendment for police officers to essentially trick people into behavior the law 

considers “suspicious,” so I dissent.