The Honor able Gr eg ory F. Va n Tatenhove , United States District J udg e for the Easter

n * District of Ke ntucky , sitti ng by desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0644n.06 No. 08-4178 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. L EWI S E. L ARCH, J R., De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE N O R T H E R

N D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

BEFORE: GIBBONS and COOK, Cir cuit Judges, and VAN TATENHOVE, District Judge. * GREGORY F . VAN TATENHOVE, District Judge. L ewis E. L arc h, J r. cha lleng es the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence used t o co n v i ct h i m of fe dera l firea rms char g es and the inclusion and omission of certain jury i nstructions at his trial. Be cause the g overnme nt presente d sufficie nt evidenc e that L arc h knowing ly possessed the f

irea rms in question and bec ause the district judge ’s ins tr uc tio ns to t

he jur y we re pr op e r, we a ff

ir m. I. I n the Spring of 2008, L arc h stood trial for beinga felon in possession of firea rms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1) and possessing stolen firea rm s in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j). The

e vid e nc e pr e se nte d o ve r t he c ours e of

tw o d ay s unf

old e d a s f oll ow s.-2-

I n 20 0 4 , M i ch ael and Kar la Sheeha n resided in Avon L ake, O hio, with their colleg e-a g ed son, who had re turned home f or the summer. O ne af

ternoon a nd evening , Mr. a nd Mrs. Sheeha n attended a

n impromptu family

picnic. B efor e leaving, Mr s. Sheehan, who had j u s t returned from

a we ekend tr ip, left her suitca se on an upstairs bed. Mr. Sheehan locked all of the doors a nd turned off a ll of the lights. At a pp ro xima te ly

9:3 0 o r 1 0:0 0 p .m. , th e She e ha ns re tur ne d f ro m th e pic nic to f

ind the ir house burg larized. After

briefly enter ing the residenc e, they exit ed and repor

ted the intrusion to the police. Offic er Susan Stevens a nd Detec tive Timothy

Schleicher

from the Av o n L ake Police De pa rtme nt i nv e sti g a te d th e burg lary . D ur ingthe ir ini tia l wa lkt

hr ou g h, Ste ve ns ob se rv e d th a t a window to the home’s enc losed bac k porch, a pproxi mately

five fe et from the ground, wa s halfwa y open and that the window blinds had bee n bent and pu l l ed off from their mooring s. A larg e, cla y flower pot was si tuated directly under the window. I nside the porch, a door le adingto the interior of the home ha d been kic ked in. Fr om t h i s ev i d ence, Schleiche r and Steve ns conclude d that the porch w indow was the point of e ntry for the bur g lar. The fi r s t f

lo o r o f th e h o u s e w a s in d is a r r ay . I n a d d it io n to th e o v e r a ll ransa ck, an enter tainment cente r had be en pulled awa y from the wall and its two g lass doors wer e lying on the floor. Mrs. Shee han’s unpa cked suitca se had be en moved to a c o u ch downstairs. The upsta irs showed similar sig ns of looting. A f te r th e p o li c e ’ s in it ia l i n s p e c ti o n , th e Sh e e h an s e n te r e d th e h o u s e to id e n ti f

y missing property
. Th e y

f o u n d th e ir d a u g h te r ’ s w e d d in g p r e s e n ts an d a la r g e , f o u r - f o o t l o n g d

u f f e l b agAl tho ug h L arc h in iti a lly ob je c te d to the re lia

bil ity of the fi ng e rp ri nt a

na ly sis , h e c ho se to 1 abandon this cha lleng e at tria l. -3- missing from the diningroom. Electr onics wer e also stolen fr om the living room, and jewe lry and their son’s video g ame sy stem had bee n taken f rom the sec ond floor. Mr. Sheeha

n also noticed the a

bsence of the six firearms i d en t i fi ed in the indictment. He testified that two wee ks ear lier he move d the wea pons to underneath his daug hter’s b ed while the master bedroom, wher e he nor mally kept the guns, underwe nt renovations as part of a long- term remode ling pr oject. The firea rms wer e stored in ha

rd and soft case s with ha

ndles. A seve nth rifle, which re mained in the master bedroom c loset, was not missing. The da y afte r the invasion, the Shee hans discover ed an unf amiliar ca mouflag e h at in the

ma ste r b e dr oo m. B e lie vin g that it m ig ht b e lon g to t he burg lar, the y

tur ne d it ov e r t o O ff

ic e r S te ve ns , wh o e nte re d th e hat in to e vid e nc e . D e te c tiv e Sc hle ic he r e xami ne d th e hat but, b e lie vin g it w ou ld po se c ha in- of

-c us tod y pr ob le ms and c on ta ine d no us e fu l e vid e nc e , de c ide d no t se nd it f or fo re ns ic

ana ly sis

. On that s ame day , Offic er St evens filed a report l isting t he Sheeha ns’ missing prope rty . One

e n t r y s t a t e d , “ P o t t e r

y c h an g e d i s h e mp t i e d

o f c h an g e b y su sp e c ts , enter ed into e vidence for proce ssing.” Stevens testified at trial that the w ord “suspe cts” wa s not meant to imply that she knew more than one person ha d been involved in the bur g lary

. Despite dusting other pa rt s o f t h e h ouse, includingthe point of entry and the upstairs bedroom, only two identifiable fing erpr ints were r ecove red. B oth were found on the e ntertainment cente r glass doors in the l iving room. Two indepe ndent ana ly ses deter mined that the prints belong ed to L arc h. 1-4-

Two y ear s after

the burg lary , a Clevela

nd narc otics office r rec overe d three of Mr. Sheeha n’s firea rms in the course of an unr elated inve stigation. The other f irea rms have not be en re cover ed. At the close of

the g overnme nt’s proof, L arc h chose not to ca ll any witnesses. Instead, he moved for a cquittal pursuant to Rule 29 of the F eder al Rules of Criminal Procedur e, ar g uing that the re wa s in su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e to s ho w that he po sse sse d – e ith e r a c tua lly , c on str

uc tiv e ly , or

joi ntl y – the fire arms take n from the Shee han re sidence . The district judg e denie d the motion, and proce eded to c onduct the cha rg e conf ere nce. Duringthe conf

ere nce, L arc h objected to a n instruction that the possible guilt of other persons is not a defense to a criminal char g e. S ince the de fenda nt’s theory

was that a third party

took the we a po ns wi tho ut h is k

no wl e dg e or perm is si on, L arc h a rgue d th a t th is i ns tr

uc tio n c ou ld o nly confuse the jury

and pre judice his defe nse. T h e j udg e over ruled the obje ction but modified the ins tr uc tio n in re sp on se to d e fe ns e c ouns e ls’ c on c e rn s. The jury returne d g uilty

verdic ts on

b o th counts. Subsequently , L arc h filed a r enew ed motion for a cquittal pursuant to Rule 29, and the court iss ued a written opinion denying the motion. Upon the entry of judg ment, L arc h filed a timely n o t i ce of appe al. He c halleng es the suff iciency of the evidenc e that he know ingly possessed t h e fi re arms and the district court’s de nial of his Rule 29 motion. He also cha lleng es the inclusion of the “guilt of others” instruction and the omission of an instruction relatingto constructive possession throug h a co- conspirator

. II. A. The Court re views L arc h’s cha ll e n g e to the sufficie ncy of the e vidence and the district cour t’s denial of his Rule 29 m otion accor ding to the sa me standar d. Un ite d S

tates v . D av is , 397 F.3d 340,-5-

3 4 4 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g United S t a t es v. Bowker , 3 72 F .3 d 3 65 , 3 87 (6 th C ir . 2 00 4) ). I n b oth sit ua tio ns , re lie f wi ll be de nie d so lon g a s “ a ft e r vie wi ng the e vid e nc e in the lig ht m os t f a vo ra ble to the g overnme nt, any

rational trier

of fa ct could have found the e lements of the cr ime bey ond a

rea sonable doubt.” Id

. (q u o t i n g Un ite d S tates v . W ar e , 2 8 2 F. 3 d 9 0 2 , 9 0 5 (6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 2 ) )

. In applying this standar d, the Court makes a de novo assessment. United States v. Kelley , 461 F.3d 817, 825 (6th Cir. 2006). Neve rtheless, a defe ndant raising a sufficie ncy of t he evidence challeng e “be ars
a ver y heavy burden” and “[c]ircumstantial evidenc e alone is sufficient to sustain a convic tion and such evide nce ne ed not re move every re asonable hy pothesis except that of g uilt.” Id. (interna l quotation marks and c itations omi tted). To convict L arc h of being a felon in posse ssion of a firea rm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1), the g overnme nt was re quired to prove beyond a re asonable doubt that (1) the de fenda nt had a pr ior conviction for a

crime punishable by

imprisonment for a ter

m exceedingone y ear ; (2) the de fenda nt there afte r knowing ly

possessed the f

irea rms specifie d in the indictment; and (3) the f irea rm trave led in or aff ecte d interstate c ommerce . Un ite d S tates v . Ca mp be ll , 549 F.3d 364, 374 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Schre ane , 331 F.3d 548, 560 (6th Cir. 2003)). Possession of a stolen fir ear m purs ua nt t o § 92 2(

j) dif fe rs in t hat no pr oo f o f a

pr ior fe lony is r e qu ir e d a

nd the gov e rnme nt m

us t show that the def

endant knowing ly

possessed a stolen w eapon. United St ates v. Thomas , No. 08- 6471, 2010 WL 2294535, at *8 (6th Cir. J une 7, 2010). L arc h on l y

ch al l en ges t h e “ kn o wi n g p o s s es s i o n ” r eq u i re m en to f t h es e o ff en s es . T h i s element may be base d on either a ctual or c onstructive possession of a firea rm. Cam pb e ll , 549 F.3d at 374. I n essenc e, L arc h argues that the United States proved only two fa cts , i.e. , that he ente red the Sheehan r e s id e n c e an d

th a t t h e f ir e ar ms w e n t m is s in g a t s o me p o in t i nti me a f te r M r . She ehan-6-

re loc a te d th e we a

po ns to hi s daug hte r’ s b e dr oo m. H e c on te nd s th a t th e se fa c ts a re ins uf fi c ie nt t o
e sta bli shtha t he po sse sse d th e g un s e ith e r a ctu all y , con stru c tiv e ly , o r j ointly . T his argume nt i s unpersua sive. F ir st, a re a so na

ble tr ie r of fa c t c ou ld c on c lud e that L arc h a c tua lly po sse sse d the fi re arm s in question. “Ac tual possession require s that a def endant have immediate possession or control of the firea rm . . . .” Cam

pb e ll , 549 F.3d at 374. L ike constructive possession, it may be prove n either by d i re ct or c ircumstantial evidenc e. Id. T h e e v id e n c e p r e s e n te d a t t r ia l s h o w e d

mo r e th anL arc h’s

me re pr e se nc e in t

he She e ha

n h ou se and

the ind e pe nd e nt d isa

pp e ara nc e of the fi re arm s. I t a lso confirme d that he ente red the residenc e with the intent to steal their belong ings. L arc h did not know the Sheeha

ns and ente red the ir home at a time when they

wer e aw ay . His fing erpr ints were f ound on the g lass doors to the enter tainment cente r, fr om which a DV D play er ha d been tak en. Other rooms throug hout the house w er e ransacked, inc luding the be droom wher e the f irea rms had bee n stored. I n fac t, L arc h conce des that the g overnme nt presente d sufficie nt evidence to prove that he inv a de d the ho me and sto le the DV D p lay e r a nd the we dd ing

g if ts i n th e din ingro om. A r e a so na ble jury could believe that the per son who forc i b l y enter ed anothe r’s home a nd stole some of that person’ s proper

ty also possessed other

proper ty stolen from the re sidence

. T h e j u r y c o u l d a l s o r e a s o n a

b l y c o n c l u d e t h a tL ar c hc o n s t r u c t i v e l y p o s s e s s e d

t h e f i r e ar ms. “[C] onstructive possession exist s when the defe ndant does not ha ve [actual] possession but instead know in g ly h a s th e p o w e r an d inte n ti o n a t a g iv e n ti me to e xe r c is e d o mi n io n an d c o n tr o l o v e r an object, either direc tly or throug h others.” Cam pb e ll , 549 F.3d at 374 (internal quotation mar ks and citation omitted). Howeve r, the de fenda nt’s mere prese nce ne ar a

firea rm is insufficient to show the “re quisite k n o wl edg e, powe r, or intention to exercise c ontrol over the gun to prove c onstructive-7-

possession.” Id. (qu o t i n g United Sta te s v . A rn old, 486 F.3d 177, 183 ( 6th Cir. 2007)). Instead,

“ [o]th e r i nc ri min a tin g e vid e nc e mus t su pp le me nt t

he de fe nd ant’ s p ro ximity

to a f ir e arm in o rd e r t o tip the scale in fa

vor of c onstructive possession.” Id. And that is this case. L arch argues that the g overnme nt proved his proxim ity to the firea

rms and nothing more. Ac c or din g ly , h e be lie ve s his c a se re se mbl e s Un ite d S tates v . B e v e rly , 750 F.2d 34 ( 6th Cir. 1984). There , the def

endant, B ever ly , had been prese nt in the home of a third party

when a police off

icer executed a se arc h war

rant of the residenc e. Id. at 35. The police office r encounte red the defe ndant in the kitchen and or dere d him to turn around and plac e his hands on the wa ll. Id. Whil e fr isking B e v e r ly , th e o f

f ic e r n o ti c e d th at a w a s te b a s k e t b y h is f e e t c o n ta in e d tw o h an d g uns. Id. One identifiable fing erpr int, later deter mined to be of Be verly ’s left ringfing er, w as re cover ed fr om one of the g un barr els. Id. at 36. A j ury convicted Be verly for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) , and the district court denie d his moti o n fo r acquittal under Rule 29. Id. a t3 5
. T h i s C o u rtr e v e r s e d

. It conclude d there was insuffic ient ev i d ence that B ever ly constructively

possessed the we apons beca use he did not have direc t or indirec t control over the kitchen, the wa ste basket, or the g un, and the e vid e nc e me re ly

e sta bli sh e d th a t B e ve rl y

wa s in c los e pr oximi ty

to t he fi re arm

and ha d at so me point touched it. Id. at 37. By analog izi ng his situation t o Be v e rly , L arc h essentially argues that the evidenc e of B ever ly ’s construc tive possession is stronge r than his own. But L arc h overlooks the ke y distinction between his situation and Be verly ’s: he ente red the Sheehan r esiden ce as a bur g lar; B ever ly was mer ely

a socia l gue st. This dist inction provides the additional “incr iminating evide nce” nece ssary “to t ip the sca le in favor of construc tive possession.” Cam pb e ll , 5 49 F .3 d at 374. As the dis tr ic t court re c og nize d, on e wh o en te rs ano the r’ s h ou se wi th-8-

the intent to steal, by

definition , demonstrates the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over

the per sonal proper

ty there in. L arc h attempts to divert attention from these fac ts by rea rguing his theory

that a third per son took the firea

rms without his knowledge . That theory is based o n the abse nce of direc t, phy sical evidenc e linking him to the sec ond floor of the residenc e, the discove ry of the camouflag e hat, the

rec ov ery of three firea

rms from an unr elated pe rson, and the r efe renc e to “suspec ts” in Offic er Stevens’s re port. He a lso emphasizes that since Mr. Shee han did not direc tly testify to seeingthe

wea pons on the day

of the burg lary , the possibilit y exis ts that other per sons – a construc tion worker, the Sheeha

ns’ son, or another burg lar – had acc ess to the Sheehan residenc e in the we eks lea ding up to the theft. Howe ver pla usible th ese arguments may be, they do not rende r the jury ’s ver dict irrational. After all, “[c]ircumstantial evidence alone is suffic ient to sustain a conviction and such

e v ide nc e ne e d not r e mo v e e v e ry re as on ab le hy

po the sis e x c e pt t ha t of gu ilt .” Kelley , 461 F.3d at 825 (empha sis added) ( internal quotation marks a nd citation omitted). Mo r e o v e r , in d e te r mi n in g whether

su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e of

po sse ssi on

e xists , th e Court

mus t vie w a ll e vid e nc e and re so lve a ll r e a so na

ble infere nces in favor of t he gover nment and may

not independently

weig h the evidenc e, conside r the

cre dibilit y

of witnesses, or substit ute its judgment for the jury ’s. Un ite d S

tates v . D av is , 577 F.3d 660, 671 (6th Cir. 2009)

. Acc ording ly , we f ind that the g overnme nt presente d sufficie nt evidence that L arc h actua lly

and construc tively

possessed the f

irea rms in question.

B. 1.-9-

L arc h a lso se e ks re ve rs a l be c a us e of on e jur y ins tr uc tio n that wa s g ive n an d one that w a s n ot. Th e g ive n in str

uc tio n r e late d to the imp a c t of the po ssi ble g uil t of oth e rs on the jur y ’s de lib e ratio ns .

I n g ener al, jury

instructions are r eviewe d “as a whole [] to determine whether they fairly and adequately

inform the jury

of t h e re levant conside rations and pr ovide a sound e x planation of the applicable law to aid t he jury in rea ching its decision.” United States v. Harrod , 168 F.3d 887, 890 (6th Cir. 1999) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). “This court may reve rse a judg ment b as edo nan i mp ro p er

j u ry i n s t ru ct i o no n l y i f t h e i n s t ru ct i o n s , v i ew ed as a wh o l e, we re co n fu s i n g, misleading , or pre

judicial.” Id. at 892 (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). B e fo re the c ha

rg e c on fe re nc e , th e dis tr ic t c ourt ind ic a te d it s in te nti on to inc lud e Sixth C ir c uit Pattern Instruction 8.08(2). L arc h objected. H e believe d this instruction would confuse the jury and

encour ag e it to disreg ard his defe nse t hat a third party took the firea

rms without his knowledge or approva l. H e also emphasized that the first a nd last sentence s were particula r sourc es of c onfusion and pre judice. Th e dis trict ju dg e ov e rr ule d L arc h’ s o bje c tio n. She c on c lud e d th a t in c lus ion of thi s ins tr uc tio n w a s p ro pe r but mod if ie d th e fi rs t se nte nc e and

omi tte d th e fi na l se nte nc e to a c c omm od a te the Appellant’ s conce rns. As a r esult, the final instruction deliver ed to the jury rea d: Also remember that the fa ct that someone e lse may also be guilty

of the off

enses c ha rg e d wo uld no t pr oh ibi t y ou fr om r e a c hin g the c on c lus ion that th is d e fe nd ant i s g uilty of the crimes char g ed. The possible guilt of others is no defe nse to a c riminal c h ar g e . Y o u r

j o b i s t o d e c i d e i f

t h e g o v e r n m e n th a s p r o v e d

t h i s d e f e n d an tg u i l t y. I t is certainly

possible that this i nstruction could prove misleading in some c ases. In fac t, the officia l c ommentary to the pattern instruction rec og nizes as much. See Com mi tte e Com me nta ry to-10-

Sixth Circuit Patt ern Instruction 8.08 (“Where the defendant claims that someone e lse committed the crime, it may be confusing to instruc t the jurors that they should not be conce rned w ith any one
e l s e ’ s g u i l t
. ” )

. In t h i s s i tu a t i o n , h o w e v e r , t h e i n s t r u c t i o n w a s n e i t h e r c o n f

u s i n g n o r p r e j u d i c i a l

. It pla c e s a pp ro pr iate e mph a sis on

the jur y ’s ob lig a tio n to de te rm ine wh e the r t he e vid e nc e c on c lus ive ly pr ov e d t he defe nda

nt guil ty of the c ha rg e d o ff e ns e and that it sh ou ld n ot p e rm it the po ssi ble additional

criminal l iability of ot hers to influence its decision. This duty was e x pressly

undersc ored i n t h e f i r s t ( “ s o m e o n e e l s e m ay also be guilty ”) and final (“ y our job is to decide if the g overnme nt has prove d thi

s defendant

g uilty ”) se ntence s of the instruction. I n the context of the other

s u b s t an t i v e i n s t r

u c t i o n s , t h i s m e an tt h a tt h e j u r y w a s t o j u d g e w h e t h e r

L ar c ha c tu a l l y, c o n s t r

u c t i v e l y,
or joi ntl y po sse sse d fir e arm s re g ard le ss of the a c tio ns of thi rd pa rt ie s. Con se qu e ntl y , whe n r e a d in its entirety , the instruction convey s only its int ended pur

pose: to ensure that a def endant is not excused from be ing held acc ountable for his actions simply beca use someone e lse als o un lawf ull y possessed Sheeha

n’s fire arms. In s u m , t h e deliver ed instruction neither preve nted L arc h from prese nting his de fense to the jurors nor they from duly consideringit. W e ther efor e conc lude that the “ g uil t of

oth e rs ” ins tr

uc tio n w a s n ot c on fu sin g , mi sle a din g , o r p re jud ic ia l. 2. L arc h also contends that the district court e rre d in failing to instruct the jury on constructive possession thr oug h a co-c onspirator. He admits that he did not specifica lly reque st this i nstruction or objec t to its omission during trial. Instead, he argues t hat he prese rved the issue by apprisingthe dis tr ic t c ourt

of his the or y that a thir d part

y sto le the fi re arm s with out his kno wl e dg e or a pp ro va l in the c ours e of ob

je c tin g to the “ g uil t of

oth e rs ” ins tr

uc tio n. Th is i s n ot s uf

fi c ie nt. Un de r F e de ra l Ru le of Criminal Procedur e 30(d) , parties who obje ct to instructions must “inform the c ourt of the sp e c ifi c-11-

objection and the grounds for the objection .” F ED . R. C R IM . P. 30(d) (e mphasis added) . L arc h’s discussion of his de fense theory is f ar too g ener ic to me et this standa rd. See, e .g., United States v. Mc Cal l , 8 5 F .3 d 1 19 3, 11 95 -9 6 ( 6th Cir . 1 99 6) ; se e als o F ED . R. C R IM . P. 30(d). Under the plain er

ror st an d ar d , the def

endant be ars the bur den of pr oof. United States v. Polihonki , 5 43 F .3 d 318 , 323 (6 th Cir . 200 8)

. To pr e va il, the re fo re , L arc h “ mus t sh owthat th e re is (1 ) er ro r, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affe cts [his ] subs tantial rig hts.” Id. ( a l t e r a t i o n i nor ig ina l) (q u o t i n g United States v. Lalonde , 509 F.3d 750, 757 ( 6th Cir. 2007)); United States v. Olano , 507 U. S. 7 25 , 7 32 (1 99 3) . E ve n if the se thr e e c on di tio ns are satis fi e d, re ve rs ingthe dis tr ic t c ourt is within this Court’s discretion. Olano , 5 0 7 U
. S

. a t7 3 5 ( “ R u l e 5 2 ( b ) i s p e r

m i s s i v e , n o tm an d a t o r

y. I f t he fo rf e ite d er ro r is ‘pl a in’ and ‘a ff

e c t[s] subs tanti a l rig hts ,’ the c ourt of a pp e a ls h a s a

uth or ity to order corr ection, but is not require d to do so.” (alteration i n orig inal)). In such circ umstances, the

c ourt ’s dis c re tio n is g uid e d b y wh e the r t he e rr or “ se ri ou sly

a ff e c te d the fa ir

ne ss, int e g ri ty

or pu bli c
re p u tation of judicial proce eding s.” United States v. J ones , 1 0 8 F
. 3 d

6 6 8 , 6 7 0 ( 6 th

Ci r . 1 9 9 7 ); Olano , 5 0 7 U
. S

. a t 7 3 6

. M o r e o v e r , “ [a ]n o m i t t e d o r i n c o mp l e t e i n s t r u c t i o n i s e v e n l e s s l i k e l y

to justify reve rsal, si nce such an ins truction is not as pre judicial as a misstatement of the law.” United S t a t es v. Sanderson , 9 6 6 F
. 2 d 1 8 4 , 1 8 7 ( 6 th

Ci r . 1 9 9 2 ) ( inte r

n a l q u o tati o nma

r k s an d c it a ti on omitted). L arc h has fa iled to show that the failure to instruct th e j u ry o n constructive posse ssion throug h a co- conspirator

was plain e rror . See Olano , 5 07 U. S. at 73 2- 34 (d e fi nin g “ e rr or ” a s a deviation from a lega l rule and “plain” as “cle ar” or “obvious”). His leg al t heory arises most often in the context of sentencingunder U .S.S.G. §2D1.1. See U nited States v. Bende r , 265 F.3d 464, 474 (6th Cir. 2001) (“ Th i s court ha s consistently held that possession of a f irea rm under se ction-12-

2D1.1(b)( 1) i s attributable to a co- conspirator not present at the commission of the offe nse as long as i t constitutes reasona

bly fore seea ble conduc t.” (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted)). But he has not cited a

ny case wher e this theor

y was prese nted to a jury , and our own sea rch ha s been in vain. We are unwilling to re verse a distri ct co u rt fo r fa iling to instruct the jury , su a s po nte , on such an e ntrepre neuria l theory as the one raised by

the def endant he re. Even if this theory

was fir mly entre nched, ba sed on the e vidence prese nt ed i t i s far from

cer tain that L arc h woul d b e entitled to it. Although the de fenda nt’s burden in obtaininga jury instruction is not heavy , and an instruction should be given if it “finds some support in the e vidence ” or whe n the “supportingevidenc e is wea k or of doubtful c redibility ,” United States v. Garne r , 529 F.2d 962, 970 ( 6th Cir. 1976), L arc h’s theory that a c o -c o n s p i ra tor was pr esent tests the limits of even this lenient standa

rd. Moreove r, L arc h has not shown that the omission of this i nstruction aff ecte d his substantial rig hts. I n most cases, this re quires the def endant to show that the e rror aff ecte d the outcome of

the district court’s proc eeding s. Jones , 1 0 8 F. 3d at 672; Olano , 5 07 U. S. at 73 4. Th is b ur de n is insurmountable for him bec ause, a s alrea dy discussed, the jury

could re asonably

find that he e ither

a c tua lly , c on str

uc tiv e ly , o r j ointly

po sse sse d th e sto le n f

ir e arm s. Finally , even if

plain err or wa s prese nt, this i s not t h e case in which w e would use our discreti o n t o reve rse the district c ourt. Jones , 1 08 F .3 d at 67 2. Th e dis c re tio n c on fe rr e d b y Rul e 52 (b ) i s u su a lly

re se rv e d to tho se c ir c ums tanc e s in whic h a misc arr ia g e of jus tic e wo uld oth e rw ise result. Id. (c i t i n g Olano , 507 U.S. at 736). “Misca rriag e of justice” can mean t h at the def endant

was a ctually

innocent or that the err or “se riously aff ect[s] the fairne ss, integr ity , or public re putation-13-

of judicial proc eeding s.” Id. (alter ation in or igina l) (interna l quotation mar ks and citation omitted).

I n this case , L arc h had eve ry opportunity

to reque st whateve r jury

instruction he desire d but failed to reque st any

thing compara

ble t o the i nstruction of which he now seeks the benef it. See, e .g., Mc Cal l , 85 F.3d at 1195-96 (finding no plain err or when the defendant presented evidence of an a libi defe nse but failed to r equest such instruc tion at trial beca use the dist rict court was depr ived of the knowledg e that the de fenda nt desired the instruc tion or the opportunity to c orre ct his failure to objec t to its om ission). Moreover , a jury conclude d that he —not a c o-c o n s pirator— e x erc ised either actua l, constructive, or

joint possession over t h e fi rearms. Under these c ircumstance s, we see no miscarr iag e of justice. III . F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , th e c on vic tio n o f t he a pp e lla nt, L e wi s E . L arch, Jr ., is AF F IRM ED
.