In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-24-00032-CR

___________________________

On Appeal from the 297th District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 1764157

Before Wallach, J.; Sudderth, C.J.; and Walker, J.

Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

DAVID BOYCE CORNETT, Appellant

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant David Boyce Cornett attempts to appeal his conviction for indecency 

with a child. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11. Under a charge bargain, Cornett pled 

guilty in exchange for the State’s waiving a second count of indecency with a child. See 

Harper v. State, 567 S.W.3d 450, 455 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, no pet.)

(discussing charge bargains). As part of his written plea agreement, Cornett waived 

any right of appeal, and he was admonished that if the trial court followed the 

agreement, he would have to obtain permission from the trial court before he could 

“prosecute an appeal on any matter in the case except for matters raised by written 

motion filed prior to trial.”

In accordance with the parties’ agreement, the trial court found Cornett guilty 

of one count of indecency with a child, sentenced Cornett to fifteen years’ 

confinement, and recorded on the judgment that the State had waived the second 

count. However, the trial court’s certification of Cornett’s right of appeal stated that 

this was not a plea-bargain case and that Cornett had a right of appeal. Cornett then 

filed his notice of appeal. Because the certification did not reflect the record, we 

abated the appeal and ordered the trial court to amend the certification to comport 

with the record. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d), 34.5(c)(2); Harper, 567 S.W3d at 455.

The trial court’s amended certification notes that this is a plea-bargain case and 

that Cornett has no right of appeal, and Cornett has offered no indication that he is 
3

appealing from a written pretrial motion.

1 We therefore notified Cornett that we had 

received the trial court’s amended certification stating that this is a plea-bargain case

and that he has no right of appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2) (providing that in a 

plea bargain case, “a defendant may appeal only: (A) those matters that were raised by 

written motion filed and ruled on before trial, (B) after getting the trial court’s 

permission to appeal, or (C) where the specific appeal is expressly authorized by 

statute”); Harper, 567 S.W.3d at 455 (applying Rule 25.2(a)(2) to charge bargains and 

holding that we had no jurisdiction over issues not raised in pretrial motions and for 

which the trial court had not given permission to appeal). We warned him that this 

appeal could be dismissed unless he or another party filed a response showing 

grounds for continuing the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d), 44.3.

We have received no response. Thus, in accordance with the trial court’s 

certification, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d), 

43.2(f).

1

Cornett signed “Written Waivers of Defendant” in connection with the plea 

agreement, and in that document, he stated that he was “giv[ing] up and waiv[ing] all 

pretrial motions that may have been filed in [his] case.”
4

Per Curiam

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: August 1, 2024