## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

04-1515

HEARTLAND BY-PRODUCTS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee.

Stanley McDermott III , DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary US LLP, of New York, New York, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With him on the brief were Daniel J. Gluck and Jerome L. Hanifin , Serko & Simon, of New York, New York. Aimee Lee , Attorney, International Trade Fi eld Office, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justic e, of New York, New York, argued for defendant-appellee. With her on the brief were Peter D. Keisler , Assistant Attorney General, David M. Cohen , Director, of Washington, DC, and Barbara S. Williams , Attorney in Charge, International Tr ade Field Office, of New York, New York. Of counsel on the brief were Karen P. Binder , Assistant Chief Counsel, International Trade Litigation, United States Customs and Bo rder Protection, of New York, New York, Yelena Slepak , Attorney, and Allan Martin , Associate Chief Counsel, of Washington, DC; and Ellen Daly , Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, of Washington, DC. Appealed from: United States Court of International Trade Judge Judith M. Barzilay

## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

04-1515

HEARTLAND BY-PRODUCTS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee.

__________________________ DECIDED: September 26, 2005

_______________ ___________

Before MICHEL, Chief Judge , SCHALL and PROST, Circuit Judges

. MICHEL, Chief Judge

. Heartland By-Products, Inc. (“Heartland”) appeals the order of the United States Court of International Trade dismissing its May 2003 complain t for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Heartland By-P rods., Inc. v. United States , 341 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2004). This appeal was submitted for decision following oral argument on August 2, 2005. Because we hold that the Court of International Tr ade has ancillary jurisdiction to determine the scope and effect of its prior dec ision in Heartland By -Products, Inc. v. United States , 74 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1999), we reverse the order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings on the merits.BACKGROUND This case comes to us by a long and tor t uous path. The dis pute between Heartland and the Unit ed States Customs Service (“Customs”) 1 originated in 1995. At that time, Heartland, a sugar refiner, requested an advance ruling from Customs regarding t he classific a tion of its prospecti v e sugar sy rup imports from Canada. O n May 15, 1995, Customs issued New York Ruling Letter 810328 (“New York Ruling Letter”), cl assifying Heartland’s prospective imports under subh eadin g 1702.90.40 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the Un ited States (“HTSUS”). Under this classification, Heartland’s sugar syrup was not subject to the signi ficantly higher duty rates imposed under the Tariff Rate Quota (“TRQ”). 2 Hav i ng obtained the advanc e classification ruling from Customs, Heartl and began its import and refining operations in the United States in mid-1997. About four years later, in response to a petition under 19 U.S.C. § 1516 by a number of domestic trade associ ations, Customs published a notice of its intent to revoke the New York Ruling Let ter and to re classify Heartland’s sugar syrup imports under a different HTSUS provis ion, subject to the TRQ. Proposed Revocat i on of Ruling Letter & Treatment Relating to Tariff Cla s s ification of Certain Sugar Syrups , 33 Cust. Bull. No. 22/23, at 56-57 (J une 9, 1999). On September 8, 1999, following a comment period, Customs issued a fi nal notice revoking the New Yor k Ruling Letter and

1 Effective March 1, 2003, the United States Customs Service was renamed the United States Bur eau of Cus t oms and Border Protection. Hom e land Secu rity Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 07-296, § 1502, 116 Stat. 2135, 2308-2309 (2002).

2 According to Heartland, the non-TR Q duty during the relevant period wa s 0.35 cents per liter compared to the TR Q rate of 35.74 cents per kilogram, approximately 10,000 percent hig her than the non-TRQ rate.

04-1515 2reclassifying Heartland’s sugar syrup imports, effective November 8, 1999. Revocation of Ruling Letter & Treatment Relating to Ta r i ff Classific a tion of Certain Sugar Syrups , 33 Cust. Bull. No. 35/36, at 41 (Sept. 8, 1999) (“Revocation Ruling”). On September 20, 1999, Hear tland filed a c o mplaint in the Court of Internationa l Trade seeking pre-importation review of the Revocation Ruli ng under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(h) and an injunction pr ev enting Cus t oms from enfor cing t he Rev o cation Ruling under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). On October 18, 1999, the Cour t of International Trade exercis ed its jurisdiction under § 1581(h) 3 to grant Heartland’s motion for judgment on the agency record. H eartland By -P rods., Inc. v. United States , 74 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1999) (“Heartland I ”). The court declared Customs’ Revocation Ruling unlawful and ordered that Heartland’s s ugar syrup be classif i ed under subheading 1702.90.40 HTSUS, the classifi c a tion established by the Ne w York Rulin g Letter. Id. at 1345. Rely ing on Heartland I , Heartland continued to import sugar syrup into the United States. The gov ernment, joined by the United States Beet Sugar Associat ion, which had intervened as a defendant below , appealed the Court of Inte rnational Trade’s decis i on

3 28 U.S.C. § 1581(h) provides: The Court of International Trade shall have e x clus ive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced to review, prio r to the importation of the goods involv ed, a ruling iss u ed by the Secretar y of the Treasury, or a refusal to issue or change s u ch a ruling, relating to classificati on, valuatio n, rate of duty, marking, restricted merchandise , entry requirements, dra w backs, vessel repairs, or similar matters, but only if the party co mmencing the civil action demonstrates to the court that he would be irreparably harmed unless giv en an opportunity to obtain j udicial rev i ew prior to such importation.

04-1515 3in Heartland I

. 4 We reversed, reasoning that Cust oms’ persuasive interpretation of t he relevant HTSUS prov isions merited defer ence under Skidmore v. Swift & Co. , 323 U.S. 134 (1944) . Heartland By-Pr ods ., Inc. v. United States , 262 F.3d 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Heartland II ”). This court’s decis ion did not spec ify the date as of which the TRQ rates would apply to Heartland’s sugar syrup entri es. Our decision is sued on August 30, 2001, nearly two years after the decision wa s reviewed. The following day, Heartland ceased importing sugar syrup into the United States. After denying Heartland’s petition for rehea ring, this c ourt issued its mandat e on December 4, 2001. Customs, however, did not wait for the mandate to issue before commencing full-scale liquidati on and reliquidation of Heartl and’s sugar syrup entries at the TRQ rates. Beginning on Oc tober 5, 2001, Customs liquidat ed some 1, 225 entries prior to the issuance of the mandate. Customs continued to liquidate and reliquidat e Heartland’s entries after the mandate issued. Heartland r e sponded by filing a motion for entry of judgment on December 13, 2001, ask i ng that the Court of I n ternational Trade determine the effe ctive date of its ruling in Heartland I and thus the propriety of Customs’ actions. Heartland alleged that § 1581(h) conferred jurisdiction on the trial court to consider the scope of its ruling in Heartland I and argued that, under 19 U.S. C. § 1625(c), 5 the higher TRQ dut ies bec ame applicable no earlier than 60 day s after the i ssuance of the appellate mandate.

4 The government did not seek to stay Heartland I pending appeal.

5 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c) provides, in relevant part: (c) Modification and r e vocation. A proposed interpretive ruling or decision which would--

04-1515 4In December 2001, Heartland b egan to file protective prot ests under 19 U.S.C. § 1514, administratively cha llenging Customs’ allegedly premature liquida tions and reliquidations of its sugar syrup en tries at th e TRQ rate

. The Court of International Trade heard oral argument on Heartland’s motion for entry of judgment on January 23, 2002. At oral argument, counsel for the government represented that Heartland may establis h j u risdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) 6 by protesting the liquidation or reliquidation of a single entry and that Customs “would likely” suspend action on Heartl and’s other entries pending co urt proceedings. In view of this representation, the tr ial court advised the parties to work together to settle the jurisdictional issue. Heartland promptly contacted the governm en t, suggesting that it deny a protest of a si ngle entry, which Hear tland would contest under § 1581(a), while Customs deferred taking any ac tion on all other pending entr ies. Customs, however, proposed denying three representat ive entries, the first reliquidat ed prior to the issuanc e of the mandate, the s e cond re liquidated after the issuance of the mandate, and the third liquidated after the issuance of the mandate. On Febr uary 15, 2002, two days after

(1) modify (other than to correct a cleric al error) or revoke a prior interpretive ruling or decision which has been in effect for at least 60 days; or (2) have the effect of modifying t he treatment previous ly accorded by the Customs Service to substantially ident ical transactions; shall be published in t he Customs Bulleti n. . . . The final ruling or decision shall bec ome effective 60 days afte r the date of it s publication.

6 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) provides: The Court of International Trade shall have e x clus ive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced to contest the denial of a pr otest, in whole or in part, under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930.

04-1515 5Heartland questioned the neces sity of deny ing th ree rather than just one entry, Customs resumed liquidating and reliquidating Hear tland’s entries at the TRQ rate. On February 26, 2002, the Court of In ternational T r ade denied Heartland’s motion for entry of judgment. Heartl and By-Prods., Inc. v. United States , 223 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2002) (“Heartland III ”). The court vehem ently rejected the government’s argument that § 1581(h) covers only prospe ctive rather than actual entries, “even when the actual entry was the prospective entry contemplated by the court when it took jurisdiction of the case , and by the ruling that was the subject of [Heartland’s] complaint.” Id. at 1330. The Court of Inter national Trade explained that “[w]hile the jurisdictional predic a te for § 158 1(h) requires that the entries be prospective, this must be distinguis hed from the effect of a judicial decision which can o n ly be useful if it is app lied to real entries.” Id. The court thus ruled t hat it continued to have jurisdiction to adjudicate issues pertaining to the actual ent ries covered by Heartland I : “To force an importer to seek relief under § 1581( h) to establish its rights, and then force it to litigate aga in whe n it seeks to enforce t hose rights with actual entries, would make § 1581(h) superfluous as an avenue of relief.” Id. at 1331. The trial court also observed that because its decision in Heartland I remained binding and enforceable until the issuance of the appellate mandate, “[a]ny action by Cust oms that applies the [Revocation Ruling] prior to t he issuance of the mandate dire ctly flouts the authority of this court over rulings under § 1581(h).” Id. Nonetheles s , the Cour t of International Tr ade dec lined to exercise its jurisdict i on under § 1581(h) to determine the temporal effect of its ruling in Heartland I , stating that a “better alternative” was ava ilable to Heartland in this case, namely, jurisdiction under

04-1515 628 U.S.C. § 1581(a). Id. at 1335. The court reasoned that while it had “the option of ruling on t he applicability of § 1625(c) to so me of the entries covered by [Heartland ’s ] motion” — specifically, those entered and liquidated prior to December 11, 2001 — it would be unable to consider a ll of the relief requested by H eartland, given the unclear factual record and the uncertain status of other entries in the liquidation proc ess. Id. at 1334. The protest process, the court explai ned, would allow the develo p ment of a clea r factual record. Hence, the court concluded that “[i]n this case, to maintain jurisdiction under § 1581(h), or extend it under § 1581(i), when another more comprehensive avenue is available is unwise.” Id. at 1335. The Court of International Trade thus entered judgment in accordance with th e appellate mandat e and dis m issed the complaint. Heartland did not appeal Heartland III . Several months later, Heartland renewed its proposal that Customs deny the protest of a s i ngle entry to establish jurisdiction under § 1581(a). Heartland had filed two s u ch protests, dated March 1 and March 8, 2002, eac h covering only a single entry. Despite Heartland’s renewed proposal, on December 3, 2002, Customs deni ed four pending prot ests, totaling approximately $10
million in T R Q duties. Customs denie d one addition al protest wo rth $26 million in TRQ
duties on F ebruary 27, 2003. No ne of these protests included the single-entry protests filed by Heartland. On May 29, 2003, Heartland f iled a second complaint in the Court of Internati ona l Trade, challenging Customs’ retroactive imposition of TRQ duties on Heartland’s suga r syrup entries imported in relianc e on Heartland I . Bot h counts of the complaint, the first styled under § 1581(h) and the se cond under § 1625(c), sought declaratory judgment a s

04-1515 7well as a preliminary and permanent injunc tion. On July 28, 2003, the government moved to dismiss Heartland’s complaint for la ck of subject matter ju risdiction or, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim upo n which relief can be gr anted. On July 1, 2004, almost one year later, hav ing heard no oral argument, the Court of International Trade dism issed Heartland’s com p laint. He artland By-Prods., Inc. v. United States , 341 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2004) (“Heartland IV ”)

. The Court of International Trade determined that it la c k ed jurisdic tion under both § 1581(h) and § 1581(i). 7 With respect to § 1581(h), the c ourt concluded that it could no longer exercise jurisdiction because it “for mally relinquishe d jurisdiction” under that provision when it denied He artland’s motion for entry of judgment and dismissed the original case in Heartland III . The present action, the trial court reasoned, “[w]hile

7 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) provides: (i) In addition to the juri sdiction conferred upon the Court of International Trade by subsections (a)-(h) of this section and subject to the exception set forth in subsection (j) of this sect ion, the Court of International Trade shall have exc l usiv e jurisdiction of any civil action commenced against the United States, its agencies, or it s officers, that arises out of any law of the United States providing for-- (1) revenue from imports or tonnage; (2) tariffs, duties, fees, or ot her taxes on the importation of merchandise for reasons other than the raising of revenue; (3) embargoes or other quantitative re strictions on the importation of merchandise for reasons other than the protection of the public health or safety; o r 4) adminis tration and enforcement with respect to the matters referred to in paragraphs (1)-(3) o f this subsection and subsections (a)-(h ) of this secti on.

. . . .
04-1515 8involv ing t he same parties, entries and underlying dispute as Heartland III . . . is an entirely separate, new cause of action. T herefore, Heartl and carries the burden of reestablishing the jurisdiction of this court to survive the gov ernment’s motion to dismiss.” Id. at 1287. The trial court next determined that no new basis for § 1581(h) jurisdiction existed. T he Court of International Trade found that Heartland c ould not satisfy the requirements of § 1581(h) anew, as all of it s entries had already been imported, and no prospective entries were in dispute. Turning to § 1581(i), the trial court observ ed that this “catch-all” jurisdictional provision “may not be invoked when jurisdic tion under another subsection of section 1581 is, or could hav e been av ailable, unless the remedy provided under that other subsection would be mani festly inadequate.” Id. at 1289. Here, the court explained, Heartland’s alleged inability to pay “rui nous” duties on the protested entries did not alone render a remedy under § 1581(a) manifestly inadequate. Id. (citing, inter alia , Am. Air Parcel Forwar ding Co. v. United States , 718 F. 2d 1546, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ). The court thus found j u risdicti on under § 1581(i) unav ailable. F i nding no subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Heartland’s co mplaint, the Court of Internati onal Trade dismissed the action. Heartland t i mely appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5). DISCUSSI ON Heartland makes three main arguments on appeal. First, it contends that the Court of International Trade er red by no t treating Heartland’s complaint as “an independent action” for relief from the judgment of dismissal in Heartland III under Cour t

04-1515 9of Internati onal Trade Rule 60(b). 8 Such an action, Heartland argues, does not require an independent bas is for jurisdiction. Sec ond, Heartland ass e rts that the Court of International Trade had continued to poss e ss jurisdic tion under § 1581(h) t o determine the scope of its ruling in Heartland I . This inherent authority, Heartland maintains, did not terminate upon the court’s dismissal of the original action in Heartland III . Third, Heartland claims the trial court had jurisdicti on under the catch-all provision in § 1581(i). To that end, Heartland challe nges the trial court’s det erminati on that jurisdiction und e r § 1581(a) was not “manifestly inadequate,” renderi ng § 1581(i) jurisdiction unavailable
as a matte r of law. The gov ernment responds that Heartland’s complaint f a ils to seek relief from the judgment in Heartland III under Rule 60(b), as the comp laint mentions neither Rule 60(b) nor Heartland III . In reply to Heartland’s argum ent that the Court of Internationa l Trade continued to have jurisdiction under § 1581(h), the government asserts that the court forever relinquished jurisdiction ov er the ori g inal action when it dismissed Heartland III , and that the present action consti tutes an entirely new, separate case, requiring an independent juri sdic tional basis . Finally, t he government defends the trial court’s finding that the alleged adequacy of § 1581(a) rendered jurisdiction unde r § 1581( i) unavailable, arguing that financial hardship alone does not make jurisdiction under § 1581(a) “manifestly inadequate.”

8 Rule 60(b) provides, in relevant part: This rule does not limit the power of the court to entertain an ind ependent action to relieve a party from a judgm ent, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personal ly notified as provided in Title 28 U.S.C. § 1655, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action . (Emphasis added).

04-1515 10We review decisions of the Court of In ternational Trade dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo . Xerox Corp. v. United Stat es , 289 F.3d 792, 794 (Fed. Cir. 2002). W e begin wit h Heartland’s argument that the Court of I n ternational Trade continued to have juri sdiction under § 1581(h) to determine the scope and effect of its decision in Heartland I , an argument that we accept. The Court of Internati onal Trade conclud ed that because it “formally relinquis hed jurisdiction” over the original action in Heartland III , juri sdiction under § 1581(h) was no longer available. Indeed, in Heartland III , the tri a l court “declined” to exercis e jurisdiction under § 1581(h) despite correctly fi nding such jurisdiction did lie. Mindful of the fact that Heartland IV , not Heartland III , i s before us on review, we nonetheless not e that the C ourt of Internat ional Trade did not have the aut hority to simply decline to exercis e jurisdiction conferred by § 1581(h) . Such an exercise is not optional. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Counc il of New O r leans , 491 U.S. 350, 358 (1989) (“federal courts lack the authority to abstain from the exercis e of jurisdiction that has been conferred”). Hav i ng a ssured its e lf of § 1581(h) jurisdic tion over at least s o me of the entries, the trial c o urt should have deferr ed ruling on the govern ment’s motion to dismiss pending c l arif ication of t he factual record as to other entries or dis m issed the action without prejudice pending such clarif ic ation, rather than ent ering judgment that finally dismissed the action. In Heartland IV , despite acknowledging that Heartland’s second action inv o lv ed the same parties, the same entries, and t he same underlying dispute as Heartland III , the court nevertheless seemed to treat as legally dispositive the fact that it had “finally relinquished” jurisdiction over t he original case in Heartland III . The central is sue in this

04-1515 11appeal is t hus whether the Court of Inter national Trade had jurisdic tion to review the scope of its prior decision in Heartland I , despite its dismissal in Heartland III of the original action of whic h the prior decision was part. We have had occasion t o e x amine the underly ing question in United States v. Hanover Insurance Co. , 82 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1996). There, the United States co mmenced an ac tion agains t Hanover, a surety, in 1992 to recover unpaid ant idumping duties and interest from 1978. T h e Court of International Trade gr anted Hanover’s motion to dismiss the action as barred by the six year statute of limitat ions set forth in 28 U.S. C. § 2415(a). Desp ite the dismissal, Customs continued t o demand payment and threatened Hanov er with administrative sanctions, including directing all district and regional directors not to accept any merchandise covered by bonds underwritten by Hanover and requesting that the Treasury Department remove Hanover from t he list of approved s u reties pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1623. Hano ver sought redress from the Court of In ternationa l Trade by filin g a motion for civil contempt, arguing that the threatened administrative actions contravened the court’ s order dismi ssing the case as ti me-barred. Concluding that it had “jurisdiction to deter mine the effect of, and to enforc e its own judgm ents,” and therefore power to determine the legal effect of its prior dismissal, the court enjoined Customs from further administrative attempts to collect the unpaid duties and interest. This c ourt affi rmed, explaining: Like district courts, see 28 U.S.C. § 1585 (1994), the Court of International Trade has the inherent power to determi ne the effect of its judgments and issue injunctions to protect against a ttempts to attack or evade those judgments. The iss ue before the c ourt on Hanov er’s motion for civil contempt was whether Customs’ atte mpt to circumvent the limitation period by r e sort to administrative actions was contrary to the prior order of dismissal. Such an in quiry falls s quarely wit hin the court’s inherent power to determine the effect of its prior judgments. Where a party’s conduct is

04-1515 12in violation, or evasive, of a pri o r judgment, the Court of International Trade als o has authority to enjoin that conduct regardless of whether the conduct amounts to civil contempt. Id. at 1054. This inher ent power, which flows fr om a federal court’s or iginal authority to render a judgment in the case, has been termed “ancillary jurisdiction.” 9 A s t h e Supreme Court has explained: We have reserved the use of ancillary jurisdiction in s u bsequent proceedings for the exercise of a feder al court’s inherent power to enforce its judgments. Without jurisdiction to enforce a judgment entered by a federal court, the judici al power would be inco mplete and entirely inadequate to the purposes for which it was conferred by the Constitution. Peacock , 516 U.S. at 356 (citati on and quotation omitted); 10 see also Peter Bay Homeowners Assoc., Inc. v. Stillman , 294 F.3d 524, 533 (3d Cir. 2002) (“There is no question . . . that the District Court had jurisdiction to interpret the scope of the easement ordered by Judge Young in his 1975 decis ion. It had the jurisdiction pursuant to its inherent power to interpret, and thereb y effect, the District Court’s own decrees.” (citing Kok k onen v. Guardian Lif e Ins. Co. , 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994))). As in Ha no ver , here, the Court of International Trade had anc illary jurisdiction to determine the effect of Heartland I on the sugar syrup entries made in reliance on that judgment before its reversal by our court. Like the motion for civil contempt in Hanover , the complaint at issue in this c a s e alleged that Customs’ liquidat io ns and reliquidations

9 A federal c ourt may exercise anc illar y jurisdiction “(1) to permit disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually interdependent; and (2) to enable a court to function s u ccessfully , that is, to manage its proceedings, vindic a te its authority, and ef fe ctuate its decrees.” Peac ock v. Thomas , 516 U.S. 349, 355 (1996) (citat ion and quotation omitted).

10 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1 585, the Court of Inter national T r ade posse sses “all the powers in law and equity of, or as confe rred by statute upon, a district court of the United States.”

04-1515 13of these entries at the TRQ rate prior to the issuance of the appellat e mandate contravened the Court of Internati onal Trade’s ruling in Heartland I. T h e Cour t of International Trade, therefore, had jurisdic tion to assess the propriety of Customs’ allegedly premature liquidations and reliquidations — purportedl y violative of its prior ruling in Heartland I — despite the dismiss a l of the or iginal action in Heartland III . In other words, the dismissal of Heartland III did not deprive the court of its inherent power to examine the effect of or ensure complia nce with its own prior ruling in Heartland I

. While federal courts hold the inherent pow er to enforce their prior judgments, in determining the reach of such power, t he Supreme Court has “cautioned against the exercis e of jurisdiction over proceedings t hat are ‘entirely new and original,’ or wher e ‘the relief [sought is] of a differ ent kind or on a different princi ple’ than that of the prior decree.” P eacock , 516 U.S. at 357-59 (finding no jurisdiction bec ause the second suit involv ed new theories of liability not asse rted in and having little connection with the original suit) (citations omitted, brackets in original). In this regard, the government insists that Heartland’s second su it is wholly distinc t from the original action, thus requiring an independent jurisdictional predic ate. The original case, the government alleges, dealt with the validi t y of Customs’ Rev o cation Rulin g, while this ca se challenges the application of t hat ruling through a separate st atutory provision, namely § 1625. The government’s view of the two actions is myopic. Both cas e s, as the government implicitly admits, concern Customs’ Revocation Ruling. As the Court of International Trade correctly reasoned in Heartland III , “ [t]h ere is an obvious link between t he restoration of the [Revocati on Ruling] by the F ederal Circuit, and determining the effective date of its applic ation.” 223 F. Supp. 2d at 1334. Like

04-1515 14Heartland’s motion for entry of judgment in Heartland III , this acti on asks th e Court of International Trade to determine the reac h of its own judgment in Heartland I and determine the legalit y of Cust oms’ liquidations and reliqui dations in vie w of that judgment, a task that is always wi thin the court’s jurisdiction. 11 S e e Hanover , 8 2 F.3d at
1054. Indeed, requiring Heartland to establish j u risdicti on under § 1581(a), including the payment of TRQ duties on it s denied pr otests, to receive a determination as to the proper scope of the trial court’s original ruling under § 1581(h) would frustrate the purpose of the latter provision, which was ena cted to provide import ers with a means for obtaining pre-importati on relief without having to pay post-i mportation duties. As the Court of International Trade corr ectly explained in Heartland III , Section 1581(h) is an extraordinary in strument, and a significant exception to the proc edural requirements traditi onally placed on those challenging a decision by Customs. Historically, in order to challenge a decis ion like the Revocation [Ruling] at issue in this cas e , it was necessary for a party to exh aust remedies av aila ble thro ugh the ad ministrative agency by filing a protest with Customs. Exhaustion in such a case also requires plaintiffs to pay any duties owed on the entries in question before filing with this court. Section 1581(h) allows for bypa ssing these proce dural and monetary burdens in specific and narrow circumst ances, namely , if the importer can demonstrate that it would be irreparably harmed unless given an opportunity to obtain judicial revi ew prior to [an] importation. 223 F. Supp. 2d at 1324 (citati ons and quotations omitted). It would def y reason for Congress to permit Heartland to obtain pr e-importation relief from the Court of

11 The gov ernment als o renews an ar gum ent rejected by the Court of International Trade in Heartland III , that jurisdiction under § 1581(h) cannot lie without prospective rather than actual entries before the cour t, as required by t he statute. This argument only has f o rce if Heartland were required to establish a new basis for § 1581(h) jurisdiction. Becaus e, as we held above, the C ourt of International Trade has ancillary jurisdiction to assess the scope and effe ct of its prior decis io ns, the fact that no prospective entries are at issue is of no moment.

04-1515 15International Trade under § 1581(h), yet requi re it to invoke an entirely s eparate and less favorable jurisdictional basis , § 1581(a), to resolve the sc ope of that relief. We will not impute such intent to Congress. Moreover, settl ed precedent, discussed above, finds a constitutional basis for ancillary ju risdiction to enforce continually its prior judgments under the same jurisdictional bas is supporting the original ruling. Finally, the government proposes that any harm to Heartland, including the $10 million duty payment needed to m eet the requirements for § 1581( a) jurisdiction, is selfinflicted. That is, Heartland chos e to rely on the non-stayed but al so non-final judgment in Heartland I to continue its sugar syrup imports , the government c ontends, and failed to challenge the dismissal of th e original cas e in Heartland III , either by filing a motion to vacate the judgment or by appealing to this court. Wh ile the government’s argument has no bearing on the question of the tria l court’s jurisdiction over Heartland I V , we note that Heartland had little incentive to pur sue a costly appeal from Heartland I I I , especially in the face of the trial court’s directive to work out rulings on protests to invoke jurisdiction under § 1581(a) and t he government’s representations that it would agree to an expedient and affordable m eans for establishi ng jurisdiction under that provision. Heartland’s current predicament, in part a re sult of the Court of International Trade’s erroneous dismissal of its motion for entry of judgment in Heartland III and in part a result of the parties’ inability to agree on a feasible juri sdictional mechanism , in no way precludes Heartland from having the merits of its complaint heard by the Court of International Trade. In sum, the Court of Inter national Trade erred by holding that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the temporal scope of its ruling in Heartland I and the effect of our decision

04-1515 16in Heartland II on that ruling. Bec ause we hold t hat the Court of International Trade had ancillary jurisdiction t o determine the effect ive date the higher TR Q rates applied to Heartland’s sugar syrup imports and thus the legality of Customs’ ac tions with regard to the disputed imports, we ne ed not reach Heartland’s rema ining arguments on appeal, namely, that the Co urt of Inte rnational Trad e erred by failin g to treat its com p laint as a n independent action under Rule 60(b), or that the trial court erred in holding t hat it had no jurisdiction to hear Heartland’s complaint under § 1581(i). 12
CONCLUS ION For the foregoing r easons, the order of the Court of International T r ade dismissing Heartland’s complain t is reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings on the merits.
REV E RS E D AND RE MANDE D

12 Some precedent indic a tes that the ex ercis e of ancilla ry jurisdiction might be committed to the discretion of the trial c ourt. See, e.g. , U.S.I. Props. Corp. v. M.D

. Construction Co. , 230 F.3d 489, 496 (1st Cir . 2000) (“Ancillary enforcement jurisdiction, given its origins in the courts of equity, traditionally has an equit able and dis c retionary character.”). To the extent that the C ourt of International Trad e may pos sess suc h discretion, declining t o exercis e ancillary jurisdiction in this case would c o nstitute an abuse of that discretion.

04-1515 17