TERRORISM:

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND THE HOME FRONT

Stephen C. Pelletiere

Editor

May 15, 1995
ii

*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is approved for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may

be conveyed to the Director of Research, Dr. Earl H. Tilford,

Jr., by calling commercial (717) 245-3234 or DSN 242-3234, or to

the editor of this volume, Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere, at

commercial (717) 245-4080 or DSN 242-4080.

*******

Chapters 1, 2, and 3 of this volume are papers originally

presented at a roundtable on “Terrorism: Hizbollah, Hamas and the

Iranian Connection,” held November 4, 1994. The Strategic Studies

Institute; the Institute for National Security Studies, U.S. Air

Force Academy; and the Center for International Strategy,

Technology and Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology

cosponsored the roundtable.
iii

FOREWORD

The recent bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma has

highlighted the complexity of the phenomenon of political

extremism. Until this occurred, inside the United States foreign

terrorists were the focus of attention, particularly the socalled Islamic fundamentalists. Undue emphasis on the "foreign

connection” can make it appear that only Middle Eastern terror is

of consequence.

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) has long resisted this

approach. We view terrorism as a universal phenomenon, one that

can erupt anywhere. As part of our continuing investigation of

this problem, SSI held a conference last November at Georgia

Tech, at which a number of terrorist-related issues were

considered. The emphasis was on international terror, but the

threat of domestic extremism also was examined. Included in this

volume are three papers presented at the conference—two are

related to international terror, while one is concerned with the

domestic variety—and a concluding chapter.

In the first chapter, Dr. Kenneth Katzman, an analyst with

the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress,

uncovers important facts about Hizbollah, considered by many the

most lethal of the Islamic fundamentalist groups. Based on his

findings, Dr. Katzman ventures to predict what the group’s likely

future course of action will be.

Dr. Lew Ware’s contribution in the second chapter is equally

important. A professor of Mid-East studies at the Air Command and

Staff College, he has painstakingly, and with impressive

scholarship, detailed the differences between Sunni and Shia

ideas of jihad, a concept crucial to understanding a range of

Middle Eastern fundamentalist organizations. Analysts who are

less serious than Dr. Ware profess to see no difference between

the Shias and Sunnis on this point. However, as Dr. Ware shows, a

world of difference exists on this and other matters relating to

the fundamentalists’ modus operandi.

In the third chapter, Dr. Stephen Sloan, Professor of

Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, has, with

remarkable prescience, focused on the likelihood of domestic

terror groups escalating their activities inside the United

States, and he speculates about the various manifestations that

could develop.

Finally, Dr. Steven Metz, Associate Research Professor at

SSI, completes the volume with an essay on America’s role in

world affairs, and how this makes the nation a prey to acts of

terror by international and domestic actors.
iv

SSI is pleased to offer this monograph as an aid to

understanding this perplexing subject.

WILLIAM W. ALLEN

Colonel, U.S. Army

Acting Director

Strategic Studies Institute
5

CHAPTER 1

HIZBOLLAH:

NARROWING OPTIONS IN LEBANON1

Kenneth Katzman

Introduction.

Hizbollah is under pressure. One of the keys to its survival

thus far has been the alliance between its two outside patrons,

Iran and Syria. Its primary patron, Iran, opposes an ArabIsraeli peace settlement. Syria, on the other hand, is moving

toward peace with Israel, a peace that will likely include

guarantees that Hizbollah be subject to significant constraints.

As a result, Hizbollah is seeking to play a larger role in the

legitimate Lebanese political process to hedge its bets against

what Hizbollah may see as likely further limitations on its

regional influence in a future peace agreement between Israel and

Syria and Lebanon. Meanwhile, Hizbollah hardliners do not accept

change in the Middle East and they are increasingly resorting to

international terrorism against Israeli and Jewish targets to try

to avenge Israeli attacks and to derail the peace process.

Hizbollah also appears to believe that the buildup of its

terrorist cells overseas might enable the military wing of the

organization to survive offshore in case the militia is

dismantled in Lebanon as part of an Israeli/Syrian/Lebanese peace

settlement.2

Hizbollah’s tactics and strategies are evolving, but it is

still remembered for spectacular acts of terrorism against the

United States and the West during the 1980s. In its annual report

on international terrorism for 1993, the State Department

describes Hizbollah as a “radical Shia Muslim group formed in

Lebanon, dedicated to the creation of an Iranian-style Islamic

republic in Lebanon and removal of all non-Islamic influences

from [the] area. [It is] strongly anti-West and anti-Israel [and]

closely allied with, and often directed by, Iran.”3 The report

adds that Hizbollah is “known or suspected to have been involved

in numerous anti-U.S. terrorist attacks, including the suicide

bombings of the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut (April

and October 1983, respectively) and the U.S. Embassy annex in

September 1984. The group also hijacked TWA Flight 847 in 1985.

Elements of the group were responsible for the kidnapping and

detention of most, if not all, U.S. and other Western hostages in

Lebanon. Islamic Jihad [another name used by Hizbollah elements]

publicly claimed responsibility for the car-bombing of Israel’s

Embassy in Buenos Aires in March 1992,4 and it is believed

responsible for bombings of Israeli and Jewish installations in

Buenos Aires and London in July 1994. In part to mask its

responsibility for certain actions, Hizbollah elements sometimes

act under a variety of names, possibly corresponding to different

cells or clans within the organization, including: Islamic Jihad,

Revolutionary Justice Organization, Organization of the Oppressed
6

on Earth, and Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine.

Hizbollah’s military operations are carried out under the name

Islamic Resistance. A Hizbollah branch that claimed

responsibility for the July 18, 1994 bombing of a Jewish services

building in Buenos Aires calls itself Ansarallah (partisans of

God).

Hizbollah’s Formation.

A number of factors accounted for Hizbollah’s emergence in

1982. First and foremost, Lebanon provided fertile ground for

Shia political action. Lebanon’s Shia Muslims–who comprise

Hizbollah–have been underrepresented in the Lebanese power

structure and, possibly as a consequence, economically

downtrodden. These conditions created Shia resentment,

particularly toward the economically and politically dominant

Christian community. In addition, the civil war that began in

1975 and pitted virtually all of Lebanon’s factions against each

other at one time or another left the Lebanese government with

very little authority.5 Power was primarily in the hands of

militias linked to the factions that split Lebanon along ethnic,

religious, familial, and regional lines.

Second, there were a number of Shia clerics in Lebanon who

were enamored of Iran’s Islamic revolution. Many of the clerics

that ultimately formed Hizbollah had studied under either

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, when he was in exile in Najaf, Iraq,

in the 1970s, or his colleague Muhammad Baqr Al Sadr, who was

executed by Saddam Hussein’s regime in 1980. Abbas Musawi and

Subhi Tufayli, both former leaders of Hizbollah, reportedly

studied there at that time. The current leader, Hasan Nasrallah,

visited Khomeini when he was teaching in Najaf. (Khomeini began

teaching in Najaf, which is sacred to Shias worldwide, when the

Shah of Iran exiled him from Iran in 1964.) Hizbollah cleric

Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah helped found the Da’wa (Islamic Call),

a forerunner of Hizbollah, when he was a student of Muhammad Baqr

Al Sadr and Ayatollah Abol Qasim Musavi-Khoi in Najaf in the

1960s. Fadlallah brought the Da’wa to Lebanon, or according to

other accounts, supported Da’wa’s establishment there in the mid

1960s.6 This mentor-student relationship–a crucial element in the

Shia clerical hierarchy–in large part forms the emotional bond

between Hizbollah’s clerics and Iran. However, there are

occasional strains between Iran and Hizbollah over specific

tactics and Iranian financial support, as well as cultural

differences between Arab Hizbollah and Persian Iran.

Third, the building blocks of the Hizbollah organization

were present even before the 1982 Israeli invasion. There had

already been growing Islamic awareness among Lebanese Shias,

encapsulated in such movements as the leftwing “Movement of the

Disinherited,” and its military offshoot, Amal (hope) founded by

Iranian-born Sayyid Musa Sadr in 1975. (Musa Sadr disappeared on

a visit to Libya in 1978, and he was believed killed by the

Libyans. This was an early source of contention between the
7

Islamic Republic and Libya.) Hizbollah drew many of its recruits

from Amal, including the followers of radical non-clerics Hussein

Musawi and Mustafa Dirani. In addition, prior to its invasion of

Lebanon, Israel had established contact with Shia leaders in

southern Lebanon in an attempt to create an anti-Palestinian ally

there and the Shiites in southern Lebanon initially welcomed the

1982 Israeli invasion, hoping it would cleanse the Palestinian

forces from there.7 However, many of these Shias turned on Israel

after its invasion and occupation and later joined Hizbollah.

The June 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, a response to

attacks on northern Israel by Palestinian fighters, was the

trigger event in Hizbollah’s formation as a party. The invasion

provoked Iran, with Syrian approval, to send a contingent of

about 1,000 Revolutionary Guards to Baalbek in eastern Lebanon,

ostensibly to combat the Israelis.8 However, along with fighting

Israeli forces about 35 miles south of their position, the Guards

began propagating Iran’s Islamic revolution among the Shia

community and began running social welfare programs, schools, and

hospitals.9 Gradually, the Guards and hardline Iranian clerics,

most notably then-Ambassador to Syria Ali Akbar Mohtashemi-Pur,

promoted the coalescence of the radical Lebanese Shia clerics and

non-clerical militants who, by late 1982, were referring to

themselves as Hizbollah, the Arabic word for Party of God. Each

cleric who joined Hizbollah brought large parts of his

congregation into Hizbollah’s militia; significant numbers of

additional recruits were attracted by Hizbollah propaganda,

sermons, and seminars.10 It offered to these recruits a vision of

an Islamic Lebanon within a broader Islamic revolution, catering

to the economically deprived.

Hizbollah’s Organizational Structure and Operations.

The organizational structure of Hizbollah–both its political

and military wings–is fluid and flexible. This flexibility has

enabled Hizbollah to survive challenges from other militias, from

Israel, and sometimes from Syria. Hizbollah’s flexibility will

likely be the key to its survival if there is a comprehensive

Arab-Israeli peace. Hizbollah’s organization traditionally has

been based on the personal authority and following of its

clerical leaders and its militia commanders, linked by a common

ideology and background. In addition, clans and families have

dominated large factions within Hizbollah. In the late 1980s,

however, Hizbollah attempted to become more centralized and

structured. It formed an overarching consultative council–

subordinate to the Secretary-General and deputy Secretary

General–and three regional councils corresponding to its areas of

greatest influence in Lebanon: the Bekaa Valley (the base of most

of Hizbollah’s senior clerics), the southern suburbs of Beirut

(to which many Shias migrated during the 1975-90 civil war), and

the traditional Shia villages in southern Lebanon. Hasan

Nasrallah comes from southern Lebanon, but he served as

Hizbollah’s chief mobilization officer in the Bekaa, enabling him

to expand his political base there. Decisions of the consultative
8

council are implemented by a Political Bureau, which is chosen

by an electoral body of delegates that meets in a congress about

every four years. A separate executive committee oversees the

regional commands and several administrative departments, such as

social affairs, finance, trade union affairs, education, health,

and information.11 Hizbollah also established a screening system

for its militia recruits, probably to prevent penetration by

Israeli, Syrian, and Lebanese government agents.12 According to

Hasan Nasrallah, Hizbollah’s decisions are by a majority vote of

the recognized leaders of Hizbollah, but on major decisions

Hizbollah leaders usually try to achieve a consensus. Some

observers believe that, in hesitating to discuss its

organization, Hizbollah leaders are trying to mask a high degree

of factionalization.

One of Hizbollah’s most important strengths has been its

ability to deliver social services when and where the Lebanese

government could not. This social service network not only made

Hizbollah popular among Lebanese Shias, but it also helped it

attract recruits and take away support from its chief rival for

Shia loyalties, Amal, which does not enjoy financial support from

Iran. Hizbollah’s strong social services network will probably

help Hizbollah remain popular even if Hizbollah’s militia is

disarmed in connection with a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace

agreement. In Beirut’s southern suburbs and other Hizbollah

strongholds, Hizbollah has provided clean water, hospitals, and

subsidized medical clinics. It also runs schools reportedly

staffed by well-qualified teachers, sells food at discount

supermarkets, and rebuilds damaged homes for poor Lebanese.13

During a snowstorm in the winter of 1991-92, Hizbollah organized

teams of relief workers to open roads and distribute food and

other provisions to villages cut off in the storm.14 Hizbollah

also has a reconstruction arm, the Holy Struggle for

Reconstruction, that financed repairs of over 1,000 homes in

south Lebanon following an Israeli offensive into two Shia areas

north of the security zone villages in February 1992.15 Moreover,

Hizbollah activists often have tried, sometimes through violence,

to interfere with other businesses it considers “un-Islamic.”

However, Hizbollah reportedly is less strict in its enforcement

of Islamic values in areas under its control than was the case a

few years ago. Lebanese officials say that, as the Lebanese

government rebuilds Lebanon, it hopes to take over the

performance of these traditional governmental services from

Hizbollah.

Hizbollah’s social net enabled it to win “hearts and minds”

among the Shia population of Lebanon. However, to flourish in

Lebanese politics and to combat Israel it placed significant

weight on developing a strong military arm. The State

Department’s 1993 report on international terrorism lists

Hizbollah’s “strength” at several thousand. Hizbollah sources

assert that the organization has about 5,000-10,000 fighters.16

Other sources believe that Hizbollah’s militia consists of a hard

core of about 300-400 fighters, which can be expanded to up to
9

3,000 within several hours as a battle with Israel develops.17

These reserves presumably are called in from other Hizbollah

strongholds in Lebanon, including the Bekaa Valley and Beirut’s

southern suburbs. (Hizbollah’s main military bases are in the

Bekaa Valley, where they are protected by Syrian air cover.)

Hizbollah fighters tend to operate in dispersed, small units in

order to avoid becoming a concentrated target, in contrast to the

Palestinian forces that operated in southern Lebanon during the

1970s and early 1980s. The Hizbollah units use information and

support from the local Shia population. Over the past few years,

Hizbollah fighters in south Lebanon have pioneered new tactics,

infiltrating into Israel’s security zone and waiting in ambush

for days to hit Israeli patrols from long range. Support units

nearby then hit Israeli strongpoints with mortars as its

infiltration units escape the zone.18 Israeli military officials

believe the new tactics have made Hizbollah a much more

formidable force than it was in the mid-1980s, when it emphasized

suicide bombings and other highly unconventional tactics.

However, it should be noted that Hizbollah’s operations

against Israeli forces in Lebanon during the Israeli occupation

contributed to Israel’s decision in early 1985 to withdraw from

Lebanon and to accelerate the withdrawal once it had begun.

Hizbollah, as well as Amal, conducted car, truck, and remote

detonation bombings against Israeli forces during their

occupation of parts of Lebanon (1982-85), killing many Israeli

soldiers.19 Hizbollah, as well as other Lebanese and

Palestinians, continued to attack Israeli forces in the southern

“security zone” after Israel withdrew in 1985 from all areas

north of the zone. The security zone is inhabited largely by

Lebanese Shias. As Hizbollah became more organized and well

trained in the post-withdrawal period, its attacks on the South

Lebanese Army (SLA) (a pro-Israeli militia led by Brigadier

General Antoine Lahad) increasingly took on a more conventional

form, and the use of suicide attacks decreased.

Hizbollah’s militia is still predominantly a light force. It

is equipped primarily with small arms, such as automatic rifles,

mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and Katyusha rockets, which

it occasionally has fired on towns in northern Israel. U.S.

officials say it does not have truck-mounted multiple launch

systems for the Katyushas, however. Hizbollah guerrillas are

sometimes shown on television conducting military parades in

Beirut, which often include tanks and armored personnel carriers

that may have been captured from the Lebanese army or purchased

from Palestinian guerrillas or other sources. Hizbollah has also

frequently used remotely detonated bombs against Israeli or SLA

patrols in Israel’s “security zone” in southern Lebanon.

According to State Department counter- terrorism officials,

Hizbollah also has short-range anti-tank weapons, including the

Sagger. Beirut television sometimes shows film of Hizbollah

Saggers homing in on Israeli vehicles. U.S. officials add that

there is an assumption that Hizbollah also has some Russian-made

shoulder held anti-aircraft missiles such as the heat-seeking
10

SAM-7 (Strela), but there is no record of Hizbollah shooting

down Israeli aircraft.

Hizbollah is not known to possess such sophisticated weapons

as Stinger anti-aircraft missile launchers, but its patron, Iran,

is believed to possess some and is reportedly attempting to

acquire additional Stingers in Afghanistan.20 Iran might, at some

point if not already, give Stingers to Hizbollah. One report in

October 1994, quoting a Hizbollah militia commander, suggested

Iran was training Hizbollah fighters, at a base outside Tehran,

in the use of Stingers and Scud-like surface-to-surface

missiles.21 It is reasonable to assume that, whether in Iran,

Sudan, or somewhere else in the Middle East, Iran is training

Hizbollah pilots to fly combat aircraft. However, even if this

training were taking place, it is not clear how or from where

Hizbollah could operate an air arm in Lebanon, even if it were

allowed to do so by Syria.

Hizbollah has used its military wing not only to fight

Israel, but also to make it a major force within Lebanon. After

rapid growth in size and influence during the early 1980s, in

1987 Hizbollah became embroiled in a violent political struggle

for supremacy among Lebanese Shias. Its adversary in that

struggle was the secular Amal militia, which has enjoyed the

strong backing of Syria and is generally better armed than

Hizbollah.22 Hizbollah’s revolutionary and Islamic ideology

enabled it to siphon many recruits and some leaders from the more

pragmatic Amal, which has been less willing to fight Israel in

southern Lebanon. For example, Hussein Musawi, the leader of the

Islamic Amal faction of Hizbollah, broke away from Amal in favor

of Hizbollah in 1983, after Amal, in 1982, decided to enter the

Lebanese National Salvation Authority, a coalition regime that

included representatives from all of Lebanon’s major religions

and sects.23 The tensions between Hizbollah and Amal manifested

themselves as violent clashes during 1988-90, in which Amal

defeated Hizbollah in Amal’s traditional stronghold in southern

Lebanon but Hizbollah wrested from Amal control of the largely

Shia southern suburbs of Beirut. Amal reportedly initiated the

fighting in 1988 in an effort to solidify its base in Lebanon’s

Shia community in advance of anticipated 1988 elections (not

held).24 Hizbollah was allowed to return to southern Lebanon

under an Iranian-brokered cease-fire of January 30, 1989. There

have been some clashes between the two forces since that time,

primarily in early 1990 and again in April 1990, but Amal and

Hizbollah began cooperating in June 1992 to contest Lebanese

parliamentary elections.

Efforts to Disrupt the Peace Process. The latest phase of

operations against Israel began following the start of Middle

East peace talks in October 1991, and appears intended, at least

partly, to derail the peace process. Hizbollah knows that a peace

between Israel and Syria and Lebanon will require its

dismantlement as a militia. To head off this result, Hizbollah,

backed by Iran, has sought to prevent–or at least forestall–any
11

peace agreement among these parties. It can be argued that

Iranian opposition to the peace process stems not only from

Iran’s ideology, but from a real political desire not to see its

prime offspring, Hizbollah, eliminated.

Hizbollah has tried to disrupt the peace process by

provoking clashes with Israel that Hizbollah hoped would bring

Israel into conflict with Syria and Lebanon. The most violent

round of clashes since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon took place

in July 1993, after Hizbollah attacks against Israeli and SLA

forces in the security zone killed six Israeli soldiers within

two weeks in mid-July. (Hizbollah attacks killed 3 Israeli

soldiers on July 8 and another on July 22; its de facto ally, the

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command

[PFLP-GC], killed two Israeli soldiers on July 8.) The Hizbollah

attacks occurred shortly before U.S. Secretary of State

Christopher was to visit the Middle East in an effort to organize

an eleventh round in the Middle East peace talks.25 In response

to the Hizbollah attacks, Israel, on July 25, 1993, launched a

series of large-scale air, naval, and artillery attacks on

Hizbollah and PFLP-GC positions in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa

Valley, termed “Operation Accountability.” Syria apparently was

sufficiently committed to the peace process that it did not

retaliate against Israel directly. As the Israeli offensive

began, Hizbollah launched Katyusha rockets on towns in northern

Israel, such as Qiryat Shemona. Israel subsequently began

striking Hizbollah positions in civilian areas in southern

Lebanon in an effort to pressure Syria and Lebanon to curb

Hizbollah by creating a flood of about 300,000 refugees.26

(Hizbollah has often established positions in civilian areas in

an effort to discourage retaliation.) In response, Hizbollah

expanded its rocket attacks on northern Israel.

The escalating violence–and threats of an Israeli ground

invasion into Lebanon that would almost certainly have suspended

the peace process for a significant period–may have contributed

to a decision by the United States to mediate a cease-fire. U.S.

mediation largely ended the fighting by July 31 (a few days

before Secretary of State Christopher’s arrival in the region);

Hizbollah reportedly pledged not to attack Israeli towns but did

not agree to discontinue operations against Israel and the SLA in

the security zone.27 The Administration, as well as Israel,

praised Syria for helping arrange the cease-fire.28 On August 19,

1993, however, Hizbollah detonated three remote control bombs in

the security zone, resulting in the death of nine Israeli

soldiers. Probably to avoid another prolonged round of fighting

that could derail the Arab-Israeli peace process and/or its

private negotiations with the PLO, Israeli retaliation was

limited.

Following the cease-fire, about 300 Lebanese troops moved

into southern Lebanon, presumably to rein in Hizbollah attacks on

Israel. Lebanon reportedly wanted to deploy more than the largely

symbolic 300 troops but Damascus reportedly pressured Beirut to
12

scale back the deployment.29 Syria was said to fear that the

Lebanese deployment could lead to fighting between Lebanese

soldiers and Hizbollah, legitimize Israeli demands for security

guarantees with Lebanon and, possibly, lead the United Nations to

conclude that its peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon was no

longer necessary.30 The Lebanese government, reportedly at the

behest of Syria, said its troops would not attempt to disarm

Hizbollah or take over its positions. The United Nations allowed

the Lebanese army to deploy in southern Lebanon alongside units

of the 5,900 man U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a

peacekeeping force.31 (UNIFIL, which is to maintain strict

neutrality among warring parties, had previously opposed

maintaining joint checkpoints with the Lebanese army in southern

Lebanese villages.)

Sporadic, small clashes continued after that time, flaring

up again in the summer of 1994. On May 21, 1994, Israel abducted

a Hizbollah faction leader, Mustafa Dirani, who is said to have

information about downed Israeli pilot Ron Arad. On June 2, 1994,

Israel killed about 25 young Hizbollah fighters in an attack on

Hizbollah’s main training base in the Bekaa Valley. Hizbollah

vowed retaliation for these two actions, which it apparently took

in the form of overseas terrorism against Israeli and Jewish

targets in July 1994 (see below), before and after the July 25,

1994, summit in Washington between Jordan’s King Hussein and

Israel’s Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Fighting between Hizbollah

and Israel, apparently also intended to cloud the IsraeliJordanian summit in Washington, flared in July and early August,

including Hizbollah rocket attacks on northern Israel. During

Secretary of State Christopher’s early August 1994 visit to the

region to narrow Syrian-Israeli differences on the peace process,

the United States publicly praised Syria for its role in calming

the fighting.

Hizbollah has also supported radical Palestinian groups

opposed to peace, apparently as part of an effort to obstruct the

Arab-Israeli peace process. Hizbollah and the radical Palestinian

groups are united by their opposition to any territorial

compromise with Israel and by their fears that a successful peace

agreement will weaken them politically. The Palestinian uprising

on the West Bank and Gaza strip, which began in late 1987,

created an opportunity for Hizbollah to develop de facto

alliances with like-minded Palestinian groups. Hizbollah held

conferences and rallies in Lebanon in support of the uprising,

and it built ties to a Palestinian Islamic group called

Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot that

originated among militant Palestinian fundamentalists in the Gaza

Strip during the 1970s. (Not to be confused with Islamic Jihad,

which is one of the names used by Hizbollah activists in

terrorist operations).32 The uprising also helped spawn another

militant Palestinian Islamic group, Hamas, with which Hizbollah

and Iran are also reported to have developed strong ties.33

Hamas, also an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim

Brotherhood, has become the major rival to the Palestine
13

Liberation Organization (PLO) among Palestinians on the West

Bank and Gaza Strip. Both Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad

reject the Arab-Israeli peace talks, but some Hamas leaders are

believed to be open to joining the Palestinian authority;

Palestinian Islamic Jihad rejects the authority. In recent years,

Hizbollah also has expanded its ties to a secular Palestinian

radical group, the PFLP-GC, headed by Ahmad Jibril, a former

captain in the Syrian army. Fighters from the PFLP-GC and other

radical Palestinian groups fought alongside Hizbollah in the July

1993 clashes with Israel in southern Lebanon.

Hizbollah and representatives of Palestinian Islamic Jihad,

Hamas, and the PFLP-GC expressed rejection of the Arab-Israeli

peace process at a conference hosted by Iran, held on the eve of

the October 30, 1991 Madrid Middle East peace conference.

Hizbollah also has called on radical Palestinian groups to

aggressively oppose the September 13, 1993 Israel-PLO agreement

and, the day of the signing, Hizbollah and its Palestinian allies

demonstrated in Beirut against the agreement. When Hamas

militants kidnapped Israeli soldier Nachshon Waxman in October

1994, they demanded that Israel release not only Palestinian

Islamists but also abducted Hizbollah figures Mustafa Dirani and

Abd al-Qarim Ubayd, a radical Hizbollah cleric from Jibshit.34

Even the combined efforts of Hizbollah and Palestinian

rejectionists have been unable thus far to derail the peace

process, although progress in the Syrian/Lebanese/Israeli track

appears to be very slow.

International Terrorism. Hizbollah’s involvement in

international terrorism is not new to the organization, although

its use of terrorism might also help Hizbollah ensure its own

survival. Recent Hizbollah terrorism has reportedly been

orchestrated by hardliners within Hizbollah, including Subhi

Tufayli and former hostage holder (in Lebanon) Imad Mughniyah,

who has been living in Tehran for the past two years.35 The

hardliners appear to believe they might still be able to derail

an Israeli-Syrian peace agreement and they apparently are not

concerned that Hizbollah-orchestrated terrorism will strengthen

Israel’s insistence that Hizbollah be curbed in any IsraeliLebanese-Syrian peace agreement. The hardliners, backed by a

broader constituency within Hizbollah, appear to believe that

expanding the organization’s terrorist infrastructure abroad–to

such places as Sudan, Europe, and Latin America–can hedge against

any peace settlement that mandates Hizbollah’s dismantlement.36

In essence, Hizbollah may be moving its militia overseas,

preserving the possibility that the militia could one day be

reconstituted in Lebanon if the peace process fails. At the very

least, Hizbollah cells are positioned to strike at Israeli and

Jewish targets in an increasing number of regions abroad.37

Hizbollah’s militiamen can join existing Hizbollah cells abroad,

conducting international terrorism, while waiting for an

opportune time to return to Lebanon.

Recent acts of Hizbollah terrorism have been directed at
14

Israeli and Jewish targets as revenge for Israeli attacks on

Hizbollah. There have been no new hostage takings or hijackings

against the United States and its European allies over the past

two years. The latest round of Hizbollah terrorist activities

began as retaliation for the February 16, 1992, Israeli

helicopter attack on Hizbollah positions, which resulted in the

death of Hizbollah leader Abbas Musawi and members of his family.

(Israel did not deny that the attack on Musawi was premeditated.)

On March 17, 1992, Hizbollah responded by planting a bomb at the

Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, killing 29 and wounding 242.38

Hizbollah claimed responsibility for the attack under the name

Islamic Jihad. In July 1994, Hizbollah was allegedly responsible

for bombing Jewish and Israeli installations in Buenos Aires and

London, most likely in retaliation for Israel’s June 2, 1994,

attack on a Hizbollah base (over 20 Hizbollah fighters were

killed) and Israel’s abduction on May 21, 1994, of Hizbollah

faction leader Mustafa Dirani. However, the terrorist attacks–as

well as clashes with Israeli and Israeli proxy forces in southern

Lebanon–came just before and just after the summit in Washington

between King Hussein and Yitzhak Rabin, and prior to visits by

Secretary of State Christopher to the Middle East to advance the

Israeli-Syrian peace process. This suggests that Hizbollah is

timing its acts of vengeance to adversely affect the Middle East

peace process.

Hizbollah’s worldwide expansion means that the radical

elements of the organization might live on even if Hizbollah’s

militia is dismantled in Lebanon. Hizbollah’s ability to conduct

the bombings of the Israeli Embassy (1992) and the JewishArgentine Mutual Association (1994) demonstrates a presence in

South America, far from Lebanon. The State Department listed

Sudan’s harboring of Hizbollah–as well as several other groups–as

a reason for placing Sudan on the “terrorism list” on August 18,

1993.39 Sudan would be ideal for harboring several hundred

Hizbollah militiamen if Hizbollah’s military arm in Lebanon is

curbed. There have also been allegations that Hizbollah is

building a network of support in the United States, Germany, and

the United Kingdom, and has established at least one cell in

Canada.40 Hizbollah cells also have appeared in Somalia and

Bosnia.41 In 1989, Spanish police uncovered a Hizbollah cell in

that country, and African authorities reportedly have seen

evidence of Hizbollah activity in Zaire, Gabon, Senegal, and the

Ivory Coast.42 Available evidence suggests that Hizbollah cells

abroad are aided and abetted by Iranian diplomats who can use

diplomatic immunity to assist Hizbollah operations overseas. Many

of those Iranian diplomats most helpful to Hizbollah have turned

out to be participants in the 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy

in Tehran.43 These Iranians are posted abroad for the chief

purpose of promoting international terrorism, tracking Iran’s

opponents abroad, or recruiting Islamic militants to participate

in Iranian efforts to export Islamic revolution throughout the

Muslim world.
15

Ideology and Evolving Tactics.

Hizbollah’s leaders have always viewed Lebanon as an

artificial creation of the West and they still apparently want to

see it become a purely Islamic republic within a greater Islamic

state that would encompass the whole region, including Israel.

Even though the creation of an Islamic republic in Lebanon was

not included in Hizbollah’s manifesto,44 Hizbollah leaders, at

least publicly, continue to see the creation of an Islamic

republic in Lebanon as a step in promoting the formation of a

greater Islamic state. They argue that Lebanon is too small and

politically and militarily weak to form an Islamic republic that

could stand by itself. Hizbollah rejected the provisions for

political reform contained in the 1989 Ta’if Accords, primarily

because the accords included a commitment to disarmament of

Lebanon’s militias, of which Hizbollah is one, and did not

contain what it considered sufficient political concessions to

the Shia community.45 However, Hizbollah supported the accords’

references to U.N. Security Council Resolution 425 of March 19,

1978, which called for an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. (About

1,000 Israeli troops, in cooperation with the 2,000 -3,000 man

SLA, have maintained a 5-10 miles deep and about 50 miles long

“security zone” along the Lebanese-Israeli border since the

Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. See Figure 1.)

After twelve years of combat against Israel, Israel’s proxy

forces, and other groups in Lebanon, Hizbollah is showing signs

of compromise, at least in its tactics. Hizbollah appears to

realize that its military operations, including the taking of

hostages and bombings abroad, have not made Lebanon an Islamic

republic, eliminated the State of Israel from the region, or

cleansed Israeli patrols and proxy forces from southern Lebanon.

Hizbollah is probably frustrated that it has not yet been able to

end the Arab-Israeli peace process, even though attacks by it and

by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have slowed progress

toward peace considerably. Hizbollah probably recognizes that it

must retain the option of carving out a role for itself in a more

peaceful Middle East, or its survival as an organization will be

threatened. If it does not survive, Hizbollah will be unable to

pursue its more maximalist goals at a more politically opportune

time –i.e., if the peace process be reversed. Therefore,

Hizbollah is cultivating an alternate source of power in the

legitimate political system. In 1992, it decided to participate,

for the first time, in parliamentary elections which were held

that September. An alternate interpretation is that Hizbollah’s

electoral participation does not represent compromise, but rather

a belief that Hizbollah’s gaining a greater share of legitimate

political power will strengthen its efforts to form an Islamic

republic in Lebanon and to purge Western influence from the

region. In addition to running candidates in the 1992 elections,

Hizbollah has also begun a political dialogue with Lebanese

Christian leaders; such a dialogue with those whom Hizbollah had

previously denounced as U.S./Israeli puppets was anathema as late

as a few years ago.
16

The decision to participate in the 1992 elections was a

difficult one for Hizbollah, despite its cogent rationale. The

former Secretary General of Hizbollah, Subhi Tufayli, opposed

Hizbollah’s participating in the elections as a sellout of its

ideology. The Lebanese press reported that Tufayli’s position had

substantial support among rank and file Hizbollah members.46

Acknowledging that the decision was a departure for Hizbollah,

its leader, Hasan Nasrallah, explained the goals of that decision

as stiffening political and moral support in Lebanon for

Hizbollah’s “resistance” against Israel; ending Lebanon’s

participation in the U.S.-sponsored Middle East peace talks

(begun October 30, 1991) and voting down any agreement under

those talks that might require parliamentary approval;

overturning what Nasrallah describes as political domination by

Lebanon’s Maronite Christians and the confessional basis of the

Lebanese political system; and promoting laws that better serve

the lower classes.47 The decision to participate taken, Tufayli

and other Hizbollah hardliners apparently have chosen to focus

instead on continuing to battle Israel through international

terrorism, and Hizbollah’s militia leaders in southern Lebanon,

who are close to the radical wing of Hizbollah, continue to

combat Israel and its proxy forces in the Israeli security zone.

The militia commanders reportedly enjoy a certain amount of

autonomy from the cleric-dominated Hizbollah party structure

based in Beirut and the Bekaa Valley.48

In the elections, Hizbollah concentrated on winning seats in

its three major strongholds, forming a common slate with its

erstwhile rival, Amal, in southern Lebanon under a “Liberation

List.” Hizbollah won heavily in the Baalbek region of the Bekaa

Valley. Out of 128 seats up for election, Hizbollah won eight

seats outright and its Sunni Muslim fundamentalist allies won

four others, giving Hizbollah control over the largest single

bloc in the new parliament. Hizbollah’s strong showing can be

partly attributed to the boycott of the elections by most

Maronite Christians, who argued elections could not be fair

because Syria maintained a presence in Beirut. However,

Hizbollah’s provision of social services has given Hizbollah

opportunities for political patronage and made it genuinely

popular among many poor Lebanese Shias. Some believe Hizbollah

did commit some election fraud, although few believe it was so

widespread as to have drastically affected Hizbollah’s vote.

According to its current leader, Hasan Nasrallah, Hizbollah’s

support comes mainly from younger Lebanese Shias. Hizbollah

therefore wants to lower the voting age in Lebanon from 21 to 18

years of age.49

Belying its ambivalence about entering the legitimate

political process, following the elections Hizbollah continued to

assert that it is an opposition element. Its spokesmen declared

that Hizbollah would not accept any positions in the Lebanese

government but indicated it would coordinate and cooperate with

Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. (Hizbollah may also have foresworn
17

membership in the Cabinet because it knew it would not be

offered any cabinet portfolios.) Hizbollah said it would allow

its four Sunni fundamentalist allies in the Chamber of Deputies

(parliament) to participate in the government. Lebanese officials

note that Hizbollah deputies in parliament have followed

parliamentary procedure and have not been disruptive, but they

continue to assert the stated goals of destroying Israel and

creating an Islamic republic in Lebanon. Hizbollah deputies have

become focused to some degree on local issues, such as services

and infrastructure, however. Some note that because Hizbollah is

based on ideology, Hizbollah deputies in parliament are less

willing to engage in corrupt practices that have allegedly

tainted members of Lebanon’s traditional power blocs.

Hizbollah’s Supporters.

Hizbollah’s two major patrons are Iran and Syria, which

formed an alliance in 1982 against Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. With

Saddam weak after his defeat in Desert Storm, the Syrian-Iranian

axis may be less crucial to both parties, and the two countries

diverge on the issue of peace with Israel. The possibility of

peace between Israel and Syria threatens to dissolve the SyrianIranian entente, and a major rift between Syria and Iran would

undoubtedly harm Hizbollah. Syrian officials, however, maintain

that Syria’s alliance with Iran is deeply rooted and would

survive a Syrian peace with Israel.50

Iran. Iran is Hizbollah’s primary patron and there is an

emotional and ideological bond between Hizbollah and the Islamic

Republic. Iranian clerics and Revolutionary Guards played a key

role in creating Hizbollah in 1982, as noted above. Like

Hizbollah, Iran has consistently called for Israel’s destruction,

an end to Middle East peace talks, and the purging of Western

influence from the region. Hizbollah supports the doctrine of

clerical rule (velayat-e-faqih, rule by the supreme Islamic

jurisprudent) that was first espoused by Ayatollah Khomeini and

forms the basis of Iran’s revolutionary regime. Hizbollah leaders

consistently emphasize that Hizbollah is a part of the Islamic

revolution that achieved power in Iran. At the same time, Iran

has tried to ensure that the movement remains under its control.

At the time Iran was trying to persuade Hizbollah to release U.S.

hostages from Lebanon (1991), Iran reportedly intervened to

replace the hardline Subhi Tufayli as Hizbollah leader with the

somewhat more pragmatic Abbas Musawi.51

In spite of recent cutbacks in Iranian aid to Hizbollah,

Iran reportedly still provides about $60 million annually to

underwrite Hizbollah activities, and it arms and trains Hizbollah

through its Revolutionary Guard contingent in Lebanon.52 Some of

the Iranian funds reportedly are provided by hardliner-dominated

foundations, such as the Foundation for the Oppressed and

Disabled, which are not directly accountable to the Iranian

government.53 The Guard contingent is provided logistical help

through Iran’s embassies in Beirut and Damascus, which have
18

always been staffed by Iranian hardliners who sympathize with

Hizbollah’s goals. (According to Lebanese officials, Iranian aid

to Hizbollah had been as high as $300 million per year.54)

According to the U.S. Government, in 1992 Iran was the ninth

largest arms exporter to the Third World with about $200 million

in arms exports; a sizeable part of this figure undoubtedly

consisted of arms transfers to Hizbollah, and possibly to

Afghanistan and Sudan.55 A State Department official adds that

Hizbollah may also purchase some weapons in the free-wheeling

market for arms in Lebanon. Iran also reportedly helps fund and

administer Hizbollah’s social services network in Lebanon.

There are some strains between Iran and Hizbollah, but they

probably are not significant enough to threaten the relationship.

First and foremost, Iran’s President Rafsanjani has been trying

to improve Iran’s relations with the West and he probably sees

Hizbollah as an obstacle to that process. Rafsanjani is widely

perceived as encouraging Hizbollah to concentrate on the

legitimate political process, while his hardline opponents in

Iran, including many in the Revolutionary Guard, apparently want

Hizbollah to remain militant. In April 1991, for example, the

Guard commander in Lebanon, Hadi Reza Askari, vowed that the

Guard would not withdraw from Lebanon until Israel evacuated the

south of that country.56 In addition, there are cultural

differences in that Iranians are Persians and Hizbollah members,

although Shias, are Arabs. Some evidence of strain was provided

by Iran’s refusal to provide significant additional funds to

Hizbollah for repair of damage to its infrastructure in south

Lebanon following the July 1993 clashes, as well as other

cutbacks that began in late 1992.57 Iranian leaders reportedly

told Hizbollah to raise the funds privately,58 probably by

seeking donations from hardliner-dominated Iranian foundations.

The rebuff may have indicated that Iran wants Hizbollah to be

more self-sufficient financially, given a serious shortage of

funds in Iran itself. In addition, Iran no longer deals

exclusively with Hizbollah in Lebanon, an Iranian policy shift

that has angered Hizbollah somewhat. Iran has recently begun

normal state-to-state relations with Lebanon, including a January

1993 visit of Lebanon’s Foreign Minister Faris Buways to Tehran.

Iran has also upgraded its Charge d’Affaires in Beirut to the

rank of Ambassador.

Syria. Syria’s support for Hizbollah is far less clear cut

than is Iran’s. Syria, which maintains about 35,000 troops in

Lebanon, exercises some influence on Hizbollah and sometimes

approves of or encourages Hizbollah’s aggressive actions. Syria

supports Hizbollah, in part to preserve Syria’s close relations

with Iran, from which it gets political support and significant

help in containing Iraq. U.S. Embassy officers in Damascus

believe that Syria also sees its alliance with Tehran as a means

to prevent any Iranian support for radical Islamists in Syria,

such as remnants of the Muslim Brotherhood. Syria permits

Hizbollah to operate in areas under Syrian control, such as the

Bekaa Valley and it allows Iran to use Syrian territory and
19

facilities, such as Damascus airport, to provide arms to

Hizbollah. Syrian encouragement for Hizbollah operations against

Israel is also part of Syria’s effort to force Israel to withdraw

from Lebanon and to exercise leverage over Israel in the Middle

East peace process. If Syria decided to move forcefully against

Hizbollah, Syrian forces in Lebanon could help the Lebanese Armed

Forces disarm Hizbollah at any time and as provided for in the

Ta’if Accords.

However, there are instances in which Syria has tried to

restrain Hizbollah. For example, Syria backed the Amal militia

during the Amal-Hizbollah clashes of the late 1980s and, in 1991,

it helped persuade Hizbollah to release remaining U.S. hostages.

Syria has also worked to end clashes between Israel and Hizbollah

when those clashes threatened to escalate out of control and

perhaps lead to fighting between Syria and Israel or to scotch

peace negotiations. This appeared to be the case in the July 1993

and July-August 1994 fighting between Hizbollah and Israel.

Syria’s willingness to curb Hizbollah may explain why Israel and

the United States have been somewhat tolerant of Syria’s

continued presence in Lebanon. (It is required to withdraw from

the Beirut area under the 1989 Ta’if Accords.) A Syrian

withdrawal from Lebanon might remove Syria’s restraining

influence in Lebanon.

Implications and Prospects.

Many observers believe that Hizbollah poses several risks to

the United States and Israel, but Hizbollah’s zenith in Lebanon

may have passed. Through its operations in southern Lebanon, its

alliances with radical Palestinian groups, and its conduct of

international terrorism, Hizbollah is still trying to threaten

the U.S.-sponsored Middle East peace process. However, major

progress between Israel and the Palestinians–including the

September 13, 1993 Israel-PLO agreement and the October 26, 1994

Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty–occurred despite the July 1993

clashes and subsequent Hizbollah bombings abroad. Paradoxically,

the actions of Hizbollah and its radical Palestinian allies may

have backfired in that these actions helped persuade Israel to

reach accommodation with the PLO, which appears moderate by

comparison. Nonetheless, it is always possible that future

Hizbollah attacks in southern Lebanon could succeed in bringing

Israeli and Syrian forces into conflict, a possibility that will

increase if the Syrian or Israeli leadership is seeking an

opportunity to slow progress in the talks, or if the talks break

down altogether.

Hizbollah’s relative autonomy also threatens the

reconstruction of Lebanon’s political and economic system, a goal

the United States supports. Any disarmament of Hizbollah would

almost certainly need Syrian approval, since the Lebanese armed

forces are considered too weak and vulnerable to fragmentation to

accomplish that task themselves. The Lebanese army split in 1984

when it tried to gain control over Shiite areas of Beirut.59 If
20

Hizbollah resists a Syrian-Lebanese attempt to disarm it, the

organization could trigger a new round of fighting inside

Lebanon, possibly including Hizbollah suicide or other type

attacks against Syrian troops in Lebanon. Hizbollah clashed with

Syria during a violent demonstration to mark Jerusalem Day, March

31, 1994. Moreover, a Syrian attempt to help Lebanon disarm

Hizbollah will almost certainly strain Syria’s relationship with

Iran, which strongly opposes disarming Hizbollah.

Alternately, it is possible that Hizbollah, realizing it

cannot prevent a determined Syrian/Lebanese effort to disarm it,

will agree to disarm and focus instead on exploiting Lebanon’s

legitimate political process. Those who believe Hizbollah will

take this route note than an Israeli withdrawal from south

Lebanon, which would result from a peace settlement, would

satisfy a key Hizbollah demand. Some Hizbollah leaders have

recently said the resistance to Israel in the south would end if

Israel withdrew. Hizbollah may decide to push for seats in the

Lebanese government and try to work from within to institute

Islamic law in Lebanon. In this scenario, Hizbollah might opt to

“live to fight another day,” perhaps hoping that the economic

benefits of peace will not materialize and that it later can

rally support for an Islamic republic.

Although Hizbollah has not committed acts of terrorism

against the United States in Lebanon since the release of

remaining hostages, U.S. officials nonetheless are concerned

about Hizbollah’s growing worldwide presence. Hizbollah could

potentially use its increasing presence abroad to retaliate

against the United States or its allies if, for example, the

United States helps Lebanon disarm it. Even if disarmed in

Lebanon, Hizbollah also could attempt to carry a continuing war

against Israel overseas through a permanent campaign of bombing

Israeli and Jewish targets worldwide. Hizbollah could disperse

its militiamen to its cells abroad, perhaps hoping to

reconstitute as a military force when political winds in Lebanon

turn more favorable.

U.S. Policy. The United States clearly wants to limit

Hizbollah’s influence in Lebanon and its potential for terrorism

abroad. According to State Department officials, with certain

possible exceptions, the United States has no contacts with

Hizbollah, nor are official contacts contemplated.60 Hizbollah is

officially considered a terrorist group by the State Department,

as noted in its annual report to Congress on international

terrorism. However, the United States did not oppose Hizbollah’s

participation in the August/September 1992 parliamentary

elections, largely because the Lebanese government legally

recognized Hizbollah as a political party in advance of the

elections.

The United States supports all aspects of the Ta’if Accords,

which present a blueprint for the political reconstruction of

Lebanon but also call for the disarming of militias, including
21

Hizbollah. The United States also believes that a successful

conclusion to Middle East peace talks, which presumably would

result in an Israeli and Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, would

remove the potential for confrontation between Israel and

Hizbollah and facilitate Hizbollah’s disarmament. In March 1993,

Assistant Secretary of State Edward Djerejian said that, as of

December 1992, the Lebanese army had begun to extend its

authority in the southern suburbs of Beirut and had retaken

control of some of those areas, presumably from Hizbollah.61 The

Lebanese army has also taken over some Hizbollah positions in the

Bekaa Valley, including the Shaykh Abdallah barracks, which

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard took from the Lebanese Army in 1984

and placed at Hizbollah’s disposal.62 State Department officials

say they favor the continuing extension of Lebanese military

authority into southern Lebanon and they are pressing for the

complete disarming of Hizbollah with its Lebanese and Syrian

counterparts. Lebanon, however, says it will not try to disarm

Hizbollah as long as Israel maintains its security zone in

southern Lebanon. The United States also is urging Syria not to

allow resupply of Hizbollah through territory under Syrian

control.

Because of the continuing poor relations between the United

States and Iran, the United States has little leverage with which

to persuade Tehran to end support for Hizbollah. Unilateral U.S.

sanctions on Iran, such as the ban on Iranian imports, have had a

small effect on Iran’s economy, although Iran might be hurt

considerably if similar sanctions were adopted by U.S. allies.

However, Hizbollah is Iran’s most successful example of export of

the revolution, and the price for Iran to end its assistance to

Hizbollah is likely to be quite high.

The United States also sees economic and military aid as a

means to strengthen Lebanon’s central government against

Hizbollah. The United States has resumed providing International

Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance, the primary

stated purpose of which is to make Lebanese Armed Forces

personnel in the program well disposed towards the United States

and its values. After consultation with Congress, the IMET

program for Lebanon was resumed in March 1993 (FY 1993) after a

suspension since January 1991.

In addition, since July 1992, the United States has provided

Lebanon excess non-lethal defense articles, including uniforms,

helmets, and trucks to help bolster the Lebanese army. The United

States had discontinued sales of lethal equipment in 1985 for

fear the equipment would not remain under central government

control. On July 19, 1993, as tensions between Israel and

Hizbollah were escalating, the United States modified its policy

somewhat by approving the commercial sale of $500,000 worth of

spare parts for lethal items (track shoes for M113 armored

personnel carriers). Following the July 1993 clashes, in which

the Lebanese army deployed to areas near Hizbollah positions, the

Secretary of State approved aid to the Lebanese Armed Forces
22

(LAF). The Clinton administration allowed the LAF to buy limited

amounts of U.S. lethal equipment with $500 million Lebanon

received from other Arab states and international lending

institutions following the July clashes. The Department of

Defense identified used armored personnel carriers, requested by

the LAF, for sale to Lebanon.

Other Measures and Options. State Department officials say

there is currently no U.S. antiterrorism assistance program for

Lebanon because of the poor security conditions there. That

program is intended to enhance the ability of recipient country

law enforcement personnel to deter terrorists and terrorist

groups from engaging in the types of activities (bombing,

kidnapping, assassination, hostage taking, and hijacking) in

which Hizbollah has engaged in the recent past. An anti-terrorism

assistance program for Lebanon is likely to be instituted if and

when the United States deems the security situation there to be

acceptable.

Should Hizbollah resume terrorist activities against the

United States and the West–in or outside the Middle East–an

additional option likely to be considered is military retaliation

against it or its sponsors, most notably Iran’s Revolutionary

Guard. This option reportedly was considered during the period of

incarceration of the U.S. hostages in Lebanon but never

exercised. The primary drawback at that time was the possibility

of revenge by the kidnappers against the U.S. captives. Targets

under discussion during that time included Iranian Revolutionary

Guard garrisons and training bases for Hizbollah, including the

Zabadani base in western Syria and the Shaykh Abdullah Barracks

in the Bekaa Valley. Additional targets are possible, such as

other Hizbollah training camps; Revolutionary Guard bases in

Lebanon, Sudan, or Iran; or Revolutionary Guard military targets

such as airfields, naval bases, or even Revolutionary Guard

headquarters itself. Recently, President Clinton proposed U.S.

economic sanctions against Iran, i.e., preventing U.S. oil

companies from trading Iranian oil overseas, but such measures

affect the Iranian population as a whole without necessarily

impinging on the Revolutionary Guard or Iranian support for

Hizbollah.

ENDNOTES

1. This article is an adaptation of U.S. Library of

Congress, Congressional Research Service, Hizballah: A Radical

Militia in Lebanon, CRS Report 93-905 F, October 7, 1993, by

Kenneth Katzman.

2. According to the State Department’s Patterns of Global

Terrorism: 1993, produced by the Office of the Coordinator for

Counter-Terrorism, Hizbollah now has cells in Europe, Africa,

South America, North America, and elsewhere. See p. 46 of that

publication, released April 1994.
23

3. U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism:

1992, April 1993, p. 38.

4. Ibid.

5. For further discussion of Lebanon’s political crisis, see

U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service,

Lebanon: The Current Crisis, by Clyde Mark, CRS Issue Brief

89118, updated regularly.

6. Lara Marlowe, “Cleric Who Holds the Reins of Power,”

Financial Times, August 31, 1991, p. 14. Hizbollah in Lebanon

apparently retained connections to Da’wa branches in the Persian

Gulf states, which are still active, particularly in southern

Iraq. During the time of the holding of Western hostages by

Hizbollah in Lebanon, a consistent demand of the hostage holders

was the release of 17 Da’wa prisoners, held in Kuwait for the

bombing on December 12, 1983, of six foreign and Kuwaiti

installations, including the U.S. Embassy compound in Kuwait. At

least one of the Da’wa prisoners was reportedly related or linked

to Imad Mughniyah, identified alternately as chief of the hostage

holders, the head of Islamic Jihad, or chief of security for

Hizbollah. See, also, Shimon Shapira, “The Origins of Hizbollah,”

Jerusalem Quarterly, No. 46, Spring 1988, pp. 115-130.

7. Andrew Rathmell, “The War in South Lebanon,” Jane’s

Intelligence Review, April 1994, pp. 178-182.

8. The Guard contingent in Lebanon subsequently grew to

about 3,000 by the mid-to-late 1980s, but apparently shrank to

about 1,000 after the release of remaining U.S. hostages from

Lebanon in December 1991. There was speculation that many of them

had been sent to Sudan, where a buildup of Revolutionary Guards

reportedly has been underway since 1991. When the remaining

hostages were released, there also was a debate in the Iranian

leadership about whether or not to withdraw the Guards from

Lebanon but the Guard resisted and has remained. See Kenneth

Katzman, The Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard,

Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993, p. 97.

9. An account of the infiltration of the Revolutionary Guard

into the Baalbek area is provided in Robin Wright, Sacred Rage:

The Wrath of Militant Islam, New York: Linden Press/Simon and

Schuster, 1985, p. 80-82.

10. For a further discussion of the factions that comprise

Hizbollah, see Shapira, “The Origins of Hizbollah,” Jerusalem

Quarterly, Spring 1988.

11. “Backgrounder: Hizbullah (Party of God): Goals and

Ideology,” Middle East Reporter, April 24, 1993, p. 11.

12. Martin Kramer, “The Moral Logic of Hizbollah,”

International Security Studies Program, Woodrow Wilson
24

International Center for Scholars, Working Paper No. 84,

Washington, DC: November 1987.

13. Geraldine Brooks, “Changing Image: Radical Islamic

Groups in Lebanon Tone Down Anti-Western Fervor,” The Wall Street

Journal, November 19, 1991, p. A1.

14. Giles Trendle, “Lebanon: The Grass Roots of Success,”

The Middle East, February 1993, p. 12.

15. Ibid.

 16. Nadim Ladki, “Die Hard Hizbollah Guerrillas Torment

Israel,” Reuters, August 19, 1993.

17. Andrew Tarnowski, “Guerrilla ‘Mini-Army’ Wins Israel’s

Respect,” Reuters, September 30, 1994.

18. Ibid.

19. Wright, Sacred Rage: The Crusade of Militant Islam, p.

228.

20. Tim Weiner, “U.S. Will Try to Buy Antiaircraft Missiles

Back From Afghans,” The New York Times, July 24, 1993, p. A1.

21. “Iran Said Training Hizbollah Fighters in Weapon Use,”

Al Sharq Al Awsat, October 3, 1994, p. 5, in FBIS-NES-94-192,

October 4, 1994, p. 58.

22. From the time of Iran’s Islamic revolution in 1979 until

Hizbollah’s formation in 1982, Amal enjoyed the support of Iran,

which was looking to promote its revolution to Lebanese Shias.

Iran backed away from Amal when Hizbollah, which was more in line

with Iran’s ideology, was formed.

23. Amal, which has suspended its militia activities in

accordance with post-Taif reconciliation, is led by Nabih Berri,

who now serves as Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament.

24. Many analysts believed that Amal’s patron, Syria,

encouraged Amal to clash with Hizbollah in an effort to limit

Hizbollah’s influence in Lebanon. Syria is a secular state that,

to some degree, fears the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and has

generally tried to prevent other powers from exercising major

influence in Lebanon. However, Syria has tolerated Hizbollah’s

presence in areas of Lebanon that are under Syrian control (such

as the Bekaa Valley) in order to maintain good relations with

Iran and to gain leverage vis-a-vis Israel.

25. The flareup appeared to temporarily threaten the peace

talks but did not derail them; and an eleventh round began on

August 31, 1993. However, according to press accounts, the

fighting caused Secretary of State Christopher to abbreviate a
25

diplomatic trip to Asia in order to deal with defusing the

confrontations.

26. Chris Hedges, “Israel Continues to Blast Villages in

South Lebanon,” The New York Times, July 28, 1993, p. A1; Clyde

Haberman, “Bombs Kill 8 Israeli Soldiers on Patrol in South

Lebanon,” The New York Times, August 20, 1993, p. A1.

27. Some Hizbollah leaders later said Hizbollah had not

agreed not to attack northern Israel, and that the cease-fire

represented only an “understanding,” not an agreement.

28. Steven Holmes, “Peres Praises Syrian Leader for Role in

Cease-fire,” The New York Times, August 4, 1993, p. A7.

29. “Lebanese-Syrian Summit to Step Up Coordination Follows

Strains Over Army Deployment in UNIFIL Zone,” Middle East Mirror,

August 16, 1993, pp. 20-21.

30. “Lebanese Leaders in Talks With Syria’s Assad,” Reuters,

August 16, 1993.

31. “Lebanese Army to Deploy Up to ‘Security Zone’ Alongside

UNIFIL,” Mideast Mirror, August 2, 1993, p. 13.

32. Martin Kramer, Hezbollah’s Vision of the West, p. 59.

33. U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research

Service, Hamas: The Organization, Goals, and Tactics of a

Militant Palestinian Organization, by James Wootten, CRS Report

No. 93-511F, revised and updated August 19, 1993.

34. Barton Gellman, “Hamas Kidnaps Israeli, Threatens to

Kill Him,” The Washington Post, October 12, 1994, p. A27.

35. “Partisans of Terror,” U.S. News and World Report,

August 8, 1994, pp. 36-38; “Velayati Said to Offer Hizbollah

Assurances,” Al Sharq Al Awsat, August 23, 1994, p. 3, in FBISNES-94-164, August 24, 1994, p. 53.

36. Paul Wilkinson, “Hezbollah–A Critical Appraisal,” Jane’s

Intelligence Review, August 1993, pp. 369-370; “Paraguay: Sources

on Possible Hizbollah Safe Haven,” FBIS, November 25, 1994;

Douglas Jehl, “Iran Backed Terrorists Are Growing More

Aggressive, U.S Warns,” The New York Times, March 18, 1993, p.

A8.

37. Ibid.

38. U.S Department of State, “Patterns of Global Terrorism:

1992,” p. 22. The State Department report adds that Iran “at

least had foreknowledge of this act and was probably involved.”

39. State Department Regular Briefing, Federal News Service,
26

August 18, 1993.

40. Jehl, p. A-8.

41. Aidan Hartley, “U.S Says Hizbollah May Plan Car Bombs in

Somalia,” Reuters, November 15, 1993; “Hizbollah Announces Death

of Officer in Bosnia,” Al Shira’, October 3, 1994, p. 7, in FBISNES-94-195, October 7, 1994, p. 37.

42. Wilkinson, p. 370.

43. “Iran Hostage Takers Now Hold Key Posts,” Roanoke Times

and World News, September 8, 1994, p. A11.

44. Text of an Open Letter Presented by Hizbollah to the

Oppressed in Lebanon and the World, pamphlet issued in Beirut,

February 16, 1985, p. 6; Martin Kramer, “Hezbollah’s Vision,

Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy

Paper No. 16, 1989, p. 51. This open letter is commonly referred

to as Hizbollah’s manifesto or charter.

45. The Taif Accords refers to an agreement on a possible

solution to Lebanon’s civil war, reached in Taif, Saudi Arabia.

The process began in September 1989 in Taif and was formally

approved by deputies of Lebanon’s National Assembly on November

5, 1989. For further discussion of the Taif Accords and their

provisions, see U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research

Service, Lebanon: The Current Crisis, by Clyde Mark, CRS Issue

Brief 89118, updated regularly.

46. “Hizbollah Faces Divisions Over Iranian Policies,”

Beirut Al Shira’, January 4, 1993, in FBIS, January 5, 1993, p.

34.

47. “Nasrallah Views Hizbollah’s Political Activity,” Tehran

Keyhan in Persian, October 27, 1992, p. 16, in FBIS-NES- 92-217,

November 9, 1992, p. 42.

48. Tarnowski, September 30, 1994.

49. “Nasrallah on Hizbollah’s Political Profile, Israeli

Prisoners,” Tehran Resalat in Persian, October 13, 1992, in FBISNES-92-209, October 28, 1992, p. 38.

50. Author’s interviews with Syrian officials in Damascus,

January 1995.

51. Magnus Ranstorp, “Hezbollah’s Future?–Part 2, Jane’s

Intelligence Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 81-83.

52. Middle East Mirror, August 12, 1993, p. 19.

53. Steve Coll, “Multicontinental Investigators Target

Global Bombers of Jews,” The Washington Post, July 31, 1994, p.
27

A1.

54. Author’s interview with Lebanese diplomats, August 17,

1993.

55. U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research

Service, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1985-

1992, by Richart Grimmett, CRS Report No. 93-656F, July 19, 1993,

p. 56. The figures for arms transfer values are rounded to the

nearest $100 million.

56. “Lebanon: Hizbollah Reportedly Dismantling Military

Installations,” Agence France Presse, June 28, 1991.

57. “Hizbollah Faces Division Over Iranian Policies,” Beirut

Al Shira’, January 4, 1993, in FBIS-NES-93-002, January 5, 1993,

p. 34. Some Hizbollah leaders believe Iran has cut back its aid

because it wants Hizbollah to achieve self-sufficiency through

its own businesses.

58. Mideast Mirror, August 12, 1993, p. 19.

59. “Lebanon’s Army Steers Clear of Hizbollah,” Jerusalem

Report, December 29, 1994, pp. 30-32.

60. U.S. officials noted in August 1993 that there may be

some operational contact with Hizbollah regarding the security of

the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. They note that similar arrangements

have been made in the past with such groups as the PLO in order

to ensure the security of the Embassy and U.S. personnel.

61. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Developments in the

Middle East: March 1993, Hearing, 103rd Congress, 1st Session,

Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 9, 1993, p.

38-39.

 62. “Lebanon: Hizbollah Reportedly Dismantling Military

Installations,” Agence France Presse, July 28, 1991.
28

CHAPTER 2

A RADICAL ISLAMIST CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

Lew B. Ware

Introduction.

The “new world order” is as much a term of uncertain

significance for the nations of the Middle East as it is a

representation of the profound ambiguity that today qualifies the

reconceptualization of the international political system.

Statism and pan-Arabism, for so long a comfortable context for

the evolution of the regional social and political order, can no

longer be considered exclusive formulas for the comprehensive

solution of contemporary Middle Eastern socio-political ills.

Only religious nationalism, as the primary competitor of statism

and pan-Arabism for regional dominance, has demanded the right to

define both the place and the meaning of the Middle East in the

“new world order” and to recast its options in radically

different political terms.

Of course, the appearance of religious nationalism in the

Middle East is not new. During the past century and one half of

Middle Eastern history, the politicization of Islam has played an

important part in crafting the response of Middle Easterners to

colonialism and nation-building. What is new is the demonstrably

radical solution that, in the name of a rejuvenated faith,

religious nationalism offers to meet the challenge that the “new

world order” presents to a traditionalist Islam allegedly

betrayed by secular philosophies. We in the West have been

content inaccurately to label this challenge “fundamentalist.”

The nature of the challenge from religious nationalism clearly

indicates that it embraces a revolutionary ideology the

definition of which the indeterminate nature of Islamic

fundamentalism simply cannot encompass. We are not talking here

about the various aspects of reformism as ideology in terms of

which Islamic fundamentalism is commonly qualified. We are

talking, on the contrary, about radical Islamism, an activist and

nationalist religio-political force that has been evolving since

the early decades of this century, has had its epiphany in the

Iranian revolution of 1979, and which continues today to exert an

important influence on contemporary Middle Eastern society.

Underpinning radical Islamist activism and justifying its use of

violence is jihad, a theoretical and practical concept of

conflict whose roots stretch back to the very earliest days of

the Islamic ecumene which Islamism has revived and now employs to

serve the purpose of reshaping the regional political landscape.

The author of this chapter proposes to trace the historical

evolution of the meaning of Islamic jihad, demonstrate in what

ways it has been radicalized, especially by Khomeini and

Hizbollah, and to pose the question of its importance for the

stability of the post-Gulf War regional environment. To
29

accomplish this task the chapter has a number of interrelated

objectives. First, it will explain the meaning of jihad as an

Islamic concept of conflict that has evolved differently within

the historical framework of Sunni and Shii sectarianism. Second,

it will discuss the situational character of jihad as a

manifestation of the survival ethos of Muslim communities faced

with non-Muslim hostility and by so doing point out how

analytically dangerous it is to presume that jihad possesses a

monolithic and inflexible nature. Third, it will show how the

Islamist variety of jihad, in adapting itself to the

circumstances of the secular regional order, seeks to supplant

it. And lastly, the author will suggest that there exists a

correlation between the level of Islamist radicalism against the

regional secular state and the degree to which the concept of

jihad is translated into direct political action.

Because radical Islamism transcends the boundaries of the

traditional Middle Eastern region, many believe that Islamist

jihad is unequivocally dangerous and therefore that the

containment of radical Islamism is crucial. Certainly it cannot

be denied that radical Islamism extends its appeal to the

universal Muslim community and in that sense is a transnational

phenomenon. But one must be careful to avoid the temptation to

perceive in radical Islamism the spearhead of an Islamic

civilizational crusade with predetermined historical fault lines

that pits the Muslim East against the Christian West.1 By the

same token, one must be equally aware of the perils in explaining

radical Islamism solely in terms of its Khomeinist variation and

in assigning to the Iranian Islamic Republic sinister motives

with import for global security. Without taking a position on

these specific issues and, yet on the other hand, without

minimizing the potential problems involved in the link between

Iranian Islamists, their surrogates and acts of international

terrorism, the reader is counseled against the assumption that

radical Islamism and Iranian foreign policy are synonymous and

thus will bring Iran and its proxies into inevitable collision

with U.S. national security interests. This being said, the

author hopes nevertheless to shed some light on the contribution

that an understanding of Islamist jihad makes to the changeable

nature of the relationship between Iranian Islamism and the

external world.

An Islamic Concept of Conflict from the Sunni Point of View.

Religious cultures have concepts of conflict which can be

perceived as means by which religions keep from dying; that is,

from tolerating truths which tend to exclude them. Islam is no

exception to this. The Islamic concept of conflict is called

jihad, which means “striving in the path of the One God” (jihad

fi sabil Allah). Conceived broadly, jihad signifies the

obligation of every Muslim to strive for both the physical and

spiritual defense of the ummah, the community of true belief and

of salvation. It is Islamic doctrine that death in the defense of

the ummah assures the believer immediate entry into paradise
30

absolved of the sins for which he would have accounted before

God on the Day of Reckoning.

 The Quran, which is the immutable, eternal and final

revelation of God, enjoins the faithful to accept the burden of

jihad. And so jihad derives its force from the principle that

Islam is universal and true for all time.2 Since the Quran is

also the principal material source of Islamic law, jihad is more

than just bellum pium, that is, sanctioned according to universal

religious precepts; it enjoys full legal sanction as bellum

justum (just war).3

The various Islamic denominations place a different accent

on the martial and the moral aspects of jihad: the classical

Sunnism of the Arabo-Islamic empire emphasized the defense of the

community and its faith through the territorial expansion of the

imperium while Shii tradition demands that jihad “be declared

vehemently against the agents of discrimination, injustice,

deprivation, oppression, strangulation, ‘taghut-ism’ (acts of

Satan) and subservience to other-than-God.”4 But the result is

the same; jihad is both a legal instrument and a means of

litigation with which the Sunni and Shii ummahs define and

conduct their relations with the non-Muslim world.5

The emergence of a concept of conflict from the moral

imperative to assure the security of the ummah and through it the

supremacy of the true and just faith presupposes an idea of peace

that achieves permanency only when Islam becomes the universal

religion explicit in Quranic revelation. The world is thus

divided into two spheres: where sharia holds sway and right

belief is assured, the Dar al-Islam (Abode of Submission to the

One God) guarantees a perfect moral order of which jihad is the

instrument of hegemony; wherever disbelief is, the Dar al-Harb

(Abode of War) exists implying an absence of liberty to embrace

self-evident truths.6 These worlds have always been contiguous in

space but, as the Pakistani scholar Muhammad Iqbal points out,

Islamic “likemindedness” attaches to the Dar al-Islam the

characteristic of “border- lessness.”7

Inasmuch as non-Muslims have ruled at times over Muslims and

have alienated Muslim territory from the Dar al-Islam, the

believer cannot carry out his Quranic duty to “command the good

and to forbid evil” with respect to defense of the ummah without

a possibility of enjoying the liberty to avoid the oppressiveness

of the disbelievers.8 In classical terms, then, jihad ceases when

the Dar al-Harb is absorbed into the Dar al-Islam, that is, when

universal religious liberty is restored.9 Until that time jihad

persists as Islam’s struggle against “persecutors in order to end

persecution.”10 The Syrian scholar, Bassam Tibi, contends that in

this permanently evolving cosmic imbalance there can be little

latitude for absolute toleration because Islamic tolerance refers

exclusively to the Jews and Christians in and outside the

ummah.

11 The Jews and the Christians are “People of the Book,”

scriptures whose imperfect revelations prefigure the perfected
31

Quran. Hence they must be respected. But this does not imply

that Islam possesses either a concept of, or guarantees the right

to, an equality of difference that applies to all religions. And

this was certainly the case with the polytheists of the Dar alHarb against whom jihad was applied without the compunctions

reserved for the tolerated peoples.

Thus the distinction between the defensive and offensive

aspects of the concept of jihad is unclear. Likewise the equality

of violence under a state of war that marks de jure and de facto

aspects of conflict in Western international law is also absent.

Since jihad is a religious duty it cannot be dictated by

contractual conventions defining a legal state of war without

hostilities or hostilities without a legal declaration.12

Although jihad certainly possesses defensive and offensive

aspects that relate, strategically and tactically, to the conduct

of conflict (jus in bello), jihad is always offensive war in its

intention.13 Therefore to claim that the various reasons for

proclaiming jihad (jus ad bellum) are acts of self-defense in the

Western sense, such as punishment against Islam’s enemies,

support of oppressed Muslims in the Dar al-Harb, subjugation of

Muslim rebels in the Dar al-Islam, or idealistic war to “command

the good and forbid evil,” begs the question of the nature of

Islamic conflict.

So long as Islam was imperially on the march; that is, so

long as a clear understanding of what constituted internal peace

and external war between the two abodes of belief and disbelief,

the falling together of an offensive and defensive concept of

jihad was not a matter for great controversy among Muslims. The

authority for the religious definition of peace and war came from

God and was declared by God’s executor for his ummah, the caliph.

That authority gave internal legitimacy to the early

confederation in Medina under the Prophet and his successors,

while military expansion held it together externally.14 And so

during the first two centuries of Islamic history, the Muslim

faith pushed steadily outward under jihad toward the realization

of a pax islamica which Muslims deemed inevitable for the triumph

of God’s “best” community.

This is not to say that the Quran decreed, or the Prophet

himself demanded, that jihad be waged continually. In the Quran

and, secondarily, in the Hadith (Sayings and Deeds of the

Prophet), the verses pertaining to jihad often contradict

themselves as to the possibility of maintaining truces and

armistices indefinitely. The problem was that the exegetical

method of Quranic interpretation permitted the emphasis of

earlier revelatory verses declaring peace over later ones that

declared war. This led to the “atomization” of the historical

situations which jihad was obliged to define. Therefore, by

avoiding an examination of the historical context in which the

concept of jihad evolved in the Quran, jurists assured that

permanent hostility between the Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb

could be maintained as the norm.15
32

But history was eventually to have its effect on the norms

of jihad. By the 11th century Islamic expansion had run its

course and a triumphal Christianity took the counteroffensive in

Spain and in the Holy Land. The pagan Mongols followed on the

heels of the Christians. Adapting to the nature of its

adversaries and the type of wars they fought, the Islamic

imperium found itself fighting defensive wars against invaders

which departed from the classical doctrine of jihad.

16 The result

was ultimately a shrinking and a stabilization of the boundaries

between the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds. This new stability also

demanded that Islamic thinkers reformulate the notion of a

binomial world to take into account the many non-Muslim states

and principalities now on its periphery with which Muslims were

not actually at war.17

Thus between the Dar al-Islam and the Dar al-Harb there came

into being conceptually a “third world,” so to speak, called the

Dar al-Sulh (Abode of Armistice) which, under treaties of

coexistence, was not subject to sharia law.18 These arrangements

between Islam and non-Islamic states were undertaken for the

protection of the ummah. Muslims and non-Muslims crossed the

frontiers under protection of personal immunity (aman) and

negotiated directly with each other. While these temporary

privileges did not imply recognition by Islam of the states the

holders of safe conduct represented, the Dar al-Islam was

nevertheless now able to interact directly with the outside under

conditions of relative security. With the impetus for offensive

jihad effectively dormant, the defensive nature of “striving in

the path of the One God” evolved a less ambiguous meaning. The

nearest equivalent to this state of affairs under the Western law

of nations was insurgency in the sense that Islam’s tacit

acceptance of the Dar al-Sulh, while not precluding a later de

facto or de jure recognition of the two parties, certainly did

not exclude a return to hostilities on a limited scale.19 But

neutrality played no role in this equation since in Islamic law

conflictual relations with a non-Muslim belligerent could not be

postponed indefinitely.20

The process of historical interpenetration of the Muslim and

non-Muslim worlds inevitably accelerated and brought new ideas to

bear on their respective world views. Not only did borders form

and have to be defended; the universal values of sharia and the

assumption that the classical Islamic imperium vouchsafed God’s

political authority within those borders also came under the

assault of alien ideas at a time when Islamic imperial power was

in a state of rapid decay. The military and ideological challenge

from Christendom and later from the Mongol Horde was one aspect

of that decay; the other challenge occurred when the Muslim

periphery attempted to wrest control from the central institution

of the caliphate, causing both the empire and the unity of the

ummah it represented to break up from the inside.

 The influence of these events on the concept of jihad was
33

immense. So long as a central Muslim power existed backed by

military force, jihad could be accomplished as a collective duty

(fard kifayah) which meant that certain categories of people were

exempt from army service and the declaration of jihad was limited

to the head of state.21 But when the validity of the sharia was

put into question as the true moral order for society, the attack

was perceived to be directed against Islamic values. In this case

jihad came to mean more than simply jihad of the “hand”; that is,

of the sword; it became also jihad of the “tongue and of the

heart” and therefore required the individual obligation (fard

‘ain) of each Muslim to prevent further depredations of Islamic

society and its true beliefs. Such was the view of the 12th

century jurist, Ibn Taymiyyah, who was to have in later centuries

a profound ideological impact both on reformist Islam and radical

Islamism.

The Islamic ecumene and its unitary power was a myth which

was further eroded as clashes between Muslim principalities and

peoples increased over time. These clashes were also called jihad

since only jihad is just and no other concept of war was

permitted. But the Quran forbids jihad between Muslims. In fact,

these conflicts were “secular.” Many Muslim jurists called them

simply harb (war), disapproved of them and endeavored to explain

them away as social aberrations inconsistent with sharia. The

14th century North African jurist, Ibn Khaldun, however, whose

work laid the groundwork for Western historical sociology and

philosophy of history, saw war as inherent in man. Because Ibn

Khaldun believed that human nature made war the norm and not the

exception,22 the concept of jihad as the just means for the

territorial expansion of God’s preordained moral order became

more and more a problematical issue.

The Sunni perspective on jihad depended for its cogency on

the inseparability of religion and politics. Theoretically

speaking, the ummah and the state were unified under the divinely

instituted caliphal office. The caliphate executed God’s design

for the universalization of Islam. But when the first Turkish

republic replaced the Ottoman Turkish Empire as successor state

to the old Arabo-Islamic imperium and, as a consequence, the

caliphate was disestablished, the reimposition of an Islamic

world order as an extension of the imperial ideal was moot.

The process of imperial disintegration had in fact spanned

almost the past half millennium of history, during the last

century and one half of which European colonialism dominated the

relationship of the Dar al-Islam and the Dar al-Harb. Colonialism

offered the Islamic world a vision of the secular state in which

dogmatic sharia and ritual practice were relegated to the domain

of personal conscience, and material and human improvement were

elevated through science to the status of social virtue. Being a

practical rather than abstract faith, Islam responded to these

new circumstances by attempting to bring the sharia into line

with Western secular modernism. This adaptation extended also to

the concept of jihad. To the Islamic modernists jihad was a
34

purely defensive principle of war.23 They accepted the prevalent

Western view that international relations were grounded in a

peaceful intercourse between nations. The modernists proposed

that disbelief alone was not a sufficient cause for conflict but

imposed the additional requirement of physical oppression of

Muslims by non-Muslims before jihad could be declared.24 In this

way the modernists defended themselves against the Western

accusation that Islamic jihad was aggressive. Rather they

insisted on a “greater” jihad of the heart and mind, which

through reflection–and abundant apologetics–would defend and

strengthen Islamic values under the assault of Western belief

systems and lead eventually to the West’s acceptance of the selfevident truth of Islam.

For this to materialize the ummah had first to reform

itself. Such a reformation did not, however, demand that the

conditions of Muslim backwardness be addressed in structural

terms. Inasmuch as the normative, moral orientation of Islam

remained the decisive element of modernist discourse, the

problems of Islam could be solved by behaving according to the

literal dictates of holy scripture purified of non-Islamic

accretions.25 Thus modernist jihad meant war against the immoral

base instincts of the self. It presupposed the individual

obligation (fard ‘ain) to make oneself better by defending

oneself intellectually against falsehood. It proposed that Islam

could master Western science, turn it to the advantage of the

ummah, and raise Muslims to the ranks of the Europeans while

preserving simultaneously their faith. Jihad was the highest form

of knowledge. The ummah itself had complete command over the

working out of a formula for progress and the elimination,

through the reeducation of youth, of pernicious Western

influence.26 The relationship between jihad and the resurrection

of the ummah was set out in terms of religio-social monisms: that

is, because Islam had positive social significance, a return to

religiosity by means of an “inner” jihad was beneficial for the

development of the community.27

To recapitulate the above discussion, the Sunni view of

jihad depended on a ruler who declared war and the

instrumentality of a state which executed his orders insofar as

they were consistent with sharia law. When Islamic lands fell

under the sway of Europe and direction by a divinely appointed

executor was no longer possible, this active offensive was

transformed into the active defense of each Muslim to protect his

way of life as enshrined in the precepts of the ummah. The

assumption was that Islam could coexist with secular Europe on

the legal plane because it, too, was grounded in a just and

merciful law of nations. Furthermore, Islam could meet the

requirements of European scientific positivism and live under the

institutions of popular democracy without the separation of

church from state. The emphasis was therefore laid on the ethical

value of the law as it applied to jihad and not on the

elaboration of rules for the conduct of conflict.28 This, in

turn, confirmed a civilizing mission for Islam.
35

The Islamic modernists’ view of jihad collapsed with their

failure to render compatible the values of Islam and modernism

within the institutional framework of the contemporary secular

Sunni Muslim state, many of which have been unable to provide for

the moral and material welfare of the ummah. The reaction gave

rise to radical religious movements which responded with the

elaboration of fully political ideologies. In this way, Islamic

reformism slowly gave way to Islamist activism. The Islamist

position on jihad was fundamentally opposed to that of the

modernists. But as for the strategy and tactics of Islamist

jihad, that is with respect to its view of jus ad bellum and jus

in bello, the political cultures of the various peoples to whom

this new jihad was preached exercised as much an influence as did

classical Islamic doctrine. To understand the evolution of

Islamist jihad, we must first, however, appreciate its links to

the Shiite perspective.

An Islamic Concept of Conflict from the Shii Point of View.

The seeds of the Sunni-Shii split were nourished by a

political quarrel during the first 30 years of Islamic history as

to who possessed the legitimate authority to exercise both

spiritual and temporal successorship to the Prophet and to

execute God’s will for his ummah. Those who believed that the

Prophet favored the passing of his authority to the most

qualified of his Quraysh tribe through an election by peers

proposed Mu’awiyah, the governor of Damascus, as the Prophet’s

successor. Those who opposed the concept of egalitarian election

believed that Ali, the fourth caliph and the Prophet’s cousin and

son-in-law, had the right to govern the ummah by virtue of his

pious character and his blood relationship to the Prophet’s

immediate family.29 The “partisans” (Shi’a) of Ali contested the

pretensions of Mu’awiyah to the office of caliph and in the

ensuing struggle lost a decisive military engagement to his

forces. Declaring their actions to reflect, ex post facto, the

Prophet’s normative behavior (sunnah), Mu’awiyah’s men

established egalitarian election as the norm underpinning the

institutional legitimacy of the classical Sunni Arabo-Islamic

caliphate. Although the Sunni-Shii split was caused primarily by

a conflict of clans, it was also brought about by a clash between

the two competing theories of egalitarian and imperial

governance.

At the moment when enthusiasm for Ali’s political cause was

transferred to his person and after his death to his designated

successors in direct line through his martyred sons, we can say

that Shiism has its beginnings as a religious sect. To Shiites,

Ali and his successors are, like the Prophet, both caliphs and

imams, that is, the epitome in one individual of secular and

religious leadership. Although schisms arose concerning the right

of the fifth and the seventh imams to lead the Shii community,

the imamic line continued uninterrupted until the disappearance

of the twelfth imam in the late ninth century. This twelfth imam
36

was said to be in a state of “occultation,” out of the sight and

hearing of humankind, but would return at a time of great

troubles to right the wrongs of the world. Muslims who adhere to

this messianic belief in the efficacy of the Hidden Imam

(walayah) are called Twelver or Imami Shiites. They constitute

the mainstream of the Shii community and are, for the most part,

ethnic Persians.

For centuries the Imami Shiites lived among the majority

Sunnis without the power to alter the political disposition of

their ummah. To the Shii mind the Sunni were usurpers who had

perpetrated evils on the Shii community. Sunni control over

territory of overwhelming Shii preponderance rendered these

territories technically Dar al-Harb in Shii eyes. Consequently,

the Shiites conceived of jihad in a fundamentally different way

than their Sunni overlords, especially with respect to the

question who could lead jihad and against whom jihad might be

waged. With no state of their own and no political leader to

serve as the agent of jihad, the Shiites were forbidden to wage

legitimate war until the Hidden Imam emerged from his occultation

and gave his consent to jihad. When the Imam reappeared the

object of Shii jihad would be to cleanse the world of the

injustices inflicted upon the Shii community by the unbelieving

Sunnis and other heretics. As in Sunnism this duty conforms with

the Quranic injunction to “command the good and forbid evil” in

pursuit of which the Hidden Imam would declare jihad. But that

declaration could be made only if the unbelievers first refused a

call to accept the true faith, that is to say if they failed to

obey the Hidden Imam.30

Not only is the declaration of offensive jihad the

prerogative of the infallible Hidden Imam, it is also linked to

the concept of walayah through which absolute allegiance to the

Imam is enjoined. Since all true believers owe allegiance to the

Imam, to go on jihad without the sanction of such allegiance

meant that jihad could never constitute iman (faith), that is, a

necessary requirement for salvation.31 Therefore, jihad for Imami

Shiites, in principle, has been suspended indefinitely. In sum,

the suspension of an offensive jihad is, for the Sunni, a

response to the end of imperial expansion; to the Shiites jihad

has been declared in abeyance in response to the absence of the

Hidden Imam and his authority.

Early Shii historiography is filled with sufferings and

martyrdom at the hands of the Sunni. Sufferings engendered

pietistic expectation of final vindication and personal

preparation for the millennium. Transposed to a spiritual plane,

jihad came to mean the greater spiritual struggle for knowledge

of right from wrong and of mastery over base instincts. As the

noted Shii philosopher Sayyid Hossein Nasr explains,

Jihad [is] not simply the defense or extension of

Islamic borders . . . but the constant inner war

against all that veils man from the truth and destroys
37

his equilibrium. The greater holy war (al-jihad al-akbar)

is . . . like the unseen warfare of orthodox

spirituality, the very means of opening the royal path

to the center of the heart . . .32

This mystical vision of jihad as self-discipline in the

expectation of the imminent end of time favored nonviolence. In

giving physical representation to this view of jihad, Shii

thinkers envisaged a “frontier” between the Abode of Submission

to the One God and the Abode of War. On this frontier, called the

Dar al-Iman (Abode of Faith), Shiism would vie for the souls of

the infidels.33 Such conflict was to be executed as a campaign of

proselytization and thus would postpone the onslaught of

unbelief. But it ought not be conceived as aggressive jihad,

properly speaking. Rather it was an ethical “holy war of defense”

(harb difa’iyyah muqaddasah) against the ahl al-baghy (those who

do not accept the imamic principle; i.e., the Sunni world and

other heretics) which was both licit and commendable in the

absence of the Hidden Imam.34 For moral reasons, then, every true

believer had the duty (fard ‘ain) to wage a defensive “war”

against unbelief and for his ummah by resisting the imposition of

tyrannical rule.35

The elaboration of the true nature and conduct of conflict

fell ultimately to the most learned Shii clerics (mujtahidun) of

each historical period. The authority to explore these questions

did not emanate from the incommunicado Hidden Imam, however.

Rather it emanated from the clergy who, because of their

knowledge of imamic law, gradually arrogated to themselves, in

the absence of autonomous Shii secular power, the right to

legislate for the Shii ummah in all religious and socio-political

matters. Thus, over the centuries of political powerlessness, the

Imami Shii clergy developed a theory of general agency which

justified their claim to be the representatives on earth of the

Hidden Imam and which necessarily encompassed all manner of

speculation regarding jihad.

Until the restoration of Shii imperial power under the

Safavid Persian shahs at the beginning of the 16th century, the

clergy seemed content to assign jihad either an eschatological

value or one that encouraged passive resistance to usurping

infidel authority. When the Safavid shahs made Shiism the

official cult of their empire, the rulers assumed the prerogative

to declare and execute jihad since, to legitimize their power,

they conveniently claimed descent from a collateral branch of the

family of the first Shii imam Ali.

The consolidation of the shahs’ prerogative within the

framework of an imperial Shii state and political culture put the

clergy in an ambiguous position. Safavid imperial expansion had

reactivated the need for the political and military aspects of

jihad as the cornerstone of an aggressive imperial foreign

policy. In subjecting the concept of jihad to the principle of

political expediency, the shahs blurred the already indeterminate
38

classical legal distinction between aggressive and defensive

conflict. As long as secular imperial power remained strong and

the shahs officially patronized the clerical class, the clergy

acquiesced in the usurpation of their traditional privilege to

interpret the Hidden Imam’s law. The result was an uneasy

accommodation of religion to imperial political ethics.36 Yet

once imperial power began to wane in the middle of 18th century

with the replacement of the Safavids by the Qajar dynasty, which

did not make the same claim to imamic descent, the clergy

reasserted its primacy in the domain of legal interpretation of

jihad.

The decadence of imperial Iran, which the clergy associated

with the external pressure of Britain and Russia on the frontier

and European domination of domestic economic life, gave the

clerics opportunities for greater political influence. The

manipulation of jihad was an important key to the pursuit of

these opportunities and to the gradual transformation of de facto

clerical authority into de jure clerical power.

When the clergy called for jihad against the Russians in the

early 19th century, they were acting in the absence of a strong

state to protect the Shii ummah. Contrary to classical Shii

theology, they reasoned that jihad in times of national danger

was more praiseworthy in the absence than in the presence of the

Hidden Imam.37 This reasoning was extended to the struggle

against internal domination of an already weakened ruling

establishment by foreign powers. Clerical reinterpretation of

jihad tended to cast doubts on the legitimacy of the shahs but

did not challenge that legitimacy per se. It simply reflected the

fact that the clergy now clearly thought of themselves as both

deputies of the Hidden Imam and the chief guardians of Shii

society and its values. And so, whereas jihad had in the past a

single aggressive purpose bound up in the working out of the

messianic eschatology of the Hidden Imam, it now had a purpose

more in line with the Sunni perspective: to repel the physical

and spiritual attacks on the Shii ummah from outside and inside

the nation. But whatever the circumstances of the various jihads,

the clergy proclaimed they considered each to be defensive in

intent if not in actual practice. From the Shii point of view it

is clear that jihad was to be waged in the service of selfpreservation whenever strong secular power proved unable to

defend the ummah. For this reason Shii doctrine was less

restrictive and more flexible in the conduct of jihad than was

its Sunni counterpart.

Following are examples from Imami literature concerning the

conduct of jihad: 1) It mattered little who granted permission to

go on defensive jihad, only that a respected mujtahid take the

responsibility; 2) under conditions of offensive jihad, where the

state had an army at its disposal, jihad was a collective duty,

but in the defensive mode it was every believer’s obligation and

thus no exemptions were possible; 3) as opposed to the Sunni

conception, Shii jihad for the defense of the faith and the Shii
39

ummah operated under no constraint of time; 4) everyone had to

pay for the conduct of jihad; 5) the spoils of such a jihad had

to be used for its continuation; 6) if adequate funds were not

available, they could be coerced; 7) in order to prosecute jihad,

treaties impeding it could be revoked; 8) under defensive

conditions, no distinction was made between unbelievers and

Muslims who rendered them aid; 9) it was not necessary to call

first on the unbelievers to accept the true faith, thus losing

the element of military surprise; 10) believers do not

necessarily have to outnumber unbelievers; 11) all stratagems

were acceptable; 12) and finally, all cease-fires could be

violated.38

From the above we can see that the historical evolution of

the Twelver Imami Shii community, even after Shiism eventually

gained official status in Iran, left traces of a marked minority

mentality on its concept of jihad and on the meaning of defensive

and offensive war. By placing its emphasis more on right belief,

adherence to the law, social justice, messianism, community

solidarity, and individual responsibility rather than on the

state’s role in the legitimation, protection, and propagation of

these benefits for humankind, Imami Shiism was encouraging a kind

of conflict that approximated most closely what in the West might

be called revolutionary warfare. This important distinction, born

from the marriage of Persian political culture and ethos to Shii

millenarianism, had a profound effect on the development of

radical Islamism throughout the contemporary Muslim world.

A Variety of Contemporary Radical Islamist Jihad.

The ultimate objective of religion is utopian since religion

proposes that the purpose of human history may be found in an

ideal and perfected cosmic order through which God makes

meaningful the chaos of the temporal world. It is when religion

rejects expectation for action in its endeavor to overcome an

existing situation that faith begins to lose its other-worldly,

utopian characteristic. Put in another way, when religion

includes a program that mobilizes sentiment toward the goal of

resolving a given issue, it crosses the boundary into political

ideology in the contemporary sense of the word.39 Under such

circumstances religion is intended to control the behavior, mood,

sentiments, and values of a society on behalf of the whole

community for which rituals act as instruments of instruction and

direction.40 At this juncture Islam–the religious culture–

transitions to Islamism–the political ideology–and Khomeini’s

Shiism may be called one of its most radical variants.

In mobilizing the religious sentiments of the Persian people

in a defense of the ummah against the state, Khomeini radicalized

Shiism and put it at the service of socio-political

transformation. Khomeini’s Islamism was nourished by a political

culture which evolved from the long struggle between the Persian

imperial state and the clergy for social control and which, once

Iran fell under the influence of the colonial West, established
40

the clerics as the general agents of the Hidden Imam. But the

historical consolidation of this doctrinal tendency in Twelver

Imami Shiism is not sufficient to explain Khomeini’s world view.

His personality, as a reflection of the Persian cultural ethos,

plays an equally important role in the evolution of his thought.

Khomeini was a radical moralist who applied the literal law

(nomos) of the twelve Shii Imams to Muslim society. From his

point of view, the divine origin of Shii sharia law rendered

satanic all that did not emanate from it. According to Khomeini

it is every Muslim’s duty to participate in “nomocratic” politics

and combat the will of Satan.41 If the roots of this view were

not imbedded in the Zoroastrian ethos of Persian culture, it

would be possible to dismiss Khomeini psychologically as an

aberrant personality.42 The prophet Zarathustra was obsessed with

the punishment of evildoers. In his reform of Mazdaism the

dualist motif of light and darkness reifies in the free choice of

every Mazdean to engage in the struggle against the Devil and

thereby to secure for himself the paradise which the Lord Ahura

promises to the righteous.43 Lord Ahura shows to his appointed

servant, Zarathustra, the pattern of behavior which will cure the

existence of all its terrors and transfigure the world.44

Zarathustra, whose holiness is a manifestation of Ahura’s

goodness, could tolerate no evil, no division between virtues and

their opposites, and no breach between spirit and things

material.45 Zoroastrianism was a religion of moral considerations

par excellence in which the techniques of transfiguration took

the final form for Shii Islam of an esoteric knowledge of the

Hidden Imam.46

It is not difficult to perceive in Twelver Imami Shiism the

ethical and cultural legacy of Zoroastrianism, nor in the person

of Khomeini an emanation of the Zoroastrian savior transmuted

into a holy imam-prophet. Zoroastrian and Twelver Shii Islamic

ethics both apotheosize justice and make it the moral imperative,

without the attainment of which there can be no salvation in

history. For man to comprehend the significance of justice for

salvation in both religions, prophecy is needed because man’s

corruption disbars him from legislating rationally in his own

behalf. Although Khomeini never claimed for himself such a role–

in Shiism that would be tantamount to the heresy of proclaiming

oneself the Hidden Imam returned–nevertheless he acted as if he

were indeed the savior of all Muslims.

Khomeini’s view of the place which the state occupies in the

international order is closely modeled on this eschatological

interpretation of Shii history and the fulfillment of the law as

its driving force. Khomeini constructed an international order of

three state systems: the liberal, capitalist West; the atheistic,

communist East; and the moral, divine Islamic system, neither

East nor West. The first two systems may, as sovereign systems,

be in competition with each other, but they are both antithetical

to the Islamic third system because they represent political

blocs whose ideological roots take nourishment not from the
41

divine source of perfect justice, but from the satanic desire

for lust and power.47 Capitalism and communism both answer to

Mammon; they must necessarily fail because, as quintessentially

human ideologies, they recognize only the physical domination of

man over man and his law over God’s law.48 The divine,

universally valid moral law of Islam transcends the territorial

and national limitations which an anthropocentric philosophy of

history imposes on communism and capitalism. As Khomeini said:

“The world is the homeland of humanity,” by which he meant a

spiritualized, triumphalist Dar al-Islam, the homeland of all

true believers.49

Thus defined, the international system is in a constant

state of flux and conflict. To pursue jihad within such a system

is to pursue the permanent revolutionary struggle for universal

justice and freedom since only jihad can bring about the moral

conditions lacking in Western positivistic international law.

This message transparently clothes the classic Islamic argument

for jihad in the modern garb of religio-political progressivism.

But it does not otherwise disguise the falling together of the

sacred and the profane which is the hallmark of religious

cultures, such as Khomeini’s, that have lacked historical control

over their socio-economic and social environment.50

Since Islam, in Khomeini’s view, is the only state system

based on the morality of divine law, it stands to reason that

Islamic law, as an expression of the international order, is

clearly superior to its Western counterpart. For if God requires

man to defend the superiority of sharia through jihad, then the

use of force to combat universal evil accords perfectly with the

right of every nation to defend itself even under Article 51 of

the United Nations’ Constitution, for instance.51 And since every

government acts as judge of its own cause, then the Islamic

Republic of Iran, representing a step in the evolution of Islamic

state system, has always fought defensive jihads. Thus the 8

years of war between Iran and Iraq can be seen as an attempt by

the rebellious Baath polytheists of Iraq to destroy the evolving

Islamic order. And because a contest between Muslim and nonMuslim nations cannot be arbitrated within the framework of

Islamic law, a perpetual state of war is insured between Iran and

her neighbor until Iraq accepts Khomeini’s faith.52 The present

cessation of hostilities between Iran and Iraq may be observed

for practical reasons. But even though the moral basis of Islamic

law demands that, under the rules of jihad, all agreements be

honored (pacta sunt servanda), it is inevitable that one day war

will be resumed.53 The universalism of Khomeinist Islamism, its

ideological radicalism, and the absence of a specifically

national Islamic territory in which it operates guarantee the

exportation of revolution beyond the Iranian frontier. Yet, if

the Iranian constitution forbids interference–except as selfdefense–in the internal affairs of other countries, under what

conditions can Khomeinist jihad foment revolution in the world?

Can force be used short of war and be called, at the same time,

jihad? Are subversion or terrorism permissible in jihad? The
42

Iranian scholar R. K. Ramazani remarks that what Khomeini

exported abroad was jihad in the form of proper Islamic

“behavior.” His clerical diplomats propagated Islamic behavior

guided by the directives of the Council of the Revolution in

Tehran. Their activities were meant to safeguard the Islamic

revolution at home.54 The decision regarding the definition of

Islamic “behavior,” however, was left to the practical clerical

politicians in the field and often contravened the prescriptions

of sharia.

Terrorism and jihad, for instance, are doctrinally

contradictory. Terrorism has no religious basis in sharia but

reacts to despair over civil circumstances. Terrorists,

therefore, cannot be “mujahidun” (people involved in jihad).55

Yet, in Lebanon where Islamic “behavior” has been recently

transmogrified into an active ideological force, the Lebanese

Shii Hizbollah party called its 1983 terrorist attack on the U.S.

Marine compound a defensive jihad against an aggressive military

enemy. It matters little whether jihad represents an offensive or

defensive posture but whether such jihad makes a difference in

the quality and character of an outward Islamic movement as it

was destined to be.56 Put into sociological terms, this means

that the dogmatics of jihad are supposed to furnish answers to

given situations. These dogmatics deal with functionally

unanalyzed abstractions such as “justice,” “revolution,”

“aggression,” and “defense” and thus are unreflective categories

of thought incapable of “thematizing” social functions. They rest

instead on the context-free availability of material, that is, on

a distance from the connections dogmatics are supposed to

interpret.57 In the case of Hizbollah the group’s political aims

have led to a moral ambiguity with respect to what the dogmatics

of Shii sharia render permissible in the pursuit of defensive

jihad. Terrorism, justified as a military operation against an

enemy of the faith under the rules of jihad, was considered an

aspect of self-defense. But the issue of suicide, abhorrent to

Islamic sensibilities, was somewhat more difficult to justify.

In the final analysis, Lebanese Shii clerics might condone

the terrorist attack by a suicide bomber on the Marine barracks

in Beirut in 1983 on the grounds of extenuating circumstances, an

argument not normally accepted in Islamic law. Sheikh Fadlallah,

the head of the Lebanese Shii community and the “spiritual guide”

of the Hizbollah at that time, reasoned that because of the

imbalance of power between Hizbollah and the American forces and,

furthermore, since defense of the Lebanese Shii ummah was

mandatory under jihad, suicide was a commendable moral, if not

necessarily licit, act. The Sheikh argued that suicide differs

little from the death of a mujahid who knows he will be killed in

the service of his cause. Only the circumstances are different.

Thus if the act of suicide will have a political effect on the

enemy it is therefore an act of jihad.

58

Fadlallah’s reasoning not only demonstrates how flexible the

Shii doctrine of jihad can be in fluctuating political situations
43

but also underscores the psychological disposition under which

the mujahid acts. In the Western mind suicide occurs in a state

of mental derangement and moral disengagement. To the mujahid

suicide sanctifies the act of “annihilating” oneself in God

(fana’ billah).59 Since it was possible that the act of suicide

could bring success against the enemy, then Fadlallah insisted

that it was provisionally valid. This signifies that the

legitimacy of suicide for jihad rests on the ends it attains but

requires nonetheless a cleric to disengage the believer from his

actions.60

From this we see that the mujahid’s sacrifice of his life in

jihad makes him a martyr (shahid). In Shii theology the death of

the martyr puts him on an equal footing with greatest of all Shii

martyrs, the third Imam Hussein, as an intercessor for believers

on the Day of Judgment.61 To take this conclusion a step further,

martyrdom is not merely another more spiritualized aspect of

jihad; it represents an alternative which remains after jihad

because the martyr is able, by making jihad his “mission,” to

inspire those who follow him with revolutionary fervor.62

It is possible to disengage from this a notion of the

contemporary, radical Shii philosophy of history. Revolution may

be defined as the resurrection of the mujahid-shahid in every

generation to do battle against the people of taghut (Satan) so

that God may revenge himself on evildoers. Because revolution can

only lead to good, God has determined that man is the agent of

goodness in history. Revolution is therefore not only man’s

obligation; it is his divine inheritance.63

From the above it is can be seen that these ideas conform

neatly to Ayatollah Khomeini’s radical Islamist view of the

world. Khomeini did not distinguish defensive from offensive

jihad. And what he called self-defense, he invariably defined as

such himself. He acted in this manner because he was a “just”

ruler who declared all forms of jihad legitimate in the name of

defending God’s chosen community.64 So long as Khomeini

interpreted God’s sharia without error and applied it to the

governance of the ummah, the possibility of jihad remained a

constant given in the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims.

The fundamental condition for waging jihad was the Ayatollah’s

rightly-guided intention to close the gap between believer and

non-believer by “drawing the evil-doers nigh to God.” Moral

intention, especially in the execution of war, distinguishes in

the ethos of Persian Zoroastrianism, in classical Shii Islam and

in Khomeini’s Islamist revision the praiseworthy from the

damnable action.65

Conclusions.

This chapter has demonstrated how Islam provides the basis

for an Islamist concept of jihad. Historically jihad has never

been a static concept. Adaptive and flexible, jihad has not only

evolved to serve the needs of the Islamic imperium in regulating
44

its international affairs with non-Muslim powers, it has

furnished the context through which radical Islamist ideology is

today attempting to transform Muslim socio-political values. The

radical Islamist message of jihad has been the subject of this

study because Islamists alone purport to have a blueprint for the

future prosperity of the Islamic Middle East. That blueprint

makes it abundantly clear that the use of jihad is the sine qua

non condition for the success of radical Islamist revolutionism.

Radical Islamism perceives in jihad a legal instrument for

the militant revival of Islamic power. Radical Islamism does not

accept the Western concept of war as a function of law. Therefore

it cannot accept the legal equality of violence between

belligerents. For radical Islamists war exists as a perpetual

state of confrontation exclusive of hostilities because war is a

religious duty which renders null and void the contractual

conventions defining legal states of conflict. Treaties are

temporary. The legal position of a Muslim state under such

conditions is irrelevant because conflict defends religious

principles, not national boundaries. In a word, war fought in the

context of radical Islamist jihad is a concept totally

independent of peace.66

Khomeini’s contribution to the Islamist concept of conflict

was to raise jihad to the level of a universal moral crusade by

reaffirming the connection between jihad and the Shii dogma of

the Hidden Imam. Without the acceptance of the idea that conflict

precedes the reappearance of a messianic personage–in this case,

the Hidden Imam–jihad cannot constitute an article of faith. The

Ayatollah Taleqani put it very well when he said that jihad can

be imposed because its object is the defense of humanity from

evil and its preparation for the good which signifies credence in

tawhid, the doctrine of the unity of the Godhead. Tawhid is

freedom in its purest form. Freedom is not only right; it is

everyone’s right. To understand what is one’s right is to choose

the right. Therefore nobody can act against what is right when it

comes to salvation. And so it stands to reason that religion

cannot be an issue of simple personal choice, nor can it be the

extension into politics of the secular nation-state.67 Jihad

constitutes an integral part of religion. It is a form of worship

that inheres in man’s struggle for the good. In the broadest

sense, jihad is transnational humanitarianism.68

Jihad is obviously a device radical Islamists use to close

the gap that the modern Middle Eastern secular state has opened

between a theory and practice of governing Muslim peoples. The

secular state has attempted to answer the Islamist challenge by

modernizing jihad for its own purposes. It has been argued that

only the secular state guarantees the rights of citizens to avoid

sin, liberates them from oppression, and secures for them

liberty.69 Jihad recognizes the need for the state to encourage

self-sufficiency in its arms industries and to prepare its armies

for conflict through rigorous economic planning. Every citizen

has the duty to prepare for this eventuality by contributing his
45

energy, money, or physical strength to the commonwealth.70 Faith

in religion is a defense against the state’s enemies. Jihad,

then, is really self-instilled patriotism for the Muslim state.

Hence, obedience to the state is not submission to arbitrary

authority but a social necessity in the interest of the nation.71

This is a view that accords with the historical reality of the

development of the Islamic imperium.

Because radical Islamists consider the secular state to be

the perpetrator of unwanted social, economic and political

transformations that threaten the survival of Islam, it should

not be surprising that jihad is the means radical Islamism has

chosen to oppose it. This opposition is unfolding in a world in

whose destiny the fate of Islam itself is nonetheless interwoven,

a constantly shifting world that is a by-product of the universal

empowerment to redefine state, nation, ethos, nationality and

even religion. To ease the pain of change, radical Islamist jihad

promotes a view of history that is both a therapy for the Muslim

psyche and a compensation for the loss of Muslim status in world

civilization. Furthermore, jihad is the preferred instrument

whereby Islamists recast the character of Islamic religious

culture in the face of what it perceives to be the bitter

adversity of the West. In philosophical terms, jihad helps to

keep God alive–in the words of the philosopher Emile Cioran–by

constantly adding adjectives to his cause. In this way jihad aids

in the process of mobilizing Muslims for political action.

Some of those adjectives are anti-secularist, revolutionary,

anti-democratic, and maximalist. They are used by Islamists to

demand individual responsibility for actions which would have

otherwise been a collective duty, to reimpose Islamic law as the

sole source of political legitimization for the morally corrupted

state, to apply in a totalistic manner social strictures to women

regarding abortion, sex, and birth control, and to maximalize

Islamist political discourse with opponents.

This being said, the degree to which jihad is the

justification for anti-state violence depends in part on the

weight each radical Islamist movement gives jihad in its

ideology. And the importance of the role that jihad plays in

overall radical Islamist ideology may, in turn, be indexed

against the historical experience of the impact of Westernism on

the various Middle Eastern cultures. There are many versions of

radical Islamism in the Middle East today. These versions are not

all Shii. Neither do they all fit the Khomeinist view of the

world, nor do they all support the goals of the Lebanese

Hizbollah. Rather, they reflect the fact that there are as many

ummahs as there exist cultures to which Islam was first preached.

What Khomeinist Islamism has given to radical Islamism in general

is a great sense of elan which reflects the particular

constellation of Persia’s Shiite culture and history, its

interaction with the West and the personality and example of the

Ayatollah himself. Because that particular constellation cannot

be replicated everywhere, the theory and practice of Khomeinist
46

jihad on which such an elan rests can likewise not be

replicated. The theory and practice of radical Islamist jihad

will fluctuate accordingly, and this fluctuation, paradoxically,

will always threaten the unity of the ummah that radical Islamism

is dedicated to preserve.

So if, on one hand, the crux of jihad resides in a

definition of what constitutes legitimate conflict, it is clear

that there is no one concept of jihad that applies monolithically

to radical Islamism. If, on the other hand, the issue of jihad is

merely a matter of expediency, that is, to justify the

application of force to any political action that hastens the

downfall of the secular state, then most Islamists will agree on

its religious basis. It is the tension between the conceptual and

the practical aspects of jihad that determines the scope of

Islamist political action and no one cleric in the Muslim world–

not even Khomeini–has succeeded in making the intellectual

synthesis.

For the present moment radical Islamists use the ammunition

of jihad against the target of the Middle East secular state. So

long as radical Islamism targets the state, it may be politically

tractable. When, however, jihad no longer serves the needs of the

territorial defense or expansion of the various Muslim

populations but is generalized as the radical Islamist’s

instrument of choice in the permanent ideological struggle

between the civilization of the East and the West; when the

collective duty to go on jihad which was a Muslim’s obligation to

the ummah as state or imperium yields to the universal duty of

each individual Muslim to become an international revolutionary,

then Islamism will be difficult for the West to combat.

Nevertheless, to think that this will happen, that radical

Islamism must by necessity spearhead this clash of civilizations

across predetermined global fault lines is to accept the validity

of the historical assumptions that have for centuries informed

the process of Islamic religio-cultural mythmaking. An Islamic

“veil” is not falling across the face of the earth. A resurgent

Islamic empire is not about to replace the defunct Soviet

imperium. To succumb to such thinking is to make the mistake of

applying the theory of strategic implications–the domino theory–

to circumstances in all respects distinct from those that sparked

the Cold War from which the world is just now emerging.

ENDNOTES

1. See Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,”

Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49.

2. “Djihad,” The Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed., Vol. 2,

London: Luzae and Co., 1960, p. 538.

3. Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam,

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955, p. 57. In

international law this is the difference between bellum pium and
47

bellum justum.

4. Ayatollah Murtaza Mutahhari, Fundamentals of Islamic

Thought: God, Man and the Universe, ed., Hamid Algac, trans., R.

Campbell, Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press, 1985, p. 93.

5. Khadduri, p. 59.

6. Mustansir Mir, “Jihad in Islam,” p. 115; and Hadia

Dajani-Shakeel, “A Reassessment of Some Medieval and Modern

Perceptions of the Counter-Crusades, p. 44, in Jihad In Its

Times, ed., Hadia Dajani-Shakeel and Ronald A. Messier, Ann

Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Center for Near East and North

African Studies, Series No. 4.

7. As cited in Martin Kramer, Political Islam, The

Washington Papers, No. 73, Washington, DC: Georgetown University

Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1980, pp. 10-11.

8. Mahmud Taleqani and Murtaza Mutahhari, Jihad and

Shahadat: Struggle and Martyrdom in Islam, ed., Mehdi Abedi and

Gary Legenhausen, Houston: Institute for Research and Islamic

Studies, 1986, p. 12.

9. Majid Khadduri, trans., The Islamic Law of Nations:

Shaybani’s Siyar, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,

1966, p. 17. See also Mahmud Shaltut, “Koran and Fighting,” in

Jihad in Medieval and Modern Islam, Rudolph Peters, trans.,

Leyden, Netherlands: Brill and Co., 1977, p. 45.

10. Shaltut, pp. 47-48.

11. Bassam Tibi, The Crisis of Modern Islam: A Preindustrial

Culture in the Scientific-Technological Age, trans., Judith Von

Sivers, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988, p. 144.

12. Mohamed Mokbel Elbakry, “Different Conceptions of Jihad

and Its Relevance to Contemporary Trends of Islamic Movements,”

Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol. 9, No. 4,

1987, pp. 46-47.

13. Rudolph Peters, Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of

Jihad in Modern Islam, The Hague, Netherlands: Mouton, 1979, p.

133.

14. Tibi, p. 62.

15. Mir, p. 117.

 16. Dajani-Shakeel, p. 45.

17. Ibid., p. 44.

18. Peters, Islam and Colonialism, p. 34-35.
48

19. Khadduri, The Islamic Law, p.14.

20. Ibid., p. 18.

21. Khadduri, War and Peace, p. 60.

22. Ibid., pp. 70-72.

23. Regarding jihad, in the Mecca revelations, the term has

consistently meant spiritual striving to attain nearness to God.

(See 29:69, 19:6, and 29:8; also 22:78 and 25:52.) The term jihad

or any of its derivatives, such as jehada, most Muslim scholars

would argue, means nonviolent striving to be carried out

primarily by means of the Quran, i.e., to argue and preach the

word. The Quran permits Muslims to take up the sword in selfdefense in the Medina suras: i.e., the meaning of the term was

expanded (9:73, 66:9), whereby fighting becomes legitimate in

self-defense against nonbelievers.

24. Mir, p. 120; Taleqani and Mutahhari, pp. 12-13.

25. Tbi, p. 137.

26. Ibid., p. 138; Peters, Islam and Colonialism, p. 109.

27. Tibi, p. 87.

28. Peters, Islam and Colonialism, p. 113.

29. In point of fact, the seeds of dissension, which

eventually produced the basic split within the Muslim faith, were

sewn much earlier, immediately upon the death of the Prophet. A

companion of Muhammad, Abu Bakr, was chosen as his successor. The

selection was contested by those who claimed that, in line with

tribal practice, Muhammad’s heir must be Ali, his closest male

relative. Ali was passed over twice before he was finally chosen

caliph. But then Mu’awiyah, the cousin of the third caliph,

declared war on Ali, and it is in this contest–in which Ali was

slain–that the Muslim community divided along the lines it has

preserved until this day.

30. E. Kohlberg, “The Development of the Imami Shi’s

Doctrine of Jihad,” Zeitschrift der morgenlandischen

Gesellschaft, No. 126, 1976, p. 67. See also Amir Arjomand, The

Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order and

Societal Change in Shi’ite Iran From the Beginning to 1890,

Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 33; and Seyyed

Hossein Nasr, et al., eds., Expectation of the Millennium:

Shi’ism in History, Albany, NY: State University of New York

Press, 1989, pp. 58, 93, 96.

31. Elbakry, pp. 50-51; Khadduri, War and Peace, p. 66.
49

32. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islamic Life and Thought, Albany,

NY: State University of New York Press, 1981, p. 195.

33. Arjomand, p. 62; Kohlberg, p. 69.

 34. Arjomand, p. 62; Taleqani and Mutahhari, p. 18;

Kohlberg, pp. 69, 74-75; Peters, Islam and Colonialism, p. 10.

35. Taleqani and Mutahhari, p. 16.

36. Kohlberg, p. 81; Nasr, et. al., Expectation of the

Millennium, p. 59; Arjomand, p. 62.

37. Kohlberg, pp. 81, 83.

 38. Ibid., p. 84-86. See also Shaftut, p. 34-35.

39. Citing the contemporary scholar of Islam, Maxime

Rodinson, in Tibi, p. 41.

40. Ibid., p. 33.

41. This view of Khomeini is developed in Farhang Rajaee,

Islamic Values and World View: Khomeyni on Man, State, and

International Politics, Vol. 13, Lanham, MD: University Press of

America, 1984.

42. Bruce Mazlish, a leading proponent of psychohistory,

does so by dismissing Khomeini as abnormal in his “Hidden

Khomeyni,” The New Yorker, Vol. 24, December 1979.

43. The coincidentia oppositorum of Mircea Eliade. See his A

History of Religious Ideas: From the Stone Age to the Eleusinian

Mysteries, Vol. 1, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978,

pp. 306-307, 310.

44. Ibid., p. 104.

45. Ibid., p. 313.

46. Ibid., pp. 316, 318.

47. Rajaee, p. 75.

48. Ibid., pp. 78-79; Shaltut, p. 130.

49. Rajaee, p. 77.

50. Shaltut, p. 131; Tibi, p. 78.

51. R. K. Ramazani, “Shiism in the Persian Gulf,” in Shi’ism

and Social Protest, eds., Juan R. Cole and Nikkie R. Keddie, New

Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986, p. 36.
50

52. Rajaee, pp. 90-91.

53. Shaltut, p. 144.

54. Ramazani, p. 37.

55. Elbakry, p. 64.

56. Mir, p. 124.

57. The sociologist Luhmann’s formulation as cited by Tibi,

p. 91.

58. Martin Kramer, The Moral Logic of Hizbollah, No. 101,

Tel Aviv: The Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies

of Tel Aviv University, 1987, p. 13.

59. On annihilation in God, see the Ayatollah Taleqani on

jihad in Taleqani and Mutahhari, p. 68.

60. Kramer, The Moral Logic of Hizbollah, pp. 14-16, 22-23.

61. The Ayatollah Mutahhari on shahid in Taleqani and

Mutahhari, pp. 128-129, 137.

62. Ali Shariati on jihad, ibid., pp. 200, 207-208.

63. Shariati on thawrah (revolution), ibid., pp. 258, 260-

262.

64. Ibid., p. 20.

65. Ibid., p. 21.

66. Elbakry, pp. 46-47, 57.

67. Taleqani and Mutahhari, p. 50.

68. Ibid., p. 53.

69. Korkut Ozal, The Islamic Concept of Security, London:

Islamic Institute of Defence Technology, February 7, 1979, p. 6.

70. Maj. Gen. Mohamed Gamal al-Din Mahfouz, Military Thought

in Islam, London: Islamic Institute of Defence Technology,

February 7. 1979, pp. 3-4.

71. Ibid., p. 7.
51

CHAPTER 3

TERRORISM:

HOW VULNERABLE IS THE UNITED STATES?

Stephen Sloan

Introduction.

If there is a “fog of war,” there is probably a more dense

“smog of terrorism,” for the small nature of terrorist groups,

their close interpersonal communications, and their predilection

for soft targets of opportunity make it difficult to predict

their future operations. Counterterrorism analysts must therefore

peer through a very cloudy crystal ball when assessing the

intentions, capabilities, and targets of existing and future

terrorist groups. Life would be easier if, as when assessing a

conventional army, analysts could pour over communications

intercepts to discern orders of battle and make predictions based

on the enemy’s known doctrine and strategy. The problem of

penetrating the “smog of terrorism” is further exacerbated by the

fact that it is difficult to infiltrate terrorist cells to

acquire the tactical information needed to prevent, or at least

to mitigate, a potential threat or actual incident. The most

sophisticated capabilities in the arsenal of technical

intelligence are no substitutes for the HUMINT (human

intelligence) capabilities that are needed to gather information

on terrorists. The problem of predictive analysis is further

complicated by the fact that even if terrorist organizations have

an encompassing ideology–or what is at best a proto-strategy–it

tends to be rather general in nature and directed at establishing

a broad declaration on revolutionary action that may not provide

a clear plan for action that can enable the analyst to have a

foundation for assessing future terrorist operations.

Furthermore, predictive capabilities are challenged by the fact

that there is a whole range of potential new terrorist weapons

and associated scenarios for destruction that create major

problems for those responsible for identifying a new generation

of terrorist threats. There are those in the field who sometimes

long for the “good old days” when a “terror network” guided by

Moscow could be blamed for bombings, hostage-taking, skyjacking

and other forms of mayhem.

Given these conditions, one faces an onerous task in

attempting to assess how vulnerable the United States is to

future threats and acts of terrorism. Nevertheless, such an

assessment can prove useful if it can assist the analyst and

those responsible for countering terrorism to look beyond the

immediate threats or the latest incident. In their contingency

driven, highly pressurized environment, analysts must concentrate

on the collection and analysis of what is primarily tactical,

combat or operational intelligence. They often lack the time to

deal with strategic threats, to veer from the current

requirements for narrowly focused, tactical intelligence.
52

What follows is a brief overview of the terrorist threat to

the United States based on the application of strategic

intelligence. This form of intelligence has a broader application

than either operational or tactical intelligence, forms of

information analysis dealing with immediate threats. Strategic

intelligence integrates politics, social studies, and the study

of technology. It is designed to provide officials with longrange forecasts of what is important rather than what is urgent.1

The Analytical Framework.

The analytical framework employed in this chapter will

consist of the following components. The author will attempt to

identify major changes in the international environment. He will

then discuss how these changes create new terrorist threats in

the United States. The author will then focus on probable

technological/operational changes among terrorist groups.

Finally, changes in terrorist motivations and goals will be

examined. All of these components will then be analyzed in a

strategic context to assess potential terrorist targets,

operations, and resulting vulnerabilities within the United

States.

The International Environment.

Even though it probably never fully existed, the artificial

and superficial equilibrium imposed by the Cold War has been

destroyed. Within the former republics of the defunct Soviet

Union the order imposed by Moscow on ethnic and nationalist

movements has given way to separatists’ demands often accompanied

by political violence including terrorism, various forms of low

intensity conflict, rapidly growing organized crime, and civil

war. The instability has spilled over into Eastern Europe where

the former satellites are attempting to cope with the

uncertainties of democratization. Additionally, now that Moscow

and Washington are no longer inclined to use regional surrogates

as a way of avoiding direct confrontation, a number of regional

powers are emerging. Neither Moscow nor Washington have either

the inclination or the influence needed to constrain many of

these regional would-be superpowers. Iran is a case in point.

Countries like Iran, Syria and Libya use terrorism as a form of

diplomacy and as an adjunct to their foreign policies.2 To these

states, terrorism is as integral a part of their diplomacy as the

exchange of ambassadors. Smaller states can easily emulate their

example.

In this era of what should be called a “new world disorder,”

the breakdown of central authority and the domination of the

existing state system has been under assault from a number of

quarters. First, the legitimacy of many states has been

challenged by the growing assertion of both sub-national and

transnational calls for “self-determination” by ethnic groups and

religious movements that deny the legitimacy of what they
53

perceive to be a discredited international order. Despite the

optimism of the past, primordial loyalties have not withered away

in the face of technology, democracy, and the introduction of

free market economies. Indeed, many groups and movements have fed

upon a reaction to what is sometimes viewed as the secular

immorality of the West. Tribal loyalties on a sub-national level

share the rejection of secular mass societies with fundamentalist

movements. Some of these movements seem to offer the chimera of

psychological, sociological and political security to people who

are trying to find their place in an uncertain, even threatening,

world.

New and dangerous players have emerged in the international

arena. The level of instability and concomitant violence is

further heightened by the rise to international political

significance of non-state actors willing to challenge the primacy

of the state. Whether it be the multinational corporation or a

terrorist group that targets it, both share a common

characteristic. They have each rejected the state-centric system

that emerged 175 years ago at the Congress of Vienna.

All of these factors have accelerated the erosion of the

monopoly of the coercive power of the state as the disintegration

of the old order is intensified. And, this process will in all

probability gain even greater momentum because of the wide

ranging and growing activities of criminal enterprises. These

include everything from arms traders and drug cartels, which will

provide and use existing and new weapons in terrorist campaigns

as a part of their pursuit of profit and political power.

In sum, present and future terrorists and their supporters

are acquiring the capabilities and freedom of action to operate

in the new international jungle. They move in what has been

called the “gray areas,” those regions where control has shifted

from legitimate governments to new half-political, half-criminal

powers.3 In this environment the line between state and rogue

state, and rogue state and criminal enterprise will be

increasingly blurred. Each will seek out new and profitable

targets through terrorism in an international order that is

already under assault.

Technological/Operational Changes.

The remarkable changes in the international environment have

been accompanied by technological changes that may have serious

ramifications as regards future terrorist operations both

internationally and in the United States. Up to now, terrorists

have not been especially innovative in their tactics. Bombing,

although not on the intended magnitude of that at the Oklahoma

City Federal Building, remains the most common type of attack.

Hostage taking and kidnapping are fundamental to the terrorist

repertoire and skyjacking is always a possibility. Automatic and

semi-automatic rifles and pistols remain the weapons of choice.
54

However, the employment of stand-off weapons like American

Stinger and Russian SA-7 hand-held anti-aircraft missiles, the

U.S. Army M-72 light anti-tank weapon (LAW), and the Russianbuilt RPG-7 anti-tank weapon may be more readily available to

terrorists than many like to believe. The same may be said of

terrorist bombing technologies. Dynamite has been replaced by the

more destructive and easily concealed Semtex. Furthermore, the

threat has grown as a result of increased technological

sophistication of timing devices and fuses. But weapons need not

be sophisticated to be destructive. One only has to consider what

might have happened if the pilot of the lone single-engine light

aircraft which crashed into the White House had filled his plane

with something as simple as a fertilizer bomb. That incident,

even if it was not a terrorist act, should serve as a warning for

those who are concerned with more advanced technological threats.

They should remember that smaller and more conventional

instruments of destruction are still quite lethal and can have a

profound effect on the targeted individual, corporation,

government or what is often the ultimate target: public opinion.

A growing concern is that terrorists will cross the

threshold to engage in acts of mass or “super terrorism” by using

atomic, biological, and chemical (ABC) weapons. So far, the

international order has been spared terrorist incidents involving

nuclear weapons. Indeed, those that have been reported have

turned out to be elaborate hoaxes. Fortunately, the threats have

yet to be translated into actual incidents, but many believe it

is only a matter of time before they are. 4

All this could easily change as a result of the

disintegration of the Soviet Union. The current trade in illicit

weapons grade plutonium serves to underscore the fact that the

necessary material and attendant technology will be increasingly

available for those terrorist groups who may want to exercise a

nuclear option, be it in the form of a dispersal of radioactive

material that could contaminate a large area or the use of a

relatively small but very lethal atomic weapon. The illegal trade

in weapons and technology will be further exacerbated by the very

real dangers resulting from the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

There is good reason to fear that either a rogue state, its

terrorist surrogates, or independent terrorist groups will have

the capacity to go nuclear. Whether this threshold will be

crossed will depend in part on the motivation, attendant

strategies, and goals of present and future terrorist groups. In

sum, there is every reason to be concerned that terrorists will

engage in their own form of technical innovation to develop the

capacity to make the nightmare of a nuclear, chemical, or

biological threat move from the pages of an adventure novel to

the shores of the United States.

Scenarios addressing future acts of high-tech terrorism

include a wide variety of assaults on the delicate interdependent

infrastructure of modern industrialized society. These scenarios

move beyond the bombing or seizing of conventional or nuclear
55

power plants to include the potentially disastrous destruction

of the technological infrastructure of the information super

highway. However, the scope of what constitutes a terrorist act

on computers and their associated facilities is subject to

interpretation. The bombing of a multinational corporation or a

government’s crucial computer centers could be judged an act of

terrorism, but what if a terrorist hacker placed a computer virus

in a very sensitive network? The results could range from the

massively inconvenient to dangerous or disastrous. Such an act,

however, would lack an essential element of terrorism as it is

now defined: the use or threat of the use of physical violence.

Nevertheless, as the technology expands so may definitions of

what constitutes a terrorist act. From the terrorist’s point of

view the following dictum may apply, “so many new targets . . .

so little time.”

Finally, if indeed terrorism is “theater” and the people are

the audience, the stage is changing.5 CNN and other networks

provide the terrorists with a potential and almost instantaneous

means for spreading their message of fear and intimidation. The

reality of video proliferation is just as significant as that of

nuclear proliferation. Some terrorist groups already have the

ability to stage and videotape their acts, sending them out to

either a broad or limited audience. They can even transmit live

events through low power transmitter stations. Furthermore, the

next generation of terrorists may produce highly imaginative

presentations to seize the attention of a violence-jaded public,

one which has grown used to the now standard images of hooded

terrorists holding hostages in embassies, prisons, or aircraft

cabins. This kind of theater of the obscene will find a ready

mass audience among those who watch the tabloid television shows

and depend on the National Inquirer for their news.6 Given the

public’s fascination with television happenings like the O.J.

Simpson trial, one can only imagine what might happen if future

terrorists direct and produce their own television spectaculars.

Changes in Terrorist Motivations and Goals.

There are almost certainly going to be changes in both the

motivation and goals of terrorist groups. The traditional

motivations for terrorism: ethnic, tribal, and religious

animosities, will continue and intensify. Even while people of

goodwill struggle to find solutions to problems in Northern

Ireland and in the Middle East, the disintegration of the former

Soviet Union and the related turmoil in the former Yugoslavia and

elsewhere have engendered new groups pursuing their own varied

agendas through violence, including terrorism. While much of the

violence is confined to the various regions, the potential for

involving surrounding states and for international assaults is

significant. Even in the Middle East, where the Palestine

Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel are moving along a

tortuous road toward accommodation, various factions, willing and

able to engage in non-territorial terrorism, will continue to
56

“bring the war home” to Israel and its primary supporter, the

United States.

Perhaps even more ominous is the growing significance of

apolitical groups which resort to terrorism in pursuit of

financial gain as a part of criminal enterprises. While a number

of these groups may, in part, justify their actions under the

rubric of political rationalization, their major goal will relate

to maximizing their profits through co-opting, corrupting, and

neutralizing the authority of the states in their respective

countries and regions of operations. These groups, which include

narco-terrorists, are particularly difficult to counteract given

their vast resources gleaned by illicit trade in drugs or

weapons, and because of their ability to influence, control or

demoralize governments in countries where they operate. This new

criminal order can engage in operations with the kind of violence

that makes the old Mafia seem pacifistic by comparison.

Finally, one might anticipate that in addition to existing

extremists operating according to issue-oriented movements such

as radical environmentalism, fringe elements of the pro-life

movement, and extremist animal rights groups, there will emerge

new groups willing to use terrorism to avenge grievances both

real and imaginary. These groups, which at the outset may be

small and not tied to any recognized social or political

movement, may have the capability to maximize their impact

through the availability of a wide variety of weapons, a rich

selection of targets, and the skillful use of the media and

communications technology. There will be both old and new

adversaries to threaten the international order and, more

specifically, U.S. interests and citizens both at home and

abroad.

How Vulnerable is the United States and What Are the Terrorists

Goals?

The following assessment is based on integrating the

analytical components presented above. The focus will be on the

vulnerabilities in the United States to attacks by international terrorist or domestic groups or by such groups with

domestic-international linkages.

The new threat environment may see the emergence of a wide

variety of sub-national and transnational groups intent on

venting their frustrations with Washington for what they perceive

to be a lack of support for their causes or, conversely, for

supporting their adversaries. As the major military superpower,

with an increased global involvement, even when engaged under the

United Nations, the United States is likely to be viewed as the

primary party in future disputes. Even when neutral, Washington

is likely to be viewed suspiciously by one or more warring

factions. In addition, when Washington moves beyond “peace

keeping” to “peace enforcement” operations, the likelihood of a

reaction among one or more disputants is possible. Even though
57

the United States may not want to be the policeman or the

conscience of the world, the parties in any conflict may question

whether Washington is intentionally or unintentionally pursuing a

political agenda that may be counter to their objective. The

result might be the spillover of violence to the United States by

one or more parties in the dispute. Resort to terrorism could be

a punitive action or it might be an effort to dramatize a cause.

As the United States tries to redefine the formulation and

execution of its foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, even if

Washington is motivated by the highest of ideals, i.e.,

democratization, humanitarian assistance, or nation-building,

those who will be the objects of such efforts might resent it.

Their use of terrorism on American soil is a likely response.

The potential spillover effect may be intensified by the

domestic political and economic environment. The potency of

ethnic-based politics, coupled with the tendentious debates over

immigration policy, may provide fertile ground by which ethnicbased conflicts from overseas may be transported to the United

States. Even if that is not the case, the existence of large

immigrant communities may provide the “human jungle” in which

external terrorist groups can operate. The emergence of a variety

of issue-oriented transnational groups could also lead extremists

within their respective organizations to establish linkages with

like-minded individuals or groups within the United States. Such

groups could undertake joint operations against American targets

in an effort to dramatize their causes or seek changes in public

policy. Cooperation between home-grown terrorists and their

foreign counterparts cannot be understated. In an increasingly

interrelated international environment, a new “terror network”

might emerge with issue-oriented groups launching assaults on

domestic targets.

The threat posed by fundamentalist religious groups of all

faiths cannot be discounted. Not only Islamic extremists, but

other “true believers” of a variety of faiths are likely to

engage in terrorist acts against American targets. These groups

might be supported or joined in their operations by domestic

religious extremists. In addition, they might also seek alliances

with a variety of cultists, survivalists, or neo-fascists who,

for their own reasons, reject the existing social, economic, and

political order and await their own versions of Armageddon.

Perhaps even more dangerous will be the resort to terrorism

by apolitical terrorists who are engaged in violence and

intimidation as a part of criminal pursuits. Such groups have

operated overseas with impunity. Inner city America could become

a fertile ground for their operations. They will be particularly

threatening since, as a result of their illegal trade in drugs

and other criminal enterprises, they may have access to vast

funds with which to corrupt local authorities. What will make

these groups especially dangerous may be the fact that their

threats and acts of terrorism will not necessarily be meant to

achieve publicity or to dramatize their cause.
58

Such groups may use terrorist tactics in extortion attempts

like those used to “shake down the neighborhood”–only these gangs

may attempt to blackmail the entire city. With their vast

revenues, they could acquire a formidable arsenal of weapons with

which to challenge local authorities and carry out their acts of

violence on a scale not yet experienced in the United States.

Furthermore, it may be very difficult for our already strained

criminal justice system to address the development of new

criminal cartels.

The scope and magnitude of future potential terrorist

organizations will be enhanced by the rapid changes in technology

that will provide the next generation of terrorists with

capabilities undreamed of by the most highly dedicated and

skilled terrorist of today. In a sense the capture of the

infamous Carlos marked the end of an era. A new generation of

terrorists armed with technologically advanced weaponry will be

able to engage in violence that is more dramatic and destructive

than that intended in the bombing in Oklahoma City. The threat at

the lower end of the spectrum is likely to grow as well. The M16, M-10, Uzi and AK-47 assault rifles will be supplemented by

stand-off weapons like Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, LAWs and

RPG-7s, already available on the world weapons market. Just

because a weapon is relatively unsophisticated does not mean it

cannot cause massive casualties. A stinger missile aimed at a

jumbo jet as it takes off or as it approaches a large

metropolitan airport could cause tremendous casualties. A LAW or

RPG round lobbed into the right area of a nuclear power plant

could produce catastrophic consequences.

Ultimately, the most fearful and recurrent terrorist

nightmare may be drawing closer to reality. The proliferation of

nuclear weapons and associated technologies, and the diffusion of

knowledge needed to manufacture chemical and biological weapons,

raises the fearful specter of mass destruction that makes

concerns related to use of anthrax as a way of spreading both

disease and panic pale to insignificance. The scary truth is that

the United States is all too vulnerable to this kind of attack.

The porous borders that have allowed massive illegal immigration

are just as open to those who want to import new instruments of

mass destruction. And, because there are significant profits to

be made, there are suppliers who are willing to provide the new

generation of portable nuclear weapons, chemical and biological

delivery systems despite Washington’s growing concern and the

improving technical means to counter such threats. Furthermore,

the next generation of terrorists will have the capability of

effectively exploiting the highly competitive electronic and

print media both to dramatize their conventional or ABC

capabilities and to extort money.

Technological changes will certainly have an impact on

target selection. At the outset, the availability of more

sophisticated conventional explosives could enable terrorists to
59

inflict greater damage on potential targets while lessening the

risk of capture that results from having to process or transport

the material. Highly symbolic targets like government buildings

and corporate headquarters will be more vulnerable to attack.

Major public events, like the Super Bowl or the 1996 Atlanta

Olympics are also prime targets.

Despite more effective physical security and technological

countermeasures it will be increasingly difficult to harden

potential targets. Even if the range of the weapons is relatively

short, it will be a considerable challenge to expand an antiterrorist security zone beyond the immediate periphery of

potential targets like sports facilities, government buildings,

or nuclear power plants. Defense in depth will require broader

protective measures.

Even of greater concern is the potential threat of such

weapons to aviation security. While anti-skyjacking measures have

been largely successful in the industrialized West, the

possibility of the threat or the destruction of commercial

aircraft cannot be dismissed. It is exceedingly difficult to

expand a security zone beyond the confines of an airport.

Moreover, stand-off weapons provide the opportunity for highly

flexible hit and run attacks. The resulting mobility will make it

very difficult to predict or take appropriate action against

terrorists. Finally, as potential targets continue to be hardened

in urban areas, there is no reason to believe that terrorists

will not seek softer targets of opportunity either in the suburbs

(corporate headquarters) or rural areas (nuclear or thermal power

plants and other installations). Despite these threats, it will

remain difficult to develop the necessary awareness, technology

and training among those corporations outside urban areas. Too

many people may not take the threat seriously enough due to an

“it can’t happen here” syndrome.

Most ominous, however, is the threat issuing from mass or

super-terrorism. Cities may be held hostage by threats to poison

the water supply or to disseminate any number of dangerous

chemical or biological agents. Such threats must also be taken

seriously given the proliferation of ABC capabilities. The threat

might be overt, in which case the authorities will have the

onerous task of reconciling the need to take appropriate action

without creating a panic. Or the threat might be covert, in which

case governments will be facing a form of nuclear, chemical, or

biological blackmail unknown to the public. Finally, one can

anticipate that there will be more incidents of criminal

terrorism directed against senior executives, public officials,

and their families. The terrorists will justify such acts of

hostage-taking and kidnapping on the basis of political

causation, but in many cases they will be motivated by nothing

more than a desire for ransom money. There is no reason to

believe that criminal extortion, which has become a major

industry in Mexico and throughout Central and South America, will

not be emulated within the United States. In sum, the
60

constellation of potential targets and the means to attack them

will continue to expand in the coming decade.

The traditional motivation behind the resort to terrorism by

various groups is sure to continue. Ethnic identification and

hatred, the call to right perceived wrongs, and the demand for

self-determination will continue to inspire terrorists. The ranks

of the traditional terror mongers will be joined by religious

extremist groups who have rejected what they view to be the

excesses of Western and American secular society. These forces of

reaction may come from the Middle East, but there will be the

non-Islamic equivalents of the Hamas and Hizbollah venting their

anger and demanding the destruction of the “Great Satan.” These

true believers, in the conduct of what they view to be a “just

war,” may attack the symbols of their religious or secular

rivals. Acts such as the bombings of the Israeli Embassy and the

Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires might be emulated in

Washington or New York. Moreover, domestic groups acting either

independently or with the support of external terrorist

organizations may launch their own assaults. One need only recall

how a sectarian dispute within the United States was transformed

into a mass hostage taking by the Hanafi Muslims in Washington,

DC in 1977. The most alarming aspect of the religious extremists

is the fact that they do not necessarily constrain their actions

by using terror as a weapon to coerce or to propagandize for

their causes. The new true believer, armed with the certainty of

faith, may not be concerned with current public opinion or a

change in the policy of an adversary. To them, being killed while

undertaking an act of terrorism may be a way to paradise in the

next life. The image of the smiling truck bomber driving his

vehicle into the Marine barracks in Beirut may be duplicated in a

large urban center in the United States. And the nightmare only

becomes more horrific if such a perpetrator uses a nuclear

device. While one does not want to overstate the threat, the

strategic thinker must be willing to “think the unthinkable” so

that appropriate responses may be conceived.

The panoply of potential attacks, save for the nuclear

option or other forms of super-terrorism, will probably not

create a major change in U.S. foreign policy or the articulation

and pursuit of U.S. strategic interests and national security

objectives. However, in this new world disorder terrorism may

come to the United States whenever foreign adversaries want to

test Washington’s resolve in continuing its support for

activities of the United Nations and friendly governments. Given

the lack of coherence in the international environment and the

low threshold of pain in regard to the taking of American

casualties in ill-defined conflicts and the emergence of neoisolationism, one must recognize that future acts of terrorism,

if skillfully executed, might have a strategic result. The

bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut changed the course of

U.S. policy toward Lebanon. That kind of act could be duplicated

in the United States with even more dramatic results.
61

Conclusion.

As noted at the start of this chapter, it is difficult to

see through the smog of terrorism to assess America’s

vulnerabilities. Furthermore, it is dangerous to either

understate or overstate the threat. If one minimizes the threat,

little action may be taken. If one overstates it, the public and

the authorities might overreact. What is needed is a realistic

assessment which avoids both extremes. While recognizing that

there is a threat, but not overemphasizing it, appropriate

measures can be taken to lessen the likelihood of an attack.

Moreover, a balanced and cautious view can assist both the public

and policymakers in developing a consistent level of antiterrorism awareness and countermeasures. Constant awareness and

preparedness are fundamental to deterring terrorists. Such a

prudent approach is far better than the overreaction that might

occur after an incident. In the final analysis, the United States

is vulnerable to the changing terrorist threat. But the threat

can be met through heightened levels of awareness, resolve,

counterterrorism measures, and consistent policies.7

ENDNOTES

1. Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, Strategic

Intelligence for American National Security, Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press, 1989, pp. 304.

2. Stephen Sloan, “International Terrorism: Conceptual

Problems and Implications,” Journal of Thought: An

Interdisciplinary Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 2, Summer 1982, p. 23.

3. Xavier Raufer, “Gray Area: A New Security Threat,”

Political Warfare: Intelligence, Active Measures and Terrorism

Report, No. 20, Spring 1992, p. 1.

4. For a short chronology of chemical and biological

incidents, see Joseph L. Douglass, Jr. and Neil C. Livingstone,

“Selected List of C/B Incidents by Terrorists and Other Nonstate

Actors,” in America the Vulnerable: The Threat of Chemical and

Biological Warfare. The New Shape of Terrorism and Conflict,

Lexington Books, 1987, pp. 183-187.

5. Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of

Conflict, Research Paper No. 48, California Seminar on Arms

Control and Foreign Policy, Crescent Publication, 1976, p. 4.

6. See Stephen Sloan, “Acts of Terrorism or the Theater of

the Obscene, in Simulating Terrorism, Norman, OK: University of

Oklahoma Press, 1981, pp. 19-28. This book illustrates how the

techniques of improvisational theater in the form of highly

realistic simulations were prepared and conducted to test the

ability of police and military forces who are responsible for

responding to terrorist threats.
62

7. Stephen Sloan, “US Anti-Terrorism Policies: Lessons to

be Learned to Meet an Enduring and Changing Threat,” Terrorism

and Political Violence, Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring 1993.
63

CHAPTER 4

TO INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY:

TERRORISM AND THE PRICE OF GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT

Steven Metz

Introduction.

The contemporary world is one of rapid and extensive flows,

whether electronic flows of information and communication, or

physical flows of goods, services, and people. Seamlessness is a

defining feature of the late-20th century; the result is an

erosion of the distinction between foreign policy and domestic

conditions. This is especially true for the United States where

deliberate choices have amplified the connection between the

world and the nation. In his foreign policy, President Clinton

has continued a 50-year tradition of global engagement, the goal

to expand the community of free market democracies.1 However

sound, this approach has unintended costs, sometimes violent

ones. As the world’s dominant power, the United States is seen as

a bulwark of the status quo. Opponents of the status quo–the

repressed, dispossessed, and disgruntled–often consider the

United States a natural enemy. Hostility is thus part of the

price of global engagement.

The relationship is actually circular: just as American

actions abroad have domestic repercussions, domestic public

opinion shapes foreign policy and national security strategy. The

starkest venue for this relationship is terrorism on U.S. soil.

Admittedly, not all terrorism within the United States is

performed by foreigners. Most is not. Still, a fringe group of

those dissatisfied with American foreign policy could at any time

strike targets in the United States. Today, this is becoming

increasingly easy. With the 1993 bombing of the World Trade

Center in New York City, terrorism, according to Congressman

Benjamin A. Gilman, “had come home to America. We Americans,

frequently the target of terrorists abroad, were no longer safe,

even on our own soil.”2

The World Trade Center bombing may offer a glimpse of the

future, serving as the first skirmish in a campaign of violence

within the United States. Increasingly, American policymakers

must consider whether their decisions will spark terrorism.

Terrorism at home could debilitate U.S. foreign policy and

national security strategy, thus destroying any chance of

constructing a more positive and prosperous global system. Having

won the Cold War, the United States could lose the peace to a

handful of violent extremists. Only determined political

leadership can prevent this.
64

Effects.

Terrorism is premeditated, politically motivated violence

perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or

clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.3

It has existed for millennia, but first had a major effect on

American foreign policy in the 1970s. Following the 1973 ArabIsraeli War, several Palestinian groups launched or escalated

terror campaigns just as the United States became Israel’s

foremost arms supplier. This coincidence enmeshed the United

States in the war against international terrorism. Active support

from the Soviet Union and its clients in training, equipping, and

aiding terrorist movements of all kinds heightened the problem.

By the early 1980s, conflict in Lebanon and the Gulf as well as

support for Egypt forced the United States even deeper into the

dark struggle. Elsewhere, the violently disgruntled drew

inspiration from the Middle East and from earlier terrorism in

Vietnam. Counterinsurgency campaigns in the Philippines and El

Salvador led to American deaths, as did support for the

governments of several NATO allies facing their own terrorist

challenges.

As terrorism swept the world, some experts expected an

active home front in the United States, but it never emerged.

This was due, in part, to the vigilance of U.S. security

agencies, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation.4 The

difficulty terrorists faced operating in American culture was

also an obstacle. But now this may be changing. The United States

is much less alien to Third World nationals, whether from the

Middle East or elsewhere, than 20 years ago. Members of almost

every culture can find hospitable corners in major American

cities. Nations such as Iran and Syria have at least partially

compensated for the collapse of the Soviet-led support network.5

And, to a large extent, global terrorism has matured to the point

where external sponsors are less crucial. No connections have

been established, for instance, between the World Trade Center

bombers and a foreign government.6 This suggests those experts

who predicted the opening of a terrorist “home front” in the

1970s were not wrong, but simply premature. There is currently no

concerted campaign of international terrorism directed at targets

within the United States, but there could be in the future.

At this point, it is not clear what impact widespread

terrorism at home would have on American public opinion and

foreign policy. It is possible, though, to delineate a range of

feasible reactions. First, it might create public pressure for

American disengagement from conflict-prone regions or from the

Third World in general. Making the public conclude that global

engagement is not worth the cost is precisely the outcome

terrorists seek. And, unfortunately, total disengagement might be

the only true palliative. The recent history of the Middle East

suggests it is less the actual content of American policy that

provokes terrorism than the extent of U.S. involvement. What the

United States saw as pro-Arab positions were just as likely to
65

spark political violence as explicitly pro-Israel stands.

Framing a more “balanced” U.S. foreign policy or paying greater

attention to the “legitimate grievances” of groups that

terrorists claim to represent may not diminish terrorism.

Terrorist acts on U.S. soil could also have the exact

opposite effect on American public opinion. Rather than opting

for disengagement, terrorism could enrage Americans and generate

pressure for a more aggressive policy toward international

supporters of terrorism or its sympathizers. Media coverage of

the agony of terrorism’s victims might lead to calls to punish

states proven to have supported the terrorists (or even suspected

of doing so). Rather than deterring American involvement,

something like the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut could

inflame passions as did the destruction of the Maine or the

sinking of the Lusitania.

Terrorism associated with foreign states or political

movements is almost certain to exacerbate hostility against

groups associated with them. This is especially true if it were

connected to the Middle East in some way. If this happened,

American Muslims would be particularly vulnerable to guilt by

association. Even though Islam is one of the fastest growing

religions in the United States, it is poorly understood. The

appearance of self-professed Islamic terrorists during the past

two decades has created fear and distrust.7 Terrorist attacks by

those claiming to act on behalf of Islam–even when condemned by

the majority of Muslims–will provoke anti-Islamic feelings in the

United States. Potentially, this could increase the influence of

violent nativist movements like skinheads and neo-Nazis.

Since modern terrorists pay little attention to national

borders when choosing targets and techniques, attacks within the

United States are likely to speed the melding of traditional

military functions with traditional law enforcement activities.

In fact, writers such as Donald J. Hanle contend that

international terrorism must be considered a form of warfare.8 To

some extent, the American approach to terrorism already blends

military and law enforcement functions. The Department of

Defense, Department of Justice, State Department, and Central

Intelligence Agency all play some role in countering

international terrorism.9 If terrorists become more high-tech,

either by targeting the U.S. communications network or by using

chemical, biological, or nuclear devices, and do open an active

front within the United States, the integration of domestic and

international security services may accelerate.

 In general, terrorists use and manipulate the open press,

legal protection of privacy, and rights of due process and public

trial.10 They deliberately force democracies to either accept

their ravages or surrender some of the rights which define open

political systems. This poses an extraordinarily difficult

problem for democracies.11 Nations facing serious terrorist

threats have often been forced to alter their structures of civil
66

and legal rights in order to combat the problem. The United

Kingdom is one example. While treating terrorism as a species of

crime, the Prevention of Terrorism legislation gives the

government wide-ranging prerogatives including the banning of

certain organizations, the right to stop any person or vehicle in

Northern Ireland, and special powers to attack terrorist finances

and perform investigations.12 Abnormal abrogations of civil

liberties have thus become the norm, not only in Britain, but

throughout Western Europe. If faced with a significant terrorist

challenge on home soil, the United States might be forced to

follow the same path.

The Role of Leadership.

What, then, is the solution? Ironically, the onset of

serious terrorism within the United States would provide a golden

opportunity for American political leaders. Terrorism’s pain and

tragedy would arouse emotions, but not dictate appropriate

responses. Political leaders could thus harness the energy of

public passion and use it any number of ways, constructively or

destructively. This means the form and quality of political

leadership will determine which of the possible effects of

domestic terrorism come to fruition.

Initially, policymakers would see more dilemmas than

opportunities in a terrorist assault. For example, political

leaders attempting to deal with widespread terrorism will be

struck by the inadvertent symbiosis between the terrorists and

the media.13 Terrorists want and need publicity. Because dramatic

terrorism draws audiences, the media focus on it, thus providing

inducements for further terrorism. For political leaders, this

creates a conflict between their constitutional mandate to

“establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the

common defence, promote the general Welfare” and the

constitutional prohibition on laws “abridging the freedom of

speech.” So long as the media will not admit they provide

precisely the publicity terrorists seek and assume no

responsibility beyond “providing the public what it wants,” there

will be no solution to this problem. The endless, melodramatic

coverage of the terror bombing of April 19, 1995, in Oklahoma

City suggests the American media are far from understanding this.

Another dilemma that may also confound American leaders is

that terrorism is a form of conflict where one failure obviates a

string of successes. In fact, the public often may not know of

counterterrorist victories since protection of sources and

methods will require silence. Officials cannot publicize

informers, agents, or cooperation from friendly governments

without risking future activities. But one failure opens the

government to criticism and a handful of failures will generate

an image of crisis. The government may thus know it is winning

the war on terrorism while appearing to lose. Losing will always

be hot news, winning will not.
67

Faced with these dilemmas, the only reasonable option will

be a complex balance between too much concern for terrorism and

too little. There is probably no more difficult task for leaders

in a communication-rich and fluid democracy than creating and

sustaining tolerance for low-intensity conflict, particularly

when the payoffs are abstract–world order and the like–rather

than tangible. Yet that is what American political leaders must

do. In the minds of the public, terrorism must be relegated to

irrelevancy lest foreign policy and national security strategy

become paralyzed. Obsession will be disastrous. The major

difficulty, though, is overcoming the natural human tendency to

focus on dramatic failures rather than on more mundane successes.

Conflicts that break out despite American efforts are always more

newsworthy than those deterred. The same holds for terrorist

attacks.

If terrorism escalates, it will be difficult to convince the

public that global engagement is worth the price. So far, the

Clinton administration has made a concerted effort to do so. The

need for global American leadership has been a common theme in

statements by the President and his top advisers.14 This must

continue. American political leaders must also make the public

understand that partial disengagement would not end the terrorist

threat. In fact, the failure of the United States to act in a

foreign crisis is almost as likely to provoke anti-American

violence as acting itself. Americans must realize that in many

parts of the world, people sincerely believe that the United

States could solve all their problems if Washington wished to.

The appearance of disdain or unconcern infuriates the repressed

and dispossessed. It also leads them to conclude that if they

could only inspire and motivate the United States, things would

change. Phrased differently, not all terrorists seek to deter

American action, many aim to provoke it. This means the only way

the United States could remove itself from the list of terrorist

targets is to fully abdicate superpower status. In some parts of

the world and for some types of conflict, disengagement is

wise.15 It will not, however, end terrorism. The adverse effects

of fully abdicating superpower status are so stark that if the

public understood this choice, pressure for disengagement would

diminish.

By the same token, American political leaders must not allow

terrorism to stoke enmity among Americans. In particular, care

must be taken to quash anti-Islamism that may grow from terrorist

attacks. Even though Federal officials said there was no

connection between the bombing in Oklahoma City and people of

Muslim faith, an Iraqi refugee family was assaulted and early

speculation that the attack was the work of Middle Eastern

terrorists led to bitter criticism from the Arab world.16 Such

antagonism will escalate if terrorism grows. So far, American

political leaders have done little to correct public

misunderstanding of Islam and the apparent fear that arises from

it. The entertainment industry, particularly its low-brow

segment, has made the situation worse by frequent use of a
68

stereotype Arab terrorist, again under the guise of “giving the

public what it wants.” A concerted educational program to provide

a more balanced assessment is past due. Iman Plemon T. El-Amin

has written, “The voices of peace, justice, mercy, and tolerance

are not difficult to find among Muslims and Islamic media, who

consistently denounce acts of terrorism and reject them as

illegitimate and unacceptable Islamic strategies or methods.”17

The American government must help make this known.

Punishment of external sponsors of terrorism has long been

an element of U.S. policy. This may need further amplification.

Serious consideration should be given to considering sponsorship

of terrorism an act of war (particularly attacks using weapons of

mass destruction). The combination of economic sanctions,

political pressure, and punitive military strikes has not fully

deterred the more diehard friends of terrorism like Iran and

Syria. The possibility that sponsorship will lead to an American

declaration of war might. Since this would require a clear

“smoking gun,” the U.S. intelligence community will play a vital

role. In fact, countering terrorism and countering the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction should be the top

priorities of post-Cold War U.S. intelligence efforts. These are

difficult steps which again require determined political

leadership.

The Oklahoma City bombing suggests that most of the

terrorism faced by the United States in the near future will be

home-grown. There is the potential, though, that U.S. foreign

policy will provoke terrorist attacks from foreign-backed groups.

If this happens, the United States is not ready. The World Trade

Center bombing, according to Congresswomen Olympia J. Snowe,

showed “that the U.S. Government remains psychologically, and in

some cases, legislatively unprepared to cope with the arrival of

international terrorism on American shores.”18 In response,

President Clinton sent a tough new counterterrorism bill to

Congress in February 1995. This was designed to clarify criminal

jurisdiction for terrorist acts on U.S. soil and prevent fundraising in the United States by organizations that support

international terrorism.19 Following the Oklahoma City bombing,

the President created a new domestic counterterrorism center and

sought authority for Federal agents to monitor the telephones

calls and check the credit, hotel and travel records of suspected

terrorists.20 Civil liberties activists immediately opposed these

steps, thus reopening what could become an intense debate over

the degree to which laws and procedures should be adapted to

confront terrorism.21

Even if the President’s actions gain approval, further

psychological preparation and political action is required.

Americans have grown accustomed to some of the costs of global

engagement. Money and military casualties have been deemed

acceptable burdens of world leadership, but Americans are not yet

used to the idea that terrorism at home may be an additional cost

of global engagement. Unfortunately, terrorists understand this.
69

In the near future, they are likely to use this vulnerability

and the growing multiculturalism of the United States in attempts

to either deter U.S. activity or provoke it. Only wise and

persistent leadership, exercised before terrorism at home reaches

crisis proportions, can prevent it from paralyzing American

involvement in world affairs.

ENDNOTES

 1. William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of

Engagement and Enlargement, Washington, DC: The White House,

February 1995.

2. Benjamin A. Gilman, remarks at the 42nd EP/U.S. Congress

Interparliamentary Meeting, Athens, Greece, January 1994,

reprinted in Congressional Record, 104th Congress, p. E221.

3. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns

of Global Terrorism: 1993, U.S. Department of State Publication

10136, April 1994, n.p. (electronic file transfer).

4. See Oliver B. Revell, “Structure of Counterterrorism

Planning and Operations in the United States,” Terrorism, Vol.

14, No. 3, 1991, pp. 135-144.

5. See Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1993. On Iranian

motives and internal debates, see Richard H. Shultz, Jr.,

“Iranian Covert Aggression: Support for Radical Political

Islamists Conducting Internal Subversion Against States in the

Middle East/Southwest Asia Region,” Terrorism and Political

Violence, Vol. 6, No. 3, Autumn 1994, pp. 281-302.

6. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1993.

7. On the misuse of Islam to justify terrorism, see Steven

Metz, “The Ideology of Terrorist Foreign Policies in Libya and

South Africa,” Conflict, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1987, pp. 387-391.

8. Donald J. Hanle, Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare,

Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989.

9. By law, the Department of State is the lead agency for

international counterterrorist efforts and the Federal Bureau of

Investigation for domestic activities.

10. Alex P. Schmid, “Terrorism and Democracy,” in Alex P.

Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten, eds., Western Responses to

Terrorism, London: Frank Cass, 1993.

11. The classic discussion of the problems terrorism pose

for open political systems is Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the

Liberal State, London: Macmillan, 1977.

12. David Bonner, “United Kingdom: The United Kingdom
70

Response to Terrorism,” in Schmid and Crelinsten, eds., Western

Responses to Terrorism, pp. 179-187.

13. There is a fairly extensive literature on terrorism and

the media. A good statement of basic problems is Yonah Alexander,

“Terrorism and the Media: Some Considerations,” in Yonah

Alexander, David Carlton, and Paul Wilkinson, eds., Terrorism:

Theory and Practice, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1979.

14. For example, Warren Christopher, “Principles and

Opportunities For American Foreign Policy,” address at the John

F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge,

MA, January 20, 1995, reprinted in Department of State Dispatch,

January 23, 1995, n.p. (electronic file transfer); Strobe

Talbott, “American Eagle or Ostrich? The Case for U.S.

Leadership,” remarks at the McConnell Center for Political

Leadership, Louisville, KY, March 20, 1995, reprinted in

Department of State Dispatch, March 27, 1995, n.p. (electronic

file transfer); and William Clinton, “The Vital Tradition of

American Leadership in the World,” remarks to the Nixon Center

for Peace and Freedom Policy Conference, Washington, DC, March 1,

1995, reprinted in Department of State Dispatch, March 6, 1995,

n.p. (electronic file transfer).

15. This is explored in detail in Steven Metz, America and

the Third World: Strategic Alternatives and Military

Implications, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College,

Strategic Studies Institute, 1994.

16. Melinda Henneberger, “Muslims Continue to Feel

Apprehensive,” New York Times, April 24, 1995, p. B10; Youssef M.

Ibrahim, “In Arab World, Bitterness and Anger Over Early FingerPointing,” New York Times, April 24, 1995, p. B10.

17. Plemon T. El-Amin, “A Muslim Voice Against Terrorism,”

Tikkun, Vol. 10, No. 2, reprinted in Congressional Record, 104th

Congress, p. S4836.

18. Olympia J. Snowe, “Stop Bureaucratic Turf Fights Over

Terrorism Rewards,” remarks in the House of Representatives, July

21, 1993, reprinted in Congressional Record, 103d Congress, p.

E1842.

19. Report of Proposed Legislation Entitled “The Omnibus

Counterterrorism Act of 1995"–Message From the President,

February 9, 1995, reprinted in Congressional Record, 104th

Congress, p. S2398.

20. Todd S. Purdum, “Clinton Seeks Broad Powers in Battle

Against Terrorism,” New York Times, April 24, 1995, pp. A1, B6.

21. Joan Biskupic and John M. Goshko, “Proposals to Expand

Police Powers Worry Civil Liberties Groups,” Washington Post,

April 25, 1995, p. A6. Also, Neil A. Lewis, “Clinton Plan Would
71

Let F.B.I. Infiltrate Menacing Groups,” New York Times, April

25, 1995, p. A19; “Don’t Legislate in Haste” (editorial), New

York Times, April 25, 1995, p. A22; and A.M. Rosenthal, “Stand

Pat and Die,” New York Times, April 25, 1995, p. A23.
72

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

KENNETH KATZMAN is an analyst in Middle East Affairs with the

Congressional Research Service. He has served in government and

the private sector as an analyst in Persian Gulf affairs, with

special emphasis on Iran and Iraq. In his current position, he

analyzes U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf region and has authored

many CRS publications. He also has written numerous articles in

professional journals. He is the author of a book on Iran’s

Revolutionary Guard entitled The Warriors of Islam: Iran’s

Revolutionary Guard, Westview Press, 1993.

STEVEN METZ is Associate Research Professor at the Strategic

Studies Institute. Dr. Metz has taught at the Air War College,

the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and several

universities. He holds a B.A. and M.A. in international studies

from the University of South Carolina, and a Ph.D. in political

science from the Johns Hopkins University.

STEPHEN C. PELLETIERE (editor) received his Ph.D. in Middle East

politics from the University of California, Berkeley. In the

early 1960s he served in the Middle East as a foreign

correspondent, during which time he was based in Beirut. He

returned to the Lebanese capital in 1970, and in 1975, when the

Lebanese civil war erupted, Dr. Pelletiere was in Cairo, Egypt,

conducting research on a Fulbright Fellowship. From 1982 until

1987, he was an intelligence officer in Washington, DC,

monitoring the Iran-Iraq War. He came to the Strategic Studies

Institute in 1988, and became a full professor in 1991. He has

written two books on the Middle East: The Kurds–An Unstable

Element in the Gulf, and The Iran-Iraq War–Chaos in a Vacuum.

STEPHEN SLOAN is Professor of Political Science at the University

of Oklahoma. He received his Ph.D. and M.A. degrees in

comparative politics from the Graduate School of Arts and

Sciences at New York University, and his B.A. from Washington

Square College of New York University. Dr. Sloan has been

involved in formulating counterterrorism doctrine for the

military, and was an expert contributor to the Vice President’s

Task Force on Combating Terrorism in 1986. His latest books are

Corporate Aviation: The Next Frontier in Aerospace Operations,

coauthored with Harry Pier, University of Oklahoma Press; and

Historical Dictionary of Terrorism, coauthored with Sean Kendal

Anderson, Scarecrow Press.

LEW B. WARE is Professor of Middle East Studies, Air University,

and presently a course director at the Air Command and Staff

College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. He has served in a number of

positions at Air University, in particular as Chief, PoliticalMilitary Affairs Division at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine,

Research and Education. He has a Ph.D. in Near Eastern studies

from Princeton University with a research interest in political

Islam. Dr. Ware’s latest publication is a contribution to

Challenge and Response: Anticipating US Military Security
73

Concerns, edited by Karl P. Magyar, Air University Press, 1994.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Acting Director

Colonel William W. Allen

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Editor

Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere

Institute Editor

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretary

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler