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77–601 PDF 2002

S. HRG. 107–390

THE GLOBAL REACH OF AL–QAEDA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

AND TERRORISM

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 18, 2001

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota

BARBARA BOXER, California

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

BILL NELSON, Florida

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia

JESSE HELMS, North Carolina

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon

BILL FRIST, Tennessee

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming

EDWIN K. HALL, Staff Director

PATRICIA A. MCNERNEY, Republican Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

AND TERRORISM

BARBARA BOXER, California, Chairman

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

BILL NELSON, Florida

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DELAWARE

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming

BILL FRIST, Tennessee

JESSE HELMS, North Carolina

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Caruso, Mr. J. T., Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, DC ........................................................................................... 3

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 4

Flournoy, Ms. Michele, senior advisor, International Security Program, Center

for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC ................................ 20

Johnson, Mr. Larry C., former Deputy Director, (1989-1993) Office of

Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ....................... 15

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 17

Wilshere, Mr. Thomas, Deputy Section Chief, International Terrorism Operational Section, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, DC ................ 7

(III)

(1)

THE GLOBAL REACH OF AL-QAEDA

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 18, 2001

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL

OPERATIONS AND TERRORISM,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in room

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Barbara Boxer,

(chairman of the subcommittee), presiding.

Present: Senators Boxer and Bill Nelson.

Senator BOXER. The hearing will come to order. Today, the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism meets to discuss the next steps in the global fight against

the al-Qaeda terrorist organization. It has been just over 3 months

since al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked U.S. civilian aircraft and used

them as missiles to attack the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, a vicious and cruel act that killed and injured thousands of

innocent people from more than 80 different nations.

While it was evident shortly after the September 11 attack that

Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organization were responsible,

the administration’s initial steps were of a diplomatic nature and

quickly bore fruit. The United Nations Security Council passed a

binding resolution requiring all member countries to pursue terrorists and the financial systems that support them.

NATO invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, declaring

that the September 11 attack on America was an attack on all 19

NATO nations. The Organization of American States followed suit

by invoking the Rio Treaty, which obligates signators to consider

an attack against any member as an attack against all, and more

than 150 countries have joined the United States in targeting terrorist assets.

On October 7, the United States launched military strikes

against al-Qaeda camps and Taliban military installations, and

today I am happy to say the Taliban has been ousted from power.

The Taliban is a regime that we in this committee have discussed

over the years since 1997. We have always passed legislation,

under both Republican and Democratic Presidents, that called on

the Executive never to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate Government of Afghanistan and both Democratic and Republican administrations followed the will of this committee. The American

flag has been raised at the embassy in Kabul, and a new Afghan

Government will shortly be sworn into power, and I am very

pleased to say it will have two women in the interim government.

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Al-Qaeda and their Taliban cohorts once controlled 95 percent of

Afghanistan. Thanks to U.S. military action, al-Qaeda and Taliban

control of Afghanistan is limited to just a number of caves. Despite

the fact that Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden are still at large,

which is what we believe, the U.S. campaign against them has

been extremely successful, and Americans should be very proud.

With bin Laden and his lieutenants on the run, I think it is important to look at the next steps in the campaign against al-Qaeda.

At today’s hearing, we will be examining the following:

No. 1. The impact of U.S. military, diplomatic, and financial actions, the impact of those actions on the al-Qaeda organization;

No. 2. The global reach and threat of al-Qaeda cells, including

the possibility that al-Qaeda terrorists have obtained materials

useful in creating weapons of mass destruction; and

No. 3. What can be done to build on the success of U.S. policies

in fighting al-Qaeda terrorists and those that support them?

To help us accomplish these goals, I placed a call to Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff to ask that the Justice Department make available to this subcommittee a former member of alQaeda who testified for the government during the embassy bombing trials. We had a very long and interesting conversation, and it

was agreeable. For a variety of reasons Mr. Chertoff suggested that

the committee hear instead from members of the FBI who were

very familiar with the testimony of these former members of alQaeda.

As a result, our witnesses on the first panel are Mr. J. T. Caruso,

Acting Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division,

and Mr. Thomas Wilshere, Deputy Chief of the FBI’s International

Terrorism Operations Section. Mr. Caruso will testify on al-Qaeda’s

global reach, al-Qaeda’s ties to other terrorist organizations, and

summarize what we learned about al-Qaeda from the embassy

bombing trial.

Our second panel consists of two private witnesses, Mr. Larry

Johnson, a former Deputy Director of the Office of

Counterterrorism at the State Department, and Ms. Michele

Flournoy, senior advisor of the International Security Program at

the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Last week, the world saw a videotape in which Osama bin Laden

admitted to being the cold, calculating murderer we all thought

that he was. In the videotape, Osama bin Laden said, ‘‘when people

see a strong horse and a weak horse by nature they will like the

strong horse.’’ Clearly, to me, we know who the strong horse is. It

is the people of this country. It is the strength of this country. It

is the convictions of this country. It is the democracy of this country. It is the military of this country. It is everything this country

stands for.

And Mr. Caruso, I want to thank you very much for coming here

today and making yourself available, because I do believe that we

have lost our breath since September 11. Collectively as a country

we did not know we had this enemy. We had no idea, in terms of

the breadth and reach of this enemy. It came at us out of the blue,

literally and figuratively, and you are going to help us today understand what this enemy looks like, how deep the roots are, and that

will help us set policy that will ensure our success, so we welcome

3

you very much. We do not have any time limits. Please present

what you have to say.

STATEMENT OF MR. J. T. CARUSO, COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WASHINGTON,

DC

Mr. CARUSO. Good afternoon, Madam Chairman. I am pleased to

appear before the subcommittee to discuss al-Qaeda. I have a

longer statement, which I have submitted to be included in the

record, but what I would like to do is just touch upon some highlights, and we will move on to the discussion.

Senator BOXER. Please, take your time.

Mr. CARUSO. Al-Qaeda, roughly translated, ‘‘The Base,’’ was developed by Osama bin Laden and others in the early 1980’s to support the war effort in Afghanistan against the former Soviet Union.

The resulting victory in Afghanistan gave rise to the overall jihad,

or Holy War.

Senator BOXER. Would you pull the mike closer to you so everyone can hear.

Mr. CARUSO. Trained Mujahedin fighters from Afghanistan

began returning to such countries as Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi

Arabia with extensive jihad experience and the desire to continue

the jihad. One of the principal goals of al-Qaeda was to drive the

U.S. Armed Forces out of Saudi Arabia and elsewhere on the Saudi

Arabian Peninsula, as well as out of Somalia. Although al-Qaeda

functions independently of other terrorist organizations, it also

uses other terrorist organizations to accomplish its goals.

Osama bin Laden justifies the criminal action of al-Qaeda

through the issuance of fatwahs, which are nothing more than his

own warped interpretation of Islamic law. Al-Qaeda’s fatwahs essentially indicate that attacks against U.S. interests, domestic and

foreign, civil and military, are both proper and necessary.

For example, on February 22, 1998, bin Laden issued a fatwah

stating that it is the duty of all Muslims to kill Americans. This

fatwah read in part, ‘‘in compliance with God’s order we issue the

following fatwah to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans

and their allies, including civilians and military, is an individual

duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is

possible to do it.’’

Senator BOXER. Would you repeat that fatwah, the whole thing,

from the top?

Mr. CARUSO. It is an excerpt from a February 22, 1998 fatwah.

In it, bin Laden states it is the duty of all Muslims to kill Americans. This fatwah read in part, ‘‘in compliance with God’s order, we

issue the following fatwah to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the

Americans and their allies, including civilians and military, is an

individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in

which it is possible to do it.’’

Those fatwahs have resulted in attacks against U.S. nationals in

locations around the world, including Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania,

Yemen, and now in the United States. Since 1993, thousands of

people have died in those attacks. As was revealed at the trial that

took place in New York earlier this year, bin Laden and al-Qaeda

4

were seeking to obtain nuclear and chemical weapons, and the organization engaged in sophisticated training.

The persons who carried out the 1998 attacks in Kenya and Tanzania have since been publicly identified. The principal participants

were members of al-Qaeda and/or the affiliated terrorist group, the

Egyptian Islamic Jihad. In short the testimony in the trial confirmed that al-Qaeda has access to the money, training, and equipment it needs to carry out successful terrorist attacks. They plan

their operations well in advance, and have the patience to wait to

conduct the attack at the right time.

In conclusion, let me state that it is too early to tell from a law

enforcement perspective how the current military campaign in Afghanistan will affect al-Qaeda and its ability to operate in the future. Determination and vigilance will remain the keys to any success. It is one thing to disrupt an organization such as al-Qaeda.

It is another to dismantle and destroy it. This must truly remain

an international effort, and all agencies within the U.S. Government must remain vigilant and must continue to work together in

order to eradicate this scourge to all mankind everywhere known

as al-Qaeda.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Caruso follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF J. T. CARUSO, ACTING ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,

COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Good morning, Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee. My name

is J. T. Caruso and I am the Acting Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counterterrorism

Division. I am pleased to appear before the Subcommittee to discuss Al-Qaeda International.

AL-QAEDA INTERNATIONAL

‘‘Al-Qaeda’’ (‘‘The Base’’) was developed by Osama Bin Laden and others in the

early 1980’s to support the war effort in Afghanistan against the Soviets. The resulting ‘‘victory’’ in Afghanistan gave rise to the overall ‘‘Thad’’ (Holy War) movement.

Trained Mujahedin fighters from Afghanistan began returning to such countries as

Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia, with extensive ‘‘jihad’’ experience and the desire

to continue the ‘‘jihad’’. This antagonism began to be refocused against the U.S. and

its allies.

Sometime in 1989, Al-Qaeda dedicated itself to further opposing non-Islamic governments in this region with force and violence. The group grew out of the ‘‘mekhtab

al khidemat’ (the Services Office) organization which maintained offices in various

parts of the world, including Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States. Al-Qaeda

began to provide training camps and guesthouses in various areas for the use of AlQaeda and its affiliated groups. They attempted to recruit U.S. citizens to travel

throughout the Western world to deliver messages and engage in financial transactions for the benefit of Al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups and to help carry out

operations. By 1990 Al-Qaeda was providing military and intelligence training in

various areas including Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Sudan, for the use of AlQaeda and its affiliated groups, including the Al-Jihad (Islamic Jihad) organization.

One of the principal goals of Al-Qaeda was to drive the United States armed

forces out of Saudi Arabia (and elsewhere on the Saudi Arabian peninsula) and Somalia by violence. Members of Al-Qaeda issued fatwahs (rulings on Islamic law) indicating that such attacks were both proper and necessary.

Al-Qaeda opposed the United States for several reasons. First, the United States

was regarded as an ‘‘infidel’’ because it was not governed in a manner consistent

with the group’s extremist interpretation of Islam. Second, the United States was

viewed as providing essential support for other ‘‘infidel’’ governments and institutions, particularly the governments of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the nation of Israel

and the United Nations organization, which were regarded as enemies of the group.

Third, Al-Qaeda opposed the involvement of the United States armed forces in the

Gulf War in 1991 and in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992 and 1993,

5

which were viewed by Al-Qaeda as pretextual preparations for an American occupation of Islamic countries. In particular, Al-Qaeda opposed the continued presence of

American military forces in Saudi Arabia (and elsewhere on the Saudi Arabian peninsula) following the Gulf War. Fourth, Al-Qaeda opposed the United States Government because of the arrest, conviction and imprisonment of persons belonging to

Al-Qaeda or its affiliated terrorist groups or with whom it worked, including Sheik

Omar Abdel Rahman, who was convicted in the first World Trade Center bombing.

From its inception until approximately 1991, the group was headquartered in Afghanistan and Peshawar, Pakistan. Then in 1991, the group relocated to the Sudan

where it was headquartered until approximately 1996, when Bin Laden, Mohammed

Atef and other members of Al-Qaeda returned to Afghanistan. During the years AlQaeda was headquartered in Sudan the network continued to maintain offices in

various parts of the world and established businesses which were operated to provide income and cover to Al-Qaeda operatives.

AL-QAEDA TIES TO OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

Although Al-Qaeda functions independently of other terrorist organizations, it also

functions through some of the terrorist organizations that operate under its umbrella or with its support, including: the Al-Jihad, the Al-Gamma Al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group—led by Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and later by Ahmed Refai Taha,

a/k/a ‘‘Abu Yasser al Masri,’’), Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and a number of jihad groups

in other countries, including the Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia, Croatia, Albania, Algeria, Tunisia,

Lebanon, the Philippines, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, the Kashmiri region of India, and

the Chechen region of Russia. Al-Qaeda also maintained cells and personnel in a

number of countries to facilitate its activities, including in Kenya, Tanzania, the

United Kingdom, Canada and the United States. By banding together, Al-Qaeda

proposed to work together against the perceived common enemies in the West—particularly the United States which Al-Qaeda regards as an ‘‘infidel’’ state which provides essential support for other ‘‘infidel’’ governments. Al-Qaeda responded to the

presence of United States armed forces in the Gulf and the arrest, conviction and

imprisonment in the United States of persons belonging to Al-Qaeda by issuing

fatwahs indicating that attacks against U.S. interests, domestic and foreign, civilian

and military, were both proper and necessary. Those fatwahs resulted in attacks

against U.S. nationals in locations around the world including Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Yemen, and now in the United States. Since 1993, thousands of people have

died in those attacks.

THE FATWAH’S OF AL-QAEDA

The Fatwah Against American Troops in Somalia

At various times from about 1992 until about 1993, Osama Bin Laden, working

together with members of the fatwah committee of Al-Qaeda, disseminated fatwas

to other members and associates of Al-Qaeda which directed that the United States

forces stationed in the Horn of Africa, including Somalia, should be attacked. Indeed, Bin Laden has claimed responsibility for the deaths of 18 U.S. servicemen

killed in ‘‘Operation Restore Hope’’ in Somalia in 1994.

February, 1998 Fatwah

On February 22, 1998, Bin Laden issued a fatwah stating that it is the duty of

all Muslims to kill Americans. This fatwah read, in part, that ‘‘in compliance with

God’s order, we issue the following fatwah to all Muslims: the ruling to kill the

Americans and their allies, including civilians and military, is an individual duty

for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.’’ This

fatwah appears to have provided the religious justification for, and marked the start

of logistical planning for, the U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

In February 1998, Osama Bin Ladin and one of his top lieutenants and leader

of the Al-Jihad organization in Egypt, Ayman Al Zawahiri, endorsed a fatwah under

the banner of the ‘‘International Islamic Front for Jihad on the Jews and Crusaders.’’ This fatwah, published in the publication Al-Quds al-‘Arabi on February 23,

1998, stated that Muslims should kill Americans—including civilians—anywhere in

the world where they can be found. In or about April 1998, one of the defendants

in the East Africa trial, Mohamed Sadeek Odeh, discussed the fatwahs issued by

Bin Ladin and Al-Qaeda against America with another defendant, Mustafa

Mohamed Fadhil. This discussion took place in Kenya.

6

THE TRIAL IN NEW YORK CITY

As was revealed at the trial that took place in New York earlier this year, a

former member of Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network began working with the United

States government in 1996. That witness revealed that Bin Laden had a terrorist

group, Al-Qaeda, which had privately declared war on America and was operating

both on its own and as an umbrella for other terrorist groups, The witness revealed

that Al-Qaeda had a close working relationship with the aforementioned Egyptian

terrorist group known as Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The witness recounted that Bin

Laden and Al-Qaeda were seeking to obtain nuclear and chemical weapons and that

the organization engaged in sophisticated training. He also revealed that Al-Qaeda

obtained specialized terrorist training from and worked with Iranian government officials and the terrorist group Hezballah. Thereafter, in August 1996, two years

prior to the bombings of the embassies in East Africa, Osama Bin Laden issued a

public Declaration of Jihad against the United States military. This was followed

by a series of other statements including a February 1998 joint declaration, signed

by Osama Bin Laden and the leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), among others,

which declared war on the American population, military and civilian. The public

statements corroborated the witness information that Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and EIJ

were working to kill Americans. In May 1998, Bin Laden gave a press interview in

which he threatened American interests and complained that the United States was

using its embassies overseas to track down terrorists.

On August 7, 1998, the bombings of the embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar

es Salaam, Tanzania, occurred roughly simultaneously. The persons who carried out

the attacks in Kenya and Tanzania have since been identified publicly: the principal

participants were members of Al-Qaeda and/or the affiliated terrorist group EIJ. Indeed, Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-‘Owhali, a Saudi who admitted he was in the

bomb truck used in Nairobi, confessed that he had been trained in Al-Qaeda camps,

fought with the Taliban in Afghanistan (with the permission of Osama Bin Laden),

had asked Bin Laden for a mission and was thereafter dispatched by others to East

Africa after undergoing extensive specialized training at camps in Afghanistan. Another defendant, Mohamed Sadeek Odeh, in whose residence was found a sketch of

the area where the bomb was to be placed, admitted he was a member of Al-Qaeda

and identified the other principal participants in the bombing as Al-Qaeda members. Odeh admitted that he was told the night prior to the bombings that Bin

Laden and the others he was working with in Afghanistan had relocated from their

camps because they expected the American military to retaliate.

There was independent proof of the involvement of Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and EIJ

in the bombings. First, the would-be suicide bomber, al-‘Owhali, ran away from the

bomb truck at the last minute and survived. However, he had no money or passport

or plan by which to escape Kenya. Days later, he called a telephone number in

Yemen and thus arranged to have money transferred to him in Kenya. That same

telephone number in Yemen was contacted by Osama Bin Laden’s satellite phone

on the same days that al-‘Owhali was arranging to get money. Moreover, al-‘Owhali

and Odeh both implicated men named ‘‘Harun,’’ ‘‘Saleh’’ and ‘‘Abdel Rahman,’’ now

all fugitives, as organizing the Nairobi bombing. All three have been conclusively

shown to be Al-Qaeda and/or EIJ members. Indeed, documents recovered in a 1997

search of a house in Kenya showed Harun to be an Al-Qaeda member in Kenya.

The house where the Nairobi bomb was assembled was located and proved to have

been rented by that same Al-Qaeda member Harun. Moreover, the records for the

telephone located at the bomb factory showed calls to the same number in Yemen

which al-‘Owhali contacted for money after the bombing and which Osama Bin

Laden’s satellite telephone also contacted before and after the bombings.

The person arrested for the Tanzania bombing, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, also

implicated ‘‘Saleh’’ and ‘‘Abdel Rahman’’ in the Tanzania bombing—as did Odeh.

Telephone records confirmed that the Kenya and Tanzania cells were in contact

shortly before the bombings.

Additional proof of the involvement of Al-Qaeda and EIJ in the East Africa bombings came from a search conducted in London of several residences and business addresses belonging to Al-Qaeda and EIJ members. In those searches, a number of

documents were found, including claims of responsibility in the name of a fictitious

group. Al-‘Owhali, the would-be suicide bomber, admitted that he was told to make

a videotape of himself using the name of a fictitious group, the same name found

on the claims of responsibility. The claims of responsibility were received in London

on the morning the bombings occurred, likely before the bombings even occurred.

The claim documents could be traced back to a telephone number that was in contact with Bin Laden’s satellite telephone. The claims, which were then disseminated

to the press, were clearly authored by someone genuinely familiar with the bombing

7

conspirators as they stated that the bombings were carried out by two Saudis in

Kenya and one Egyptian in Tanzania. The nationality of the bombers did not become known to investigators until weeks later. Moreover, the plan had been for two

Saudis to be killed in the Nairobi bombing but only one was actually killed as al-

‘Owhali ran away at the last minute. Thus the claims were written by someone who

knew what the plan was but before they knew the actual results.

In short, the trial record left little doubt that the East Africa embassy bombings

were carried out as a joint operation of Al-Qaeda and EIJ. The testimony in the trial

confirmed that:

– Al-Qaeda has access to the money, training, and equipment it needs to carry

out successful terrorist attacks. – They plan their operations well in advance and have the patience to wait to

conduct the attack at the right time. – Prior to carrying out the operation, Al-Qaeda conducts surveillance of the target, sometimes on multiple occasions, often using nationals of the target they

are surveilling to enter the location without suspicion. The results of the surveillance are forwarded to Al-Qaeda HQ as elaborate ‘‘ops plans’’ or ‘‘targeting

packages’’ prepared using photographs, CADCAM (computer assisted design/

computer assisted mapping) software, and the operative’s notes.

HOW U.S. MILITARY ACTIONS MIGHT AFFECT AL-QAEDA

It is too early to tell, from a law enforcement perspective, how the current military campaign in Afghanistan will affect Al-Qaeda and its ability to operate in the

future. Determination and vigilance will remain the keys to any success. It is one

thing to disrupt an organization such as Al-Qaeda, it is another to totally dismantle

and destroy it. This must truly remain an international effort, with international

cooperation on all levels, in order to be successful. All agencies within the U.S. government must remain vigilant, and must continue to cooperate and work together,

in order to truly eradicate this scourge to all mankind everywhere known as AlQaeda.

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much.

Mr. Wilshere, do you want to add anything? We would love to

hear from you if you have something to add.

STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS WILSHERE, DEPUTY SECTION

CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM OPERATIONAL SECTION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WASHINGTON,

DC

Mr. WILSHERE. I would be happy to answer questions.

Perhaps if I could just do an overview, in fact, all the way back

to the beginning, if you view the worldwide jihad movement, that

much of it is considered to be legitimate by many of our allies in

terms of defense of Islam. It is a multi, maybe even a multibillion

effort that manifests itself in places like Chechnya or Bosnia, the

Philippines, and it has been going on for a long time and it involves

a great logistics effort as well.

If you view that as a large river with a number of tributaries,

many of which are somehow legitimate, or illegitimate, including

humanitarian aid, al-Qaeda is one of the most significant offshoots. There are several others, and one could look at the last 10

years as a process by which those off-shoots converged and began

to assist each other more regularly and with greater effect.

The goals of the group, I think it was evident during some of the

testimony during the bombing trials, and certainly came out during

the course of the FBI’s investigations over the years, as well as

that of other agencies and countries, have evolved, as well as their

capabilities from one that insisted on the United States leaving bin

Laden’s Holy Land, which would be Mecca and Medina and the

surrounding area, to one in which the United States is viewed as

8

the stabilizing mechanism that allows the regimes that bin Laden

views to be corrupt to stay in power.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia would be two examples of that, and so

as Mr. Caruso noted, one of bin Laden’s key allies is the Egyptian

Islamic Jihad, and their goal started off as an attack on the Egyptian Government.

As long ago as the February 1998 fatwah the views evolved to

incorporate the Arab-Israeli conflict which had not been too much

on bin Laden’s screen before that, at least visibly. That has become

more solidly part of the effort, and the effect of that has been to

draw more diverse support into bin Laden’s fold. It would appear

that one of the other objectives that bin Laden certainly achieved,

although I do not think he perhaps anticipated it taking quite this

form, was to so provoke the West that it would engage in a land

war in Afghanistan, thereby provoking Armageddon between the

West and the Muslim world.

That latter effect has not happened, which is a good thing, but

that could be said to be one of his objectives in terms of degrees

of arrogance and self-belief. He overreached, it would appear.

The other parts, your comment right at the very end of your

opening remarks, struck a chord as well, on contrasting strengths,

and one of the key things that drove bin Laden over the years was

the American withdrawal from Lebanon and Somalia, and he cites

this repeatedly in his public statements. In fact, when 18 soldiers

were killed in Somalia, the Americans left, and that to him was a

lesson that he took, that Americans prize people, Russians prize

machines, and between the two of them, that was kind of the approach that the extremists took against each target.

With that, I will stop.

Senator BOXER. I have so many questions, and since I do not

have any colleagues here, I can ask them all.

You had the benefit, the FBI did, of a couple of defections. Without naming any names—some of them are in the public record, because they testified in court—what do you take away from these

people in terms of how deep does the loyalty run to bin Laden, for

example? We know that a lot of folks would work for bin Laden because they are mercenaries, and he is going to pay them. He is

going to give them pay, going to give them health benefits, if you

will, and my understanding is some people were upset that he did

not come through on his promise. So in other words, how much of

bin Laden’s power, if you will, is a real belief in what he stands

for, his fatwahs, and how much of it is, it is a job and we are going

to go do this?

Mr. CARUSO. Mr. Wilshere and I will probably take and split answers to questions to give you as satisfying a response as we can.

I think you are going to find individuals who run the gamut with

reference to commitment, and I think that bin Laden certainly

symbolizes a cause which brings individuals who are impoverished

and who want to be aligned with something larger, and something

they perceive to be good and be involved in a cause, and so I think

you have some individuals who are very much committed to the

cause, and he is the best symbol in their eyes at this time.

I think from that core group you have concentric circles of individuals who have varying allegiances, varying intensities in their

9

allegiance to the cause and to him, and then it goes all the way

out to individuals who are venture seekers and the like. That

would be kind of the breadth that I would say.

Mr. WILSHERE. In particular, from the former members who we

have talked to, there is—again you also have several generations,

because, for example, the Africa bombers were people who came

out of the Afghanistan jihad era and then the Somali fight, whereas the others have come up since then and they are younger, but

bin Laden first, if you look at him as one among several principalities among the Arab jihadists in Afghanistan and Chechnya, there

was an active assessment process and a recruitment process, a collaboration and a swapping of resources that went on.

In the course of this, potential candidates for al-Qaeda were sized

up and assessed, and at least in the earlier version of the al-Qaeda

pre-Africa bombings there are very special qualities that went with

somebody who became a formal member who swore allegiance. It

is called, giving bayat, who swore allegiance to bin Laden.

Senator BOXER. What does giving bayat mean?

Mr. WILSHERE. It means swearing allegiance, a particular kind

of oath, but essentially the qualities were, commitment to Islamic

scholarship—they needed to be able to recite a large portion of the

Koran from memory—the ability to play nicely with others, because

one of bin Laden’s key contributions to the jihadist effort, and one

of the reasons why this will continue to be an ongoing issue for us

for sometime to come, I believe, is the ecumenical approach.

It does not matter if you are a Lebanese or a Palestinian or an

Egyptian or an Iraqi, if you believe in the cause, that is the prerequisite, and a third would be staying power, the ability to continue to grow and to develop. Again, you have enlisted folk and you

have officers, and there are different levels of talent and commitment within.

Senator BOXER. If you were to give me—and I know this is not

a science. Clearly, we are trying to do the best from all of the intelligence that we have, from the defectors, from your experience— and I am going to ask the next panel this as well—the American

people are trying to wrap their arms around this enemy, if you will.

What are we talking about in terms of size, and out of that, would

we say the top echelon is just a very small group? I mean, how

many people are we talking about worldwide here, and how many

of those do we think are at the top level?

I understand this is a guesstimate on this part. Just give it your

best shot.

Mr. WILSHERE. If I could just characterize a little bit of type first,

and then I will take a shot at the numbers. First of all, you have

the al-Qaeda hard core that brought us the USS Cole bombing, the

Africa bombing, the World Trade Center, very particular type of operation, much smaller elite, probably in the hundreds perhaps in

terms of terrorist capabilities probably in the hundreds, but also a

lot of the al-Qaeda hard core was committed to supporting the

Taliban militarily against the Northern Alliance, supporting the

jihads in Chechnya in particular, so you are talking in the thousands, probably, small thousands.

Beyond that you have groups that are less talented, perhaps, or

their skill level is not yet as high, but who certainly have bad inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:43 Apr 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 77601 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
10

tent in improving capabilities, because they have been cycled

through graduate schools, the equivalent of graduate schools in the

camps. Those number in the thousands, and they are dispersed

throughout the world.

Senator BOXER. You say thousands. Are we talking tens of thousands, or are we talking 20,000? I have heard 26,000 as a number.

Mr. WILSHERE. I would say in terms of a terrorist threat that is

probably too high, in terms of the actual terrorist part of it. In

terms of a supporting community, or in terms of the ability to

launch, for example, paramilitary or insurgency situation in Indonesia, the Philippines, or Malaysia, or certainly Tajikistan or the

former Soviet Union, you are talking in the thousands, but I would

not regard all those as terrorists, either.

So in terms of terrorist capability there is a sympathetic support

group that probably numbers in the thousands, an actual terroristcapable element that numbers in the hundreds, but that might be

low, but that is what I would say.

Senator BOXER. Well, that is very helpful to us, because that is

what I am trying to put my arms around here, what we are dealing

with.

Would you agree with that, Mr. Caruso?

Mr. CARUSO. Yes, I would.

Senator BOXER. Now, knowing what you know, again from the

people who have talked to you and have come over to our side, and

I do not know if you have asked this question to these people, but

the bin Laden tape—and I am trying to put myself in the place of

someone who was loyal to him, and then you see him laughing, because the people who were on the planes supposedly did not really

know exactly what their mission was, and he finds it amusing. Is

there—and I was really glad the administration chose to let that

tape out. I mean, I think it was very important.

Can you make an assessment, just based upon your intelligence—I mean, your natural intelligence, as well as information

you have, as to how that would play with some of these people who

appear to be educated at the upper level? We know some of them

are going to say it was doctored, but most people looking at that

would never say that, it seems to me, so what is your sense of how

that tape would play with those people who are loyal to him up to

this point? Do you think it would sway them in any way?

Mr. WILSHERE. I would probably look at and interpret the tape

in a slightly different way, I think, in the sense that people who

are committed to a cause, particularly if they have gone through

the training to become suicide operatives, they do not necessarily

know when they are going to be tapped on their shoulder, but they

commit to going once they are tapped.

In terms of operational security, there would be a difference between telling them what their specific mission was and tapping

them on the shoulder to say now is your time, go over there, this

is it, but we are not going to tell you exactly what you are going

to do until the last minute, so in terms of that, I would see that

perhaps as differently than as a betrayal of them, and I suspect

that those who are sympathetic to bin Laden would see it in the

same light.

11

Senator BOXER. Well, why would he laugh about it, if that was

par for the course?

Mr. WILSHERE. He was not laughing in terms of playing a trick

on them so much as it was preserving operational security, saying

no, we would not tell them until the last minute to preserve operational security. It could very well have been that it was an uncalculated laugh that, had he known it was going to be preserved for

posterity, he would not have made, you are right, but in terms

of——

Senator BOXER. That is when you learn the truth about people,

right, when they are off-guard.

What do you think, Mr. Caruso?

Mr. CARUSO. You asked about the natural thinking about this.

There is no one that is so blind as they that would not see, and

individuals who are aligned with him see victory, and do not see

the kind of detail that you and I see and that we find shocking to

our conscience.

Senator BOXER. So would you say he is a very charismatic leader?

Mr. CARUSO. He certainly has focused me and energized me.

Senator BOXER. And he has energized all Americans. I am talking about his followers. Would you say that he is a charismatic

leader, that he has a loyal following, whatever the size of it is?

Mr. CARUSO. I believe that he does.

Mr. WILSHERE. His followers who have talked to us say he is extraordinarily charismatic. He is the type of person who is perceived

to be humble. He gets down in the dirt with the troops. He clearly

puts himself in the line of fire. I am told, and I do not know myself,

but I am told that he has extraordinarily beautiful Arabic, and an

idea that just shines for them, so yes, he is very charismatic.

Senator BOXER. OK, having said that now, he is an extremely

charismatic leader, what happens when we get him, to his followers, if he is the charismatic leader that you say he is. When we

get him, what happens to the organization? Does it continue? Does

a new leader come up? Because it takes me back to the old days

of World War II, when there was a big dispute about what would

happen if Hitler were killed and half the people said, oh, it would

get worse, because his followers—and the other half said, get rid

of him, everything will fall apart, people are more afraid than they

are loyal to him, and we know what history shows.

What do you think happens when you get him?

Mr. CARUSO. Different people have different opinions. This is one

opinion.

Senator BOXER. This is all about what you think. This is not

something that we are saying is gospel, because no one knows. I

am just trying to get a picture of what you think from what you

know.

Mr. CARUSO. I think to disrupt and dismantle the organization

we need to go beyond just one leader and dig down into middle

management, or at least upper middle management. That kind of

decapitation works.

Having said that, however, there is a natural momentum in organizations, and although we may reduce the horrific consequences

by 30 percent, we still have the 70 percent to deal with, and I go

12

back to the original, my opening statement and what FBI Director

Mueller has said and Attorney General Ashcroft has said, that we

need to keep the pressure on worldwide and just continue this fight

to really dismantle and disorganize.

Senator BOXER. So you do not see it falling apart when we get

him?

Mr. CARUSO. I see that there is going to be a stuttering in the

organization’s momentum. The question is, will that stutter turn

into a pause? I do not know, but there will be a residual momentum in the organization that, if we reduce the effort, if we reduce

the horrific consequences by 30 or 40 percent, meaning they do 40

percent less, we still have to deal with the 50 or 60 percent that

it might represent.

Senator BOXER. Well, let me follow that through and get into the

terrorists’ mind here who work for him, the group that is really

pretty much on the top. They have seen the response of America.

I mean, this has been an all-out military response, spare nothing.

Now, you are sitting there, you see this, you see these bombs falling, you see what happens, and now bin Laden is, let us say, killed.

You continue this, is that what you are saying? You would continue

this, knowing that—is your point that we need to stick with it so

that it can never rear its head again? I think that is what you are

basically saying, that we cannot just say we have done this, we

have stopped it, but we need to continue on.

That is one of the purposes of this hearing, to look ahead, and

the President has certainly said this, and many of us have said this

as well, that we cannot risk the fact that this could go away. We

have got to just keep on tracking it wherever it appears. Is that

what you are saying?

Mr. CARUSO. I do not believe that we will experience what we experienced in 1945, with the V–E Day [Victory in Europe], or V–J

Day [Victory in Japan]. I think that it is, as the President has laid

out, a strategy that we must continue on, but it is more than just

certainly a military approach. It is all the tools in the toolbox that

the President has actually put in place, as just briefly in the diplomatic area, the kind of coalition-building that the Secretary of

State has been able to produce, in the stunning military achievements that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Director of Central

Intelligence Tenet within the intelligence services, our own Director Mueller in law enforcement, individual countries who are not

on the front line in Afghanistan are in the front line of their own

nations, and just now Attorney General Ashcroft has come back

from a visit to Europe with key partners there.

So it is a multiple-level law enforcement as well as the militaryeconomic, and the law enforcement breaks out into subtools, if you

will, financial investigations and the kind of vigorous financial effort that is going on there, and disruption.

Senator BOXER. So you agree, regardless of bin Laden’s fate, that

we need to continue on and continue on until we have truly

stopped this everywhere in the world. That is basically what you

are saying. You do not think this goes away if he is gone.

Mr. CARUSO. Yes. I would ask my colleague, Mr. Wilshere, to

speak to that.

13

Mr. WILSHERE. I would agree completely with Mr. Caruso that

perhaps—I do not know, perhaps 5 years ago had bin Laden left

the picture, things might have evolved differently, but in my view

what has happened is, the capabilities and reach of the organization have reached critical mass. They had a long head start they

built, so the campaign against the safe haven in Afghanistan is to

my mind as important, if not more important than the search for

bin Laden and his top two leaders, because of the capability that

those safe havens represented.

I have seen an estimate that somewhere between 70 and 80

dozen people have moved through the training camps there, and

out to who knows where. The large majority of those people have

probably had their late teen adventure and will go on to become

normal citizens, but for that group that decides they want to pick

this up as a way of life, that is a serious, serious worldwide threat,

as has been demonstrated, so yes, I would agree that it is a really

important campaign.

Senator BOXER. That leads me to my last question for this panel,

and then we will bring up the next. No safe haven, that is basically

your message to us. We can have no safe haven, and Afghanistan

was the safe haven, and it is clearly not open to them, and we have

got to just follow all of the safe havens, wherever the path may

lead us.

And that takes me to—and I know you do not like to call this

a training manual, or a manual, because it is a bunch of papers,

but we have them all together here, and one of the pages talks

about the following security precautions should be taken into account during training, and they list 13 things. They say, the place

should have the following specifications.

Distance from the population areas with the availability of living

necessities, availability of medical services during the training. The

place should be suitable for the type of training, physical fitness,

shooting and tactics. No one except the trainers and trainees

should know about the place. The place should have many roads

and entrances. The place should be visited at suitable times. Hiding any training traces immediately after the training, guarding

the place during the training. Appropriateness of the existing facilities for the number of training members. Exclusion of anyone who

is not connected with the training. Taking all security measures regarding the establishment. Distance of the place from police stations, public establishments, and the eyes of informants, and last,

the place should not be situated in such a way that the training

and trainees can be seen from another location.

Now, are these camps, as far as you know—where are these

training camps? Do we have a sense that any could be in the

United States?

Mr. WILSHERE. I think that they have looked at—not necessarily

the bin Laden people, but other people related to jihadist training

have looked at the possibility of setting up camps in the United

States.

I think logistically and security speaking they found it perhaps

more benign in Europe to do this, and kind of the very introductory

training facilities perhaps, where they would have the broomsticks

and what-not, could occur—for example, several of the people who

14

were involved on the attack side in the kidnapping in Yemen of

some Western tourists, where some British citizens were killed,

and I think an American citizen was also killed, several of those

people were British citizens who had started their training in the

U.K.

Senator BOXER. So we do not really know where these training

camps are. We certainly know they were in Afghanistan.

Mr. WILSHERE. In Afghanistan there is a pretty good idea of

where they are. Right now, they are going through them, but other

than Afghanistan the military training and the more advanced

training, they gravitated toward Afghanistan. There were also

some in South Lebanon, probably, that they used, in the refugee

camps, perhaps, but not large-scale.

Senator BOXER. Because it does not fit the criteria. It has to be

far away from everyone who is not a member. I am assuming they

stick to these—they do not compromise on these 13. One of them

says it has to be completely isolated, and I just wondered, could we

use our satellite capabilities and those kinds of capabilities to track

these kinds of camps, now that we have this document and we

know what they are doing, because that seems to me to be something worthwhile.

Mr. Caruso, can you comment on that, or can you not comment

on that? I do not want to compromise anything.

Mr. CARUSO. Thank you. I would recommend that some other

agencies talk to you about that in a private setting. I think you

would get a very satisfying answer.

Senator BOXER. I do have one last question. One of my constituents, Mr. Sabero, was killed by Abu Sayyef rebels in the Philippines, and I wonder if you feel there are ties between Abu Sayyef

and al-Qaeda, and is the FBI working with the Philippines to combat terrorism?

Mr. WILSHERE. Certainly, what was noticeable when Abu Sayyef

group kidnapped the first lot of European tourists that did not include an American, that they looked like they tried to get some

Americans and missed. Their demands were very focused on people

who were in prison in the United States for Islamic terrorism, the

blind sheik, Ramsi Yussef and that crowd. It is not something that

would be typical of a very small, rural Filipino Muslim independence movement, so there was an outside influence there.

There is more than likely some consulting that goes on, and they

have probably trained in Afghanistan, some of them, so it is a reasonable suspicion.

Senator BOXER. Mr. Caruso.

Mr. CARUSO. We are working with the Philippine authorities on

the particular matter that you mentioned, and I would if I may just

leave it at that, but we are engaged.

Senator BOXER. Well, I want to thank you for coming very, very

much, and tell Mr. Chertoff he sent me two terrific people, and I

am very grateful for that. Thank you.

Now we are going to ask our second panel to come forward, and

you are welcome to stay and listen to the next panel, but if you

have things to do like what I think you have to do, you had better

go do it.

15

The second panel consists of Mr. Larry Johnson—he is the CEO

of Berg Associates, an international consulting firm. Previously,

Mr. Johnson was the Deputy Director of the State Department Office of Counterterrorism, and he also worked for the Central Intelligence Agency, and also Ms. Michele Flournoy, senior advisor for

the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and

International Studies. Ms. Flournoy has written a book called, ‘‘To

Prevail, an American Strategy for the Campaign Against Terrorism.’’ We are very happy to have you here, and Mr. Johnson, why don’t

you begin, and I think you know what I am trying to get for the

record and for the American people is the sense of taking a moment’s time out from what is happening right now, and looking a

little bit ahead, and where we go from here, so please go right

ahead and edify us.

STATEMENT OF MR. LARRY C. JOHNSON, FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR (1989–1993) OFFICE OF COUNTERTERRORISM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you for having me today, Senator Boxer,

and I submitted my statement, and presumably it will be included

in the record. I can tell you a first-hand story of an experience that

I had in Panama in the Colon Free Zone to illustrate some of the

issues that were brought up.

I agree with everything that the FBI colleagues expressed beforehand. The al-Qaeda network exists. They have sympathizers

around the world, but they are not these Islamic supermen that

can go anywhere, do anything, anytime that they want. They are

human beings. They face the same kind of limitations that every

other human being does, and as someone who has been involved

with scripting counterterrorism exercises for the U.S. military

forces that have that mission, I know what it takes to put those

folks in motion and to get them from point A to point B, and it is

not easy. It is not something you do at a snap of the fingers. They

can do it fairly quickly, but you have an enormous amount of resources dedicated to that task. These terrorists fortunately do not

have those kinds of resources. They do not have their own military

airlift command. They do not have their own logistics support agency.

Twelve years ago, I was involved in Central America, doing an

investigation into product counterfeiting that was taking place

against a U.S. company, and one of the individuals that we discovered—he is not an al-Qaeda member, but he is involved with radical Palestinian groups that are involved with terrorism. The person we found selling the stuff was named Waleed Sayeed Mazees,

and he was out in San Francisco at one point, I think you will be

happy to know.

When we busted him for selling these counterfeit products, the

local Panamians working with me said this guy is a terrorist, did

you know that? I said, no. They said, and he also went to jail for

money-laundering, and in this book that he wrote—it is in Spanish—Palestine, the ‘‘Burning Silence,’’ he details his secret entries

into Palestine to meet with members of the Palestinian Islamic

Jihad and some other groups.

16

The reason I raise him is, you find right now throughout Latin

America, particularly in the Colon Free Zone of Panama, in a little

town up in the Guajira Peninsula of Colombia called Maicao and

down on the triborder area, in the Cuidad Del Este, which is on

the border of Paraguay and Brazil, with Argentina close, there are

networks of good Muslims and there are also networks of people affiliated with radical Islamic groups such as Hezbollah, some

Hamas ties, and people with sympathies with al-Qaeda.

What makes these potentially of concern, and I can cite the case

of Argentina in particular, you have radical groups that sympathize

with the Muslims that also have some ties with neo-Nazi groups

and that have ties with right-wing groups up here in the United

States. Now, fortunately, none of those groups have been willing to

carry out attacks against the United States, but these groups exist,

they are there, they are operating, and when you look at the case

of Argentina, I led a U.S. team when I was with the State Department to Buenos Aires in the aftermath of the bombing of the

Israeli Embassy back in 1992, and to this day there is some suspicion that elements of Argentinian intelligence were involved, or

at least were sympathetic in helping facilitate the activities of

groups like Hezbollah.

In dealing with al-Qaeda—and this goes back to a question you

raised earlier—I hesitate to draw the parallel, but I will, because

the parallel is humorous and al-Qaeda is not, but they have taken

on a bit of the persona of the Black Knight from Monty Python’s ‘‘Holy Grail,’’ while as you are lopping of limbs the individual continues to want to fight, to make the most outrageous threats.

We need to take their threats seriously, there is no doubt. As illustrated by the videotape of last week, bin Laden believes what

he says. It may be delusional when he cites that they have had

more people join Islam since the bombing on 9/11, or the murder

on 9/11 than in the previous 11 years. I mean, that is delusional.

It is almost borderline psychotic, because it is not true, but I am

sure he sincerely believes it. He tells his followers that, and he has

enough sycophants around him that will nod their head, say yes,

you are absolutely correct, and yet without him—he has not recognized the ability to see that in the streets of Islamabad, in the

streets in Indonesia and Malaysia, in significant countries around

the world with Muslim populations, millions were not going into

the streets to say, we support bin Laden.

They were staying at home. They were voting with their feet by

not getting out in the streets, and that is an important point, because in lopping off these arms of the al-Qaeda movement we are

sending a very important message, and I think over the short term

it is going to be very difficult for them to reconstitute.

But that brings me to a final point, and I will wrap up here and

turn it over to Michele. State sponsorship is critical. There have

been some in the past that have argued that bin Laden and alQaeda represent a new kind of terrorist that is independent of

state sponsorship. That is total garbage. We are realizing that

when we are looking at what is going on in Afghanistan.

Without those training camps and those places to feed people,

house them, teach them how to shoot—no one is born knowing how

to shoot or build a bomb, and particularly when you are talking

17

about building bombs, that is something that takes practice. If you

go home with your own recipe book more often than not you are

going to blow yourself up before you kill someone else. You have

to practice these skills, and these are perishable skills.

As we take care of Afghanistan, the one target that I never really

understood why we would not go after, at least in a concerted effort

diplomatically first, is Lebanon. Apart from Afghanistan there is no

other country in the world, not one, that has as many terrorist

training camps, as many activist terrorist groups and terrorists

that have killed, up to 9/11, more Americans than any other group

in the world.

The folks who murdered U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem and

CIA station chief Bill Buckley, and Marine Colonel Rich Higgins,

and the 241 marines and former CIA colleague Mr. Ames as well

as other members of the U.S. Embassy—I mean, the list goes on,

and we have allowed Lebanon a pass, and that must come to an

end, because what we learned—it took us a while to learn it during

the cold war, is that these groups, without the sponsorship of a

state, cannot function, and we have seen some pretty effective results.

Libya, as a case in point, has really substantially backed out of

the terrorist sponsor game, in part because they got bombed, in

part because we kept coming after them with international sanctions, and because the world community was finally willing to unite

against them, and even Khadafi gave up. He forced Abu Ibraham,

a bomber from the battle days, out of his country.

We also saw in the case of Syria, when Turkey mobilized its

forces on the northern border of Syria, threatening to invade because Syria was harboring a terrorist leader by the name of

Abdullah Ochalan, Syria got rid of the guy, and the Turks ultimately captured him.

And I will stop there.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LARRY C. JOHNSON, FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF

COUNTERTERRORISM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

I am pleased to appear before this subcommittee today to discuss the global threat

posed by Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network and the steps the United States

should take to neutralize this threat. I have worked on the issue of terrorism in several capacities during the last 22 years—as an academic at the American University, as an analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency from 1985 to 1989, and as

a policymaker in the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for

Counter Terrorism. Since leaving the State Department October of 1993 I have provided consulting services on terrorism issues to the U.S. Government. My work has

included an analysis of the U.S. Government’s databases on chemical and biological

agents and scripting terrorism exercises for the U.S. military.

As we press the attack against bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network, we must

not lose sight of the fact that international terrorism cannot prosper without the

support of one or more state sponsors. No one is born with the knowledge of how

to build bombs, use a pistol, conduct surveillance, or hijack airplanes. These are

skills that must be taught and practiced. Guns, bullets, and explosives do not grow

on trees. They have to be purchased. If you are going to train people to conduct terrorist operations you have to have a place or places for the training. Ranges for

shooting guns and detonating explosives are essential. The people being trained also

need a place to sleep and something to eat. All of this requires money.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and its proxies bank rolled a variety of

Marxist-Leninist groups that attacked U.S. interests around the world. They also

provided training and protection against retaliatory strikes. When the Soviet Union

collapsed, many leftist terrorist groups also disappeared or curtailed their activities.

18

Without a source of funding and a safe place to live and train, many terrorist

groups, such as the Japanese Red Army, the National Marxist Leninist Front

(FMLN) of El Salvador, and the Red Army Faction, found it impossible to continue

operating.

While Al-Qaeda differs in many respects from the groups that attacked the United

States during the cold war era, it also has required the support of several states

in order to carry out its operations. The biggest booster was Afghanistan, which provided bin Laden and his followers a place to live, plan, train, and organize. Also

implicated, albeit indirectly, are Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Prominent citizens of

these countries have provided money to bin Laden and facilitated the movement of

Al-Qaeda personnel in and out of Afghanistan.

The threat posed by the Al-Qaeda network is particularly dangerous because they

do not appear to be constrained by a desire to forge political coalitions or rally public opinion. Instead, they are embarked on a holy mission and are prepared to do

anything to achieve that goal. According to the Al-Qaeda Manual, which was discovered by Manchester England’s Metropolitan Police, bin Laden warns his disciples

that:

The confrontation that we are calling for with the apostate regimes does

not know Socratic debates . . . Platonic ideals . . . nor Aristotelian diplomacy. But it knows the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination,

bombing, and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and machinegun. . . . Islamic governments have never and will never be established

through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are established as

they [always] have been by pen and gun, by word and bullet, by tongue and

teeth

Al-Qaeda marks a distinctive departure from the attitude and actions of other

radical Islamist movements. Even groups like Hamas and Hizbollah, who are guilty

of heinous attacks against U.S. citizens, in recent years have shied away from direct

attacks on the U.S., choosing instead to use the United States as a fund raising

base.

The threat posed by bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network predates the attacks

of 11 September 2001. In the eleven years preceding the attacks on 11 September

107 American’s were murdered in international terrorist incidents (1990 thru 2000).

Bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network were implicated in 81 of these deaths. The

death toll includes the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, the bombing

of the U.S. military housing complex in Dahran, Saudi Arabia, the bombing of two

U.S. embassies in East Africa in August of 1998, and the bombing of the USS Cole

in Yemen in October of last year.

The targets hit by bin Laden during the past decade are consistent with the objectives identified in the Al-Qaeda Manual:

The main mission for which the Military Organization is responsible is

the overthrow of the godless regimes and their replacement with an Islamic

regime. Other missions consist of the following:

1. Gathering information about the enemy, the land, the installations, and the

neighbors.

2. Kidnapping enemy personnel, documents, secrets, and arms.

3. Assassinating enemy personnel as well as foreign tourists.

4. Freeing the brothers who are captured by the enemy.

5. Spreading rumors and writing statements that instigate people against the

enemy.

6. Blasting and destroying the places of amusement, immorality, and sin; not

a vital target. (sic)

7. Blasting and destroying the embassies and attacking vital economic centers.

8. Blasting and destroying bridges leading into and out of the cities.

While acknowledging the international threat posed by Al-Qaeda, we should also

admit they have not demonstrated the ability to strike at will. There is no doubting

their desire to attack U.S. targets and kill U.S. citizens, but desire is not enough.

They also need trained personnel, adequate financial resources, and a vulnerable

target. The Al-Qaeda attack against the U.S. Embassy in Kenya in August 1998

demonstrated that no matter how committed the terrorist is their ability to achieve

their objectives can be thwarted by security practices and technologies. The refusal

of U.S. Embassy security guards to open a gate and provide the terrorists access

to the parking garage prevented much greater loss of life by U.S. citizens.

Most of the terrorist attacks directed against the United States last year (and this

year as well) were not carried out by Al-Qaeda. Colombia was the site of most antiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:43 Apr 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 77601 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
19

U.S. attacks, accounting for 186 out of the 423 incidents recorded in the year 2000.

These were directed against oil pipelines managed by U.S. and British companies.

Fortunately, the Colombian terrorists generally shied away from causing international casualties and no U.S. oil workers in Colombia were killed or injured last

year.

While not engaging in many attacks, Al-Qaeda terrorism caused all of the U.S.

fatalities. Apart from the attacks in Colombia, there were seventeen other incidents

that harmed U.S. citizens or interests:

– Eleven kidnappings involved one or more U.S. citizens. Seven of these involved

U.S. companies—Haliburton, Shell, Chevron, Mobil, Noble, and Erickson AirCrane. – Five bombings killed or injured U.S. citizens or caused property damage. Terrorists tied to bin Laden bombed the USS Cole killing 17 and wounding 39. A

bomb at a McDonalds in France killed one. The other explosions—outside the

U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, at a Citibank in Greece, and in the offices of

PT Newmont Mining in Indonesia—caused property damage and no loss of life. – Vandals trashed a McDonalds restaurant in South Africa.

Groups linked to Al-Qaeda, which received training at bin Laden sponsored camps

in Afghanistan, carried out significant attacks in India last year and are continuing

their campaign of terror. Almost one of every five international terrorist attacks in

2000 occurred in India. India accounted for almost 50% of all deaths (187) and injuries (337) from terrorist attacks during 2000. The culprits included the Harakat-ulAnsar and the Lashkar Tayyiba, which have been trained in Afghanistan and protected by Pakistan.

Terrorist attacks in India and in Washington, DC and New York were facilitated

by groups that received tacit, if not full, support of at least one country. Regretfully,

the U.S. record in identifying and punishing states that sponsor terrorism has been

inconsistent. In the past we have placed some countries on the black list and applied economic and diplomatic sanctions. In other cases we have ignored evidence

of sponsorship, Pakistan and Greece are two examples, because of bilateral policy

concerns. I hope that our campaign in Afghanistan marks a watershed and sends

a clear message to the rest of the world that the United States will no longer tolerate or excuse any nation that sponsors, directly or indirectly, terrorism.

In dealing with the immediate threat posed by Al-Qaeda we inevitably will require the support of countries like Pakistan, Yemen, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Somalia where these terrorists have families and friends. Of these four countries only

Sudan is currently listed by the U.S. Government as a terrorist sponsor. These

countries must understand there is no middle ground in tracking down and detaining these terrorists. Preventing these individuals from reconstituting their capabilities and developing new terrorist schemes will require bilateral cooperation, clandestine intelligence operations, and targeted military special operations.

We also need to rethink and reenergize our policy for dealing with the other countries currently listed as state sponsors of terrorism—Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Cuba,

and North Korea—as key backers of Al-Qaeda. Of the five, Iran and Syria are the

most active in providing support to groups that are more active than Al-Qaeda and

almost as lethal. This includes groups such as Hamas, Hazbollah, and Palestinian

Islamic Jihad. These groups are backed by Syria and Iran and operate freely from

Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley.

Lebanon, which is also not listed as a state sponsor of terrorism, came up on the

radar with a remarkable piece of intelligence made public in October 2000. On October 20, the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, accepted

a guilty plea from Ali A. Mohamed, an Egyptian-born former U.S. Army green beret

sergeant, and one of six men indicted in the U.S. for the bombings of the U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998. Mohamed not only confessed that he took part in

a conspiracy to murder U.S. citizens in Somalia, Saudi Arabia, and East Africa, but

he tied the assaults directly to Saudi exile Osama bin Laden. Mohamed’s confession

also linked bin Laden with another terrorist-at-large—a murky man whose American victims over the last two decades far outnumber bin Laden’s—Hezbollah security chief, Imad Mughniyeh.

Prior to 11 September, Mughniyeh and Hezbollah had killed more Americans in

international terrorist attacks than any other group. Two hundred sixty Americans

and 116 foreigners died in the bombings of the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. Marine

barracks in Beirut in 1983, operations believed to have been carried out by

Mughniyeh. He was also behind the 1985 hijacking of TWA 847 and the murder of

U.S. Navy diver, Robert Stethem, a passenger on that flight. And Mughniyeh is believed to have masterminded the kidnapping of more than 50 hostages in Beirut,

including CIA Chief William Buckley and U.S. Marine Colonel Rich Higgins, both

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1The book can be be purchased on-line by visiting the Center for Strategic and International

Studies’ website: www.csis.org

tortured and murdered while in captivity. Mughniyeh has not limited his terror to

American targets. He has been implicated in the bombings of the Israeli installations in Argentina in 1992 and 1994, and more recently, in a terrorist rocket attack

against the Russian Embassy in Beirut.

The importance of Ali Mohamed’s confession is not just that it represents the first

credible, public evidence that Mughniyeh and bin Ladin have been collaborating, but

that Iran has been backing them. Mohamed gave sworn testimony that between

1991 and 1993, he handled security arrangements for a meeting between

Mughniyeh and bin Ladin where they established their common goal of forcing the

U.S. to withdraw from the Middle East. According to Mohamed’s testimony, bin

Ladin was inspired to replicate Mughniyeh’s success in compelling the withdrawal

of U.S. forces from Lebanon in 1984, following the bombings of the U.S. Embassy

and the Marines barracks in Beirut. Mohamed’s testimony also adds authority to

a media report that Iran’s Ministry of Information and Security convoked a terrorist

conclave in Tehran in 1996 that included Mughniyeh and a senior aide to bin

Laden.

Mughniyeh and bin Laden are the two most prolific mass murderers currently at

large. Their networks extend beyond the Middle East and include contacts and supporters in places like the Philippines and Paraguay/Brazil/Argentine border in

South America. Our policies to deal with these threats must be tailored to the local

conditions. In the Philippines three groups—Abu Sayyef, Moro Islamic Liberation

Front, and Moro National Liberation Front—are active in remote areas in the south

and have attacked and killed Americans. The Philippine military and police would

definitely benefit from direct support by U.S. military Special Forces.

The tri-border area of South America, in the city Ciudad del Este, offers a different challenge. Unlike the terrorist camps in Afghanistan, this area is a commercial center characterized by drug smuggling, contraband cigarettes and liquor, counterfeit merchandise, and stolen vehicles. It is the wild west of organized criminal

activity. But this area reportedly also was used by Imad Mughniyeh to plot bombings in Buenos Aires of the Israeli Embassy (1992) and the Jewish Cultural Center

(1994). Shutting down operations in this area require a close integration of law enforcement and intelligence operations.

A key to preventing and deterring future terrorist attacks is to ensure that the

world enforces a zero tolerance policy when it comes to sponsoring terrorism. While

we may never be able to eliminate or neutralize every terrorist cell willing to murder innocent civilians, we know from experience that these cells cannot thrive without the support of a state. From the horror and ruin of September 11 we have an

opportunity to start afresh with a more sharply defined set of terrorism goals—we

have made a good start going after bin Laden and his protectors—and bring the full,

coordinated force of American diplomatic, military, and intelligence capabilities to

bear on the problem.

Senator BOXER. Thank you. You gave us some very good information. We appreciate it.

Michele Flournoy, welcome. Thank you very much.

STATEMENT OF MS. MICHELE FLOURNOY, SENIOR ADVISOR,

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Ms. FLOURNOY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you for the

opportunity to speak to you this afternoon. I have submitted the

findings and recommendations of our book,1 ‘‘To Prevail,’’ as my

formal prepared statement, but if I could I would just like to take

a few minutes to address the question you raised about next steps.

I think to answer the question about next steps, we have to go

back to our primary objectives in this war, in this long-term campaign, and I would argue that there are four. Obviously, the first

is to try to defeat and destroy terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda

with global reach who are aiming to attack us. Second is to diminish and end state sponsorship of such groups where it occurs. Third

21

is to enhance our homeland security, and fourth, I would argue, is

to try to address some of the conditions that create fertile soil for

such terrorism to take root and grow. This is really a part of the

debate where we have not had extensive discussions yet, and it is

a part of the discussion where I feel this committee has particular

strength to move into.

When I talk about the conditions, I want to be clear that we are

quite categorical in the work we did at CSIS in saying there is

nothing that justifies or excuses what happened on 9/11, but you

can identify conditions that allowed the terrorists to get recruits,

allowed them to get money, and allowed them to get sympathy in

certain quarters of the world, and those are conditions that our foreign policy needs to address over the very long term.

So, next steps. In my mind, the No. 1 priority is to continue the

campaign against al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda is anything but a hierarchy.

It is a truly global network. It is akin to a multiheaded hydra.

While we are succeeding in chopping off one head in Afghanistan,

it does not keep the rest of the organism from functioning. So I

think first and foremost is continuing intelligence cooperation, law

enforcement cooperation, financial cooperation to track and choke

off money supplies to close down cells or severely hamper the operations of cells in Europe, in the United States perhaps, still, in the

Middle East, in Asia. That has to remain our first priority in this

campaign as we go forward.

Second, I think we need to turn our attention to other states who

have provided some sort of support, direct or indirect, to groups

like al-Qaeda, and to pressure them—in each case I think it will

require a different mix of instruments, but I think that is a second

key set of steps.

And third is to go back to this issue of addressing the underlying

conditions, and here I am really talking about four key areas. The

first is, I think we have to address the question of failed states, not

just from a humanitarian impulse, now, but from a strategic perspective. If we allow failed states to fester unaddressed for long periods of time, many of them will become, some of them have become sanctuaries that terrorists use to operate, they use to recruit,

train, et cetera. I think we have to address that issue more strategically as part of our foreign policy.

Obviously, the first test case is going to be what we do with Afghanistan once the fighting stops. If we do not take post conflict

reconstruction seriously in Afghanistan, I would argue that we will

risk being back there within a decade doing the same thing over

again. We have to care, not about building the perfect democracy

in Afghanistan—that is not a realistic goal—but about restoring a

measure of a functioning state and stability in that country.

I think we also need to look at other failed states and ask the

same question, if they are, in fact, providing sanctuary for terrorists.

A second element is, I think we need to reexamine our Middle

East strategy, and here I want to build on what was said in the

first panel, that the United States is an object of deep resentment

in some populations like in Saudi Arabia, like in Egypt, because we

are perceived as supporting governments who are not as responsive

as they should be to the needs of their populations.

22

I think the United States needs to use its very close relationships

with those governments to pressure them to modernize, to create

more real economic opportunities for their populations, to create

real opportunities for political participation in those societies.

Again I am not talking about supporting American-style democracies, but I am talking about modernization in a way that creates

outlets for a whole generation of people who have no other alternative but to turn to extremism and violence.

The second thing I think is untenable is that these close allies

of ours have, in the past, turned somewhat of a blind eye to activities and financing of extreme groups on their soil as long as the

violence was directed outside their borders. That is no longer a tenable position for those countries to take, and I think again we need

to leverage our relationship to try to work toward changing some

of the conditions that are fueling discontent that creates the conditions where a group like al-Qaeda can gain recruits and so forth.

A third element is our foreign assistance, a very, very powerful

instrument that I would argue we are not using as well as we could

to support our foreign policy objectives. As you all know, our foreign assistance goes primarily to two countries. There are more

than 100 earmarks on the foreign assistance. Eighty cents on the

dollar actually goes through U.S. companies.

There are lots of problems with that budget, and I would argue

if we are going to get serious about economic and political development that changes the conditions, that really does drain the swamp

that terrorism thrives in, we need to use our foreign assistance

much more strategically. I will give you one example, educational

reform. Right now, a whole generation of young boys in certain

Middle Eastern states are going through these madrasses and

being indoctrinated into jihad because they have no other way to

feed themselves, they have no other way to clothe themselves, they

have no other way to get an education, if that can be called an education. Investing some money in helping to build a real educational

system and real economic opportunities for that generation would

be one that would pay off, I think, in the long term.

Senator NELSON. Madam Chairman, might I ask what particular

countries are you thinking of? Pakistan is certainly one.

Ms. FLOURNOY. I am thinking primarily of Saudi Arabia, Egypt,

and Pakistan, but you could certainly add others to the list. Those

are the big three, in my view.

Senator NELSON. And how could you, with the incentive of foreign assistance, get—take, for example, Pakistan, to suddenly

clamp down on these religious schools where these children are getting this kind of extremist education?

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think one of the questions we have to ask is

whether we want to funnel all of our foreign assistance through

governments, or whether we want to invest more directly in civil

societies and through nongovernmental organizations, through

other groups that will buildup educational structures and so forth.

It is not clear in every case that funneling the money through

the government is the right answer. I think obviously we need to

look at it on a case-by-case basis, but I think in some cases giving

the government more money will not be the right answer, but you

23

may want to look at alternatives, particularly in the area of education, in my view.

Senator NELSON. That was Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and what?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Egypt. Those are the main three I would highlight, although there would be others.

If I may, the fourth and final area that I would encourage you

to look at is the whole question of public diplomacy. I believe that

over the last decade or more the mechanisms that allow us to get

our message out in key parts of the world, particularly the Middle

East, have atrophied severely, so that even when we are doing the

right thing, even when U.S. troops are saving Muslims lives in Bosnia, when the United States is the No. 1 food donor to Afghanistan

before the war, and you can go on with this list of facts that no

one can dispute, the message does not get out. I think part of that

is that we really do not have the kinds of mechanisms that we had

in the cold war to get that message out, and so I would urge you

to take a look at that as well.

Thank you.

Senator BOXER. Well, there are many questions. I would say, Ms.

Flournoy, that I followed everything you said. I would just take exception with one thing, and I want to get into a little discussion

before I turn to Mr. Johnson.

You say that if we were to change our Middle East policy, and

you use the word, help countries like Saudi Arabia modernize is

what was said, that that would help. I honestly do not think so.

I mean, I think we should do that, do not get me wrong, because

Saudi Arabia needs to modernize, but the last thing al-Qaeda

wants, and the fundamentalists want, is to see Saudi Arabia modernized. They want them to become more religious and more fundamentalist, and so I do not think we should delude ourselves. I

mean, these countries are certainly not perfect, and we went in to

help Kuwait and did the right thing, but the bottom line is, though,

they do not have a perfect government either, and I do not think

if we suddenly changed their government, then you would find alQaeda going away. I think it is a little—I just do not think it is

real. I wonder if you could respond.

In other words, if tomorrow we just said the United States is

changing its foreign policies, we are going to help Saudi Arabia

modernize—what were the other countries?—Egypt to modernize,

and——

Ms. FLOURNOY. Pakistan.

Senator BOXER. And Pakistan modernize, that suddenly al-Qaeda

would go away. I think it would be in a way worse for us, because

I think they would say, why are you interfering, we do not want

them modernized, so I am a little confused. Maybe the word modernize is the wrong word, or we are not communicating.

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think maybe modernize is not as specific as I

need to be. In the case of Saudi Arabia, I think the issue is not

so much economic development, because I think the average citizen

enjoys quite a good standard of living, comparatively speaking. The

issue is political participation. People feel they have no voice, and

they feel they are living under a government that does not represent their interests, and so in Saudi Arabia the issue is political.

24

If you do not want to call it modernization, political participation,

creating avenues for participation to give people—— Senator BOXER. You mean a democracy?

Ms. FLOURNOY. More democratic, whether it is—it does not have

to be democracy as in our system, but something that is moving in

that direction, to allow people forms of political participation that

are real.

In the case of Egypt, then you add on the economic dimension.

There is real poverty for the majority of the population in Egypt,

and there we are talking about not only political participation but

also real economic development to create opportunities.

Part of this is the demographics. You have countries where their

populations are becoming more than 50, 60 percent under the age

of 25. Very few people have prospects, any hope of employment in

their lifetimes, very little opportunity to participate economically or

politically. They are very frustrated, so they turn to groups that

offer them some sense of meaning and cause. I think we need to

create alternatives. I think one of the best measures of success

long-term could be a whole generation of young men turning away

from groups like al-Qaeda to participate economically and politically in their societies and in making them better.

Senator BOXER. Mr. Johnson, I wanted to ask you if you agreed

with that part of Ms. Flournoy’s presentation. I agreed with everything else but that point. I just do not see it.

Mr. JOHNSON. I do not represent myself as an Arab expert, but

a very good friend of mine is one of the preeminent ones in the

world, and in one of those private conversations we had a few

weeks back with a couple of other folks he said, look, the reality

is if we had democracy in some of these Middle Eastern countries

we would not like the results, because where a lot of the mass population is politically would be against the very things we are trying

to prevent.

And the problem with these societies, there is some genuine discontent in there, but the discontent that exists is not the result of

U.S. actions and policies, and maybe we can be accused of being

a facilitator for some of these governments where they have continued to persist in their policies, but they themselves are not always

in touch with reality.

I appeared a couple of weeks ago with Adel al Jubeir, who is the

right-hand man to Crown Prince Abdullah in Saudi Arabia, and I

had what we used to call in diplomatic parlance a frank exchange

of views, saying look, the Saudi Arabians need to understand that

U.S. citizens have now reached a level that we are not tolerant of

you playing both sides of the fence. You cannot tell us you are our

friend and then send money to these murderers, and then you guys

run off and go whoring in London and then come back and try to

be the defenders of Islam.

I said, that does not wash any more, because we have got 3,000

dead Americans. My people, who most of whom came from Saudi

Arabia, and instead of you being friends, instead of you stepping

up and saying, let us find every way we can to cooperate, you acted

like defense attorneys. You cooperated in the fullest sense of the

law term, but we had to drag it out of you piece by piece. You were

not being proactive as friends.

25

And he said to me, he said, well, why doesn’t anyone else in this

administration—and he says, you are not the administration, but

why isn’t the government saying this to me? I was over meeting

with Secretary Armitage. He did not tell me that. And I said, well,

they should, and part of the problem is because they are not hearing that kind of message from the administration, it is not just this

administration, it has been every administration, and consistently

from the Senate and the House, they run away with this impression that this is just a temporary tempest in a teapot that is going

to blow over, and they get away with it.

Senator BOXER. Very interesting.

Ms. Flournoy, do you agree with Mr. Johnson that Lebanon is a

place we need to look in terms of state-sponsored terrorism, because you said that was the second thing we had to stop, was statesponsored terrorism. Do you agree with his assessment that Lebanon is one of the worst offenders here?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Not related to al-Qaeda, but related to other

groups, yes. If we are going to broaden our scope beyond al-Qaeda

to look at other groups that have the potential to damage our interests, I think Lebanon is certainly on the list.

Senator BOXER. What other states do you see on the list?

Ms. FLOURNOY. I would say Yemen, I would say the Philippines,

I would say parts of the Caucasus, and I would say Somalia, and

each one is unique, and each one is going to take a different strategy, a different set of tactics.

Senator BOXER. Do you agree with that list?

Mr. JOHNSON. Not as sponsors. Right now where the terrorist activity is underway, I do not see Yemen as much of a concern, because President Saleh, he told a group of Americans last year in

private conversation, he said look, I do not like you guys, but you

are winning and I am going with the winner. He was very up-front

about it.

Senator BOXER. It is the big horse theory.

Mr. JOHNSON. Absolutely. I think when you are looking at where

the terrorist activity is, Pakistan is a problem. In the year 2000 almost 50 percent of everyone who died and was injured in an international terrorist attack died in India. Those were the groups that

were operating from Pakistan that we have been blowing up in Afghanistan.

Now, Pakistan has been one of these odd fellows. I mean, they

have been a very good friend with us in helping us apprehend

Ramsi Yussef, the first World Trade Center bomber, Mir Amal

Kansi, the fellow who shot up the CIA employees in February 1993,

and yet on the other hand, the ISI, the intelligence service of Pakistan, aggressively funding and helping the Taliban and al-Qaeda,

and these groups like the—— Senator BOXER. Not any more, right? Didn’t the head of that

ISI——

Mr. JOHNSON. The head was replaced, I believe. I cannot show

you documents or evidence, but there are elements of ISI that continue to lend that support. Now, it is not the official government

policy, and I recognize the difficult position that President

Musharraf is in, but the reality—and again, this is something that

has to be conveyed to the Pakistanis very clearly.

26

We have got to get away from this notion that people can play

with double standards, that they can give us the lip service and

continue to slip the dollars under the table to these folks, because

when you step back and look at it, Lebanon does not do what Lebanon does without the help of Syria and Iran. Now, I am glad that

Iran says they want to be part of this global campaign. Great. Step

to the plate, shut down the camps, and give us Imad Mugniyeh for

starters.

The group that is operating in the Philippines, that is one that

is a little more containable, and Michele is correct that the Philippines, particularly in the southern rim, with the Moro Islamic

Liberation Front and Abu Sayyef, they were taking money from

some of these Muslim charities. That was the case, and in fact I

do recall when Ramsi Yussef, who blew up the World Trade Center

the first go-around, was implicated in that, when he escaped from

the Philippines he had two cohorts that were identified and taken

into custody. One of those fellows escaped.

I am told by my former boss at the State Department, and I have

no reason to doubt him, No. 1, because he was a marine, and marines do not lie, they had on videotape at one of the Filipino hotels

a Saudi Arabian diplomat passing an envelope to one of those individuals. Now, how the whole money lash-up works between these

charities, between these official governments—but that has been

going on for several years, and that has got to stop, because when

you dry up the money and you dry up the support, the reality of—

last year, most of the terrorist incidents, they took place in Colombia, and India. Those two accounted for over 60 percent, and then

when you factor in the Philippines, I do not want to say that terrorism disappears. There is always going to be a problem there, but

this threat we face from people willing to kill Americans, I think

that will disappear.

Senator BOXER. I just notice, neither of you mentioned Iraq.

Would you care to give us your view on that?

Ms. FLOURNOY. If I could just clarify, my previous answer was

really focused, actually, on countries that have groups affiliated

with al-Qaeda, not necessarily state sponsors. I am sorry, I was answering a different question.

On Iraq, I have not seen evidence that has directly tied Iraq to

the activities of al-Qaeda on 9/11. That said, I think that we know,

we certainly know Iraq is a rogue state. We know that it has engaged in a range of illegal activities. We know that Saddam tried

to assassinate a former U.S. President. I think regime change in

Iraq should definitely be a U.S. foreign policy objective, no question

in my view. It is a question of timing and sequencing.

If we were to go after Iraq as a next step, an immediate next

step, I fear that we would lose many of the key members of the coalition that are critical to our success against al-Qaeda as we move

forward in intelligence, law enforcement, financial cooperation. So

I think we have to make a choice in sequence here. I personally

would finish the job against al-Qaeda before turning the focus on

Iraq, unless we gain some new evidence that links Saddam Hussein, for example, to supplying some weapons of mass destruction

or something like that to al-Qaeda.

27

Mr. JOHNSON. I agree. Let me just add a couple of tidbits. I am

not a believer in conspiracy theories, and having worked both in

the Bush administration and the start of the Clinton administration I find it hard to believe that the CIA and the FBI have somehow conspired to keep intelligence about Iraqi involvement in terrorism out of ‘‘Patterns of Global Terrorism,’’ which is published

every year.

Here is what we know for a fact. Iraq sponsors the Mujahedin

el Kalhq, who attack Iranians. They have sponsored the PKK,

which was attacking the Kurdish Workers Party, which was attacking Turkish targets, and they have gone after Iraqi dissidents.

The only recorded attempt we have since 1993, April 1993, was the

attack in April to go after Bush for one, and they failed.

What I have seen in looking at Iraq’s intelligence capabilities,

they have tended to be sort of the Wile E. Coyote of terrorism.

They more often than not pull the anvil down on their own head.

They launched forty hit teams during the gulf war. Every one of

them was wrapped up. Two of the guys blew themselves up in Manila. They were not terribly artful. They continued that pattern in

the case of the attempt to kill former President Bush, thank God,

that they failed.

So, could they be involved, yes. Do they have to be, are they one

of the top sponsors right now? I think people that are saying that,

they are making up facts, because the facts are not there to justify

it, but as Michele correctly noted, we do need to deal with them

because they are not living up to their agreement that they signed

in 1991 not to go after weapons of mass destruction.

Senator BOXER. Exactly, and that is a huge issue, because we

cannot get in there.

Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. If you were to state—this is a question for both

of you—to one of the leaders of these nations like the King in Saudi

Arabia, or the President in Egypt or Pakistan, how you would like

them to stop their duplicity, how would you put it? Ms. Flournoy.

Ms. FLOURNOY. I would say, and I am not a diplomat, and that

may show, a couple of things. One is, I would say, we know you

have a problem of extremists on your soil. In the past, you have

managed that problem by tolerating a certain degree of activity as

long as it was directed outward. That is no longer acceptable to us,

because we have lost too many lives as a result of that posture, so

that needs to change.

The second thing I would say is, when we look at the demographics of your region, we are quite alarmed, and we think that

if you do not create more political opportunities for participation,

real economic development for your population, you will go the way

of Iran.

When people say democracy does not work, modernization does

not work, my question back is, what is the alternative, and I think

the alternative is to watch the region go the way of Iran over the

next decade or two. That is my fear.

So I think the demographics give us no choice but to try to find

some means of giving these populations voice and opportunity, so

they choose a nonviolent course.

Senator NELSON. Mr. Johnson.

28

Mr. JOHNSON. I would not put Egypt in the same category as

Saudi Arabia in terms of not being cooperative. They have actually—they have been very aggressive in going after their elements,

and you will find that the key elements in al-Qaeda from Zawahiri

Atef, they have been sort of the brains for bin Laden’s vision, and

this Muslim brotherhood issue is something that goes back in the

1980’s.

I think, though, with the Egyptians is, it is a different tack of

saying, you have got to start doing something about addressing the

lack of economic development in your country. You cannot continue

to be a breeding ground for some of these folks. With the Saudis,

though, I think we are going to have to be even more direct and

say, we are not going to continue doing business as usual. You are

not going to continue getting visas just because you are Saudis, we

trust that you have enough money and that you are not going to

come to the states and stay. Until you start showing us with concrete actions across the board that you are not going to tolerate

this—I give you another case in point.

When Khobar Towers was blown up in 1996, the Central Intelligence Agency was not allowed to collect information on Saudi

Hezbollah because we did not want to offend the Saudis. Now, I realize sometimes I am a little harsh and I may say things in an

awkward manner and tick people off, but look, if we are going to

make our concern in Saudi Arabia whether or not we keep them

happy, we have got the wrong focus. We need to be willing to make

them unhappy, because the people who blew up Khobar Towers, it

was Saudi Hezbollah, and because we were not looking at them, we

could not see it coming.

Senator NELSON. How would you say it to President Musharraf,

given the fact that Musharraf has gone a great part of the distance

already in helping us out?

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think there I would start by actually acknowledging that he has exhibited a fair degree of courage in how he has

responded to our request for assistance. And that has been wonderful in the short term. But in the long term, we need to look at the

underlying conditions, at what is fueling this, at economic situation

in your country. The fact is that, for many people, these fundamentalist religious institutions that indoctrinate jihad are the only opportunities they have for some sort of education. You need to help

change that. You need to be a participant in actively changing the

conditions that continue to fuel this fire.

Mr. JOHNSON. There is a need to, I think, start being very creative about the international focus, and whether it is U.S. troops

on the border in Kashmir, because I do not sleep comfortably at

night with India and Pakistan both nuclear armed, engaged with

this proxy war of terrorism up in the Kashmir, and I realize

Musharraf has got some significant problems to contend with domestically in trying to keep the fundamentalists and extremists

tamped down, and trying to cooperate with us, and I think we are

going to have to broaden this to beyond just the bilateral U.S.-Pakistani issue, that they are going to get some solid assurances that

neither Pakistan nor India are going to find themselves feeling at

risk.

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Senator NELSON. Finally, Madam Chairman, you had suggested,

Ms. Flournoy, that you would use NGO’s instead of the government

in order to encourage this changed kind of behavior. Can you amplify on that?

Ms. FLOURNOY. I am thinking of the kind of work that a USAID

sometimes does in its longer term development assistance work,

where we essentially contract out with either United States or

sometimes international NGO’s to actually do the work. If you are

trying to fundamentally change a civil society and an educational

system, you cannot just go from the top down. You have got to

work from the bottom up. I am not a development economist, but

I am sure there are models out there of programs that have been

more effective in actually reaching local populations and addressing the whole question of civil society, but again I am not an expert

in that area.

Senator NELSON. Thank you.

Senator BOXER. Let me just bring this back to kind of what is

happening on the ground, Mr. Johnson. What effect would the capture or death of Osama bin Laden or Al Zawahiri have on the ability of al-Qaeda to operate, knowing what you know about them?

Are there others who would step up? I mean, the FBI seem to

think—well, I did not get too direct an answer on the point from

them to tell you the truth.

Mr. JOHNSON. These guys are not in the situation like the New

England Patriots, where you have Tom Brady at quarterback and

a great backup on the bench.

Senator BOXER. I knew someone would use a football analogy

sooner or later. That is OK.

Mr. JOHNSON. But they are really not deep. They are not deep

in the leadership, and taking them out would be like taking out

Adolf Hitler and Goebbels and Hermann Goering during World

War II. Is it a blow that they could recover from potentially, and

that assumes that we back off, allow these countries to go on, allow

them to reconstitute.

As long as they cannot reconstitute and we can keep that pressure on, I do not think they are in a position to just suddenly magically grow intelligence, because even looking, with all of the skills

and resources and commitment that al-Qaeda and bin Laden have

had, and with the support of Zawahiri, on average they were only

able to carry off a terrorist spectacular event about once every 12

months. Sometimes it took 24 months. They were in about a 12-

month cycle, and I think we need to recognize that, because I am

not suggesting they do not represent a threat, but also they are not

in a position like a U.S. military force who can go and carry out

an attack every day, every week, every month.

Senator BOXER. And particularly, do you think because they are

under such enormous pressure?

Mr. JOHNSON. Look, you have got to have a place to sleep. I do

not know if you had the chance—there was a wonderful image on

CNN this morning of one of the al-Qaeda fighters who had a veil

half over his face and the guy was sobbing about what the bombing

did to him. I do not care how tough you think you are, if you are

getting 5,000-pound bombs dropped on your head and you are not

getting to sleep for a week you do not do well psychologically.

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There is no human being in the world that can be sleep-deprived

for a week or two and function well without going psychotic, and

that is what these people are up against right now. Cut out their

money as well, cut out their ability to travel, and without that,

then you do disrupt the organization, and I think over the short

term we make it much more difficult for them to carry out.

What I worry about is the long term, because our human nature

is, we then go, well, we got that licked, and then we ignore it and

it comes back.

Senator BOXER. Before, Michele, you add your point, I wanted to

ask you about this reward, the large monetary reward. Do you

think that—are those rewards a good strategy in capturing terrorists, do you think?

Mr. JOHNSON. As one of the individuals that helped put together

the first terrorism rewards advertising campaign back in 1989 and

1990, when we used Charlton Heston, Charles Bronson, and Charlie Sheen in the Heroes Campaign, that was only $2 million.

Senator BOXER. You had to be Charlie to get into it?

Mr. JOHNSON. It was a Charlie Campaign, but my partner on

that, Brad Smith, who died 2 years ago of Lou Gehrig’s disease,

Brad was—he was running the rewards program from his wheelchair, and he was paralyzed from the neck down, working from his

house down in Fredericksburg, Virginia, but it was Brad’s creativity in coming up with a matchbook cover—in fact, the real story

behind that was, he knew he was dying of Lou Gehrig’s disease,

and he went to his boss, Tony Quenton, who was the head of Diplomatic Security, and said, I have got this idea, and Mr. Quenton

said, that is a terrible idea, do not do it.

So Brad went ahead and did it because he figured, I am dying,

what can they do to me, and then he was smart enough, he sent

copies up here to the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees, and all the Members said, this is a great idea, and they

called the State Department and said, this is a wonderful idea. Mr.

Quenton said yes, I know, I thought of it.

Now, it was Brad that thought of it, and that matchbook cover

was important in bringing in information that led to the arrest of

Ramsi Ussef the first go-around in January 1995 in Pakistan.

Senator BOXER. So you think there are people running around

looking for bin Laden, looking under the veils of the 6 foot 5 inch

individuals?

Mr. JOHNSON. The family of Miramal Kansi, who assassinated

CIA employees outside the entrance to the CIA headquarters, his

own family gave him up for $2 million, so for $25 million, there are

folks over there who do understand the value of a dollar.

Ms. FLOURNOY. I was just going to add one counterpoint on the

question of the mid to long term. My concern is that members of

al-Qaeda and other affiliated groups have demonstrated what I

think is pretty extraordinary patience, and the ability to go to

ground and to be sleepers for a very long time. If you look at someone like Atta, the years of planning and preparation this took, and

the degree to which he waited, my concern is that people will go

to ground for the next couple of years and we will think it is over,

and once the guard is let down, I worry about whether we can sustain our national resolve.

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Can we sustain our national vigilance? Can we keep on this

when there is not a demonstrated threat of attack? If we think it

is, ‘‘over,’’ we will let our guard down and they will be back. That

is my concern. Yes, you hurt them when they cannot recruit and

train openly, et cetera, but there is enough of them now that if they

go to ground and wait us out—— Senator BOXER. I am really glad you said that, because that is

one of the purposes of this hearing also. This is very different than

a lot of challenges we face, because it is so long term, as in forever.

Look, all you have to do is read Larry’s testimony where he quotes

from what we are calling the manual, the main mission—this is the

words of al-Qaeda. The main mission for which the military organization is responsible is the overthrow of the godless regimes and

their replacement with an Islamic regime. That is the main mission.

Now, there are a lot of countries that are not going to become

Islamic regimes because they tell us we have to do that. There is

a lot of countries. So that is a very deep hole for certain people.

That is why I have a little pull with you, Michele, just because I

know your point is that you are saying well, if people are fed and

they have opportunity, they will not go, but a lot of these people

that go there are not poor people.

Look at Osama bin Laden himself. Look at some of the people

in the top echelons. You are right in terms of lower down, but the

top operatives are not going to be dissuaded because they could get

a job, that is my own opinion, because it is a deeper motivation

that reaches to their soul, and therefore we have to reach to our

soul to say, this is not what we are about. We are about diversity.

We respect Islam and we respect everything else, and that is what

our country is, and so therefore we remain a target for these people

who are on this terror, and so I think your pointing this out is really, really important.

I was asked today on some TV program did I think the American

people had the wherewithal to stick with it, and I believe that we

do, because I believe what they did in this attack on us touched

so deep into our minds and our hearts and our lives that we will

never, ever, ever forget it. Whether we were 8 years old and we

saw it on TV and we asked our mother to explain it, or dad, or we

were 85, we will never forget it. We know where we were when we

saw it. We know it was one of those seminal moments in American

history that we will not forget, and therefore I do not feel we will

let down our guard.

But I think hearings like this really help, because we need people like you to level with us, and what I liked about hearing from

all of you is that Larry makes a good point, this is very serious,

but do not be in despair, because they are not everything that they

want us to believe they are. It is an important point, Michele’s

point that we need multifaceted response to all of this, and the FBI

just on the ground saying they are not going to stop until probably—they will never stop.

So this has been extremely helpful. Bill, do you have any more

to add, or would you like to make a closing statement?

Senator NELSON. No. I just wanted to reconfirm, I spent 2 hours

Sunday with the widower of a beautiful friend who was on AmerVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:43 Apr 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 77601 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
32

ican Flight 11, sitting up there in first class, close to seat 2D where

Mohammed Atta was sitting, and I will tell you, when you hear

that widower just pour his heart out for 2 hours, it is something

that just so sears you, not even to speak of the experience you and

I had on the morning of September 11 on the west side of the Capitol as we looked out the window when somebody burst in and said

the Pentagon has been hit, and what we saw, not even to speak

of what my wife saw in the apartment that we had just moved into

3 days before, overlooking the southwest corner of the Pentagon.

While she was getting dressed she heard the plane. She said, it

sounded so low, like it was going to hit the apartment. She heard

the explosion. She ran to the window and saw the whole thing. So

what she saw, what you and I experienced, and tragically what my

friend from Boston and Miami experienced is seared in the minds

of good people all over Planet Earth, and they will not forget it.

Senator BOXER. Eighty people they killed, 300 Muslims they

killed in the World Trade Center. Every plane was headed for California.

So therefore, Michele, I think that we will stick to this, and I just

want to thank both of you very much for excellent testimony and

all the panelists, and we stand adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

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