In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 17-2042 & 17-2111

JAM PRODUCTIONS, LTD., EVENT

PRODUCTIONS, INC., STANDING ROOM

ONLY, INC., and VICTORIA OPERATING

CO.,

Petitioners, Cross-Respondents, 

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

Respondent, Cross-Petitioner,

and 

THEATRICAL STAGE EMPLOYEES

UNION, LOCAL NO. 2 I.A.T.S.E.,

Intervenor-Respondent.

Petition for Review and Cross-Application for Enforcement of an 

Order of the National Labor Relations Board.

No. NLRB-1, No. 13-CA-186575

ARGUED DECEMBER 8, 2017 — DECIDED JUNE 28, 2018
2 Nos. 17-2042 & 17-2111

Before KANNE and ROVNER, Circuit Judges, and DURKIN,

District Judge.

*

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. The National Labor Relations Board

(“the Board”) seeks to enforce its order requiring Jam Productions, Ltd., Event Productions, Inc., Standing Room Only, Inc.,

and Victoria Operating Co. (collectively “Jam Productions” or

“Jam”) to bargain with the Theatrical Stage Employees Union

Local No. 2, (“Local No. 2”). Jam argues that in the period

before the election to determine whether Local No. 2 would

represent Jam employees, the union attempted to influence the

election outcome by steering premium union jobs to Jam

employees. We have jurisdiction to review the Board’s application for enforcement pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). Because

Jam presented enough evidence to warrant a hearing on the

validity of the election results, we deny enforcement and

remand for an evidentiary hearing. 

I.

In mid-September 2015, Local No. 2 filed an election

petition to represent employees of Jam Productions as a single

employer. Jam produces concerts, shows, and events at venues

in and around Chicago, including the Riviera Theatre, Park

West Theatre, and Vic Theatre. In conjunction with these

productions, Jam hires part-time and non-union stagehands to

unload lighting and sound equipment into the venue, set it up,

maintain it, take it down, and move it out of the venue afterthe

show. Given the irregular schedule of shows at any given

*

 Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
Nos. 17-2042 & 17-2111 3

venue (shows followed by days or weeks without performances) and the fact that one venue (the Riviera) was closed

forthe entire summer because it lacks air conditioning, none of

the stagehands are employed full time and their employment

is generally sporadic. 

On September 30, Jam and Local No. 2 entered into a

Stipulated Election Agreement identifying the potential

bargaining unit as stagehands at the Riviera, Vic, and Park

West Theatres employed during the payroll period ending on

October 4, 2015. The unit was defined more specifically as: “All

full-time and regular part-time stage production employees

employed by the Employer at the Riviera, Park West, and Vic

Theatres, but excluding production managers and crew

leaders, office clerical employees and guards, professional

employees and supervisors as defined in the Act.” Given the

sporadic nature of the work, the parties agreed to add the

following additional definition to the Agreement: “Also

eligible to vote are all employees in the unit who have been

employed by the Employer for a total of 18 concerts, shows,

and/or events over a 1-year period immediately preceding the

eligibility date.”

The day after the parties signed the Election Agreement,

however, the representation petition was held in abeyance

pending the investigation of an unfair labor practice charge

that Local No. 2 had filed only the day before it filed its

representation petition. Local No. 2’s charge was based on

Jam’s termination of the Riviera’s crew leader, Chris Shaw and

the fifty-three employees he supervised (the “Shawcrew”).The

unfair labor practice charge was not resolved until April 6,

2016, when the Board’s Acting Regional Director approved an
4 Nos. 17-2042 & 17-2111

agreement containing a non-admissions clause and providing

that Jam would reinstate the terminated employees by offering

them immediate and full participation in Jam’s “on-call list.”

Just over a month afterthe unfair-labor-practice charge was

resolved, on May 16, 2016, the election was held. Prior to the

election, Jam had asked the Regional Director to move the

eligibility date of the election back two weeks on account of the

seven-month election delay. The Regional Director did not

issue an order in response, so Jam included on its voter

eligibility list five stagehands hired in the two-week period

after the agreed-upon October 4, 2015 date, along with a

notation about their hiring date. Local No. 2 prevailed with

twenty-two votes in its favor and ten against; the victory was

not entirely decisive, however, because there were an additional twenty-one ballots challenged by either Jam or Local

No. 2. Eight of the challenges were uncontested, which left

thirteen contested ballots—all union challenges contested by

Jam. Five of those were the ballots cast by the employees who

had been hired in the two weeks following the stipulated

eligibility date. Local No. 2 challenged the remaining eight

ballots on various grounds such as number of shows worked

and whether the voting employees were in fact “supervisors”

ineligible to vote. 

Jam also timely filed an objection contesting the election

results on the grounds that Local No. 2 unlawfully provided

economic benefits to employees during the critical period

preceding the election. Specifically, Jam alleged that Local

No. 2 provided employees premium, higher-paid work at

union venues in the weeks before the election in an attempt to
Nos. 17-2042 & 17-2111 5

influence the employees—particularly the Shaw crew—to vote

for the union.

Inresponse to Jam’s objections, the Board’s Acting Regional

Director conducted an investigation and issued a Corrected

Report on June 20, 2016, concluding that Jam’s offer of proof in

support of its objection fell short of demonstrating the required

“substantial andmaterial factual issues,” see Park Chevrolet-Geo,

Inc., 308 NLRB 1010, fn. 1 (1992), that, if proven, would warrant

setting aside the election. Specifically, the Director concluded

that although Jam had shown that employees did work union

jobs during the critical period, it had not shown that Local

No. 2 engaged in any wrongdoing by hiring those employees

through its open referral system. The report further concluded

that Jam’s evidence of an undeserved financial benefit was too

speculative to support its claim that Local No. 2 engaged in

wrongdoing. As relevant here, the Director also sustained

Local No. 2’s challenges to the ballots of four of the five

employees hired in the two weeks after the original eligibility

date,1and certified Local No. 2 as the employees’ bargaining

agent. 

Jam filed a request for review, and on January 5, 2017, a

three-member panel of the NLRB denied Jam’s request and

affirmed the Regional Director’s Corrected Report certifying

1

The Regional Director sustained twelve union challenges in all: four

employees hired after the original eligibility date and eight employees who

had not worked the requisite number of shows as defined by the eligibility

agreement. Because the nine remaining ballots would be insufficient to

impact the election results, the Regional Director did not consider those

challenges. 
6 Nos. 17-2042 & 17-2111

Local No. 2 as the relevant bargaining unit. On the issue of

challenged ballots, one member of the panel would have

overruled the four Local No. 2 ballot challenges to employees

hired after the eligibility date. The dissenting panel member

reasoned that the delay occasioned by the Board’s resolution

of the unfairlabor practice prevented the Board from enforcing

other material terms of the Election Agreement like the

eligibility date; he also noted that there was no prejudice to

Local No. 2 because Jam provided proper notice as to those

four employees. He would have, however, denied Jam’s

request for review of five additional union challenges, so the

four ballots he would have allowed would not have impacted

the election’s outcome.

Jam then refused to recognize or engage in collective

bargaining with Local No. 2, prompting the Board’s general

counsel to file a complaint alleging an unfair labor practice in

violation of § 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations

Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) and (5). In its answer to the complaint, Jam repeated its objections and challenges to the

certification of the election, but the Board rejected Jam’s

affirmative defenses and issued an order holding that Jam’s

refusal to bargain amounted to an unfair labor practice. See id.

Jam timely petitioned for review of the Board’s order compelling it to bargain, and the Board cross-applied for its enforcement. 

II.

Because Jam refused Local No. 2’s request to enter into

collective bargaining, the central issue on appeal is whetherthe

Board reasonably certified Local No. 2 as the Jam employees’
Nos. 17-2042 & 17-2111 7

representative. As detailed above, an employer’s path to

judicial review of a Board’s decision upholding an election and

certifying a union is “circuitous.” Hanson Cold Storage Co. v.

NLRB, 860 F.3d 911, 914 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting NLRB v. Serv.

Am. Corp., 841 F.2d 191, 193 n.3 (7th Cir. 1988)). Unlike an

unfair labor practice order by the Board, Board-certification

decisions are not immediately appealable. Thus, an employer

seeking judicial review must, as Jam did here, expose itself to

an unfair labor practice charge by refusing to bargain with the

Board-certified union. Only once Local No. 2 files an unfair

labor practice charge that is sustained by the Board can we

review the Board’s underlying certification decision. See id.

(describing process for employer to obtain judicial review of

Board’s decision upholding election and certifying union); see

also Ruan Transp. Corp. v. NLRB, 674 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir.

2012). 

We have jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e) and (f) over

Jam’s petition for review of the Board’s May 16, 2017 decision.

See, e.g., NLRB v. City Wide Insulation, Inc., 370 F.3d 654, 657

(7th Cir. 2004). If the Board acted reasonably in certifying Local

No. 2, we will uphold the Board’s enforcement of its order

compelling Jam to enter into collective bargaining. See NLRB v.

River City Elevator Co., Inc., 289 F.3d 1029, 1032 (7th Cir. 2002).

We review factual conclusions by the Board to ensure that they

are supported by “substantial evidence” and expect its legal

conclusions to have a “reasonable basis in law.” City Wide

Insulation, 370 F.3d at 657. Both standards are deferential; the

Board’s factual conclusions are supported by substantial

evidence when they are based on “such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
8 Nos. 17-2042 & 17-2111

conclusion.” Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 349 F.3d 493, 502–03

(7th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and citation omitted); NLRB

v. O’Daniel Trucking Co., 23 F.3d 1144, 1148 (7th Cir. 1994)

(same). We review the Board’s determination not to hold a

hearing on an employer’s objections under the same substantial evidence standard. Clearwater Transport, Inc. v. NLRB, 133

F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1998).

Jam’s primary argument on appeal is that the Board erred

in certifying the election results without holding a hearing on

its objections. Specifically, Jam challenges the Board’s determination that Local No. 2 work given to the Shaw crew preceding

the election did not make the election unfair. 

Here, Jam contends that Local No. 2 engaged in a concerted

effort to steer high-paying union jobs to the twenty-one voting

members of the recently reinstated Shaw crew (whose votes

made up a majority of the counted votes). Jam submitted an

offer of proof outlining multiple instances in the critical period

before the election (between April and the first half of May

2016) where Local No. 2 chose members of the Shaw crew to

work shows Jam alleged would have ordinarily been staffed by

Local No. 2 Union members. 

Local No. 2 selects stagehands for shows through an

“automated call steward” system accessible through its web

site. Individuals could log in to the automated system, where

they filled out a member profile describing their applicable job

classifications and availability. Stagehands then received job

offers via text, and simply replied to confirm or deny offers.

To support its theory, Jam submitted the anticipated

testimony of Behrad Emami, the production manager at the
Nos. 17-2042 & 17-2111 9

Riviera Theatre, and Eric Linz, a runner who worked at a

David Gilmour show at the Auditorium Theater on April 5.

Based on telephone conversations and text messages (attached

to Jam’s proffer), Emami would have testified to a number of

interactions with the members of the Shaw crew who were

unavailable to work or attend meetings at the Riviera because

they were working at union venues during the critical period.

Emami was prepared to testify that of the twenty-one voting

members of the Shaw crew, at least thirteen were hired to work

union shows during the critical period, including the David

Gilmour show at the Auditorium Theatre on April 5 and 6; the

Rihanna show at the United Center from April 14 to 16; the

NFL Draft in Grant Park from April 28 to 30; and the stage set

up at Northerly Island at the beginning of May. Eric Linz

would have testified that he had seen at least six members of

the Shaw crew while he was working as a runner at the David

Gilmour show, including two more not included in the thirteen

listed by Emami. 

Jam also offered its own records from shows it produced at

union venues2 demonstrating that when Local No. 2 had

supplied stagehands for Jam outside the critical period, it did

not hire non-union employees. Jam’s records demonstrated

that at three large productions at the United Center outside the

critical period—January 13 (a Muse concert with 129 stagehands), January 19 (a Bruce Springsteen concert with 109

stagehands), and February 17 (an AC/DC concert with 116

2

In addition to the Riviera, Vic, and Park West Theatres, Jam occasionally

produced shows at union venues. For those shows Local No. 2 typically

provided the stagehands.
10 Nos. 17-2042 & 17-2111

stagehands)—Local No. 2 did not hire any members of the

Shaw crew. And Jam identified (as a hostile witness) the

individual on the Shaw crew, Justin Hoffman, who it believed

helped coordinate the plan to offer union jobs. Finally, Jam

sought employment records from Local No. 2 for the twentyone voting employees of the Shaw crew so that Jam could

demonstrate that it was unusual for the Shaw crew to have

received union jobs. 

Local No. 2 refused to provide any of the requested records,

and the Regional Director declined to interview any of the

individuals identified in the offer of proof or require Local

No. 2 to turn over any business records. In rejecting Jam’s

request for a hearing, the RegionalDirector acknowledged that

the Shaw crew had received union jobs during the critical

period, but concluded that Jam had not demonstrated that

Local No. 2 made a gift of “tangible economic value” to garner

union votes.

The Regional Director is obligated to hold a hearing only

when the objecting party raises “substantial and material

factual issues” sufficient to support a prima facie showing of

objectionable conduct. Clearwater Transport, 133 F.3d at 1011

(quoting NLRB v. Lake Holiday Assoc., Inc., 930 F.2d 1231,

1236–37 (7th Cir. 1991)); 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(c)(1)(i). Jam could

meet its burden by alleging misconduct that, if proven, would

warrant setting aside the election underthe substantive law of

representation elections. See, e.g., NLRB v. AmeriCold Logistics,

Inc., 214 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The NLRB must hold a

hearing when the employer makes a prima facie showing of

misconduct that would be sufficient to set aside the election.”);
Nos. 17-2042 & 17-2111 11

see also Serv. Am. Corp., 841 F.2d at 195; Clearwater Transport, 133

F.3d at 1011. 

Although the standard of review is deferential, we believe

Jam presented enough evidence to obtain an evidentiary

hearing, and that the Board abused its discretion by failing to

hold one. When conducting a representation election, the

Board has wide discretion to “ensure the fair and free choice”

of bargaining representatives by employees. NLRB v. Savair

Mfg. Co. 414 U.S. 270, 276–77 (1973). This obligation to ensure

fair and free choice includes a prohibition on campaign tactics

by eitherthe employer orthe union that induce workers to cast

their votes on grounds other than the advantages and disadvantages of union representation. See id. (“We do not believe

that the statutory policy of fair elections ... permits endorsements, whetherfor or against the union, to be bought and sold

in this fashion.”); see also Freund Banking Co. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d

928, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Not only does the Act forbid employers from utilizing threats or rewards as campaign tactics, it

prohibits “both crude and subtle forms of vote-buying” by the

union. Freund, 165 F.3d at 931 (emphasis added). Thus, a union

is barred from both blatantly giving something of value to an

employee in exchange for his vote as well as offering a benefit

in a way that “tacitly obliges the employee” to vote for the

union. Id. (citing Savair, 414 U.S. at 277–78). 

In considering whether a particular incentive taints the

fairness of the election, we ask whether what is offered is

“‘sufficiently valuable and desirable in the eyes of the person

to whom they are offered, to have the potential to influence

that person’s vote?’” River City Elevator, 289 F.3d at 1033
12 Nos. 17-2042 & 17-2111

(quoting Nestle Ice Cream Co. v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 578, 583 (6th Cir.

1995)). Specifically, the Board has held that a union is forbidden from providing voters anything of “tangible economic

benefit” during the critical period before the election. See King

Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 440 F.3d 471, 474 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting

Freund, 165 F.3d at 931–32); see also Mailing Servs., Inc., 293

NLRB 565, 565–66 (1989)).

The financial benefit of the higher-paying jobs immediately

preceding the election could plausibly be seen as an economic

inducement to secure votes in favor of Local No. 2. The NLRB

has refused to certify elections where a union has offered

benefits to employees of similar or lesser value than the

premium-pay jobs allegedly offered here. See Owens-Ill., Inc.,

271 NLRB 1235, 1235–36 (1984) (gift of union jackets); Mailing

Servs., 293 NLRB at 566 (free medical screenings offered by

union impermissible conferral of benefit); Wagner Elec. Corp.,

167 NLRB 532, 533 (1967) (union’s gift of life insurance coverage “is a tangible economic benefit”).

The Board defends the refusal to investigate or hold a

hearing on the grounds that union job referrals “in the ordinary course of its referral system, according to the pre-existing

standards and practice” provide no reason to suspect Local

No. 2 of using the jobs to induce votes. But whether the jobs

were in fact offered to the Shaw crew “according to preexisting standards and practice” is precisely the question Jam

sought to answer with its objection. The Board attacks Jam’s

offer of proof as nothing more than a fishing expedition,

devoid of the type of “specific evidence” about “specific

people” required to warrant an evidentiary hearing. See NLRB
Nos. 17-2042 & 17-2111 13

v. Service Am. Corp., 841 F.2d 191, 195 (7th Cir. 1988). But in

describing the alleged deficiencies in Jam’s offer of proof, the

Board highlights precisely the Catch-22 Jam faced in attempting to demonstrate that the referrals were in fact an aberration

from Local No. 2’s ordinary referral operating system.

Forinstance, the Board faults Jam’s offer of proof forfailing

to provide evidence showing (1) Local No. 2’s normal referral

procedures; (2) whether the voting employees were treated

differently than others with access to the referral system; or

(3) whetherthe employees who received Local No. 2 jobs were

members of Local No. 2 or not. But these are the very questions

Jam sought to have answered with its offer of proof. 

As detailed above, Jam provided more than vague, unsubstantiated accusations. Using its own employment records, it

compared the likelihood of non-union members receiving

union jobs before the critical period to what appeared to be the

dramatic increase in availability of union jobs during the

critical period. It also identified by name three individuals who

could provide further detail about how the referrals were

given and which specific employees had received Local No. 2

work. And it requested the very union records that the Board

now faults it for failing to produce: Local No. 2’s employment

records that would have identified union members and shed

light on the referral procedures and whether the Shaw crew

received different treatment during the critical period. 

The Board’s primary argument is that Local No. 2 did not

engage in objectionable conduct because the referral system

was available to non-union members and thus it was unremarkable that the Shaw crew received union work. But that
14 Nos. 17-2042 & 17-2111

reasoning begs the question whether, despite the availability of

the referral system, non-union employees were ever selected

for union jobs outside of the critical period. As we noted in

Service American Corporation, “[t]he whole purpose for the

hearing is to inquire into the allegations to determine whether

they are meritorious; it makes little sense to expect the employerto prove its case, especially without power of subpoena,

to the Regional Director before a hearing will be granted.” 841

F.2d at 197 (quoting NLRB v. J-Wood/A Tappan Div., 720 F.2d

309, 315 (3d Cir. 1983)). Because the Regional Director declined

to interview either Justin Huffman, who Jam believed was

responsible for coordinating jobs forthe Shaw crew during the

critical period, or any of the twenty-one Shaw crew members

identified in Jam’s offer of proof, he had no way of knowing if

members of Shaw’s crew ordinarily received union job offers

outside the critical period. 

Without subpoena power, Jam produced as much evidence

as it had available tending to suggest that non-union voting

employees received a sudden increase in offers to work union

jobs in the period immediately preceding the election. Although such a benefit may not have formally obligated

members of the Shaw crew to vote for Local No. 2, having been

the beneficiaries of the premium-pay jobs, members of the

Shaw crew may well have felt some duty to return the favor

with a union vote. See Savair, 414 U.S. at 277 (noting that

although an employee may not be “legally bound to vote for

the union and has not promised to do so in any formal sense”

some “would feel obliged” to cast a union vote after having

signed aunion recognition slip) (emphasis added).Thismay be

especially true if, outside of the critical period, the jobs offered
Nos. 17-2042 & 17-2111 15

were rarely, if ever, available for those non-union voting

employees. 

Given the large pay disparity for union and non-union

stagehands, certainly the jobs at union venues during the

critical period could be seen as a gift of “tangible economic

value.” If the jobs were in fact, as Jam maintains, previously

unavailable to those employees, the offer of the premium-pay

jobs could certainly be seen as an unearned benefit to induce

union support. Savair, 414 U.S. at 280 (“[A]lthough the benefits

granted by the employer were permanent and unconditional,

employees were ‘not likely to miss the inference that the source

of benefits now conferred is also the source from which future

benefits must flow and which may dry up if it is not obliged.’”)

(quoting NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1973)).

And, as discussed above, without an evidentiary hearing on

Jam’s objections, it is impossible to determine whetherthe jobs

at union venues amounted to an improper inducement to vote

in favor of Local No. 2.

It follows that Jam’s circumstantial evidence of a concerted

effort to incentivize non-union employees with access to Local

2 jobs prior to the vote established a “substantial and material

factual issue” sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. The

Regional Director thus abused his discretion by failing to

investigate or hold such a hearing. 

That leaves Jam’s contention that the Board’s rulings on the

challenged ballots were clearly erroneous. Jam takes issue

primarily with the Board’s decision to uphold the Regional

Director’s refusal to move the eligibility date in light of the

delay attributable to the unfair labor practice charge. Jam
16 Nos. 17-2042 & 17-2111

suggests that by failing to count the votes of those employees

hired shortly after the original date in the Stipulated Election

Agreement, the Board effectively disenfranchised those

employees. 

Under the Board’s election rules, the parties may enter a

stipulated election agreement, which must include, among

other things, the payroll period to be used for determining

voter eligibility. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.62(b). The Board has long

treatedsuch election agreements as “‘contracts,’ binding on the

parties that executed them.” T & L Leasing, 318 NLRB 324, 325

(1995) (quoting Barceloneta Shoe Corp., 171 NLRB 1333, 1343

(1968), enforced mem., 1970 WL 5417 (1st Cir. 1970)). As such,

election agreements will be enforced except in limited circumstances. For instance, upon a showing of “cause,” Regional

Directors may revoke their approval of the agreements. And

the parties may withdraw from election agreements upon

agreement of all the parties or an “affirmative showing of

unusual circumstances.” T & L Leasing, 318 NLRB at 325.

Otherwise, the agreement will be enforced so long as the terms

are clear and unambiguous and it does not run afoul of settled

Board policy or specific statutory exclusions. Id. 

Given the express and unambiguous payroll period cut-off

of October 4, 2015 in the stipulated agreement, we would be

hard-pressed to conclude that the Board committed clear error

by refusing to allow the ballots of the employees who started

working after the cut-off date. Jam cites several cases it claims

lend support to its argument that eligibility dates may be

moved in the case of a delayed election. But the cases Jam cites

not only involve much longer delays (two or more years) than
Nos. 17-2042 & 17-2111 17

the seven months at issue here, they also speak to the issue of

whether the Regional Director has the authority to change the

eligibility date when an election is delayed, not to whether it

would be an abuse of discretion to enforce the agreed-upon

eligibility date. See Hartz v. Mountain Corp., 260 NLRB 323, 327

(1982) (three-member panel of the Board affirmed decision

allowing union that had not participated in proceedings for

election held two years earlier to withdraw petition for

certification and intervention in another union’s petition);

Interlake v. Steamship Co., 178 NLRB 128, 129 (1969) (concluding

that a new eligibility date would be appropriate for a second

runoff election held three years after original election) (emphasis

added). No one disputes that the Regional Director could have

allowed the parties to agree on a new eligibility date or

perhaps accepted Jam’s request to push back the eligibilitydate

two weeks on account of the delay. Indeed, on review one

member of the panel would have allowed Jam to push back the

eligibility date. That there were reasons for allowing the

additional voters who shared a community of interest with the

other employees does not mean that it was clear error not to

count the challenged votes. 

As the Board noted, the terms of the stipulated agreement

were clear and unambiguous. As detailed above, such terms

will ordinarily be enforced. There was nothing so extraordinary about the delay preceding the election here that the Board

committed clear error by upholding Local No. 2’s challenges to

the voters hired after the agreed-upon eligibility date. In light

of our deferential standard of review, we affirm the Board’s

ruling on the challenged ballots. 
18 Nos. 17-2042 & 17-2111

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we GRANT Jam Productions’

petition for review and REMAND for a hearing on its election

objection, and DENY the Board’s cross-application for enforcement.