Report Of The

Defense Science Board

Task Force

ON

UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE (UXO)

CLEARANCE, ACTIVE RANGE UXO

CLEARANCE, AND

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD)

PROGRAMS

April 1998

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FOR ACQUISITION & TECHNOLOGY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3140
This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). The

DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide

independent advice to the Secretary of Defense. Statements,

opinions, conclusions, and recommendations in this report do not

necessarily represent the official position of the Department of

Defense.

This report is UNCLASSIFIED.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

DEFENSE SCIENCE

BOARD 24 APR 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENCE (ACQUISITION

AND TECHNOLOGY)

SUBJECT: Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task

Force on Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Clearance,

Active Range UXO Clearance, and Explosive Ordnance

Disposal (EOD) Programs

I am forwarding the final report of the Defense Science

Board Task Force on Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Clearance,

Active Range UXO Clearance, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal

(EOD) Programs.

This report reviews the UXO related policies, programs,

and technologies and identifies key issues facing the

Department of Defense in UXO remediation. The Task Force

finds that UXO remediation is a costly problem facing the

Department of Defense, one for which the Department is not

well organized to solve, at present. The Task Force also

concludes that, for remediation to be successful, new, cost

effective remediation technology must be developed to

replace current tools, which are up to 50 years old and are

labor intensive.

The Task Force has proposed a set of clear

recommendations that can be implemented, without adding

bureaucracy or new reporting demands. I endorse their

recommendations and propose that you review the Task Force

Chairman's letter and report.

Cra

Cha

lds
DEFENSE SCIENCE

BOARD

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3 140 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-31 40

24 APR 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on

Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Clearance, Active Range UXO

Clearance, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

Programs

The final report of the Task Force on Unexploded Ordnance

(UXO) remediation is attached. This report is focused on the

Department's need to clean up unexploded ordnance resulting from

decades of military training, exercises, and testing of weapons

systems. In particular, there is now considerable interest and

activity by Federal, state, and local authorities in UXO

remediation at formerly used defense and base closure sites.

The DOD has the responsibility to clean up and render such

sites safe. It is estimated that there are some 1500 sites

within the continental United States involving perhaps 15 million

acres of land. The total expenditures required for clean-up of

such sites using current technology and practices could exceed

tens of billions of dollars. Today's techniques are labor

intensive and very expensive because most of the detections that

require excavation turn out to be false alarms. This Task Force

sees the need to reallocate the current DOD investment which is

now heavily focused on actual remediation operations toward one

which for the next few years aggressively pursues R&D to reduce

the false alarm rate. We believe that reallocation of those

resources planned to be spent by the Department over the coming

five years will greatly (by a factor of ten) increase the

efficiency of UXO remediation efforts.

The Task Force makes six major recommendations for

strengthening the Department's UXO Remediation efforts:

1 . To provide a DOD internal and external focal point for UXO

objectives, policy, plans, and programs, it is recommended the

DUSD (Environmental Security) be assigned that responsibility.

2. To dramatically reduce the cost of cleanup, it is recommended

that the Department initiate and fund an aggressive program of

research and demonstration, primarily by industry and the

universities, to reduce the number of false alarms by about a 

factor of 10 within the next 3 to 5 years.
3 . For DDR&E to formulate and direct such

20% of the total DOD UXO cleanup funds.

increasing expenditures on UXO, it is a

better use of available funds‘.

a program using up to

It is not a matter of

matter of making

4 . To provide more visibility, flexibility, balance, and control

over commitments and expenditures, it is recommended that OSD

accounts for UXO remediation and RDT&E be established.

5. As humanitarian UXO remediation is not a warfighting

requirement and as the Department cannot afford the costs of

establishing and properly resourcing an organic capacity for

this effort, it is recommended that contracting incentives be

provided to encourage commercialization of promising

technologies and to encourage large as well as small companies

to participate in actual UXO remediation efforts.

The Task Force co-sponsor, Director, Strategic and Tactical

Systems, has informed me that parallel to the DSB Task Force

study, the USD(A&T) established the UXO Center of Excellence

(UXOCOE) in May 1997 to function as the DOD focal point for UXO

clearance and detection technology, following concerns expressed

by Congress and the GAO. USD(A&T) had previously released the

"Report to Congress: Unexploded Ordnance Clearance - A

Coordinated Approach to Requirements and Technology Development,"

in March 1997, which surveyed the UXO technologies and

requirements and outlined the plan for the UXOCOE. The DOD

Directive and Instruction for the UXOCOE are currently staffing

at the Principal Staff Assistant level. The UXOCOE mission is to

foster the exchange of technical information and ensure the

coordination of requirements and technology in the UXO arena

within DOD and with other U.S. government and international

agencies, academia, and industry.

On behalf of the Task Force members, I wish to thank the

Government officials, advisors, and all those who made -

presentations to us for their contributions.

6ohn S. Foster, Jr.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Charge to the Task Force

2. Executive Summary

3. Introduction and Background

4. Findings and Recommendations Regarding

Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Remediation

A. Policy

B. DOD UXO Remediation Requirements

C. Technology

D. Program Management

E. Public Involvement

F. Minimizing Exposure

G. Project Restoration

H. Closed Ranges on DOD Property

Appendices

A. Terms of Reference

B. Membership of Task Force

C. Alternative Technologies Supporting UXO Remediation

1

2

8

12

12

1 5

16

21

24

2 5

26

26

D. Presentations to the Task Force
1 .CHARGE TO THE TASK FORCE

The Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology requested the Defense Science

Board undertake two separate studies on different aspects of landmines and other unexploded

ordnance (UXO). Phase I examined US landmines, land mine detection and demining efforts,

and alternatives to anti-personnel mines. This Task Force (Phase II) was charged to “examine

UXO remediation, active range UXO clearance, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

efforts. Include in this examination, the relationship between the UXO/EOD detection/

characterization/clearance and neutralization issues and landmine detection/neutralization issues

addressed in Phase One.

In developing its findings and recommendations, this Task Force was tasked to:

n Review 1) UXO rernediation, 2) active range UXO clearance, and 3) EOD programs;

including the technologies involved, the applicable policies, the pertinent requirements,

and the organizations involved.

n Analyze the technologies, development programs, and systems that may improve 1) UXO

remediation, 2) active range UXO clearance, and 3) EOD efforts. Focus on means to

make remediation, range clearance and EOD operations cheaper, safer, and/or faster.

Give particular emphasis to identifying those technologies that can be rapidly developed

and matured for selective initiation of engineering development and/or production.

Recommend the combination of technologies, strategies, and doctrines that can best cope

with the present UXO remediation, UXO clearance, and EOD challenges.

H Analyze the technologies, development programs, and systems that may minimize or

preclude the production of UXO, including self-destruct fuzing and self-neutralizing or

degradable explosives. Give particular emphasis to identifying those technologies that

can be rapidly developed and matured for selective initiation of engineering development

and/or production. Recommend the technologies or combination of technologies that

could be incorporated in future munitions programs to render them less likely to produce

UXO. Assess current munitions stocks and the potential for retrofitting them with

technologies that will render them less likely to produce UXO.”

1
2.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Contamination of land and sea from unexploded ordnance has grown to a level where it now

presents a serious problem in the United States. The contamination prevents civilian land use,

threatens public safety and causes environmental concerns. Estimates provided to the Task Force

indicate that over 15 million acres in the United States may contain some level of UXO

contamination, at about 1,500 different sites. This figure does not include the acreage of UXO

contamination undersea.

Virtually all UXO contamination in the United States results from weapons system testing and/or

troop training activities conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD). Property containing

UXO includes active military sites and land transferring or transferred to private use, such as

Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS) and Base Realignment And Closure (BRAC) sites. DOD’S

responsibilities include providing UXO site clean-up project management, assuring compliance

with federal, state and local laws and environmental regulations, assumption of liability, and

appropriate interactions with the public.

DOD has no specific UXO remediation policy, goals or program. Current UXO site remediation

efforts are based on decades-old technology and use several procedures that are inefficient, laborintensive and costly. Because the suspect sites have not been surveyed, there is great uncertainty

about the actual size of the UXO problem. However, even if only 5% of suspect acreage needs

cleanup, remediation costs would still be high (possibly exceeding 15 billion dollars) and times

would be long (possibly exceeding several decades to complete) using current technologies.

UXO site remediation in the United States currently is being funded at about $125M per year,

excluding special clean-up programs (such as the on-going clean-up at Kaho’olawe, which has

funding projected to total about $400M).

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

The key to more efficient UXO remediation lies in the products that can come from an

aggressive development of cost effective remediation technology to replace currently fielded

tools and practices. The Task Force concludes, however, that DOD is not yet positioned to

execute the required technology program. Except for the recent Defense Advanced Research

Projects Agency (DARPA) initiatives, DOD’S RDT&E base lacks a coherent set of technology

requirements specifically designed to support UXO remediation needs. The Services’ RDT&E

base reflect the warfighting needs of the Military Departments, and the UXO support is

incidental. DOD’S current UXO related RDT&E effort to develop the needed tools is estimated to

be about $20M per year.
CURRENT APPROACH: “MAG AND FLAG”

Normandy 1945 Bosnia 1996

The technologies currently used for sub surface UXO remediation requires walking with metal

detection devices, placing a flag at each location of a detection and manually digging up detected

objects - traditional “Mag and Flag”. These techniques are not cost effective for large areas of

land nor feasible for all terrain. Most important, “Mag and Flag” surveys are plagued by

excessive false alarm rates. Some sites will have more than 100 subsurface non-ordnance items

(clutter) flagged and excavated for each actual ordnance item found and removed. Under normal

circumstances UXO remediation costs could be as high as $20,000 per acre. However under

emergency situations, the cost could be much higher. (For example, UXO remediation efforts at

Spring Valley in Washington, DC, performed between Jan 1993-Jan 1995 under RCRA

emergency procedures, cost about $45,000 per acre). Highly cluttered sites may require complete

excavation due to the number of false alarms. Of the approximately $125M per year spent on

UXO remediation, about $70-80M per year is expended by using such labor-intensive practices.

In the near term, the biggest potential improvement in the detection and discrimination of UXO

to depths of three feet or more is expected to come from a special configuration of

magnetometers, electromagnetic induction (EMI) and data processing. A magnetometer can

measure the change in the earth’s magnetic field due to the presence of a nearby object having

magnetic permeability. An EM1 detector imposes an external, time-varying magnetic field on

the region and detects the effect caused by objects which are electrically conducting (magnetic or

nonmagnetic). By using arrays of both instruments, and three axis EM1 drive, in concert with

appropriate computer algorithms, and fusion of that information, the operator will be able not

only to detect and determine the position of an object, but also determine if it is magnetic,

estimate whether it is a single piece or a cluster of pieces, and estimate its aspect ratio (length to

width) and orientation. The proper development and application of these technologies is expected

to reduce the false alarms by about a factor of 10.

3
To obtain such a capability, the Task Force recommends a two track approach.

Track 1. The first track calls for the aggressive development and demonstration of a baseline

system-of-systems approach to reduce the false alarms by about a factor of 10. In our

view, it would be appropriate to conduct a competitive effort by at least two industrial

systems integration teams. The development and demonstration efforts are expected to

require 3-5 years to achieve the objective and would include demonstration of

integrated, ground and aerial precision navigation, aerial survey detections of surface

and near surface objects, vehicular and man portable equipment to detect and

categorize objects and the appropriate computer architecture, data base and processing

algorithms. The Task Force emphasizes contractor integrated, to assure common

communications, navigation, data bases, etc. Over the next 3 to 5 years we would

expect these activities to average about $20M per year.

Track2. The second track would involve an aggressive research and development effort,

running in parallel with the effort described above. The objectives would be to explore

some avenues which have received too little attention in the past (e.g.,

seismic/acoustic, neutron activation, synthetic dog’s nose, motion of subsurface

objects over time, etc.) and also to conduct research on those pacing elements used in

the baseline approach which will benefit from continuing and competitive research,

such as the characterization of clutter at different sites, clutter rejection algorithms,

design of sensor arrays, etc. The Task Force proposes that this second track be

performed largely by universities coupled with industry, and also funded at about

$20M per year.

Since the current UXO-related R&D is funded at about $20M per year, the proposed program

can be judged as about a two-fold increase. The basic justification for such an increase is that the

DOD is spending about $125M per year on UXO remediation using a very inefficient approach.

Current understanding of the physics and experimental data to date suggest that by developing

the proper tools, DOD will save about $60-70M per year. As such, it would be a good and urgent

investment.

Once the baseline program demonstrates the required reduction in the false alarm rate, the Task

Force recommends that DOD rely on industry to commercialize the technologies into systems for

use in UXO remediation. It will be important to continue the second track activities because of

its value to DOD range clearing and countermine operations, specifically the detection of nonmetallic landmines and the detection and characterization of more deeply buried objects (5-20

feet).

If DOD is to be successful in introducing major technological improvements, it will be necessary

not only to verify the improvements but also to initiate educational and training programs to

accomplish two objectives. First, to convince the operational experts that the new systems are

safe and can be trusted. And second, to train the operators in the use of the computer and

associated software.

EASING FUTURE UXO PROBLEMS

4
A number of steps should be taken to reduce future deposits of unexploded ordnance and ease its

clean-up. For example, the use of navigational and positioning systems can help map UXO

locations more precisely, active ranges may employ “fire-finding” instrumentation to accurately

track ordnance to impact points during tests, and the development of taggants for ordnance and

explosive materials to help identification of specific UXO on-site. Improved data keeping and

archiving as well as periodic sweeping at active ranges will also prove very helpful in reducing

uncertainties about the type and number of potential UXO on ranges and help prolong the useful

life of the range.

The Task Force recommends including “Render Safe Procedures” and “Disposal Procedures”

guidance as part of DOD Directive 5000.2R. This action would incorporate these important

procedures much earlier than the Milestone III decision point, where they currently begin, and

help reduce the number of future UXO.

ORGANIZATION FOR AND EXECUTION OF DOD-WIDE UXO REMEDIATION PROGRAM

The Task Force recommends the following assignments:

To address DOD’S management responsibilities for UXO, the Task Force recommends the

assignment of a focal point within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for oversight

of UXO remediation activities in the Department of Defense. This focal point would

recommend UXO remediation objectives and policy to the Secretary of Defense, formulate

an investment strategy for the allocation of resources based upon the expected performance

of advanced technology, -promulgate the UXO RDT&E program’s priorities (but not set the

RDT&E program and budget level), establish goals and requirements, and recommend and

support investments in new technology to remedy UXO safety and cost issues. The Task

Force believes the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense/Environmental Security (DUSD/ES) is

the logical focal point, given its existing responsibilities. .

Current DOD Active Range policy has a number of gaps that need to be filled. These include

the inadequate dissemination of some “Top Secret” information to the UXO/EOD

community and the cessation of practices that threaten the long term viability of active

ranges. The Task Force recommends formation of a DOD-wide Active Range Policy that

addresses safety issues, advocates range clean-up initiatives to maintain the long-term

viability of the range (e.g. avoids creating areas with permanent UXO contamination), and

that improves information management concerning the location and clean-up following the

testing/training and emergency drops of “Special Compartmented Ordnance.”

DOD should develop a risk-based priority system, similar to the Relative Risk Site Evaluation

Framework for hazardous waste sites, to weigh the many competing UXO needs, based upon

explosive risks, other human health risks, ecological concerns, and other pertinent factors,

including current and future property use. Such priority determinations should be made in

consultation with environmental regulatory agencies and the affected public. The present

approach to clean-up varies widely from site to site and does not have clearly established

methods for assessing priorities and risks. A two-stage risk management process should be

employed, the first stage focusing on immediate responses to UXO risks, and the second

designed to provide subsequent responses to risks.

5
Many Tribal Lands are Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS) and contain substantial

amounts of UXO. The Task Force notes that these Lands present an immediate threat to

public safety due to insufficient DOD clean-up and lack of tribal government authority to

issue land use restrictions. To remedy these immediate safety problems, the Task Force

recommends accelerated improvement of UXO remediation efforts on Tribal lands.

To address the fragmented technology base, the Task Force recommends that the Director,

Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) develop a DOD-wide RDT&E investment

strategy and initiate an aggressive R&D program along the lines of the two track approach

described earlier.

To address technical challenges and RDT&E funding shortfalls, the Task Force recommends

establishing a specific UXO RDT&E account controlled by OSD (by Director, Defense

Research and Engineering) and coordinated with other related RDT&E efforts. The Task

Force suggests funding the increase in this account over the next 3-5 years by using offsets

from the total clean-up budget.

Execution of the RDT&E program will occur through the Services and Defense Agencies, in

coordination with the Joint UXO Coordinating Office.

OUTSOURCING OF UXO REMEDIATION WORK

As the proposed Range Rule and the new Munitions Rule are implemented, we foresee an

increase in the demands for near term remediation. The Task Force is persuaded that UXO

remediation is not now and should not be a core competence of the DOD. As a consequence it is

recommended that incentives be provided to outsource this work to industry. The Task Force

believes that it will be necessary for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to modify its contracting

process for UXO remediation. Current contracting terms tend to discourage the use of new tools

(technologies that have not been formally certified by DOD as acceptable for use in the contract).

The current use of a time and materials approach does not provide an incentive for efficiency.

Strict liability is frequently required of the contractor, creating exposure to long term suits often

deemed unacceptable by larger companies. The contracting is generally for small tasks. As a

consequence, most of the remediation is performed by Small and Small Disadvantaged Business

(8a) set-asides who have no real technology base to offer and very limited technology assets. In

summary, the result is a remediation program that does not build or expand present industrial

capabilities.

The Task Force recommends that UXO site clean up activities be packaged and outsourced

entirely to contractors to achieve more cost effective solutions. Performance-based contracting

procedures should be required and the Federal Acquisition Regulations used to relieve private

companies of unreasonable third party liability and indemnification burdens. Further contractual

arrangements should provide incentives to stimulate industry to invest in and use advanced

technology. The objective is to have industry commercialize and apply DOD developed

technologies as well as to develop their own proprietary products.

Equally important is the need for stable funding. Quarterly funding does not allow the execution

of a long-term project, because most work is under the Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity

6
(IDIQ) concept. This results in needless temporary duty assignments and a significant

unnecessary cost in travel.

Future base closures should have full disclosure of any UXO problems, if any, early on, so the

public, Congress and the Administration will be aware of any UXO issue and the likely costs for

certain land reuse so that property use and transfer plans can be made accordingly.

The Task Force review of UXO (and EOD) technologies currently used at active ranges revealed

a dependence on outdated techniques and tools. Improvements are needed in the technology and

tools used at these ranges to help ensure better safety of personnel and to maintain long term

viability of the ranges.

Scrap material sold to wholesalers has also inadvertently contained UXO. A policy is needed to

direct the processing of all scrap material that is potentially contaminated with UXO. Active

ranges should have ready access to suitable processing equipment, such as flash furnaces, to

process this scrap material.

7
3. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

THE UXO PROBLEM: How BIG?

DOD defines “explosive ordnance” as any munition, weapon delivery system, or ordnance item

that contains explosives, propellants or chemical agents. For this report, unexploded ordnance

(UXO) consists of these same items after they (1) are armed or otherwise prepared for action, (2)

are launched, placed, fired, or released in a way that they cause hazards, and (3) remain

unexploded through malfunction or otherwise armed.

UXO contamination of land and sea has grown for decades and now presents a serious problem

in the United States. The contamination prevents civilian land use, threatens public safety and

causes environmental concerns. Estimates provided to the Task Force indicate that over 15

million acres in the United States may contain some level of UXO contamination, on about 1,500

different sites. This figure does not include the acreage of UXO contamination undersea, which

may be even larger.

At present, UXO-related injuries in the United States are infrequent. For example, in 1996

CONUS DOD Ranges experienced two injuries and two deaths due to UXO. The situation

overseas is much different, however, due to the exposure of large civilian populations to AntiPersonnel Landmines (APL) and UXO contaminated areas. According to the International Red .

Cross, 2000 people outside the United States are injured or killed every month by landmines.

These APL/UXO related casualties demonstrate the dangers inherent to civilian populations

when they are exposed to APL/‘UXO contaminated land. And some US military peacekeeping

and humanitarian operations are conducted in such areas. (Point of clarification: there are

definitional distinctions between UXO and Anti-Personnel Landmines. However in the context

of this report, UXO related technologies apply across the five functional areas of Countermining,

Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Humanitarian De-mining, Active Range Clearance, and

Environmental Remediation.)

Most UXO in the United States is the result of weapons system testing and troop training

activities conducted by the DOD. Property containing UXO includes active military sites and

land transferred to private use, such as Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS), and Base

Realignment And Closure (BRAC) sites.

As defined in this report, UXO remediation focuses on efforts to clean FUDS and BRAC sites

for private use and to maintain the long term viability of active ranges. Remediation efforts also

include developing tools and techniques designed to reduce the number of future UXO.

Adding to its inherent complexity, UXO remediation also involves communities and the full

range of government, including Federal, State, Tribal, and local agencies.

The increased concern about the UXO situation has been driven largely by base closure activities

and the development of the Range and Munitions Rules. Accordingly, the DOD is in the process

of enhancing its capabilities to address the situation.
DOD’S UXO responsibility includes providing UXO site clean-up project management, assuring

compliance with state and local laws and environmental regulations, assumption of liability, and

appropriate interactions with the public.

GOVERNMENT ACTIONS

The government has taken a number of recent actions concerning UXO remediation. In the

conference report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994,

Congress directed DOD to undertake a large scale detection and clearance technology

demonstration. An Advanced Technology Demonstration was mandated by Congress and funded

for Fiscal Years 1993 and 1994.

Congress also directed the Army to develop technologies for detection, neutralization and

removal of mines for Operations Other Than War in the FY 1995 National Defense

Authorization Act conference report. The House Committee on National Security cited the need

for a central authority to plan, oversee, and coordinate the research, development and acquisition

of the technology applicable to area ordnance clearance.

The General Accounting Office (GAO) in its September 1995 report “UNEXPLODED

ORDNANCE: A Coordinated Approach to Detection and Clearance Is Needed,” recommended

that the Secretary of Defense consult with other agencies involved and then develop a plan on

how such a multi-agency clearinghouse would work and urged that an executive agent be

designated to serve this clearinghouse function.

GAO identified over 20 US organizations that conduct or fund research and development on

systems to detect and clear UXO. The Secretary of Defense was directed to prepare a plan to

define research and development priorities, program management, and cooperative activities with

international programs.

CHANGING PRIORITIES

The military priorities affecting UXO removal have changed dramatically. Historically, UXO

removal was required to improve our warfighting capability and training. The primary mission

for traditional Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) is to support the tempo of traditional military

operations. This EOD focus is on point-removal of explosive hazards (e.g. dud fired conventional

munitions). In those cases where area clearance is needed (such as in ammunition storage areas

after a detonation) normally only a surface clearance is performed.

Today, the importance of UXO has been greatly expanded by the emergence of Operations Other

than Warfare (OOTW), peacekeeping and other non-traditional missions as primary tasks of US

forces. Correct handling of UXO now is a key to effectiveness in these new military operations.

UXO IS NOT MILITARY EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL OR COUNTERMINE

Currently, UXO remediation is handled as if it were an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

problem, largely because the EOD community is the closest matching resource presently

available for UXO remediation. But major differences exist between UXO remediation and the

traditional Explosive Ordnance Disposal (or Countermine) communities in the Department of

9
Defense. These differences must be understood to effectively address the UXO remediation

problem.

UXO remediation involves a complex set of tools, skills, personnel, training and requirements.

The ultimate goal of UXO remediation is to permit safe public use of contaminated lands - a

problem that requires tools and skills capable of detecting and removing deeply buried UXO

(down to 20 feet or more) with high confidence. Required skills will include knowledge of

ordnance recognition, computer and associated software, precise mapping, sub-surface geophysical methods of detection and characterization, Occupational Safety and Health

Administration safety training, explosives handling, blaster skills and data management. UXO

remediation also requires the expertise to handle complex legal, policy and safety problems

involved when transferring UXO sites to private use. UXO remediation efforts could employ

EOD-style surface clearance tools, but only as a first step in the full remediation of a site.

.

Conversely, Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Countermine (EOD/CM) efforts are military missions

designed to clear UXO and mines in support of combat operations. Countermine efforts focus on

minefield breaching, while EOD efforts normally focus on clearance of UXO on the surface or

near surface (but can involve the recovery of test ordnance at ranges). Unlike UXO remediation

of sites, which may be studied in-depth by clean-up crews, EOD/CM areas typically must be

cleared quickly to support combat operations. Typical non-combat EOD mission involves the

elimination of an immediate threat from explosive ordnance to life or property in an emergency

response role. EOD/CM operations, skills, tools and methods therefore focus on speed, work to

clear a pathway through the area, generally avoid subsurface UXO and do not involve the

complex issues associated with past or current land transfer.

ACTIVE RANGE CLEARANCE Is ALSO DIFFERENT

The requirements and practices for UXO clearance at active ranges are different from those for

environmental UXO remediation or combat explosive ordnance disposal. Active range clearance

is usually surface clean-up, without the urgency of countermine operations. But there are also

requirements and additional hazards in the recovery of experimental ordnance, sometimes deeply

buried, for which there may be limited descriptions or documentation. Clean-up at active ranges

by EOD units also provides training in EOD operations for these units.

PROPOSED R ANGE R ULE R EQUIREMENTS/PROCESS

The Proposed Range Rule, which has been signed by the Office of Management and Budget and

appeared in the Federal Register for public comment on September 26, 1997, is a DOD

originated, interagency-coordinated document that will set forth a process for evaluating

appropriate responses/actions on closed, transferring, and transferred ranges. Closed ranges are

on active installations while transferring ranges are in a BRAC status. Transferred ranges are

those in the FUDS program.

The Proposed Range Rule process involves five phases through close out.

Phase 1: Inventory the sites

10
Phase 2: Assess and determine accelerated response needs

Phase 3: Evaluate and take site-specific action

Phase 4: Recurring reviews (includes options for protective processes and monitoring)

Phase 5: Close out

The Task Force wishes to emphasize the importance to DOD of prompt implementation of the

proposed Range Rule, especially for the Phase I inventory of sites. It is important for DOD to

quickly identify and characterize the universe of UXO sites, and to research, develop and update

realistic working estimates of the cost of clearance or other forms of response consistent with

anticipated reuse.

MUNITIONS RULE

The military Munitions Rule was signed and released by the Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA) on February 3, 1997. The rule became effective on August 12, 1997, The Rule is the

culmination of a major effort by the Federal Government (particularly EPA and DOD), States,

Tribes and other interest groups. It was developed in response to a Congressional mandate in the

Federal Facility Compliance Act.

Several aspects of the Munitions Rule are of particular importance to UXO clean-up. It defines

when munitions are waste. This triggers the legal requirements which result in additional

administrative actions regarding reporting, storage and disposal which generally increases

management costs. It also provides for conditional exemption for storage and transportation of

military munitions. Additionally, the Rule codifies long-standing EPA exemptions for

emergency response activities involving munitions and explosives. The Rule excludes active and

inactive ranges from most Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) requirements.

It is expected that the Range Rule will be in effect by fall of 1998. Once the Range Rule is

promulgated, EPA is expected to modify the Munitions Rule to defer to the Range Rule’s

requirements for UXO remediation.

1 1
4. FINDINGS AND

REMEDIATION

A. Policy

FINDINGS

A review of current policy

RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING UXO

shows that DOD has no specific UXO remediation policy or program

as it is all subsumed in the DOD Environmental Restoration Program DOD1 4715.7. In fact, UXO

is not even mentioned in that document. While, there is no uniform DOD UXO Remediation

Policy to guide all affected DOD components, DOD Directive 6055.9 does provide specific

safety and restoration clean-up standards for all DoD lands to include Formerly Used Defense

Sites (FUDS) activities

As a result, there are no specific DOD-wide UXO clean-up goals, objectives, or management

plans. Consequently, UXO remediation decisions today are made within the individual Services,

where UXO remediation requirements are forced to compete against traditional warfighting and

toxic waste clean-up requirements. In the current period of declining budgets, this competition

has resulted in UXO efforts being relegated to “housekeeping duties” at the activity or

installation level.

There are a number of deleterious consequences of this lack of policy guidance regarding UXO

management of training and test ranges which puts the long-term viability of those sites at risk -

a problem of particular importance to active test ranges.

Many Tribal Lands are FUDS and today still contain substantial amounts of UXO. The Task

Force notes that these lands currently are used for private activities, such as farming, and present

an immediate public UXO hazard due to insufficient DOD clean-up and the lack of tribal

government authority to issue land-use restrictions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To address DOD’S unmet management responsibilities in UXO, the Task Force recommends the

establishment of an OSD focal point for oversight of UXO activities in the Department of

Defense.

This focal point would recommend UXO remediation objectives and policy to the Secretary of

Defense, formulate an investment strategy that sets the expenditure of resources on remediation

(based upon the DDR&E’s estimate of the performance to be gained from the application of

advanced technology), promulgate the UXO RDT&E program’s priorities (but doesn’t set the

RDT&E program or budget), establish goals and requirements, and recommend and support

investments in new technology to remedy UXO safety and cost issues.

The Task Force believes the Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense/Environmental

Security is a logical focal point for several reasons. First, because of its long experience in

working/partnering with the private sector as well as environmental regulatory agencies, the

12
Environmental Security Office is well equipped to promote private sector investment, transfer

scientific knowledge and technology to the private sector, and win regulatory acceptance/

support.

Second, as DOD’S front line in facing communities concerned about environmental and public

safety hazards, environmental security is likely to emphasize those aspects of ordnance response

technology that are unique to this mission. For example, environmental UXO response requires

attention to subsurface UXO.

Third, to leverage DOD investment in technology in related mission areas, as well as share the

fruits of environmental UXO research and development, there needs to -be a focal point in

Environmental Security. The Task Force notes the Department’s recent decision to improve and

coordinate such activity. We believe that the entire effort will benefit from the creation of an

office within DUSD(ES) to lead OSD’s UXO response.

The Task Force recommends that the DUSD(ES) take the policy lead for DOD UXO remediation

efforts, in coordination with other relevant DOD components.

DUSD(ES) should:

Identify the needed Congressional actions that will drive UXO requirements for an improved

DOD program, including the likely FUDS/BRAC sites with high congressional priority and those

closed ranges that should be converted to more productive uses. To date, neither DOD nor the

private sector fully appreciate the magnitude of UXO remediation. Therefore, we recommend the

establishment of a closed range UXO remediation line item in the Environmental Security

budget. This line item will offer the DOD and Congress the opportunity to determine the proper

level of effort for UXO response; it will provide the information that both the DOD and the

private sector need in order to develop plans for investment of technology, personnel, and other

resources appropriate to the clean-up task; and it will make it easier to apply relative risk

principles to the allocation of UXO project money without comparison to totally different kinds

of risks. The OSD-managed Program Element would be managed by DUSD(ES), executed by

Services/Agencies (or Executive Agent designation) and help ensure transition funding in out

years.

Provide recommendations to Congress concerning appropriate clean-up budgets based on a

DOD UXO remediation plan:

n Develop a two-stage risk management process.

n Use clean-up budgets as the market incentive to attract industry.

n Provide the needed interface between industry and in-house DOD efforts.

Develop a risk-based priority system, similar to the Relative Risk Site Evaluation Framework for

hazardous waste sites, to weigh the many competing UXO needs, based upon explosive risks,

other human health risks, ecological concerns, and other pertinent factors, including current and

future property use. Such priority determinations should be made in consultation with

environmental regulatory agencies and the affected public. The present approach to clean-up

varies widely from site to site and does not have clearly established methods for assessing

priorities and risks. A two-stage risk management process should be employed, the first stage

13
focusing on immediate responses to UXO risks, and the second designed to provide subsequent

responses to risks.

Accelerate the improvement of UXO remediation efforts on Tribal lands. Many Tribal Lands are

Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS) and contain substantial amounts of UXO. The Task Force

notes that these Lands present an immediate public UXO threat due to insufficient DOD clean-up

and lack of Tribal government land use restrictions.

Create a DOD-wide Active Range Policy that ensures the safety of people, directs the use of

UXO practices that maintain the long-term viability of the range (e.g. avoids creating areas with

permanent UXO contamination), and that improves information management concerning the

clean-up from activities involving the expenditure of “Special Compartmented Ordnance.”

Current DOD Active Range policy has a number of gaps that need to be filled. Some major gaps

include the inadequate dissemination of “Special Compartmented Information” i.e., “Top

Secret,” to the UXO/EOD community and the continuation of practices that may threaten the

long term viability of the active range.

Tasks in managing UXO remediation are:

Prepare a site master plan that establishes the end state for each location that is

cleanup, including what should be left in place and what should be cleaned

upon level to accommodate future land use.

Identify, evaluate and, where appropriate, remediate the threat from UXO.

identified for

to an agreed

Ensure that “lessons learned” are spread throughout all remediation communities.

Ensure immediate action to remove imminent threats to public safety.

Risk management strategies are needed to handle the widespread presence of unmapped UXO in

areas where members of the public are (or may be) exposed to serious explosive hazards.- While

many locations will require facility-specific plans, we believe that the general approach should

be to divide responses into at least two stages.

The immediate goal must be to eliminate potential public exposure to UXO. This may be

accomplished through surface clearance, physical controls such as fences, and/or legal

restrictions (on digging, for example). In areas where subsurface UXO is known to migrate to the

surface, these responses must receive periodic maintenance.

Because current remediation capabilities are so inefficient, they should be used primarily on

relatively small areas containing surface or near surface, ferrous-based UXO. However, currently

there is no safe, reliable, cost-effective method for clearing large areas of subsurface UXO,

despite the fact that the intended use of some properties clearly requires large scale, subsurface

remediation.

14
In many areas, current clean-up capabilities cannot render sites safe for their intended reuse.

Rather than rush to clear these large areas with current tools, DOD should make it clear that it

will conduct an aggressive R&D effort to develop more efficient tools and practices for the more

thorough and efficient remediation of the sites within a few years.

Future base closures should have full disclosure of UXO problems, if any, early on, so the public,

Congress and the Administration will be well aware of any UXO issue and likely costs for

certain land reuse and so that property use and transfer plans can be made accordingly.

Scrap range material sold to wholesalers has also inadvertently contained UXO. A policy is

needed regarding the processing of all scrap material that is potentially contaminated with UXO.

Active ranges should have ready access to suitable processing equipment, such as flash furnaces,

to process scrap material. A full discussion of these issues may be found in the Report from the

Office of the Inspector General “Evaluation of the Disposal of Munitions Items,” dated

September 5, 1997.

To date, neither DOD nor the private sector fully appreciates the magnitude of UXO remediation.

Therefore, we recommend the establishment of an OSD account for remediation and one for

RDT&E. These line items will offer the DOD and Congress the opportunity to determine the

proper level of effort for UXO response; it will provide the information that both the DOD and

the private sector need to develop plans for investment of technology, personnel, and other

resources appropriate to the clean-up task; and it will make it easier to apply relative risk

principles to the allocation of UXO project money without comparison to totally different kinds

of risks. The OSD-managed Program Element would be managed by DUSD(ES), responsive to

the DDR&E UXO RDT&E plans and programs and executed by Services/Agencies (or

Executive Agent designation) and help ensure transition funding in out years.

B. DOD UXO Remediation Requirements

FINDINGS

UXO remediation is generally performed by private sector companies under contract to the

government. Typically these are time and material contracts designed for Response Action

Requirements as opposed to long-term projects. The guidelines describing their UXO effort

largely is found in addenda to government contracts, such as Work Plans. There does not appear

to have been a rigorous analysis of UXO remediation tasks. As a result, there is no

documentation of the areas with the highest potential payoff for the benefits of technology to be

applied.

DOD recently has undertaken several initiatives with the objective of addressing the requirements

issue. The first is an in-house effort to develop specific requirements. This effort is closely

linked to the ad hoc oversight organization DOD put into place to tie together all the related

mission areas dealing with removing UXO contamination from the ground (Counter-mine, EOD

Ordnance Disposal, Humanitarian Demining, Active Range Clearance and Environmental

Remediation). These efforts are too recent to have yielded measurable results and it’s too early to

predict their overall contribution to solving the problems.

1 5
The lack of formal UXO requirements creates problems involving processes and procedures. An

example of such a problem involves the current practice of military aircraft being permitted to

drop live ordnance in designated areas (such as military test ranges) during flight emergencies.

While current practice permits dropping the ordnance, it does not require sufficiently detailed

reporting to operators of the range regarding what and where ordnance was dropped. This means

that because of such activities, test ranges may have substantial amounts of UXO that is of

unknown type or quantity. In this example, a requirement to provide a timely report on such

emergency actions to the appropriate authority is needed.

RECOMMENDATIONS 

UXO remediation will compete with other DOD requirements in the annual budget cycle. In

order to best use the resources allocated to the UXO remediation efforts, every effort must be

made to eliminate the ad hoc approach to UXO rernediation and establish organizational

structures and priorities that allow UXO remediation to be accomplished in a safe and timely

manner. The Task Force recommends that the DUSD(ES) coordinate the development of a

Requirements Document which defines and codifies LJXO remediation missions and tasks, and to

also:

n Write, staff, approve and publish materiel requirements documents;

n Define an investment and acquisition strategy (DDR&E to provide the RDT&E

portion);

n Designate and define roles and responsibilities;

n Establish an unbiased materiel tester to evaluate results of the R&D program;

n Publish and periodically update the UXO remediation materiel acquisition Master Plan

(roadmap showing short-, mid-, and long-term strategy);

n Provide a constant flow of funds to contractors, to maximize planning and staffing on a

project basis.

C. Technology

FINDINGS

The technology and practices currently used in the field have not changed dramatically over the

last several decades They generally consist of a hand held magnetometer that detects where the

earth’s magnetic field is distorted by the presence of a nearby object having magnetic properties

(e.g. piece of iron). Each time a detection is made, the operator places a flag at the location. At

some sites it may be necessary to place flags every five or ten feet and at other sites the flags

might be separated by hundreds of feet. Subsequently, operators with a magnetometer and shovel

return to each flag and manually dig in the ground to recover the detected object. This is the

“Mag and Flag” process.

1 6
Current sensor technology “finds” far more “objects” than pieces of ordnance (i.e. the clutter

generates false alarms). False alarms greatly increase target removal costs, since each false alarm

must be treated (excavated) as actual ordnance.

According to econometric models developed by the Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal

Technology Center, excavation costs for each UXO target will range between $35 - $450,

depending upon the nature of the terrain, the type of ordnance being removed and whether

mechanical or manual excavation techniques are employed. Using current tools and techniques,

Under normal circumstances UXO remediation costs could be as high as $20,000 per acre.

However under emergency situations, the cost could be much higher. (For example, UXO

remediation efforts at Spring Valley in Washington, DC, performed between Jan 1993-Jan 1995

under RCRA emergency procedures, cost about $45,000 per acre).

Because the suspect sites have not been surveyed, there is great uncertainty about the actual size

of the UXO problem. However, even if only 5% of suspect acreage needs cleanup, remediation

costs would still be high (possibly exceeding 15 billion dollars) and times would be long

(possibly taking over several decades to complete) using current technologies. UXO site

remediation in the United States currently is being funded at about $125M per year, exclusive of

special clean-up programs (such as Kaho’olawe at $400M, based upon projected Senate action,

and Mare Island, CA at $1 OM). Of the $125M/per year we estimate that labor accounts for about

$70-80M per year which could be reduced dramatically. These estimates are based on currently

used sensors, typical remediation costs, and do not include surface clearance or UXO disposal

costs.

Until the last several years, improvements in the remediation of UXO relied mainly on products

coming from research and development that targeted EOD and Counter-mine needs. While

EOD/Countermine R&D amounts to some $26M per year, in our judgment, the portion

applicable to UXO remediation has averaged about $3-6M per year. This funding cannot provide

a major improvement to our UXO remediation effort anytime soon.

The recent interest in UXO remediation has stimulated a number of different R&D efforts related

to UXO. We estimate the total current UXO related effort now to be $15-20M per year, with the

increase being largely due to the DARPA programs. However, the program still lacks overall

technical leadership of objectives, investment strategy, directed funding, and coordinated

management. The result is a mixed bag:

n The DARPA program on characterization of the clutter by various sensors and

processing of data is exemplary and long overdue, as is its research to develop an

“artificial dog’s nose” to detect the presence of high explosive.

n Analysis of the UXO technology by the Institute for Defense Analyses is well done.

n The recent OSD-directed establishment of small research contracts with universities on

several relevant topics is an important step in the right direction.

n The navigation experiments using differential GPS have demonstrated that the

necessary precision can be obtained.

m Recent tests on arrays of magnetometers and electromagnetic induction sensors (EMI)

demonstrate the capability to detect and discriminate some objects at useful depths, and

17
with reasonable extensions, offer the possibility to provide data which can be processed

and fused to provide estimations of their location, material properties, shape and

orientation.

However:

Much of the in-house laboratory activity is subcritical,

to produce the necessary capability in industry.

Recent tests of off-the-shelf commercial products

improvements but are far short of what is needed.

institutionalized and not likely

have demonstrated marginal

There has been too little attention given to some techniques which may provide

capabilities important for particular sites (acoustic/seismic for deeply buried objects,

fast and thermal neutron activation for detection of high explosives, advanced removal

techniques, the migration of underground objects over time, etc.)

Despite the limitations of the current R&D program, there is enough scientific understanding and

experimental data to convince the Task Force that an aggressive and well managed program

could demonstrate dramatic improvements in cost effectiveness within the next few years. The

pacing element is the need to reduce false alarms. From our discussion with many researchers,

we conclude that a properly structured and funded RDT&E program executed by the nation’s

best performers could reasonably lead to a reduction of false alarms by about a factor of 10 in 3-5

years Such an improvement would apply particularly to UXO sites heavily cluttered in the past

by human activity and thus cost so much to clean up.

This field of investigation is not “idea” limited. What is needed is an aggressive research and

development program to demonstrate an integrated system-of-systems capability, involving

precision navigation, communications, new sensors and associated algorithms and fusion of

information, to provide discrimination of UXO from other objects.

R&D RECOMMENDATIONS

The Task Force recommends that the Department set as an objective the demonstration of a

reduction in the false alarms by about a factor of ten within 3-5 years. To do so, the Task Force

recommends a two-track approach:

Track 1. To provide a baseline capability, conduct an aggressive, competitive industrial

development and demonstration program to provide a contractor integrated system-ofsystems capability with about a ten fold reduction in the number of false alarms.

Because the contaminated sites differ from one another, it will be necessary to provide

different combinations of systems to produce the necessary improvement. But whatever

combination is chosen to work a particular site, the combination must be integrated

and perform as a system.

For example, the Task Force suspects that following a review of the historical use of a site, the

competitive program would have produced a capability to perform an efficient site survey using

helicopter or fixed wing aircraft employing Radar and/or infrared detectors of surface and near

surface objects. The location of each object would be entered into a common database to an

1 8
accuracy of l-3 feet. Appropriate components to provide such a capability have already been

demonstrated individually.

Following examination and clean-up of surface objects, the program would also have

demonstrated a capability to detect and estimate the characteristics (classification) of

underground objects to a depth of at least three feet. Some elements of such a capability already

have been demonstrated but major advances are required in the sensors, associated processing

and fusion algorithms. Subsequently, advanced techniques would be used for excavations.

The Task Force expects that the required improvements will come from the use of:

n Stabilized or periodically stationary platforms.

n Precise navigation of sensor positions.

n Total field magnetometers, to detect magnetic objects, their location and depth.

n Electromagnetic induction (EMI) sensors with orthogonal transmit coils and digitally

controlled waveforms to detect electrically conducting objects and estimate their

location, depth, material, length-to-width ratio and orientation.

H Integrated processing to alert and inform the operator as to the target position, depth,

magnetic properties and estimates of target size and orientation.

The effectiveness of such a system will depend on the quality of the processing algorithms and

especially the calibration of the systems against the clutter and expected ordnance at each site.

While it seems relatively straightforward to deploy such a system-of-systems on a wheeled

vehicle, it will be more difficult and may take longer, to provide comparable capability in the

man portable system which must be used where vehicle passage is too restricted.

It is estimated that the competitive development and demonstration of such a capability will

require about $20M per year for three to five years.

Track 2. Conduct, in paraIIe1 with the baseline program, a longer range research program to

explore the value and limits of approaches that are not chosen for the baseline program

and, in addition, to provide an additional, separate, and competitive supporting effort

on the most pacing aspects of the baseline program.

Examples of such activities are: seismic/acoustic detection for the deeper objects, neutron

activation and chemical sensing for high explosives (“artificial dog’s nose”) the migration of

buried objects over time, the characterization and discrimination of clutter, sensor specific

algorithms, data fusion, advanced excavation techniques etc.

Surface clearance often requires intrusive activity, such as the removal of vegetation. Subsurface

clearance, by definition, disturbs the land. To limit the environmental damage of .remediation, it

is important to develop sustainable approaches. For example, at Fort Ord - where fire is part of

the natural ecosystem - the Army and Department of the Interior have developed a plan for

controlled burns to support clearance. In other areas, remediation may be planned to avoid

disturbance of sensitive animal populations. For this reason, the remediation technology program

should support ecological research to improve the coordination of conservationlresource

management and clearance activity.

19
It is estimated that the Track 2 investigations should also be funded at about S20M per year for

the foreseeable future.

The Task Force recognizes that such an aggressive program will require professional focused

management and the support of the Congress. An incremental investment of $20M per year over

the next 3-5 years represents about a two-fold increase over the present funding. However,

remediation efforts currently expend about $125M per year, of which we estimate that $70-80 M

is labor intensive. If a ten fold reduction in false alarms is achieved, $60-70 M/year can be saved.

Thus the Task Force recommends that the incremental funds to support an aggressive R&D

program be provided from offsets to the total UXO clean-up program.

It should be understood that for several decades we have depended on the “Mag and Flag”

equipment, procedures and training to remediate UXO contaminated sites. And although these

are always potentially hazardous operations, the operators have developed the necessary

understanding, confidence and trust in their equipment and procedures. The Task Force is

persuaded that even afier new equipment, software and procedures demonstrate about a ten fold

reduction in false alarms, a special effort will be required to convince clean-up crews to trust the

new equipment and procedures.

To reduce future UXO remediation problems, achieving the lower “dud” rate also should be a

requirement when new munitions are developed. A program to examine the capability of selfdestruction or self-deactivization fuzing should be initiated in all conventional munitions as a

step to reduce duds and subsequent remediation costs.

Specific improvements that should be pursued include development of tags for ordnance that can

withstand environmental degradation (and still identify the location or type of UXO),

development of self-destructing ordnance to reduce the UXO problem, improvement of the

collection and management of site use data, expanding the use of ordnance in-flight tracking

systems (“fire finders”) to locate impact areas, and better overall documentation and

instrumentation of UXO clean-up efforts.

Test ranges must have ongoing remediation programs (not just traditional EOD clearance) to .

extend their productivity and decrease the need for the acquisition of new ranges.

The Task Force review of UXO (and EOD) technologies currently used at active ranges

discovered a dependence on outdated techniques and tools. Improvements are needed in the

technology and tools used at these ranges to help ensure better safety of personnel and to

maintain long term viability of the ranges. There should be an emphasis placed on disposal

techniques and the availability of processing equipment such as flash furnaces, etc.

2 0
D. Program Management

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

To initiate an aggressive and effective program, and to better maintain the organizational

connectivity between Acquisition and RDT&E, the Task Force recommends that DDR&E

develop DOD-wide objectives, RDT&E strategy, plans and programs that emphasize the

discovery, demonstration and exploitation of much more efficient methods of detection,

classification, removal and safing of UXO’s. This must be coordinated across service lines and

provide sufficient funding to meet the near term challenges and the long term interests of public

safety. The major focus of DOD’S R&D program over the coming 3-5 years is to achieve

significant out year savings in the Department’s UXO remediation efforts.

To ensure program success, stable but flexible funding is required. The funding must be stable to

enable the technology efforts to mature, but flexible enough to pursue aggressively highly

promising programs as they become evident.

CURRENT MUNITIONS/RDT&E FINDINGS

The Task Force learned that some types of munitions (e.g. submunitions) have rates as high as

10%. We suspect that when the cost of clean-up is included in the life cycle cost it may be

appropriate to lower the allowable dud rates.

The DOD 5160.62 (a regulation on operation of the EOD training and technology program)

requires munitions Project Managers (PM’s) to provide data and hardware to the EOD

community (EODTECHDIV) for development of Render Safe Procedures (RSP) and Disposal

Procedures (DP) at the Milestone III (Production) decision point. Under these guidelines, an

approved RSP/DP will be available when the Service makes the formal decision for Materiel

Release, about two years after the Milestone III decision. Interim RSP will be available during

the entire RDT&E process, if munitions items are transported and the potential for an accident

exists. Ideally, the EOD community should be involved in the entire RDT&E process to ensure

the designers consider the requirement for a RSP/DP. Practically, EOD considerations are not

included in the munitions design process.

The Milestone III decision point is too late to formally start development of a RSP/DP. At

Milestone III, production dollars are committed for the initial production quantities. Any design

changes after Milestone III will be minor to accommodate production processes. At this point,

the munition has been “Type Classified” or “Accepted for Service Use” and the Technical Data

Package (TDP) is fixed; changes to accommodate an EOD requirement are very high in cost and

virtually impossible.

The requirements for the RSP/DP are found in the DOD Directive which establishes

responsibilities for EOD technology and training. There is no guidance on the need to consider

and incorporate an EOD RSP/DP in the capstone DOD acquisition directive DOD 5000.2R. Such

guidance needs to be included in this directive.

2 1
RECOMMENDATIONS

Make the development of EOD RSP/DP a consideration from the start of a munitions design and

have EOD represented at all design reviews. EOD requirements must be formally included in the

design process, otherwise it is entirely possible an EOD procedure will be imposed at the

expense of safety or workability simply because it was not considered earlier in the design.

Making the requirement for a final EOD RSP/DP a part of the type classification package will

ensure consideration during design. Placing this in the DOD materiel acquisition guidance will

institutionalize the requirement beyond the EOD community.

C ONTRACTING: FINDINGS

The Task Force is persuaded that humanitarian UXO clean-up is not and does not need to be a

DOD core competence. The Task Force contends that the fiscal reality is that the Department

cannot afford the costs of establishing and properly resourcing an organic capacity for this effort

nor is this a warfighting requirement . We believe that invigorating private sector involvement

in UXO remediation is critical to the success of the DOD UXO clean-up effort. But to encourage

private sector participation, a UXO remediation “market” must first be more evident. The Task

Force recognizes that the DOD must sustain a core competency in countermining and explosive

ordnance disposal (EOD) which are tactical missions narrower in scope than broad area UXO

clearance .

In the absence of a well-defined DOD program, Congressional actions heavily influence the UXO

remediation market. Such actions have usually focused upon specific FUDS, BRAC sites, and

other situations of Congressional interest..

UXO remediation necessitates a vigorous, continuing dialogue among numerous federal

agencies, state, local and tribal governments, local communities and civic groups. DOD must

achieve an effective level of communication and interaction with all entities in this dialogue.

Past and current UXO projects procured by the US Army Corps of Engineers, US Navy and

others generally do not offer the contractor indemnification or relief from third party liability.

While insurance can be purchased within specific limits, it is expensive and costs are passed back

to the government (which is already self-insured).

Even with added insurance, larger companies are reluctant to accept undefined third party

liability. Large firms see themselves potentially as “deep pocket” targets. (At least one major

firm declined to bid the Kaho’olawe clean-up project specifically because of the

indemnification/third party liability issue). Smaller firms have accepted third party liability and

contracts without indemnification, in part because they have far fewer assets at risk.

The Government develops and/or approves all requirements, specifications, work plans and

procedures. Technology and project methodology is either directed by the government or

defaulted to “current best technology”. Ongoing quality control is performed by the contractor

and repeated by the government. Because of this contracting approach, it would seem the

government has assumed continuing responsibility.

Current Federal Acquisition Regulations offer indemnification and relief from third party

liability, however the contracting offices are not encouraged to use them. To the larger

2 2
companies, the indemnification and third party liability issue is potent enough to discourage

participation in UXO projects. This tends to limit participation to smaller firms with limited

resources and technology development capability.

Most of the contracts issued are time and materials IDIQ for Response Actions, which are

typically single small jobs (or level of effort projects) that may be attractive to the small firms,

but not the larger ones. As a consequence, the larger firms have little incentive to invest in

advanced technology or to bring to bear their considerable capability in management systems

engineering and integration. Larger sites should be treated as “Projects” and managed with a

semi-permanent staff.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To effectively include the use of integration contractors, and to encourage the development and

use of advanced capabilities, current contracting procedures must change.

The Task Force recommends employing performance/objective/criteria-based contracting

procedures that provide incentives to the private sector to participate more efficiently and

aggressively in UXO clean-up effort.

The Federal Acquisition Regulations should also be used to relieve private companies of

unreasonable third party liability and indemnification burdens.

Develop a contractual remediation plan that requires the clean-up of several appropriate sites and

encourages the participation of larger contractors and economies from their management and

integration capabilities.

The US Army Corps of Engineers should modify its contracting process to provide incentives to

deploy advanced technology as it becomes available. The use of IDIQ’s should be reserved for

Response Actions only. Sites should be handled as “Projects” with a constant flow of funds.

Develop a baseline standard of performance metrics to measure cost and quality, applicable to all

instruments and processes. This would become the unit of measure for judgiug the acceptability

of new technologies and improvements to existing methods. Furthermore, a standard for UXO

clean-up should be implemented so technology developers work with one set of rules.

UXO remediation is a potentially life threatening task that uses technology largely unchanged .

over the past 50 years. DOD must play a leading role in training and proving to UXO clean-up

crews that new systems (and their associated procedures) are safe and effective.

2 3
PERSONNEL: FINDINGS

The Task Force concludes that existing tools, methods, and training for uniformed EOD

personnel are insufficient to fully address the total scope of the UXO problem. EOD has become

a center of mass for this within the DOD, yet this is more a default practice than an actual

solution. The private sector presently relies upon retired EOD personnel for the supervisory skills

necessary for site remediation. (This reliance is driven by DOD contractual requirements.) The

reality appears to be that military EOD experience, coupled with on-the-job training in the

private sector, provide the necessary skills required for large scale UXO clearance.

Unfortunately, recent statistics indicate that only about 30-40 EOD personnel per year enter the

UXO business arena after retirement.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Task Force makes the following recommendations concerning personnel to support UXO

remediation efforts:

n Support and provide incentives for the expansion of industrial capabilities and capacity for

UXO remediation.

n Encourage and support, as appropriate, private/public based non-DOD training. This support

should include related publications, lesson plans and training aides as may be available

within the DOD and other Federal agencies.

E. Public Involvement

FINDINGS

Public involvement is required for environmental projects within the DOD, including UXO

remediation projects. A primary element of the public involvement program is the Restoration

Advisory Board (RAB) which is established for each geographical area.

Public involvement is far broader than “Public Information” because it includes inviting the

public to participate and often “approve”, not just to be informed. The threat of explosions

injuring civilians often prompts a justifiable emotional response by members of the public.

State and Tribe regulators have a significant impact on the success of the project because they

apply exposure scenarios based upon “reasonably anticipated land use” and establish the

acceptable levels of clearance/clean-up criteria. They also inherit any future problems. The

continuing debate over the “Munitions Rules” and the “Range Rule” is evidence of the lack of

agreement between the State regulators and the DOD. State and tribe regulators have formed a

group to work on the Range Rule specifically called the “Range Rule Partnering Initiative”.

Members include State regulators from various States and Tribal governments.

Risk management systems that are designed to balance risk reduction with the availability of

resources for range remediation need public involvement and support to be successful.

24
RECOMMENDATIONS

To encourage constructive input from concerned populations, all military representatives who

interact with the public in these situations should be trained in “two-way” communications. State

and Tribe regulators should be acknowledged and treated as a group separate from public

involvement stakeholders.

Public stakeholders, including local government entities (such as local reuse authorities) and

property owners (and prospective transferees) should play a lead role in the establishment of land

use plans for UXO-contaminated property.

Clearance to levels less protective than those required to meet land use preferences of affected

communities should be accompanied by a promise to reconsider remedies once more costeffective technologies become available.

Land owners, planning agencies and potential transferees should play a role in the determination

of certification of UXO-cleared land-and the negotiation of indemnification.

Public interest groups, natural/cultural resource trustees, as well as other Federal, State and

Tribal agencies, with an interest in the protection of natural or cultural resources should have the

opportunity to help ensure that responses minimally threaten those resources.

F. Minimizing Exposure

FINDINGS

Reducing risk depends heavily upon educating the public about UXO hazards and the

minimization of potential exposure pathways. Some work has already been done to educate the

public about the hazards of UXO. For example, Fort Ord has developed educational brochures,

Tierra Santa, a clean-up site in southern California, has produced educational videos and the

Huntsville Division of the Army Corps of Engineers has developed informational materials

suitable for children.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In areas where UXO exposure is likely, people exposed to UXO, including children, should be

educated to recognize and respond properly to UXO.

Physical controls, including fences, barriers, and signs should be constructed where necessary,

and will require on-going maintenance.

Deed restrictions designed to limit potential exposure pathways on land with (potential) residual

UXO contamination should be supported by zoning restrictions and/or environmental regulatory

authority.

2 5
G. Project Restoration

FINDINGS

UXO remediation efforts will have long term impact on a site. Many UXO sites will require

restoration work well after the UXO safety issue has been successfully mitigated. Significant

future problems may arise on these sites as a result of the UXO remediation effort if sufficient

planning is not made.

For example, no standards currently exist to mitigate the contamination of soil caused from nitro

aromatic compounds (common to high explosives). UXO site clean-up may require substantial

deforestation; yet no reforestation standards currently exist. Furthermore, water and air

surrounding or contained within a UXO site may need continuous monitoring to confirm the

safety of the site and to protect the communities surrounding it.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Require the site remediation plans to consider possible need for restoration in later years.

Develop standards to mitigate soil contamination, reforestation, etc.

H. Closed Ranges on DOD Property

FINDINGS

In addition to ranges at former or closing bases, numerous Department of Defense installations

contain closed ranges that will never again be used as impact areas. At some of these facilities,

the presence of UXO is the major reason that such closed ranges remain in the DOD inventory.

Since these closed ranges are usually off-limits to the public, they pose less of a threat to public

safety than transferred or transferring ranges. Nevertheless, much of this property could be put to

other uses once cost-effective remediation technologies are developed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Develop and implement a risk management strategy for such closed ranges, and create a funding

stream - other than base operations and maintenance - to support appropriate responses.

26
APPENDIX A: TERMS OF REFERENCE

A-l
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

30 10 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3010

AQUISITION AND

TECHNOLOGY

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference -- Defense Science Board Task Force on Anti-Personnel

Landmine Alternatives, Landrnine Detection and Demining, and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)

Clearance Operations.

Request that you establish a Defense Science Board Task Force on anti-personnel landmine

alternatives, landmine detection and demining, and UXO clearance operations. This Task force shall

be conducted in two phases. Phase one will study U.S. landmine, landmine detection, and demining

efforts, and alternatives to anti-personnel landmines. Phase two will study UXO remediation, active

range UXO clearance, and explosive ordnance disposal efforts.

PHASE ONE:

Examine U.S. landmine, landmine detection and demining efforts, and alternatives to antipersonnel landmines. In developing its findings and recommendations, the Task Force will:

l Review U.S. Anti-Personnel Landmine (APL) programs, including the technologies involved, the

doctrine for their employment, the military need they fulfill, and applicable international law

governing their use.

l Review 1) U.S. landmine detection and 2) U.S. humanitarian demining programs, focusing the

technologies involved, the doctrine for their employment, and the military and/or humanitarian

needs they fulfill.

l Review and analyze the broad strategic situation facing the U.S. in Southwest Asia, North Korea,

Africa, Central America, and the Third World countries. Focus on the potential/likelihood of the

U.S. military’s use of APL in operations in those areas and the need for landmine detection

capabilities in those areas.

Analyze the technologies, development programs, and systems that may provide viable

alternatives to APL. Viable is defined as militarily effective, affordable, and consistent with

applicable International Humanitarian Law. Give particular emphasis to identifying those

technologies that can be developed and matured for selective initiation of engineering

development and/or production. Recommend the combination of technologies, strategies, and

doctrines that can best cope with the capabilities that will likely be acquired by hostile nations

five to ten years from now. This should include not only defensive capabilities but revolutionary

offensive capabilities as well.

Analyze the technologies, development programs, and systems that may improve 1) landmine

detection capabilities and 2) demining efforts. For demining, focus on means to make it cheaper,

safer, and/or faster. Give particular emphasis to identifying those technologies that can be

developed and matured for selective initiation of engineering development and/or production.
Recommend the combination of technologies, strategies, and doctrines that can best cope with 1)

the mine capability presently held by hostile nations and those likely to be acquired five to ten

years from now, and 2) the present demining challenge.

l Assess, where appropriate, the potential impact of Task Force recommendations on military

readiness, to include training, operational concepts, organization, and tactics. Recommend and

prioritize areas that should be explored including C3I, SOF, unmanned vehicles, unattended

sensors, non-lethal weapons, and equipment that would improve our capability to operate in

built-up areas.

l Review U.S. and international law governing the potential transfer of technologies, systems, etc.,

that the Task Force recommends for landmine detection and humanitarian demining.

Phase one interim recommendations are desired to support the PPBS process in the

September 1996 timeframe. The phase one final report should be completed by December 13, 1996.

PHASE TWO:

Examine UXO remediation, active range UXO clearance, and explosive ordnance disposal

(EOD) efforts. Include in this examination, the relationship between the UXO/EOD

detection/characterization/clearance and neutralization issues and landmine detection/neutralization

issues addressed in Phase One. In developing its findings and recommendations, the Task Force

will:

l Review 1) UXO remediation, 2) active range UXO clearance, and 3) EOD programs; including

the technologies involved, the applicable policies, the pertinent requirements, and the

organizations involved.

l Analyze the technologies, development programs, and systems that may improve 1) UXO

remediation, 2) active range UXO clearance, and 3) EOD efforts. Focus on means to make

remediation, range clearance and EOD operations cheaper, safer, and/or faster. Give particular

emphasis to identifying those technologies that can be rapidly developed and matured for

selective initiation of engineering development and/or production. Recommend the combination

of technologies, strategies, and doctrines that can best cope with the present UXO remediation,

UXO clearance, and EOD challenges.

l Analyze the technologies, development programs, and systems that may minimize or preclude

the production of UXO, including self-destruct fuzing and self-neutralizing or degradable

explosives. Give particular emphasis to identifying those technologies that can be rapidly

developed and matured for selective initiation of engineering development and/or production.

Recommend the technologies or combination of technologies that could be incorporated in future

munition programs to render them less likely to produce UXO. Assess current munitions stocks

and the potential for retrofitting them with technologies that will render them less likely to

produce UXO.

Phase two will begin in September 1996. A phase two interim report is desired in the

February 1997 timeframe. The phase two final report should be completed by April 25, 1997.
 ’ .

The Director, Strategic and Tactical Systems will be the lead sponsor for this Task Force and

the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Environmental Security) will be a co-sponsor. The

Chairman will be Mr. Robert Parker. Mr. Peter ONeill, OUSD(A&T)/S&TS-M, will serve as the

lead Executive Secretary. COL Paul Ihrke, DOD Explosives Safety Board, will be co-Executive

Secretary. The Defense Science Board Secretariat representative will be LTC T. Van Horn.

This Task Force will be operated in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 92-463, the

“Federal Advisory Committee Act,” and DOD Directive 5104.5, the “DOD Federal Advisory

Committee Management Program.” It is not anticipated that this Task Force will need to go into

any “particular matters” within the meaning of Section 208 of Title 18, U. S. Code, nor will it

cause any member to be placed in the position of acting as a procurement official.

&iiLdiAe

Paul G. Kaminski
APPENDIX B: TASK FORCE MEMBERS AND GOVERNMENT

ADVISORS

TASK FORCE MEMBERS

Chairman: Dr. John S. Foster*

Members: LtGen James Brabham, USMC Ret.

LTG Marvin D. Brailsford, USA Ret.

Mr. Bert Fowler*

Dr. Robert Frosch

BrigGen Roy Goodwin, USAF Ret.

COL Richard H. Johnson, USA Ret.

Dr. Gene H. McCall

MajGen Mike Myatt, USMC Ret.

Mr. Lenny Siegel

Mr. Drexel Smith

Mr. Lewis D. Walker

Dr. George Whitesides*

Executive Secretary: CAPT Monty Mathews, USN

*DSB Member

GOVERNMENT ADVISORS

Mr. Jim Arnold

Mr. Doug Bell

Ms. Christine Crabill

Dr. John Cullinane

COL Joseph Daves, USA

Mr. Dave Douthat

Dr. Regina Dugan

Mr. Scott Edwards

Mr. Hap Hambric

Mr. Dwight Hempel

COL Bob Hilliard, USA

Mr. Tom Hitchcock

Mr. Ron Hoffman

Mr. Andy Hooper

Ms. Tayna Lynch

Dr. Jeff Marqusee

Mr. Chris O’Donnell

Mr. John Potter

Ms. Maureen Raley

Ms. Kelly Regano

Mr. Leo Shanley

Mr. Bob Taylor

LTC Michael Winzeler, USA

Mr. Jim Wollford

COL Dick Wright, USA

Dr. Roger Young

COL George Zahaczewsky, USA

B-l
APPENDIX C: ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES SUPPORTING UXO

REMEDIATION -

A variety of sensor and signal processing technologies have been proposed for use in UXO

remediation. Table A-l lists the major sensor approaches presented to the task force. The table

organizes these approaches broadly by whether their primary strength is detecting objects on the

surface, near-surface or deeper subsurface. Some of these technologies are novel; others are

adaptations of approaches that have proven effective in other applications. The table includes a

brief commentary on each approach, addressing issues such as:

n Is the approach capable of wide area searches or for locating individual UXO?

n Can the technology provide valuable depth, size and orientation data on UXO?

H At what depth can the technology reliably detect LJXO?

W Are there any serious limiting factors in the technology (environmental, etc.)?

There are important trade-offs to be made in developing a cost-effective UXO remediation

capability. For example:

Designs that are effective for wide-area searches tend to be unsuitable for local UXO

identification.

The deeper a sensor system penetrates the ground, the less precision it tends to have on

valuable depth, size and orientation data, especially for smaller objects.

The use of “active” (radiating) systems (such as radar and electromagnetic induction systems)

will tend to provide more insight on size and orientation of UXO than do “passive” (nonradiating) systems, but will have their own cost and deployment limitations (e.g., they may

not be suitable for all soil types).

The more sensitive detection approaches tend to have more difficulty in eliminating false

alarms.

The demand for cost-effective UXO remediation drives the need for improvement in our UXO

remediation capability - determining whether a suspect site actually contains UXO, determining

what kind of UXO is on the site, locating individual UXO at reasonable cost and with high

confidence, and determining the depth, size and orientation of the suspect UXO. The table

highlights the fact that substantial technology progress must be made to achieve cost-effective

UXO remediation. It is also important to note that no single technology can address all

remediation needs. The UXO community must develop and exploit a variety of sensing

approaches to their fullest if the Department of Defense is to obtain its objective of cost-effective

remediation. This is a fundamental finding of this task force.

C-l
Detection/ Remediation of Surface UXO

Electra-Optical/Thermal

Imaging.

Synthetic Aperture Radar.

Biological Detectors

(including artificial)

+

0

(dogs) +

(artificial

dogs) -

0

0

+

0 A surface detection system that can provide wide area search for UXO.

Best concept is combined active laser system with passive IR. Can

detect ferrous and non-ferrous objects, and provides high resolution

data on shape and orientation. Has difficulty in foliage. EO needs direct

line of sight to UXO.

- Primarily a surface detection system, suitable for surveying very large

areas (and detecting large objects and providing 2-D images). Best

suited for detecting minefield areas rather than for locating individual

ordnance. Best against metal objects.

+ A surface detection system, perhaps useful against shallow-depth UXO,

but primarily for mines and explosives; include trained canines or

surrogates. Best for identifying individual UXO; does not measure

depth, size or orientation.

C-2

Key: + high feasibility/value/lowest cost; 0 moderate; - marginal

iyperspectral imaging 1 It is primarily used to detect changes in surface soil properties due to

ulk Chemical Detectors.

etection. Remediation of

assive Magnetometers +

Deeply Buried UXO 1

+

a mine burial. For newly emplaced mines on road beds, -this

technique should be very good, but is not likely to work in foliage and

fields. Can detect ferrous and non-ferrous objects.

0 Includes chemical interaction with x-rays and Nuclear Quadrupole

Resonance (NQR). In principal, can measure size, orientation and

depth; severely limited by soil attenuation. NQR may achieve very low

false alarm rates, but ineffective against radio frequency (RF)

shielded explosives.

>10 feet)

- Most widely used subsurface detection system today; capable for

near-surface and deep objects; discrimination better deep given

highly cluttered environment near the surface (except in highly

magnetic soils). Fair to poor capability for discrimination, very good

depth accuracy, fair to good information on size. Orientation of the

magnetic moment can be determined, but this does not map one-toone with the ordnance orientation. Performance degrades

significantly in highly magnetic soils. This can be improved by

magnetic gradiometry. Limited to ferrous materials; since mine-like

targets not typically deeply buried, not a significant limitation. Biggest

cost factor is wide area survey.

c-4 .

Key: + high feasibility/value/lowest cost; 0 moderate; - marginal

I

Acousto-Electromagnetic 0

Sensor

I I

Unknown

until further

research

Ultrasonic Stimulation with

Chemical Detection - Unknown ? Stimulation of UXO with ultrasonic radiation and detection of chemical

until further

research particulates/vapor emitted from UXO (concept uses particle sampler

with Micro-Electra Mechanical System (MEMS) actuator).

? Stimulation of UXO with surface acoustic wave; sensing of the UXO

vibrations (down to 20 microns) using 10GHz radar.

C-6

Key: + high feasibility/value/lowest cost; 0 moderate; - marginal
APPENDIX D: PRESENTATIONS TO THE TASK FORCE

SEPTEMBER 6, 1996 

“Charge to the Task Force”, Ms. Sherri Goodman, DUSD(ES) and Dr. George Schneiter, D,

S&TS

“Phase I Presentation”, Mr. Peter O’Neill, Phase I Executive Secretary

“Phase II Task Force Deliverables”, Dr. John Foster, Phase II Chairman

“The UXO Problem - an Overview”, COL Dick Wright, USA, ODUSD(ES)

“The UXO Clearance Information Briefing”, BG Roy Beauchamp, Army Materiel Command

“The Joint Service EOD Program Board”, RADM George Yount, NAVSEA

NOVEMBER 21-22, 1996 

“ESTCP UXO Investments”, Dr. Jeff Marqusee, ODUSD(ES)

“Detection Technologies Introduction”, Dr. Jeff Marqusee, ODUSD(ES)

“Magnetometry”, Dr. Thomas W. Altshuler/Institute for Defense Analyses

“Induction Coil Technology”, Dr. White/APL

“Ground Penetration SAR for Detection of Shallow Buried Targets”, Dr. Serpil Ayasli, MITLincoln Laboratories

“Traditional Analytical Chemistry Techniques for Mine Detection”, Dr. Wayne A. Bryden, Johns

Hopkins University

“Olfaction and Array Based Detection”, Dr. Kauer, Tufts

“Multi-University UXO Research Initiation”, Dr. Lawrence Carin, Duke University

“Ultra-wide UHF/VHF”, Dr. Ron Stocks, NRO

“UXO Prevention - Enhanced Munitions Detection Working Group”, Mr. John Rosamilia,

ARDEC

“Risk Assessment Model”, Dr. Arkie Fanning

“Countermine R&D”, Dr. Tom Broach, NVL

“Cost Analysis/Benefit Model”, Mr. Richard A. Johnson, Executive Vice President, Strategic

Analysis, Inc.

D-l
DECEMBER 17-18, 1996 

“Cost Analysis/Benefit Model Update”, Mr. Bradford L. Smith, Jr., President, Strategic Analysis,

Inc. for Mr. Richard A. Johnson

“FUDS Program Time Line and Costs”, Mr. Roger Young, US Army Corps of Engineers

“DOD K-9 Work”, Col. Andrew Corso, USAF/MSgt Dave Kontny, USAF

“Green Bullet Program”, Mr. Robert Scola, Director, Industrial Ecology Center, US Army

“JDL UXO Plan”, Mr. William Konick, US Army TACOM-ARDEC

“UXO Permanent Committee/International”, Mr. Andy Hooper, YPG

“DARPA Chemical Sensor Program”, Dr. Regina Dugan, DARPA

“Location & Recovery of Buried Bombs”, Dr, Bahktar

“SERDP UXO Investments”, Bradley P. Smith, Executive Director, SERDP

“R&D Strategy for UXO Detection”, Dr. Cullinane/Dr. Bernadette Johnson, MIT Lincoln

Laboratories

“FUDS Matrix”, Dr. Charles Theisen, NAOC

JANUARY 22-23,1997 

January 22,1977 was held at EODTECHDIV

“EOD Mission & Functions”, CDR Dee, USN Joint Service EOD

“Overview of JSEOD Technology & Training Program and NAVSCOLEOD” (Video)

“Joint Service EOD Training”’ CDR McLawhorn, USN

“NAVEODTECHDIV Brief’, CAPT McCarley, USN

“Technology Roadmaps”, Mr. O’Donnell

“EOD Ordnance Threat Briefing”’ Mr. Gjeming, Mr. Behm

“EOD Procedures Development”, Mr. Hayes

“LIDDS/MCD”, Ms. Sherlock

“BUGS Program” and “DIODE Pumped Laser Technology for Neutralization of IJXO”, Mr.

Christopher Debolt

“JPG I/II/III/IV Discussion”, Mr. Snyder

“Kaho’olawe Island UXO Clearance”, Mr. Hersey

“EOD Detection Technologies Demo”, Dr. Manley, et. al.

EOD Tools Display/Brief/Demo

D-2
January 23, 1997 was held at Strategic Analysis, Inc.

“EOD Technology (Magnetics)“, Dr. Claude Manley

“UXO Countermeasures Computer Modeling and Simulation,” Mr. Richard Gold,

EODTECHDIV

“Joint DEMIL Technology”, Jim Wheeler, JDPO

“Army BRAC UXO Briefing”, Mr. Hud Heaton, US Army Corps of Engineers

“Navy BRAC UXO Program”, CAPT David Jones, CNOBO

“Air Force BRAC UXO Briefing”’ Dr. A. Naim Qazi, AFBCA

“Accoustic Technology for Detection”’ Dr. Tom Muir, Naval Postgraduate School

“UXO Clearance: The Report to Congress”, MG Roy Beauchamp, USA

FEBRUARY 12-l 4, 1997 (AT YUMA PROVING GROUNDS, YUMA, ARIZONA)

“UXO Contamination of Test Ranges”, Mr. John Kruger, Director of Plans, YPG

“Overview of Training Range Operations Related to UXO-CMS”, Mr. Hank Domme, Luke

AFB

“Active Range Clearance Technology Requirements”’ Mr. Michael Kolodny, Army Research

Laboratory

“Potential for Test Ranges offered by Munitions Tracking Technology”, Mr. Andrew Ladas,

ARL and Mr. Andy Hooper, YPG

“Enhanced Detectability of Future Ordnance”, Mr. Leon Springer, Army Fuze Management

Office

“Site Management Model”, Jim Ingram, 29 Palms

“Range Management”’ Mr. Ron Pierce, MCAS, Yuma

“Improved Robotics”, Capt. Walter M. Waltz, WL/FIVC

“Range Residue”, Capt. Jara Lang, USAF, 99th Air Base Wing, Nellis AFB, NV

“Overview of ARL Detection Sensor Testing at YPG”, Mr. Marc Ressler, Army Research

Laboratory

“Minimizing Rounds Fired”, Mr. Andy Hooper, YPG

“Tribal Concerns Associated with Unexploded Ordnance” - Ms. Emma Feather-man-Sam,

Director, Badlands Bombing Range Project, Oglala Lakota Nation, Pine Ridge South Dakota

“Department of Interior UXO Issues”, Mr. Dwight Hempel, Dept. of Interior

“UXO RDT&E Investments”’ Dr. Jeff Marqusee, ODUSD(ES)

D-3
MARCH 26-27, 1997

“UXO Remediation Contracting, COE Huntsville", Mr. Dave Douthat, Army Corps of Engineers

“UXO Remediation Issues, NAOC”, Mr. Kevin Lombardo, National Association of Ordnance

Contractors

“Untitled”, Dr. David Heberlein, Deputy Director, Night Vision Electronics Sensors Directorate,

US Army CECOM

“Update on DARPA Background Clutter Research”, Dr. Thomas W. Altshuler, IDA

“Opportunities to Leverage Counter-mine RDT&E”, Mr. Jim Campbell

“Comparison of Tech Requirements for Countermine Req. Vs. UXO Remediation Req.“, Mr.

Lawrence J. Nee, Chief, Counter-mine Division Program Manager Mines, Counter-mine &

Demolitions

“JPG Update, Phase III Results”, Ms. Kelly Regano/Mr. Jim Arnold

“Update on UXO RDT&E Funding”, Dr. Jeff Marqusee, ODUSD(ES)

“Summary of Funding for UXO Remediation”, Ms. Patricia A. Rivers, Assistant Deputy Under

Secretary of Defense, (Environmental Clean-up)

D-4