alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
41927.

#### BEALE v. LIFE & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY OF TENNESSEE.

Jordan, Judge.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the trial court directing a verdict for the defendant insurance company in an action brought by the plaintiff beneficiary on a policy of life insurance issued to her husband. The evidence adduced on the trial demanded a finding that the insured made certain material misrepresentations concerning his health in the application for insurance which was attached to and made a part of the policy which would void the policy unless, as contended by the plaintiff, the insurance company was estopped to rely on this defense. The plaintiff testified that her husband at the time of making application for the insurance informed the defendant’s agent as to the true state of his health, specifically telling the agent that he had Hodgkin’s disease and was uninsurable; and assuming for the sake of argument only that this testimony was uncontradicted, the sole question for determination here is whether or not such knowledge on the part of the defendant’s agent could be imputed to the defendant insurance company so as to estop it from claiming the defense of material misrepresentation. *Held:*

The application for insurance contained the following provision: “With the exception of officers of the Company, notice to or knowledge of the agent, medical examiner or any other person is not notice to or knowledge of the Company unless stated in this application, including Part B or supplemental Part B hereof if a medical examination is required, and none of such *507persons are authorized to accept risks or pass upon insurability, nor shall any of such persons have the power on behalf of the Company to make or modify any contract of the Company or to waive any of the Company’s right or requirements.” In view of this express limitation on the authority of the agent contained in the application for insurance, the knowledge of its agent would not be imputable to the defendant insurance company and would not constitute a waiver by or estoppel against the insurer of the defense of material misrepresentation. *New York Life Ins. Co. v. Patten,*151 Ga. 185 (106 SE 183); *Reliance Life Ins. Co. v. Hightower,*148 Ga. 843, 845 (98 SE 469); *National Acc. &c. Ins. Co. v. Davis,*179 Ga. 595 (176 SE 387); *National Life &c. Ins. Co. v. Hullender,*86 Ga. App. 438 (71 SE2d 754). The evidence demanded a verdict for the defendant and the judgment appealed from is not erroneous for any reasons enumerated.

Submitted April 4, 1966

Decided April 20, 1966.

*Strickland ■& Morgan, Charles D. Strickland,*for appellant.

*W. L. Preston, Erwin, Birchmore & Epting, Eugene A. Epting,*for appellee.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Bell, P. J., and Eberhardt, J., concur.*
IN THE COURT OFAPPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent,

v. RAFAEL CONTRERAS GONZALES, Appellant. No. 70293-9-1

UNPUBLISHED OPINION 

### FILED: MAR 1 0 2014 PerCuriam

— Rafael Contreras Gonzales appeals the sentence imposed following his convictions for attempting to elude a police vehicle and driving underthe influence ofalcohol. He contends, and the State concedes, that the sentence condition requiring him to obtain a "substance abuse evaluation" does not accurately reflectthe sentencing court's intent and should be amended to require evaluation and treatment 

### only for alcohol abuse. Gonzales also notes, and the State also concedes, that the portion ofthejudgment and sentence pertaining to the DUIconviction erroneously refers to 60 months of "community custody" and community custody statutes instead of "probation" under RCW 9.95.210. We acceptthe State's concessions and remand for amendment ofthejudgment and sentence. 

### Remanded for proceedings consistentwith this opinion. FOR THE COURT:
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2429 Engrossed in House (EH)]

  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2429

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide an exception 
to the 60-day limit on Medicare reciprocal billing arrangements between 
  two physicians during the period in which one of the physicians is 
ordered to active duty as a member of a reserve component of the Armed 
                                Forces.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXCEPTION TO 60-DAY LIMIT ON MEDICARE RECIPROCAL BILLING 
              ARRANGEMENTS IN CASE OF PHYSICIANS ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY 
              IN THE ARMED FORCES.

    (a) In General.--Section 1842(b)(6)(D)(iii) of the Social Security 
Act (42 U.S.C. 1395u(b)(6)(D)(iii)) is amended by inserting after ``of 
more than 60 days'' the following: ``or are provided (before January 1, 
2008) over a longer continuous period during all of which the first 
physician has been called or ordered to active duty as a member of a 
reserve component of the Armed Forces''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply to services furnished on or after the date of the enactment of 
this section.

            Passed the House of Representatives May 23, 2007.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
110th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                               H. R. 2429

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide an exception 
to the 60-day limit on Medicare reciprocal billing arrangements between 
  two physicians during the period in which one of the physicians is 
ordered to active duty as a member of a reserve component of the Armed 
                                Forces.
```
#### Catherine M. LANE, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.

No. 7839.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

April 17, 1935.

Guy Chase, of St. Paul, Minn., for petitioner.

Frank J. Wideman, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Robert H. Jackson, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue, of Washington, D. C., for respondent.

Before WILBUR, GARRECHT, and DENMAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Upon motion of counsel for respondent, consented to by counsel for petitioner, and good cause therefor appearing, ordered petition to review herein dismissed; mandate forthwith.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Defense

###### Office of the Secretary 

          - [Transmittal Nos. 09-44] 

# AGENCY:

Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense. 

# ACTION:

Notice. 

# SUMMARY:

The Department of Defense is publishing the unclassified text of a section 36(b)(1) arms sales notification. This is published to fulfill the requirements of section 155 of Public Law 104-164 dated 21 July 1996. 

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Ms. B. English, DSCA/DBO/CFM, (703) 601-3740. 

The following is a copy of a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Transmittals 09-44 with attached transmittal, policy justification, and Sensitivity of Technology. 

Dated: September 15, 2009. 

Patricia L. Toppings, 

OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

      ( print page 48928)          ( print page 48929)          ( print page 48930)          ( print page 48931)          ( print page 48932)    

BILLING CODE 5001-06-P 

[FR Doc. E9-22947 Filed 9-24-09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 5001-06-C
§ 20.1000 Rule 1000. Vacating a decision. An appellate decision may be vacated by the Board of Veterans' Appeals at any time upon request of the appellant or his or her representative, or on the Board's own motion, on the following grounds: ( a ) *Denial of due process.* Examples of circumstances in which denial of due process of law will be conceded are: ( 1 ) When the appellant was denied his or her right to representation through action or inaction by Department of Veterans Affairs or Board of Veterans' Appeals personnel,
( 2 ) When there was a prejudicial failure to afford the appellant a personal hearing. (Where there was a failure to honor a request for a hearing and a hearing is subsequently scheduled, but the appellant fails to appear, the decision will not be vacated.), and
( 3 ) For a legacy appeal, as defined in § 19.2 of this chapter, when a Statement of the Case or required Supplemental Statement of the Case was not provided.
( b ) *Allowance of benefits based on false or fraudulent evidence.* Where it is determined on reconsideration that an allowance of benefits by the Board has been materially influenced by false or fraudulent evidence submitted by or on behalf of the appellant, the prior decision will be vacated only with respect to the issue or issues to which, within the judgment of the Board, the false or fraudulent evidence was material.
(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 7104(a))
[57 FR 4109, Feb. 3, 1992. Redesignated and amended at 84 FR 177, 191, Jan. 18, 2019, as amended at 84 FR 4337, Feb. 15, 2019]
###### Editorial Note on Part 1

#### Editorial Notes:

1. In Patent and Trademark Office publications and usage the part number is omitted from the numbers of §§ 1.1 to 1.352 and the numbers to the right of the decimal point correspond with the respective rule numbers.

2. For nomenclature changes to part 1, see 68 FR 14335, Mar. 25, 2003; 87 FR 68904, Nov. 17, 2022.

#### § 1.750 Determination of eligibility for extension of patent term.

A determination as to whether a patent is eligible for extension may be made by the Director solely on the basis of the representations contained in the application for extension filed in compliance with § 1.740 or § 1.790. This determination may be delegated to appropriate Patent and Trademark Office officials and may be made at any time before the certificate of extension is issued. The Director or other appropriate officials may require from applicant further information or make such independent inquiries as desired before a final determination is made on whether a patent is eligible for extension. In an application for extension filed in compliance with § 1.740, a notice will be mailed to applicant containing the determination as to the eligibility of the patent for extension and the period of time of the extension, if any. This notice shall constitute the final determination as to the eligibility and any period of extension of the patent. A single request for reconsideration of a final determination may be made if filed by the applicant within such time as may be set in the notice of final determination or, if no time is set, within one month from the date of the final determination. The time periods set forth herein are subject to the provisions of § 1.136.

[60 FR 25618, May 12, 1995]

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 2 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 6 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 7 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 1 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 3 pertaining to both patents and trademarks is placed in the grouping pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 4 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 5 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markm an Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_________________________________________ Clerk November 20, 2012

s1113 

# Order

November 20, 2012

145392 & (69)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 145392

COA: 303099

Wayne CC: 10

- 010139

- FC

RASHOD LAMAR BROWN,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 22, 2012

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. The motion to

remand is DENIED.
41937.

#### CODY et al. v. PEAK et al.

Jordan, Judge.

This is a companion case to that of *Peak v. Cody,*ante. In this action Mrs. Mary M. Peak sought to recover damages for the loss of consortium of her husband arising out of the injuries allegedly sustained by him as a result of *677the negligence of the defendant hotel and the defendant elevator company. The jury returned a verdict in the amount of $10,000 in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant hotel only; and the appeal is from the judgment of the trial court entered thereon, error being enumerated on the denial of the defendant hotel’s amended motion for new trial. The defendant elevator company was also named as a party appellee to this appeal and has filed a motion to be dismissed. *Held:*

1. The defendant hotel in its answer to the plaintiff’s petition did not deny the allegations of negligence charged against the co-defendant, and the trial court committed error, as contended in special ground 5, in instructing the jury that “All of these allegations of negligence are denied by both of the defendants.” *Thomas v. Barnett,*107 Ga. App. 717 (5), 728 (131 SE2d 818). Since it cannot be said that a verdict was demanded for the plaintiff, this error requires the grant of a new trial. *Baker v. Moore,*182 Ga. 131, 137 (184 SE 729).

2. The defendant hotel in special ground 6 assigned error on the court’s instructions to the jury on the issue of assessing damages for the plaintiff’s loss of consortium in the future on the ground that there was no evidence in the record of the age and life expectancy of both the plaintiff and her husband upon which the jury could base an award for future loss of consortium. Since, as contended by the defendant, the right of consortium exists only during the joint lives of the husband and wife, such evidence is essential to the jury’s determination of this issue; and the jury should be clearly instructed that a recovery, if any, for future loss of consortium must be based on the shorter of two life expectancies. *Walden v. Coleman,*105 Ga. App. 242 (124 SE2d 313).

3. Since this case must be tried again, it is unnecessary to consider the general grounds and special ground 7 which attacked the verdict as being excessive. It is also unnecessary to consider the remaining special grounds since the alleged errors complained of therein are not likely to recur on the retrial of this case.

4. As held in *Peak v. Cody,*ante, the defendant elevator company was properly named as a party appellee to this appeal notwithstanding the fact that it will not be affected by the *678further proceedings in this case, and its motion to be dismissed is denied.

Argued April 4, 1966

Decided April 22, 1966.

*Lokey A Bowden, Glenn Frick,*for appellants.

*Irwin, Anderson, Smith A Pazol, R. Beverly Irwin, Eugene Simons, Ben Weinberg, Jr., Gregg Loomis,*for appellees.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Bell, P. J., and Eberhardt, J., concur.*
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

DOMINIC O. ROACH,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 387 MAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

DOMINIC O. ROACH,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 388 MAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 29th day of December, 2020, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED.
41976.

#### ESTES HEATING & AIR CONDITIONING COMPANY v. McGUIRE.

Argued May 2, 1966

Decided June 2, 1966.

Felton, Chief Judge.

1. “The Civil Court of Fulton County is a court of record and has jurisdiction to render summary judgments.” *Cole v. Cates,*113 Ga. App. 540 (1) (149 SE2d 165).

2. The trial court did not err in granting a summary judgment in favor of the appellee in the appellant’s trover action for a “Carrier 150 B. T. U. Furnace Model #58 BV150-21” where the subject of the conditional sale contract on which the action was based was a “Chrysler Gas Furnace #4215-04.”

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Frankum and Pannell, JJ., concur.*

*801*John M. Hames, William W. Miller, Jr.,*for appellant.

*Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Warner S. Currie, Overton A. Currie, Robert S. Harkey,*for appellee.
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, September 06, 2018.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes 

of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto 

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, September 06, 2018

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A19D0054. MICHAEL DAVID DYER v. THE STATE.

Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be 

hereby DENIED.

LC NUMBERS:

06CR1284
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 23.1

                         INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS' REPORT


Celestial Seasonings, Inc.:

We have reviewed the accompanying consolidated balance sheet of Celestial
Seasonings, Inc. and subsidiaries (the "Company") as of December 31, 1999 and
the related consolidated statements of income and cash flows for the three-month
periods ended December 31, 1999 and 1998. These financial statements are the
responsibility of the Company's management.

We conducted our review in accordance with standards established by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants. A review of interim financial
information consists principally of applying analytical procedures to financial
data and of making inquiries of persons responsible for financial and accounting
matters. It is substantially less in scope than an audit conducted in accordance
with generally accepted auditing standards, the objective of which is the
expression of an opinion regarding the financial statements taken as a whole.
Accordingly, we do not express such an opinion.

Based on our review, we are not aware of any material modifications that should
be made to such consolidated financial statements for them to be in conformity
with generally accepted accounting principles.

We have previously audited, in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards, the consolidated balance sheet of the Company as of September 30,
1999, and the related consolidated statements of income, stockholders' equity,
and cash flows for the year then ended (not presented herein); and in our report
dated November 3, 1999, we expressed an unqualified opinion on those
consolidated financial statements. In our opinion, the information set forth in
the accompanying consolidated balance sheet as of September 30, 1999 is fairly
stated, in all material respects, in relation to the consolidated balance sheet
from which it has been derived.





Deloitte & Touche LLP


Denver, Colorado
January 12, 2000
#### § 20.1103 Rule 1103. Finality of determinations of the agency of original jurisdiction where issue is not appealed.

A determination on a claim by the agency of original jurisdiction of which the claimant is properly notified is final if an appeal is not perfected as prescribed in § 19.52 of this chapter. If no Notice of Disagreement is filed as prescribed in subpart C of this part, the claim shall not thereafter be readjudicated or allowed, except as provided by 38 U.S.C. 5104B or 5108, or by regulation.

[84 FR 191, Jan. 18, 2019]
#### § 401.17 Submissions and inquiries.

All submissions or inquiries should be directed to the Chief Counsel for NIST, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 100 Bureau Drive, Mail Stop 1052, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899-1052; telephone: (301) 975-2803; email: *nistcounsel@nist.gov.* Information about and procedures for electronic filing under this part are available at the Interagency Edison website and service center, *http://www.iedison.gov*.

[83 FR 15963, Apr. 13, 2018, as amended at 88 FR 17739, Mar. 24, 2023]
Exhibit 10.66


                      MODIFICATION ADDENDUM TO THE BUSINESS
                               MANAGER  AGREEMENT
                        WITH BUSINESSES AND PROFESSIONALS

Upon  signature  by both parties, the Business Manager Agreement with Businesses
and  Professionals  entered  into  as  of  the 14th day of October, 2002, by and
between  AnchorBank,  fsb  (the "Bank") and Integrated Information Systems, Inc.
(the  "Business")  shall  hereby  be  extended  for a period of one (1) year, as
follows:

                    OCTOBER 14, 2003 THROUGH OCTOBER 14, 2004

All other terms and provisions of the Business Manager Agreement with Businesses
and  Professionals  shall  remain  in  full  force  and  effect.


BANK:  ANCHORBANK,  FSB

/s/Thomas  S.  Mecum
--------------------
Thomas  S.  Mecum
VP  -  Commercial  Credit  Administration

______________________________
Date


BUSINESS:  INTEGRATED  INFORMATION  SYSTEMS,  INC.

/s/James  G.  Garvey,  Jr.
--------------------------
James  G.  Garvey,  Jr.
CEO

______________________________
Date