alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 19.2 Appellant's election for review of a legacy appeal in the modernized system. ( a ) *Effective date.* As used in this section, *the effective date* means February 19, 2019.
( b ) *Modernized review system.* The modernized review system refers to the current statutory framework for claims and appeals processing, set forth in Public Law 115-55, and any amendments thereto, applicable on the effective date. The modernized review system applies to all claims, requests for reopening of finally adjudicated claims, and requests for revision based on clear and unmistakable error for which VA issues notice of an initial decision on or after the effective date, or as otherwise provided in paragraph (d) of this section.
( c ) *Legacy appeals.* A legacy appeal is an appeal of a legacy claim, as defined in 38 CFR 3.2400(b), where a claimant has not elected to participate in the modernized review system as provided in paragraph (d) of this section. A legacy appeal is initiated by the filing of a Notice of Disagreement and is perfected to the Board with the filing of a Substantive Appeal pursuant to applicable regulations in accordance with 38 CFR parts 19 and 20.
( d ) *Election into the modernized review system.* The modernized review system applies to legacy claims and appeals where: ( 1 ) A claimant with a legacy claim or appeal elects the modernized review system pursuant to 38 CFR 3.2400(c)(1);
( 2 ) A claimant with a legacy claim or appeal elects the modernized review system, following issuance, on or after the effective date, of a VA Statement of the Case or Supplemental Statement of the Case. The election is made by filing, on a form prescribed by the Secretary, an appeal in accordance with 38 CFR 20.202, or a review option in accordance with 38 U.S.C. 5108 or 5104B, as implemented by 38 CFR 3.2500 and other applicable regulations. The election must be filed within the time allowed for filing a substantive appeal under § 19.52(b); or
( 3 ) VA issued notice of a decision prior to the effective date, and, pursuant to the Secretary's authorization to participate in a test program, the claimant elects the modernized review system by filing an appeal in accordance with 38 U.S.C. 7105, or a review option in accordance with 38 U.S.C. 5108 or 5104B.
(Authority: Pub. L. 115-55; 131 Stat. 1105; 38 U.S.C. 5104B, 5104C(a); 5108; 38 U.S.C. 7105)
[84 FR 177, Jan. 18, 2019]
#### American Express Company *v.*The State.

[No. 20,564.

Filed November 27, 1906.]

Appeal and *Error.—Answer.—Sustaining Demurrer to Paragraph.—Facts Provable Under*Another.—It is harmless error to sustain a demurrer to a paragraph of answer whose facts are provable under another paragraph.

From Monroe Circuit Court; *James B. Wilson,*Judge.

Action by the State of Indiana against the American Express Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

*Affirmed.*

*J. E. Henley*and *Baker & Daniels,*for appellant.

*Robert G. Miller, Arthur M. Hadley*and *Brooks & Brooks,*for appellee.

Monks, J.

This action was brought by the State against appellant to recover the penalty of $500 for an alleged violation of certain provisions of the act of March *1,*1901 (Acts 1901, p. 149, §§3312b-3312f Burns 1901). An answer in six paragraphs was filed. Appellee’s demurrer for want of facts was sustained to the second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth paragraphs of said answer.

A trial of said cause resulted in a special finding and judgment in favor of appellee for $500 and costs.

*429If the second, fifth, and sixth paragraphs were each sufficient to withstand the demurrer for want of facts, a question we need not and do not decide, it was because each of said paragraphs was good as an argumentative denial. All the evidence, if any, admissible under said paragraphs of answer was admissible under the first paragraph of said answer, which was a general denial. It follows that the error, if any, in sustaining the demurrer to said second, fifth, and sixth paragraphs of answer was harmless. *Tomlinson*v. *Bainaka*(1904), 163 Ind. 112, 115, 116, and cases cited.

The questions presented in this case are substantially the same as those involved and decided in *Adams Express Co.*v. *State*(1903), 161 Ind. 328; *American Express Co.*v. *Southern Ind. Express Co.*(1906), ante, 292, and *American Express Co.*v. *State*(1906), *ante,*319, and upon the authority of those cases this case is affirmed.
#### Janice Faye KLINE *v.*Roy Lee KLINE

76-113

542 S.W. 2d 499

Opinion delivered November 1, 1976

*551
      *Michael L. Ellig,*for appellant.

*William M. Stocks,*for appellee.

Frank Holt, Justice.

This appeal is from a proceeding under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-2401, *et seq.*(Supp. 1975) in which appellant sought enforcement of a child support order which was rendered in a Tennessee divorce action between herself and appellee. Here, by the provisions of the Act, Tennessee is the initiating state and Arkansas the responding state. Upon trial of the cause, the Arkansas chancellor considered that a change in circumstances had affected appellee’s ability to pay. Therefore, the court reduced his payment from $400 a month to $25 a week for the support and maintenance of his two minor children. The payments, however, were made contingent upon the appellant making their children available to appellee for visitation both in Tennessee and at appellee’s home in Fort Smith, Arkansas. From that portion of the order making the support payments contingent on visitation rights, appellant brings this appeal. Appellant contends that the Arkansas trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the visitation rights of the parties in a proceeding under the URESA and, therefore, it was error to make the child support payments contingent upon visitation rights. We must agree.

§ 34-2401, the first section of the Act, states: “The purposes of this Act are to improve and extend by reciprocal legislation the enforcement of duties of support.” § 34-2423 provides:

> *552If the action is based on a support order issued by another court, a certified copy of the order shall be received as evidence of the duty to support, subject only to any defenses available to an obligor [appellee] with respect to paternity as provided in § 27 hereof or to a defendant in an action or a proceeding to enforce a foreign money judgment.

Further, § 34-2432 states: “Participation in any proceeding under this Act does not confer jurisdiction upon any court over any of the parties thereto in any other proceeding. ” Obviously, the Act is intended to facilitate enforcement of support orders rendered in our sister states by way of an *exparte*proceeding whereby a duly rendered valid support decree is prima facie evidence of the obligor’s duty. The URESA is a uniform law, remedial in nature and purpose, and should be liberally construed in order to effectuate its purpose to accomplish and enforce the duty of a parent to support his children. *State of Illinois*v. *Sterling,*80 N.W. 2d 13 (Minn. 1956). There it was also said that parental visitation rights are governed by the laws of that state, Tennessee here, where the divorce was secured. Consequently, the visitation rights or the enforcement of them should be addressed to the Tennessee court where the appellant mother and children continue to reside following the divorce action there. That is the court which has continuing jurisdiction over the parties as to visitation rights.

Reversed.

We agree: Harris, C.J., and Byrd and Roy, JJ.
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2298 Introduced in House (IH)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2298

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make geothermal heat pump 
                systems eligible for the energy credit.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 14, 2007

   Mr. Gordon of Tennessee (for himself, Mr. Cooper, and Ms. Loretta 
    Sanchez of California) introduced the following bill; which was 
              referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make geothermal heat pump 
                systems eligible for the energy credit.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. GEOTHERMAL HEAT PUMP SYSTEMS TREATED AS ENERGY PROPERTY.

    (a) In General.--Subparagraph (A) of section 48(a)(3) is amended by 
striking ``or'' at the end of clause (iii), by inserting ``or'' at the 
end of clause (iv), and by adding at the end the following new clause:
                            ``(v) equipment which uses the ground or 
                        ground water as a thermal energy source to heat 
                        a structure or as a thermal energy sink to cool 
                        a structure,''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to property placed in service after the date of the enactment of 
this Act.
                                 <all>
```
41757, 41758.

#### SAMPLES v. ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC.; and vice versa.

Pannell, Judge.

The findings and award of the Board of Workmen’s Compensation were as follows: “I find as a matter of fact there was no causal connection between the death of Joseph Samples and his employment; that the only medical information we have is contained in the death certificate. The cause of death is given as ‘acute massive necrosis of liver’ and ‘significant’ but ‘not related’ to terminal disease condition, ‘Acute Peptic Ulcer with Surgery; acute subparenic abscess.’ That both these conditions are diseases, and not considered as related to employment, without at least some evidence of causal connection. That Samples’ widow said he had never undergone surgery for his stomach condition, yet the death certificate shows ‘surgery’ in connection with the ulcer; that although he was under the treatment of a Dr. Moore, we have no evidence as to what was done for deceased. That an autopsy was performed and was presumably available. I therefore find compensation must be denied.

“Award. Wherefore, based upon the above findings of fact, compensation is denied, and it is so ordered, this the 6th day of January, 1965.”

Upon appeal the superior court ruled that the death certificate was without probative value and remanded the case to the board for further hearings and findings on the evidence in the present record, with the exception of the death certificate, and together with such additional evidence as might properly be heard. Both the claimant and the employer entered an appeal to this court. *Held:*

Irrespective of the correctness of the ruling as to the probative value of the death certificate, the trial court erred in reversing and remanding for further hearings and findings. In view of the fact that the evidence amply authorized the finding that there was no causal connection between the death of Joseph Samples and his employment, such finding is conclusive and will not be reversed although the board made other findings of fact not essential to the judgment in the case and not authorized by the evidence. *American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Sisson,*198 Ga. 623 (32 SE2d 295). It follows, therefore, that the judge of the superior court should have affirmed the award rather than reversing and remanding for additional findings. *392Under these circumstances, the judgment of the superior court is reversed on the appeal of the employer (Case No. 41758) and affirmed on the appeal of the claimant (Case No. 41757) who alleges error solely on the ground that the evidence demanded an award in favor of the claimant.

Argued January 4, 1966

Decided March 16, 1966

Rehearing denied March 28, 1966

*Poole, Pearce ■& Cooper, Martin H. Rubin,*for appellant.

*Burt DeRieux, Jim Manning,*for appellee.

*Judgment reversed in Case No. 41758 and affirmed in Case No. 41757.*

*Felton, C. J., and Frankum, J., concur.*
###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 2 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 6 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 7 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 1 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 3 pertaining to both patents and trademarks is placed in the grouping pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 4 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 5 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

#### § 11.704 Communication of fields of practice and specialization.

(a) A practitioner may communicate the fact that the practitioner does or does not practice in particular fields of law.

(b) A registered practitioner under § 11.6(a) who is an attorney may use the designation “Patents,” “Patent Attorney,” “Patent Lawyer,” “Registered Patent Attorney,” or a substantially similar designation. A registered practitioner under § 11.6(b) who is not an attorney may use the designation “Patents,” “Patent Agent,” “Registered Patent Agent,” or a substantially similar designation. A registered practitioner under § 11.6(d) who is an attorney may use the designation “Design Patent Attorney.” A registered practitioner under § 11.6(d) who is not an attorney may use the designation “Design Patent Agent.” Unless authorized by § 11.14(b), a registered patent agent or design patent agent shall not hold themself out as being qualified or authorized to practice before the Office in trademark matters or before a court.

(c) [Reserved]

(d) A practitioner shall not state or imply that a practitioner is certified as a specialist in a particular field of law, unless:

(1) The practitioner has been certified as a specialist by an organization that has been approved by an appropriate state authority or that has been accredited by the American Bar Association; and

(2) The name of the certifying organization is clearly identified in the communication.

(e) Individuals granted limited recognition may use the designation “Limited Recognition” but may not hold themselves out as being registered.

[78 FR 20201, Apr. 3, 2013, as amended at 86 FR 28467, May 26, 2021; 88 FR 78650, Nov. 16, 2023]
#### § 205.3 Waiver of rules.

In extraordinary situations, when the interest of justice requires, the General Counsel may waive or suspend the rules of this part, *sua sponte* or on petition of an interested party, subject to such requirements as the General Counsel may impose on the parties. However, the inclusion of certain legal processes within the scope of these rules, e.g., state legal proceedings, does not represent a waiver of any claim of immunity, privilege, or other defense by the Office in a legal proceeding, including but not limited to, sovereign immunity, preemption, or lack of relevance. This rule does not create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the Copyright Office, the Library of Congress, or the United States.
---

Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
OF 2002

In connection with this Amendment No. 1 to the Quarterly Report
of Silverado Gold Mines Ltd. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the quarterly
period ending May 31, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Garry L. Anselmo, Principal Executive
Officer of the Company, certify to the best of my knowledge, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
13 (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.

*/s/ Garry L.
Anselmo*Garry L. Anselmo,Principal Executive Officer

January 21, 2009

---
# U ni te d S ta te s Co ur t of A pp ea ls For the Eig hth Circu it

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ _ No. 1 9- 13 76

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ _ Rap ha el Men de z
ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll l Pla in ti

ff - App el la nt

v. Bryan Me ek , Cor rect io na l Offi cer; Lt. Hol bu s, Co rrec ti on al Offic er; Lt. Sl ad ek , Co rrec ti on al Offic er; Ms . W hi pl in ge r, Co rrec ti on al Offic er; Ms . G. Bala s, Un it Dis ci pl in ary Offi cer; T. Mu ll er, Uni t Dis ci pl in ary Offi cer; W ard en Dav id Pau l, et al

.

ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll l Defe nd

an ts - App el le es

__

__ __ __ __ __ App eal fro m

Uni te d S ta te s Di st ric t Co ur t fo r th e Dis tri ct of M in ne so ta

__

__ __ __ __ __ Su bm it te d: Aug us t 9 , 20 19 Fi le d: Aug us t 2 1, 2 01 9 [Un pu bl is he d]

__ __ __ __ __ __ Befo re BENTON, SHEPHERD, and KELLY , Cir cu it Ju dg es

.

__ __ __ __ __ __ PER CURI AM.Fed eral ci vi l de ta in ee Rap ha el M e n d e z a pp eal s aft er th e di st ric t co ur t 1

di sm is se d hi s pr o se ci vi l rig ht s co m pl ai nt , pu rs ua nt to 28 U.S.C. § 19 15 (e)( 2) (B)( ii ). He ch al le ng es th e di sm is sa l of hi s cl ai m as se rti ng th at c on fis cat io n of hi s pr op ert y vi ol at ed hi s d ue pro ces s ri gh ts

. Upo n care fu l rev ie w of th e reco rd an d Men de z’s arg um en ts on ap pe a l , we
co nc lu de th at th e di sm is sa l was pr op er. See Hud so n v. Pal m er, 46 8 U.S. 51 7, 53 3 (1 98 4) (u na ut ho riz ed de pr iv at io n of pr op ert y by go ve rn m en t of fic ia l do es no t vi ol at e pr oc ed ur al du e pr oc es s un le ss su it ab le po st -d ep riv at io n rem ed y is un av ai la bl e); se e al so 28 C.F.R. § 54 2.1 0- .19 (s et ti ng fo rth Bu reau of Pri so n’s ad m in is tra ti ve rem ed y pr oc ed ur es ); Mo or e v. Si m s, 20 0 F.3 d 11 70 , 11 71 (8 th Ci r

. 2 0 0 0 ) ( p er cu ria m ) (d e no vo rev ie w of § 19 15 (e)( 2) (B) di sm is sa l); cf. Gard ne r v. Howar d, 10 9 F.3 d 42 7, 43 0 (8 th Ci r. 19 97 ) (th ere is no li ab il it y un de r 42 U.S.C. § 19 83 ba se d on ly on pr is on of fic ia l’s v io la ti on of p ris on po li cy ). Acco rd in gl y , we affi rm

. See 8 th Cir . R. 47 B.

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __

The Hon or ab le Eric C. Tos tru d, Uni te d St at es Dis tri ct Ju dg e fo r th e Dis tri ct 1 of Mi nn es ot a, ad op ti ng th e rep or t an d reco mm en da ti on s of th e Hon or ab le Hil dy Bo wbe er, Un it ed Sta te s M ag is tra te Ju dg e fo r th e Dis tri ct of M in ne so ta

. -2

-
#### Theodore Goodness, Plaintiff, *v.*The Metropolitan Street Railway Company, Defendant.

(Supreme Court, Kings Special Term,

March, 1899.)

Practice — When, plaintiff will not be required, by motion, to state Ms residence by street and number.

A motion by a defendant, a corporation, to require the plaintiff to furnish it his place of residence by street and number will be denied where it does not appear that the plaintiff’s attorney has, on request, refused to furnish these particulars.

Motion to require the plaintiff to furnish his place of residence by street and number to the defendant.

*12Henry A. Robinson for motion.

Frederick G. Wetterau opposed.

Gaynor, J.:

The court should not be bothered with a motion like this except upon proof that a request has been made to the, attorney for the Opposite side for the information and refused. In this case the order to show cause seems to have, been obtained only as a subterfuge to get an extension of time to answer.

The motion is denied, with' $10 costs and the extension of time to answer is vacated.
EXHIBIT 32
                                                                      ----------





          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned have executed this certification in connection with the filing
with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the Company's Quarterly Report on
Form 10-QSB for the period ending March 31, 2006. The undersigned hereby certify
that to our knowledge:

(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Dated:   May 15, 2006               /s/ Raul S. McQuivey
                                    ----------------------------
                                    Raul S. McQuivey
                                    President and Chief Executive Officer
                                    (Principal Executive Officer)




Dated:   May 15, 2006               /s/ Sidney C. Hooper
                                    ----------------------------
                                    Sidney C. Hooper
                                    Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer
                                    (Principal Accounting Officer)
§ 388.2 Definition of coin-operated phonorecord player. As used in this part, the term *coin-operated phonorecord player* is a machine or device that: ( a ) Is employed solely for the performance of nondramatic musical works by means of phonorecords upon being activated by insertion of coins, currency, tokens, or other monetary units or their equivalent;
( b ) Is located in an establishment making no direct or indirect charge for admission;
( c ) Is accompanied by a list of the titles of all the musical works available for performance on it, which list is affixed to the phonorecord player or posted in the establishment in a prominent position where it can be readily examined by the public; and
( d ) Affords a choice of works available for performance and permits the choice to be made by the patrons of the establishment in which it is located.