*

The Honorable Ann Aldrich, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.

1

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0172P (6th Cir.)

File Name: 04a0172p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

_________________

TENNESSEE PROTECTION &

ADVOCACY, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JON A. WELLS, ESQUIRE;

RONALD BRUCE ARRISON;

and KING’S DAUGHTERS &

SONS NURSING HOME, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

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No. 02-6221

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Tennessee at Cookeville.

No. 01-00078—William J. Haynes, Jr., District Judge.

Argued: March 9, 2004

Decided and Filed: June 9, 2004 

Before: BOGGS, Chief Judge; DAUGHTREY, Circuit

Judge; and ALDRICH, District Judge.*

2 Tenn. Protection & Advocacy

v. Wells, Esquire, et al.

No. 02-6221

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Gary Housepian, TENNESSEE PROTECTION

& ADVOCACY, INC., Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant.

Tyree B. Harris IV, WILLIS & KNIGHT, Nashville,

Tennessee, Brigid M. Carpenter, BAKER, DONELSON,

BEARMAN, CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ, Nashville,

Tennessee, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Gary Housepian,

TENNESSEE PROTECTION & ADVOCACY, INC.,

Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Tyree B. Harris IV,

WILLIS & KNIGHT, Nashville, Tennessee, Brigid M.

Carpenter, BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN,

CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ, Nashville, Tennessee,

Ronald L. Smith, Michael Kirkman, OHIO LEGAL RIGHTS

SERVICE, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees.

BOGGS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which

ALDRICH, D. J., joined. DAUGHTREY, J. (pp. 18-20),

delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

BOGGS, Chief Judge. Tennessee Protection & Advocacy,

Inc. (TP&A) is a federally-mandated independent non-profit

agency that investigates allegations of abuse against the

disabled. It appeals the district court’s holding that one of its

clients, Martin Earle Bentley, is not covered under the

Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act

(DD Act), and that therefore TP&A has no statutory authority

to obtain Bentley’s records without the permission of his

court-appointed conservator. We hold that the plain meaning

of the statutory definition of developmental disability covers
No. 02-6221 Tenn. Protection & Advocacy

v. Wells, Esquire, et al.

3

individuals with Bentley’s kind of traumatic brain injury, and

we reverse the decision of the district court.

I

Martin Earle Bentley, a long-haul truck driver, suffered a

traumatic brain injury from an on-the-job crash in 1976, when

he was 20 years old. As a result, he was permanently

disabled and must live in a nursing home because he is unable

to care for himself. In light of Bentley’s condition after the

accident, the Probate Court of Macon County, Tennessee

appointed attorney Jon Wells to be the conservator of

Bentley’s person and estate in 1980. 

In 2001, Bentley contacted TP&A because he had concerns

about both the handling of his financial affairs and restraints

on his personal autonomy. In a conference call with TP&A

representatives, including a TP&A staff attorney, Bentley

explained his grievances. In the staff attorney’s opinion,

Bentley demonstrated “adequate cognitive ability” to speak

for himself, and expressed his wishes in an “unequivocal

consistent manner.” Bentley summed up his situation as

follows: “A man of my age and ability should not be locked

up in a nursing home.” Bentley authorized TP&A to examine

all the necessary records to advocate on his behalf.

TP&A is the Tennessee chapter of a network of

independent agencies, known as the Protection & Advocacy

System, that Congress funded in the DD Act as part of the

Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Developmental

Disabilities (PADD) Program. In order to receive funding

under the Act, each state must “have in effect a system to

protect and advocate the rights of individuals with

developmental disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 15043(a)(1). For

the state to qualify for funding, the agency must “not be

administered by the State Council on Developmental

Disabilities [and must] be independent of any agency that

provides treatment, services, or habilitation to individuals

4 Tenn. Protection & Advocacy

v. Wells, Esquire, et al.

No. 02-6221

with developmental disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 15043(a)(F)-

(G). In general, the P&A System serves individuals with a

range of developmental disabilities by, among other things,

investigating allegations of abuse; the agency is authorized to

take legal action on behalf of its clients if claims cannot

otherwise be resolved. See 42 U.S.C. § 15043(a) (giving full

recitation of the agency’s powers).

Following normal procedures, a case advocate with TP&A

faxed a letter to Wells on December 8, 2000 asking to see

Bentley’s records and offering to help resolve any dispute

between the two. She then called Wells on December 11,

when he informed her that he would only release Bentley’s

records in response to a court order. TP&A also tried to

secure the records through the King’s Daughters and Sons

Nursing Home, where Bentley is a resident, but met with the

same response. The Nursing Home administrator also

forbade his staff to discuss the litigation with Bentley.

Unable to obtain the necessary information to investigate

Bentley’s allegations, TP&A filed suit in district court in

September 2001 against Wells, the Nursing Home, and its

administrator, Ronald Arrison. TP&A moved for summary

judgment and a preliminary injunction; Wells cross-claimed

for summary judgment. The Nursing Home did not respond

to TP&A’s motion for summary judgment.

In September 2002, the district court granted Wells

summary judgment on the grounds that the DD Act did not

cover traumatic brain injury, Bentley’s type of disability, and

therefore TP&A had no right to review Bentley’s records.

This appeal then followed.

II

This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo.

Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 478 (6th Cir. 1995) (per

curiam). Summary judgment is appropriate when the
No. 02-6221 Tenn. Protection & Advocacy

v. Wells, Esquire, et al.

5

1

There appea rs to be no dispute that if Bentley is covered, then

TP&A has authority to access his records under the DD Act. 42 U.S.C.

§ 15043(a)(2)(I)(iii) (stating that the P&A system shall have access to all

records of any individual with a developmental disability in a situation in

which 1) the individual has a legal conservator; 2) a complaint has been

received; 3) there is probable cause to believe the person has been subject

to abuse or neglect; and 4) the representative has been contacted and

offered assistance but has failed to act on behalf of the individual). 

evidence submitted shows “that there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The

facts in this case are not disputed, and therefore one of the

parties is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

Jerome-Duncan, Inc. v. Auto-By-Tel, L.L.C., 176 F.3d 904,

909 (6th Cir. 1999). 

To demonstrate that it has legal authority to gain access to

Bentley’s records, TP&A must show that he is covered by the

DD Act. 42 U.S.C. § 15001 et seq.

1

 This case turns on

whether the term “developmental disability,” as used in the

Act, can apply to those who suffer from traumatic brain

injury, rather than being limited to those afflicted by some

type of congenital or disease-related defect. The district court

concluded that the “clear language of the statute reflects that

it is intended to cover individuals who have some physical or

mental disability or condition as a result of natural causes.”

Tenn. Protection & Advocacy v. Wells, No. 2:01-0078, at 4

(M.D. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2002) (Mem. Op.) (emphasis added).

The court invoked the rule of statutory construction that all

words of the statute are intended to have meaning and no

interpretation should be adopted that “would render statutory

phrases meaningless, redundant, or superfluous.” Ibid. (citing

United States v. Holmquist, 36 F.3d 154, 160 (1st Cir. 1994)).

To expand the definition further to include disabilities

resulting from injury, would, according to the district court’s

opinion, ignore the meaning of the word “developmental,”

6 Tenn. Protection & Advocacy

v. Wells, Esquire, et al.

No. 02-6221

and therefore Bentley was not qualified for protection under

the Act. Id. at 5.

However, the statute in Holmquist did not define the term

in dispute. Instead, the court had to solve an “interpretive

riddle” presented by a customs statute. Holmquist, 36 F.3d at

158. In contrast, the DD Act contains an explicit and multifaceted definition of the term “developmental disability,” and

that definition must govern the resolution of this case; we are

not at liberty to put our gloss on the definition that Congress

provided by looking to the generally accepted meaning of the

defined term. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of

Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 698 n.10

(1995) (pointing out that “Congress explicitly defined the

operative term ‘take’ in the [Endangered Species Act] . . .

thereby obviating the need for us to probe its meaning”);

United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998)

(observing that when “the meaning of a word is clearly

explained in a statute, courts are not at liberty to look beyond

the statutory definition”). Therefore, although it may not be

intuitive to think of a brain injury that results from a vehicle

accident when the victim is 20 years old as a “developmental

disability,” we must do so because Bentley’s condition fits the

definition that is provided in the statute. 

TP&A is not reading the term “developmental” out of the

statute, but is asking us to follow the definition that Congress

crafted. According to the statute: 

The term “developmental disability” means a severe,

chronic disability of an individual that--

(i) is attributable to a mental or physical impairment or

combination of mental and physical impairments;

(ii) is manifested before the individual attains age 22;

(iii) is likely to continue indefinitely;
No. 02-6221 Tenn. Protection & Advocacy

v. Wells, Esquire, et al.

7

2

This opinion refers to the appellees collectively as “Wells.” Bruce

Arrison, the nursing home administrator, indicated that he was following

Wells’s instructions and does not object per se to releasing Bentley’s

information. Therefore, Wells is de facto the sole appellee in this case. 

(iv) results in substantial functional limitations in 3 or

more of the following areas of major life activity:

(I) Self-care.

(II) Receptive and expressive language.

(III) Learning.

(IV) Mobility.

(V) Self-direction.

(VI) Capacity for independent living.

(VII) Economic self-sufficiency; and

(v) reflects the individual's need for a combination and

sequence of special,interdisciplinary, or generic services,

individualized supports, or other forms of assistance that

are of lifelong or extended duration and are individually

planned and coordinated.

42 U.S.C. § 15002 (8)(A). 

For the reasons below, we reject Wells’s2 arguments that

Bentley does not have a developmental disability because

1) he did not gradually acquire it; 2) his condition does not

satisfy the medical definition of chronic; and 3) it did not

manifest, or reveal, itself over a period of time. Under a

straightforward reading of the statute, Bentley is covered. 

Nature of the Disability

The definition of developmental disability in the DD Act is

framed in terms of a person’s functional limitations and does

not refer to any specific diseases or causes. Earlier versions

of the DD Act defined the term by a list of specific

conditions, such as mental retardation or cerebral palsy.

8 Tenn. Protection & Advocacy

v. Wells, Esquire, et al.

No. 02-6221

3

Bentley’s brain injury is permanent (42 U.S.C. § 15002(8)(A)(iii)

and has resulted in more than three “substantial functional limitations”

(subsection iv). Finally, Bentley requires “lifelong” specialized and

general care (subsection v). 

Congress consistently expanded the definition to include

more diagnoses; in 1978, it amended the statute again,

“deleting all references to specific handicapping conditions

and establishing a definition based on functional limitations.”

Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental

Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, Sec.

503, 42 U.S.C. § 6001, 92 Stat. 2955 (1978); S. Rep. No. 103-

120, at 5 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 164, 168.

Functional limitations, i.e., the result of the condition, govern

the determination of whether a person falls under the Act’s

protection, not medical history, i.e., the cause. No one doubts

that Bentley meets the functional limitation requirements of

the DD Act.3 The statute treats the words “functional” and

“developmental” as essentially synonymous and we conclude

that his disability meets the statutory definition. 

Chronic Condition

Bentley’s brain injury resulted in a severe, “chronic”

disability that is a result of physical impairment (subsection

i). Chronic means “persisting over a long period of time.”

Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 363 (30th ed.

2003). The DD Act does not define the term, but the Family

Leave and Medical Act defines a “chronic serious health

condition” as one which “[c]ontinues over an extended period

of time (including recurring episodes of a single underlying

condition); and [is characterized by a] . . . period of incapacity

which is permanent or long-term due to a condition for which

treatment may not be effective. . . . Examples include

Alzheimer's, a severe stroke, or the terminal stages of a

disease.” Perry v. Jaguar of Troy, 353 F.3d 510, 515 (6th

Cir. 2003) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)). A “severe
No. 02-6221 Tenn. Protection & Advocacy

v. Wells, Esquire, et al.

9

4We construe the term “chronic” in the DD Act in pari materia with

the FMLA, as both acts seek to protect those who have pressing medical

needs and their families. Cf. Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla., 344 F.3d

1161, 1168 (11th Cir. 2003) (drawing upon Title VII, the Americans with

Disabilities Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act to construe the term

“person” in the FMLA in conformity with other civil rights statutes). 

stroke” is also a condition that comes on suddenly, with

devastating consequences, meaning that a chronic condition

is not limited to those characterized by a slow and steady

deterioration. The focus is on the prognosis for recovery, not

on the cause or onset of the medical disorder.4

Furthermore, a chronic condition can result from an outside

agent: the Black Lung Benefits Act defines

“pneumoconiosis,” the condition needed for an award of

benefits, as “a chronic dust disease of the lung and its

sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments,

arising out of coal mine employment.” 30 U.S.C. § 902(b)

(emphasis added). On one occasion, this circuit even

described a series of suicide attempts as a “chronic” health

problem. Williams v. Mehra, 135 F.3d 1105, 1109 (6th Cir.

1998) rev’d en banc, 186 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 1999).

Therefore, neither Congress nor this circuit has limited its

understanding of a chronic medical problem to a long-term

condition resulting from natural causes. It is undisputed that

Bentley’s brain injury has resulted in permanent incapacity,

which would qualify it under the general understanding of the

term “chronic,” as used in § 15002(8)(A). 

Manifestation of the Disability

Bentley’s disability “manifested” itself, that is became

obvious, before age 22 (subsection ii). The dictionary defines

“manifest” as “[c]learly apparent to the sight or

understanding; obvious” and “manifested” as “[t]o show or

demonstrate plainly.” American Heritage Dictionary 1064

(4th ed. 2000). Black’s Law Dictionary uses the term in

10 Tenn. Protection & Advocacy

v. Wells, Esquire, et al.

No. 02-6221

various legal contexts, consistently with the meaning of

obvious: e.g., “manifest injustice,” defined as “[a]n error in

the trial court that is direct, obvious, and observable,” Black’s

Law Dictionary 974 (7th ed. 1999); “manifest necessity” is

defined as a “sudden and overwhelming emergency” that

precludes completion of a trial. Id. at 975.

Wells argues that “manifest” means “revealed” and

therefore refers exclusively to the exposure of something that

already existed but was hidden. Bentley’s brain injury was

not a condition that lay dormant, but rather was the instant

result of his collision in the truck, leading Wells to conclude

that Bentley’s injury did not “manifest” itself, as the statute

requires. Although “reveal” is one plausible meaning, it is

not the only one. This circuit has consistently used the term

“manifest” to mean “be apparent:” Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. Dir.,

Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States

Dep’t of Labor, 865 F.2d 727, 732 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating a

preexisting condition must have manifested itself either to the

employer through observation or to a doctor from a medical

examination for the company to qualify for special fund

disability payments due to subsequent injury); Abbott v.

Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 926 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that an

impairment must be taken into consideration under the

Medical-Vocational guidelines for determining disability,

even if it does not manifest itself as a limitation on strength)

(emphases added). Therefore, nothing in either the dictionary

definition of “manifest,” the legal usage of the term, or the

way that this circuit has used the word, suggests that it must

refer to a condition that always existed and became obvious.

We see no reason why “manifest” cannot just as easily be

used to describe something newly created that is now visible.

It simply is another way of saying that a condition is readily

observable.
No. 02-6221 Tenn. Protection & Advocacy

v. Wells, Esquire, et al.

11

5

See, e.g., American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry,

Practice Parameters for the Assessment and Treatment of Children,

Adolescents, and Adults with Mental Retardation and Comorbid Mental

Disorders, 1999 (explaining that “developmental disability is actually not

a medical term but a ‘legislative/legal concept’”). 

End point of the Developmental Period 

Nor is age 22 a random cut-off point; it is an eligibility

requirement that resulted from policy, rather than medical,5

judgments. In 1978, Congress revised the DD Act and raised

the eligibility age for assistance from 18 to 22 years. H.R.

Rep. No. 95-1188, at 8 (1978), reprinted in 1978

U.S.C.C.A.N. 7355, 7362. The initial objective was to

include everyone with a severe disability within the purview

of the statute. Advocates for disabled children objected,

however, fearing that universal coverage would spread the

available resources too thinly. Rehabilitation Amendments of

1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources

of the United States Senate, 95th Cong. 83, 113 (1978)

(testimony advocating that the Senate adopt the definition of

development disability drafted by a task force that

recommended an eligibility cut off at age 22). Therefore, the

eligibility age of 22 represents the limitation that Congress

determined would provide the optimal balance between a

general commitment to helping the disabled and funding

realities. Restricting eligibility further through the cramped

reading of the statute that Wells proposes would ignore both

the plain meaning of the legislation and its intent. 

In adjudicating disability claims, we must respect the

eligibility requirements established by Congress. For

instance, the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program

considers someone disabled “if he is unable to engage in any

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be

12 Tenn. Protection & Advocacy

v. Wells, Esquire, et al.

No. 02-6221

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than

twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382(c)(3)(A). However, to

receive SSI disability payments for mental retardation

evidenced simply by a low IQ score, a claimant must

demonstrate “a significantly subaverage general intellectual

functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning initially

manifested during the developmental period; i.e.,the evidence

demonstrates or supports onset of the impairment before age

22.” 20 CFR Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.05 (emphasis

added). This circuit has denied benefits to claimants who

could not demonstrate mental deficiency before age 22.

Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 354-55 (6th Cir. 2001)

(denying claim because Foster’s first IQ test was done when

she was 42 years old and therefore she could not demonstrate

that her subaverage intellectual functioning manifested itself

before age 22); Brown v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,

948 F.2d 268, 271 (6th Cir. 1991) (remanding to determine if

the claimant's mental impairment was “‘manifested during

[claimant's] developmental period’ or rather [was] a partial

consequence of claimant's history of heavy alcohol use after

the age of twenty-two”). We accept the eligibility provision

in the DD Act at face value in order to be consistent with our

interpretation of the same age requirement in the context of

other public welfare legislation.

Congress has determined that it is appropriate to consider

a person’s “developmental period” to extend to age 22 to

assess eligibility for government assistance. However natural

it would be to consider a 20-year old truck driver as a fully

grown adult, it is well-settled law that when a statutory

definition contradicts the everyday meaning of a word, the

statutory language generally controls: judges should

“construe legislation as it is written, not as it might be read by

a layman.” Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 485 (1987). Only

when following the literal language of the statute would lead

to “an interpretation which is inconsistent with the legislative

intent or to an absurd result” can a court modify the meaning

of the statutory language. Appleton v. First Nat’l Bank of
No. 02-6221 Tenn. Protection & Advocacy

v. Wells, Esquire, et al.

13

Ohio, 62 F.3d 791, 801 (6th Cir. 1995). Congress may not

have had truck drivers with brain injuries in mind when it

drafted the legislation, but Bentley easily falls into the

category of people whom Congress intended to protect.

Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, 917 F.2d 266, 270

(6th Cir. 1990) (clarifying that if the plain language of a

statute leads to a broader result than Congress might have

anticipated, it is still not automatically tantamount to an

absurd result). We have no basis on which to second guess

the language that Congress used because applying the statute

to Bentley neither contradicts the legislative intent nor

produces an absurd result. 

The district court erred in inferring a requirement that the

disability result from natural causes because reference to

injury is lacking in the statute. It is axiomatic that the

statutory definition of the term excludes unstated meanings of

that term. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 n.10

(1979). The Supreme Court reiterated this rule last term,

rejecting the plaintiff’s attempt to read a requirement for

heightened burden of proof for a “mixed motive” jury

instruction into the 1991 Civil Rights Act. Desert Palace,

Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). In a unanimous opinion,

the Court dismissed the plaintiff’s interpretation because

“[o]n its face, the statute does not mention, much less require,

that a plaintiff make a heightened showing through direct

evidence.” Id. at 99. 

In this case, the statute does not distinguish between

disabilities caused by injury and those that result from organic

defects, but emphasizes improving the condition of all

citizens with disabilities by delivering various kinds of

assistance: 

(1) disability is a natural part of human experience that

does not diminish the right of individuals with

developmental disabilities to live independently, to exert

control and choice over their own lives, and to fully

14 Tenn. Protection & Advocacy

v. Wells, Esquire, et al.

No. 02-6221

participate in and contribute to their communities

through full integration . . .; [but that] (5) individuals

with developmental disabilities are at greater risk than

the general population of abuse, neglect, financial and

sexual exploitation, and the violation of their legal and

human rights. 

42 U.S.C. § 15001(a)(1), (5). The statute contrasts the

disabled with the general population, but does not distinguish

among the different categories of disability, because its

purpose is to erase all distinctions made because of handicap.

Narrowing the definition of “developmental disability” to

prevent TP&A from assisting Bentley in achieving greater

personal autonomy contravenes the basic intent of the statute.

The declaration that it is a “goal of the nation” that people

with disabilities “live free of abuse, neglect, financial and

sexual exploitation, and violations of their legal and human

rights,” 42 U.S.C. § 15001(a)(16)(F), confirms the

conclusion that the cause of the disability is immaterial for the

purposes of determining eligibility under the DD Act.

III

The district court bolstered its reading of the statute to

exclude Bentley from its protection by pointing to the

enactment in 2000 of the “State Grants for Protection and

Advocacy Services,” which authorizestheSecretary of Health

and Human Services to make grants to agencies such as

TP&A to provide services to individuals with traumatic brain

injuries. 42 U.S.C. § 300d-53. The statute’s general

provision states:

The Secretary, acting through the Administrator of the

Health Resources and Services Administration (referred

to in this section as the “Administrator”), shall make

grants to protection and advocacy systems for the

purpose of enabling such systems to provide services to

individuals with traumatic brain injury. 
No. 02-6221 Tenn. Protection & Advocacy

v. Wells, Esquire, et al.

15

6

The parties dispute the legal significance, if any, of this document:

TP&A argues that it is the work of a private organization that has the

same weight as “commentary by a columnist in a trade journal.”

Appellant Br. at 34. Wells argues in his brief that it is a “federallymandated” report and therefore authoritative. Appellee Br. at 8. The

report itself was prepared by the Advocacy Training and Technical

Assistance Center, which receives funding from three government

agencies. Because the government paid for the publication, and it does

not bear a disclaimer divorcing the sponsoring agencies from the opinions

expressed in the report, we consider the extent to which we should be

guided by the report’s characterization of those with traumatic brain

injuries as a “new” population under the DD Act. 

42 U.S.C. § 300d-53. The rest of the section describes

funding mechanisms. Therefore, the statute is most easily

read as a funding earmark to support those with traumatic

brain injury. Its language does not shed any light on whether

TP&A should have access to Bentley’s records under the

current statutory regime because it does not address authority

to serve those with brain injuries under the DD Act. The

language is too sketchy to support the district court’s

conclusion that it is “highly probative of Congress’ intention

as [to] the scope of Section 15002(8) [the statutory definition

of developmental disability].” Mem. Op. at 4.

The Protection and Advocacy System is the network of

congressionally mandated advocacy agencies, of which

TP&A is a member. The 2001 annual report described the

§ 300d-53 legislation as a program “for [a] new population in

special need of our services — persons with traumatic brain

injury.”6 Mem. Op. at 5. A court should consider any agency

publication because it reflects expertise in the subject matter.

United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234-35 (2001).

Nevertheless, this court is not bound by the annual report’s

assertion that those with traumatic brain injuries constitute a

“new population” of clients. Christensen v. Harris County,

529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (holding that interpretations “in

policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement

16 Tenn. Protection & Advocacy

v. Wells, Esquire, et al.

No. 02-6221

guidelines, all of which lack the force of law, do not warrant

Chevron-style deference”). Furthermore, we are forbidden to

defer to agency guidelines that contradict the plain meaning

of the statute. Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 482

(1999) (holding that the EEOC guidelines reflected an

impermissible interpretation of the Americans with

Disabilities Act and therefore did not warrant judicial

deference). 

The statement in the annual report may reflect the reality

that agencies such as TP&A have generally not, as a matter of

fact, included people with traumatic brain injuries in their

programs. It cannot, however, provide a basis to preclude

such individuals from receiving services under the DD Act

because, on its face, the statute’s definition of “development

disability” encompasses individuals, such as Bentley, who

have suffered traumatic brain injury. 

The case law is not helpful in resolving this question of

statutory construction. TP&A is correct that federal courts

have generally interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 15043 to allow the

P&A system access to client records. Wisconsin Coalition for

Advocacy v. Czaplewski, 131 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (E.D. Wis.

2001) (holding right of access to patient records under the DD

Act preempts more restrictive state regulations); Iowa

Protection & Advocacy Services v. Rasmussen, 206 F.R.D.

630 (S.D. Iowa 2001) (same). Wells has not provided any

case law that prevents us from following the general trend of

allowing organizations in the P&A system liberal access to

patient records.

Wells properly challenges the cases that TP&A cites in its

brief for the proposition that traumatic brain injury is covered

under the DD Act because the cited precedent addresses the

legal rights of those with traumatic brain injuries under

different statutes, e.g., the Federal Tort Claims Act. See

Colleen v. United States, 843 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1987).

Furthermore, the court in each cited case assumed that the
No. 02-6221 Tenn. Protection & Advocacy

v. Wells, Esquire, et al.

17

disability is covered under the relevant statute. See, e.g.,

Blackmon ex rel. Blackmon v. Springfield R-XII School

District, 198 F.3d 648 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting without

elaboration that student with a bilateral brain injury was

covered under the Individuals with Disabilities Education

Act). However, Wells did not cite any case in which a court

held that traumatic brain injury is not covered under the DD

Act. Since Bentley can fulfill the five requirements in the

statute and construing the statute to include his kind of injury

furthers the legislative intent of the Act, the district court

erred in finding that it did not apply to him.

IV

We therefore REVERSE the district court’s grant of

summary judgment and REMAND so that the district court

may consider the release of Mr. Bentley’s records to TP&A

under the standards of the DD Act. 

18 Tenn. Protection & Advocacy

v. Wells, Esquire, et al.

No. 02-6221

_____________

DISSENT

_____________

MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge,

dissenting. In construing statutes, we are frequently

admonished to avoid interpretations that will produce absurd

results. In stretching the meaning, intuitive or as statutorily

defined, of the term “developmental disability” to cover the

effect of a traumatic brain injury suffered spontaneously by a

fully-functioning 20-year-old, however, the majority in this

case has failed to heed the admonition. To demonstrate the

absurdity of this interpretation of the statute at issue here, one

need only ask: Why would Congress provide protection under

the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 15043, to an adult who suffers such an

injury one day short of his or her twenty-second birthday, but

not to the same person injured in exactly the same manner 24

hours later? The answer is, of course, as the district judge

held, that the Act was never meant to apply to individuals in

Martin Bentley’s situation – the holder of a GED, who served

two years in the United States Army and then became a longdistance truck driver, and who, according to the majority,

retains the “‘adequate cognitive ability’ to speak for himself

. . . and express[ ] his wishes in an ‘unequivocal consistent

manner’.”

It is not surprising that Congress initially attempted to

describe the term “developmental disability” in terms of a

diagnosis but then abandoned the effort. The term is a

contemporary euphemism for “mental retardation,” which

itself came into use in an effort to erase the stigma attached to

much cruder descriptive terms used in the early part of the last

century and before, terms such as “moron” (used to describe

those with intelligence quotients ranging from 50-69),

“imbecile” (having an IQ of 25-50), “idiot” (having an IQ

under 25), and the like. 
No. 02-6221 Tenn. Protection & Advocacy

v. Wells, Esquire, et al.

19

But there are many causes of mental retardation, and the

disability can (but does not necessarily) accompany other

conditions, such as cerebral palsy and autism – hence the

effort to describe developmental disability in terms of

function, rather than diagnosis. As the district court

recognized, however, the key concept here is not “disability,”

from which Mr. Bentley undoubtedly suffers. The key,

rather, is the descriptive term “developmental,” referring

obviously to an impairment that “manifests” itself over time

and impedes an individual’s progress from childhood to postadolescence and into adulthood, equipped with what are

recognized as adequate skills to live independently and

productively. Mr. Bentley was living independently, and

presumably productively, at the time he became the victim of

an unexpected and debilitating accident, one which

unfortunately befalls other adults all too frequently but which

does not implicate a potential for the denial of civil rights

such as the statute in question here was designed to protect

against. 

Perhaps the problem here is merely poor legislative

drafting, an impediment we sometimes face in trying

rationally to construe statutes conceived by special interest

groups, drafted by committees working under pressure to

reach political consensus, and thereafter amended and made

increasingly complex. If so, the majority has compounded

the problem by reading a badly drafted statute too literally

and has thereby reached what I believe is a result that

Congress did not intend and would never have envisioned,

had it been prescient enough to foresee the application of this

civil rights statute to a situation such as the one before us.

This seems obvious from the fact that this case presents itself

as one of first impression, suggesting that the legislation has

never been understood to apply to victims of sudden

traumatic injury, regardless of age.

Despite my sympathy for Mr. Bentley’s disabled condition

and my conviction that the plaintiff here is acting with the

20 Tenn. Protection & Advocacy

v. Wells, Esquire, et al.

No. 02-6221

best of intentions, I would affirm the district court for the

reasons set out in its memorandum opinion and deny relief.