Filed 3/19/14 In re N.C. CA6 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

In re N.C., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law. 

 H039619 

 (Santa Clara County 

 Super. Ct. No. JD21592) 

SANTA CLARA COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND 

CHILDREN'S SERVICES, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

D.C., 

Defendant and Appellant. 

 D.C. is the father of four-year-old N.C., and appeals an order of the juvenile court 

sustaining a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, 

subdivision (b)1

 adjudging N.C. a ward of the court and ordering reunification services. 

Father asserts the court erred in sustaining two of the allegations in the petition, because 

there is not substantial evidence to support the findings. 

 1

 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code. 
2 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

 The instant appeal arises out of a November 29, 2012 referral concerning general 

neglect and emotional abuse of N.C. to the Santa Clara County Department of Family and 

Children Services (Department). The family had a history of eight prior referrals to the 

Department between 2009 and 2012 concerning mother’s mental health and father’s 

substance abuse. The family received informal services in 2012. 

 In November 2012, mother lived in the maternal grandmother’s home, and father 

lived with his parents. N.C. spent time in both places. The referral to the Department in 

November 2012 arose from an incident during which mother had an argument with the 

maternal grandmother in N.C.’s presence and threatened to kill the maternal 

grandmother. Mother grabbed N.C.’s arm during the argument, causing red marks. 

 In investigating the allegations of abuse and neglect, the Department talked to 

mother, father and N.C., as well as the maternal grandmother and paternal grandparents. 

Mother said that father had a medical marijuana card, smoked marijuana and drank beer. 

The maternal grandmother said that mother had untreated mental health issues, and father 

drove N.C. while he was under the influence of marijuana. The maternal grandmother 

also stated that she was concerned for N.C.’s safety and that mother and father would 

physically fight with each other in front of N.C. 

 The paternal grandmother stated that mother was aggressive and that father 

smoked marijuana and drank alcohol often. She stated that father would drive N.C. 

without a car seat. The paternal grandfather stated that mother did not take her 

medication for Schizophrenia, and he believed father smoked marijuana and drank beer 

daily. The paternal grandfather called the police in November 2012 when he saw father 

driving N.C. without a car seat. 

 Father told the social worker that the paternal grandparents were making 

everything up. He denied ever driving with N.C. while under the influence or without a 
3 

car seat. Father denied there was ever any domestic violence with mother, denied that 

mother was aggressive and violent, and denied that he had any problem with marijuana or 

alcohol. 

 N.C. told the social worker that her parents argued often, and yelled at each other 

and said bad words. N.C. was afraid of her mother because her mother had grabbed her 

and hurt her and left her home alone sometimes. She had never seen her father smoke 

anything. 

 The Department filed a first amended petition under section 300, subdivision (b) 

on December 12, 2012. N.C. was placed in protective custody and remained with her 

paternal grandparents as a temporary placement. The court detained N.C., and ordered 

supervised visitation for both parents. 

 On January 3, 2013, the Department filed a second amended petition under 

section 300, subdivision (b). On January 7, 2013, the court held a joint jurisdiction and 

disposition hearing. At the hearing, father disagreed with the recommendations and 

requested a date for trial. 

 Trial on the matter started on March 21, 2013. At trial, the social worker assigned 

to the case testified regarding her risk assessment, and father’s substance abuse that she 

believed impacted his ability to care for N.C. properly. She stated that father selfreported he began using marijuana at the age of 11 and alcohol at the age of 13 in his 

Department of Alcohol and Drugs (DADS) assessment conducted on December 17, 2012. 

Father told his DADS assessor that he last used marijuana on December 10, 2012, and 

last used alcohol on December 9, 2012. The DADS assessor diagnosed father with an 

Axis I Cannabis Dependence and referred him to an outpatient substance abuse program. 

The assessor believed that father was at risk of continues substance abuse if he did not 

engage in treatment and participate in the recovery community. Following the 

assessment, father did begin participating in an outpatient program, but resisted making 
4 

changes and continued to minimize how alcohol and marijuana affected him and his 

family. 

 Father testified at trial and described his marijuana and alcohol use as 

experimentation or socializing. He stated that he went to detox when he was 17 because 

his father made him, telling him he had to go, or move out. Father also stated that he has 

never been intoxicated in his life. Father said he did not believe he was an addict because 

he did not use every day, and he could quit at any time. Neither mother, nor any of the 

grandparents testified at trial. 

At the conclusion of trial, the court sustained the second amended petition as 

requested by the Department, declared N.C. a dependent of the court, removed her from 

her parents’ care, and ordered a plan of reunification for both father and mother. The 

court specifically stated that with regard to the allegations of father’s substance abuse, 

there was ample independent evidence besides the grandparents’ statements, including 

the DADS’s assessment and findings, as well as father’s own statements to the assessor. 

 Father filed a timely notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support two of the 

jurisdictional findings related to his substance abuse. Specifically, he asserts the findings 

in b-1 and b-3 were not supported by substantial evidence. [B]-1 states as follows: “On 

12/10/12, the child, [N.C.] . . . , age 4, was placed in protective custody pursuant to a 

protective custody warrant issued on 12/10/12 due to the mother, [E.B.]’s severe mental 

health problem and the father, [D.C.]’s substance abuse issues.” [B]-3 states as follows: 

“Further, the child’s father, [D.C.], has a substance abuse problem which negatively 

impacts his ability to safely parent the child. [D.C.] smokes marijuana and drinks alcohol 

to the point of intoxication on a regular basis and he has driven the child while he is 

under the influence. On 11/30/12 the father was under the influence of marijuana and 
5 

drove with the child in the car without a car seat. The mother was also in the car and 

failed to ensure the safety of the child.” 

 The principles governing such a challenge are familiar. In the trial court, child 

welfare authorities have the duty to establish the jurisdictional facts by a preponderance 

of the evidence. (In re D.C. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1014.) On appeal, however, 

“ ‘we must uphold the [trial] court’s [jurisdictional] findings unless, after reviewing the 

entire record and resolving all conflicts in favor of the respondent and drawing all 

reasonable inferences in support of the judgment, we determine there is no substantial 

evidence to support the findings. [Citation.]’ ” (In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 

1022.) 

 “To be sufficient to sustain a juvenile dependency petition the evidence must be 

‘ “reasonable, credible, and of solid value” ’ such that the court reasonably could find the 

child to be a dependent of the court . . . . [Citation.]” (In re R.M. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 

986, 988.) Moreover, “[s]ubstantial evidence . . . is not synonymous with any evidence. 

[Citation.] ‘A decision supported by a mere scintilla of evidence need not be affirmed on 

appeal.’ [Citation.] Although substantial evidence may consist of inferences, those 

inferences must be products of logic and reason and must be based on the evidence. 

Inferences that are the result of mere speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding. 

The ultimate test is whether a reasonable trier of fact would make the challenged ruling 

considering the whole record. [Citations.]” (In re James R., Jr. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 

129, 135.) 

Father cites section 355 for the proposition that the hearsay evidence that is the 

foundation of the conclusions in b-1 and b-3 is not sufficient to support substantial 

evidence because the hearsay is not corroborated. Section 355, subdivision (c)(1), 

provides that if a “party to the jurisdictional hearing raises a timely objection to the 

admission of specific hearsay evidence contained in” the Department’s report, “the 
6 

specific hearsay evidence shall not be sufficient by itself to support a jurisdictional 

finding or any ultimate fact upon which a jurisdictional finding is based unless the 

petitioner establishes one or more” of specified exceptions. (Italics added.) The 

exceptions are: if a hearsay exception applies (§ 355, subd. (c)(1)(A)); if the “hearsay 

declarant is a minor under the age of 12 years who is the subject of the jurisdictional 

hearing” (§ 355, subd. (c)(1)(B)); if the hearsay declarant is a peace officer, health 

practitioner, social worker, or teacher (§ 355, subd. (c)(1)(C)); or if the “hearsay 

declarant is available for cross-examination,” (§ 355, subd. (c)(1)(D)). (See Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 5.684.) Section 355, subdivision (d), confirms the right of any party to 

subpoena a hearsay declarant as a witness or “to introduce admissible evidence relevant 

to the weight of the hearsay evidence or the credibility of the hearsay declarant.” 

Here, Father’s attorney made a specific hearsay objection at trial to the mother and 

grandparents’ hearsay statements that he drove N.C. in a car while under the influence of 

drugs or alcohol. The corroborating evidence of Father’s substance abuse is his own 

admission to the Department and the DADS assessor that he uses marijuana and alcohol 

and began doing so when he was 11 years old. Father also admitted to using marijuana in 

the home while N.C. was asleep. Father’s own statements, as well as the opinion of the 

DADS assessor and social worker supported the jurisdictional finding of substance abuse 

by father and were sufficient in themselves to support the finding of substance abuse in 

both b-1 and b-3. (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.) There is ample 

corroborating evidence. (See In re R.R. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1280-1281.) 

Thus, none of the hearsay statements regarding father’s substance abuse to which Father 

objected was the sole basis to support the substance abuse finding and the jurisdictional 

finding based upon it. (§ 355, subd. (c).) 

With regard to the finding in b-3 that father drove N.C. in the car while he was 

under the influence, and specifically drove her on November 20, 2013 without a car seat, 
7 

there is no independent evidence to corroborate the grandparents’ and mother’s 

statements. While mother was present at the trial, she chose not to testify, and as a result, 

was unavailable for cross-examination. However, the grandparents were “available for 

cross-examination,” (§ 355, subd. (c)(1)(D); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.684(c)). Father’s 

counsel had contact information for the grandparents and the right to subpoena them or 

“to introduce admissible evidence relevant to the weight of the hearsay evidence or the 

credibility of the hearsay declarant.” (§ 355, subd. (d).) In addition, the grandparents 

were cooperative witnesses, and were available on telephone standby during the trial. 

Therefore, because the grandparents were available for cross-examination, their hearsay 

statements could provide substantial evidence to support the findings in b-3. 
8 

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. 

 ______________________________________ 

 RUSHING, P.J. 

WE CONCUR: 

 

____________________________________ 

PREMO, J. 

____________________________________ 

ELIA, J.