I 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1891 

To promote the development of disaster plans that will protect the maximum 

number of citizens; to foster public trust, confidence, and cooperation 

with these plans; and to encourage greater public participation in homeland security by allowing the American people to have a direct and 

influential role in developing and modifying community disaster preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation plans in collaboration with government officials, emergency managers, health authorities, and professional responders, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 17, 2007 

Mr. KENNEDY (for himself, Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi, Mr. LANGEVIN, 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas, Mr. BLUMENAUER, Mr. GRIJALVA, Ms. ZOE

LOFGREN of California, Mr. GONZALEZ, and Mr. COHEN) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Transportation 

and Infrastructure, and in addition to the Committees on Energy and 

Commerce and Homeland Security, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions 

as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To promote the development of disaster plans that will protect the maximum number of citizens; to foster public 

trust, confidence, and cooperation with these plans; and 

to encourage greater public participation in homeland 

security by allowing the American people to have a direct 

and influential role in developing and modifying community disaster preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation plans in collaboration with government officials, 


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emergency managers, health authorities, and professional 

responders, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Ready, Willing, and 

5 Able Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 The Congress finds as follows: 

8 (1) Research indicates that effective responses 

9 to emergencies, particularly terrorist attacks, require 

10 the United States to adopt a new paradigm for de11 veloping disaster plans. The current emergency man12 agement approach mistakenly assumes the general 

13 public to easily be prone to panic and social chaos 

14 and expects citizens to comply with disaster plans 

15 they had little or no direct influence in developing. 

16 Keeping the general public away from participating 

17 in the actual development of disaster plans, and fail18 ing to incorporate their ‘‘common-sense’’ knowledge, 

19 has alienated many citizens and jeopardized the abil20 ity of the United States to respond effectively to do21 mestic emergencies: 

22 (A) According to the New York Academy 

23 of Medicine’s report, ‘‘Redefining Readiness: 

24 Terrorism Planning Through the Eyes of the 


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1 Public’’, despite this Nation’s investment in 

2 working out logistics and purchasing technology 

3 for responding to terrorist attacks and other 

4 disasters, current emergency response plans will 

5 ultimately fall significantly short of expectations 

6 because they were developed without the direct 

7 involvement of the public and therefore fail to 

8 account for all of the risks citizens would face 

9 in a disaster. Because current plans do not pro10 tect the millions of Americans who would be at 

11 risk of developing complications from the small12 pox vaccine, 60 percent of citizens surveyed 

13 said they would not go to a public vaccination 

14 site in a smallpox outbreak. Because schools 

15 and workplaces have not been prepared to func16 tion as safe havens, 40 percent of citizens sur17 veyed said they would not shelter in place for 

18 as long as told in a dirty bomb explosion. Only 

19 20 percent of people believe disaster planners 

20 know very much about their concerns and needs 

21 in the event of a disaster; only 50 percent are 

22 confident that they would receive the help they 

23 might require in the wake of a disaster; and 

24 only 30 percent believe the public can have a lot 

25 of influence on disaster plans being developed. 


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1 Nonetheless, even in communities that have 

2 never experienced a terrorist attack, over one3 third of the population has a very strong inter4 est in personally helping government agencies 

5 and community organizations develop disaster 

6 plans. 

7 (B) According to the Heritage Foundation 

8 Executive Memorandum, ‘‘Beyond Duct Tape: 

9 The Federal Government’s Role in Public Pre10 paredness’’, community public safety measures 

11 and disaster response activities will succeed 

12 only if they are community-based. Every com13 munity is unique and local preparedness plan14 ning must account for local conditions of cul15 ture, geography, language, infrastructure, poli16 tics, and numerous other factors. Programs are 

17 much more effective when members of the com18 munity are engaged in preparedness planning, 

19 sharing their concerns and ideas with emer20 gency officials. 

21 (C) Direct, participatory disaster planning, 

22 unlike the current approach, is a fail-safe 

23 against developing unrealistic emergency plans. 

24 It benefits lawmakers, government officials, and 

25 professional responders by identifying the full 


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1 range of risks that the public would face in dis2 aster situations, by instructing what is feasible 

3 and not feasible in terms of crisis management, 

4 and by facilitating closer relations with leaders 

5 from different communities, which in turn fos6 ters greater public trust and confidence. This is 

7 particularly important, as some communities 

8 may be less resilient to the consequences of dis9 asters than others. For example, different com10 munities have different degrees of access to 

11 health care, use languages other than English, 

12 and have variable levels of trust in traditional 

13 news sources, the medical community, and gov14 ernment officials. 

15 (2) According to ‘‘Clinical Infectious Diseases: 

16 Confronting Biological Weapons’’, in June 2001, the 

17 simulated bioterrorism exercise, Dark Winter, was 

18 conducted to examine the challenges senior-level pol19 icymakers would face if confronted with a bioter20 rorist attack that initiated outbreaks of a contagious 

21 disease. The exercise was intended to increase 

22 awareness of the scope and character of the threat 

23 posed by biological weapons among senior national 

24 security experts and to bring about actions that 

25 would improve prevention and response strategies. 


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1 One of the important lessons learned was that indi2 vidual actions of United States citizens will be crit3 ical in ending the spread of a contagious disease, 

4 and leaders must gain the cooperation of the Amer5 ican people. Dark Winter participants concluded— 

6 (A) it is not possible to forcibly vaccinate 

7 the public or impose travel restrictions on large 

8 groups of the population without their coopera9 tion; 

10 (B) to gain cooperation, the public must 

11 believe there is fairness in the distribution of 

12 vaccines and other vital resources; and 

13 (C) the public must be convinced that dis14 ease-containment measures are for the general 

15 good of society and that all possible measures 

16 are being taken to prevent the further spread of 

17 the disease. 

18 (3) Decades of social scientific research un19 equivocally demonstrate that people are often at 

20 their finest during crises, contrary to the widely held 

21 belief that disasters easily lead to panic and a break22 down in social order: 

23 (A) Rather than panicking, members of the 

24 public typically converge en masse to help when 

25 disasters strike. Numerous studies document 


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1 the fact that individuals and groups in the im2 mediate impact area of a disaster help manage 

3 evacuations, perform rescues, locate and dig out 

4 victims who are trapped, transport them to 

5 emergency care providers, and repeatedly put 

6 themselves in danger to ensure that others are 

7 safe. For example, in the immediate wake of 

8 the World Trade Center’s collapse, numerous 

9 ordinary citizens acted swiftly and collectively in 

10 supporting search and rescue activities despite 

11 the obvious hazards and uncertainty about ad12 ditional attacks. 

13 (B) During disasters, people rarely panic, 

14 turn against their neighbors, or suddenly forget 

15 personal ties and moral commitments. Instead, 

16 the more consistent pattern is for people in dis17 asters to bind and work together to help one 

18 another. For example, on September 11th, peo19 ple successfully evacuated from lower Manhat20 tan in one of the largest waterborne evacuations 

21 in history. Barges, fishing boats, ferries, and 

22 pleasure boats spontaneously and collectively 

23 supported the Coast Guard and harbor pilots in 

24 moving hundreds of thousands of people away 

25 from danger, as well as transporting emergency 


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1 personnel and equipment to docks near 

2 ‘‘Ground Zero’’. 

3 (C) Despite the fact that people may feel 

4 terrified in disaster situations, even to the point 

5 of feeling that their own lives are in imminent 

6 danger, individualistic, competitive behavior is 

7 rare. Instead, social bonds remain intact, and 

8 the sense of responsibility to family members, 

9 friends, fellow workers, neighbors, and even 

10 total strangers remains strong. For example, 

11 there are numerous accounts of healthy office 

12 workers delaying their evacuation in order to 

13 help injured and disabled colleagues down the 

14 stairwells of the World Trade Center. 

15 (D) Highly adaptive and pro-social behav16 ior by the public is common in various types of 

17 crises, including public health crises. For exam18 ple, when the greater Toronto area faced an 

19 outbreak of SARS in 2003 that sickened a dis20 proportionate number of health care workers, 

21 hundreds of American physicians volunteered to 

22 aid their Canadian colleagues despite the fact 

23 that SARS was a potentially lethal disease. 

24 (E) Often, people focused on the manage25 rial and technical challenges of crisis manageVerDate Aug 31 2005 18:51 Apr 20, 2007 Jkt 059200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1891.IH H1891

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1 ment misinterpret the general public as panic2 stricken and chaotic when they are, in fact, en3 gaging in rational behavior. Such behaviors in4 clude seeking more information, questioning au5 thorities, and undertaking precautionary meas6 ures even if authorities believe these measures 

7 are unwarranted. 

8 (F) While there always exists a possibility 

9 for a breakdown in the social order during a 

10 crisis, numerous disaster experts agree that the 

11 most effective ways for government officials to 

12 counter any potential for panic and to facilitate 

13 recovery are— 

14 (i) to provide the public with the most 

15 accurate and timely information possible 

16 during a crisis and not withhold vital infor17 mation; 

18 (ii) to make provisions for the ethical 

19 and rational distribution of vital resources 

20 that could have a direct impact on health; 

21 and 

22 (iii) to include community residents in 

23 disaster preparedness efforts before a crisis 

24 occurs to ensure that response plans are 


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1 realistic and address the full range of risks 

2 that the public would face. 

3 (4) Civil-society organizations, those organiza4 tions created to bring people together for common 

5 pro-social purposes, such as professional societies, 

6 business groups, labor unions, service organizations, 

7 neighborhood associations, and faith-based groups, 

8 have assumed critical roles in responding to disas9 ters. In the wake of the attacks on the World Trade 

10 Center and the Pentagon, civil-society organizations 

11 and their members organized themselves to aid the 

12 search-and-rescue efforts and the longer-term recov13 ery process. Unions, tenant associations, professional 

14 societies, businesses, churches, and other groups gal15 vanized existing social ties, leadership structures, 

16 and communication links to channel crucial aid: 

17 (A) The American Medical Association 

18 contacted State and local medical societies and 

19 specialty organizations to request volunteers. 

20 More than 1,700 medical personnel responded 

21 to requests for critical-care specialists. 

22 (B) Building trades and labor unions im23 mediately gathered crews of engineers, iron24 workers, laborers, Teamsters, and others to set 

25 up equipment and to look for architectural 


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1 drawings in order to perform the dangerous 

2 work of searching through the rubble for sur3 vivors. One union hall located in Tribeca was 

4 converted into a Red Cross Disaster Service 

5 Center that helped connect affected residents 

6 with critical relief services. 

7 (C) Members of the Independence Plaza 

8 North Tenants’ Association in lower Manhattan 

9 effectively directed streams of people to safety 

10 and away from the World Trade Center com11 plex; they organized ‘‘urgent needs’’ crews to 

12 canvass the area around ‘‘Ground Zero’’ looking 

13 for homebound residents who required assist14 ance; and they acted as volunteers for local 

15 businesses when paid employees could not get 

16 to the area. 

17 (D) The Seamen’s Church Institute of 

18 New York and New Jersey, headquartered in 

19 lower Manhattan, dedicated its cooking facilities 

20 to feeding rescue and recovery workers; mem21 bers of the Episcopal churches in the area took 

22 turns staffing the kitchen. 

23 (5) Effective communication by government and 

24 emergency officials helps facilitate the public’s pro25 ductive responses to disasters: 


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1 (A) According to the Presidential/Congres2 sional Commission on Risk Assessment and 

3 Risk Management, risk communication and 

4 analysis should be integrated at all stages of 

5 the risk management process so emergency 

6 managers and government officials address 

7 issues of concern to the public and share infor8 mation in a way that facilitates effective action 

9 and creates public confidence. 

10 (B) According to the New York Academy 

11 of Medicine’s report, ‘‘Redefining Readiness: 

12 Terrorism Planning Through the Eyes of the 

13 Public’’, officials cannot effectively commu14 nicate risk to the public until they first learn 

15 the full range of risks the public would actually 

16 face in particular disaster situations. 

17 (C) According to the Heritage Foundation 

18 Executive Memorandum, ‘‘Beyond Duct Tape: 

19 The Federal Government’s Role in Public Pre20 paredness’’, the most vital role the Federal Gov21 ernment can have in enhancing the public re22 sponse to a terrorist attack is to ensure that its 

23 communications are understandable, credible, 

24 and actionable. 


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1 SEC. 3. GOALS. 

2 The goals of this Act are as follows: 

3 (1) To promote the development of disaster 

4 plans that will protect the maximum number of citi5 zens; to foster public trust, confidence, and coopera6 tion with these plans; and to encourage greater pub7 lic participation in homeland security by allowing the 

8 American people to have a direct and influential role 

9 in developing and modifying community disaster pre10 paredness, response, recovery, and mitigation plans 

11 in collaboration with government officials, emergency 

12 managers, health authorities, and professional re13 sponders. 

14 (2) To create a working group composed of 

15 Federal officials and State, county, local, and tribal 

16 Citizen Corps Council members to coordinate the ef17 forts of different government agencies in identifying, 

18 developing, and implementing strategies to allow the 

19 American public to have such a role. 

20 (3) To encourage greater public participation in 

21 homeland security and to improve disaster plans by 

22 enabling the States and localities to effectively incor23 porate volunteers from the general public to assume 

24 a direct and influential role in community-based dis25 aster preparedness, response, recovery, and mitiga26 tion planning efforts in collaboration with State and 


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1 local government officials, emergency managers, 

2 health authorities, and professional responders, 

3 thereby integrating these volunteers’ collective expe4 riential knowledge into disaster plans which will ulti5 mately protect many more citizens than would other6 wise be possible. 

7 (4) To encourage integration of risk commu8 nication and analysis protocols into all stages of the 

9 risk management process within the Department of 

10 Homeland Security and the Department of Health 

11 and Human Services so that emergency managers, 

12 health officials, and government officials can better 

13 address issues of concern to the public and can 

14 share that information in a way that more effectively 

15 facilitates action and promotes greater public con16 fidence and safety. 

17 SEC. 4. WORKING GROUP TO INCREASE PUBLIC PARTICIPA18 TION IN COMMUNITY-BASED DISASTER PLAN19 NING EFFORTS. 

20 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of Homeland 

21 Security and the Secretary of Health and Human Serv22 ices, acting jointly, shall establish a working group to per23 form the duties described in subsection (b). 

24 (b) DUTIES.—The working group shall— 


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1 (1) assist the Department of Homeland Secu2 rity and the Department of Health and Human 

3 Services— 

4 (A) to promote the development of disaster 

5 plans that will protect the maximum number of 

6 citizens, to foster greater public trust, con7 fidence, and cooperation with these plans, as 

8 well as to encourage greater public participation 

9 in homeland security, by identifying, developing, 

10 and reviewing strategies that provide the Amer11 ican people the means to volunteer to develop 

12 community-based disaster preparedness, re13 sponse, recovery, and mitigation plans, and to 

14 modify pre-existing disaster plans, in collabora15 tion with State and local government officials, 

16 emergency managers, health authorities, and 

17 professional responders; 

18 (B) to help State and local officials provide 

19 the necessary means and infrastructure for the 

20 American public to volunteer to assume a direct 

21 and influential role in community-based disaster 

22 preparedness, response, recovery, and mitiga23 tion planning efforts, and to modify pre-existing 

24 disaster plans, in collaboration with State and 

25 local government officials, emergency managers, 


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1 health authorities, and professional responders, 

2 thereby integrating these volunteers’ collective 

3 experiential knowledge into disaster plans which 

4 will ultimately protect many more citizens than 

5 would otherwise be possible; and 

6 (C) to develop standards to measure the 

7 success of a community’s level of direct, 

8 participatory disaster planning efforts in— 

9 (i) building partnerships between 

10 State and local government officials, emer11 gency managers, health authorities, profes12 sional responders, and community-based 

13 leaders of: industry and business, civil soci14 ety organizations, schools, infrastructure 

15 (such as utilities, transit systems, rail16 roads, ports, and airports) and health care 

17 organizations; 

18 (ii) identifying the full range of risks 

19 citizens would actually face as a result of 

20 a conventional or unconventional terrorist 

21 attack, as well as the most likely other dis22 asters for their particular community; 

23 (iii) developing community-based dis24 aster preparedness, response, recovery, and 

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1 ing plans, which take into account the full 

2 range of risks identified pursuant to clause 

3 (ii); and 

4 (iv) developing communication links 

5 for government authorities to disseminate, 

6 in a timely manner, vital health and safety 

7 information to community-based leaders, 

8 allowing the information to be forwarded 

9 to the greater general public by individuals 

10 who speak the same languages and are 

11 part of their community’s particular cul12 ture and day-to-day life; 

13 (2) consult with the Department of Justice, the 

14 Department of Defense, the Department of Edu15 cation, the Department of Commerce, the Depart16 ment of Labor, the American Red Cross, and other 

17 agencies and organizations deemed appropriate by 

18 the working group to identify and develop strategies 

19 for— 

20 (A) promoting greater public participation 

21 in homeland security by facilitating community22 based disaster preparedness, response, recovery, 

23 and mitigation planning efforts; and 


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1 (B) helping State and local officials to in2 corporate public volunteers into community3 based disaster planning efforts; 

4 (3) consult with and provide guidance to State 

5 and local governments for the purpose of helping 

6 them to provide the necessary means and infrastruc7 ture for the American public to have a direct and in8 fluential role in developing and reviewing community 

9 disaster preparedness, response, recovery, and miti10 gation plans, and to modify pre-existing disaster 

11 plans, in collaboration with State and local govern12 ment officials, emergency managers, health authori13 ties, and professional responders, thereby integrating 

14 these volunteers’ collective experiential knowledge 

15 into disaster plans which will ultimately protect 

16 many more citizens than would otherwise be pos17 sible; and 

18 (4) not later than the working group’s termi19 nation date described in subsection (g), prepare and 

20 present to the Secretary of Homeland Security and 

21 the Secretary of Health and Human Services specific 

22 recommendations on how the Department of Home23 land Security and the Department of Health and 

24 Human Services may— 


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1 (A) promote the development of disaster 

2 plans that will protect the maximum number of 

3 citizens; to foster public trust, confidence, and 

4 cooperation with these plans; and to encourage 

5 greater public participation in homeland secu6 rity by providing the American people with the 

7 necessary means to volunteer to develop and 

8 modify community disaster preparedness, re9 sponse, recovery, and mitigation plans in col10 laboration with government officials, emergency 

11 managers, health authorities, and professional 

12 responders; and 

13 (B) help State and local officials provide 

14 the necessary means and infrastructure for the 

15 American public to volunteer to assume a direct 

16 and influential role in community-based disaster 

17 preparedness, response, recovery, and mitiga18 tion planning efforts, and to modify pre-existing 

19 disaster plans, in collaboration with State and 

20 local government officials, emergency managers, 

21 health authorities, and professional responders, 

22 thereby integrating these volunteers’ collective 

23 experiential knowledge into disaster plans which 

24 will ultimately protect many more citizens than 

25 would otherwise be possible. 


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1 (c) MEMBERSHIP.— 

2 (1) COMPOSITION.—The working group shall be 

3 composed of 21 members, as follows: 

4 (A) Three representatives of the Depart5 ment of Homeland Security, as follows: 

6 (i) The Secretary of Homeland Secu7 rity (or the Secretary’s designee). 

8 (ii) The Under Secretary for Federal 

9 Emergency Management (or the Under 

10 Secretary’s designee). 

11 (iii) The Under Secretary for Pre12 paredness (or the Under Secretary’s des13 ignee). 

14 (B) Three representatives of the Depart15 ment of Health and Human Services, as fol16 lows: 

17 (i) The Secretary of Health and 

18 Human Services (or the Secretary’s des19 ignee). 

20 (ii) The Director of the Centers for 

21 Disease Control and Prevention (or the Di22 rector’s designee). 

23 (iii) The Assistant Secretary for Pre24 paredness and Response (or the Assistant 

25 Secretary’s designee). 


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1 (C) Fifteen members appointed by the 

2 Comptroller General of the United States in ac3 cordance with paragraph (2). 

4 (2) APPOINTED MEMBERS.— 

5 (A) QUALIFICATIONS.—The Comptroller 

6 General of the United States may appoint an 

7 individual under paragraph (1)(C) only if the 

8 individual— 

9 (i) is a current member of a State, 

10 county, local, or tribal Citizen Corps Coun11 cil; 

12 (ii) is not a Federal, State, or local 

13 government employee or elected official; 

14 and 

15 (iii) is not an employee, volunteer, or 

16 representative of a business, association, or 

17 advocacy organization involved in home18 land security services other than volunteer 

19 services to Citizen Corps. 

20 (B) DIVERSITY.—The Comptroller General 

21 of the United States shall ensure that the mem22 bers appointed under paragraph (1)(C)— 

23 (i) reflect a broad geographic and cul24 tural representation; 


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1 (ii) include at least 3 representatives 

2 from urban areas, 3 representatives from 

3 suburban areas, and 3 representatives 

4 from rural areas; and 

5 (iii) include 5 representatives who 

6 serve on a State Citizen Corps Council and 

7 10 representatives who serve on either a 

8 county, local, or tribal Citizen Corps Coun9 cil. 

10 (C) TERMS.—Each member appointed 

11 under paragraph (1)(C) shall be appointed for 

12 the life of the working group. 

13 (D) CHAIRPERSON.—Not later than 14 

14 days after the date on which the Comptroller 

15 General of the United States completes the ap16 pointment of the 15 members required to be ap17 pointed under paragraph (1)(C), the Comp18 troller General shall designate the chairperson 

19 of the working group from among such mem20 bers. 

21 (E) VACANCIES.—A vacancy in the work22 ing group shall not affect the powers or the du23 ties of the working group and shall be filled in 

24 the same manner in which the original appoint25 ment was made. 


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1 (d) SUBCOMMITTEES.—The working group may es2 tablish subcommittees for the purpose of increasing the 

3 efficiency of the working group. 

4 (e) MEETINGS.—The working group shall meet not 

5 less than 4 times each year. 

6 (f) STAFF.—The Secretary of Homeland Security 

7 and the Secretary of Health and Human Services may de8 tail, on a reimbursable basis, personnel of the Department 

9 of Homeland Security or the Department of Health and 

10 Human Services, respectively, to the working group to as11 sist the working group in carrying out the duties described 

12 in subsection (b). 

13 (g) TERMINATION.—The working group shall termi14 nate not later than 3 years after the date on which the 

15 working group adjourns its first meeting. 

16 (h) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section: 

17 (1) The term ‘‘disaster’’ includes terrorist at18 tacks and any other emergency event designated by 

19 the working group involved. 

20 (2) The term ‘‘working group’’ means the work21 ing group established under this section. 

22 SEC. 5. STATE COOPERATION WITH WORKING GROUP. 

23 Clause (ii) of section 319C–1(b)(1)(A) of the Public 

24 Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247d–3a(b)(1)(A)) is 

25 amended— 


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1 (1) in subclause (IV), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the 

2 end; 

3 (2) in subclause (V), by striking ‘‘or’’ at the 

4 end and inserting ‘‘and’’; and 

5 (3) by adding at the end the following: 

6 ‘‘(VI) will take specific steps to 

7 comply with the recommendations of 

8 the working group established pursu9 ant to section 4 of the Ready, Willing, 

10 and Able Act to provide the means 

11 and infrastructure necessary for the 

12 public to volunteer to assume a direct 

13 and influential role in community14 based disaster preparedness, response, 

15 recovery, and mitigation planning ef16 forts, and to modify pre-existing dis17 aster plans, in collaboration with gov18 ernment officials, emergency man19 agers, health authorities, and profes20 sional responders, thereby integrating 

21 these volunteers’ collective experiential 

22 knowledge into disaster plans which 

23 will ultimately protect many more citi24 zens than would otherwise be possible; 

25 or’’. 


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1 SEC. 6. REPORT TO CONGRESS. 

2 Not later than 1 year after receiving the rec3 ommendations of the working group established pursuant 

4 to section 4, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the 

5 Secretary of Health and Human Services, acting jointly, 

6 shall submit a report to the Congress that includes each 

7 of the following: 

8 (1) The recommendations of the working group 

9 relevant to the Department of Homeland Security or 

10 the Department of Health and Human Services. 

11 (2) A description of the steps that have or have 

12 not been taken by each Federal department to im13 plement the recommendations of the working group. 

14 (3) Thorough explanations for rejection of any 

15 recommendations by the working group. 

16 (4) Other steps taken to meet the goals of this 

17 Act. 

Æ 


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