alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 10.39 Mental or physical defect of child. If claim is made under section 602(b), (2), of title IV of the Act as amended, alleging that a child over 18 years of age was incapable of self-support at the death of the veteran or that he became incapable of self-support subsequent to the death of the veteran but on or before January 2, 1935, or that he was incapable of self-support at the disappearance of the veteran or became incapable of self-support after the disappearance of the veteran and before the expiration of the period of seven years mentioned in section 312(c), (2), of the Act, it will be necessary to furnish evidence as to the mental or physical condition of the child at the time it is alleged he became incapable of self-support. ( a ) Where incapability of self-support by reason of the mental defect of the child is alleged, the following evidence will be required: ( 1 ) Certified copy of court order or decree declaring the child to be mentally incompetent; or
( 2 ) A report of a licensed physician setting forth all of the facts as to the child's mental condition; or
( 3 ) The affidavit of the person having custody and control of the child, setting forth all of the available information as to the child's mental condition. The affidavit must be substantiated by two competent disinterested persons who shall state that they personally know the child, that they have read the affidavit made by the person having custody and control of the child, and that the information therein set forth is true to the best of their knowledge and belief.
( b ) Where incapability of self-support by reason of physical defect of the child is alleged, the following evidence will be required: ( 1 ) Report of a licensed physician setting forth all of the facts as to the child's physical condition; and
( 2 ) Affidavit of the child regarding his physical condition and the affidavits of two competent disinterested persons, who shall state that they personally know the claimant, that they have read his affidavit and that the same is true to the best of their knowledge and belief.
§ 21.290 Training and rehabilitation resources. ( a ) *General.* For the purpose of providing training and rehabilitation services under Chapter 31 VA may: ( 1 ) Use facilities, staff and other resources of VA;
( 2 ) Employ any additional personnel and experts needed;
( 3 ) Use the facilities and services of any: ( i ) Federal agency;
( ii ) State agency;
( iii ) Other public agency; or
( iv ) Agency maintained by joint Federal and state contributions.
( 4 ) Use the facilities and services of any: ( i ) Public institution or establishment;
( ii ) Private institution or establishment; or
( iii ) Private individual.
( b ) *Agreement required.* Use of facilities and services provided under paragraph (a) of this section shall be procured through contract, agreement, or other cooperative arrangement. The specific requirements for use of contracts or other arrangements are described in 48 CFR 871.2.
(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 3115)
**Exhibit 31.2****CERTIFICATIONS**I, Roger B. Plank, certify that:1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q of Apache Offshore Investment Partnership; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have: (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is madeknown to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared;  (b) Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internalcontrol over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to providereasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparationof financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally acceptedaccounting principles;  (c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and proceduresand presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosurecontrols and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and  (d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter thathas materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions): (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;and  (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.       /s/ Roger B. Plank   Roger B. Plank  Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
§ 21.8050 Scope of training, services, and assistance. ( a ) *Allowable training, services, and assistance.* VA may provide to vocational training program participants: ( 1 ) Vocationally oriented training, services, and assistance, to include: ( i ) Training in an institution of higher education if the program is predominantly vocational; and
( ii ) Tuition, fees, books, equipment, supplies, and handling charges.
( 2 ) Employment assistance including: ( i ) Vocational, psychological, employment, and personal adjustment counseling;
( ii ) Services to place the individual in suitable employment and post-placement services necessary to ensure satisfactory adjustment in employment; and
( iii ) Personal adjustment and work adjustment training.
( 3 ) Vocationally oriented independent living services only to the extent that the services are indispensable to the achievement of the vocational goal and do not constitute a significant portion of the services to be provided.
( 4 ) Other vocationally oriented services and assistance of the kind VA provides veterans under the 38 U.S.C. chapter 31 program, except as paragraph (c) of this section provides, that VA determines the program participant needs to prepare for and take part in vocational training or in employment. (Authority: 38 U.S.C. 1804(c), 1814)
( b ) *Vocational training program.* VA will provide either directly or by contract, agreement, or arrangement with another entity, and at no cost to the beneficiary, the vocationally oriented training, other services, and assistance that VA approves for the individual child's program under this subpart. Authorization and payment for approved services will be made in a comparable manner to that VA provides for veterans under the 38 U.S.C. chapter 31 program. (Authority: 38 U.S.C. 1804(c), 1814)
( c ) *Prohibited services and assistance.* VA may not provide to a vocational training program participant any: ( 1 ) Loan;
( 2 ) Subsistence allowance;
( 3 ) Automobile adaptive equipment;
( 4 ) Training at an institution of higher education in a program of education that is not predominantly vocational in content;
( 5 ) Employment adjustment allowance;
( 6 ) Room and board (other than for a period of 30 days or less in a special rehabilitation facility either for purposes of an extended evaluation or to improve and enhance vocational potential);
( 7 ) Independent living services, except those that are incidental to the pursuit of the vocational training program.
(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 1804(c), 1814)
§ 21.344 Facility offering training or rehabilitation services. ( a ) *Approval of leaves of absence required.* Leaves of absence normally must be approved in advance by the case manager when the facility offering training or rehabilitation services arranges for the leave. The approval of the case manager is required: ( 1 ) During periods in a rehabilitation program identified in § 21.342(c); or
( 2 ) A period of hospitalization at VA expense during one of the periods identified in § 21.342(c).
( b ) *Responsibility of the veteran in obtaining leave.* VA will not authorize leave without a verbal or written request by the veteran, and the approval of the facility.
( c ) *Conditions permitting approval of leaves of absence.* ( 1 ) The case manager may approve leaves of absence up to a total of 30 days during a twelve-month period if the facility certifies that the use of the leave does not interfere materially with the veteran's progress;
( 2 ) An additional period of up to 15 days of leave in the same twelve-month period under exceptional circumstances may be approved by the case manager if failure to approve leave will: ( i ) Result in personal hardship, or
( ii ) Adversely affect the veteran's ability to continue in his or her rehabilitation program.
(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 3110)
[49 FR 40814, Oct. 18, 1984, as amended by 56 FR 14649, Apr. 11, 1991]
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Shelter
Properties VI Limited Partnership 1999 First Quarter 10-QSB and is qualified in
its entirety by reference to such 10-QSB filing.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000730013
<NAME> SHELTER PROPERTIES VI LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          OCT-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-31-1999
<CASH>                                           1,409
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0<F1>
<PP&E>                                          53,601
<DEPRECIATION>                                  27,224
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  30,533
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0<F1>
<BONDS>                                         25,973
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                       3,304
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    30,533
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 2,618
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 2,374
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 586
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       244
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     5.72<F2>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>Registrant has an unclassified balance sheet.
<F2>Multiplier is 1.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
§ 93.226 Retaliation. *Retaliation* for the purpose of this part means an adverse action taken against a complainant, witness, or committee member by an institution or one of its members in response to— ( a ) A good faith allegation of research misconduct; or
( b ) Good faith cooperation with a research misconduct proceeding.
*The National Map* - Lake Tahoe Pilot Project - RETIRED EDITION**Fact Sheet 117-01 (November 2001)**

PLEASE NOTE:
This fact sheet has been replaced by the fact sheet titled "***The National Map***Pilot Projects" located at:
mac.usgs.gov/mac/isb/pubs/factsheets/fs06202.html for the HTML versionandmac.usgs.gov/mac/isb/pubs/factsheets/fs06202.pdf for the PDF version
Most browsers will automatically load the new version in 20 seconds.
| Top | Main Table of Contents| MappingPublications| Eastern Region Geography | Geography Home |

U.S. Department of the Interior — U.S. Geological Survey — 509 National Center, Reston, VA 20192, USA **URL:***http://mac.usgs.gov/mac/isb/pubs/factsheets/fs11701.html* — **Contact:**[email protected]**Page Maintainer:** USGS Eastern Region Geography**Last modified:**   14:26:55 Tue 31 Dec 2002 — USGS Privacy Policy and Disclaimers— Accessibility
HPMSVtypeID yearID HPMSBaseYearVMT baseYearOffNetVMT

10 2015 333975 0

20 2015 34237365 0

30 2015 23588125 0

40 2015 250025 0

50 2015 2396590 0

60 2015 8083290 0
<partyblock><br><br><div align="center"><b><font size="+1">Elmont Rehab P.T., P.C., as Assignee of Gamero, Alfredo, Respondent, <br><br>against<br><br>New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Appellant.</font></b></div><br><br><p>Gullo &amp; Associates, LLP ( Natalie Socorro, Esq.), for appellant.The Rybak Firm, PLLC ( Damin J. Toell, Esq.), for respondent.</p><p>Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Harriet L. Thompson, J.), entered April 11, 2014. The order denied defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.</p><p>ORDERED that the order is reversed, with $30 costs, and defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.</p><p>In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant appeals from an order of the Civil Court denying defendant's motion which sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff's assignor had failed to appear for duly scheduled independent medical examinations (IMEs).</p><p>In support of its motion, defendant established that, before receiving the claims at issue, it had mailed letters scheduling an initial and follow-up IME to plaintiff's assignor (<i>see St. Vincent's Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co.</i>, 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). Defendant also established that the assignor had failed to appear for the duly scheduled IMEs (<i>see Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.</i>, 35 AD3d 720 [2006]). Thus, defendant demonstrated that plaintiff had failed to comply with a condition precedent to coverage (<i>id. </i>at 722). As defendant's moving papers established that defendant had timely denied <i>(see St. Vincent's Hosp. of Richmond</i>, 50 AD3d 1123) the claims on that ground, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to defendant's motion, defendant was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint.</p><p>Accordingly, the order is reversed and defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.</p><p>PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.</p><br>ENTER:<br>Paul Kenny<br>Chief Clerk<br>Decision Date: July 21, 2017<br><br><div align="center"><form method="LINK" action="../../slipidx/at_2_idxtable.shtml"><input type="submit" value="Return to Decision List"></form></div></partyblock>
#### Martin Schenck *against*J. Vannest and C. Vanderveer.

ON CERTIORARI.

Rent claim-tenant’s goods

THIS suit was originally brought before a justice of Peace> and judgment given for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed to the Common Pleas of *Somerset,*where the judgment was affirmed : and it was removed into this court by certiorari. The facts appeared to be as follows. *John C. Kelly,*had, by a parol agreement, rented of the plaintiff, for three years, a tenement in *Somerville,*at the yearly rent of 80 dollars, -payable quarterly; the possession commencing in *April*1815. The first quarter’s rent fell due *July*15,1815, and was paid. *Kelly*being indebted to *M’Donald*and *Latourette,*confessed a judgment in their favour for 700 dollars, which was entered in *April*1815, and execution *delivered to the plaintiff in certiorari, as sheriff of *Somerset,*on the 10th of *June.*He made a levy on the goods of *Kelly,*on the day he received the execution, and on the 22d of *September,*sold the goods. The second quarter’s rent became due the 15th of *October;*and bn the day of the sale by the sheriff, *Vannest*and *Vanderveer*gave a notice, in writing, to the sheriff and to *Latourette,*that rent was due, and that before the sale of the goods, *Kelly*had left the premises. The sheriff did not pay any rent to *Vannest*and *Vanderveer,*and they brought suit against him.

By the Court.

No rent was actually due. *Pat.*164-The quarter had not expired. The sheriff was not bound to pay any thing to the landlord, (a) The judgment must be reversed.

(a)

 Nix. Dig. 490, $ 4. See also *Central Bank vs. Peterson, 4 Zab. 668. Kirkpatrick vs. Cason, 1 Vr. 331. Ayers vs. Johnson, 2 Hal. 119. Peacock vs. Hammitt, 3 Gr. 165.*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kenneth Adams TOLLIVER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15216.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

June 20, 1963.

Seymour A. Terrell, Cleveland, Ohio (Terrell, Williams & Salim, Cleveland, Ohio, on the brief), for appellant.

Nathaniel R. Jones, Asst. U. S. Atty., Cleveland, Ohio (Mrele M. McCurdy, U. S. Atty., C. M. Diamond, Gerald J. Celebrezze, Asst. U. S. Attys., Cleveland, Ohio, on the brief), for appellee.

Before O’SULLIVAN, Circuit Judge, and WILSON and FOX, District Judges.

ORDER.

This Cause having come on to be heard upon the record, briefs and appendices, and upon the arguments of counsel, and upon due consideration thereof,

It Is Ordered that the judgment of the District Court be, and it is, hereby affirmed.
Denied and Opinion Filed December 21, 2018 

# S

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-18-01518-CV IN RE TEXAS HEALTH MANAGEMENT, LLC, Relator Original Proceeding from the 219th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 219-00125-2018



### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Francis, Evans, and Schenck Opinion by Justice Francis In this original proceeding, relator seeks a writ of mandamus o rdering the trial court to strike the real party in interest’s motion for sanctions and mo tion for entry of final judgment, which are set for hearing in the trial court on January 18, 2019. To be entitled to mandamus relief, a relator must show both that the trial court has clearly abused its discretion and that relator has no adequate appellate remedy. In re Prudential Ins. Co. , 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). “Due to the extraordinary nature of the remedy, the right to ma ndamus relief generally requires a predicate request fo r action by the respondent, and the respondent’s erroneous refusal
to act.” In re Coppola , 535 S.W.3d 506, 510 (Tex. 2017) ( orig. proceeding) (citing In re Perritt , 992 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding)). Here, rel ator complains of no action by the trial court for this Court to review for an abuse of discretion , and the record includes nothing to show that relator asked the trial court for the relief it now s eeks from this Court. Relator has not–2– argued or shown that the facts of this case present one of the “rare occasions” in which the predicate-request requirement should be relaxed. See id. Based on the record before us, we conclude relator has not shown it is entitled to mandamus relie f. Accordingly, we deny relator’s petition for writ of mandamus. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 52.8(a) (the court must deny the petition if the court determines relator is not entitled to the relief sought).

181518F.P05 /Molly Francis/ MOLLY FRANCIS JUSTICE
§ 17.3250 Veteran responsibilities. ( a ) Veterans must use items provided under §§ 17.3230 and 17.3240 as they are prescribed, and consistent with the manufacturer's instructions and any training provided. Failure to do so may result in the item not being replaced under § 17.3230(a)(13).
( b ) Except for emergency care under §§ 17.120 through 17.132, §§ 17.1000 through 17.1008, or § 17.4020(c), or urgent care under § 17.4600, veterans obtaining items and services provided under § 17.3230 must obtain prior authorization from VA in order to obtain VA reimbursement for such items and services obtained from a VA-authorized vendor. VA will not be responsible for the cost of items and services provided that are not preauthorized by VA or not covered as emergency care under §§ 17.120 through 17.132, §§ 17.1000 through 17.1008, or § 17.4020(c), or urgent care under § 17.4600.
ABSTRACTS OF DECISIONS.

FINAL JUDGMENT.

[Cuyahoga Circuit Court,

January Term, 1888.]

Baldwin, Caldwell and Upson, JJ.

#### HART v. MURRAY.

Overruling Demurrer not a Final Order.

An order overruling a demurrer and a judgment for the costs of the demurrer !s mot a final order subject to review in error. . , ,

Petition in error to reverse judgment of court of common pleas.

The last action of the court of common pleas was the overruling of a •demurrer, and a judgment for the costs of the demurrer.

*244Arnold Green, for plaintiff in error.

A. T. Brinsmade, city solicitor, for defendant in error.

Held: There was no final judgment subject to review in error, and the petition in error was dismissed.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 10**  **- 1072** 

In R e: MARSALINA MACHUCA , Petitioner
.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. ( 4 : 05

- c r - 0000 2

- jlk

- 2 )

Submitted : March 30 , 2010 Decided: April 5 , 2010

Before WI LKINSON, GREGORY, and SHEDD , Circuit Judges.

Petition deni e d by un published per curiam opinion
.
Marsalina Machuca, Petitioner Pro Se
. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Marsalina Machuca moved in the distr ict court for reduction of sentence based on substantial assistance. The district court denied her motions. Machuca now petitions this
court for a writ of mandamus seeking an order to compel the district court to grant her motion for sentence reduction
. Mandamus may not be used as a substitute for appeal. In re United Steelworkers , 595 F.2d 958, 960 (4th Cir. 1979). Thus, the relief sought by Machuca is not available by way of mandamus. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus and the motion for appointment of counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decision al process.
PETITION DENIED