US POLICY TOWARDS SECESSION IN THE BALKANS 

AND EFFECTIVENESS OF DE FACTO PARTITION 

Evelyn N. Farkas 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

USAF Academy, Colorado 
2 
3 

US POLICY TOWARDS SECESSION IN THE BALKANS 

AND EFFECTIVENESS OF DE FACTO PARTITION 

INTRODUCTION 

Issues of separatism in its extreme form—secession—are a direct challenge to 

the international system, as the 1999 Kosovo crisis vividly illustrated. The 

decision to allow, facilitate, support or obstruct efforts by ethnic or communal 

groups to carve their own states out of existing entities is the most difficult 

and controversial one confronting powerful states and the international 

community. This is particularly true in Europe, where ethnic conflict affects 

the viability and credibility of NATO, the uniquely operational transatlantic 

political-military alliance. As the NATO operation in Kosovo demonstrated, 

miscalculations threaten to shatter alliances, bring great powers to blows, and 

render international organizations (chief among them the UN) irrelevant. 

 During the decade of the 1990s, as ethnic conflicts obtained greater 

salience and demonstrated renewed ability to destabilize the international 

order, successive US administrations fostered cautious multilateral policies. 

Washington advocated interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo which were 

designed to end conflict and restore order in the short-run, while firmly 

denying the right to partition the original state. Partition—the creation of one 

or more new independent states from an existing one—was normatively and 

practically rejected. Instead, the US and its NATO allies opted for de facto

partition as the “best of the worst” policy choices. 

 The de facto partitions in Bosnia and Kosovo involve the use of nonsovereign boundaries to divide states ethnically, geographically and 

politically. Diplomats advocate de facto partition for several reasons having 

to do with justice, demonstration effects, and most obviously, halting and 

preventing conflict. De facto partition does not fully reward secessionists for 

adopting violence or criminal means such as genocide and “ethnic cleansing.” 
4 

Policymakers regard it as less precedent setting than outright partition, and as 

such less likely to cause demonstration effects (attempts by other secessionists 

to achieve results in a similar fashion). Finally—and most significantly—de 

facto partition has been portrayed by US and European officials as an interim 

solution, a means toward reinstating or establishing a tolerant multiethnic 

state. 

Policymakers regard de facto partition as a short-term military and 

political expedient formulated to allow a return to rational interest-based, as 

opposed to nationalist, politics. The fundamental assumption driving US 

policy towards secession and de facto partition is the notion that ethnic 

conflict is instrumental. While nationalists may appeal to primordial instincts, 

ethnic conflict itself is not inevitable and immutable; it can be managed based 

on an appeal to interests.1

 Political and economic mechanisms can be 

employed to reduce the benefits of ethnically-based politics. 

 The regimes imposed by the Dayton Accords and the UN protectorate 

in Kosovo emphasize the use of political and economic incentives to bridge 

military and territorial boundaries. The following study examines the two 

major ongoing civil-military attempts to manage ethnic conflict in the Balkans 

via de facto partition. The analysis focuses on the extent to which policy 

implementation bolsters the underlying objective—to maintain a multiethnic 

sovereign state and prevent secession or partition. The study assesses the de 

facto partition regimes in Bosnia and Kosovo in terms of their short-term 

effectiveness containing conflict and the long-term prospects for state 

preservation. 

 The evidence demonstrates that some progress has been made 

towards achieving the underlying objective in both cases—to establish 

multiethnic democracy and prevent secession or partition. However, 

integration or multiethnic coexistence has not gained the upper hand against 
5 

separatism. Peace has been restored to both Bosnia and Kosovo; NATO and 

its allies have completed the fundamental security assignments, reinforcing 

cease-fires and boundaries against major incursions or excursions. Yet, on the 

political and legal front much remains to be done. Bosnia is not functioning as 

a unified state; its central government barely functions. In Kosovo, there is 

still less ethnic tolerance and Serbs and Albanians fail to even cooperate on 

the question of elections. In both cases the rule of law is weak, interethnic 

trust is low, and only international edict has been able to bring about the 

minimal progress that has occurred. This paper examines the peace 

implementation efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo. In each case, the analysis 

begins with a brief review of the objectives of the intervening organs. 

Subsequent sections focus on the military and political aspects of the 

intervention, and the extent to which they are reinforcing partition or 

integration. The conclusion offers a blunt final assessment of international 

efforts in the Balkans and policy recommendations addressing current 

shortcomings. 

BOSNIA 

The 1995 Dayton Peace Accords established the framework for maintaining 

peace in Bosnia, preserving the sovereignty of the Bosnian state—albeit in a 

much diluted form—and for forging a democratic system of government. The 

agreement divides Bosnia into two non-sovereign political “entities” or 

nationalist boundaries. The cease-fire line, with some modifications, became 

the Inter-entity Boundary Line (IEBL) designating 49 percent of Bosnian 

territory as the Republika Srbska and 51 percent as the Bosnian-Croat 

Federation. The peace accords consist of eleven articles and thirteen annexes. 

The first two annexes outline the partition, including the role of NATO and its 

allies in enforcing the separation of the warring parties. The remaining eleven 

annexes comprise the civilian program for establishing a confederation, 
6 

securing justice (including the right of refugees to return) and respect for 

human rights.2

 US negotiators accepted de facto partition as an undesirable but 

necessary way to achieve Serbian acceptance of an agreement ending the war. 

The NATO military forces would oversee the separation of the military forces, 

while the creation of the entities ensured that the political elites would 

maintain local control. At the same time, the negotiators intended to bridge 

the territorial and military divisions through state institutions, and provisions 

related to human rights, refugee return and property rights. 

Security 

In 1996 NATO and its partners sent 60,000 troops into Bosnia to keep the 

peace. By D+120 they succeeded in securing the IEBL, separating the 

warring parties and moving weapons into cantonment sites. Their success 

enabled subsequent reductions so that by May 2000 the Stabilization Force 

(SFOR)’s total strength had tapered off to 23,000 troops, including 4,600 US 

troops (about 20 percent of the total.) The cease-fire holds, and the 

boundaries are set. The status of Brcko—straddling the strategic Posavina 

corridor, which potentially links north-central Bosnia to eastern Bosnia and 

Serbia—was arbitrated and declared without any armed resistance.3

 Brcko, a 

single demilitarized unit of local self-government outside of the entities and 

directly under the sovereignty of Bosnia and Hercegovina, is functioning as a 

multiethnic district.4

 Beyond Brcko, there is one country, but there are 

currently three armies in Bosnia, which absorb about forty percent of all 

public spending.5

 Finally, Bosnia’s borders remain unregulated and “probably 

the greatest revenue source for criminal elements and hard-line nationalists in 

Bosnia and Hercegovina.”6

 In a step toward creating a unified military the international 
7 

community pushed the entity armed forces to establish a functioning 

Secretariat for the Dayton mandated Standing Committee on Military Matters 

(SCMM) in July 1999, and is pressuring the entities to forge—via the 

SCMM—a common state security policy. International officials assert that the 

Bosnian leadership should be focused on joining European organizations. 

Yet, there cannot be any question of association with NATO, much less 

membership, if Bosnia has three militaries and no defense policy.7

 To date, 

Bosnia still has no national security strategy. The international politicalmilitary leadership did, however, manage to convince the entities to plan and 

implement a 15 percent reduction in military personnel and budget. As of 

May 2000, according to SFOR, the reduction was complete.8

 Meanwhile, the 

January 2000 elections in Croatia yielded a change of government and a 

pledge to cut off support to the Herceg-Bosna extremists. The US, Croatia 

and the Federation signed an agreement in the spring of 2000 asserting that all 

security assistance would be channeled through the SCMM.9

 But as of now—

even with the international community’s recent seizure of the banks funding 

the Bosnian Croat nationalist movement—none of this has removed the threat 

of independent Bosnian Croat military action. 

 On the internal security front, there are also three de facto police 

forces, and all three ethnic groups manage to employ illegal secret police. 

Political patronage is the thread holding this system together. The UN 

Mission in Bosnia, with the mandate for police restructuring and reform, is 

trying to tear holes into this venal web. On the entity or federal levels the UN 

is actively working to foster multiethnicity. The UN established a Standing 

Committee on Police Matters and on 3 May 2000 the entities signed an 

agreement to facilitate the redeployment of 200-300 police across the IEBL to 

their pre-war assignments. At about the same time, a specially trained twelvemember multiethnic police unit was sent to East Timor. In addition, the UN 
8 

Special Representative and Head of Mission established a small multiethnic 

border police force, which deployed to the Sarajevo airport on 6 June 2000. 

The UN, with the help of the Austrian government, hopes to expand this force, 

ultimately, to address the porous nature of Bosnian borders.10 

 Unfortunately, while it is possible for the UN to take decisive action 

at the highest levels to create state-level cooperation, or structures, the UN is 

severely restricted by its mandate on the local level. The UN International 

Police Task Force (IPTF) only has a mandate to advise and observe the local 

police, not to enforce the law themselves. As a result, though they routinely 

review police organization and behavior, they cannot force implementation. 

Nonetheless, the IPTF audits local police and conducts human rights training. 

The IPTF attempts to work with local police to help them deal with organized 

crime and corruption, but in most cases police are part of the patronage 

systems, and even criminal networks. The Office of the High Representative 

(OHR) bolsters these efforts by removing cantonal ministers and local police 

chiefs for noncompliance.11 Meanwhile, SFOR made one of the most 

significant contributions to crime fighting, successfully “busting” an extensive 

criminal network in West Mostar. This is another way to attack the 

obstructionist political actors, shaking the socioeconomic foundation of its 

power. 

 The environment in Bosnia is generally secure, although ethnically 

motivated violence is still common, especially in areas where minorities are 

returning. Local criminal rings serve their own economic interests, 

intimidating refugees and others who represent a threat to their objectives. 

Many of the ringleaders are war criminals who control formal and/or informal 

patronage systems, much like Mafia dons. They often act in collusion with 

local nationalist political leaders, and since NATO forces have not 

apprehended them, their influence remains without serious challenge. As of 
9 

June 2000 the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 

(ICTY) reported 67 indictees. Of those, 41 had surrendered or been captured 

and were in proceedings. Twenty-five remain at large.12 

 The shaky security situation—with many key war criminals at 

large—has directly impacted the refugee issue. Article 7 of the Dayton 

Accords is the single most significant integrating mechanism established by 

the US and its allies. Its promise, however, goes unfulfilled. Refugees, 

especially those returning to areas where they will be in the minority, are 

afraid to return. The war left Bosnia with over 2 million refugees and 

displaced persons. Since 1996, however, 310,000 refugees returned to Bosnia 

and an additional 250,000 displaced persons went home. At the start of 1999 

experts estimated that about 400,000 refugees and 800,000 displaced persons 

were still waiting to return.13 The international community has only made 

half-hearted, toothless attempts to address this situation. OHR’s 

Reconstruction and Return Task Force has been gradually working to address 

administrative and legal obstacles to return and has used economic leverage in 

targeted areas to encourage and support returns. Still, while the UN declared 

1998 the Year of the Refugee, only 100,000 Bosnians, half of the official 

target, went home. Of that group only 30,000 returned to areas where they 

would be in the minority. In the following year about 70,000 minority returns 

occurred. Most of the remaining one million or so displaced persons and 

refugees are potential minority returns. However, unorchestrated returns have 

been increasing over the last year, signaling a shift of initiative to the 

population. Perhaps in response to this phenomenon—and to international 

pressure—the ethnic Serb leadership has demonstrated more willingness to 

address the issue of resettlement.14 

 Current criticism of NATO’s efforts focuses on the issue of civil 
10 

violence and arson in refugee resettlement areas, and SFOR’s reluctance to 

apprehend war criminals.15 For the first two years of the mission, NATO 

commanders interpreted their mandate to capture war criminals “during the 

course of normal duties” in the strictest fashion. Indeed, they went to great 

lengths to avoid coming across war criminals during normal operations. From 

July 1997 onward, however, SFOR began staging raids aimed at capturing 

them. British troops were the first to act, conducting two operations in July 

1997, which led to the capture of one war criminal and the death of another. 

Since then several others have been apprehended by British or US troops. The 

French commanders have been most reluctant to act, and most of the 

remaining indictees are believed to be in their sector, including the former 

Bosnian Serb President, Radovan Karadzic.16 In April 2000, under acute 

pressure from their allies, the French finally seized Momcilo Krajsnik, a senior 

deputy to Karadzic and the Serb member of the first Dayton Presidency. 

 Meanwhile, after SFOR troops had demonstrated a hampered ability 

to respond to various civil disturbances in Brcko in 1997 and elsewhere, the 

Peace Implementation Council (PIC) members and NATO agreed to establish 

the Multinational Special Unit (MSU). The MSU, initially 800-strong and 

composed mainly of European police units, is the SFOR Commander’s 

emergency force in the event of riots or other civil disturbances.17 In 1998, 

the international political and military leadership began to develop a more 

cooperative and coordinated approach. The High Representative began to 

remove local officials who were violating electoral laws or otherwise blocking 

the implementation of Dayton. SFOR and the IPTF stepped in to ensure that 

OHR’s decisions were implemented. The MSU provided confidence that this 

could achieved with minimum unrest. There were some successes, most 

notably the Westar operation.18 Nevertheless, change—especially of the 

demographic sort—is strongly resisted by local nationalists and war criminals. 
11 

It is this de facto alliance that prevents most refugees from returning and 

blocks implementation of Dayton beyond Annex 1A. “As long as these 

criminals remain at liberty, the rule of law is incomplete—police and judges 

are intimidated, corruption is rife, normal democratic politics is impossible.” 19

Political Institutions and Processes 

Politically speaking, Bosnia is a shell of a state. Indeed, the federal 

government exists largely on paper. Over the last six years the international 

community has been unable to transform the constitution into reality. Bosnia 

does not exist as a united functioning federal state. Instead, there are two 

entities grudgingly co-existing, but not cooperating. Indeed, the Spring 2001 

secession declaration by the nationalist Croats in western Bosnia highlights 

the serious division within the Bosnian-Croat Federation; there are three 

competing groups preventing the government from functioning. The federal 

government is “at the mercy of three entities; two don’t want the central 

government to function and the central government needs the entities for the 

authority to function.”20 The central government remains hostage to 

nationalism. After more than $5 billion in foreign aid, including over $1 

billion from the US, this is where Dayton has failed most. 

 Yet Dayton has failed on this score partly because it has 

acknowledged nationalism and ethnic interests. In the compromise between 

the nationalist Serbs and Croats, who wanted as much separation as possible, 

and their Muslim counterparts, who insisted on integration and a unified state, 

the negotiators created a European government unlike any other. The entities 

were to resolve their differences through an ethnically divided assembly and a 

tripartite Presidency representing the major Bosnian ethnic groups. “The 

entire constitution enshrines ethnic discrimination as a principle of law.”21 

Under this system the basis for all politics remains ethnic. Not only has it 

proved unworkable, but also experts point out that it is incompatible with 
12 

European human rights law. Bosnia cannot join the Council of Europe or the 

European Union with such a constitution (and joining NATO would require 

the creation of a single Bosnian army). 

 From 1996 to 2001, three OHR administrations have worked to 

establish common institutions and to invest them with power. After two 

frustrating years where the OHR struggled simply to bring the three Presidents 

together—literally in one room—the international community adopted a 

harder line toward the Bosnian leaders. In 1997-98 at the meetings of the 

Peace Implementation Conference (PIC) in Sintra (Portugal) and Bonn, the 

OHR obtained support for a stronger interpretation of its mandate (Article 5 of 

Annex 10 of the DPA.)22 As a result, in the face of extended stalling and 

contention, the High Representative, Carlos Westendorp, was able to impose a 

common license plate, flag and currency upon the Bosnian Presidency. The 

PIC reaffirmed the authority of the OHR and the Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to remove obstructionist officials from 

office or ballots. This practice has been exercised with some vigor ever since, 

though OHR and OSCE decisions often must be enforced by police forces, 

and even after problematic individuals are removed from office they generally 

continue to function behind the scenes. The Sintra/Bonn decisions brought 

about the single most dramatic change in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Suddenly, 

freedom of movement existed. From 1998 onwards the climate shifted. The 

prevalent fear for one’s physical safety gave way to concern about long-term 

economic viability. 

 Meanwhile, the central institutions meet infrequently and usually to 

no effect. The Parliamentary Assembly passed over twenty laws over the 

course of three years, but only due to coercion from the international 

community. Few of these laws have proper provisions for enforcement.23 As 

a result, the state legislature has failed to alter the political or economic 
13 

landscape in Bosnia. Despite all of this, at the end of 1998 the PIC members 

agreed that the subsequent two years would involve “the authorities in BiH 

[Bosnia and Hercegovina] increasingly assuming greater responsibility.”24 

Then, in September 1999 Wolfgang Petritsch was appointed High 

Representative. His tenure marked the shift from the aggressive quasiprotectorate-style Westendorp espoused, to a coaxing effort Petritsch 

characterizes as “ownership.” According to the OHR, this concept 

“emphasizes the fact that it is the leadership and authorities of BiH who are 

primarily responsible for the implementation of the Peace Agreement, and not 

the International Community.”25

 Petritsch’s deputy concedes that there is an apparent contradiction 

between ownership and unity, in as much as the “owners” are not interested in 

unity. However, he explains that, “local indigenous politicians need to be 

more responsible, because if we can’t succeed, they will develop a readiness 

to depend on the International Community for decisionmaking.”26 Indeed, 

OHR officials state that the Bosnian politicians hide behind international 

officials and refuse to take blame or credit themselves. They stonewall until 

the internationals impose a solution. Of course, these nationalist leaders have 

everything to lose from the provisions aimed at strengthening the central 

government and establishing a multiethnic system of government. They have 

no interest in furthering change and therefore achieve their objectives by 

stalling and hoping that the passage of time will favor their interests. It 

generally has. Therefore, it is not surprising that ownership looks relatively 

ineffectual. Its critics maintain that Petritsch’s approach is “like 

Vietnamization—it provides the US with cover so we can leave.”27 General 

Wesley Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe reckons, 

“Ownership is a step backwards.”28

 As a result, the burst of progress in 1998 has been followed by far too 
14 

plodding efforts, as the OHR makes an “effort to continue to resist stepping in 

too early.”29 OHR officials aim to encourage the development of a successor 

generation of politicians. Faced with indigenous opposition, they insist, 

“[if]...people don’t cooperate we need to take people off the table. If people 

obstruct, they need to be removed. Maybe that encourages successors.”30 

Indeed, Petritsch has exercised this power much more frequently than his 

predecessor, removing a total of forty-five officials between November 1999 

and September 2000; Westendorp only removed one obstructionist politician. 

It is unclear whether this has encouraged cooperation, or merely increased 

public disgust with politics. Nonetheless, the modus operandi is to push the 

Bosnian leaders or wait them out on more urgent issues, hoping that they 

might be forced to take action under the threat of public embarrassment. 

 In the meantime, the OHR has made progress on the issue of creating 

new ministries. Quietly, it has also been formulating a solution to deal with 

the fact that the rotational Presidency is unconstitutional. The Social 

Democratic Party of Bosnia proposed a new ethnically blind electoral law, so 

that, for example, a Serb living in the Federation can become a President too. 

They explain, “If the Presidency is made up of three representatives of three 

peoples, then this does not reflect the civic principle. That principle exists to 

the extent that individuals feel that they are first of all citizens of BosniaHerzegovina. But according to the Constitution and the structure of the 

electorate, the national principle is absolutely dominant.”31

 In theory, the most encouraging development is the 4 July 2000 

decision by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Hercegovina that it “shall 

have exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether any provision of an Entity’s 

Constitution or Law is consistent with this Constitution.”32 The exercise of 

this right would be truly exciting. In the meantime, OHR and the UN (under 

the auspices of its Judicial Assessment Program) have focused on pressuring 
15 

the entities to reform their judicial systems. Reform legislation has been 

adopted by the parliament; similar legislation was imposed by OHR on the 

Federation in May 2000. The objective is to establish a judicial selection 

commission to review the appointments and dismissals of judges and 

prosecutors, and to review all sitting judges and prosecutors. In an effort to 

tackle the criminal problems from another angle, OHR imposed a law 

directing the Federation to establish a first instance criminal court to try 

criminal, terrorist and organized crime cases. The court was established in 

February 2000, but the Federation did not authorize funding for it.33 

Developing a robust independent judiciary does not appear to be on the 

agenda of the Federation leadership. Naturally, this does nothing to establish 

respect for law and justice. 

 There is no escape from the fact that, “Very few [Bosnian leaders]—

Silajdzic and Izetbegovic excepted—want the central institutions to work.” 34 

And even the Bosnian Muslim leadership is unwilling to make significant 

changes that might jeopardize its grip on power. In short, as Jacques Klein the 

head of the UN mission sees it, “The leaders that got us into war, can’t get us 

out.... Here in Bosnia, things are frozen.”35 The electoral process is partly to 

blame, as it has reinforced ethnic divisions and made it difficult for moderates 

to attempt to gain large multiethnic constituencies. The nationalist parties 

control the machines, which include the jobs, the media and business. OHR 

addressed this conundrum by instituting a regulation prohibiting members of 

any government from simultaneously holding positions as business managers 

or board members of state-owned or private enterprises. Nonetheless, change 

is slow. “The April municipal elections demonstrated that hard-line nationalist 

parties remain a powerful force, even though their grip is weakening.”36

 Indeed, the fall national elections brought more moderates to power 
16 

among the Muslims, but Bosnia’s problems go beyond security and ethnic 

harmony. The economic foundation upon which the entire Dayton structure 

rests, arguably, is rotted through and incapable of supporting a robust 

multiethnic democratic state.37 OHR officials cite fewer attacks on returnees 

in 2000 and early signs of an increasing return rate as encouraging trends.38 

Nonetheless, “as each year passes, the clock runs out. The economic situation 

hinders the process because of the lack of employment.”39 The private sector 

in Bosnia is at a standstill; corruption and red tape prevent new enterprise. 

Foreign investors are deterred by corruption and communist-era red tape. 

Domestic investors are also inhibited by the patronage systems; they also 

suffer for lack of capital and an open banking system. Unfortunately, the 

internationals only began to express concern about such issues about two 

years into the peace implementation process. Now, new reform proposals 

must contend with the fact that economic assistance to Bosnia is shrinking. 

More disturbingly, the Bosnian government appears uncommitted to working 

with the Stability Pact, the international community’s latest proposal for 

bolstering the economies of Southeastern Europe.40 Sadly, this only bolsters 

assessments that the Stability Pact itself “is likely to remain a framework 

organization.”41

 The internationals have concluded that in Bosnia, “It’s easier to turn 

an aquarium into fish soup than to make fish soup into an aquarium.” 42 It 

certainly took less time to rip Bosnia apart than it is taking to reconstruct a 

stable, nominally democratic multiethnic state. Nonetheless, much progress 

has been made—especially from 1998 on. Mistakes were made and lessons 

learned. The civilian and military components of the IFOR operation did not 

have a close cooperative or collaborative relationship. In fact, IFOR 

commanders resisted pressure by the OHR, the civilian coordinating authority, 

to interpret the Dayton mandate more broadly. IFOR commanders provided 
17 

minimal assistance to civilian agencies implementing Annexes 2-11 of the 

Accords. Moreover, the lack of civil-military cooperation was compounded 

by the fact that the OHR did not have its own operational arm at the outset, 

and had no direct authority over the other civilian institutions operating in 

Bosnia. OHR’s coordinating function, in short, was weak. Ultimately, de 

facto partition was enforced within a few months. Yet, the measures that were 

to soften the boundary lines did not begin to be implemented until 1998. 

Today, after more active SFOR-OHR coordination, there is freedom of 

movement, but progress on refugee returns remains tentative. Four years later, 

the international community has realized that keeping people (especially 

educated youths) in Bosnia, much less returning them, requires addressing not 

only security, but also economics. Bosnia is in dire need of judicial and 

economic reform. 

KOSOVO 

The multinational peace operation, headed by the UN, aims to maintain the 

boundaries and stability of the province of Kosovo and to establish an 

autonomous democratic government for the territory. UN Security Council 

Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 authorizes and establishes the framework for 

achieving those objectives. The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is charged 

with coordinating the effort “to provide an interim administration for Kosovo 

under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”43 UNMIK’s mandate includes establishing a 

transitional administration to run the province, ostensibly until a future date 

when Kosovo’s political and territorial status will be definitively settled. In 

the meantime, a NATO-led international Kosovo Force (KFOR) provides for 

overall security. 

 Though the first head of UNMIK, Bernard Kouchner, assumed office 

asserting that a multicultural society must be established in Kosovo within six 
18 

months, he was referring to achieving “coexistence” among Serbs, Albanians, 

Roma (Gypsies), and others. The goal now is to establish mono-ethnic 

communities through which other communities can move freely. 

The final disposition of Kosovo has been put off into the indefinite future; the 

first prerequisite was regime change in Belgrade—removal of Milosevic, 

which has occurred. Nonetheless, the Kostunica government must also be 

willing and able to negotiate with the Kosovar Albanians; conversely the 

Albanians must be willing to meet with representatives of the government in 

Belgrade. Even the new regime may not be able to solve the long-term selfdetermination issue. For now, the Kosovars must settle for de facto autonomy, 

enforced by the international de facto partition of Serbia. 

Security 

KFOR troop strength is approximately 50,000, with 42,500 troops from 28 

countries in Kosovo and another 7,500 supporting troops in Macedonia, 

Albania and Greece.44 The US contributes about 5,500 military personnel, 

roughly a 14 percent contribution. KFOR’s mission is to “establish and 

maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, including public order” until 

UNMIK can assume this responsiblity. KFOR is also responsible for 

enforcing the Military Technical Agreement reached with the Yugoslav 

military—providing for their pullout from Kosovo—and demilitarizing the 

Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA.) Significantly, one of three KFOR mission 

objectives is to “provide assistance to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 

including core functions until they are transferred to UNMIK.”45 The KFOR 

command asserts that “KFOR and UNMIK are Partners in the international 

effort to restore Kosovo and to help the local population to transfer the 

province into a free and democratic society.” 46 Thus, though KFOR’s main 

function is to provide security, it will provide resources and manpower to 

directly assist the various organizations and entities working under UN 
19 

auspices or coordination.47 Unquestionably, this language is a direct outcome 

of a lesson learned in Bosnia, where lack of coordination or even cooperation, 

especially during 1996-97 led to slow implementation of the nonmilitary 

annexes of Dayton, and even victories for nationalists.48 

 KFOR has managed to prevent major military incursions or 

excursions through Kosovo’s boundaries. The Yugoslav army in accordance 

with the Military Technical Agreement and KFOR has established military 

dominance over the territory. Yet, there are still external security challenges 

in the form of incursions by the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and 

Bujanovac (UCPMB), a military organization mirroring the KLA with a 

mission to wrest majority Albanian towns just southeast of Kosovo from 

Serbian/Yugoslav control. UCPMB militia use Kosovo as a base or safe 

haven and a weapons transit point. Through attacks on Serb police units in the 

Presevo valley inside Serbia, the UCPMB hopes to wrest this eastern border 

area from Yugoslav control and to attach it to Kosovo. Increased military 

activity in the buffer zone separating Kosovo from Yugoslav territory led 

KFOR to conclude an agreement in early 2001 allowing Yugoslav troops to 

reenter the zone. KFOR officials insist, “KFOR is determined to prevent any 

action that would make Kosovo a staging area for exporting violence.”49 They 

have been sorely tested by the UCPMB and also by the related ethnic 

Albanian militia elements crossing back and forth between Kosovo and 

Macedonia. 

 On the internal security front, the KLA and associated Kosovar 

Albanian extremists have posed the greatest challenge. On 21 June 1999 the 

KLA Commander-in-Chief signed the “Undertaking of Demilitarization and 

Transformation,” which effectively disbanded the KLA. KLA forces were 

divided into a new Kosovo Police Service (KPS), and the Kosovo Protection 

Corps (KPC, functioning), and some KLA members formed the Party of 
20 

Democratic Progress of Kosovo (PPDK). Still others returned to civilian life. 

The 5,000 man KPC, though it functions akin to a national guard with a civil 

relief mission, is also aimed to “defuse possible resistance to the KLA’s 

demilitarization by providing ex-KLA fighters and commanders with jobs and 

a quasi-military structure.”50 By September 1999 the demilitarization of the 

KLA was complete. Tons of weapons and ammunition have been seized or 

relinquished. However, informed observers insist that the KLA still exists as a 

de facto organization, and that its access to arms remains unobstructed. “No 

one in Kosovo believes that the KLA has simply disappeared: it remains as a 

powerful and active element in every aspect of Kosovo Albanian life.” 51 

Nevertheless, the KLA, formerly a large grass-roots military organization, has 

shrunk and the new leaders of the PPDK and KPC no longer have the popular 

appeal they had two years ago. 

 The former KLA elements have proved troublesome in as much as 

they are suspected to be behind organized and ethnically motivated crime. The 

international community has not been able to ascertain the extent to which 

violence against Serbs, Roma, Slavic Muslims and others has been 

coordinated. In addition, it is also unclear how many perpetrators are 

masquerading as KLA members. Most analysts believe that “criminal groups, 

including some from Albania, have taken advantage of the slow deployment 

of international police and the lack of a functioning judicial system.”52 While 

not all of the criminals are former KLA, “anecdotal and circumstantial 

evidence has made it harder to believe that the KLA is entirely clean at any 

level.”53 There have been countless allegations against KPS members for 

unmandated or criminal activity. KFOR initiated 95 investigations of 

individuals, and subsequently expelled four men from the KPS and suspended 

a further nine.54
21 

 The single biggest challenge to achieving a peaceful security 

environment within Kosovo are the acts of intimidation and violence directed 

at ethnic minorities, especially Serbs and Gypsies. Most of the roughly 

830,000 ethnic Albanian refugees in neighboring countries returned to Kosovo 

in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, leaving only 25,000 Albanian, Serb 

and Roma refugees in the Balkan region and several thousand others outside 

the region.55 However, since NATO troops entered Kosovo in June 1999 

approximately 190,000 Serbs have left—about three-quarters of the pre-war 

population of 200-250 thousand.56 This exodus of the largest minority 

population in Kosovo is generally attributed to intimidation by Kosovar 

Albanians, who are seeking retribution for past individual or collective Serb 

actions.57 At the onset of the mission the interethnic murder rate averaged 

about 50 per week. About a year later, in the summer of 2000 the rate of such 

killings was 1-2 per week.58 Lesser ethnically motivated crimes have 

continued at a higher rate than that of homicides. 

 Most of the ethnic Serbs live in northern Kosovo, with about 

55,000—about half the total—in the town of Mitrovica.59 Yet Mitrovica is 

also home to Albanians who have resisted Serb pressure to leave entirely. 

Still, in February 2000 there were hundreds of Albanians expelled from the 

north side of town. KFOR was unable to prevent this population shift, and 

their attempts at quelling the concomitant violence highlighted alliance and 

coalition weaknesses. Several countries had let their troop contingent number 

fall and had significantly circumscribed their activities to prevent them from 

undertaking potentially dangerous tasks. The French KFOR troops in 

Mitrovica were unable to cope with the turmoil and requested US assistance. 

The US forces were subsequently attacked by rock-throwing mobs, and this in 

turn provoked a DoD decision to bar US troops from moving outside their 

sector in non-emergencies.60
22 

 In the aftermath of the February violence the town and the two ethnic 

groups were clearly divided by the Ibar River, with the Serbs in the north and 

Albanians in the south. Low-level unrest continued and on 22 March 2000 

KFOR established a “confidence area” within the town. This measure was 

adopted “with the purpose of providing a visible reassurance of their security 

to the general population of Mitrovica, protecting minorities, controlling 

access to the Confidence Area, and improving the freedom of movement of 

those living or working in the Confidence Area.”61 When it came to the last 

objective, freedom of movement was only secured within each side of the 

river. The UN and KFOR ultimately solidified the de facto partition of the 

town. This was far from the original intent; indeed, the UN intended to 

establish a “united city” with a joint administration including Serbs and 

Albanians. Since then, frustrated at every turn by the hard-line pro-Milosevic 

Serbs in Mitrovica, the UN has focused on economic mechanisms for 

achieving a sustainable level of coexistence. On 14 August 2000 the UN 

authorized KFOR to seize the mining facilities at Trepca, in the immediate 

proximity of Mitrovica. Also on that date, UNMIK signed an agreement with 

a French-Swedish-American consortium to rehabilitate the mining and 

metallurgical complex. The UN now manages it as a public enterprise. On 

this front at least the UN had moved closer to one final objective of their 

strategy for coexistence—establishing an industry that can attract investment 

and provide employment for the province.62 Indeed Kouchner declared, “By 

providing jobs and income for Kosovo, Trepca could be a key to achieving 

coexistence in northern Kosovo.”63

 Mitrovica stands as a stark symbol of the failure to achieve 

multiethnicity. Undeniably, for the internationals, “their signal failure, so far, 

has been to get the [Albanian] Kosovars to live with the remaining [Kosovar] 

Serbs.”64 According to one UN official, “The UN had lost [this battle] by 
23 

August because we came in too slow.”65 In the eight months it took the UN to 

install their personnel and take control of local administration, the KLA 

leaders managed to place their people in influential positions, where they 

continue to shape current political struggles. The fact that there was 

effectively no judicial system until the spring of 2000 benefited extreme 

nationalist and criminal elements. Ultimately, a common refrain among 

international observers and minorities in Kosovo was that the UN and KFOR 

effectively favored the Albanian Kosovars. 

 Since the spring of 2000, however, UNMIK and KFOR have made 

concerted attempts to address the persecution of the ethnic minorities, as well 

as the related rule of law vacuum. The internationals reached out to the 

moderate Serbian National Council located in Gracanica, central Kosovo. On 

28 February US Secretary of State Madeline Albright met with Bishop 

Artemije, the leader of the Serbian National Council, and secured his 

agreement to support a US government project to gradually return 

approximately 440 internally displaced Serbs to Kosovo. In March KFOR and 

the UN International Police (UNIP) initiated Operation Trojan I to provide 

security to Serbs traveling to and from church, market and as they worked 

their fields. In May a joint committee on returns, including UNMIK, KFOR 

and moderate Serbs, was established.66 And finally, during July 29 Serbs were 

returned to Slivovo in the predominantly Albanian area of eastern Kosovo.67

In a significant departure from, and improvement based on, UN 

experiences in Bosnia, the UN civil police in Kosovo are responsible for law 

enforcement and for developing a professional impartial Kosovar police force. 

Unlike the IPTF, its counterpart in Bosnia, UNIP does not simply monitor the 

local police. As of 29 March 2000 only 2,734 of the 3,500 police authorized 

by the international community had been deployed to Kosovo.68 By April, in 

response to pressure from Kouchner and the UN Secretary-General (who 
24 

recommended a force strength of 3,110), the deployed police force had grown 

to 3,954.69 In addition, only somewhat more than half of the special police 

unit for riot control—similar to the MSU in Bosnia—had been deployed by 

late-spring 2000.70 Even with the OSCE graduating approximately 800 new 

recruits from its police school and planning to train 4,000 by early 2001, 

security demands outpaced the international and local police supply.71

Political Institutions and Processes 

UNMIK, currently headed by Hans Haekkerup, is responsible for running the 

transitional administration for Kosovo and preparing the province for elections 

and local autonomy. The UN coordinates its efforts with those of the OSCE 

and EU. Under the “pillar” system UNMIK provides the roof or umbrella, 

with the head of each organization responsible for implementing a portion of 

the mandate reporting to Haekkerup. The UN itself is responsible for civil 

administration, the OSCE handles democratization and institution building, 

and the EU focuses on economic development. Humanitarian assistance, a 

fourth pillar run by UNHCR, completed its work in the spring of 2000. Its 

remaining longer-term development projects were absorbed by UNMIK. 

 On 16 July 1999 UNMIK established a Kosovo Transition Council of 

Kosvar Albanians and minority ethnic group political leaders to serve as a 

consultative body. Six months later, on 15 December 1999 UNMIK and three 

Albanian leaders (of the PPDK, LDK and LBD parties) signed an agreement 

establishing a Joint Administrative Structure (JIAS.) The agreement also 

stipulated that all monies of the former shadow government and parallel 

government structures be transferred to the JIAS. This organization is 

composed of an Interim Administrative Council of three Albanians, one Serb, 

four UNMIK representatives, and 19 administrative departments. It has been 

boycotted off and on by the Serb National Council (whose representatives 

joined the administrative departments in June 2000 as observers), as well as by 
25 

the Albanian PDK party. Nevertheless, it meets twice a week, has appointed 

administrative department heads and has approved measures to increase 

security and improve the judicial system.72 On the municipal level, UNMIK 

officials tout the establishment of representative municipal councils, including 

minorities, as a key success.73 Certainly, measures to include minorities and to 

address their security concerns, while a bit belated, have somewhat dispelled 

the notion that UNMIK is Albanian-partisan. 

 UNMIK was given a robust mandate with clear civilian lines of 

authority in order to avoid the delays in implementation experienced in 

Bosnia. “The international effort to organize the civil implementation mission 

in Kosovo drew heavily on the lessons learned from Bosnia.”74 Nonetheless, 

almost a year later, US officials conceded that UNMIK “has not fully 

established its authority over civil administration.”75 The experience in 

Bosnia proved that the first three months make or break a mission, but the UN, 

greeted in 23 out of 29 municipalities by self-appointed KLA administrators, 

scrambled to gain control.76 Administrative services arrived slowly and 

complaints regarding UN management of utilities and public services were 

rampant during the first six months of the mission. Since then UNMIK 

appears to have settled these issues, but as of July 2000 it was only 60 percent 

staffed.77 Nonetheless, one distinguished Kosovar Albanian asserts, “The 

truth is that in Kosov[o] there is no political system. There is a vacuum and 

not only in politics. There is a vacuum also in security, in the administration, 

and in the economy. We are the only country in Europe today that I can think 

of that is ruled by the self-constraint of its citizens rather than by the rule of 

law.”78

 The JIAS will be replaced sometime after province-wide elections are 

held. UNMIK is currently holding negotiations among Kosovar Albanians 

and Serbs regarding Kosovo’s internal legal structure. Meanwhile, the 28 
26 

October 2000 municipal elections yielded victory for the moderate Democratic 

League of Kosovo (LDK) party, run by Ibrahim Rugova, the former shadow 

President of Kosovo. This is significant, signaling that a significant number of 

Kosovar Albanians no longer remain as militantly nationalist as they were 

during the war in 1999. “In contrast to Bosnia immediately after the war, 

political trends in post-war Kosovo seem to be moving in favour of moderate 

political leaders and parties and away from the party most closely associated 

with the war-time KLA.” 79 Seen in this light, elections are a positive step for 

Kosovo, clearly transferring authority from the more radical nationalists to the 

moderates. Unfortunately, few ethnic Serbs registered or voted and no Serb 

parties participated.80

 The elections provided an impetus for politically motivated violence 

throughout Kosovo, with the local media fueling vigilante killings of Serbs 

allegedly guilty of war crimes during the 1999 war.81 This only serves to 

highlight the fact that the rule of law is virtually absent in Kosovo. When the 

UN entered Kosovo, it “was devoid of laws and institutions. There were no 

police, no judicial system, no prisons.”82 Since then, UNMIK appointed 242 

local judges and 75 local prosecutors, and re-established the court system. 83 

Six foreign judges were brought to Kosovo to preside over the most sensitive 

interethnic cases. “But after more than a year, the courts are still barely 

working.”84 There are shortages of facilities, local and international judges, 

and prison space.85 Even if they do function, they do not do so impartially, 

especially when it comes to the Kosovar Serbs. 

 Kosovo “remains a poor, disorganized society with a long-term 

security problem.”86 The UN together with KFOR has made some progress 

addressing the sources of instability most notably by providing overall 

security for the province, ensuring against large incursions or excursions. 

Other successes include organizing Operation Trojan I and II to protect the 
27 

Serbs, as well as seizing the Trepca mining facility, placing it under UN 

supervision and beginning to clean up and reorganize the enterprise. The de 

facto partition of Serbia—as well as the localized de facto partition of 

Mitrovica—has kept the peace. 

 In the meantime, achieving multiethnicity has been replaced by 

securing coexistence as a long-term objective of the UNMIK mission. Yet, 

aiming for coexistence is not conceding defeat or capitulating to extreme 

nationalist forces. In Kosovo the largest ethnic groups—the Serbs and the 

Albanians—may have worked together over time, but they did not have a high 

rate of intermarriage and lived instead, side-by-side, coexisting until outside 

forces or opportunities prompted them to try to take the upper hand and seize 

military and political control of the territory.87 Thus, the original language 

was a misstatement and misunderstanding of Kosovar history. It is surely not 

in the UNMIK mandate to attempt to create something that has never existed 

before. The current effort in Trepca is on the right track. As one KFOR 

officer explained, “If the Serbs in the north will cooperate we will have 

various sites working without multiethnicity at the site level, but at the higher 

level.”88 This is certainly a stable scenario. 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

De facto partition has brought short-term gains to Bosnia and Kosovo. It has 

proven to be an effective post-conflict mechanism to separate formerly 

warring parties. The international forces have restored peace to Bosnia and 

Kosovo. However, the presence of war criminals and criminal networks has 

stalled the prospects for long-term change. In Bosnia, the baseline 

requirement for establishing any type of unity is the capture of persons 

indicted by the ICTY. SFOR and KFOR must increase their operations in this 

area. Radovan Karadzic, foremost among others, must be brought to trial, 

even at the risk that his revelations might tarnish Western European and 
28 

American reputations. In both Bosnia and Kosovo the criminal networks must 

be broken so that refugees can return and foreign investment can resume. The 

international police forces in both operations must be expanded and directed 

towards Westar-type operations, where the local criminal networks are 

threatening the physical security of returnees. In other cases, economic 

reform—coupled with law enforcement—may be sufficient means to deal with 

local mafias. 

 If the long-term objective in Bosnia and Kosovo is reintegration and 

coexistence, respectively, it is imperative to remove the internal security 

threats to all minorities. Beyond that, the basis for genuine stability is the 

overall reform of the economic systems so that there are employment 

opportunities for all ethnic groups in every corner of the state or territory. The 

security measures must be taken in the near-term even if there is no movement 

in dealing with the political structures and questions of sovereignty. At the 

same time, however, political reform is a prerequisite for long-term stability in 

Bosnia. The federal government is not functioning and has not done so for 

over four years. Moreover, the nationalistic principles used to award quotas 

and ethnically based representation only serves to stymie liberalization efforts. 

The recent Bosnian Constitutional Court decision that Serbs, Croats and 

Muslims must enjoy full legal equality everywhere on Bosnian territory” must 

be enforced; undoubtedly such thinking should become reflected in the 

constitution itself.89 In short, the constitution must be revised. Bosnia must 

prepare for a future within Europe. Its current ethnically divided institutions 

only hold it back. 

 The future status of Kosovo is currently in limbo. There have been 

vocal calls for a decision to prepare for independence or reintegration. The 

change in regime in Serbia has provided an opportunity to open negotiations 

about Kosovo’s future within the context of a long overdue redrafting of the 
29 

Serb/Yugoslav constitution. However, most Kosovar Albanians are still bent 

on achieving full independence; they might take military action if forced to 

accept anything short thereof. They should not be forced to remain within 

Yugoslavia. They must be given incentives to remain, but at the end of the 

day the most sustainable outcome may be a negotiated departure arrived at 

with the full participation and acquiescence of the government in Belgrade. 

 The ouster of Slobodan Milosevic, unfortunately, did not provide 

hope for an immediate breakthrough on the question of Kosovo. Yugoslav 

President Voijslav Kostunica is a true nationalist, committed to avoiding 

further territorial losses. More significantly, the bulk of the Serbian 

population is still unprepared for the concession that forfeiting Kosovo entails. 

Until the Serbs of Yugoslavia are convinced that it is in their political and 

even nationalistic interest (given demographic trends) to allow Kosovo to split 

off from Serbia, it will be political suicide for any federal or Serbian leader to 

make such a proposal. Yet, it is up to moderate Serbian leaders to prepare the 

groundwork, and to provide antidotes to the virulent nationalist arguments of 

the past that have so sickened the Yugoslav body politic. Strong decisive 

leadership focused on contemporary political realities is required. The 

Kosovo problem will be on the road to resolution when Serbian leaders realize 

that power today is derived from links to the global and European economy 

and not from possession of territory and stringent control of minorities. 

 The implementation of international policy in Bosnia and Kosovo has 

not sufficiently furthered the ultimate objective in both cases—fostering the 

multiethnic state. In a desire to avoid establishing a protectorate in Bosnia and 

a fear of violent backlash, political and military implementers have not been 

consistently firm and aggressive. In Kosovo, the fear of a military response 

from either local ethnic group or their allies has had a similar—though less 

intense—braking effect. Four years into peace implementation in Bosnia and 
30 

a year into the effort in Kosovo, US politicians are eager to pull American 

troops out and turn the field operations entirely over to the Europeans (who 

currently shoulder 75-85 percent of the total cost of both operations.) Yet, as 

the military generals have stated time and again, in peace operations the 

military needs to “get in to get out.” The US military—with its unparalleled 

capabilities and credible deterrent force—is needed in order to maintain 

stability and deter large-scale violence if the international community is to 

make a final push to achieve its objectives. But it is US political leadership 

that is most crucial. The US government can provide the will and resources to 

fuel an international push based on the recommendations stated above. 

 To summarize the recommendations of this study, the implementers 

in Bosnia and Kosovo must move quickly and assertively to: 1) remove 

internal security threats, 2) begin to reform the economic system and 3) in 

Bosnia, rewrite the constitution to strengthen the central government. The 

first recommendation entails the capture of war criminals, a task for 

SFOR/KFOR. It also includes breaking the mafias, a job of the international 

police with the help of law enforcement agencies such as the FBI and the 

gendarme forces of the MSU. The second measure involves legal and political 

reform and should be orchestrated by the UN and OHR. The third 

recommendation, applying to Bosnia alone, would fall to OHR with heavy 

input from professionals representing the Council of Europe and other 

European institutions. Again, capture of war criminals, especially in Bosnia, 

would begin to create a more secure environment for refugee returns, and in 

both Bosnia and Kosovo economic liberalization will bring investment and 

competition and a reason for ethnic groups to cooperate. 

 In the meantime, the international community must not encourage the 

Kosovar Albanians, and by extension Albanians in Macedonia and other 

nationalists in the region. Would-be separatists must not be tempted to follow 
31 

the Kosovo pattern, provoking military operations by their central 

government, hoping for US or international intervention.90 It is clearly in the 

US interest to prevent further state fragmentation in Europe. Yet, de facto

partition cannot become the basis for policy if it is nothing but a vehicle for 

stalemate. The civilian and military peace implementers must put more energy 

into bridging ethnic divisions at the outset of their operations, even as they 

enforce territorial divisions. Then, over time, political and economic reforms 

can soften territorial divisions through a gradual process of liberalization. In 

the short term, international implementers must be honest about the degree of 

control they possess. They must openly concede that these entities are 

protectorates and administer them in an aggressive fashion, while at the same 

time empowering and cultivating moderates who can take over sooner rather 

than later. Imposing reform upon these ethnically divided societies is the only 

“shock-therapy” that will allow for relatively quick political change and 

conditions conducive to a removal of the international forces that enforce the 

de facto partitions. 

ENDNOTES 

 

1

 The terms “instrumental” and “primordial” refer to two schools of thought 

regarding the theoretical basis for nationalism and ethnic conflict. 

Instrumentalists tend to believe that nationalism is created by manipulative 

leadership, whereas primordialists generally believe that nationalism is an 

inborn trait or instinct that cannot be manipulated or created from something 

that did not already exist. Since US policy generally follows the assumption 

that Milosevic manipulated the Serbian masses which greatly contributed to 

the problems in Bosnia/Kosovo, undoing his efforts over time by first 

separating the parties and allowing de facto partition, then later reuniting the 

policy organs of each nation (Serb/Croat/Bosnian Muslim or Serb/Albanian) 

into each of the respective states (Bosnia and Serbia/Yugoslavia), the 

manipulations can be undone and the ethnic groups will once again over time 

be able to live together in multiethnic societies. 
32 

 

2

 U.S. Department of State, The Dayton Peace Accords: General Framework 

Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina (Washington, DC: US 

Department of State, Office of Public Communications, Bureau of Public 

Affairs, 1995). 

3

 The district was established on 8 March 2000 by the arbitration final award 

as stipulated in the Dayton Accords. 

4

 A multiethnic district assembly, judiciary, mayor’s office and police force 

are governing, enforcing and adjudicating based on an increasingly 

harmonized (between Yugoslav and entity laws) legal regime. This is a 

significant development, in as much as it represents the general arrangement 

the US hopes to achieve Bosnia-wide.

5 Draft Report of President to Congress in compliance with Section 7 of Public 

Law 105-174 on the Latest Developments in the Efforts to Achieve Sustainable 

Peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina, July 2000. Other estimates place spending 

lower at approximately twenty-five percent. Alan J. Carlson, Second 

Secretary, US Embassy, Sarajevo, Bosnia, email correspondence, 20 October 

2000. 

6

 Jacques Klein, The Activities of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and 

Hercegovina, Statement to the OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, Austria, 3 

February 2000, 6. 

7

Ambassador Ralph Johnson, Deputy High Representative, Office of the High 

Representative, interview, Sarajevo, Bosnia, 22 March 2000, and Ambassador 

Jacques Klein, Special Representative of the Secretrary General and 

Coordinator of United Nations Operations in Bosnia and Hercegovina, 

interview, Sarajevo, Bosnia, 23 March 2000. 

8 Draft Report of President to Congress, 2. 

9

 Ibid. 

10 Klein interview. 

11 The UN Security Council is responsible for appointing the OHR, who is the 

ultimate civil authority in Bosnia responsible for monitoring the 

implementation of the Dayton peace settlement. He has power to establish 

subordinate civilian commissions and also is tasked to meet in a Joint 

Consultative Committee with the IFOR Commander. However, he cannot 

interfere with the military authorities under IFOR (now SFOR). See Dayton 

Accords, Annex 10. 
33 

 

12 Online at http:///www.un.org/icty/glance/indictlist-e.htm and Carlson, email 

correspondence, 20 October 2000 regarding suicide of Janic Janko on 13 

October 2000. 

13 Ray Wilkenson, “Decisive Year,” Refugees, vol. 1, no. 114 (1999), 4-10. 

14 Ambassador Johnson explains that most of the returns in the early part of 

2000, even those recorded, are spontanteous. See also Report of President to 

Congress, 6-7. As an encouraging example, for the first time since 1996 

Muslims (about 20 families) have returned to Serb-held Kopaci, a village 

designated by IFOR as a top-ten hotspot during the 1996 elections. Also, in 

April 2001 RS officials opened a resettlement office in Sarajevo to assist 

Serbs who want to return to homes in the Federation. 

15 Steven R. Bowman, Bosnia: U.S. Military Operations, CRS Issue Brief 

(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 20 July 1993), 3. 

16 Charles Trueheart, “A New Kind of Justice,” The Atlantic Monthly (April 

2000), 80-90. 

17 Bowman, 3. 

18 As of October 1999, the MSU had conducted over 260 public disorder 

operations, and numerous information gathering patrols. MSU contributed to 

Operation Westar, which struck at illicit intelligence and criminal activity. 

MSU commanders also credit the unit with seizing two internationally-wanted 

terrorists, supporting ICTY exhumations and investigating the Arizona market 

and Stolac car market, human organ theft and PWICS. Maj. J.S. Hoffman, 

SFOR After-Action Review: April - October 1999, slide presentation. 

19 Jacques Paul Klein, “Commentary: War Criminals,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 

28 February 2000. 

20 James Lyons, Director, International Crisis Group, interview, Sarajevo, 

Bosnia, 22 March 2000. 

21 Is Dayton Failing? Bosnia Four Years after the Peace Agreement 

(International Crisis Group, 1999), 16. Only the Brcko constitution meets 

European standards. 

22 Office of the High Representative: Information, online at 

http://www.ohr.int/info.htm (Accessed on 7 March 2000). 

23 Is Dayton Failing? 53. 

24 Office of the High Representative: Information. 
34 

 

25 Ibid. 

26 Johnson interview. 

27 Lyons interview. 

28 General Wesley Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 

interview, Washington, DC, 7 November 2000. 

29 Johnson interview. 

30 Ibid. 

31 Sabrija Pojskic, Member, Steering Committee of the Social Democratic 

Party of Bosnia-Hercegovina, South Slavic Report, RFE/RL, March 2, 2000, 

vol. 2, no.9, online at http://rferl.org/southslavic/index.html. 

32 SFOR Transcript: Joint Press Conference, 4 July 2000 received from 

NATODATA@LISTSERV.CC.KULEUVEN.AC.BE, 4 July 2000. 

33 Report of President to Congress, 3. 

34 Klein interview. 

35 Ibid. 

36 Report of President to Congress, 2. 

37 For more on the dismal investment climate in Bosnia see, Why Will No One 

Invest in Bosnia and Hercegovina: An Overview of Impediments to Investment 

and Self Sustaining Economic Growth in the Post Dayton Era, International 

Crisis Group Report, No. 64 (21 April 1999). 

38 Johnson. 

39 Ibid. 

40 Ibid. 

41 Andrew J. Pierre, De-Balkanizing the Balkans: Security and Stability in 

Southeastern Europe, United States Institute for Peace Special Report, 20 

September 1999, 13. 

42 Klein interview. 

43 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), online at 

http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc1244.htm (accessed on 17 April 

2000). 
35 

 

44 KFOR Online: Structure, Objectives, MNBs, online at 

http://www.kforonline.com/kfor/objectives.htm (accessed on 3 March 2000). 

45 Ibid. Author’s emphasis. 

46 Ibid. 

47 According to one UNMIK administrator, the Norwegian commander in the 

Oblic area asked during the first KFOR-UNMIK meeting “What can I do for 

you?” Laura Dolci, Deputy Civil Administrator, Oblic region, UNMIK, 

interview, Pristina, Kosovo, 30 March 2000. 

48 One example of a victory for nationalists occurred in February 1996 when 

Serb extremists organized the burning of the Serb inhabited areas of Sarajevo 

that were being turned over to the Muslim-Croat Federation for 

administration, and forced the Serb population to evacuate to the Republika 

Srpska. The UN Secretary General reports, “UNMIK and KFOR have 

established close working relationships and have put I place a comprehensive 

structure of coordination mechanisms...,” Report of the Secretary General on 

the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, 12 July 1999, 

online at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1999/s1999779.htm. 

49 KFOR Daily Press Release 2 August 2000, from NATODOC 

(natodo@HQ.NATO.INT). 

50 Ibid., 3. 

51 For details on this process see What Happened to the KLA? International 

Crisis Group Balkan Report, No. 88, Pristina/Washington/Brussels, 3 March 

2000. 

52 Woehrel and Kim, 3. 

53 Ibid., 14. 

54 James W. Pardew, Jr., Principal Deputy Advisor to the President and 

Secretary of State for Dayton and Kosovo Implementation, U.S. Department 

of State, Statement, Kosovo: One Year After the Bombing, Foreign Relations 

Committee, United States Senate, 8 June 2000. In March 2000 two KPC 

members were dismissed after it was proven that they were assisting the 

UCPMB. See Bernard Kouchner, Weekly Situation Report for 21 to 27 March 

2000, UNMIK-247, 28 March 2000, 10. 

55 Woehrel and Kim, 9. 

56 Mark Baskin, Deputy Regional Administrator, Prizren, Plan for Community 

Development in the Tusus Area of Prizren, 19 March 2000. 
36 

 

57 However, during a March trip to the region the author heard internationals 

blame Serbs for some of the cleansing by “ceding” certain areas to the 

Albanians. Serb realtors were pressuring their co-nationals to sell their 

properties at prices drastically lower than market value. 

58 Michael Ignatieff, “The Reluctant Imperialist,” NY Times Magazine, 6 

August 2000, 44. 

59 Ignatieff, 44. 

60 Woehrel and Kim, 6. Given the high potential for escalation, this begs the 

question: what constitutes an emergency? 

61 UNMIK Executive Decision No. 2000/1 On the Confidence Area in the City 

of Mitrovica, 16 March 2000. 

62 Mitrovica - A Strategy Towards Coexistence, UNMIK planning document. 

63 UNMIK Assumes Responsibility for Operations at Zvecan Smelter, UNMIK 

Press Release, 14 August 2000, online at 

http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/press/templ.pr312.html (accessed on 22 

August 2000). 

64 Ignatieff, 44. 

65 Mark Baskin, Deputy Regional Administator, UNMIK, Prizren, Kosovo, 

interview, 30 March 2000. 

66 Bernard Kouchner, Weekly Situation Report for 21 to 27 March 2000, 10. 

67 The author attended a 28 March 2000 Operation Trojan planning meeting. 

68 Bernard Kouchner, Weekly Situation Report for 21 to 27 March 2000, 6. 

69UN Interim Administration in Kosovo, Deployment, August 4, 2000 online 

at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo_status.htm (accessed on 14 

August 2000). 

70 Pardew, 6-7. 

71 Pardew 6-7. 

72 Woehrel and Kim, 7. 

73 J.F. Carter, Deputy Civil Administrator, Pristina Region, UNMIK, 

interview, Pristina, Kosovo, 27 March 2000. 

74 Pardew, 4. 

75 Pardew, 9. 
37 

 

76 Carter interview. 

77 Pardew, 9. A year later the pressure was on to downsize the mission. 

78 Surroi Wants Concepts, Radio Free Liberty/Radio Europe Balkan Report, 

Vol. 17, No. 1, 29 February 2000. 

79 Elections in Kosovo: Moving Toward Democracy? International Crisis 

Group, 7 July 2000, 25; online at 

http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/kosovo/reports/kos37erep.htm (accessed on 

1 August 2000). 

80 Meanwhile, more than 30 ethnic Albanian parties have registered. Starting 

From Scratch in Kosovo: The Honeymoon is Over, International Crisis Group, 

10 December 1999 online at http://www.intl-crisisgroup.org/projects/sbalkans/reports/kos31rep.htm (accessed on 9 March 

2000). 

81 Kosovo’s Interim Administrative Council Condemns Recent Spate of 

Violence, online at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/news/kosovo2.htm

(accessed on 14 August 2000). 

82 Pardew, 3. 

83 Ibid. 

84 Richard Mertens, “Justice a Foreign Term in Kosovo,” Christian Science 

Monitor, 1 August 2000, 6. 

85 Pardew, 10-11. 

86 Morton I. Abramowitz, Board of Trustees, International Crisis Group, 

statement, Kosovo: One Year After the Bombing, 25. 

87 See Noel Malcom, A Short History of Kosovo (New York: University Press, 

1998). 

88 Lt. Col. Joseph Abbott, USAF, J-5 Plans, HQ KFOR, interview, Pristina, 

Kosovo, 29 March 2000. 

89 Three Overlooked Stories, Radio Free Liberty/Radio Liberty Balkan Report, 

Vol. 4., No. 50 (4 July 2000). 

90 This is not to lift the blame off of Slobodan Milosevic’s government for its 

decade-long suppression of the Albanians and the brutal execution of 

Operation Horseshoe in the spring of 1999. 
38