alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### CLIFFORD WREN ET AL. *v.*MACPHERSON INTERIORS, INC., ET AL.

*William F. Gallagher,*in support of the petition.

*William J. Wenzel*and *Alice Ann Carey,*in opposition.

Decided January 16, 1997

The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 919 (AC 15083), is denied.
§ 19.50 Who can file an appeal. ( a ) *Persons authorized.* A Notice of Disagreement and/or a Substantive Appeal may be filed by a claimant personally, or by his or her representative if a proper Power of Attorney or declaration of representation, as applicable, is on record or accompanies such Notice of Disagreement or Substantive Appeal.
( b ) *Claimant rated incompetent by Department of Veterans Affairs or under disability and unable to file.* If an appeal is not filed by a person listed in paragraph (a) of this section, and the claimant is rated incompetent by the Department of Veterans Affairs or has a physical, mental, or legal disability which prevents the filing of an appeal on his or her own behalf, a Notice of Disagreement and a Substantive Appeal may be filed by a fiduciary appointed to manage the claimant's affairs by the Department of Veterans Affairs or a court, or by a person acting as next friend if the appointed fiduciary fails to take needed action or no fiduciary has been appointed.
( c ) *Claimant under disability and able to file.* Notwithstanding the fact that a fiduciary may have been appointed for a claimant, an appeal filed by a claimant will be accepted.
(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 7105(b)(2) (2016))
[57 FR 4109, Feb. 3, 1992. Redesignated and amended at 84 FR 177, 179, Jan. 18, 2019]
#### Ada McCobb, Appellant, *v.*Simon Christiansen, Respondent.

Appeal from an order demanding the return of a chattel.

F. Bien, for appellant.

Harris & Goldfarb, for respondent.

McCarthy, J.

After a careful examination I am of the opinion that section 1725 of Code of Civil Procedure is clearly permissive and not mandatory, and that where, as claimed and conceded in this case, the answer contained a demand for the return of the chattel taken by the plaintiff, under a writ of replevin, it was not necessary to serve the notice, mentioned in section 1725, Code of Civil Procedure, in order to obtain a return of the chattel.

This was intended for those who had failed to demand the return of the chattel in the answer. There can be no reason for a demand for the return of the chattel in the answer, which is a part of the pleadings, and again in a separate notice. All the court requires to know is that a return of the chattel is demanded. Besides the plaintiff is clearly guilty of laches, in that it appears judgment by default was rendered on June 9, 1894, and a motion to vacate and set aside the judgment, taken by default, was not made until June 4, 1896.- I fully concur with Van Wyclc, Ch. J., in his memorandum.

Scotchman and Olcott, JJ., concur.

Order affirmed, with costs.
§ 68.3 Who is eligible to apply? To be eligible for consideration for the NIH LRPs, applicants must meet the following criteria: ( a ) Be citizens, nationals, or permanent residents of the United States;
( b ) Have the necessary degree from an accredited institution as determined by the NIH to be consistent with the needs of the LRP;
( c ) ( 1 ) For Intramural LRPs only: Applicants must be employed by the NIH and engage in qualified full-time research as specified by the LRP and be recommended by the employing IC or have a firm commitment of employment from an authorized official of the NIH;
( 2 ) For Extramural LRPs only: Applicants must be conducting qualified research for an average of at least 20 hours per week that is supported by a domestic nonprofit foundation, nonprofit professional association, or other nonprofit institution (e.g., university), or a U.S. or other government agency (Federal, state or local);
( d ) Have total qualifying educational loan debt as determined on the program eligibility date;
( e ) The NIH or the employing institution must provide an assurance that the applicant will be employed/appointed and provided research support for the applicable term of the LRP contract; and
( f ) Recipients of LRP awards must conduct their research in accordance with applicable Federal, state, and local law (e.g., applicable human subject protection regulations).
( g ) For Clinical Research for Individuals from Disadvantaged Background only: Individual must be from a disadvantaged background. (See § 68.2, Definitions, *Individual from disadvantaged background.*)
§ 10.44 Evidence required to support claim of mother or father. The term *mother* and *father* as referred to in the order of preference as outlined in section 601 of the Act, as amended, includes stepmothers, stepfathers, mothers and fathers through adoption, and persons who, for a period of not less than one year, have stood in the place of a mother or father to the veteran at any time prior to the beginning of his service. In addition to the evidence of dependency required from a natural mother or father, a claim of a stepmother or stepfather shall be supported by evidence of marriage to the natural parent of the veteran. This evidence shall be in accordance with the requirements of proof of marriage as set forth in regulations of the Department of Veterans Affairs. A claim of a mother or father through adoption shall be supported by a certified copy of the court record of such adoption. A claim by a person who claims to have stood in the place of a mother or father shall be supported by evidence of such relationship satisfactory to the Department of Veterans Affairs. Such evidence shall comprise: ( a ) An affidavit of the claimant containing a complete detailed statement of the alleged relationship and
( b ) Affidavits of two competent witnesses to whom claimant was personally known at the time of the death of the veteran, said witnesses certifying to the truth of the statement as made by the claimant.
Editorial Note on Part 84
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 84 appear at 69 FR 18803, Apr. 9, 2004.

§ 84.137 Inhalation and exhalation valves; check valves; minimum requirements. ( a ) Inhalation and exhalation valves shall be provided where necessary and protected against distortion.
( b ) Exhalation valves shall be: ( 1 ) Protected against damage and external influence; and
( 2 ) Designed and constructed to prevent inward leakage of contaminated air.
( c ) Check valves designed and constructed to allow airflow toward the facepiece only shall be provided in the connections to the facepiece or in the hose fitting near the facepiece of all Type A, AE, B, and BE supplied-air respirators.
#### Brewer *v.*The State.

*Habeas Corpus.*

(Decided Jan. 12, 1912.

57 South. 386.)

*Habeas Corpus; Detention; Prima Facie Case.*— Where the return to the habeas corpus shows a requisition for the prisoner made by the Governor of the state, from which he is alleged to have filed, a copy of the affidavit made before the proper officer charging him with a crime, and certified by the Governor making the requisition as authentic, and the warrant of the Governor of this state authorizing an arrest, a prima facie case of detention in properly made out.

Appeal from Montgomery City C’onrt.

Heard before Hon. Gaston Gunter.

Habeas corpus by H. F. Brewer to secure his discharge from arrest under extradition proceedings. From an order denying relief petitioner appeals.

Affirmed.

L. A. Sanderson, for appellant.

No brief reached the Reporter.

B. C. Brickell, Attorney General, and W. L. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, and John V. Smith, for appellee.

The order of the court should be affirmed on the authority of *Ex parte Mohr,*73 Ala. 504; *Barrierre v. The State,*142 Ala. 78; *Loao v. The State,*56 Sfouth. 79.

WALKER, P. J.

The return to the writ of habeas corpus and the evidence offered in support of it showed: (1) A demand or requisition for the petitioner (the a.p pella.nt), made by the Governor of the state of California, from which he is alleged to have fled, upon the Governor of this state; (2) a'copy of an affidavit made be*222fore a magistrate, charging the petitioner with the commission of the crime of murder in the state of California, arid certified as authentic by the Governor of that state; and (3) the warrant of the Governor of Alabama authorizing the arrest of the petitioner. The papers showing these facts were regular on their face, and were not subject to any of the objections interposed to their admission in evidence. There was no error in the order or judgment appealed *from.*—Barriere *v. State,*142 Ala. 72, 39 South. 55.

Affirmed.
PUBLIC LAW 107–113—JAN. 8, 2002 115 STAT. 2099

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—H.R. 2199:

SENATE REPORTS: No. 107–103 (Comm. on Governmental Affairs).

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 147 (2001):

Sept. 25, considered and passed House.

Dec. 11, considered and passed Senate, amended.

Dec. 19, House concurred in Senate amendment.

Æ

Public Law 107–113

107th Congress

An Act

To amend the National Capital Revitalization and Self-Government Improvement

Act of 1997 to permit any Federal law enforcement agency to enter into a cooperative agreement with the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia to assist the Department in carrying out crime prevention and law enforcement

activities in the District of Columbia if deemed appropriate by the Chief of

the Department and the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia,

and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘District of Columbia Police

Coordination Amendment Act of 2001’’.

SEC. 2. PERMITTING ADDITIONAL FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

AGENCIES TO ENTER INTO COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS

WITH METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

Section 11712(d) of the National Capital Revitalization and

Self-Government Improvement Act of 1997 (D.C. Code, sec. 5–

133.17(d)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

‘‘(33) Any other law enforcement agency of the Federal

government that the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department and the United States Attorney for the District of

Columbia deem appropriate to enter into an agreement pursuant to this section.’’.

Approved January 8, 2002.

District of

Columbia Police

Coordination

Amendment Act

of 2001.

Jan. 8, 2002

[H.R. 2199]
#### William Carroll et al., Respondents, *v.*Solomon B. Toplitz, Appellant.

" Appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, entered upon a. verdict.

H. L. Toplitz, for appellant,

Mulqueen & Mulquéen, for respondents.

McCarthy, J.

This case was fairly and, we think:, properly-submitted to the jury.

Upon the question which the jury were to and did pass on, we find no ground for any claim that they have found through prejudice, sympathy or passion arid, therefore, unless there is clearly some error of law, we cannot and will not- disturb the-verdict of the juiy.

It is true that many objections have been taken during the trial, but we do not, after careful examination, find reasonable error.

Oloott, J., concurs.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.
#### § 10.20 “Demand for payment” certification.

Certification to the execution of *demand for payment* forms appearing on the reverse side of adjusted service certificates issued pursuant to the World War Adjusted Compensation Act, as amended, is required in accordance with instructions printed on said forms. Such certification if made in the United States or possessions will be accepted if made by and bearing the official seal of a United States postmaster, an executive officer of an incorporated bank or trust company, notary public, or any person who is legally authorized to administer oaths in a State, Territory, District of Columbia or in a Federal judicial district of the United States. If the demand for payment be executed in a foreign country, the same shall be certified by an American consul, a recognized representative of an American embassy or legation or by a person authorized to administer oaths under the laws of the place where execution of demand is made, provided there be attached to the certificate of such latter officer a proper certification by an accredited official of the State Department of the United States that the officer certifying to the execution of the demand for payment was authorized to administer oaths in the place where certification was made.
###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 2 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 6 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 7 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 1 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 3 pertaining to both patents and trademarks is placed in the grouping pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 4 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 5 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

#### § 11.307 Practitioner as witness.

(a) A practitioner shall not act as advocate at a proceeding before a tribunal in which the practitioner is likely to be a necessary witness unless:

(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue;

(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or

(3) Disqualification of the practitioner would work substantial hardship on the client.

(b) A practitioner may act as advocate in a proceeding before a tribunal in which another practitioner in the practitioner's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by §§ 11.107 or 11.109.
§ 484.45 Condition of participation: Reporting OASIS information. HHAs must electronically report all OASIS data collected in accordance with § 484.55. ( a ) *Standard: Encoding and transmitting OASIS data.* An HHA must encode and electronically transmit each completed OASIS assessment to the CMS system, regarding each beneficiary with respect to which information is required to be transmitted (as determined by the Secretary), within 30 days of completing the assessment of the beneficiary.
( b ) *Standard: Accuracy of encoded OASIS data.* The encoded OASIS data must accurately reflect the patient's status at the time of assessment.
( c ) *Standard: Transmittal of OASIS data.* An HHA must— ( 1 ) For all completed assessments, transmit OASIS data in a format that meets the requirements of paragraph (d) of this section.
( 2 ) Transmit data using electronic communications software that complies with the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS 140-2, issued May 25, 2001) from the HHA or the HHA contractor to the CMS collection site.
( 3 ) Transmit data that includes the CMS-assigned branch identification number, as applicable.
( d ) *Standard: Data Format.* The HHA must encode and transmit data using the software available from CMS or software that conforms to CMS standard electronic record layout, edit specifications, and data dictionary, and that includes the required OASIS data set.
[82 FR 4578, Jan. 13, 2017, as amended at 85 FR 70356, Nov. 4, 2020]
§ 1.914 Collection in installments. ( a ) Whenever feasible, VA shall collect the total amount of a debt in one lump sum. If a debtor is financially unable to pay a debt in one lump sum, VA may accept payment in regular installments. VA should obtain financial statements from debtors who represent that they are unable to pay in one lump sum and independently verify such representations whenever possible. If VA agrees to accept payments in regular installments, VA should obtain a legally enforceable written agreement from the debtor that specifies all of the terms of the arrangement and contains a provision accelerating the debt in the event of default.
( b ) The size and frequency of installment payments should bear a reasonable relation to the size of the debt and the debtor's ability to pay. If possible, the installment payments should be sufficient in size and frequency to liquidate the debt in 3 years or less.
( c ) Security for deferred payments should be obtained in appropriate cases. However, VA may accept installment payments if the debtor refuses to execute a written agreement or to give security.
(Authority: 31 U.S.C. 3711; 38 U.S.C. 501)
[69 FR 62195, Oct. 25, 2004]
Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I
Editorial Note: Part 2 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I
Editorial Note: Part 6 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I
Editorial Note: Part 7 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I
Editorial Note: Part 1 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I
Editorial Note: Part 3 pertaining to both patents and trademarks is placed in the grouping pertaining to patents regulations.

Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I
Editorial Note: Part 4 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I
Editorial Note: Part 5 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

§ 41.35 Jurisdiction over appeal. ( a ) *Beginning of jurisdiction.* Jurisdiction over the proceeding passes to the Board upon the filing of a reply brief under § 41.41 or the expiration of the time in which to file such a reply brief, whichever is earlier.
( b ) *End of jurisdiction.* The jurisdiction of the Board ends when: ( 1 ) The Director or the Board enters a remand order (*see* §§ 41.35(c), 41.35(e), and 41.50(a)(1)),
( 2 ) The Board enters a final decision (*see* § 41.2) and judicial review is sought or the time for seeking judicial review has expired,
( 3 ) An express abandonment which complies with § 1.138 of this title is recognized,
( 4 ) A request for continued examination is filed which complies with § 1.114 of this title,
( 5 ) Appellant fails to take any required action under §§ 41.39(b), 41.50(a)(2), 41.50(b), or 41.50(d), and the Board enters an order of dismissal, or
( 6 ) Appellant reopens prosecution pursuant to § 41.40(b) or in response to a new ground of rejection entered in a decision of the Board (*see* § 41.50(b)(1)).
( c ) *Remand ordered by the Director.* Prior to the entry of a decision on the appeal by the Board (*see* § 41.50), the Director may sua sponte order the proceeding remanded to the examiner.
( d ) *Documents filed during Board's jurisdiction.* Except for petitions authorized by this part, consideration of any information disclosure statement or petition filed while the Board possesses jurisdiction over the proceeding will be held in abeyance until the Board's jurisdiction ends.
( e ) *Administrative remands ordered by the Board.* If, after receipt and review of the proceeding, the Board determines that the file is not complete or is not in compliance with the requirements of this subpart, the Board may relinquish jurisdiction to the examiner or take other appropriate action to permit completion of the file.
[76 FR 72297, Nov. 22, 2011]
### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FORTHE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MONTGOMERY BLAIR SIBLEY, ) ) 

### Plaintiff, ) ) 

### v. ) Civil Case No. 08-1797 (RJL) ) 

### SAMUEL A. ALITO, JR. 

### etal., ) ) 

### Dekndanb. ) )

## ~ MEMORANDUM ORDER

### (June~, 2009) [# 

### 16] Before the Court ispro se 

### plaintiffMontgomery Blair Sibley's motion [Dkt. # 

### 16] to alter or amend its May 15,2009, Order, which denied Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Appeal In Forma Pauperis 

### [Dkt. # 

### 14]. Forthe reasons discussed below, plaintiff's motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Federal Rule ofAppellate Procedure 24(a)(2) requires that when a District Court denies a motion to appeal informapauperis 

### ("IFP"), it must state its reasons in writing. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS plaintiff's motion in part and amends its May 15,2009, Order, which did not contain a statement ofreasons, to include the following explanation. Mr. Sibley is a frequent filer. The issue he sought leave ofthis Court to appeal IFP, i.e., whether claims against Justices and officers ofthe Supreme Court for official acts are barred byjudicial immunity-is not only well settled, but it has been decided against

### Mr. Sibley in a nearlyidentical case he filed previously in thisjurisdiction. See Sibley v. Breyer, No. 07- 5009 (D.C. Cir. May 15,2007) (unpublished opinion) (summarily affirming the District Court's determination thatjudicial immunity barredMr. Sibley's claims against federal Judges and Justices ofthe Supreme Court). Therefore, pursuantto 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(3), the Court certifies that Mr. Sibley's appeal may notproceed IFP because it is not in good faith. See Wooten v. Districto/Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, 129 F.3d 206, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In addition to requesting a statement ofreasons, Mr. Sibley asks thatthe Courtreconsider its decision to deny him leave appeal IFP. Mr. Sibley has provided no basis for reconsideration under Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b)(6), however. 1 Therefore, the portion ofplaintiffs motion that seeks reconsideration ofthe Court's May 15,2009, Order is DENIED. SO ORDERED.

1 See, e.g., Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting "[a] Rule 59(e) motion 'is discretionary' and need not be granted unless the district court finds that there is an 'intervening change ofcontrolling law, the availability ofnew evidence, or the need to correct a clear error orprevent manifest injustice"') (citations omitted); GoodLuckNursingHome, Inc. v. Harris, 636 F.2d 572,577 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that Rule 60(b)(6) applies only to "extraordinary circumstances") (citations omitted).