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i 

58–292 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–88] 

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, 

NUCLEAR, AND HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVES CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL 

THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 28, 2009 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND 

CAPABILITIES 

ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

ERYN ROBINSON, Professional Staff Member 

ALEX KUGAJEVSKY, Professional Staff Member 

ANDREW TABLER, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, July 28, 2009, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and HighYield Explosives Consequence Management ..................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, July 28, 2009 ............................................................................................ 27 

TUESDAY, JULY 28, 2009 

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, AND HIGHYIELD EXPLOSIVES CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Miller, Hon. Jeff, a Representative from Florida, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities ............... 2 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities ............... 1 

WITNESSES 

D’Agostino, Davi M., Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 21 

Heyman, Hon. David, Assistant Secretary for Policy, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security ............................................................................................... 2 

Renuart, Gen. Victor E., Jr., USAF, Commander, U.S. Northern Command 

and North American Aerospace Defense Command ......................................... 6 

Stockton, Hon. Paul N., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 

and Americas’ Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense .......................... 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

D’Agostino, Davi M. .......................................................................................... 64 

Heyman, Hon. David ........................................................................................ 34 

Miller, Hon. Jeff ................................................................................................ 32 

Renuart, Gen. Victor E., Jr. ............................................................................. 56 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 31 

Stockton, Hon. Paul N. ..................................................................................... 45 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, 

AND HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVES CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL

THREATS AND CAPABILITIES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, July 28, 2009. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. SMITH. Good morning. I will call the meeting to order. 

Welcome. 

I have an opening statement that I have submitted for the record 

and will, with unanimous consent, just if we have that read into 

the record, and make a couple of quick comments. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 31.] 

Mr. SMITH. We mostly want to hear from the panel on a very important issue that we are talking about this morning on chemical, 

biological, radiological and nuclear—preventing those attacks on 

the United States. It is a very complicated issue, mainly because 

so many different people are working on it. Trying to make sure 

we keep that coordinated and have a comprehensive strategy that 

maximizes our resources is a challenge, and one that we will always have to work on, and something that is very important for 

this committee. 

And more than anything, we on this committee want to make 

sure that this continues to be a priority within the Department of 

Defense (DOD). I know there are a lot of competing interests, a lot 

of competing challenges—certainly from Afghanistan and Pakistan, 

Iraq, a number of different other issues—that it is easy for this to 

sort of slip a little bit, just because it is not happening immediately, not happening right now. 

It is a big threat that we want to make sure never happens. And 

to do that, I think we need to constantly work as much as possible 

to make sure that this stays a high priority for the Department of 

Defense and for our entire government. And that is the main purpose of our hearing is to get the update this morning on where we 

are at from our witnesses, who I will introduce in a moment. 
2 

But first, I will turn it over to the ranking member, Mr. Miller, 

for any opening comments he might have. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF MILLER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM FLORIDA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate 

you having this timely hearing. I thank the witnesses who are 

going to testify before us today. I have a statement that I would 

also like to have entered into the record. 

But we know that ensuring that DOD can provide a much-needed capability really is the reason that we are here today, and to 

hear testimony from Government Accountability Office (GAO) and 

DOD on the military’s consequent management capability. 

I would like to ask that, as we delve into this critical and important topic, that I would like to hear comments on the national 

strategy and the national military strategy to combat weapons of 

mass destruction, which I am sure we will hear more about. And 

as we noted in this year’s defense bill, there seems to be a divergence in the application of the concepts contained in those strategy 

documents. 

So, I would like to hear your thoughts on what might be lacking, 

what might be effective in our overall plan in organizing to deal 

with this threat. And I look forward to hearing your testimony 

today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller can be found in the Appendix on page 32.] 

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Miller. 

With that, I will introduce the panel, and then I will take you 

left to right. 

We have the Honorable David Heyman, who is the assistant secretary of homeland security for policy in the United States Department of Homeland Security—welcome. 

The Honorable Paul Stockton, who is the assistant secretary of 

defense for homeland defense and America’s security affairs, the 

United States Department of Defense. 

We are joined again also by General Victor ‘‘Gene’’ Renuart, the 

United States Air Force commander of U.S. Northern Command 

(NORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command. 

They don’t give out short titles over at the Pentagon to anybody, 

I don’t think. 

So, welcome. 

Mr. Heyman, we will start with you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID HEYMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. HEYMAN. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Miller, thank 

you for inviting me here today and for the opportunity to address 

you. 

The topic of the hearing is consequence management of chemical, 

biological, radiological, nuclear or high-consequence or high-yield 

explosive attacks—otherwise known as CBRNE. It is a topic that 
3 

sits at the intersection of what I believe are three winding roads: 

the spread of transnational terrorism; the proliferation of nuclear 

weapons; and the advancement and diffusion of biotechnology. 

Our top priority at the department is to secure the American 

people from a range of terrorist threats. Preventing CBRNE attacks is at the core of Department of Homeland Security (DHS)’s 

mission and the reason the department was, in fact, created. So, 

too, is ensuring we are prepared to respond for any attack that 

may occur despite the nation’s best efforts. 

Consequence management is a critical element in our nation’s efforts to ensure that we are resilient in the face of an attack. We 

can be a more resilient nation. The more robust we are, the more 

agile we are responding to an attack, the more rapidly we can recover. 

But I want to stress that, alongside any discussion of our ability 

to respond to and recover from an attack, we need to also talk 

about prevention. Prevention and resiliency are two sides of the 

same coin, or to mix metaphors, they are the yin and yang of the 

nation’s ability to manage risk. 

My testimony, which I will submit for the record, focuses primarily on biological and nuclear threats, because they are particularly of high consequence. Our best CBRNE defense is to put in 

place national and, in some cases, international systems consisting 

of robust prevention, protection, response and recovery capabilities. 

This is not simply a DHS responsibility. It is a national interest, 

requiring a comprehensive, integrated and layered approach, which 

combines the capabilities and resources of many entities across not 

only the federal government, but across levels of society. I have detailed these layers in my written statement. 

As Secretary Napolitano has said, one of our principal priorities 

within the department’s all-hazard mission is to ensure that the 

nation can respond and recover from any incident, including terrorist attacks. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 tasked DHS 

with coordinating the federal government’s civilian efforts to identify and develop countermeasures to CBRNE and other emerging 

terrorist threats. 

A number of national security and homeland security presidential directives, including particularly HSPD–5, the Management 

of Domestic Incidents, further defined the department’s roles and 

responsibilities for consequence management. These authorities are 

also detailed in my written statement. 

When we consider nuclear threats, our emphasis must be primarily on preventing an attack, because the consequences would be 

catastrophic. As such, the nation’s first line of defense against a 

nuclear attack is to ensure the control of nuclear materials and 

prevent the proliferation of nuclear technologies. 

If radiological materials and nuclear weapons cannot be controlled at its source, the next layer is to detect and interdict their 

movement. That is where DHS plays a critical role. 

Should these defenses fail, however, DHS and its partners must 

be ready to respond. Like natural disasters, a terrorist nuclear attack would be handled by the primary response arm of the Department of Homeland Security, and that is the Federal Emergency 
4 

Management Agency, or FEMA. FEMA rapidly deploys to assist 

state and local officials in disaster-stricken areas. 

Unlike radiological and nuclear threats, however, we face a much 

different set of challenges with respect to bio. For biological attacks, the emphasis must be on consequence management and ensuring resiliency, because prevention is more difficult, and there 

are ways we can save lives after an attack to prevent it from becoming catastrophic. 

The biggest building blocks of the nation’s biodefense strategy 

are to detect, to treat, to protect people from the attack, to partner 

with the National Center for Medical Intelligence and, finally, to 

strengthen the public health community at the state and local levels. 

Let me conclude by saying that the challenges of responding to 

high-consequence terrorist attacks are real. Our top priority will always be to mitigate the risk in the best possible way. Prevention 

and consequence management are central elements to our CBRNE 

defense, an approach that requires continued collaboration with our 

federal, state and local and international partners. 

We look forward to continuing to strengthen these partnerships 

and, thus, to improve our nation’s resilience. And we also thank 

the subcommittee for inviting me here today, for its support, as 

DHS continues to carry out this important mission. 

Thank you. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Heyman can be found in the Appendix on page 34.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Stockton. 

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL N. STOCKTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND AMERICAS’ SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Dr. STOCKTON. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Miller, distinguished members of the committee, thanks for the opportunity to 

testify today. 

My formal statement has been submitted to the record. I would 

like to make some brief oral remarks now, to provide a bit of context for the substance that I have put into my prepared statement. 

I want to have a key goal today with you, and that is, begin a 

dialogue that I hope will continue for years to come. Let me say 

a few words about why I hope that is going to be the case. 

It is my responsibility, obviously, to faithfully execute the laws. 

But there is much more at stake here. That is not nearly enough. 

Since well before 9/11, Congress has exercised a leading role in the 

policy realms over which I now have responsibility as assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense and Americas’ security affairs. 

Today’s hearing gives me the opportunity to listen to you and 

learn from your perspectives as I carry out my policy responsibilities in support of the undersecretary for policy, the deputy secretary and Secretary Gates, and, most importantly, as we all work 

together to help strengthen the security of the United States. 

Let me say a few words about the importance of the missions 

that we are going to be discussing today. 
5 

The U.S. government’s preeminent national security goal is to 

prevent a CBRNE attack on the United States. But as David 

Heyman just mentioned—and as you did, Mr. Chairman, in your 

opening remarks—we also have to be prepared for the eventuality 

that, despite our best prevention efforts, our adversaries will succeed in conducting an attack. 

So, today, as we examine how DOD can best support preparedness for CBRNE response, a key word that I keep in mind here is 

that of support. DOD is going to be in support of civil authorities 

in responding to catastrophic natural or manmade disasters when 

directed by the President or as authorized by the secretary of defense. 

At the federal level, this means being in support of DHS and the 

other lead federal agencies. But it is also important to remember 

that federal civil authorities aren’t the only ones who are vital in 

response and preparedness. Governors, mayors, county executives, 

state and local contribution to preparedness in response for disasters is absolutely vital. It is enshrined in our Constitution. And we 

take that support role very, very seriously at the Department of 

Defense. 

It is something I thought a lot about as an academic, and now 

that I have the honor of serving here, something I am going to continue to take very, very seriously. 

Let me close by offering a few words of thanks. First of all, 

thanks to all of you for keeping the heat on, for creating the position that I now have the privilege to occupy. Thank you for the creation of National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) civil 

support teams, and then many other initiatives on which Congress 

took the lead that have helped strengthen the nation. 

Secondly, I want to take a moment to thank the brave women 

and men in uniform today for serving both in far-off places, like Afghanistan and Iraq, but also here at home, whether it is defending 

our skies in Operation Nobel Eagle, or whether it is assisting first 

responders in dealing with fires, earthquakes or other natural hazards. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Stockton can be found in the Appendix on page 45.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

General Renuart. 

I should point out for you, and I didn’t mention this in the opening, we do have a second panel, or a second person as the second 

panel. It is a panel of one, I guess. Ms. D’Agostino is going to be 

testifying from the Defense Capabilities and Management from the 

GAO’s office. So, we will go through this round. That is for members’ information as much as anybody’s. 

We will do questions with you and then move on to the next 

panel. 

Go ahead, General. 
6 

STATEMENT OF GEN. VICTOR E. RENUART, JR., USAF, COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND 

General RENUART. Well, Mr. Chairman, good morning. It is great 

to be back with you again. I appreciate the support that we have 

had from this committee over the years of my tenure. 

Members of the committee, I am particularly pleased to have a 

chance to join my two colleagues here, Dr. Stockton and Dr. 

Heyman, in participating in this important opportunity to describe 

a national capability that is critical to our future. 

It is also an opportunity to say thanks to our young men and 

women each day who are wearing the cloth of our nation, both defending the homeland here and deployed, as you mentioned early 

on, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, in your comments as 

we began the hearing. 

As commander of NORTHCOM, I am assigned two principal missions: that of providing for military defense of our homeland 

against nation-state threats and non-nation-state threats; and to 

support civil authorities, when directed, with unique DOD capabilities in times of crisis. 

Our role in responding to a crisis such an attack involving 

CBRNE materials is to provide trained and ready consequence 

management response forces, when requested from those civil authorities, as Dr. Stockton mentioned, to save lives and help mitigate pain and suffering. The specialized response force teams augment the consequence management efforts of state and local first 

responders, of the National Guard when called to duty by their governors, and of other federal agencies. 

We provide complementary and unique capabilities as a followon line of defense, as it were, only when the effects of the first responders are exceeded—I am sorry, the capabilities of the first responders are exceeded. 

Our efforts at NORTHCOM to prepare forces to assist in the 

aftermath of a CBRNE event are part of a combined national response framework. Our collaboration with federal and state partners, with governors, with the National Guard, are all key to this 

homeland response strategy and to our level of preparedness, as 

well. 

We also partner actively and aggressively with our colleagues in 

the Department of Homeland Security, particularly with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to prepare for—and I stress 

‘‘to prepare for’’—these kinds of events, so that we can respond rapidly to minimize loss of life and property. 

At NORTHCOM we train hard to ensure our operational readiness, and our mission effectiveness in executing this mission are always at the best they could be. We cannot delay our ability to defend our nation against any threat. We cannot delay our planning 

efforts to mitigate the threat of an attack on our nation. 

We will keep up the momentum, remain alert, and partner with 

all of our other mission partners to anticipate and prepare for possible crisis. We don’t have the luxury in the homeland of longterm—of long lead time in many cases. Whether it is Mother Nature or the potential for a terrorist attack, the response must be 

of high quality, and it must be immediate. 
7 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to be here today. 

And we look forward to your questions as well. 

[The prepared statement of General Renuart can be found in the 

Appendix on page 56.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

We will follow the five-minute rule in questioning. We should 

have plenty of time, so if members have more questions than that, 

we will go around and do a second round. But I find it best to keep 

it to the five-minute rule in terms of moving the conversation forward. 

Dr. Heyman, I want to start with you in terms of the coordination efforts. Could you give us a picture of who all you are coordinating basically within this effort up front at preventing the attacks in the first place? 

What other agencies are principally involved? How are those responsibilities divided up? And then, following up on that, I would 

be interested to get your perspectives on how well that is working 

and how it could be better coordinated. 

Mr. HEYMAN. Sure. Thank you for the question. At the centerpiece of our coordination effort is Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive–5 (HSPD–5), which describes the domestic incident system. That management of the crisis is the principal responsibility 

of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Homeland Security. 

The ability to do that starts with our national operations center, 

which continually monitors potential major disasters. 

Mr. SMITH. And I am sorry—are you talking here—you are talking here about responding to disasters, as opposed to prevention. 

Mr. HEYMAN. I am talking about responding. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Do that, and I am interested in prevention, 

too, as well, but go ahead. 

Mr. HEYMAN. Okay. Sure. On the response side, on the consequence management side, the department continues to monitor 

potential disasters and emergencies. And when advance warning is 

received, DHS may deploy, in coordination with other federal agencies, liaison officers and personnel to states that may require assistance. 

If there is a determination that there is a need for additional resources, and the disaster is declared, the department coordinates 

all of the federal family. 

And the central centerpiece of this is something called the emergency support functions. There are 15 of them, and they have various capabilities that are required for responding to a crisis to include communications, to include debris removal, mass medical 

care and such. 

The federal family all play roles in each of those support functions, including the Department of Defense. There are also sort of 

state and nongovernmental entities that are involved in response 

as well. So the department has a broad reach in coordinating the 

response. 

Mr. SMITH. And two quick follow ups to that. One, so that is for 

whatever the disaster is, even beyond—and occasionally I miss an 

initial here, but CBRNE—even beyond that, like if there was, you 

know, a natural disaster, but also disease—you know, we are very 
8 

concerned about the swine flu and the way that is going—if there 

was a big huge outbreak, DHS would be at the theater that with 

FEMA’s well, no matter the disaster, and the different agencies 

that you plug in, depending on what the specific threat is. Is that? 

Mr. HEYMAN. That is correct. We have an all hazards approach, 

whether it is a natural disaster or a deliberate attack. The department has taken leadership role in domestic—management of domestic incident. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. And what about on the preventions side? This 

may be more DOD that we are talking to, so Dr. Stockton, feel free 

to jump in, or General Renuart. 

But what is sort of the coordinating agencies that are most looking out there, trying to figure out how to prevent that specifically— 

obviously, you can’t prevent a hurricane—CBRNE attacks? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Well, I will take the first answer on that, that I 

think it is the—what you have to do is look at each of these separately. And I focused on nuclear and biological. 

On nuclear on the prevention side, we sort of have a layered defense approach. The government looks at controlling nuclear material as a first line of defense, so that they don’t fall into the hands 

of those who would seek to do harm. 

There are a number of agencies that are leading that effort. The 

Department of Energy has a role to play. The Department of State 

has a role to play. The Department of Defense has a role to play. 

Nunn-Lugar legislation is one of the governing authorities on protecting from materials going—— 

Mr. SMITH. Does any one of those groups have the lead? I know 

when I have traveled internationally recently, there has been—you 

know, DHS has shown up in different embassies, depending on the 

issue, and there is, you know, consternation—basically, people trying to figure out, okay, where does DHS fit within the traditional 

State Department role and the traditional DOD role? 

Focusing on this aspect of it on nonproliferation, actually, who is 

leading that effort? And then how is that support group put together? 

Mr. HEYMAN. So the proliferation security initiative, which is led 

by the State Department, really tries to be an umbrella for including most of these activities as coordinated not just with the federal 

government, but on the international level. And other nations contribute to what is a large international effort to stem the spread 

of the nuclear material and nuclear weapons. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. I will follow up with this later on. I will respect the five-minute time and recognize Mr. Miller for five minutes. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Heyman, you know Florida prepares every year for a very 

long hurricane season, and so we are accustomed to coordinating 

working with the federal agencies on natural disasters. But what 

I would like for you to talk about is how DHS manages CBRNE 

incidents—a CBRNE incident compared with a natural disaster. 

Mr. HEYMAN. It is a good question. And let me just thank the 

state of Florida for our new FEMA director, who is a—— 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, you got a good one. 
9 

Mr. HEYMAN. We are very grateful to have them here. In fact, 

I thank him this morning for giving me the opportunity to testify 

instead of him. 

Mr. MILLER. Let the record reflect that Mr. Fugate did not report 

to where he should have been. 

Mr. HEYMAN. On the distinction between CBRNE attacks and all 

other hazards is slight. We actually do have the design of our nation’s ability to respond to these type of attacks goes through the 

national response framework and, as I said, our domestic incident 

preparedness concept. 

The distinction between the CBRNE attack and other hazards is 

the notion is the notion that they are deliberate and therefore require potentially additional interdiction or attribution. As a consequence of that, in some—in those instances, you would have additional work, perhaps by the FBI, Justice Department, in leadership roles looking at those two particular aspects. 

Mr. MILLER. And, Dr. Stockton, Research and Development 

(R&D) investments are crucial, if you will, to the advancement of 

the technologies for CBRNE consequences management. How does 

DOD spread that across the, I guess, the system, if you will, the 

investment of those R&D dollars? 

Dr. STOCKTON. The under secretary of defense for acquisition 

technology and logistics provides overall oversight to make sure 

that the priority needs for response are going to be addressed by 

the research and development community. So he is in the lead on 

the civilian side. 

Very important, the Joint Staff also has a joint requirements office for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense. These 

acronyms are going to kill me at some point. And they ensure coordination to make sure that from the armed services perspective, 

the R&D requirements are going to be met. 

We also coordinate very closely with our interagency partners 

across the spectrum, including DHS, but also the Department of 

Energy, our other federal partners. And let me emphasize also that 

we exercise frequently for these response requirements so we can 

discover unmet needs, we can figure out how DOD’s research and 

development capabilities can best be harnessed to serve the 

CBRNE response. 

Mr. MILLER. Thanks. 

And, General, how does NORTHCOM coordinate intelligence 

sharing and operational planning activities with other DOD organizations and with other agencies in response to a CBRNE incident? 

General RENUART. Well, Mr. Miller, I would even like to jump 

back before the event to talk about that, because I think it also 

gets to both of your questions about prevention. 

This partnership in intelligence sharing is critical to prevention 

for these kinds of events. We have an active role to play each day 

as a member of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). 

We and the United States Special Operations Command 

(USSOCOM) have invested intelligence and operations analysts to 

sit in these organizations each day, looking to reach into that network of proliferators and potential users of a weapon of mass effect 

for terrorist activities. 
10 

We have a partnership not only with NCTC, but with the FBI’s 

Joint Terrorism Task Force. We work very closely with the Department of Energy with DTRA, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 

on the technical capability of some parties to take advantage of, to 

use, and then maybe to weaponize some of these kinds of agents 

or nuclear materials. 

So that partnership with both law enforcement and with the intelligence communities has allowed us to become much more 

proactive ahead of one of these events. Certainly, when an event 

occurs, if it were to occur, again DOD has a supporting role, but 

a very key supporting role. 

For example, the FBI has the responsibility for the recapture and 

recovery of nuclear material that may have been stolen. We provide 

very significant support for the FBI—in fact, have exercised that 

in our last spring Ardent Sentry exercise. 

We work very closely with the FBI on the attribution. An event 

like this becomes a crime scene to a degree, and it is important for 

the FBI and other law enforcement agencies to be able to capture 

the evidence so that we can begin to attribute. 

So this interagency partnership is one that is critical to our success, and we play a very active role on a day-to-day basis with 

them. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Stockton, you began by addressing yourself to the chairman 

and the ranking member and the distinguished members, and I 

found myself wondering whether or not you were talking with me 

as well. I kind of doubted that. 

This is slightly off topic, but it would be helpful to me to have 

your thoughts on the value in preparedness for these kinds of problems of having a secure power on base—on military bases scattered 

throughout the United States. 

The House version of the bill at my request—this year’s authorization bill at my request has a provision requiring that DOD study 

the possibility of installing nuclear power on military installations. 

The intent is to explore the possibility of public-private partnerships that would both enhance the independence and security function that military bases can provide, with secure power available, 

despite what catastrophe might occur, and at the same time try 

and address energy independence and affordable energy, because 

the power plants presumably would feed back into the grid from 

military bases. 

And I would like your thoughts on—you know, we are extremely 

familiar with this; at least in the Navy we have been doing this for 

50 years with no incident—thoughts on smaller nuclear plants that 

are hardened against various attacks—Electromagnetic Pulse 

(EMP) comes to mind—and what benefit that provides us. 

During Katrina, it seems to me that it would have been nice to 

have some secure power plants in the region that was just—where 

power was knocked out for days at a time. 

Dr. STOCKTON. Thank you, Congressman Marshall. 
11 

It is an especially important question for me to address, because 

in my responsibilities as assistant secretary of defense, I am also 

responsible for defense critical infrastructure protection and ensuring the ability of the United States military to execute its core mission. 

And if there is no power, it is very difficult to do so. In fact, it 

would be catastrophic in terms of our ability to execute our core 

mission. 

So ensuring the reliability of power through the bulk power system, through backup power systems that would deal with the 

eventualities of either natural catastrophes are potentially attacks 

on that power system—that is a priority. 

And I want to thank you for calling everybody’s attention to it 

that—you and your colleagues both this year and in years past. 

In terms of the particular ways in which best providing for the 

reliability of the flow power to the Department of Defense facilities 

and also, as you point out, finding ways of leveraging such investments so they benefit the civilian economy as well, especially because so much of the Department of Defense depends on our private sector for the execution of our core mission, I think it is terrific to look for the dual advantages of investment in terms of—in 

particular, how to accomplish this goal of reliability and resilience 

in the flow of power. 

I don’t yet have a lot of expertise on that issue, but I sure do welcome the attention that you and your colleagues are helping to 

focus on this issue, which is absolutely vital for our ability to assure the execution of DOD missions. 

Mr. MARSHALL. As the language now stands, I don’t know that 

it encourages DOD to think about this particular aspect. Well, I 

think it does, but in any event I would hope that perhaps you could 

add your voice within DOD, encouraging DOD to be thinking about 

these kinds of benefits associated with independent secure power 

on our military installations. 

Dr. STOCKTON. I will do so, sir. Thank you. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Good. Thank you. 

Mr. Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here and for your testimony and 

addressing our questions. I am still sort of grappling, and I think 

all of us are at one level or another, with the fundamental question 

of who is in charge. 

I know when I was out, General, visiting with your predecessor, 

Admiral Keating, at NORTHCOM, I was very impressed by the 

sort of interagency presence that was there and plans that were either developed or being developed and being put on the shelf. I am 

sure they are all completed and ready to go now. But the question 

is still sort of troubling. 

Dr. Heyman, you said at one time there are a number of agencies 

leading that effort. And the chairman sort of followed up and said, 

‘‘Well, who really is in the lead,’’ because if there are a number of 

agencies leading, I would argue that nobody is really leading. 

There is nobody in charge. 
12 

And in the case of the DOD assets—gosh, we have a lot of them, 

and that is a pretty good thing, I suppose—we have the National 

Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, the National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages, the 

DOD CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force, the Joint 

Task Force Civil Support Program. 

And again, we always have these Title 10 sort of questions. 

When are these forces federal and when are they state? When do 

they work for the governor? When do they work for the general? 

And looking in particularly at the CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force, which is fundamentally a pretty large force 

when you put it all together, I am looking at the notes here, frankly prepared by the quite excellent staff, that point out that originally these CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces 

were to be assigned to U.S. NORTHCOM, and now they are being 

allocated to NORTHCOM. 

And so again, it is a question of who is in charge when. And I 

am wondering, General, if you could talk about why that change 

and the impact it might have? Does it lessen your ability to influence these forces to make sure they are trained and prepared? 

Could you address that change for me, please? 

General RENUART. Yes, sir. Happy to. And thank you for the 

question. 

Important to note that the forces you described, the civil support 

teams (CST), the CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package 

(CERFP) and that acronym, and then the Consequence Management Response Force are not designed to be stand-alone forces, but 

really are designed to integrate with each other as the size of the 

event grows. 

Very small events, and we have—technically, CBRNE events 

occur almost every day in our country, and those small Civil Support Teams travel out on behalf of the governor to do the assessment and identification of the agent and begin to recommend initial mitigation actions. 

And those are done, if you will, under the command of the local 

first responder—that fire chief, that police chief, the mayor. As the 

event is seen to be more significant, the governor has the ability 

to pull in that large—next larger team, the CERFP. 

Those are guardsmen in state active duty status. They could also 

be in Title 32 funding, but still under the command of the governor, to provide sort of the next layer of muscle if the event grows. 

And then finally, if there is need for—and I must add if all—at 

the same time these military forces are being employed, that 

FEMA and DHS have similarly configured civilian first responders. 

So this becomes additive as we see the significance of the event 

occur. 

Finally, if we approach a catastrophic type of event—we talked 

about nuclear, but there could be other types—this Consequence 

Management Response Force (CCMRF), which is fairly robust, 

could come in then to provide sustainability over longer periods of 

time for larger casualties for a broader event. 

The command, if you will, of those state forces rests with the 

governor and continues to do that. Both the federal military and 

the federal civilian responders come at the request of the governor 
13 

really to support the needs of that state, but bring capability that 

the governor does not have in his quiver, if you will. 

Those military forces stay under the command of U.S. Northern 

Command, and they are there in support of those lead agencies— 

federal and state agencies. So command is not ever a question. It 

is how you integrate the control and the execution of those operations on the ground. 

To your specific question of assigned versus allocated—sorry I 

am long-winded sometimes, Mr. Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. It is all right. So my time has turned to red, but as 

long as the chairman will let you answer, I am a happy guy. 

Mr. SMITH. Go ahead. Please do. Yes. No, go ahead. 

General RENUART. And I appreciate—— 

Mr. SMITH. We have plenty of time. Go ahead. 

General RENUART [continuing]. Mr. Chairman, the ability to continue. 

But in terms of assigned versus allocated, in a perfect world 

every commander would like all of their forces assigned to them. 

We are in a very busy time in our nation right now, and we are 

using forces in many ways, and in some cases ways they were not 

originally designed for. 

And so we have—the secretary and the chairman have adjusted 

this assignment process to something called allocated with operational control. The bottom line is it allows me to get access to 

those forces at—when I need them. It allows me to have training 

and readiness oversight of them. It allows me to make an input on 

funding for them, if funding is an issue. 

But they can also be used—they are not technically assigned to 

me for the administrative process. I have no difficulty with that 

today. And given the circumstances that we have with the demands 

on our forces, it is appropriate to continue that. But that is—maybe 

it is a nuance difference in the assignment versus the allocation. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you. I would suggest it is perhaps a tad more 

than nuance, but thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

A couple of other questions. I know we have the Government Accountability Office (GAO) testifying afterwards, but I want to get 

your comments, and perhaps both General Renuart, Dr. Stockton, 

about DOD’s plans on consequence management in this area. 

A GAO report basically finds those points are—they are being 

worked on, but they are incomplete. They have not actually finished, you know, integrating them fully into what Homeland Security and others are doing. I just wonder if you could comment on 

the progress of that and your thoughts on the GAO report. 

General RENUART. Just very quickly, sir, the GAO’s—the GAO 

has a—it is fair to say that the progress is mixed in certain areas. 

We have done a great deal of work in partnership with DHS on 

each of those planning scenarios. 

The integrated planning system that we are now using as the 

benchmark has been in existence formally for just about a year and 

a half, and so we are still building some momentum in that regard. 
14 

Having said that, Secretary Chertoff and now Secretary Napolitano have invested in significant ways in creating the planning capacity within DHS that can partner with the DOD in these areas. 

And I am actually very comfortable that we have made great 

progress over the last year in particular to begin to complete actually a number of those plans. And I think we are well on the road 

to complete the remainder in a very short period of time. 

Dr. STOCKTON. Let me just support what General Renuart has 

just said, but also emphasize that across the board, we are looking 

for opportunities and acting on them to strengthening the planning 

process to build integration. And that is true not only within the 

federal family, but with our state and local partners as well. 

The Integrated Planning System (IPS) is a key vehicle for this. 

Is IPS perfect now? No. We are just standing it up. We are looking 

forward to making improvements, but we have terrific partners at 

DHS and building on the foundation that we currently have today 

and doing more to integrate and complete the process that is now 

under way. 

Mr. SMITH. I have one other specific question about the response 

side, and it has long been a frustration. You know, certainly, it was 

present in 9/11. It was also present in Katrina that when a largescale disaster like this hits, the communications, the ability 

through cell phones, walkie-talkies, whatever communication system. 

And there have been a number of technologies out there that attempt to prioritize this. I am aware of a couple of them that basically set it up so that in the emergency you can instantly get, you 

know, your—you know, the people who need to be able to communicate with each other will have priority, will be able to do that, 

and that they will also be integrated just in general, so the fire department can talk to the police department can talk to the National Guard can talk to DOD. 

There has long been a frustration that while this technology exists, that it is seemingly very slow in the appointment as of last 

report. And I am just wondering if anyone of you would like to give 

an update on that. 

Mr. HEYMAN. I actually am—I would have to get back to you on 

that one. I am familiar with the prioritization. There is a system 

in place to prioritize communications during a crisis, which the department has led on. 

And there are also additionally—in order to restore communications, we have put in place pre-authorized contracts to ensure that 

communications amongst first responders and other officials are established rapidly in a priority way. 

Mr. SMITH. When you say there is a system in place on the front 

end, I mean, are you confident right now? I mean, pick a random 

city, you know, Denver. You know, if there is a big huge incident 

there, are all the key players in that area, you know, linked into 

a system that would enable them to communicate with one another 

in an emergency? 

Mr. HEYMAN. So the answer—the answer is yes, but the way that 

that goes forward is both in terms of our public-private partnership 

and our relationship with the private sector that has communications, as well as federal communication systems as well, including 
15 

the Department of Defense, that support our ability to put in place 

rapidly, within the first 48 to 72 hours, communications. And I can 

get you some more details on that. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes, I would be very interested, because a lot—as I 

understand it, a lot of this technology is stuff that, you know, needs 

to be, you know, implemented now, obviously. 

And some of it is, you know, in a crisis situation, you know, systems are down. There is limited bandwidth. All of a sudden, you 

know, everybody is on the phone for one thing. You know, how do 

we make sure that the people who really need to be on the phone 

can be? Is that in place? 

And the other piece of it is more upfront. You know, there are 

a lot of different hardware and software systems that are spread 

out amongst the various different organizations, and they may or 

may not be able to talk to one another. I know some cities, some 

counties in my area have bought technology that enables them 

mainly through software, so they don’t have to change the hardware. Software enables them to be able to do that. 

But I would be interested in if you could, you know, get back to 

the committee on specific answers on how—what sort of progress 

we have made on these two technologies. That would be great. 

Mr. Miller. 

Mr. MILLER. I think Mr. McIntyre would like to go into this for 

his round of questions. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Go ahead. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. I am fine. You go ahead. 

Mr. MILLER. Just one quick question to the general. What protocols have to be met for NORTHCOM to become involved in a 

CBRNE event? 

General RENUART. Mr. Miller, I think the—as we have mentioned earlier, we come at the request of the governor and the lead 

federal agency. 

And so there is a process that would be activated upon an event 

occurring, where the state emergency manager and the governor 

would make a determination that the size or consequences of this 

particular event were large enough that the state and their emergency management assistance partners, those Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) partners, may not have the capacity. 

At the same time, the governor would go to the President with 

a request for a disaster declaration, which, as you know, frees resources to begin to support the state. 

But in terms of NORTHCOM in particular, as soon as the event 

occurs, we establish contact with the adjutant general in the state. 

We establish contact with our FEMA region director. We have a defense coordinating officer, who sits with that FEMA region director 

so that we begin to get a sense if this event is growing large 

enough for rapidly enough that there may be a need for DOD support. 

Mr. MILLER. What happens—and I am going to ruffle some feathers by asking this question—if the governor and the local officials 

don’t get it. They absolutely have become overwhelmed, as they did 

with Katrina, and don’t make the call quick enough. 
16 

General RENUART. Well, Mr. Miller, I think the President ultimately has a responsibility for the nation to make a determination 

of the speed at which some event is unfolding. That is not a 

NORTHCOM decision. 

My role is to ensure that, if I am asked, I have all the pieces in 

place to be supportive. So, I would defer to the national leadership 

to make a policy decision on the ability of an individual state. That 

is not really mine to call. 

What we try to do is look at each of the states, and in each of 

the regions, to understand where they have shortfalls and limitations in equipment, in expertise, in planning capacity, and then try 

to help them up front before an event occurs to be as successful as 

they can. 

How things unfold under pressure is really more a national issue 

to deal with. 

Mr. MILLER. And I understand, but you led the answer to your 

question by saying that the call would be made by the governor 

and—— 

General RENUART. I understand. 

Mr. MILLER [continuing]. With individuals. And that is why I 

wanted to drill down. 

Mr. Chairman, that is all. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. McIntyre. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Just one question, Mr. Chairman. 

Can you tell us, General, in specific, what kind of exercises have 

occurred that have tested the consequence management system? 

I know occasionally, maybe one city might do some type of exercise. But can you tell us specifically what exercises have been done, 

and whether or not they have been done in such a way that they 

could serve as an example for yet other cities, who may not have 

done them, to follow? 

General RENUART. Mr. McIntyre, absolutely. And this is an area 

that I think is not well understood by many. 

There is a very detailed and layered exercise program that exercises each of these elements of the consequence management system repeatedly. And I will just give you a couple of examples. 

On behalf of the National Guard, U.S. Northern Command managed the Vigilant Guard exercise. And these are conducted in 

states by the National Guards of each individual state. They are 

supported by U.S. Northern Command with evaluators and certifiers, and those kinds of folks, who specifically look at our consequence management civil support teams and the CERFPs in each 

state. 

Those are done at the request of the states, so they are not on 

a recurring basis. But each year we conduct about seven or eight 

of those around the country. 

Secondly, we have the training and readiness oversight for the 

CSTs, as well. So, they actually have a periodic certification exercise that we conduct through U.S. Army North and their consequence management evaluation team. 

The follow-on piece, the large-scale piece, is the exercise of the 

so-called consequence management response forces. In the last 

year, as you know, we brought the first one into operational status. 
17 

Prior to that operational determination, we had a series of small 

unit to large unit exercises and training programs that allowed the 

leaders and allowed the individual soldiers and airmen, sailors, to 

practice the skills that they would need. 

We then conducted a consolidated command and control exercise, 

so that we had an integrated opportunity to test and evaluate decision-makers from the headquarters down to the small unit commanders. 

Finally, twice each year we have an exercise, one called Vigilant 

Shield, one called Ardent Sentry, which are designed to test some 

or all elements of the consequence management response forces at 

a deployed location. 

This past year, we conducted a no-notice—a number of no-notice 

deployment exercises, so that we tested the ability of each unit to 

pack up its stuff, in some cases to have it prepositioned already, 

to move it to airlift heads, and then to move to a location where 

the exercise would occur. We have done that twice this year. 

As we approach the new fiscal year, we have two large-scale exercises for the new consequence management response forces that 

will come on line. And we will physically deploy a full CCMRF— 

that 4,500 size force—to a location well away from their home stations, to exercise for an extended period of time in a catastrophic 

event. 

We have partnered these with the national exercise program that 

DHS leads, so that we also get national level policymakers involved 

in the decision process as we go through these scenarios. 

So, I think we have developed a layered and very well thoughtout exercise program—very different from what we had just a few 

years ago. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, I am heartened to hear about the exercise. It addresses 

the issue that I was getting at earlier, that if these forces are allocated, not assigned, do you still have the ability to train and exercise the forces. It sounds like you do, certainly with the exercise 

schedule. 

I hope that the individual training that goes with that is proceeding, as well, and that you are providing oversight for that, for 

these forces that are not assigned to you and presumably are stationed elsewhere, but are allocated to you. 

But seriously, I am heartened by the response to Mr. McIntyre’s 

question. 

I want to kind of follow up, because I am still grappling with the 

‘‘who’s in charge’’ question. And Mr. Miller asked the question, 

what if the governor or the local authorities simply aren’t responding, they are incapable, or sort of don’t understand the magnitude. 

Another way to get at this problem is, what if you have an event, 

CBRNE event, that I can think of at least one major city where you 

might have four or five states involved, presumably Pennsylvania 

and New Jersey, perhaps Delaware or Maryland. Pretty easily you 

could get four or five states involved instantly. 

Who is in charge? 
18 

To anybody here, are the procedures in place to make that—presumably, the President can be in charge at any time. But is there 

an established series of steps to address that? 

Mr. HEYMAN. There are a number of triggers by law that set in 

motion when the federal government gets involved. If a—in addition to a governor requesting aid, a Stafford Act declaration can be 

made along a number of different paths: if one federal agency requests it, if a multiple number of federal agencies are involved in 

the response, if the President determines that it is a natural—an 

emergency and an emergency declaration is required. 

States have an interest, obviously, in declaring a Stafford Act 

emergency, because it means that federal resources can start to 

flow to the state. And it is a mechanism I think that has worked 

quite well. 

In terms of how assignments go out as the department begins 

crisis management and consequence response, there is a standard 

mechanism called the ‘‘mission assignment,’’ which goes through 

these emergency support functions I laid out earlier, 15 different 

support functions, that have basic functionality that is required for 

managing the crisis and reestablishing elements of society—things 

like firefighting, mass care, housing, human services, medical surge 

capacity, et cetera. 

The mission assignment is the vehicle that is used by FEMA in 

a Stafford Act disaster or declaration. And it gets your response 

going. It goes out to the different agencies that would have the 

lead. For example, the Army Corps of Engineers has the lead for 

emergency support in debris removal, and they would take it from 

there. 

The same thing for any kind of relationship with the Defense Department. There are mission assignments that go out. The secretary of defense reviews them to make sure those do not conflict 

with readiness of the forces. And we have operated under that for 

a number of years. 

Mr. KLINE. General. 

General RENUART. Mr. Kline, I might follow up, just maybe an 

example that is very close to home, the I–35 bridge collapse in Minnesota. 

Mr. KLINE. Great example. 

General RENUART. The process that we describe sounds bureaucratic and cumbersome. In point of fact, within about two hours of 

Governor Pawlenty’s phone call to the Secretary of Transportation, 

who then went to the President, who went to the Secretary of Defense, who came to me, we had those Navy divers moving within 

a matter of two hours after that was complete. So, the process can 

work very quickly. 

And the difference between Katrina and today, is we have established the relationships among those participating partners, those 

other agencies of government, such that we can compress that response time down to hours and minutes, as opposed to days. 

We did a spectacular job after Katrina of moving 72,000 uniformed military to Louisiana. The challenge is, we had no plans to 

integrate them. We had not done the spade work ahead of time, so 

that we knew who would be coordinating these activities. 
19 

Mr. KLINE. If I can, I see that my time is about to—I appreciate 

that. And it was a good example. It took really a couple of days before the President talked to Mary Peters, the Secretary of Transportation, who then talked to the Secretary of the Navy, who came 

back to you. 

But I guess, once you made that call, it was a matter of a couple 

of hours. But it took some time to get there. 

And just one more time on who is in charge, Dr. Heyman said 

that the DOD or Guard had responsibility for—had the lead for debris removal. But at some point, there is a competition for resources. And somebody has to be in charge to say, ‘‘No, no. You 

can’t have those cranes and that equipment for debris removal. We 

need it for rescue operations over here.’’ 

And as these things grow in size and you have multiple states, 

somebody has to be in charge. Whether it is the director of FEMA, 

or NORTHCOM, somebody has to make that resource allocation. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

And one question, I know we were talking primarily about consequence management after the fact, how you respond. But as long 

as I have you here, the prevention piece is something that I am 

also interested in, and I asked a little bit about earlier. 

And General Renuart, I would be interested in your comments on 

the level of coordination on that, because this is a very, very complicated thing. Obviously, a lot of the prevention of these type of 

attacks happens overseas with some of the nonproliferation work, 

tracking the terrorist groups that might be inclined to launch such 

an attack. 

And then, a lot of it happens within the U.S., as well. And as 

NORTHCOM commander, preventing those sorts of attacks is, I am 

sure, right up at the top of your list of priorities. 

How do you plug in to that entire system of all of the different 

pieces that are involved with prevention, including FBI, other aspects of our intelligence community? And how satisfied are you in 

terms of the level of coordination, in terms of it is clear who is in 

charge of what, and how coordinated it all is? 

General RENUART. Mr. Chairman, again to sort of beat this 

drum, we do most of these things in support of a federal agency 

or to defend against a nation-state. And so, that requires a partnership with other combatant commands around the world. 

We share intelligence. We have a daily counterterrorist intelligence video teleconference (VTC) that we use to share information 

with Central Command (CENTCOM), for example, on terrorist elements that may be resident in their area of operations. And then, 

we work with our intelligence partners to study the networks, the 

links, that might bring them back here to the homeland. 

The partners who sit in that are not just military. We also have 

the FBI, as I mentioned. We have all of the intelligence agencies 

of our government. 

And that is an active discussion, sharing information, but also 

arguing points back and forth, so that we try to make sure we have 

asked the tough questions of how an event in Southwest Asia may 

relate to proliferation, may relate to a terrorist threat here in the 

homeland—with the intent being that we can interdict that chain 
20 

somewhere outside our borders, we prevent an attack from occurring here in our country. 

That is not just a DOD effort. How we participate in that is 

through each of these collaborative analysis activities, and by raising questions and concerns that I have about a particular element 

of threat. We have talked about CBRNE events here, so bioresearch, protection and security of nuclear materials in other 

countries. 

I drive my intel team to go out and find that information. But 

that is resident in other agencies of government. And that is the 

kind of integrated collaboration we try to participate in. 

Mr. SMITH. I think—yes, and that would be a piece, you know. 

Mr. Kline was talking about who is in charge. And there are a lot 

of different pieces to tracking particular individuals. But in this 

area in particular, it would be tracking specific threats with the 

chem-bio-nuclear area. 

And then, of all those different people, I mean, if a threat comes 

up, we think, you know—I don’t know. If some chemical agent has 

been stolen in large quantities from some place, and it links in 

with some terrorists who we think might be in the United States, 

you know, at that point, I mean, you are there. FBI is there. Homeland security is there. 

But who is the person who would then say, ‘‘I am managing 

these resources, okay. You are doing this. You are doing that. You 

are doing the other thing,’’ to respond to this specific threat? 

General RENUART. Sir, just very quickly, this exercise we just 

completed is a good example of your question. It simulated a terrorist organization who had gained access to nuclear material in 

our country. 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has the lead responsibility. 

But DHS partners with that. We partner with that. DOD has some 

unique technical capabilities that are exercised in support of that. 

So we have worked out those relationships and procedures ahead 

of the event. And in this particular exercise, we actually live deployed the FBI team, the DOD teams from home station to Wyoming to conduct this exercise in real time. 

So, very positive experience, and the command and control communications all worked very, very well. 

So, I think we are forcing ourselves to practice those scenarios 

and make them realistic. 

Mr. SMITH. And ultimately, I think that is what works best is integration, is getting to know each other and working together 

through various collaborative processes. And there are a lot of different ways to do that. That is critical. 

I have nothing further. Does anyone else have any further questions for this panel? Okay. 

Thank you very much for your testimony. I really appreciate you 

coming here today. 

And we will stay in touch. 

Next up, we have Ms. Davi—and I am just not going to be able 

to pronounce it. D’Agostino, I believe, is somewhere in the neighborhood. And you can correct me once you—once we are cleared out 

here and you can have your seat. 
21 

For the members’ information, Ms. D’Agostino is going to be the 

one testifying. Mr. Kirschbaum, Mr. Anderson are there in support, 

in case we ask really tough questions—— 

So, but Ms. D’Agostino, please—well, we have some shifting 

around here. Why don’t we just—— 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. Sure. 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. Take a moment for folks to get in and 

out. 

And if you could introduce—— 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. Sure. 

Mr. SMITH. [continuing]. More formally the two gentlemen to 

your left—— 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. Of course. 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. That would be great. 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. All right. 

Mr. SMITH. All right. Go ahead, please. 

STATEMENT OF DAVI M. D’AGOSTINO, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE 

CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. Okay. I am Davi D’Agostino with the Defense 

Capabilities and Management Team at the GAO. This is Joseph 

Kirschbaum, assistant director, and Rodell Anderson, who is the 

analyst in charge on the work that we have been done for the committee on CBRNE consequence management capabilities at DOD. 

I would like to submit our testimony statement for the record, 

please. And I have a brief oral summary to present at this time. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Miller, distinguished members 

of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here before you today to 

discuss the preliminary results of our work on DOD’s efforts to provide CBRNE or CBRNE consequence management support to civilian authorities in the event of a catastrophic incident. 

The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security highlighted 

the continued threat posed to the United States by potential terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction and the need for comprehensive capability to deal with the consequences of a CBRNE 

attack. A catastrophic CBRNE event within the United States 

would require a unified whole-of-government, national response 

and would be a tremendous challenge. 

DOD plays a support role, including providing capabilities needed to save lives, alleviate hardship and suffering and minimize 

property damage caused by the event. NORTHCOM is to lead the 

military operations in direct support of another federal agency, 

most often FEMA. DOD has set its own goal of having forces ready 

to respond to multiple mass-casualty CBRNE incidents and has 

created significant capabilities that could be used to support a federal CBRNE response. 

Our work for this subcommittee has focused on DOD’s CBRNE 

Consequence Management Response Force, the CCMRF, a brigadesized force comprised of parts of various military services units 

that are dispersed across the country. This testimony provides our 

preliminary answers to the following questions. 

One, to what extent are DOD’s plans and capabilities to respond 

to CBRNE incidents in the homeland integrated with other federal 
22 

government agencies’ plans? Two, to what extent has DOD planned 

for, and structured, its force to provide CBRNE consequence management assistance. Three, how well-prepared are DOD’s CCMRF 

to perform their mission? And four, does DOD have funding plans 

in place for the CCMRF that are linked to requirements for specialized capabilities? 

First, our work has shown DOD has its own consequence management plans in place for more than a decade now, but cannot 

fully integrate them, because the IPS, the Integrated Planning System led by DHS, is not complete. Second, our work today has 

shown that DOD’s CCMRF’s ability to respond effectively may be 

compromised because of its land response times, which are very 

long. And they may not meet the needs of a catastrophic event. 

Mr. SMITH. Can I ask you—sorry, but the Integrated Planning 

System that has been discussed a couple of time. DHS is supposed 

to put this study together. It is not quite done. 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. And they don’t have timelines to complete either, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. It is reported on the—— 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. What is done, what isn’t done? 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. We have laid out in our testimony a chart. Let 

me—that talks about the various status. And I think it is on 

page—— 

Is this it? 

Yes, page nine. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. I see. Okay. Sorry, please continue. 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. Sure. Secondly, the CCMRF may lack sufficient 

capacity in certain key areas, such as medical personnel and equipment and decon, decontamination capabilities. And third, it faces 

challenges enforcing the CCMRFs, because of the competition for 

overseas missions and the use of the Guard and the Reserves. 

Compounding these challenges is the fact that, starting in October 2009, DOD will allocate the units from all three CCMRFs to 

NORTHCOM, rather than assign them outright. As a result even 

though NORTHCOM’s commander is responsible for commanding 

the domestic military CBRNE response, he will have less direct authority to control domestic deployment availability, to manage dayto-day training and to monitor the readiness of the units responsible for carrying out the mission. 

Third, our work has shown that, in the last year, DOD has taken 

many actions to improve the readiness of the units that were assigned to the CCMRF. But the CCMRF could be limited in its ability to successfully conduct operations, because first, it does not conduct realistic full-force field training to confirm the units’ readiness 

to assume the mission or to deploy quickly. And, again, conflicting 

priorities between the CCMRF mission and the overseas deployments impacts some units’ mission preparation and unit cohesion. 

Basically, the training and force rotation problems we have identified in our work have prevented DOD from providing the kind of 

stability to the CCMRF that would allow the units to build cohesiveness. 

Fourth, and finally, our work thus far shows that DOD is making 

progress in identifying and providing funding and equipment to 
23 

meet CCMRF mission requirements. However, its efforts to identify 

total program requirements have not been completed. And its approach to providing program funding has been fragmented and is 

not subject to central oversight. 

For example, the initial CCMRF that was established in October 

2008 does not have fully defined funding requirements for the necessary dedicated resources to effectively carry out the CCMRF mission in an integrated and consistent manner. While DOD officials 

have told us they are in the process of developing essential equipment requirements, they have not been fully identified and funded. 

We identified cases in which units have purchased their mission 

equipment and have funded CCMRF-related training activities 

from global war on terrorism monies and from operations and 

maintenance accounts. These accounts are not developed considering the CCMRF mission. 

As a result, DOD lacks the visibility into the total funding requirements for this mission. We do plan to provide the subcommittee and our other congressional requester with our final report in September 2009. 

And Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, this concludes 

my prepared statement. And we would be happy to respond to any 

questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. D’Agostino can be found in the 

Appendix on page 64.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

I am just following for a little bit on that. So, is it a matter of 

resources? They haven’t dedicated enough money to complete this? 

Or do you think it is just of the—they have the resources, but it 

is complicated, and they haven’t worked their way through exactly 

how to set up the CCMRFs and assign responsibilities? Which 

would that be? 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. Well, it could be a combination, because these 

are—— 

Mr. SMITH. Sure. 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO [continuing]. From units that are spread all 

throughout the country. And so, there is the administrative issue 

of the funding that comes just from the structure—the inherent 

structure of the CCMRF. But beyond that, there is no single, you 

know, centralized point that, kind of, is responsible for hovering 

over and watching the total amount of funding that goes to the 

units that make up the CCMRF. 

Mr. SMITH. So, there is no, sort of, CCMRF budget, if you will. 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. No—— 

Mr. SMITH. They have to sort of—— 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO [continuing]. Program element, right—— 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. You know, getting a piece of equipment 

there, a piece of equipment there. 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. Exactly. 

Mr. SMITH. Within the DOD then, could you identify who is, sort 

of, in charge or making sure the—got to love the acronym, by the 

way, the CCMRFs. 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. I know. 

Mr. SMITH. Strikes fear in the heart of our enemies, I am sure. 

[Laughter.] 
24 

Got these little blue guys running around to make sure nothing 

happens. Sorry about that. 

In terms of is there someone in DOD—like if you wanted to go 

say, okay, how come all this isn’t happening—is there someone who 

is, like, the deputy under secretary in charge of CCMRFs? Or not 

that, but someone who is, sort of, supposed to be monitoring this? 

Or is this spread out across DOD? 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. It is spread out, no? 

It is spread out. 

Mr. KIRSCHBAUM. Yes, Mr. Chairman. It is rather spread out. I 

mean, there are elements in the, for example, Dr. Stockton’s office 

responsible for homeland defense. There are offices in—the policy 

office responsible for those kind of things, also for consequence 

management, civil support. They all have responsibilities, are directly involved in providing for those forces. But there is no direct 

one person. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. It would seem to me that when in 

NORTHCOM, it would make sense to have such a person, you 

know, under General Renuart. Is that something that has been 

suggested to your knowledge? Or what is the—— 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. We are formulating our recommendations into 

our report, which, you know, basically is—you have all the findings 

that are going to be in our report laid out here before you today. 

And we are formulating our recommendations. And one of the recommendations is toward the funding with centralized oversight. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. And again, I don’t think that we are going to 

be prescripted to DOD about who should be doing it. But—— 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO [continuing]. I think we will have a recommendation to the secretary that someone be duly appointed to 

do so. 

Mr. SMITH. And how many CCMRFs are there? 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. There are three—— 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO [continuing]. To be three. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Regionally dispersed, I assume. 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. Well, even CCMRF 1 is very dispersed. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. And then the follow on that the other two units 

are to be sourced from the National Guard. So—— 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO [continuing]. It makes it a little even more difficult to—— 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Mr. Miller, do you have anything? 

Mr. MILLER. No, other than don’t forget the Teletubbies. [Laughter.] 

Mr. SMITH. That would be a subgroup. 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. That is right. 

Mr. MILLER. Yes. They will work on the push. 

No, no questions. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. I don’t have anything further. We will certainly take a look at the report. And I think those recommenda-
25 

tions are very helpful. And I think these are things that we should 

work on developing to get better coordination of who is in charge 

of what and where they are doing. 

This hearing has been very helpful to me. 

Do you have anything—any of you have anything to add? 

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. Did you want to add? 

Mr. ANDERSON. Well, I would just add that, there is a lot of 

training programs in place for a strategic-type training at the tactical level where the CCMRF would operate. There—DOD and 

NORTHCOM are just beginning to get a training program in place. 

Because these units—it is not really a unit. It is a number of individual units that span all services. 

There are some civilian agencies that provide some of the resources as well as National Guard and reserve. And to bring this 

force together in an integrated manner to respond in a quick manner, there needs to be more opportunities for them to train together. 

Generally, the training plan that DOD used is crawl, walk, run. 

Because of frequent rotation in the units that have provided capabilities to this force, this force has not been able to get much past 

the crawl stage, because just as they are gaining some momentum, 

a new unit comes in and they have to be brought up to speed. 

So, while there are a number of strategic-level training programs, there have been a number of programs geared toward the 

leaders who are in charge of the various units. The actual tactical 

training for the units who would actually be on the ground providing support, that hasn’t quite caught up yet. And hopefully in 

the future, they can get the participation that General Renuart 

spoke about, get the whole force actually in the field doing their 

mission real time. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Anybody else? 

Well, thank you. I appreciate just knowing. I know when your 

full report comes out, we will do this again. 

So, I appreciate your work. And we will certainly stay in touch. 

We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JULY 28, 2009 

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JULY 28, 2009 

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