alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 17.615 Eligibility. A veteran is considered eligible to receive funding for the VHVMASP if such veteran meets the following criteria. ( a ) Has been discharged or released, under conditions other than dishonorable, from the Armed Forces for not more than 10 years before the date of application for admission to a covered medical school;
( b ) Is not concurrently receiving educational assistance under chapter 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, or 35 of title 38 United States Code or chapter 1606 or 1607 of title 10 United States Code at the time the veteran would be receiving VHVMASP funding;
( c ) Applies for admission to a covered medical school for the entering class of 2020;
( d ) Indicates on the application to the covered medical school that they would like to be considered for the VHVMASP;
( e ) Meets the minimum admissions criteria for the covered medical school to which the eligible veteran applies; and
( f ) Agrees to the terms stated in § 17.617.
42076.

#### ROBBINS v. RIALES et al.

Submitted June 6, 1966

Decided June 27, 1966.

*882
      *Henry M. Henderson,*for appellant.

*Gettle & Jones, M. David Merritt,*for appellees.

Felton, Chief Judge.

This action is without question one based on *Code*§ 113-1102, which is as follows: “If any person, without authority of law, wrongfully intermeddles with, or converts to his own use, the personalty of a deceased individual whose estate has no legal representative, he shall be held and deemed an executor in his own wrong, and as such shall be liable to the creditors and heirs or legatees of such estate for double the value of the property so possessed or converted by him; nor shall such executor be allowed to set off any debt due to him by the deceased, or voluntarily paid by him out of the assets. If such executor dies, his legal representatives shall be liable in the same manner, and to the same extent, as he would be if he were still living.” This Code section is in derogation of common law and must be strictly construed. It is a harsh remedy in that it provides a one hundred percent penalty based on the value of property involved plus the denial of benefits which could otherwise accrue to the defendant. For a petition under this section to be *883good as against a general demurrer it must show intermeddling in bad faith, possession amounting to a conversion in bad faith, or an attempt to deal with the property in question as an executor, in bad faith. The general allegations of the petition to the effect that the defendant had wrongfully converted the property to her own use and was exercising control over the same and had wrongfully intermeddled with petitioners’ share must yield to the specific allegation that the defendant refused to give up said property by treating it as her own “and demanding that petitioners assign their share to her.” The petition does not allege the necessary ingredient in that it is not alleged that the defendant is acting in bad faith and not under a bona fide claim of right whether the bona fide claim is founded or unfounded. The petition also shows on its face that the defendant could not perform the function of an executor with reference to the stock and dividends because she could do nothing with the property without the consent of the plaintiffs to a sale or transfer of the property by endorsing the dividend checks and transferring the certificates of stock. See as to the rulings above: *Chattanooga Stove Co. v. Adams,*81 Ga. 319 (6 SE 695); *Willingham v. Rushing,*105 Ga. 72 (31 SE 130); *Robinson v. Murray,*198 Ga. 690 (10b) (32 SE2d 496).

The court erred in overruling the renewed general demurrer to the petition.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Frankum and Pannell, JJ., concur.*
# Countering Terrorism

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#### JOHN HORSTMANN COMPANY *v.*THE UNITED STATES. NATRON SODA COMPANY *v.*THE UNITED STATES.

[54 C. Cls. 169, 214; 55 id. 66; 257 U. S. 138.]

Judgments were rendered in favor of the United States in the court below. On appeal the judgments were *affirmed,*and the Supreme Court decided:

In actions in the Court of Claims for damages resulting from an unforeseen flooding of claimants’ soda lakes following construction and operation of a Government irrigation project by which water was brought into the watershed—

*Held:*(1) That allegations that the water percolated through the ground, due to lack of proper lining in the Government’s canals and ditches, the manner of their construction, and the natural conditions, were not intended to set up negligence, but merely to show causal connection between the project and the flooding, and hence did not characterize the cause of action as e® *delicto.*

(2) That, as no intentional taking of claimants’ property could be implied, the Government was not liable *ex contractu,*assuming such causal relation. *United States*v. *Lynah,*188 U. S. 445, distinguished.

Mr. Justice McKeNNa

delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court November 21,1921.
§ 26.4 Policy. ( a ) VA must act with care in carrying out its mission of providing services for veterans to ensure it does so consistently with national environmental policies. Specifically, VA shall ensure that all practical means and measures are used to protect, restore, and enhance the quality of the human environment; to avoid or minimize adverse environmental consequences, consistently with other national policy considerations; and to attain the following objectives: ( 1 ) Achieve the fullest possible use of the environment, without degradation, or undesirable and unintended consequences;
( 2 ) Preserve historical, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage, while maintaining, where possible, an environment that supports diversity and variety and individual choice;
( 3 ) Achieve a balance between the use and development of resources, within the sustained capacity of the ecological system involved; and,
( 4 ) Enhance the quality of renewable resources while working toward the maximum attainable recycling of nonrenewable resources.
( b ) VA elements shall: ( 1 ) Interpret and administer the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States in accordance with the policies set forth in the NEPA and CEQ Regulations;
( 2 ) Prepare concise and clear environmental documents which shall be supported by documented environmental analyses;
( 3 ) Integrate the requirements of NEPA with Department planning and decision-making procedures;
( 4 ) Encourage and facilitate involvement by affected agencies, organizations, interest groups and the public in decisions which affect the quality of the human environment; and,
( 5 ) Consider alternatives to the proposed actions which are encompassed by the range of alternatives discussed in relevant environmental documents, and described in the environmental impact statement.
(Authority: 42 U.S.C. 4321-4370a)
[51 FR 37182, Oct. 20, 1986, as amended at 54 FR 34987, Aug. 23, 1989]
EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report of Bel Fuse Inc (the "Company") on Form
10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2004 filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "Report"), I, Daniel Bernstein, President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the consolidated financial condition of the Company as of the dates
presented and consolidated result of operations of the Company for the periods
presented.

Dated: May 11, 2004

                                        By: /s/ Daniel Bernstein
                                            ---------------------------
                                            Daniel Bernstein, President
                                            and Chief Executive Officer
This fact sheet has been replaced by the fact sheet titled "The National Map Pilot Projects" located at:

mac.usgs.gov/mac/isb/pubs/factsheets/fs06202.html for the HTML version

and 

mac.usgs.gov/mac/isb/pubs/factsheets/fs06202.pdf for the PDF version.

Please visit the USGS Publications About Mapping and Related Subjects Web site at

mapping.usgs.gov/mac/isb/pubs/pubslists/index.html for the current fact sheets available.

The National Map - Pennsylvania Pilot Project - 

RETIRED EDITION

Fact Sheet FS-120-01 (November 2001)

PLEASE NOTE:

Mapping Applications Center

Information Services Branch

Publications Section

macweb@usgs.gov
MATS Higgins, Cortney to: RobertJ Wayland 11/16/2012 11:58 AM Cc: Bill Maxwell, Karen Thundiyil

EO12866_MATS_Reconsideration_2060-AR 62_Proposal_20121116.pdf.pdf

Hi Bob, We have no further comments. Is the attached version the final one (this is from the 10:28 am email)? If so, can you have OP upload it into

ROCIS?

Thanks, Cortney
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18
- 4845

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. PEDRO GUILLEN

- CORDOVA, a/k/a Amigo , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina , at Wilmington

. Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge. ( 7:18

- cr
- 00025

- BO

- 1 )

Submitted : July 16, 2019 Decided: July 31, 2019

Before THACKER and HARRIS , Circuit Judges , and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Jorgelina E. Araneda, ARANEDA LAW FIRM, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Brian A. Benczkowski, Assistant Attorney General, Matthew S. Miner, Deputy A ssistant Attorney General, Sonja M. Ralston, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C. ; Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer May

- Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North C arolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:
Pedro Guillen

- Cordova appeals the 180

- month sentence imposed by the district

court following his guilty plea to possess ing with intent to distribute five kilograms or
more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012); and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (2012). On appeal, Guillen

- Cordova challenges the c onstitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences. But this challenge is squarely foreclosed by decisions of

t he Supreme Court and this c ourt

. Chapman v. United States , 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991) ( Congress has constitutional authority “to define criminal punishments without giving the courts any sentencing discretion” ) ; United States v. Bolding , 876 F.2d 21, 22 (4th
Cir. 1989) (“It is undisputed that Congress may enact mandatory and determinate sentencing laws

. . . . ”); see Stokeling v. United St ates , 139 S. Ct. 544, 555 (2019)

. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in sentencing
Guillen

- Cordova to the applicable mandatory minimum sentences, and we affirm the district court’s criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argume nt because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
#### §§ 17.3121-17.3124 [Reserved]
§ 21.6260 Financial assistance. ( a ) *Direct financial assistance prohibited.* The provisions of § 21.260 and § 21.264 through § 21.276 of this part are not applicable to veterans pursuing training and employment under this temporary program, except as indicated in paragraph (b) of this section. (Authority: 38 U.S.C. 1524(b)(2)(B)(ii))
( b ) *Training costs.* The provisions of § 21.262 of this part pertaining to reimbursement for training costs will be followed to reimburse vendors for services provided under this temporary program.
(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 1524(d))
1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-10281

EDITH JUANITA DAMRON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

HELEN FARABEE CENTER, WICHITA COU NTY, entity being the MHMR authority for Wichita Count, Texas, jointly and severally, et al.,

Defendants,

HELEN FARABEE CENTER, WICHITA COUNTY, entity be ing the MHMR authority for Wichita County, Texas, jointly and severally;

Defendant-Appellee.

___________________________________________________________________

EDITH JUANITA DAMRON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

GEORGE ALLEN GOULD, Individually and in his official capacity, et
al.,
Defendants,

HELEN FARABEE CENTER, WICHITA COUNTY, entity being the MHMR authority for Wichita County, Texas, jointly and severally;

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

(7:96-CV-105-X & 7:96-CV-70)

March 9, 1999

Before DAVIS, STEWART and PARKER, Circuit Judges.* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R . 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

2 PER CURIAM: *

Edith Jaunita Damron, Plaintiff-Appellant, appeals the summary

judgment for Defendant-Appellee and the denial of her Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) Motion for Relief from Judgment or

Order in this employment discrimination case. We affirm.

Damron contends that she attached to her Rule 60(b)(6) motion

deposition testimony garnered after summary judgment which creates

a genuine issue of material fact with regard to her 42 U.S.C. §

1983 claim. Specifically, the deposition testimony allegedly

supporte d her claim that her supervisor was having an amorous

affair with the individual who was promoted into Damron's job after

Damron's termination. However, as set out in the district court's

thorough and well-reasoned opinion, assuming such a fact question

exists, Damron's § 1983 claim is without merit because she failed

to even allege two of the four prima facie elements o f a sex

discrimination cause of action. S ee Portis v. First Nat'l Bank of

New Albany, 34 F.3d 325, 328 n.6 (5th Cir. 1994).

Having reviewed the record, briefs and authorities, we affirm

for substantially the reasons sta ted by the district court's

Memorandum Opinion and Order date January 21, 1998.

AFFIRMED.
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h
Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk June 23, 2009

p0616 

# Order

June 23, 2009

136956

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 136956 COA: 278189 St. Joseph CC: 06-013718-FC LARRY EUGENE WILCOX, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 5, 2008 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is GRANTED, limited to the issue whether the legislative sent encing guidelines, MCL 777.1 et seq ., applied to the defendant’s sentence and, if so , whether the defendan t is entitled to be resentenced. The parties may wish to comp are the result in this ca se with the result in People v Walton

, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued June 3, 2008 (Docket No. 276161).

We further ORDER the St. Joseph Circ uit Court, in accordance with Administrative Order 2003-03, to determine whether the defendant is indigent and, if so, to appoint counsel to represent the defendant in this Court.

K ELLY

, C.J., would also grant leave to appe al with respect to the defendant’s challenge to the constitutionality of MCL 76 8.27a, for the reasons set forth in her dissenting statement in People v Xiong , 483 Mich ___ (Docket No . 135158, order entered April 17, 2009).
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED MAY 10, 2013

NO. 03-12-00580-CV

Francisco Ivarra, Rebecca Lugo, Juan Villareal, Neal Zabicki, Anahli Vasquez, 

Willie Galvan, Helen Galvan, and Lee Rivas, Appellants

v.

American GI Forum of the United States, Inc.; Gilberto Rodriguez; Antonio G. Morales 

and Paul Herrera, Appellees

APPEAL FROM THE 201ST DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE JONES, JUSTICES GOODWIN AND FIELD

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION -- OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE JONES

THIS CAUSE having this day come on to be considered, and the Court being of the opinion that 

it is without jurisdiction of the cause and that the appeal should therefore be dismissed for want 

of jurisdiction: IT IS ACCORDINGLY considered, adjudged and ordered that the appeal is 

dismissed for want of jurisdiction. It is FURTHER ordered that the appellants pay all costs 

relating to this appeal, both in this Court and the court below; and that this decision be certified 

below for observance.
§ 23.520 Job classification and structure. A recipient shall not: ( a ) Classify a job as being for males or for females;
( b ) Maintain or establish separate lines of progression, seniority lists, career ladders, or tenure systems based on sex; or
( c ) Maintain or establish separate lines of progression, seniority systems, career ladders, or tenure systems for similar jobs, position descriptions, or job requirements that classify persons on the basis of sex, unless sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for the positions in question as set forth in § 23.550.
#### John Kerr, Respondent, *v.*The Metropolitan Street Railway Co., Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term,

April, 1899.)

Negligence — Police blotter not evidence of a motorman’s recklessness.

An extract from the blotter of a city police department, purporting to be the report of a police officer respecting the conduct of a motorman at the time his car collided with a horse and wagon and characterizing such conduct as reckless and causative of the accident, is not a public record in such a sense as to make' its contents evidence of the facts in an action brought by the owner of. the horse and wagon to recover damages of the corporation which operated the car.

Kerr v. Metropolitan Street R. Co., 26 Misc. Rep, 875, reversed.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the General Term of the City Court, affirming a judgment of the Trial Term, in favor of the plaintiff, entered upon the verdict of a jury.

Henry A. Robinson, for appellant.

Foley *&*Wray, for respondent.

MacLean, J.

In., an action brought to recover damages for injuries to a horse and wagon through collision with a car of the defendant, the plaintiff was allowed, contrary to the defendant’s objection and exception, to introduce and have read in evidence "from a blotter of the police department, an extract purporting to be the report of a police officer respecting, among other things, the conduct of the motorman at the time of the accident. Even were it hot. proven, as it was by his own testimony, that the officer did not see the occurrence, the reception in evidence of the blotter, wherein the motorman’s conduct was characterized as reckless and causative of the accident, was error prejudicial to. the defendant. It was at best but a record required for specific purposes, and not a public record in such sense as to make its contents evidence of. the facts as between private parties.. The judgment of the Gen*191eral Term of the City Court should be reversed and a new trial-ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.

Freedman, P. J., concurs; Leventritt, J., taking no part.

Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event. •
§ 21.4277 Discontinuance: unsatisfactory progress, conduct and attendance. ( a ) *Satisfactory pursuit of program.* Entitlement to benefits for a program of education is subject to the requirement that the veteran or eligible person, having commenced the pursuit of such program, continues to maintain satisfactory progress. If the veteran or eligible person does not maintain satisfactory progress, educational benefits will be discontinued by the Department of Veterans Affairs. Progress is unsatisfactory if the veteran or eligible person does not satisfactorily progress according to the regularly prescribed standards and practices of the institution he or she is attending.
( b ) *Satisfactory conduct.* Entitlement to a program of education is subject to the requirement that the veteran or eligible person, having commenced the pursuit of such program, continues to maintain satisfactory conduct in accordance with the regularly prescribed standards and practices of the institution in which he or she is enrolled. If the veteran or eligible person will no longer be retained as a student or will not be readmitted as a student by the institution in which he or she is enrolled, educational benefits will be discontinued, unless further development establishes that the action of the school is of a retaliatory nature. See § 21.4253.
( c ) *Satisfactory attendance.* Entitlement to benefits for a program of education is subject to the requirement that the veteran or eligible person, having commenced the pursuit of such program, continues to maintain satisfactory attendance in accordance with the regularly prescribed standards and practices of the institution in which he or she is enrolled. If the veteran or eligible person will no longer be retained as a student or will not be readmitted as a student by the institution in which he or she is enrolled, educational benefits will be discontinued. (Authority: 38 U.S.C. 3474, 3524)


Cross Reference.
*Reports—requirements.* See § 21.4203.
[48 FR 37994, Aug. 22, 1983, as amended at 57 FR 29804, July 7, 1992]
ATTACHMENT.

#### DONNEGAN ET AL. v. ARMOUR ET AL.

1. Defenses not a Counterclaim or Set-off.

In an- attachment suit the defenses cannot be made that the attachment wa* a malicious prosecution, or that it was' wrongful.

8. Undischarged Attachment.

A defense should show that the attachment has been terminated.

Error by defendant below.

Armour et al. sued Donnegan et al. for goods sent them to sell on commission, and procured an attachment which was executed, and remained undissolved iirdicrh?rg'’d.

*245Hessenmueller & Gallup, for plaintiff in error.

Henderson, Kline & Tolies, for defendant in error.

Donnegan et al. as a second defense, sought to recover for said attachment as a wrongful attachment, in the same suit, and

Third — For the same attachment as a malicious prosecution.

Held: 1. As to the third defense, that it was insufficient, not setting forth the termination of the attachment.

2. Again, it was not a proper counter-claim or set-off. As to the second defense.

3. Held: First, not a counter-claim, as not connected with the subject ol the action.

4. Second, it was no proper set-off, as not in existence at the beginning dfffhe suit.