alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 40609

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SCOTT ML WEBB,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 322

Filed: January 14, 2014

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 

OPINION AND SHALL NOT 

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Timothy L. Hansen, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction and unified sentence of twenty-five years, with a 

minimum period of confinement of ten years, for robbery, affirmed.

Stephen D. Thompson, Ketchum, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge; LANSING, Judge;

and GRATTON, Judge

PER CURIAM

Scott ML Webb was convicted of robbery, Idaho Code §§ 18-6501, 18-6502, 18-204. 

The district court sentenced Webb to a unified term of twenty-five years with a minimum period 

of confinement of ten years. Webb appeals, contending that his sentence is excessive.

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the 

factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and 

need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-

15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 

1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing 

the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 
2

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record 

in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

Therefore, Webb’s judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
**
Exhibit 35.1 

Servicer Compliance Statement of Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation 

**NISSAN MOTOR ACCEPTANCE COMPANY LLC**

**OFFICER’S CERTIFICATE**

The undersigned, Kevin J. Cullum, President and Chief Executive Officer of NISSAN MOTOR ACCEPTANCE COMPANY LLC, a Delaware limited liabilitycompany (successor by conversion to Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation, the “Company”), does hereby certify, in his capacity as such officer, as follows: 

(1) The undersigned has caused a review of the activities of the Company, in its capacity as Servicer, during the 12-month period ended March 31, 2022 (the “Reporting Period”), and of its performance pursuant to the Amended and Restated Servicing Agreement, dated as of April 1, 2021, as amended and assupplemented by the 2020-B Series Servicing Supplement, dated as of September 29, 2020 (as amended and supplemented, the “Agreement”), by and among Nissan-Infiniti LT LLC, as titling company,NILT LLC, and the Company, as servicer, to be conducted under his supervision; and 

(2) To the best of the undersigned’s knowledge,based upon such review, the Company has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period. 

This Officer’s Certificate is being furnished pursuant to Item 1123 of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulation AB forpublicly-issued asset-backed securities. Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings assigned to such terms in the Agreement. 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand effective as of the 27th day of June, 2022. 

 

/s/ Kevin J. Cullum
Kevin J. CullumPresident and Chief Executive Officer
 
21 

**
### NUMBER S 13 - 14 - 00 146 - CR & 13 - 14 - 00148 - CR & 13 - 14 - 00150 - CR 

## COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

VICENTE FABIAN , A ppellant ,
v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, A ppellee
.

On a ppeal from the 117th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.



## MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Perkes Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam Appellant, Vicente Fabian , attempts to appeal convictions for burglary of a habitation, theft, and aggravated assault

. The trial court has certified in these cases that

“ the defendant has waived the right of appeal. ” See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 25.2(a)(2).2

On June 16, 2014 , this Court notified appellant ’ s counsel of the trial court ’ s certification s and ordered counsel to: (1) review the record; (2) determine whether appellant has a right to appeal; and (3) forward to this Court, by letter, counsel ’ s findings as to whether appellant has a right to appeal, or , alternatively, advise this Court as to the existence of any amended certification s

. No response to this Court's order was received and the case s were abated and remanded to the trial court on August 19, 2014

. A hearing on abatement of the appeal s

was he ld by the trial court and on August 29, 2014 , counsel filed a letter brief with this Court. Accordingly, the appeal s are REINSTATED. Counsel ’ s response does not establish that the certification s currently on file with this Court are incorrect or that
app ellant otherwise has a right to appeal. The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that an appeal must be dismissed if the trial court ’ s certification does not show that the defendant has the right of appeal.
T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.2(d); see T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 37.1, 44.3, 44.4. Accordingly, th ese appeal s

are DISMISSED. PER CURIAM Do not publish. T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 47.2(b).
D elivered and filed the 6th day of November, 2014

.
§ 1.933 Joint and several liability. ( a ) When two or more debtors are jointly and severally liable, VA will pursue collection activity against all debtors, as appropriate. VA will not attempt to allocate the burden of payment between the debtors but should proceed to liquidate the indebtedness as quickly as possible.
( b ) VA will ensure that a compromise agreement with one debtor does not release VA's claim against the remaining debtors. The amount of a compromise with one debtor shall not be considered a precedent or binding in determining the amount that will be required from other debtors jointly and severally liable on the claim.
(Authority: 31 U.S.C. 3711; 38 U.S.C. 501, 3720)
[69 FR 62198, Oct. 25, 2004]
P.1 

OAR Box 1770 

Prepped by Keeia Richards 

Document Number: 

40) XII-A-38 

Docket Number: 

A-79-15 

Printed 107287200810:20:29 AM Sheet 40 of 93 
P.2 

(3) 

Docket No. A-79-15 

Item No. XII-A-38 

United States 

Environmental Protection 

Agency 

Office Of Air Quality 

Planning And Standards 

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711 

EPA-453/R-01-003 

January 2001 

Air 

c/EPA National-Scale Air Toxics 

Assessment for 1996 

NOTE: THIS DOCUMENT IS A PRELIMINARY DRAFT. 

It has not been formally released by the U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency and should not at this stage be construed to 

represent Agency policy or factual conclusions. This 

document is being provided now for review to EPA's Science 

Advisory Board. It should not be cited or referred to as EPA's 

final National-Scale Air Toxics Assessment. 

This document is available at 

http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/sab/natareport.pdf 
3\AJ3r 

> 

EPA-453/R-01-003 

National-Scale Air Toxics Assessment for 1996 

EPA Office of Air Quality 

Planning and Standards 

DRAFT for EPA Science Advisory Board Review: January 18,2001 

A 

P.3 

•
42026.

#### McEWEN v. THE STATE.

Hall, Judge.

The defendant appeals from his conviction and sentence for larceny of an automobile.

1. The trial court did not err in overruling the motion to quash the indictment on the ground that it alleged that the defendant had been twice previously convicted of a felony. *Lewis v. State,*113 Ga. App. 714.

2. The trial court did not err in overruling the defendant’s motions to dismiss the prosecution and to exclude evidence on the ground that the defendant was illegally arrested without a warrant. The facts and circumstances surrounding the arrest would justify a reasonable belief by the arresting officers that the offender was escaping and that there would likely be a failure of justice if an arrest were not made before a warrant could be obtained. *Code*§ 27-207; *Pistor v. State,*219 Ga. 161, 165 (132 SE2d 183); *Bloodworth v. State,*113 Ga. App. 278 (147 SE2d 833).

3. The evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. The trial court did not err in overruling the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment or to instruct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty, and in overruling the defendant’s motion for new trial on the general grounds.

4. The trial court in charging the jury the statute prescribing the sentence in the event the defendant was convicted and was shown to have been previously convicted of a felony *(Code*§ 27-2511, as amended, Ga. L. 1953, Nov. Sess., p. 289), used the words “the offense of which he stands accused” rather than the words of the statute, “the offense of which he stands convicted.” It is unlikely that this verbal inaccuracy confused or misled the jury; it is not shown to have harmed the defendant, and was not error. *Siegel v. State,*206 Ga. 252 (56 SE2d 512); *Mills v. State,*41 Ga. App. 834 (155 SE 104); *Kane v. Standard Oil Co.,*108 Ga. App. 602, 604 (133 SE2d 913).

5. The trial court did not err in failing to charge the jury the requests submitted by the defendant, which did not meet the *766requirement of being perfect, apt, and precisely adjusted to some principle involved in the case. *Lewis v. State,*196 Ga. 765 (27 SE2d 659); *Downs v. Powell,*215 Ga. 62, 65 (108 SE2d 715).

Argued May 3, 1966

Decided May 13, 1966

Rehearing denied May 27, 1966.

*L. Paul Cobb, Jr.,*for appellant.

*Lewis R. Slaton, Solicitor General, Ernest Stanford, Jr., J. Walter LeCraw, Amber W. Anderson,*for appellee.

6. Other enumerations of error, Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 15 and 17, are not supported in the defendant’s brief by citation of authority or argument and are deemed to be abandoned. Rule 17 (c) (2), Rules of the Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia, effective August 1, 1965.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Nichols, P. J., and Deen, J., concur.*
###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 2 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 6 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 7 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 1 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Part 2

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 2 appear at 68 FR 14337, Mar. 25, 2003.

#### § 2.74 Form and signature of amendment.

(a) *Form of Amendment.* Amendments should be set forth clearly and completely. Applicant should either set forth the entire wording, including the proposed changes, or, if it would be more efficient, indicate which words should be added and which words should be deleted. The examining attorney may require the applicant to rewrite the entire amendment, if necessary for clarification of the record.

(b) *Signature.* A request for amendment of an application must be signed by the applicant, someone with legal authority to bind the applicant (*e.g.,* a corporate officer or general partner of a partnership), or a practitioner qualified to practice under § 11.14 of this chapter, in accordance with the requirements of § 2.193(e)(2). If the amendment requires verification, see § 2.2(n).

[73 FR 67770, Nov. 17, 2008, as amended at 74 FR 54908, Oct. 26, 2009; 80 FR 33184, June 11, 2015]

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 3 pertaining to both patents and trademarks is placed in the grouping pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 4 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 5 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.
```

[107th Congress Public Law 156]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]

<DOC>
[DOCID: f:publ156.107]

[[Page 116 STAT. 117]]

Public Law 107-156
107th Congress

                                 An Act

 
   To extend the authority of the Export-Import Bank until April 30, 
               2002. <<NOTE: Mar. 31, 2002 -  [S. 2019]>> 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION <<NOTE: 12 USC 635f note.>> 1. EXTENSION OF EXPORT-IMPORT BANK.

    Notwithstanding the dates specified in section 7 of the Export-
Import Bank Act of 1945 (12 U.S.C. 635f) and section 1(c) of Public Law 
103-428, the Export-Import Bank of the United States shall continue to 
exercise its functions in connection with and in furtherance of its 
objects and purposes through April 30, 2002.

    Approved March 31, 2002.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY--S. 2019:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 148 (2002):
            Mar. 14, considered and passed Senate.
            Mar. 19, considered and passed House.

                                  <all>
```
#### § 20.406 Rule 406. Notices sent to last addresses of record in simultaneously contested claims.

Notices in simultaneously contested claims will be forwarded to the last address of record of the parties concerned and such action will constitute sufficient evidence of notice.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

October 6, 2022

No. 04-22-00623-CR

EX PARTE Luis Alfredo APARICIO

From the County Court, Maverick County, Texas

Trial Court No. 3976

Honorable Mark R. Luitjen, Judge Presiding

ORDER

The reporter’s record was due on September 21, 2022. On October 3, 2022, the court 

reporter filed a notification of late record requesting an extension until October 21, 2022. We 

GRANT the reporter’s request for extension. The court reporter is ORDERED to file the 

reporter’s record with this court no later than October 21, 2022.

_________________________________

Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 6th day of October, 2022.

___________________________________

MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court
41941.

#### MITCHELL v. THE STATE.

Submitted April 5, 1966

Decided April 21, 1966.

Hall, Judge.

This indictment for cheating and swindling alleged that the defendant did “knowingly and falsely represent that he was a good credit risk and that there were no liens or judgments of any kind against his property, and that he then and there had a good job and was' capable of paying a loan in the amount of $112.50, . . .” At the trial a bank officer testified that the defendant, in making application to the bank for a loan “listed his total indebtedness as one hundred dollars to Sears Roebuck and seventy dollars to a Mr. Sheppard listing that as all the debts he had.” “He represented that all he owed was one hundred dollars to Sears Roebuck & Co. and seventy dollars to a Mr. Sheppard.” This was the only evidence offered in support of the indictment, insofar as it related to the representation made by the accused. “The false representation is the foundation upon which all the elements of this charge of cheating and swindling are based. . .” *Fischer v. State,*46 Ga. App. 207, 208 (167 SE 200).

The variance between the allegations of the indictment and the proof rendered the conviction contrary to law. *Smith v. State,*185 Ga. 365 (195 SE 144); *Nalls v. State,*27 Ga. App. 38 (107 SE 354); *McDaniel v. State,*54 Ga. App. 407 (187 SE 896).

Other errors alleged in the enumeration of errors should not occur on another trial.

*Case remanded for new trial.*

*Nichols, P. J., and Deen, J., concur.*

*524
      *Casey Thigpen,*for appellant.

*Thomas A. Hutcheson, Solicitor,*for appellee.
41723.

#### LAFKOWITZ v. MARTIN THEATRES OF COLUMBUS, INC.

Argued January 11, 1966

Decided January 14, 1966

Rehearing denied February 2, 1966

*Saul Blau,*for appellant.

*64
      *Long, Weinberg & Ansley, Ben Weinberg, Gregg Loomis,*for appellee.

Eberhardt, Judge.

The owner of a motion picture theatre owes ordinary care to one who purchases a ticket and enters for the purpose of witnessing a show. *United Theatre Enterprises v. Carpenter,*68 Ga. App. 438 (23 SE2d 189). We have found no instance when the factual situation here presented has been passed upon by the appellate courts of this State. It has been held to be a jury question as to whether permitting a platform weighing scale in the lobby, over which a patron tripped and fell, was negligence *(Atlanta Enterprises v. Douglass,*93 Ga. App. 237 (91 SE2d 296)), though the presence of a popcorn box in the aisle is not. *Rogers v. Atlanta Enterprises,*89 Ga. App. 903 (81 SE2d 721).

Appellee urges since this was not a static situation, but one in which changes might occur momentarily in the moving or shifting of his feet and legs by the man sitting on the steps, those cases have no application. That may well be a valid position as to tripping over feet or legs of other patrons who are seated in places provided for them. See Paramount Richards Theatres v. Johnson, 199 Miss. 645 (25 S2d 129). It was pointed out by the Supreme Court of Arizona in Lyric Amusement Co. v. Jeffries, 58 Ariz. 381 (120 P2d 417) that where a patron in his seat deliberately extends his foot an abnormal length for the purpose of tripping another who, in leaving her seat for the aisle, must pass the patron, no actionable negligence appears against the owner of the theatre. However, it is alleged here that the offending patron was not in a seat provided for him, but on the steps which constituted the only means of getting down from the balcony. There is a duty on the part of the owner to keep the aisles, steps and passageways reasonably free for passage by patrons, and if one sits upon the steps to the balcony instead of proceeding to a seat, he should not be permitted to remain.

Constructive knowledge of the situation is all that is charged against the defendant, but it is alleged in that connection that the man had taken the position on the balcony steps and remained there for nearly two hours before appellant proceeded *65to leave and that there were ushers whose duty it was to keep the aisles and steps free for passage. This sufficiently meets the test of *Setzers Super Stores of Ga. v. Higgins,*104 Ga. App. 116 (1) (121 SE2d 305).

Under the facts pleaded the owner should have anticipated that the man sitting on the steps might trip patrons seeking to leave the balcony—whether purposely or accidentally. It cannot be said as a matter of law that the owner was free of negligence in permitting him to remain in that position. That is a jury question.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Bell, P. J., and Jordan, J., concur.*
#### § 17.259 Direct costs.

Direct costs to which grant funds may be applied may include in proportion to time and effort spent, but are not limited to, fees and costs directly paid to personnel or for fringe benefits, rent, publications, educational programs, training, research, demonstration activities, or construction carried out in connection with pilot programs for planning or exchange of information.

[33 FR 6012, Apr. 19, 1968. Redesignated at 61 FR 21966, May 13, 1996]
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#### In re: SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE FOR SITTING IN DIVISIONS

July 19, 1976

PER CURIAM

'Fhe court’s caseload has more than doubled in the past fifteen years and continues to increase from year to year. As a measure necessary to keep the docket current the court has unanimously decided that, at least until the procedure proves to be unsatisfactory or there is some other change in circumstances, the court will exercise its constitutional, statutory and inherent authority to sit in divisions. There will be two divisions, each consisting of the Chief Justice and three associate justices, with the makeup of the divisions *381rotating from time to time. Whenever a division is not unanimous the case will be referred to the full court. The court will also sit in banc from the outset in cases presenting a substantial question arising under the Arkansas Constitution, in criminal cases in which capital punishment has been imposed, in cases of original jurisdiction under Rule 17, and in other cases designated by the Court. All opinions in all cases will be circulated to all seven judges and considered in conference before their release. As in the past, no decision will be reached without the concurrence of at least four members of the court. No other change in the court’s procedure or rules is expected to be necessary.