a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

October 2001 ELECTIONS

A Framework for 

Evaluating Reform 

Proposals

GAO-02-90

Page i GAO-02-90 Elections

Contents

Letter 1

Introduction 4

Results in Brief 6

Section 1: States and Local Jurisdictions Indicated the Desire for 

Reasonable Flexibility and Time to Implement Reforms 9

Section 2: Challenges Exist to All Parts of Election Systems: People, 

Process, and Technology 18

Section 3: Framework for Assessing Election Reform Proposals 43

Section 4: Conclusion 53

Appendixes

Appendix I: Results of Our Election Work 56

The Scope of Congressional Authority in Election 

Administration 56

Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges Across the 

Nation 58

Voting Accessibility for Voters with Disabilities 61

Improving Voting Assistance for Military and Overseas Voters 63

Status and Use of Federal Voting Equipment Standards 65

Statistical Analysis of Factors Affecting Uncounted Votes in the 2000 

Presidential Election 66

Appendix II: List of Recently Issued Election Reports 69

GAO Reports 69

Other Recent National Reports 69

State Commission and Task Force Reports 70

Tables Table 1: Percentage of Jurisdictions That Collected Data on 

Accuracy, by Type of Voting Equipment 40

Table 2: Election Issues and GAO Reports 56

Figures Figure 1: Oklahoma and Pennsylvania Illustrate Differences 

Between Statewide Election Systems and Locally 

Autonomous Jurisdictions 11

Figure 2: Size of Jurisdiction Affects Magnitude of Key Tasks for 

Election Officials 12

Figure 3: Some States Require An Excuse Before Allowing Voters 

to Cast An Absentee Ballot, But Others Do Not 14

Figure 4: Voting Methods Used In November 2000 Election by 

Registered Voters 16
Contents

Page ii GAO-02-90 Elections

Figure 5: Jurisdictions Offer Various Types of Voter Education 

Materials 23

Figure 6: Prevalence of Potential Impediments at Polling Places 

and Availability of Curbside Voting 25

Figure 7: Persons Voting Absentee in the November 2000 Election 

Cast Ballots Both by Mail-in and In-Person Absentee 

Voting 28

Figure 8: Example of An Absentee Ballot Secrecy Envelope That 

Must Be Completed Correctly in Order For the Absentee 

Ballot to be Counted 30

Figure 9: Optical Scan Ballots Can Be Mismarked in a Variety of 

Ways 33

Figure 10: Voting Technologies Perform Roughly on Par With Each 

Other 37

Figure 11: Percentage of Total Variation in Uncounted Presidential 

Votes Explained By County Demographics, Voting 

Equipment, State Differences, and Unknown Factors 38
Page 1 GAO-02-90 Elections

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Comptroller General A of the United States

October 15, 2001 Letr

The President of the Senate

The Speaker of the House of Representatives

Voting is fundamental to our democracy. Each year the millions of people 

who go to the polls expect that their ballots will be cast in private and 

accurately processed and counted. However, events surrounding the 

November 2000 presidential election raised broad-based concerns, 

including such issues as the performance of different types of voting 

equipment, the disqualification of absentee ballots, and the accuracy of 

vote tallies and recounts. As a result, public officials and various interest 

groups have proposed a number of reform measures to address the 

perceived shortcomings of various election systems.

As part of the broad congressional interest in these issues, we were asked 

to review certain aspects of elections throughout the United States. This 

capping report draws upon the extensive body of recent work done by GAO 

at the request of several congressional leaders, congressional committees 

and Members of Congress on matters surrounding the November 2000 

election. Our work, which culminated in six other reports that are 

summarized in the appendices, addressed the following topics:

• the scope of Congressional authority in election administration,

• compilation and maintenance of voter registration lists,

• absentee and early voting,

• voting assistance for military and overseas voters,

• election day administration, 

• voting accessibility for voters with disabilities,

• vote counts, recounts, and certification, 

• voting technology,

• Internet voting, and

• status and use of the Federal Election Commission voting equipment 

standards.

This capping report serves three purposes. First, we discuss how the 

constitutional and operational division of federal and state authority to 

conduct elections has resulted in great variability in the ways elections are 

administered in the United States. As a result, given this diversity and the 

decentralized nature of election administration, careful consideration 

needs to be given to the degree of flexibility and the planned timeframes for 

implementing new initiatives.
Page 2 GAO-02-90 Elections

Second, in order for election reform to be effective, reform proposals must 

address all major parts of our election systems—its people, processes, and 

technology—which are interconnected and significantly affect the election 

process. We discuss the main challenges that election officials face in each 

of these areas and the need to accurately characterize and diagnose related 

issues. 

Finally, as Congress considers if and how to address the challenges to our 

national election system it will have to deliberate upon a number of reform 

proposals. Based on our work, this report offers basic criteria for assessing 

a range of election reform proposals. It is not our intention to advocate any 

particular reform proposal, but we believe that these criteria offer a useful 

analytical framework with which to consider changes to our nation’s 

election system. 

Copies of this report are being sent to the President, the congressional 

leadership and all other Members of Congress. Copies will also be made 

available to other interested parties via our web site at www.gao.gov.

If you or your offices have any questions about matters discussed in this 

report, please contact me at (202) 512-5500; Norman J. Rabkin at (202) 512-

3610, Managing Director, Tax Administration and Justice; or Richard M. 

Stana, Director, at (202) 512-8816. They can also be reached by e-mail at 

rabkinn@gao.gov and stanar@gao.gov, respectively.

David M. Walker

Comptroller General

of the United States
Page 3 GAO-02-90 Elections
Page 4 GAO-02-90 Elections

Introduction On November 7, 2000, more than 100 million Americans cast their votes for 

various candidates and ballot issues across the country. This hallmark of 

American democracy unfolded in more than 10,000 local election 

jurisdictions, which used several different types of voting equipment, 

ranging from hand-counted paper ballots to electronic touchscreen voting 

machines. Staffing the precincts were some 1.4 million dedicated poll 

workers who opened the polls, logged in and assisted voters, closed polls, 

and in many cases, tabulated the votes cast at the precinct. These poll 

workers were assisted by an army of unseen election workers who 

answered phone calls from both voters and poll workers, delivered extra 

ballots to precincts, replaced or repaired broken voting machines, 

tabulated absentee ballots, and compiled the election results from 

individual precincts within their jurisdiction. This highly decentralized, 

complex, and massive logistical effort made it possible for American 

citizens to participate in one of the most fundamental democratic 

traditions—that of eligible citizens to cast their votes for candidates of 

their choice.

The controversy surrounding the presidential vote in the November 2000 

election cast America’s election system in a new and revealing light, 

spotlighting issues such as the

• accuracy of voter registration lists;

• procedures used to accept or disqualify absentee ballots for counting;

• variety of ways elections are administered across and within 

jurisdictions;

• widely varying types of voting equipment used to cast and count ballots; 

and

• many different methods of determining voter intent when voters 

improperly or incompletely marked their ballots.

Several congressional leaders, congressional committees, and Members of 

Congress asked us to review our nation’s election systems. Accordingly, 

we focused on issues that may affect the ability of eligible U.S. citizens to 

cast their ballots in private and have those ballots counted accurately. 

This capping report draws on a considerable body of work recently done by 

GAO on election systems. We address three main issues that Congress may 

wish to keep in mind as it approaches election reform. First, we examine 

the division of federal and state authority to conduct elections and the 

resulting variation among election jurisdictions. Second, we describe the 
Page 5 GAO-02-90 Elections

challenges that election officials face as they work with the people, 

processes, and technology involved in our administering our nation’s 

election systems. And third, we suggest four criteria that Congress could 

use as it weighs the merits of various reform proposals. 

Our work on election systems, which is contained in this capping report 

and six separate reports, took us across the United States and around the 

world as we employed a variety of methods to answer Congress’ questions. 

We conducted a detailed analysis of relevant constitutional provisions, 

federal statutes, and federal court decisions as well as state statutes and 

regulations on selected election issues. We met with and reviewed 

documents provided by local election officials in 41 election jurisdictions in 

22 states and met with officials at the Department of State, the Department 

of Defense, the Federal Election Commission (FEC), and the National 

Conference of State Legislatures. We surveyed District of Columbia and 

state election directors.1

 Moreover, we used a mail survey and a telephone 

survey2

 and interviews with local election officials to obtain information 

about the election process that would generally be representative of the 

more than 10,000 local election jurisdictions in the United States. We also 

visited 585 polling places and met with embassy and military personnel 

abroad and overseas citizens as well as with manufacturers and testers of 

voting equipment. And finally, we reviewed documents provided by state 

and local election officials, voting equipment manufacturers and testers, 

and obtained data on voting methods and election results for the November 

2000 election from Election Data Services, Inc., and other sources. 

1

In our discussion of state election systems, we include the District of Columbia.

2

Our mail survey is generalizeable to 90 percent of the U.S. population, and our telephone 

survey is generalizeable nationwide. 
Page 6 GAO-02-90 Elections

Results in Brief Principal findings from our work provide a context for considering 

challenges and subsequent reforms of our nation’s election systems. When 

considering election reform proposals, careful consideration should be 

given to the way election systems have evolved throughout history. First, if 

required to adopt federal election reform, states and local jurisdictions 

have indicated their desire to have reasonable flexibility and time to 

implement any changes. Traditionally, election administration has 

primarily been the responsibility of state and local governments which are 

guided by a tapestry of federal and state laws and regulations. Historically, 

Congress has exercised its constitutional authority to affect the way state 

and local jurisdictions conduct elections, primarily focusing on prohibiting 

certain discriminatory practices and providing statutory protections for the 

rights of groups as racial and language minorities, elderly voters, and voters 

with disabilities. Over time, our nation’s election system has evolved into 

51 individual systems3

 that in turn are administered and principally funded 

by more than 10,000 counties, cities, townships, and villages. We found 

considerable variation in how these jurisdictions register voters; arrange 

for polling places; recruit, train and pay poll workers; buy and maintain 

voting equipment; conduct the election; and count the votes. Given this 

variability, states and local jurisdictions have indicated the need for 

reasonable flexibility in tailoring reform proposals to accommodate local 

needs. Because implementing reform may require states and local 

jurisdictions to transform long held practices, they will also need 

appropriate time to successfully integrate the changes into policies and 

procedures. 

Second, our work also underscores the complexity and intricacy inherent 

in the American electoral system. The success of an election system is 

contingent on the appropriate integration of people, processes, and 

technology. Our research disclosed various challenges that election 

officials face in each of these areas.

People: The people involved in an election include the election officials 

and legions of temporary poll workers who prepare for and conduct the 

election as well as the voters who participate in them. Our work disclosed 

a wide range of challenges election officials faced related to both election 

workers and voters. For example, recruiting and training a sufficient 

number of poll workers presented a challenge to many officials. We 

3

Including the 50 states and the District of Columbia.
Page 7 GAO-02-90 Elections

estimate that 51 percent of jurisdictions nationwide found it somewhat or 

very difficult to recruit a sufficient number of poll workers. As a second 

example, providing education to voters on election processes and 

equipment also posed a challenge to election officials, in some cases due to 

a lack of funds. We estimate that 38 percent of jurisdictions nationwide 

support federal funding to subsidize voter education. We also found that 

making polling places accessible to voters with disabilities or providing 

alternative methods for voting to individuals with disabilities posed a 

challenge to many election jurisdictions. 

Process: Processes guide people involved in the election process. For 

example, election workers rely on processes as they carry out their duties 

such as registering voters, distributing and processing absentee ballots, 

educating voters, conducting the election, and counting the votes. We 

found that a wide variety of process-related challenges confronted election 

officials. For instance, keeping registration lists accurate and current 

presented a challenge. In some cases, difficulties maintaining current voter 

registration lists were related to the National Voter Registration Act 

(NVRA, which is widely known as the “Motor Voter” Act) in part because 

local election officials received incomplete or incorrect voter registration 

information from motor vehicle authorities. We estimate that about 46 

percent of jurisdictions nationwide had problems with NVRA during the 

November 2000 election. Our work also surfaced process-related 

challenges associated with providing assistance for military personnel and 

overseas citizens absentee voters. These voters’ absentee ballots were 

disqualified at higher rates than absentee ballots cast by voters living in the 

United States. We found the availability of assistance to military personnel 

and overseas citizens lacking and recommend that the Departments of 

State and Defense take action to improve voter education and assistance 

efforts. As a final example, determining voter intent when ballots were 

improperly marked presented a challenge to many election officials. We 

estimate that nationwide about 32 percent of local election jurisdictions 

had no written instructions to interpret voter intent when ballots are 

mismarked. 

Technology: Technology, such as voting equipment, provides tools for 

officials as they administer elections and for voters as they participate in 

them. We identified diverse technology-related challenges facing our 

nation’s election systems. Assessing why voting equipment does not meet 

the needs of a jurisdiction presented a challenge to many election officials. 

As a result, election officials may face a related challenge--a lack of 

performance data to help them make informed decisions regarding 
Page 8 GAO-02-90 Elections

acquisition of new voting equipment. Overall, about 96 percent of 

jurisdictions nationwide reported being satisfied with the performance of 

their voting equipment, but this level of satisfaction was typically based on 

election officials’ subjective impressions rather than objective performance 

data. We estimate that less than half of election jurisdictions collected data 

on how well their voting equipment performed in the November 2000 

election. In addition to these challenges, we found that federal standards 

for voting equipment should be updated (the FEC has initiated plans to 

issue revised standards in 2002). We are making recommendations to the 

FEC aimed at improving its efforts to update its 1990 voting equipment 

standards. Because development, maintenance, and implementation of 

voting equipment standards are very important responsibilities, we also 

raise as a matter for congressional consideration the explicit assignment of 

responsibility in these areas. 

Our research also indicates that failure to coordinate these components 

can cause problems that may be hard to accurately characterize, diagnose 

and correct. For example, many of the problems that received media 

attention in the November 2000 election were attributed to the failure of 

voting technologies to accurately record the voter’s selections or count the 

ballots. Our analysis showed that the type of voting equipment used 

(including equipment which allowed for error correction) explained a 

relatively small percent of the total variation among jurisdictions in 

uncounted presidential votes. Jurisdictions, however, may still wish to 

obtain benefits from modernizing voting equipment. In addition, many 

election officials pointed to greater voter education as a more immediate 

way to resolve voter error and uncounted votes.

Third, this report delineates an analytical framework that Congress could 

use as it weighs the merits of various reform proposals. This framework 

entails the following four fundamental criteria:

• Criterion I: The Appropriate Role of the Federal Government in 

Election Reform.

Does the proposed change call for an appropriate federal role in 

affecting election reform, given the historic balance struck between 

Congress’ constitutional authority to legislate election administration 

and some states’ laws and traditions that grant autonomy to local 

jurisdictions as they administer elections?
Page 9 GAO-02-90 Elections

• Criterion II: The Balance Between Accessibility and Integrity.4

How are the goals of providing citizens broad access to the voting 

process balanced against the public’s interest in ensuring the integrity of 

our election systems?

• Criterion III: Coordination and Integration of People, 

Processes, and Technology.

How does the proposed change affect both the discrete problem it is 

intended to resolve and the election system as a whole? 

• Criterion IV: The Affordability and Sustainability of Proposed 

Election Reforms.

Have the necessary resources been identified to institute the change and 

to continually monitor and re-evaluate it over time?

Section 1: States and 

Local Jurisdictions 

Indicated the Desire 

for Reasonable 

Flexibility and Time to 

Implement Reforms

Election administration in the U.S. is guided by federal and state laws, 

regulations and policies. Within the broad framework established by the 

Constitution and federal statutes, each state sets its own requirements for 

conducting local, state, and federal elections within the state. 

Consequently, state requirements and processes vary considerably, and the 

U.S. election system comprises 51 separate election systems. In turn, states 

typically have decentralized this process so the responsibility for 

administering and funding elections resides in thousands of local 

government election jurisdictions, creating even more variability among 

our nation’s election systems. Thus, in adopting federal election reforms, 

the degree of flexibility and the timeframes for implementing new 

initiatives need to be given careful consideration during deliberation and 

execution of related reforms. 

4

As used in this criterion, accessibility refers to voters’ access to the political process rather 

than the access of a voter with disabilities to the polling place.
Page 10 GAO-02-90 Elections

The Federal Government 

Establishes a General 

Framework for Elections, 

but Elections Are Primarily 

the Responsibility of State 

and Local Governments

The constitutional framework for elections contemplates both state and 

federal roles. With regard to the administration of federal elections, 

Congress has certain constitutional authorities over both congressional 

and presidential elections. 5 Congress has passed legislation relating to the 

administration of federal elections, under its various constitutional 

authorities in certain areas, including the timing of federal elections, voter 

registration, accessibility provisions for the elderly and persons with 

disabilities, and absentee voting. Congress has, however, been most active 

with respect to enacting prohibitions against discriminatory voting 

practices, which apply in the context of both federal and state elections. 

The Voting Rights Act of 1965, for example, established the constitutional 

guarantee that no person be denied the right to vote on account of race or 

color. In addition, subsequent amendments to the Act expanded it to 

include protections for members of language minority groups, as well as 

other matters regarding voting registration and procedures.

Within the broad framework established by the Constitution and federal 

statutes, each state sets the requirements for conducting local, state, and 

federal elections within the state. For example, states regulate such aspects 

of elections as ballot access, registration procedures, absentee voting 

requirements, establishment of voting places, provision of election day 

workers, and counting and certifying the vote. The states, in turn have 

typically delegated responsibility for administering and funding state 

election systems to the thousands of local election jurisdictions—more 

than 10,000 nationwide—creating even more variability among our nation’s 

election systems. 

State election codes and regulations may be very specific or very general. 

In particular, some states have mandated statewide election administration 

guidelines and procedures that foster uniformity in the way local 

jurisdictions conduct elections. It is common for state provisions to furnish 

some guidance regarding voter registration requirements and procedures, 

absentee voting requirements and procedures, performance requirements 

for voting methods used within the state, establishment of polling places, 

provision of election day workers, and the count and certification of the 

vote. Other states have guidelines that generally permit local election 

5

For additional details, see Elections: The Scope of Congressional Authority in Election 

Administration (GAO-01-470, Mar. 13, 2001).
Page 11 GAO-02-90 Elections

jurisdictions considerable autonomy and discretion in the way they run 

elections (see figure 1). 

Figure 1: Oklahoma and Pennsylvania Illustrate Differences Between Statewide 

Election Systems and Locally Autonomous Jurisdictions 

Source: GAO analysis based on information from local election officials.

Great Variability Exists in 

the Ways Various Local 

Elections Are Conducted

The variability from state to state becomes even more pronounced at the 

local level, as local jurisdictions have used the flexibility afforded in state 

provisions to create local elections systems that vary from county to 

county, and even, in some cases, within counties. This variation stems 

from several factors. One factor can be a consequence of the size of local 

election jurisdictions, which varies considerably. For example, one rural 

county has 208 registered voters in contrast with a large, urban county, 

such as Los Angeles County, whose total number of registered voters 

exceeds that of 41 states. The complexity of preparing for and conducting 

an election in large jurisdictions is generally greater than in smaller 

jurisdictions. For example, a rural county, with a few thousand voters who 

share the same language, prints its ballot in one language. In contrast, in a 

large, urban jurisdiction with a diverse population of 4 million registered 

voters prints its ballots in 7 different languages. This can also have an 

effect on the processes and type of voting equipment used. As illustrated in 

figure 2, the magnitude of other key administrative tasks in this large, urban 

jurisdiction is a thousand times larger than for the small jurisdiction.

Oklahoma has

• standard election day

• standard poll worker training.

election mamagement system.

• one type of voting machine.

Pennsylvania has

• minimal state guidelines.

• 67 counties with 67 different election

systems.

• diverse voting technologies.
Page 12 GAO-02-90 Elections

Figure 2: Size of Jurisdiction Affects Magnitude of Key Tasks for Election Officials 

Source: GAO analysis based on information from local election officials.

Variability can also be a consequence of local needs. For example, a 

jurisdiction with a large population segment that moves out of the location 

each year might opt for certain voter registration and voter education 

processes that reflect the need to address a large voter turnover. As a 

second example, a jurisdiction might use a certain type of voting equipment 

based on financial resource availability. More wealthy jurisdictions have 

had the resources necessary to modernize equipment, while others need to 

make do with what they have. 

Finally, variability can be a consequence of a jurisdiction’s perceived need 

to maintain voting traditions that have been in place for a long time. In two 

jurisdictions we visited, election officials opted to replace lever machines 

with full-screen electronic voting machines because this machine uses a 

ballot that most closely resembles the type of ballot voters were used to 

seeing on lever machines. This choice was possible because ballots did not 

100,000

120,000

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

80,000

90,000

0

100,000

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

80,000

90,000

0 2,843 28 5

4,000,000

4 million

25,000

4,963

Numbers Numbers 

Registered 

 voters

Poll workers

Voting precinct

Registered 

voters

Poll workers

Voting precinct
Page 13 GAO-02-90 Elections

have to be printed in more than two languages in either jurisdiction so the 

ballots could fit on a single page.

Variability among states and local jurisdictions was evident in each major 

stage of an election--voter registration, absentee and early voting, preparing 

for and conducting election day activities, and vote counting and 

certification. Some examples follow.

Who Could Vote Varied For the November 2000 election, the FEC reported that nearly 168 million 

people, or about 82 percent of the voting age population,6

 were registered 

to vote. Registering to vote is not a federal requirement, but in November 

2000, all states except North Dakota required citizens to register before 

voting. At a minimum, every state and the District of Columbia required 

that a voter be a U.S. citizen, at least 18 years of age, and a resident. 

Additional requirements to vote, such as time in residence, varied. Due to 

variations in voter eligibility requirements, different citizens with the same 

qualifications would be eligible to vote in some states but not in others 

including (1) those that had completed their sentence after a felony 

conviction; (2) those who had been adjudged mentally incompetent; and 

(3) those who met all of the qualifications to vote but who had not 

registered in accordance with prescribed timeframes.

When People Could Vote Varied In November 2000, citizens had different opportunities for obtaining and 

successfully casting absentee ballots due to the differences in absentee and 

early voting requirements, administration, and procedures. All states allow 

some provision for absentee balloting; some, however, require a reason to 

vote absentee as indicated in the figure below. 

6

This number includes active and inactive voters. FEC defines inactive voters as those who 

remain on the registration list but who have moved, according to information provided by 

the Postal Service, have been mailed a registration confirmation notice, but have neither 

responded nor offered to vote in the subsequent federal election. All other persons on the 

registration list are considered to be active voters. In The Impact of The National Voter 

Registration Act of 1993 on the Administration of Elections for Federal Office, 1999-

2000, the FEC reported that for the November 2000 general elections, there were 

149,476,705 active registered voters, about 73 percent of the voting age population. 
Page 14 GAO-02-90 Elections

Figure 3: Some States Require An Excuse Before Allowing Voters to Cast An Absentee Ballot, But Others Do Not

Source: GAO review of state statutes.

Who Conducted the Election 

Varied 

For the November 2000 election, about 1.4 million poll workers staffed 

polling places across the country on election day. Although poll workers 

are usually employed for only one day, the success of election 

administration largely hinges upon their ability to perform their jobs well. 

Depending on state law and the organization and traditions of the local 

jurisdiction, poll workers have different titles, levels of pay, training 

Allows no-excuse voting before election day

Requires an excuse to vote before election day

WA

CA

OR

NV

AZ

UT

MT

WY

CO

NM

ND

SD

N

KS

OK

TX

S

AL

AK

HI

NJ

DE

NH

RI

CT

MA

DC
Page 15 GAO-02-90 Elections

requirements, and responsibilities. Some poll workers are elected, some 

are appointed, and some volunteer. Levels of authority and responsibility 

that jurisdictions grant to poll workers also ranged from significant 

autonomy over the operation of the polling place with final authority to 

interpret improper ballot markings to having limited discretion, functioning 

primarily as clerks and facilitators who refer issues and problems back to 

elections headquarters. 

How Elections Were Conducted 

Varied

Jurisdictions followed various procedures on election day that created 

differences in the way elections were conducted. For example, to 

determine whether a citizen who appeared at the polls was eligible to vote, 

some jurisdictions required voters to identify themselves by stating their 

names and addresses to the poll workers, who also matched the signature 

on the voter application with the voter registration records. Other 

jurisdictions also required voters to present a valid photo identification 

card. In other jurisdictions, a hunting or fishing license was sufficient to 

verify one’s identity. Still other jurisdictions required no identification other 

than the voter stating his or her name. If a voter’s name did not appear on 

the list of registered voters, some jurisdictions accommodated these 

individuals by automatically giving them a provisional ballot which may 

have been counted if the voter’s eligibility was verified at a later time. 

Others did not. 

How the Votes Were Cast Varied Registered voters cast their ballots using one of five voting methods in the 

November 2000 election: hand-counted paper ballots and lever, punch card, 

optical scan, and Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting equipment. 

Punch card and optical scan equipment was most widely used by registered 

voters, as figure 4 shows.
Page 16 GAO-02-90 Elections

Figure 4: Voting Methods Used In November 2000 Election by Registered Voters

Source: GAO analysis of data from Electronic Data Services and states.

Election Reform Requires 

An Appreciation for 

Variability Among 

Jurisdictions 

Although the states have traditionally had broad authority to regulate and 

conduct elections, Congress also has broad authority to regulate federal 

elections, and, in particular, congressional elections. State and local 

election officials generally use the same people, processes, and technology 

to conduct local, state, and federal elections. Consequently, as a practical 

matter, congressionally directed changes in the conduct of congressional 

elections are likely to affect the administration of state and local elections. 

In addition, through the use of its spending power, Congress may 

encourage state action by attaching conditions to the receipt of federal 

funds.7

31 31

17

12

8

1

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Optical scan

Punch card

Lever

DRE

Mixed

Paper ballots

Percentage

7

For additional details, see GAO-01-470, Mar. 13, 2001.
Page 17 GAO-02-90 Elections

Our work found wide variations across the country which have developed 

over time in response to local economic, demographic, political, and 

cultural traditions in each state and local jurisdiction. As might be 

expected given this variety, local election officials do not share a common 

perspective on election reform. For example, when asked their 

preferences for the use of federal funds, should they become available, 

local election officials identified a range of spending priorities, with no 

clear consensus on the top priority. Among these priorities were voter 

education, voting equipment, poll worker pay, and postage for mailing 

voting materials and printing ballots. Nor was there a consensus among 

local election officials on how involved the federal government should be 

in state and local election administration and reform. About 27 percent of 

the local jurisdictions we surveyed supported uniform standards for 

election administration, and 30 percent supported updated federal 

standards for voting equipment. However, many of the jurisdictions we 

visited did not want federal funding for election administration if it meant 

sacrificing local autonomy. Some supported the concept of a federal 

clearinghouse for sharing information about election administration 

practices. 

Overall, our work suggests that a "one size fits all" approach may not be 

suitable for every aspect of election administration. In jurisdictions with a 

small number of voters, for example, hand-counted paper ballots may 

produce accurate and complete vote counts. Conversely, full-faced DRE 

equipment (this type of machine uses a large, single-page ballot) could not 

readily accommodate Los Angeles County's long ballot printed in 7 

languages. Thus, the degree of flexibility afforded local jurisdictions in 

implementing any reform should be given careful consideration when 

deliberating specific reform initiatives. Historically, changes in election 

administration have been evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Both 

National Survey Results

We estimate that 54 percent of local election officials support federal

funding to subsidize postage for materials mailed to voters, 42 percent

support federal funding to help with the operational costs of elections, and

over 38 percent support federal funding for voter education.

GAO Mail Survey of Jurisdictions
Page 18 GAO-02-90 Elections

election officials and voters become accustomed to and comfortable with 

how elections are planned and conducted in their individual jurisdictions. 

Many of the underlying conditions associated with the variations are not 

likely to change in the short term. Large-scale, immediate changes in the 

use of people, processes, or technology will not necessarily change those 

conditions. Thus, appropriate time may be needed for state and local 

jurisdictions to determine how to implement changes effectively in their 

specific jurisdictions.

Section 2: Challenges 

Exist to All Parts of 

Election Systems: 

People, Process, and 

Technology 

The second principal finding that emerged from our work is that election 

officials face a range of challenges connected with all parts of the election 

system: people, process, and technology. The people involved in an 

election include election officials, legions of temporary poll workers, and 

voters. Processes guide people as they carry out their duties, such as 

registering voters and conducting the vote. Technology, such as voting 

equipment, provides tools for officials to administer elections and for 

voters to participate in them. 

Our work identifies several challenges that can be categorized as primarily 

people, process, or technology-related issues. Although we classify 

problems as falling into one of these three areas, what becomes apparent is 

that a problem in any one of these three broad categories is related in some 

way to another part of the system. For example, people-related challenges 

impinge upon process issues, process challenges affect technology, and 

technology challenges affect people issues. 

Specifically, several challenges emerged from our work on elections. 

Issues with recruiting and training poll workers, educating voters, and 

National Survey Results

We estimate that 57 percent of jurisdictions nationwide had major problems

in one or more areas on election day.

GAO Mail Survey of Jurisdictions
Page 19 GAO-02-90 Elections

addressing needs of voters with disabilities posed major people-related 

challenges in the November 2000 elections. Election officials confronted 

process-related challenges that included maintaining accurate voter 

registration lists, completing and processing absentee ballots, and 

canvassing the vote. Technology-related challenges that faced our nation’s 

election systems included assessing why voting equipment may fail to meet 

jurisdictions’ needs, collecting useful performance data to make informed 

investment decisions, and needing federal leadership in updating and 

implementing standards for voting equipment. Below we highlight the 

main challenges identified through discussions with election officials and 

our analysis.

People, Both Election 

Workers and Voters, 

Presented Challenges

Issues with recruiting and training poll workers, educating voters, and 

addressing needs of voters with disabilities posed major challenges in the 

November 2000 elections. We estimate that over half of the jurisdictions in 

the United States found it somewhat or very difficult to recruit and train a 

sufficient number of poll workers. The major challenge many jurisdictions 

identified regarding voter education was finding sufficient funding. On the 

basis of our mail survey, we estimate that over a third of the jurisdictions 

nationwide believed that the federal government should provide monetary 

assistance for voter education programs. Limited availability of accessible 

buildings and other constraints create obstacles to election officials’ efforts 

to make polling places accessible to voters with disabilities. We estimate 

that, from the parking area to the voting booth, 16 percent of all polling 

places have no potential impediments, 56 percent have one or more 

potential impediments but offer curbside voting, and 28 percent have one 

or more potential impediments and do not offer curbside voting.

Recruiting and Training Qualified 

Poll Workers Presents a Major 

Challenge for Many Jurisdictions

Many election officials told us recruiting and training a sufficient number of 

poll workers with appropriate skills to open, operate, and close polling 

places was a major challenge on election day. Factors that can work in 

concert to complicate an already difficult task for election officials include 

an aging work force, low pay, and little or no poll worker training.

Recruiting Enough Poll Workers Is Difficult for Many

On the basis of our mail survey, we estimate that 51 percent of jurisdictions 

nationwide had a somewhat or very difficult time getting enough poll 

workers. For these jurisdictions, obtaining enough poll workers (27 
Page 20 GAO-02-90 Elections

percent) was the most frequently identified major problem the jurisdictions 

faced. 

Poll Workers Drawn From Aging Labor Pool

Many people who are available for occasional full-day employment as poll 

workers are older, perhaps retired, and likely attracted to the work because 

of something other than the pay because poll workers are generally paid 

low wages. For example, an election official in a small jurisdiction said 

that over 70 percent of their poll workers are over 65 years old. One official 

remarked that volunteering is characteristic of an older generation. 

Several officials echoed the statement of an official in a small jurisdiction 

that “[o]ur election workforce is aging and we are having difficulty 

recruiting younger workers.” 

Low Pay, Long Hours May Discourage Younger Workers

The pool of potential poll workers may be shrinking because poll worker 

pay is inadequate to attract employed or more skilled workers and poll 

workers often are required to complete a 15- to 18-hour day. One election 

official reported that “[s]ince compensation for this job is only $80 to $135 

per day, depending upon the election district, it is not sufficient to attract a 

younger workforce.” The length of the day is a complaint of many poll 

workers and may even pose an obstacle for younger workers. Another 

official said that, “[w]hat they (the election judges) used to consider as a 

fun and interesting day and an American duty has become ‘heavy duty’.” In 

one large jurisdiction, election officials asked poll workers to provide 

feedback on their experience in the November 2000 election. One poll 

worker responded that it was “[a]bsolutely, positively too long a day. I am 

National Survey Results

We estimate 51 percent of the jurisdictions nationwide reported that it was

somewhat or very difficult to get a sufficient number of poll workers.

GAO Mail Survey of Jurisdictions
Page 21 GAO-02-90 Elections

26 years old and very athletic and still went home at night and fell asleep 

with my clothes on. With the majority of helpers either older or disabled, I 

have no idea how they survived the day.”

Poll Workers With Specialized Skills Are Often Difficult to Recruit 

Another problem is addressing the specialized labor needs unique to 

particular polling sites, according to several local election officials. Some 

polling places required poll workers to have specific language skills. 

Finding qualified bilingual workers, specifically workers fluent in Asian 

languages, is one very large jurisdiction’s biggest recruiting problem. Some 

places had trouble finding poll workers who are able to learn the technical 

skills necessary to operate voting equipment. Officials in one very large 

jurisdiction said they have no scarcity of people willing to serve, but finding 

people to meet specialized needs is the issue. Obstacles to recruiting poll 

workers may overlap. One election official wrote that “[i]t is increasingly 

difficult to find folks to work for $6 an hour. We are relying on older retired 

persons—many who can’t/won’t keep up with changes in the technology or 

laws. Many of our workers are 70+.” 

Minimal Training May Not Have Adequately Prepared Poll Workers 

for Election Day 

We estimate that 87 percent of jurisdictions nationwide provided some 

training for poll workers. Poll worker training courses generally span a few 

hours’ time and focus on the key processes that poll workers should follow, 

including how to operate voting equipment. Although most of the 

jurisdictions we visited required some poll worker training, election 

officials cited instances where poll workers who had attended training still 

either did not understand what they were to do or chose not to follow 

specific instructions on how to run the polls. For example, to handle 

unregistered voters in one very large jurisdiction, the poll workers were 

instructed to provide those voters with questionable credentials a 

provisional ballot. However, some poll workers failed to follow these rules 

and turned away some voters from the polling place. Poll worker training 

in the sites we visited rarely included discussion of the interpersonal skills 

that poll workers should employ when dealing with frustrated citizens or 

with each other.

Educating Voters About 

Processes, Voting Equipment is a 

Challenge

Another people-related challenge concerns educating voters about 

particular processes, such as voter registration and how to operate voting 

equipment. Jurisdictions place varying degrees of emphasis on educating 
Page 22 GAO-02-90 Elections

voters about election processes and procedures. A lack of funds is the 

primary challenge that election officials said they face in expanding their 

efforts to educate voters about elections. Further, spending for voter 

education is considered discretionary. Some local officials must first take 

care of mandatory items such as equipment, supplies, poll worker salaries 

and polling places. Many officials said that they see voter education as an 

area where federal funds could be particularly helpful. On the basis of our 

mail survey, we estimate that over 38 percent of jurisdictions nationwide 

believed that the federal government should provide monetary assistance 

for voter education programs.

Voter Education Needed Regarding Processes, Use of Voting 

Equipment

How well a jurisdiction educates voters about election processes and how 

to use voting equipment can effect how well an election system functions. 

For example, a number of problems associated with processes, such as 

requesting and completing absentee ballots and registering to vote, are 

precipitated by voters failing to provide complete information or to meet 

deadlines. Voter education can be used to help remedy some of these 

difficulties. 

How well jurisdictions educate voters on the use of voting equipment can 

affect how easy voters find the equipment to use and integrity of the vote. 

Jurisdictions provide various types of voter education materials to help 

voters correctly use voting equipment.
Page 23 GAO-02-90 Elections

Figure 5: Jurisdictions Offer Various Types of Voter Education Materials

Source: Local election officials.

How frequently the voting equipment counts votes as intended by voters is 

a function not only of equipment design, but of how well poll workers 

properly instructed and guided voters, how well voters followed applicable 

instructions, and what type of assistance was available to help voters who 

Cuyhoga County provides instructions on how to 

vote a punch card ballot.

Detroit warns voters against choosing more 

than one candidate in a single race on one 

page of its voter guide.

Los Angeles County advises 

voters to remove hanging chads 

from their punch card ballots.

A

B

Tulsa uses the front side (A) of 

wallet cards to educate voters on 

the proper way to complete optical 

scan ballots and the reverse side to 

provide (B) schedules for key 

events.
Page 24 GAO-02-90 Elections

have questions or make mistakes in voting. To illustrate this point, officials 

from a very large jurisdiction stated that in the November 2000 election 

1,500 voters had inserted their punch cards in the recording device upside 

down, thus causing their votes to be inaccurately recorded. Similarly, at a 

small jurisdiction that we visited where optical scan equipment was used, 

officials reported that some voters incorrectly marked the ovals or used a 

nonreadable pen to mark the ballot, resulting in partially read ballots. In a 

medium-sized jurisdiction that we visited, voters selected a candidate on 

the optical scan ballot and then wrote the candidate’s name in the write-in 

section of the ballot, thus overvoting (making more choices than are 

permitted per contest) and spoiling the ballot. The election officials stated 

that they believed that this misunderstanding contributed to the 

jurisdictions’ almost 5-percent overvote rate. In each of these cases, the 

way that the voter completed the ballot caused the vote to be recorded 

inaccurately, even though the voting equipment correctly counted the votes 

as recorded.

Officials Face Challenges 

Addressing Needs of Voters with 

Disabilities 

A third people-related challenge surfaced during the November 2000 

election—making polling places accessible to voters with disabilities or 

providing alternative voting methods such as curbside voting. The extent 

to which any given feature may prevent or facilitate access to a polling 

place is unknown; however, based on our onsite work during the 

November 2000 election, we estimate that, from the parking area to the 

voting room, 16 percent of all polling places have no potential 

impediments, 56 percent have one or more potential impediments but offer 

curbside voting, and 28 percent have one or more potential impediments 

and do not offer curbside voting (see fig. 6).8

 These potential impediments 

would primarily affect individuals with mobility impairments and occur 

most often on the route from the parking area to the building or at the 

entrance to the polling place. Inside the voting room, the types and 

arrangement of voting equipment used may also pose challenges for people 

with mobility, vision, or dexterity impairments. 

8

Although curbside voting is not available at a number of polling places with potential 

impediments, as noted earlier all states have provisions for absentee voting, and many states 

provide for other alternative voting methods or accommodations, which may facilitate 

voting by people with disabilities on or before election day.
Page 25 GAO-02-90 Elections

Figure 6: Prevalence of Potential Impediments at Polling Places and Availability of 

Curbside Voting

Note: These potential impediments are located along the route from the parking area to the voting 

room.

Source: GAO analysis of polling place data collected on Nov. 7, 2000.

A number of efforts have been made by states and localities to improve 

voting accessibility for people with disabilities, such as modifying polling 

places, acquiring new voting equipment, and providing curbside voting. 

State and county election officials we surveyed cited a variety of challenges 

to improving access, including limited availability of accessible facilities 

and funding constraints at the local level. Some disability advocates 

believe that alternative voting methods and accommodations should not be 

viewed as permanent solutions for inaccessible polling places because 

these remedies do not provide the same opportunity for voting afforded the 

general public, that is, in a polling place and in private.

Processes for Election 

Activities Present 

Challenges to Election 

Administration Officials 

Election officials confronted process-related challenges that included 

maintaining accurate voter registration lists, completing and processing 

absentee ballots, and interpreting voter intent. A number of jurisdictions 

reported they had trouble maintaining accurate voter registration lists 

because of the NVRA. This difficulty, in turn, may have exacerbated 

problems related to qualifying voters at the polls on election day. As the 

Percentage of polling places with no

potential impediments

16%

56%

28%

Percentage of polling places with

one or more potential impediments

that offer curbside voting

Percentage of polling places with one

or more potential impediments that do not

offer curbside voting
Page 26 GAO-02-90 Elections

number of voters at home and abroad who cast absentee ballots grows, 

challenges related to absentee voting are increasing. Election officials 

reported difficulties with processing millions of absentee ballots cast in the 

weeks and days before election day and noted the added financial burden 

of processing these ballots. Military personnel and overseas citizens’

absentee ballots were disqualified at a higher rate than voters at home 

which presents another challenge. And finally, interpreting improperly 

marked ballots to determine the voter’s intent was a challenging process 

because local jurisdictions often lack specific, written guidance and the 

task itself can be inherently difficult. 

NVRA May Complicate 

Maintenance of Voter 

Registration Lists, Qualifying 

Voters on Election Day 

Primarily, a citizen’s access to voting was based on the appearance of his or 

her name on a voter registration list, which is compiled and maintained by 

election officials. Officials encountered several process-related challenges 

connected with compiling and maintaining accurate voter registration lists, 

chief among them processing applications submitted through sources other 

than elections offices, such as motor vehicle authorities. Specifically, local 

election officials around the country expressed concerns about processing 

voter registration applications submitted at state motor vehicle authorities, 

as permitted by NVRA. They claimed motor vehicle authorities forward 

incomplete, illegible and late applications. Some election officials attribute 

not only missing or incomplete applications to NVRA, but a new problem, 

duplicate registrations. In the words of one official:

“You can ask any county clerk in the state and they will tell you that the biggest problem is 

motor voter [NVRA]. Residents can register at the welfare office, the health department, the 

motor vehicle authorities, and they do, time and again. This results in tons of registrations 

which are costly and time-consuming to sort through and check against records.”

National Survey Results

We estimate that about 46 percent of jurisdictions nationwide had problems

with the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA or motor voter) during the

November 2000 election.

GAO Telephone Survey of Jurisdictions
Page 27 GAO-02-90 Elections

Inaccurate registration lists affect other parts of the election system, 

especially qualifying voters on election day. Officials reported that voters 

appeared at the polls on election day claiming to have registered to vote 

through the motor vehicle authority, but their applications never arrived in 

the elections office. These individuals were sometimes turned away from 

the polls. Dealing with voter eligibility issues can be a major problem for 

some jurisdictions. We estimate that 30 percent of jurisdictions considered 

dealing with unregistered voters at the polls to be a major problem. 

Processes for Assisting Citizens 

at Home and Abroad with 

Absentee Voting Present 

Challenges

All 50 states and the District of Columbia allowed some form of absentee or 

early voting to increase voter access, convenience, and participation, and 

the number of American voting absentee is growing. Using Census data, 

we estimate that for the November 2000 election about 14 percent of voters 

nationwide cast their ballots before election day. 9 Of these voters, about 73 

percent used mail ballots and 27 percent voted in-person, as seen in Figure 

7. This represents an increase from the 1996 presidential election in which 

a total of about 11 percent of voters cast ballots before election day. We 

estimate that nationwide local election officials received about 14.5 million 

applications for mail-in absentee ballots (plus or minus 3 million) for the 

November 2000 election.

9

Based on GAO analysis of U.S. Census Current Population Survey, November 2000 Voting 

Supplement.
Page 28 GAO-02-90 Elections

Figure 7: Persons Voting Absentee in the November 2000 Election Cast Ballots Both 

by Mail-in and In-Person Absentee Voting

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey, November 2000 Voting 

Supplement.

As more voters, at home and abroad, cast absentee ballots, officials from 

several local election jurisdictions reported costs and workload involved in 

reviewing the volume of ballots have grown. Each of the millions of mail-in 

absentee ballots received by local election officials had to be qualified 

before being counted. Officials from one very large jurisdiction stated that 

the sheer volume of mail-in ballots received creates a greater potential for 

errors.

Voted in person

Voted by mail

Voted before

election day

14%

27%

73%
Page 29 GAO-02-90 Elections

Military and Overseas Citizens’ Absentee Ballots Disqualified at 

Higher Rates

Because military and overseas citizens’ absentee ballots are disqualified at 

higher rates than those of citizens voting absentee at home, processes for 

assisting military personnel and overseas citizens need to be improved. 

Although precise numbers are not available, we estimate that counties 

having a voting age population of less than 60,000 nationwide disqualified 

about 8 percent of ballots cast by military and overseas voters. In contrast, 

the ballot disqualification rate for civilian voters not living overseas was 

less than 2 percent.10 While counties having a voting age population of 

more than 60,000 that responded to GAO's survey showed a similar pattern, 

the data was insufficient to make a national estimate.11 

The survey showed that for all absentee ballots cast, almost two-thirds of 

the disqualified absentee ballots were rejected because the ballots arrived 

too late to be counted or the envelopes or forms accompanying the ballots 

were not completed properly. The figure below describes the forms that 

must be completed in order for the mail-in absentee ballot to be qualified.

10The confidence intervals in this report are calculated at the 95-percent confidence level. 

For example, we are 95 percent certain that the actual disqualification rate for civilians not 

living overseas was between 1.2 and 2.4 percent. In this analysis, GAO uses the term 

"disqualified ballots" to refer to absentee ballots that, in the judgement of local election 

officials, did not meet state requirements and that were rejected prior to the vote counting 

process. For instance, the ballot may have been received after the deadline or may have 

lacked certain required information on the ballot/return envelope, such as the voter's 

signature. Disqualification does not refer to ballots that were rejected during ballot 

counting due to problems in reading the ballot and/or determining a voter's actual 

preferences.

11Not enough counties in the sample provided data on the reasons ballots were disqualified 

from specific groups of voters, such as military versus non-military, to enable GAO to make 

reasonable estimates for these groups.
Page 30 GAO-02-90 Elections

Figure 8: Example of An Absentee Ballot Secrecy Envelope That Must Be Completed 

Correctly in Order For the Absentee Ballot to be Counted

Source: Local election officials.

Processes for Assisting Military and Overseas Citizens Need 

Improvement

The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 198612

protects the right to vote by absentee ballot in federal elections for more 

than 6 million military and overseas citizens and recommends that states 

adopt a number of provisions that facilitate absentee voting by these 

populations. The Federal Voting Assistance Program, established within 

the Department of Defense (DOD), is responsible for implementing the act 

by informing U.S. citizens worldwide about their right to vote, fostering 

voting participation, and working with states to simplify the registration 

and absentee voting process. Also, the State Department works with DOD 

to provide voter assistance to overseas citizens.

1242 U.S.C. 1973ff-1973ff-6.

B

C

The secrecy envelope

containing the ballot is

then to be placed into

the ballot/return 

envelope.

A voter is to complete

his or her ballot and

place it in the secrecy

envelope.

The voter must sign

the envelope for the

vote to be counted.

(A) 

(B) 

(C) 

A
Page 31 GAO-02-90 Elections

The extent and quality of federal voter assistance for military personnel 

and overseas citizens varied considerably in the November 2000 election. 

While the Federal Voting Assistance Program developed a number of useful 

tools for voters and some installations GAO visited had well run programs 

providing assistance and information to potential voters, other installations 

did not meet DOD and service requirements. The variability in executing 

the program is due to incomplete service-level guidance that does not 

reflect DOD's directive, a lack of command support at some installations, 

and a lack of program oversight by some DOD components. Finally, the 

State Department provided citizens abroad with a variety of useful 

assistance, according to overseas citizens and federal employees GAO 

spoke to, although both groups believed more outreach could be beneficial. 

Also, State Department Headquarters has not played an active role in 

sharing best practices and lessons learned or in overseeing the program. 

We recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and State improve (1) the 

clarity and completeness of service guidance, (2) voter education and 

outreach programs, (3) oversight and evaluation of voting assistance 

efforts, and (4) sharing of best practices.13

Processes for Interpreting Voter 

Intent Posed a Challenge to 

Many

Processes for handling improperly marked ballots present a challenge for 

many election officials, especially when an election is close. Many states 

specifically require election officials to count ballots if the “intent of the 

voter” can be determined. Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia 

reported to us that they make some determination of voter intent. Voter 

intent issues arise with paper, optical scan, and punch card ballots, not 

when the ballots are marked properly for the type of ballot used, but when 

there are variations from proper marking. During the canvassing stage 

(when votes are counted and totals calculated), election officials are 

tasked with reviewing ballots that are not properly marked and sometimes 

required to determine how those voters intended to cast their votes. 

After the polls close and ballots are returned to election headquarters, 

workers canvass the votes, a process that entails reviewing all votes by 

precinct, resolving problem votes, and counting all valid votes. At this 

point, workers deal with ballots that are either unclearly or improperly 

marked. 

13The recommendations made to the Secretaries of Defense and State were made in 

Elections: Voting Assistance to Military and Overseas Citizens Should be Improved 

(GAO-01-1026, Sept. 28, 2001)
Page 32 GAO-02-90 Elections

Ballots can be improperly marked in variety of ways that differ according 

to the type of voting equipment being used in a jurisdiction. Because the 

DRE and lever machines voters record the vote directly on the equipment 

rather than a separate ballot, there is no opportunity for a mismarked 

ballot. Paper, punch card, and optical scan ballots, however, can be 

improperly marked. For example, on an optical scan ballot voters may 

have circled a candidate’s name, instead of completing the oval, box, or 

arrow next to the candidate’s name as illustrated in figure 9. 
Page 33 GAO-02-90 Elections

Figure 9: Optical Scan Ballots Can Be Mismarked in a Variety of Ways

Source: Local election officials and GAO analysis.

Interpreting a mismarked ballot to determine the voter’s intent can be a 

challenging process. While states may instruct officials to determine 

voter’s intent on mismarked ballots, states do not always provide guidance 

on how to do so. Our work indicates that nationwide about 30 percent of 

local jurisdictions had no instructions, either from the state or local 

jurisdiction, on how to interpret voter intent, for example, how to read 

John Doe

A. Optical Scan Ballots

may be improperly

marked when voters

(a) do not complete the

arrow,

(b) circle nominee's

names, and

(c) both fill in the arrow and

write in the candidate's

name.

B. Optical scan ballots are

properly marked when

the ends of the arrow

are connected.

A

B

(a)

(b)

(c)
Page 34 GAO-02-90 Elections

stray marks on paper ballots or dimples or partially punched chads on 

punch card ballots. We estimate that about 15 percent of jurisdictions had 

instructions developed by the jurisdiction and 23 percent had both state 

and local written guidance. 

Developing processes to interpret a voter’s intent can be challenging, and 

local jurisdictions vary in how they approach this task. Processes for 

handling punch card ballots illustrate this point. Jurisdictions we visited 

reported various ways to handle problem punch card ballots. For example, 

in one jurisdiction, election officials told us if the punch card ballot 

contains a dimple with a pinhole, employees put the original ballot over a 

pink (or duplicate) ballot and held it up to the light. Where they saw light, 

they punched. The employee also turned over the ballot and looked for 

bumps, which indicated the voter inserted the ballot backwards. If a ballot 

contained bumps on the backside, the ballot could be duplicated.

In another jurisdiction, a vote on a punch card consisted of any removed 

chad plus any chad that freely swung by one side. The person scanning the 

ballot inspected it for improperly punched chads by running the ballot 

through their fingers. In another jurisdiction, the ballot inspection teams 

are given a pair of tweezers and told to remove any chads remaining on the 

punch card. 

One jurisdiction used persons called “scanners” to go over the ballots 

before they are counted. Each ballot is inspected for improperly punched 

chad by running the ballot cards between the scanners’ fingers. Very loose 

chad will be removed through this process. If the chad does not come off 

and freely swings by one side, it may be removed. Problem ballots, such as 

National Survey Results

We estimate that nationwide about 32 percent of local election jurisdictions

had no written instructions, either from the state or local jurisdiction, on how

to interpret voter intent, such as stray marks on ballots or partially punched

punch card boxes.

GAO Mail Survey of Jurisdictions
Page 35 GAO-02-90 Elections

those that are unreadable because of incompletely removed punches or 

incorrect punches, can alter the counting results or create problems with 

the computer processing. They are given to “makeover scanners” to be 

remade. 

Technology Challenges 

Include Assessing Why 

Equipment May Not Meet 

Needs, Collecting Useful 

Performance Data, and 

Updating Standards 

While problems related to voting equipment performance during the 

November 2000 election received a great deal of media attention, the 

performance of voting equipment is not only a function of the technology 

design itself. The people who interact with the technology and the 

processes governing this interaction can also affect whether voting 

technology meets the needs of a jurisdiction. As a result, assessing why 

voting equipment may not meet needs of some jurisdictions can be 

difficult. Another challenge facing election officials involved obtaining 

reliable measures and objective data to make informed decisions about 

whether to invest in new voting equipment or to invest in measures to 

improve performance of existing equipment, such as maintenance 

personnel. Local jurisdictions do not always have the information they 

need to select the most appropriate investment option given their needs 

and resource constraints. Although 96 percent of local jurisdictions report 

that they are satisfied with their voting equipment, less than 50 percent of 

them collect data on how well their equipment performed. This 

information is vital for jurisdictions considering modernizing their 

equipment. Another challenge relates to developing and maintaining 

updated standards for voting equipment. Although the FEC is in the 

process of updating voting equipment standards issued in 1990, 

responsibility for establishing, maintaining, and implementing up-to-date 

standards for voting equipment has not been explicitly assigned. As a 

result, the 1990 standards have become dated. 

Assessing Why Voting Equipment 

May Not Meet Jurisdictions’

Needs Poses a Challenge

Understanding a jurisdiction’s voting equipment needs and why voting 

equipment may not meet those needs can pose a challenge. In assessing 

whether voting equipment meets the needs of a jurisdiction’s user 

communities (both the voters and the officials who administer the 

elections), election officials must have reliable measures and objective 

performance data. When voting equipment does not meet the needs of a 

jurisdiction, officials must also understand the cause or causes of the 

problem before they can choose an appropriate solution, such as more 

voter education, increased training for election workers, or acquiring new 

equipment. These causes can be difficult to identify because performance 

of voting equipment is not only a function of the technology design itself, 
Page 36 GAO-02-90 Elections

but also of the people who interact with the technology and the processes 

governing this interaction. 

To illustrate this point, our survey of vendors showed little difference 

among the basic performance characteristics of DRE, optical scan, and 

punch card equipment.14 However, when local election jurisdictions’

experiences with the equipment are considered, performance differences 

among voting equipment became more evident. These differences arise 

because a real-world setting—such as an election in which equipment is 

operated by actual voters, poll workers, and technicians—tends to result in 

performance that differs from that in a controlled setting (such as in the 

manufacturer’s laboratory). This difference demonstrates the importance 

of the effect of people and process on equipment performance. 

While Some Voting Equipment Is Easier to Use, No Clear “Best 

Performer”

Figure 10 shows a relative comparison of certain characteristics—

accuracy, ease of use, efficiency, and security—of the various types of 

voting equipment used in the November 2000 elections. The comparison 

reflects the results of our analysis of data provided by voting equipment 

vendors that responded to our survey and survey responses of 513 local 

election jurisdictions.15 With appropriate maintenance and proper 

operation, most equipment performs on par with each other. Some voting 

technology is easier to use thus eliminating some opportunities for voter 

error. Overall, our analysis of both the vendor and jurisdiction data 

showed that DREs are slightly easier to use and slightly more efficient than 

the other types of equipment. In the area of security, DRE and optical scan 

are relatively equal, and in the area of accuracy, all equipment is relatively 

the same.

14Our vendor survey did not include lever machines because these machines are no longer 

manufactured.

15In our survey of jurisdictions, we grouped those that used punch card, lever, and handcounted paper ballots, and placed them in an “other” category. In our vendor survey, we 

excluded lever equipment because it is no longer manufactured and, of course, handcounted paper ballots, for which no equipment is needed.
Page 37 GAO-02-90 Elections

Figure 10: Voting Technologies Perform Roughly on Par With Each Other 

Source: GAO analysis.

The differences among voting equipment can be attributed, in part, to the 

differences in the equipment itself. However, they also can be attributed to 

the people who use the equipment and the rules or processes that govern 

its use. Further, all voting equipment is influenced by security, testing, 

maintenance, and cost issues, each of which also involves people and 

processes.

In addition, the accuracy of voting equipment (as measured by how reliably 

the equipment captures the voter’s intent) can be affected by the processes 

and procedures that govern how voters interact with the technologies. 

Differences in these procedures can have noticeable effects on the 

prevalence of undervotes (votes for fewer choices than permitted, such as 

not voting for president) and overvotes, for example. In particular, we 

found that some precinct-count optical scan voting equipment can be 

programmed to return a voter’s ballot if the ballot is overvoted or 

undervoted. Such programming allows the voter to make any changes 

necessary to ensure that the vote is recorded correctly. However, not all 

states allow this. For example, election officials in one Virginia jurisdiction 

state that Virginia jurisdictions must accept ballots as cast.

Characteristics

Accuracy

Ease of use

Efficiency

Security

= Technology type performs slightly better relative to other technology types.

= Technologies have relatively equal performance, or data were insufficient to judge.

= Technologies have relatively worse performance.

DREOpticalPunch

DREOpticalOthera

GAO analysis of

vendor-reported data

GAO analysis of

jurisdiction-reported data

Technology Technology

a

Other includes punch card, lever machines, and paper ballots
Page 38 GAO-02-90 Elections

Interaction Between People and Technology Affect Uncounted 

Votes

Our analysis showed that the type of voting equipment used (including 

equipment which allowed for error correction) explained a relatively small 

percent of the total variation among jurisdictions in uncounted presidential 

votes. The state in which counties were located had more of an effect on 

the number of uncounted presidential votes than either a county’s voting 

equipment or demographic characteristics. Figure 11 shows the results of 

our analysis. 16

Figure 11: Percentage of Total Variation in Uncounted Presidential Votes Explained 

By County Demographics, Voting Equipment, State Differences, and Unknown 

Factors

a

This contribution of 4% results from an analysis of the 404 counties for which we had error correction 

information.

Source: GAO analysis.

Counties’ demographic characteristics also affected their percentages of 

uncounted presidential votes. Specifically, counties with higher 

percentages of minority residents tended to have higher percentages of 

uncounted presidential votes, which counties with higher percentages of 

younger and more educated residents tended to have lower percentages of 

16Our findings, which are based on aggregate statistics and only those data that were 

comprehensively available for the more than 2,000 counties included in our analyses, have 

methodological limitations that are inherent to statistical studies of this type.

52% 26%

16%

Unknown

State differences

County demographics

overall

Voting equipment 2%

Error correction 4%a
Page 39 GAO-02-90 Elections

uncounted presidential votes. Counties that used punch card equipment 

did not generally have higher percentages of minority, less educated, or 

lower income residents.

We found that the state in which counties are located had a greater effect 

on counties’ percentage of uncounted presidential votes than did counties’

voting equipment or demographic characteristics combined. State 

differences, which may have included such factors as statewide voter 

education efforts and state standards for determining that is a valid vote, 

accounted for 26 percent of the total variation in uncounted presidential 

votes across counties. County demographic characteristics accounted for 

16 percent of the variation. Voting equipment, including the use of optical 

scan error correction technology, accounted for a total of about 6 percent 

of the variation in counties’ uncounted presidential votes. The largest 

percentages of uncounted presidential votes tended to occur in counties 

that used punch card equipment. Counties that used optical scan 

equipment with error correction had about 1.1 percentage points fewer 

uncounted presidential votes than did counties with punch card equipment. 

The remaining 52 percent of variation was due to unknown factors such as 

whether a county switched to a new type of voting equipment or the 

number of inexperienced voters in a county.

Absence of Data Limit Ability to 

Make Informed Investment 

Decisions

Looking back to the technology used in the November 2000 elections, our 

survey of jurisdictions showed that the vast majority of jurisdictions were 

satisfied with the performance of their respective technologies. However, 

this satisfaction was in most cases not based on hard data, but on the 

subjective impressions of election officials. While these impressions 

should not be discounted, informed decision-making regarding where to 

make the most appropriate investments, for example, in new equipment, 

training for election workers, or voter education, requires more objective 

data. Acquiring new voting equipment is not the only investment option 

jurisdictions may consider, and, in some cases, may not be the most 

appropriate solution for jurisdictions who find their voting equipment does 

not meet their needs.

Making wise technology investment decisions present a challenge to our 

election systems. It is extremely important that election officials be able to 

define, measure, evaluate voting equipment performance so that they may 

properly assess whether their current technology is meeting their needs. 

This information is also important as election officials consider the 

suitability of available technology options to get the best return on their 

investment if they choose to modernize their voting equipment.
Page 40 GAO-02-90 Elections

However, we found that about half of the jurisdictions did not collect actual 

performance data for the voting equipment that they used in the November 

2000 election. Table 1 shows the percentage of jurisdictions that collected 

data on accuracy (which is one measure of performance) by type of voting 

equipment.

Table 1: Percentage of Jurisdictions That Collected Data on Accuracy, by Type of 

Voting Equipment

a The 95-percent confidence interval is plus 7 or minus 8 percentage points.

b

The 95-percent confidence interval is plus or minus 7 percentage points.

c

Other includes punch cards, lever machines, and paper ballots.

Source: GAO mail survey of jurisdictions.

Further, it is unclear the extent to which jurisdictions have meaningful 

performance data. For those local election jurisdictions that we visited 

that stated that their voting equipment was 100-percent accurate, none was 

able to provide actual data to substantiate these statements. Similarly, the 

results of our mail survey indicates that only about 51 percent of 

jurisdictions nationwide collected data on undervotes, and about 47 

percent of jurisdictions nationwide collected data on overvotes for the 

November 2000 election.

Jurisdiction election officials were nevertheless able to provide their 

perceptions about how the equipment performed. For example, our mail 

survey results indicated that 96 percent of jurisdictions nationwide were 

Technology Percentage of jurisdictions that collected accuracy data

DRE 44a

Optical scan 54b

Otherc 42b
Page 41 GAO-02-90 Elections

satisfied with the performance of their voting equipment during the 

November 2000 election.

These perceptions aside, a lack of performance data may limit 

jurisdictions’ abilities to select the most appropriate voting equipment that 

gives them the best return on their investment. Thus, without reliable 

performance data, were federal funds to be made available for the 

purchase of new voting equipment, over half of the jurisdictions in the U.S. 

would not be in the best position to make wise investment choices.

Updating and Implementing 

Voting Equipment Standards 

Presents a Challenge

While no federal agency has been assigned explicit statutory responsibility 

for developing voting equipment standards, the FEC assumed this role 

developing voluntary standards in 1990 for computer-based systems, and 

Congress has supported this role with appropriations. These standards 

describe specific performance benchmarks and address many—but not 

all—types of systems requirements. However, these standards have not 

been maintained and are now out of date (the FEC initiated plans to issue 

revised standards in 2002). 

According to FEC officials, the Commission has not proactively maintained 

the standards because it has not been assigned explicit responsibility to do 

so. Without current, relevant, and complete voting equipment standards, 

states may choose not to follow them, resulting in the adoption of disparate 

standards that could drive up the cost of voting equipment and produce 

unevenness among states in the capabilities of their respective voting 

equipment.

National Survey Results

We estimate that 96 percent of jurisdictions nationwide were satisfied with

the performance of their voting equipment during the November 2000

election.

GAO Mail Survey of Jurisdictions
Page 42 GAO-02-90 Elections

No federal agency has been assigned responsibility for or assumed the role 

of testing voting equipment against the federal standards. Instead, NASED, 

through its Voting Systems Committee, has assumed responsibility for 

implementing the federal voting equipment standards by accrediting 

independent test authorities,17 which in turn, test voting equipment against 

the standards. To this end, the committee has developed procedures to 

accredit the independent test authorities.18 When testing is successfully 

completed, the independent test authorities notify the NASED that the 

voting equipment has satisfied testing requirements. 19 As of July 3, 2001, 

the Association had qualified 21 voting equipment, representing 10 vendors. 

Because development, maintenance, and implementation of voting 

equipment standards are very important responsibilities, we are raising 

matters for congressional consideration regarding the explicit assignment 

of responsibility in these areas. Additionally, we are making 

recommendations to the FEC aimed at improving its efforts to update its 

1990 voting equipment standards.20

The Interaction of People, 

Process, and Technology 

Needs To Be Considered

Our nation’s election systems are complex and intricate. Successful 

election administration requires the appropriate integration of people, 

processes and technology. In the challenges that we have categorized as 

related primarily to this part of the system, it is important to note that each 

of them is related in some way to another part of the system. Therefore, in 

considering election reform proposals, it is important to remember that 

people, processes, and technology issues should not be addressed in 

isolation. Any reform proposal that influences one part of the system, for 

example, a process, may have an unforeseen and perhaps undesirable 

17Independent test authorities are contractors independent from the voting equipment 

vendors and are responsible for testing voting equipment to ensure that they meet the 

Commission's standards.

18According to the NASED, accreditation signifies formal recognition that the independent 

test authority possesses or will acquire the competence to design and perform specific test 

methods applicable to voting equipment hardware and software, and that the test authority 

has adequately demonstrated its competence for voting equipment testing.

19Independent test authorities notify the Election Center, which serves as the NASED’s 

Secretariat and maintains the list of the association's approved voting equipment.

20The matters for congressional consideration and recommendations to the FEC were made 

in Elections: Status and Use of Federal Voting Equipment Standards (GAO-02-52,

Oct. 15, 2001).
Page 43 GAO-02-90 Elections

effect on another part of the system, such as the people. Additionally, any 

problem attributed to people, processes, or technology might actually have 

its root cause in a different part of the system or be precipitated by a lack 

of integration among the components of the system.

For example, many problems that surfaced in the November 2000 election 

were attributed to faulty technology, more specifically to punch card 

machines. While voting technology may need to be modernized, our work 

showed that any of the types of voting equipment, if used properly, can 

reliably record a voter’s selections. In most cases, technology was not the 

dominant factor related to voter error such as mismarked ballots or 

uncounted votes. Rather, problems were more closely related to voter 

error included processes that did not allow for poll workers and voters to 

recognize when errors occurred. In fact, one of the jurisdictions we visited 

that used punch card machines had a voter error rate of 1.2 percent, which 

election officials attributed in part to voter education efforts. Greater voter 

education on voting processes and equipment, rather than the purchase of 

new voting equipment, can be a more immediate way to resolve issues 

related to voter error.

Section 3: Framework 

for Assessing Election 

Reform Proposals

Our work and the work of others have disclosed a number of challenges to 

our national election system. As Congress considers if and how it may 

wish to address these challenges, it may turn to a number of reform 

proposals put forth by commissions or by proposed legislation. The 

proposals to date may be grouped into broad categories such as those 

listed below:

• providing federal funds for replacing voting equipment,

• providing federal funds for state or locally determined election 

administration needs,

• creating special postal rates, or requiring no postage, for election 

materials,

• creating federal election administration standards, mandatory or 

voluntary,

• updating FEC voluntary voting equipment standards and developing 

operation standards for voting equipment,

• developing or improving electronic voter registration systems and 

statewide information sharing capabilities,

• reforming absentee or early voting requirements,

• creating uniform statewide standards for what constitutes a vote and 

how votes are counted and recounted, and
Page 44 GAO-02-90 Elections

• mandating the availability of provisional ballots for all jurisdictions.

Variation in specific proposals may occur because of many factors, 

including the source of the proposal.

Proposals may be crafted with various goals in mind—among them 

enhancing the accessibility, integrity, fairness, consistency, affordability, 

and sustainability of election systems. While all of these goals are 

consonant with our democratic traditions, some reform proposals may 

advance one goal at the expense of the other. For example, some officials 

promote reforms such as early voting to enhance the accessibility of the 

electoral process to the general public, while others claim such a move 

could open the door to voter fraud and thus may come at the price of the 

integrity of the election system. When reform proposals forward 

competing goals, the debate over election reform becomes more complex 

and assessing different reform proposals more difficult. 

We do not presume to endorse any particular election reform proposal or 

package, because this is best left to the Congress and other elected 

officials. However, our review of state and local practices, as well as our 

analysis of input from state and local officials, suggest criteria that 

Congress could use as it weighs the merits of reform proposals. 

• Criterion I: The Appropriate Role of the Federal Government in 

Election Reform. Does the proposed change call for an appropriate 

federal role in affecting election reform, given the historic balance 

struck between Congress’ constitutional authority to legislate election 

administration and some states’ laws and traditions that grant autonomy 

to local jurisdictions as they administer elections?

• Criterion II: The Balance Between Accessibility and Integrity.

21 How 

are the goals of providing citizens broad access to the voting process 

balanced against the public’s interest in ensuring the integrity of our 

election systems?

• Criterion III: Coordination and Integration of People, Processes, and 

Technology. How does the proposed change affect both the discrete 

21As used in this criterion, accessibility refers to voters’ access to the political process rather 

than the access of a voter with disabilities to the polling place.
Page 45 GAO-02-90 Elections

problem it is intended to resolve and the election system as a whole? 

• Criterion IV: The Affordability and Sustainability of Proposed 

Election Reforms. Have the necessary resources been identified to 

institute the change and to continually monitor and re-evaluate it over 

time?

We believe using these criteria will help clarify the debate and provide a 

framework to evaluate the potential effects of various election reform 

proposals. The following sections further elaborate how Congress might 

use each of the four criteria.

A threshold consideration in assessing various proposals and legislation is 

the appropriate role of the federal government in effecting election reform. 

Pursuant to its constitutional authority, Congress has periodically enacted 

legislation that mandates elections be conducted in particular ways. For 

example, Congress has prohibited discrimination based on certain voter 

characteristics, such as race or age for both state and federal elections. In 

addition, Congress has broad authority to establish requirements for 

congressional elections that are binding on the states. As a practical 

matter, such requirements may also affect state and local elections held in 

conjunction with elections to federal office. Congress has enacted 

legislation affecting the timing of federal elections, voter registration, 

absentee voting for military and overseas civilian citizens of the United 

States, and voting accessibility for the elderly and the disabled in federal 

elections. These statutes have basically focused on facilitating the 

opportunity for voters to participate in the voting process and ensuring fair 

and equitable treatment of voters. Aside from direct regulation of election 

administration, Congress may also, in exercising its spending power, 

encourage state action by attaching conditions to the receipt of federal 

funds. The scope of congressional authority in election administration is 

discussed in our March 2001 report.22

22GAO-01-470, Mar. 13, 2001.

The Appropriate Federal Role in Election

Reform

Criterion I
Page 46 GAO-02-90 Elections

This constitutionally-derived authority notwithstanding, election 

administration has principally been the responsibility of state and local 

jurisdictions that conduct elections for local, state, and federal offices. As 

discussed elsewhere in this report, states and local jurisdictions have 

determined voter qualifications, types of voting equipment to be used, 

ballot design, selection of poll workers, and what constitutes a vote. This 

historical balance between Congress’ constitutional authority to prescribe 

change and the states’ and localities’ traditional roles in defining the terms 

of election administration raises fundamental policy issues that must be 

confronted in the debate about the federal government’s efforts to pursue 

election reform.

Various reform proposals offered to date differ in the role envisioned for 

the federal government. These can be categorized into essentially four 

distinct options for federal action that fall along a continuum of low- to 

high- federal involvement. The first option, falling on the low end of the 

continuum, calls for the federal government to provide information, 

guidance, and encouragement to states and local jurisdictions to take 

action in specific areas. At the second point on the continuum, a reform 

proposal may envision a more involved federal role that calls for the federal 

government to provide funds to states and localities to improve election 

administration, allowing each jurisdiction to use the funds where it 

believes they are most needed. At the third point on the continuum, 

proposals may go a step further suggesting that the federal government 

provide funds, contingent on states and local jurisdictions taking specific 

actions or achieving specific results. In this role the federal government 

uses a “carrot” to encourage a desired behavior by states and local 

jurisdictions. However, the states and local jurisdictions still have the 

ability to opt for the status quo by refusing the federal funds. At the fourth 

point on the continuum, where election reform would involve the greatest 

use of federal authority, the federal government would mandate that state 

and local jurisdictions take specific actions or achieve specific results--with 

or without accompanying funding. Historically, this option has been used 

when the federal government wishes to guarantee a voter right or 

protection. 

By way of illustration, consider how Congress would reach different 

conclusions on the issue of replacing existing voting equipment given how 

it might use its authority. Many recommendations from recently completed 

studies and congressional legislative proposals call for providing federal 

assistance to state and local election jurisdictions for replacing voting 

equipment. 
Page 47 GAO-02-90 Elections

• Under the first option, Congress could require the FEC to act as a 

clearinghouse to gather and disseminate information and to sponsor 

research on the various types of voting equipment. The federal 

government would provide information, assistance, and advice that 

would make it easier for that state and local election jurisdictions to 

examine their choice of voting equipment in light of national data on 

specific practices or issues. This approach provides a minimal federal 

role in affecting change, leaving the greatest discretion and control to 

states and local election jurisdictions. This federal role would not entail 

disbursing federal funds to support purchase and installation of new 

technologies, leaving acquisition decisions up to local jurisdictions.

• Under the second option, the federal government could create a grant 

program that would make federal funding available to states to support 

purchase and installation of new voting equipment. Funds would be 

provided with no “strings” attached regarding which type of equipment 

the state could buy.

• Under the third option, the federal government could create a similar 

grant program to that in the second option, except that strings would be 

attached. For example, funds would only be provided for states to buy 

equipment that meets federal standards, or only for certain types of 

equipment (e.g., precinct-based optical scanners). This further limits 

local jurisdictions’ discretion in choosing appropriate equipment and 

allows states to opt out of the program.

• Under the fourth option, the federal government could mandate that 

only certain types of voting equipment could be used in federal 

elections. Congress might or might not provide funding to enable states 

without this type of equipment to purchase and install it. Either way, 

jurisdictions would have no choice but to comply with the law and 

acquire that voting equipment, regardless of whether this choice best 

meets local needs. This option provides the least discretion. Because 

federal elections are usually conducted in conjunction with state and 

local elections, congressional mandates regarding the conduct of federal 
Page 48 GAO-02-90 Elections

elections would likely involve changes in many, if not all, state and local 

elections. 

In addition to the appropriate federal role in election reform, the degree to 

which reform proposals may affect the accessibility and integrity of an 

election system, our work suggests, is an important criterion for Congress 

to use in assessing the effect of reform proposals on our election systems. 

Some proposals may seek to increase the general public’s access to the 

election system. Accessibility describes the degree to which an election 

system promotes inclusiveness, thus making it as easy as possible for the 

general population to register to vote and to cast their votes. For example, 

reform proposals that attempt to (1) make voter registration less 

cumbersome, (2) give voters more opportunity to cast absentee or early 

ballots, or (3) provide voting equipment that all voters can use with ease 

can be considered as affecting an election system’s accessibility. Other 

proposals may attempt to increase the system’s integrity, that is, the degree 

to which the system is impervious to voter fraud. For instance, proposals 

may implement controls to ensure that (1) voters present identification or 

proof of eligibility at the polls on election day or (2) all eligible votes are 

counted can be said to affect an election system’s integrity.

The goal of making the election system more accessible to voters can run at 

cross purposes with the goal of ensuring the election system’s integrity. 

This tension suggests decision makers should ask how reform proposals 

balance the goals of providing all citizens broad access to the voting 

process against the public interest in ensuring the integrity of the vote.

Most election reform proposals address one or both of these concepts to 

some degree, with some placing more emphasis on one or the other. The 

weight individual policymakers may place on different concerns could vary, 

depending on how they value different attributes. For example, increasing 

the opportunity to use absentee ballots may improve access to the vote, but 

it also might negate the possibility of using some of the controls that may 

be used at a polling place to assure voter identification and eligibility. If 

increasing access to the vote is deemed more important than ensuring the 

Criterion II Balancing Accessibility and Integrity
Page 49 GAO-02-90 Elections

presence of rigorous controls, then reform proposals emphasizing 

accessibility considerations might be preferred.

In the past when Congress has taken action to change the election system, 

it considered both accessibility and integrity issues. Constitutional 

amendments and federal legislation affecting the election process opened 

access to those whose access was either denied or circumscribed—e.g., 

African-Americans, women, language minorities, people with disabilities. 

All of these reforms assumed the existence of controls to ensure that only 

those who were otherwise eligible among these groups would be able to 

register to vote and cast their ballots. The most recent federal statute 

affecting the election process—NVRA, or motor voter act—specifically 

recognized the dual goals of access and integrity. The act established 

registration procedures designed to “increase the number of eligible 

citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal office,” without 

compromising “the integrity of the electoral process” or the maintenance of 

“accurate and current voter registration rolls.”23 

Creating a proper balance between accessibility and integrity is sometimes 

difficult, as seen in the following examples which illustrate the inherent 

tension between these competing goals:

• Requiring that citizens who register to vote present a form of picture 

identification with their residence’s address provides some proof of 

identify and some assurance that the person resides in the voting 

jurisdiction and is therefore eligible to vote in the jurisdiction in which 

he or she is registering. However, this procedure makes it more difficult 

for persons to register to vote if they meet registration qualifications but 

do not have a driver’s license or other picture identification indicating 

their place of residence. 

• Providing a provisional ballot to every person who wishes to vote but is 

not listed in the poll books at the polling place maximizes the 

opportunity of every person to cast a ballot.24 The purpose of checking 

whether these persons are in fact registered to vote prior to counting 

23National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. 1973gg to 1973gg-10. Also see GAO-01-

470, p. 12 and footnote 65).

24Provisional ballots are not an issue in those jurisdictions that do not require registration, 

such as North Dakota, or that permit eligible voters to register and vote on election day. 

Election day registration is permitted in six states. 
Page 50 GAO-02-90 Elections

their ballots is to assure that the vote count will include only ballots cast 

by eligible voters. 

• Election officials may go to nursing homes to review absentee ballot 

requests, and accept ballots cast by nursing home residents while the 

officials are present to supervise the voting process. In effect, the 

nursing home becomes an unofficial polling place. Residents are 

provided a greater opportunity to vote but with better controls in place 

to address the potential that the absentee ballot might be voted by 

someone other than the registered voter.

• Allowing remote voting via the Internet may improve some voters’

opportunities to cast a ballot. Although this method is in an 

experimental stage, unresolved questions about its impact on the 

integrity of election systems remain. As with other forms of remote 

voting, such as absentee voting by mail, there is a need to ensure that 

only eligible voters cast ballots, voter privacy is protected, and voters 

are not subject to coercion.

As Congress assesses various reform proposals, it may consider both 

reforms that address a discrete problem and that address the election 

system more broadly. Congress may also be asked to choose among 

proposals that address specific parts of a perceived problem or address 

perceived problems in a more systematic fashion.

Effective election administration requires the appropriate coordination and 

integration of people, processes, and technology. For example, 

successfully registering a new voter, whether the person registers by mail, 

at the Department of Motor Vehicles, or at the registrar’s office, involves 

the coordination and integration of (1) voters and registration workers who 

know and follow the registration process, including obtaining the 

information required to register successfully; (2) the process for 

registering new voters that guides election workers as they supply the 

correct forms to voters, compile and update voter information, and notify 

voters of their registration status; and (3) a computer system or other 

means of creating and updating a voter registration list to assure an 

Criterion III Integration of People, Processes and

Technology
Page 51 GAO-02-90 Elections

accurate, current list of registered voters. Shortcomings in any of three 

areas can affect the ability of persons to register successfully and the 

accuracy of the registration rolls. 

To illustrate the difference between approaching reforms from a discrete 

versus system-wide perspective, consider election reform proposals that 

recommend Congress provide assistance to states and localities to 

purchase new voting equipment in order to reduce voter error. Some of 

these proposals approach voter error as if it were precipitated by a single 

cause, such as the type of voting equipment used. However, introducing 

new technology alone may not necessarily reduce voter error. In fact, 

switching equipment actually may introduce new opportunities for voter 

error unless the jurisdiction deals with the people aspects of successfully 

fielding new voting technology and offers voter education on how to use 

the new equipment effectively. Moreover, successful implementation must 

include processes for dealing with machine failure, ensuring that the 

equipment is programmed properly to accurately count the votes for each 

office on the ballot and that the ballots and machines are secure. Failure to 

consider the interaction of people, processes, and technology in fielding 

new voting equipment may result in increased voter or counting error, 

rather than a decrease.

As a second example, some proposals suggest a change in process that 

establishes standard voting hours such that all polling places across the 

nation are opened and closed simultaneously, regardless of time zone. With 

this proposal, voters in every part of the country would cast their votes 

while the outcome of the election is still unknown, thus negating any 

influence that media reports of election results may have. Although voter 

participation might increase as a result, this proposal might also have 

unintended consequences for other parts of the election system. For 

example, keeping polling places open at earlier or later hours may increase 

the burden placed on poll workers. Some elections officials currently 

report difficulties in securing poll workers who are willing to work 15 to 18 

hour days, a situation that might be exacerbated if poll workers were asked 

to work even earlier or later. 
Page 52 GAO-02-90 Elections

The implementation of election reforms will likely increase the overall cost 

of our nation’s election systems. Choosing among election reform 

proposals, therefore, should include a careful assessment of the 

affordability and sustainability of the reform as well as who is expected to 

shoulder the costs. Simply making funding available to state and local 

governments to implement a reform without consideration of whether all 

associated lifecycle costs have been considered or how the reform is to be 

sustained could result in having to revisit reform issues. 

Historically, incurring the costs of election administration and equipment 

has largely fallen to local jurisdictions, with some support provided by the 

state governments. Elections have been conducted over the years with 

relatively small budgets, and election officials consistently find themselves 

competing for funds with other local government priorities. Our work 

confirmed that election administration is not usually at the top of state and 

local funding priorities. As an official in a large election jurisdiction told 

us, election administration is often number 11 in the top 10 priorities of 

local government budgets.

As a result, realistic reform proposals are those that not only identify 

solutions to the issues at hand, but are also affordable and sustainable with 

achievable financial commitments for the federal, state, and local 

government stakeholders. Along these lines, as Congress assesses reform 

proposals, it should consider three factors related to affordability and 

sustainability. 

The first factor is the initial outlay required to fully implement the 

proposal. In this regard, the assessment should consider whether the initial 

outlay for the proposed reform would be affordable to the state and 

localities, including all associated and transition costs (e.g., training 

workers and voters to use new equipment and any changes to voting 

processes necessitated by new equipment). For example, were Congress 

to implement a proposal that requires all states to develop a state-wide 

voter registration system, some states might find themselves unable to 

comply unless federal funding sources were forthcoming. States with 

Criterion IV Affordability and Sustainability of Proposed

Election Reforms
Page 53 GAO-02-90 Elections

budgetary pressures that prevented them from quickly implementing the 

federal requirement could be even less likely to supply the funding to 

comply with the federal requirements. In addition, the costs to the other 

components of election administration (e.g., the cost of training election 

workers to use the new voting technology) should also be considered.

The second factor is whether the federal government and/or state and local 

jurisdictions could afford the long-term costs of sustaining the proposed 

reform over time. Reform proposals that provide funding for purchasing 

new technology could enable some jurisdictions to upgrade their voting 

equipment. To the extent that a local jurisdiction could sustain the funding 

needed to continue its use, the performance of voting equipment would be 

improved. For example, if the federal government were to make funds 

available to purchase different voting technology (e.g., replacing punch 

cards with electronic equipment), it should have some assurance that the 

additional resources necessary to sustain the reform (e.g., software, 

programming capability, vendor support, and updates) would be available. 

However, not all jurisdictions are in a position to make that commitment.

The third factor is assigning responsibility for costs, and whether all 

levels of government could commit to implement and sustain the reform. 

As mentioned above, it is doubtful that every local jurisdiction could alone 

commit the resources necessary to fund many of the reforms envisioned in 

several proposals. However, they might be in a position to fund some of 

them, thereby making a commitment to the success of the reform. On the 

other hand, the question arises as to how much of a federal or state 

presence in local election administration is perceived as desirable or 

financially possible.

Section 4: Conclusion Events surrounding the November 2000 election brought into question the 

integrity of our nation’s election systems. Although not all states and 

jurisdictions reported experiencing major problems during the November 

2000 election, important concerns were raised in most jurisdictions related 

to each stage of the election process—registration, absentee and early 

voting, preparing for and conducting election day activities, and vote 

tabulations. Congress has the opportunity to address these challenges 

now, to avoid similar problems in the future. However, addressing these 

challenges involves complex considerations and even more difficult 

choices when considering the range of proposals for election reform. 
Page 54 GAO-02-90 Elections

Accordingly, we have offered four criteria against which any election 

reform proposals may be measured. These may not be the criteria that 

every analyst would suggest, and each policymaker would not give the 

same weight to each criterion. However, if election system reform 

proposals were to be evaluated as to the (1) appropriate federal role in 

election reform; (2) balance between accessibility and integrity; (3) 

integration of people, process, and technology; and (4) affordability and 

sustainability of election reforms, Congress would have a good foundation 

for devising sustainable solutions that will meet the needs of future 

generations of U.S. citizens.
Page 55 GAO-02-90 Elections
Page 56 GAO-02-90 Elections

Appendix I

Results of Our Election Work ApApenednxidexiIs

This section summarizes the major issues contained in the other six reports 

that we prepared on our nation’s election systems. Table 2 lists the issues 

that we addressed in our elections work and the reports that discuss them 

in further detail. 

Table 2: Election Issues and GAO Reports

Collectively, our extensive research shows that election systems vary 

widely across states and jurisdictions. It also shows that federal, state, and 

local governments face daunting, often long-standing challenges. In the 

following sections we summarize our findings and insights from each of 

our reports.

The Scope of 

Congressional 

Authority in Election 

Administration

This report describes Congress’ constitutional authority to regulate 

congressional, presidential, and state and local elections and identify major 

federal statutes enacted in the area of election administration. Under the 

Constitution, states are responsible for the administration of both their 

own and federal elections. Accordingly, states and localities incur the costs 

associated with these activities.

Notwithstanding the state role in administering elections, Congress has 

authority to affect the administration of elections in certain ways. 

Congressional authority to legislate in this area derives from various 

constitutional sources, depending upon the type of election. With regard to 

Election Issues Addressed GAO Election Reports

The scope of congressional authority in election administration Elections: The Scope of Congressional Authority in Election 

Administration (GAO-01-470, Mar. 2001)

Compiling and maintaining voter registration lists, absentee and 

early voting, election day administration, voting technology, 

Internet-based voting technologies, vote counts, certification, and 

recounts

Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges Across the 

Nation (GAO-02-03, Oct. 2001)

Voting accessibility for voters with disabilities Voters with Disabilities: Access to Polling Places and Alternative 

Voting Methods (forthcoming)

Improving voting assistance for military and overseas voters Elections: Voting Assistance to Military and Overseas Citizens 

Should be Improved (GAO 01-1026, Sept. 2001)

Status and use of federal voting equipment standards Elections: Status and Use of Federal Voting Equipment Standards

(GAO-02-52, Oct. 2001)

Factors affecting uncounted votes in the 2000 presidential election Elections: Statistical Analysis of Factors that Affected Uncounted 

Votes in the 2000 Presidential Election (GAO-02-122, Oct. 2001)
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the administration of federal elections, Congress has constitutional 

authority over both congressional and presidential elections. 

Congress’ authority to regulate congressional elections derives primarily 

from Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the Constitution (known as the 

Elections Clause). The Elections Clause provides that the states will 

prescribe the “Times, Places and Manner” of congressional elections, and 

that Congress may “make or alter” the states’ regulations at any time, 

except as to the places of choosing Senators. The courts have held that the 

Elections Clause grants Congress broad authority to override state 

regulations in this area. Therefore, while the Elections Clause 

contemplates both state and federal authority to regulate congressional 

elections, Congress’ authority is paramount to that of the states. 

With respect to presidential elections, the text of the Constitution is more 

limited. Specifically, Article II, Section 1, Clause 4, provides that “Congress 

may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they 

shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United 

States.” Despite this limited language, the Supreme Court and federal 

appellate courts have upheld certain federal statutory provisions regulating 

presidential elections that go beyond regulating the “time” of choosing the 

electors. However, because federal legislation that relates solely to the 

administration of presidential elections has been fairly limited, case law on 

this subject has been sparse. Consequently, the precise parameters of 

Congress’ authority to pass legislation relating to presidential elections 

have not been clearly established. 

With regard to state and local elections, although Congress does not have 

general constitutional authority to legislate regarding these elections, a 

number of constitutional amendments authorize Congress to enforce 

prohibitions against specific discriminatory practices in state and local 

elections, such as discrimination on the basis of race or color, in all 

elections—federal, state, and local.
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Historically, Congress has passed legislation related to the administration 

of both federal and state elections in several major functional areas of the 

voting process, including: (1) timing of federal elections; (2) voter 

registration;1

 (3) absentee voting requirements;2 (4) accessibility provisions 

for elderly and disabled voters;3

 and (5) prohibitions against discriminatory 

voting practices.4

 In general, the purpose of these federal statutes has been 

either to prohibit discrimination on the basis of specific voter 

characteristics or make it easier for citizens to register to vote.

Elections: Perspectives 

on Activities and 

Challenges Across the 

Nation

Our report on the administration of the 2000 elections presents the results 

of our review of aspects of elections in the United States. Specifically, we 

(1) describe elections in the United States and the activities and challenges 

associated with each of the four major stages of election administration—

voter registration, absentee and early voting, preparing for and conducting 

election day activities, and vote tabulation; (2) identify the types of voting 

methods used, their distribution in the United States, and any associated 

challenges; assess such characteristics of voting equipment as accuracy, 

ease of use, efficiency, security, and cost; and estimate the cost of replacing 

existing voting equipment in the United States with either optical scan or 

electronic voting equipment; and (3) identify issues and challenges 

associated with the use of the Internet for voting.

Although registration is a prerequisite to voting in nearly all states, we 

found that different citizens with the same qualifications would be eligible 

to vote in some states but not in others because of variations in voter 

eligibility requirements. A citizen’s access to voting is primarily based on 

the appearance of his or her name on a voter registration list, which is 

1

The National Voter Registration Act of 1993, commonly referred to as “motor voter.” The 

Act requires states to establish certain procedures to facilitate the registration of voters in 

federal elections, both congressional and presidential, including permitting voters to 

register by mail or in person when applying for a driver’s license. 

2

Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 requires states to permit 

specified domestic and overseas military personnel and their dependents and citizens living 

overseas to vote by absentee ballot in federal elections.

3

The Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1984 requires, with some 

exceptions, local election jurisdictions to assure that polling places and registration sites 

are accessible to elderly and disabled voters.

4

The Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, provides, in general, that no person shall be 

denied the right to vote on account of race or color. 
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developed from registration applications and compiled and maintained by 

election officials using various technologies and information sources. 

Election officials nationwide expressed varying degrees of confidence in 

the accuracy of their voter registration lists; however, information about 

list accuracy and currency, as well as the extent of error, was difficult to 

obtain. Among the challenges identified were processing applications 

submitted through sources other than elections offices, such as state motor 

vehicle authorities; obtaining accurate and timely information from 

numerous sources to update voter registration lists; and using technology 

to help process applications and compile registration lists.

All states allowed some form of absentee or early voting in the November 

2000 election; using U.S. Census data, we estimate that for the November 

2000 election, about 14 percent of voters nationwide cast their ballots 

before election day, three-fourths of them using mail-in ballots and onefourth voting in person. However, we found that no national data are 

currently maintained on the number of mail-in absentee ballots 

disqualified. Differences in requirements, administration, and procedures 

resulted in citizens having different opportunities for obtaining and 

successfully casting absentee ballots. For example, the likelihood of a 

ballot being disqualified due to voters’ errors in completing and returning 

mail-in absentee ballots varied even, in some instances, among 

jurisdictions in the same state. Among the challenges local election 

officials face are deciding whether and how to process incomplete and late 

mail-in absentee applications and ballots; processing large numbers of 

mail-in absentee applications and ballots in a timely manner; and obtaining 

adequate staffing, ballots, and locations for conducting early voting.

Election officials across the country, with some variation, performed 

similar duties to prepare for and conduct the November 2000 election. Our 

survey indicated that 57 percent of voting jurisdictions nationwide 

encountered major problems in conducting the 2000 election. While 

jurisdictions did not experience the same problems, more than half cited 

problems with recruiting enough qualified poll workers. However, because 

few jurisdictions systematically collected information on how they 

administer elections, what they consider to be major problems may be 

based on anecdotal information and limited analysis. From the perspective 

of election officials, a major election day challenge is resolving questions 

about voter eligibility. Large numbers of ineligible voters can create long 

lines, voter frustration, and problems for poll workers. Many eligibility 

issues stem from the reliability of voter registration lists.
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Counting votes is not a simple task. It involves counting votes cast before 

and on election day and may be carried out at the precinct, at a central 

location, by hand, or by some type of counting equipment. Vote counting 

problems are highlighted when the election results are close. A ballot may 

not be counted when a voter overvotes—marks for two candidates--or 

when the ballot cannot be read by the counting equipment. What 

constitutes a proper mark on a ballot differs based on the type of voting 

method used. According to our survey of state election directors, 31 states 

and the District of Columbia have a state law or other provision specifying 

what is a proper ballot marking for each voting method, but state guidance 

also varied from general to specific. Forty-seven states and the District of 

Columbia have laws with provisions for recount, but they vary. For 

example, 17 states provide for a mandatory recount, but two of these 

require a tie vote and another requires a 1 percent or 200 vote difference. 

According to officials in 42 of the jurisdictions that had recounts in the 2000 

election, none of the recounts altered the original election outcome. 

Counting ballots posed several challenges for election officials, including 

counting only votes cast by eligible voters; interpreting variations when 

ballots are not properly marked; and completing the results of a recount in 

a close or contested election in a fair, accurate, and timely manner.

Four types of voting equipment—punch card, optical scan, lever, and 

DRE—were used in 98 percent of all election jurisdictions in 2000.5

 While a 

survey of vendors showed little performance difference among DRE, 

optical scan, and punch card equipment, local election officials we 

contacted rated DRE as more easy to use than other voting methods. Only 

about 50 percent of jurisdictions collected data on accuracy and few of the 

jurisdictions we visited had collected actual performance data on the 

voting equipment used in the 2000 election. Nevertheless the vast majority 

of jurisdictions across the nation were satisfied with their respective voting 

equipment, based largely on officials’ perceptions of how their equipment 

performed. The cost to replace existing voting equipment depends on the 

type of equipment purchased and the number of jurisdictions for which it is 

purchased. We estimated the cost of purchasing optical scan units, not 

including certain software costs, could range from $191 million for optical 

scan machines that use a central-count unit to about $1.3 billion for optical 

scan equipment that counts ballots at the precinct and thus allows for voter 

error correction. We estimated the cost of purchasing touchscreen DRE 

units to be about $3 billion (including one DRE touchscreen unit per 

5

Two percent of jurisdictions used paper ballots; no “equipment” was required.
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precinct equipped for voters with disabilities and one central count optical 

scan unit per county for absentee ballots). Among the voting equipment 

challenges identified by election officials were having reliable measures 

and objective data to know whether the technology used is meeting the 

jurisdictions’ needs; ensuring that necessary security, testing, and 

maintenance activities are performed; and ensuring that the technology 

will provide benefits over its useful life commensurate with life cycle costs 

and that these collective costs are affordable and sustainable. 

Our review identified three kinds of internet voting--at a polling place; in a 

voting “kiosk” at public places, such as malls or libraries; or at any location, 

including the voter’s workplace or home through a personal computer. 

Although opinion is not unanimous, security is seen as the primary 

challenge for Internet voting. The cost effectiveness of Internet voting 

remains unclear because reliable cost data are not available. The broad 

application of Internet voting presents several social and technological 

challenges, including providing adequate voter privacy safeguards, security 

for voting equipment to ensure that it is adequately safeguarded, and equal 

access to all voters.

Voting Accessibility for 

Voters with Disabilities

This report examines state and local provisions and practices for ensuring 

voting accessibility, both at polling places and with respect to alternative 

voting methods and accommodations; estimates the proportion of polling 

places with features that might facilitate or impede access, including 

features of polling booths and voting accommodations; and identifies 

efforts and challenges to improving accessibility.

All states6

 have provisions (in the form of statutes, regulations, or policies) 

that specifically address voting by people with disabilities. However, 

consistent with the broad discretion afforded states, these provisions vary 

greatly. State laws and policies also vary on how counties are to assure 

accessibility of polling places. Our survey of counties confirms that most 

counties inspect all polling places for accessibility, although county 

practices for ensuring accessibility vary. 

All states provide for one or more alternative voting methods or 

accommodations that may facilitate voting by people with disabilities 

6

For analytical purposes we treated the District of Columbia as a state, resulting in a total of 

51 states.
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whose assigned polling places are inaccessible. For example, all states 

have provisions allowing voters with disabilities to vote absentee without 

notary or medical certification requirements, although the deadlines and 

methods (for example, by mail or in person) for absentee voting vary 

among states. In addition, many states, but not all, have laws or policies 

that provide for other accommodations and alternatives for voting on or 

before election day—such as reassignment to a polling place that is 

accessible, curbside voting, or early voting.

Our onsite work on election day 2000 found that polling places are 

generally located in schools, libraries, churches, and town halls, as well as 

other facilities. Although the extent to which any given feature may 

prevent or facilitate access is unknown, we estimate that, from the parking 

area to the voting room, 16 percent of all polling places in the contiguous 

United States have no potential impediments, 56 percent have one or more 

potential impediments but offer curbside voting, and 28 percent have one 

or more potential impediments and do not offer curbside voting.7

 These 

potential impediments would primarily affect individuals with mobility 

impairments and occur most often on the route from the parking area to 

the building or at the entrance to the polling place. Inside the voting room, 

the types and arrangement of voting equipment used may also pose 

challenges for people with mobility, vision, or dexterity impairments. To 

facilitate voting inside the voting room, polling places generally provide 

accommodations, such as voter assistance, magnifying devices, and voting 

instructions or sample ballots in large print. However, none of the polling 

places that we visited had special ballots or voting equipment adapted for 

blind voters.8

A number of efforts have been made by states and localities to improve 

voting accessibility for people with disabilities, such as modifying polling 

places, acquiring new voting equipment, and expanding voting options. 

Nevertheless, state and county election officials we surveyed cited a 

7

Although curbside voting is not available at a number of polling places with potential 

impediments, as noted earlier all states have provisions for absentee voting, and many states 

provide for other alternative voting methods or accommodations, which may facilitate 

voting by people with disabilities on or before election day.

8

Although we did not observe such aids on election day, some county officials told us that, 

upon request, they try to provide special aids so that blind individuals can vote 

independently. We may not have observed these aids on election day because they may not 

have been requested in advance by voters in the polling places that we visited or the local 

poll workers we interviewed may not have been aware of these aids.
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variety of challenges to improving access, including limited availability of 

accessible facilities and funding constraints at the local level. Some 

disability advocates believe that although alternative voting methods and 

accommodations, such as curbside voting, expand options for voters with 

disabilities, they do not provide the same voting opportunities afforded the 

general public (that is, the opportunity to vote independently and privately 

at a polling place) and should not be viewed as permanent solutions for 

inaccessible polling places.

Improving Voting 

Assistance for Military 

and Overseas Voters

This report describes the extent and quality of voter assistance provided 

for uniformed and overseas citizens; the challenges that state and local 

requirements may pose to these voters; and the extent of and reasons for 

disqualification of ballots cast by these voters. 

The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 19869

protects the right to vote by absentee ballot in federal elections for more 

than 6 million military and overseas citizens. The act also recommends 

that states adopt a number of provisions that facilitate absentee voting by 

these populations. The Federal Voting Assistance Program, established 

within the Department of Defense (DOD), is responsible for implementing 

the act by informing U.S. citizens worldwide about their right to vote, 

fostering voting participation, and working with states to simplify the 

registration and absentee voting process. Voter education and assistance 

efforts for military personnel are largely implemented by the military 

services through Voting Assistance Officers. Also, the State Department 

works with DOD to provide voter assistance to overseas citizens.

The extent and quality of federal voter assistance for military personnel 

and overseas citizens varied considerably for the 2000 general election. 

The Federal Voting Assistance Program developed a number of useful tools 

for voters and Voting Assistance Officers, but many potential voters we 

spoke to were unaware of them. While some installations we visited had 

well run programs providing assistance and information to potential voters, 

other installations did not meet DOD and service requirements because 

they did not provide sufficient numbers of trained Voting Assistance 

Officers, voter training, and voting materials. The variability in executing 

the program is due to incomplete service-level guidance that does not 

9

42 U.S.C. 1973ff-1973ff-6.
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reflect DOD’s directive, a lack of command support at some installations, 

and a lack of program oversight by some DOD components. Finally, the 

State Department provided citizens abroad with a variety of useful 

assistance, according to overseas citizens and federal employees we spoke 

to, although both groups believed more outreach could be beneficial. Also, 

State Department Headquarters has not played an active role in sharing 

best practices and lessons learned or in overseeing the program.

Despite progress made by states to facilitate absentee voting, many military 

and overseas voters we spoke to believe that challenges remain, including 

helping voters understand and comply with state requirements and local 

procedures for absentee voting, such as deadlines for registering and 

returning ballots. Continued efforts by DOD officials to work with the 

states to simplify procedures, modify election schedules, or allow more use 

of technology, such as faxing and the Internet, to speed some portions of 

the voting process may help alleviate the challenges, but state legislative 

actions may be required. 

Although precise numbers are not available, we estimate that small 

counties (having a voting-age population of less than 60,000) nationwide 

disqualified 8.1 percent (plus or minus 3.2 percent) of ballots cast by 

military and overseas voters. In contrast, the ballot disqualification rate for 

civilian voters not living overseas was 1.8 percent (plus or minus 0.6 

percent).10 While larger counties (having a voting age population of more 

than 60,000) that responded to GAO's survey showed a similar pattern, the 

data were insufficient to make a national estimate.11 The survey showed 

that for all absentee ballots cast, almost two-thirds of the disqualified 

absentee ballots were rejected because the ballots arrived too late to be 

counted or the envelopes or forms accompanying the ballots were not 

completed properly.

This report includes recommendations to the Secretaries of Defense and 

State to improve (1) the clarity and completeness of service guidance, (2) 

10The confidence intervals in this report are calculated at the 95-percent confidence level. 

For example, we are 95 percent certain that the actual disqualification rate for civilians not 

living overseas was between 1.2 and 2.4 percent

11Not enough counties in the sample provided data on the reasons ballots were disqualified 

from specific groups of voters, such as military versus non-military, to enable GAO to make 

reasonable estimates for these groups
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voter education and outreach programs, (3) oversight and evaluation of 

voting assistance efforts, and (4) sharing of best practices.

Status and Use of 

Federal Voting 

Equipment Standards 

This report identifies the Federal Election Commission’s (FEC) role 

regarding various voting equipment and assesses how well the FEC is 

fulfilling its role. Our work also identifies the National Association of State 

Election Directors’ (NASED) process for testing and qualifying voting 

equipment.

No federal agency has been assigned explicit statutory responsibility for 

developing voting equipment standards; however, the FEC assumed this 

role by developing voluntary standards in 1990 for computer-based 

equipment, and Congress has supported this role with appropriations. 

These standards describe specific performance benchmarks, and address 

many—but not all—types of systems requirements. In 1997, the FEC 

initiated efforts to evaluate the 1990 standards to identify areas to be 

updated, and in 1999, initiated efforts to update the standards. The FEC 

plans to issue revised standards in 2002. This update is necessary because 

the FEC has not proactively maintained them, thus allowing them to 

become out of date. According to FEC officials, the FEC has not 

proactively maintained the standards because it has not been assigned 

explicit responsibility to do so. Unless voting equipment standards are 

current, relevant, and complete, states may choose not to follow them, 

resulting in the adoption of disparate standards that could drive up the cost 

of voting equipment and produce unevenness among states in the 

capabilities of their respective voting equipment.
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No federal agency has been assigned responsibility for or assumed the role 

of testing voting equipment against the federal standards. Instead, NASED, 

through its Voting Systems Committee, has assumed responsibility for 

implementing the federal voting equipment standards by accrediting 

independent test authorities,12 which in turn, test voting equipment against 

the standards. To this end, the committee has developed procedures to 

accredit the independent test authorities.13 According to the test 

authorities, testing is generally iterative, in which the voting equipment 

vendors are provided an opportunity to correct deficiencies identified 

during testing and resubmit the modified voting equipment for retesting. 

When testing is successfully completed, the independent test authorities 

notify the NASED that the voting equipment has satisfied testing 

requirements.14 As of July 3, 2001, the NASED had qualified 21 different 

types of voting equipment, representing 10 vendors. 

Because development, maintenance, and implementation of voting 

equipment standards are very important responsibilities, we are raising 

matters for congressional consideration regarding the explicit assignment 

of responsibility in these areas. Additionally, we are making 

recommendations to the FEC's Commissioners aimed at improving its 

efforts to update its 1990 voting equipment standards. 

Statistical Analysis of 

Factors Affecting 

Uncounted Votes in the 

2000 Presidential 

Election

Our analysis of data from 2,455 counties shows that the type of voting 

equipment that counties used in the 2000 general election had an effect on 

uncounted presidential votes. Specifically, counties that used punch card 

equipment had roughly 0.6 percentage points higher percentages of 

uncounted presidential votes than counties using electronic, paper, or 

optical scan voting equipment. Counties using lever equipment had 0.7 

percentage points lower percentages of uncounted presidential votes than 

counties using electronic, paper or optical scan voting equipment. When 

12Independent test authorities are contractors independent from the voting equipment 

vendors who are responsible for testing voting equipment to ensure that they meet the FEC 

standards

13According to the NASED, accreditation signifies formal recognition that the independent 

test authority possesses or will acquire the competence to design and perform specific test 

methods applicable to voting equipment hardware and software, and that the test authority 

has adequately demonstrated its competence for voting equipment testing

14Independent test authorities notify the Election Center, which serves as the NASED’s 

Secretariat and maintains the list of the association's approved voting equipment
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we supplement this analysis with information about the performance of 

optical scan equipment with error correction from our sample of 404 

counties, we found that counties using punch card equipment had 

significantly higher percentages of uncounted presidential votes than 

counties using error corrected optical scan equipment. If we apply the 

relationship we found in these 404 counties to the larger set of 2,455 

counties, an estimated 300,000 additional votes may have been counted if 

counties that used punch card equipment had, instead, used optical scan 

equipment with error correction. Overall, county voting equipment 

accounted for 2% of the variation in uncounted presidential votes across 

counties. Additionally, the analysis of the subset of 404 counties showed 

that the use of error correction accounts for another 4% of variation in 

uncounted presidential votes across counties.

We found that counties’ demographic characteristics accounted for about 

16 percent of the total variation in uncounted presidential votes. Counties 

with higher percentages of minority residents were more likely to have 

higher percentages of uncounted presidential votes. Counties with higher 

percentages of 18- to –24 year olds and higher education were more likely 

to have lower percentages of uncounted presidential votes.

The state in which counties are located accounted for about 26 percent of 

the total variation in uncounted presidential votes. Data were not available 

to examine the extent to which specific factors that were common to 

counties within a state but varied across states affected uncounted 

presidential votes. However, such factors may include statewide voter 

education efforts, the number of candidates on the ballot, the extent to 

which absentee or early voting occurred, and the state’s standards for 

determining that is a valid vote. Non-election specific factors, such as the 

percentage of the state’s population for which English is a second language, 

may have also contributed to the variability in uncounted presidential 

votes.

Our statistical models left about half of the variation in uncounted 

presidential votes unexplained. Several factors may have contributed to 

this remaining variability, including differences among counties, precincts, 

and people. An example of this type of difference is whether a county had 

switched to a new type of voting equipment that voters found difficult to 

operate. 

Our findings, which are based on aggregate statistics and only those data 

that were available for our sample of 2,455 counties, and the subset of 404 
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counties, have methodological limitations that are inherent to statistical 

studies of this type.
Page 69 GAO-02-90 Elections

Appendix II

List of Recently Issued Election Reports ApendxiI

GAO Reports Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges Across the Nation 

(GAO-02-03, Oct. 2001).

Elections: Status and Use of Federal Voting Equipment Standards (GAO02-52, Oct. 2001).

Voters with Disabilities: Access to Polling Places and Alternative Voting 

Methods (forthcoming).

Elections: Voting Assistance to Military and Overseas Citizens Should be 

Improved (GAO-01-1026, Sept. 2001).

Elections: Statistical Analysis of Factors that Affected Uncounted Votes 

in the 2000 Presidential Election (GAO-02-122, Oct. 2001).

Elections: The Scope of Congressional Authority in Election 

Administration (GAO-01-470, Mar. 2001).

Bilingual Voting Assistance: Assistance Provided and Costs (GAO/GGD97-81, May 1997).

Other Recent National 

Reports 

The Constitution Project, Building Consensus for Election Reform (Aug. 

2001).

National Association of Secretaries of State, State-by-State Election 

Reform Best Practices Report (Aug. 2001).

The National Commission on Federal Election Reform, To Assure Pride 

and Confidence in the Electoral Process (July 2001).

National Conference of State Legislatures, Voting in America: Final 

Report of the NCSL Elections Reform Task Force (Aug. 2001).

National Task Force on Election Reform, Election 2000: Review and 

Recommendations by The Nation's Elections Administrators (Aug. 2001)

Caltech-MIT Voting Technology Project, Voting: What Is, What Could Be

(July 2001).
Appendix II

List of Recently Issued Election Reports

Page 70 GAO-02-90 Elections

State Commission and 

Task Force Reports

(alphabetical order by state)

The Governor’s Select Task Force on Election Procedures, Standards, and 

Technology, Revitalizing Democracy in Florida (Mar. 2001).

Hon. Cathy Cox, Georgia Secretary of State, The 2000 Election: A Wake-Up 

Call For Reform and Change - Report to the Governor and Members of the 

General Assembly (Jan. 2001).

Hon. Chet Culver, Iowa Secretary of State, Commissioner of Elections, and 

Registrar of Voters, Iowa’s Election 2000: Facts, Findings, and Our 

Future (Mar. 2001).

Hon. Ron Thornburgh, Kansas Secretary of State, Kansas Secretary of 

State’s Six-Point Election Improvement Plan (Jan. 2001).

Special Committee on Voting Systems and Elections Procedures in 

Maryland, Report and Recommendations (Feb. 2001).

Hon. Matt Blunt, Missouri Secretary of State, Making Every Vote Count: 

Report of Secretary of State Matt Blunt to the People of Missouri (Jan. 

2001).

Hon. Bob Brown, Montana Secretary of State, 2001 Election Reform Plan 

(2001).

Office of New York Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, Voting Matters in New 

York: Participation, Choice, Action, Integrity (Feb. 2001).

Hon. Henry Cellar, Texas Secretary of State, Texas Overvote/Undervote 

Study (Jan. 2001).

Secretary of State Deborah L. Markowitz, Review of Vermont's Election 

Administration and Proposals for Improvement (Jan. 2001).

United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

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