COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-15-00373-CR

GERONIMO SCOTT AGUILAR APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM THE 213TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 1327533D

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant Geronimo Scott Aguilar appeals his convictions for two counts of 

aggravated sexual assault of a child under fourteen years of age, three counts of 

sexual assault of a child under seventeen years of age, and two counts of 

indecency with a child by contact. In four issues, Aguilar argues that the trial 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of extraneous bad acts and 

testimony that allegedly constituted backdoor hearsay. Although Aguilar’s four 

issues are thoroughly briefed, our review of the record reveals—as argued by the 

State—that Aguilar’s alleged errors were not preserved in the trial court for our 

review; accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.2

II. BACKGROUND3

When Aguilar was around eighteen or nineteen years old, he got involved 

in the music ministry and youth ministry at Set Free in Anaheim, California. 

While with Set Free, Aguilar met the complainant’s mother and stepfather and 

later moved in with them and their three daughters. Aguilar would sleep on the 

couch behind the eleven-year-old complainant, “spooning” with her while his 

penis was erect. 

When Aguilar’s uncle asked him to move to Texas to perform music for 

Kenneth Copeland Ministries, Aguilar agreed. While Aguilar was volunteering 

with Kenneth Copeland Ministries, he worked on staff with a ministry called New 

Beginnings. Aguilar talked to the pastor of New Beginnings about opening up a 

rehab home for the addicts that they were ministering to and volunteered the 

complainant’s mother to oversee a women’s rehab home. The pastor gave his 

 

2Aguilar’s appellate attorneys are not the same attorneys who represented 

him at trial.

3Because Aguilar does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support his convictions, we include only a brief background here. Additional 

facts, when necessary, are set forth under each issue.
3

blessing, and the complainant’s family moved to Fort Worth in August 1996 when 

the complainant was thirteen years old. Within a few months, the pastor of New 

Beginnings was unhappy with the way that the complainant’s mother was running 

the women’s rehab home, so Aguilar and his wife moved into the women’s rehab 

home with the complainant’s family to help oversee it. 

While Aguilar’s wife was on a trip to California, Aguilar took the 

complainant and her eleven-year-old sister to a house owned by someone 

affiliated with New Beginnings and played strip poker with them. On various 

occasions, Aguilar “dry humped” the complainant while they both had clothes on. 

Aguilar and the complainant also often watched movies together, including Lolita

and Great Balls of Fire. 

On Halloween night in 1996, Aguilar came into the complainant’s bedroom 

and had sex with her. The complainant was thirteen years old at the time. After 

that night, Aguilar and the complainant had “a lot of sex in a lot of different 

places.” 

When Aguilar, his wife, and the complainant’s family left New Beginnings 

and moved to a house in Grapevine, Aguilar and the complainant continued to 

have sex, though it was less frequent. The complainant recounted a 

conversation that took place in Aguilar’s bedroom in Grapevine when “[h]e was 

crying, and he was on his knees, and begging [the complainant] to forgive him 

and he was so sorry, he loved [her].” 
4

After Aguilar and his wife moved to another house and after the 

complainant’s family moved to Euless, Aguilar continued to have contact with the 

complainant; he picked her up and took her to motels so that they could have 

sex. The last memory that the complainant had of Aguilar was when he picked 

her up, took her to his house in Forest Hill, and had sex with her there. The 

complainant said that she had sex with Aguilar beginning on Halloween night in 

1996 and continuing through 1997 when she was almost fifteen years old.4

In September 1998, Aguilar and his wife moved to Richmond, Virginia, 

where he ultimately started his own ministry. As Aguilar’s ministry grew, he “lost 

his way,” and by 2006 or 2007, he was involved in a number of extramarital 

affairs with parishioners and with females on staff at his ministry. When rumors 

of the affairs came to light, C.H., a sixteen-year-old girl who was on Aguilar’s staff 

and with whom Aguilar had an inappropriate relationship, confronted Aguilar 

about the affairs. 

The complainant learned that C.H. wanted to come forward with her 

allegations against Aguilar, and that convinced the complainant to come forward 

with her allegations against Aguilar that dated back to 1996 and 1997. 

Based on the complainant’s allegations, Aguilar was indicted in 2014, and 

after a five-day trial, the jury convicted Aguilar of two counts of aggravated sexual 

assault of a child under fourteen years of age, three counts of sexual assault of a 

 

4The complainant was born in January 1983. 
5

child under seventeen years of age, and two counts of indecency with a child by 

contact. The trial court sentenced Aguilar to forty years’ imprisonment on each of 

the two counts of aggravated sexual assault, to twenty years’ imprisonment on 

each of the three counts of sexual assault, and to twenty years’ imprisonment on 

each of the two counts of indecency and ordered the seven sentences to run 

concurrently. Aguilar then perfected this appeal.

III. NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION SHOWN REGARDING THE ADMISSION OF 

THE COMPLAINED-OF EVIDENCE

In his first three issues, Aguilar argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion by admitting evidence of extraneous bad acts. In his fourth issue, 

Aguilar argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting testimony 

that allegedly constituted backdoor hearsay. We discuss each of these 

evidentiary challenges below.

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence, as well as its decision 

regarding the relative weight of the probative value of the evidence, under an 

abuse-of-discretion standard. Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2010), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 727 (2011); De La Paz v. State, 279 

S.W.3d 336, 343–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). “The rules of evidence favor the 

admission of relevant evidence and carry a presumption that relevant evidence is 

more probative than prejudicial.” Kirk v. State, 421 S.W.3d 772, 782 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. ref’d). As long as the trial court’s ruling falls within
6

the zone of reasonable disagreement, we will affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Martinez, 327 S.W.3d at 736; Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2003). 

B. The Law on Preservation of Error

To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have presented to the 

trial court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds 

for the desired ruling if they are not apparent from the context of the request, 

objection, or motion. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Douds v. State, 472 S.W.3d 

670, 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1461 (2016). A party 

must continue to object each time the objectionable evidence is offered. 

Martinez v. State, 98 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Clay v. State, 361 

S.W.3d 762, 766 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.). Any error in the 

admission of evidence is cured when the same evidence comes in elsewhere 

without objection. Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). 

Most complaints, “whether constitutional, statutory, or otherwise, are 

forfeited by failure to comply with Rule 33.1(a).” Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 

334, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). A reviewing court should not address the 

merits of an issue that has not been preserved for appeal. Ford v. State, 305 

S.W.3d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
7

C. Analysis of Complaints Regarding the Admission of Evidence of 

Extraneous Bad Acts 

1. Testimony that Aguilar Had an Inappropriate Relationship with C.H.

In the defense’s case in chief, Aguilar was asked whether there was “ever 

any time that [he] ever had any inappropriate sexual contact with [the 

complainant],” and he responded, “No, sir, never ever in my life and never even 

[been] accused of having sex with a child until this [case].” On crossexamination, the State asked Aguilar without objection whether he had fondled 

C.H. and whether he had touched her breasts or her vagina; Aguilar denied any 

such touching of C.H. other than giving her hugs. The State then called C.H. to 

testify on rebuttal. C.H. testified without objection that Aguilar had expressed 

feelings for her when she was sixteen years old5 and had told her to let him know 

when she was ready for sex and where she wanted to meet and that he would be 

there. C.H. further testified that her relationship with Aguilar progressed from 

hugs, to a peck on the lips, and to kissing with tongues and that he then started 

touching her butt and her breasts under her bra and “dry humped” her on her 

“privates.” When C.H. heard rumors about Aguilar’s affairs with other women, 

she confronted Aguilar about the affairs and told him that she was mad at him for 

bringing her into this “sick, twisted relationship in the first place”; Aguilar started 

 

5C.H. testified that she was born in July 1993; she would have turned

sixteen years old in 2009. Aguilar testified that he was born in February 1970; 

thus, Aguilar would have been thirty-nine or forty years old when C.H. was 

sixteen years old.
8

“bawling,” apologized, and admitted that he had a problem. Several weeks later, 

C.H. told her godparents that Aguilar had touched her inappropriately. C.H.’s 

godfather testified without objection that after he confronted Aguilar about what 

he had done to C.H., Aguilar went to counseling. 

In his second issue, Aguilar argues that the trial court abused its discretion 

by permitting the State to question him, C.H., and her godfather about his 

inappropriate sexual contact with C.H. on the basis that the State was allowed to 

clear up the false impression Aguilar had created during his testimony—that he 

had never had inappropriate sexual contact with the complainant or any other 

child. Aguilar cites to over sixty pages of the record without pointing to a specific 

overruled objection that forms the basis of his complaint on appeal. 

We have reviewed C.H.’s entire testimony and note that of the five 

objections made by the defense, one objection was sustained before the answer 

was completed, and no adverse ruling was pursued; three objections were 

general objections that preserved nothing for review; and one leading-relevancy 

objection about whether Aguilar was crying was not re-urged later when C.H. 

testified about Aguilar bawling. Because Aguilar did not lodge specific objections 

to the bulk of C.H.’s detailed testimony about their relationship and because 

evidence of Aguilar’s reaction to being confronted came in later without objection, 

no complaint to C.H.’s testimony regarding Aguilar’s inappropriate relationship 

with her is preserved for our review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Fuller v. State, 

253 S.W.3d 220, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (holding appellant’s failure to object 
9

to witness’s testimony at trial waived appellate review of any error associated 

with witness’s testimony), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1105 (2009); Valle, 109 S.W.3d 

at 509–10 (holding any error in the admission of the objected-to testimony was 

cured when the same or similar evidence came in elsewhere without objection). 

Moreover, to the extent Aguilar complains that the trial court erred by overruling

unspecified objections during his testimony and C.H.’s godfather’s testimony 

about Aguilar’s relationship with C.H., any error in overruling such unspecified 

objections was cured when the same or similar evidence came in without 

objection during C.H.’s testimony. See Valle, 109 S.W.3d at 509–10. 

Accordingly, we overrule Aguilar’s second issue.

2. Testimony Regarding the Complainant’s Motivation to Come Forward

In his first issue, Aguilar argues that the trial court abused its discretion by 

admitting evidence that the complainant came forward with her allegations 

against Aguilar only after hearing that there was a sixteen-year-old girl from 

Virginia—C.H.—who wanted to come forward with allegations against Aguilar.

The State responds that resolution of Aguilar’s second issue moots his first issue. 

We agree. Because we have held that no complaint to C.H.’s testimony 

regarding Aguilar’s inappropriate relationship with her was preserved for our 

review and because C.H.’s testimony was more detailed than the complainant’s 

testimony about C.H.’s desire to come forward, any error in admitting the 

complainant’s testimony that she came forward after learning that C.H. wanted to 

come forward was cured. See id. We overrule Aguilar’s first issue.
10

3. Testimony that Aguilar Had Extramarital Affairs

During the State’s case in chief, Aguilar sought to expose the bias of two of 

the State’s witnesses—Jamie Chasteen and Amber Baker—by asking about their 

affairs with him. On redirect, the State questioned both witnesses about the

details of the affairs. 

Additionally, during Aguilar’s case in chief, his wife Samantha testified that 

his affairs were exposed in 2012 or 2013, a former parishioner named Melissa 

Dixon testified that Chasteen had admitted to her that she had an affair with 

Aguilar, and Aguilar testified in his own defense and admitted that he had 

engaged in several affairs. The State cross-examined Samantha, Dixon, and 

Aguilar about his affairs.

In his third issue, Aguilar argues that the trial court abused its discretion by 

admitting the details of his extramarital affairs through his testimony as well as

the testimony of Chasteen, Baker, Samantha, and Dixon because such testimony 

went beyond the scope of the evidence that defense counsel had elicited and 

was not relevant. We will evaluate the testimony of each of these witnesses 

below.

a. Jamie Chasteen

With regard to Chasteen, Aguilar argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion by permitting her to testify, over defense counsel’s relevance objection, 

that Aguilar once described her during sex as “look[ing] like a 12-year-old” and

that Aguilar compared their relationship to the movie Lolita. The record 
11

demonstrates that Aguilar’s comment about Chasteen “look[ing] like a 12-yearold” referred to the fact that her makeup came off during sex; Chasteen was not 

a minor but rather twenty-three years old when she first had sex with Aguilar. 

Aguilar cites no case law, and we have found none, in which making a comment 

similar to his or watching Lolita with a woman in her twenties constitutes

evidence of an extraneous bad act. Moreover, earlier in the State’s case in chief, 

the complainant had testified without objection that she and Aguilar had watched 

Lolita together and that she had noticed that there were similarities between the 

movie and her relationship with Aguilar. Because this evidence—which is similar 

to but more damaging than the complained-of evidence—came in without 

objection, any error in overruling Aguilar’s objection to the State’s redirect 

examination of Chasteen on this topic was cured. See Valle, 109 S.W.3d at 

509–10. 

b. Amber Baker

With regard to Baker, Aguilar cites to four pages of the record during which 

the State questioned her on redirect about her affair with Aguilar and elicited 

testimony that he had also had an affair with Baker’s mother. Aguilar did not 

object to this testimony, and there was no running objection in place. Thus, no 

complaint about Baker’s testimony regarding her affair with Aguilar and his affair 

with her mother is preserved for our review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Fuller, 

253 S.W.3d at 232.
12

c. Samantha Aguilar

With regard to Samantha’s testimony, Aguilar complains about the State’s 

questioning on pages 123 through 137 of volume 9 of the reporter’s record. The 

fifteen cited pages contain twelve objections. Of those twelve objections, Aguilar 

specifically challenges on appeal only one objection that was overruled—“I object 

to the specificity of the affairs now that the affairs have been acknowledged. 

Now I assume we’re going to go through them one at a time”—which was urged 

in response to the State’s question about whether Samantha knew that her 

husband had an affair with Baker. Any error in the admission of Samantha’s 

testimony about Aguilar’s affair with Baker was harmless because the same 

evidence was previously admitted by Aguilar during his cross-examination of 

Baker. See Valle, 109 S.W.3d at 509–10. 

d. Melissa Dixon

With regard to Dixon’s testimony, Aguilar argues generally that “the State 

freely cross-examined her about several other affairs” and cites us to six pages 

of the record. On those six pages, only two objections appear, both of which

were sustained by the trial court. Dixon did not give answers to the two 

objectionable questions. Aguilar thus fails to identify any objectionable evidence 

that came in as a result of the State’s cross-examination of Dixon. 

e. Aguilar

With regard to his own testimony, Aguilar cites to pages 96, 97, 140, 146, 

184, 191 to 193, and 203 to 204 of volume 10 of the reporter’s record and argues 
13

that the State relentlessly questioned him about the details of his extramarital 

affairs. Of the pages cited by Aguilar, pages 96, 97, 140, and 184 contain no 

objections. Page 146 contains an objection regarding a repetitive question, 

which was made and sustained after Aguilar answered; no motion to strike or 

disregard was made. Pages 191 to 192 contain an overruled objection to the 

question regarding how many women Aguilar brought to the parsonage to have 

sex.

6 After Aguilar answered the question, the State asked three related followup questions, and Aguilar failed to object to those questions. Thus, any error in 

overruling Aguilar’s objection to the State’s question about how many other 

women he had sex with in the parsonage was cured. See Valle, 109 S.W.3d at 

509–10. On pages 203 to 204, the State asked Aguilar about his presence at a 

slumber party where minors were in attendance, and Aguilar answered the 

question in the negative before his attorney objected that the question was 

cumulative, prejudicial, and “beyond any remote relevance to the case.” The 

untimely objection preserved nothing for our review. See Tex. R. App. P. 

33.1(a); Luna v. State, 268 S.W.3d 594, 604 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (holding 

untimely objection, which was made after the question was asked and answered, 

did not preserve error for appeal), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 883 (2009).

 

6Page 193 contains a sustained objection to the question of who else 

Aguilar had sex with outside of his marriage. Because Aguilar did not answer 

this question, no objectionable evidence came in.
14

f. Disposition of Issue 3

Having reviewed each of the portions of the record cited by Aguilar during 

which he and four witnesses testified about his extramarital affairs and having

determined that no error occurred or that no error was preserved for our review, 

we overrule Aguilar’s third issue.

7

D. Analysis of Complaint Regarding Alleged Backdoor Hearsay

During its case in chief, the State called Elinor Lutine Martinez (Lou), who 

knew Aguilar when he ministered in Fort Worth. The State questioned Lou about 

a frantic call that she received from the complainant’s mother in the middle of the 

night sometime in 1997. Lou testified without objection that after she convinced

the complainant’s mother to calm down, the information she received from the 

complainant’s mother “blew [her] mind a little.” The following colloquy then 

transpired:

Q. Based upon what she [the complainant’s mother] told you, 

without saying what she said, did you give her instructions on what 

she needed to do?

A. I asked her what her plans were.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Objection. 

Objection.

 

7Aguilar also argues that harm from the alleged errors in his first three 

issues should be considered cumulatively. Because we have held in each of his 

first three issues that no error occurred or that no error was preserved for our 

review, there is no harm or not enough harm to accumulate. See Murphy v. 

State, 112 S.W.3d 592, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“Because we have found 

little or no error in the above-alleged points, there is no harm or not enough harm 

to accumulate.”), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 940 (2004). 
15

THE COURT: Okay.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Without knowing what was 

said, the instructions would imply the answer to what was said, 

which is not permissible. We don’t know, so that’s a backdoor 

hearsay, and I just object to that. Her giving instructions is not 

relevant to the case. 

A bench conference followed, during which the parties explained what testimony 

might be elicited in response to the question set forth above, and the trial court

ultimately overruled defense counsel’s backdoor hearsay objection. The State

then resumed its questioning of Lou:

Q. (By [PROSECUTOR]) Ms. Martinez, what instructions did you 

give to [the complainant’s mother] with how she needed to proceed?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Object, Your Honor, for the 

record.

THE COURT: All right. Your objection is noted, and it’s 

overruled.

THE WITNESS: Do I answer?

Q. (By [PROSECUTOR]) Yes, ma’am. Yes, ma’am.

A. I told her, “You have to report this; you do know that.”[8]

On the following page of the record, the State asked Lou without objection 

whether she saw anything being done by authorities—such as law enforcement 

or CPS—with regard to the victim, and Lou said, “No . . . [nothing].” Lou testified 

 

8Although Aguilar contends on appeal that Lou advised the complainant’s 

mother to call Child Protective Services, the record reflects that Lou told the 

complainant’s mother only that she had “to report this.” 
16

without objection that because nothing was being done, she called Pastor 

Zaragoza, who was involved with Aguilar’s ministry. 

Pastor Zaragoza testified that after he received the phone call from Lou, he 

immediately called Aguilar and told him that they needed to have a meeting 

“now.” When Aguilar came to Pastor Zaragoza’s house, Pastor Zaragoza 

confronted him about the information he had received from Lou and told him that 

they needed to do what was right for the girls and what was right for Aguilar, 

including that Aguilar needed to get help. Pastor Zaragoza testified without 

objection that in response to being confronted, Aguilar “became extremely

distraught, began to weep, cry” and grabbed Pastor Zaragoza’s knee and said 

over and over, “I don’t want to go to jail over this.” 

In his fourth issue, Aguilar argues that the trial court abused its discretion 

by admitting Lou’s testimony because it allegedly constitutes backdoor hearsay

that corroborates the complainant’s accusations. As set forth above, the record 

reflects that more explicit evidence than the complained-of evidence came in 

later without objection through Pastor Zaragoza. Accordingly, any error in 

overruling Aguilar’s backdoor-hearsay objection was harmless. See Valle, 109

S.W.3d at 509–10; see also Burks v. State, 876 S.W.2d 877, 898 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1994) (holding that erroneously admitted backdoor hearsay was harmless 

because other testimony proved the same facts), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1114 

(1995). We therefore overrule Aguilar’s fourth issue.
17

IV. CONCLUSION

Having overruled each of Aguilar’s four issues, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgments.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: WALKER, MEIER, and SUDDERTH, JJ.

SUDDERTH, J., concurs without opinion.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: April 6, 2017