SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5530-16T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MIKIEL A. ADL,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

Argued May 6, 2019 – Decided August 7, 2019

Before Judges Sabatino and Sumners.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Middlesex County, Indictment Nos. 11-07-

1083, 11-07-1088 and 11-12-1872.

Lauren S. Michaels, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, 

Public Defender, attorney; Lauren S. Michaels, of 

counsel and on the briefs).

Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney General, argued 

the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney 

General, attorney; Jane C. Schuster, of counsel and on 

the briefs).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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PER CURIAM

Defendant Mikiel Adl was indicted for controlled dangerous substance 

(CDS) and weapons offenses arising out of a warrantless search of a house in 

Edison. Following the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence 

seized in that search, defendant reached a global plea agreement involving that 

indictment and two other indictments. He pled guilty to second-degree 

conspiracy to distribute CDS while in possession of a firearm and second-degree 

certain persons not to possess a weapon, which both arose out of the warrantless 

search, and second-degree witness tampering. In accordance with the plea 

agreement, he was later sentenced to an aggregate prison term of twelve years 

with a six-year period of parole ineligibility. Pursuant to Rule 3:5-7(d), 

defendant preserved his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. 

Defendant raises the following arguments on appeal: 

POINT I

BECAUSE NEITHER THE ARREST WARRANT 

FOR A NON-RESIDENT NOR CONSENT OR 

APPARENT AUTHORITY ALLOWED POLICE TO 

ENTER AND SEARCH THE HOME, THE MOTION 

TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

A. The Police Entry Into The Dwelling Cannot 

Be Justified By The Arrest Warrant For NonResident Bradley.
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B. Adl's Act Of "Stepping Aside" For The Police 

Did Not Equate To Consent To Enter.

C. Adl's Act Of Answering The Door Did Not, 

By Itself, Provide The Police With A Reasonable 

Basis To Believe That He Had Apparent 

Authority To Consent To A Search Of The 

Premises.

D. The State Has Waived Any ExigentCircumstances Argument By Declining To Raise 

It Below.

POINT II

BECAUSE THE IMPOSITION OF THE 

DISCRETIONARY PAROLE BAR VIOLATED 

ALLEYNE V. UNITED STATES, THE PAROLE 

DISQUALIFIER ON THE WITNESS-TAMPERING 

COUNT MUST BE VACATED. IN THE 

ALTERNATIVE, BECAUSE THE SENTENCING 

JUDGE IMPOSED A DISCRETIONARY PAROLE 

BAR WITHOUT ARTICULATING ITS REASONS 

FOR DOING SO, RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED.

A. The Imposition Of The Discretionary Parole 

Bar Violated Our State And Federal 

Constitutions.

B. Alternatively, The Sentencing Judge Imposed 

The Discretionary Parole Bar Without Making 

The Requisite Findings, And Therefore, 

Resentencing Is Required.

Prior to oral argument, we requested the parties to submit supplemental 

briefs addressing the implications of our decision in State v. Bradley, Nos. A-
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3707-15, A-0060-16 (App. Div. Sep. 28, 2018), certif. denied, 237 N.J. 318

(2019), where we reversed the decision of a different trial court denying a 

similar motion to suppress evidence arising from the same warrantless search

that defendant sought to suppress, and our Supreme Court's decision in State v. 

Kiriakakis, 235 N.J. 420 (2018), regarding the constitutionality of imposing a 

period of parole ineligibility on the witness tampering conviction under N.J.S.A. 

2C:43-6(b) without a jury trial. In his submission, defendant argues:

POINT I

THE COURT PROPERLY RECOGNIZED IN 

BRADLEY THAT THE EXACT SAME ENTRY AND 

SEARCH AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE WAS 

UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AND BECAUSE THE 

FACTS ADDUCED AT BRADLEY'S AND ADL'S 

SUPPRESSION HEARING[S] WERE LEGALLY 

INDISTINGUISHABLE. SUPPRESSION IS 

REQUIRED.

POINT II

ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE RAISED IN POINT [II A]

OF DEFENDANT'S OPENING BRIEF IS 

CONTROLLED BY THE SUPREME COURT'S 

DECISION IN STATE V. KIRIAKAKIS, 

RESENTENCING IS STILL REQUIRED FOR THE 

REASONS EXPRESSED IN POINT [II B].

Having considered these arguments in light of the applicable law and the 

record, we reverse the denial of defendant's motion to suppress based on
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essentially the same reasoning we followed in Bradley, as applied to the present 

record. Accordingly, we vacate the convictions for second-degree conspiracy 

to distribute CDS while in possession of a firearm and second-degree certain 

persons not to possess weapons, and remand so that defendant can move to 

vacate his guilty pleas. That being said, for the sake of completeness, we 

conclude the record does not support his contention that the court did not set 

forth its reasons for imposing a discretionary parole disqualifier for the witness 

tampering charge – which he now concedes did not violate his constitutional 

rights.

I

Since the events leading up to the law enforcement officers' decision to 

conduct the warrantless search were fully detailed in Bradley, we need not repeat 

them here. Suffice it to say, that more than ten police officers went to the Edison 

house to execute an arrest warrant against Malcom A. Bradley – believing he 

was present in the house – who was accused of fatally shooting a victim while 

they were in separate cars waiting at a stoplight in Plainfield. As a result of the 

evidence seized during the warrantless search, defendant and five co-defendants, 

including Bradley, were charged in forty-nine counts of Indictment No. 11-07-

01083. Defendant was named in eight of those counts; CDS and weapons 
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offenses, and a charge of second-degree conspiracy to distribute CDS while in 

possession of a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1 and 2C:5-2. On that same date, the 

one-count Indictment No. 11-07-01088, also arising from the warrantless search,

charged him with second-degree certain persons not to possess a weapon, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7. 

Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized in the warrantless 

search. At the suppression hearing, the State presented the sole testimony of 

Sergeant Michael Triarsi of the Union County Prosecutor's Office. He stated 

that at 11:44 p.m. on March 25, 2011, possessing an arrest warrant, he knocked 

on the door of a house in Edison to apprehend Bradley. He was wearing plain 

clothes and had a police badge around his neck. Law enforcement did not know 

that defendant was present in the house nor did they suspect him of any 

wrongdoing at that time. 

According to Sgt. Triarsi, a man, who he later identified as defendant, 

opened the door. Sgt. Triarsi asked, "where is he [?]" and defendant stepped to 

the side, which Sgt. Triarsi said he understood to mean "[c]ome on in." The 

officers located Bradley in the den located to the right of the front door. The 

officers found a handgun "underneath" Bradley and observed narcotics, baggies, 

and "things of that nature" in his immediate vicinity. The police arrested 
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Bradley, secured defendant and his girlfriend Heather Ganz, along with three 

other occupants, and applied for a search warrant. Bradley admitted to 

possession of the handgun and the narcotics in his vicinity, but denied 

possession of anything else in the house. During the subsequent warrant search,

additional contraband was found. 

In addition to Sgt. Triarsi's testimony, the State played the home 

surveillance video, which it obtained from co-defendant Ganz. The video was 

not played at Bradley's motion to suppress hearing. Although the video is blurry 

and interrupted by flashes of light, it shows that when Sgt. Triarsi knocked on 

the front door there were two other law enforcement officers on the steps directly 

behind him. The officers do not appear to have their guns drawn, although they 

are holding their right hands close to their sides. It appears from the video that 

after defendant opened the door, he moved left, and Sgt. Triarsi and two officers 

on the steps entered the residence followed by six other officers, some of whom 

appear to be in uniform. 

Defendant was the only witness presented on his behalf. He testified that 

as he opened the door to leave the house the police shined a light in his face, 

threw him to the ground and handcuffed him. Although he was dating Ganz at 
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the time of the search, he denied having the authority to let anyone into the house 

and said that it was not his intention to let the police enter. 

After reserving decision, the court issued an order and a written decision 

denying the motion to suppress.1 The decision was based upon the court's

assessment of whether there was an exception to the prohibition against 

warrantless searches because defendant gave third-party consent to the police to 

search the house. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990). The court 

found the police officers' belief that defendant had the authority to consent to a 

search was objectively reasonable in view of the attendant facts and 

circumstances. Id. at 188-89; State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 219, 221 (1983). 

The court held:

Based on all the testimony presented . . . , the facts 

establish that [defendant] opened the door in response 

to the police knocking; he did not object to police entry

or state in any way, shape, or form that the police were 

not allowed to come in; police asked about Bradley's 

presence and [defendant] stepped aside in response to 

the question. The act of stepping aside by [defendant] 

can fairly be interpreted as granting permission to enter 

the premises. The reasonableness of that inference is 

also buttressed by [defendant's] failure to verbalize any 

objection to the officer's search into the residence.[]

 

1

 Although the court was aware that Bradley had previously moved in Middlesex 

and Union vicinages to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless 

search of the house, there is no indication in the record that the court was aware 

of those rulings or reviewed the transcripts or opinions rendered in those cases. 
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Based on these circumstances, the court finds that the 

police had an objectively reasonable basis to believe 

that [defendant] possessed common authority over the 

property to be searched and that his actions and 

inactions granted the officers consent to enter the 

residence.

Ten months later, defendant reached a global plea agreement resolving 

three indictments. He pled guilty to second-degree conspiracy to distribute CDS

while in possession of a firearm under Indictment No. 11-07-01083 (count two) 

and second-degree certain persons not to possess weapons under Indictment No. 

11-07-01088 (count one). He also pled guilty to second-degree witness 

tampering under Indictment No. 11-12-01872 (count three), which arose from a 

separate incident involving threats defendant made to a woman arising from 

their mutual involvement in a legal proceeding. In accordance with the plea 

agreement, defendant was sentenced to: a six-year prison term with a three-year 

parole bar for second-degree conspiracy to distribute CDS while in possession 

of a firearm; a five-year prison term with a five-year parole bar for seconddegree certain persons not to possess weapons to run concurrent to the CDS 

offense; and a six-year prison term with a discretionary three-year parole bar 

under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b) for second-degree witness tampering to run 

consecutive to the CDS offense and to run concurrent to the certain persons

offense. 
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II

We first address defendant's contention that the trial court erred in denying 

his motion to suppress because the law enforcement officers' warrantless search

in the house was not justified because they did not have valid consent to enter 

the house to execute the arrest warrant against Bradley. The State disagrees 

based upon the court's factual findings and legal conclusions that valid consent 

to enter the house was given by defendant.2

Under our standard of review, we must defer to the trial court's findings 

of fact "so long as those findings are supported by sufficient evidence in the 

record." State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015) (internal citations omitted); 

see also State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101 (2016) (recognizing that factual 

findings will be upheld if there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to 

support the findings).

 

2

 Issues regarding the scope of the law enforcement officers' execution of the 

arrest warrant and the search incident to an arrest, and whether there were 

exigent circumstances to enter the house, were not present in this appeal as they 

were in Bradley. 
11 A-5530-16T3

However, we owe no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law. See

State v. Hinton, 216 N.J. 211, 228 (2013) (internal citations omitted). Nor are 

we "obliged to defer to clearly mistaken findings . . . that are not supported by 

sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Gibson, 218 N.J. 277 (2014). 

To a considerable extent, the court's ruling on the suppression motion 

embody a mixture of factual and legal determinations, and the significance, 

under search-and-seizure principles, of factual details that emerged at the 

hearing. Our scope of review is therefore a mixed one, depending upon the 

particular facet of the trial court's decision in question.

It is well-established that a resident of property may vitiate the warrant 

requirement by consenting to a search by the police. State v. Domicz, 188 N.J. 

285, 305 (2006); see also State v. Legette, 227 N.J. 460, 474-75 (2017) (ruling 

the State failed to establish consent to justify the warrantless police search of a 

residence).

An "essential element" of such consent to conduct a warrantless search is 

the individual's "knowledge of the right to refuse [it]." State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 

349, 353-54 (1975); see also Legette, 227 N.J. at 475 (reversing a finding of 

consent by a defendant who had been stopped by an officer on a reasonable 

suspicion of illegal drug use, because the State had not shown the defendant 
12 A-5530-16T3

"thought he could refuse [the officer's] search into his apartment"). In a 

noncustodial setting such as the present one, the State does not necessarily have 

to establish that police officers expressly advised the person who allowed their 

search of the right to refuse consent, but that burden remains on the State to 

demonstrate that person's knowledge of right to refuse. Johnson, 68 N.J. at 354.

"[C]onsent to a warrantless search . . . must be shown to be unequivocal, 

voluntary, knowing, and intelligent." State v. Sugar, 108 N.J. 151, 156 (1987). 

Consent is a factual question determined by an examination of the totality of the 

circumstances. State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 264 (1988).

Applying these legal standards, as we did in Bradley, we respectfully 

disagree with the court's conclusion that defendant's opening of the house's front 

door and standing to the side, gave the large group of assembled police officers 

valid consent to enter and search the dwelling. Sgt. Triarsi did not testify that 

he or any of the other officers present advised defendant of his right to refuse 

consent. Nor did the State establish that defendant was already aware of that 

right.

The video clearly shows that defendant leaned aside after he encountered 

the officers at the door. See State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 374-81 (2017) 

(clarifying the limited scope of appellate review of factual findings based on 
13 A-5530-16T3

video evidence, but declaring that "[a]ppellate courts have an important role in 

taking corrective action when factual findings are so clearly mistake – so wide 

of the mark – that the interest of justice demand intervention"); see also State v. 

A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 395-96 (2019). This is insufficient proof that he knowingly 

and voluntarily consented to their search into the dwelling. Wearing garb that 

identified him as a law enforcement officer, Sgt. Triarsi knocked on the door

with several other officers assembled behind him. Rather than identify himself 

or converse with defendant, Sgt. Triarsi immediately demanded to know 

"[W]here is he[?]"; referring to Bradley.

The totality of circumstances objectively would have been intimidating or 

alarming for a citizen opening the door to this encounter. As the Court observed 

in Johnson, "[m]any persons, perhaps most, would view the request of a police 

officer to make a search as having the force of law." 68 N.J. at 354. Hence, 

"[u]nless it is shown by the State that the person involved knew that he had the 

right to refuse to accede to such a request, his assenting to the search is not 

meaningful." Ibid.; see also State v. Rice, 115 N.J. Super. 128, 130-31 (App. 

Div. 1971) (ruling that where a police officer knocked on an apartment door and 

entered, without any words being spoken between the officer and the person who 
14 A-5530-16T3

opened the door, the search was not with knowing consent and instead was, "[a]t 

best . . . permitted in submission to authority").

Accordingly, we are constrained to rule that the court's conclusion that 

defendant's actions and inactions granted the officers consent to enter the 

residence is unpersuasive and not supported by substantial credible evidence. 

We thus conclude the consent exception to a warrantless search does not apply.

We likewise are unpersuaded that the record suffices to establish 

defendant had apparent authority to allow the officers into this private dwelling. 

The United States Supreme Court has applied the apparent authority doctrine 

"when officers enter without a warrant because they reasonably (though 

erroneously) believe that the person who has consented to their search is a 

resident of the premises[.]" Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186 (emphasis added); see

also Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 (2006) (noting that police may 

reasonably rely upon consent given by "a co-occupant whom the police 

reasonably, but erroneously, believe to possess shared authority as an occupant." 

(emphasis added)).

The Court has warned in this context that Fourth Amendment rights must 

not be "eroded . . . by unrealistic doctrines of 'apparent authority.'" Stoner v. 

California, 376 U.S. 483, 488 (1964). The trial court's analysis here threatens 
15 A-5530-16T3

such an erosion. It is not objectively reasonable for police to assume that 

whenever an adult answers a door to a dwelling, the adult has the apparent 

authority to consent to the police entering.

None of the officers asked defendant if he owned or lived in the house. 

They obtained no information before entering about his reason for being on the 

premises. Defendant's mere conduct in opening the door in response to Sgt. 

Triarsi's knocking, and in thereafter leaning his body away from the officers' 

path, does not provide sufficient objective indicia that he possessed the right to 

decide who may enter the premises.

Indeed, the police appeared to know little about the house other than they 

suspected Bradley was inside. They had no information about who lived there 

or whether defendant was their relative or a guest of the residents. There simply 

is not enough evidence in this record to conclude, as a matter of law, that 

defendant possessed the apparent authority to consent to the police search.

Having concluded that the record or the applicable law does not support 

the consent exceptions to the warrant requirement, we must consider the 

ramifications of that conclusion. It is clear that the firearm and CDS that were 

seized from the house after their illegal warrantless search were "fruits of the 

poisonous tree" and should have been suppressed. See State v. O'Neill, 193 N.J. 
16 A-5530-16T3

148, 171 n.13 (2007). Consequently, this matter must be remanded to afford 

defendant an opportunity to withdraw his guilty pleas to three offenses and have 

the judgment of conviction vacated.

III

In his initial appellate brief, defendant contends a remand is necessary for 

resentencing because the imposition of a discretionary parole bar on the witness 

tampering conviction violated Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013).

However, in his supplemental brief, he acknowledges that our Supreme Court 

rejected the identical argument in State v. Kiriakakis, 235 N.J. 420, 442 (2018). 

Yet, he continues to press forward with the alternative argument he initially 

raised that the court imposed a discretionary parole bar without articulating its 

reasons for doing so. State v. Bessix, 309 N.J. Super. 126, 129-30 (App. Div. 

1998); see also State v. Sainz, 107 N.J. 283, 290 (1987).

Normally, we would not address this issue because we reverse the court's 

denial of defendant's motion to suppress and, therefore, a remand is necessary 

so that defendant can withdraw his guilty pleas. However, for the sake of 

completeness, we address and reject defendant's remaining contention. 

The record clearly provides that the court set forth its reasons for imposing 

defendant's sentence in accordance with the plea agreement. In weighing the 
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sentencing factors, the court noted defendant's age and his extensive and 

significant criminal history (including parole violations) and concluded that 

aggravating factor three, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3) (the risk of re-offense), applied.

The court specifically found that no mitigating factors applied. Thus, there is 

no basis for a remand based upon alleged errors made at sentencing. 

Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We 

do not retain jurisdiction.