Docket No. 86710–Agenda 31–May 1999.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 

								JETTIE WILLIAMS, Appellee.

Opinion filed November 18, 1999.

	CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the

court:

	Defendant, Jettie Williams, pled guilty to the attempted

murder of the victim, Leroy Wade. The circuit court of Cook

County accepted defendant’s guilty plea and, based thereon,

convicted and sentenced defendant for that crime. Nearly five

years later, the victim died. Defendant was then charged with the

victim’s murder. At a preliminary hearing, the circuit court

granted defendant’s motion in limine to bar the State from using the prior guilty plea to attempted murder as evidence at

defendant’s murder trial.

	The State appealed (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)). The appellate

court upheld the circuit court’s in limine order (No. 1–97–2930 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23)). We allowed

the State’s petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). We

now reverse the appellate and circuit courts, and remand the cause

to the circuit court for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

	On February 1, 1989, defendant pled guilty to the charge of

attempted murder. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 8–4,

9–1(a). The parties stipulated to the following factual basis for the

plea. The victim and defendant were friends; they had known each

other for over 10 years and had served time in a penitentiary

together. Between midnight and 7 a.m. on September 29, 1986, the

victim and defendant were sitting and talking in the front seats of

a van. For some unknown reason, defendant produced a pistol and

shot the victim once in the head. The victim next remembered

awaking in a hospital. The victim’s head wound rendered him a

paraplegic with very limited use of his arms. After questioning and

admonishing defendant, the circuit court found that defendant’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 402.

Accordingly, the circuit court convicted defendant of attempted

murder and sentenced him to a prison term of nine years.

	On April 14, 1994, the victim died. On May 2, 1994,

defendant was charged with murder. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch.

38, pars. 9–1(a)(1), (a)(2). Defendant moved in limine to bar the State from using his prior guilty plea to attempted murder as

evidence at his murder trial.

	At a preliminary hearing, the circuit court granted defendant’s

motion. The circuit court concluded that the use of defendant’s

prior guilty plea to attempted murder as evidence at his murder

trial was a “direct consequence” of the guilty plea, and that

defendant was never advised of this consequence. Accordingly,

the circuit court found that defendant’s prior guilty plea to

attempted murder was not knowing and intelligent and, therefore,

inadmissible at his murder trial.

	The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, upheld the

circuit court. No. 1–97–2930 (unpublished order under Supreme

Court Rule 23). The appellate court reasoned that the use of

defendant’s guilty plea to attempted murder as evidence at his

murder trial was so severe a consequence that it became a “direct”

consequence. Thus, the circuit court was required to admonish

defendant of this consequence to render his guilty plea knowing

and intelligent. The State appeals.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

	The parties disagree, as they did before the appellate court, as

to the standard of review. The State contends that our review of

the circuit court’s in limine order should be de novo because that order centers on an issue of law. Defendant contends that our

review should be deferential because it was within the discretion

of the circuit court to enter such an order. The appellate court

employed a deferential standard of review.

	This appeal is from the circuit court’s in limine order excluding evidence. A motion in limine is a pretrial motion that seeks an order excluding inadmissible evidence and prohibiting

questions concerning such evidence, without the necessity of

having the questions asked and objections thereto made in front of

the jury. Thus, the in limine order will protect the movant from whatever prejudicial impact the mere asking of the questions and

the making of the objections may have upon a jury. Reidelberger v. Highland Body Shop, Inc., 83 Ill. 2d 545, 549 (1981); see generally M. Graham, Cleary & Graham’s Handbook of Illinois

Evidence §103.9 (7th ed. 1999).

	A motion in limine is addressed to the trial court’s inherent power to admit or exclude evidence. A court of review will not

reverse a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion in limine absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Holman, 257 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 1033 (1994); People v. Jordan, 205 Ill. App. 3d 116, 121 (1990); People v. Escobar, 168 Ill. App. 3d 30, 43 (1988); People v. Williams, 60 Ill. App. 3d 529, 532-33 (1978); see, e.g., People v. Eddington, 77 Ill. 2d 41, 44-47 (1979) (in limine order reviewed under abuse-of-discretion standard).

	However, a trial court must exercise its discretion within the

bounds of the law. Where a trial court’s exercise of discretion has

been frustrated by an erroneous rule of law, appellate review is

required to permit the exercise of discretion consistent with the

law. People v. Brockman, 143 Ill. 2d 351, 363 (1991).

	In this case, whether the use of a defendant’s prior guilty plea

to attempted murder as evidence at the defendant’s murder trial

was a “direct” consequence of the guilty plea is a question of

law.“[W]here the question presented is one of law, a reviewing

court determines it independently of the trial court’s judgment.” In re Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d 523, 526 (1996). 

II. Admissibility of Guilty Plea

A. Knowing and Intelligent

	The State contends that the appellate and circuit courts erred

in barring the use of defendant’s guilty plea to attempted murder

as evidence at his murder trial. The State argues that the guilty

plea constitutes an admission based on a knowing and intelligent guilty plea. Defendant contends that the circuit court’s in limine order was proper. Defendant argues that the circumstances

surrounding the guilty plea render it unknowing and, therefore,

inadmissible at his murder trial.

	The controlling legal principles are quite established. “It is

generally held that a voluntary plea of guilty on a prior trial or

hearing, even for another offense, where the plea in effect admits

certain facts which are relevant and material on the present trial,

is admissible.” 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law §883, at 92-93 (1989); accord United States v. Williams, 104 F.3d 213, 216 (8th Cir. 1997) (“ ‘A guilty plea is admissible in a subsequent collateral

criminal trial as evidence of an admission by a party opponent’ ”),

quoting United States v. Holmes, 794 F.2d 345, 349 (8th Cir. 1986). Illinois has long followed this general rule. People v. Epping, 17 Ill. 2d 557, 564-65 (1959); accord M. Graham, Cleary & Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence §802.4, at 758 (7th ed.

1999). The prior guilty plea is admissible in the subsequent

proceeding so long as the guilty plea was voluntary. People v. Lefler, 38 Ill. 2d 216, 220 (1967); see also People v. McLain, 32 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1000 (1975).

	Consequently, the admissibility of defendant’s prior guilty

plea to attempted murder as evidence at his murder trial depends

on whether his guilty plea was voluntary. “A plea of guilty is more

than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts;

it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and

determine punishment.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 279, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1711-12 (1969). A defendant

who pleads guilty waives several constitutional rights, including

the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to

trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers. Due process

of law requires that this waiver be voluntary and knowing. If a

defendant’s guilty plea is not voluntary and knowing, it has been

obtained in violation of due process and, therefore, is void. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 n.5, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 280 n.5, 89 S. Ct. at 1712 n.5,

quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418, 425, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 1171 (1969); accord Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 756, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1468-69 (1970); People v. Burt, 168 Ill. 2d 49, 64 (1995).

	Fundamentally then, a defendant’s guilty plea must be

knowing and intelligent, i.e., the defendant must be “ ‘ “fully aware of the direct consequences” ’ ” of the plea. (Emphasis added.) Brady, 397 U.S. at 755, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 760, 90 S. Ct. at 1472. Courts have commonly distinguished the “direct”

consequences of a guilty plea from the “collateral” consequences

of the plea. A defendant must be advised of the direct

consequences of a guilty plea. However, if a consequence of the

plea is collateral, then the defendant need not be advised of it

before entering the plea. State v. Ross, 129 Wash. 2d 279, 284, 916 P.2d 405, 409 (1996); People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397, 403, 657 N.E.2d 265, 267, 633 N.Y.S.2d 270, 272 (1995); State v. James, 176 Wis. 2d 230, 238, 500 N.W.2d 345, 348 (App. 1993); People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 526 (Colo. 1987). In other words, the defendant’s knowledge of the collateral consequences of a guilty

plea is not a prerequisite to the entry of a knowing and intelligent

guilty plea. State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Utah App. 1994) (collecting cases); City of Ottawa v. Lester, 16 Kan. App. 2d 244, 246, 822 P.2d 72, 74-75 (1991) (collecting cases); accord

People v. Huante, 143 Ill. 2d 61, 71 (1991); People v. Warship, 59 Ill. 2d 125, 128 (1974).

	Courts reason that the lone concern is the case in which the

plea is entered. Future or contemplated, but uncertain,

consequences are irrelevant to the validity of the guilty plea.

Williams v. State, 641 N.E.2d 44, 46 (Ind. App. 1994). “Manifestly, a criminal court is in no position to advise on all the

ramifications of a guilty plea personal to a defendant.” Ford, 86 N.Y.2d at 403, 657 N.E.2d at 267, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 272. Because

the consequences of committing an offense “are so numerous and

logically unforeseeable, to require more would be an absurdity and

would impose upon the trial court an impossible, unwarranted and

unnecessary burden.” State v. Fournier, 118 N.H. 230, 231, 385 A.2d 223, 224 (1978); accord Carson v. State, 755 P.2d 242, 244- 45 (Wyo. 1988) (“We will not require our trial courts to consult

astrologers or invoke psychic powers to comply with [that state’s

disclosure responsibilities in accepting guilty pleas]”). This sound reasoning “reflects the proper concerns for the *** practical

administration of criminal justice, and for the integrity of the plea

process.” Huante, 143 Ill. 2d at 71.

	A direct consequence of a guilty plea, of which a defendant

must be informed, “represents a definite, immediate and largely

automatic effect on the range of the defendant’s punishment.”

Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973); accord Ford, 86 N.Y.2d at 403, 657 N.E.2d at 267, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 272; James, 176 Wis. 2d at 238, 500 N.W.2d at 348; People v. Moore, 841 P.2d 320, 324 (Colo. App. 1992). In other words, a trial court’s obligation to ensure that a defendant

understands the direct consequences of his or her plea

encompasses only those consequences of the sentence that the trial

judge can impose. See Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir. 1974).

	“A collateral consequence is one that is not related to the

length or nature of the sentence imposed on the basis of the plea.”

McFadden, 884 P.2d at 1304. A collateral consequence generally results from action taken by an agency that the trial court does not

control. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d at 403, 657 N.E.2d at 268, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 273; Sanchez v. United States, 572 F.2d 210, 211 (9th Cir. 1977) (and cases cited therein). Collateral consequences include

“ ‘loss of public or private employment, effect on immigration

status, voting rights, possible auto license suspension, possible

dishonorable discharge from the military, or anything else.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Cox v. State, 16 Kan. App. 2d 128, 130, 819 P.2d 1241, 1243 (1991), quoting State v. Heitzman, 209 N.J. Super. 617, 622, 508 A.2d 1161, 1164 (1986), aff’d, 107 N.J. 603, 527 A.2d 439 (1987). “Accordingly, a guilty plea is not invalid for

failure of a trial court to warn a defendant of its possible effect on

future criminal liability.” Moore, 841 P.2d at 324.

	Applying these principles to this case, we conclude that the

circuit court erred in barring the use of defendant’s prior guilty

plea to attempted murder as evidence at his murder trial. The

circuit court concluded that a direct consequence of the guilty plea

was its subsequent use as evidence at his murder trial. The court

reasoned: “It’s a direct consequence because all the facts are the same. Everything is the same except for the fact that the victim

died.”

	This reasoning is erroneous. It ignores the quite-settled rule

that the direct consequences of a guilty plea are limited to the

penal consequences of that plea, i.e., the consequences that relate to the sentence imposed on the basis of the plea. The subsequent

use of defendant’s guilty plea to attempted murder as evidence at

his murder trial has nothing to do with his sentence for attempted

murder. Further, the decision to so use the prior guilty plea was

made by the Cook County State’s Attorney, whom, of course, the

circuit court does not control.

	We note that the circuit court expressly relied on a New York

trial court case, People v. Ortiz, 141 Misc. 2d 747, 534 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1988), which, to the circuit court, provided “dispositive”

guidance. Ortiz shot his victim, severely paralyzing him. Pursuant

to a plea agreement, Ortiz pled guilty to first degree assault and,

based thereon, was convicted and sentenced for that crime. Two

years later, the victim died. Ortiz was then charged with second

degree murder. He moved to bar the State from using his prior

guilty plea as evidence at his murder trial.

	The trial court in Ortiz held that “[t]he prosecution’s use of Ortiz’s allocution against him in a subsequent murder trial is a

direct consequence of his guilty plea, and a consequence of which

Ortiz should have been alerted.” Ortiz, 141 Misc. 2d at 752, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 319. The court also reasoned that the subsequent use

of Ortiz’s guilty plea to assault as evidence at his murder trial was

a direct consequence of the guilty plea because “[t]he conduct

which formed the basis of the Assault proceeding, namely the

shooting of Martinez, is precisely the conduct which forms the

basis of the murder trial.” Ortiz, 141 Misc. 2d at 753, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 320. However, that court overlooked the definition of

a direct consequence as limited to sentencing issues surrounding

the guilty plea. We question the correctness of that decision, even

as a matter of New York law. See Ford, 86 N.Y.2d at 403, 657 N.E.2d at 267, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 272 (“A direct consequence is one

which has a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on

defendant’s punishment”).

	We likewise conclude that the appellate court erred in

upholding the circuit court’s in limine order. The appellate court reasoned that the use of defendant’s prior guilty plea to attempted

murder as evidence at his murder trial was so severe a

consequence that it became a “direct” consequence. However, like

the circuit court and the court in Ortiz, the appellate court overlooked the narrow definition of a direct consequence of a

guilty plea as relating to the sentence imposed on the plea. The

dissenting justice correctly stated the controlling legal principles

and correctly concluded “that the possible use of a prior plea of

guilty to the charge of attempted murder in a subsequent murder

trial is not a direct consequence of the plea of which the defendant

must be advised.”

B. Other Arguments

	We note defendant’s argument that we should apply to this

case the legal principles that pertain to the withdrawal of a guilty

plea. See People v. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d 240, 244 (1991); People v. Walston, 38 Ill. 2d 39, 42 (1967). We decline defendant’s invitation. Defendant himself concedes that he did not ask the

circuit court to withdraw or otherwise vacate his guilty plea to

attempted murder.

	We lastly note defendant’s argument that the circuit court did

not err in barring the use of his guilty plea to attempted murder as

evidence at his murder trial because its probative value is

substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See generally M.

Graham, Cleary & Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence

§403.1 (7th ed. 1999). We cannot accept this argument. This court

is not the proper forum to first consider the question of what

evidence should be admitted at trial. Rather, the circuit court is in

the best position to decide the effect of evidence on a jury. See

People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 375-76 (1991). In this case, the circuit court should consider this issue on remand prior to a court

of review doing so. See People v. Linscott, 142 Ill. 2d 22, 42 (1991).

	Further, as the appellate court dissent noted, at defendant’s

murder trial the State “must prove that the gunshot wounds inflicted years ago caused the victim’s death. This is not an easy

task.” Moreover, defendant’s prior guilty plea to attempted murder

would not be used as a confession at his murder trial, but rather only as evidence. Defendant would have the right to explain the circumstances under which the plea was made. See Epping, 17 Ill. 2d at 564-66; McLain, 32 Ill. App. 3d at 1000.

CONCLUSION

	In explaining its order barring the use of defendant’s guilty

plea to attempted murder as evidence at his murder trial, the circuit

court conceded that there was “no way to predict” that the victim

would die approximately five years subsequent to the guilty plea.

This is exactly why courts have narrowly limited the “direct”

consequences of a guilty plea, of which a defendant must be

advised, to sentencing issues relating to the plea, which a trial

court can control. To hold that the circuit court should have

warned defendant of the consequence presented in this appeal

would “require our trial courts to consult astrologers or invoke

psychic powers.” Carson, 755 P.2d at 244-45.

	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court

and the order of the circuit court of Cook County are reversed, and

the cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

Appellate court reversed;

circuit court reversed;

cause remanded.