UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4931

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

BRIAN KEITH WATTS, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Columbia. Margaret B. Seymour, District 

Judge. (3:06-cr-00452-MBS-11) 

Submitted: November 17, 2009 Decided: November 19, 2009 

Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

W. Michael Duncan, AUSTIN & ROGERS, P.A., Columbia, South 

Carolina, for Appellant. W. Walter Wilkins, United States 

Attorney, Stanley D. Ragsdale, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Brian Keith Watts appeals his conviction by a jury on 

charges of conspiracy to manufacture, possess with intent to 

distribute, and distribution of 50 grams or more of 

methamphetamine and 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance 

containing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A) (2006) (Count 1); manufacture and 

possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a 

substance containing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A) (Count 13); possession of materials 

used to manufacture a controlled substance, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. §§ 843(a)(6), 843(d)(2) (2006) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) 

(Count 14); and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug 

trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2006). 

Watts was sentenced to a 181-month term of imprisonment. 

 His sole challenge on appeal is to the validity of the 

search warrant used to search the residence in which Watts was 

living and a shed located behind that residence, the results of 

which search led to the discovery of various items that could be 

used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, as well as firearms, 

which evidence was used at trial against Watts. Watts moved to 

suppress the evidence on the ground that the warrant was 

defective because it failed to list an address, the affidavit 

used to obtain the warrant listed an incorrect address, and the 

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police allegedly did not make a good faith effort to describe 

with particularity the place to be searched. The district court 

denied Watts’ motion to suppress. 

 We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to 

suppress for clear error on factual findings and de novo on 

legal determinations. United States v. Cain, 524 F.3d 477, 481 

(4th Cir. 2008). Facts are viewed in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party, United States v. Jamison, 509 F.3d 623, 

628 (4th Cir. 2007), and great deference is shown to the 

district court’s findings of probable cause, Illinois v. Gates, 

462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). 

 We find no merit to Watts’ claims. The description of 

the premises to be searched was sufficient to alert law 

enforcement officers as to the proper locations which were the 

subject of the search warrant, and were sufficient to meet 

constitutional muster. The execution of the warrant was headed 

by the lead agent, who previously had engaged in surveillance, 

including aerial surveillance, of the locations to be searched. 

While the Fourth Amendment1 requires that a warrant particularly 

 1

 Watts’ assertion that the warrant did not meet state 

statutory requirements does not appear to have been argued 

below. Even if it had, the Fourth Amendment provides the proper 

standard by which to review the admissibility in federal court 

of a search warrant and ensuing search. See United States v. 

Clyburn, 24 F.3d 613, 617-18 (4th Cir. 1994). 

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describe the place to be searched, that standard is met if the 

officer, can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the 

place to be searched. United States v. Owens, 848 F.2d 462, 463 

(4th Cir. 1988); Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 

(1925). Moreover, even where a warrant contains a technical 

inaccuracy,2 a sufficient description of the premises, especially 

where the executing officer had knowledge of the particular 

place to be searched, will meet the Fourth Amendment’s 

particularity requirement. See, e.g., United States v. 

Blackwood, 913 F.2d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1990). 

 Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of 

Watts’ motion to suppress, and affirm Watts’ conviction and 

sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED

 2

 While Watts alludes to an incorrect address being listed 

in the search warrant, neither the body of the search warrant 

nor the supporting affidavit contains an actual address upon 

which either the magistrate issuing the warrant or the officer 

executing the warrant relied.