1

 The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 03-3531

___________

United States of America, * 

* 

Appellee, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Northern District of Iowa.

David Joseph Mickelson, * 

* 

Appellant. *

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Submitted: June 16, 2004

Filed: August 11, 2004

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Before SMITH, BEAM, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

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SMITH, Circuit Judge.

David Mickelson appeals his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to

manufacture methamphetamine and to distribute pseudoephedrine knowing or having

reasonable cause to believe it would be used to make methamphetamine in violation

of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), (c)(2), and 846. A jury convicted Mickelson of

these charges, and the district court1

 sentenced him to 121 months' imprisonment, five

years supervised release, and a special $100 assessment. We affirm. 
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I. Background

Mickelson, as manager of a BIG Ten Mart convenience store in Waterloo,

Iowa, gained access through a wholesale distributor to large quantities of

pseudoephedrine pills that were sold at the store. Mickelson and co-defendant Paul

Finn, a BIG Ten Mart employee, sold case quantities of pseudoephedrine to various

people including Misty Cook, the father-daughter pair of Chuck and Mindy Hobart,

and Mindy Hobart's boyfriend, Brad. Finn typically acted as middleman between

Mickelson and the buyers in these transactions. Mickelson and Finn earned

approximately $400 per case of pseudoephedrine. Finn received either money or

methamphetamine in exchange for his involvement. 

Evidence at trial indicated that Mickelson's coworkers and Finn's friends

overheard conversations between the two men or observed activities concerning

deliveries of pseudoephedrine. Coworker Matthew Chapman overheard Finn and

Mickelson discuss that they could acquire cases of pseudoephedrine pills apart from

the documented inventory for the store. Chapman also saw Mickelson place a box or

case of pseudoephedrine pills, which had just been delivered to the store, into

Mickelson's green Jeep Cherokee. Chapman saw another case of pills at Finn's

residence. Jimmy Joachim, a friend of Finn's, was present on one occasion when

Mickelson delivered a duffle bag containing 172 bottles of pills to Finn. Finn then

met with Chuck Hobart. In January 2001, Finn's friend Kevin Boike saw Finn deliver

boxes of pseudoephedrine pills to Mindy Hobart on two occasions. He also observed

Mickelson deliver a box of pills to Mindy Hobart outside of Finn's residence.

Finn also spoke to various people regarding his and Mickelson's enterprise.

Kevin Boike, with whom Finn used methamphetamine, testified that Finn told him

that Mickelson would store the pills at Finn's apartment, and Finn would receive $300

per transaction plus additional methamphetamine from Mindy Hobart. Later, Finn

told Boike that Mickelson had cut Finn out of the middleman position and was

dealing with Mindy Hobart directly. Finn told Boike that fake invoices were created
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for the pills. Finn said that Mickelson bought the pills for about $900 and resold the

pills for between $1,400 to $1,700 per case. Finn estimated that each case contained

about 32,000 pills. BIG Ten Mart employee Cheryl Russell testified that Finn told her

that Mickelson sold boxes of pseudoephedrine to Chuck Hobart. Cleo Wilder, who

used drugs with Finn, testified that Finn would get a "cut" for pseudoephedrine pills

sold by Mickelson. Finn told Joachim that Mickelson gave him pills to deliver to the

Hobarts. Finn told him that Mickelson would order the pills and reroute the

paperwork through other convenience stores.

During a six-month period in 2001, Finn told Misti Boike (coworker and sister

to witness Kevin Boike) and her fiance!, with whom Finn lived, that Mickelson gave

him pills to deliver to Chuck Hobart, and he would then bring the money back to

Mickelson. Another witness, Misty Cook, met both Finn and Mickelson when she

worked at the BIG Ten Mart in 1999. Cook testified that she obtained

pseudoephedrine pills from various people and provided them to Scott Reavis, who

used them to make methamphetamine. Cook, who sometimes assisted Reavis and

received methamphetamine in exchange for her involvement, testified that she

approached Finn in the summer of 2000 seeking to buy larger quantities of

pseudoephedrine pills. Cook testified that Finn told her to buy pills from Mickelson

because Finn knew of another couple buying large quantities of pills from Mickelson

and knew Cook would be able to as well. Cook knew that the other individuals

buying pills were Mindy Hobart and her boyfriend. Thereafter, Cook purchased case

quantities of pills from Mickelson on two occasions, once at a car wash when Reavis

was present. Each case cost $1,400. Cook testified that each case contained twentyfour bottles, each containing sixty pills. She turned over all of the pills to Reavis for

the purpose of making methamphetamine. 

Reavis manufactured methamphetamine at a former welding shop in Waterloo,

Iowa. At trial, he testified that he produced about two ounces of methamphetamine

from 600 to 1,000 pseudoephedrine pills. Reavis said he produced one to two pounds
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of methamphetamine at the shop. Reavis identified several people who had assisted

him in cooking or in gathering precursors to make methamphetamine. Reavis testified

that Misty Cook was one of his suppliers, and that he once accompanied Cook to the

BIG Ten Mart to arrange delivery of a case containing approximately 4,000 pills. The

delivery of the case of pills occurred at a nearby car wash. Although Reavis was

unable to identify the individual who had provided the pills, he stated that the man

was driving a green Jeep Cherokee. 

On March 22, 2001, authorities searched the welding shop. Authorities seized

numerous items relating to the manufacture of methamphetamine, including

equipment and containers used in the manufacturing process. Several kinds of

precursors and containers for precursors were seized, including a number of empty

pseudoephedrine bottles. 

Mickelson and Finn were charged in the one-count indictment filed on May 21,

2002. At the time of his arrest, Mickelson admitted his activities to two different law

enforcement officers. Mickelson told Trooper Mike McVey that he had sold cases of

pseudoephedrine pills to Mindy and Chuck Hobart and Mindy's boyfriend. Mickelson

stated that after they acquired the ammonia, they would purchase from $200 to $1,500

worth of pills at a time. He stated that $1,500 was equivalent to a case of pills, while

$200 would purchase twenty bottles of pills. Mickelson stated that he sold five-toseven full cases of pills to Mindy Hobart. Mickelson said he obtained the pills from

a salesman named Steve Devine. Later that same day, Mickelson told Sergeant

Reicherts that he paid Devine in cash with no paperwork exchanged. Mickelson

admitted that he had sold the equivalent of approximately two cases of pills to Misty

Cook. He said he knew that the pills were used to make methamphetamine and that

his profit on the pills was about $400 per case. He said that the deliveries occurred

at his apartment in Cedar Falls, at the BIG Ten Mart, or at College Square Mall in

Cedar Falls. Mickelson also said that Joachim was present once when pills were

delivered to Finn in a duffle bag. 
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Prior to trial, Mickelson moved to sever his and Finn's trials, claiming that Finn

could provide exculpatory testimony on his behalf if given a separate trial. In his

written motion, Mickelson stated:

Specifically, Paul Finn would testify that he and Mickelson did not

conspire to manufacture methamphetamine in any amount, and Finn

would further testify that Mickelson did not have any cause to believe

that the distribution of pseudoephedrine to Finn would be used by Finn

or any other person to manufacture methamphetamine.

At the motion hearing on January 2, 2003, counsel asserted that Finn would only be

willing to testify in a separate trial that "there was no conspiracy or agreement to

manufacture methamphetamine." He could not say that Finn would testify that

Mickelson would not have known the purpose for which the cases of

pseudoephedrine were intended. In response, the government argued that the

proposed testimony, even if adequately established, was not exculpatory. The district

court denied the motion to sever. Mickelson did not raise his severance issue again

during trial.

A jury convicted Mickelson and Finn after a three-day trial. The jury

specifically found, in connection with the methamphetamine manufacturing aspect

of the offense, that Mickelson was responsible for more than 500 grams of a mixture

or substance containing methamphetamine. Mickelson filed no post-trial motions and

timely appealed.

II. Analysis

On appeal, Mickelson argues that the district court erred in denying his motion

to sever, that his inability to cross-examine Finn violated his Sixth Amendment right

of confrontation pursuant to Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), and that

the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. 
2

 The government contends that the appropriate standard of review is for plain

error because Mickelson did not renew his motion to sever at trial to preserve the

issue for appeal. However, instead of adhering to a rigid preservation rule, we

examine whether the two main concerns underlying the rule have been satisfied.

These concerns are "(1) the appellate court's practical ability to determine whether the

appellant knew of the error and consented to it; and (2) the unfairness of reversing the

trial court on an issue that it did not have the opportunity to consider." United States

v. Westbrook, 896 F.2d 330, 337 (8th Cir. 1990). This means that even if Mickelson

failed to renew his motion for severance at trial, he may not have waived his

objection, so long as he did not consent to the error and so long as the district court

had the opportunity to consider his motion with full knowledge of the situation. In

this case, no evidence exists that Mickelson consented to the error. In addition, the

trial court considered the issue in whole prior to trial, and nothing at trial changed

regarding the reason for severance. Therefore, Mickelson did not waive his claim for

severance.

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A. Motion to Sever

Mickelson first argues that the district court erred in denying his request to

sever his trial from Finn's because Finn would have offered exculpatory evidence at

Mickelson's trial. Mickelson argues that Finn's testimony would have been "powerful

evidence" that he did not conspire with Finn or anyone else. He argues that 1) no

other evidence supported the conspiracy charge because Reavis stated he never

conspired with Mickelson to make methamphetamine; 2) Misty Cook only assumed

Mickelson knew of her plans to make methamphetamine with Reavis; and 3) the

Hobarts did not testify at trial.

On appeal, we review whether the district court abused its discretion in denying

Mickelson's motion to sever and thus prejudiced Mickelson's right to a fair trial.

United States v. Robaina, 39 F.3d 858, 861 (8th Cir. 1994).2

 Because defendants who

are jointly indicted on similar evidence from the same or related events should

normally be tried together, to warrant severance a defendant must show "real

prejudice," that is, "something more than the mere fact that he would have had a

better chance for acquittal had he been tried separately." United States v. Oakie, 12
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F.3d 1436, 1441 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Adkins, 842 F.2d 210, 211–12

(8th Cir. 1988)). A defendant can demonstrate real prejudice to his right to a fair trial

by showing (a) his defense is irreconcilable with that of his co-defendant or (b) the

jury will be unable to compartmentalize the evidence as it relates to the separate

defendants. United States v. Washington, 318 F.3d 845, 858 (8th Cir. 2003); United

States v. Jackson, 64 F.3d 1213, 1217 (8th Cir. 1995).

Severance is not required merely because evidence that is admissible only

against some defendants may be damaging to others, United States v. Blum, 65 F.3d

1436, 1444 (8th Cir. 1995). Nor is it enough for a defendant to claim, as Mickelson

does here, that he needed a separate trial in order to call a co-defendant as a witness.

He must show that it is likely his co-defendant actually would have testified and that

this testimony would have been exculpatory. United States v. Delpit, 94 F.3d 1134,

1143–44 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Anthony, 565 F.2d 533, 538 (8th Cir.

1977)). The risk of prejudice posed by joint trials is best cured by careful and

thorough jury instructions. Id. (citing Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537

(1993)).

In Oakie, the defendant argued that severance was appropriate because a codefendant would have testified in his favor in a severed trial. 12 F.3d at 1441.

Specifically, the co-defendant would have testified that the defendant–who was

charged with assault with a deadly weapon and other gun crimes–did not procure the

rifle used in the crimes, did not see the defendant shoot the rifle at the end of a car

chase, and did not tell the gunman to shoot at the police officer. However, even with

this detailed proposed testimony, we affirmed the district court's denial of severance.

We noted that to warrant severance, the defendant had to show that his co-defendant's

testimony would be "substantially exculpatory"–that it "would do more than merely

tend to contradict a few details of the government's case." Id. at 1441 (citing United

States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897, 920 (8th Cir. 1985)). We determined that, in light of
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the other trial evidence and the impeachment evidence available to the government,

the proffered testimony of the co-defendant did not meet this standard. Id.

Here the proposed testimony is even less detailed than in Oakie. Mickelson

notes that Finn's attorney stated, "I would agree and concur that if called to testify at

Mr. Mickelson's trial, [Finn] would testify there was no conspiracy or agreement of

any kind to manufacture methamphetamine." Such testimony is insufficient to be

"substantially exculpatory," particularly because it is a legal conclusion without facts

to support it. The evidence presented at trial clearly supports the conclusion that

Mickelson was deeply involved in a conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine–he

was the supplier of the precursor to make the drug, and he admittedly knew that he

was supplying it for the production of the drug. As such, we conclude that Finn's

potential testimony consisting of a conclusory statement regarding whether a

conspiracy existed is insufficient to warrant severance.

B. Bruton Issue

Mickelson next asserts that his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights

were violated by the admission of Finn's numerous statements to others implicating

Mickelson in the conspiracy. Mickelson argues that because Finn did not testify at

trial, his inability to cross-examine Finn was prejudicial pursuant to Bruton v. United

States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The government responds that the statements were

otherwise admissible as co-conspirator statements and, as such, did not trigger the

protections in Bruton. In addition, the government argues that if any of the challenged

statements were admitted in error, it was harmless error in light of the overwhelming

evidence of Mickelson's guilt.

We review this challenge for plain error because Mickelson failed to object to

all but one of the challenged statements, and that particular statement was admitted

as an admission of a co-conspirator. Reversal for plain error is warranted only if "(1)

the court committed an error; (2) the error is clear under current law; and (3) the error
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affects [the defendant's] substantial rights." United States v. Turner, 104 F.3d 217,

221 (8th Cir. 1997). However, even if there has been plain error affecting the

defendant's substantial rights, whether we notice the error is a matter of discretion,

and we reverse for plain error only where the error seriously affects the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507

U.S. 725, 736 (1993); United States v. Griggs, 71 F.3d 276, 279 (8th Cir. 1995).

In Bruton, the Supreme Court held that the admission of statements from a nontestifying defendant that inculpated a co-defendant violated the latter's Confrontation

Clause rights, despite a curative instruction otherwise. Id. at 135–36; United States

v. Coleman, 349 F.3d 1077, 1085 (8th Cir. 2003). However, when the statements are

those of a co-conspirator and are admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence

801(d)(2)(E), the Sixth Amendment and Bruton are not implicated. United States v.

Alcantar, 271 F.3d 731, 739 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Coco, 926 F.2d

759, 761 (8th Cir. 1991)). Therefore, if the statements about which Mickelson

complains were statements that satisfy Rule 801(d)(2)(E), Bruton and the Sixth

Amendment are not implicated. 

Co-conspirator statements are admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) if the

prosecution demonstrates that (1) a conspiracy existed, (2) the defendant and the

declarant were members of the conspiracy, and (3) the declaration was made during

the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Alcantar, 271 F.3d at 739. The

phrase "in furtherance of the conspiracy" is broadly interpreted. Alcantar, 271 F.3d

at 739; United States v. Johnson, 925 F.2d 1115, 1117 (8th Cir. 1991). When a

statement satisfies the requirements of Rule 801, both the Rules of Evidence and the

Confrontation Clause allow the government to introduce the statement through a

witness who heard the statement, even if the government cannot show that the

co-conspirator is unavailable. United States v. Reyes, 362 F.3d 536, 541 (8th Cir.

2004) (citing United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 400 (1986)). The Confrontation

Clause does not give the defendant the right to cross-examine a non-testifying co-
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conspirator whose statements are introduced under the co-conspirator hearsay

exclusion. Id. (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992)); cf. United States

v. Kehoe, 310 F.3d 579, 590–91 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that the Confrontation

Clause did not guarantee the defendant the right to cross-examine a speaker whose

statements were imputed to the defendant as adoptive admissions of a party

opponent), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1048 (2003).

Mickelson complains that numerous statements violated his rights. They

include: 1) coworker Cheryl Russell's testimony that Finn said that Mickelson was

selling large amounts of pseudoephedrine; 2) coworker and friend Matthew

Chapman's testimony that Finn described the arrangements for pseudoephedrine sales

between Finn, Mickelson, and Chuck Hobart; 3) friend and fellow drug user Kevin

Boike's testimony that Finn described the arrangement for pseudoephedrine sales,

calling himself the middleman, discussing the false invoices, and eventually

becoming disgruntled when cut out of the middleman position; 4) one-time roommate

Misti Boike's testimony that Finn stated that he was the middleman for

pseudoephedrine between Chuck Hobart and Mickelson; 5) friend and fellow drug

user Jimmy Joachim's testimony that Finn said that pills were ordered through

different stores and the paperwork rerouted; 6) friend and fellow drug user Cleo

Wilder's testimony that Finn stated that he received a "cut" for selling

pseudoephedrine for Mickelson.

In this case, however, these statements clearly satisfied the elements of Rule

801(d)(2)(E) as admissible statements of a co-conspirator. Mickelson and Finn

supplied pseudoephedrine pills to numerous people for the purpose of making

methamphetamine. For a good portion of the time, Mickelson used Finn as a contact

and middleman with the Hobarts and others to take orders and deliver the product.

Finn made these statements while he was a participant in a conspiracy with Mickelson
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to sell substantial quantities of pseudoephedrine used to make methamphetamine. We

conclude that there was no plain error in this case.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Finally, Mickelson argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him

in a conspiracy to manufacture over 500 grams of methamphetamine or in a

conspiracy to distribute pseudoephedrine knowing that it would be used in the

manufacture of illegal drugs. Mickelson's argument focuses on whether the evidence

was sufficient to prove a conspiracy–he claims there was never an agreement–and on

whether the government proved the drug quantity.

"The standard of review of an appeal concerning the sufficiency of the

evidence is very strict, and the verdict of the jury should not be overturned lightly."

United States v. Davidson, 195 F.3d 402, 406 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v.

Burks, 934 F.2d 148, 151 (8th Cir. 1991)). "In reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence on appeal, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the

government, resolving evidentiary conflicts in favor of the government, and accepting

all reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence that support the jury's verdict."

United States v. Erdman, 953 F.2d 387, 389 (8th Cir. 1992).

1. Existence of a Conspiracy

Mickelson first argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish the

existence of a conspiracy. In order to convict Mickelson of conspiracy to manufacture

methamphetamine and to distribute pseudoephedrine, the government had to prove

that (1) a conspiracy existed; (2) Mickelson knew of the conspiracy; and (3)

Mickelson knowingly became a part of the conspiracy. Davidson, 195 F.3d at 406.

However, "[o]nce a conspiracy has been established, only slight evidence is needed

to link a defendant to the conspiracy." United States v. Pena, 67 F.3d 153, 155 (8th

Cir. 1995). "Participation by a defendant in a single act may in fact demonstrate

membership in a conspiracy if the act itself will justify an inference of knowledge of
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the broader conspiracy." Davidson, 195 F.3d at 406; United States v. Tran, 16 F.3d

897, 904 (8th Cir. 1994). 

A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in a conspiracy case

has a heavy burden. United States v. Jimenez-Perez, 238 F.3d 970, 973 (8th Cir.

2001). The government need only show that those involved operated pursuant to a

common scheme or had a tacit understanding, rather than a formal agreement. United

States v. Hoelscher, 914 F.2d 1527, 1534 (8th Cir. 1990). Because the details of a

conspiracy often are shrouded in secrecy, circumstantial evidence and inferences from

the parties' actions may be used to establish the conspiracy's existence. United States

v. Sparks, 949 F.2d 1023, 1027 (8th Cir. 1991). Finally, evidence of the parties'

association, although not in itself enough to establish a conspiracy, is a relevant

factor. United States v. Ivey, 915 F.2d 380, 384 (8th Cir. 1990).

The evidence in this case establishes a conspiracy existed between Mickelson,

Finn, and others. Mickelson and Finn created a system to distribute pseudoephedrine

that Mickelson fraudulently obtained from his employer. Mickelson admittedly knew

that the pills were being used by various people to manufacture methamphetamine,

and he continued to sell to those people. Mickelson's actions indicated that he and

Finn agreed that Mickelson would supply pseudophedrine to the people Finn brought

to him.

2. Drug Quantity Calculation

Mickelson also argues that insufficient evidence exists to support the district

court's determination of drug quantity. The jury found that Mickelson was responsible

for 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. The district court then determined at

sentencing that Mickelson was responsible for more than 1.5 kilograms of

methamphetamine. Typically, we review a sentencing court's findings of fact

regarding the quantity of drugs attributed to a defendant for clear error. United States

v. Maggard, 156 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 1998). However, where a defendant fails to
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object to the presentence report, as Mickelson did here, we review for plain error.

United States v. Flores, 959 F.2d 83, 88 (8th Cir. 1992). 

Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the quantity of drugs is an issue for the

sentencing judge; the government must prove the quantity of drugs attributed to a

defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. Maggard, 156 F.3d at 847–48 (citing

United States v. Padilla-Pena, 129 F.3d 457, 467 (8th Cir. 1997)); United States v.

Candie, 974 F.2d 61, 64 (8th Cir. 1992). Additionally, the district court is required

to make findings of fact and rule on unresolved objections to the presentence

investigation report, which the district court did in this matter. Candie, 974 F.2d at

64. Finally, a "court may rely solely upon a presentence report for findings relevant

to sentencing only if the facts in the presentence report are not disputed by the

defendant." United States v. Hammer, 3 F.3d 266, 271 (8th Cir. 1993) (internal

citations omitted). 

When a conspiracy is involved, "[a] defendant convicted of conspiracy is

properly held accountable for all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of any

co-conspirator taken in furtherance of the conspiracy." United States v. Atkins, 250

F.3d 1203, 1211–12 (8th Cir. 2001). Therefore, in a drug conspiracy, the district court

may consider amounts from drug transactions in which the defendant was not directly

involved if those dealings were part of the same course of conduct or scheme. In

order to attribute a quantity of drugs to a defendant, the sentencing court is required

to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the activity involving those drugs was

in furtherance of the conspiracy and either known to that defendant or reasonably

foreseeable to him. Id. Therefore, the district court correctly considered all of the

transactions in which Mickelson was involved or that were reasonably foreseeable to

him.

A district court has wide discretion at sentencing as to the kind of information

considered or its source. United States v. Johnson, 767 F.2d 1259, 1276 (8th Cir.
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1985). The court's inquiry upon sentencing is largely unlimited either as to the kind

of information it may consider, or the source from which it may come. Id. Moreover,

the court may consider criminal activity for which the defendant has not been

prosecuted and "uncorroborated hearsay, provided the [defendant is] given a chance

to rebut or explain it." Id. Additionally, the testimony of co-conspirators is sufficient

evidence on which the court may base the quantity of drugs used for sentencing. See

United States v. Phillippi, 911 F.2d 149, 151 n.3 (8th Cir. 1990). Finally, "the

sentencing court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is nearly unreviewable."

United States v. Dierling, 131 F.3d 722, 736 (8th Cir. 1997).

The district court's determination of drug quantity was not in error. The district

court calculated the methamphetamine quantity based on an average amount of

pseudoephedrine Mickelson sold and an estimate of the amount of methamphetamine

produced. The calculation included quantities to which Cook and Reavis testified, as

well as the amount to which Mickelson admitted selling to the Hobarts. The district

court did not plainly err by taking all of the evidence into consideration to conclude

for sentencing that Mickelson was responsible for 1.5 kilograms or more of

methamphetamine. 

III. Conclusion

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mickelson's motion

to sever his trial from Finn's. Furthermore, Finn's statements, as those made by a coconspirator, were properly admitted and did not violate Bruton and the Sixth

Amendment. Finally, sufficient evidence supports Mickelson's conspiracy conviction

and drug-quantity calculation. Therefore, we affirm.

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