United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Ranking Minority Member,

Committee on Governmental Affairs,

U.S. Senate

July 1995 DEFENSE

COMMUNICATIONS

Management Problems

Jeopardize DISN

Implementation

GAO/AIMD-95-136

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Accounting and Information

Management Division

B-259834 

July 13, 1995

The Honorable John Glenn

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

Dear Senator Glenn:

The Department of Defense (DOD) initiated the Defense Information

System Network (DISN) program in 1991 as a two-phase effort to improve

its long-distance telecommunications services and reduce costs. In the

near term, Defense envisioned that DISN would achieve these goals by

consolidating and integrating about 100 existing communications

networks into one network, operated by the Defense Information Systems

Agency (DISA). For the far term, DISN would replace older

telecommunications systems, such as the Defense Commercial

Telecommunications Network (DCTN), and use new technology and

improved acquisition strategies to provide a more cost-effective system.

While Defense was planning its far-term DISN initiative, the General

Services Administration (GSA) and the Interagency Management Council

(IMC) in 1993 began planning a replacement for the Federal

Telecommunications System (FTS) 2000 program, which provides the

federal government’s long-distance service. The existing FTS 2000 contracts

expire in 1998. Although Defense is currently one of the largest customers

of FTS 2000 services, less than 20 percent of Defense’s long-distance

telecommunications traffic is handled by FTS 2000. Defense has been

determining how to use the Post-FTS 2000 program to help meet its DISN

objectives.

This report responds to your request that we review Defense’s efforts to

implement DISN. Specifically, you asked that we (1) assess DISN’s

objectives, requirements, management plans, and implementation status,

and (2) determine whether Defense has positioned itself to participate

effectively in the governmentwide Post-FTS 2000 program.

Results in Brief Defense has not effectively planned and managed its DISN program.

Specifically, Defense has spent more than $100 million over the past 3-1/2

years on DISN’s planning, implementation, operation, and management. In

spite of this expenditure, DISN still lacks (1) validated operational

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B-259834 

requirements, (2) approved plans for network implementation, and

(3) guidelines needed to ensure efficient and effective end-to-end

management of this important communications network. As a result,

Defense’s near-term DISN implementation is over 2 years behind schedule

and DISN’s objectives of improving Defense’s communications services and

reducing costs are at risk.

Recognizing the need to identify and document the Department’s

requirements for DISN, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff developed a

statement outlining Defense’s communications service needs in broad

terms. Validation of DISN’s joint operational requirements is expected by

August 1995.

Defense has recently revised its far-term DISN program strategy. Rather

than buy services from commercial providers through initiatives such as

the Post-FTS 2000 program, Defense currently intends to use Post-FTS 2000

primarily to buy the communications bandwidth it needs to build its own

private DISN network.1

 Defense has not justified this strategy, however.

Without first defining its valid requirements, identifying and evaluating

alternatives for meeting those requirements, and presenting a convincing

cost/benefit analysis supporting its selected alternative, Defense cannot

determine whether a private network is the best solution to meet its needs.

By limiting its use of Post-FTS 2000 services, Defense risks spending

hundreds of millions of dollars to establish, operate, and maintain

redundant communications facilities and services that do not efficiently or

effectively respond to its requirements.

Background The Department of Defense estimates that it spends about $1 billion

annually for its long-distance communications systems and services. The

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,

Communications and Intelligence (OASD/C3

I) has overall responsibility for

communications policy, planning, and budgeting. DISA, which reports to

OASD/C3I, is responsible for Defense-wide, long-distance communications

service. Military services and other Defense agencies independently

procure, operate, and manage their own long-distance communications

systems. Defense has long had problems efficiently and effectively

managing this fragmented and redundant communications environment. In

fact, Defense does not even know how many long-distance

communications networks it has. Estimates range from about 100 to more

than 200.

1

Bandwidth is a measure of the capacity of communications lines.

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B-259834 

Numerous GAO, Defense Inspector General, and Defense internal studies

have criticized Defense’s communications management practices over the

years. Senior Defense managers recognize that this costly, duplicative

environment precludes providing the efficient and interoperable

end-to-end communications services essential for successful joint military

operations. Defense Management Report Decisions 968 and 918 were

issued during the past 4-1/2 years to address these long-standing problems.2

They called for more accurately identifying, tracking, and accounting for

communications resources throughout the Department, and improving the

management and oversight of Defense’s communications networks and

programs.

The DISN program was established in 1991 as a two-phase effort to solve

many of these problems by unifying and modernizing communications

throughout Defense. DISN Near-Term (DISN-NT) focused on integrating

select military service and agency data communications systems and

services, and automating and consolidating their network management

capabilities. By achieving this integration in a timely and cost-effective

manner, Defense estimated that it could reduce the costs of operating

these networks by almost 21 percent, or $100 million, over 6 years.

Defense’s DISN Far-Term (DISN-FT) was to emphasize replacement of older

communications systems, such as DCTN, using emerging technologies and

more effective acquisition strategies to provide more efficient and

cost-effective global voice, data, video, and imagery communications.3

 The

DCTN contract expires in February 1996. As we reported to you in

April 1993, Defense’s planning for far-term DISN acquisition to permit

timely replacement of this large contract has been very optimistic.4

Concurrent with Defense’s planning of its far-term DISN, the IMC, in

cooperation with GSA, began planning the acquisition of governmentwide,

long-distance telecommunications in the Post-FTS 2000 environment. In

December 1994, GSA approved and released the Post-FTS 2000 Program

Strategy recommended by the IMC. This strategy calls for a more diverse

approach to acquire commercial telecommunications services than the

current FTS 2000 program offers. Specifically, this strategy calls for award

of contracts for (1) two or more comprehensive providers of voice, data,

2

Beginning in July 1989, Defense Management Review reports were issued that outlined actions needed

to improve DOD management.

3

The DCTN contract with AT&T primarily provides switched voice, video teleconferencing, and leased

transmission services to Defense users.

4

Defense: Telecommunications Management (GAO/IMTEC-93-26R, April 28, 1993).

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B-259834 

video, and other services, (2) one or more data service and value-added

service providers, (3) two or more technical service providers to help user

agencies apply telecommunications services and technologies to their

missions, and (4) a possible wireless communications services provider.

This approach is intended to allow agencies to select from multiple

contracts for different services.

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

To obtain information about Defense’s DISN Far-Term acquisition strategy

and progress in implementing its DISN Near-Term initiative, we interviewed

officials from OASD/C3

I, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and DISA, and

reviewed program documentation. We also interviewed DISA officials and

reviewed documentation on DISN network management at DISA

headquarters in Arlington, Virginia, as well as DISA’s network control

centers at Columbus, Ohio, and Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.

To obtain information about Defense’s participation in the current FTS

2000 program and the planned Post-FTS 2000 acquisition effort, we

interviewed officials and reviewed documentation from OASD/C3

I, DISA, and

GSA. In addition, we reviewed documentation, prepared by the Joint

Concept Review Committee (JCRC), that examined the feasibility of

consolidating Defense and civil agency telecommunications acquisition

initiatives.

To obtain broader knowledge of the issues and challenges associated with

planning, acquiring, implementing, and managing corporate

telecommunications programs, we interviewed officials from several

private sector firms that rely on large communications networks, including

Frito-Lay Inc., Plano, Texas; Boeing Computer Services, Inc., Seattle,

Washington; Electronic Data Systems Inc., Herndon, Virginia, and Plano,

Texas; JC Penney Co., Inc., Dallas and Plano, Texas; and Texas

Instruments, Plano, Texas.

Also, we reviewed documentation prepared for Defense describing the

lessons that Electronic Data Systems personnel learned as they

implemented corporate telecommunications for General Motors. We also

reviewed other studies prepared for Defense, including

telecommunications management benchmarking studies and best

practices reports prepared by Booz Allen & Hamilton, Inc.; COMPASS

America, Inc.; Real Decisions Corporation; and Nolan, Norton & Co.

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B-259834 

Our work was performed between June 1994 and May 1995 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense, Command, Control, Communications

and Intelligence (ASD/C3

I), provided written comments on a draft of this

report. These comments are discussed in the “Agency Comments and Our

Evaluation” section and are reprinted in appendix I.

Ineffective

Telecommunications

Management Places

DISN at Increased

Risk

Organizations that successfully implement corporate telecommunications

strategies identify critical elements for success, including:

• a valid description of the organization’s communications requirements,

• a coherent plan for implementing a system that meets those requirements,

and

• a clear definition of the roles and responsibilities for managing that

system.

At present, DISN lacks these three key elements. Over 3 years into the

program, Defense has yet to validate its operational requirements for DISN.

Inadequate program planning and lack of effective management oversight

have contributed to program slippage. In addition, Defense has yet to

define the end-to-end network management roles and responsibilities

essential to effective operation of near-term DISN.

Defense Has Not Validated

DISN Operational

Requirements

Defining and validating operational requirements is an essential first step

in the telecommunications acquisition and process. These requirements

form the basis for properly identifying and evaluating alternative

approaches, and selecting an appropriate solution. However, more than 3

years after it began planning and implementing DISN, Defense has yet to

define and validate DISN’s operational requirements. Personnel in the

Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff observed in March 1994 that all DISN

implementation efforts, near-term and far-term, had proceeded without an

overarching requirements document.

Senior Defense managers have recently taken some steps to address this

shortcoming. For example, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council has

approved a statement outlining DISN’s required capabilities in broad terms.

Further, DISA and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are directing efforts

to specifically define and document the Department’s operational

requirements for DISN; validated operational requirements are expected by

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B-259834 

August 1995. Nevertheless, until Defense completes this critical first step,

it cannot ensure that any actions it takes to plan, design, or implement its

DISN communications capabilities will efficiently, effectively, or

economically meet its needs.

Planning and Management

of DISN Are Inadequate

A second problem facing Defense is that inadequate program planning and

management have impaired its near-term efforts to integrate existing

networks into DISN. Electronic Data Systems Corporation personnel found,

while building General Motors’ global corporate communications network,

that thorough planning—based on resources, costs, and time—was the key

to success. Although Defense initially followed a similar approach with

DISN planning, it did not sustain this effort. Defense’s May 1992 Defense

Information System Network Near-Term Transition Plan clearly outlined

an implementation strategy, identified resources, presented a detailed

schedule, and estimated DISN costs over a 6-year life cycle. In addition, the

Deputy ASD/C3

I for Defense Communications chaired three

telecommunications program reviews to oversee DISN planning and

implementation.

Since that time, DISN’s strategy and schedule have changed significantly.

For example, although the initial near-term strategy called for completing

the integration of eight large independent networks by the second quarter

of fiscal year 1993, these efforts are still under way. Efforts to integrate the

Navy’s transmission network are still in process, while integration of the

Defense Logistics Agency’s Corporate Network has just begun. The

integration of Navy and Air Force router networks are now planned to be

completed by October 1995 and October 1996, respectively. Despite these

changes, the transition plan, schedule, and resource estimates initially

developed to justify and guide DISN implementation have never been

updated. Further, Defense’s near-term DISN efforts have not undergone a

program review in over 2 years. In the absence of adequate planning and

management, Defense’s efforts to achieve DISN’s objectives will not be

timely or cost-effective.

Defense Has Not Defined

DISN Management Roles,

Responsibilities, and

Procedures

The third problem in implementing DISN is a lack of clearly defined roles,

responsibilities, and procedures for effective management of Defense’s

operational DISN networks. Benchmarking studies of best private sector

practices have found that having clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and

procedures that are well-documented and understood by staff at all levels

are essential to effective network management. Senior Defense officials,

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B-259834 

DISA managers, and DISN program documentation all recognize that

effective network management is the key to lowering costs and assuring

the interoperability of their global communications systems.

However, despite their recognized importance, the roles, responsibilities,

and procedures for effective end-to-end DISN network management have

not been defined and documented. A Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

published in 1993 made DISA responsible for managing DISN in accordance

with validated operational requirements; as we previously stated, however,

those requirements still do not exist. Further, although they have been

under development for over 3 years, DISA has not finalized and approved

the comprehensive policies and procedures for DISN management.

According to DISN regional network managers, the different versions of

DISA’s draft guidelines that have been circulating have created confusion

because they provide different and sometimes conflicting direction. In

addition, there is little direction of any kind regarding responsibilities of

the base-level managers at Defense installations where most DISN

equipment is actually located. Without clear guidelines outlining the roles,

responsibilities, and procedures for end-to-end network management

based on joint operational requirements, Defense cannot operate and

manage its operational near-term DISN in a way that efficiently and

effectively meets its needs.

Defense’s Revised

DISN Strategy Limits

Use of Post-FTS 2000

Defense has stated publicly that it intends a large degree of participation in

Post-FTS 2000. Nevertheless, the Department continues its plans to acquire

and provide its own services through the DISN initiative. This decision

limits Defense’s ability to contribute to and benefit from commercial

services offered under the consolidated Post-FTS 2000 initiative. As yet,

Defense has not justified this course of action.

Spurred by congressional interest in the potential duplication of their

acquisition efforts, Defense, GSA, and the IMC established the Joint Concept

Review Committee in February 1994 to determine the extent to which the

government’s telecommunications acquisitions could be consolidated.5

After assessing technical, economic, and managerial issues, the JCRC could

find no insurmountable obstacles to consolidating these acquisitions.

Rather, the JCRC found that combining government agencies’ buying power

5

The JCRC’s membership included representatives from the Defense Information System Agency; the

General Services Administration; the Interagency Management Council; the Office of the Director,

National Communications System; the Department of Veterans Affairs; the Department of the

Treasury; and the Department of Agriculture. Acquisition programs specifically considered by the

JCRC included Post-FTS 2000, DISN, and the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service.

Page 7 GAO/AIMD-95-136 Defense Information System Network
B-259834 

would actually promote establishment of the Government Services

Information Infrastructure advocated by the National Performance

Review, while offering significant cost savings to all users of data services.

In his endorsement of the JCRC findings, the ASD/C3

I testified in May 1994

before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs that a joint

Defense/GSA acquisition strategy was the most cost-efficient way to

proceed, and stated his commitment to increased cooperation with GSA. In

addition, the former DISA director testified that Defense’s Cold War

strategy to acquire and operate dedicated private networks was driven by

its need for unique features that were not commercially available. The

director testified further that since that time technology providing

security, assured access, and other critical features had matured, and most

equivalent services are now readily available commercially.6

Defense’s increased use of commercial telecommunications services is

also supported by an October 1994 report on battlefield information

architecture. In this report, the Defense Science Board recommended that

Defense increase its use of federal government communications systems

and commercial communications services.7

 In making this

recommendation, the Board noted that over 80 percent of Defense’s

communications satellite use during Desert Shield/Desert Storm was

provided through commercial communications assets. Furthermore, in

March 1995 testimony before the House Committee on Government

Reform and Oversight, the ASD/C3

I stated that perhaps as much as

70 percent of Defense’s telecommunications service needs within the

continental United States could be met through the Post-FTS 2000 initiative.

Despite these public statements, however, Defense’s program strategy for

DISN indicates that it intends only limited use of Post-FTS 2000 to meet DISN

requirements. For example, in December 1994, the ASD/C3I, the Office of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the military services agreed on a revised DISN

approach that will use the follow-on Post-FTS 2000 program primarily to

acquire the communications bandwidth it needs to build a private DISN

network. That is, rather than acquire its communications services within

the continental United States directly from a communications services

6

A study of Defense telecommunications conducted by Booz Allen Hamilton in 1994 for DISA found

that, in analyzing 24 military-unique features, 20 of these features had commercial equivalents that

matched or exceeded the required capabilities.

7

Report of the Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force on Information Architecture for the

Battlefield, October 1994.

Page 8 GAO/AIMD-95-136 Defense Information System Network
B-259834 

provider, Defense is buying its own communications equipment, and plans

to operate its own network by leasing bandwidth from Post-FTS 2000.

Defense has approved this revised DISN approach without first

documenting that development, operation, and management of its own

network infrastructure is the sole or most cost-effective way to meet its

requirements. For example, Defense’s documentation supporting this

revised approach exists in draft form; there is no validated economic

analysis or approved program plan supporting this decision. A draft

cost/benefit analysis developed by DISA in November 1994 was based on

requirements that had not been validated.8

 Nevertheless, the ASD/C3I has

authorized DISA to invest over $100 million over the next 2 years to

implement its DISN concept within the continental United States despite

this lack of plans and agreement regarding requirements. As a result,

Defense’s intent to build its own, redundant communications

infrastructure risks hundreds of millions of dollars to establish and

operate a telecommunications capability that might not cost-effectively

meet its needs. Further, Defense’s actions jeopardize the benefits of a

consolidated telecommunications acquisition program as envisioned by

the JCRC.

Conclusions Defense managers recognize that improving the efficiency and

cost-effectiveness of the Department’s communications services is

essential to all operations, including its warfighting mission. Despite this

recognition, Defense has not taken the basic steps to efficiently and

effectively plan, acquire, and manage its own major communications

initiative, DISN.

Defense has revised its DISN strategy without a clear understanding of its

operational and management requirements, without fully considering all

alternatives for meeting those requirements, and without first

documenting that the development, operation, and maintenance of its own

network infrastructure would be the most cost-effective way to meet these

needs. As a result, there is no assurance that Defense’s approach to DISN

will meet its long-standing telecommunications needs. What is assured is

that this approach will limit Defense’s ability to contribute to and benefit

8

The revised far-term DISN approach recently underwent a review by Defense’s Major Automated

Information System Review Council. In providing Milestone 0 approval, the Assistant Secretary of

Defense (C3I) directed the DISA Director to provide a total proposed program strategy for DISN,

including implementation strategy, schedule, and plans for developing supporting cost and economic

analyses, to the OASD/C3I by April 28, 1995. DISA has missed this deadline; a program strategy is still

being developed.

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B-259834 

from a consolidated governmentwide Post-FTS 2000 initiative, and will

perpetuate its practice of acquiring and managing its own redundant

networks.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and

Intelligence to develop a strategy and plans that establish and document

the roles, responsibilities, and procedures essential to ensuring the

efficient and effective end-to-end management of its operational near-term

DISN services.

We recommend further that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and

Intelligence to:

• reassess DISA’s proposed far-term DISN approach, reconsider decisions on

Post-FTS 2000 participation, and ensure that the approach is based on valid

operational requirements and approved plans, and

• fully justify any decision to procure communications circuits rather than

services from the Post-FTS 2000 program. This should include identifying

the additional life-cycle acquisition, operations, maintenance, and support

costs that will be incurred in developing and operating DISN, as well as the

effects on Defense’s warfighting and administrative support missions.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

We obtained written comments on a draft of this report and have

incorporated those comments where appropriate. These comments are

presented in appendix I.

In commenting on the draft report, the Department of Defense concurred

with our findings and recommendations. In its concurrence with our

recommendation that Defense fully justify any decisions to procure

circuits rather than services from the Post-FTS 2000 program, Defense

stated that any strategic decision to procure circuits rather than services

would be fully documented and justified. We want to emphasize that our

recommendation is that Defense fully justify any actions or decisions to

procure circuits in lieu of services from the Post-FTS 2000 program.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of

this report earlier, we will not distribute it until 30 days from its date. We

Page 10 GAO/AIMD-95-136 Defense Information System Network
B-259834 

will then send copies to the Chairman of your Committee, the House

Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, the House and Senate

Appropriations Committees, the House National Security Committee, the

Senate Armed Services Committee, and other interested congressional

committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Office of

Management and Budget. Copies will also be sent to others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-6240 if you or your staff have any questions.

Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.

Sincerely yours,

Jack L. Brock, Jr.

Director, Information Resources Management/

National Security and International Affairs

Page 11 GAO/AIMD-95-136 Defense Information System Network
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

14

Appendix II 

Major Contributors to

This Report

18

Abbreviations

ASD/C3I Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,

Communications, and Intelligence

DCTN Defense Commercial Telecommunications Network

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency

DISN Defense Information System Network

DISN-FT DISN Far-Term

DISN-NT DISN Near-Term

DOD Department of Defense

FTS Federal Telecommunications System

GSA General Services Administration

IMC Interagency Management Council

JCRC Joint Concept Review Committee

OASD/C3I Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,

Control, Communications, and Intelligence

Page 12 GAO/AIMD-95-136 Defense Information System Network
Page 13 GAO/AIMD-95-136 Defense Information System Network
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 14 GAO/AIMD-95-136 Defense Information System Network
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 15 GAO/AIMD-95-136 Defense Information System Network
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p.10.

Now on p.10.

Page 16 GAO/AIMD-95-136 Defense Information System Network
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p.10.

Page 17 GAO/AIMD-95-136 Defense Information System Network
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

Accounting and

Information

Management Division,

Washington, D.C.

Franklin W. Deffer, Assistant Director

Kevin E. Conway, Evaluator-in-Charge

Mary T. Marshall, Staff Evaluator

Linda A. Johnson, Reports Analyst

(511271) Page 18 GAO/AIMD-95-136 Defense Information System Network
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