SOUTHWEST 

BORDER SECURITY

Additional Actions 

Needed to Assess 

Resource Deployment 

and Progress

Statement of Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland 

Security and Justice

Testimony Before the Subcommittee on 

Border and Maritime Security, 

Committee on Homeland Security, 

House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 am ET

Tuesday, March 1, 2016

GAO-16-465T

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-16-465T, a testimony

before the Subcommittee on Border and 

Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland 

Security, House of Representatives.

March 1, 2016

SOUTHWEST BORDER SECURITY

Additional Actions Needed to Assess Resource 

Deployment and Progress

Why GAO Did This Study

The southwest border continues to be 

vulnerable to cross-border illegal 

activity, with DHS apprehending over 

331,000 illegal entrants, and making 

over 14,000 seizures of drugs in fiscal 

year 2015. DHS has employed a 

variety of resources to help secure the 

border, including personnel,

technology—such as cameras and 

sensors, tactical infrastructure—such 

as fencing and roads, and air and 

marine assets. 

This statement discusses (1) DHS 

efforts to deploy resources on the 

southwest border and measure the 

effectiveness of these resources in 

securing the border, and (2) DHS

efforts to develop performance goals 

and measures for achieving situational 

awareness and border security. This 

statement is based on GAO reports 

and testimonies issued from 

September 2009 through May 2015,

with selected updates through 

February 2016 on DHS enforcement 

efforts and actions to address prior

GAO recommendations. To conduct 

the updates, GAO interviewed agency 

officials and reviewed related 

documentation.

What GAO Recommends

GAO previously made 

recommendations for DHS to, among 

other things, (1) strengthen its 

management of technology plans and 

programs and (2) establish milestones 

and time frames for the development of 

border security goals and measures. 

DHS generally agreed and has actions 

underway to address the 

recommendations. 

What GAO Found

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS), has taken action to deploy various resources—including agents 

and technology—along the southwest border and assess those resources’ 

contributions to border security. For example, in December 2012, GAO reported 

that CBP’s Border Patrol scheduled agents for deployment differently across 

southwest border locations, and although in most locations less than half of 

Border Patrol apprehensions were made within five miles of the border in fiscal 

year 2011, Border Patrol had moved overall enforcement efforts closer to the 

border since the prior fiscal year. GAO also reported in December 2012, that 

Border Patrol tracked changes in the effectiveness rate for response to illegal 

activity across border locations to determine if the appropriate mix and placement 

of personnel and assets were deployed and used effectively, and took steps to 

improve the data quality issues that had precluded comparing performance 

results across locations at the time of GAO’s review. For example, Border Patrol 

issued guidance in September 2012 for collecting and reporting data with a more 

standardized and consistent approach. DHS has reported the effectiveness rate 

as a performance measure in its Fiscal Year 2015-2017 Annual Performance 

Report.

Further, in March 2014, GAO reported that CBP had made progress in deploying 

programs under the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, but that CBP 

could strengthen its management and assessment of the plan’s programs. GAO 

reported that while CBP had identified mission benefits of technologies to be 

deployed under the plan, the agency had not developed key attributes for 

performance metrics to identify the technologies’ individual and collective 

contribution, as GAO had recommended in 2011. GAO also reported in 2014 that 

CBP officials stated that baselines for each performance measure would be 

developed and that by the end of fiscal year 2016, CBP would establish a tool to 

explain the impact of technology and infrastructure on situational awareness in 

the border environment. CBP should complete these actions in order to fully 

assess its progress in implementing the plan and determine when mission 

benefits have been fully realized.

In December 2012, GAO reported on Border Patrol’s efforts to develop 

performance goals and measures for assessing the progress of efforts to secure

the border between ports of entry and informing the identification and allocation 

of border security resources. GAO reported that DHS had transitioned from a 

goal and measure related to the capability to detect, respond to, and address 

cross-border illegal activity to an interim performance goal and measure of 

apprehensions between the land border ports of entry beginning fiscal year 2011. 

GAO reported that this interim goal and measure did not inform program results 

or resource identification and allocation decisions, limiting DHS and 

congressional oversight and accountability. DHS concurred with GAO’s 

recommendation that CBP develop milestones and time frames for the 

development of border security goals and measures and Border Patrol works to 

define a new overarching performance goal for achieving a low-risk border and 

develop associated performance measures. CBP should complete these actions 

in order to fully assess its capabilities and progress to secure the border. 

View GAO-16-465T. For more information, 

contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777

or gamblerr@gao.gov.
Letter

Page 1 GAO-16-465T

March 1, 2016

Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our past work reviewing actions 

taken by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to deploy 

resources at the southwest border, and the extent that DHS measures the 

effectiveness of these deployed resources to improve situational 

awareness and achieve a more secure border. The southwest border 

continues to be vulnerable to cross-border illegal activity, and DHS 

reported apprehending over 331,000 illegal entrants and making over 

14,000 seizures of drugs in fiscal year 2015.

The U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol), within DHS’s U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP), is the federal agency with primary responsibility 

for securing the border between the U.S. ports of entry.1 CBP has divided 

geographic responsibility for the southwest border among nine Border 

Patrol sectors.2 Border Patrol’s 2004 National Border Patrol Strategy 

(2004 Strategy), developed following the terrorist attacks of September 

11, 2001, was designed to facilitate the buildup and deployment of border 

resources to ensure the agency had the right mix of personnel, 

technology—such as cameras and sensors, and tactical infrastructure—

such as fencing, roads, and lighting and to deploy those resources in a 

layered approach at the immediate border and in other areas distant from 

the border. Since fiscal year 2004, the first full fiscal year DHS was in 

operation, the number of agents assigned to patrol U.S. southwest land 

borders increased from about 9,500 to about 17,500 agents near the end 

of fiscal year 2015.3 In addition to personnel, DHS has employed a variety 

of technology, tactical infrastructure, and air and marine assets to assist 

 1

Ports of entry are facilities that provide for the controlled entry into or departure from the 

United States. Specifically, a port of entry is any officially designated location (seaport, 

airport, or land border location) where DHS officers or employees are assigned to clear 

passengers and merchandise, collect duties, and enforce customs laws, and where a 

person may apply for admission into the United States pursuant to U.S. immigration law

2

Each of the nine Border Patrol sectors has a headquarters with management personnel 

and these sectors are further divided geographically into varying numbers of stations, with 

agents assigned to patrol defined geographic areas. 

3

Border Patrol reported agent staffing statistics for on-board personnel as of September 

19, 2015. 

Letter
Page 2 GAO-16-465T

with its efforts to secure the border. For example, in November 2005, 

DHS announced the launch of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) program, 

which was responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection 

system using technology, known as the Secure Border Initiative Network 

(SBInet), and tactical infrastructure along the southwest border to deter 

smugglers and aliens attempting to illegally cross the border. In January 

2011, in response to internal and external assessments that identified 

concerns regarding the performance, cost, and schedule for implementing 

the systems, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced the 

cancellation of further procurements of SBInet systems. After the 

cancellation of SBInet, under which CBP deployed surveillance systems 

along 53 of the 387 miles of the Arizona border with Mexico, CBP 

developed the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan) in 

January 2011, which includes a mix of radars, sensors, and cameras to 

help provide security for the remainder of the Arizona border. Moreover, 

we reported in 2011 that DHS continued to deploy other tactical 

infrastructure along the southwest border, and CBP’s Air and Marine 

Operations (AMO)—formerly known as the Office of Air and Marine—

operates a fleet of air and marine assets in support of federal border 

security efforts.

Through fiscal year 2010, these resources were used to support DHS’s 

goal to achieve “operational control” of the nation’s borders by reducing 

cross-border illegal activity. The extent of operational control—also 

referred to as effective control—was defined as the number of border 

miles where Border Patrol had the capability to detect, respond to, and 

interdict cross-border illegal activity. In May 2012, Border Patrol issued 

the 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan (2012-2016 Strategic Plan), 

stating that the buildup of its resource base and the operations conducted 

over the past two decades would enable the Border Patrol to focus on 

mitigating risk rather than further increasing resources to secure the 

border. This new strategic plan, with a goal to achieve a low risk border, 

emphasized using intelligence information to inform risk relative to threats 

of cross-border terrorism, drug smuggling, and illegal migration across 

locations; integrating border security operations with those of other law 

enforcement partners; and developing rapid response capabilities to 

deploy the resources appropriate to changes in threat.

Over the years, we have reported on the progress and challenges DHS 

faces in implementing its border security efforts. My statement discusses 

our key findings in the areas of (1) DHS efforts to deploy agents, 

technology, tactical infrastructure, and air and marine assets on the 

southwest border and measure the effectiveness of these resources in 
Page 3 GAO-16-465T

securing the border, and (2) DHS performance measures for achieving 

situational awareness and border security.

My statement today is based on reports and testimonies we issued from 

September 2009 through May 2015 that examined DHS efforts to 

enhance border security and assess the effectiveness of its border 

security operations on the southwest border (see Related GAO Products 

at the end of this statement). It also includes selected updates we 

conducted through February 2016 on DHS enforcement efforts and 

actions to address our previous recommendations. Our reports and 

testimonies, as well as the selected updates, incorporated information we 

obtained by examining CBP’s management of resources; analyzing 

Border Patrol planning and operational assessment documents; reviewing 

DHS’s processes for measuring security at the southwest border; and 

interviewing relevant DHS officials. More detailed information about our 

scope and methodology can be found in our reports and testimonies. We 

conducted all of this work in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

CBP Has Deployed 

Resources to Secure 

the Southwest 

Border, but Additional 

Actions Are Needed 

to Measure Their 

Effectiveness
Page 4 GAO-16-465T

In December 2012, we reported on Border Patrol’s evolving approach for 

deploying agents along the southwest border.4 In that report we found 

that Border Patrol’s 2004 Strategy provided for increasing resources and 

deploying these resources using an approach that provided for several 

layers of Border Patrol agents at the immediate border and in other areas 

100 miles or more away from the border (referred to as defense in depth). 

According to the CBP officials we interviewed for our report, as resources 

increased, Border Patrol sought to move enforcement closer to the border 

over time to better position the agency to ensure the arrest of those trying 

to enter the country illegally. Additionally, headquarters and field officials 

said station supervisors determined (1) whether to deploy agents in 

border zones or interior zones, and (2) the types of enforcement or 

nonenforcement activities agents were to perform.5 Similarly, Border 

Patrol officials from the five sectors we visited stated that they used 

similar factors in making deployment decisions, such as intelligence 

showing the presence of threat across locations, the nature of the threat, 

and environmental factors including terrain and weather.

We reported in December 2012 on Border Patrol data from fiscal year 

2011 that showed how agent workdays were scheduled and found 

differences across sectors in the percentage of agent workdays 

scheduled for border zones and interior zones and across enforcement 

and nonenforcement activities. Specifically, we found that while Tucson 

sector scheduled 43 percent of agent workdays to border zones in fiscal 

year 2011, agent workdays scheduled for border zones by other 

southwest border sectors ranged from 26 percent in the Yuma sector to 

53 percent in the El Centro sector. Our analysis of agents deployed for 

enforcement compared to nonenforcement activities ranged from 66 

percent for Yuma sector to 81 percent in Big Bend sector.

Border Patrol officials we interviewed attributed the variation in scheduling 

border zone deployment in fiscal year 2011 to differences in geographical

factors among the southwest border sectors—such as varying 

 4

GAO, Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to Inform 

Border Security Status and Resource Needs GAO-13-25 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2012).

5

Within the Border Patrol station areas, “border zones” are those with land directly on the 

U.S.-Mexico border, and “interior zones” are without international border miles. 

Enforcement activities include, for example, patrolling the border and traffic checks, while 

nonenforcement activities include, for example, remote-video surveillance, facility 

maintenance, and training. 

Border Patrol Scheduled 

Agents Differently across 

Sectors and Enforcement 

Activities, and Took Steps 

to Improve Data 

Measuring Overall 

Effectiveness
Page 5 GAO-16-465T

topography, ingress and egress routes, and land access issues, and 

structural factors such as technology and infrastructure deployments—

and stated that these factors affect how sectors operate and may 

preclude closer deployment to the border. Additionally, we found that 

many southwest border sectors have interior stations that are responsible 

for operations at some distance from the border, such as at interior 

checkpoints generally located 25 miles or more from the border, which 

could have affected their percentage of agent workdays scheduled for 

border zones. We have planned work to assess Border Patrol deployment 

and management of agents across the southwest border beginning later 

this year.

We also reported in December 2012 that Border Patrol sector 

management used changes in various data over time to help inform 

assessment of its efforts to secure the border against the threats of illegal 

migration, smuggling of drugs and other contraband, and terrorism. These 

data showed changes in the (1) percentage of estimated known illegal 

entrants who are apprehended, (2) number of seizures of drugs and other 

contraband, and (3) number of apprehensions of persons from countries 

at an increased risk of sponsoring terrorism.6 In addition, apprehension 

and seizure data could be analyzed in terms of where they occurred 

relative to distance from the border as an indicator of progress in Border 

Patrol enforcement efforts. Border Patrol officials at sectors we visited, 

and our review of fiscal years 2010 and 2012 sector operational 

assessments, indicated that sectors historically used these types of data 

to inform tactical deployment of personnel and technology to address 

cross-border threats. Our analysis showed that in most southwest border 

sectors less than half of Border Patrol’s apprehensions and seizures were 

made within five miles of the border in fiscal year 2011. In Tucson sector, 

for example, 47 percent of Border Patrol’s apprehensions of illegal 

entrants, 38 percent of the drugs and contraband seizures, and 8 percent 

of the apprehensions of aliens from special interest countries were within 

five miles of the border. However, our analysis also showed that Border 

Patrol had moved overall enforcement efforts closer to the border since 

the prior fiscal year.

Further, we reported that Border Patrol sectors and stations tracked 

changes in their overall effectiveness as a tool to determine if the 

 6

These data also included the percentage of estimated known illegal entrants who are 

apprehended more than once (repeat offenders). 
Page 6 GAO-16-465T

appropriate mix and placement of personnel and assets were being 

deployed and used effectively and efficiently, according to officials from 

Border Patrol headquarters. Border Patrol calculated an overall 

effectiveness rate using a formula in which it added the number of 

apprehensions and “turn backs” in a specific sector and divided this total 

by the total estimated known illegal entries—determined by adding the 

number of apprehensions, turn backs, and “got aways” for the 

sector.7 Border Patrol views its border security efforts as increasing in 

effectiveness if the number of turn backs as a percentage of estimated 

known illegal entries has increased and the number of got aways as a 

percentage of estimated known illegal entries has decreased. In our 

December 2012 report, we analyzed apprehension, turn back, and got 

away data from fiscal years 2006 through 2011 for the Tucson sector and 

found that while apprehensions remained fairly constant at about 60 

percent of estimated known illegal entries, the percentage of reported turn 

backs increased from about 5 percent to about 23 percent, while the 

percentage of reported got aways decreased from about 33 percent to 

about 13 percent. As a result of these changes in the mix of turn backs 

and got aways, our analysis of Border Patrol data using Border Patrol 

methodology for our report showed that the enforcement effort, or the 

overall effectiveness rate for Tucson sector, improved 20 percentage 

points from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2011, from 67 percent to 87 

percent. Border Patrol data showed that the effectiveness rate for eight of 

the nine sectors on the southwest border also improved from fiscal years 

2006 through 2011, using Border Patrol methodology.

At the time of our review in 2012, Border Patrol headquarters officials said 

that differences in how sectors defined, collected, and reported turn back 

and got away data used to calculate the overall effectiveness rate 

precluded comparing performance results across sectors. They stated 

that each Border Patrol sector decided how it would collect and report 

turn back and got away data, and as a result, practices for collecting and 

reporting the data varied across sectors and stations based on 

differences in agent experience and judgment, resources, and terrain. 

The ability to obtain accurate or consistent data using these identification 

 7

Border Patrol defines estimated illegal entries as the total number of deportable aliens 

who were apprehended, in addition to the number of entrants who illegally crossed the 

border but were not apprehended either because they crossed back to Mexico—”turn 

backs”—or continued traveling to the U.S. interior and Border Patrol was no longer 

actively pursuing them—”got aways.”
Page 7 GAO-16-465T

sources depends on various factors, such as terrain and weather, 

according to Border Patrol officials. As a result of these data limitations, 

Border Patrol headquarters officials said that while they considered turn 

back and got away data sufficiently reliable to assess each sector’s 

progress toward border security and to inform sector decisions regarding 

resource deployment, they did not consider the data sufficiently reliable to 

compare—or externally report—results across sectors at the time we 

issued our report in December 2012.

Border Patrol headquarters officials issued guidance in September 2012 

to provide a more consistent, standardized approach for the collection 

and reporting of turn back and got away data by Border Patrol sectors. As 

we reported in 2012, Border Patrol officials expected that once the 

guidance was implemented, data reliability would improve. Since that 

time, DHS has reported the effectiveness rate in its Fiscal Year 2015-

2017 Annual Performance Report as a performance measure and method 

to publicly report results of its border security efforts on the southwest 

border.

In March 2014 and April 2015, we reported that CBP had made progress 

in deploying programs under the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology 

Plan, but that CBP could take additional action to strengthen its 

management of the Plan and its various programs.8 The Plan’s 

acquisition programs include fixed and mobile surveillance systems, 

agent portable devices, and ground sensors. Specifically, we reported in 

March 2014 that CBP had identified the mission benefits of its 

surveillance technologies, as we recommended in November 2011.9 CBP 

had identified mission benefits of surveillance technologies to be 

deployed under the Plan, such as improved situational awareness and 

agent safety. However, we also reported that the agency had not 

developed key attributes for performance metrics for all surveillance 

 8

GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed to 

Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness, GAO-14-368 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 

4, 2014), and Homeland Security Acquisitions: Major Program Assessments Reveal 

Actions Needed to Improve Accountability, GAO-15-171SP (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 22, 

2015).

9

GAO-14-368 and GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on 

Plans and Costs Is Needed before Proceeding, GAO-12-22 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 4, 

2011). 

CBP Has Not Yet Fully 

Applied Performance 

Metrics or Assessed the 

Contributions of its 

Deployed Surveillance 

Technologies and Fencing
Page 8 GAO-16-465T

technology to be deployed as part of the Plan, as we recommended in 

November 2011. As of May 2015, CBP had identified a set of potential 

key attributes for performance metrics for all technologies to be deployed 

under the Plan; however, CBP officials stated that this set of measures 

was under review as the agency continued to refine the measures to 

better inform the nature of the contributions and impacts of surveillance 

technology on its border security mission.10 While CBP had yet to apply 

these measures, CBP had established a time line for developing 

performance measures for each technology. In November 2014, CBP 

officials stated that baselines for each performance measure were to be 

developed, at which time the agency was to begin using the data to 

evaluate the individual and collective contributions of specific technology 

assets deployed under the Plan. Moreover, CBP plans to establish a tool 

by the end of fiscal year 2016 that explains the qualitative and 

quantitative impacts of technology and tactical infrastructure on situational 

awareness in specific areas of the border environment. While these are 

positive steps, until CBP completes its efforts to address our 

recommendation and fully develop and apply key attributes for 

performance metrics for all technologies to be deployed under the Plan, it 

will not be able to fully assess its progress in implementing the Plan and 

determine when mission benefits have been fully realized.

Further, in March 2014, we found that CBP did not capture complete data 

on the contributions of these technologies, which in combination with 

other relevant performance metrics or indicators could be used to better 

determine the contributions of CBP’s surveillance technologies and inform 

resource allocation decisions. Although CBP had a field within its 

Enforcement Integrated Database for data on whether technological 

assets, such as SBInet surveillance towers, and nontechnological assets, 

such as canine teams, assisted or contributed to the apprehension of 

illegal entrants and seizure of drugs and other contraband, according to 

CBP officials, Border Patrol agents were not required to record these 

data.11 This limited CBP’s ability to collect, track, and analyze available 

data on asset assists to help monitor the contribution of surveillance 

technologies, including its SBInet system, to Border Patrol apprehensions 

 10GAO, Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to Implement and 

Assess Infrastructure and Technology, GAO-15-595T (Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2015). 

11In addition to maintaining data on asset assists, the Border Patrol collects and maintains 

data on apprehensions and seizures in DHS’s Enforcement Integrated Database.
Page 9 GAO-16-465T

and seizures and inform resource allocation decisions. We made two 

recommendations that (1) CBP require data on asset assists to be 

recorded and tracked within its database; and that once these data were 

required to be recorded and tracked, (2) analyze available data on 

apprehensions and technological assists, in combination with other 

relevant performance metrics or indicators, as appropriate, to determine 

the contribution of surveillance technologies to CBP’s border security 

efforts. CBP concurred with our recommendations and has implemented 

one of them. In June 2014, in response to our recommendation, CBP 

issued guidance informing Border Patrol agents that the asset assist data 

field within its database was now a mandatory data field. Agents are 

required to enter any assisting surveillance technology or other 

equipment before proceeding. As we testified in May 2015, to fully 

address our second recommendation, CBP needs to analyze data on 

apprehensions and seizures, in combination with other relevant 

performance metrics, to determine the contribution of surveillance 

technologies to its border security mission.

In addition, with regard to fencing and other tactical infrastructure, CBP 

reported that from fiscal year 2005 through May 2015, the total miles of 

vehicle and pedestrian fencing along the nearly 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexico 

border increased from approximately 120 miles to 652 miles.12 With the 

completion of the new fencing and other tactical infrastructure, DHS is 

now responsible for maintaining this infrastructure including repairing 

breached sections of fencing.13 We have previously reported on CBP’s 

efforts to assess the impact of tactical infrastructure on border security. 

Specifically, in our May 2010 and September 2009 reports, we found that 

CBP had not accounted for the impact of its investment in border fencing 

and infrastructure on border security.14 CBP had reported an increase in 

control of southwest border miles, but could not account separately for 

the impact of the border fencing and other infrastructure. In September 

 12The length of the border with Mexico is defined by the U.S. International Boundary and 

Water Commission at 1,954 miles. The length of the land border is 675 miles, while the 

length of the border along the Colorado River and Rio Grande is 1,279 miles.

13 CBP reported that maintaining the fence cost the department at least $7.2 million in 

2010. 

14GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying Technology and 

Fencing Along the Southwest Border, GAO-10-651T (Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2010), 

and Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact of 

Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed, GAO-09-896 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2009).
Page 10 GAO-16-465T

2009, we recommended that CBP determine the contribution of border 

fencing and other infrastructure to border security.15 DHS concurred with 

our recommendation, and in response, CBP contracted with the 

Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute to conduct an analysis 

of the impact of tactical infrastructure on border security. We have 

ongoing work for this subcommittee and others assessing CBP’s 

deployment and management of tactical infrastructure, and we plan to 

report on the results of this work later this year.

Our March 2012 report on AMO assets highlighted several areas the 

agency could address to better ensure the mix and placement of assets is 

effective and efficient.16 These areas included: (1) documentation clearly 

linking deployment decisions to mission needs and threats, (2) 

documentation on the assessments and analysis used to support 

decisions on the mix and placement of assets, and (3) consideration of 

how deployment of border technology will affect customer requirements 

for air and marine assets across locations.

Specifically, we found that AMO had not documented significant events, 

such as its analyses to support its asset mix and placement across 

locations, and as a result, lacked a record to help demonstrate that its 

decisions to allocate assets were the most effective ones in fulfilling 

customer needs and addressing threats, among other things. While 

AMO’s Fiscal Year 2010 Aircraft Deployment Plan stated that AMO 

deployed aircraft and maritime vessels to ensure its forces were 

positioned to best meet the needs of CBP field commanders and respond 

to the latest intelligence on emerging threats, AMO did not have 

documentation that clearly linked the deployment decisions in the plan to 

mission needs or threats.

We also found that AMO did not provide higher rates of support to 

locations Border Patrol identified as high priority, a fact that indicated that 

a reassessment of AMO’s resource mix and placement could help ensure 

that it meets mission needs, addresses threats, and mitigates risk. AMO 

officials stated that while they deployed a majority of assets to high-

 15GAO-09-896.

16GAO, Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of DHS’s Air 

and Marine Assets, GAO-12-518, (Washington, D.C. Mar. 30, 2012).

CBP Has Reassessed Its 

Mix and Placement of Air 

and Marine Assets to 

Better Address Mission 

Needs and Threats
Page 11 GAO-16-465T

priority sectors, budgetary constraints, other national priorities, and the 

need to maintain presence across border locations limited overall 

increases in assets or the amount of assets they could redeploy from 

lower-priority sectors. While we recognized AMO’s resource constraints, 

the agency did not have documentation of analyses assessing the impact 

of these constraints and whether actions could be taken to improve the 

mix and placement of assets within them. Thus, the extent to which the 

deployment of AMO assets and personnel, including those assigned to 

the southwest border, most effectively utilized AMO’s constrained assets 

to meet mission needs and address threats was unclear.

We further found in March 2012 that AMO did not document assessments 

and analyses to support the agency’s decisions on the mix and placement 

of assets. DHS’s 2005 aviation management directive requires operating 

entities to use their aircraft in the most cost-effective way to meet 

requirements. Although AMO officials stated that it factored in costeffectiveness considerations, AMO did not have documentation of 

analyses it performed to make these decisions. AMO headquarters 

officials stated that they made deployment decisions during formal 

discussions and ongoing meetings in close collaboration with Border 

Patrol, and considered a range of factors such as operational capability, 

mission priorities, and threats. AMO officials said that while they generally 

documented final decisions affecting the mix and placement of assets, 

they did not document assessments and analyses to support these 

decisions.

Finally, we reported that CBP and DHS had ongoing interagency efforts 

under way to increase air and marine domain awareness across U.S. 

borders through deployment of technology that may decrease Border 

Patrol’s use of AMO assets for air and marine domain awareness. 

However, at the time of our review, AMO was not planning to assess how 

technology capabilities could affect the mix and placement of air and 

marine assets until the technology has been deployed. Specifically, we 

concluded that Border Patrol, CBP, and DHS had strategic and 

technological initiatives under way that would likely affect customer 

requirements for air and marine support and the mix and placement of 

assets across locations—CBP and DHS also had ongoing interagency 

efforts under way to increase air and marine domain awareness across 

U.S. borders through deployment of technology that may decrease 

Border Patrol’s use of AMO assets for air and marine domain awareness. 

AMO officials stated that they would consider how technology capabilities 

affect the mix and placement of air and marine assets once such 

technology has been deployed.
Page 12 GAO-16-465T

To address the findings of our March 2012 report, we recommended that 

CBP, to the extent that benefits outweigh the costs, reassess the mix and 

placement of AMO’s air and marine assets to include mission 

requirements, performance results, and anticipated CBP strategic and 

technological changes. DHS concurred with this recommendation and 

responded that it planned to address some of these actions as part of the 

Fiscal Year 2012-2013 Aircraft Deployment Plan. In September 2014, 

CBP provided us this Plan, which was approved in May 2012, and 

updated information on its subsequent efforts to address this 

recommendation, including a description of actions taken to reassess the 

mix and placement of AMO’s assets. According to AMO, after consulting 

with DHS and CBP officials and approval from the Secretary of Homeland 

Security in May 2013, the office began a realignment of personnel, 

aircraft, and vessels from the northern border to the southern border 

based on its evaluation of the utilization and efficiency of current assets 

and available funding to accomplish the transfers. In September 2015, 

AMO officials provided GAO with data and analysis documenting that 

personnel, aircraft, and vessels were in the process of being moved to 

support the realignment of assets, which addressed the intent of our 

recommendation.
Page 13 GAO-16-465T

In December 2012, we reported on Border Patrol’s efforts to develop 

performance goals and measures for assessing the progress of its efforts 

to secure the border between ports of entry and for informing the 

identification and allocation of resources needed to secure the border.17

We found that until fiscal year end 2010, DHS used Border Patrol’s goal 

and performance measure of operational control as the publicly reported 

DHS goal and outcome measure for border security and to assess 

resource needs to accomplish this goal.18 We had previously testified in 

February 2011 that at the time this goal and measure was discontinued at 

the end of fiscal year 2010, Border Patrol reported achieving varying 

levels of operational control of 873 (44 percent) of the nearly 2,000 

southwest border miles.19 Border Patrol officials attributed the uneven 

progress across sectors to multiple factors, including terrain, 

transportation infrastructure on both sides of the border, and a need to 

prioritize resource deployment to sectors deemed to have greater risk of 

illegal activity.

DHS transitioned from using operational control as its goal and outcome 

measure for border security in its Fiscal Year 2010-2012 Annual 

Performance Report. Specifically, citing a need to establish a new border 

security goal and measure that reflected a more quantitative methodology 

as well as the department’s evolving vision for border control, DHS 

established the interim performance goal and measure of the number of 

apprehensions between the land border ports of entry until a new border 

control goal and measure could be developed. We testified in May 2012 

that the interim goal and measure provided information on activity levels, 

but did not inform program results or resource identification and allocation 

decisions, and therefore, until new goals and measures could be 

developed, DHS and Congress could experience reduced oversight and 

DHS accountability.20 Further, studies commissioned by CBP 

documented that the number of apprehensions bore little relationship to 

 17See GAO-13-25. 

18Border Patrol sector officials assessed the miles under operational control using factors 

such as operational statistics, third-party indicators, intelligence and operational reports, 

resource deployments, and discussions with senior Border Patrol agents.

19GAO, Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border Control Measures for the 

Southwest Border, GAO-11-374T Washington D.C.: Feb. 15, 2011). 

20GAO, Border Patrol Strategy: Progress and Challenges in Implementation and 

Assessment Efforts, GAO-12-688T (Washington D.C.: May 8, 2012).

Border Patrol Has Not 

Yet Developed Goals 

and Measures for 

Assessing Efforts and 

Identifying Resource 

Needs under the 

Fiscal Year 2012-

2016 Strategic Plan
Page 14 GAO-16-465T

effectiveness because agency officials did not compare these numbers 

with the amount of cross-border illegal activity.21

In our December 2012 report, we found that Border Patrol was in the 

process of developing performance goals and measures for assessing 

the progress of its efforts to secure the border between ports of entry and 

for informing the identification and allocation of resources needed to 

secure the border, but had not identified milestones and time frames for 

developing and implementing them. According to Border Patrol officials, 

establishing milestones and time frames for the development of 

performance goals and measures was contingent on the development of 

key elements of the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan, such as a risk assessment 

tool, and the agency’s time frames for implementing these key 

elements—targeted for fiscal years 2013 and 2014—were subject to 

change. Specifically, under the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan, the Border 

Patrol planned to continuously evaluate border security—and resource 

needs—by comparing changes in risk levels against available resources 

across border locations. Border Patrol officials stated that the agency was 

in the process of identifying performance goals and measures that could 

be linked to the new risk assessment tools that would show progress and 

status in securing the border between ports of entry, and determine 

needed resources, but had not established milestones and time frames 

for developing and implementing goals and measures because the 

agency’s time frames for implementing key elements of the plan were 

subject to change.22

We recommended in our December 2012 report that Border Patrol 

establish milestones and time frames for developing a (1) performance 

goal, or goals, for border security between the ports of entry that defines 

how border security is to be measured and (2) performance measure, or 

measures—linked to a performance goal or goals—for assessing 

progress made in securing the border between ports of entry and 

 21For example, see Homeland Security Institute, Measuring the Effect of the Arizona 

Border Control Initiative (Arlington, Va.: Oct. 18, 2005).

22Border Patrol officials stated that DHS and Border Patrol had established a performance 

goal—linked to relevant measures—addressing border security that, as of October 2012, 

was being used as an internal management indicator. However, a DHS official said it had 

not been decided whether this goal and the associated measures would be publicly 

reported or used as an overall performance goal and as measures for border security.
Page 15 GAO-16-465T

informing resource identification and allocation efforts.23 DHS agreed with 

these recommendations and since our December 2012 report, has added 

performance measures for border security to its Annual Performance 

Report. In its Fiscal Year 2015-2017 Annual Performance Report, these 

measures included the percent of people apprehended multiple times on 

the southwest border and the rate of effectiveness in responding to illegal 

activity. Further, as part of its efforts to revise the Border Patrol strategic 

plan, Border Patrol has developed outcome measures for each of 14 

objectives, and according to officials, Border Patrol continues to work 

toward the development of goals and measures to support its overarching 

performance goal of low-risk borders. Until these new goals and 

measures are in place, it is unknown the extent to which they will address 

our past findings and would provide DHS and Congress with information 

on the results of CBP efforts to secure the border between ports of entry 

and the extent to which existing resources and capabilities are 

appropriate and sufficient.

Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and members of the 

subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy 

to respond to any questions you or members of the committee may have.

For questions about this statement, please contact Rebecca Gambler at 

(202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement 

included David Alexander; Cindy Ayers; Tom Lombardi; Krista Mantsch; 

Jon Najmi; and Edith Sohna.

 23GAO-13-25. 

GAO Contacts and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(100660)
GAO Related Products

Page 1 GAO-16-465T 

Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to Implement 

and Assess Infrastructure and Technology, GAO-15-595T (Washington, 

D.C.: May 13, 2015).

Homeland Security Acquisitions: Major Program Assessments Reveal 

Actions Needed to Improve Accountability, GAO-15-171SP (Washington, 

D.C.: April 22, 2015).

Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed 

to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness, GAO-14-411T. 

(Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2014). 

Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed 

to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness, GAO-14-368 

(Washington, D.C.: March 4, 2014)

Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS Implementation and 

Assessment Efforts, GAO-13-653T. (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2013). 

Border Security: DHS’s Progress and Challenges in Securing U.S. 

Borders, GAO-13-414T. (Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2013). 

Border Patrol: Goals and Measures Not Yet in Place to Inform Border 

Security Status and Resource Needs, GAO-13-330T (Washington, D.C.: 

Feb. 26, 2013).

Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to 

Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs, GAO-13-25 

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 2012).

Border Patrol Strategy: Progress and Challenges in Implementation and 

Assessment Efforts, GAO-12-688T (Washington D.C.: May 8, 2012). 

Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of 

DHS’s Air and Marine Assets, GAO-12-518, (Washington, D.C. March 30, 

2012). 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border Security Fencing, 

Infrastructure and Technology Fiscal Year 2011 Expenditure Plan, 

GAO-12-106R. (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2011). 

Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and 

Costs Is Needed before Proceeding, GAO-12-22 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 

4, 2011).

GAO Related Products
Page 2 GAO-16-465T 

Border Security: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Key 

Southwest Border Technology Programs, GAO-11-448T (Washington, 

D.C.: March 15, 2011).

Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border Control Measures 

for the Southwest Border, GAO-11-374T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 

2011). 

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying 

Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border, GAO-10-651T

(Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2010).

Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the 

Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed, GAO-09-896

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2009). 
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 

policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 

to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. 

GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 

cost is through GAO’s website (http://www.gao.gov). Each weekday 

afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, 

and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted 

products, go to http://www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.”

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of 

production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 

publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and 

white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s website, 

http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537.

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 

MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube.

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates.

Listen to our Podcasts and read The Watchblog.

Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov.

Contact:

Website: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-

4400, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 

7125, Washington, DC 20548

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548

GAO’s Mission

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Phone

Connect with GAO

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Congressional 

Relations

Public Affairs

Please Print on Recycled Paper.