PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 23-2068

___________

CRYSTAL HARRIS; KADEYJA DIXON-FOWLER,

Appellants

v.

DISTRICT ATTORNEY LARRY KRASNER; BRIAN 

KEAN, ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY; CITY OF 

PHILADELPHIA; PHILADELPHIA DISTRICT 

ATTORNEY’S OFFICE

____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2-22-cv-00839)

District Judge: Honorable Joel H. Slomsky

____________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

June 3, 2024

Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and AMBRO, Circuit 

Judges.
2

(Filed: June 6, 2024)

Sharon Gilbert Timm

5410 Simpson Circle

Doylestown, PA 18902

Counsel for Appellants

Jennifer MacNaughton

Senior Attorney, Appeals

City of Philadelphia Law Department

1515 Arch Street, 17th Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Appellee City of Philadelphia

Ira Neil Richards

Dilworth Paxon LLP

1500 Market Street, Suite 3500E

1515 Arch Street, 17th Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19101

Counsel for Appellees District Attorney Defendants

________________________

OPINION OF THE COURT

________________________

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

Crystal Harris and her daughter, Kadeyja DixonFowler, sued the City of Philadelphia and its District 

Attorney’s Office, District Attorney Larry Krasner, and 

Assistant District Attorney Brian Kean, seeking damages and 

injunctive relief. Plaintiffs claim Defendants violated their 
3

rights under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions

by disclosing Internal Affairs Division (IAD) complaints filed 

against Harris. Harris also claimed that Defendants violated her 

state and federal rights by barring her from testifying as a trial 

witnesses. The District Court dismissed the suit and Plaintiffs 

appeal. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.

I

Harris, a 23-year veteran of the Philadelphia Police 

Department, learned in 2020 that the Philadelphia District 

Attorney’s Office had disclosed IAD complaints against her to 

defendants when she had testified as a prosecution witness.

1

These disclosures included a 2014 complaint in which Harris’s 

former domestic partner accused her of abusing her authority.

Harris’s partner made this complaint after Harris reported him 

for sexually abusing Dixon-Fowler. Harris claims IAD

investigated the complaint, “determined it was unfounded,” 

and “agreed” in 2017 “that any evidence of . . . alleged lying 

during an official investigation would be expunged” from 

Harris’s disciplinary file. App. 40.

In 2021, after Harris and another officer arrested a 

motorist for driving under the influence, Assistant District 

Attorney Brian Kean emailed Harris’s supervisor “stating he 

was declining prosecution . . . because it was not clear which 

officer did what during the arrest” and because “Harris was Do 

Not Call.” App. 37. According to the complaint, “Do Not Call” 

1 At this stage in the proceedings, we take all well-pleaded facts 

in the operative complaint as true and make all reasonable 

inferences in Harris’s and Dixon-Fowler’s favor. See Blanyar 

v. Genova Prods. Inc., 861 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 2017).
4

refers to the District Attorney’s “Do Not Call List”—a roster

of police officers whom the District Attorney will not call to 

testify in court because of IAD complaints filed against them.

Harris and Dixon-Fowler sued District Attorney Larry 

Krasner and Assistant District Attorney Brian Kean (together, 

the Prosecutors) as well as the City of Philadelphia and its 

District Attorney’s Office (together, the City). They sought 

damages and equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the 

Pennsylvania Constitution, and state common law.

Harris claimed Defendants violated her First 

Amendment right to testify and deprived her of overtime pay 

for court appearances without due process in violation of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Harris and Dixon-Fowler also sought 

to enjoin the Prosecutors from disclosing 

“any . . . information . . . relating to either [Harris’s] expunged 

IAD complaint . . . or [Dixon-Fowler’s] sexual

assault . . . in . . . any future criminal prosecution,” claiming 

these disclosures harmed reputational interests protected by the 

Pennsylvania Constitution. App. 43. Finally, Plaintiffs argued

that Defendants were liable for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress under Pennsylvania law because the 

disclosure of Dixon-Fowler’s sexual assault and the 

designation of Harris as “Do Not Call” had caused “serious 

psychological and emotional harm.” App. 45.

The District Court granted Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss. It concluded that Plaintiffs had failed to allege a 

violation of a constitutional right and that the Prosecutors were 

immune from suit. See Harris v. Krasner, 2023 WL 3431233, 

at *7–12 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 2023). Harris and Dixon-Fowler 
5

timely appealed.2

II

A

Harris claims the District Court erred when it held that 

the Prosecutors were entitled to absolute immunity on her § 

1983 claims. “[P]rosecutors are absolutely immune from 

liability in § 1983 lawsuits” for “their official actions,” 

including “actions that are intimately associated with the 

judicial phase of the criminal process.” Van de Kamp v. 

Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341 (2009) (cleaned up). Absolute 

prosecutorial immunity derives from the “public policy” 

“‘concern that . . . unfounded litigation’ could both 

‘ . . . deflect[] . . . the prosecutor’s energies from his public 

duties’ and also lead . . . [him] to ‘shade his decisions instead 

of exercising the independence of judgment required by his 

public trust.’” Id. at 341 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 

409, 423 (1976)). We agree with the District Court that 

Defendants’ disclosure of Harris’s IAD complaint in discovery 

material and their refusal to call Harris as a witness are 

“prosecutorial function[s]” protected by absolute immunity.

Harris, 2023 WL 3431233, at *9. 

The Prosecutors disclosed Harris’s IAD file, including 

the complaint alleging abuse of authority in Dixon-Fowler’s 

2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 

1343, and 1367. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s order 

granting a motion to dismiss. See Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. 

Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013).
6

case, to comply with their obligations under Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Brady requires the prosecution 

to disclose evidence “favorable to the accused, either because 

it is exculpatory, or impeaching,” including evidence “which 

may well alter the jury’s judgment of the credibility of a crucial 

prosecution witness.” Dennis v. Sec’y, Pennsylvania Dep’t of 

Corr., 834 F.3d 263, 284, 287 (3d Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). 

The Supreme Court’s decisions in Imbler v. Pachtman

and Van de Kamp v. Goldstein explain that prosecutors are 

afforded absolute immunity in fulfilling their Brady 

obligations. “[D]etermining what information” from Harris’s 

Internal Affairs file to disclose “require[s] legal knowledge and 

the exercise of related discretion.” Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at

344. It is thus “‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of 

the criminal process’ because it concern[s] the evidence 

presented at trial,” id. at 345 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430),

and “[p]reparation . . . for a trial,” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33.

Harris responds that her IAD file contains “not [Brady] 

material,” but “false . . . claims brought by [a] convicted 

rapist” in retaliation “against Harris for reporting the rapes.” 

Harris Br. 11–12. She notes further that the IAD determined 

that the allegations were “unfounded” and agreed to 

“expunge[] [the complaint] from her personnel file.” Harris Br. 

7. Because the file does not contain Brady material, Harris

argues, the District Court erroneously held that Defendants’

disclosure of the file was protected by absolute immunity. We 

disagree. 

Harris’s IAD file contained a complaint alleging that 

Harris had abused her authority. It is possible that a

prosecutor’s Brady obligations may, in some cases, include a 

duty to disclose “[a]n internal investigation report” accusing a
7

testifying officer of “lying during the course of h[er] official 

duties” or “abus[ing] h[er] authority to get what [s]he wants.”

Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1012 (9th Cir. 2013). But even 

assuming, as Harris argues, that her IAD file does not contain 

Brady material, or that “unsubstantiated allegations against a 

government witness” need not be disclosed under Brady, see 

United States v. Souffront, 338 F.3d 809, 823 (7th Cir. 2003), 

the Prosecutors would still be entitled to absolute immunity.

If absolute immunity is to serve its purpose, the 

line between official conduct, as to which there 

is immunity, and extra-official conduct, as to 

which there is not, must . . . leave[] officials 

room for good faith mistakes about the extent of 

their authority. Thus, if the circumstances in a 

particular case were such that a reasonable 

prosecutor in the defendant’s position could have 

had a good faith belief that he was authorized by 

his office to act as he did, immunity will be 

recognized. In such a case, an allegation that the 

official acted in bad faith, knowing his conduct 

to be unauthorized, will not strip the official of 

absolute immunity. Similarly, absolute 

immunity will be available, in such a case, even 

if the authority in fact was lacking under the law. 

Stated conversely, immunity will be denied only 

for those acts which a reasonable prosecutor 

would recognize as being clearly outside his 

jurisdiction to represent the state before the 

court. 
8

Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. of Chester Cnty., 108 F.3d 486, 

502 (3d Cir. 1997) (second emphasis added) (cleaned up). In 

short, whether the Prosecutors are entitled to absolute 

immunity turns not on whether the allegedly expunged 

complaint was properly disclosed as Brady material, but 

whether the Prosecutors could have had any good faith basis to 

believe that they could disclose the complaint when Harris 

testified as a witness. We conclude that they did.

As we have emphasized, prosecutors have an obligation 

to “inspect” an arresting officer’s personnel file and “disclose 

impeachment material that is exculpatory to the defendant,” 

United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 191 (3d Cir. 1998), and 

the Ninth Circuit has held that Brady may, in some cases,

compel disclosure of allegations that a testifying officer has 

abused her authority, see Milke, 711 F.3d at 1012. And 

although Harris alleges that the complaint was expunged, we 

know of no authority holding that expunged or dismissed 

complaints against an arresting officer can never be disclosed 

under Brady and its progeny. Rather, “the prudent prosecutor 

will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure.” United 

States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976). Thus, we hold that 

the Prosecutors had a good-faith basis to believe they were 

authorized—if not compelled—to disclose Harris’s IAD

complaint. Accordingly, the Prosecutors’ disclosure of 

Harris’s IAD file is a “quasi-judicial” function protected by 
9

“absolute immunity from [§] 1983 suits.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 

420.3

The same is true of the Prosecutors’ decision not to call 

Harris as a witness. “[T]he duties of the prosecutor . . . involve 

actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and 

actions apart from the courtroom,” including “which witnesses

to call.” Mancini v. Lester, 630 F.2d 990, 994 n.6 (3d Cir. 

1980) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33) (emphasis 

added). Like our sister courts, we conclude that prosecutors 

have absolute immunity from suits challenging their strategic 

decision not to call a police officer as a witness, see Savage v. 

Maryland, 896 F.3d 260, 270 (4th Cir. 2018), or their decision 

not to prosecute a case, see Roe v. City and County of San 

Francisco, 109 F.3d 578, 583 (9th Cir. 1997).

Harris’s First Amendment § 1983 claim against the City

fares no better. “[F]or Monell liability to attach, there must still 

be a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Johnson 

v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 403 n.13 (3d Cir. 2020)

(cleaned up). Harris has no unqualified right to testify in any 

trial she pleases, nor to compel the District Attorney’s Office 

“to prosecute . . . [her] cases.” Savage, 896 F.3d at 271. 

Indeed, “the prosecution has no duty to call any witness . . . if 

it believes after examination or investigation that [her]

testimony is either unreliable, surplusage, or irrelevant.” 

3 In reaching this conclusion, we assume that the complaint in 

Harris’s IAD file was deemed unfounded and was later 

expunged. See Blanyar, 861 F.3d at 431. So we need not

consider Harris’s broader IAD file or Defendants’ assertion 

that the IAD sustained misconduct allegations filed against 

Harris.
10

United States ex rel. Drew v. Myers, 327 F.2d 174, 179 n.16

(3d Cir. 1964) (emphasis added). Because Harris has failed to 

allege any freedom of speech violation, her First Amendment 

§ 1983 claim fails. 

B

Harris also argues that the District Court erroneously 

dismissed her Fourteenth Amendment § 1983 claim. She

contends that her placement on the Do Not Call List and 

inability to testify about her arrests resulted in the deprivation 

of her public employment without notice or a hearing. The 

District Court held that the Prosecutors had absolute immunity 

from this claim because “[t]he decision to include police 

officers on the Do Not Call List is ‘directly connected with the 

conduct of a trial’” and “require[s] legal knowledge and the 

exercise of related discretion.” Harris, 2023 WL 3431233, at 

*9 (quoting Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 344). We agree. 

As for Harris’s reputational argument, the District Court 

concluded that the Prosecutors had absolute immunity, so it did 

not consider whether Harris’s placement on the Do Not Call 

List harmed her reputational interests under the First or 

Fourteenth Amendment. But “reputation alone, apart from 

some more tangible interests such as employment,” does not 

implicate a liberty or property interest “by itself sufficient to 

invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause.” 

Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976); see also Clark v. Twp.

of Falls, 890 F.2d 611, 619–20 (3d Cir. 1989).

In sum, the Prosecutors’ disclosure of Harris’s IAD file 

and their decision to place her on the Do Not Call List did not 

deprive her of any interest protected by the United States 

Constitution, and Harris cannot sustain her § 1983 claim on 
11

reputational harm alone. So the District Court properly 

dismissed this claim as to all Defendants.

4

C

Harris and Dixon-Fowler argue that the Prosecutors’ 

disclosure of Harris’s IAD file violated their “right to protect 

[their] reputation[s]” under the Pennsylvania Constitution. 

App. 43 (citing Pa. Const. art. I, §§ 1, 11). Citing Fraternal 

Order of Police Lodge No. 5 by McNesby v. City of 

Philadelphia, 267 A.3d 531, 535 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2021), the 

District Court denied Plaintiffs’ request to enjoin the District 

Attorney’s Office from disclosing information relating to 

Harris’s IAD complaint or Dixon-Fowler’s sexual assault in 

any future criminal prosecutions. See Harris, 2023 WL 

3431233, at *10. As the District Court emphasized, the 

Commonwealth Court denied the police union’s request “to 

enjoin [District Attorney] Krasner from creating and 

maintaining an internal Do Not Call List, or from disclosing 

potentially exculpatory or impeachment information to 

criminal defense counsel.” FOP Lodge, 267 A.3d at 544

(emphasis added).

Because Harris sought “the same relief” denied in FOP 

Lodge, the District Court rejected her request to “enjoin the 

4 We decline to consider Harris’s and Dixon-Fowler’s 

argument that Defendants violated their Fourteenth 

Amendment due process rights by revealing “personal[,]

private information about Harris and Dixon-Fowler to the

public in court.” Harris Br. 12. Plaintiffs did not make this 

argument in the District Court, so it is forfeited. See Simko v. 

U.S. Steel Corp., 992 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2021).
12

District Attorney from fulfilling its obligations under Brady

and Giglio.” Harris, 2023 WL 3431233, at *10. The District 

Court did not err in this conclusion. “[N]otion[s] of comity” 

and “a proper respect for state functions” militate against

enjoining the Prosecutors from complying with their Brady 

obligations. ACRA Turf Club, LLC v. Zanzuccki, 748 F.3d 127, 

132 (3d Cir. 2014) (cleaned up).

In response, Plaintiffs argue that the District Court 

misreads FOP Lodge. It is true that the Commonwealth Court 

afforded the FOP Lodge plaintiffs some relief, but it was not 

the same relief that Harris and Dixon-Fowler now seek. The 

Commonwealth Court denied the FOP Lodge plaintiffs’

request to enjoin the District Attorney’s disclosure of 

potentially exculpatory material. But it held that plaintiffs had 

stated a claim that the City “deprived them of their fundamental 

rights to reputation without due process” under the 

Pennsylvania Constitution by failing to give exonerated 

officers an “opportunity to argue why they should not be on the 

Do Not Call List before it is disclosed to the public.” 267 A.3d 

at 538, 545. 

To be sure, the FOP Lodge court held “the trial court 

erred by . . . concluding . . . that the appellant police officers 

[were] not entitled to prior notice that they [were] being 

considered for placement on the . . . Do Not Call List or 

afforded a[n] . . . opportunity to be heard concerning whether 

they should be removed from the . . . List.” Id. at 553. But 

Harris and Dixon-Fowler seek a broad injunction barring the 

Prosecutors from sharing Harris’s complaint file in any future

Brady disclosures—the very relief the FOP Lodge court 

denied. See Harris, 2023 WL 3431233, at *10. So the District 
13

Court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief 

under the Pennsylvania Constitution.

5

D

Lastly, Harris and Dixon-Fowler argue that the District 

Court erred in dismissing their common-law claim for 

intentional infliction of emotional distress. We agree with the 

District Court that this claim is barred by high public official 

immunity and Pennsylvania’s Political Subdivision Tort 

Claims Act (PSTCA). 

As for the claim against the Prosecutors, “[t]here is no 

question that the doctrine of high official immunity 

applies . . . to claims for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress,” Feldman v. Hoffman, 107 A.3d 821, 835 (Pa. 

Commw. Ct. 2014), appeal denied, 121 A.3d 497 (Pa. 2015),

or that it applies to district attorneys and assistant district 

attorneys, see Durham v. McElynn, 772 A.2d 68, 70 (Pa. 2001). 

And the Prosecutors’ disclosure of Harris’s IAD file and their 

decision not to call Harris as a witness are “actions taken in the 

course of the official[s’] duties or powers and within the scope 

of [their] authority.” Id. at 69 (cleaned up).

As for the City, “it is well-settled that where a plaintiff 

has averred willful misconduct on the part of local agency 

employees, [the PSTCA] bars recovery from the local agency 

because liability may be imposed . . . only for negligent acts,”

5 Nothing in our opinion prevents Harris from asserting that her 

placement on the Do Not Call List without notice and a hearing 

violates her reputational interests and due process rights under 

the Pennsylvania Constitution.
14 

Orange Stones Co. v. City of Reading, 87 A.3d 1014, 1022 (Pa. 

Commw. Ct. 2014), “not . . . willful misconduct,” 42 Pa.C.S. § 

8542(a)(2).

6

 And “the term ‘willful misconduct’ is 

synonymous with the term ‘intentional tort.’” Sanford v. Stiles, 

456 F.3d 298, 315 (3d Cir. 2006) (cleaned up). 

So the District Court did not err in dismissing the claims 

against the Prosecutors and the City for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress. 

* * * 

For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District 

Court’s order dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims against the 

Prosecutors and the City. 

6 Both the City of Philadelphia and the District Attorney’s 

Office are “local agenc[ies]” under the PSTCA. See Maloney 

v. City of Philadelphia, 535 A.2d 209, 211 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 

1987); Pettit v. Namie, 931 A.2d 790, 798 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 

2007).