UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-5191

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

JAMES THOMAS DILLARD,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, 

Jr., District Judge. (1:08-cr-00394-WO-1) 

Submitted: June 29, 2010 Decided: July 20, 2010

Before KING and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Amy Lee Copeland, AMY LEE COPELAND, LLC, Savannah, Georgia, for 

Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Graham 

T. Green, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM: 

James Thomas Dillard pled guilty, pursuant to a 

written plea agreement, to one count of possession, with the 

intent to defraud, of fifteen or more unauthorized access 

devices, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3) (2006). The 

district court calculated Dillard’s advisory Guidelines range 

under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2008) at 

15 to 21 months’ imprisonment and imposed a variance sentence of 

27 months’ imprisonment. Dillard timely appeals his sentence, 

challenging the substantive reasonableness of the 27-month 

prison term.*

We review the district court’s sentence, “whether 

inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines 

range,” under a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” 

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). This review 

entails appellate consideration of both the procedural and 

substantive reasonableness of a sentence. Id. at 51. Dillard 

challenges the 27-month prison sentence as substantively 

unreasonable, but concedes its procedural reasonableness. 

 We affirm. 

 * Although Dillard has completed serving his term of 

imprisonment, this appeal is not moot, because Dillard is still 

subject to a three-year term of supervised release. If Dillard 

were to prevail on the merits of this appeal, the district court 

could grant him relief by shortening or modifying the terms of 

his supervised release. 
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In determining whether a sentence is substantively 

reasonable, we “take into account the totality of the 

circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the 

Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Although we presume on 

appeal that a sentence within a properly-calculated Guidelines 

range is reasonable, see United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 

193 (4th Cir. 2007), we may not presume that a sentence outside 

the Guidelines range is unreasonable, see United States v. Abu 

Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 261 (4th Cir. 2008). 

In reviewing a sentence outside the Guidelines range, 

we may “consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due 

deference to the district court’s decision that the [18 U.S.C.] 

§ 3553(a) [(2006)] factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the 

variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. “[A] major departure should be 

supported by a more significant justification than a minor one[,] 

[b]ut a district court need not justify a sentence outside the 

Guidelines range with a finding of extraordinary circumstances.” 

United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir. 2008) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Even if we

would have imposed a different sentence, this fact alone will not 

justify vacatur of the district court’s sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. 

at 51. 

Dillard’s 27-month variant sentence is reasonable. The 

district court heard counsel’s argument on the appropriate 
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sentence, heard Dillard’s lengthy allocution, and thoroughly 

considered relevant § 3553(a) factors, namely, Dillard’s history 

and characteristics, the nature and circumstances of his offense, 

and the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the 

offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just 

punishment. We find that the sentence was “selected pursuant to 

a reasoned process in accordance with law,” and that the reasons 

relied upon by the district court are plausible and justify the 

sentence imposed. See United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 

473-76 (4th Cir. 2007). 

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s 

judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED