UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 99-4717

MARSHAWN DIMAR STOKES, a/k/a

Shawn,

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 99-4718

AHMAD SIMMION LINTON,

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 01-4174

CORNELL ALVIN WILLIAMS, a/k/a

Corney,

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 01-4275

ANTWAN ASKIA,

Defendant-Appellant. 
Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Benson Everett Legg, Chief District Judge.

(CR-98-258-L)

Argued: February 28, 2003

Decided: April 14, 2003

Before WIDENER and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and

C. Arlen BEAM, Senior Circuit Judge of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,

sitting by designation.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Harvey Greenberg, Towson, Maryland; Arcangelo

Michael Tuminelli, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Robert

Reeves Harding, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jack B. Rubin, Flynn M. Owens,

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant Stokes; Peter D. Ward, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant Askia. Thomas M. DiBiagio, United

States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Appellants Marshawn Stokes ("Stokes"), Ahmad Linton ("Linton"),

Cornell Williams ("Williams"), and Antwan Askia ("Askia") appeal

2 UNITED STATES v. STOKES
a jury verdict finding them guilty of conspiracy to distribute cocaine

and finding Stokes and Linton guilty of conspiracy to commit murder

in aid of racketeering. We affirm. 

I.

Stokes, Askia, Williams, Linton and others worked together in the

sale of crack cocaine in the O’Donnell Heights housing development

of Baltimore. They protected and looked out for each other in order

to prevent robberies and they pooled their money to buy drugs in

quantity. 

Another group of drug dealers, the "Nickel Boys,"1 also sold drugs

in O’Donnell Heights. The Nickel Boys and the appellants fought

over O’Donnell Heights turf because they were vying for the same

customers. On August 15, 1997, Stokes and Linton murdered

Anthony Hamilton ("Hamilton"), a member of the Nickel Boys, after

an argument over sales territory. Askia and Williams were not

involved in the murder. Two days after Hamilton’s death, shots were

fired at members of the Nickel Boys from the same gun that was used

in the killing. 

Each appellant was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (Count III of the indictment).

Stokes and Linton were also charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1959 with

conspiracy to commit murder in aid of racketeering for the murder of

Hamilton (Count I of the indictment) and conspiracy to murder other

members of the Nickel Boys, namely Damon Reaves, Alfred Cheese,

and Antonio Howell (Count II of the indictment). The appellants were

tried together, despite their motions for severance. All were found

guilty of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Stokes and Linton were

found guilty of conspiracy to commit murder in aid of racketeering

for the murder of Hamilton, but were found not guilty of the conspiracy to murder Reaves, Cheese and Howell. Each appellant filed an

appeal, and their appeals were consolidated into this one proceeding.

1So named because of their propensity to sell "nickel" bags, or $5

bags, of crack. 

UNITED STATES v. STOKES 3
II.

Appellants argue five issues: (1) that the district court2 erred in failing to suppress evidence obtained from the execution of warrants

allowing a search of Stokes’s and Linton’s homes and Stokes’s car,

(2) that "periodic arrest" evidence was erroneously admitted at trial,

(3) that the district court erred in denying the motions to sever, (4)

that the district court erred in admitting coconspirator statements of

Stokes and Linton against Askia and Williams, and (5) that the district

court erred in denying Stokes’s and Linton’s motion for acquittal.

A.

Stokes and Linton claim that the affidavits supporting the warrants

used to search Stokes’s homes and car and Linton’s home lacked a

showing of probable cause that evidence of the crimes could be found

in these locations and that, as a result of this shortcoming, the district

court should have suppressed the evidence obtained from these areas.

The district court has a limited role in reviewing an issuing magistrate’s probable cause determination and must only "‘ensure that the

magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause

existed.’" United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 202 (4th Cir. 2002),

quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983). We review the

district court’s determination de novo, United States v. Han, 74 F.3d

537, 540 (4th Cir. 1996), and, upon doing so, we disagree with appellants’ contention. 

The affidavits supporting the requests for the search warrants

showed that Stokes had been identified as the shooter in the killing

of Hamilton and that Linton had been present at the murder scene

with a handgun and fled with Stokes. The affidavits also indicated

that the places to be searched were Stokes’s residences and Linton’s

residence and the automobile that Stokes regularly drove. These facts

established probable cause to believe that evidence of the crime

would be found in the designated homes and vehicle. 

2The Honorable Benson Everett Legg, United States District Judge for

the District of Maryland (Northern Division). 

4 UNITED STATES v. STOKES
We have clearly held that an affidavit seeking a warrant to search

a murder suspect’s home need not contain any particular facts showing that the murder weapon is located in the home. Rather, it is

enough that the judge issuing the warrant can infer that the weapon

is likely to be kept at the residence because weapons are usually kept

either on the person or at the person’s abode. United States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 727, 729 (4th Cir. 1988). While probable cause to arrest

a suspect does not equate with sufficient cause to search a suspect’s

home, United States v. Jones, 994 F.2d 1051, 1055 (3d Cir. 1993),

when a murder suspect has been identified by several witnesses and

left the scene with a murder weapon, that is enough to create probable

cause to search the suspect’s residence and car for the weapon. In any

event, the district court was correct in finding that the good faith

exception to the exclusionary rule would apply. Even a well trained

officer would not have known that there was any defect in these particular warrants. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913, 922-

23 (1984); United States v. Hyppolite, 65 F.3d 1151, 1156 (4th Cir.

1995). 

B.

The appellants argue that the district court erred in admitting "periodic arrest" evidence. We review a trial court’s admission of evidence

for abuse of discretion. United States v. Mohr, 318 F.3d 613, 618 (4th

Cir. 2003). If evidence is admitted improperly, the next test is whether

that evidence was harmless or not; in other words, whether it is probable that the error could have affected the jury verdict in the particular

circumstances of the trial. United States v. Hernandez, 975 F.2d 1035,

1041 (4th Cir. 1992). 

Evidence that is intrinsic to the crime charged is admissible. United

States v. Lipford, 203 F.3d 259, 268 (4th Cir. 2000). Evidence of acts

extrinsic to the crime charged is subject to Federal Rule of Evidence

404(b), or, perhaps, other applicable evidentiary rules depending upon

the purpose for which the proof is offered. The district court found

that the periodic arrest evidence was intrinsic to the crimes of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and conspiracy to commit murder in the aid

of racketeering. Criminal acts are intrinsic when the crimes at issue

are "inextricably intertwined or [the] acts are part of a single criminal

episode or the other acts were necessary preliminaries to the crime

UNITED STATES v. STOKES 5
charged." United States v. Lambert, 995 F.2d 1006, 1007 (10th Cir.

1993) (adopted by United States v. Chin, 83 F.3d 83, 88 (4th Cir.

1996)). The government alleged and was required to prove that the

drug conspiracy was an enterprise under 18 U.S.C. § 1959. To help

establish such an enterprise, the government offered evidence that all

of the appellants were engaged in drug distribution, carried firearms,

and committed crimes of violence during the time they were charged

with conducting this business. Guns and acts of violence are tools of

the drug trafficking trade. United States v. Otis, 107 F.3d 487, 491

(7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Gonzalez, 33 F.3d 56, No. 93-2848,

1994 WL 464425 (7th Cir. Aug. 26, 1994) (unpublished), citing

United States v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1105, 1113 & n.11 (7th Cir. 1990);

United States v. Soler, No. 94 Cr. 533, 1998 WL 167327 (S.D.N.Y.

Apr. 9, 1998). Accordingly, this evidence tended to prove the existence of both a drug conspiracy and a racketeering enterprise. Thus,

it was admissible intrinsic evidence under both counts of conviction.

C.

The appellants also argue that it was error not to sever the defendants’ trials. We review severance decisions for abuse of discretion.

United States v. Ford, 88 F.3d 1350, 1361 (4th Cir. 1996). We have

already held that juries are capable of segregating evidence properly

when there are multiple defendants charged with multiple, unrelated

crimes and conspiracies. United States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 883

(4th Cir. 1994). Here, the jury would have been able to distinguish the

evidence against each defendant for each charge and there was no risk

that Askia and Williams were convicted because of the evidence that

Stokes and Linton committed the Hamilton murder. There was also

ample evidence that Askia and Williams were guilty of conspiring to

distribute cocaine and we have already noted that the use of firearms

and the commission of crimes of violence are part and parcel of illicit

drug commerce. The district court properly instructed the jury on how

to separately consider the evidence against each defendant.3 There

was no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motions to sever. 

3The jury instruction stated, "There are four men here on trial, four

defendants. In an ideal world, they would each be tried separately, in a

trial in which they would be the sole defendant. . . . So consider the evi6 UNITED STATES v. STOKES
D.

Coconspirator statements are not hearsay under Federal Rule of

Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) if they are made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. The district court admitted statements by

Stokes and Linton under this rule, finding they were made during the

course and in furtherance of the conspiracy charged. The statements

involved Stokes’s and Linton’s attempts to conceal conspiratorial acts

and to intimidate and kill potential witnesses. Appellants Williams

and Askia argue that the district court erred in receiving these statements because the declarations were made after the conclusion of the

drug conspiracy when Stokes and Linton were in prison. Thus, they

contend, any "conspiracy" must have been one newly designed for the

purpose of obstructing justice, not distributing drugs. 

We review for clear error the district court’s factual determination

that the statements were made during the course and in furtherance of

the drug conspiracy and we may only overturn the court’s decision to

admit evidence under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) if it constituted an abuse of

discretion. United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1255 (4th Cir.

1992). There is some support for appellants’ "after arrest" contention.

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 490 (1963). However,

application of the limited rule set forth in Wong Sun is not appropriate

in this case because the evidence established that the incarceration of

Stokes and Linton did not end the drug conspiracy or their involvement in it.4

 The Supreme Court recently explained that "conspiracy

dence against each defendant separately and consider the evidence on

each count separately. . . . Each defendant is entitled to separate consideration. . . . Your verdict should be based solely upon the evidence or

lack of evidence as to the defendant you are considering in accordance

with my instructions and without regard to whether the guilt of other

people has or has not been proven." 

4The government also contends that even if the drug conspiracy ended

with the arrest of Stokes and Linton, the admission of coconspirator

statements need not be supported by the conspiracy charged in the indictment. United States v. Shores, 33 F.3d 438, 442, n.3 (4th Cir. 1994). On

its face, Shores is not precisely on point here and in any event, we

believe we need not travel this path today. 

UNITED STATES v. STOKES 7
law does not contain any . . . ’automatic termination’ rule," United

States v. Jimenez Recio, 123 S. Ct. 819, 821 (2003), even when the

object of the criminal agreement has become impossible to achieve.

Acts of witness intimidation and concealment of the conspiracy often

constitute a continuation of the scheme. See Grunewald v. United

States, 353 U.S. 391, 405 (1957). The disputed evidence emanated

from letters written or conversations undertaken at the jail. It appears

that when some of these oral and written statements were formulated,

both Stokes and Linton were present. At the time, Williams, Askia

and several other coconspirators were still on the street. Stokes noted

in one letter that he and Linton were in jail on "one murder" charge

but not "drug charges." He then directed those on the outside to "chill

until the 15th" because the federal authorities "have to have phone

taps or be watching" and "[c]hilling the next couple of days is worth

not spending the next couple of years in jail." 

The district court found that these and other contemporaneous

statements were made in the course and in furtherance of the objectives of the charged drug conspiracy and were admissible under Rule

801(d)(2)(E). We agree. 

E.

Finally, appellants Stokes and Linton argue that the district court

erred in denying their motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge

of conspiring to murder Hamilton because there was no Racketeer

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") enterprise. 18 U.S.C.

§ 1959. The jury’s verdict must be sustained if there is substantial evidence to support it, taking a view most favorable to the government.

United States v. Steed, 674 F.2d 284, 286 (4th Cir. 1982). Employing

this standard, we find no merit to the claim. 

Stokes and Linton were convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1959. Thus,

the government had to prove, 

"(1) that the organization was a RICO enterprise, (2) that the

enterprise was engaged in racketeering activity as defined in

RICO, (3) that the defendant in question had a position in

the enterprise, (4) that the defendant committed the alleged

crime of violence, and (5) that his general purpose in so

8 UNITED STATES v. STOKES
doing was to maintain or increase his position in the enterprise." 

United States v. Fiel, 35 F.3d 997, 1003 (4th Cir. 1994), quoting

United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 381 (2d Cir. 1992).

Stokes and Linton argue that elements one and five were not met

because the drug conspiracy could not be considered a "RICO enterprise" and the government did not show that their general purpose in

carrying out the murder was to maintain or increase their position in

the enterprise. We disagree with their contention. 

A "RICO enterprise" includes "any union or group of individuals

associated in fact although not a legal entity, which is engaged in, or

the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce." 18

U.S.C. § 1959(b)(2). The "hallmark concepts" that identify RICO

enterprises are "continuity, unity, shared purpose and identifiable

structure." Fiel, 35 F.3d at 1003; United States v. Griffin, 660 F.2d

996, 1000 (4th Cir. 1981). A group of drug dealers can be considered

an "enterprise" under RICO if these elements are satisfied. See United

States v. Hoyte, 51 F.3d 1239, 1244-45 (4th Cir. 1995). In the present

case, the appellants engaged in a course of drug dealing over multiple

years and there was no suggestion that the conspiracy would not have

continued had the appellants not been arrested. Thus, there was continuity. The appellants worked together, watched each others’ backs,

protected each other, and engaged in continuing "turf wars" with the

Nickel Boys. The conspiracy was unified. The shared purpose of the

conspiracy was for each member to obtain, sell, and profit from the

sale of drugs. The members of the conspiracy called themselves the

"family" and Stokes was identified as the leader of the group. There

was an identifiable structure. Accordingly, all of the "hallmarks" of

a RICO enterprise were present in appellants’ drug conspiracy. See

Fiel, 35 F.3d at 1003. 

In Hoyte, a group of drug dealers murdered a man who had allegedly stolen drugs from them and the evidence suggested that the drug

dealers wanted to intimidate others into not stealing their narcotics.

51 F.3d at 1245. We upheld the drug dealers’ conviction in Hoyte

under section 1959 because a reasonable jury could have found that

"the murder was committed in furtherance of the defendants’ drug

trafficking." Id. The circumstances of this case are similar to Hoyte.

UNITED STATES v. STOKES 9
A reasonable jury could have found that Hamilton’s murder was committed by Stokes and Linton in furtherance of their drug trafficking

initiative and their relative positions in that undertaking. Thus, there

was substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict. 

III.

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the district

court. 

AFFIRMED

10 UNITED STATES v. STOKES