alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 14.709 Surety bonds; court-appointed fiduciary. ( a ) It is the policy of the Department of Veterans Affairs to require, where possible under State laws and rules of the court, corporate surety bonds in all court-appointed fiduciary cases where the fiduciary is an individual and the estate is sufficient to justify the expense of procuring a corporate surety bond. Corporate bonds may be required of corporate fiduciaries in accordance with State laws. In cases wherein fiduciaries neglect or refuse to furnish corporate bonds, as requested by the Regional Counsel, the Regional Counsel should take appropriate court action and notify the Veterans Service Center Manager.
( b ) When it is not practical or feasible to require a fiduciary to furnish a corporate surety bond, the Regional Counsel is authorized to accept bonds with such number of personal sureties as is permissible under State law, but in no event less than one. To be acceptable for Department of Veterans Affairs purposes, each personal surety must be worth at least the penal sum named in the bond over and above all debts, liabilities and exemptions and qualify in accordance with the requirements of State law. The Regional Counsel will request suitable evidence of financial responsibility whenever there is any question as to the ability of a personal surety to meet any probable liability. When suitable evidence is not furnished as requested, or financial responsibility is found to be insufficient to meet the penal sum of the bond, the Regional Counsel should take appropriate court action and notify the Veterans Service Center Manager.
( c ) It is the policy of the Department of Veterans Affairs to require surety bonds in an amount commensurate with value of the personal estate derived from Department of Veterans Affairs benefits plus the anticipated net income from Department of Veterans Affairs benefits received during the ensuing accounting period. In cases where the fiduciaries neglect or refuse to furnish surety bonds in the amount requested by the Regional Counsel, the Regional Counsel should take appropriate court action and notify the Veterans Service Center Manager. When permissible under State law, the Regional Counsel may accept, without objection, a lesser degree of protection approved by the court when it is determined that such action will adequately protect the beneficiary's estate.
[42 FR 41422, Aug. 17, 1977, as amended at 71 FR 28586, May 17, 2006]
###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 2 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 6 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 7 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 1 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Part 2

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 2 appear at 68 FR 14337, Mar. 25, 2003.

#### § 2.181 Term of original registrations and renewals.

(a)

(1) Subject to the provisions of section 8 of the Act requiring an affidavit or declaration of continued use or excusable nonuse, registrations issued or renewed prior to November 16, 1989, whether on the Principal Register or on the Supplemental Register, remain in force for twenty years from their date of issue or the date of renewal, and may be further renewed for periods of ten years, unless previously cancelled or surrendered.

(2) Subject to the provisions of section 8 of the Act requiring an affidavit or declaration of continued use or excusable nonuse, registrations issued or renewed on or after November 16, 1989, whether on the Principal Register or on the Supplemental Register, remain in force for ten years from their date of issue or the date of renewal, and may be further renewed for periods of ten years, unless previously cancelled or surrendered.

(b) Registrations issued under the Acts of 1905 and 1881 remain in force for their unexpired terms and may be renewed in the same manner as registrations under the Act of 1946.

(c) Registrations issued under the Act of 1920 cannot be renewed unless renewal is required to support foreign registrations and in such case may be renewed on the Supplemental Register in the same manner as registrations under the Act of 1946.

[30 FR 13193, Oct. 16, 1965, as amended at 54 FR 37597, Sept. 11, 1989; 64 FR 48926, Sept. 8, 1999]

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 3 pertaining to both patents and trademarks is placed in the grouping pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 4 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 5 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUL-29-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             AUG-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-30-1999
<CASH>                                           5,359
<SECURITIES>                                        63
<RECEIVABLES>                                    8,257
<ALLOWANCES>                                       389
<INVENTORY>                                     13,358
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                27,516
<PP&E>                                          16,708
<DEPRECIATION>                                  10,334
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  40,080
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            5,850
<BONDS>                                          5,207
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         2,769
<OTHER-SE>                                         791
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    40,080
<SALES>                                         14,784
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                14,784
<CGS>                                           10,695
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   13,953
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  (106)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  96
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    937
<INCOME-TAX>                                       366
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                563
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       563
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .20
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .20


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               MAR-31-2001
<PERIOD-END>                    JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                           9,332
<SECURITIES>                    25,403
<RECEIVABLES>                   19,529
<ALLOWANCES>                     1,581
<INVENTORY>                     14,909
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                71,246
<PP&E>                          40,253
<DEPRECIATION>                  24,072
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  92,625
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           16,822
<BONDS>                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                0
<PREFERRED>                          0
<COMMON>                        23,602
<OTHER-SE>                      52,201
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    92,625
<SALES>                         22,303
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                22,303
<CGS>                           13,389
<TOTAL-COSTS>                   18,099
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                    76
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                  4,695
<INCOME-TAX>                     1,596
<INCOME-CONTINUING>              3,099
<DISCONTINUED>                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                      0
<CHANGES>                            0
<NET-INCOME>                     3,099
<EPS-BASIC>                     0.25
<EPS-DILUTED>                     0.24



</TABLE>
§ 14.803 Policy. ( a ) VA personnel may provide testimony or produce VA records in legal proceedings covered by §§ 14.800 through 14.810 only as authorized in accordance with these regulations. In determining whether to authorize testimony or the production of records, the determining official will consider the effect in this case, as well as in future cases generally, based on the factors set forth in § 14.804, which testifying or producing records not available for public disclosure will have on the ability of the agency or VA personnel to perform their official duties.
( b ) The Department of Veterans Affairs does not seek to deny its employees access to the courts as citizens, or in the employees' private capacities on off-duty time.
( c ) The Department of Veterans Affairs does not seek to deny the Nation's veterans access to the courts.
(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 501 (a) and (b); 5 U.S.C. 301)
#### Frederick B. Wilson, appellant, *v.*Georgiana B. Terry et al., respondents.

[Argued July 11th, 1906.

Decided March 4th, 1907.]

On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery, advised, by Vice-Chancellor Emery, whose opinion is reported in TO *N. J. Fq. (1). Robb.) 231.*

*Mr. Robert II. McCarter,*attorney-general, and *Messrs. Frank Durand*and *Da,vid, Harvey, Jr.,*on the brief, for the appellant.

*Mr. Gilbert Collins*and *Mr. James D. Carton,*on the brief, for the respondents.

Per Curiam.

This is an appeal from a decree advised by Vice-Chancellor Emery dismissing the bill of the appellant, the object of which was to have a deed for certain premises in Asbury Park made by him through an intermediary to his wife (who died prior to the filing of the bill) adjudged to be a mortgage. Our examination of the case leads us to the conclusion that the decree should be affirmed. The opinion of the learned vice-chancellor contains so thorough and accurate an ana}dsis of the testimony, and so *786full a statement of the reasons which led him to his conclusion, and those reasons, with the exception of one hereafter mentioned, are, in our view of the case, so plainly sound, that we would be content to rest our affirmance upon that opinion were it not for the fact that, as we conceive, certain evidence offered by the defendants was erroneously admitted, and that evidence received consideration in the opinion and was one of the reasons upon which the conclusion of the learned vice-chancellor was rested. The evidence referred to consisted of entries contained in the private diary of the deceased wife, which, it was considered by the vice-chancellor, tended to show that the deed-which the appellant sought to have declared to be a mortgage, was, in fact, what it purported to be on its face, viz., an absolute conveyance.' If the bill of complaint had been filed against the wife during her life, clearly these entries would have had no probative force against her husband. They seem to us equally objectionable as tevidence in favor of those who claim in her right. But, excluding these entries from consideration, the other facts discussed in the opinion of the vice-chancellor amply support his conclusion that the appellant failed to make out a case which entitled him to the relief prayed for.

*For*affirmance-—Ti-ie Chiee-Justioe, Garrison, Fort, Hendrickson, Pitney, Swayze, Reed, Trenoi-iard, Bogert, Green, Gray—11.

*For*reversal—Vredenburgh, Vroom—2.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. EDUARDO PENALOZA-CARLON, AKA Eduarto Carlon Penaloza, Defendant - Appellant. No. 13-10150D.C. No. 4:12-cr-00727-JGZBGM-1
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Jennifer G. Zipps, District Judge, Presiding Submitted April 7, 2014 ** Before: McKEOWN and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and ROBART, District Judge. *** 

# FILED
APR 07 2014 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable James L. Robart, District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.Eduardo Penaloza-Carlon appeals from his sentence for illegal reentry, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Because the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history of this case, we repeatonly those facts necessary to resolve the issues raised on appeal. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for resentencing on a closed record. The district court did not err in re jecting an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. The court correctly noted that Penaloza-Carlon’s refusal to plead guilty “doesn’t preclude the Court from c onsidering a reduction,” and the court’s conclusion that Penaloza-Carlon has not accepted responsibility is entitled to deference on appeal. See United States v. Scrivener , 189 F.3d 944, 948 (9th Cir. 1999). However, the district court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b). 1 At the time of sentencing, the district court did not have the benefit of our recent decision in United States v. Caceres-Olla , 738 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2013). Under Caceres-Olla , Penaloza-Carlon’s predicate Oregon conviction for rape in the third degree is not categorically a forcible sex offense, because the relevant Oregon statute, O.R .S. § 163.355, criminalizes sexual conduct

1 As the parties agree, the judgmen t incorrectly indicates that PenalozaCarlon’s sentence was enhanced under 8 U.S .C. § 1326(b)(2), rather than under § 1326(b)(1). 2based entirely on age. See Caceres-Olla , 738 F.3d at 1054–56. Further, PenalozaCarlon’s predicate conviction does not constitute “statutory rape” under the applicable Guideline, because the Oregon statute “does not have an age difference element.” Id. at 1057. And the government has waived any argument that the conviction constitutes sexual abuse of a minor. Id. at1054 n.1. In view of this disposition, we need not reach the remaining issues argued by the parties. Because Penaloza-Carlon has been incarcerated for a longer period of time than the Guidelines would have pr ovided absent the improper enhancement, we respectfully urge the district court to resentence Penaloza-Carlon expeditiously. The mandate shall issue forthwith. AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED

3
#### Emil Goldnick, Respondent, *v.*Niels Toelberg, Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff rendered in the Municipal Court of the city of New York, borough of Manhattan, ' tenth district.

Heath *&*Stewart, for appellant.

De Witt C. Morrell, for respondent.

*Per Curiam.*

We think that there was no waiver by the plaintiff of the completion of the contract within the time limited, nor was the defendant’s failure to complete occasioned by any act or omission of the plaintiff. Indeed, the evidence clearly shows that on the 1st day of September, the date fixed for such completion, the house was not much more than half finished, owing to delays on the part of the defendant in no way attributable to the plaintiff. It is claimed that because of some variation in the specifications agreed upon, the defendant was excused from a strict performance within the contract period. We do not think that this was the case. *806There was no agreement that the time should be extended, and the changes made were not of such a nature as to render further time necessary. It is also obvious that the delay was not caused by the changes in question. The contract provided that certain tiling, mantels and gas fixtures that were to be furnished by the defendant were to be selected by the plaintiff, and it is claimed that because no such selection was made before the 1st day of September, the plaintiff was not in a position to stand upon the time limit. It appears, however, from the postal card received by him from the defendant that the request for such selection, so far as the mantels are concerned, was made on the 1st day of September, the very day upon which the contract was by its terms to be fully performed, and when plaintiff had refused to take the house because it was not then completed. Furthermore, the defendant in his letter of October 8th advised the plaintiff that the house was then finished “ up to the selection of mantels and ’tiles,” thus indicating that such selection was not necessary until the building had advanced far beyond the stage in which it was on September 1st. In the correspondence which passed between the parties, no complaint is made by the defendant of any failure on the part of the plaintiff to make the selections above referred to, nor is the delay in the work in any way attributed by the former to any such cause. Indeed, a perusal of the letter above mentioned clearly shows that he in effect assumed all the responsibility for the delay.

We are satisfied that the failure to complete in time was not caused by any act of the plaintiff; that up to September 1st he had not failed in the performance of the contract on his part; that time was of the essence of the contract, and that there was such a breach on the part of the defendant as to support the recovery which was awarded in the court below. The judgment must, therefore, be affirmed.

Present: Beekman, P. J.; Gildersleeve and Giegerich, JJ.

Judgment affirmed, 'with costs.
#### § 14.502 Requests for legal opinions from Central Office.

Requests for formal legal advice, including interpretation of law or regulations, shall be made only by the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries, the Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and the administration head or top staff office official having jurisdiction over the particular subject matter, or by a subordinate acting for any such official.

[54 FR 34982, Aug. 23, 1989]
#### § 230.3 Response to request.

A party opposing a request for a reconsideration may file a response to the request within 30 days of the date of service of the request. Such response shall be no more than 12 pages and shall meet the requirements set forth in § 220.5(b) of this subchapter.
Exhibit 32.1


                      AXA EQUITABLE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In  connection  with the  Quarterly  Report on Form 10-Q for the  quarter  ended
September 30, 2006 of AXA Equitable  Life Insurance  Company (the  "Company") as
filed with the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on the date  hereof  (the
"Report"), I, Christopher M. Condron,  Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive
Officer of the Company,  certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
             15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

         (2) the  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all
             material respects, the financial condition and results of
             operations of the Company.



                                           /s/ Christopher M. Condron
                                           ----------------------------------
                                           Christopher M. Condron
                                           Chairman of the Board
                                           and Chief Executive Officer



         Date: November 13, 2006
##### 



EXHIBIT 32
 COMM BANCORP, INC.
 CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO  SECTION 1350
  1.
    
    The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2007, of the Company
(the Report) fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable,
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and result of operations of the Company at the dates and for the periods
indicated.
  Date: November 8, 2007
    
    /s/ William F. Farber, Sr.

William F. Farber, Sr.President and Chief Executive Officer
  A signed copy of this written statement required by Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to the Company and will be
retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.
 56




---



##### 



COMM BANCORP, INC.
 CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO  SECTION 1350
  1.
    
    The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2007, of the Company
(the Report) fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable,
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and result of operations of the Company at the dates and for the periods
indicated.
  Date: November 8, 2007
    
    /s/ Scott A. Seasock

Scott A. SeasockExecutive Vice President and Chief Financial
Officer
  A signed copy of this written statement required by Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to the Company and will be
retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.
 57
41446.

#### DEAN v. BELK-GALLANT COMPANY.

Submitted September 9, 1965

Decided September 21, 1965.

*306
      *Kimzey & Kimzey, Herbert B. Kimzey,*for plaintiff in error.

*George B. Ramsay, Jr.,*contra.

Ebbrhardt, Judge.

This case is controlled by *Code*§ 53-510, the cases of *Wright v. Universal Garage Co.,*54 Ga. App. 323 (187 SE 718), *Mather-Groover Co. v. Roberts,*54 Ga. App. 398 (187 SE 913), and other cases of like nature. Nothing in this record indicates that it was the intention of the parties that Mrs. Dean be bound to the exclusion of her husband when the credit card was issued or when the items were sold and charged to the account in her name. There was no express agreement that she was to be liable, and certainly it was not shown that any such intention was communicated to her at either time. The jury was authorized to find against the husband on the basis of the presumed agency of the wife under the facts shown.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Nichols, P. J., and Pannell, J., concur.*