NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ROBERT B. MILGROOM, NADA MARTL,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-5145

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:15-cv-00193-MBH, Judge Marian Blank 

Horn.

______________________ 

Decided: June 10, 2016

______________________ 

ROBERT B. MILGROOM, Miami Beach, FL, pro se.

NADA MARTL, Miami Beach, FL, pro se.

DOUGLAS GLENN EDELSCHICK, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also 

represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E.

KIRSCHMAN, JR., DEBORAH A. BYNUM. 

______________________ 
2 MILGROOM v. US

Before PROST, Chief Judge, PLAGER and LOURIE,

Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Robert B. Milgroom (“Milgroom”) and Nada Martl 

(“Martl”) (collectively, “the Appellants”) appeal from the 

decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims 

(“the Claims Court”) dismissing their complaint for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. See Milgroom v. United 

States, 122 Fed. Cl. 779 (2015). Because the Claims Court 

did not err in dismissing the complaint, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

I 

In 1987, Mary Valvanis, John Valvanis, and George 

Valvanis (collectively, “Valvanis”) filed a lawsuit against 

Milgroom in the Superior Court for the County of Norfolk, 

Massachusetts, alleging that Milgroom “illegally used his 

influence as an attorney and certified public accountant 

for the Valvanis Family business . . . to divert to his own 

benefit monies raised by the mortgaging of and sale of the 

company assets.” Def.-Appellee’s App. (“D.A.”) 173–74, 

222. In October 2005, the state court entered default 

against Milgroom after he failed to appear for a final 

pretrial conference or otherwise participate in the action. 

Id. at 174–75, 223. The state court awarded Valvanis 

close to $4 million in damages in 2007. Id. at 175, 224.

On July 11, 2005, Milgroom filed a bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Hawaii. Id. at 43–44. Prior to filing that petition, 

Milgroom married Martl in 2001 and transferred millions 

of dollars in cash and other assets to Martl, who then filed 

for divorce. Id. at 176–82, 224–27. Martl held the transferred funds in a foreign bank account and supported 

Milgroom financially even after their divorce was finalized on June 28, 2005. Id.
MILGROOM v. US 3

Valvanis did not learn of Milgroom’s bankruptcy filing 

until November 2005. Id. at 68–69, 71. On May 12, 2006, 

the bankruptcy court found Milgroom in contempt of 

court, imposed sanctions against him, granted immediate 

relief to Valvanis from the automatic bankruptcy stay 

nunc pro tunc as of July 11, 2005, and authorized Valvanis to pursue or continue litigation against Milgroom in 

any state or Federal court. Id. at 67–84. The bankruptcy 

court then entered final judgment dismissing the bankruptcy case with prejudice. Id. at 86–87. Milgroom did 

not appeal from the bankruptcy court’s final judgment. 

In March 2006, Valvanis filed a complaint against 

Martl in the United States District Court for the District 

of Hawaii. Valvanis v. Martl, No. 06-00144 (D. Haw. filed 

Mar. 10, 2006) (“Valvanis”); D.A. 94. On May 23, 2006, 

Valvanis filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) adding 

Milgroom as a defendant. D.A. 95. Valvanis alleged that 

Milgroom and Martl sought to evade Milgroom’s creditors 

by using Milgroom’s money to purchase real property 

located at 253 Pu’uikena Drive, Honolulu, Hawaii (“the 

Hawaii property”) for $5.2 million in cash, transferring 

that property and other assets to Martl for no consideration, and then filing for divorce and releasing Milgroom’s 

interest in the Hawaii property. Valvanis thus asserted 

an equitable interest in the Hawaii property.

In December 2007, the clerk of the district court entered default against Martl for her failure to answer or 

otherwise plead to the FAC. Id. at 185, 230. Valvanis 

then filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”) against 

Milgroom. In December 2008, the district court entered 

default against Milgroom on the SAC for his willful violations of numerous court orders and rules. Id. at 186, 232. 

In June 2009, the district court granted Valvanis’ motions for entry of default judgment against Milgroom and 

against Martl. Id. at 171–258. The court then entered 

final judgment. Id. at 260–63. The court awarded dam-
4 MILGROOM v. US

ages to Valvanis to the extent that they had not been fully 

recovered in the Massachusetts action, as well as punitive 

damages against Milgroom. The court imposed a constructive trust on the Hawaii property and all assets in 

that property for the benefit of Valvanis, and directed a 

court-appointed receiver to oversee the sale of that property to satisfy the judgment. Later in 2009, the receiver 

sold the Hawaii property at an auction to a third-party 

private entity and provided the net proceeds to Valvanis. 

Id. at 264–67. Neither Milgroom nor Martl appealed from 

the district court’s final judgment. 

II

On March 2, 2015, Milgroom and Martl jointly filed a 

complaint against the United States in the Claims Court, 

which gave rise to the present appeal. In their complaint, 

they alleged that the district court violated the Fourth, 

Fifth, and Tenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution by entering a civil judgment against them in 

Valvanis, which resulted in the sale of the Hawaii property, notwithstanding the automatic bankruptcy stay. Id.

at 32–42. They requested money damages for the alleged 

taking of their real and personal properties without just 

compensation. Id. The government moved to dismiss for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Claims Court 

granted the motion and dismissed the suit for lack of 

jurisdiction. Milgroom, 122 Fed. Cl. at 803. 

First, the Claims Court found that Martl had previously filed two complaints against the United States in 

the Claims Court alleging the same claims based on the 

alleged taking of the Hawaii property by the district 

court, and that the Claims Court had dismissed those

complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 

790–91. The court concluded in this case that Martl was 

barred by claim preclusion and issue preclusion from 

bringing her claims for a third time. Id. at 792–96. 

Because Milgroom was not a party in the two prior law-
MILGROOM v. US 5

suits filed by Martl, the court concluded that his claims 

were not barred by preclusion. Id. at 796. 

But the Claims Court analyzed Milgroom’s and 

Martl’s claims collectively and concluded that it lacked 

jurisdiction over all of the claims regardless of claim or 

issue preclusion. Id. Specifically, the court dismissed the 

constitutional claims based on the Fourth Amendment, 

the due process component of the Fifth Amendment, and 

the Tenth Amendment, because it is well-established that 

those provisions are not money-mandating. Id. at 800–01. 

The court also concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to 

review the alleged taking by the district court because

review of such a judicial takings claim would require the 

Claims Court to scrutinize the merits of district court and 

bankruptcy court decisions, a task it is without authority 

to undertake. Id. at 801–02. 

Finally, the Claims Court found the complaint to be

“frivolous” and barred further filings based on the same 

subject matter absent approval by the court. Id. at 803.

The Appellants timely appealed to this court. We 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

We review the Claims Court’s decision to dismiss for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Waltner v. 

United States, 679 F.3d 1329, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012). A 

plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a 

preponderance of the evidence, Taylor v. United States, 

303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002), and “the leniency 

afforded pro se litigants with respect to mere formalities 

does not relieve them of jurisdictional requirements,” 

Demes v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 365, 368 (2002) (citing 

Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 

(Fed. Cir. 1987)). 

The Appellants argue that the district court effected

an unconstitutional taking of the Hawaii property and its 
6 MILGROOM v. US

contents by supervising the sale of that property “to an 

entity that wanted to convert the Property into a small 

vacation resort . . . , which would benefit that part of 

Hawaii by creating jobs and improving the economy.” 

Pls.-Appellants’ Br. 1, 3, 6, 10, 12, 16, 17–18, 22, 23, 31, 

32. They challenge the validity of the district court’s 

judgment, arguing that Valvanis failed to state a valid 

claim, that Valvanis filed their complaint and amended 

complaints in violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay, 

that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Valvanis’ 

claims, and that the district court improperly ordered the 

sale of the Hawaii property owned by Martl to satisfy 

Milgroom’s debt. They also question the validity of the 

Massachusetts state court’s judgment. But they contend

that they did not request the Claims Court to review a 

district court or bankruptcy court judgment. They allege 

violations of due process and other constitutional provisions. Finally, Martl also argues that her claims in this 

case were not barred by claim or issue preclusion. 

The government responds that the Claims Court correctly determined that it did not possess jurisdiction to 

entertain the claims asserted by the Appellants for alleged violations of constitutional provisions that are not 

money-mandating and for review of district court and 

bankruptcy court judgments. The government also responds that the Appellants’ argument is based on a faulty 

premise that the automatic bankruptcy stay somehow 

deprived the district court of jurisdiction to enter a judgment in 2009, when the dockets of those cases demonstrate that no action was filed against Milgroom until 

after the bankruptcy court lifted the stay. 

We agree with the government that the Claims Court 

lacked jurisdiction. The Claims Court is a court of limited 

jurisdiction. Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 

(Fed. Cir. 1997). Congress created the Claims Court “to 

permit a special and limited class of cases to proceed 

against the United States,” and the Claims Court “can 
MILGROOM v. US 7

take cognizance only of those [claims] which by the terms 

of some act of Congress are committed to it.” Hercules 

Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 423 (1996) (alteration 

in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, limits the jurisdiction of the Claims Court to claims for money damages 

against the United States based on sources of substantive 

law that “can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government.” United States v. 

Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 290 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the Claims Court correctly

determined that none of the Appellants’ claims were tied 

to money-mandating statutes or provisions of law or any 

contract with the United States, thus depriving the 

Claims Court of jurisdiction over their claims.

Specifically, the Claims Court correctly dismissed the 

Appellants’ constitutional claims based on the Fourth 

Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 

Amendment, and the Tenth Amendment. Such claims are 

not tied to money-mandating sources of law, and the 

Claims Court does not possess jurisdiction to entertain 

them. Brown, 105 U.S. at 623–24 (Fourth Amendment); 

Crocker v. United States, 125 F.3d 1475, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 

1997) (Fifth Amendment due process); Carpenter v. United States, 603 F. App’x 935, 937 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Tenth 

Amendment); Fry v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 500, 508 

(2006) (“Nothing in the language of [the Tenth Amendment] ‘can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government . . . .’” (quoting United 

States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983))); see also 

Milgroom, 122 Fed. Cl. at 800–01 (collecting cases).

Likewise, the Claims Court correctly dismissed the 

remaining judicial takings claims. While the Claims 

Court does possess jurisdiction to consider certain takings 

claims under the Fifth Amendment, it may only exercise 

that jurisdiction when the claimant “concede[s] the validity of the government action which is the basis of the 
8 MILGROOM v. US

taking claim to bring suit under the Tucker Act.” Tabb 

Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 802–03 (Fed. 

Cir. 1993). Here, the Appellants challenge the validity of 

the district court’s judgment, which forms the basis of 

their takings claim. 

Moreover, as we have explained, the Claims Court 

does not possess jurisdiction to review the judgments of 

district courts and bankruptcy courts. Shinnecock Indian 

Nation v. United States, 782 F.3d 1345, 1352–53 (Fed. 

Cir. 2015) (district court); Allustiarte v. United States, 256 

F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (bankruptcy court); see 

also Milgroom, 122 Fed. Cl. at 801–02 (collecting cases). 

The Appellants attempt to couch their allegations in 

terms of a Fifth Amendment taking by the district court, 

but the Claims Court could not review those allegations 

without second-guessing the merits of the district court 

and bankruptcy court decisions. Thus, the true nature of 

the Appellants’ claims is a collateral attack on the final 

judgments of the district court and bankruptcy court. The 

Claims Court does not possess jurisdiction to entertain 

them. Pines Residential Treatment Ctr., Inc. v. United 

States, 444 F.3d 1379, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Regardless 

of a party’s characterization of its claim, we look to the 

true nature of the action in determining the existence or 

not of jurisdiction.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

We have considered the Appellants’ remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, the Claims Court did not err in concluding that it

lacked jurisdiction over all of the Appellants’ claims. In 

light of our resolution of this appeal on jurisdictional 

grounds, we need not address the preclusion grounds of 

the Claims Court’s decision.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Claims 

Court is affirmed. 
MILGROOM v. US 9

AFFIRMED