****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subjectto modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut LawJournal andbound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************MICHAEL MISENTI v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION (AC 37091)
DiPentima, C. J., and Gruendel and Keller, Js.* Argued January 4—officially released May 17, 2016 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Tolland, Bright, J.)
Jeanne M. Zulick, assigned counsel, for the appel-lant (petitioner). Timothy F. Costello, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state’s attorney, and David M. Carlucci, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).Opinion DiPENTIMA, C. J. The petitioner, Michael Misenti, appeals from thejudgment ofthe habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitionerclaimsthatthe court (1) abusedits discretion in denying certification to appeal from the determination that Richard Grabow, the petitioner’s trial counsel, hadnotrenderedineffective assistance, and (2) improperly denied the motion to withdraw from the case filed by the petitioner’s habeas counsel, David B. Rozwaski, at the start ofthe habeas trial. We dismiss the petitioner’s appeal.
The court set forth the following factual findings and procedural history in its memorandum of decision. In November, 2013, while operatinghis computer, thepetitioner visited an adult only website ‘‘through which he sought customers for gay pornographic videos.’’ Throughthatwebsite, hemetandbegancommunicating with the victim, whom the petitioner believed to be an adult but was, in fact, a fourteen year old male. The petitioner made arrangements to meet the victim in person for the purpose of selling him pornographic videos.
The petitioner went to the victim’s home and provided him with abag containingvideos and a ‘‘sex toy.’’ The victim later told the police that the petitioner had kissed him, had touched his buttocks and had placed his mouth on the victim’s penis. Prior to his arrest or being in custody, the petitioner admitted to the police that he had kissed the victim. At the habeas trial, however, the petitioner denied that any physical contact had occurred.
Thepetitionerwas arrestedandchargedwithattempt to commit sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-71, sexual assault in the fourth degree inviolation ofGeneral Statutes § 53a-73a, use of a computer to entice a minor in violation of General Statutes § 53a-90a, and risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53- 21. The petitioner retained Grabow to represent him.
Grabow filed a broad discovery request and had
numerous discussions with prosecutors regarding a plea agreement. Grabow also met with the petitioner several times and explained the offers from the state. He also explained the elements of the charges to the petitioner, as well as the evidence that the state intended to introduce at trial. Although the petitioner maintainedthathe hadnotviolated anycriminal statute because he had believed that the victim was at least sixteen or seventeen years old, Grabow explained that
a mistake about the victim’s age was not a defense to the charges of risk of injury and sexual assault in the fourth degree.1
On September 8, 2004, the petitioner and Grabowappeared forjury selection. At the outset, the criminal trial court told the petitioner that he had to decide if he was going to accept the state’s offer or proceed to trial. The court further explained that once the jury selection process began, ‘‘all bets are off on whatever pleabargaining has occurred before today.’’ After some brief discussion, it notified the parties that jury selection would start after a thirty minute recess. After the recess, the court noted that parties had reached an agreement. As noted by the habeas court, ‘‘[t]he petitioner agreed to accept the [state’s] offer so longashe coulddo sothroughapleaofnolo contendere andundertheAlford doctrine.’’2 The state filed asubstitute information charging the petitioner with risk of injuryto achild inviolation of§ 53-21 (a) (2) and sexual assaultinthefourthdegreeinviolationof§ 53a-73a. The parties agreedthatthepetitionerwouldbe sentencedto ten years incarceration, execution suspended after six months, tenyearsprobation, no contactwiththevictim, and sex offender registration and treatment.
The court then made the following statement to the petitioner: ‘‘Mr. Misenti, you’ve entered a nolo plea. Thatmeansyou’renotagreeingtoanyofthefactsstated by the state’s attorneyjust now, all right? It also gives you a certain amount of protection if there’s any civil suits. But you know that, under those facts, I will be making a finding ofguilty underthe charges as well the facts, throughyou’re notadmitting—oreven denying, at this time—to the point that youjust don’t want to take the chance of going to trial and taking the chance that
ajurymightfeelotherwise andthe statemightbe ableto get aconviction; isthattrue?’’ The petitionerresponded that he was not guilty of these charges and that ‘‘[t]his thing is taking a tremendous physical and emotional toll on me, and I feel I cannot proceed with a trial.’’ He furtherexplainedthathe was notmentallyorphysically capable of proceeding. The court then explained the differences between a nolo contendere plea and a plea made pursuant to the Alford doctrine.
The petitionermaintainedthat he did notbelieve that he was guilty of the charges and that the only reason that he could notproceed was the emotional andphysical toll on him. The court replied that it would not accept anAlfordplea. Grabow indicatedthattheAlford plea would be withdrawn. The court stated: ‘‘The nolo does not require that requirement; so it’s a nolo plea, forthereasonsstatedby [thepetitioner]. Allright. Okay. So solely nolo. All right. Have you had enough time to thinkaboutthis?’’Thepetitionerresponded: ‘‘Notreally. I would have liked more time, but my attorney told me thatIhadtomakeadecisionnow.’’The courtresponded that it could not accept the nolo contendere plea ifthe petitioner felt he did not have enough time to think about it. The court agreed to Grabow’s suggestion of a brief recess. During this second recess, the petitionerwent to his car and ingested Klonopin, his prescribed antianxiety medicine. Grabow knew that the petitioner
was receiving treatment for mental health issues but the petitioner did not inform him that he took Klonopin during the recess. Aftertheproceedingresumed, Grabowindicatedthat
a written plea of nolo contendere had been filed. The state then offered the following recitation offacts. The victim and the petitioner had been in contact via an online instant messaging system and then spoke on the telephone. Thepetitionerarrangedaninpersonmeeting at the victim’s home. ‘‘While in the house

. . . [the petitioner] and [victim] allegedly kissed, and the [petitioner] allegedly touched the [victim’s] buttocks; he pulled away. He then was, allegedly, Your Honor, according to the statement, allegedly put his mouth on the [victim’s] penis. He then was told to leave, Your Honor, by the [victim]. He did comply with that and left

. . . .’’
The petitioner informed the court that he did not agree with the facts as stated by the prosecutor. The court responded: ‘‘That’s the nolo plea. You’re not admitting to those facts

. . . .’’ The petitioner interruptedthe courtandstatedthatthe chargeswere ‘‘absolutely false.’’ The court, after pointing out that a nolo plea afforded certain protections in a possible civil action, iterated that ‘‘[t]hat’s what the nolo plea is. You’re not admitting anything

. . . .’’ The court then conductedapleacanvasswherethepetitioneracknowledged, inter alia, that he had enough time to consider the plea, that he had spoken with his attorney, that Grabow had explained the charges against him and the potential penalties that he faced. The petitioner stated that he understood everything that the court had said and that no one had forced him to make the decision to enter the nolo plea. The court accepted the plea as made voluntarily, intelligently and with the effective assistance of counsel.
In the following weeks, the petitioner changed his mind and told Grabow that he wanted to withdraw the plea. On October 13, 2004, Grabow wrote to the petitioner to inform him that he would not file the motion to withdraw until he spoke to the petitioner on October 19, 2004. Thepetitionerultimatelydecidedthat he did not want the plea vacated, so Grabow did not file the motion.
The sentencinghearing occurredonJanuary20, 2005. At the outset, the prosecutor recommended a ten year period ofincarceration, execution fully suspended. The prosecutor stated that on September 8, 2004, he had recommended that the petitioner serve six months, but
as a result of further conversation with the victim, he
was now recommending a fully suspended sentence. The court and the prosecutor also addressed the fact that the victim had returned to the website and againmisrepresented his age and had made a reference that he had ‘‘chickened out’’ in his meeting with the petitioner. The court agreed to impose the sentence as recommended by the prosecutor.
In an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, thepetitionerallegedthatGrabowhasrenderedineffective assistance of counsel in a variety of ways,3 and soughtto have his convictionvacated andhispleawithdrawn. On February 25, 2014, Attorney Rozwaski filed
amotionto withdrawhis appearance as habeas counsel pursuant to Practice Book § 3-10 (b).
The court held a trial on February 26, 2014, and, at the outset, addressed Rozwaski’s motion. After hearing from the petitioner and Rozwaski, the court denied the motion to withdraw and declined to appoint new counsel for the petitioner. After further discussion, the petitionerelectedtoproceedwithRozwaskiashisattorney. During the habeas trial, Rozwaski called Grabow and the petitioner as witnesses.
On July 2, 2014, the court issued a memorandum of decision denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Relevant to this appeal, the court determined that the claim that Grabow had failed to investigate and discover that the victim was ‘‘still entering websites by misrepresenting his age even after the petitioner was arrested’’ was without merit. Specifically, the court credited Grabow’stestimonythathe knew onthe morning of September 8, 2004, prior to the petitioner’s plea, that the victim continued to engage in such conduct. The court further observed that Grabow’s knowledge ofthis conduct helped him to secure the plea offer that the petitioner accepted. In regards to the claim that Grabowhadfailedto explainthe elements ofthe crimes to which the petitioner pleaded guilty, or the factual bases for those charges, the court credited Grabow’s testimony to the contrary. The court also rejected the claimthatGrabowimproperlyhadfailedtofileamotion to withdraw the guilty plea, noting that although the petitioner had asked Grabow to file such a motion, therewas evidence thatthepetitionerchangedhismind prior to sentencing and did not want such motion filed. With respect to the petitioner’s claim that his plea had been made while under the effects of Klonopin, the court noted that there was no evidence that the petitioner had taken this medication, nor was there evidence regarding how quickly it took effect, and what effect it had. ‘‘Given the short nature of the recess, approximately twelve minutes, the court cannot just
assume that the petitioner was under its effects at the time he entered his plea.’’ Finally, the court concluded that the petitioner had failed to sustain his burden of establishing that he would have insisted on going to trial.
On July 10, 2014, the petitioner filed his petition for certification to appeal the denial of his petition for awrit ofhabeas corpus. He setforthfive specific grounds
as the bases for his appeal.4 The court denied the petition for certification on July 16, 2014. This appeal followed.
I
The petitioner first claims that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying certification to appeal from the determination that Grabow had not rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the petitioner argues that Grabow was ineffective by failing to (1) investigate the victim’s credibility and (2) move for
acontinuance before the pleacanvass and laterto withdraw the petitioner’s plea because it was not made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying certification to appeal the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
We begin by setting forth our standard of review following the denial of certification to appeal from the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. ‘‘In Simms v. Warden, 229 Conn. 178, 187, 640 A.2d 601 (1994), [our Supreme Court] concluded that

. . . [General Statutes] § 52-470 (b) prevents a reviewing court from hearing the merits of a habeas appeal following the denial ofcertificationto appealunlessthepetitioner establishes that the denial of certification constituted
an abuse of discretion by the habeas court.

. . . This standard requiresthe petitionerto demonstrate thatthe issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner];
orthatthequestionsareadequateto deserveencouragement to proceed further.

. . . A petitioner who establishes an abuse ofdiscretion through one ofthe factors listed above must then demonstrate that the judgment of the habeas court should be reversed on its merits.

. . . In determining whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request for certification, wenecessarilymustconsiderthemerits of thepetitioner’s underlying claimsto determine whether the habeas court reasonably determined that the petitioner’s appeal was frivolous.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Turner v. Commissioner of Correction, 163 Conn. App. 556, 562–63, A.3d (2016); see alsoFinev. CommissionerofCorrection, 163 Conn. App. 77, 80–81, A.3d , cert. denied, 320 Conn. 925, A.3d (2016).
‘‘A criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to adequate and effective assistance ofcounsel at all critical stages of criminal proceedings.

. . . This right arises under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution.

. . . As enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)], this court has stated: It is axiomatic that the right to counsel is the right to theeffective assistance of counsel.

. . . A claim ofineffective assistance of counsel consists oftwo components:
a performance prong and a prejudice prong. To satisfy the performance prong

. . . the petitioner must demonstrate that his attorney’s representation was not reasonably competent or within the range of competence displayed by lawyers with ordinary training and skill inthe criminallaw.’’ (Internalquotationmarksomitted.) Ebron v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 307 Conn. 342, 351, 53 A.3d 983 (2012), cert. denied sub nom. Arnone

v. Ebron, U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 1726, 185 L. Ed. 2d 802 (2013); see also Thiersaint v. Commissioner of Correction, 316 Conn. 89, 100–101, 111 A.3d 829 (2015). ‘‘Under

. . . Hill [v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985)]

. . . which

. . . modified the prejudice prong of the Strickland test for claims of ineffective assistance when the conviction resulted from a guilty plea, the evidence must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the petitioner] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Patterson v. Commissioner of Correction, 150 Conn. App. 30, 35, 89 A.3d 1018 (2014); see also Carraway v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 317 Conn. 594, 600 n.6, 119 A.3d 1153 (2015). Finally, we note that ‘‘[t]he conclusions reached by the trial court in its decision to dismiss [a] habeas petition are matters of law, subject to plenary review.

. . . [When] the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, [the reviewing court] must determine whether they are legally and logically correct

. . . and whether theyfind supportinthe facts that appearinthe record.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grant v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 121 Conn. App. 295, 298, 995 A.2d 641, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 920, 996 A.2d 1192 (2010).
We now address the specifics of the petitioner’s appeal.5 First, the petitioner claims that Grabow was ineffective by failing to investigate the victim’s credibility and his continued misrepresentation of his age in order to access the website, especially given the comments ofthe prosecutor duringthe sentencingproceeding. Specifically, the petitioner contends that he was not aware ofthis information regarding the victim and, if he had been, he would have proceeded to trial. We
are not persuaded.
The habeas court made two credibility determinations relevant to this claim. First the court concluded that Grabow ‘‘testified credibly that he knew on the morning of September 8, 2004, before the petitioner entered his plea, that the victim was still engaging in such activity.’’ The court further concluded that the petitioner’s contention that he was unaware ofthe victim’s ongoing activities until two years later was not credible. ‘‘In fact, the transcript of the petitioner’s sentencing makes it clear that everyone present, includingthe petitioner, knew that the victim was still visiting such websites.’’ ‘‘[T]his court does not retry the case or evaluate the credibility ofthe witnesses.

. . . Rather, we must defer to the [trier of fact’s] assessment of the credibility of thewitnessesbased onitsfirsthand observation oftheir conduct, demeanor and attitude.

. . . The habeas judge, as the trier of facts, is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mincewicz v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 162 Conn. App. 109, 112, 129 A.3d 791 (2015); see Brown v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 161 Conn. App. 770, 773, 129 A.3d 172 (2015), cert. denied, 320 Conn. 916, 131 A.3d 751 (2016); see also Couture v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 160 Conn. App. 757, 770, 126 A.3d 585 (axiomatic that appellate court cannot pass on credibility of witnesses), cert. denied, 320 Conn. 911, 128 A.3d 954 (2015). We refrain from invading the province of the habeas court to determine the credibility of Grabow andthepetitioner, andemployourcustomarydeference
as areviewing court. Accordingly, we conclude thatthe petitioner’sclaimofineffectiveassistanceforthefailure to investigatethe credibilityofthevictimfails and, thus, that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying certification to appeal this issue. Second, the petitioner claims that Grabow was ineffective for failing to move for a continuance before the plea canvass and subsequently for failing to move to withdraw his plea. Specifically, the petitioner contends that he did not understand the plea due to his ingestion ofKlonopin and Grabow’s failure to explainthe charges adequately. With respect to the latter, the court determined that Grabow testified credibly that he had fully explained the elements ofthe crimes ofwhich the petitioner pleaded, as well as the factual bases for the charges. Later, the court noted that ‘‘[t]here is no question that [the petitioner] understood the proceedings and what he was doing.’’ Deferring to the habeas court
on matters of credibility, we conclude that this argument must fail.
With respect to the petitioner’s claim that he did not make a knowing, intelligent and voluntary plea as a result of his ingestion of Klonopin during a recess in the proceedings, the court rejected it for several reasons. First, there was no evidence that Grabow knew that the petitioner had taken Klonopin during the
recess. Second, thepetitionerfailedtopresentevidence duringthehabeastrialregarding ‘‘howquicklyKlonopin becomes effective and what effects it has. Given the short nature of the recess, approximately twelve minutes, the court cannot just assume that the petitioner was under its effects at the time he entered his plea.’’ Third, the court concluded that the record and the evidence presented during the habeas trial estab-lished that the petitioner was not impaired at the time ofthe plea. Specifically, it found that the petitionerwas lucid and appeared to understand the court’s questions during the canvass. We agree with the habeas court that the petitioner’s claim fails as aresult ofthe absence ofevidence regardingthe time ittakes for Klonopinto affect an individual. It is not enough for the petitioner to allege that his plea
was not intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily made due to his use ofKlonopin. He was requiredto establish that he actuallywas impairedby his use ofthat medication. See Hunnicutt v. Commissioner of Correction, 83 Conn. App. 199, 207, 848 A.2d 1229, cert. denied, 270 Conn. 914, 853 A.2d 527 (2004). As a result of this evidentiary gap, we cannot conclude that Grabow was ineffective for not requesting a continuance or moving to withdraw the plea.
None ofthe claims regarding Grabow’s performance is debatable amongjurists ofreason, could be resolved in a different manner or deserve encouragement to proceed further. In other words, the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying certification to appeal from the denial of the petitioner’s claim that Grabow provided ineffective assistance of counsel.
II
The petitioner also claims that the court improperly denied Rozwaski’s motionto withdraw as habeas counsel. Specifically, he argues that the court abused its discretionbecausetherewasatotallackofcommunication between himselfand Rozwaski thatprevented adequate representation. The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, counters that this claim is not properly before this court because it was not within the list of grounds for appeal attached to the petition for certification to appeal. We agree with the respondent.
As we noted previously, the petitioner set forth five bases for grounds of his appeal from the decision of the habeas court, all ofwhich pertained to the conduct ofGrabow, notRozwaski. Seefootnote4 ofthis opinion. Simplyput, the claim regarding the denial ofthe motion to withdraw filed by Rozwaski was not part of the petitionfor certificationto appeal. ‘‘We have statedthat when a petitioner does not raise a specific claim in the petition for certification to appeal, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification with respect to that claim.’’ Fine

v. Commissioner ofCorrection, supra, 163 Conn. App. 82. Reviewofthis claimwouldamountto anambuscade ofthehabeasjudge. Tutsonv. CommissionerofCorrection, 144 Conn. App. 203, 216–17, 72 A.3d 1162, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 928, 78 A.3d 145 (2013); Perry v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 131 Conn. App. 792, 796, 28 A.3d 1015, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 913, 32 A.3d 966(2011). Accordingly, we decline to consider it. Fine

v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 82; Tutson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 216–17; Perry v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 797.
The appeal is dismissed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.
1 Grabow did opine that the victim’s misrepresentation of his age could help the petitioner’s case with respect to the charge of sexual assault in the second degree.

2 ‘‘Under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), a criminal defendant is not required to admit his guilt

. . . but consents to being punished as if he were guilty to avoid the risk of proceeding to trial.

. . . A guilty plea under the Alford doctrine is ajudicial oxymoron in that the defendant does not admit guilt but acknowledges that the state’s evidence against him is so strong that he is prepared to accept the entry of a guilty plea nevertheless.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Celaj, 163 Conn. App. 716, 718–19 n.3, A.3d (2016).

3 Specifically, the petition alleged that Grabow was ineffective as follows: ‘‘[Grabow]

. . . did not investigate the alleged victim’s statements as to whether or not false information had been provided regarding the victim’s activities

. . . [Grabow] did not seek to suppress the petitioner’s statements to the police when the petitioner maintained that he had been questioned without being advised of his rights

. . . [t]hat at the time ofthe petitioner’s plea, the petitioner informed the court that he was not willing to proceed andthatduetomentalhealthproblems, emotional, physicalandotherissues, he did not want to go forward with the scheduled trial that day nor with the proposedplea agreement, and that [Grabow] did not seek a continuance for the petitioner

. . . [Grabow] did not properly explain the factual basis and the nature of and legal elements of the charges to the petitioner

. . . [Grabow] did not seek to withdraw the petitioner’s guilty pleas when the petitioner stated to the court that he was insisting upon his innocence and the court had improperly canvassed and accepted the petitioner’s pleas, despite the petitioner’s insistence upon his innocence

. . . [Grabow] did not seek to determine if the medication that the petitioner was [taking] on the date ofhis pleas impacted the petitioner’s ability to knowingly, voluntarily and with understanding enter into his guilty pleas and

. . . [t]hat the petitioner did not want to plead guilty and wanted to proceed to trial with his case, but that [Grabow] did not seek to withdraw the petitioner’s guilty pleas, nor to vacate the court’s findings after the pleas were improperly accepted by the court.’’

4 Specifically, the petitioner’s grounds for certification to appeal stated: ‘‘Counsel for the petitioner

. . . hereby submits the following grounds upon which he proposes to seek certification to appeal. ‘‘1. Whether or not the habeas court erred in finding that trial counsel

was not deficientinhis failure to conductasufficientinvestigationregarding the victim’s statements to the police regarding his activities; ‘‘2. Whether or not the habeas court erred in finding that trial counsel failed to seek a continuance when the petitioner informed him that he was not prepared to go forward with either a plea nor the trial; ‘‘3. Whether or not the habeas court erred in finding that trial counsel

was not ineffective in explaining the factual and legal basis ofthe charges to thepetitionersothatthepetitionercouldmakeaknowingandvoluntaryplea; ‘‘4. Whether or not the habeas court erred in finding that trial counsel had failed to move to withdraw the petitioner’s guilty pleas; ‘‘5. Whether or not the habeas court erred in finding that trial counsel’s deficient performance was not prejudicial to the petitioner—particularly when the petitioner insisted that he wanted to have a trial; ‘‘6. Whether or not the habeas court erred in denying the certification to appeal; and ‘‘7. Such other errors as may become evident after a review of the transcripts and the trial record.’’

5 With respect to the petitioner’s claim regarding Grabow, the habeas court concluded that the petitioner had failed to establish both the deficient performance and the prejudice prongs of the Strickland / Hill test.