DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellant,

v.

TIFFANY SNUFFER,

Appellee.

No. 4D16-3003

[August 9, 2017]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Bernard I. Bober, Judge; L.T. Case No. 09-18644 CF10B.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Luke R. 

Napodano, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Mara C. Herbert, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

GERBER, C.J.

The state appeals from the circuit court’s order granting the defendant’s 

motion to dismiss her probation violations. The court found that it lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant’s probation violations

because, pursuant to Mobley v. State, 197 So. 3d 572 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016),

review denied, SC16-936, 2016 WL 3149708 (Fla. June 6, 2016), the 

defendant was not arrested on the probation violations until after her

probationary period expired, and the probationary period was not tolled 

due to the non-criminal nature of the probation violations.

The state argues that because the defendant’s alleged non-criminal 

probation violations included absconding from supervision, her

probationary period was tolled pursuant to Williams v. State, 202 So. 3d 

917 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), which we issued after the circuit court’s decision.

The defendant properly concedes that Williams controls. We agree and 

reverse, as explained in the following procedural history and analysis.
2

Procedural History

The defendant was sentenced to a probationary period for various 

crimes. During the defendant’s probationary period, the defendant’s 

probation officer filed an affidavit alleging the defendant violated her 

probation by:

1. failing to make a full and truthful report to her probation officer 

in that she failed to report as directed for four consecutive months; 

2. failing to comply with all instructions given by her probation 

officer in that she failed to report as instructed for a probation 

appointment;

3. changing her residence without first obtaining her probation 

officer’s permission and “her current whereabouts [are] unknown”;

4. failing to make a full and truthful report to the probation officer 

in that she falsely reported her home address;

5. having contact with a person whom she was prohibited from 

contacting;

6. failing to make restitution payments;

7. failing to pay supervision costs; 

8. failing to undergo a drug and alcohol abuse evaluation; and

9. failing to complete drug and alcohol abuse treatment.

Based upon these allegations, and before the defendant’s probationary 

period expired, the circuit court issued a warrant for the defendant’s 

arrest.

After the defendant’s probationary period expired, the defendant was 

arrested on the probation violation warrant in South Carolina.

Following the defendant’s arrest, she filed a motion to dismiss the 

probation violations. She argued that the circuit court lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction over her probation violations because, pursuant to 

Mobley, she was not arrested on the probation violations until after her 

probationary period expired, and the probationary period was not tolled 

due to the non-criminal nature of the probation violations.
3

At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the state argued, among other 

things, that Mobley was inapplicable because the probation violation 

affidavit alleged the defendant had absconded during her probationary 

period, thus tolling the probationary period.

The circuit court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court 

found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant’s 

probation violations pursuant to Mobley. The court dismissed the 

defendant’s probation violations and terminated her probation.

This appeal followed. The state argues that because the defendant’s 

alleged non-criminal probation violations included absconding from 

supervision, her probationary period was tolled pursuant to Williams, 

which we issued after the circuit court’s decision.

Our Analysis

We agree with the state’s argument. We rely upon our reasoning in 

Williams:

We follow our supreme court and our sister courts to hold 

that when a probationer absconds from supervision, the 

probationary period is tolled until the probationer is once 

more placed under probationary supervision.

The fact that the defendant here allegedly absconded from 

supervision distinguishes this case from Mobley. If the 

defendant in Mobley had been alleged to have absconded from 

supervision, then Mobley’s reasoning would have been moot, 

as we would have concluded there, as we do here, that the 

probationary period was tolled until the defendant was once 

more placed under probationary supervision.

Put another way, absconding from supervision is an 

independent basis for tolling a defendant's probation term, 

regardless of whether Mobley’s reasoning against tolling would 

have otherwise applied. Put yet another way, Mobley does not 

overrule the case law recognizing that when a probationer 

absconds from supervision, the probationary period is tolled 

until the probationer is once more placed under probationary 

supervision.

Williams, 202 So. 3d at 921.
4

Consistent with Williams, we reverse to allow the circuit court to 

determine if the defendant absconded from supervision as alleged in the 

probation violation affidavit. If the court finds that the defendant 

absconded from supervision, then her probationary period was tolled until 

she was arrested, and the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction over

the alleged probation violations.

Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

LEVINE and CONNER, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.