This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains regulatory documents having general

applicability and legal effect, most of which

are keyed to and codified in the Code of

Federal Regulations, which is published under

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Rules and Regulations Federal Register

55505 

Vol. 80, No. 179 

Wednesday, September 16, 2015 

NATIONAL FOUNDATION ON THE 

ARTS AND THE HUMANITIES 

National Endowment for the 

Humanities 

2 CFR Part 3374 

45 CFR Part 1174 

RIN 3136–AA35 

Uniform Administrative Requirements, 

Cost Principles, and Audit 

Requirements for Federal Awards 

AGENCY: National Endowment for the 

Humanities, National Foundation on the 

Arts and the Humanities. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The National Endowment for 

the Humanities (NEH) has adopted as 

final its interim final rule outlining 

uniform administrative requirements, 

cost principles, and audit requirements 

for Federal awards. 

DATES: This rule is effective on 

September 16, 2015. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Robert Straughter, Director, Office of 

Grant Management, National 

Endowment for the Humanities, 400 7th 

Street SW., Room, 4060, Washington, 

DC 20506; (202) 606–8237, 

rstraughter@neh.gov (please include 

RIN 3136–AA35 in the subject line of 

the message). 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On 

December 19, 2014, the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) 

published an interim final rule that 

implemented for all Federal awardmaking agencies, including NEH, OMB’s 

final guidance on Uniform 

Administrative Requirements, Cost 

Principles, and Audit Requirements for 

Federal Awards. 79 FR 75871. OMB 

published the uniform rules as 2 CFR 

part 200. As part of that rulemaking, 

NEH adopted part 200 through an 

agency-specific addendum at 2 CFR part 

3374. NEH removed and reserved its 

prior regulations about administrative 

requirements for Federal awards, 45 

CFR part 1174, which were rendered 

obsolete by the new provisions. 

NEH received no comments in 

response to its adoption of the interim 

final rule. Therefore, 2 CFR part 3374 as 

described in the interim final rule, is 

adopted with no changes. 

Regulatory Findings 

For the regulatory findings regarding 

this rulemaking, please refer to the 

analysis prepared by OMB in the 

interim final rule, which is incorporated 

herein by reference. 79 FR at 75876. 

Accordingly, the interim rule adding 

2 CFR part 3374 and amending 45 CFR 

part 1174, which was published at 79 

FR 75871 on December 19, 2014, is 

adopted as a final rule without change. 

Dated: September 10, 2015. 

Michael P. McDonald, 

General Counsel. 

[FR Doc. 2015–23186 Filed 9–15–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7536–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2014–0126; Directorate 

Identifier 2013–NM–236–AD; Amendment 

39–18267; AD 2015–19–04] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all The 

Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes. 

This AD was prompted by reports of 

latently failed fuel shutoff valves 

discovered during fuel filter 

replacement. This AD requires revising 

the maintenance or inspection program 

to include new airworthiness 

limitations. We are issuing this AD to 

detect and correct latent failures of the 

fuel shutoff valve to the engine and 

auxiliary power unit (APU), which 

could result in the inability to shut off 

fuel to the engine and APU and, in case 

of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire 

that could lead to structural failure. 

DATES: This AD is effective October 21, 

2015. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2014– 

0126; or in person at the Docket 

Management Facility between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is 

Docket Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, 

Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 

1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 

98057–3356; phone: 425–917–6509; fax: 

425–917–6590; email: rebel.nichols@

faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 by adding an AD that would 

apply to all The Boeing Company Model 

757 airplanes. The NPRM published in 

the Federal Register on March 5, 2014 

(79 FR 12431). The NPRM was 

prompted by reports of latently failed 

fuel shutoff valves discovered during 

fuel filter replacement. The NPRM 

proposed to require revising the 

maintenance or inspection program to 

include new airworthiness limitations. 

We are issuing this AD to detect and 

correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff 

valve to the engine and APU, which 

could result in the inability to shut off 

fuel to the engine and APU and, in case 

of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire 

that could lead to structural failure. 

Record of Ex Parte Communication 

In preparation of AD actions such as 

NPRMs and immediately adopted rules, 

it is the practice of the FAA to obtain 

technical information and information 

on operational and economic impacts 


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from design approval holders and 

aircraft operators. We discussed certain 

comments addressed in this final rule in 

a teleconference with Airlines for 

America (A4A) and other members of 

the aviation industry. All of the 

comments discussed during this 

teleconference are addressed in this 

final rule in response to comments 

submitted by other commenters. A 

discussion of this contact can be found 

in the rulemaking docket at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2014– 

0126. 

Clarification of Certain Terminology 

Throughout the preamble of this final 

rule, commenters may have used the 

terms ‘‘fuel shutoff valve’’ and ‘‘fuel 

spar valve’’ interchangeably. Both terms 

refer to the same part. In our responses 

to comments, we have used the term 

‘‘fuel shutoff valve.’’ The term ‘‘fuel spar 

valve’’ is more commonly used in 

airplane maintenance documentation 

and, therefore, we have used that term 

in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. The 

following presents the comments 

received on the NPRM (79 FR 12431, 

March 5, 2014) and the FAA’s response 

to each comment. 

Request To Withdraw the NPRM (79 FR 

12431, March 5, 2014) 

American Airlines (AA) stated that 

Boeing’s internal review found that the 

issue addressed by the NPRM (79 FR 

12431, March 5, 2014) is not a safety 

concern, and that Boeing has not 

recommended any interim action on 

this issue. In addition, AA stated that 

Boeing is addressing the issue in the 

long term with a design change to the 

motor-operated valve (MOV) actuator of 

the fuel shutoff valve. AA also noted 

that in a previous NPRM for Model 757 

airplanes, it had submitted data 

showing the failure of the actuator was 

unlikely and that coupled with the 

likelihood of an erroneous indication 

occurring at the same time, the latent 

hazard was even more improbable. AA 

stated the same analysis applies to this 

NPRM. We infer that AA is requesting 

the NPRM be withdrawn. 

We disagree with AA’s request to 

withdraw the NPRM (79 FR 12431, 

March 5, 2014). We have determined 

that an unsafe condition exists that 

warrants an interim action until the 

manufacturer finishes developing a 

modification that will address the 

identified unsafe condition. Boeing did 

not formally comment on whether it 

considers this issue to be an unsafe 

condition. We have determined that, 

without the required interim actions, a 

significant number of flights with a fuel 

shutoff valve actuator that is failed 

latently in the open valve position will 

occur during the affected fleet life. With 

a failed fuel shutoff valve, if certain fire 

conditions were to occur, or if extreme 

engine or APU damage were to occur, or 

if an engine separation event were to 

occur during flight, the crew procedures 

for such an event would not stop the 

fuel flow to the engine strut and nacelle 

or APU. The continued flow of fuel 

could cause an uncontrolled fire or lead 

to a fuel exhaustion event. 

The FAA regulations require all 

transport airplanes to be fail safe with 

respect to engine or APU fire events, 

and the risk due to severe engine or 

APU damage events be minimized. 

Therefore, we require, for each flight, 

sufficiently operative fire safety systems 

so that fires can be detected and 

contained, and fuel to the engine strut 

and nacelle or APU can be shut off in 

the event of an engine or APU fire or 

severe damage. 

The FAA airworthiness standards 

require remotely controlled powerplant 

valves to provide indications that the 

valves are in the commanded position. 

These indications allow the prompt 

detection and correction of valve 

failures. We do not allow dispatch with 

a known inoperative fuel shutoff valve. 

Therefore, we are proceeding with the 

final rule—not because of the higherthan-typical failure rate of the particular 

valve actuator involved, but instead 

because the fuel shutoff valve actuator 

can fail in a manner that also defeats the 

required valve position indication 

feature. That failure can lead to a large 

number of flights occurring on an 

airplane with a fuel shutoff valve 

actuator failed in the open position 

without the operator being aware of the 

failure. Airworthiness limitations 

containing required inspections are 

intended to limit the number of flights 

following latent failure of the fuel 

shutoff valve. Issuance of an AD is the 

appropriate method to correct the 

unsafe condition. We have not changed 

this final rule in this regard. 

Requests To Revise the Proposed AD 

(79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) To Limit 

the Applicability Specified in Certain 

Figures 

DHL and United Airlines (UAL) 

requested that we revise the proposed 

AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) to 

limit the applicability specified in figure 

1 and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of the 

proposed AD to airplanes with fuel 

shutoff valve actuators on which the 

identified unsafe condition exists. 

DHL stated that the proposed AD (79 

FR 12431, March 5, 2014) should make 

it clear that airworthiness limitations 

(AWL) numbers 28–AWL–ENG and 28– 

AWL–APU do not apply to airplanes 

that are equipped with the actuators 

made by supplier V35840, having part 

number (P/N) AV31–1 (Boeing P/N 

S343T003–111), for the engine fuel 

shutoff valve and APU fuel shutoff 

valve. DHL stated that the deficiencies 

identified in the NPRM are related to 

potential common mode failures, which 

affect integral electronic circuit boards 

that commutate the brushless motor and 

control the position indicating signals 

on some actuators made by supplier 

V73760. DHL also stated that fuel 

shutoff valve P/N AV31–1 (Boeing P/N 

S343T003–111) is not susceptible to the 

type of deficiency described in the 

NPRM because this valve uses brushes 

and mechanical switches rather than 

electronic circuit boards to commutate 

the motor and to control position 

indicating signals. 

UAL stated that the proposed AD (79 

FR 12431, March 5, 2014) did not 

specify which MOV actuator part 

number the proposed AD applies to. 

UAL stated that proposed ADs were 

issued for Model 737NG, 757, 767, and 

777 airplanes to replace the MOV 

actuator with P/N MA30A1001. UAL 

also stated there are known issues with 

this MOV actuator part number, and 

presumes that the proposed AD is for 

MOV actuator P/N MA30A1001. 

We agree with the commenters’ 

requests to limit the applicability 

specified in figure 1 and figure 2 to 

paragraph (g) of this AD to airplanes 

with the actuators on which the 

identified unsafe condition exists. Only 

two fuel shutoff valve actuator designs 

are susceptible to the identified unsafe 

condition specified in this final rule, 

and it would be unnecessarily 

burdensome to require the inspections 

on airplanes that do not have any of the 

susceptible valves installed. We have 

changed the Applicability column in 

figure 1 and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of 

this AD to clarify that the limitations 

apply to Model 757 airplanes on which 

fuel shutoff valve actuator P/N 

MA20A2027 (Boeing P/N S343T003–56) 

or P/N MA30A1001 (Boeing P/N 

S343T003–66) is installed at the engine 

and APU fuel shutoff valve positions. 

Requests To Change the Initial 

Compliance Time for the Operational 

Check 

AA and US Airways requested that 

the compliance time for the initial 

accomplishment of the operational 


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check be extended after accomplishing 

the maintenance or inspection program 

revision. 

AA requested that the compliance 

time be revised to 60 days after 

accomplishing the maintenance or 

inspection program revision. AA stated 

that the extended time of 60 days is for 

publishing the new criteria, for 

distribution of cards and manuals/

checklists, and for the initial 

compliance time to be taken into 

account. AA stated that the 7-day 

compliance time is not justified by the 

failure rates for this safety concern. AA 

also stated that the compliance deadline 

would therefore become unclear. 

US Airways requested that the 

compliance time be extended to 7 days 

after the 30-day compliance time for the 

maintenance or inspection program 

revision. US Airways stated that 

accomplishing the initial compliance 

time based on completion of adding to 

the maintenance program would make 

the compliance deadline very difficult 

to track as making program changes is 

typically not a closely tracked process. 

We partially agree with the 

commenters’ requests to extend the 

initial compliance time for the actions 

specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of 

this AD. We have changed the initial 

compliance time for accomplishing the 

actions specified in figure 1 to 

paragraph (g) of this AD to 10 days. A 

compliance time of 10 days is consistent 

with regulatory actions for other 

affected airplane models and with the 

initial compliance time in figure 2 to 

paragraph (g) of this AD. We have 

determined that the initial compliance 

time for the check represents an 

appropriate time in which the required 

actions can be performed in a timely 

manner within the affected fleet, while 

still maintaining an adequate level of 

safety. 

In developing an appropriate 

compliance time, we considered the 

safety implications, parts availability, 

and normal maintenance schedules for 

timely accomplishment of the 

operational checks. The manufacturer 

does not expect a large number of 

latently failed fuel shutoff valve 

actuators to be discovered. Existing 

parts stores are expected to be sufficient, 

and parts can be repositioned in time to 

support the initial checks. However, 

under the provisions of paragraph (i)(1) 

of this AD, we might consider requests 

for adjustments to the compliance time 

if data are submitted to substantiate that 

such an adjustment would provide an 

acceptable level of safety. 

Request To Change Compliance Time 

Intervals to Flight Cycles 

US Airways requested that the 

compliance time intervals be changed to 

specify flight cycles. US Airways stated 

that it has heard of no evidence 

suggesting the subject condition is a 

function of time and believes the 

condition would likely only occur either 

at engine or APU start or shutdown. US 

Airways also stated that it and other 

operators utilize its airplanes on longhaul trips that span many time zones. 

US Airways stated that, according to a 

report from the airplane manufacturer 

during the fourth quarter of 2013, 68 

percent of the operators had a daily 

utilization rate of 3.3 flight cycles, and 

95.4 percent had a daily utilization rate 

of 4.7 flight cycles. 

We disagree with the commenter’s 

request. While the failure of the fuel 

shutoff valve is likely associated with 

the cycling of the valve, the purpose of 

the inspections is to minimize the 

exposure to flights that are initiated 

with a fuel shutoff valve actuator that is 

latently failed in the open position. 

Operators may request approval of an 

AMOC in accordance with the 

provisions specified in paragraph (i)(1) 

of this AD to change the interval to a 

cycle-based interval, provided it 

includes at least one check each day for 

the engine fuel shutoff valves and that 

the data substantiate that the request 

would provide an acceptable level of 

safety. We have not changed this AD in 

this regard. 

Requests To Extend the Repetitive 

Inspection Interval for the Engine Fuel 

Shutoff Valves 

AA and UAL requested that the daily 

repetitive inspection interval for the 

engine fuel spar valve be extended. 

AA requested that we add a choice to 

the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 

5, 2014) to allow monitoring the 

disagreement light in combination with 

checking the actuator itself every 100 

flight hours or 50 flight cycles, 

whichever occurs later. AA stated that 

this means to check the indication and 

physically check the closure of the 

engine and APU fuel spar valve at 100 

flight hours or 50 flight cycles, 

whichever occurs later, as an alternative 

maintenance task. AA stated that Model 

767–400 series airplanes identified in 

the NPRM having Directorate Identifier 

2013–NM–237–AD (79 FR 12420, March 

5, 2014) are allowed 10 days to inspect 

the spar valve actuator arm when it is 

fully closed and commanded closed. AA 

stated that 10 days equates closely to 

100 flight hours/50 flight cycles. AA 

also stated that Model 757 and 767 

airplanes have the same actuator valve 

and indication, except that Model 767– 

400 series airplanes do not have a 

disagreement light. 

UAL requested that we extend the 

daily interval for AWL number 28– 

AWL–ENG to 10 days. UAL stated that 

Model 757–200 and –300 series 

airplanes and Model 767–400 series 

airplanes use the same MOV actuator. 

UAL stated that the interval for Model 

757–200 and –300 series airplanes is 

daily while the Model 767–400 series 

airplanes is 10 days. 

We disagree with the commenters’ 

requests. For the engine fuel shutoff 

valve, an interval increase from daily to 

every 10 days, or to the later of 100 

flight hours or 50 flight cycles, would 

result in at least 10 times as many 

flights at risk of an uncontrollable 

engine fire. The daily check has been 

deemed practical because in practice it 

likely means the flightcrew will need to 

watch a light just above the FUEL 

CONTROL switch as they start or shut 

down the engine. As AA stated, Model 

767–400ER series airplanes do not have 

the disagreement light, so the inspection 

is more complex. As a result, we 

determined it is not practical to require 

this inspection on a daily basis on 

Model 767–400ER airplanes. We have 

not changed the inspection interval for 

Model 757 airplanes addressed in this 

AD. 

Request for Operational Check Relief 

AA requested that any recurring 

interval include only the days or flight 

cycles when the airplane is in revenue 

service, or when an APU is in 

operational status. AA stated that the 

proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 

2014) does not account for airplanes in 

routine maintenance or in an out-ofservice condition. AA also proposed 

that a provision for the APU on the 

minimum equipment list (MEL) be 

included in the proposed AD. AA stated 

that once an APU is returned to service 

from the MEL, the ‘‘10 day or 100 flight 

hours/50 cycles whichever occurs later’’ 

interval would be restarted. AA stated 

that any task interval in the proposed 

AD should have the mechanism to 

exclude the elapsed time when the 

aircraft or APU is non-operational, since 

the latent failure finding task is not 

accumulating time toward a next 

potential latent failure. 

We partially agree with the 

commenter’s request. We agree to limit 

operational checks to days when the 

airplane is in revenue service or when 

an APU is in operational status because 

it would be unnecessarily burdensome 

to require the inspections on airplanes 

that are not in operation. We have 


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added a note in the Interval column of 

figure 1 and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of 

this AD indicating that the operational 

check for the engine and APU is not 

required on days when the airplane is 

not used in revenue service. We have 

revised figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this 

AD to include a note stating that the 

check must be done before further flight 

once the airplane is returned to revenue 

service. We have also revised figure 2 to 

paragraph (g) of this AD to state that the 

check must be done before further flight 

with an operational APU if it has been 

10 or more calendar days since the last 

check. 

However, we disagree with restarting 

the 10-day interval once an APU is 

returned to service. The interval for the 

operational check of the APU fuel 

shutoff valve should not be extended 

simply because the APU was out of 

service for a time. It is likely that this 

check will be done as a matter of course 

whenever an APU is returned to service. 

Request To Add Requirement To 

Provide Electrical Power Before the 

Operational Check 

UAL requested that we add a 

requirement to the proposed AD (79 FR 

12431, March 5, 2014) to provide 

electrical power before performing the 

operational check required by figure 1 

and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of the 

proposed AD. UAL stated that electrical 

power is required to perform the check 

and other maintenance might be 

underway, which could deactivate 

required circuits. 

We agree with the commenter’s 

request because electrical power is 

required. In item C.1. of figure 1 and 

item A.2. of figure 2 to paragraph (g) of 

this AD, we have added an instruction 

to supply electrical power to the 

airplane using standard practices when 

performing the operational check. 

Request To Allow Flightcrew To 

Perform Certain AD Requirement 

Without Principal Operations Inspector 

(POI) Approval 

Allegiant Air requested the proposed 

verbiage that states ‘‘(unless checked by 

the flightcrew in a manner approved by 

the principle [sic] operations 

inspector)’’ be revised to ‘‘the 

operational check can be performed 

either as a maintenance action or as a 

flightcrew action.’’ Allegiant Air stated 

that the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, 

March 5, 2014) allows either the 

flightcrew or maintenance crew to 

perform the operational check. Allegiant 

Air stated that section 91.403(c) of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

91.403(c)) requires the affected operator 

to accomplish the test provided by the 

airworthiness limitation. Allegiant Air 

also stated that FAA Master Minimum 

Equipment List (MMEL), Policy Letter 

25, Revision 16, dated April 2, 2010 

(PL–25 is designated as MMEL Global 

Change GC–164) (http://fsims.faa.gov/

wdocs/policy%20letters/pl-025_

r16.htm) provides allowance for ‘‘other 

personnel’’ to be qualified and 

authorized to perform certain functions 

that do not require the use of tools or 

test equipment. Allegiant Air stated that 

this change would eliminate the need 

for a second approval process (via the 

POI), while providing an equivalent 

level of safety. 

We partially agree with the 

commenter’s request. We agree that the 

AWL allows either the flightcrew or 

maintenance crew to perform the 

operational check. We consider it to be 

very important that the expectations as 

to what must be done to check the 

operation of the fuel shutoff valve, as 

defined in figures 1 and 2 to paragraph 

(g) of this AD, be well understood by all 

parties, and yet we want to provide the 

maximum flexibility to operators. 

If an operator chooses to have the 

flightcrew accomplish the check, the 

POI is in the best position to make sure 

this check is done properly. However, it 

is also acceptable for an operator to 

choose to accomplish the check as a 

maintenance action and record 

compliance as specified in section 

43.11(a) of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 43.11(a)) without 

POI involvement. In addition, affected 

operators may apply for approval of an 

AMOC in accordance with the 

provisions specified in paragraph (i)(1) 

of this AD by submitting data 

substantiating that the request would 

provide an acceptable level of safety. 

We have not changed the AD in this 

regard. 

Request for Clarification Regarding the 

Use of the MEL 

US Airways requested clarification on 

the use of the MEL. US Airways asked 

if operators may still apply the MEL and 

be in compliance with the requirements 

of the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, 

March 5, 2014) if the SPAR VALVE light 

becomes inoperative. US Airways stated 

the maintenance action specified by the 

MEL should meet the intent of the 

proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 

2014). US Airways stated that the 

operational checks in figure 1 to 

paragraph (g) of the proposed AD are 

predicated on the SPAR VALVE light 

being operative. US Airways also stated 

that MEL 28–40–2 of the FAA Boeing 

B757 Master Minimum Equipment List 

(MMEL), Revision 30a, dated June 9, 

2014, provides relief should the 

indication be inoperative, and the 

proposed AD requirements should 

provide the same relief. 

We disagree with providing MEL 

relief for an inoperative fuel shutoff 

valve indication because MEL relief 

could potentially allow the fuel shutoff 

valve to be inoperative for up to 10 days 

of revenue operation. However, we do 

agree to provide flexibility in regard to 

verification that the fuel shutoff valve 

actuator is operational. In figure 1 to 

paragraph (g) of this AD, we have added 

item D., ‘‘Perform an Inspection to the 

Fuel Spar Valve MOV Actuator 

Position,’’ to verify the valve is closing, 

which can be used when the fuel shutoff 

valve indication does not function 

properly. 

Request To Clarify Recording 

Requirements 

US Airways requested that we 

provide a more complete explanation of 

the requirements regarding the 

documentation of accomplishment of 

the requirements of the proposed AD 

(79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014). US 

Airways stated that typically, ADmandated actions require 

documentation of accomplishment. US 

Airways stated that it should be made 

clear whether logbook entries would be 

required should the flightcrew perform 

the required actions in an approved 

manner, such as part of a procedure 

checklist. 

We agree that clarification is 

necessary. This AD requires including 

the information in figure 1 and figure 2 

of paragraph (g) of the AD in the 

maintenance or inspection program. 

However, the AD does not require 

accomplishing the actions specified in 

figure 1 and figure 2 of paragraph (g) of 

the AD. The actions specified in the 

figures in this AD are done, and remain 

enforceable, as part of the airworthiness 

limitations of the Instructions for 

Continued Airworthiness. Section 

43.11(a) of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 43.11(a)) requires 

maintenance record entries for 

maintenance actions such as the 

required checks. If an operator elects to 

have a flightcrew member do the check 

in accordance with the applicable 

airworthiness limitation, that same 

action would be considered an 

operational task (not maintenance), and 

therefore 14 CFR 43.11(a) would not 

apply. In that case, operators should 

follow their normal processes for 

operational activities, including 

necessary POI involvement. We have 

not changed this AD in this regard. 


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Request To Clarify Requirements for 

Certain Disagreement Lights 

UAL requested that we clarify certain 

requirements of the proposed AD (79 FR 

12431, March 5, 2014). UAL stated that, 

in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the 

proposed AD, item C.5.a. and item C.6.a. 

(item C.6.a. and item C.7.a., 

respectively, in this AD) instruct to 

move the left and right FUEL CONTROL 

switches, respectively, to the RUN 

position, but do not instruct to monitor 

the left and right SPAR VALVE 

disagreement lights, unlike item C.5.c 

and item C.6.c. of the proposed AD. 

UAL stated that it presumes it is not 

required to verify the left and right 

SPAR VALVE disagreement lights when 

the left and right FUEL CONTROL 

switches are moved to the RUN 

position. 

We agree to provide clarification. It is 

not required to verify the left and right 

SPAR VALVE disagreement lights when 

the left and right FUEL CONTROL 

switches are moved to the RUN position 

during that portion of the operational 

check. We have not changed this AD in 

this regard. 

Explanation of Error in the Published 

Version of the NPRM (79 FR 12431, 

March 5, 2014) 

The model designation for The Boeing 

Company Model 757 airplanes is 

missing from the SUMMARY section of the 

NPRM (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014). 

This information has been added to this 

final rule. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data, 

considered the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting this AD 

with the changes described previously, 

and minor editorial changes. We have 

determined that these minor changes: 

• Are consistent with the intent that 

was proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 

12431, March 5, 2014) for correcting the 

unsafe condition; and 

• Do not add any additional burden 

upon the public than was already 

proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 12431, 

March 5, 2014). 

We also determined that these 

changes will not increase the economic 

burden on any operator or increase the 

scope of this AD. 

Interim Action 

We consider this AD interim action. 

The manufacturer is currently 

developing a modification that will 

address the unsafe condition identified 

in this AD. Once this modification is 

developed, approved, and available, we 

might consider additional rulemaking. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD affects 590 

airplanes of U.S. registry. 

We estimate the following costs to 

comply with this AD: 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per 

product 

Cost on U.S. 

operators 

Incorporating Airworthiness Limitation ............ 1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 ................. $0 $85 $50,150 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), 

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(4) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

2015–19–04 The Boeing Company: 

Amendment 39–18267; Docket No. 

FAA–2014–0126; Directorate Identifier 

2013–NM–236–AD. 

(a) Effective Date 

This AD is effective October 21, 2015. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to all The Boeing 

Company Model 757–200, –200PF, –200CB, 

and –300 series airplanes, certificated in any 

category. 

(d) Subject 

Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 28, Fuel. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by reports of 

latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered 

during fuel filter replacement. We are issuing 

this AD to detect and correct latent failures 

of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine and 

auxiliary power unit (APU), which could 

result in the inability to shut off fuel to the 

engine and APU and, in case of certain fires, 

an uncontrollable fire that could lead to 

structural failure. 


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55510 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Revision of Maintenance or Inspection 

Program 

Within 30 days after the effective date of 

this AD, revise the maintenance or inspection 

program, as applicable, to add airworthiness 

limitations Nos. 28–AWL–ENG and 28– 

AWL–APU, by incorporating the information 

specified in figure 1 and figure 2 to paragraph 

(g) of this AD into the Airworthiness 

Limitations Section of the Instructions for 

Continued Airworthiness. The initial 

compliance time for accomplishing the 

actions specified in figure 1 and figure 2 to 

paragraph (g) of this AD is within 10 days 

after accomplishing the maintenance or 

inspection program revision required by this 

paragraph. 

FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION

OPERATIONAL CHECK

AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description 

28–AWL–ENG ...... ALI DAILY ................................

INTERVAL NOTE: Not required on days when the 

airplane is not used in 

revenue service. The 

check must be done before further flight once 

the airplane is returned 

to revenue service 

ALL ....................................

APPLICABILITY NOTE: 

Only applies to airplanes 

with an MA20A2027 

(S343T003–56) or 

MA30A1001 

(S343T003–66) actuator 

installed at the engine 

fuel spar valve position 

Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position 

Indication Operational Check. 

Concern: The fuel spar valve actuator design can result in airplanes operating with a failed fuel spar 

valve actuator that is not reported. A latently failed 

fuel spar valve actuator could prevent fuel shutoff to 

an engine. In the event of certain engine fires, the 

potential exists for an engine fire to be uncontrollable. 

Perform one of the following checks/inspection of the 

fuel spar valve position (unless checked by the 

flightcrew in a manner approved by the principal operations inspector). 

A. Operational check during engine shutdown 

1. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar 

valve actuator. 

a. As the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant 

control stand is moved to the CUTOFF position, 

verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on 

the quadrant control stand illuminates and then 

goes off. 

b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing 

AMM 28–22–11). 

2. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel 

spar valve actuator. 

a. As the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant 

control stand is moved to the CUTOFF position, 

verify the right SPAR VALVE disagreement light on 

the quadrant control stand illuminates and then 

goes off. 

b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing 

AMM 28–22–11). 

B. Operational check during engine start 

1. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar 

valve actuator. 

a. As the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant 

control stand is moved to the RUN position, verify 

the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the 

quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes 

off. 

b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing 

AMM 28–22–11). 

2. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel 

spar valve actuator. 

a. As the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant 

control stand is moved to the RUN position, verify 

the right SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the 

quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes 

off. 

b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing 

AMM 28–22–11). 

C. Operational check without engine operation 

1. Supply electrical power to the airplane using standard practices. 

2. Make sure all fuel pump switches on the Overhead 

Panel are in the OFF position. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 55511 

FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION

OPERATIONAL CHECK—Continued 

AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description 

3. If the APU is running, open and collar the L FWD 

FUEL BOOST PUMP (C00372) circuit breaker on 

the Main Power Distribution Panel. 

4. Make sure LEFT and RIGHT ENG FIRE switches 

on the Aft Aisle Stand are in the NORMAL (IN) position. 

5. Make sure L and R Engine Start Selector Switches 

on the Overhead Panel are in the OFF position. 

6. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar 

valve actuator. 

a. Move L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant 

control stand to the RUN position and wait approximately 10 seconds. 

NOTE: It is normal under this test condition for the 

ENG VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant 

control stand to stay illuminated. 

b. Move L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant 

control stand to the CUTOFF position. 

c. Verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on 

the quadrant control stand illuminates and then 

goes off. 

d. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing 

AMM 28–22–11). 

7. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel 

spar valve actuator. 

a. Move R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant 

control stand to the RUN position and wait approximately 10 seconds. 

NOTE: It is normal under this test condition for the 

ENG VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant 

control stand to stay illuminated. 

b. Move R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant 

control stand to the CUTOFF position. 

c. Verify the right SPAR VALVE disagreement light on 

the quadrant control stand illuminates and then 

goes off. 

d. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing 

AMM 28–22–11). 

8. If the L FWD FUEL BOOST PUMP circuit breaker 

was collared in step 3, remove collar and close. 

D. Perform an inspection of the fuel spar valve actuator position 

NOTE: This inspection may be most useful whenever 

the SPAR VALVE light does not function properly. 

1. Make sure the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the 

quadrant control stand is in the CUTOFF position. 

NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do this inspection. 

2. Inspect the left engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the left rear spar. 

NOTE: Access is through access panel 551EBX. 

a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine 

fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position. 

b. Repair or replace any actuator that is not in the 

CLOSED position (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 

3. Make sure the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the 

quadrant control stand is in the CUTOFF position. 

NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do this inspection. 

4. Inspect the right engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the right rear spar. 

NOTE: Access is through access panel 651EBX. 

a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine 

fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position. 

b. Repair or replace any actuator that is not in the 

CLOSED position (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 


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FIGURE 2 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—AUXILIARY POWER UNIT (APU) FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE POSITION INDICATION

OPERATIONAL CHECK

AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description 

28–AWL–APU ....... ALI 10 DAYS ............................ ALL .................................... APU Fuel Shutoff Valve Position Indication Operational Check. 

INTERVAL NOTE: Not required on days when the 

airplane is not used in 

revenue service. 

Must be done before further flight with an operational APU if it has 

been 10 or more calendar days since last 

check. 

APPLICABILITY NOTE: 

Only applies to airplanes 

with an MA20A2027 

(S343T003–56) or 

MA30A1001 

(S343T003–66) actuator 

installed at the APU fuel 

shutoff valve position. 

Concern: The APU fuel shutoff valve actuator design 

can result in airplanes operating with a failed APU 

fuel shutoff valve actuator that is not reported. A latently failed APU fuel shutoff valve actuator could 

prevent fuel shutoff to the APU. In the event of certain APU fires, the potential exists for an APU fire to 

be uncontrollable. 

Perform the operational check of the APU fuel shutoff 

valve position indication (unless checked by the 

flightcrew in a manner approved by the principal operations inspector). 

A. Do an operational check of the APU fuel shutoff 

valve position indication. 

1. If the APU is running, unload and shut down the 

APU using standard practices. 

2. Supply electrical power to the airplane using standard practices. 

3. Make sure the APU FIRE switch on the Aft Aisle 

Stand is in the NORMAL (IN) position. 

4. Make sure there is at least 700 lbs (300 kgs) of fuel 

in the Left Main Tank. 

5. Move APU Selector switch on the Overhead Panel 

to the ON position and wait approximately 10 seconds. 

6. Move APU Selector switch on the Overhead Panel 

to the OFF position. 

7. Verify the APU FAULT light on the Overhead Panel 

illuminates and then goes off. 

8. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight requiring APU availability, repair faults as 

required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–25–11). 

NOTE: Dispatch may be permitted per MMEL 28–25– 

2 if APU is not required for flight. 

(h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals 

After accomplishment of the maintenance 

or inspection program revision required by 

paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative 

actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be 

used unless the actions or intervals are 

approved as an alternative method of 

compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the 

procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of 

this AD. 

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO) FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 

send your request to your principal inspector 

or local Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the ACO, send it to the 

attention of the person identified in 

paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be 

emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOCRequests@faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/

certificate holding district office. 

(j) Related Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle 

Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind 

Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; 

phone: 425–917–6509; fax: 425–917–6590; 

email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov. 

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference 

None. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

September 7, 2015. 

Jeffrey E. Duven, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2015–23120 Filed 9–15–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2014–0127; Directorate 

Identifier 2013–NM–237–AD; Amendment 

39–18265; AD 2015–19–02] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all The 

Boeing Company Model 767 airplanes. 

This AD was prompted by reports of 

latently failed fuel shutoff valves 

discovered during fuel filter 

replacement. This AD requires revising 

the maintenance or inspection program 

to include new airworthiness 

limitations. We are issuing this AD to 

detect and correct latent failures of the 

fuel shutoff valve to the engine and 

auxiliary power unit (APU), which 


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