### IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2013 W Y 3

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2012

January 9, 2013

S T E P H E N S M I T H a

n d A U D R E Y
S M I T H

, h u s b a n d a n d w i f e ,

A p p e l l a n t s ( P l a i n t i f f s )

,

v

.

B O A R D O F C O U

N T Y
C O M M I S S I O N E R S O F P A R K
C O U N T Y

, W Y O M I N G

A p p e l l e e ( D e f e n d a n t )

. S

- 12

- 0103

App eal from the District Court of Park County The Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

Representing Appellant

s : S. Joseph Darrah of Darrah Law Office, P.C., Powell, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee:

L arry B. Jones and William L. Simpson of Simpson, Kepler & Edwards, LLC The Cody, Wyoming division of Burg Simpson Eldredge Hersh and Jardine, P.C. Argument by Mr. Jones.

B e f ore KITE, C.J., and HILL, VOIGT, BURKE, and DAVIS, JJ.

N O T I C E : T h i

s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f

o r m a l r e v i

s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n P a c i f i c R e p o r t e r T h i

r d

. R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e C l e r k o f t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t , S u p r e m e C o u r t B u i l d i n g , C h e y e n n e , W

y o m i n g 8 2 0 0 2
, o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r f

o r m a l e r r o r s s o t h a t c o r r e c t i o n m a y b e

m a d e b e f o r e f i n a l p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e p e r m a n e n t v o l

u m e

.1

V O I G T
, J u s t i c e

.

[¶1 ] T h e S m

i t h s c o n t e n d t

h a t a n u n l a w f

u l t a k i n g o c c u r r e d w

h e n t h e B o a r

d o f C o u n t y Commissioners of Park County (the Board) declared the Smiths’ private driveway to be part of a county road. Failing to obtain any relief through administrative proceedings, the Smiths sued the Board in district court, alleging claims of inverse condemnation under Wyo. Sta t. Ann. § 1

- 26

- 512 (LexisNexis 201 1), inverse condemnation under article 1,
sections 32 and 33 of the Wyoming Constitution, trespass, and ejectment. The district court granted summary judgment to the Board on all of the Smiths’ claims, concluding
that the inverse condemnation claims were bar red by the statute of limitations found
in the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. § § 1

- 3 9

- 1 0 1

t o

- 1 2 1 ( L e x i s N e x i s 2011), and that the trespass and ejectment claims failed as a matter of law because the Smiths no longer had sufficient possessory interest to make those
claims.

[ ¶ 2 ] W i t h d u e r e s p e c t f o r t h e d o c t r i n e o f s t a r e d e c i s i s , b u t r e c o g n i z i n g i t s l i m

i t a t i o n s , we will reverse the district cour t’s grant of s ummary judgment as to the inverse condemnation claims. The Smiths have not pursued their claims for trespass and ejectment in this appeal.

I S S U E

[¶3 ] Does the statute of limitations found in the WGCA govern in inverse

c ondemnation cases?

F A C T S

[¶4 ] The Smiths live on rural ranch land in Park County, Wyoming. They have always considered their access road to be a private driveway. In January 2006, the Smiths’ neighbors to the north, Scott and Marjory Justice, filed with the Board a Petition for
Estab lishment of a County Ro ad

, along an unsurveyed legal description that closely

eq uated to the Smiths’ driveway.

[¶5 ] The Board held an informal meeting on February 21, 2006

, to discuss the Justices’ petition. At that meeting, the Board voted to appoint a v iewer to determine the practicality of the proposed road. The viewer’s report presented on April 3, 2006

, indicated that “no signif

icant reason appears to hinder P ark County from proceeding with the process to establish this section of County Road R.O.W. ” On May 17, 2006, however, the Board dismissed the Justices’ petition on the ground that the Smiths’ driveway already was part of County Road 11, which had been established in 1902.

[¶6 ] The gravame n of the Smiths’ disagreement with the Board is stated succinctly in paragraph 25 of their C omplaint:2 2 5

. T h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e P l a i n t i f f s ’ d r i v e w a y i s q u i t e d i f

f e r e n t f r o m t h e l o c a

t i o n o f C o u n t y R o a

d 1 1 d e p i c t e d o n t h e 1 9 1 1 C o u n

t [ y ] R o a d P l a

t m a p w h i c h i s t h e o f

f i c i a l current record map recorded in the Office o f [ t ] h e P a r k County Clerk. Plaintiffs[ ’ ] p r i v a t e d r i v e w a y i s a t l e a s t a

q u a r t e r o f a m

i l e a w a y f

r o m C o u n t y R o a d N o

. 1 1 a t

p l a c e s , a n d r

u n s a c r o s s d i f

f e r e n t p a r c e l s o f l a n d t

h a n County Road No. 11 [a]s clearly depicted on the offi c i a l County Road Plat map

.

[¶7 ] After reading in the newspaper of the Board’s action, the Smiths sought a reconsideration of the decision. The Board discussed the matter at a general meeting on September 5, 2006, and declined the Smiths’ request. The Smiths then filed a Petitio n for
Judicial Review in the district court, challenging the Board’s authority to create a county road at a new location without following the provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § § 24

- 3

- 101

to

- 127 (LexisNexis 2011)

, which statutes govern the procedures for the establishment,
vacation

, o r alteration of county roads. On February 25, 2008, the district court
remanded the matter to the Board f or the purpose of conducting a survey of the existing county road to determine whether the Smiths’ driveway was, or was not , contained withi n the county road right

- of

- way.

[¶8 ] Upon remand, rather than do as the district court ordered, the Board simply appointed a second viewer to view the Smiths’ driveway. Without obtaining a survey of either the driveway or County Road 11, the Board declared that the driveway was part of the county road in that the former was “close” to the latter, and in that the 1902 survey of the county road likely was inaccurate on the county plat map. The Smiths then filed in
the district court a Peti tion for Review of Agency Action. After a hearing on December 10, 2009, the district court again remanded the matter to the Board, ruling that the Board should follow the statutory procedures for establishing, altering, or vacating a county road, specific ally to include a s urvey of the Smiths’ driveway.

[¶9 ] Rather than obtain a survey of the Smiths’ driveway, the Board hired an expert, who determined that the 1902 survey used to create County Road 11 on the county’s official county road plat map was in f act correct. On December 18, 2009, the Smiths met with representatives of the county attorney’s office and with the Board’s expert to discuss the expert’s conclusions. The Smiths took the position that, if the 1902 survey of the county road was accurate, as the expert had established, their private driveway was not part of the county road because the two roadways were in different locations. Some time later, the county attorney informed the Smiths’ attorney that the Board did not intend to3

c h a n g e i t s p o s ition that the Smiths’ driveway was part of the existing county road. This
lawsuit followed. 1

S T A N D A R D O F R E V I E W

[¶10 ] Our standard for the review of a summary judgment is so well know n that it need not be repeated here. See, e.g., Knapp v. Landex Corp. , 2006 WY 36, ¶ 7, 130 P.3d 924, 926 (Wyo. 2006); and Ahrenholtz v. Laramie Econ. Dev. Corp. , 2003 WY 149, ¶ 16, 79 P.3d 511, 515 (Wyo. 2003 ). The question of the application of the WGCA to claims of
inverse condemnation involves statutory construct ion, which i s a q u e s t i o n o f l a w t h a t w e review de novo

. State ex rel. Wyo. D ep ’ t of Revenue v. Hanover Compression, LP , 2008 WY 138, ¶ 8, 196 P.3d 781, 784 (Wyo. 2008).

D I S C U S S I O N

[¶11 ] I n its a nswer to the Smiths’ Complaint, the Board asserted the foll owing
affirmative defense s :

2

. P l a i n t i f

f s h a v e f a i l e d t o c o m

p l y w i t h t

h e W y o m i n g G o v e r n m e n t a l C l a i m s A c t

, W

. S

. § 1

- 3 9

- 1 0 1

, e t s e q

. ( L e x i s N e x i s 2 0 0 9 ) a n d / o r A r t i c l e 1 6

, § 7 o f t h e W y o m i n g C o n s t i t u t i o n a n d t h

u s t h i s C o u r t d o e s n o t h a v e s u b j e c t m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n o v

e r s o m e o r a l l t

h e c l a i m s p r e s e n t e d

.

3

. D e f e n d a n t i s i m m

u n e f r o m l i a b i l i t y f

o r t h e c l a i m s o f

P l a i n t i f f s , o r s o m e o f t h e m , u n d e r t h e W y o m i n g G o v e r n m e n t a l C l a i m s A c t

, W

. S

. § 1

- 3 9

- 1 0 1

, e t s e q

. ( L e x i s N e x i s 2 0 0 9 ) a n d

/ o r A r t i c l e 1

, § 8 a n d A

r t i c l e 1 6

, § 7 o f the Wyoming Constitution.

. . . .

1 1

. P l a i n t i f

f s ’ c l a i m s , o r s o m e o f t h e m , a r e b a r r e d b y t h e
st atute of limitations.

[¶12 ] As noted above, the district court granted summary judgment to the Board on the ground that the Smiths’ inverse condemnation cause of action was barred by the statute of

1 T h e b a c k g r

o u n d f a c t s s e t f o r t h a b o v e a r e t a k e n f r o m t h e S m i t h s ’ C o m p l a i n t

. S u f

f i c e i t t o s a

y t h a t

, w h i l e denying many of the facts and legal conclusions of the Complaint, the primary defense to the issues involving the creation of the road is the Board’s position that it is not required at this point in time to follow the statutory road creation procedures because the Smiths’ driveway is part of the existing County
Road 11.4

l i m i t a t i o n s f

o u n d i n t h e WGCA. The district court’s analysis leading to this conclusion is enlightening and we will quote from it at length:

I n v e r s e c o n d e m

n a t i o n i s e x

p l a i n e d b y t h e W

y o m i n g S t a t u t e s

a s f o l l o w s :

W h e n a p e r s o n p o s s e s s i n g t h e p o w e r o f c o n d e m n a t i o n
t a k e s p o s s e s s i o n o f o r d a m a g e s l a n d i n w

h i c h h e h a s

n o i n t e r e s t

, o r s u b s t a n

t i a l l y d i m i n i s h e s t h e u s e o r v

a l u e

o f l a n d

, d u e t o a c t i v

i t i e s o n a d

j o i n i n g l a n d w i t h o u t t

h e

a u t h o r i z a t i o n o f t h e o w

n e r o f t h e l a

n d o r b e f o r e f i l i n g

a n a c t i o n o f c o n d e m

n a t i o n , t h e o w n e r o f t h e l a n d m a y f i l e a n a c t i o n i n d i s t r i c t c o u r t s e e k i n g d a m a g e s f

o r t h e
t a k i n g o r d a m a g

e a n d s h a l l b e g

r a n t e d l i t i g

a t i o n

e x p e n s e s i f d a m a g

e s a r e a w a r d e d t o t h e o w

n e r

.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1

- 26

- 516 (2011).

U n t i l v e r y r e c e n t l y , t h e W

y o m i n g S u p r e m e C o u r t h a s b e e n c o n s i s t e n t c o n c e r n i n g w h e t h e r t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s a n d

t i m e l i m i t s o f t h e W G C A a p p l y t o a c l a i m o f i n v e r s e

c o n d e m n a t i o n

. F o r e x a m

p l e , t w e l v

e y e a r s a g

o i n W a i d v

. S t a t e e x r e l

. D e p t

. o f T r a n s p

. , 9 9 6 P

. 2 d 1 8 ( W

y o

. 2 0 0 0 )

, t

h e W y o m i n g S u p r e m e C o u r t u n e q u i v o c a l l y h e l d t h a

t t h e t i m e l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h e W G C A a p p l y t o c l a i m s o f i n v e r s e

c o n d e m n a t i o n

.

T h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a

t a c l a i m b e p r e s e n t e d p u r s u a n t t o
t h e p r o c e d u r e e s t a b l i s h e d b y t h e W y o m i n g G o v e r n m e n t a l C l a i m s A c t i s a p p l i c a b l e t o i n v e r s e condemnation actions, and the claim must be filed within two years of the “act, error or omission” giving
rise to the claim.

I d

. a t 2 5

. F o u r y e a r s l a t e r , i n L a n k f o r d v

. C i t y o f L a r a m i e , 2 0 0 4 W Y 1 4 3

, 1 0 0 P

. 3 d 1 2 3 8 ( W y o

. 2 0 0 4 )

, t

h e W y o m i n g S u p r e m e C o u r t h e l d t

h a t a p p l y i n g t h e t i m e l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h e W G C A t o i n v

e r s e c o n d e m

n a t i o n c l a i m s i s n o t

u n c o n s t i t u

t i o n a l

.

T h e c o n c l u s i o n t

h a t i n v e r s e c o n d e m

n a t i o n c l a i m s a r e

s u b j e c t t o t h e l i m

i t a t i o n p e r i o d s f

o u n d i n t h e W G C A means that the district court was correct in applying its5 s t a t u t e o f l i m

i t a t i o n a n a

l y s i s t o a l l o f t

h e s t a t e l a w

c l a i m s

. T h e n e x t l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n t h e n b e c o m e s

w h e t h e r t h a t a n a l y s i s w a s a p p r o p r i a t e

. W e c a n n o t h e l p b u t c o n c l u d e t

h a t i t w a s

. T h e a m e n d e d c o m p l a i n t

r e f l e c t e d o n i t s f

a c e t h a t t h e a c t i o n w a s n o t f i l e d w i t h i n

o n e y e a r o f p r e s e n t m e n t o f t h e c l a i m

. O u r l a w i s c l e a r
t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r

t d o e s n o t h a v

e s u b j e c t m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n t o a

d j u d i c a t e g

o v e r n m e n t a l c l a i m c a s e s

w h e r e t h e a c t i o n w a s n o t t i m e l y f i l e d

.

Id ., ¶ 22, 100 P.3d at 1244. Next, in 2008, the Wyoming Supreme Court again clearly opined that the time limitations of the WGCA apply to inverse condemnation claims.

There is little question that the Goses’ claim for inverse condemnation is subject to the time limits for filing claims set forth in the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, as well as the requirements of Wyo.

Const. a r t. 16, § 7. W a id v. State ex rel. Dept. of Transp. , 996 P.2d 18, 24

- 25 (Wy o. 2000). (“[The parties] agree that the time limits for filing claims set forth in the Wyoming Governmen tal Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1

- 3 9

- 101 through 1

- 39

- 120, apply to a claim against the State for inverse condemnation.... [W]e agree with the parti es that the time limits articulated in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1

- 39

- 113 apply.”).

G o s e v

. C i t y o f D o u g l a s

, 200 8 WY 126, ¶ 15, 193 P.3d 1159, 1163 (Wyo. 2008) , overruled on other grounds by Brown v. City of Casper , 2011 WY 35, 248 P.3d 1136 (Wyo. 2011). Finally , in 2011, the Wyoming Supreme Court again noted that claims of inverse condemnation require compliance with
the WGCA.

I n Wyo. State Highway Dep’t v. Napolitano

, 578 P.2d 1342, 1346 (Wyo. 1978), the Court h e l d t h a t

p r e s e n t i n g

a notice of claim is a condit ion precedent to suing the State even in condemnation cases

. . . .

U p t o t h i s p o i n t

, W

y o m i n g l a w w a s c l e a r t h a t

p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a n o t i c e o f c l a i m i s r e q u i r e d i n o r d e r t o bring an action against a governmental entity and the6 f a i l u r e t o c o m

p l y w i t h t h a

t c o n d i t i o n p r e c e d e

n t r e s u l t s i n d i s m i s s a l

.

Brown v. City of Casper , 2011 WY 35, ¶¶ 27

- 28, 248 P.3d 1136, 1143 (Wyo. 2011) (emphasis added). Thus, from 2000 through 2011, the Wyoming Supreme Court consistently required that inverse condemnation claims comply with the requirements in the WGCA.

H o w e v e r , t h e d a y b e f

o r e t h e s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t h e a r i n g i n t h i s c a s e , t h e W y o m i n g S u p r e m e C o u r t i s s u e d i t s

o p i n i o n i n S

i n c l a i r v

. C i t y o f G i l l e t t e , 2 0 1 2 W

Y 1 9

, [ 2 7 0 P

. 3 d

6 4 4 ( W y o

. 2 0 1 2 ) ]

, w

h e r e i t s e e m i n g

l y a l t e r e d i t s t o n e o n t

h i s i s s u e

. T h e p l a i n t i f

f s i n S i n c l a i r s u b m i t t e d a n o t i c e o f c l a i m t o
t h e C i t y o f G i l l e t t e a n d t h e n f i l e d a c o m

p l a i n t i n d i s t r i c t c o u r

t

. Id ., ¶ 5. Their complaint included three claims of relief: (1) injunction, (2) “statutory damages” for inverse condemnation, and (3) “alternative damages” consistent with their WGCA
notice of claim. Id

. The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs third cause of action was not viable under the WGCA and, therefore, was barred by the doctrine of

g overnmental immunity. Id ., ¶ 16. The Court then went on to discuss the plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claim:

T h e S i n c l a i r s a l s o b r o u g h t a c l a i m a g a i n s t t h e C i t y under the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act. One section of that Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1

- 26

- 516, is
entitled “A ction for inverse condemnation,” and provides that:

W h e n a p e r s o n p o s s e s s i n g t h e p o w e r o f

c o n d e m n a t i o n t a k e s p o s s e s s i o n o f o r d a m a g e s l a n d i n w h i c h h e h a s n o i n t e r e s t

, o r s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i m i n i s h e s t h e u s e o r v

a l u e o f l a n d

. . . b e f

o r e f i l i n g a n a c t i o n o f c o n d e m n a t i o n , t h e o w n e r o f

t h e l a n d m a y f

i l e a n a c t i o n i n d i s t r i c t c o u r t

s e e k i n g d a m a g e s f

o r t h e t a k i n g o r d a m a g

e a n d

s h a l l b e g

r a n t e d l i t i g

a t i o n e x p e n s e s i f d a m a g e s

a r e a w a r d e d t o t

h e o w n e r

.

W e h a v e e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e W y o m i n g E m i n e n t
D o m a i n A c t “ c o v e r s t h e e n t i r e s u b j e c t o f e m i n e n t
domain.” L.U. Sheep Co. v. Board of County7 C o m m ’ r s , 7 9 0 P

. 2 d 6 6 3
, 6 6 9 ( W y o

. 1 9 9 0 )

. A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e A c t p r o v i d e s t h e e x c l u s i v e r e m e d y

a v a i l a b l e i n c a s e s o f i n v e r s e c o n d e m n a t i o n

. S e e W a i d v

. S t a t e , 9 9 6 P

. 2 d 1 8
, 2 3 (

W y o

. 2 0 0 0 )

. The fact that the Sinclairs’ exclusive remedy is under the

W y oming Eminent Domain Act reinforces our

c o n c l u s i o n t

h a t t h e y h a v

e n o v i a b l e c a u s e o f a c t i o n against the City under the W yoming Governmental
Claims Act.

Id ., ¶ 17 (emphasis added). The Wyoming Supreme Court’s language in Sinclair hints that the WGCA does not apply to
causes of action for inverse con demnation and that only the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act applies to such claims.

. . . .

T h i s C o u r t r e c o g

n i z e s t h e c o n f

l i c t i n h e r e n t i n r e q u i r i n g

a n i n v e r s e c o n d e m

n a t i o n c l a i m a n t t o o p e r a t e u n d e r t h e W G C A

. S p e c i f

i c a l l y , t h e W G C A a f

f i r m s g o v e r n m e n t a l
immu nity “from liability for any tort except as provided in
W.S. 1

- 39

- 105 through 1

- 39

- 112.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1

- 39

- 104(a) (2011) (emphasis added). A legitimate question exists regarding whether inverse condemnation is a tort and should be subject to the WGC A. Further, none of the exceptions found in Wyoming Statutes 1

- 39

- 105 through 1

- 39

- 112 appear to waive immunity for anything approaching inverse condemnation. Thus, even if a claimant complies with all requirements under the WGCA, it could be argued that the claimant would have no remedy because the WGCA does not waive governmental immunity for inverse condemnation. However, in light of the very explicit statements from the Wyoming Supreme Court over the past decade which hold that the WGCA “is applicabl e to inverse condemnation actions,” Waid, supra , this Court finds little choice in the matter but to apply the WGCA’s requirements to inverse
condemnation claims.

. . . .

I n s u m , t h i s C o u r t b e l i e v

e s i t h a s n o a

l t e r n a t i v e b u t t o conclude that the WGCA ap plies to Plaintiffs’ two claims of inverse condemnation based upon controlling case law from8 t h e W y o m i n g S u p r e m e C o u r t

. . . . T h e r e f o r e , P l a i n t i f

f s ’

c l a i m s o f i n v

e r s e c o n d e m

n a t i o n a r e b a r r e d b y t h e t w o

- year time limitation set forth in Wyoming Statute § 1

- 39

- 113(a). Accordingly, summary judgment must be granted in the

Boar d’s favor on these two claims.

[¶13 ] We have quoted at such length from the district court’s decision letter because it

m akes several points that need to be made in this opinion. First , it sets forth this Court’s precedent on the subject, while recognizing the “hole in the dike” left by Sinclair

. Second, it notes the inconsistency resulting from requiring an inverse condemnation claimant to meet the requirements of the WGCA, while the WGCA itself provides no
remedies for such claimant. And third, it reluctantly embraces the doctrine of precedent

t hat requires the district court to abide by the ruling of this Court, even when the district court obviously does not agree.

[¶14 ] This seems a good point to interject some comments about stare decisis , which
doctrine has been defined as follows:

T h e d o c t r i n e o f p r e c e d e

n t

, u n d e r w

h i c h a c o u r t m

u s t f o l l o w

e a r l i e r j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s w h e n t h e s a m e p o i n t s a r i s e a g a i n i n l i t i g a t i o n

.

Black’s Law Dictionary 1537 (9th ed. 2009). The reasons for this Court’s usual adherence to precedent were described in Borns e x rel. Gannon v. Voss , 20 03 WY 74, ¶ 25, 70 P.3d 262, 271 (Wyo. 2003 ):

“ ‘ Today’s decision is supported, though not compelled, by the important doctrine of stare decisis

, the means by which we ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion. That doctrine permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivit ies of individuals, and thereby contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in fact. While stare decisis is not an inexorable command, the careful observer will discern that any detours from the straight path of stare decisis in our past have occurred for articulable reasons, and only when the Court has felt obliged “to bring its opinions into agreement with experience and with facts newly ascertained.”’”9 S t a t e v

. C

a r t e r , 7 1 4 P

. 2 d 1 2 1 7

, 1 2 2 8 ( W y o

. 1 9 8 6 ) ( U

r b i g k i t

, J

. , d i s s e n t i n g , w i t h w

h i c h C a r d i n e , J

. j o i n e d ( q u o t i n g B u r n e t

v

. C o r o n a d o O i l & G a s C

o

. , 2 8 5 U

. S

. 3 9 3

, 4 1 2

, 5 2 S

. C t

. 4 4 3

, 4 4 9

, 7 6 L

. E d

. 8 1 5 ( 1 9 3 2 ) ( B r a n d e i s , d i s s e n t i n g ) a n d V a s q u e z

v

. H i l l e r y , 4 7 4 U

. S

. 2 5 4

, 1 0 6 S

. C t

. 6 1 7

, 6 2 4

- 2 5

, 8 8 L

. E d

. 2 d

5 9 8 ( 1 9 8 6 ) )

. S i m

i l a r l y , i n W

o r t h i n g t o n v

. S t a t e , 598 P.2d 796, 804 (Wyo. 1979), we declared that “[w]ithout exercise of judicial restraint in this area, the law would lose its

s tability and certainty, which is the basis of a well

- ordered

so ciety and the keystone of a stable and orderly system.” In recent years, we have often cited Payne v. Tennessee , 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2609, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) for the proposition that s t a r e d e c i s i s “furthers the

‘ “ evenhanded, predictable , and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”’” State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Compensation
Div. v. Barker , 978 P.2d 1156, 1161 (Wy o. 1999) ( quoting
Goodrich v

. Stobbe , 908 P.2d 416, 420 (Wyo. 1995) and
Cook v. State , 841 P.2d 1345, 1353 (Wyo. 1992)).

[¶15 ] Recognizing that stare decisis is not an “inexorable command,” but a “principle of policy,” we have rejected it now and then ove r the years for specific articulated reasons. See, e.g., Arnott v. Arnott, 2012 WY 167 , ¶¶ 2, 29, 293 P.3d 440, 442, 453 (Wyo. 2012) (presumption in best interest of child analysis when custodial parent relocates overturned); Motley v. Platte C nty

. , 2009 WY 147, ¶ 6, 220 P.3d 518 , 520 (Wyo. 2009) (Burke, J.

, dissenting) (governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned) ( overruled in part on other gro unds by Brown v. City of Casper , 20 11 WY 35, ¶¶ 38

- 44, 248 P.3d 1136, 1145

- 47 (Wyo. 2011 ) ) ; Borns

, 2003 WY 74, ¶ 26, 70 P.3d at 271 (need for common law to keep pace with society); Dunnegan v. Laramie C nty

. Co m m’rs , 852 P.2d 1138, 1140 (Wyo. 1993) ( “to prevent the perpetuation of error and ‘ to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law [] ’ ”); Cook v. Sta te , 841 P.2d 1345, 1353 (Wyo. 1992) ( “ to clarify an inappropriate application of a traditional rule [so as] ‘ to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice []’” ); and Oroz v. B d . of C nty

. Comm’ rs , 575 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Wyo. 1978 ) (to discontinue an unfair and improper rule that operates to the detriment of those who may suffer tortious injury; to re

- examine the efficacy of an anachronistic doctrine in modern society). Plainly put, the rule of stare decisis does not justify the perpetuation of past wrongs.

[¶16 ] A few points can be added to the district court’s observations to help explain why
this Court now concludes that the WGCA should not, and does not, apply to inv erse condemnation actions. In 1 978, t his Court issued the Oroz opinion mentioned above

. See supra ¶ 15. I

n that opinion, we concluded that the long

- standing doctrine of10

g o v e r n m e n t a l i m m

u n i t y f r o m d a m a g

e s i n t o r t a c t i o n s s h o u l d b e a b r o g a t e d

, d e s p i t e t

h e

e q u a l l y l o n g

- s t a n d i n g d o c t r i n e o f s t a r e d e c i s i s

. I d

. , 5 7 5 P

. 2 d a

t 1 1 5 7

- 5 8

. The gravamen of our opinion was that enforcement of the doctrine resulted in “unfair and inequitable consequences” and that, instead, g overnmental entities should be subject “ to the same rules as private persons or co rporations if a duty has been violated and a tort has been
committed.” Id

. at 1158. In short, the focus of Oroz was upon torts and upon immunity.

[¶17 ] Very shortly after Oroz was published, the Wyoming Legislature adopted the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. Significantly, in stating the purpose of the Act, the Legislature referred specifically to Oroz and “recognize[d] the inherently unfair and inequitable results which occu r in the strict application of the doctrine of governmental immunity.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1

- 39

- 102. The focus of the WGCA, like the focus of
Oroz , was upon torts and upon immunity . The Act was not, however, open

- e nded. Schematically, the WGCA reta ined g overnmental immunity for tort liability, but then enumerated numerous specific exceptions where such immunity would no longer apply. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § § 1

- 39

- 104 to

- 121.

[¶18 ] It is within this context that we now discuss inverse condemnation. Both the Wyoming Constitution and Wyoming Statutes provide for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 32; Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1

- 2 6

- 5 01 to

- 516 (LexisNexis 2011). Similarly, both the Wyoming Constitution and the Wyoming Statutes require that the exercise of the power of eminent domain

-- sometimes called a “taking”

-- cannot occur without the payment of just compensation for the property lost. Wyo.
Const. art. 1, § 33 ; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1

- 26

- 514. More particular to the instant action, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1

- 26

- 516 provides that when a taking has occurred without the contemplated compensation, the injured party “may file an action in district court seeking damages for the taking or damage . . . .” This action is called an inverse condemnation

a ction.

[¶19 ] Logic now leads us to conclude that there is nothing about the constitutional and statutory right to an inverse condemnation action, and nothing about the WGCA, that could reasonably suggest that the former should be subject to the latter. T he WGCA abrogated governmental immunity for certain listed torts. Inverse condemnation is not a tort, and because it is a constitutional and statutory remedy, it never was subject to

g overnmental immunity. See 11A McQuillin

, Municipal Corporations § 32:158 , at 383 ( 3d ed. Revised 2009) (inverse condemnation is not based on tort or contract principles). In fact, just the opposite i s true ; rather than recognizing or providing for governmental immunity, both the constitutional provision and the statute provide that there can be no taking without compensation

. The avowed purpose of the WGCA was to enlarge the number of circumstances in which a private citizen could seek a remedy from a

g overnmental entity. The tool used in achieving that goal was the ab rogation of common law governmental immunity fo r certain specific torts . For example, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1

- 39

- 105 provides as follows:11 A g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t y i s l i a b l e f o r d a m a g e s r e s u l t i n g f r o m b o d i l y i n

j u r y , w r o n g f u l d e a t h o r p r

o p e r t y d a m a g

e

c a u s e d b y t h e n e g

l i g e n c e o f p u b l i c e m

p l o y e e s w

h i l e a c t i n g

w i t h i n t h e s c o p e o f t h e i r d u t i e s i n t h e o p e r a t i o n o f a n y m o t o r

v e h i c l e , a i r c r a f

t o r w a t e r c r a f

t

.

N e i t h e r t h e p u r

p o s e n o r t h e s t r

u c t u r e o f t h e W G C A s u g g e s t s t h a t i t a p p l i e s t o i n v e r s e condemnation actions, whic h was the subtle message underlying the district court’s
decision letter.

[¶20 ] If the WGCA does not, as a general matter, apply to inverse condemnation claims,
neither does its two

- year period of limitations for the presentment of a claim, found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1

- 39

- 113, nor its one

- year period of limitations for the commencement
of an action

, found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1

- 39

- 114. The question then becomes what period of limitations do es apply in inv erse condemnation actions. The answer to that

ques tion is not readily apparent within the Eminent Domain Act, found at Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § § 1

- 2 6

- 5 0 1 t o

- 5 1 6

. F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e r e d o e s n o t a p p e a r t o b e a c o n s e n s u s

n a t i o n w i d e on what statute of limitations should apply. See 27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent

Domain § 795 (2004). W hile this Court has not directly addressed the application of a statute of limitations to inverse condemnation claims, outside of the WGCA, we did make the following observation in dicta in Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers , 707 P.2d 717, 725 (Wyo. 1985):

S e c t i o n 1

- 3

- 1 0 3

, W

. S

. 1 9 7 7

, p r o v i d e s t h a t a

n a c t i o n f

o r t h e

r e c o v e r y o f t i t l e o r p o s s e s s i o n o f l a n d s , t e n e m e n t s o r h e r e d i t a m e n t s c a n o n l y b e b r o u g h t w i t h i n t e n y e a r s a f

t e r t h e

c a u s e o f a c t i o n a c c r

u e s

. C a s e s f

r o m o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e r u n n i n g o f s u c h s t a t u t e s o f l i m i t a t i o n s b a r

s u b s e q u e n

t c l a i m s o f i n v

e r s e c o n d e m

n a t i o n

. See Annot., 26 A.L.R.4th 68 (1983). Thus, § 1

- 3

- 103, supra, would

s eemingly preclude a claim (had such a claim even been

m ade) that the federal or state government had taken a

g eneral flight easement by either their declarations of public right of way or by their use of the airspace.

I d

. ; s e e a l s o 1 1 A M c Q u i l l i n , M

u n i c i p a l C o r p o r a t i o n s

, s u p r a

, a t § 32:162 , at 412

- 13

.

[¶21 ] While there may be some logic in comparing inverse condemnation to causes of action such as adverse possession

-- the common denominator being someone’s use of another’s property wi thout permission or compensation

-- that logic does not extend into a reading of Article 1, Chapter 3 of the Wyoming Statutes, which is entitled “Limitation of12

A c t i o n s

. ” W

y o

. S t a t

. A

n n

. § 1

- 3

- 103 is entitled “Recovery of real property; generally.”
It reads as follows:

A

n a c t i o n f o r t h e r e c o v

e r y o f t h e t i t l e o r p o s s e s s i o n o f

l a n d s , t e n e m e n t s o r h e r e d i t a m e n t s c a n o n l y b e b r o u g h t w i t h i n
t e n ( 1 0 ) y e a r s a f

t e r t h e c a u s e o f s u c h a c t i o n a c c r u e s

.

A n a c t i o n i n i n v

e r s e c o n d e m

n a t i o n i s n o t a n a c t i o n f o r t h e r e c o v

e r y of the title or possession of property. It is an action for damages. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1

- 3

- 103 is not ambiguous, and by its clear words, it does not apply to inverse condemnation actions.

[¶22 ] On the other hand, the language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1

- 3

- 1 05(a)(ii)(B) much more closely fits an inverse condemnation action. First, the section is entitled “Actions other than recovery of real property.” An inverse condemnation action is an “action other than recovery of real property.” Second, the language o f the subsection speaks directly to
such a cause of action:

( a ) C i v i l a c t i o n s o t h e r t h a n f o r t h e r e c o v

e r y o f r e a l

p r o p e r t y c a n o n l y b e b r

o u g h t w i t h i n t h e f

o l l o w i n g p e r i o d s

a f t e r t h e c a u s e o f a c t i o n a c c r u e s :

. . . .

( i i ) W i t h i n e i g

h t ( 8 ) y e a r s , a n a c t i o n :

. . . .

( B ) U p o n a l i a b i l i t y c r e a t e d b y s t a t u t e

o t h e r t h a n a f o r f e i t u r e o r p e

n a l t y

.

[¶23 ] Alt hough both article 1, section 32 and article 1, section 33 of the Wyoming Constitution declare that private property shall not be taken without compensation, it is Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1

- 26

- 516 that creates the cause of action whereby an inju red party may recover damages f

r om the person responsible for an unlawfu l taking. The statute does not create a forfeiture or a penalty; it creates liability for damages caused by a taking. The period of limitations for bringing an action in inverse condemnation is eight years.

[¶24 ] The pleadings allege, and the district c ourt found, that the Smiths submitted a notice of claim to the Board on February 10, 2009 , prior to the filing of the instant action, which occurred on February 3, 2010 . The notice of claim is in the record, and it clearly13

a p p e a r s t o m e e t t

h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f a r t i c l e 1 6

, s e c t i o n 7 o f the Wyoming Constitution. 2
Without going into unnecessary detail as to dates, we will note that the current controversy began in 2006 with the filing of the Justice petition described above. See

supra ¶ 5. The district court found that the Smiths knew of th eir inverse condemnation
claim via events occurring on May 17, 2006, or, at the latest, on October 4, 2006.

I nasmuch a s a period of eight years has not passed since then, the statute of limitations
has not run on the Smith s’ claim.

C O N C L U S I O N

[¶25 ] We conclude that inverse condemnation actions are not subject to the WGCA, and we reverse all previous opinions of this Court that have held to the contrary. The period of limitations applying to inverse condemnation action s i s that period found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1

- 3

- 105(a)(ii)(B), a period of eight years. The Smiths’ action was filed well within that period. Therefor e , we reverse and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

2 The specific issue before the Court in this case is the period of limitations fo r c o m m e n c i n g a n a c t i o n , n o t

t h e p e r i o d o f l i m i t a t i o n s f o r p r e s e n t i n g a c l a i m

. B e c a u s e w e h a v e c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e W G C A d o e s n o t

a p p l y t o i n v e r s e c o n d e m

n a t i o n a c t i o n s , n e i t

h e r W G C A p e r i o d o f l i m i t a t i o n s a p p l i e s i n t

h i s c a s e

. A

r t i c l e 1 6

, s e c t i o n 7 o f t

h e W y o m i n g C o n s t i t

u t i o n c o n t i n u e s t o r e q u i r e , h o w e v e r , t h a t c l a i m s a g a i n s t governmental entities not be paid until a “full itemized statement” of such is filed in the appropriate office. We do not herein undertake to determine the appropriate time constraints for the presentment of
such a cla im under this payment provision

.