GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

August 1999 CHEMICAL AND 

BIOLOGICAL 

DEFENSE

Program Planning and 

Evaluation Should 

Follow Results Act 

Framework

GAO/NSIAD-99-159

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-159 Chemical and Biological Defense 

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-282699 Letter

August 16, 1999

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

Since the Persian Gulf War, Members of Congress have raised concerns 

regarding the adequacy of technology used by the Department of Defense 

(DOD) to detect, identify, prepare for, and protect troops against chemical 

and biological (CB) weapons.1

 In 1993, the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (P.L. 103-160) directed the Secretary of Defense to 

take actions designed to improve the Department’s CB defense capabilities, 

including coordination and integration of all CB defense programs into 

what is now the CB Defense Program. More recently, concerns that 

terrorists might move beyond using conventional weapons to chemical or 

biological devices led Congress to authorize the federal government to 

improve domestic capabilities to respond to such incidents. With the 

initiation of these domestic preparedness programs in fiscal year 1997, 

federal research and development efforts to develop nonmedical 

CB defense technology expanded considerably, and they continue to grow.2

 

According to the White House, the President’s fiscal year 2000 budget 

request includes over $10 billion to combat terrorism. Almost $1.4 billion is 

for programs specifically aimed at terrorist threats from chemical, 

biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons, an amount which exceeds the 

1

 See Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains Insufficient to Resolve Continuing Problems

(GAO/NSIAD-96-103, Mar. 29, 1996) and Chemical Weapons: DOD Does Not Have a Strategy to Address

Low-Level Exposures (GAO/NSIAD-98-228, Sept. 23, 1998). 

2

 Nonmedical technologies refer to technologies for detecting, identifying, protecting against, or 

decontaminating personnel and equipment of chemical and biological agents. By contrast, examples of 

medical research and development include the development of prophylactics such as vaccines, medical 

diagnostics for determining exposure to chemical or biological agents, and therapeutic drugs or 

procedures for countering the effects of exposure.

Letr
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funding of less than $1 billion for military programs to counter chemical 

and biological threats. 

In 1993 Congress enacted the Government Performance and Results Act 

(commonly referred to as the Results Act). The legislation was designed to 

have agencies focus on the performance and results of their programs 

rather than on program activities and resources, as they had traditionally 

done. Congress sought to shift federal management and oversight from its 

preoccupation with program staffing, activity levels, and tasks completed 

to program results—that is, to the real difference that federal programs 

make in people’s lives. Congressional reports and administrative guidance 

indicate that programs such as the CB Defense Program should follow the 

Results Act’s outcome-oriented principles, including the establishment of 

general goals as well as quantifiable, measurable, outcome-oriented 

performance goals and related measures.

As you requested, we examined the extent to which DOD has applied the 

Results Act’s outcome-oriented principles to the CB Defense Program, 

focusing in particular on research, development, testing, and evaluation 

(RDT&E) activities that lead to new technologies and defensive 

capabilities. Specifically, we assessed whether (1) CB Defense Program 

goals are explicit and measurable, (2) the CB Defense Program has 

performance measures that assess outcomes and impacts rather than 

outputs and activities, and (3) organizations executing the CB Defense 

RDT&E activities have incorporated Results Act principles in their program 

planning and evaluation. A companion report Chemical and Biological

Defense: Coordination of Nonmedical Chemical and Biological Research

and Development Programs (GAO/NSIAD-99-160, Aug. 16, 1999) examines 

coordination on nonmedical CB defense research and development 

programs. 

Results in Brief DOD’s CB Defense Program in general, and its RDT&E activities in 

particular, have not incorporated key Results Act principles, as evidenced 

by the fact that the goals of the program are vague and unmeasurable and 

do not articulate specific desired impacts. Program planners do not 

explain, for example, the meaning of goals such as denying military 

advantage or allowing U.S. forces to operate largely unimpeded by 

chemical and biological attacks. In the absence of explicit and measurable 

goals, it is difficult to assess whether the program has been successful in 

achieving its goals.

Letr
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The performance measures of CB Defense Program RDT&E emphasize 

activities rather than impacts. The program is not being evaluated 

according to its impact on the defensive or operational capabilities of 

U.S. forces, either individually or collectively. CB Defense Program 

planners use roadmaps to track program progress toward meeting 

chemical and biological defense goals. These goals frequently take the 

form of advanced concept technology demonstrations.3

 However, the 

demonstration of a new defensive technology or capability is not a measure 

of the program’s impact or contribution to the military’s ability to survive, 

fight, and win in chemical and biological environments. For example, these 

technology demonstrations may still need additional engineering and 

manufacturing development or product and concept development, as well 

as successful operational testing, before production begins and warfighters 

are equipped.

CB Defense Program research and development organizations have 

incorporated Results Act principles inconsistently. Only one organization 

has adopted the Results Act planning and evaluation tools. The remaining 

research and development organizations cited either the utilization of 

equivalent planning tools or the unique challenges of evaluating research 

and development activities as reasons why they had not or could not adopt 

the Results Act processes. 

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense take actions to 

develop a performance plan for the CB Defense Program based on the 

outcome-oriented management principles embodied in the Results Act.

Background Consistent with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

1994,4 the Secretary of Defense assigned responsibility for the overall 

coordination and integration of the CB Defense Program to a single office, 

the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation 

and Chemical/Biological Defense. The office is responsible for approving 

all planning, programming, and budgeting documents, ensuring 

3

 Advanced concept technology demonstrations assess the military utility of mature technologies and 

their capabilities in realistic operational scenarios. CB defense capabilities that have been explored 

through these technology demonstrations include the capability to (1) provide early warning of remote 

biological warfare agents; (2) detect, warn, dewarn, identify, protect, and decontaminate air bases and 

seaports against biological attack; and (3) integrate biological and chemical detection and early 

warning capability at an air base or seaport.

4

 P.L. 103-160, sec. 1701.
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coordination between the medical and nonmedical CB defense efforts, and 

overseeing management oversight in accordance with the law. Several 

organizations within DOD conduct RDT&E activities on behalf of the CB 

Defense Program. These include the Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency (DARPA), the Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, and the 

Joint Program Office for Biological Defense. In addition, CB defense 

research and development is conducted at the national laboratories of the 

Department of Energy (DOE), funded both by DOD and DOE.

The program addresses five defensive capabilities, three of which are 

nonmedical: contamination avoidance, protection, and decontamination,5

as well as medical chemical defense and medical biological defense. These 

areas comprise the framework that DOD uses to formulate nonmedical CB 

Defense Program requirements. When doctrinal, training, or organizational 

solutions cannot satisfy warfighters’ needs in these areas, DOD seeks new 

equipment through the research, development, and acquisition cycle.6

 CB 

defense funding is divided between the program’s two primary activities: 

RDT&E and procurement. Of the CB Defense Program budget of 

$717 million proposed for fiscal year 2000, $340 million (47 percent) would 

be for RDT&E and the remaining $377 million (53 percent) for 

procurement.

The Results Act is the primary legislative framework through which 

agencies, at all levels, are required to set strategic goals, measure 

performance, and report on the degree to which goals are met. The 

outcome-oriented principles of the Results Act, which Congress 

anticipated would be institutionalized and practiced at all organizational 

levels in federal agencies, include (1) establishing general goals and 

quantifiable, measurable, outcome-oriented performance goals and related 

measures; (2) developing strategies for achieving the goals, including 

strategies for overcoming or mitigating major impediments to goal 

achievement; (3) ensuring that goals at lower organizational levels align 

with and support general goals; and (4) identifying the resources that will 

be required to achieve the goals.

5

 Contamination avoidance includes detecting, avoiding, and bypassing contaminated areas; protection 

consists of individual and collective protection; decontamination is the restoration of combat power 

after a CB attack.

6

 DOD categorizes RDT&E into five budget activities: basic research (6.1 account), applied research 

(6.2), advanced technology development (6.3), demonstration/validation (6.4), and engineering and 

manufacturing development (6.5). DOD refers to “activities 6.1 to 6.3” as Defense Science and 

Technology.
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In its guidance on Results Act implementation, the Chief Financial Officers 

Council advised agencies that to comply with the spirit and intent of the 

act, the goals and measures used at lower organizational levels should be 

linked with the agency’s strategic goals.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) serves as DOD’s overall strategic 

planning document. The QDR directs DOD organizations at all levels to 

review their strategic and mission objectives in order to ensure that they 

link to the goals and objectives of the QDR and that Results Act 

performance plans indicate progress toward meeting QDR goals. DOD 

implementing guidance states that the goals, objectives, measures of 

success, quantifiable performance measures, and program outcome 

evaluations of subordinate organizations should be linked to the DOD 

corporate goals articulated in the QDR and made operational in the DOD 

performance plan. DOD does not routinely link its performance measures 

to specific organizational units or individuals, which have sufficient 

flexibility, discretion, and authority to accomplish desired results. DOD’s 

performance plan for fiscal year 2000 does not specifically discuss the CB 

Defense Program. (CB Defense Program RDT&E activities are aggregated 

with those of other modernization activities to support DOD’s second 

corporate goal to “prepare now for an uncertain future by pursuing a 

focused modernization effort that maintains U.S. qualitative superiority in 

key warfighting capabilities.”) 

Congressional reports and administrative guidance indicate that programs 

such as the CB Defense Program should follow the outcome-oriented 

principles of the Results Act. In our assessment of the adherence of the 

program to the act, we only evaluate of the first of four principles—

establishing general goals and quantifiable, measurable, outcome-oriented 

performance goals, and related measures.7

7

 Tasks required for implementing the first principle include (1) identifying the organization’s mission 

and long-term strategic goals, (2) describing how the organization’s annual performance goals are 

related to its long-term goals, (3) specifying annual performance goals for each program activity, 

(4) identifying the performance measures the organization will use to assess its progress, and 

(5) describing how data will be verified and validated.
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Goals of the CB 

Defense Program Are 

Vague and 

Unmeasurable and Do 

Not Articulate Specific 

Desired Impacts

Although DOD has taken the initial and necessary step of articulating CB 

Defense Program goals, the goals are not articulated in a manner consistent 

with Results Act principles. The stated goals are vague and unmeasurable, 

and they fail to articulate specific desired impacts. A Results Act 

framework requires that managers define a related set of long-term 

strategic goals, annual agency goals, and measurable performance goals for 

each program. The five CB Defense Program goals are to 

1. deter CB weapon use by denying military advantage to an enemy 

through a combination of avoidance, protection, decontamination, and 

medical support capabilities, allowing U.S. forces to operate largely 

unimpeded by chemical and biological attacks and their subsequent 

effects;

2. address the most probable CB weapon threats that could be 

encountered in regional conflicts and field capabilities to the forces 

required for two major theater wars;

3. ensure the CB weapon Threat Evaluation Projection drives CB defense 

research, development, and acquisition programs;

4. emphasize a joint service approach to CB defense research and 

development, and acquisition; and

5. complete critical RDT&E and acquisition of improved CB detection, 

identification, and warning systems; individual and collective protection 

systems; and medical support and decontamination systems.

Measuring the first goal is unachievable, determining a deterrence effect is 

problematic, and attributing the specific rationale for the deterrence is 

unrealistic. The second, third, and fourth goals address the size, focus, and 

coordination of the program—not program outcomes. Together, these 

goals direct that the program be sufficiently large to address the needs 

resulting from two major theater wars; sufficiently focused to address the 

likely validated threats; and sufficiently coordinated to capitalize on 

efficiencies and other benefits of joint requirements determination, 

research, development, and acquisition. The objective of the fifth goal is 

measurable but speaks to program outputs without addressing program 

outcomes or impacts (such as decreased defensive vulnerabilities or 

increased operational capabilities). The completion of RDT&E or 

procurement cannot be assumed to result in a positive impact on the 
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defensive posture or operational flexibility of U.S. forces. While the 

completion of these activities may well generate benefits for U.S. troops, in 

the absence of valid, reliable measures, the contributions of RDT&E or 

procurement cannot be determined. 

CB Defense Program 

Performance Measures 

Emphasize Activities 

Rather Than Outcomes 

and Impacts 

The CB Defense Program is not evaluated on the impact of its activities on 

the defensive or operational capabilities of U.S. forces, either individually 

or collectively. 

CB Defense Program planners use roadmaps, Defense Technology 

Objectives (DTO) and advanced concept technology demonstrations 

(ACTD) to assess progress toward goals. Program planners collectively 

prepare a number of strategic plans they describe as “in the spirit of the 

Results Act,” if not specifically for the purpose of assessing outcomes and 

impacts. For example, DOD’s Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) 

Defense Annual Report to Congress8

 and the Joint Service NBC Defense 

Research, Development, and Acquisition Plan are updated annually and 

include detailed metrics and time lines reflecting the performance of the 

program (such as the demonstration of a new technology). Roadmaps 

track program progress toward DTOs that, when achieved, DOD claims will 

create new operational capabilities. A number of DTOs are ACTDs, and 

plans state that technology demonstrations provide a means for the rapid 

field testing of technical options to solve operational needs. CB Defense 

Program roadmaps explicitly link the completion of DTOs and ACTDs with 

an increase in the demonstrated warfighting capabilities of U.S. forces. In 

addition, CB Defense Program planners cited ongoing programmatic peer 

reviews, such as Technology Area Reviews and Assessments (TARA), as 

additional means to measure progress toward meeting program goals. 

We do not concur that the conduct of an ACTD or a peer review of ongoing 

work measures the impact of the CB Defense Program on the warfighter. 

Both measures have limitations that make them inappropriate for 

appraising progress toward achieving program objectives. ACTDs 

represent a means for rapidly introducing new technologies and reducing 

the time from the start of a program to the system’s initial operational 

capability. However, the demonstration of a new technology may not by 

itself result in the effective and safe deployment of a military capability in 

8

 Submitted to Congress annually pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1523.
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support of the warfighter. Moreover, as we previously reported, DOD has 

not always emphasized the need to complete concept and product 

development or testing before production, thus increasing the risk of 

approving ACTDs in support of CB defense that include immature 

technologies and then prematurely starting production.9

 

Technology Area Review 

Assessments Are Not a 

Measure of Program Impact

TARAs are peer reviews conducted by the Director, Defense Research and 

Engineering on each of DOD’s 12 science and technology programs—one 

being, CB defense. TARAs address progress toward achieving DTOs and 

form the basis of the Results Act rating for DOD’s performance in science 

and technology.10 However, the application of the TARA to generate 

performance measures of DOD’s science and technology programs—such 

as CB defense—is limited by several factors. First, the scope of the TARA 

Results Act ratings is limited because TARAs only address DTOs. Funding 

for DTOs comprises less than 50 percent of total funding for applied and 

advanced technology research and development. Thus, the Results Act 

ratings do not capture the majority of the CB Defense Program’s RDT&E 

activities. Second, the focus of TARAs is on budgets, schedules, and 

technical performance. TARAs do not measure technology transition from 

the laboratory to the battlefield. Lastly, TARAs do not measure 

improvements in the ability of U.S. troops to survive, fight, and win in a CB 

environment.

CB Defense Program 

Research and 

Development 

Organizations Have 

Incorporated Results 

Act Principles 

Inconsistently

The organizations that execute or contribute to the research and 

development goals of the CB Defense Program vary in their use of the 

Results Act principles to plan and assess their activities. 

9

 Defense Acquisition: Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration Program Can Be Improved

(GAO/NSIAD-99-4, Oct. 15, 1998).

10 In fiscal year 1999, there were 23 chemical and biological defense DTOs, many in the form of ACTDs.
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The Soldier and Biological 

Chemical Command Is the 

Only RDT&E Organization 

to Systematically Apply 

Results Act Principles

The Soldier and Biological Chemical Command has demonstrated that the 

Results Act principles can be integrated into the planning and evaluation 

process of an organization conducting research and development for the 

CB Defense Program.11 In 1996, the Chemical and Biological Defense 

Command (which in fiscal year 1999 merged with the Soldier Systems 

Command to form the Soldier and Biological Chemical Command) 

developed a Business Planning Guide aligned with the Results Act 

guidelines. The guide linked planning guidance of higher headquarters 

(the Army Materiel Command); the Army’s Planning, Programming, 

Budgeting, and Execution System; and the Results Act. The guide stated 

that the Results Act “is the basis for the three products that result from our 

business planning process outlined in this document: a strategic plan, an 

annual performance plan, and an annual report.” Subsequently, the 

Chemical and Biological Defense Command issued strategic plans for the 

fiscal years 1997–2003 and fiscal years 1998–2004 time frames, annual 

performance plans for fiscal years 1997 and 1998, and an annual report for 

fiscal year 1997.

The Chemical and Biological Defense Command strategic plan is driven by 

and linked with the overarching planning architectures of DOD, the Army, 

and the Army Materiel Command. The Chemical and Biological Defense 

Command’s strategic planning model directly links the attainment of its 

vision with the development of goals and enabling strategies—followed by 

the execution of the strategies and measurement of performance. Separate 

measures were developed to assess goal achievement as well as progress 

toward goal achievement. 

Specifically, the plan identified Chemical and Biological Defense Command 

goals, strategies for achieving the goals, and measures of goal achievement. 

Two of the Command’s six goals address their potential contributions to the 

CB Defense Program. They are to

• research, develop, acquire, and field NBC defense, smoke, and 

obscurant materiel that meets warfighter requirements and reduces 

acquisition costs and timeliness (i.e., produces products faster and at 

lower costs) and 

• become the organization of choice for chemical, biological, and 

smoke/obscurant research, development, and technology services.

11 We did not assess the comprehensiveness, quality, or effectiveness of the command’s effort.
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The performance plan identifies performance measures for each Command 

goal and performance goals for each strategy. The performance measures 

address both accomplishments and progress toward accomplishments. 

Examples of quantitative measures of research and development 

accomplishments include (1) the percentage of new NBC systems that 

meet NBC survivability requirements, (2) the percentage of nonexempt 

acquisitions receiving waivers from performance specifications, and (3) the 

percentage of Soldier and Biological Chemical Command science and 

technology programs transitioning to joint service and Army development 

programs with user validation through modeling, wargames, or similar 

methods.

Soldier and Biological Chemical Command officials explained that the 

Command is still evaluating some of the fundamental dilemmas in applying 

Results Act principles. For example, the Command has yet to agree on 

what the right measures are. The identification of measures in the research 

and development component of the Soldier and Biological Chemical 

Command (and CB defense in general) has been an ongoing challenge and 

continues to evolve.

Other CB Defense RDT&E 

Organizations Have Not 

Applied Results Act 

Principles

The remaining RDT&E organizations cited a variety of reasons for not 

incorporating the Results Act’s principles in their program planning or 

evaluation systems.12 The two most common reasons cited were that 

current DOD planning processes were equivalent to those of the act, 

resulting in plans that were “in the spirit” of the Results Act, and that the 

unique nature of RDT&E activities did not lend itself to the act’s 

performance measurement and evaluation.

CB Defense Program Planning 

and Evaluation

DOD officials explained that the Office of the Secretary of Defense, NBC 

Defense Steering Committee, conducts planning consistent with Results 

Act principles for the CB Defense Program by issuing and executing the 

Program Objectives Memorandum. They claimed that 

memorandum-related planning documents, including reports that address 

different aspects of the CB Defense Program (such as the Joint Operational 

Concept; the Research, Development, and Acquisition Plan; the Joint 

Logistics Support Plan; and the Joint Modernization Plan) as well as the 

12 Of the remaining principal federal organizations that conduct RDT&E on CB defense topics, only 

DOE’s CB Nonproliferation Program has developed a strategic plan, and none have developed a 

performance plan.
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NBC Defense Annual Report to Congress, constitute the equivalent of a 

strategic plan. Moreover, CB Defense Program managers stated that DOD’s 

Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System is equivalent to the system 

required by the act and that therefore no substantive changes are necessary 

to comply with the spirit of the legislation.13

Measurement of RDT&E 

Activities

There is no consensus on the appropriateness of applying performance 

measures to RDT&E activities. While the Soldier and Biological Chemical 

Command has developed and applied measures of research and 

development outcomes, other organizations conducting CB Defense 

Program RDT&E have not. Neither DARPA, DOE, nor the Joint Program 

Office for Biological Defense have taken the initiative to develop a 

performance plan. In its strategic plan, DOE included a 5-year roadmap for 

developing, demonstrating, and delivering technology that would lead to 

major improvements in preparedness and capabilities. The Joint Program 

Office cites the conduct of ACTDs as measures of its performance. DARPA 

officials maintain that the nature of their RDT&E activities do not lend 

themselves to the application of performance measurement. 

DARPA conducts leading-edge research where the risks of failure are high 

and the probability of success is low. Its mission is to pursue long-term, 

far-reaching, and high-risk/high-payoff technology for military systems in 

the distant future. DARPA officials argued that developing useable metrics 

that are measurable, relevant, and timely for technology anticipated 10 or 

more years into the future is impossible. Moreover, they stated that goals 

and expectations are set at the project level and cannot be aggregated at 

the program level. Therefore, according to the officials, it would be 

inappropriate to develop programwide or agencywide measures of success 

or performance.

Nonetheless, DARPA did try to develop a performance contract and 

submitted a draft to the Defense Management Council in early 1998. It also 

argued, however, that it did not fit the mold of most DOD agencies and 

should therefore be exempt from the act’s requirements. DARPA drafted 

performance metrics addressing its research operations as well as 

administrative efficiency. The performance metrics proposed for the 

research portion of its activities consisted of a series of assessments 

13 The DOD Comptroller has noted that the Results Act is related to, but distinct from, DOD’s Planning, 

Programming, and Budgeting System, and has stated that Results Act planning and program evaluations 

need to be integrated with DOD’s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System.
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performed by an independent panel of experts.14 In December 1998, the 

Defense Management Council notified DARPA that it was exempt from the 

requirement. The draft performance contract was never finalized or 

implemented. 

Congress has recognized that successful implementation on the Results Act 

in science agencies would not come quickly or easily. Nonetheless, 

research organizations have concluded that the Results Act can or should 

be applied. The Research Roundtable, a group of federal researchers and 

managers representing a cross section of departments and agencies, 

concluded in 1995 that the results of a research program’s performance can 

be measured. The Army Research Laboratory was designated as a pilot 

project for performance measurement under the act and ultimately 

outlined an evaluation approach that made use of three pillars: metrics, 

peer review, and customer feedback. In 1999, the Committee on Science, 

Engineering, and Public Policy of the National Academy of Sciences, the 

National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine reported 

on the results of their work on the issue of measuring and evaluating 

research in compliance with the act’s requirements. The committee 

concluded that both applied research and basic research programs 

supported by the federal government can be evaluated meaningfully on a 

regular basis.

Conclusions The CB defense research and development outcomes and impacts are not 

being systematically measured. The CB Defense Program lacks both 

quantifiable performance measures and measurable objectives. In the 

absence of measures of program impacts and measurable objectives, 

progress toward achieving program goals cannot be determined. Program 

planning consists of a series of roadmaps leading to specific equipment 

items. Managers cite activity measures and technology demonstrations as 

measures of the program’s contribution. These planning and programming 

steps are appropriate and necessary, but they are insufficient for 

quantifying outcomes and impacts. Current measures do not assess the 

incremental changes attributable, in whole or in part, to the CB Defense 

14 The Defense Science Board was the proposed panel. It would have been tasked to review the 

portfolio of DARPA projects to assess projects with regard to (1) relevance to warfighters, (2) ratio of 

technology investments versus system development, (3) level of risk, (4) ratio of new versus continuing 

efforts, and (5) level of service and commercial sector participation.
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Program that improve warfighters’ ability to survive, fight, and win in a CB 

environment.

The Results Act outcome-oriented principles have not been widely applied 

by either CB Defense Program planners or executing organizations. The 

utilization of these principles can enable managers and those overseeing 

the program to quantify the relative success of the program and of 

component projects in satisfying requirements across different activities 

(e.g., point detection, early warning, warning and reporting, and modeling). 

Impact measures can provide a planning tool to allocate finite CB Defense 

Program resources among competing sets of unmet requirements.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take actions to develop a 

performance plan for the CB Defense Program based on the 

outcome-oriented management principles embodied in the Results Act. 

The plan should be agreed to and supported by the relevant RDT&E 

organizations and incorporated in DOD’s NBC Defense Annual Report to 

Congress. Specifically, the plan should

• establish explicit and outcome-oriented goals linked to warfighters’ 

ability to survive, fight, and win in a CB environment;

• identify quantitative or qualitative performance measures that can be 

used to assess progress toward goal achievement;

• describe how performance data would be validated; 

• describe how RDT&E activities of participating DOD and non-DOD 

organizations are coordinated to achieve program goals; and 

• identify human capital, financial, and resource challenges or external 

factors that limit the ability of the program to achieve its goals. 

Agency Comments In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our 

recommendation. DOD stated it will develop a strategic plan more closely 

aligned with the tenets of the Results Act and publish the plan in the next 

DOD NBC Defense Annual Report to Congress. DOD’s comments are 

reprinted in appendix I. Our scope and methodology are explained in 

appendix II, and CB Defense Program RDT&E organizations are described 

in appendix III.
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As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 7 days after its 

issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the Honorable William S. 

Cohen, Secretary of Defense and other congressional committees. We will 

also make copies available to others on request.

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me or 

Sushil K. Sharma at (202) 512-3092. Key contributors to this assignment 

were Jeffrey Harris and Weihsueh Chiu. 

Kwai-Cheung Chan

Director, Special Studies and Evaluations
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Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-159 Chemical and Biological Defense

Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I

Comments From the 

Department of Defense

18

Appendix II

Scope and 

Methodology

20

Appendix III

Chemical and 

Biological Defense 

Program Research, 

Development, Test, and 

Evaluation 

Organizations

22

Figures Figure III.1: Primary Planning and Executing Organizations and 

Programs of DOD’s Chemical and Biological Defense Program 

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 23

Abbreviations

ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration

CB chemical and biological 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DOD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

DTO Defense Technology Objective

NBC Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review

RDT&E research, development, testing, and evaluation

TARA Technology Area Review Assessment
Contents

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Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-159 Chemical and Biological Defense

Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense ApenxIdi
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense

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Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-159 Chemical and Biological Defense

Appendix II

Scope and Methodology ApenxIdi

The scope of our study was limited to the nonmedical research, 

development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) activities of the Department 

of Defense’s (DOD)Chemical and Biological (CB) Defense Program. This 

study does not address any classified programs or projects. 

To determine whether the program goals were explicit and measurable and 

whether its performance measures assessed outcomes and impacts rather 

than outputs and activities, we reviewed the legislative record, interviewed 

agency officials, and analyzed program documents. To understand the 

requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act, we 

reviewed the legislation as well as implementation guidance issued by the 

Office of Management and Budget, DOD Comptroller, and the General 

Accounting Office.1

 We queried representatives of the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense’s Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Defense 

Steering Committee and the executing organizations (i.e., Joint Program 

Office, Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, Defense Advanced 

Research Projects Agency (DARPA)) regarding their familiarity with, and 

utilization of, the Results Act’s performance measurement principles. We 

reviewed strategic and performance plans implementing the act as well as 

documents characterized by DOD officials as complying with the “spirit of 

the legislation.”2

To determine whether organizations executing the CB Defense RDT&E 

activities have incorporated Results Act principles in their program 

planning and evaluation, we interviewed program officials, examined 

program documents, observed program review meetings, and attended 

scientific conferences on CB defense technologies. Program documents 

we examined included program budgets, strategic and performance plans, 

annual reports, internal program planning documents, program briefings, 

and proceedings of program review meetings. We also observed the 1999 

DOD Technology Area Review and Assessment of chemical and biological 

defense. Scientific conferences we attended included the 1998 Joint 

Workshop on Standoff Detection for Chemical and Biological Defense and 

the 1998 Scientific Conference on Chemical and Biological Defense 

1

 See Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act

(GAO/GGD-96-118, June 1996); Agencies’ Annual Performance Plans Under the Results Act: An 

Assessment Guide to Facilitate Congressional Decisionmaking (GAO/GGD/AIMD-10.1.18, February 

1998); and The Results Act: An Evaluator’s Guide to Assessing Agency Annual Performance Plans

(GAO/GGD-10.1.20, April 1998).

2

 These include the DOD NBC Defense Annual Report to Congress (submitted pursuant to 50 CFR 

1523), the Joint NBC Modernization Plan, the Joint Service NBC Defense Research, Development, and 

Acquisition Plan, and the Joint Service NBC Defense Logistics Plan.
Appendix II

Scope and Methodology

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-159 Chemical and Biological Defense

Research. We also obtained proceedings from these and other scientific 

conferences.

To respond to all three objectives, we contacted the following 

organizations: DARPA, Arlington, Virginia; Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency, Dulles, Virginia; DOD Inspector General, Washington, D.C.; 

Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.; Director, Defense Research and 

Engineering, Washington, D.C.; Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, Utah; 

Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, 

Maryland; Joint Program Office for Biological Defense, Falls Church, 

Virginia; National Domestic Preparedness Office, Washington, D.C.; 

National Ground Intelligence Center, Charlottesville, Virginia; 

Nonproliferation and National Security Office, Department of Energy, 

Washington, D.C.; Office of Science and Technology Policy, White House, 

Washington, D.C.; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.; 

U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, Aberdeen Proving 

Ground, Maryland; and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort 

Monroe, Virginia.

We conducted our review from November 1998 to April 1999 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-159 Chemical and Biological Defense

Appendix III

Chemical and Biological Defense Program 

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 

Organizations ApenxIdi

The CB Defense Program is overseen by the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense’s Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Steering Committee, 

which is comprised of the Directors of the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency and Defense Research and Engineering as well as their top officials 

responsible for CB defense. The steering committee funds research and 

development at numerous laboratories in DOD, Department of Energy, and 

private industry.1

 

As illustrated in figure III.1, key research and development organizations in 

the execution of the program include the SBCCOM, JPO-BD, DARPA.

1

 The CB Defense Program addresses nonmedical research and development in the areas of chemical 

detection, biological detection, individual protection, collective protection, decontamination, modeling 

and simulation, core science and technology, and basic research. In addition, core science and 

technology includes threat assessment and aerosol technology; and basic research includes aerosol 

science, chemistry and toxicology, and analytical chemistry.
Appendix III

Chemical and Biological Defense Program 

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 

Organizations

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-159 Chemical and Biological Defense

Figure III.1: Primary Planning and Executing Organizations and Programs of DOD’s Chemical and Biological Defense Program 

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation

SBCCOM is organized around two integrated business areas, one of which 

is research, development, and acquisition. Nearly half of SBCCOM 

research, development and acquisition funding supports the CB Defense 

Program. SBCCOM is engaged in the full range of research and 

development encompassing both biological and chemical systems. 

Department of 

Defense

Department of

Energy

Defense Threat

Reduction 

Agency

Director of Defense

Research and 

Engineering

DATSD

Counterproliferation

and CB Defense

Director of

CB Defense

Directorate

CB Nonproliferation

Program

CB Nonproliferation

Program

Department

of Energy

Labs

SBCCOM JPO-BD

$ $

DARPA

NBC Defense Steering Committee

CB Defense Program

DATSD = Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

SBCCOM = Soldier and Biological Chemical Command

JPO-BD = Joint Program Office for Biological Defense

DARPA = Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

= Funding flows

= Informal coordination
Appendix III

Chemical and Biological Defense Program 

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 

Organizations

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-159 Chemical and Biological Defense

SBCCOM business areas include chemical detection, biological detection, 

decontamination, protection, and supporting science and technology. 

JPO-BD was created in 1994 to manage the biological warfare agent 

detection program. The office monitors emerging technologies for 

advanced development, demonstration, and upgrades of fielded biological 

detection systems. 

The DARPA Biological Warfare Defense Program is an applied research 

program established by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 1997 (P.L. 103-160, as amended) to fund an applied research program 

supporting revolutionary new approaches to biological warfare defense. 

The Biological Warfare Defense Program pursues high-risk, high-potential 

technologies from the demonstration of technical feasibility through the 

development of prototype systems.

DOE’s CB Nonproliferation Program was established in 1997 in response to 

the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, which 

appropriated $17 million to DOE to conduct research and development to 

develop new means for detecting the presence, transportation, production, 

and use of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and 

technologies. According to DOE, the purpose of this appropriation was to 

ensure the full engagement of DOE national laboratories in responding to 

the threat posed by CB weapons to U.S. civilians. DOE funds research and 

development, from basic research to fieldable prototypes, in pursuit of 

advanced technologies that can enable first responders to more effectively 

prepare and respond to the use of CB agents.

(713039) Lert
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