UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-4665

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

COLEEN MILLICENT WILLIAMS, a/k/a Millie,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 04-4082

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

GILBERT GOULBOURNE, a/k/a Carol Angel, a/k/a

Gail Chambers,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Greenville. Margaret B. Seymour, G. Ross

Anderson, Jr., District Judges. (CR-03-231)

Submitted: June 27, 2005 Decided: July 28, 2005

Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
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Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part by unpublished per

curiam opinion.

David W. Plowden, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville

South Carolina; Robert M. Sneed, FOSTER LAW FIRM, Greenville, South

Carolina, for Appellants. Jonathan S. Gasser, Acting United States

Attorney, Isaac Louis Johnson, Jr., Assistant United States

Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
1

Williams’ presentence report assessed an offense level of 30

based on drug quantity, and added two points for her role in the

offense, for a total offense level of 32. During the sentencing

hearing, the district court stated that it would have assessed four

levels for her role in the offense, but instead would only assess

two levels based on the probation officer’s recommendation. When

the court pronounced sentence, however, it used a total offense

level of 30. There is no explanation in the transcript for this

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PER CURIAM:

Gilbert Goulbourne and Coleen Williams appeal their

convictions and sentences for conspiracy to distribute cocaine in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000), and possession with intent to

distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000). We

affirm their convictions, but we vacate their sentences and remand

for resentencing in light of United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct.

738 (2005), and United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540 (4th Cir.

2005).

Goulbourne and Williams claim that the district court

improperly sentenced them when it imposed a sentence greater than

the maximum authorized by the facts found by the jury alone.

Because they failed to raise this claim below, we review it for

plain error. Hughes, 401 F.3d at 547. The jury convicted

Goulbourne and Williams of responsibility for 500 for or more grams

of cocaine for each count. At sentencing, the district court found

Williams accountable for 2,958.02 grams of cocaine, for a total

offense level of thirty pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

Manual § 2D1.1(c)(5) (2002).1 The court held Goulbourne
discrepancy. 

2Just as we noted in Hughes, 401 F.3d at 545 n.4, “[w]e of

course offer no criticism of the district judge, who followed the

law and procedure in effect at the time” of Williams’ and

Goulbourne’s sentencing.

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accountable for 2,975.06 grams of cocaine and 10.81 grams of

cocaine base, USSG § 2D1.1(c)(5), and assessed an additional four

offense levels for his role in the offense, USSG § 3B1.1(a), for a

total offense level of thirty-four. Given their criminal history

category of I, the district court’s drug quantity factual finding

increased Williams’ sentencing range from 63-78 months to 97-121

months. The drug quantity and role in the offense findings

increased Goulbourne’s sentencing range from 63-73 months to 151-

188 months. Goulbourne’s 188 month sentence and Williams’ 121

month sentence thus exceeded the sentences that could have been

imposed based only on the facts found by the jury. The district

court thus erred in basing their sentence on judge-found facts

under a mandatory guidelines regime, and the error was plain.2

 Id.

at 547-48. Because Goulbourne’s and Williams’ sentences were

longer than what could have been imposed based on the jury’s

verdict alone, the error affected their substantial rights, id. at

548, and we will notice the error, id. at 555. Therefore,

Goulbourne and Williams must be resentenced.

Although the Sentencing Guidelines are no longer

mandatory, Booker makes clear that a sentencing court must still
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“consult [the] Guidelines and take them into account when

sentencing.” 125 S. Ct. at 767. On remand, the district court

should first determine the appropriate sentencing range under the

Guidelines, making all the factual findings appropriate for that

determination. See Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546. The court should

consider this sentencing range along with the other factors

described in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000), and then impose a

sentence. Id. If that sentence falls outside the Guidelines

range, the court should explain its reasons for the departure as

required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (2000). Id. The sentence must

be “within the statutorily prescribed range and . . . reasonable.”

Id. at 546-47.

We affirm Goulbourne’s and Williams’ convictions. We

deny Goulbourne’s motion for leave to file a pro se supplemental

brief because the issue he seeks to raise in that brief was

adequately raised in his formal brief. In light of Booker and

Hughes, we vacate Goulbourne’s and Williams’ sentences and remand

for resentencing. We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and oral argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED

AND REMANDED IN PART