1

Filed 9/27/16 In re C.G. CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or 

ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re C.G. et al., Persons Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

HUMBOLDT COUNTY DEPARTMENT 

OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JAMIE G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A145626

 (Humboldt County

 Super. Ct. Nos. JV140224, JV140226)

Jamie G. (Mother) and Alex G. (Father) are the parents of C.G. (Daughter) and 

D.G. (Son). At the outset of this case, Father was a noncustodial parent of one-year-old 

Daughter and a custodial parent of five-year-old Son. The juvenile court sustained 

petitions removing both children from Mother’s care based on mental health and 

substance abuse concerns. Mother appeals an order terminating dependency jurisdiction 

after placement of both children with Father. The court’s exit orders granted custody to 

Father and visitation to Mother. Mother argues the court should have retained 

jurisdiction and continued to provide her with services to facilitate visitation. We reject 

an argument by the Humboldt County Department of Health and Human Services

(Department) that the appeal is moot because of a subsequent stipulated custody and 

visitation order in the family court. We affirm the juvenile court order on the merits.
2

I. BACKGROUND

In the fall of 2014, Mother and Father were living separately in Eureka. In early 

December, the police were notified after Mother called staff at the University of 

California, San Francisco to cancel a medical appointment and said “she was in a motel 

with [Daughter] and had to stay there so [they] did not infect anyone. [Mother] said, ‘I 

can’t handle it anymore,’ ‘I don’t think we are going to make it.’ [She] said there were 

bugs crawling under her and her child’s skin and coming out of the child’[s] eyes and 

ears. [She] said the child had a ‘green glowing stuff’ coming from her body the previous 

night that [she] looked at under a microscope and saw it was ‘hexagonal and shining like 

crystal.’ ”

After Mother and Daughter were located in a Santa Rosa hotel, Sonoma County 

Child Welfare Services investigated and reported that Mother “moved out of her home 

[in Eureka] because she thought she and the baby were being infected by bugs in her 

home and she ha[d] been staying in hotels in the Eureka area. Today [Mother] took the 

baby and drove to Santa Rosa to find new medical providers . . . [and] checked into [a 

motel] in Santa Rosa. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [Mother] seem[ed] too preoccupied with the 

undiagnosed disease that she does not attend to the cues of the baby, and is not feed[ing] 

the baby when the baby is clearly hungry. Today the baby had one packet organic pureed 

food to eat and the baby was crying from hunger. Mother had to be prompted several 

times to nurse the baby. [¶] . . . Mother made [a] statement to the mental health workers: 

‘I should have stayed in Eureka and let my baby die.’ ” Mother was deemed a flight risk. 

“While [an] officer called for the mobile crisis unit [Mother] was packing her car to 

leave.” Father said Mother suffered from mental health problems including a history of 

depression. When they separated about nine months previously, “she was acting 

irrational but always came back to her senses after awhile. . . . [I]n the last few days, 

[Mother] ha[d] been doing very badly and she ha[d]n’t come back.” Father did not 

intervene because he hoped she would get better, and he was concerned about a custody 

battle. 
3

The Department filed a juvenile dependency petition on behalf of Daughter

pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to 

protect).

1

 On December 5, 2014, the court detained the child from Mother and gave the 

Department discretion to place her with Father. The Department visited Father’s home,

assessed it as safe, and placed Daughter there. Son was already living with Father. The 

parents were married in 2005, and Mother moved out in 2014, about four months after 

Daughter was born. They shared physical custody of Son, but he had been staying fulltime with Father for about a month because Mother, who was a nurse, claimed Daughter

had lice. Mother did not stay in contact with Son during this period. Father was 

concerned Mother might be using drugs and said she talked about taking both children 

away from Humboldt County.

The Department filed a petition on behalf of Son pursuant to section 300, 

subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (j) (abuse of sibling) based on the facts 

underlying his sister’s petition plus the allegation that Mother had tested positive for 

methamphetamines, opiates and THC on December 4, 2014.

2

 The court detained Son

from Mother and placed him with Father.

In December 2014, Mother told the Department that Father had been financially 

and emotionally abusive toward her, and she left when he became verbally abusive 

toward Son. Mother believed Father would use “high powered attorneys” to take the 

children away from her “as punishment for leaving the abusive relationship,” and she 

accused him of trying to take her car. Son told the social worker, “Daddy is mean to us 

for no reason.” When asked to elaborate, however, Son said Father yelled and used time 

outs when the child said prohibited words.

Mother told the social worker she believed she was suffering from end-stage Lyme 

disease. She had lost 50 pounds in a month and had fever, pain, heart palpitations, very 

low blood pressure, and compromised cognitive functioning. She was seeing a Lyme 

 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 Daughter’s petition was amended to include this allegation as well.
4

disease specialist in San Francisco, Dr. Raphael B. Stricker, who took her concerns

seriously. Mother had prescription medication for Lyme disease and a written diagnosis, 

dated the day after Daughter’s removal, for Lyme disease from Dr. Stricker’s office. 

Mother said she was previously diagnosed with narcolepsy and hyperthyroidism and did 

not have access to her medications for those conditions. She also suffered from chronic 

back pain. She recently used methamphetamine to stay awake on trips to San Francisco

for medical care because she did not have her regular narcolepsy medication. She also 

used medical marijuana with a valid recommendation. The social worker wrote, “At this 

time it is unknown if [Mother’s] behavior is due to a mental health issue, drug use, or a 

disease.”

Mother sought dismissal of both children’s petitions, arguing the Department had 

not established she had mental health problems and a single positive test for 

methamphetamine was insufficient to support jurisdiction. At a January 7, 2015 

jurisdiction hearing, the court sustained both petitions.

In a January 2015 disposition report, the Department attached a December 12, 

2014 letter from a family nurse practitioner, Melissa C. McElroy. The letter, on 

Dr. Stricker’s stationery, stated: “[Mother] is under my care for the treatment of Lyme 

disease and its associated co-infection, Morgellons. Her symptoms include severe joint 

pains, muscle aches, peripheral neuropathy, ‘brain fog’ and memory loss, insomnia, 

fatigue, and skin lesions. [She] requires treatment with antibiotics and anti-parasitics to 

treat the underlying infection, as well as medications to control her symptoms. . . . 

Anticipated resolution is guarded at this point.” The Department was not able to confirm 

the diagnosis with Dr. Stricker directly. A printout from WebMD was attached to the 

disposition report and described Morgellons as “a controversial and poorly understood 

condition in which unusual thread-like fibers appear under the skin. The patient may feel 

like something is crawling, biting, or stinging all over. [¶] Some medical experts say 

Morgellons is a physical illness. Others suggest it is a type of psychosis called 

‘delusional parasitosis,’ in which a person thinks parasites have infected their skin.” A 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) description of a study of Morgellons
5

(also attached to the disposition report) concluded that “[s]kin damage from the sun was 

the most common skin abnormality found [among suspected Morgellons patients], and no 

single underlying medical condition or infectious source was identified. Upon thorough 

analysis, most sores appeared to result from chronic scratching and picking, without an 

underlying cause. The materials and fibers obtained from skin-biopsy specimens were 

mostly cellulose, compatible with cotton fibers. [¶] Neuropsychological testing revealed a 

substantial number of study participants who scored highly in screening tests for one or 

more co-existing psychiatric or addictive conditions . . . .”3 The Department 

recommended Mother complete a mental health assessment. The Department also 

recommended the children and Father be tested to verify they were free of Lyme disease, 

although Daughter’s pediatrician opined that she did not have Lyme disease. The

 

3 A report from a public health nurse was admitted as evidence at the jurisdiction 

and disposition hearing. That report quoted a different CDC Web page on standards for 

diagnosing Lyme disease via blood tests. Mother asks us to take judicial notice of the

entire CDC Web site.

We deny Mother’s request for judicial notice for several reasons. First, we are not 

persuaded that the entire contents of a government Web site are facts “not reasonably 

subject to dispute” or “capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to 

sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h).) In

particular, there appears to be substantial controversy regarding the existence or nature of 

Lyme disease and Morgellons. Second, even if the Web site were deemed an official act 

of a government executive department as urged by Mother (see Evid. Code, § 452, 

subd. (c)), we could take judicial notice only of the existence of the site’s contents, not 

the truth of those contents. (See Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 

1057, 1063, overruled on other grounds in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 

1257, 1276.) Third, we do not ordinarily consider facts that were not before the trial 

court when it made the orders under review. (Pulver v. Avco Financial Services (1986) 

182 Cal.App.3d 622, 632.) Finally, the parties’ dispute about the nature and appropriate 

diagnosis for Lyme disease and Morgellons is relevant only to the reasonableness of 

Mother’s services and the need to remove the children from her custody—issues we need 

not address for reasons stated post. (See Mangini, at p. 1063 [only relevant material is a 

proper subject of judicial notice].) In any event, Mother apparently wants us to take 

notice of the fact that the Web page discussing the Morgellons study is “outdated.”

Given that the printout in the record clearly states, “This website is archived for historical 

purposes and is no longer being maintained or updated,” no additional evidence is needed 

to make that point.
6

Department recommended that the juvenile court declare the children dependents, place 

them with Father, offer Father family maintenance services, and offer Mother family 

reunification services.

In a January 2015 addendum to the disposition report, the Department reported 

Father was fully cooperating with the Department and providing the children with a safe 

and loving home. He agreed to have the children tested for Lyme disease. The children 

had “an emotional attachment” to Father and a “strong attachment” to Mother. The 

social worker investigated Mother’s allegations of emotional and psychological abuse by 

Father, but found no evidence substantiating the allegations. The Department also 

changed its recommendation to termination of jurisdiction: “Based on the . . . complexity 

of [Mother’s] condition . . . and [M]other’s statement [about] the medical care and 

support she needs, the Department is unable to recommend that there is a substantial 

probability that the children would be able to return to the care of [Mother] in six months 

and that offering reunification services to [Mother] would be in the best interest of the 

children.” The addendum further stated: “It is the understanding of the Department that 

[M]other’s medical treatment, support systems and best resources for her condition are 

located in the [Bay Area] and therefore continued court jurisdiction with the family [in 

Humboldt County] would prevent [her] from receiving necessary medical treatment. It 

also appears that [M]other’s family resides in the [Bay Area] and [she] would be able to 

maintain stable housing [there]. . . . [T]his would allow her to obtain custody of her 

children through the Family Law Court at a later date . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Pending resolution 

in the family law court, the [D]epartment respectfully recommends the children remain 

released to [Father] and [Father] maintain sole legal and physical custody of the children 

and [M]other be provided weekly supervised visits . . . .”

In a March 2015 addendum, the Department again reported the children were safe 

and thriving in Father’s care. Father had sought out counseling to better address Son’s 

“questions about [Mother] and the grief and loss he is experiencing.” Mother submitted 

evidence of abnormal thyroid levels and possible Lyme disease, and she asked that the 

children be tested for abnormal thyroid levels in addition to Lyme disease. She continued 
7

to express the importance of her medical treatment in the Bay Area. The Department 

asked the juvenile court to maintain jurisdiction for 90 days so Lyme disease testing 

could be completed on the children, but it did not recommend thyroid testing.

In a May 2015 addendum, the Department reported Mother had not provided any 

evidence of participation in services. She had moved out of Humboldt County and had 

little to no contact with the Department. She missed 14 of 28 possible visits; she did not 

call or show for four visits and cancelled 10 due to transportation or health issues. She 

also failed to appear at a mediation session in April. The children tested negative for 

Lyme disease. In conclusion, the Department stated: “It is clear that [Mother] has not 

addressed her mental health or her substance abuse issues which continue to impact her 

ability to appropriately and safely parent her children. The Department respectfully 

recommends that the children remain in [Father’s] care and [Mother’s] visits continue to 

be supervised.”

The juvenile court held a contested disposition hearing and admitted, among other 

exhibits, the public health nurse’s reports in the dependency proceedings and the entire 

record of the pending family court dissolution case. Mother testified she had more than 

20 years of experience in the medical field, including work as a nurse in birthing centers 

and a neonatal intensive care unit. She said she tested positive for Lyme disease but 

acknowledged the laboratory that conducted her tests did not follow CDC diagnostic 

standards. Regarding the “glowing green” statement, Mother said, “[W]hen we were in 

the hotel in Cloverdale, she had removed the drain cover from the tub, and all of this 

black slimy mold went in the water. . . . [W]e were woke up about three hours later with a 

call from my son’s physician in UCSF, and . . . I was half asleep, and that’s where that 

report came from.” Mother said that sometime after August 2014 she had “lost [her] 

medications when [she] was put on Medi-Cal because her physician [did] not accept 

that,” and she tested positive for methamphetamine because a friend gave it to her to use 

in emergencies for her sleep disorder. The first time Mother used methamphetamine was 

in December after Daughter’s removal because she was feeling “down and out,” and she

had not used it since that incident. She did not use it when she breastfed. She did not 
8

recall telling her children’s pediatrician on December 5, 2014, that she had used 

methamphetamine and marijuana a month earlier. Mother testified that her other positive 

drug results were probably attributable to a nighttime medication she used for pain or

leftover prescription Xanax she took occasionally to help her sleep. She acknowledged 

using medical marijuana for 13 to 15 years. She acknowledged testing positive for 

marijuana in February 2015, submitting a diluted test sample in January, and missing one 

drug test. Mother did not believe she needed substance abuse or mental health treatment

because she had a bacterial infection that could cause mental symptoms when she was

under extreme stress. However, she agreed to undergo a mental health and substance 

abuse assessment if ordered by the court.

At the time of the May 2015 hearing, Mother lived in the Bay Area with her 

grandmother, who had room to house the children. Mother lived on disability benefits 

and had applied for long-term Social Security benefits and food stamps. Mother’s 

participation in visitation had dropped off due to her transportation difficulties and health 

problems. She had no place to stay in Humboldt County, and she had no means of 

transportation because her car was taken while parked outside Department offices during 

a supervised visit. She asked for the vehicle’s return in a family court proceeding but the 

matter was still unresolved. In the meantime, she used mass transit or a rental car to visit 

the children. She never asked the Department for transportation assistance.

Mother wanted protection from stalking by Father. She sought a restraining order 

in the family court, but withdrew the request “[b]ecause I didn’t feel that that piece of 

paper would really protect me and [Father] would get other people to do what he couldn’t 

do if I had it.”

Social worker Diana Rodriguez testified that her concerns about Mother’s mental 

health were based on Mother’s behavior in early December 2014, and Mother’s “really 

long e-mails about her condition and about the case, which are really concerning, 

especially because she was aware that all of those e-mails were going to be presented to 

the Court. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] She was threatening to take action against mostly [Father]. She 

also threatened that she believed that the Department has something to do with what was 
9

going on, . . . family law, her car . . . .” Mother further alleged the Department was 

making her children sick because they were not being treated for Lyme disease. 

Rodriguez frequently had to repeat herself when speaking to Mother. During visits, 

Mother took pictures of Daughter’s vaginal area even after she was instructed not to do 

so. Daughter’s pediatrician had never seen signs that she might be suffering from Lyme 

disease, and ultimately both children tested negative for the disease.

Rodriguez investigated Mother’s allegations of domestic violence by Father and 

found no evidence to support them. She had no concerns about the children’s safety in 

Father’s care and came to believe Mother was not a reliable reporter. Rodriguez testified 

that Mother seemed relieved to learn the Department recommended termination of 

jurisdiction because she did not think she could both treat her Lyme disease and reunify 

with her children.

In a June 1, 2015 order, the court removed the children from Mother based on a 

finding by clear and convincing evidence that they faced a substantial danger to their 

physical or emotional well-being if left in her care. “[Mother] has a pattern of avoidance 

in obtaining offered mental health and drug/alcohol assessments, punctuated by 

documented symptoms and objective findings of diagnoses of Lyme’s Disease and 

Morgellon’s Disease. Reasonable services have been offered to [Mother], but she refused 

them. . . . The evidence strongly suggests that she resorted to methamphetamine use when 

she decompensated after losing her access to the various medications she was prescribed, 

including medication to manage her narcolepsy. The testimony and documentary 

evidence are clear and convincing that [Mother’s] mental health, physical health and 

alcohol or drug issues continue to interfere with her ability to safely parent her children. 

[Mother’s] record of failing to timely communicate when she was going to miss a 

visitation . . . or the mediation session . . . demonstrate[s] ongoing conduct which is 

contrary to safe parenting.” The court found the Department had made reasonable efforts 

to return the children to Mother’s care.

The court also found continuing juvenile court supervision was not necessary: 

“The goal of dependency proceedings is to reunify the children with at least one parent, 
10

and that has been accomplished.” “While the Court is troubled by some of the allegations 

by [Mother] in the dissolution case, which, if true, would be cause for concern in 

fashioning appropriate orders in the family law case, [Mother] dismissed her domestic 

violence petition before there were any findings in the family law case. There was no 

evidence that the [D]epartment identified issues or concerns with placement with the nonoffending father since the cases were filed.”

The juvenile court declared the children dependents and placed them with Father 

subject to Department supervision. It then granted Father sole physical custody of the 

children pending resolution of the family court case. The court denied reunification 

services to Mother after finding there was no substantial probability the children would 

be returned to her care. It granted Mother supervised visitation once or twice a week for 

three hours at a time, but barred her from photographing the children without clothing. 

Mother was to have open access to communicate with the children by phone, social 

media, or video conferencing media. The court then terminated jurisdiction. Mother 

appealed the jurisdiction and disposition orders and the order terminating dependency 

jurisdiction.

II. DISCUSSION

Although Mother’s notice of appeal encompassed the jurisdiction, disposition, and 

termination of jurisdiction orders in their entirety, she expressly declines here to 

challenge the jurisdiction findings or the decisions to remove the children from her care

and place them with Father. She challenges only the juvenile court’s decision to 

terminate jurisdiction and services.

A. Mootness

As a preliminary matter, we address the Department’s argument that Mother’s 

appeal is moot “there has been a final stipulated judgment . . . which disposes of the 

issues raised on appeal. . . . The judgment makes the family law court—not the 
11

dependency court—the appropriate forum to address any issues which relate to 

[Mother’s] custody and visitation rights.”4 We disagree.

“As a general rule, it is a court’s duty to decide ‘ “ ‘actual controversies by a 

judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions 

or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the 

matter in issue in the case before it.’ ” ’ [Citation.] An appellate court will dismiss an 

appeal when an event occurs that renders it impossible for the court to grant effective 

relief.”

5

 (In re N.S., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 58–59; see id. at p. 59 [rejecting as 

inapplicable to current statutory scheme the oft-stated standard that a dependency appeal 

is “not moot if the purported error is of such magnitude as to infect the outcome of the 

ensuing . . . termination action or where the alleged defect undermines the juvenile 

court’s initial jurisdictional finding”].) “[T]he critical factor in considering whether a 

dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can provide any effective relief 

if it finds reversible error.” (Id. at p. 60; see In re Michelle M. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, 

328–329.)

 

4

The Department asks us to take judicial notice of a February 2016 judgment and 

notice of entry of judgment filed in Mother’s and Father’s family court dissolution case. 

The judgment recites that there was an “Agreement in court” and Mother and Father were 

present. The judgment dissolved the marriage, divided the marital property, provided for 

child and spousal support and payment of attorney fees, continued the juvenile court’s 

custody and visitation orders, and provided that Mother “may not move for modification 

of child custody or visitation without first filing proof of attendance at the Children of 

Divorce Workshop.” The Department correctly notes that these court documents are 

proper subjects of judicial notice pursuant to Evidence Code sections 452, 

subdivision (d), and 459, and it persuasively argues the documents are relevant to its 

mootness argument. (See Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., supra, 7 Cal.4th at 

p. 1063.) Therefore, we grant the Department’s request for judicial notice.

5

The Department wisely does not argue that the order terminating the juvenile 

court’s jurisdiction itself mooted this appeal, as Mother remained subject to adverse exit 

orders. (See In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1548; see also In re N.S.

(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60, fn. 3 [despite juvenile court’s termination of jurisdiction, 

appellate court has jurisdiction over appeal]; cf. In re N.S., at p. 61 [termination of 

juvenile court jurisdiction mooted appeal because exit order was not adverse to 

appellant].)
12

Mother argues the juvenile court should have continued jurisdiction and provided

continuing services to facilitate her visitation with the children. Child welfare services 

may be ordered only by the juvenile court, not the family court. (§§ 361.5, subd. (a), 362, 

subd. (c), 16501.) Therefore, Mother’s apparent stipulation to the February 2016 custody 

and visitation order in family court did not constitute a waiver of her request for or 

entitlement to services, and she could possibly obtain relief in this appeal (an order for 

services) that could not be obtained in the family court proceeding. Mother also seems to 

contest the adequacy of the juvenile court’s exit orders on appeal. The family court’s 

discretion to modify the exit orders was and continues to be constrained: a family court 

may not modify a juvenile court’s exit orders unless it finds “there has been a significant 

change of circumstances since the juvenile court issued the order and modification of the 

order is in the best interests of the child.” (§ 302, subd. (d); see In re Marriage of David 

& Martha M. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 96, 101, 103.) The family court in fact continued 

the juvenile court’s exit orders with one additional restriction on Mother’s visitation. 

Again, Mother could possibly obtain relief in this appeal (revision of the exit order) that 

she could not obtain in the family court proceeding. We therefore reject the 

Department’s argument that this appeal should be dismissed as moot.6

B. Termination of Jurisdiction and Exit Orders

In its June 1, 2015 order, the juvenile court removed the children from Mother’s 

custody based on a finding by clear and convincing evidence that they faced a substantial 

risk of harm if returned to her care. Mother expressly declines to challenge that removal 

order. After removal, the juvenile court had to determine whether the children could be 

placed with another parent. The parties agree that Father was the noncustodial parent of 

Daughter and a second custodial parent of Son, who was in Father’s care at the time of 

his removal from Mother. Because the applicable standards differ for custodial and 

noncustodial parents, we consider each child’s case separately.

 

6

The Department cites cases addressing the family court’s power to modify 

juvenile court exit orders, but these authorities do not directly address the mootness 

question and do not alter our analysis.
13

1. Daughter

In Daughter’s case, the court was required by section 361.2, subdivision (a) to 

“first determine whether there is a parent of the child, with whom the child was not 

residing at the time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child within the 

provisions of Section 300, who desires to assume custody of the child. If that parent 

requests custody, the court shall place the child with the parent unless it finds that 

placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or 

emotional well-being of the child.” Pursuant to this statute, the court placed Daughter

with Father. As noted ante, that decision is not challenged on appeal.

The court then was faced with three alternatives: order the noncustodial parent to 

assume custody of the child, terminate juvenile court jurisdiction, and enter a custody 

order (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(1)); continue juvenile court jurisdiction and require a home visit 

within three months, after which orders could be made as provided in subdivision (b)(1), 

(2) or (3) of section 361.2 (id., subd. (b)(2)); or order reunification services for either or 

both parents and determine at a later review hearing which parent, if either, shall have 

custody of the child (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(3)). (In re Karla C. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 

1236, 1243.) The court followed the option in section 361.2, subdivision (b)(1), by 

granting custody to Father with prescribed visitation rights for Mother and terminating 

jurisdiction. Mother argues the court should have maintained jurisdiction and provided 

her additional services. That is, she argues the court should have chosen the 

section 361.2, subdivision (b)(3) option. Specifically, she wanted services to assist her 

with arranging visits and enforcing the exit order. We thus consider whether the court 

erred in proceeding under section 361.2, subdivision (b)(1).

Decisions about how to proceed under section 361.2, subdivision (b)—including 

whether to grant either parent services or terminate jurisdiction, as well as the content of 

exit orders—are committed to the juvenile court’s discretion. (See In re Nada R. (2001) 

89 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1179; In re Maya L. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 81, 102.) The 

standard guiding the court’s exercise of this discretion is whether a need exists for 

continuing juvenile court supervision, considering the child’s best interests. (In re 
14

John M. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 410, 421; see In re Michael W. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 

190, 195 [juvenile court’s best interest analysis differs from that of the family court].) 

The ultimate question is who should have custody of the children. (John M., at p. 421.) 

“ ‘If the previously noncustodial parent can provide a safe and stable permanent home for 

the child and the evidence establishes that the other parent cannot, reunification services 

may be offered only to the previously noncustodial parent since this serves the 

Legislature’s goals by placing the child in parental custody and providing for a safe and 

stable permanent home for the child. . . . [¶] If, on the other hand, the previously 

noncustodial parent who is now assuming custody does not appear to be an appropriate 

permanent placement for the child, and the previously custodial parent has the potential 

to provide a safe stable permanent home for the child, reunification services can be 

offered to the previously custodial parent in the hope that this parent will remedy his or 

her deficiencies and reunify with the child. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . “. . . [T]he purpose of 

reunification services is to facilitate the return of a dependent child to parental custody.” 

[Citations.] . . . When a child is placed in nonparental custody, reunification services are 

necessary to promote a possible return of the child to parental custody. However, when a 

child is placed in parental custody, this goal has already been met and therefore 

reunification services are not necessary.’ ” (In re Karla C., supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1244.)

Here, the juvenile court reasonably found the children were in a safe and stable 

placement with one of their parents, and thus continuing juvenile court supervision was 

not needed. Father had a pre-existing relationship with the children, and he was 

consistently observed to act appropriately with them. The children were thriving in his 

care and had an “emotional” and “healthy” attachment to him. Son’s single comment 

concerning Father’s “meanness” early in the dependency case turned out, upon probing, 

to be nothing more than dissatisfaction with Father’s nonphysical discipline techniques, 

about which the Department apparently had no concerns. All other allegations of 

domestic violence originated with Mother and could not be corroborated by other family 

friends or police reports. Father was “soft spoken and kind” in his interactions with the 
15

social worker. He denied the allegations of abuse, but nevertheless agreed to participate 

in any services the Department thought would help him appropriately parent the children, 

and he voluntarily engaged in therapy to help Son deal with his separation from Mother. 

The social worker ultimately concluded Mother was not a reliable reporter, and the court 

similarly found Mother to be lacking in credibility. Mother’s allegations of harassment 

and interference with her visitation during the dependency case were supported only by 

Mother’s statements. In light of the Department’s inability to corroborate the abuse 

allegations, the juvenile court reasonably could have rejected the harassment and 

interference allegations as lacking in credibility as well. Because no evidence was before 

the court that the children were not safe in Father’s home or that Father would interfere 

with Mother’s visitation rights under the exit orders, the court did not abuse its discretion 

in awarding custody to Father and terminating jurisdiction.

Significantly, Mother’s request for additional services was not premised on a need 

to protect the children; instead, she sought financial assistance (including legal 

representation) to assist her in maintaining visitation. It is not appropriate, however, to 

use juvenile court resources to subsidize parents’ engagement in a custody dispute. “The 

juvenile courts must not become a battleground by which family law war is waged by 

other means. It is common knowledge that the resources of local government social 

service agencies are stretched thin; in the juvenile dependency context those resources are 

manifestly intended to be directed at neglected and genuinely abused children. [¶] 

Moreover, the misuse of the juvenile dependency system to litigate custody battles is not 

only unfair to taxpayers, but to litigants as well. . . . [A] litigant may be unfairly 

prejudiced in a custody fight when the battlefield is shifted to the juvenile courts. At that 

point he or she faces not only an embittered ex-spouse, but a government adversary paid 

at public expense.” (In re John W., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 975.)

Mother argues it would be in the children’s best interest to preserve their 

relationship with her, and therefore it was an abuse of discretion for the court to terminate 

services and issue exit orders failing to account for either Father’s alleged interference 

with her visitation or her health problems that impeded her ability to maintain visitation. 
16

However, the family court was equally well-positioned to preserve the children’s 

relationship with Mother by considering modification of the custody and visitation orders

based on these concerns. (§ 302, subd. (d).) Also, for the reasons stated ante, the

juvenile court reasonably could have found there was no reason to anticipate that Father 

would interfere with Mother’s visitation rights. Accordingly, Mother has not 

demonstrated on appeal that “the relatively heavy hand of the juvenile court was needed.” 

(In re J.S. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1081–1082 [although goal of dependency 

proceedings is to ensure child’s safety and preserve family relationships, court’s award of 

custody to father with visitation for mother and termination of jurisdiction was not an 

abuse of discretion where the record demonstrated father’s cooperation with mother’s 

visitation].)

Mother argues the juvenile court erred by terminating jurisdiction without a 

finding that she was provided or offered reasonable reunification services.

7

 She devotes a 

substantial portion of her appellate brief to arguing she did not receive reasonable 

services. It is well established, however, that a reasonable services finding is not a 

prerequisite to terminating jurisdiction under section 361.2, subdivision (b) (In re 

Janee W. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1454), as the provision of services is 

discretionary once a section 361.2, subdivision (a) placement has been made (In re 

Karla C., supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1244). Thus, we need not review the 

Department’s provision of services.

Finally, some of Mother’s arguments suggest she also challenges the content of 

the exit orders. For example, she refers to a need for a neutral person to facilitate 

visitation because of supposed interference by Father. However, as discussed ante, 

substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s implied finding that Father would not 

interfere with Mother’s visitation rights under the exit orders; so we cannot conclude the 

court abused its discretion in not adopting modified orders.

 

7 Because Mother expressly declines to challenge the removal order, we need not 

address her apparent argument that the court’s reasonable services (i.e., reasonable 

efforts; see § 361, subd. (d)) finding was not supported by substantial evidence.
17

2. Son

The juvenile court needed to determine if formal removal could be avoided by 

allowing a nonoffending custodial parent to retain physical custody of Son after 

presenting an adequate safety plan to protect him from the risk of harm posed by Mother. 

(§ 361, subd. (c)(1)(B).) Consistent with this statute, the court granted custody of Son to 

Father. Again, this decision is not challenged on appeal.

In a section 361, subdivision (c)(1)(B) case, the provision of services is governed 

by section 362, subdivision (c), and the conduct of review hearings and the decision 

whether to terminate dependency jurisdiction is governed by section 364. (In re Pedro Z.

(2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 12, 20 [citing former § 362, subd. (b), predecessor of current 

§ 362, subd. (c), as amended by Stats. 2012, ch. 130, § 1.) At review hearings, the 

court’s focus is on “determining ‘whether the dependency should be terminated or 

whether further supervision is necessary.’ [Citations.] This is so because the focus of 

dependency proceedings ‘is to reunify the child with a parent, when safe to do so for the 

child.’ ” (Pedro Z., at p. 20.) Whether to grant services to the parent who no longer has 

custody of the children is committed to the discretion of the court. (See In re Gabriel L. 

(2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 644, 651 [where child was returned to care of one parent, 

provision of services to other parent under § 364 was discretionary].) In sum, the 

standards governing the court’s decision to provide services, terminate jurisdiction, and 

fashion exit orders with respect to Son, who was placed with Father pursuant to 

section 361, subdivision (c)(1)(B), and with respect to Daughter, who was placed with 

Father pursuant to section 361.2, subdivision (a), were very similar.

8

 (See Gabriel L., at 

 

8

The Department notes the statutory standard for terminating jurisdiction under 

section 364 is different from the standard in section 361.2, subdivision (b). Section 364, 

subdivision (c) provides: “The court shall terminate its jurisdiction unless the social 

worker or his or her department establishes by a preponderance of evidence that the 

conditions still exist which would justify initial assumption of jurisdiction under 

Section 300, or that those conditions are likely to exist if supervision is withdrawn.” This

language is not in section 361.2, subdivision (b).

The express statutory standard of section 364, which usually applies in cases 

where the child was never removed from the offending parent’s care, anticipates that 
18

p. 651.) We conclude that our analysis of Mother’s claims with respect to Daughter

applies equally to Son’s dependency case.

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

_________________________

BRUINIERS, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

JONES, P. J.

_________________________

SIMONS, J.

 

termination of jurisdiction would leave the child in the care of the former offending 

custodial parent. In such cases, jurisdiction should not be terminated unless the offending 

parent has resolved the problems that led to the dependency and no similar problems have 

arisen. When the child has been placed with a nonoffending custodial parent pursuant to 

section 361, subdivision (c)(1)(B), on the other hand, the pertinent question before the 

court is whether continuing supervision is necessary—i.e., whether custody of the child 

may be granted to at least one parent who can keep the child safe. Stated differently, 

conditions justifying assumption of jurisdiction no longer exist because the child has been 

safely placed with a nonoffending parent.