alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 2 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 6 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 7 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 1 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 3 pertaining to both patents and trademarks is placed in the grouping pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 4 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 5 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

#### § 42.201 Who may petition for a post-grant review.

A person who is not the owner of a patent may file with the Office a petition to institute a post-grant review of the patent unless:

(a) Before the date on which the petition for review is filed, the petitioner or real party-in-interest filed a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of the patent; or

(b) The petitioner, the petitioner's real party-in-interest, or a privy of the petitioner is estopped from challenging the claims on the grounds identified in the petition.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 29, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-30643

Summary Calendar

 

DOLAN FRANKLIN,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

BURL CAIN, WARDEN, LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY,

Respondent-Appellee.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 01-CV-2637-C

--------------------

Before Jones, Benavides, and Clement, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Dolan Franklin, Louisiana prisoner # 93892, convicted of

second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, appeals

the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. 

The district court granted a certificate of appealability (COA)

for the issue whether Franklin’s attorneys were ”ineffective for

failing to properly develop and present evidence regarding

petitioner’s competency to proceed to trial and his sanity at the

time of the offense.” 
No. 03-30643

-2-

Franklin argues that his trial attorneys were ineffective

for failing to present to the trial court in support of his

motion for the appointment of a sanity commission evidence of 

(1) a one-day hospitalization in a San Francisco psychiatric unit

17 months before his killing of the victim and (2) a suicide

attempt while in prison following his arrest for that offense. 

Franklin contends that, had his attorneys provided such

information to the trial court, the trial court would have

appointed a sanity commission. 

The State argues that Franklin did not exhaust this issue

because he raised it only in his state postconviction pleading

filed in the state appellate court but not in his petition filed

in the Louisiana Supreme Court. Given that the substance of

Franklin’s appeal is without merit, we need not determine whether

review of the ineffective assistance claim is barred based upon a

failure to exhaust. We nevertheless note that a review of

Franklin’s state postconviction petitions reveals that he

exhausted the claim. See Bledsue v. Johnson, 188 F.3d 250, 255

(5th Cir. 1999). 

In light of the testimony of Franklin and his attorneys at

the district court’s evidentiary hearing and the reports not

submitted to the trial court, Franklin has not shown that his

attorneys were ineffective in not presenting the reports to the

trial court or that he was prejudiced by the reports not being

submitted. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694

(1984); State v. Martin, 769 So. 2d 1168. 1169 (La. 2000). 

AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT
32





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





The
undersigned have executed this certification in connection with the filing with
the Securities and Exchange Commission of the Company’s Quarterly Report on Form
10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2009. The undersigned hereby certify
that to our knowledge:





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.










Dated:   November
      13, 2009
            /s/Raul
      S. McQuivey
              Raul
      S. McQuivey
              President
      and Chief Executive Officer
              (Principal
      Executive Officer)Dated:   November
      13, 2009
            /s/Sidney
      C. Hooper
              Sidney
      C. Hooper
              Chief
      Financial Officer
              (Principal
      Accounting Officer)
#### Wasserman Estate

Before Klein, P. J., Bolger, Hunter, Lefever, Saylor and Shoyer, JJ.

*123*Milton A. Kamsler,*of *Folz, Bard, Kamsler, Goodis & Greenfield,*for exceptants.

*Joseph S. Iseman, Edivin S. Cohen, C. Leo Sutton,*and *Dilworth, Paxson, Kalish & Green,*contra.

December 30, 1955.

Klein, P. J.,

The question raised by these exceptions is a narrow one. Did testator’s widow have the right, by implication, to exercise a power of appointment under her will to dispose of the corpus of this estate, no children having been born of her marriage to decedent? The auditing judge concluded that she did have such right, basing his decision principally upon Riegel et al. v. Oliver et al., 352 Pa. 244 (1945). We have studied this will carefully from its four corners and are in agreement with the auditing judge for the reasons so well set forth by him in the adjudication.

Counsel for the exceptant earnestly contends that the present case is squarely controlled by Whitman’s Estate, 329 Pa. 377 (1937). In our opinion the auditing judge was clearly correct in concluding that Whitman’s Estate is inapposite. In that case, the claimant, who was the widow of testatrix’s son, was completely unknown to the testatrix, her marriage to the son having taken place 12 years after testatrix’s death. In the present case testator’s wife was obviously the primary object of his bounty and concern, she being the only beneficiary' specifically designated by name in the will. The Whitman will provided for a gift over of the principal of the estate to the testatrix’s brothers of their children, thereby making a complete disposition of decedent’s estate. Rejection of the daughter-in-law’s claim did not, therefore, create an intestacy. In the present case there is no gift over of principal, so that an intestacy would result if the exceptants *124prevailed in their contention that the widow did not possess a power of appointment. Such an interpretation would contravene the strong presumption that testator intended to dispose of his entire estate, as well as the basic rule of construction requiring all doubts to be resolved against an intestacy. See cases cited in Hunter’s Pa. O. C. Commonplace Book, Vol. 11, page 1435, et seq.

The exceptions are therefore dismissed, and the adjudication is confirmed absolutely.
<PAGE>   1


                                  EXHIBIT 11.1
                                  ------------


                          THE COAST DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
                        Computation of Earnings Per Share
                          Quarter Ended March 31, 1997


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                                 Primary       Fully Diluted
                                               Loss Per Share  Loss Per Share
                                               --------------  --------------
<S>                                                 <C>            <C>      
  I.    Weighted Averages Shares Outstanding        5,212,330      5,212,330

 II.    Net Loss                                  $   (92,000)   $   (92,000)

        Dividends paid on preferred stock of
        subsidiary                                     (3,000)        (3,000)
                                                  -----------    -----------

        Net loss attributable to common
        shareholders                              $   (95,000)   $   (95,000)

        Divided by Common and Equivalent
        Shares                                      5,212,330      5,212,330
                                                  -----------    -----------

        Loss Per Share                            $     (0.02)   $     (0.02)
                                                  ===========    ===========
</TABLE>
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

[Fayette Circuit Court,

November Term, 1887.]

Stewart, Shauck and Shearer, JJ.

#### *J. D. Stuckey et al. v. J. T. Bloomer, Admr.

1. Overruling a Motion for New Trial Continued to a Subsequent Term.

Where a motion for a new trial, for errors of law occurring at the trial, is continued to a subsequent term, the overruling of such motion is not assignable as error, unless such errors were excepted to at the time aud the exceptions reduced to writing at the trial term.

2. Motion for New Trial on the Ground of Newly Discovered Evidence.

A motion for a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence, must be made at the trial term. After such term the application must be by petition in accordance with the provisions of sec. 5309 of the Rev. Stat.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette county.

At the February term, 1887, of the common pleas, the defendant in error, as administrator of Elijah Bloomer, deceased, obtained a verdict against the plaintiffs in error.

A motion for a new trial upon the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and for errors of law occurring at the trial, was made, but not heard until the following (June) term.

At the latter term an additional motion was filed on the ground of newly discovered evidence which was supported by affidavits. These were controverted. Both motions were overruled and judgment entered on the verdict. Thereupon a bill of exceptions, embodying all the evidence as well upon the merits of the case as upon said motions, together with the charge and the exceptions thereto, was taken and this proceeding instituted to obtain a reversal of said judgment.

*

This case was dismissed by the Supreme Court, for want of preparation, April 21, 1891.

Shearer, J.

The error assigned in this case is the refusal of the court to grant a new trial upon the grounds stated in the motion therefor.- The exceptions based upon alleged errors of law occurring at the trial not having been reduced to writing at the trial term, must be disregarded. Sec. 5307, Rev. Stat.; Kline v. Wynne, 10 O. S., 223.

This being so, the only question to be considered under the first motion is whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, and whether, upon the whole case, the judgment is contrary to law. We see no error in this regard.

*632C. A. Palmer and Mills Gardner, for plaintiffs in error.

Judge Ace Gregg, for defendant in error.

The second motion was properly overruled. An application for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and in the absence of statutory provisions, the rulings thereon cannot be assigned for error unless there has plainly been an abuse of judicial discretion. Smith v. Bailey, 26 O. S., 1; Moore v. Coates, 35 O. S., 177.

Again the motion came too late. The application by motion can only be made at the term at which the verdict is rendered. Sec. 5307, Rev. Stat. After the term the party seeking a new trial on this ground, must proceed by petition in accordance with the provisions of sec. 5309, Rev. Stat.

Judgment affirmed.
§ 17.3125 Approving HISA benefits applications. ( a ) *Approval of application.* VA will approve the HISA benefits application if: ( 1 ) The application is consistent with §§ 17.3100 through 17.3130, and
( 2 ) VA determines that the proposed improvement or structural alteration is reasonably designed to address the needs of the beneficiary and is appropriate for the beneficiary's home, based on documentation provided and/or through a pre-award inspection of the home.
( b ) *Notification of approval.* No later than 30 days after a beneficiary submits a complete application, VA will notify the beneficiary whether an application is approved. The notification will: ( 1 ) State the total benefit amount authorized for the improvement or structural alteration.
( 2 ) State the amount of any advance payment, if requested by the beneficiary, and state that the advance payment must be used for the improvements or structural alterations detailed in the application. The notification will also remind beneficiaries receiving advance payment of the obligation to submit the request for final payment upon completion of the construction.
( 3 ) Provide the beneficiary with the notice of the right to appeal if they do not agree with VA's decision regarding the award.
(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 501, 1717, 7104)
Central Valley

Project

Improvement Act

October 1999

US Department of the Interior

Bureau of Reclamation

US Fish & Wildlife Service

Sacramento, California

Final Programmatic

Environmental

Impact Statement

Executive

Summary
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Purpose and Need . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Definition of the Study Area and Study Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Description of the No-Action Alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Description of PEIS Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Multiple Option Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Development of the Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

PEIS Alternatives Defined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Summary of Impact Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

PEIS Public Involvement Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Post Draft PEIS Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Final PEIS: What Happens Next? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Table of Contents
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from 
Shelter Properties VI Limited Partnership 1998 Second Quarter 10-QSB
and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such 10-QSB filing.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000730013
<NAME> SHELTER PROPERTIES VI LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                    6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          OCT-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               APR-30-1998   
<CASH>                                           2,904
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0<F1>
<PP&E>                                          52,672
<DEPRECIATION>                                  25,739   
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  32,661   
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0<F1>
<BONDS>                                         26,477     
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0     
<PREFERRED>                                          0  
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                       4,948    
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    32,661    
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 4,994    
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 4,884    
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,212    
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       110     
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     2.58<F2>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>Registrant has an unclassified balance sheet.
<F2>Multiplier is 1.
</FN>
        


</TABLE>
Order entered January 7 , 2019

In The



## Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 18

- 00884

- CR

MICHAEL SHANNON THED FORD, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 296

- 80655

- 2018



### O RDER

Before the Court is court reporter Kristen Kopp’s January 4, 2019 request for an

extension of time to file the reporter’s record. On the Court’s own initiative , w e GRANT the

request and ORDER the reporter’s record filed FORTY

- FIVE DAYS from the date of this

order. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 2, 35.3 (c).

/s/ BILL PEDERSEN, III

JUSTICE
Second Amendment to Amended & Restated Employment Agreement



 EXHIBIT 10.22 
  
 SECOND AMENDMENT 
 TO 

AMENDED AND RESTATED EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
  
 Second Amendment (“Amendment”) made as of the 15th day of December, 2008 to the Amended and Restated Employment Agreement (“Employment Agreement”) dated as of November 29, 2002, as
subsequently amended as of November 1, 2007, by and between Boston Properties, Inc., a Delaware corporation with its principal executive office in Boston, Massachusetts (the “Company”), and Raymond A. Ritchey
(“Employee”). 
  
 WHEREAS, the parties hereto
desire to amend the Employment Agreement further to comply with the requirements of Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended; and 
  
 WHEREAS, the parties hereto desire that this Amendment be deemed a modification and an amendment to the Employment Agreement. 
  
 NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants contained herein,
the Company and Employee agree as follows: 
  
 1. Subparagraph
8(e)(iii) of the Employment Agreement is amended by deleting the penultimate sentence of clause (A) thereof and substituting therefor the following: 
  
 “The Severance Amount shall be paid in equal installments in accordance with the Company’s then payroll practice over a twelve (12) month
period beginning with the first payroll date that occurs at least thirty (30) days after the Date of Termination.” 
  
 2. All other provisions of the Employment Agreement shall remain in full force and effect according to their respective terms, and nothing contained
herein shall be deemed a waiver of any right or abrogation of any obligation otherwise existing under the Employment Agreement except to the extent specifically provided for herein. 







 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Amendment has been executed as a sealed instrument by the Company and by
Employee as of the date first above written. 
  

					
	 BOSTON PROPERTIES, INC.

		
	 By:
	 	/s/ Douglas T. Linde
		 	 Name:
	 	Douglas T. Linde
		 	 Title:
	 	President
	
	/s/ Raymond A. Ritchey
	 RAYMOND A. RITCHEY



  

 2
#### Bynum *v.*The State.

*Failure to Work the Road.*

(Decided Feb. 8, 1912.

57 South. 1024.)

*Highway; Failure to Worlc; Indictment.*— An indictment charging that defendant was liable to do road duty, but that he wilfully failed or refused, after legal notice, to work the public road, either in person or by substitute without sufficient excuse, etc., was sufficient, and not rendered defective by a failure t.o charge the particular road that the defendant failed to work.

Appeal from Madison Law and Equity Court.

Heard before Hon. James H. Ballentine.

Will Bynum was convicted of failure to work tbe road and he appeals.

Affirmed.

Douglass Taylor, for appellant.

No brief came to tbe Reporter.

R. C. Brickell, Attorney General, and W. L. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for tbe State.

Tbe indictment was *sufficient.*— Brown *v. The*State, 63 Ala. 97.

WALKER, P. J.

Tbe indictment in this case charged that tbe defendant, “a person liable to road duty, willfully failed or refused, after legal notice, to work the public road, either in person or by substitute, without a sufficient excuse therefor, against tbe peace,” etc. Tbe allegation of tbe commission of tbe offense substantially followed tbe terms of tbe statute creating it. Tbe indictment sufficiently designated tbe offense, without- specifying what road tbe defendant failed to *work*.—Brown *v.*State, 63 Ala. 97. Tbe demurrer to it was properly overruled.

Tbe record presents no other question for review.

Affirmed.
§ 51b.606 How can grant funds be used? ( a ) Grant funds may be used for the costs associated with planning, organizing, and conducting applied research, demonstrations, and public information and education programs.
( b ) Grant funds may also be used to reimburse individuals who agree to be participants in the applied research projects. This reimbursement, however, must be justified as necessary and reasonable. A schedule of reimbursements must be submitted with the application and approved as part of the program plan.
( c ) Grant funds may not be used to supplant funds supporting existing venereal disease control services provided by a State or locality.