NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0390n.06 No. 08-1992 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
ERI C PA UL

CO CKREA M, Pe tit ion e r- Ap pe lla

nt,
v. KURT J ONES, Warden, Re sp on de nt, and J OHN PREL ESNI K, Warden, H andlon Mic hig an T ra ini ngUn it, Respondent-Appe llee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

B e fo re : B OG GS, RO GE RS, a nd CO OK , Ci rc uit

Judg e s. COOK, Circuit J udg e. Eric Cockrea m appea ls the district court’s denial of his petition for habea s relief

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2 2 5 4, in which he a lleg ed prose cutorial misconduct a nd ineffe ctive assis ta

n c e o f tria l a n d appellate counsel. F inding that his appe llate counse l’s perf ormanc e did not prejudice him, and that the rema inder of his claims nece ssarily fail as a result, we a ffirm the district court’s judg ment.No. 08-1992

Cockream v. Jone

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- 2 - I. A Michig an jury convicted Cockream of kidnapping Michele D rog osch fr om the parkinglot of her apar

tment c omplex
. At Cockrea m’s trial, Drog osch testified that, as she r eturne d home from work at 4:00 a.m. and appr oache d the door of the complex, a man g rabbe d her f rom behind, putting
one ar m around he r nec k and a ha nd over her nose and mout h. Her assailant dra g g ed her

acr oss the lot toward a w hite For d Taurus w ith the eng ine running , but when he relea sed his g rip to open the door, she esca

ped and ran back toward the building, scre aming
. Ey e-w itness Jonathan Pike testified that he sawthe Taur

us in the lot before he ente red the building, also at about 4:00 a .m., a nd, once inside, hear d scre ams that prompted him to look out the window. When he y elled out t he window, the Taur us “we nt fly ing.” Pike and his g irlfriend the n opened the front door for Drog osch, who Pike descr ibed as “ scar ed out o f h er mind.” The jury lear ned throug h police testimony that Cockrea

m initially denied be ing in the a

partment c omplex ’s par

king lot, but l ater

admitted pulling into the lot to s no rt a lin e of c oc a ine , th ou g h h e ins ist e d h e ne ve r g ot o ut o f h is car. Dro gosc h p os iti ve ly identified Cockre am as he r attac ker at a police lineup.
On di rec t appea l, repr esente d by counsel, Cockream challeng ed the jury instructions and the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence ag ainst hi m , and contended that his 15- to 50-y ear sentenc e wa s disproporti o n at e t o his offense . The Michig an Court of Appe als aff irmed the judg ment of conviction, People v . Cockream , No. 235560, 2003 WL356367 (Mich. C t. App. Feb. 14, 2003), and the Michig an S upreme Court denied leave to appea l, 666 N.W.2d 669 (Mich. 2003). Cockre am then
sou ght state post-conviction re lief, alleg ing thr ee c onstitut ional violations: prosecutorialNo. 08-1992

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The dist rict court perc eived Cockream’ s post-conviction petit ion to include a stand-alone 1 prosec utorial misconduct claim. The fede ral co u rt rec ord, howe ver, doe s not include the petition its e lf , le a vin g on ly

the Mic hig an tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on fr om whic h to div ine the pe tit ion ’s c on te nts
. Thoug h the Michig an cour t ’s d ec ision seems to indicate that Cockre am ra ised only ineffe ctive assistance claims , m en t i o n i n g p ro s ec u t o ri al m i s co n d u ct o n l y t o ch al l en ge h i s co u n s els ’ per formanc e, we, like the district c ourt, g ive Cockrea m the benef

it of the doubt a

nd assume he r aised prose cutorial misconduct duringstate post-convic tion procee dings a s a distinct claim. - 3 - misconduct ; ineffe ctive assistanc e of tria l counsel for failing to object to t he misconduct a nd to an 1

a lle g e dly imp ro pe r j ur

y ins tr uc tio n; an d ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of a pp e llate c ouns e l f

or fa ili ngto r a ise ineffe ctive assistanc e of trial counsel a nd prosec utorial misconduct. The state trial court he ld that Cockrea m proced urally

defa ulted his ineffe ctive assistanc e of tria l counsel and pr osecutoria l misconduct claims when he failed to ra ise them on direc t appea l. People v . Cockream , No. 2000- 35 33 -F C ( Ma c omb County Cir . Ct . D e c . 3 , 2 00 3) . A nd tho ug h Co c kr e a m atte mpt e d to ov e rc ome the def ault by claiming ineffe ctive assistance of appellate counsel, the c ourt found the pr osecutor’ s
c on du c t and

the jur y ins tr uc tio ns pr op e r, re nd e ri ngCoc kr e a ms’ s a pp e llate c ouns e l’ s f

a ilure to r a ise the now-de faulted c laims nonprejudicial. Id . I n one-se ntence o rd er s ref ere ncingMichig an Court Rul e (M .C. R.) 6. 50 8( D) , both Mic hig an ap pe llate c ou rt s den ie d Coc kr e a m leave to a pp e a l. Pe op le v. Cock ream , No. 252953 (Mich. Ct. App. Jul . 9, 2004); 690 N.W.2d 106 (Mich. 2004).
Coc kr e am th e n s ou g ht a

fe de ra l wri t of

ha be a s c or pu s o n g ro un ds ne arl y

ide nti c a l to tho se he raised i n state post -convic tion proce eding s: prosec utorial misconduct; ineffe ctive assistanc e of trial counsel for failing to obje ct to the misconduct (he no longe r complained of the jury instruction); and inef fec tive assistance of appe llate counse l for fa i l ing to r aise inef fec tive assistance of trial
c ouns e l or

pr os e c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t on dir e c t a pp e a l. T ho ug h f

a c e d w itha

pr oc e dura l de fa

ultNo. 08-1992

Cockream v. Jone

s

- 4 - argument from the wa

rden, the district court addr es s ed the merits of Cockrea m’s claims in the i n t e r e s to f j u d i c i a l e f

f i c i e n c y, d e n i e d t h e p e t i t i o n , an d d e c l i n e d t o i s s u e a c e rt i f i c a t e o f a p p e a l a b i l i t y. Cockrea m timely appea led, and this court g rante d a ce rtificate of appe alability on eac h of his three
c la ims
. II.
We reviewthe district court’s le g al conc lus i ons de novo and its fa ctual finding s for c lear
err or. Hill v. Hofbauer , 33 7 F .3 d 70 6, 71 0 (6 th Cir
. 20 03 ). Th e An tit e rr or ism and Ef fe c tiv e De a th Pe na lty Ac t ( AE DPA ) g ov e rn s Co c kr e a m’ s f e de ra l ha be a s pe tit ion
. Un de r A ED PA, wh e n a state court ha s adjudicate d the merits of a claim, we ma

y not grant a habe as petition unless the state cour t
a dju dic a tio n o f t

he c la im: (1 ) r e su lte d i n a deci sion that w a s c ontr ary to, or inv olv e d a

n unr e a so na

ble application of, c lear ly

established F eder al law, a s deter mined by the S upreme Court of the United States; or (2) r esulted in a de cision that was base d on an unre asonable d et er m i n ati on of the fa ct s i nl i gh to f t h e e v i d en ce p re s en t edi nt h e S t at e c o u rt p ro ce ed i n g.
28 U. S.C. § 2 25 4( d) ; see also Dorn v . Lafler , 601 F.3d 439, 442 (6th Cir. 2010) (AED PA defe renc e l i m i t e d t o c l a i m s a d

j u d i c a t e d i n s t a t e c o u rto nt h e m e r i t s )
. A na d j u d i c a t i o nqu a l i f

i e s a s “ c o n t r ar

y” to fede ral lawwhen the c ourt “a rrives at a co n cl u sion opposite to that reac hed by [t he Supreme ] Court o n a qu e s ti o n o f la w ” o r “ d e c id e s a c a s e d if f e r e n tl y th an [th e Su

p r e me ] Co u rt has on . . . materia lly

indisti ng uishable fa cts.” W illiams v. Taylor , 5 29 U. S. 36 2, 41 2– 13 (2 00 0) . A nd “ [a] s tateNo. 08-1992

Cockream v. Jone

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The Michig an cour

t determined that Cockream’s appellate counsel’s pe rfor mance did not 2 prejudice him by

concludin g t h at t he prose cutor’s misconduc t did not render Coc krea m’s trial fundame ntally

unfair. I f that dec ision withst ands AEDPA sc rutiny , we mu s t also find that Cockrea m’s stand-alone prosec utorial misconduct claim l acks merit and that his trial counsel met c on sti tut ion a l e ff

e c tiv e ne ss s tand ard s e ve n th ou g h h e fa ile d to ob je c t to the c on du c t. - 5 - court unre asonably

applies Supreme Court pr ece dent ‘i f t h e s tate cour t identifies the cor

rec t g overningleg al rule
. . . but unr easona bly applies it to the fac ts of the par ticular prisone r’s c ase.’ ” Ba rn es v . E lo , 3 3 9 F. 3 d

4 9 6 , 5 0 1 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 3 ) ( qu o t i n g W illiams , 529 U.S. at 407). Unde r § 22 54 (e )( 1) , we pr e sume the c or re c tne ss of a state c ourt ’s fa c tua l fi nd ing s un le ss t he pe tit ion e r r e bu ts them with clear

and convinc ing e vidence
. Sinkfield v. Brigano , 487 F.3d 1013, 1016 (6th Cir. 2007).
The war den seeming ly urg es us to conclude that Cockream proce durally defa ulted all three of t he claims befor e us. But because this Circuit’s interpre tation of refer ence s to M.C.R. 6.508(D) in one-line state- court orde rs re mains in flux , see Guilmette v. Howes , 591 F.3d 505 (6th Cir. 2010) (o pin ion va c a te d; e n b anc re he ari ngg ra nte d) , w e tur

n d ir e c tly to t he me ri ts o f C oc kr e a m’ s c la ims , see H udson v. Jone

s , 3 51 F .3 d 2 12 , 2 15 (6 th Cir . 200 3) (“ [F ]ed e ra l cou rt s ar e no t r e qu ir e d to a dd

re ss a proc edura l-defa

ult issue before decidingag ainst the petitioner on the mer i t s . ”). We be g in by examining whethe r his ap p el l ate c ounsel provided c onstitut ionally eff ective a ssistance, a sking whether the Michig an trial c ourt unrea sonably applied S upreme Court prec edent whe n it determined that Co c kr e a m’ s a

p p e l l a t e c o u n s e l m e t c o n s t i t ut ion a l r e qu ir e me nts . I f w e e nd or se the re a so na ble ne ss of the stat e court ’s de c isi on , w e ne c e ssa ri ly c on c lud e that Co c kr e a m’ s tw o a dd iti on a l c la ims a lso fa il. 2No. 08-1992

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- 6 - To establish ineff

ective a ssistance of a

ppellate c ounsel, Cockre am “ mu s t s h o w th at counse l’s perf ormanc e wa s defic ient,” and that “the deficient pe rfor mance prejudice d the def

ense.” Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1 9 8 4 ). Only wher e counse l’s perf

ormanc e fa lls “below an objective standa

rd of r easona

bleness,” which we e valuate “ i n d u l g[ i n g ] a strong pr esumption that counsel’s p erformanc e fa lls withi n the wide r ang e of r easona ble profe ssional assistance,” do we deem it def

icient. Id . at 68 8– 89 . Pr e jud ic e , in thi s cont ex t, r e qu ir e s sh ow inga “ pr ob a bil ity sufficie n t t o u n dermine c onfidenc e in the outcome” such that, “but for counsel’s unpr ofessional
err ors, t he re sult of the proce eding would have be en diffe rent.” Id
. at 694. “B oth the perf ormanc e and pre judice compone nts of the ineffe ctiveness inquiry are mix ed questions of law and fac t entitled to de novo re view.” Com bs v . Co y le , 205 F.3d 269, 278 ( 6th Cir. 2000).
Cockrea m alleg es that his appellate c ounsel err ed by failing to raise ( 1) prose cutorial misconduct; and (2) ineffe ctive assistanc e of Cockr eam’ s trial counsel for failing to ob

j ec t to the mis c on du c t. B ut we ne e d n ot e xami ne wh e the r c ouns e l pe rf or me d d e fi c ie ntl y

be c a us e , a s th e state court found, Coc krea

m fails to establish that he suffe red pr ejudi ce a s a re sult of his attorney ’s perf ormanc e. S t r ickland , 466 U.S. at 697 (“[A] court need not de termine whe ther c ounsel’s perf ormanc e was defic ient befor e examining the prejudice suffe red by the defe ndant as a result of the alleg ed def

iciencie s.”). As we explain below, the state cour t conforme d its decision to releva nt fede ral lawwhen it conc luded that none of the a lleg ed violations—vouching for the c redibility of witnesses, commentingon Cockrea m’s decision not to testify at trial, shifting the burde n of proof to Cockream, and appe aling to the sy mpathy of the jury

—wer e suff

icient to undermine c onfidenc eNo. 08-1992

Cockream v. Jone

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- 7 - in the outcome of the trial.
Th e Mic hig an tri a l court a pp lie d th e fe de ra l Strickland standard to trigg er pr ejudice r eview, prompting A EDPA defe renc e. But when it examined the prosecutor’s conduct, it consistently cited state c ourt pr e c e de nt t o h old

the pr os e c uto r’ s con du c t pro pe r. Re luc tant to e ns na re the fe de ra l c ourt s in dec i p h eringstate law c laims, the Supreme Court has plac ed the bur den on state c ourts to make
c le ar whe the r fe de ra l or state law c on tr ols the ir de c isi on s. “ I n h a

be a s, if the de c isi on

of the [state
c ourt ] fa ir ly

a pp e are d to re st p ri mari ly

on re so lut ion of tho se c la ims , or to b e int e rw ov e n w iththo se claims, and did not clea

rly and expressly

rely on an independe nt a

nd adequate state g round, a f eder al
c o u rt m ay

a d dr e s s th e p e ti ti on.” Co l eman v. Thompson , 5 01 U. S. 7 22 , 7 35 (1 99 1) . B e c a us e Coc kr e a m c on te nd s th a t th e pr os e cut or’ s remark s r e nd e re d h is tri a l so fu nd a me nta lly

un fa ir a s to deny him due proce ss of law, he raises a fede ral issue cog nizable on habea s revie w. And though the Mic hig an tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on re lie s o n M ic hig an s tate c ourt c a se s to re

je c t Co c kr e a m’s c la im, it
a c kn ow le dg e s th a t “ [t]he te st f or pr os e c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t is wh e the r a d e fe nd ant w a s d e nie d h is rig ht to a fair a

nd impartial trial.” People v. Cockre am , No. 2000-3533-F C, at 3. We thus afford the state cour t’s decision due de fer ence under AEDPA, assig ning petitioner the burde n of showingthat fede ral law demands a dif

fer ent conc lusion. Se e Ha rri s v . S tov all , 212 F.3d 940, 943 ( 6th Cir. 2000) (Wh e re a pe tit ion e r a lle g e s c on sti tutiona l e rr or but th e state c ourt

do e s n ot a dd

re ss t he iss ue in federa l co n s t i t utional terms, we ultimately inquire “whether

the state c ourt result is contra ry to or
unrea sonably

applies cle arly

established fe dera l law.”)
. Under rele vant Supreme Court pr ece dent, prosec utorial misconduct demands reve rsal if thatNo. 08-1992

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- 8 - conduct “ ‘so infec ted the trial with unfa irness as t o m ake the resulting conviction a de nial of due proce ss.’” Darden v . W

ainwright , 4 7 7 U. S
. 1 6 8 , 1 8 1 (1 9 8 6 ) ( qu o t i n g Do nn e lly v . D e Chr istofo ro , 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). When revi ew ing the prosec utor’s re marks, we keep in mind that “the appropr iate standa

rd of r eview f

or such a claim on writ of ha

beas c orpus is the narr ow one of due proce ss, and not the broa d exercise of supervisory

power .” D a rden , 4 77 U.S. at 181 (interna l qu otatio ns omi tte d) ; see als o B yrd v. Coll ins , 2 0 9 F. 3 d

4 8 6 , 5 2 9 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g Cook v. Bordenkirc her , 6 02 F .2 d 1 17 , 1 19 n. 5 ( 6th Cir
. 19 79 ), fo r the pr op os iti on that “ it i s th e re sp on sib ili ty of the [st ate courts] to police their prosec utors; w e have no such authority .”). Thus, “the touchstone of due process analy sis in case s of allege d prosec utorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability

of the prose cutor.” Smith v. Phillips , 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982).
To examine prosec utorial misconduct, we e mploy a two-pr ong test, asking first whethe r the pr os e c uti on ’s re mark s q

ua lif ie d a s imp ro pe r, a

nd , if so , wh e the r the y “ we re su ff ic ie ntl y fl a g ra

nt t o
war rant re versa l.” Slagle v. Bagley , 457 F.3d 501, 516 (6th Cir. 2006). We measure flag ranc y by looking to (1) t h e st reng th of the prose cutor’s e vidence ; (2) the de g ree to which the prose cutor’s
rema rks tended to mislead the jury or prejudice the defe ndant; (3) the extensivi ty (or isolated nature) of the improper

conduct; and ( 4) the de liberate ness of the pr osecutor’ s statements. Id
. Cockrea m attempts to establish the requisite prejudice by first contendingthat the prosec utor rende red his trial fundame ntally unfair when he vouched for the cre dibilit y of wit nesses. “ I mproper vouching occur s when a

jury could re asonably

believe that a prosec utor was indicating a persona l belief in a

witness’ cr edibility .” Taylor v. United States , 985 F.2d 844, 846 ( 6 t h Cir. 1993).No. 08-1992

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- 9 - Cockrea m fails to demonstrate that the prosecutor re ache d that threshold her e. The trial transc ript ref lects that the prose cutor made rema rks i n his opening and closing st atements about how “nice ” Drog osch appe are d and that she te stified truthfully . Specifica lly , during his opening he commente d that “y ou’re g oing to listen to Michele and y ou’re g oing to see what an incredible ni ce y oung g irl she is and she is not making th i s u p . ” T ri al Tr. Vol. I I , Dist. Ct. Doc. (“Doc .”) 13, 79. H e fur ther commented that “ if we didn’t h ave a ll that [ other e vidence ], y ou believe it just on the victim’s testimony herse lf.” Id . I n closing , he re marke d that “ [t] is is a wonderf ul gir l this happened to,” a nd “[w]e’ve talked a

bout how y ou would g aug e somebody ’s cr edibilit y , ” and alluded to a dditional
e vid e nc e no t in

the re c or d wh e n he de sc ri be d he r a s “ a lmo st tr ying to min imi ze wh a t ha pp e ne d to her.” Trial Tr. V ol. I I I , Doc. 1 4 , 3 1
. Cockrea m also contends that the pr osecutor e rre d when he commented that “I believe the best witness we had here was the other guy who lived at the c omplex .” Id
. “Pro s e c u to r ia l v o u c h in g is s a id to o c c ur w h e n th e p r o s e c u to r s u p p o rts th e c r e d ib ility

of a witness by indicating a persona l be lief in the witness’s cre dibilit y [,] there by placingthe pre stige of a [prosecutor’ s off

i ce ] b eh ind that witness throug h comments that imply that the prosec utor has specia l knowledg e of f

acts not in front of t h e jury .” Davis v. Book er , 589 F.3d 302, 310 ( 6th Cir. 20 09 ) ( int e rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s and c itatio n omi tte d)
. As kin g the jur y to inf e r c re dib ili ty fr om f

a c ts alre ady in e vidence by virtue of Drog osch’s testimony —that she appea

red nice or minimi ze d her testimony —does not cross that impropriety threshold. United States v. Owens , 426 F.3d 800, 806 (6th Cir. 2 0 0 5 ) ( “ Co u n s e l ma y ar g u e f o r a r e a s o n a

b le in f e r e n c e th a t a w it

n e s s is n o t c r e d ib le
. . .No. 08-1992

Cockream v. Jone

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- 10 - assuming the re e x ists evidence f rom which to so infer.” ). The prosecutor did not asser t or imply that he dr e w fro m anyth ingbut D ro g os c h’ s tr ia l te sti mony to a rgue that sh e wa s c re dib le . A nd his comments about the e y e-w itness’s testimony sug g ested only

that Pike, as someone uninvolved in the
a l t e r c a t i o n , p r e s e n t e d

f a c t s w i t h o u tb i a s
— a

c o n c l u s i o nt h e j u r

y c o u l d , b a s e d

o nP i k e ’ s t e s t i m o n y,
re a c h o n it s o wn . Coup le d with the tr ia l court ’s ins tr uc tio ns to the jur

y be fo re op e nin g state me nts that the lawy ers’ statement and a rguments did not qualify as evidence, a nd standard instruc tions on the fa ctors the jury should use to e valuate a witness’s cre dibilit y , the prosec utor’s statements did not deprive Cockrea

m of his due proc ess rig hts to a fair tria l. Se e By rd , 209 F.3d at 537–38. Next, C ockre am alleg es th at the prose cutor impermissibly commented on his dec ision not to testify when he stated in closing that there exis ted “no c ontradiction to what [Drog osch] said.” Tr i a l T r . V o l I I I , D o c . 1 7
- 2 , 3
. T h e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e C o c kr e a mr e l i e s u p o nf i n d s s t r o n g supp or t: “[i] t is well established that a prosecutor’s direct refer ence to a cr iminal defenda nt’s failure to testify is a violation of that defe ndant’s F ifth Amendment privileg e ag ainst compelled self -incrimination.” By rd , 2 0 9 F. 3 d at 5 3 3 (c i t i n g Gr iff in v . Ca lif or nia , 380 U.S. 609 (1965)). Eve n indirect re fer ence s to a def endant’ s failure to testify may brea ch constit utional g uara ntees, but we must “‘look at all the surroundingcirc umstances’ ” to assess a possible due process vi olation. Id . (quoting Bu tle r v . R os e , 686 F.2d 1163, 1170 ( 6th Cir. 1982) (en ba nc))
. This court has adapted its four- fac tor inquiry into the flag ranc y

of a pr osecutor’ s improper
r e ma rks t o a d dr e s s mo r e s p e c if ic a ll y a p r o s e c u to r ’ s in d ir e c t c o mm e n t o nth e r igh t t o s il e n c e . We ask: “1) [w]ere the comments manifestly intend ed t o ref

lect on the a ccuse d’s silence or of such aNo. 08-1992

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- 11 - char acte r that the jury

would naturally

and nec essar ily

take them a s such; 2) we re the rema rks isolated or extensive; 3) was the evidenc e of g uilt otherwise over whelming ; [ and] 4) what cur ative instructions were g iven and whe n.” Bowling v. Parker , 344 F.3d 487, 514 (6th Cir. 2003) (interna l qu ota tio n m ar

k s an d c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d )
. I f

w e d e t e r

m i n e t h a ts o m e o t h e r

e qu a l l y p l a u s i b le explanation for the prose cutor’s r emar ks exi sts, we cannot find manifest intent. Gall v. Parke r , 231 F.3d 265, 311 (6th Cir. 2000), supersede d by statute on other grounds . And thi s c ourt ha s p re vio us ly held that “[g ]eneral r efe renc es to evidenc e as unc ontradicte d, while not rec ommended, may not ref lect on the defe ndant’s failure to te stify wher e witnesses other than the defe n d an t co u l d have contra dicted the e vidence .” By rd , 2 0 9 F. 3 d at 5 3 4 (q u o t i n g Raper v. M intzes , 706 F .2 d 161 , 164 (6 th Cir . 1 98 3) ); see also United States v . Tarwat er , 308 F.3d 494, 511 (6th Cir. 2002) (The pr ohibition
a g a ins t com me nti ng on a

c ri min a l de fe nd ant’ s si le nc e “ do e s n ot e xten d to a de fe nd ant’ s f

a ilure to call a w itness or to otherwise pr esent e x culpatory evidenc e.”) . Be cause other witnesses who te sti fi e d—

name ly , Pi ke —c ou ld h ave c a lle d D ro g os c h’ s v e rs ion of the fa c ts i nto qu e sti on , th e state court re asonably

conclude d that the re cord do es n o t give rise to “a ny implication that this was desig ned to point out that Def endant did not testify

in his own defense .” People v . Cockream , No. 2000-3533-F C, at 4.
Coc kr e am r e li e s o nth e s ame r e ma r k

— “ th e r e ’ s n o c o n tr a d ic ti o nto w h a t [ D r o g osch] sai d”—to a

rgue tha t th e pr os e c uto r i mpe rm iss ibl y sh if te d th e burd e n o f p ro of

to h im. Th ou g h “ it [i s] i mproper f

or the prose cutor to sug g est that the def endant ha [s] the burde n of proof or any ob l i gati on to produce evidenc e to prove his innocence ,” Un ite d S tates v . Clar

k , 982 F.2d 965,No. 08-1992

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- 12 - 968–69 (6th Cir. 1993), no err or results from point ing out that the def ense the ory

lacks e videntiary support, Un ite d S

tates v . F orre st , 402 F.3d 678, 686 (6th Cir. 2005). Indeed, w e re cently found “nothing improper a

bout hig hlighting uncontrove rted testimony befor e the jury .” United States v. Kuehne , 547 F.3d 667, 690 ( 6th Cir. 2008).
Cockrea m next urg es us t o fi n d prejudice in the prosec utor’s re marks that appe aled to the passions or sy

mpathies of the jury , deprivinghim of a fa ir trial. We, like the district court, take issue with the prosecu t o r’s description of the cr ime as “e very woman’s nig htmare, e very fathe r’s nightmar e”; his comment that Drog osch’s escape could be attributed t o God; the ex planation of the eff ect that the c rime had on his e ating and slee ping pa tterns, and pe rsonal re marks that he w orried for his own mother’ s safe ty ; and the prose cutor’s repeated foc us on the continuing traumatic impac t that the crime would have on D rog osch. See U nited States v. Payne , 2 F.3d 706, 712 ( 6th Cir. 1993) (conde mning “comments [t hat] ha d the ability to mislea d the jury as well as i gn i t e s t rong sy mpathetic passions for the victims a nd ag ainst [t he def

endant].”). We strain to “unde rstand how
any c omp e te nt pr os e c uto r c ou ld be lie ve that su c h c omm e nts we re pr op e r i n a c ri min a l tr ia l.” Di st. Ct. Op . at 12 . B ut t

ho ug h th e state me nts we re imp ro pe r, g ive n th e ir iso late d n a tur e (c omp are d to the leng thy

summary of the trial testimony comprising the remainder of the prosec utor’s re marks), they did not ri s e t o the flag rant leve l neede d to warr ant re versa l. Se e By rd , 209 F.3d at 532. Moreove r, the stre ng th of the evide nce a g ainst Cockrea m a nd the trial court’s instruc tions that the jury must base their de cision on the evidenc e, not sy mpathy or pre judice, we igh a g ainst finding that the prosec utor’s statements violated Cockrea m’s due proc ess rig hts. See id. a t 53 3. Thus , a s to thi sNo. 08-1992

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- 13 - and the thr e e oth e r pr os e c uto ri a l imp ro pr ie tie s that Coc rk e a m c on te nd s und e rm ine d c on fi de nc e in his trial’s outcome, we cannot c onclude that the state cour t u n re as o n ably

applied Supreme Court pr e c e de nt whe n it

he ld t hat Co c kr e am f

a ile d to e sta

bli shthe pr e

jud ic e re qu ir e d to state a via ble ineffe ctive assistanc e of a ppellate c ounsel claim. Finally , Cockrea

m contend s th a

t the prosec utor’s comments, eve n if individually insufficient to deny him due proce ss, acc umulated to his pr ej u d i ce . But thoug h ag g reg ated ha rmless err ors
re qu ir e re ve rs a l w he n “ the c omb ine d e ff e c t
. . . wa s so pr e

jud ic ia l a s to re nd e r [a] tr ia l f un dame nta lly unfair,” Un ite d Sta te

s v . Tr uji llo , 376 F .3 d 593 , 614 (6 th C ir . 2 00 4) , o nly a c tua l e rro rs may

combine to ge nerate cumulative pr ejudice. Be cause we discern im propriety only in the prosec utor’s re marks that a pp e a le d to the jur

y ’s sy mpa th i e s , a n d n o n e t he le ss f ind the pr os e c uto r’ s c omm e nts ins uf fi c ie ntl y flag rant to g ener ate pr ejudice, Coc krea m’s cumulative ar g ument fails. That is , ev en i f Cockre am pr e se nts a

me ri tor iou s atta c k u

po n th e pr os e c uto r’ s atte mpt s to g e ne rate jur or symp ath y , he sti ll exposes only

that set of errors, a

nd no others to combine it with. Acc ording ly , there was no cumulative pre

judice.
Be cause Cockrea

m fails to demonstrate that the state trial cour t unrea s o n ably

applied Supreme Court pre cede nt when it found that hi s appellate counsel’s perfor mance did not prejudice him , w e de ny

his pe tit ion

on ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of a pp e llate c ouns e l g ro un ds . A nd a s th e same prosec utorial misconduct arg ument underlies the rema inder of his claims, those nece ssarily fail as well.No. 08-1992

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- 14 - III
. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the district court’s denial of Cockrea m’s petition f

or a writ of habe as
c or pu s.