In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 17-2040

JOHN DOE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, Secretary of the 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security; 

JAMES W. MCCAMENT, Deputy Director, 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 

Services; and NICHOLAS COLUCCI, Chief, 

Immigrant Investor Program Office,

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 15-cv-01387 — John Z. Lee, Judge.

____________________

FEBRUARY 26, 2018

____________________

Before RIPPLE, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff John Doe seeks lawful permanent residence in the United States under the 
2 No. 17-2040

Employment-Based Immigration: Fifth Preference category 

(“EB-5”). This visa program requires applicants to demonstrate that they have invested or are currently investing 

capital in a “new commercial enterprise” within the United 

States. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(A). To that end, Doe invested 

$500,000 in Elgin Assisted Living EB-5 Fund, LLC. That 

entity then loaned funds to Elgin Memory Care, LLC, so it 

could build and operate a memory care facility in Elgin, 

Illinois.

Despite this investment, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) denied Doe lawful permanent 

resident status. The USCIS expressed particular concern that 

the Elgin memory care center had not been built since it was 

first proposed in 2011. Doe objected to the decision and filed 

a lawsuit against the USCIS alleging that the denial of his 

application violated the Administrative Procedure Act. 

5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. The district court entered summary 

judgment in the government’s favor and Doe appealed.

Doe is represented in this appeal by the Kameli Law 

Group, LLC. The law firm has three attorneys. John R. Floss 

is one of two associates and also Doe’s counsel of record. 

Taher Kameli is the firm’s principal. TAHER KAMELI LAW 

GROUP, Our Attorneys, http://www.kamelilawgroup.com/

our-attorneys/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). Illinois records list 

Kameli as the sole manager of the LLC. OFFICE OF THE ILL.

SEC’Y OF STATE, http://www.ilsos.gov/corporatellc/.

While briefing in this appeal was underway, the Securities and Exchange Commission brought a civil action against 

Kameli for violating the Securities and Exchange Acts. 

Complaint, SEC v. Kameli, No. 17-cv-04686 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 

2017). The agency filed an amended complaint late last 
No. 17-2040 3

month. First Amended Complaint, Kameli, No. 17-cv-04686 

(N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2018). The SEC accuses Kameli of defrauding at least 226 immigrant investors who participated in the 

EB-5 immigrant investor program. Id. ¶¶ 1–2. More specifically, the SEC alleges that Kameli solicited over $88 million 

to invest in a number of new commercial enterprises, only to 

squander and misappropriate some of those funds. Id. ¶¶ 9–

11.

There is significant overlap between the SEC’s claims 

against Kameli and the facts in this case. Kameli is alleged to 

have misappropriated funds that were invested in the Elgin 

memory care center. Id. ¶¶ 159–167, 169. This supposedly 

left the project in debt and unfinished. Id. ¶¶ 195–96, 200–01. 

The SEC alleges that Kameli’s actions have “jeopardized 

investors’ chances at obtaining permanent U.S. residency 

through the EB-5 visa program.” Id. ¶ 13. Doe is one of those 

investors. This raises a serious question of conflict of interest.

Accordingly, we ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs regarding the possible conflicts of interest the 

Kameli Law Group may have in representing Doe. The briefs 

are now in. We conclude that disqualification is appropriate.

It is our duty to “maintain public confidence in the legal 

profession and assist[] in protecting the integrity of the 

judicial proceeding.” Freeman v. Chi. Musical Instrument Co., 

689 F.2d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 1982). Disqualifying conflicted 

counsel is “a drastic measure” toward this end, but we must 

take this step when necessary to “protect[] the attorneyclient relationship.” Id. The facts of this case force our hand.

The Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit representation if “there is a significant risk that the representation 
4 No. 17-2040

of one or more clients will be materially limited by the 

lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or 

a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.” ILL. R.

PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2). Client consent can sometimes 

resolve such a conflict, but it is not a panacea. See Owen v. 

Wangerin, 985 F.2d 312, 317 (7th Cir. 1993). The lawyer must 

always “reasonably believe[] that [he] will be able to provide 

competent and diligent representation to each affected 

client.” ILL. R. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(1). Put slightly 

differently, representation is prohibited notwithstanding 

informed client consent if the court “cannot reasonably 

conclude that the lawyer will be able to provide competent 

and diligent representation.” Id. cmt. [15].

This case presents at least two concurrent conflicts of interest, neither of which can be waived by informed client 

consent.1 No lawyer could reasonably continue the representation under these circumstances.

First, a conflict of interest arises when an attorney has an 

incentive to reject lines of inquiry or argument that might 

help his client’s case. See, e.g., United States v. Algee, 309 F.3d 

1011, 1014 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding conflict when “ethical 

constraints would prohibit [counsel] from cross-examining 

[witnesses] in any meaningful way”); People v. Taylor,

930 N.E.2d 959, 971–72 (Ill. 2010) (“[T]he defendant must 

point to some specific defect in his counsel’s strategy tactics, 

or decision making attributable to the conflict.”) (internal 

 1 In response to our order for supplemental briefing, the Kameli Law

Group submitted an affidavit from Doe purporting to waive any conflict 

of interest. As we explain, the two conflicts at issue here are not waivable.
No. 17-2040 5

quotation marks omitted). Kameli has precisely this motivation. He and Doe might share an interest in proving that the 

Elgin investment was not a sham, but that is where their 

alliance begins and ends. Kameli would not advise Doe to 

litigate his case any other way, such as by alleging fraud and 

seeking reconsideration of the USCIS’s decision. It therefore 

strains credulity to think that Kameli would be diligent in 

Doe’s case. Indeed, a diligent lawyer must take “whatever

lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a 

client’s cause or endeavor.” ILL. R. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 

cmt. 1 (emphasis added). Kameli’s self-interest inhibits him 

from carrying out this duty.

Second, a lawyer owes his client a duty of “undivided 

fidelity.” Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96, 100 (Ill. 1982). 

Having a duty to someone else obviously “interfere[s] with 

the undivided loyalty [that] the attorney owes his client” 

and ultimately “detract[s] from achieving the most advantageous position for his client.” Id. Kameli’s divided obligations to his various investors and clients put him in precisely 

this position. The SEC alleges that Kameli “has remained in 

total control” of the relevant EB-5 projects he created. First 

Amended Complaint, ¶ 12, Kameli, No. 17-cv-04686. Many of 

these projects evidently “lack money to complete construction,” id. ¶ 196, meaning Kameli must decide which projects 

to shore up with the limited funds he has. His duty of loyalty to Doe would require him to complete the Elgin project 

because that would best position him to obtain lawful 

permanent residence. His obligations to his other investors, 

on the other hand, require him to invest in their respective 

enterprises. This catch-22 is the epitome of divided loyalty 

and thus makes Kameli’s continued representation untenable.
6 No. 17-2040

Having identified the relevant conflicts of interest, we 

have the final issue of whether Kameli’s conflicts can be 

imputed to his associate and Doe’s counsel of record, John 

Floss. The Illinois rules provide that no lawyer associated in 

a firm “shall knowingly represent a client when any one of 

them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by 

Rules 1.7 or 1.9.” ILL. R. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10(a). This 

language on its own would bar Floss from representing Doe. 

An exception arises, however, when “the prohibition is 

based on a personal interest of the prohibited lawyer and 

does not present a significant risk of materially limiting the 

representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the 

firm.” Id. Kameli’s conflict is plainly personal to him—he 

alone is in the SEC’s crosshairs—so we must determine 

whether Kameli’s civil case presents a significant risk of 

materially limiting Floss’s continued representation of Doe.

We conclude that it does. As discussed, the Kameli Law 

Group is a small law firm with just three attorneys. Kameli is 

the only principal, so Floss reports directly to him. This 

presents an unacceptably high risk of materially limiting 

Doe’s representation. There is virtually no chance Floss 

would do anything to upset Kameli’s case. In fact, Floss’s 

briefing on the conflict-of-interest issue suggests that he 

would champion Kameli’s cause. The brief goes out of its 

way to describe the allegations against Kameli as “salacious.” It also lauds the district judge in the SEC’s civil 

action for “denying the SEC’s motion for a preliminary 

injunction” against Kameli. None of this is relevant to Doe’s 

case, and unfortunately, it suggests that Floss’s priority 

would be to protect Kameli.
No. 17-2040 7

It is therefore ORDERED that the Kameli Law Group is 

disqualified from representing Doe in this case. The appeal 

will be held in abeyance for 60 days to permit Doe to secure

substitute counsel.