Report to Congressional Committees

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

October 2001 DEFENSE LOGISTICS

Strategic Planning

Weaknesses Leave

Economy, Efficiency,

and Effectiveness of

Future Support

Systems at Risk

GAO-02-106
Page i GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 4

Conclusions 15

Recommendations for Executive Action 15

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 16

Appendix I Analysis of Military Components’ Logistics

Transformation and Implementation Plans 18

Appendix II Scope and Methodology 24

Appendix III Comments From the Department of Defense 26

Related GAO Products 29

Tables

Table 1: Defense-wide Objectives and Performance Measures and a

Summary of Weaknesses in the Components’

Implementation Plans 3

Table 2: Objective One—Optimize Support to the Warfighter 9

Table 3: Objective Two—Improve Strategic Mobility to Meet

Warfighter Requirements 10

Table 4: Objective Three—Implement Customer Wait Time as the

Department-wide Logistics Metric 11

Table 5: Objective Four—Fully Implement Total Asset Visibility

Across the Department of Defense 12

Table 6: Objective Five—Reengineer and Modernize Applicable

Logistics Processes and Systems 13

Table 7: Objective Six—Minimize Logistics Costs While Meeting

Warfighter Requirements 14

Contents
Page 1 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation

October 11, 2001

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable John Warner

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Bob Stump

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

Since the end of the Cold War, the Department of Defense has

dramatically reduced its fighting forces and logistics infrastructure. The

Department estimates it is spending about $59 billion a year on logistics

support1

 programs to operate and sustain weapon systems,2 but it reports

that significant reductions can be achieved by adopting a variety of

different logistics support practices. We reported in January 2001 that

serious weaknesses persist throughout the Department’s logistics

activities and that it is unclear to what extent ongoing reengineering

management improvement initiatives will overcome them.3

 The

Department has taken a number of significant steps in recent years

directed at improving its outdated and inefficient logistics processes.

Specifically, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and each of the military

services and appropriate Defense commands have established a number of

significant logistics reengineering efforts. In addition, the Office of the

Secretary of Defense developed the Fiscal Year 2000 Logistics Strategic

Plan in August 1999, which outlines six overall objectives, a basic

 1

 The Department of Defense defines “logistics support” as planning and carrying out the

movement and maintenance of forces.

2

 The Department does not routinely capture these costs in its accounting and estimating

systems. However, beginning in 1999, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,

Technology, and Logistics used a contractor to estimate the amount of funds DOD spends

annually on logistics support.

3 Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense

(GAO-01-244, Jan. 2001).

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation

framework for a Department-wide logistics concept, and a general time

frame for implementation. The plan required that the military services, the

Defense Logistics Agency, and the U.S. Transportation Command develop

supporting implementation plans that reflect the vision, objectives, and

metrics outlined in the Department-wide plan.

The House Committee on Armed Services report on the Floyd D. Spence

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Report 106-616)

requires that we assess the Department of Defense’s long-range logistics

strategic planning process. As agreed with your offices, we focused our

review on the Department-wide Logistics Strategic Plan and the Defense

components’ supporting implementation plans. Specifically, this report

addresses whether (1) the Department’s Logistics Strategic Plan provides

an adequate overarching logistics strategy to guide the reengineering

initiatives of the military services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the

U.S. Transportation Command and (2) the related implementation plans

prepared by those components are likely to result in overall improvements

to the economy and efficiency of logistics activities. Our scope and

methodology are discussed in appendix II. The Department of Defense is

currently engaged in a strategic review of its warfighting goals, objectives,

and capabilities that, when completed, could influence the way it

approaches logistics support and strategic planning.

The Department of Defense’s Logistics Strategic Plan is not sufficiently

comprehensive and does not provide an adequate overarching logistics

strategy to effectively guide the Defense components’ logistics plans. The

plan, which is organized around six broad objectives and associated

generic performance measures, is very general and does not provide a

cohesive planning strategy for developing future logistics systems. Also,

the objectives and actions outlined in the plan are almost exclusively

related to supply and inventory management issues and do not fully

address several other critical logistics functions, such as maintenance and

transportation. Specifically, the plan does not adequately address (1) all

aspects of the logistics life-cycle process, (2) how the Department should

be organized in the future to fulfill evolving logistics requirements, or

(3) the facilities and personnel the Department anticipates it will need to

fulfill its future logistics requirements. Furthermore, the Department’s

long-range initiative to design a logistics architecture for the years 2010

and beyond is progressing slowly, and it is not clear how this initiative will

fit into the Department’s overall future logistics strategy set forth in the

strategic plan.

Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation

While the military services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the U.S.

Transportation Command each developed separate logistics

transformation plans and other implementation plans to support the

Department-wide Logistics Strategic Plan, these plans also have a number

of fundamental weaknesses and are, therefore, not likely to result in

overall improvements to the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of

logistics activities. Specifically, these plans (1) are not always consistent

with the actions in the Defense-wide plan; (2) are not directly related to

the Defense-wide plan or to each other; and (3) do not contain some key

management elements needed to develop an effective management

framework for measuring progress, such as performance measures and

specific milestones. Table 1 identifies the six strategic objectives set forth

in the Department-wide strategic plan, along with stated performance

measures and a summary of our analyses regarding the weaknesses in the

components’ implementation actions.

Table 1: Defense-wide Objectives and Performance Measures and a Summary of Weaknesses in the Components’

Implementation Plans

Objective/action Performance measure Weakness in components’ plans

1. Optimize support to the warfighter.

• Military components will determine

existing mission capable rates within

the specified time frame.

Mission capable rates The definitions and metrics regarding

mission capable rates are not

consistent. In many cases, the plans

lack specific performance measures.

2. Improve strategic mobility to meet

warfighter requirements.

• Increase cargo airlift capacity and sealift

surge and afloat preposition capacity to

meet current Department guidance.a

• Develop a measurement approach and

appropriate targets for mobility

infrastructure and mobility process

improvements.

Airlift, sealift, and afloat preposition capacity

and mobility infrastructure and process

improvements

The plans do not define a consistent

strategy that recognizes the

interrelationship of the various

initiatives and do not include the

necessary metrics to measure

progress.

3. Implement customer wait timeb as the

Department-wide logistics metric.

• Refine the definition of “customer wait

time,” develop appropriate measures,

and implement them.

Customer wait time The definitions and metrics regarding

customer wait time are not consistent.

4. Fully implement total asset visibility across

the Department of Defense.

• View information on the identity and

status of Defense material and assets.

• In some cases, complete a business

transaction using that information.

Total asset visibility The components are relying on asset

visibility systems that have not been

fully developed. Consequently,

performance targets and measures

have not been defined.

5. Reengineer and modernize applicable

logistics processes and systems.

• Develop logistics processes/systems

modernization plans by the end of FY

2001.

Components’ logistics system

modernization plans

The components’ initiatives are

generally not directly linked to the

Department-wide Logistics Strategic

Plan or to each other. Additionally, the

plans generally lack adequate
Page 4 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation

Objective/action Performance measure Weakness in components’ plans

• Increase the proportion of modernized

logistics business systems according to

those plans by the end of fiscal year

2006.

performance measures.

6. Minimize logistics costs while meeting

warfighter requirements.

• Reduce the overall costs of logistics

support for selected weapon systems

by fiscal year 2006.

Weapon system support cost reductions The plans do not identify which

weapon systems the components are

focusing on to reduce logistics costs

and do not include adequate

performance measures.

a

Current guidance is Mobility Requirements Study (MRS-05).

b

Customer wait time is the total elapsed time between issuance of a customer order and satisfaction

of that order.

We are recommending that the Department revise the August 1999

Department-wide Logistics Strategic Plan to include a more detailed

framework for organizing logistics support throughout the Department

and for guiding the components’ logistics planning and implementation

efforts. We are also recommending that the Office of the Secretary of

Defense establish a mechanism for ensuring that the components’

implementation plans include key management elements for measuring

progress, such as performance measures and detailed milestones. In its

written comments on a draft of this report, the Department agreed with

our recommendations and stated that it will initiate corrective actions.

The Department of Defense understands that a comprehensive

transformation of its logistics structures, processes, and supporting

information systems is necessary to improve its customer services and

reduce the cost of support. To lead this transformation, the Department

established the Logistics Reform Senior Steering Group—comprised of

senior officials from the Joint Staff, the military services, the Defense

Logistics Agency, and the U.S. Transportation Command—to develop its

Fiscal Year 2000 Logistics Strategic Plan. This plan was designed during a

series of workshops that focused the collective attention and resources

that the Department believed were necessary for achieving its key

objectives. This top-leadership effort concentrated on developing a

common mission, vision, and associated performance goals. To meet the

Department of Defense goal to have a successful logistics transformation,

the Logistics Reform Senior Steering Group prescribed the following

specific “success criteria.”

• Optimize cycle times—acquisition, supply, maintenance, transportation,

and distribution.

Background
Page 5 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation

• Manage the total life-cycle through integration of acquisition and logistics

processes.

• Meet deployment and sustainment requirements across the full spectrum

of military operations.

• Guarantee joint total asset visibility through fully integrated, secure

information systems, with asset visibility being the capability for users to

view information on the identity and status of Defense material assets and,

in some cases, complete a business transaction using that information.

• Meet or exceed the Department of Defense logistics metrics and costreduction goals.

To address the above criteria, the Logistics Strategic Plan includes six

broad objectives developed by the Logistics Reform Senior Steering Group

to assist logistics managers in planning and executing the Department’s

priority initiatives for transforming logistics. The objectives are as follows:

• Optimize support to the warfighter.

• Improve strategic mobility to meet warfighter requirements.

• Implement customer wait time as the Department-wide logistics metric.

• Fully implement total asset visibility across the Department of Defense.

• Reengineer and modernize applicable logistics processes and systems.

• Minimize logistics costs while meeting warfighter requirements.

The Department’s Fiscal Year 2000 Logistics Strategic Plan directed the

services and Defense commands to develop implementing plans that

reflect the vision, objectives, and metrics of the Department-wide plan.

The plan also specified that the implementing strategies and related plans

are governed in content and format by the provisions of the Government

Performance and Results Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-62), commonly referred to

as the Results Act. As such, these plans should include detailed actions,

performance measures, completion dates, and resource requirements. To

support the implementation of the Logistics Strategic Plan, the Deputy

Secretary of Defense directed the military services, the Defense Logistics

Agency, and the U.S. Transportation Command in a March 23, 2000,

directive entitled the Department of Defense Reform Initiative #54, to

establish logistics transformation plans for submission to the Office of the

Secretary of Defense. This directive also provided guidance for the

preparation of these plans, which were intended to serve as vehicles for

aligning the military component initiatives, documenting their approach

for achieving the objectives in the Department’s Logistics Strategic Plan,

and obtaining resources. Appendix I provides an overview of the logistics

reengineering initiatives that each of the components is individually

pursuing as part of its transformation plan.
Page 6 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation

We reported in December 19964 that the Department’s 1994 version of its

Logistics Strategic Plan contained similar weaknesses to those outlined in

this report. Specifically, we reported that the 1994 version of the plan did

not adequately (1) link the action plans to resource requirements, (2) link

the services’ and the Defense Logistics Agency’s plans to the strategic

plan, or (3) identify interim approaches that could be developed and

implemented when milestones of a priority strategy had been extended.

Other related GAO reports and testimonies are listed on the last page of

this report.

While the Department-wide Logistics Strategic Plan outlines six key

objectives and a general time frame for implementation, it is not

sufficiently comprehensive and does not provide an adequate framework

for guiding the military services’, the Defense Logistics Agency’s, and the

U.S. Transportation Command’s logistics reengineering initiatives. 5

Specifically, the plan does not address the logistics lifecycle process from

acquisition through support and system disposal.

In addition, the Department’s plan does not specify how the Department

will be organized in the future to fulfill the logistics requirements that will

be needed to support the National Military Strategy or how the

Department will eventually attain a new logistics structure. The

Department’s plan identifies that the logistics vision is that, by fiscal year

2006, the joint logistics process will be a highly efficient, integrated system

that ensures required support to the warfighter. This vision, however, does

not identify the logistics requirements the Department will have to fulfill,

how it will be organized to fulfill these requirements, or who will be

responsible for providing specific types of logistics support. Furthermore,

while the Department will likely face further changes in size and structure

in the near future, its strategic plan has not identified the logistics facilities

or personnel it will need to support future logistics requirements and has

not specified a process for determining what resources it will need.

Without addressing all logistics functions, as well as these facilities and

personnel requirements through its strategic planning process, the

 4 Logistics Planning: Opportunities for Enhancing DOD’s Logistics Strategic Plan

(GAO/NSIAD-97-28, Dec. 18, 1996).

5

 We previously reported in our Performance and Accountability Series in January 2001 that

the Department’s plan is very general and does not provide a cohesive planning strategy for

developing future logistics systems (GAO-01-244, Jan. 2001).

The Department-wide

Logistics Strategic Plan

Does Not Provide an

Adequate Overarching

Logistics Strategy
Page 7 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation

Department will be unable to identify the resources (i.e., maintenance

facilities, storage capacity, transportation assets, and depot personnel) it

will need to support the Department’s future logistics concepts.

In assessing the Logistics Strategic Plan, we also reviewed the relationship

between the Department’s logistics architecture initiative and the strategic

plan. The architecture initiative is intended to provide a strategic

framework to synchronize logistics improvements for the years 2010 and

beyond and to define a Department-wide logistics organization. In a

previous report6

 on the Department of Defense’s reengineering initiatives,

we identified that in October 1999, the Department established the Office

of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics

Architecture to oversee defense logistics reengineering efforts. This office

was given responsibility for designing a logistics system for business

processes, physical infrastructure, and information technologies, as well

as for defining the services’ responsibilities within the new logistics

architecture. With the assistance of a contractor, the Office began work on

an integrated logistics architecture that was intended to facilitate the

implementation of reengineered logistics support processes and

procedures. To some extent, this logistics concept was intended to

address the logistics facilities and personnel requirements.

This project has progressed slowly and it is not clear how it will fit into the

Department’s Logistics Strategic Plan. A planned report on the contractor

study has not yet been completed. Further, according to defense officials,

this planning effort may be refocused to incorporate the vision of the

Department’s new leadership regarding how future logistics planning

should proceed. The title of the office overseeing this effort has been

changed to the Assistant Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Logistics

Plans and Programs and its stated mission has been expanded to cover the

entire future logistics environment. The Office is pursuing an approved

long-term logistics planning strategy and plans to identify specific

operational efforts to undertake to move the Department along toward

achieving that strategy. Nonetheless, service planning officials expressed

concerns regarding the realism of this study effort and the extent to which

the proposed concept would work in wartime. They also questioned how

this effort fits in with other planning initiatives, such as the Logistics

Strategic Plan. Therefore, it is too early for us to determine whether this

 6 Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Enhance Success of Reengineering Initiatives

(GAO/NSIAD-00-89, June 23, 2000).
Page 8 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation

new concept for logistics support planning is an effective one, whether it

will be accepted throughout the Department, and whether it will be

feasible for future implementation.

While each of the military services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the

U.S. Transportation Command prepared implementation plans7

 in the form

of transformation plans and other documents to support the Logistics

Strategic Plan, these plans will not likely result in overall improvements to

the economy and efficiency of logistics activities. We found that these

plans (1) are not always consistent with the actions in the Defense-wide

plan, (2) are not directly related to the Defense-wide plan or to each other,

and (3) do not contain some key management elements as outlined in the

Results Act,8

 such as performance measures and specific milestones.

According to officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the

components’ plans were generally a summation of ongoing initiatives

reformatted to support the Department-wide generic objectives and did

not include any new initiatives. According to Air Force officials, one

contributing factor to this lack of any new initiatives was that the

approximately 3 months the components were given to prepare their

implementation plans was insufficient given the scope of the task.

The military services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the U.S.

Transportation Command have initiated implementation actions to

address the Department’s six objectives set forth in the Department-wide

strategic plan. Tables 2 through 7 outline the six strategic objectives and

the stated performance measures and provide a summary of the

weaknesses we identified in the corresponding parts of the components’

implementation plans. A more detailed discussion of our findings related

to each objective follows the individual tables.

 7

 Unlike the other military components, the U.S. Transportation Command’s plan focused

primarily on objective 2—improve strategic mobility to meet warfighter requirements—

and, to a lesser extent, objective 4—fully implement joint total asset visibility.

8

 The Results Act provides the primary guiding principles that agencies should use to

develop a successful management framework. Its key elements require each agency to (1)

define its mission and goals, (2) develop quantifiable performance measures that will

indicate how well goals are being achieved, and (3) include a description of required

resources (i.e., staff operational roles, skills, schedules, and other costs). Additionally, the

Results Act requires agencies to report actual performance against performance goals, the

reasons certain goals were not met, and future actions they plan to take to meet these

goals.

The Components’ Plans

Lack Necessary Elements

for Improving Logistics

Management

Implementation Plan

Weaknesses
Page 9 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation

Table 2: Objective One—Optimize Support to the Warfighter

Objective/action Performance measures Weakness in components’ plans

Optimize support to the warfighter.

• Military components will determine existing mission

capable rates within the specified timeframe.

Mission capable rates The definitions and metrics regarding mission

capable rates are not consistent. In many

cases, the plans lack specific performance

measures.

While we found that each component, with the exception of the U.S.

Transportation Command, addressed this objective, mission capable rates

are not defined and/or measured the same among the components. For

example, to measure mission capable rates, the Army plans to use the

percent of equipment that is fully mission capable and the revised

readiness report for tracking mission capable rates. These readiness

reports are embedded in the development of the Army’s Global Combat

Support System. However, this system has not been fielded Army-wide.

The Air Force, on the other hand, uses historical and forecasted aggregate

aircraft mission capable rates to measure readiness and has implemented

four initiatives to improve logistical support to the warfighter—aircraft

spare parts availability, informational advancements, reengineered

logistical support concepts, and supply chain management. Many of the

Marine Corps initiatives to support this objective are still under

development. The Navy included a sample of 12 ongoing initiatives to

support this objective. These initiatives, however, are not directly linked to

defining or measuring mission capable rates. For example, the Navy’s OneTouch Support initiative allows a customer to use the Internet to access

the supply system, identify the location and status of stock, and input

requisitions. The Navy has predicted that the upgraded version will be an

electronic single point of entry that will link Navy users via the Internet to

over 20,000 suppliers and manufacturers.

The military components have not fully defined specific performance

measures that can be used to monitor the implementation of actions that

will meet the Department’s objective. The measures are generally not

specified or are under development. For example, the Army plans to utilize

its revised readiness reports when available. However, these reports will

be developed at a later date based on an ongoing Army War College study

being conducted at the request of the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for

Logistics. The Air Force states that its current best measure is logistics

response-time days. However, the Department is transitioning from the

logistics response-time measurement to customer wait time. The Marine

Corps developed draft metrics during a working group session that was
Page 10 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation

completed in May 2000. The operational performance of the Navy’s One

Touch Support initiative is measured by the number of “logins” by the

customer and the number of “hits” experienced by the program.

Table 3: Objective Two—Improve Strategic Mobility to Meet Warfighter Requirements

Objective/action Performance measure Weakness in components’ plans

Improve strategic mobility to meet warfighter

requirements.

• Increase cargo airlift capacity and sealift

surge and afloat preposition capacity to

meet current Department guidance.

• Develop a measurement approach and

appropriate targets for mobility

infrastructure and mobility process

improvements.

Airlift, sealift, and afloat preposition capacity

and mobility infrastructure and process

improvements

The plans do not define a consistent

strategy that recognizes the

interrelationship of the various

initiatives and do not include the

necessary metrics to measure

progress.

The military components have not established the necessary metrics to

measure progress toward a successful implementation of this objective or

defined a strategy that recognizes the interrelationship of the components’

initiatives. With regard to the components’ initiatives, the Army and Air

Force, for example, are relying on the future outcome of the Mobility

Requirements Study. The Department believes this study is the absolute

key to determining its strategic mobility requirements. However, the

expected completion date is not until fiscal year 2005. The Army is also

relying on the future deployment of its Transportation Coordinator

Automated Information for Movement System II. This system is intended

to provide automation support to warfighters during deployment,

sustainment, and redeployment operations and to provide source data to

strategic command and control systems to increase the visibility of intransit personnel and items during those operations. However, the Army

has encountered delays in the development of this system and fielding will

not be completed until September 2007. We reported in February 20009

that a critical $22.7-million software requirement was unfunded and could

further delay the project’s completion. The Army’s Transformation Plan

indicates that some of these requirements are still unfunded.

The Defense Logistics Agency states in its transformation plan that

objective two does not apply to them. We agree with their position since

 9 Defense Inventory: Plan to Improve Management of Shipped Inventory Should Be

Strengthened (GAO/NSIAD-00-39, Feb. 22, 2000).
Page 11 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation

this agency’s mission does not directly involve mobility issues. While the

U.S. Transportation Command has initiated many actions, the successful

implementation of these actions has been hindered by inadequacies in the

Department’s transportation systems. For example, in order for the U.S.

Transportation Command to execute its global mission in support of a

National Military Strategy, a healthy and robust Defense transportation

system infrastructure, including all mobility assets and critical nodes (i.e.

installations, depots, rail/highway networks, air bases including en route

bases, and seaports) is required worldwide. The continued decline of the

U.S. flag merchant marine fleet and the maritime industry may affect the

Command’s ability to meet peacetime and wartime Defense requirements.

Therefore, the success of the Command’s initiatives depends largely on the

services’ actions.

We found that in most cases the military services, the Defense Logistics

Agency, and the U.S. Transportation Command have not identified

performance measures to indicate a successful implementation of

objective two. The proposed measures that were outlined simply define a

goal and do not include baseline data or interim steps for implementing

the initiatives necessary to meet this objective.

Table 4: Objective Three—Implement Customer Wait Time as the Department-wide Logistics Metric

Objective/action Performance measure Weakness in components’ plans

Implement customer wait time as the Department-wide

logistics metric.

• Refine the definition of “customer wait time,” develop

appropriate measures, and implement them.

Customer wait time The definitions and metrics regarding customer

wait time are not consistent.

The Department considers customer wait time, in general, to be the total

elapsed time between issuance of a customer order and satisfaction of that

order. However, the capability to capture and to report customer wait time

is still under development; and the Department is relying on the individual

components to develop a more specific definition of, and a process for

measuring, customer wait time. Further, the Department has not identified

how it plans to integrate the military components’ efforts. The Logistics

Strategic Plan does not define how customer wait time will be calculated

or provide information on expected outcomes, such as to what extent

customer wait time will be reduced. The capability to capture and report

customer wait time is still under development. The Marine Corps, for

example, uses retail and wholesale order ship time for all classes of

supply. According to the Marine Corps, its order ship time measurement is
Page 12 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation

identical to the Department’s logistics metric of customer wait time. The

Marine Corps believes that implementing customer wait time will not

require significant changes in its business process or the way response

time is measured. According to the Army, its Single Stock Fund initiative

will provide the Army with its initial capability to collect customer wait

time data. Initiatives included in the plans submitted by the Defense

Logistics Agency and the U.S. Transportation Command did not relate to

establishing customer wait time. In addition, the performance measures

specified in the other component’s plans are primarily stated objectives

and are too broad to measure whether a successful implementation will

occur.

Table 5: Objective Four—Fully Implement Total Asset Visibility Across the Department of Defense

Objective/action Performance measure Weakness in components’ plans

Fully implement total asset visibility across the

Department of Defense.

• View information on the identity and status of Defense

material and assets.

• In some cases, complete a business transaction using

that information.

Total asset visibility The components are relying on asset visibility

systems that have not been fully developed.

Consequently, performance targets and

measures have not been defined.

The military components are focusing on achieving 100-percent asset

visibility by fiscal year 2006 through the use of automatic identification

technology and automated information systems. However, some of the

systems that the Department is relying on to achieve that 100-percent

visibility may not be fully developed in time to support that schedule. For

example, the Army’s Global Combat Support System is expected to

substantially improve asset visibility for the warfighter and the logistics

support community. This system is being developed in three tiers

concurrently—retail, wholesale, and joint integration—but the expected

completion date is also fiscal year 2006. The Air Force has tasked the Air

Force Audit Agency to perform a series of reviews to determine the

continued need for Air Force manual accounts that are targeted for total

asset visibility by fiscal year 2004. We noted in our November 2000 report10

that the Air Force plans to complete these reviews by December 2001. Air

Force audit officials stated that the scope of this work has recently

 10 Defense Inventory: Implementation Plans to Enhance Controls Over Shipped Items

Can Be Improved (GAO-01-30, Nov. 15, 2000).
Page 13 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation

changed and that they will likely not complete the work by December

2001.

In many cases, the performance measures will be based on the progress

made in achieving the components’ individual initiatives to have 100-

percent visibility by fiscal year 2006. For example, the Army has outlined

several initiatives to meet this goal; but in many cases, no stated

performance measures were given. The Defense Logistics Agency states

that its sample inventory accuracy for all products in each fiscal year will

be greater than or equal to 95 percent and that the depot location accuracy

for all products will be greater than or equal to 99 percent. The U.S.

Transportation Command did not define a performance measure.

Table 6: Objective Five—Reengineer and Modernize Applicable Logistics Processes and Systems

Objective/action Performance measure Weakness in components’ plans

Reengineer and modernize applicable logistics

processes and systems.

• Develop logistics processes/systems

modernization plans by the end of FY 2001.

• Increase the proportion of modernized

logistics business systems according to

those plans by the end of fiscal year 2006.

Components’ logistics system

modernization plans

The components’ initiatives are

generally not directly linked to the

Department-wide Logistics Strategic

Plan or to each other. Additionally, the

plans generally lack adequate

performance measures.

With the exception of the U.S. Transportation Command, we found that

the components have ongoing initiatives to address objective five.

However, the components’ individual initiatives are generally not directly

linked to the Department’s Logistics Strategic Plan or to each other. It

appears that the components’ initiatives will have limited, if any, interface.

For example, the Navy’s Transformation Plan outlined 16 objectives to

represent a sample of the initiatives that are ongoing throughout the Navy,

but it did not indicate how these systems will interface with the other

military components. The Air Force has established a Logistics

Transformation Team specifically chartered to reengineer overarching Air

Force logistics system processes and identify opportunities to increase

performance and optimize costs. This team will also develop plans and

schedules that will outline the approach for identifying process

enhancements for the logistics system and describe the key activities

required. However, the plan does not state how the different Air Force

systems will be linked with similar systems in the rest of the Department.

The Marine Corps has initiated a program called Integrated Logistics

Capability to reengineer and modernize its logistics processes and system.

The Army’s stated solution to logistics software modernization includes
Page 14 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation

both its Global Combat Support System, which is scheduled to be

completed in fiscal year 2006, and its web-based logistics system. The webbased logistics system will transform existing serial, sequenced, batch

processing into a real-time set of logistics management systems that will

connect enterprises with customers, suppliers, and transportation

providers worldwide. The Defense Logistics Agency plans to implement

commercial business-based systems and practices.

For objective five, we also found that the military components have not

defined adequate performance measures. In most cases, the performance

measures will be determined once the initiatives have matured. The

Marine Corps states that its detailed schedule for key activities and

milestones will identify performance measures and will be finalized by

September 2001. For the Navy’s 16 initiatives, either no firm decision has

been reached for the performance measures; or it will be based on future

progress in achieving completion of the Navy’s stated objectives.

Table 7: Objective Six—Minimize Logistics Costs While Meeting Warfighter Requirements

Objective/action Performance measure Weakness in components’ plans

Minimize logistics costs while meeting

warfighter requirements.

• Reduce the overall costs of logistics support

for selected weapon systems by fiscal year

2006.

Weapon system support cost reductions The plans do not identify which weapon

systems the components are focusing

on to reduce logistics costs and do not

include adequate performance

measures.

Under objective six, the Department is relying on the individual

components to reduce the overall costs of logistics support for selected

weapon systems. With the exception of the U.S. Transportation Command,

which did not address this objective, the components have each outlined

initiatives to meet this objective. However, the components did not

identify which weapon systems they are focusing on to reduce logistics

costs. For example, the Marine Corps has established a Total Ownership

Cost Integrated Product Team to identify its total ownership cost

methodology and to obtain the necessary data to compute the costs and

minimize the logistics costs. The Air Force has a cost savings

modernization initiative to identify and highlight cost reduction

opportunities and to ensure that the opportunities receive due

consideration for funding. The Army initiatives are ongoing, and it plans to

reduce the total ownership costs for its weapons.
Page 15 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation

In most cases, the components’ performance measures were not defined

or were under development. The goal is to reduce costs by fiscal year

2006.

While the Department of Defense has taken a number of steps toward

improving the economy and efficiency of its logistics support systems, its

Logistics Strategic plan lacks a realistic and practicable overarching

logistics framework to effectively guide the Defense components’ logistics

planning and implementation efforts. In the absence of a clearly defined,

Department-wide logistics strategy, the Department is unable to develop a

Defense-wide logistics structure that is both economical and efficient and

supports the needs of the warfighter. Furthermore, because the

Department’s plan and the components’ implementation plans lack a

comprehensive strategy that addresses the logistics life-cycle process from

acquisition through disposal, the Department cannot evaluate and

prioritize the initiatives on a Department-wide basis. The Department also

faces an increased risk that the Defense components will continue to

develop individual initiatives that may not be compatible with each other

or may have differing objectives. Furthermore, without detailed

performance measures and milestones, the Department will be unable to

monitor the progress of its logistics initiatives or ensure that the

components’ individual initiatives are contributing to meeting the

Department’s overall objectives.

To provide the military services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the

U.S. Transportation Command with a framework for developing a

Department-wide approach to logistics reengineering, we recommend that

the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to revise the Department-wide

Logistics Strategic Plan to provide for an overarching logistics strategy

that will guide the components’ logistics planning efforts. Among other

things, this logistics strategy should

• specify a comprehensive approach that addresses the logistics life-cycle

process from acquisition through support and system disposal, including

the manner in which logistics is to be considered in the system and

equipment acquisition process and how key support activities such as

procurement, transportation, storage, maintenance and disposal will be

accomplished;

Conclusions

Recommendations for

Executive Action
Page 16 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation

• identify the logistics requirements the Department will have to fulfill, how

it will be organized to fulfill these requirements, and who will be

responsible for providing specific types of logistics support; and

• identify the numbers and types of logistics facilities and personnel the

Department will need to support future logistics requirements.

We also recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,

Technology and Logistics establish a mechanism for monitoring the extent

to which the components are implementing the Department’s Logistics

Strategic Plan. Specifically, the Under Secretary of Defense for

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics should monitor the extent to which

the components’ implementation plans are (1) consistent with the

Department-wide plan, (2) directly related to the Department-wide plan

and to each other, and (3) contain appropriate key management elements,

such as performance measures and specific milestones.

We received written comments from the Department of Defense, which

are reprinted in appendix III. The Department generally agreed with the

report and our recommendations.

The Department agreed with our recommendation that the Under

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics should

revise the Department-wide Logistics Strategic Plan to provide for an

overarching logistics strategy that will guide the components’ logistics

planning efforts. The Department specifically stated in its comments that

the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Materiel Readiness)

will lead the Department in developing a comprehensive Logistics

Strategic Plan that incorporates our recommendation, the results of the

recent Quadrennial Defense Review, and the logistics requirements of the

new National Defense Strategy.

The Department also agreed with our recommendation that the Under

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics should

establish a mechanism for monitoring the extent to which the components

are implementing the Department’s Logistics Strategic Plan. Specifically,

the Department stated in its comments that it will establish metrics to

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
Page 17 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation

measure performance of the components’ implementation of the Logistics

Strategic Plan, within the context of the normal program and budget

review cycles.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional

committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, the

Navy, and the Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the

Director of the Defense Logistics Agency; the Commander-in-Chief of the

U.S. Transportation Command; and the Director of the Office of

Management and Budget. We will also make it available at www.gao.gov

and to others.

If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please

contact me at (202) 512-8412. Key contributors to this report were Julia

Denman, David Schmitt, Patricia Albritton, and Marjorie J. Hunt.

David R. Warren, Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Analysis of Military Components’

Logistics Transformation and Implementation

Plans

Page 18 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation

This appendix provides our analysis of the logistics transformation plans

and other implementation plans prepared by the military services, the

Defense Logistics Agency, and the U.S. Transportation Command as they

relate to the Department of Defense’s Logistics Fiscal Year 2000 Strategic

Plan. The overall objective of the Department-wide plan was to focus the

collective attention and resources necessary for achieving the key

objectives required to improve the Department’s logistics support to the

warfighter. The Logistics Strategic Plan includes the following six basic

objectives: (1) optimize support to the warfighter, (2) improve strategic

mobility to meet warfighter requirements, (3) implement customer wait

time as the Department-wide logistics metric, (4) fully implement total

asset visibility across the Department of Defense, (5) reengineer and

modernize applicable logistics processes and systems, and (6) minimize

logistics costs while meeting warfighter requirements.

To support the implementation of the Department’s Logistics Strategic

Plan, the Department of Defense Reform Initiative 54, dated March 23,

2000, requires the military services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the

U.S. Transportation Command to develop logistics transformation plans to

relate the 400 different service-sponsored logistics reengineering

initiatives to the Department-wide Logistics Strategic Plan. These plans

serve as the primary vehicles for aligning the military component

initiatives, obtaining resources, and documenting the approach for

achieving the Logistics Strategic Plan goals and objectives. With the

exception of the U.S. Transportation Command, each component prepared

a transformation plan based on high-level guidance provided by the

Department to address the six strategic objectives. The U.S.

Transportation Command’s plan primarily focused on objective 2–improve

strategic mobility to meet warfighter requirements–and, to a lesser extent,

objective 4–fully implement joint total asset visibility. The Defense

Logistics Agency submitted an annotated agency performance contract

that specifically addressed its implementation plan for the Department’s

six objectives.

The following is both a brief overview of the logistics reengineering

initiatives that each of the military services, the U.S. Transportation

Command, and the Defense Logistics Agency are individually pursuing and

our analyses of how these initiatives related to the Office of the Secretary

of Defense’s Fiscal Year 2000 Logistics Strategic Plan. The components’

implementation plans are embodied in their transformation plans and

other related documents.

Appendix I: Analysis of Military Components’

Logistics Transformation and Implementation

Plans
Appendix I: Analysis of Military Components’

Logistics Transformation and Implementation

Plans

Page 19 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation

The Navy’s focus on High Yield Logistics began several years ago and

includes 46 ongoing initiatives in its logistics transformation plan.

According to Navy officials, the Navy’s vision of logistics transformation is

captured in its High Yield Logistics Strategy. However, the Navy is using its

logistics transformation plan as the tool to meet the challenge and address

all aspects of logistics transformation required under the Department of

Defense’s Reform Initiative #54. These initiatives, however, do not directly

link with the other components’ initiatives. For example, the Navy’s four

ongoing initiatives to support how it plans to implement customer wait

time, objective three, do not relate to the other components’ initiatives

regarding customer wait time. While the Navy was scheduled to begin

collecting data to define customer wait time after the Logistics Reform

Senior Steering Group met in June 2000, this initiative is still in process.

Additionally, the Navy has implemented a “Response to Failure”1 metric,

which the Navy is synonymous with customer wait time. The Response to

Failure metric has been prototyped and developed for use by cognizant

fleet and Headquarters staff. However, the specific goals for Response to

Failure man-hours by fiscal year are under development. The Navy also

plans to utilize the Logistics E-Business Concept of operations to integrate

e-business interfaces, applications and data environments. The Navy has

not developed, however, any performance measures to monitor the

success of implementing these initiatives.

The Navy outlined six ongoing initiatives in its transformation plan as a

sample of the efforts that it has underway to support fully implementing

objective four, total asset visibility across the Department. These

initiatives include, among others, (1) the Navy’s Total Asset Visibility

Strategic Plan, (2) fielding the Transportation Coordinator Automated

Information for Movement System II system throughout the Navy shore

commands, (3) developing a serial number tracking capability for Naval

Aviation, and (4) establishing a Military Sealift Command Total Asset

Visibility System. However, the Navy’s success in implementing some of

these ongoing initiatives will be governed by other military components.

For example, the Navy plans to field the Transportation Coordinator

Automated Information for Movement System II throughout the Navy by

 1

 The Navy defines “Response to Failure” as the total time that maintenance personnel wait

for material.

The Military Services

Navy
Appendix I: Analysis of Military Components’

Logistics Transformation and Implementation

Plans

Page 20 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation

fiscal year 2002. However, we reported in November 20002 that the Army

has encountered delays in developing this system and does not expect to

complete fielding it until September 2007, which may be further delayed

due to a reported critical $22.7-million unfunded software development

requirement. The Army’s Transformation Plan indicates that some of these

requirements are still unfunded. The Transportation Coordinator

Automated Information for Movement System II system will also have a

direct link to the Global Transportation Network that will be relying on

more than 20 Defense automated logistics systems to provide data that our

prior reports and Department of Defense audit reports have found

inaccurate.

With regard to reengineering and modernizing applicable logistics

processes/systems, the Navy outlined 16 objectives to represent a sample

of ongoing initiatives, such as Enterprise Resource Planning, Technical

Publications Lifecycle processes, and update and revise Military Sealift

Command Logistics Systems Procedures. However, it is not clear how

these initiatives will correlate with the initiatives of other components.

The Marines Corps’ current logistics effort began several years ago when it

grouped enhancements in its logistics community under the title

“Precision Logistics.” Marine Corps officials stated that the Precision

Logistics concept embodies its logistics evolution effort because its

principal priorities are to improve equipment readiness, enhance

distribution and joint warfighting capabilities, and develop a robust

command and control capability. The Marine Corps has also developed the

Marine Corps Logistics Campaign Plan that is considered a “living

document” designed to evolve the Marine Corps’ current and future

external logistics requirements and opportunities. This plan is supposed to

provide the necessary overarching framework, guidance, strategies,

specific goals, objectives, and tasks to successfully evolve Marine Corps

logistics. The Marine Corps also included some of its current and emerging

capabilities in its Transformation Plan to address the objectives in the

Department of Defense’s Plan. However, the Marine Corps did not specify

in its Transformation Plan how it would coordinate its efforts with the

other components. For example, to implement objective three–customer

wait time–the Marine Corps is using retail and wholesale order ship time

instead for all classes of supply. The Marine Corps believes, however, that

 2 GAO-01-30, Nov. 15, 2000.

Marine Corps
Appendix I: Analysis of Military Components’

Logistics Transformation and Implementation

Plans

Page 21 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation

its retail and wholesale order ship time measurement is identical to the

Department-wide customer wait time logistics metric and will not require

significant changes in its process or the way response time is measured.

However, it will require new tools to capture customer wait time rather

than order ship time data. The Navy is establishing baseline data based on

its current performance.

To fully implement objective four, total asset visibility, the Marine Corps

plans to develop and field total asset visibility/in-transit visibility systems

along with the automatic identification technology to support the

identification and processing of materiel within the supply and distribution

pipeline. During 1998, the Marine corps initiated a program—Integrated

Logistics Capability—to reengineer and modernize its logistics processes

and systems.

The Army plans to synchronize its logistics transformation with the overall

Army Force transformation, which is expected to be completed by about

2010. The Army Force transformation is a three-phased approach to

develop a consistent, Army-wide force structure. According to Army

officials, while there are many Army-wide supporting plans, the plans most

critical to the success of logistics transformation are its Strategic Logistics

Plan and Combat Support/Combat Service Support Transformation

Campaign Plan. The Army’s Strategic Plan includes initiatives from all

elements of the Army’s logistics community. In order to define customer

wait time, the Army is relying on an ongoing effort—the Single Stock Fund

initiative—that is intended to provide the Army with the initial capability

to collect customer wait time data. According to the Army, the Global

Combat Support System will be the platform for the customer wait time

data collection and dissemination. However, this system is being

developed in three tiers and the expected completion date for fielding this

system is not until fiscal year 2006. To fully implement Total Asset

Visibility, the Army plans to achieve this objective through the use of its

automatic identification technology/automated information systems and

transformed business practices. The Army is also relying on the Global

Combat Support System that is being used to define customer wait time as

the solution to the Army’s logistics software modernization but as

mentioned earlier, the fielding of this system is not scheduled for

completion until fiscal year 2006.

The Air Force integrated several of its ongoing initiatives into its

Transformation Plan to meet the Department of Defense’s objectives.

Army

Air Force
Appendix I: Analysis of Military Components’

Logistics Transformation and Implementation

Plans

Page 22 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation

However, it is uncertain as to how the actions the Air Force has taken will

achieve a successful overarching framework. For example, the Air Force

plans to measure customer wait time starting with the logistics pipeline

documentation of a requisition by a customer to receipt of the asset by the

customer to include retail transactions. However, it does not indicate how

this action will link with the other components or how this objective will

be assessed, since the metrics have not been defined. To implement the

Joint Total Asset Visibility concept, the Air Force plans to rely on a series

of ongoing studies being conducted by the Air Force Audit Agency, in

response to section 349 of the National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 1999, to assess its policies, procedures, and business practices

regarding controls over assets. Additionally, the Air Force has established

a Logistics Transformation Team specifically designed to create an

overarching logistics system process and identify opportunities to increase

performance and optimize costs. The Air Force is relying on this team to

develop a set of plans and schedules that will outline the approach for

identifying logistics system process enhancements. However, none of the

Air Force actions indicates a successful coordination with the other

components.

To meet the Department of Defense’s goals, the Defense Logistics Agency

annotated its Fiscal Years 2001 through 2005 Performance Contract sorted

by the objectives outlined in Department’s Logistics Strategic Plan.

According to officials, the agency’s basic mission, operations, authority, or

reporting chain was not altered in any way. However, according to these

officials, only two of the six objectives were in line with the Defense

Logistics Agency’s operations and easy to address. These were objective

three–implementing customer wait time–and objective four–total asset

visibility. Officials stated that these two objectives were easy to support

due to the way the Defense Logistics Agency does its business.

Additionally, the Defense Logistics Agency plans to develop a “balanced

scorecard” approach to measure its strategic performance. According to

officials, this approach will allow the agency to more closely align its

performance indicators used to measure its strategic goals and objectives

that support logistics transformation. However, the agency’s actions

defined do not show a correlation to the Department’s overall objective.

For example, to implement customer wait time, the Defense Logistics

Agency states that it will consistently provide responsive, best-value

supplies and services to its customers. Specifically, the logistics response

time reliability for “supply–non-energy materials” will improve over the

program period to reflect greater percentages of requisitions processed

within shorter timeframes. To fully implement objective four, total asset

Defense Logistics

Agency
Appendix I: Analysis of Military Components’

Logistics Transformation and Implementation

Plans

Page 23 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation

visibility, the Defense Logistics Agency plans to sample inventory accuracy

for all products, as determined by a statistical sampling in each fiscal year.

The sampling accuracy is expected to be greater than or equal to 95

percent. The agency plans to shift to commercial practices for its

hardware, energy, and troop support items as a way to

reengineer/modernize its applicable logistics processes/systems.

The U.S. Transportation Command used its 1999 Strategic Plan to

implement the Department of Defense’s Logistics Strategic Plan and

develop its Logistics Transformation Plan. The Command’s plan consists

of two parts: (1) the Strategic Guidance, which identifies the Command’s

mission, vision and long-term goals for executing each of its five core

processes, and the Strategic Objectives, which must be accomplished to

ensure the vision is met, and (2) the Corporate Resource Plan, which is

intended to link the long-term goals and objectives, strategies and various

resources needed to accomplish the goals and objectives, and an avenue

to evaluate, establish, and revise strategic goals and objectives. The

Command incorporated a table in its transformation plan to depict the

Command’s strategic objectives and how they support the Department of

Defense’s Logistics Strategic Plan objectives. Of the six objectives, the

Command primarily focused on two–objective two–improving strategic

mobility to meet warfighter requirements–and to a lesser extent, how it

plans to fully implement objective four–total asset visibility. However, the

Command has not identified in its plan how the actions it plans to

implement will be coordinated with those of the other components.

U.S. Transportation

Command
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

Page 24 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation

To assess the Department of Defense’s logistics strategic planning process,

we reviewed the Department’s August 1999 Logistics Strategic Plan and

the various logistics transformation plans prepared by the military

services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the U.S. Transportation

Command. We met with officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense,

each of the military services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the U.S.

Transportation Command to discuss these various planning documents

and the Department’s planning approach. We also relied on our prior work

regarding logistics planning and reengineering.

Our review of the logistics strategic planning process focused on the

Department’s Logistics Strategic Plan because the purpose of this plan was

to provide an overall Defense-wide corporate direction for accomplishing

the Department’s logistics mission. To determine whether this plan

provides an adequate overarching logistics strategy to guide logistics

reengineering initiatives, we analyzed the contents of the plan and the

extent to which it contained the elements we believe are necessary for

focusing current and future initiatives. Specifically, we assessed whether

the plan included an appropriate definition of (1) the future role of

logistics in supporting the operational forces; (2) how the Department

should be organized and staffed to fulfill its logistics mission; and (3) the

types of capabilities, facilities, and systems that will likely be needed to

meet future logistics requirements. We also reviewed the status of the

Department’s long-range logistics architecture initiative because the intent

of this initiative is to identify the framework for logistics support for the

years 2010 and beyond. Specifically, we met with officials in the Office of

the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics Architecture and of

the Science Applications International Corporation to discuss the

objectives, status, and future plans for this project. These officials

provided us with the basic principles and long-range vision of the logistics

architecture initiative and discussed with us the current status and

proposed milestones for this project.

To determine whether the components’ related implementation plans are

likely to result in overall improvements to the economy and efficiency of

logistics activities, we reviewed the plans, comparing the objectives and

planned actions outlined in each of the various transformation plans and

other logistics reengineering initiatives. Our review concentrated on

determining whether there was a direct linkage among the various plans

and initiatives and whether the objectives and actions outlined in these

documents represented a coordinated approach to logistics reengineering

on a department-wide basis. Specifically, we reviewed the components’

implementation plans to determine the extent to which these plans are (1)

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

Page 25 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation

consistent with the Defense-wide plan, (2) directly related to the Defensewide plan and to each other, and (3) contain appropriate key management

elements. We also reviewed the various plans to determine whether they

contained an appropriate management framework for implementation. For

these analyses, we used the requirements of the Government Performance

and Results Act, commonly referred to as the Results Act, as a model for

the types of information the plans should contain. We compared the

contents of the plans and the requirements of the Results Act.

Additionally, we reviewed the plans in terms of outcome-oriented Results

Act principles and identified areas in which they could be improved to

achieve successful implementation. Congressional reports and

administrative guidance regarding the Results Act indicate that activities

such as strategic planning should be subject to the outcome-oriented

principles of the Results Act. We did not assess the merits of the

Department’s proposed actions or the likelihood of success for these

actions.

We conducted our review from January to May 2001 in accordance with

generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 26 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation

Appendix III: Comments From the

Department of Defense
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 27 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 28 GAO-02-106 Strategic Planning for Logistics Transformation
Actions Needed to Overcome Capability Gaps in the Public Depot System

(GAO-01-612, Oct. 2001).

Defense Maintenance: Sustaining Readiness Support Capabilities

Requires a Comprehensive Plan (GAO-01-533T, Mar. 23, 2001).

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of

Defense (GAO-01-244, Jan. 2001).

Defense Inventory: Implementation Plans to Enhance Controls Over

Shipped Items Can Be Improved (GAO-01-30, Nov. 15, 2000).

Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Enhance Success of Reengineering

Initiatives (GAO/NSIAD-00-89, June 23, 2000).

Defense Inventory: Plan to Improve Management of Shipped Inventory

Should Be Strengthened (GAO/NSIAD-00-39, Feb. 22, 2000).

Defense Inventory: DOD Could Improve Total Asset Visibility Initiative

With Results Act Framework (GAO/NSIAD-99-40, Apr. 12, 1999).

Performance and Accountability Series: Major Management Challenges

and Program Risks – Department of Defense (GAO/OCG-99-4, Jan. 1999).

High-Risk Series: An Update (GAO/HR-99-1, Jan. 1999).

Defense Inventory Management: Problems, Progress, and Additional

Actions Needed (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-109, Mar. 20, 1997).

High-Risk Series: Defense Inventory Management (GAO/HR-97-5, Feb.

1997).

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