alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
|   | (i) | the      quarterly report of the Company on Form 10-Q for the period ended      September 27, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission      (the “Report”), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or      15(d), whichever is applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,      and |
|--------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (ii) | the      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company      at the dates and for the periodsindicated. |
|--------|------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Dated:  November      5, 2008 |   |   | /s/HENRY C.      PAO                         |
|-----------------------------------------|--------|--------|----------------------------------------------|
|                                    |   |   | Henry      C. Pao, Ph.D.                     |
|                                    |   |   | President      & Chief Executive Officer |
|                                    |   |   | (Principal      Executive Officer)           |
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-13-00386-CR

Deshawn Ondrey WILLIAMS,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 14, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 360545

Honorable Phil Chavarria Jr., Judge Presiding

BEFORE JUSTICE ANGELINI, JUSTICE ALVAREZ, AND JUSTICE CHAPA

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, we MODIFY the judgment and bill of 

costs to delete Williams’s requirement to pay attorney’s fees. The trial court’s judgment is 

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

SIGNED April 16, 2014.

_____________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
AFS

- 14

- 190

- E

June 13, 2014

Exemption No. 10177D Regulatory Docket No. FAA

- 20 10

- 0970

Mr. Garry Foss

President/ Chief Executive Officer

S eaborne Virgin Islands, Inc., d/b/ a Seaborne Airlin es World Plaza Building, 9 th Floor

268 Avenida Luis Munoz Rivera San Juan, PR 00918

Dear Mr. Foss :

This letter is to inform you that we have granted a 120 day extension for your petition to extend Exemption No. 10177 , as amended. It explains the basis f or our decision , desc ribes its effect, and

lists the conditions and limitations.

The Basis for Our Decision

By letter dated March 1, 2014 , you petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on behalf

of Seaborne Virgin Islands, Inc

., d / b /a Seaborne Airlines ( Seaborne Airlines ) for an extension of Exemption No. 10177 , as amended. That e xemption from part 121, appendix K, paragraph 5a of

Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) allows Seaborne Airlines to continue to operate

DHC

- 6

- 300 float

- equi

pped airplanes after the December 20, 2010, effective date without meeting certain aircraft performance requirements.

In your petition, you indicate that there has been no change in the conditions and reasons relative to public interest and safety that we re the basis for granting the original exemption.

The FAA has determined that good cause exists for not publishing a summary of the petition in the Federal Register because the requested extension of the exemption would not set a precedent, and any delay in acting on this petition would be detrimental Seaborne Airlines

.2

The FAA is requiring Seaborne Airlines to develop a permanent solution showing an equivalent level of safety from 14 CFR part 121, appendix K, paragraph 5a. In addition Seaborne Airlines m ust submit to the FAA prior to the expiration of Exemption No. 10177, any documentation 1 showing when Seaborne Airlines operates their aircraft, a safety risk assessment is accomplished to ensure it is free of any hazard for take

- off, the route to be flown , and landing.

Our Decision

The FAA has determined that the justification for the issuance of Exemption No. 10177, as amended, remains valid with respect to this exemption and is in the public interest. Therefore, under the authority provided by 49 U.S.C

. §§ 106(f), 40113

, and 44701

, which the FAA Administrator has delegat ed to me

, Seaborne Virgin Islands, Inc., d / b /a Seaborne Airlines is granted an extension

to its exemption from 14 CFR par t 121, appendix K, paragraph 5a, which allows Seaborne Airlines

to continue to operate DHC

- 6

- 300 float

- equipped airplanes after the December 20, 2010, effective date without meeting certain ai rcraft performance requirements.

The FAA has determined a 120 day extension of Exemption No. 10177 will allow Seaborne Airlines ample time to provide the required documentation as outlined above to the FAA.

This exemption terminates on October 31, 2014 , unless sooner superseded or rescinded.

Sincerely,

/S/ John Barbagallo Acting Deputy Director, Flight Standards Service

1 This includes pilot checklists, policy

, and procedures.
§ 360.23 Content of notices regarding independent administrators. ( a ) The independent administrator jointly appointed by the interested copyright parties, as defined in 17 U.S.C. 1001(7)(A), and the American Federation of Musicians (or any successor entity) for the purpose of managing and ultimately distributing royalty payments to nonfeatured musicians as defined in 17 U.S.C. 1006(b)(1), must file a notice informing the Copyright Royalty Board of his/her appointment.
( b ) The independent administrator jointly appointed by the interested copyright parties, as defined in 17 U.S.C. 1001(7)(A) and the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (or any successor entity) for the purpose of managing and ultimately distributing royalty payments to nonfeatured vocalists as defined in 17 U.S.C. 1006(b)(1), must file a notice online through eCRB informing the Copyright Royalty Board of his/her appointment.
( c ) A notice filed under paragraph (a) or (b) of this section must include the full name, telephone number, mailing address, and email address of the place of business of the independent administrator.
( d ) The independent administrator must file the notices identified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section through eCRB no later than March 31 of each year, commencing with March 31, 2018.
[82 FR 27018, June 13, 2017. Redesignated and amended at 85 FR 37753, June 24, 2020]
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21

- 7615

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. LORENZO BUTTS, a/k/a Lorenza Butts, a/k/a Lorenzo Butts, Jr. , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Norfolk

. Arenda L. Wright Allen , District Judge. ( 2:00

- cr - 00067

- AWA

- 1 )

Submitted : May 10, 2022 Decided: May 17, 2022

Before MOTZ , HARRIS , and HEYTENS , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Lorenzo Butts, Appellant Pro Se. Joseph Attias, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinion s are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Lorenzo Butts appeals the district court’s order denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for compassionate release . This court remanded the court’s original order denying Butts’ motion because it had relied in part on an erroneous factual premise. The court reevaluated Butts’ motion on remand and denied relief. We review a court’s order granting or denying a compassionate release motion for abuse of discretion

. United States v. Kibble , 992 F.3d 326, 329 (4th Cir.) (stating standard of review), cert.
denied , 142 S. Ct. 383 (2021)

. We have reviewed the record and conclude that the court
did not abuse its discretion . The court denied compassionate release after assuming Butts had demonstrated extraordinary and compelling circumstances and reviewing the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors

. See United States v. High , 997 F.3d 181, 188

- 91 (4th Cir. 2021) (discussing amount of explanation required for denial of straightforward compassionate release motion).
We therefore affirm the district court’s order. We deny Butts’ motion to appoint
counsel and to accelerate case processing . We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
§ 13.10 Purpose and applicability of other regulations. ( a ) *Purpose.* The regulations in this part implement the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) fiduciary program, which is authorized by 38 U.S.C. chapters 55 and 61. The purpose of the fiduciary program is to protect certain VA beneficiaries who, as a result of injury, disease, or infirmities of advanced age, or by reason of being less than the age of majority, cannot manage their VA benefits. Under this program, VA oversees these vulnerable beneficiaries to ensure their well-being, and appoints and oversees fiduciaries who manage these beneficiaries' benefits.
( b ) *Applicability of other regulations.* Fiduciary matters arise after VA has determined that a beneficiary is entitled to benefits, and decisions on fiduciary matters are not decisions on claims for VA monetary benefits. Accordingly, VA's regulations governing the adjudication of claims for benefits, *see* 38 CFR part 3, do not apply to fiduciary matters unless VA has prescribed applicability in this part.
(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 501)
#### The Empire Hardware Co., Respondent, *v.*William M. Young, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term,

April, 1899.)

Appellate Term — Power .to open default in Municipal Court — Payment of execution under protest.

The Appellate Term may, in the first instance and on affidavits, open a judgment taken in a Municipal Court of the city of New York by default, where the summons had never been served ón the defendant, and the fact that he, under protest, has paid an execution issued on the judgment does not bar his right to try the error in fact by an appeal.

Appeal from a judgment, in favor of the "plaintiff, rendered in the Municipal Court of the city of Hew York, borough of Manhattan, for the first district.

Samuel Seabury, for appellant.

Louis Z. Kinstler, for respondent.

Leventritt, J.

The plaintiff recovered judgment by default •on the nonappearance of the defendant; execution was issued and: the amount, claimed thereunder was paid under protest.

The defendant appeals alleging error in fact in the proceedings, not affecting the merits of the action and not within the knowledge •of the justice. Code Civ. Pro., § 3057. The error assigned is the nonservice of the summons. Under the sanctioned practice the matter is presented for our determination in the first instance on" •opposing affidavits. While the application" to open the default-might originally have "been addressed to the court below (Laws of 1882, chap. 410, § 1367; as amended by Laws of 1896, chap*. 748), that course of procedure is merely concurrent with the one adopted By the appellant. Szerlip v. Baier, 21 Misc. Rep. 331; Burkhard v. Smith, 19 id. 31.

Her did the payment of the judgment bar the appeal. The payment not having been by way of compromise or coupled with an .agreement not to take, or pursue, an appeal, the temporary compulsory submission to the mandate of the court, cannot affect the *227right to try error on appeal. Hayes v. Nourse, 107 N. Y. 577; Clowes v. Dickenson, 8 Cow. 328; Perry v. Woodbury, 44 N. Y. St. Repr. 287; Monnet v. Merz, 43 id. 59.

We are, consequently, required to pass upon the error in fact. A careful examination of the affidavits submitted satisfies us that the summons was not served on the defendant, and that at the time of the alleged service as well as prior and subsequent thereto he was not in the jurisdiction. This conclusion convincingly established by the five affidavits presented in behalf of the appellant, is not weakened by the' inconclusive and unsupported affidavit of service. ,

The judgment should be reversed.

Ebbed max, P. J., and MaoLear, J., concur,

Judgment reversed, with costs to appellant.
#### Milano Construction Co. v. Frye, Inc.

*Thomas E. Doyle,*for plaintiff.

*English, Gilson, Baker & Bowler,*for defendant.

July 23, 1955.

Evans, P. J.,

This matter is before us on exceptions to written interrogatories filed under R. C. P. 4003 (a). Specifically plaintiff seeks the right to conduct an oral crossexamination in New York City, where the interrogatories have been directed and also seeks an order of court allowing reasonable expenses to his counsel under R. C. P. 4008.

This rule provides that if a deposition is to be taken under rule 4003 or 4007 by oral examination more than 100 miles from the courthouse, the court upon petition shall grant an order imposing such limitations, including provisions for the payment of expenses and counsel fees as the court shall deem proper. Under this rule the court has wide discretion in selecting the place of examination and in attaching conditions concerning the payment of expenses.

In the complaint it is averred that defendant owes plaintiff $5,665.17, the balance unpaid on total in*706voices for an excavation job totaling $61,460.81. From the pleadings we find there are three concerns similar in name and operated by the same people. All payments on account were made by this defendant, R. T. Frye, Inc. The summons in assumpsit was served on this defendant through the Secretary of the Commonwealth. Defendant avers that this defendant is not registered in Harrisburg, but that R. T. Frye and Company, Inc., another corporation, is so registered. Defendant also avers that the company with whom plaintiff did business is neither of these corporations,, but in fact a partnership consisting of R. T. Frye and. E. Stockhausen and known as the Frye Company. These three concerns are located at the same address, in New York City.

Under such circumstances, which are in our opinion at least unusual and confusing, plaintiff is entitled to a very thorough examination of records and an oral, crossexamination. Its extent will depend upon what, develops through inquiry and discovery with respect to the way these concerns did business so as to mislead or tend to mislead plaintiff in the matter for which default is now claimed.

We, therefore, feel that it is proper for us to allow plaintiff the minimum reasonable expenses for his, counsel in an amount which is hereinafter designated by our order.

And now, to wit, July 23, 1955, it is ordered and decreed that the direct interrogatories filed on behalf of defendant be answered before William M. Budnick, 4011 149th Street, Flushing, Queens, New York, at a time to be mutually agreed upon by the parties or by an order of this court if necessary, and that plaintiff have the right of oral crossexamination at said time and place, and that defendant prior to the time to be fixed pay to plaintiff as reasonable expenses to his counsel the sum of $100.
###### Editorial Note on Part 1

#### Editorial Notes:

1. In Patent and Trademark Office publications and usage the part number is omitted from the numbers of §§ 1.1 to 1.352 and the numbers to the right of the decimal point correspond with the respective rule numbers.

2. For nomenclature changes to part 1, see 68 FR 14335, Mar. 25, 2003; 87 FR 68904, Nov. 17, 2022.

#### § 1.377 Review of decision refusing to accept and record payment of a maintenance fee filed prior to expiration of patent.

(a) Any patentee who is dissatisfied with the refusal of the Patent and Trademark Office to accept and record a maintenance fee which was filed prior to the expiration of the patent may petition the Director to accept and record the maintenance fee.

(b) Any petition under this section must be filed within two months of the action complained of, or within such other time as may be set in the action complained of, and must be accompanied by the fee set forth in § 1.17(g). The petition may include a request that the petition fee be refunded if the refusal to accept and record the maintenance fee is determined to result from an error by the Patent and Trademark Office.

(c) Any petition filed under this section must comply with the requirements of § 1.181(b) and must be signed by an attorney or agent registered to practice before the Patent and Trademark Office, or by the patentee, the assignee, or other party in interest.

[49 FR 34725, Aug. 31, 1984, as amended at 62 FR 53199, Oct. 10, 1997; 69 FR 56545, Sept. 21, 2004]

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 2 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 6 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 7 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 1 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 3 pertaining to both patents and trademarks is placed in the grouping pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 4 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 5 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.
#### Michael Brangi, Administrator (Estate of Michael Brangi) *v.*Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc., et al.

Maltbie, C. J., Brown, Jennings, Ells and Dickenson, Js.

Argued April 6

decided April 22, 1948

*Milton Rice,*with whom, on the brief, was *Alexander Winniclc,*for the appellant (plaintiff).

*Philip R. Shiff,*for the appellees (defendants).

Per Curiam.

Plaintiff’s decedent, an eight-year-old boy, was killed when he came into contact with a truck owned by the named defendant and operated by its driver, Francis R. Daniels, hereinafter referred to as the defendant. The jury brought in a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiff excepts to the charge.

The plaintiff offered evidence to prove and claimed to have proved the following facts: The defendant was operating a trailer truck, thirty-*563eight feet long, westerly on Chapel Street in New Haven. He knew that it was a populous neighborhood and that children went to and from school along Chapel and Franklin Streets. He made a left turn into Franklin Street, and the rear of the trailer came close to the curbing of the southeasterly corner of Franklin and Chapel Streets. Plaintiff’s decedent stepped from the curb onto the southerly crosswalk of Chapel Street, was struck by the left rear wheel of the trailer and died as a result of the injuries received. The defendant did not see the boy before he was struck.

The charge conformed to the usual pattern in such cases. No written requests were filed. At the close of the charge, the plaintiff excepted in accordance with Practice Book, § 156, as follows: “The only objection I can possibly think of, Your Honor, is that in defining proper lookout, Your Honor said he must keep a lookout for anything in the path of the vehicle. I thought that if that were a little broader, that it should be, ‘anything in the path or in the immediate vicinity of the vehicle,’ since in this case the boy came from the crosswalk.” The court charged with reference to lookout: “Of course, the operator of a motor vehicle must keep a reasonable lookout and he must be vigilant to detect anyone or anything in the path of his moving vehicle who is likely to suffer any injury from it.” The court then went on to state: “It is his duty to look out and see what there is for him to see. He cannot excuse himself from injuring another person on the highway by saying that he diu not see him if, under the circumstances, he would have seen him had he been using reasonable care.” The charge was sufficient, especially in the absence of a more particular request. *Nehring*v. *Connecticut Co.,*86 *564Conn. 109, 123, 84 A 301. The qourt was not required to define further “the path of his moving vehicle,” which obviously included the space traversed by the rear wheels in making the turn. The meaning of the phrase was plain. *Branch*v. *Mashkin Freight Lines, Inc.,*134 Conn. 278, 281, 57 A. 2d 136. The effort of the plaintiff to expand the scope of his exception beyond its reasonable intendment cannot avail him. *Figlar*v. *Gordon,*133 Conn. 577, 583, 53 A. 2d 645.

There is no error.
###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 2 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 6 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 7 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 1 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Part 2

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 2 appear at 68 FR 14337, Mar. 25, 2003.

#### § 2.107 Amendment of pleadings in an opposition proceeding.

(a) Pleadings in an opposition proceeding against an application filed under section 1 or 44 of the Act may be amended in the same manner and to the same extent as in a civil action in a United States district court, except that, after the close of the time period for filing an opposition including any extension of time for filing an opposition, an opposition may not be amended to add to the goods or services opposed, or to add a joint opposer.

(b) Pleadings in an opposition proceeding against an application filed under section 66(a) of the Act may be amended in the same manner and to the same extent as in a civil action in a United States district court, except that, once filed, the opposition may not be amended to add grounds for opposition or goods or services beyond those identified in the notice of opposition, or to add a joint opposer. The grounds for opposition, the goods or services opposed, and the named opposers are limited to those identified in the ESTTA cover sheet regardless of what is contained in any attached statement.

[81 FR 69973, Oct. 7, 2016]

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 3 pertaining to both patents and trademarks is placed in the grouping pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 4 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 5 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.