Quadrennial

Defense Review

Report

September 30, 2001

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Quadrennial Defense Review Report

Table of Contents

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iii

I. AMERICA'S SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

U.S. INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

A CHANGED SECURITY ENVIRONMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Current Security Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Emerging Operational Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

STATE OF THE U.S. MILITARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

II. DEFENSE STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

DEFENSE POLICY GOALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

STRATEGIC TENETS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

Managing Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

A Capabilities-Based Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

Defending the United States and 

Projecting U.S. Military Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

Strengthening Alliances and Partnerships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

Maintaining Favorable Regional Balances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

Developing a Broad Portfolio of Military Capabilities . . . . . . .15

Transforming Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

III. PARADIGM SHIFT IN FORCE PLANNING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

DEFEND THE UNITED STATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

DETER FORWARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

CURRENT FORCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

IV. REORIENTING THE U.S. MILITARY GLOBAL POSTURE . . . . . .25

V. CREATING THE U.S. MILITARY OF THE 21ST CENTURY . . . . . .29

OPERATIONAL GOALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30

TRANSFORMATION PILLARS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32
STRENGTHENING JOINT OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

Joint and Combined Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . .33

Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

Standing Joint Task Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34

Joint Presence Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35

Sustaining the Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35

EXPERIMENTING IN SUPPORT OF 

TRANSFORMATIONAL CHANGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35

EXPLOITING INTELLIGENCE ADVANTAGES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

Global Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) . . . . . . .39

Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and 

Dissemination (TPED) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40

DEVELOPING TRANSFORMATIONAL CAPABILITIES . . . . . . . . . . .40

Research and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41

Transformation Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41

Recapitalization of the Department's Legacy Forces . . . . . . . .47

VI. REVITALIZING THE DOD ESTABLISHMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

ENCOURAGE TALENT TO ENTER AND STAY IN

THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50

MODERNIZE DOD BUSINESS PROCESSES

AND INFRASTRUCTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51

VII. MANAGING RISKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57

A NEW RISK FRAMEWORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57

Force Management Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58

Operational Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60

Future Challenges Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61

Institutional Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63

MITIGATING RISKS ACROSS THE SPECTRUM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64

VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT

CHIEFS OF STAFF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67

APPENDIX A: GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND

RESULTS ACT OF 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71

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Review Report

Foreword

On September 11, 2001, the United States came under vicious,

bloody attack. Americans died in their places of work. They died

on American soil. They died not as combatants, but as innocent

victims. They died not from traditional armies waging traditional

campaigns, but from the brutal, faceless weapons of terror. They died as

the victims of war - a war that many had feared but whose sheer horror

took America by surprise.

The war the nation fights today is not a war of America's choosing. It is a

war that was brought violently and brutally to America's shores by the evil

forces of terror. It is a war against America and America's way of life. It is

a war against all that America holds dear. It is a war against freedom itself.

The attack on the United States and the war that has been visited upon us

highlights a fundamental condition of our circumstances: we cannot and

will not know precisely where and when America's interests will be

threatened, when America will come under attack, or when Americans

might die as the result of aggression. We can be clear about trends, but

uncertain about events. We can identify threats, but cannot know when

or where America or its friends will be attacked. We should try mightily to

avoid surprise, but we must also learn to expect it. We must constantly

strive to get better intelligence, but we must also remember that there will

always be gaps in our intelligence. Adapting to surprise - adapting quickly

and decisively - must therefore be a condition of planning.

The Quadrennial Defense Review was undertaken during a crucial time of

transition to a new era. Even before the attack of September 11, 2001, the

senior leaders of the Defense Department set out to establish a new

strategy for America's defense that would embrace uncertainty and

contend with surprise, a strategy premised on the idea that to be effective

abroad, America must be safe at home. It sought to set the conditions to

extend America's influence and preserve America's security. The strategy

that results is built around four key goals that will guide the development

of U.S. forces and capabilities, their deployment and use:

■ Assuring allies and friends of the United States' steadiness of

purpose and its capability to fulfill its security commitments;

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■ Dissuading adversaries from undertaking programs or

operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of our

allies and friends;

■ Deterring aggression and coercion by deploying forward the

capacity to swiftly defeat attacks and impose severe penalties for

aggression on an adversary's military capability and supporting

infrastructure; and

■ Decisively defeating any adversary if deterrence fails.

A central objective of the review was to shift the basis of defense planning

from a "threat-based" model that has dominated thinking in the past to a

"capabilities-based" model for the future. This capabilities-based model

focuses more on how an adversary might fight rather than specifically

whom the adversary might be or where a war might occur. It recognizes

that it is not enough to plan for large conventional wars in distant theaters.

Instead, the United States must identify the capabilities required to deter

and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception, and

asymmetric warfare to achieve their objectives. 

Adopting this capabilities-based approach to planning requires that the

nation maintain its military advantages in key areas while it develops new

areas of military advantage and denies asymmetric advantages to

adversaries. It entails adapting existing military capabilities to new

circumstances, while experimenting with the development of new

military capabilities. In short, it requires the transformation of U.S. forces,

capabilities, and institutions to extend America's asymmetric advantages

well into the future. 

Transforming America's defense for the 21st century will require a longstanding commitment from our country and its leaders. Transformation

is not a goal for tomorrow, but an endeavor that must be embraced in

earnest today. The challenges the Nation faces do not loom in the

distant future, but are here now. They involve protecting our critical

bases of operation - including the most critical base of operation, the

U.S. homeland - and projecting and sustaining U.S. forces in distant antiaccess environments. They entail assuring U.S. information systems

and providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement

of adversary forces and capabilities. They require enhancing the

capability and survivability of U.S. space systems and leveraging

information technology and new concepts to provide for more

effective joint operations.

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Of necessity, our efforts will begin relatively small, but will grow

significantly in pace and intensity. And over time, the full promise of

transformation will be realized as we divest ourselves of legacy forces and

they move off the stage and resources move into new concepts,

capabilities, and organizations that maximize our warfighting

effectiveness and the combat potential of America's men and women in

uniform. This will not be a simple task. It requires steadfastness of

purpose and the freedom to manage effectively and efficiently. It will

require new tools to manage the Defense Department and an overhaul of

existing approaches. 

To support the transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces and to better

manage the full range of activities of the Defense Department, the

Quadrennial Defense Review identified a new approach to assessing and

managing risk. This new approach will help to ensure that the

Department of Defense is better able to meet near-term threats even as it

invests in capabilities needed to safeguard the nation's future security.

This Quadrennial Defense Review was the product of the senior civilian

and military leadership of the Department of Defense. It benefited from

extensive consultation with the President of the United States. It was truly

"top down" in that the decisions taken on strategy, forces, capabilities, and

risks resulted from months of deliberations and consultation among the

most senior Defense Department leadership. This report outlines the key

changes needed to preserve America's safety and security in the years

to come.

The Quadrennial Defense Review and the accompanying report were

largely completed before the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on the

United States. In important ways, these attacks confirm the strategic

direction and planning principles that resulted from this review,

particularly its emphasis on homeland defense, on surprise, on preparing

for asymmetric threats, on the need to develop new concepts of

deterrence, on the need for a capabilities-based strategy, and on the need

to balance deliberately the different dimensions of risk. However, the

attack on the United States on September 11, 2001 will require us to move

forward more rapidly in these directions, even while we are engaged in

the war against terrorism.

The vast array of complex policy, operational, and even constitutional

issues concerning how we organize and prepare to defend the American

people are now receiving unprecedented attention throughout the

United States government. Importantly, since the scope of homeland

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security responsibilities span an array of federal, state, and local

organizations, it also will require enhanced inter-agency processes and

capabilities to effectively defend the United States against attacks. The

recent establishment of the Office of Homeland Security will galvanize

this vital effort.

Thus, this report represents not so much an end but a beginning. Even as

this report is concluded, the Department of Defense is engaged in the

process of reviewing and implementing the directions set forth here

through the Defense Department's military planning and resource

allocation processes. These efforts, in turn, will allow the Defense

Department leadership the opportunity to build upon and refine the

decisions taken as the result of this review.

Finally, the loss of life and damage to our economy from the attack of

September 11, 2001 should give us a new perspective on the question of

what this country can afford for its defense. It would be reckless to press

our luck with false economies or gamble with our children's future. This

nation can afford to spend what is needed to deter the adversaries of

tomorrow and to underpin our prosperity. Those costs do not begin to

compare with the cost in human lives and resources if we fail to do so. 

As we contend with the difficult challenges of the war on terrorism, we

must also proceed on the path of transforming America's defense. Our

commitment to the nation will be unwavering and our purpose clear: to

provide for the safety and well being of all Americans and to honor

America's commitments worldwide. As in generations before, the skill of

our armed forces, their devotion to duty, and their willingness to sacrifice

are at the core of our nation's strength. We must provide them with the

resources and support that they need to safeguard peace and security not

only for our generation but for generations to come.

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Donald H. Rumsfeld

Secretary of Defense
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I.

America's Security

in the 21st Century

The history of the 20th century has proven time and again that

America's security is linked directly to that of other nations, and that

America's prosperity depends on the prosperity of others. America

seeks to use its current political, economic, and military advantages not to

dominate others, but to build a durable framework upon which the United

States and its allies and friends can prosper in freedom now and into

the future.

Yet, as the September 2001 events have made clear, not all accept

America's purposes or share its values. There are many threats against this

Nation, and they will take many forms. They range from the threat of

major war to the faceless threat of terror. America's approach to security

must defend our way of life while protecting the security of all Americans

and that of our allies and friends.

America's Role in the World

America's goals are to promote peace, sustain freedom, and encourage

prosperity. U.S. leadership is premised on sustaining an international

system that is respectful of the rule of law. America's political, diplomatic,

and economic leadership contributes directly to global peace, freedom,

and prosperity. U.S. military strength is essential to achieving these goals,

as it assures friends and allies of an unwavering U.S. commitment to

common interests. 

America's security role in the world is unique. It provides the basis for a

network of alliances and friendships. It provides a general sense of

stability and confidence, which is crucial to the economic prosperity that

benefits much of the world. And it warns those who would threaten the

Nation's welfare or the welfare of U.S. allies and friends that their efforts at

coercion or aggression will not succeed.

Even now as the Nation mourns the victims of terrorist attacks on the

Pentagon and the World Trade Center, America's purposes remain clear

and its commitment resolute.
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U.S. Interests and Objectives

The purpose of the U.S. Armed Forces is to protect and advance U.S.

national interests and, if deterrence fails, to decisively defeat threats to

those interests. The United States has interests, responsibilities, and

commitments that span the world. As a global power with an open society,

the United States is affected by trends, events, and influences that originate

from beyond its borders. The development of the defense posture should

take into account the following enduring national interests:

■ Ensuring U.S. security and freedom of action, including:

■ U.S. sovereignty, territorial integrity, and freedom

■ Safety of U.S. citizens at home and abroad

■ Protection of critical U.S. infrastructure

■ Honoring international commitments, including:

■ Security and well-being of allies and friends

■ Precluding hostile domination of critical areas, particularly

Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral1, and the

Middle East and Southwest Asia 

■ Peace and stability in the Western Hemisphere

■ Contributing to economic well-being, including:

■ Vitality and productivity of the global economy

■ Security of international sea, air, and space, and information

lines of communication

■ Access to key markets and strategic resources.

Protecting these interests requires vigorous commitment and support. It

entails effective diplomacy, a strong economy, and a watchful and ready

defense. When U.S. interests are protected, America and its friends

prosper from peace and freedom. When U.S. interests are challenged, the

Nation must possess the strength and resolve to provide for their defense.

1 The east Asian littoral is defined as the region stretching from south of Japan through Australia and

into the Bay of Bengal.
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A Changed Security Environment

An assessment of the global security environment involves a great deal of

uncertainty about the potential sources of military threats, the conduct of

war in the future, and the form that threats and attacks against the Nation

will take. History has shown that rapid and unexpected changes, such as

the collapse of the Soviet Union, can transform the geopolitical landscape.

It also has demonstrated that new military technologies can revolutionize

the form of military competition and the nature of armed conflict in ways

that render military forces and doctrines of great powers obsolescent.

While contending with such uncertainty is a key challenge for U.S.

defense planning, certain features and trends of the security environment

define not only today's geopolitical and military-technical challenges but

also highlight critical operational challenges that the Nation's armed

forces will need to master in the future.

Current Security Trends

Although U.S. military forces enjoy superiority in many dimensions of

armed conflict, the United States is likely to be challenged by adversaries

who possess a wide range of capabilities, including asymmetric

approaches to warfare, particularly weapons of mass destruction. The

United States cannot predict with a high degree of confidence the identity

of the countries or the actors that may threaten its interests and security.

But it is possible to identify the trends that will give rise to important

threats and opportunities.

Key Geopolitical Trends. The international system, which was

characterized during the Cold War by the division of countries into

enduring and ideologically defined geopolitical blocs, has become more

fluid and unpredictable. America's alliances have remained strong. But

relations with other countries are often characterized both by

competition and cooperation. U.S. strategy must take into account the

important new geopolitical trends shaping the world.

Diminishing protection afforded by geographic distance. As the September

2001 events have horrifically demonstrated, the geographic position of the

United States no longer guarantees immunity from direct attack on its

population, territory, and infrastructure. Although the United States and its

overseas forces were vulnerable to Soviet missiles during the Cold War, it is

clear that over time an increasing number of states will acquire ballistic

missiles with steadily increasing effective ranges. Moreover, economic
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globalization and the attendant increase in travel and trade across U.S.

borders has created new vulnerabilities for hostile states and actors to

exploit by perpetrating attacks on the U.S. homeland.

Regional Security Developments. Although the United States will not face

a peer competitor in the near future, the potential exists for regional

powers to develop sufficient capabilities to threaten stability in regions

critical to U.S. interests. In particular, Asia is gradually emerging as a

region susceptible to large-scale military competition. Along a broad arc

of instability that stretches from the Middle East to Northeast Asia, the

region contains a volatile mix of rising and declining regional powers. The

governments of some of these states are vulnerable to overthrow by

radical or extremist internal political forces or movements. Many of these

states field large militaries and possess the potential to develop or acquire

weapons of mass destruction.

Maintaining a stable balance in Asia will be a complex task. The possibility

exists that a military competitor with a formidable resource base will

emerge in the region. The East Asian littoral - from the Bay of Bengal to the

Sea of Japan - represents a particularly challenging area. The distances are

vast in the Asian theater. The density of U.S. basing and en route

infrastructure is lower than in other critical regions. The United States

also has less assurance of access to facilities in the region. This places a

premium on securing additional access and infrastructure agreements and

on developing systems capable of sustained operations at great distances

with minimal theater-based support.

The United States and its allies and friends will continue to depend on the

energy resources of the Middle East, a region in which several states pose

conventional military challenges and many seek to acquire -- or have

acquired -- chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high

explosive (CBRNE) weapons. These states are developing ballistic missile

capabilities, supporting international terrorism, and expanding their

military means to coerce states friendly to the United States and to deny

U.S. military forces access to the region.

With the notable exception of the Balkans, Europe is largely at peace.

Central European states are becoming increasingly integrated with the

West both politically and economically. An opportunity for cooperation

exists with Russia. It does not pose a large-scale conventional military

threat to NATO. It shares some important security concerns with the

United States, including the problem of vulnerability to attack by ballistic

missiles from regional aggressors, the danger of accidental or
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unauthorized launches of strategic weapons, and the threat of

international terrorism. Yet, at the same time, Russia pursues a number of

policy objectives contrary to U.S. interests.

While the Western Hemisphere remains largely at peace, the danger exists

that crises or insurgencies, particularly within the Andean region, might

spread across borders, destabilize neighboring states, and place U.S.

economic and political interests at risk.

Increasing challenges and threats emanating from the territories of weak

and failing states. The absence of capable or responsible governments in

many countries in wide areas of Asia, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere

creates a fertile ground for non-state actors engaging in drug trafficking,

terrorism, and other activities that spread across borders. 

In several regions, the inability of some states to govern their societies,

safeguard their military armaments, and prevent their territories from serving

as sanctuary to terrorists and criminal organizations can also pose a threat to

stability and place demands on U.S. forces. Conditions in some states,

including some with nuclear weapons, demonstrate that potential threats can

grow out of the weakness of governments as much as out of their strength.

Diffusion of power and military capabilities to non-state actors. The

attacks against the U.S. homeland in September 2001 demonstrate that

terrorist groups possess both the motivations and capabilities to conduct

devastating attacks on U.S. territory, citizens, and infrastructure. Often

these groups have the support of state sponsors or enjoy sanctuary and

protection of states, but some have the resources and capabilities to

operate without state sponsorship. In addition, the rapid proliferation of

CBRNE technology gives rise to the danger that future terrorist attacks

might involve such weapons.

Developing and sustaining regional security arrangements. U.S. alliances,

as well as its wide range of bilateral security relationships, are a

centerpiece of American security. The United States has enjoyed

unparalleled success in building regional security arrangements. In

addition, the United States has demonstrated an unmatched ability to

develop coalitions of states to confront particular challenges, including

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. This ability will be critically important in

responding to the events of September 11, 2001. These security

arrangements and coalitions constitute a formidable combination of

actual and potential power that enables the United States and its partners
to make common cause to shape the strategic landscape, protect shared

interests, and promote stability.

Increasing diversity in the sources and unpredictability of the locations of

conflict. Together, these trends produce a geopolitical setting that is

increasingly complex and unpredictable. Unlike the Cold War period,

where the key geographic regions of competition were well defined, the

current period has already imposed demands for U.S. military intervention

or activity on virtually every continent and against a wide variety of

adversaries. The United States will not be able to develop its military

forces and plans solely to confront a specific adversary in a specific

geographic area. Instead, the United States could be forced to intervene in

unexpected crises against opponents with a wide range of capabilities.

Moreover, these interventions may take place in distant regions where

urban environments, other complex terrain, and varied climatic

conditions present major operational challenges.

Key Military-Technical Trends. Technology in the military sphere is

developing as rapidly as the tremendous changes reshaping the civilian

sector. The combination of scientific advancement and globalization of

commerce and communications have contributed to several trends that

significantly affect U.S. defense strategy.

Rapid advancement of military technologies. The ongoing revolution in

military affairs could change the conduct of military operations.

Technologies for sensors, information processing, precision guidance,

and many other areas are rapidly advancing. This poses the danger that

states hostile to the United States could significantly enhance their

capabilities by integrating widely available off-the-shelf technologies into

their weapon systems and armed forces. For the United States, the

revolution in military affairs holds the potential to confer enormous

advantages and to extend the current period of U.S. military superiority.

Exploiting the revolution in military affairs requires not only technological

innovation but also development of operational concepts, undertaking

organizational adaptations, and training and experimentation to

transform a country's military forces.

Increasing proliferation of CBRNE weapons and ballistic missiles. The

pervasiveness of proliferation in an era of globalization has increased the

availability of technologies and expertise needed to create the military

means to challenge directly the United States and its allies and friends.

This includes the spread of CBRNE weapons and their means of delivery,

as well as advanced conventional weapons. In particular, the pace and

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scale of recent ballistic missile proliferation has exceeded earlier

intelligence estimates and suggests these challenges may grow at a faster

pace than previously expected. Likewise, the biotechnology revolution

holds the probability of increasing threats of biological warfare.

Emergence of new arenas of military competition. Technological advances

create the potential that competitions will develop in space and cyber

space. Space and information operations have become the backbone of

networked, highly distributed commercial civilian and military

capabilities. This opens up the possibility that space control - the

exploitation of space and the denial of the use of space to adversaries - will

become a key objective in future military competition. Similarly, states

will likely develop offensive information operations and be compelled to

devote resources to protecting critical information infrastructure from

disruption, either physically or through cyber space.

Increasing potential for miscalculation and surprise. Together, these

military-technical trends create an increased potential for miscalculation

and surprise. In recent years, the United States has been surprised by the

speed with which other states have progressed in developing weapons of

mass destruction and ballistic missiles. In the future, it is unlikely that the

United States will be able accurately to predict how successfully other

states will exploit the revolution in military affairs, how rapidly potential

or actual adversaries will acquire CBRNE weapons and ballistic missiles, or

how competitions in space and cyber space will develop. 

Emerging Operational Challenges

These geopolitical and military-technical trends will profoundly shape the

future security environment. U.S. adversaries will have new capabilities

that previous opponents lacked. U.S. defense strategy must take into

account the need to transform U.S. forces to address several key emerging

operational challenges that are inherent in current security trends. These

challenges and an associated set of operational goals are explored in depth

in Section V of this report.

State of the U.S. Military

To secure U.S. interests and objectives despite the challenges of the future

security environment is the fundamental test for U.S. defense strategy and

U.S. Armed Forces. While U.S. military forces - comprising a total force of
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Active, Reserve, and National Guard forces - remain the best trained, best

equipped, and most capable in the world, there are significant challenges

that are eroding the advantage the United States currently enjoys. These

challenges affect the readiness and tempo of personnel and units, the major

weapons systems of the Armed Forces, and the defense infrastructure.

While U.S. forward-deployed and "first to fight" forces are trained and

ready, other operational units are less ready. During the past decade, DoD

sustained readiness of "first to fight" forces, but fiscal constraints

prevented other units from achieving desired readiness levels.

For example:

■ The degraded readiness of non-deployed carrier airwings has

made it increasingly difficult to return those airwings to desired

readiness levels when they deploy. 

■ The U.S. military has an existing shortfall in strategic transport

aircraft. This shortfall is aggravated by continuing low readiness

of the C-5 airlifter, which has had an average peacetime mission

capable rate over the last five years of approximately 60 percent.

This readiness level is about eight percent below peacetime

performance objectives for this aircraft. 

■ The readiness of the Army's highest priority units has been

sustained at the expense of non-divisional and Reserve

Component units and the institutional Army. 

■ The uniquely American superiority in training is eroding,

particularly as evident in the aging infrastructure and

instrumentation of U.S. training ranges.

Excessive operational demands on the force have taken a toll on military

personnel. Since the end of the Cold War, the Armed Forces experienced

a reduction of total personnel but an increase in the demands placed on

those smaller forces. One indication of this increased operational tempo

has been the growing reliance on the Reserve Component. The high

tempo of operations, coupled with continued demand for workers in the

private sector, adversely impacted the ability of the Armed Forces to

recruit and retain quality people for a number of years. 

While competition from a strong economy has made retention difficult,

Services face additional personnel challenges as a result of a decade of

downsizing. Because of the reduced accessions during most of the last 10

years, the Services must achieve higher than historic retention rates in

order to properly man the force in the future.
The quality of life in the military is critical to retaining a Service member

and his or her family. Recent surveys conducted by the Department

indicate that the two primary reasons that Service members leave or

consider leaving are basic pay and family separation. The current junior

officer force has a proportionately higher married population than ever

before experienced. Also, a very high proportion of married junior

officers have dual-career marriages. As a result, the Armed Forces must

not only retain the Service member, but also retain his or her family.

Family separation due to extended deployments has a significant impact

on a family's propensity to remain in the military.

The Department of Defense must recruit, train, and retain people with the

broad skills and good judgment needed to address the dynamic challenges

of the 21st century. Having the right kinds of imaginative, highly

motivated military and civilian personnel, at all levels, is the essential

prerequisite for achieving success. Advanced technology and new

operational concepts cannot be fully exploited unless the Department has

highly qualified and motivated enlisted personnel and officers who not

only can operate these highly technical systems, but also can lead

effectively in the highly complex military environment of the future.

DoD's civilian workforce also must be transformed to meet the challenges

of the future. An increasing number of civilian personnel are nearing

retirement age. In addition, as a result of downsizing in recent years, DoD

has not sufficiently emphasized efforts to bring talented young civilian

personnel into the Department to develop them to fill leadership

positions. This has been particularly true with respect to young people

with the skills needed to address emerging science and technology needs.

The pressure to maintain near-term readiness has also limited DoD's ability

to recapitalize the force. At the end of the Cold War, the Department made

a conscious decision to cut its procurement accounts and lived off the

systems procured as a result of investments made in the 1980s. Although

procurement spending has increased in recent years, it remains at

historically low levels. As a result, many major systems are approaching

the end of useful service. This in turn results in reduced mission capable

rates, increased operating costs, and frustration in keeping aged

equipment operational. The effect is to reduce the readiness of the force. 

In addition, the defense infrastructure also has suffered from

underfunding and neglect. Defense infrastructure includes facilities such

as the piers, runways, and hangars that support U.S. combat forces, the

buildings where DoD personnel work, and the housing in which military

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personnel and their families live, and training space. These facilities are

supported in two ways: sustainment and recapitalization. In recent years,

facility sustainment was funded at only 75-80 percent of the requirement.

The result is a deterioration of facilities and an accumulating restoration

backlog that has been estimated to cost over $60 billion. Recapitalization

was also significantly underfunded. While the private sector replaces or

modernizes facilities at an average rate of once every 57 years, defense

infrastructure has fallen well short of that standard. For example, in 2001,

the facilities replacement rate is 192 years. The result is a decaying

infrastructure that is less and less capable of supporting current military

needs. This trend must be reversed. If the sustainment of existing

facilities and recapitalization continues to be neglected, the resulting

facilities infrastructure will not be capable of supporting combat

readiness. Also, the difficulty of retaining a workforce, which works and

lives in substandard conditions, will only increase.

The Department of Defense cannot transform the force to deal with

tomorrow's security threats without also addressing today's challenges.

DoD must reverse the readiness decline of many operational units,

selectively recapitalize the force, and arrest the decay of aging

defense infrastructure.
II.

Defense Strategy

The defense strategy serves the broad national objectives of peace,

freedom, and prosperity. Diplomatic and economic efforts seek to

promote these objectives globally by encouraging democracy and

free markets. U.S. defense strategy seeks to defend freedom for the United

States and its allies and friends, and it helps to secure an international

environment of peace that makes other goals possible.

Defense Policy Goals

The Department of Defense has developed a new strategic framework to

defend the nation and secure a viable peace. This framework is built

around four defense policy goals:

■ Assuring allies and friends; 

■ Dissuading future military competition; 

■ Deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests; and 

■ If deterrence fails, decisively defeating any adversary.

Assuring Allies and Friends. The United States cannot retreat from the

world. The presence of American forces overseas is one of the most

profound symbols of the U.S. commitment to allies and friends. The U.S.

military plays a critical role in assuring allies and friends that the Nation

will honor its obligations and will be a reliable security partner. Through

its willingness to use force in its own defense and that of others and to

advance common goals, the United States demonstrates its resolve and

steadiness of purpose and the credibility of the U.S. military to meet the

Nation's commitments and responsibilities. Toward these ends, the U.S.

military will promote security cooperation with allies and friendly

nations. A primary objective of U.S. security cooperation will be to help

allies and friends create favorable balances of military power in critical

areas of the world to deter aggression or coercion. Security cooperation

serves as an important means for linking DoD's strategic direction with

those of U.S. allies and friends.

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Dissuading Future Military Competition. Through its strategy and

actions, the United States influences the nature of future military

competitions, channels threats in certain directions, and complicates

military planning for potential adversaries in the future. Well targeted

strategy and policy can therefore dissuade other countries from initiating

future military competitions. The United States can exert such influence

through the conduct of its research, development, test, and

demonstration programs. It can do so by maintaining or enhancing

advantages in key areas of military capability. Given the availability of

advanced technology and systems to potential adversaries, dissuasion will

also require the United States to experiment with revolutionary

operational concepts, capabilities, and organizational arrangements and

to encourage the development of a culture within the military that

embraces innovation and risk-taking. To have a dissuasive effect, this

combination of technical, experimental, and operational activity has to

have a clear strategic focus. New processes and organizations are needed

within the defense establishment to provide this focus.

Deterring Threats and Coercion Against U.S. Interests. A

multifaceted approach to deterrence is needed. Such an approach

requires forces and capabilities that provide the President with a wider

range of military options to discourage aggression or any form of coercion.

In particular, it places emphasis on peacetime forward deterrence in

critical areas of the world. It requires enhancing the future capability of

forward deployed and stationed forces, coupled with global intelligence,

strike,2 and information assets, in order to deter aggression or coercion

with only modest reinforcement from outside the theater. Improving

intelligence capabilities is particularly important, as these assets provide

U.S. forces with critical information on adversaries' intentions, plans,

strengths, and weaknesses. This new approach to deterrence also

requires non-nuclear forces that can strike with precision at fixed and

mobile targets throughout the depth of an adversary's territory; active and

passive defenses; and rapidly deployable and sustainable forces that can

decisively defeat any adversary. A final aspect of deterrence, addressed

not in the QDR but in the Nuclear Posture Review3, is related to the

offensive nuclear response capability of the United States. 

2 “Strike,” as used in this report, is meant to represent the nature of the military objectives sought,

not necessarily the weapons used. Strike capabilities may include not only long-range precision

attacks delivered from aircraft and missiles, but also appropriately structured ground force attacks,

naval fires, and other capabilities, depending on the circumstances – and particularly combinations

of these capabilities.

3 The Nuclear Posture Review is mandated by the Congress and due in December 2001. It will

describe the size, structure, and posture of the nation’s nuclear forces and the contribution they can

make to deterrence in the coming decades.
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If Deterrence Fails, Decisively Defeat Any Adversary. U.S. forces

must maintain the capability to support treaty obligations and defeat the

efforts of adversaries to impose their will on the United States, its allies, or

friends. U.S. forces must maintain the capability at the direction of the

President to impose the will of the United States and its coalition partners

on any adversaries, including states or non-state entities. Such a decisive

defeat could include changing the regime of an adversary state or

occupation of foreign territory until U.S. strategic objectives are met.

Strategic Tenets

These defense policy goals are supported by an interconnected set of

strategic tenets. It is only through careful attention and commitment to

each of these tenets that the defense policy goals will be achieved. These

tenets comprise the essence of U.S. defense strategy.

Managing Risks

The United States faces a world in which change occurs with everincreasing speed. New challenges are constantly emerging, while

longstanding threats endure. DoD must prepare for future challenges

over time, while meeting extant threats at any given time. This tension

between preparations for the future and the demands of the present

requires the United States to balance the risks associated with each.

Because resources are always finite, hard choices must be made that take

into account a wider range of risks than was necessary in the past. Some

of these risks are familiar, such as the possibility of a major war. Other

risks - such as the possibilities of mass casualty terrorism, cyber warfare, or

CBRNE warfare - are less well understood. Through the QDR, the

Department has developed a new defense strategy and an associated risk

management framework, and is in the process of building new

performance measures, both to better manage the risks the United States

faces and to meet the defense policy goals.

A Capabilities-Based Approach

The new defense strategy is built around the concept of shifting to a

"capabilities-based" approach to defense. That concept reflects the fact

that the United States cannot know with confidence what nation,

combination of nations, or non-state actor will pose threats to vital U.S.

interests or those of U.S. allies and friends decades from now. It is
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possible, however, to anticipate the capabilities that an adversary might

employ to coerce its neighbors, deter the United States from acting in

defense of its allies and friends, or directly attack the United States or its

deployed forces. A capabilities-based model - one that focuses more on

how an adversary might fight than who the adversary might be and where

a war might occur - broadens the strategic perspective. It requires

identifying capabilities that U.S. military forces will need to deter and

defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric

warfare to achieve their objectives. Moving to a capabilities-based force

also requires the United States to focus on emerging opportunities that

certain capabilities, including advanced remote sensing, long-range

precision strike, transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces and

systems, to overcome anti-access and area denial threats, can confer on

the U.S. military over time.

Defending the United States and Projecting

U.S. Military Power

Defending the Nation from attack is the foundation of strategy. As the

tragic September terror attacks demonstrate, potential adversaries will

seek to threaten the centers of gravity of the United States, its allies, and its

friends. As the U.S. military increased its ability to project power at longrange, adversaries have noted the relative vulnerability of the U.S.

homeland. They are placing greater emphasis on the development of

capabilities to threaten the United States directly in order to counter U.S.

operational advantages with their own strategic effects. Therefore, the

defense strategy restores the emphasis once placed on defending the

United States and its land, sea, air, and space approaches. It is essential to

safeguard the Nation's way of life, its political institutions, and the source

of its capacity to project decisive military power overseas. In turn, the

ability to project power at long ranges helps to deter threats to the United

States and, when necessary, to disrupt, deny, or destroy hostile entities at

a distance.

Strengthening Alliances and Partnerships

America's alliances and security relations give assurance to U.S. allies and

friends and pause to U.S. foes. These relationships create a community of

nations committed to common purposes. The defense strategy is

premised on efforts to strengthen America's alliances and partnerships

and to develop new forms of security cooperation. The American

commitment to these security arrangements bolsters the security of U.S.

allies and friends. Likewise, as witnessed in the wake of the terrorist
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attacks on the United States, NATO's invocation of Article V demonstrates

the commitment of America's partners to collective defense, which

bolsters the security of the United States. These mutually reinforcing

security relationships underpin the political stability on which the

prosperity of civilized nations is built. And these arrangements are based

on the recognition that a nation can be safe at home only if it is willing and

able to contribute to effective security partnerships abroad.

The need to strengthen alliances and partnerships has specific military

implications. It requires that U.S. forces train and operate with allies and

friends in peacetime as they would operate in war. This includes

enhancing interoperability and peacetime preparations for coalition

operations, as well as increasing allied participation in activities such as

joint and combined training and experimentation.

Maintaining Favorable Regional Balances

The defense strategy also places emphasis on maintaining favorable

military balances in critical geographic areas. By maintaining such

balances, the United States can secure peace, extend freedom, and assure

its allies and friends. It can create high costs on a decision by potential

adversaries to pursue dangerous forms of military competition. Finally, it

may convince potential adversaries that the benefits of hostile acts against

the interests of the United States are far outweighed by their costs

and consequences. 

Developing a Broad Portfolio of Military Capabilities

Creating substantial margins of advantage across key functional areas of

military competition (e.g., power projection, space, and information) will

require developing and sustaining a portfolio of key military capabilities to

prevail over current challenges and to hedge against and dissuade future

threats. Building upon the current superiority of U.S. conventional forces,

this portfolio will include capabilities for conducting information

operations, ensuring U.S. access to distant theaters, defending against

threats to the United States and allied territory, and protecting U.S. assets

in space. It will also require exploiting U.S. advantages in superior

technological innovation; its unmatched space and intelligence

capabilities; its sophisticated military training; and its ability to integrate

highly distributed military forces in synergistic combinations for highly

complex joint military operations. 
Transforming Defense

Finally, the defense strategy calls for the transformation of the U.S. military

and Defense establishment over time. Transformation is at the heart of

this new strategic approach. The Department's leadership recognizes that

continuing "business as usual" within the Department is not a viable

option given the new strategic era and the internal and external

challenges facing the U.S. military. Without change, the current defense

program will only become more expensive to maintain over time, and it

will forfeit many of the opportunities available to the United States today.

Without transformation, the U.S. military will not be prepared to meet

emerging challenges. At the same time, it would be imprudent to

transform the entire force all at once. A balance must be struck between

the need to meet current threats while transforming the force over time.

Therefore, the Department is committed to undertaking a sustained

process of transformation - based on clear goals - and strengthening the

spirit of innovation in its people, while remaining prepared to deal with

extant threats.

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III.

Paradigm Shift in Force

Planning

The DoD civilian and military leadership approached the force

planning task acutely aware of the need to provide over time a richer

set of military options across the operational spectrum than is

available today and to ensure that U.S. forces have the means to adapt in time

to surprise. The new force-sizing construct specifically shapes forces to:

■ Defend the United States; 

■ Deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions; 

■ Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while

preserving for the President the option to call for a decisive

victory in one of those conflicts - including the possibility of

regime change or occupation; and

■ Conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency

operations.

In doing so, DoD will maintain sufficient force generation capability and a

strategic reserve to mitigate risks. This new construct - which supports

the defense strategy - has four underlying elements.

First, it places new emphasis on the unique operational demands

associated with the defense of the United States and restores the defense

of the United States as the Department's primary mission.

Second, the approach shifts the focus of U.S. force planning from

optimizing for conflicts in two particular regions - Northeast and

Southwest Asia - to building a portfolio of capabilities that is robust across

the spectrum of possible force requirements, both functional and

geographical. This approach to planning responds to the capabilitiesbased strategy outlined above. It focuses more on how an adversary might

fight than on who the adversary might be and where a war might occur.

The shift is intended to refocus planners on the growing range of

capabilities that adversaries might possess or could develop. It will

require planners to define the military objectives associated with

defeating aggression or coercion in a variety of potential scenarios in

addition to conventional cross-border invasions. It calls for identifying,
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developing, and fielding capabilities that, for a given level of forces, would

accomplish each mission at an acceptable level of risk as established by

the National Command Authorities. 

Third, the new construct serves as a bridge from today's force, developed

around the threat-based, two-MTW construct, to a future, transformed

force. The United States will continue to meet its commitments around the

world, including in Southwest and Northeast Asia, by maintaining the

ability to defeat aggression in two critical areas in overlapping timeframes.

The United States is not abandoning planning for two conflicts to plan for

fewer than two. On the contrary, DoD is changing the concept altogether

by planning for victory across the spectrum of possible conflict.

Fourth, the new construct for the first time takes into account the number

and nature of the tasks actually assigned to the Armed Forces. Unlike

previous force-sizing constructs, the new construct explicitly calls for the

force to be sized for defending the homeland, forward deterrence,

warfighting missions, and the conduct of smaller-scale contingency

operations. As a result, the construct should better account for force

requirements driven by forward presence and rotational issues. It will also

better address requirements for low-density/high-demand (LD/HD)

assets, enabling forces (e.g., transport aircraft), and active and reserve

force-mix issues.

Defend the United States

The highest priority of the U.S. military is to defend the Nation from all

enemies. The United States will maintain sufficient military forces to

protect the U.S. domestic population, its territory, and its critical defenserelated infrastructure against attacks emanating from outside U.S. borders,

as appropriate under U.S. law. U.S. forces will provide strategic

deterrence and air and missile defense and uphold U.S. commitments

under NORAD. In addition, DoD components have the responsibility, as

specified in U.S. law, to support U.S. civil authorities as directed in

managing the consequences of natural and man-made disasters and

CBRNE-related events on U.S. territory. Finally, the U.S. military will be

prepared to respond in a decisive manner to acts of international terrorism

committed on U.S. territory or the territory of an ally.

Ensuring the safety of America's citizens at home can only be achieved

through effective cooperation among the many federal departments and

agencies and state and local governments that have homeland security
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responsibilities. It is clear that the roles, missions, and responsibilities of

the many organizations and agencies involved in national preparedness

must be clearly delineated through an integrated interagency process.

The Office of Homeland Security, which is responsible for overseeing and

coordinating a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard the United

States against terrorism and respond to any attacks that may come, will

lead this important process.

Those who respond first to any incident will likely be those closest to the

event - local law enforcement and emergency response personnel. It was

clear from the diverse set of agencies involved in responding to the

September 11, 2001 terror attacks on the World Trade Center and the

Pentagon that the Department of Defense does not and cannot have the

sole responsibility for homeland security. DoD must institutionalize

definitions of homeland security, homeland defense, and civil support and

address command relationships and responsibilities within the Defense

Department. This will allow the Defense Department to identify and

assign homeland security roles and missions as well as examine resource

implications. DoD must be committed to working through an integrated

inter-agency process, which in turn will provide the means to determine

force requirements and necessary resources to meet our homeland

security requirements. DoD must bolster its ability to work with the

organizations involved in homeland security to prevent, protect against,

and respond to threats to the territorial United States. In particular, the

Defense Department will place new emphasis upon counter terrorism

training across federal, state, and local first responders, drawing on the

capabilities of the Reserve and National Guard. 

Preparing forces for homeland security may require changes in force

structure and organization. For example, in conjunction with the ongoing

review of national preparedness requirements undertaken by the Vice

President, DoD will continue to examine the roles and responsibilities of

its Active and Reserve forces to ensure they are properly organized,

trained, equipped, and postured to provide for the effective defense of the

United States. It is clear that U.S. forces, including the United States Coast

Guard, require more effective means, methods, and organizations to

perform these missions. As part of this examination, DoD will review the

establishment of a new unified combatant commander to help address

complex inter-agency issues and provide a single military commander to

focus military support.

Defending the United States, which is the critical base of operations for

U.S. defense activities worldwide, will be a crucial element of DoD's
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transformation efforts. Integration of protection mechanisms (e.g.,

counterintelligence, security, infrastructure protection, and information

assurance) will be a key component. In particular, the United States must

enhance its capabilities to protect its critical infrastructure, especially

infrastructure that supports oil and gas transportation and storage,

information and communications, banking and finance, electrical power,

transportation, water supply, emergency, and government services.

Deter Forward

As a global power, the United States has important geopolitical interests

around the world.

DoD's new planning construct calls for maintaining regionally tailored

forces forward stationed and deployed in Europe, Northeast Asia, the East

Asian littoral, and the Middle East/Southwest Asia to assure allies and

friends, counter coercion, and deter aggression against the United States,

its forces, allies, and friends. 

As this strategy and force planning approach are implemented, the

United States will strengthen its forward deterrent posture. Over time,

U.S. forces will be tailored increasingly to maintain favorable regional

balances in concert with U.S. allies and friends with the aim of swiftly

defeating attacks with only modest reinforcement and, where necessary,

assuring access for follow-on forces. A key objective of U.S.

transformation efforts over time will be to increase the capability of its

forward forces, thereby improving their deterrent effect and possibly

allowing for reallocation of forces now dedicated to reinforcement to

other missions.

Security cooperation will serve as an important means for linking DoD's

strategic direction with those of its allies and friends. DoD will focus its

peacetime overseas activities on security cooperation to help create

favorable balances of military power in critical areas of the world and to

deter aggression and coercion. A particular aim of DoD's security

cooperation efforts will be to ensure access, interoperability, and

intelligence cooperation, while expanding the range of pre-conflict

options available to counter coercive threats, deter aggression, or

favorably prosecute war on U.S. terms. 
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Major Combat Operations

U.S. forces will remain capable of undertaking major combat operations

on a global basis and will train to be effective across a wide range of

combat conditions and geographic settings. The focus will be on the

ability to act quickly when challenged and to win decisively at a time and

place and in the manner of the President's choosing. 

For planning purposes, U.S. forces will remain capable of swiftly defeating

attacks against U.S. allies and friends in any two theaters of operation in

overlapping timeframes. Combat operations will be structured to

eliminate enemy offensive capability across the depth of its territory,

restore favorable military conditions in the region, and create acceptable

political conditions for the cessation of hostilities. In addition, U.S. forces

will degrade an aggressor's ability to coerce others through conventional

or asymmetric means, including CBRNE weapons. U.S. forces will fight

from a forward deterrent posture with immediately employable forces,

including long-range precision strike capabilities from within and beyond

the theater, and rapidly deployable maneuver capabilities.

At the direction of the President, U.S. forces will be capable of

decisively defeating an adversary in one of the two theaters in which

U.S. forces are conducting major combat operations by imposing

America's will and removing any future threat it could pose. This

capability will include the ability to occupy territory or set the

conditions for a regime change if so directed.

Smaller-Scale Contingencies

The new planning approach requires the United States to maintain and

prepare its forces for smaller-scale contingency operations in peacetime,

preferably in concert with allies and friends. This approach recognizes

that such contingencies could vary in duration, frequency, intensity, and

the number of personnel required. DoD will explicitly plan to provide a

rotational base - a larger base of forces from which to provide forwarddeployed forces - to support long-standing contingency commitments in

the critical areas of interest. These long-standing commitments will, in

effect, become part of the U.S. forward deterrent posture. 

Moreover, DoD will ensure that it has sufficient numbers of specialized

forces and capabilities to ensure that it does not overstress elements of the

force when it is involved in smaller-scale contingency operations.
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Current Forces

Today's force structure - both Active and Reserve components - is the

baseline from which the Department will develop a transformed force for

the future. The current force structure, shown in the table below, was

assessed across several combinations of scenarios on the basis of the new

defense strategy and force sizing construct, and the capabilities of this

force were judged as presenting moderate operational risk, although

certain combinations of warfighting and smaller-scale contingency

scenarios present high risk.

Army

Divisions (Active/National Guard) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10/8

Active Armored Cavalry/Light Cavalry Regiments . . . . . . . .1/1

Enhanced Separate Brigades (National Guard) . . . . . . . . . . .15

Navy

Aircraft Carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Air Wings (Active/Reserve) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10/1

Amphibious Ready Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Attack Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55

Surface Combatants (Active/Reserve) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .108/8

Air Force

Active Fighter Squadrons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46

Reserve Fighter Squadrons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38

Reserve Air Defense Squadrons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Bombers (Combat-Coded) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .112

Marine Corps (3 Marine Expeditionary Forces)

Divisions (Active/Reserve) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3/1

Air Wings (Active/Reserve) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3/1

Force Service Support Groups (Active/Reserve) . . . . . . . . .3/1
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Just as U.S. forces have transformed in the past, the process of

fundamental transformation to sustain U.S. military advantages, meet

critical operational goals, and dominate future military competitions has

begun.

The Department of Defense has embarked on an ambitious transformation

of U.S. military forces to meet such challenges. As this transformation

effort matures - and as it produces significantly higher output of military

value from each element of the force - DoD will explore additional

opportunities to restructure and reorganize the Armed Forces.

To support this strategy, DoD will continue to rely on Reserve Component

forces. To ensure the appropriate use of the Reserve Components, DoD

will undertake a comprehensive review of the Active and Reserve mix,

organization, priority missions, and associated resources. This review will

build on recent assessments of Reserve Component issues that highlighted

emerging roles for the Reserve Components in the defense of the United

States, in smaller-scale contingencies, and in major combat operations.

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IV.

Reorienting the

U.S. Military Global Posture

During the latter half of the 20th century, the United States

developed a global system of overseas military bases primarily to

contain aggression by the Soviet Union. U.S. overseas presence

aligned closely with U.S. interests and likely threats to those interests.

However, this overseas presence posture, concentrated in Western

Europe and Northeast Asia, is inadequate for the new strategic

environment, in which U.S. interests are global and potential threats in

other areas of the world are emerging. 

A reorientation of the posture must take account of new challenges,

particularly anti-access and area-denial threats. New combinations of

immediately employable forward stationed and deployed forces; globally

available reconnaissance, strike, and command and control assets;

information operations capabilities; and rapidly deployable, highly lethal

and sustainable forces that may come from outside a theater of operations

have the potential to be a significant force multiplier for forward stationed

forces, including forcible entry forces. One of the goals of reorienting the

global posture is to render forward forces capable of swiftly defeating an

adversary's military and political objectives with only modest

reinforcement. Decisively defeating an adversary would likely require

substantial reinforcement even after transformation. 

Transforming the U.S. global military posture begins with the development

of new ways to deter conflict. Deterrence in the future will continue to

depend heavily upon the capability resident in forward stationed and

forward deployed combat and expeditionary forces, including forcible

entry forces, along with the rapidly employable capabilities that the U.S.

military possess throughout the globe. U.S. forces must possess a wide

range of offensive and defensive capabilities that can achieve strategic and

operational objectives in the face of determined adversaries, to include

those armed with asymmetric weapons of war. DoD will pursue new

deterrence tools that not only hold at risk an adversary's military forces and

other valued assets, but also extend greater protection to allies and friends

in crisis through capabilities such as missile defenses, defensive

information operations, and counter-terrorist operations.
Capabilities and forces located in the continental United States and in

space are a critical element of this new global posture. Long-range strike

aircraft and special operations forces provide an immediately employable

supplement to forward forces to achieve a deterrent effect in peacetime.

New forms of deterrence, emphasizing the strategic and operational

effects that U.S. capabilities can impose upon an adversary, can

incorporate globally distributed capabilities and forces to rapidly strike

with precision mobile and fixed targets at various distances.

One of the goals of reorienting the global posture is to render forward

forces capable of swiftly defeating an adversary's military and political

objectives with only modest reinforcement. Key requirements for this

reorientation include new combinations of immediately employable

forward stationed and deployed forces; expeditionary and forcible entry

capabilities; globally available reconnaissance, strike, and command and

control assets; information operations; special operations forces; and

rapidly deployable, highly lethal and sustainable forces that may come

from outside a theater of operations. Decisively defeating an adversary

will require substantial reinforcement even after transformation.

Based on changes in the international security environment, DoD's new

strategic approach, and this transformed concept of deterrence, the U.S.

global military posture will be reoriented to:

■ Develop a basing system that provides greater flexibility for U.S.

forces in critical areas of the world, placing emphasis on

additional bases and stations beyond Western Europe and

Northeast Asia.

■ Provide temporary access to facilities in foreign countries that

enable U.S. forces to conduct training and exercises in the

absence of permanent ranges and bases.

■ Redistribute forces and equipment based on regional deterrence

requirements.

■ Provide sufficient mobility, including airlift, sealift, prepositioning, basing infrastructure, alternative points of

debarkation, and new logistical concepts of operations, to

conduct expeditionary operations in distant theaters against

adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction and other

means to deny access to U.S. forces.

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Accordingly, the Department has made the following decisions:

■ The Secretary of the Army will accelerate the introduction of

forward-stationed Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) to

strengthen deterrence and improve U.S. strategic

responsiveness on a global basis. In consultation with its

European Allies, the United States envisages that an IBCT should

be stationed in the European area by 2007. In addition, the

Secretary of the Army will explore options for enhancing ground

force capabilities in the Arabian Gulf.

■ The Secretary of the Navy will increase aircraft carrier

battlegroup presence in the Western Pacific and will explore

options for homeporting an additional three to four surface

combatants, and guided cruise missile submarines (SSGNs), in

that area.

■ The Secretary of the Air Force will develop plans to increase

contingency basing in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, as well as

in the Arabian Gulf. The Secretary of the Air Force will ensure

sufficient en route infrastructure for refueling and logistics to

support operations in the Arabian Gulf or Western Pacific areas.

■ The Secretary of the Navy will develop new concepts of

maritime pre-positioning, high-speed sealift, and new

amphibious capabilities for the Marine Corps. The Secretary of

the Navy will develop options to shift some of the Marine Corps'

afloat pre-positioned equipment from the Mediterranean toward

the Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf to be more responsive to

contingencies in the Middle East. In consultation with U.S. allies

and friends, the Secretary of the Navy will explore the feasibility

of conducting training for littoral warfare in the Western Pacific

for the Marine Corps.

■ DoD will also recommend changes in the worldwide alignment

of special operations forces assets to account for new regional

emphases in the defense strategy. 

■ The United States will maintain its critical bases in Western

Europe and Northeast Asia, which may also serve the additional

role of hubs for power projection in future contingencies in

other areas of the world.

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V.

Creating the U.S. Military

of the 21st Century

Achieving the objectives of the defense strategy requires the

transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces. Transformation results

from the exploitation of new approaches to operational concepts

and capabilities, the use of old and new technologies, and new forms of

organization that more effectively anticipate new or still emerging

strategic and operational challenges and opportunities and that render

previous methods of conducting war obsolete or subordinate.

Transformation can involve fundamental change in the form of military

operations, as well as a potential change in their scale. It can encompass

the displacement of one form of war with another, such as fundamental

change in the ways war is waged in the air, on land and at sea. It can also

involve the emergence of new kinds of war, such as armed conflict in new

dimensions of the battlespace.

Transformation has intellectual, social and technological dimensions.

Fundamental changes in the conceptualization of war as well as in

organizational culture and behavior are usually required to bring it about.

During the early phase of transformation, only a small portion of the force

is typically transformed. However, small transformed forces with a critical

mass of spearhead capabilities can produce disproportionate strategic

effects. Because transformation is highly path-dependent, choices made

today may constrain or enhance options tomorrow.

To support the transformation effort, and to foster innovation and

experimentation, the Department will establish a new office reporting

directly to the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The

Director, Force Transformation will evaluate the transformation efforts of

the Military Departments and promote synergy by recommending steps to

integrate ongoing transformation activities.

To further facilitate transformation, the Military Departments and Defense

Agencies will develop transformation roadmaps that specify timelines to

develop Service-unique capabilities necessary to meet the six critical

operational goals described below.
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Operational Goals

Not all change in military capabilities, however desirable for other reasons,

is transformational. The purpose of transformation is to maintain or

improve U.S. military preeminence in the face of potential disproportionate

discontinuous changes in the strategic environment. Transformation must

therefore be focused on emerging strategic and operational challenges and

the opportunities created by these challenges. Six critical operational goals

provide the focus for DoD's transformation efforts:

■ Protecting critical bases of operations (U.S. homeland, forces

abroad, allies, and friends) and defeating CBRNE weapons and

their means of delivery;

■ Assuring information systems in the face of attack and

conducting effective information operations;

■ Projecting and sustaining U.S. forces in distant anti-access or

area-denial environments and defeating anti-access and areadenial threats;

■ Denying enemies sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance,

tracking, and rapid engagement with high-volume precision

strike, through a combination of complementary air and ground

capabilities, against critical mobile and fixed targets at various

ranges and in all weather and terrains;

■ Enhancing the capability and survivability of space systems and

supporting infrastructure; and

■ Leveraging information technology and innovative concepts to

develop an interoperable, joint C4ISR architecture and

capability that includes a tailorable joint operational picture.

Protecting the American homeland from attack is the foremost responsibility

of the U.S. Armed Forces and a primary mission for the Reserve Components.

Future adversaries will most certainly have a range of new means with which

to threaten the United States. It is possible to identify confidently some of

these means, including new techniques of terror; ballistic and cruise

missiles; weapons of mass destruction, including advanced biological

weapons; and weapons of mass disruption, such as information warfare

attacks on critical information infrastructure. Others, like those used to

attack the United States on September 11, 2001, may be a surprise. Defenses

against known and emerging threats must be developed. New approaches

to achieving early warning of new threats are a high priority.
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The increasing dependence of societies and military forces on advanced

information networks creates new vulnerabilities and opportunities.

Potential adversaries could exploit these vulnerabilities through means

such as computer network attack and directed energy weapons. The

emergence of these new tools of warfare also provides opportunities for

non-kinetic attack by U.S. forces. 

Future adversaries could have the means to render ineffective much of our

current ability to project military power overseas. Saturation attacks with

ballistic and cruise missiles could deny or delay U.S. military access to

overseas bases, airfields, and ports. Advanced air defense systems could

deny access to hostile airspace to all but low-observable aircraft. Military

and commercial space capabilities, over-the-horizon radars, and lowobservable unmanned aerial vehicles could give potential adversaries the

means to conduct wide-area surveillance and track and target American

forces and assets. Anti-ship cruise missiles, advanced diesel submarines,

and advanced mines could threaten the ability of U.S. naval and

amphibious forces to operate in littoral waters. New approaches for

projecting power must be developed to meet these threats.

Adversaries will also likely seek to exploit strategic depth to their

advantage. Mobile ballistic missile systems can be launched from

extended range, exacerbating the anti-access and area-denial challenges.

Space denial capabilities, such as ground-based lasers, can be located deep

within an adversary's territory. Accordingly, a key objective of

transformation is to develop the means to deny sanctuary to potential

adversaries. This will likely require the development and acquisition of

robust capabilities to conduct persistent surveillance, precision strike,

and maneuver at varying depths within denied areas.

In addition to exploiting space for their own purposes, future adversaries

will also likely seek to deny U.S. forces unimpeded access to space. Space

surveillance, ground-based lasers and space jamming capabilities, and

proximity micro satellites are becoming increasingly available. A key

objective for transformation, therefore, is not only to ensure the U.S.

ability to exploit space for military purposes, but also as required to deny

an adversary's ability to do so.

Finally, new information and communications technologies hold promise

for networking highly distributed joint and combined forces and for

ensuring that such forces have better situational awareness - both about

friendly forces as well as those of adversaries - than in the past.

Information technology holds vast potential for maximizing the

effectiveness of American men and women in uniform.
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Transformation Pillars

Transformation is not an end point. DoD's approach to transformation

rests on four pillars:

■ Strengthening joint operations through standing joint task force

headquarters, improved joint command and control, joint

training, and an expanded joint forces presence policy; 

■ Experimenting with new approaches to warfare, operational

concepts and capabilities, and organizational constructs such as

standing joint forces through wargaming, simulations and field

exercises focused on emerging challenges and opportunities; 

■ Exploiting U.S. intelligence advantages through multiple

intelligence collection assets, global surveillance and

reconnaissance, and enhanced exploitation and dissemination;

and

■ Developing transformational capabilities through increased and

wide-ranging science and technology, selective increases in

procurement, and innovations in DoD processes.

Strengthening Joint Operations

To better meet future warfare challenges, DoD must develop the ability to

integrate combat organizations with forces capable of responding rapidly

to events that occur with little or no warning. These joint forces must be

scalable and task-organized into modular units to allow the combatant

commanders to draw on the appropriate forces to deter or defeat an

adversary. The forces must be highly networked with joint command and

control, and they must be better able to integrate into combined

operations than the forces of today. 

These joint forces will be used to manage crises, forestall conflict, and

conduct combat operations. They must be lighter, more lethal and

maneuverable, survivable, and more readily deployed and employed in an

integrated fashion. They must be not only capable of conducting

distributed and dispersed operations, but also able to force entry in antiaccess or area-denial environments.
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Joint and Combined Command and Control

Future military responses will require the rapid movement and integration

of joint and combined forces. To be successful, operations will demand a

flexible, reliable, and effective joint command and control architecture

that provides the flexibility to maneuver, sustain, and protect U.S. forces

across the battlefield in a timely manner.

Such a joint command and control structure must reside not only at the

joint command, but also extend down to the operational service

components. The structure must be networked to ensure shared

battlespace awareness. It must be supported by the appropriate doctrine,

tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as a highly trained operational

force. Most important, it must develop and foster a joint professional

culture, a requirement that presents a significant challenge to service and

joint training and professional education programs. The joint command

and control system - both the information that flows through the network

and the equipment upon which it resides - must be secure and protected

from an adversary's information operations or other attacks. 

U.S. forces require the ability to communicate not only with one another,

but also with other government agencies and allies and friends. Such joint

and combined interoperability requires forces that can immediately "plug"

into the joint battlefield operating systems (command and control,

intelligence, fire support, logistics, etc.) and perform effectively. These

forces need compatible systems with interoperable standards, doctrine,

tactics, techniques, and procedures. 

To support joint and combined command and control and to enable a

common relevant operational picture of the battlespace, the Department

will enhance end-to-end interoperable communications for secure

planning and operations. These communications will provide shared

situational awareness and integration of joint fires, maneuver, and

intelligence. They must be interoperable across all components and

tailorable for coalition operations with other countries. The capability

provided by this network and its applications will enable rapid response

forces to plan and execute faster than the enemy and to seize tactical

opportunities. 

Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters

To strengthen joint operations, the Department will develop over the next

several months proposals to establish a prototype for Standing Joint Task

Force (SJTF) Headquarters. The goal is to establish a SJTF headquarters in
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each of the regional combatant commands. The headquarters will

provide uniform, standard operating procedures, tactics, techniques, and

technical system requirements, with the ability to move expertise

among commands. 

SJTF headquarters will have a standardized joint C4ISR architecture that

provides a common relevant operational picture of the battlespace for

joint and combined forces. And it will have mechanisms for a responsive

integrated logistics system that provide warfighters easy access to

necessary support without burdensome lift and infrastructure

requirements. SJTF headquarters will also utilize adaptive mission

planning tools that allow U.S. forces to operate within the adversary's

decision cycle and respond to changing battlespace conditions.

Standing Joint Task Forces

In addition, the Department will examine options for establishing

Standing Joint Task Forces (SJTFs). SJTF organizations will focus in

particular on the critical operational goals described previously. They will

seek to develop new concepts to exploit U.S. asymmetric military

advantages and joint force synergies. These concepts will be designed to

take into account the potential to achieve significantly greater military

capability at lower total personnel levels.

One option will include a plan for a SJTF for unwarned, extended-range

conventional attack against fixed and mobile targets at varying depths.

Such an SJTF would address one of the critical operational challenges of

the future - developing the capability to continuously locate and track

mobile targets at any range and rapidly attack them with precision.

Overcoming this challenge will require enhanced intelligence

capabilities, including space-based systems, additional human

intelligence, and airborne systems that can locate and track moving

targets and transmit that information to strike assets. It will require the

ability to strike without warning from the air, from the sea, on the ground,

and through space and cyber space. It will also require that these forces

be networked to maximize their combined effects.

Establishing a Standing Joint Task Force for extended-range, unwarned

conventional strike would provide the organizational means to achieve a

networked capability. This Standing Joint Task Force could serve as the

vanguard for the transformed military of the future. It could undertake

experimental exercises as new technologies become available. It would

also offer immediate operational benefits.
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Joint Presence Policy

To strengthen the Secretary of Defense's management of the allocation of

joint deterrent and warfighting assets from all Military Departments, the

QDR calls for the establishment of a joint presence policy. This new policy

would build on the existing Global Naval Forces Presence Policy, but it

would also subsume the rotational overseas presence force of all

military Services. 

Establishing a joint presence policy will increase the capability and

flexibility of U.S. forward-stationed forces and aid in managing force

management risks. This policy will establish steady-state levels of air, land,

and naval presence in critical regions around the world. It will

synchronize deployments of U.S. forces and facilitate cross-Service trades

for presence and deterrence. It will also allow for better coordination in

the readiness and tempo of operations of all U.S. forces.

Sustaining the Force

To ensure the Department transforms its logistics capabilities, DoD will

pursue actions to sustain the force more effectively and efficiently.

Specific areas will include a dramatically improved deployment process

and accelerated implementation of logistics decision support tools. DoD

must also accelerate logistics enterprise integration, reduce logistics

demand, and reduce the cost of logistics. In addition, conducting

industrial vulnerability assessments and developing sustainment plans for

the most critical weapons systems and preferred munitions will help

ensure effective sustainment.

Experimenting in Support of

Transformational Change

To identify the best available solutions to emerging operational challenges, the

defense strategy will employ military field exercises and experiments. Over

the last century, military field exercises and experiments oriented toward

addressing emerging challenges and opportunities at the operational level of

war have been important enablers of military innovation and transformation.

These operations reduce uncertainty about the future conflict environment

and future capabilities. Exercises and experiments are a critical phase in

developing new types of forces and operational concepts that can respond to

emerging operational challenges and dominate opponents who effectively

exploit aspects of the changing security environment.
Field exercises that incorporate experimentation - at both the joint and

the service levels - provide an indispensable means for solving emerging

challenges. For instance, with respect to the challenge of projecting

power in an anti-access environment, field exercises and experiments will

enable the military to identify promising operational concepts for

deploying forces into theater and conducting extended-range precision

strikes against mobile targets. Further, these exercises and experiments

will help to determine if secure access to forward bases is possible and to

identify ways to sustain operations for a period sufficient to achieve U.S.

objectives. They will also assist the United States in determining which

new systems and capabilities will be required, which existing systems and

capabilities should be sustained, and what combination of

transformational and legacy systems should be created.

Moreover, field exercises and experiments that enable the U.S. military to

create and maintain options for a variety of emerging capabilities greatly

complicate the planning of would-be adversaries. By enabling the

creation of a range of capabilities and warfighting options, field exercises

and experimentation can compel future competitors into an unenviable

choice. They can seek to develop responses to most or all of the U.S.

capabilities and options and consequently stretch their limited resources

thin, or they can choose the high-risk option of focusing their efforts on

offsetting only one or a few of the new warfighting options, leaving

themselves vulnerable to the others. When confronted with this dilemma,

potential adversaries may find themselves dissuaded from entering into a

military competition in the first place.

U.S. forces will rely heavily on wargames and simulations to support this

program of field exercises and experiments. These important analytic

tools can greatly enhance the effectiveness of field exercises by

identifying promising capabilities that merit prototyping, new force

elements that should be established, and operational concepts that merit

the detailed evaluation that only field exercises can provide. Thus

wargames and simulations serve as a filter to enhance the focus and value

of field exercises. However, simulations and war games have inherent

limits in terms of how far they can go in identifying new forms of

operation and new military system requirements. 

During the latter stages of the Cold War, the Services invested in a number

of high-fidelity training facilities that greatly enhanced the value of their

field training. Yet comparable facilities do not exist to support joint highfidelity field exercises and experiments. DoD will explore the need to

establish a joint and interoperability training capability, including a Joint

National Training Center as well as opportunities to build on existing

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capabilities at Service training centers and ranges to enable joint

transformation field exercises and experiments and to inform the Services'

exercises and experiments. 

DoD must also undertake high-fidelity transformation exercises and

experiments that address the growing challenge of maintaining space

control or defending against attacks on the U.S. national information

infrastructure. DoD will establish a space test range for this purpose

Enabling these kinds of exercises will be a major challenge for the

Department's transformation effort.

Joint and Service field exercises oriented to military transformation have

suffered from chronic resource shortages. Joint Forces Command must

conduct at least one major joint transformation exercise every other year.

These should build on Service experimentation exercises in the

intervening years. Moreover, the regional CINCs should develop a plan to

rotate assigned forces through a joint training event for regular exercises

and evaluations. To support this effort, DoD will consider the

establishment of a Joint Opposing Force and increasing the Joint Forces

Command exercise budget. To ensure that sufficient forces are available

for experimentation, Joint Forces Command will be authorized to draw up

to 5 percent of U.S.-based forces each year for experimentation activities

within tempo guidelines and acceptable operational risk.

The findings of this program of field exercises and experiments will feed

back directly into the process for determining systems, doctrine, and force

structure requirements. Monitoring this program and providing the

Secretary with policy recommendations based on its findings will be an

important responsibility of the work of the Director, Force Transformation. 

Exploiting Intelligence Advantages

U.S. defense strategy and doctrine are increasingly dependent upon

information and decision superiority. Information superiority, in turn,

depends heavily upon timely, relevant, and comprehensive intelligence.

Today, the United States not only possesses unique intelligence

capabilities, unmatched by any potential adversary, but has numerous

efforts underway to improve and expand current intelligence capabilities.

At the same time, U.S. military dependence on information is

unprecedented and growing. This is particularly true in light of the

Department's transition to network-centric warfare. 

Demands on intelligence capabilities are certain to grow. Because

potential adversaries recognize the importance of information superiority

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to U.S. strategy and operations, they are seeking to acquire similar

capabilities. To offset U.S. conventional military capabilities, they are also

pursuing asymmetric strategies including information operations, space

warfare, and CBRNE weapons. These asymmetric threats pose daunting

new intelligence challenges. To respond effectively, DoD will vigorously

pursue new processes and procedures to better exploit existing assets

while aggressively developing new technologies that offer great potential

for responding to new threats and requirements. In particular, the

Department will treat information operations, intelligence, and space

assets not simply as enablers of current U.S. forces but rather as core

capabilities of future forces.

Global Intelligence

Throughout the Cold War, the singular nature of the strategic threat from

the Soviet Union provided U.S. intelligence with a remarkably stable

target. Today, intelligence is required to provide political and military

leaders with strategic and operational information on an increasingly

diverse range of political, military, leadership, and scientific and

technological developments worldwide. 

Human Intelligence. Performance of HUMINT must be optimized to

gain access and insights into some of the most difficult "targets," e.g.,

terrorist cells, hard and deeply buried targets, closed regimes, and CBRNE

weapons development and deployment plans. The United States needs to

enhance human intelligence capabilities and tools not only to gather

better HUMINT but also to enable better positioning of technical

collection systems. Finally, human intelligence reporting must be

integrated into the situational awareness display that provides joint forces

with battlespace visualization through the Global Command and Control

System Common Operational Picture.

Emerging Technologies. The Department will vigorously pursue the

development and exploitation of technologies that can significantly

increase U.S. advantage in intelligence collection, analysis, and security.

Some of the most promising include: 

■ Low-observable technologies that may be applied to collection

platforms;

■ Nanotechnology that may result in miniature, mobile,

autonomous sensors that could penetrate the secure and remote

facilities of an adversary;

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■ Advanced parallel processing and quantum computing to

provide real-time processes, decryption, translation, and

transcription of communications;

■ Biometrics for tracking adversaries and providing secure

authentication of individuals seeking network or facility access;

and

■ Commercial imagery for remote sensing of the earth.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)

DoD is pursuing investment strategies and migration plans for an

integrated, cost-effective mix of unmanned aerial vehicles, manned

platforms, spaceborne, maritime, and terrestrial systems responsive to

future collection needs and challenges. Efforts are underway to accelerate

the procurement of additional Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) platforms

and sensors. Enhanced Space-based Radar (SBR) systems are also required

to provide global, long-range ground moving target indicator capability to

augment existing airborne capabilities. Commercial systems, especially

satellite imagery, are being integrated into U.S. ISR capabilities.

Sensors. A wide range of imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals

intelligence (SIGINT), and measurement and signature intelligence

(MASINT) sensors are needed to respond to current and future

requirements. Satellite IMINT sensors need to provide long-dwell

capabilities. SIGINT payloads are needed for UAVs as well as for

specialized shipboard collection sensors to capture modernized radio

frequency signals from state and non-state threats. Extensive airborne

SIGINT modernization efforts are needed to provide low- and high-band

collection capabilities that elude currently deployed systems. MASINT's

multi-disciplinary scope offers great potential. MASINT sensor

development and deployment - particularly for such purposes as sampling

for agents and collection against hard and deeply buried targets - is critical

to maintaining U.S. military advantages.

Collaborative ISR Operations. The ISR community must move toward

a collaborative enterprise to achieve more responsive support for civilian

decision-makers and commanders engaged in planning and executing

operations. Collaborative capabilities are needed to permit agile and

adaptive strategies, plans, and operations, as well as rapid sharing of

analysis and time-sensitive information. A fused information picture must

provide decision-makers and commanders with a near real-time capability

to support operations and visualize the operational space. Decision aids
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and other tools are needed to develop a coherent strategy and plan and

then to enable decision makers to adjust rapidly to emerging situations.

Such systems are essential to establishing an effective, efficient, and

responsive ISR posture in joint and combined operations. 

Tasking, Processing, Exploitation,

and Dissemination (TPED)

Future military operations will require TPED approaches that integrate all

collection disciplines, including IMINT, SIGINT, MASINT, HUMINT, and

open sources. Integrated TPED must accommodate new types of multimedia, multi-spectral, and multi-source information, including

commercial imagery. A capability to incorporate real-time video, integrate

information acquired from non-intelligence sources - such as advanced

aircraft radar or commercial satellite imagery - and efficiently exploit longdwell and stare systems is essential to meet future military requirements.

Future TPED will be expected to support multiple echelons, including

tactical and national systems and to operate across diverse security

domains. Migrating to a more integrated architecture that takes advantage

of multiple intelligence disciplines and robust networking will improve

the timeliness and quality of intelligence information needed by defenserelated consumers of intelligence.

As target sets become more diverse and collection sources more varied,

tying this scarce and disparate information together requires trained and

analytical judgment. Investments need to focus on building a workforce

with the required skills, and with the analytical tools and databases

needed to improve support to planning.

Developing Transformational Capabilities

A fundamental challenge confronting DoD is ensuring that U.S. forces

have the capabilities they need to carry out the new defense strategy and

meet the demands of the 21st century. Toward that end, it is imperative

that the United States invests and transforms its forces and capabilities.

The Department's commitment to modernization has three main parts:

■ Exploiting research and development to ensure that U.S. forces

maintain a decisive lead in technologies critical to transformation;

■ Advancing key transformation initiatives; and

■ Selectively recapitalizing legacy forces to meet near-term

challenges and to provide near-term readiness.
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Research and Development

A robust research and development effort is imperative to achieving the

Department's transformation objectives. DoD must maintain a strong

science and technology (S&T) program that supports evolving military

needs and ensures technological superiority over potential adversaries.

Meeting transformation objectives also will require new information

systems. These must be married with technological advances in other key

areas, including stealth platforms, unmanned vehicles, and smart

submunitions. To provide the basic research for these capabilities, the

QDR calls for a significant increase in funding for S&T programs to a level

of three percent of DoD spending per year.

During the Cold War, U.S. government programs were a primary impetus

for research into new technologies, particularly in areas such as

computers and materials. Today and well into the foreseeable future,

however, DoD will rely on the private sector to provide much of the

leadership in developing new technologies. Thus, the Department has

embarked on an effort (a) to turn to private enterprise for new ways to

move ideas from the laboratory to the operating forces, (b) to tap the

results of innovations developed in the private sector, and (c) to blend

government and private research where appropriate. This "quiet

revolution" will take advantage of science and technology and continue to

provide U.S. forces with technological superiority.

In parallel with a new emphasis on research and development, DoD must

give increased priority to maintaining a robust test and evaluation

program, which will require test centers and ranges. While

transformation offers U.S. forces the promise of revolutionary capabilities,

the products of this transformation must be tested thoroughly before they

are deployed. This need for testing - and particularly for testing

capabilities conducted over very long distances - requires the Department

to maintain and modernize highly instrumented ranges and to manage the

challenges of range encroachment. A robust test and evaluation program

will maximize the return on future procurement expenditures, while

strengthening the public's confidence in defense acquisitions.

Transformation Initiatives

In order to advance U.S. transformation efforts, the new defense strategy

identifies key operational goals for deterring conflict and conducting

military operations. To improve the linkage between strategy and

investments, DoD's investment resources will be focused on achieving six

operational goals in the following ways:
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1. Protect bases of operation at home and abroad and defeat the

threat of CBRNE weapons.

DoD maintains many unique capabilities for mitigating and

managing the consequences of terrorist attacks on American

soil. The Department must be prepared to provide support to

state and local authorities, if requested by the lead federal

agency. DoD is enhancing its anti-terrorism and force

protection programs. It is also increasing investment in

chemical and biological countermeasures, including personal

protection for DoD personnel. Moreover, DoD has established

Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, composed

of National Guard personnel and the Marine Corps' ChemicalBiological Incident Response Force. These teams stand ready to

provide support, if directed. To improve DoD's ability to

provide such support, the QDR calls for selected readiness

enhancements to the Army's Reserve Component. 

The continued proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles poses

a threat to U.S. territory, to U.S. forces abroad, at sea, and in

space, and to U.S. allies and friends. To counter this threat, the

United States is developing missile defenses as a matter of

priority. Integrating missile defenses with other defensive as

well as offensive means will safeguard the Nation's freedom of

action, enhance deterrence by denial, and mitigate the effects of

attack if deterrence fails. The ability to provide missile defenses

in anti-access and area-denial environments will be essential to

assure friends and allies, protect critical areas of access, and

defeat adversaries. DoD must be prepared to provide near-term

capabilities to defend against rapidly emerging threats and more

robust capabilities that evolve over time.

DoD has refocused and revitalized the missile defense program,

shifting from a single-site "national" missile defense approach to

a broad-based research, development, and testing effort aimed

at deployment of layered missile defenses. These changes in the

missile defense program will permit the exploration of many

previously untested technologies and approaches that will

produce defenses able to intercept missiles of various ranges

and in various phases of flight. These defenses will help protect

U.S. forward-deployed forces. Moreover, they will provide

limited defense against missile threats not only for the American

people, but also for U.S. friends and allies. 
2. Assure information systems in the face of attack and conduct

effective information operations.

Information operations provide the means to rapidly collect,

process, disseminate, and protect information while denying

these capabilities to adversaries. Such operations provide the

capability to influence perceptions, perform computer

network defense and attack missions, conduct electronic

warfare, and carry out other protective actions. Information

operations represent a critical capability enhancement for

transformed U.S. forces. 

The QDR highlights both the imperative for the United States to

maintain an unsurpassed capability to conduct information

operations, as well as the need to strengthen U.S. capabilities in

these areas. DoD must also develop an integrated approach to

developing information system requirements, acquiring

systems, and programming for the force of tomorrow. The

ability to conduct information operations has become a core

competency for the Department.

3. Project and sustain U.S. forces in distant anti-access and areadenial environments.

The defense strategy rests on the assumption that U.S. forces

have the ability to project power worldwide. The United States

must retain the capability to send well-armed and logistically

supported forces to critical points around the globe, even in the

face of enemy opposition, or to locations where the support

infrastructure is lacking or has collapsed. For U.S. forces to gain

the advantage in such situations, they must have the ability to

arrive quickly at non-traditional points of debarkation to mass

fire against an alerted enemy and to mask their own movements

to deceive the enemy and bypass its defenses. Consequently,

DoD must carefully monitor attempts by adversaries to develop

capabilities that could detect and attack U.S. forces as they

approach conflict areas or hold at risk critical ports and airbases

with missiles and CBRNE attacks. 

The QDR emphasizes the need for new investments that would

enable U.S. forces to defeat anti-access and area-denial threats

and to operate effectively in critical areas. Such investments

will include: addressing the growing threat posed by

submarines, air defense systems, cruise missiles, and mines;

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accelerating development of the Army Objective Force;

enhancing power projection and forcible entry capabilities;

defeating long-range means of detection; enabling long-range

attack capabilities; enhancing protection measures for strategic

transport aircraft; and ensuring U.S. forces can sustain

operations under chemical or biological attack.

4. Deny enemies sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance,

tracking, and rapid engagement.

Likely enemies of the United States and its allies will rely on

sanctuaries-such as remote terrain, hidden bunkers, or civilian

"shields" - for protection. The capability to find and strike

protected enemy forces while limiting collateral damage will

improve the deterrent power of the United States and give the

President increased options for response if deterrence fails.

Such a capability would not only reduce the likelihood of

aggression, but would offer the National Command Authorities

the ability to respond immediately in the event of hostilities. 

Achieving this objective will require investments in a wide

range of cross-Service programs. Investments in intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) initiatives must be

bolstered. Also emphasis must be placed on manned and

unmanned long-range precision strike assets, related initiatives

for new small munitions, and the ability to defeat hard and

deeply buried targets. 

DoD will accelerate the conversion of Trident submarines to

guided missile submarines. DoD will procure unmanned combat

aerial vehicles and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

unmanned aerial vehicles such as Global Hawk. The Department

will also increase procurement of precision weapons. 

Special Operations Forces will need the ability to conduct

covert deep insertions over great distances and will need

enhanced C4ISR capabilities to remain in contact with their

commanders and to ensure access to real-time intelligence in a

number of forms. These capabilities will enable Special

Operations Forces to access additional communication,

intelligence, and firepower assets in support of their missions

deep in hostile environments and to aid in the reduction of

friendly losses and casualties. These capabilities will also

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enhance the strategic and operational agility of Special

Operations Forces.

5. Enhance the capability and survivability of space systems.

Because many activities conducted in space are critical to

America's national security and economic well being, the ability

of the United States to access and utilize space is a vital national

security interest. During crisis or conflict, potential adversaries

may target U.S., allied, and commercial space assets as an

asymmetric means of countering or reducing U.S. military

operational effectiveness, intelligence capabilities, economic

and societal stability, and national will. Ensuring the freedom of

access to space and protecting U.S. national security interests in

space are priorities for the Department. 

The mission of space control is to ensure the freedom of action

in space for the United States and its allies and, when directed,

to deny such freedom of action to adversaries. As the

foundation for space control, space surveillance will receive

increased emphasis. DoD will pursue modernization of the

aging space surveillance infrastructure, enhance the command

and control structure, and evolve the system from a cataloging

and tracking capability to a system providing space situational

awareness.

In recognition of the high-technology force multipliers

provided by space systems, the QDR places increased emphasis

on developing the capabilities to conduct space operations.

Ensuring freedom of access to space and protecting U.S.

national security interests are key priorities that must be

reflected in future investment decisions. 

6. Leverage information technology and innovative concepts to

develop interoperable Joint C4ISR.

Information technology will provide a key foundation for the

effort to transform U.S. armed forces for the 21st century. The

recent U.S. experience in Kosovo underscored the need for

high-capacity, interoperable communications systems that can

rapidly transmit information over secure, jam-resistant datalinks

to support joint forces. In the near future, the United States
must also develop alternatives capable of overcoming current

and projected bandwidth constraints. The Department must

stay abreast of the new communications landscape and leverage

it to maximize U.S. advantages in this area. 

Future operations will not only be joint, but also include Reserve

Components, civilian specialists, and other federal agencies and

state organizations. Most likely they will involve a coalition effort

with other countries. The effectiveness of these operations will

depend upon the ability of DoD to share information and

collaborate externally as well as internally. Interoperability,

which enables joint and combined operations, is a key element in

all DoD operational and systems architectures. It must include

the ability to overcome language and cultural barriers.

Experience shows that fixing systems after the fact to achieve

interoperability is typically costly and often fails to satisfy mission

requirements and creates security problems. The better

approach is to incorporate interoperability at the outset in

designing new systems. However, the Department will continue

its efforts, where cost effective, to bring its legacy systems up to

interoperability standards.

Based on QDR deliberations, funding will be focused on

achieving end-to-end Command, Control, Communication,

Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

(C4ISR) capabilities. An integrated joint and combined C4ISR

capability is necessary to ensure that accurate and relevant

information can be gathered swiftly from various sources and

then securely transmitted to forces and their commanders.

Improving communications must be a priority for U.S.

conventional, special operations, and strategic forces.

Information technology offers U.S. forces the potential of

conducting joint operations more effectively, with smaller

forces and fewer weapon systems.

To achieve these operational goals, the Defense Department must

transform military training. Three basic tenets describe the changes the

Department will implement to transform training in parallel with the

transformation of its missions and forces:

■ Reverse the erosion of DoD's training range infrastructure and

ensure that ranges are sustainable, capable, and available;

■ Revise acquisition and logistics policies and procedures to

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emphasize training and the timeliness of fielding modern, fully

capable training systems; and

■ Use distributed learning technologies to reengineer individual

training and job performance.

Recapitalization of the Department's Legacy Forces

The Department of Defense is committed to transforming its forces to

meet future challenges. This transformation will be conducted in a timely

but prudent manner. In particular, prudence dictates that those legacy

forces critical to DoD's ability to defeat current threats must be sustained

as transformation occurs. Consequently, while emphasizing

transformation, DoD will also selectively recapitalize legacy forces. This

effort will be a challenge because recapitalization of all elements of U.S.

forces since the end of the Cold War has been delayed for so long. As the

force aged throughout the 1990s, few replacements were procured.

Without a significant effort to increase resources devoted to

recapitalization of weapons systems, the force structure will not only

continue to age but, perhaps more significantly, become operationally

and technologically obsolete.

The need to recapitalize is evident from the rising age of the current force

structure, particularly tactical aircraft. On average, the age of Air Force air

superiority aircraft now stands at almost 20 years, an unprecedented level.

The multi-role fleet will continue to age as well, with its average age

projected to reach 20 years in the coming decade. The situation with

other platforms, while not as dramatic as that of tactical aircraft, is also

problematic. Overall, there is an imperative need for recapitalization of

legacy systems by replacement, selected upgrade, and life extension.

Recognizing this imperative, the Department plans to pursue selective

upgrades to systems such as Abrams tanks, B-1 bombers, Navy ship selfdefense, and amphibious assault vehicles to sustain capabilities critical to

ensuring success in any near-term conflict.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

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DoD must overcome trends of the past to sustain a balanced defense

program that maintains near-term readiness without mortgaging the longterm capabilities of the force. To support this goal, DoD is committed to

identifying efficiencies and reductions in less relevant capabilities that can

free resources to be reinvested to accelerate the Department's

transformation efforts. The Military Departments and Defense Agencies

will identify significant, auditable savings to be reinvested in high-priority

transformation initiatives. 

In light of the markedly increased requirements associated with the

unfolding U.S. war against terrorism, prior estimates of available resources

for defense are no longer accurate. Before the September 2001 attacks,

DoD had planned for gradual increases in defense spending accompanied

by roughly corresponding increases in available resources realized

through internal efficiencies. At this juncture, the Defense Department is

developing new estimates of needed funding, in line with emerging, new

military requirements. At the same time, it is critical that DoD's efforts to

realize internal efficiencies not be relaxed, as any increased funding will

be urgently needed to meet the Nation's new defense demands.

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VI.

Revitalizing the DoD

Establishment

The need to transform America's military capability encompasses

more than strategy and force structure. Transformation applies not

just to what DoD does, but how DoD does it. During the same

period that the security environment shifted from a Cold War structure to

one of many and varied threats, the capabilities and productivity of

modern businesses changed fundamentally. The Department of Defense

has not kept pace with the changing business environment.

A transformed U.S. force must be matched by a support structure that is

equally agile, flexible, and innovative. It must be a structure in which each

of DoD's dedicated civilian and military members can apply their talents to

defend America - where they have the resources, information, tools,

training, and freedom to perform. 

Transforming DoD's outdated support structure is a key step in achieving

a more capable fighting force.

■ DoD maintains between 20 and 25 percent more facility

infrastructure than needed to support its forces - at an annual

excess cost of $3 to $4 billion.

■ DoD's financial systems are decades old and not well

interconnected, and accounting and auditing processes would

struggle to meet the standards of generally accepted accounting

principles.

■ DoD's business processes and regulations seem to be engineered

to prevent any mistake. By doing so, these regulations often

discourage taking any risk.

An infrastructure that needs to be streamlined to match the new reality,

financial systems that limit the ability to see and manage the enterprise,

and processes that discourage action and reasonable risk at the working

level are hallmarks of a mature enterprise that must be transformed. While

America's business have streamlined and adopted new business models to

react to fast-moving changes in markets and technologies, the Defense

Department has lagged behind without an overarching strategy to

improve its business practices.

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To redress this situation and lead the Defense Department's revitalization

process, the DoD has established the Senior Executive Council (SEC) led

by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and consisting of the Service

Secretaries, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,

Technology and Logistics. The SEC will steer the Defense Department

through what will be a challenging period of change. The Defense

Department has also created a Defense Business Practices

Implementation Board to tap outside expertise as the Department moves

to improve its business practices. 

To focus these efforts, the Defense Department will institute programs to

improve its performance in the following areas:

■ Encourage talent to enter and stay in the military and civilian

service; and

■ Modernize DoD business processes and infrastructure.

Encourage Talent to Enter and Stay in the Military

and Civilian Service

Skilled, talented, and motivated people are the foundation of a leaner,

more flexible support structure. Improving the skills of the existing

workforce and recruiting, retaining, training, and educating new people

must be a top priority. Many of the skills the Department needs are the

same ones most in demand in the private sector. The Department must

forge a new compact with its warfighters and those who support them -

one that honors their service, understands their needs, and encourages

them to make national defense a lifelong career. 

Accomplishing this management imperative will require strong

leadership and innovative thinking about how to attract, motivate, and

compensate the workforce. It will require new rules for hiring and

managing personnel. It will also require increased interaction with the

private sector to ensure that the flow of people and knowledge between

both sectors is enhanced.

Toward this end, DoD will develop a strategic human resources plan for

military and civilian personnel. This strategy will identify the tools necessary

to size and shape the military and civilian force to provide adequate numbers

of high-quality, skilled, and professionally developed people.

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In recognition of the changing demographics of DoD's military families

and the changes that will be initiated as a result of this review, DoD will

also review existing quality of life services and policies to guarantee that

they have kept pace with modern requirements. The Government also

needs to ensure that it fulfills its responsibility to fund quality programs

required to sustain the force. Further, the Department will address the

need to manage personnel tempo and improve military housing.

To create a world class health system, DoD has initiated a comprehensive

review of all Defense and Service health agencies, management activities,

and programs; and strengthened the TRICARE system to ensure better

management and accountability. A coordinated, integrated, and

adequately resourced health care system with an improved organizational

structure will ensure the availability of contingency medical capabilities

for active forces. It also will administer medical benefits to dependents

and retirees in order to meet the needs of the force and expectations of the

broader Service family. 

The need to attract, develop, and retain civilian personnel is just as

important. Many of the advances in private sector human resources

management have not been incorporated into the DoD civilian

personnel system. For civilian personnel, the human resources

approach will include:

■ Modernized recruiting techniques;

■ More flexible compensation approaches;

■ Enhanced training and knowledge management; and

■ Career planning and management tools.

Modernize DoD Business Processes

and Infrastructure

The Department of Defense must transform its business processes and

infrastructure to both enhance the capabilities and creativity of its

employees and free up resources to support warfighting and the

transformation of military capabilities.

To accomplish this, DoD's organizational structure will be streamlined and

flattened to take advantage of the opportunities that the rapid flow of data

and information present. As in business, entire functions need to be

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eliminated. Boundaries must be broken to accelerate change across the

entire organization, promote cooperation, share information and best

practices, and institutionalize change throughout the Department. In

both the organizational structure and the military culture, DoD must find

ways to encourage and reward innovation and risk-taking among fighting

forces as well as support personnel.

On the support side, the task is to remove layers that no longer provide

value added. To accomplish this, the Department will initiate efforts in

the following areas:

■ Streamline the overhead structure and flatten the organization;

■ Focus DoD "owned" resources on being excellent in those areas

that contribute directly to warfighting;

■ Modernize the DoD-wide approach to business information; and

■ Consolidate and modernize base infrastructure.

Streamline the overhead structure and flatten the organization.

The Department of Defense is committed to reducing all of its

headquarters staffs by 15 percent from FY1999 baseline as specified in

section 921(b) of the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act. DoD is

currently developing a plan to comply with this goal. In light of emerging,

new requirements associated with the U.S. war on terrorism, any savings

realized from such reductions would assist the Department in meeting

higher-priority needs.

The Department must also align, consolidate, or differentiate overlapping

functions of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Services, and the

Joint Staff. To do this, DoD will develop recommendations to eliminate

redundancy.

The military departments also are evaluating changes in their

headquarters structures to improve their ability to perform executive

functions at lower staffing levels. 

Two major institutional processes - the planning, programming and

budgeting system (PPBS) and the acquisition process - create a significant

amount of the self-imposed institutional work in the Department.

Simplifying these processes will support a streamlining of the entire

organization. The Department has already taken the first step by

conducting a concurrent program and budget review. DoD will explore

options to fully redesign the way it plans, programs, and budgets. DoD has

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already begun streamlining the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) process,

including reducing funding for acquisition-related studies and analyses by

10 percent and eliminating 31 of 72 acquisition-related advisory boards.

The goal throughout this set of initiatives is to reduce the complexity of

the Department of Defense, which has been driving the increase in the

relative size of the overhead structure. In fact, the goal will be to increase

measurably the tooth-to-tail ratio over the next five years. DoD will

measure success by comparing the headquarters personnel totals to

dollars spent on headquarters and headquarters personnel versus

warfighting forces.

Focus DoD "owned" resources on excellence in those areas that

contribute directly to warfighting. Only those functions that must be

performed by DoD should be kept by DoD. Any function that can be

provided by the private sector is not a core government function.

Traditionally, "core" has been very loosely and imprecisely defined and too

often used as a way of protecting existing arrangements.

Over the last several decades, most private sector corporations have

moved aggressively away from providing most of their own services.

Instead they have concentrated efforts on core functions and businesses,

while building alliances with suppliers for a vast range of products and

services not considered core to the value they can best add in the

economy. The Department has experimented with this business practice

with some success (e.g., providing vertical replenishment at sea, oilers

manned by civilians, or food and other services in forward deployed

areas). Aggressively pursuing this effort to improve productivity requires

a major change in the culture of the Department.

DoD will assess all its functions to separate core and non-core functions.

The test will be whether a function is directly necessary for warfighting.

The review will divide these functions into three broad categories:

■ Functions directly linked to warfighting and best performed by

the federal government. In these areas, DoD will invest in

process and technology to improve performance.

■ Functions indirectly linked to warfighting capability that must

be shared by the public and private sectors. In these areas, DoD

will seek to define new models of public-private partnerships to

improve performance.

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■ Functions not linked to warfighting and best performed by the

private sector. In these areas, DoD will seek to privatize or

outsource entire functions or define new mechanisms for

partnerships with private firms or other public agencies.

The Department has already taken steps to outsource and shed non-core

responsibilities, including the privatization of military housing and the

privatization of utility services for military installations. In addition, DoD

will create a small team to develop alternatives to the Agency or Field

Activity model that permits the Department to produce cross-DoD

outputs at a significantly lower cost.

Defense Agencies. Over time, the Defense Agencies have served to

consolidate functions common to the Services. This process has resulted

in better, more integrated outputs and has helped to modernize the

Department's business processes. To improve the business practices of

the Defense Agencies, DoD will begin a review of the Agencies to seek

efficiencies. Transformation roadmaps for Defense Agencies will be

developed keyed toward agencies planned contributions to helping DoD

meet the critical operations goals outlined earlier. 

Defense Working Capital Fund. DoD will develop a plan for improving the

effectiveness of the Defense Working Capital Fund. The fund was created

as a pricing mechanism for the military services to procure goods and

services from Defense Agencies. The notion of paying for outputs is right

minded. However, the Fund mechanism subsumes a number of elements

in its pricing mechanism (for example, the expected cost of mobilization),

which masks the peacetime cost of outputs.

Modernize the DoD-wide approach to business information.

Today's technology makes the accurate, timely flow of information

possible. Pushing this information down will enable decision-making at

the right level and will, in turn, support the flattening and streamlining of

the organization. DoD must keep its information, communication, and

other management technologies on a par with the best, proven

technologies available.

The Department's business activities include financial as well as nonfinancial operations and systems. Non-financial business operations and

systems include those that support the acquisition, medical, maintenance,

transportation, property, inventory, supply, and personnel communities.

However, the Department's financial and non-financial operations and

systems do not work together effectively to produce the most desirable

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business management information. Correcting this deficiency will

require a broad set of initiatives.

DoD will create a Department-wide blueprint (enterprise architecture)

that will prescribe how the Department's financial and non-financial

feeder systems and management processes will interact. This architecture

will guide the development of enterprise-level processes and systems

throughout DoD.

Regular periodic consultation with the U.S. Comptroller General has been

initiated to gain insight and support for improving the Defense

Department's financial processes. DoD will also continue to work with

Congress to better coordinate financial management oversight activities.

Consolidate and modernize DoD facility infrastructure.

Currently, DoD has 20 to 25 percent more facility structure than it needs

to support its forces. Due to budget constraints over the last decade,

much of that infrastructure has begun to age beyond acceptable levels.

Dollars that could be spent on more urgent transformation priorities are

being used to maintain installations that may no longer be needed.

To reduce waste and inefficiencies, facilities must be restructured to

support multi-Service missions. In July 2001, the Department announced

an Efficient Facilities Initiative (EFI). EFI will enable the U.S. military to

match facilities to forces, meet the threats and challenges of a new

century, and make the wisest use of limited defense dollars. EFI ensures

the primacy of military value in making decisions on facilities and

harnesses the strength and creativity of the private sector by creating

partnerships with local communities. All military installations will be

reviewed, and recommendations will be based on the military value of the

facilities and the structure of the force.

The EFI will encourage a cooperative effort between the President, the

Congress, and the military and local communities to achieve the most

effective and efficient base structure for America's Armed Forces. It will

give local communities a significant role in determining the future use of

facilities in their area by transferring closed installations to local

redevelopers at no cost (provided that proceeds are reinvested) and by

creating partnerships with local communities to own, operate, or

maintain those installations that remain.

Consolidating facilities will focus funds on facilities that are actually

needed and help to reduce the recapitalization rate of those that remain to

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a level closer to DoD's goal of 67 years. Consolidation will also save an

estimated $3.5 billion annually.

Compress the Supply Chain. American businesses have achieved some of

their greatest efficiencies and savings by reforming their supply chain

processes to remove steps, reduce inventories, and cut costs. By

scrubbing their warehousing, distribution, and order fulfillment

processes, they have cut out "non-value-added" steps. The Department

has made some recent advances in reducing inventories of common

consumable items and in promoting practices like direct vendor

deliveries. However, DoD still maintains large inventories that could be

substantially reduced by applying an array of supply chain practices. This

could include use of industrial partners responsible for life cycle support

of a weapon system or commodity item. DoD also incurs significant

overhead costs for functions that vendors could perform. PerformanceBased Logistics and modern business systems with appropriate metrics

can eliminate many of these non-value-added steps. DoD will implement

Performance-Based Logistics to compress the supply chain and improve

readiness for major weapons systems and commodities. 

Reduce Cycle Time. Every reduction in cycle time brings improvements in

efficiency and reductions in cost. Industry has figured out how to get their

average delivery time down to 24 to 48 hours; the government customer

should get the same or better from the government supplier. Private

sector benchmarks should set the standard for government providers,

whether the function is processing and paying a bill, moving a part from a

supply center or depot to a field unit, or making the transformation from

concept to employment.

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VII.

Managing Risks

Managing risk is a central element of the defense strategy. It

involves balancing the demands of the present against

preparations for the future consistent with the strategy's

priorities. It entails assuring allies and friends, deterring threats of

coercion and aggression, and, when necessary, defeating adversaries. It

involves maintaining military advantages and developing new military

competencies while dissuading future military competitors.

Over the past 60 years, the United States has spent an average of 8 percent

of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense; in 2001, 2.9 percent of

GDP was spent on defense. The tendency to reduce spending in periods

with no clear or well-defined threat has the potential effect of creating

risks by avoiding or delaying investment in the force. Consequently, an

assessment of the capabilities needed to counter both current and future

threats - across the spectrum of military challenges - must be included in

the Department's approach to assessing and mitigating risk.

A New Risk Framework

DoD has developed a new, broad approach to risk management. The new

risk framework ensures that the Defense establishment is sized, shaped,

postured, committed, and managed with a view toward accomplishing

the defense policy goals outlined in this report. 

This risk framework is made up of four related dimensions:

■ Force management - the ability to recruit, retain, train, and equip

sufficient numbers of quality personnel and sustain the readiness

of the force while accomplishing its many operational tasks; 

■ Operational - the ability to achieve military objectives in a nearterm conflict or other contingency;

■ Future challenges - the ability to invest in new capabilities and

develop new operational concepts needed to dissuade or defeat

mid- to long-term military challenges; and

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■ Institutional - the ability to develop management practices and

controls that use resources efficiently and promote the effective

operation of the Defense establishment.

This framework allows the Department to consider tradeoffs among

fundamental objectives and fundamental resource constraints, and it

reflects DoD's experiences over the last decade in attempting to balance

strategy, force structure, and resources. By assessing the Defense

establishment in these four areas, the Department is directly addressing

the issues associated with developing and assessing the operational force,

key enabling capabilities, and its supporting deployment and industrial

infrastructure.

Force Management Risks

DoD must always be able to meet its missions. It must deploy forces to

assure friends and deter potential adversaries; it must acquire new

capabilities to dissuade potential enemies from challenging U.S. interests;

and, if necessary, it must defeat foes in combat. All of these risks require

members of the military force to risk their lives at home and abroad for

extended periods of time.

However, the Department should not expect its people to tolerate

hardships caused by inequitable or inappropriate workloads within the

force, aging and unreliable equipment, poor operational practices, and

crumbling infrastructure. Consequently, this strategy requires explicit

measurement and control of force management risk.

As an illustration, the figure below depicts the number of active duty

military personnel deployed to various operations from November 1994

through December 2000. The figure shows large variations in the number

of personnel deployed during this period, which coincided with

substantial reductions in active-duty deployable forces. In addition, the use

of reserve forces increased from eight million to 12 million man-days per

year. The bulk of the deployment burden during this time was not spread

among the entire force, due in part to the belief that the deployments were

temporary and that permanent changes in rotational procedures and

forward presence were not required. Prior to the end of 1994, the

Department did not even collect data at the Joint level on the number of

deployed personnel. DoD must better control this turbulence and manage

its effects.

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U.S. military involvement in operations throughout the 1990s revealed

substantial shortages of certain types of forces. In response to these

shortages, the Department instituted force management mechanisms.

These included the Global Naval Forces Presence Policy (GNFPP) to

allocate the peacetime presence of naval assets across warfighting

theaters and the Global Military Force Policy (GMFP) to manage demand

for LD/HD assets, such as key surveillance and reconnaissance platforms.

DoD will seek to expand these policies by developing a Joint Presence

Policy. 

Mitigating Force Management Risks: Tempo Standards and

Rotational Base. DoD can no longer solely rely on such "lagging"

indicators as retention and recruiting rates to detect personnel problems;

by the time those indicators highlight a problem, it is too late. Nor can

DoD delay necessary action to address growing force management risk

due to high personnel tempo. 

Toward these ends, DoD has committed to developing realistic tempo

standards and limitations to control explicitly the amount of time DoD

personnel are deployed away from home station or stationed outside the

United States. These standards will help the Department maintain

personnel tempo at acceptable peacetime levels. More importantly, DoD

has made the overseas posture of U.S. military forces a principal

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component of force design. The QDR analyzed the relationships between

forward-stationed and rotational forces. As a result, DoD is developing

more effective ways to compute the required "rotational base" across

various types of forces to support forward posture. DoD will also

implement a Joint Presence Policy to ensure that all elements of the force

are considered in the development of rotational presence requirements.

Adopting these principles for force design and management should

greatly decrease force management risk.

Operational Risks

DoD's new force planning approach recognizes the need to size U.S.

military forces not only for the most demanding near-term warfighting

tasks, but also for a plausible set of other near-term contingencies,

including small-scale contingencies. Consequently, all measurements of

operational risk will reflect the full range of capabilities U.S. forces must

possess and missions that U.S. forces must perform.

In the past, major elements of the forces were designed and evaluated

against a narrow set of military missions and associated tasks. With a

wider set of missions and tasks, the measurement of operational risk will

consider both the missions that forces were designed to accomplish, and

those that they are currently assigned to conduct. 

Mitigating Operational Risks: Force Structure Priorities, Forward

Posture, and New Readiness Measurements. The QDR has developed a

broader approach to operational risk that involves assessing the

Department's ability to perform the following:

■ Defend the United States;

■ Deter forward in critical areas;

■ Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts; and

■ Conduct a limited number of small-scale contingencies.

Promoting the defense of the United States to the top priority restores its

primacy and better allows the Department to focus and prioritize its

efforts to mitigate operational risk. 

This approach requires analysis of a broader range of contingencies to

determine operational risk than the Department has traditionally

analyzed. While instituting such an approach to operational risk

management requires a considerable expansion of DoD's previous

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process, it directly addresses the importance of assessing the force's

adequacy for a wider range of near-term operations. To this end, DoD will

undertake a comprehensive re-engineering of its current readiness

reporting system. The new system will allow measurement of the

adequacy of the force to accomplish all its assigned missions, not just

major combat operations. Such a system will also help the Department

identify - and transform - force elements that are less relevant to the full

spectrum of missions and tasks.

Planning for a wider range of contingencies affects recent assessments

conducted by the Department. In particular, a major study of the size and

shape of the Department's airlift, sealift, and pre-positioned equipment

was completed in FY2000, but was based on the previous defense

strategy. The mix of new threats and missions that DoD will consider in

the near- to mid-term requires the Department to reevaluate this study in

detail and adjust the results as necessary.

Finally, rather than equating risk mitigation with additional force

structure, the new strategy calls for assessing changes in capabilities,

concepts of operations, and organizational designs to help reduce risk.

For instance, contingencies involving adversaries armed with CBRNE

weapons, as well as ballistic missiles and artillery to deliver them, impose

high risks for U.S. and allied militaries regardless of the size of the force

amassed against them. In those instances, risk mitigation is more

dependent on the decisions taken to pursue offensive and defensive

systems and to develop new concepts of operations to deal with those

threats than on increases in force structure.

Future Challenges Risks

Despite the strains on U.S. military forces during the past decade, the U.S.

military has conducted its operations superbly. Nonetheless, the United

States cannot take its recent successes for granted or mistakenly assume

that no other nation or group will seek to challenge the United States in

the future. The attacks of September 2001 demonstrate that the risks of

future challenges are a permanent feature of the international system.

While the United States cannot predict with confidence which adversaries

will pose threats in the future, the types of military capabilities that will be

used to challenge U.S. interests and U.S. military forces can be identified

and understood. As in the September terror attacks in New York and

Washington, future adversaries will seek to avoid U.S. strengths and attack

U.S. vulnerabilities, using asymmetric approaches such as terrorism,

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information operations, and ballistic and cruise missile attacks. The

President has directed the Department to transform to meet such

emerging challenges. As discussed earlier, DoD has identified critical

operational goals to focus the Department's transformation on such

priority areas.

Assessing future challenges risk provides a measure of the ability to meet

the transformational challenges described above in the mid-term and

longer-term. It also recognizes that the desired capabilities and missions

for the Armed Forces will change over time, and it provides a bridge to the

future by institutionalizing the shift from a threat-based to capabilitiesbased paradigm. It provides a way to monitor how DoD balances the

needs to preserve long-term military preeminence and address shortterm priorities.

Future challenges risk not only addresses possible future threats, but also

the ability to meet critical transformational challenges. For example, the

decision not to pursue a new technology due to the lack of a current

threat entails risk: introducing it early provides a military advantage for a

time, and it may dissuade any potential adversary from pursuing

similar capabilities.

Mitigating Future Challenge Risks: Experimentation, R&D, and

Selective Procurement. Achieving DoD's strategic goals mandates

embarking on the long-term transformation of U.S. military capabilities. It

requires a substantial investment in explicit searches for new and

improved capabilities. These capabilities may derive from innovative

operational concepts, advanced systems, new organizational

arrangements, and enhanced training. To achieve these ends, DoD will

expand experimentation efforts under the leadership of Joint Forces

Command. The Department will experiment with new forces and

organizations - including new joint task force organizations - to address

those operational challenges identified previously. In particular, the

possible establishment of a Joint National Training Center, a space test

range, and a Joint "opposing force" for training are intended to help

mitigate future challenges risk via expanded experimentation.

Complementing this focus on experimentation will be a new DoD

emphasis on concept development - that is, new ways to use existing and

proposed forces. One advantage of the transition to Standing Joint Task

Force organizations is an ability to provide more opportunities for joint

and combined experiments and exercises, both to discover existing

weaknesses and exploit emerging opportunities.

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The Department also recognizes the value of stable investment in science

and technology to identify new defense technologies. DoD plans to

stabilize investment in science and technology at three percent of the

defense budget for FY03-07.

The Department plans to reduce the time required to introduce new

concepts and systems into the fielded force. The time between design and

deployment for major DoD systems has doubled since 1975. Some of the

delay can be attributed to the custom of making decisions program by

program, rather than mission area by mission area. This practice leads to

mere substitution of new weapons for existing ones, rather than a

broader, system-level transformation. DoD's new approach will serve to

hasten and integrate decision processes, as DoD plans to make selective

procurement decisions within the transformation framework described

by this report. Thus, the Department will reduce future challenges risk by

assessing the contributions of combinations of options in each

transformation area.

The Department has already committed to many transformation

initiatives, as discussed in Section V. Initiatives in counterterrorism,

missile defense, advanced weapons, and information operations are

examples of programs that are underway to reduce future challenges risk.

Institutional Risks

The final dimension of risk is aimed at making the best use of the

Department's resources in the day-to-day operations of the Defense

establishment. By formally addressing institutional risk, the Department

aims to maximize the efficient use of defense expenditures to sustain longterm public support for the Nation's defense needs. To manage DoD

efficiently, the Defense establishment needs to be transformed - how it

operates internally, how it deals with its industrial suppliers, and how it

interacts with the Congress. Currently, DoD leaders manage under a set of

controls that do not allow them to operate with the freedom necessary to

transform the force. DoD recognizes that it must explicitly reduce these

institutional risks to better manage the Defense establishment.

Mitigating Institutional Risk: Changes in DoD Operating Practices.

One of the primary objectives in reducing institutional risk is the

restoration of vitality in the Defense establishment. In particular, the

military and civilian personnel systems merit serious examination.

Consequently, DoD will develop a strategic human resources plan to help

size and shape the Department's personnel for the new strategy. This plan

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will not only examine ways to ensure that DoD personnel have the

necessary critical skills, but it will also examine the balance of personnel

and work among the active, reserve, and civilian workforces.

DoD will work to achieve a transformation in business practices, with a

particular emphasis on financial management. It will develop a new

financial management architecture to guide the modernization of

these practices.

DoD has also committed to a substantial streamlining and upgrading of its

infrastructure. The Department needs another round of infrastructure

reductions to reduce unneeded facilities. DoD has adopted a goal of

achieving a 67-year recapitalization rate for 80 percent of current

infrastructure by 2010, as specified in the Efficient Facilities Initiative.

Currently, DoD recapitalization rates average 192 years.

In addition to the longer-term initiatives listed above, the Department is

taking steps to reduce institutional risk immediately. An important

managerial change is the establishment of the Senior Executive Council

(SEC), which will conduct a comprehensive review of the Defense

Agencies. In addition, the Department has already begun streamlining the

processes associated with the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) and the

Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), as discussed in

Section VI.

Mitigating Risks Across the Spectrum

These four dimensions of risk cannot be assessed and managed

independently. As noted previously, increasing near-term risk in one area,

such as force management risk, would most likely affect another area,

such as operational risk. Maintaining a strategy-driven balance among the

four dimensions of risk is essential, and that balance must be sustained

and, where necessary, adapted over time.

Adopting this risk framework is not the end but just the beginning of the

Department's effort to assess and manage risk. DoD has practiced risk

management in the past, but by specifying this new strategy-driven risk

management framework, the Department has begun to develop a

management tool that will enable greater focus on the implementation of

the QDR defense program. DoD has already committed to the risk

mitigation steps discussed above to reduce risk in areas that have been

well documented. The broader commitment to measure and balance risk

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using this framework requires extensive revisions to the readiness

measurement system and development of new mechanisms to address the

other risks. When implemented, these mechanisms will provide the

needed assessments across all dimensions of risk.

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VIII.

Statement of the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Introduction. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) faced two

challenging tasks. First, it had to address significant concerns regarding

the near-term ability of the force to protect and advance U.S. interests

worldwide in a dangerous and evolving security environment. Second, it

had to implement the President's goal of transforming the Armed Forces to

meet future security challenges. In my view, the defense strategy and

program recommendations contained in the QDR report are a major step

toward accomplishing these two tasks, while balancing the associated

near-, mid-, and long-term risks.

Over the past decade, our response to the strategic environment has

placed a wide range of demands on the U.S. military. Increases in missions

and requirements coupled with decreases in structure and procurement

have stretched elements of the force and resulted in imbalance between

strategy, force structure, and resources. Against this backdrop, on

September 11, 2001, enemies of the U.S. demonstrated the capability to

carry out large-scale, non-conventional attacks against the U.S. homeland;

asymmetric attack against the sovereignty of the U.S. became a reality.

While the QDR sets the broad direction for transforming to meet the

defense demands of the future, there remains a need for a more

comprehensive roadmap that will sustain the tenuous balance between

strategy and resources.

Assessment of the QDR. In my view the defense strategy outlined in the

QDR 2001 - if matched with resources over time - will adequately address

the current and emerging challenges of the strategic environment. The

goals of the strategy recognize that the military will continue to generate

forces to conduct a wide range of missions for the foreseeable future.

Particularly noteworthy, the QDR calls for the capability to respond to

overlapping major crises and defeat adversaries or their efforts in more

than one region. In my view, maintaining a credible military capacity to

respond to multiple crises worldwide is absolutely fundamental to

America's global leadership role.

The broad range of military requirements identified in the QDR lays the

foundation for determining the size and structure of the force. The

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recommendations of the review are the starting point for determining

how best to organize, man, train and equip the Total Force. An initial look

at the force structure indicates the current force is capable of executing

the new defense strategy with moderate risk. Considerably more

warfighting analysis on a range of scenarios must be done, however, to

confirm this initial assessment.

First and foremost, end strength sufficient to meet strategic requirements

at a sustainable OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO must be maintained, or our

greatest military asset - quality people - will be placed at risk. I believe that

sustaining an end strength and force structure capable of executing the

new defense strategy at moderate risk will be a significant challenge. The

Services must balance limited resources between the significant QDR

transformation and quality of life priorities and the competing

requirements for operations and maintenance, recapitalization, and

modernization beginning with their FY03 budgets. Of particular concern

are rapidly aging weapon systems. While we have successfully raised

annual procurement spending to the $60 billion level, some estimates

point to spending $100 to $110 billion per year to sustain today's force

structure and arrest the aging problem. If this requirement is met by

diverting resources from current operations accounts, then near-term

and, eventually mid-term, military risk will increase.

The QDR set priorities and identifies major goals for transforming the

Armed Forces of the United States to meet future challenges. It calls for

new operational concepts, advanced technological capabilities, and an

increased emphasis on joint organizations, experimentation, and training.

If truly dramatic improvement in future joint operational effectiveness is

to be achieved; however, more is required. First, a DOD-wide

transformation strategy, a joint organizing vision, and a joint

transformation roadmap are essential to guide, integrate, and synchronize

the efforts of the Services. Second, we need DOD-wide reform of key

institutional planning, programming, budgeting, and acquisition

processes. These two requirements are interdependent; no real progress

will be made in one without the other. Further, throughout the

transformation period, we still require forces to meet the needs of the

Nation; for this we will continue to rely on the current force, as we are

today as we begin the campaign against terrorism. We must acknowledge

and plan for the impact that aggressive transformation and

experimentation could have on the near- and mid-term ability of the force

to execute actual peacetime and warfighting missions. Units undergoing

transformation, and those involved in experimentation, may not be

available or ready to respond to crises within required operational

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timelines. None of this is to suggest that transformation should be slowed;

we must not let the demands of today overwhelm the necessity to prepare

for the future.

The QDR states that defense of the U.S. homeland is the highest priority

for the U.S. military; this was painfully reinforced on September 11th. The

U.S. must deter, preempt, and defend against aggression targeted at U.S.

territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and critical infrastructure, as

well as manage the consequences of such aggression and other domestic

emergencies. Defending the U.S. homeland requires a comprehensive

strategy beginning with fixing responsibility for integrating all related

activities. President Bush's establishment of the Office of Homeland

Security is being paralleled within DOD. As a start, an integrated DOD

Homeland Security working group can identify HLS roles and mission for

DOD and examine resource implications. Further analysis and interaction

with the Office of Homeland Security is required to strengthen ties

between federal, state and local agencies to combat terrorism in the

United States. This analysis is leading to important changes in the Unified

Command Plan.

Additional work beyond the QDR is required in several areas. First, the

role of the Reserve Components - critical to the execution of the strategy -

demands attention and will lead to decisions on Reserve and Guard

readiness, transformation, and civilian employer support, as well as the

basics of end strength and structure.

Logistics capabilities - including strategic mobility, sustainment, and the

repair and reengineering of our infrastructure - remain immediate

concerns. A comprehensive analysis of all requirements must be

completed and appropriate priority of resources established. As for

strategic lift, we must aggressively achieve the capabilities called for in the

Mobility Requirements Study 2005, as a minimum. Further, we must

accelerate the restoration, modernization, and replacement of our

mission-essential and quality-of-life facilities, even as we seek authority to

eliminate excess infrastructure. These near-, mid-, and long-term logistics

needs have significant implications for all levels of risk and must be given

appropriate attention.

People remain our most critical asset. The QDR is a good starting point for

the transformation of the Department's human resource systems.

Although we have a highly trained professional military and civilian

workforce today, we need to continue to fund quality of life initiatives,

such as health care, pay parity and improved housing, to sustain the

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quality force required in the future. More analysis is required to determine

how we will continue to recruit and retain the force.

Assessment of Risk. Analytical tools such as Dynamic Commitment and

Positive Match wargames indicate that the QDR reduces the strategy-tostructure imbalance and results in moderate near-term risk for the current

force executing the revised strategy. This assessment includes the most

demanding scenario where U.S. forces respond to two overlapping major

crises in different regions, decisively defeating one adversary while

defeating the efforts of the other.

Over time the full implications of the QDR will emerge. The ability of the

force to field transformed capabilities, while continuing to protect and

advance U.S. world-wide interests in the near- and mid-term, will be more

accurately assessed as joint and Service transformation roadmaps are

developed. Finally, force structure, budget, and infrastructure impacts

will become clearer as the Services complete their FY03 budgets and

Program Objective Memoranda.

Summary. The Services, Combatant Commanders and Joint Staff have

worked with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to ensure that this

QDR is founded on strategic requirements. The QDR provides a vision for

how our forces will be employed now and into the future. Further, the

QDR moves DOD toward balance in two key dimensions: between

strategy and force structure, and between the demands of today and those

of the future. Sustaining this balance is essential to ensuring that U.S.

Armed Forces remain preeminent now and well into the 21st Century. 

HENRY H. SHELTON

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Appendix A:

Government Performance and

Results Act of 1993

This QDR Report serves as the overall strategic planning document of

the Department, as required by Public Law 103-62. Section III,

"Defense Strategy," gives the Department's comprehensive mission

statement. General goals are covered in Section II, under "U.S. Interests and

Objectives." The Department's general policy objectives are to (1) assure

allies and friends; (2) dissuade future military competition, (3) deter threats

and coercion against U.S. interests, and (4) if deterrence fails, decisively

defeat any adversary. These goals are also discussed in Section II.

The Department's risk framework of mitigating (1) force management

risk, (2) operational risks, (3) future challenges risk, and (4) institutional

risks, are described in Section VII, along with a variety of management

initiatives for these areas. These risk areas will form the basis for the

Department's annual performance goals under the Government

Performance and Results Act. 

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