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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

AARON BRUNSON, : No. 52 EDA 2017

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, July 22, 2016,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0004492-2015

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OTT, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 15, 2019

Aaron Brunson appeals from the July 22, 2016 judgment of sentence 

entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County following his 

conviction of burglary, robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and 

aggravated assault.1 After careful review, we remand with instructions.

On May 20, 2016, a jury convicted appellant of the aforementioned 

crimes. The trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate sentence of 

25-50 years’ imprisonment. During the sentencing hearing, appellant’s trial 

counsel, Joseph Santaguida, Esq., provided appellant with his post-sentence 

rights as follows:

You’ve now been sentenced by the [trial court] to 

25-50 years. You have 10 days from today to ask 

the judge to reconsider. You have 30 days from 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3502(a), 3701(a), 903(a), and 2702(a), respectively.
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today to take an appeal to the Superior Court, which 

we will do.

If you can’t afford going to the appellate court, 

they’re going to appoint counsel for you.

Notes of testimony, 7/22/16 at 17-18.

The following day, appellant filed a pro se post-sentence motion. The 

trial court denied appellant’s post-sentence motion by operation of law 

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 720 on November 21, 2016. Appellant filed a 

pro se notice of appeal on December 14, 2016. On January 13, 2017, the 

trial court appointed Donald Bermudez, Esq., to represent appellant.

On January 23, 2017, the trial court ordered appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Appellant timely complied on February 13, 2017. On June 12, 2018, the trial 

court filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

We must first determine whether appellant’s appeal is properly before 

us. The Commonwealth contends that appellant’s appeal should be quashed 

as untimely filed because appellant filed a pro se post-sentence motion 

while he was still represented by counsel, thus rendering the post-sentence 

motion to be a legal nullity. (Commonwealth’s brief at 13.) Therefore, the 

Commonwealth argues that appellant’s notice of appeal was not timely filed. 

(Id.)

It is well settled that hybrid representation is not permitted in this 

Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Williams, 151 A.3d 621, 623 
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(Pa.Super. 2016). A pro se filing of post-sentence motions by a litigant 

represented by counsel is considered a legal nullity. Commonwealth v. 

Nischan, 928 A.2d 349, 355 (Pa.Super. 2007), citing Commonwealth v. 

Piscanio, 608 A.2d 1027, 1029 n.3 (Pa. 1992). 

Our cases have recognized an exception to the rule against hybrid 

representation. Indeed, this court recognized that in cases where a 

defendant is effectively abandoned by his counsel and the trial court fails to 

appoint new counsel in a timely manner, a defendant’s pro se filing while 

still represented by counsel “does not offend considerations of hybrid 

representation.” Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 79 

(Pa.Super. 2015). In Leatherby, the defendant could no longer afford his 

counsel’s services, and his counsel requested that the trial court appoint new 

counsel. Id. During the sentencing hearing, however, counsel asked the 

defendant if the defendant would like either counsel or his 

yet-to-be-appointed counsel to file a post-sentence motion on his behalf, 

and the defendant answered in the affirmative. Id. The defendant also 

indicated that he requested counsel and his yet-to-be-appointed counsel to 

perfect the appeal and file a notice of appeal with the Superior Court. Id. 

Finally, counsel made the following statement: “Just so [we] are clear. 

Judge, with that on the record again, what I will do is perfect his 

post-sentencing appeal before Your Honor and file that motion in 

Mr. Leatherby’s name. But again, I would ask the court-appointed attorney 
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to handle that matter.” Id. (citations to the record and emphasis omitted). 

Seven days later, the defendant filed a pro se post-sentence motion in order 

to protect his rights. Id.

The record reflects that Attorney Santaguida never filed a motion to 

withdraw, nor did he make an oral motion to withdraw in open court in the 

presence of appellant pursuant to Rule 120 of the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Criminal Procedure. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 120(A)(4); (B)(1)-(2). Unlike in 

Leatherby, Attorney Santaguida did not make a request on the record to 

have newly court-appointed counsel file appellant’s post-sentence motion 

and/or notice of appeal. We, therefore, remand for the trial court to hold an 

evidentiary hearing to determine whether Attorney Santaguida had 

effectively abandoned appellant, thereby necessitating appellant’s filing of a 

pro se post-sentence motion in order to preserve his appellant rights. The 

trial court shall make a determination of record within 90 days of the filing of 

this memorandum.

Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction retained.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/15/19