J-S59017-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.

v.

THOMAS E. DOUGHTY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1169 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered March 12, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 

2014-02037-RC

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 10, 2018

Thomas E. Doughty appeals, pro se, from the order, entered in the Court 

of Common Pleas of Chester County, denying his petition to set aside a 

sheriff’s sale. Upon review, we affirm.

The trial court set forth the factual and procedural history of this matter 

as follows:

On July 12, 2007, [Doughty] executed and delivered a mortgage 

on 872 Spring City Road, Phoenixville, Pennsylvania (“Property”) 

to Well[s] Fargo Bank, NA (“Bank”) in the amount of $184,500 

(“Mortgage”). The Mortgage was recorded on July 20, 2007. 

[Doughty] also executed a promissory note agreeing to repay the 

loan on a monthly basis. [Doughty] defaulted under the terms of 

the Mortgage by failing to make payments due October 1, 2013 

and each month thereafter.

On March 13, 2014, the Bank commenced this foreclosure action. 

[Doughty] was duly served and pleadings closed on or about 

October 20, 2015. On August 19, 2016, summary judgment was 

entered in favor of the Bank in the amount of $199,577.64. 

[Doughty] sought reconsideration, which was granted to review 
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documents [Doughty] submitted, but summary judgment was 

then reinstated by order dated December 22, 2016. 

The Property was sold a sheriff’s sale on September 21, 2017 to 

the attorney on the writ.

On November 22, 2017, [Doughty] filed a suggestion of 

bankruptcy. 

On December 19, 2017, [Doughty] filed a document titled 

“Emergency Petition to Reverse the Sale of Defendant’s Property 

and to Deny Confirmation of Title and Notice of Filing Complaint 

Case in the United States District Court of Pennsylvania.” The 

petition was two pages long and sought relief, specifically a stay, 

based on the pendency of a newly filed action in the United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania at No. 17-

5018. A copy of [Doughty’s] filing with the Eastern District was 

attached. 

On January 8, 2018, [Doughty] was directed to provide a rationale 

for the court to act on his emergency petition given the automatic 

bankruptcy stay. It was determined that the action was not 

stayed because of the frequency of [Doughty’s] bankruptcy filings.

A rule order was entered to dispose of the emergency petition. 

The Bank filed an answer and memorandum of law. [Doughty] 

filed multiple documents in support of his emergency petition. A 

hearing was held on March 9, 2018, at which [Doughty] failed to 

submit any evidence[,] relying instead on the documents he had 

filed. Three days later the order that is now on appeal was 

entered.

The sheriff’s deed was recorded on April 4, 2018.

Trial Court Opinion, at 1-2.

Doughty filed a timely notice of appeal on April 10, 2018, followed by a 

court-ordered statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Doughty raises the following claims for our review:

[1.] Did the [c]ourt of [c]ommon [p]leas err in not addressing 

[the] claim that Wells Fargo was not the holder of the Note at the 

time the complaint was filed and therefore not entitled to enforce 

the Note?
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[2.] Did the [c]ourt of [c]ommon [p]leas err in not addressing the 

claim that [Wells Fargo] was not the real party in interest and 

therefore [Wells Fargo] improperly invoked the jurisdiction of the 

[c]ourt?

[3.] Did the [c]ourt of [c]ommon [p]leas err in not addressing the 

claim that an order issued by a court without jurisdiction is void 

ab initio?

Brief of Appellant, at 2-3.

“When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a petition to set aside a sheriff’s 

sale, it is recognized that the trial court’s ruling is one of discretion, thus a 

ruling will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear demonstration of an abuse 

of that discretion.” Provident Nat. Bank, N.A. v. Song, 832 A.2d 1077, 

1081 (Pa. Super. 2003), citing Blue Ball National Bank v. Balmer, 810 A.2d 

164, 167 (Pa. Super. 2002).

The purpose of a sheriff’s sale in mortgage foreclosure 

proceedings is to realize out of the land, the debt, interest, and 

costs which are due, or have accrued to, the judgment creditor. 

Kaib v. Smith, [ ] 684 A.2d 630 ([Pa. Super.] 1996). A sale may 

be set aside upon petition of an interested party where “upon 

proper cause shown” the court deems it “just and proper under 

the circumstances.” Pa.R.C.P. 3132. The burden of proving 

circumstances warranting the exercise of the court’s equitable 

powers is on the petitioner. Bornman v. Gordon, [ ] 527 A.2d 

109, 111 ([Pa. Super.] 1987). Courts have entertained petitions 

and granted relief where the validity of sale proceedings is 

challenged, or a deficiency pertaining to the notice of sale exists 

or where misconduct occurs in the bidding process. National 

Penn Bank v. Shaffer, [ ] 672 A.2d 326 ([Pa. Super.] 1996). 

Song, 832 A.2d at 1081, quoting Balmer, 810 A.2d at 166-67. The burden 

of proof rests upon the petitioner to demonstrate by clear and convincing 

evidence that the circumstances warrant relief. Jefferson Bank v. Newton 

Associates, 686 A.2d 834, 838 (Pa. Super. 1996).
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In his petition to set aside the sheriff’s sale, Doughty did not present to 

the trial court any claims relating to the circumstances of the sale itself, i.e. 

lack of notice, insufficient sales price. See Song, 832 A.2d at 1081 (courts 

have granted relief from sheriff’s sale where validity of sale proceedings is 

challenged, or deficiency pertaining to notice of sale exists or where 

misconduct occurs in bidding process). Rather, Doughty sought relief based 

on the fact that he had filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court,1 and asked 

that the sale be “reversed” pending a determination in the federal matter. 

However, Doughty’s federal complaint was grounded in the very same claims 

he raised in defense of Wells Fargo’s underlying state court foreclosure action, 

which the court ultimately found to be lacking merit.2 See Defendant’s 

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1 Although the copy of the federal complaint attached to Doughty’s emergency 

petition was not time-stamped, his signature thereon is dated November 6, 

2017. 

2 To the extent that Doughty attempts to raise on appeal a new claim that the 

trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the foreclosure matter, he is entitled to 

no relief. Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction are non-waivable and may 

be raised by the parties, or the court sua sponte, at any time. Robert Half 

Int'l, Inc. v. Marlton Techs., Inc., 902 A.2d 519, 525 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) 

(en banc). However, in his brief, Doughty bases his jurisdictional argument 

on his assertion that Wells Fargo lacked standing to pursue the foreclosure 

action. In doing so, Doughty conflates the concepts of “standing” and 

“jurisdiction.” “[T]he doctrine of standing is a prudential, judicially created 

principle designed to winnow out litigants who have no direct interest in a 

judicial matter. For standing to exist, the underlying controversy must be real

and concrete, such that the party initiating the legal action has, in fact, been 

aggrieved.” Grimm v. Grimm, 149 A.3d 77, 83 (Pa. Super. 2016) (ellipses

and citation omitted). In Pennsylvania, “[w]hether a party has standing to 

maintain an action is not a jurisdictional question.” In re Adoption of 

Z.S.H.G., 34 A.3d 1283, 1289 (Pa. Super. 2011) (per curiam) (internal 
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Objection to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 5/9/16 (raising issues 

relating to standing and possession and ownership of note). As such,

Doughty’s petition was clearly an attempt to obtain relief from the sheriff’s 

sale while he sought a “second bite at the apple” in federal court. However, 

it is apparent that Doughty’s federal claims were barred by the doctrine of 

collateral estoppel. 

The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue 

determined in a previous action where: 

(1) the issue decided in the prior case is identical to the one 

presented in the later action; (2) there was a final adjudication on 

the merits; (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted was a 

party or in privity with a party in the prior case; (4) the party or 

person privy to the party against whom the doctrine is asserted 

had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior 

proceeding; and (5) the determination in the prior proceeding was 

essential to the judgment. 

Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kiesewetter, 889 A.2d 47, 50–51 (Pa. 

2005), quoting Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Duffield, 644 A.2d 1186, 

1189 (Pa. 1994). 

Here, in deciding Wells Fargo’s summary judgment motion, the trial 

court addressed the same issues that form the basis Doughty’s claims in 

federal court, i.e., lack of standing and possession/ownership of the note. In 

rejecting Doughty’s defense, the court necessarily determined that Wells 

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quotation marks and citation omitted). It is beyond cavil that the courts of 

common pleas of this Commonwealth possess subject matter jurisdiction over 

mortgage foreclosure proceedings. 
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Fargo had standing and possessed the note. Second, the trial court’s grant of 

summary judgment, which Doughty did not appeal, constituted a final 

adjudication on the merits. See Cigna Corp. v. Executive Risk Indem., 

Inc., 111 A.3d 204, 214 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“A judgment is deemed final for 

purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel unless or until it is reversed on 

appeal.”). Third, Doughty was a party to the state court foreclosure 

proceeding. Fourth, Doughty had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the

issues. Finally, because Wells Fargo could not proceed with the foreclosure 

without standing, the trial court’s determination was central to the final 

judgment.3

Because the only basis of Doughty’s petition to set aside the sheriff’s 

sale was the existence of a federal lawsuit, which we have concluded was 

barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel,4 Doughty did not satisfy his 

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3 We note that the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

reached the same conclusion and dismissed Doughty’s complaint. See 

Doughty v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2018 WL 1784159, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 

13, 2018). 

4 The trial court concluded that Doughty’s claims were barred by the doctrine 

of res judicata. Collateral estoppel (also known as “issue preclusion”) is 

closely related to res judicata, but possesses certain distinctions. The doctrine 

of res judicata bars any future suit on the same cause of action between the 

same parties and requires that both the former and latter suits possess the 

following common elements: (1) identity in the thing sued upon; (2) identity 

in the cause of action; (3) identity of persons and parties to the action; and 

(4) identity of the capacity of the parties suing or being sued. Chada v. 

Chada, 756 A.2d 39, 42-43 (Pa. Super. 2000). As set forth above, collateral 

estoppel does not require identity of causes of action or parties. Id. Here, 

while the issues Doughty raised in state and federal court are identical, the 
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burden of proving circumstances warranting the exercise of the court’s 

equitable powers. Song, supra. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying his petition to set aside the sheriff’s sale. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/10/18

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causes of action are not. Accordingly, collateral estoppel, rather than res 

judicata, applies. However, we may affirm the trial court’s order on any basis 

if the result is correct. Greenberg v. McGraw, 161 A.3d 976, 989 n.12 (Pa. 

Super. 2017).