alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Bickley *v.*Sherrod.

*Assumpsit.*

(Decided Feb. 6, 1912.

57 South. 1013.)

1. *Bills of Exceptions; Construction.*— Bills of exceptions are construed most strongly against the exceptor. ■ •

2. *Appeal and Error; Presumptions.*— Error is never presumed but. must be affirmatively shown on appeal.

3. *Same; Absence of Evidence.*— Where it is not shown that the bill of exceptions contains all the evidence, and in the absence of a contrary showing from the record, this court will presume that the trial court was justified in giving the affirmative charge from evidence in the case not shown by the record.

Appeal from Colbert Circuit Court.

Heard before Hon. A. H. Alston.

Assumpsit by B. W. Sherrod against E. L. Bickley. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Paul Hodges, and W. P. Chitwood, for appellant.

The court, erred in giving the affirmative charge as it should never be given where there is conflict' in the evidence or reasonable inferences may be drawn therefrom unfavorable to the right of *recovery.*— Peters *v. Railroad Go.,*135 Ala. 537; 5 Ma.yf. 150.

A. E. Walker, for appellee.

Where the bill of exceptions does not purport to contain all the evidence and in *546the absence of a contrary showing from the record proper, the presumption will be indulged that there was evidence justifying the court in giving the affirmative *charge.*— Sanders *v, Steen,*128 Ala. 663; *Glardy v. Walker,*132 Ala. 264. .

db GNAFFENNIED, J.

In the case of *Doe ex dem School Commissioners v. Godwin,*30 Ala. 242, the Supreme Court lays down the following propositions as definitely settled: (1) That bills of exceptions are to be construed most strongly against the exceptor. (2) That error will not be presumed, but must be affirmatively shown. (3) That when an affirmative charge is given, which is correct as an abstract legal proposition, this court will presume there was evidence to justify the charge, unless it affirmatively appears to the contrary. The above rules have not, so far as we are informed, been at any time departed from.

In the present case the bill of exceptions fails to show that' it sets out all of the evidence. It is. therefore impossible for this court to say that the trial court erred in giving the affirmative charge to the jury, which the plaintiff requested it in writing to give, for the simple reason .that, taking the bill of exceptions most strongly against the exceptor, it is not shown that it contains all of the *evidence.*—Evansville, *etc., Packet Co. v. Slater,*101 Ala. 245, 15 South. 241; *Sanders v. Steen,*128 Ala. 633, 29 South. 586; *Clardy v. Walker,*132 Ala. 264, 31 South. 78.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed.

Affirmed.
### Faulk, Scott (OST) From: 

### Sent: To:


### Cc: Subject: All, Faulk, Scott (OST) Friday, March 27, 2015 3:29 PM 'Shawn'; Great Lakes, Chuck Howell (chowell@flygreatlakes.com); Great Lakes, Doug Voss (DVoss@flygreatlakes.com); Makani Kai, Richard Schuman ; Ron Hansen ;SeaPort Airlines, EAS Mailbox (eas@seaportair.com); Seaport/Wings ofAlaska, Rob McKinney (rob@seaportair.com); 'Tim Sieber'; Tim Sieber 'Citycouncil@cityofmerced.org'; 'Young, Janet'; Schlemmer, Kevin (OST) Essential Air SeNice at Merced, CA

One carrier has proposed a modification to its original proposal-t6 serve Merced, CA. Inorderto continue to provide a fair carrier selection process, the Department is offering all carriers that originally proposed service at Merced an opportunity to amend their proposal, ifthey so choose. Please provide the Departmentwith any amended proposals by April 

### 6, 2015. Feel free to contact me ifyou have any questionsorconcerns. Regards, Scott Faulk U.S. Department ofTransportation Office ofAviation Analysis 

### 202-366-9967

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EPA Comments / District Response

The comments (from Shirley Rivera) regarding the proposed Title V Operating 

Permit for Avenal Power Center LLC (District facility C-3953) is encapsulated 

below followed by the District’s response. 

EPA Comments – Email Dated August 15, 2008 

EPA Comment #1:

For the purposes of EPA's review of the PDOC evaluation and PDOC, although 

not required as part of our PSD permit application review/permit development 

process, we are in the process of identifying whether information provided by the 

Applicant through the PSD permit application process is consistent with the 

information in the District's evaluation. (Note: The Applicant provided sections 

from its CEC AFC that includes the Air Quality and Public Health sections, which 

presumably is information that the District evaluation also is based. PSD review 

has been triggered for NOx, CO, and PM.) 

We would like to ensure that, at a minimum, those data sets and assumptions 

shared between the PSD and PDOC processes that contribute to the 

determination of the potential-to-emit, BACT, and assumptions for the air quality 

analysis/modeling are consistent. At this time, we simply would like to make the 

District aware that this evaluation is in process. To the extent that we identify 

inconsistencies during our review, we will address them as part of our PSD 

permit process. 

Districts Response:

Thank you for the notification. 

EPA Comment #2:

The emission limits proposed for each combustion turbine generator (CTG), 

Units C-3953-10-0 and C-3953-11-0, are 4.0 ppmvd @ 15% O2. EPA is aware 

of CTGs achieving CO emissions less than 4.0 ppmvd @ 15% O2. Therefore, 

please provide confirmation whether the District's evaluation considered 

achieved in practice CO ppm levels less than 4.0 ppmvd @ 15% O2. If so, 

please provide reasons why a lower level was eliminated from consideration. 

Districts Response:

The facility has proposed to lower their CO emission limit to 2.0 ppmvd @ 15% 

O2.
#### Rose Schwartz *v.*Chapel Realty Company

Mambie, C. J., Bbown, Jennings, Eixs and Dickenson, Js.

Argued June 4

decided June 26, 1947

. *Benjamin*M. *Chapnick,*for the appellant (plaintiff. in error).

*101
      *T. Holmes Bracken,*for the appellee (defendant in error).

Per Curiam.

The questions presented in this appeal are whether a party in a summary process action tried to a jury before a justice of the peace is entitled to more than one peremptory challenge, and whether there was error in the charge.

General Statutes, § 5577, is as follows: “On the trial of any civil action, each party may challenge peremptorily four jurors, except in an action before a justice of the peace, when one juror only may be peremptorily challenged by each party.” The plaintiff in error contends that this rule does not apply to summary process actions and that the justice was in error in limiting her to one challenge. The authority she cites in her brief in support of her claim relates to earlier statutes or different courts. There is no ambiguity in the present statute. It limits the peremptory challenges in any action before a justice of the peace to one for each party.

While the other assignment of error pursued in the brief of the plaintiff in error purports to be an attack upon the admission in evidence of the notice to quit possession, her counsel stated in oral argument that the claim relied upon was error by the justice in the submission to the jury of the question of adequacy of the notice. The defendant in error has so treated it in its brief and we so consider it.

The bill of exceptions recites that the premises in question are a part of a large building containing an entrance to upper floors, which entrance is known as No. 1056 Chapel Street; that the next premises are those of the Roger Kent store and would be No. 1058; that next is the Christian Science reading room, which would be No. 1060, although *102no number appears on the door; that then comes the plaintiff in error’s store, on the transom over the door of which appears the number 1060; and that the city directory lists this store as No. 1060A, and a quantity of mail matter addressed to the plaintiff in error at No. 1060A reached her in due course. The plaintiff in error claims in her brief that the number of the premises was in fact 1060 and therefore the notice was necessarily defective. This claim is obviously based on the fact that the number 1060 appears over the door of the premises. Under the charter of New Haven it is the duty of the board of aldermen to provide for street numbering; 13 Spec. Laws 429; and presumably it has done so. The mere fact that a number appears over a door to certain premises does not conclusively establish that it is the correct number. Upon the basis of the evidence before the justice, he had no other recourse than to submit to the jury the issue whether or not 1060A was the proper number to insert in the notice; and this he did. While we cannot in all respects approve the charge, it is not open to objection on the ground that he should have ruled as matter of law that 1060 was the correct number.

There is no error.
#### William Kennedy, Plaintiff, *v.*Michael E. Bridgman et al., Defendants.

(Supreme Court, Greene Special Term,

May, 1899.)

(Foreclosure — Besale.

Where property has been sold, in foreclosure, to a third party, below its assessed valuation and without notice, other than by advertisement, to a subsequent mortgagee whose mortgage will be wholly cut off, a resale will be ordered at his instance, where the plaintiff does not object, the subsequent mortgagee binding himself legally to bid more at the resale than the assessed valuation.

Motion to set aside a sale under a judgment in foreclosure and for a resale.

Charles I. Webster, for John E. Bridgman, for motion*

Joseph C. Behan, for purchaser, opposed.

Shaw, Bailey & Murphy, for plaintiff.

Chase, J.

Plaintiff is the owner of a mortgage of $5,000, given by the defendants, Michael E. Bridgman and Ellen C. Bridgman, on certain property in Troy, N. Y. The defendant, John F. Bridgman, is the owner of á mortgage of $500, given by the same persons on the same property, which mortgage is a subsequent lien to that of the plaintiff’s mortgage. Plaintiff commenced this action to foreclose his mortgage, and the summons and complaint were served on all the defendants.

After the action was commenced the plaintiff having left the city for the winter, the defendant, John F. Bridgman, had a talk with the person who had charge of plaintiff’s business, and he understood from such talk that nothing further would be done in the suit unless he (John F. Bridgman) was notified. Judgment was, however, entered in the action, and the property advertised for sale and sold on the 18th day of February, 1899, to Patrick Farrelly for $5,515, being just sufficient to pay the plaintiff’s claim and costs. The purchaser was the only bidder at the sale other than the plaintiff’s attorney. In case this sale is not set *586aside, the $500 mortgage of John F. Bridgman will he a total loss to him. John E. Bridgman was never- notified, of the proceedings subsequent to the talk with plaintiff’s agent, and he did not in fact know of the property being advertised for sale or that the sale was about to take place. The facts as above stated are not contradicted.

Plaintiff neither asks for nor objects to a resale. John F. Bridgman asserts that the property is assessed for $6,000 and is worth $7,000, and offers to bid at least $6,100 on a resale, and presents with his papers on this motion an adequate bond conditioned that he will on a resale make such bid and that in case the property is struck off to him he will pay the amount so bidden.

The motion is granted on condition that John E. Bridgman pay to Patrick Farrelly or his attorney, the sum of $50 to reimburse him for moneys expended by reason of his purchase, and on the further condition that such payment be made within five" days from the entry of this order and the service of a copy thereof with notice" of entry on each of the parties appearing on this motion.

Ordered accordingly.
#### George Russel BENNINGTON, Petitioner, v. Verne C. THORNTON, Jr., Administrator of the Broward County Jail, Respondent.

No. 79-1003.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

May 10, 1979.

Rehearing Denied May 23, 1979.

Paul M. Rashkind of Sams, Gerstein & Ward, P.A., Miami, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

MOORE, Judge.

Petitioner seeks our writ of habeas corpus contending that he is illegally detained. The petition and the appendix thereto show that petitioner was placed on probation on June 28, 1977. When his whereabouts became unknown to his probation supervisor on or about February 1,1978, a warrant for petitioner’s arrest for violation of probation was issued by the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit on March 2, 1978. *857Petitioner was thereafter arrested in Citrus County, Florida, on April 23,1979, pursuant to the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit warrant for his arrest. It is the contention of petitioner that he, pursuant to Section 949.11, Fla.Stat. (1977), was entitled to a hearing within ten (10) days from the date of such arrest. We disagree.

The hearing required under Section 949.11 is applicable only in those situations where a probationer has been arrested on a felony charge and pursuant to Section 949.10 the automatic provisions for temporary revocation apply. The record herein reflects that petitioner was arrested pursuant to a warrant for his arrest, as opposed to his arrest for a new felony charge.

When a probationer is arrested pursuant to a warrant, the provisions of Section 948.06, Fla.Stat. (1977), apply. Under this section if the probationer does not admit the violation(s), the court may commit him “with or without bail” and must hold a hearing “as soon as may be practicable.” Unless the petitioner can show an abuse of the trial court’s discretion in denying bail or failing to hold a hearing as soon as practicable, he has not established a prima facie cause for the issuance of our writ of habeas corpus. No such abuse of discretion has been demonstrated here.

Accordingly, the petition for writ of ha-beas corpus is denied.

ANSTEAD and DAUKSCH, JJ., concur.
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<PERIOD-START>                             FEB-01-1998
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<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
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<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  114,352
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,589
<INVENTORY>                                     75,095
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               222,608
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<DEPRECIATION>                                 281,321
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 739,441
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          123,975
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,195
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```

[107th Congress Public Law 130]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]

<DOC>
[DOCID: f:publ130.107]

Public Law 107-130
107th Congress

                                 An Act

 
To designate the Richard J. Guadagno Headquarters and Visitors Center at 
  Humboldt Bay National Wildlife Refuge, California. <<NOTE: Jan. 16, 
                         2002 -  [H.R. 3334]>> 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, <<NOTE: 16 USC 668dd 
note.>> 

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

    The headquarters and visitors center at Humboldt Bay National 
Wildlife Refuge, located at 1020 Ranch Road in Loleta, California, is 
designated as the ``Richard J. Guadagno Headquarters and Visitors 
Center''.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

    Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other 
record of the United States to such building is deemed to be a reference 
to the ``Richard J. Guadagno Headquarters and Visitors Center''.

    Approved January 16, 2002.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY--H.R. 3334:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

HOUSE REPORTS: No. 107-319 (Comm. on Resources).
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 147 (2001):
            Dec. 18, considered and passed House.
            Dec. 20, considered and passed Senate.

                                  <all>
```
Exhibit 31.1








I, Susan B. Sheffield, certify that:





1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of AmeriCredit Automobile Receivables Trust 2020-1  (the “Exchange Act periodic reports”);





2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;





3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;





4. Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statement required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicing agreements in all material respects; and





5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report.  Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.





In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties:  Citibank, N.A.








By:/s/ Susan B. SheffieldName:Susan B. SheffieldTitle:Executive Vice President and Chief Financial OfficerDate:March 4, 2024
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM BEL FUSE
INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AT SEPTEMBER 30, 1996 AND THE NINE
MONTHS THEN ENDED AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
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<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1996
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<SECURITIES>                                   2,002,036
<RECEIVABLES>                                  9,936,200
<ALLOWANCES>                                   155,000
<INVENTORY>                                    8,585,970
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               42,235,409
<PP&E>                                         47,290,746
<DEPRECIATION>                                 21,102,452
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 69,459,657
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          7,861,626
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<SALES>                                        47,832,403    
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<CGS>                                          33,984,034    
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  42,456,282    
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0             
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0             
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<INCOME-PRETAX>                                7,066,188     
<INCOME-TAX>                                   1,415,000     
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<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0             
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   5,651,118
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  1.12
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0

        


</TABLE>
#### § 14.603 Disposition of claims.

*Setoff for cost of unauthorized medical treatment.* In any tort claim administratively settled or compromised where the claimant owes the Department of Veterans Affairs for unauthorized medical treatment, there will be included in the tort claim award the amount of the claimant's indebtedness to the Government. The amount of the indebtedness is for credit to the appropriation account from which the services were provided. The voucher prepared for settlement of the claim will specify the amount to be deposited to the credit of the designated account and that the balance of the award be paid to the claimant.

[42 FR 41416, Aug. 17, 1977, as amended at 43 FR 2722, Jan. 19, 1978. Redesignated and amended at 61 FR 27784, June 3, 1996]
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Leslie’s, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the year ending October 3, 2020 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

|   | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company. |
|--------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

| Date: December 23, 2020 |   | By:    | /s/ Steven M. Weddell   |
|-------------------------|--------|--------|-------------------------|
|                    |   |   | Steven M. Weddell       |
|                    |   |   | Chief Financial Officer |