Filed 6/24/14 In re A.T. CA2/8

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re A.T., Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

 B250532

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

N.F.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. CK74200)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Anthony 

Trendacosta, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.

Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant.

John F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, 

Tracey F. Dodds, Deputy County Counsel for Respondent.

__________________________
2

Mother N.F. appeals from the juvenile court’s exit orders regarding visitation with 

daughter A.T. after the court terminated its dependency jurisdiction and gave father K.T. 

sole legal and physical custody of the child. We affirm those orders.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In November 2012 we affirmed a juvenile court order placing seven-year-old A.T. 

with her father after the court sustained an amended petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300)

filed by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) 

alleging that A.T. was a dependent of the court because mother had been coaching the 

minor to falsely accuse father of sexually abusing her when in fact the abuse was 

committed by mother’s nephew. (Los Angeles County Dept. of Children and Family 

Services v. N.F. (Nov. 29, 2012) [nonpub. opn.].) The court had previously taken 

jurisdiction of A.T. in 2008 after father was wrongly blamed for sexually abusing the 

child, finding that A.T. had been a victim of sexual abuse, but that someone else in the 

household had been the perpetrator.1

In May 2013 the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over A.T. and placed her 

with father, granting him sole legal and physical custody of the child. The court entered 

exit orders regarding monitored visitation by mother that ordered mother to pay for the 

costs of the monitor. The court did not specify the frequency and duration of her visits.

Mother contends the juvenile court erred because: (1) it cut her off when she tried 

to argue at the hearing; (2) there was no showing she had the ability to pay for a monitor; 

and (3) the order failed to specify how often she was allowed to visit the minor.2

 

1 This condensed version of the facts comes from our prior decision in this matter. 

As for the facts that give rise to this appeal, we have distilled those to address the issues 

raised by mother.

2 Mother does not contest the termination order, or the apparent basis for granting 

father sole legal and physical custody of the minor: mother’s failure to cooperate with 

DCFS; her apparent false statement that she discontinued therapy because her therapist 
3

DISCUSSION

1. The Court Did Not Stop Mother From Arguing the Exit Orders

Mother contends the juvenile court did not permit her to respond to the court’s 

tentative ruling concerning visitation. She bases this on the following exchange:

“[MOTHER]: Okay, I wasn’t really done.

“[THE COURT]: Well, Ma’am, you’re done as far as the court’s concerned.

“[MOTHER]” Okay. Thank you.

“[THE COURT]: We’re back in open session. . . . The Court’s tentative from the 

15th is the – will be the order.”

These comments must be placed in context with the events that preceded them. 

When the hearing started, the court noted that mother had filed a request to renew a 

restraining order against father. Although mother had counsel, the court allowed her to 

argue the restraining order herself because mother applied for that order on her own 

without the assistance of counsel. After hearing argument from the parties, the court 

denied the request to renew the restraining order.

When the hearing started mother also said she wanted to bring a Marsden3 motion 

to replace her lawyer. After the court denied mother’s request for a renewed restraining 

order it went into closed session with mother and her lawyer so mother could argue her 

Marsden motion. After the court denied that motion, counsel for the parties, along with 

father, returned to the courtroom. As the trial court announced the presence of counsel 

for DCFS, mother said, “Can I ask you a question, sir?” The trial court asked what the 

 

was ill; her 2012 false accusation of sexual abuse by father, leading to an unnecessary 

sexual assault exam of the minor; and the fact that even though the minor loved her 

mother and wanted to live with her, she was also satisfied living with father, who by all 

accounts was giving her proper care.

3 This was a reference to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, which holds that 

criminal defendants represented by appointed counsel may move to replace counsel if the 

lawyer is not adequately representing them. Because parents have a statutory and due 

process right to competent counsel, Marsden-type hearings are permitted in dependency 

court. (In re M.P. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 441, 455.)
4

question was, followed by mother’s statement that she was not really done, along with the

remainder of the exchange quoted above. This was followed by the trial court’s 

statement that it “was back in open session.”

It appears to us that the juvenile court allowed mother to first argue regarding the 

restraining order and her Marsden motion, after which it intended to conduct the hearing 

on the termination and exit orders. Viewed in this context, mother’s request to ask a 

question and her statement that she “wasn’t really done” indicate that mother wanted to 

make further argument regarding the just-concluded Marsden hearing. Therefore, when 

the court said that mother was “done as far as the court’s concerned,” and then said 

“we’re back in open session,” it was nothing more than a statement that the court would 

hear no more argument on the Marsden motion – it would have been improper in open 

court – and would proceed to the termination and exit orders.

At that point, mother’s counsel was responsible for arguing on her behalf. When 

the court said that its previous tentative would become the final order, mother said 

“okay” while her counsel remained silent and made no objections to the court ruling 

without argument or the introduction of evidence. We therefore deem the issue waived. 

(In re Carrie W. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 746, 755.)

2. Mother Waived Her Challenges to the Visitation Order

A. The Frequency of Visitation

When a juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a dependent child, it can 

make exit orders regarding custody and visitation. Those orders become part of any 

family court proceeding concerning the same child and remain in effect until they are 

terminated or modified by the family court. (In re T.H. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1119, 

1122-1123.) The court has the power to determine the right and extent of visitation by a 

noncustodial parent in a dependency case, and may not delegate that power to nonjudicial 

officers or private parties. (Id. at p. 1123.) A visitation order may delegate to a third 

party the responsibility for managing the details of visits, including their time, place, and 
5

manner. (Ibid.) However, discretion to determine whether visitation will occur at all 

may not be delegated. (Ibid.)

Mother contends the juvenile court improperly delegated her right to visit the 

minor by failing to specify how often she was allowed to visit. We reject this contention 

for two reasons. First, the court did not delegate that power to anyone. Instead, its order 

was silent on the frequency of visitation. Second, in May 2012 the court ordered 

visitation for mother of no less than two to three times a week, with visits to last two to 

three hours. By virtue of minute orders stating that all prior orders remained in force and 

effect, that visitation order was in effect up to and including the ultimate hearing on May 

22, 2013. We believe the court intended to keep that order in place as part of its exit 

order, subject to later modification by the family court.

Alternatively, we hold that mother waived her objection by failing to raise the 

point during the hearing. (In re Carrie W., supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 755.)

B. Order to Pay for Visitation Monitor

DCFS recommended that mother be allowed monitored visitation with the minor, 

but said nothing about making mother pay for the monitor. Instead, the court announced 

that requirement as part of its tentative ruling at the May 15, 2013 hearing. Mother 

contends the juvenile court erred because there was no evidence she could afford to pay 

for the monitor, or that a paid monitor was required for some special reason and would 

afford the minor better supervision than would an unpaid monitor.

When the court announced its tentative, it told counsel to “be prepared on that 

issue” for the May 22 hearing. Mother made no argument, and presented no evidence on 

those issues in advance of or at the May 22 hearing. Instead, mother’s counsel remained 

silent when the final ruling was announced. We therefore deem the issue waived.4 (In re 

Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338.)

 

4 Mother remains free to seek modification of the visitation orders through the 

family court.
6

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s exit orders regarding visitation are affirmed.

RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

BIGELOW, P.J.

GRIMES, J.