alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 10.11

                               MED-LINK USA, INC.
                                  69 Mall Drive
                             Commack, New York 11725




                                                                     May 5, 2003


Vested Health Care
Kevin Mannix
5 Rodeo Drive
Syosset, NY  11791

Dear Mr. Mannix:

           Consider the following as a letter of understanding between Med-Link
USA, Inc. and Vested Health Care that holds a licensing agreement with Avreo,
Inc. whereby Vested Health Care will grant the Med-Link VPN authorization to
offer to its clients the Avreo Radiology Workflow Software that allows for the
reading of MRI's and CAT scans digitally.

           The initial targets for this initiative will be New Island Hospital
of Bethpage, New York, clients of Med-Link USA, Inc. and any other diagnostic
centers in the New York area. Med-Link USA, Inc. and Vested Health Care will
work together to mutually define agreed upon terms and conditions of the
transactions including compensation.


                                                       Very truly yours,


                                                       /S/ MICHAEL CARVO
                                                       ------------------
                                                       Michael Carvo
                                                       President
                                                       Med-Link, USA, Inc.


ACCEPTED AND APPROVED BY:
Vested Health Care

By:/S/ KEVIN MANNIX
-------------------
       Kevin Mannix
       President





                                      -34-
<PAGE>
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Repligen Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the
period ending June 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned officers of the Company hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the undersigneds knowledge, that:



|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                     |  |     |  |                                             
|-------------------- |  | --- |  | --------------------------------------------
|Date: August 9, 2006 |  | By: |  | /s/ Walter C. Herlihy                       
|                     |  |     |  | Chief Executive Officer and President       
|                     |  |     |  | (Principal Executive Officer)               
|                     |  |    
|Date: August 9, 2006 |  | By: |  | /s/ Daniel W. Muehl                         
|                     |  |     |  | Chief Financial Officer                     
|                     |  |     |  | (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
Editorial Note on Part 501
Editorial Note: At 78 FR 4766, Jan. 23, 2013, parts 500-599 were transferred from Title 37, Chapter V, to Title 37, Chapter IV. Chapter V was removed and reserved.

§ 501.9 Patent protection. ( a ) A Government agency, upon determining that an invention coming within the scope of §§ 501.6(a)(1) or (a)(2) has been made, shall promptly determine whether patent protection will be sought in the United States by or on behalf of the agency for such invention. A controversy over the respective rights of the Government and of the employee shall not unnecessarily delay the filing of a patent application by the agency to avoid the loss of patent rights. In cases coming within the scope of § 501.6(a)(2), the filing of a patent application shall be contingent upon the consent of the employee.
( b ) Where there is an appealed dispute as to whether §§ 501.6 (a)(1) or (a)(2) applies in determining the respective rights of the Government and of an employee in and to any invention, the agency may determine whether patent protection will be sought in the United States pending the Secretary's decision on the dispute. If the agency decides that an application for patent should be filed, the agency will take such rights as are specified in § 501.6(a)(2), but this shall be without prejudice to acquiring the rights specified in paragraph (a)(1) of that section should the Secretary so decide.
( c ) Where an agency has determined to leave title to an invention with an employee under § 501.6(a)(2), the agency will, upon the filing of an application for patent, take the rights specified in that paragraph without prejudice to the subsequent acquisition by the Government of the rights specified in paragraph (a)(1) of that section should the Secretary so decide.
( d ) Where an agency has filed a patent application in the United States, the agency will, within 8 months from the filing date of the U.S. application, determine if any foreign patent applications should also be filed. If the agency chooses not to file an application in any foreign country, the employee may request rights in that country subject to the conditions stated in § 501.7(b) that may be imposed by the agency. Alternatively, the agency may permit the employee to retain foreign rights by including in any assignment to the Government of an unclassified U.S. patent application on the invention an option for the Government to acquire title in any foreign country within 8 months from the filing date of the U.S. application.
[61 FR 41000, Aug. 7, 1996]
Exhibit 23.1


                  INDEPENDENT  ACCOUNTANTS'  REPORT


Celestial Seasonings, Inc.:

We  have  reviewed  the accompanying consolidated  balance  sheet  of
Celestial  Seasonings, Inc. and subsidiaries  (the "Company")  as  of
March 31, 1998 and the related consolidated statements of income  and
cash flows for the three-month and six-month periods ended March  31,
1998  and  March  31,  1997.  These  financial  statements  are   the
responsibility of the Company's management.

We  conducted our review in accordance with standards established  by
the  American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. A review  of
interim   financial  information  consists  principally  of  applying
analytical  procedures to financial data and of making  inquiries  of
persons  responsible  for  financial and accounting  matters.  It  is
substantially  less  in scope than an audit conducted  in  accordance
with generally accepted auditing standards, the objective of which is
the expression of an opinion regarding the financial statements taken
as a whole. Accordingly, we do not express such an opinion.

Based  on  our review, we are not aware of any material modifications
that  should  be  made to such consolidated financial statements  for
them   to   be  in  conformity  with  generally  accepted  accounting
principles.

We  have  previously  audited, in accordance with generally  accepted
auditing standards, the consolidated balance sheet of the Company and
subsidiaries  as of September 30, 1997, and the related  consolidated
statements  of income, stockholders' equity, and cash flows  for  the
year  then  ended  (not presented herein); and in  our  report  dated
November  3,  1997,  we  expressed an unqualified  opinion  on  those
consolidated  financial statements. In our opinion,  the  information
set  forth  in  the  accompanying consolidated balance  sheet  as  of
September  30,  1997 is fairly stated, in all material  respects,  in
relation  to  the consolidated balance sheet from which it  has  been
derived.





Deloitte & Touche LLP


Denver, Colorado
April 15, 1998

                               PAGE 16
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 31.1

                                 CERTIFICATIONS

I, Brian T. Beckwith, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Peoples Educational
Holdings, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business
issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The small business issuer's other certifying officer and I are responsible
for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and
have:

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the small business issuer, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer's disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the small business
issuer's most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuer's fourth fiscal
quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is
reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting; and

5. The small business issuer's other certifying officer and I have disclosed,
based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial
reporting, to the small business issuer's auditors and the audit committee of
small business issuer's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):

a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the small business issuer's ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; and

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting.

Date: August 12, 2004

/s/ Brian T. Beckwith
----------------------
Brian T. Beckwith,
President and Chief Executive Officer
#### ELLA CORRIGAN v. FREDERICK W. FOOT.1

July 17, 1914.

Nos. 18,607-(132).

Compromise — evidence.

Action upon a compromise and settlement. Verdict sustained by the evidence, [Reporter.]

*532Interest.

Where partial payments are made upon an obligation, they should he applied on the principal as of the date made and thereby interest reduced. It was error to charge the jury that interest should be computed on the principal from the date of the compromise, then the payments deducted, and the balance would be the amount of the verdict. [Reporter.]

Appeal and Error.

Where an exception to the charge is taken at the time and in a motion for a new trial, but not assigned as error on appeal, it cannot be considered. [Reporter.]

Action in the district court for Goodhue county to recover $275.25, and interest, the amount of a compromise of plaintiff’s claim against defendant. The •case was tried before Johnson, J., who denied defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, and a jury which returned a verdict for $444.99 in favor of plaintiff. Defendant’s motion for judgment in his behalf, notwithstanding the verdict, was •denied. Shorn an order denying his motion for a new trial, defendant appealed.

Affirmed.

*Mohn*& *Mohn,*for appellant.

*Edward A. Knapp,*for respondent.

1

 Reported in 148 N. W. 98.

Per Curiam.

This action was brought to recover a sum alleged to have been promised by the defendant to the plaintiff on compromise. There was a verdict for the plaintiff and the defendant appeals from the order denying his motion for a new trial.

Some 14 or 15 years ago the defendant was one of the plaintiff’s attorneys in a personal injury suit which resulted in a recovery of something like $5,000. There was a dispute or misunderstanding as to the amount of the attorneys’ fees, the •question being whether the attorneys were to have one-third or one-fourth of the recovery.

The plaintiff alleges that in March, 1901, the matter was compromised by the defendant agreeing to pay her $275.25, and the suit is upon such agreement. The evidence is very unsatisfactory, but we are of the opinion that it justified ithe jury in finding that such an agreement was made and that such sum was ito be immediately payable though the agreement may have contemplated an (insignificant delay of a few days.

'The .evidence supports the claim that partial payments were made which 'kept the obligation alive.

The court was in error in instructing the jury to compute interest on the $275.25 from the date of the compromise, then to deduct the payments made, and that the balance would be the verdict. The payments should have been *533applied on the principal as of the date made and thereby interest reduced. Exception was taken at the time and in the motion for new trial, but is not assigned as error here. It cannot be considered.

Order affirmed.
#### § 494.20 Condition: Compliance with Federal, State, and local laws and regulations.

The facility and its staff must operate and furnish services in compliance with applicable Federal, State, and local laws and regulations pertaining to licensure and any other relevant health and safety requirements.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

RONALD STOCKTON,

Petitioner

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; MARIROSA LAMAS; B. THOMPSON; R. MARSH; T. MILLER; L. EATTON; AND R. VANCE,

Respondents :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 712 MAL 2019

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the

Commonwealth Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 14th day of April, 2020

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
IIB 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2246 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

DECEMBER 5, 2007 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural 

Resources 

AN ACT 

To provide for the release of any reversionary interest of 

the United States in and to certain lands in Reno, Nevada. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


bajohnson on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
2 

HR 2246 RFS 

1 SECTION 1. RAILROAD LANDS DEFINED. 

2 For the purposes of this Act, the term ‘‘railroad 

3 lands’’ means those lands within the City of Reno, Ne4 vada, located within portions of sections 10, 11, and 12 

5 of T.19 N., R. 19 E., and portions of section 7 of T.19 

6 N., R. 20 E., Mount Diablo Meridian, Nevada, that were 

7 originally granted to the Union Pacific Railroad under the 

8 provisions of the Act of July 1, 1862, commonly known 

9 as the Union Pacific Railroad Act. 

10 SEC. 2. RELEASE OF REVERSIONARY INTEREST. 

11 Any reversionary interests of the United States (in12 cluding interests under the Act of July 1, 1862, commonly 

13 known as the Union Pacific Railroad Act) in and to the 

14 railroad lands as defined in section one of this Act are 

15 hereby released. 

Passed the House of Representatives December 4, 

2007. 

Attest: LORRAINE C. MILLER, 

Clerk. 


bajohnson on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 _________________________________________

 Clerk

November 20, 2012

s1113

Order 

November 20, 2012

145392 & (69)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 145392

COA: 303099

Wayne CC: 10-010139-FC

RASHOD LAMAR BROWN,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 22, 2012 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. The motion to 

remand is DENIED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 9
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                           3,903
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                              65
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                11,285
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     33,990
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                         87,044
<ALLOWANCE>                                      1,271
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 145,116
<DEPOSITS>                                     128,501
<SHORT-TERM>                                       290
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              1,442
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         4,485
<OTHER-SE>                                      10,398
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                  14,883
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                  6,198
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                2,027
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                    71
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                 8,296
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               3,409
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,524
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            4,772
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                      225
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                  61
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  5,259
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    507
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                         507
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       483
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.08
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.08
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    5.08
<LOANS-NON>                                        720
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                    740
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 1,258
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                      262
<RECOVERIES>                                        50
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                1,271
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                               943
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                            328
        

</TABLE>
Affirmed and Opinion filed October 20, 2011.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

___________________

NO. 14-11-00555-CR

___________________

ZAVIER SHAWN WILSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 209th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1164195

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant entered a plea of guilty to murder. The trial court sentenced appellant on 

June 10, 2011, to confinement for forty years in the Institutional Division of the Texas 

Department of Criminal Justice.

In two issues, appellant claims his sentence was grossly disproportionate to the 

offense underlying the conviction, resulting in cruel and unusual punishment in violation 

of the United States and Texas constitutions. 1 To preserve for appellate review a 

complaint that a sentence is grossly disproportionate, constituting cruel and unusual 

 

1 Appellant concedes that his sentence was within the applicable statutory range. See Tex. Penal 

Code Ann. §§ 12.32 and 19.02(b)(1) (West 2011).
2

punishment, a defendant must present to the trial court a timely request, objection, or 

motion stating the specific grounds for the ruling desired. See Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a); 

Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (defendant waived any error 

because he presented his argument for first time on appeal); Jagaroo v. State, 180 S.W.3d 

793, 802 (Tex. App. -- Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd) (defendant did not raise 

complaints that his sentences violated his state and federal rights against cruel and unusual 

punishment in the trial court, and thus failed to preserve them for appellate review).

Appellant cites Meadoux v. State, 325 S.W.3d 189, 193 n. 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2010), as a case in which the court ―reviewed the constitutionality of severe sentences for 

juveniles despite such claims being raised for the first time on appeal.‖ In Meadoux the 

court noted that the State had failed to argue error was not preserved in the court of appeals, 

the court of appeals did not address it in affirming the conviction, and the court did not 

grant review to consider it. Here, the State argues in its brief that error was not preserved. 

Meadoux does not support a departure from well-established precedent that claims of cruel 

and unusual punishment must be preserved in the trial court. See Arriaga v. State, 335 

S.W.3d 331, 334-35 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d).

The claim presented on appeal was not raised when appellant was sentenced or in a 

post-verdict motion filed with the trial court. Accordingly, nothing is preserved for our 

review. See Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App. -- Dallas 2003, no pet.). 

We overrule appellant’s issues and affirm the trial court's judgment.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Brown, Boyce, and McCally.

Do Not Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).