Judicial Council

of the Ninth Circuit

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK 06
NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

United States Supreme Court ..................................................... x

Ninth Circuit .............................................................. xxiv

District Courts in Ninth Circuit ................................................ xlvi

Other Circuits .............................................................. xlix

District Courts in Other Circuits ................................................ lix

State Courts ................................................................ lxi

Federal Statutes .......................................................... lxxviii

Federal Rules ............................................................. lxxxii

State Statutes ............................................................ lxxxiii

State Rules ................................................................ xcvi

STATE LAW SUMMARIES

Arizona ...................................................................... 1

California ................................................................... 36

Idaho ...................................................................... 89

Montana ................................................................... 115

Nevada .................................................................... 137

Oregon .................................................................... 166

Washington ................................................................ 185

CHAPTER 1: CONSTITUTIONALITY AND OTHER GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Constitutionality and Other General Considerations ........................... 203

1.1 Constitutionality and Guided Discretion .................................... 203

1.2 Mandatory Death Sentences ............................................. 206

1.3 Death Penalty for Crimes other than Murder ................................. 209

1.4 Requirement of Competency to Execute .................................... 211

1.4.1 Involuntary Administration of Anti-Psychotic Drugs .................... 214

1.4.2 Competency to Volunteer ......................................... 216

1.5 Prohibition of Execution of Minors ........................................ 217

1.6 Prohibition of Execution of the Mentally Retarded ............................ 221

1.6.1 Retroactivity of Atkins ............................................ 225

1.7 Requisite Mental State for Imposition of Judgment of Death .................... 226

1.7.1 Retroactivity of Enmund .......................................... 229
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ii NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

1.8 Method of Execution ................................................... 230

1.8.1 Electrocution ................................................... 234

1.8.2 Lethal Gas ..................................................... 235

1.8.3 Lethal Injection ................................................. 236

1.8.4 Hanging ....................................................... 237

1.8.5 Firing Squad .................................................... 238

1.8.6 Choice of Method of Execution ..................................... 238

1.9 Tenure on Death Row .................................................. 239

1.9.1 Last Rites ...................................................... 243

1.10 Proportionality Review ................................................. 243

1.11 Double Jeopardy Considerations .......................................... 246

1.11.1 Generally ...................................................... 246

1.11.2 Resentencing to Death After Appeal ................................. 247

1.11.3 Sentencing for Murders Including Felonies ............................ 249

1.11.4 Sentencing to Death After Breach or Withdrawal of Plea Agreement ....... 250

1.11.5 Prosecutions by Different Sovereigns for Same Conduct ................. 250

1.11.6 Judicial Override of Jury Life Sentence .............................. 251

1.12 Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentencing ................................. 252

1.13 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel ......................................... 257

1.13.1 Legal Standard .................................................. 257

1.13.2 Deficiency of Counsel ............................................ 260

1.13.2.1 Conflicts of Interest ..................................... 264

1.13.2.2 Deficiencies for Failure to Investigate and Prepare ............. 268

1.13.2.3 Failure to Present Mitigating Evidence at Sentencing ........... 273

1.13.3 Prejudice ...................................................... 278

1.13.3.1 Presumed Prejudice ...................................... 281

1.13.3.2 Prejudice Due to Failure to Investigate ....................... 283

1.14 Clemency Hearings .................................................... 284

1.15 Public Access to Executions ............................................. 285

1.16 Standard of Review .................................................... 288

1.16.1 Direct vs. Collateral Review of Trial Error ............................ 288

1.16.2 Trial Error vs. Structural Error ..................................... 292

1.16.3 Appellate Review of Federal Habeas Corpus .......................... 294

1.17 Ex Post Facto and Related Due Process Considerations ........................ 295

1.18 Retroactivity of New Law ............................................... 297

1.18.1 Retroactivity of New Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure .......... 297

1.18.1.1 Application to Federal Cases .............................. 303

1.18.1.2 AEDPA’s § 2254(e)’s Restriction on Teague Analysis .......... 305

1.18.2 Retroactivity of New Statutes ...................................... 306

1.19 Frivolous and Non-Frivolous Appeals ...................................... 307
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) iii

CHAPTER 2: PRETRIAL AND PRELIMINARY STAGE ISSUES

2. Pretrial and Preliminary Stage Issues ...................................... 308

2.1 Prosecutor’s Decision to Seek Death Sentence ............................... 308

2.2 Right to Counsel and Right to Waive Counsel ............................... 309

2.3 Pre-Trial Publicity and Venue ............................................ 313

2.4 Competency to Stand Trial .............................................. 317

2.5 Psychiatric and Other Expert Assistance .................................... 318

2.5.1 Retroactivity of Ake v. Oklahoma ................................... 322

2.5.2 Harmless Error Applicable ........................................ 323

2.6 Jury Selection Issues ................................................... 323

2.6.1 Voir Dire Procedure Generally ..................................... 323

2.6.1.1 Individual Voir Dire ...................................... 325

2.6.2 Jury Impartial to Death Penalty–“Death Qualified” and “Life Qualified” .... 326

2.6.2.1 Harmless Error Analysis Not Applicable ...................... 329

2.6.2.2 Remedy for Witherspoon Violations ......................... 330

2.6.2.3 Conviction-Prone Juries at Guilt Phase ....................... 331

2.6.3 Inquiry into Racial Attitudes of Jurors ............................... 333

2.6.4 Discriminatorily Motivated Peremptory Challenges ..................... 333

2.6.4.1 Retroactivity of Batson v. Kentucky .......................... 342

2.6.4.2 Harmless Error not Applicable .............................. 343

2.7 Grand Juries .......................................................... 344

CHAPTER 3: GUILT PHASE ISSUES

3. Guilt Phase Issues ..................................................... 345

3.1 Standard of Collateral Review for Constitutional Trial Errors ................... 345

3.2 Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence .......................... 345

3.3 Prosecutor’s Inappropriate Statements ..................................... 348

3.4 Prosecutor’s Decision to Grant Immunity ................................... 351

3.5 Jury Instructions ....................................................... 352

3.5.1 Burden-Shifting Instructions ....................................... 352

3.5.1.1 Retroactivity of Sandstrom and Francis ....................... 355

3.5.1.2 Harmless Error .......................................... 355

3.5.2 Reasonable Doubt Instructions ..................................... 357

3.5.2.1 Not Subject to Harmless Error Analysis ....................... 358

3.5.2.2 Retroactivity of Cage ..................................... 358

3.5.3 Lesser-Included Offense Instructions ................................ 360

3.5.4 Alternative Grounds for Conviction: 

Malice or Premeditation vs. Felony-Murder ........................... 363

3.5.5 Standard for Measuring Constitutionality of Jury Instruction .............. 364
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iv NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

3.6 Juror Misconduct ..................................................... 365

CHAPTER 4: SENTENCING PHASE ISSUES

4. Sentencing Phase Issues ................................................. 366

4.1 General Due Process Concerns ........................................... 366

4.1.1 Rights Regarding Evidence Presented at Sentencing .................... 366

4.1.2 Right to Speak .................................................. 368

4.1.3 Notice of Death Sentence Possibility ................................. 368

4.1.4 Right to Confront and Cross-Examine Witnesses ....................... 369

4.1.5 Length of Sentencing Proceeding ................................... 370

4.1.6 Defendant’s Appearance Before Jury: Jail Clothing and Restraints ......... 371

4.1.7 Sentencer Reliance on Undisclosed Information ........................ 374

4.1.8 Right to Be Present at Verdict ...................................... 375

4.1.9 Competency at Penalty Phase ....................................... 376

4.2 Fifth and Sixth Amendment Restrictions on Use of Psychiatric Examinations at

Sentencing ........................................................... 376

4.2.1 Harmless Error .................................................. 379

4.2.2 Retroactivity of Estelle v. Smith .................................... 379

4.2.3 Psychiatric Testimony on Future Dangerousness ....................... 380

4.3 Victim Impact Testimony ............................................... 381

4.4 Prosecutorial Misconduct ............................................... 383

4.4.1 Prosecutorial Expertise ........................................... 384

4.4.2 Possibility of Escape ............................................. 385

4.4.3 Role of Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances ..................... 385

4.4.4 Deterrence ..................................................... 386

4.4.5 Inflammatory Comments .......................................... 386

4.4.6 Diminished Jury Responsibility ..................................... 388

4.4.6.1 Retroactivity of Caldwell v. Mississippi ....................... 390

4.5 Jury Instructions ....................................................... 391

4.5.1 Ambiguous or Vague Instructions ................................... 391

4.5.2 Role of Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances ..................... 392

4.5.3 Sympathy and Passion ............................................ 394

4.5.3.1 Retroactivity of California v. Brown ......................... 395

4.5.4 Possibility of Commutation or Parole ................................ 395

4.5.4.1 Retroactivity of Simmons .................................. 398

4.5.5 Allen-type Charges ............................................... 398

4.5.6 Diminishing Jury Sense of Responsibility ............................. 399

4.6 Role of the Jury and Judge ............................................... 400

4.6.1 Right of Capital Defendant to Jury Determination of Any Fact Leading

to Increase in Maximum Punishment ................................ 400

4.6.1.1 Retroactivity of Ring v. Arizona ............................. 403
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) v

4.6.1.2 Advisory Jury ........................................... 404

4.6.2 Resentencing by Judge or Jury ..................................... 406

4.7 Aggravating Circumstances .............................................. 407

4.7.1 Statutory and Nonstatutory Aggravating Circumstances .................. 409

4.7.2 Constitutionality of Aggravating Circumstances: Application to

Subclass Only; Not Vague ......................................... 410

4.7.3 Specific Aggravating Circumstances ................................. 412

4.7.3.1 Element of Underlying Crime as Aggravating Factor ............ 412

4.7.3.2 Unadjudicated Criminal Conduct ............................ 413

4.7.3.3 “Outrageously or Wantonly Vile” ........................... 414

4.7.3.4 “Wicked or Morally Corrupt” ............................... 414

4.7.3.5 “Heinous, Cruel or Depraved” .............................. 414

4.7.3.6 “Torture, Depravity of Mind or Mutilation” .................... 417

4.7.3.7 “Utter Disregard for Human Life” ........................... 418

4.7.3.8 Unadjudicated Criminal Conduct ............................ 419

4.7.3.9 Protected Conduct ........................................ 419

4.7.3.10 Prior Felony Convictions .................................. 420

4.7.3.11 Pecuniary Gain .......................................... 421

4.7.3.12 Miscellaneous .......................................... 421

4.8 Mitigating Circumstances ............................................... 421

4.8.1 Consideration of all Relevant Mitigating Circumstances ................. 421

4.8.2 Scope of Mitigating Factors ........................................ 426

4.8.2.1 Minimal Participation in Crime ............................. 426

4.8.2.2 Youth/Family History ..................................... 427

4.8.2.3 Good Prison Behavior/ Potential for Rehabilitation .............. 427

4.8.2.4 Mental Retardation ....................................... 427

4.8.2.5 Lack of Significant Prior Criminal Activity/Violence ............ 428

4.8.2.6 Coercion ............................................... 428

4.8.2.7 Good Character .......................................... 429

4.8.2.8 “Catch All” ............................................. 429

4.8.2.9 Reliable Hearsay Evidence ................................. 430

4.8.2.10 Polygraph Evidence ...................................... 430

4.8.3 Improper Mitigating Evidence ...................................... 430

4.8.3.1 Irrelevant Evidence ....................................... 430

4.8.3.2 Residual Doubt of Defendant’s Guilt ......................... 431

4.8.3.3 Sympathy and Passion .................................... 432

 4.8.3.3.1 Retroactivity of California v. Brown ................ 432

4.8.4 Burden of Persuasion ............................................. 433

 4.8.4.1 Retroactivity of Mills v. Maryland ......................... 434

4.9 Balancing Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances ................... 435

4.9.1 Weighing or Nonweighing by Sentencing Body ........................ 435

4.9.1.1 One Invalid/Weak Aggravating Circumstance .................. 437
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vi NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

4.9.2 Mandatory Presumption ........................................... 441

4.9.3 Federal Review ................................................. 442

CHAPTER 5: FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY

5. Federal Death Penalty .................................................. 444

5.1 Federal Death Penalty Crimes ............................................ 444

5.2 Federal Capital Procedure ............................................... 451

CHAPTER 6: HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS

6. Habeas Corpus Proceedings .............................................. 458

6.1 Habeas Corpus Generally ............................................... 458

6.1.1 Retroactivity of the AEDPA ....................................... 462

6.1.2 State Waiver of AEDPA's Application ............................... 466

6.1.3 Mode of Challenging Sentence ..................................... 466

6.2 Habeas Corpus Procedure ............................................... 468

6.2.1 First Petition Filing Deadlines ...................................... 468

6.2.1.1 Retroactivity of First Petition Filing Deadlines ................. 478

6.2.2 Successive Petition Filing Authorization .............................. 478

6.2.2.1 Retroactivity of Successive Petition Filing Authorization ......... 483

6.2.3 Federal Procedural Default–Subsequent Petitions ....................... 485

6.2.3.1 Petitions Raising Same Grounds ............................. 486

 6.2.3.1.1 Ends of Justice Exception ....................... 488

 6.2.3.1.2 Recalling the Mandate .......................... 489

 6.2.3.1.3 Rule 60(b) ................................... 491

6.2.3.2 Petitions Raising Different Grounds .......................... 492

 6.2.3.2.1 Retroactivity of § 2244(b)(2) ..................... 497

 6.2.3.2.2 Types of Claims Constituting Cause and Prejudice 

Under Pre-AEDPA Law ........................ 499

 6.2.3.2.2.1 New Fact Claims .................. 499

6.2.3.2.2.2 New Law Claims .................. 500

6.2.3.2.2.3 Tactically Withheld Claims .......... 500

 6.2.3.2.3 Exception to Procedural Default Bar: 

Miscarriage of Justice .......................... 501

 6.2.3.2.4 Burden of Proof–Abuse of the Writ ................ 504

 6.2.3.2.5 Successive Motions Under § 2241(c) .............. 505

6.2.4 Amended Petitions ............................................... 505

6.2.5 State Procedural Default–Adequate and Independent State Ground ......... 508

6.2.5.1 Independent State Ground ................................. 512

 6.2.5.1.1 Alternative Rulings on Federal Law 

Do Not Negate Independent State Ground .......... 514
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) vii

 6.2.5.1.2 Ambiguous Rulings Presumed Not Independent ...... 516

6.2.5.2 Adequate State Ground .................................... 518

 6.2.5.2.1 Firmly Established, Regularly Applied ............. 518

6.2.5.3 State Ruling on Merits Negates Procedural Default .............. 521

6.2.5.4 Waiver ................................................. 522

6.2.5.5 Estoppel ............................................... 523

6.2.5.6 Exception to Procedural Default Bar: Cause and Prejudice ....... 524

 6.2.5.6.1 Cause ....................................... 524

 6.2.5.6.1.1 New Law/Novel Claims ............. 527

 6.2.5.6.1.2 Futility Not an Excuse .............. 528

 6.2.5.6.1.3 Incompetence of Defendant .......... 529

 6.2.5.6.1.4 State Withholding Necessary

 Information ...................... 529

6.2.5.6.1.5 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel ..... 530

 6.2.5.6.2 Actual Prejudice ............................... 532

6.2.5.7 Exception to Procedural Default Bar: Miscarriage of Justice ...... 533

6.2.6 Authorization of Petition on Petitioner’s Behalf ........................ 537

6.2.6.1 Next Friend Standing ..................................... 538

6.2.7 Representation by Foreign State .................................... 540

6.2.8 Right to and Payment of Counsel, Experts, and Investigators .............. 541

6.2.8.1 State Exhaustion and Clemency Proceedings ................... 546

6.2.9 Petitioner’s Presence at Habeas Proceedings ........................... 550

6.2.10 Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination .................. 550

6.2.11 Expedited Procedures ............................................ 551

6.2.12 Discovery ...................................................... 552

6.2.12.1 Protective Orders ....................................... 554

6.2.13 Evidentiary Hearings ............................................. 556

6.2.14 Stays of Execution ............................................... 563

6.2.14.1 Standard for Granting Stay ................................ 563

6.2.14.2 Jurisdiction to Enter Stay ................................. 566

6.2.15 Appellate and Supreme Court Review ................................ 568

6.2.15.1 Certificate of Probable Cause/Certificate of Appealability ....... 568

 6.2.15.1.1 Retroactivity of Certificate of Appealability 

Requirement .................................. 573

 6.2.15.1.2 Ninth Circuit Rule 22-1 ......................... 574

6.2.15.2 Jurisdictional Requirement: Resolution of all Guilt

 Phase Issues ........................................... 576

6.2.15.3 Appellate Standards of Review .............................. 576

 6.2.15.3.1 Grant or Denial of Habeas Relief ................. 577

 6.2.15.3.2 Factual vs. Legal Findings ....................... 577

 6.2.15.3.3 Stay of Order Granting Habeas Relief .............. 578

 6.2.15.3.4 Dismissal of Second or Successive Habeas Petition ... 578
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viii NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

 6.2.15.3.5 State Exhaustion .............................. 579

 6.2.15.3.6 Discovery .................................... 579

 6.2.15.3.7 Batson Claims ................................ 580

6.2.15.4 Writ of Mandamus ...................................... 580

6.2.15.5 Writ of Certiorari ....................................... 580

6.2.16 Special Procedures for “Opt-In” States ............................... 581

6.2.16.1 “Opt-In” Requirements ................................... 581

6.2.16.2 Mandatory Stay of Execution .............................. 585

 6.2.16.2.1 No Subsequent Stay Unless 

Successive Petition Authorized ................... 586

6.2.16.3 Filing Deadlines ........................................ 586

6.2.16.4 Amended Petitions ...................................... 587

6.2.16.5 Federal Court Priorities and Deadlines for Adjudication ......... 588

6.2.16.6 Exhaustion of State Remedies ............................. 589

6.3 Section 2254 Review: Habeas Corpus Review of State Convictions .............. 590

6.3.1 Standard for Granting Petitions ..................................... 590

6.3.1.1 Retroactivity of § 2254(d) .................................. 599

6.3.2 Restricted Claims ................................................ 600

6.3.2.1 No Ineffective Assistance of Habeas Counsel Claims ............ 600

6.3.2.2 No State Law Claims ..................................... 601

6.3.2.3 No Fourth Amendment Claims .............................. 603

 6.3.2.3.1 Limitations on Stone v. Powell: Fundamental Rights ... 604

6.3.2.4 No Claims of Error in State Postconviction Proceedings .......... 606

6.3.2.5 No “Freestanding” Actual Innocence Claims ................... 606

6.3.3 Exhaustion of State Remedies ...................................... 610

6.3.3.1 “Full and Fair Presentation” to State Court .................... 616

6.3.3.2 New Evidence in Federal Court ............................. 620

6.3.3.3 State Postcard Denials .................................... 621

6.3.3.4 Mixed Petitions .......................................... 622

6.3.3.5 Holding Petition in Abeyance Pending Exhaustion .............. 624

6.3.3.6 Patently Frivolous Claims .................................. 628

6.3.3.7 Waiver of Exhaustion by the State ........................... 629

6.3.3.8 Exceptions to Exhaustion Requirement: No State Remedies, 

 Futility, Delay and Unavailability of State Procedure ............ 629

6.3.4 Presumption of Correctness of State Court Fact Findings ................. 631

6.3.4.1 Findings of Fact ......................................... 631

6.3.4.2 Questions of Law ........................................ 635

6.3.4.3 Mixed Questions of Law and Fact ........................... 635

 6.3.4.3.1 District Court’s Duty to Review State Record ........ 637

6.3.4.4 Classification of Issues .................................... 638

 6.3.4.4.1 Generally .................................... 638

 6.3.4.4.2 Jury Determinations ............................ 638
NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) ix

 6.3.4.4.3 Pretrial Publicity .............................. 640

 6.3.4.4.4 Competence of Defendant ....................... 640

 6.3.4.4.5 Right to Counsel: Ineffective Assistance, 

Conflict of Interest, and Request for Counsel ........ 641

 6.3.4.4.6 Witness Issues ................................ 641

 6.3.4.4.7 Voluntariness of Confessions, Pleas and Waivers ..... 642

 6.3.4.4.8 Preclusive Effect of Verdict ...................... 643

 6.3.4.4.9 Harmless Error ................................ 643

 6.3.4.4.10 Custody for Miranda Purposes ................... 643

 6.3.4.4.11 Pretrial Identification Procedures ................. 644

 6.3.4.4.12 Existence of Mitigating Circumstances ............. 644

 6.3.4.4.13 Shackling Defendant ........................... 644

 6.3.4.4.14 Plea Agreements .............................. 645

6.3.5 Review Where State Court Did Not Reach Merits of Properly Raised

 Issue ......................................................... 645

6.4 Section 2255 Review: Habeas Corpus Review of Federal Convictions ............ 645

6.4.1 No Fourth Amendment Claims ..................................... 648

6.4.2 Exhaustion and Procedural Bar ..................................... 649

6.4.3 Successive Petitions .............................................. 649
x NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

United States Supreme Court

Abdur’Rahman v. Bell, 537 U.S. 88 (2002) (per curiam) ................. .............. 6.2.3.1.3

Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980) ................. ................. ................. . 2.6

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) ................. ................. ........ 2.5, 4.2, 6.2.5

Alabama v. Evans, 461 U.S. 230 (1983) ................. ................. ............. 6.2.3

Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986) ................. ................. ................. 2.6

Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896) ................. ................. ............ 4.5

Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988) ................. ................. ......... 6.2.5, 6.2.15

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) ................. ................. ............ 1.19

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4 (1982) ................. ................. ............... 6.3

Angelone v. Bennett, 519 U.S. 959 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ................. 6.2.3, 6.2.14, 6.3

Antone v. Dugger, 465 U.S. 200 (1984) ................. ................. ............. 6.2.14

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) ................. .......... AZ, ID, MT, NV, 4.6, 5.2

Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993) ................. ................. .............. ID, 4.7

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) ................. ................. ....... 1.16, 6.3

Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203 (1984) ................. ................. .............. 1.11

Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000) ................. ................. ................. 6.2.1

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) ............... AZ, CA, ID, MT, NV, OR, WA, 1.6, 1.18, 4.8

Autry v. Estelle, 464 U.S. 1 (1983) ................. ................. ................ 6.2.14

Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372 (1985) ................. ................. ......... 1.2, 4.6

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27 (2004) ................. ................. .............. 6.3.3.1

Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004) ................. ................. ................. 3.2

Barber v. Tennessee, 513 U.S. 1184 (1995) (mem.) ................. ................. ...... 4.7

Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) ................. ................. ............... 4.7

Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) ................. .............. 4.2, 6.2.11, 6.2.14, 6.2.15

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) ................. ................. ............... 2.6
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) xi

Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406 (2004) ................. ................. ............... 4.8.4.1

Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) ................. ................. ................ 3.5

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002) ................. ................. .............. 1.13, 6.3.1

Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978) ................. ................. ................. ... 4.8

Bell v. Thompson, 125 S. Ct. 2825 (2005) ................. ................ . ......... 6.2.3.1.2

Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) ................. ................. ............ 3.3

Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990) ................. ................ 1.2, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9

Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), 

overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) ................. ............. 4.3

Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) ................. ................. ..... 1.18, 6.4

Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990) ................. ................. ... 1.2, 4.5, 4.8, 4.9

Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (1997) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.12, 6.2.15

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) ................. ................. ................ 3.2

Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curiam) ................. ................. ... 6.2.5

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) ................. ................. 1.16, 3.1, 4.9, 5.1

Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) ................. ................. ................. . 6.3

Brown v. Payton, 125 S. Ct. 1432 (2005) ................. ................. ........... 4.8.2.8

Brown v. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. 884 (2006) ................. ................. .......... CA, 4.9.1

Brown v. Texas, 522 U.S. 940 (1997) ................. ................. ................. 4.5

Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269 (1998) ................. ................. ............ 4.8

Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987) ................. ................. ........ 2.6, 4.2

Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981) ................. ................. ........... 1.11

Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) ................. ................. ......... 2.6

Burden v. Zant, 498 U.S. 433 (1991) ................. ................. .............. 6.3, 6.4

Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987) ................. ................. ......... 1.6, 1.13, 3.5

Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990) ................. ................. .............. 1.18

Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986) ................. ................. ............... 1.7

Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) ................. ................. ................ 3.5

Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740 (1998) ................. ................. ........... 6.2.15
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

xii NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141 (1998) (per curiam) ................. .............. 1.16, 4.5

Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998) ................. ................ 6.2.2, 6.2.3, 6.2.5

Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting) ................. ........ 6.2.3

Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) ................. ................. .... 2.5, 4.4, 4.5

California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987) ................. ................. .......... 4.5, 4.8

California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983) ................. ................. .............. 4.5

California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2 (1996) ................. ................. ............. 1.16, 3.1

Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994) ................. ................. ............... 1.1

Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392 (1998) ................. ................. ............ 2.7

Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002) ................. ................. ............ CA, 6.2.1

Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346 (1989) ................. ................. ............... 6.3

Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375 (2003) ................. ................. .... 6.2.2, 6.2.3

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) ................. ................. .... CA, 1.16, 3.5

Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522 (2003) ................. ................. ........ 6.2.1, 6.4

Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990) ................. ................. ........... 4.9

Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) ................. ................. ................ 1.3

Cole v. Texas, 499 U.S. 1301 (1991) 

(Scalia, J., as Fifth Circuit Justice) ................. ................. .......... 6.2.14

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) ................. ................. ..... 6.2.5, 6.2.8

Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990) ................. ................. ............ 1.18

Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981) ................. ............. 1.14

Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996) ................. ................. ............. 2.4

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) ................. ................. .......... 1.13, 6.3

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) ................. ................. 1.13, 2.6, 3.3, 4.4

Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (per curiam) ................. ................. ...... 2.6

Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115 (1994) ................. ................. ............. 2.6

Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992) ................. ................. ............. 4.7

Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ................. ........ 2.6

Deck v. Missouri, 125 S. Ct. 2007 (2005) ................. ................. ............ 4.1.6
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) xiii

Delo v. Blair, 509 U.S. 823 (1993) ................. ................. ................ 6.2.14

Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272 (1993) ................. ................. ............. 4.7, 4.8

Delo v. Stokes, 495 U.S. 320 (1990) ................. ................. ............... 6.2.14

Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731 (1990) ................. ................. . . 6.2.6, 6.2.14, 6.3

Dickey v. United States, 524 U.S. 947 (1998) ................. ................. ........ 6.2.15

Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977) ................. ................. .............. 1.17

Dobbs v. Zant, 506 U.S. 357 (1993) ................. ................. ............... 6.2.12

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974) ................. ................. .... 3.3, 4.4

Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386 (2004) ................. ................. ............ 6.2.3.2.3

Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989) ................. ................. ............. 2.2

Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1 (1981) (per curiam) ................. ................. .... 6.3

Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401 (1989) ................. ................. ........... 4.4, 6.2.5

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995) ................. ................. ................ 6.3

Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001) ................. ................. ............. 6.2.1

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam) ................. ................. . 2.4

Dye v. Hofbauer, 126 S. Ct. 5 (2005) ................. ................. .............. 6.3.3.1

Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 (2003) (per curiam) ................. ................. ....... 6.3.1

Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) ................. ................. ............. 1.3

Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) ................. ................. ..... ID, 1.5, 4.8

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) ................. ................. .............. 2.9

Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000) ................. ................. .......... 6.2.5

Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ................. ............. 1.9

Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982) ................. ................. ................ 6.2.5

Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) ................. ................. .... AZ, 1.3, 1.7, 3.5

Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992) ................. ................. ......... 4.7, 4.9

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) ................. ................. ............ 3.5, 6.3

Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) ................. ................. ................. 4.2

Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) ................. ................. ............... 4.1

Evans v. Chavis, 126 S. Ct. 846 (2006) ................. ................. ...... CA, 6.2.1, 6.3.1
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

xiv NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) ................. ................. ................. 1.13

Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) ................. ................. ................. . . 6.3

Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1866) ................. ................. ................. 6.3

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) ................. ................. ............. 2.2

Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) ................. ................. ................ 6.1, 6.3

Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) ................. ................. ....... 6.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3

Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004) ................. ................. ............ 1.13.3.1

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) ................. ................. ............... 6.2.4

Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411 (1991) ................. ................. ............ 2.6, 6.2.5

Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) ................. ................. .......... AZ, 1.4

Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) ................. ............. 1.9

Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ................. .............. 1.9

Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) ................. ................. .............. 3.5

Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988) ................. ................. ............. 4.8

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) ............... AZ, CA, ID, MT, WA, 1.1, 5.1

Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) ................. ................. .............. 4.1

Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) ................. ................. ............. 2.6

Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ................. ................. ............ 1.16

Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1977) ................. ................. ........ 6.2.6, 6.2.14

Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080 (1985) ................. ................. .............. 1.8

Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) ................. ................. .............. 4.7

Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) ................. ................. ............... 2.2

Gomez v. Fierro, 519 U.S. 918 (1996) ................. ................. .......... CA, 1.8, 1.9

Gomez v. Fierro, 519 U.S. 918 (1996) (Stevens, Breyer, JJ., dissenting) ................. ....... 1.9

Gomez v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal., 

503 U.S. 653 (1992) ................. ................. .... 1.8, 6.1, 6.2.1, 6.2.3, 6.2.14

Gonzalez v. Crosby, 125 S. Ct. 2641 (2005) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.3.1.3

Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461 (1993) ................. ................. .............. 1.18

Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987) ................. ................. .............. 6.3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) xv

Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987) ................. ................. .............. 2.6

Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152 (1996) ................. ................. .............. 4.1

Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) ................. ................. ................. 4.8

Greene v. Georgia, 519 U.S. 145 (1996) ................. ................. ............... 6.3

Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987) ................. ................. ................. . 3.3

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) ................. ................. ..... CA, 1.1, 1.2, 4.7

Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) ................. ................. .............. 3.3

Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) ................. ................. .............. 2.6

Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504 (1995) ................. ................. .............. 1.11

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969) ................. ................. ............. 6.2.12

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989) ................. ................. ................ 6.2.5

Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255 (1982) ................. ................. ............. 6.2.5

Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1986) ................. ................. ............... 1.11

Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) ................. ................. ............... 1.8

Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) ................. ................. ........... 2.6

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) ................. ................. .... 6.2.3, 6.2.14, 6.3

Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989) ................. ................. ............... 4.6

Hill v. Crosby, 126 S. Ct. 1189 (2006) (mem.) ................. ................. ..... 1.8, 6.1.3

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) ................. ................. ............... 6.2.13

Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770 (1987) ................. ................. ........... 6.2.15

Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) ................. ................. ........ 1.11, 4.8

Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998) ................. ................. ...... 6.2, 6.2.15

Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) ................. ................. ........... 1.13

Hooks v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) ................. ................. ................ 1.3

Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88 (1998) ................. ................. ............ 1.7, 3.5

Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605 (1982) ................. ................. ................ 3.5

Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266 (2002) (per curiam) ................. ................. ....... 1.18

House v. Bell, 125 S. Ct. 2991 (2005) (mem.) ................. ................. 6.2.5.7, 6.3.2.5

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988) ................. ................. ............... 6.2.1
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

xvi NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) ................. ................. ................. 4.1

In re Berger, 498 U.S. 233 (1991) (per curium) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.8

In re Blodgett, 502 U.S. 236 (1992) ................. ................. ................. . . 6.3

In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1980) ................. ................. ................. . 1.8

In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968 (2002) (mem.) ................. ................. ............ 1.5

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) ................. ................. ................. . . 3.5

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) ................. ................. ................. . . 2.3

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) ................. ................. .......... 4.8, 6.3

James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341 (1984) ................. ................. ............. 6.2.5

J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) ................. ................. ............... 2.6

Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980) ................. ................. ............ 6.2.5

Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445 (1965) ................. ................. ........... 4.5

Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 2410 (2005) ................. ................. ........ 2.6.4

Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988) ................. ................. ............ 4.7

Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993) ................. ................. ................ 4.8

Johnson v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1571 (2005) ................. ................. ...... 6.2.1

Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 

reh’g denied, 527 U.S. 1058 (1999) ................. ................. ............ 5.2

Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) ................. ................. ....... OR, 1.1, 1.2, 4.7

Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 126 S. Ct. 407 (2005) ................. ................. .......... 2.2

Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969) ................. ................. ......... 6.4

Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205 (1973) ................. ................. ........... 3.5

Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992) ................. ................. ......... 6.2.13

Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246 (2002) ................. ................. ........... 4.5

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) ................. ................. . . 1.13.2.2, 6.3

Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring) ................. ............. 1.9

Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 992 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ................. .......... 1.9

Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996) ................. ................. ............ 1.11

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) ................. ................. ........ 1.16
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) xvii

Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (plurality) ................. ............... 6.2.3, 6.2.5

Kyles v. Whitley, 498 U.S. 931 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring) ................. ........... 6.2.14

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) ................. ................. ................. 3.2

Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) ................. ................. ................ 1.9

Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518 (1997) ................. ................. . . 1.18, 4.9, 6.2.5

Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) ................. ..... 1.18, 1.19, 6.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3

Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110 (1991) ................. ................. ............ ID, 4.1

Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764 (1990) ................. ................. .......... 4.7, 4.9, 6.3

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) ................. .......... 1.18, 1.19, 6.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3, 6.3

Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) ................. ................. ......... AZ, CA, 4.8

Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993) ................. ................. ....... 1.13, 1.18

Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 402 (1986) ................. ................. .............. 2.6

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) ................. ................. ......... 6.2.15, 6.3

Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314 (1996) ................. ................. ... 6.1, 6.2.1, 6.2.14

Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) ................. ................ 1.8

Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996) ................. ................. ........... 5.1

Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988) ................. ................. ......... 4.5, 4.7

Lozada v. Deeds, 498 U.S. 430 (1991) (per curiam) ................. ................. ... 6.2.15

Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962) ................. ................. ..... 6.2.9

Madden v. Texas, 498 U.S. 1301 (1991) ................. ................. ............ 6.2.14

Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 112 (1983) ................. ................. ............... 6.3

Maggio v. Williams, 464 U.S. 46 (1983) ................. ................. ............ 6.2.14

Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1983) ................. ................. ............ 6.3

Massaro v. United States, 538 U. S. 500 (2003) ................. ................. ....... 6.4.2

Mayle v. Felix, 125 S. Ct. 2562 (2005) ................. ................. .............. 6.2.4

Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988) ................. ................. ........... 4.7

McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) ................. ................. ............. 1.12

McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.3, 6.2.12

McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849 (1994) ................. ................. ... 6.1, 6.2.8, 6.2.14
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

xviii NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) ................. ................. ............ 1.16

McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990) ................. ................. ......... 4.8

Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992) ................. ................. ............. 2.4

Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, reh’g denied, 535 U.S. 1074 (2002) ................. ........ 1.13

Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985) ................. ................. ................. 6.3

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) ................. ................. ... 2.6.4, 6.2.15.1

Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317 (2005) ................. ................. ........... 2.6.4

Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) ................. ................. ............... 4.8

Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990) ................. ................. ............ 2.2

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ................. ................. .......... 2.2, 2.4

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12 (2003) (per curiam) ................. ............ 1.6.2, 3.5, 6.3.1

Moore v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 115 (1997) ................. ................. ............... 6.3

Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) ................. ................. ............... 2.2

Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992) ................. ................. ............... 2.6

Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991) ................. ................. .............. 2.3

Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975) ................. ................. ............... 2.3

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) ................. ................. ........ 6.2.3, 6.2.5

Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) ................. ................. .... 1.13, 6.2.8, 6.3

NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) ................. ............... 6.2.5

Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (2004) ................. ................. ......... 1.8, 6.1.3

Netherland v. Gray, 519 U.S. 1301 (1997) ................. ................. .......... 6.2.14

O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151 (1997) ................. ................. ........ 1.18, 4.5

Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998) (plurality opinion) ................. . 1.14

O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995) ................. ................. ..... 1.16, 3.1, 4.9

Oregon v. Guzek, 126 S. Ct. 1226 (2006) ................. ................. ......... OR, 4.8.1

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.5, 6.3

Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991) ................. ................. ............ 4.9, 6.3

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 125 S. Ct. 1807 (2005) ................. ................. ......... 6.2.1

Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988) ................. ................. .............. 2.2
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) xix

Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984 (2002) (mem.) ................. ................. ......... 1.5

Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984) ................. ................. ............ 2.3, 6.3

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) ................. ................. .............. 4.3

Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) ................. ................. ..... 1.6, 4.2, 4.8, 6.3

Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) ................. ................. .... OR, 1.6, 1.18, 4.8

Penry v. Texas, 515 U.S. 1304 (1995) ................. ................. .............. 6.2.15

Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988) ................. ................. ................. 1.13

Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990) ................. ................. ................ 1.4

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971) ................. ................. ................ 6.3

Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225 (2004) ................. ................. ......... 6.3.3.4, 6.3.3.5

Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147 (1986) ................. ................. .......... 1.11, 4.9

Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987) ................. ................. ................. 1.12

Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61 (2000) ................. ................. ............... 3.3

Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680 (1989) ................. ................. ................. 4.2

Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) ................. ................. ................. 2.6

Poyner v. Murray, 508 U.S. 931 (1993) ................. ................. ............... 1.8

Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14 (1979) ................. ................. ............... 4.7

Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501 (1984) ................. ................. . 2.6

Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) ................. ................. ........ 1.1, 1.2, 4.7

Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984) ................. ................. ...... CA, 1.10, 4.5, 6.3

Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 265 (1995) ................. ................. ................. 2.6

Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156 (2000) ................. ................. ............. 4.5

Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984) ................. ................. ................. ... 6.2.5

Rhines v. Weber, 125 S. Ct. 1528 (2005) ................. ................. ..... 6.3.3.5, 6.3.3.6

Rice v. Collins, 126 S. Ct. 969 (2006) ................. ................. .......... 2.6.4, 6.3.1

Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40 (1992) ................. ................. ............ 4.7, 4.9

Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987) ................. ................. ............... 1.11

Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) ................. ................. .............. 2.3

Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) ................. ................. ............... 1.4
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xx NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) ................. ........... AZ, ID, MT, NV, 1.11, 4.6, 5.2

Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298 (1994) ................. ................. ... 1.19

Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) ................. ................. ............. 1.2

Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977) ................. ................. ............. 1.2

Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) ................. ................. ............ 1.13

Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994) ................. ................. .......... 4.1, 4.9

Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456 (2005) ................. ................. ......... 1.13.2.2

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) ................. .... AZ, CA, ID, MT, NV, OR, WA, 1.5

Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986) ................. ................. .............. 1.16, 3.5

Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19 (1975) ................. ................. ................. . 6.3

Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) ................. ................. ................. . 6.3

Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) ................. ................. ................. 6.3

Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988) ................. ................. ................ 2.6

Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983) ................. ................. ......... 3.5.1.2, 6.3.4

Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990) ................. ................. .......... 1.18, 4.5, 4.8

Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963) ................. ................. ..... 6.2.3, 6.2.9

Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) ................. ................. ............ 3.5

Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101 (2003) ................. ................. ........ 1.11

Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988) ................. ................. .............. 4.2

Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990) ................. ................. ............ 1.18, 4.4

Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992) ................. ................. ... 6.2.1, 6.2.3, 6.2.5

Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991) ................. ................. ................ 3.5

Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222 (1994) ................. ................. ............ 1.11, 6.3

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.3, 6.2.5, 6.3

Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) ................. ............ AZ, ID, MT, NV, 4.6.1.1

Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2001) ................. ................. ........... 4.5

Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1 (1990) ................. ................. ................ 4.7

Shellmon v. Cambra, 531 U.S. 1005 (2000) ................. ................. .......... 6.2.2

Shick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974) ................. ................. ................. . . ID
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) xxi

Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) ................. ................. .... 4.1, 4.7

Singletary v. Duest, 507 U.S. 1048 (1993) ................. ................. ............. 4.9

Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) ................. ................. .... 4.1, 4.7, 4.8

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) ................. ................. ........ 6.2.2, 6.2.3

Smith v. Digmon, 434 U.S. 332 (1978) (per curiam) ................. ................. ...... 6.3

Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986) ................. ................. .......... 6.2.3, 6.2.5

Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000) ................. ................. ............... 1.19

Smith v. Texas, 125 S. Ct. 400 (2004) (per curiam) ................. ................. ..... 4.8.1

Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) ................. ................. ........... 4.1

Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527 (1992) ................. ................. ....... 4.6, 4.9, 6.2.5

South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), 

overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) ................. ............. 4.3

Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984) ................. ................. ...... 1.11, 3.5, 4.6

Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) ................. ................. .............. 4.1

Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) ................. ................. ............. 1.5

Stewart v. LaGrand (Walter), 526 U.S. 115 (1999) (per curiam) ............ AZ, 1.8, 1.13, 1.18, 6.2.5

Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998) ................. ................. . 1.4, 6.2.2

Stewart v. Smith, 534 U.S. 157 (2001) (per curiam) ................. ................. . AZ, 6.2.5

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 (2002) (per curiam) ................. ................. . AZ, 6.2.5

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) ................. ................. ................ 6.3

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ................. ................. ..... 1.13, 6.3

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) ................. ................. .......... 3.2, 6.2.5

Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992) ................. ................. ........ 1.18, 4.7, 4.9

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) ................. ................. ........ 1.16, 3.5

Sullivan v. Wainwright, 464 U.S. 109 (1983) ................. ................. ........ 6.2.14

Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981) ................. ................. ................. 6.3

Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591 (1982) ................. ................. ................. 6.3

Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987) ................. ................. ............ NV, 1.2

Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947) ................. ................. ................. . 6.3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

xxii NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), 

overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) ................. ............... 2.6

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) ................. ......... 1.6, 1.7, 1.18, 2.5, 2.6, 6.2.3, 6.2.5

Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004) ................. ................. ............. 4.8.1

Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995) ................. ................. ............. 6.3

Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) ................. ................. ........... 1.5

Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) ................. ................. ............. AZ, 1.7

Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), 

overruled in part, 504 U.S. 1 (1992) ................. ................. ..... 6.2.13, 6.3

Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87 (1997) ................. ................. ................. . 6.2.5

Trevino v. Texas, 503 U.S. 562 (1992) ................. ................. ................ 2.6

Truesdale v. Aiken, 480 U.S. 527 (1987) ................. ................. ............... 4.8

Tuggle v. Netherland, 516 U.S. 10 (1995) ................. ................. .............. 4.9

Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994) ................. ................. ..... CA, 4.5, 4.7

Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) ................. ................. ................. 1.16

Turner v. California, 498 U.S. 1053 (1991) ................. ................. ........... 1.10

Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986) ................. ................. ................. 2.6

Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, reh’g denied, 533 U.S. 970 (2001) ................. ......... 1.18, 3.5

Ulster County Ct. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979) ................. ................. .... 3.5, 6.2.5

United States v. Allen, 536 U.S. 953 (2002) (mem.) ................. ................. ...... 5.2

United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) ................. ................. ....... 1.12

United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862 (2002) (per curiam) ................. ................. . 1.12

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) ................. ................. ......... .1.13

United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.5, 6.3

United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (2000) ................. ................. ... 2.6

United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) ................. ................. ............ 2.2

Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) ................. ................. . . 1.16, 2.7, 6.2.1, 6.3

Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994) ................. ................. ................. 3.5

Visciotti v. Woodford, 537 U.S. 19 (2002) (per curiam) ................. ................. . . 1.13

Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78 (1983) ................. ................. .............. 4.7
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) xxiii

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) ................. ................. ............ 6.2.5

Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982) ................. ................. ........... 6.2.8

Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) ................. ................. ........... 2.6, 6.3

Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) ................. ................. ............... 1.16

Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) ................. ...... AZ, NV, 1.2, 1.10, 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) ................. ................. ............ 1.4

Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) ................. ................. .......... 6.2.6

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) ................. ................. .... 1.13.2.2, 1.13.2.3

Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878) ................. ................. ................ 1.8

Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) ................. ................. ............ 4.1

Williams (Michael) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000) ................. ................. .... 6.2.13

Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) ................. ................. .... 1.13, 6.3

Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971) (per curiam) ................. ................. 6.3

Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) ................. ................. ........... 2.6

Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) ................. ................. ............. 6.3

Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003) ................. ................. .......... 6.1.1

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) ................. ......... ID, MT, NV, WA, 1.2

Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992) ................. ................. ................. . 6.3

Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1 (2003) (per curiam) ................. ................. . 1.13.2

Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211 (1988) ................. ................. ................. . 3.5

Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 (1991), 

disapproved of on other grounds, Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) ................ 3.5

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991) ................. ................. ......... 6.2.5, 6.3

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) ................. ................. .......... 3.5, 4.7, 4.9
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: NINTH CIRCUIT

xxiv NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Ninth Circuit

Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139 (9th Cir. 1992) ................. ................. ..... 6.3

Adamson v. Ricketts, 758 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1985), 

rev’d on other grounds, 789 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc), 

and rev’d on other grounds, 483 U.S. 1 (1987) ................. ................. ... 6.3

Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1031 (1990) ................. ................. ............. 2.1

Aiken v. Spalding, 841 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) ................. ................ 6.3

Ainsworth v. Calderon, 152 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1998) ................. ............. 2.3, 4.1, 4.2

Ainsworth v. Woodford, 268 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2001) ................. ................. ... 1.13

Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 2003) ................. ................. ... 1.13.2.2

Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946 (9th Cir.) 

cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1140 (2006) ................. ................. ........ 1.4, 1.9

Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 134 (2005) ................. ................. .... 1.10, 1.13.2.2

Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 486 (9th Cir. 1997), 

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1130 (1998) ................. ................. ............. 2.4

Ames v. Endell, 856 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988) ................. ................. .......... 6.3

Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2000), 

cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036 (2001) 

reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 276 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 2001) ............. ID, 1.13, 6.2.12.1

Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2000), 

cert. denied, 533 U.S. 941 (2001) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.1, 6.2.4

Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1989) ................. ...... 6.2.4

Ashmus v. Calderon, 123 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 1997), 

vacated on other grounds, 523 U.S. 740 (1998) ................. ................. 6.2.16

Ashmus v. Woodford, 202 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2000), 

cert. denied, 531 U.S. 916 (2000) ................. ................. ........... 6.2.16

Austad v. Risley, 761 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir.) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 474 U.S. 856 (1985) ................. ................. .......... 2.3, 6.3

Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 1998), 

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1159 (1999) ................. ................. ........ 1.13, 4.8

Babbitt v. Woodford, 177 F.3d 744 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1107 (1999) ................. ................. ........... 6.2.3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: NINTH CIRCUIT

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) xxv

Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. .... 6.2.13

Bargas v. Burns, 179 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.5

Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1982) ................. ................. ... 6.2.5, 6.3

Bates v. Nelson, 485 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1973) ................. ................. ............ 6.3

Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321 (9th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. ..... 1.13, 6.3

Beam v. Paskett, 966 F.2d 1563 (9th Cir. 1992), 

cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1060 (1994) ................. ................. ..... 1.18, 4.9, 6.3

Beam v. Paskett, 3 F.3d 1301 (9th Cir. 1993), 

cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1060 (1994) ................. ................. ..... ID, 4.7, 6.2.5

Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1998), 

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 922 (1999) ................. ................. ............. 1.13

Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 560 (9th Cir.) 

cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 281 (2004) ................. ................. ......... 1.13.2.2

Beardslee v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), 

cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 982 (2005) ................. ................. ......... CA, 1.8

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2002), 

cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1053 (2003) ................. ................. .......... 6.2.13

Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir.), 

petition for cert. filed (Oct. 12, 2005) (No. 05-493) ................. .............. 4.8.2.8

Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 540 U.S. 938 (2003) ................. ................. ......... CA, 6.2.5

Binford v. Rhode, 116 F.3d 396 (9th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.5

Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir.) (en banc) 

cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1013 (2003) ................. ................. ......... 6.2.12.1

Blair v. Woodford, 319 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2003) ................. ................. ...... 6.3.1

Bland v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 513 U.S. 947 (1994) ................. ................. ............. 1.16

Blazak v. Ricketts, 971 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1992) ................. ................. . . 3.3, 6.2.15

Bloom v. Calderon, 132 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1145 (1997) ................. ................. ............ 1.13

Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 506 U.S. 904 (1992) ................. ................. .............. 4.1

Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 1995), 

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1142 (1996) ................. ................. ... 1.13, 4.7, 6.2.4
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: NINTH CIRCUIT

xxvi NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Bonin v. Calderon, 77 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1143 (1996) ................. ................ 1.8, 1.9, 6.2.5, 6.2.8

Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. ......... 6.2.1

Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. ..... 6.2.5

Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir.) 

amended on granting of petition for reh’g, 421 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2005) ............ 1.13.2.2

Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir.), 

amended on denial of petition for reh’g, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) ........... 1.13, 6.2.13

Brewer v. Lewis, 989 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1993) ................. ................. .... 6.2.7, 6.3

Brimmage v. Sumner, 793 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1986) ................. ................. .... NV

Brown v. Lambert, 431 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 2005) ................. ................. ... WA, 2.6.2

Brown v. Maass, 11 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 1993) ................. ................. ........... 6.3

Brown v. Myers, 137 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. ........ 1.13

Brown v. Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164 (9th Cir. 1991) ................. ................. ..... 6.2.14

Bruni v. Lewis, 847 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1988) ................. ................. ......... 6.2.5

Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1988) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.13

Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) ................. ............. 6.2.1

Burks v. Borg, 27 F.3d 1424 (9th Cir. 1994), 

cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1160 (1995) ................. ................. ......... 2.6, 6.3

Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504 (9th Cir. 1994) ................. ................. 6.2.4

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Beeler), 

128 F.3d 1283 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099, 

cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1061 (1998), 

and overruled en banc, 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) ................. .......... 6.1, 6.2.1

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Kelly V), 

163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1060 (1999) ................. .............. 6.1, 6.2.1, 6.2.3, 6.2.15

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Malone), 

137 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. ............. 6.2.14

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Cal. (Bean), 

96 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. ............... 6.2.5

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Cal. (Gordon), 

107 F.3d 756 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 907 (1997) ................. ...... 6.2.8, 6.3

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Cal. (Hayes), 

103 F.3d 72 (9th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. ................ 6.2.5
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: NINTH CIRCUIT

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) xxvii

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Cal. (Roberts), 

F.3d 149 (9th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. ................. . 6.2.12

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal. (Hill), 

120 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. .............. 6.2.12

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. Of Cal. (Nicolaus), 

98 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. .............. 6.2.12

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal. (Taylor), 

134 F.3d 981 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 920 (1998) ................. ...... 6.2.3, 6.3

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal. (Thomas), 

 144 F.3d 618 (9th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. ............. 6.2.12

Caldwell v. Amend, 30 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 1994) ................. ................. ...... 6.2.5

California First Amendment Coalition v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002) ........... CA, 1.15

Campbell v. Blodgett, 978 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1992), 

reh’g granted, 978 F.2d 1519 (9th Cir. 1992), ................. ...... 1.8, 1.13, 4.9, 6.2.13

Campbell v. Blodgett, 997 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1992) ................. ................. 6.2.3, 6.3

Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1987), 

cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948 (1988) ................. .... WA, 1.13, 2.1, 4.4, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, 6.3

Campbell v. Rice, 408 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir.) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 735 (2005) ................. ................. ....... 1.13.2.1

Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1119 (1994) ................. ......... WA, 1.1, 1.8, 2.6, 4.1, 6.2.11

Canales v. Roe, 151 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. .......... 6.3

Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 536 U.S. 951 (2002) ................. ................. ............. 1.13

Carothers v. Rhay, 594 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1979) ................. ................. ........ 6.3

Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1992), 

cert. denied, 507 U.S. 992 (1993) ................. .............. 1.12, 3.5, 4.6, 4.8, 6.2.5

Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1133 (1998) ................. ................. ........ 6.2.3, 6.3

Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 2005) 

cert. denied, 2006 WL 386448 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2006) ................. .............. 6.3.3

Castillo v. Stainer, 997 F.3d 669 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1014 (1993) ................. ................. ............. 4.1

Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. ...... 4.7, 6.2.5

Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1085 (1998) ................. ................. ............. 1.9
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xxviii NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191 (9th Cir. 1986), 

cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1023 (1987) ................. ................. .... 4.7, 6.2.8, 6.3

Chaney v. Stewart, 156 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. ........ 2.5

Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1960) ................. ................. ...... 1.9

Claibourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373 (9th Cir. 1995) ................. ................. ...... 1.13

Clark v. Lewis, 1 F.3d 814 (9th Cir. 1993) ................. ........... 4.7, 4.9, 6.2.3, 6.2.14, 6.3

Clark v. Ricketts, 958 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 506 U.S. 838 (1992) ................. ................. ... 4.1, 4.6, 6.1, 6.3

Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1990) ................. ................. ......... 1.18

Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.), 

rev’d on other grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998) ................. ................. ... 1.13

Coleman v. McCormick, 874 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir.), 

 cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989) ................. ................. ...... 1.17, 6.2.13

Coley v. Gonzales, 55 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir. 1995) ................. ................. .... 6.2.3, 6.3

Collazo v. Estelle, 940 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) ................. ................. . 6.3

Comer v. Stewart, 215 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2000) ................. ................. . . 1.4.2, 6.2.6

Cooper v. Calderon, 274 F.3d 1270 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) ................. ........... 6.2.2

Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978), 

cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979) ................. ................. ............. 1.13

Cooper v. Rimmer, 379 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2004) ................. ................. ... 1.8, CA

Cooperwood v. Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 534 U.S. 900 (2001) ................. ................. ............. 2.6

Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 984, 

and cert. denied, 525 U.S. 996 (1998) ................. ............... 1.13, 6.2.5, 6.2.13

Crandell v. Bunnell, 144 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. ..... 1.13

Creech v. Arave, 928 F.2d 1481 (9th Cir. 1991), 

rev'd on other grounds, 507 U.S. 463 (1993) ................. ................. ..... 4.8

Creech v. Arave, 947 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1991), 

rev’d on other grounds, 507 U.S. 463 (1993) ................. ................. ..... 1.2

Cuffle v. Goldsmith, 906 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1990) ................. ................. ...... 1.11

Daniels v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 

76 F.3d 385 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished) ................. ................. ..... 6.2.8

Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2005) ................. ................. .1.13.2.1
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Davis v. Kramer, 167 F.3d 494 (9th Cir. 1999), 

vacated and remanded on other grounds, 528 U.S. 1133 (2000) ................. ....... 6.3

Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628 (9th Cir. 2004) 

 cert. dismissed, 126 S. Ct. 410 (2005) ................. ................. ........ 4.1.9

Deere v. Woodford, 339 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2003) ................. ................. ....... 2.4

Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2000) ................. ................. .... 1.13, 6.3

Dennis ex rel. Butko v. Budge, 378 F.3d 880 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 542 U.S. 959 (2004) ................. ................. .............. 1.4

Deutscher v. Angelone, 16 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1994) ................. ................. .... 6.2.6

Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1989), 

vacated on other grounds, 

500 U.S. 901 (1992) ................. ............ 1.12, 1.13, 4.7, 4.9, 6.2.3, 6.2.5, 6.2.15

Deutscher v. Whitley, 991 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1993), 

opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh’g, 16 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1994) .............. 6.2.3

Dickey v. Lewis, 859 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1988) ................. ................. 3.5, 6.3

Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 540 U.S. 810 (2003) ................. ................. ......... 1.13.2.3

Downs v. Hoyt, 232 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2000), 

cert. denied, 532 U.S. 999 (2001) ................. ................. .............. 3.2

Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 704 (9th Cir. 2000), 

cert. denied, 532 U.S. 984 (2001) ................. ................. .............. 3.3

Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734 (9th Cir. 1995), 

cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1158 (1996) ................. ................. ............. 4.1

Duckett v. Godinez, 109 F.3d 533 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 848 (1997) ................. ................. .............. 4.1

Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2000) ................. ................. ..... 6.3

Dyer v. Calderon, 139 F.3d 970 (9th Cir.) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1033 (1998) ................. ................. ............. 2.6

Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1033 (1998) ................. ................. ............. 6.3

Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2005) ................. ................. ....... 6.3.1

Edelbacher v. Calderon, 160 F.3d 582 (9th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. .... 6.3

English v. United States, 42 F.3d 473 (9th Cir. 1994) ................. ................. ... 6.2.5

Eslaminia v. White, 136 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. 1.16, 6.2.15

Evans v. Lewis, 855 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1988) ................. ................. ... 1.13, 2.6, 3.5
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Evans v. Raines, 800 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1986) ................. ................. .......... 6.3

Farmer v. McDaniel, 98 F.3d 1548 (9th Cir. 1996), 

abrogated by Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) ................. ............ 6.2.3

Fetterly v. Paskett, 997 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1993) ................. ................. . . 6.2.4, 6.3

Fetterly v. Paskett, 15 F.3d 1482 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 513 U.S. 914 (1994) ................. ................. .............. 4.1

Fetterly v. Paskett, 163 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. ....... 2.3

Fields v. Brown, 431 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2005) ................. ................. .... 2.6.1, 3.6

Fields v. Calderon, 125 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 1997), 

cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1132 (1998) ................. ................. ........... 6.2.5

Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir.), 

vacated and remanded, 519 U.S. 918 (1996) ................. ................. . CA, 1.8

Fierro v. Grant, 53 F.3d 338 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished) ................. ................. 1.8

Fierro v. Terhune, 147 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. . CA, 1.8, 6.1

Fisher v. Roe, 263 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2001) ................. ................. ............ 6.3

Fitzpatrick v. McCormick, 869 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989) ................. ................. ........ 1.11, 1.13

Forde v. United States Parole Comm’n, 114 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 1997) ................. ...... 6.2.15

Forrest v. Vasquez, 75 F.3d 562 (9th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.5

Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1990) ................. ................. ........ 6.2.5

Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1989) ................. ................. ....... 6.3

Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2001), 

 cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1055 (2002) ................. ................. .......... 6.2.1

Furman v. Wood, 190 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. . . 2.6, 3.3, 6.3

Gallego v. McDaniel, 124 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 

U.S. 917 (1998), and cert. denied, 524 U.S. 922 (1998) ................. ...... 2.3, 4.5, 6.3

Garcia v. Bunnell, 33 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1994), 

cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1024 (1995) ................. ................. ............ 1.13

Garrison v. McCarthy, 653 F.2d 374 (9th Cir. 1981) ................. ................. ... 6.2.5

Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 1999), 

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1087 (2000) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.15, 6.3

Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 1997), 

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 903 (1998) ................. ................. ...... 1.13, 3.5, 4.7
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) xxxi

Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 167 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1131 (1999) ................. ................. ....... 1.9, 6.2.15

Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2002) ................. ................. ....... 2.2

Greenawalt v. Ricketts, 943 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1991), 

cert. denied, 506 U.S. 888 (1992) ................. ................ 1.7, 1.18, 2.3, 3.5, 6.3

Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1102 (1997) ................. ................. ... 6.2.2, 6.2.3, 6.3

Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1287 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1103 (1997) ................. ................. ...... 6.2.2, 6.2.3

Gretzler v. Stewart, 112 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 1997), 

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1081 (1998) ................. ................. 1.18, 2.5, 4.7, 6.2.5

Gretzler v. Stewart, 146 F.3d 675 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 524 U.S. 912 (1998) ................. ................. ......... 1.9, 6.2.2

Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. . . 4.8, 6.2.13

Guizar v. Estelle, 843 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1988) ................. ................. ..... 6.2.1, 6.3

Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1983) ................. ................. ...... 6.3

Hamilton v. Calderon, 134 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. ...... 6.3

Hamilton v. Vasquez, 882 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1989) ................. ................. 6.2.3, 6.3

Hamilton v. Vasquez, 17 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1229 (1994) ................. ................. 1.13, 1.17, 4.1, 4.5

Harding v. Lewis, 834 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1987), 

cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988) ................. ................. ......... 1.13, 2.2

Hardnett v. Marshall, 25 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 1994), 

cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1130 (1995) ................. ................. ............. 3.3

Harmon v. Ryan, 959 F.2d 1457 (9th Cir. 1992) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.5

Harris v. Pulley, 692 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1982), 

rev’d on other grounds, 465 U.S. 37 (1984) ................. ................. . . 4.2, 4.5

Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1988), 

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1051 (1990) ................ 1.12, 1.13, 2.3, 2.6, 4.8, 6.2.1, 6.2.3, 6.2.8

Harris v. Superior Ct., 500 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc) ................. ............. 6.3

Harris v. Vasquez, 901 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1990) ................. ................. 6.2.14, 6.2.15

Harris v. Vasquez, 913 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1990) ................. ................. ........ 1.13

Harris v. Vasquez, 928 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1991) ................. ................. ...... 6.2.1.3

Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d. 1497 (9th Cir. 1990), 

cert. denied, 503 U.S. 910 (1992) ................. .......... 1.18, 2.5, 6.2.1, 6.2.3, 6.2.15
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: NINTH CIRCUIT

xxxii NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir.), 

reh’g granted in part (June 15, 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 929 (1999) ................ 1.13

Hartman v. McCarthy, 74 F.3d 1245 (9th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. ..... 4.1

Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) ................. ................. ... 1.13, 6.2.1

Hawkins v. Risley, 984 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1993) ................. ................. ......... 6.3

Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) ................. ................. . 3.2

Hays v. Arave, 977 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1992) ................. ................. ........... 1.16

Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1995), 

cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1111 (1996) ................. ................. ............ 1.13

Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990) ................. ................. .... 6.2.6

Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir. 1992) ................. ................. . . 6.2.13

Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 1999), 

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 963 (1999) ................. ................. ............ 6.2.4

Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2001) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.15

Herd v. Kincheloe, 800 F.2d 1526, 1528 (9th Cir. 1986) ................. ................. . . 3.5

Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1991) ................. ................. ......... 2.4

Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), 

cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1009 (2000) ................. ................. . . 6.2.5, 6.2.15, 6.3

Hill v. Roe, 321 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 2003) ................. ................. ............ 6.2.5

Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1981), 

cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1211 (1983) ................. ................. ............ 1.10

Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 534 U.S. 944 (2001) ................. ................. . ID, 4.2, 4.6, 6.2.5

Houston v. Roe, 177 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. ....... 3.5, 6.3

Howard v. Lewis, 905 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1990) ................. ................. 6.2.3, 6.2.15

Howey v. United States, 481 F.2d 1187 (1973) ................. ................. ........ 6.2.4

Huffman v. Ricketts, 750 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1984) ................. ................. ..... 6.2.5

Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1986) ................. ..... 6.2.5

Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2001) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.1

Hunt v. Vasquez, 899 F. 2d 878 (9th Cir. 1990) ................. ................. ......... 6.3

Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d 344 (9th Cir. 1992) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.5

Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1986) ................. ................. ............. 6.3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: NINTH CIRCUIT

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) xxxiii

In re Morris, 363 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) ................. ............... 6.2.15.4

In re Turner, 101 F.3d 1323 (9th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. .......... 6.2.2

Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2000), 

cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1072 (2001) ................. ................. ....... 1.13, 6.2.5

Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2005) ................. ................. ........ 6.3.3.5

Jackson v. Vasquez, 1 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 1993) ................. ................. ........ 6.2.8

Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1990) ................. ................. ...... 1.18, 2.5

Jacobson v. California, 431 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1970) ................. ................. .... 2.6

James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20 (9th Cir. 1994) ................. ................. .............. 6.3

James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2000) ................. ................. .......... 6.3

Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1984) ................. ................. .... 1.13

Jeffers v. Lewis, 5 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 1993) ................. ................. ............ 4.9

Jeffers v. Lewis, 38 F.3d 411 (9th Cir. 1994), 

cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1071 (1995) ................. ................. ..... AZ, 1.12, 4.9

Jeffers v. Ricketts, 832 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1987), 

rev'd on other grounds, 497 U.S. 764 (1990) ................. ................. ..... 2.6

Jeffries v. Blodgett, 974 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1992) ................. ................. ....... 4.9

Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 1993), 

cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1191 (1994) ................. ................ 2.3, 3.3, 4.4, 4.8, 6.3

Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484 (9th Cir.) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997) ................. ................. ......... 6.1, 6.3

Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2003) ................. ................. ..... 6.2.1

Jennings v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2002), 

cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003) ................. ................. ..... 1.13.2, 6.2.15

Jennison v. Goldsmith, 940 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1991) ................. ................. .... 6.3

Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478 (9th Cir. 2001) ................. ................. ......... 6.2.1

Johnson v. Baldwin, 114 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. ...... 1.13

Johnson v. Campbell, 92 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. ....... 2.6

Johnson v. Lumpkin, 769 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1985) ................. ................. ..... 6.2.3

Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. .......... 6.3

Jones v. Meyer, 899 F.2d 883 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990) ................. ................. .............. 4.1
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: NINTH CIRCUIT

xxxiv NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 1997) ................. ............... 6.2.12, 6.2.13, 6.3

Jones v. Wood, 207 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 2000) ................. ................. .......... 1.13

Jorss v. Gomez, 266 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2001) ................. ................. ......... 6.2.1

Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2002), 

 cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003) ................. ................. ........ 1.13, 3.2

Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. ......... 6.3

Kellotat v. Cupp, 719 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir. 1983) ................. ................. ......... 6.3

Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir), 

cert. denied, 538 U. S. 1042 (2003) ................. ................. ......... 6.3.3.5

Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2002) 

 cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1179 (2003)................. ................. .............. 3.2

Kim v. Villalobos, 799 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1986) ................. ................. ........ 6.3

King v. Brown, 8 F.3d 1403 (9th Cir. 1993) ................. ................. ......... 6.2.15

Knapp v. Cardwell, 667 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1055 (1982) ................. ................. 1.11, 1.17, 4.4, 6.3

Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 479 U.S. 867 (1986) ................. ................. ........... 6.2.1.3

La Crosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 2001) ................. ................. . 6.2.5, 6.3

LaGrand (Karl) v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 971 (1998) ................. .............. AZ, 1.13, 3.5, 4.7, 6.2.5

LaGrand (Karl) v. Stewart, 170 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 1999) ................. ................ 6.2.2

LaGrand (Karl) v. Stewart, 173 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir.), 

stay vacated, 525 U.S. 1173, 

and cert. dismissed, 526 U.S. 1061 (1999) ................. ................. . . 1.8, 6.2.5

Lambright v. Stewart, 191 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) ................. ............. 1.16

Lambright v. Stewart, 220 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2000) ................. ................. . . 6.2.15

Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2001), 

cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1188 (2002). ................. ................. .... 6.2.5, 6.2.13

Landrigan v. Stewart, 272 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2001) ................. ................. .... 1.13

Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380 (9th Cir. 1996), 

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 881 (1997) ................. ................. . 1.8, 4.8, 6.2.16, 6.3

Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2004), 

 cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2540 (2005) ................. ................. ........ ID, 3.5

Leavitt v. Vasquez, 875 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1989) ................. ................. ........ 3.5
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: NINTH CIRCUIT

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) xxxv

Lenhard v. Wolff, 603 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) ................. ............... 6.2.7

Lewis v. Borg, 879 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1989) ................. ................. ............ 6.3

Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1987) ................. ................. ...... 3.3, 6.3

Lindquist v. Gardner, 770 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1985) ................. ................. ..... 6.3

Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 2001) ................. ................. . 1.13, 6.3

Logan v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 169 (9th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. ........... 4.1

Lord v. Wood, 184 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. .......... 1.13

Loveland v. Hatcher, 231 F.3d 640 (9th Cir. 2000) ................. ................. ..... 6.2.5

Lowell v. Prunty, 91 F.3d 1358 (9th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.1.5

Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344 (9th Cir. 1994), 

cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1001 (1994) ................. ................. ............ 1.13

Lozada v. Deeds, 964 F.2d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 1992) ................. ................. ..... 1.13

Lucky v. Calderon, 86 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.6

Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001) ................. ................. . 6.2.1.5, 6.3

Mach v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. ......... 1.16

Madera v. Risley, 885 F.2d 646, 648 (9th Cir. 1989) ................. ................. . . 6.2.15

Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1984) ................. ................. ... 6.2.5

Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770 (9th Cir. 2002) ................. ................. ............ 6.3

Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1992), 

cert. denied, 507 U.S. 951 (1993) ................. ................. . WA, 1.13, 4.5, 4.8

Malone v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. ... 6.2.14

Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002) ................. ................. ..... 1.16

Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) ................. ................. ..... 6.2.5

Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1987) ................. ................. ........ 6.3

Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1030 (1996), 

and stay granted, 118 F.3d 625 (9th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. . 6.2.5

Martinez-Villareal v. Stewart (Martinez-Villareal II), 

 118 F.3d 628 (9th Cir. 1997), aff’d, 523 U.S. 637 (1998) ................. .......... 6.2.2

Massie v. Hennessey, 875 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1989), 

cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1039 (1990) ................. ................. ............ 1.11

Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 833 (1997) ................. ................. .............. 6.3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: NINTH CIRCUIT

xxxvi NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Matus-Leva v. United States, 287 F.3d 758 (9th Cir.) 

cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1022 (2002) ................. ................. ............. 6.4

Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) ................. ....... 1.13, 6.2.14

McClain v. Calderon, 134 F.3d 1383 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 942 (1998) ................. ................. ............. 4.5

McDaniel v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Nevada (Jones), 

 127 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. ........ 6.2.12, 6.2.15

McDowell v. Calderon, 130 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1103 (1998) ................. ................. ............. 4.5

McDowell v. Calderon, 173 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir.), 

en banc reh’g granted, opinion withdrawn, 187 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 1999) ............. 6.2.12

McKenna v. McDaniel, 65 F.3d 1483 (9th Cir. 1995), 

cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1150 (1996) ................. ................. ........ 4.7, 6.2.5

McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1493 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1104 (1995) ................. ................. ............. 1.9

McKenzie v. McCormick, 27 F.3d 1415 (9th Cir. 1994), 

cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1033 (1995) ................. ................. ............. 4.1

McKenzie v. Risley, 801 F.2d 1519 (9th Cir. 1986), 

vacated on other grounds, 842 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir.) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 488 U.S. 901 (1988) ................. ................. .............. 1.7

McKenzie v. Risley, 842 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 488 U.S. 901 (1988) ................. ............ 1.10, 3.5, 4.3, 4.7, 4.8, 6.3

McNeeley v. Arave, 842 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1988) ................. ................. ........ 6.3

McQuown v. McCartney, 795 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1986) ................. ................. ... 6.3

Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1985) ................. ................. ....... 6.3

Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.1

Miles v. Stainer, 108 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. ......... 2.4

Miller ex rel. Jones v. Stewart, 231 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir.), stay

vacated sub. nom. Stewart v. Miller, 531 U.S. 986 (2000) ................. ... 1.4, 6.2.6, 6.3

Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1989) ................. ................. ........ 1.13

Molina v. Rison, 886 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1989) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.3

Montiel v. City of Los Angeles, 2 F.3d 335 (9th Cir. 1993) ................. ................. . 2.6

Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1111 (1997) ................. ................. ......... 2.2, 6.3

Moore v. Reno, 185 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), 

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1178 (2000) ................. ................. ............. 6.4
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: NINTH CIRCUIT

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) xxxvii

Morales v. Hickman, 438 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2006) .............. .............. ....... . . CA, 1.8

Morales v. Woodford, 388 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2004) 

 cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 420 (2005) ................. ................. ........... CA

Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 1994), 

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 976 (1995) ................. ................. ....... 2.2, 2.4, 6.3

Moran v. McDaniel, 80 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir. 1996) ................. ........... 6.2.5, 6.2.8, 6.2.15

Morgan v. Bunnell, 24 F.3d 49 (9th Cir. 1994) ................. ................. .......... 4.1

Morris v. Woodford, 273 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2001) 

cert. denied, 537 U.S. 941 (2002) ................. ................. .............. 4.5

Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2001), 

cert. denied, 534 U.S. 935 (2002) ................. ................. ......... 1.17, 4.5

Nefstad v. Baldwin, 66 F.3d 335 (9th Cir. 1995), 

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1081 (1996) ................. ................. ............. 4.4

Nelson v. McCarthy, 637 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1980) ................. ................. ...... 6.3

Neuschafer v. McKay, 807 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1987) ................. ................. 6.2.13, 6.3

Neuschafer v. Whitley, 816 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) ................. ................ 1.10, 4.9

Neuschafer v. Whitley, 860 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1988) ................. ........... 6.2.3, 6.2.4, 6.3

Nevius v. McDaniel, 104 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. .... 6.2.3

Nevius v. Sumner, 852 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1988), 

cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1059 (1989) ................. ................. ...... 2.6, 3.3, 6.3

Nevius v. Sumner, 105 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 1996), 

cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1006 (1999) ................. ................. ........... 6.2.2

Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. ........ 6.2.1

Noltie v. Peterson, 9 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1993) ................. ................. . 6.2.5, 6.2.8, 6.3

Northern Mariana Islands v. Mendiola, 976 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1992) ................. ......... 3.3

O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1990) ................. ................. ....... 6.3

Odle v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 534 U.S. 888 (2001) ................. ................. ............. 2.4

Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 1998), 

cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1123 (1999) ................. . AZ, 1.13, 4.1, 6.2.3, 6.2.5, 6.2.8, 6.2.16

Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. .... 3.3

Osband v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2002) ................. ................. . 6.2.12.1

Ostrosky v. State of Alaska, 913 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1990) ................. ................. . . 6.3

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1989) ................. ................. ... 6.3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: NINTH CIRCUIT

xxxviii NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Palmer v. Estelle, 985 F.2d 456 (9th Cir.), 

 cert. denied, 509 U.S. 928 (1993) ................. ................. .......... 2.6, 6.3

Paradis v. Arave, 20 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 1994), 

cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1117 (1995) ................. ................. ......... 4.1, 4.7

Paradis v. Arave, 130 F.3d 385 (9th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. ..... 6.2.5, 6.3

Paradis v. Arave, 240 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2001) ................. ................. ......... 3.2

Park v. California, 164 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. ..... 6.2.5

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 531 U.S. 918 (2000) ................. ................. .............. 6.3

Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir. 2001) ................. ................. ... 6.2.1.1

Pawlyk v. Wood, 248 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2001), 

cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1085 (2002) ................. ................. ............. 2.5

Peters v. Gunn, 33 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 1994) ................. ................. ........... 2.2

Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) ................. ............ 6.3.3.1

Petrocelli v. Angelone, 248 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2001) ................. ................ NV, 6.2.5

Phillips v. Vasquez, 56 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 1995) ................. ................. ........ 6.3

Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2001) ................. ................ 1.13, 6.2.13

Pierre v. Thompson, 666 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1982) ................. ................. ....... 6.3

Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2002), 

cert. denied, 539 U.S. 916 (2003) ................. ................. ..... 1.13.2, 6.3.5

Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1997), 

cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1082 (1998) ................. ..... AZ, 1.8, 1.11, 1.16, 4.7, 4.9, 6.2.2

Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 845 (1999) ................. ................. . . AZ, 2.6, 4.9, 6.2.5

Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 488 U.S. 861 (1988) ................. ................. .............. 3.5

Reiger v. Christensen, 789 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir. 1986) ................. ................. ..... 6.3

Reutter v. Crandel, 109 F.3d 575 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 851 (1997) ................. ................. ............. 6.3

Rhinehart v. Gunn, 598 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1979) ................. ................. ........ 6.3

Rhoden v. Rowland, 172 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. ....... 4.1

Ricardo v. Rardin, 189 F.3d 474 (9th Cir.) (unpublished), 

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1047 (1999) ................. ................. ............. 2.6

Rice v. Wood, 77 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 873 (1996) ................. ................. ......... 1.16, 4.1
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: NINTH CIRCUIT

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) xxxix

Rich v. Calderon, 170 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 1999), 

amended and superseded on denial of reh’g, 

187 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. ........... 1.16, 4.1

Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999) ................. ........... 1.13, 2.3, 4.5, 6.2.12

Rich v. Woodford, 210 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 2000) ................. ................. ......... 1.9

Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1990), 

rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S. 40 (1992) ................ 1.7, 1.9, 1.12, 3.5, 4.8, 4.9, 6.2.3

Richmond v. Ricketts, 774 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1985) ................. ............... 6.2.3, 6.2.13

Robinson v. Borg, 918 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1990) ................. ................. ........ 6.3

Robtoy v. Kincheloe, 871 F.2d 1478 (9th Cir. 1989) ................. ................. ...... 6.3

Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1069 (2003) ................. ................. .... 6.2.1, 6.2.6.1

Roman v. Estelle, 917 F.2d 1505 (9th Cir. 1990) ................. ................. ......... 6.3

Ross v. Craven, 478 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1973) ................. ................. ........... CA

Ruff v. Kincheloe, 843 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1988) ................. ................. .... 3.5, 6.3

Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434 (9th Cir. 1996), 

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1142 (1997) ................. ................. ....... 4.8, 6.2.5

Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1990) ................. ................. ........ 6.2.5

Sager v. Maass, 84 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. ........... 4.3

Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446 (9th Cir. 1994) ................. ................. . . 1.13, 6.2.15

Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765 (9th Cir. 2000), 

cert. denied, 534 U.S. 847 (2001) ................. ................. .......... 2.2, 4.4

Sassounian v. Roe, 230 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2000) ................. ................. ....... 3.6

Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2000) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.15

Seidel v. Merkle, 146 F.3d 750 (9th Cir. 1998), 

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999) ................. ................. .......... 6.2.13

Sherwood v. Tomkins, 716 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1983) ................. ................. ...... 6.3

Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825 (9th Cir,), 

cert. denied, 537 U.S. 942 (2002) ................. ................. ............ 1.13

Simmons v. Blodgett, 110 F.3d 39 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 892 (1997) ................. ................. ............. 1.16

Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560 (9th Cir.), 

amended and superseded on denial of reh’g, 

430 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2005) ................. ................. ............. 4.8.2.8
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: NINTH CIRCUIT

xl NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1994), 

cert. denied, 513 U.S.1183 (1995) ................. ................. ... 1.13, 2.6, 6.2.5

Siripongs v. Calderon, 167 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. . . 6.2.3

Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) ................. ................. 6.2.1

Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1990) ................. ...... MT, 2.5, 4.8, 4.9, 6.2.13

Smith v. Ratelle, 323 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2003) 

cert. denied, 542 U.S. 945 (2004) ................. ................. ........... 6.2.1

Smith v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263 (9th Cir. 1998), 

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 929 (1998) ................. ................. ............. 1.13

Snook v. Wood, 89 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. ........... 1.18

Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2000) ................. ................. ........ 6.2.15

Spain v. Rushen, 883 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1989), 

cert. denied, 495 U.S. 910 (1990) ................. ................. .............. 4.1

Spears v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2001), amended and superseded, 

 283 F.3d 992 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 977 (2002) and 

cert. denied, 537 U.S. 995 (2002) ................. ................. ........ AZ, 6.2.16

Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2003) ................. ................. ........ 6.2.1

Staatz v. Dupnik, 789 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1986) ................. ................. ......... 1.11

Summerlin v. Schriro, 427 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), 

petition for cert. filed. 74 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006) (No. 05-903) ............... 1.13.2.2

Suniga v. Bunnell, 998 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1993) ................. ................. ........ 1.16

Swan v. Peterson, 6 F.3d 1373 (9th Cir. 1993) ................. ................. .......... 6.3

Sweet v. Cupp, 640 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1981) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.5, 6.3

Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1988) ................. ................. . . 6.2.5, 6.3

Tapia v. Roe, 189 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. ........... 1.11

Taylor v. Kincheloe, 920 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1990) ................. ................. ....... 6.3

Telink, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42 (9th Cir. 1994) ................. ................. . 6.2.1

Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1991) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.5

Thompson v. Borg, 74 F.3d 1571 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 889 (1996) ................. ................. .............. 2.3

Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 524 U.S. 965 (1998) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.2, 6.2.3

Tillema v. Long, 253 F.3d 494 (9th Cir. 2001) ................. ................. ........ 6.2.1

Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1990) ................. ................. ........... 6.3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: NINTH CIRCUIT

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) xli

Tolbert v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. ..... 2.6, 6.3

Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) ................. .............. 2.6, 6.2.15

Toomey v. Bunnell, 898 F.2d 741 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 960 (1990) ................. ................. ......... 1.17, 6.3

Tran [also referred to as Van Tran] v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 531 U.S. 944 (2000) ................. ................. ........ 6.2.15, 6.3

Tripati v. Herman, 843 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1988) ................. ................. ........ 6.4

Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 2002) ................. ................. . 1.13, 6.2.13

Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1987) ................. ................. ........ 6.3

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449 (9th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. . . 1.13, 6.2.3

Turner v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. ....... 2.6

Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1995), 

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1153 (1998), 

and overruled en banc on other grounds by 

Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. .... 2.6

United Mexican States v. Woods, 126 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir.1997), 

cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1075 (1998) ................. ................. ............ 1.6

United States v. $814,254.76 in United States Currency, 51 F.3d 207 (9th Cir. 1995) ............. 1.18

United States v. Allen, 157 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. .... 6.2.3

United States v. Annigoni, 96 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) ................. ............ 2.6

United States v. Asrar, 116 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. . 6.2.15

United States v. Baker, 256 F.3d 855 (9th Cir. 2001) ................. ................. .... 1.13

United States v. Baldwin, 987 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1993), 

cert. denied, 508 U.S. 967 (1993) ................. ................. ............. 1.13

United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 1996), 

cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1132 (1997) ................. ................. ............ 1.13

United States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1986) ................. ................. .... 1.13

United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1992) ................. ................. .... 2.6

United States v. Brown, 761 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1985) ................. ................. .... 3.5

United States v. Chacon-Palomares, 208 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2000) ................. ....... 6.2.13

United States v. Changco, 1 F.3d 837 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1019 (1993) ................. ................. ............ 2.6

United States v. Cheely, 36 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994) ................. ................. .... 5.1
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: NINTH CIRCUIT

xlii NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1989) ................. ................. . 2.6

United States v. Collins, 90 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. .... 2.6

United States v. Colvin, 204 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2000) ................. ................. .... 6.4

United States v. Contreras-Contreras, 83 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 1996), 

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 903 (1996) ................. ................. .............. 2.6

United States v. Cooper, 173 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1019 (1999) ................. ................. ............ 3.2

United States v. Cruz-Mendoza, 147 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir.), 

as amended, 163 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. ... 6.2.15

United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992) ................. ................. . 2.6

United States v. Deeb, 944 F. 2d 545 (9th Cir. 1991) ................. ................. ..... 6.4

United States v. Del Muro, 87 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. . 1.13

United States v. Fernandez, et al, 231 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 2000) ................. ............. 5.2

United States v. Garcia, 210 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2000) ................. ................. ... 6.4

United States v. Garrett, 179 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 978 (1999) ................. ................. .............. 2.2

United States v. Harris, 683 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1982) ................. ................. ..... 2.2

United States v. Hayes, 231 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2000) ................. ................. .... 2.2

United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980) ................. ................. ... 6.4

United States v. Horodner, 993 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1993) ................. ................. . 1.13

United States v. Jackson, 209 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2000) ................. ................ 6.2.13

United States v. Judge, 944 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1991), 

cert. denied, 504 U.S. 927 (1992) ................. ................. ............. 1.18

United States v. Kelley, 539 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 429 U.S. 963 (1976) ................. ................. .............. 2.2

United States v. Kinslow, 5 F.3d 542 (9th Cir. 1993), 

cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1205 (1994) ................. ................. ............ 1.18

United States v. Kramer, 195 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. 6.2.15

United States v. Lewis, 837 F.2d 415, 417 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 488 U.S. 923 (1988) ................. ................. .............. 2.6

United States v. Lord, 711 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1983) ................. ................. ...... 3.4

United States v. Lorentsen, 106 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1997) ................. .............. 6.2.3, 6.4

United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2000) ................. .............. 6.2.15, 6.4
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: NINTH CIRCUIT

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) xliii

United States v. Mikels, 236 F.3d 550 (9th Cir. 2001) ................. ................. . . 6.2.15

United States v. Montgomery, 998 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1993) ................. ................ 6.4

United States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1993) ................. ................. 4.4

United States v. Omoruyi, 7 F.3d 880 (9th Cir. 1993) ................. ................. ..... 2.6

United States v. Petty, 992 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993) ................. ................. ..... 4.1

United States v. Pirro, 104 F.3d 297 (9th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. ...... 6.4

United States v. Roston, 986 F.2d 1287 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 510 U.S. 874 (1993) ................. ................. .............. 3.5

United States v. Salemo, 81 F.3d 1453 (9th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. . . 6.2.8

United States v. Santiago-Martinez, 58 F.3d 422 (9th Cir. 1995), 

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1044 (1996) ................. ................. ............. 2.6

United States v. Seesing, 234 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2000) ................. ................ 6.2.3, 6.4

United States v. Shirley, 884 F.2d 1130 (9th Cir.1989) ................. ................. .... 3.4

United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1987) ................. ................. ..... 2.2

United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070 (9th Cir. 1991) ................. ................. . 1.13

United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254 (9th Cir. 1987) ................. ................. . 2.6

United States v. Valdez, 195 F.3d 544 (9th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. .... 6.4

United States v. Villa-Gonzalez, 208 F. 3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) ............. 6.2.2, 6.2.3

United States v. Walker, 915 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1990) ................. ................. .... 3.5

United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1981) ................. ................. ... 6.2.4

United States v. Westerdahl, 945 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1991) ................. ................. 3.4

Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) 

cert. denied, 538 U.S. 994 (2003) ................. ................. . NV, 4.7, 6.2.15

Vang v. Nevada, 329 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2003) ................. ................. . . NV, 6.2.5.4

Van Pilon v. Reed, 799 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1986) ................. ................. .... 6.2.1.5

Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 1999) ................. ................ 2.6, 6.2.5, 6.3

Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 531 U.S. 944 (2000) ................. ................. ........ 6.2.15, 6.3

Vargas v. Lambert, 159 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir.), 

stay vacated, 525 U.S. 925 (1998) ................. ................. ........... 6.2.6

Vickers v. Ricketts, 798 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1986), 

cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054 (1987) ................. ................. ........ 3.5, 6.2.5
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: NINTH CIRCUIT

xliv NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613 (9th Cir. 1998), 

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1073 (1999) ................. ................. .......... 6.2.6

Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616 (9th Cir. 1997), 

 cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1079 (1998) ................. ................. ... 3.5, 4.1, 6.2.5

Villafuerte v. Stewart, 142 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. ... 6.2.3

Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir. 1994), 

cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1120 (1995) ................. ................. 1.13, 4.7, 4.9, 6.2.9

Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1987) ................. ................. ........ 6.2.5

Wallace v. Stewart, 184 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. 1.13, 6.2.13

Walter v. United States, 969 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1992) ................. ................. ... 1.18

Washington v. Cambra, 208 F.3d 832 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 531 U.S. 919 (2000) ................. ................. ............ 6.2.5

Watts v. Bonneville, 879 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1989) ................. ................. ........ 3.5

Webster v. Woodford, 369 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir.) 

cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 626 (2004) ................. ................. ........... CA 

Welch v. Carey, 350 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2003), 

cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2423 (2004) ................. ................. .......... 6.2.1

Wells v. Arave, 18 F.3d 656 (9th Cir.), 

order amended to add dissent, 18 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 1994) ................. ......... 6.2.6

Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 1994) ................. ................. ......... 6.2.5

Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F. 3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) ................. ........... 6.2.1

Wharton v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. . . 6.2.12

Willard v. California, 812 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1987) ................. ................. ...... 3.5

Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465 (9th Cir. 1995), 

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1124 (1996) ................. ................. ............ 1.13

Williams v. Calderon, 83 F.3d 281 (9th Cir. 1996) ................. ............ 6.2.2, 6.2.3, 6.2.4

Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465 (9th Cir. 1995), 

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1124 (1996) ................. ................. ............ 1.13

Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 2004), 

reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 396 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2005) ................. ..... 2.6.4

Wilmer v. Johnson, 30 F.3d 451 (9th Cir. 1994) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.5

Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. .......... 6.3

Wilson v. McCarthy, 770 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1985) ................. ................. ...... 4.1

Wilson v. United States Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal. (Siripongs), 

161 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. ............... 1.14
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: DISTRICT COURTS IN NINTH CIRCUIT

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) xlv

Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1998) ................. .............. 2.6, 3.5, 6.2.5

Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2001), 

cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1143 (2002) ................. ................. ........... 6.2.1

Wood v. Hall, 130 F.3d 373 (9th Cir. 1997), 

cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1129 (1998) ................. ................. ........... 6.2.5

Woolery v. Arave, 8 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1993) ................. ................. .......... 6.3

Woratzeck v. Arizona Board of Executive Clemency, 

117 F.3d 400 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) ................. ............... AZ, 1.13, 1.14

Woratzeck v. Ricketts, 820 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1987), 

vacated on other grounds, 486 U.S. 1051 (1988) ................. ........... 1.13, 3.5, 4.8

Woratzeck v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 329 (9th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. ... AZ, 4.7

Woratzeck v. Stewart, 118 F.3d 648 (9th Cir. 1997) ................. ....... 1.13, 1.14, 6.2.2, 6.2.3

Zarska v. Stewart, 182 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: DISTRICT COURTS IN NINTH CIRCUIT

xlvi NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

District Courts in Ninth Circuit

Ainsworth v. Vasquez, 759 F. Supp. 1467 (E.D. Cal. 1991) ................. ............... 6.2.3

Alldredge v. Davis, 2001 WL 793274 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 2001) ................. .............. 1.9

Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (D. Ariz. 2001) ................. ............... AZ

Arnett v. Ricketts, 665 F. Supp. 1437 (D. Ariz. 1987) ................. ................. . 4.2, 4.7

Ashmus v. Calderon, 977 F. Supp. 987 (N.D. Cal. 1997) ................. ................. . . 6.3

Barrett v. Yearwood, 63 F. Supp.2d 1245 (E.D. Cal. 1999) ................. ............... 6.2.1

Beam v. Paskett, 744 F. Supp. 958 (D. Idaho 1990), 

rev'd on other grounds, 966 F.2d 1563 (9th Cir. 1992) ................. .............. 4.7

Bean v. Calderon, 166 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Cal. 1996) ................. ................. ... 6.2.10

Bloom v. Vasquez, 840 F. Supp. 1362 (C.D. Cal. 1993), 

rev’d, 132 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 1997), 

and cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1124 (1998) ................. ................. ......... 2.5

Bolds v. Newland, No. C 97-2103, 

1997 WL 732529 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 1997) ................. ................. ... 6.2.1

Bonin v. Vasquez, 794 F. Supp. 957 (C.D. Cal. 1992), 

aff’d, 59 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 1995), 

and cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1051 (1996) ................. ................. 2.3, 3.3, 4.1.1

Bonin v. Vasquez, 807 F. Supp. 586 (C.D. Cal. 1992) ................. ............ 4.3, 4.5.4, 6.2.4

Brown v. Vasquez, 743 F. Supp. 729 (C.D. Cal. 1990), 

aff’d, 952 F.2d 1164 (9th Cir. 1991) ................. ................. ........ 6.2.14.2

Caro v. Vasquez, 789 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Cal. 1992) ................. ................. . . 6.3.3.5

Chivars v. Borg, No. C-91-4350-CAL, 

1994 WL 28016 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 1994), 

aff’d, 34 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1994), 

and cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1166 (1995) ................. ................. ........ 1.16

Clair v. Vasquez, 827 F. Supp. 1465 (C.D. Cal. 1993) ................. ................. 6.2.14.2

Coleman v. Calderon, No. C 89-1906, 1996 WL 83882 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 1996), 

aff’d, 150 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.), rev’d on other grounds, 525 U.S. 141, 

and cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1058 (1998) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.5

Coleman v. Ignacio, 164 F.R.D. 679 (D. Nev. 1996) ................. ................ 1.13, 6.2.5

Coleman v. Vasquez, 771 F. Supp. 300 (N.D. Cal. 1991) ................. ................. 6.2.8

Contreras v. Rice, 5 F. Supp. 2d (C.D. Cal. 1998) ................. ................. ....... 6.3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: DISTRICT COURTS IN NINTH CIRCUIT

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) xlvii

Deere v. Calderon, 890 F. Supp. 893 (C.D. Cal. 1995) ................. ................. . . 6.2.5

Delaney v. Shobe, 235 F. Supp. 662 (D. Or. 1964) ................. ................. ....... OR

Dennis v. Woodford, 65 F. Supp.2d 1093 (N.D. Cal. 1999) ................. ............... 6.2.1

Ferguson v. United States, 911 F. Supp. 424 (C.D. Cal. 1995) ................. ......... 1.13, 1.18

Fetterly v. Paskett, 744 F. Supp. 966 (D. Idaho 1990), 

cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1002 (1992) ................. ................. ..... 1.10, 2.3, 4.7

Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Cal. 1994), 

aff’d, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir.), 

vacated and remanded, 519 U.S. 918 (1996) ................. ................. ..... 1.8

Frierson v. Calderon, 968 F. Supp. 497 (C.D. Cal. 1997) ................. ................. . . 2.2

Gerlaugh v. Lewis, 898 F. Supp. 1388 (D. Ariz. 1995), 

aff’d, 129 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 1997), 

and cert. denied, 525 U.S. 903 (1998) ................. ................. ..... 1.12, 3.5

Gordon v. Vasquez, 859 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Cal. 1994) ................. ................. . 6.2.8

Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2000) ................. ................. ........ 6.2.1

Harding v. Lewis, 795 F. Supp. 953 (D. Ariz. 1992) ................. ................. .... 6.2.8

Hunter v. Vasquez, No. C-90-3275, 

1996 WL 612484 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 1996) ................. ................. .... 6.2.13

Karis v. Vasquez, 828 F. Supp. 1449 (E.D. Cal. 1993) ................. ................. . . 6.2.5

KQED v. Vasquez, No. C-90-1383 RHS, 

1995 WL 489485 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 1991) ................. ................. ..... 1.15

LaGrand v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 451 (D. Ariz. 1995), 

aff’d sub nom. LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir.), 

and cert. denied, 525 U.S. 971 (1998) ................. ................. ...... 1.8, 2.3

Lambright v. Lewis, 932 F. Supp. 1547 (D. Ariz. 1996), 

aff’d in part and remanded en banc sub nom. Lambright v. Stewart, 

 191 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. ................ 1.8

Leavitt v. Arave, 927 F. Supp. 394 (D. Idaho 1996) ................. ................. ...... 6.1

McClain v. Calderon, No. CV 89-3061 JGD, 

1995 WL 769176 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 1995), 

aff’d, 134 F.3d 1383 (9th Cir.), and cert. denied, 545 U.S. 942 (1998) ................. . . 4.8

McClain v. Hill, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (C.D. Cal. 1999) ................. ............. 6.2.1, 6.2.5

McKinney v. Paskett, 753 F. Supp. 861 (D. Idaho 1990) ................. ................. . 6.2.8

Odle v. Calderon, 884 F. Supp. 1404 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ................. ................. . . 6.2.5

Odle v. Vasquez, 754 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Cal. 1990) ................. .............. 1.6, 1.18, 4.7
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: DISTRICT COURTS IN NINTH CIRCUIT

xlviii NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Paradis v. Arave, 667 F. Supp. 1361 (D. Idaho 1987) ................. ................. ... 6.2.5

Perez v. Marshall, 946 F. Supp. 1521 (S.D. Cal. 1996), 

aff’d, 121 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. ............. 6.3

Poland v. Stewart, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (D. Ariz. 1999) ................. ........... 1.4, 6.2.2, 6.3

Protsman v. Pliler, 318 F. Supp.2d 1004 (S.D. Cal. 2004) ................. ............ 6.2.5.1

Riley v. Nevada, 763 F. Supp. 446 (D. Nev. 1991) ................. ................. .... 6.2.11

Rogers v. Whitley, 701 F. Supp. 757 (D. Nev. 1988) ................. ................. ...... 6.3

Rowland v. Calderon, No. C 94-3037 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 1996) (unpublished order) ........... 6.2.8

Rupe v. Wood, 863 F. Supp. 1315 (W.D. Wash. 1994), 

aff’d, 93 F.3d 1434 (9th Cir. 1996), 

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1142 (1997) ................. ................. ............. 1.8

Sager v. Maass, 907 F. Supp. 1412 (D. Or. 1995), 

aff’d, 84 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. ............. 2.2

Shine v. Cambra, No. C 97-1433, 1999 WL 252475 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 1999) ................. . . 6.3

Sperling v. White, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1246 (C.D. Cal. 1998) ................. ................. 6.2.1

Troiani v. Poole, 858 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D. Cal. 1994) ................. ................. ..... 4.2

Turner v. Calderon, 970 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. Cal. 1997) ................. ................. . 6.2.5

United States v. Kashiwabara, 962 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Haw. 1996) ................. ......... 6.2.2

United States v. Van Poyck, 980 F. Supp. 1108 (C.D. Cal. 1997) ................. ........... 6.2.1

United States v. Vest, 905 F. Supp. 651 (D. Mont. 1995) ................. ................. . . 4.2

United States v. Zuno-Arce, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (C.D. Cal. 1998) ................ 6.2.1, 6.2.3, 6.2.4

Wade v. Vasquez, 752 F. Supp. 931 (C.D. Cal. 1990) ................. ................. ..... 4.5

Williams v. Calderon, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (C.D. Cal. 1998) ................. ............ 4.1, 4.4

Williams v. Calderon, 48 F. Supp. 2d 979 (C. D. Cal. 1998) ................. ................ 3.2

Williams v. Vasquez, 817 F. Supp. 1443 (E.D. Cal. 1993), 

aff’d, 52 F.3d 1465 (9th Cir. 1995), 

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1124 (1996) ................. ................. ......... 2.5, 4.7

Ybarra v. Sumner, 678 F. Supp. 1480 (D. Nev. 1988) ................. ................. ..... 6.3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: OTHER CIRCUITS

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) xlix

Other Circuits

Ables v. Scott, 73 F.3d 591 (5th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1198 (1996) ................. ................. ............. 4.1

Adams v. Aiken, 41 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 1994), 

cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1124 (1995) ................. ................. ........ 1.18, 3.5

Agan v. Dugger, 835 F.2d 1337 (11th Cir. 1987) ................. ................. ..... 6.2.13

Aldridge v. Dugger, 925 F.2d 1320 (11th Cir. 1990) ................. ................. ...... 6.3

Alvord v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1282 (11th Cir.) 

cert. denied, 469 U.S. 956 (1984) ................. ................. .............. 4.2

Amrine v. Bowersox, 128 F.3d 1222 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1123 (1998) ................. ................. .......... 6.2.13

Anderson v. Groose, 106 F.3d 242 (8th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. ....... 6.3

Antwine v. Delo, 54 F.3d 1357 (8th Cir. 1995), 

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1067 (1996) ................. ................. ............. 4.4

Armstrong v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1430 (11th Cir. 1987) ................. ................. .... 4.1

Arnold v. Evatt, 113 F.3d 1352 (4th Cir. 1997), 

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1058 (1998) ................. ................. ............ 1.16

Arrango v. Wainwright, 716 F.2d 1353 (11th Cir. 1983) ................. ................. . . 6.3

Austin v. Bell, 126 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 1997), 

cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1079, 

and cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1088 (1998) ................. ................. ........ 1.13

Bannister v. Delo, 100 F.3d 610 (8th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. ...... 6.2.13

Barnard v. Collins, 958 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1992), 

cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1057 (1993) ................. ................. ............ 1.13

Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1990), 

cert. denied, 499 U.S. 982 (1991) ................. ................. .............. 4.1

Battie v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1981) ................. ................. .......... 4.2

Battle v. Delo, 19 F.3d 1547 (8th Cir. 1994) ................. ................. ............ 4.7

Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2002) ................. ................. ........... 1.6

Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336 (4th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. .... 6.2.16

Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089 (3d Cir. 1996) ................. ................. ...... 6.3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: OTHER CIRCUITS

l NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Bird v. Collins, 924 F.2d 67 (5th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1213 (1991) ................. ................. ............. 1.6

Bocian v. Godinez, 101 F.3d 465 (7th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. ....... 1.16

Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1994), 

cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1135 (1995) ................. ................. ............. 3.3

Brewer v. Reynolds, 51 F.3d 1519 (10th Cir. 1995), 

cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1996) ................. ................. ............. 2.5

Brogdon v. Blackburn, 790 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1986), 

cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1042 (1987) ................. ................. ............. 4.8

Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc), 

vacated on other grounds, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986) ................. ................. . . 4.4

Buenoano v. Singletary, 963 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1992) ................. ................ 6.2.13

Buford v. Dugger, 841 F.2d 1057 (11th Cir. 1988) ................. ................. ....... 3.5

Bundy v. Dugger, 850 F.2d 1402 (11th Cir. 1988), 

cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034 (1989) ................. ................. ............ 1.12

Burden v. Zant, 903 F.2d 1352 (11th Cir. 1990), 

rev'd on other grounds, 498 U.S. 433 (1991) ................. ................. ..... 4.4

Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2001) ................. ................. ....... 1.13

Byrd v. Armontrout, 880 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1989), 

cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990) ................. ................. ............ 1.12

Campino v. United States, 968 F.2d 187, 189 (2d Cir. 1992) ................. ................ 6.4

Cannon v. Johnson, 134 F.3d 683 (5th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. ..... 6.2.16

Cardwell v. Greene, 152 F.3d 331 (4th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1037 (1998) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.13, 6.3

Castellanos v. United States, 26 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1994) ................. ................. 1.13

Castro v. Ward, 138 F.3d 810 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 971 (1998) ................. ................. .............. 2.5

Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. ....... 6.4

Christy v. Horn, 115 F.3d 201 (3rd Cir. 1997) ................. ................. .......... 6.3

Coleman v. McCormick, 874 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1989), 

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989) ................. ................. ............. 1.17

Collier v. Turpin, 177 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. ....... 1.13

Collins v. Zant, 892 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 (1990) ................. ................. ............. 1.18

Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565 (8th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. ........... 1.16
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: OTHER CIRCUITS

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Cunningham v. Zant, 928 F.2d 1006 (11th Cir. 1991) ................. ................. ..... 4.4

Curtis v. Duval, 124 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997) ................. ................. ............ 1.16

Davis v. Executive Director of Dept. of Corrections, 100 F.3d 750 (10th Cir. 1996), 

cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1215 (1997) ................. ................. ............. 6.1

Death Row Prisoners of Pennsylvania v. Ridge, 106 F.3d 35 (3d Cir. 1997) ................. . 6.2.16

Delap v. Dugger, 890 F.2d 285 (11th Cir. 1989), 

cert. denied, 496 U.S. 929 (1990) ................. ................. .............. 4.1

Deters v. Collins, 985 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1993) ................. ................. .......... 6.3

Dickerson v. Walsh, 750 F.2d 150 (1st Cir. 1984) ................. ................. ........ 6.3

Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1988) ................. ................. ........ 6.3

Dobbs v. Turpin, 142 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. ....... 1.13

Dobbs v. Zant, 963 F.2d 1403 (11th Cir. 1991), 

rev'd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 357 (1993) ................. ................. .... 1.12

Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986) ................. ................. ......... 3.5, 4.4

Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1996), 

cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997) ................. ................. ............. 6.3

Duvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 933 (1998) ................. ................. ............. 1.13

Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439 (11th Cir.), 

withdrawn in part, 833 F.2d 250 (11th Cir. 1987), 

and cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1014 (1988) ................. ................. ......... 4.1

Evans v. McBride, 94 F.3d 1062 (7th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. ......... 6.3

Felde v. Blackburn, 795 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1986), 

cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873 (1987) ................. ................. .............. 3.4

Felder v. Johnson, 180 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. ......... 6.1

Felker v. Turpin, 101 F.3d 95 (11th Cir.) 

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 989 (1996) ................. ................. .............. 6.1

Fern v. Gramley, 99 F.3d 255 (7th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. ........... 6.3

Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914 (5th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. ......... 6.1

Fisher v. Texas, 169 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. ........... 6.3

Ford v. Norris, 67 F.3d 162 (8th Cir. 1995) ................. ................. ........... 1.16

Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1975) ................. ................. . 1.13

Franklin v. Hightower, 215 F.3d 1196 (11th Cir. 2000) ................. ................. ... 6.2
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: OTHER CIRCUITS

lii NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 1993) ................. ................. ............. 4.3

Free v. Peters, 50 F.3d 1362 (7th Cir.) 

cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1034 (1995) ................. ................. ............. 1.9

Funchess v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 683 (11th Cir. 1985), 

cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031 (1986) ................. ................. ............. 4.6

Gaines v. Kelly, 202 F.3d 598 (2nd Cir. 2000) ................. ................. .......... 3.5

Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977), 

cert. denied, 438 U.S. 914 (1979) ................. ................. ............. 1.15

Gaskins v. McKellar, 916 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1990), 

cert. denied, 500 U.S. 961 (1991) ................. ................. .............. 4.4

Gates v. Zant, 863 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir.)

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 945 (1989) ................. ................. .............. 4.4

Gilberti v. United States, 917 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1990) ................. ................. .... 1.18

Glass v. Butler, 820 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1987) ................. ................. ........... 4.8

Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204 (6th Cir. 1995), 

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 910 (1996) ................. ................. ............. 1.13

Goodwin v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 162 (5th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. ....... 2.5

Gosier v. Welborn, 175 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. ........ 6.1

Graham v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 762 (5th Cir. 1999), 

cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1097 (2000) ................. ................. ........... 6.2.3

Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 1998), 

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1090 (1999) ................. ................. ............. 6.1

Green v. Zant, 715 F.2d 551 (11th Cir. 1983) ................. ................. ........ 6.2.13

Griffin v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 1397 (11th Cir. 1989), 

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1051 (1990) ................. ................. ............ 1.12

Groseclose v. Bell, 120 F.3d 1161 (6th Cir. 1997), 

cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1132 (1998) ................. ................. ............ 1.13

Hain v. Mullin, 436 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2006) ................. ................. ...... 6.2.13

Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1993) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.13

Hall v. Kelso, 892 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1990) ................. ................. .......... 1.18

Hance v. Zant, 981 F.2d 1180 (11th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 510 U.S. 920 (1993) ................. ................. ............. 1.13

Harrington v. State of Iowa, 109 F.3d 1275 (8th Cir. 1998) ................. ................ 1.16

Harris v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 756 (11th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1011 (1989) ................. ................. ............ 1.13
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: OTHER CIRCUITS

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Hatch v. Oklahoma, 92 F.3d 1012 (10th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. ...... 6.3

Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131 (6th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. .......... 6.3

Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088 (11th Cir. 1997), 

cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1203 (1997) ................. ................. ............. 6.1

Hill v. Lockhart, 992 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1993) ................. ................. ........ 6.2.8

Hill v. Lockhart, 28 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1994), 

cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1102 (1995) ................. ................. ............ 1.13

Hogan v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 189 (7th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. ........... 6.3

Hogue v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 466 (5th Cir. 1997), 

cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1014 (1998) ................. ................. ............ 1.16

Hollis v. Davis, 912 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1990) ................. ................. ......... 6.3

Holman v. Gilmore, 126 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 1997), 

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1150 (1998) ................. ................. ............. 6.1

Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1991), 

cert. denied, 503 U.S. 952 (1992) ................. ................. ............. 1.13

Hoxsie v. Kerby, 108 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 844 (1997) ................. ................. .............. 6.3

Humphrey v. Cain, 138 F.3d 552 (5th Cir.) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 935, and cert. denied, 525 U.S. 943 (1998) ................. 1.18, 3.5

Hunt v. Nuth, 57 F.3d 1327 (4th Cir. 1995), 

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1954 (1996) ................. ................. ............. 1.8

In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. .......... 6.4

In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997) ................. ................. ........... 6.4

In re Gasery, 116 F.3d 1051 (5th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. ........... 6.3

In re Hill, 113 F.3d 181 (11th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. .............. 3.5

In re Joiner, 58 F.3d 143 (5th Cir. 1995) ................. ................. ............. 6.2.8

In re Lindsey, 875 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 1989) ................. ................. ........ 6.2.8

In re Minarik, 166 F.3d 591 (3rd Cir. 1999) ................. ................. ............ 6.3

In re Pruett, 133 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. ........... 6.2.12

In re Sapp, 118 F.3d 460 (6th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. ............... 6.1

In re Smith, 142 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. .............. 3.5

In re Sterling-Suarez, 306 F.3d 1170 ................. ................. ................. . 5.2

In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) ................. ................. ...... 3.5
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: OTHER CIRCUITS

liv NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

James v. Singletary, 957 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1992) ................. ................. . . 6.2.13

Jefferson v. Welborn, 222 F.3d 286 (7th Cir. 2000) ................. ................. ... 6.2.15

Jernigan v. Collins, 980 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1992), 

cert. denied, 508 U.S. 978 (1993) ................. ................. .............. 4.8

Johnson v. Thigpen, 806 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1986) 

cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987) ................. ................. .............. 4.8

Johnson v. Wainwright, 778 F.2d 623 (11th Cir. 1985), 

cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872 (1987) ................. ................. .............. 4.4

Jones v. Butler, 864 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1988) ................. ................. ........... 4.4

Jones v. Johnson, 134 F.3d 309 (5th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. ...... 6.2.15

Jones v. Thigpen, 741 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1984), 

vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 1003 (1986) ................. ................. . 1.7

Julius v. Jones, 875 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 900 (1989) ................. ................. .............. 4.5

Kennedy v. Dugger, 933 F.2d 905 (11th Cir. 1991), 

cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1066 (1992) ................. ................. ............. 4.4

Kirby v. Dutton, 794 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1986) ................. ................. ........... 6.3

Kirkpatrick v. Blackburn, 777 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1985) ................. ................. ... 3.5

Knox v. Collins, 928 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1991), 

cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1061 (1994) ................. ................. ............. 2.6

Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506 (3d Cir. 1997), 

cert. denied, 532 U.S. 919 (2001) ................. ................. .............. 6.3

Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d 608 (9th Cir. 1995) ................. ................. ........... 6.3

Lawson v. Dixon, 25 F.3d. 1040 (4th Cir. 1994) (unpublished) ................. ............. 1.16

Liegakos v. Cooke, 106 F.3d 1381 (7th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. ....... 6.3

Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 1996), 

rev’d on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) ................. ................. ..... 6.3

Lockhart v. Johnson, 104 F.3d 54 (5th Cir.), 

cert. denied., 525 U.S. 1123 (1997) ................. ................. ............ 6.3

Lombard v. Lynaugh, 868 F.2d 1475, 1480 (5th Cir. 1989) ................. ................ 1.13

Lusk v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 946 (11th Cir. 1992), 

cert. denied, 508 U.S. 920 (1993) ................. ................. .......... 4.1, 4.5

Magill v. Dugger, 824 F.2d 879 (11th Cir. 1987) ................. ................. ........ 4.6

Magwood v. Smith, 791 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1986) ................. ................. ...... 6.3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: OTHER CIRCUITS

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) lv

Marquez v. Collins, 11 F.3d 1241 (5th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 513 U.S. 881 (1994) ................. ................. .............. 4.1

Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918 (11th Cir.), 

modified, 781 F.2d 185 (11th Cir. 1985), 

and cert. denied, 479 U.S. 909 (1986) ................. ................. .......... 4.8

Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F. 2d 255 (7th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990) ................. ................. .............. 6.4

Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc), 

cert. denied sub nom. Matteo v. Brennan, 528 U.S. 824 (1999) ................. ........ 6.3

May v. Collins, 955 F.2d 299 (5th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 504 U.S. 901 (1992) ................. ................. ........... 6.2.13

McCain v. Gramley, 96 F.3d 288 (7th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. ........ 6.3

McDonald v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 1056 (5th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. . 6.2.13

McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302 (6th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. ...... 6.3

McWilliams v. State of Colorado, 121 F.3d 573 (10th Cir. 1997) ................. ............. 6.3

Meeks v. Singletary, 963 F.2d 316 (11th Cir. 1992) ................. ................. ... 6.2.13

Millard v. Lynaugh, 810 F.2d 1403 (5th Cir. 1987) ................. ................. ....... 6.3

Miller v. Estelle, 677 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir. 1982) ................. ................. ......... 6.3

Mitchell v. Wyrick, 727 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1984) ................. ................. ........ 6.3

Mollett v. Mullen, 348 F.3d 902 (10th Cir. 2003) ................. ................. ...... 4.5.4

Moore v. Johnson, 101 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. ........ 6.3

Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 1998), 

cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1025 (1999) ................. ................. ....... 2.5, 6.2.16

Mueller v. Angelone, 181 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. . . 6.1, 6.2.3

Mulligan v. Kemp, 818 F.2d 746 (11th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1043 (1987) ................. ................. ............. 4.5

Neelley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d 917 (11th Cir. 1998), 

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1075 (1999) ................. ................. ............. 6.1

Nelson v. Nagle, 995 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1993) ................. ................. ........ 4.4

Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 1997), 

cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1139 (1998) ................. ................. ............. 6.1

Nowaczyk v. Warden, New Hampshire State Prison, 299 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2002) ................. 6.3

Nutter v. White, 39 F.3d 1154 (11th Cir. 1994) ................. ................. ..... 1.18, 3.5

Pagan v. Keane, 984 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1993) ................. ................. ......... 6.2.13
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: OTHER CIRCUITS

lvi NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Parkus v. Delo, 33 F.3d 933 (8th Cir. 1994) ................. ................. ......... 6.2.13

Peoples v. Haley, 227 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2000) ................. ................. ..... 6.2.15

Plunkett v. Johnson, 828 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987) ................. ................. ........ 6.3

Porter v. Singletary, 14 F.3d 554 (11th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1009 (1994) ................. ................. ............ 1.13

Porter v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 930 (11th Cir. 1986) ................. ................. . . 6.2.13

Pratt v. United States, 129 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 1997), 

cert. denied, 118 U.S. 1807 (1998) ................. ................. ............. 6.1

Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir. 1982) ................. ................. ... 4.1

Proffitt v. Wainwright, 756 F.2d 1500 (11th Cir. 1985) ................. ................. ... 4.6

Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998), 

cert. denied, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) ................. ................. ............ 6.2.7

Rivera v. Sheriff of Cook County, 162 F.3d 486 (7th Cir. 1998) ................. .............. 6.1

Roach v. Aiken, 781 F.2d 379 (4th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1039 (1986) ................. ................. ............. 1.5

Ruffin v. Kemp, 767 F.2d 748 (11th Cir. 1985) ................. ................. ......... 1.13

Russell v. Lynaugh, 892 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1989), 

cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1259 (1991) ................. ................. ............. 4.1

Schneider v. Bowersox, 105 F.3d 397 (8th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. ..... 6.1

Sena v. State of New Mexico Prison, 109 F.3d 652 (10th Cir. 1997) ................. ....... 6.2.13

Sherman v. Smith, 89 F.3d 1134 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) ................. ................. 1.16

Singletary v. Smith, 61 F.3d 815 (11th Cir. 1995), 

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1140 (1996) ................. ................. ............ 1.16

Smith v. Black, 904 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1990), 

vacated on other grounds, 503 U.S. 930 (1992) ................. ............... 1.18, 3.5

Smith v. Dixon, 14 F.3d 956 (4th Cir.) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 513 U.S. 841 (1994) ................. ................. ............. 1.16

Smith v. Dugger, 840 F.2d 787 (11th Cir. 1988), 

cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1047 (1990) ................. ................. ............ 1.12

Smith v. Wainwright, 777 F.2d 609 (11th Cir. 1985), 

cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905 (1986) ................. ................. ............ 1.13

Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 1280 (8th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 513 U.S. 995 (1994) ................. ................. .............. 2.5

Sterling v. Scott, 57 F.3d 451 (5th Cir. 1995) ................. ................. ......... 6.2.8
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: OTHER CIRCUITS

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Stewart v. Angelone, 149 F.3d 1170 (4th Cir.) (unpublished), 

cert. denied, 524 U.S. 978 (1998) ................. ................. .............. 2.5

Stewart v. Dugger, 877 F.2d 851 (11th Cir. 1989), 

 cert. denied, 495 U.S. 962 (1990) ................. ................. ............. 4.5

Stewart v. Nix, 31 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 1994) ................. ................. .......... 6.2.13

Story v. Kindt, 26 F.3d 402 (3d Cir. 1994) ................. ................. .............. 6.3

Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 1998) ................. ................. ..... 1.16

Taylor v. Whitley, 933 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1991), 

cert. denied, 503 U.S. 988 (1992) ................. ................. ............. 1.11

Thompson v. Dixon, 987 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1993) ................. ................. ...... 3.5

Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1983) ................. ................. . 6.3

Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 1997) ................. ................. . . 6.4

Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) ................. ................. 4.4

Tucker v. Scott, 66 F.3d 1418 (5th Cir. 1995) ................. ................. ......... 6.2.8

Tuggle v. Netherland, 79 F.3d 1386 (4th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 894 (1996) ................. ................. ......... 1.16, 2.5

United States v. Allen, 406 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc), 

petition for cert. filed (Sept. 29, 2005) (No. 05-6764) ................. ............... 5.2

United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 1999) ................. ................. ..... 6.4

United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. ... 5.1

United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495 (8th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. .... 3.3

United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073 (11th Cir. 1993), 

cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1227 (1994) ................. ................. ............. 5.1

United States v. Cook, 997 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir. 1993) ................. ................. .... 6.4

United States v. Dashney, 52 F.3d 298 (10th Cir. 1995) ................. ................. . . 1.18

United States v. Flores, 63 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1995), 

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 825 (1996) ................. ................. .............. 2.6

United States v. Juvenile Male, 819 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 1987) ................. ............... 1.17

United States v. Marshall, 910 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1990) ................. ................. . . 4.1

United States v. Martinez, 139 F.3d 412 (4th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. . . 1.18

United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087 (10th Cir. 1996), 

cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1213 (1997) ................. ................. ...... 2.6, 4.7, 5.1

United States v. McKie, 73 F.3d 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ................. ................. . . 1.18
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: OTHER CIRCUITS

lviii NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

United States v. Moore, 149 F.3d 773 (8th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1030 (1998) ................. ................. ............ 5.1

United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2002), 

 cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1051 (2003) ................. ................. ............. 5.1

United States v. Rich, 141 F.3d 550 (5th Cir. 1998) ................. ................. ..... 1.18

United States v. Robinson, 367 F.3d 278 (5th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 623 (2004) ................. ................. ............ 5.2

United States v. Stewart, 20 F.3d 911 (8th Cir. 1994) ................. ................. ..... 4.1

United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861 (4th Cir. 1996), 

cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1253 (1997) ................. ................. ......... 2.6, 5.1

United States v. Villareal, 963 F.2d 725 (5th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 506 U.S. 927 (1992) ................. ................. .............. 5.1

United States v. Walker, 142 F.3d 103 (2d Cir.), 

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 896 (1998) ................. ................. .............. 5.1

United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1999), 

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 829 ................. ................. ................. ... 5.1

United States v. Woolard, 981 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1993) ................. ................. ... 5.1

Van Daalwyk v. United States, 21 F.3d 179 (7th Cir. 1994) ................. ................ 1.18

Victor v. Hopkins, 90 F.3d 276 (8th Cir. 1996), 

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1153 (1997) ................. ................. ............. 6.3

Watkins v. Meloy, 95 F.3d 4 (7th Cir. 1996) ................. ................. ............ 6.1

Weeks v. Bowersox, 119 F.3d 1342 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1093 (1998) ................. ................. .......... 6.2.13

White v. Estelle, 720 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1983) ................. ................. ........... 4.2

Williams v. Coyle, 167 F.3d 1036 (6th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. ........ 6.1

Williams v. Hopkins, 130 F.3d 333 (8th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997) ................. ................. ............. 6.1

Williams v. Kemp, 846 F.2d 1276 (11th Cir. 1988), 

cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990) ................. ................. ........ 1.11, 4.4

Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. .... 1.13

Wilson v. Kemp, 777 F.2d 621 (11th Cir. 1985), 

cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153 (1986) ................. ................. ............. 4.4

Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1999) ................. ................. ........ 6.4

Wyzykowski v. Department of Corrections, 

226 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2000) ................. ................. ............... 6.1
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: DISTRICT COURTS IN OTHER CIRCUITS

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) lix

District Courts in Other Circuits

Bernal v. Helman, 958 F. Supp. 349 (N.D. Ill. 1997), 

postconviction relief denied, No. 97 C 2922, 

1998 WL 325222 (N.D. Ill. 1998) ................. ................. .......... 6.2.13

Booth v. Maryland, 940 F. Supp. 849 (D. Md. 1996), 

vacated on other grounds, 112 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 1997) ................. .......... 6.2.16

Chambers v. Johnson, 133 F. Supp. 2d 931 (E.D. Tex. 2001) ................. ............. 6.2.8

Death Row Prisoners of Pennsylvania v. Ridge, 948 F. Supp. 1278 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ............. 6.2.9

Hamblin v. Anderson, 947 F. Supp. 1179 (N.D. Ohio 1996) ................. .............. 6.2.16

Hill v. Butterworth, 941 F. Supp. 1129 (N.D. Fla. 1996), 

judgment reversed on other grounds, 147 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 1998) ................ 6.2.16

Lowery v. Anderson, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (S.D. Ind. 2001) ................. .............. 6.2.8

Moseley v. Freeman, 977 F. Supp. 733 (M.D.N.C. 1997) ................. ................. 6.2.8

Nichols v. Reno, 931 F. Supp. 748 (D. Colo. 1996), 

aff’d, 124 F.3d 1376 (10th Cir. 1997) ................. ................. ........... 5.1

Patrick v. Johnson, 48 F. Supp. 2d 645 (N.D. Tex. 1999) ................. ................. 6.2.8

Rahman v. Bell, 927 F. Supp. 262 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) ................. ................. . 6.2.16

Ryan v. Hopkins, No. 4:CV95-3391, 

1996 WL 539220 (D. Neb. July 31, 1996) ................. ................. .... 6.2.16

Satcher v. Netherland, 944 F. Supp. 1222 (E.D. Va. 1996), 

aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 126 F.3d 561 (4th Cir.), 

and cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997) ................. ................. ...... 6.2.16

Strickler v. Greene, 57 F. Supp. 2d 313 (E.D. Va. 1999) ................. ................. 6.2.8

United States ex rel. John Whitehead v. Page, 914 F. Supp. 1541 (N.D. Ill. 1995) .............. 6.2.8

United States v. Beckford, 966 F. Supp. 1415 (E.D. Va. 1997) ................. ............... 5.1

United States v. Boyd, 931 F. Supp. 968 (D.R.I. 1996) ................. ................. .... 5.1

United States v. Bradley, 880 F. Supp. 271 (M.D. Pa. 1994) ................. ............... 5.1 

United States v. Cooper, 754 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Ill. 1990), 

aff’d, 19 F.3d 1154 (7th Cir. 1994) ................. ................. ............. 5.1

United States v. Davis, 904 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. La. 1995) ................. ................. . . 5.1

United States v. DesAnges, 921 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Va. 1996), 

aff’d, 134 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1997), 

cert. denied, 524 U.S. 911 (1998) ................. ................. .............. 5.1
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: DISTRICT COURTS IN OTHER CIRCUITS

lx NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

United States v. Glover, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D. Kansas 1999) ................. .............. 5.2

United States v. Green, 372 F. Supp. 2d 168 (D. Mass. 2005) ................. ............... 5.2

United States v. Hammer, 25 F. Supp. 2d 518 (M.D. Pa. 1998) ................. .............. 5.2

United States v. Haynes, 269 F. Supp. 2d 970 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) ................. ............ 5.2

United States v. Holloway, 29 F. Supp. 2d 435 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) ................. ........... 5.1

United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Pa 2001) ................. ............ 5.2

United States v. Menzer, 817 F. Supp. 64 (E.D. Wis. 1993) ................. ................. 5.1

United States v. Minerd, 176 F. Supp. 2d 424 (W.D. Pa 2001) ................. ............... 5.2

United States v. Nelson, 920 F. Supp. 825 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) ................. ............... 5.1

United States v. Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. 1525 (D. Kan. 1996), 

aff’d, 155 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 1998), 

and cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1167 (1999) ................. ................. ......... 5.1

United States v. Pitera, 795 F. Supp. 546 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), 

aff'd, 986 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1992) ................. ................. ............. 5.1

United States v. Pretlow, 779 F. Supp. 758 (D.N.J. 1991) ................. ................. . 5.1

United States v. Roman, 931 F. Supp. 960 (D.R.I. 1996) ................. ................. . . 5.2

United States v. Tidwell, No. 94-CR-353, 

1995 WL 764077 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1995) ................. ................. ...... 5.1

United States v. Walker, 910 F. Supp. 837 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) ................. ................ 5.1

Walker v. Reno, 925 F. Supp. 124 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) ................. ................. ...... 5.1

Williams v. Cain, 942 F. Supp. 1088 (W.D. La. 1996), 

aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 125 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1997), 

and cert. denied, 525 U.S. 859 (1998) ................. ................. ....... 6.2.16

Wilson v. Horn, No. 96-7838, 1997 WL 137343 (E.D. Pa. 1997) ................. ........... 6.2.8

Wilson v. United States, 969 F. Supp. 1054 (E.D. Mich. 1997) ................. ............... 6.4
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE COURTS

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) lxi

State Courts

Alcorn v. Gladden, 237 Or. 106, 390 P.2d 625 (1964) ................. ................. .... OR

Alford v. State, 111 Nev. 1409, 906 P.2d 714 (1995) ................. ................. .... NV

Anderson v. State, 90 Nev. 385, 528 P.2d 1023 (1974) ................. ................. ... NV

Baal v. State, 106 Nev. 69, 787 P.2d 391 (1990) ................. ................. ........ NV

Bedell v. Schiedler, 307 Or. 562, 770 P.2d 909 (1989) ................. ................. .... OR

Beets v. State, 110 Nev. 339, 871 P.2d 357 (1994) ................. ................. ...... NV

Bennett v. State, 106 Nev. 135, 787 P.2d 797, 

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 925 (1990) ................. ................. ............. NV

Bishop v. State, 95 Nev. 511, 597 P.2d 273 (1979) ................. ................. ...... NV

Blake v. State, 121 P.3d 567 (Nev. 2005) (en banc) ................. ................. ..... NV

Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So.2d 693 (Fla) (per curiam), 

 cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1070 (2002) ................. ................. ......... 4.6.1.2

Bridges v. State, 116 Nev. 752, 6 P.3d 1000 (2000) (en banc) ................. .............. NV

Bryant v. Thompson, 324 Or. 141, 922 P.2d 1219 (1996) ................. ................. . . OR

Butler v. State, 102 P.3d 71 (Nev. 2004) (en banc) ................. ................. ...... NV

Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215, 994 P.2d 700 (en banc), 

cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1016 (2000) ................. ................. ............ NV

Calambro v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 114 Nev. 961, 964 P.2d 794 (1998), 

 cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1149 (1999) ................. ................. ........... NV

Canape v. State, 109 Nev. 864, 859 P.2d 1023 (1993), 

cert. denied, 513 U.S. 862 (1994) ................. ................. ............. NV

Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983), 

overruled, 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 742 P.2d 1306, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1987) ................. . . CA

Castillo v. State, 114 Nev. 271, 956 P.2d 103 (1998), 

cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1031 (1999) ................. ................. ............ NV

Cavanaugh v. State, 102 Nev. 478, 729 P.2d 481 (1986) ................. ................. . NV

Chambers v. State, 113 Nev. 974, 944 P.2d 805 (1997) ................. ................. . . NV

Collman v. State, 116 Nev. 687, 7 P.3d 426 (2000) (en banc) ................. ............... NV

Colwell v. State, 112 Nev. 807, 919 P.2d 403 (1996) ................. ................. .... NV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE COURTS

lxii NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807, 59 P.3d 463 (1996) ................. ................. ..... NV

Covarrubias v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. App. 4th 1168, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 91 (1998) ................ CA

Crump v. Warden, Nevada State Prison, 113 Nev. 293, 934 P.2d 247 (1997) ................. . . NV

Dawson v. State, 301 Mont. 135, 10 P.3d 49 (2000), 

cert. denied, 532 U.S. 928 (2001) ................. ................. ............. MT

Dennis v. State, 116 Nev. 1075, 13 P.3d 434 (2000) (en banc) ................. .............. NV

Deutscher v. State, 95 Nev. 669, 601 P.2d 407 (1979) ................. ................. ... NV

Domingues v. State, 112 Nev. 683, 926 P.2d 265, 

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 968 (1996) ................. ................. ............. NV

Domingues v. State, 114 Nev. 783, 961 P.2d 1279 (1998), 

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 963 (1999) ................. ................. ............. NV

Dunlap v. State, 131 Idaho 576, 961 P.2d 1179 (1998) ................. ................. .... ID

Emil v. State, 105 Nev. 858, 784 P.2d 956 (1989) ................. ................. ....... NV

Evans v. State, 113 Nev. 885, 944 P.2d 253 (1997) ................. ................. ...... NV

Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 28 P.3d 498 (2001) (en banc) ................. ................ NV

Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 17 P.3d 230 (2000), 

reh’g denied, 135 Idaho 286, 17 P.3d 230 (2001) ................. ................. . ID

Finger v. State, 117 Nev. 548, 27 P.3d 66 (2001) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1127534 U.S. 1127 (2002) ................. ................. NV

Flannagan v. State, 112 Nev. 1409, 930 P.2d 691 (1996) ................. ................. . NV

Gallego v. State, 101 Nev. 782, 711 P.2d 856 (1985), 

cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871 (1986). ................. ................. ............ NV

Gallego v. State, 117 Nev. 348, 23 P.3d 227 (2001) (en banc) ................. ........... NV, 2.2

Geary v. State, 112 Nev. 1434, 930 P.2d 719 (1996), 

decision clarified on reh’g, 114 Nev. 100, 952 P.2d 431 (1998) ................. ...... NV

Geary v. State, 115 Nev. 79, 977 P.2d 344 (1999) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1090 (2000) ................. ................. ............ NV

Gollehon v. District Court, 271 Mont. 363, 897 P.2d 1058 (1995) ................. ........... MT

Gollehon v. State, 296 Mont. 6, 986 P.2d 395 (1999), 

cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1041 (2000) ................. ................. ............ MT

Greene v. State, 113 Nev. 157, 931 P.2d 54 (1997) ................. ................. ...... NV

Guy v. State, 108 Nev. 770, 839 P.2d 578 (1992), 

cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1009 (1993) ................. ................. ............ 1.10

Hagen v. State, 293 Mont. 60, 973 P.2d 233 (1999) ................. ................. ..... MT
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE COURTS

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) lxiii

Halquist v. Department of Corrections, 

113 Wash. 2d 818, 783 P.2d 1065 (1989) (en banc) ................. ................ 1.15

Hans v. State, 283 Mont. 379, 942 P.2d 674 (1997) ................. ................. ..... MT

Harte v. Nevada, 116 Nev. 1054, 13 P.3d 420 (2000) (en banc) ................. ............. NV

Hartzog v. Keeney, 304 Or. 57, 742 P.2d 600 (1987) ................. ................. ..... OR

Hawkins v. Mahoney, 294 Mont. 124, 979 P.2d 697 (1999) ................. ................ MT

Hernandez v. State, 43 Ariz. 424, 32 P.2d 18 (1934) ................. ................. ..... AZ

Hill v. State, 102 Nev. 377, 724 P.2d 734 (1986), 

cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101 (1987) ................. ................. ............ NV

Hollaway v. State, 116 Nev. 732, 6 P.3d 987 (2000) (en banc) ................. .............. NV

Holmberg v. DeLeon, 189 Ariz. 109, 938 P.2d 1110 (1997) ................. ................. AZ

Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312, 658 P.2d 983 (1983) ................. ................. ..... ID

Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 825 P.2d 600 (1992), 

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1012 (1996) ................. ................. ............ NV

Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980), 

abrogation by statute noted in Covarrubias v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. App. 4th 1168, 

71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 91 (1998) ................. ................. ................. . . CA

In re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 447 P.2d 117, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1968), 

cert. denied, 406 U.S. 971 (1972) ................. ................. .............. CA

In re Brett, 142 Wash. 2d 868, 16 P.3d 601 (2001) ................. ................. . WA, 1.13

In re Brown, 143 Wash. 2d 431, 21 P.3d 687 (2001) ................. ................ WA, 1.13

In re Carpenter, 9 Cal. 4th 634, 889 P.2d 985, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 665, 

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 981 (1995) ................. ................. .............. CA

In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 855 P.2d 729, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509 (1993) ................. ........ CA

In re Collie, 38 Cal. 2d 396, 240 P.2d 275 (1952), 

cert. denied, 345 U.S. 1000 (1953) ................. ................. ............. CA

In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756, 264 P.2d 513 (1953) ................. ................. ........ CA

In re Gallego, 18 Cal. 4th 825, 959 P.2d 290, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 132 (1998) ................. ..... CA

In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th 813, 855 P.2d 391, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 373 (1993) ................. ....... CA

In re Hawthorne, 35 Cal. 4th 40, 105 P.3d 552, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 189 (2005) ................. .... CA

In re Horowitz, 33 Cal. 2d 534, 203 P.2d 513 (1949) ................. ................. ..... CA

In re Jackson, 3 Cal. 4th 578, 835 P.2d 371, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 531 (1992), 

cert. denied, 508 U.S. 941 (1993) ................. ................. .............. CA
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE COURTS

lxiv NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

In re Jackson, 61 Cal. 2d 500, 393 P.2d 420, 39 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1964) ................. ........ CA

In re Johnson, 19 Cal. 4th 447, 957 P.2d 299, 75 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1998) ................. ....... CA

In re Lucas, 33 Cal. 4th 682, 94 P.3d 447, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 331 (2004) ................. ........ CA

In re Keene, 95 Wash. 2d 203, 622 P.2d 360 (1980) ................. ................. ..... WA

In re Martin, 44 Cal. 3d 1, 744 P.2d 374, 241 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1987) ................. .......... CA

In re Reed, 33 Cal. 3d, 914, 663 P.2d 216, 191 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1983) ................. ......... CA

In re Reismiller, 101 Wash. 2d 291, 678 P.2d 323 (1984) ................. ................. . WA

In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 959 P.2d 311, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 153 (1998) ................. ..... CA

In re Ross, 10 Cal. 4th 184, 892 P.2d 1287, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 544 (1995), 

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1051 (1996) ................. ................. ............. CA

In re Sakarias, 35 Cal. 4th 140, 106 P.3d 931, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 265 (2005) ................. ..... CA

In re Sanders, 21 Cal. 4th 697, 981 P.2d 1038, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 899 (1999) ................. .... CA

In re Sassounian, 9 Cal. 4th 535, 887 P.2d 527, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 665 (1995) ................. .... CA

In re Stankewitz, 40 Cal. 3d 391, 708 P.2d 1260, 220 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1985) ................. .... CA

In re Sterling, 63 Cal. 2d 486, 407 P.2d 5, 47 Cal. Rptr. 205 (1965) ................. .......... CA

In re the Personal Restraint Petition of Lord, 123 Wash. 2d 737, 870 P.2d 964 (1994) ............ WA

In re Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d 218, 397 P.2d 1001, 42 Cal. Rptr. 9, 

cert. denied, 382 U.S. 853 (1965) ................. ................. .............. CA

In re Woods, 154 Wash. 2d 400, 114 P.3d 607 (2005) ................. ................. ... WA

In the Matter of Keene, 95 Wash. 2d 203, 662 P.2d 360 (1981) ................. ............. WA

Johnson v. State, 118 Nev. 787, 59 P.3d 450 (2002) (en banc) ................. .............. NV

Johnson v. State, 904 So.2d 400 (Fla. 2005) ................. ................. ......... 4.6.1.2

Kills on Top v. State, 273 Mont. 32, 901 P.2d 1368 (1995), 

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1177 (1996) ................. ................. ............ MT

King v. Moore, 831 So.2d 143 (Fla) (per curiam), 

cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1067 (2002) ................. ................. .......... 4.6.1.2

Kirksey v. State, 107 Nev. 499, 814 P.2d 1008, 

cert. denied, 502 U.S. 989 (1991) ................. ................. ............. NV

Lane v. State, 114 Nev. 299, 956 P.2d 88 (1998) ................. ................. ....... NV

Langford v. State, 287 Mont. 107, 951 P.2d 1357 (1997) ................. ................. . MT

Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 17 P.3d 397 (2001) (en banc) ................. ............... NV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE COURTS

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) lxv

Leslie v. Warden, 118 Nev. 773, 59 P.3d 440 (2002) (en banc) ................. ............. NV

Libby v. State, 113 Nev. 251, 934 P.2d 220 (1997) ................. ................. ...... NV

Lisle v. State, 113 Nev. 679, 941 P.2d 459, 

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 830 (1998) ................. ................. ............. NV

Lord v. State, 107 Nev. 28, 806 P.2d 548 (1991) ................. ................. ........ NV

Lynn v. Reinstein, 205 Ariz. 186, 68 P.3d 412 (2003) ................. ................. ..... AZ

Mack v. State, 119 Nev. 421, 75 P.3d 803 (2003) ................. ................. ....... NV

Manley v. State, 115 Nev. 114, 979 P.2d 703 (1999) ................. ................. .... NV

Marks v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 4th 176, 38 P.3d 512, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 674 (2002) ............. CA

Mason v. State, 118 Nev. 554, 51 P.3d 521 (2002) ................. ................. ...... NV

Mazzan v. Warden, Ely State Prison, 116 Nev. 48, 993 P.2d 25 (2000) (en banc) ................ NV

McConnell v. State, 102 P.3d 606 (Nev. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam) ................. ........ NV

McCracken v. Teets, 41 Cal. 2d 648, 262 P.2d 561 (1953) ................. ................. . CA

McKenna v. State, 101 Nev. 338, 705 P.2d 614 (1985), 

cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093 (1986) ................. ................. ............ NV

McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 992 P.2d 144 (1999) ................. ................. . . ID

McNelton v. State, 111 Nev. 900, 900 P.2d 934 (1995), 

cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1212 (1996) ................. ................. ........... NV

McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 990 P.2d 1263 (2000) (en banc) ................. ........... NV

Meller v. State, 94 Nev. 408, 581 P.2d 3 (1978) ................. ................. ........ NV

Oregon Newspaper Publishers Ass’n v. Oregon Dep’t of Corrections, 

329 Or. 115, 988 P.2d 359 (1999) ................. ................. ........ OR, 1.15

Ortiz v. State, 869 A.2d 285 (Del. 2005) ................. ................. ............ 4.6.1.2

Page v. Cupp, 78 Or. App. 520, 717 P.2d 1183, 

review denied, 301 Or. 338, 722 P.2d 737 (1986) ................. ................. . OR

Paine v. State, 107 Nev. 998, 823 P.2d 281 (1991), 

cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1038 (1995) ................. ................. ............ NV

Paradis v. State, 128 Idaho 223, 912 P.2d 110 (1996) ................. ................. .... ID

Paz v. State, 123 Idaho 758, 852 P.2d 1355 (1993) ................. ................. ....... ID

Pellegrini v. State, 104 Nev. 625, 764 P.2d 484 (1988) ................. ................. . . NV

Pelligrini v. State, 107 Nev. 860, 34 P.3d 519 (2001) (en banc) ................. ............. NV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE COURTS

lxvi NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

People v. Adcox, 47 Cal. 3d 207, 763 P.2d 906, 253 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1988), 

cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1038 (1990) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Alvarez, 14 Cal. 4th 155, 926 P.2d 365, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 385 (1996), 

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 829 (1997) ................. ................. .............. CA

People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 

cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972) ................. ................. .............. CA

People v. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 742 P.2d 1306, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1987) ................. CA

People v. Anderson, 25 Cal. 4th 543, 22 P.3d 347, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 575 (2001) 

cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1136 (2002) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Andrews, 49 Cal. 3d 200, 776 P.2d 285, 260 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1988), 

cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1060 (1990) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Ashmus, 54 Cal. 3d 932, 820 P.2d 214, 2 Cal. Rptr. 112 (1991), 

cert. denied, 506 U.S. 841 (1992) ................. ................. .............. CA

People v. Avena, 13 Cal. 4th 394, 916 P.2d 1000, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 301 (1996) ................. . . CA

People v. Bacigalupo, 6 Cal. 4th 457, 862 P.2d 808, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 808 (1993), 

cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1253 (1994) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144, 711 P.2d 480, 222 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1985) ................. ... CA

People v. Bell, 49 Cal. 3d 502, 778 P.2d 129, 262 Cal. Rptr. 1, 

cert. denied, 495 U.S. 963 (1990) ................. ................. .............. CA

People v. Benson, 52 Cal. 3d 754, 802 P.2d 330, 276 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1990), 

cert. denied, 502 U.S. 924 (1991) ................. ................. .............. CA

People v. Bittaker, 48 Cal. 3d 1046, 774 P.2d 659, 259 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1989), 

cert. denied, 496 U.S. 931 (1990) ................. ................. .............. CA

People v. Boyd, 38 Cal. 3d 762, 700 P.2d 782, 215 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1985) ................. ........ CA

People v. Bradford, 14 Cal. 4th 1005, 929 P.2d 544, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 225 (1997) ................. CA

People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 709 P.2d 440, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1985), 

rev’d on other grounds, 479 U.S. 538 (1987) ................. ................. ..... CA

People v. Brown, 46 Cal. 3d 432, 758 P.2d 1135, 250 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1988), 

cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059 (1989) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Bunyard, 45 Cal. 3d 1189, 756 P.2d 795, 249 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1988) ................. ... CA

People v. Burgener, 29 Cal. 4th 833, 62 P.3d 1, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 747, 

cert. denied, 540 U.S. 855 (2003) ................. ................. .............. CA

People v. Burgener, 223 Cal. App. 3d 427, 272 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1990) ................. ......... CA

People v. Burton, 48 Cal. 3d 843, 862, 771 P.2d 1270, 258 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1989) ................. CA

People v. Cain, 10 Cal. 4th 1, 892 P.2d 1224, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 482 (1995) ................. ..... CA
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE COURTS

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) lxvii

People v. Carpenter, 15 Cal. 4th 312, 935 P.2d 708, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (1997), 

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1078 (1998) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Cash, 28 Cal.4th 703, 50 P.3d 332, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545 (2002) ................. ..... CA

People v. Catlin, 26 Cal. 4th 81, 26 P.3d 475, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 31 (2001), 

 cert. denied, 535 U.S. 976 (2002) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Champion, 9 Cal. 4th 879, 891 P.2d 93, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547 (1995), 

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 105 (1996) ................. ................. .............. CA

People v. Clair, 2 Cal. 4th 629, 828 P.2d 705, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d (1992), 

cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1063 (1993) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Coleman, 48 Cal. 3d 112, 148, 768 P.2d 32, 255 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1989) ................. CA

People v. Coleman, 71 Cal. 2d 1159, 459 P.2d 248, 80 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1969) ................. ... CA

People v. Crew, 1 Cal. App. 4th 1591, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755 (1991) ................. ............ CA

People v. Crittenden, 9 Cal. 4th 83, 885 P.2d 887, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 474 (1994) ................. . . CA

People v. Daniels, 52 Cal. 3d 815, 802 P.2d 906, 277 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1991) ................. .... CA

People v. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d 247, 710 P.2d 861, 221 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1985) ................. . . CA

People v. Dennis, 17 Cal. 4th 468, 950 P.2d 1035, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680, 

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 912 (1998) ................. ................. .............. CA

People v. Dent, 30 Cal. 4th 213, 65 P. 3d. 1286, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 527 (2003) ................. . . CA

People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 442, 668 P. 2d. 697, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1983) ................. .... CA

People v. Duncan, 53 Cal. 3d 955, 979, 810 P.2d 131, 281 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1991) ................. CA

People v. Earp, 20 Cal. 4th 826, 978 P.2d 15, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 857 (1999), 

cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1005 (2000) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Easley, 34 Cal. 3d 858, 679 P.2d 813, 196 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1983) ................. ..... CA

People v. Edelbacher, 47 Cal. 3d 983, 1035, 766 P.2d 1, 254 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1989) ............... CA

People v. Estrada, 11 Cal. 4th 568, 904 P.2d 1197, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 586 (1995) ................. . CA

People v. Fitzpatrick, 2 Cal. App. 4th 1285, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 808 (1992) ................. ....... CA

People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142, 599 P.2d 587, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1979) ................. ... CA

People v. Frye, 18 Cal. 4th 894, 959 P.2d 183, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 25 (1998), 

cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1023 (1999) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Ghent, 43 Cal. 3d 739, 739 P.2d 1250, 239 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1987), 

cert. denied, 485 U.S. 929 (1988) ................. ................. .............. CA

People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d 1179, 1232, 800 P.2d 1159, 275 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1990), 

cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835 (1991) ................. ................. .............. CA
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE COURTS

lxviii NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

People v. Grant, 45 Cal. 3d 829, 755 P.2d 894, 248 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1988), 

cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1050 (1989) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Griggs, 67 Cal. 2d 314, 431 P.2d 225, 61 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1967) ................. ...... CA

People v. Hart, 20 Cal. 4th 546, 976 P.2d 683, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 132 (1999), 

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1085 (2000) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Hawkins, 10 Cal. 4th 920, 897 P.2d 574, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 636 (1995), 

cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1193 (1996) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Hawthorne, 4 Cal. 4th 43, 841 P.2d 118, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 133 (1992), 

cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1013 (1993) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Heard, 31 Cal. 4th 946, 753 P.2d 629, 246 Cal. Rptr. 673 (2003), 

 cert. denied, 541 U.S. 910 (2004) ................. ................. ........ CA, 2.6.1

People v. Heishman, 45 Cal. 3d 147, 753 P.2d 629, 246 Cal. Rptr. 673, 

cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948 (1988) ................. ................. .............. CA

People v. Hendricks, 43 Cal. 3d 584, 737 P.2d 1350, 238 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1987) ................. . . CA

People v. Hines, 15 Cal. 4th 997, 938 P.2d 388, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594 (1997) ................. ... CA

People v. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d 375, 749 P.2d 279, 243 Cal. Rptr. 842, 

cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988) ................. ................. .............. CA

People v. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d 264, 618 P.2d 149, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1980), 

cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1035 (1981) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Jackson, 49 Cal. 3d 1170, 783 P.2d 279, 264 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1989), 

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 (1990) ................. ................. .............. CA

People v. Keenan, 46 Cal. 3d 478, 758 P.2d 1081, 6 Cal. 4th 215 (1988), 

cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1012 (1989) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Kelly, 1 Cal. 4th 495, 822 P.2d 385, 3 Cal. Rptr. 677, 

cert. denied, 506 U.S. 881 (1992) ................. ................. .............. CA

People v. Kirkpatrick, 7 Cal. 4th 988, 874 P.2d 248, 30 Cal. Rptr. 248 (1994), 

cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1015 (1995) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Lawson, 163 Ill. 2d 187, 644 N.E.2d 1172, 206 Ill. Dec. 119 (1994) ............... 1.13.2.1

People v. Lewis, 50 Cal. 3d 262, 786 P.2d 892, 266 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1990) ................. ..... CA

People v. Lewis, 26 Cal. 4th 334, 28 P.3d 34, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272 (2001), 

cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1019 (2002) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Livatidis, 2 Cal. 4th 759, 831 P.2d 297, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 72 (1992), 

cert. denied, 507 U.S. 975 (1993) ................. ................. .............. CA

People v. Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d 259, 753 P.2d 1052, 247 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988) ................. ...... CA

People v. Marshall, 15 Cal. 4th 1, 931 P.2d 262, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 84 (1997) ................. CA, 2.2

People v. McLain, 46 Cal. 3d 97, 115, 757 P.2d 569, 249 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1988) ................. . CA
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE COURTS

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) lxix

People v. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d 713, 750 P.2d 741, 244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 

cert. denied, 488 U.S. 934 (1988) ................. ................. .............. CA

People v. Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d 612, 818 P.2d 84, 286 Cal. Rptr. 801, 

cert. denied, 506 U.S. 819 (1992) ................. ................. .............. CA

People v. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d 57, 744 P.2d 1127, 243 Cal. Rptr. 842, 

cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1038 (1988) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Morales, 48 Cal. 3d 527, 770 P.2d 244, 257 Cal. Rptr. 64, 

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 984 (1989) ................. ................. .............. CA

People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 631 P.2d 446, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981), 

cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922 (1982) ................. ................. .......... CA, 4.2

People v. Musselwhite, 17 Cal. 4th 1216, 954 P.2d 475, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 212 (1998), 

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1073 (1999) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Ochoa, 19 Cal. 4th 353, 966 P.2d 442, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 408 (1998), 

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 862 (1999) ................. ................. .......... CA, 4.8

People v. Ochoa, 26 Cal. 4th 398, 28 P. 3d 78, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 324 (2001), 

cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1040 (2002) ................. ................. ......... CA, 1.9

People v. Phillips, 41 Cal. 3d 29, 711 P.2d 423, 222 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1985) ................. .... CA

People v. Prieto, 30 Cal. 4th 226, 66 P.3d 1123, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 18, 

cert. denied, 540 U S. 1008 (2003) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Proby, 60 Cal. App. 4th 922, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 706 (1998) ................. .......... CA

People v. Ramirez, 50 Cal. 3d 1158, 1193, 791 P.2d 965, 270 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1990) .............. CA

People v. Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d 136, 689 P.2d 430, 207 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984), 

cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1119 (1985) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Robertson, 33 Cal. 3d 21, 655 P.2d 279, 188 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1982) ................. .... CA

People v. Rodrigues, 8 Cal. 4th 1060, 885 P.2d 1, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 235 (1994), 

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 851 (1995) ................. ................. .............. CA

People v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal. 3d 730, 726 P.2d 113, 230 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1986) ................. . . CA

People v. Rodriguez, 66 Cal. App. 4th, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 676 (1998) ................. ........... CA

People v. Samayoa, 15 Cal. 4th 795, 938 P.2d 2, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 400 (1997) ................. ... CA

People v. Sanders, 51 Cal. 3d 471, 797 P.2d 561, 273 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1990) ................. .... CA

People v. Sanders, 11 Cal. 4th 475, 905 P. 2d 420, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 751 (1995), 

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 838 (1996) ................. ................. .............. CA

People v. Sheldon, 48 Cal. 3d 935, 771 P.2d 1330, 258 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1989) ................. ... CA

People v. Sims, 5 Cal. 4th 405, 853 P.2d 992, 20 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1993) ................. ........ CA
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE COURTS

lxx NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

People v. Smithey, 20 Cal. 4th 936, 978 P.2d 1171, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 243 (1999), 

cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1026 (2000) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Snow, 30 Cal. 4th 43, 65 P.3d 749, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 271, 

cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1076 (2003) ................. ................. ......... 1.13.2.3

People v. Stanley, 10 Cal. 4th 764, 897 P.2d 481, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 543 (1995) ................. . . CA

People v. Stanworth, 71 Cal. 2d 820, 457 P.2d 889, 80 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1969) ................. .... CA

People v. Superior Court, ex rel. Engert, 31 Cal. 3d 797, 647 P. 2d 76, 

183 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1982) ................. ................. ................. ... CA

People v. Terry, 61 Cal. 2d 137, 390 P.2d 381, 37 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1964) ................. ....... CA

People v. Thompson, 45 Cal. 3d 86, 753 P.2d 37, 246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 

cert. denied, 488 U.S. 960 (1988) ................. ................. .............. CA

People v. Trevino, 26 Cal. 4th 237, 27 P.3d 283, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 567 (2001) ................. . . CA

People v. Tuilaepa, 4 Cal. 4th 569, 842 P.2d 1142, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 382 (1992), 

aff’d, Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994) ................. ................. . CA

People v. Turner, 37 Cal. 3d 302, 690 P.2d 669, 208 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1984) ................. ..... CA

People v. Turner, 8 Cal. 4th 137, 878 P.2d 521, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 762, (1994), 

cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1068 (1995) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Visciotti, 2 Cal. 4th 1, 825 P. 2d 388, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 495, 

cert. denied, 506 U.S. 893 (1992) ................. ................. .............. CA

People v. Wader, 5 Cal. 4th 610, 854 P.2d 80, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 788 (1993), 

cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1253 (1994) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Weaver, 26 Cal. 4th 876, 29 P.3d 103, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2 (2001), 

cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1058 (2002) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Welch, 20 Cal. 4th 701, 976 P.2d 754, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 203 (1999) ................. ... CA

People v. Williams, 16 Cal. 4th 153, 940 P.2d 710, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 123 (1997), 

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1150 (1998) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Williams, 16 Cal. 4th 635, 941 P.2d 752, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573 (1997), 

cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1027 (1998) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Williams, 45 Cal. 3d 1268, 756 P. 2d 221, 248 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1988), 

cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1050 (1989) ................. ................. ............. CA

People v. Windham, 19 Cal. 3d 121, 560 P.2d 1187, 137 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1997) ................. ... CA

People v. Wright, 52 Cal. 3d 367, 802 P.2d 221, 276 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1990), 

cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834 (1991) ................. ................. .............. CA

Pertgen v. State, 110 Nev. 554, 875 P.2d 361 (1994) ................. ................. .... NV

Petition of Runyan, 121 Wash. 2d 432, 853 P.2d 424 (1993) ................. ............... WA
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE COURTS

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) lxxi

Phelps v. Director, Nevada Dep’t of Prisons, 104 Nev. 656, 764 P.2d 1303 (1988) .............. NV

Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 903 P.2d 58 (1995) ................. ................. ...... ID

Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793, 10 P.3d 742 (2000) ................. ................. ...... ID

Porter v. State, 139 Idaho 420, 80 P.3d 1021 (2003) ................. ................. ..... ID

Porter v. State, 140 Idaho 780, 102 P.3d 1099 (2004), 

cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2967 (2005) ................. ................. ............ ID

Porter v. State, 136 Idaho 257, 32 P.3d 151 (2001) ................. ................. ...... ID

Randolph v. State, 117 Nev.970, 36 P.3d 424 (2001) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 537 U.S. 845 (2002). ................. ................. ............ NV

Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 801 P.2d 1077, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1990) ................. CA

Redmen v. State, 108 Nev. 227, 828 P.2d 395 (1992), 

cert. denied, 506 U.S. 880 (1992), 

overruled on other grounds, Alford v. State, 111 Nev. 1409, 906 P.2d 714 (1995) ......... NV

Rhoades v. State, 135 Idaho 299, 17 P.3d 243 (2000), 

rehearing denied, 135 Idaho 299, 17 P.3d 243 (2001) ................. ............... ID

Riley v. State, 107 Nev. 205, 808 P.2d 551 (1991), 

cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1052 (1995) ................. ................. ............ NV

Rippo v. State, 113 Nev. 1239, 946 P.2d 1017 (1997), 

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 841 (1998) ................. ................. ............. NV

Rockwell v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 420, 556 P.2d 1101, 134 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1976) ............ CA

Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 21 P.3d 895 (2001) ................. ................. ........ ID

Servin v. State, 117 Nev. 775, 32 P.3d 1277 (2001) (en banc) ................. .............. NV

Shaw v. State, 104 Nev. 100, 753 P.2d 888 (1988) ................. ................. ...... NV

Sherman v. State, 114 Nev. 998, 965 P.2d 903 (1998), 

cert. denied, 526 U. S. 1122 (1999) ................. ................. ........... NV

Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 731 P.2d 192, 

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1095 (1996) ................. ................. ............. ID

Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 P.3d 636 (2000) ................. ................. ........ ID

Smith v. State, 303 Mont. 47, 15 P.3d 395 (2000), 

cert. denied, 533 U.S. 917 (2001) ................. ................. ............. MT

Smith v. State, 93 Nev. 82, 560 P.2d 158 (1977) ................. ................. ........ NV

Sonner v. State, 114 Nev. 321, 955 P.2d 673 (1998) ................. ................. ..... NV

State ex rel. Carlile v. Frost, 326 Or. 607, 956 P.2d 202, 

remand after reversal, 155 Or. App. 260, 958 P.2d 909 (1998) ................. ........ OR
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE COURTS

lxxii NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

State ex rel. Napolitano v. Brown, 194 Ariz. 340, 982 P.2d 815 (1999) ................. ........ AZ

State v. Anderson, 197 Ariz. 314, 4 P.3d 369 (2000) (en banc) ................. ............... AZ

State v. Arnett, 158 Ariz. 15, 760 P.2d 1064 (1988) (en banc) ................. ............... AZ

State v. Baker, 81 Wash. 2d 281, 501 P.2d 284 (1972) ................. ................. ... WA

State v. Barone, 328 Or. 68, 969 P.2d 1013 (1998), 

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1135 (2000). ................. ................. ............ OR

State v. Barrett, 153 Or. App. 621, 958 P.2d 215, 

review allowed, 327 Or. 553 (1998) ................. ................. ............ OR

State v. Barrett, 331 Or. 27, 10 P.3d 901 (2000) ................. ................. ......... OR

State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wash. 2d 631, 683 P.2d 1079 (1984) ................. ............ WA

State v. Baruso, 72 Wash. App. 603, 865 P.2d 512, 

review denied, 124 Wash.2d 1008 (1994) ................. ................. ....... WA

State v. Bennett, 119 Nev. 589, 81 P.3d 1 (2003) ................. ................. ....... NV

State v. Bejarano, 158 Ariz. 253, 762 P.2d 540 (1988) (en banc) ................. ............. AZ

State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 858 P.2d 1152 (1993) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1046 (1994) ................. ................. ............. AZ

State v. Bishop, 118 Ariz. 263, 576 P.2d 122 (1978) (en banc), 

vacated and remanded, 439 U.S. 810 (1979) ................. ................. ..... AZ

State v. Bocharski, 200 Ariz. 50, 22 P.3d 43 (2001) (en banc) ................. ............... AZ

State v. Boots, 308 Or. 371, 780 P.2d 725 (1989) ................. ................. ........ OR

State v. Boots, 315 Or. 572, 848 P.2d 76 (1993) ................. ................. ......... OR

State v. Brett, 126 Wash. 2d 136, 892 P.2d 29 (1995), 

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1121 (1996) ................. ................. ....... WA, 1.10

State v. Brown, 132 Wash. 2d 529, 940 P.2d 546 (1997), 

cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1007 (1998) ................. ................. ............ WA

State v. Canez, 202 Ariz. 133, 42 P.3d 564 (2002), 

reconsideration denied (May 21, 2002) ................. ................. ......... AZ

State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 915 (1992) ................. ............. ID

State v. Carreon, 210 Ariz. 54, 107 P.3d 900 (2005) (en banc) ................. .............. AZ

State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299, 

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 922 (1989), 

overruled on other grounds, State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991) ......... ID 

State v. Clabourne, 194 Ariz. 379, 983 P.2d 748 (1999) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1028 (2000) ................. ................. ............. AZ
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE COURTS

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) lxxiii

State v. Clark, 129 Wash. 2d 805, 920 P.2d 187 (1996) ................. ................. . . WA

State v. Clark, 143 Wash. 2d 731, 24 P.3d 1006, 

cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1000 (2001) ................. ................. ............ WA

State v. Coleman, 177 Mont. 1, 579 P.2d 732 (1978) (Coleman I) ................. ........... MT

State v. Coleman, 185 Mont. 299, 605 P.2d 1000 (1979) (Coleman II), 

cert. denied, 446 U.S. 970 (1980) ................. ................. ............. MT

State v. Compton, 333 Or. 274, 39 P.3d 833, 

cert. denied, 537 U.S. 841 (2002) ................. ................. ............. OR

State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463 (1983), 

cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984) ................. ................. ............. ID

State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1, 966 P.2d 1 (1998), 

cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1147 (1999) ................. ................. ............. ID

State v. Cunningham, 320 Or. 47, 880 P.2d 431 (1994) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1005 (1995) ................. ................. ............. OR

State v. Davis, 6 Wash. 2d 696, 717, 108 P.2d 641 (1940) ................. ................. WA

State v. Davis, 141 Wash. 2d 798, 10 P. 3d 977 (2002) ................. ................. ... WA

State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, 84 P.3d 456 (2004) (en banc) ................. ............... AZ

State v. Dearbone, 125 Wash. 2d 173, 883 P.2d 303 (1994) ................. ................ WA

State v. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d 1, 838 P.2d 86 (1992) ................. ................. ..... WA

State v. Elledge, 144 Wash. 2d 62, 26 P.3d 271 (2001) ................. ................. ... WA

State v. Elmore, 139 Wash. 2d 250 (1999) ................. ................. ............ WA

State v. Farrar, 309 Or. 132, 786 P.2d 161 (1990) (en banc) ................. ................ OR

State v. Fetterly, 137 Idaho 729, 52 P.3d 874 (2002) ................. ................. ..... ID

State v. Furman, 122 Wash. 2d 440, 858 P.2d 1092 (1993) ................. ................ WA

State v. Gallegos, 178 Ariz. 1, 870 P.2d 1097 (en banc), 

cert. denied, 513 U.S. 934 (1994) ................. ................. .............. AZ

State v. Gentry, 125 Wash. 2d 590, 888 P.2d 1105 (1995) ................. ................. WA

State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 662 P.2d 1007 (1983) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1059 (1985) ................. ................. ............. AZ

State v. Gollehon, 262 Mont. 1, 864 P.2d 249 (1993), 

cert. denied, 513 U.S. 827 (1994) ................. ................. ............. MT

State v. Green, 91 Wash. 2d 431, 588 P.2d 1370 (1979), 

reconsidered on other grounds, 94 Wash. 2d 216, 616 P.2d 628 (1980) ................. WA

State v. Greenway, 170 Ariz. 155, 823 P.2d 22 (1991) (en banc) ................. ............. AZ
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE COURTS

lxxiv NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

State v. Gretzler, 159 Ariz. 42, 659 P.2d 11 (1983), 

cert. denied, 461 U.S. 971 (1983) ................. ................. .............. AZ

State v. Guzek, 336 Or. 424, 86 P.3d 1106 (2004), 

vacated on other grounds, 2006 WL 397856 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2006) ................. ..... OR

State v. Hairston, 113 Idaho 496, 988 P.2d 1170 (1999) ................. ................. ... ID

State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 988 P.2d 1170 (1999) ................. ................. ... ID

State v. Harris, 114 Wash. 2d 419, 789 P.2d 60 (1990) ................. ................. . . WA

State v. Harrod, 204 Ariz. 567, 65 P.3d 948 (2003) (en banc) ................. ............... AZ

State v. Henry, 189 Ariz. 542, 944 P.2d 57 (1997) (en banc) ................. ................ AZ

State v. Hoffman, 142 Idaho 27, 121 P.3d 958 (2005) ................. ................. ..... ID

State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, 14 P.3d 997 (2000) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 534 U.S. 970 (2001) ................. ................. .............. AZ

State v. Isom, 313 Or. 391, 837 P.2d 491 (1992) ................. ................. ......... OR

State v. Jeffries, 105 Wash. 2d 398, 717 P.2d 722, 

cert. denied, 479 U.S. 922 (1986) ................. ................. ............. WA

State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 917 P.2d 200 (1996) (en banc) ................. ................ AZ

State v. Jordan, 126 Ariz. 283, 614 P.2d 825 (en banc), 

cert. denied, 449 U.S. 986 (1980) ................. ................. .............. AZ

State v. Kayer, 194 Ariz. 423, 984 P.2d 31 (1999) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1196 (2000). ................. ................. ............ AZ

State v. Keith, 231 Mont. 214, 754 P.2d 474 (1988) ................. ................. ..... MT

State v. Kills on Top, 279 Mont. 384, 928 P.2d 182 (1996) ................. ................. MT

State v. Lacy, 187 Ariz. 340, 929 P.2d 1288 (1996) (en banc) ................. ............... AZ

State v. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. 21, 734 P.2d 563 (1987) ................. ................. ..... AZ

State v. Landrigan, 176 Ariz. 1, 859 P.2d 111 (1993) ................. ................. ..... AZ

State v. Langford, 248 Mont. 420, 813 P.2d 936 (1991), 

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1102 (1998). ................. ................. ........... MT

State v. Langley, 314 Or. 247, 839 P.2d 692 (1992) ................. ................. ...... OR

State v. Lehr, 201 Ariz. 509, 38 P.3d 1172 (2002) (en banc) ................. ................ AZ

State v. Lehr, 205 Ariz. 107, 67 P.3d 703 (2003) (en banc) ................. ................. AZ

State v. Leslie, 147 Ariz. 38, 708 P.2d 719 (1985) (en banc) ................. ................ AZ

State v. Lindquist, 99 Idaho 766, 768, 589 P.2d 101 (1979) ................. ................. ID
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE COURTS

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) lxxv

State v. Maney, 297 Or. 620, 688 P.2d 63 (1984) ................. ................. ........ OR

State v. Mann, 188 Ariz. 220, 934 P.2d 784 (1997) (en banc) ................. ................ AZ

State v. Marshall, 144 Wash. 2d 266, 27 P.3d 192 (2001) ................. ................. WA

State v. Martinez, 196 Ariz. 451, 999 P.2d 795, 

cert. denied, 531 U.S. 934 (2000) ................. ................. .............. AZ

State v. McCall, 160 Ariz. 119, 770 P.2d 1165 (1989) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1031 (1990) ................. ................. ............. AZ

State v. McDonnell, 313 Or. 478, 837 P.2d 941 (1992) ................. ................. .... OR

State v. McKenzie, 186 Mont. 481, 608 P.2d 428, 

cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1050 (1980) ................. ................. ............ MT

State v. McKenzie, 271 Mont. 32, 894 P.2d 289 (1995) ................. ................. . . MT

State v. McMurtrey, 143 Ariz. 71, 691 P.2d 1099 (1984) (en banc) ................. ........... AZ

State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 94 P.3d 1119 (2004) (en banc) ................. .............. AZ

State v. Moore, 324 Or. 396, 927 P.2d 1073 (1996) ................. ................. ...... OR

State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 906 P.2d 542 (1995) (en banc) ................. ................ AZ

State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 694 P.2d 222 (en banc), 

cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1143 (1985) ................. ................. ............. AZ

State v. Oatney, 335 Or. 276, 66 P.3d 475 (2003) ................. ................. ........ OR

State v. Ortiz, 119 Wash. 2d 294, 831 P.2d 1060 (1992) ................. ................. . . WA

State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187 (1981) ................. ................. ..... ID

State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 253 P.2d 203 (1953) ................. ................. ....... ID

State v. Pandeli, 204 Ariz. 569, 65 P.3d 950 (en banc), 

 cert. denied, 540 U.S. 962 (2003) ................. ................. .............. AZ

State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992) ................. ................. .............. 1.4

State v. Phillips, 205 Ariz. 145, 67 P.3d 1228 (en banc), 

 cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1000 (2003) ................. ................. ............. AZ

State v. Quinn, 289 Or. 727, 618 P.2d 412 (1980) ................. ................. ........ OR

State v. Quinn, 290 Or. 383, 623 P.2d 630 (1981) ................. ................. ........ OR

State v. Redcrow, 294 Mont. 252, 980 P.2d 622 (1999) ................. ................. . . MT

State v. Rhodes, 164 Mont. 455, 524 P.2d 1095 (1974) ................. ................. ... MT

State v. Ring, 200 Ariz 267, 25 P.3d 1139 (2001) (en banc), 

rev’d on other grounds, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (2002) ................. ................. ... AZ

State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 65 P.3d 915 (2003) (en banc) ................. ................. AZ
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE COURTS

lxxvi NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

State v. Roberts, 142 Wash. 2d 471, 17 P.3d 713 (2001) ................. .............. WA, 1.6

State v. Rogers, 330 Or. 282, 4 P.3d 1261 (2000) ................. ................. ....... OR

State v. Romanosky, 162 Ariz. 217, 782 P.2d 693 (1989) (en banc) ................. ........... AZ

State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 955 P.2d 1082, 

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 967 (1998) ................. ................. .............. ID

State v. Sagastegui, 135 Wash. 2d 67, 954 P.2d 1311 (1998) ................. ............... WA

State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 844 P.2d 566 (1992) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 509 U.S. 912 (1993) ................. ................. ......... AZ, 1.10

State v. Sansing, 200 Ariz. 347, 26 P.3d 1118 (2001) (en banc) ................. .............. AZ

State v. Sattler, 288 Mont. 79, 956 P.2d 54 (1998) ................. ................. ...... MT

State v. Second Judicial District Court, 116 Nev. 953, 11 P.3d 1209 (2000) ................. ... NV

State v. Simonson, 329 Or. 288, 986 P.2d 566 (1999), 

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1090 (2000) ................. ................. ............. 2.6

State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 674 P.2d 396 (1983), 

cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1220 (1984) ................. ................. ............. ID

State v. Smith, 136 Ariz. 273, 665 P.2d 995 (1983) (en banc) ................. ................ AZ

State v. Smith, 211 Mont. 379, 704 P.2d 19 (1984) ................. ................. ...... MT

State v. Smith, 217 Mont. 461, 705 P.2d 1087 (1985), 

cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1073 (1986) ................. ................. ............ MT

State v. Smith, 261 Mont. 419, 863 P.2d 1000 (1993) ................. ................. .... MT

State v. Smith, 280 Mont. 158, 931 P.2d 1272 (1996), 

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 965 (1997) ................. ................. ............. MT

State v. Soto-Fong, 187 Ariz. 186, 928 P.2d 610 (1996) (en banc) ................. ............ AZ

State v. Spencer, 176 Ariz. 36, 43, 859 P.2d 146, 

cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1050 (1994) ................. ................. ............. AZ

State v. Sparks, 336 Or. 298, 83 P.3d 304 

cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 219 (2004) ................. ................. ............. OR

State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 39 P.3d 525 (2002) (en banc) ................. ................. . AZ

State v. Stevens, 319 Or. 573, 897 P.2d 162 (1994) ................. ................. ....... OR

State v. Stokley, 182 Ariz. 505, 523 P.2d 454 (1995) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1078 (1996) ................. ................. ............. AZ

State v. Thornton, 187 Ariz. 325, 929 P.2d 676 (1996) (en banc) ................. ............. AZ

State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386, 64 P.3d 828 (en banc), 

 cert. denied, 539 U.S. 986 (2003) ................. ................. .............. AZ

State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 951 P.2d 869 (1997) (en banc) ................. ................. AZ
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE COURTS

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) lxxvii

State v. Wagner, 305 Or. 115, 752 P.2d 1136 (1988), 

vacated on other grounds, 309 Or. 5, 786 P.2d 93, cert. denied, 489 U.S. 879 (1990) ....... OR

State v. Wagner, 309 Or. 5, 786 P.2d 93, 

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 879 (1990) ................. ................. .............. OR

State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441, 586 P.2d 1253 (1978) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 440 U.S. 924 (1979). ................. ................. ............. AZ

State v. White, 194 Ariz. 344, 982 P.2d 819 (1999) (en banc), 

cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1005 (2000) ................. ................. ............. AZ

State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063 (La. 1996), 

cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1259 (1997) ................. ................. ............. 1.3

State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 967 P.2d 702 (1998), 

cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1118 (1999) ................. ................. ............. ID

State v. Woods, 143 Wash.2d 561, 23 P.3d 1046, 

cert. denied, 534 U.S. 964 (2001) ................. ................. ............. WA

State v. Wright, 323 Or. 8, 913 P.2d 321 (1996) ................. ................. ......... OR

Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 46 P.3d 1067 (2002) ................. ................. ..... AZ

Still v. State, 95 Idaho 766, 519 P. 2d 435 (1974) ................. ................. ........ ID

Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 83 P.3d 818 (2004) ................. ................. ...... NV

Thorburn v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 

66 Cal. App. 4th 1284, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 584 (1998) ................. ............. CA, 1.8

Toliver v. Olsen, 109 Wash. 2d 607, 746 P.2d 809 (1987) ................. ................. WA

Vanisi v. State, 117 Nev. 330, 22 P.3d 1164 (en banc), 

cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1024 (2001) ................. ................. ............ NV

Wallis v. Baldwin, 152 Or. App. 295, 954 P.2d 192, 

review denied, 327 Or. 174, 966 P.2d 218 (1998) ................. ................. . OR

White v. State, 8 Ariz. App. 46, 442 P.2d 869 (1968) ................. ................. ..... AZ

Williams v. State, 110 Nev. 1182, 885 P.2d 536 (1994) ................. ................. . . NV

Wilson v. State, 99 Nev. 362, 664 P.2d 328 (1983), 

aff’d on reh’g, 101 Nev. 452, 705 P.2d 151 (1985) ................. ................ NV

Wright v. Thompson, 324 Or. 153, 922 P.2d 1224 (1996) ................. ................. . . OR

Yoshisato v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 978, 831 P.2d 327, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 102 (1992) ............. CA
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: FEDERAL STATUTES

lxxviii NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Federal Statutes

8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B) (2000) ................. ................. ................. .... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 32 (2000) ................. ................. ................. ............ 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 33 (2000) ................. ................. ................. ............ 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 34 (2000) ................. ................. ................. ............ 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 36(b)(2) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ........ 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 37(a) (2000) ................. ................. ................. .......... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 241 (2000) ................. ................. ................. ........... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000) ................. ................. ................. ........... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 245(b) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ......... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 247(d)(1) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ....... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 351 (2000) ................. ................. ................. ........... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 794 (2000) ................. ................. ................. ........... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 844(d) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ......... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(3) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ....... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ......... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ....... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 930(c) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ......... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 1091(b)(1) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ...... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ........ 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000) ................. ................. ................. .......... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ........ 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 1118 (2000) ................. ................. ................. .......... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 1119 (2000) ................. ................. ................. .......... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 1120 (2000) ................. ................. ................. .......... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 1121 (2000) ................. ................. ................. .......... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ........ 5.1
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: FEDERAL STATUTES

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) lxxix

18 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ........ 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 1503(b)(1) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ...... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(2)(A) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 1513 (2000) ................. ................. ................. .......... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 1716 (2000) ................. ................. ................. .......... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 1751 (2000) ................. ................. ................. .......... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 1958 (2000) ................. ................. ................. .......... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ...... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 1992 (2000) ................. ................. ................. .......... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ........ 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 2119(3) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ........ 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 2245 (2000) ................. ................. ................. .......... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 2251(e) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ........ 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 2280 (2000) ................. ................. ................. .......... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 2281 (2000) ................. ................. ................. .......... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 2332(a)(1) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ...... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 2332a (2000) ................. ................. ................. ......... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 2332b (2000) ................. ................. ................. ......... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2000) ................. ................. ................. ......... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2000) ................. ................. ................. .......... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000) ................. ................. ................. .......... 5.1

18 U.S.C. § 3005 (2000) ................. ................. ................. .......... 5.2

18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(4) (2000) ................. ................. ................. . . 6.2.8

18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(4) (2000) ................. ................. ................. . . 6.2.8

18 U.S.C. § 3235 (2000) ................. ................. ................. .......... 5.2

18 U.S.C. § 3281 (2000) ................. ................. ................. .......... 5.2

18 U.S.C. § 3432 (2000) ................. ................. ................. .......... 5.2

18 U.S.C. § 3591 (2000) ................. ................. ................. ...... 1.5, 5.2

18 U.S.C. § 3592 (2000) ................. ................. ................. .......... 5.2
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: FEDERAL STATUTES

lxxx NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ........ 2.1

18 U.S.C. § 3596 (2000) ................. ................. ................. ... 1.6, 1.8, 5.2

18 U.S.C. § 3597 (2000) ................. ................. ................. ...... 1.8, 5.2

18 U.S.C. § 3599, as added by Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 222 ..................... 5.2, 6.2.8, 6.2.8.1

18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)-(e), as added by Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 222 .......................... 6.2.8

18 U.S.C. § 3599(f), as added by Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 222 ............................. 6.2.8

18 U.S.C. § 3599(g), as added by Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 222 ............................ 6.2.8

21 U.S.C. § 848(e) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ......... 5.1

21 U.S.C. § 848(h)(1) (2000) [repealed] ................. ................. ............... 2.1

21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(9) (2000) [repealed] ................. ................. ............. 6.2.8

21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(10) (2000) [repealed] ................. ................. ............ 6.2.8

28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2000) ................. ................. ................. ....... 6.2.15

28 U.S.C. § 2101(d) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ..... 6.2.15

28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000) ................. ................. ................. .......... 6.3

28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(2) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ...... 6.3

28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2255 (2000) ................. ................. ................ 1.18, 6.1

28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2000) ................. ................. ................. ........ 6.2.6

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (2000) ................. ................. ................. .... 6.2.3

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (2000) ................. ................. ................. .... 6.2.3

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) (2000) ................. ................. ............... 6.2.3, 6.2.16

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000) ................. ................. ................. .... 6.2.1

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (2000) ................. ................. ................. .... 6.2.1

28 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000), as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 507(f) ................. ... 6.2.14.1

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ..... 6.2.15

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) ................. ................. ................. ..... 6.2.8, 6.3

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ........ 6.3

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ...... 6.3

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) ................. ................. ................. .............. 4.2

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994) [repealed] ............................................... 6.2.13
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: FEDERAL STATUTES

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) lxxxi

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ........ 6.3

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2000) ................. ................. ................ 1.4, 1.7, 6.3

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2000) ................. ................. ................ 1.18, 6.2.13

28 U.S.C. § 2254(h) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ...... 6.2.8

28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ... 1.13, 6.3

28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) ................. ................. ........ 6.1, 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.8, 6.4

28 U.S.C. § 2261(b) (2000), as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 507(a) and (b). ........... 6.2.16

28 U.S.C. § 2261(c) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ..... 6.2.16

28 U.S.C. § 2261(e) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ........ 6.3

28 U.S.C. § 2262(a) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ..... 6.2.16

28 U.S.C. § 2262(b) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ..... 6.2.16

28 U.S.C. § 2263 (2000) ................. ................. ................. ........ 6.2.1

28 U.S.C. § 2263(a) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ...... 6.2.1

28 U.S.C. § 2263(b) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ..... 6.2.16

28 U.S.C. § 2264(a) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ..... 6.2.16

28 U.S.C. § 2265 (2000), repealed by Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 507(c) ................. ...... 6.2.16

28 U.S.C. § 2265 (2000), as added by Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 507(c) ................. ...... 6.2.16

28 U.S.C. § 2266(a) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ..... 6.2.16

28 U.S.C. § 2266(b) (2000), as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 507(e) ................. . . 6.2.16

28 U.S.C. § 2266(b)(1)(A) (2000), as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 507(e) ............. 6.2.16

28 U.S.C. § 2266(b)(3)(B) (2000) ................. ................. ................. 6.2.16

28 U.S.C. § 2266(c) (2000) ................. ................. ................. ..... 6.2.16

28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266 (2000), as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 507 ................. ... 6.1

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) ................. ................. ................. ........ 6.1.3

49 U.S.C. § 46502 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) ................. ................. ............. 5.1
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: FEDERAL RULES

lxxxii NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Federal Rules

28 C.F.R. §§ 26.1–26.5 (2005) ................. ................. ................. . 1.8, 5.2

9th Cir. R. 22-1 ................. ................. ................. .............. 6.2.15

9th Cir. R. 22-2–22-6 ................. ................. ................. ............. 6.1

9th Cir. R. 22-4 ................. ................. ................. .............. 6.2.14

9th Cir. R. 22-5 ................. ................. ................. .............. 6.2.14

Fed. R. App. P. 22(b) ................. ................. ................. .......... 6.2.15

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) ................. ................. ................. ........... 6.2.1

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) ................. ................. ................. ........ 6.2.3.1.3

Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(b) ................. ................. ................. ............ 5.2

Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(a) ................. ................. ................. ............. 5.2

Fed. R. Habeas Corpus 4 ................. ................. ................. ....... 6.2.13

Fed. R. Habeas Corpus 6 ................. ................. ................. ....... 6.2.12

Fed. R. Habeas Corpus 8 ................. ................. ................. ....... 6.2.13

Fed. R. Habeas Corpus 9(a) ................. ................. ................. ...... 6.2.1
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE STATUTES

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) lxxxiii

State Statutes

Ariz. Const. art. II, § 23 ................. ................. ................. ........... AZ

Ariz. Const. art. V, § 5 ................. ................. ................. ............ AZ

Ariz. Const. art. XXII, § 22 ................. ................. ................. ........ AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-120.21 (1992) ................. ................. .............. AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703 (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. ..... AZ, 4.7, 4.8

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(A) (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. ......... AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(B) (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. ..... AZ, 1.6

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(C) (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. ......... AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(E) (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. ......... AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(F) (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. ......... AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(G) (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. ......... AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(G)(5) (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. ....... AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.01 (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. ......... AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.01(B) (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. ...... AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.01(C) - (F) (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. . . AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.01(E) (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. ....... AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.01(G) (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. ...... AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.01(H) (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. ...... AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.01(I) (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. ....... AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.01(J)-(L) (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. .... AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.01(N) and (O) (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.01(Q) (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. ...... AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.01(R) (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. ...... AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.01(R)(1) (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. .... AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02 (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. ......... AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.03 (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. ......... AZ
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE STATUTES

lxxxiv NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.04 (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. .... AZ, 1.10

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.05 (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. .... AZ, 1.10

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-704 (2001) ................. ................. ............. AZ, 1.8

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-705 (2001) ................. ................. ................. AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-706 (2001) ................. ................. ................. AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1105 (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. ........... AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-3981–3990 (2001) ................. ................. .......... AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4013(B) (2001) ................. ................. ............. AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4022 (2001) ................. ................. ................ AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4023 (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. ........... AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4024 (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. ........... AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-4025, 4026 (2001) ................. ................. .......... AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4031 (2001) ................. ................. ................ AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4037 (2001) ................. ................. ................ AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4040 (2001) ................. ................. ................ AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4041 (2001) ................. ................. ................ AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4121, et seq. (2001) ................. ................. .......... AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-4121-4145, 13-4147 (2001) ................. ................. . . AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4231 (2001) ................. ................. ................ AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-4231–4239 (2001) ................. ................. .......... AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4231, et seq. (2001) ................. ................. .......... AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4232 (2001) ................. ................. ................ AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4233 (2001) ................. ................. ................ AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4234 (2001) ................. ................. ................ AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4234(D) (2001) ................. ................. ............. AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4234(J) (2001) ................. ................. ............. AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4239 (2001) ................. ................. ................ AZ

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-102 (1990) ................. ................. ................. AZ
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE STATUTES

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) lxxxv

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-441–446 (1996) ................. ................. ............ AZ

Cal. Const. art. I, § 17 ................. ................. ................. ............ CA

Cal. Const. art. I, § 27 ................. ................. ................. ............ CA

Cal. Const. art. II, § 10 ................. ................. ................. ............ CA

Cal. Const. art. IV, § 13 ................. ................. ................. ........... CA

Cal. Const. art. V, § 8 ................. ................. ................. ............. CA

Cal. Const. art. VI, § 10 ................. ................. ................. ........... CA

Cal. Const. art. VI, § 11 ................. ................. ................. ........... CA

Cal. Gov’t Code § 68660, et seq. (West Supp. 2006) ................. ................. ..... CA

Cal. Mil. & Vet. Code § 1672(a) (West 1988) ................. ................. ........... CA

Cal. Penal Code § 37 (West 1999) ................. ................. ................. ... CA

Cal. Penal Code § 128 (West 1999) ................. ................. ................. . . CA

Cal. Penal Code § 190 (West Supp. 2006) ................. ................. .............. CA

Cal. Penal Code § 190.1(a) (West 1999) ................. ................. ............... CA

Cal. Penal Code § 190.2 (West Supp. 2006) ................. ................. ............ CA

Cal. Penal Code § 190.3 (West 1999) ................. ................. .......... CA, 4.7, 4.8

Cal. Penal Code § 190.4(a) (West 1999) ................. ................. ............... CA

Cal. Penal Code § 190.4(e) (West 1999) ................. ................. ............... CA

Cal. Penal Code § 190.5 (West 1999) ................. ................. ............. CA, 1.5

Cal. Penal Code § 190.6 (West 1999) ................. ................. ................. CA

Cal. Penal Code § 190.8 (West 1999) ................. ................. ................. CA

Cal. Penal Code § 190.9 (West Supp. 2006) ................. ................. ............ CA

Cal. Penal Code § 219 (West 1999) ................. ................. ................. . CA

Cal. Penal Code § 987(b) (West Supp. 2006) ................. ................. ........... CA

Cal. Penal Code § 987(d) (West Supp. 2006) ................. ................. ........... CA

Cal. Penal Code § 987.9 (West Supp. 2006) ................. ................. ............ CA

Cal. Penal Code § 1193 (West Supp. 2006) ................. ................. ............. CA

Cal. Penal Code § 1218 (West 2004) ................. ................. ................. . CA
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE STATUTES

lxxxvi NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Cal. Penal Code § 1219 (West 2004) ................. ................. ................. . CA

Cal. Penal Code § 1227 (West 2004) ................. ................. ................. . CA

Cal. Penal Code § 1227.5 (West 2004) ................. ................. ................ CA

Cal. Penal Code § 1239(b) (West 2004) ................. ................. .......... CA, 1.10

Cal. Penal Code § 1240(a)(4) (West 2004) ................. ................. ............. CA

Cal. Penal Code § 1240.1(e)(1) (West 2004) ................. ................. ............ CA

Cal. Penal Code § 1241 (West 2004) ................. ................. ................. . CA

Cal. Penal Code § 1243 (West 2004) ................. ................. ................. . CA

Cal. Penal Code § 1254 (West 2004) ................. ................. ................. . CA

Cal. Penal Code § 1259 (West 2004) ................. ................. ................. . CA

Cal. Penal Code § 1376 (West Supp. 2006) ................. ................. ............. CA

Cal. Penal Code § 1473, et seq. (West 2000 and West Supp. 2006) ................. ........... CA

Cal. Penal Code § 1475 (West 2000) ................. ................. ................. . CA

Cal. Penal Code § 1506 (West 2000) ................. ................. ................. . CA

Cal. Penal Code § 3600 (West Supp. 2006) ................. ................. ............. CA

Cal. Penal Code §§ 3600-3607 (West 2000 and West Supp. 2006) ................. ........... CA

Cal. Penal Code § 3603 (West 2000) ................. ................. ................. . CA

Cal. Penal Code § 3604 (West 2000) ................. ................. ................. . 1.8

Cal. Penal Code § 3605 (West Supp. 2006) ................. ................. ............. CA

Cal. Penal Code § 3700 (West 2000) ................. ................. ................. . CA

Cal. Penal Code § 3700.5 (West 2000) ................. ................. ................ CA

Cal. Penal Code § 3701 (West 2000) ................. ................. ................. . CA

Cal. Penal Code § 3702 (West 2000) ................. ................. ................. . CA

Cal. Penal Code § 3703 (West 2000) ................. ................. ................. . CA

Cal. Penal Code § 3704 (West 2000) ................. ................. ................. . CA

Cal. Penal Code § 4500 (West 2000) ................. ................. ................. . CA

Cal. Penal Code § 4800, et seq. (West 2000) ................. ................. ............ CA

Cal. Penal Code § 4850, et seq. (West 2000) ................. ................. ............ CA
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE STATUTES

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) lxxxvii

Cal. Penal Code § 4852.16 (West 2000) ................. ................. ............... CA

Cal. Penal Code § 5075 (West 2000) ................. ................. ................. . CA

Idaho Code § 18-4003 (2004) ................. ................. ................. ...... ID

Idaho Code § 18-4004 (2004) ................. ................. ................. ...... ID

Idaho Code § 18-4004(A) (2004) ................. ................. ................. .... ID

Idaho Code § 18-4502 (2004) ................. ................. ................. ...... ID

Idaho Code § 18-4504 (2004) ................. ................. ................. ...... ID

Idaho Code § 18-4505 (2004) ................. ................. ................. ... ID, 4.8

Idaho Code § 18-4505(6) (2004) ................. ................. ................. .... ID

Idaho Code § 18-5411 (2004) ................. ................. ................. ...... ID

Idaho Code § 19-106 (2004) ................. ................. ................. ....... ID

Idaho Code § 19-852 (2004) ................. ................. ................. ....... ID

Idaho Code § 19-853(b) (2004) ................. ................. ................. ..... ID

Idaho Code § 19-860 (2004) ................. ................. ................. ....... ID

Idaho Code § 19-863A (2004) ................. ................. ................. ...... ID

Idaho Code § 19-867–872 (2004) ................. ................. ................. ... ID

Idaho Code § 19-2515 (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. AZ, ID, MT, 4.6, 4.7, 4.8

Idaho Code § 19-2513(a) (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. ................ ID

Idaho Code § 19-2515(5) (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. ................ ID

Idaho Code § 19-2515(8) (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. ................ ID

Idaho Code § 19-2515(9) (Supp. 2005) ................. ................. ................ ID

Idaho Code § 19-2515A (2004) ................. ................. ................. . ID, 1.6

Idaho Code § 19-2705 (2004) ................. ................. ................. ...... ID

Idaho Code § 19-2706 (2004) ................. ................. ................. ...... ID

Idaho Code § 19-2713 (2004) ................. ................. ................. ...... ID

Idaho Code § 19-2714 (2004) ................. ................. ................. ...... ID

Idaho Code § 19-2715(2) (2004) ................. ................. ................. .... ID

Idaho Code § 19-2715(4) (2004) ................. ................. ................. .... ID
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE STATUTES

lxxxviii NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Idaho Code § 19-2716 (2004) ................. ................. ................. ... ID, 1.8

Idaho Code § 19-2718 (2004) ................. ................. ................. ...... ID

Idaho Code § 19-2719 (2004) ................. ................. ................. ...... ID

Idaho Code § 19-2719(3) (2004) ................. ................. ................. .... ID

Idaho Code § 19-2719(4) (2004) ................. ................. ................. .... ID

Idaho Code § 19-2719(5) (2004) ................. ................. ................. .... ID

Idaho Code § 19-2719(6) (2004) ................. ................. ................. .... ID

Idaho Code § 19-2719(10) (2004) ................. ................. ................. ... ID

Idaho Code § 19-2719(11) (2004) ................. ................. ................. ... ID

Idaho Code § 19-2719(12) (2004) ................. ................. ................. ... ID

Idaho Code § 19-2719A (2004) ................. ................. ................. ..... ID

Idaho Code § 19-2802 (2004) ................. ................. ................. ...... ID

Idaho Code § 19-2818 (2004) ................. ................. ................. ...... ID

Idaho Code § 19-2827 (2004) ................. ................. ................. ...... ID

Idaho Code § 19-2827(c)(3) (2004) ................. ................. ................. . 1.10

Idaho Code §§ 19-4201–4226 (2004) ................. ................. ................. ID

Idaho Code §§ 19-4901–4911 (2004) ................. ................. ................. ID

Idaho Code § 19-4901(a)(6) (2004) ................. ................. ................. . . ID

Idaho Code § 19-4901(b) (2004) ................. ................. ................. .... ID

Idaho Code § 19-4902(b) - (f) (2004) ................. ................. ................. ID

Idaho Code § 19-4904 (2004) ................. ................. ................. ...... ID

Idaho Code § 19-4907(b) (2004) ................. ................. ................. .... ID

Idaho Code § 19-4909 (2004) ................. ................. ................. ...... ID

Idaho Code § 20-210 (2004) ................. ................. ................. ....... ID

Idaho Code § 20-240 (2004) ................. ................. ................. ....... ID

Idaho Const. art. I, § 5 ................. ................. ................. ............ ID

Idaho Const. art. I, § 7 ................. ................. ................. ............ ID

Idaho Const. art. IV, § 7 ................. ................. ................. .......... ID
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE STATUTES

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) lxxxix

Idaho Const. art. V, § 9 ................. ................. ................. ........... ID

Mont. Code Ann. § 45-2-101(50) (2005) ................. ................. .............. MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-102 (2005) ................. ................. .............. MT, 1.5

Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-303 (2005) ................. ................. ................. MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-503(3)(c) (2005) ................. ................. ............ MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-1-401 (2005) ................. ................. ................. MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-8-101 (2005) ................. ................. ................. MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-8-104 (2005) ................. ................. ................. MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-8-111 (2005) ................. ................. ................. MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-8-201 (2005) ................. ................. ................. MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-16-115(2)(h) (2005) ................. ................. ........... MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-16-116 (2005) ................. ................. ................ MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-16-122(3) (2005) ................. ................. .............. MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-301 (2005) ................. ................. ...... AZ, ID, MT, 4.6

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-302 (2005) ................. ................. ................ MT

Mont. Code Ann. §§ 46-18-302, 303 (2005) ................. ................. ............ 4.7

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-303 (2005) ................. ................. ................ MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-304 (2005) ................. ................. ............. MT, 4.8

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-305 (2005) ................. ................. ................ MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-306 (2005) ................. ................. ................ MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-307 (2005) ................. ................. ................ MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-308 (2005) ................. ................. ................ MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-310 (2005) ................. ................. ............ MT, 1.10

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-19-103(1) (2005) ................. ................. .............. MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-19-103(3) (2005) ................. ................. ........... MT, 1.8

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-19-103(4) (2005) ................. ................. .............. MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-19-103(5) (2005) ................. ................. .............. MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-19-103(6) (2005) ................. ................. .............. MT
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE STATUTES

xc NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Mont. Code Ann. §§ 46-19-201–202 (2005) ................. ................. ........... MT

Mont. Code Ann. §§ 46-19-203–204 (2005) ................. ................. ........... MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-20-104 (2005) ................. ................. ................ MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-20-204(1) (2005) ................. ................. .............. MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-20-701 (2005) ................. ................. ................ MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-20-701(2) (2005) ................. ................. .............. MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-20-703 (2005) ................. ................. ................ MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-101 (2005) ................. ................. ................ MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-101(1) (2005) ................. ................. .............. MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-102 (2005) ................. ................. ................ MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-104 (2005) ................. ................. ................ MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-105 (2005) ................. ................. ................ MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-105(2) (2005) ................. ................. .............. MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-201(1)(b) (2005) ................. ................. ........... MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-201(3) (2005) ................. ................. .............. MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-201(3)(e) (2005) ................. ................. ........... MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-201(5) (2005) ................. ................. .............. MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-203 (2005) ................. ................. ................ MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-22-101 (2005) ................. ................. ................ MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-301(1) (2005) ................. ................. .............. MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-301(2) (2005) ................. ................. .............. MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-301(3) (2005) ................. ................. .............. MT

Mont. Code Ann. §§ 46-23-302–307 (2005) ................. ................. ........... MT

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-315 (2005) ................. ................. ................ MT

Mont. Const. art. VI, § 12 ................. ................. ................. ........ MT

Mont. Const. art. VII, § 2 ................. ................. ................. ......... MT

Nev. Const. art. I, § 5 ................. ................. ................. ............ NV

Nev. Const. art. V, § 14 ................. ................. ................. .......... NV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE STATUTES

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) xci

NRS § 2.090 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ............. NV

NRS § 34.360, et seq. (2005) ................. ................. ................. ...... NV

NRS § 34.720 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ............ NV

NRS § 34.720, et seq. (2005) ................. ................. ................. ...... NV

NRS § 34.726 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ............ NV

NRS § 34.800 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ............ NV

NRS § 34.810 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ............ NV

NRS § 34.820 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ............ NV

NRS § 171.188 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ........... NV

NRS § 174.098 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ........... NV

NRS § 175.051 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ........... NV

NRS § 175.151 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ........... NV

NRS § 175.552 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ........... NV

NRS § 175.552(3) (2005) ................. ................. ................. ........ NV

NRS § 175.554 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ........... NV

NRS § 175.556 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ........... NV

NRS § 175.558 (repealed) ................. ................. ................. ........ NV

NRS § 175.562 (repealed) ................. ................. ................. ........ NV

NRS § 176.025 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ........ NV, 1.5

NRS § 176.345 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ........... NV

NRS § 176.355 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ........ NV, 1.8

NRS § 176.415 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ........... NV

NRS § 176.425 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ........... NV

NRS § 176.435 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ........... NV

NRS § 176.455 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ........... NV

NRS § 176.465 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ........... NV

NRS § 176.486 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ........... NV

NRS § 176.495 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ........... NV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE STATUTES

xcii NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

NRS § 176.505 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ........... NV

NRS § 177.055 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ........... NV

NRS § 177.055(2)(d) (2005) ................. ................. ................. ...... 1.10

NRS § 177.095 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ........... NV

NRS § 180.060 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ........... NV

NRS § 200.010 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ........... NV

NRS § 200.030 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ........... NV

NRS § 200.033 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ........ NV, 4.7

NRS § 200.035 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ........ NV, 4.8

NRS §§ 213.005–213.100 (2005) ................. ................. ................. . . NV

NRS § 213.085 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ........... NV

Or. Const. art. V, § 14 ................. ................. ................. ............ OR

Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 34.310-34.730 (2005) ................. ................. ................ OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 34.330 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ...... OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 34.360 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ...... OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 34.710 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ...... OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.045 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ..... OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.050 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ..... OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 136.001, et seq. (2005) ................. ................. ................ OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 136.230 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ..... OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.463 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ..... OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.464 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ..... OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.466 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ..... OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.473 (2005) ................. ................. .............. OR, 1.8, 1.15

Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.473(1) (2005) ................. ................. ................. . . OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.476 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ..... OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.478 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ..... OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.482 (2005) ................. ................. ................. ..... OR
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE STATUTES

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) xciii

Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.707 (2005) ........................................................ OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.012 (2005) ................................................... OR, 1.10

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.220 (2005) ........................................................ OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.510, et seq. (2005) .................................................. OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.510(2) (2005) ..................................................... OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.510(3) (2005) ..................................................... OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.530 (2005) ........................................................ OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.540 (2005) ........................................................ OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.540(1) (2005) ..................................................... OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.550 (2005) ........................................................ OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.550(1) (2005) ..................................................... OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.550(2) (2005) ..................................................... OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.550(3) (2005) ..................................................... OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.560 (2005) ........................................................ OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.590 (2005) ........................................................ OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.620 (2005) ........................................................ OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.650 (2005) ........................................................ OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.660 (2005) ........................................................ OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.686 (2005) ........................................................ OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.649 (2005) ........................................................ OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.650(4) (2005) ..................................................... OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.660 (2005) ........................................................ OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.095 (2005) .................................................... OR, 4.7

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.105 (2005) ........................................................ OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.115 (2005) ........................................................ OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150 (2005) .................................................... OR, 4.8

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(1) (2005) ..................................................... OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(1)(b) (2005) ................................................... OR
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE STATUTES

xciv NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(1)(c) (2005) ................................................... OR

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(2) (2005) ..................................................... OR

Wash. Const. art. III, § 9 ................. ................. ................. ......... WA

Wash. Rev. Code § 2.06.030 (2002) ................. ................. ................. WA

Wash. Rev. Code § 4.88.330 (2002) ................. ................. ................. WA

Wash. Rev. Code § 7.36.010, et seq. (1992) ................. ................. ........... WA

Wash. Rev. Code § 7.36.040 (1992) ................. ................. ................. WA

Wash. Rev. Code § 7.36.130 (2002) ................. ................. ................. WA

Wash. Rev. Code § 7.36.250 (Supp. 2006) ................. ................. ............ WA

Wash. Rev. Code § 9.82.010 (Supp. 2006) ................. ................. ............ WA

Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.885 (2002) ................. ................. ................ WA

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.01.120 (2002) ................. ................. ................ WA

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090 (2002) ................. ................. ................ WA

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.100 (2002) ................. ................. ................ WA

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.140 (2002) ................. ................. ................ WA

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.150 (2002) ................. ................. ................ WA

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020 (Supp. 2006) ................. ................. ....... WA, 4.7

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.030 (2002) ................. ................. ............ WA, 1.6

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.040 (2002) ................. ................. ................ WA

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.050 (2002) ................. ................. ................ WA

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.050(3) (2002) ................. ................. .............. WA

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.060 (2002) ................. ................. ................ WA

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.070 (2002) ................. ................. ......... WA, 1.5, 4.8

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.080 (2002) ................. ................. ................ WA

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.090 (2002) ................. ................. ................ WA

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.100 (2002) ................. ................. ................ WA

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.120 (2002) ................. ................. ................ WA

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.130 (2002) ................. ................. ................ WA
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE STATUTES

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) xcv

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.130(2)(b) (2002) ................. ................. ............ 1.10

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.140 (2002) ................. ................. ................ WA

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.150 (2002) ................. ................. ................ WA

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.160 (2002) ................. ................. ................ WA

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.180 (2002) ................. ................. ............ WA, 1.8
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE RULES

xcvi NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

State Rules

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 6.1(b) ................. ................. ................. ........... AZ

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 6.2 ................. ................. ................. ............. AZ

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 6.4 ................. ................. ................. ............. AZ

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 6.5(b) ................. ................. ................. ........... AZ

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 6.6 ................. ................. ................. ............. AZ

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 6.8 ................. ................. ................. ............. AZ

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1(i) ................. ................. ................. ........... AZ

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.9 ................. ................. ................. ............ AZ

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.2(b) ................. ................. ................. .......... AZ

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.9 ................. ................. ................. ............ AZ

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.17 ................. ................. ................. ........... AZ

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.17(c) ................. ................. ................. ......... AZ

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.23(b) ................. ................. ................. ......... AZ

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1–32.9 ................. ................. ................. ........ AZ

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2 ................. ................. ................. ............ AZ

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) ................. ................. ................. ........ AZ

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.3 ................. ................. ................. ............ AZ

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(c) ................. ................. ................. .... AZ, 6.2.16

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9 ................. ................. ................. ............ AZ

Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 1(a)-1(e) ................. ................. ................. ......... AZ

Cal. R. Ct. 4.551 ................. ................. ................. ................. CA

Cal. R. Ct. 30.2(b), (d) ................. ................. ................. ............ CA

Cal. R. Ct. 34–36 ................. ................. ................. ................ CA

Cal. R. Ct. 39.2 ................. ................. ................. ................. . CA

Cal. R. Ct. 60, 60.5(b) ................. ................. ................. ............ CA
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE RULES

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) xcvii

Cal. R. Ct. 76.5 ................. ................. ................. ................. . CA

Cal. R. Ct. 76.6 ................. ................. ................. ................. . CA

Cal. R. Ct. 4.315 ................. ................. ................. ................. CA

Cal. Sup. Ct. Guidelines for Fixed Fee Appointments, 

on Optional Basis, to Automatic Appeals and Related Habeas Corpus 

Proceedings in the Cal. Sup. Ct. ................. ................. ............... CA

Cal. Sup. Ct. Internal Practices & Procedures XIV(F) ................. ................. ..... CA

Cal. Sup. Ct. Internal Practices & Procedures XV(A) ................. ................. ..... CA

Cal. Sup. Ct. Internal Practices & Procedures XV(B) ................. ................. ..... CA

Cal. Sup. Ct. Internal Practices & Procedures XV(C) ................. ................. ..... CA

Cal. Sup. Ct. Internal Practices & Procedures XV(D) ................. ................. ..... CA

Cal. Sup. Ct. Internal Practices & Procedures XV(E) ................. ................. ..... CA

Cal. Sup. Ct. Payment Guidelines for Appointed Counsel Representing 

Indigent Criminal Appellants in the Cal. Sup. Ct. ................. ................. . CA

Cal. Sup. Ct. Policies Regarding Cases Arising from Judgments of Death ................. ...... CA

Cal. Sup. Ct. Policies Regarding Cases Arising from Judgments of Death– 

Policy 1 ................. ................. ................. ................. CA

Cal. Sup. Ct. Policies Regarding Cases Arising from Judgments of Death– 

Policy 3 ................. ................. ................. ................. CA

Cal. Sup. Ct. Policies Regarding Cases Arising from Judgments of Death– 

Policy 3.1 ................. ................. ................. ............... CA

CALCRIM 763 ................. ................. ................. ................. CA

CALJIC 8.85 ................. ................. ................. ................. . . CA

Idaho Appellate R. 14 ................. ................. ................. ............ ID

Idaho Crim. R. 31 ................. ................. ................. ................ ID

Idaho Crim. R. 33.1 ................. ................. ................. .............. ID

Idaho Crim. R. 33.2 ................. ................. ................. .............. ID

Idaho Crim. R. 38(a) ................. ................. ................. ............. ID

Idaho Crim. R. 44 ................. ................. ................. ................ ID

Idaho Crim. R. 44.2 ................. ................. ................. .............. ID

Idaho Crim. R. 44.3 ................. ................. ................. .............. ID
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE RULES

xcviii NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Idaho Crim. R. 57 ................. ................. ................. ................ ID

Mont. R. App. P. 7 ................. ................. ................. .............. MT

Mont. R. Death Sent. Rev. 1 ................. ................. ................. ...... MT

Mont. R. Death Sent. Rev. 2 ................. ................. ................. ...... MT

Mont. R. Death Sent. Rev. 5 ................. ................. ................. ...... MT

Mont. R. Death Sent. Rev. 7 ................. ................. ................. ...... MT

Mont. R. Death Sent. Rev. 9 ................. ................. ................. ...... MT

Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 250(2) ................. ................. ................. .......... NV

Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 250(3) ................. ................. ................. .......... NV

Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 250(4) ................. ................. ................. .......... NV

Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 250(5) ................. ................. ................. .......... NV

Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 250(6) ................. ................. ................. .......... NV

Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 250(7) ................. ................. ................. .......... NV

Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 250(8) ................. ................. ................. .......... NV

Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 250(10)(a) ................. ................. ................. ....... NV

Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 250(10)(b) ................. ................. ................. ....... NV

Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 250(10)(c) ................. ................. ................. ....... NV

Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 250(10)(d) ................. ................. ................. ....... NV

Or. Qualification Standards for Ct. Appointed Counsel 3.1 ................. ................. OR

Or. R. App. P. 12.10(1) ................. ................. ................. ........... OR

Or. R. App. P. 12.12 ................. ................. ................. .............. OR

Wash. R. App. P. 16.3–16.15 ................. ................. ................. ...... WA

Wash. R. App. P. 16.3(c) ................. ................. ................. ......... WA

Wash. R. App. P. 16.4 ................. ................. ................. ........... WA

Wash. R. App. P. 16.11 ................. ................. ................. .......... WA

Wash. R. App. P. 16.12 ................. ................. ................. .......... WA

Wash. R. App. P. 16.13 ................. ................. ................. .......... WA

Wash. R. App. P. 16.14(b) ................. ................. ................. ........ WA

Wash. R. App. P. 16.19–16.23 ................. ................. ................. ..... WA
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: STATE RULES

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) xcix

Wash. R. App. P. 16.24 ................. ................. ................. .......... WA

Wash. R. App. P. 16.25 ................. ................. ................. .......... WA

Wash. R. App. P. 16.25–16.27 ................. ................. ................. ..... WA

Wash. R. App. P. 16.26 ................. ................. ................. .......... WA

Wash. R. App. P. 16.27 ................. ................. ................. .......... WA

Wash. Crim. R. 3.1 ................. ................. ................. .............. WA

Wash. Crim. R. 7.8(c)(2) ................. ................. ................. ......... WA

Wash. R. Super. Ct. Spec. Proc. Crim. R. 2 ................. ................. ............ WA

Wash. R. Super. Ct. Spec. Proc. Crim. R. 4 ................. ................. ............ WA

Wash. R. Super. Ct. Spec. Proc. Crim. R. 5 ................. ................. ............ WA

Wash. R. Super. Ct. Spec. Proc. Crim. R. 6 ................. ................. ............ WA


STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 1

ARIZONA

History

In response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238

(1972), Arizona’s legislature enacted a new death penalty statute (1973 Ariz. Sess.

Laws ch. 138, § 5, at 968–70; current version at Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated

§ 13-703) eliminating the trial court’s broad discretion in imposing capital punishment. 

The statute enumerated aggravating and mitigating factors and permitted imposition of

the death penalty only when the court found at least one aggravating factor and no

mitigating factors to warrant leniency. 

Shortly after the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Bishop, 118 Ariz. 263,

576 P.2d 122 (1978), construed the list of mitigating factors to be exclusive, the U.S.

Supreme Court in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), held unconstitutional any

limitation of mitigating circumstances in capital sentencing. Consequently, the Arizona

Supreme Court in State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441, 586 P.2d 1253 (1978), severed the

portion of the statute limiting mitigating circumstances and reinterpreted the statute to

allow consideration of any mitigating circumstance. The 1979 legislature amended the

applicable statute, and the court resentenced all death row inmates accordingly. 

In response to the decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),

Arizona’s legislature amended the death penalty statute, effective August 1, 2002, to

provide for jury determination of aggravating and mitigating factors and jury

sentencing, except in those cases in which both the state and the defendant waive a jury

trial. See “Trial of Capital Offenses” and “Capital Sentencing,” below.

United States Supreme Court:

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that capital defendants are entitled to

jury determination of any fact on which legislature conditions increase in their

maximum punishment).

Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (holding unconstitutional Ohio death penalty

statute limiting mitigating circumstances).
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

2 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding unguided discretionary sentencing

unconstitutional).

Arizona Supreme Court:

State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441, 586 P.2d 1253 (1978) (en banc) (reinterpreting capital

statute to allow consideration of any mitigating circumstance), cert. denied, 440 U.S.

924 (1979).

State v. Bishop, 118 Ariz. 263, 576 P.2d 122 (1978) (en banc) (construing list of

mitigating factors in first death penalty statute after Furman to be exclusive), vacated

and remanded in light of Lockett, 439 U.S. 810 (1978).

Arizona Statutes:

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(A) (Supp. 2005) (providing sentence for first degree

murder).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(E) (Supp. 2005) (requiring trier of fact to take

aggravating and mitigating circumstances into account in determining sentence of death

or life imprisonment and authorizing death sentence if trier of fact finds one or more

aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection (F) and no sufficient mitigating

circumstances to call for leniency).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(F) (Supp. 2005) (codifying Watson interpretation of

mitigating circumstances: providing that mitigating factors are any factors proffered by

defendant or state relevant to determining whether to impose sentence less than death

and enumerating non-exclusive list of mitigating factors).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02 (Supp. 2005), (providing for I.Q. screening of capital

defendants; prohibiting imposition of death penalty on person suffering from mental

retardation).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.03 (Supp. 2005) (providing for prescreening of capital

defendant for competency to stand trial and sanity at time of offense).

Capital Offenses

First degree murder, which is a capital offense, is defined as knowingly or intentionally

causing the death of another with premeditation or causing the death of another while
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 3

in the process of committing a delineated felony. First degree murder is punishable by

death, life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, or life imprisonment with the

possibility of parole. 

In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), the Supreme Court held that the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the imposition of the death penalty on those

who were under the age of 18 at the time their crimes were committed. Previously,

Arizona law did not prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on those under age 18,

although the defendant’s age could be considered as a mitigating circumstance.

United States Supreme Court:

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the

age of 18 when their crimes were committed).

Arizona Statutes:

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(A) (Supp. 2005) (providing sentence of death or life

with the possibility of parole or life without the possibility of parole for first degree

murder).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1105 (Supp. 2005) (defining first degree murder).

Prescreening to Determine Whether Defendant is Mentally Retarded

Under Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02, if the state files a notice of intent to seek the

death penalty, the court must appoint a prescreening psychological expert in order to

determine the defendant’s I.Q. using current community, nationally, and culturally

accepted intelligence testing procedures. The prescreening psychological expert must

submit a written report of the I.Q. determination to the court within 10 days of the

testing. If the prescreening psychological expert determines that the defendant’s I.Q. is

75 or less, the trial court will appoint one or more additional psychological experts to

independently determine whether the defendant has mental retardation. “Mental

retardation” is defined in § 13-703.02(K)(2) as a condition based on a mental deficit
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

4 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

that involves significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning, existing

concurrently with significant impairment in adaptive behavior, where the onset of these

conditions occurred before the defendant reached the age of 18. Under § 13-703.02(G)

a determination by the trial court that the defendant’s I.Q. is 65 or less establishes a

rebuttable presumption that the defendant has mental retardation, but that does not

preclude a defendant with an I.Q. of 70 or below from proving mental retardation by

clear and convincing evidence. If the trial court finds that the defendant has mental

retardation, the trial court must dismiss the intent to seek the death penalty and not

impose a sentence of death on the defendant if the defendant is convicted of first degree

murder.

If the prescreening psychological expert determines that the defendant’s I.Q.

is higher than 75: (1) the notice of intent to seek the death penalty will not be dismissed

on the ground that the defendant has mental retardation, and (2) the report will be

sealed by the court and be available only to the defendant. A prescreening

determination that the defendant’s I.Q. is higher than 75 does not prevent the defendant

from introducing evidence of the defendant’s mental retardation or diminished mental

capacity as a mitigating factor at the penalty phase of the sentencing proceeding. 

The United States Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304

(2002), that the execution of the mentally retarded constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. See § 1.6.

United States Supreme Court:

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that executing the mentally retarded

violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).

Arizona Statutes:

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02 (Supp. 2005) (providing for evaluation of capital

defendant for mental retardation).
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 5

Representation in Capital Cases

In addition to an indigent defendant having a right to counsel during the trial and direct

appeal of a capital case, an indigent prisoner under capital sentence has a statutory right

to counsel in state postconviction proceedings. The Arizona legislature has adopted

representation and compensation standards for counsel who represent capital

defendants in state postconviction proceedings. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4041. 

Additionally, the Arizona Supreme Court has adopted representation standards for trial,

appellate, and postconviction counsel in death penalty cases and has provided for the

appointment of lead and co-counsel throughout all stages of capital litigation. See Ariz.

R. Crim. P. 6.8.

After appointing qualified counsel, the court may also appoint investigators

and experts “reasonably necessary” to adequately present an indigent defendant’s

defense at trial and any subsequent proceeding. The court orders “reasonable”

compensation for appointed investigators and experts.

The Ninth Circuit ruled in Spears v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2001),

amended and superseded by 283 F.3d 992 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 977 (2002),

and cert. denied 537 U.S. 995 (2002), that Arizona had in place as of July 17, 1998 (the

relevant date as to the petitioner), a mechanism for the appointment and compensation

of counsel for indigent capital defendants in state postconviction proceedings that met

the requirements of Chapter 154 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (AEDPA), and therefore qualified for opt-in status as of that date, but that

Arizona was not entitled to enforce the expedited procedures of Chapter 154 because it

had not complied with the timeliness requirements of its own system as to the

petitioner. Arizona’s timeliness requirement codified in Rule of Criminal Procedure

32.4(c) was amended in 2000 and no longer requires that counsel be appointed within

15 days if an indigent capital defendant requests the appointment. Rule 32.4 now

provides that counsel must be appointed pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4041

(requiring that counsel must be appointed “[a]fter the supreme court has affirmed a

defendant’s conviction and sentence in a capital case” ) and Ariz. R. Crim. P. 6.8

(attorney competency standards). In 2002, Rule 32.4(c) was amended to provide for

appointment of postconviction relief counsel after issuance of the decision affirming
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

6 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

the defendant’s conviction and sentence but prior to completion of certiorari

proceedings or issuance of the mandate.

Ninth Circuit:

Spears v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2001), amended and superseded by 283 F.3d

992 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 977 (2002), and cert. denied, 537 U.S. 995 (2002)

(holding that Arizona had in place as of July 17, 1998 (the relevant date as to the

petitioner), a mechanism for appointment and compensation of counsel for indigent

capital defendants in state postconviction proceedings that met requirements of 

Chapter 154 of AEDPA and therefore qualified for opt-in status as of that date, but that

Arizona was not entitled to enforce expedited procedures of Chapter 154 because it had

not complied with timeliness requirements of its own system as to the petitioner).

Arizona Statutes:

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4013(B) (2001) (providing for appointment of investigators

and expert witnesses reasonably necessary to adequately present defense at trial and

any subsequent proceeding and providing compensation rate as what court deems

appropriate).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4041 (2001) (detailing the appointment of postconviction

counsel in a capital case, the required qualifications, and the compensation).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4234(D) (2001) (providing for indigent right to counsel in

postconviction proceedings).

Arizona Rules:

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 6.1(b) (providing for indigent right to representation).

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 6.2 (setting procedure for appointment of dual trial counsel).

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 6.4 (providing for determination of indigency).

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 6.5(b) (providing for public defender as counsel).

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 6.8 (requiring standards for appointment of counsel in capital cases).

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.9 (governing appointment of investigators, expert witnesses for
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 7

indigent defendants).

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(c) (setting time frame for appointment of counsel in

postconviction proceedings).

Trial of Capital Offenses

Arizona’s county superior courts are the state trial courts of general jurisdiction. These

courts have original jurisdiction over all criminal cases, including petitions for

postconviction relief and habeas corpus. 

In Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), reversing the decision of the

Arizona Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.

639 (1990), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), are irreconcilable and

overruled Walton to the extent that it allowed a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury,

to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. The

Court reasoned that because Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as “the

functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense” (Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.

19), the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury. The Court held that

capital defendants are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the

legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment. The Court pointed

out that 29 of 38 states in which there is a death penalty generally commit sentencing

decisions to juries, and that other than Arizona, only four States commit both capital

sentencing factfinding and the ultimate sentencing decision entirely to judges: Colorado

(Colo. Rev. Stat §16-11-103 (2001) (three-judge panel); Idaho (Idaho Code §19-2515

(Supp. 2001)); Montana (Mont. Code §46-18-301 (1997)); and Nebraska (Neb. Rev.

Stat. §29-2520 (1995)). The Court observed that the right to trial by jury guaranteed by

the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the

factfinding necessary to increase a defendant’s sentence by two years, but not the

factfinding necessary to put him to death. Subsequently, in Schriro v. Summerlin, 542

U.S. 348 (2004), the Supreme Court ruled that Ring does not apply retroactively to

cases already final on direct review

In response to Ring v. Arizona, the 2002 Arizona Legislature enacted new

capital jury sentencing procedures. The legislative intent of the statute provides those
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

8 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

persons who were previously sentenced to death in Arizona are not entitled to a new

sentencing proceeding if they have already exhausted direct appeals of their sentences.

2002 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 1, § 9 (5th special session). The statute retains the

bifurcated adjudication process for capital cases. However, unlike the former

procedure in which the judge conducted the penalty phase and determined the sentence,

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.01, provides that if a defendant is found guilty of first

degree murder at trial, the “trier of fact” then immediately determines whether the

aggravating circumstances have been proved (aggravation phase of sentencing

proceeding). If the trier of fact determines that at least one of the aggravating

circumstances was proved, the trier then proceeds to determine whether a death

sentence should be imposed (penalty phase of sentencing proceeding). “Trier of fact” is

defined in § 13-703.01(S)(1) as meaning a jury unless the defendant and the state waive

a jury, in which case the trier of fact is a judge. The statute applies to all sentencing or

resentencing proceedings held after August 1, 2002 (2002 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 1, § 7). 

The defendant is entitled to notice of the state’s intent to seek the death

penalty; however, the basic procedures for the trial of a capital case are the same as

those for the trial of other felonies. The prosecution is entitled to “death-qualify” the

jury. See State v. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. 21, 33, 734 P.2d 563, 575 (1987).

The Arizona Supreme Court has held that “an accused is not entitled to a

unanimous jury verdict on the precise manner in which the defendant committed the

crime,” State v. Smith, 136 Ariz. 273, 665 P.2d 995 (1983) (en banc), but is entitled to a

unanimous jury verdict on whether the defendant in fact committed first degree murder. 

See State v. Arnett, 158 Ariz. 15, 760 P.2d 1064 (1988) (en banc).

United States Supreme Court:

Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (holding that Ring v. Arizona did not apply

retroactively to cases already final on direct review).

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that capital defendants are entitled to

jury determination of any fact on which legislature conditions increase in their

maximum punishment; also holding that Walton and Apprendi are irreconcilable and

overruling Walton to extent that it allowed sentencing judge, sitting without jury, to

find aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of death penalty).
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 9

Arizona Supreme Court:

State v. Anderson, 197 Ariz. 314, 4 P.3d 369 (2000) (en banc) (finding structural error

where court removed for cause prospective jurors who indicated a general objection to

the death penalty in their questionnaires without allowing voir dire to possibly

rehabilitate).

Holmberg v. DeLeon, 189 Ariz. 109, 938 P.2d 1110 (1997) (en banc) (holding death

penalty precluded when state filed its notice of intent to seek death penalty one year

and three months after defendant’s arraignment, notwithstanding lack of prejudice

argument).

State v. Arnett, 158 Ariz. 15, 760 P.2d 1064 (1988) (en banc) (holding defendant

entitled to unanimous jury verdict on whether defendant committed first degree

murder).

State v. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. 21, 33, 734 P.2d 563, 575 (1987) (discussing deathqualifying guilt jury).

State v. Smith, 136 Ariz. 273, 665 P.2d 995 (1983) (en banc) (holding defendant not

entitled to unanimous verdict on manner in which defendant committed crime).

Arizona Statutes:

Ariz. Const. art. II, § 23 (requiring twelve jurors and unanimous verdict for capital

trial).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703 (Supp. 2005) (detailing capital case sentencing).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.01 (Supp. 2005) (providing procedures for capital cases

including sentencing proceedings composed of aggravation phase and penalty phase).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-3981–3990 (2001) and (Supp. 2005) (detailing trial

procedures).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4031 (2001) (providing supreme court exclusive appellate

jurisdiction over capital cases).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-102 (2002) (setting capital jury at twelve persons and

unanimous verdict).
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

10 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Arizona Rules:

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1(i) (requiring notice of intent to seek death penalty).

Capital Sentencing

Penalty Hearing

As discussed in “Trial of Capital Offenses,” above, the 2002 Arizona Legislature

enacted new capital jury sentencing procedures in response to the decision in Ring v.

Arizona. These procedures apply to all sentencing or resentencing proceedings held

after August 1, 2002, pursuant to 2002 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 1, § 7 (5th special

session). The amended death penalty statute employs the term “trier of fact,” defined

as a jury unless the defendant and the state waive a jury, in which case the trier of fact

is a judge. In the discussion below, “jury” is also used where it is appropriate in

context.

Before trial, the state must provide the defendant with notice of the

aggravating factors it intends to prove at the sentencing hearing. Before the defendant

is eligible for the death penalty for first degree murder, the state must prove at least one

enumerated aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. If the defendant is

death-eligible pursuant to a felony murder conviction, the state must also show that the

defendant killed, attempted to kill or intended to kill, or was a major participant in the

underlying felony and acted with reckless disregard for human life. See Tison v.

Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). In State v.

Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 65 P.3d 915 (2003) (en banc), the Arizona Supreme Court held

that the Sixth Amendment principles of Apprendi/Ring do not require that EnmundTison findings be made by a jury. 

The defendant must prove the existence of mitigating circumstances by a

preponderance of the evidence and must show that the mitigating circumstances are

sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. If the trier of fact is a jury, the jurors do not

have to agree unanimously that a mitigating circumstance has been found to exist; each

juror may consider any mitigating circumstance found by that juror in determining the

appropriate penalty. In the sentencing proceeding, the state or defendant may present
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 11

any information relevant to mitigating circumstances regardless of its admissibility

under the rules of evidence that govern trial proceedings. Information relevant to

aggravating circumstances, however, is admissible only in accordance with the rules of

evidence. If there is the same trier of fact at any subsequent phase of the trial as there

was at a prior phase, any evidence presented at the prior phase is deemed admitted in

the subsequent phase, including evidence admitted at the trial as to aggravating or

mitigating factors. 

After a guilty verdict of first degree murder, the trier of fact immediately

determines whether aggravating circumstances have been proved and must make a

special finding on whether each aggravator has been proved. If the trier of fact is a

jury, the decision on aggravators must be unanimous. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 13-703.01(E). The penalty phase is then held if the trier finds at least one aggravator

to have been proved. Under § 13-703.01(H), the determination whether death is the

appropriate sentence must be unanimous. If the jury determines unanimously that the

death penalty is not appropriate, the court will determine whether to impose a sentence

of life with or without the possibility of parole. 

 If the jury is unable to reach a verdict on any of the alleged aggravating

circumstances and the jury does not find that at least one of the alleged aggravators has

been proved, the court must dismiss the jury and impanel a new one. The new jury

does not retry the issue of guilt or the issue regarding any of the aggravating

circumstances that the first jury found not proved by a unanimous verdict. If the

second jury does not reach a unanimous verdict, the court must then impose a sentence

of life with or without the possibility of parole. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.01(J).

Likewise, under § 13-703.01(K), if the jury at the penalty phase is unable to reach a

verdict, the judge must impanel a new jury, which does not retry the issue of guilt or

any aggravators found to be proved or not proved unanimously by the first jury. If the

second jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict, the court must impose a life

sentence with or without the possibility of parole. 

Under § 13-703.01(R), a victim (defined as a person’s spouse, parent, child

or other lawful representative, unless such person is in custody for an offense or is the

accused) has a right to be present at the aggravation phase and to present any

information that is relevant. A victim also has the right to be present at the penalty
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

12 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

phase and to be heard. The right to be heard includes presentation of evidence,

information, and opinions that concern the criminal offense, the defendant, and the

sentence. In 2003 the Arizona legislature conditionally amended § 13-703.01(R) to

provide that victims in capital cases have the right to make recommendations regarding

the appropriate sentence in the same manner as defendants. The conditional

amendment is to become effective if on or before June 30, 2013, the Arizona Supreme

Court or United States Supreme Court rules that it is constitutional for a crime victim in

a case to make a sentencing recommendation.

In State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 65 P.3d 915 (2003) (en banc), consolidated

cases involving all defendants sentenced to death who had matters pending on direct

appeal at the time of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Ring, the Arizona Supreme

Court held that changes in the state’s capital sentencing statutes were procedural in

nature and that resentencing these defendants under the new statutes would not violate

the ex post facto clauses of the state or federal constitutions, nor did double jeopardy

principles preclude resentencing them. The court also held that the failure to submit

capital aggravating factors to a jury was not a structural error mandating reversal. 

United States Supreme Court:

Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (holding that Ring v. Arizona did not apply

retroactively to cases already final on direct review; also holding that (1) that the Ring

decision is properly classified as procedural, rather than substantive; and (2) the Ring

rule does not fall under the second exception under Teague for watershed rules of

criminal procedure).

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that capital defendants are entitled to

jury determination of any fact on which legislature conditions increase in their

maximum punishment).

Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (holding that to qualify for death sentence,

felony murder defendant must have been a major participant in the underlying felony

and acted with reckless disregard for human life).

Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (holding that to qualify for death sentence,

felony murder defendant must have actually killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill

the victim).
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 13

Ninth Circuit:

Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that amended notice of

aggravating factors given to defendant 13 days before sentencing hearing did not

violate due process), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1123 (1999).

Arizona Supreme Court:

State v. Carreon, 210 Ariz. 54, 107 P.3d 900 (2005) (en banc) (holding that because

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.584 (2002) (Ring II), announced a new procedural rule, rather

than a substantive one, the retroactive application of Arizona’s new death penalty

statute enacted in response to Ring II did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the

state and federal constitutions or the statutory prohibition against retroactive

application of statutes).

State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, 84 P.3d 456 (2004) (en banc) (holding that in a capital

murder prosecution of a juvenile defendant, in which the death penalty was imposed

but the trial court had failed to make individualized assessment of defendant’s maturity

before trial, the proper remedy was remand for the trial court to determine, if possible,

the extent of defendant's maturity and moral responsibility at the time he committed the

murders).

Lynn v. Reinstein, 205 Ariz. 186, 68 P.3d 412 (2003) (en banc) (holding that the Eighth

Amendment prohibits a victim from making a sentence recommendation to a jury in a

capital case, although a victim’s statement as to the harm caused by the defendant’s

criminal acts are no longer barred). 

State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 65 P.3d 915 (2003) (en banc) (holding in consolidated

cases involving all defendants sentenced to death who had matters pending on direct

appeal at the time of Ring, that changes in state’s capital sentencing statutes were

procedural in nature and that resentencing these defendants under new statutes would

not violate the ex post facto clauses of state or federal constitutions, nor did double

jeopardy principles preclude resentencing them; also holding that Sixth Amendment

principles of Apprendi/Ring do not require that Enmund-Tison findings be made by 

jury; ruling that failure to submit capital aggravating factors to jury was not structural

error mandating reversal). 

State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386, 64 P.3d 828 (en banc) (holding that Ring v. Arizona

does not apply retroactively to those defendants whose cases have become final;

holding that new rule announced in Ring did not meet either of two exceptions to

Teague’s general rule that new rules do not apply to cases that have become final; also
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

14 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

holding under an Allen v. Hardy analysis the rule did not apply retroactively where (1)

the rule was not designed to improve the accuracy of criminal trials; (2) the Arizona

justice system acted in good faith in applying the rule in Walton; and (3) applying the

rule would greatly disrupt the administration of justice and noting that Arizona has

approximately 90 prisoners on death row whose cases are final), cert. dismissed, 539

U.S. 986 (2003). 

State v. Lacy, 187 Ariz. 340, 929 P.2d 1288 (1996) (en banc) (finding that evidence of

reckless indifference to human life in felony-murder death sentence was insufficient

when record unclear whether defendant knew codefendant had a gun or whether

defendant should have anticipated violence).

State v. Thornton, 187 Ariz. 325, 335, 929 P.2d 676, 686 (1996) (en banc) (rejecting

argument that death penalty unconstitutional because sentencer not required to find that

aggravators outweigh mitigators beyond a reasonable doubt).

State v. Landrigan, 176 Ariz. 1, 859 P.2d 111 (holding nonjury sentencing does not

violate equal protection), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 927 (1993).

State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 858 P.2d 1152 (1993) (en banc) (holding capital

sentencing scheme must perform genuine narrowing function, narrowing class of deatheligible defendants), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1046 (1994).

State v. McCall, 160 Ariz. 119, 770 P.2d 1165 (1989) (en banc) (holding detailed

findings regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances not required in state trial

record; holding defendant must show mitigating circumstances are sufficiently

substantial to call for leniency), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1031 (1990).

State v. Leslie, 147 Ariz. 38, 708 P.2d 719 (1985) (en banc) (finding that trial court

must show in record that it considered all relevant mitigating factors in sentencing

defendant).

State v. McMurtrey, 143 Ariz. 71, 691 P.2d 1099 (1984) (en banc) (holding defendant

must prove mitigating circumstances by preponderance of evidence).

State v. Jordan, 126 Ariz. 283, 614 P.2d 825 (en banc) (holding eligibility for death

penalty requires state to prove at least one enumerated aggravating circumstance

beyond reasonable doubt), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 986 (1980).
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 15

Arizona Statutes:

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(B) and (C) (Supp. 2005) (providing for admissibility of

evidence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.01(B) (Supp. 2005) (providing for notice by prosecution

of aggravating circumstances).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.01(C) - (F) (Supp. 2005) (providing for aggravation and

penalty phases of sentencing proceeding).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.01(G) (Supp. 2005) (providing for presentation of

mitigating evidence at penalty phase).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.01(H) (Supp. 2005) (providing that jury determination

of whether to impose death sentence must be unanimous).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.01(I) (Supp. 2005) (providing for admissibility of

evidence admitted trial).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.01(J)-(L) (Supp. 2005) (providing for procedures where

jury is unable to reach unanimous verdict at aggravation phase or penalty phase).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.01(N) and (O) (Supp. 2005) (providing for procedures

for sentencing and resentencing where death sentence is overturned).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.01(R) (Supp. 2005)(providing for victim impact

statement and right of victim to be present at sentencing proceeding).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.01(S) (defining “trier of fact” and “victim”).

Arizona Rules:

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1(i)(2), (i)(3) and (i)(5) (requiring state to disclose proof of

aggravation).

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.2(i)(3)(d) (requiring defendant to disclose proof of mitigation).

Aggravating Circumstances

Under Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(E), the trier of fact must impose a death sentence
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

16 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

if the trier finds one or more of the enumerated aggravating circumstances and no

mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.

The aggravating circumstances enumerated in § 13-703(F) are:

(1) a previous felony conviction for which under Arizona law a sentence of

life imprisonment or death may be imposed;

(2) a previous conviction of a serious offense, whether preparatory or

completed (convictions for serious offenses committed on the same occasion

as the homicide or not committed on the same occasion as the homicide but

consolidated for trial with the homicide are treated as serious offenses);

(3) knowing creation of a grave risk of death to other persons in the

commission of the offense;

(4) procurement of the commission of the crime by payment to another;

(5) commission of the offense as consideration for or in expectation of the

receipt of anything of pecuniary value;

(6) commission of the offense in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved

manner;

(7) commission of the offense while in the custody of or on release,

authorized or not, from a correctional facility or jail or on probation for a

felony offense;

(8) conviction of one or more other homicides committed during the

commission of the offense;

(9) the defendant was an adult or was tried as an adult and the victim was

under 15 years of age or was 70 years of age or older; or

(10) the victim was an on-duty peace officer killed in the course of his or her

official duties and defendant knew or should have known the victim was a

peace officer.

Under § 13-703.01(R) and (S) , a victim (defined as a person’s spouse,

parent, child or other lawful representative, unless such person is in custody for an

offense or is the accused) has a right to be present at the aggravation phase and to

present any information that is relevant.
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 17

United States Supreme Court:

Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) (upholding the “heinous, cruel or depraved”

aggravating factor, as construed by the Arizona Supreme Court in Gretzler, 159 Ariz.

42, 659 P.2d 11 (1983)), overruled on other grounds in Ring v. Arizona, above.

Ninth Circuit:

Woratzeck v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 329 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding pecuniary gain aggravating

factor constitutional as applied to robbery felony-murder death-eligible defendants).

Arizona Supreme Court:

State v. Carreon, 210 Ariz. 54, 107 P.3d 900 (2005) (en banc) (holding that aggravators

need not be alleged in the indictment, and that Arizona’s method of providing notice to

defendants of the aggravating factors that the state will seek to prove at sentencing

violates neither the state nor federal constitutional right to a jury trial).

State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 94 P.3d 1119 (2004) (en banc) (affirming convictions

for the first degree murder but vacating a death sentence and remanding for

resentencing, the supreme court held that it could not find harmless error in having the

trial judge, rather than the jury, find the aggravating circumstance of expectation of

pecuniary gain, where the jury could have differently assessed evidence that (1)

defendant suffered from brain dysfunction, psychosis, and dissociative identity

disorder at the time of the murders; (2) defendant had used massive amounts of

cocaine at some time before the murders and that heavy cocaine use could lead to

violent behavior; and (3) a small television, microwave, jewelry, and cocaine were left

behind at one of the murder scenes).

State v. Phillips, 205 Ariz. 145, 67 P.3d 1228 (2003) (en banc) (holding on appeal in

case that was pending at time decision was issued in Ring v. Arizona that because

pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance is so fact-intensive, supreme court would not

affirm judge’s finding of pecuniary gain unless supreme court was convinced beyond a

reasonable doubt that no jury could find that state failed to prove pecuniary gain

beyond a reasonable doubt), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1000 (2003). 

 

State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 65 P.3d 915 (2003) (en banc) (holding in consolidated

cases involving all defendants sentenced to death who had matters pending on direct

appeal at time of U.S. Supreme Court decision in Ring v. Arizona, that Sixth

Amendment did not require resentencing on (F)(1) and (F)(2) aggravating factors since
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

18 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

prior conviction aggravating circumstances set it apart from other circumstances; also

holding that age of victim aggravating circumstance (F)(9) can logically inhere in

verdict where jury also convicted defendant of age-dependent crime and other

circumstances of harmless error include instances where defendant stipulated to

victim’s age or there was overwhelming evidence of victim’s age).

State v. Harrod, 204 Ariz. 567, 65 P.3d 948 (2003) (en banc) (holding that trial court’s

finding that state had proven pecuniary gain statutory aggravating factor was not

harmless error and remanding for resentencing under Arizona’s new statutory scheme

following decision in Ring v. Arizona). 

State v. Canez, 202 Ariz. 133, 42 P.3d 564 (2002) (upholding as permissible (F)(9) 

aggravating factor of victim’s age as having rational basis to protect the young and

elderly as particularly vulnerable; using age as aggravating factor did not result in

double counting since judge explicitly made heinous, cruel, and depraved finding

without regard to murder victim’s age), reconsideration denied (May 21, 2002).

State v. Lehr, 201 Ariz. 509, 38 P.3d 1172 (2002) (en banc) (although (F)(6)

aggravating factor was not established beyond a reasonable doubt, the (F)(1) and (2)

aggravating factors that were established were sufficient to warrant death penalty

absent sufficient mitigation; mitigating factors were weak and insufficient to warrant

leniency).

State v. Sansing, 200 Ariz. 347, 26 P.3d 1118 (2001) (en banc) (holding existence of

economic motive at some point during events surrounding murder is not enough to

establish pecuniary gain as motive; holding there must be connection between

economic motive and killing), cert. granted, 536 U.S. 954 (2002), vacated and

remanded in light of Ring.

State v. Ring, 200 Ariz 267, 25 P.3d 1139 (2001) (en banc) (finding evidence supported

trial court’s finding of pecuniary gain as an aggravating circumstance but did not

support a finding of heinousness and depravity), rev’d on other grounds, 536 U.S. 584

(2002).

State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, 14 P.3d 997 (2000) (en banc) (affirming death sentence

with pecuniary gain as only aggravating factor; finding pecuniary gain where defendant

car-jacked vehicle and killed driver; distinguishing pecuniary gain from felony

murder), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 970 (2001).

State v. Martinez, 196 Ariz. 451, 999 P.2d 795 (en banc) (holding conviction of

dangerous and deadly assault by a prisoner qualifies as a “serious offense” even though
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 19

§ 13-703H(1)(d) (now (H)(4)) does not contain the word “prisoner.”), cert. denied, 531

U.S. 934 (2000).

State v. Henry, 189 Ariz. 542, 944 P.2d 57 (1997) (en banc) (holding that twenty-fiveyear-old armed robbery conviction supports (F)(2) aggravation factor), cert. denied 523

U.S. 1028 (1998).

State v. Mann, 188 Ariz. 220, 934 P.2d 784 (en banc) (finding (F)(6) and (8) factors do

not constitute double punishment), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 895 (1997).

State v. Soto-Fong, 187 Ariz. 186, 928 P.2d 610 (1996) (en banc) (holding trial court’s

alternative (F)(6) findings of physical cruelty or gratuitous violence unconstitutional)

cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1231 (1997).

State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 906 P.2d 542 (1995) (en banc) (holding that only one

(F)(6) element must be proved to establish aggravating factor since list is disjunctive).

State v. Gallegos, 178 Ariz. 1, 870 P.2d 1097 (en banc) (finding (F)(9) aggravating

factor applies when defendant tried as an adult and victim was younger than 15), cert.

denied, 513 U.S. 934 (1994).

State v. Spencer, 176 Ariz. 36, 43, 859 P.2d 146 (1993) (holding (F)(5) aggravation

factor requires expectation of pecuniary gain be a motive, cause, or impetus for the

murder, not merely a result of the murder), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1050 (1994). 

State v. Greenway, 170 Ariz. 155, 823 P.2d 22 (1991) (en banc) (holding (F)(5)

consideration of pecuniary gain as aggravating factor constitutional).

State v. Romanosky, 162 Ariz. 217, 782 P.2d 693 (1989) (en banc) (finding extrinsic

evidence of circumstances of defendant’s prior felonies was not required for felony

convictions to be considered as (F)(2) statutory aggravating circumstances).

State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 662 P.2d 1007 (1983) (en banc) (finding statutory

definition of prior crime governs (F)(2) qualification; extrinsic evidence inadmissible),

cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1059 (1985).

State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 659 P.2d 1 (1983) (listing factors constituting

heinousness or deprivation to establish (F)(6) aggravation), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 971

(1983).
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

20 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Arizona Statutes:

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(E) (Supp. 2005) (requiring court to take aggravating and

mitigating circumstances into account in determining sentence of death or life

imprisonment and authorizing death sentence if court finds one or more aggravating

circumstances enumerated in subsection (F) and no sufficient mitigating circumstances

to call for leniency).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(F) (Supp. 2005) (enumerating aggravating

circumstances).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.01(R) and (S) (Supp. 2005) (providing for victim impact

statement and right of victim to be present at aggravation and penalty phases of

sentencing proceeding; defining victim).

Mitigating Circumstances

In presenting evidence of mitigating circumstances, the defendant may proffer any

factors relevant to the determination of whether to impose a sentence less than death. 

These circumstances include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) significant

impairment to defendant’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to

conform his conduct to the requirements of the law; (2) unusual and substantial duress;

(3) relatively minor participation; (4) death not reasonably foreseeable; and (5)

defendant’s age. 

The defendant must prove the existence of the mitigating circumstances by a

preponderance of the evidence. If the trier of fact is a jury, the jurors do not have to

agree unanimously that a mitigating circumstance has been proved to exist. Each juror

may consider any mitigating circumstance found by that juror in determining the

appropriate penalty. 

Ninth Circuit:

Jeffers v. Lewis, 38 F.3d 411 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that sentencing court not required

to specifically discuss each item of mitigation as long as it appears that it considered all

relevant evidence), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1071 (1995).
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 21

Arizona Supreme Court:

State v. Lehr, 205 Ariz. 107, 67 P.3d 703 (2003) (en banc) (holding that reversible error

occurred where judge sentenced defendant to death under procedure invalidated in Ring

where two of defendant’s three murder convictions had been reversed on appeal and

therefore jury may have according less weight to (F)(1) aggravating factor, and

reasonable jury might have accepted mitigating factors rejected by trial judge).

State v. Grell, 205 Ariz. 57, 66 P.3d 1234 ( 2003) (en banc) (holding that remand was

required in capital case in order to conduct a hearing to determine whether defendant

was mentally retarded where trial judge had viewed issue of defendant’s mental

retardation as a possible mitigating circumstance rather than as a factor that would

preclude imposition of the death penalty, as required in the later-decided case of Atkins

v. Virginia).

State v. Pandeli, 204 Ariz. 569, 65 P.3d 950 (en banc) (holding that trial court’s finding

that there were no mitigating circumstances was not harmless error where defense had

presented expert who diagnosed defendant as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia

and post traumatic stress disorder, and remanding for resentencing under Arizona’s

new statutory scheme following decision in Ring v. Arizona) cert. denied, 124 S. Ct.

386 (2003). 

State v. Bocharski, 200 Ariz. 50, 22 P.3d 43 (2001) (en banc) (finding capital

mitigation investigation lacked adequate funding; remanding for resentencing).

State v. Kayer, 194 Ariz. 423, 984 P.2d 31 (1999) (en banc) (finding defendant

competent to waive cooperation with court-appointed mitigation specialist; finding trial

court did not err in proceeding to sentencing under circumstances), cert. denied, 528

U.S. 1196 (2000). 

State v. Clabourne, 194 Ariz. 379, 983 P.2d 748 (1999) (en banc) (holding economic

cost of death sentence not mitigating evidence; holding mental illness alone insufficient

to support finding of impairment mitigator), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1028 (2000).

State v. White, 194 Ariz. 344, 982 P.2d 819 (1999) (en banc) (declining to adopt

“aberrant behavior” as a mitigating factor; discussing “model inmate” mitigating

evidence), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1005 (2000).

State v. Lacy, 187 Ariz. 340, 929 P.2d 1288 (1996) (en banc) (finding that victim’s

opposition to death penalty not relevant mitigation evidence).
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22 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 917 P.2d 200 (1996) (en banc) (finding that sentencing

judge must consider any aspect of defendant’s character, circumstance, or record

relevant to imposing sentence; court has discretion to determine how much weight to

give each mitigating circumstance).

State v. Stokley, 182 Ariz. 505, 898 P.2d 454 (1995) (en banc) (holding that

unexplained disparity in sentencing of codefendant may be mitigation factor;

nonstatutory mitigation weight given where defendant had documented mental

disorders), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1078 (1996).

Arizona Statutes:

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(C) (Supp. 2005) (providing for presentation of

mitigating evidence and placing burden of proof on defendant).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(G) (Supp. 2005) (stating that mitigating factors are any

factors proffered by defendant or state relevant to determining whether to impose

sentence less than death and enumerating non-exclusive list of mitigating factors).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1105 (Supp. 2005) (defining first degree murder).

Appellate Review of Capital Sentences

When a court sentences a defendant to death, the superior court clerk files a notice of

appeal on the defendant’s behalf at the time of entry of judgment and sentence. The 

Arizona Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over all direct appeals of death

penalty cases. In 2002 Arizona’s legislature rewrote the statutory scheme as to the

scope of the supreme court’s review. As to cases in which a murder was committed

before August 1, 2002, the state supreme court must independently review the trial

court’s findings of aggravation and mitigation and the propriety of the sentence. Ariz.

Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.04. As to any sentencing or resentencing proceeding on any

first degree murder case in which the offense was committed after August 1, 2002,

there is no longer an independent review by the supreme court of the findings of the

trier of fact of aggravation and mitigation and the propriety of the death sentence.

Instead, newly enacted § 13-703.05 provides that the supreme court must review all

death sentences to determine whether the trier of fact abused its discretion in finding

aggravating circumstances and imposing a death sentence. If the supreme court
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 23

determines that an error occurred, the court must determine whether the error was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. If the court cannot determine whether the error

was harmless, the court must remand for a new sentencing proceeding. 

Arizona Supreme Court:

State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 951 P.2d 869 (1997) (en banc) (holding that if supreme

court finds error in trial court’s findings, court independently reweighs evidence to

determine whether leniency appropriate).

State v. Lacy, 187 Ariz. 340, 929 P.2d 1288 (1996) (en banc) (finding that although the

appellate court is charged with the duty of reviewing, and, when appropriate,

reweighing various factors, the court will not engage in de novo application of statutory

aggravating factors on appeal; § 13-703.01 (now 13-703.04) of the Arizona Code

reflects strong legislative preference for supreme court not to remand for resentencing).

State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 858 P.2d 1152 (1993) (en banc) (holding that supreme

court will remand for resentencing where trial judge has erred in the sentencing process

and there is mitigating evidence of more than de minimis weight), cert. denied, 511

U.S. 1046 (1994).

State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 844 P.2d 566 (1992) (en banc) (holding appellate

proportionality review not constitutionally required and discontinued), cert. denied, 509

U.S. 912 (1993).

State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 694 P.2d 222 (en banc) (holding state supreme court must

independently review record to determine aggravating and mitigating circumstances),

cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1143 (1985).

Arizona Statutes:

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-120.21 (1992) (providing that court of appeals does not have

jurisdiction over appeal of criminal actions in which sentence of death imposed).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.04 (formerly 13-703.01) (Supp. 2005) (applicable in

first degree murder cases where murder occurred before August 1, 2002 and providing

that supreme court must review all death sentences and must independently review trial

court’s finding of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and propriety of death

sentence and providing that review required does not prevent remand to trial court for

further action in cases of error).
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24 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.05 (Supp. 2005) (providing that supreme court reviews

findings of trier of fact as to finding aggravating circumstances and imposing death

sentence for abuse of discretion and providing that if court determines there was error,

whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; also providing that if court cannot

determine whether error was harmless, court must remand for new sentencing

proceeding)

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4031 (2001) (providing exclusive appellate jurisdiction to

supreme court over capital cases).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4037 (2001) (providing power of the supreme court to

correct sentences).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4040 (2001) (providing jurisdiction on remittitur).

Arizona Rules:

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 6.6 (providing for appointment of appellate counsel).

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.15 (setting special procedure for capital cases; filing notice of

appeal).

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.2(b) (providing for automatic appeal of death sentence).

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.9 (providing that after filing of notice of appeal in capital case,

notice be sent to all court reporters directing them to submit their portion of record to

supreme court).

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.17(c) (fixing date of execution after the death sentence has been

affirmed).

Collateral Remedies

A defendant may seek postconviction relief through Arizona Code § 13-4231, et seq.

(postconviction relief) or Arizona Code § 13-4121, et seq. (habeas corpus). Relief is

generally governed by Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. If a

petition for writ of habeas corpus attacks the validity of the petitioner’s conviction or

sentence, it is treated as a postconviction relief petition.
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 25

Arizona Statutes:

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-4121–4145, 4147 (2001) (providing for habeas corpus

relief).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-4231–4239 (2001) (providing for postconviction relief).

Arizona Rules:

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1–32.9 (providing for postconviction relief).

Postconviction Relief

In capital cases, a postconviction relief proceeding commences with the clerk of the

supreme court filing a notice of postconviction relief with the trial court upon issuance

of a supreme court mandate affirming the defendant’s conviction and sentence on direct

appeal. The petitioner has 120 days from the date of notice to file a postconviction

relief petition. An untimely filed petition can be dismissed with prejudice. On May 23,

2002, Rule 32.4(c) was amended to provide for appointment by the Arizona Supreme

Court of postconviction relief counsel after issuance of the decision on direct appeal

affirming the defendant’s conviction and sentence but prior to completion of certiorari

proceedings in the U.S. Supreme Court or issuance of the Arizona Supreme Court’s

mandate.

The petition must include all known challenges to the defendant’s conviction

and sentence. The defendant is precluded from relief if the court finds by a

preponderance of the evidence that the issue (1) remains appealable on direct appeal or

post-trial motion; (2) was previously adjudicated on the merits; or (3) was waived in a

previous proceeding. In State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 39 P.3d 525 (2002), the Arizona

Supreme Court clarified that claims of ineffective assistance must be raised in the

postconviction relief petition and not on direct appeal.

The state has forty-five days to respond to defendant’s petition. The court

may dismiss the petition summarily if it finds that the petition raises no material issues

of law or fact. If the court holds a hearing on the merits, the defendant must prove the

allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. The state must then prove the defect
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

26 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the rules of evidence apply in these

proceedings, the defendant has no privilege against self-incrimination.

Arizona Supreme Court:

State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 39 P.3d 525 (2002) (en banc) (holding that ineffective

assistance of counsel claims are to be brought only in postconviction petition, not direct

appeal).

State ex rel. Napolitano v. Brown, 194 Ariz. 340, 982 P.2d 815 (1999) (en banc)

(holding the part of Arizona Code § 13-4234 that allowed defendant only sixty days to

file postconviction relief petition was unconstitutional under separation of powers

doctrine because it conflicted with the court rules allowing 120 days).

State v. Bejarano, 158 Ariz. 253, 762 P.2d 540, 541 (1988) (en banc) (holding

unconstitutional one-year limitation period for filing state habeas petition under former

Arizona Code § 13-4232).

Arizona Statutes:

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-4231–4239 (2001) (providing for postconviction relief).

Arizona Rules:

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1–32.9 (providing for postconviction relief).

Habeas Corpus

Collateral relief is also available in the form of a writ of habeas corpus. However, if a

prisoner challenges the validity of a sentence or conviction, the petition will be

transferred to the court where the prisoner was convicted and will be treated as a

petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Criminal Procedure Rule 32.

Arizona Court of Appeals:

White v. State, 8 Ariz. App. 46, 442 P.2d 869 (1968) (holding summary denial proper if

record refutes allegations of petition).
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 27

Arizona Statutes:

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-4121-4145, 13-4147 (2001) (providing for habeas corpus

relief).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4233 (2001) (providing that habeas corpus writ treated as

petition for postconviction relief).

Arizona Rules:

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.23(b) (detailing timing of issuance of mandate in capital cases

affirming death sentence).

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.3 (providing that habeas corpus writ treated as petition for

postconviction relief).

Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 1 (providing rules governing original filing of habeas petition in

supreme court).

Appellate Review of Collateral Proceedings

Any aggrieved party may move the court for rehearing and/or petition the supreme

court for review of the trial court’s ruling. The supreme court may summarily grant or

deny review or rule after oral argument on the petition.

Arizona Statutes:

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4239 (2001) (providing rehearing and appellate review).

Arizona Rules:

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9 (providing for rehearing and appellate review).

Procedural Bar/Waiver/Exhaustion

Pursuant to statute, a defendant is precluded from state postconviction relief if: (a) the

issue is still presentable on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; (b) the issue was
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

28 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

finally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in any previous collateral proceeding; or

(c) the issue was waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding.

Exceptions to these procedural bars are claims based on: (a) newly

discovered material facts, (b) a significant change in the law which, if applied

retroactively, would probably overturn petitioner’s conviction or sentence, (c) the

defendant’s failure to appeal within the prescribed time without fault on defendant’s

part, (d) the defendant being held after his or her sentence has expired, or (e) the

defendant can show by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder

would have found the defendant guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable

doubt or that the court would not have imposed the death penalty. The state has the

burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any ground of preclusion

asserted.

The U.S. Supreme Court, in Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 (2002) (per

curiam) held that because a state court’s finding of preclusion by waiver under Ariz. R.

Crim. P. Rule 32.2(a)(3) does not require an examination of the merits of the claim, it is

independent of federal law. In addition, Rule 32.2(a)(3) has been found by the Ninth

Circuit to be regularly and consistently applied (see Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923,

931-32 (9th Cir 1998)). Thus Rule 32.2(a)(3) is to be distinguished from preclusion

under Rule 32.2(a)(2) (any ground finally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in any

previous collateral proceeding), which is not a bar to federal relief, as explained in

Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 578 (9th Cir 1999).

United States Supreme Court:

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 (2002) (per curiam) (holding, following answering of

certified question by Arizona Supreme Court, that because finding of waiver under

Rule 32.2(a)(3) does not require examination of merits of claim, it is independent of

federal law).

Stewart v. Smith, 534 U.S. 157 (2001) (per curiam) (as to Ninth Circuit decision

holding petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim not to be procedurally

defaulted because Arizona’s Rule 32.2 requires that state court consider nature of claim

before finding it procedurally defaulted, U.S. Supreme Court certified question to

Arizona Supreme Court as follows: at time of respondent’s Rule 32 petition in 1995,

did question whether asserted claim was of “sufficient constitutional magnitude” to
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 29

require a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver for purposes of Rule 32.2(a)(3)

depend on the merits of the particular claim or merely on the particular right alleged to

be violated; question answered by Arizona Supreme Court in Stewart v. Smith, 202

Ariz. 446, 46 P.3d 1067 (2002), discussed below). 

Arizona Supreme Court:

Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 46 P.3d 1067 (2002) (answering question certified by

U.S. Supreme Court in Stewart v. Smith, 534 U.S. 157 (2001), above, and holding that

at time of respondent’s third Rule 32 petition in 1995, question whether asserted claim

was of “sufficient constitutional magnitude” to require a knowing, voluntary, and

intelligent waiver for purposes of Rule 32.2(a)(3), depended not on merits of particular

claim, but rather merely on particular right alleged to be violated). 

State v. White, 194 Ariz. 344, 982 P.2d 819 (1999) (en banc) (stating defendant waived

claim on appeal by not raising it in earlier proceeding), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1005

(2000).

Arizona Statutes:

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4231 (2001) (providing scope of postconviction relief).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4232 (2001) (precluding postconviction relief for certain

barred claims).

Arizona Rules:

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2 (precluding remedy).

Execution

After the state supreme court affirms a death sentence and the first postconviction relief

proceeding is concluded, or the period to file a postconviction relief petition has

expired, the supreme court issues an execution warrant to the director of the department

of corrections. The warrant designates a 24-hour period for execution of the sentence

between 35 and 60 days following its issuance. 

If any court stays the initial warrant, the supreme court is required to issue

subsequent warrants upon the state’s motion. The warrant orders the director to

provide 20-days’ notice of the designated hour of execution. The director makes a
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30 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

return on the warrant to the supreme court showing the time and manner of execution.

In 1992, Arizona voters passed a constitutional amendment changing the

method of execution from lethal gas to lethal injection. However, if sentenced before

November 23, 1992, the prisoner may elect execution by lethal gas. The director of the

state department of corrections or a designee of the director is present at the execution. 

The prisoner may have two clergymen and five relatives or friends present at the

execution. 

Subsequent to a June 25, 1998 amendment to Rule 31.17(c) of the Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Arizona Department of Corrections changed their

execution time from 12:01 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. The executions occur at the state prison in

Florence. 

United States Supreme Court:

Stewart v. LaGrand (Walter), 526 U.S. 115 (1999) (per curiam) (holding that petitioner

waived claim that execution by lethal gas violated Eighth Amendment by choosing to

be executed by lethal gas rather than lethal injection).

Ninth Circuit:

LaGrand (Karl) v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1264 (9th Cir.) (holding that lethal gas

challenge was not ripe for adjudication because petitioner would be executed by lethal

gas only if he affirmatively chose that option), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 971 (1998).

Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that option to choose

between gas and injection by a prisoner sentenced to death before adoption of lethal

injection is constitutional), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1082 (1998).

Arizona Supreme Court:

Hernandez v. State, 43 Ariz. 424, 32 P.2d 18 (1934) (holding Arizona Constitution

article 22, § 22 provision of execution by lethal gas not cruel and unusual punishment).

Arizona Statutes:

Ariz. Const. art. XXII, § 22 (providing for lethal injection as method of execution).
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 31

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-704 (2001) (providing for lethal injection as method of

execution, or, if sentenced before November 23, 1992, choice of lethal injection or

lethal gas).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-705 (2001) (listing witnesses allowed to view execution).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-706 (2001) (requiring warrant for execution by supreme

court and return by director of department of corrections). 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4040 (2001) (providing for supreme court jurisdiction to

issue execution warrant).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4234 (2001) (providing for stay of execution date on the

filing of a second or subsequent petition).

Arizona Rules:

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.17(c) (fixing the date of execution after exhaustion of state court

remedies).

Competency for Execution

A mentally incompetent, mentally retarded, or pregnant prisoner is not subject to

execution in Arizona. If the director of the state department of corrections, the

prisoner’s attorney, or the state’s attorney believe the prisoner may be mentally

incompetent, he or she files a motion with the superior court in the county where the

prisoner is located requesting the prisoner to be examined for mental competency. A

separate motion must be filed with the supreme court to obtain a stay of execution. 

If the superior court finds that the motion is timely and presents reasonable

grounds for the requested examination, the court appoints experts to examine the

prisoner. After the examinations are completed, the court may hold a hearing to

determine the prisoner’s competency. The prisoner is presumed to be competent and

must prove incompetency by clear and convincing evidence. 

If the prisoner is found incompetent, the prisoner remains in the custody of

the department of corrections until the supreme court reviews the finding. If the

supreme court upholds the finding of incompetency, the prisoner is transferred to a
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

32 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

licensed behavioral health or mental health in-patient facility operated by the

department of corrections for competency restoration treatment. The sentence is

suspended until such time as the prisoner is restored to competency. 

Although an incompetent prisoner is housed in a facility operated by the

department of corrections, the department of health services is responsible for

competency restoration treatment. The chief medical officer of the state hospital files

status reports with the superior court at sixty-day intervals until the prisoner’s

competency is restored. When the individual who supervised the prisoner’s treatment

determines that the prisoner is competent, he or she must submit a written report to the

superior court, attorney general, and prisoner’s attorney. Additionally, the chief

medical officer certifies to the supreme court that the prisoner is competent to be

executed. The supreme court then orders execution of the death warrant.

The 1999 Arizona Legislature substantially rewrote parts of the existing

competency statutes. The superior court now may order the prisoner to submit to any

evaluation or examination necessary to determine competency. If the prisoner refuses

to be examined by the state’s experts, the court will not consider any expert evidence

offered by the prisoner. The state’s expert must specifically report on whether the

prisoner suffers from a mental disorder, illness, defect, or disability and whether the

prisoner will benefit from competency restoration treatment. Additionally, the 1999 law

provides that a motion to determine competency filed fewer than twenty days before a

scheduled execution is untimely and constitutes consent by the prisoner to be evaluated

by the state’s mental health expert. The statute requires that the court dismiss the

motion if the prisoner refuses to cooperate. Finally, when a motion to determine

competency has been denied, or the superior court has determined a prisoner

competent, or the chief medical officer has issued a certificate of competency, the

prisoner may not file a successive competency motion without submitting an affidavit

from a licensed physician or psychologist showing a substantial change of

circumstances since the previous denial or competency determination. 

In Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (D. Ariz. 2001), the district

court held that Arizona’s statutory procedures for competency restoration did not meet

due process standards. The court found that the unilateral power of the chief medical

officer to decide whether a defendant had regained competency as well as the lack of
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 33

statutory provisions to provide for a judicial hearing, appointment of defense experts,

or the right to appeal the chief medical officer’s certification violated Ford v.

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). The 2002 Arizona Legislature amended Arizona

Revised Statutes Annotated §§ 13-4023 and 13-4024 to address the concerns raised in

Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart. See §§ 1.4 and 1.6. 

If the superintendent of the state prison has reason to believe that a prisoner

is pregnant, the superintendent notifies the county district attorney who seeks court

determination of the pregnancy. If the court finds that the prisoner is pregnant,

sentence is suspended until the prisoner is no longer pregnant.

Arizona Statutes:

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02 (Supp. 2005) (providing procedure to evaluate

defendant for possible mental retardation).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4022 (2001) (providing procedure for raising and

determining competency after inmate receives death sentence).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4023 (Supp. 2005) (requiring chief medical officer to submit

sixty-day reports and certificate of competency).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4024 (Supp. 2005) (providing for untimely or successive

motions).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-4025, 4026 (2001) (providing procedures for determining

pregnancy of a person under death sentence and staying execution while pregnant).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (D. Ariz. 2001) (granting evidentiary

hearing to determine competency where Arizona’s statutory procedures for competency

restoration did not provide for a hearing upon the chief medical officer’s certification of

restoration to competency).

Stays of Execution

If the state supreme court has set the time for the execution, the court will not grant a

stay of execution upon the filing of a second or subsequent postconviction relief
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

34 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

petition except upon a separate application for a stay made to the supreme court. The

application must set forth with particularity the issues appropriate for subsequent

postconviction relief.

The supreme court issues subsequent execution warrants in the event the

initial warrant is stayed by any court beyond the time period fixed for the execution of

sentence.

Arizona Statutes:

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4234(J) (2001) (providing stay pursuant to second or

subsequent postconviction relief petition).

Arizona Rules:

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.17(c) (providing issuance of initial and subsequent execution

warrants).

Clemency Procedures

Arizona has a board of executive clemency (formerly named board of pardons and

paroles) that makes recommendations to the governor on all clemency applications. 

The governor has constitutional authority to grant a death-sentenced prisoner pardon or

clemency. At least ten days before the board acts upon an application, the applicant

must notify the county attorney of his or her intent to apply. A copy of the notice must

be published thirty days from the first publication in a paper in the county where the

conviction occurred unless imminent danger of the death of the applicant exists or

when the term of imprisonment of the applicant is within ten days of execution. 

The governor has great discretion in granting clemency. However, if the

governor grants a commutation or pardon, the governor must publish the reasons for

doing so in a newspaper of general circulation in the county of conviction.

Ninth Circuit:

Woratzeck v. Arizona Board of Executive Clemency, 117 F.3d 400 (9th Cir. 1997)
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: ARIZONA

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 35

(holding that Arizona’s clemency statute does not create a constitutionally protected

liberty interest and applicant is entitled only to minimal due process and concluding

that a procedural due process violation arising from clemency proceedings exists only

if the board’s procedures “shock the conscience”).

Arizona Statutes:

Ariz. Const. art. V, § 5 (authorizing governor to grant reprieves, commutation, parole,

or pardon).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-441–446 (2002) (providing clemency requirements and

procedure).

Attorney General Opinion:

Ariz. Op. Att’y Gen. I80-224 (1980) (stating board of pardons and paroles has duty and

authority to review all death cases and determine whether grounds for reprieve exist).
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: CALIFORNIA

36 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

CALIFORNIA

History

In 1972, the California Supreme Court declared that the state death penalty law violated

the California constitutional prohibition against “cruel or unusual punishment.” People

v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S.

958 (1972). That same year, California voters responded to Anderson by approving

Proposition 17, a constitutional amendment sanctioning capital punishment. However,

the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972),

rendered four months after Anderson, blocked Proposition 17 from reviving the death

penalty.

As a result of Furman, California adopted a mandatory death penalty scheme

in 1973. The statute imposed the death sentence for first degree murder if the trier of

fact found particular enumerated special circumstances. However, following the U.S.

Supreme Court’s decision in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the California

Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision striking down California’s mandatory

death penalty law. Rockwell v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 420, 556 P.2d 1101, 134

Cal. Rptr. 650 (1976).

The state legislature responded rapidly to Rockwell. Adopted in 1977, over a

gubernatorial veto, California Senate Bill 155 endeavored to conform California’s

procedures to Gregg and its companion cases. The bill provided that a person

convicted of first degree murder could be sentenced to death if the trier of fact found

one of seven “special circumstances” and decided on death after weighing the

aggravating and mitigating factors. One year later, the electorate approved Proposition

7, which expanded the list of special circumstances for which death could be imposed

and altered procedures for weighing mitigating and aggravating circumstances in

capital cases. The California Supreme Court has upheld California Senate Bill 155 and

the subsequent initiative.

In the 1990 election, California voters approved Propositions 114 and 115,

which enlarged the list of special circumstances for which a death sentence could be
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: CALIFORNIA

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 37

imposed. Proposition 115 also amended the state constitution, preventing any

interpretation affording greater rights to defendants than those afforded by the federal

Constitution; however, the state supreme court invalidated this provision, ruling that it

amounted to a qualitative constitutional revision which could not be accomplished

through the initiative process. See Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 801 P.2d

1077, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1990).

Amendments to California’s death penalty law subsequent to Proposition 115

have maintained the same general framework for imposition of the death penalty. Most

recently, Proposition 196, enacted by California voters in 1996, expanded the number

of special circumstance qualifiers.

United States Supreme Court:

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (ruling mandatory death sentencing schemes

unconstitutional).

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (invalidating as unconstitutional state capital

death statutes which granted juries unguided discretion to impose the death penalty).

California Supreme Court:

People v. Alvarez, 14 Cal. 4th 155, 926 P.2d 365, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 385 (1996) (holding

California death penalty law not superseded by 1994 three strikes law (codified at

California Penal Code §§ 667 and 1170), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 829 (1997).

Yoshisato v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 978, 831 P.2d 327, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 102 (1992)

(holding Propositions 114 and 115 complementary and effective to extent no conflict

between them).

Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 801 P.2d 1077, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1990)

(rejecting contention that death penalty provisions in Proposition 115 were

unconstitutional; however, finding provision in Proposition 115 preventing construction

of state constitution to afford greater rights than those afforded by U.S. Constitution

unconstitutional as qualitative amendment of state constitution, not allowed by

initiative process).

People v. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d 264, 618 P.2d 149, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1980) (ruling
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: CALIFORNIA

38 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

California death penalty statute weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances

constitutional), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1035 (1981).

Rockwell v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 420, 556 P.2d 1101, 134 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1976)

(striking down California’s mandatory death penalty sentencing scheme).

People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (ruling

California’s death penalty cruel and unusual punishment under California constitution),

cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).

California Statutes:

Cal. Const. art. I, § 17 (prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment) (formerly art. I, § 6).

Cal. Const. art. I, § 27 (stating that all death sentences in effect 2/17/1972 will not be

deemed to violate constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment).

Cal. Const. art. II, § 10 (setting forth procedures for voter initiatives).

Cal. Penal Code § 190.2 (West Supp. 2006) (listing special circumstances for death

eligibility).

Capital Offenses

The death penalty is statutorily authorized for first degree murder committed under

special circumstances. The alternative sentence for a capital crime is life imprisonment

without parole. Other capital offenses include treason, train wrecking, perjury resulting

in execution of an innocent person, killing by a convict under life sentence, and

sabotage causing death. There is no reported case involving a capital conviction for

any of these latter crimes.

California Penal Code § 190.5 prohibits imposition of the death penalty on a

person who was under 18 years old at the time of the commission of the crime.

Furthermore in 2005, in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), the Supreme Court

held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the imposition of the death

penalty on those who were under the age of 18 at the time their crimes were committed. 

 The United States Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304

(2002), that the execution of the mentally retarded constitutes cruel and unusual
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: CALIFORNIA

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 39

punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. See § 1.6. Accordingly, in 2003, the

California Legislature added Penal Code § 1376, prohibiting the execution of the

mentally retarded. “Mentally retarded” is defined as the condition of significantly

subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in

adaptive behavior and manifested before the age of 18. Section 1376 also provides that

a defendant in any case in which the prosecution seeks the death penalty may apply for

an order directing that a mental retardation hearing be held and requires the court to

order a hearing to determine whether a defendant is mentally retarded upon submission

of a declaration by a qualified expert opining that the defendant is mentally retarded. At

the request of the defendant, the court must conduct the hearing without a jury prior to

the commencement of the trial, or if the defendant does not request a court hearing at

that time, to conduct the hearing at the conclusion of the trial. The defense has the

burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is mentally

retarded. The penalty for a mentally retarded defendant found guilty of murder in the

first degree where special circumstances which would otherwise make him or her

eligible for imposition of the death penalty have been found, is life without possibility

of parole. If, after a mental retardation hearing, the court or jury finds that the

defendant is not mentally retarded, the trial must proceed as in any other case in which

a sentence of death is sought by the prosecution, and the criminal jury must not be

informed of the prior proceedings or the findings concerning the defendant's claim of

mental retardation. 

United States Supreme Court:

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the

age of 18 when their crimes were committed).

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that executing the mentally retarded

violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).

California Supreme Court:

People v. Smithey, 20 Cal. 4th 936, 978 P.2d 1171, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 243 (1999) 
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: CALIFORNIA

40 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

(declining to rule on constitutionality of executing the mentally retarded upon finding

that defendant is not mentally retarded by other state standards; note concurring

opinion of Mosk, J., stating that execution of mentally retarded now violates Eighth

Amendment because of “evolving standards of decency”), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1026

(2000).

California Statutes:

Cal. Mil. & Vet. Code § 1672(a) (West 1988) (defining death caused in acts hindering

defense or preparation for war as capital offense). 

Cal. Penal Code § 37 (West 1999) (defining treason as a capital offense).

Cal. Penal Code § 128 (West 1999) (defining perjury causing conviction and execution

of innocent person as a capital offense).

Cal. Penal Code § 190 (West Supp. 2006) (providing that first degree murder is a

capital offense).

Cal. Penal Code § 190.5 (West 1999) (prohibiting death penalty as to minor).

Cal. Penal Code § 219 (West 1999) (providing that train wrecking which results in

death is a capital offense).

Cal. Penal Code § 1376 (West Supp. 2006) (prohibiting imposition of death penalty on

defendant who is mentally retarded; providing for hearing to determine mental

retardation).

Cal. Penal Code § 4500 (West 2000) (defining assault by convict under life sentence

resulting in death as a capital offense).

Representation in Capital Cases

In capital cases, the trial court will appoint counsel to represent an indigent defendant

at all preliminary and trial proceedings. Effective January 1, 2003, California Rule of

Court 4.117 establishes qualifications for appointed trial counsel in capital cases;

however, the rule provides that it is not intended to be a standard by which to measure

if the defendant received effective assistance of counsel. Even if the defendant can but

does not employ counsel, the court will assign counsel after a reasonable time. The
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: CALIFORNIA

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 41

trial court may appoint capital co-counsel upon a written request by the first appointed

attorney. Capital defendants are entitled to “reasonably necessary” compensation of

trial expert and investigative services upon request to the court. Capital trial counsel,

whether retained by the defendant or court-appointed, continue to represent the

defendant until the entire record on the automatic appeal is certified. 

In addition to provisions of the penal and government codes, several supreme

court rules, policies, guidelines, and standards provide the current framework for posttrial capital representation. California Rule of Court 76.5 requires each appellate court

to adopt procedures for appointment of counsel for indigent criminal appellants,

including establishing and maintaining a list of qualified appointed counsel. California

Rule of Court 76.6 provides qualification standards for counsel in death penalty appeals

and habeas corpus proceedings. 

With an eye on opting into chapter 154 of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996, the 1997 legislature established the California Habeas

Corpus Resource Center and passed additional legislation pertaining to the appointment

of capital postconviction counsel. In addition to adopting California Rule of Court 76.6

in 1998, the supreme court made substantial changes to its policies on death cases,

internal procedures, fixed fee guidelines, and payment guidelines.

The 1997 legislature created the California Habeas Corpus Resource Center

to provide legal representation to capital prisoners for state and federal habeas review. 

The legislation requires the supreme court to offer habeas counsel to an indigent capital

prisoner and to document the offer or appointment by entry of an order. The legislation

precludes trial or appellate counsel from representing a capital inmate in state

postconviction proceedings unless the inmate and counsel expressly request continued

representation. The legislation also directs the supreme court to adopt binding and

mandatory competency standards for post-trial capital counsel. The minimum hourly

compensation rate as of October 1, 2005 is $130 per hour.

California Rule of Court 76.6, promulgated in 1998, specifies that the State

Public Defender, the California Habeas Corpus Resource Center, and the California

Appellate Project (CAP) all are eligible to represent capital defendants in the supreme

court; however, the entity must assign counsel who meet the competency standards

outlined in this rule.
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: CALIFORNIA

42 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

The Supreme Court Internal Operating Practices and Procedures (IOPP) XV,

Appointment of Attorneys in Criminal Cases, directs the supreme court to appoint

capital counsel in appellate, state habeas, executive clemency, sanity, and Supreme

Court certiorari proceedings. The supreme court must appoint habeas counsel

concurrently with the appointment of appellate counsel unless the inmate knowingly

rejects habeas counsel. IOPP XV(C) and (D) delegates recruitment, evaluation, and

recommendation of appointed capital counsel responsibility to the court’s Automatic

Appeals Monitor and provides for attorney compensation by either the “time and costs”

or the “fixed fee and expenses” method, as provided in the corresponding supreme

court payment and fixed fee guidelines. IOPP XV(E) provides that capital habeas

corpus petitions are governed by the timeliness and compensation standards set forth in

the Supreme Court Policies Regarding Cases Arising From Judgments of Death. 

Finally, the Supreme Court Policies Regarding Cases Arising From

Judgments of Death define the representation parameters for capital appellate, habeas

corpus, and executive clemency counsel, and allow up to $25,000 for capital habeas

investigation without prior authorization. The court’s payment guidelines for appointed

capital counsel provide a $130 hourly compensation rate (Guideline II.A most recently

amended in 2005). The guidelines provide that the California Appellate Project (CAP)

is the appointed counsel administrator that assists private counsel with automatic

criminal appeals. Guideline II.I.3 lists “allowable hours” benchmarks for expected

time allowance for the various stages of post-trial capital representation.

California Supreme Court:

People v. Dent, 30 Cal.4th 213, 65 P.3d 1286, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 527 (2003) (holding

that trial court committed reversible error in denying defendant’s request to represent

himself because “it was a death penalty case”). 

People v. Marshall, 15 Cal. 4th 1, 931 P.2d 262, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 84 (1997) (holding

that a motion for self-representation may properly be denied when made in passing

anger, frustration, or ambivalence, or made for the purpose of delay or to frustrate the

orderly administration of justice).

People v. Windham, 19 Cal. 3d 121, 560 P.2d 1187, 137 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1977) (holding

that defendant must make an unequivocal assertion of his right to self-representation
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: CALIFORNIA

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 43

within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial; if not, trial court has

discretion to grant or deny motion), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 848 (1977).

In re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 447 P.2d 117, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1968) (holding counsel

will be provided to indigent capital defendants in California Supreme Court

postconviction review, postconviction review of state court judgments in the U.S.

Supreme Court, and applications for executive clemency and sanity hearings), cert.

denied, 406 U.S. 971 (1972).

California Statutes:

Cal. Gov’t Code § 68660, et seq. (West Supp. 2006) (creating California Habeas

Corpus Resource Center; appointing capital postconviction counsel; prohibiting

postconviction counsel representation by trial or appellate counsel; providing minimum

rate of $125 hourly compensation (in 2005, raised to $130).

Cal. Penal Code § 987(b) (West Supp. 2006) (providing procedures for assigning

capital trial counsel).

Cal. Penal Code § 987(d) (West Supp. 2006) (providing procedures for assignment of

capital trial co-counsel).

Cal. Penal Code § 987.9 (West Supp. 2006) (providing procedures for granting

reasonable compensation for defense expert and investigative services for capital trial).

Cal. Penal Code § 1240(a)(4) (West 1982) (providing allowance for discretionary

supreme court appointment of capital appellate counsel other than State Public

Defender or trial counsel).

Cal. Penal Code § 1240.1(e)(1) (West 2004), (requiring capital counsel to continue

representation of defendant until entire record on automatic appeal is certified).

Cal. Penal Code § 1241 (West 2004) (providing reasonable compensation for courtappointed appellate counsel).

California Rules:

Cal. R. Ct. 4.117 (establishing qualifications for appointment of trial counsel in capital

cases, effective January 1, 2003). 

Cal. R. Ct. 76.5 (establishing procedure for appointment of counsel in criminal
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: CALIFORNIA

44 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

appeals).

Cal. R. Ct. 76.6 (establishing competency standards for capital counsel for appeals and

state habeas corpus proceedings).

Sup. Ct. Policies Regarding Cases Arising from Judgments of Death (addressing

withdrawal of capital counsel; timeliness and compensation standards regarding capital

habeas petitions).

Sup. Ct. Payment Guidelines for Appointed Counsel Representing Indigent Criminal

Appellants in the Cal. Sup. Ct. (referencing CAP as appointed counsel administrator;

provides $130 an hour compensation for capital appellate, habeas, and executive

clemency counsel; providing “allowable hour” benchmarks for compensation) (as

amended Oct. 1, 2005) .

Sup. Ct. Guidelines for Fixed Fee Appointments, on Optional Basis, to Automatic

Appeals and Related Habeas Corpus Proceedings in the Cal. Sup. Ct. (providing

optional fixed fee guidelines for capital appeal, habeas corpus, and executive clemency

representation).

Sup. Ct. Internal Operating Practices & Procedures XV(A) (providing supreme court

will appoint capital counsel for indigent party in automatic appeal, habeas and

clemency proceedings, appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court from state appeal or

postconviction proceeding, and sanity hearing).

Sup. Ct. Internal Operating Practices & Procedures XV(B) (requiring supreme court to

offer counsel for habeas review when appointing appellate counsel).

Sup. Ct. Internal Operating Practices & Procedures XV(C) (charging supreme court

Automatic Appeals Monitor with screening and recommending capital appellate

counsel). 

Sup. Ct. Internal Operating Practices & Procedures XV(D) (allowing compensation by

“time and costs” or “fixed fee and expenses” methods).

Sup. Ct. Operating Internal Operating Practices & Procedures XV(E) (providing

capital habeas petitions governed by Sup. Ct. Policies Reg. Cases Arising From

Judgments of Death).
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: CALIFORNIA

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 45

Trial of Capital Offense

In California, the superior court is the trial court for capital murder. California’s death

penalty statute provides for a bifurcated trial procedure with a jury participating in both

the guilt and penalty phases. In addition to determining whether the defendant is guilty

of first degree murder, the guilt phase jury also must determine beyond a reasonable

doubt whether at least one statutory special circumstance exists before the defendant is

eligible for the death penalty. Even if the court convicts the defendant at a bench trial

or the defendant pleads guilty, a jury still determines the truth of a special circumstance

unless both the defense and the state waive a jury determination. If the state alleges a

special circumstance requiring proof of the commission or attempted commission of a

crime, the state must charge and prove the crime.

The trier of fact must make special findings for each special circumstance,

stating whether each is or is not true. The jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt

that at least one special circumstance is “true” for the case to proceed to a capital

penalty phase.

If a defendant is found guilty by a jury, but the jury is unable to reach a

unanimous verdict as to whether one or more of the charged special circumstances is

true or whether all of the special circumstances are not true, the court must impanel a

new jury to retry the special circumstances. If the second jury also is unable to reach a

unanimous verdict on one or more of the special circumstances, the court can either

impanel a third jury to try the undetermined special circumstances or impose a twentyfive-year to life sentence.

The special circumstances enumerated in California Penal Code § 190.2(a)

are:

(1) intentional murder carried out for financial gain; 

(2) defendant previously convicted of murder;

(3) defendant in instant proceeding convicted of more than one murder;

(4) murder committed by destructive device, bomb, or explosive planted,

hidden, or concealed;

(5) murder committed to avoid or prevent arrest or to escape from lawful

custody;
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: CALIFORNIA

46 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

(6) murder committed by destructive device, bomb, or explosive that

defendant mailed or delivered;

(7) victim was a peace officer killed on duty or in retaliation for official

duties;

(8) victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent killed on duty or in

retaliation for official duties;

(9) victim was a firefighter killed on duty;

(10) victim was witness to a crime, killed to prevent testimony or in

retaliation for testimony;

(11) victim was a prosecutor killed in retaliation for or to prevent the

performance of official duties;

(12) victim was a judge killed in retaliation for or to prevent performance of

official duties;

(13) victim was public official killed in retaliation for or to prevent

performance of official duties;

(14) murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting

exceptional depravity;

(15) defendant intentionally killed victim while lying in wait;

(16) victim was intentionally killed because of his or her race, color, religion,

nationality, or country of origin;

(17) murder was committed while defendant was engaged in . . . or

attempting to commit one of twelve statutorily enumerated felonies;

(18) murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture;

(19) defendant intentionally killed victim by the administration of poison;

(20) victim was a juror killed in retaliation for or to prevent performance of

official duties;

(21) murder was intentional and caused by discharging a firearm from a

motor vehicle;

(22) defendant intentionally killed victim while defendant was an active

member of a criminal street gang and the murder was carried out to further

the gang’s activities.

 California does not require that a defendant who personally commits a
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: CALIFORNIA

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 47

homicide possess a specific intent to kill in order to be sentenced to death unless a

particular special circumstance requires an intent to kill. Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(b);

People v. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 742 P.2d 1306, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1987)

(holding that intent to kill is not an element of the felony-murder special circumstance),

overruling Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79

(1983).

Under §190.2(d), a felony-murder special circumstance may be applied to

any individual who acted with reckless indifference to human life and, as a major

participant, aided or abetted the felony. As a matter of statutory California law, such an

individual may be sentenced to death. Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(d). As a matter of

practice, every reported decision that has invoked § 190.2(d) to sustain a special

circumstance finding has involved a non-capital sentence. People v. Estrada, 11 Cal.

4th 568, 904 P.2d 1197, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 586 (1995).

Under § 190.2(c), when a defendant’s guilt of first degree murder is based on

evidence that the defendant aided and abetted another in killing, rather than the

defendant personally committed the killing, a special circumstance cannot be found

“true” unless the prosecution also proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

harbored the specific intent to kill and intentionally aided in a killing. People v.

Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 742 P.2d 1306, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1987).

Ninth Circuit:

Webster v. Woodford, 369 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir.) (holding in a pre-AEDPA capital case

that petitioner’s due process rights were not denied by a judicial expansion of

California’s definition of death-qualifying special circumstances-- “immediate

presence” element of robbery and what constituted “lying in wait for murder (that

lying in wait could occur without physical concealment)--because the California

Supreme Court’s construction was readily foreseeable), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 626

(2004).

Morales v. Woodford, 388 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding in a pre-AEDPA capital

case that California’s special circumstance of lying in wait did not violate the Eighth

Amendment on its face because it was not unconstitutionally vague and was not overly

broad such that it applied to every defendant convicted of a murder; also holding that 

the trial court gave an improper instruction on a torture special circumstance, but the
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48 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

error was harmless; but see the opinion of McKeown, J, concurring in part and

dissenting in part, expressing view that the lying-in-wait special circumstance violated

the Eighth Amendment because the confluence of lying-in-wait and other types of

murder was virtually complete in California), amending and superseding opinion at

336 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 420 (2005).

California Supreme Court:

In re Sakarias, 35 Cal. 4th 140, 106 P.3d 931, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 265 (2005) (granting a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus as to one capital habeas petitioner, but denying the

petition of another, the court held that a prosecutor’s unjustified use of inconsistent and

irreconcilable factual theories to convict two people of a crime only one could have

committed, or to obtain harsher sentences for both on the basis of an act only one could

have committed, violates due process because in those circumstances the state has

necessarily convicted or sentenced a person on a false factual basis).

People v. Prieto, 30 Cal.4th 226, 66 P.3d 1123, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 18 (holding that

although Ring v. Arizona undermines the holding in People v. Odle (1988) 45 Cal.3d

386, 754 P.2d 184, 247 Cal. Rptr. 137, that there is no right under the Sixth or Eighth

Amendments to have a jury determine the existence of all of the elements of a special

circumstance, erroneous jury instruction that omits an element of a special

circumstance is still subject to harmless error analysis; holding that instructional error

in felony murder special circumstance instructions was harmless), cert. denied, 540

U.S. 1008 (2003).

People v. Trevino, 26 Cal. 4th 237, 27 P.3d 283, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 567 (2001) (holding

that conviction in another jurisdiction may be deemed conviction of first or second

degree murder under § 190.2(a)(2) (prior-murder special circumstance) if offense

involved conduct satisfying all elements of offense of murder under California law,

regardless of whether defendant, when he committed that offense, was old enough to be

tried as an adult in California).

People v. Catlin, 26 Cal. 4th 81, 26 P.3d 475, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 31 (2001) (holding the

special circumstance of murder by poison does not violate the Eighth Amendment),

cert. denied, 535 U.S. 976 (2002). 

People v. Anderson, 25 Cal. 4th 543, 22 P.3d 347, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 575 (2001)

(holding § 190.2 does not impose overbroad death eligibility, either because of number

and scope of special circumstances or because it permits capital exposure for

unintentional felony murder), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1136 (2002). 
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 49

People v. Musselwhite, 17 Cal. 4th 1216, 954 P.2d 475, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 212 (1998)

(stating felony murder special circumstance § 190.2(a)(17) is not constitutionally

limited to premeditated and deliberate murders), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1073 (1999).

People v. Dennis, 17 Cal. 4th 468, 950 P.2d 1035, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680 (holding

California Penal Code § 12022.9 is a sentencing enhancement and not an alternative to

multiple murder special circumstance), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 912 (1998). 

People v. Williams, 16 Cal. 4th 635, 941 P.2d 752, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573 (1997)

(reversing trial court’s special circumstance multiple murder finding because judge

failed to instruct special circumstance/penalty phase jury on intent to kill where

defendant was aider/abettor, even though first jury, which deadlocked on finding

special circumstances, found defendant guilty as aider/abettor on four counts of first

degree murder), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1027 (1998).

People v. Stanley, 10 Cal. 4th 764, 897 P.2d 481, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 543 (1995) (stating

law-of-the-case doctrine can apply to preclude California Supreme Court review of

issue on automatic appeal already decided by state court of appeal in writ proceeding

prior to judgment), cert. denied 517 U.S. 1208 (1996).

People v. Bacigalupo, 6 Cal. 4th 457, 862 P.2d 808, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 808 (1993)

(analyzing California 1978 capital statute, stating that it follows constitutionally

mandated guided discretion and narrowing of defendants eligible for death penalty),

cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1253 (1994).

People v. Sanders, 51 Cal. 3d 471, 797 P.2d 561, 273 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1990) (finding

heinous, atrocious, or cruel special circumstance unconstitutionally vague but holding

error not prejudicial as to death judgment), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 948 (1991).

People v. Andrews, 49 Cal. 3d 200, 776 P.2d 285, 260 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1988)

(addressing prior murder special circumstance), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1060 (1990).

People v. Morales, 48 Cal. 3d 527, 770 P.2d 244, 257 Cal. Rptr. 64 (discussing lyingin-wait special circumstance), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 984 (1989).

People v. Keenan, 46 Cal. 3d 478, 758 P.2d 1081, 250 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1988) (rejecting

unconstitutionality challenge on basis of prosecutor’s discretion in choosing to seek

death penalty), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1012 (1989).

People v. Bunyard, 45 Cal. 3d 1189, 756 P.2d 795, 249 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1988) (finding no

federal or state constitutional infirmity in applying the multiple-murder special
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50 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

circumstance to murder of woman and unborn viable fetus).

People v. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d 375, 749 P.2d 279, 243 Cal. Rptr. 842 (addressing

purpose of financial gain special circumstance), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988).

People v. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 742 P.2d 1306, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1987)

(holding that intent to kill is not an element of the felony murder or multiple murder

special circumstance, unless the defendant is the aider and abettor rather than the actual

killer), overruling Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal.

Rptr. 79 (1983) and People v. Turner, 37 Cal. 3d 302, 690 P.2d 669, 208 Cal. Rptr. 196

(1984) .

People v. Ghent, 43 Cal. 3d 739, 739 P.2d 1250, 239 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1987) (holding

court may excuse for cause juror whose views would prevent or substantially impair the

performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath,

adopting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985)), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 929 (1988).

People v. Hendricks, 43 Cal. 3d 584, 737 P.2d 1350, 238 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1987) (holding

prior murder special circumstance may be established by a conviction for a murder that

occurred after the murder at issue; finding reversible error where trial court reconvened

original jury five months later for sanity determination).

People v. Superior Court, ex rel. Engert, 31 Cal. 3d 797, 647 P.2d 76, 183 Cal. Rptr.

800 (1982) (holding subdivision (a)(14) (heinous, atrocious, or cruel murder)

unconstitutionally vague and violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, sections 7 subdivision (a)

and 15 of the Constitution of the State of California).

California Court of Appeal:

People v. Rodriguez, 66 Cal. App. 4th 157, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 676 (1998) (holding special

circumstance § 190.2(a)(21)–shooting from a motor vehicle–not facially

unconstitutional).

Covarrubias v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. App. 4th 1168, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 91 (1998)

(holding Cal. Civ. P. § 223, adopted in 1990 by Proposition 115, abrogates the holding

in Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980),

requiring individual sequestered voir dire in capital cases).

People v. Proby, 60 Cal. App. 4th 922, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 706 (1998) (holding trial court

did not err in rejecting requested instruction defining “major participant” in felonymurder aider and abettor special circumstance trial, reasoning that “major participant”
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 51

is commonly understood and not used in a technical sense).

California Statutes:

Cal. Const. art. VI, § 11 (requiring exclusive appellate jurisdiction of capital cases to

California Supreme Court).

Cal. Penal Code § 190.1(a) (West 1999) (providing for trier of fact to first determine

guilt and then determine truth of special circumstance(s)).

Cal. Penal Code § 190.4(a) (West 1999) (requiring special finding by trier of fact of

truth of each alleged special circumstance beyond reasonable doubt; requiring

impaneling of new jury if jury cannot make unanimous finding; providing truth of

special circumstances is to be decided by jury, unless waived).

Capital Sentencing

Penalty Hearing

If the trier of fact finds at least one special circumstance to be true, the defendant is

eligible for the death penalty. Except on a showing of good cause, the same jury that

determined the defendant’s guilt will also determine the defendant’s sentence if the

prosecution seeks the death penalty. If the jury cannot reach a unanimous sentencing

determination, the court impanels a second jury for the task. If the second jury cannot

reach a unanimous verdict, the court may either impanel a third jury or impose a

sentence of life imprisonment without parole. If the defendant was convicted without a

jury, the court is required to impanel a sentencing jury unless a jury is waived by both

the defense and the prosecution.

Section 190.3 of the California Penal Code lists specific factors for the

sentencer to weigh, if relevant, when determining the penalty. The factors are not

broken down into aggravating or mitigating circumstances. This undifferentiated

approach is mirrored in California’s model jury instruction. The instruction lists eleven

statutory factors and directs the jurors to consider and be guided by the listed factors “if

applicable.” The § 190.3 factors are:

(a) circumstances of the crime and special circumstances found to be true;
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52 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

(b) other violent criminal activity by the defendant;

(c) prior felony conviction;

(d) whether offense was committed while defendant was under influence of

extreme mental or emotional disturbance;

(e) whether victim was a participant in defendant’s homicidal conduct or

consented to the homicidal act;

(f) whether offense was committed under circumstances that defendant

reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for conduct;

(g) whether offense was committed while defendant was under extreme

duress or under the substantial domination of another person; 

(h) capacity of defendant to appreciate criminality of his or her conduct or to

conform conduct to law, whether impaired from mental disease or defect, or

intoxication;

(i) defendant’s age at time of crime;

(j) whether defendant was accomplice to offense and level of participation

relatively minor;

(k) any other circumstance which extenuates gravity of crime even though

not a legal excuse for the crime.

The 1977 version of § 190.3 allowed parties to introduce “any matter

relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence” at the penalty phase. In 1978, the

legislature amended § 190.3 to its current form, requiring the sentencer to impose a

sentence of death after considering the statutorily enumerated relevant factors and

determining that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. 

In People v. Boyd, 38 Cal. 3d 762, 700 P.2d 782, 215 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1985), the court held

that aggravating evidence not relevant to a listed factor is not admissible at sentencing. 

The court reasoned that the amended statute limits consideration of evidence to the

statutorily listed relevant factors. The Boyd court, however, recognized that the statute

did not preclude admission of any evidence weighing in favor of mitigation. Boyd, 38

Cal. 3d at 775, 700 P.2d at 791, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 10.

The jury may return a capital sentence only if it finds that the aggravating

factors so substantially outweigh the mitigating factors that death, rather than life

imprisonment, is appropriate. People v. Tuilaepa, 4 Cal. 4th 569, 842 P.2d 1142, 15
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: CALIFORNIA

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 53

Cal. Rptr. 2d 382 (1992). Otherwise, the sentencer must impose a sentence of life

without possibility of parole.

Section 190.3 specified that the court instruct the trier of fact at the penalty

hearing that a sentence of life without possibility of parole may in the future be

commuted or modified by the governor to one that includes the possibility of parole. 

Although it has not been found to violate the federal constitution, the California

Supreme Court found this statutorily-mandated instruction in People v. Ramos, 37 Cal.

3d 136, 689 P.2d 430, 207 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984) to be so misleading as to violate the

California Constitution’s guarantee of due process.

United States Supreme Court:

Brown v. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. 884 (2006) (holding an invalidated sentencing factor

(whether an eligibility factor or not) will render the sentence unconstitutional by reason

of its adding an improper element to the aggravation scale in the weighing process

unless one of the other sentencing factors enables the sentencer to give aggravating

weight to the same facts and circumstances”; also holding that, despite the fact that the

California Supreme Court invalidated two special circumstances on direct appeal, there

was no constitutional error in the jury’s consideration of the invalid eligibility factors in

the weighing process because all the facts necessary to establish the “heinous,

atrocious, or cruel” and burglary-murder eligibility factors were also properly adduced

as aggravating facts bearing upon the “circumstances of the crime” sentencing factor).

Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994) (stating that a capital sentencer need not be

instructed how to weigh any particular fact in the capital sentencing decision).

California Supreme Court:

People v. Lewis, 26 Cal. 4th 334, 28 P.3d 34, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272 (2001) (holding

that juries are not required to (1) make written findings regarding aggravating

circumstances, (2) achieve unanimity as to aggravating circumstances, (3) find beyond

a reasonable doubt that either aggravating circumstances are proved (other than other

criminal conduct) and the aggravating circumstances outweigh those in mitigation, or

that death is the appropriate penalty), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1019 (2002).

People v. Earp, 20 Cal. 4th 826, 978 P.2d 15, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 857 (1999) (discussing

various challenges to, and upholding constitutionality of CALJIC 8.85–instruction that

enumerates sentencing factors but fails to define as aggravators or mitigators), cert.
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54 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

denied, 529 U.S. 1005 (2000).

People v. Hart, 20 Cal. 4th 546, 976 P.2d 683, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 132 (1999) (holding

clemency instruction not constitutionally deficient where, upon jury inquiry, court

failed to instruct regarding procedure for twice-convicted felon), cert. denied, 528 U.S.

1085 (2000). 

People v. Frye, 18 Cal. 4th 894, 959 P.2d 183, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 25 (1998) (holding

defendant does not have the right to be absent at capital penalty hearing), cert. denied,

526 U.S. 1023 (1999).

People v. Carpenter, 15 Cal. 4th 312, 935 P.2d 708, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (1997) (holding

trial court did not abuse discretion selecting penalty jury before selecting guilt jury, and

having penalty jury hear guilt evidence), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1078 (1998).

People v. Hawkins, 10 Cal. 4th 920, 897 P.2d 574, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 636 (1995) (holding

defendant’s constitutional rights not violated by introduction of second jury on penalty

phase after first jury deadlocked on question of whether death penalty should be

imposed), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1193 (1996).

People v. Kirkpatrick, 7 Cal. 4th 988, 874 P.2d 248, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 248 (1994)

(stating “aggravating” and “mitigating” are commonly understood terms that trial court

need not define for the jury), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1015 (1995).

People v. Duncan, 53 Cal. 3d 955, 979, 810 P.2d 131, 281 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1991)

(stating that “[t]he jury may decide, even in the absence of mitigating evidence, that the

aggravating evidence is not comparatively substantial enough to warrant death”).

People v. Edelbacher, 47 Cal. 3d 983, 1035, 766 P.2d 1, 254 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1989)

(stating that jurors are entitled to vote for a life sentence if they believe that the death

penalty is not “appropriate” under the circumstances).

People v. McLain, 46 Cal. 3d 97, 115, 757 P.2d 569, 249 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1988), citing

Brown, 40 Cal. 3d at 540–41 (interpreting the “shall” of § 190.3 “to require jurors to

make an individualized moral assessment on the basis of the character of the defendant

and the circumstances of the crime, and thereby decide which penalty is appropriate in

the particular case”).

People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 709 P.2d 440, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637, (1985) (concluding

1978 amendment to § 190.3 preserves jury’s constitutional discretion to decide

appropriate penalty; declining to interpret “shall” and “weighing” as limiting scope of
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: CALIFORNIA

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 55

the jury’s ultimate discretion), rev’d on other grounds, 479 U.S. 538 (1987).

People v. Boyd, 38 Cal. 3d 762, 700 P.2d 782 , 215 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1985) (holding that

aggravating evidence not relevant to a listed § 190.3 factor is not admissible at

sentencing since the amended statute limits consideration of evidence to the statutorily

listed relevant factors; recognizing that § 190.3 does not preclude admission of any

evidence weighing in favor of mitigation).

People v. Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d 136, 689 P.2d 430, 207 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984) (holding

mandatory jury instruction–stating that life without parole is subject to gubernatorial

commutation–violates due process clause of California constitution as seriously

misleading and inviting speculative and improper considerations), cert. denied, 471

U.S. 1119 (1985).

California Statutes:

Cal. Penal Code § 190.3 (West 1999) (enumerating relevant factors in aggravation and

mitigation; requiring sentencer to consider listed factors and determine whether

aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances; requiring notice of

aggravators by prosecution).

Cal. Penal Code § 190.4(a) (West 1999) (providing for penalty jury when defendant’s

guilt adjudicated by court).

California Jury Instructions:

CALCRIM 763 (providing model jury instructions listing factors for consideration at

penalty trial, leaving aggravating and mitigating undifferentiated) (adopted 2005).

CALJIC 8.85 (providing model jury instructions listing factors for consideration at

penalty trial, leaving aggravating and mitigating undifferentiated).

Aggravating Circumstances

As discussed above, a prosecutor may not introduce evidence in aggravation unless it is

relevant to one of the statutory factors. However, the prosecutor may offer evidence

not related to a statutory factor to rebut a defendant’s mitigating evidence. The

prosecution’s rebuttal evidence must relate directly to the defendant’s evidence in

mitigation. “The scope of rebuttal must be specific, and evidence presented or argued
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56 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

as rebuttal must relate directly to a particular incident of character trait defendant offers

in his own behalf.” However, if a defendant places his general character in issue, the

prosecutor may be entitled to rebut with evidence or argument suggesting a more

balanced picture of his personality. See People v. Ramirez, 50 Cal. 3d 1158, 1193, 791

P.2d 965, 270 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1990); People v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal. 3d 730, 726 P.2d

113, 230 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1986); People v. Boyd, 38 Cal. 3d 762, 776–77, 700 P.2d 782,

215 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1985).

Three factors frequently relied upon as factors in aggravation are: (1) 

circumstances of the crime and existence of the special circumstances which were

found to be true; (2) other violent criminal activity; or (3) prior felony convictions.

There are four important caveats regarding the sentencing factor relating to

other violent criminal activity. First, the actions of the defendant must have involved

force or violence or the threat of force or violence. People v. Burton, 48 Cal. 3d 843,

862, 771 P.2d 1270, 258 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1989). Second, the necessary “force or

violence” must be directed toward persons. People v. Boyd, 38 Cal. 3d 762, 776–77,

700 P.2d 782, 215 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1985). Third, the activity must amount to conduct that

violates a penal statute. People v. Clair, 2 Cal. 4th 629, 672, 828 P.2d 705, 7 Cal. Rptr.

2d (1992). Evidence of violent juvenile conduct that would have been a crime if

committed by an adult is admissible under § 190.3, factor (b). People v. Avena, 13 Cal.

4th 394, 426, 916 P.2d 1000, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 301 (1996). And, fourth, evidence of

other criminal activity involving force or violence may be admitted in aggravation only

if it can support a finding by a rational trier of fact as to the existence of such activity

beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Clair, 2 Cal. 4th 629, 672, 828 P.2d 705, 7 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 564 (1992).

The evidence of other violent crimes need not have been the subject of a

prior prosecution or conviction. People v. Coleman, 48 Cal. 3d 112, 148, 768 P.2d 32,

255 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1989). The evidence is admissible even if it was included in a

charge that was dismissed without determination of its merits. People v. Ghent, 43 Cal.

3d 739, 774, 739 P.2d 1250, 239 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1987). However, evidence of prior

criminal activity may not be admitted if it relates to an offense for which the defendant

was prosecuted and acquitted. Cal. Penal Code § 190.3.

Although the jurors are required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
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criminal activity occurred before they may consider the facts as evidence in

aggravation, the trial court need not instruct on the elements of unadjudicated crimes

admitted as evidence in aggravation. People v. Heishman, 45 Cal. 3d 147, 183–184,

753 P.2d 629, 246 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1988).

The California cases have repeatedly emphasized that a capital defendant’s

“‘mere failure to confess guilt or express remorse’ at a later time is not a circumstance

of the crime, does not fit within any other statutory sentencing factor, and thus should

not be urged as aggravating.” People v. Cain, 10 Cal. 4th 1, 77 n.31, 892 P.2d 1224, 40

Cal. Rptr. 2d 482 (1995) (quoting People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d 1179, 1232, 800 P.2d

1159, 275 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1990). When dealing with evidence of remorse, three

general legal principles govern California law. 

First and foremost, “a defendant’s lack of remorse may not be considered by

the jury as a factor in aggravation.” People v. Williams, 16 Cal. 4th 153, 254, 940 P.2d

710, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 123 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1150 (1998) (quoting People v.

Sims, 5 Cal. 4th 405, 465, 853 P.2d 992, 20 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1993).

Second, the defendant may, if he or she chooses to do so, introduce evidence

of remorse. The California courts recognize that the jury’s obligation “to consider

‘[a]nything mitigating’” necessarily encompasses “evidence of . . . remorse.” People v.

Ochoa, 19 Cal. 4th 353, 459, 966 P.2d 442, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 408 (1998), cert. denied,

528 U.S. 862 (1999). As a result of this, if the defendant introduces evidence of

remorse, the prosecution may, by way of rebuttal, introduce evidence of a defendant’s

lack of remorse. However, even though the prosecution may be allowed to introduce

evidence that the defendant lacked remorse, the California courts have made manifestly

clear that “lack of remorse, because it suggests the absence of a mitigating factor, is

deemed a relevant factor in the jury’s determination as to whether the factors in

aggravation outweigh those in mitigation, and [is] thus an appropriate subject of

comment by the prosecutor, so long as he or she does not argue that lack of remorse

constitutes a factor in aggravation.” People v. Champion, 9 Cal. 4th 879, 943, 891 P.2d

93, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547 (1995) (quoting People v. Crittenden, 9 Cal. 4th 83, 150, 885

P.2d 887, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 474 (1994).

The third important caveat is that, in evaluating whether a defendant has

expressed or exhibited remorse, “a prosecutor is not permitted to argue that the
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58 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

defendant’s failure to confess should be deemed evidence of lack of remorse.” People

v. Frye, 18 Cal. 4th 894, 1019, 959 P.2d 183, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 25 (1998) (citing People

v. Coleman, 71 Cal. 2d 1159, 1169, 459 P.2d 248, 80 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1969). “Even

after he has been found guilty, a defendant is under no obligation to confess, and he has

a right to urge his possible innocence to the jury as a factor in mitigation of penalty.” 

People v. Coleman, 71 Cal. 2d 1159, 1168, 459 P.2d 248, 80 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1969)

(citing People v. Terry, 61 Cal. 2d 137, 145–47, 390 P.2d 381, 37 Cal. Rptr. 605

(1964)).

The prosecutor may introduce evidence of any prior felony conviction. The

prosecution is not limited to only violent felonies. This factor does not encompass

juvenile adjudications. People v. Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d 259, 295, 753 P.2d 1052, 247 Cal.

Rptr. 1 (1988).

The prosecution must give the defendant notice of the evidence it intends to

introduce in aggravation. No evidence may be presented by the prosecution in

aggravation unless notice of that evidence to be introduced has been given to the

defendant within a reasonable period of time prior to trial. However, evidence may be

introduced without such notice in rebuttal to evidence introduced by the defendant in

mitigation. As a general matter, notice should be given before the cause is called to

trial or as soon thereafter as the prosecution learns the evidence exists. People v.

Daniels, 52 Cal. 3d 815, 879, 802 P.2d 906, 277 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1991). Although

individual items of evidence need not be recited in detail, the notice must be sufficient

to give the defendant a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense to the allegations. 

People v. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d 375, 424–25, 749 P.2d 279, 243 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1988).

California Supreme Court:

People v. Heard, 31 Cal. 4th 946, 75 P.3d, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 131 (2003) (reversing a

judgment as to the sentence of death and remanding for a new penalty trial before a

properly selected jury because the trial court erred and was unwarranted in excusing a

juror for cause, despite the juror's written response in a jury questionnaire that indicated

he thought imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole represented a “worse”

punishment than death where, after the trial court explained to the juror during voir dire

that California law considers death the more serious punishment and that the death

penalty can be imposed under California law only if the aggravating circumstances
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outweigh the mitigating circumstances, the juror stated he would do “whatever the law

states”; under the U.S. Supreme Court cases of Gray v. Mississippi and Davis v.

Minnesota, this type of error is not subject to harmless error analysis, but must be

considered reversible per se with regard to any ensuing death penalty judgment), cert.

denied, 541 U.S. 910 (2004).

People v. Ochoa, 19 Cal. 4th 353, 966 P.2d 442, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 408 (1998)

(recognizing the jury’s obligation “to consider ‘[a]nything mitigating’” necessarily

encompasses “evidence of . . . remorse.”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 862 (1999).

People v. Frye, 18 Cal. 4th 894, 1019, 959 P.2d 183, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 25 (1998) (citing

People v. Coleman, 71 Cal. 2d 1159, 1169, 80 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1969) (finding that “a

prosecutor is not permitted to argue that the defendant’s failure to confess should be

deemed evidence of lack of remorse”), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1023 (1999).

People v. Williams, 16 Cal. 4th 153, 940 P.2d 710, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 123 (1997) (finding

“a defendant’s lack of remorse may not be considered by the jury as a factor in

aggravation”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1150 (1998).

People v. Avena, 13 Cal. 4th 394, 916 P.2d 1000, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 301 (1996) (finding

that evidence of violent juvenile conduct that would have been a crime if committed by

an adult is admissible under § 190.3, factor (b)).

People v. Cain, 10 Cal. 4th 1, 892 P.2d 1224, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 481 (1995) (emphasizing

that a capital defendant’s “‘mere failure to confess guilt or express remorse’ at a later

time is not a circumstance of the crime, does not fit within any other statutory

sentencing factor, and thus should not be urged as aggravating.”

People v. Champion, 9 Cal. 4th 879, 891 P.2d 93, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547 (1995) (stating

use of juvenile misconduct as aggravating factor is permissible), cert. denied, 516 U.S.

105 (1996).

People v. Rodrigues, 8 Cal. 4th 1060, 885 P.2d 1, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 235 (1994) (stating

that § 190.3 allows evidence of violent criminal activity regardless of where it

occurred), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 851 (1995).

People v. Wader, 5 Cal. 4th 610, 854 P.2d 80, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 788 (1993) (rejecting

unconstitutionality claims based on (1) jury not having to find beyond reasonable doubt

that death is the appropriate penalty; (2) jury not having to find that the aggravating

circumstances were true beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) jury not having to find that the

aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt; (4)
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60 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

jury not required to unanimously find which aggravating circumstances are true or that

the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, and (5) jury not required to

make written findings on the aggravating factors found to be true), cert. denied, 512

U.S. 1253 (1994).

People v. Tuilaepa, 4 Cal. 4th 569, 842 P.2d 1142, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 382 (1992) (stating

simple weapon possession can constitute implied threat of force as aggravation;

evidence of gang affiliation may be admitted where directly relevant to material issue

of otherwise admissible evidence in aggravation), aff’d, Tuilaepa v. California, 512

U.S. 967 (1994).

People v. Livatidis, 2 Cal. 4th 759, 831 P.2d 297, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 72 (1992) (stating

where prior felony conviction was for non-violent offense, prosecution is limited to

introducing and proving only the existence of the conviction, not the underlying facts),

cert. denied, 507 U.S. 975 (1993).

People v. Clair, 2 Cal. 4th 629, 828 P.2d 705, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 564 (1992) (holding §

190.3 applies to crimes which involve implied threat of force as well as express use of

force), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1063 (1993).

People v. Ashmus, 54 Cal. 3d 932, 820 P.2d 214, 2 Cal. Rptr. 112 (1991) (stating that

evidence of other violent criminal activity factor includes evidence of results and

impact of such activity), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 841 (1992).

People v. Daniels, 52 Cal. 3d 815, 879, 802 P.2d 906, 277 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1991)

(stating that the prosecutor must give notice of the evidence it intends to introduce in

aggravation before the cause is called to trial or as soon thereafter as the prosecution

learns the evidence exists).

People v. Jackson, 49 Cal. 3d 1170, 783 P.2d 279, 264 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1989) (allowing

jury to consider violent crimes of which defendant was neither charged nor convicted),

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 (1990).

People v. Bell, 49 Cal. 3d 502, 778 P.2d 129, 262 Cal. Rptr. 1 (declining to extend

Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 631 P.2d 446, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981) to apply to

prosecutor’s comments regarding potential future dangerousness), cert. denied 495 U.S.

963 (1990).

People v. Sheldon, 48 Cal. 3d 935, 771 P.2d 1330, 258 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1989) (holding

evidence of other criminal activity for an offense of which defendant was acquitted

may not be considered in aggravation).
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People v. Coleman, 48 Cal. 3d 112, 768 P.2d 32, 255 Cal. Rrptr. 813 (1989) (holding

that evidence of an unadjudicated crime is admissible even if the defendant was never

charged with the crime).

People v. Grant, 45 Cal. 3d 829, 755 P.2d 894, 248 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1988) (stating

evidence of other violent criminal activity need not be inherently violent, as long as it

was perpetrated in a violent manner), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1050 (1989).

People v. Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d 259, 295, 753 P.2d 1052, 247 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988)

(regarding the prior felony convictions sentencing factor, evidence of juvenile

adjudications is not admissible).

People v. Heishman, 45 Cal. 3d 147, 753 P.2d 629, 246 Cal. Rptr. 673 (holding lack of

remorse may be introduced by prosecution on cross-examination of defense witness in

rebuttal or other testimony suggesting defendant was remorseful), cert. denied, 488

U.S. 948 (1988).

People v. Thompson, 45 Cal. 3d 86, 753 P.2d 37, 246 Cal. Rptr. 245 (stating that

prosecutor may offer evidence not related to enumerated aggravating factor as rebuttal

to defendant’s mitigating evidence), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 960 (1988).

People v. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d 713, 750 P.2d 741, 244 Cal. Rptr. 867 (stating § 190.3(b)

permits evidence surrounding violent criminal activity, provided defendant not

acquitted of criminal charge based on activity), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 934 (1988).

People v. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d 375, 749 P.2d 279, 243 Cal. Rptr. 842 (upholding

admissibility of evidence of other crimes against charge that it violates due process;

stating that the prosecution need not recite individual items of evidence it intends to

introduce in aggravation but must give notice that is sufficient to give the defendant a

reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense to the allegations), cert. denied, 488 U.S.

871 (1988).

People v. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d 57, 744 P.2d 1127, 243 Cal. Rptr. 842 (enforcing notice

requirement of § 190.3, and stating that notice need not be in writing), cert. denied, 486

U.S. 1038 (1988).

People v. Ghent, 43 Cal. 3d 739, 739 P.2d 1250, 239 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1987) (stating

evidence regarding prior criminal charge which was dismissed can be introduced under 

§ 190.3 as other crimes evidence because dismissal is not equivalent to acquittal), cert.

denied, 485 U.S. 929 (1988).
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62 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

People v. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d 247, 710 P.2d 861, 221 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1985) (stating

prosecution erred arguing that the absence of a mitigating factor may be considered as

an aggravating factor but error was harmless).

People v. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144, 711 P.2d 480, 222 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1985) (holding

violent acts committed after the murder may be shown in aggravation of the offense;

statute limits the evidence of prior convictions only to convictions before commission

of the capital crime).

People v. Phillips, 41 Cal. 3d 29, 711 P.2d 423, 222 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1985) (holding the

criminal activity factor must constitute an actual violation of the penal code).

People v. Robertson, 33 Cal. 3d 21, 655 P.2d 279, 188 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1982) (holding

that if prosecution presents evidence of other crimes for which defendant has not been

convicted, trial judge must instruct jury that proof beyond reasonable doubt of such

offenses is required).

People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 631 P.2d 446, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981) (holding

inadmissible as aggravating factor during penalty phase expert testimony forecasting

future dangerousness), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922 (1982).

People v. Coleman, 71 Cal. 2d 1159, 1168, 459 P.2d 248, 80 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1969)

(citing People v. Terry, 61 Cal. 2d 137, 145–47, 390 P.2d 381, 37 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1964)

(stating “[e]ven after he has been found guilty, a defendant is under no obligation to

confess, and he has a right to urge his possible innocence to the jury as a factor in

mitigation of penalty”).

California Statutes:

Cal. Penal Code § 190.3 (West 1999) (enumerating relevant factors in aggravation and

mitigation; requiring sentencer to consider listed factors and determine whether

aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances; requiring notice of

aggravators by prosecution).

Mitigating Circumstances

Section 190.3(k) allows the trier of fact to consider “any other circumstance which

extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.” 

Consistent with Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), the California courts have

interpreted this section to allow the trier to consider any mitigating evidence of the
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defendant’s character or record which the defendant offers. The phrase is an openended, catch-all provision, allowing the jury’s consideration of any mitigating

evidence, limited only by relevance. To avoid any misunderstandings, the sentencing

court must inform the jury that it can consider as a mitigating factor any other

circumstance or aspect of the defendant’s character or record that the defendant

proffers as a basis for sentence less than death.

In addition to the catch-all clause, § 190.3 also enumerates several nonexclusive factors the trier of fact may consider in mitigation:

(1) whether the victim was a participant in the defendant’s homicidal

conduct;

(2) the defendant’s age at the time of the crime;

(3) whether the defendant was an accomplice to the offense and his

participation was relatively minor;

(4) whether the defendant committed the offense under extreme mental or

emotional disturbance;

(5) whether the defendant believed he or she had a moral justification for his

or her conduct;

(6) whether the defendant acted under extreme duress or domination; and

(7) whether the defendant acted under mental disease or defect or the effects

of intoxication.

California Supreme Court:

In re Lucas, 33 Cal. 4th 682, 94 P.3d 447, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 331 (2004) (holding that 

defense counsel’s inadequate and tardy investigation of available mitigating evidence

for use at the penalty phase of the case constituted ineffective assistance of counsel in

view of the fact that evidence of child abuse suffered by defendant was available

through several sources, and counsel's decision not to present mitigating evidence was

not reasonable in the absence of counsel’s knowledge and understanding of the

potential effect of this evidence).

People v. Ochoa, 19 Cal. 4th 353, 966 P.2d 442, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 408 (1998) (holding

jury may not consider impact of death sentence on defendant’s family), cert. denied,

528 U.S. 862 (1999).
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64 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

People v. Sanders, 11 Cal. 4th 475, 905 P.2d 420, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 751 (1995)

(addressing mitigating factor of defendant’s age), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 838 (1996).

People v. Visciotti, 2 Cal. 4th 1, 825 P.2d 388, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 495 (addressing moral

justification belief mitigating factor), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 893 (1992).

People v. Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d 612, 818 P.2d 84, 286 Cal. Rptr. 801 (holding 8th and

14th amendments require that sentencer not be precluded from considering as

mitigating factor any aspect of defendant’s character or record and any of

circumstances of offense, as long as it is relevant), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 819 (1992).

People v. Benson, 52 Cal. 3d 754, 802 P.2d 330, 276 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1990) (addressing

emotional disturbance mitigating factor), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 924 (1991).

People v. Adcox, 47 Cal. 3d 207, 763 P.2d 906, 253 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1988) (addressing

duress mitigating factor), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1038 (1990).

People v. Williams, 45 Cal. 3d 1268, 756 P.2d 221, 248 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1988)

(addressing accomplice mitigating factor), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1050 (1989).

People v. Thompson, 45 Cal. 3d 86, 753 P.2d 37, 246 Cal. Rptr. 245 (holding defendant

not entitled to present evidence concerning how death penalty carried out or conditions

of confinement for someone serving life without possibility of parole), cert. denied, 488

U.S. 960 (1988).

People v. Ghent, 43 Cal. 3d 739, 739 P.2d.1250, 239 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1987) (addressing

mental disease or defect mitigating factor), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 929 (1988).

People v. Easley, 34 Cal. 3d 858, 679 P.2d 813, 196 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1983) (adopting

Lockett in analysis of 1978 statute).

California Statutes:

Cal. Penal Code § 190.3 (West 1999) (enumerating relevant factors in aggravation and

mitigation; requiring sentencer to consider listed factors and determine whether

aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances).

California Rules:

CALJIC 8.85 (jury instruction on consideration of all mitigating evidence).
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Automatic Application for Modification of Verdict

The trial court must automatically review any death verdict handed down by a capital

sentencing jury. Section 190.4(e) requires the trial judge to be guided by the relevant

factors listed in § 190.3 and to determine whether the sentencer’s decision is contrary to

the law or evidence presented. In ruling on the application, the trial judge must

independently reweigh the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and

determine whether, in the judge’s independent judgment, the weight of the evidence

supports the jury verdict. People v. Samayoa, 15 Cal. 4th 795, 859, 938 P.2d 2, 64 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 400 (1997). Although the law requires a trial judge to determine whether the

law and evidence support the verdict, the law does not require the trial judge to

independently determine whether the penalty of death is appropriate. People v.

Alvarez, 14 Cal. 4th 155, 245, 926 P.2d 365, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 385 (1996).

When the trial court reviews a death penalty verdict under § 190.4(e), the

court must limit its consideration to the evidence presented to the penalty phase jury. 

People v. Welch, 20 Cal. 4th 701, 775, 976 P.2d 754, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 203 (1999). A

trial court should not read or consider a presentence report, statements of the victim’s

relatives, or any other evidence not presented to the jury during the penalty phase trial

before ruling on an automatic motion to modify penalty. People v. Benson, 52 Cal. 3d

754, 812, 802 P.2d 330, 276 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1990) (victim’s relatives); People v. Lewis,

50 Cal. 3d 262, 287, 786 P.2d 892, 266 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1990) (presentence report).

The state supreme court reviews a trial judge’s decision not to modify a

verdict of death at the time of a defendant’s automatic appeal. The state supreme court

reviews only for an abuse of discretion. The court’s “role is to review the trial court’s

ruling on a defendant’s modification motion for error, rather than to independently

evaluate whether the evidence shows that the defendant’s sentence of death is

appropriate.” People v. Hines, 15 Cal. 4th 997, 1080, 938 P.2d 388, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d

594 (1997). The state supreme court will “not make a de novo determination of

penalty.” People v. Samayoa, 15 Cal.4th 795, 859, 938 P.2d 2, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 400

(1997). The state court has emphasized that it “lack[s] the power to overturn a

judgment of death simply because [the court] disagree[s] with the jury’s penalty

determination.” People v. Hines, 15 Cal. 4th 997, 1080, 938 P.2d 388, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d
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66 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

594 (1997).

If the trial judge grants the automatic motion and reduces the sentence to a

noncapital sentence, the state may appeal to the intermediate court of appeal. People v.

Crew, 1 Cal. App. 4th 1591, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755 (1991); People v. Burgener, 223 Cal.

App. 3d 427, 272 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1990).

California Supreme Court:

People v. Burgener, 29 Cal. 4th 833, 62 P.3d 1, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 747 (vacating a death

sentence and remanding to the superior court for a new hearing on the application for

modification of the verdict, the court held that the trial judge erred in using a

deferential substantial evidence standard of review and in failing to make an

independent determination whether imposition of the death penalty was proper in light

of the relevant evidence and applicable law, as required by § 190.4(e)), cert. denied,

540 U.S. 855 (2003).

People v. Weaver, 29 Cal. 4th 833, 29 P.3d 103, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2 (2001) (holding

that in ruling on a verdict-modification application under § 190.4(e), trial judge’s

function is not to make independent and de novo penalty determination, but rather to

independently reweigh evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and then

to determine whether, in judge’s independent judgment, weight of evidence supports

jury verdict), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1058 (2002).

People v. Welch, 20 Cal. 4th 701, 775, 976 P.2d 754, 85 Cal. Rptr. 203 (1999) (finding

that when the trial court reviews a death penalty verdict under § 190.4(e), it must limit

its consideration to the evidence presented to the penalty phase jury).

People v. Hines, 15 Cal. 4th 997, 1080, 938 P.2d 388, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594 (1997)

(holding that the state supreme court’s “role is to review the trial court’s ruling on a

defendant’s modification motion for error, rather than to independently evaluate

whether the evidence shows that the defendant’s sentence of death is appropriate”).

People v. Samayoa, 15 Cal. 4th 795, 859, 938 P.2d 2, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 400 (1997)

(finding that the trial judge, during automatic review, must independently reweigh the

evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and determine whether, in the

judge’s independent judgment, the weight of the evidence supports the jury verdict;

finding that the state supreme court will “not make a de novo determination of

penalty”).
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People v. Alvarez, 14 Cal. 4th 155, 245, 926 P.2d 365, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 385 (1996)

(finding that the law requires trial judge to determine whether the law and evidence

support the verdict but does not require trial judge to independently determine whether

penalty of death is appropriate), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 829 (1997).

People v. Benson, 52 Cal. 3d 754, 812, 802 P.2d 330, 276 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1990)

(holding that a trial court should not read or consider a presentence report, statements

of the victim’s relatives, or any other evidence not presented to the jury during the

penalty phase trial before ruling on an automatic motion to modify penalty), cert.

denied, 502 U.S. 924 (1991).

People v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal. 3d 730, 726 P.2d 113, 230 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1986) (holding,

in deciding automatic application for modification of death verdict, trial court failed to

adequately make independent determination whether death penalty was proper under

law and evidence as statutorily required).

California Court of Appeal:

People v. Crew, 1 Cal. App. 4th 1591, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755 (1991) (holding that trial

judge erred by considering, based on past experience as trial judge in capital cases, and

relying on the conclusion that imposition of the death penalty was disproportionate to

the penalties imposed on other persons for similar offenses).

People v. Burgener, 223 Cal. App. 3d 427, 272 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1990) (holding trial

court lacked authority to consider, when ruling on automatic motion, (1) the possibility

the jury could not, as it was instructed, ignore the successfully objected-to evidence at

trial, (2) a “most likely” reversal by the Supreme Court, and (3) the length and expense

of a retrial of the penalty phase).

California Statutes:

Cal. Penal Code § 190.4(e) (West 1999) (providing for automatic application for

modification and review by trial judge of penalty phase evidence when defendant

sentenced to death).

Appellate Review of Capital Sentences

Standard of Review

The California Supreme Court’s capital trial standard of review is determined by the
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68 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

type of proceeding being reviewed and the error asserted. Article IV, § 13 of the

California Constitution prohibits appellate reversal absent a miscarriage of justice. For

state law error in guilt phase proceedings, miscarriage of justice requires a showing that

there is a reasonable probability a result more favorable to the defendant would have

been reached had the error not occurred. However, at the penalty phase, state law error

is reviewed under a lesser “reasonable possibility” standard: the supreme court

determines whether, absent the error, a reasonable possibility exists that the sentencer

would have returned a life sentence. 

Error of federal constitutional dimension asserted at any stage of the capital

proceeding is scrutinized under the “reasonable doubt” standard of Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Appellate review of federal constitutional error

requires harmless error to be established beyond a reasonable doubt.

A single valid special circumstance is sufficient to determine that the

defendant is eligible for the death penalty. Errors involving additional special

circumstances, while they may prejudicially affect the penalty trial, do not affect the

verdict at the close of the guilt phase. An invalid special circumstance is not

prejudicial per se but is subject to “harmless error” analysis.

United States Supreme Court:

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (holding appellate court’s review of

federal constitutional error requires harmless error to be established beyond a

reasonable doubt).

California Supreme Court:

People v. Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d 612, 818 P.2d 84, 286 Cal. Rptr. 801 (applying

independent review standard of review to appeal of denial of verdict modification

explaining court reviews the trial court’s determination after independently considering

the record but does not make a de novo determination of penalty), cert. denied, 506

U.S. 819 (1992).

People v. Benson, 52 Cal. 3d 754, 802 P.2d 330, 276 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1990) (applying

harmless error analysis to jury instruction addressing an invalid special circumstance),

cert. denied, 502 U.S. 924 (1991).
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People v. Bittaker, 48 Cal. 3d 1046, 774 P.2d 659, 259 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1989) (stating

single valid special circumstance finding sufficient to qualify defendant as deatheligible), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 931 (1990).

People v. Brown, 46 Cal. 3d 432, 758 P.2d 1135, 250 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1988) (applying

“reasonably probable” standard of review of state law error, announced in People v.

Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 299 P.2d 243 (1956), at guilt phase of capital trial; holding

“reasonable-possibility” test applicable to review of state law error at penalty phase),

cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059 (1989).

California Statutes:

Cal. Const. art. VI, § 13 (prohibiting reversal absent showing of miscarriage of justice).

Proportionality Review

The California Supreme Court reviews a case to determine if the penalty is

disproportionate to individual culpability. The court applies the proportionality

principles of California’s cruel and unusual punishment case law when reviewing

proportionality claims. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has held that the federal

Constitution does not require comparative, or “inter-case” proportionality review if a

state’s capital justice system meets the requirements of Furman. In Pulley v. Harris,

465 U.S. 37 (1984), the Court held that California was not constitutionally required to

engage in an appellate comparative proportionality review.

United States Supreme Court:

Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984) (finding California’s capital punishment scheme

constitutional notwithstanding absence of comparative proportionality review).

California Supreme Court:

People v. Ochoa, 26 Cal. 4th 398, 28 P. 3d 78, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 324 (2001) (holding

that there is no constitutional requirement of intercase proportionality review; also

holding as to intracase review, court need not compare defendant’s death sentence with

plea bargain terms received by defendant’s companions, and that in any event
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70 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

defendant’s sentence was not disproportionate to that of his accomplices), cert. denied,

535 U.S. 1040 (2002).

People v. Sanders, 11 Cal. 4th 475, 905 P.2d. 420, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 751 (1995)

(rejecting request for “intercase” proportionality review), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 838

(1996).

People v. Wright, 52 Cal. 3d 367, 802 P.2d 221, 276 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1990) (allowing

appellate review for disproportionality of offense to individual culpability), cert.

denied, 502 U.S. 834 (1991).

People v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal. 3d 730, 726 P.2d 113, 230 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1986) (rejecting

comparative proportionality review, citing Pulley).

People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 442, 668 P.2d. 697, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1983) (discussing

proportionality review required by state and federal “cruel and unusual punishment”

provisions).

People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142, 599 P.2d 587, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1979) (holding

“cruel and unusual punishment” proportionality principles allow review of alleged

disproportionality between offense and punishment).

Appeal of Death Judgment

Superior Court death judgments are automatically appealed to the California Supreme

Court. A capital defendant cannot waive the Court’s statutorily-mandated review.

California Penal Code § 190.6(a) declares a legislative desire for all capital

sentences to be reviewed expeditiously. To realize this goal, the 1996 legislature

imposed a new time schedule on capital appeals arising from post January 1, 1997,

convictions. Section 190.8 requires the trial court to certify the record for completeness

ninety days after imposition of sentence and to certify the record for accuracy 120 days

after either appointment of appellate counsel or the record is certified as complete. 

Section 190.6(b) allows seven months for appellate counsel to file an opening brief, and

subdivision (c) of § 190.6 sets a 210-day goal for the supreme court to decide and file

an opinion reaching the merits of the appeal. 

The legislature provides for extensions of time in § 190.8(d), particularly

when the transcript exceeds 10,000 pages. Additionally, failure to comply with these
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time requirements does not preclude imposition of the death penalty. 

California Rules of Court 34-36 provide more detailed procedure for record

preparation, certification, and transmittal and provide a time schedule for appellate

briefing in death penalty cases.

On appeal, the supreme court may consider any question of law preserved by

objection, provided it pertains to the defendant’s substantial rights. Moreover, the

court will review any instruction, notwithstanding trial counsel’s failure to object,

provided it affects substantial rights of the defendant. The supreme court will not

substitute its conclusions regarding the weight of aggravating and mitigating

circumstances for that of the sentencer.

California Supreme Court:

Marks v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 4th 176, 38 P.3d 512, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 674 (2002)

(holding that if timing of appointment process permits, habeas corpus counsel may

submit to appellate counsel suggestions for correction, augmentation, and settlement of

record on appeal, but that appellate counsel retains ultimate and plenary control of

record correction process; accordingly holding that trial court did not abuse its

discretion in declining to permit petitioner’s habeas corpus counsel to participate in

record correction).

People v. Turner, 8 Cal. 4th 137, 214 n.19, 878 P.2d 521, 566 n.19, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d

762, 807 n.19 (1994) (noting perfunctory assertions of error are not properly presented

to supreme court), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1068 (1995).

People v. Hawthorne, 4 Cal. 4th 43, 841 P.2d 118, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 133 (1992) (stating

supreme court will not substitute its conclusions regarding balance of aggravating and

mitigating factors for that of trier of fact), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1013 (1993).

People v. Stanworth, 71 Cal. 2d 820, 457 P.2d 889, 80 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1969) (holding

defendant not entitled to waive automatic appeal).

California Court of Appeals:

People v. Fitzpatrick, 2 Cal. App. 4th 1285, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 808 (1992) (stating

California Penal Code § 1259 provides that instructions may be reviewed on appeal

even though no objection was made at trial if substantial rights of defendant are

affected).
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72 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

California Statutes:

Cal. Const. art. VI, § 11 (providing supreme court appellate jurisdiction over death

judgments).

Cal. Penal Code § 190.6 (West 1999) (providing for expeditiousness of death judgment

appeals for post January 1997 convictions).

Cal. Penal Code §§ 190.7 (West 1999), 190.9 (West Supp. 2006) (providing for record

of capital cases on appeal; presence of court reporter and recording of proceedings).

Cal. Penal Code § 190.8 (West 1999) (providing for expeditious certification of record

on appeal for trials on or after January 1, 1997).

Cal. Penal Code § 1239(b) (West Supp. 2006) (providing automatic appeal of death

judgment).

Cal. Penal Code § 1254 (West 1982) (providing that two counsel are entitled to argue

for each party at oral argument on capital appeal).

Cal. Penal Code § 1259 (West 1982) (providing scope of review on appeal).

California Rules:

Cal. R. Ct. 34–36 (providing preparation and certification of record for accuracy and

completeness in death penalty cases; transmission of record; schedule for brief filing).

Collateral Remedies

Habeas Corpus

The writ of habeas corpus, originally codified in 1872, is the exclusive state

postconviction relief vehicle for collaterally attacking a capital conviction and

sentence. Original habeas corpus jurisdiction is constitutionally vested with the

Supreme Court of California, the courts of appeal, and the superior courts. Despite this

broad grant of jurisdiction, habeas corpus proceedings involving sentences of death are

usually filed in the state supreme court.

The Supreme Court Policies Regarding Cases Arising From Judgments of

Death provide timeliness and compensation schedules for capital habeas proceedings
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 73

before the supreme court, as well as procedure for funding habeas investigations. 

Supreme Court Rule 76.6 provides competency standards for capital habeas counsel

and Internal Operating Practices and Procedure XV(A)(2) vests appointment of capital

habeas counsel in the supreme court. Additionally, the 1997 legislature created the

California Habeas Corpus Resource Center, a state agency housed in the judicial branch

of the government, to ensure adequate representation of capital habeas petitioners by

employing competent counsel and securing additional private counsel and investigators

for needed representation.

The supreme court established timeliness standards, found in the court’s

Policies Regarding Cases Arising From Judgments of Death, to ensure that potential

habeas corpus claims are presented to and heard by the supreme court in a timely

fashion. Timeliness Standard 1–3 allows the court to deny any petition that fails to

meet these timeliness standards. As amended effective November 30, 2005, the court

presumes a habeas petition is timely (i.e. filed without substantial delay) if it is filed

within 180 days after the final due date of the state’s reply brief on direct appeal or

within 36 months after appointment of habeas counsel, whichever is later. 

A petition filed outside of this time frame may be considered timely if it is

filed within a reasonable time after petitioner or counsel knew or should have known

about the facts supporting the claim and became aware or should have become aware of

the legal basis for the habeas claim. An untimely petition may be heard if good cause is

established for the delay. Good cause requires a showing of particular circumstances

sufficient to justify substantial delay. 

In In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 855 P.2d 729, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509 (1993), the

court created a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception to the 1993 Timeliness

Standards on successive or untimely capital petitions. The supreme court defined

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” as (1) constitutional error in the absence of which

no reasonable fact finder would have convicted petitioner, (2) actual innocence, (3) trial

error resulting in a grossly misleading profile of petitioner, or (4) invalid charging or

sentencing statute. 

If the inmate alleges facts which, if proved, would establish entitlement to a

writ of habeas corpus, the supreme court may appoint a referee to hear and determine

the facts. The California Supreme Court has indicated that it will ask a referee to make
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74 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

findings only on disputed factual issues and will not ask the referee to resolve legal

issues arising from these facts. The referee’s findings of fact, though not binding, are

given great weight when supported by substantial evidence. In habeas corpus

proceedings, the petitioner bears the burden of proving the facts that establish a basis

for habeas relief by a preponderance of the evidence.

If the capital prisoner files an initial application for writ of habeas corpus in

the superior court, subsequent applications based on new facts may be filed in the

superior court. However, all subsequent applications based on a point of law not raised

in the original applications must be raised in the court of appeals or the supreme court. 

United States Supreme Court:

Evans v. Chavis, 126 S. Ct. 846 (2006) (holding that unexplained delay of at least six

months between California Court of Appeal’s denial of state noncapital habeas petition

and the filing of notice of appeal from that decision in the California Supreme Court

could not be “reasonable” under state law and thus state habeas petition was not timely

filed and statute of limitations under AEDPA was not tolled; where the Ninth Circuit

had treated a decision of the California Supreme Court in denying a state habeas

petition without comment or citation as on the merits, the Supreme Court said that if the

appearance of "on the merits" does not automatically warrant a holding that a filing was

timely, the absence of those words could not automatically warrant such a holding;

concurring in the judgment, Stevens, J. wrote that the Court should endorse the Ninth

Circuit presumption that a ruling on the merits, simpliciter, means that the state court

has concluded that a habeas petition was timely).

Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002) (holding that (1) as used in 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2), “pending” covers time between lower state court’s decision and filing

notice of appeal to higher state court; and (2) same “pending” rule applies to

California’s unique collateral review system, even though that system involves not

notice of appeal but filing within “reasonable time” of further original state habeas

petition in higher court; rejecting contention that state petition is not “pending” during

interval between lower court’s entry of judgment and timely filing of notice of appeal

in next court as being inconsistent with ordinary meaning of “pending,” which means in

present context, until completion of collateral review process; remanding to Ninth

Circuit to reconsider timeliness issue, with instructions to evaluate any special

conditions justifying petitioner’s delay in filing in state court and any other relevant

considerations). 
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Ninth Circuit:

Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.) (holding that California Supreme Court’s

denial of state court habeas petition “on the merits and for lack of diligence” in reliance

on In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 855 P.2d 729, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509 (1993), and In re

Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 959 P.2d 311, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 153 (1998), for untimeliness

constituted an independent state ground; reversing on issue whether state ground was

adequate and remanding for district court to reconsider this issue with the ultimate

burden of proof on state; stating that on this record, the court could not conclude that

California had regularly and consistently applied untimeliness bar in habeas cases),

cert. denied, 540 U.S. 938 (2003).

Ross v. Craven, 478 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1973) (stating California Supreme Court’s

disposition of petition on the merits ends state habeas attack).

California Supreme Court:

In re Steele, 32 Cal. 4th 682, 85 P.3d 444, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 536 (2004) (holding that

those who seek discovery under Penal Code § 1054.9 because they are preparing to file

or have filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging a judgment of death or life

without the possibility of parole should generally first make the discovery motion in the

trial court that rendered the judgment and that after the trial court has ruled, either party

may challenge that ruling by a petition for writ of mandate in the California Court of

Appeal; also holding that discovery includes, and is limited to, specific materials the

prosecution or law enforcement authorities involved in the case currently possess that

defendant can show fall into any of these categories: (1) materials the prosecutor

provided at time of trial but have since become lost to defendant, (2) materials the

prosecution should have provided at time of trial, or (3) materials defendant would

have been entitled to at time of trial had defendant specifically requested them.

In re Sanders, 21 Cal. 4th 697, 981 P.2d 1038, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 899 (1999) (explaining

timeliness requirements of Clark, Robbins, and Gallego; addressing whether

abandonment by counsel can be “good cause” to excuse substantial delay in filing a

state habeas petition). 

In re Johnson, 19 Cal. 4th 447, 957 P.2d 299, 75 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1998) (discussing

burden of proof and standard of review applied to referee’s findings).

In re Gallego, 18 Cal. 4th 825, 959 P.2d 290, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 132 (1998) (concluding a

denial of a request for investigative funds is relevant to determining when a petitioner

should have known of information supporting a claim and, therefore, may be grounds
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76 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

for establishing absence of substantial delay pursuant to Timeliness Standard 1–1.2).

In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 959 P.2d 311, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 153 (1998) (analyzing

timeliness of habeas petition for (1) absence of substantial delay; (2) good cause to

justify substantial delay; and (3) under Clark standards; finding no substantial delay

where claims filed within a reasonable time after discovering prosecution allegedly lied

about discovery, withheld impeaching evidence, and solicited/promoted alleged

false/perjured testimony).

In re Ross, 10 Cal. 4th 184, 892 P.2d 1287, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 544 (1995) (stating

supreme court will ask referee to make findings of fact only, not resolve legal issues

arising from facts), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1051 (1996).

In re Carpenter, 9 Cal. 4th 634, 889 P.2d 985, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 665 (stating California

Constitution article VI, § 10 grants concurrent subject matter jurisdiction to courts in

death penalty proceedings; habeas jurisdiction granted to court where first filing

occurs), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 981 (1995).

In re Sassounian, 9 Cal. 4th 535, 887 P.2d 527, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 665 (1995) (stating

habeas petitioner has burden of proving facts by a preponderance of the evidence).

In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th 813, 855 P.2d 391, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 373 (1993) (stating, in noncapital case, where issue was available on direct appeal, habeas review is available only

where claimed constitutional error is both clear and fundamental and strikes at heart of

trial process).

In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 855 P.2d 729, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509 (1993) (creating

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception to 1993 Timeliness Standards on

successive or untimely capital petitions).

In re Jackson, 3 Cal. 4th 578, 835 P.2d 371, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 531 (1992) (holding

referee’s findings of fact given great weight when supported by substantial evidence

but not binding), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 941 (1993).

People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d 1179, 800 P.2d 1159, 275 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1990)

(limiting discovery in a post conviction proceeding to verified prima facie claims;

stating a criminal judgment may be collaterally attacked on the basis of newly

discovered evidence only if the new evidence casts fundamental doubt on the accuracy

and reliability of the proceedings. To undermine a penalty judgment, the evidence

must so clearly change the balance of aggravation against mitigation that its omission

more likely than not altered the outcome), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835 (1991).
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 77

In re Stankewitz, 40 Cal. 3d 391, 708 P.2d 1260, 220 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1985) (involving

writ where counsel discovered facts that formed the basis of a juror misconduct claim

but waited nearly one and one half years to file the petition; permitting petitioner to file

habeas with direct appeal but warning that in the future petitions should be filed as

promptly as circumstances allow even if prior to direct appeal).

In re Sterling, 63 Cal. 2d 486, 407 P.2d 5, 47 Cal. Rptr. 205 (1965) (denying habeas

petition based upon fourth amendment violation).

In re Jackson, 61 Cal. 2d 500, 393 P.2d 420, 39 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1964) (holding habeas

corpus available for showing of reversible error established by subsequent caselaw).

In re Horowitz, 33 Cal. 2d 534, 203 P.2d 513 (1949) (stating policy to deny application

for habeas corpus when grounds either presented in an earlier petition or known at time

earlier petition submitted).

California Statutes:

Cal. Const. art. VI, § 10 (providing that habeas corpus jurisdiction is vested in supreme

court, courts of appeal, and superior courts).

Cal. Gov’t Code § 68660, et seq. (West Supp. 2006) (providing for California Habeas

Corpus Resource Center).

Cal. Penal Code § 1054.9. (West Supp. 2006) (providing for access to discovery

materials in specified circumstances).

Cal. Penal Code § 1473, et seq. (West 2000 and West Supp. 2006) (providing

codification of writ provision).

Cal. Penal Code § 1475 (West 2000) (providing for subsequent habeas applications).

California Rules:

Cal. R. Ct. 4.551 (as amended and renumbered effective Jan. 1, 2002) (setting forth

habeas corpus procedure in superior court petitions).

Cal. R. Ct. 60, 60.5(b) (providing capital habeas corpus petition filing in appellate

courts).
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78 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Cal. R. Ct. 76.6 (providing supreme court competency standards for capital appellate

and state habeas counsel).

Sup. Ct. Policies Regarding Cases Arising from Judgments of Death–Policy 3 (setting

forth timeliness and compensation standards for capital habeas petitions).

Sup. Ct. Internal Operating Practices & Procedures XV(A)(2) (providing for supreme

court appointment of counsel for indigent capital habeas petitioner).

Appellate Review of Collateral Proceedings

A superior court’s order denying habeas corpus relief is not appealable. The denial of a

habeas petition can be challenged only by filing a new petition in the next higher court. 

People v. Griggs, 67 Cal. 2d 314, 431 P.2d 225, 61 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1967); In re Reed,

33 Cal. 3d 914, 918 n.2, 663 P.2d 216, 217 n.2, 191 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1983).

The state may appeal from an order of the superior court granting relief on a

defendant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. In capital cases, the appeal will lie

directly to the California Supreme Court. Cal. Penal Code § 1506.

California Supreme Court:

In re Reed, 33 Cal. 3d, 914, 918 n.2, 663 P.2d 216, 217 n.2, 191 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1983)

(holding that petitioner challenging a denial of a habeas petition must file a new

petition in the next higher court).

People v. Griggs, 67 Cal. 2d 314, 431 P.2d 225, 61 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1967) (holding that

the denial of a habeas petition can be challenged only by filing a new petition in the

next higher court).

California Statutes:

Cal. Penal Code § 1506 (West 2000) (providing procedure for habeas appeal).

California Rules:

Cal. R. Ct. 39.2 (providing for appeals and hearings in habeas matters).
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Procedural Bar/Waiver/Exhaustion

Habeas corpus may not be used as a substitute for raising issues that should have been

raised on appeal. In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756, 264 P.2d 513 (1953); In re Harris, 5 Cal.

4th 813, 855 P.2d 391, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509 (1993). Similarly, contentions raised and

rejected on appeal cannot be renewed in a state habeas petition. In re Waltreus, 62 Cal.

2d 218, 397 P.2d 1001, 42 Cal. Rptr. 9, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 853 (1965).

Case law recognizes the reviewing court’s discretion to issue a writ if it

believes an appeal is not an adequate remedy or if prompt disposition is required in the

interests of justice. Additionally, California Penal Code § 1475 provides for successive

applications for writ of habeas corpus if there exists “some ground not existing in fact

at the issuing of the prior writ.”

California Supreme Court:

In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th 813, 855 P.2d 391, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 373 (1993) (stating, in noncapital case, where issue was available on direct appeal, habeas review is available only

where claimed constitutional error is both clear and fundamental and strikes at heart of

trial process).

In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 855 P.2d 729, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509 (1993) (providing

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception to Timeliness Standards procedural

bar).

In re Martin, 44 Cal. 3d 1, 744 P.2d 374, 241 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1987) (discussing rule

that petition for habeas corpus based on same grounds as previously denied petition

will be denied where change in facts or law does not substantially affect petitioner).

In re Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d 218, 397 P.2d 1001, 42 Cal. Rptr. 9 (holding contentions

raised and rejected on appeal cannot be renewed in petition for habeas corpus), cert.

denied, 382 U.S. 853 (1965).

In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756, 264 P.2d 513 (1953) (holding, in absence of special

circumstances, habeas corpus not available where the claimed errors could have been

but were not raised on appeal).
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80 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

California Statutes:

Cal. Penal Code § 1475 (West 2000) (granting successive habeas applications).

California Rules:

Sup. Ct. Policies Regarding Cases Arising from Judgments of Death–Policy 3.1

(providing timeliness standards for capital habeas petitions).

Execution

California Penal Code § 3603 requires that all death judgments be executed at San

Quentin State Prison. Capital male inmates are usually housed at San Quentin.

Effective January 1, 2002, the California Legislature amended California Penal Code §

3600 to provide that inmates who commit certain enumerated offenses while

incarcerated or order others to commit such offenses as members of a prison gang will

be housed in secure condemned inmate housing at the California State Prison in

Sacramento and that condemned inmates whose medical or mental conditions are so

critical as to endanger themselves or others may be housed at the California Medical

Facility or other appropriate institution. Capital female inmates are held at the Central

California Women’s Facility in Chowchilla. At least three days prior to the day of

execution, they are transferred to San Quentin. 

Upon notification that the supreme court has affirmed a capital sentence on

automatic appeal, the superior court in which the conviction was rendered enters an

order establishing the day of execution and issues a warrant to the state prison warden. 

The court sets the execution day between sixty and ninety days from the date of the

court’s order. The convicting court also may issue an order and death warrant setting

the execution date between thirty and sixty days from the issuance of the order when a

death judgment remains outstanding for any reason other than pendency of an

automatic appeal. In either scenario, the prisoner may not appeal the order fixing the

time for execution. Rule 4.315 of the California Rules of Court requires that an

execution date be set at a public court session at which the defendant and the state are

represented. The court must provide at least ten days’ notice of the hearing to the

attorney general, the district attorney, the defendant, defendant’s counsel (or, if none,
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 81

counsel who most recently represented the defendant on appeal or in postconviction

legal proceedings), and the executive director of the California Appellate Project.

The legislature amended California’s Penal Code in 1992 to provide that the

death penalty can be inflicted either by lethal gas or lethal injection at the election of

the inmate; prior to that amendment, lethal gas was the method of administering the

death penalty. In 1996, the legislature amended the code to provide for execution by

lethal injection in the event the inmate declines to elect an execution method. Although

the Ninth Circuit held that execution by lethal gas was cruel and unusual punishment,

Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996), the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the

decision and remanded with instructions for the Ninth Circuit to consider the decision

in light of the statutory changes. See Gomez v. Fierro, 519 U.S. 918 (1996). The

California Supreme Court held the 1996 amended statute constitutional in People v.

Bradford, 14 Cal. 4th 1005, 929 P.2d 544, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 225 (1997).

California Penal Code § 3605 requires the warden to be present at the

execution. The warden also is required to invite two physicians, the attorney general,

the victim’s family, and at least twelve “reputable” citizens. If the defendant requests,

the warden additionally must permit the presence of up to two spiritual counselors and

up to five relatives or friends selected by the defendant. Effective January 1, 2002, the

California Legislature amended California Penal Code § 3605 to provide that (1) no

physician or any other person invited to witness an execution, whether or not employed

by the Department of Corrections, may be compelled to attend the execution; (2) any

physician’s attendance is voluntary; and (3) any person’s refusal to attend the

execution may not be used in any disciplinary action or negative job performance

citation. The Ninth Circuit has held that a prison procedure limiting public viewing to

the time after administrators insert the IV into the prisoner unconstitutionally restricts

the public’s First Amendment right to view executions from the moment the inmate is

escorted into the execution chamber. California First Amendment Coalition v.

Woodford, 299 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002).

United States Supreme Court:

Gomez v. Fierro, 519 U.S. 918 (1996) (vacating Ninth Circuit opinion declaring lethal

gas unconstitutional, remanding in light of amended California Penal Code § 3604
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82 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

allowing choice of method of execution and requiring death by lethal injection if

prisoner declines to choose).

Ninth Circuit:

Morales v. Hickman, 438 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (holding that district

court did not abuse its discretion in modifying lethal injection protocol to give State of

California the option of allowing an anesthesiologist to monitor and verify that inmate

remained unconscious throughout the execution procedure). 

Beardslee v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir.) (per curiam) (denying motion for stay

of execution in § 1983 action alleging that prisoner’s execution pursuant to California’s

lethal injection protocol would constitute cruel and unusual punishment, the court held

that given undisputed evidence that death or unconsciousness is likely to occur prior to 

administration of pancuronium bromide and lack of showing of any unique risk to him

in limited record, district court did not abuse its discretion in denying preliminary

injunction; also rejecting prisoner’s First Amendment claim that administration of

pancuronium bromide would prevent him from audibly expressing his pain), cert.

denied, 125 S. Ct. 982 (2005).

Cooper v. Rimmer, 379 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming the district court’s order

denying prisoner’s motion for preliminary injunction in his action under 42 U.S.C. §

1983, seeking to prevent his execution in accordance with California’s lethal injection

protocol, the court held that prisoner failed to show that he was subject to an

unnecessary risk of unconstitutional pain or suffering such that his execution by lethal

injection must be restrained; noting that the Ninth Circuit had previously upheld the

constitutionality of lethal injection as a method of execution as to executions in

Arizona, the court said that the prisoner made no case that there were material

differences in California’s process).

California First Amendment Coalition v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868 (9th Cir.2002)

(holding prison procedure limiting public viewing of lethal injection execution to time

after IV was inserted into condemned inmate was exaggerated, unreasonable response

to prison official’s legitimate concerns for safety of prison staff and violates public’s 

First Amendment right to view executions; affirming permanent injunction prohibiting

defendants from prohibiting uninterrupted viewing of executions from moment

condemned inmate enters execution chamber until condemned inmate is declared

dead).

Fierro v. Terhune, 147 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 1998) (remanding to district court with

instruction to vacate prior judgment, subject to reinstatement on motion of inmate who
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 83

has standing to challenge execution by lethal gas).

Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir.) (affirming district court ruling that execution

by lethal gas is unconstitutional), vacated and remanded, 519 U.S. 918 (1996).

California Supreme Court:

People v. Bradford, 14 Cal. 4th 1005, 929 P.2d 544, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 225 (1997)

(holding California Penal Code § 3604(b), as amended in 1996, constitutional because

it permits an election by persons sentenced to death to have punishment imposed by

either lethal gas or lethal injection and provides for death by lethal injection if the

prisoner chooses not to elect execution method).

California Court of Appeal:

Thorburn v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 66 Cal. App. 4th 1284, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d

584 (1998) (holding physician participation in executions is not unprofessional conduct

within the meaning of California Business and Professional Code).

California Statutes:

Cal. Penal Code § 1193 (West Supp. 2006) (providing for superior court order and

warrant for execution date).

Cal. Penal Code § 1227 (West 1982) (providing for superior court order on unexecuted

death judgment).

Cal. Penal Code §§ 3600–3607 (West 2000 and West Supp. 2006) (providing

designation of prison; delivery of female inmates; location, method, and election of

execution; witnesses to execution).

California Rules:

Cal. R. Ct. 4.315, as renumbered effective Jan. 1, 2001 (providing that execution date

set at a public court session).

Competency for Execution

California capital punishment law forbids execution of an insane or pregnant inmate. 
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84 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Therefore, once an execution date is set, three psychiatrists employed by the

department of corrections examine the prisoner’s sanity and report their opinions to the

governor at least twenty days prior to the execution date. 

Additionally, if at any time the prison warden believes a death-eligible

inmate is insane, the warden must notify the district attorney of the county where the

prison is located. The district attorney then must file a petition in superior court for an

inquiry into the prisoner’s sanity. The court is required to hold a jury trial on the sanity

determination.

The warden has considerable discretion to trigger an inquiry into the

prisoner’s sanity. State law presumes that the warden will correctly determine whether

there is good reason to question the prisoner’s sanity at the time the prisoner is

delivered for execution.

If the medical institution determines that the inmate is sane, it must certify

this determination to the superior court that declared the prisoner insane. Upon

receiving the certification, the court holds a bench trial to determine whether the inmate

is sane. The court certifies its sanity finding to the governor, who is required to issue

an execution warrant to the prison warden who must proceed with the execution. 

However, if the judge concludes that the defendant is still insane, the court orders that

the prisoner be placed in the Department of Correction’s medical facility until sanity is

restored.

Three doctors examine an allegedly pregnant inmate and certify their

findings to the superior court. If the inmate is pregnant, the superior court orders the

warden to suspend the execution. Upon notification that the inmate is no longer

pregnant, the governor issues an execution warrant.

California Supreme Court:

People v. Kelly, 1 Cal. 4th 495, 822 P.2d 385, 3 Cal. Rptr. 677 (stating state may not

constitutionally execute insane person), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 881 (1992).

McCracken v. Teets, 41 Cal. 2d 648, 262 P.2d 561 (1953) (stating warden is presumed

to correctly determine whether there is good reason to question prisoner’s sanity at time

of execution).
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California Statutes:

Cal. Penal Code § 3700.5 (West 2000) (providing sanity investigation of all persons

sentenced to death, report to governor, warden, counsel).

Cal. Penal Code § 3701 (West 2000) (providing warden’s notice to district attorney

upon good cause; jury trial).

Cal. Penal Code § 3702 (West 2000) (providing hearing, subpoena power).

Cal. Penal Code § 3703 (West 2000) (providing commitment to medical facility upon

verdict).

Cal. Penal Code § 3704 (West 2000) (providing certification if sanity recovered,

hearing, governor’s warrant).

Cal. Penal Code §§ 3705–06 (West 2000) (providing procedures when inmate is

pregnant).

Stays of Execution

The statutorily-mandated appeal automatically stays a judgment of death. Once the

court has affirmed the judgment on direct appeal, a date for execution of a judgment of

death may be set only at a public hearing, and all interested parties must be given at

least ten days’ notice prior to the hearing. Cal. R. Ct. 4.315(a).

If the supreme court affirms a judgment and sentence of death, the superior

court may, on its own motion, and shall, on the motion of the district attorney, set an

execution date. The date of execution must be at least sixty, but not more than ninety,

days after the date of the order. If the direct appeal is no longer pending and the

judgment of death remains valid but has not been executed, on the motion of the district

attorney, the trial court shall set a date for the execution of the judgment of death at

least thirty, but not more than sixty, days after the date of the order. Cal. Penal Code

§1227. Alternatively, the trial court may set an execution date on its own motion. An

order fixing the time for execution of a death judgment is not an appealable order. Cal.

Penal Code §§ 1193, 1227.

The supreme court has authority to stay an execution upon a motion

submitted in connection with a petition for writ of habeas corpus or to permit certiorari
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86 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

review by the U.S. Supreme Court. The prison warden also may stay an execution

upon cause to believe the inmate is insane or pregnant. Finally, the governor has the

power to grant a stay in connection with clemency proceedings. However, if the

governor grants a reprieve and then denies clemency, the execution must be carried out

on the day immediately after the period of the stay without further judicial proceedings.

California Statutes:

Cal. Penal Code § 1193 (West Supp. 2006) (setting execution date; order fixing time

for execution of a death judgment is not an appealable order).

Cal. Penal Code § 1227 (West 1982) (providing if direct appeal is no longer pending

and judgment of death remains valid but has not been executed, on motion of district

attorney, trial court shall set a date for execution of judgment of death at least thirty,

but not more than sixty, days after date of order; order fixing time for execution of

death judgment is not an appealable order).

Cal. Penal Code § 1227.5 (West 1982) (setting execution after governor’s reprieve or

denial of clemency).

Cal. Penal Code § 1243 (West Supp. 2006) (providing stay of death judgment on appeal

to supreme court).

Cal. Penal Code § 3700 (West 2000) (providing for executive clemency, governor’s

power to stay execution; no stay unless appeal is taken).

California Rules:

Cal. R. Ct. 30.2(b), (d) (providing stay of judgment on appeal to supreme court).

Cal. R. Ct. 4.315(a) (providing that once judgment is affirmed on direct appeal, date for

execution for judgment of death may be set only at public hearing, and all interested

parties must be given at least ten days’ notice prior to hearing).

Sup. Ct. Policies Regarding Cases Arising from Judgments of Death–Policy 1

(addressing stay of execution related to habeas corpus petition and Supreme Court

certiorari proceedings).

Sup. Ct. Internal Practices & Procedures XIV(F) (requiring supreme court to rule on
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: CALIFORNIA

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 87

stays of execution at weekly meetings).

Clemency Procedures

The California Constitution grants clemency power to the governor subject to

application procedures provided by statute. In capital cases, the governor’s power is

entirely discretionary. Section 1218 of the California Penal Code requires a court that

imposed a death judgment automatically to transmit to the governor a copy of the

judgment, conviction, and record.

The governor may seek the assistance of the Board of Prison Terms, which

comprises nine commissioners appointed by the governor with senate confirmation, to

investigate and report on clemency applications. The Board has broad latitude to

conduct a complete investigation. In addition to reviewing the record, the

commissioners may take testimony and examine witnesses. Both the governor and the

Board of Prison Terms may request the prosecutor and the trial court to furnish

statements of fact, grounds, and recommendations for granting or denying clemency. If

an applicant is a twice-convicted felon, California Penal Code § 4802 requires the

governor to refer the matter to the Board of Prison Terms for recommendation.

The Board of Prison Terms may also initiate clemency proceedings without

receiving an application. Under California Penal Code § 4801, the Board may report to

the governor the names of any persons it recommends to receive clemency. If the

Board of Prison Terms recommends relief in favor of the applicant, or if the governor

independently chooses relief in favor of an applicant, the supreme court also submits a

recommendation on the application. A favorable supreme court recommendation

requires the endorsement of four justices. Although a favorable supreme court

recommendation normally is required for the governor to grant clemency to a twiceconvicted felon, since 1996, this limitation on the governor’s power no longer applies

to capital defendants.

The supreme court is statutorily required to review any application receiving

a favorable recommendation by the Board of Prison Terms in addition to any

application specially referred by the governor. 

At the beginning of every legislative session, the governor must provide the

legislature with an accounting of any reprieve, commutation, or pardon, including the
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88 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

name of the person, the crime, and the date of clemency.

United States Supreme Court:

Shick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974) (defining pardoning powers as intending to include

powers to commute sentences on conditions that do not offend the Constitution).

California Supreme Court:

In re Collie, 38 Cal. 2d 396, 240 P.2d 275 (1952) (stating governor’s power includes

conditional pardon), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 1000 (1953).

California Statutes:

Cal. Const. art. V, § 8 (providing for governor’s clemency power).

Cal. Penal Code § 1218 (West 1982) (providing for statement transmitted to governor).

Cal. Penal Code § 1219 (West 1982) (providing for opinion of supreme court justices

and attorney general on statement).

Cal. Penal Code § 4800, et seq. (West 2000) (providing procedure for consideration of

clemency applications).

Cal. Penal Code § 4852.01(d) (West 2000) (omitting capital defendants from prisoners

subject to § 4852.16).

Cal. Penal Code § 4852.16 (West 2000) (limiting governor’s power where defendant

twice convicted of a felony).

Cal. Penal Code § 4850, et seq. (West 2000) (providing duties of supreme court

regarding clemency applications).

Cal. Penal Code § 5075 (West 2000) (providing for Board of Prison Terms).

California Rules:

Sup. Ct. Internal Practices & Procedures XIV(A) (providing procedure for supreme

court clemency recommendation).
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 89

IDAHO

History

Prior to 1973, Idaho’s sentencing statutes provided for either a sentence of death or life

imprisonment for capital offenses. In 1973, in response to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.

238 (1972), the Idaho legislature amended the capital sentencing law to make the death

penalty mandatory for all first degree murder convictions, in an attempt to eliminate

any discretion on the part of the sentencer. The legislature also transferred the role of

sentencing from the jury to the court. 

In 1977, after mandatory death sentences were held unconstitutional in

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), the Idaho legislature amended the

sentencing statute to require the court to conduct a sentencing hearing at which all

relevant information on aggravation and mitigation is presented prior to the court’s

determination of whether the death penalty should be imposed. In addition, the

statutory scheme provides for mandatory review of all death sentences by the Idaho

Supreme Court.

 In 2003, in response to Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (see § 4.6.1.), 

the Idaho legislature amended the sentencing statute to provide that a sentencing

proceeding be conducted before a jury unless the jury is waived by the defendant with

the prosecuting attorney’s consent (Idaho Code § 19-2515). 

United States Supreme Court:

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that capital defendants are entitled to

jury determination of any fact on which legislature conditions increase in their

maximum punishment).

 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (declaring mandatory death

sentences unconstitutional).

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding unguided discretionary sentencing

unconstitutional).
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90 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Idaho Supreme Court:

State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187 (1981) (stating that § 19-2827 mandates

supreme court examine not only sentence but procedure followed in imposing sentence

regardless of whether an appeal taken).

State v. Lindquist, 99 Idaho 766, 768, 589 P.2d 101, 103 (1979) (holding 1977

amendment to unconstitutional death penalty statute did not apply retroactively to

defendant).

Idaho Statutes:

Idaho Code § 18-4004 (2004) (providing death or life imprisonment for first degree

murder) (defining first degree murder).

Idaho Code § 19-2515 (2004) (providing for sentencing hearing for aggravation and

mitigation evidence).

Idaho Code § 19-2827 (2004) (requiring automatic review of all death sentences by 

Idaho Supreme Court).

Capital Offenses

Section 18-4004 of the Idaho Code, as amended in 2003, provides that every person

convicted of first degree murder must be sentenced to death or a fixed life sentence. 

Idaho also permits the imposition of a death sentence for first degree kidnaping or

perjury resulting in the execution of an innocent person. Prosecution for the death

penalty for the latter crimes, however, is rarely, if ever, pursued.

In 2003, following the decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)

(see § 1.6), the Idaho legislature enacted Idaho Code § 19-2515A, which prohibits the

execution of the mentally retarded. “Mentally retarded” is defined as significantly

subaverage general intellectual functioning, which in turn is defined as an I.Q. of 70 or

below. The significantly subaverage general intelligence functioning must be

accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning and both must have had

an onset before age 18.

Section 19-2515A of the Idaho Code provides that in any case where the
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 91

state has provided notice of an intent to seek the death penalty and where the defendant

intends to claim he or she is mentally retarded, the defendant must give notice of such

intention at least 90 before trial. On receipt of such notice the court must conduct a

hearing promptly. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the

defendant is mentally retarded, the death penalty may not be imposed. 

United States Supreme Court:

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the

age of 18 when their crimes were committed).

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that executing the mentally retarded

violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).

Idaho Statutes:

Idaho Code § 18-4003 (2004) (defining first degree murder).

Idaho Code § 18-4004 (2004) (providing death penalty or life imprisonment for first

degree murder).

Idaho Code § 18-4502 (2004) (defining first degree kidnaping).

Idaho Code § 18-4504 (2004) (providing death sentence for first degree kidnaping

unless kidnaped person liberated unharmed).

Idaho Code § 18-5411 (2004) (providing death penalty for perjury resulting in

execution of innocent person).

Idaho Code § 19-2515A (2004) (prohibiting execution of mentally retarded person).

Representation in Capital Case

Idaho defendants have a statutory right to counsel during trial and appeal. Deathsentenced defendants also have the right to appointed counsel for representation during 
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92 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

their first postconviction relief proceeding. At the time the district court imposes a

death sentence, it also appoints at least one attorney, other than trial counsel, for

postconviction relief representation. Appointed counsel may also handle a defendant’s

appeal.

At the trial stage, the public defender represents indigent defendants. If the

county does not have a public defender, contract attorneys provide representation. The

amount of compensation paid to contract attorneys depends upon the complexity of the

case.

In 1998, the Idaho legislature passed the State Appellate Public Defender Act

to alleviate the fiscal burden of an indigent’s legal representation on appeal. The

appellate defender, appointed by the governor, provides representation for deathsentenced indigent defendants during their criminal appeals and postconviction relief

proceedings. The act also created the capital crimes defense fund. Appellate defender

representation is available only to counties who are members of this fund.

Also in 1998, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted Rule 44.3, which establishes

standards for the qualification of appointed counsel in capital cases at all stages of

representation. The rules went into effect on January 2, 2001.

Idaho Supreme Court:

Porter v. State, 139 Idaho 420, 80 P.3d 1021 (2003) (holding in capital case that fact

that defendant's counsel during his first post-conviction proceedings was different from

trial counsel satisfied requirement that he be afforded ability to consult with different

counsel on appeal; also holding that claims of prosecutorial misconduct and

ineffectiveness of counsel could not be raised on third post-conviction proceeding.

Idaho Statutes:

Idaho Code § 19-106 (2004) (providing that defendant entitled to counsel in criminal

actions).

Idaho Code § 19-852 (2004) (providing for indigent defendant’s entitlement to

counsel).

Idaho Code § 19-860 (2004) (providing for establishment of county public defender’s
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: IDAHO

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 93

office; representation and compensation by contract attorney).

Idaho Code § 19-863A (2004) (creating capital crimes defense fund).

Idaho Code § 19-867–872 (2004) (providing State Appellate Public Defender Act).

Idaho Code § 19-2719A (2004) (requiring court inquiry at sentencing into need for new

postconviction counsel).

Idaho Code § 19-4904 (2004) (providing for district court’s authority to appoint

counsel for defendants for postconviction relief representation).

Idaho Rules:

Idaho Crim. R. 44 (providing criminal defendant’s right to assignment of counsel).

Idaho Crim. R. 44.2 (requiring sentencing judge to appoint at least one attorney, other

than trial counsel, for postconviction representation).

Idaho Crim. R. 44.3 (establishing competency standards for appointed capital defense

counsel).

Trial of Capital Offenses

Idaho’s trial court of general jurisdiction is the district court. This court exercises

original jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases, including felonies, postconviction

applications, and habeas corpus petitions.

Idaho’s capital offense trials proceed in two steps: a guilt phase and a

sentencing phase. Prior to 2003, if the jury convicted a defendant of a capital crime in

the guilt phase, the court held a sentencing hearing and determined whether the death

sentence should be imposed 

In Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) the Supreme Court held that capital

defendants are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature

conditions an increase in their maximum punishment. See § 4.6.1. In 2003, the Idaho

legislature amended Idaho Code § 19-2515 to comply with Ring. The statute now

provides that, where a notice of intent to seek the death penalty was filed as provided in

Idaho Code § 18-4004A, and where a guilty plea or verdict is entered, the special
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94 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

sentencing phase of a first degree murder case must be conducted before a jury unless

a jury trial was waived by the defendant with the prosecuting attorney’s consent. See

discussion below “Capital Sentencing, Penalty Hearing.”

United States Supreme Court:

Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (holding that Ring v. Arizona did not apply

retroactively to cases already final on direct review; also holding that (1) that the Ring

decision is properly classified as procedural, rather than substantive; and (2) the Ring

rule does not fall under the second exception under Teague for watershed rules of

criminal procedure).

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that capital defendants are entitled to

jury determination of any fact on which legislature conditions increase in their

maximum punishment; also holding that Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) and

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) are irreconcilable and overruling Walton

to extent that it allowed sentencing judge, sitting without jury, to find aggravating

circumstance necessary for imposition of death penalty).

Ninth Circuit: 

Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523 (9th Cir. 2001) (declining to engage in a participatory

overruling and holding that Walton v. Arizona forecloses Hoffman’s Apprendi-based

challenge to Idaho’s capital sentencing scheme; but see Judge Pregerson’s dissent

holding that Idaho’s sentencing scheme is unconstitutional in light of Apprendi but

harmless error under in this case). 

Idaho Supreme Court:

State v. Hoffman, 142 Idaho 27, 121 P.3d 958 (2005) (rejecting the contention that

Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004), was not applicable to Idaho cases).

Porter v. State, 140 Idaho 780, 102 P.3d 1099 (2004) (reversing an order that had

granted a petition for post-conviction relief in a capital case based on the retroactive

application of Ring v. Arizona, the court rejected petitioner’s contention that Idaho

should apply a more lenient standard of retroactively to Ring than did the Supreme

Court in Schriro v. Summerlin), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2967 (2005).
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 95

Idaho Statutes:

Idaho Const. art. I, § 7 (1982) (providing right to jury trial).

Idaho Code § 18-4004A (2004) (requiring prosecutor to provide notice of intent to

seek death penalty within 30 days of entry of plea; requiring notice to contain list of

statutory aggravating circumstances on which state will rely; providing that jury be

informed at start of jury selection if death penalty is not sentencing option).

Idaho Code § 19-2515(3)(a) (2004) prohibiting imposition of death sentence without

notice of intent).

Idaho Rules:

Idaho Crim. R. 31 (requiring unanimous verdict).

Capital Sentencing

Penalty Hearing

In 2003 the Idaho legislature amended the statutory scheme in response to the decision

of the Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). See § 4.6.1 for a

discussion of Ring.

Formerly, the court heard all relevant evidence and arguments of counsel in

aggravation and mitigation of the offense without jury participation. As amended in

2003, Idaho Code § 19-2515 provides that if a person is found guilty of first degree

murder, whether by acceptance of a guilty plea, by a jury verdict, or by the court sitting

without a jury, and if a notice of intent to seek the death penalty was filed, a special

sentencing proceeding must be conducted before a jury unless a jury trial is waived

with the prosecutor’s consent. If the defendant’s guilt was determined by a jury verdict,

the same jury must hear the special sentencing proceeding unless it is impractical to

reconvene the same jury due to an insufficient number of jurors. If a special sentencing

proceeding is conducted before a newly impaneled jury, the state and defense may

present evidence to inform the jury of the nature and circumstances of the murder.

Section 19-2515, as amended in 2003, provides that a sentence of death
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96 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

cannot be imposed unless the jury, or the court if a jury is waived, finds beyond a

reasonable doubt at least one statutory aggravating circumstance. Where a statutory

aggravating circumstance is found, the defendant must be sentenced to death unless

mitigating circumstances are found to be sufficiently compelling that the death penalty

would be unjust. The jury must not direct imposition of a death sentence unless it

unanimously finds at least one statutory aggravating circumstance and unanimously

determines the death penalty should be imposed. If the jury finds the existence of a

statutory aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances, the defendant will

be sentenced to death by the court. 

The jury must return a special verdict stating whether the aggravating

circumstances were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and if so, when weighed against

the aggravating circumstance, whether there are mitigating circumstances that are

sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would be unjust.

 If a jury trial was waived, the court must make written findings regarding

any aggravating and mitigating factors it considers at the sentencing hearing. If the

court finds that mitigating circumstances compel a life sentence, it must detail this

finding in writing.

At the sentencing hearing all relevant evidence in aggravation and mitigation

is admissible. Disclosure of evidence to be relied on must be made in accordance with

Idaho Criminal Rule 16.

United States Supreme Court:

Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110 (1991) (holding death sentence unconstitutional where

state did not seek death penalty but trial court imposed it after a sentencing hearing in

which the parties argued over concurrent or consecutive sentences).

Idaho Supreme Court:

State v. Fetterly, 137 Idaho 729, 52 P.3d 874 (2002) (noting that Ring v. Arizona

appears to invalidate Idaho’s death penalty scheme, which to this time has allowed the

sentencing judge to make factual findings of the aggravating factors necessary to the

imposition of a death sentence, while Ring requires those factual findings to be made

by a jury; vacating death sentence and remanding to district court for resentencing

following appeal of death sentence and petition for postconviction review). 
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 97

State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 988 P.2d 1170 (1999) (holding trial court did not

violate United States or Idaho constitutions by refusing to appoint a mitigation

specialist).

State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1, 966 P.2d 1 (1998) (holding no double jeopardy when trial

court changed its findings at resentencing, when death sentence imposed at initial

sentencing), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1147 (1999).

State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (holding district court must weigh

all mitigating factors against each aggravating factor; mitigating circumstances must

outweigh each aggravating factor), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 922 (1989), overruled on

other grounds, State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 915 (1992).

Idaho Statutes:

Idaho Code § 19-2515 (2004) (providing for capital sentencing procedure; requiring

written findings of aggravation and/or mitigation; listing aggravating factors; requiring

finding of at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt; providing for

presentence report only when no statutory aggravating circumstance is proven beyond

reasonable doubt or when no special sentencing proceeding is held; providing for

impanelment of new jury in some circumstances).

Idaho Code § 18-4505 (2004) (defining capital sentencing procedure for first degree

kidnaping).

Idaho Rules:

Idaho Crim. R. 33.1 (defining court procedure in capital sentencing hearing).

Idaho Crim. R. 33.2 (requiring report on defendant’s background).

Aggravating Circumstances

Idaho Code § 19-2519(9) specifies ten aggravating circumstances for first degree

murder, one of which must be found beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain a sentence of

death. These circumstances are as follows:

(1) defendant had a prior conviction of murder;

(2) defendant also committed another murder at the same time as the instant

murder;
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98 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

(3) defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons;

(4) defendant committed murder for remuneration, promise of remuneration,

or defendant employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or

promise of remuneration;

(5) murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting

exceptional depravity;

(6) murder, or circumstances surrounding its commission, exhibited

defendant’s utter disregard for human life;

(7) defendant committed murder in perpetration or attempted perpetration of

arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnaping, or mayhem and defendant killed,

intended a killing, or acted with reckless indifference to human life;

(8) by prior conduct or in murder at hand, defendant exhibited propensity to

commit murder which will probably constitute continuing threat to society;

(9) defendant committed murder of a peace officer, executive officer, officer

of the court, judicial officer, or prosecuting attorney because of the exercise

of official duty;

(10) defendant committed murder of a witness or potential witness in a

criminal or civil legal proceeding because of such proceeding.

Aggravating circumstances for first degree kidnaping are codified at Idaho

Code § 18-4505.

In 2003, the Idaho legislature amended Idaho Code § 19-2515 in response to

decision of the Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), in which the

Supreme Court held that capital defendants are entitled to a jury determination of any

fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment. See

§ 4.6.1. Section 19-2515(8) of the Idaho Code, as amended in 2003, provides that the

jury must return a special verdict stating whether each statutory aggravating

circumstance alleged has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and if so, whether all

mitigating circumstances, when weighed against the aggravating circumstance, are

sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would be unjust. If a jury trial has been

waived, the court must make written findings setting forth any statutory aggravating

circumstance found beyond a reasonable doubt, any mitigating circumstance

considered, and, after weighing the mitigating circumstances against each statutory
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 99

aggravating circumstance, whether mitigating circumstances are found to be

sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would be unjust.

United States Supreme Court:

Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993) (holding aggravating factor “utter disregard for

human life” is constitutional as narrowed by the Idaho Supreme Court in Osborn).

Ninth Circuit: 

Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (holding that aggravating

circumstance that murder was “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting

exceptional depravity” was not unconstitutionally vague where the Idaho Supreme

Court construed the aggravator by relying in part on the limiting construction given to

similar language by other states), cert denied, 125 S. Ct. 2540 (2005). 

Idaho Supreme Court:

State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 988 P.2d 1170 (1999) (declining to address

challenges to two of four aggravators found by sentencer where sentencer had found

that mitigating factors did not outweigh any of the four found aggravating

circumstances).

State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 967 P.2d 702 (1998) (holding g(7) (presently codified as

h(7)) aggravating factor not overbroad or arbitrary; g(7) (presently codified as h(7))

factor constitutional notwithstanding that it duplicates an element of first degree murder

in § 18-4003), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1118 (1999).

State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (holding g(5) and g(6) (presently

codified as h(5) and h(6)) not duplicative aggravating factors), cert. denied, 493 U.S.

922 (1989), overruled on other grounds, State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, cert. denied, 506

U.S. 915 (1992).

State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 674 P.2d 396 (1983) (stating court need not apply

beyond a reasonable doubt standard to weighing aggravating circumstances against

mitigating circumstances), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1220 (1984).

State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463 (1983) (holding list of statutory

aggravating factors not exclusive, but decision to impose death must be based on

finding at least one statutory factor), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984).
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100 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187 (1981) (holding (g)(6) (presently codified

as h(6)) statutory aggravating factor “utter disregard” interpreted as “cold-blooded,

pitiless slayer,” constitutional; (g)(5) (presently codified as h(5)) aggravating factor, as

defined, also constitutional).

Idaho Statutes:

Idaho Code § 18-4505(6) (2004) (setting forth five aggravating circumstances for first

degree kidnaping).

Idaho Code § 19-2515(9) (2004), as amended by 2005 Id. Laws, ch. 152, § 1 

(enumerating aggravating circumstances for first degree murder).

Mitigating Circumstances

The Idaho capital sentencing statute enumerates no mitigating factors, reflecting the

unlimited mitigation provision endorsed in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). 

Section 19-2515 of the Idaho Code specifies that the jury, or the court if a jury trial is

waived, should consider only “relevant” mitigating circumstances. The Idaho Supreme

Court has held that § 19-2515 encompasses not only the defendant’s conduct and

circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime but also the conduct and

character of the defendant as an individual apart from the crime. These factors may

include defendant’s background, age, upbringing, and environment, as well as any

other considerations appropriate to a determination of the degree of defendant’s

culpability.

United States Supreme Court:

Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (requiring mitigating evidence in capital

sentencing).

Idaho Supreme Court:

State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 955 P.2d 1082 (holding when one statutory factor

outweighs all mitigating factors, court not required to perform weighing against other

established aggravating factors), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 967 (1998).
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 101

State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (holding district court must weigh

all mitigating factors against each aggravating factor; mitigating circumstances must

outweigh each aggravating factor), cert. denied 493 U.S. 922 (1989), overruled on

other grounds, State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 915 (1992).

Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 731 P.2d 192 (holding that resentencing trial judge must

permit defendant to introduce new mitigating evidence, including evidence of events

taking place after first sentencing), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1095 (1996).

State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463 (1983) (holding that judge not required to

reference each circumstance of mitigation in its findings when imposing death

sentence), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984).

State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 253 P.2d 203 (1953) (interpreting § 19-2515 to

encompass defendant’s character and background as possible mitigating factors).

Idaho Statutes:

Idaho Code § 19-2515(5) (2004) (requiring hearing considering all relevant aggravating

and mitigating circumstances).

Appellate Review of Capital Sentences

The Idaho Supreme Court hears all appeals of trial court determinations in death

penalty cases. The state court of appeals lacks the jurisdiction to hear cases involving

extraordinary writs or capital appeals.

The supreme court considers the mandatory sentencing review and direct

appeal, if any, in a consolidated proceeding. If the defendant seeks postconviction

relief, the court also considers any appeal of the district court’s denial of such relief in a

consolidated proceeding. Section 19-2719 of the Idaho Code provides special

procedures for appeals and petitions for postconviction relief in death penalty cases. 

Section 19-2827 provides the procedures for the supreme court’s mandatory sentencing

review. 

The defendant has forty-two days from the filing of the death warrant to file a

direct appeal. The supreme court initiates mandatory sentencing review upon receipt of

the trial transcript. The parties have a right to brief submission and oral argument. On
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102 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

mandatory review, the supreme court must determine: (1) whether the death sentence

was imposed under passion or prejudice, or arbitrarily; (2) whether the record supports

a finding of a statutory aggravating factor; and (3) whether the death sentence is

excessive. By considering these factors, the Idaho Supreme Court reviews the

imposition of a death sentence for constitutional error.

The supreme court may either affirm the death sentence, remand for

resentencing by the district court, or remand for a new trial.

Ninth Circuit:

Beam v. Paskett, 3 F.3d 1301, 1306–07 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding supreme court is

deemed to have implicitly reviewed imposition of death sentence for certain

constitutional error even though defendant did not raise claims with specificity on

appeal to supreme court), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1060 (1994).

Idaho Statutes:

Idaho Const. art. V, § 9 (1994) (providing original and appellate jurisdiction of Idaho

Supreme Court).

Idaho Code § 19-2719 (2004) (providing special procedures for appeals and petitions

for postconviction relief in capital cases; all issues relating to conviction, sentence, and

postconviction challenge must be considered in the same appellate proceeding).

Idaho Code § 19-2719(4), § 19-4901(a)(6) and § 19-4902(b)-(f) (2004) (providing

special procedures for fingerprinting and DNA testing on evidence secured in respect to

petitioner’s trial that resulted in petitioner’s conviction).

Idaho Code § 19-2827 (2004) (requiring and setting procedures for supreme court

mandatory review of death sentences).

Collateral Remedies

The Idaho Code provides for a system of state postconviction review in capital cases

designed to minimize successive petitions for relief. Section 19-2719 of the Idaho

Code provides special postconviction procedures for capital cases. These procedures

govern a death-sentenced defendant’s use of Idaho’s Uniform Post-Conviction
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Procedure Act (Idaho Code §§ 19-4901–4911). Under § 19-2719, the defendant must

make any collateral attack on the judgment before direct appellate review. The trial

court files a death warrant forty-two days after judgment of death. The court stays this

time period during the time the defendant makes a postconviction challenge. During

this forty-two-day period before filing of the death warrant, the defendant must make a

collateral challenge to the sentence or conviction or waives the right to do so. The

district court has ninety days to hear any petition for collateral relief. 

The time for filing of the direct appeal begins to run when the death warrant

is filed. The defendant then takes any direct appeal and any appeal of the denial of

postconviction relief to the supreme court. 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the forty-two day time limit

violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Consequently, the federal habeas court

will hear any claims that were procedurally defaulted by the state court for not being

raised within this time period. Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

534 U.S. 944 (2001).

Ninth Circuit:

Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523 (9th Cir.) (holding Idaho Code § 19-2719's forty-two

day statute of limitations for filing a postconviction petition in a capital case violates

the Sixth Amendment because it denies the petitioner any meaningful review of his

ineffective assistance of counsel claims, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 944 (2001).

Idaho Statutes:

Idaho Code § 19-2719 (2004) (providing special postconviction procedures for capital

cases; defendant must make collateral attack before direct review; trial court must file

death warrant forty-two days after death judgment; stay during time postconviction

action pending; if no collateral challenge to sentence or conviction during forty-twoday period, challenges deemed waived; district court has ninety days to hear petition;

after death warrant filed, time for filing direct appeal begins to run and any appeal may

be taken to supreme court).

Idaho Code §§ 19-4901–4911 (2004) (setting forth postconviction procedures).
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104 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Habeas Corpus

The writ of habeas corpus is a remedy recognized and protected by the Idaho

Constitution. Article I, § 5. The legislature may enact statutes to promote the efficiency

of proceedings, but may not limit this remedy secured by the Idaho Constitution.

Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 231, 392 P. 2d 279, 280 (1964).

Prior to 1999, the Idaho habeas corpus statute, Idaho Code § 19-4201,

provided that “[e]very person unlawfully committed, detained, confined or restrained of

his liberty, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to

inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint.” In 1999, the Idaho legislature

repealed the habeas corpus statute, and replaced it with a series of statutes comprising

the “Idaho Habeas Corpus and Institutional Litigation Procedures Act,” Idaho Code §

19-4201, et seq. Currently, Idaho Code § 19-4203 delineates five specific categories of

claims that may be brought by an in-state prisoner in a habeas corpus petition: (a)

conditions of confinement; (b) revocation of parole; (c) miscalculation of sentence; (d)

loss of good time credits; or (e) a detainer lodged against him or her. 

In Idaho, a petitioner challenging the validity of his conviction is required to

use the post-conviction petition procedure rather than habeas corpus to raise such

issues. Dionne v. State, 93 Idaho 235, 237, 459 P.2d 1017, 1019 (1969). The Idaho

Supreme Court has construed the postconviction relief statute as an expansion, not a

limitation, of the writ of habeas corpus. Id.

Idaho Supreme Court:

Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 392 P. 2d 279 (1964) (holding legislature may not

limit remedy of habeas corpus, but may enact statutes to promote efficiency of

proceedings).

Still v. State, 95 Idaho 766, 519 P. 2d 435 (1974) (holding Uniform Post-Conviction

Procedure Act is expansion of constitutional habeas remedy and therefore properly

replaces it).

Dionne v. State, 93 Idaho 235, 459 P.2d 1017 (1969) (holding that petitioner

challenging validity of conviction must use post-conviction petition procedure rather

than habeas corpus). 
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 105

Idaho Statutes:

Idaho Const. art. I, § 5 (providing constitutional remedy of habeas corpus).

Idaho Code §§ 19-4201 - 19-4226 (2004) (providing Idaho Habeas Corpus and

Institutional Litigation Procedures Act)

Idaho Code § 19-4901(b) (2004) (providing that Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure

Act replaces proceedings in habeas corpus).

Postconviction Relief

Since 1967, Idaho has had in place the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, which

replaces all common law or statutory remedies as the sole procedural device available

to challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence. Idaho Code § 19-4901, et seq. 

Proceedings under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act are distinct from the

criminal action that resulted in the conviction; as a result, state rules of civil procedure

govern the proceedings.

Grounds for relief under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, as set

forth in Idaho Code § 19-4901(a), include the following: (1) that the conviction or the

sentence violates the federal or state constitution or laws of the state; (2) that the court

was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) that the sentence exceeds the

maximum authorized by law; (4) that there exists evidence of material facts, not

previously presented and heard, requiring vacation of the conviction or sentence in the

interest of justice; (5) that the sentence has expired, or that probation or conditional

release was unlawfully revoked by the court in which he was convicted, or that he is

otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint; (6) subject to the provisions of

Idaho Code § 19-4902(b) through (f), that the petitioner is innocent of the offense; and

(7) that the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any

ground of alleged error heretofore available under any common law, statutory or other

writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy.

Idaho Code § 19-2719 provides special postconviction procedures for capital

cases. These special capital procedures are used in addition to the Uniform PostConviction Procedure Act; the special capital procedures supersede any conflicting
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106 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

sections in the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho

695, 992 P.2d 144 (1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1208 (2000). The special capital

procedures provide a different time limitation on filing, different appellate procedures,

and different language regarding waiver of claims. See supra “Collateral Remedies.” 

Idaho Code § 19-4903 requires a petitioner to include specific content in his

postconviction petition; all facts within the petitioner’s personal knowledge must be

verified. If the petitioner is unable to supply affidavits, records, or other evidence

supporting the allegations of the petition, the petition must specify why they are not

attached.

The district court where the conviction took place initially hears the

postconviction relief petition. Any court within that district may hear the petition. The

Uniform Post-Conviction Act requires the state to reply to the petition within thirty

days or such further time as fixed by the court. The special death penalty procedures

require the court to decide the petition within 90 days after filing, unless extraordinary

circumstances exist. 

After reviewing the postconviction petition and record, if the court is

satisfied that the petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction relief and no purpose

would be served by any further proceedings, the court may indicate that it intends to

dismiss the application and must indicate the reasons therefor. The petitioner then has

20 days to reply to the proposed dismissal. After reviewing the reply, or if none is

filed, the court may order the petition dismissed, grant leave to file an amended

petition, or direct that the proceedings otherwise continue. Summary dismissal is

appropriate where it appears from the petition and from accompanying documentary

evidence that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the respondent is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

If a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court holds an evidentiary

hearing, and may receive proof by affidavit, deposition, oral testimony, or other

evidence, and may order the petitioner to appear at the hearing. Idaho Code § 19-

4907(a). When the court grants a hearing on a sentence challenge, the petitioner should

be present at the hearing if there are “substantial issues of fact as to the evidence in

which he participated.” Idaho Code § 19-4907(b).
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 107

Idaho Supreme Court:

Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793, 10 P.3d 742 (2000) (affirming dismissal of third

amended petition for postconviction relief as facially insufficient because allegation

was one of withheld impeachment evidence).

McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 992 P.2d 144 (1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1208

(2000) (holding that special capital procedures of Idaho Code § 19-2719 supersede any

conflicting sections in the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act).

State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 988 P.2d 1170 (1999) (finding trial court did not

abuse its discretion declining to appoint two attorneys in capital defendant’ s

postconviction relief proceeding).

Idaho Statutes:

Idaho Code § 19-853(b) (2004) (notifying that defendant’s right to court-appointed

counsel for uniform postconviction relief cases is with the discretion of the court 

pursuant to § 19-4904).

Idaho Code § 19-2719 (2004) (providing special postconviction procedures for capital

cases; defendant must make collateral attack before direct review; trial court must file

death warrant forty-two days after death judgment; stay during time postconviction

action pending; if no collateral challenge to sentence or conviction during forty-twoday period, challenges deemed waived; district court has ninety days to hear petition,

extended upon showing that fair consideration impossible; after death warrant filed,

time for filing direct appeal begins to run, and any appeal may be taken to supreme

court).

Idaho Code § 19-2719(4), § 19-4901(a)(6) and § 19-4902(b) - (f) (2004) (providing

special procedures for fingerprinting and DNA testing on evidence secured in respect to

petitioner’s trial that resulted in petitioner’s conviction).

Idaho Code §§ 19-4901 – 4911 (2004) (providing postconviction procedures).

Idaho Rules:

Idaho Crim. R. 57 (providing form for postconviction relief petition).
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108 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Appellate Review of Collateral Proceedings

Either party may appeal the district court’s final postconviction judgment to the Idaho

Supreme Court within forty-two days from entry of the judgment. Under Idaho Code

§ 19-2719(6), however, the appeal in a capital case must be consolidated with the

appeal from the conviction and sentence. The state supreme court reviews the district

court’s postconviction order under a clearly erroneous standard.

Idaho Supreme Court:

Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312, 658 P.2d 983 (1983) (applying clearly erroneous

standard to supreme court review of postconviction order).

Idaho Statutes:

Idaho Code § 19-2719(6) (2004) (consolidating appeal of collateral proceedings with

appeal of conviction and sentence).

Idaho Code § 19-4909 (2004) (stating final judgment under Post-Conviction Act may

be reviewed on appeal by either party within forty-two days of judgment).

Idaho Rules:

Idaho Appellate R. 14 (requiring notice of appeal to be filed in district court within

forty-two days of death warrant filing).

Procedural Bars/Waivers/Exhaustion

The Idaho Code has various waiver and other limiting provisions governing the failure

of a party to make objection or to pursue a claim under the procedures set forth under

state law. The special capital procedures specify that the failure to assert a claim for

relief within 42 days after judgment acts as a waiver of any claim he or she knew or

reasonably should have known existed. The courts have no power to consider or grant

relief on any such waived claims. Idaho Code § 19-2719(5). 

Idaho courts have consistently applied the special capital procedures set forth

in Idaho Code § 19-2719(5) to bar “any legal or factual challenge to the sentence or
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: IDAHO

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 109

conviction that [was] known or reasonably should [have been] known” within 42 days

after judgment. In Paz v. State, 123 Idaho 758, 852 P.2d 1355 (1993), the Idaho

Supreme Court extended the reach of § 19-2719(5)(a), holding that claims that were not

known or could not have reasonably been known within 42 days of judgment must be

asserted within a “reasonable time” after they are known. In Dunlap v. State, 131 Idaho

576, 577, 961 P.2d 1179, 1180 (1998), the Idaho Supreme Court held that a two-year

delay in filing was reasonable. There, the defendant did not know the difference

between an appeal and postconviction relief until his postconviction counsel informed

him, and he did not know that his first attorney had failed to file a postconviction relief

petition. 

The special capital procedures severely limit the filing of successive

postconviction petitions. Idaho Code § 19-2719(5)(a) through (c). Successive petitions

not falling into one of the specified exceptions must be summarily dismissed. Such a

summary dismissal is not subject to a motion to alter, amend, or reconsider, and it is not

appealable. These procedures are currently being challenged in the Idaho Supreme

Court by death penalty petitioners asserting that they should be able to bring sentence

challenges based upon Ring v. Arizona in a successive postconviction petition. 

In contrast to the special capital procedures, the Uniform Post-Conviction

Act has a more liberal successive petition provision for noncapital petitioners, who may

use a successive proceeding to assert claims “which for sufficient reason [were] not

asserted or [were] inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended

application. Idaho Code § 19-4908. 

In a capital case, the defendant has exhausted all state remedies only after the

defendant has asserted or waived any postconviction challenges, the state supreme

court has completed its mandatory review and issued a remittitur, and the district court

has set an execution.

When a federal court returns a death sentence to the state courts for further

proceedings, Idaho Code § 19-2818 requires the Idaho Supreme Court to consider

whether it can correct any legal or factual error without further remand to the state

district court.
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110 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Idaho Supreme Court:

Porter v. State, 136 Idaho 257, 32 P.3d 151 (upholding trial court’s dismissal of

defendant’s second postconviction petition, finding that three-year span from date of

filing of first appellate brief to assertion of current claims was unreasonable length of

time; concluding that Fields did not per se bar consideration of claims, but also noting

that second postconviction petition was filed one year after Federal Defenders' office

was appointed to represent defendant for purposes of his federal habeas corpus petition

and more than five months after his habeas petition was filed), rehearing denied, 136

Idaho 257, 32 P.3d 151 (2001).

Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 21 P.3d 895 (finding that where same counsel was

prosecuting both appeal and simultaneous postconviction proceeding, to hold that

counsel’s failure to raise in the postconviction proceedings the alleged errors they were

making while prosecuting appeal would effectively preclude defendant from ever

having the opportunity to raise claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel;

dismissing appeal from summary dismissal of second application for postconviction

relief and request for habeas corpus relief on alternate basis that petition, which listed

various issues that defendant desired to raise regarding effectiveness of her appellate

counsel, did not include, nor was it accompanied by, sworn statements setting forth

material facts supporting the issue), rehearing denied, 135 Idaho 573, 21 P.3d 895

(2001).

Rhoades v. State, 135 Idaho 299, 17 P.3d 243 (2000) (finding claims based on newly

discovered evidence not brought within reasonable time following discovery where

none of claims brought earlier than six months from time of discovery), rehearing

denied, 135 Idaho 299, 17 P.3d 243 (2001).

Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 17 P.3d 230 (2000)(affirming trial court’s dismissal of

postconviction petition, holding that two and one-half year span between date first

appellate brief filed and filing of postconviction petition asserting ineffective assistance

of appellate counsel is an unreasonable length of time), rehearing denied, 135 Idaho

286, 17 P.3d 230 (2001).

Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 P.3d 636 (2000) (affirming trial court’s dismissal of

third postconviction petition as procedurally barred because state’s withholding of

exculpatory evidence was cumulative and claim of prosecutorial misconduct should

have been know at time of first petition), rehearing denied, 134 Idaho 641, 8 P.3d 636

(2000).

McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 992 P.2d 144 (1999) (holding that ineffectiveness of
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: IDAHO

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 111

postconviction counsel neither constitutes a separate basis for an additional

postconviction proceeding nor justifies petitioner’s failure to raise issues that should

reasonably have been known at time of first petition).

Dunlap v. State, 131 Idaho 576, 961 P.2d 1179 (1998) (finding two-year delay in filing

postconviction relief petition reasonable where defendant did not know his first

attorney failed to file a timely postconviction relief petition).

Paradis v. State, 128 Idaho 223, 912 P.2d 110 (1996) (applying § 19-2719 to bar late

claims)

Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 903 P.2d 58 (1995) (barring late claims under § 19-

2719).

Paz v. State, 123 Idaho 758, 852 P.2d 1355 (1993) (holding claims not known or

reasonably could have been known within forty-two days of judgment must be asserted

within reasonable time).

Idaho Statutes:

Idaho Code § 19-2719(5) (2004) (providing that defendant deemed to waive claims if

fails to apply timely for § 19-2719(3) appellate or postconviction relief; court may not

consider any claims so waived).

Idaho Code § 19-2719(10) (2004) (requiring exhaustion of state remedies).

Idaho Code § 19-2719(11) (2004) (requiring dismissal of successive petitions).

Idaho Code § 19-2818 (2004) (providing for duties of supreme court upon federal

remand).

Execution

The district court must file a death warrant forty-two days after its judgment imposing

death or, if the defendant has initiated postconviction proceedings, forty-two days after

the conclusion of such proceedings. The warrant must set forth an execution date no

more than thirty days after the date of entry of the warrant. Rule 38(a) of the Idaho

Criminal Rules mandates a stay of execution during any appeal or review. Section 19-

2802 provides that an appeal to the supreme court stays the sentence in a capital case. 
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112 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Any stay pursuant to § 19-2719 is dissolved upon remittitur, at which time the district

court sets a new execution date. 

Death-sentenced prisoners are housed at the Idaho Maximum Security

Institution at Boise. In 2003 the Idaho legislature amended Idaho Code § 19-2705 to

remove statutory restrictions regarding the imposition of solitary confinement on

persons on death row. Section 19-2705 provides for solitary confinement of those

prisoners on death row for whom a death warrant has been issued that has not been

stayed. When a person has been sentenced to death, but the death warrant has been

stayed, the warden is not required to hold such person in solitary confinement until the

stay of the death warrant is lifted or a new death warrant is issued, but such prisoner

must still be housed in maximum security. Prisoners subject to solitary confinement are

allowed visits only with family members, their spiritual adviser, and their attorneys of

records and those attorneys’ agents.

 The prisoner is put to death by lethal injection or, if the prison director finds

lethal injection “impractical,” by a firing squad.

Idaho Statutes:

Idaho Code § 19-2705 (2004) (providing warrant sets execution date no more than

thirty days after date of warrant; providing for housing and visits for death row

inmates)

Idaho Code § 19-2716 (2004) (providing lethal injection or firing squad as method of

execution).

Idaho Code § 19-2718 (2004) (providing for return of death warrant by executioner).

Idaho Code § 19-2719 (2004) (setting forth district court filing of death warrant fortytwo days after judgment imposing death). 

Competency for Execution

Idaho death penalty statutes provide that a death-sentenced inmate who is pregnant may

not be executed until the district court is satisfied that the inmate is no longer pregnant. 

Idaho does not have a statute addressing the competency of an inmate to be executed.
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: IDAHO

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 113

Idaho Statutes:

Idaho Code § 19-2713 (2004) (providing procedures to determine whether pregnancy

exists).

Idaho Code § 19-2714 (2004) (providing procedures after determination of pregnancy).

Stays of Execution

Upon appeal of a capital conviction, the clerk of the Supreme Court of Idaho

automatically enters a stay of execution to permit consideration of defendant’s direct

appeal, mandatory review, and appellate review of postconviction proceedings. If the

supreme court upholds the sentence, the stay is dissolved when the court files a

remittitur. The district court then sets a new execution date for not more than thirty

days thereafter. The district court can reset the execution date without holding a

hearing.

Idaho Statutes:

Idaho Code § 19-2715(2) (2004) (setting new execution date thirty days after remittitur

when death sentence affirmed by supreme court).

Idaho Code § 19-2715(4) (2004) (providing that no hearing necessary when execution

date reset).

Idaho Code § 19-2719(12) (2004) (setting automatic stay of execution during pendency

of § 19-2719 review).

Idaho Code § 19-2802 (2004) (setting automatic stay of execution upon appeal to

supreme court).

Idaho Rules:

Idaho Crim. R. 38(a) (requiring death sentence stayed during any appeal or review).
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114 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Clemency Procedures

Pursuant to the Idaho constitution, the governor appoints a five-member Commission of

Pardons and Parole who make recommendations to the governor in capital cases

regarding commutation or pardon. The Commission makes its recommendation only

after extensive notice and public hearing. Any recommendation not approved by the

governor within thirty days of submission is deemed denied.

The governor may grant reprieves or respites, including stays of execution. 

However, the duration of these executive stays do not extend beyond the next session

of the Board of Pardons.

During the summer of 1996, the governor applied Idaho’s clemency

procedures for the first time to a capital case. After receiving a recommendation from

the Commission, the governor commuted the death sentence of state prisoner Donald

M. Paradis to fixed life.

Idaho Statutes:

Idaho Const. art. IV, § 7 (1986) (creating pardoning power; requiring public notice and

hearing).

Idaho Code § 20-210 (2004) (creating Commission of Pardons and Parole).

Idaho Code § 20-240 (2004) (defining pardoning power of governor; limiting power of

Commission under governor in capital cases; thirty-day limit for governor to grant

approval of Commission’s decision; duration of governor’s reprieves or respites not to

extend beyond next session of legislature).
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 115

MONTANA

History

In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238

(1972), Montana amended its capital sentencing law, which had allowed for complete,

unguided sentencing discretion in determining either a sentence of death or life

imprisonment for capital offenses. The legislature’s 1973 amendment to the capital

sentencing law sought to guide the sentencing authority’s decision by eliminating any

discretion on the part of the sentencer. The new law made the death penalty mandatory

for anyone convicted of first degree murder.

In 1977, the Montana legislature, in response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s

holding in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), again amended its death

penalty statute by enacting the current capital sentencing scheme. Montana Code § 46-

18-301 provides for imposition of the death penalty only after a sentencing hearing

where the sentencing court considers the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

However, in 2003 Montana Code § 46-18-302 was amended to provide that evidence of

aggravating circumstances may not be considered at the sentencing hearing unless the

trier of fact found beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances existed. 

Montana Code § 46-18-301 provides for imposition of the death penalty only after a

sentencing hearing where the sentencing court considers the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances. Additionally, § 46-18-307 provides for mandatory supreme court review

of all death sentences. Automatic review of death sentences is limited to the issues set

forth in § 46-18-310(1)(a), (b), and (c).

United States Supreme Court:

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (declaring mandatory death sentences

unconstitutional).

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding complete, unguided discretion

capital punishment statute unconstitutional).
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116 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Montana Supreme Court:

State v. Coleman, 185 Mont. 299, 605 P.2d 1000 (1979) (Coleman II) (upholding

constitutionality of Montana’s bifurcated capital sentencing scheme), cert. denied, 446

U.S. 970 (1980).

State v. Coleman, 177 Mont. 1, 579 P.2d 732 (1978) (Coleman I) (finding Montana’s

mandatory death penalty statute unconstitutional in light of Woodson).

State v. Rhodes, 164 Mont. 455, 524 P.2d 1095 (1974) (finding pre-1973 capital

punishment statute unconstitutional in light of Furman because statute provided for

complete, unguided sentencing discretion).

Montana Statutes:

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-1-401 (2005) (providing penalty enhancements).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-301 (2005) (requiring sentencing hearing after capital

conviction to determine appropriate sentence).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-302 (2005) (listing evidence that may be received at

sentencing hearing; evidence introduced at guilt phase need not be reintroduced at

penalty phase).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-307 (2005) (requiring automatic review of death sentences

by Montana Supreme Court, limited to issues set forth in § 46-18-310(a)-(c)).

Capital Offenses

Deliberate homicide is subject to capital punishment in Montana. Section 45-5-102 of

the Montana Code defines deliberate homicide as (1) purposely or knowingly causing

the death of another human being, or (2) death incident to a robbery, rape, arson,

burglary, kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, felonious escape, assault with a weapon,

aggravated assault, or any other forcible felony. Deliberate homicide is punishable by

death, life imprisonment, or a term of between ten to one hundred years. 

The death penalty is also available upon a conviction for aggravated

kidnapping. In 1997, the Montana legislature sanctioned the death penalty for a second
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 117

conviction for rape, provided the offender inflicted serious bodily injury upon the

victim during each offense. 

The 1999 legislature amended Montana Code § 46-18-220, which previously

subjected state inmates to the death penalty if convicted of aggravated kidnapping,

attempted deliberate homicide, aggravated assault or aggravated kidnapping while in

state prison. The new law subjects anyone “in official detention” to the death penalty if

convicted of an above-listed offense. Official detention is defined broadly. It includes

any confinement or lawful detention, including detention pursuant to an arrest. The

legislature also passed a law prohibiting the death penalty from being imposed upon a

person less than 18 years old when the offense was committed. 

The Montana Code does not currently prohibit execution of the mentally

retarded. However, on June 20, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Atkins v.

Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), that the execution of the mentally retarded constitutes 

cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. See § 1.6.

United States Supreme Court:

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the

age of 18 when their crimes were committed).

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that executing the mentally retarded

violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).

Montana Statutes:

Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-102 (2005) (defining deliberate homicide and punishment).

Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-303 (2005) (providing death penalty for aggravated

kidnapping).

Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-503(3)(c) (2005) (providing death penalty for second

aggravated rape offense).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-220 (2005) (providing death sentence for person in official
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118 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

detention committing attempted deliberate homicide, aggravated assault, or aggravated

kidnapping).

Mont. Code Ann. § 45-2-101(50) (2005) (defining “official detention”).

Representation in Capital Cases

On April 24, 1997, the Montana Legislature passed legislation directing the state

attorney general to petition the supreme court for a court order establishing standards

for competency of counsel appointed to represent death-sentenced indigents on their

state postconviction proceedings. 1997 Mont. Laws ch. 378, § 7. In response to this

petition, the supreme court established an advisory commission who submitted

proposed competency standards in October 1998. The supreme court adopted these

standards for competency on June 29, 1999, and they became effective on January 1,

2000. The standards provide for the appointment of two attorneys to represent a deathsentenced indigent at trial, appellate, and postconviction stages. 

The legislation also requires the trial court within thirty days of sentencing to

notify a death-sentenced indigent defendant of the right to appointed postconviction

counsel who meet the supreme court’s competency standards. Additionally, within

seventy-five days from the date the death conviction becomes final, the sentencing

court must appoint postconviction counsel unless the court determines after a hearing

that the indigent defendant knowingly rejects counsel. The standards prohibit the court

from appointing counsel who previously represented the defendant at any stage in the

case unless the defendant and counsel agree to the appointment. Appointed counsel

receive “reasonable compensation” and reasonable costs as determined by the court.

In 2005, the Montana Legislature passed the Montana Public Defender Act

establishing a statewide public defender system and replacing the Appellate Defender

Commission with a Public Defender Commission. Many of the provisions of the Act

do not take effect until July 1, 2006.

 

Montana Statutes:

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-8-101 (2005), (providing for indigent criminal defendant right to

counsel).
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Mont. Code Ann. § 46-8-104 (2005) (providing appointment of postconviction

counsel).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-8-111 (2005), repealed by 2005 Mont. Laws, ch 449 § 74,

effective 7/1/2006 (providing determination of indigence eligibility for court-appointed

counsel); see 2005 Mont Laws, ch 449 establishing a statewide public defender system.

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-8-201 (2005), repealed by 2005 Mont. Laws, ch 449 § 74,

effective 7/1/2006 (providing remuneration of court-appointed counsel); see 2005 Mont

Laws, ch 449 establishing a statewide public defender system.

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-201(3) (2005), amended by 2005 Mont. Laws, ch 449 § 53,

effective 7/1/2006 (requiring sentencing court, within specified time period, to appoint

postconviction counsel pursuant to supreme court guidelines); see 2005 Mont Laws, ch

449 establishing a statewide public defender system.

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-201(3)(e) (2005), amended by 2005 Mont. Laws, ch 449 §

53, effective 7/1/2006 (requiring appointed counsel to be compensated as provided in §

46-8-201–compensation certified as reasonable by the supreme court); see 2005 Mont

Laws, ch 449 establishing a statewide public defender system.

1997 Mont. Laws ch. 378, § 7 (requiring state attorney general to petition supreme

court for competency standards).

Trial of Capital Offenses

Montana’s trial court of general jurisdiction is the district court. The district court

exercises original jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases, including felonies and

postconviction proceedings. Capital trials are held in two phases, a guilt phase and a

penalty phase. In any case in which death is a potential punishment if: (1) the

defendant is found guilty; (2) an enhancing act was noticed in the information; and (3)

the jury unanimously finds the enhancing act occurred beyond a reasonable doubt, the

court holds a penalty phase to determine the defendant’s sentence. General criminal

trial procedures provided in Chapter 16 of Title 46 of the Montana Code apply to the

guilt phase proceedings in a capital case. Also, a few rules and procedures apply

specifically to capital cases: A juror who has conscientious objections to the death

penalty may not serve on a capital case. Each side in a capital case has eight

peremptory challenges, and the defendant’s voluntary absence in a capital case
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precludes the case from proceeding through the verdict.

Montana Supreme Court:

State v. Gollehon, 262 Mont. 1, 864 P.2d 249 (1993) (holding that death qualification

of jury is constitutional), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 827 (1994).

Montana Statutes:

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-1-401 (2005) (providing penalty enhancements).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-16-115(2)(h) (2005) (allowing challenge for cause in capital

case where juror has conscientious objections to death penalty).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-16-116 (2005) (providing each side in capital case eight

peremptory challenges).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-16-122(3) (2005) (voluntary absence of defendant precludes

case from continuing through verdict in capital cases).

Capital Sentencing

Penalty Hearing

If the trier returns a verdict of guilty in a capital case, the court conducts a sentencing

hearing to determine the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the crime. This

determination is made by the court alone. A jury does not participate in the sentencing

process. In Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), the Supreme Court held that capital

defendants are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature

conditions an increase in their maximum punishment. The Supreme Court reasoned that

because Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as “the functional equivalent

of an element of a greater offense” (Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 n.19

(2000), the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury. See § 4.6.1, for

further discussion.

In 2003 Montana Code § 46-18-302 was amended, in response to Ring v.

Arizona, to provide that evidence of an aggravating circumstance may not be

considered at the sentencing hearing unless the defendant pleaded guilty and admitted
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the aggravating circumstance or the trier of fact found beyond a reasonable doubt that

the aggravating circumstance existed. Montana Code § 46-1-401 was also amended to

provide that a penalty enhancement may not be imposed unless a defendant who

knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty to an offense also admitted to the enhancing

act, omission, or fact. The Legislature did not amend the language of Montana Code §

46-18-301, which provides for imposition of the death penalty only after a sentencing

hearing where the sentencing court considers the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances. At the capital sentencing hearing, the court hears evidence concerning

the nature and circumstances of the crime; the defendant’s character, background,

history, and mental and physical condition; the harm caused to the victim and the

victim’s family as a result of the offense; and any other facts in aggravation or

mitigation of the penalty. Mont. Code § 46-18-302. Evidence of an aggravating or

mitigating nature introduced at the guilt phase of the trial need not be reintroduced at

the sentencing phase. The court may receive any evidence of probative value,

notwithstanding its admissibility under the rules of evidence.

After receiving this evidence, the court must impose a death sentence if the

evidence shows that one or more aggravating circumstances exist and that no

mitigating circumstance is “sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” If the court

finds at least one aggravating factor but also finds that mitigating circumstances are

sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency, it may impose a sentence for life or a term

of years.

When the court imposes a sentence of death, the court must render specific

written findings of fact as to the existence or nonexistence of each statutorily

enumerated mitigating and aggravating circumstance. The court must pronounce

sentence within 120 days of the verdict and is limited to one extension of time of up to

sixty days.

Supreme Court:

Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (holding that Ring v. Arizona did not apply

retroactively to cases already final on direct review).

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that capital defendants are entitled to
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jury determination of any fact on which legislature conditions increase in their

maximum punishment; also holding that Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) and

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) are irreconcilable and overruling Walton

to extent that it allowed sentencing judge, sitting without jury, to find aggravating

circumstance necessary for imposition of death penalty).

Montana Supreme Court:

State v. Smith, 280 Mont. 158, 931 P.2d 1272 (1996) (holding death penalty statute that

does not require court to find aggravating factor(s) beyond a reasonable doubt 

constitutional), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 965 (1997).

State v. Smith, 261 Mont. 419, 863 P.2d 1000 (1993) (expressing displeasure with

district court’s verbatim adoption of state’s proposed findings but finding not inherently

flawed to warrant reversal; stating written findings need not be filed

contemporaneously with oral imposition of death penalty).

State v. Langford, 248 Mont. 420, 813 P.2d 936 (1991) (holding death penalty

constitutional under state constitution; affirming McKenzie), cert. denied, 522 U.S.

1102 (1998).

State v. Smith, 217 Mont. 461, 705 P.2d 1087 (1985) (holding jury participation in

capital sentencing not constitutionally required), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1073 (1986).

State v. Smith, 211 Mont. 379, 704 P.2d 19 (1984) (finding statute imposes no

affirmative duty on supreme court to predisclose to defendant cases it will consider in

proportionality review).

State v. McKenzie, 186 Mont. 481, 608 P.2d 428 (holding death penalty does not

violate Eighth Amendment or state constitution, as amended by the 1972 constitutional

convention), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1050 (1980).

Montana Statutes:

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-301 (2005) (providing capital penalty sentencing hearing

conducted before court alone; providing 120-day time limit).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-302 (2005) (listing evidence that may be received at

sentencing hearing; evidence of aggravating circumstance may not be considered at 

sentencing hearing unless defendant pleaded guilty and admitted aggravating

circumstance or trier of fact found beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating
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circumstance existed; evidence introduced at guilt phase need not be reintroduced at

penalty phase).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-305 (2005) (stating court at sentencing phase must impose

death sentence if defendant pleaded guilt and admitted to, or trier of fact found beyond

a reasonable doubt, one or more aggravating circumstances and court finds no

mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-306 (2005) (requiring written findings of fact).

Aggravating Circumstances

Section 46-18-303 of the Montana Code sets forth ten aggravating circumstances for

the court’s consideration:

(1) deliberate homicide committed while in official detention;

(2) deliberate homicide committed by an offender previously convicted of

another deliberate homicide;

(3) deliberate homicide committed by torture;

(4) deliberate homicide committed by lying in wait or ambush;

(5) deliberate homicide committed as part of a scheme or operation which

could cause death of more than one person;

(6) deliberate homicide committed during commission of rape, deviant sexual

conduct, or incest, and victim was less than 18 years old;

(7) deliberate homicide of peace officer;

(8) aggravated kidnapping resulted in death of victim or death of victim’s

rescuer;

(9) attempted deliberate homicide, aggravated assault, or aggravated

kidnapping committed while in official detention by an offender who was

previously convicted of deliberate homicide or is a persistent felon; and

(10) rape committed by an offender previously convicted of rape and

offender inflicted serious bodily harm upon victim in course of committing

both offenses.

As amended in 2003, § 46-1-401 provides that the aggravating circumstances

contained in § 46-18-303 are enhancing acts, omissions, or facts, except that use of the

fact of one or more prior convictions for the same type of offense or for one or more
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other types of offenses to enhance the penalty for a charged offense is not subject to the

requirements of § 46-1-401.

Montana Supreme Court:

State v. Gollehon, 262 Mont. 1, 864 P.2d 249 (1993) (holding lower court’s finding that

conviction for deliberate homicide by accountability constituted deliberate homicide for

aggravating factors determination was not error), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 827 (1994).

State v. Smith, 261 Mont. 419, 863 P.2d 1000 (1993) (holding constitutional § 46-18-

303(5), defining a deliberate homicide committed as a part of a scheme or operation

that, if completed, would have resulted in the death of more than one person). 

State v. Langford, 248 Mont. 420, 813 P.2d 936 (1991) (holding sentencing court’s

consideration of lack of remorse as aggravating factor not error), cert. denied, 522 U.S.

1102 (1998).

State v. Keith, 231 Mont. 214, 754 P.2d 474 (1988) (finding that parolee does not

qualify as person serving sentence of imprisonment under § 46-18-303; § 303(7)

constitutionally narrows class of death-eligible defendants).

Montana Statutes:

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-1-401 (2005) (providing penalty enhancements).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-303 (2005) (enumerating aggravating circumstances).

Mitigating Circumstances

Section 46-18-304 of the Montana Code sets forth seven specific statutory mitigating

circumstances:

(1) lack of significant prior criminal activity;

(2) influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance;

(3) extreme duress or substantial domination by another person;

(4) substantial impairment of defendant’s capacity to appreciate criminality

of conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law;

(5) victim’s participation in or consent to defendant’s conduct;

(6) defendant’s conduct was relatively minor participation as accomplice in
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offense committed by another person;

(7) defendant was less than18 years of age;

In addition, the statute provides that the court may consider “any other fact

that exists in mitigation of the penalty.”

Ninth Circuit:

Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that court applied § 403

unconstitutionally by not weighing and considering all mitigating circumstances

together).

Montana Supreme Court:

State v. Sattler, 288 Mont. 79, 956 P.2d 54 (1998) (holding that court did not err in

discussing each statutory mitigating factor in its findings, even when defendant did not

raise each factor; court not required to make findings on each piece of proffered

mitigating evidence).

State v. Smith, 280 Mont. 158, 931 P.2d 1272 (1996) (holding that proportionality

evidence cannot be considered by sentencing court as a mitigating factor), cert. denied,

522 U.S. 965 (1997).

State v. Smith, 261 Mont. 419, 863 P.2d 1000 (1993) (holding postconviction conduct

is relevant mitigation evidence; therefore, court erred resentencing defendant without

ordering a current presentence report).

State v. Langford, 248 Mont. 420, 813 P.2d 936 (1991) (allowing lack of remorse as

evidence of absence of mitigating factors; holding defendant’s lack of prior violent

criminal activity does not require sentencing leniency), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1102

(1998).

State v. Dawson, 233 Mont. 345, 761 P.2d 352 (1988) (holding court did not err finding

mitigating factor 304(1)(a), lack of significant history of prior criminal activity, but

finding factor did not warrant leniency; prosecutor’s comment regarding defendant’s

silence at trial was not an improper comment on defendant’s failure to testify because

reference was in response to defense presented at trial; finding that defendant has

demonstrated no remorse or genuine concern or respect for human life was properly

viewed as absence of a mitigating factor).
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126 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Fitzpatrick v. State, 194 Mont. 310, 638 P.2d 1002 (1981) (finding statute placing

burden on defendant to prove mitigating circumstances in order to avoid penalty of

death constitutionally sound because evidence in mitigation does not have to do with

guilt or innocence).

Montana Statutes:

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-304 (2005) (listing mitigating factors).

Appellate Review of Capital Sentences

The Montana Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of the

district courts. Additionally, the court conducts an automatic, en banc review of every

death sentence. The court considers the mandatory sentencing review and any direct

appeal in a consolidated proceeding. The court’s sentencing review is limited to

determining: (1) whether the sentencing court imposed the death sentence under the

influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, (2) whether the evidence

supports the court’s finding of the existence or nonexistence of the aggravating or

mitigating circumstances, and (3) considering both the crime and the defendant,

whether the death sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty that the court

imposed in other § 46-18-310 sentencing hearing cases.

To assure that a death sentence is not disproportionate to the degree of the

defendant’s culpability for the victim’s death, in 1996 the Montana Supreme Court

rejected the U.S. Supreme Court’s Tison analysis, adopting instead an Enmund

proportionality analysis grounded in the state constitution. See State v. Kills on Top,

279 Mont. 384, 928 P.2d 182 (1996). Although the supreme court had affirmed the

defendant’s sentence on appeal in 1991, it reversed itself, as well as the defendant’s

death sentence, in the postconviction appeal.

Montana’s Rules for Automatic Review of a Death Sentence consist of

eleven rules defining the procedures involved in such review. The Rules require the

county attorney to file in the district court a notice of automatic review within five days

after a death sentence is imposed. Within sixty days after receiving certification of the

trial court record, the supreme court initiates the automatic review. This time period

can be extended for good cause. The automatic review has priority over other cases

before the supreme court. The rules also provide to the parties the right to brief
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submission and oral argument. 

The defendant may appeal any final judgment of conviction as well as orders

affecting the defendant’s substantial rights. The supreme court cannot reverse a

conviction on trial court error unless the record shows that the defendant suffers

prejudice as a result of the error. On appeal, the supreme court may: (1) reverse,

affirm, or modify a judgment or order; (2) set aside, affirm, or modify proceedings

dependent upon the judgment or order from which the appeal was taken; (3) reduce an

offense to a lesser included offense; (4) reduce the punishment imposed by the trial

court; or (5) order a new trial.

Montana Supreme Court:

State v. Sattler, 288 Mont. 79, 956 P.2d 54 (1998) (holding that if one of several

statutory aggravating factors found not to exist on appeal, court not required to reverse

or remand as long as it finds inapplicability of factor does not render death penalty

arbitrary or capricious).

State v. Smith, 280 Mont. 158, 931 P.2d 1272 (1996) (holding that supreme court’s role

in reviewing death sentence is not to reweigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances

but rather to independently determine whether evidence supports trial court’s findings;

proportionality review does not violate due process), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 965 (1997).

State v. Kills on Top, 279 Mont. 384, 928 P.2d 182 (1996) (adopting Enmund-type

proportionality analysis grounded in the state constitution and reversing death

sentence), reh’g denied January 2, 1997.

State v. Smith, 261 Mont. 419, 863 P.2d 1000 (1993) (holding that remand for

sentencing to different judge appropriate in death penalty case when error found

relating to mitigation findings).

State v. Langford, 248 Mont. 420, 813 P.2d 936 (1991) (finding that automatic supreme

court review prevents random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty), cert.

denied, 522 U.S. 1102 (1998).

Montana Statutes:

Mont. Const. art. VII, § 2 (providing for supreme court appellate jurisdiction).
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128 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-307 (2005) (providing automatic review by supreme court of

death sentences).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-308 (2005) (providing sixty days for supreme court initiation

of automatic review; consolidating automatic review and direct appeal if any; setting

automatic review cases as priority).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-310 (2005) (listing issues court shall determine on

mandatory sentencing review; requiring clearly erroneous standard of review).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-20-104 (2005) (defining scope of appeal by defendant).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-20-701 (2005) (providing that no cause reversed unless showing

of prejudicial error).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-20-703 (2005) (listing action reviewing court may take).

Montana Rules:

Mont. R. Death Sent. Rev. 1 (stating violation of rules does not entitle party to relief

unless right to a fair hearing is significantly prejudiced).

Mont. R. Death Sent. Rev. 2 (providing for notice of automatic review by county

attorney within five days of death sentence).

Mont. R. Death Sent. Rev. 5 (limiting supreme court review to issues listed in § 46-18-

310 unless defendant files notice of appeal).

Mont. R. Death Sent. Rev. 6, 7 (providing for briefs from parties and en banc oral

argument on automatic appeal).

Collateral Remedies

Montana provides postconviction collateral relief for challenges to the validity of a

conviction or sentence. Montana’s postconviction review statute incorporates all

common law remedies, including the writ of habeas corpus.
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Postconviction Relief

An application for postconviction relief must allege that the sentence is in violation of

the state or federal constitution or laws, that the sentencing court was without

jurisdiction, or that the trial proceedings would have otherwise been subject to attack

through a writ of habeas corpus or other common law writ.

A petition for postconviction relief is made to the sentencing court. It must

be filed within one year of the date of conviction, or, if the claim is based on newly

discovered evidence which would establish petitioner’s innocence, within one year

from the date the evidence is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered. 

In a postconviction proceeding, the district court has the discretion to dismiss

the petition on its face, dismiss the petition after briefing, or adjudicate the issues. The

district court may receive proof by affidavit or deposition, or hold an evidentiary

hearing. The rules of civil procedure apply in postconviction proceedings, to the extent

they are applicable and are not inconsistent with the postconviction statute.

In death penalty cases, the court is required to promptly hold a conference to

schedule an expeditious resolution of the proceeding. The court must issue its opinion

within ninety days of any hearing or within ninety days of the submission of briefs if

there is no hearing.

Montana Supreme Court:

State v. Redcrow, 294 Mont. 252, 980 P.2d 622 (1999) (holding that for statute of

limitation purposes, conviction means the date of verdict).

Hawkins v. Mahoney, 294 Mont. 124, 979 P.2d 697 (1999) (setting forth 1997

amendment, precluding postconviction relief petitions from being filed in the supreme

court and imposing new one-year statute of limitation that applies only to convictions

that became final after April 24, 1997, or to convictions that became final between

April 24, 1996, and April 24, 1997, if a petition was filed within one year after April

24, 1997 (quoting Compiler’s Comments)).

Hagen v. State, 293 Mont. 60, 973 P.2d 233 (1999) (holding that nonrecord-based

ineffective assistance of trial counsel and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

claims properly brought in a postconviction relief petition).
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130 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Gollehon v. District Court, 271 Mont. 363, 897 P.2d 1058 (1995) (holding, under

former five-year statute of limitation, that state has right to seek execution of death

sentence during five-year period within which postconviction petition can be filed).

Montana Statutes:

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-101(1) (2005) (providing grounds for postconviction

collateral petition).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-102 (2005) (providing that petition must be filed within one

year of conviction or if claim based on newly discovered evidence within one year from

date evidence discovered).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-104 (2005) (requiring elements of petition).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-105 (2005) (providing amendments; subsequent petitions;

waiver of grounds for relief).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-201(1)(b) (2005) (duty imposed on court to expedite death

penalty proceeding; ninety-day decision deadline).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-201(5) (2005) (providing for evidentiary hearing and proof

by other evidence such as affidavits and depositions).

Habeas Corpus

The statutory habeas writ is available to inquire into the cause of imprisonment or

restraint, but it is not available to attack the validity of a prisoner’s conviction or

sentence. In such cases, a postconviction collateral petition is the appropriate remedy.

Montana Supreme Court:

Kills on Top v. State, 273 Mont. 32, 901 P.2d 1368 (1995) (holding substitution of

postconviction relief proceedings is not unconstitutional suspension of writ of habeas

corpus), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1177 (1996).
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Montana Statutes:

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-101 (2005) (providing that error alleged under writ of habeas

corpus should be raised in postconviction relief petition).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-22-101 (2005) (providing that writ of habeas corpus not

appropriate for attacking validity of sentence or conviction).

Appellate Review of Collateral Proceedings

Either party may appeal a district court’s decision to the supreme court within sixty

days of the entry of a postconviction order.

Montana Statutes:

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-203 (2005) (providing either party may appeal to the

supreme court on order entered on postconviction petition within sixty days).

Procedural Bar/Waiver/Exhaustion

Montana law provides that the failure to make a timely objection during trial to any

alleged error affecting the judgment of the court constitutes a waiver of the objection. 

Errors concerning jurisdictional or constitutional rights will be disregarded on appeal if

not objected to at trial, unless the error is shown to be prejudicial to the guilt or

sentencing determination and the defendant establishes either: (1) that the right

claimed did not exist at the time of trial and that it has a retroactive application, (2) that

the state suppressed evidence that prevented the claim from being raised, or (3) that

“material and controlling facts” upon which the claim is based were not known to the

defendant or the defendant’s attorney and could not have been ascertained by use of

reasonable diligence.

Grounds that could reasonably have been raised on direct appeal may not be

raised in a postconviction proceeding. Additionally, any grounds for relief that were

not raised in the original or amended petition are considered waived. However, the

court may permit a subsequent petition if the petition alleges grounds which could not

reasonably have been raised in the first petition, except for an ineffective assistance
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132 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

claim against prior postconviction counsel.

Montana Supreme Court:

Smith v. State, 303 Mont. 47, 15 P.3d 395 (2000) (affirming trial court’s dismissal of

postconviction petition in capital case because issues either procedurally barred or

barred by res judicata), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 917 (2001).

Dawson v. State, 301 Mont. 135, 10 P.3d 49 (2000) (declining to reconsider claims

raised on direct appeal because petitioner failed to make a showing that the “ends of

justice” would be served by reconsideration), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 928 (2001).

Gollehon v. State, 296 Mont. 6, 986 P.2d 395 (1999) (declining to rule whether claims

raised in postconviction proceeding were raised on appeal, notwithstanding that

petitioner sought clarification to assure exhaustion of claims in federal court; holding

claims-if properly raised-were barred by res judicata and if improperly raised were

procedurally barred), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1041 (2000).

State v. Redcrow, 294 Mont. 252, 980 P.2d 622 (1999) (holding “miscarriage of

justice” exception to § 46-21-102 procedural bar arises when a jury could find, in light

of new evidence, that the defendant is actually innocent of the crime).

Hans v. State, 283 Mont. 379, 942 P.2d 674 (1997) (holding when counsel has

abandoned defendant’s appeal, defendant should raise in one postconviction relief

petition all claims that could have been raised on direct appeal, along with all

postconviction relief issues; court rejected procedure allowing “out of time” appeal

when counsel abandoned defendant’s appeal).

Kills on Top v. State, 273 Mont. 32, 901 P.2d 1368, 1387 (1995) (applying § 46-21-

105(2), holding claims which could reasonably have been raised on appeal are

procedurally barred from consideration in postconviction proceedings; bar not limited

to cases where state establishes that claims were withheld from appeal to cause delay),

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1177 (1996).

Montana Statutes:

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-20-104 (2005) (providing that failure to make objection during

trial waives objection).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-20-701(2) (2005) (listing errors considered on review).
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Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-105(2) (2005) (providing postconviction relief proceedings;

waiver of grounds for relief).

Execution

At the time of sentencing, the trial court sets a date for execution between thirty and

sixty days from the date of sentencing. After setting the date, the court must sign an

execution warrant within five days. The warrant, which communicates the date of

execution and the duration of the warrant, is delivered to the director of the department

of corrections.

There must be a currently valid execution warrant for an execution to occur. 

Accordingly, if the date set for execution by a warrant passes while a judicial stay is

imposed, the sentencing court must set a new date twenty to ninety days from the date

the new warrant is issued. The capital prisoner is entitled to be present in court on the

day the new execution date is set. If the governor stays an execution by granting a

respite, the death warrant remains valid and the execution occurs on the date the respite

expires.

Montana inflicts death by lethal injection. State statute requires that

executions occur at the state prison outside of public view. However, the warden must

allow twelve witnesses to the execution, three of whom the prisoner may designate.

Montana Supreme Court:

Langford v. State, 287 Mont. 107, 951 P.2d 1357 (1997) (requiring all executions to be

performed by lethal injection, not ex post facto law or bill of attainder under state

constitution, as applied to prisoner who opted for execution by hanging under former

law), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1102 (1998).

State v. McKenzie, 271 Mont. 32, 894 P.2d 289 (1995) (holding failure to execute death

warrant on original date fixed does not result in discharge of prisoner but rather

requires court to fix new date for execution).

Montana Statutes:

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-19-103(1) (2005) (requiring court to set execution date with
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: MONTANA

134 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

pronouncement of death sentence; reissue execution date if passes during stay; presence

of defendant).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-19-103(3) (2005) (providing lethal injection as method of

execution).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-19-103(4) (2005) (requiring execution warrant issued within

five days of death sentence; delivery of warrant to department of corrections’ director).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-19-103(5) (2005) (providing for place of execution).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-19-103(6) (2005) (providing for witnesses to execution).

 Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-315 (2005) (providing for grant of respite by governor

during period when application for clemency is being considered).

Competency for Execution

Montana law suspends execution while the defendant lacks mental fitness. If there is

good reason to believe that the defendant lacks mental fitness, the district court will

conduct a competency hearing. If the defendant is found unfit, the court will suspend

the execution and remand the defendant to the custody of the state hospital until fitness

is reestablished. Once the court determines that the defendant has regained fitness, the

court must direct the warden to discharge the death sentence. However, if the court

determines that the sentence would be unjust considering the time spent in the state

hospital, the court may suspend the death sentence and order the defendant discharged.

The court orders the suspension of an execution if three physicians determine

that the defendant is pregnant. The governor issues a new death warrant specifying a

date for the execution upon satisfaction that the defendant no longer is pregnant.

Montana Statutes:

Mont. Code Ann. §§ 46-19-201–202 (2005) (providing procedures regarding mental

fitness of death row inmate).

Mont. Code Ann. §§ 46-19-203–204 (2005) (providing procedures regarding pregnancy

of death row inmate).
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Stays of Execution

When a notice of automatic review of a death sentence is filed, the district court enters

a stay of execution. The stay expires upon issuance of remittitur on the supreme

court’s order affirming, vacating, or modifying the death sentence. If the stay expires

after the execution date or within five days before the execution date, the district court

sets a new execution date.

A petitioner seeking postconviction relief may seek a stay of execution from

the district court.

Montana Statutes:

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-20-204(1) (2005) (providing for stay of execution issued on

initiation of appeal).

Montana Rules:

Mont. R. App. P. 7 (providing for stay of execution during appeal of postconviction

judgment).

Mont. R. Death Sent. Rev. 9 (providing for stay of execution on automatic appeal;

expires on remittitur of Supreme Court; remand for new execution date if stay expires

within five days prior to execution date).

Clemency Procedures

The governor has the power to grant clemency subject to statutory procedures. The

Montana Code defines clemency as mercy exercised by the governor, such as

commutation of the death sentence to one less severe, respite (stay of execution of the

sentence), or pardon (relieving the convict of all legal consequences of the conviction). 

In capital cases, an application for clemency may not be filed while an automatic

review is pending. An application must also be filed within ten days after the district

court sets a date of execution.

While clemency is a matter for the governor’s discretion, the governor may

exercise these powers only upon an application for clemency filed with the state Board
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136 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

of Pardons. The Board of Pardons, after investigating the case and holding a hearing if

favored by majority vote, recommends to the governor whether clemency should be

granted or denied. The Board of Pardons may hold a public hearing concerning the

grant or denial of clemency after giving appropriate notice. The governor’s grant or

denial of clemency is not appealable.

The governor may also grant a respite, a temporary suspension of the death

sentence for a definite period of time, upon application of a person authorized to apply

for executive clemency, without any prior recommendation or action by the Board of

Pardons. Where the execution of a prisoner has been stayed by the governor’s respite,

if no further clemency is granted before the end of the respite period, the death warrant

still will be considered valid. If the date set for execution has passed, execution will

occur on the date the respite expires.

Montana Statutes:

Mont. Const. art. VI, § 12 (providing pardoning power of governor).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-301(1) (2005) (defining clemency).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-301(2) (2005) (requiring filing of all clemency applications

with board; capital defendant may not file application while automatic review pending

and must file application within ten days after district court sets execution date).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-301(3) (2005) (providing that governor’s clemency ruling

final).

Mont. Code Ann. §§ 46-23-302–307 (2005) (providing board hearing on clemency).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-315 (2005) (providing authority of governor to grant 

respite).
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 137

NEVADA

History

In Anderson v. State, 90 Nev. 385, 528 P.2d 1023 (1974), the Nevada Supreme Court

acknowledged the unconstitutionality of the state’s pre-Furman death penalty statute. 

The statute failed because it provided no guidance to control the sentencing authority in

determining who would receive the death penalty and who would receive a sentence of

life imprisonment.

The legislature’s 1973 amendment to the capital sentencing law attempted to

correct this problem by eliminating any discretion on the part of the sentencing

authority. Section 200.030 of the Nevada Revised Statutes made the death penalty

mandatory for defendants convicted of capital murder. However, in accord with U.S.

Supreme Court opinions striking down mandatory capital sentencing, the Nevada

Supreme Court held several aspects of § 200.030 unconstitutional. The U.S. Supreme

Court more recently held unconstitutional the last remnant of Nevada’s mandatory

capital sentencing scheme as applied to a state prisoner convicted of murder while

serving a life sentence. See Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987).

The 1977 Nevada legislature enacted the current capital sentencing scheme. 

After weighing all aggravating and mitigating factors, the jury determines the

punishment in a bifurcated sentencing proceeding. Additionally, Nevada law provides

for automatic appellate review of death judgments and sentences.

United States Supreme Court:

Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987) (holding unconstitutional last remnant of

Nevada’s mandatory sentencing scheme for state prisoner convicted of murder while

serving life sentence).

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (declaring mandatory death penalty

statute unconstitutional).
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138 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (holding unguided discretionary

sentencing unconstitutional).

Nevada Supreme Court:

Finger v. State, 117 Nev. 548, 27 P.3d 66 (2001) (en banc) (holding that legal insanity

is a well-established and fundamental principle of law of United States and is

protected by Due Process Clauses of United States and Nevada Constitutions; holding,

therefore, that legislature could not abolish insanity as complete defense to criminal

offense and that 1995 legislative amendment (S.B. 314) abolishing insanity defense

was unconstitutional; also holding that all prior versions of statutes amended or

repealed by S.B. 314 remain in full force and effect), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1127

(2002).

Bennett v. State, 106 Nev. 135, 787 P.2d 797 (affirming constitutionality of Nevada’s

capital sentencing scheme), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 925 (1990).

Deutscher v. State, 95 Nev. 669, 601 P.2d 407 (1979) (holding death penalty statute

constitutional in light of Furman).

Bishop v. State, 95 Nev. 511, 597 P.2d 273 (1979) (holding death penalty statute does

not violate state constitution). 

Meller v. State, 94 Nev. 408, 581 P.2d 3 (1978) (holding mandatory death penalty for

murder of police officer unconstitutional because failure to consider mitigating factors).

Smith v. State, 93 Nev. 82, 560 P.2d 158 (1977) (holding mandatory death penalty for

multiple murder under Nevada statute unconstitutional).

Nevada Statutes:

NRS § 200.030 (2005) (providing death penalty for first degree murder only if one or

more aggravating circumstances found and not outweighed by mitigation).

NRS § 177.055 (2005) (providing automatic appeal of death judgment and sentence).

Capital Offenses

First degree murder is a capital offense in Nevada. If found guilty of first degree

murder, a defendant may receive a sentence of life imprisonment, with or without the
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 139

possibility of parole, a definite 50-year prison term with eligibility for parole after 20

years, or a death sentence. First degree murder includes murder perpetrated by means

of poison, lying in wait, torture, child abuse, or any other willful, deliberate, and

premeditated killing; statutorily defined felony murder; murder committed to avoid or

prevent a lawful arrest or to effect escape from legal custody of any person; and murder

committed under certain circumstances that threaten the safety of pupils and school

employees. 

In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), the Supreme Court held that the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the imposition of the death penalty on those

who were under the age of 18 at the time their crimes were committed. Previously,

Nevada law had prohibited the imposition of the death penalty on those under 16 years

of age at the time the crime was committed. In 2005, NRS § 176.025 was amended to

raise the threshold age for imposition of the death penalty to 18.

The U.S. Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), that

the execution of the mentally retarded constitutes cruel and unusual punishment

prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. See § 1.6. In 2003, the Nevada legislature

enacted legislation that prohibits a sentence of death for a person who is mentally

retarded. See NRS § 174.098. The statute provides that “mental retardation” means

significant subaverage general intellectual functioning that exists concurrently with

deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental period. NRS §

174.098(7).

Under the statute a defendant who is charged with first degree murder may,

at least 10 days before the date set for trial, file a motion to declare that he or she is

mentally retarded. NRS § 174.098(1). If such a motion is filed, the court must stay the

proceedings pending a decision on the issue and hold a hearing within a reasonable

time to determine whether the defendant is mentally retarded. The defendant must

provide evidence of mental retardation not less than 30 days before the date set for the

hearing and undergo an examination by an expert selected by the prosecution on the

issue of mental retardation. At the hearing the defendant has the burden of proving by

a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is mentally retarded. If the court

determines that the defendant is mentally retarded, the court must make such a finding

in the record and strike the notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Such a finding
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140 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

may be appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court. 

United States Supreme Court:

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the

age of 18 when their crimes were committed).

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that executing the mentally retarded

violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).

Ninth Circuit:

Brimmage v. Sumner, 793 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding convictions for felonymurder and underlying felony does not constitute double jeopardy).

Nevada Supreme Court:

Domingues v. State, 114 Nev. 783, 961 P.2d 1279 (1998) (holding imposition of death

penalty on persons under 18 years old did not violate international treaty because

senate ratified treaty with caveat reserving right to impose capital punishment on

minors), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 963 (1999).

Rippo v. State, 113 Nev. 1239, 946 P.2d 1017 (1997) (interpreting killing by torture to

require the infliction of pain to be an integral part of the murders; the torture method

need not be the cause of the victim’s death), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 841 (1998).

Nevada Statutes:

NRS § 174.098 (2005) (specifying procedures for filing motion to declare that capital

defendant is mentally retarded).

NRS § 200.010 (2005) (defining murder).

NRS § 200.030 (2005) (defining first degree murder; providing death penalty or life

imprisonment for first degree murder).

NRS § 176.025 (2005) (prohibiting death sentence on person under 18).
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 141

Representation in Capital Cases

Section 2 of Nevada Supreme Court Rule 250 governs appointment of counsel for

indigent capital defendants. Section 2 applies to all defense counsel, including public

defenders. It establishes competency standards for capital counsel at all stages of

representation, requires each judicial district to maintain a list of qualified defense

counsel, and requires the court to appoint counsel from this list or hold a hearing to

establish that counsel is otherwise qualified. Section 2 requires appointment of two

counsel for representation at capital trials. 

Section 3 of Rule 250, which applies to all capital cases, instructs trial

counsel to turn over all records to successor counsel in the event of withdrawal and to

prepare a detailed memorandum for successor appellate counsel. Section 3 further

requires capital counsel to keep a record of all work performed while serving as trial,

appellate, or postconviction counsel. The record must include time records and

rationale for strategic decisions. Counsel is required to file affidavits with the district

court at specified times throughout the proceedings certifying that counsel has

maintained these records. Counsel must also retain either the original record or a copy

until disposal is authorized by a court. 

Rule 250(3) also provides for ex parte proceedings to authorize employment

and payment of investigative and expert services.

Nevada Supreme Court:

Vanisi v. State, 117 Nev. 330, 22 P.3d 1164 (en banc) (clarifying that complexity of the

case is not a basis for denying a defendant’s request for self-representation; rather, case

complexity should be considered when determining whether defendant’s decision to

waive counsel is made with full understanding of the consequences of the decision),

cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1024 (2001).

Nevada Statutes:

NRS § 171.188 (2005) (providing for appointment of counsel for indigent defendants).

NRS § 180.060 (2005) (listing duties of state public defender).
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142 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

NRS § 34.820 (2005) (requiring appointment of postconviction counsel for deathsentenced inmates).

Nevada Rules:

Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 250(2) (detailing appointment and qualification of capital counsel).

Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 250(3) (detailing duties and compensation of capital counsel).

Trial of Capital Offenses

The state’s trial court of general jurisdiction is the district court. The district court

exercises original jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases, including capital cases,

postconviction review, and habeas corpus. Capital trials are held in two phases. If the

defendant is found guilty of first degree murder during the guilt phase, then a penalty

proceeding occurs to determine the defendant’s sentence. 

Chapter 175 of the Nevada Revised Statutes sets out the general trial

procedures applicable at the guilt phase. The defense and the prosecution may exercise

eight, rather than four, peremptory challenges to selected jurors, and two counsel for

each side may argue to the jury.

Nevada Supreme Court Rule 250 requires the prosecutor to file a notice of

intent to seek the death penalty within thirty days after filing an information or

indictment, and the notice must specifically allege all aggravating circumstances the

state intends to prove at sentencing. The state may file a late or amended notice only

upon a showing of good cause, but not later than thirty days before the trial starts. The

state also must file a notice of evidence in aggravation no later than 15 days before the

trial commences, specifying the evidence it intends to introduce at the penalty hearing. 

Rule 250 additionally directs the trial court to give capital cases calendar priority and

conduct proceedings with minimal delay.

Nevada Supreme Court:

Blake v. State, 121 P.3d 567 (Nev. 2005) (en banc) (holding that trial judge’s failure on

six occasions to admonish jury before it recessed to refrain from talking about the trial
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 143

and to avoid contact with the media did not require reversal, despite the fact that a

statute mandated giving the admonishments, where there was no evidence of prejudice

to defendant). 

Mason v. State, 118 Nev. 554, 51 P.3d 521 (2002) (holding that Nev. Sup. Ct. R.

250(4)(f) requires state to produce notice of all evidence it intends to produce at capital

penalty hearing, and that court erred in admitting certain evidence at penalty phase of

trial without determining whether state had good cause for not providing notice of it

earlier).

Finger v. State, 117 Nev. 548, 27 P.3d 66 (2001) (en banc) (holding that legal insanity

is a well-established and fundamental principle of law of United States and is

protected by Due Process Clauses of United States and Nevada Constitutions; holding,

therefore, that legislature could not abolish insanity as complete defense to criminal

offense and that 1995 legislative amendment (S.B. 314) abolishing insanity defense

was unconstitutional; also holding that all prior versions of statutes amended or

repealed by S.B. 314 remain in full force and effect; remanding to district court with

instructions to permit defendant to withdraw plea of “guilty, but mentally ill”), cert.

denied, 534 U.S. 1127 (2002).

State v. Second Judicial District Court, 116 Nev. 953, 11 P.3d 1209 (2000) (holding

Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 250 does not violate the separation of powers doctrine; finding district

court acted within its discretion denying state’s untimely notices of intent to seek the

death penalty).

Manley v. State, 115 Nev. 114, 979 P.2d 703 (1999) (finding violation of attorneyclient privilege constituted sixth amendment violation; holding error not harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt).

Evans v. State, 113 Nev. 885, 944 P.2d 253 (1997) (holding when first degree murder

charged in alternative, jury verdict need not be unanimous on theory of first degree

murder).

Libby v. State, 113 Nev. 251, 934 P.2d 220 (1997) (remanding case for evidentiary

hearing, following U.S. Supreme Court’s remand in light of J.E.B. v. T.B., 511 U.S. 127

(1994), where defendant established a prima facie case of venire gender discrimination,

and trial court refused to require the state’s Batson explanation).

Alford v. State, 111 Nev. 1409, 906 P.2d 714 (1995) (holding state must give notice in

charging document if it intends to pursue felony murder conviction; open charge of

murder that did not contain felony murder charge was insufficient notice). 
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144 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Shaw v. State, 104 Nev. 100, 753 P.2d 888 (1988) (holding state not required to charge

underlying felony when charging felony-murder).

Nevada Statutes:

NRS § 175.051 (2005) (providing eight peremptory challenges in capital cases).

NRS § 175.151 (2005) (providing that two counsel may argue).

Nevada Rules:

Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 250(4) (addressing pretrial proceedings; notice of intent; notice of

evidence in aggravation).

Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 250(5) (addressing trial procedures).

Capital Sentencing

Penalty Hearing

After a jury finds the defendant guilty in a capital case, the court conducts a sentencing

hearing to determine the penalty. At the sentencing hearing, the jury determines the

sentence. The rules of evidence are generally inapplicable at the sentencing hearing. 

Any evidence that the court determines relevant is admissible.

The jury must determine whether aggravating and/or mitigating

circumstances exist, and, based on the findings, whether the defendant should be

sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, life imprisonment without

parole, or death. The jury may impose a death sentence only if it finds at least one

aggravating factor and no mitigating factors sufficient to outweigh the aggravating

factor.

In 2003, the Nevada legislature enacted changes to the law, as a result of the

decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). In Ring, the Supreme Court held that 

Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466

(2000) are irreconcilable and overruled Walton to the extent that it allowed a

sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary
STATE LAW SUMMARIES: NEVADA

NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 145

for imposition of the death penalty. The Supreme Court reasoned that because

Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as “the functional equivalent of an

element of a greater offense” (Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n. 19), the Sixth Amendment

requires that they be found by a jury. The Court held that capital defendants are entitled

to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in

their maximum punishment. Under the former procedure in Nevada, if the penalty

phase jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict, the supreme court would appoint a

three-judge panel to conduct the required penalty hearing and determine a sentence.

Effective June 9, 2003, NRS § 175.556, provides that if the penalty phase jury is unable

to reach a unanimous decision, the judge who conducted the trial or accepted a guilty

plea must sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole

or impanel a new jury to determine the sentence. Formerly, if the defendant pleaded

guilty or waived a jury trial, a three-judge panel determined the sentence. In this

situation NRS § 175.552 now provides a jury must be impaneled for the penalty phase

of the trial. 

In Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807, 59 P.3d 463 (2002) (en banc), the Nevada

Supreme Court held that Ring did not apply retroactively on state collateral review of a

finalized death penalty imposed by a three-judge panel. The court adopted the general

framework of a Teague analysis, but reserved the prerogative as a state court “not to

bind quite so severely our own discretion in deciding retroactivity.” Colwell, 59 P. 3d at

471. See generally as to Teague v. Lane, § 1.18.1. Later, in Schriro v. Summerlin, 542

U.S. 348 (2004) the United States Supreme Court also held that Ring v. Arizona did

not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review. However, in Johnson v.

State, 118 Nev. 787, 59 P.3d 450 (2002) (en banc), the Nevada Supreme Court held that

Ring applied in a case in which the supreme court had not yet reviewed the death

sentence on appeal and in which the death sentence was imposed by a three-judge panel

after the jury deadlocked at the penalty phase. 

United States Supreme Court:

Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (holding that Ring v. Arizona did not apply

retroactively to cases already final on direct review).
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146 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that capital defendants are entitled to

jury determination of any fact on which legislature conditions increase in their

maximum punishment; also holding that Walton and Apprendi are irreconcilable and

overruling Walton to extent that it allowed sentencing judge, sitting without jury, to

find aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of death penalty).

Nevada Supreme Court:

Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 83 P.3d 818 (2004) (reversing death sentence and

remanding for new penalty phase trial, Nevada Supreme Court held that trial counsel’s

failure to object to erroneous penalty phase instruction that state board of pardons

could, under certain circumstances, modify sentence, constituted deficient performance

that prejudiced defendant).

Mack v. State, 119 Nev. 421, 75 P.3d 803 (2003) (per curiam) (rejecting defendant’s

assertion that NRS § 175.558 was unconstitutional because it did not permit a

defendant to waive a jury trial as to the guilt phase, and to have a jury determine the

sentence at the penalty phase, the court observed that offering a defendant the choice of

having his entire trial before a jury or entirely without one does not appear to offend

any of the reasoning in Ring; holding that here the record showed that defendant was

aware that if his request for a bench trial was granted, a three-judge panel would

determine his sentence). 

Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807, 59 P.3d 463 (2002) (en banc) (holding that Ring does

not apply retroactively on state collateral review of a finalized death penalty imposed

by three-judge panel; alternatively, concluding that Ring was inapplicable here because

petitioner had pleaded guilty and waived his right to a jury trial).

Johnson v. State, 118 Nev. 787, 59 P.3d 450 (2002) (en banc) (ruling that Ring applied

in a case in which the supreme court had not yet reviewed the death sentence on appeal

and in which the death sentence was imposed by a three-judge panel after the jury

deadlocked at the penalty phase; holding that finding of aggravating circumstances and

imposition of the death penalty by a three-judge panel violated the Sixth Amendment

and that the error was not harmless).

Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 28 P.3d 498 (2001) (en banc) (remanding for new penalty

hearing because trial and appellate counsel were ineffective in failing to challenge

improper arguments made by prosecutor during penalty phase asking jurors whether

they had the “intestinal fortitude" to do their “legal duty” and incorrectly informing

jurors that they could consider evidence of petitioner’s other crimes before determining 
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 147

“death eligibility”).

Hollaway v. State, 116 Nev. 732, P.3d 987 (2000) (en banc) (remanding for new

penalty hearing because the stun belt worn by defendant was accidently activated

during the prosecution’s closing argument).

Middleton v. State, 114 Nev. 1089, 968 P.2d 296 (1998) (rejecting any suggestion in

Lisle v. State, below, that character evidence can be used to determine death eligibility

itself) 

Sherman v. State, 114 Nev. 998, 965 P.2d 903 (1998) (holding evidence of victim

impact of prior murder not admissible in current sentencing hearing and holding

prosecutor’s argument that jury should return a death sentence in favor of future

victims improper), cert. denied, 526 U. S. 1122 (1999).

Lisle v. State, 113 Nev. 679, 941 P.2d 459 (stating consideration of character evidence

at penalty hearing not limited to cases where jury has determined that defendant is

death-eligible), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 830 (1998), limited by Middleton v. State, above.

Colwell v. State, 112 Nev. 807, 919 P.2d 403 (1996) (holding three-judge sentencing

panel constitutional).

Canape v. State, 109 Nev. 864, 859 P.2d 1023 (1993) (stating that constitutional right

to be free from prison clothing does not apply at sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 513

U.S. 862 (1994).

Redmen v. State, 108 Nev. 227, 828 P.2d 395 (1992) (holding state may argue

defendant’s future dangerousness even when no evidence of violence exists

independent of the charged murder; however, psychiatric opinion of defendant’s future

dangerousness highly unreliable inadmissible evidence at penalty hearing), cert.

denied, 506 U.S. 880 (1992), overruled on other grounds, Alford v. State, 111 Nev.

1409, 906 P.2d 714 (1995).

Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 825 P.2d 600 (1992) (finding admissibility of victim

impact evidence at sentencing comports with state constitution), cert. denied, 519 U.S.

1012 (1996).

Lord v. State, 107 Nev. 28, 806 P.2d 548 (1991) (holding nontestifying codefendant’s

confession not admissible at penalty hearing).

Baal v. State, 106 Nev. 69, 787 P.2d 391 (1990) (rejecting constitutional challenge to
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148 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

three-judge panel sentencing defendant who pleads guilty).

Emil v. State, 105 Nev. 858, 784 P.2d 956 (1989) (holding polygraph inadmissible at

trial equally inadmissible at penalty hearing).

Pellegrini v. State, 104 Nev. 625, 764 P.2d 484 (1988) (holding capital defendant’s

character and record relevant to jury’s sentencing determination; however, evidence

must be more probative than prejudicial).

Hill v. State, 102 Nev. 377, 724 P.2d 734 (1986) (holding three-judge panel sentencing

procedure, when jury unable to reach unanimous verdict, did not violate defendant’s

right to jury trial, double jeopardy clause, or result in arbitrary and capricious

imposition of death penalty), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101 (1987).

McKenna v. State, 101 Nev. 338, 705 P.2d 614 (1985) (stating jury not required to

determine beyond a reasonable doubt that death was the appropriate sentence), cert.

denied, 474 U.S. 1093 (1986)

Wilson v. State, 99 Nev. 362, 664 P.2d 328 (1983) (holding trial court not precluded

from imposing death penalty where defendant had pled guilty to first degree murder

prior to district attorney’s notice to seek death penalty), aff’d on reh’g, 101 Nev. 452,

705 P.2d 151 (1985).

Nevada Statutes:

NRS § 175.552 (2005) (requiring capital penalty hearing before jury; any evidence

relevant to sentence admissible).

NRS § 175.554 (2005) (addressing instructions to jury; required findings; verdict).

NRS § 175.556 (2005) (providing for sentencing panel when jury unable to reach

verdict).

NRS § 175.558 (repealed by 2003 Nev. Laws ch 366, § 8) (former procedure

providing for penalty hearing panel procedure where defendant convicted without jury).

NRS § 175.562 (repealed by 2003 Nev. Laws ch 366, § 8) (former providing for

procedure when panel of judges unable to agree on sentence)

NRS § 200.030 (2005) (providing death penalty for first degree murder only if one or

more aggravating circumstances found and not outweighed by mitigating factors).
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 149

Aggravating Circumstances

Section 200.033 of Nevada’s Revised Statutes lists the only circumstances by which

murder of the first degree may be aggravated. These circumstances are:

(1) defendant was under sentence of imprisonment;

(2) defendant was previously convicted of another murder or a felony

involving violence;

(3) defendant knowingly created great risk of death to more than one person

with a hazardous weapon or action;

(4) murder incident to robbery, sexual assault, first degree arson, burglary,

invasion of the home, or first degree kidnaping and defendant had intent to

kill;

(5) murder committed to prevent lawful arrest or to escape from custody;

(6) murder for money or property;

(7) murder of peace officer or firefighter;

(8) torture or the mutilation of the victim;

(9) random and motiveless murder(s);

(10) victim less than 14 years old;

(11) murder was committed because of race, color, religion, national origin,

physical or mental disability, or sexual orientation of victim;

(12) multiple first or second degree murder;

(13) victim subjected to nonconsensual sexual penetration before, during, or

after the murder;

(14) murder committed under certain circumstances that threatened the safety

of pupils and school employees;

(15) murder committed with the intent to commit, cause, aid, further, or

conceal an act of terrorism.

The state may also introduce additional evidence that is relevant to the

sentence but is not a statutory aggravating factor if it has been disclosed to the

defendant before the commencement of the penalty hearing. Evidence obtained in

violation of the state or federal constitution is inadmissible.
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150 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Ninth Circuit:

Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding that “depravity of

mind” aggravating-circumstances jury instruction was unconstitutionally vague under

Godfrey v. Georgia and that state appellate court cannot cure such error under Walton

v. Arizona, by applying a narrowing construction to the instruction to a de novo finding

of the facts when the penalty phase factfinder has been a jury; also holding that, even if

the Walton procedure were available, the Nevada Supreme Court failed to provide

“close appellate scrutiny” and therefore failed to cure the error caused by the

unconstitutionally vague jury instruction and the error was not harmless)

Petrocelli v. Angelone, 248 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that trial court did nor err

by admitting a deferred sentence for kidnapping from Washington state in aggravation;

finding the deferred sentence constituted a conviction under Nevada law). 

Nevada Supreme Court:

McConnell v. State, 102 P.3d 606 (Nev. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam) (holding that the

State is prohibited from selecting among multiple felonies that occur during “an

indivisible course of conduct having one principal criminal purpose” and using one to

establish felony murder and another to support an aggravating circumstance).

Butler v. State, 102 P.3d 71 (Nev. 2004) (en banc) (affirming two convictions for firstdegree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, but vacating death sentences and

remanding for a new penalty hearing, the court held that the cumulative impact of an

erroneous instruction regarding the limited use of “other matter” evidence (any other

matter that the court deems relevant to sentence admitted against defendant during the

penalty phase), taken together with other penalty hearing errors involving improper

closing argument by the prosecutor, deprived defendant of a fair hearing).

State v. Bennett, 119 Nev. 589, 81 P.3d 1 (2003) (en banc) (holding in post-conviction

capital habeas petition that death sentence that was based on invalid “at random and

without apparent motive” aggravator must be vacated where, when considered in

combination with the State's violations, particularly the State's failure to disclose

evidence that defendant’s accomplice played a dominant role in the crimes, the court

could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a

verdict of death in the absence of these errors; also holding that application of

procedural bars to preclude consideration of defendant's claim amounted to a

fundamental miscarriage of justice, and thus, defendant was entitled to raise claim in an

untimely and successive petition).
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 151

Vanisi v. State, 117 Nev. 330, 22 P.3d 1164 (2001) (en banc) (finding penalty phase

evidence supported finding of aggravating circumstances of mutilation, but clarifying

that language referring to “other serious and depraved physical abuse” should no longer

be included in the definition of “mutilation”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1024 (2001).

Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 17 P.3d 397 (2001) (en banc) (holding that prior

conviction aggravator NRS § 200.033(2) (both pre and post-1997 amendment) does not

require conviction to occur before date of capital offense).

Bridges v. State, 116 Nev. 752, 6 P.3d 1000 (2000) (en banc) (holding erroneous jury

instruction– which failed to limit kidnapping aggravator to first degree

kidnapping–harmless error, where defendant committed the murder in the course of

both a first degree and second degree kidnapping; concluding there was no compelling

evidence in mitigation in the case).

Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215, 994 P.2d 700 (2000) (en banc) (holding that postmortem

mutilation falls within the statutory aggravator of mutilation; holding evidence

supported finding of torture; finding instructions properly directed jurors to not

consider general character evidence until they found at least one aggravating factor). 

Lane v. State, 114 Nev. 299, 956 P.2d 88 (1998) (holding sentencer’s finding of both

robbery and receiving money as aggravating factors in context of a robbery-murder

improper as duplicative).

Greene v. State, 113 Nev. 157, 931 P.2d 54 (1997) (rejecting challenge that

§ 200.033(12) is unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous because it cannot be

differentiated from § 200.033(2)).

Geary v. State, 112 Nev. 1434, 930 P.2d 719 (1996) (holding “random and motiveless”

aggravating circumstance is not unconstitutionally vague), decision clarified on reh’g,

114 Nev. 100, 952 P.2d 431 (1998).

Flannagan v. State, 112 Nev. 1409, 930 P.2d 691 (1996) (stating one who intends to

commit multiple murders within a closely related time and place engages in a course of

conduct inherently hazardous to the lives of more than one person).

Domingues v. State, 112 Nev. 683, 926 P.2d 265 (requiring torture or mutilation to

exceed the act of killing itself to qualify as an aggravating circumstance; defining

torture as inflicting pain for revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic purpose),

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 968 (1996).
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152 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

McNelton v. State, 111 Nev. 900, 900 P.2d 934 (1995) (stating aggravator “under

sentence of imprisonment” does not require physical incarceration), cert. denied, 517

U.S. 1212 (1996).

Williams v. State, 110 Nev. 1182, 885 P.2d 536 (1994) (holding provision of murder

statute defining child abuse as nonaccidental physical injury to child is not

unconstitutionally vague).

Pertgen v. State, 110 Nev. 554, 875 P.2d 361 (1994) (holding “torture” and

“deprivation of mind” unconstitutionally vague when not defined for jury).

Redmen v. State, 108 Nev. 227, 828 P.2d 395 (1992) (holding state may argue

defendant’s future dangerousness even when no evidence of violence exists

independent of the charged murder; however, psychiatric opinion of defendant’s future

dangerousness highly unreliable inadmissible evidence at penalty hearing), cert.

denied, 506 U.S. 880 (1992), overruled on other grounds, Alford v. State, 111 Nev.

1409, 906 P.2d 714 (1995).

Riley v. State, 107 Nev. 205, 808 P.2d 551 (1991) (holding each conviction for a

violent felony, pursuant to § 200.033(2), may be alleged as separate aggravating

factor), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1052 (1995).

Bennett v. State, 106 Nev. 135, 787 P.2d 797 (holding state not required to charge

crime enumerated in § 200.033(4) to use crime as aggravator), cert. denied, 498 U.S.

925 (1990).

Cavanaugh v. State, 102 Nev. 478, 729 P.2d 481 (1986) (stating that aggravating

circumstance involving murder committed to avoid lawful arrest does not require proof

that arrest is imminent and that victim was in some way involved in effectuating that

arrest; it only requires that murder be perpetrated to avoid arrest).

Gallego v. State, 101 Nev. 782, 711 P.2d 856 (1985) (holding murder committed after

present capital offense can be used as aggravating factor if defendant convicted before

present trial and holding that evidence of unrelated homicide not resulting in a

conviction admissible as “other matter which court deems relevant to sentencing”),

cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871 (1986). 

Wilson v. State, 99 Nev. 362, 664 P.2d 328 (1983) (holding that § 200.033(4) crimes

constitute multiple, not single, aggravators), aff’d on reh’g, 101 Nev. 452, 705 P.2d 151

(1985).
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 153

Deutscher v. State, 95 Nev. 669, 601 P.2d 407 (1979) (holding mutilation aggravating

factor not unconstitutionally vague).

Nevada Statutes:

NRS § 175.552(3) (2005) (providing that evidence secured contrary to state or federal

constitution inadmissible; providing that nonstatutory aggravating factors admissible at

penalty hearing if disclosed to defendant).

NRS § 200.033 (2005) (enumerating aggravating circumstances).

Mitigating Circumstances

Section 200.035 of Nevada’s Revised Statutes enumerates seven factors of mitigation

for first degree murder. They are:

(1) lack of significant prior criminal history;

(2) influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance;

(3) victim’s participation in or consent to defendant’s criminal conduct;

(4) defendant’s relatively minor participation as accomplice;

(5) duress or under the domination of another person;

(6) defendant’s youth; and

(7) all other mitigating circumstances.

Nevada Supreme Court:

Gallego v. State, 117 Nev. 348, 23 P.3d 227 (2001) (en banc) (finding no error where

jury did not check any mitigating factors on special verdict form notwithstanding that

evidence was presented in mitigation; declining to conclude that the jury failed to

consider the mitigating evidence because it failed to fill out the verdict form in full).

Collman v. State, 116 Nev. 687, 7 P.3d 429 (2000) (en banc) (affirming trial court’s

denial of defendant’s motion to admit witness character evidence in a penalty hearing;

finding proposed testimony not mitigating evidence). 

Hollaway v. State, 116 Nev. 732, 6 P.3d 987 (2000) (en banc) (finding error in court’s

failure to instruct appropriately on mitigation where defendant refused to present any

evidence in mitigation; concluding that jury may have erroneously believed they were

not required or permitted to consider trial evidence in mitigation).
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154 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215, 994 P.2d 700 (2000) (en banc) (holding that under NRS

§ 175.554(1) in capital penalty hearing, court must instruct jury as to mitigating

circumstances alleged by defense on which evidence has been presented, and does not

restrict such instructions to enumerated statutory mitigators). 

Rippo v. State, 113 Nev. 1239, 946 P.2d 1017 (1997) (holding district court may

instruct jury to disregard sympathy provided jury instructed to consider mitigating

circumstances), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 841 (1998) (citing Riley v. State, 107 Nev. 205,

808 P.2d 551 (1991)).

Nevada Statutes:

NRS § 200.035 (2005) (enumerating mitigating circumstances for first degree murder).

Appellate Review of Capital Sentences

A judgment and sentence of death is automatically appealed to the Nevada Supreme

Court. The defendant may waive the appeal of conviction within thirty days from

judgment; however, the supreme court’s sentence review is mandatory. Upon review,

the supreme court must consider: (a) any errors enumerated in an appeal, (b) whether

the evidence supports the finding of an aggravating circumstance or circumstances, (c)

whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or

any arbitrary factor, and (d) whether the sentence of death is excessive, considering

both the crime and the defendant. In 1985, the Nevada legislature abolished appellate

proportionality review.

The supreme court has statutory authority to affirm the death sentence, set

aside the sentence and remand for new hearing, or set aside the sentence and impose a

sentence of life without parole. The court has affirmed death sentences after

reweighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon a determination that an

aggravating circumstance is not supported by substantial evidence.

Supreme Court Rule 250 requires the supreme court clerk to docket the

appeal upon receipt of the record from the district court. The rule addresses

conferencing, briefing, and hearing schedules. The court orders oral argument only

when the court determines it is warranted. The rule also allows the court to remand to

the district court for supplementary proceedings to assist in resolving the appeal.
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 155

Nevada Supreme Court:

Leslie v. Warden, 118 Nev. 773, 59 P.3d 440 (2002) (en banc) (rejecting argument that

supreme court’s reweighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances constituted

impermissible fact-finding that deprived petitioner of right to sentencing by jury or

three-judge panel; holding that the “random and without apparent motive” aggravator

does not apply to unnecessary killings during a robbery and vacating sentencing of

death after invalidating two of four aggravators and remanding for new penalty

hearing;).

Randolph v. State, 117 Nev. 970, 36 P.3d 424 (2001) (en banc) (holding that

prosecutor’s mischaracterization of reasonable doubt standard as “[y]ou have a gut

feeling he’s guilty, he’s guilty,” while highly improper, was harmless error where jury

instructions correctly defined reasonable doubt and district court immediately ordered

incorrect argument stricken; stating that court should have also explicitly admonished

the jury that prosecutor’s remark was improper and was to be disregarded), cert.

denied, 537 U.S. 845 (2002).

Servin v. State, 117 Nev. 775, 32 P.3d 1277 (2001) (en banc) (holding that death

penalty was excessive and instead imposing two consecutive terms of life in prison

without possibility of parole where evidence that defendant was shooter was

problematical, he was 16 at time of robbery and murder and was youngest of three

involved in crime, his background did not include significant criminal history, he

expressed remorse for his actions, and he was under the influence of methamphetamine

at time of crime).

Dennis v. State, 116 Nev. 1075, 13 P.3d 434 (2000) (en banc) (discussing comparative

review in the context of determining “excessiveness;” stating that inquiry may involve

a consideration of whether various objective factors which the supreme court

previously considered relevant to determine excessiveness in other cases, exist in the

present case).

Harte v. Nevada, 116 Nev. 1054, 13 P.3d 420 ( 2000) (en banc) (holding district court

did not err refusing to admit testimony from a Protestant pastor, Catholic priest and

Jewish rabbi regarding their opposition to the death penalty as mitigating evidence).

Geary v. State, 115 Nev. 79, 977 P.2d 344 (1999) (en banc) (holding that district court

correctly found that defendant was competent to waive right to appeal death sentence

where both defendant and counsel informed court that they had communicated

extensively about waiver, both appointed psychiatrists testified that defendant

understood proceedings, and court thoroughly questioned defendant; despite waiver,
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156 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

supreme court was required to conduct mandatory review under § 177.055(2)), cert.

denied, 529 U.S. 1090 (2000).

Chambers v. State, 113 Nev. 974, 944 P.2d 805 (1997) (holding that death penalty was

excessive and instead imposing life imprisonment without the possibility of parole

where facts suggested that defendant was intoxicated when he came upon victim

burning heroin on defendant’s tools, that both parties were stabbed, and that killing

resulted from overreaction and anger and was not planned in advance). 

Colwell v. State, 112 Nev. 807, 919 P.2d 403 (1996) (stating that court can conduct

meaningful review to determine whether death sentence was imposed arbitrarily, under

influence of passion or prejudice, or was excessive, even though defendant

intentionally failed to challenge evidence, failed to present mitigating evidence, and

aided state in presenting its case at penalty hearing).

Canape v. State, 109 Nev. 864, 859 P.2d 1023 (1993) (finding supreme court’s decision

to reweigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances on appeal does not constitute

impermissible finding and is constitutional), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 862 (1994).

Kirksey v. State, 107 Nev. 499, 814 P.2d 1008 (applying procedure established in

Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(a) to capital defendant choosing to waive

appeal), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 989 (1991).

Nevada Statutes:

NRS § 2.090 (2005) (providing supreme court jurisdiction on appeal).

NRS § 177.055 (2005) (providing automatic appeal of death judgments; waiver;

resentencing).

Nevada Rules:

Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 250(6) (detailing docketing appeal; transmitting record; briefing

schedule; extensions of time; oral argument).

Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 250(8) (setting prebriefing conferences; limited remand to district

court).

Collateral Remedies

Section 34.724 of Nevada’s Revised Statutes provides exclusive postconviction habeas
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 157

relief for challenges to capital convictions and sentences. This statutory remedy

replaces all other common law and statutory remedies previously available for

challenging the validity of a conviction or sentence. The traditional habeas writ is

available to inquire into the cause of imprisonment or restraint but is not available to

attack the validity of a prisoner’s conviction or sentence.

Nevada Statutes:

Nev. Const. art. I, § 5 (guaranteeing habeas corpus remedy).

NRS § 34.360, et seq. (2005) (providing habeas corpus relief).

NRS § 34.724 (2005) (providing postconviction habeas relief from conviction or

sentence).

Postconviction Relief

A postconviction petition for habeas corpus must be filed within one year after entry of

judgment or supreme court remittitur following appeal. The court will accept a late

petition if the delay is not the petitioner’s fault and dismissal would unduly prejudice

the petitioner. A late petition may be dismissed upon a showing of prejudice unless the

petition is based on previously unknown grounds or petitioner demonstrates that a

fundamental miscarriage of justice occurred at trial. A rebuttable presumption of

prejudice to the state is created when a petition is filed five or more years after entry of

judgment or supreme court remittitur.

A postconviction habeas petition must be filed in the district court where the

conviction occurred. The petition must be filed with the record of original proceedings

and, if possible, assigned to the original judge or court. After reviewing the

postconviction record, the judge determines whether an evidentiary hearing is required. 

An evidentiary hearing will not be held on a capital petition unless each issue of fact to

be considered at the hearing has not been determined in any prior evidentiary hearing in

a state or federal court or the prior evidentiary hearing was not a full and fair

consideration of the issue. The rules of civil procedure apply in a postconviction

proceeding to the extent they are consistent with the postconviction act.
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158 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Nevada law requires the court to make all reasonable efforts to expedite

postconviction relief adjudications. In capital cases, the court has sixty days after

submission to issue a decision.

Nevada Supreme Court:

Pelligrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 34 P.3d 519 (2001) (en banc) (holding that one-year

time bar of § 34.726 applies to all postconviction petitions, not just to first petitions;

rejecting contention that dismissal for delayed filing of second or successive petitions is

governed only by laches provisions of § 34.800).

Beets v. State, 110 Nev. 339, 871 P.2d 357 (1994) (holding summary judgment not

appropriate procedure in postconviction petition for habeas relief).

Nevada Statutes:

NRS § 34.720, et seq. (2005) (defining scope of applicable postconviction relief

statute).

NRS § 34.724 (2005) (providing postconviction habeas relief from conviction or

sentence).

NRS § 34.726 (2005) (providing one year statute of limitation).

NRS § 34.800 (2005) (providing for dismissal of late petitions).

NRS § 34.820 (2005) (setting forth procedures in capital cases).

Appellate Review of Collateral Proceedings

Nevada Supreme Court Rule 250(7), which invokes limited application of the Nevada

Rules of Appellate Procedure, governs procedure in capital postconviction appeals. 

The original trial record is not transmitted to the supreme court unless requested. In

postconviction appeals, the court makes a decision without oral argument unless the

supreme court orders otherwise.
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Nevada Rules:

Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 250(7) (providing procedures in capital postconviction appeals).

Procedural Bar/Waiver/Exhaustion

A petition shall be dismissed if (1) the conviction was upon a plea of guilty and the

petition is not based upon an allegation that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly

entered or that the plea was entered without effective assistance of counsel; or (2) the

conviction was the result of a trial and the grounds for the petition could have been

raised at trial, on direct appeal, or in a prior petition, unless petitioner alleges cause and

prejudice. In Pelligrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 34 P.3d 519 (2001) (en banc), the court

disapproved of Pertgen v. State, 110 Nev. 554, 875 P.2d 361 (1994), to the extent that

Pertgen implied that special discretion attaches to procedural bars applied in capital

habeas cases. The court stated in Pelligrini that special import attaches to this

discretion where the death penalty has been imposed; however, the plain error rule is a

rule for review on direct appeal and does not create a procedural bar exception in any

habeas proceeding, capital or not.

A second or subsequent petition is barred if it fails to allege new grounds for

relief or if there was an abuse of the writ by the petitioner’s failing to raise the issue in

the initial postconviction relief petition. 

Once the state raises the affirmative defenses of waiver or abuse of writ, the

petitioner has the burden of proving good cause and actual prejudice. The court may

dismiss a petition that fails to reference any prior proceeding known to the court.

Ninth Circuit:

Vang v. Nevada, 329 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding in noncapital case, that 

because the state filed a length response in which it did not rely on procedural bar, the

district court erred in sua sponte applying that defense as to three claims and that NRS

§ 34.810, which bars claims on collateral review if they could have been brought on

direct appeal, was an independent and adequate procedural bar as to two other claims

and distinguishing Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) on the

basis that the capital nature of the sentence in that case played a pivotal role in the
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160 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Nevada Supreme Court’s discretion not to apply the bar).

Nevada Supreme Court:

Pelligrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 34 P.3d 519 (2001) (en banc) (holding that good

cause and actual prejudice is required to overcome statutory procedural bars to habeas

corpus relief; reaffirming that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel brought in

timely first postconviction petition for writ of habeas corpus are not subject to dismissal

on grounds of waiver, regardless of whether claims could have been appropriately

raised on direct appeal; holding that trial court error may be appropriately raised in a

timely first postconviction petition in context of claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel, but independent claims based on same error are subject to waiver bars because

such claims could have been presented to trial court or raised in direct appeal).

Mazzan v. Warden, Ely State Prison, 116 Nev. 48, 993 P.2d 25 (2000) (en banc)

(finding cause and prejudice and granting relief on second postconviction petition;

finding prosecutor withheld exculpatory material in violation of Brady).

McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 990 P.2d 1263 (2000) (en banc) (refusing to address

issues not raised in petition but raised for first time on postconviction appeal alleging

ineffective assistance of counsel because petitioner failed to allege good cause and

prejudice for failing to include claims in petition).

Crump v. Warden, Nevada State Prison, 113 Nev. 293, 934 P.2d 247 (1997) (holding

postconviction petitioner who has counsel appointed by statutory mandate is entitled to

effective assistance of that counsel; defendant can allege ineffectiveness of his

postconviction counsel in subsequent postconviction relief petition, but defendant must

prove cause and prejudice to overcome procedural default).

Pertgen v. State, 110 Nev. 554, 875 P.2d 361 (1994) (considering appellate claim in

postconviction proceeding). 

Phelps v. Director, Nevada Dep’t of Prisons, 104 Nev. 656, 764 P.2d 1303 (1988)

(holding that legislature intended that the affirmative defenses of waiver or abuse of the

writ must be raised by the state; the burden then falls upon the petitioner to show good

cause or actual prejudice).

Nevada Statutes:

NRS § 34.810 (2005) (providing for dismissal of petition for procedural bar).
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Execution

The trial court issues a death warrant along with the judgment of death. The warrant

sets a week for the execution, between sixty and ninety days after the time of judgment. 

The director of the department of prisons may execute the sentence anytime within the

designated week. The prison director is required to invite two doctors, the coroner, and

not less than six citizens to the execution. Nevada law gives preference to

representatives of the victim’s family. The law has no provision for attendance of the

defendant’s family. The director of prisons is present at the execution, which is

performed by lethal injection. 

When a remittitur is filed in the trial court affirming a death judgment and

sentence upon appeal or a postconviction relief proceeding, the clerk of the trial court

may issue a new warrant ordering a new time for the execution. Additionally, the

attorney general or district attorney may petition the trial court for a new warrant when

the supreme court has denied appellate relief in a postconviction proceeding but has

entered a stay of issuance of remittitur.

Counsel for the state is required to file written notice of any warrant of

execution with the supreme court clerk and the prison director. The prison director is

required to file notice of the execution date with the supreme court.

Nevada Statutes:

NRS § 176.345 (2005) (providing death warrant issued upon judgment of death;

execution date set for within sixty to ninety days).

NRS § 176.355 (2005) (providing for execution by lethal injection).

NRS § 176.495 (2005) (executing new warrant).

NRS § 176.505 (2005) (providing for court order requiring execution of judgment at

specified time).
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162 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Nevada Rules:

Nev. S. Ct. R. 250(10)(a) (providing notice of warrant to supreme court).

Nev. S. Ct. R. 250(10)(b) (providing notice of execution date to supreme court).

Competency for Execution

When postconviction sanity is an issue, Nevada law provides that the director of the

department of prisons may allege the insanity in a petition to the state district court in

the county in which the prison is located. After two doctors examine the prisoner, the

court holds a hearing to determine sanity. The attorney general is required to attend the

hearing. Although neither the district attorney nor the defense attorney’s presence is

statutorily required, each has the right to offer evidence and cross-examine witnesses.

If the court finds that the defendant is not sane, it stays the execution and

orders the prison director to continue confining the defendant. If the prisoner regains

sanity, the director notifies the court. If the court is satisfied with the defendant’s

sanity, it lifts the stay and notifies the district court who issued the death sentence. 

The trial court then issues a new warrant for the defendant’s execution.

In Calambro v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 114 Nev. 961, 964 P.2d 794

(1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1149 (1999), the supreme court affirmed the district

court’s denial of next friend standing. In Calambro, the prison director never raised the

issue of defendant’s mental capacity in a petition to the district court. Six days before

defendant’s scheduled execution, Calambro’s mother petitioned the court in a

postconviction habeas proceeding, as next friend, raising the issue of defendant’s

mental incompetence. The supreme court upheld the district court’s findings that

Calambro was competent and that he voluntarily waived his right to challenge his

sentence and conviction in postconviction proceedings and affirmed the lower court’s

ultimate conclusion that Calambro’s mother consequently lacked standing as next

friend to challenge her son’s sentence.

The prison director may also petition the district court where the prison

is located if a death-sentenced inmate is pregnant. Upon a determination by three

physicians that the defendant is pregnant, the death sentence is stayed until the
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 163

defendant is no longer pregnant.

Nevada Supreme Court:

Calambro v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 114 Nev. 961, 964 P.2d 794 (1998) (holding

capital prisoner’s mother lacked standing to assert the absence of sanity to be executed

because defendant, who was found competent, stated he did not wish to challenge his

sentence), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1149 (1999).

Nevada Statutes:

NRS § 176.425 (2005) (providing for sanity investigation, stay of execution).

NRS § 176.435 (2005) (providing for sanity investigation; conduct of hearing).

NRS § 176.455 (2005) (requiring suspension of execution while defendant insane).

NRS § 176.465 (2005) (providing for investigation of pregnancy).

Stays of Execution

A death sentence is automatically stayed upon appeal. The first petition challenging the

defendant’s conviction or sentence automatically stays the execution during the

pendency of the petition and appeal. However, after the first petition, a stay of

execution to pursue collateral postconviction relief is granted only after the defendant

(1) files a petition, (2) establishes a compelling basis for the stay, and (3) gives notice

to the state. The trial judge may enter a stay of execution to pursue an investigation

into the defendant’s sanity or pregnancy. The Board of Pardons Commissioners may

also enter a stay.

Defense counsel must file any motion for stay of execution in the supreme

court promptly upon learning the grounds to be asserted in the motion. The supreme

court may impose sanctions when defense counsel knowingly delays filing the motion. 

Counsel for the state must notify the supreme court of any stay of execution issued by

any court other than the supreme court.
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164 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Nevada Statutes:

NRS § 34.820 (2005) (providing for mandatory stay of execution for first

postconviction petition).

NRS § 34.726 (2005) (providing no stay of execution during one-year period to file

postconviction petition unless petition filed and compelling basis for stay).

NRS § 176.415 (2005) (providing when execution of death penalty may be stayed).

NRS § 176.425 (2005) (providing stay of execution for sanity determination).

NRS § 176.486 (2005) (permitting stay of execution after postconviction petition filed

only after notice provided to state).

NRS § 177.095 (2005) (requiring automatic stay on appeal).

Nevada Rules:

Nev. S. Ct. R. 250(10)(c) (providing for notice to supreme court of entry of stay of

execution).

Nev. S. Ct. R. 250(10)(d) (providing for duty of defense counsel to promptly notice

supreme court of intent to file motion to stay execution).

Clemency Procedures

The State Board of Pardons Commissioners has sole authority to commute a death

sentence. The Board is composed of the governor, the justices of the state supreme

court, and the attorney general. However, the 1995 Nevada legislature precluded

commutation of death sentences for persons convicted of capital murder after July 1,

1995, “to a sentence that would allow parole.”

Nevada Supreme Court:

Sonner v. State, 114 Nev. 321, 955 P.2d 673 (1998) (providing jury instruction to

comport with new Nevada Revised Statutes § 213.085 provision; holding instruction

shall not discuss modification of sentences by the pardons board).
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Colwell v. State, 112 Nev. 807, 919 P.2d 403 (1996) (holding Nevada Revised Statutes

§ 213.085 does not unconstitutionally deny defendant chance at clemency; statute

merely limits power of commutation).

Nevada Statutes:

Nev. Const. art. V, § 14 (addressing power of commutation).

NRS §§ 213.005–213.100 (2005) (governing applications for clemency).

NRS § 213.085 (2005) (prohibiting commutation of death sentence).
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166 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

OREGON

History

Oregon’s death penalty history reflects ambivalence toward capital punishment. In

1864, the legislature established the death penalty for first degree murder and provided 

the court with discretion to decide punishment. In a 1914 constitutional amendment

initiative, Oregon voters abolished capital punishment. However, six years later the

legislature reinstated the death penalty but allowed the jury to make a binding

recommendation for a life sentence. In 1964, voters again abolished capital punishment

by popular vote. Although voters reinstated the death penalty in 1978, the Oregon

Supreme Court invalidated the new law.

In 1984, voters adopted Oregon’s current death penalty law for aggravated

murder. The law, modeled after a Texas capital punishment statute approved by the

U.S. Supreme Court in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), allowed for a jury to

impose the death penalty after a sentencing hearing if it answered three statutory

questions affirmatively. In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Penry v.

Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), the 1989 Oregon legislature amended its statute by

adding a fourth sentencing question that assured jury consideration of all mitigating

circumstances. In State v. Wagner, 309 Or. 5, 786 P.2d 93 (1990), the Oregon Supreme

Court, troubled with the imprecise grammar of the 1989 amendment, clarified the

constitutional requirements of the new legislation. Consequently, the 1991 legislature

rewrote the fourth question to simply ask the jury whether the defendant should receive

a death sentence.

United States Supreme Court:

Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (requiring jury consideration of mitigating

evidence at death sentencing).

Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding Texas capital punishment statute

against Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment attacks).
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Oregon Supreme Court:

State v. Wagner, 309 Or. 5, 786 P.2d 93 (holding pre-1989 death penalty statute

requires submission of additional question to sentencing jury, allowing jury to conclude

mitigating evidence justifies life sentence; clarifies additional question to be asked

pursuant to 1989 amendment), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 879 (1990).

State v. Quinn, 290 Or. 383, 623 P.2d 630 (1981) (finding Oregon 1978 death penalty

statute unconstitutional because it required the court to base its death penalty decision

on a factual determination of the criminal act, which should be a jury decision).

Oregon Statutes:

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.105 (2005) (providing death penalty for aggravated murder).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150 (2005) (requiring sentencing hearing, before trial jury, to

determine death or life sentence).

Capital Offenses

Aggravated murder is the only capital offense in Oregon. A defendant convicted of

aggravated murder is sentenced to death, life imprisonment without possibility of

release, or life imprisonment (a minimum of thirty years without possibility of parole).

Aggravated murder requires a finding of murder, as defined in Oregon

Revised Statutes § 163.115, plus a finding of one of twelve aggravating circumstances. 

In State v. McDonnell, 313 Or. 478, 837 P.2d 941 (1992), the Oregon Supreme Court

found that the aggravating circumstances listed in Oregon Revised Statutes § 163.095

presumptively constitute a narrow class of conduct sufficient to justify a death penalty.

In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), the Supreme Court held that the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the imposition of the death penalty on those

who were under the age of 18 at the time their crimes were committed. Prior to Roper, 

Oregon law also provided that the death penalty may not be imposed upon a person

who was a minor at the time the offense was committed, although the offender will be

prosecuted as an adult if older than 15 years at the time of the offense.

Although no Oregon statute currently prohibits execution of the mentally

retarded, on June 20, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.

304 (2002), that the execution of the mentally retarded constitutes cruel and unusual
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168 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. See § 1.6.

United States Supreme Court:

Roper v Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments forbid imposition of death penalty on those who were under the age of 18

at time their crimes were committed).

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that executing the mentally retarded

violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).

Oregon Supreme Court:

State v. McDonnell, 313 Or. 478, 837 P.2d 941 (1992) (holding aggravating

circumstances listed in § 163.095 presumptively constitute narrow class of conduct

sufficient to justify death penalty).

Oregon Statutes:

Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.707 (2005) (prohibiting death penalty for offenders under 18 at

time of offense).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.105 (2005) (providing death, life without parole, or life sentences

for aggravated murder).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.115 (2005) (defining murder).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.095 (2005) (defining aggravated murder).

Representation in Capital Cases

An indigent defendant’s right to counsel attaches at arraignment. In Oregon, all

counsel appointed to represent indigent defendants at trial and postconviction

proceedings are contract appointments. Effective October 1, 2001 the Public Defense

Services Commission (PDSC) assumed responsibility for the Office of Defense Service

(formerly the state public defender). The PDSC maintains contracts with capital

counsel who meet established competency standards. Upon a determination of

indigency, the circuit court appoints counsel in compliance with the applicable PDSC

contracts for all stages of capital representation. 
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Upon imposition of a death sentence and a showing of indigency, the Oregon

Supreme Court appoints counsel to represent the defendant on automatic appeal. The

supreme court appoints counsel from the Legal Services Division of the Office of

Public Defense Services unless that office has a conflict of interest or lacks the capacity

to undertake the representation for budgetary or other reasons, or the court has a

reasonable and objective basis to believe that the office could not provide adequate

representation to the defendant. Generally, trial counsel is not reappointed for the

appeal. The supreme court may limit the number of compensable hours appellate

counsel may expend on the case without further review. At all stages of representation,

capital counsel’s pay is $55 per hour

Oregon Supreme Court:

State v. McDonnell, 313 Or. 478, 837 P.2d 941 (1992) (holding defendant has no state

constitutional right to act as co-counsel in capital punishment trial proceedings).

Oregon Statutes:

Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.045 (2005) (providing for court appointment of criminal counsel at

arraignment).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.050 (2005) (providing eligibility for court-appointed counsel).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.590 (2005) (providing for court appointment of counsel at

postconviction proceeding).

Oregon Rules:

Or. R. App. P. 12.12 (providing appointment of counsel for automatic capital appeal).

Or. Qualification Standards for Ct. Appointed Counsel 3.1 (providing competency

standards for capital counsel at trial, appeal, and state postconviction proceeding).

Or. Indigent Defense Compensation Policies & Procedures § 3.1(B) (providing fee

schedule for contract appointments).
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170 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Trial of Capital Offenses

The circuit court is the state trial court of general jurisdiction. It has original

jurisdiction over all civil and criminal cases, including felonies, habeas corpus, and

postconviction review. Oregon’s general criminal trial procedures apply to the guilt

phase of a capital case. In aggravated murder cases, both the defendant and the state

are entitled to twelve peremptory challenges instead of the usual six. To be convicted

of aggravated murder, the state must prove at least one aggravating circumstance listed

in § 163.095.

Oregon Statutes:

Or. Rev. Stat. § 136.001, et seq. (2005) (providing general criminal trial procedures).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 136.230 (2005) (allowing twelve peremptory challenges in capital

cases).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.095 (2005) (defining circumstances that constitute aggravated

murder).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150 (2005) (requiring separate sentencing hearing for aggravated

murder).

Capital Sentencing

Penalty Hearing

When a defendant is convicted of aggravated murder, the same trial jury, after a

sentencing hearing, determines whether the defendant should receive a sentence of

death, life, or life without the possibility of release.

At the sentencing hearing, the court may admit new evidence that it deems

relevant to sentencing, including victim impact evidence and any evidence bearing on

the issue of whether the defendant should receive a death sentence. The jury may

consider all evidence received at trial, but the evidence cannot be reintroduced at the

penalty hearing.

At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the court instructs the jury to
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consider any mitigating evidence and to return unanimous special verdicts on four

statutory questions: (1) whether the murder was deliberate and with expectation that

death would result, (2) whether it is probable that the defendant will be a continuing

violent threat to society, (3) whether the murder was an unreasonable response to

provocation, if any, by the deceased, and (4) whether the defendant should receive the

death penalty.

If a defendant pleads guilty or no contest to aggravated murder, the court

impanels a jury for sentencing purposes. If the state declines to pursue the death

penalty, the court will impanel a jury to determine the appropriate life sentence.

United States Supreme Court:

Oregon v. Guzek, 2006 WL397856 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2006) (vacating and remanding a

decision of the Oregon Supreme Court, which had held that the federal Constitution

guaranteed defendant the right at resentencing to present live alibi evidence from his

mother, U.S. Supreme Court held that Constitution does not prohibit State from

limiting the innocence-related evidence a capital defendant may introduce at trial;

explaining that Supreme Court had not interpreted Eighth Amendment as providing

such defendant a right to introduce at sentencing alibi evidence designed to cast

residual doubt on his guilt of basic crime of conviction; noting that negative impact of

rule restricting defendant’s ability to introduce new alibi evidence was minimized by

Oregon law giving defendant right to present sentencing jury all the innocence

evidence from original trial through transcripts).

Oregon Supreme Court:

State v. Guzek, 336 Or. 424, 86 P.3d 1106 (2004) (holding that failure to give jury

instructions on “true life sentencing option” in defendant’s third penalty phase

proceeding was reversible error where defendant moved to have trial court instruct jury

on that sentencing option and expressly waived all ex post fact guarantees), vacated on

other grounds, 2006 WL 397856 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2006) (see above). 

State v. Sparks, 336 Or. 298, 83 P.3d 304 (holding that nonfamily members of a murder

victim could present victim impact evidence during the penalty phase of the trial and

that sentencing defendant “to death on all fifteen counts” of aggravated murder did not

improperly impose multiple sentences of death), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 219 (2004).
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172 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

State v. Oatney, 335 Or. 276, 66 P.3d 475 (2003) (holding that Ring v. Arizona (see §

4.6.1) does not require that “deliberateness” be charged specifically in the indictment

before the question of deliberateness can be submitted to a jury, and that unlike in Ring,

the trial court did not impose on defendant any punishment that the jury’s answers in

the special verdict in the penalty phase did not require).

State v. Rogers, 330 Or. 282, 4 P.3d 1261 (2000) (vacating death sentence and holding

that trial court erred in refusing to permit jury to consider option under § 163.150(5)(a)

of sentencing defendant to life in prison without possibility of parole and to permit

defendant to waive ex post facto objection to jury's consideration of that option).

State v. Barone, 328 Or. 68, 969 P.2d 1013 (1998) (holding victim’s opinion on death

penalty not relevant to fourth sentencing question; conduct of past crimes admissible at

sentencing hearing to establish future dangerousness, notwithstanding stipulation to

charge or conviction), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1135.

State ex rel. Carlile v. Frost, 326 Or. 607, 956 P.2d 202 (holding all evidence properly

admitted at first trial and sentencing hearing admissible in new penalty proceeding

without an Oregon Evidence Code Rule 403 balancing analysis), remand after reversal,

155 Or. App. 260, 958 P.2d 909 (1998).

State v. Cunningham, 320 Or. 47, 880 P.2d 431 (1994) (en banc) (holding federal and

state constitutions do not require district attorney to disclose statewide information

about similarly situated defendants to analyze disparate treatment in plea bargaining or

sentencing), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1005 (1995).

State v. Stevens, 319 Or. 573, 897 P.2d 162 (1994) (stating that standard of relevance

set forth in Oregon Evidence Code Rule 401 applies in penalty-phase hearing).

State v. Boots, 315 Or. 572, 848 P.2d 76 (1993) (holding trial court did not err limiting

retrial to aggravation enhancement when underlying murder conviction affirmed). 

Oregon Statutes:

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150 (2005) (requiring bifurcated capital sentencing hearing;

allowing any evidence relevant to sentencing; guilty or no contest pleas; resentencing).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(1)(b) (2005) (enumerating four questions requiring special

verdict at sentencing hearing).
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Aggravating Circumstances

To be convicted of aggravated murder, the district attorney must prove at least one of

the following eleven aggravating circumstances: (1) receipt of money for committing

the murder, (2) solicitation of another to commit the murder, (3) a prior homicide

conviction, (4) multiple murder victims, (5) murder involved intentional maiming or

torture, (6) victim was under 14 years old, (7) victim was a police, correctional, or

judicial officer, juror, witness, or employee of the court or parole board, (8) defendant

was in custody or had escaped from a penal or correctional facility at the time of the

murder, (9) the murder was committed by use of explosives, (10) intentional felony

murder, and (11) murder committed to conceal a crime. The jury must agree

unanimously on the same aggravating circumstance.

Additionally, the sentencing jury must answer four interrogatories

affirmatively to impose the death penalty: (1) Did the defendant act deliberately and

with the reasonable expectation that death would result? (2) Is there is a probability

that the defendant would constitute a continuing threat to society? (3) Was the

defendant’s conduct an unreasonable response to provocation, if any? and (4) Should

the defendant receive a death sentence? The jury must agree unanimously on each of

the first three questions in order to render a “yes” response.

Oregon Supreme Court:

State v. Compton, 333 Or. 274, 39 P.3d 833 (holding that § 163.150(1) and its related

jury instruction did not violate Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments and that federal

constitution does not require court to instruct jury in penalty phase that it is entitled to

consider only aggravating factors that relate to defendant’s character or to

circumstances of defendant’s crime in deciding whether to impose death sentence),

cert. denied, 537 U.S. 841 (2002)

State v. Barrett, 331 Or. 27, 10 P.3d 901 (2000) (holding three aggravated murder

convictions, involving same conduct and same victim, did not violate two or more

statutory provisions, for purposes of constituting two or more separately punishable

crimes).

State v. Langley, 314 Or. 247, 839 P.2d 692 (1992) (holding terms “confined” and

“otherwise in custody” as used in §163.095(2)(b) not vague under state or federal
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174 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

constitutions).

State v. Isom, 313 Or. 391, 837 P.2d 491 (1992) (appeal after remand) (holding that

state correctional facility, as referenced in § 163.095(2)(f), includes a state correctional

facility in any state; § 163.095(2)(f) not unconstitutionally vague under state and

federal constitutions).

State v. Farrar, 309 Or. 132, 786 P.2d 161 (1990) (en banc) (holding § 163.095(2)(d)

and (2)(e), defining aggravated felony murder and aggravated murder by concealment,

not unconstitutionally vague under state and federal constitutions).

State v. Boots, 308 Or. 371, 780 P.2d 725 (1989) (holding jury must unanimously agree

on manner in which aggravated murder was committed when alternative theories of

aggravated murder charged).

State v. Wagner, 305 Or. 115, 752 P.2d 1136 (1988) (holding second interrogatory,

regarding defendant being a threat to society, is not unconstitutionally vague under

state constitution), vacated on other grounds, 309 Or. 5, 786 P.2d 93, cert. denied, 489

U.S. 879 (1990).

State v. Maney, 297 Or. 620, 688 P.2d 63 (1984) (holding that term “witness in a

criminal proceeding,” found in § 163.095 includes someone who has not yet been

subpoenaed but whose testimony is desired in a criminal proceeding or grand jury

investigation).

Oregon Statutes:

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.095 (2005) (listing circumstances that qualify murder as

aggravated murder).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(1) (2005) (allowing victim impact evidence at sentencing;

listing four issues jury must decide after presentation of evidence at sentencing;

requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt on non-mitigating issues).

Mitigating Circumstances

Oregon death penalty law requires the court to instruct the sentencing jury to consider

any mitigating circumstances offered in evidence, including, but not limited to, the

defendant’s age, the extent and severity of the defendant’s prior criminal conduct, and

the extent of the mental and emotional pressure under which the defendant was acting
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at the time the defendant committed the offense. The Oregon Supreme Court, in State

v. Wagner, 305 Or. 115, 752 P.2d 1136 (1988), rejected the contention that only

mitigating evidence causally related to the offense is relevant to the sentence.

The fourth special verdict that a jury must return in a capital case is whether

the defendant should receive a death sentence. The legislature added this special

verdict to the statute in 1991 so the jury could consider mitigating factors and choose a

punishment less than death even when all aggravating factors are present. The court

must instruct the jury to answer the fourth interrogatory negatively if one or more of the

jurors believe the death penalty inappropriate after considering any aggravating

evidence, mitigating evidence concerning the defendant’s character or background, any

victim impact evidence, and the circumstances of the offense.

Oregon Supreme Court:

State v. Wright, 323 Or. 8, 913 P.2d 321 (1996) (stating that to be relevant to fourth

question, evidence must relate to some aspect of defendant’s character or background

or to any circumstance of the crime).

State v. Wagner, 305 Or. 115, 752 P.2d 1136 (1988) (rejecting contention that all

mitigating evidence causally related to offense is relevant to sentence), vacated on

other grounds, 309 Or. 5, 786 P.2d 93, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 879 (1990).

Oregon Statutes:

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(1)(c) (2005) (enumerating mitigating factors; requiring “no”

verdict if at least one juror finds sentence less than death is justified).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150(2) (2005) (requiring life sentence if no unanimous jury verdict

reached).

Appellate Review of Capital Sentences

When a defendant receives a capital sentence, the judgment of conviction and the

sentence receive automatic direct review by the Oregon Supreme Court. The trial court

clerk commences the review by serving statutorily mandated papers on the Supreme

Court Administrator. Court proceedings are transcribed and forwarded to the supreme
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court. However, jury selection proceedings are not part of the appellate record unless

requested by a party upon a showing of good cause. Death penalty cases take priority

over other supreme court cases.

Section 138.012 of the Oregon Revised Statutes provides procedures for

resentencing when a death sentence is set aside. At the election of the state, the trial

court sentences the defendant to life or impanels a jury to determine if the defendant

should be sentenced to death, life imprisonment, or life imprisonment without release.

Oregon Supreme Court:

State v. Moore, 324 Or. 396, 927 P.2d 1073 (1996) (holding that fourth sentencing

question, which vests jury with discretion to impose death sentence and contains no

burden of proof, does not unconstitutionally preclude meaningful appellate review).

State v. Quinn, 289 Or. 727, 618 P.2d 412 (1980) (holding automatic review is sole

direct review in capital cases).

Oregon Statutes:

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.012 (2005) (providing direct and automatic review for capital

cases; defining procedure for resentencing after remand).

Oregon Rules:

Or. R. App. P. 12.10(1) (providing procedure for automatic supreme court review of

death cases).

Collateral Remedies

The legislature enacted Oregon’s Post-Conviction Hearing Act to replace the multitude

of common law remedies that were available to challenge the lawfulness of criminal

convictions. The Act replaces all postconviction collateral remedies except habeas

corpus.

Oregon Court of Appeals:

Page v. Cupp, 78 Or. App. 520, 717 P.2d 1183 (stating purpose of Post-Conviction
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Hearing Act), review denied, 301 Or. 338, 722 P.2d 737 (1986).

Oregon Statutes:

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.540(1) (2005) (providing exclusive means for challenging

lawfulness of criminal judgment or proceedings; replacing, with the exception of

habeas corpus, all common law postconviction remedies).

Postconviction Relief

A defendant may seek postconviction relief under Oregon’s Post-Conviction Hearing

Act, codified at Oregon Revised Statutes §§ 138.510–138.680. This relief is not

available if direct appellate review of the sentence or the conviction is pending. 

For conviction or appeals becoming final after August 5, 1989, the petition

must be filed within two years of either the trial judgment or the date that the state

supreme court’s automatic review is final. The 1993 legislature set a one-year time

period in which to file petitions for convictions and appeals which became final prior to

August 5, 1989. Grounds for relief under the Act are: (1) federal or state constitutional

violations at trial and on appeal, (2) lack of trial court jurisdiction, (3) illegal or

unconstitutional sentence, and (4) unconstitutional charging statute.

The postconviction statute limits standing to the convicted criminal

defendant, who may waive the right to file. Although the Oregon Supreme Court held

that the statute does not recognize the right of a third party or “next-friend” to file such

a claim, see Bryant v. Thompson, 324 Or. 141, 922 P.2d 1219 (1996), the 1999

legislature enacted law providing for next friend representation. However, the court

must personally serve the defendant with copies of all documents filed in a next friend

petition proceeding. 

The postconviction relief petition is filed in the circuit court in the

jurisdiction where the petitioner is imprisoned but can be transferred to the circuit court

in the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred. The state responds to the petition by

demurrer, answer, or motion within thirty days unless the court grants an extension. 

After the state responds, if the petition states a ground for relief, the court conducts a

hearing on the merits. A petitioner has a right to be present at any hearing unless the

state demurs or the hearing involves only issues of law. The capital inmate has the
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burden of proving the contents of the petition by a preponderance of the evidence. 

The failure of a petitioner to seek appellate review does not preclude relief

under the postconviction relief act. However, a petitioner waives any grounds that

could have been raised on appeal unless the petitioner did not have counsel on appeal. 

Finally, the petitioner must raise all known grounds for relief available in the original

or amended petition for postconviction relief. The petitioner waives any grounds not

raised in the original petition unless petitioner shows that the grounds could not

reasonably have been raised in the first petition.

Oregon Supreme Court:

Wallis v. Baldwin, 152 Or. App. 295, 954 P.2d 192 (holding one-year limitation period

without escape clause constitutional on pre-1989 convictions), review denied, 327 Or.

174, 966 P.2d 218 (1998).

Wright v. Thompson, 324 Or. 153, 922 P.2d 1224 (1996) (denying third-party-counsel

standing to litigate).

Bryant v. Thompson, 324 Or. 141, 922 P.2d 1219 (1996) (ruling no next-friend standing

in postconviction death penalty case).

Oregon Court of Appeals:

Page v. Cupp, 78 Or. App. 520, 717 P. 2d 1183 (holding defendant required to raise all

grounds for relief available in original or amended petition for postconviction relief),

review denied, 301 Or. 338, 722 P.2d 737 (1986). 

Oregon Statutes:

Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.482 (2005) (providing for personal service to defendant of all

documents in a § 138.510(2) proceeding).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.510, et seq. (2005) (providing Post-Conviction Hearing Act).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.510(2) (2005) (providing for next friend standing).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.510(3) (2005) (providing two-year deadline for filing

postconviction petition).
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Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.530 (2005) (providing grounds for postconviction relief).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.540 (2005) (limiting postconviction relief to challenging

lawfulness of judgment or conviction).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.550 (2005) (providing waiver of grounds for relief).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.560 (2005) (defining contents of postconviction petition). 

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.620 (2005) (providing hearing; burden of proof).

Habeas Corpus

Certain collateral relief is also available by petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Habeas

corpus is available for challenging confinement on grounds other than the lawfulness of

the judgment or the grounds upon which it is based; therefore, it is rarely sought in

death penalty cases. Grounds for filing a habeas petition are statutorily limited to

matters such as revocation of parole, completion of service of the sentence imposed,

and conditions of confinement.

Oregon Supreme Court:

Bedell v. Schiedler, 307 Or. 562, 770 P.2d 909 (1989) (providing comprehensive

discussion of Oregon’s habeas procedure).

Oregon Statutes:

Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 34.310-34.730 (2005) (providing for habeas corpus).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 34.330 (2005) (providing that relief available under postconviction

petition may not be sought under habeas corpus).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 34.360 (2005) (setting forth contents of petition challenging conditions

of confinement).

Appellate Review of Collateral Proceedings

Either party may appeal to the court of appeals within thirty days after the entry of the
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final judgment on a postconviction petition. The scope of review is the same as in

appeals for other criminal actions except that the trial court may provide that the

transcript contain only the evidence relevant to the issues on appeal. Also, there is no

“escape hatch” provision for an untimely appeal. The scope of review is limited to

questions of law appearing on the record, and the appellate court is not authorized to

examine disputed questions of fact.

The court of appeals may dismiss the appeal without oral argument or

submission of briefs if it finds that the appeal presents no substantial question of law.

Such a dismissal constitutes a decision on the merits of the appeal. A decision on

habeas corpus may be appealed pursuant to Oregon Revised Statutes § 34.710.

Oregon Supreme Court:

Hartzog v. Keeney, 304 Or. 57, 742 P.2d 600 (1987) (holding neither court of appeals

nor supreme court may try questions of fact on appeal in postconviction proceeding).

Alcorn v. Gladden, 237 Or. 106, 390 P.2d 625 (1964) (holding trial court findings of

fact in postconviction proceeding are conclusive and supreme court not authorized to

reexamine disputed questions of fact, citing §138.650).

Oregon Statutes:

Or. Rev. Stat. § 34.710 (2005) (providing for appeal of habeas corpus).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.650 (2005) (providing for postconviction appeal).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.220 (2005) (defining scope of review).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.660 (2005) (providing for summary affirmance).

Procedural Bar/Waiver/Exhaustion

Postconviction relief is not available until completion of direct appellate review in

capital cases. Any grounds for relief that could reasonably have been asserted in the

direct appellate review may not later be asserted in a postconviction action unless the

petitioner was not represented on appeal. Section 138.550(1) of the Oregon Revised
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Statutes provides that the failure of petitioner to seek appellate review or to preserve an

issue at trial does not preclude postconviction review of the issue.

Any known ground for relief that is not asserted in the original or amended

petition for postconviction relief is deemed waived and may not be asserted in

subsequent postconviction petitions, unless petitioner shows that the grounds could not

reasonably have been raised in the first petition.

Oregon Statutes:

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.540 (2005) (providing when postconviction petition may be filed;

availability of relief).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.550(1) (2005) (providing that availability of relief not precluded by

failure to appeal or failure to raise issue at trial).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.550(2) (2005) (providing waiver of claims that reasonably could

have been asserted in direct review).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.550(3) (2005) (providing waiver of claims that reasonably could

have been asserted in earlier postconviction petition).

Execution

The trial court issues a death warrant upon a hearing after the supreme court’s direct

review of the sentence. The defendant must be present at the hearing. If the defendant

wishes to waive counsel, the court is statutorily directed to determine whether the

waiver is constitutional. At the hearing, the court makes a finding as to the defendant’s

competency to be executed and advises the defendant of the right to pursue certiorari to

the Supreme Court, state postconviction and federal habeas. The trial court then issues

a death warrant to be delivered to the superintendent of the correctional institution. 

The court is required to personally serve the defendant with all papers filed in a death

warrant proceeding, even if the defendant is represented by counsel. The trial court’s

orders resulting from the death warrant hearing are not appealable. 

Oregon’s method of execution is lethal injection. In 2001, the legislature

amended the statute to provide that representatives of the media may be invited to
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182 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

witness an execution.

Oregon Supreme Court:

Oregon Newspaper Publishers Ass’n v. Oregon Dep’t of Corrections, 329 Or. 115, 988

P.2d 359 (1999) (holding limited access rules as to executions promulgated by Oregon

Department of Corrections invalid because they limit too severely activities witnesses

may see and holding that nondisclosure rules promulgated by the department of

corrections invalid to extent they purport to place limits on expression rights of persons

who are granted right by statute to be present at executions).

Oregon Statutes:

Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.463 (2005) (providing for death warrant hearing and delivery of

warrant to prison; providing for no appeal of trial court order).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.473(1) (2005) (providing lethal injection as method of execution;

providing who may witness execution).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.476 (2005) (providing that inflicting lethal injection does not

constitute practicing medicine).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.478 (2005) (return of warrant after execution).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.482 (2005) (providing personal service of documents in death

warrant hearing).

Competency for Execution

The initial death warrant is issued after the circuit court conducts a hearing to address

the defendant’s competency to be executed. The court must order a state directed

competency evaluation if the defendant wishes to waive his or her right to counsel, if

the court has substantial reason to doubt defendant’s competency, or if requested by the

state. The court must conduct an additional hearing if either party contests the state

expert’s competency assessment. The court lacks jurisdiction to issue a death warrant

without a finding of competency. According to the Oregon Code, the circuit judge’s

competency determination is not appealable. 
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 183

Oregon Statutes:

Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.463 (2005) (providing for death warrant hearing addressing

competency; providing for no appeal of trial court order).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.464 (2005) (providing for competency assessment by state mental

health experts).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.466 (2005) (providing for hearing on contested competency

findings; providing for no appeal of trial court order). 

Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.482 (2005) (providing personal service of documents in death

warrant hearing).

Stays of Execution

The initial death warrant is issued after the supreme court affirms the judgment and

sentence on automatic review. See “Executions,” supra. However, the death sentence

is automatically stayed for 90 days and, if the defendant files a petition for certiorari,

the sentence is further stayed until the Supreme Court rules on the petition. 

Once the Oregon Supreme Court’s review is final, the death warrant is again

automatically stayed for 30 days to provide the defendant the opportunity to file a

notice of intent to file a postconviction review petition. If a notice of intent is filed and

the defendant files a postconviction petition within 90 days, the death warrant is stayed

until the postconviction petition is finally resolved. If the petition is not filed within 90

days following the notice of intent filing, the stay of execution will continue provided

the defendant demonstrates to the circuit court that progress is being made in the

preparation of the petition. 

Oregon Statutes:

Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.463 (2005) (providing for death warrant issued after hearing).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.686 (2005) (providing stays of execution to file petition for

certiorari and to file state postconviction petition).
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184 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Clemency Procedures

The state constitution provides that the governor shall have the power to grant

reprieves, commutations, and pardons for all offenses except treason. The governor’s

discretion is without limitation, except that the governor must exercise it in good faith.

The applicant must serve an application for clemency on the district attorney,

the state board of parole and postprison supervision, and the director of the department

of corrections. These agencies must provide the governor with all information and

records relevant to the application, including, but not limited to, photos of the victim,

statements by the victim’s family members, the autopsy report, and a statement by the

district attorney.

After receiving the application, the governor cannot grant a request for

clemency for at least thirty days. If the governor does not act upon the request within

180 days of receipt, the request lapses. The governor must report each reprieve,

commutation, or pardon to the Oregon Legislative Assembly and include a statement of

particulars for each case.

Ninth Circuit District Courts:

Delaney v. Shobe, 235 F. Supp. 662 (D. Or. 1964) (holding governor’s discretion is

without limitation, except that it must be exercised in good faith).

Oregon Statutes:

Or. Const. art. V, § 14 (providing for reprieves, commutations, pardons; power of

governor).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.649 (2005) (formerly § 144.640) (providing governor power to

grant reprieves).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.650(4) (2005) (providing that governor must act on clemency

request between thirty and 180 days of receipt).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.660 (2005) (providing communication to legislature by governor).
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WASHINGTON

History

After the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972),

the Washington Supreme Court held that the state’s death penalty statute violated the

Eight and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution because it provided no

guidance to control the sentencing authority in determining who would receive the

death penalty and who would receive a sentence of life imprisonment. See State v.

Baker, 81 Wash. 2d 281, 501 P.2d 284 (1972).

The Washington legislature’s 1976 amendment to the capital sentencing law

attempted to correct this problem by eliminating any discretion on the part of the

sentencing authority. The new law imposed a mandatory death penalty. However, in

light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280

(1976), the Washington Supreme Court held the amended statute unconstitutional. 

See State v. Green, 91 Wash. 2d 431, 588 P.2d 1370 (1979).

In 1981, the legislature enacted the current capital punishment scheme which 

provides for a bifurcated sentencing proceeding where the jury hears all evidence

relevant to mitigation.

United States Supreme Court:

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 238 (1976) (declaring mandatory death sentences

unconstitutional).

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 349 (1972) (holding complete, unguided discretion

capital punishment statute unconstitutional).

Ninth Circuit:

Brown v. Lambert, 431 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that under Campbell v.

Kincheloe, the Washington death penalty statute is facially valid and adequately

channels and guides jury sentencing discretion with respect to evidence of collateral
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186 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

convictions).

Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding death penalty statute

constitutional against attacks of unguided jury discretion, unbridled discretion of

prosecutor in seeking the death penalty, and mandatory presumption in favor of death

penalty), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948 (1988). 

Washington Supreme Court:

State v. Green, 91 Wash. 2d 431, 588 P.2d 1370 (1979) (holding Washington

mandatory death penalty statute unconstitutional), reconsidered on other grounds, 94

Wash. 2d 216, 616 P.2d 628 (1980).

State v. Baker, 81 Wash. 2d 281, 501 P.2d 284 (1972) (holding Washington death

penalty statute, which leaves imposition of penalty to unguided discretion of jury,

violates constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).

Washington Statutes:

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.050 (Supp. 2006) (providing special sentencing hearing for

aggravated first degree murder).

Capital Offenses

Aggravated first degree murder and treason are capital crimes in Washington. If found

guilty of aggravated first degree murder, a defendant receives either a death sentence or

a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release. Under Washington

law, mentally retarded or juvenile persons cannot be sentenced to death. Furthermore, 

in 2002 the United States Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304

(2002), that the execution of the mentally retarded constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment (see § 1.6), and in 2005 the Court

held in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), that the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments forbid the imposition of the death penalty on those who were under the

age of 18 at the time of the offense.

United States Supreme Court:

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that Eighth and Fourteenth
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 187

Amendments forbid imposition of death penalty on those who were under the age of 18

at time their crimes were committed).

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that executing the mentally retarded

violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).

Washington Supreme Court:

State v. Furman, 122 Wash. 2d 440, 858 P.2d 1092 (1993) (holding that a person under

eighteen years old when crime committed cannot be sentenced to death).

Washington Statutes:

Wash. Rev. Code § 9.82.010 (Supp. 2006) (providing capital punishment for treason).

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020 (Supp. 2006) (defining aggravated first degree murder).

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.030 (2002) (providing sentences for aggravated first degree

murder, providing for death penalty if warranted by special sentencing hearing;

prohibiting death penalty if defendant mentally retarded).

Representation in Capital Cases

An indigent capital defendant has a right to court-appointed counsel at trial, on appeal,

and for the first postconviction relief petition. The defendant may also request payment

of investigative, expert, and other services necessary for an adequate defense. 

In 1997, the Supreme Court of Washington adopted rules for the appointment

of counsel in death penalty cases. The trial court appoints at least two attorneys for

trial representation in a capital case. The supreme court, who also appoints counsel for

personal restraint petitions, appoints two attorneys for the direct appeal. The supreme

court will not appoint trial counsel for postconviction representation. The court will

appoint appellate counsel for postconviction representation only if appellate counsel

and petitioner request continued representation. The supreme court maintains a list of

counsel who meet capital case competency standards. The trial court must make

findings of fact if good cause is found for not appointing list counsel. In appointing

counsel on appeal, the supreme court will consider the list, but will have final

discretion in the appointment of counsel. 
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188 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Washington Statutes:

Wash. Rev. Code § 4.88.330 (2002) (providing payment by state for appellate review

counsel for indigent defendant).

Wash. Rev. Code § 7.36.250 (Supp. 2006) (providing waiver of filing fees and costs for

indigent in habeas proceeding).

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.150 (2002) (providing indigent capital defendant’s right to

counsel on first appeal and first postconviction petition; right to counsel on second and

subsequent postconviction petitions if collateral attack not barred).

Washington Rules:

Wash. Crim. R. 3.1 (providing right to and assignment of counsel generally).

Wash. R. App. P. 16.25 (providing for appointment of counsel for personal restraint

petition in capital cases; supreme court roster of death penalty qualified counsel).

Wash. Super. Ct. Spec. Proc. Crim. R. 2, as amended effective Jan. 1, 2003 (providing

for appointment of counsel in capital cases; supreme court roster of death penalty

qualified counsel).

Trial of Capital Offenses

The state superior court, which exercises original jurisdiction over civil and criminal

cases, tries all capital cases. Capital trials have two phases: a guilt phase and a penalty

phase. The state must file a notice of intent to pursue a capital sentence within thirty

days of arraignment. Before filing the notice, the state must determine whether

sufficient mitigating circumstances exist to merit leniency.

During the guilt phase, the jury determines whether the defendant is guilty of

aggravated first degree murder. Aggravating circumstances are: (1) murder of a law

enforcement officer, (2) defendant was imprisoned at time of murder, (3) murder for

financial gain, (4) solicited murder, (5) murder to maintain status in organization, (6)

drive-by shooting, (7) murder of judge, probation officer, or district attorney, (8)

murder to conceal crime or identity, (9) multiple murder victims, and (10) felony

murder. A defendant also commits aggravated murder when the victim has a
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restraining order against the defendant or when the victim is a family or household

member and the defendant has a history of violence against the victim. If the jury finds

at least one aggravating circumstance, it convicts the defendant of aggravated first

degree murder. The defendant is then subject to a separate sentencing proceeding to

determine whether there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency.

Washington Supreme Court:

State v. Thomas, 150 Wash. 2d. 821, 83 P.3d 970 (2004) (reversing a conviction for

aggravated first degree murder and the death sentence, the court agreed with the

defendant’s contention that the jury instruction and the aggravating factors special

verdict form given did not require the jury to find that defendant in particular had the

intent to murder or that the aggravating factors specifically applied to him as opposed

to his accomplice, and held that these instructional errors were not subject to a harmless

error analysis for purposes of upholding a death sentence because to do so would be to

find facts that increase the sentence beyond the statutory maximum). 

State v. Marshall, 144 Wash. 2d 266, 27 P.3d 192 (2001) (vacating guilty plea by

defendant to aggravated first degree murder after which death sentence was imposed,

and holding that where defendant moves to withdraw guilty plea on asserted basis of

defendant’s incompetence when plea was made, trial court must either grant motion to

withdraw guilty plea or convene formal competency hearing).

In re Brett, 142 Wash. 2d 868, 16 P.3d 601 (2001) (reversing convictions for

aggravated first degree murder and felony murder and vacating death sentence based on

ineffectiveness of defense counsel at guilt and penalty phase of trial, where counsel

knew or should have known of petitioner’s significant medical and mental conditions,

substantial medical opinion was available at time of trial to support defense theory, and

counsel failed to conduct reasonable investigation into medical and mental conditions).

State v. Roberts, 142 Wash. 2d 471, 17 P.3d 713 (2001) (holding jury instruction

unconstitutional that did not require a finding that the defendant personally caused the

victim’s death or was a major participant in the homicidal acts).

State v. Finch, 137 Wash. 2d, 975 P.2d 967 (1999) (holding that court abused discretion

shackling defendant during a capital sentencing hearing).

State v. Brown, 132 Wash. 2d 529, 940 P.2d 546 (1997) (holding that qualifying jurors

for a death case does not violate state constitution), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1007 (1998).
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190 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

State v. Clark, 129 Wash. 2d 805, 920 P.2d 187 (1996) (holding personal service of

notice of intent to seek death penalty not required; service required in accordance with

Civ. R. 5, governing service and filing of pleadings).

State v. Brett, 126 Wash. 2d 136, 892 P.2d 29 (1995) (holding robbery need not be

completed to be used as an aggravating factor; aggravating factors are sentencing

enhancements, not crimes; first degree murder is not a lesser included offense of

aggravated first degree murder; state’s reliance on multiple aggravating circumstances

constitutional), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1121 (1996).

State v. Ford, 125 Wash. 2d 919, 891 P.2d 712 (1995) (en banc) (holding trial court did

not abuse discretion continuing arraignment in first degree murder case where

defendant wanted to plead guilty but prosecutor indicated that it needed to disclose

exculpatory evidence, and then allowing prosecutor to amend information to charge

aggravated first degree murder).

State v. Dearbone, 125 Wash. 2d 173, 883 P.2d 303 (1994) (stating that good cause to

extend thirty-day notice period requires proof of an external impediment to compliance;

substantial compliance with terms of statute insufficient).

State v. Ortiz, 119 Wash. 2d 294, 831 P.2d 1060 (1992) (stating second degree felonymurder is not a lessor included offense of aggravated murder).

State v. Jeffries, 105 Wash. 2d 398, 717 P.2d 722 (holding, in regard to aggravating

circumstance pertaining to concealment of crime, that specific crime is not an element

of aggravated murder; it need not be stated nor proved; holding “crime” and “plan or

scheme” are not unconstitutionally vague), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 922 (1986).

Washington Court of Appeals:

State v. Baruso, 72 Wash. App. 603, 865 P.2d 512 (holding conviction for murder not

required to support jury’s finding of aggravated circumstance of more than one victim

in a “common scheme or plan”), review denied, 124 Wash. 2d 1008 (1994).

Washington Statutes:

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020 (2002) (requiring at least one aggravating circumstance

for finding defendant guilty of aggravated first degree murder; enumerating aggravating

circumstances).

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.040 (2002) (requiring notice of special sentencing hearing).
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Capital Sentencing

Penalty Hearing

When a jury convicts the defendant of aggravated murder, a separate sentencing

proceeding occurs where the jury hears evidence and determines whether the defendant

should receive a death sentence. The court with the consent of the parties has

discretion to waive the jury at the sentencing hearing. If the original jury is

unavailable, the court will convene a new jury.

Before the guilt phase of the trial begins, the court requires the state and the

defense to provide discovery that they anticipate offering at the sentencing proceeding. 

However, upon a showing of cause, the trial court has discretion to defer disclosure of

penalty phase evidence until completion of the guilt phase.

The Washington Rules of Evidence apply at sentencing. If the guilt phase

jury is not the sentencing jury, then the defense and the state may reintroduce evidence

concerning the facts and circumstances of the murder.

At the end of the sentencing hearing, the jury must return a special verdict on

the following question: “Having in mind the crime of which the defendant has been

found guilty, are you convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient

mitigating circumstances to merit leniency?” If a unanimous jury answers

affirmatively, the defendant receives a sentence of death.

As a matter of first impression, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that the

trial court need not conduct a colloquy to ensure that a capital defendant’s decision to

waive the right to present mitigating evidence was knowing, voluntary and intelligent. 

The court reasoned that the decision is akin to other trial strategy decisions and thus,

discussion with counsel is all that is required. State v. Woods, 23 P.3d 1046 (2001).

Ninth Circuit:

Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding jury instruction which required

unanimous “yes” or “no” answer to mitigation question violates due process), cert.

denied, 507 U.S. 951 (1993).
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192 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Washington Supreme Court:

In Re Woods, 154 Wash. 2d 400, 114 P.3d 607 (2005) (holding defense counsel were

not deficient in failing to present a mitigation case during the penalty phase where

counsel did investigate mitigation and were ready to put forth mitigation evidence but

defendant steadfastly objected to the presentation of mitigation evidence, and counsel

exercised reasonable professional judgment in abiding by defendant’s wishes). 

In Re Davis, 152 Wash. 2d 647, 101 P.3d 1 (2004) (holding that the failure of a capital

defendant’s attorney to object to defendant’s being shackled during the penalty phase

of the trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel requiring remand for a new

penalty phase trial, even though the jury’s opportunity to observe defendant in shackles

was partial and fleeting, since the focus in the penalty phase was not on guilt, but,

rather, on defendant’s character and future dangerousness).

State v. Clark, 143 Wash. 2d 731, 24 P.3d 1006 (2001) (reversing death sentence

because introduction of prior conviction went beyond scope of RCW 10.95.060(4) and

because evidence was unduly prejudicial), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1000 (2001).

State v. Woods, 143 Wash. 2d 561, 23 P.3d 1046 (2001) (holding that the trial court

need not conduct a colloquy to ensure that a capital defendant’s decision to waive the

right to present mitigating evidence was knowing, voluntary and intelligent), cert.

denied, 534 U.S. 964 (2001).

In re Brown, 143 Wash. 2d 431, 21 P.3d 687 (2001) (holding that claim of budgetary

constraints did not support finding of cruel and unusual punishment where petitioner

was provided at state expense services of three attorneys and four experts to assist in

preparation of defense against imposition of death penalty).

State v. Gentry, 125 Wash. 2d 590, 888 P.2d 1105 (following U.S. Supreme Court’s 

Payne decision in holding no per se state constitutional bar to victim impact evidence), 

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 843 (1995).

State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wash. 2d 631, 683 P.2d 1079 (1984) (holding that state due

process clause requires application of rules of evidence at sentencing).

Washington Statutes:

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.050(3) (2002) (providing jury at sentencing hearing).

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.060 (2002) (providing for admission of evidence at
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 193

sentencing proceeding, jury deliberation).

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.080 (2002) (providing for imposition of sentence upon

sentencing jury’s verdict).

Washington Rules:

Wash. Super. Ct. Spec. Proc. Crim. R. 4 (providing discovery in death sentence

proceeding).

Aggravating Circumstances

The guilt-phase jury considers circumstances in aggravation and in mitigation of a

death sentence. The sentencing-phase jury considers whether there are sufficient

mitigating circumstances to merit leniency.

Washington Statutes:

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020 (2002) (defining aggravated first degree murder as first

degree murder and at least one enumerated aggravating circumstance).

Mitigating Circumstances

In answering the sentencing interrogatory, the jury may consider any relevant factors

including but not limited to: (1) prior criminal history, (2) extreme mental disturbance

when murder committed, (3) defendant’s age, (4) victim’s consent, (5) defendant’s

participation compared to co-defendant’s participation, (6) duress, (7) incapacity to

appreciate wrongfulness of actions and (8) likelihood that defendant will pose a danger

to others in the future.

Washington Supreme Court:

State v. Davis, 141 Wash. 2d 798, 10 P. 3d 977 (2002) (finding jury could have found

that there was not sufficient evidence to merit leniency despite the introduction of

mental incapacity by physiologists and a difficult childhood ).
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194 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

State v. Elmore, 139 Wash. 2d 250 (1999) (affirming the constitutionality of RCW

10.95.060(4) rejecting the defendant’s argument that the instructions limited the jury to

find mitigating evidence that only related to the crime itself).

State v. Sagastegui, 135 Wash. 2d 67, 954 P.2d 1311 (1998) (stating a competent

defendant constitutionally entitled not to present any mitigating evidence at sentencing;

absence of mitigating evidence does not preclude mandatory appellate review).

State v. Brett, 126 Wash. 2d 136, 892 P.2d 29 (1995) (holding language “jury may

consider any relevant factors” is not arbitrary and capricious), cert. denied, 516 U.S.

1121 (1996).

Washington Statutes:

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.070 (2002) (enumerating possible mitigating factors).

Appellate Review of Capital Sentences

The Washington Supreme Court has jurisdiction over direct appeals of death penalty

cases and also conducts a mandatory death sentence review. To facilitate this review,

the superior court provides an information report to the supreme court, which includes: 

(1) personal and background information about the defendant, (2) procedural and

substantive information about the trial and sentencing proceeding, (4) information

about the victim, and (5) information about defendant’s counsel. The trial court

prepares this report after receiving input from both parties.

The supreme court consolidates the mandatory sentencing review and direct

appeal. On mandatory review, the supreme court must determine: (1) whether

sufficient evidence supports the death verdict, (2) whether the sentence of death is

excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both

the crime and the defendant, (3) whether the sentence is the result of passion or

prejudice, and (4) whether the defendant was mentally retarded.

At least thirty days prior to the commencement of the capital trial, the

defense must notify the prosecution if it intends to raise the defendant’s mental

condition at the sentencing hearing. If the defense intends to raise the defendant’s

mental condition, a mental expert designated by the prosecution examines the
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defendant. The expert’s results are disclosed to the prosecution only after the jury

returns a guilty verdict and defendant elects to proceed with a mentally ill sentencing

defense.

The parties may file briefs and present oral argument to the supreme court in

death sentence reviews. If the supreme court invalidates the sentence based upon

insufficient evidence, a proportionality analysis, or a finding of passion or prejudice,

the court remands the case to the trial court for resentencing. The court has one year to

make a determination and file an opinion on the mandatory sentence review.

Washington Supreme Court:

State v. Elledge, 144 Wash. 2d 62, 26 P.3d 271 (2001) (holding that defendant’s waiver

of right to directly appeal death sentence was made “knowingly, voluntarily, and

intelligently,” despite absence of expert testimony as to defendant’s competency to

make waiver, where defendant was questioned by counsel and trial court concerning

choice to accept death sentence and his answers demonstrated appreciation of

consequences of that decision; rejecting argument that special counsel be appointed to

investigate and present mitigating evidence).

State v. Brett, 126 Wash. 2d 136, 892 P.2d 29 (1995) (upholding statutory appellate

proportionality review as constitutional; stating purpose of review is to provide

additional assurance that sentence is not disproportionate, rather than to ensure

proportionality in the first instance), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1121 (1996).

State v. Dodd, 120 Wash. 2d 1, 838 P.2d 86 (1992) (holding capital defendant can

waive right of general review but cannot waive statutory review of death sentence).

Washington Statutes:

Wash. Rev. Code § 2.06.030 (2002) (providing for appellate jurisdiction over death

cases).

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.100 (2002) (providing supreme court mandatory review of

death sentence).

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.120 (2002) (requiring trial court to provide information

report to supreme court in aggravated murder cases).
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196 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.130 (2002) (setting forth consolidation of sentencing review

and appeal; briefing and oral argument; substance of sentencing review).

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.140 (2002) (providing for remand upon supreme court

decision). 

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.150 (2002) (providing one-year deadline for supreme court to

file opinion on mandatory sentence review).

Washington Rules:

Wash. R. App. P. 16.19–16.23 (defining rules of procedure for capital appeals).

Wash. R. Super. Ct. Proc. Crim. 5 (providing for mental examination of defendant).

Wash. R. Super. Ct. Proc. Crim. 6 (requiring counsel to submit proposed questionnaires

to trial court).

Collateral Remedies

The Washington Supreme Court established by rule a single procedure, a personal

restraint petition, for obtaining collateral relief in the appellate courts. This petition

replaces all postconviction common law remedies in the court of appeals and the

supreme court. The supreme court has original jurisdiction over personal restraint

petitions in capital cases.

Habeas relief is still available through a petition to the superior court,

although the superior court may transfer such a habeas petition to the appellate court

for consideration as a personal restraint petition.

A petitioner must file a collateral relief petition within one year after the

judgment becomes final. This limitation period is not applicable if the petitioner

alleges: (1) newly discovered evidence, (2) unconstitutional charging statute, (3)

double jeopardy, (4) insufficient evidence at trial, (5) illegal sentence, or (6) significant

retroactive change in the law.

Washington Supreme Court:

Petition of Runyan, 121 Wash. 2d 432, 853 P.2d 424 (1993) (holding one-year statute
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 197

of limitation for filing collateral relief petition does not violate state or federal equal

protection clauses).

In the Matter of Keene, 95 Wash. 2d 203, 662 P.2d 360 (1981) (holding conviction may

not be collaterally attacked on a nonconstitutional ground which could have been raised

on appeal).

Washington Statutes:

Wash. Rev. Code § 7.36.010, et seq. (2002) (addressing habeas corpus).

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090 (2002) (permitting one-year deadline for collateral

petition).

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.100 (2002) (enumerating exceptions to one-year statute of

limitation).

Washington Rules:

Wash. R. App. P. 16.3–16.15, 16.25–16.27 (providing personal restraint petition

procedures generally; special procedure in capital cases).

Wash. R. App. P. 16(3)(c) (providing Supreme Court with exclusive original

jurisdiction in capital personal restraint proceedings).

Postconviction Relief

Washington Rules of Appellate Procedure establish procedures for obtaining collateral

relief by way of a personal restraint petition. Appellate Rule 16.4(c) provides personal

restraint relief on the following grounds: (a) lack of jurisdiction, (b) violation of state

or federal constitution, (c) existence of new material facts, and (d) significant

retroactive change in the law.

The supreme court chief justice initially reviews a capital personal restraint

petition to determine whether the court can dispose of the petition based on the record

or whether the court must remand the petition for a determination on the merits or for a

limited hearing. If the court remands the petition for further findings, a superior court

in the county of conviction that was not involved in the original proceeding holds a
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198 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

hearing and forwards its findings of fact to the supreme court.

If the chief justice does not dismiss the petition as frivolous or remand it to

the superior court for a determination on the merits, a panel of supreme court justices

decides the petition.

Washington Rules:

Wash. R. App. P. 16.4 (listing grounds for personal restraint relief).

Wash. R. App. P. 16.11 (providing for chief judge’s initial determination petition).

Wash. R. App. P. 16.12 (providing for superior court hearing).

Wash. R. App. P. 16.13 (detailing procedure after reference hearing).

Wash. R. App. P. 16.26 (providing for discovery in capital personal restraint petitions).

Wash. R. App. P. 16.27 (addressing investigative and expert fees in capital personal

restraint petitions).

Habeas Corpus

The state’s appellate courts have original discretionary jurisdiction in habeas corpus

cases and consider all habeas petitions to be personal restraint petitions. The superior

court shares concurrent original jurisdiction of habeas corpus cases. Although the

superior court has discretion to transfer a habeas petition to the appellate court, it is not

required to do so. 

The only grounds for habeas relief are violations of the state or federal

constitution. As in personal restraint petitions, a one-year statute of limitation applies

to writs of habeas corpus.

Washington Supreme Court:

Toliver v. Olsen, 109 Wash. 2d 607, 746 P.2d 809 (1987) (holding superior court shares

concurrent original jurisdiction of habeas proceeding with appellate courts; Washington

Superior Court Criminal Rule 7.8(c)(2), which allows superior court to transfer motion

for vacation of judgment to appellate court to be considered as a personal restraint
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petition, applies to habeas petitions).

Washington Statutes:

Wash. Rev. Code § 7.36.040 (2002) (providing original jurisdiction over habeas

corpus).

Wash. Rev. Code § 7.36.130 (2002) (listing grounds for habeas relief).

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090 (2002) (setting one-year limit for habeas petition).

Washington Rules:

Wash. Crim. R.7.8(c)(2) (providing for superior court’s discretion to transfer habeas

petition to appellate court).

Appellate Review of Collateral Proceedings

A superior court decision in a personal restraint proceeding that is transferred for a

merits determination is reviewable to the same extent as any other trial court decision. 

A habeas determination is also reviewable; however, there is no express statutory

provision pertaining to review of collateral proceedings in capital cases. 

Washington Rules:

Wash. R. App. P. 16.14(b) (providing review of dismissal by superior court).

Procedural Bar/Waiver/Exhaustion

The appellate court will not consider a subsequent personal restraint petition unless the

petitioner certifies that he or she has not filed a previous petition on similar grounds

and shows good cause why he or she did not raise the new grounds in a previous

petition.

Generally, a defendant must exhaust his or her appeal before seeking

collateral remedies. However, a petitioner may pursue a constitutional claim if the

constitutional error attributed to petitioner’s actual and substantial prejudice.
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200 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Washington Supreme Court:

In re Reismiller, 101 Wash. 2d 291, 678 P.2d 323 (1984) (holding failure to raise

constitutional claim on appeal does not automatically bar claims in personal restraint

petition; to overcome bar, must demonstrate “actual and substantial prejudice”).

In re Keene, 95 Wash. 2d 203, 622 P.2d 360 (1980) (holding a conviction may not be

collaterally attacked upon nonconstitutional ground which could have been raised on

appeal but was not).

Washington Statutes:

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.140 (2002) (limiting collateral attack as to subsequent

petitions).

Execution

After the state supreme court affirms a death sentence, it remands the case to the

superior court for issuance of a death warrant. The trial court judge signs the warrant

and directs it to the superintendent of the state penitentiary. The superior court sets the

date of execution between thirty and ninety days from the date of the supreme court

remand. Lethal injection is the primary method of execution; however, the inmate may

choose execution by hanging. 

Washington allows up to seventeen witnesses to an execution. An interested

witness, who is required to submit an application to the superintendent of prisons, must

be a member of the media, the judiciary, the victim’s family, or the defendant’s family. 

The superintendent compiles a list of witnesses which is certified by the superior court.

Ninth Circuit:

Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.) (execution by hanging is not cruel and

unusual punishment), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1119 (1994).

Washington Statutes:

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.140 (2002) (providing affirmation of sentence; remand for
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 201

execution).

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.160 (2002) (providing for death warrant issuance).

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.180 (2002) (providing for lethal injection, or, at election of

defendant, hanging).

Stay of Execution

The clerk of the supreme court grants a stay of execution upon request of a petitioner

filing a first personal restraint petition. The en banc court grants stays pursuant to

subsequent petitions only upon a showing that the subsequent petition is not barred by

state law or supreme court rule. When a stay issued by any court of competent

jurisdiction is lifted, a new execution date is automatically set by the department of

corrections at thirty days after entry of the order lifting a stay.

Washington Supreme Court:

In re the Personal Restraint Petition of Lord, 123 Wash. 2d 737, 870 P.2d 964 (1994)

(holding order lifting stay is not inherent in the denial of a personal restraint petition;

such order is entered separately and simultaneously with a “certificate of finality”).

State v. Davis, 6 Wash. 2d 696, 717, 108 P.2d 641 (1940) (stating courts possess an

inherent power, independent of statutory authority, to act upon a showing of

supervening insanity, and, if necessary, to issue a stay of execution to permit a proper

and adequate investigation).

Washington Statutes:

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.160 (2002) (setting new execution date when stay lifted).

Washington Rules:

Wash. R. App. P. 16.24 (setting stay of execution in capital cases).
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202 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Competency for Execution

Procedures for determining whether a defendant is competent to be executed are set out

in State v. Harris, 114 Wash. 2d 419, 789 P.2d 60 (1990). The Harris court urged the

state legislature to address postconviction competency issues in capital cases. 

However, the legislature has not addressed these issues.

Washington Supreme Court:

State v. Harris, 114 Wash. 2d 419, 789 P.2d 60 (1990) (setting forth procedures to be

followed when capital prisoner’s mental state at issue).

Clemency Procedures

Clemency and pardoning powers are vested in the governor. After a recommendation

from the clemency and pardons board, the governor may commute a death sentence

only to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. The clemency and pardons

board may not recommend clemency without first conducting a hearing, of which the

prosecuting attorney must be notified. 

Washington Statutes:

Wash. Const. art. III, § 9 (setting forth pardoning power).

Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.885 (2002) (providing for clemency and pardons board;

petitions for review and commutation of sentences and pardons).

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.01.120 (2002) (providing for pardons, reprieves, commutations).

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.090 (2002) (setting forth sentence if death sentence

commuted).

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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 203

1. CONSTITUTIONALITY AND 

OTHER GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1.1 Constitutionality and Guided Discretion

In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Supreme Court held the death penalty

statutes of Georgia and Texas (and indirectly virtually every capital sentencing statute

in the country) unconstitutional because they permitted arbitrary and unguided

imposition of the death sentence. The Furman decision prompted over thirty states to

enact new capital punishment statutes. Beginning with Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153

(1976), the Court found a number of these statutes constitutional. According to the

Court, a death sentence may not be imposed unless the sentencing authority finds the

presence of at least one statutory aggravating factor and then weighs that factor against

the evidence of mitigating factors adduced by the defendant. In general, a system for

imposing the death penalty must focus on the circumstances of the crime and the

character of the individual defendant and must provide “specific and detailed guidance”

to the sentencing body.

Supreme Court:

Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994) (J. Blackmun, dissenting) (dissenting from the

denial of certiorari and concluding that U.S. Supreme Court Eighth Amendment law of

guided discretion and individualized sentencing is contradictory, and death penalty as

administered by Supreme Court is unconstitutional).

Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding Texas statute limiting capital

homicides to intentional and knowing murders committed in five specified situations,

and creating sentencing procedure that requires jury in penalty phase of bifurcated trial

to answer three questions affirmatively in order to sentence death, and also providing

for expedited review by state court).

Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (upholding Florida statute requiring sentencing

judge, after bifurcated trial and advisory jury verdict, to weigh aggravating and

mitigating circumstances when determining death sentence and set forth these findings

in writing, and also providing for automatic review by state supreme court of all death

sentences).
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204 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding Georgia statute requiring sentencing

judge or jury, in bifurcated trial, to find at least one of ten statutory aggravating

circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt when sentencing death, to consider any

additional mitigating or aggravating evidence, and to specify aggravating

circumstance(s) found, and also providing for direct review by state supreme court of

appropriateness of all death sentences).

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding Georgia and Texas death penalty

statutes cruel and unusual punishment due to sentencer’s arbitrary discretion and thus

declaring almost all death penalty statutes then in existence unconstitutional).

See generally:

William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View

from the Court, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 313 (1986) (providing behind the scenes summary,

by Justice Brennan, of Supreme Court death penalty views leading up to Furman).

Scott Burris, Note, Death and a Rational Justice: A Conversation on the Capital

Jurisprudence of Justice John Paul Stevens, 96 Yale L.J. 521 (1987) (hypothesizing

discussion between Justices Marshall, Rehnquist, and Stevens regarding issues of

rational justice in Furman and post-Furman cases).

Michael W. Combs, United States Supreme Court and Capital Punishment: 

Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Judicial Control, 7 S.U. L. Rev. 1 (1980) (analyzing

Supreme Court’s own uncertainty and ambiguity as seen through Gregg and its

progeny).

Edward J. Erler & Ernest O. Vincent, The California Supreme Court and the Death

Penalty, 2 Benchmark 143 (1986) (reviewing California death penalty history and

criticizing Bird Court’s approach). 

Mary R. Falk & Eve Cary, Death-Defying Feats: State Constitutional Challenges to

New York’s Death Penalty, 4 J.L. & Pol’y 161 (1995) (summarizing U.S. capital

jurisprudence and common constitutional challenges to death penalty and focusing on

likely challenges to New York’s new capital statute).

Daniel Givelber, The New Law of Murder, 69 Ind. L.J. 375, 397, 410 (1994) (analyzing

fate of parties in early death penalty cases under new post-Gregg law of aggravating

circumstances).

Arthur J. Goldberg, Memorandum to the Conference re: Capital Punishment, 27 S.
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Texas L. Rev. 493 (1986) (publishing memorandum by Justice Goldberg to fellow

Supreme Court Justices in 1963 prompting certiorari in later death penalty cases).

Gary Goodpaster, Judicial Review of Death Sentences, 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminology

786 (1983) (summarizing Furman and post-Furman cases, analyzing statutes, focusing

on arbitrariness).

Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here: The Death Penalty Moratorium

Movement in the United States, 73 U. Colo. L. Rev.1 (2002) (reviewing legal and

historical developments surrounding death penalty and current movement to place

moratorium on executions).

Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today’s

Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. 345

(1998) (focusing on aggravating and mitigating factors and arguing that “guided

discretion” has the constitutional problems of both mandatory death penalties and

unlimited discretion death penalties).

James S. Liebman, Esq., Jeffrey Fagan and Valerie West, A Broken System, Error Rates

in Capital Cases, 1973 - 1995, http://www.law.columbia.edu/instructionalservices/

liebman/liebman_final.pdf, (2000) (analyzing error rate in capital cases and concluding

capital punishment system in the United States if flawed), see also Barry Latzer and

James N.G. Cauthen, Capital Appeals Revisited, JUDICATURE, Sept.-Oct. 2000 and The

Meaning of Capital Appeals: A Rejoinder to Liebman, Fagan, and West, JUDICATURE,

Nov. - Dec. 2000 (arguing capital punishment system not “broken.”) and see also

James S. Liebman, Esq., Jeffrey Fagan and Valerie West’s replies in JUDICATURE,

Sept.-Oct. 2000 and JUDICATURE, Nov. - Dec. 2000.

Stephen R. McAllister, The Problem of Implementing a Constitutional System of

Capital Punishment, 43 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1039 (1995) (examining apparent

contradiction between guided discretion and individualized sentencing goals in

Supreme Court’s capital jurisprudence and suggesting Supreme Court resolve the

dilemma along lines of J. Thomas’ position that guided discretion principle be

reemphasized and individualized sentencing be narrowed).

Lewis F. Powell, Commentary: Capital Punishment, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1035 (1989)

(summarizing history of Furman and its progeny from perspective of retired Supreme

Court Justice Powell).

Paul Reidinger, A Court Divided, 73 A.B.A. J. 46 (Jan. 1987) (summarizing Furman

and its progeny, focusing on opinions of each justice).

Jordan M. Steiker, The Limits of Legal Language: Decisionmaking in Capital Cases, 94
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206 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Mich. L. Rev. 2590 (1996) (arguing that current body of death penalty law and guided

discretion is “disastrous”; proposing model jury instructions which return to relatively

unstructured capital sentencing).

Richard E. Wirick, Comment, Dark Year on Death Row: Guiding Sentencer Discretion

After Zant, Barclay, and Harris, 17 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 689, 692-97 (1984) (analyzes

sentencer discretion and summarizes guided discretion in Furman and later cases).

Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, A Punishment in Search of a Crime: 

Standards for Capital Punishment in the Law of Criminal Homicide, 46 Md. L. Rev.

115, 123-28 (1986) (analyzing statutes upheld in Gregg, Jurek, and Proffitt, in light of

Model Penal Code drafted before Furman).

1.2 Mandatory Death Sentences

After the Furman decision in 1972, several states chose one of two methods to amend

their death penalty statutes to avoid the “arbitrary and capricious” pitfalls of the

unguided discretion procedures invalidated by Furman. One method (now universally

accepted by those states that have the death penalty) provided guidance to the

sentencing body regarding the factors it should consider in imposing the death penalty. 

The Court upheld this approach in 1976 in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), 

Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). The

other method removed all discretion by providing for mandatory death sentences upon

conviction for certain offenses. On the same day that it decided Gregg, Proffitt, and

Jurek, the Supreme Court decided Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976),

and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), holding the mandatory method

unconstitutional. The Court determined that the Eighth Amendment proscription of

cruel and unusual punishment requires heightened reliability in death cases and that this

in turn requires that each defendant be evaluated individually to determine whether the

death penalty is an appropriate punishment for the particular crime.

 In these 1976 opinions, the Court noted one potential exception to the ban on

mandatory death sentences: defendants who committed murder while serving a

previously imposed life sentence. In 1987, however, the Court decided Sumner v.

Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987), eliminating even this potential exception to mandatory

death penalties. The Court held that an individualized sentencing determination is

required in each capital case, and therefore a mandatory death penalty even for murders
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committed by inmates serving life sentences without possibility of parole was

unconstitutional. 

Supreme Court:

Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) (upholding Arizona statute mandating that

court “shall” impose death penalty if it finds one or more aggravating circumstances

and finds mitigating circumstances insufficient for leniency, because statute does not

preclude consideration of mitigation, nor create presumption of death).

Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990) (upholding, based on Blystone, now changed

California jury instruction mandating that jury “shall” impose death sentence if it finds

aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating).

Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990) (upholding Pennsylvania statute

mandating death sentence if jury finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no

mitigating circumstances or finds aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating

circumstances, because consideration of mitigation satisfies constitutional

individualized sentencing requirement).

Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987) (holding now repealed Nevada mandatory death

penalty statute unconstitutional, even as applied to life prisoner convicted of murdering

fellow prisoner, because statute does not provide constitutionally required

individualized sentencing).

Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372 (1985) (upholding now-repealed Alabama statute

requiring jury, when convicting defendant of any of specified aggravated crimes, to

impose death sentence, but requiring judge, notwithstanding jury “sentence,” to weigh

aggravating and mitigating circumstances in sentencing death or life imprisonment).

Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (holding Louisiana statute specifying killing

of on-duty police officer as one of five mandatory death penalty homicides

unconstitutional because no consideration of mitigating factors).

Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (holding Louisiana mandatory death penalty

statute, restricting death penalty eligibility to five homicide categories and jury finding

of intent, unconstitutional for same reasons North Carolina statute unconstitutional in

Woodson).

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding North Carolina mandatory

death penalty statute unconstitutional because statute contrary to contemporary
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208 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

standards regarding mandatory death penalty, lack of jury standards satisfying Furman,

and failure to consider individual offender and offense).

Ninth Circuit:

Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 674–75 (9th Cir.) (upholding Washington statute

providing death sentence where jury finds beyond reasonable doubt insufficient

mitigating circumstances to merit leniency, because allows sentencer to consider any

mitigating factors), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1119 (1994).

Creech v. Arave, 947 F.2d 873, 886 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding Idaho statute mandating

that court “shall” sentence death upon finding an aggravating circumstance “unless” it

finds outweighing mitigating circumstances because satisfies individualized sentencing

requirement by allowing consideration of all relevant mitigation), rev’d on other

grounds, 507 U.S. 463 (1993).

See generally:

Peter G. Barber, Note, People v. Smith: Mandatory Death Laid to Rest, 49 Alb. L. Rev.

926 (1985) (analyzing, prior to Sumner, New York Court of Appeals case striking

down mandatory death penalty applied to life-term inmate convicted of murder,

reviewing New York history of death penalty, and analyzing U.S. Supreme Court and

New York Court of Appeals decisions regarding mandatory death penalty).

Jocelyn March Dreier, The Pennsylvania Death Penalty, Which Mandates a Sentence of

Death Upon a Finding of One Statutory Aggravating Circumstance and No Mitigating

Circumstance, Does Not Violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, 68 U. Det. L. Rev. 565 (1991) (discussing Blystone).

David S. Frankel, Note, The Constitutionality of the Mandatory Death Penalty for LifeTerm Prisoners Who Murder, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 636 (1980) (analyzing, prior to

Sumner, constitutionality of mandatory death penalty for life-term prisoners convicted

of murder, focusing on Alabama case, Harris v. State).

Andrea Galbo, Note, Death After Life: The Future of New York’s Mandatory Death

Penalty For Murders Committed by Life-Term Prisoners, 13 Fordham Urb. L.J. 597

(1985) (analyzing, prior to Sumner, constitutionality of mandatory death penalty for

life-term prisoners convicted of murder, focusing on New York statute and recent Court

of Appeals decision, People v. Smith).

Daniel R. Harris, Note, Capital Sentencing After Walton v. Arizona: A Retreat from the
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“Death is Different” Doctrine, 40 Am. U. L. Rev. 1389, 1394-1403 (1991)

(summarizing Furman and its progeny, and proposing that Walton represents a

departure from that precedent).

Philip E. Mackey, The Inutility of Mandatory Capital Punishment: An Historical Note,

54 B.U. L. Rev. 32 (1974) (summarizing American nineteenth century opinions of

mandatory death penalty, focusing on consequences of jury reluctance to sentence

death).

John W. Poulos, The Supreme Court, Capital Punishment and the Substantive Criminal

Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory Capital Punishment, 28 Ariz. L. Rev. 143

(1986) (reviewing history of capital jurisprudence up to Furman, and analyzing

legislative response of mandatory statutes, and 1976 Supreme Court cases invalidating

them).

1.3 Death Penalty for Crimes Other than Murder

In Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), the Court held that capital punishment is

inherently disproportionate, as opposed to comparatively disproportionate, and thus

unconstitutionally excessive for the crime of rape of an adult woman. The broad

application of this principle to cases such as rape of minors, treason, and terrorism,

however, has not been tested since the Court has heard only a few non-homicide cases

since Coker in which a court has sentenced a defendant to death.

At least one jurisdiction has held that a statute which allows a defendant who

is convicted of a rape of a child under the age of twelve to be sentenced to death is not

invalid on its face. In State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063 (La. 1996), the Louisiana

Supreme Court refused to hold as a mater of law that such a statute violated the Eighth

Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The Wilson court found

the age factor sufficient to potentially distinguish such a sentence from the result

prohibited by Coker.

Supreme Court:

Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (holding death penalty unconstitutional for

one who aids and abets a felony involving a murder but does not himself kill, attempt to

kill, intend to kill, or to use lethal force; objective societal evidence, disproportionality,

and lack of deterrent or retributive effect indicates death penalty is excessive
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210 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

punishment for “nontriggerman” who lacks intent).

Hooks v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (following Coker, reversing state death

sentence for rape conviction).

Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (holding death penalty disproportionate for

kidnapping and rape in which victim not killed).

Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding death penalty excessive and

disproportionate for rape of adult woman where rape victim not killed).

State Courts:

State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063 (La. 1996) (holding statute allowing death penalty for

rape of child under age of twelve is not cruel and unusual punishment), cert. denied,

520 U.S. 1259 (1997).

See generally:

Jennifer L. Cordle, State v. Wilson: Social Discontent, Retribution and the

Constitutionality of Capital Punishment for Raping a Child, 27 Cap. U. L. Rev. 135

(1998) (discussing State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063 (La. 1996).

David J. Karp, Note, Coker v. Georgia: Disproportionate Punishment and the Death

Penalty for Rape, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1714 (1978) (reviewing Coker, disagreeing with

rationale, and arguing for constitutionality of death penalty for rape and certain other

non-homicide crimes).

Pamela J. Lormand, Proportionate Sentencing for the Rape of a Minor: The Death

Penalty Dilemma, 73 Tul. L. Rev. 981 (1999) (analyzing the constitutionality of

Louisiana’s death penalty statute for rape of a minor under the age of twelve, and the

Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in light of U.S. Supreme Court precedent).

Debra C. Moss, Is Death Penalty for Killers Only?, 73 A.B.A. J. 54 (Jan. 1987)

(discussing Enmund and possibility of death penalty being extended beyond murder

cases, mentioning failed death penalty for espionage bill).

Project, Twenty-First Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme

Court and Courts of Appeals 1990-1991, 80 Geo. L.J. 939, 1530-33 (1992) (providing

brief summary of capital punishment proportionality law).
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Supreme Court Review, 68 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 601 (1977) (summarizing

holding, rationale, and arguments of justices in Coker opinion).

Pallie Zambrano, The Death Penalty Is Cruel and Unusual Punishment for the Crime of

Rape–Even the Rape of a Child, 39 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1267 (1999) (discussing the

appropriateness of the 1995 amendment to the Louisiana Criminal Code providing a

death sentence for a person convicted of the rape of a minor under the age of twelve).

1.4 Requirement of Competency to Execute

In Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), the Supreme Court held that the Eighth

Amendment prohibits a state from executing a prisoner who is insane. Although some

states have a higher standard, the constitutional threshold for sanity, according to

Justice Powell in his Ford concurrence, is the prisoner’s awareness of the execution as

well as the reason for it. Most state statutes refer to a prisoner’s “competence” to be

executed.

Ford also addressed procedural requirements necessary to determine a

condemned inmate’s sanity. If a capital prisoner alleges insanity in a habeas corpus

petition, the federal district court must determine if the state afforded the petitioner an

adequate fact-finding procedure on the claim. If so, the facts found by the state are

entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2000). If not,

there is no presumption of correctness, and the district court must hold an evidentiary

hearing on the claim. 

However, the U.S. District Court in Arizona remanded a Ford-based habeas

petition to state court for a competency hearing. Poland v. Stewart, 41 F. Supp. 2d

1037 (D. Ariz. 1999). The district court reasoned that, unlike the Florida statute struck

down in Ford, Arizona’s statute for determining a capital defendant’s competency was

not facially unconstitutional. The court considered the Anti-Terrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) restrictions on evidentiary hearings, and,

recognizing “judicial federalism,” concluded the state was the more appropriate forum

for conducting the hearing. 

The Ford Court left to the states the task of establishing a constitutionally

adequate procedure for determining a condemned’s sanity. In rejecting Florida’s
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procedure as unconstitutional, Ford suggests a few minimum requirements: (1) an

opportunity or hearing for the insane prisoner to present evidence and argument, (2)

decision-makers at the hearing who are separate from the prosecutorial or executive

branch of government, and (3) an opportunity for the prisoner to submit expert

psychiatric evidence and argument different from the state’s expert evidence. Justice

Powell’s concurrence specifically suggests that states should provide an impartial

officer or board to receive evidence, including expert evidence, and argument from the

prisoner’s counsel.

In Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998), the Supreme Court

addressed whether the AEDPA’s prohibition against successive petitions would

effectively eliminate the ability of prisoners to bring Ford claims in federal habeas

petitions. The Court determined that Villareal’s Ford claim was not a “second or

successive” petition, as that term is used in the AEDPA, and was therefore properly

before the district court.

Supreme Court:

Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998) (holding that a Ford claim initially

brought in a first petition but dismissed as unripe and later brought in a second petition

was not a successive petition prohibited by the AEDPA).

Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (holding Eighth Amendment prohibits

execution of the insane; finding Florida’s (1) failure to include prisoner in truth seeking

process, (2) denying prisoner opportunity to challenge state-appointed psychiatrists,

and (3) placement of decision-making power wholly in executive branch, amounted to

inadequate fact-finding procedure for determining sanity, and thus petitioner entitled to

evidentiary hearing on competence to be executed).

Ninth Circuit:

Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946 (9th Cir.) (denying requests for leave to file SOS

petition and for issuance of a certificate of appealability and holding that Ford v.

Wainwright was inapposite, because there was nothing in the record that suggested that

petitioner's age of 75 and physical infirmities rendered him unable to comprehend the

nature and purpose of the death penalty that he faced), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1140

(2006).
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District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (D. Ariz. 2001) (granting evidentiary

hearing on competency because state’s statutory scheme offered no hearing after state’s

chief medical officer unilaterally determined that the petitioner had regained

competency). 

Poland v. Stewart, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (D. Ariz. 1999) (remanding a Ford claim

brought in habeas petition to state court for a competency hearing). 

See generally:

Rachelle D. Dick, Note, Ford v. Wainright: Warning–Sanity on Death Row May Be

Hazardous to Your Health, 47 La. L. Rev. 1351 (1987) (reviewing Ford and focusing

on proper procedural requirements for determining competence in Louisiana).

Roberta M. Harding, “Endgame:” Competency and the Execution of Condemned

Inmates–A Proposal to Satisfy the Eighth Amendment’s Prohibition Against the

Infliction of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 14 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 105 (1994)

(addressing need to revise competency-to-execute model in light of Ford to resolve

Eighth Amendment dilemmas left after Ford and reduce number of executions which

violate Supreme Court law).

Joseph H. Hickey, Note, Ford v. Wainright: The Supreme Court Reconsiders the

Procedural Requirements for Post-Conviction Sanity Determinations, 18 Toledo L.

Rev. 919 (1987) (reviewing Ford and analyzing requirements and ramifications of Ford

on state procedure for determining sanity of death row inmates).

Stephen L. Ihm, Note, Ford v. Wainright, The Eighth Amendment, Due Process and

Insanity on Death Row, 7 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 89 (1986) (analyzing existing precedent

found not to control issue of execution of insane, historical background of Ford, and

basis for Ford decision, and also examining practical impact on states when attempting

to meet constitutional requirements in executing the insane).

Gordon L. Moore III, Note, Ford v. Wainright: A Coda in the Executioner’s Song, 72

Iowa L. Rev. 1461 (1987) (analyzing Ford’s lack of standards for minimum due

process of state procedures for determining insanity, and arguing for stricter standards

to back up Ford basic requirements).

Sanford M. Pastroff, Note, Eighth Amendment–The Constitutional Rights of the Insane

on Death Row, 77 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 844 (1986) (summarizing Ford opinion
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and interpreting what procedures necessary to satisfy due process requirements for

determining sanity).

Robert F. Schopp, Wake Up and Die Right: The Rationale, Standard, and

Jurisprudential Significance of the Competency to Face Execution Requirement, 51 La.

L. Rev. 995 (1991) (analyzing existing justifications for rule that insane may not be

executed, and proposing alternative rationales and jurisprudential issues).

Esmeralda D. Yu, Note, Constitutional Law: The Death Penalty and the Insanity

Defense–Ford v. Wainwright, 10 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 253 (1987) (summarizing Ford

and critiquing rationales of each Justice).

1.4.1 Involuntary Administration of Anti-Psychotic Drugs

In Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), the Supreme Court held that treating a

mentally ill prisoner with anti-psychotic drugs against his or her will does not violate

substantive due process if the prisoner is dangerous to himself or herself or others and

the treatment is in the prisoner’s medical interest. In Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38

(1990), the Court examined the constitutionality of the involuntary administration of

such drugs to treat death row prisoners to competency. Instead of answering the

question, however, the Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of

Harper. On remand, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that such involuntary

medication was both cruel and unusual punishment and a violation of privacy. The

court did not apply Harper because it recognized that medication used on death row

prisoners is administered for neither the protection nor the medical interest of the

prisoner.

The Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionality of administering

drugs to incompetent detainees against their will in order to make them competent for

trial. In Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992), the Court found that forced

administration of such drugs before or during trial is unconstitutional without a

showing that the drugs are in the defendant’s best medical interest, because it may

interfere with the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a full and fair trial and a

due process liberty interest in freedom from unwanted drugs. 
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Supreme Court:

Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (holding forced administration of antipsychotic drug to defendant at trial violates Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

where no showing that drugs given in prisoner’s best medical interest).

Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990) (vacating Louisiana trial court’s decision that

state may administer psychotropic drugs to render mentally ill prisoner competent to be

executed and remanding for reconsideration in light of Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S.

210 (1990)).

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (holding that forcible injection of

medication into nonconsenting person’s body is substantial interference with liberty

interest, but, because of state’s unique interest in prison safety and security, due process

allows such involuntary treatment where there is determination that inmate is

dangerous to self or others and treatment is in inmate’s medical interest).

State Courts:

State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992) (holding involuntary medication

of incompetent death row prisoners violates state constitutional prohibition against

cruel and unusual punishment and right to privacy; Harper inapplicable because

medication administered for neither protection nor medical interest of death row

prisoner).

See generally:

Keith A. Byers, Incompetency, Execution, and the Use of Anti-psychotic Drugs, 47 Ark.

L. Rev. 361 (1994) (summarizing legal, medical, and ethical issues in use of antipsychotic drugs to render condemned prisoners competent for execution, and reviewing

latest law on subject, including Ford, Perry, and Harper).

Kristen W. Crosby, Comment, State v. Perry: Louisiana’s Cure-to-Kill Scheme Forces

Death Row Inmates to Choose Between a Life Sentence of Untreated Insanity and

Execution, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 1193 (1993) (critiquing Ford and Perry, arguing druginduced competence is insufficient for execution).

M. Catherine Healy, Comment, Riggins v. Nevada: Are “Synthetically Sane” Criminal

Defendants Competent to Stand Trial?, 20 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement

384 (1994) (analyzing Riggins v. Nevada).
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Douglas Mossman, M. D., The Psychiatrist and Execution Competency: Fording

Murky Ethical Waters, 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1 (1992) (analyzing psychiatrists’

ethical dilemmas of treating mentally incompetent death row prisoners).

William P. Ziegelmueller, Supreme Court Review: Sixth Amendment–Due Process on

Drugs: The Implications of Forcibly Medicating Pretrial Detainees with Antipsychotic Drugs: Riggins v. Nevada, 83 J. Crim. L. 836 (1993) (reviewing Riggins and

anti-psychotic drugs in general and arguing that Riggins should be read as requiring

strict scrutiny of any governmental administration of unwanted anti-psychotic drugs to

pretrial detainees).

1.4.2 Competency to “Volunteer”

Courts are seeing an increasing number of death row inmates wishing to forgo their

appeals, sometimes at the state level and sometimes later during federal habeas

proceedings. Either the condemned’s attorney, if the condemned is represented at the

time, or a next friend, will petition either the state or federal court for a competency

determination. The court’s inquiry is twofold: firstly, is the condemned competent to

withdraw his consent to proceed with his appeal and, secondly, is the condemned

competent to be executed. See §§ 6.2.6, et. seq. and 6.3.4.4.4, infra, for additional

discussion.

Ninth Circuit:

Dennis ex rel. Butko v. Budge, 378 F.3d 880 (9th Cir.) (holding that prisoner’s capacity

to make decision to forego further appeals of his death sentence was not substantially

affected by mental illness, and therefore prisoner’s former attorney failed to establish

“next friend” status; holding that to establish next friend status one must (1) provide an

adequate explanation–such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other

disability–why the real party in interest cannot appear to prosecute the action; and (2)

next friend must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf

he or she seeks to litigate; also holding that evidence showing that prisoner’s decision

to seek execution is the product of a mental disease does not show that prisoner lacks

the capacity to make a rational choice and that it is the latter that matters; concurring in

the judgment, Judge Berzon would explicitly adopt the three-pronged approach of

Rumbaugh v. Procunier, 753 F.2d 395 (5th Cir.1985): (1) Is the person suffering from a

mental disease or defect? (2) If the person is suffering from a mental disease or defect,
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does that disease or defect prevent him from understanding his legal position and the

options available to him? (3) If the person is suffering from a mental disease or defect

which does not prevent him from understanding his legal position and the options

available to him, does that disease or defect, nevertheless, prevent him from making a

rational choice among his options), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 959 (2004).

Comer v. Stewart, 215 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2000) (remanding for evidentiary hearing on

issue whether petitioner competent to validly withdraw consent to proceed with

appeal).

Miller v. Stewart, 231 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir.) (staying execution and remanding for

hearing whether petitioner is competent to elect to die; finding that state court’s Faretta

hearing in 1998 did not address issue whether in November 2000 petitioner is

competent to forgo his federal habeas appeals; finding next friend status of petitioner’s

former attorney sufficient for evidentiary hearing. But see dissent by Rymer, J., finding

that next friend did not make threshold showing of petitioner’s incompetence and

concluding that evidentiary hearing not warranted), stay vacated sub. nom. Stewart v.

Miller, 531 U.S. 986 (2000).

See generally:

John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: “Volunteers,” Suicide and Competency, 103

Mich. L. Rev. 361 (2005) (summarizing the current legal standards for volunteering

and assisted suicide and proposing a standard for assessing waiver which takes in takes

into account the prevalence of a suicidal motivation among volunteers).

1.5 Prohibition of Execution of Minors

In Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), the Supreme Court held that executing

those who were under the age of 16 at the time of their offense violates the Eighth

Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment prohibition. The Court based its

conclusion on society’s “evolving standards of decency,” as reflected in existing

legislation, and on the reduced culpability of juveniles due to their lesser experience,

maturity, and education. A year later, in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989),

the Court held that the imposition of death sentences upon individuals who were 16 or

17 years old at the time of their crime, however, does not violate the Eighth

Amendment. The Court found no clear societal consensus against such executions
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reflected in the relevant state or federal law.

Following the decision in Stanford, the Supreme Court reconsidered the issue

and held in Roper v Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), that the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments forbid the imposition of the death penalty on those who were under the

age of 18 at the time their crimes were committed. The Court said that, as in Atkins v.

Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the objective indicia of national consensus-- the

rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of states; the infrequency of its

use even where it remains on the books; and the consistency in the trend toward

abolition of the practice--provide sufficient evidence that today society views juvenile

as “categorically less culpable than the average criminal.” The Court concluded that

both objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by legislative enactments

and the Court’s own determination in the exercise of its independent judgment,

demonstrate that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for juveniles.

Additionally, by statute, the imposition of the death penalty for federal

crimes is limited to those over eighteen at the time of the offense, see infra § 5.1.

Prior to the decision in Roper, California, Montana, and Oregon prohibited

executing defendants who were under the age of 18 during the commission of the

crime, and Nevada prohibited executing defendants who were under the age of 16

during the commission of the crime. Also, it has been held by the Washington Supreme

Court in State v. Furman, 122 Wash. 2d 440, 858 P.2d 1092 (1993) that a person under

eighteen years old when the crime was committed cannot be sentenced to death. In

2005 Nevada enacted legislation raising the threshold age for imposition of the death

penalty to 18.

Supreme Court:

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the

age of 18 when their crimes were committed).

In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968 (2002) (mem.) (denying petition for writ of habeas corpus;

but see dissenting opinion of Stevens, J. (joined by Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., and Breyer,

J.,), expressing view that there were no valid procedural objections to reconsideration

of issue of whether Eighth Amendment prohibits capital punishment for offense
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committed by one under age of eighteen, and that given decision in Atkins v. Virginia,

Court should reconsider issue; noting that since Stanford v. Kentucky was decided in

1989, four state legislatures and the Supreme Court of Washington have forbidden such

execution).

Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984 (2002) (mem.) (denying stay of execution of sentence

of death for crime petitioner committed when seventeen; but see dissenting opinions of

Stevens, J. and Ginsburg, J. (joined by Breyer, J.). expressing view that it was time to

revisit issue of whether Eighth Amendment prohibits capital punishment for crime

committed while under eighteen).

Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding Eighth Amendment not violated by

imposition of death sentence on sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds; not contrary to

“evolving standards of decency” because pattern of existing legislation insufficient to

establish societal consensus against execution of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds).

Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (holding Eighth Amendment, defined by

“evolving standards of decency,” violated by execution of those under sixteen when

crime committed because state statutes and jury determinations show societal

consensus against such execution; juveniles receive reduced culpability because less

experienced, mature, educated, and intelligent, and more susceptible to influence than

adults).

Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (holding mitigating evidence of family

history and emotional disturbance must be considered at death sentencing; for sixteen

year old defendant, evidence of turbulent family history, abuse, and emotional

disturbance especially relevant as mitigating factors; stating youth less mature,

responsible than adults).

Federal Statutes:

18 U.S.C. § 3591 (2000) (prohibiting enforcement of federal death penalty on those

under eighteen at time of crime).

State Statutes in Ninth Circuit:

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(G)(5) (Supp. 2005), (including age as mitigating factor).

Cal. Penal Code § 190.5 (West 1999) (prohibiting imposition of death penalty on

defendant less than 18 at time of crime).
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Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-102 (2005) (prohibiting imposition of death penalty on

defendant less than 18 at time of crime).

NRS § 176.025 (2005) (prohibiting imposition of death penalty on defendant less than

18 at time of crime).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.707 (2005) (prohibiting death penalty for offenders under 18 at

time of offense).

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.070 (2002) (listing age as a mitigating factor).

See generally:

Lisa K. Arnett, Comment, Death at an Early Age: International Law Arguments

Against the Death Penalty for Juveniles, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 245 (1988) (reviewing

Thompson in light of international law regarding death penalty for juveniles).

Laura Dalton, Note, Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri: A Violation of An

Emerging Rule of Customary International Law, 32 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 161 (1990)

(summarizing customary international law and treaties regarding death penalty and

juveniles, and U.S. reliance and duty to follow, and critiques Stanford in light of

international law).

Katherine Hunt Federle, Emancipation and Execution: Transferring Children to

Criminal Court in Capital Cases, 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 447 (1996) (arguing against

judicial transfer provisions allowing minors to be tried as adults and lowering age

required for adult trial; proposing alternative analysis for constitutionality of a juvenile

death penalty and need for reform).

Robert P. Gritton, Note, Capital Punishment: New Weapons in the Sentencing Process,

24 Ga. L. Rev. 423 (1990) (summarizing 1990 Supreme Court philosophy on death

penalty and modern effect of Supreme Court rulings on death penalty for juveniles and

mentally retarded).

Joseph L. Hoffman, On the Perils of Line-Drawing: Juveniles and the Death Penalty,

40 Hastings L.J. 229 (1989) (analyzing retributive purpose and effect of juvenile death

penalty, arguing ban on juvenile death penalty cannot be supported by retributive

justice principles).

Sherri Jackson, Note, Too Young to Die–Juveniles and the Death Penalty–A Better 
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Alternative to Killing Our Children: Youth Empowerment, 22 New Eng. J. on Crim. &

Civ. Confinement 391 (1996) (arguing that imposition of death penalty on juveniles is

cruel and unusual punishment, and offering alternatives to respond to juvenile

offenses).

Jennifer Seibring Marcotte, Comment, Death Penalty for Minors: Who Should

Decide?, 20 S. Ill. U. L.J. 621 (1996) (arguing against Supreme Court’s arbitrarily

established minimum age for death sentencing and that it should be left to state

legislatures).

Tanya M. Perfecky, Note, Children, the Death Penalty and the Eighth Amendment: An

Analysis of Stanford v. Kentucky, 35 Vill. L. Rev. 641 (1990) (analyzing Stanford in

light of precedent, American norms, and international law and custom on execution of

minors, and arguing Stanford holding inadequate).

1.6 Prohibition of Execution of the Mentally Retarded

In Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I), 492 U.S. 302 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the

Eighth Amendment does not categorically prohibit imposition of the death penalty

upon the mentally retarded. The Court found no societal consensus against the

execution of the mentally retarded and held that where a mentally deficient defendant is

found competent to stand trial, and thus sane–meaning able to appreciate the

wrongfulness of his or her actions–the Constitution does not prohibit the imposition of

a death sentence on that defendant. Mental retardation must be considered as a 

mitigating factor in determining a death sentence, however, to ensure the individual

consideration of each offender and offense.

Subsequently in Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (Penry II), the

Supreme Court held that the jury instructions given at the defendant’s resentencing did

not comply with the mandate in Penry I that the jury be able to “consider and give

effect to [a defendant’s mitigating] evidence in imposing sentence” and that the jury

instructions were internally inconsistent. The Court held that the supplemental

instruction, which stated that the jury could say “no” to one of the special issues, if the

jury believed that a life sentence was appropriate in light of mitigating circumstances,

but also stated that the jury should answer “no” to the special issue only if it found

reasonable doubt to give a “yes” answer, provided an “inadequate vehicle for the jury

to make a reasonable moral response to Penry’s mitigating evidence. Id at 799-800.
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On June 20, 2002, the Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.

304 (2002), that executions of mentally retarded individuals convicted of capital

crimes are cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Stating

that it was fair to say that a national consensus has developed against executions of

mentally retarded persons, the Court noted that in the intervening 13 years since Penry

I, 18 state legislatures have passed laws limiting the death eligibility of certain

defendants based on mental retardation alone. The Court stated that it was not so much

the number of these states that was significant, but the consistency of the direction of

change. The Court reasoned that given that anticrime legislation is far more popular

than legislation protecting violent criminals, the large number of states prohibiting the

execution of mentally retarded persons (and the complete absence of legislation

reinstating such executions) provided “powerful evidence that today society views

mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the average criminal.”

As to what constitutes mental retardation, the Court pointed out that not all people who

claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally

retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus. The Court held that it

would leave to the states the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the

constitutional restriction upon its execution of sentences.

Federal law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for a federal crime,

see infra § 5.1, on those who are mentally retarded or disabled to the point of not

understanding the death penalty to be imposed. Federal law also prohibits federal

execution of pregnant women.

 Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, and Washington have enacted

legislation that expressly prohibits execution of the mentally retarded.

Supreme Court:

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that executing the mentally retarded

violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).

Penry v. Johnson (Penry II), 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (holding that jury instructions given

at resentencing failed to comply with mandate of Penry I that jury was to consider and

give effect to [a defendant's mitigating] evidence in imposing sentence).
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Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I), 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (holding Eighth Amendment does not

categorically prohibit execution of mentally retarded capital offenders; where mentally

retarded defendant found competent to stand trial, and thus sane, execution not

prohibited because no national consensus against execution of mentally retarded; where

mitigating evidence of mental retardation is presented, jury must be given opportunity

to consider it in determining sentence).

Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987) (holding not ineffective assistance of counsel to

fail to fully investigate defendant’s background for mitigating circumstances where

seventeen-year-old defendant has IQ of eighty-three and functioning ability of twelveyear-old).

Ninth Circuit:

United Mexican States v. Woods, 126 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir.1997) (stating in footnote two

that claim that petitioner’s execution would violate customary international law since

he was retarded was not binding on United States and did not require a qualitatively

different analysis than the incompetence to be executed claim already undertaken), cert.

denied, 523 U.S. 1075 (1998).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Odle v. Vasquez, 754 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (finding imposition of death

penalty on defendant with brain lobectomy not disproportionate under Eighth

Amendment because capacity in light of mental retardation is question of fact, not law,

and jury given sufficient information to conclude competency).

Other Circuits:

Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2002) (following remand from the Supreme

Court to reconsider in light of Atkins v. Virginia, holding that as to petitioner who

consistently offered clinical evidence of mental retardation since his first trial in the

1970s, habeas petition should be dismissed without prejudice so that State of Texas

could reconsider case in light of Atkins; stating that inferior federal courts have no

useful role to play until and unless following Atkins, death sentence is reaffirmed or

again imposed by state courts; noting that Supreme Court neither conclusively defined

mental retardation nor provided guidance on how its ruling should be applied to

prisoners already convicted of capital murder).

Bird v. Collins, 924 F.2d 67 (5th Cir.) (finding, on the facts, that district court should
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not have raised, sua sponte, unexhausted Penry claim not raised in habeas petition),

cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1213 (1991).

Federal Statutes:

18 U.S.C. § 3596 (2000) (prohibiting enforcement of federal death penalty on mentally

retarded, insane, and pregnant persons).

State Statutes in Ninth Circuit:

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(B) (Supp. 2005) (prohibiting imposition of death

penalty on person suffering from mental retardation pursuant section 13-703.02 and

imposing sentence of life imprisonment instead).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.02 (Supp. 2005), (providing for I.Q. screening of capital

defendants; prohibiting imposition of death penalty on person suffering from mental

retardation).

Cal. Penal Code § 1376 (West Supp. 2006) (prohibiting imposition of death 

penalty on defendant who is mentally retarded; providing for hearing to determine

mental retardation).

Idaho Code § 19-2515A (Supp. 2005) (prohibiting execution of mentally retarded

person).

NRS § 174.098 (2005) (specifying procedures for filing motion to declare that capital

defendant is mentally retarded).

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.030 (2002) (prohibiting imposition of death sentence on

those mentally retarded at time of crime).

See generally:

Samuel R. Gross, Update: American Public Opinion on the Death Penalty--It’s 

Getting Personal, 83 Cornell L.Rev.1448, 1468 (1998) (public opinion on execution of

mentally retarded individuals).

Rebecca Dick-Hurwitz, Comment, Penry v. Lynaugh: The Supreme Court Deals a

Fatal Blow to Mentally Retarded Capital Defendants, 51 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 699 (1990)

(summarizing Penry, death penalty in general, and rationale behind Penry, arguing it

reflects Supreme Court’s misunderstanding of mental retardation, and thus Penry
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wrongly decided).

Denis W. Keyes and William J. Edwards, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty:

Current Status of Exemption Legislation, 21 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 687

(1997) (summarizing the current status of legislation regarding capital punishment and

mental retardation and juxtaposing with public opinion).

Juliet L. Ream, Note, Capital Punishment for Mentally Retarded Offenders: Is It

Morally and Constitutionally Impermissible?, 19 Sw. U. L. Rev. 89 (1990) (reviewing

Eighth Amendment death penalty jurisprudence, mental retardation, mental illness, and

youth, and criticizing Penry opinion, arguing justifications for exempting insane and

young should apply to mentally retarded offenders).

David L. Rumley, A License to Kill: The Categorical Exemption of the Mentally

Retarded from the Death Penalty, 24 St. Mary’s L.J. 1299 (1993) (summarizing mental

deficiency in general, characteristics of mentally retarded, and recently enacted state

statutes setting IQ minimums for execution, and supporting Supreme Court’s refusal to

categorically exempt such offenders from capital punishment).

Joshua N. Sondheimer, Note, A Continuing Source of Aggravation: The Improper

Consideration of Mitigating Factors in Death Penalty Sentencing, 41 Hastings L.J. 409

(1990) (reviewing constitutional requirements of capital punishment statutes, and

application of certain factors, such as mental deficiency, as “double-edged sword” of

both aggravating and mitigating weight, and arguing that modern death penalty

schemes allowing such misapplication of mitigation is unconstitutionally arbitrary).

William K. Wetzonis, Note, Capital Punishment for Mentally Retarded Defendants: A

Boundary for the Eighth Amendment is Drawn, 34 How. L.J. 651 (1991) (summarizing

Penry and problems of capital punishment for mentally retarded offenders, and arguing

Court should extend Eighth Amendment protection to prevent mentally retarded

execution).

1.6.1 Retroactivity of Atkins

The two exceptions to the rule in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) are: (1) rules

placing certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the

criminal law to proscribe, and (2) procedures implicit in the concept of ordered liberty

without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished. In

Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), the Court noted that the first exception should

also apply to rules “prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of
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defendants because of their status or offense.” In that case, the Court indicated that if it

had announced a new rule that mentally retarded defendants could not be sentenced to

death, then such a rule would satisfy the first exception. In Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d

330 (5th Cir. 2002), citing Penry, the Fifth Circuit held that Atkins constitutes an

exception to the nonretroactivity rule of Teague.

Other Circuits:

Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that Atkins v. Virginia

constitutes exception to nonretroactivity rule of Teague v. Lane, and therefore

retroactivity applied to capital habeas case in which petitioner had consistently offered

clinical evidence of his mental retardation since first trial in 1970s).

1.7 Requisite Mental State at Time of Offense for Imposition of Judgment of Death

In Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), the Supreme Court held that the Eighth

Amendment forbids the execution of “one who neither took life, attempted to take life,

nor intended to take life.” Specifically, a person who aids and abets a felony in the

course of which a murder is committed by another cannot be executed absent a finding

that he or she killed, attempted to kill, or intended or contemplated that life would be

taken or that lethal force would be employed. In Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137

(1987), the Supreme Court held that a capital sentence does not violate the Eighth

Amendment where a defendant both possesses a mental state of “reckless indifference

to the value of human life” and is a major participant in the felony that resulted in

murder. 

In Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986), the Court resolved a split of

authority between the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits and held that a determination of

Enmund culpability need not be made by a jury or even by the trial court. Under

Cabana, Enmund is satisfied if the factual culpability determination is made at any time

in the state proceedings by the jury, the trial judge, or the appellate court. This state

court finding is entitled to a presumption of correctness in federal court, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2000).

In Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88 (1998), the Supreme Court refused to

extend the Enmund holding to require that a second degree murder instruction that
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includes a mens rea element be given to juries in capital felony murder cases. The

Court held that the Enmund rationale applies only when determining the propriety of a

capital sentence, not when deciding whether a defendant is guilty of a particular charge.

Supreme Court:

Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88 (1998) (holding that the Enmund rationale applies only

when determining the propriety of a capital sentence, not when deciding whether a

defendant is guilty of a particular charge).

Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (holding death penalty not cruel and unusual

punishment for major participant in felony that resulted in murder and who had mental

state of reckless indifference to human life).

Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986) (holding states may make Enmund

determination of culpable intent at any point in state trial or appellate proceedings;

where state court failed to make any Enmund finding, federal court should require

state’s own judicial system to make intent findings in first instance).

Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (holding death penalty unconstitutional for

one who aids and abets a felony involving a murder but did not himself kill, attempt to

kill, intend to kill or to use lethal force; objective societal evidence, disproportionality,

and lack of deterrent or retributive effect indicates death penalty is excessive

punishment for “nontriggerman” who lacks intent).

Ninth Circuit:

Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding, even where trial court

never specifically found Enmund intent, death penalty permissible because jury

instructed on both premeditation and felony murder, and sufficient evidence of

petitioner’s intent to participate in murder was presented), rev’d on other grounds, 506

U.S. 40 (1992).

Greenawalt v. Ricketts, 943 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding state findings that

petitioner was active participant and knowingly created a grave risk of death is

sufficient to satisfy Enmund requisite culpability), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 888 (1992).

McKenzie v. Risley, 801 F.2d 1519, 1530-31 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding, pursuant to

Cabana, trial judge’s factual findings of intent sufficient to satisfy Enmund culpability,

even if jury made no specific finding of intent), vacated on other grounds, 842 F.2d
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1525 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 901 (1988).

State Courts:

State v. Roberts, 142 Wash. 2d 471, 17 P.3d 713 (2001) (affording condemned

defendant great right under Washington Constitution than federal constitution and

holding that major participation in the act giving rise to a homicide is required to

convict capital defendant under an accomplice theory).

See generally:

Roy Conn III, Note, Constitutional Law–Imposition of the Death Penalty is Violative of

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments Where One Neither Took Life, Attempted to

Take Life, nor Intended to Take Life: Enmund v. Florida, 26 How. L.J. 1679 (1983)

(reviewing Supreme Court cases before Enmund, analyzing and supporting Enmund

conclusion).

Andrew H. Friedman, Note, Tison v. Arizona: The Death Penalty and the NonTriggerman: The Scales of Justice are Broken, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 123 (1989)

(analyzing Tison, arguing that it reverses Enmund’s requirement of intent to kill,

arguing Court fails to provide clear guidance, and proposes absolute prohibition of

death penalty for all “nontriggermen”).

Margaret C. Jenkins, Comment, Intent After Enmund v. Florida: Not Just Another

Aggravating Circumstance, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 809 (1985) (analyzing implications of

Enmund on state capital sentencing schemes, reviewing existing constitutional

constraints on state sentencing proceedings, and explaining additional constraints

necessitated by constitutional status of Enmund intent determination).

Nancy A. McKerrow, Note, Mens Rea as an Element Necessary for Capital

Punishment, 48 Mo. L. Rev. 1063 (1983) (reviewing Enmund in light of recent preEnmund cases and role of mens rea).

Deborah Sachs, Note, Cabana v. Bullock: The Proper Tribunal–The Supreme Court

Revisits Enmund v. Florida, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 1023 (1986) (analyzing Cabana,

reviewing felony-murder rule, and focusing on differing interpretations of Enmund

resolved in Cabana). 

Douglas W. Schwartz, Note, Imposing the Death Sentence for Felony Murder on a

Non-Trigger Man, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 857 (1985) (reviewing Enmund, criticizing Court’s

language and reasoning, and proposing mens rea standard to relieve confusion caused
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by Enmund in lower courts).

John L. Wickert, Note, Eighth Amendment–The Death Penalty and Vicarious Felony

Murder: Nontriggerman May Not Be Executed Absent a Finding of an Intent to Kill,

73 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1553 (1982) (summarizing and analyzing Enmund in

light of Supreme Court cases recent to Enmund, showing that Enmund involves

divergent approaches of Court on death penalty constitutional issues and that Enmund

represents attempt by Court to provide clear, definitive sentencing guidelines).

Lynn D. Wittenbrink, Note, Overstepping Precedent? Tison v. Arizona Imposes the

Death Penalty on Felony Murder Accomplices, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 817 (1988) (reviewing

death penalty history in Supreme Court, focusing on death penalty of felony murder

defendants, suggesting Tison inconsistent with Enmund, and arguing Tison “reckless

indifference” standard too arbitrary).

1.7.1 Retroactivity of Enmund

The Supreme Court has not ruled on the retroactive application of Enmund. Prior to

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), the Fifth Circuit, in Jones v. Thigpen, 741 F.2d

805 (5th Cir. 1984), held that Enmund does apply retroactively. The Ninth Circuit,

however, has addressed the issue in light of Teague with language to the contrary. In

Greenawalt v. Ricketts, 943 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit acknowledged

the Fifth Circuit’s position but indicated that the intent culpability requirement of

Enmund may constitute a new rule under Teague because it could not have been

reasonably anticipated before it was announced. The court did not conclusively decide

the issue, however, because it found that Enmund did not affect the outcome of that

case.

Ninth Circuit:

Greenawalt v. Ricketts, 943 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing whether Enmund

should be applied retroactively, despite Jones, because, consistent with intent of

Teague, Enmund holding could not have been reasonably anticipated before announced,

but ultimately not deciding the question since Enmund did not apply to petitioner’s

claims), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 888 (1992).
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Other Circuits:

Jones v. Thigpen, 741 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding, prior to Teague, that Enmund

applies retroactively), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 1003 (1986).

1.8 Method of Execution

Of the current methods used to impose the death penalty in America–electrocution,

lethal gas, lethal injection, hanging, and firing squad–the Supreme Court has

specifically found electrocution and the firing squad to be constitutional as not

violative of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 

The Court also has denied certiorari on claims that lethal injection and hanging are

unconstitutional.

The Ninth Circuit has held that lethal injection and hanging are both

constitutional execution methods. Although the Ninth Circuit has ruled more than once

that execution by lethal gas is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court has vacated the

Ninth Circuit decisions on nonsubstantive grounds. In Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301

(9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that execution by

lethal gas is cruel and unusual punishment. However, the Supreme Court vacated that

opinion, in light of a 1996 statutory amendment to California’s execution law, allowing

death row inmates a choice between execution by lethal gas and lethal injection, with

lethal injection as the default procedure. Gomez v. Fierro, 519 U.S. 918 (1996). On

remand, the Ninth Circuit determined that the petitioners lacked standing to challenge

the constitutionality of lethal gas since they had not chosen execution by that method. 

Fierro v. Terhune, 147 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 1998).

In LaGrand (Karl) v. Stewart, 173 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth

Circuit held that petitioner did not waive his challenge to the constitutionality of

execution by lethal gas by voluntarily choosing gas over the default lethal injection

method of execution. The court also ruled execution by lethal gas unconstitutional and

enjoined Arizona from performing any executions by lethal gas. However, the

Supreme Court immediately lifted the Ninth Circuit’s stay. One week later, in a per

curiam decision as to the codefendant’s petition, the Supreme Court ruled that
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petitioner Walter LaGrand had waived his right to challenge execution by lethal gas

because he opted for it. Stewart v. LaGrand (Walter), 526 U.S. 115 (1999) (per

curiam). 

In the Ninth Circuit, Montana, Oregon, and Nevada provide for execution

exclusively by lethal injection. California and Arizona provide for execution by lethal

injection unless the prisoner chooses lethal gas. Washington imposes a capital sentence

by lethal injection unless the inmate chooses hanging. Idaho provides for execution by

lethal injection or by firing squad if lethal injection is impractical. 

Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. §§ 26.1–26.5, the federal government’s method of

execution is lethal injection at a federal institution. However, 18 U.S.C. § 3596 

provides that the method of implementing the death penalty for a federal conviction

will follow that of the state in which it is imposed, and, if there is no state death

penalty, then that of another state designated by the judge. Section 3597 of Title 18

provides for the use of state facilities to carry out a federally imposed death penalty.

Supreme Court:

Hill v. Crosby, 126 S. Ct. 1189 (2006) (mem.) (granting certiorari and a stay of

execution, with the following questions presented: “1. Whether a complaint brought

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a death-sentenced state prisoner, who seeks to stay his

execution in order to pursue a challenge to the chemicals utilized for carrying out the

execution, is properly recharacterized as a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. Sec.

2254?; 2. Whether, under this Court's decision in Nelson [v. Campbell], a challenge to

a particular protocol the State plans to use during the execution process constitutes a

cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983?”). 

Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (2004) (without reaching the question of how to

categorize method-of-execution claims generally, holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an

appropriate vehicle for petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim seeking a temporary stay

and permanent injunctive relief and alleging that the use of a “cut-down” procedure

requiring an incision into his arm or leg to access his severely compromised veins

constituted cruel and unusual punishment). 

Stewart v. LaGrand (Walter), 526 U.S. 115 (1999) (per curiam) (holding that petitioner

waived right to challenge constitutionality of execution by lethal gas by opting for

execution by lethal gas).
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232 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Gomez v. Fierro, 519 U.S. 918 (1996) (vacating Ninth Circuit opinion declaring lethal

gas unconstitutional, remanding in light of Cal. Penal Code § 3604 providing lethal

injection as execution method unless inmate chooses death by lethal gas).

Ninth Circuit:

Morales v. Hickman, 438 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (holding that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in modifying a lethal injection protocol to

give State of California the option of allowing an anesthesiologist to monitor and verify

that inmate remained unconscious throughout the execution procedure). 

Beardslee v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir.) (per curiam) (affirming the district

court’s order denying prisoner’s motion for a preliminary injunction and denying a

motion for a stay of execution in a § 1983 action alleging that prisoner’s execution

pursuant to California’s lethal injection protocol would violate his Eighth Amendment

right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, the court held that given the

undisputed evidence that death or unconsciousness is likely to occur prior to the

administration of pancuronium bromide and the lack of a showing of any unique risk to

him in the limited record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the

appropriate balancing tests in the context of the case and denying the preliminary

injunction; as to the prisoner’s First Amendment claim that the administration of

pancuronium bromide would prevent him from audibly expressing his pain, holding

that prisoner failed to establish that he would be conscious when the final two drugs

were administered; further holding that claim that prisoner’s rights under the First and

Eighth Amendments would be violated was more properly considered as a “conditions

of confinement” challenge, which is cognizable under § 1983, rather than as a

challenge that would implicate the legality of his sentence and thus be appropriate for

federal habeas review), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 982 (2005).

LaGrand (Karl) v. Stewart, 173 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir.) (holding petitioner did not waive

his challenge to the constitutionality of execution by lethal gas by voluntarily choosing

gas over the default lethal injection method of execution; holding execution by lethal

gas unconstitutional), stay vacated, 525 U.S. 1173, cert. dismissed, 526 U.S. 1061

(1999).

Fierro v. Terhune, 147 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding, on remand, that petitioners

lacked standing to assert unconstitutionality of lethal gas because amended state statute

provided for execution by lethal gas only by choice, and petitioners had not chosen

lethal gas as means of execution).

Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding Eighth Amendment claim
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Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir.) (holding § 1983 proceeding proper vehicle for

challenging constitutionality of execution method; holding execution by lethal gas cruel

and unusual punishment), vacated and remanded, 519 U.S. 918 (1996).

State Courts:

Thorburn v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 66 Cal. App. 4th 1284, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d

584 (1998) (holding physician participation in executions is not unprofessional conduct

within meaning of the California Business and Professional Code).

Federal Statutes:

18 U.S.C. § 3596 (2000) (providing federal death penalty carried out in manner

prescribed by state in which sentence imposed).

18 U.S.C. § 3597 (2000) (providing for use of state facilities for implementing federal

death sentence).

28 C.F.R. §§ 26.1–26.5 (2002) (establishing procedures for carrying out federal death

sentence at federal institution; providing lethal injection as execution method).

State Statutes in Ninth Circuit:

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-704 (2001) (providing lethal injection, or, for those

sentenced before November 23, 1992, choice of lethal injection or lethal gas).

Cal. Penal Code § 3604 (West 2000) (providing lethal injection, unless inmate chooses

lethal gas).

Idaho Code § 19-2716 (2004) (providing lethal injection, or, if impractical, firing

squad).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-19-103(3) (2005) (providing lethal injection as execution

method).

NRS § 176.355 (2005) (providing lethal injection as execution method).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.473 (2005) (providing lethal injection as execution method).

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.180 (2002) (providing lethal injection, or at inmate’s
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234 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

method).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.473 (2005) (providing lethal injection as execution method).

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.180 (2002) (providing lethal injection, or at inmate’s

election, hanging).

See generally:

Kristina E. Beard, Comment, Five Under the Eighth: Methodology Review and the

Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 51 Miami L. Rev. 445 (1997) (analyzing each

method of execution under standards used by Supreme Court in deciding

constitutionality of punishments under the Eighth Amendment in reviewing challenges

other than method of execution).

Julian Davis Mortenson, Earning the Right to be Retributive: Execution Methods,

Culpability Theory, and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 88 Iowa L.Rev.

1009(2003) (arguing that tort cause of action exists in cases of botched executions and

analyzing Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of Constitution to methods of

execution).

Martin R. Gardner, Executions and Indignities–An Eighth Amendment Assessment of

Methods of Inflicting Capital Punishment, 39 Ohio St. L.J. 96 (1978) (analyzing

constitutionality of various methods of execution, in light of Supreme Court opinions,

meaning of “cruel and unusual,” and witness descriptions of each method).

1.8.1 Electrocution

Supreme Court:

Poyner v. Murray, 508 U.S. 931 (1993) (denying certiorari to Fourth Circuit decision

upholding constitutionality of Virginia’s electric chair).

Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080 (1985) (denying certiorari to Louisiana Supreme

Court decision upholding constitutionality of electrocution).

Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (holding repeated

electrocutions due to initial failure not cruel and unusual punishment).

In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1980) (holding electrocution not cruel and unusual

punishment).
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See generally:

Deborah W. Denno, Is Electrocution Unconstitutional Method of Execution?, 35 Wm.

& Mary L. Rev. 551 (1994) (analyzing in detail constitutionality of electrocution both

in theory and practice).

Lonny J. Hoffman, The Madness of the Method: The Use of Electrocution and the

Death Penalty, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1039 (1992) (reviewing constitutionality of

electrocution, arguing Kemmler and Francis were misapplied and mistakenly

expanded, and should not be relied upon as authority for upholding electrocution).

1.8.2 Lethal Gas

Supreme Court:

Stewart v. LaGrand (Walter), 526 U.S. 115 (1999) (per curiam) (holding that petitioner

waived right to challenge constitutionality of execution by lethal gas by opting for

execution by lethal gas).

Gomez v. Fierro, 519 U.S. 918 (1996) (vacating Ninth Circuit opinion declaring lethal

gas unconstitutional, remanding in light of amended state statute, providing for lethal

injection as execution method unless inmate chooses death by lethal gas).

Gomez v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653 (1992) (holding

California inmate Robert Alton Harris’ claim that lethal gas constitutes cruel and

unusual punishment is procedurally barred).

Ninth Circuit:

LaGrand (Karl) v. Stewart, 173 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir.) (holding execution by lethal gas

unconstitutional), stay vacated, 525 U.S. 1173, cert. dismissed, 526 U.S. 1061 (1999) .

Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding lethal gas is cruel and unusual

punishment), vacated and remanded, 519 U.S. 918 (1996) (for further consideration in

light of Cal. Penal Code § 3604), on remand sub nom. Fierro v. Terhune 147 F.3d 1158

(9th Cir. 1998) (dismissing cause of action for lack of standing).
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236 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (ruling that lethal gas is cruel and

unusual punishment), aff’d, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded, 519

U.S. 918 (1996), on remand sub nom. Fierro v. Terhune, 147 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 1998)

(dismissing cause of action for lack of standing).

See generally:

Note, Constitutional Law–Eighth Amendment–Ninth Circuit Holds California’s Lethal

Gas Method of Execution Unconstitutional.–Fierro v. Gomez, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 971

(1997) (summarizing Fierro).

1.8.3 Lethal Injection

Supreme Court:

Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (upholding FDA decision not to exercise its

enforcement power to ban unapproved drugs used in lethal injections; FDA decision

not subject to judicial review).

Ninth Circuit:

Beardslee v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir.) (per curiam) (holding that given the

undisputed evidence that death or unconsciousness is likely to occur prior to the

administration of pancuronium bromide and the lack of a showing of any unique risk to

the prisoner in the limited record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

applying the appropriate balancing tests in the context of the case and denying the

preliminary injunction; as to the prisoner’s First Amendment claim that the

administration of pancuronium bromide would prevent him from audibly expressing his

pain, holding that prisoner failed to establish that he would be conscious when the final

two drugs were administered), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 982 (2005).

Cooper v. Rimmer, 379 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming the district court’s order

denying prisoner’s motion for preliminary injunction in his action under 42 U.S.C. §

1983, seeking to prevent his execution in accordance with California’s lethal injection

protocol, the court held that prisoner failed to show that he was subject to an

unnecessary risk of unconstitutional pain or suffering such that his execution by lethal

injection must be restrained; see also concurring opinion of Browning, J. noting that the

court’s review of the denial of preliminary injunctive relief is limited and deferential,
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and that the court’s review of the district court’s merits decision--if it is appealed--

would be more rigorous).

Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting claim that lethal injection is

cruel and unusual method of execution), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1082 (1998).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Lambright v. Lewis, 932 F. Supp. 1547 (D. Ariz. 1996) (agreeing with LaGrand that

lethal injection–other Arizona method of execution–is not unconstitutional), aff’d in

part and remanded en banc sub nom. Lambright v. Stewart, No. 191 F.3d 1181 (9th

Cir. 1999).

LaGrand v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 451 (D. Ariz. 1995) (holding execution by lethal

injection is not unconstitutional method of execution), aff’d sub nom. LaGrand (Karl)

v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1264–65 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 971 (1998).

See generally:

Bob Egelko, Wider Access to Executions Upheld, San Francisco Daily Journal, August

6, 1996 (reporting Ninth Circuit upholding of Northern District of California order

allowing California execution witnesses to see entire lethal injection procedure, starting

with insertion of needles into prisoner).

1.8.4 Hanging

Ninth Circuit:

Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1393 (9th Cir. 1996) (refusing to overturn en banc

Campbell decision and rejecting argument for reconsideration of constitutionality of

hanging based on South Africa’s elimination of death penalty), cert. denied, 522 U.S.

881 (1997).

Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.) (holding hanging not cruel and unusual

punishment), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1119 (1994) (including Blackmun, J., dissent

arguing hanging is cruel and unusual).
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District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Rupe v. Wood, 863 F. Supp. 1315 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (finding, although hanging is not

generally unconstitutional, where there is significant risk of decapitation in hanging of

obese inmate, hanging violates Eighth Amendment), aff’d, Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434

(9th Cir. 1996) (finding issue moot because of change in Washington capital statute),

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1142 (1997).

See generally:

Gary E. Hood, Note, Campbell v. Wood: The Death Penalty in Washington State: 

“Hanging” on to a Method of Execution, 30 Gonz. L. Rev. 163 (1994-1995) (analyzing

Campbell rationale).

1.8.5 Firing Squad

Supreme Court:

Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878) (holding execution by shooting not cruel and

unusual punishment; stating “cruel and unusual” includes that of “torture” and

“unnecessary cruelty”).

1.8.6 Choice of Method of Execution

Several circuits, including the Ninth, have held that a statute creating a choice between

two methods of execution is constitutional. The Ninth Circuit has also held that a

capital inmate has no “significantly protectable right” in the mode of execution or in

the right to choose between methods under a state statute.

Ninth Circuit:

Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting claim that presenting

prisoners with a choice of method of execution is unconstitutional), cert. denied, 523

U.S. 1082 (1998).

Bonin v. Calderon, 77 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir.) (holding defendant does not have state

created liberty interest under California law to choose between lethal injection and gas

chamber methods of execution), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1143 (1996).
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Hunt v. Nuth, 57 F.3d 1327 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding statute allowing choice between

lethal injection or lethal gas not unconstitutional), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1054 (1996).

Fierro v. Grant, 53 F.3d 338 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished) (affirming district court’s

denial of death row inmate’s motion to intervene in Fierro v. Gomez because

condemned inmate has no “significantly protectable interest” in method of execution).

Campbell v. Blodgett, 978 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir.) (holding statute providing choice

between death by hanging or lethal injection not cruel and unusual), reh’g granted, 978

F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1992).

1.9 Tenure on Death Row

In a pre-Furman case, the Ninth Circuit denied relief to an inmate who argued that an

inordinately long time on death row could itself constitute an Eighth Amendment

violation of cruel and unusual punishment. Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604 (9th

Cir. 1960). In 1992, the Ninth Circuit confirmed its denial of such a claim in Richmond

v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473, 1491 (9th Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S. 40

(1992), pointing out the inherent contradiction created where the delay is due to the

petitioner’s own appeals. 

The Supreme Court later entertained but declined to decide this issue. 

Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995). Justice Stevens, however, issued a

memorandum in conjunction with this decision, inviting the federal courts to

investigate whether executing an inmate who has been on death row for an inordinately

long time constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Although the Supreme Court

ruling in Lackey did not address the issue, Justice Stevens’ statements nevertheless

prompted several appeals based on this claim. In McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1493 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1104 (1995), the Ninth Circuit again expressed its rejection

of the claim that lengthy incarceration on death row itself constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment.

Supreme Court:

Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (concurring in denial

of certiorari as to inmate who spent over 27 years awaiting execution).
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240 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

certiorari as to inmate who spent over 27 years awaiting execution).

Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring) (concurring in denial of

certiorari regarding two cases over 20 years old with delays resulting in large part from

the states’ failure to apply constitutionally sufficient procedures at the time of initial

sentencing).

Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 992 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (dissenting from

denial of certiorari regarding two cases over 20 years old with delays resulting in large

part from the states’ failure to apply constitutionally sufficient procedures at the time of

initial sentencing).

Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (dissenting from denial of

certiorari regarding twenty-three-year delay on death row substantially resulting from

successful appeals). 

Gomez v. Fierro, 519 U.S. 918 (1996) (Stevens, Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (objecting to

Supreme Court’s remand on procedural grounds out of concern for undue delay in

execution of capital judgments, where Court’s decision causes delay without providing

any relief to petitioner).

Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari, but

urging judges to study whether long execution delay amounts to cruel and unusual

punishment, so that the Court can rule on the “novel” issue).

Ninth Circuit:

Allen v. Ornoski, 436 F.3d 946 (9th Cir.) (rejecting capital petitioner’s Lackey claim, in

which he asserted that he had been confined on death row for over 23 years under

“horrific” conditions, and holding that it was SOS application which could have been

discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; noting that the Lackey

claim was devoid of support in federal or state law), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1140 (2006).

Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 167 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir.) (holding that a Lackey claim does not

satisfy either gatekeeping provision of § 2244(b)(2)), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1131 (1999).

Gretzler v. Stewart, 146 F.3d 675 (9th Cir.) (holding that Lackey claim raised in

successive petition filed twenty-three years after conviction is barred under 28 U.S.C. §

2244(b); claim could have been raised in earlier petition filed seventeen years after

conviction), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 912 (1998).
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conviction), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 912 (1998).

Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368 (9th Cir.) (holding that petitioner’s Eighth Amendment

claim as to length of death row confinement, which was not raised in first habeas

petition, is covered by AEDPA, and petitioner failed to seek or obtain permission to file

second or successive petition), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1085 (1998).

Bonin v. Calderon, 77 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir.) (barring Lackey claim because procedurally

defaulted; noting McKenzie with approval), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1143 (1996).

McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1493 (9th Cir.) (adopting Richmond analysis of claim of

Eighth Amendment violation due to lengthy delay on death row), cert. denied, 514 U.S.

1104 (1995).

Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473, 1491 (9th Cir. 1990) (ruling lengthy delay on death

row not unconstitutional because time due to petitioner’s appeals; “a defendant must

not be penalized for pursuing his constitutional rights, but he also should not be able to

benefit from the ultimately unsuccessful pursuit of those rights”), rev’d on other

grounds, 506 U.S. 40 (1992).

Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1960) (denying claim that eleven and

one-half years on death row constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; “it may show a

basic weakness in our governmental system that a case like this takes so long, but . . .

we can[not] offer life (under a death sentence) as a price for one who can stall the

processes for a given number of years”; also noting inevitable arbitrariness of minimum

time necessary for delay claims).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Alldredge v. Davis, 2001 WL 793274 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 2001) (holding that imprisoned

petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus, in which he claimed a constitutional entitlement to a

sentence of death, is dismissed without prejudice because collateral challenges to

length of confinement must properly be exhausted through state remedies first).

Other Circuits:

Free v. Peters, 50 F.3d 1362 (7th Cir.) (denying Eighth Amendment claim,

distinguishing on grounds that Free’s time on death row was spent pursuing

discretionary–as opposed to mandatory–direct appeals; any inordinate delay in

execution of sentence is directly attributable to defendant’s own conduct), cert. denied,

514 U.S. 1034 (1995).
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242 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

State Courts:

State v. Richmond, 180 Ariz. 573, 886 P.2d 1329 (1994) (reducing capital sentence to

life sentence after twenty years on death row; declining to decide constitutional

question of delay, but implying that extended time weighs in favor of leniency).

People v. Ochoa, 26 Cal. 4th 398, 28 P.3d 78, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 324 (2001) (holding

that execution notwithstanding 9-year delay associated with defendant’s appeals

furthered both deterrent and retributive functions and that shielding defendant from

execution solely on this basis would frustrate these two penological purposes), cert.

denied, 535 U.S. 1040 (2002) .

See generally:

Dwight Aarons, Can Inordinate Delay Between a Death Sentence and Execution

Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 29 Seton Hall L. Rev. 147 (1998) (arguing

that executions after inordinate delay are “unusual” because most defendants are

executed before spending inordinate time on death row and are “cruel” in the

constitutional sense because defendants experience severe mental anguish while

awaiting execution).

Amber A. Bell, Note, McKenzie v. Day: Is Twenty Years on Death Row Cruel and

Unusual Punishment?, 26 Golden Gate L. Rev. 41 (1996) (addressing issue of length of

death row incarceration as cruel and unusual punishment and criticizing McKenzie

opinion).

Jessica Feldman, Comment, A Death Row Incarceration Calculus: When Prolonged

Death Row Imprisonment Becomes Unconstitutional, 40 Santa Clara L. Rev. 187

(1999) (addressing whether execution after prolonged death row incarceration violates

Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and whether there is

merit to “Lackey claim.”

Michael P. Connolly, Note, Better Never Than Late: Prolonged Stays on Death Row

Violate the Eighth Amendment, 23 New Engl. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 101

(1997) (exploring question of whether prolonged time on death row violates cruel and

unusual punishment clause of Eighth Amendment, arguing it does).

Kathleen M. Flynn, Note, The “Agony of Suspense”: How Protracted Death Row

Confinement Gives Rise to an Eighth Amendment Claim of Cruel and Unusual

Punishment, 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 291 (1997) (arguing that execution after

protracted death row confinement violates Eighth Amendment).
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1.9.1 Last Rites

Rich v. Woodford, 210 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 2000) (Reinhardt, Pregerson, Kozinski and

Wardlaw, J.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing condemned inmate

entitled to last rites of Native American sweat lodge ceremony as fundamental to

religious beliefs, notwithstanding prison’s stated security concerns).

1.10 Proportionality Review

The capital statutes of certain states include appellate review for comparative

proportionality to ensure that a given death sentence is not disproportionate relative to

other sentences imposed for similar crimes. The Supreme Court has held that

comparative proportionality, as opposed to inherent proportionality (which measures

the proportionality of a sentence to the severity of the crime) is not constitutionally

required. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984). The Court upheld California’s death

penalty sentencing statute, which does not include comparative proportionality review. 

However, in doing so, the Court recognized that a capital sentencing scheme could be

so lacking in other checks on arbitrariness that it would not pass constitutional muster

without comparative proportionality review. Pulley further indicated that the federal

constitution may require a state to follow its own statutory proportionality requirement. 

However, constitutional review on federal habeas is limited to whether the state court

engaged in a good faith proportionality review. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,

655–56 (1990). In the Ninth Circuit, only Montana and Washington require

comparative proportionality review.

Supreme Court:

Turner v. California, 498 U.S. 1053 (1991) (denying certiorari in appeal of California

Supreme Court refusal, based on Pulley, to review petitioner’s complaints of lack of

comparative proportionality).

Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 655–56 (1990) (limiting federal habeas review of

state proportionality analysis to whether state court engaged in good faith review). 

Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984) (upholding California statute, and holding

Constitution does not require comparative proportionality review in every capital case).
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244 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Ninth Circuit:

Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979 (9th Cir.) (holding that Pulley v. Harris foreclosed the

claim that either the Eighth Amendment or due process required comparative

proportionality review; also holding that for equal protection purposes, defendants

sentenced under the California Determinate Sentencing Law are not similarly situated

to defendants sentenced in the capital system, and, therefore, a capital defendant was

not denied equal protection on the basis that state law required that the Board of Prisons

Terms review all determinate sentences to ascertain comparative proportionality, while

there was no comparable provision under the capital sentencing scheme), cert. denied,

126 S. Ct. 134 (2005).

McKenzie v. Risley, 842 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir.) (finding Montana sentencing procedure

constitutionally adequate, citing Pulley for proposition that comparative review not

constitutionally required), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 901 (1988).

Neuschafer v. Whitley, 816 F.2d 1390, 1393-94 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that, once state

sentencing scheme places checks on arbitrariness, proportionality review is question of

state law).

Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 672 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding federal habeas relief may

be available if state’s failure to conform to own law amounts to a denial of due

process), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1211 (1983).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Fetterly v. Paskett, 744 F. Supp. 966 (D. Idaho 1990) (upholding Idaho’s sentencing

scheme, because provides enough safeguards against arbitrariness so that

proportionality review not constitutionally required), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1002

(1992).

Neuschafer v. Whitley, 630 F. Supp. 897, 902 (D. Nev. 1986) (holding that where state

statute requires proportionality review, federal court does not conduct de novo review

but rather determines whether state court properly performed its task under statute),

aff’d, 816 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1987).

State Courts:

State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 844 P.2d 566 (1992) (en banc) (holding appellate

proportionality review not constitutionally required and discontinued), cert. denied, 509

U.S. 912 (1993).
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State v. Brett, 126 Wash. 2d 136, 892 P.2d 29 (1995) (upholding constitutionality of state

appellate proportionality review ), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1121 (1996).

State Statutes in Ninth Circuit:

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703.01 (Supp. 2005) (providing automatic supreme court

review, without mention of comparative proportionality review).

Cal. Penal Code § 1239(b) (West 2004) (providing automatic appeal, without

mentioning comparative proportionality review).

Idaho Code § 19-2827(c)(3) (2004) (requiring review for inherent excessiveness only). 

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-310 (2005) (requiring comparative proportionality review).

NRS § 177.055(2)(d) (2005) (requiring review for inherent excessiveness only).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.012 (2005) (providing automatic review by supreme court, without

mentioning comparative proportionality review).

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.130(2)(b) (2002) (requiring comparative proportionality

review).

See generally:

David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of

the Georgia Experience, 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 661 (1983) (analyzing in detail

Georgia’s system of comparative proportionality review, concluding that Georgia system

not consistently, rationally conducted, but could be if used systematic empirically-based

procedures).

David C. Baldus et al., Identifying Comparatively Excessive Sentences of Death: A

Quantitative Approach, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1980) (demonstrating utility of quantitative

methods in identifying comparatively excessive death sentences).

Robert M. Carney, Comment, The Case for Comparative Proportionality Review, 59

Notre Dame L. Rev. 1412 (1984) (arguing to states without comparative proportionality

review that public policy and federal and state constitutional principles urge adoption of

comparative proportionality review).

Bruce Gilbert, Comment, Comparative Proportionality Review: Will the Ends, Will the
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246 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

review that public policy and federal and state constitutional principles urge adoption

of comparative proportionality review).

Bruce Gilbert, Comment, Comparative Proportionality Review: Will the Ends, Will the

Means, 18 Puget Sound L. Rev. 593 (1995) (addressing comparative proportionality

review in Washington state, asserting flaws in system, and offering alternative method).

W. Ward Morrison, Jr., Comment, Washington’s Comparative Proportionality Review: 

Toward Effective Appellate Review of Death Penalty Cases Under the Washington

State Constitution, 64 Wash. L. Rev. 111 (1989) (critiquing Washington’s mandatory

comparative proportionality review procedure, arguing it has not been effectively

applied in practice, and therefore violates Washington’s constitutional guarantee

against cruel and unusual punishment).

Note, A Procedural Due Process Argument for Proportionality Review in Capital

Sentencing, 21 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 385 (1988) (reviewing Eighth Amendment

analysis in Pulley and due process analysis in Ford v. Wainright, and arguing that

Eighth Amendment creates substantive right to proportionate penalties and Fourteenth

Amendment due process requires comparative proportionality review of all death

sentences).

Daryl P. Rush, Note, Constitutional Law–Safeguarding Eighth Amendment Rights with

a Comparative Proportionality Review in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 28 How.

L.J. 331 (1985) (arguing death penalty should not be imposed unless comparative

proportionality review performed).

Steven M. Sprenger, Note, A Critical Evaluation of State Supreme Court

Proportionality Review in Death Sentence Cases,73 Iowa L. Rev. 719 (1988)

(critiquing current systems of comparative proportionality review, reviewing key

opinions, purpose of proportionality review, state court interpretations of “similar

cases,” and offering alternate interpretation). 

1.11 Double Jeopardy Considerations

1.11.1 Generally

The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment protects an individual against both

multiple prosecutions and punishments for the same offense. Because of the unique

nature of capital proceedings, double jeopardy issues in death penalty cases form a

separate body of case law.
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See generally:

William S. McAninch, Unfolding the Law of Double Jeopardy, 44 S.C. L. Rev. 411,

483–89 (1993) (including summary of double jeopardy issues in general as well as

capital sentencing procedures).

1.11.2 Resentencing to Death After Appeal

In non-capital cases, because imposing one sentence does not imply an acquittal of a

greater sentence, double jeopardy is not violated by an appeal of a sentence or an

increase of a sentence by an appellate court. In capital cases, however, this general rule

does not apply. In Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981), the Supreme Court

held that one who is accused of a capital crime but sentenced to life may not be

sentenced to death on retrial. This rule is attributed to the unique, trial-like nature of

capital sentencing proceedings. If the state carries the burden of establishing

aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt in a sentencing proceeding, that

proceeding is regarded as a second trial. Thus, a sentence of life imprisonment

amounts to an implied acquittal for the alternative sentence of death and any attempt to

impose the death sentence after that would violate double jeopardy. This analysis

applies even when the initial life sentence is made in error. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467

U.S. 203 (1984).

In Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101 (2003), the Supreme Court noted

that it had held in Bullington v. Missouri, that the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to

capital-sentencing proceedings that “have the hallmarks of the trial on guilt or

innocence.” In Sattazahn, the Court held that the relevant inquiry is not whether a

defendant received a life sentence the first time around, but whether a first life sentence

was an “acquittal” based on findings sufficient to establish legal entitlement to the life

sentence; i.e., findings that the government failed to prove one or more aggravating

circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court held that where, as here, a

defendant who is convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment succeeds in

having the conviction set aside on appeal, jeopardy has not terminated, so that a life

sentence imposed in connection with the initial conviction raises no double-jeopardy

bar to a death sentence on retrial. 
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248 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

When the initial sentence is one of death rather than life imprisonment, the

death sentence may be imposed on retrial. Even if the initial death sentence was

erroneous, double jeopardy does not prevent a later death sentence. Thus, in Hitchcock

v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987), the Court found that the death penalty could be

imposed on remand even though the initial death sentencing court improperly refused

to consider mitigating evidence. Likewise, the Court did not prohibit a death sentence

in Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147 (1986), where the first trial court imposed a capital

sentence based on an unsupported aggravating circumstance.

Supreme Court:

Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101 (2003) (holding that relevant inquiry for

double jeopardy purposes is not whether a defendant received a life sentence the first

time around, but whether a first life sentence was an “acquittal” based on findings

sufficient to establish legal entitlement to the life sentence; holding that here, petitioner

could not establish that the jury or the court “acquitted” him during his first capital

sentencing proceeding where the verdict form returned showed the jury deadlocked 9-

to-3 on whether to impose the death penalty, and it made no findings as to the alleged

aggravating circumstances).

Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) (allowing death penalty on remand where

initial sentencing court improperly refused to consider mitigating evidence not listed in

statute).

Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147 (1986) (holding double jeopardy does not preclude

death sentence where evidence insufficient to support aggravating circumstance on

which initial sentencer relied, but not insufficient to support death sentence altogether,

where other aggravating circumstances alleged but not relied on).

Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203 (1984) (following Bullington, holding double

jeopardy prohibits death sentence on reconviction where initial sentencer

misinterpreted aggravating circumstance; error of law does not change double jeopardy

effects of judgment amounting to acquittal).

Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981) (holding double jeopardy bars imposition

of death sentence at retrial of capital charge where initial sentencing proceeding

resulted in life sentence; trial-like nature of sentencing proceeding amounts to acquittal

of death sentence).
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Ninth Circuit:

Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding trial judge’s rejection of

aggravating circumstance in initial capital murder prosecution does not constitute

“acquittal” of that circumstance for double jeopardy purposes and does not foreclose

consideration of it at retrial), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1082 (1998).

Cuffle v. Goldsmith, 906 F.2d 385, 390 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying Rumsey to hold life

sentence imposed after capital sentencing proceeding triggers double jeopardy and

prohibits death penalty on retrial).

Massie v. Hennessey, 875 F.2d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding double jeopardy

does not apply to California death sentence where state has automatic appeal of death

penalty cases, because no expectation of finality in sentence, despite defendant’s

objection to the mandatory appeal), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1039 (1990).

Fitzpatrick v. McCormick, 869 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir.) (following Bullington), cert.

denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989).

Staatz v. Dupnik, 789 F.2d 806, 808 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding double jeopardy does not

prevent retrial of defendant who has succeeded in getting first conviction set aside).

Knapp v. Cardwell, 667 F.2d 1253, 1263-65 (9th Cir.) (holding first death sentence was

not “acquittal” on certain aggravating factors; distinguishing Bullington on grounds that

first trial there resulted in life sentence and penalty phase in Bullington was more like a

trial than Arizona’s penalty phase which involves only judge), cert. denied, 459 U.S.

1055 (1982).

1.11.3 Sentencing for Murders Including Felonies

Although the double jeopardy clause prohibits prosecution for both felony-murder and

an underlying felony, it does not prohibit prosecution for intentional murder and a

felony committed as part of that same act. Moreover, where the state charges felonymurder and intentional murder, and a defendant is found guilty based on the felonymurder, double jeopardy does not prohibit the use of the intentional-murder

aggravating circumstance, if applicable, at sentencing.

Supreme Court:

Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222 (1994) (holding jury verdict of guilty of felony-murder,
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250 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

one of three murder counts, did not amount to acquittal of other counts and thus double

jeopardy did not prohibit use of intentional-murder aggravating circumstance at

sentencing).

Other Circuits:

Taylor v. Whitley, 933 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding, although double jeopardy

clause prohibits prosecution for both felony-murder and underlying felony, it does not

prohibit prosecution for specific intent murder and armed robbery), cert. denied, 503

U.S. 988 (1992).

1.11.4 Sentencing to Death After Breach or Withdrawal of Plea Agreement

Double jeopardy does not prevent the imposition of a death sentence upon retrial of a

defendant who has previously pled guilty to a lesser charge (not carrying the death

penalty) and has subsequently withdrawn or breached the plea agreement.

Supreme Court:

Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987) (holding defendant sentenced to life

imprisonment pursuant to plea agreement was subject to reprosecution and

resentencing for capital murder because defendant waived double jeopardy defense by

breaching agreement in which consequences of breach were clearly expressed in

agreement).

Other Circuits:

Williams v. Kemp, 846 F.2d 1276 (11th Cir. 1988) (allowing death sentence sought

after defendant voluntarily withdrew guilty plea to manslaughter), cert. denied, 494

U.S. 1090 (1990).

1.11.5 Prosecutions by Different Sovereigns for Same Conduct

The dual sovereignty doctrine provides that when a defendant violates the law of two

sovereigns with a single act, that act constitutes two distinct offenses for double

jeopardy purposes, and double jeopardy thus does not bar successive prosecutions,

even capital prosecutions, for that conduct. The accused has no right to control the
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order of prosecution or punishment.

Supreme Court:

Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996) (relying on Heath in deciding in a noncapital case that successive prosecutions in state and federal courts for the same

underlying conduct did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause).

Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1986) (holding prosecution and death sentence in

Alabama for murder for which defendant had been convicted and sentenced to death in

Georgia not barred by double jeopardy).

Ninth Circuit:

Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding meritless petitioner’s claim

that Arizona cannot impose death penalty until federal sentence concluded), cert.

denied, 523 U.S. 1082 (1998).

1.11.6 Judicial Override of Jury Life Sentence

The Supreme Court has upheld state sentencing schemes involving judicial overrides of

jury-recommended sentences. Even when such judicial override involves the

imposition of the death penalty over a jury recommendation of a life sentence, the

double jeopardy clause is not violated. The Court has held, in Spaziano v. Florida, 468

U.S. 447 (1984), that since jury recommendations are not judgments, they do not

trigger double jeopardy.

However, in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), the Supreme Court held

that capital defendants are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the

legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment. See § 4.6.1 for further

discussion of Ring.

Supreme Court:

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that capital defendants are entitled to

jury determination of any fact on which legislature conditions increase in their

maximum punishment; also holding that Walton and Apprendi are irreconcilable and
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252 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

overruling Walton to extent that it allowed sentencing judge, sitting without jury, to

find aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of death penalty)

Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504 (1995) (holding Alabama system of judicial override

of jury recommendation of life or death does not violate Eighth Amendment by not

specifying weight judge must give to jury’s recommendation).

Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222 (1994) (allowing judge-imposed death sentence over

jury rejection of capital punishment).

Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984) (state law that allows judge to override jury’s

recommendation of life sentence does not constitute double jeopardy).

See generally:

Neil R. Lebowitz, Note, Harris v. Alabama: Standardless Jury Override in Capital

Cases Deemed Constitutional, 7 Md. J. Contemp. Legal Issues 515 (1996) (analyzing

strengths, weaknesses, implications of principles set forth in Harris).

Michael Mello & Ruthann Robson, Judge over Jury: Florida’s Practice of Imposing

Death over Life in Capital Cases, 13 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 31 (1985) (analyzing Florida’s

policy of allowing judicial imposition of death penalty over jury recommendation of

life imprisonment, reviewing Spaziano, policy considerations mitigating against

retention of override policy).

David A. Scheffel, Harris v. Alabama–A Portrait of Deference to the States in Capital

Punishment, 19 Thomas Jefferson L. Rev. 39 (1997) (analyzing Harris).

Jeffrey A. Wellek, Note, Eighth Amendment–Trial Court May Impose Death Sentence

Despite Jury’s Recommendation of Life Imprisonment, 75 J. Crim. L. & Criminology

813 (1984) (reviewing Spaziano and arguing Florida death penalty statute violates

Eighth Amendment because question of life or death must be left to jury).

1.12 Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentencing

In McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), the Supreme Court rejected Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendment challenges to the Georgia capital punishment statute and its

administration, based on a study (“the Baldus study”) indicating that, in Georgia,

persons who murder whites receive the death penalty more often than persons who
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murder blacks, and that black murderers of whites receive the death penalty more often

than white murderers of whites. 

The Court held that for such a claim to prevail under the equal protection

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a petitioner must prove that the decision makers

in his or her case acted with discriminatory purpose. The Court held that the Baldus

study was insufficient to support an inference that any of the decision makers in

McCleskey’s case acted with discriminatory purpose.

The Court further denied the claim that the Georgia capital punishment

statute was cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment because of its

arbitrary and capricious application due to the influence of racial considerations on the

sentencing decisions. The Court upheld the Georgia statute–already found

constitutional in previous decisions–finding that the Baldus study did not prove that

race entered into any capital sentencing procedures or that race was a factor in

petitioner’s case; the study established only a likelihood that race entered into some

decisions. In concluding, the Court held that, although the Constitution does not

require such disparities to be eliminated, the legislature is entitled to address the

disparities with statutory mechanisms.

In response to the Court’s suggestion that the matter be resolved

legislatively, legislation has twice been introduced to effectively reverse McCleskey. In

1990 and 1994, the House voted to include the Racial Justice Act in its version of

pending crime control legislation. The Racial Justice Act responded to McCleskey by

proscribing imposition of the death penalty unless it is applied in a race-neutral manner,

and by allowing a defendant to challenge a death sentence by showing that race played

a statistically significant role in capital sentencing in the jurisdiction in which he or she

was tried. However, Congress omitted the Racial Justice Act from the final version of

the 1994 crime bill, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.

L. No. 103-322, 140 Cong. Rec. 8772.

Supreme Court:

United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862 (2002) (per curiam) (holding that defendant, who

was claiming government selectively sought death penalty based on race, was not

entitled to discovery of information relating to government's capital charging practices
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254 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

and that district court erred in dismissing death penalty notice after government

informed court it would not comply with discovery request based on defendant’s

evidence of purported nationwide statistics demonstrating that United States charges

blacks with death-eligible offense more than twice as often as it charges whites and

that United States enters into plea bargains more frequently with whites than it does

with black, where such raw statistics regarding overall charges said nothing about

charges brought against similarly situated defendants, and where plea bargain statistics

were even less relevant, since respondent was offered plea bargain but declined it).

United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (holding in a non-capital case that in

order to make a claim of selective prosecution based on race, petitioner must show that

similarly situated defendants of another race could have been prosecuted but were not).

McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (holding statistical evidence of disparity in

imposition of death penalty due to race of victim and of defendant insufficient to

demonstrate denial of equal protection or violation of cruel and unusual punishment

clause; to show denial of equal protection, defendant must prove that sentencers in his

or her case acted in discriminatory manner, or that state enacted or maintained death

penalty statute “because of” its racially discriminatory effect).

Ninth Circuit:

Jeffers v. Lewis, 38 F.3d 411 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding no evidence that the Arizona

sentencing process discriminates against impoverished males convicted of killing

males), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1071 (1995).

Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1992) (following Richmond and McCleskey,

in holding statistical information showing increased likelihood of death penalty where

murder victim is white is insufficient to establish equal protection violation), cert.

denied, 507 U.S. 992 (1993).

Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding evidentiary hearing

properly denied because statistical evidence indicating that Arizona’s administration of

the death penalty is racially, sexually, and socio-economically discriminatory is

insufficient to demonstrate that the decision makers in his or her case acted with

discriminatory purpose), rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S. 40 (1992).

Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1988) (following McCleskey in denying

statistics-based challenge to death penalty statute as violative of Fourteenth and Eighth

Amendments; statistical study showing disproportionate application of death penalty

along racial or gender lines is insufficient to demonstrate (1) decision makers in
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particular case acted with “discriminatory purpose” or (2) racial or gender bias affected

state’s capital sentencing process), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1051 (1990).

Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding failure to raise claim of

discriminatory application of death penalty not ineffectiveness of counsel because

claim is barred under McCleskey), vacated on other grounds, 500 U.S. 901 (1992).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Gerlaugh v. Lewis, 898 F. Supp. 1388 (D. Ariz. 1995) (applying McClesky, Richmond,

holding petitioner failed to prove that prosecution acted with discriminatory purpose in

not presenting plea offer to him), aff’d, 129 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525

U.S. 903 (1998).

Other Circuits:

Dobbs v. Zant, 963 F.2d 1403 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding backgrounds and general racial

attitudes of various trial participants insufficient to show racial prejudice influenced

state’s decision to impose death penalty), rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S. 357 (1993).

Byrd v. Armontrout, 880 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding prosecution’s use of

peremptory challenges to achieve all white jury (against black defendant) insufficient to

prove decision to seek death penalty motivated by racial prejudice; therefore,

evidentiary burden under McCleskey to prove decision maker acted with

“discriminatory purpose” not met), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990).

Griffin v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 1397 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding statistical evidence of

discriminatory application of death penalty insufficient to prove prosecutor acted with

discriminatory intent in commenting on race of victims), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1051

(1990).

Bundy v. Dugger, 850 F.2d 1402 (11th Cir. 1988) (upholding district court’s denial of

evidentiary hearing on claim that Florida death penalty is discriminatorily applied

where victim is white because no evidence decision makers in case acted with

discriminatory purpose), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034 (1989).

Smith v. Dugger, 840 F.2d 787 (11th Cir. 1988) (rejecting petitioner’s request for

evidentiary hearing because, under McCleskey, statistical studies showing

discriminatory application of death penalty are insufficient to demonstrate

unconstitutional discrimination under Fourteenth Amendment or arbitrariness under

Eighth Amendment), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1047 (1990).
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256 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

See generally:

David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the

Death Penalty: A Challenge to State Supreme Courts, 15 Stetson L. Rev. 133 (1986)

(analyzing evidence of and reasons for racial discrimination in post Furman capital

sentencing and proposing remedies for such discrimination).

Fredric J. Bendremer et al., Note, McCleskey v. Kemp: Constitutional Tolerance for

Racially Disparate Capital Sentencing, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 295 (1986) (analyzing

racial disparity in capital sentencing under Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and

critiquing analysis in McCleskey and other decisions).

John H. Blume et al., Symposium, How the Death Penalty Works: Empirical Studies of

the Modern Capital Sentencing System: Post-McCleskey Racial Discrimination Claims

in Capital Cases, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1771 (1998) (discussing court’s reluctance to find

intentional discrimination by state officials; ten years post-McCleskey and not one

claimant has prevailed.

Stephen B. Bright, Symposium, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of

Racial Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 Santa Clara L. Rev. 433

(1995) (discussing racial discrimination in capital sentencing).

Erwin Chemerinsky, Symposium, Eliminating Discrimination in Administering the

Death Penalty: The Need for the Racial Justice Act, 35 Santa Clara L. Rev. 519 (1995)

(addressing racial discrimination in death penalty administration and need for Racial

Justice Act).

M. Shanara Gilbert, Racism and Retrenchment in Capital Sentencing: Judicial and

Congressional Haste Toward the Ultimate Injustice, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change

51 (1990) (exploring racism in death sentencing in light of McCleskey and proposed

1990 Racial Justice Act).

Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial

Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 27

(1984) (analyzing patterns in capital sentencing from 1976-1980 in southern states,

based on race of both defendant and victim).

Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme

Court, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1388 (1988) (analyzing McCleskey from community-oriented

race-of-victim theory; asserting African American community denied equal protection

because killers of blacks are less vigorously prosecuted).
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Katherine R. Kruse, Race, Angst and Capital Punishment: The Burger Court’s

Existential Struggle, 9 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 67 (1998) (explaining the Burger Court’s

failure to remedy racism in the discretionary capital sentencing system; prescribing a

more effective response).

1.13 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

1.13.1 Legal Standard

A capital defendant may assert a violation of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of

effective assistance of counsel based on counsel errors at both the guilt and sentencing

phases of a capital trial and a violation of due process for ineffective assistance of

counsel during subsequent appeals. According to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 686 (1984), ineffective assistance of counsel exists when “counsel’s conduct so

undermine[s] . . . the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having

produced a just result.” To prevail on such a claim, a petitioner must make two

showings: (1) the counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.

In Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the

right to counsel does not attach to postconviction proceedings. Thus, there is no claim

for ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel. See infra § 6.3.2.1. This was

codified in the 1996 habeas corpus reform in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (2000).

The Supreme Court has also held that a petitioner can waive the right to

present Sixth Amendment claims on federal habeas review. In Stewart v. LaGrand

(Walter), 526 U.S. 115 (1999), the Court affirmed the district court and Ninth Circuit’s

determinations that petitioner waived his right to raise ineffective assistance of counsel

claims when he chose to have trial counsel continue representation on federal collateral

review and the district court required counsel to discuss all possible ineffective

assistance claims with petitioner and file a status report with the court.
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Supreme Court:

Stewart v. LaGrand (Walter), 526 U.S. 115 (1999) (per curiam) (holding petitioner

waived Sixth Amendment claims on federal habeas review by knowingly choosing to

have trial counsel continue representation).

Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding state not constitutionally required to

provide counsel for indigent death row inmates seeking state postconviction relief).

Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) (holding where state provides a direct criminal

appeal as of right, due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment guarantees criminal

defendant effective assistance of counsel on first appeal as of right).

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishing standard for Sixth

Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel).

Ninth Circuit:

LaGrand (Karl) v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1271 (9th Cir.) (concluding district court

did not err limiting evidentiary hearing to first prong of Strickland, since testimony

directed at second Strickland prong irrelevant without proof of deficient performance),

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 971 (1998). 

Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that review of claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel will be according to standard set out for trial counsel

in Strickland).

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (2000) (stating “the ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel

during federal or state collateral postconviction proceedings shall not be a ground for

relief in a proceeding arising under § 2254.”).

See generally:

Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime

but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 Yale L.J. 1835 (1994) (discussing reasons for pervasive

inadequacy of counsel for poor, including lack of functioning adversary system, lack of

indigent defense programs, limited attorney compensation, role of judges, and minimal
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standard of legal representation tolerated in capital cases).

Ivan K. Fong, Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 39 Stan.

L. Rev. 461 (1987) (stating Strickland failed to ensure that capital defendants receive

effective assistance of counsel at sentencing; arguing that failure to investigate and

present mitigating evidence at sentencing constitutes denial of Sixth Amendment right

to effective assistance of counsel).

Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty

Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 299 (1983) (stating standards for assessing effectiveness of

counsel’s performance at penalty phase of capital trial inadequate and proposing new

standards).

Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of “Counsel” in the Sixth Amendment,

78 Iowa L. Rev. 433 (1993) (arguing for narrower construction of “counsel” under

Sixth Amendment to encompass only attorneys qualified to wage adequate criminal

defense).

Lissa Griffin, The Right to Effective Assistance of Appellate Counsel, 97 W. Va. L.

Rev. 1 (1994) (addressing question of whether same standard for evaluating ineffective

assistance of counsel should also be applied to evaluations of appellate counsel).

Gary Hengster, Attorneys for the Damned, 73 A.B.A. J. 56 (1987) (discussing obstacles

faced by attorneys representing death row inmates, including quality of counsel,

Strickland standard, and procedural defaults).

Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., The Defunding of the Post Conviction Defense Organizations

as a Denial of the Right to Counsel, 98 W. Va. L. Rev. 863 (1996) (arguing that

congressional defunding of postconviction defender organizations in 1996 will lead to

denial of death row inmates’ right to counsel).

John C. Jeffries, Jr., & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Default

in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 679 (1990) (proposing reform of law

governing federal collateral review of defaulted claims).

Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the

Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 Hastings Const. L.Q. 625

(1986) (discussing several Supreme Court decisions, including Strickland, as

limitations on claims based on ineffective assistance of counsel; generally describing

under-funding of agencies providing defense counsel to indigents as endangerment to

Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel).
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Celestine Richards McConville, Protecting the Right to Effective Assistance of Capital

Postconviction Counsel: The Scope of the Constitutional Obligation to Monitor

Counsel Performance, 66 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 521 (2005) (arguing that the government

must attempt to prevent counsel’s conduct from interfering with the capital inmate’s

ability to have claims decided on the merits and suggesting that basic remedies include

(1) a written or oral notification to counsel identifying the problem, followed by

additional monitoring; (2) an extension of time; and (3) the removal and substitution of

counsel).

Note, The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Trials,

107 Harv. L. Rev. 1923 (1994) (arguing that because of uniqueness of capital trials,

Eighth Amendment requires a higher standard of effective assistance of counsel in

death penalty cases).

Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The Evolving

Standard of Care, 1993 U. Ill. L. Rev. 323 (1993) (assessing first prong of Strickland

standard and stating capital defense attorney’s failure to take action–specifically,

failure to seek and introduce mitigating evidence, to seek favorable plea bargain

avoiding death sentence, and to try to establish relationship of trust with

defendant–usually should be viewed as deficient representation).

1.13.2 Deficiency of Counsel

To establish that an attorney’s performance was deficient, the defendant must show that

counsel made errors so serious that the attorney was not functioning as “counsel”

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. As the Court held in Strickland, a

petitioner must overcome “a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the

wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”

Supreme Court:

Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1 (2003) (per curiam) (holding in noncapital habeas

case that state appellate court's determination that trial defense counsel had not

performed deficiently, for Sixth Amendment purposes, in failing to highlight all

potentially exculpatory evidence in his closing argument, in highlighting defendant's

bad character traits while arguing that these traits were irrelevant to issues before jury
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and in making only passive request that jurors reach verdict rather than demanding that

they acquit, was not objectively unreasonable application of federal law, and did not

warrant federal habeas relief; also holding that Sixth Amendment guarantees

reasonable competence, not perfect advocacy judged with the benefit of hindsight;

noting that the right to effective representation extends to closing arguments, but that

tactical decisions in closing presentation is particularly important because of the broad

range of legitimate defense strategy at that stage).

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002) (holding that attorney’s asserted ineffective

assistance of counsel claim during sentencing phase of capital murder trial in which

defendant was sentenced to death by failing to present mitigating evidence and waiving

final argument were the type of errors subject to Strickland test; further holding that

state court decision was not an unreasonable application of Strickland and that it was

not objectively unreasonable for state court to deem counsel’s performance as

involving tactical decisions about which competent lawyers might disagree where

counsel’s final argument options were to plead for his client’s life and impress on jury

other, less significant facts, knowing that it would give prosecutor chance to depict his

client as heartless killer just before jury began deliberations or prevent prosecutor from

arguing by waiving his own summation, and where counsel had tactical reasons for not

calling witnesses during sentencing phase, including fear that prosecution might elicit

testimony about defendant’s criminal history from witnesses; Justice Steven’s dissent

addressing possibility that trial counsel, who began treatment for mental illness “a

couple of years after trial,” was suffering from mental impairment at time of trial). 

Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) (holding that counsel is deficient failing to

consult with a defendant about an appeal where either a rational defendant would want

to appeal or where a defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel an interest in

appealing). 

Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993) (holding counsel’s failure to make objection

based on case later overruled by Supreme Court did not constitute prejudicial

ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland).

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding claimant must establish both

that counsel’s performance was seriously deficient and that claimant as a result suffered

prejudice in order to prevail on claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Sixth

Amendment).

Ninth Circuit:

Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that habeas petitioner’s

counsel rendered ineffective assistance by requesting an intoxication jury instruction
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262 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

and failing to request a diminished capacity instruction in light of the following facts:

(1) Washington had long recognized a diminished capacity defense; (2) counsel theory

was that defendant’s brain was kindled from chronic drug use and that he suffered from

a seizure at the time of the murders that impaired his ability to premediate; and (3) 

there was evidence to support a finding that he was not intoxicated at the time of the

murders; noting that only issue in dispute at guilt phase was premeditation), cert.

denied, 539 U.S. 916 (2003).

Jennings v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2002) (vacating conviction for murder

and other crimes and remanding with instructions to district court to grant writ of

habeas corpus unless state decided to retry petitioner and holding that there was

ineffective assistance of counsel during guilt phase of trial in that counsel failed to

discover and consider vast and easily obtainable information about petitioner’s fragile

and failing mental health; also holding that ineffective assistance prejudiced petitioner

by depriving him of opportunity to help his counsel make informed judgments as to his

defense and potentially to have defense presented that would have negated mental state

necessary for first degree murder conviction), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).

Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that habeas petitioner

asserted colorable claim that combined prejudicial effect of his counsel’s ineffective

assistance in failing to present defense that victim was killed during “shoot-out” rather

than presenting only his meritless alibi defense, and state’s presentation of false

testimony regarding existence of plea agreement with its chief witness, required setting

aside findings that rendered him eligible for death sentence and entitled him to

evidentiary hearing on those two claims). 

LaGrand (Karl) v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir.) (holding state not estopped from

challenging petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim notwithstanding

attorney general submitted trial counsel’s affidavit in support of habeas claim to state

bar; affirming district court’s denial of ineffective assistance challenging various trial

strategies), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 971 (1998). 

Bloom v. Calderon, 132 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir.) (holding that defense counsel’s failure to

provide defendant’s experts with psychiatric information requested by experts, along

with general lack of effort, was ineffective assistance), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1145

(1997).

Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding counsel in a noncapital case

ineffective for failing to follow up on criminalist’s report that semen sample taken from

victim might not have come from defendant), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1151 (1997).
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Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir. 1994) (reversing district court finding of no

ineffective assistance of counsel, holding instead that counsel’s choice not to have

defendant’s mother and sister testify and to have defendant testify as alternative

personality at penalty phase constitutes ineffective assistance), cert. denied, 513 U.S.

1120 (1995).

Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding no ineffective assistance of counsel

for failing to file suppression motion where attorney researched and talked with attorneys

who handled similar motions), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1001 (1994).

Campbell v. Blodgett, 978 F.2d 1502, 1511–12 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding counsel not

ineffective for allowing defendant to waive right to be present at jury empanelment where

counsel testified that it was tactical decision in order to preserve good working

relationship with defendant), reconsideration denied, 992 F.2d 984 (9th Cir. 1993).

Harris v. Vasquez, 913 F.2d 606, 628 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding counsel not ineffective for

failing to put on psychiatric-based defense that could have conflicted with alibi defense

and mitigation based on petitioner’s remorse and abusive childhood).

Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354, 1368 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding possibility that counsel’s

failure to introduce abnormal EEG when later EEG result was normal was tactical

decision and thus counsel’s conduct not deficient), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1051 (1990).

Evans v. Lewis, 855 F.2d 631, 636–37 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding counsel’s failure to

investigate possibility of petitioner’s mental problems could not be construed as trial

tactic where counsel did not view available relevant documents).

Harding v. Lewis, 834 F.2d 853, 859 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding counsel’s recommendation

to petitioner that he represent himself at trial in order to inject fundamental error is not

per se prejudicial), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988).

Woratzeck v. Ricketts, 820 F.2d 1450, 1455 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding trial counsel’s

failure to request lesser-included offense instruction where defendant relied on alibi

defense and trial counsel’s decision not to call witnesses who stated that they would have

had to commit perjury to say anything good about defendant were trial strategies and did

not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel), vacated on other grounds, 486 U.S. 1051

(1988).

Other Circuits:

Groseclose v. Bell, 120 F.3d 1161 (6th Cir. 1997) (granting writ where counsel failed to
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264 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

devise any defense theory, failed to subject the state’s case to any adversarial testing,

including foregoing cross-examination of more than half of the state’s witnesses, failed to

object to evidence, failed to present any defense witnesses, failed to make a closing

argument, and failed to present meaningful mitigating evidence at penalty phase), cert.

denied, 523 U.S. 1132 (1998).

Porter v. Singletary, 14 F.3d 554 (11th Cir.) (holding counsel made informed tactical

decision not to introduce potentially mitigating family background evidence in order to

avoid inclusion of damaging evidence of defendant’s prior criminal activity), cert.

denied, 513 U.S. 1009 (1994).

Hance v. Zant, 981 F.2d 1180 (11th Cir.) (finding counsel not ineffective for presenting

psychologist’s testimony of defendant’s poor chance of rehabilitation from mental illness

where counsel had evaluated evidence from six to eight mental health experts and chosen

psychologist was only one willing to testify as to defendant’s mental disorder), cert.

denied, 510 U.S. 920 (1993).

Barnard v. Collins, 958 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding counsel’s tactical decision not

to present mitigating evidence concerning petitioner’s mental condition did not constitute

ineffective assistance, absent showing that counsel would have reason to believe

defendant suffered from mental defect at time of offense or trial), cert. denied, 506 U.S.

1057 (1993).

Smith v. Wainwright, 777 F.2d 609 (11th Cir. 1985) (requiring evidentiary hearing to

determine reasonableness of counsel’s failure to challenge admissibility of defendant’s

confessions where defendant was prejudiced by their admission), cert. denied, 477 U.S.

905 (1986).

1.13.2.1 Conflicts of Interest

A lawyer’s conflict of interest may amount to a denial of the effective assistance of

counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Under Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,

348 (1980), to establish a Sixth Amendment violation based on a conflict of interest, a

defendant “who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict . . .

adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Once an actual conflict of interest is

established prejudice is presumed. Although the Sixth Amendment does not impose an

affirmative duty upon a state trial court to inquire into the propriety of multiple

representation in every case, the Supreme Court, in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475

(1978), required a state court to investigate timely objections to multiple representation.
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 In order to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation where the trial court fails to

inquire into a potential conflict of interest about which it knew or reasonably should have

known, the Supreme Court held, in Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, reh’g denied, 535

U.S.1074 (2002), that a defendant must establish that a conflict of interest adversely

affected his or her counsel’s performance. The Court held in Mickens that “actual conflict

of interest” means precisely a conflict that affected counsel’s performance, as opposed to

a mere theoretical division of loyalties. A determination concerning the adequacy of

counsel and conflicts of interest is a mixed question of law and fact and thus is not

entitled to the presumption of correctness afforded state court findings of fact under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e).

Supreme Court:

Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (in case in which lead defense counsel had represented

murder victim on criminal charges holding that to demonstrate Sixth Amendment

violation where trial court failed to inquire into potential conflict of interest about which

it knew or reasonably should have known, defendant had to establish that this conflict of

interest adversely affected counsel’s performance; rejecting proposed “automatic

reversal” rule whereby if trial judge neglected duty to inquire into attorney’s potential

conflict of interest, defendant, to obtain reversal of judgment, need only show that lawyer

was subject to conflict of interest), reh’g denied, 535 U.S. 1074 (2002). 

Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987) (holding no conflict of interest where two partners

were appointed to represent coindictees in respective trials even though partners

cooperated with one another in planning and conduct of trial strategy; even single

attorney representing codefendants not per se violative of Sixth Amendment; not every

instance of multiple representation justifies presumption of prejudice; where actual

conflict and adverse impact on representation exists, no need to show prejudice).

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (holding, although possibility of prejudice

inheres in almost every instance of multiple representation, defendant must still establish

actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel’s performance).

Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) (requiring state trial courts to investigate

timely objections to multiple representation; stating that simultaneous representation of

codefendants is not “per se violative of constitutional guarantees of effective assistance

of counsel”; defendant may waive right to assistance of counsel unhindered by conflicts

of interest, citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942)).
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266 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Ninth Circuit:

Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that when trial court denied

capital habeas petitioner’s motions for substitution of counsel, he was deprived of his

Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free representation because there was a complete

breakdown in communication between his trial counsel and him, the trial court did not

conduct any inquiry into the conflict, and the motions to substitute were timely; also

holding that petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel due to: (1) the lack of

communication and counsel’s ineffective efforts to overcome the impasse, and (2)

counsel’s failure to conduct a thorough investigation into the petitioner’s mental illness

and possible brain damage).

Campbell v. Rice, 408 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (holding in a noncapital case that

the state court’s determination–that an assumed actual conflict of interest due to the fact

that petitioner’s attorney was being prosecuted at the same time by the same district

attorney’s office did not cause the attorney to render ineffective assistance–was not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; also holding

that any violation of petitioner’s due process rights when he was excluded from the inchambers conference where the trial court concluded that his attorney did not have a

conflict was trial error subject to harmless error review and any error was harmless), cert.

denied, 126 S. Ct. 735 (2005).

United States v. Baker, 256 F.3d 855 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding petitioner failed to

demonstrate actual conflict where attorney pleaded guilty to federal fraud charges in New

York, cooperated with authorities and received reduced sentence, while representing

petitioner on his appeal in Los Angeles on unrelated drug charges). 

Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding conflict of interest that

adversely affected counsel’s ability to represent petitioner in murder trial where counsel

also represented separate client who was implicated in earlier homicide petitioner also

implicated in, and state’s case would have been significantly weaker if separate client had

been implicated in first homicide; finding waiver inadequate to remedy conflict).

Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir.) (finding no active representation of conflicting

interest or actual adverse effect on performance where counsel agreed to represent

petitioner’s cousin in unrelated offense but withdrew during petitioner’s trial after

learning that cousin was possible witness/accomplice to petitioner’s murder charge),

amended on denial of petition for reh’g, 253 F.3d 1150 (2001).

Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2000) (presuming prejudice where petitioner

was represented at sentencing by co-defendant’s counsel and the representation was

deficient because of a conflict of interest).
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Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding no economic conflict of interest

where petitioner submitted affidavit of appointed trial counsel discussing financial

pressures), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1092 (2000).

Woratzeck v. Stewart, 118 F.3d 648 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding former defense counsel’s

involvement as prosecutor in subsequent capital clemency hearing not conflict of interest

because prisoner has no constitutional right to clemency).

United States v. Del Muro, 87 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding court created inherent

conflict of interest by forcing trial counsel to prove own ineffectiveness at evidentiary

hearing on motion for new trial).

Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding no conflict of interest where

counsel had only discussed literary rights agreement with defendant but had not actually

entered into formal agreement; no conflict where counsel had offered to represent

codefendant and key prosecution witness against defendant where defendant could not

prove attorney-client relationship had adverse affect on attorney’s performance at trial),

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1142 (1996).

Garcia v. Bunnell, 33 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding no conflict of interest created

by defense counsel’s acceptance of offer of employment in prosecutor’s office, to begin

after end of defendant’s trial), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1024 (1995).

Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding attorneys representing

defendant at first and second trial were faced with impermissible conflicts of interest that

adversely affected defendant’s representation where first attorney initially represented

defendant’s brother and advised him to take Fifth Amendment in defendant’s trial despite

knowing brother’s confession and willingness to testify, and attorney in second trial

pursued weaker defenses despite awareness of brother’s confession).

Fitzpatrick v. McCormick, 869 F.2d 1247, 1251–53 (9th Cir.) (finding direct conflict of

interest where counsel previously represented petitioner’s codefendant and failed to

present evidence that might have put uncertainty into minds of jury but would have

implicated codefendant), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989).

Other Circuits:

Ruffin v. Kemp, 767 F.2d 748 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding petitioner entitled to habeas relief

due to actual conflict of interest that adversely affected attorney’s performance where

appointed attorney representing codefendants attempted to work out plea bargain that

would call for one defendant to testify against other). 
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Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding conflict of interest

where one defendant stood to gain significantly by counsel adducing probative arguments

damaging to cause of codefendant also represented by counsel; in establishing ineffective

assistance of counsel, it is sufficient to show plausible defense foreclosed because might

have prejudiced other codefendants represented by same counsel; “irrelevant or merely

hypothetical” conflicts of interest do not violate Sixth Amendment).

1.13.2.2 Deficiencies for Failure to Investigate and Prepare

In Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986), the Supreme Court reiterated the strong

presumption of attorney competence established by Strickland v. Washington but

established that where a counsel’s failure to investigate indicates a complete lack of trial

preparation, such performance falls below the level of reasonable professional assistance

and is thus constitutionally deficient.

In Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003), the Supreme Court emphasized that

Strickland v. Washington does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line

of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist the defendant

at sentencing, nor require defense counsel to present mitigating evidence at sentencing in

every case. The Wiggins court held that counsel’s decision not to expand their

investigation beyond a presentence investigation and city department of social services

report fell below prevailing professional standards since the standard practice in

Maryland capital cases was to prepare a social history report. 

Supreme Court:

Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456 (2005) (holding that even when a capital defendant’s

family members and defendant himself have suggested that no mitigating evidence is

available, counsel is required to make reasonable efforts to obtain and review material

that counsel knows the prosecution will probably rely on as evidence of aggravation at

the trial’s sentencing phase).

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (holding in case in which counsel attempted to

justify limited investigation as reflecting a tactical judgment to pursue alternate strategy

to focus of petitioner’s direct responsibility, that in evaluating an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, Supreme Court’s principal concern is not whether counsel should have

presented a mitigation case but whether the investigation supporting the decision not to
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introduce mitigating evidence of petitioner’s background was itself reasonable;

concluding that counsel did not conduct a reasonable investigation where the decision not

to expand their investigation beyond a presentence investigation report and a city

department of social services record fell short of the professional standards prevailing in

Maryland in 1989 in that standard practice in capital cases at that time included

preparation of a social history report and funds were available to retain a forensic social

worker).

Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (holding petitioner’s Strickland right to

counsel was violated where trial counsel failed to conduct a thorough mitigation

investigation of petitioner’s childhood for sentencing trial; holding that trial counsel’s

Strickland violation was both “contrary to” and an “unreasonable application of” federal

law, under § 2254(d)(1)).

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) (finding counsel ineffective because failed

to conduct pretrial discovery and thus unaware of search revealing interim evidence, and

therefore failed to file timely suppression motion; adversarial testing process generally

will not function properly unless counsel has done some investigation).

Ninth Circuit:

Summerlin v. Schriro, 427 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (on remand from Supreme

Court, en banc court reversed district court’s denial of pre-AEDPA habeas petition as to 

penalty phase and held that petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel because

his attorney “utterly failed” in his duty to investigate and develop potential mitigating

evidence for presentation at penalty phase: he conducted no investigation of petitioner’s

family and social history; he did not speak to petitioner’s family or friends; and his

development of mental health defense was based solely on limited information developed

at petitioner’s pre-trial competency examination, which was prepared for an entirely

different purpose), petition for cert. filed. 74 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Jan. 17, 2006) (No. 05-903)

Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir.) (in a pre-AEDPA case, holding that as to the

penalty phase of a capital trial, counsel was deficient in failing to investigate mitigating

childhood abuse, in failing to introduce the evidence that his limited investigation did

uncover as to the petitioner’s history of suffering violent physical abuse as well as the

family history of sexual abuse that petitioner knew about growing up, and in failing to

object to inadmissible aggravating evidence), amended on granting of petition for reh’g,

421 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979 (9th Cir.) (holding that counsel’s failure to prepare for

the penalty phase of a capital case until one week before it began, and his resulting
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failure to investigate thoroughly and present the petitioner’s mitigation case, was

constitutionally deficient, but that, nonetheless, the evidence in mitigation, coupled with

the potential mitigating evidence produced during the federal habeas proceedings, was

insufficient to outweigh the overwhelming evidence in aggravation), cert. denied, 126 S.

Ct. 134 (2005). 

Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 560 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that counsel’s strategic

decision to offer complete cooperation without investigating other potential mitigation

strategies fell below constitutionally acceptable standards; holding, nevertheless, that

petitioner could not show that counsel’s decision actually prejudiced his penalty phase

trial under Strickland because: (1) full cooperation did not preclude a substantial case in

mitigation; (2) district court did not err in finding that petitioner himself originated the

cooperation tactic; (3) counsel’s decision to allow petitioner to testify about the prior

homicide did not have a substantial effect on the verdict when petitioner had already

admitted committing that crime; and (4) petitioner received new trial counsel, who

conducted a reasonably thorough investigation).

Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming in capital case a conditional

grant of habeas petition, the court held that trial counsel’s failure to present alibi defense

was plainly deficient and prejudiced petitioner; noting that trial counsel at evidentiary

hearing could not recall why he failed to call alibi witness, who was identified as a

potential trial witness, or present business records bearing on alibi defense).

Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 2002) (remanding for evidentiary hearing to

determine whether counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failure to investigate and

present evidence of petitioner’s long-term drug use and his abusive and difficult

childhood, which, if true, could have altered result of penalty phase of capital murder

trial).

Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. ) (holding that there was ineffective

assistance of counsel at penalty phase where counsel was aware of petitioner’s

extraordinary history of exposure to pesticides and toxic chemicals, yet counsel neither

fully investigated this history nor informed experts who examined petitioner of those

facts that were known to him, and counsel failed to seek out expert to assess damage

done by this poisoning), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 951 (2002).

Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825 (9th Cir.) (granting writ of habeas corpus and holding

that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective during penalty phase of murder trial in

failing to investigate defendant’s background and present potentially compelling

mitigating evidence), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 942 (2002).

Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that counsel was
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ineffective in penalty phase of trial in which petitioner was sentenced to death where he

failed to conduct thorough investigation of petitioner’s background; noting that attorney

did not associate co-counsel to assist although petitioner was entitled to second attorney

in capital case, he billed only 40 hours in preparation for both phases of trial, he spent

less than half of defense investigation budget authorized by county, he did not consult

experts in endocrinology regarding petitioner’s diabetes or in toxicology regarding his

substance abuse, nor did he obtain petitioner’s medical records; concluding that jury

might not have imposed death sentence had mitigating evidence been presented).

Ainsworth v. Woodford, 268 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that counsel’s

performance at penalty phase of murder trial was deficient where counsel failed to

investigate and present wealth of evidence concerning habeas petitioner’s troubled

background and emotional problems).

Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2001) (remanding for evidentiary hearing

to determine whether counsel was deficient for failure to investigate and present evidence

of petitioner’s psychiatric condition and social history at sentencing), cert. denied, 534

U.S. 1188 (2002).

Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir.) (finding no failure to investigate based on

record; denying evidentiary hearing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254(e) for failure to request

an evidentiary hearing in state court), amended on denial of petition for reh’g, 253 F.3d

1150 (2001).

Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding no deficient

performance–but rather strategy–in counsel asking jury to convict on first degree murder

but not felony murder; finding no deficiencies in counsel’s death penalty defense), cert.

denied, 534 U.S. 1036 (2001), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 276 F.3d 483. 

Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding ineffective assistance of

counsel at capital penalty phase, which included failure to compile a social history of

petitioner, failure to present evidence regarding petitioner’s PCP addiction, failure to

present medical testimony, failure to present expert evidence regarding petitioner’s

impaired mental condition at time of crime, and failure to investigate prior aggravating

act of sodomy), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1072 (2001).

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel

based on cumulative impact of error failing to investigate or prepare for trial).

Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding trial counsel’s decision not to

pursue additional investigation into defendant’s post-traumatic syndrome disorder at guilt

and sanity trials reasonable where evidence largely cumulative; finding counsel’s
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272 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

investigatory efforts preparing for penalty trial and presentation of mitigating evidence

reasonable), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1159 (1999). 

Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.) (finding deficient performance where trial

counsel never read expert report which contained evidence favorable to defendant, but

finding no prejudice in light of other evidence of guilt; finding no deficiency, under

circumstances, in failing to investigate physical evidence and serology evidence, or

failing to request a continuance), rev’d on other grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998).

Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming district court’s finding that

counsel’s alleged failure to properly prepare for sentencing or to investigate information

in presentence report not ineffective where petitioner failed to show what further

preparation or investigation would have shown), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1123 (1999).

Brown v. Myers, 137 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding trial counsel’s failure to

investigate alibi claim or call alibi witnesses, coupled with sufficient inconsistencies in

state’s case resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel). 

Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding counsel’s failure to investigate

defendant’s childhood did not amount to ineffective assistance), cert. denied, 516 U.S.

1051 (1996).

Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding petitioner entitled to

evidentiary hearing due to colorable showing that counsel’s failure to pursue accomplice

defense amounted to deficient performance at penalty phase), cert. denied, 513 U.S.1183

(1995), on appeal after remand, 133 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding counsel was not

ineffective).

Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel

due to counsel’s failure to investigate purported confession of another suspect in the case,

petitioner’s brother, despite suspect’s willingness to talk and counsel’s pursuit of

mistaken identity defense without reference to other suspect, and other weaker defenses).

Other Circuits:

Collier v. Turpin, 177 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 1999) (granting relief from petitioner’s death

sentence where trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately prepare and present

evidence in mitigation of petitioner’s sentence for killing a police officer).

Dobbs v. Turpin, 142 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding counsel ineffective at

petitioner’s capital sentencing proceeding for failing to investigate and present any
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mitigating evidence and for making an inadequate closing argument).

Austin v. Bell, 126 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel

where attorney failed to investigate and present any evidence during capital penalty

phase, even though petitioner’s friends and family were willing to testify), cert. denied,

523 U.S. 1079 (1998), and cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1088 (1998).

Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding counsel’s failure to investigate

evidence of brain damage of mentally retarded petitioner to be ineffective assistance of

counsel), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 910 (1996).

State Courts:

In Re Personal Restraint of Brett, 142 Wash. 2d 868, 16 P.3d 601 (2001) (holding trial

counsel ineffective during both guilt and penalty phases of capital trial where counsel

knew of petitioner’s mental and physical conditions yet did not locate proper records,

experts, consultants or properly research mitigating evidence to maintain an adequate

defense).

1.13.2.3 Failure to Present Mitigating Evidence at Sentencing

The Constitution requires that the sentencer consider any relevant mitigating evidence. 

Ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment may exist, therefore, when

a defense counsel fails to adequately investigate and present such mitigating evidence.

Supreme Court:

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (holding that petitioner’s defense was prejudiced

where mitigating evidence counsel failed to present and discover was powerful:

petitioner experienced severe privation and abuse while in custody of his alcoholic

mother and physical and sexual abuse while in foster care, was homeless, and had

diminished mental capacities).

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002) (holding that attorney’s asserted ineffective assistance

of counsel claim during sentencing phase of capital murder trial in which defendant was

sentenced to death by failing to present mitigating evidence and waiving final argument

were the type of errors subject to Strickland test; also holding that state court correctly

identified Strickland principles as governing claim and that there was no merit to

contention that state court’s adjudication was contrary to court’s clearly established law;

further holding that state court decision was not an unreasonable application of Strickland
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274 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

and that it was not objectively unreasonable for state court to deem counsel’s

performance as involving tactical decisions about which competent lawyers might

disagree where counsel had tactical reasons for not calling witnesses during sentencing

phase, including fear that prosecution might elicit testimony about defendant’s criminal

history from witnesses; Justice Steven’s dissent addressing possibility that trial counsel,

who began treatment for mental illness “a couple of years after trial,” was suffering from

mental impairment at time of trial). 

Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987) (holding counsel’s strategic choice not to introduce

any mitigating evidence even after a less than complete investigation was supported by

reasonable professional judgment when the evidence that could have been presented

would not have been helpful in establishing mitigation).

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 185–87 (1986) (holding it is reasonable for counsel

not to introduce any mitigating evidence and rely on plea for mercy when potential

mitigating evidence would have been rebutted with extremely damaging evidence from

state).

Ninth Circuit:

Summerlin v. Schriro, 427 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (on remand from Supreme

Court, en banc court reversed district court’s denial of pre-AEDPA habeas petition as to

penalty phase and held that counsel was ineffective in failing to present mitigating

evidence; also holding that record did not support state’s argument that petitioner

requested that mitigating evidence not be presented), petition for cert. filed, 74 U.S.L.W.

(U.S. Jan. 17, 2006) (No. 05-903).

Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir.) (holding that counsel was constitutionally

ineffective in failing to investigate and present, at penalty phase of a capital murder trial,

significant mitigating evidence regarding petitioner’s social history and mental health,

including evidence of his difficult childhood and exposure to toxic solvents; finding that

even though petitioner refused to submit to further psychological testing, counsel’s

investigation of his mental health was deficient), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 810 (2003). 

Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that there was ineffective

assistance of counsel at penalty phase of trial where counsel failed to investigate and

present mitigating evidence of abuse petitioner witnessed and suffered as a child), cert.

denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003). 

Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir.) (holding that there was ineffective assistance

of counsel at penalty phase of trial where counsel was aware of petitioner’s extraordinary
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history of exposure to pesticides and toxic chemicals, yet counsel neither fully

investigated this history nor informed experts who examined petitioner of those facts that

were known to him, counsel failed to seek out expert to assess damage done by this

poisoning, and counsel failed to present testimony at penalty phase of trial explaining

effects of severe physical, emotional, and psychological abuse to which petitioner was

subjected as a child), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 951 (2002). 

Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825 (9th Cir.) (granting writ of habeas corpus and holding

that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective during penalty phase of murder trial in

failing to investigate defendant’s background and present potentially compelling

mitigating evidence; holding that counsel had a duty to seek out all available sources of

mitigating evidence, including contacting family members even if they would not be

called on to testify and that counsel was deficient in failing to inform defendant about

consequences of not investigating), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 942 (2002).

Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that counsel was

ineffective in penalty phase of murder trial in which petitioner was sentenced to death

where he did not present and explain to jury significant mitigating evidence; noting that

counsel called only one witness, a psychologist, and failed to call endocrinologist to offer

testimony regarding petitioner’s diabetes or toxicologist to testify regarding his substance

abuse, nor did he call any friends or family members; applying test that court must weigh

mitigating evidence against aggravating evidence and determine whether there was “a

reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer–including an appellate court,

to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence–would have concluded that the

balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances do not warrant death,” court

concluded that petitioner was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance at penalty

phase).

Ainsworth v. Woodford, 268 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that counsel’s

performance at penalty phase of murder trial was deficient where counsel failed to

investigate and present wealth of evidence concerning habeas petitioner’s emotional

problems and troubled background including drug and alcohol abuse and suicide

attempts, and failed to present to jury evidence of petitioner’s positive adjustment to

prison life during his previous incarceration).

Wallace v. Stewart, 184 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 1999) (remanding to district court for

evidentiary hearing to determine whether defense counsel ineffective at capital

sentencing hearing, in light of Hendricks and affidavits submitted to district court

revealing a depressive disorder and possibly organic brain damage).

Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding counsel ineffective at capital
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276 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

penalty hearing who failed to provide experts with necessary information, failed to have

testing performed at request of experts, and put expert on stand without preparation or

foundation, and where defendant presented evidence at habeas hearing that he suffered

from post-traumatic stress disorder, was functionally mentally retarded, brain damaged

from childhood experiences, unable to form intent and incompetent to stand trial), cert.

denied, 528 U.S. 922 (1999).

Smith v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding trial counsel ineffective by

failing to offer any mitigating evidence or argument at capital sentencing, where

presentence report indicated some mitigating evidence and counsel’s decision was not the

result of tactical consideration), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 929 (1998).

Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404 (9th Cir.) (holding petitioner presented colorable claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel where there was almost complete absence of

investigation, development, and presentation of mitigating evidence, including evidence

of petitioner’s psychiatric history), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 984, and cert. denied, 525 U.S.

996 (1998).

Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding defense attorney’s decision

to forego insanity plea in capital prosecution does not preclude obligation to explore

mental impairment resulting from physical and mental abuse as mitigating evidence at

sentencing), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1111 (1996).

Claibourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding counsel ineffective at penalty

phase for failing to prepare and present case for mitigation; evidence of mental illness,

and influence of co-defendant).

Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating where mitigating evidence is

presented at guilt trial and jury instructed to consider it at penalty phase, counsel is not

necessarily ineffective for not presenting additional evidence at penalty phase), cert.

denied, 516 U.S. 1124 (1996).

Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding counsel’s decision not to

present testimony of defendant’s mother and sister was failure to present mitigating

evidence constituting ineffective assistance of counsel), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1120

(1995).

Paradis v. Arave, 20 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding no ineffective assistance for

failure to present mitigating evidence because counsel spent adequate time preparing for

sentencing, competently responded to inaccuracies and ambiguities in presentence report,

and presented testimony to establish defendant amenable to rehabilitation), cert. denied,
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513 U.S. 1117 (1995).

Hamilton v. Vasquez, 17 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir.) (finding failure to argue to jury that it

should consider lingering doubt about defendant’s guilt as mitigating factor not

ineffective assistance because counsel could reasonably have concluded jury would not

be persuaded by such an argument), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1229 (1994).

Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding ineffective assistance where

attorney presented no mitigating evidence despite fact that there was substantial available

evidence concerning petitioner’s family background, good character, and cultural

difficulties), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 951 (1993).

Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding ineffective assistance

for failure to investigate and present any mitigating evidence of petitioner’s mental

problems; since sole mitigating argument was that petitioner must have had some mental

problem, counsel did not make a reasoned decision that the evidence would not be

useful), vacated on other grounds, 500 U.S. 901 (1992).

Evans v. Lewis, 855 F.2d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding counsel’s failure to

investigate defendant’s mental condition for purpose of establishing mitigating factor at

sentencing phase was ineffective assistance where documents indicating defendant’s

history of mental problems were available to counsel and review of totality of evidence

established prejudice; since counsel presented no mitigating evidence, this failure to

investigate cannot be construed as a trial tactic).

Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453, 1462-64 (9th Cir. 1987) (rejecting per se rule that

counsel must present mitigating evidence at sentencing; counsel not ineffective for

failing to present any mitigating evidence when it would have opened door to extremely

damaging rebuttal evidence from state), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948 (1988).

Other Circuits:

Duvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768 (10th Cir. 1998) (differentiating between failure to

present evidence and failing to investigate, and allowing more latitude for the former),

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 933 (1998).

Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding defense counsel’s failure to

present mitigating evidence at sentencing was ineffective assistance, particularly in light

of fact that counsel attacked defendant’s character and separated himself from

defendant), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 952 (1992).
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278 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Harris v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 756 (11th Cir.) (holding new sentencing required where

each of two co-counsel testified that he believed his co-counsel had prepared for the

sentencing phase, and mitigating evidence, although available, was not discovered or

presented), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1011 (1989).

State Courts:

People v. Snow, 30 Cal.4th 43, 65 P.3d 749, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271 (holding that trial

court did not err in failing to appoint new defense counsel to argue to the jury on

defendant's behalf during penalty phase of capital murder trial when defense counsel

failed to present any mitigating evidence and then, refusing to explain why, waived

argument, and defendant responded affirmatively when the court inquired whether he

would accept substitute counsel where counsel's confidential declarations in the record

on appeal raised a reasonable inference that defendant did not desire, and indeed would

not permit, defense counsel to investigate or present any family background evidence in

mitigation; also holding that the record on appeal was inadequate for resolution of the

question of ineffective assistance of defense counsel and that question could only be

resolved by means of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus), cert. denied, 540 U.S.

1076 (2003).

See generally:

Jonathan P. Tomes, Damned if you Do, Damned if you Don’t: The Use of Litigation

Experts in Death Penalty Litigation, 23 Am. J. Crim. L 359 (1997).

1.13.3 Prejudice

An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside

the conviction if the error had no effect on the judgment. A defendant must establish

prejudice resulting from the error. In Strickland, the Supreme Court held that prejudice

requires a showing that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” The Court in Strickland emphasized that the ultimate focus of an ineffective

assistance of counsel inquiry “must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding

whose result is being challenged.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696.

In Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993), the Supreme Court further

clarified that to establish prejudice a defendant must show more than merely that the
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outcome would have been different absent the deficiency of counsel. The Court held

that a trial is not unfair or unreliable unless counsel’s ineffectiveness deprived the

defendant of a substantive or procedural right to which he was entitled by law.

Lockhart. 506 U.S. at 372.

Supreme Court:

Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) (holding prejudice established when

counsel’s deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise

would have taken).

Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391-95 (2000) (stating Lockhart’s

fundamental fairness test not applicable inquiry when Strickland analysis shows

deprivation of substantive or procedural right; holding that Lockhart’s fundamental

fairness test is not an additional requirement to Strickland prejudice nor does Lockhart

supplant prejudice under Strickland).

Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993) (holding to show prejudice under Strickland,

defendant must demonstrate more than different outcome caused by deficient counsel;

unfairness or unreliability does not result unless counsel’s ineffectiveness deprives

defendant of a substantive or procedural right entitled by law).

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (holding although possibility of prejudice

inheres in almost every instance of multiple representation, defendant must still

establish actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel’s performance).

Ninth Circuit:

Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 928 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that

Williams v. Taylor does not establish per se rule that death sentence must be reversed if

counsel’s performance at penalty phase is deficient, but rather that applying Strickland

analysis, court must weigh mitigating evidence against aggravating evidence and

determine whether there was “a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the

sentencer–including an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the

evidence–would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating

circumstances do not warrant death”). 

Ainsworth v. Woodford, 268 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding there to be prejudice to

habeas petitioner based on counsel’s deficient performance at penalty phase of murder

trial where counsel failed to investigate and present wealth of evidence concerning
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petitioner’s troubled background and his emotional problems, and had jury been able to

consider mitigating evidence, there was reasonable probability jury would have

rendered verdict of life imprisonment without parole rather than death sentence).

Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding prima facie showing of

prejudice where third party who passed note to juror in courthouse was found to be in

romantic relationship with a witness for the prosecution).

Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding no prejudice in counsel’s

failure to meet with petitioner in jail before the guilt phase trial where there was no

evidence that the failure to do so affected the trial outcome; finding no prejudice with

counsel’s death penalty defense), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036 (2001), reh’g and reh’g

en banc denied, 276 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 2001).

Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding prejudice where defense counsel

failed to introduce evidence that corroborated a key defense witness whom the jury

might otherwise not believe and which evidence, if believed, would prove defendant’s

innocence), reh’g granted in part (June 15, 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 929 (1999).

Johnson v. Baldwin, 114 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding prejudice where trial counsel

failed to investigate alibi defense–which investigation would have prompted counsel to

advise defendant on scope of testifying–and where state’s evidence very weak and codefendant’s nondeficient trial strategy resulted in acquittal).

United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding no prejudice where

counsel failed to assert viable defense to charge that results in probation if defendant in

same case is convicted and sentenced for more serious offense), cert. denied, 520 U.S.

1132 (1997).

Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1333 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating prejudice to

defendant may result from cumulative impact of multiple deficiencies of counsel), cert.

denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979).

Other Circuits:

Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding failure to investigate

mental illness satisfied prejudice where defendant had extensive history of mental

problems and may have been incompetent to stand trial; finding prejudice where

counsel failed to investigate and present to jury another person’s confession to the

murder).
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See generally:

Jennifer N. Foster, Note, Lockhart v. Fretwell: Using Hindsight to Evaluate Prejudice in

Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 1369 (1994) (analyzing

Lockhart, ineffective assistance of counsel in Sixth Amendment and development of

prejudice requirement; arguing court’s use of hindsight to evaluate prejudice departs

from Strickland and undermines consistency in evaluation of prejudicial error).

1.13.3.1 Presumed Prejudice

In United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), and later in Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75

(1988), the Court stated that certain circumstances may create a presumption of prejudice

resulting in Sixth Amendment violations. In Penson, the Court distinguished between

two types of ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) when the deficiency consists of a

failure to raise or properly brief or argue certain issues on appeal, requiring a showing of

Strickland prejudice, and (2) when there has been complete actual or constructive denial

of any assistance of counsel and prejudice is presumed. When the latter has occurred, it

is presumed to result in prejudice, and a Strickland second prong showing of prejudice is

not required. As to presumed prejudice when an “actual conflict of interest” is

established, see § 1.13.2.1, supra.

Supreme Court:

Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004) (holding that counsel’s failure to obtain

defendant’s express consent to a strategy of conceding guilt in a capital trial does not

automatically render counsel’s performance deficient, and that counsel’s effectiveness

should not be evaluated under the Cronic standard, but under the Strickland standard).

Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988) (holding prejudice will be presumed if there has been

actual or constructive denial of assistance of counsel at trial or on appeal, and thus

Strickland prejudice standard not required; noting that appellate counsel had been granted

leave to withdraw at time court of appeals considered merits of appeal, leaving petitioner

entirely without assistance of counsel on appeal).

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (acknowledging exception to general rule

requiring showing of prejudice where surrounding circumstances make it so unlikely that

any lawyer could perform effectively at trial that it justifies presumption of

ineffectiveness without inquiring into actual performance, such as when there is complete
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complete denial of counsel or if counsel entirely fails to subject prosecution’s case to

meaningful adversarial testing resulting in petitioner’s denial of right to effective crossexamination).

Ninth Circuit:

Crandell v. Bunnell, 144 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 1998) (presuming prejudice where

petitioner was forced to choose between self-representation and representation by an

attorney who refused to investigate or establish a relationship with petitioner).

Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding failure to plead for

leniency at sentencing not structural error), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 903 (1998).

United States v. Horodner, 993 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding counsel’s untimely

filing of notice of appeal is presumed prejudice).

United States v. Baldwin, 987 F.2d 1432, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding no

presumed prejudice where defense attorney conceded client’s lack of defense to court

during pretrial conference in presence of prosecutor but not jury), cert. denied, 508

U.S. 967 (1993).

Lozada v. Deeds, 964 F.2d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding prejudice is presumed

where defense counsel failed to file notice of appeal despite client’s instructions).

United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding presumed prejudice

where defense counsel concedes during closing argument that no reasonable doubt

exists as to only factual issues in dispute; attorney conduct was more than negligent

representation, but rather constituted abandonment of defense of client at critical stage

of proceedings).

United States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846, 848 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding failure of counsel to

appear at oral argument or file a reply brief not so essential to fundamental fairness of

appellate process as to constitute presumed prejudice).

Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831, 834 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that defense attorney

sleeping through substantial portion of trial is inherently prejudicial conduct, thus no

separate showing of prejudice necessary).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Coleman v. Ignacio, 164 F.R.D. 679 (D. Nev. 1996) (finding presumed prejudice where
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assistance of counsel altogether denied).

Other Circuits:

Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2001) (declining to adopt per se rule that

any sleeping by defense counsel during trial merits presumption of prejudice but

holding that repeated unconsciousness of defendant’s counsel through not insubstantial

portions of critical guilt-innocence phase of capital murder trial warranted presumption

of prejudice; rejecting argument that Cronic calls for presumption of prejudice relating

to absence of counsel during critical stage of trial only when state action causes such

absence), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1120 (2002).

Castellanos v. United States, 26 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding where defendant told

lawyer to appeal and lawyer did not, then defendant was deprived of counsel altogether,

constituting per se violation of Sixth Amendment).

Lombard v. Lynaugh, 868 F.2d 1475, 1480 (5th Cir. 1989) (presuming prejudice under

Penson where appellate counsel filed two-page brief failing to raise indisputably

nonfrivolous issues apparent in record and stating appeal lacked merit).

1.13.3.2 Prejudice Due to Failure to Investigate

Ninth Circuit:

Jones v. Wood, 207 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding prejudice where trial counsel

failed to investigate and present substantial circumstantial evidence of another person

committing crime in case based on circumstantial evidence).

Lord v. Wood, 184 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding prejudice where trial attorneys

failed to call three alibi witnesses without personally interviewing witnesses and

government’s case not strong enough to make error harmless).

Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding no prejudice where

counsel declined to pursue psychological testing for sentencing purpose after petitioner

objected to such tactic during guilt phase and where postconviction evidence revealed a

sociopath disorder but evidence had countervailing tactical drawbacks), cert. denied,

525 U.S. 903 (1998).

Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding petitioner prejudiced by

counsel’s failure to investigate and present any mitigating evidence at sentencing phase
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in light of evidence concerning defendant’s good character, strong family relationship,

cultural difficulties, and that he was an honor student), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 951

(1993).

Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1161 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding petitioner was

prejudiced by counsel’s failure to investigate and present any mitigating evidence of

petitioner’s mental problems), vacated on other grounds, 500 U.S. 901 (1992).

Evans v. Lewis, 855 F.2d 631, 637-39 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding counsel’s failure to

investigate petitioner’s mental problems prejudiced petitioner because at petitioner’s

resentencing psychiatrists were unable to give an opinion with a reasonable degree of

certainty due to lapse of time between crime and examination).

1.14 Clemency Hearings

In Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998), the Court held that

Ohio’s clemency procedure was constitutional. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by

Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, opined that no due process right exists in the

executive’s clemency authority. Justices O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and

Stevens agreed that minimal due process safeguards apply in clemency hearings. 

Justice Stevens, who wrote separately, concurred with the Sixth Circuit that the case

should be remanded for a hearing on whether petitioner received due process. The

Court unanimously agreed that the voluntary interview portion of Ohio’s executive

clemency procedure does not violate the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.

In Woratzeck v. Arizona Board of Executive Clemency, 117 F.3d 400 (9th

Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit held that Arizona clemency laws do not create a

constitutionally protected liberty interest. However, the court recognized a limited

procedural due process right in the clemency hearing as an integral part of the state’s

criminal justice procedure and heard petitioner’s § 1983 cause of action. The court

held that due process is violated only when clemency hearing procedures “shock the

conscience” and concluded that Woratzeck’s hearing was not constitutionally deficient. 

The court stated that Woratzeck and his witnesses had opportunity to testify on

Woratzeck’s behalf and to expose challenged participation of former defense attorneys

now employed as county attorneys.
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Supreme Court:

Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998) (plurality opinion) (holding

Ohio’s clemency procedure does not violate due process; conducting voluntary

interviews does not violate prisoners’ Fifth Amendment rights).

Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981) (holding

Connecticut’s commutation statute does not create a constitutional liberty interest; nor

does the failure to provide plaintiff with a statement of reasons for denying

commutation violate his due process rights).

Ninth Circuit:

Wilson v. United States Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal. (Siripongs), 161 F.3d 1185

(9th Cir. 1998) (holding, in mandamus action, that district court did not err in granting

a TRO based on condemned’s assertion that governor’s failure to notify capital defense

counsel regarding scope of issues to be considered in clemency hearing violates due

process).

Woratzeck v. Stewart, 118 F.3d 648 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding claim regarding

constitutionality of clemency proceeding not cognizable under AEDPA because there is

no constitutional right to clemency).

Woratzeck v. Arizona Bd. of Clemency, 117 F.3d 400 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)

(holding Arizona clemency laws do not create a constitutionally protected liberty

interest, but defendant has a procedural due process right in the hearing; holding § 1983

proper vehicle for raising due process claim; holding due process violated only if

clemency hearing procedures “shock the conscience;” holding that Woratzeck’s hearing

not constitutionally deficient). 

1.15 Public Access to Executions

The Supreme Court has not ruled on the extent of the public’s access to executions. 

However, the Ninth Circuit has held that restrictions on the public’s viewing of lethal

injections at San Quentin Prison in California until after prison administrations had

inserted IV lines and left the execution chamber were an exaggerated, unreasonable

response to prison official’s legitimate concerns for the safety of prison staff and

violates the public’s First Amendment right to view executions from the moment the

inmate is escorted into the execution chamber. California First Amendment Coalition v.
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Woodford, 299 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002).

The Oregon Supreme Court similarly struck down prison rules that limited

public viewing of an execution to the lethal injection itself. Oregon Newspaper

Publishers Ass’n v. Oregon Dep’t of Corrections, 329 Or. 115, 988 P.2d 359 (1999). 

The court based its ruling on the interpretation of Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.473 (1999),

which allows viewers to “be present at the execution.” The court construed “the

execution” to encompass preinjection procedures including connecting monitoring

equipment to the prisoner, placing the prisoner in restraints, and inserting the catheter

in the prisoner. 

The court also ruled that § 137.473 does not grant to the prison the authority

to impose nondisclosure restrictions on witnesses whom the superintendent is

statutorily required to invite. The superintendent is required to invite one or more

physicians, the attorney general, and a county sheriff. Because the court’s holding

essentially requires the department of corrections to rewrite its rules, the court declined

to rule on whether the nondisclosure restrictions as applied to the capital prisoner’s

invited guests are unconstitutional.

Ninth Circuit:

California First Amendment Coalition v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002)

(holding prison procedure limiting public viewing of lethal injection execution to time

after IV was inserted into condemned inmate was exaggerated, unreasonable response

to prison official’s legitimate concerns for safety of prison staff and violates public’s 

First Amendment right to view executions; affirming permanent injunction prohibiting

defendants from prohibiting uninterrupted viewing of executions from moment

condemned inmate enters execution chamber until condemned inmate is declared

dead).

Other Circuits:

Lawson v. Dixon, 25 F.3d. 1040 (4th Cir. 1994) (unpublished) (affirming district

court’s dismissal of declaratory and injunctive complaint alleging First and Fourteenth

Amendment right to videotape execution).

Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977) (reversing district court ruling that

press has First Amendment right to televise executions), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 914
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(1979).

District Courts in the Ninth Circuit:

KQED v. Vasquez, No. C-90-1383 RHS, 1995 WL 489485 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 1991)

(ruling press had right to be present at Harris execution in California but no right to

film it).

State Courts:

Oregon Newspaper Publishers Ass’n v. Oregon Dep’t of Corrections, 329 Or. 115, 988

P.2d 359 (1999) (holding witnesses to execution have statutory right to view

preinjection procedures; holding non-disclosure restrictions cannot be applied to

viewers statutorily invited by superintendent).

Halquist v. Department of Corrections, 113 Wash. 2d 818, 783 P.2d 1065 (1989) (en

banc) (denying journalist and independent television and radio producer right to

videotape execution in Washington state).

See generally:

Jeff Angeja, Note, Televising California’s Death Penalty: Is there a Constitutional

Right to Broadcast Executions, 43 Hastings L.J. 1489 (1992) (arguing broadcast media

has constitutional right to televise executions).

John D. Bessler, Televised Executions and the Constitution: Recognizing a First

Amendment Right of Access to State Executions, 45 Fed. Com. L.J. 355 (1993)

(considering relationship between private execution laws and press and general public,

concluding that private execution statutes are unconstitutional under existing authority).

Pamela A. MacLean, Judge Gives Press Right to See Execution, Los Angeles Daily J.,

Nov. 4, 1996, at A1 (reporting ruling in California First Amendment Coalition v.

Calderon, No. 96-1291 by Northern District of California Judge Walker that First

Amendment requires reporters must be allowed to observe execution by lethal injection

from time needles inserted).

Neil E. Nussbaum, “Film at Eleven . . .”–Does the Press Have the Right to Attend and

Videotape Executions?, 20 N.C. Cent. L.J. 121 (1992) (analyzing KQED decision,

suggesting why First Amendment might require removal of restriction on videotaping).
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Jeff I. Richards & R. Bruce Easter, Retrospective Forum: The Robert Alton Harris

Execution: Televising Executions: The High Tech Alternative to Public Hangings, 40

UCLA L. Rev. 381 (1992) (examining current prohibition on televising executions and

weighing arguments).

Gil Santamarina, The Case For Televised Executions, 11 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 101

(1992) (reviewing televised execution cases and arguing First Amendment right to

broadcast).

Jerome T. Tao, Note, First Amendment Analysis of State Regulations Prohibiting The

Filming of Prisoner Executions, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1042 (1992) (reviewing

constitutional issues re: televised executions, arguing prohibitions against filming

executions should be analyzed as content-based restrictions on First Amendment

freedoms and thus unconstitutional).

1.16 Standard of Review

The standard of review used to determine the merits of a federal constitutional claim

depends on whether the claim is being reviewed by an appellate or habeas court. 

1.16.1 Direct vs. Collateral Review of Trial Error

In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Supreme Court held that the

standard for determining whether a verdict must be set aside because of a federal

constitutional error is whether the error “was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” In

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), the Supreme Court limited the Chapman

harmless error standard to direct review of constitutional error and announced a

different harmless error standard for collateral habeas corpus review. Brecht adopted

the standard set forth in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), which is

whether the error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict.” Id. at 776. The Brecht Court reasoned that the Kotteakos harmless

error standard is better tailored to the nature and purpose of collateral review because

application of a less onerous harmless error standard on collateral review promotes the

considerations underlying habeas jurisprudence. The Court did not decide whether this

less onerous harmless error standard also applies where the federal court is the first to

determine that a constitutional error has occurred, although some circuits have since
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addressed that question.

In O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995), the Court further refined the

Brecht harmless error standard holding that this standard does not place the burden of

proof upon the petitioner to show that a trial error substantially affected the verdict. 

Rather, where the issue is evenly balanced and the judge has doubts about whether the

error had “substantial and injurious effect” on the jury’s verdict, then the judge must

treat the error as if it were not harmless and must rule for the petitioner. 

In California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2 (1996), the Supreme Court ruled that the

Ninth Circuit’s application of a modified O’Neal harmless error standard (“the

omission is harmless only if review of the facts found by the jury establishes that the

jury necessarily found the omitted element”) was too strict and remanded the case for

further consideration in light of Brecht and O’Neal.

Supreme Court:

Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141 (1998) (per curiam) (holding Ninth Circuit erred

by failing to apply Brecht standard of review on habeas writ regarding sentencing

instruction, applying Boyle standard of review instead, which finds constitutional error

if there is a “reasonable likelihood” jury interpreted instruction to prevent consideration

of constitutionally relevant evidence).

California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2 (1996) (vacating and remanding Ninth Circuit en banc

decision reversing murder convictions because of jury instruction error, ruling that

Ninth Circuit incorrectly used stricter harmless error standard than that established in

Brecht and O’Neal; remanded for consideration in light of those cases).

O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995) (rejecting Sixth Circuit interpretation of

Brecht as shifting burden of proof of trial error to petitioner; holding where a federal

habeas court finds a constitutional trial error and is in “grave doubt” about whether it

had a substantial and injurious effect on verdict, error is not harmless).

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (holding standard for determining whether

habeas relief is warranted for state error in federal constitution is whether the error had

a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict).

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (establishing harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt standard for review of constitutional errors).
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290 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946) (setting forth harmless error

standard of whether error had “substantial or injurious effect or influence on jury’s

verdict”).

Ninth Circuit:

United States v. Montalvo, 331 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding in noncapital habeas

case that Brecht harmless error standard applies to habeas cases under 28 U.S.C. § 2255

as well as to cases under § 2254). 

Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that reviewing court must

determine independently whether trial error had substantial and injurious effect,

without consideration of burdens of proof). 

Lambright v. Stewart, 191 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding court did not

need to reach whether constitutional error would have been structural or would have

been subjected to harmless error review where court held that there is no per se

constitutional error in the use of dual juries either in general or in this specific case),

cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1188 (2002).

Tapia v. Roe, 189 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding court did not need to reach

whether proper standard of review was the substantial and injurious effect or influence

on the jury’s verdict standard under Brecht or the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

standard under Chapman where claim had not been reviewed on direct appeal and was

presented for the first time on habeas corpus because the claim failed under both

standards).

Mach v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 1998) (deciding that potential jurors’

statements which may have prejudiced entire panel constituted structural error, but not

expressly holding so since the error was clearly not harmless even under Brecht).

Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying abuse of discretion standard

on habeas where petitioner challenged impartiality of judge who presided over retrial

where parties did not argue applicability of § 2254(d) (now § 2254(e)(1)), recognizing

standard less vigorous than Brecht standard), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1082 (1998).

Other Circuits:

Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565 (8th Cir. 1997) (affirming view articulated in Harrington

v. State of Iowa), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 834 (1998).
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Hogue v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 466 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Brecht standard

applies on federal habeas review regardless of whether the states used the Chapman

standard), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1014 (1998).

Curtis v. Duval, 124 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997) (applying Brecht standard even though state

courts failed to use Chapman analysis).

Arnold v. Evatt, 113 F.3d 1352 (4th Cir. 1997) (subjecting jury viewing of crime scene

without defense counsel’s presence to harmless error analysis under Brecht even

though state courts did not review for harmless error under Chapman), cert. denied sub

nom. Arnold v. Moore, 522 U.S. 1058 (1998).

Harrington v. State of Iowa, 109 F.3d 1275 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying Chapman

standard of harmless error analysis where it was unclear if state courts conducted

harmless error review).

Sherman v. Smith, 89 F.3d 1134 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding Brecht standard for

harmless error review applies in habeas corpus and other collateral proceedings even

when state court on direct review failed to find error harmless beyond reasonable doubt

under stricter Chapman standard).

Singletary v. Smith, 61 F.3d 815 (11th Cir. 1995) (applying O’Neal, finding Hitchcock

error had substantial effect on verdict where court had “grave doubts” regarding impact

of error), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1140 (1996).

Smith v. Dixon, 14 F.3d 956 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (applying Brecht standard in habeas

corpus proceeding where state court had conducted no harmless error analysis at all

because it found no error), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 841 (1994).

See generally:

Jennie Anest, Note, Brecht v. Abrahamson and Harmless Error: The Court Continues

to Narrow Federal Habeas Corpus, 38 How. L.J. 201 (1994) (analyzing Brecht and

Chapman standards and possibility of exception to Brecht standard).

James A. Carey, Jr., Note, Habeas Corpus–Harmless Error Rule–Proper Harmless

Error Standard on Habeas Review of Fifth Amendment Violations is Whether the Error

Had “Substantial or Injurious Effect” on the Jury’s Determination of Petitioner’s

Guilt, 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1636 (1994) (analyzing Brecht v. Abrahamson in light of

historical and modern harmless error jurisprudence).
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Matthew T. Martens, Survey of Developments in North Carolina and the Fourth

Circuit, 1994, Criminal Law: Smith v. Dixon: Was it Really Harmless?, 73 N.C. L.

Rev. 2351 (1995) (analyzing Smith v. Dixon).

1.16.2 Trial Error vs. Structural Error

In Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), the Supreme Court distinguished “trial

errors” from “structural” errors in the context of constitutional rights violations stating

that the former are subject to harmless error analysis but the latter requires automatic

reversal. A “trial error” occurs during a case’s presentation to the trier of fact and “may

therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order

to determine whether its admission is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” A

structural defect, on the other hand, “affects the framework within which the trial

proceeds” and therefore defies harmless error analysis. Thus, the Brecht distinction

between harmless error standards applicable on direct or collateral review applies only

to “trial errors” and is irrelevant to structural defects.

Supreme Court:

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12 (2003) (per curiam) (holding that precedent did not

support Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the failure of the state to

charge in an indictment for aggravated murder in the course of committing aggravated

robbery that defendant was a “principal” was the functional equivalent of “dispensing

with the reasonable doubt requirement,” as prohibited by Sullivan v. Louisiana).

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) (holding constitutionally deficient

reasonable doubt instruction is structural defect requiring automatic reversal, not

harmless error analysis).

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (distinguishing trial error–error in the trial

process itself–which is subject to harmless error analysis, from structural

defect–affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds–which requires

automatic reversal; holding involuntary confession is only trial error).

Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986) (describing structural defect as an error such that

the “criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of

guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally
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fair”).

Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (involving structural defect of unlawful

exclusion of members of defendant’s race from grand jury).

Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984) (involving structural defect regarding

right to public trial).

McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177–78, n.8 (1984) (involving structural defect

regarding right to self-representation at trial).

Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (involving structural defect of total

deprivation of the right to counsel at trial).

Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (involving structural defect of biased, nonimpartial judge).

Ninth Circuit:

Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999) (declining to extend Vasquez v. Hillery

holding to apply to any source of pretrial bias), cert. denied sub nom. Rich v. Woodford,

528 U.S. 1092 (2000).

Mach v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 1998) (deciding that potential jurors statements

which may have prejudiced entire panel constituted structural error, but not expressly

holding so since the error was clearly not harmless even under Brecht).

Simmons v. Blodgett, 110 F.3d 39 (9th Cir.) (applying O’Neal, finding no showing that

constitutional error occurred and thus no relief where factual issue of existence of

constitutional trial error stands in “virtual equipoise”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 892

(1997).

Rice v. Wood, 77 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir.) (holding trial court’s acceptance of jury’s death

verdict in defendant’s absence constitutes “structural defect” in proceedings, requiring

automatic reversal), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 873 (1996).

Suniga v. Bunnell, 998 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding jury instruction error was

structural defect, not subject to harmless error analysis).

Hays v. Arave, 977 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating “unconstitutional in abstentia

sentencing is a structural error” that cannot be affirmed on the basis of harmless error).
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Bland v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1478 (9th Cir.) (applying

Brecht harmless error standard in reviewing claim of Sixth Amendment deprivation of

counsel), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 947 (1994).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Chivars v. Borg, No. C-91-4350-CAL, 1994 WL 28016 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 1994)

(holding Strickland standard, not Brecht, is appropriate standard for evaluating

ineffective assistance of counsel claims on habeas), aff’d, 34 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1994),

and cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1166 (1995).

Other Circuits:

Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that Batson/Powers claim

is structural error not subject to harmless error review).

Tuggle v. Netherland, 79 F.3d 1386 (4th Cir.) (applying Brecht harmless error standard

to Ake error), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 894 (1996).

Ford v. Norris, 67 F.3d 162 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding constitutional error in racial

discrimination in jury selection is structural defect not subject to harmless error

analysis).

See generally:

David Bowman, Note, A Matter of Life and Death: Revising the Harmless Error

Standard for Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 72 Wash. L. Rev. 567 (1997) (analyzing

obstacles to petitioner’s establishing magnitude of error sufficient for reversal under

new harmless error doctrine and difficulties lower courts face in applying new

doctrine).

1.16.3 Appellate Review of Federal Habeas Corpus

The circuit court reviews de novo the denial of a state prisoner’s petition for federal

habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1998). Eslaminia v. White, 136 F.3d

1234, 1236 (9th Cir. 1998).

See also § 6.3.1 for discussion of AEDPA’s standard of review when

reviewing a state court decision reached on the merits.
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1.17 Ex Post Facto and Related Due Process Considerations

The constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws is particularly relevant in death

penalty law where state statutes have been rewritten so often. A law is ex post facto

when it is retroactively applied and not ameliorative–but rather disadvantageous–to the

offender.

In Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977), the Supreme Court held that

procedural changes in the law are not ex post facto. Specifically, Dobbert held that a

change in Florida’s statute–altering the methods used in determining whether the death

penalty is to be imposed but not changing the amount of punishment for the crime–was

both procedural and ameliorative and therefore not ex post facto. In contrast, the

Fourth Circuit found ex post facto the retroactive application of a statute allowing

certain juvenile defendants to be tried as adults because it increased the potential

punishment to include the death penalty. United States v. Juvenile Male, 819 F.2d 468

(4th Cir. 1987).

Although the ex post facto prohibition literally applies only to substantive

legislation, the Supreme Court has incorporated its principles into the due process

clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments so that application of procedural

changes also may be unconstitutional. Thus, in Coleman v. McCormick, 874 F.2d

1280, 1286–89 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit held that it was unconstitutional to

resentence a defendant under a state’s new bifurcated sentencing scheme after the court

tried and sentenced the defendant pursuant to a mandatory death penalty statute that

was later held unconstitutional. Although the statutory change was procedural,

resentencing would violate due process because the defendant was given no notice that

the evidence used in the original guilt phase would be used at resentencing.

Supreme Court:

Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977) (upholding death sentence of inmate who

committed crime just before state death penalty statute held unconstitutional but was

convicted and sentenced under newly enacted constitutional statute; finding no ex post

facto because changes in statute were procedural as well as ameliorative; existence of

death penalty statute at time of offense served as “operative fact” that death sentence

might be penalty imposed and thus gave sufficient notice to avoid offending ex post
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facto clause).

Ninth Circuit:

Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that there was ex post

facto violation requiring reversal of death sentence where jury was instructed on 1978

California death penalty statute, rather than the 1977 statute, in effect at time of crime;

1978 statute was more onerous than 1977 statute, which permitted jury discretion to

reject death penalty even if it found that aggravating factors outweighed mitigating

factors; under 1978 statute, jury did not have this discretion), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 935

(2002).

Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that giving a prisoner the

option to choose lethal gas as a method of execution where he had been sentenced

before the adoption of lethal injection did not make the death penalty more burdensome

and therefore was not an ex post facto violation), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1073 (1999).

Hamilton v. Vasquez, 17 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir.) (holding, where defendant’s death

sentence reversed by state supreme court decision which state supreme court later

overruled, retroactive application of overruling opinion on remand not ex post facto

because law applied same as law at time of offense), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1229

(1994).

Toomey v. Bunnell, 898 F.2d 741 (9th Cir.) (holding change in state criminal procedure,

pursuant to state constitutional amendment not ex post facto violation), cert. denied,

498 U.S. 960 (1990).

Coleman v. McCormick, 874 F.2d 1280, 1286–89 (9th Cir.) (holding, although

procedural change, resentencing defendant under new bifurcated sentencing scheme,

where defendant originally tried under Montana’s mandatory death penalty statute later

held unconstitutional, violates due process because no notice that guilt phase evidence

would be used at resentencing), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).

Knapp v. Cardwell, 667 F.2d 1253, 1262-63 (9th Cir.) (following Dobbert, holding that

since change in Arizona statute was procedural and ameliorative, no ex post facto

violation), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1055 (1982).

Other Circuits:

United States v. Juvenile Male, 819 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding retroactive

application of statute allowing certain juvenile defendants to be tried as adults,
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increased potential punishment–including death penalty–ex post facto violation).

See generally:

Robert Woll, Note, The Death Penalty and Federalism: Eighth Amendment

Constraints on the Allocation of State Decisionmaking Power, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 787,

823-26 (1983) (reviewing effects of Dobbert on resentencing defendants to death under

newly enacted death penalty statutes, after defendant already tried under

unconstitutional statute).

1.18 Retroactivity of New Law

1.18.1 Retroactivity of New Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure

Addressing perceived inconsistencies in its prior rulings, the Supreme Court ruled, in

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), that “new” constitutional rules of criminal

procedure will not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review unless they fall

within two narrow exceptions. Cases pending on direct review, or otherwise not yet

final, however, are not so restricted. A “new rule” is one that “breaks new ground

or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government” or one whose

“result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction

became final.” Although Teague itself was not a capital case, the Court has held that

its holding applies to capital as well as noncapital cases.

In Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990), the Court explained that “the

‘new rule’ principle validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing

precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later

decisions.” To facilitate this purpose, the Court, expanded the new rule definition to

include any rule whose result state courts would not have felt “compelled” by existing

precedent to reach. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484 (1990). However, the Court has

noted that even where precedent “informs,” “controls,” “governs,” or is “within the

logical compass” of precedent, the result is not necessarily “compelled” by precedent

and is therefore a new rule. Id. In Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1990), the

Ninth Circuit explained that Teague’s limitation applies only to new rules imposing an

obligation on the state. Thus, a threshold issue such as the court’s ability to consider an

unexhausted claim is not subject to analysis under Teague. 
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The two exceptions to the Teague rule are: (1) rules placing certain kinds of

primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law to proscribe,

and (2) procedures implicit in the concept of ordered liberty without which the

likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished. Such rules would apply

retroactively. Although no Supreme Court case to date has satisfied either criteria, the

Court has had occasion to comment on the nature of the exceptions. In Penry v.

Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), the Court noted that the first exception should also

apply to rules “prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants

because of their status or offense.” In that case, the Court indicated that if it had

announced a new rule that mentally retarded defendants could not be sentenced to death

(whereas it found in fact to the contrary), then such a rule would satisfy the first

exception. Subsequently, the Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304

(2002), that executions of mentally retarded individuals convicted of capital crimes are

cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. See § 1.6. In

Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990), the Court explained that in order for a new rule

to satisfy the second exception it not only must improve the accuracy of a trial but also

“alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of

a proceeding.”

In Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990), the Court held that the Teague

rule is not jurisdictional. Therefore, the Court need not raise the retroactivity issue sua

sponte. In Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993), the Supreme Court held that

while the state may use Teague to deny a habeas petitioner the benefit of retroactive

application of new rules, a habeas petitioner on the other hand may not invoke Teague

to challenge the state’s retroactive application of new rules. The habeas petitioner is

barred from such use of Teague, the Court reasoned, because Teague’s purpose is to

protect the state’s interest in the finality of criminal convictions and its reliance on the

constitutional standards prevailing at the time of the original proceedings. These are

interests which the habeas petitioner does not have. Thus, only the state may object to

the retroactive application of a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure to an old

case.

The Supreme Court held in, Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266 (2002) (per

curiam), that, in addition to performing any analysis required by the AEDPA, a
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threshold Teague analysis is required in federal habeas corpus proceedings whenever

the state advances a Teague argument, even if the state supreme court did not consider

the issue of retroactivity of the rule.

Supreme Court:

Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266 (2002) (per curiam) (holding that federal court

considering habeas petition, in addition to performing any analysis required by

AEDPA, must conduct threshold Teague analysis whenever state advances Teague

argument, even though here state supreme court had evaluated claim that penalty phase

jury instructions and verdict forms were improper under Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S.

367 (1988), without considering retroactivity of Mills).

Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 666-67, reh’g denied, 533 U.S. 970 (2001) (noting that

standard for determining whether error is structural is not coextensive with second

Teague exception and that a holding that error is structural does not logically dictate

conclusion that second Teague exception has been met). 

Stewart v. LaGrand (Walter), 526 U.S. 115 (1999) (indicating that proposed rule

prohibiting capital defendant from waiving Eighth Amendment protections would

violate Teague).

O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151 (1997) (holding Simmons v. South Carolina rule

that capital defendant must be permitted to inform sentencing jury of paroleineligibility if prosecution argues defendant presents future danger is “new rule” under

Teague).

Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518 (1997) (holding rule in Espinosa v. Florida, 505

U.S. 1079 (1992)–if a weighing state requires the sentencing trial judge to give

deference to a jury’s advisory recommendation, neither the judge nor the jury is

constitutionally permitted to weigh invalid aggravating circumstances–is Teaguebarred; also holding that federal habeas court should ordinarily rule on procedural bar

before undertaking Teague inquiry).

Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461 (1993) (applying Teague in light of Butler, Saffle, and

Penry to bar claim that Texas sentencing scheme unconstitutionally prevented

consideration of mitigation, because reasonable jurists at time would not have felt

compelled to find scheme unconstitutional, and thus claim sought is new rule, not

within exceptions, and thus not retroactive).

Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993) (holding habeas petitioner may not invoke
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Teague to challenge state’s retroactive application of new rule because petitioner

challenging decision on collateral review has no interest in finality of state court

convictions).

Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992) (holding petitioner may rely on cases announced

after death sentence became final since they did not announce new rules under Teague). 

Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990) (holding Caldwell announced new rule under

Teague and was therefore unavailable to petitioner, reasoning even if precedent

informed, controlled, or governed result in Caldwell, the result was not necessarily

compelled; second Teague exception inapplicable because to qualify for exception, new

rule must not only improve accuracy of trial but also “alter our understanding of the

bedrock procedural elements” essential to the fairness of a proceeding).

Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990) (holding, although grounded in federalism

considerations, Teague rule is not jurisdictional, and thus court need not raise it sua

sponte).

Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990) (interpreting Teague to mean rule is new if state

court hearing petitioner’s claim at time conviction became final would not have felt

“compelled” by existing precedent to adopt it).

Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990) (holding Arizona v. Roberson (regarding

police-initiated interrogation) announced a new rule under Teague and was therefore

unavailable to petitioner; that Roberson was controlled by or within logical compass of

precedent is not conclusive for purpose of new rule determination–if reasonable

disagreement exists between courts, then result not dictated by precedent).

Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (applying Teague principles in capital

sentencing context and holding that first Teague exception also applies to rules

“prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their

status or offense”).

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (holding a new constitutional rule of criminal

procedure may not be retroactively applied to cases on collateral review, including case

announcing new rule, unless it concerns procedures implicit in the concept of ordered

liberty or places certain kinds of private individual conduct beyond the power of the

criminal law to proscribe; new rule is one whose result “was not dictated by precedent

existing when defendant’s conviction became final”).
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Ninth Circuit:

Gretzler v. Stewart, 112 F.3d 992 (9th Cir.1997) (holding rule in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470

U.S. 68 (1985)– that state must provide competent psychiatrist to assist in trial defense

when a defendant demonstrates that sanity at time of offense will be significant factor

at trial–new rule not falling within Teague exceptions; holding rule announced in

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), did not apply to petitioner’s collateral

constitutional claim because Gretzler’s conviction was final prior to the Edwards

decision, notwithstanding that state supreme court remanded Gretzler for resentencing

and the Supreme Court denied certiorari after it decided Edwards), cert. denied, 522

U.S. 1081 (1998).

Snook v. Wood, 89 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding rule that court must conduct incourt colloquy with defendant regarding dangers of self-representation is not “new

rule” under Teague).

Beam v. Paskett, 966 F.2d 1563 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding rule that Eighth Amendment

bars consideration of nonviolent sexual history as aggravating factor may be

retroactively applied under Teague because it prohibits a certain kind of punishment for

a class of defendants based on their status or offense and therefore falls under the

second exception), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1060 (1994).

Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding petitioner’s proposed rule,

entitling petitioner to collateral review on defense selected trial psychiatrist’s

competence, not dictated by precedent existing when his conviction became final and

does not fall within Teague exceptions), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 910 (1992).

Greenawalt v. Ricketts, 943 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding petitioner seeking

benefit of rule, whose result was not dictated by precedent but rather was extension of

precedent about which reasonable courts might differ, was new rule under Teague),

cert. denied, 506 U.S. 888 (1992).

Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding rule allowing petitioner to seek

federal habeas relief, based on state’s untimely hearing of appeal, during pendency of

state court appeal is not “new rule” under Teague because rule imposes no obligation

on the state).

Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding precedent does not dictate right

to appointment of expert on eyewitness identification and to substitution of counsel and

it therefore is a new rule under Teague).
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District Courts in Ninth Circuit

Odle v. Vasquez, 754 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (holding where state does not

challenge petitioner’s claims as new rules, court will not consider question sua sponte,

citing Collins).

Other Circuits:

Humphrey v. Cain, 138 F.3d 552 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (holding that Cage rule–a

constitutionally deficient reasonable doubt instruction violates the Due Process

Clause–fits into the second Teague exception and therefore can be applied retroactively

to cases on collateral review), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 935, and cert. denied, 525 U.S.

943 (1998).

Adams v. Aiken, 41 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding rule that constitutionally deficient

reasonable doubt instruction violates due process should apply retroactively under

Teague second exception), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1124 (1995).

Nutter v. White, 39 F.3d 1154 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding Cage rule–a constitutionally

deficient reasonable doubt instruction violates the Due Process Clause–announces a

new rule of law falling within Teague’s second exception).

Smith v. Black, 904 F.2d 950, 981–87 (5th Cir. 1990) (interpreting Supreme Court’s

holdings to mean, where Teague issue and a procedural default issue are presented,

better practice is to review Teague issue first), vacated on other grounds, 503 U.S. 930

(1992).

Hall v. Kelso, 892 F.2d 1541, 1543 n.1 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting cases governing claims

of improper burden-shifting not barred by Teague because burden-shifting error is

“bedrock” constitutional principle that diminishes the likelihood of accurate conviction

and therefore falls under second Teague exception).

Collins v. Zant, 892 F.2d 1502, 1510-12 (11th Cir.) (deciding abuse of writ issues

before addressing retroactivity of case regarding police interrogation under Teague),

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 (1990).

See generally:

Marc M. Arkin, The Prisoner’s Dilemma: Life in the Lower Federal Courts after

Teague v. Lane, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 371 (1991) (analyzing impact of Teague and its

progeny on lower court decisions and observing developing complications for prisoners
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seeking habeas review).

Susan Bandes, Taking Justice To Its Logical Extreme: A Comment On Teague v. Lane,

66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2453 (1993) (critiquing Teague and examining how Teague and its

progeny have changed nature of federal habeas jurisdiction).

Lori Bienstock, Note, Federal Habeas Corpus: The New Standard of Retroactivity, 57

Brooklyn L. Rev 865 (1991) (analyzing impact of Teague on availability of habeas

relief for capital offenders and urging legislative action to aid capital prisoners seeking

relief when new constitutional rule renders their convictions or sentences illegal).

John Blume & William Pratt, The Changing Face of Retroactivity, 58 UMKC L. Rev.

581 (1990) (addressing several retroactivity questions left unanswered by Teague).

Ellen E. Boshkoff, Resolving Retroactivity after Teague v. Lane, 65 Ind. L.J. 651

(1990) (arguing against Teague’s use of categorical approach to resolve retroactivity

question in habeas cases because it fails to accommodate concerns of inaccuracy in

individual cases).

Alan W. Clarke, Procedural Labyrinths and the Injustice of Death: A Critique of

Death Penalty Habeas Corpus (Part Two), 30 U. Rich. L. Rev. 303 (1996) (discussing

issues related to pre-Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

retroactivity in habeas corpus proceedings and procedural default).

Patrick E. Higginbotham, Notes On Teague, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2433 (1993) (analyzing

Teague’s impact on availability of habeas relief).

David F. Latherow, Graham v. Collins: A Return to Arbitrary Sentencing, 20 Ohio

N.U. L. Rev. 1075 (1994) (critiquing Graham v. Collins).

Gilbert S. Merritt, Access to the Federal Courts in Habeas Corpus Cases, 58 Tenn. L.

Rev. 145 (1990) (criticizing Teague decision to treat new rule analysis as threshold

question).

Linda Meyer, “Nothing We Say Matters”: Teague and New Rules, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev.

423 (1994) (critiquing Teague, arguing “new rule” doctrine poses dangers to legitimacy

of traditional adjudicative process).

1.18.1.1 Application to Federal Cases

Several circuits have held that the finality concerns behind the Teague retroactivity
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doctrine apply equally strongly in federal prisoners’ collateral challenges as it does in

state collateral challenges. Thus, these circuits have concluded that Teague applies to

federal prisoners.

The Ninth Circuit is unsettled on the issue. In Walter v. United States, 969

F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1992), it reiterated that there has been no specific ruling on the

applicability of Teague to federal prisoners, although in United States v. Judge, 944

F.2d 523, 525 (9th Cir. 1991), it applied Teague to one such case with no comment. 

One district court in the Ninth Circuit, however, in Ferguson v. United States, 911 F.

Supp. 424 (C.D. Cal. 1995), has specifically held that Teague applies to federal

prisoners “because of the opposite side of comity.”

Supreme Court:

Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) (holding Teague’s limitation on

collateral review applies only to procedural rules and is inapplicable to Court’s decision

as to meaning of a federal criminal statute).

Ninth Circuit:

United States v. Kinslow, 5 F.3d 542 (9th Cir. 1993) (unpublished) (stating “we have

not yet determined whether the holding in Teague v. Lane applies in § 2255 cases” and

declining to make determination), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1205 (1994).

Walter v. United States, 969 F.2d 814, 817 (9th Cir. 1992) (declining to decide whether

Teague is applicable to § 2255 cases).

United States v. Judge, 944 F.2d 523, 525 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying Teague with no

comment), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 927 (1992).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Ferguson v. United States, 911 F. Supp. 424 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding Teague

nonretroactive rule applies to federal prisoners as well as state).

Other Circuits:

United States v. Rich, 141 F.3d 550 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding, in the course of
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denying petitioner leave to file a second § 2255 motion for failure to satisfy the

AEDPA’s successor requirements, that Kyle v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), did not

announce a new rule of constitutional law), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1011 (1999).

United States v. Martinez, 139 F.3d 412 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that Teague applies to

federal prisoners’ actions for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255), cert. denied, 525

U.S. 1073 (1999).

United States v. McLamb, 77 F.3d 472 (4th Cir. 1996) (unpublished) (stating that

Teague does not apply to retroactive application on collateral review of decision

regarding reach of federal statute or sentencing guidelines).

United States v. McKie, 73 F.3d 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (applying Teague threshold

analysis in federal drug case).

United States v. Dashney, 52 F.3d 298 (10th Cir. 1995) (assuming Teague applies to

federal prisoners, but declining to apply it in instant case because statutory construction

involved).

Van Daalwyk v. United States, 21 F.3d 179, 180 (7th Cir. 1994) (concluding Teague

applies to federal prisoners).

Gilberti v. United States, 917 F.2d 92, 94 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding Teague principle of

retroactivity applies to collateral review of federal as well as state convictions).

1.18.1.2 AEDPA’s § 2254(e)’s Restriction on Teague Analysis

When a federal habeas petitioner has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in

state court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) allows a federal court to hold an evidentiary hearing

to develop factual findings in two limited circumstances. The first is essentially newlydiscovered evidence and the second is a Teague-type analysis: Petitioner must establish

that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court. Contrary to § 2254(e), Teague did not limit

application of the retroactivity test to the Supreme Court. 

Supreme Court:

Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266 (2002) (per curiam) (holding that federal court
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considering habeas petition, in addition to performing any analysis required by

AEDPA, must conduct threshold Teague analysis whenever state advances Teague

argument).

Federal Statutes:

 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2000)

1.18.2 Retroactivity of New Statutes

In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), the Supreme Court set forth a

standard for determining the retroactivity of a new statute where there is an absence of

clear congressional intent. In such a circumstance, the court determines whether

application of the particular statutory provision would have a “retroactive effect.” If so,

the statute should not be applied retrospectively to a case pending at the time of

enactment. 

The Ninth Circuit has used the term “retrospective” to describe the

application of a statute to events preceding its enactment. “Retroactive,” as in the

phrase “retroactive effect,” is used to describe the prohibited effect described in

Landgraf, preventing application of the statute. Thus, “a retrospective statute is

retroactive– i.e. has retroactive effect–if it attaches new legal consequences to prior acts

so as to justify the presumption against retrospective application.” United States v.

$814,254.76 in United States Currency, 51 F.3d 207, 210 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995). Court

opinions, however, are not consistent in their usage of these terms.

A statute has “retroactive effect” when its application would attach “new

legal consequences to events completed before its enactment.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at

270. If a new statute “impair[s] the rights a party possessed when he acted, increases a

party’s liability for past conduct, or imposes new duties with respect to transactions

already completed,” it will not be applied retroactively. Id. at 280. Provisions that are

substantive in nature generally have prohibited retroactive effect; however, procedural

provisions, as a general rule, are applied retroactively, unless their application would

result in manifest injustice.

Application of Landgraf has been especially important in implementing the
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habeas corpus changes in the AEDPA; however, it is not clear whether Landgraf’s

retroactivity analysis should be applied to cases filed after the effective date of the

AEDPA.

Chapter 154 of Title 28 of the United States Code (28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266)

specifically provides that its provisions apply to cases pending on or after the date of

enactment of the AEDPA , but Chapter 153 (28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2255) is silent as to its

effective date. In Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), the Supreme Court held that

the negative implication of Chapter 154 retrospective application provision means that

new provisions of Chapter 153 apply only to cases filed after the AEDPA became

effective.

Supreme Court:

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (holding negative implication of Chapter 154

retrospective application provisions means that new provisions of Chapter 153 apply

only to cases filed after the AEDPA became effective).

Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298 (1994) (setting forth standard for

retroactivity of new statutes; companion case to Landgraf).

Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (setting forth standard for

retroactivity of new statutes).

1.19 Frivolous and Non-Frivolous Appeals

Supreme Court:

Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000) (holding that California’s procedure–allowing

appellate counsel, when they find only frivolous appellate issues, to submit letter briefs

stating that counsel found no issues but asking the court to independently search the

record–does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment).

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (holding that counsel appointed for direct

review must either file appeal or submit brief in some detail showing that no nonfrivolous appellate issues exist).

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2. PRETRIAL AND PRELIMINARY STAGE ISSUES

2.1 Prosecutor’s Decision to Seek Death Sentence

Generally, prosecutors have wide discretion deciding when to seek the death penalty. 

In Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453, 1465 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S.

948 (1988), the Ninth Circuit rejected petitioner’s argument that Washington’s death

penalty statute vests unbridled discretion in its prosecutors to decide when to seek the

death penalty and held the statute constitutional. The death penalty statute requires a

prosecutor to have “reason to believe that there are not sufficient mitigating

circumstances to merit leniency” before seeking the death penalty. Additionally, the

Ninth Circuit has held that where the circumstances surrounding a prosecutor’s

decision to seek the death penalty create the appearance of vindictiveness, the burden

shifts to the prosecution to present evidence that its decision was based on legitimate

grounds. Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert.

denied, 497 U.S. 1031 (1990).

In federal death penalty prosecutions, 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) requires that the

government provide notice to the defendant of its intention to seek the death penalty

within “a reasonable time before trial.” This notice must include the statutory and

nonstatutory factors the government intends to prove as the basis for the penalty. 

Formerly, 21 U.S.C. § 848(h) contained similar provisions, but this subsection was

repealed in 2006. 

Ninth Circuit:

Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (following Ninth

Circuit precedent that where circumstances surrounding prosecutor’s decision to seek

death penalty create appearance of vindictiveness, court will assume prosecutorial

vindictiveness and burden shifts to prosecution to rebut with independent reasons or

intervening circumstances demonstrating legitimate purpose for prosecutor’s decision),

cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1031 (1990).

Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453, 1465 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding prosecutorial
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discretion to seek death sentence sufficiently guided by Washington statute that

requires reason to believe there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to merit

leniency), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948 (1988).

Federal Statutes:

18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (2000) (describing notice by the government detailing aggravating

circumstances that may justify the death penalty).

21 U.S.C. § 848(h) (2000) [repealed].

See generally:

Jonathan DeMay, A District Attorney’s Decision Whether to Seek the Death Penalty:

Toward an Improved Process, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 767 (1999) (arguing for the

imposition of controls over the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the decision

whether to seek the death penalty).

John A. Horowitz, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Death Penalty: Creating a

Committee to Decide Whether to Seek the Death Penalty, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 2571

(1997) (discussing death penalty law and practical impact of prosecutorial discretion to

seek death penalty).

F. Thomas Schornhorst, Preliminary Screening of Prosecutorial Access to Death

Qualified Juries: A Missing Constitutional Link, 62 Ind. L.J. 295 (1987) (urging

screening process requiring prosecutors to show legitimate interest in seeking death

penalty before death qualification of jury begins).

2.2 Right to Counsel and Right to Waive Counsel

The Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel exists not only at trial but at

“any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s

absence might derogate the accused’s right to a fair trial.” United States v. Wade, 388

U.S. 218, 226 (1967).

Custodial interrogation is considered a critical stage, carrying not only the

right to counsel, but also, as evidenced by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),

the right to be warned prior to questioning of the right to have counsel present during

questioning. The Supreme Court reinforced this assertion in Edwards v. Arizona, 451
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U.S. 477 (1981), holding that once an accused requests counsel, the police may not

reinitiate questioning until counsel has been provided. In Minnick v. Mississippi, 498

U.S. 146 (1990), the Supreme Court held that Edwards protection does not cease once

the accused has consulted with counsel; rather, once counsel is requested, officials may

not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present regardless of whether the accused

consults with counsel.

Concomitant to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Supreme Court

held that a defendant in a state criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed

without counsel when the defendant voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so. 

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). The Court indicated that the extent of the

defendant’s legal knowledge was irrelevant to the determination of the defendant’s

knowing exercise of this right. For federal cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2000) guarantees

parties the right to plead and conduct their own cases in federal courts. In Godinez v.

Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), the Supreme Court, reversing the Ninth Circuit, held that

the standard for competency to waive the right to counsel is no higher than the standard

for competency to stand trial. However, the criteria for waiving counsel in custodial

interrogation are more exacting. See generally Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986);

Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989).

The Ninth Circuit has reversed a federal conviction because the trial judge

failed to adequately warn a § 2255 petitioner of the dangers of self-representation, even

though the judge told the defendant that there were dangers with self-representation. 

Although the court declined to articulate a minimum Faretta warning, it did set forth an

example of an adequate warning. United States v. Hayes, 231 F.3d 1132 (2000). 

While it has been argued that the special procedural demands of capital cases

warrant appointing counsel over a defendant’s objections, courts have not yet

distinguished between capital and noncapital cases with respect to the defendant’s right

to counsel or right to waive counsel.

Supreme Court:

Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 126 S. Ct. 407 (2005) (per curiam) (holding in a noncapital

case that there is no clearly established right under federal law to law library access by

a pro se defendant).
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Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (holding competency standard for waiving

right to counsel is same as standard for standing trial; competency required of

defendant is competency to waive right, not competency to represent self).

Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990) (holding when accused requests counsel,

interrogation must cease, and officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel

present whether or not accused has consulted with attorney).

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (holding once accused requests counsel,

police may not reinitiate questioning until counsel has been provided).

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (holding defendant in state criminal trial has

right to proceed without counsel if voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so).

United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (holding right to assistance of counsel

exists not only at trial but at “any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court

or out, where counsel’s absence might derogate the accused’s right to a fair trial”).

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that interrogator must warn person

prior to questioning that he or she has right, inter alia, to have counsel present during

questioning).

Ninth Circuit:

Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2002) (remanding to district court with

instructions to grant writ of habeas corpus with respect to finding of special

circumstances and imposition of death sentence where psychiatrist’s testimony in

special circumstances retrial in violation of petitioner’s Miranda rights constituted

prejudicial error)

 Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding trial judge did not err in

relying on counsel’s representation and not engaging in colloquy with petitioner, that

petitioner would give up his Faretta request in exchange for library privileges), cert.

denied, 534 U.S. 847 (2001).

United States v. Hayes, 231 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2000) (granting relief in a § 2255

proceeding, holding that the trial court did not warn the defendant of the dangers of

self-representation when the defendant requested same). 

United States v. Garrett, 179 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir.) (holding district court did not abuse

its discretion denying petitioner’s motion to continue trial for new attorney to prepare
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when defendant had previously fired two attorneys and insisted on proceeding pro se

and district judge had informed defendant he would not grant additional continuances),

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 978 (1999).

Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261 (9th Cir.) (following Faretta, finding violation of

Sixth Amendment right to self-representation in trial court’s failure to acquiesce to

timely “knowing and intelligent” request for self-representation), cert. denied, 521 U.S.

1111 (1997).

Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding state trial court’s failure to

hold competency hearing where there was doubt as to defendant’s competence to waive

counsel at change-of-plea hearing violated defendant’s constitutional rights, but

violation was cured by state court’s postconviction retrospective hearing three years

later which found defendant competently, knowingly, and willingly waived counsel and

finding is fairly supported by record), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 976 (1995).

Peters v. Gunn, 33 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding trial court’s finding that

defendant would not be able to do “competent” job representing himself was improper

basis for denying defendant’s motion for self-representation; lack of legal qualifications

alone cannot be a basis for refusing a defendant’s pro se request).

Harding v. Lewis, 834 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding trial court need not hold

hearing on defendant’s competency to waive counsel unless court has or should have a

good faith doubt about defendant’s ability to understand nature and consequences of

waiver, or to participate intelligently in proceedings), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871

(1988).

United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 810, 811 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding constitutional right

of self-representation is waived if it is not timely and unequivocally asserted).

United States v. Harris, 683 F.2d 322, 324 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding criminal defendant

must be aware of nature of charges against him, possible penalties, and dangers and

disadvantages of self-representation, in order for decision to waive counsel to be

knowing and intelligent).

United States v. Kelley, 539 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir.) (holding right to waive

counsel and represent self does not include right to assistance of non-lawyer), cert.

denied, 429 U.S. 963 (1976).
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District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Frierson v. Calderon, 968 F. Supp. 497 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that defendant does

not have right to self-representation merely to delay trial).

Sager v. Maass, 907 F. Supp. 1412 (D. Or. 1995) (holding trial court’s failure to warn

petitioner about dangers of self-representation is reversible error), aff’d, 84 F.3d 1212

(9th Cir. 1996).

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2000) (guaranteeing parties right to plead and conduct their own

cases in federal courts).

State Courts:

Gallego v. State, 117 Nev. 348, 23 P.3d 227 (2001) (finding trial court did not abuse its

discretion refusing to allow capital defendant to represent himself at sentencing retrial

based on defendant’s pretrial behavior).

People v. Marshall, 15 Cal. 4th 1, 931 P.2d 262, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 84 (1997) (holding

motion for self-representation can be denied when defendant is ambivalent, insincere,

or interested only in delay).

See generally:

Frederic Paul Gallun, Note, The Sixth Amendment Paradox: Recent Developments on

the Right to Waive Counsel Under Faretta, 23 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ.

Confinement 559 (1997) (analyzing recent jurisprudence on defendant’s waiver of right

to counsel).

Eric Rieder, The Right of Self-Representation in the Capital Case, 85 Colum. L. Rev.

130 (1985) (seeking to reconcile the right of self-representation with the special

procedural demands of capital cases).

2.3 Pre-Trial Publicity and Venue

In Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), the Supreme Court held that if prejudicial

pretrial publicity jeopardizes a defendant’s right to a fair trial by an impartial jury, the

trial judge should grant a defendant’s motion for a change of venue. According to the
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Court’s decision in Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975), a defendant may challenge

a trial court’s denial of a change of venue by showing that pretrial publicity created

either “actual prejudice” or “inherent prejudice” among the jurors. A showing of actual

prejudice focuses on the voir dire responses of the jurors, as in Irvin, and establishes

actual prejudice if the responses demonstrate actual juror partiality or hostility that

cannot be laid aside.

To establish inherent or presumed prejudice, on the other hand, the focus is

on the content, volume, and distribution of the publicity regardless of voir dire

responses. In Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), the Supreme Court concluded

that where highly prejudicial publicity may deprive the defendant of a fair trial, the

Court will apply the inherent prejudice test. In Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984),

the Court indicated that the inherent prejudice test is applied only in cases where

extreme and inflammatory publicity is distributed immediately prior to trial, creating a

“huge . . . wave of public passion.” Id. at 1033 (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,

728 (1961)). Otherwise, the inquiry is limited to the actual prejudice standard.

Supreme Court:

Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991) (holding trial court need not question

prospective jurors about specific content of exposure to news reports; accused is only

entitled to know whether juror can remain impartial; trial court’s finding of juror

impartiality may be overturned only for manifest error).

Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984) (holding passage of time between first and

second state murder trials rebutted presumption of prejudice created by adverse pretrial

publicity that existed at time of first trial).

Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975) (noting defendant must show trial setting was

“inherently prejudicial” or that jury selection process “permits inference of actual

prejudice”).

Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (holding that due process requires change of

venue where impartial jury cannot be seated due to pervasive prejudicial pretrial

publicity).

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (holding defendant entitled to change of venue

where pretrial publicity had tainted jury pool).
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Ninth Circuit:

Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding petitioner waived claim that

indictment tainted by pretrial publicity where petitioner failed to object to jury venire

following change in venue), cert. denied sub nom., Rich v. Woodford, 528 U.S. 1092

(2000)

Fetterly v. Paskett, 163 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding, in capital murder

prosecution, a change of venue is not necessarily required despite extensive pretrial

publicity which focused mainly on factual aspect of charge).

Ainsworth v. Calderon, 152 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding no presumptive or

actual prejudice in capital petitioner’s change of venue challenge).

Gallego v. McDaniel, 124 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding petitioner carries burden

of showing presumptive prejudice due to pretrial publicity), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 917

(1998), and cert. denied, 524 U.S. 922 (1998).

Thompson v. Borg, 74 F.3d 1571 (9th Cir.) (holding that awkwardly phrased comment

regarding knowledge that defendant previously pled guilty by venireman during jury

selection does not amount to pretrial publicity), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 889 (1996).

Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding prejudice could not be

presumed from pretrial publicity to require change of venue because news coverage,

including details of murder and defendant’s criminal history, was factual rather than

inflammatory and most of publicity occurred six months before jury selection; no actual

prejudice from pretrial publicity even though almost all jurors had heard or read about

case prior to trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1191 (1994).

Greenawalt v. Ricketts, 943 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1991) (following Austed, holding

district court on habeas has no sua sponte duty to order all exhibits relevant to pretrial

publicity unless petitioner demonstrates inability to do so), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 888

(1992).

Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354, 1359-65 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding community prejudice

insufficiently inflammatory to deny defendant a fair trial; actual prejudice not

demonstrated by mere showing of exposure to pretrial publicity, and no actual

prejudice demonstrated in voir dire), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1051 (1990).

Austad v. Risley, 761 F.2d 1348, 1354 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (holding petitioner must

produce pretrial publicity exhibits on own unless proves inability to do so), cert.
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denied, 474 U.S. 856 (1985).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

LaGrand v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 451 (D. Ariz. 1995) (holding where effect of printed

media coverage of crimes was not to inflame comity passions but rather to inform

public of local government bodies, prejudice is not presumed), aff’d sub nom. LaGrand

(Karl) v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir.), and cert. denied, 525 U.S. 971 (1998).

Bonin v. Vasquez, 794 F. Supp. 957 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (holding denial of change of

venue motion due to extensive pretrial publicity by review of criteria including gravity

of offense, community population, status of defendant and victims, and volume of

media coverage did not deprive defendant of right to fair trial), aff’d, 59 F.3d 815 (9th

Cir. 1995), and cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1051 (1996).

Fetterly v. Paskett, 744 F. Supp. 966 (D. Idaho 1990) (holding that need not show

actual prejudice if media coverage invoked such a probability of prejudice that failure

to change venue inherently lacking in due process), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1002 (1992).

See generally:

Sophia R. Friedman, Note, Sixth Amendment–The Right to an Impartial Jury: How

Extensive Must Voir Dire Questioning Be?, 82 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 920 (1992)

(arguing that majority opinion in Mu’Min failed to adequately address issue of whether

defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were compromised).

Stephen Jones and Holly Hillerman, McVeigh, McJustice, and McMedia, 1998 U. Chi.

Legal F. 53 (1998) (focusing on First, Fifth and Sixth Amendment issues relating to the

change of venue resulting from pretrial publicity, the media’s access to sealed

documents, restrictions on extra judicial statements, broadcasting of hearings and

special arrangements for press during trial).

Robert S. Stephen, Note, Prejudicial Publicity Surrounding a Criminal Trial: What a

Trial Court Can Do to Ensure a Fair Trial in the Face of a “Media Circus,” 26 Suffolk

U. L. Rev. 1063 (1992) (analyzing trial court devices used to balance interests of

defendant, state, and media in highly publicized criminal cases).

Michael J. Whellan, Note, What’s Happened to Due Process Among the States? 

Pretrial Publicity and Motions for Change of Venue in Criminal Proceedings, 17 Am.

J. Crim. L. 175 (1990) (examining various standards state court judges apply in

determining whether pretrial publicity justifies change of venue and proposing uniform
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standard).

2.4 Competency to Stand Trial

As established in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam), a defendant

is not competent to stand trial if he or she lacks “sufficient present ability to consult

with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding–and a rational as

well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” In Medina v. California,

505 U.S. 437 (1992), the Supreme Court held that a state may legislate the presumption

that defendants are competent to stand trial and require defendants to bear the burden of

proving that they are not. In Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996), the Supreme

Court further clarified that a state may not set the standard for such proof at “clear and

convincing evidence.” The Court stated that such a rule allows the state to try a

defendant who is “more likely than not” incompetent to stand trial and thus violates due

process.

Supreme Court:

Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996) (holding Oklahoma’s procedural rule

requiring defendant to prove incompetency to stand trial by “clear and convincing

evidence” is too onerous a burden and violates due process).

Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992) (holding due process clause permits state to

require that a defendant claiming incompetence to stand trial bear burden of proving so

by preponderance of evidence).

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam) (stating defendant is

incompetent to stand trial if he lacks “sufficient present ability to consult with his

lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding–and a rational as well as

factual understanding of the proceedings against him”).

Ninth Circuit:

Deere v. Woodford , 339 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding in capital case in which the

AEDPA did not apply that petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he

presented sufficient facts, including the post-plea declarations of a psychologist and a

psychiatrist, to create a real and substantial doubt as to his competency to stand trial at
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the time he entered guilty plea), as amended on denial of rehearing.

Odle v. Woodford, 534 U.S. 888 (9th Cir.) (holding trial court erred in failing to

conduct competency hearing, notwithstanding that no one questioned petitioner’s

competency over the course of two years of pretrial proceedings and a month-long trial,

where record showed petitioner had suffered from massive head trauma, was missing

part of his brain and exhibited psychotic behavior; instructing state to either hold

retroactive competency hearing or set aside capital conviction), cert. denied, 534 U.S.

888 (2001).

Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 486 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that due process requires

a state trial court to sua sponte inquire into defendant’s competency if a reasonable

judge would have a bona fide doubt as to defendant’s competency), cert. denied, 522

U.S. 1130 (1998).

Miles v. Stainer, 108 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding, in a noncapital case, that

standard of competency to plead guilty is equivalent to that needed to stand trial).

Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 695 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating trial court must hold

hearing before allowing defendant to waive constitutional rights if court doubts

defendant’s competency), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 976 (1995).

Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1991) (articulating standard for incompetency

to stand trial).

2.5 Psychiatric and Other Expert Assistance

To ensure that the ability to defend against criminal charges does not depend on a

defendant’s wealth, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution requires a trial court

to appoint a psychiatric expert to assist an indigent capital defendant when sanity will

be a “significant factor” in determining the defendant’s guilt (e.g., to establish an

insanity defense or to challenge competency to stand trial) or sentence (e.g., to rebut a

claim of future dangerousness). Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). The Court

considered three factors in determining that Ake was entitled to psychiatric assistance: 

(1) the private interest affected by the action of the state, (2) the governmental interest

affected if the safeguard is to be provided, and (3) the probable value of additional or

substitute safeguards sought and risk of erroneous deprivation if the safeguards are not

provided. Id. at 77. In meeting the threshold “significant factor” requirement, a
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defendant must make some showing beyond merely pleading insanity that a psychiatric

expert is necessary.

Although addressed by some lower courts, the Supreme Court has not

directly ruled whether the Ake entitlement extends to requests for the assistance of

nonpsychiatric experts, such as ballistics experts. The only Supreme Court case to

address the issue, Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), disposed of the issue in

a footnote by finding an insufficient showing of reasonableness of the requested

experts, and thus avoided establishing a necessary showing which would entitle an

indigent defendant to such nonpsychiatric experts.

The Ninth Circuit has made several specific interpretations of the Ake right to

expert assistance. In Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1990), the court

held that Ake requires more than evaluation by a “neutral” court psychiatrist, but rather

the right to use the services of a psychiatrist in whatever capacity defendant finds

appropriate, including participating in partisan decisions of what claims to assert. In

Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1516 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 910

(1992), the Ninth Circuit held that Ake was complied with when the trial court provided

adequate funds for the defense to choose its own psychiatric doctors, notwithstanding a

collateral challenge to the doctors’ competency.

More recently, the Ninth Circuit held that the prosecution’s compelled

disclosure of a defense-requested psychiatric evaluation to rebut an insanity defense did

not violate Ake. The court reasoned that the right to psychiatric assistance does not

protect against disclosure of an evaluation performed at the defense’s request that has

an adverse effect of a mental status defense. Pawlyk v. Wood, 248 F.3d 815 (9th Cir.

2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1085 (2002). 

Supreme Court:

Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) (holding since only undeveloped

assertions of benefit for requested psychiatric and other expert assistance, no due

process violation in trial court’s denial of requests).

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (holding due process violated by denial of expert

psychiatric assistance to indigent defendant where sanity was at issue in both guilt and

sentencing phases of trial).
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Ninth Circuit:

Pawlyk v. Wood, 248 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the prosecution’s

compelled disclosure of a defense-requested psychiatric evaluation to rebut insanity

defense did not violate Ake), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1085 (2002). 

Chaney v. Stewart, 156 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding defendant does not have state

constitutional liberty interest in expert psychiatric assistance at sentencing. But see

Reinhardt, J, dissent, finding liberty interest created by Arizona statute).

Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that trial court’s denial of

request for out-of-state testing for temporal lobe epilepsy did not violate Ake), cert.

denied, 525 U.S. 1073 (1999).

Gretzler v. Stewart, 112 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding Ake established a new rule

under Teague and was not retroactively applicable; holding alternatively no showing

that sanity was significant factor at trial and therefore trial court did not violate due

process in failing to appoint independent psychiatrist to assist capital defendant in

preparing insanity defense), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1081 (1998).

Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding Ake does not extend to

challenge defense psychiatrist’s competency where court provided adequate funding for

doctor who was selected by defense; declining to adopt new rule allowing for collateral

attack on trial psychiatrist’s competency), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 910 (1992).

Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding Ake includes right to

partisan psychiatric assistance).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Bloom v. Vasquez, 840 F. Supp. 1362 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (following Harris, holding Ake

does not provide legal basis for challenging, in federal habeas, competency of defense

trial psychiatrist), rev’d, 132 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 1997), and cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1124

(1998).

Williams v. Vasquez, 817 F. Supp. 1443 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (following Harris), aff’d by

52 F.3d 1465 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1124 (1996).
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Other Circuits:

Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that due process requires

appointment of mental health expert during sentencing phase if defendant established

his mental condition could have been a mitigating factor), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1025

(1999).

Stewart v. Angelone, 149 F.3d 1170 (4th Cir.) (unpublished) (holding that Ake does not

guarantee the right to effective assistance of psychiatric experts), cert. denied, 524 U.S.

978 (1998).

Goodwin v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 162 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that defendant is entitled to

expert psychiatric assistance only when state makes an issue of mental state and future

dangerousness with psychiatric testimony, and refusing to adopt petitioner’s view that

Ake required experts whenever future dangerousness could be considered an issue).

See generally:

Mark P. Goodman, The Right to a Partisan Psychiatric Expert: Might Indigency

Preclude Insanity?, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 703 (1986) (arguing that, due to unpredictability

of psychiatric diagnoses in criminal trials, Ake right to psychiatric assistance must

include right to partisan psychiatrist to aid in defense, or else meaningless).

David A. Harris, Ake Revisited: Expert Psychiatric Witnesses Remain Beyond Reach

for the Indigent, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 763 (1990) (arguing lower court restrictive

interpretation of Ake violates due process, disadvantaging indigent defendants; urging

that indigent defendant who presents evidence of reasonable need for psychiatric

assistance should be entitled to private psychiatrist of own choice, paid for but not

controlled by state).

Donna H. Lee, In the Wake of Ake v. Oklahoma: An Indigent Criminal Defendant’s

Lack of Ex Parte Access to Expert Services, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 154 (1992) (arguing

constitutional requirement of ex parte proceedings in implementing Ake right to expert

assistance, despite discretion left to states).

Michael J. Lorenger, Ake v. Oklahoma and Harmless Error: The Case for a Pre Se

Rule of Reversal, 81 Va. L. Rev. 521 (1995) (analyzing Ake and Supreme Court

harmless error jurisprudence, and concluding that Ake violations demand automatic

reversal, not harmless error analysis).

Michael J. Todd, Criminal Procedure–Due Process and Indigent Defendants: 
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Extending Fundamental Fairness to Include the Right to Expert Assistance, 29 How.

L.J. 609 (1986) (tracing expansion of indigent defendant’s due process rights,

examining due process balancing test used in Ake, and determining future course of

indigent’s right to expert assistance). 

John M. West, Expert Services and the Criminal Defendant: The Constitutional

Mandate of Ake v. Oklahoma, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1326 (1986) (defining boundaries of

indigent criminal defendant’s right to expert assistance, in light of Ake, arguing Ake

right should extend as far as right to counsel).

A. Michelle Willis, Nonpsychiatric Expert Assistance and the Requisite Showing of

Need: A Catch-22 in the Post-Ake Criminal Justice System, 37 Emory L.J. 997 (1988)

(arguing Ake should be read to provide indigent defendants constitutional right to stateprovided nonpsychiatric expert assistance and suggests alternative showing of need for

Ake rights eliminating potential for misapplication inherent in current Ake version).

2.5.1 Retroactivity of Ake v. Oklahoma

In 1997, the Ninth Circuit analyzed Ake pursuant to Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288

(1989), to determine Ake’s retroactive applicability to cases on collateral review. In

Gretzler v. Stewart, 112 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1081 (1998),

the court held that Ake announced a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure and

was not applicable to cases which were final before Ake was decided. Id. at 999. Judge

Pregerson dissented, however, arguing for relief on collateral review. He considered

Ake’s rule a watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness

and accuracy of petitioner’s trial.

Ninth Circuit

Chaney v. Stewart, 156 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding defendant’s Ake-based

sentencing challenge Teague-barred).

Gretzler v. Stewart, 112 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that Ake is a new rule and

does not fall within the Teague exceptions), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1081 (1998).

Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding Ake claim of entitlement to

psychiatric assistance not retroactive under Teague), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 910 (1992).
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Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding recognition of a right to

appointment of an expert on eyewitness identification not retroactive under Teague).

2.5.2 Harmless Error Applicable

Although Ake does not require a specific showing of prejudice, several circuits have

held that an Ake violation is subject to harmless error analysis.

Ninth Circuit:

Chaney v. Stewart, 156 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that denial of defendant’s

request for psychiatric or neurological expert is subject to harmless error analysis).

Other Circuits:

Castro v. Ward, 138 F.3d 810 (10th Cir.) (reaffirming Brewer), cert. denied, 525 U.S.

971 (1998).

Tuggle v. Netherland, 79 F.3d 1386 (4th Cir.) (concluding Ake error is subject to

harmless error analysis under Brecht), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 894 (1996).

Brewer v. Reynolds, 51 F.3d 1519 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding Ake violations subject to

harmless error analysis), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1996).

Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 1280 (8th Cir.) (concluding Ake violations are subject to

harmless error analysis), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 995 (1994).

2.6 Jury Selection Issues

2.6.1 Voir Dire Procedure Generally

In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501 (1984), the Court extended the

guarantee of public criminal proceedings to include death qualification voir dire

proceedings. In Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit held

that a capital defendant’s rights were not violated when he knowingly and voluntarily

waived his right to be present during jury impanelment. In Knox v. Collins, 928 F.2d
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657 (5th Cir. 1991), the Fifth Circuit held that the voir dire procedure, in which the

judge told prospective jurors that he would instruct on the definition of a life sentence,

interfered with the capital defendant’s ability to constitutionally exercise his

peremptory challenges where counsel selected jurors relying on the judge’s

representation and the court refused to give the applicable instruction.

In United States v. Flores, 63 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1995), the Fifth Circuit

ruled that the trial court did not err when it refused to allow counsel to question each

prospective juror individually about the death penalty. In Flores, the trial judge

questioned the prospective jurors about capital punishment during group voir dire,

questioned individuals privately whose group answers indicated a problem, and

allowed counsel three hours to freely question the venire. Similarly, the Fourth and

Tenth Circuits have held that inquiry into each prospective juror’s views on the specific

mitigating factors in the case is not required as long as the voir dire is adequate to

detect those in the venire who would automatically vote for the death penalty.

Supreme Court:

Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (stating voir dire in capital

case must be public absent showing of need for closure).

Ninth Circuit:

Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.) (holding defendant’s absence from jury

impanelment not unconstitutional where defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived

right to be present), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1119 (1994).

Other Circuits:

United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding inquiry into each

prospective juror’s views on mitigating factors not necessary where voir dire

adequately detected those in venire who would automatically vote for death penalty),

cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1253 (1997).

United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding inquiry into each

prospective juror’s views on mitigating factors not necessary where voir dire

adequately detected those in venire who would automatically vote for death penalty),
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cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1213 (1997).

United States v. Flores, 63 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding individual voir dire of

jurors who expressed opposition to death penalty in group voir dire not necessary

where court questioned jurors further, in private, and answers indicated that

information on voir dire was free flowing), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 825 (1996).

Knox v. Collins, 928 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding voir dire procedure that

effectively impairs defendant’s ability to exercise peremptory challenges intelligently is

ground for penalty reversal, irrespective of prejudice), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1061

(1994).

State Courts:

People v. Heard, 31 Cal. 4th 946, 75 P.3d, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 131 (2003) (reversing a

judgment as to the sentence of death and remanding for a new penalty trial before a

properly selected jury because the trial court erred and was unwarranted in excusing a

juror for cause, despite the juror's written response in a jury questionnaire that indicated

he thought imprisonment for life without possibility of parole represented a “worse”

punishment than death where, after the trial court explained to the juror during voir dire

that California law considers death the more serious punishment and that the death

penalty can be imposed under California law only if the aggravating circumstances

outweigh the mitigating circumstances, the juror stated he would do “whatever the law

states”; under the U.S. Supreme Court cases of Gray v. Mississippi and Davis v.

Minnesota, this type of error is not subject to harmless error analysis, but must be

considered reversible per se with regard to any ensuing death penalty judgment), cert.

denied, 541 U.S. 910 (2004).

State v. Simonson, 329 Or. 288, 986 P.2d 566 (1999) (holding trial court did not abuse

discretion in failing to dismiss jurors on sentencing venire who heard potential juror

reference defendant’s death sentence previously being overturned), cert. denied, 528

U.S. 1090 (2000).

2.6.1.1 Individual Voir Dire

Ninth Circuit:

Fields v. Brown, 431 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that capital habeas

petitioner’s claim that a juror was impliedly biased was not barred by the rule of

Teague v. Lane but that bias could not be inferred as a matter of law solely

because juror was the spouse of a rape victim and petitioner’s charged crimes
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included that offense; also concluding that juror did not intentionally mislead the

trial court on voir dire when he said his wife had been assaulted, beaten, and

robbed two years ago and did not reveal that she was raped and kidnapped, and

that juror was not actually biased).

Dyer v. Calderon, 139 F.3d 970 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (presuming bias from similarities

between the killing of a juror’s family member and the facts surrounding the charge

against capital defendant as well as lack of truthful answers to voir dire questions), cert.

denied, 525 U.S. 1033 (1998).

2.6.2 Jury Impartial to Death Penalty–“Death Qualified” and “Life Qualified”

Prior to 1968, jurors could be struck for cause from a capital jury if they exhibited any

feelings against the death penalty. In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), the

Court strictly limited the challenges for cause of potential jurors with reservations

about the death penalty based on a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial

jury made up of a fair cross section of the community. The Witherspoon Court ruled

that a judge could not exclude every potential juror with reservations about the death

penalty. Instead, the Court stated that a court may exclude only those extreme

opponents who would vote against the capital punishment in all cases regardless of the

evidence presented. 

In Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980), the Court confirmed that the

Witherspoon rule still applied in the post-Furman era of death penalty statutes and

provided a new formulation of the rule. In Adams, the Court stated that a capital

punishment opponent may not be challenged for cause unless his views would “prevent

or substantially impair” his ability to carry out his duties as a juror. In Wainwright v.

Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), the Supreme Court confirmed the Adams formulation as the

proper rule and clarified that the stricter standard set forth in Witherspoon is not the

proper basis for excluding death-scrupled jurors. Under Witt, a potential juror’s views

about the death penalty may not be the basis for a challenge for cause unless those

views would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in

accordance with his instructions and his oath.” Id. at 424 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448

U.S. at 45).

In 1992, the Supreme Court ruled that a defendant has a right to “lifequalified” jurors capable of sentencing life imprisonment just as the state has a right to
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“death qualified” jurors capable of sentencing death. In Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S.

719 (1992), the Court held that a state trial court may not refuse to permit inquiry into

whether a potential juror will automatically vote for the death penalty upon a

conviction of the defendant as the basis for a challenge for cause.

Supreme Court:

Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992) (holding state trial court may not refuse inquiry

into whether potential juror would automatically impose death penalty upon conviction

of defendant).

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) (applying Witt to uphold exclusion of juror

because of attitudes about death penalty; discussing scope of federal appellate review).

Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (holding proper standard for determining

when prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of capital punishment views

is whether juror’s views would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his

duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath;” state court’s

determination to excuse juror for cause is finding of fact subject to presumption of

correctness accorded by former 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (now § 2254(e)(1)).

Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980) (applying Witherspoon post-Furman, stating that

juror cannot be struck for cause unless views on capital punishment would “prevent or

substantially impair” performance of jury duties).

Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (per curiam) (holding death sentence

unconstitutional where a single juror excluded in violation of Witherspoon).

Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (holding right to impartial jury requires

juror with reservations about death penalty may be excluded for cause only if

“unmistakably clear” that juror would automatically vote against death sentence or that

juror could not be impartial on the issue of guilt).

Ninth Circuit:

Brown v. Lambert, 431 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that two jurors were properly

dismissed for cause due to their views on the death penalty, but that another juror was

excluded for insufficient reasons, and not on the ground that his views would prevent or

substantially impair the performance of his duties, as required by Witherspoon v.
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328 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Illinois, where state court did not find that the juror would be unable to follow

instructions, and the juror ultimately stated he could consider the death penalty in an

appropriate case; also holding that prejudice was presumed, and so the death sentence

could not stand).

Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1994) (following Ross; actual jury

impaneled was impartial, no due process violation for loss of peremptories to excuse

jurors not excluded for cause, even assuming court used improper Witherspoon

standard), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1183 (1995).

State Courts:

People v. Cash, 28 Cal.4th 703, 50 P.3d 332, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545 (2002) (reversing a

death sentence and holding that trial court erred in prohibiting defense counsel from

inquiring during death-qualification voir dire whether prospective jurors would

automatically vote for death penalty if defendant had previously committed another

murder where that fact was likely to be of great significance to prospective jurors

because defendant had been convicted of prior murders of his grandparents as a

juvenile). 

See generally:

John C. Belt, Morgan v. Illinois: The Right to Balance Capital Sentencing Juries as to

their Views on the Death Sentence is Finally Granted to Defendants, 24 N.M. L. Rev.

145 (1994) (exploring history of “death qualification” and “life qualification” of juries,

progression of law of jury impartiality in capital cases, and focusing on latest case,

Morgan).

Patrick J. Callans, Note, Sixth Amendment–Assembling a Jury Willing to Impose the

Death Penalty: A New Disregard for a Capital Defendant’s Rights, 76 J. Crim. L. &

Criminology 1027 (1985) (analyzing Witt in light of prior cases, concluding coherent

standard of Witt abandons Witherspoon’s safeguards for defendant’s right to impartial

jury).

James M. Carr, Note, At Witt’s End: The Continuing Quandary of Jury Selection in

Capital Cases, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 427 (1987) (discussing death qualification procedure,

evolution from Witherspoon to Witt, and arguing it provides lack of clear guidelines for

capital jury selection process).

Christopher R. Drahozal, Comment, Wainright v. Witt and Death-Qualified Juries: A

Changed Standard But an Unchanged Result, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1187 (1986) (analyzing
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Witt, criticizing relaxed standard but concluding it will have little practical impact).

Stanton S. Krauss, The Witherspoon Doctrine at Witt’s End: Death Qualification

Reexamined, 24 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1 (1986) (analyzing Witherspoon in light of Witt).

Valerie T. Rosenson, Note, Wainwright v. Witt: The Court Casts a False Light

Backward, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 311 (1986) (analyzing Witt, in light of background cases

and practical implications on capital defendants’ access to habeas corpus review, and

arguing states should provide additional safeguards for defendants’ rights after Witt).

2.6.2.1 Harmless Error Analysis Not Applicable

In Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987), the Supreme Court stated that the nature

of the jury selection process requires that the harmless error standard not apply to

reviews of Witherspoon/Witt violations where a court erroneously excludes a juror who

qualifies as impartial under Witt. Where a court erroneously fails to exclude a juror,

however, the Court has used a harmless error type analysis. In Ross v. Oklahoma, 487

U.S. 81 (1988), the Court held that where a trial court mistakenly fails to exclude a

juror who does not qualify as impartial under Witt, the crucial issue is whether the jury

that actually sat was impartial.

Supreme Court:

United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (2000) (following Ross and finding no

due process error where trial court in federal prosecution erroneously failed to remove

for cause a juror later removed by a defense peremptory challenge because defendant

convicted by an impartial jury).

Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988) (holding trial court’s erroneous failure to

remove juror for cause not violation of defendant’s due process rights because no

showing that ultimate jury which actually sat was not impartial).

Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987) (holding exclusion of juror in violation of

Witherspoon is not subject to harmless error analysis even if prosecutor did not utilize

all peremptory challenges, and even if trial court erroneously denied prosecutor’s

Witherspoon challenge of another juror).
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330 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Ninth Circuit:

Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding trial court’s denial of

challenges for cause did not violate Sixth Amendment where no prejudice shown), cert.

denied, 528 U.S. 845 (1999).

See generally:

Ross v. Oklahoma: A Strike Against Peremptory Challenges, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 219

(1990) (discussing Ross’s departure from precedent, describing Court’s blurred

distinction between peremptory and for cause challenges, and arguing for constitutional

protection of peremptory challenges).

Ross v. Oklahoma: A Reversal of the Reversible Error Standard in Death Qualification

Cases, 38 Cath. U.L. Rev. 881 (1989) (analyzing history and development of for cause

and peremptory challenges, focusing on capital cases, comparing Gray and Ross, and

concluding Gray provides better protection of capital defendants’ constitutional rights).

2.6.2.2 Remedy for Witherspoon Violations

Although not completely clear, the plurality in Gray, along with a separate opinion by

Justice Powell, seems to hold that a Witherspoon violation requires only that the death

sentence, and not the conviction, be vacated. This conclusion is further supported by

the Court’s ruling that Witherspoon/Witt errors entitle defendant to relief only if a death

sentence was imposed. In Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968), the Court

held that Witherspoon does not govern cases where life imprisonment instead of death

was the sentence.

Supreme Court:

Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987) (granting relief from death sentence in case

with Witherspoon violation).

Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (holding appellant may not complain

of Witherspoon error where jury recommends life imprisonment rather than death

penalty).
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Ninth Circuit:

Jacobson v. California, 431 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1970) (citing Bumper, denying relief

based on Witherspoon claim because sentence of death commuted to life imprisonment

by Governor; not addressing applicability of Witherspoon violation to overturn

conviction because claim not presented).

2.6.2.3 Conviction-Prone Juries at Guilt Phase

In Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 402 (1986), the Supreme Court addressed an issue left

unresolved in Witherspoon: whether death qualification created a jury more prone to

conviction at the guilt phase so that it violates a defendant’s right to an impartial jury. 

In McCree, the Court rejected the argument that death qualification of jurors prior to

the guilt phase of a bifurcated trial violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an

impartial jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community. Even assuming that

Witherspoon exclusions produce juries which may be more “conviction-prone” than

“non-death-qualified” juries, the Court held that the practice of death qualification does

not violate the fair cross-section requirement. In McCree, the Court also explained that

the fair-cross section requirement applies only to jury venires and does not require that

the petit jury actually chosen reflect the composition of the community at large.

Supreme Court:

Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987) (holding that death qualified jury in joint

trial of capital and non-capital defendants did not violate the Sixth Amendment right to

an impartial jury).

Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (holding removal of jurors under

Witherspoon does not violate Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury or to jury

drawn from fair cross-section of community notwithstanding argument that resulting

jury was “prosecution prone”).

Ninth Circuit:

Furman v. Wood, 190 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 1999) (clarifying that the death qualification

of a jury does not affect the rights of defendant who is not eligible for the death

penalty).
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332 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1988) (following and applying McCree, in

rejecting claim of violation of right to fair and impartial jury based on convictionproneness), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1051 (1990). 

Evans v. Lewis, 855 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1988) (following McCree in holding fair

cross-section requirement applies only to venire panels, not to petit juries).

See generally:

Jane Byrne, Note, Lockhart v. McCree: Conviction-Proneness and the

Constitutionality of Death-Qualified Juries, 36 Cath. U. L. Rev. 287 (1986) (reviewing

history of concept of jury impartiality and cross-section of community, Supreme Court

treatment of Witherspoon-excludables, and McCree’s impact on case law attempting to

establish conviction-proneness).

Maury A. Hubbard III, Note, Lockhart v. McCree: Death Qualification of Jury Prior

to Guilt Phase of Bifurcated Capital Trial Held Constitutional, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 183

(1987) (analyzing McCree reasoning in light of prior Sixth Amendment decisions,

concluding that Court issued unnecessarily broad opinion which will undermine Sixth

Amendment rights of capital and non-capital defendants).

Rick Seltzer, et al., The Effect of Death Qualification on the Propensity of Jurors to

Convict: The Maryland Example, 29 How. L.J. 571 (1986) (critically examining

McCree, in light of social science data, arguing ruling incorrect because of Court’s

inability to accurately interpret and apply social science data).

John A. Wasleff, Note, Lockhart v. McCree: Death Qualification As a Determinant of

the Impartiality and Representativeness of a Jury in Death Penalty Cases, 72 Cornell

L. Rev. 1075 (1987) (arguing Court correctly decided McCree, preserving important

procedural corollary to implementation of state death penalty laws; even if Court had

concluded differently on cross-section and impartiality issues, balance of interests

between state and defendant would compel same result).

Barbara J. Whisler, Note, Sixth Amendment–Death Qualification of the Jury: Process

is Permissible Where Defendant Does Not Face Death Penalty, 78 J. Crim. L. &

Criminology 954 (1988) (reviewing Buchanan, arguing it is unwarranted expansion of

state’s right to death qualify, infringing on defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights).
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2.6.3 Inquiry into Racial Attitudes of Jurors

In Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986), the Court held that a capital defendant

accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the

race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias. The Court reasoned that a

capital case presents a special circumstance warranting this intrusion into a state trial

court’s conduct of voir dire because “the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a

capital sentencing hearing [allows] a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate

but remain undetected.” Id. at 35.

A defendant must specifically request or instigate such questioning of the

jury venire. Should a state trial court refuse a request to question prospective jurors on

racial prejudice, thereby failing to adequately protect a capital defendant’s

constitutional right to an impartial jury, the death sentence must be vacated. The court,

however, need not however mandate a retrial on the issue of guilt.

Supreme Court:

Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986) (holding Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments

guarantee defendant accused of interracial crime right to have prospective jurors

informed of race of victim and questioned on issue of racial bias; remedy for denial of

that right is vacation of the death sentence but not conviction).

See generally:

Stephen B. Bright, Challenging Racial Discrimination in Capital Cases, 21 Champion,

Feb. 1997 at 19 (examining issues of racial discrimination that frequently arise in

capital cases).

Nancy L. Alvarez, Comment, Racial Bias and the Right to an Impartial Jury: A

Standard for Allowing Voir Dire Inquiry, 33 Hastings L.J. 959 (1982) (addressing,

prior to Turner, issue of racial inquiry on voir dire, discussing prior Supreme Court

cases, and urging clear constitutional standard be adopted requiring such inquiry in

criminal cases where juror panel of different race than defendant).

2.6.4 Discriminatorily Motivated Peremptory Challenges

In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Supreme Court held that the Equal
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Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor from using peremptory challenges to exclude

potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as

a group are unable to impartially consider the case against a black defendant. Batson

overturned Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), which required a defendant to

show discrimination through exclusion of black jurors in repeated cases in addition to

defendant’s case. 

Under Batson, in order to contest the discriminatory use of peremptory

challenges by the prosecution, a defendant must establish a prima facie case of

discrimination by showing circumstances indicating that the exclusion of jurors was

based on their race. These circumstances include but are not limited to a pattern of

striking members of a certain racial group, or voir dire questions that reveal the

prosecutor’s intent to strike solely for racial reasons. Once a defendant puts forth a

prima facie case, the prosecutor must come forward with “clear and reasonably

specific” neutral explanations for the peremptory strikes. In Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S.

265 (1995), the Supreme Court further clarified that a Batson analysis must follow

three steps in sequence: (1) the opponent of the peremptory challenge makes a prima

facie showing of racial discrimination, (2) the burden of proof then shifts to the

proponent of the strike to present a race-neutral explanation, noting that unless a

discriminatory intent is inherent in the explanation, the reason offered will be deemed

race-neutral, and (3) the court then determines whether the opponent of the strike has

proved purposeful discrimination. In Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 2410 ( 2005),

the Supreme Court held that the objector, in order to establish a prima facie case under

Batson, is not required to show that it is more likely than not that the other party’s

peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were based on impermissible group bias. 

In 1991, the Court decided Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), which

expanded the Batson rule to cases where the defendant and excluded jurors are not of

the same race. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) extended Batson’s equal

protection rationale to prohibit the use of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges

by criminal defendants. In 1994, the Court extended the Batson prohibition to

peremptory strikes based on the gender of a potential juror. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511

U.S. 127 (1994). 

The Ninth Circuit has held en banc that a trial court’s determination of the
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first prong of Batson–the prima facie showing of racial discrimination–is reviewed

deferentially in a federal habeas proceeding. Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677 (9th Cir.

1999) (en banc). This ruling is consistent with the appellate standard of review in other

jurisdictions.

Supreme Court:

Rice v. Collins, 126 S. Ct. 969 (2006) (holding that on direct appeal in federal court, the

credibility findings a trial court makes in a Batson inquiry are reviewed for clear error,

(2) under AEDPA, however, a federal habeas court must find the state-court conclusion

“an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding,” and thus (3) a federal habeas court can only grant a habeas

petition if it was unreasonable to credit a prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations for the

Batson challenge). 

Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 2410 (2005) (holding that the objector, in order to

establish a prima facie case under Batson, is not required to show that it is more likely

than not that the other party’s peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were based on

impermissible group bias; resolving a conflict between decisions of the California

Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit, the Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit and said

that it did not intend the first step in Batson to be so onerous that a defendant would

have to persuade the judge--on the basis of all the facts, some of which are impossible

for the defendant to know with certainty--that the challenge was more likely than not

the product of purposeful discrimination).

Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317 (2005) (holding that a capital habeas petitioner was

entitled to prevail on his Batson claim in a case in which 91% of eligible AfricanAmerican venire members were struck; also holding that if a prosecutor’s proffered

reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack

who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination;

noting that here (1) at least two of the blacks on venire panel were ostensibly

acceptable to prosecutors seeking the death penalty, and that prosecutors’ chosen raceneutral reasons for the strikes did not hold up; (2) district attorney’s office had, for

decades, followed a specific policy of systematically excluding black people from

juries; (3) prosecutors’ notes of the race of each panel member showed that they took

their cues from a jury selection manual that included racial stereotypes; and (4)

different questions were asked of black prospective jurors than of white ones).

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (holding that jurists of reason could have
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debated whether prosecution’s use of peremptory strikes against African-American

prospective jurors was a result of purposeful discrimination, and therefore petitioner

was entitled to a COA; noting that the statistical evidence that prosecution used

peremptory strikes to exclude 91 percent of the eligible African-American venire

members and that 10 of the 14 peremptory strikes used by the prosecution were used

against African-Americans raised some debate as to whether prosecution acted with

race-based reason).

Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (insisting on sequence of each Batson “step”: (1)

opponent of peremptory challenge has made prima facie case of racial discrimination,

(2) burden of production shifts to proponent of strike to present race-neutral

explanation, (3) trial court determines whether opponent of strike has proved

purposeful discrimination; reversing Eighth Circuit’s combining of second and third

steps, noting unless explanation reveals inherent evidence of discrimination, it is

deemed race-neutral).

Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115 (1994) (denying certiorari for Minnesota Supreme

Court’s ruling, in State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (1993), that Batson does not extend

to peremptory strikes based on religion).

J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (holding Fourteenth Amendment equal

protection prohibits peremptory challenges on basis of gender as well as race because

under heightened scrutiny analysis, peremptory challenge discrimination does not

further state’s legitimate interest in fair and impartial trial).

Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (holding Fourteenth Amendment equal

protection prohibits state criminal defendant from purposeful racial discrimination

through peremptory challenges).

Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (stating that once a prosecutor has offered

a race-neutral explanation for peremptory challenges and trial court has ruled on

ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether

defendant has made a prima facie showing becomes moot).

Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (modifying Batson, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); holding

defendant may object to prosecutor’s race-based peremptory challenges to jurors

whether or not defendant and excluded juror share same race).

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding equal protection prohibits peremptory

exclusion of jurors based on race; where defendant establishes prima facie case of

purposeful discrimination by showing that: (1) defendant is member of cognizable
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racial group; (2) group’s members have been excluded from defendant’s jury by

prosecutor’s peremptory challenges; and (3) circumstances of case raise inference that

exclusion was based on race, burden shifts to prosecutor to justify exclusion).

Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (holding prima facie case of purposeful

discrimination established only where defendant shows systematic exclusion of blacks

from juries by the prosecution in case after case, over period of time), overruled by

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

Ninth Circuit:

Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that capital habeas

petitioner failed to make the “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right”

necessary to warrant a COA on a Batson claim because he did not make a prima facie

showing of a violation; noting that statistical facts like a high proportion of AfricanAmericans struck and a disproportionate rate of strikes against African-Americans can

establish a pattern of exclusion on the basis of race that gives rise to a prima facie

Batson violation, the court said that here it was impossible to say whether any

statistical disparity existed that might support an inference of discrimination since,

despite alleging that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike the only two

African-American females as prospective jurors and used one peremptory challenge to

strike an African-American male as an alternate juror, petitioner did not allege, and the

record does not disclose, facts like how many African-Americans (apparently men, if

any) sat on the jury, how many African-Americans were in the venire, and how large

the venire was), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 396 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2005).

Cooperwood v. Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir.) (holding in noncapital case that

whenever state court used incorrect “strong likelihood” standard rather than the Batson

“reasonable inference” test that peremptory challenge was based on race, rule of

deference to state court decision would not be applied, and court would review issue de

novo; concluding that male African-American defendant failed to establish prima facie

Batson violation in peremptory strike of male African-American prospective juror

without voir dire where two prior excused jurors were white and jury ultimately

included two African-American women, as well as three Asian Americans and one

Pacific Islander), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 900 (2001).

Tolbert v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding petitioner failed to establish a

prima facie Batson violation where prosecutor exercised peremptory challenge against

black man who approached bench during voir dire to inquire why race was not being

discussed in trial of black co-defendants).
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338 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding a trial court’s

determination of the first prong of Batson is reviewed deferentially, not de novo, in a

federal habeas proceeding).

Ricardo v. Rardin, 189 F.3d 474 (9th Cir.) (unpublished) (finding Batson violation

where prosecutor’s explanations were tainted by racial references making them not

race-neutral as a matter of law), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1047 (1999).

Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092 (1998) (finding no race-related Batson violation

where prosecutor, who, after accepting three black jurors, challenged three black

women because he wanted more men on jury and at time of objection, nine of twelve

jurors in box were women).

Turner v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir. 1997) (ruling that prosecutor’s stated

reason for dismissing black juror was “pretextual” where prosecution did not dismiss

white female juror with similar reservations), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1153 (1998). 

Johnson v. Campbell, 92 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding district court did not err in

refusing to question challenged juror about sexual orientation or to permit Batson

hearing where there was no showing of purposeful discrimination).

United States v. Collins, 90 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding prosecutor’s use of two

peremptory challenges on Hispanic jurors not purposeful discrimination based on

explanation that jurors behaved strangely).

United States v. Contreras-Contreras, 83 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding

prosecution’s volunteered explanation for exercising peremptory challenge on AfricanAmerican juror does not preserve issue for appeal where defense fails to object at voir

dire or during trial; also finding no error to accept explanation of recent jury service as

race-neutral explanation for strike), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 903 (1996).

Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding prima facie evidence of

Batson violation; fact that prosecutor did not attempt to remove all black jurors weighs

against Batson claim, but is not dispositive; declining to address issue of “black males”

as protected Batson class), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1153 (1998), and overruled en banc

on other grounds by Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1999).

United States v. Santiago-Martinez, 58 F.3d 422 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding equal

protection analysis of Batson does not apply to prohibit peremptory strikes based on

obesity), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1044 (1996).
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Burks v. Borg, 27 F.3d 1424 (9th Cir. 1994) (deferring to trial court’s Batson finding as

long as no erroneous reading of the law), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1160 (1995).

United States v. Omoruyi, 7 F.3d 880 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding peremptory challenges

based on marital status do not violate Batson).

Montiel v. City of Los Angeles, 2 F.3d 335 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding when plaintiff

raised Batson objection to defendant’s peremptory challenge of black juror, district

court should have conducted Batson inquiry).

United States v. Changco, 1 F.3d 837 (9th Cir.) (holding passivity, inattentiveness,

inability to relate to other jurors, and demonstrated lack of proficiency in English are

sufficiently race-neutral reasons to rebut prima facie Batson showing), cert. denied, 510

U.S. 1019 (1993).

Palmer v. Estelle, 985 F.2d 456 (9th Cir.) (holding prosecutor’s acceptance of

minorities on jury is valid but not dispositive consideration in determining Batson

violation), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 928 (1993).

United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding, prior to J.E.B. v.

Alabama, that gender-based discriminatory peremptory challenges violate equal

protection).

United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding impression of bias based

on low-income and social status is not race-neutral reason sufficient to rebut prima

facie Batson showing).

United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1989) (overturning trial court

finding of no Batson violation where comparison between answers of prospective

jurors struck and those not struck undermines prosecutor’s credibility).

United States v. Lewis, 837 F.2d 415, 417 (9th Cir.) (stating trial court’s finding of

discriminatory intent rests largely upon credibility and is entitled to deference), cert.

denied, 488 U.S. 923 (1988).

United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1257-59 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding, while

Batson did not formulate procedures for dealing with defendant’s objection, judge may

not adopt procedures such as ex parte procedures that impair defendant’s right to due

process; objections may be timely even if made after the jury is sworn).
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340 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

See generally:

Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should be Abolished, 65 Temp.

L. Rev. 369 (1992) (arguing peremptory challenge offensive to federal constitution and

basic concepts of justice).

Cameron M. Currie, Gender-Based Peremptory Strikes: A Post-J.E.B. Analysis, 7-Feb.

S.C. Law. 14 (1996) (tracing Supreme Court law of discriminatory peremptory

challenges and analyzing impact of J.E.B).

Michael J. Desmond, Limiting A Defendant’s Peremptory Challenges: Georgia v.

McCollum and the Problematic Extension of Equal Protection, 42 Cath. U. L. Rev. 389

(1993) (analyzing role of peremptory challenge, discriminatory abuse and limitations

by Supreme Court, focusing on shortcomings of Batson and McCollum remedies).

Nancy D. Dillard, The Death Knell of the Insurmountable Burden: Batson v. Kentucky,

31 St. Louis U. L.J. 473 (1987) (analyzing Batson in light of Swain).

Eric K. Ferraro, United States v. De Gross: The Ninth Circuit Expands Restrictions on

a Criminal Defendant’s Right to Exercise Peremptory Challenges, 23 Golden Gate U.

L. Rev. 109 (1993) (reviewing Ninth Circuit De Gross decision in light of related

cases).

Michele A. Gemskie, Fourteenth Amendment–Peremptory Challenges by Defendants

and the Equal Protection Clause, 83 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 920 (1993) (reviewing

and analyzing McCollum).

Dave Harbeck, Eliminating Unconstitutional Juries: Applying United States v. De

Gross to All Heightened Scrutiny Equal Protection Groups in the Exercise of

Peremptory Challenges, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 689 (1993) (analyzing Ninth Circuit De

Gross case, endorsing holding as solution to discrimination in jury selection process

while maintaining peremptory challenges, arguing it should extend to any group

warranting intermediate or strict scrutiny under traditional equal protection principles).

Susan Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement,

Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 1807 (1993) (discussing Batson line of

cases as Court’s response to problem of racism in criminal justice system, addressing

new focus on prospective jurors’ rights, and discussing practical impact).

Barbara L. Horwitz, The Extinction of the Peremptory Challenge: What Will the Jury

System Lose by its Demise?, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1391 (1993) (examining peremptory
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NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006) 341

challenge, its weakening through Batson and progeny, and arguing equal protection

concerns do not outweigh protections to litigants offered by peremptory challenge).

Scott W. Howe, Juror Neutrality or An Impartiality Array? A Structural Theory of the

Impartial Jury Mandate, 70 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1173 (1995) (analyzing Supreme

Court jury impartiality doctrine as a whole, and suggesting theory for integrating the

decisions as a logical and conceptual whole).

Brian A. Howie, A Remedy Without a Wrong: J.E.B. and the Extension of Batson to

Sex-Based Peremptory Challenges, 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1725 (1995) (analyzing

and criticizing J.E.B. opinion).

Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects

of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 63 (1993) (reviewing effect of jury

discrimination on jury decisions, arguing for possible solutions).

Jason Laeser, Jurors and Litigants Beware–Savvy Attorneys are Prepared to Strike:

Has Purkett v. Elem Signaled the Demise of the Peremptory Challenge at the Federal

And State Levels?, 52 U. Miami L. Rev. 635 (1998) (illustrating that peremptory

challenges are still being used for discriminatory purposes, undermining the intent of

Batson).

Barat S. McClain, Turner’s Acceptance of Limited Voir Dire Renders Batson’s Equal

Protection a Hollow Promise, 65 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 273 (1989) (analyzing Court’s

equal protection decisions relating to petit jury selection and to peremptory challenges,

noting inconsistencies).

Sherrie J. O’Brien, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: The Collapse of the Peremptory

Challenge, 14 St. Louis U. Publ. L. Rev. 655 (1995) (discussing J.E.B. and evolving

law of peremptory challenges, and concluding J.E.B. effectively eliminates the

peremptory challenge).

J. Christopher Peters, Georgia v. McCollum: It’s Strike Three for Peremptory

Challenges, But is it the Bottom of the Ninth?, 53 La. L. Rev. 1723 (1993) (analyzing

McCollum and impact on future exercise of peremptory challenges).

Salvatore Picariello, Fourteenth Amendment–Peremptory Challenges–The Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Prohibits a Criminal Defendant’s

Exercise of Racially Peremptory Challenges–Georgia v. McCollum, 23 Seton Hall L.

Rev. 1160 (1993) (reviewing McCollum).
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Deborah A. Ramirez, Excluded Voices: The Disenfranchisement of Ethnic Groups

from Jury Service, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 761 (1993) (arguing against Supreme Court

decision effectively permitting arbitrary exclusion of all Spanish-speaking potential

jurors where witness will testify in Spanish).

William C. Slusser, David Hricik, & Matthew P. Eastus, Batson, J.E.B. and Purkett: A

Step-By-Step Guide to Making and Challenging Peremptory Challenges in Federal

Court, 37 S. Tex. L. Rev. 127 (1996) (outlining practical steps to take to follow recent

Supreme Court law on peremptory challenges).

Joel H. Swift, The Unconventional Equal Protection Jurisprudence of Jury Selection,

16 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 295 (1996) (analyzing Supreme Court jurisprudence on equal

protection and jury selection and arguing that conventional doctrine has not been

applicable to determination of prima facie case of “purposeful discrimination”).

Joshua E. Swift, Batson’s Invidious Legacy: Discriminatory Juror Exclusion and the

“Intuitive” Peremptory Challenge, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 336 (1993) (arguing once prima

facie case of discrimination established, only allowable peremptory challenges are

hard-data exclusions evincing “substantial nexus” between juror’s statements and facts

of case; urging Court to disallow soft-data exclusions).

David A. Sutphen, True Lies: The Role of Pretext Evidence under Batson v. Kentucky

in the Wake of St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 488 (1995)

(addressing standard of proof analysis for proof of pretext in peremptory strike validity

challenges, focusing on burden-shifting framework in post-Batson cases).

2.6.4.1 Retroactivity of Batson v. Kentucky

In Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986), the Supreme Court held that the Batson rule is

not applicable to cases on collateral habeas review. Cases pending on direct review or

otherwise not yet final, however, are entitled to retroactive application of Batson. 

Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). In Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411 (1991),

the Court further held that since Batson did not change the nature of the violation

recognized in Swain but rather only the quantum of proof necessary to substantiate a

claim, an allegation of an equal protection violation under Swain necessarily triggers an

equal protection violation under Batson.

Supreme Court:
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Trevino v. Texas, 503 U.S. 562 (1992) (holding case on direct review when Batson

announced is entitled to Batson rule; defendant filed pretrial motion to prevent

prosecutor from using peremptory challenges on basis of race and claimed historical

pattern of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges and made express references to

Swain).

Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411 (1991) (holding since Batson did not change nature of

violation recognized in Swain but only the quantum of proof necessary to substantiate a

claim; allegation of an equal protection violation under Swain necessarily states an

equal protection violation under Batson).

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (reaffirming Allen v. Hardy and holding that

Batson claim not available to petitioner whose conviction was final when Batson was

decided).

Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) (holding Batson retroactive to cases pending

on direct review or not yet final when decision announced; does not overrule Hardy

regarding retroactivity to habeas cases).

Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986) (holding Batson not retroactive to cases pending

on habeas review when decision announced; decisions explicitly overruling past

precedent almost automatically nonretroactive).

Ninth Circuit:

Nevius v. Sumner, 852 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding, where Batson does not apply

because conviction is final, conviction may be set aside under Swain if prosecutor

voluntarily places on record the reasons for peremptory challenges), cert. denied, 490

U.S. 1059 (1989).

2.6.4.2 Harmless Error not Applicable

The Supreme Court found that the constitutional violation in Batson was structural

error, warranting automatic reversal.

Supreme Court:

Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting Court

declined to apply harmless error analysis in Batson).
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Ninth Circuit:

Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953 (9th Cir.) (acknowledging that petitioner’s federal due

process right violated by denial of half of the peremptory challenges to which petitioner

entitled under state law but holding, on federal habeas review of state prosecution,

petitioner unable to show cause and prejudice on procedurally defaulted claim; dissent

arguing prejudice should be presumed), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 965 (1999).

United States v. Annigoni, 96 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding erroneous

denial of defendant’s right of peremptory challenge requires automatic reversal, not

subject to harmless error analysis; following pre-Batson case law regarding erroneous

denial of peremptory challenge; rejecting argument that peremptory challenges be

eliminated altogether; vacating panel opinion holding opposite).

2.7 Grand Juries

Supreme Court:

Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392 (1998) (holding that a defendant had to object to

race-based exclusion of grand jury foremen on Equal Protection grounds even if the

defendant is not of the same race as the excluded foremen). 

Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (holding that intentional discrimination in the

selection of a grand jury is “a grave constitutional trespass,” which can not be remedied

by harmless error review).

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3. GUILT PHASE ISSUES

3.1 Standard of Collateral Review for Constitutional Trial Errors

The Supreme Court has held that a federal court can grant habeas relief on a

constitutional trial error claim only if the error had a “substantial or injurious effect” on

the jury’s verdict in deciding whether a constitutional trial error is harmless. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). The Court further refined the harmlessness

standard of Brecht, holding that the standard does not place the burden of proof upon

the petitioner to show that a trial error substantially affected the verdict. Rather, where

the issue is evenly balanced and the judge has doubts about whether the error had a

“substantial and injurious effect” on the jury’s verdict, then the judge must treat the

error as if it were not harmless. O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995). In

California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2 (1996), the Supreme Court ruled that the Ninth Circuit’s

application of a modified O’Neal harmless error standard (“the omission is harmless

only if review of the facts found by the jury establishes that the jury necessarily found

the omitted element”) was too strict and remanded the case for further consideration in

light of Brecht and O’Neal.

Sections 1.16 and 4.9.3 of this handbook cover thoroughly the standard for

collateral review for constitutional trial errors.

3.2 Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence; Knowing Presentation of

False Evidence

In Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), the Supreme Court held that if the state fails

to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83

(1963), the conviction cannot stand if there is a reasonable probability that the

evidence, considered cumulatively, would have produced a different result at trial. The

Court in Kyles also held that once a habeas petitioner establishes the “reasonable

probability” of a different result, the error cannot subsequently be found harmless under

Brecht. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436.
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Supreme Court:

Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004) (holding in capital case that the state’s

suppression of evidence of witness’s informant status constituted “cause” for

petitioner’s failure to present such evidence in support of Brady claim at state postconviction proceeding where petitioner had reasonably relied on prosecution’s pretrial

promise to disclose all Brady material and state had denied that witness was informant).

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (applying Kyles standard and finding

petitioner failed to show a reasonable probability that capital conviction and sentence

would have been different if non-disclosed exculpatory evidence were available at

trial.)

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (holding conviction cannot stand if net effect of

state-withheld exculpatory evidence raises reasonable probability that disclosure would

have produced different result at trial).

Ninth Circuit:

Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding under pre-AEDPA

law, that the prosecutor’s knowing presentation of false evidence and failure to correct

the record regarding the dismissal of charges against a witness violated capital habeas

petitioner’s due process rights even where the witness was unaware of the agreement to

dismiss the charges and thus did not commit perjury; remanding for the district court to

grant the habeas writ, the court also held that (1) the application of the constitutional

prohibition against the knowing presentation of false evidence, as distinguished from

the prohibition against suborning perjury, was not barred under Teague v. Lane, 489

U.S. 288 (1989), because this rule was not “new”; and (2) the false testimony was

“material” because there was a reasonable likelihood that it could have affected the

judgment of the jury, and there was no need for a separate harmless error analysis under

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993)).

Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that even if testimony of

prosecution witness was manipulated, to be entitled to relief on ground of prosecutorial

misconduct petitioner would need to show a “reasonable likelihood that the false

testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury”), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958

(2003). 

Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland as to standard of

prejudice and holding in noncapital case that habeas relief was warranted for failure of

prosecution to disclose evidence discrediting key prosecution witness; also holding that
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even if failure to disclose impeachment evidence, perjury by key prosecution witness,

and prosecutor’s comments on privileged conduct were not each sufficient to justify

habeas relief, cumulative effect required it), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1179 (2003). 

Paradis v. Arave, 240 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding Brady violation and granting

habeas relief where state failed to disclose notes of prosecutor taken at meeting with

sheriff’s officer discussing autopsy at which officer was present; nondisclosure of

notes, which could have lead to discovery of admissible evidence, put defense team at

substantial disadvantage).

Downs v. Hoyt, 232 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding no prosecutorial misconduct

where prosecutor failed to turn over investigative materials that were discovered in the

federal habeas proceeding; finding materials might have provided leads but denying

habeas relief because petitioner could not show that production would have created a

reasonable probability of a different result). 

United States v. Cooper, 173 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir.) (stating that to show Brady error, the

petitioner must show that the evidence (1) was exculpatory, (2) should have been but

was not produced, and (3) was material to guilt or innocence), cert. denied, 528 U.S.

1019 (1999).

Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (finding Brady violation

where state failed to disclose key witness’s department of corrections’ file to defense in

capital prosecution and witness’s credibility was key to case), cert. denied, 523 U.S.

1133 (1998). 

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Williams v. Calderon, 48 F. Supp. 2d 979 (C. D. Cal. 1998) (granting summary

judgment for state where petitioner presented no evidence that state’s witness had deal

in exchange for testimony and even if deal existed, petitioner failed to establish that

disclosure would have resulted in different outcome).

See generally:

Cynthia L. Corcoran, Prosecutors Must Disclose Exculpatory Information When the

Net Effect of the Suppressed Evidence Makes It Reasonably Probable That Disclosure

Would Have Produced a Different Result–Kyles v. Whitley, 26 Seton Hall L. Rev. 832

(1995) (examines application of Brady Doctrine and suggests change in standard by

which petitioner could prove a Brady violation).
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Ty Howton, Kyles v. Whitley: Death or Declaration?, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology

1461 (1996) (arguing that Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kyles not to review 5th

Circuit’s “materiality” standard, but rather to consider whether innocent man was

sentenced to death, and consequently confused “materiality” standard for future courts).

Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effect of the Enforcement of the

Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 Okla. City. U. L. Rev. 833

(1997) (examines application of Brady Doctrine and suggests change in standard by

which petitioner could prove a Brady violation)

3.3 Prosecutor’s Inappropriate Statements

The Supreme Court has held that inappropriate statements by a prosecuting

attorney–particularly during closing argument–may warrant reversal. In Donnelly v.

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974), the Court held that in federal habeas actions,

improper jury argument by the state does not present a claim of constitutional

magnitude unless it is so prejudicial that the petitioner’s trial was fundamentally unfair

within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. To establish

prejudice, the petitioner must demonstrate either persistent and pronounced misconduct

or that the evidence was so insubstantial that, in all probability, but for the remarks, no

conviction would have occurred. Thus, in Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 182

(1986), the Court rejected a claim of prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecutor’s

comments “did not manipulate or misstate the evidence, nor . . . implicate other specific

rights of the accused, such as the right to counsel or to remain silent.” In addition, the

Court noted that the weight of the evidence against the defendant was heavy, reducing

the likelihood that the jury’s decision was influenced by the prosecutor’s argument. Id.

Supreme Court:

Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61 (2000) (reversing second circuit and holding, in a

noncapital case, that prosecutor’s comments that defendant’s presence allowed him to

tailor his testimony did not violate rights to confrontation, to testify, and to due

process).

Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987) (holding prosecutor’s improper question did not

constitute due process violation because not of sufficient significance to deny

defendant’s right to fair trial).
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Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) (holding prosecutor’s closing argument at

guilt phase, sharing personal views that defendant is an “animal,” does not warrant

habeas relief because does not render trial fundamentally unfair).

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974) (holding improper prosecutorial

comment during closing argument of guilt phase of trial not basis for federal habeas

relief unless prejudice amounting to denial of constitutional due process is shown).

Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (prohibiting prosecutor from commenting on

defendant’s decision not to testify).

Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) (reversing conviction for improper

prosecutorial argument).

Ninth Circuit:

Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 704 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that there was prosecutorial

misconduct where prosecutor during closing argument recited soliloquy in deceased

victim’s voice, but that misconduct did not rise to a due process violation because

remarks did not render trial fundamentally unfair), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 984 (2001).

Furman v. Wood, 190 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting habeas claim for relief

because although some of prosecutor’s comments were improper, jury was told

comments were not evidence, and evidence against defendant was strong).

Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 1996) (denying relief because, although 

prosecutor’s closing argument was improper, it did not render trial fundamentally

unfair).

Hardnett v. Marshall, 25 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding improper to introduce

testimony of witness who could not be cross-examined because self-incrimination

privilege invoked, but harmless on the facts), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1130 (1995).

Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding prosecutor’s sole comment on

defendant’s failure to testify not sufficiently harmful to constitute constitutional error),

cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1191 (1994).

Northern Mariana Islands v. Mendiola, 976 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding

prosecutor’s comments regarding defendant’s future dangerousness improper

prosecutorial conduct at guilt phase where evidence against defendant not strong).
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Blazak v. Ricketts, 971 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding prosecutor’s repeated

references to defense as “phony,” during closing argument, unconstitutional

prosecutorial misconduct).

Nevius v. Sumner, 852 F.2d 463, 470 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding prosecutor’s emotionchoked voice and expression of personal opinions may have approached misconduct

but insufficient prejudice shown), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1059 (1989).

Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding prosecutor’s comments

regarding defendant’s failure to testify mandate reversal if: they are extensive, stress an

inference of guilt from the silence and there is evidence that could have supported

acquittal).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Bonin v. Vasquez, 794 F. Supp. 957 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (holding not misconduct for

prosecutor to intentionally elicit testimony that petitioner admitted killing twenty young

males in addition the killings he was charged with), aff’d, 59 F.3d 815 (9th Cir.1995),

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1051 (1996).

Other Circuits:

United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding prosecutor’s reference

to African-Americans as “bad people” and calling attention to fact that defendants were

not locals was improper).

Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding prosecutor’s “improper

appeals to societal alarm” and requests for “vengeance for the community to set an

example” were unwarranted but not violation of due process), cert. denied, 515 U.S.

1135 (1995).

Drew v. Collins, 964 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding not constitutional violation

where prosecutor asked jury to return a verdict quickly to avoid insulting the victim’s

family), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 925 (1993).

Felde v. Blackburn, 795 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding no prosecutorial misconduct

in prosecution’s references to evidence not in record, and warning defendant might

escape if found not guilty by reason of insanity), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873 (1987).
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3.4 Prosecutor’s Decision to Grant Witness Immunity 

A criminal defendant is not entitled to compel the government to grant immunity to a

witness. United States v. Shirley, 884 F.2d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 1989). However, this

general rule does not apply when a prosecutor’s refusal to grant immunity to a defense

witness intentionally distorts the fact finding process and denies the defendant a fair

trial. United States v. Lord, 711 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1983).

Ninth Circuit:

United States v. Westerdahl, 945 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating Lord does not

require a showing that testimony is either exculpatory or essential to defense).

United States v. Shirley, 884 F.2d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating general rule that a

criminal defendant is not entitled to compel the government to grant immunity to a

witness).

Jeffers v. Ricketts, 832 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir. 1987) (following Lord, finding no prima

facie case of relevance and distortion in prosecution’s refusal to grant immunity to

defense witness), rev’d on other grounds, 497 U.S. 764 (1990).

United States v. Lord, 711 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that prosecution’s denial

of immunity to defense witness amounts to due process violation where testimony was

relevant to defense and prosecutor acted with deliberate intention of distorting fact

finding process).

See generally:

Sheree Strom Carson, Note, Walking the Thin Line in Otey v. Stenberg: Did the AG’s

Dual Role of Arbiter and Prosecutor Shock the Conscience?, 73 Neb. L. Rev. 483

(1994) (analyzing Otey dissent and procedural vs. substantive due process claims).

Kenneth Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy: Case

studies in an Emerging Jurisprudence, 71 Temp. L. Rev. 887 (1998) (discussing

prosecutor’s exercise of power in cases that go to trial).
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3.5 Jury Instructions

3.5.1 In General; Burden-Shifting Instructions

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), established the principle that the Fourteenth

Amendment requires the government to prove every element of a criminal offense

beyond a reasonable doubt. Since then, the Supreme Court has held that instructions

requiring the jury to presume intent are unconstitutional because they relieve the

government of its burden to prove intent as an element of the crime. Therefore, an

instruction reading “the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences

of his or her voluntary acts” violates due process in a case where intent is an element of

the crime charged. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).

Whether an instruction on presumption violates due process depends largely

on whether the presumption is permissive or mandatory. A permissive presumption or

inference allows, but does not require, the jury to infer an element from proof by the

prosecutor of the basic element and places no burden of proof on the defendant. In

other words, the state must still convince the jury that the suggested conclusion should

be inferred based on the evidence. In Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985), the

Supreme Court stated that a permissive inference violates due process only if the

suggested conclusion is not one that reason and common sense justify in light of the

facts proved to the jury.

A mandatory presumption, on the other hand, requires the jury to infer the

presumed fact if the state proves certain predicate facts. Such a presumption may be

either conclusive or rebuttable. Since the decision in Francis, however, this distinction

appears to have little significance. The Francis Court held that a rebuttable, mandatory

presumption violates due process because such an instruction unconstitutionally shifts

the burden of persuasion to the defendant. 

Supreme Court:

Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211 (1988) (holding instruction that intent is implied or

presumed from use of deadly weapon unconstitutional Sandstrom error).

Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) (holding due process bars jury instruction
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stating that the acts of a person of sound mind are rebuttably presumed to be the

product of the person’s will because it constitutes a mandatory rebuttable presumption

shifting burden of persuasion to defendant on the element of intent).

Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) (holding jury instruction that “the law

presumes a person intends the ordinary consequences of his [or her] voluntary acts”

violates Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by creating a mandatory

presumption which unconstitutionally shifts burden of proof to defendant).

Ulster County Ct. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979) (holding validity of permissive

statutory presumption must be evaluated in light of facts of individual case; permissive

presumption that illegal gun in car was possessed by all occupants of vehicle was

reasonable under circumstances of case).

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that Constitution requires government to

prove every element of criminal offense beyond reasonable doubt).

Ninth Circuit:

Houston v. Roe, 177 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding California jury instruction

8.81.15, addressing special circumstance lying in wait, does not require defendant to

prove a gap between lying in wait and the killing and, thereby, does not

unconstitutionally shift the prosecution’s burden of proof), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1159

(2000).

Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding jury instruction regarding

vicarious liability imposed on an aider/abettor for acts of his cohorts that are the natural

and probable consequence of the originally contemplated crime does not create a

mandatory presumption).

Leavitt v. Vasquez, 875 F.2d 260 (9th Cir.) (following Willard, holding instruction re:

intent and aiding and abetting, which California Supreme Court held unconstitutional,

not Sandstrom error because due process does not require aiding and abetting charge

contain distinct instruction re: specific intent), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 866 (1989).

Dickey v. Lewis, 859 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding instruction that intent

may be presumed from use of deadly weapon could have been reasonably interpreted

by a juror to require presumption of intent in violation of Sandstrom; since trial court

did not immediately qualify challenged instruction, there was no certainty its impact

was reduced by a later instruction that state must prove all elements of crime).
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354 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Evans v. Lewis, 855 F.2d 631, 635-36 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding instruction that “you

may determine that the defendant intended to do the act if he did it voluntarily” is

permissive inference which does not violate Sandstrom).

Willard v. California, 812 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding jury instruction which

California Supreme Court held unconstitutional not Sandstrom error because charged

crime does not require intent instruction).

Other Circuits:

Thompson v. Dixon, 987 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding presumption of sanity

instruction not Sandstrom error).

Buford v. Dugger, 841 F.2d 1057 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding trial court’s jury instruction

on “associates” did not allow jury to conclusively presume defendant intended to cause

death and therefore did not violate Sandstrom).

Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449, 1452–53 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (holding jury

instruction that acts of a person of sound mind are rebuttably presumed to be products

of person’s will and instruction that person of sound mind rebuttably presumed to

intend natural and probable consequences of acts is impermissible burden-shifting

instruction under Sandstrom; Sandstrom error not harmless where evidence of intent to

aid and abet the murder was not overwhelming and it was unclear from jury verdict

under what theory defendant was convicted), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986). 

See generally:

Laurie A. Briggs, Note, Presumptive Mens Rea: An Analysis of the Federal Judiciary’s

Retreat from Sandstrom v. Montana, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 367 (1989) (examining

goals of Sandstrom and their frustration by application of Sandstrom by federal

judiciary).

Charles Collier, Note, The Improper Use of Presumptions in Recent Criminal Law

Adjudication, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 423 (1986) (arguing that, in developing contemporary

mandatory/permissive standard, Court has misunderstood effects of presumptions on

juries).

David D. Cook, Note, Presumptive Intent Jury Instructions After Sandstrom, 1980 Wis.

L. Rev. 366 (1980) (reviewing Sandstrom and arguing that Sandstrom established strict

test to erroneous presumption instructions, despite Court’s declining to resolve

harmless error issue).
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Shari L. Jacobson, Special Topics in the Law of Evidence: Mandatory and Permissive

Presumptions in Criminal Cases: The Morass Created by Allen, 42 U. Miami L. Rev.

1009 (1988) (discussing presumptions in criminal cases, analyzing mandatorypermissive standard, and arguing mandatory criminal presumptions have created

unnecessary confusion and serve no useful purpose).

William J. Leahy and Brownlow M. Sheer, An End to Burden–Shifting Presumptions:

The Signal Criminal Law Achievement of the Post–Warren Court, 35 B. B.J. 10 (1991)

(outlining the developments of the doctrine of “presumptions” from Winship to Yates).

3.5.1.1 Retroactivity of Sandstrom and Francis

In Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211 (1988), the Supreme Court determined that Francis did

not represent a new rule of law but was instead an amplification of principles

announced in Sandstrom. Therefore, the Court reasoned that Francis should be applied

retroactively. 

Supreme Court:

Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211 (1988) (holding Francis applies retroactively).

3.5.1.2 Harmless Error

In Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986), the Supreme Court held that Sandstrom

violations are reviewed under harmless error analysis. The Court stated that jury

instructions that erroneously create a mandatory presumption of intent do not require

reversal of an otherwise valid conviction if they are harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt. Since the Sandstrom rule is designed to promote accurate adjudication of guilt

or innocence, the Court reasoned, there is no ground for reversal if the correctness of

the verdict is clear. Although Rose was a habeas case, it was decided prior to Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), which established a new harmless error standard of

review for habeas cases. See supra § 1.16.2.
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Supreme Court:

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12 (2003) (per curiam) (holding that precedent did not

support Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the failure of the state to

charge in an indictment for aggravated murder in the course of committing aggravated

robbery that defendant was a “principal” was the functional equivalent of “dispensing

with the reasonable doubt requirement,” as prohibited by Sullivan v. Louisiana; noting

that in noncapital cases, trial court's failure to instruct a jury on all of the statutory

elements of an offense is subject to harmless-error analysis and that “we cannot say that

because the violation occurred in the context of a capital sentencing proceeding that our

precedent requires the opposite result. Indeed, a number of our harmless-error cases

have involved capital defendants.”).

Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 (1991) (holding on certiorari to South Carolina Supreme

Court that the court failed to apply proper harmless error standard when it determined

beyond a reasonable doubt that jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the

unconstitutional presumptions; proper inquiry is whether jury actually rested its verdict

on evidence establishing the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt, independent of

the presumption), disapproved of on other grounds, Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62

(1991).

Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987) (holding Sandstrom violation harmless where

evidence so dispositive of intent that it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that jury

would have found it unnecessary to rely on the presumption).

Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987) (holding test for harmless error of Sandstrom

violation is whether “facts found by jury were such that it is clear beyond a reasonable

doubt that if the jury had never heard the impermissible instruction its verdict would

have been the same”).

Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986) (holding harmless error analysis of Chapman

applies to Sandstrom violations).

Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) (holding unconstitutional burden-shifting

instruction regarding intent not harmless where intent was issue at trial and state’s

evidence of intent was not overwhelming).

Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983) (holding factual findings underlying state court

determination of harmless error entitled to presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)).
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Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (creating harmless beyond reasonable

doubt standard for appellate review of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional

errors).

Ninth Circuit:

Watts v. Bonneville, 879 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1989) (following Willard, finding

unconstitutional instruction regarding aiding and abetting harmless error).

Leavitt v. Vasquez, 875 F.2d 260 (9th Cir.) (following Willard, holding unconstitutional

jury instruction regarding intent and aiding and abetting, even if was Sandstrom

violation, merely harmless error), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 866 (1989).

Dickey v. Lewis, 859 F.2d 1365, 1371 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding state has burden of

proving Sandstrom error harmless; “overpowering” evidence of intent to kill renders

error harmless).

Ruff v. Kincheloe, 843 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding review of entire record for

evidence rendering Sandstrom error harmless is not required where portions of record

relevant to petitioner’s claim are dispositive on issue of intent).

Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314 (9th Cir.) (holding erroneous jury instruction does

not merit habeas relief if deficiencies pertain to matters not in dispute, and error did not

so affect entire trial as to deprive defendant of due process), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 861

(1988).

McKenzie v. Risley, 842 F.2d 1525, 1530-35 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (holding since jury

could not have found that defendant committed the acts without also finding intent,

Sandstrom error is harmless), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 901 (1988).

Willard v. California, 812 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding unconstitutional jury

instruction regarding intent and aiding and abetting, even if was Sandstrom violation,

merely harmless error).

Herd v. Kincheloe, 800 F.2d 1526, 1528 (9th Cir. 1986) (specifying de novo review for

determining whether Sandstrom error is harmless as question of federal constitutional

law).

3.5.2 Reasonable Doubt Instructions

In Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990), the Supreme Court held that a reasonable
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doubt jury instruction requiring “moral certainty” and describing “actual substantial

doubt” and “grave uncertainty” violated due process. The Court held such deficient

reasonable doubt instructions unconstitutional because they allow a lower degree of

proof than that required by due process.

Supreme Court:

Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (holding reasonable doubt instruction describing

“grave uncertainty” and “actual substantial doubt” and requiring “moral certainty”

unconstitutional because reasonable juror, taking instructions as a whole, could have

interpreted instruction to allow degree of proof below that required by due process).

3.5.2.1 Not Subject to Harmless Error Analysis

The Supreme Court held that a deficient reasonable doubt instruction, unlike a

Sandstrom error, is a structural defect requiring automatic reversal because a verdict

based on an improper reasonable doubt instruction vitiates all of the jury’s factual

findings. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993). Therefore, a constitutionally

deficient instruction regarding reasonable doubt is not subject to harmless error

analysis.

Supreme Court:

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) (holding constitutionally deficient

reasonable doubt instruction–identical to one in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39

(1990)–requires reversal; not subject to harmless error analysis because, unlike an

erroneous presumption instruction, a deficient reasonable doubt instruction vitiates all

of jury’s factual findings).

3.5.2.2 Retroactivity of Cage

In Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, reh’g denied, 533 U.S. 970 (2001), the Supreme Court

held under the AEDPA that Cage had not been “made retroactive to cases on collateral

review by the Supreme Court,” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). The

court held that as used in § 2244(b)(2)(A), “made” means held. The court declined in
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Tyler to make the rule of Cage retroactive because the Court stated such a holding

would be dictum as it would not help the petitioner, and stressed that neither Cage itself

nor Sullivan v. Louisiana had held Cage to be retroactive. Subsequently in Leavitt v.

Arave, 383 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), the Ninth Circuit held that a Cage

error was not a watershed rule of the sort from which the petitioner can retroactively

benefit on federal habeas review under Teague.

Supreme Court:

Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 970 (holding under AEDPA that Cage rule was not “made

retroactive to cases on collateral review by Supreme Court” within meaning of §

2244(b)(2)(A) and thus was not available to habeas petitioner), reh’g denied, 533 U.S.

970 (2001).

Ninth Circuit

Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (holding that Cage error

was not a watershed rule of the sort from which a capital habeas petitioner could

retroactively benefit on habeas review, and that his claim was barred by Teague,

making it unnecessary to determine whether the jury instruction actually ran afoul of

Cage; noting that the six other circuits that had held Cage error to be a watershed rule

and to be retroactive were decided after Sullivan, but before Tyler v. Cain), cert.

denied, 125 S. Ct. 2540 (2005).

Other Circuits:

Gaines v. Kelly, 202 F.3d 598 (2nd Cir. 2000) (holding in pre-AEDPA case that Cage

fits into the second Teague exception and therefore can be applied retroactively to cases

on collateral review).

In re Smith, 142 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that under the AEDPA, Cage

is not retroactive since Supreme Court has not made it so).

Rodriguez v. Bay State Correctional Center, 139 F.3d 270 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that

under the AEDPA, Cage is not retroactive as Supreme Court has not made it so).

Humphrey v. Cain, 138 F.3d 552 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (holding that Cage fits into the
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second Teague exception and therefore can be applied retroactively to cases on

collateral review), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 935, and cert. denied, 525 U.S. 943 (1998).

In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding that under the AEDPA,

Cage is not retroactive because Supreme Court has not made it so).

In re Hill, 113 F.3d 181 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that under the AEDPA, Cage is not

retroactive as Supreme Court has not made it so).

Adams v. Aiken, 41 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding rule that constitutionally deficient

reasonable doubt instruction violates due process applies retroactively under Teague

second exception), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1124 (1995).

Nutter v. White, 39 F.3d 1154 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding Cage announces a new rule of

law falling within Teague’s second exception).

3.5.3 Lesser-Included Offense Instructions

In Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980), the Supreme Court held that a capital

defendant is constitutionally entitled to an instruction on lesser-included offenses if the

evidence could support a finding of guilt on such offenses. The Court confirmed in

Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605 (1982), that the guarantee of a lesser-included offense

instruction is limited to cases where the evidence supports such an instruction. The

Hopper Court stated “[t]he federal rule is that a lesser-included offense instruction

should be given ‘if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find [a defendant]

guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.’” Id. at 612 (quoting Keeble

v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973)).

The Beck guarantee is limited in another way, as well. In Spaziano v.

Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), the trial court offered to instruct the jury on lesserincluded offenses if the defendant would waive the statute of limitations on those

offenses. The defendant refused to waive his statute of limitations defenses, and the

court consequently did not instruct on lesser-included offenses. In upholding the trial

court’s refusal to instruct on lesser-included offenses, the Supreme Court held that no

such instructions are necessary where no such offense is actually at issue. In Spaziano,

since the statute of limitations for the lesser-included offenses had expired and the

defendant had not waived the statute of limitations, the offenses were not at issue, and
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Beck did not require instruction on them.

In Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88 (1998), the Court resolved a split of

authority between the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. The Hopkins Court reversed the

Eighth Circuit and held that in a case of felony-murder, a defendant is not entitled to an

instruction on second degree murder or manslaughter since neither is a lesser-included

offense of felony-murder. The Court rejected the argument that Enmund v. Florida,

458 U.S. 782 (1982) and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) effectively added an

intent element to capital felony-murder charges. The Court distinguished Beck and

held that the jury could convict on felony-murder or acquit.

Supreme Court:

Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88 (1998) (holding that second degree murder and

manslaughter instructions were not required when state pursued first degree felonymurder conviction since they were not lesser-included offenses of felony-murder).

Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991) (holding Beck does not require an instruction on

every possible lesser-included offense supported by the evidence; since trial court

instructed on second degree murder, it need not also have instructed on robbery).

Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984) (holding constitutional for trial court to

refuse to instruct jury on lesser-included offense where defendant refused to waive the

statute of limitations as to the lesser offenses in exchange for jury instructions on the

lesser offenses).

Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605 (1982) (holding constitutional to preclude consideration

by the jury of lesser-included offenses where evidence would not support the lesser

offenses).

Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (holding unconstitutional to preclude

consideration by the jury of lesser-included offenses where evidence would support the

lesser offenses).

Ninth Circuit:

LaGrand (Karl) v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir.) (holding trial court did not err in

refusing to instruct on second degree murder as lesser-included offense of felonymurder; distinguishing Beck because court alternatively instructed LaGrand jury on
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premeditated murder which included a stepdown second degree murder instruction),

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 971 (1998).

Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that no lesserincluded homicide offense exists to felony-murder under Arizona law; holding even if

facts purporting to negate specific intent warranted second degree murder instruction,

claim still fails under Brecht), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 903 (1998).

Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding, in felony-murder trial, no

constitutional error in failing to give lesser-included offense instruction of unlawful

imprisonment on predicate felony of kidnapping when conviction of predicate felony

does not require finding of guilt on murder charge), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1079 (1998). 

United States v. Roston, 986 F.2d 1287 (9th Cir.) (holding trial court did not err in

refusing to instruct on lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter in murder

case because, on facts, not clear that jury would have found manslaughter instead of

murder), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 874 (1993).

Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding no error where judge

instructed jury on second degree murder but failed to provide jury with verdict form for

second degree murder where jury found petitioner guilty of underlying felony as well

as first degree felony-murder), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 992 (1993).

Greenawalt v. Ricketts, 943 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding trial court did not

commit error for failing to give second degree murder instruction where defendant was

tried solely for felony-murder; Arizona law recognizes no lesser-included offense for

felony-murder), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 888 (1992).

United States v. Walker, 915 F.2d 480, 486 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating defendant entitled to

lesser-included offense instruction when elements of lesser offense are subset of

charged offense and factual basis supports instruction).

Woratzeck v. Ricketts, 820 F.2d 1450, 1457 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding due process

requires that lesser-included offense instruction to a capital offense be given whenever

the evidence warrants such an instruction; however, failure to instruct on the lesserincluded offenses underlying felony-murder charge may be harmless error), vacated on

other grounds, 486 U.S. 1051 (1988).

Vickers v. Ricketts, 798 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding second degree murder

instruction required because premeditation–difference between first and second degree

murder–was in dispute even though the evidence on lack of premeditation was not
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compelling), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054 (1987).

United States v. Brown, 761 F.2d 1272, 1277 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding defendant

entitled to lesser-included offense instruction if (1) lesser-included offense is within

offense charged, and (2) based on evidence presented at trial, a rational jury could find

defendant guilty of lesser-included offense but not greater offense).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Gerlaugh v. Lewis, 898 F. Supp. 1388 (D. Ariz. 1995) (applying Beck, holding no

entitlement to lesser-included offense instruction on voluntary intoxication), aff’d, 129

F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 1997), and cert. denied, 525 U.S. 903 (1998).

See generally:

Michael H. Hoffheimer, Note, Habeas Corpus Review of State Trial Court Failure to

Give Lesser Included Offense Instructions, 16 U. Mich. L. Rev. 617 (1983) (advocating

federal review of state convictions where lesser-included offense instructions were

available under state law but were not given).

3.5.4 Alternative Grounds for Conviction: Malice or Premeditation vs. Felony-Murder

Where a capital conviction is supported on alternative grounds of premeditation or

felony-murder, the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not require the

jury to reach separate verdicts on each alternate theory. Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S.

624 (1991). However, where the court instructs the jury that it may rely on two or

more independent grounds for conviction, and the evidence is insufficient on one of

those grounds, the general verdict must be set aside since it may have rested

exclusively on the insufficient ground. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 881 (1983).

Supreme Court:

Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991) (plurality) (holding premeditation and felonymurder are not separate offenses requiring separate verdicts; rather, they are two means

of satisfying the mens rea requirement for first degree murder; therefore, it was

constitutionally permissible for the jury to reach one verdict based on any combination

of the statutory alternatives of premeditation or felony-murder).

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 881 (1983) (holding general verdict must be set aside
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when jury is instructed that it may rely on two or more independent grounds for

conviction and evidence is insufficient on one of those grounds because the verdict may

have rested exclusively on the insufficient ground).

Ninth Circuit:

LaGrand (Karl) v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir.) (holding that lesser-included

offense instruction to felony-murder need not be given where jury is given the option of

first degree murder and second degree murder), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 971 (1998).

See generally:

Elizabeth R. Carty, Schad v. Arizona: Jury Unanimity on Trial, 42 Cath. U. L. Rev.

355 (1993) (analyzing Schad and whether Arizona statute violates defendant’s due

process rights, and contrasting felony-murder doctrine with premeditated murder

doctrine as alternative theories of first degree murder).

James J. McGuire, Note, Schad v. Arizona: Diminishing the Need for Verdict

Specificity, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 936 (1992) (reviewing Schad and its precedent, concluding

that Court’s recharacterization of jury unanimity is misguided).

3.5.5 Standard for Measuring Constitutionality of Jury Instruction

In Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991), the Supreme Court established that the

proper inquiry for determining the constitutional validity of a jury instruction is not

whether the instruction “could have” been applied in an unconstitutional manner, but

rather, whether a “reasonable likelihood” exists that the jury applied the instruction

unconstitutionally.

Supreme Court:

Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994) (applying Estelle standard in reviewing

constitutionality of reasonable doubt instruction).

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) (setting forth standard for reviewing

constitutionality of jury instruction as whether there is “reasonable likelihood” that jury

unconstitutionally applied it).
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3.6 Juror Misconduct

Ninth Circuit:

Fields v. Brown, 431 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that claim of juror misconduct

based on the jury’s use of Biblical quotations and dictionary definitions during penalty

phase of capital trial was not Teague-barred; also holding that the Biblical references

were not necessarily extrinsic, factual material and to the extent that the material was

extrinsic or improper it did not have an injurious effect on the verdict).

Sassounian v. Roe, 230 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended on denial of rehearing,

(applying Brecht to claim in pre-AEDPA petition and finding prejudicial error where

jurors considered evidence discussed at side bar but not admitted in evidence; but see

dissenting opinion finding error harmless under Brecht).

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4. SENTENCING PHASE ISSUES

4.1 General Due Process Concerns

In Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977), the Supreme Court established that a

capital sentencing proceeding must comply with due process, just as the trial itself,

because it is a critical stage in the criminal proceeding. The Court has also made

various specific findings of a defendant’s rights at sentencing based on the due process

clause.

Supreme Court:

Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (stating capital sentencing proceedings

must satisfy due process; no due process where petitioner sentenced to death on basis

of information of which he had no opportunity to deny or explain).

Ninth Circuit:

Fetterly v. Paskett, 15 F.3d 1472, 1482 (9th Cir.) (citing Gardner, stating sentencing

must satisfy due process; defendant has legitimate interest in character of procedure

which leads to imposition of sentence, even if defendant may have no right to object to

particular result of sentencing proceedings), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 914 (1994).

See Generally:

Beth S. Brinkman, Note, The Presumption of Life: A Starting Point for a Due Process

Analysis of Capital Sentencing, 94 Yale L.J. 351 (1984) (reviewing Supreme Court’s

due process treatment of capital cases, focusing on sentencing, and arguing that due

process analysis of capital sentencing system should include presumption of life,

analogous to presumption of innocence).

4.1.1 Rights Regarding Evidence Presented at Sentencing

In Gardner v. Florida, the Supreme Court established that a defendant cannot be

sentenced to death based on confidential evidence presented at sentencing that the
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defendant had no opportunity to deny or explain. In Skipper v. South Carolina, 476

U.S. 1 (1986), the Court confirmed that this rule applies not only in situations where

the evidence was not disclosed but also where the defendant was prevented from

rebutting the information. In Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152 (1996), the Supreme

Court held that while a capital defendant at sentencing has a due process right to notice

of all of the charges against him or her, there is no constitutional right to notice of the

evidence which the state plans to use to prove the charges.

Supreme Court:

Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152 (1996) (holding, while capital defendant at

sentencing has right to notice of charges against him, there is no constitutional right to

notice of evidence which state will use to prove charges; distinguishing Gardner as

involving confidential information kept from defendant altogether).

Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994) (holding introduction at sentencing of

defendant’s prior conviction and death sentence not violation of due process because

instructions did not offer jury any means to give effect to such evidence, and other

evidence presented by state was sufficient to justify imposition of death sentence).

Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (stating sentencer cannot be precluded

from considering any mitigating evidence defendant offers as basis for sentence less

than death).

Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (holding judge’s consideration of confidential

sentence reports submitted but not available to defendant violated due process:

defendant could not be sentenced based on evidence which he had no opportunity to

deny or explain).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Bonin v. Vasquez, 794 F. Supp. 957, 977 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that barring

petitioner’s co-counsel from presenting argument at the penalty phase after lead

counsel presented argument did not violate due process), aff’d, 59 F.3d 815 (9th Cir.

1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1051 (1996).

Other Circuits:

Ables v. Scott, 73 F.3d 591 (5th Cir.) (stating criminal defendant entitled to notice and
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due process at sentencing, to a “lesser degree than at trial”), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1198

(1996).

Russell v. Lynaugh, 892 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding admission in guilt phase of

evidence of robbery conviction which was later reversed on appeal did not undermine

fundamental fairness of sentencing phase), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1259 (1991).

See generally:

Steven P. Smith, Unreliable and Prejudicial: The Use of Extraneous Unadjudicated

Offenses in the Penalty Phases of Capital Trials, 93 Colum. L. REV. 1249 (1993)

(arguing that introduction of extraneous, unadjudicated offenses at sentencing phase of

capital trial violates due process and should be barred or severely restricted).

A.J. Stephani, Dead Again: Prior Death Sentences in Capital Sentencing Procedures,

64 U. Cin. L. Rev. 249 (1995) (analyzing Romano and agreeing with Romano dissent).

4.1.2 Right to Speak

The Ninth Circuit has held that a capital defendant has a due process right to speak at

sentencing.

Ninth Circuit:

Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir.) (holding where defendant, either

unrepresented or represented by counsel, makes an affirmative request to speak at the

sentencing phase, denial of that request is a denial of due process), cert. denied, 506

U.S. 904 (1992).

See generally:

Caren Myers, Note, Encouraging Allocution at Capital Sentencing: A Proposal for Use

Immunity, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 787 (1997) (addressing question of detriment to

defendant from speaking at sentencing phase, and advocating use immunity as

solution).

4.1.3 Notice of Death Sentence Possibility

The Supreme Court has held that the imposition of the death penalty where the state has
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given notice that it will not recommend death is a violation of due process.

Supreme Court:

Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110 (1991) (holding petitioner’s due process rights were

violated where trial court imposed death penalty despite state’s notice that it would not

recommend the death penalty).

4.1.4 Right to Confront and Cross-Examine Witnesses

In Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), the Supreme Court held that the

sentencing judge’s consideration of information contained in a presentence report did

not violate due process because a defendant does not have the right to confront and

cross-examine witnesses at sentencing. However, in light of Gardner, the Ninth Circuit

has construed Williams to stand for the proposition that a sentencing judge can rely on

information provided by non-testifying witnesses when the defendant is aware of and

has the opportunity to rebut, deny, or explain, the submitted information. Ortiz v.

Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 937 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1123 (1999). 

Supreme Court:

Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (distinguishing Williams, basing due process

violation on confidential nature of information rather than on its hearsay character).

Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (reaffirming Williams but declining to extend

it to non-capital case).

Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (holding defendant has no due process right

to confront and cross-examine witnesses during sentencing proceeding).

Ninth Circuit:

Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 937 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing Williams and Gardner,

holding no due process violation where sentencing judge considered evidence offered

by defendant’s wife at her trial to rebut defendant’s mitigation evidence, reasoning that

the defendant had an opportunity to rebut wife’s testimony), cert. denied, 526 U.S.

1123 (1999). 
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United States v. Petty, 992 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993) (following Williams, holding

confrontation clause does not apply at capital sentencing to bar admission of hearsay

evidence; dissent arguing capital sentencing does entitle defendant to right to confront

and cross-examine).

Other Circuits:

Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932, 939 (4th Cir. 1990) (suggesting defendants in

capital cases do not have right to confront and cross-examine at sentencing all

witnesses under due process), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 982 (1991).

United States v. Marshall, 910 F.2d 1241, 1244 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding use of hearsay

at sentencing did not deny defendant right of confrontation).

Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1255 (11th Cir. 1982) (distinguishing Williams

and holding trial court erred by refusing to allow defense counsel to cross-examine

prosecution expert witness at sentencing hearing; reasoning that due process requires

cross-examination–at least where necessary to ensure the reliability of the witnesses’

testimony).

See generally:

Christopher K. Tahbaz, Note, Fairness to the End: The Right to Confront Adverse

Witnesses in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1345 (1989)

(analyzing Supreme Court and state court approaches, including Eighth Amendment

and due process, to defendant’s right to confront and cross-examine witnesses in capital

sentencing phase).

4.1.5 Length of Sentencing Proceeding

Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, the Eleventh Circuit has held

that due process does not require a sentencing proceeding to be a specific length.

Other Circuits:

Armstrong v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1430 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding due process does not

require sentencing proceeding to be specific length, rather, the proceeding is consistent

with due process if not fundamentally unfair).
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4.1.6 Defendant’s Appearance Before Jury: Jail Clothing and Restraints

The presumption of innocence prevents a court from compelling a defendant to wear

identifiable prison clothing at trial. The presumption of innocence does not apply to a

sentencing proceeding, however, and the Ninth Circuit and other circuits have held that

requiring a defendant to wear prison clothing at sentencing does not offend due

process.

The Supreme Court has held that courts may, at times, compel a defendant to

wear restraints. In Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), the Court held that although

“inherently prejudicial” to a defendant, security interests may warrant shackling a

defendant at trial. However, shackling must be done only as a “last resort.” 

Furthermore, the Court held in Deck v. Missouri, 125 S. Ct. 2007 (2005), that the

Constitution forbids the use of visible shackles during the penalty phase of a capital

case, unless that use is “justified by an essential state interest”–such as courtroom

security–specific to the defendant on trial. The Ninth Circuit has held that due process

requires the trial judge to find compelling circumstances of courtroom security and to

pursue less restrictive alternatives before imposing such physical restraints. Jones v.

Meyer, 899 F.2d 883, 885 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). According to

Wilson v. McCarthy, 770 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1985), shackling in the Ninth Circuit is

proper where there is a serious threat of escape or danger to those in and around the

courtroom, or where courtroom disruption is likely if the defendant is not restrained. 

These limitations on shackling exist at sentencing proceedings as well.

Supreme Court:

Deck v. Missouri, 125 S. Ct. 2007 (2005) (holding that Constitution forbids use of

visible shackles during penalty phase, just as it does during guilt phase, unless that use

is “justified by an essential state interest” specific to the defendant on trial). 

Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (holding presumption of innocence prohibits

trial court from compelling defendant to wear identifiable prison clothes at trial,

without violating due process).

Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (holding public’s interest in security may warrant

use of shackles, but only as “last resort”).
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Ninth Circuit:

Rhoden v. Rowland, 172 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding petitioner, who was

unjustifiably shackled during entire trial, entitled to habeas relief where five jurors saw

shackles and case involved violent crimes and disputed evidence).

Rich v. Calderon, 170 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir.) (holding no constitutional error resulted

from shackling capital defendant where record devoid of any indication that jury saw

shackles), amended and superseded on denial of reh’g, 187 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 628 (9th Cir.) (holding no constitutional violation

where defendant appeared in jail clothing on first day of trial, because civilian clothes

were available but rejected and defendant volunteered to jury that he had been in jail

for five months), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1079 (1998).

Ainsworth v. Calderon, 152 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding no due process violation

where up to six armed guards in courtroom during trial). 

Duckett v. Godinez, 109 F.3d 533 (9th Cir.) (holding defendant’s appearance before

sentencing jury in shackles is error, but harmless error where shackles not visible to

jury), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 848 (1997).

Logan v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 169 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding shackling of defendant at trial

prejudicial, remanding for evidentiary hearing to determine if error was harmless).

Hartman v. McCarthy, 74 F.3d 1245 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding no compelling need

for shackles, but harmless error because state had strong case, defendant’s

dangerousness was not an issue, and jury knew defendant was an inmate).

Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding petitioner’s due process rights

were violated by being required to appear in shackles at sentencing because no

evidence of disruptive behavior; noting that requiring defendant to wear prison clothes

during sentencing does not violate due process, citing Estelle v. Williams), cert. denied,

517 U.S. 1158 (1996).

Morgan v. Bunnell, 24 F.3d 49 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding shackling justified on facts, for

courtroom security).

Hamilton v. Vasquez, 17 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir.) (holding shackling defendant during trial

not due process violation because defendant’s conduct justified restraint and less

restrictive alternatives were attempted and failed), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1229 (1994).
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Castillo v. Stainer, 997 F.3d 669 (9th Cir.) (describing two-step process necessary

before shackles may be used at trial), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1014 (1993).

Jones v. Meyer, 899 F.2d 883, 885 (9th Cir.) (stating Ninth Circuit precedent that

“court must be persuaded by compelling circumstances that some measure was needed

to maintain security of courtroom,” and that court must “pursue less restrictive

alternatives before imposing physical restraints”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990).

Spain v. Rushen, 883 F.2d 712, 716, 720 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding defendant has

constitutional right to appear before jury without shackles, absent compelling

circumstances), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 910 (1990).

Wilson v. McCarthy, 770 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1985) (addressing limits on right to

appear before jury free of shackles).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Williams v. Calderon, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (finding no evidence to

justify leg chain and handcuffs, but finding error harmless under Brecht).

Other Circuits:

United States v. Stewart, 20 F.3d 911, 916 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that when

circumstances permit shackling defendant during trial, compelling defendant also to

wear prison clothing is not inherently prejudicial because prisoner status is already

apparent to jury).

Marquez v. Collins, 11 F.3d 1241 (5th Cir.) (holding capital defendant must not be

shackled before jury unless restraint is necessary to protect safety of trial participants or

sanctity of trial itself; holding shackling at trial not due process violation, on facts),

cert. denied, 513 U.S. 881 (1994).

Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439 (11th Cir.) (holding new capital sentencing hearing

required where defendant forced to appear before jury in shackles and state failed to

establish shackling was necessary and trial court failed to consider less restrictive

alternatives or give defendant an opportunity to rebut charges that he [or she] was a

security threat), withdrawn in part, 833 F.2d 250 (11th Cir. 1987), and cert. denied,

485 U.S. 1014 (1988).
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4.1.7 Sentencer Reliance on Undisclosed Information

In Gardner v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that a death sentence based in part on a

confidential presentence report given to the trial judge but not to the defense was

unconstitutional because it was based on information which the defendant had no

opportunity to deny or explain. Thus, under Gardner and its progeny, a capital

defendant must be permitted to see and respond to any evidence or argument on which

the death sentence might be based.

Supreme Court:

Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (citing Gardner, holding that where a

defendant’s future dangerousness is at issue, and state law prohibits defendant’s release

on parole, due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that defendant is

parole ineligible; to extent that jury’s potential belief that defendant was parole eligible

may have affected its deliberations, defendant would be sentenced to death on basis of

information which he or she had no opportunity to deny or explain).

Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (holding Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

bar reliance by sentencer on confidential presentence report; “full disclosure of the

basis for the death sentence” is required).

Ninth Circuit:

McKenzie v. McCormick, 27 F.3d 1415 (9th Cir. 1994) (distinguishing Gardner in

upholding death sentence issued after meeting between prosecutor and judge after

verdict and before sentencing because no evidence that meeting, or substance of it,

affected sentencing decision), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1033 (1995).

Paradis v. Arave, 20 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding private letter from co-defendant

and in camera statements to judge not Gardner violation because no showing that judge

considered them in sentencing), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1117 (1995).

Clark v. Ricketts, 958 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.) (holding no constitutional violation where

judge had presentence report before him at sentencing phase where evidence showed

that judge’s finding that defendant lacked remorse was based on evidence at trial and

not information contained in presentence report), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 838 (1992).
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Other Circuits:

Lusk v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 946 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding court’s failure to ensure

defendant personally reviewed presentence report not a due process Gardner violation),

cert. denied, 508 U.S. 920 (1993).

Delap v. Dugger, 890 F.2d 285 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding judge’s ex parte visit to

prison death row constitutes Gardner violation, but harmless error), cert. denied, 496

U.S. 929 (1990).

See generally:

Lawrence E. Jacobs, Note, Ex Parte Information and the Appellate Review of Capital

Sentences, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 104 (1985) (reviewing Gardner, concluding use of ex

parte information in appellate review of death sentence is unconstitutional).

4.1.8 Right to Be Present at Verdict

A defendant has a due process right to be present in court when the presence bears a

reasonably substantial relation to the opportunity to defend but not where the presence

would be useless. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934). The Supreme Court,

however, has not specifically addressed the constitutionality of a capital defendant’s

absence when a jury announces sentence. In Rice v. Wood, 77 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 873 (1996), a case in which the state conceded that petitioner’s

absence from the reading of her capital sentencing verdict amounted to constitutional

error, the Ninth Circuit held that the error was not structural error and upheld the

verdict under a harmless error analysis.

Ninth Circuit:

Rice v. Wood, 77 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir.) (holding trial court’s acceptance of jury’s death

verdict in defendant’s absence was harmless error), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 873 (1996).

Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.) (stating felony defendant has fundamental

right to be present at every stage of trial; right may be waived if voluntary, knowing,

and intelligent), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1119 (1994).
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4.1.9 Competency at Penalty Phase

Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming denial of a habeas petition

in a capital case, the court held that, although petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to a

fair trial would have been implicated if he had actually been incompetent at penalty

phase of trial, the trial court did not err in not sua sponte holding a competency hearing

at the penalty phase where there was no substantial evidence of incompetency, and the

petitioner was not actually incompetent; thus holding district court did not err in

denying an evidentiary hearing on these issues, and counsel was not ineffective in

failing to request a competency hearing), cert. dismissed, 126 S. Ct. 410 (2005).

4.2 Fifth and Sixth Amendment Restrictions on Use of Psychiatric Examinations at

Sentencing

In Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), the Supreme Court held that the state may not

compel a defendant to submit to a psychiatric examination for sentencing purposes. 

The Court held that Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) applies to any

examination of a defendant performed for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used

at sentencing. A psychiatric interview conducted without proper Miranda warnings or

without notice to counsel violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, respectively, and is

inadmissible at sentencing.

The Smith Court, acknowledging the state’s interest in ensuring a defendant’s

mental competency, held that a defendant does not have a right to refuse to submit to a

psychiatric examination to determine his or her competency to stand trial. However,

the state must limit its use of the elicited testimony to that issue only.

In Smith, the Supreme Court established that the Fifth Amendment privilege

against self-incrimination applies to capital proceedings. The Court’s holding

regarding the use of psychiatric testimony is limited to those defendants “who neither

initiate . . . a psychiatric evaluation nor attempt . . . to introduce any psychiatric

evidence.” In a noncapital case, Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987), the Court

reasoned that where a defendant requests a psychiatric examination or presents his or

her own psychiatric evidence, then the prosecution should at least be allowed to rebut

this evidence with evidence from the psychiatric examinations requested by the
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defendant. Thus, the Buchanan Court held that a defendant waives his or her Fifth

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by raising a mental status defense. 

Following this logic, some circuits have held that raising an insanity defense constitutes

a waiver of a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right with regard to psychiatric testimony. 

In the capital case of Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680 (1989), the Court ruled that a Fifth

Amendment waiver due to the insanity defense does not also constitute a waiver of the

Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

In Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001), the Court limited Estelle to its

narrow facts and denied relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Court noted the

distinguishing facts: (1) Penry made his mental status an issue in both his prior case and

the death case; (2) Penry’s counsel requested the competency evaluation in the earlier

case; (3) the testimony elicited at Penry’s sentencing trial was presented in crossexamination through Penry’s own witness; and (4) Penry had not committed the capital

murder when he underwent the competency-determination interview so future

dangerousness was not an issue.

A defendant is protected by the Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the

psychiatric exam takes place after formal adversary proceedings have begun. Thus, 

under Smith, a defendant must also validly waive his or her right to counsel before a

psychiatric examination or testimony regarding that examination is admissible at

sentencing.

Supreme Court:

Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (holding Texas court did not err in

distinguishing Estelle–where, on state’s cross-examination and over defense objection,

psychiatrist recited from report of another psychiatrist who evaluated defendant for

competency to stand trial on an earlier unrelated charge; finding Texas court’s decision

not “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of” Supreme Court law within

meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), because the Court never extended Estelle’s Fifth

Amendment holding beyond its particular facts; also stating that even if the testimony

was admitted contrary to Estelle, error probably harmless under Brecht).

Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680 (1989) (applying Satterwhite to reverse death sentence

on Sixth Amendment grounds where psychiatric testimony re: future dangerousness

admitted at sentencing in violation of Estelle v. Smith; waiver of Fifth Amendment
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rights by raising insanity defense does not constitute waiver of Sixth).

Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988) (holding Smith violation because admission

of psychiatric testimony based on examination undertaken without notice to defense

counsel or waiver of right to counsel violated Sixth Amendment).

Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 422–23 (1987) (applying Smith to use of

psychiatric evidence as rebuttal during guilt stage of noncapital case; “if a defendant

requests [a psychiatric] evaluation or presents psychiatric evidence, . . . at the very

least, the prosecution may rebut this presentation with evidence from reports of the

examination that the defendant requested”). 

Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendments bar admission of psychiatric testimony resulting from court-ordered

examination where defendant was not advised of Miranda rights).

Ninth Circuit:

Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523 (9th Cir.) (finding court’s refusal to allow counsel to

attend petitioner’s presentence interview violated petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right

to counsel at a critical stage; remanding for evidentiary hearing to determine whether

error was harmless), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 944 (2001). 

Harris v. Pulley, 692 F.2d 1189, 1202–03 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding, where defendant

had not requested or retained counsel and was not yet arraigned or indicted, no Sixth

Amendment concerns raised by psychiatric interview conducted; at this stage,

statements to psychiatrist should be analyzed for voluntariness under Fifth

Amendment), rev’d on other grounds, 465 U.S. 37 (1984).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

United States v. Vest, 905 F. Supp. 651 (D. Mont. 1995) (ruling defendants would be

compelled to undergo pretrial examination by government mental health experts if

defendants planned to introduce mental health testimony at penalty phase).

Troiani v. Poole, 858 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (finding no Fifth or Sixth

Amendment violations under Smith).

Arnett v. Ricketts, 665 F. Supp. 1437, 1442-43 (D. Ariz. 1987) (holding testimony of

psychiatrist and probation officer at sentencing violated petitioner’s Miranda rights,

under Smith).
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See generally:

Welsh S. White, Government Psychiatric Examinations and the Death Penalty, 37

Ariz. L. Rev. 869 (1995) (addressing constitutional issues raised when defendant is

subjected to government psychiatric examination).

Welsh S. White, The Psychiatric Examination and the Fifth Amendment Privilege in

Capital Cases, 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 943 (1983) (analyzing Fifth Amendment

issues raised when a defendant presents expert psychiatric testimony in support of

mitigating circumstances at sentencing).

4.2.1 Harmless Error

In Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988), the Supreme Court held that the harmless

error standard applies to the review of Estelle v. Smith violations.

Supreme Court:

Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988) (holding harmless error standard applies in

capital cases to admission of testimony in violation of Sixth Amendment right set out in

Estelle v. Smith; in this case, error not harmless because impossible to say beyond

reasonable doubt that expert testimony re: future dangerousness did not influence

sentencing jury).

4.2.2 Retroactivity of Estelle v. Smith

The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits apply Estelle v. Smith retroactively.

Other Circuits:

Alvord v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1282 (11th Cir.) (holding, following Battie, that Smith

applies retroactively), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 956 (1984).

White v. Estelle, 720 F.2d 415, 417 (5th Cir. 1983) (following Battie in applying Estelle

v. Smith retroactively).

Battie v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 692, 696-99 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding Smith applies

retroactively).
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4.2.3 Psychiatric Testimony on Future Dangerousness

In Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), the Supreme Court rejected the argument

that psychiatric testimony regarding future dangerousness is too unreliable. The Court

held instead that the state may introduce psychiatric evidence of a defendant’s future

dangerousness in capital sentencing proceedings. The psychiatric evidence does not

have to be based on personal examinations of defendant, but, if it is, the state must give

Miranda warnings to the defendant or notice to defendant’s counsel pursuant to Estelle

v. Smith. The evidence may also be responses to hypothetical questions given without

the benefit of an examination. The answers to hypothetical questions may not,

however, “be influenced by” or “derive from” a psychological examination conducted

without the proper warnings and waivers.

When the state intends to introduce psychiatric evidence on future

dangerousness, the defendant has a due process right under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S.

68 (1985), to access to psychiatric assistance in the preparation of his or her defense. 

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).

Supreme Court:

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (holding where defendant’s mental state at issue,

defendant entitled to access to psychiatrist and psychiatric assistance in preparing

defense).

Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (upholding admission in sentencing

proceeding of psychiatric testimony regarding future dangerousness).

State Courts:

People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 631 P.2d 446, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981) (finding

no showing of reliability and holding inadmissible as aggravating factor during penalty

phase expert testimony forecasting future dangerousness), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922

(1982).

See generally:

Deborah W. Denno, Comment, Review Essay: “Death is Different” and Other Twists
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of Fate: The Death Penalty in the Nineties: An Examination of the Modern System of

Capital Punishment. By Welsh W. White, 83 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 437 (1992)

(discussing Barefoot as an example of Supreme Court’s twisting of original “death is

different” doctrine).

George E. Dix, Expert Prediction Testimony in Capital Sentencing: Evidentiary and

Constitutional Considerations, 19 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1 (1981) (discussing, after Smith

but prior to Barefoot, due process problems with admission of “unreliable” evidence in

capital sentencing proceedings).

William S. Geimer, Death at Any Cost: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s Recent

Retreat from its Death Penalty Standards, 12 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 737 (1985) (reviewing

Barefoot and other Supreme Court decisions, arguing that Court has abandoned

commitment to due process in capital cases; Barefoot is one example).

Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 97 (1984)

(arguing that “clinical” testimony re: future behavior should be admissible only if

defendant first seeks to use clinical testimony to show not dangerous; otherwise, state

must rely on hard “actuarial” data to prove future dangerousness).

4.3 Victim Impact Testimony

From 1987 until 1991, the Supreme Court maintained the position that the introduction

of victim impact evidence in the sentencing phase of a capital trial violated the Eighth

Amendment. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987); South Carolina v. Gathers, 490

U.S. 805 (1989). However, in 1991, the Court overruled Booth and Gathers. Payne v.

Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). Payne held that the Eighth Amendment erects no per

se bar against the admission of victim impact evidence relating to a victim’s personal

characteristics and the emotional impact on the victim’s family. Thus, such evidence is

admissible at capital sentencing if the state legislature chooses to permit it. However,

under Payne, a due process violation arises if victim impact evidence is “so unduly

prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair.” 

Supreme Court:

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (holding Eighth Amendment erects no per se

bar against admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on the

subject at capital sentencing).
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South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989) (extending Booth, holding prosecutor’s

description of victim’s personal qualities based on items found in victim’s possession

was not related directly to circumstances of the crime and therefore inadmissible at

capital sentencing, under Booth), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808

(1991). 

Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) (holding Eighth Amendment bars introduction

of statement at capital sentencing hearing because irrelevant to sentencing decision and

creates risk of arbitrary and capricious imposition of death penalty), overruled by

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).

Ninth Circuit:

Sager v. Maass, 84 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel

where petitioner’s attorney introduced victim impact testimony for purpose of showing

victim’s signature, which could easily have been obtained by other means).

McKenzie v. Risley, 842 F.2d 1525, 1537–38 n.25 (9th Cir.) (finding, during Booth era,

that strictures in Booth apply only to sentencing, not to decision to take case to trial;

thus any consideration prosecution gives to family’s wishes in decision not to plea

bargain is not Booth violation), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 901 (1988).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Bonin v. Vasquez, 807 F. Supp. 586 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (holding prosecutor’s statements

regarding impact of murders on victims’ families constitutional and not unduly

prejudicial under Payne).

Other Circuits:

Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding petitioner not entitled to

retroactive application of Booth because Booth is new rule under Teague; noting

petitioner also cannot object to state’s retroactive use of Payne under Teague because

Teague protects state’s interest in finality of criminal convictions, and thus only state

may object to retroactive application of new rule to old case).

See generally:

Kathryn E. Bartolo, Payne v. Tennessee: The Future Role of Victim Statements of

Opinion in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 1217 (1992) (examining

Payne and identifying difficulties in future use of victim impact evidence, concluding
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victim statements of opinion should not be allowed, and urging admission of victim

impact evidence should not extend beyond limits in Payne).

Matthew V. Brammer, Note, Eighth Amendment No Longer Bars Victim Impact

Statements Admission in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 261

(1992) (reviewing victim impact precedent and Payne, offering model for admission of

such evidence).

Randall Coyne, Inflicting Payne on Oklahoma: The Use of Victim Impact Evidence

During the Sentencing Phase of Capital Trials, 45 Okla L. Rev. 589 (1992) (analyzing

and summarizing legal and practical issues and impact of Payne).

Craig E. Gilmore, Note, Payne v. Tennessee: Rejection of Precedent, Recognition of

Victim Impact Worth, 41 Cath. U. L. Rev. 469 (1992) (tracing development of use of

victim impact information at sentencing).

Jonathan H. Levy, Limiting Victim Impact Evidence and Argument After Payne v.

Tennessee, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1027 (1993) (arguing Payne failed to give adequate

guidelines for using victim impact evidence at capital sentencing proceedings and

attempting to fill gap by exploring post-Payne constitutional limitations on use of

victim impact evidence and argument).

Elizabeth A. Meek, Note, Victim Impact Evidence and Capital Sentencing–A Casenote

on Payne v. Tennessee, 52 La. L. Rev. 1299 (1992) (reviewing Payne, recommending

states keep victim impact evidence out, especially in capital cases, because causes

troubling results).

Michael Ira Oberlander, The Payne of Allowing Victim Impact Statements at Capital

Sentencing Hearings, 45 Van. L. Rev. 1621 (1992) (arguing victim impact evidence

should not be admissible at capital sentencing; reviewing victims’ rights movement,

arguing system catering to victims’ “rights” when in conflict with defendants’ rights, is

unconstitutional, and reviewing Payne and progeny).

David M. Paul, Note, Payne v. Tennessee: A Case of Precedents Forgotten, 54 U. Pitt.

L. Rev. 893 (1993) (arguing Payne cannot be reconciled with Court’s death penalty

jurisprudence).

4.4 Prosecutorial Misconduct

The constitutional restraints on a prosecutor’s comments during the guilt phase, see

§ 3.3, also apply to the capital sentencing phase. Improper closing argument by a state
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prosecutor in a capital sentencing hearing justifies federal habeas corpus relief only if

the argument rendered the capital sentencing hearing fundamentally unfair. 

Supreme Court:

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974) (ruling on alleged guilt phase

prosecutorial misconduct as establishing “fundamental fairness” standard for reviewing

prosecutorial misconduct).

4.4.1 Prosecutorial Expertise

Assertions of expertise (“vouching”) on the part of the prosecutor during sentencing is

improper when it undermines the jury’s perception that it has discretion to determine

the appropriate sentence. Such improper assertions in sentencing argument, however,

do not always render the sentencing proceeding “fundamentally unfair.”

Ninth Circuit:

United States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1278 (9th Cir. 1993) (describing factors to

consider in determining improper prosecutorial vouching).

Other Circuits:

Nelson v. Nagle, 995 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1993) (granting relief because prosecution’s

reading during closing sentencing argument of portion of state case discouraging mercy

rendered penalty phase of trial fundamentally unfair).

Johnson v. Wainwright, 778 F.2d 623 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding prosecutor’s closing

comments at sentencing regarding limited number of times his office seeks death

penalty and personal opinion that death penalty is warranted in this case constituted

prosecutorial misconduct because undermined jury’s perception that it had unfettered

discretion to decline to impose the death penalty, but in context of entire sentencing

proceeding, did not render trial fundamentally unfair), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872

(1987).

Tucker v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1505 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (holding sentencing

opening argument invoking prosecutorial expertise was improper but did not render

trial fundamentally unfair).
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Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (finding harmful

prosecutorial misconduct where prosecutor invoked hundred-year- old cases suggesting

with apparent weight of state supreme court that mercy is inappropriate consideration

for jury to use in sentencing), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986).

Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (holding prosecutor’s

discussion of his seeking death in only a few cases improperly implied that prosecutor’s

office had already made careful determination that case warranted death penalty but did

not render trial fundamentally unfair), vacated on other grounds, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986).

4.4.2 Possibility of Escape

The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have held that references in sentencing argument to

the potential harm to witnesses if defendant were to escape are proper because they

relate to future dangerousness.

Ninth Circuit:

Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding statement in sentencing

rebuttal argument regarding potential harm to trial witnesses “if jury did not protect

them,” although suggesting possibility of escape, was not improper because jury may

speculate about what defendant might do if released), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948

(1988).

Other Circuits:

Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding arguments regarding

possibility of escape were proper because they were arguments about future

dangerousness which were appropriate inferences from record before jury), vacated on

other grounds, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986).

4.4.3 Role of Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

The Fifth Circuit has held that in closing arguments during the sentencing phase of a

trial, a prosecutor cannot distract the jury from its duty to focus on the aggravating and

mitigating circumstances of the crime. If a prosecutor’s arguments make rational

assessment by the jury unlikely, then the sentencing hearing is fundamentally unfair.
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Other Circuits:

Kirkpatrick v. Blackburn, 777 F.2d 272, 283–84 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding prosecutor’s

references to law on defense of others improperly distracted jury from focus on

aggravating and mitigating circumstances but not so prejudicial as to render trial

fundamentally unfair), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1178 (1986).

4.4.4 Deterrence

The Eleventh Circuit has held that a capital sentencing jury may properly consider

deterrence.

Other Circuits:

Davis v. Kemp, 829 F.2d 1522, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding prosecutor may argue

that death penalty serves as deterrent, citing statement in Brooks that deterrence is

appropriate subject of jury consideration), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 929 (1988).

Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449, 1459-60 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding prosecutor may

argue deterrence of death penalty during argument at sentencing because under Gregg

v. Georgia deterrence is valid rationale for imposing death penalty), cert. denied, 478

U.S. 1020 (1986).

Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (stating deterrence is proper

consideration of a sentencing jury in a capital case), vacated on other grounds, 478

U.S. 1016 (1986).

4.4.5 Inflammatory Comments

Inflammatory comments by a prosecutor during sentencing warrants relief for

prosecutorial misconduct only if they meet the “fundamental unfairness” standard.

Ninth Circuit:

Nefstad v. Baldwin, 66 F.3d 335 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished) (holding no violation of

due process where prosecutor during closing argument shows photographs of victim

before and after murder because relevant to intent), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1081 (1996).
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District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Williams v. Calderon, 48 F. Supp. 2d 979 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (granting summary

judgment for state on petitioner’s habeas claim where prosecutor used analogy of caged

versus wild tiger, comparing petitioner to the wild tiger in penalty phase closing

argument).

Other Circuits:

Kennedy v. Dugger, 933 F.2d 905 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding prosecutor’s argument that

allegedly invited jury to put themselves in position of victim upheld as permissible

comment on defendant’s future dangerousness), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1066 (1992).

Cunningham v. Zant, 928 F.2d 1006 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding prosecutor’s

“outrageous” statements that he was personally offended by defendant’s exercise of his

right to trial and that defendant had abused the legal system by exercising that right

inflamed and misinformed the jury and were therefore improper; court did not reach

prejudice issue because sentence reversed on other grounds).

Smith v. Black, 904 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding prosecutor’s presentation of

evidence of rape at sentencing phase proper because tended to support aggravating

factor of “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel”), vacated on other grounds, 503 U.S.

930 (1992).

Burden v. Zant, 903 F.2d 1352 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding references during sentencing

closing to publicity and public anger not prosecutorial misconduct), rev’d on other

grounds, 498 U.S. 433 (1991).

Gates v. Zant, 863 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir.) (holding prosecutor’s “war on crime”

argument improper but harmless error), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 945 (1989).

Williams v. Kemp, 846 F.2d 1276 (11th Cir. 1988) (prosecutor’s sentencing phase

closing argument that defendant was trained to kill in the Marine Corps, although

offensive and undesirable, did not render the sentencing proceeding fundamentally

unfair because argument was “obvious overstatement and its factual incorrectness [wa]s

readily apparent”), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990).

Davis v. Kemp, 829 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding prosecutorial arguments that

jurors were like soldiers fighting for their country, death penalty a deterrent to crime,

retribution and future dangerousness were factors justifying imposition of death

penalty, and that jury had duty to impose death, did not render sentencing proceeding
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fundamentally unfair), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 929 (1988).

Wilson v. Kemp, 777 F.2d 621 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding sentencing proceeding

rendered fundamentally unfair by prosecutor’s argument emphasizing jury’s duty to

show mercy to society rather than defendant and express society’s moral outrage), cert.

denied, 476 U.S. 1153 (1986).

See generally:

Mark S. Davies, Comment, Enlisting the Jury in the “War on Drugs:” A Proposed Ban

on Prosecutor’s Use of “War on Drugs” Rhetoric During Opening and Closing

Argument of a Narcotics Trial, 1994 U. Chi. Legal F. 395 (1994) (addressing use of

“war on drugs” rhetoric in prosecutor’s argument).

4.4.6 Diminished Jury Responsibility

The Supreme Court has held that there is a specific prohibition in capital cases against

arguments that have the effect of misleading the jury about its role in sentencing. 

Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985). The Caldwell Court stated that it is

“constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a

sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the

appropriateness of the defendant’s death rests elsewhere.” Id. at 328–329 Thus, such

statements are unconstitutional because they indicate that the jury’s decision would

automatically be reviewed by a higher court and, therefore, the jury’s decision would

not be the final decision in the case. The Court in Caldwell held that the danger from

these statements–that the jury would minimize the importance of its role–violates the

Eighth Amendment requirement that the jury make an individualized decision that

death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.

In Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407 (1989), the Court stated that to

establish a Caldwell violation, a defendant must show that the remarks to the jury

“improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local law,” minimizing their

sense of true responsibility.

The Ninth Circuit has reversed a death sentence because the prosecutor’s

closing argument invoked biblical passages that undercut the jury’s sense of

responsibility to impose the appropriate sentence. Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765

(9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 847 (2001).
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Supreme Court:

Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401 (1989) (holding no basis for Caldwell claim because to

establish Caldwell violation, defendant necessarily must show that remarks to jury

improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local law, and defendant here

made no objection to challenged jury instructions under local law).

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) (holding Caldwell not violated by

prosecutor’s statements at guilt stage which could not have misled the jury into

thinking it had a reduced role in the sentencing process).

Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) (holding closing argument that

responsibility for determining appropriateness of death sentence rested with state

supreme court and not jury was improper because it diminished jury’s sense of

responsibility for determining death sentence, in violation of Eighth Amendment).

Ninth Circuit:

Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765 (9th Cir. 2000) (reversing death sentence where

prosecutor invoked biblical passages in closing argument commonly understood as

sanctioning the death penalty), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 847 (2001).

Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F. 3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that judge’s comments

to jury at resentencing–that petitioner had been sentenced to death by a prior jury and

the sentence was reversed on automatic appeal because of “technical questions” with

the sentence–did not rise to Caldwell violation), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036 (2001),

reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 276 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 2001).

Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1192 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding prosecution’s passing

reference to defendant’s right to appeal did not indicate jury’s diminished responsibility

and thus proper under Caldwell; jury instructions also made jury responsibility clear),

cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1191 (1994).

Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453, 1460–61 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding statement in

sentencing closing argument that jury should not debate the death penalty but only

determine if there are mitigating factors sufficient to merit leniency was proper because

was only general comment on validity of death penalty, and no prejudice because trial

court clearly instructed jury on its proper role), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948 (1988).
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Other Circuits:

Antwine v. Delo, 54 F.3d 1357 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding prosecutor’s statements during

penalty phase closing argument indicating death sentence would be quick,

instantaneous process diminished jurors’ sense of responsibility for imposing death

penalty and thus violated due process), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1067 (1996).

Gaskins v. McKellar, 916 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding evidence that defendant’s

prior death sentence was vacated does not diminish jury’s sense of responsibility by

leading it to believe its sentence was advisory only, and is proper under Caldwell), cert.

denied, 500 U.S. 961 (1991).

See generally:

Theodore Eisenberg et al., Jury Responsibility in Capital Sentencing: An Empirical

Study, 44 Buff. L. Rev. 339 (1996) (addressing issues surrounding jury responsibility in

capital sentencing, and suggesting reforms).

4.4.6.1 Retroactivity of Caldwell v. Mississippi

In Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990), the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth

Circuit’s conclusion that Caldwell states a “new rule” under Teague v. Lane and is thus

not retroactive. Therefore, a habeas petitioner whose conviction was final at the time

Caldwell was decided (June 11, 1985) is barred from pursuing a Caldwell claim and is

entitled to relief for prosecutorial misconduct only under the pre-Caldwell standard of

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974) (“improper prosecutorial arguments. . .

vitiate a sentencing proceeding only if they render the proceedings fundamentally

unfair”).

Supreme Court:

Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990) (holding Caldwell announces a “new rule” and is

not retroactively applicable under Teague).

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974) (stating “improper prosecutorial

arguments . . . vitiate a sentencing proceeding only if they render the proceedings

fundamentally unfair”).
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4.5 Jury Instructions

4.5.1 Ambiguous or Vague Instructions

In Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990), the Supreme Court held that the standard

of reviewing a claim that a sentencing instruction is ambiguous is “whether there is a

reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that

prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.” A federal court

reviewing the issue on habeas still must apply the Brecht analysis after determining the

constitutionality of the instruction. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141 (1998).

In Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994), the Supreme Court stated that

its review of sentencing eligibility factors in the context of jury instructions is

deferential. An instruction will not be ruled unconstitutional for vagueness if it has

some “common-sense core of meaning . . . that criminal juries should be capable of

understanding.” Id. at 973–974. In addition, the Court stated that jury instructions at

capital sentencing need not be only in the form of specific propositional questions. An

instruction may direct the jury to consider a crime’s “facts and circumstances.” Id. at

978.

Supreme Court:

Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141 (1998) (per curiam) (holding Ninth Circuit erred

by failing to apply Brecht standard of review on habeas writ regarding sentencing

instruction; applying Boyde standard of review was not adequate).

Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994) (upholding as not unconstitutionally

vague, California sentencing factors of Penal Code § 190 requiring sentencer to

consider (1) the “circumstances of the crime of which defendant was convicted . . . and

the existence of any special circumstances found to be true,” (2) the “presence or

absence of criminal activity [involving] the use or attempted use of force or violence or

the express or implied threat to use force or violence,” and (3) defendant’s age at the

time of the crime).

Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990) (holding standard of review of a claim that an

instruction is ambiguous is “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has

applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of

constitutionally relevant evidence”).
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Ninth Circuit:

McDowell v. Calderon, 130 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding that where jury

returns note showing confusion as to proper mitigating evidence, it is reversible error to

simply refer to and repeat the same instruction already given which the jury previously

misunderstood), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1103 (1998), implicitly rejected in Calderon v.

Coleman, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). 

See generally:

Susie Cho, Comment, Capital Confusion: The Effect of Jury Instructions on the

Decision to Impose Death, 85 J. Crim. L. 532 (1994) (discussing jury’s comprehension

and application of law in capital cases).

Shari S. Diamond & Judith N. Levi, Improving Decisions on Death by Revising and

Testing Jury Instructions, Judicature, Vol. 79, No.5, at 224 (March-April 1996)

(suggesting improvements to reduce jury miscomprehension of capital jury

instructions).

Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in

Capital Cases, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1993) (reviewing inaccuracy and

misunderstanding in jury instructions at capital sentencing).

Christopher Slobogin, Symposium, The Capital Jury Project: Should Juries and the

Death Penalty Mix?, 70 Ind. L.J. 1249 (1995) (addressing research of Capital Jury

Project, and whether evidence of unpredictable jury decision-making in capital cases

has constitutional significance).

Peter M. Tiersma, Dictionaries and Death: Do Capital Jurors Understand Mitigation?,

1995 Utah L. Rev. 1 (1995) (addressing nature of mitigating and aggravating

circumstances and evidence of jurors’ non-comprehension of instructions on mitigation

in death penalty cases).

4.5.2 Role of Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

In Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994), the Supreme Court held that the jury

need not be instructed on how to weigh any particular factor in the sentencing decision. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that a trial court need not instruct that the jury find beyond a

reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
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circumstances. Harris v. Pulley, 692 F.2d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 1982). In reversing this

Ninth Circuit decision on other grounds, the Supreme Court noted, without

disapproving, this Ninth Circuit holding. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984).

Supreme Court:

Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994) (holding that instructions need not tell jury

how to weigh any particular factor).

Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984) (noting, without disapproving, Ninth Circuit’s

lower holding that no beyond a reasonable doubt finding required for determining death

sentence).

Ninth Circuit:

Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that there was ex post

facto violation requiring reversal of death sentence where jury was instructed on more

onerous 1978 California death penalty statute, rather than the 1977 statute, in effect at

time of crime; 1977 statute permitted jury discretion to reject death penalty even if it

found that aggravating factors outweighed mitigating factors, but under 1978 statute,

jury did not have this discretion), cert. denied, 535 U. S. 935 (2002). 

Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding ambiguous jury instruction at

sentencing phase which suggested that jury must unanimously find that mitigating

factors outweigh aggravating factors was error), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 951 (1993).

Harris v. Pulley, 692 F.2d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding beyond-a-reasonabledoubt standard not required to determine whether death penalty should be imposed),

rev’d on other grounds, 465 U.S. 37 (1984).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Wade v. Vasquez, 752 F. Supp. 931 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (applying Harris in rejecting

petitioner’s argument that trial court should have instructed jury that it must find

beyond reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating and that

death is appropriate punishment).
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See generally:

James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Symposium, The Capital Jury Project: Discretion in

Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or Misguided?, 70 Ind. L.J. 1161 (1995)

(addressing jury comprehension of capital sentencing instructions and jury application

of guided discretion principle of Furman).

4.5.3 Sympathy and Passion

In California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987), the Supreme Court held that a jury

instruction that the jurors must consider and weigh aggravating and mitigating

circumstances but “must not be swayed by mere sympathy” or public sentiment is

permissible and does not violate the Eighth Amendment. The Court reasoned that a

reasonable juror would interpret the instruction to mean he or she should ignore only

the sort of sympathy not rooted in the aggravating and mitigating evidence introduced

at sentencing.

Supreme Court:

California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987) (holding jury instruction that jurors “must

not be swayed by mere sympathy” or by public sentiment does not violate Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendment prohibition of unbridled discretion and requirement that

defendants be allowed to introduce any mitigating evidence).

Other Circuits:

Lusk v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 946 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Brown, holding sentencing

judge’s statement that mercy should not be extended to defendant did not indicate that

judge refused to consider mercy where judge found that no mitigating factors existed),

cert. denied, 508 U.S. 920 (1993).

Julius v. Jones, 875 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir.) (holding guilt phase instruction that jury was

not to be swayed by sympathy did not preclude consideration of mitigating evidence at

penalty phase), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 900 (1989).

See generally:

Paul W. Cobb, Jr., Note, Reviving Mercy in the Structure of Capital Punishment, 99

Yale L.J. 589 (1989) (discussing role of mercy, including Brown, in capital sentencing,
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and proposing revival of mercy through courts, legislatures, and governors).

4.5.3.1 Retroactivity of California v. Brown

In Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990), the Supreme Court stated that the decision in

California v. Brown created a new rule because its reasoning was not dictated by

Lockett v. Ohio or Eddings v. Oklahoma. Therefore, under Teague v. Lane, it is not

retroactively applied to cases which became final before it was decided.

Supreme Court:

Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990) (stating Brown not retroactively applied under

Teague).

4.5.4 Possibility of Commutation or Parole

In California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983), the Supreme Court held that the Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendments allow but do not require a state capital sentencing jury to

be instructed that a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole may

be commuted by the governor to a lesser sentence that includes the possibility of

parole. On the other hand, the Supreme Court held in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512

U.S. 154 (1994), that where a defendant’s future dangerousness is at issue and state law

prohibits the defendant’s release on parole, due process requires that the sentencing

jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible.

Supreme Court:

Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246 (2002) (holding that capital defendant’s future

dangerousness was at issue and it was error for the trial court to refuse to instruct that

he would be ineligible for parole under life sentence where prosecution presented

evidence that while in prison, defendant had made a knife and had taken part in escape

attempt; also holding that it was not dispositive that jury did not ask judge for further

instruction on parole eligibility, whereas juries in Shafer v. South Carolina and

Simmons v. South Carolina did).

Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2001) (holding that whenever future

dangerousness is at issue in a capital sentencing proceeding, due process requires that
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jury be informed that life sentence carries no possibility of parole under South Carolina

statute providing that if jury finds statutory aggravator, it must recommend a sentence

and its choices are limited to death and life without parole).

Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156 (2000) (denying habeas relief in death case where

petitioner refused a jury instruction explaining parole ineligibility because, although

petitioner was found guilty of a felony making him ineligible for parole under state law,

the judgment of conviction was not entered before petitioner’s sentencing hearing in

the capital case and under state law, entry of a judgment is more than a ministerial act).

Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141 (1998) (reversing grant of habeas relief based on

state court’s inaccurate instruction on the governor’s power to commute a sentence;

must first apply the Brecht harmless error standard).

Brown v. Texas, 522 U.S. 940 (1997) (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and

Breyer, JJ., respecting denial of petition for certiorari) (pointing out tension between

Texas law, which prohibits a capital defendant from presenting evidence regarding

parole eligibility for a life imprisonment sentence, and Simmons rule).

Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (holding where the state makes an

issue of defendant’s future dangerousness during sentencing phase of a capital trial, and

state law prohibits defendant’s release on parole, due process requires that the court

inform the sentencing jury that the defendant is ineligible for parole).

California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983) (upholding against federal constitutional

challenge state law requiring instruction on governor’s power to commute life sentence

without possibility of parole). But see People v. Ramos, 689 P.2d 430 (Cal. 1984)

(voiding same law on state constitutional grounds), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1119 (1985).

Ninth Circuit:

Morris v. Woodford, 273 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (granting writ of habeas corpus and

reversing in part and remanding with instructions to vacate sentence of death and

ordering new penalty-phase trial because of typographical error in written jury

instructions in penalty phase whereby jury was instructed “ if you have a reasonable

doubt as to which penalty to impose, death or life in prison without the possibility of

parole, you must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict fixing

the penalty of life in prison with the possibility of parole; holding error was not

harmless where jury was confused by instruction and inquired about it and court

inadvertently exacerbated problem), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 741 (2002).
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Coleman v. Calderon, 210 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding reversible error under

Brecht and reversing death sentence based on jury instruction which mislead jury

regarding possibility of gubernatorial commutation of a “life without parole” sentence;

dissent finding error harmless).

McClain v. Calderon,134 F.3d 1383 (9th Cir.) (following Hamilton, holding trial court

erred instructing jury on governor’s commutation power, where–under former state

law–power was limited by supreme court approval), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 942 (1998),

implicitly rejected by Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141 (1998).

Gallego v. McDaniel, 124 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that penalty phase

instruction, discussing executive clemency procedure applicable to a sentence of life

imprisonment without possibility of parole, was reversible error since instruction failed

to state that defendant–convicted of capital murder out of state–faced additional

clemency hurdles), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 917 (1998), and cert. denied, 524 U.S. 922

(1998).

Hamilton v. Vasquez, 17 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir.) (holding improper jury instruction re:

possibility of governor commuting life sentence prevented jury from making reasoned

and informed choice between a sentence of life without possibility of parole and death),

cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1229 (1994), implicitly rejected by Calderon v. Coleman, 525

U.S. 141 (1998).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Bonin v. Vasquez, 807 F. Supp. 586 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (holding court need not define

meaning of “life without parole” to jury).

Other Circuits:

Mollett v. Mullen, 348 F.3d 902 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that where (1) in a capital

case the prosecution placed future dangerousness at issue through the charging of a

continuing threat aggravator; (2) the jury requested an explanation of the definition of

life imprisonment; (3) the judge’s response created a false choice in that the judge

replied that matters of parole are beyond the purview of the jury or the court to

consider; and (4) there was no opportunity to cure the confusion because counsel were

not informed of the jury’s question, petitioner was entitled to habeas relief).
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See generally:

Janie Clark, Note, Putting an End to the Imposition of Death by Misperception and

Misunderstanding: Simmons v. South Carolina, 43 Kan. L. Rev. 1147 (1995)

(addressing Simmons and arguing Court should have gone further to hold that Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendments require capital sentencing jury to be informed, on request

of either prosecution or defense, of defendant’s parole status).

John Christopher Johnson, Note, When Life Means Life: Juries, Parole, and Capital

Sentencing, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 1211 (1995) (analyzing Simmons and its impact in context

of capital sentencing procedures).

Anthony Paduano & Clive A. S. Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror Misperceptions

Concerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 Colum. Hum. Rts. L.

Rev. 211 (1987) (discussing popular misperceptions regarding life imprisonment and

parole, analyzing practical and legal effects on capital sentencing).

4.5.4.1 Retroactivity of Simmons

In a five to four split, the Supreme Court ruled that Simmons presents a “new rule”

under Teague and, therefore, may not be used to disturb a death sentence which was

final at the time Simmons was decided. O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151 (1997). 

Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, argued that the Simmons rule is a bedrock

procedural element of a full and fair hearing and should be excepted from Teague.

Supreme Court:

O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151 (1997) (holding Simmons is “new rule” under

Teague).

4.5.5 Allen-type Charges

In Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988), the Supreme Court held that at least

some forms of supplemental jury charges by the trial court to secure jury

unanimity–traditional “Allen charges”–are not coercive of jury decision-making at

capital sentencing proceedings.
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Supreme Court:

Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988) (holding penalty phase jurors not coerced by

trial court’s supplemental instruction that fellow jurors’ views should be considered,

but that no juror should surrender honest belief as to the weight of the evidence; even

more of attempt to secure jury unanimity than traditional “Allen” charge because not

directed specifically to minority jurors).

Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445 (1965) (requiring supplemental charges be

considered in context and “under all the circumstances”).

Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896) (upholding as not coercive, supplemental

charge by trial court urging minority jurors to consider views of majority, and whether

own views were reasonable under circumstances; charge is attempt to secure jury

unanimity, to avoid societal costs of retrial).

Ninth Circuit:

Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding no trial error where judge

refused to inform jury at impasse that a deadlock results in a sentence of life without

parole), cert. denied sub nom., Rich v. Woodford, 528 U.S. 1092 (2000).

4.5.6 Diminishing Jury Sense of Responsibility

The prohibition against prosecutorial argument that diminishes the jury’s sense of its

sentencing responsibility applies with equal force to jury instructions.

Other Circuits:

Stewart v. Dugger, 877 F.2d 851 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding no Caldwell violation where

prosecutor and trial judge called attention to jury’s advisory role during voir dire but

entire record established jury’s role was properly explained), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 962

(1990).

Mulligan v. Kemp, 818 F.2d 746 (11th Cir.) (holding instruction that jury could

“recommend” death sentence, followed by instruction that such a verdict would require

a death sentence, adequately explained jury’s responsibility for sentence), cert. denied,

481 U.S. 1043 (1987).
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See generally:

Joseph L. Hoffman, Symposium, The Capital Jury Project: Where’s the Buck? Juror

Misperception of Sentencing Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 Ind. L.J. 1137

(1995) (addressing hypothesis that capital jurors faced with death sentencing decision

seek to avoid perception that they bear personal moral responsibility for making

decision).

Steven J. Sherman, Symposium, The Capital Jury Project: The Role of Responsibility

and How Psychology Can Inform the Law, 70 Ind. L.J. 1241 (1995) (discussing

psychological issues re: jury’s sense of responsibility in capital sentencing hearings).

4.6 Role of the Jury and Judge

4.6.1 Right of Capital Defendant to Jury Determination of Any Fact Leading to

Increase in Maximum Punishment

In Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), the Supreme Court ruled that the Sixth

Amendment does not guarantee that the death sentence be determined by a jury. The

Court stated that nothing in the constitutional safeguards against arbitrary and

discriminatory application of the death penalty requires that the sentence be imposed by

a jury and the purposes of the death penalty are not frustrated by or inconsistent with a

sentencing scheme where the imposition of the death sentence is determined by a judge. 

In Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), the Court specifically held that a sentencing

scheme in which a judge alone determines the death sentence, based on aggravating and

mitigating circumstances, is constitutional. In addition to Arizona, in the Ninth Circuit

Idaho and Montana have judge-based capital sentencing. In Nevada if the defendant

pleads guilty or waives a jury trial or if the penalty phase jury is unable to reach a

unanimous verdict, the supreme court appoints a three-judge panel to conduct the

required penalty hearing and determine a sentence.

The Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000),

however, raised issues as to the continuing validity of the Walton decision. The

Apprendi Court struck down a New Jersey hate crime statute that increased the

exposure for a second degree felony from a 10 year maximum sentence to a 20 year

maximum sentence. The statute provided for the extended term if the prosecutor
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proved to a judge (as opposed to a jury) the elements of the hate crime statute by a

preponderance of the evidence. The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment right to

due process and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, taken together, require that

any factual determination required to increase a sentence that otherwise could not be

imposed without the factual determination must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt

to a jury. 

 In Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), the Supreme Court held that

Walton and Apprendi are irreconcilable and overruled Walton to the extent that it

allowed a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance

necessary for imposition of the death penalty. The Supreme Court reasoned that

because Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as “the functional equivalent

of an element of a greater offense” (Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n. 19), the Sixth

Amendment requires that they be found by a jury. The Court held that capital

defendants are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature

conditions an increase in their maximum punishment. The Court pointed out that 29 of

38 states in which there is a death penalty generally commit sentencing decisions to

juries, and that other than Arizona, only four States commit both capital sentencing

factfinding and the ultimate sentencing decision entirely to judges: Colorado (Colo.

Rev. Stat § 16-11-103 (2001) (three-judge panel); Idaho (Idaho Code § 19-2515 (Supp.

2001)); Montana (Mont. Code § 46-18-301 (1997)); and Nebraska (Neb. Rev. Stat. §

29-2520 (1995)). The Court observed that the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the

Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding

necessary to increase a defendant’s sentence by two years, but not the factfinding

necessary to put a defendant to death. 

Supreme Court:

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that capital defendants are entitled to

jury determination of any fact on which legislature conditions increase in their

maximum punishment; also holding that Walton and Apprendi are irreconcilable and

overruling Walton to extent that it allowed sentencing judge, sitting without jury, to

find aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of death penalty).

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding, in the context of noncapital
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sentencing, that the Due Process Clause requires that any factual determination that is

required to increase a sentence that otherwise could not be imposed without the factual

determination must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury).

Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) (holding Sixth Amendment not violated by

sentencing scheme in which judge alone determines aggravating and mitigating

circumstances and imposes sentence), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, supra.

Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372 (1985) (upholding as constitutional later repealed

Alabama death penalty statute requiring that jury must fix sentence at death if

aggravating circumstances are found but then leaving the trial judge, after considering

aggravating and mitigating circumstances, total sentencing discretion).

Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984) (holding state may allocate sentencing power

as it wishes between the judge and jury since Constitution does not require a death

sentence to be imposed by a jury).

Ninth Circuit:

Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying Richmond, 948 F.2d 1473

(9th Cir. 1992), in rejecting challenge to Arizona’s judge-only sentencing scheme),

cert. denied, 507 U.S. 992 (1993).

Clark v. Ricketts, 958 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.) (applying Richmond, 948 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir.

1992), in rejecting equal protection challenge to Arizona’s sentencing scheme), cert.

denied, 506 U.S. 838 (1992).

Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting equal protection challenge

to Arizona’s judge-only sentencing scheme), rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S. 40

(1992).

See generally:

Michael Mello, Taking Caldwell v. Mississippi Seriously: The Unconstitutionality of

Capital Statutes that Divide Sentencing Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 30

B.C. L. Rev. 283 (1989) (examining constitutionality of capital sentencing schemes that

divide sentencing responsibility between judges and juries, focusing on Caldwell,

arguing–based on Caldwell’s ruling regarding diminished jury responsibility, see supra

§§ 4.4.6, 4.5.6–that when responsibility for death sentence is divided, no one bears

ultimate responsibility, and thus such schemes are unconstitutional).
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Welsh S. White, Fact-finding and the Death Penalty: The Scope of a Capital

Defendant’s Right to Jury Trial, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1 (1989) (analyzing capital

defendant’s right to jury at both guilt and sentencing phases). 

4.6.1.1 Retroactivity of Ring v. Arizona 

The majority opinion in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (see § 4.6.1), did not

discuss the retroactivity of the decision. In Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004),

the Supreme Court held that Ring does not apply retroactively to cases already final on

direct review. The Supreme Court held that the Ring decision is properly classified as

procedural, rather than substantive, because it did not alter the range of conduct or the

class of persons subject to the death penalty in Arizona, but only the method of

determining whether the defendant engaged in that conduct. The Court also held that

the rule in Ring does not fall within Teague’s exception for a watershed rule of criminal

procedure, since the Court could not confidently say that judicial factfinding seriously

diminishes accuracy.

Supreme Court:

Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (holding that Ring v. Arizona did not apply

retroactively to cases already final on direct review; also holding that (1) that the Ring

decision is properly classified as procedural, rather than substantive; and (2) the Ring

rule does not fall under the second exception under Teague for watershed rules of

criminal procedure).

State Cases:

State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 65 P.3d 915 (2003) (en banc) (holding in consolidated

cases involving all defendants sentenced to death who had matters pending on direct

appeal at the time of Ring, that changes in state’s capital sentencing statutes were

procedural in nature and that resentencing these defendants under new statutes would

not violate the ex post facto clauses of state or federal constitutions, nor did double

jeopardy principles preclude resentencing them; also holding that Sixth Amendment

principles of Apprendi/Ring do not require that Enmund-Tison findings be made by 

jury; ruling that failure to submit capital aggravating factors to jury was not structural

error mandating reversal). 
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State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386, 64 P.3d 828 (en banc) (holding that Ring v. Arizona

does not apply retroactively to those defendants whose cases have become final;

holding that new rule announced in Ring did not meet either of two exceptions to

Teague’s general rule that new rules do not apply to cases that have become final; also

holding under an Allen v. Hardy analysis the rule did not apply retroactively where (1)

the rule was not designed to improve the accuracy of criminal trials; (2) the Arizona

justice system acted in good faith in applying the rule in Walton; and (3) applying the

rule would greatly disrupt the administration of justice and noting that Arizona has

approximately 90 prisoners on death row whose cases are final), cert. dismissed, 539

U.S. 986 (2003). 

State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. 2003) (holding that Missouri statutory scheme

that permitted trial judge to make independent determination to impose sentence of

death if jury deadlocked violated defendant’s right to have jury make findings of fact

that are predicate to death eligibility and that requirements of Ring were retroactive;

applying approach of Linkletter v. Walker and Stovall v. Denno and not a Teague

analysis, court considered following factors: (1) purpose to be served by new rule; (2)

extent of reliance by law enforcement on old rule; and (3) effect on administration of

justice of retroactive application of new rule, in holding Ring to be retroactive; setting

aside sentence of death and resentencing defendant to life imprisonment without

eligibility for probation, parole or release except by act of governor).

 Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807, 59 P.3d 463 (2002) (en banc) (holding that Ring does

not apply retroactively on state collateral review of a finalized death penalty imposed

by three-judge panel; alternatively, concluding that Ring was inapplicable here because

petitioner had pleaded guilty and waived his right to a jury trial).

4.6.1.2 Advisory Jury

Prior to the Ring decision, Alabama, Delaware, Florida and Indiana had chosen to

retain a sentencing jury but only to render an advisory “recommendation” of the proper

sentence, which the court then reviewed and upon occasion may override. In Spaziano

v. Florida, the Supreme Court, finding this scheme constitutional, held that the

constitution does not require a jury recommendation to be final because the constitution

does not provide the right to a jury determination of death in the first place. However,

in Ring v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that capital defendants are entitled to a jury

determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their

maximum punishment. See § 4.6.1 above for further discussion of Ring. In response
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to Ring, the legislatures of Delaware and Indiana amended the statutes in question: (1)

the Delaware statute was amended to provide that the jury’s role at the narrowing phase

was transformed from one that was advisory into one that is now determinative as to

the existence of any statutory aggravating circumstances; and (2) the Indiana statute

was amended to provide that if the jury reaches a sentencing decision, the court “shall

sentence the defendant accordingly.”

Supreme Court:

Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504 (1995) (holding Alabama statute requiring judge to

“consider” jury verdict rather than to give it “great weight” nevertheless adequately

channels sentencer discretion so as to prevent arbitrary results; Eighth Amendment

does not require state to define weight which sentencing judge must give advisory jury

verdict).

Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527 (1992) (holding Supreme Court will not presume jury

error where general verdict at sentencing phase came after consideration of aggravating

factor that was unsupported by the evidence because the judge reviewed the jury’s

sentencing determination).

Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989) (reaffirming Spaziano, finding no

constitutional requirement that advisory jury make specific factual finding that

sufficient aggravating circumstances exist to warrant death penalty). 

Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984) (holding state law that allows judge to

override jury’s recommendation of life sentence is constitutional, no requirement that

jury recommendation be final; law does not constitute double jeopardy and does not

violate requirement of reliability in capital sentencing).

State Courts:

Ortiz v. State, 869 A.2d 285 (Del.) (holding that Delaware’s hybrid form of sentencing,

which allows the jury to find the defendant death eligible and then allows a judge to

impose the death penalty once the defendant is found to be death eligible, satisfies the

Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution as construed in Ring v. Arizona),

cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 55 (2005).

Johnson v. State, 904 So.2d 400 (Fla. 2005) (holding that Ring did not apply

retroactively in Florida).
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Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So.2d 693 (Fla.) (per curiam opinion with one justice

concurring, two justices concurring specially, and four justices concurring in result

only) (holding that petitioner was not entitled to relief in light of Ring decision, where

U.S. Supreme Court had stayed petitioner’s execution and placed petitioner’s case in

abeyance while Court decided Ring, and then summarily denied petitioner’s certiorari

petition and lifted stay without directing Florida Supreme Court to reconsider

petitioner’s case in light of Ring, and where court in Ring did not address alleged areas

of irreconcilable conflict in precedent concerning Florida’s capital sentencing statute),

cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1070 (2002); to same effect, see King v. Moore, 831 So.2d 143

(Fla) (per curiam opinion with two justices concurring, and four justices concurring in

result only), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1067 (2002).

See generally:

Michael Mello & Ruthann Robson, Judge over Jury: Florida’s Practice of Imposing

Death over Life in Capital Cases, 13 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 31 (1985) (critiquing Florida’s

death penalty statute allowing judicial override of jury recommendation of life

sentence).

Abe Muallem, Note, Harris v. Alabama: Is the Death Penalty in America Entering the

Fourth Phase?, 22 J. Legis. 85 (1996) (discussing constitutionality of Alabama death

penalty statute and analyzing Harris majority and dissenting opinions).

Jeffrey A. Wellek, Note, Eighth Amendment–Trial Court May Impose Death Sentence

Despite Jury’s Recommendation of Life Imprisonment: Spaziano v. Florida, 75 J.

Crim. L. & Criminology 813 (1984) (reviewing Spaziano and arguing Eighth

Amendment does require jury-determined sentence of life or death). 

4.6.2 Resentencing by Judge or Jury

The Eleventh Circuit has held that there is no constitutional right to a jury resentencing

on rehearing. Proffitt v. Wainwright, 756 F.2d 1500 (11th Cir. 1985). However, this

holding is affected by the decision in Ring v. Arizona, in which the Supreme Court

held that capital defendants are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the

legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment. See § 4.6.1 for further

discussion of Ring v. Arizona. 

Other Circuits:

Magill v. Dugger, 824 F.2d 879, 894 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding where resentencing was
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without a new advisory jury and trial court in imposing death specifically relied on

jury’s recommendation, errors in original penalty phase of trial impermissibly tainted

subsequent sentence). 

Funchess v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 683, 692 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding resentencing by

jury not required where initial sentencing proceeding was “free of serious error”), cert.

denied, 475 U.S. 1031 (1986).

Proffitt v. Wainwright, 756 F.2d 1500 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding because there is no

constitutional entitlement to have a jury consider the sentence in the first instance, there

is no constitutional requirement to have advisory jury as well as judge consider the

penalty on rehearing).

4.7 Aggravating Circumstances

In Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983), the Supreme Court stated that a capital

sentencing statute must “circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death

penalty” by permitting execution only where specified aggravating circumstances are

present. The capital sentencer must find at least one aggravating circumstance in order

for the defendant to be eligible for the death penalty. This can be done either at the

guilt phase of a capital trial, as in California, or as part of the penalty phase. 

The ultimate purpose of statutory aggravating circumstances is to direct and

limit sentencing discretion and minimize the risk of arbitrary and capricious infliction

of the death penalty. Statutory aggravating circumstances “narrow the class of persons

eligible for the death penalty” by providing a meaningful basis for distinguishing the

few cases in which capital punishment is imposed from the many in which it is not

appropriate. Id. at 877. According to Zant, a constitutional death penalty statute must

provide an “objective, evenhanded, and substantively rational way” for drawing this

distinction. Id. at 879. A statute that “provides for categorical narrowing at the

definition stage and for individualized determination and appellate review at the

selection stage” ordinarily will meet this requirement. Id.

In Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), the Supreme Court overruled

Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), to the extent that Walton allowed a sentencing

judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for the

imposition of the death penalty. The Supreme Court held that because Arizona’s

enumerated aggravating factors operate as “the functional equivalent of an element of a
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408 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

greater offense,” the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury. Ring, 

536 U.S. at 609. See § 4.6.1 for further discussion of Ring.

Supreme Court:

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (overruling Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639

(1990) to extent that Walton allowed a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find

an aggravating circumstance necessary for the imposition of the death penalty)

Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994) (stating sentencer must find at least one

aggravating circumstance to render death sentence, citing Lowenfield and Zant).

Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988) (stating sentencer must find at least one

aggravating factor at guilt or penalty phase in order to sentence death).

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (holding aggravating circumstances must

genuinely narrow class of persons eligible for the death penalty and justify imposition

of death penalty in given case as compared to others).

Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (ruling death sentence invalid because state

court did not give limiting construction to aggravating circumstance to “distinguish this

case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was

not”).

Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14 (1979) (holding death sentence unconstitutional where

no jury finding of an aggravating circumstance is necessary to impose death).

Ninth Circuit:

Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating function of aggravating

factors is not to give notice to potential defendants that their contemplated conduct

would put them at risk but rather to guide sentencer), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1082

(1998).

McKenzie v. Risley, 842 F.2d 1525, 1538–39 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (stating state capital

sentencing procedures must conform to two requirements: (a) must minimize the risk

of arbitrary sentencing by delimiting the classes of crimes for which death penalty is

permissible punishment and by requiring consideration of mitigating evidence; and (b)

must provide review of the death sentence by a state appellate court to ensure sentence

is not arbitrary and disproportionate to underlying crime), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 901

(1988).
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4.7.1 Statutory and Nonstatutory Aggravating Circumstances

Subject to the constitutional requirement that a death penalty statute must nonarbitrarily define the class of death-eligible murderers, states are free to determine what

aggravating factors best serve this purpose. Unlike mitigating factors, the constitution

does not require a state to treat any particular factor as an aggravator. Moreover, in

Zant v. Stephens, the Court stated that a statute identifying aggravating circumstances

need not also provide standards to govern the jury in weighing the significance of those

circumstances. Id. at 880. Finally, in Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 306–07

(1990), the Court stated that the Eighth Amendment does not require that the jury

evaluate the weight of a given aggravating circumstance to determine if the severity of

the aggravating circumstance in each particular case justifies the death sentence.

According to Zant and Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983), a state may

choose to make its statutory aggravating circumstances exclusive or it may permit the

consideration of nonstatutory aggravating factors. Any nonstatutory aggravating

circumstance considered must be relevant to either the defendant’s character or the

circumstances of the crime. Barclay, 463 U.S. at 966–67.

Supreme Court:

Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 306–07 (1990) (holding presence of

aggravating circumstances serves purpose of limiting class of death-eligible defendants;

Eighth Amendment does not require any further weighing of severity of aggravating

circumstances by jury). 

Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78 (1983) (holding despite improper reliance on

nonstatutory circumstance under state law, procedures used did not produce arbitrary

sentence in violation of Eighth Amendment).

Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (finding no constitutional violation in

sentencer’s improper consideration of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances against

state statutory prohibition of consideration of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances,

because did not infect balancing process created by state statute).

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (stating statutory and nonstatutory factors may

be considered; under Jurek v. Texas, specific standards for balancing aggravating

against mitigating circumstance are not required).
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410 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

State Statutes:

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703 (Supp. 2005) (listing statutory aggravating

circumstances).

Cal. Penal Code § 190.3 (West 1999) (listing factors sentencer should consider).

Idaho Code § 19-2515 (2004) (listing statutory aggravating circumstances).

Mont. Code Ann. §§ 46-18-302, 303 (2005) (listing non-exclusive aggravating

circumstances).

NRS § 200.033 (2005) (listing exclusive aggravating circumstances).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.095 (2005) (listing circumstances of “aggravated murder”).

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.020 (Supp. 2006) (listing circumstances of aggravated first

degree murder).

4.7.2 Constitutionality of Aggravating Circumstances: Application to Subclass Only;

Not Vague

In Tuilaepa v. California, the Supreme Court enumerated two requirements for the

constitutionality of an aggravating circumstance: first, it must apply only to a subclass

of death-eligible defendants, and second, it must not be vague.

In Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993) the Court held that an aggravating

circumstance must not be applicable to every defendant convicted of murder but rather

only to a subclass of such defendants. If an aggravating circumstance could apply to

every defendant eligible for the death penalty, then it would not serve to “genuinely

narrow” the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty as required in Zant v.

Stephens. 

To overcome a vagueness challenge, the Court has held that the aggravating

factor must channel the sentencing decision against an arbitrary and capricious result. 

Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). A statutory aggravating factor that appears

facially invalid may nevertheless be validated by more exacting jury instructions. 

Thus, federal rulings on a vagueness attack of an identical or similar aggravating
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circumstance vary among cases, particularly because federal courts afford deference to

state interpretation of state law. Moreover, in Tuilaepa v. California, the Supreme

Court announced that it has struck down few sentencing factors for vagueness,

acknowledging that a factor is constitutional if it has some “commonsense core of

meaning . . . that criminal juries should be capable of understanding.” Id. at 973

(quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 279 (1976)).

Supreme Court:

Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994) (adopting language in Jurek v. Texas, 428

U.S. 262, 279, that factor not unconstitutionally vague if has some “commonsense core

of meaning . . . that criminal juries should be capable of understanding”).

Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474 (1993) (stating “[i]f the sentencer fairly could

conclude that an aggravating circumstance applies to every defendant eligible for the

death penalty, the circumstance is constitutionally infirm”).

Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1 (1990) (holding when limiting instructions are used to

cure defect in facially vague statute, the instructions must meet specificity requirements

of Godfrey).

Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) (holding that Arizona State Supreme Court’s

narrowing definition of facially vague statutory aggravating circumstance furnishes

sufficient guidance to sentencer to satisfy Eighth Amendment and is therefore not

unconstitutionally vague), overruled in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), to the

extent that Walton allowed a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an

aggravating circumstance necessary for the imposition of the death penalty).

Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988) (stating review process for use of facially

vague statutory aggravating circumstances).

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983) (stating aggravating circumstances must

genuinely narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty).

Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (stating under post-Furman cases, death

penalty statute must not have standards so vague that they create arbitrary and

capricious sentencing).
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Ninth Circuit:

Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding that “depravity of

mind” aggravating-circumstances jury instruction was unconstitutionally vague under

Godfrey v. Georgia and that state appellate court cannot cure such error under Walton

v. Arizona, by applying a narrowing construction to the instruction to a de novo finding

of the facts when the penalty phase factfinder has been a jury; also holding that, even if

the Walton procedure were available, the Nevada Supreme Court failed to provide

“close appellate scrutiny” and therefore failed to cure the error caused by the

unconstitutionally vague jury instruction and the error was not harmless), cert. denied,

538 U.S. 994 (2003).

Knapp v. Cardwell, 667 F.2d 1253, 1260 (9th Cir.) (stating federal courts will not

review state court’s interpretation of statute unless clearly untenable and amounts to

subterfuge to avoid federal review of the unconstitutional deprivation of rights), cert.

denied, 459 U.S. 1055 (1982).

See generally:

Diale Taliaferro, Note, Constitutional Law—A Ruling on the Constitutionality of a

State’s Capital Punishment Statute Under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

Requires the Court to Base its Holding on the Relevant State’s Highest Court’s

Construction of Such Statute, Rather than its Own, 72 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 229

(1994) (analyzing limiting construction used in Arave v. Creech).

4.7.3 Specific Aggravating Circumstances

4.7.3.1 Element of Underlying Crime as Aggravating Factor

In Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988), the Supreme Court held that an element

of the underlying crime may constitutionally be used as an aggravating circumstance,

provided that the constitutionally required narrowing function was performed at the

guilt phase of the trial. In such cases, the fact that the aggravating circumstance

duplicated one of the elements of the crime did not invalidate the sentence. Id. at 245.

Supreme Court:

Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988) (upholding Louisiana capital punishment

scheme in which the intent to kill more than one person is both an element of first
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degree murder and an aggravating circumstance).

Ninth Circuit:

Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding jury properly instructed to

consider: (a) the circumstances of the crime; and (b) the presence or absence of

criminal activity including force or threats of force; instructions did not improperly lead

jury to count circumstances of crime twice).

McKenzie v. Risley, 842 F.2d 1525, 1539 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (holding “by means of

torture” may be both element of crime and aggravating factor), cert. denied, 488 U.S.

901 (1988).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Odle v. Vasquez, 754 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (holding fact that special

circumstance found by California jury is also a statutory aggravating factor does not

create presumption in favor of death penalty; invalid special circumstance was harmless

error with respect to penalty phase because there was clear record of what was being

charged and jury instructed not to count up aggravating and mitigating factors in a

mechanical fashion).

Other Circuits:

United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding double counting in

federal death penalty case where statutory and nonstatutory aggravating factors

substantially overlapped).

4.7.3.2 Unadjudicated Criminal Conduct

In a capital case, evidence of unadjudicated criminal conduct may constitute an

aggravating circumstance and be admissible at sentencing.

Ninth Circuit:

Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453, 1461 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding unadjudicated

criminal conduct may be introduced to support the aggravating factor of probable future

violence), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948 (1988).
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414 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Williams v. Vasquez, 817 F. Supp. 1443 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (holding admission of prior

criminal conduct does not violate due process), aff’d, 52 F.3d 1465 (9th Cir. 1995), and

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1124 (1996).

4.7.3.3 “Outrageously or Wantonly Vile”

Supreme Court:

Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362–64 (1988) (stating “outrageously or

wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman” aggravating circumstance too vague under

Eighth Amendment).

Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (holding Georgia Supreme Court construction

of “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman” aggravating circumstance too

broad and vague, not sufficiently limiting to satisfy Eighth Amendment).

See generally:

Paul J. Heald, Medea and the Un-Man: Literary Guidance in the Determination of

Heinousness Under Maynard v. Cartwright, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 571 (1995) (illustrating

methodology that literary texts may be applied to interpreting concrete legal problems,

bringing Dante, C.S. Lewis, and Euripides to bear on development of ethical

framework for determining what constitutes “heinous, atrocious, or cruel,” as addressed

by Supreme Court in Maynard v. Cartwright).

4.7.3.4 “Wicked or Morally Corrupt”

Supreme Court:

Barber v. Tennessee, 513 U.S. 1184 (1995) (mem.) (denying certiorari on other

grounds, but noting “wicked or morally corrupt” is “plainly impermissible” because

such a state of mind is characteristic of every murder, citing Godfrey and Maynard).

4.7.3.5 “Heinous, Cruel or Depraved”

Supreme Court:

Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40 (1992) (holding Arizona’s “especially heinous, cruel,
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or depraved” aggravating factor unconstitutionally vague at time of petitioner’s

resentencing).

Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992) (holding Florida’s “especially heinous,

wicked, evil, atrocious or cruel” aggravating circumstance is unconstitutional where no

limiting instruction or definition applied to it).

Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992) (holding Mississippi’s “especially heinous,

atrocious, or cruel” aggravating circumstance unconstitutionally vague without further

limiting instruction).

Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1 (1990) (per curiam) (holding trial court’s instruction

limiting “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel” aggravating factor insufficient to cure

vagueness; instruction nothing more than dictionary definitions, did not limit

population of those to be punished under capital statute).

Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764 (1990) (holding Arizona state court construction of

“especially heinous . . . or depraved” not unconstitutionally vague, following Walton).

Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) (holding Arizona’s “especially heinous, cruel

or depraved” aggravating circumstance constitutional because trial judge, not jury,

makes sentencing determination and Arizona courts have sufficiently narrowed the

definition of this factor to circumstances where victim suffers mental anguish or

physical abuse), overruled in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), to the extent that

Walton allowed a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating

circumstance necessary for the imposition of the death penalty).

Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988) (holding that in the absence of limiting

construction by state courts, Oklahoma statutory aggravating circumstance of

“especially heinous, atrocious or cruel” did not adequately channel jury discretion and

was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad).

Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255–56 (1976) (plurality opinion) (stating “heinous,

atrocious or cruel” aggravating circumstance provides adequate guidance to sentencing

bodies where it is interpreted as applying only to “the conscienceless or pitiless crime

which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim”).

Ninth Circuit:

Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding that “depravity

of mind” aggravating-circumstances jury instruction was unconstitutionally vague
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under Godfrey v. Georgia and that state appellate court cannot cure such error under

Walton v. Arizona, by applying a narrowing construction to the instruction to a de novo

finding of the facts when the penalty phase factfinder has been a jury; also holding that,

even if the Walton procedure were available, the Nevada Supreme Court failed to

provide “close appellate scrutiny” and therefore failed to cure the error caused by the

unconstitutionally vague jury instruction and the error was not harmless), cert. denied,

538 U.S. 994 (2003).

Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1043 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting vagueness

challenge to Arizona’s “heinous, cruel or depraved” aggravating circumstance because

petitioner’s final sentencing occurred after the Arizona Supreme Court sufficiently

construed aggravator), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 903 (1998).

Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding Arizona Supreme Court’s

narrowing construction re: “additional violence” of facially vague “heinous, cruel or

depraved” aggravating circumstance).

McKenna v. McDaniel, 65 F.3d 1483 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding jury instruction re:

Nevada “depravity of mind” aggravating factor was unconstitutionally vague), cert.

denied, 517 U.S. 1150 (1996).

Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir. 1994) (outlining procedure for federal court

in deciding whether aggravating factor violates Eighth Amendment: (1) determine

whether statutory language defining the factor is itself too vague to guide sentencer, (2)

if so, determine whether state courts have construed vague terms to provide guidance),

cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1120 (1995).

Clark v. Lewis, 1 F.3d 814 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding Arizona’s “depraved” aggravating

factor not unconstitutionally applied because court narrowed it by stating “depraved”

referred to “mental state and attitude of perpetrator as reflected in words and actions”).

Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 1986) (following Walton), cert. denied,

481 U.S. 1023 (1987).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Fetterly v. Paskett, 744 F. Supp. 966 (D. Idaho 1990) (holding narrowing instruction on

Idaho’s “heinous, atrocious and cruel” aggravating factor cures vagueness).

Beam v. Paskett, 744 F. Supp. 958 (D. Idaho 1990) (holding Idaho’s “especially

heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity” aggravating
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circumstance not impermissibly vague on its face and sufficiently narrowed by state

supreme court decisions), rev’d on other grounds, 966 F.2d 1563 (9th Cir. 1992).

See generally:

Richard N. Garnett, Note, Depravity Thrice Removed: Using the “Heinous, Cruel, or

Depraved” Factor to Aggravate Convictions of Nontriggermen Accomplices in Capital

Cases, 103 Yale L.J. 2471 (1994) (exploring peculiar confluence of constitutional

standards governing execution of nontriggermen with those controlling operation and

construction of statutory aggravating factors).

Jonathan Kennedy, Florida’s “Cold, Calculated & Premeditated Aggravating

Circumstance in Death Penalty Cases,” 17 Stetson L. Rev. 47 (1987) (reviewing “cold,

calculated and premeditated” aggravating circumstance and arguing it is

unconstitutional as applied).

Terrill Pollman, Note, Maynard v. Cartwright: Channeling Arizona’s Use of the

Heinous, Cruel, or Depraved Aggravating Circumstance to Impose the Death Penalty,

32 Ariz. L. Rev. 193 (1990) (examining history underlying guidelines Supreme Court

has established for constitutionally permissible application of “heinous, cruel or

depraved” aggravating circumstance provisions).

Richard A. Rosen, The “Especially Heinous” Aggravating Circumstance in Capital

Cases–The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 941 (1986) (examining “especially

heinous” aggravating circumstance in light of Eighth Amendment guided discretion and

Fourteenth Amendment due process, concluding that overbroad and inconsistent

application undermines limits on discretion).

4.7.3.6 “Torture, Depravity of Mind or Mutilation”

Supreme Court:

Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255–58 (1976) (holding question whether crime was

“conscienceless or pitiless crime which was unnecessarily torturous to victim” was not

unconstitutionally vague).

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (finding “torture, depravity of mind”

aggravating circumstance not unconstitutional on face).
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Ninth Circuit:

Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding torture aggravating

circumstance unconstitutionally vague without limiting construction re: intent;

instructions at guilt phase do not spill over to cure vagueness at sentencing), cert.

denied, 513 U.S. 1120 (1995).

Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1162–63 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding while

“depravity of mind” factor of Nevada’s “torture, depravity of mind or mutilation of the

victim” aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally vague, “torture” and

“mutilation” are sufficiently clear), vacated on other grounds, 500 U.S. 901 (1992).

Other Circuits:

Battle v. Delo, 19 F.3d 1547 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding “depravity of mind” aggravating

circumstance without further definition unconstitutionally vague, but “some kind of

torture or serious physical abuse” is sufficient limiting instruction).

See generally:

Ellen F. Beckman, Note, Mental Illness as an Aggravating Circumstance in Capital

Sentencing, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 291 (1989) (arguing that sentencer in capital

punishment proceeding cannot constitutionally consider aggravating circumstances

stemming from defendant’s mental illness).

4.7.3.7 “Utter Disregard for Human Life”

Supreme Court:

Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993) (reversing Ninth Circuit and holding Idaho

supreme court’s consistent limiting construction of “utter disregard for human life”

meets constitutional standards, not vague as applied).

Ninth Circuit:

Paradis v. Arave, 20 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 1994) (following Creech, reversing earlier

position that Idaho’s “utter disregard” aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally

vague as applied), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1117 (1995).

Beam v. Paskett, 3 F.3d 1301 (9th Cir. 1993) (following Creech, reversing earlier
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position that Idaho’s “utter disregard” aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally

vague as applied), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1060 (1994).

See generally:

Cheri L. Bugajski, Criminal Law–Capital Punishment–Aggravating

Circumstances–Clear and Objective Standard, 32 Duq. L. Rev. 347 (1994) (analyzing

Arave v. Creech).

Jonah J. Goldstein, Note, Arave v. Creech: Utter Disregard for the “Clear and

Objective” Standard for Death Sentencing, 71 Denv. U. L. Rev. 509 (1994) (critiquing

Arave v. Creech, arguing it misapplies Walton and undermines precedent that

aggravating circumstance must make reference to facts capable of objective

determination).

4.7.3.8 Unadjudicated Criminal Conduct

Supreme Court:

Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272 (1993) (ruling petitioner not entitled to instruction at

sentencing phase that he or she was presumed innocent of other unadjudicated crimes

that were being considered as aggravating factors by the jury).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Williams v. Vasquez, 817 F. Supp. 1443 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (holding lack of jury

instruction enumerating elements of offenses or standard of proof which must be met

before jury can consider those offenses does not render California’s aggravating factor

allowing jury to weigh unadjudicated criminal conduct unconstitutionally vague).

4.7.3.9 Protected Conduct

Supreme Court:

Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992) (holding evidence of defendant’s

membership in white racist group irrelevant to capital sentencing; no per se

constitutional barrier to admissibility of evidence re: beliefs and associations, but if

irrelevant to sentencing, then not admissible).

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (noting “factors that are constitutionally
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impermissible or totally irrelevant to sentencing process, such as race, religion, or

political affiliation of defendant”; aggravating circumstance is invalid if “it authorizes a

jury to draw adverse inference from conduct that is constitutionally protected”).

Ninth Circuit:

Beam v. Paskett, 3 F.3d 1301 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding evidence of defendant’s prior

nonviolent consensual and involuntary sexual history in support of “continuing threat”

aggravating circumstance violates Eighth Amendment because serves no retributive

purpose), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1060 (1994).

4.7.3.10 Prior Felony Convictions

Supreme Court:

Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988) (holding Eighth Amendment requires

reexamination of death sentence based in part on aggravating circumstance of prior

conviction which was later declared invalid; error extended beyond mere invalidation

of aggravating circumstances since jury was allowed to consider evidence which was

materially inaccurate).

Ninth Circuit:

Gretzler v. Stewart, 112 F.3d 992, 1004–5 (9th Cir. 1997) (approving use of prior outof-state conviction as aggravator, even though the California judge did not accurately

inform petitioner, who was facing capital murder charges in Arizona when he pled to

nine counts of murder in California, of the consequences in Arizona of his plea in

California), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1081 (1998).

Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453, 1461 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding use of prior

conviction improper if (1) prior conviction unconstitutional and (2) sentence enhanced

in reliance on this conviction), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948 (1988).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Arnett v. Ricketts, 665 F. Supp. 1437, 1444 (D. Ariz. 1987) (holding allowance of

hearsay evidence of prior convictions to prove aggravating circumstance of prior

conviction constitutes fundamental error violating defendant’s due process rights).
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4.7.3.11 Pecuniary Gain

Ninth Circuit:

LaGrand (Karl) v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir.) (finding Arizona pecuniary gain

aggravating factor not arbitrary or capricious), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 971 (1998).

Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding Arizona Supreme Court

ruling that pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance applies to one who kills in

expectation of financial gain as well as to parties involved in a murder for hire is not an

unforeseeable judicial enlargement of sentence), cert. denied, 118 U.S. 1533 (1998).

Woratzeck v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 329 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding pecuniary gain aggravating

factor does not apply to all persons convicted of robbery felony-murder; sentencer’s

discretion is adequately channeled), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1173 (1997).

4.7.3.12 Miscellaneous

Supreme Court:

Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994) (holding following sections of California

Penal Code § 190.3 not unconstitutionally vague: (1) “circumstances of crime,” (2)

“presence or absence of criminal activity involving use or attempted use of force or

violence,” (3) defendant’s age at time of crime).

Ninth Circuit:

Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1194 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding Washington’s

aggravating circumstance addressing whether murder was committed to conceal the

commission of a crime and whether the murder involved more than one victim and was

the common scheme of the defendant are not unconstitutionally vague), cert. denied,

510 U.S. 1191 (1994).

4.8 Mitigating Circumstances

4.8.1 Consideration of all Relevant Mitigating Circumstances

In the post-Furman era, the Supreme Court established that the Eighth Amendment

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment requires the individualized
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consideration of mitigating circumstances in determining a sentence of death. In

Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), and later in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104

(1982), the Court ruled that the sentencer must consider all relevant mitigating evidence

in a capital case. In Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986), the Court, quoting

Eddings, stated that the sentencer may “not be precluded from considering, as a

mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the

circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less

than death.” Thus, the capital sentencer must consider both statutory and nonstatutory

mitigating evidence. In Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (Penry I), the Court

held that the trial judge must instruct the jury that it may consider evidence presented

by the defendant of nonstatutory mitigating factors. In Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272

(1993), the Court clarified its precedent on mitigating jury instructions holding that

such instructions are constitutionally required only when supported by evidence.

In Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (Penry II), the Court held that Mr.

Penry’s second sentencing trial was constitutionally flawed because the jury

instructions were internally inconsistent. Although the additional supplemental

instruction mentioned mitigating evidence, in order to consider the evidence in

mitigation, the jury would have to disregard the instructions on answering the special

issues. 

Supreme Court:

Oregon v. Guzek, 126 S. Ct. 1226 (2006) (holding that Constitution does not prohibit

State from limiting the innocence-related evidence a capital defendant may introduce at

trial; explaining that Supreme Court had not interpreted Eighth Amendment as

providing such defendant a right to introduce at sentencing alibi evidence designed to

cast residual doubt on his guilt of basic crime of conviction). 

Smith v. Texas, 125 S. Ct. 400 (2004) (per curiam) (holding that an instruction that

directed the jury to give effect to mitigation evidence, but allowed the jury to do so

only by negating what would otherwise be affirmative responses to two special issues

relating to deliberateness and future dangerousness was constitutionally inadequate

under Penry II).

Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004) (holding that the Fifth Circuit assessed a

capital habeas petitioner’s Penry v. Lynaugh claim under an improper standard: that is,
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by applying a threshold test to the petitioner’s mitigating evidence presented at the

penalty phase of the trial that he had an IQ of 67 as to whether it was evidence of a

“uniquely severe permanent handicap” that bore a “nexus” to the crime; noting that the

“Eighth Amendment requires that the jury must be able to consider and give effect to” a

capital defendant's mitigating evidence).

Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (Penry II) (reversing death sentence because

jury had no way to meaningfully consider supplemental mitigation instruction). 

Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269 (1998) (holding that jury need not be instructed

specifically on particular statutory mitigating factors as long as jury is instructed that

all mitigating evidence should be considered).

Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272 (1993) (upholding trial court’s refusal to give instruction

in sentencing phase that jury could consider petitioner’s lack of significant prior

criminal activity because petitioner presented no evidence of prior criminal history and

Constitution does not obligate court to give mitigating circumstance instruction when

no evidence offered to support it).

Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990) (holding states are free to structure and shape

consideration of mitigating evidence in effort to achieve more rational and equitable

administration of death penalty).

Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990) (stating requirement of individualized

sentencing in capital cases is satisfied by allowing jury to consider all mitigating

evidence).

Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (Penry I) (holding Texas death penalty

statute–as applied–unconstitutional as impermissibly restricted the jury’s consideration

of Penry’s mental retardation as mitigating evidence).

Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988) (affirming death sentence on facts of this

case; however five Justices stating that Texas death penalty scheme may or does violate

Lockett because jury cannot consider all mitigating evidence).

Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) (holding death sentence unconstitutional

where advisory jury was precluded from considering nonstatutory mitigating

circumstances and trial judge also refused to do so).

Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (stating sentencer cannot be precluded

from considering as mitigating factor any evidence that defendant offers as basis for
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sentence less than death).

Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (holding sentencing court’s refusal to

consider defendant’s difficult family history as mitigating factor violates Lockett).

Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978) (holding capital statute unconstitutional because it

precluded consideration of circumstances offered in mitigation).

Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (holding capital sentencing procedure, to be

constitutional, must permit consideration, as a mitigating circumstance, of “any aspect

of the defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that

the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death”).

Ninth Circuit:

Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding California jury

instruction constitutional, allowing jury to consider “[a]ny other circumstance which

extenuates the gravity of the crime,” even though the court did not define “extenuates”

and the jury was not told which factors it could consider as extenuating), cert. denied,

525 U.S. 1159 (1999). 

Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding, where defendant and counsel

do not ask to find mitigation, Eighth Amendment does not require sentencing court to

search record to address specifically less-than-substantial unenumerated mitigating

factors neither offered nor pointed out as mitigation at time of sentencing), cert. denied,

522 U.S. 881 (1997).

Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that failure to allow jury to hear

key state witness’ polygraph results violates defendant’s Eighth Amendment right to

have all relevant mitigating evidence admitted at sentencing), cert. denied, 519 U.S.

1142 (1997).

Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding instructions stating whether

there were sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency and for the jury to

consider “any relevant factors” did not preclude jury from giving full effect to

mitigating evidence), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1191 (1994).

Creech v. Arave, 928 F.2d 1481, 1489 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding defendant must be

permitted to present new mitigating evidence on resentencing), rev’d on other grounds,

507 U.S. 463 (1993).
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Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding court may not refuse to

consider evidence which is not “sufficiently substantial to call for leniency”).

McKenzie v. Risley, 842 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (holding Montana statute does

not list mitigating circumstances and does not set out procedure for considering them;

no constitutional violation because trial judge gave defendant full opportunity to

present mitigating evidence), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 901 (1988).

State Statutes:

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703 (Supp. 2005) (listing mitigating factors).

Cal. Penal Code § 190.3 (West 1999) (listing factors sentencer should consider).

Idaho Code §§ 18-4505, 19-2515 (2004) (addressing mitigating circumstances).

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-304 (2005) (listing mitigating circumstances).

NRS § 200.035 (2005) (listing mitigating circumstances).

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150 (2005) (providing nonexclusive list of mitigating factors).

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.070 (2002) (listing factors to consider for leniency in capital

sentencing).

See generally:

Craig Haney, Symposium, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and

the Logic of Mitigation, 35 Santa Clara L. Rev. 547 (1995) (addressing societal image

and stereotypes of capital criminals and commenting on role of mitigation at

sentencing).

Mary Kay Sicola & Richard R. Shreves, Jury Consideration of Mitigating Evidence: A

Reviewed Challenge to the Texas Death Penalty Statute, 15 Am. J. Crim. L. 55 (1988)

(addressing infirmities in Texas death penalty procedure resulting from failure to

effectively guide jury in considering and acting upon mitigating evidence during

sentencing).

Joshua N. Sondheimer, Note, A Continuing Source of Aggravation: The Improper

Consideration of Mitigating Factors in Death Penalty Sentencing, 41 Hastings L.J. 409

(1990) (discussing “double-edged sword” nature of mitigating factors that can also
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426 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

weigh against defendant, such as those indicating future dangerousness, arguing that

modern death penalty statutes are thus just as arbitrary and irrational as pre-Furman

era). 

Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided

Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA. L. Rev. 1147 (1991) (examining changes

in Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence since Lockett and addressing conflict

between guided discretion of post-Furman cases and full mitigation under Lockett).

Jonathan P. Tomes, Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don’t: The Use of Mitigation

Experts in Death Penalty Legislation, 24 Am. J. Crim. L. 359 (1997) (reviewing

practical use and impact of using mitigation experts from practitioner’s perspective).

4.8.2 Scope of Mitigating Factors

Since the capital sentencer must consider “any” relevant mitigating factors, no finite list

of mitigating factors exists. However, there are several common categories of

mitigating circumstances which the Supreme Court and the circuits have specifically

discussed.

4.8.2.1 Minimal Participation in Crime

Supreme Court:

Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (involving minimal participation in crime as

mitigating factor).

Ninth Circuit:

Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding refusal of trial court to admit at

penalty phase circumstantial evidence that petitioner’s co-defendant and a third party,

rather than petitioner, might have planned the murder in question was constitutional

error), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 951 (1993).
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4.8.2.2 Youth/Family History

Supreme Court:

Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993) (holding Texas special issues allowed adequate

consideration of defendant’s youth because ample room in future dangerousness

assessment for juror to take into account youth as mitigating factor).

Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (holding sentencing court’s refusal to

consider defendant’s difficult family history as mitigating factor violates Lockett).

4.8.2.3 Good Prison Behavior/ Potential for Rehabilitation

Supreme Court:

Truesdale v. Aiken, 480 U.S. 527 (1987) (holding Skipper fully retroactive).

Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding evidence that defendant has

adjusted well to incarceration is relevant mitigation evidence, and exclusion violates

Lockett).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

McClain v. Calderon, No. CV 89-3061 JGD, 1995 WL 769176 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22,

1995) (holding trial judge should have allowed defense attorneys to introduce

psychological evidence to support claim that defendant would not be threat to prison

employees if sentenced to life), aff’d, 134 F.3d 1383 (9th Cir.), and cert. denied, 545

U.S. 942 (1998).

4.8.2.4 Mental Retardation

In Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), the Supreme Court held that mental

retardation may be considered as a mitigating factor, but that executing mentally

retarded persons was not categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. However,

more recently the Court held in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), that executing

the mentally retarded violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and

unusual punishment. The Court recognized that not all people who claim to be

mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded
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428 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

offenders about whom there is a national consensus against execution. The Court left to

the states “the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional

restriction upon its execution of sentences.” Id. at 317. For further discussion of Atkins,

see § 1.6.

Supreme Court:

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that executing the mentally retarded

violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).

Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (holding mental retardation may be considered

mitigating factor).

Ninth Circuit:

Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354, 1383 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding, while Zant suggests

mental illness may be mitigating, evidence regarding petitioner’s personality disorder

need not be identified as mitigating), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1051 (1990).

4.8.2.5 Lack of Significant Prior Criminal Activity/Violence

Supreme Court:

Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272 (1993) (involving mitigating factor of lack of prior

criminal activity).

Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) (involving lack of prior criminal activity as

mitigating factor).

4.8.2.6 Coercion

Other Circuits:

Glass v. Butler, 820 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding, on facts of case, “coercion”

could be considered mitigating factor).
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4.8.2.7 Good Character

Other Circuits:

Jernigan v. Collins, 980 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding Texas sentencing statute did

not prevent jury from giving mitigating effect to petitioner’s evidence of good

character), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 978 (1993).

4.8.2.8 “Catch All”

Supreme Court:

Brown v. Payton, 125 S. Ct. 1432 (2005) (ruling that the Ninth Circuit exceeded the

limits on federal habeas review imposed by § 2254(d) in concluding that the California

Supreme Court had unreasonably applied Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990), in

holding that the California “factor (k)” catchall mitigating factor was not

unconstitutionally ambiguous as applied in petitioner’s case; holding that it could not

be said that the California Supreme Court acted unreasonably in reading Boyde as

establishing that factor (k)’s text was broad enough to accommodate petitioner’s postcrime mitigating evidence of religious conversion and good behavior in prison where

the factor directed consideration of any circumstance that might excuse the crime; also

holding that even assuming that the state supreme court was incorrect in concluding

that the prosecutor’s argument did not mislead the jury into believing it could not

consider the petitioner’s post-crime mitigation evidence, that court’s conclusion was

not unreasonable and was just the type of decision that AEDPA shields on habeas

review).

Ninth Circuit:

Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560 (9th Cir.) (holding as to a pre-AEDPA capital habeas

petition, that petitioner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were not violated

by the prosecutor’s closing argument in the penalty phase about “factor (k),” the last

factor in mitigation under California law that covers “any other circumstance which

extenuates the gravity of the crime,” because there was no reasonable possibility that

the jury was misled to believe it could not consider petitioner’s background, including

childhood abuse, in mitigation), as amended on denial of reh’g, 430 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir.

2005).

Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2005) (on remand from the United States

Supreme Court for further consideration in light of Brown v. Payton, 125 S. Ct. 1432

(2005), the panel reaffirmed its previous opinion in a pre-AEDPA capital habeas case,
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affirming the district court’s denial of habeas relief as to the guilt phase of trial and

reversing the denial of relief as to the penalty phase; distinguishing Payton on the

ground that Payton held that under the standards of AEDPA, the state court was not

objectively unreasonable in concluding that the use of California’s “factor (k),”

instructing the jury in the penalty phase to consider “any other circumstance which

extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime,”

did not unconstitutionally prevent the jury from considering relevant post-crime

mitigating evidence; also holding that here the factor (k) instruction resulted in a

reasonable probability that the jury did not consider petitioner’s principal mitigating

evidence), petition for cert. filed (Oct. 12, 2005) (No. 05-493).

Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453, 1464 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding Washington

statute’s sentencing factor permitting consideration of “any relevant factors” was

properly limited by state courts to mitigating factors), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948

(1988).

4.8.2.9 Reliable Hearsay Evidence

Supreme Court:

Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (holding exclusion of evidence at sentencing

phase based on state hearsay rule is unconstitutional).

4.8.2.10 Polygraph Evidence

Ninth Circuit:

Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that Court need not determine

whether exclusion of polygraph evidence was error, since there was no showing of

substantial or injurious effect).

4.8.3 Improper Mitigating Evidence

4.8.3.1 Irrelevant Evidence

Any mitigating evidence that is not relevant to guilt or sentencing does not satisfy the

Lockett rule and need not be admitted or considered in determining a sentence of death.
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Supreme Court:

Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (rejecting state’s argument that evidence

of future adaptability to prison life is irrelevant).

Other Circuits:

Glass v. Butler, 820 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding trial court need not allow a

defendant to introduce evidence not relevant to his or her character, prior record or the

circumstances of offense; evidence of church’s opposition to death penalty not

relevant).

Johnson v. Thigpen, 806 F.2d 1243, 1250–51 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding purported

irrationality of Mississippi’s definition of capital murder, a description of the execution,

and the issue of whether imposing a sentence of death is morally equivalent to killing

not relevant to defendant’s character or offense), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987).

Brogdon v. Blackburn, 790 F.2d 1164, 1169 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding co-defendant’s

life sentence not relevant to defendant’s character or offense), cert. denied, 481 U.S.

1042 (1987).

Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918, 936 (11th Cir.) (holding failure to admit evidence

on deterrent effect of death penalty does not violate Lockett because it does not help

sentencer focus on unique characteristics of the defendant), modified, 781 F.2d 185

(11th Cir. 1985), and cert. denied, 479 U.S. 909 (1986).

State Courts:

People v. Ochoa, 19 Cal. 4th 353, 966 P.2d 442, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 408 (holding jury

may not consider impact of death sentence on defendant’s family, but family members

may offer testimony of the impact of an execution on them if by so doing they

illuminate some positive quality of the defendant’s background or character), cert.

denied, 528 U.S. 862 (1999).

4.8.3.2 Residual Doubt of Defendant’s Guilt

In order to qualify for Lockett-Eddings status of admission and consideration at

sentencing, mitigating evidence must be not only relevant but also related to

defendant’s character, record, or circumstances of the offense. The Supreme Court, in

Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988), held that the jury’s residual doubt about a
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defendant’s guilt was not a proper Lockett-Eddings mitigating factor because such

doubt is not of the defendant’s “character,” “record,” or “circumstances of the offense.”

Supreme Court:

Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988) (holding no constitutional right to have

residual doubt re: guilt of defendant considered as a mitigating factor at sentencing

because not related to defendant’s character, record, or circumstances of offense).

Ninth Circuit:

Woratzeck v. Ricketts, 820 F.2d 1450, 1457 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding once guilt has been

established beyond a reasonable doubt, a doubt about defendant’s guilt is not relevant

and may be excluded from an evaluation of mitigating factors), vacated on other

grounds, 486 U.S. 1051 (1988) (vacated for reconsideration in light of Maynard v.

Cartwright).

4.8.3.3 Sympathy and Passion

In California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987), the Supreme Court upheld an instruction

that the jury “must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion,

prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling.” The Court reasoned that the instruction

did not violate Lockett because it only barred feelings of sympathy arising from outside

the evidence presented. Thus, to the extent that mitigating sympathy is unrelated to the

evidence presented, it is constitutionally prohibited.

Supreme Court:

California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987) (holding jury instruction that jurors “must

not be swayed by mere sympathy” or by public sentiment does not violate Eighth

Amendment requirement under Lockett that sentencer be allowed to consider any

relevant mitigating evidence about the crime or the defendant).

4.8.3.3.1 Retroactivity of California v. Brown

In Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990), the Supreme Court stated that the decision in

California v. Brown created a new rule because its reasoning was not dictated by

Lockett or Eddings. Therefore, under Teague, California v. Brown is not retroactively
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applied to cases which became final before it was decided.

Supreme Court:

Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990) (stating Brown not retroactively applicable under

Teague).

4.8.4 Burden of Persuasion

In Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), the Supreme Court held that a state may

require the defendant to bear the risk of nonpersuasion in the sentencing phase. So

long as the method of allocating burdens of proof does not lessen the state’s burden to

prove the existence of aggravating circumstances, a defendant’s constitutional rights

are not violated by placing on him or her the burden of proving, by a preponderance of

the evidence, mitigating circumstances “sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” In

Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit ruled that while

the “sufficiently substantial to call for leniency” standard may be used in the weighing

process under Walton, it may not be used to restrict the consideration of relevant

mitigating evidence. Moreover, in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), the Court

held that a state may not instruct the jury that it may consider only those mitigating

circumstances which all jurors found unanimously. Such an instruction violates the

requirement of Lockett that the sentencer may not be precluded from considering any

relevant mitigating evidence.

Supreme Court:

Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) (holding defendant may be given burden of

proving mitigating circumstances “sufficiently substantial to call for leniency”).

McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990) (holding Mills violated where capital

sentencing procedure precludes jurors from considering mitigating evidence unless all

jurors agree that the evidence is a mitigating factor).

Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) (vacating death sentence for Lockett violation

where jurors may have believed they were precluded from considering any mitigating

evidence unless they agreed unanimously on the existence of a particular
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circumstance).

Ninth Circuit:

Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1992) (following Walton in rejecting claim

that Arizona death penalty statute should require state to show absence of mitigating

circumstances beyond reasonable doubt), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 992 (1993).

Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir.1992) (following Walton in rejecting claim

that death penalty statute illegitimately shifts burden of proof by requiring defendant to

establish mitigating circumstances), rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S. 40 (1992).

Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding Montana Supreme Court

improperly used “sufficiently substantial to call for leniency” standard as a qualifier to

exclude consideration of evidence which did not excuse defendant’s conduct; however,

that standard may be used in the weighing process under Walton).

See generally:

Miranda B. Strassmann, Note, Mills v. Maryland: The Supreme Court Guarantees the

Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances Pursuant to Lockett v. Ohio, 38 Cath. U. L.

Rev. 907 (1989) (reviewing Mills in light of precedent).

Victor L. Streib, Symposium: Death Penalty for Battered Women, 20 Fla. St. U. L.

Rev. 163 (1992) (proposing battery be considered mitigating factor and in severe cases

to exclude battered women from death penalty altogether).

4.8.4.1 Retroactivity of Mills v. Maryland

In Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406 (2004), the Supreme Court stated that the decision in

Mills v. Maryland (see § 4.8.4) created a new rule because its reasoning was not

dictated by Lockett. The Court held that the Mills v. Maryland rule did not fall under

either Teague exception and would not be retroactively applied to cases that became

final before it was decided.

Supreme Court:

Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406 (2004) (holding that Mills was not retroactively
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applicable under either Teague exception).

4.9 Balancing Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

4.9.1 Weighing or Nonweighing by Sentencing Body

While all death penalty statutes require a finding of at least one aggravating

circumstance for a defendant to be eligible for the death penalty, the treatment of

aggravating circumstances by the sentencer depends on whether state law requires the

sentencer to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In nonweighing

states, if the jury finds the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance, then it

has the option to impose the death penalty. In deciding whether to impose this penalty,

the jury is not instructed to consider the aggravating circumstances in any particular

fashion. The Supreme Court in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983), approved this

nonweighing approach holding that a statute identifying aggravating circumstances

need not provide standards to govern the jury in weighing the significance of those

circumstances. In lieu of such standards, however, the Court stated that a statute must

provide for appellate review of “the death sentence to determine whether it was

arbitrary, excessive, or disproportionate.” Id. at 879.

In weighing states, on the other hand, the statute specifically instructs the

sentencing jury to weigh certain enumerated aggravating factors against any mitigating

factors. If the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors, then the jury is not

entitled to impose the death penalty. If the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating

factors, the jury then has the option–but is not required–to impose a death sentence. In

Brown v. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. 884 (2006), the Supreme Court held that it would simplify

the sentence-invalidating factors it had previously applied to nonweighing states and

would be guided by the following rule: “An invalidated sentencing factor (whether an

eligibility factor or not) will render the sentence unconstitutional by reason of its

adding an improper element to the aggravation scale in the weighing process unless one

of the other sentencing factors enables the sentencer to give aggravating weight to the

same facts and circumstances.” Id. at 892. The Court also said that the “circumstances

of the crime factor” has the effect of rendering all the specified sentencing factors
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nonexclusive thus “causing California to be (in our prior terminology) a non-weighing

State.” Id. at 893.

Supreme Court:

Brown v. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. 884 (2006) (holding an invalidated sentencing factor

(whether an eligibility factor or not) will render the sentence unconstitutional by reason

of its adding an improper element to the aggravation scale in the weighing process

unless one of the other sentencing factors enables the sentencer to give aggravating

weight to the same facts and circumstances”; also holding that, despite the fact that the

California Supreme Court invalidated two special circumstances on direct appeal, there

was no constitutional error in the jury’s consideration of the invalid eligibility factors in

the weighing process because all the facts necessary to establish the “heinous,

atrocious, or cruel” and burglary-murder eligibility factors were also properly adduced

as aggravating facts bearing upon the “circumstances of the crime” sentencing factor).

 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (holding, based on Jurek v. Texas, that

standards for balancing aggravating against mitigating circumstances not required, but

appellate review by state needed in the alternative).

Ninth Circuit:

Jeffries v. Blodgett, 974 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding jury not required during

penalty phase to specify mitigating factors it considered and how those factors weighed

against aggravating factors).

Clark v. Ricketts, 958 F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir.) (holding petitioner’s due process rights

were not denied when state court sentencing judge did not identify and explain each

mitigating factor where it was clear from record that sentencing court considered all

statutory and nonstatutory mitigating evidence before imposing death sentence), cert.

denied, 506 U.S. 838 (1992).

Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding trial court must consider

the mitigating factors as a whole to determine if they are “sufficiently substantial to call

for leniency”).

See generally:

Marcia A. Widder, Comment, Hanging Life in the Balance: The Supreme Court and the

Metaphor of Weighing in the Penalty Phase of the Capital Trial, 68 Tul. L. Rev. 1341
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(1994) (exploring Supreme Court reliance on weighing as doctrine governing appellate

review of capital sentencing, arguing doctrine is misplaced and distorting).

4.9.1.1 One Invalid/Weak Aggravating Circumstance

In a nonweighing state, a death sentence based upon an aggravating circumstance found

to be invalid or insufficient alone to support a death sentence need not be set aside as

long as at least one other aggravating circumstance supporting the sentence is valid. In

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983), the Supreme Court adopted the Georgia

Supreme Court’s determination that the invalid aggravating circumstance had only an

“inconsequential” impact on the sentencing. The Court’s holding, however, was also

based on the state supreme court’s mandatory appellate review of the sentence “to

avoid arbitrariness and to assure proportionality.” Zant at 890. This review allows the

state appellate court to determine whether the elimination of an improperly considered

aggravating circumstance possibly could have affected the sentence imposed.

In Tuggle v. Netherland, 516 U.S. 10 (1995), the Court clarified that Zant

does not stand for the proposition that the existence of one valid aggravator always

excuses a constitutional error, regardless of the reasons invalidating the other

aggravating factor(s). The Tuggle Court reversed a capital sentence based on an Ake

error, even though the error did not affect the validity of the “vileness” aggravating

circumstance.

In a weighing state, some sort of reweighing process must occur before a

reviewing court may affirm a death sentence based in part on an invalid aggravating

circumstance–even where the sentence is also based on additional aggravating

circumstances which are valid. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990). The

Supreme Court reiterated this rule in Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992), stating

that in a weighing state, where the jury must weigh all aggravating factors against

mitigating factors, the state appellate court must determine what the sentencer would

have done absent the invalid aggravating factor. The court may not simply uphold the

sentence because the jury found other valid aggravating factors. Thus, in a weighing

state, when an aggravating factor is invalidated, the appellate court may, short of

remanding for resentencing, either reweigh the remaining factors or determine whether

the sentencer’s consideration of the invalid factor was harmless error.
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In Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147 (1986), the Supreme Court held that a

trial judge’s rejection of an aggravating circumstance does not constitute an “acquittal”

of that circumstance for double jeopardy purposes. A reviewing or resentencing court

may still consider such circumstance.

In Singletary v. Duest, 507 U.S. 1048 (1993), the Court held that the Brecht

standard applies to federal habeas review of a capital sentence involving an invalid

aggravating factor. Therefore, on remand, the Eleventh Circuit was required to

determine whether the error had a “substantial or injurious effect” on the jury’s verdict.

Supreme Court:

Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518 (1997) (holding that rule announced in Espinosa v.

Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992)–if a weighing state requires the sentencing trial judge to

give deference to a jury’s advisory recommendation, neither the judge nor the jury is

constitutionally permitted to weigh invalid aggravating circumstances–established a

new rule of procedure which would not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral

review). 

Tuggle v. Netherland, 516 U.S. 10 (1995) (holding Fourth Circuit erred in interpreting

Zant to mean that in nonweighing states a death sentence may be upheld on basis of one

valid aggravating circumstance regardless of the reasons other aggravating factors are

found invalid; one valid aggravator does not always excuse constitutional error in

admission or exclusion of evidence).

Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994) (upholding appellate court’s reweighing of

three untainted aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances).

Singletary v. Duest, 507 U.S. 1048 (1993) (remanding Eleventh Circuit vacating of

death sentence for invalid aggravating circumstance to review in light of Brecht).

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (holding, where state court determined

prosecutor’s comments regarding defendant’s silence after being given Miranda

warnings was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, federal district court need only

determine whether error had “substantial or injurious effect” on jury’s verdict”).

Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40 (1992) (holding reweighing after jury’s consideration

of invalid aggravating factor had not occurred where it was clear from state supreme

court opinion that majority of court had not reweighed evidence in light of the invalid

factor).
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Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992) (holding in a state such as Florida, where

both jury and judge weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances, neither

constitutionally permitted to weigh invalid aggravating circumstances).

Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527 (1992) (holding weighing of invalid aggravating factor

was not cured by Florida Supreme Court where Court did not discuss whether error was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; stating it is Eighth Amendment violation to weigh

unconstitutional aggravating factor despite weighing other constitutional aggravating

factors).

Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992) (holding death sentence invalid where jury

weighs unconstitutional aggravating circumstance against mitigating circumstance even

though jury found two other valid aggravating circumstances; in order for a state

appellate court to affirm a death sentence after sentencer was instructed to consider an

invalid aggravating factor, court, to comply with Eighth Amendment, must determine

what the sentencer would have done absent the factor).

Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991) (reversing death sentence where state supreme

court had incorrectly determined that trial court found no mitigating circumstances after

invalidating two of the trial court’s aggravating factors in sentencing defendant to death

and had consequently failed to follow required procedure of either reweighing

aggravating and mitigating factors or applying harmless error analysis).

Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990) (holding, if it finds an aggravating factor

unconstitutional, appellate court may re-weigh aggravating and mitigating factors to

determine if death sentence still warranted; no constitutional prohibition against

reweighing by court because no constitutional requirement that sentence of death be

determined by a jury). 

Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147 (1986) (holding double jeopardy does not bar

consideration of an aggravating factor on review or retrial that was rejected by the

original sentencing court).

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (holding death sentence not unconstitutional

where one of several statutory aggravating circumstances found by jury is held to be

invalid where invalidity did not involve any constitutionally protected behavior and

evidence submitted in support of invalid circumstance was otherwise properly before

jury and not misleading or inaccurate).
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440 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Ninth Circuit:

Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.) (holding Arizona Supreme Court properly

reweighed aggravating and mitigating circumstances after striking an aggravating

factor), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 845 (1999).

Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding Arizona Supreme Court

properly reweighed aggravating and mitigating circumstances after striking an

aggravating factor), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1082 (1998).

Jeffers v. Lewis, 38 F.3d 411 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding Arizona Supreme Court’s

independent review of record and explanation of its reweighing process satisfied

requirements of Clemons and Stringer, and because it performed such reweighing, it

thus was not required to remand the case under federal law; finding no clear

requirement under federal or Arizona law that sentencer must itemize and discuss every

piece of mitigating evidence in opinion), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1071 (1995).

Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir. 1994) (vacating death sentence because error

of invalid aggravating circumstance was not harmless, and no reweighing possible

because other special circumstance invalidated by California Supreme Court), cert.

denied, 513 U.S. 1120 (1995).

Jeffers v. Lewis, 5 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 1993) (remanding case where, after striking

aggravating factors, state supreme court failed to properly reweigh remaining

aggravating and mitigating circumstances).

Clark v. Lewis, 1 F.3d 814 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding Arizona supreme court on direct

appeal properly narrowed “depraved” aggravating factor and reweighed mitigating and

remaining two aggravating factors).

Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding unconstitutionality of one

aggravating circumstance harmless since jury found two other aggravating

circumstances), vacated on other grounds, 500 U.S. 901 (1992).

Beam v. Paskett, 966 F.2d 1563 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding death sentence invalid where

one statutory aggravating circumstance was invalid and non-statutory aggravating

circumstance invalid despite other valid statutory aggravating circumstances), vacated,

507 U.S. 1027 (1993) (and remanded in light of Supreme Court’s finding statutory

aggravating circumstance not invalid), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1060 (1994).

Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453, 1461 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding because
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petitioner did not show a reasonable probability that his sentence was enhanced by the

allegedly unconstitutional aggravating factor and jury found other aggravating factors,

death sentence appropriate), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948 (1988).

Neuschafer v. Whitley, 816 F.2d 1390, 1393 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding death sentence

valid where one aggravating circumstance held unconstitutional but jury found other

aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances; further, if at least one

valid aggravating circumstance present, court need not consider whether other

aggravating circumstances are valid).

See generally:

Stephen Hornbuckle, Note, Capital Sentencing Procedure: A Lethal Oddity in the

Supreme Court’s Case Law, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 441 (1994) (examining Supreme Court’s

differing treatment of weighing and nonweighing states, arguing distinction should not

determine method of reassessing death sentence; focusing on treatment of review of

sentences based on invalid aggravating circumstance(s)).

4.9.2 Mandatory Presumption

An instruction that the jury “shall” impose the death sentence if it finds that the

aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances does not create an

improper “mandatory death sentence.” According to Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494

U.S. 299 (1990), the requirement of individualized sentencing is satisfied as long as the

jury is permitted to consider all relevant mitigating evidence.

Supreme Court:

Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) (holding instruction that court shall impose

death sentence if it finds one or more aggravating circumstances and no mitigating

circumstances sufficient to call for leniency is proper under Blystone and Boyde).

Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990) (instruction that, if aggravating circumstances

outweigh mitigating circumstances jury “shall impose” the death sentence, is proper

under Blystone).

Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990) (holding instruction that verdict must be

death if jury finds one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances or if

aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances is constitutional since
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jury is permitted to consider all mitigating evidence).

Ninth Circuit:

Campbell v. Blodgett, 978 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir.) (following Blystone, upholding

Washington death penalty statute as not creating a mandatory death penalty formula),

reh’g granted, 978 F.2d 519 (1992).

Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1990) (following Walton, upholding “shall

impose” language in Arizona death penalty statute), rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S.

40 (1992).

4.9.3 Federal Review of State Law Errors

Federal courts do not grant relief for state law errors. Thus, federal habeas review of a

state’s application of its own aggravating circumstances is limited to a due process

analysis–whether the error rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair. The

standard for federal habeas review, therefore, is not de novo but rather that of the

“rational factfinder.” Additionally, in Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 781 (1990), the

Court stated that the federal habeas court must view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution to determine whether “any rational trier of fact” could have

found the aggravating circumstance “beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

In Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), the Court determined that the

standard for a federal habeas court to apply is whether a constitutional trial error was

harmless. A federal district court need only determine whether the error had a

“substantial or injurious effect” on the jury’s verdict. This standard is much less

onerous than the traditional “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. However,

in O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995), the Court elaborated that the petitioner

does not carry any burden of proof in this inquiry. When a federal judge is in “grave

doubt” about the likely effect of an error on the jury’s verdict, the judge should treat it

as having a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict.

Supreme Court:

O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995) (holding where federal habeas court finds a
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constitutional trial error and is in “grave doubt” about whether the error had “a

substantial or injurious effect” on jury’s verdict, the error is not harmless, and

petitioner must win).

Singletary v. Duest, 507 U.S. 1048 (1993) (vacating death sentence which relied on

invalid aggravating circumstance, and remanding in light of Brecht).

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (holding, where state court determined

prosecutor’s comments re: defendant’s silence after being given Miranda warnings was

harmless beyond reasonable doubt, federal district court need only determine whether

error had “substantial or injurious effect” on jury’s verdict).

Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764 (1990) (holding the standard of review of a state’s

application of a constitutionally narrowed aggravating factor is the “rational factfinder”

standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), not de novo review).

Ninth Circuit:

Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.) (applying Jeffers, denying habeas relief),

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 845 (1999).

Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying Jeffers, denying habeas

relief), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1082 (1998).

Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996) (regarding petitioner’s attack on

the presumption of correctness of state court factual findings, denying relief stating

petitioner cannot transform a state law issue into a federal claim merely by alleging a

due process violation), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 881 (1997).

Campbell v. Blodgett, 978 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir.) (following Jeffers in limiting standard

of review of state sentencing), reh’g granted, 978 F.2d 519 (1992).

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5. FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY

5.1 Federal Death Penalty Crimes

Before 1988, there was a limited number of federal death penalty crimes and relatively

little procedural guidance for processing these cases or for carrying out a federal death

sentence. Then, beginning in 1988 with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act and then in 1994

with the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, there was a significantly

increased possibility of charging federal defendants with the death penalty. The AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1988, 21 U.S.C. § 848(e), created capital punishment for drugrelated killings. The 1994 Act created several new federal capital offenses and added

procedural clarifications to executing these sentences. Prior to the 1994 Act, some

federal courts had found some federal death penalty statutes unconstitutionally arbitrary

under Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The 1994 Act attempted to remedy

this by including several sections on procedure, statutory aggravating and mitigating

circumstances, and appointment of counsel.

Supreme Court:

Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996) (upholding constitutionality of military

death penalty; President’s prescription of aggravating factors does not violate

separation of powers).

Ninth Circuit:

United States v. Cheely, 36 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(d)

and 1716(a), providing federal death penalty for mail bombing, unconstitutionally

allow disparate and arbitrary sentencing, do not “genuinely narrow class of persons

eligible for death penalty,” and thus violate Furman v. Georgia).

Other Circuits:

United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49 (2nd Cir. 2002) (holding that the Federal Death

Penalty Act does not violate the Due Process Clause; also holding, relying on Herrera

v. Collins (see § 6.3.2.5), that the district court erred in recognizing a fundamental right

of an innocent person not to be deprived, by execution, of the opportunity to
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demonstrate that person’s actual innocence), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1051 (2003). 

United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1350 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that 

18 U.S.C. § 3596 is a constitutional delegation of federal power), cert. denied, 529 U.S.

1022 (2000).

United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308 (5th Cir) (upholding constitutionality of the

Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 829 (1999).

United States v. Moore, 149 F.3d 773, 778 n.2 (8th Cir.) (finding nothing

unconstitutionally vague in § 848(e)), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1030 (1998).

United States v. Walker, 142 F.3d 103 (2d Cir.) (finding § 848(e) a valid exercise of

Congress under the Commerce Clause), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 896 (1998).

United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding constitutionality of §

848; Congress’ power to legislate means of executing death sentence not exclusive

power of executive branch), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1253 (1997). 

United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding statutory and

nonstatutory aggravating factors in § 848(e) prosecution constitutionally valid), cert.

denied, 520 U.S. 1213 (1997).

United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073 (11th Cir. 1993) (affirming conviction and

death sentence; holding that the sentencing procedures under 21 U.S.C. § 848 do not

violate the Eighth Amendment), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1227 (1994).

United States v. Woolard, 981 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding federal statute

providing for death penalty for first degree murder of various federal employees

unconstitutional because does not require weighing of mitigating evidence).

United States v. Villareal, 963 F.2d 725 (5th Cir.) (holding § 848(e) constitutional;

states a crime, not merely a sentencing provision), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 927 (1992).

District Courts in Other Circuits:

United States v. Holloway, 29 F. Supp. 2d 435 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (denying defendant’s

motion to dismiss request for death penalty and request for discovery from Department

of Justice because defendant failed to present “clear evidence” of discriminatory effect

and intent).
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United States v. Beckford, 966 F. Supp. 1415 (E.D. Va. 1997) (holding that 21 U.S.C.

848(e)(1)(A) is neither unconstitutional on its face nor as applied since jury could

convict on drug conspiracy charge without convicting on murder charge).

United States v. Boyd, 931 F. Supp. 968 (D.R.I. 1996) (holding Department of Justice

death penalty authorization procedure not critical stage of prosecution and thus denial

of defendant’s requested discovery did not violate Sixth Amendment).

Nichols v. Reno, 931 F. Supp. 748 (D. Colo. 1996) (holding Attorney General’s public

statements in aftermath of Oklahoma City bombing that prosecutors would seek death

penalty was insufficient charge of bias to support constitutional challenge to notice;

death penalty protocol in U.S. Attorney’s Manual does not provide defendant with

judicially enforceable substantive or procedural rights), aff’d, 124 F.3d 1376 (10th Cir.

1997).

United States v. Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. 1525 (D. Kan. 1996) (upholding constitutionality

of 18 U.S.C. § 924; holding statutory definition of capital offense under § 924

constitutional; statutory aggravating factors constitutional; federal death penalty statute

provided meaningful review, proportionality review not required), aff’d, 155 F.3d 1219

(10th Cir. 1998), and cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1167 (1999).

Walker v. Reno, 925 F. Supp. 124 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding Attorney General’s

determination to seek death penalty is action committed to agency discretion as mater

of law; Attorney General Protocol is improper and insufficient source from which

district court can draw law and apply it to review Attorney General’s determination).

United States v. DesAnges, 921 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Va. 1996) (holding § 848 does not

unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to executive branch by allowing

prosecutors to identify nonstatutory aggravating factors; § 848 adequately narrows

death eligible class; no showing of racial bias in government’s seeking of death

penalty), aff’d, 134 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 911 (1998). 

United States v. Nelson, 920 F. Supp. 825 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (upholding

constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c); concluding that “if death results” clause

merely enhances penalty and does not create new offense).

United States v. Tidwell, No. 94-CR-353, 1995 WL 764077 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1995)

(upholding constitutionality of 21 U.S.C. § 848(e); § 848(e) is a substantive offense,

not just sentencing provision; language of § 848(e) not ambiguous–sufficient nexus

between murder and continuing criminal enterprise).
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United States v. Walker, 910 F. Supp. 837 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding § 848(e) does not

unconstitutionally limit scope of appellate review).

United States v. Davis, 904 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. La. 1995) (upholding constitutionality

of 18 U.S.C. § 3591, § 241 and § 1512, following Flores; finding aggravating

circumstances sufficiently narrowed class of eligible defendants, even though required

in all capital cases; § 3592 not vague or overly broad; § 3592's discretion to prosecutor

to argue nonstatutory aggravating factors is proper delegation of legislative authority to

executive because statutory factors designate minimum requirements).

United States v. Bradley, 880 F. Supp. 271 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (rejecting statistical

evidence as basis for claim that federal death penalty applied in racially discriminatory

manner; upholding constitutionality of § 848; government’s reliance on nonstatutory

aggravating circumstances did not violate nondelegation doctrine).

United States v. Menzer, 817 F. Supp. 64 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 34,

which provides for death penalty for death caused by aircraft or motor vehicle felony,

unconstitutional).

United States v. Pitera, 795 F. Supp. 546 (E.D.N.Y.) (upholding constitutionality of

§ 848(e)), aff’d, 986 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1992).

United States v. Pretlow, 779 F. Supp. 758 (D.N.J. 1991) (upholding constitutionality

of § 848(e)).

United States v. Cooper, 754 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (denying defendant’s motion

to prevent government from seeking death penalty under 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)), aff’d, 19

F.3d 1154 (7th Cir. 1994).

Federal Statutes:

8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B) (2000) (providing death penalty for illegal transportation of

alien resulting in death).

18 U.S.C. § 32 (2000) (defining crime of destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities).

18 U.S.C. § 33 (2000) (defining crime of destruction of motor vehicles or motor vehicle

facilities).

18 U.S.C. § 34 (2000) (providing death penalty for violation of § 32 and § 33 resulting

in death).
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448 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

18 U.S.C. § 36(b)(2) (2000) (providing death penalty for drive-by shooting resulting in

death).

18 U.S.C. § 37(a) (2000) (providing death penalty for fatal violence in international

airports).

18 U.S.C. § 241 (2000) (providing death penalty for conspiracy to violate civil rights

resulting in death).

18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000) (providing death penalty for willful deprivation of federal

rights resulting in death).

18 U.S.C. § 245(b) (2000) (providing death penalty for interference with federally

protected activities resulting in death).

18 U.S.C. § 247(a), (d)(1) (2000) (providing death penalty for obstruction of free

exercise of religious rights resulting in death).

18 U.S.C. § 351 (2000) (providing death penalty for murder of members of Congress,

cabinet officers, Supreme Court justices, federal judges, families of federal officials

with intent to impede or retaliate).

18 U.S.C. § 794 (2000) (providing death penalty for espionage offenses involving

identification of U.S. agent to a foreign power).

18 U.S.C. § 844(d) (2000) (providing death penalty for interstate explosives offense

resulting in death).

18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(3) (2000) (providing death penalty for damage of federal property

by fire or explosives resulting in death).

18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2000) (providing death penalty for damage of federal property

affecting commerce by fire or explosives resulting in death)

18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1) (2000) (providing death penalty for murder with firearm in course

of federal violent crime or drug crime).

18 U.S.C. § 930(c) (2000), as amended by Act of Oct. 26, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,

115 Stat. 381 (providing death penalty for murder during firearms attack in or on

federal facility).
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18 U.S.C. § 1091(b)(1) (2000) (providing death penalty for genocide).

18 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (2000) (providing death penalty for murder in special maritime

and territorial jurisdiction).

18 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000) (providing death penalty for murder of federal employees and

law enforcement officers).

18 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2000) (providing death penalty for murder of diplomats or certain

foreign officials).

18 U.S.C. § 1118 (2000) (providing death penalty for murder by lifetime federal

prisoner).

18 U.S.C. § 1119 (2000) (providing death penalty for murder of U.S. national in

foreign country).

18 U.S.C. § 1120 (2000) (providing death penalty for murder by escaped federal

prisoner).

18 U.S.C. § 1121 (2000) (providing death penalty for murder of state employees,

officials, or law enforcement officers assisting in federal investigation).

18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000) (providing death penalty for kidnaping resulting in death).

18 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (2000) (providing death penalty for hostage-taking resulting in

death).

18 U.S.C. § 1503(b)(1) (2000) (providing death penalty for murder of court officer,

juror).

18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(3)(A) (2000) (providing death penalty for killing with intent to

tamper with witness, victim, or informant).

18 U.S.C. § 1513 (2000) (providing death penalty for retaliatory murders of witnesses).

18 U.S.C. § 1716(j)(3) (2000) (providing death penalty for mailing dangerous articles

where death results).

18 U.S.C. § 1751 (2000) (providing death penalty for murder of president, vice

president, high-level members of president’s or vice president’s staffs).
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18 U.S.C. § 1958 (2000), as amended by Pub. L. No. 108-458, Title VI, § 6704, 118

Stat. 3766 (providing death penalty for use of interstate or foreign commerce facilities

in commission of murder for hire).

18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1) (2000) (providing death penalty for murder in aid of

racketeering).

18 U.S.C. § 1992 (2000) (providing death penalty for wrecking trains where death

results).

18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) (2000) (providing death penalty for murder in course of bank

robbery).

18 U.S.C. § 2119(3) (2000) (providing death penalty for carjacking resulting in death).

18 U.S.C. § 2245 (2000) (providing death penalty for sexual abuse offenses resulting in

death).

18 U.S.C. § 2251(e) (2000), as amended by Pub. L. No. 108-21, Title V, § 506, 117

Stat. 652 (providing death penalty for child sexual exploitation resulting in death).

18 U.S.C. § 2280 (2000) (providing death penalty for acts of violence against maritime

navigation resulting in death).

18 U.S.C. § 2281 (2000) (providing death penalty for violence against maritime fixed

platforms).

18 U.S.C. § 2332(a)(1) (2000) (providing death penalty for terrorism outside the U.S.

resulting in death).

18 U.S.C. § 2332a (2000), as amended by Pub. L. No. 108-48, Title VI, § 6802, 118

Stat. 3766 (providing death penalty for use of weapons of mass destruction resulting in

death).

18 U.S.C. § 2332b (2000), as amended by Pub. L. No. 108-48, Title VI, §§ 6603, 6803,

6908, 118 Stat. 3762, 3769, 3774 (providing death penalty for terrorist act, which

transcended national boundaries, resulting in death).

18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2000) (providing death penalty for torture resulting in death).

18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2000) (providing death penalty for treason).
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18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000) (providing death penalty for breaches of Geneva Convention

resulting in death).

21 U.S.C. § 848(e) (2000) (providing death penalty for drug kingpins and leaders of

major drug trafficking enterprises who murder or direct another to murder in order to

obstruct justice or further the enterprise).

49 U.S.C. § 46502 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (providing death penalty for aircraft piracy

where death results).

See generally:

U.S. Department of Justice, Survey of the Federal Death Penalty System (1988-2000),

www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/dpsurvey.html (2000) (providing statistical compilation of

death penalty cases in the United States, broken down by region, race/ethnicity of

defendant and race/ethnicity of victim).

John P. Cunningham, Death in Federal Courts: Expectations and Realities of the

Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 32 U. Rich. L. Rev. 939 (1998).

Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46 Case W.

Res. L. Rev. 1 (1995) (summarizing capital procedure and current status of death

penalty cases in U.S.; arguing that public should realize that increasing number of

crimes eligible for death penalty is self-defeating tactic; differentiating most depraved

killers for capital punishment is more effective use of judicial and public resources

currently drained by capital caseload).

Jeffrey C. Matura, When Will It Stop? The Use of the Death Penalty for Non-Homicide

Crimes, 24 J. Legis. 249 (1998).

David J. Novak, Anatomy of the Federal Death Penalty Prosecution: A Primer for

Prosecutors, 50 S.C. L. Rev. 645 (1999).

Peyton Robinson, Judge Over Jury: Judicial Discretion In The Federal Death Penalty

Under the Drug Kingpin Act, 45 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1491 (1997).

5.2 Federal Capital Procedure

The 1994 Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 3591–3598) created a new federal system for sentencing,

imposing, and reviewing the death sentence for certain federal crimes. Specifically, the
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Act established statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be considered in

determining whether justification exists for a federal death sentence, established a

special hearing for such determination, and established a system of appeal and review. 

The Attorney General sets forth policy and procedures in a Protocol to be followed in

all federal cases in which a defendant is charged with an offense subject to the death

penalty. Federal courts have found, however, that the Protocol (as well as the United

States Attorney Manual in which it is included) does not create judicially enforceable

substantive or procedural rights.

 In 2006, 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)-10) was repealed, and similar provisions

regarding providing counsel, and expert and investigative services for capital defendant

unable to pay for such fees and services, were enacted as 18 U.S.C. § 3599 (see § 6.2.8,

infra).

In United States v. Allen, 536 U.S. 953 (2002), the U.S. Supreme Court

vacated a death sentence imposed under the 1994 Act and remanded for reconsideration

in light of the decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). In Ring, the Court held

that capital defendants are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the

legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment. In United States v.

Allen, 247 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 536 U.S. 953

(2002), the petitioner had asserted that the failure to allege in the indictment both the

mental culpability factor from 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a) and the aggravating factors from §

3592(c) on which the government relied at sentencing for justification of imposition of

the death penalty was unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey. For further

discussion of Apprendi and Ring, see § 4.6.1. On remand the 8th Circuit held in United

States v. Allen, 406 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc), petition for cert. filed (Sept. 29,

2005) (No. 05-6764), that it has been the practice of the Department of Justice since the

Ring decision to submit mental culpability and aggravating factors to the grand jury for

inclusion in the indictment and that this practice of the DOJ preserves the

constitutionality of FDPA prosecutions. 

Section 26.3 of Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides that the

federal government’s method of execution is lethal injection at a federal penal or

correctional institution. However, 18 U.S.C. § 3596 provides that the method of

implementing the death penalty for a federal conviction will follow that of the state in
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which it is imposed, and, if there is no state death penalty, then that of another state

designated by the judge. Section 3597 of Title 18 provides that “[a] United States

marshal charged with supervising the implementation of a sentence of death may use

appropriate State or local facilities for the purpose . . . .” The federal government’s

first death row and execution chamber opened in July 1999 at a penitentiary in Terre

Haute, Indiana.

Supreme Court:

United States v. Allen, 536 U.S. 953 (2002) (vacating death sentence and remanding for

further consideration in light of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); in case below,

United States v. Allen, 247 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 2001), petitioner had asserted that failure

to allege in indictment both mental culpability factor from 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a) and

aggravating factors from § 3592(c) on which the government relied at sentencing for

justification of imposition of the death penalty was unconstitutional under Apprendi v.

New Jersey).

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that capital defendants are entitled to

jury determination of any fact on which legislature conditions increase in their

maximum punishment; also holding that Walton and Apprendi are irreconcilable and

overruling Walton to extent that it allowed sentencing judge, sitting without jury, to

find aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of death penalty).

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding, in the context of noncapital

sentencing, that the Due Process Clause requires that any factual determination that is

required to increase a sentence that otherwise could not be imposed without the factual

determination must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury).

Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373 (holding that Eighth Amendment does not require

the court to instruct jurors in federal death penalty cases on consequences of their

failure to agree on a sentence of death or life imprisonment without the possibility of

parole), reh’g denied, 527 U.S. 1058 (1999).

Ninth Circuit:

United States v. Fernandez, et al, 231 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding district court

erred by precluding the government from seeking the death penalty where the

government refused to answer a discovery order requiring that it provide the defense

with its confidential predecisional death penalty evaluation form and memoranda
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454 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

regarding the AG’s decision to seek the death penalty).

Other Circuits:

In re Sterling-Suarez, 306 F.3d 1170 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that “promptly” as used in

18 U.S.C. § 3005, providing that following indictment of defendant on a capital crime,

court “shall promptly, upon the defendant’s request” assign two counsel “of whom at

least 1 shall be learned in the law applicable to capital cases” means promptly after

indictment, not, as government asserted, only after Attorney General has made

determination to seek death penalty).

United States v. Fell, 360 F.3d 135 (2nd Cir.) (vacating district court order that had

held that the federal death penalty is unconstitutional on the basis that the direction in

28 U.S.C. § 3593(c) to ignore the Federal Rules of Evidence when considering

information relevant to death penalty eligibility is a violation of the Due Process Clause

of the Fifth Amendment and the rights of confrontation and cross-examination

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, the Second Circuit held that the standard set forth

in § 3593(c) meets constitutional requirements because it “does not impair the

reliability or relevance of information at capital sentencing hearings”), cert. denied, 543

U.S. 946 (2004). 

United States v. Robinson, 367 F.3d 278 (5th Cir.) (holding that FDPA is not facially

unconstitutional under the Indictment Clause since the government can comply with its

constitutional obligations by first going to the grand jury and its statutory obligations

by later filing a notice of intention to seek the death penalty; rejecting argument that

FDPA violates the substantive and procedural components of Due Process Clause), cert.

denied, 125 S. Ct. 623 (2004). 

United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that FDPA does not

require jury to return special findings regarding which mitigating factors the jury found

to exist or the number of jurors who found a mitigating factor to exist), cert. denied,

526 U.S. 1117 (1999).

United States v. Allen, 406 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (on remand from the

Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Ring v. Arizona, holding that it has been

the practice of the DOJ since the Ring decision to submit mental culpability and

aggravating factors to the grand jury for inclusion in the indictment and that this

practice preserves the constitutionality of FDPA prosecutions; also holding that

although the Fifth Amendment requires that at least one statutory aggravating factor

and the requisite mental state be found by the grand jury and charged in the indictment

in FDPA prosecutions, the failure to do so in this pre-Ring case was harmless beyond a
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reasonable doubt), petition for cert. filed (Sept. 29, 2005) (No. 05-6764) .

District Courts in Other Circuits:

United States v. Green, 372 F. Supp. 2d 168 (D. Mass. 2005) (granting defendants’

motion that allegations of prior unadjudicated crimes not charged in the indictment and

unrelated to the current prosecution be struck from the notice of intent to seek the death

penalty; limiting ruling to prior unadjudicated crimes, and distinguishing cases holding

to the contrary, noting that they were decided prior to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.

296 (2004)).

United States v. Haynes, 269 F. Supp. 2d 970 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (holding that the

direction in 28 U.S.C. § 3593(c) to ignore the Federal Rules of Evidence when

considering information relevant to death penalty eligibility was not a violation of the

Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the rights of confrontation and crossexamination guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment; also holding that the Federal Death

Penalty Act’s silence regarding grand jury’s role in finding mens rea and aggravating

factors did not render the statute unconstitutional)

United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (denying defendant’s

motion to preclude penalty phase hearing and/or imposition of death penalty and

holding that Federal Death Penalty Act was not unconstitutional on asserted basis that

it unconstitutionally restricted mitigating evidence that jury may consider because it

provides that sentencer may not consider race, color, religious beliefs, national origin,

or sex of defendant or of any victim; also holding that Act was not unconstitutionally

incomprehensible and that it adequately narrowed class of persons eligible for death

penalty). 

United States v. Minerd, 176 F. Supp. 2d 424 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that Federal

Death Penalty Act was constitutional and that Act properly delegated Congressional

authority in permitting prosecution to define nonstatutory aggravating factors; also

holding that statutory aggravating factors were not unconstitutionally vague).

United States v. Glover, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D. Kansas 1999) (holding that Federal

Death Penalty Act did not violate Eighth Amendment by allowing use of nonstatutory

aggravating factors without accompanying proportionality review).

United States v. Hammer, 25 F. Supp. 2d 518 (M.D. Pa. 1998) (rejecting claim that trial

court should have used defendant’s jury instruction relating to the consequences of a

jury’s failure to reach an unanimous verdict).
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United States v. Roman, 931 F. Supp. 960 (D. R.I. 1996) (denying petitioner’s motion

to reveal aggravating circumstances that justify death sentence under 18 U.S.C. §

3593(a) as premature because government not yet decided to seek death penalty;

holding that Department of Justice protocol does not create judicially enforceable

substantive or procedural rights).

Federal Statutes:

18 U.S.C. § 3005 (2000) (providing for appointment of counsel in federal death penalty

case).

18 U.S.C. § 3235 (2000) (providing venue in capital cases).

18 U.S.C. § 3281 (2000) (stating no time limitation on instituting capital proceedings).

18 U.S.C. § 3432 (2000) (setting procedures regarding indictment and list of jurors and

witnesses in capital cases).

18 U.S.C. § 3591 (2000) (defining federal death sentence).

18 U.S.C. § 3592 (2000) (listing aggravating and mitigating circumstances).

18 U.S.C. § 3593 (2000) (providing for special hearing to determine whether death

penalty justified).

18 U.S.C. § 3595 (2000) (providing for direct appeal and review of federal death

sentence).

18 U.S.C. § 3596 (2000) (providing that federal death penalty carried out in manner

prescribed by state in which sentence imposed).

18 U.S.C. § 3597 (2000) (providing for use of state facilities for implementing federal

death sentence).

18 U.S.C. § 3599, as added by Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 222(a) (providing for

appointment of counsel and for reasonably necessary expert and investigative services

in capital cases).

28 C.F.R. §§ 26.1-26.5 (2001) (establishing procedures for carrying out federal death

sentence in federal institution; providing lethal injection as execution method).
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Federal Rules:

Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(a) (prohibiting waiver of indictment in capital cases).

Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(b) (providing twenty peremptory challenges for offenses

punishable by death).

See generally:

Charles C. Boettcher, Testing that Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§

3591-98 (1994): United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 1998), 29 Tex. Tech L.

Rev. 1043 (1998) (examining federal death penalty law prior to United States v. Jones;

analyzing the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Jones).

Sara L. Golden, Comment, Constitutionality of the Federal Death Penalty Act: Is the

Lack of Mandatory Appeal Really Meaningful Appeal, 74 Temp. 429 (2001) (arguing

that Federal Death Penalty Act’s failure to provide for mandatory appellate review

violates Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment and proposing that

Act be amended to require at least one level of review). 

Sandra D. Jordan, Symposium on the Seventh Circuit as a Criminal Court: Death for

Drug Related Killings: Revival of the Federal Death Penalty, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 79

(1991) (discussing and analyzing future impact of providing for death penalty in cases

of drug related killings).

George Kannar, Federalizing Death, 44 Buff. L. Rev. 325 (1996) (summarizing

legislation and procedural issues surrounding federal death penalty).

Brian Serr, Of Crime and Punishment, Kingpins and Footsoldiers, Life and Death: The

Drug War and the Federal Death Penalty Provision–Problems of Interpretation and

Constitutionality, 25 Ariz. St. L.J. 895 (1993) (arguing § 848(e) is not a substantive

capital offense, but just an enhanced penalty provision for drug felonies aggravated by

murder).

Richard P. Shafer, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Operation of Federal Death

Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3591 et seq., 195 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (2005).

Appointment of Counsel and Jury Selection Issues in Federal Death Penalty Cases,

Chambers to Chambers, Vol. 10, No.1 (May 1995).

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458 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

6. HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS 

6.1 Habeas Corpus Generally

Section 2241 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides federal courts with original

jurisdiction over writs of habeas corpus. Under current procedure, a § 2241 petition is

the proper means to challenge the execution of a sentence or to challenge confinement

that is not the result of a criminal court’s judgment. Challenges to the validity or

lawfulness of a conviction itself, however, are properly brought through a petition for

writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for state convictions or a motion to

vacate, set aside, or correct the judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 for federal

convictions.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.

L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat 1214 (1996), made significant changes in the law of federal

habeas corpus. The AEDPA, signed into law on April 24, 1996, amended many

provisions in Chapter 153 (28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255) and added Chapter 154 (28 U.S.C.

§§ 2261-2266), which applies exclusively to capital cases. Chapter 154 contains

special optional provisions triggered by the state’s establishment of a mechanism for

the appointment and compensation of counsel in state postconviction proceedings.

Supreme Court:

Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) (discussing the AEDPA in context of habeas

corpus history; finding that the AEDPA does not violate Article III, Section 2 of the

U.S. Constitution or violate the Constitution’s ban on suspension of the writ pursuant to

Article I, Section 9, clause 2).

Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (tracing history and importance of habeas corpus).

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000) (providing for writ of habeas corpus).

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) (providing petition for writ of habeas corpus for relief from

state convictions).
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28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) (providing relief from federal convictions).

28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (2000) (applying to capital and noncapital cases brought by

state and federal prisoners).

28 U.S.C. 2261-2266 (2000) (applying only to capital cases and providing requirements

for state to “opt in”).

Ninth Circuit Rules:

9th Cir. R. 22-1–22-6 (applying to habeas cases and direct criminal appeals in capital

cases).

See generally:

A.B.A. Panel Discussion, Dead Man Walking Without Due Process? A Discussion of

the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 23 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc.

Change 163 (1997) (discussing the AEDPA and the panelists’ ongoing concern with

due process violations in capital cases).

Charles F. Baird, The Habeas Corpus Revolution: A New Role for State Courts?, 27 St.

Mary’s L.J. 297 (1996) (portraying recent changes in and impact of Supreme Court

habeas corpus jurisprudence and addressing question of whether Supreme Court’s

reduction in federal oversight should be accompanied by greater measure of review by

state courts).

John H. Blume & David P. Voisin, An Introduction to Federal Habeas Practice and

Procedure, 47 S.C. L. Rev. 271 (1996) (outlining federal habeas corpus procedure, with

special reference to death sentencing issues).

Alan Clarke, Habeas Corpus: The Historical Debate, 14 N.Y. L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 375

(1998) (discussing the history of habeas corpus as it pertains to the current debate over

the scope of habeas relief).

Betty Binns Fletcher, The Death Penalty in America: Can Justice Be Done?, 70 N.Y.U.

L. Rev. 811 (1995) (addressing issues for the federal judiciary in providing habeas

corpus review in capital cases; concluding “backwards” system overall expends

immense effort and resources at appellate review, but too often fails to provide

adequate representation at trial).

Clarke D. Forsythe, The Historical Origins of Broad Federal Habeas Review

Reconsidered, 70 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1079 (1995) (reassessing common law history of
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original habeas corpus act and evolution of Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Act

and anticipating Congress’ habeas reform).

Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court’s Habeas Reform, 83 Cal. L.

Rev. 485 (1995) (examining Supreme Court habeas corpus jurisprudence and arguing

that Court’s reform efforts have failed the goals that Court set out to further).

Andrew Hammel, Diabolical Federalism: A Functional Critique and Proposed

Reconstruction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1 (2002)

(proposing reforms to the current federal habeas corpus statute). 

Marshall J. Hartman & Jeanette Nyden, Habeas Corpus and the New Federalism After

the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 J. Marshall L. Rev. 337

(1997) (addressing habeas corpus historically and in light of changes brought by habeas

reform act).

Joseph L. Hoffman, Is Innocence Sufficient? An Essay on the U.S. Supreme Court's

Continuing Problems with Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death Penalty, 68 Ind. L.J.

817 (1993) (arguing that both habeas corpus jurisprudence and death penalty law in

general unduly emphasize process rather than substance; suggesting that recent

limitations on habeas review represent an effort to limit the scope of death penalty

review).

Brian M. Hoffstadt, The Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Habeas, 78 S. Cal. L.

Rev. 1125 (2005) (arguing that reconstruction of habeas review is necessary or else the

writ will “remain an unjustified, theoretical outlier under any view of federal courts

law.”

James S. Leibman, Opting for Real Death Penalty Reform, 63 Ohio St. L. J. 315 (2002)

(arguing for change to system in which capital defendants would agree to give up

existing postconviction review rights in return for better qualified trial counsel).

Scott Moss, Recent Development, An Appeal by Any Other Name: Congress' Empty

Victory Over Habeas Rights, 32 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 249 (1997) (analyzing Felker

and constitutionality of the AEDPA).

Note, The Avoidance of Constitutional Questions and the Preservation of Judicial

Review: Federal Court Treatment of the New Habeas Provisions, 111 Harv. L. Rev.

1578 (1998) (summarizing the AEDPA’s modifications of habeas corpus law;

reviewing leading cases interpreting the AEDPA and concluding that Congress’ goal of

curtailing habeas corpus, as expressed by the AEDPA, will be achieved in part as a
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result of the statutory interpretation employed by courts to avoid the AEDPA’s

restrictions in the first place).

Kathleen Patchel, The New Habeas, 42 Hastings L.J. 939 (1991) (analyzing the

Supreme Court’s limitation of habeas review through the development of the doctrines

of procedural default, successive petitions, and nonretroactivity; arguing that the Court

has elevated finality concerns at the expense of other values).

Stephen Reinhardt, The Anatomy of an Execution: Fairness vs. “Process,” 74 N.Y.U.

L. Rev. 313 (1999) (discussing the history and current state of habeas corpus in the

context of the Thomas Thompson case).

Yale L. Rosenberg, Kaddish for Federal Habeas Corpus, 59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 362

(1991) (discussing history of modern habeas corpus jurisprudence and arguing that the

Supreme Court's retroactivity decisions have eliminated meaningful federal habeas

review of state judgments).

Christopher E. Smith, Federal Habeas Corpus Reform: The States’ Perspective, 18

Just. Sys. J. 1 (1995) (assessing impact and efficacy of Supreme Court’s judicial policymaking on habeas corpus from perspective of states’ attorneys).

Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right to

Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 862 (1994) (longing for

constitutional right to habeas corpus).

J. Thomas Sullivan, A Practical Guide to Recent Developments in Federal Habeas

Corpus for Practicing Attorneys, 25 Ariz. St. L.J. 317 (1993) (outlining very briefly the

structure of federal habeas review).

J. Thomas Sullivan, “Reforming” Federal Habeas Corpus: The Cost to Federalism: 

The Burden on Defense Counsel, and the Loss of Innocence, 61 UMKC L. Rev. 291

(1992) (arguing that recent Supreme Court habeas decisions undermine the

enforcement of federal rights in state courts, impose unreasonable burdens on defense

counsel, encourage ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and retreat from the Court's

earlier emphasis on the importance of innocence).

Ronald J. Tabak, Capital Punishment: Is There Any Habeas Left in This Corpus?, 27

Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 523 (1996) (presenting commentary on and transcript of panel

discussion held in August 1995 on proposed habeas reform legislation, and related

issues).

Nicole Veilleux et al., Habeas Relief for State Prisoners, 84 Geo. L.J. 1400 (1996)
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(summarizing law of habeas corpus).

Kenneth Williams, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: What’s Wrong

with it and How to Fix it?, 33 Conn L. Rev. 919 (Spring 2001) (proposing that AEDPA

be amended to make it easier for death row inmates to present evidence of innocence

and to permit federal courts to review de novo claims of prosecutorial misconduct or

ineffective assistance of counsel in capital cases). 

Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 Buff. L. Rev. 381

(1996) (reviewing principal changes of 1996 habeas corpus reform to existing law,

focusing on process of federal habeas corpus adjudication and new § 2254(d) governing

effect federal courts must give to state court judgments of federal claims).

6.1.1 Retroactivity of the AEDPA

Chapter 154 of Title 28 of the United States Code specifically provides that its

provisions apply to cases pending on or after the date of enactment of the AEDPA, but

Chapter 153 is silent as to its effective date. In Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997),

the Supreme Court held that the provisions amending Chapter 153 “generally apply

only to cases filed after the Act became effective” on April 24, 1996. Prior to Lindh, a

split among the circuits existed as to whether Chapter 153 applied to pending cases. 

The Ninth Circuit in Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,

522 U.S. 1008 (1997), concluded that it did not apply.

The Ninth Circuit has considered several cases presenting the question of

when a case is “pending” for purposes of general application of the AEDPA. In

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283

(9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099, cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1061, and overruled

en banc, 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit initially held that a habeas case

is “pending” within the meaning of the AEDPA and Lindh only when the petition is

filed.

In Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Kelly V),

163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1060 (1999), an en banc

panel of the Ninth Circuit reconsidered Beeler in light of the Supreme Court's decision

in Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998). The Kelly V court determined that

Hohn necessitated the overruling of Beeler and held that a petition for the appointment
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of counsel to prepare and file a habeas petition coupled with a motion for a stay of

execution also suffices as a “pending” case. Abrogating Kelly V, the Supreme Court in

Woodford v Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003), held that a case does not become “pending”

for purposes of the AEDPA until actual application for habeas corpus relief is filed in

federal court. The Court therefore held that the AEDPA applies to a habeas application

filed after the AEDPA’s effective date even though the applicant sought either

appointment of counsel or a stay or execution (or both) before the AEDPA’s effective

date. Id. at 206. The Court concluded that if on the AEDPA’s effective date “the state

prisoner had before a federal court an application for habeas relief seeking an

adjudication on the merits of the petitioner’s claim, then amended § 2254(d) does not

apply.” Id. at 207.

Additionally, a remaining question, not expressly addressed in Lindh, exists

as to whether courts should apply the retroactivity analysis set forth in Landgraf v. USI

Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994), to cases filed after the AEDPA’s effective date. See

§§ 6.2.1.1, 6.2.2.1, and 6.2.3.2.1.

Supreme Court:

Woodford v Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003) (holding that AEDPA applies to a habeas

application filed after AEDPA’s effective date even though the applicant sought either

appointment of counsel or a stay or execution (or both) before AEDPA’s effective date;

abrogating Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Kelly V), 163

F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 

Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998) (relying on Ex Parte Quirin in determining

that an application for certificate of appealability constitutes a “case” within the

meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1254, and holding that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to

review decisions of the courts of appeals denying applications for certificates of

appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)).

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (holding negative implication of Chapter 154

retrospective application provision means that new provisions of Chapter 153 apply

only to cases filed after the AEDPA became effective).

Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) (applying the AEDPA to prisoner’s second

petition despite the fact that prisoner filed first petition prior to AEDPA’s enactment).
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McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994) (holding that for purposes of 21 U.S.C. §

848(q)(4(B), which provides for the appointment of counsel for capital defendants in

postconviction proceedings, a “post conviction proceeding” is pending when a request

for the appointment has been made).

Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (setting forth standard for

retroactivity of new statutes, preventing retroactive application of statute where doing

so attaches new legal consequences to events completed before enactment).

Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (holding that a request for leave to file a habeas

petition constituted a case in a district court over which the court of appeals could

assert jurisdiction; “Presentation of the petition for judicial action is the institution of a

suit. Hence the denial by the district court of leave to file petitions in these causes was

the judicial determination of a case or controversy . . . .”).

Ninth Circuit:

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Kelly V), 163 F.3d 530,

540 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (holding, in light of Hohn v. United States, that “a

petition for the appointment of counsel to prepare and file a habeas petition, coupled

with a motion for a stay of execution, also suffices as a pending case”), cert. denied,

526 U.S. 1060 (1999), abrogated by Woodford v Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003), above.

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,

1288–89 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a habeas case is “pending” within the meaning of

the AEDPA and Lindh only when the petition is filed), cert. denied, cert. denied, 522

U.S. 1099, cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1061 (1998), and overruled en banc, 163 F.3d 530

(9th Cir. 1998).

Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1494 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (AEDPA does not apply to

cases filed before enactment date; reviewing legislative history and finding that

congressional intent clear–lack of retroactive application provision in Chapter 154

means Congress did not intend it to apply retrospectively), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008

(1997).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Leavitt v. Arave, 927 F. Supp. 394 (D. Idaho 1996) (holding that the AEDPA was

intended to apply to all pending habeas cases; statutes defining scope of habeas actions

deal with “prospective relief” and thus applying AEDPA to pending applications does

not have retroactive effect).
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Other Circuits:

Mueller v. Angelone, 181 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999) (reading Lindh to permit application

of the AEDPA to cases filed after enactment only where the effect of doing so is not

impermissibly retroactive under Landgraf; undertaking Landgraf analysis to determine

applicability of AEDPA to first habeas petition filed after enactment of AEDPA and

concluding Landgraf did not prohibit application).

Gosier v. Welborn, 175 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that the AEDPA applied to

petitioner who sought appointment of counsel before effective date of AEDPA but did

not file habeas petition until after AEDPA became effective).

Williams v. Coyle, 167 F.3d 1036, 1037 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that a habeas case is

not pending for purposes of Lindh until the application for the writ is filed pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2242).

Rivera v. Sheriff of Cook County, 162 F.3d 486, 489 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Lindh for

the proposition that AEDPA provisions necessarily apply to petitions filed after

enactment of the AEDPA).

Fields v. Johnson, 159 F.3d 914, 915 (5th Cir. 1998) (same as above).

Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 868 (4th Cir. 1998) (same as above), cert. denied, 525

U.S. 1090 (1999).

Neelley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d 917, 921 (11th Cir.1998) (same as above), cert. denied, 525

U.S. 1075 (1999).

Pratt v. United States, 129 F.3d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that the AEDPA applied

to second § 2255 petition even though prisoner filed first petition prior to the AEDPA),

cert. denied, 118 U.S. 1807 (1998).

Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that case is “filed” for

retroactivity analysis when petition is actually filed, not when motion to proceed in

forma pauperis or for appointment for counsel is made), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1139

(1998).

Holman v. Gilmore, 126 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the AEDPA applied to

state capital prisoner's petition, filed after AEDPA's effective date, despite petitioner's

pre-AEDPA request for counsel to assist with filing of petition), cert. denied, 522 U.S.

1150 (1998).
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6.1.2 State Waiver of AEDPA’s Application

Other Circuits:

Davis v. Executive Director of Dept. of Corrections, 100 F.3d 750, n.1 (10th Cir. 1996)

(noting that both parties asserted the inapplicability of the AEDPA and that the state

affirmatively waived its application), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1215 (1997).

Watkins v. Meloy, 95 F.3d 4 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that the provisions of AEDPA are

waivable because they do not affect the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts).

6.1.3 Mode of Challenging Sentence

The Supreme Court has determined that any action that challenges the underlying

conviction resulting in imprisonment is properly considered a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus. Actions that challenge the conditions of confinement may be brought

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Gomez v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal.,

503 U.S. 653 (1992).

Supreme Court:

Hill v. Crosby, 126 S. Ct. 1189 (2006) (mem.) (granting certiorari and a stay of

execution, with the following questions presented: “1. Whether a complaint brought

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a death-sentenced state prisoner, who seeks to stay his

execution in order to pursue a challenge to the chemicals utilized for carrying out the

execution, is properly recharacterized as a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. §

2254?; 2. Whether, under this Court’s decision in Nelson [v. Campbell (see below)], a

challenge to a particular protocol the State plans to use during the execution process

constitutes a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?”). 

Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (2004) (without reaching the question of how to

categorize method-of execution claims generally, holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an

appropriate vehicle for petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim seeking a temporary stay

and permanent injunctive relief and alleging that the use of a “cut-down” procedure

constituted cruel and unusual punishment). 

Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314 (1996) (explaining Gomez as holding that the habeas

rules apply to a last minute § 1983 method of execution claim).

Gomez v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653 (1992) (refusing
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to consider eleventh-hour § 1983 challenge to execution method (cyanide gas) and

holding that action was an obvious attempt to avoid the application of McCleskey).

Ninth Circuit:

Fierro v. Terhune, 147 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 1998) (considering inmates’ § 1983 action

challenging state’s execution method; holding that inmates lacked standing because

they were not currently subject to execution by unconstitutional method).

Other Circuits:

Felder v. Johnson, 180 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 1999) (denying petitioner’s challenge to

method of execution as procedurally barred; noting that several circuits have applied

habeas requirements to suits challenging methods of execution even when they are

denominated civil rights claims).

Williams v. Hopkins, 130 F.3d 333 (8th Cir.) (holding that § 1983 claim challenging

constitutionality of electrocution was functional equivalent of habeas petition subject to

procedural requirements for successive petitions and, therefore, district court lacked

jurisdiction to hear claim), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997).

In re Sapp, 118 F.3d 460 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that rules applying to successive

petitions similarly apply to § 1983 petitions which challenge the underlying sentence of

death, including claim that method of execution is cruel and unusual).

Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088 (11th Cir. 1997) (a per se challenge to a method of

execution mandated by state law must be brought as a habeas petition, not under §

1983), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1203 (1997).

Schneider v. Bowersox, 105 F.3d 397 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that § 1983 action cannot

be used to evade procedural requirements of habeas petition).

Felker v. Turpin, 101 F.3d 95 (11th Cir.) (treating § 1983 challenge to method of

execution as a second habeas petition and concluding that claim was subject to

procedural requirements for bringing second or successive petitions), cert. denied, 519

U.S. 989 (1996).
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6.2 Habeas Corpus Procedure

6.2.1 First Petition Filing Deadlines

The AEDPA created statutes of limitations for filing § 2254 or § 2255 petitions in

federal court. For general petitions, the deadline is one year from the date on which:

(1) the judgment became final; (2) the removal of the impediment, created by the state

or federal government, to filing; (3) the Supreme Court recognized the right asserted

and made the right retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review, or (4) the

factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered by due diligence. In Clay v.

United States, 537 U.S. 522 (2003), the United States Supreme Court held that a

petitioner’s judgment of conviction becomes “final” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §

2255 paragraph 6(1) one year after the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari

expires.

For capital habeas petitions in cases falling under the “opt-in” provisions,

however, the time limit for a § 2254 petition is 180 days from “final State court

affirmance of the conviction and sentence on direct review or the expiration of the time

for seeking such review.” See infra § 6.2.16.3.

Tolling of the one-year or 180-day time limitations may occur while a state

postconviction or other collateral review is pending. The Supreme Court has held that

“other collateral review” is modified by “state;” consequently, § 2254 does not allow

for tolling when a federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167

(2001).

The Supreme Court also has held that a state postconviction application is

“properly filed,” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), when its “delivery and acceptance

are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filing.” Artuz v.

Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000). Answering a question reserved by the Artuz Court, the

Supreme Court held that a state postconviction petition rejected by a state court as

untimely is not “properly filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 125 S. Ct. 1807 (2005). The Court said that a petition filed after a time

limit, and which does not fit within any exceptions to that limit, is no more “properly

filed” than a petition filed after a time limit that permits no exception and that under
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petitioner’s theory, a state prisoner could toll the statute of limitations at will simply by

filing untimely state postconviction petitions. Id. at 1812. 

In Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Beeler), 128

F.3d 1283 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099, cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1061,

and overruled en banc on other grounds, 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth

Circuit held that a court may equitably toll AEDPA’s limitation provisions where

“extraordinary circumstances” are present. 

Because the one-year limitation is not jurisdictional and may be subject to

equitable tolling, the Ninth Circuit, in accordance with the Second, Fifth and Tenth

Circuits, has held that AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitation does not violate the

Suspension Clause. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001(9th Cir. 2000). However, the

Eleventh Circuit has suggested that the statute of limitations could violate the

Supremacy Clause if a petitioner was asserting an actual innocence claim. Wyzkowski

v. Department of Corrections, 226 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2000). 

Some courts have avoided AEDPA’s statute of limitations and the associated

tolling issues by “relating back” the filing of an untimely federal habeas proceeding to

the filing of a previously filed federal habeas proceeding pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 15(c). The “relation back” doctrine is currently a source of conflicting

opinion among the courts. See § 6.2.4, infra.

In Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314 (1996), the Supreme Court held that

serious delay in filing a federal habeas corpus petition does not constitute a violation of

general “equitable” rules separate from established habeas corpus statutes and

precedent.

Supreme Court:

Evans v. Chavis, 126 S. Ct. 846 (2006) (holding in noncapital case that unexplained

delay of at least six months between California Court of Appeal’s denial of state

noncapital habeas petition and the filing of notice of appeal from that decision in the

California Supreme Court could not be “reasonable” under state law and thus state

habeas petition was not timely filed and statute of limitations under AEDPA was not

tolled; also holding that absent clear direction or explanation from the California

Supreme Court about the meaning of “reasonable time” in the present context, or (2)

clear indication that a particular request for appellate review was timely or untimely,
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the Ninth Circuit must itself examine the delay in each case and determine what the

state courts would have held in respect to timeliness).

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 125 S. Ct. 1807 (2005) (holding in noncapital case that state

postconviction petition rejected by state court as untimely is not “properly filed” within

the meaning of § 2244(d)(2)) and that petitioner’s federal habeas petition was time

barred).

Johnson v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1571 (2005) (in the case of a prisoner’s collateral

attack on a federal sentence (noncapital) on the ground that the state conviction used to

enhance that sentence was later vacated, holding that the state court order is a matter of

“fact” supporting a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, discovery of which triggers the

refreshed 1-year limitations period under the fourth paragraph of § 2255; also holding

that the statute of limitations in § 2255 para. 6(4) begins to run when the petitioner

receives notice of the order vacating the prior conviction provided, however, that

petitioner sought the state court order vacating the sentence with due diligence, after

entry of judgment in the federal case with the enhanced sentence).

Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522 (2003) (holding in noncapital case that for purpose

of starting the clock on § 2255's one-year limitation period, the judgment becomes final

when the time expires for filing a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate court’s

affirmation of the conviction).

Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002) (holding that (1) as used in 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2), “pending” covers time between lower state court’s decision and filing

notice of appeal to higher state court; and (2) same “pending” rule applies to

California’s unique collateral review system, even though that system involves not

notice of appeal but filing within “reasonable time” of further original state habeas

petition in higher court; rejecting contention that state petition is not “pending” during

interval between lower court’s entry of judgment and timely filing of notice of appeal

in next court as being inconsistent with ordinary meaning of “pending,” which means in

present context, until completion of collateral review process; remanding to Ninth

Circuit to reconsider timeliness issue, with instructions to evaluate any special

conditions justifying petitioner’s delay in filing in state court and any other relevant

considerations). 

 Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001) (holding that a federal habeas petition is not an

“application for State post-conviction or other collateral review,” and therefore does

not toll the 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) statute of limitations).

Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000) (holding that a state postconviction application is

“properly filed,” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), when its “delivery and acceptance
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are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filing; declining to

adopt state’s position that § 2244(d)(2) requires an application in state court to be free

of procedural bars to qualify as “properly filed”).

Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314 (1996) (holding that a district court may not dismiss

a petition for delay based on ad hoc “equitable” reasons separate from habeas corpus

statutes and precedent; rather, Rule 9 governs).

Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992) (stating that “[w]e of course do not in the least

condone, but instead condemn, any efforts on the part of habeas petitioners to delay

their filings until the last minute.”).

Gomez v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653 (1992)

(dismissing petition, stating “[t]his claim could have been brought more than a decade

ago. There is no good reason for this abusive delay, which has been compounded by

last-minute attempts to manipulate the judicial process.”).

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988) (establishing prison “mailbox rule”).

Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 264–65 (1986) (holding state must show it was

prejudiced in its ability to respond to allegations in petition; prejudice to state's ability

to successfully convict petitioner again is irrelevant).

Ninth Circuit:

Welch v. Carey, 350 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (distinguishing Carey v.

Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002), and holding in noncapital case that a state petition was

not “pending” for purposes of tolling of the statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2) when there was a four-and-one-half-year gap between a petition in the

California Superior Court and a petition, raising different claims, in the California

Supreme Court), cert denied, 541 U.S. 1078 (2004).

Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding based on unique facts of

noncapital murder case that the statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), was

equitably tolled where an attorney was retained to prepare and file a habeas petition,

failed to do so, and disregarded requests to return files pertaining to the case until well

after the petition was due.)

 Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803 (9th Cir.) (holding that a district court

must stay capital habeas proceedings during the petitioner’s incompetence, rather than

appointing a “next friend” and requiring the friend to pursue the habeas petition on the
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petitioner’s behalf; following Calderon v. U.S. District Court (Kelly V), 163 F.3d 530

(9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and distinguishing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149

(1990), the panel construed 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (providing for statutory right to

counsel in habeas proceedings) to incorporate a statutory right to competence, and held

that the denial of the stay violated this right because the petitioner raised claims that

could potentially benefit from his ability to communicate rationally), cert. denied, 540

U.S. 1069 (2003).

Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that for purposes of

determining whether the statute of limitations was tolled under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2),

the petitioner’s Oregon state court petition for postconviction relief was “properly

filed” even though it was dismissed either as untimely or as successive and remanding

for the district court to consider whether: (1) the post-conviction petition was pending

for a sufficient period even though the petitioner’s appeal to the Oregon Court of

Appeals was untimely; or (2) the petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling due to the

state court’s failure to mail a notice of judgment to petitioner’s counsel; but see dissent

of O’Scannlain, J. in which he stated that Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.510, Oregon’s timeliness

requirement for postconviction petitions, was a “condition to filing,” rather than a

“condition to obtaining relief” and that Oregon law was not ambiguous as to whether

the timeliness requirement contained a good cause exception).

 Smith v. Ratelle, 323 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding in a noncapital case that pro se

petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling because district court had erroneously

dismissed his earlier, timely habeas petition due to failure to exhaust one remaining

claim without first giving him opportunity to file amended petition withdrawing

unexhausted claim as alternative to dismissal), cert. denied, 542 U.S.945 (2004).

Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding that state court

petitions attacking earlier conviction could toll statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(2)

because even though earlier conviction was not “pertinent judgment” attacked in

federal habeas petition, federal petition claimed that petitioner’s current sentence was

inappropriately enhanced by the earlier conviction and thus, state court petitions made

“pertinent claim” under § 2244(d)(2)).

Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) does

not toll AEDPA limitations period while federal habeas petition is pending).

Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that state habeas corpus

petition is deemed filed for purposes of equitable tolling under AEDPA when prisoner

hands petition to prison officials for mailing to state court, and diligently follows up

with state court once prisoner fails to receive disposition within reasonable period of

time, even if petition was never received or filed by state court).
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Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding in noncapital case that

miscalculation of limitations period by habeas petitioner’s retained counsel and his

negligence in general did not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to

warrant equitable tolling of limitations period under AEDPA), cert. denied, 535 U.S.

1055 (2002).

Jorss v. Gomez, 266 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that statute of limitations is 

equitably tolled when district court’s erroneous dismissal of prior habeas corpus

petition accounts for petitioner’s failure to timely file petition).

Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that state claim is no

longer “pending” for purposes of tolling limitations period for filing federal habeas

corpus petition under AEDPA when petitioner’s appeal in state court is denied, and

petitioner fails to appeal denial within the prescribed time), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1143

(2002).

Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (as to petitioner whose

conviction became final before AEDPA was enacted, statute of limitations for filing

federal petition for habeas corpus was tolled until 30 days after decision of California

Supreme Court summarily denying her petition for habeas corpus was filed).

Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that although district court has 

authority to raise AEDPA statute of limitations sua sponte, court must give federal

habeas corpus petitioner prior notice and opportunity to respond before dismissing

petition as time-barred).

Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (remanding for hearing to establish

when, with exercise of due diligence, factual predicate could have been discovered to

support ineffective assistance of counsel claim, in turn allowing for a timely filing

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(D)).

Tillema v. Long, 253 F.3d 494 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding tolling of limitations period

applies to time when state petition pending, notwithstanding that state petition did not

include claim later asserted in federal petition; alternatively holding that equitable

tolling applied to time after court dismissed petition to exhaust without giving option to

petitioner to proceed with exhausted claims pursuant to Rose v. Lundy).

Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding mailbox rule properly

applied to state postconviction petition to determine tolling of federal statute of

limitation), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 941 (2001).

Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F. 3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (remanding for
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evidentiary hearing to determine whether petitioner is entitled to an “impediment” 

finding or to equitable tolling where petitioner’s declaration stated that the prison

library did not contain the 1996 AEDPA until June 1998, petitioner’s conviction

became final on July 23, 1996 and petitioner filed his first state postconviction petition

in December 1997). 

Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that AEDPA’s one-year statute

of limitation does not violate the Suspension Clause, because the one-year limitation is

not jurisdictional and may be subject to equitable tolling).

Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the period of direct review

in § 2244(d) includes the period within which a petitioner can file a petition for writ of

certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court whether or not the petitioner actually files such

a certiorari petition).

Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding extraordinary circumstances

sufficient to justify equitable tolling of the AEDPA's statute of limitations where prison

officials failed to honor inmate's timely request to draw the habeas filing fee from his

prison trust account and mail the fee and petition to the district court for filing; noting,

in dicta, that the prison mailbox rule “would appear to apply” to habeas petition filed

under the AEDPA, and recognizing that a majority of other circuits have determined

that the mailbox rule so applies).

Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that for purposes of §

2244(d) the time for filing habeas petition is tolled for the entire period during which

petitioner is pursuing and exhausting state remedies–through proper use of the state

courts–including the intervals between dispositions at one state level and filing of a

petition at the next), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1104 (2000).

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Kelly V), 163 F.3d 530

(9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (holding that prisoner's incompetency is an “extraordinary

circumstance beyond the prisoner's control” such that where there is a threshold

showing of incompetency, a sufficient showing has been made for equitably tolling the

statute of limitation; determining that a court order or judicial error, depriving

petitioner of opportunity to bring petition, tolls the statute), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1060

(1999).

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,

1288–89 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that one-year statute of limitation for filing of habeas

petitions can be equitably tolled if “extraordinary circumstances” beyond a prisoner's

control make it impossible to file a petition on time), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099, cert.

denied, 523 U.S. 1061, and overruled en banc on other grounds, 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir.
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1998).

Caldwell v. Amend, 30 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying Houston rule to Rule 50(b)

filing; stating that “the adversity of interests between prisoners and prison officials

central to Houston and its progeny . . . commends extension of Houston’s filing

exception for pro se habeas petitioners).

Telink, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Pulley and stating that in

order for laches to bar writ of error coram nobis, government must first make prima

facie showing of prejudice as result of petitioner's delay; respondent's showing shifts

burden to petitioner to show either no prejudice, or reasonable diligence in filing

claim).

Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding petitioner's Ake claim barred

for delay under Rule 9(a) where petitioner had background material relied upon for

claim more than five years after Ake; delay prejudiced state because petitioner's trial

psychiatrists now unavailable).

Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354, 1366 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying Rule 9(a) “laches” and

finding respondent prejudiced by delay due to witness' inability to recall important facts

but also finding that petitioner's counsel acted with reasonable diligence because

nothing in trial record would have put him on notice of the claim at an earlier date).

Guizar v. Estelle, 843 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that court may accept

resubmitted petition with only exhausted claims nunc pro tunc to date of original

filing).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Dennis v. Woodford, 65 F. Supp.2d 1093 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (denying without prejudice

petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file habeas petition; holding petitioner’s

motion–to equitably toll § 2241(d) statute of limitation based on nine month delay in

appointing counsel–premature because petitioner failed to make a factual showing as to

why the petition could not be prepared in the remaining three months).

Barrett v. Yearwood, 63 F. Supp.2d 1245 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (disagreeing with the

Central District and reading § 2244(d)(2)’s “properly filed application for State

postconviction or other collateral review” language to include a properly filed federal

petition, and holding that the AEDPA’s statute of limitations is tolled during the time a

federal habeas petition is pending).
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McClain v. Hill, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (barring amendment to habeas

petition where original petition was filed prior to expiration of the AEDPA's statute of

limitations, and the amendment after expiration, because amended claims did not

“relate back” to original petition).

Sperling v. White, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1246 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (reading § 2244(d)(2)’s

“properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review” language

to exclude a properly filed federal habeas petition, and holding that the AEDPA’s

limitations period was not tolled during the time petitioner’s prior federal habeas

petition, dismissed for failure to exhaust, was pending; discussing and disapproving

“relation back” doctrine).

United States v. Zuno-Arce, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (stating that

foreclosure of a constitutional claim where there has been a colorable factual innocence

showing would likely constitute a due process violation or an improper suspension of

habeas relief; extending the miscarriage of justice gateway to claims otherwise barred

by the AEDPA's statute of limitation).

Bolds v. Newland, No. C 97-2103, 1997 WL 732529 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 1997)

(holding ignorance of law and lack of legal assistance do not constitute extraordinary

circumstances which toll the statute of limitations).

United States v. Van Poyck, 980 F. Supp. 1108, 1111 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (determining

that inability to secure transcripts from court reporters and lockdowns at prison lasting

several days allegedly eliminating access to law library were not extraordinary

circumstances justifying equitable tolling of limitations period).

Other Circuits:

Wyzykowski v. Department of Corrections, 226 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2000) (remanding

for determination of whether petitioner could make showing of actual innocence before

reaching constitutional question of whether Suspension Clause required exception to

statute of limitations for actual innocence.)

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000) (setting one-year filing deadline).

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (2000) (setting exemption from one-year deadline during time

properly filed application for state postconviction or other collateral review pending).
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28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) (setting one-year filing deadline for § 2255 cases).

28 U.S.C. § 2263(a) (2000) (setting 180-day deadline for capital § 2254 petition in

“opt-in” state).

28 U.S.C. § 2263(b) (2000) (setting tolling provisions for 180-day deadline).

Federal Rules:

Fed. R. Habeas Corpus 9(a) (provision regarding dismissal for delayed or successive

petitions was deleted as unnecessary as of Dec. 1, 2004, in light of one-year statute of

limitations for § 2254 petitions; Fed. R. Habeas Corpus 9(b) redesignated as Fed. R.

Habeas Corpus 9).

Fed. R. Civil Procedure 15(c) (stating when amendment may relate back to original

pleading). 

See generally:

Angela Carson, Comment, Lonchar v. Thomas: Protecting the Great Writ, 13 Ga. St.

U. L. Rev. 809 (1997) (examining modern abuse of the writ doctrine in light of

Lonchar v. Thomas).

Alan Ellis, Peter Goldberger & Nancy Simmons, It’s Not Too Late: Time Period for

Filing § 2255 Motions Under the New Habeas Corpus Reform Law, The Champion,

July 1996, at 21 (addressing constitutional and procedural issues of new § 2255 filing

deadlines).

Notice of Adoption of Interim Local Rules 22.1 and 22.2, United States Court of

Appeals for the First Circuit, Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly at 27 (Sept. 30, 1996)

(adopting interim rules accommodating new time limitations and procedural rules of

AEDPA).

Peter Sessions, Note, Swift Justice?: Imposing a Statute of Limitations on the Federal

Habeas Corpus Petitions of State Prisoners, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1513 (1997) (arguing

that the AEDPA’s statute of limitations is fundamentally flawed; conceding its

probable constitutionality and, in light of that conclusion, making a policy argument

against its implementation).

Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in Capital
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478 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 699 (2002) (discussing apparently

unintended consequences of AEDPA’s successive petition provisions, including the

foreclosure of certain types of constitutional claims and the injection of numerous

procedural complexities that arguably undermine reliability and fairness).

6.2.1.1 Retroactivity of First Petition Filing Deadlines

Most courts have determined that the AEDPA’s statutes of limitation have retroactive

effect under Landgraf and that, in light of Lindh, the limitations periods do not run

against prisoners prior to the AEDPA’s enactment date. Most courts have determined

that the one-year limit begins on the day after AEDPA’s enactment (April 25, 1996)

and that a “reasonable time” is the one-year time period. See §§ 6.1.1, 6.2.2.1 and

6.2.3.2.1.

Ninth Circuit:

Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir. 2002 ) (holding that Fed R. Civ. P. 6(a)

governs the calculation of the one-year grace period afforded prisoners whose

convictions became final before AEDPA’s enactment; holding one-year grace period

commences on April 25, 1996–the day after AEDPA’s enactment).

Calderon v. United States District Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Beeler), 128 F.3d

1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that AEDPA's one-year deadline does not run

against state prisoner prior to AEDPA's enactment because such application would

attach “new legal consequences to events completed prior to enactment” and thus

would have impermissible retroactive effect), cert. denied 522 U.S. 1099, cert. denied,

523 U.S. 1061, and overruled en banc on other grounds, 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998).

6.2.2 Successive Petition Filing Authorization

A petitioner must pass the AEDPA’s “gatekeeping” hurdle before filing a second or

successive (SOS) § 2254 habeas petition or § 2255 habeas motion in district court. The

petitioner must obtain an order authorizing the second or successive filing from a threejudge appellate court panel. The circuit court evaluates petitioner's request for

authorization according to the following statutory criteria set forth in § 2244(b)(3), 

which provides:
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(3)(A) Before a second or successive application permitted by this

section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the

appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district

court to consider the application.

(B) A motion in the court of appeals for an order authorizing the

district court to consider a second or successive application shall

be determined by a three-judge panel of the court of appeals.

(C) The court of appeals may authorize the filing of a second or

successive application only if it determines that the application

makes a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the

requirements of this subsection. [i.e. requirements of § 2244(b)(2)

for granting review, see infra § 6.2.4.1].

(D) The court of appeals shall grant or deny the authorization to

file a second or successive application not later than 30 days after

the filing of the motion.

(E) The grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to

file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and

shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of

certiorari.

Section 2255, in relevant part, provides the following requirements as to

second or successive § 2255 motions:

A second or successive motion must be certified as provided in

§ 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain–

(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light

of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by

clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would

have found the movant guilty of the offense; or

(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable.

The law is somewhat unclear as to exactly what circumstances render a

petition “second or successive” for purposes of the AEDPA. The Supreme Court held

that a habeas petition, filed in district court after an initial petition was unadjudicated

and dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies, and which contained claims that

were not contained in the initial unadjudicated petition, is not a second or successive

petition. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000). The Supreme Court also vacated
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and remanded a Ninth Circuit decision in light of Slack. Shellmon v. Cambra, 531 U.S.

1005 (2000). The appellate decision that was reversed held that a petition–originally

containing one exhausted and several exhausted claims–should be dismissed with

prejudice after the one exhausted claim was denied on the merits. 

In Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998), the Supreme Court

held that where the petitioner presented a Ford claim (incompetence to be executed) in

his initial petition–which was dismissed as not ripe because his execution was stayed at

the time–petitioner could bring a subsequent Ford claim without running afoul of the

prohibitions against successive petitions. The Court followed and affirmed the analysis

of the Ninth Circuit in Martinez-Villareal v. Stewart (Martinez-Villareal II), 118 F.3d

628 (9th Cir. 1997), and compared the unripe Ford claim to one initially dismissed for

failure to exhaust and subsequently refiled after completion of state proceedings. See

In re Turner, 101 F.3d 1323 (9th Cir. 1997). Ultimately, the Court held that a renewed

Ford claim, previously dismissed as unripe, was not really a second petition.

However, in Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998), the Supreme Court

held that a motion to recall an appellate court mandate can be considered “second or

successive,” triggering application of the AEDPA's restrictions. See infra §§ 6.2.3.1

and 6.2.3.2.

In United States v. Villa-Gonzalez, 208 F. 3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2000) (per

curiam), the Ninth Circuit held that § 2244(b)(4) requires the district court to dismiss a

claim if, after appellate court authorization pursuant to § 2244(b)(3)(A), the district

court conducts a thorough review and finds that the motion does not meet the §

2244(b)(2) second or successive motion requirement. 

Supreme Court:

Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375 (2003) (holding that federal court cannot

recharacterize a pro se litigant’s motion as a first § 2255 motion unless: it first informs

the litigant of its intent to recharacterize; warns the litigant that this recharacterization

means that any subsequent § 2255 motion will be subject to the restrictions on “second

or successive” motions; and provides the litigant an opportunity to withdraw the motion

or to amend it so that it contains all the § 2255 claims that the litigant believes he or she

has).

Shellmon v. Cambra, 531 U.S. 1005 (2000) (granting certiorari, vacating and
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remanding Ninth Circuit’s judgment that petition–containing one exhausted claim

denied on the merits and several unexhausted claims–should be dismissed with

prejudice; remanded in light of Slack v. McDaniel). 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) (holding that a habeas petition, filed in district

court after an initial petition was unadjudicated on the merits and dismissed for failure

to exhaust state remedies, and which contained claims that were not contained in the

initial unadjudicated petition, is not a second or successive petition).

Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998) (affirming the Ninth Circuit in

holding that Ford claim, previously dismissed as unripe, is not second or successive

petition within meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)).

Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998) (determining that a prisoner's motion to

recall an appellate court mandate on the basis of the underlying merits in a capital

habeas case can be regarded as second or successive and, if the court grants the motion,

its action is subject to the AEDPA irrespective of whether the motion is based on new

or old claims; if, in recalling the mandate, the appellate court considers new claims or

evidence presented in a successive application, it is proper to regard the court's action

as based on that application triggering the AEDPA's application regardless of whether

the court labels the action as sua sponte).

Ninth Circuit:

Cooper v. Calderon, 274 F.3d 1270 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (rejecting petitioner’s

contention in capital case that his petition was not second or successive because claim

was presented in his first petition, but district court erroneously failed to decide it on its

merits; finding that petitioner, who now alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for

not adequately investigating confession of another person to murders and calling that

person to stand to testify during petitioner’s murder trial, had only obliquely referred to

that person’s confession in his first petition’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

and reference was insufficient to identify that petitioner was raising distinct claim of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on that confession).

United States v. Villa-Gonzalez, 208 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (holding

that § 2244(b)(4) requires the district court to dismiss a claim if, after appellate court

authorization pursuant to § 2244(b)(3)(A), the district court conducts a thorough review

and finds that the motion does not meet the § 2244(b)(2) second or successive motion

requirement). 

LaGrand (Karl) v. Stewart, 170 F.3d 1158, 1160 (9th Cir. 1999) (extending Martinez-
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482 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Villareal II in holding that a section 2244(b)(2) motion for leave to file a second or

successive petition is unnecessary as to claim–that lethal gas is an unconstitutional

execution method–brought in first petition but dismissed as unripe.

Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918 (9th Cir.) (treating petitioner's Rule 60(b) motion

for relief from judgment as a successive petition governed by the AEDPA; holding that

en banc court was authorized to determine petitioner's request for successive petition

authorization; finding that § 2244(b) permits a successive petition to establish deathineligibility, but that petitioner did not satisfy the § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) actual innocence

requirement), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 965 (1998).

Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 944 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that a Lackey (length of

capital confinement) claim, not raised in a first § 2254 petition, does not fall within

either exception to the AEDPA's bar against subsequent claims), cert. denied, 526 U.S.

1123 (1999).

Gretzler v. Stewart, 146 F.3d 675 (9th Cir.) (affirming dismissal of second petition

asserting Lackey claim; reasoning that petitioner could have included claim in first

petition amended in 1992; rejecting contention that claim is not ripe until execution is

imminent), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 912 (1998).

Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1371–72 (9th Cir.) (declining to extend the MartinezVillareal II reasoning to a Lackey claim), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1085 (1998). 

Woratzeck v. Stewart, 118 F.3d 648 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that inmate failed to make

a prima facie showing to justify successive petition authorization; holding that, because

there is no constitutional right to a clemency hearing, petitioner's claim that former

attorneys involvement as prosecutors at his clemency hearing presented a constitutional

conflict of interest was not cognizable in a second petition under the AEDPA).

Martinez-Villareal v. Stewart (Martinez-Villareal II), 118 F.3d 628, 632 (9th Cir. 1997)

(holding the § 2244 “gatekeeping” provisions inapplicable to Ford claims), aff'd, 523

U.S. 637 (1998).

Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that if petitioner makes a

prima facie showing for authorization of one successive claim, then he may proceed

upon entire application in district court), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1082 (1998).

Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1287 (9th Cir.) (dismissing request for order

authorizing consideration of successive petition under § 2244(b)(2); finding no new

rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the Supreme Court in claim that lethal

injection for crime of first degree murder is unconstitutional), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
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1103 (1997).

Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir.) (holding that § 2244(b)(2)(B)

forecloses all successive petition reviews of constitutional claims unrelated to guilt or

innocence), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1102 (1997).

Nevius v. Sumner, 105 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 1996) (interpreting § 2244(b)(3)(C) to mean

authorization of entire successive petition, not just those claims meeting § 2244's

requirements), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1006 (1999).

In re Turner, 101 F.3d 1323 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that § 2244(b)(3) does not apply

to subsequent petitions where first petition was dismissed without prejudice for failure

to exhaust).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Poland v. Stewart, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (D. Ariz. 1999) (holding that petitioner may

bring a Ford claim in a subsequent petition without complying with the AEDPA's

successive petition requirements because the reasoning of Martinez-Villareal II applied

with equal force to the case despite petitioner's failure to raise the claim in his initial

petition).

United States v. Kashiwabara, 962 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Haw. 1996) (reading § 2255's

reference to § 2244 to incorporate authorization “procedures” only).

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (2000) (providing “gatekeeping” requirements for SOS

petitions).

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) (2000) (providing authorization requirement for SOS petitions).

28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) (providing authorization requirement for SOS § 2255

petitions).

6.2.2.1 Retroactivity of Successive Petition Filing Authorization

In Williams v. Calderon, 83 F.3d 281 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit held that the

petitioner did not have to obtain authorization under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 when the

petitioner filed a successive petition prior to the AEDPA's enactment date, which is

April 24, 1996. That decision is consistent with the Supreme Court's subsequent
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decision, in Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), that the AEDPA does not apply to

cases pending at the time of the AEDPA's enactment.

The Ninth Circuit held in U.S. v. Villa-Gonzalez, 208 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.

2000), that 28 U.S.C. § 2244 authorization applied to a successive § 2255 motion filed

after the AEDPA’s enactment, notwithstanding that the initial § 2255 motion was filed

pre-AEDPA.

Supreme Court:

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (holding that the AEDPA does not apply to

habeas cases pending at the time of enactment).

Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) (applying the AEDPA to prisoner’s second

petition despite the fact that prisoner filed first petition prior to AEDPA’s enactment).

Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (setting forth standard for

retroactivity of new statutes; preventing retroactive application of statute where doing

so attaches new legal consequences to events completed before enactment).

Ninth Circuit:

U.S. v. Villa-Gonzalez, 208 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2000 (per curiam) (holding that 28

U.S.C. § 2244 authorization applies to a successive § 2255 motion filed after the

AEDPA’s enactment, notwithstanding that the initial § 2255 motion was filed preAEDPA).

Williams v. Calderon, 83 F.3d 281, 285 (9th Cir. 1996) (declining to require

authorization for successive petition filed prior to the AEDPA's enactment).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Poland v. Stewart, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (D. Ariz. 1999) (noting the court's prior order

that petition alleging new Ford claim be filed as a new habeas action, not subject to the

AEDPA's successive petition restrictions, but otherwise subject to the AEDPA, where

petitioner filed his initial petition (without the Ford claim) prior to the AEDPA's

enactment).
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6.2.3 Federal Procedural Default–Subsequent Petitions

Although res judicata is inapplicable in a habeas proceeding, Calderon v. United States

Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Kelly V), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,

526 U.S. 1060 (1999), 28 U.S.C. § 2244 limits federal court consideration of any §

2254 petition filed subsequent to the first federal habeas petition. Prior to the AEDPA,

§ 2244(b) permitted a district court to dismiss a subsequent petition unless the

petitioner predicated the writ on new grounds and the petitioner had not “abused the

writ.”

In 1996 the AEDPA significantly changed the standard of review requiring

dismissal of all successive petitions, see § 6.2.3.1, and dismissal of abusive petitions

unless the petitioner satisfies the standard set forth in § 2244(b). See § 6.2.3.2.

In Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000), the Court held that a habeas

petition–filed after an initial petition was unadjudicated and dismissed for failure to

exhaust state remedies–is not a second or successive petition, notwithstanding that

additional claims were included in the subsequent petition. Even though both of

Slack’s petitions were filed before AEDPA’s enactment, the Court’s analysis probably

applies to post-AEDPA petitions as well: “[W]e do not suggest the definition of second

or successive would be different under AEDPA.” Id. at 486. 

 Supreme Court:

Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375 (2003) (holding that federal court cannot 

recharacterize a pro se litigant’s motion as a first § 2255 motion unless: it first informs

the litigant of its intent to recharacterize; warns the litigant that this recharacterization

means that any subsequent § 2255 motion will be subject to the restrictions on “second

or successive” motions; and provides the litigant an opportunity to withdraw the motion

or to amend it so that it contains all the § 2255 claims that the litigant believes he or she

has; also holding that if these warning are not given, the motion cannot be considered

to have been a § 2255 motion for purposes of applying to later motions the law’s

“second or successive” restrictions). 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) (holding that a habeas petition–filed after an

unadjudicated initial petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies–is not

a second or successive petition, notwithstanding that additional claims were included in

the subsequent petition). 
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Angelone v. Bennett, 519 U.S. 959 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that

legislative reforms limiting federal court authority to entertain successive petitions

increases the importance of full and fair first petition review and thus federal court

should give greater, rather than less, scrutiny to capital inmates’ first petitions).

Ninth Circuit:

United States v. Seesing, 234 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that when a prisoner

files a pro se request of the court, the court cannot recharacterize the request as a §

2255 motion without giving the prisoner either the option to consent or the option to

withdraw the motion so that the prisoner does not lose the right to file a comprehensive

first motion).

Neuschafer v. Whitley, 860 F.2d 1470, 1474 n.3 (9th Cir. 1988) (distinguishing

“abusive” and “successive” petitions).

See generally:

Jane A. Gordon, Comment, Pleading Rule 9 of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus: 

Sua Sponte Departure From Precedent and Congressional Intent, 38 Emory L.J. 489

(1989) (exploring the principles governing Rule 9(a) and (b) pleading; discussing

whether court may raise Rule 9 sua sponte, or whether it is affirmative defense).

John B. Morris, Jr., Note, The Rush to Execution: Successive Habeas Corpus Petitions

in Capital Cases, 95 Yale L.J. 371 (1985) (analyzing various types of successive

petitions and different procedural situations in which they arise).

6.2.3.1 Petitions Raising Same Grounds

Prior to AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provided for the dismissal of a petition alleging the

same grounds for relief as those raised in an earlier petition where the prior

determination was on the merits. Section 2244(b)(1) now simply provides: “A claim

presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that

was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.” See supra § 6.2.2.

Supreme Court:

Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998) (determining that in a § 2254 case, a

prisoner’s motion to recall the mandate on the basis of the merits of the underlying
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decision can be regarded as second or successive for purposes of § 2244(b), and that if

the court grants such a motion, its action is subject to the AEDPA irrespective of

whether it is based on old claims).

Alabama v. Evans, 461 U.S. 230 (1983) (vacating stay of execution based on finding

that successive petition sought to re-litigate previously decided issues without

justification; finding no merit to sole new claim presented).

Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963) (ruling that denial of prior § 2254 petition

or § 2255 motion should be given controlling weight only if (1) same ground presented

in subsequent petition was determined adversely to petitioner on prior petition, (2) prior

determination was on the merits, (3) ends of justice would not be served by reaching

merits of subsequent petition).

Ninth Circuit:

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Kelly V), 163 F.3d 530

(9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (holding that, even after the AEDPA, res judicata doctrine

does not apply to a federal habeas petition regardless of the nature of the prior

proceeding), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1060 (1999).

Williams v. Calderon, 83 F.3d 281 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding no cause or prejudice

sufficient to justify successive claims previously raised, or abusive claims not

previously raised).

Campbell v. Blodgett, 997 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting claims raised in prior

 petition as successive where subsequent claims based upon same factual and legal

precedents).

Howard v. Lewis, 905 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that dismissal of federal

habeas petition on procedural default grounds is a determination on the merits for

purposes of the Sanders successive petition doctrine).

Molina v. Rison, 886 F.2d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that a successive claim is

improper if gravamen of legal claim is the same, regardless of whether the basic claim

is supported by new or different legal arguments).

Hamilton v. Vasquez, 882 F.2d 1469, 1473 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that dismissal

without prejudice for exhaustion does not constitute a dismissal on merits and, thus,

subsequent filing is not a successive petition in violation of Sanders).
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Johnson v. Lumpkin, 769 F.2d 630, 637 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that dismissal with

prejudice of prior habeas petition does not necessarily constitute a merit decision for

Sanders purposes).

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (2000) (requiring dismissal of all § 2254 petitions raising same

grounds as prior petition).

6.2.3.1.1 Ends of Justice Exception

In Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), the Supreme Court held that in order for

a federal court to consider a claim previously addressed in a habeas proceeding, the

petitioner must demonstrate that the previous decision was not on the merits or that

reconsideration of the merits would serve the ends of justice. Courts typically defined

the “ends of justice” by objective factors such as, but not limited to, whether a full and

fair hearing occurred on the original petition or whether an intervening change in the

facts or applicable law occurred. However, in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436

(1986), a Supreme Court plurality limited consideration of the “ends of justice” to cases

in which the petitioner supplements the claim with a colorable showing of factual

innocence.

Moreover, the post-AEDPA version of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)–“A claim . . .

that was presented in a previous application shall be dismissed”–does not include the

“ends of justice” exception for previously presented claims to be raised again in a

subsequent petition.

Supreme Court:

Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992) (holding that in order to prove actual

innocence, petitioner must show fair probability that rational trier of fact would have

entertained reasonable doubt re: existence of facts which are prerequisites under state

or federal law for imposition of death penalty).

Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (plurality) (holding “ends of justice” served

where exception to dismissal of successive petition made only when the petitioner
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supplements constitutional claim with colorable showing of factual innocence).

Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963) (permitting re-litigation of successive

claim where previous adjudication was not on merits, or where reconsideration of the

claim serves the ends of justice).

Ninth Circuit:

Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (emphasizing that a

petitioner need not prove that he is actually innocent in order to pass through the

Schlup gateway; petitioner need only present evidence of innocence that undermines

confidence in the outcome of the trial; “the claim is procedural, not substantive”), cert.

denied, 523 U.S. 1133 (1998).

Richmond v. Ricketts, 774 F.2d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that where petitioner

did not appeal the denial of previously litigated claims because they were not the basis

for relief, reaching those claims serves Rule 9(b) ends of justice).

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (2000) (prohibiting review of successive petitions).

See generally:

George W. Sherrell IV, Note, Successive Chances for Life: Kuhlmann v. Wilson,

Federal Habeas Corpus and the Capital Petitioner, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 455 (1989)

(summarizing Kuhlmann and arguing that standard for review of successive petitions is

too restrictive).

6.2.3.1.2 Recalling the Mandate

In Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998), the Supreme Court addressed the issue

of whether a circuit court's mandate recall is subject to successive petition analysis. 

Although the court held AEDPA inapplicable, in reaching its holding it stated that a

prisoner's motion to recall an appellate court mandate on the basis of the underlying

merits in a capital habeas case would be subject to § 2244(b). The Court explained that

because the Ninth Circuit acted sua sponte and recalled the mandate based on the

merits of Thompson’s first petition, the mandate recall did not contravene the letter of
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490 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

AEDPA. However, the Supreme Court also found that while AEDPA did not govern

the case, the appellate court was nevertheless required to act in a manner consistent

with the statute. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that a federal court of appeals

abuses its discretion if, absent a miscarriage of justice, it recalls sua sponte a mandate

to revisit the merits of an earlier decision denying habeas relief. The Court determined

on the specific facts of Thompson that the Ninth Circuit abused its discretion recalling

its mandate.

Supreme Court:

Bell v. Thompson, 125 S. Ct. 2825 (2005) (holding that, assuming Fed. R. App. P. 41

authorizes a stay of a mandate following a denial of certiorari and that a court

may stay the mandate without entering an order, the Sixth Circuit’s decision to

do so here was an abuse of discretion; also holding that Sixth Circuit did not accord 

appropriate level of respect to state’s judgment where it withheld its mandate for over

five months--based on evidence supporting only arguable constitutional claim--while

the state prepared to carry out the execution; commenting that while state’s reliance

interest was not as strong in a case where, unlike Calderon v. Thompson, the mandate

has not issued, the finality and comity concerns that animated Thompson were

implicated in the present case).

Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998) (determining that a motion to recall a 

mandate can be considered successive under the AEDPA; holding that it is an abuse of

discretion for a court of appeals to recall a mandate sua sponte absent a miscarriage of

justice; finding that the Ninth Circuit abused its discretion in recalling its mandate).

Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that

nothing in the AEDPA speaks to the courts of appeals’ inherent power to recall a

mandate, so long as the power is not abused to enable litigation of otherwise forbidden

SOS claims; stating that, “[w]hatever policy the court is pursuing, it is not the policy of

the AEDPA”).

Ninth Circuit:

Nevius v. Sumner, 105 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 1996) (denying capital habeas petitioner’s

motion to recall the mandate to reopen proceedings and present new claims,

recognizing that recall would undermine McCleskey and AEDPA), cert. denied, 527
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U.S. 1006 (1999)

See generally:

Stephen Reinhardt, The Anatomy of an Execution: Fairness vs. “Process,” 74 N.Y. L.

Rev. 313 (1999) (discussing the Thomas Thompson case and asserting that the

Supreme Court's Calderon decision implicitly extends the rule holding defendants

liable for procedural errors made by their attorneys to holding defendant's liable for

procedural errors made by their judges).

6.2.3.1.3 Rule 60(b)

In Gonzalez v. Crosby, 125 S. Ct. 2641 (2005), the Supreme Court held that if a motion

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) for relief from judgment contains one or more “claims,” it

is subject to AEDPA’s restrictions on successive habeas petitions. The Court also held

that a Rule 60(b) motion can be said to bring a claim if it seeks to add a new ground for

relief from the state conviction or attacks the federal court’s previous resolution of a

claim on the merits, but not if it merely attacks a defect in the integrity of the federal

habeas proceedings. Id. at 2648. The Court concluded that if neither the motion itself

nor the federal judgment from which it seeks relief substantively addresses federal

grounds for setting aside the movant’s state conviction, allowing the Rule 60(b) motion

to proceed as denominated creates no inconsistency with the habeas statute or rules. Id.

Supreme Court:

Gonzalez v. Crosby, 125 S. Ct. 2641 (2005) (holding that where neither the Rule 60(b)

motion itself nor the federal judgment from which it seeks relief substantively

addresses federal grounds for setting aside the movant’s state conviction, allowing the

motion to proceed on its own terms creates no inconsistency with the habeas statute or

rules; accordingly, a Rule 60(b) motion that challenged only the district court’s

previous ruling on AEDPA’s statute of limitations was not the equivalent of a

successive habeas petition and did not require a certificate of appealability).

Abdur’Rahman v. Bell, 537 U.S. 88 (2002) (per curiam) (dismissing writ of certiorari as

improvidently granted; but see dissenting opinion of Stevens, J. expressing view that

there was a need for clarification of the availability of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

60(b) motions to challenge the integrity of final orders entered in habeas proceedings,

and agreeing with the view that the difference between a second and successive habeas
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motion and a Rule 60(b) motion lies in the harm intended to be cured: a second or

successive habeas petition is meant to remedy a constitutional violation, while a Rule

60(b) motion is designed to cure procedural violations in an earlier proceeding that

raise questions about that proceedings integrity). 

6.2.3.2 Petitions Raising Different Grounds

Prior to enactment of the AEDPA, Rule 9(b) of the rules governing § 2254 and § 2255

cases provided for the dismissal of a subsequent petition where the court found that

petitioner's failure to assert new or different grounds in an earlier petition constituted an

“abuse of the writ.” In Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), the Supreme Court

ruled that a petition constitutes an “abuse of the writ” if the petitioner: (a) deliberately

withheld the new grounds from a prior petition, (b) is pursuing needless piecemeal

litigation, or (c) has raised the claims only to vex, harass, or delay.

In 1991, the Supreme Court substantially revised the abuse of the writ

standard in McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991). The McCleskey Court held that in

order to avoid dismissal of a new claim as an abuse of the writ, a petitioner must show

(1) cause for the failure to raise the claim previously and (2) prejudice resulting

therefrom, or (3) a miscarriage of justice. The Court lifted this “cause and prejudice”

standard from its procedural default cases. To demonstrate cause, a petitioner must

show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to

raise the claim in state court. The petitioner must then show actual prejudice from the

claimed error. The Advisory Committee Notes to former Rule 9(b) provided that a

retroactive change in the law and newly discovered evidence constituted acceptable

cause for failing to raise a claim in an earlier petition.

In 1996, Congress enacted the AEDPA which amended § 2244(b)(2) to

prohibit review of subsequent petitions raising new claims unless one of two conditions

are met. Section 2244(b)(2) provides:

A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus

application under § 2254 that was not presented in a prior

application shall be dismissed unless–

(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of

constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review
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by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or

(B)(I) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been

discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and

(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of

the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear

and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no

reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the

underlying offense.

Supreme Court:

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) (holding that a pre-AEDPA habeas

petition–filed after an initial petition was unadjudicated and dismissed for failure to

exhaust state remedies–is not a second or successive petition, notwithstanding that

additional claims were included in the subsequent petition; suggesting that the

definition of second or successive would be the same under AEDPA.).

Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) (holding that the AEDPA codified abuse of the

writ doctrine in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)).

Gomez v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653 (1992) (holding

that petitioner's last-minute § 1983 claim, that execution by gas violates the Eighth

Amendment, was abusive where it could have been raised in earlier habeas petitions) 

McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (holding that claims in subsequent petition that

were not alleged in previous petitions will be dismissed as an abuse of the writ unless

petitioner can show: (a) cause for failure to raise claim previously, and prejudice

resulting therefrom, or (b) factual innocence).

Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963) (setting forth abuse of writ standard prior

to McCleskey; holding that since res judicata is not applicable in habeas proceedings,

federal court must reach merits of subsequent claims unless: (a) the claims were

deliberately withheld or abandoned, or (b) the purpose of the petition is to vex, harass,

or delay; re-litigation of successive claim is permitted if the ends of justice is thereby

served).

Ninth Circuit:

Babbitt v. Woodford, 177 F.3d 744 (9th Cir.) (barring petitioner's claim that trial

counsel's racial bias created structural error because factual predicates underlying claim
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could have been discovered through exercise of due diligence and, even if proven,

claims would not establish actual innocence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1107 (1999).

Siripongs v. Calderon, 167 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir.) (analyzing facts and holding that

petitioner's claim that prosecutors withheld exculpatory evidence did not satisfy either

element of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B) so as to establish cause for his default), cert.

denied, 525 U.S. 1131 (1999)

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Kelly V), 163 F.3d 530

(9th Cir. 1998) (stating that habeas petitioner's failure to present all possible grounds

for relief in the defensive posture of an opposition to state's mandamus petition did not

turn later petition into an abuse of the writ; opposition to a mandamus petition is not a

substitute for a habeas petition), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1060 (1999).

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that state waived abuse of

writ argument by failing to raise it when it filed objections to magistrate judge's

recommendations).

United States v. Allen, 157 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that a ground is

successive if the basic thrust or gravamen of the legal claim is the same, regardless of

whether the basic claim is supported by new and different legal arguments; identical

grounds may often be proved by different factual allegations).

Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918 (9th Cir.) (quoting Sawyer and interpreting last

“prong” of § 2244(b)(2) as permitting petitioner to show by clear and convincing

evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found

petitioner death eligible under state law; finding that petitioner did not meet the §

2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) actual innocence standard), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 965 (1998).

Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 944 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that a Lackey (length of

capital confinement) claim, not raised in a first § 2254 petition, does not fall within

either exception to the AEDPA's bar against subsequent claims), cert. denied, 526 U.S.

1123 (1999).

Villafuerte v. Stewart, 142 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 1998) (refusing to allow pursuit of new

claims brought in second petition, including claim of racial bias by judge later

suspended for use of racial epithets, because petitioner failed to meet § 2244(b)(2)(B)'s

requirements).

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal. (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981 (9th

Cir.) (noting that proposed second amended petition, adding newly exhausted claims to
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first amended petition held in abeyance while petitioner pursued unexhausted claims,

could be barred as an abuse of the writ, but finding that state's challenge is premature

until petitioner attempts to re-amend), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 920 (1998).

Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (allowing petitioner to pass

through Schlup actual innocence gateway, emphasizing that petitioner need not prove

that he is actually innocent, but instead must present evidence such that a court cannot

have confidence in the outcome of the trial; the claim is procedural, not substantive),

cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1133 (1998).

Woratzeck v. Stewart, 118 F.3d 648 (9th Cir. 1997) (precluding inmate's claims under

the AEDPA where inmate failed to make a prima facie showing that he could not have

uncovered the claim through prior exercise of due diligence).

United States v. Lorentsen, 106 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1997) (denying movant's successive

§ 2255 motion because it relied on new statutory interpretation, rather than new

constitutional rule, and because the interpretation was not made retroactive to cases on

collateral review).

Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1287 (9th Cir.) (finding no new rule of constitutional

law made retroactive by the Supreme Court in claim that penalty of death by lethal

injection for first degree murder is unconstitutional), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1103

(1997).

Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that § 2244(b)(2)(B)

forecloses all successive petition reviews of constitutional claims unrelated to guilt or

innocence), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1102 (1997).

Nevius v. McDaniel, 104 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that petitioner made

a prima facie showing of new rule of constitutional law and granting request for leave

to file a second habeas petition).

Farmer v. McDaniel, 98 F.3d 1548 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that subsequent habeas

corpus petition alleging “new and different” grounds for relief is subject to Rule 9(b)

abuse of writ scrutiny, even though dismissal of prior petition was not based on merits),

abrogated by Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000).

Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that McCleskey abuse of writ

standard does not create new rule and thus is retroactive under Teague), cert. denied,

503 U.S. 910 (1992).
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496 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that where district court

granted relief from sentence on one ground, failure to appeal denial of relief on other

grounds does not constitute an abuse of the writ), rev'd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 40

(1992).

Molina v. Rison, 886 F.2d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 1989) (defining, prior to McCleskey,

“abusive” petition as one in which petitioner has: (a) deliberately withheld the new

grounds from a prior petition, (b) pursued needless piecemeal litigation, or (c) raised

the claims only to vex, harass, or delay).

Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating, prior to McCleskey,

that district court's decision not to dismiss petition for abuse of the writ is reviewed for

abuse of discretion), vacated on other grounds, 500 U.S. 901 (1992).

Hamilton v. Vasquez, 882 F.2d 1469, 1473 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that re-filed petition

following dismissal of prior petition without prejudice is not abusive).

Neuschafer v. Whitley, 860 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that petitioner did not

abuse writ in bringing claims in second petition that were left out of first petition for

lack of exhaustion).

See generally:

Alan Ellis, et al., It's Not Too Late Part II: Filing Second and Successive 2255 Motions

Under the New Habeas Corpus Reform Law, 21-Feb Champion 16 (1997) (arguing that

while the AEDPA was supposedly enacted to restrict abusive petitions, it actually

restricts the postconviction rights of prisoners).

Steven M. Goldstein, Application of Res Judicata Principles to Successive Federal

Habeas Corpus Petitions in Capital Cases: The Search for an Equitable Approach, 21

U.C. Davis L. Rev. 45 (1987) (analyzing standards of review for successive petitions

and, focusing on capital cases, attempting to resolve confusion).

David D. Kammer, Note, Restricting New-Claim Successive Applications for Federal

Writs of Habeas Corpus, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1405 (1992) (summarizing McCleskey and

related law on successive petitions).

Andrea A. Kochan, The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996:

Habeas Corpus Reform?, 52 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 399 (1997) (arguing that

the AEDPA actually exacerbates the problems in habeas corpus jurisprudence and
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severely restricts prisoners' habeas corpus rights).

Mark M. Oh, The Gateway for Successive Habeas Petitions: An Argument for Schlup v.

Delo's Standard for Actual Innocence Claims, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 2341 (1998)

(arguing that while the AEDPA's actual innocence standard appears to overrule the

prior Supreme Court standard, the AEDPA's standard should be abandoned because it

violates due process).

Deborah L. Stahlkopf, A Dark Day for Habeas Corpus: Successive Petitions under the

Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 1115 (1998)

(describing the effects of the new gatekeeper provisions under the AEDPA, how the

provisions affect inmate's ability to bring successive claims, and the implications of

such restrictions).

Cheryl R. Sweeney, McCleskey v. Zant, The Cause and Prejudice Standard in Capital

Punishment Cases, 24 U. Tol. L. Rev. 231 (1992) (analyzing history and evolution of

habeas corpus writ and new standard set forth in McCleskey).

6.2.3.2.1 Retroactivity of § 2244(b)(2)

In Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996), the Supreme Court retroactively applied 

§ 2244(b)(2) to a petitioner who had already completed his first habeas proceeding

without specifically addressing the retroactivity issue. However, the Supreme Court

decided Felker prior to Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). In Lindh, the Court

held that the AEDPA does not apply to cases that were pending at the time of the

AEDPA's enactment.

In U.S. v. Villa-Gonzalez, 208 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit

held that the application of § 2244 to a post-AEDPA successive § 2255 motion is not a

retroactive application of the AEDPA, notwithstanding that the initial § 2255 motion

was filed pre-AEDPA.

Supreme Court:

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (holding that negative implication of Chapter

154's retrospective application provision means that new provisions of Chapter 153

apply only to cases filed after the AEDPA became effective).
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Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) (applying new § 2244(b)(2) to pending case

where petitioner had already completed first habeas corpus proceeding).

Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (setting forth standard for

retroactivity of new statutes, preventing retroactive application of statute where doing

so attaches new legal consequences to events completed before enactment).

Ninth Circuit:

U.S. v. Villa-Gonzalez, 208 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the application of §

2244 to a post-AEDPA successive § 2255 motion is not a retroactive application of the

AEDPA, notwithstanding that the initial § 2255 motion was filed pre-AEDPA).

Other Circuits:

Mueller v. Angelone, 181 F.3d 557 (4th Cir.) (concluding that the Court in Lindh did

not foreclose the possibility that in some cases filed after enactment, certain of the

AEDPA's provisions might not be applicable because of an impermissible retroactive

effect; conducting Landgraf analysis, however, and finding application of AEDPA

proper), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1065 (1999).

Graham v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 762 (5th Cir. 1999) (rejecting petitioner's argument that

fourth habeas petition filed after enactment of AEDPA was continuation of third

petition, pending at the time of enactment and subsequently dismissed; reading Lindh to

recognize implicit congressional intent as satisfying Landgraf clear statement

requirement and holding that AEDPA's gatekeeping provisions apply), cert. denied,

529 U.S. 1097 (2000).

In re Minarik, 166 F.3d 591 (3rd Cir. 1999) (holding that the AEDPA's ambiguity

regarding retroactive application of its gatekeeping procedures to a second petition,

where the first petition was filed before the AEDPA, necessitates Landgraf analysis;

applying AEDPA under Landgraf because petitioner failed to show he would be

permitted a second petition under pre-AEDPA law).
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6.2.3.2.2 Types of Claims Constituting Cause and Prejudice Under Pre-AEDPA Law

6.2.3.2.2.1 New Fact Claims

Prior to the AEDPA, a prisoner could excuse a federal procedural default by

demonstrating sufficient cause for the failure to previously raise the claim. A

subsequent petition grounded on new facts or evidence not available at the time of an

earlier petition met the sufficient cause requirement under pre-AEDPA law of excusing

the failure to raise the claim earlier. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Herrera v.

Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993), however, emphasized that new evidence of innocence

alone is not sufficient cause. A new innocence claim must include a claim of

constitutional error. See infra § 6.3.2.5.

Supreme Court:

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (holding that actual innocence claim based on

new evidence is not cognizable on habeas and cannot serve as exception to abuse of

writ without identification of some constitutional error).

McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (holding that where petitioner had sufficient

evidence to support a Massiah claim before filing first petition, new evidence

discovered later was not “cause” for a Massiah claim first raised in a second petition

and thus petitioner abused the writ).

Ninth Circuit:

Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354, 1370–71 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding, prior to McCleskey,

that newly developed scientific evidence is cause for failure to include claim in prior

petition), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1051 (1990).

See generally:

Kathleen C. Boyd, Note, The Paradox of Actual Innocence in Federal Habeas Corpus

After Herrera v. Collins, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 479 (1994) (reviewing Herrera and analyzing

the resulting confusion regarding claims of innocence in federal habeas corpus cases).
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6.2.3.2.2.2 New Law Claims

A change in the law subsequent to the filing of the first habeas petition is sufficient

cause, under pre-AEDPA law, for failing to earlier include the claim based on such law,

provided that the new law is retroactive under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).

Under AEDPA, the Supreme Court would have to hold the new law should be applied

retroactively. 

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (2000).

6.2.3.2.2.3 Tactically Withheld Claims

Prior to McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991), the Ninth Circuit held in Neuschafer

v. Whitley, 860 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1988), that a petitioner does not deliberately abuse

the writ where he omitted unexhausted claims from his first petition because he

believed in good faith that the claims would be barred until exhausted. Thereafter, the

Supreme Court held in McCleskey that where a petitioner was aware of a ground

supporting a prior petition but deliberately withheld it, the petitioner could not maintain

a subsequent petition raising that ground.

Supreme Court:

McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (prohibiting petitions raising grounds

previously available but deliberately withheld).

Ninth Circuit:

Hamilton v. Vasquez, 882 F.2d 1469, 1473 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding, prior to McCleskey,

no abuse of writ where there was no affirmative indication in the record that petitioner

made a conscious decision to deliberately withhold claim).

Neuschafer v. Whitley, 860 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding, prior to McCleskey, no

abuse of writ where petitioner did not bring certain unexhausted claims in a prior

petition due to a good faith belief that their inclusion would require dismissal under
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Rose), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 906 (1989).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Ainsworth v. Vasquez, 759 F. Supp. 1467 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (adopting procedural

suggestion in Judge Alarcón's Neuschafer concurrence; stating that magistrate judges

have discretion to hold hearings to determine existence of additional claims, including

unexhausted claims; hearings, so limited, do not unduly infringe on attorney-client

privilege).

6.2.3.2.3 Exception to Procedural Default Bar: Miscarriage of Justice

The Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991), created a “fundamental

miscarriage of justice” exception to the pre-AEDPA Rule 9(b) abuse of the writ bar. 

The Court, however, appeared to limit the “miscarriage of justice” exception to claims

of factual innocence. Subsequently, in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993), the

Court emphasized that courts may not hear a federal habeas claim of actual innocence

unless the petition also alleges a federal constitutional violation.

However, in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995)–a case involving a

successive habeas petition asserting that a constitutional trial error caused the

conviction of an innocent defendant–the Court held that the standard for reviewing

such actual innocence claims is whether a constitutional violation “probably resulted in

the conviction of one who is actually innocent,” as set forth in Murray v. Carrier, 477

U.S. 478 (1986).

The current version of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2), amended by the AEDPA in

1996, does not include the “miscarriage of justice” exception to the abuse of the writ

bar. Most courts having an opportunity to determine how an actual innocence claim

operates post-AEDPA have avoided directly addressing the issue. In United States v.

Zuno-Arce, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (C.D. Cal. 1998), however, the Central District of

California held that foreclosure of a constitutional claim where there has been a

colorable factual innocence showing would likely constitute a due process violation or

an improper suspension of habeas relief. The court, therefore, extended the miscarriage

of justice gateway to claims otherwise procedurally barred by the AEDPA's statute of

limitation.
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Supreme Court:

Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386 (2004) (holding in a noncapital habeas case that a

federal court faced with allegations of actual innocence, whether of the sentence

or of the crime charged, must first address all nondefaulted claims for

comparable relief and other grounds for cause to excuse the procedural default;

in the present posture of the case, the Supreme Court declined to extend the

actual innocence exception to procedural default of constitutional claims

challenging the noncapital sentencing error).

Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998) (distinguishing the Schlup and Sawyer

miscarriage of justice standards and finding that petitioner's new evidence did not meet

either standard).

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) (holding that the Murray standard, rather than the

more stringent Sawyer standard, governs the miscarriage of justice inquiry when a

capital habeas petitioner raises an actual innocence claim to avoid procedural bar).

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (holding that an actual innocence claim does

not establish an exception to abuse of the writ unless accompanied by a claim of federal

constitutional violation).

Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992) (stating that actual innocence standard for

fundamental miscarriage of justice exception requires clear and convincing evidence

that, but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found petitioner

eligible for death penalty under applicable state law).

McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (holding that claims in subsequent petition not

alleged in previous petitions will be dismissed as an abuse of writ unless petitioner can

show: (a) cause and prejudice, or (b) a miscarriage of justice in the form of factual

innocence).

Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986) (emphasizing that the miscarriage of justice

exception addresses actual, not legal, innocence).

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (setting forth the “probably resulted in the

conviction of one who is actually innocent” actual innocence standard).

Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (holding that to show “fundamental

miscarriage of justice,” petitioner must make “colorable showing of actual innocence”).
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Ninth Circuit:

Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (emphasizing that the

Schlup gateway is a procedural mechanism for consideration of otherwise barred

claims, as opposed to a substantive, independent avenue to relief; thus, petitioner need

only present evidence of innocence which undermines confidence in the outcome of the

trial, not establish Herrera/Sawyer actual innocence), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1133

(1998).

Coley v. Gonzales, 55 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding no miscarriage of justice via

actual innocence because no showing under Schlup).

Clark v. Lewis, 1 F.3d 814 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding no miscarriage of justice where no

constitutional error occurred).

Deutscher v. Whitley, 991 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that in order to show actual

innocence of death penalty in a weighing state, petitioner must show by clear and

convincing evidence that, but for some constitutional error, the sentencing body would

have weighed the aggravating and mitigating evidence differently and elected a

sentence other than death), opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh’g, 16 F.3d 981

(9th Cir. 1994).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

United States v. Zuno-Arce, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that

foreclosure of a constitutional claim where there has been a colorable factual innocence

showing would likely constitute a due process violation or an improper suspension of

habeas relief; extending the miscarriage of justice gateway to claims otherwise

procedurally barred by the AEDPA's statute of limitation; finding that movant failed to

make sufficient showing of actual innocence).

Harding v. Lewis, 795 F. Supp. 953 (D. Ariz. 1992) (holding that petitioner did not

make necessary showing of factual innocence under miscarriage of justice exception).

See generally:

Kathleen C. Boyd, Note, The Paradox of Actual Innocence in Federal Habeas Corpus

After Herrera v. Collins, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 479 (1994) (reviewing Herrera and analyzing

the resulting confusion regarding innocence claims in federal habeas corpus cases).
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Vernon E. Googe III, Herrera v. Collins–Federal Habeas Corpus Review and Claims

of Actual Innocence, 27 Ga. L. Rev. 971 (1993) (focusing on Herrera and analyzing the

dilemma for federal courts in habeas cases alleging innocence).

Robert C. Stacy II, Note, Schlup v. Delo: The Result of Curbing Unlimited Jurisdiction

by Limiting Discretion, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 897 (1996) (focusing on miscarriage of justice

exception to procedural default rules and Schlup standard and predicting future

problems in application of Schlup because of inconsistencies in Supreme Court habeas

jurisprudence).

Jordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 303 (1993)

(analyzing Herrera and Supreme Court's new “innocence-focus” in habeas cases).

6.2.3.2.4 Burden of Proof–Abuse of the Writ

Prior to the AEDPA, the Court in McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991), held that in

order to establish an abuse of the writ or successive petition bar, the state must plead

with clarity and particularity. In response to the state’s pleading, the petitioner carries

the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that no abuse of the writ

exists. While a hearing on the abuse question is not automatic, a petitioner is entitled to

an opportunity to explain the alleged abuse.

The current version of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) requires a court of appeals

order authorizing the filing of a subsequent petition in the district court. See § 6.2.2. 

Thus, for successive petitions filed pursuant to the current version of § 2244(b), the

court of appeals will have already determined that a given petition under review makes

a prima facie showing that the petition meets the § 2244(b)(2) requirements.

Supreme Court:

McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (holding that the government satisfies its

burden of pleading abuse of the writ if it notes, with clarity and particularity,

petitioner's prior writ history, identifies the claims that appear for the first time, and

alleges that petitioner abused the writ; burden then shifts to petitioner to show cause for

failing to raise the claim, and prejudice therefrom).
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6.2.3.2.5 Successive Motions Under § 2241(c) 

See also § 6.4.3 addressing section 2255 successive motions.

Ninth Circuit:

Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1287, 1287–88 (9th Cir.) (holding that state prisoner

may not avoid the limitations imposed on successive petitions by styling his petition as

one pursuant to § 2241 rather than § 2254), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1103 (1997).

6.2.4 Amended Petitions

Section 2242 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that a petitioner may

amend a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

15. After a brief period in which a party may amend as of right, the district court has

sole discretion to grant leave to amend. In Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962), the

Supreme Court enumerated four factors relevant to determining whether to deny a

motion for leave to amend: (1) undue delay, (2) bad faith or dilatory motive, (3) futility

of amendment, and (4) prejudice to the opposing party. The Ninth Circuit, in Howey v.

United States, 481 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1973), held that these factors are not of equal

weight and found that denial should occur only where prejudice or bad faith exists. 

However, in Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit stated

that futility alone may be sufficient to deny a motion to amend.

In the context of death penalty habeas petitions, amended petitions take on

special significance in light of the doctrines limiting successive and abusive petitions

where the petitioner knew or should have known of the amended claims at the time of

initial filing, see supra §§ 6.2.2, 6.2.3 and infra § 6.3.3, and in light of AEDPA’s

statute of limitation. See supra § 6.2.1. In Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568 (9th Cir.

2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 941 (2001), the Ninth Circuit allowed for two

amendments to a habeas petition. First, the petitioner moved to amend a mixed petition

dismissed without prejudice, to include only the exhausted claim. The Ninth Circuit

affirmed the district court’s exercise of equitable power to accept petitioner’s

amendment nunc pro tunc to the date of original filing, notwithstanding that the initial

petition was dismissed. The Ninth Circuit also ruled that Anthony’s later amended
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petition incorporating the newly exhausted claims–which by itself would be barred by

the statute of limitation–related back to the date of original filing. The Anthony court

felt the relation back was appropriate because the state was on notice of the newly

exhausted claims since they were included in the first federal petition.

In a noncapital case, the Supreme Court held in Mayle v. Felix, 125 S. Ct.

2562 (2005), that an amended habeas petition does not relate back when it asserts a

new ground for relief supported by facts that differ in both time and type from those set

forth in the original pleading. The Court rejected the view that the relevant transaction

for purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2) was the petitioner’s state-court trial and

conviction; however, the Court held that so long as the original and the amended

petitions state claims that are tied to a common core of operative facts, relation back

will be in order. 

Finally, if a state “opts in” to the AEDPA’s special capital provisions, see

infra § 6.2.16, then, according to the AEDPA, a petitioner may amend a habeas corpus

petition only if it meets the grounds for successive petitions specified in § 2244(b). See

supra §§ 6.2.2 and 6.2.3.2.

Supreme Court:

Mayle v. Felix, 125 S. Ct. 2562 (2005) (holding in a noncapital case that an amended 

habeas petition does not relate back when it asserts a new ground for relief supported

by facts that differ in both time and type from those set forth in the original pleading).

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) (analyzing amendment of petitions under Rule

15; listing factors for consideration of amendment: undue delay, bad faith or dilatory

motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by prior amendments, undue prejudice,

futility, etc.).

Ninth Circuit:

Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding district court properly

exercised equitable power to accept petitioner’s amendment–dismissing unexhausted

claims in mixed petition–nunc pro tunc to the date of original filing, notwithstanding

that the initial petition was dismissed; also holding petitioner’s later amended petition

incorporating the newly exhausted claims–which by itself would be barred by the
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statute of limitation–related back to the date of original filing since the state was on

notice of the newly exhausted claims which were included in the first habeas petition,

but see Fernandez, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 941 (2001).

Zarska v. Stewart, 182 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished) (denying petitioner's

motion to amend as futile).

Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir.) (holding that petitioner's second habeas

petition, following dismissal of first petition for failure to exhaust, did not relate back

to first petition for purpose of determining whether petitioner was “in custody” at time

of second petition, notwithstanding rule permitting relation back of amended pleadings;

district court did not retain jurisdiction over original petition because a dismissal

without prejudice for failure to exhaust terminates the action), cert. denied, 528 U.S.

963 (1999).

Williams v. Calderon, 83 F.3d 281 (9th Cir.) (holding that post AEDPA amendment to

pending petition relates back to original filing date), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1183

(1996).

Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying Ninth Circuit's Rule 15

amended petition policy; affirming district court’s denial of motions for leave to amend

because of petitioner's abuse of the writ and the amendment's futility), cert. denied, 516

U.S. 1051 (1996).

Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting amended petition as

proper pleading to raise additional grounds for relief), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1026

(1995).

Fetterly v. Paskett, 997 F.2d 1295, 1297 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting amended petition's

potential Rose exhaustion problem), cert. denied sub nom., Arave v. Fetterly, 513 U.S.

914 (1994).

Western Shoshone Nat'l Council v. Molini, 951 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding no

abuse of discretion in denial of leave to file third amended complaint where delay and

prejudice existed), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 822 (1992).

Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989)

(upholding district court's denial of leave to amend where bad faith, undue delay, and

prejudice were “readily apparent” and district court previously granted leave to amend).

United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1981) (following Howey and noting that
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where no bad faith or prejudice, court cannot determine whether denial of motion for

leave to amend was abuse of discretion; remanding for further proceedings).

Howey v. United States, 481 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that delay alone, no

matter how lengthy, is insufficient to deny leave to amend; courts should deny leave to

amend only where the government shows prejudice or bad faith).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

United States v. Zuno-Arce, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that after

the government filed its opposition, movant had no right to amend his motion to assert

additional claims without leave of court).

Bonin v. Vasquez, 807 F. Supp. 586 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (denying petitioner's motion to

amend because of undue delay, prejudice, and abuse of the writ), aff’d, 59 F.3d 815

(9th Cir. 1995).

6.2.5 State Procedural Default–Adequate and Independent State Ground

To preserve comity and federalism, federal courts will not review a petitioner's claim

denied by a state court based on independent state law adequate to support the

judgment. Thus, in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) and later in Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), the Supreme Court held that where the state, by a state

procedure, procedurally bars a defendant from raising a federal claim in state court, the

defendant may not then raise that claim in a federal petition absent a showing of

“cause” for the procedural default and “actual prejudice” from the failure to raise the

claim, or a demonstration that failure of the court to consider the claims will result in a

fundamental miscarriage of justice. In Sykes, the defendant failed to object at trial to

the admission of statements allegedly obtained in violation of Miranda. The Court held

that the state rule requiring contemporaneous objection to such evidence represented an

adequate and independent state procedural ground barring federal habeas review absent

a demonstration of cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice.

In English v. United States, 42 F.3d 473 (9th Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit

stated that federal courts in habeas proceedings will not find a procedural bar simply

because the petitioner failed to raise the claim at trial or on appeal. Procedural default
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is triggered by the violation of a state procedural rule, not the mere failure to raise a

claim. In English, no state procedural rule required the petitioner to raise or waive his

particular claim.

Supreme Court:

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999) (stating that a prisoner who fails to timely

present his claims in a petition for discretionary review to a state court of last resort has

not properly presented his claims to the state court, and therefore procedurally defaults

his claims).

Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518 (1997) (stating that the independent and adequate

state ground doctrine applies to bar federal habeas claims defaulted under state law,

even though such doctrine is not technically jurisdictional when federal court considers

state prisoner’s federal habeas petition).

Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527 (1992) (holding that pretrial motion challenging state’s

“heinousness” aggravating factor does not preserve claim for federal review where

defendant procedurally defaulted claim by failing to object after factor was read to

jury).

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (barring petitioner from federal review

where state judgment clearly relied on state rule of appellate procedure independent of

federal claim and adequate to support judgment; expanding Sykes' cause and prejudice

standard to all procedural defaults).

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989) (holding that state court's adequate and

independent finding of procedural default bars federal review unless petitioner shows

cause and prejudice for default or fundamental miscarriage of justice).

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (holding that where a state prisoner defaulted

on federal claims in state court pursuant to independent and adequate state procedural

rule, the procedural default doctrine bars federal habeas review unless prisoner

demonstrates cause for the default and actual prejudice as result of alleged violation of

federal law, or that failure to consider claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of

justice).

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (barring petitioner who failed to comply with

state contemporaneous objection rule from federal relief unless he showed both cause

for and prejudice from default).
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Ninth Circuit:

Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.) (considering whether habeas petition was

procedurally defaulted and holding that California Supreme Court’s denial of state

court habeas petition “on the merits and for lack of diligence” for untimeliness

constituted an independent state ground; reversing on the issue whether the state

ground was adequate and remanding for district court to reconsider this issue with the

ultimate burden of proof on the state; noting that on this record, the court could not

conclude that California had regularly and consistently applied the untimeliness bar in

habeas cases), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 948 (2003).

Hill v. Roe, 321 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding in noncapital case that California

Supreme Court’s citation of In re Waltreus, 62 Cal.3d 218 (1965) (habeas petition

“ordinarily cannot serve as a second appeal”) in denying habeas petition was neither a

ruling on the merits nor a denial on procedural grounds, and therefore there was not an

independent and adequate state procedural ground that would bar federal habeas

review; also holding that petitioner did not have ultimate burden of proving the

California Supreme Court’s citation to People v Hill, 9 Cal.3d 784 (1973) (cannot raise

in state habeas an issue that has been litigated at trial and considered on direct appeal

unless it relates to innocence or guilt) was not an independent and adequate state

procedural ground that would bar federal review).

Kibler v. Walters, 220 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding claim procedurally defaulted

notwithstanding state supreme court denied claim without stating basis for denial), cert.

denied, 531 U.S. 1086 (2001).

Wood v. Hall, 130 F.3d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that when a state prisoner

defaults a claim by violating a state procedural rule that would constitute an adequate

and independent basis to bar direct review in the U.S. Supreme Court, he may not raise

the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause and prejudice), cert. denied sub

nom., Wood v. Cook, 523 U.S. 1129 (1998).

Forrest v. Vasquez, 75 F.3d 562 (9th Cir.) (holding that California Rule of Court 28(b)

is an adequate and independent state ground barring federal habeas review), cert.

denied, 519 U.S. 832 (1996).

English v. United States, 42 F.3d 473 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding no procedural

default–and thus no need to evaluate cause and prejudice–in defendant's failure to

earlier raise objection to magistrate presiding over jury selection because Supreme

Court's Gomez case not yet a rule).
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Harmon v. Ryan, 959 F.2d 1457, 1461 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining independent and

adequate requirement).

Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1380 n.5 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying Sykes cause and

prejudice test to default involving a successive state habeas petition).

Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 907–09 (9th Cir. 1986)

(applying Sykes standard to pro se petitioner's failure to appeal a dismissal of

postconviction relief to state supreme court).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Paradis v. Arave, 667 F. Supp. 1361 (D. Idaho 1987) (noting that under Idaho law there

can be no procedural default, by failure to object, arising from the sentence of death

and sentencing procedure at trial level).

See generally:

Carole C. Cooke, Note, Procedural Defaults at the Appellate Stage and Federal

Habeas Corpus Review, Stan. L. Rev. 463 (1986) (examining standard that federal

courts should use in deciding whether to review a “procedurally defaulted” state claim).

Stephanie Dest, Comment, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Procedural Default: An

Abstention-Based Interest Analysis, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263 (1989) (analyzing

procedural default and habeas jurisprudence).

James W. Dobbins, Note, Applying Wainwright v. Sykes to State Alternative Holdings

and Summary Affirmances, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 1357 (1985) (analyzing Wainwright

and Supreme Court decisions on state procedural default of federal review).

Saul B. Goodman & Jonathan B. Sallet, Wainwright v. Sykes: The Lower Federal

Courts Respond, 30 Hastings L.J. 1683 (1979).

Jason M. Halper, Note, Harris v. Reed: A New Look at Federal Habeas Jurisdiction

Over State Petitioners, 58 Fordham L. Rev. 493 (1989) (addressing cause and prejudice

standard and Harris, arguing that Harris will either eviscerate cause and prejudice test

or compel changes in state court opinion writing).

Note, On the Threshold of Wainwright v. Sykes: Federal Habeas Court Scrutiny of

State Procedural Rules and Rulings, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1393 (1985) (examining specific
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problems raised by Sykes that must be resolved in determining whether a state ruling is

based on adequate state procedural ground).

6.2.5.1 Independent State Ground

Where a state bars a federal claim based, at least in part, upon its determination of

federal law, the state's bar is not an independent state ground barring federal habeas

review under Sykes. In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74–75 (1985), the Supreme

Court held that the state court's rejection of petitioner's claim under the due process

clause that the state improperly denied him a court-appointed psychiatrist was

dependent on the state court's antecedent ruling on federal law–that indigent defendants

are not entitled to a psychiatrist–and, thus, was not an independent state ground.

Supreme Court:

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 (2002) (per curiam) (holding, following answering of

certified question by Arizona Supreme Court, that because finding of waiver of

ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Arizona’s Rule 32.2(a)(3) does not

require examination of merits of claim, it is independent of federal law; reversing

judgment in capital case that had held state procedural default ruling on ineffective

assistance of counsel claim did not rest on independent state grounds).

Stewart v. Smith, 534 U.S. 157 (2001) (per curiam) (as to Ninth Circuit decision

holding petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim not to be procedurally

defaulted because Arizona’s Rule 32.2 requires that state court consider nature of claim

before finding it procedurally defaulted, certifying question to Arizona Supreme Court

as follows: at time of respondent’s Rule 32 petition in 1995, did question whether

asserted claim was of “sufficient constitutional magnitude” to require a knowing,

voluntary, and intelligent waiver for purposes of Rule 32.2(a)(3) depend on the merits

of the particular claim or merely on the particular right alleged to be violated), answer

to certified question conformed to, 536 U.S. 856 (above) .

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74–75 (1985) (holding that state procedural rule does

not constitute an independent state ground where determination depended on state

court's antecedent ruling on federal law).
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Ninth Circuit:

La Crosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding California’s untimeliness

bar is not a basis for procedurally defaulting and dismissing federal petition where state

post conviction petition dismissed pursuant to state untimeliness bar before California

Supreme Court decided In Re Robbins).

Washington v. Cambra, 208 F.3d 832 (9th Cir.) (following Park and reversing district

court’s dismissal of petition on California’s Dixon default rule), cert denied, 531 U.S.

919 (2000).

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir.) (holding that a federal habeas petitioner is

not procedurally defaulted on federal constitutional claims where state supreme court

had to make a decision on the federal merits as part of its denial on state procedural

grounds; holding California’s Dixon rule not an independent state law ground), cert.

denied, 531 U.S. 918 (2000).

Bargas v. Burns, 179 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting petitioner's claim that state's

order impermissibly “interweaves” state and federal law), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1073

(2000).

Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that state decision adopting

mixed arguments of preclusion and waiver is not independent and adequate state law

ground), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 971 (1997).

Beam v. Paskett, 3 F.3d 1301 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that even if petitioner failed to

fairly present to state supreme court, court's affirmance of death sentence necessarily

included a determination of federal law and thus did not constitute an independent state

ground barring habeas challenge), cert. denied sub nom., Arave v. Beam, 511 U.S. 1060

(1994).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Protsman v. Pliler, 318 F. Supp.2d 1004 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (in a case in which the

noncapital habeas petitioner was tried after the Robbins decision was issued by the

California Supreme Court, holding that the application of the Dixon case, barring use of

habeas petition to raise claims that could have been raised on direct appeal, was not

“interwoven with federal law” and thus the Dixon bar was an independent state ground

barring federal review). 
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McClain v. Hill, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (finding that petitioner's claims

were not defaulted because state's ruling was not based on independent state ground).

Turner v. Calderon, 970 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. Cal. 1997) (noting the court’s

determination that California’s Dixon rule is an independent state ground which bars

federal review).

See generally:

Patrik M. Griego, Note, The “Great Writ” May Once Again Deliver Justice to the Most

Deserving Prisoners: An Analysis of Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 31.2(B) in

Light of Beam v. Paskett, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 311 (1997) (addressing question left open by

Beam as to how Ninth Circuit interprets Arizona Rule 31.2(b), automatic capital appeal

statute).

6.2.5.1.1 Alternative Rulings on Federal Law Do Not Negate Independent State Ground

The Supreme Court, in Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989), held that where a state

court explicitly and alternatively rules on both independent state grounds and the merits

of a federal claim, the independent state ground supports a procedural bar. Assuming

the bar is “adequate,” federal courts may not conduct a habeas review of the federal

claim. Where it is not clear that the state ground is an alternative holding, the federal

courts must deem the state's decision to be based on the federal merits. See infra

§ 6.2.5.1.2.

Supreme Court:

Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527 (1992) (holding that a procedural bar is independent if

the “state court’s opinion ‘indicates clearly and expressly’ that the state ground is an

alternative holding”).

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989) (stating that “a state court need not fear reaching

the merits of a federal claim in an alternative holding. By its very definition, the

adequate and independent state ground doctrine requires the federal court to honor a

state holding that is a sufficient basis for the state courts judgment, even when the state

court also relies on federal law.”).
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Ninth Circuit:

Loveland v. Hatcher, 231 F.3d 640 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding Nevada Supreme Court’s

ruling denying postconviction appeal based on state procedural bar was an independent

and alternate basis for denying relief, notwithstanding that relief also denied on the

merits).

McKenna v. McDaniel, 65 F.3d 1483, 1488–89 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that state

court’s refusal to entertain claims, at best, represented a refusal to exercise discretion to

hear the claims, and was thus insufficient for the state to invoke the procedural bar

doctrine), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1150 (1996).

Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding ineffective assistance claim

procedurally defaulted where claim was not raised on direct appeal and the state

supreme court denied claim on procedural grounds and the merits), cert. denied, 507

U.S. 992 (1993).

Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that federal court should not

presume that state courts denial of habeas claim was not independent and adequate

where state court denied claim on a procedural bar, but also reaches the merits).

Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating, “[i]t is significant in

our interpretation that the Washington Supreme Court decided not to exercise its

discretionary power–as contrasted with refusing to hear [defendant]’s case because of a

procedural bar”).

Bruni v. Lewis, 847 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that when state appellate

court alternatively bases its ruling on the merits and procedural grounds, and state

supreme court dismisses petition without explanation, there is no procedural bar to

reaching merits on federal habeas review).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Karis v. Vasquez, 828 F. Supp. 1449 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that state court decision

regarding claims reviewable in second habeas petition appeared to rely equally on state

and federal grounds and, thus, was inadequate to bar federal review).
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6.2.5.1.2 Ambiguous Rulings Presumed Not Independent

If a state ruling leaves some question as to whether it is based upon state or federal law,

it is difficult to determine whether it constitutes an independent state ground barring

federal review under Sykes. In Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989) and later in

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), the Supreme Court established that where

a state decision “fairly appears” to rest primarily on federal grounds or is “interwoven”

with federal law, it will be presumed not to rest independently on state law unless the

last state court rendering a judgment “clearly and expressly states that its judgment

rests on a state ground.” In Coleman, the Court clarified that the presumption applies

only to ambiguous state decisions that appear to rely on federal law and does not

require all state decisions, whether or not ambiguous, to include a “clear and express”

statement of the ground for judgment.

Supreme Court:

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991) (reversing the Ninth Circuit and ruling that

where one reasoned state judgment rejected a federal claim, later unexplained orders

upholding that judgment or rejecting same claim are presumed to rest upon same

ground).

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (stating that court will not presume

independent and adequate state ground when a state court decision “fairly appears” to

rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with federal law, and when adequacy

and independence of any state law ground is not clear from face of opinion; declining

to expand Harris presumption to all state opinions, only those “fairly appearing” to rest

on federal grounds or “interwoven” with federal law).

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (holding that Harris rule does not apply where

claim was not fairly presented to the state court; in such cases federal court should

apply procedural bar where state court would if given the opportunity).

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989) (holding that where state decision appears to rest

primarily on federal grounds or is interwoven with federal law, decision does not rest

independently on state law unless “clearly and expressly” indicated).
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Ninth Circuit:

Gretzler v. Stewart, 112 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that petitioner did not

procedurally default ineffective assistance of counsel claim where state court did not

clearly set forth an independent and adequate state basis for rejecting the claim, chose

to reach the merits of the claim, and did so by applying federal law), cert. denied, 522

U.S. 1081 (1998).

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Cal. (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126 (9th

Cir. 1996) (finding that state court’s ambiguous order, failing to specify which of

petitioner’s claims were rejected under each of two cited state doctrines, did not bar

federal collateral review under procedural default doctrine), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1204

(1997).

Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that since state court did

not cite to a particular procedural rule and discussed “the merits” of claim, state’s

decision was not independent and adequate and did not bar federal review), cert.

denied, 513 U.S. 1183 (1995).

Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding that when

state’s decision relies on both state procedural grounds and federal grounds, state court

must make “clear and express statement” of alternative reliance on state procedural

grounds to avoid federal review), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 992 (1993).

Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that if state court does

not “clearly and expressly” rely on procedural default, federal court will address

merits), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1260 (1991).

Vickers v. Ricketts, 798 F.2d 369, 373 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that federal court may

address merits, despite petitioner’s failure to request instruction at trial, because state

court did not invoke procedural bar), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054 (1987).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Karis v. Vasquez, 828 F. Supp. 1449 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that state court decision

regarding claims reviewable in second habeas petition appeared to rely equally on state

and federal grounds, thus ground was inadequate to bar federal review).
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6.2.5.2 Adequate State Ground

6.2.5.2.1 Firmly Established, Regularly Applied

In order for an adequate state ground to bar federal review under Sykes, the state must

apply state law that is “firmly established” and “regularly applied” at the time of the

default. In Ulster County Ct. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 147–50 (1979), the Court

reasoned that “if neither the state legislature nor the state courts indicate that a federal

claim is barred by some state procedural rule, a federal court implies no disrespect for

the state by entertaining the claim.”

Supreme Court:

Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423–24 (1991) (holding that only a firmly established

state practice, regularly followed at the time applied, will bar habeas review).

Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410–12 n.6 (1989) (holding state procedural rule

adequate because state supreme court consistently applied the rule in the “vast

majority” of cases).

James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348–51 (1984) (holding state procedural rule not

independent and adequate where defendant asked trial court for jury “admonition” and

the state supreme court refused to hear appeal because defendant had not asked for an

“instruction”; distinction between “admonition” and “instruction” not consistently

applied by state court).

Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 262–63 (1982) (stating that state procedural ground

is not adequate unless “strictly or regularly followed”).

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989) (noting that where state fails to apply procedural

rule in instant case–i.e., decides federal claim on merits–then rule is not regularly

applied and is inadequate state ground to bar habeas review).

Ulster County Ct. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 147–50 (1979) (holding that state procedural

rule triggers Sykes only if state regularly applies it; where state court reaches merits

notwithstanding procedural default, federal court may consider merits).
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NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding state procedural

bar dependent and inadequate where criminal defendant “could not fairly be deemed to

have been apprised of its existence,” even though it may retrospectively appear to form

part of consistent procedural pattern).

Ninth Circuit:

Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.) (considering in noncapital case whether 

habeas petition was procedurally defaulted and holding that California Supreme

Court’s denial of state court habeas petition “on the merits and for lack of diligence”

for untimeliness constituted an independent state ground but noting that on this record,

the court could not conclude that California had regularly and consistently applied the

untimeliness bar in habeas cases), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 948 (2003).

Petrocelli v. Angelone, 248 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that Nevada’s application

of its procedural bar rule pertaining to a claim not raised in a prior proceeding is not

consistently applied or well-established).

Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding district court erred in

dismissing ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on state procedural default;

finding that Arizona rule requiring that ineffective assistance of counsel claim be raised

on direct appeal did not bar federal habeas review because it was so unclear that it did

not provide habeas petitioner with fair opportunity to seek relief in state court and that

at time of purported default, no Arizona case required a defendant to raise ineffective

assistance of counsel claim on appeal), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1188 (2002).

Loveland v. Hatcher, 231 F.3d 640 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding Nevada’s postconviction

statute of limitations consistently applied in 1993).

Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding no “untimeliness”

procedural default where petitioners’ California habeas petition filed two days after In

Re Clark decision), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1072 (2001).

Bargas v. Burns, 179 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that procedural default can

occur even if state case law does not specifically set out rule requiring appeal from

state’s denial of postconviction relief, as opposed to bringing claim in second state

petition), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1073 (2000).

Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.) (holding that for a state procedural rule to be

adequate, it must be firmly established and regularly followed at the time applied), cert.
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denied, 528 U.S. 845 (1999).

Fields v. Calderon, 125 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that “trigger” for deciding

whether state procedural rule was firmly established is time at which state claim could

have been brought, not time of federal petition), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1132 (1998).

Binford v. Rhode, 116 F.3d 396 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that federal claims are barred

only if mandatory state law rule precluded claims as of current date; if claims could still

be raised in state court, ultimate federal review was not precluded, but claims first must

be exhausted).

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Cal. (Hayes), 103 F.3d 72 (9th

Cir. 1996) (holding that inconsistent application of state timeliness requirement before

conclusion of direct appeal precludes its use as adequate and independent state bar to

relief), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 129 (1997).

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Cal. (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126 (9th

Cir. 1996) (extending Morales to habeas claim filed after In re Clark because

defendant’s procedural default, if any, occurred before Clark; expressing no opinion

whether Clark sufficiently clarified California’s timeliness requirements to render them

adequate to bar federal review; timeliness requirements were inadequate to support

default), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1204 (1997).

Morales v. Calderon, 85 F.3d 1387 (9th Cir.) (holding that, prior to December 1992

when petitioner filed his first state habeas petition, California’s habeas time

requirements were not clear, consistently applied, or well-established), cert. denied,

519 U.S. 1001 (1996).

Moran v. McDaniel, 80 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that as of 1996, Nevada

Supreme Court consistently applied its procedural rules to bar review of untimely

claim, absent showing of cause and lack of state prejudice).

Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308, 1318 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that because state

rule was discretionary and inconsistently enforced, it was not an adequate and

independent procedural basis for default), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1183 (1995).

Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that state rule must be

clear, consistently applied, and well-established at the time of purported default to

constitute adequate and independent basis to support procedural default). 

Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d 344 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that unexplained denial from
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state supreme court could not rest on independent and adequate state grounds), cert.

denied, 510 U.S. 887 (1993).

Vickers v. Ricketts, 798 F.2d 369, 373 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that federal court may

address merits, despite petitioner’s failure to request instruction at trial, because state

court did not invoke procedural bar), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054 (1987).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Coleman v. Calderon, No. C 89-1906, 1996 WL 83882 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 1996)

(questioning methodology and conclusion of Deere; stating that analysis should be

based on state court opinion rather than argument; holding that California has not

consistently and regularly applied timeliness rule), aff’d on other grounds, 150 F.3d

1105 (9th Cir.), rev’d on other grounds, 525 U.S. 141, and cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1058

(1998).

Deere v. Calderon, 890 F. Supp. 893 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (finding that California Supreme

Court has consistently applied timeliness procedural bar in death penalty cases since In

re Clark; approving application of state’s procedural bar).

Odle v. Calderon, 884 F. Supp. 1404 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (finding that California did not

“regularly and uniformly” apply In re Dixon rule at time of defendant’s direct appeal

and state habeas, and therefore no bar to federal review).

Karis v. Vasquez, 828 F. Supp. 1449 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that California Supreme

Court has not yet consistently applied its procedural rules).

6.2.5.3 State Ruling on Merits Negates Procedural Default

When a state court does not apply an available state procedural bar, choosing instead to

rule on the merits, then the court’s ruling is not based on the state procedure and does

not bar federal review. But see § 6.2.5.1.1 for a discussion of when state court bases

ruling on both procedural grounds and the merits. 

Supreme Court:

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991) (holding that if the last state court

reaches the merits of a state claim, there is no procedural bar).
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Ninth Circuit:

Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470, 473–74 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that state court’s plain

error review of merits negates petitioner’s procedural default), cert. denied, 488 U.S.

926, and cert. denied, 488 U.S. 981 (1988).

Huffman v. Ricketts, 750 F.2d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding no bar to federal

habeas review where state declines to apply procedural bar and adjudicates federal

claim on merits).

6.2.5.4 Waiver

In Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980), the Supreme Court held that a state’s

failure to argue procedural default results in a waiver of the bar. The Supreme Court,

in Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87 (1997), reiterated the holding after the AEDPA’s

enactment and additionally held that the court of appeal is not required to raise the issue

of procedural default sua sponte. The Trest court, however, declined to resolve the

inter-circuit conflict as to whether a habeas court may consider a procedural default that

the state has at some point waived or failed to raise.

In Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit held

that a district court may raise the defense of procedural default sua sponte if to do so

serves the interests of justice, comity, federalism, and judicial efficiency. More

recently, in Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit

extended Boyd and held that the court may raise the procedural default defense sua

sponte in the court of appeals but must remand the case to provide the petitioner the

opportunity to justify the default or demonstrate miscarriage of justice. In 

Supreme Court:

Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87 (1997) (holding that a court of appeals is not required to

raise the issue of procedural default sua sponte; instead, a state is normally obligated to

raise and preserve the defense in the district court in order to thereafter prevent waiver).

Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 234 n.1 (1980) (holding that state’s failure to argue

state procedural bar in lower courts results in waiver of the bar).
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Ninth Circuit:

Vang v. Nevada, 329 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding in noncapital case, that 

because the state filed a length response in which it did not rely on procedural bar, the

district court erred in sua sponte applying that defense as to three claims and that Nev.

Rev. Stat. § 34.810, which bars claims on collateral review if they could have been

brought on direct appeal, was an independent and adequate procedural bar as to two

other claims).

Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that court of appeal may

raise procedural default sua sponte, but state’s failure to raise procedural default as a

defense to the alleged discriminatory use of peremptory challenges requires remand to

allow the defendant to show resulting cause and prejudice justification for procedural

default or miscarriage of justice).

Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that a district court

may raise the defense of procedural default sua sponte if to do so serves the interests of

justice, comity, federalism, and judicial efficiency).

Wilmer v. Johnson, 30 F.3d 451 (9th Cir.) (holding that state waived Teague defense by

failing to raise it in district court), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 970 (1994).

Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that where respondent argued

that petitioner failed to exhaust rather than argue procedural default, respondent waived

any procedural default).

Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 863–64 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that if state does not

raise procedural default at district court level, the appellate court will deem it waived),

cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1212 (1983).

6.2.5.5 Estoppel

In Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1260 (1991),

the Ninth Circuit held that a state’s prior argument that petitioner had not exhausted

state remedies estopped the state from arguing in federal court that petitioner’s claims

were procedurally defaulted on state grounds. The Russell court reasoned that the state,

having persuaded the district court to deny federal review because appellant had an

adequate and available state remedy, could not later oppose appellant’s petition for
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relief on the theory that he was actually procedurally barred in state court.

Ninth Circuit:

Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 1998) (distinguishing Russell in holding that

state was not estopped where state had not argued to federal court that petitioner had an

adequate and available state remedy or that petitioner would receive a hearing on the

merits of his state claim), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1123 (1999).

Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that state was estopped from

arguing that petitioner was procedurally defaulted on state claims where state had

previously opposed petitioner’s federal habeas petition on the grounds that petitioner

had failed to exhaust), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1260 (1991). 

6.2.5.6 Exception to Procedural Default Bar: Cause and Prejudice

6.2.5.6.1 Cause

Under Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), a federal habeas court will reach the

merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner demonstrates legally sufficient

“cause” for the default and actual “prejudice” from the alleged constitutional error. In

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986), the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of

“cause” under Sykes noting that “the existence of cause for a procedural default must

ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to

the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rule.” 

Thus, attorney error short of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel does not

constitute sufficient cause under Sykes.

The Murray Court indicated, however, that adequate cause would include,

among other things, “a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not

reasonably available to counsel . . . or that some interference by officials . . . made

compliance impracticable.” The Court also found that a new law where the “tools to

construct the new constitutional claim” were not available at time of default and that

state withholding of necessary information constitute cause. However, the Court found

that futility, illiteracy of a pro se defendant, and counsel error short of ineffective

assistance of counsel do not constitute cause.
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In Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000), the Supreme Court was

presented with the question “whether a federal habeas court is barred from considering

an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim as “cause” for the procedural default of

another claim when the ineffective-assistance claim has itself been procedurally

defaulted.” The Court held that a procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance of

counsel claim can serve as cause to excuse the procedural default of another habeas

claim (here insufficiency of the evidence) only if the petitioner can satisfy the “cause

and prejudice” standard with respect to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim

itself.

Supreme Court:

Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000) (holding that a procedurally defaulted

ineffective assistance of counsel claim can serve as cause to excuse the procedural

default of another habeas claim (here insufficiency of the evidence) only if the

petitioner can satisfy the “cause and prejudice” standard with respect to the ineffective

assistance of counsel claim itself).

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (clarifying meaning of “cause” under Sykes).

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (barring petitioner who failed to comply with

state contemporaneous objection rule from federal relief unless he shows both cause for

the default and prejudice therefrom).

Ninth Circuit:

Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding–in noncapital § 2254

proceeding–that petitioner may assert as cause for procedural default actions of prior

counsel which, even though not constitutionally defective, were not attributable to him

because they were both unauthorized and tainted by a conflict of interest; remanding

for determination of cause regarding whether trial counsel’s actions prevented

petitioner form learning of and vindicating his habeas corpus rights where trial counsel

failed to file an appeal and told petitioner his only recourse was a motion to reconsider

sentence).

Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (rejecting “cause”

argument where petitioner argued he was prevented by state officials from filing state
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post conviction personal restraint petition but facts indicated petitioner had sufficient

opportunity to file petition), cert denied, 529 U.S. 1009 (2000).

LaGrand (Karl) v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir.) (holding that a petitioner may

establish cause by showing that a factor external to the defense prohibited counsel from

complying with state procedural rules), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 971 (1998).

Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that district court

erred in granting relief where petitioner shows no cause and prejudice for failing to

conform to state procedure, thus excusing procedural default of ineffective assistance

claims), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1030 (1996), and stay granted, 118 F.3d 625 (9th Cir.

1997).

Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that “cause” is legitimate

excuse for default, and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting from alleged constitutional

violation).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Coleman v. Ignacio, 164 F.R.D. 679 (D. Nev. 1996) (holding that petitioner made

sufficient cause and prejudice showing to excuse procedural default of first state habeas

petition on timeliness grounds; finding that petitioner’s first and only opportunity to

appeal conviction was first state habeas petition, that petitioner was literally denied

counsel for state petition, and much of delay was caused by state court and former

defense counsel).

See generally:

Alan W. Clarke, Procedural Labyrinths and the Injustice of Death: A Critique of

Death Penalty Habeas Corpus (Part Two), 30 U. Rich. L. Rev. 303 (1996) (examining

the development of the cause and prejudice standard).

Steven J. Rurka, Comment, Habeas Corpus–The Supreme Court Defines the

Wainwright v. Sykes “Cause” and “Prejudice” Standard, 19 Wake Forest L. Rev. 441

(1983) (analyzing Supreme Court’s definitions of cause and prejudice and evaluating

effect of these definitions on habeas corpus relief).

Tung Yin, A Better Mouse Trap: Procedural Default as a Retroactivity Alternative to

Teague v. Lane and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 25 Am.

J. Crim. L. 203 (1998) (discussing the emergence and technical elements of the cause
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and prejudice standard).

6.2.5.6.1.1 New Law/Novel Claims

Supreme Court:

Stewart v. LaGrand (Walter), 526 U.S. 115 (1999) (per curiam) (holding that petitioner

could not show cause for default of execution method claim where constitutionality of

gas executions was being debated at time of petitioner’s direct appeal; holding that

petitioner waived execution method claim by choosing lethal gas instead of state’s

default method, lethal injection).

Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curiam) (holding that alleged novelty of

petitioner’s Vienna Convention claim did not excuse his procedural default).

Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401 (1989) (holding no cause for failure to object to jury

instructions later held unconstitutional because state law provided basis for trial

objection).

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (holding that lack of legal or factual basis for

objection at time of trial constitutes cause).

Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding that counsel’s failure to object to trial

instruction that was declared unconstitutional six years later constitutes cause under

Sykes).

Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982) (holding no cause for failure to object to jury

instruction later held unconstitutional because “tools for making federal constitutional

claim were available” at time of default).

Ninth Circuit:

LaGrand (Karl) v. Stewart, 173 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir.) (holding that plain futility of

Eighth Amendment claim, coupled with the subsequent development of information

regarding the nature of lethal gas execution, was such that factual or legal basis for the

claim was not reasonably available to petitioner at the time he pursued his direct appeal

in state court and therefore is cause for not raising the claim prior to a first federal

habeas petition), stay vacated, 525 U.S. 1173, and cert. dismissed, 526 U.S. 1061

(1999).

Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that petitioner failed to
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show cause to overcome default of his claim that, after state supreme court reversed

cruelty finding as part of aggravating factor of committing murder in especially cruel

and depraved manner, it failed to reweigh aggravating and mitigating evidence), cert.

denied, 522 U.S. 1079 (1998).

Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding cause exists if

claim is novel and had no reasonable basis at time of default), vacated on other

grounds, 500 U.S. 901 (1992).

See generally:

Kent S. Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and the Legislative Power, 98

Colum. L. Rev. 888, 959 n.500 (1998) (discussing Breard).

6.2.5.6.1.2 Futility Not an Excuse

Supreme Court:

Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982) (holding that futility of presenting objection to

state court is insufficient to establish cause).

Ninth Circuit:

LaGrand (Karl) v. Stewart, 173 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir.) (distinguishing Engle and holding

that a petitioner shows cause for failing to raise a claim regarding the

unconstitutionality of lethal gas as an execution method on direct appeal when state law

authorizing that method had recently been upheld and no reported cases anywhere held

that it was unconstitutional), stay vacated, 525 U.S. 1173, and cert. denied, 526 U.S.

1061 (1999).

Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that petitioner did not

procedurally default claim by failing to re-offer polygraph evidence at resentencing

where state supreme court had explicitly held evidence inadmissible on prior direct

appeal; attempt to re-offer would have been futile because trial court was bound by

prior supreme court ruling), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1142 (1997).

Noltie v. Peterson, 9 F.3d 802, 805–06 (9th Cir. 1993) (analyzing and rejecting

petitioner’s claim that futility doctrine excused his failure to present a claim to state

court).
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Sweet v. Cupp, 640 F.2d 233, 236 (9th Cir. 1981) (adopting “futility doctrine” as

excuse for procedural default).

6.2.5.6.1.3 Incompetence of Defendant

Ninth Circuit:

Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that pro se petitioner’s

unfamiliarity with notice of appeal procedure did not excuse default where petitioner

refused counsel three times).

Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301 (9th Cir.) (holding that procedural default

applies to mental incompetence claims), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1030 (1996), and stay

granted, 118 F.3d 625 (9th Cir. 1997).

Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 907–09 (9th Cir. 1986)

(holding that pro se petitioner’s illiteracy is not “cause” for failure to appeal denial of

postconviction relief to state supreme court).

6.2.5.6.1.4 State Withholding Necessary Information

Supreme Court:

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (finding that petitioner’s reasonable reliance

on prosecution’s open file policy established cause for procedural default of Brady

claim).

Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988) (holding that Sykes cause exists where petitioner

failed to raise jury challenge at trial because state concealed memorandum concerning

jury race disparity).

Ninth Circuit:

Paradis v. Arave, 130 F.3d 385, 394 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that petitioner

demonstrated cause and prejudice sufficient to overcome default of Brady claim by

showing that document subpoena had been quashed prior to hearing held in first habeas

proceeding and that same documents were not provided in response to pretrial

discovery request).
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Wood v. Hall, 130 F.3d 373 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting petitioner’s Brady claim as

procedurally barred where petitioner failed to show cause for defaulting the claim in

state court), cert. denied sub nom., Wood v. Cook, 523 U.S. 1129 (1998).

6.2.5.6.1.5 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Supreme Court:

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (holding that, since petitioner had no

constitutional right to counsel on state habeas corpus, he cannot claim ineffective

assistance of counsel in such proceeding; ineffective assistance is not “cause” for

failure to appeal from a denial of state habeas).

Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986) (holding that counsel’s failure to raise claim on

direct appeal, thereby procedurally defaulting it, was not ineffective assistance of

counsel, and thus is not cause under Sykes).

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (stating that cause must be due to some

objective factor external to defense; attorney error short of ineffective assistance of

counsel does not establish cause for procedural default; cause and prejudice test applies

to failure to raise claim on appeal).

Ninth Circuit:

Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523 (9th Cir.) (holding Idaho Code § 19-2719's forty-two

day statute of limitations for filing a postconviction petition in a capital case violates

the Sixth Amendment because it denies the petitioner any meaningful review of his

ineffective assistance of counsel claims), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 944 (2001).

Loveland v. Hatcher, 231 F.3d 640 (9th Cir. 2000) (reversing and remanding for

evidentiary hearing whether petitioner’s reliance on trial counsel to file direct appeal is

sufficient to excuse his state procedural default where state postconviction petition

dismissed as untimely). 

Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.) (holding that on federal habeas corpus,

appellate counsel’s failure to recognize or properly and timely raise a procedurally

defaulted claim on postconviction collateral review does not constitute cause that

excuses the default), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 845 (1999).

Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953 (9th Cir.) (holding that ignorance of law that allows
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twenty peremptory challenges in a capital case, instead of the ten as provided, was

“probably not” cause to excuse procedural default), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 965 (1999).

Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that because there is no

constitutional right to an attorney in a state or federal habeas proceeding, it follows that

there can be no deprivation of effective assistance in such proceedings), cert. denied,

526 U.S. 1123 (1999).

Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1416 (9th Cir.) (holding that mere ignorance or

inadvertence of defense counsel does not furnish sufficient cause to excuse procedural

default), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 984, and cert. denied, 525 U.S. 996 (1998).

Bonin v. Calderon, 77 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir.) (finding that ineffective assistance of

counsel is cause for procedural default only if it amounts to an independent

constitutional violation), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1143 (1996).

Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that ineffective

assistance of counsel constitutes cause; establishing that Strickland prejudice standard

is sufficient for procedural default), vacated on other grounds, 500 U.S. 901 (1992).

Garrison v. McCarthy, 653 F.2d 374, 378 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that in cases of

attorney inadvertence or ignorance, a lesser showing of incompetency of counsel

should be sufficient for cause).

See generally:

Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 247 (1988) (comparing and

analyzing Smith v. Murray and Murray v. Carrier and their holdings that, absent a

showing of ineffective assistance of counsel, federal habeas petitioners must suffer

consequences of lawyer’s mistakes).

John C. Jeffries & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Default in

Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 679 (1990) (reviewing law governing

federal collateral review of claims not properly raised in state court).

Anne M. Voights, Narrowing the Eye of the Needle: Procedural Default, Habeas

Reform, and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1103

(1999) (discussing the restrictions on federal habeas review, procedural default, and

ineffective assistance of counsel).
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6.2.5.6.2 Actual Prejudice

In United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982), the Supreme Court held that to

establish prejudice under Sykes, a petitioner must show “not merely that the errors at

trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial

disadvantage, infecting the entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.”

Supreme Court:

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (finding that petitioner could not show

prejudice that would excuse default of Brady claim).

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494 (1986) (stating that “prejudice” is a showing that

petitioner was denied fundamental fairness).

Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 12 (1984) (holding that prejudice exists where, but for the

alleged error, petitioner might not have been convicted).

United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (establishing that prejudice under Sykes

requires more than plain error; petitioner must establish that error worked to his or her

substantial disadvantage and permeated trial with error of constitutional dimension).

Ninth Circuit:

LaGrand (Karl) v. Stewart, 173 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir.) (holding that prospect of death by

allegedly unconstitutional means established prejudice excusing default), stay vacated,

525 U.S. 1173, and cert. dismissed, 526 U.S. 1061 (1999).

Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that to establish prejudice

based on ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, petitioner must

demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result would have been different but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors; the court also considers whether the result was

fundamentally unfair or unreliable under Lockhart).

Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404 (9th Cir.) (requiring petitioner to show that errors

worked to actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting the entire trial, in order to

establish sufficient prejudice to overcome default), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 984, and cert.

denied, 525 U.S. 996 (1998).
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District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Turner v. Calderon, 970 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that petitioner was not

prejudiced, so as to excuse his procedural default, by state trial court’s error in failing

to sua sponte instruct at guilt phase that petitioner’s mental state could negate specific

intent to commit robbery or murder, or by any technical error in failure of guilt-phase

verdict form to require jury to specifically find that petitioner intended to kill).

6.2.5.7 Exception to Procedural Default Bar: Miscarriage of Justice

The cause and prejudice requirements are designed to permit federal review where

failure to do so would be fundamentally unjust. Even if there is no showing of cause

and prejudice, however, a federal court may adjudicate a federal constitutional claim

which, in the absence of such adjudication, would result in a fundamental miscarriage

of justice. In Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986), the Supreme Court stated that

“where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is

actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a

showing of cause for the procedural default.”

In Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986), the Court held that the actual

innocence exception applies to one wrongly sentenced to death and, in Sawyer v.

Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992), stated that to establish actual innocence of the death

penalty, a petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable

juror would have found petitioner death eligible.

Later, in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), the Supreme Court held that

when a habeas petitioner claims actual innocence of the crime accompanied by a claim

of constitutional trial error, the standard of Murray v. Carrier–that a constitutional

violation has “probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent”–governs the miscarriage of justice inquiry rather than the more stringent

Sawyer v. Whitley standard–requiring “clear and convincing evidence that but for a

constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the

death penalty.”

The Court, noting that challenges to a sentence of death are routine, stated

that the lesser standard is appropriate because a substantial claim that constitutional
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error caused the conviction of an innocent person is rare. Thus, the threat to judicial

resources, finality, and comity posed by actual innocence claims is significantly less

than that posed by sentencing claims. To satisfy the Murray actual innocence standard,

a petitioner must “show that, in light of the new evidence, it is more likely than not that

no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”

The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in House v. Bell, 125 S. Ct. 2991

(2005) (mem.), with the following as a question presented: “Did the majority below err

in applying this Court’s decision in Schlup v.Delo to hold that Petitioner’s compelling

new evidence, though presenting at the very least a colorable claim of actual innocence,

was as a matter of law insufficient to excuse his failure to present that evidence before

the state courts – merely because he had failed to negate each and every item of

circumstantial evidence that had been offered against him at the original trial?” The

Supreme Court heard oral argument in House v. Bell on January 11, 2006. 

Supreme Court:

House v. Bell, 125 S. Ct. 2991 (2005) (mem.) (granting certiorari with the following

questions presented: “1. Did the majority below err in applying this Court’s decision in

Schlup v.Delo to hold that Petitioner’s compelling new evidence, though presenting at

the very least a colorable claim of actual innocence, was as a matter of law insufficient

to excuse his failure to present that evidence before the state courts – merely because he

had failed to negate each and every item of circumstantial evidence that had been

offered against him at the original trial? 2. What constitutes a ‘truly persuasive showing

of actual innocence’ pursuant to Herrera v. Collins sufficient to warrant freestanding

habeas relief?”)

Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998) (distinguishing the Schlup and Sawyer

miscarriage of justice standards and finding that petitioner’s new evidence did not meet

either standard).

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) (holding that the Murray v. Carrier standard of

requiring a habeas petitioner to show that “a constitutional violation has probably

resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent” rather than the more

stringent Sawyer v. Whitley standard governs the miscarriage of justice inquiry when a

death sentenced petitioner raises a claim of actual innocence to avoid a procedural bar).

Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992) (establishing “actual innocence” standard for
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capital cases; petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence that but for a

constitutional error no reasonable juror would have found petitioner death eligible

under state law).

Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401 (1989) (holding that trial judge’s finding of an equal

number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances was insufficient to show that an

alleged error in instructing jury resulted in a fundamental miscarriage of justice).

Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537–38 (1986) (stating that enforcement of procedural

default rules in cases devoid of any substantial claim that alleged error undermined the

accuracy of the guilt or sentencing determination is not fundamentally unfair;

recognizing that the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception applies to the

sentencing phase of a capital trial as to a petitioner who is “actually innocent” of the

death penalty).

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (holding that where a constitutional violation

has resulted in conviction of one who is probably innocent, federal court may grant the

writ without a showing of cause and prejudice).

Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (holding that to show “fundamental

miscarriage of justice,” petitioner must make a “colorable showing of actual

innocence”).

Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982) (holding that, in appropriate cases, the principle of

comity must yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration).

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (holding that cause and prejudice standard

does not prevent consideration of a claim where necessary to avoid a fundamental

miscarriage of justice).

Ninth Circuit:

Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that petitioner who never

asserted or presented evidence of actual innocence did not fall within miscarriage of

justice exception).

Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094, 1106 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding no actual innocence

and rejecting petitioner’s miscarriage of justice claim), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1082

(1998).

Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting petitioner’s miscarriage
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of justice claim), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1079 (1998).

Moran v. McDaniel, 80 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting actual innocence

miscarriage of justice claim because petitioner failed to meet Sawyer standard; mere

fact that sentencing panel did not find as aggravating factor that murders committed

during robbery does not mean that panel found petitioner did not commit murders

during robbery, or that petitioner is not otherwise guilty of felony-murder).

Noltie v. Peterson, 9 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting miscarriage of justice

exception because no showing of actual innocence).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Turner v. Calderon, 970 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. Cal. 1997) (finding that petitioner did not

meet the miscarriage of justice standard; holding that the miscarriage of justice

exception does not apply to procedural default of claim challenging sentence).

See Generally:

Kathleen C. Boyd, Note, The Paradox of Actual Innocence in Federal Habeas Corpus

After Herrera v. Collins, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 479 (1994) (reviewing Herrera and analyzing

the resulting confusion regarding innocence claims in federal habeas corpus claims).

Daniel M. Bradley, Comment, Schlup v. Delo: The Burden of Showing Actual

Innocence in Habeas Corpus Review and Congress’ Efforts at Reform, 23 New Eng. J.

on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 463 (1997) (examining Schlup and arguing it should

apply only where an inmate presents evidence of innocence of the crime itself;

commenting on AEDPA’s changes to § 2244(b)).

Kris T. Daniel, Sawyer v. Whitley, The Deadly Game of Procedures in Death Penalty

Cases, 61 UMKC L. Rev. 599 (1993) (analyzing impact of restrictive Sawyer rule on

availability of habeas relief for innocence claims and on Missouri habeas

jurisprudence).

Vernon E. Googe III, Herrera v. Collins–Federal Habeas Corpus Review and Claims

of Actual Innocence, 27 Ga. L. Rev. 971 (1993) (focusing on Herrera and analyzing the

dilemma for federal courts in habeas cases involving claims of innocence).

Stephen Reinhardt, The Anatomy of an Execution: Fairness vs. “Process,” 74 N.Y. L.

Rev. 313, 317 n.21 (1999) (relating inability to find any reported case in which an

individual has met the Sawyer v. Whitley standard).
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Robert C. Stacy II, Note, Schlup v. Delo: The Result of Curbing Unlimited Jurisdiction

by Limiting Discretion, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 897 (1996) (focusing on Schlup standard and

miscarriage of justice exception to procedural default and predicting future problems in

application of Schlup because of inconsistencies in Supreme Court habeas

jurisprudence).

Jordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 303 (1993)

(analyzing Herrera and Supreme Court’s new “innocence-focus” in habeas cases).

6.2.6 Authorization of Petition on Petitioner’s Behalf

Section 2242 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that someone acting on the

petitioner’s behalf may sign and verify a habeas corpus petition. In Deutscher v.

Angelone, 16 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit held that in the absence of

evidence to the contrary, a presumption exists that a petitioner is fully informed of and

consents to claims raised in the petition.

If a petitioner seeks to withdraw a habeas petition or appeal, the district court

is required to hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner is competent to validly

withdraw consent to forgo federal relief. See Comer v. Stewart, 215 F.3d 910 (9th Cir.

2000).

Ninth Circuit:

Comer v. Stewart, 215 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2000) (remanding for evidentiary hearing on

issue whether petitioner competent to validly withdraw consent to proceed with

appeal).

Lucky v. Calderon, 86 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that repeated failure to

respond to attorney coupled with lack of verification and signature rebut the

presumption; petitioner met shifted burden with affidavit stating that counsel was “fully

authorized to file and pursue” the litigation).

Deutscher v. Angelone, 16 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that a presumption

exists that petitioner is fully informed of and consents to claims raised in petition).

Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that lack of

signature, alone, is not determinative in rebutting presumption; the district court may
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disregard petitioner’s failure to sign and verify petition).

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2000).

6.2.6.1 Next Friend Standing

In Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990), the Supreme Court held that an

individual has standing to seek federal habeas relief as the “next friend” of a deathsentenced prisoner after providing (a) an adequate explanation why the real party in

interest cannot appear on his or her own behalf, and (b) a showing that the next friend

is truly dedicated to the best interests of the real party. Generally, a showing that the

real party is mentally incompetent to pursue the cause satisfies the first requirement. 

Family members, particularly parents, generally meet the second requirement.

Supreme Court:

Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731 (1990) (holding that next friend must show that real

party is unable to litigate own cause due to mental incapacity as prerequisite for

standing; state court’s finding of competency is entitled to presumption of correctness

and evidentiary hearing in district court is not necessary).

Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) (concluding that next friend must show

that real party is unable to litigate own cause due to mental incapacity, lack of access to

court, or other similar disability, and must also show true dedication to best interests of

real party; next friend fails to meet burden where evidence shows that defendant

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived right to proceed, and access to court

unimpeded).

Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1977) (holding that where record establishes

defendant’s knowing and intelligent waiver of federal rights, court lacks jurisdiction to

entertain next friend application under Article III power).
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Ninth Circuit:

Dennis ex rel. Butko v. Budge, 378 F.3d 880 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming the dismissal of

a habeas petition and denying a stay of execution, the court held that the prisoner’s

capacity to make the decision to forego further appeals of his death sentence was not

substantially affected by mental illness, and therefore the prisoner’s former attorney

failed to establish “next friend” status; holding that to establish next friend status one

must (1) provide an adequate explanation–such as inaccessibility, mental

incompetence, or other disability–why the real party in interest cannot appear to

prosecute the action; and (2) the next friend must be truly dedicated to the best interests

of the person on whose behalf he or she seeks to litigate), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 16

(2004).

Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803 (9th Cir.) (holding that a district court

must stay capital habeas proceedings during the petitioner’s incompetence, rather than

appointing a “next friend” and requiring the friend to pursue the habeas petition on the

petitioner’s behalf; following Calderon v. U.S. District Court (Kelly V), 163 F.3d 530

(9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and distinguishing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149

(1990), the panel construed 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (providing for statutory right to

counsel in habeas proceedings) to incorporate a statutory right to competence, and held

that the denial of the stay violated this right because the petitioner raised claims that

could potentially benefit from his ability to communicate rationally), cert. denied, 540

U.S. 1069 (2003).

Miller ex rel. Jones v. Stewart, 231 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir.) (staying execution and

remanding for hearing whether petitioner is competent to elect to die; finding that state

court’s Faretta hearing in 1998 did not address issue whether in November 2000

petitioner is competent to forgo his federal habeas appeals; finding next friend status of

petitioner’s former attorney sufficient for evidentiary hearing. But see dissent by

Rymer, J., finding that next friend did not make threshold showing of petitioner’s

incompetence and concluding that evidentiary hearing not warranted), stay vacated sub.

nom. Stewart v. Miller, 531 U.S. 986 (2000).

Vargas v. Lambert, 159 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir.) (holding that the parent of a capital

prisoner establishes “next friend” standing and thereby jurisdiction sufficient to support

a stay of execution with new evidence of the prisoner’s deteriorated mental condition

and psychosis-linked wish to die; there is essentially a per se rule that a parent meets

the best interests prong of the next friend standing test), stay vacated, 525 U.S. 925

(1998).

Wells v. Arave, 18 F.3d 656 (9th Cir.) (rejecting “next friend” status where no
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“meaningful evidence” was presented to cast doubt on state court’s competence

determination and therefore no further evidentiary hearing required), order amended to

add dissent, 18 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 1994).

Brewer v. Lewis, 989 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1993) (denying mother next friend standing

where no meaningful evidence of prisoner’s incompetence; affidavits of doctors who

never met prisoner and affidavit of doctor who speculated as to prisoner’s condition

were insufficient to outweigh substantial evidence demonstrating competence; state

court’s determination of competence entitled to presumption of correctness).

Lenhard v. Wolff, 603 F.2d 91, 93 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (holding that courtappointed counsel, discharged at defendant’s request, did not have next friend standing

absent some minimum showing of defendant’s incompetence).

See generally:

Paul F. Brown, Note, Third Party Standing–“Next Friends” as Enemies: Third Party

Petitions for Capital Defendants Wishing to Waive Appeal, 81 J. Crim L. &

Criminology 981 (1991) (analyzing Whitmore in light of third party standing and next

friend jurisprudence, arguing that Whitmore is consistent with “case and controversy”

constitutional requirement).

Richard W. Garnett, Sectarian Reflections on Lawyers’ Ethics and Death Row

Volunteers, 77 Notre Dame L. Rev. 795 (2002) (discussing ethical responsibilities of

attorneys to “death row volunteers”).

G. Richard Strafer, Volunteering for Execution: Competency, Voluntariness and the

Propriety of Third Party Intervention, 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 860 (1983)

(suggesting that Supreme Court’s response to prisoners’ “volunteering” to be executed

is inadequate, focusing on competency standards and intervention rights of next

friends).

6.2.7 Representation by Foreign State

Ninth Circuit:

United Mexican States v. Woods, 126 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the

Eleventh Amendment barred Mexico’s suit, alleging treaty violations on behalf of a

death-sentenced Mexican national, against the state of Arizona; suit did not fall under

Ex parte Young exception for prospective injunctive relief), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1075

(1998).
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Other Circuits:

Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that treaty

violation alleged regarding death-sentenced Paraguayan national was not ongoing

violation of federal treaty law, nor was relief sought prospective, so as to bring action

within Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity), cert. denied, 523

U.S. 371 (1998).

6.2.8 Right to and Payment of Counsel, Experts, and Investigators

Prior to 1988, courts had discretion to appoint counsel in federal habeas proceedings

under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. In 1988, Congress enacted the

Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 21 U.S.C. § 848(q), which, among other things, established a

federal death penalty for some drug-related convictions. Section 848(q)(4)(B) entitled

death-sentenced indigents pursuing § 2254 or § 2255 relief to “one or more” court

appointed counsel. On March 9, 2006, subsections (g)-(r) of 21 U.S.C. § 848 were

repealed and 18 U.S.C. § 3599, was enacted as part of the USA Patriot Improvement

and Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 109-177. Section 3599 of Title 18, contains

similar provisions to those formerly contained in 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)-(10). As in

former § 848(q)(4)-(10), 18 U.S.C. § 3599 provides that death-sentenced indigents

pursuing § 2254 or § 2255 relief are entitled to “one or more” court appointed counsel. 

18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(1). At least one appointed attorney must meet certain experience

qualifications set out in § 3599(c). The statute authorizes counsel to represent the

petitioner throughout every subsequent stage of judicial proceedings, including

competency and executive clemency proceedings. 18 U.S.C. § 3599(e). Section

3599(f) provides for investigative, expert, and other services, when the court finds such

services reasonably necessary for representation. The fee amounts authorized under 18

U. S. C. § 3599(g) must be made public upon disposition of the petition. 18 U.S.C. §

3599(g)(3).

As to the amount of compensation, fees, and expenses, § 3599 provides: 

(g)(1) Compensation shall be paid to attorneys appointed under

this subsection at a rate of not more than $125 per hour for in-court

and out-of-court time. The Judicial Conference is authorized to

raise the maximum for hourly payment specified in the paragraph
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up to the aggregate of the overall average percentages of the

adjustments in the rates of pay for the General Schedule made

pursuant to section 5305 of Title 5 on or after such date. . . .

(2) Fees and expenses paid for investigative, expert, and other

reasonably necessary services authorized under subsection (f) shall

not exceed $7,500 in any case, unless payment in excess of that

limit is certified by the court, . . . as necessary to provide fair

compensation for services of an unusual character or duration, and

the amount of the excess payment is approved by the chief judge

of the circuit. . . .

As of March 9, 2006, the maximum hourly rate for attorneys appointed under

federal capital prosecutions and capital postconviction proceedings is $163 per hour

[the amount was raised from $125 per hour by the Judicial Conference, under the

authority conferred under former § 848(q)(10)(A)] .

In Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S.

1051 (1996), the Ninth Circuit extended its appellate standard for reversing a

conviction for failure to provide investigative funds under § 3006A to habeas corpus

cases requesting funds under § 3006A or § 848(q). Under this standard, a denial of

funding warrants reversal only if the petitioner shows a denial of effective assistance of

counsel as a result of the failure to provide funds. Thus, the petitioner must (1)

establish that reasonably competent retained counsel would require such services for a

habeas petitioner who could pay for them, and (2) demonstrate, by clear and convincing

evidence, prejudice from the lack of further investigation. Id. at 837.

Supreme Court:

McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849 (1994) (holding that because § 848(q) [now 18

U.S.C. § 3599]; creates a statutory right to counsel for capital habeas defendants,

counsel should be appointed before the petition is actually filed to assist in its

preparation).

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755–56 (1991) (holding that there is no

constitutional right to postconviction counsel).

In re Berger, 498 U.S. 233 (1991) (per curiam) (holding that, under § 848(q)(10) [now

18 U.S.C. § 3599]; counsel appointed in a capital habeas case should be able to recover
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compensation for proceedings before Supreme Court in an amount not to exceed

$5,000).

Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding that state is not constitutionally

required to provide counsel for indigent death row inmates seeking state postconviction

relief).

Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982) (holding that defendant has no constitutional

right to effective assistance of counsel to pursue discretionary state appeals or Supreme

Court review).

Ninth Circuit:

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Cal. (Gordon), 107 F.3d 756 (9th

Cir.) (holding that state lacked standing to challenge fee request because request is ex

parte proceeding; district court properly considered request even though no petition

was pending; holding that AEDPA’s amendments do not apply to pre-enactment fee

requests), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 907 (1997).

United States v. Salemo, 81 F.3d 1453 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the CJA does not

authorize the district court to compensate attorney whose services as legal advisor are

requested by defendant; noting that judge may appoint counsel to serve exclusively for

benefit of court under 5 U.S.C. § 3109, to protect the integrity of proceedings from pro

se misconduct).

Moran v. McDaniel, 80 F.3d 1261, 1271 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that there is no

constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in state or federal habeas

proceedings).

Daniels v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 76 F.3d 385 (9th Cir.

1995) (unpublished) (granting mandamus petition alleging insufficient grant of funds

under § 848(q) [now 18 U.S.C. § 3599]; holding that district court erred in denying

request for investigative funds based on faulty legal premise that death sentence is no

different from other types of sentences).

Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 1995) (extending non-habeas standard for

reversing a conviction for failure to provide investigative funds under § 3006A to

habeas corpus cases requesting funds under § 3006A or § 848(q)), cert. denied, 516

U.S. 1051 (1996).

Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that, although not
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required by Sixth Amendment, complexity of issues on remand and death penalty

nature of case require district court to appoint counsel for petitioner).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Rowland v. Calderon, No. C 94-3037 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 1996) (unpublished order)

(ordering petitioner to comply with amended § 848(q)(9) [now 18 U.S.C. § 3599]

regarding confidentiality in order to make ex parte motion for funds).

McKinney v. Paskett, 753 F. Supp. 861 (D. Idaho 1990) (denying petitioner’s request

for an request for expert or investigative services ex parte haring; holding that neither

21 U.S.C. § 3006A nor 28 U.S.C. § 848(q) [now 18 U.S.C. § 3599] requires that

petitioner’s request for expert or investigative services be ex parte; citing F.R.H.C. 6

requiring a good cause showing before discovery granted and distinguishing habeas

case from criminal case)

District Courts in Other Circuits:

Patrick v. Johnson, 48 F. Supp. 2d 645 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (holding that petitioner was

not entitled to compensation for an investigator and experts to develop a claim that was

likely defaulted; stating that § 848(q) [now 18 U.S.C. § 3599] was not designed to

provide petitioners with unlimited funds to investigate speculative claims).

Federal Statutes:

18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(4), (e)(4) (2000) (requiring that counsel and service fee

amounts be made public).

18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)-(e), as added by Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 222(a) (providing for

appointment of counsel in capital cases).

18 U.S.C. § 3599(f), as added by Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 222(a) (providing for expert

and investigative services reasonably necessary for representation in capital cases).

18 U.S.C. § 3599(g)(1) and (2), as added by Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 222(a) (creating

maximum rates for counsel and expert/investigative services in capital cases).

18 U.S.C. § 3599(g)(3), as added by Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 222(a) (requiring that

counsel and service fee amounts be made public upon disposition of the petition).
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21 U.S.C. § 848(q) (2000) [repealed].

28 U.S.C. § 2254(h) (2000) (providing counsel for applicant pursuing § 2254 habeas

relief who has become financially unable to afford counsel).

28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) (providing counsel for applicant pursuing § 2255 habeas relief

who has become financially unable to afford counsel).

See generally:

Steven M. Latino, Comment, Reversing Twenty Years of Supreme Court Postconviction

Jurisprudence: Enlarging the Indigent Capital Defendant’s Right to Postconviction

Counsel in McFarland v. Scott, 22 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement (1996)

(arguing that McFarland marks a total departure from Supreme Court jurisprudence of

the last twenty years, and proposing an alternative method of assistance during preapplication federal habeas corpus review).

Brian L. McDermott, Comment, Defending the Defenseless: Murray v. Giarratano and

the Right to Counsel in Capital Post Conviction Proceedings, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 1305

(1990) (summarizing and criticizing Girarratano; examining the “death is different”

doctrine and arguing that court should have applied due process balancing test).

Geraldine S. Moohr, Note, Murray v. Giarratano: A Remedy Reduced to a

Meaningless Ritual, 39 Am. U. L. Rev. 765 (1990) (criticizing and summarizing

Giarratano and precedential history and concluding with proposed legislation requiring

states to appoint counsel for indigent death row inmates).

Scott E. Rogers, Note, Constitutional Law/Access to Courts–Limiting the Relief

Available to Indigent Death Row Inmates Denied Meaningful Access to the Courts: 

Murray v. Giarratano, 17 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 399 (1990) (examining prisoners’

constitutional right to meaningful court access; focusing on relief available to death

row inmates denied access to state habeas; tracing history and Giarratano and arguing

that it is not supported by either precedent or policy).

Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and

Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 Buff. L. Rev. 329 (1995) (arguing that the primary

obstacle to fair, consistent, non-arbitrary capital sentencing is chronic and severe

underfunding of state and local indigent defense services).
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6.2.8.1 State Exhaustion and Clemency Proceedings

Courts have disagreed about the utilization of 21 U.S.C. § 848(q) monies for attorneys

to exhaust claims in state court. Effective March 9, 2006, 21 U.S.C. § 848(q) was

repealed, and the provisions formerly contained in § 848(q)(4)-(10) were recodified as

18 U.S.C. § 3599. [See supra § 6.2.8.] Section 3599(a)(2) requires that federally

appointed counsel represent any condemned inmate financially unable to provide

counsel in any § 2254 or § 2255 postconviction proceeding. Section 3599(e) authorizes

representation throughout every subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings. 

Although exhaustion of state remedies, see infra § 6.3.3, arguably constitutes such a

“subsequent proceeding,” most federal courts have been unwilling to pay counsel for

the exhaustion of remedies in state court, following the Eleventh Circuit in In re

Lindsey, 875 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 1989).

Ninth Circuit courts, however, have held that former § 848(q) authorizes

payment of investigative or expert services on unexhausted or potentially unexhausted

claims. The Northern District of California granted investigative funds for a McClesky

investigation, notwithstanding that the investigation could reveal new claims requiring

exhaustion. Coleman v. Vasquez, 771 F. Supp. 300 (N.D. Cal. 1991). The Eastern

District of California, in Gordon v. Vasquez, 859 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Cal. 1994), held

that CJA funds can be used specifically to finance an investigation for purposes of

exhaustion in state court. Notwithstanding In Re Lindsey, supra, the Gordon court held

that the plain meaning of “every subsequent stage” in § 848(q)(8) includes exhaustion.

Finally, most courts have found clemency proceedings within the scope of

the language in former § 848(q)(8) [now 18 U.S.C. § 3599(e)] regarding “every

subsequent stage” and appear amenable to pay for counsel’s services, although a case

from the Eastern District of Texas has held that the reference to clemency proceedings

in § 848(q)(8) is limited to federal clemency proceedings and was therefore

inapplicable to state proceedings. Chambers v. Johnson, 133 F. Supp. 2d 931 (E.D.

Tex. 2001). A case from the Southern District of Indiana has disagreed with the

holding in Chambers, noting that for a petitioner challenging a death sentence through

§ 2254, only state clemency proceedings could be relevant. Lowery v. Anderson, 138

F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1125 (S.D. Ind. 2001). Although the Eighth Circuit rejected a
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clemency request, this decision was based on counsel’s failure to make an appropriate

threshold showing of reasonable necessity under former § 848(q)(10). Hill v. Lockhart,

992 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1993). The Tenth Circuit has held that counsel appointed under

§ 848(q)(4)(B) to represent state death row inmates in federal habeas proceedings are

authorized to represent these clients in state clemency proceedings and are entitled to

receive compensation for the clemency representation. Hain v. Mullin, 436 F.3d 1168

(10th Cir. 2006) (en banc).

Supreme Court:

McKleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (holding claims raised in federal habeas

petition not raised in previous petition may be treated as an abuse of the writ and thus

require petitioner to show cause and prejudice).

Ninth Circuit:

Calderon v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of California

(Gordon), 107 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding, under pre-AEDPA law, that the state

lacks standing to challenge an ex parte fee request submitted under § 848(q)(9);

holding, pursuant to McFarland v. Scott, that a district court may consider § 848(q)

requests notwithstanding that a petition is not pending in federal court).

Jackson v. Vasquez, 1 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that although § 848(q)

authorizes federal funding for expert and investigative services, it does not authorize

district court to issue ex parte coercive order compelling action from a state official at

state expense).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Gordon v. Vasquez, 859 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that CJA funds may be

used for investigation of unexhausted state claims where the state court appointed CJA

counsel to exhaust state claims but denied investigative funding; disagreeing with

Lindsey, and holding plain meaning of § 848(q)8 permits attorneys to exhaust in state

court and § 848(q)9 provides authorization for correlative investigative fees).

Coleman v. Vasquez, 771 F. Supp. 300 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (providing federal funds under

§ 848(q) for investigative services before filing habeas petition; citing McCleskey for

rationale that first habeas petition required thorough investigation to avoid procedural
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default; recognizing funds may be used to research and develop unexhausted claims but

distinguishing the McCleskey investigation from the state court exhaustion adjudication

process).

McKinney v. Paskett, 753 F. Supp. 861 (D. Idaho 1990) (holding that § 848(q) does not

authorize federal payment of counsel to exhaust state remedies).

Other Circuits:

Tucker v. Scott, 66 F.3d 1418 (5th Cir. 1995) (following Joiner and Sterling and

holding that petitioner has no right to assistance of federally appointed counsel to

exhaust state remedies; state’s refusal to appoint habeas counsel does not excuse

exhaustion).

In re Joiner, 58 F.3d 143, 144 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that McFarland did not decide

whether § 848(q) right to counsel in “every subsequent stage of proceedings” extended

to state collateral review, and thus does not change Fifth Circuit’s rule that § 848(q)

does not authorize federal funds for state exhaustion).

Sterling v. Scott, 57 F.3d 451 (5th Cir. 1995) (denying request for CJA counsel to be

appointed and paid under § 848(q)(B)(4) to exhaust in state court; reasoning that §

2254 right to relief, including correlative right to counsel, not available until petition

properly before federal court, which requires that all claims be exhausted in state

court).

Hill v. Lockhart, 992 F.2d 801, 803–04 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting request for

compensation under § 848(q) for services performed in state clemency proceedings

because petitioner failed to make a threshold showing of reasonable necessity under

former § 848(q)(10), including a showing that state law does not provide compensation

for clemency representation).

Hain v. Mullin, 436 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (holding that counsel

appointed under § 848(q)(4)(B) to represent state death row inmates in federal habeas

proceedings are authorized to represent these clients in state clemency proceedings and

are entitled to receive compensation for the clemency representation). 

In re Lindsey, 875 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B)’s

provision for appointment of counsel in death penalty cases does not entitle state death

row inmate to federally-appointed counsel to exhaust in state court because by

definition any state court exhaustion action is a precursor to the § 2254 right to relief).
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District Courts in Other Circuits:

Lowery v. Anderson, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (holding that under

§ 848(q)(8) petitioner whose habeas petition was unsuccessful, but was not frivolous,

was entitled to have counsel appointed and compensated for reasonably necessary

services relating to state clemency proceedings where petition showed that state law

provided no avenue to compensation for attorneys’ services in clemency proceedings

and petition was filed before attorneys provided clemency-related services; disagreeing

with Chambers v. Johnson, below, court noted that for petitioner challenging a death

sentence through § 2254, only state clemency proceedings could be relevant).

Chambers v. Johnson, 133 F. Supp. 2d 931 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (holding that reference to

clemency proceedings in § 848(q)(8) is limited to federal clemency proceedings and

rejecting counsel’s request for compensation for services in state clemency

proceedings).

Strickler v. Greene, 57 F. Supp. 2d 313 (E.D. Va. 1999) (distinguishing Lindsey and

granting counsel’s fee application for services rendered in the preparation of

petitioner’s state petition for executive clemency).

Patrick v. Johnson, 48 F. Supp. 2d 645 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (holding that petitioner was

not entitled to compensation for an investigator and two experts to aid in the

development of a claim that was procedurally barred).

Wilson v. Horn, No. 96-7838, 1997 WL 137343 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (distinguishing

McFarland and declining to extend § 848(q) to authorize appointment of counsel to

exhaust claims in state court).

Moseley v. Freeman, 977 F. Supp. 733 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (interpreting § 848(q)(4)(B) to

require, absent extraordinary circumstances, completion of state direct and

postconviction proceedings before requesting counsel to file § 2254 petition).

Death Row Prisoners of Pennsylvania v. Ridge, 948 F. Supp. 1278 (E.D. Pa. 1996)

(stating that in “exceptional circumstances § 848(q) counsel can be appointed prior to

exhaustion to assist inmate in preparing habeas corpus petition,” where there is an

“immediate need for habeas counsel even though there has not been exhaustion;”

determination must be made in context of legislative scheme of Anti-Drug Abuse Act,

AEDPA, and reasoning in McFarland).

United States ex rel. John Whitehead v. Page, 914 F. Supp. 1541 (N.D. Ill. 1995)

(holding that § 848(q)(B)(4) cannot be construed to authorize appointing counsel as
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provided in McFarland before claims are exhausted in state court).

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) (providing counsel for § 2254 proceedings and all subsequent

proceedings).

28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) (providing counsel for § 2255 proceedings and all subsequent

proceedings).

6.2.9 Petitioner’s Presence at Habeas Proceedings

In Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), the Supreme Court held that a habeas

petitioner is not necessarily entitled to be present at a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 habeas

proceeding which collaterally challenges a federal criminal conviction. The Ninth

Circuit, in Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312, 1325 (9th Cir. 1994), extended Sanders to

§ 2254 proceedings. Thus, whether a petitioner may be present during habeas

proceedings is entirely within the federal court’s discretion.

Supreme Court:

Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 20 (1963) (stating that in a § 2255 proceeding 

“not every colorable allegation entitles a federal prisoner to a trip to the sentencing

court”).

Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 495 (1962) (holding that there are some

circumstances where prisoner’s presence is unnecessary).

Ninth Circuit:

Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312, 1325 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that judge’s discretion

to allow prisoner’s presence at collateral proceedings is the same under both § 2254

and § 2255).

6.2.10 Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

In Bean v. Calderon, 166 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Cal. 1996), the Eastern District of
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California ruled that while a habeas petitioner may invoke the Fifth Amendment

privilege against self-incrimination, the court may, unlike in a criminal prosecution,

draw an adverse inference from the invocation. The court may draw this adverse

inference if the questions to which the petitioner asserts the privilege directly relate to

an allegation made by petitioner in the verified petition and the questions are not

otherwise objectionable.

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Bean v. Calderon, 166 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that habeas petitioner may

invoke Fifth Amendment privilege but court may draw adverse inference from its

invocation).

6.2.11 Expedited Procedures

(See also § 6.2.16 - Chapter 154 Opt-In Procedures)

In Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), the Supreme Court approved expedited

appeal procedures for capital habeas petitioners. The Barefoot Court upheld the Fifth

Circuit’s unprecedented expedited appeal procedure, explaining that death penalty

cases were different from other cases because “unlike a term of years, a death sentence

cannot begin to be carried out by the State while substantial legal issues remain

outstanding.” Id. at 888.

Supreme Court:

Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (holding that expedited procedures for

consideration of federal habeas appeals are constitutionally “tolerable”).

Ninth Circuit:

Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.) (holding that petitioner was not denied

meaningful access to courts by limited time provided by state court for briefing

unexhausted claims), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1119 (1994).
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District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Riley v. Nevada, 763 F. Supp. 446 (D. Nev. 1991) (ordering preliminary injunction

against Nevada Supreme Court rule shortening appellate briefing time for death penalty

cases because of probable equal protection violation; expedited rule did not further

interest of efficiency, nor fairly or substantially further acceleration of state appellate

process; expedited rule did not violate due process, however, because reasonable and

substantial relationship existed between rule and efficient resolution of death penalty

cases).

Other Circuits:

Truesdale v. Moore, 142 F.3d 749 (4th Cir.) (holding order of Fourth Circuit Judicial

Council setting deadlines for district courts and the circuit court to decide capital cases

was proper exercise of statutory authority (28 U.S.C. § 332) and was not inconsistent

with AEDPA), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 951 (1998).

See generally:

Julia E. Boaz, Note, Summary Processes and the Rule of Law: Expediting Death

Penalty Cases in the Federal Courts, 95 Yale L.J. 349 (1985) (arguing that Supreme

Court’s commitment to expediting death penalty cases, as evidenced by Barefoot,

distorts the administration of justice in adjudicative processes).

Raymond J. Pascucci, Special Project, Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the

Pursuit of Fairness and Consistency, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 1129, 1205 (analyzing

Barefoot and arguing that case was wrongly decided).

6.2.12 Discovery

Rule 6 of the Rules Governing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Cases and of the Rules Governing

§ 2255 Proceedings establishes that there is no automatic right to discovery in habeas

proceedings, but, in its discretion and for good cause, a court may order discovery upon

a party’s request. In Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969), the Supreme Court held

that a district court has discretion to order discovery when it would help the court make

a reliable determination with respect to petitioner’s claim. More recently, in Bracy v.

Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (1997), the Supreme Court held that there is no presumptive

right to discovery but nevertheless determined on the facts of the case that petitioner
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was entitled to discovery under Rule 6.

Rule 6 is silent regarding the propriety of discovery before a habeas corpus

petition is filed, but the Ninth Circuit held in Calderon v. United States District Ct. for

the N. Dist. Of Cal. (Nicolaus), 98 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 1996), that pre-petition

discovery is impermissible. Moreover, in Calderon v. United States District Ct. for the

E. Dist. of Cal. (Roberts), 113 F.3d 149 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit held that

discovery is inappropriate where a federal petition contains unexhausted claims not yet

dismissed or pursued in state court.

Supreme Court:

Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (1997) (holding that petitioner does not enjoy

presumptive right to discovery; finding that petitioner’s demonstration that trial judge

who took bribes was biased against defendant who did not bribe him was sufficient for

discovery under Rule 6(a)).

Dobbs v. Zant, 506 U.S. 357 (1993) (remanding case after Eleventh Circuit denied

petitioner an opportunity to supplement the record on appeal with a newly discovered

sentencing transcript).

McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (holding that petitioner’s knowledge of his

confession to cellmate was sufficient notice of potential Massiah claim such that

petitioner’s counsel should have investigated that claim).

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969) (holding that when petition for habeas corpus

establishes a prima facie case for relief, district court is authorized to use

interrogatories and other discovery procedures to establish necessary facts).

Ninth Circuit:

Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999) (examining and denying petitioner’s

claim that he was denied the opportunity to discover and present evidence supporting

his claims), cert. denied sub nom., Rich v. Woodford, 528 U.S. 1092 (2000).

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal. (Thomas), 144 F.3d 618 (9th

Cir. 1998) (holding that district court’s discovery order allowing deposition to proceed

was proper where petition was amended to delete unexhausted claims and amended

petition with exhausted claims was held in abeyance while deleted claims were
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exhausted).

McDaniel v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Nevada (Jones), 127 F.3d 886 (9th

Cir. 1997) (holding that capital prisoner was entitled to discovery).

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal. (Hill), 120 F.3d 927 (9th Cir.

1997) (granting state’s petition for mandamus and following Nicolaus in holding that

until a petitioner files a federal petition on an exhausted claim he cannot avail himself

of discovery).

Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting state’s contention that

habeas petitioners are entitled only to discovery on issues that are to be considered in

an already-scheduled evidentiary hearing; explaining that discovery is available at the

discretion of the district court for good cause shown regardless of whether there is to be

an evidentiary hearing).

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Cal. (Roberts), 113 F.3d 149 (9th

Cir. 1997) (holding discovery inappropriate where federal habeas petition contains

unexhausted claims that must be dismissed or pursued in state court).

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal. (Nicolaus), 98 F.3d 1102

(9th Cir. 1996) (holding that pre-petition discovery was impermissible because

propriety of discovery depends on factual allegations in petition and because of

presence of unexhausted claims; stating that habeas was never meant to be a fishing

expedition for petitioners to explore their case in search of its existence; concurring

opinion clarifying that once petitioner files habeas petition, it should not be dismissed

for lack of evidence until court deals with discovery request).

Other Circuits:

In re Pruett, 133 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that district court lacked authority to

issue ex parte discovery order).

Federal Rules:

Fed. R. Habeas Corpus 6 (establishing no automatic right to discovery).

6.2.12.1 Protective Order

The Ninth Circuit held in Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
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denied, 540 U.S. 1013 (2003), that a protective order in a capital habeas proceeding is

an appealable collateral order. The court in Bittaker also held that under the “fairness

principle,” a habeas petitioner who raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

does not waive the attorney-client privilege for all purposes and that the scope of the

waiver extends only to litigation of the federal habeas petition, rather than extending to

the possible retrial of the petitioner.

Ninth Circuit:

Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (affirming a protective order

regarding discovery in capital habeas proceedings, and holding that the order was an

appealable collateral order; also holding that under the “fairness principle” a habeas

petitioner who raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel waives the attorneyclient privilege as to all communications with his allegedly ineffective lawyer, and the

scope of this waiver extends only to litigation of the federal habeas petition, rather than

amounting to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege for all time and all purposes,

including that possible retrial of the petitioner; overruling Anderson v. Calderon, 232

F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2000), to the extent that it reached a contrary conclusion), cert.

denied, 540 U.S. 1013 (2003).

Osband v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding in capital habeas case in

which petitioner alleged ineffective assistance of counsel that district court’s denial of

state’s motion to reconsider magistrate judge’s protective order allowing state’s

discovery of materials that would ordinarily have been subject to evidentiary privileges,

including the attorney-client privilege, but limiting access to personnel of the attorney

general’s office and limiting use of the materials to proceedings incident to the petition

for writ of habeas corpus pending before the court was not clear error; also holding

that denial of the motion to reconsider was an appealable collateral order; further

holding that to extent that Anderson v. Calderon, was inconsistent with McDowell II,

court was bound by the en banc decision in McDowell II, which “plainly holds that

protective orders like the one issued in this case do not fall outside the bounds of the

very broad discretion of the district courts, and that it is not clear error to deny a motion

to reconsider such an order”). 

Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding district court properly

denied petitioner’s request for a protective order limiting the use of attorney-client

communications and attorney work-product materials produced in the federal habeas

proceeding to that proceeding; holding issue was one of evidentiary privilege more

appropriately decided in state court should retrial occur), overruled in part by Bittaker
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v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), above.

McDowell v. Calderon (McDowell II), 197 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (per

curiam) (holding that district court did not commit clear error when it limited access to

documents discovered from trial counsel’s file only for purposes of pending habeas

litigation and by prohibiting disclosure to “prosecutorial personnel or agencies” for use

in connection with petitioner’s penalty phase retrial; reasoning that since it was

debatable whether district court could so limit attorney general’s use of documents,

district court did not commit clear error and protective order did not fall clearly outside

bounds of district court’s broad discretion to fashion discovery orders), cert. denied,

529 U.S. 1082 (2000).

Wharton v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 1997) (vacating district court’s

protective order, which barred respondent’s interview of potential witnesses outside a

deposition setting, on the ground that attorney-client privilege is evidentiary in nature,

and not absolute, especially in light of petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims).

6.2.13 Evidentiary Hearings

Unless a petition is summarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing 28

U.S.C. § 2254 proceedings (or its § 2255 counterpart), Rule 8 of the Rules Governing

28 U.S.C. § 2254 Cases (or its § 2255 counterpart) requires the judge to review the

answer, transcript and record, to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required.

 In Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992), the Court held that the

petitioner must show cause for failing to develop the fact in state court and resulting

prejudice from the denial of an evidentiary hearing. The Keeney Court also adopted the

narrow fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to the cause and prejudice

standard.

Circuit courts have held that Keeney did not alter the discretionary power of

a district court to hold an evidentiary hearing. As the Second Circuit stated in Pagan v.

Keane, 984 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1993), the purpose of the Keeney test is to indicate those

situations where an evidentiary hearing is mandatory. In all other cases where material

facts are in dispute, the district judge has discretion to hold a hearing. The Ninth

Circuit also held that attachment of the presumption of correctness accorded state

findings of fact does not deprive the district court of discretion to hold an evidentiary

hearing.
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In 1996, Congress created a specific limitation on the district court’s

discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing as part of the AEDPA. The AEDPA repealed

previous § 2254(d) and replaced it with § 2254(e). Section 2254(e)(2) provides as

follows:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in

State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary

hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that:

(A) the claim relies on:

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously

discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish

by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error,

no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of

the underlying offense.

In Williams (Michael) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000) the Court held that § 2254(e)(2)

codifies Keeney’s threshold standard of diligence. Williams also held that “[d]iligence

require[s] in the usual case that the prisoner, at a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing

in state court in the manner prescribed by state law.” Id. at 437.

Supreme Court:

Williams (Michael) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000) (holding that pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(2), which governs evidentiary hearings in federal court, a petitioner does not

“fail to develop” the factual basis of a claim in state court unless there has been some

lack of diligence or other greater fault on the part of the petitioner or his counsel;

holding that § 2254(e)(2) codifies Keeney’s threshold standard of diligence).

Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992) (ruling that cause and prejudice, rather

than deliberate bypass, is the correct standard for evaluating a habeas petitioner’s

failure to develop a material fact in state court and granting an evidentiary hearing;

fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to cause and prejudice standard applies;

O’Connor dissent stating that district courts still possess discretion to hold hearings

even when not mandatory).
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Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (holding factual allegations insufficient to entitle

evidentiary hearing where petitioner argued that guilty plea was involuntary due to

ineffective assistance of counsel but did not allege that his attorney knew of petitioner’s

prior conviction and failed to inform him of the sentencing effect of that conviction, or

allege that but for the ineffective assistance he would not have pleaded guilty).

Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (discussing various instances where an

evidentiary hearing is mandatory; and stating that “in every case [the trial judge] has

the power, constrained only by . . . sound discretion, to receive evidence bearing upon

the constitutional claim”), overruled in part, 504 U.S. 1 (1992), and limited by §

2254(e)(2).

Ninth Circuit:

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2002) (remanding for evidentiary hearing on

issue whether petitioner’s confession to prison psychiatrist was involuntary under Fifth

Amendment because he reasonably believed his statements were protected by a

confidentiality agreement signed in connection with prison group therapy sessions),

cert denied, 538 U.S. 1053 (2003).

Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 2002) (remanding for evidentiary hearing to

determine whether counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failure to investigate and

present evidence of petitioner’s long-term drug use and his abusive and difficult

childhood, which, if true, could have altered result of penalty phase of capital murder

trial)

Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that habeas petitioner

asserted colorable claim that the combined prejudicial effect of his counsel's ineffective

assistance in failing to present defense that victim was killed during “shoot-out” rather

than presenting only his meritless alibi defense, and state's presentation of false

testimony regarding existence of plea agreement with its chief witness, required setting

aside findings that rendered him eligible for death sentence and entitled him to

evidentiary hearing on those two claims).

Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir.) (applying § 2254(e) and affirming denial of

evidentiary hearing because petitioner failed to request an evidentiary hearing in state

court and failed to file a state habeas petition, notwithstanding that questions of fact

existed regarding ineffective assistance of counsel claim), amended on denial of

petition for reh’g, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001).

Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2001) (remanding for evidentiary where
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petitioner raises colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and no state court

granted petitioner opportunity to develop his claim), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1118

(2002).

United States v. Jackson, 209 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding defendant entitled to a

§ 2255 evidentiary hearing where juror received phone threat during deliberations and

reported event differently to trial court than to petitioner’s investigator during § 2255

proceeding).

United States v. Chacon-Palomares, 208 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding § 2255

petitioner entitled to an evidentiary hearing where facts in supporting affidavit, if

proven, might establish a right to relief).

Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming the district court in

holding that petitioner was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing under § 2254(e)(2)

where he failed to develop the factual basis of his ineffective assistance claim in state

court or provide a reason for not doing so), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1079 (2000).

Wallace v. Stewart, 184 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 1999) (remanding capital habeas case for

evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance claim), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1105

(2000).

Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir.) (holding that prisoner was entitled to

evidentiary hearing on claim of ineffective assistance at sentencing), cert. denied, 527

U.S. 1049 (1999).

Seidel v. Merkle, 146 F.3d 750 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that petitioner’s obligation to

show cause for failure to develop facts in state court proceedings and actual prejudice

resulting therefrom bore only on entitlement to evidentiary hearing and not on district

court’s discretion to hold hearing), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).

Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404 (9th Cir.) (holding that petitioner alleged facts

sufficient to meet the Strickland standard, and that an evidentiary hearing was required

in district court since, at the state’s behest, no hearing was held in state court), cert.

denied, 525 U.S. 984, and cert. denied, 525 U.S. 996 (1998).

Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 1997) (remanding for determination, under

proper standard, whether evidentiary hearing was required; overruling the district

court’s use of the “trial result would have been different” standard; concluding that

proper standard was Bagley/Agurs’ “any reasonable likelihood”).
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Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 1997) (declining to apply the AEDPA to preact case but asserting that if the state courts simply do not conduct an evidentiary

hearing, a petitioner has not failed to develop a claim’s factual basis, and the AEDPA

does not preclude a federal evidentiary hearing).

Campbell v. Blodgett, 978 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir.) (holding that a one-day evidentiary

hearing was adequate where district court complied with Barefoot expedited procedures

and afforded petitioner wide latitude to present evidence), reh’g granted, 978 F.2d 519

(9th Cir. 1992).

Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding petitioner entitled to

evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance claim where state did not hold hearing and

record did not establish that counsel made any tactical decisions not to call witnesses

during guilt phase or not to present family testimony at sentencing).

Harris v. Vasquez, 928 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that declarations supporting

petitioner’s claim, brought to court’s attention on motion for rehearing, required district

court evidentiary hearing on claim and on abuse of the writ).

Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that “colorable”

ineffective assistance claim entitles petitioner to an evidentiary hearing).

Coleman v. McCormick, 874 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir.) (holding that counsel’s

conclusory statements that jurors from lower socio-economic areas were improperly

excluded from jury is insufficient to require district court to hold evidentiary hearing),

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).

Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1165 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that where there are only

conflicting affidavits regarding the facts underlying petitioner’s claim of cause for

procedural default, district court must hold evidentiary hearing).

Neuschafer v. McKay, 807 F.2d 839, 841–42 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that when state

trial and appellate courts come to inconsistent conclusions on a critical factual point,

district court should hold evidentiary hearing rather than second-guessing one court).

Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 727 n.3 (9th Cir.) (holding that attachment of

presumption of correctness does not deprive district court of discretion to hold an

evidentiary hearing), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 867 (1986).

Richmond v. Ricketts, 774 F.2d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that statutory

presumption of correctness should not be sole determinant of whether an evidentiary
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hearing is necessary).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Hunter v. Vasquez, No. C-90-3275, 1996 WL 612484 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 1996) (holding

that § 2254(e) evidentiary hearing requirements do not have retroactive effect in terms

of upsetting fair notice, reasonable expectations, or creating new legal consequences;

determining that § 2254(e) essentially codified Keeney except that it eliminated district

court discretion to hold a hearing where petitioner “failed to develop” in state court;

finding that petitioner did not fail to develop where state court denied petitioner’s

requests for discovery, investigative funds, and a hearing).

Other Circuits:

McDonald v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 1056 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that a habeas petitioner

has not failed to develop facts where petitioner diligently sought to develop facts but

was denied opportunity by state court and, thus, is entitled to federal evidentiary

hearing).

Amrine v. Bowersox, 128 F.3d 1222 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (remanding to district

court for evidentiary hearing to determine whether Schlup standard had been met), cert.

denied, 523 U.S. 1123 (1998).

Weeks v. Bowersox, 119 F.3d 1342 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (affirming denial of an

evidentiary hearing where petitioner sought hearing to develop facts necessary to make

sufficient Schlup actual innocence claim to overcome procedural default), cert. denied,

522 U.S. 1093 (1998).

Sena v. State of New Mexico Prison, 109 F.3d 652 (10th Cir. 1997) (requiring

evidentiary hearing where court of appeals concluded that substantial doubt existed as

to petitioner’s competence at time he entered guilty plea and no factual determination

of competence was made at time of plea).

Bannister v. Delo, 100 F.3d 610 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that evidentiary hearing is not

required for actual innocence claim if development of claim would not establish actual

innocence).

Parkus v. Delo, 33 F.3d 933 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding cause and prejudice for

evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance and Brady claims: (1) counsel failed to

pursue defendant’s youth mental health records simply because he was told they were
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destroyed and sole defense was defendant’s mental condition, and (2) prosecutor failed

to furnish all records favorable to defense).

Stewart v. Nix, 31 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding no cause for evidentiary hearing;

facts could have been developed in state court through affidavits like those presented in

federal court; pro se status does not excuse failure to develop facts in state court).

Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding evidentiary hearing because

factual dispute and state record did not “fairly support” finding on cause of petitioner’s

delay).

Buenoano v. Singletary, 963 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that district court did

not hold an adequate evidentiary hearing when it unduly restricted evidence allowed on

conflict of interest claim and failed to hold hearing on ineffective assistance claim).

Meeks v. Singletary, 963 F.2d 316 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that mere occurrence of

hearing in state court does not neutralize right to evidentiary hearing on federal

habeas).

James v. Singletary, 957 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding defendant entitled to

evidentiary hearing on claim that substantive due process rights were violated due to

incompetence to stand trial).

May v. Collins, 955 F.2d 299 (5th Cir.) (holding petitioner not entitled to evidentiary

hearing on actual innocence claim where trial judge also read affidavits for state

postconviction claim), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 901 (1992).

Agan v. Dugger, 835 F.2d 1337 (11th Cir. 1987) (remanding case for evidentiary

hearing on competency and ineffective assistance claims where state held no

evidentiary hearing).

Porter v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 930 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding conflict of interest and

ineffective assistance allegations sufficient to require evidentiary hearing where state

court did not hold hearing).

Green v. Zant, 715 F.2d 551 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding, where state court findings were

inadequate and seemed unreliable, evidentiary hearing required on juror exclusion

issue).
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District Courts in Other Circuits:

Bernal v. Helman, 958 F. Supp. 349 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (interpreting § 2254(e)(2) to mean

that petitioner should have evidentiary hearing only “when the alleged defect resulted

in the conviction of an innocent person”), postconviction relief denied, No. 97 C 2922,

1998 WL 325222 (N.D. Ill. 1998).

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2000) (limiting district court’s discretion to hold evidentiary

hearing where applicant “failed to develop factual bases of claim in state court

proceedings”).

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994) [repealed].

Federal Rules:

Fed. R. Habeas Corpus 4 (providing for summary dismissal of § 2254 petition).

Fed. R. Habeas Corpus 8 (requiring review for evidentiary hearing or dismissal of §

2254 petition).

6.2.14 Stays of Execution

6.2.14.1 Standard for Granting Stay

Section 2251 of Title 28 of the United States Code authorizes a federal judge to stay

execution of state judgments but does not specify the standards that govern review of

stay petitions. In Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), the Supreme Court stated

that a stay should be granted when necessary to permit consideration of the merits and

should “reflect the presence of substantial grounds upon which relief might be

granted.” That is, a petitioner must make a “substantial showing of the denial of a

federal right.” This standard does not require a showing that petitioner would prevail

on the merits but does require that the issue presented is “debatable among jurists of

reason” such that a court could resolve the issue differently, or that the issue is

“adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” This is the same standard

applied in granting a certificate of probable cause. See infra § 6.2.15.1. The Barefoot
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Court also stressed that stays should be less readily granted on second and subsequent

habeas petitions than on first petitions.

In Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314 (1996), the Supreme Court further

articulated that where a petitioner presents a request for stay on a first petition and the

district court cannot dismiss the petition on the merits before petitioner’s scheduled

execution, Barefoot requires the district court to issue a stay and address the merits to

prevent the case from becoming moot.

Ninth Circuit Rules 22-4 and 22-5 provide the procedures for granting a stay

of execution on appeal. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(d) governs the

granting of a stay pending a petition to the United States Supreme Court.

If a state “opts in” to Chapter 154 of Title 28, United States Code, an

automatic stay issues upon the filing of a § 2254 petition in federal court. See infra §

6.2.16.

Supreme Court:

Netherland v. Gray, 519 U.S. 1301 (1997) (holding that court of appeals should not

grant stay of execution to permit filing of petition for writ of certiorari without first

complying with procedures set out in Barefoot for handling applications for stays of

execution).

Angelone v. Bennett, 519 U.S. 959 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that

congressional reform, limiting federal court authority to entertain successive petitions,

increases the importance of first petition review; thus federal courts should give greater,

rather than less, scrutiny to death row inmates’ first petitions).

Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314 (1996) (holding that where district court cannot

dismiss first habeas petition on merits before scheduled execution, court must issue stay

and address merits to prevent case from becoming moot).

Delo v. Blair, 509 U.S. 823 (1993) (holding no substantial grounds for relief, and thus

vacating stay; stating that “it is an abuse of discretion for a federal court to interfere

with the orderly process of a state’s criminal justice system in a case raising claims that

are for all relevant purposes indistinguishable from those we recently rejected in

Herrera”).

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (holding “particularly egregious” the entering
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of a stay on second or subsequent petitions unless “there are substantial grounds upon

which relief might be granted”).

Gomez v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653 (1992) (stating

that a court may consider last-minute nature of application for stay in deciding whether

to grant equitable relief).

Cole v. Texas, 499 U.S. 1301 (1991) (Scalia, J., as Fifth Circuit Justice) (stating, “I will

in this case, and in every case on direct review, grant a stay of execution pending

disposition by this Court of the petition for certiorari”).

Madden v. Texas, 498 U.S. 1301 (1991) (holding that withdrawal of appellate counsel,

not reasonably unforeseeable, does not constitute good cause for stay of execution and

extension of time to apply for writ of certiorari).

Kyles v. Whitley, 498 U.S. 931 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that Court rarely

grants stay requests made after state collateral review; proper route is through federal

habeas).

Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731 (1990) (vacating stay because there was no

evidentiary basis for appellate court’s conclusion that district court erred in declining to

conduct evidentiary hearing as there were no substantial grounds upon which relief

could be granted).

Delo v. Stokes, 495 U.S. 320 (1990) (holding that court abused its discretion in granting

stay pending review of clear abuse of writ).

Antone v. Dugger, 465 U.S. 200 (1984) (refusing to grant stay on successive petition

where petitioner claimed counsel had not had adequate opportunity to develop facts due

to “press of time” in first habeas proceeding).

Sullivan v. Wainwright, 464 U.S. 109 (1983) (denying stay where case had received

repetitive and careful review during ten years of state and federal litigation).

Maggio v. Williams, 464 U.S. 46 (1983) (vacating stay where grounds for relief were

insubstantial).

Autry v. Estelle, 464 U.S. 1 (1983) (denying application for stay where fewer than four

justices would grant certiorari; refusing to adopt rule of automatic stay where applicant

seeking review of denial of first habeas petition).
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Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (holding that stay should be granted when

necessary to permit consideration of the merits when certificate of probable cause is

obtained by petitioner; in successive petition case, grant of stay should reflect existence

of substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted).

Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1977) (terminating stay based upon conclusion that

competent defendant made knowing and intelligent waiver of any and all federal

rights).

Ninth Circuit:

Clark v. Lewis, 1 F.3d 814 (9th Cir. 1993) (following Barefoot and applying earlier

Appellate Rule 22 to deny application for stay of execution).

Brewer v. Lewis, 989 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1993) (following Barefoot, denying

application for stay because no substantial showing of denial of federal right).

Harris v. Vasquez, 901 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1990) (granting stay when successive petition

showed “substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted”; right to competent

psychiatric assistance in penalty phase is “debatable among jurists of reason,” so stay is

appropriate).

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2251, as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 507(f) (authorizing federal

judge to grant stay of execution of state judgment).

Ninth Circuit Rules:

9th Cir. R. 22-1, 22-4, 22-5 (providing for automatic stay on first petition and onejudge temporary stay).

6.2.14.2 Jurisdiction to Enter Stay

In McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849 (1994), the Supreme Court held that federal courts

need not wait for a federal habeas petition to be filed in order to appoint counsel or to

grant a stay of execution. In 2006, however, 28 U.S.C. § 2251 was amended and now

states that a proceeding is not pending under § 2251 until a habeas application is filed.
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As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2251 also provides that:

(a)(3) If a State prisoner sentenced to death applies for

appointment of counsel pursuant to section 3599(a)(2) of title 18 in

a court that would have jurisdiction to entertain a habeas corpus

application regarding that sentence, that court may stay execution

of the sentence of death, but such stay shall terminate not later than

90 days after counsel is appointed or the application for

appointment of counsel is withdrawn or denied. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that a circuit court does not have jurisdiction to

stay an execution warrant issued by a state outside of the Ninth Circuit,

notwithstanding that imposition of the capital sentence would moot his California

habeas case. Malone v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1234, reconsideration denied, 164 F.3d

1210 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Supreme Court:

McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849 (1994) (holding that jurisdiction to enter stay exists

on invocation of § 848(q) right to counsel).

Ninth Circuit:

Malone v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1234 (holding that federal appellate court lacks

jurisdiction to stay the execution of a prisoner who is in the custody of state prison

officials in a different circuit, despite the fact that the imposition of sentence in the

foreign circuit will moot challenges to his Ninth Circuit conviction and an appurtenant

Johnson v. Mississippi claim; foreign state officials are not subject to Ninth Circuit

jurisdiction on the basis of their limited intervention in California habeas case),

reconsideration denied, 164 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Malone), 137 F.3d 1420,

1422 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that court of appeals has jurisdiction to review the denial

of injunctive relief in a habeas case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)).

Brown v. Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming, prior to McFarland,

district court’s stay of state prisoner’s execution where prisoner had not filed habeas

petition but had filed petition for appointment of counsel to assist in preparation of
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habeas petition; reasoning that application for appointment constitutes part of habeas

proceeding for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2251).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Clair v. Vasquez, 827 F. Supp. 1465 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (holding, prior to McFarland,

that court has jurisdiction to enter stay before habeas filing to allow petitioner time to

seek appointed counsel according to local rules; suggesting that Rule 11 sanctions may

apply if Attorney General’s office contests stays in similar situations).

Brown v. Vasquez, 743 F. Supp. 729 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (holding, prior to McFarland,

that pro se petitioner’s applications for appointment of counsel and for stay are

sufficient to confer jurisdiction under All Writs Act because applications sufficiently

established court’s potential habeas jurisdiction and stay necessary to preserve that

potential jurisdiction), aff’d, 952 F.2d 1164 (9th Cir. 1991).

See generally:

Recent Case, Habeas Corpus–Stay of State Court Proceedings–Ninth Circuit Stays

Execution to Appoint Counsel to Assist Prisoner in Filing Habeas Corpus

Petition–Brown v. Vasquez, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1807 (1992) (asserting that exercise of

jurisdiction sanctioned by Brown is inconsistent with rules governing federal habeas

and unnecessarily increases habeas review costs).

6.2.15 Appellate and Supreme Court Review of Habeas Action

6.2.15.1 Certificate of Probable Cause/Certificate of Appealability

Prior to the AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2253 required a petitioner in state custody to obtain a

“certificate of probable cause” (CPC) to establish federal appellate court jurisdiction

over an appeal of the district court’s denial of a habeas corpus petition. A CPC

required a showing of more than good faith or an absence of frivolity.

In Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), the Supreme Court held that a

CPC requires a “substantial showing of the denial of a federal right.” In a capital case,

the nature of the death penalty is a proper subject of consideration in determining

whether to issue a certificate, but the “severity of the penalty does not in itself suffice to

warrant the automatic issuing of a certificate.” A substantial showing of the denial of a
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federal right does not require a showing that the petitioner would prevail on the merits. 

Rather, the Court held that petitioner must demonstrate one of the following: (1) the

issue presented is “debatable among jurists of reason,” (2) a court could resolve the

issue in a different manner, or (3) the issue deserves further proceedings.

In 1996, the AEDPA amended § 2253 to require a “certificate of

appealability” (COA) for both § 2254 and § 2255 cases. Circuit courts may grant a

COA only upon a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional [not a federal]

right.” Also in contrast to the former CPC protocol, AEDPA requires a COA to be

issued on a claim specific basis. Specifically, § 2253 provides:

(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals

from–

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the

detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State

court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1)

only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial

of a constitutional right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall

indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required

by paragraph (2).

The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure additionally provide for a district

judge to issue a certificate of appealability. Rule 22(b) provides in pertinent part:

In a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained

of arises from process issued by a state court, or in a 28 U.S.C. §

2255 proceeding, the applicant cannot take an appeal unless a

circuit justice or a circuit or district judge issues a certificate of

appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). 

The Ninth Circuit has upheld the district courts’ authority under Circuit Rule 22(b) to

issue COAs in § 2254 and § 2255 cases. United States v. Asrar, 116 F.3d 1268 (9th

Cir. 1997).

In Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000), the Supreme Court
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570 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

acknowledged that a § 2253(c) analysis is straightforward when a district court rejects a

constitutional claim on the merits: Petitioner must show that a reasonable jurist would

find the district court’s ruling debatable or wrong. However, the Slack Court held that

a COA should issue in a petition denied on procedural grounds when jurists of reason

would find debatable both (1) whether the petition states a valid constitutional claim

and (2) whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. The Ninth

Circuit has construed the first prong of Slack as requiring a facially valid claim of a

constitutional right. Lambright v. Stewart, 20 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 2000). The

Slack Court also held that an issue apparently settled by circuit law was nevertheless

debatable for purposes of issuing a COA. Slack at 1604. 

In Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003), the Court reiterated the view

that when a habeas applicant seeks permission to initiate appellate review of the

dismissal of his or her petition, the court of appeals should limit its examination to a

threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of the claims. The Court in Miller-El held

that a prisoner seeking a certificate of appealability need only demonstrate a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right. The Court further held that a petitioner

satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the

district court’s resolution of the petitioner’s constitutional claims or that jurists could

conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed

further. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327.

Supreme Court:

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (holding that to obtain a COA, habeas

petitioners must show that reasonable jurists could debate whether petition should have

been resolved in different manner or that issues presented were adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further and that until COA has been issued, courts of appeals

lack jurisdiction to rule on merits of appeals from habeas petitions).

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) (holding that a COA should issue in a petition

denied on procedural grounds when jurists of reason would find debatable or wrong

both (1) whether the petition states a valid constitutional claim and (2) whether the

district court was correct in its procedural ruling).

Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998) (holding that the Supreme Court has
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jurisdiction under § 1254(1) to review denials of applications for COAs by a circuit

judge or a panel of a court of appeals).

Lozada v. Deeds, 498 U.S. 430 (1991) (per curiam) (granting CPC because petitioner

made substantial showing of denial of right to effective assistance regarding failure to

appeal; issue of prejudice could be resolved differently than in district court).

Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983) (holding that CPC should issue where

petitioner makes a “substantial showing of the denial of a federal right” by

demonstrating that the issue is debatable among jurists, that a court could resolve the

issue in a different manner, or that the issue deserves further proceedings; penalty’s

severity does not warrant automatic certificate issuance).

Ninth Circuit:

Jennings v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2002) (issuing COA and holding that it

was debatable under Barefoot standard as to whether allegations that trial counsel failed

to adequately investigate and present evidence regarding petitioner’s psychological and

family history that (1) might have defeated the jury’s finding of the requisite intent for

first degree murder in the guilt phase or (2) provided sufficient mitigating evidence to

warrant a sentence of life rather than death in penalty phase, and that if true, allegations

amount to denial of effective assistance of counsel), cert denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).

United States v. Mikels, 236 F.3d 550 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding circuit court has

jurisdiction to dismiss an appeal notwithstanding district court did not issue a COA,

where petitioner did not claim the denial of a constitutional right).

United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding appeal presented

constitutional question under Slack, notwithstanding that question had been resolved by

Supreme Court, because issue was whether Supreme Court ruling applied to petition

filed before ruling), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1002 (2001). 

James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying second prong of Slack–in

appeal from the district court’s denial of a motion to extend time to file a motion for a

COA–and finding debatable whether district court was correct in dismissing a mixed

petition without affording the prisoner an opportunity to amend to delete unexhausted

claims; finding analysis under first prong of Slack inapplicable pursuant to Gatlin

because the state failed to assert that the petition failed to state a valid claim of the

denial of a constitutional right).

Lambright v. Stewart, 220 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that if petitioner has
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facially alleged the denial of a constitutional right and the district court’s procedural

ruling is debatable, the court of appeals will grant a COA) (J. Thompson concurring,

stating that court of appeals should not discuss the basis for its issuance/denial of a

COA).

Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2000) (treating petitioner’s appellate brief on

uncertified issues as a request to expand the COA issued by the district court;

expanding COA without discussing basis; denying claims on the merits), cert. denied,

534 U.S. 839 (2001).

Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that once an appellate court

issues a COA without timely objection by the state, the procedural threshold for

appellate jurisdiction has been met; rejecting respondent’s request to revisit the

propriety of the certificate before reaching the merits of the appeal), cert. denied, 528

U.S. 1087 (2000).

Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 167 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 1999) (observing that circuit law

regarding petitioner’s Lackey claim is settled; affirming district court’s denial of COA).

United States v. Asrar, 116 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that district courts have

authority under Rule 22(b) to issue COAs in § 2254 and § 2255 cases; establishing

procedure for district courts’ processing of notices of appeal and COA applications).

Forde v. United States Parole Comm’n, 114 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 1997) (denying as

unnecessary petitioner’s request for a COA to review the denial of his § 2241; the plain

language of § 2253(c)(1) did not require a COA when denying a § 2241 petition

because the order denying a § 2241 petition is not a final order in a habeas proceeding

arising from state court process).

Clark v. Lewis, 1 F.3d 814 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying Appellate Rule 22, which provides

that if appellate panel votes unanimously to deny application for CPC, it should set

forth issues presented and reasons for denial; denying certificate).

Harris v. Vasquez, 901 F.2d 724, 725 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that petitioner must

make substantial showing of the denial of a federal right for certificate).

Other Circuits:

Jefferson v. Welborn, 222 F.3d 286 (7th Cir. 2000) (granting COA and finding for

petitioner on merits of procedural appeal simultaneously, and remanding for

reinstatement of petition).
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Jones v. Johnson, 134 F.3d 309 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that, where the district judge

conclusively ceded responsibility for determining whether a CPC shall issue to the

magistrate judge, the CPC is ineffective to confer jurisdiction on a court of appeals;

remanding for proper determination by the district judge).

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2000) (providing COA requirement in § 2254 and § 2255 cases).

Federal Rules:

Fed. R. App. P. 22(b) (requiring COA in § 2254 cases).

Ninth Circuit Rules:

9th Cir. R. 22-1 (addressing certificates of appealability).

6.2.15.1.1 Retroactivity of Certificate of Appealability Requirement

In Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000), the Court held that the § 2253 certificate of

appealability requirement has retroactive effect to petitions filed before the AEDPA’s

effective date when the appeal commenced after the effective date. Additionally, the

circuit court has jurisdiction to issue initial COA determinations for post-AEDPA

appeals from pre-AEDPA petitions already pending at the circuit court,

notwithstanding Rule 22-1. Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2000). See infra §

6.2.15.1.2.

Supreme Court:

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) (holding that when an appeal is commenced

after April 24, 1996, the post-AEDPA version of 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)–requiring a

certificate of appealability from the circuit court–applies).

Dickey v. United States, 524 U.S. 947 (1998) (granting certiorari, vacating the Fifth

Circuit’s order denying a COA on pre-AEDPA § 2255 petition and remanding

consideration in light of Lindh).
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6.2.15.1.2 Ninth Circuit Rule 22-1

Ninth Circuit Rule 22-1 sets forth the required procedures regarding the filing of a

certificate of appealability (“COA”). Circuit Rule 22-1(a) provides that the procedures

set forth in Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 4 and 22(b) will apply to an appeal

from a judgment of the district court in proceedings under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255. 

Rule 22-1(a) specifically provides that the court of appeals “will not act on a motion for

a COA if the district court has not ruled first.”

Pursuant to Rule 22-1(d), if the district court denies a COA as to all issues,

the petitioner may file a motion for a COA in the court of appeals within 35 days of the

district court’s entry of its order of denial of the COA in full or denial of a timely filed

post-judgment motion, whichever is later. If the petitioner files no COA motion after

the district court denies a COA motion in full, the court of appeals will deem the notice

of appeal to constitute a motion for a COA.

Pursuant to Rules 22-1(c), if the district court grants a COA as to any or all

issues, the petitioner may brief only those issues certified, or otherwise proceed

according to Rule 22-1(e). Rule 22-1(e) provides that alternatively, if a petitioner

concludes during the course of preparing the opening brief, that an uncertified issue

should be discussed in the brief, the petitioner must first brief all certified issues under

the heading, “Certified Issues,” and then, in the same brief, discuss any uncertified

issues under the heading, “Uncertified Issues.” Uncertified issues raised and designated

in this manner will be construed as a motion to expand the COA and will be addressed

by the merits panel to such extent as it deems appropriate.

A merits panel may expand a COA to include claims specifically rejected by

a motions panel as well as claims that were not presented to the motions panel for

certification. Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), cert denied,

529 U.S. 1009 (2000).

Finally, the circuit court has jurisdiction to issue initial COA determinations

for post-AEDPA appeals from pre-AEDPA petitions already pending at the circuit

court, notwithstanding Rule 22-1. Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2000); see

also Slack v. McDanial, supra § 6.2.15.1, et seq. 
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Ninth Circuit:

Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding that Circuit Rule

22-1 does not apply, either directly or by analogy, to habeas appeals in which an

expanded COA is sought in the court of appeals, and in which the district court’s order

denying a COA was entered before the effective date of the Rule (January 1, 1999) and

that for such cases, procedure approved in Cruz-Mendoza I, in which briefing of the

uncertified issue or issues in the court of appeals is treated as a request for an expanded

COA, is available; holding, therefore, that because Rule 22-1 went into effect after

district court partially granted a COA as to a penalty phase issue, but partially denied a

COA as to guilt phase issues, the requirement of Rule 22-1 that petitioner file a

“separate motion for broader certification” within thirty-five days of the district court’s

entry of its order denying a COA did not apply to petitioner’s request for an expanded

COA), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 994 (2003).

Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (noting that even though

AEDPA’s provisions applied to issue whether petitioner was entitled to COA, preAEDPA law applied to merits of petition filed in 1995, before AEDPA’s effective date

of April 24, 1996)

United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2000) (following Schell).

Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2000) (treating petitioner’s notice of appeal,

filed after April 24, 1996 from a pre-AEDPA petition, as an application for a COA;

granting COA without discussing basis and deciding merits of appellate claims).

United States v. Kramer, 195 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 1999) (declining to expand COA

issued by merits panel, citing Hiivala).

Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (per curiam) (9th Cir. 1999) (reconsidering–as part of

merits appeal–but declining to certify claims either specifically rejected by COA

motions panel or not presented to motions panel pursuant to § 2253(c) and Circuit Rule

22-1), cert denied, 529 U.S. 1009 (2000).

United States v. Cruz-Mendoza, 147 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir.) (noting the recent

adoption of Ninth Circuit Rule 22-1; declining to decide on the application of Rule 22-

1 to this pre-rule case because petitioner had not made the § 2253(c)(2) showing

regarding the uncertified claim in any event), as amended, 163 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir.

1998).
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6.2.15.2 Jurisdictional Requirement: Resolution of all Guilt Phase Claims

In Blazak v. Ricketts, 971 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth Circuit held that the

district court’s order was final and appealable where all guilt phase issues had been

adjudicated and relief had been granted on one of the claims, notwithstanding that

punishment issues were not addressed.

In the capital habeas appeal of Robbins v. Smith, 152 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir.

1997), rev’d on other grounds, 528 U.S. 259 (2000), the district court determined that

appellate counsel was ineffective and consequently failed to adjudicate petitioner’s

guilt phase issues. The Ninth Circuit ruled on the ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel issue; however, it also remanded to the district court for consideration of the

alleged trial errors. This remand was to prevent unnecessary delay–caused by a state

appellate rehearing–that might otherwise be mooted by federal relief on any of the guilt

claims.

Ninth Circuit:

Robbins v. Smith, 152 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying Blazak in holding that a

district court must rule on all exhausted guilt claims raised in a habeas petition

notwithstanding district relief based on an ineffective assistance of state appellate

counsel claim; requiring district court to rule on guilt claims prevents delay caused by

state appellate rehearing that may be mooted by district court relief on a guilt claim),

rev’d on other grounds, 528 U.S. 259 (2000).

Blazak v. Ricketts, 971 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the district court’s order

was final and appealable where all guilt phase issues had been adjudicated and relief

had been granted on one of the claims, notwithstanding that punishment issues were not

addressed).

6.2.15.3 Appellate Standards of Review

When a federal appellate court reviews a district court’s disposition of a habeas

petition, the appropriate standard of review depends on the issue involved.
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6.2.15.3.1 Grant or Denial of Habeas Relief

The Ninth Circuit reviews de novo a district court’s decision to grant or deny habeas

relief. However, in post-AEDPA cases, the appellate court, like the district court, can

grant relief on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court only if the claim

withstands 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) scrutiny. See § 6.3.1, et seq. 

Ninth Circuit–Pre-AEDPA:

Eslaminia v. White, 136 F.3d 1234, 1236 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that Ninth Circuit

reviews de novo the denial of a state prisoner’s petition for habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254).

Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that appellate courts review

grants or denials of habeas corpus relief de novo).

Madera v. Risley, 885 F.2d 646, 648 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that appellate court

reviews district court’s decision to grant or deny habeas relief de novo).

Ninth Circuit–Post-AEDPA:

Tran v. Lindsey [also referred to as Van Tran v. Lindsey], 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir.)

(applying § 2254; opining that under a de novo review standard the state court erred,

but affirming the district court denial of relief by holding that state court's decision did

not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law), cert.

denied, 531 U.S. 944 (2000), disapproved in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, § 6.3.1. 

6.2.15.3.2 Factual vs. Legal Findings

In Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988), the Supreme Court held that an appellate court

reviews a district court’s factual findings in a habeas corpus proceeding for clear error

and reviews a district court’s legal conclusions de novo. The Ninth Circuit has held

that it reviews a district court’s resolutions of mixed questions of law and fact de novo.

Supreme Court:

Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988) (holding that federal appellate courts may not set

aside a district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous).
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Ninth Circuit:

Moran v. McDaniel, 80 F.3d 1261, 1268 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding, in capital case, that

state fact findings are reviewed for clear error).

King v. Brown, 8 F.3d 1403 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that appellate courts review

district court’s factual findings for clear error).

Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that issues of law and

mixed legal-factual issues are reviewed de novo), vacated on other grounds, 500 U.S.

901 (1991).

6.2.15.3.3 Stay of Order Granting Habeas Relief

In Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770 (1987), the Supreme Court held that a district

court’s decision whether to stay an order granting habeas relief is presumed to be

correct, but the presumption can be overcome.

Supreme Court:

Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770 (1987) (holding that district court’s decision whether

to stay an order granting habeas relief is presumed correct; stating that presumption can

be overcome).

6.2.15.3.4 Dismissal of Second or Successive Habeas Petition

The AEDPA requires that the circuit court authorize filing of a second or successive

petition. Under pre-AEDPA law, the Ninth Circuit reviews a district court’s decision

regarding dismissal of successive or abusive habeas petitions for abuse of discretion. 

Ninth Circuit:

Howard v. Lewis, 905 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a district court’s decision

to deny consideration of petition’s merits on successive petition basis is reviewed for

abuse of discretion).
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Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) (2000) (requiring petitioner to motion circuit court for

permission to file second or successive petition in district court).

6.2.15.3.5 State Exhaustion

The Ninth Circuit reviews a district court’s determination as to whether a petitioner

exhausted available state remedies de novo.

Ninth Circuit:

Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying de novo standard of review

to district court’s exhaustion based dismissal in post-AEDPA case).

Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that appellate court reviews

issue of whether a petitioner exhausted available state remedies de novo).

6.2.15.3.6 Discovery

The Ninth Circuit reviews a district court’s denial of discovery motions in a habeas

corpus proceeding for abuse of discretion.

Supreme Court:

Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (1997) (holding that petitioner made a sufficient

factual showing to establish good cause as required by Habeas Corpus Rule 6(a) for

discovery on his claim of actual judicial bias where state trial judge had been convicted

of taking bribes from criminal defendants to fix cases).

Ninth Circuit:

McDaniel v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Nev. (Jones), 127 F.3d 886 (9th Cir.

1997) (holding that discovery is proper in capital proceedings in which petitioner is

pursuing exhausted claims with some factual basis).

Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that appellate court reviews

district court’s denial of discovery motions in habeas proceeding for abuse of
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discretion), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 910 (1992).

6.2.15.3.7 Batson Claims

Ninth Circuit:

Tolbert v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 1999) (reviewing de novo district court’s

dismissal of petitioner’s Batson-based habeas petition; applying deferential review of

state court’s ruling on whether a criminal defendant has established a prima facie case

of prosecutorial discrimination in the exercise of a peremptory challenge).

6.2.15.4 Writ of Mandamus

Ninth Circuit:

In re Morris, 363 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (as to a capital habeas

petitioner whose first habeas petition had not yet been decided because there were

pending guilt phases issues that were the subject of an evidentiary hearing, holding that

mandamus relief requiring district court to permit amendment of habeas petition was

not appropriate because the district court had not yet made any definitive ruling as to

petitioner’s request to amend the habeas petition to include claims based on newly

discovered evidence).

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Kelly V), 163 F.3d 530

(9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (characterizing mandamus as an “extraordinary” or “drastic”

remedy; holding that a writ of mandamus was not properly issued where it prevented

consideration of a first habeas petition; stating that there is no reason why a state’s Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) statute of limitations grounds should

be reviewed by mandamus rather than on appeal from a final judgment), cert. denied,

526 U.S. 1060 (1999).

6.2.15.5 Writ of Certiorari

Section 2101(d) of Title 28, United States Code, provides time limitations for

applications to the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. A justice of the Court

may extend the time periods, to a limited extent, “for good cause shown.”
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Supreme Court:

Penry v. Texas, 515 U.S. 1304 (1995) (ruling on application for extension of time to

file certiorari petition and stating that there is only one “good cause” standard, which

applies to both capital and non-capital cases).

Madden v. Texas, 498 U.S. 1301 (1991) (stating that withdrawal of appellate counsel

does not automatically constitute good cause for extension of time to prepare

application for writ of certiorari).

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2101(d) (2000) (providing time limitations for certiorari petitions).

6.2.16 Special Procedures for “Opt-In” States

The AEDPA created Chapter 154 of Title 28 of the United States Code entitled

“Special Habeas Corpus Procedures in Capital Cases.” Chapter 154 sets forth

expedited procedures for § 2254 capital habeas petitions in states which “opt-in” to the

chapter by meeting the statute’s counsel representation and compensation scheme. See

§ 6.2.16.1, infra. 

Supreme Court:

Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740 (1998) (holding that class action seeking injunction

preventing state of California from asserting compliance with opt-in protocol was a

non-justiciable controversy; Chapter 154 compliance would have to be determined by

capital petitioner faced with a state “opt in”).

6.2.16.1 “Opt-In” Requirements

In 2006, 28 U.S.C. § 2261, was amended by the USA Patriot Improvement and

Reauthorization Act (Pub. L. No. 109-177). As amended, § 2261(b) and (c) set forth

the requirements for a state to “opt-in” to Chapter 154:

(b) Counsel – This chapter is applicable if–

(1) the Attorney General of the United States certifies that a State has
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established a mechanism for providing counsel in postconviction proceedings

as provided in section 2265; and

(2) counsel was appointed pursuant to that mechanism, petitioner validly

waived counsel, petitioner retained counsel, or petitioner was found not to be

indigent.

(c) Any mechanism for the appointment, compensation, and reimbursement

of counsel as provided [above] must offer counsel to all State prisoners under

capital sentence and must provide for the entry of an order by a court of

record–

(1) appointing one or more counsels to represent the prisoner upon a finding

that the prisoner is indigent and accepted the offer or is unable competently

to decide whether to accept or reject the offer;

(2) finding, after a hearing if necessary, that the prisoner rejected the offer of

counsel and made the decision with an understanding of its legal

consequences; or

(3) denying the appointment of counsel upon a finding that the prisoner is 

not indigent.

Although § 2261(e) reiterates that the ineffectiveness or incompetence of

state or federal habeas counsel is not a ground for relief, see infra § 6.3.2.1, the

subsection provides that the “limitation shall not preclude the appointment of different

counsel, on the court’s own motion or at the request of the prisoner, at any phase of

State or Federal post-conviction proceedings on the basis of the ineffectiveness or

incompetence of counsel in such proceedings.”

In 2006 former section 2265 of Title 28 was repealed, and a new section

2265, pertaining to certification and judicial review, was added and provides in part:

(a) (1) If requested by an appropriate State official, the Attorney General of

the United States shall determine–

(A) whether the State has established a mechanism for the

appointment, compensation, and payment of reasonable litigation

expenses of competent counsel in State postconviction proceedings

brought by indigent prisoners who have been sentenced to death;

(B) the date on which the mechanism described in subparagraph

(A) was established; and

(C) whether the State provides standards of competency for the

appointment of counsel in proceedings described in subparagraph

(A).

 (2) The date the mechanism described in paragraph (1)(A) was established
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shall be the effective date of the certification under this subsection.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2265(c) as added in 2006, the Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to review the Attorney General’s

determination regarding certification, as specified in § 2265(a)(1), subject to review by

the Supreme Court. The determination by the Attorney General regarding certification

is subject to de novo review. Pursuant to § 2265(d), the amendments made by § 2265,

including any new time limits for taking action, apply to cases pending on the date of

the enactment of the USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act [March 9,

2006]. 

 As of March 9, 2006, no state has qualified under Chapter 154 as an “opt-in”

state under the state’s current statutes and rules. However, in Spears v. Stewart, 267

F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2001), amended and superseded by, 283 F.3d 992 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 537 U.S. 977 (2002), and cert denied, 537 U.S. 995 (2002), the Ninth Circuit

held that Arizona had in place as of July 17, 1998 (the relevant date as to the

petitioner), a mechanism for the appointment and compensation of counsel for indigent

capital defendants in state post-conviction proceedings that met the requirements of 

Chapter 154. Nevertheless, the court held that Arizona was not entitled to enforce the

expedited procedures of Chapter 154 because it had not complied with the timeliness

requirements of its own system as to the petitioner. 

Ninth Circuit:

Spears v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that state of Arizona had

mechanism for appointment of counsel for indigent capital defendants in state postconviction proceedings that met requirement of Chapter 154 and therefore qualified for

opt-in status as of that date, but that Arizona was not entitled to enforce procedures of

Chapter 154 because it did not comply with timeliness requirements of its own system

as to petitioner), amended and superseded by, 283 F.3d 992 (9th Cir.), amended and

superseded by, 283 F.3d 992 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 977 (2002), and cert

denied, 537 U.S. 995 (2002).

Ashmus v. Woodford, 202 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding, by interlocutory appeal,

that during all times relevant to state appeal and at least until 1998, California failed to

qualify for Chapter 154’s expedited procedures; however, not deciding what date
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California must have established its mechanism for appointment of counsel for 154

purposes vis a vis petitioner’s appeal time frame), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 916 (2000).

Ainsworth v. Calderon, 152 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1998) (reaffirming holding that 

California does not meet the Chapter 154 “opt-in” requirements).

Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that Chapter 154 did not

affect petition because Arizona had not finalized procedures for appointment and

compensation of counsel), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1123 (1999).

Ashmus v. Calderon, 123 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming district court’s

finding–in class action–that state did not meet requirements for state to qualify for

AEDPA’s limitations on habeas review in death penalty cases), vacated on other

grounds, 523 U.S. 740 (1998).

Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that Montana failed to

demonstrate compliance with § 2261), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 881 (1997) .

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Stenson v. Lambert, No. C01-252P (D. West. Wa, May 2, 2001) (unpublished)

(denying application of “opt-in” provision; holding state does not have adequate

mechanism for the appointment of counsel in PCR proceedings, that state has

inadequate standards for determining the qualifications of appointed counsel, and that

state does not guarantee payment of reasonable litigation expenses and attorney’s fees). 

Other Circuits:

Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 1998) (observing that Oklahoma had not

satisfied, or even argued that it could satisfy, Chapter 154; determining that the

expedited habeas procedures were inapplicable), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1025 (1999). 

Cannon v. Johnson, 134 F.3d 683 (5th Cir. 1998) (reiterating that Texas does not meet

the “opt-in” requirements set forth in section 2261).

Death Row Prisoners of Pennsylvania v. Ridge, 106 F.3d 35 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding

that Pennsylvania does not meet § 2261 “opt-in” requirements).

Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that prior to July 1, 1992,

Virginia had not satisfied the AEDPA’s “opt in” requirements and the AEDPA’s

special capital provisions did not apply to cases decided before that date).
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District Courts in Other Circuits:

Hamblin v. Anderson, 947 F. Supp. 1179 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (concluding that Ohio fails

to comply with Chapter 154 representation requirements).

Williams v. Cain, 942 F. Supp. 1088 (W.D. La. 1996) (concluding that Louisiana does

not comply with Chapter 154 competency requirements).

Hill v. Butterworth, 941 F. Supp. 1129 (N.D. Fla. 1996) (concluding that Florida does

not comply with Chapter 154 requirements), judgment reversed on other grounds, 147

F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 1998).

Booth v. Maryland, 940 F. Supp. 849 (D. Md. 1996) (concluding that Maryland does

not comply with Chapter 154), vacated on other grounds, 112 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 1997).

Zuern v. Tate, 938 F. Supp. 468 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (concluding that Ohio does not

comply with Chapter 154's counsel representation requirements).

Rahman v. Bell, 927 F. Supp. 262 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (holding that Tennessee has not

met requirements for Chapter 154 application).

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2261 (2000), as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-177 § 507(a) and (b)

(providing requirements for state to “opt in” under chapter 154).

28 U.S.C. § 2265, as added by Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 507(c) (providing for

certification by Attorney General that state has met “opt-in” requirements ).

6.2.16.2 Mandatory Stay of Execution

If a state “opts in” to Chapter 154, and if state post conviction counsel has been

appointed pursuant to § 2261(c), then, upon application to any federal court with §

2254 jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 2262(a) directs the federal court to stay the execution. 

This stay of execution expires under § 2262(b) if:

(1) a State prisoner fails to file a habeas corpus application under

section 2254 within the time required in section 2263;
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(2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, in the presence of

counsel, unless the prisoner has competently and knowingly

waived such counsel, and after having been advised of the

consequences, a State prisoner under capital sentence waives the

right to pursue habeas corpus review under section 2254; or

(3) a state prisoner files a habeas corpus petition under section

2254 within the time required by section 2263 and fails to make a

substantial showing of the denial of a Federal right or is denied

relief in the district court or at any subsequent stage of review.

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2262(a) (2000) (providing automatic stay upon filing of § 2254

application).

28 U.S.C. § 2262(b) (2000) (providing three conditions upon which automatic stay of

execution expires).

6.2.16.2.1 No Subsequent Stay Unless Successive Petition Authorized

Once one of the § 2262(b) conditions triggering the expiration of the automatic stay

occurs, § 2262(c) provides that no federal court may issue another stay “unless the

court of appeals approves the filing of a second or successive application under section

2244(b).” See supra § 6.2.3.2.

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2262(c) (2000) (prohibiting subsequent stay of execution after mandatory

stay expires unless successive petition is authorized).

6.2.16.3 Filing Deadlines

Pursuant to § 2263, if a state “opts in” to Chapter 154, the filing deadline for § 2254

petitions is 180 days after the final affirmance in state court instead of the one-year

deadline provided in § 2244(d) for non-“opt-in” petitions. Section 2263 provides as

follows:

(a) Any application under this chapter for habeas corpus relief
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under section 2254 must be filed in the appropriate district court

not later than 180 days after final State court affirmance of the

conviction and sentence on direct review or the expiration of the

time for seeking such review.

(b) The time requirements established by subsection (a) shall be

tolled–

(1) from the date that a petition for certiorari is filed in the

Supreme Court until the date of final disposition of the petition if a

State prisoner files the petition to secure review by the Supreme

Court of the affirmance of a capital sentence on direct review by

the court of last resort of the State or other final State court

decision on direct review;

(2) from the date on which the first petition for post-conviction

review or other collateral relief is filed until the final State court

disposition of such petition; and

(3) during an additional period not to exceed 30 days, if–

(A) a motion for an extension of time is filed in the

Federal district court that would have jurisdiction over

the case upon the filing of a habeas corpus application

under section 2254; and

(B) a showing of good cause is made for the failure to

file the habeas corpus application within the time period

established by this section.

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2263 (2000) (providing for 180-day filing deadline for § 2254 petitions in

“opt-in” states).

6.2.16.4 Amended Petitions

If a state “opts in” to Chapter 154, then any amendment to the habeas corpus

application must meet the § 2244(b) requirements for successive petitions. See supra

§ 6.2.3.2.

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2266(b)(3)(B) (2000) (providing amended petition standard in opt-in

states).
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6.2.16.5 Federal Court Priorities and Deadlines for Adjudication

If a state “opts in” to Chapter 154, several time restrictions apply to federal court

adjudication of the habeas petition. First, the adjudication of § 2254 or § 2255 capital

cases “shall be given priority by the district court and the court of appeals over all

noncapital matters” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2266(a). Second, 28 U.S.C.§ 2266, as

amended by Pub. L. No. 109-177 in 2006, requires that:

(1) the district court’s final determination on any capital § 2254

petition must be entered within 450 days after the date on which

the application is filed or 60 days after the date on which the case

is submitted for decision, whichever is earlier (this deadline may

be extended no more than one 30-day period upon written order

finding that the ends of justice served by the delay outweigh the

public’s and petitioner’s interest in speedy disposition);

(2) the district court must give the parties at least 120 days in

which to complete all actions (including all pleadings, briefs, and

hearing if necessary) prior to case submission;

(3) the court of appeals’ final determination of an appeal from a

district court’s decision of a capital § 2254 petition must be

rendered within 120 days after the date the reply brief is due, or the

filing of the answering brief;

(4) the court of appeals must decide a petition for rehearing or

request for rehearing en banc within 30 days of the date the

petition or responsive brief is filed, and if a petition for rehearing

or rehearing en banc is granted, the court of appeals shall hear and

render a final determination no later than 120 days after the date of

the order granting the rehearing.

Section 2266(b)(4)(B) and § 2266(c)(4)(B) provide that the state may enforce

these time limitations through a petition for writ of mandamus to the court of appeals if

petitioning a district court’s noncompliance–and the appellate court must act on such

petition within thirty days–or to the Supreme Court if petitioning a court of appeals’

noncompliance. The failure of a court to meet these deadlines, however, is “not a

ground for granting relief from a judgment of conviction or sentence,” pursuant to 

§ 2266(b)(4)(A) and § 2266(c)(4)(A). Also, pursuant to § 2266(b)(3)(A) and §

2266(c)(3), the time limitations should not be construed to entitle the applicant to a stay
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of execution to litigate any application or appeal if the applicant would not otherwise

be entitled to such a stay.

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2266(a) (2000) (requiring that § 2254 and § 2255 cases be given priority

over all noncapital cases).

28 U.S.C. § 2266(b) (2000), as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 507(a) (providing

time restrictions for federal district court adjudication of § 2254 capital cases).

28 U.S.C. § 2266(c) (2000) (providing time restrictions for court of appeals

adjudication of § 2254 capital cases).

6.2.16.6 Exhaustion of State Remedies

If a state “opts in” to Chapter 154, then an alternative standard of review applies for

claims that have not been exhausted in state court. See infra § 6.3.3. Specifically, §

2264(a) provides as follows:

[w]henever a State prisoner under capital sentence files a petition

for habeas corpus relief to which this chapter applies, the district

court shall only consider a claim or claims that have been raised

and decided on the merits in the State courts, unless the failure to

raise the claim properly is–

(1) the result of State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States;

(2) the result of the Supreme Court’s recognition of a

new Federal right that is made retroactively applicable;

or

(3) based on a factual predicate that could not have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence in time

to present the claim for State or Federal post-conviction

review.

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2264(a) (2000) (providing special opt-in standard of review for
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exhaustion).

6.3 Section 2254 Review: Habeas Corpus Review of State Convictions

Federal court jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners

derives from 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which provides that a federal court can entertain a state

prisoner’s habeas petition if the petitioner alleges his or her custody is in violation of

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. Case law has played a large

part in defining the scope of this power. To assert a claim for federal habeas relief, a

petitioner must raise the correct type of claim and must have exhausted state remedies

on that claim. In 1996, the AEDPA substantially modified federal habeas corpus law. 

See infra § 6.3.1.

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) providing for habeas relief for state court convictions).

28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(2) (2000) (defining scope of habeas corpus power).

6.3.1 Standard for Granting Petitions

In 1996, the AEDPA created § 2254(d), which sets forth the current standard for

granting a federal habeas relief from a state conviction when the claim was adjudicated

on the merits in state court. Prior to the AEDPA, federal courts reviewed state

decisions de novo, as articulated in Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992), and Thompson

v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995). Section 2254(d) provides:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim–

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
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unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362

(2000), clarified the meaning of “contrary to” and “unreasonable application of”

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court in § 2254(d). 

Although Justice Stevens viewed the new law as a codification of Teague, the Court did

not adopt his opinion. Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, rejected the Fourth

Circuit’s interpretation of § 2254(d) and held that the federal court must objectively

determine whether the state court’s decision of federal law was erroneous or incorrect. 

The Supreme Court reiterated the views expressed in Williams in Bell v. Cone, 535

U.S. 685 (2002), and held that (1) under the “contrary to” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a

federal habeas court may issue the writ if the state court applies a rule different from

the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases or if it decides a case differently

than the Supreme Court has done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts; and (2)

under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), the court may grant relief

if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from Supreme Court

decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the case. The Court held that under

the latter clause the application must be objectively unreasonable, which is different

from incorrect. Id. at 1850. 

In a Ninth Circuit opinion subsequent to Williams, the court in Tran v.

Lindsey [also referred to as Van Tran v. Lindsey], 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 531 U.S. 944 (2000), adopted a “clear error” test to determine whether a state

court decision involved an unreasonable application of federal law. More recently the

Supreme Court held in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003), that “objectively

unreasonable” and “clear error” are not the same standards, and that the “gloss of clear

error fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error)

with unreasonableness.” Id. at 75.

Supreme Court:

Rice v. Collins, 126 S. Ct. 969 (2006) (holding that on direct appeal in federal court, the

credibility findings a trial court makes in a Batson inquiry are reviewed for clear error,

(2) under AEDPA, however, a federal habeas court must find the state-court conclusion
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“an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding,” and thus (3) a federal habeas court can only grant a habeas

petition if it was unreasonable to credit a prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations for the

Batson challenge; also holding that here, where prosecutor struck a young AfricanAmerican woman and offered as race-neutral explanations for the strike that (1) the

juror rolled her eyes in response to a question from the court; (2) that she was young a

might be too tolerant of a drug crime; and (3) she was single and lacked ties to the

community, federal court improperly substituted its evaluation of the record for that of

the state trial court, which, under §2254(d)(2), did not make an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented). 

Evans v. Chavis, 126 S. Ct. 846 (2006) (where the Ninth Circuit had treated a decision

of the California Supreme Court in denying a state habeas petition without comment or

citation as on the merits, the Supreme Court held that if the appearance of the words 

“on the merits” in a order by the state supreme court denying a petition does not

automatically warrant a holding that a filing was timely, the absence of those words

could not automatically warrant such a holding; concurring in the judgment, Stevens, J.

wrote that the Court should endorse the Ninth Circuit presumption that a ruling on the

merits, simpliciter, means that the state court has concluded that a habeas petition was

timely).

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12 (2003) (holding that Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

exceeded limits imposed on federal habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) in 

holding that harmless-error review was not available for Eighth Amendment claim that

Ohio violated its own sentencing procedures where the indictment charged the

petitioner with aggravated murder in the course of committing aggravated robbery, but

did not charge him as a “principal offender”; state court’s conclusion, in rejecting an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, that defense counsel’s conduct was harmless in

failing to insist on literal compliance with death penalty statute requirement that death

penalty could only be imposed for aggravated murder during commission of aggravated

robbery if defendant was named as principal offender in indictment, was not “contrary

to” or an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law).

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (rejecting clear error standard of Tran v.

Lindsey [also referred to as Van Tran v. Lindsey]; holding that “objectively

unreasonable” and “clear error” are not the same standards, and that the gloss of clear

error “fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error)

with unreasonableness”). 

Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 (2003) (per curiam) (recognizing that state-court decision is

contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedents if it “applies a rule that
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contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases” or if it “confronts a set of facts that

are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives

at a result different from our precedent” but that avoiding this pitfall does not require

citation of Supreme Court cases nor does it “even require awareness of our cases, so

long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts

them”). 

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002) (holding that (1) under “contrary to” clause of §

2254(d)(1) federal habeas court may issue writ if the state court applies a rule different

from governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases or if it decides case differently

than Supreme Court has done on set of materially indistinguishable facts; and (2) under

“unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1) court may grant relief if the state

court correctly identifies governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but

unreasonably applies it to the facts of case; holding that state court correctly identified

Strickland principles as governing claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and that

there was no merit to contention that state court’s adjudication was contrary to court’s

clearly established law). 

Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (finding the clearly established federal law

asserted by petitioner (Estelle v. Smith, § 4.2) distinguishable and therefore affirming

the denial of § 2254(d)(1) relief on claim; however, finding state appellate court’s

conclusion–that the substance of the jury instructions given at petitioner’s second

sentencing trial satisfied the Court’s mandate in Penry I–was objectively unreasonable. 

But see Thomas, J., dissent, arguing state court’s determination of jury instruction

conforms to Penry I and is therefore not objectively unreasonable).

Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (holding that trial counsel’s Strickland

violation was both “contrary to” and an “unreasonable application of” federal law

under § 2254(d)(1); holding that § 2254(d)(1)’s “contrary to ” and “unreasonable

application of ” clauses have independent meaning; holding “unreasonable” standard is

an objective inquiry and requires more than a federal judge’s determination that the

state court application of federal law was erroneous or incorrect; defining “contrary to,”

in the context of a state court’s determination of applicable law, as law being

contradictory, diametrically different, opposite in character or nature, mutually opposed

to clearly established federal law, or, when a state court arrives at a result different

from Supreme Court precedent with a materially indistinguishable set of facts).

Angelone v. Bennett, 519 U.S. 959 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that because

congressional reform, limiting federal court authority to entertain successive petitions,

increases the importance of first petition review, federal courts should give greater,

rather than less, scrutiny to death row inmates’ first petitions).
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Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995) (holding, under pre-AEDPA law, that state

legal, as opposed to factual, findings are reviewed de novo).

Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 291 (1992) (stating no correctness presumption for state

legal, as opposed to factual, decisions; decisions subject to de novo review under preAEDPA law).

Ninth Circuit:

Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, in holding

that a federal court may not independently review the merits of a state court decision

without first applying AEDPA standards, and therefore a federal court may not grant an

evidentiary hearing without first determining whether the state court’s decision was an

unreasonable determination of the facts).

Blair v. Woodford, 319 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2003) (ordering submission withdrawn in

habeas appeal pending issuance of mandate in petitioner’s direct appeal to California

Supreme Court where petitioner sought relief on ground that state court’s failure to

process his appeal for 13 years constituted denial of his due process rights; holding that

remedy of finding due process violation and granting unconditional writ of habeas

corpus is not appropriate in absence of showing that delay adversely affected

petitioner’s chances to obtain reversal or vacation of his conviction or his sentence, and

he could not now make such a showing because his direct appeal had only recently

commenced with the filing of his opening brief). 

Fisher v. Roe, 263 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that where jury readback took

place without knowledge and participation of defendants or their counsel, and

defendants’ absence could have undermined fairness of proceedings, under AEDPA

state court’s denial of habeas petition was unreasonable application of clearly

established federal constitutional law; holding that defendants’ absence from readback

was properly characterized as trial error, rather than structural error, and was therefore

subject to constitutional harmless error review and could not be deemed harmless under

factual circumstances; distinguishing La Crosse v. Kernan, below, on basis that in

LaCrosse, attorney not only was aware of readback procedure proposed by judge, but

attorney was consulted by court and agreed to proposed procedure and stipulated that

his client need not be present).

Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223 (2001) (granting relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d), finding actual conflict of interest and finding state court’s application of state

law requiring finding of prejudice clearly erroneous; finding petitioner not made aware
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of the specific ramifications of his waiver and state court’s conclusion to the contrary

was unreasonable).

La Crosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying § 2254(d) and denying

relief because trial court’s ruling–not allowing petitioner to be present at a jury

readback–not contrary to Supreme Court law (since Supreme Court has never ruled on

issue), notwithstanding circuit law holding that a defendant does have a Sixth

Amendment right to be present at readbacks). 

Downs v. Hoyt, 232 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2000) (failing to apply Delgado’s

nondeferential test where post conviction appellate court issued no opinion but post

conviction trial court issued letter opinion and findings of fact; analyzing district

court’s denial of relief under Williams v. Taylor), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 999 (2001). 

Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that, where the state court

does not furnish a basis for its reasoning in a decision, § 2254(d) requires independent

federal review to determine whether the state’s decision was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law; stating that while

independent review is not the equivalent of de novo review, review is undertaken

through the “objectively reasonable lens ground by Williams; applying Tran v. Lindsey

[also referred to as Van Tran v. Lindsey] and holding that independent review must

reveal clear error). 

Tran v. Lindsey [also referred to as Van Tran v. Lindsey], 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir.)

(holding that federal court must first determine whether state court erred before

determining whether the error involved an unreasonable application of controlling law

within the scope of § 2254(d); holding that federal court must reverse a state court’s

decision involving an unreasonable application of federal law when independent review

results in conclusion that clear error occurred), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 944 (2000),

disapproved in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, above.

Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2000) (declining to apply Ninth Circuit

case law–substantially extending U.S. Supreme Court precedent–to post-AEDPA

habeas claim).

Furman v. Wood, 190 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that the Ninth Circuit has not

to date defined the term “unreasonable application” nor explained the difference

between “contrary to” and “unreasonable application of” as used in § 2254(d); stating

that the terms reflect the same general requirement that federal courts not disturb state

court determinations unless the state has failed to follow Supreme Court law).

Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that the Ninth Circuit has not yet
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clearly delineated how to conduct a § 2254(d) review).

Houston v. Roe, 177 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 1999) (determining that the Supreme Court

need not have addressed a factually identical case; § 2254(d) requires only that the

Supreme Court clearly determine the law).

Davis v. Kramer, 167 F.3d 494 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the AEDPA’s standard of

review provisions “reflect the . . . general requirement that federal courts not disturb

state court determinations unless the state court has failed to follow the law as

explicated by the Supreme Court”), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 528 U.S.

1133 (2000).

Canales v. Roe, 151 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that, even assuming there was

“clearly established” rule of presumed prejudice from untimely filing of notice of

appeal by counsel, the facts would not support application of such a rule and relief was

thus precluded under the AEDPA).

Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484 (9th Cir.) (finding state supreme court’s decision was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

and its application of the harmless error standard was contrary to “clearly established

federal law”; stating that a factual determination is unreasonable if it would not be

debatable among reasonable jurists, and that as to more debatable factual

determinations, the care exercised by the state court may be important), cert. denied,

522 U.S. 1008 (1997).

Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1013 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that when a state court

has made no findings of fact, the district court’s duty to ascertain the sufficiency of the

evidence by thorough review of the complete state record is unaffected by the

AEDPA).

Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261 (9th Cir.) (stating that § 2254(d) does not allow

reversal of state decision merely because of conflict with circuit law but rather only

when it is “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of” a Supreme Court decision;

noting, in dicta, that mixed fact/law questions fall under the “unreasonable application”

prong of § 2254(d); state’s denial of defendant’s timely request to represent himself

was error regardless of AEDPA’s application because denial violated clearly

established law as determined by the Supreme Court), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1111

(1997).

Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that § 2254(d) did not affect

the court’s analysis because the relevant law was clearly established by the Supreme
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Court, whether or not the AEDPA applied).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Shine v. Cambra, No. C 97-1433, 1999 WL 252475 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 1999)

(unpublished) (finding state court’s decisions contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, Supreme Court precedent in so far as trial court failed to allow defense

counsel to question witness about defendant’s statements and failed to strike witness’s

direct testimony once the trial court decided to uphold witness’ assertion of privilege).

Contreras v. Rice, 5 F. Supp. 2d (C.D. Cal. 1998) (noting the state supreme court’s

failure to cite authority or provide written opinion, applying the Supreme Court’s “look

through” approach discussed in Ylst and looking to state appellate court’s opinion to

assess the state supreme court’s decision and its relation to the application of § 2254(d)

to petitioner’s case).

Sampson v. Roe, No. C 97-1343, 1998 WL 209159 (N.D. Cal. April 28, 1998)

(unpublished) (noting that the Ninth Circuit has not fully defined “unreasonable

application” and concluding that the state court’s decision cannot be considered so

clearly incorrect as to merit relief), aff’d, No. 98-16289, 1999 WL 613462 (9th Cir.

1999).

Perez v. Marshall, 946 F. Supp. 1521 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (adopting magistrate’s report

and recommendation denying constitutional challenges to § 2254(d) based on Marbury

judicial power, due process, and Article 1 suspension of writ; finding that § 2254(d)

changes federal habeas review standard by eliminating de novo review of legal and

mixed legal-factual claims and replacing it with deferential standard; holding that

“clearly established federal law” is law articulated by Supreme Court), aff’d, 121 F.3d

716 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Other Circuits:

Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding

that § 2254(d) mandates a two-part inquiry whereby a federal court first inquires

whether the state decision was “contrary to” clearly established U.S. Supreme Court

law and, if not, then whether the state judgment rests upon an objectively unreasonable

application of U.S. Supreme Court law; finding “contrary to” to mean that Supreme

Court precedent compelled an outcome contrary to that reached by the state court;

applying § 2254(d) and affirming dismissal), cert. denied sub nom. Matteo v. Brennan,

528 U.S. 824 (1999).
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Fisher v. Texas, 169 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that state court’s decision was

not “on the merits” for purposes of the AEDPA and, thus, declining to apply

presumption of correctness).

Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1135 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that part of

reasonableness review under AEDPA “requires federal courts to take into account the

state’s care in considering the subject”).

Cardwell v. Greene, 152 F.3d 331, 339 (4th Cir.) (holding that circuit court could not

review a state court’s application of “clearly established law” when the court does not

give a rationale for its adverse determination; in such a case the federal court must

“independently ascertain whether the record reveals a violation”), cert. denied, 525

U.S. 1037 (1998).

Liegakos v. Cooke, 106 F.3d 1381 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying new § 2254(d) and

concluding that Supreme Court precedent that state transactional immunity statutes

violate the compulsory process clause of Sixth Amendment is not “clearly established,”

so no § 2254(d) violation).

Lockhart v. Johnson, 104 F.3d 54 (5th Cir.) (applying § 2254(d) and finding no

violation of “clearly established” Supreme Court precedent nor unreasonable

application of law in state’s use of physical restraints on disruptive defendant and

state’s conducting of voir dire outside of defendant’s presence after defendant

voluntarily waived right to be present), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1123 (1997).

Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089 (3d Cir. 1996) (analyzing § 2254(d) and

concluding that state court’s determination regarding trial counsel’s strategy was

“clearly an unreasonable application of Strickland to the facts,” despite assumption that

§ 2254(d)(2) establishes a more deferential standard to federal review of state factual

determinations).

McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302 (6th Cir. 1996) (pre-AEDPA holding that when a

federal court does not defer to state findings, it must provide explicit written

justification, setting forth which of the seven section 2254(d) factors exist, or

explaining why the state’s findings are unsupported by the record pursuant to the eighth

factor). 

Hogan v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 189 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that “[b]oth Teague and amended

§ 2254(d)(1) are designed to ensure that state judgements are not affected by legal rules

established or materially expanded after the conviction has become final”).
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Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that § 2254(d) is “retrenchment

from former practice, which allowed federal appellate courts to rely on their own

jurisprudence in addition to that of the Supreme Court”; extending the Teague principle

by limiting the sources on which a federal court may rely in addressing the application

for a writ; not limiting, however, the federal courts’ independent interpretive authority

regarding federal questions; a more deferential standard of review of a state court’s

application of “clearly established law” may be warranted when the state provides a

“thoughtfully reasoned decision”), rev’d on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997),

limited by Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).

McCain v. Gramley, 96 F.3d 288 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that state court’s

determination regarding Batson claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law nor was it based on an unreasonable

factual determination in light of the evidence presented).

Evans v. McBride, 94 F.3d 1062 (7th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing between circuit

“extensions of” as opposed to “glosses on” Supreme Court law in applying § 2254(d)’s

“contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court”

standard).

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000) (setting standard for granting habeas corpus petitions from

state convictions).

See generally:

Note, Rewriting the Great Writ: Standards of Review for Habeas Corpus Under the

New 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1868 (1997) (analyzing language and judicial

interpretation of § 2254 and identifying potential problems with some interpretations).

6.3.1.1 Retroactivity of § 2254(d)

Several courts have addressed the retroactivity of the § 2254(d) standard of review. 

However, the Supreme Court, in Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), implicitly

overruled decisions retroactively applying § 2254(d) to cases pending at the time the

AEDPA was enacted. Moreover, in Moore v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 1115 (1997), the

Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded for reconsideration in light of Lindh

the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Moore v. Johnson, 101 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 1996), that §
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2254(d) applied to habeas cases pending at the time of the AEDPA’s enactment.

Supreme Court:

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (holding that new provisions of Chapter 153

apply only to cases filed after the AEDPA became effective; reversing the Seventh

Circuit’s determination that the AEDPA applies to cases pending at time of enactment).

Moore v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 1115 (1997) (granting certiorari and remanding for

reconsideration in light of Lindh, the Fifth Circuit’s decision that § 2254(d)

retroactively applies to habeas cases).

6.3.2 Restricted Claims

6.3.2.1 No Ineffective Assistance of Habeas Counsel Claims

In Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the

Constitution does not require appointment of counsel for indigents seeking

postconviction collateral relief from death sentences. Accordingly, there is no Sixth

Amendment claim for ineffective assistance of counsel during habeas proceedings.

In 1996, Congress enacted the AEDPA which specifically codified this rule. 

The AEDPA added the following subsection to § 2254: “(i) The ineffectiveness or

incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings

shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254.” The

restriction is similarly stated in § 2261(e) which applies to § 2254 petitions filed under

Chapter 154. See supra § 6.2.16.

Supreme Court:

Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding that state is not constitutionally

required to provide counsel for indigent death row inmates seeking state postconviction

relief).

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (2000) (prohibiting ineffective assistance of state or federal
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collateral postconviction counsel claims in §2254 cases).

28 U.S.C. § 2261(e) (2000) (prohibiting ineffective assistance of collateral

postconviction counsel claims in § 2254 opt-in cases).

6.3.2.2 No State Law Claims

In Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984), the Supreme Court established that since a

federal writ of habeas corpus is proper only where a prisoner is “in custody in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States,” a federal court may not

issue a writ of habeas corpus based on a perceived error of state law. Federal courts

can only vindicate federal rights and therefore cannot consider violations or erroneous

applications of state law. In Pulley, the Court noted that some error could potentially

be sufficiently egregious that it amounts to a denial of equal protection or due process

under the Fourteenth Amendment but rejected Harris’ petition as not constituting such

an error.

In Hunt v. Vasquez, 899 F. 2d 878 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit held that

petitioners have no federal right to a particular state law regime and, thus, when a

federal habeas court redresses a violation of federal law it cannot order a state to apply

a particular state law.

Supreme Court:

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) (reversing Ninth Circuit finding that

fundamentally unfair trial violated due process; holding instead that admission of

challenged evidence and jury instructions did not rise to level of due process violation;

“reemphasizing that it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state

court determinations on state law questions”).

Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (stating that “federal habeas corpus relief

does not lie for errors of state law”).

Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984) (holding that federal court may not issue writ of

habeas corpus based on perceived state law error).

Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19 (1975) (holding that governor’s commutation of
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petitioners’ death sentences to life imprisonment presented state law question not

reviewable by federal habeas corpus).

Ninth Circuit:

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir.) (affirming dismissal of claim based on

petitioner’s failure to demonstrate a due process violation merely by citing to the

Fourteenth Amendment, where issue was improper admission of evidence), cert.

denied, 531 U.S. 918 (2000).

Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a state’s denial of

statutory peremptory challenges can constitute a federal due process violation

cognizable in federal habeas proceedings).

Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 698 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the denial or

misapplication of state procedures resulting in the deprivation of a substantive right

will implicate a federally recognized liberty interest).

Fetterly v. Paskett, 997 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that trial court’s failure to

comply with state law requiring trial court to weigh each aggravating factor against all

of the mitigating factors violated due process and was therefore cognizable in federal

habeas proceedings).

Campbell v. Blodgett, 997 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding petitioner’s complaint,

alleging state supreme court’s failure to “fulfill its statutory mandate” regarding

independent proportionality review, not sufficiently egregious to establish due process

violation, and thus not cognizable on habeas corpus).

Hunt v. Vasquez, 899 F. 2d 878 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that habeas petitioners have no

federal right to application of a particular state law; upon reinstating petitioner’s right

to a state court appeal, district court lacked authority to order state court to apply the

law that would have been in effect had the appeal been timely).

Knapp v. Cardwell, 667 F.2d 1253, 1260 (9th Cir.) (stating that federal courts do not

review a state’s interpretation of its death penalty statute unless the interpretation is a

subterfuge to avoid federal review of the state’s unconstitutional deprivation of right),

cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1055 (1982).

Bates v. Nelson, 485 F.2d 90, 96 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that governor’s clemency

determination is not reviewable in federal habeas proceeding).
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6.3.2.3 No Fourth Amendment Claims

A federal court may not consider a § 2254 claim that evidence obtained in violation of

the Fourth Amendment should have been excluded at trial where a prisoner had a full

opportunity to litigate the claim in state court. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976),

the Supreme Court ruled that when a state has provided a “full and fair opportunity to

litigate” a Fourth Amendment claim, federal habeas review is not available. In Stone,

the Court reasoned that the exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations is not a

personal constitutional right but instead is primarily a judicially created structural

remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights, generally, through its

deterrent effect.

Supreme Court:

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (holding that where state has provided

opportunity for full and fair litigation of Fourth Amendment claims, federal habeas

corpus relief is not available for a claim that evidence obtained in unconstitutional

search and seizure was introduced at trial).

Ninth Circuit:

Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding Fourth Amendment issue

proper habeas claim because petitioner did not have full and fair opportunity to litigate

claim in state court (claim was not established until petitioner’s appeal was pending

cert. in the U.S. Supreme Court and California Supreme Court denied claim raised in a

postconviction petition because claim not raised on appeal); also finding 48 hour

arraignment rule violated but finding suppression of petitioner’s confession to two

additional out-of-state murders given after 48 hours expired not inappropriate because

confession was voluntary and not harvest of extended prearraignment incarceration;

also finding state doctor’s examination of petitioner after petitioner held for more than

48 hour was fruit of poisonous tree and was error to admit at trial, but error was

harmless), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036 (2001). 

Woolery v. Arave, 8 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that, absent a showing that state

denied full and fair opportunity to litigate Fourth Amendment claim, Stone rule

precludes federal court from enforcing exclusionary rule through habeas corpus even

though state failed to raise Stone issue).
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See generally:

Philip Halpern, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Mapp Exclusionary Rule After Stone v.

Powell, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1982) (discussing theoretical justification for a limited

federal habeas corpus Fourth Amendment review system; presenting conditions under

which such review should occur).

Janet B. Jones, Annotation, What Constitutes “An Opportunity for Full and Fair

Litigation” in State Court Precluding Habeas Corpus Review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

in Federal Court of State Prisoner’s Fourth Amendment Claims, 75 A.L.R. Fed. 9

(1985) (analyzing federal cases addressing state prisoners’ “opportunity for full and fair

litigation” of Fourth Amendment claims under Stone).

6.3.2.3.1 Limitations on Stone v. Powell: Fundamental Rights

The Stone restriction on federal habeas jurisdiction does not apply to certain

fundamental rights claims that do not share the exclusionary rule’s deterrence function. 

In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), the Court held that Stone does not bar

habeas consideration of Fourteenth Amendment due process claims that trial evidence

was insufficient to support a conviction because that issue is “central to the basic

question of guilt or innocence.” Similarly, in Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979),

the Court held that Stone does not foreclose habeas review of an equal protection claim

of racial discrimination in the selection of a state grand jury foreman because such a

claim implicates the integrity of the judicial process and fails to raise Stone’s

federalism concerns.

In Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986), the Court held that Stone

does not bar Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims even if based

on a claim that counsel failed to move to exclude illegally obtained evidence. More

recently, in Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993), the Court also held that the

Stone restriction does not apply to claims that a conviction rests on statements obtained

in violation of Miranda because such claims invoke fundamental trial rights, as

opposed to exclusionary rule claims, which are “necessarily divorced from the issue of

guilt.”
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Supreme Court:

Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) (holding that Stone bar to federal habeas

review is not applicable to Miranda claims because Miranda claims involve

fundamental trial rights).

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) (holding that Stone bar does not apply to

Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance claims based on incompetent representation

with respect to Fourth Amendment issues).

Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (holding that grand jury discrimination claims

are not barred by Stone).

Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) (holding Stone inapplicable to equal protection

claims of racial discrimination in selection of state grand jury foreman).

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (declining to extend Stone to bar habeas

consideration of due process claim that trial evidence was insufficient to support

conviction).

See generally:

Kevin J. O’Brien, Comment, Federal Habeas Review of Ineffective Assistance Claims: 

A Conflict Between Strickland and Stone?, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 183 (1986) (analyzing

Stone in light of Strickland).

Irene M. Rosenberg, Withrow v. Williams: Reconstitutionalizing Miranda, 30 Hous. L.

Rev. 1685 (1993) (analyzing reinterpretation of Miranda in Withrow).

Yale L. Rosenberg, The Supreme Court Reinforces Both Federal Habeas Corpus and

Miranda, 29 Crim. L. Bull. 418, 418–19 (1993) (stating that Withrow court “broadened

the equitable pursuit of federal habeas courts . . . and managed to elevate the much

maligned prophylactic Miranda rule”).

Michael L. Scheier, Note, Miranda Warnings and Habeas Corpus: The Supreme

Court’s Erosion of Prisoner’s Fifth Amendment Rights in Duchworth v. Eagan, 59 U.

Cin. L. Rev. 261 (1990) (addressing, prior to Withrow, whether Miranda claims from

state court should be collaterally reviewed by federal habeas courts).
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6.3.2.4 No Claims of Error in State Postconviction Proceedings

In Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit followed other

circuits in holding that a federal habeas court may not review a petition alleging errors

in the state postconviction review process. In Dickerson v. Walsh, 750 F.2d 150 (1st

Cir. 1984), however, the First Circuit held to the contrary.

Ninth Circuit:

Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a federal habeas court

may not review claims of error in state postconviction review proceedings).

Other Circuits:

Millard v. Lynaugh, 810 F.2d 1403, 1410 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that a federal habeas

court may not review claims of error in state postconviction review proceedings).

Kirby v. Dutton, 794 F.2d 245, 247–48 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that a federal habeas

court may not review claims of error in state postconviction review proceedings).

Dickerson v. Walsh, 750 F.2d 150 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that habeas relief is

available for claims of error in state postconviction review proceedings).

Mitchell v. Wyrick, 727 F.2d 773, 774 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that a federal habeas

court may not review claims of error in state postconviction review proceedings).

6.3.2.5 No “Freestanding” Actual Innocence Claims

Newly discovered evidence generally does not provide a basis for federal habeas relief

unless it relates to the constitutionality of a petitioner’s conviction. In Herrera v.

Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993), the Supreme Court held that a claim of actual innocence

based on newly discovered evidence does not provide an independent basis for federal

habeas relief. The Court held that the purpose of habeas corpus is to correct

constitutional errors and not to reweigh questions of fact. Consequently, a

“freestanding” claim of actual innocence, unaccompanied by a claim of constitutional

error, is not cognizable by a federal habeas court. The Court stated that such claims
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should instead be addressed through executive clemency procedures.

The Herrera Court noted, however, that a truly persuasive innocence claim

in a capital case would render the petitioner’s execution unconstitutional but did not

describe exactly what type of claim would qualify. More recently, however, the Court

explained the various levels of proof required in asserting an actual innocence claim. 

In Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), the Court reemphasized the distinction between

a claim of actual innocence as the constitutional violation itself (i.e., despite a trial free

of constitutional error) and a claim of actual innocence accompanied by constitutional

trial error. The Court stated that in the latter instance the conviction is entitled to more

respect than one that is the product of an error-free trial. The Schlup Court went on to

explain that a claim of innocence alone–as in Herrera–would require evidence that

would “unquestionably establish innocence,” but a claim of innocence accompanied by

constitutional violation claim requires only sufficient doubt about the petitioner’s guilt

to justify the conclusion that execution would be a miscarriage of justice.

In Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied,

523 U.S. 1133 (1998), the Ninth Circuit emphasized that a petitioner need not prove

that he is actually innocent in order to pass through the Schlup gateway. The petitioner

need only present evidence of innocence that undermines confidence in the outcome of

the trial. As the Carriger court stated, “the claim is procedural, not substantive.”

The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in House v. Bell, 125 S. Ct. 2991

(2005) (mem.) with the following as a question presented: “What constitutes a ‘truly

persuasive showing of actual innocence’ pursuant to Herrera v. Collins sufficient to

warrant freestanding habeas relief?”

Supreme Court:

House v. Bell, 125 S. Ct. 2991 (2005) (mem.) (granting certiorari with the following

questions presented: “1. Did the majority below err in applying this Court’s decision in

Schlup v.Delo to hold that Petitioner’s compelling new evidence, though presenting at

the very least a colorable claim of actual innocence, was as a matter of law insufficient

to excuse his failure to present that evidence before the state courts – merely because he

had failed to negate each and every item of circumstantial evidence that had been

offered against him at the original trial? 2. What constitutes a ‘truly persuasive showing

of actual innocence’ pursuant to Herrera v. Collins sufficient to warrant freestanding
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habeas relief?”)

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) (distinguishing Herrera stand-alone actual

innocence claim from Schlup actual innocence accompanied by constitutional error

claim; holding that actual innocence standard in latter case is whether constitutional

violation probably resulted in the conviction of one who is “actually innocent;”

Herrera claim fails without new facts that “unquestionably establish innocence”).

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (holding that actual innocence claims based on

newly discovered evidence do not provide basis for federal habeas relief absent an

independent constitutional violation; assuming, without deciding, that truly persuasive

actual innocence demonstration in a capital case would render execution of defendant

unconstitutional and would warrant federal habeas relief if no state avenue were open

for such a claim).

Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (stating that newly discovered evidence relating

to state prisoner’s guilt is not a ground for federal habeas relief; such evidence is

relevant only if it bears on the constitutionality of petitioner’s detention), overruled in

part, 504 U.S. 1 (1992).

Ninth Circuit:

Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that petitioner in noncapital

case, who alleged that his conviction rested on perjured testimony of an accomplice to

murders and that there was a confrontation clause violation because the witness’

preliminary hearing testimony was introduced when the witness refused to testify at

trial, might fall within narrow class of cases implicating fundamental miscarriage of

justice; noting that if petitioner passed through Schlup gateway, question to be

answered was whether that had consequence of overriding AEDPA’s statute of

limitation, a question yet to be decided by either Ninth Circuit or U.S. Supreme Court;

remanding to district court for determination of whether petitioner could pass through

actual innocence gateway).

Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (emphasizing that a

petitioner need not prove that he is actually innocent in order to pass through the

Schlup gateway; petitioner need only present evidence of innocence that undermines

confidence in the outcome of the trial; “the claim is procedural, not substantive”), cert.

denied, 523 U.S. 1133 (1998).

Coley v. Gonzales, 55 F.3d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding, in non-capital case,

that Herrera precludes relief based solely on petitioner’s actual innocence of the
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crime).

Swan v. Peterson, 6 F.3d 1373 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that newly discovered evidence

is a ground for federal habeas corpus relief only when it bears on the constitutionality

of an applicant’s conviction and would probably produce an acquittal).

Clark v. Lewis, 1 F.3d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 1993) (implying that, in a capital case,

Herrera forecloses habeas relief based solely on petitioner’s actual innocence of death

penalty).

See generally:

Susan Bandes, Simple Murder: A Comment on the Legality of Executing the Innocent,

44 Buff. L. Rev. 501 (1996) (arguing that execution of innocent person violates Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendments).

Kathleen C. Boyd, Note, The Paradox of Actual Innocence in Federal Habeas Corpus

After Herrera v. Collins, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 479 (1994) (reviewing Herrera and analyzing

the resulting confusion surrounding federal habeas innocence claims).

Greg Bylinsky, Recent Development: Herrera v. Collins: A New Innocence Principle?,

11 Harv. Blackletter J. 191 (1994) (arguing that Herrera majority establishes principle

that an actual innocence claim can be basis for avoiding death sentence; criticizing

Court’s failure to specify showing necessary to establish such right).

James G. Clessuras, Schlup v. Delo: Actual Innocence as Mere Gatekeeper, 86 J. Crim.

L. & Criminology 1305 (1996) (arguing that Schlup should have answered question of

whether execution of an innocent person is unconstitutional).

Kris T. Daniel, Sawyer v. Whitley, The Deadly Game of Procedures in Death Penalty

Cases, 61 UMKC L. Rev. 599 (1993) (analyzing impact of Sawyer’s restrictive rule on

availability of habeas relief for innocence claims; reviewing impact on Missouri habeas

law).

Vernon E. Googe III, Herrera v. Collins–Federal Habeas Corpus Review and Claims

of Actual Innocence, 27 Ga. L. Rev. 971 (1993) (focusing on Herrera and analyzing

federal court’s dilemma in habeas cases alleging innocence).

Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions are Common in

Capital Cases, 44 Buff. L. Rev. 469 (1996) (arguing that nature of capital cases

multiplies likelihood of error and addressing special factors that produce error in capital
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cases).

Kelli Hinson, Comment, Post Conviction Determination of Innocence for Death Row

Inmates, 48 SMU L. Rev. 231 (1994) (critiquing actual innocence claims; detailing and

analyzing adequacy of procedures in place for attack on conviction).

Jill Hanson Reinmuth, When Actual Innocence is Irrelevant: Federal Habeas Relief for

State Prisoners After Herrera v. Collins, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 279 (1994) (analyzing role

of innocence in habeas corpus jurisprudence and summarizing Herrera).

Robert C. Stacy II, Note, Schlup v. Delo: The Result of Curbing Unlimited Jurisdiction

by Limiting Discretion, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 897 (1996) (focusing on miscarriage of justice

exception to procedural default, and Schlup standard, and predicting future problems in

application of Schlup because of inconsistencies in Supreme Court habeas

jurisprudence).

Jordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 303 (1993)

(analyzing Herrera and Supreme Court’s new “innocence-focus” in habeas cases).

J. Thomas Sullivan, “Reforming” Federal Habeas Corpus: The Cost to Federalism;

The Burden to Defense Counsel; And The Loss of Innocence, 61 UMKC L. Rev. 291

(1992) (arguing that Herrera leaves law unclear, retreats from Court’s earlier emphasis

on innocence, and allows states to preclude judicial review of constitutional violations).

James J. Turocy, Recent Decision, Schlup v. Delo, 34 Duq. L. Rev. 373 (1996)

(summarizing Schlup).

6.3.3 Exhaustion of State Remedies

Traditionally, as a matter of comity, not jurisdiction, a federal court would not consider

a habeas corpus petition until the petitioner exhausted available state remedies with

respect to each claim. In Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), the Supreme Court

explained that the exhaustion doctrine is designed to protect the state courts’ role in the

enforcement of federal law and prevent the disruption of state judicial proceedings. 

The federal statute providing for habeas relief from state custody, 28 U.S.C. § 2254,

provides that such relief is not available unless the applicant “exhausted the remedies

available in the courts of the state.” The exhaustion requirement is satisfied where the

federal claim’s substance is “fairly presented” to the highest state court, and that court
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disposes of the claim on the merits.

In Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987), the Supreme Court created an

exception to the exhaustion requirement. The Court held that if a state fails to raise

exhaustion at the district court level, whether inadvertently or otherwise, the appellate

court should determine whether the interests of comity, federalism, and justice are

better served by addressing the merits forthwith or by first requiring a series of

additional state and district court proceedings. If it is perfectly clear that the petition

does not raise even a colorable federal claim, no interest is served by requiring

exhaustion. The Supreme Court specifically noted that exhaustion is not an absolute

bar whenever raised and that the failure to raise it as a defense does not amount to an

absolute waiver by the state. Instead, federal courts should take the “middle course”

described above in evaluating such situations.

In Plunkett v. Johnson, 828 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987), the Second Circuit

extended Granberry to an exhaustion waiver in district court. In Ybarra v. Sumner, 678

F. Supp. 1480 (D. Nev. 1988), the District of Nevada questioned the Second Circuit’s

approach. The Ybarra court reasoned that the application of Granberry at the district

court level entails different considerations than at the appellate level. For instance, less

time is wasted if the district court requires exhaustion.

In 1996, the AEDPA amended § 2254 to specifically allow a federal court to

deny an unexhausted habeas corpus petition on the merits. Section 2254(b) provides:

(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted unless it appears that–

(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in

the courts of the State; or

(B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective

process; or

(ii) circumstances exist that render such process

ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.

(2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on

the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust

the remedies available in the courts of the State.

(3) A State shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement

or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the State, through
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counsel, expressly waives the requirement. 

In Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 2006 WL

386448 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2006), the Ninth Circuit adopted the Granberry standard in

determining when it is appropriate to deny an unexhausted claim on the merits under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) and thus held that a federal court may deny an unexhausted

petition on the merits only when it is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise

even a colorable federal claim.

The AEDPA also created 28 U.S.C. § 2264(a), which applies when a state

“opts-in” to the special capital chapter by meeting the chapter’s requirements. If a state

“opts-in,” then the alternative review standard of § 2264(a) for unexhausted claims

applies. See supra § 6.2.16.

Supreme Court:

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991) (stating long-held rule that petition

should be dismissed where petitioner has not exhausted available state remedies).

Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (stating that petition should be dismissed

where state remedies have not been exhausted).

Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987) (remanding for further proceedings because,

due to state’s failure to raise exhaustion defense, court did not determine whether

interests of justice would be better served by addressing merits or requiring additional

state proceedings before doing so).

Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982) (stating that exhaustion doctrine furthers

federalism and comity by protecting state courts’ role in enforcement of federal law,

and by preventing disruption of state judicial proceedings).

Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1 (1981) (per curiam) (reversing ruling that “clear

violation of petitioner’s rights” entitles petitioner to relief without exhaustion;

exhaustion requirement can be ignored “only if there is no opportunity to obtain redress

in state court or if the corrective process is so clearly deficient as to render futile any

effort to obtain relief”).

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971) (holding that petitioner must fairly present
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federal claims to state courts before presentation to federal courts).

Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1866) (describing comity nature of exhaustion

doctrine).

Ninth Circuit:

Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a federal court may deny

an unexhausted petition on the merits only when it is perfectly clear that the applicant

does not raise even a colorable federal claim), cert. denied, 2006 WL 386448 (U.S.

Feb. 21, 2006).

Brown v. Maass, 11 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying Granberry and remanding case

to district court where state failed to assert exhaustion defense; no exceptional

circumstances prevented state from raising defense; comity and federalism interests not

better served by requiring state supreme court to address claim’s merits before federal

court).

Taylor v. Kincheloe, 920 F.2d 599, 602 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that although a

mixed petition normally must be dismissed under Rose, reaching merits best serves

administration of justice where state failed to raise exhaustion and issues are primarily

issues of law).

O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that where state failed to

raise exhaustion, petitioner raised no colorable federal claims, and there were no

unresolved factual questions, judicial efficiency requires petition’s dismissal without

first requiring exhaustion).

Toomey v. Bunnell, 898 F.2d 741, 744 (9th Cir.) (holding that where state failed to raise

exhaustion, administration of justice better served by reaching merits), cert. denied, 498

U.S. 960 (1990).

Ames v. Endell, 856 F.2d 1441, 1444 (9th Cir. 1988) (setting forth Granbury review

standard for reviewing unexhausted claims and state waiver).

Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that exhaustion

requires “fair presentation” to highest state court).

Sherwood v. Tomkins, 716 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that, while state appeal is

pending, petitioner cannot seek federal habeas review of state’s decision regarding

appointment of counsel).
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Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1982) (indicating that district and appellate

court may raise exhaustion sua sponte).

Sweet v. Cupp, 640 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that state court must issue ruling

on claim’s merits prior to federal court consideration).

Harris v. Superior Ct., 500 F.2d 1124, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc) (stating that

exhaustion is a matter of comity, not jurisdiction).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Poland v. Stewart, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (D. Ariz. 1999) (dismissing petitioner’s Ford

claim without prejudice to allow petitioner to assert and exhaust the claim in state

court).

Ybarra v. Sumner, 678 F. Supp. 1480 (D. Nev. 1988) (questioning Granberry’s

application at district level; even if applicable, exhaustion was necessary in instant case

because state court had no opportunity to consider a substantial constitutional law

question).

Other Circuits:

Nowaczyk v. Warden, New Hampshire State Prison, 299 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2002)

(holding that district court abused its discretion in dismissing, rather than staying,

habeas petition containing only fully exhausted claims because of pendency of state

proceedings on another, unexhausted claim; also holding that district court is not

required to immediately adjudicate fully exhausted petition in these circumstances,

particularly where pending state claim may be outcome determinative, but that 

compelling reason must be present before dismissal may be used in lieu of stay, given

risk that habeas petitioner may run afoul of AEDPA’s limitations period if habeas

petition is not promptly refiled at conclusion of state proceedings).

Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506 (3d Cir. 1997) (discussing the relationship between

the AEDPA and prior Supreme Court precedent regarding exhaustion), cert. denied,

532 U.S. 919 (2001).

McWilliams v. State of Colorado, 121 F.3d 573 (10th Cir. 1997) (adopting the view

“espoused by every circuit that has considered this issue” that refiling after state

exhaustion does not qualify as a second or successive petition).
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In re Gasery, 116 F.3d 1051 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that where petitioner’s original

petition was dismissed for lack of exhaustion, petitioner need not seek leave from the

court of appeals to refile following exhaustion).

Hoxsie v. Kerby, 108 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir.) (noting that § 2254(b)(2), alone, does not

determine when a court should dismiss a petition on merits instead of requiring

exhaustion; reading statute in conjunction with Granberry and concluding that court

should dismiss when “convinced petition has no merit” to avoid needless state court

litigation), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 844 (1997).

Anderson v. Groose, 106 F.3d 242 (8th Cir. 1997) (1997) (holding that “arguable

factual commonality” existed between state appellate argument that trial court

preclusion of certain testimony prevented effective assistance and argument that trial

counsel was ineffective, thus allowing federal court to reach merits). 

Hatch v. State of Oklahoma, 92 F.3d 1012 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that exhaustion is

not a prerequisite to appellate court consideration of application for leave to file a

second or successive habeas petition but is instead an issue for the district court to

consider once leave is granted).

Davis v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that it was error to dismiss

habeas petition for lack of exhaustion before the state either set out exhaustion defense

or waived it). 

Plunkett v. Johnson, 828 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that Granberry applies to

district court proceeding; since petitioner presented no colorable federal claims, district

court should have dismissed on basis that exhaustion patently unnecessary).

District Courts in Other Circuits:

Kelly v. Keane, No. 96 Civ. 1742, 1996 WL 640892, at *2 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1996)

(declining to deny petition on merits under § 2254(b)(2) notwithstanding failure to

exhaust because AEDPA does not apply retroactively to habeas petitions in noncapital

cases).

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2000) (setting forth federal court exhaustion requirements and

providing for denial of habeas application without exhaustion).
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616 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HANDBOOK (2006)

See generally:

Matthew L. Anderson, Note, Requiring Unwanted Habeas Corpus Petitions to State

Supreme Courts for Exhaustion Purposes: Too Exhausting, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 1197

(1995) (proposing new flexible exhaustion doctrine where state court review is

discretionary rather than of right).

David B. Franks, Federal Court Discretion and the Exhaustion Doctrine: Granberry v.

Greer, 26 Crim. L. Bull. 210 (1990) (discussing how Granberry refined exhaustion

doctrine and “streamlined” habeas corpus review).

Jan Neuenschwander, Supreme Court Review: Habeas Corpus–Much Ado About Very

Little: The Total Exhaustion Rule: Rose v. Lundy, 73 J. Crim. L. 1641 (1982)

(examining the bases of disagreement among Rose opinions regarding problem of

piecemeal habeas corpus litigation and arguing that Court’s solution–total exhaustion

rule–fails to solve problem).

6.3.3.1 “Full and Fair Presentation” to State Court

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971), the Supreme Court stated that a federal

claim is “fairly presented if the petitioner describes the operative facts and legal

theories on which he or she bases the claim.” A state prisoner ordinarily does not

“fairly present” a federal claim to a state court if that court must read beyond a petition,

a brief, or similar papers to find material that will alert it to the presence of a federal

claim in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion, that does so. Baldwin v.

Reese, 541 U.S. 27 (2004). A petitioner must fairly present the claim to the state’s

highest court in order to satisfy the “full presentation” requirement of 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. In O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999), the Supreme Court held that

claims must be presented in the state court of last resort even when review in that court

is discretionary.

Supreme Court:

Dye v. Hofbauer, 126 S. Ct. 5 (2005) (per curiam) (holding that the failure of a state

appellate court to mention a federal claim does not mean that the claim was not

presented to it, and that whether the exhaustion requirement has been satisfied cannot

turn upon whether the state court chose to ignore in its opinion a federal constitutional
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claim squarely raised in the petitioner’s brief).

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27 (2004) (holding that a federal claim is not “fairly

presented” to a state court if that court must read beyond a petition, a brief, or similar

papers to find material that will alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order to

find material, such as a lower court opinion, that does so; rejecting contention that 

petition nonetheless fairly presented federal ineffective assistance claim because

“ineffective” is a term of art in Oregon that refers only to federal law claims since

petitioner failed to demonstrate that state law uses “ineffective assistance” as referring

only to federal law rather than a similar state law claim).

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999) (holding that to satisfy the exhaustion

requirement, a state prisoner must present his claims in a petition to the state court of

last resort even when review in that court is discretionary).

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995) (reversing the Ninth Circuit and holding there

was no fair presentation–and thus no exhaustion–where petitioner failed to raise federal

constitutional challenge to evidence in state court; mere similarity of claims is

insufficient to exhaust state remedies).

Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346 (1989) (holding fair presentation requirement not

satisfied by first-time presentation of claim to state appellate court under state

procedure that permits review “only when there are special and important reasons

therefor”).

Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 257 (1986) (stating that exhaustion requirement is

satisfied once federal claim has been “fairly presented” to state’s highest court).

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4 (1982) (holding that mere presentation of facts

necessary to support a federal claim, or presentation of state claim similar to federal

claim, is insufficient; to exhaust, petitioner must “fairly present” the “substance” of

federal claim).

Smith v. Digmon, 434 U.S. 332, 333 (1978) (per curiam) (holding that when claim is

squarely raised in state court, it is exhausted despite state court’s failure to mention the

claim in its opinion).

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971) (holding “fair presentation” requires state court

must have opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon the

claim).
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Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 249–50 (1971) (per curiam) (noting that,

although 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)’s language could be read to foreclose habeas review by

requiring a state prisoner to invoke any possible avenue of state review, the Supreme

Court has never interpreted the exhaustion requirement in such a restrictive fashion).

Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (holding that exhaustion doctrine does not include

U.S. Supreme Court proceedings).

Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 448–49 n.3 (1953) (examining § 2254(c)’s language that

petitioner has not exhausted so long as there is a right to raise the claim “by any

available state procedure”; holding that once state court rules on claim, request for

state collateral relief based on same evidence and issues decided by direct review is not

necessary).

Ninth Circuit:

Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (in a noncapital habeas

case, rejecting any suggestion in Lyons v. Crawford and Gatlin v. Madding, both

below, that for purposes of exhaustion, counseled and pro se filings in state court must

be read the same way; holding that petitioner did not fairly present his federal

ineffective assistance of counsel claim to the Oregon Supreme Court because on the

face of his petition for review in that court, he expressly limited his claim to state

constitutional law; also holding that even though petitioner presented federal claim to

Oregon Court of Appeals, Oregon Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.20, which allows the

Oregon Supreme Court to decide all issues properly presented to the Oregon Court of

Appeals was not sufficient to alert the supreme court that petitioner was seeking review

of the federal issue where the petition for review did not refer to petitioner’s appellate

brief and did not refer to federal law, and court of appeals’ opinion did not specifically

address federal claim; joining the Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits in

holding that for purposes of exhaustion, citation to a state case analyzing federal

constitutional issue serves the same purpose as citation to a federal case analyzing such

an issue).

Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2000) (declining to apply a more liberal test

to determine whether claim exhausted in state court for petitioners who acted pro se in

their state postconviction proceeding; all petitioners must show an explicit federal basis

for their state court claims). 

Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (holding petitioner failed to

exhaust federal due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim in
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state court only on state law grounds), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1009 (2000).

Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming district court’s finding that

pro se petitioner did not “fairly present” federal claim to the state supreme court where

he failed to explicitly identify the federal legal basis for his claim), cert. denied, 52

U.S. 1087 (2000).

Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that petitioner did not fairly

present, and thus did not exhaust, his federal constitutional claim in state court;

dismissing petition).

Reutter v. Crandel, 109 F.3d 575 (9th Cir.) (holding that exhaustion requirement may

be met by inclusion of issue in the prayer of the state supreme court petition), cert.

denied, 522 U.S. 851 (1997).

Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding state remedies not exhausted by

assertion of evidentiary error in state court that is “essentially the same” as claim raised

in federal petition).

Jennison v. Goldsmith, 940 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that defendant must

seek discretionary review in state supreme court, as well as direct review in

intermediate appellate court, to exhaust state law remedies).

McNeeley v. Arave, 842 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that even though petitioner

had originally filed in state supreme court, which assigned case to court of appeals,

petitioner’s failure to return to supreme court for review of appellate court decision

constituted failure to exhaust).

Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453, 1455 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that issues

presented to state court by way of a motion for stay are exhausted if the state court

ruled on the merits).

Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528–29 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that petitioner’s

failure to choose and proceed per statutorily mandated state court route renders claims

unexhausted).

Lindquist v. Gardner, 770 F.2d 876, 878 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that, except in

extraordinary circumstances, adherence to Idaho’s Uniform Postconviction Sentencing

Act is a required step in a state prisoner’s postconviction remedies).

Kellotat v. Cupp, 719 F.2d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that petitioner must
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present state court claim through proper procedures in order to satisfy fair opportunity

requirement).

Carothers v. Rhay, 594 F.2d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that, to satisfy

exhaustion requirement, a claim must be presented to highest state court).

Other Circuits:

Aldridge v. Dugger, 925 F.2d 1320 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that petitioner presented

claim’s substance to state courts and thereby fulfilled exhaustion requirement;

presentation of additional facts in support of claim in federal court is not precluded).

6.3.3.2 New Evidence in Federal Court

In Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986), the Supreme Court indicated that where

new evidence supporting a federal claim fundamentally alters that claim, the claim

becomes unexhausted.

Supreme Court:

Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986) (holding that supplemental evidence

supporting unconstitutional grand jury composition claim did not circumvent

petitioner’s obligation to exhaust where evidence did not fundamentally alter the claim

considered by the state courts).

Ninth Circuit:

Nevius v. Sumner, 852 F.2d 463, 470 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that court cannot

consider new, unexhausted evidence that places claim in a significantly different

posture).

Aiken v. Spalding, 841 F.2d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (holding that new

evidence in a federal habeas proceeding that “substantially improves” petitioner’s claim

renders the claim unexhausted; expert’s studies using modern sound equipment

rendered petitioner’s claim, that interrogating officers ignored his requests for an

attorney, unexhausted).
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Other Circuits:

Miller v. Estelle, 677 F.2d 1080, 1083–84 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that new factual

allegations, cumulative to those presented in state court, do not require exhaustion).

6.3.3.3 State Postcard Denials

When a state denies a habeas claim without citation or comment, known as a

“postcard” denial, the decision is deemed to be on the merits for exhaustion purposes if

the state has a longstanding practice of exercising original habeas jurisdiction.

Supreme Court:

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991) (reversing the Ninth Circuit and ruling that

where one reasoned state judgment rejects a federal claim, later unexplained orders

upholding that judgment or rejecting the claim are presumed to rest upon the same

ground).

Ninth Circuit:

Lewis v. Borg, 879 F.2d 697, 698 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that state supreme court’s

denial of habeas claim without citation or comment constitutes a decision on the

merits).

Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1378–79 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that when a state

appellate court denied habeas petition solely on procedural grounds and state supreme

court issued postcard denial, a federal court should not assume the state supreme court

ignored procedural rules and passed solely on the merits).

Dickey v. Lewis, 859 F.2d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that where state trial

court expressly ruled only on merits in postconviction review, and state supreme court

denied petition without explanation, a federal court will presume the state court

decision was on the merits).

McQuown v. McCartney, 795 F.2d 807, 808–10 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that when

state appellate court ruled on procedural grounds in postconviction proceeding, federal

court will not presume that state supreme court’s postcard order upon review is on the

merits).
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Sweet v. Cupp, 640 F.2d 233, 237 (9th Cir. 1981) (presuming that state supreme court’s

postcard denial is on procedural grounds where state does not have a longstanding

practice of exercising original habeas jurisdiction).

Harris v. Superior Ct., 500 F.2d 1124, 1128–29 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc) (deeming that

state supreme court’s postcard habeas denial, lacking comment or citation, is a decision

on the merits for exhaustion purposes).

6.3.3.4 Mixed Petitions

In Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), the Supreme Court held that a federal court

must dismiss entirely a “mixed” petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted

claims. However, a petitioner with mixed claims must be given the opportunity to

amend the mixed petition to present only exhausted claims. James v. Giles, 221 F.3d

1074 (9th Cir. 2000). The required dismissal under Rose is without prejudice, so the

habeas petitioner may return to federal court after state exhaustion. However, postAEDPA petitioners still must protect themselves against the statute of limitations. See

§ 6.3.3.5 infra and §§ 6.2.1, 6.2.4 supra. 

Supreme Court:

Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225 (2004) (in a noncapital case under the AEDPA in which a

pro se petitioner had timely filed mixed habeas petitions, the petitions were dismissed

without prejudice, petitioner returned to state court to exhaust remaining claims, and

the petition was then dismissed in federal court as time-barred, holding that the failure

of the district court to have given the petitioner two specific warnings regarding the

stay-and-abeyance procedure before dismissing the mixed petitions did not make the

dismissal improper; stating that because the dismissals were not improper, the Supreme

Court need not address the second question presented, whether respondent's

subsequent untimely petitions related back to his “improperly dismissed” initial

petitions).

Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (holding that federal court must dismiss a habeas

petition that contains a mix of exhausted and unexhausted claims; providing option of

amending petition to delete unexhausted claims rather than suffer dismissal).

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984) (stating that exhaustion rule

requiring dismissal of mixed petitions “though to be strictly enforced, is not
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jurisdictional”).

Ninth Circuit:

James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding petitioner has right to delete

unexhausted claims from mixed petition in lieu of suffering dismissal).

Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907 (9th Cir.) (stating that when petition includes both

exhausted and unexhausted claims, district court must dismiss entire petition), cert.

denied 522 U.S. 833 (1997).

Phillips v. Vasquez, 56 F.3d 1030, 1034–35 (9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that “[i]n

Rose, the Supreme Court held that a petition containing both exhausted and

unexhausted claims must be dismissed”).

District Courts in Other Circuits:

Kethley v. Berge, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (dismissing mixed petition

without prejudice and allowing petitioner to retain original filing date to avoid the

AEDPA’s statute of limitations).

Williams v. Vaughn, 3 F. Supp. 2d 567 (E.D. Pa.) (holding that, to eliminate any risk of

bar from the AEDPA’s statute of limitations, amended capital petition filed after the

AEPDA’s enactment and dismissed without prejudice as mixed would “relate back” to

the original pre-AEDPA petition pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)), motion denied, No.

Civ. A. 95-7977, 1998 WL 238466 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 1998).

See generally:

Mark J. Ryan, Note, Rose v. Lundy: The Supreme Court Adopts the Total Exhaustion

Rule for Review of Mixed Habeas Corpus Petitions, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. 859 (1984)

(analyzing Rose and recommending that federal courts reject the plurality’s expanded

abuse-of-the-writ standard in order to protect petitioner’s interest in swift habeas

review).

Gary A. Sultz, Note, Federal Habeas Corpus: The Exhaustion Doctrine and Mixed

Petitions–Rose v. Lundy and Exhaustion Under the Illinois Post Conviction Remedies,

1983 U. Ill. L. Rev. 515 (1983) (examining implementation of exhaustion doctrine in

context of mixed petition case and criticizing Rose decision).
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6.3.3.5 Holding Petition in Abeyance Pending Exhaustion

In Neuschafer v. Whitley, 860 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit stated that

when a petitioner does not exhaust state remedies before filing a federal habeas

petition, the district court may hold the federal petition in abeyance, issue a stay of

execution, and allow the petitioner an opportunity to exhaust state remedies.

In Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Cal. (Gordon), 107

F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit specified that Neuschafer does not apply to

“mixed” petitions. However, in Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of

Cal. (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 920 (1998), the Ninth

Circuit held that the district court had authority to allow petitioner to amend his petition

to delete unexhausted claims from a mixed petition and then hold the amended, fully

exhausted petition in abeyance subject to the further amendment of reincorporating the

deleted claims after state litigation.

In Rhines v. Weber, 125 S. Ct. 1528 (2005), a noncapital habeas case, the

Supreme Court held that the AEDPA does not deprive district courts of the authority to

issue stays where a stay would be a proper exercise of discretion. However, the Court

held, stay and abeyance of a mixed petition to allow a petitioner to present the

unexhausted claims to the state court in the first instance and then to return to federal

court for review of the perfected petition is only appropriate when the district court

determines there was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust the claims first

in state court. Id. at 1535. The Court added that even if a petitioner had good cause for

that failure, the district court would abuse its discretion if it were to grant a stay when

the unexhausted claims are plainly meritless. Id. The Court said that the district

court’s discretion in structuring the stay is limited by the timeliness concerns reflected

in the AEDPA and a mixed petition should not be stayed indefinitely. Id. The Court

concluded that if a petitioner engages in abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay,

the district court should not grant a stay at all. Id.

If AEDPA’s statute of limitations is implicated, petitioners must “relate

back” an amended petition to its initial filing date. See § 6.2.4 supra.
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Supreme Court:

Rhines v. Weber, 125 S. Ct. 1528 (2005) (holding in a noncapital habeas case that stay

and abeyance is only appropriate when the district court determines there was good

cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust the claims first in state court; stating that if

a petitioner presents a district court with a mixed petition and the court determines that

stay and abeyance is inappropriate, the court should allow the petitioner to delete the

unexhausted claims and to proceed with the exhausted claims if dismissal of the entire

petition would unreasonably impair the petitioner’s right to obtain federal relief).

Pliler v. Ford, 542 U. S. 225 (2004) (in a noncapital case under AEDPA in which a pro

se petitioner had timely filed mixed habeas petitions, the petitions were dismissed

without prejudice, petitioner returned to state court to exhaust remaining claims, and

the petition was then dismissed in federal court as time-barred, holding that the failure

of the district court to have given petitioner the following two specific warnings

regarding the stay-and-abeyance procedure before dismissing the mixed petitions did

not make the dismissal improper: (1) that the court could consider his stay motions only

if he opted to amend the petitions and dismiss unexhausted claims, and (2) that his

federal claims would be time-barred, absent cause for equitable tolling, upon his return

to federal court if he opted to dismiss the petitions “without prejudice” and return to

state court to exhaust all of his claims; stating that because the dismissals were not

improper, the Supreme Court need not address the second question presented, whether

respondent's subsequent untimely petitions related back to his “improperly dismissed”

initial petitions).

In re Blodgett, 502 U.S. 236 (1992) (reprimanding the Ninth Circuit for delay in

considering petitioner’s claim where petition was held in abeyance, and execution

stayed, pending exhaustion).

Ninth Circuit:

Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that pursuant to Rhines v. Weber, 

a district court has discretion, under limited circumstances, to stay a mixed petition to

allow petitioner to present his unexhausted claims to the state court in the first instance

and then to return to federal court; noting that these limited circumstances are those in

which there was good cause for petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims first in state

court, the panel remanded for application of Rhines; since it was not considered by the

noncapital habeas petitioner or the district court, the panel did not consider the

continuing propriety of the three-step stay-and-abeyance procedure approved in Kelly v.

Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003)).
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Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir.) (holding in noncapital case that district court

must consider alternative of staying the petition after dismissal of unexhausted claims,

in order to permit petitioner to exhaust those claims and then add them by amendment

to his stayed petition; also holding that exercise of discretion is particularly appropriate

when outright dismissal will render it unlikely or impossible for petitioner to return to

federal court within AEDPA’s one-year limitation period; directing that if district court

stays federal proceedings while petitioner exhausts dismissed claims, district court may

require petitioner to file new state petition within 30 days), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1042

(2003). 

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal. (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981 (9th

Cir.) (holding that the district court had authority to allow amendment to delete

unexhausted claims from mixed petition and hold the amended, fully exhausted petition

in abeyance subject to further amendment reincorporating the deleted claims after state

litigation), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 920 (1998).

Reutter v. Crandel, 109 F.3d 575 (9th Cir.) (ruling that a mixed petition requires

dismissal), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 851 (1997).

Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Cal. (Gordon), 107 F.3d 756 (9th

Cir.) (distinguishing Neuschafer, and finding that, under Rose, holding petition in

abeyance is error where federal habeas petition contains unexhausted claims; dismissal

is required), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 907 (1997).

Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that district court did

not err in dismissing, rather than staying, death row inmate’s mixed petition; Supreme

Court and circuit precedent compel dismissal; distinguishing Fetterly as involving first

habeas petition containing only exhausted claims, and distinguishing Neuschafer as

dicta), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1102 (1997).

James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 24 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that petitioner may strike

unexhausted claim and resubmit petition to district court).

Fetterly v. Paskett, 997 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that, in light of petitioner’s

diligence in discovery of new claim and attempt to raise all claims in a single habeas

petition, district court abused its discretion in denying stay of federal proceedings while

petitioner exhausted state remedies).

Roman v. Estelle, 917 F.2d 1505 (9th Cir. 1990) (ruling that, where only one claim in

habeas petition is exhausted, petitioner should have opportunity to amend petition to

include only the exhausted claim).
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Ostrosky v. State of Alaska, 913 F.2d 590, n.9 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that petitioner

amended petition to delete unexhausted claim).

Guizar v. Estelle, 843 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that petitioners who submit

mixed petitions should have option of either resubmitting petitions without

unexhausted claims, or exhausting unexhausted claims in state court; court may accept

resubmitted petition with only exhausted claims nunc pro tunc to date of original

filing).

Neuschafer v. Whitley, 860 F.2d 1470, 1472 n.1 (9th Cir. 1988) (suggesting that when a

petitioner has not exhausted before filing federal habeas petition, district court may

hold federal petition in abeyance, issue a stay of execution, and allow petitioner an

opportunity to exhaust).

District Courts in Ninth Circuit:

Ashmus v. Calderon, 977 F. Supp. 987 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (finding that district court

could exercise its discretion to hold exhausted petition in abeyance while petitioner

exhausted additional claims).

Caro v. Vasquez, 789 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (vacating stay of execution where

petitioner failed to timely file state habeas petition in proper court).

Rogers v. Whitley, 701 F. Supp. 757, 759 (D. Nev. 1988) (stating that if petitioner

chooses to return to state court, district court will hold petition in abeyance rather than

dismiss so that court can enter a stay of execution if necessary).

Other Circuits:

Christy v. Horn, 115 F.3d 201 (3rd Cir. 1997) (disallowing the holding in abeyance of

mixed petitions).

Victor v. Hopkins, 90 F.3d 276 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that district court has no

authority to hold mixed petition in abeyance or maintain stay of execution pending

exhaustion and that proper procedure is to dismiss the petition and lift the federal stay),

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1153 (1997).

Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that district court

may continue considering exhausted claims at petitioner’s request pending petitioner’s

presentation of unexhausted claims to state court).
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Arrango v. Wainwright, 716 F.2d 1353 (11th Cir. 1983) (remanding case, on appeal

from habeas denial where defendant was pursuing separate issues in state court, for

district court to hold in abeyance until state claims are exhausted and merged with

proper federal court claims; on rehearing district court can apply abuse of writ doctrine

if it determines that defendant is delaying).

6.3.3.6 Patently Frivolous Claims

In his concurrence in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 525 (1982), Justice Blackmun noted

that requiring state exhaustion of patently frivolous claims would not serve the

principles of comity underlying the exhaustion doctrine. Following this reasoning, the

Ninth Circuit held, in Clark v. Ricketts, 958 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S.

838 (1992), that a federal court need not send a petition back to state court to exhaust a

patently frivolous claim. 

Supreme Court:

Rhines v. Weber, 125 S. Ct. 1528 (2005) (holding in a noncapital habeas case that the

district court would abuse its discretion if it were to grant a stay when the unexhausted

claims are plainly meritless).

Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 525 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that

requiring exhaustion of patently frivolous claim does not demonstrate respect for state

courts).

Ninth Circuit:

Clark v. Ricketts, 958 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.) (holding petitioner need not return to state

court to exhaust claims so insubstantial as to be frivolous because serves no comity

purpose and would only delay petitioner’s return to federal court), cert. denied, 506

U.S. 838 (1992).

Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197–98 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that petitioner’s

meritless claims, failing to allege deprivation of a federal right, may be dismissed

without exhaustion because exhaustion would not serve comity purposes).
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6.3.3.7 Waiver of Exhaustion by the State

Since the exhaustion doctrine is not jurisdictional, a state may waive the exhaustion

requirement. The Ninth Circuit and other circuits have held that a state’s failure to

raise exhaustion at the district court level impliedly waives the issue on appeal. 

However, the AEDPA amended § 2254 to prohibit implied waivers of exhaustion. 

Section 2254(b)(3) provides: “A State shall not be deemed to have waived the

exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the

State, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement.”

Supreme Court:

Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134 (1987) (stating that when the state fails to raise

exhaustion, it is “appropriate for the court of appeals to take a fresh look at the issue”).

Ninth Circuit:

Paradis v. Arave, 130 F.3d 385 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that state waived exhaustion

by failing to advise the district and circuit courts whether claims were exhausted, and

that comity, federalism, and finality are not served by insisting on exhaustion).

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3) (2000) (requiring express waiver of exhaustion requirement by

state).

See generally:

Lawrence S. Hirch, Note, State Waiver of the Exhaustion Requirement in Habeas

Corpus Cases, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 419 (1984) (reviewing state exhaustion waiver

issues).

6.3.3.8 Exceptions to Exhaustion Requirement: No State Remedies, Futility, Delay and 

Unavailability of State Procedure

Section § 2254(b)(1) of Title 28, United States Code, excuses a petitioner from the

exhaustion requirement if there is an absence of available state corrective process or if
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it would be ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant. In Phillips v. Vasquez, 56

F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit held that an extraordinary state court delay

in making a final sentencing decision renders the state corrective process “ineffective”

within the meaning of § 2254(b). Such circumstances entitle the petitioner to bring a

habeas petition regarding the constitutionality of the conviction despite the fact that the

state has not made a final sentencing decision. 

Supreme Court:

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.838 (1999) (resolving circuit conflict by stating that

state court’s discretion to review claims in state petition does not make state procedure

unavailable for purposes of establishing exception to exhaustion doctrine).

Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1 (1981) (per curiam) (refusing to recognize

exhaustion exception for clear constitutional violation because it would not promote

judicial economy).

Ninth Circuit:

Edelbacher v. Calderon, 160 F.3d 582 (9th Cir. 1998) (distinguishing Phillips and

finding no extraordinary delay where: (1) retrial of petitioner’s penalty phase was

ongoing, (2) there was no assignment of the necessary capital or non-capital status, (3)

there were no unusual circumstances suggesting that “no end was in sight” for state

proceedings, and (4) the delay at issue was not attributable to ineffective state process

but to the extended proceedings related to the guilt issue; affirming dismissal of petition

while state proceedings are pending).

Hamilton v. Calderon, 134 F.3d 938, 939 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that Phillips does not

apply absent “extreme delay” by state court).

Phillips v. Vasquez, 56 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that where state’s decision

on defendant’s final sentence is extraordinarily delayed, petitioner may bring federal

habeas challenge to conviction; petitioner’s right to reasonably prompt conviction

review outweighs judicial interest in deference to exhaustion).

Noltie v. Peterson, 9 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1993) (criticizing futility doctrine; stating

that there are indications that the Supreme Court may make an exception to exhaustion

in actual innocence cases).
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Beam v. Paskett, 966 F.2d 1563 (9th Cir. 1992) (declining to default petitioner’s

challenge to state’s “utter disregard” for aggravating factor despite petitioner’s failure

to raise it before state supreme court where state court recently resolved the issue

adversely to petitioner), vacated on other grounds, 507 U.S. 463 (1993).

Kim v. Villalobos, 799 F.2d 1317, 1321 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that if state procedural

requirements consistently prevent a fairly presented claim from being heard on the

merits, exhaustion is excused; state court twice denied petitioner’s “fairly presented”

claim for lack of particularity).

Sweet v. Cupp, 640 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1981) (adopting futility doctrine that petitioner

may be excused from exhausting state remedies if highest state court has recently

addressed the issue and resolved it adversely to petitioner and there are no intervening

U.S. Supreme Court decisions on point or other indications state court would depart

from its prior decision).

Other Circuits:

Story v. Kindt, 26 F.3d 402 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding exhaustion requirement excused

because of inordinate nine-year delay in state postconviction collateral proceedings).

Deters v. Collins, 985 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1993) (declining to apply exhaustion doctrine

where state system inordinately and unjustifiably delays review of petitioner’s claims

thereby infringing on due process rights).

Hollis v. Davis, 912 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that because state court failed

to act on inmate’s three previous pro se petitions and did not appoint a lawyer, further

resort to state courts was futile and exhaustion requirement satisfied).

6.3.4 Presumption of Correctness of State Court Fact Findings

6.3.4.1 Findings of Fact

Prior to the AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 required federal habeas courts to presume the

correctness of state court factual findings–whether trial, appellate, or state

postconviction. For the presumption to apply, former § 2254(d) required that a state

court of competent jurisdiction make the findings in writing after a hearing on the

merits. Former § 2254(d) provided seven enumerated exceptions to the application of

the presumption and additionally prohibited application if the factual determination

lacked “fair support in the record.” In Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981), the
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Supreme Court held that federal habeas courts must explicitly apply § 2254(d) and state

in the opinion their reasoning for refusing to apply the presumption to any state court

factual findings.

In 1996, Congress enacted the AEDPA which repealed former § 2254(d) and

created § 2254(e) with new presumption of correctness language. Section 2254(e)(1)

provides as follows:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall

be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing

evidence.

Supreme Court:

Burden v. Zant, 498 U.S. 433 (1991) (holding that a federal court must presume

correctness of a state court’s factual findings or state reasons why presumption of

correctness is not supported).

Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991) (holding that a state appellate court’s resolution

of an ambiguity in a state trial court statement is a finding of fact entitled to

presumption of correctness under former § 2254(d) unless not “fairly supported by the

record”; concluding in instant case that state appellate court’s finding that state trial

court found no evidence of non-statutory mitigating factors was not “fairly supported

by the record” and therefore should not be presumed correct ).

Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1983) (holding that a federal court may not 

substitute its own judgment for a state court’s determination regarding credibility of

witnesses who appeared before state court; concluding that state court’s implicit

credibility findings provided “fair support in the record” for state court’s factual

determination).

Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591 (1982) (holding that, although presumption of

correctness does not apply to ultimate resolution of mixed law-fact questions, a federal

court must apply statutory presumption to the facts underlying a mixed question or

must explain why the presumption is inapplicable).

Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981) (holding that a federal habeas court must make
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clear that it applied the § 2254(d) presumption of correctness to state court findings and

must explain its reasons for applying any statutory exceptions to presumption; holding

that presumption of correctness is equally applicable to state appellate court findings of

fact; stating that “hearing on the merits” under former § 2254(d) requires only that

petitioner and state be parties and that state court make written findings).

Ninth Circuit:

Tolbert v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying on remand the deferential

standard of review as set forth by the en banc court in Tolbert v. Page; holding that the

pre-AEDPA § 2254(d) “presumption of correctness” applies to state court’s

determination of whether a criminal defendant established a prima facie case of

prosecutorial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges; affirming the

state court’s judgment of conviction).

Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (declining to presume

correct the state court’s finding that state’s star witness’s post-trial confession was not

credible where the confession was the only time witness was not speaking under a grant

of immunity), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1133 (1998).

Gallego v. McDaniel, 124 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 1997) (court must defer to state

court factual findings unless based on an unreasonable determination in light of the

evidence presented), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 917, and cert. denied, 524 U.S. 922 (1998).

Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 1997) (granting less deference to state court

decision where state did not make findings of fact).

Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that state’s factual

determinations regarding counsel’s alleged failure to advise defendant of meritorious

pretrial arguments were entitled to presumption of correctness).

Burks v. Borg, 27 F.3d 1424 (9th Cir. 1994) (deferring to state court finding that trial

court’s ruling on prosecutor bias in exercising peremptory challenges warranted

deference where ruling turned on an evaluation of prosecutor’s credibility).

Palmer v. Estelle, 985 F.2d 456 (9th Cir.) (stating that, where record is ambiguous,

state appellate court’s findings of fact are deemed “fairly supported by the record”

within the meaning of former § 2254(d)(8)), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 928 (1993).

Hawkins v. Risley, 984 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that state habeas court’s

factual findings are presumed correct under former § 2254(d) unless petitioner
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establishes that state hearing was inadequate).

Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that former § 2254(d)’s “written

findings” requirement does not demand infinite detail and clarity and can be satisfied

by findings implicit in state court’s actions).

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that state court’s

reasonable inferences drawn from evidence are presumed correct under former

§ 2254(d)).

Robtoy v. Kincheloe, 871 F.2d 1478 (9th Cir. 1989) (considering “convincing

evidence” standard interchangeable with “clear and convincing evidence” standard in

non-habeas case).

Ruff v. Kincheloe, 843 F.2d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that Chaney limits

Austad’s holding–that there is no duty for court to obtain record sua sponte–to factual

determinations only).

Neuschafer v. McKay, 807 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that presumption of

correctness applies to state appellate court factual determinations; federal court must

defer to state appellate reading of record on appeal just as it must defer to state trial

court’s factual findings).

Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that, with respect to purely

factual issues, district court is under no duty to obtain and review state trial record sua

sponte because petitioner must overcome presumption of correctness).

Austad v. Risley, 761 F.2d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (holding that district court

has no duty to obtain record sua sponte where petitioner has not claimed an inability to

produce record), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 856 (1985).

Nelson v. McCarthy, 637 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1980) (considering “convincing evidence”

standard same as “clear and convincing evidence” standard in non-habeas case).

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2000) (articulating presumption of correctness standard).

See generally:

Andrew A. Jones, Note, Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes and Federal Habeas Corpus
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Evidentiary Hearings: Has the Court Deliberately Bypassed § 2254(d)?, 1994 Wis. L.

Rev. 171 (1994) (summarizing and analyzing Tamayo-Reyes and focusing on difficulty

it poses for enforcement of § 2254(d) presumption of correctness of state factual

findings).

John Greene, Note, Sumner v. Mata: Muddying the Waters of Federal Habeas Court

Deference to State Court Findings, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 751 (1983) (examining the

Supreme Court’s reasoning in Mata and exploring its possible implications for future

federal habeas corpus reviews of state convictions).

6.3.4.2 Questions of Law

State court resolutions of purely legal questions are not entitled to a presumption of

correctness under former § 2254(d). Under pre-AEDPA law, a federal habeas corpus

court reviewed legal questions de novo. The current version of § 2254(d), enacted with

the AEDPA in 1996, creates a new standard of review for state legal decisions. See

supra § 6.3.

Supreme Court:

Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (holding that federal courts should defer to state

court findings of fact made after a full and fair hearing but may not defer to state

findings of law; “issues of fact” do not include resolutions of mixed questions of law

and fact), overruled in part, 504 U.S. 1 (1992).

Ninth Circuit:

Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that former § 2254(d)

presumption of correctness applies only to state court factual determinations and does

not extend to state decisions regarding purely legal questions or mixed law-fact

questions).

Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that federal habeas courts must defer

to state court factual findings but not to state determinations of purely legal questions

or mixed questions of law and fact).

6.3.4.3 Mixed Questions of Law and Fact

Under former § 2254(d), a state court’s resolutions of mixed questions of law and fact
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were also not entitled to a presumption of correctness. A federal habeas court would

review the state determinations de novo. It should be noted that, in Sumner v. Mata,

455 U.S. 591 (1982), the Supreme Court held that a state court’s determinations of the

facts underlying a mixed question are presumed correct under former § 2254(d). In

Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992), the Supreme Court discussed the appropriate

standard for a federal habeas court reviewing state court resolutions of mixed questions. 

Four justices argued that de novo was well established and that there was no reason to

change it. Three justices indicated doubt that de novo was clearly established and

suggested that deferential review might be more appropriate. Ultimately, the seven

justices agreed that resolving the standard of review question was not essential to the

case’s disposition. Two justices did not reach the standard of review issue.

With the enactment of the AEDPA, § 2254(d) was changed to create a new

standard of review for state legal decisions. See supra § 6.3.1.

Supreme Court:

Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995) (reversing the Ninth Circuit and holding that

state court ruling that a suspect was not “in custody” for Miranda warning purposes

was mixed question of law and fact).

Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992) (declining to adopt a deferential standard of

review of state court determinations of mixed questions of law and fact).

Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591 (1982) (noting that state court’s mixed question

resolutions are not entitled to a presumption of correctness; stating that, in deciding

mixed questions, “the federal court may give different weight to the facts as found by

the state court and may reach a different conclusion in light of the legal standard. But

the question of facts that underlie this ultimate conclusion are governed by the statutory

presumption”).

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (stating that state court resolutions of mixed

questions are “open to review on collateral attack”).

Ninth Circuit:

Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that former § 2254(d)

presumption of correctness applies only to state court findings of fact and does not
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extend to state court decisions regarding purely legal questions or mixed questions of

law and fact, both of which are reviewed de novo).

Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that federal habeas courts must defer

to state court findings of fact but not to state court resolutions of purely legal questions

or mixed questions of law and fact).

6.3.4.3.1 District Court’s Duty to Review State Record

Case law interpreting former § 2254(d) established that since a presumption of

correctness attaches to state factual findings, the burden of providing the district court

with relevant portions of the state record or showing an inability to do so is on the

petitioner. In Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth Circuit held

that a district court has no obligation to obtain and review the state court record when

disposing of purely factual questions. Claims raising questions of law or mixed

questions of law and fact, however, do impose on the district court a sua sponte duty to

obtain and review all relevant portions of the state record.

Ninth Circuit:

Hamilton v. Vasquez, 882 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1989) (remanding to district court for

review of state record and determination whether evidentiary hearing is required to

analyze whether shackling defendant during trial violated due process–a mixed

question of law and fact).

Ruff v. Kincheloe, 843 F.2d 1240, 1243 n.5 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that district court

has duty to review the entire state court record to determine whether a constitutional

error is harmless).

Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that absent specific

findings and conclusions, appellate court cannot be sure that the district court

conducted independent state record review).

Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that where habeas claim raises

mixed questions of law and fact, district court has a sua sponte duty to obtain and

review relevant portions of state record, unlike questions of fact which impose no such

duty).
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Reiger v. Christensen, 789 F.2d 1425, 1428 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that where district

court denies petition without evidentiary hearing, record on appeal must show that

district court independently reviewed all relevant portions of petitioner’s claims).

Rhinehart v. Gunn, 598 F.2d 557, 558 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that appellate court

cannot affirm a district court’s dismissal of petition unless record shows that district

court reviewed all relevant portions of state record).

6.3.4.4 Classification of Issues

6.3.4.4.1 Generally

Supreme Court:

Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985) (stating that an issue does not lose its factual

character merely because its resolution is dispositive of the ultimate constitutional

question; discussing the considerations involved in labeling an issue “factual,” “legal,”

or “mixed”).

6.3.4.4.2 Jury Determinations

In Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), the Supreme Court held that

determinations as to individual juror bias, see supra § 2.6.2, in both trial and capital

sentencing juries, are factual questions entitled to the presumption of correctness. The

Ninth Circuit additionally held, in Greenawalt v. Ricketts, 943 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir.

1991), that the presumption applies to determinations as to the entire jury’s

impartiality.

However, in Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth

Circuit held that while jury misconduct is a factual inquiry, the determination as to

whether the misconduct was prejudicial is a mixed question of law and fact.

Supreme Court:

Greene v. Georgia, 519 U.S. 145 (1996) (holding that Witt standard, whereby federal

courts accord presumption of correctness to state court’s juror bias findings, does not

control as standard for state appellate court review of trial court’s jury selection

rulings).
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Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (holding that state court’s decision to excuse

capital sentencing juror for cause under Witherspoon is a finding of fact subject to the

presumption of correctness under § 2254(d)).

Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984) (finding that impartiality of individual jurors is a

question of fact ).

Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983) (holding that substance and effect of ex parte

communication between judge and juror, on juror’s impartiality is fact question;

ultimate question whether error was harmless is question of law; state court’s failure to

contemporaneously record finding does not deprive it of “fair support in the record”).

Ninth Circuit:

Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970 (9th Cir.) (determining that state court’s finding that

juror was impartial was not entitled to presumption of correctness), cert. denied, 535

U.S. 1033 (1998).

Greenawalt v. Ricketts, 943 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that state court’s

determination that the jury was impartial is a finding of historical fact treated as

presumptively correct).

Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1990) (affording presumption of correctness to

state court’s finding that no juror misconduct occurred).

Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that state court conclusion

that juror’s misconduct was not prejudicial is mixed question of law and fact not

entitled to presumption).

Austad v. Risley, 761 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (holding that determination of

juror’s bias is factual and entitled to presumption of correctness), cert. denied, 474 U.S.

856 (1985).

See generally:

Elise E. Walthall, Constitutional Law–The Practical and Procedural Implications of

Jury Misconduct in the Third Circuit, 39 Vill. L. Rev. 1005 (1994) (discussing common

factors in jury misconduct cases and addressing Third Circuit’s treatment of such

cases).
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6.3.4.4.3 Pretrial Publicity

The question of whether pretrial publicity prejudiced the jury is a factual question

accorded the presumption of correctness.

Ninth Circuit:

Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that question of jury bias due

to pretrial publicity is a factual determination entitled to presumption of correctness).

6.3.4.4.4 Competence of Defendant

State court determinations regarding a defendant’s competence to stand trial and to

waive rights are accorded the former § 2254(d) presumption of correctness. However,

in Miller v. Stewart, 231 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir. 2000), the court declined to defer to a state

court’s factual findings of competency that were issued two years prior.

Supreme Court:

Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731 (1990) (stating that state court’s determination

regarding defendant’s competency is entitled to presumption of correctness).

Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 112 (1983) (applying presumption of correctness to state

court competency determination).

Ninth Circuit:

Miller v. Stewart, 231 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir.) (declining to defer to state court

determination of defendant’s Faretta right to self-representation to determine, two

years later, whether federal habeas petitioner is competent to forgo federal appeals and

“volunteer” to be executed), stay vacated sub nom Stewart v. Miller ex rel. Jones, 531

U.S. 986 (2000). 

Brewer v. Lewis, 989 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that state court’s conclusion

regarding defendant’s competence is entitled to presumption of correctness if “fairly

supported by the record”).
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Evans v. Raines, 800 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that state court’s determinations

of defendant’s competency to stand trial and waive counsel are entitled to presumption

of correctness, although they may be mixed questions of law and fact).

Austad v. Risley, 761 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (holding that issue of fitness to

stand trial is factual determination accorded presumption of correctness), cert. denied,

474 U.S. 856 (1985).

6.3.4.4.5 Right to Counsel: Ineffective Assistance, Conflict of Interest, and Request for

 Counsel

Conflict of interest and counsel competence issues are mixed questions of law and fact

and thus do not come within the presumption of correctness afforded state court

findings of fact. Whether defendant’s statements constitute a request for counsel,

however, is a legal question.

Supreme Court:

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that both performance and

prejudice components of ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact).

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (concluding that whether counsel undertook

multiple representation is mixed question of law and fact).

Ninth Circuit:

Robinson v. Borg, 918 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that while state court’s

determination as to what was said during an interrogation is a factual finding entitled to

presumption of correctness, whether defendant’s words constituted a request for

counsel is a legal determination subject to de novo review).

Adamson v. Ricketts, 758 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that whether counsel’s error

was harmless is mixed question), rev’d on other grounds, 789 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1986)

(en banc), and rev’d on other grounds, 483 U.S. 1 (1987).
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6.3.4.4.6 Witness Issues

Whether a witness testified under a grant of immunity is a fact question entitled to the

presumption of correctness. Questions as to a witness’ constitutional unavailability,

however, are not entitled to the presumption.

Supreme Court:

Burden v. Zant, 498 U.S. 433 (1991) (holding that state court finding that witness

testified under grant of immunity is entitled to presumption of correctness).

Ninth Circuit:

Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that state court’s

determination that witness is constitutionally unavailable is subject to de novo review

by federal habeas court).

6.3.4.4.7 Voluntariness of Confessions, Pleas and Waivers

The voluntariness of a defendant’s confession, plea, or waiver of rights is a legal

question. The Ninth Circuit held, however, that a state court’s decision whether a

waiver was knowing and intelligent is a factual question entitled to a presumption of

correctness.

Supreme Court:

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (holding that voluntariness of defendant’s

confession is a legal question requiring independent federal court determination).

Ninth Circuit:

Collazo v. Estelle, 940 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (holding that voluntariness of

confession and determination of whether police coerced confession are reviewed de

novo; voluntariness of Miranda waiver is reviewed de novo, while determination of

whether Miranda waiver was knowing and intelligent is entitled to presumption of

correctness).
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Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that voluntariness of guilty plea is

question of law ).

6.3.4.4.8 Preclusive Effect of Verdict

The preclusive effect of a jury verdict is a legal question.

Supreme Court:

Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222 (1994) (holding that the preclusive effect of a jury

verdict is a question of federal law subject to de novo habeas review).

6.3.4.4.9 Harmless Error

Whether a constitutional error is harmless is a legal question, but the underlying factual

determinations are accorded the presumption of correctness.

Ninth Circuit:

Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d 608, 612–13 (9th Cir. 1995) (determining that state’s harmless

error conclusion was not a finding of fact entitled to presumption of correctness).

Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that state court’s harmless

error determination was a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review).

McKenzie v. Risley, 842 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (holding that the ultimate

determination of whether a constitutional error was harmless is subject to de novo

review, while underlying state court findings of fact are entitled to presumption of

correctness), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 901 (1988).

6.3.4.4.10 Custody for Miranda Purposes

In Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995), the Supreme Court held that whether a

defendant is in custody for Miranda purposes is a mixed question of law and fact not

entitled to a presumption of correctness. The decision reversed the Ninth Circuit and

resolved a circuit split regarding that issue.
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Supreme Court:

Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995) (holding that state court rulings that a

suspect was not “in custody” for Miranda warning purposes were mixed questions of

law and fact).

6.3.4.4.11 Pretrial Identification Procedures

The constitutionality of pretrial identification procedures is a mixed question of law

and fact.

Supreme Court:

Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591 (1982) (holding that constitutionality of pretrial

identification procedures is mixed question).

6.3.4.4.12 Existence of Mitigating Circumstances

The Eleventh Circuit held that a federal habeas court’s review of a state court factual

finding regarding the existence of mitigating circumstances is entitled to the

presumption of correctness.

Other Circuits:

Magwood v. Smith, 791 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that federal habeas corpus

court’s review of a state court factual finding concerning the existence of mitigating

circumstances is constrained by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).

6.3.4.4.13 Shackling Defendant

The Ninth Circuit held that the propriety of shackling a defendant during trial is a

mixed question of law and fact.

Ninth Circuit:

Hamilton v. Vasquez, 882 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that whether shackling

defendant during trial violated due process was mixed question “requiring the
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application of legal principles to the historical facts” and requiring trial court to review

state record sua sponte), denial of habeas corpus aff’d in part and rev’d in part on

other grounds, 17 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 1994).

6.3.4.4.14 Plea Agreements

Whether a modified sentence was adequate specific performance of a broken plea

agreement is a mixed question of law and fact.

Ninth Circuit:

Pierre v. Thompson, 666 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that whether a modified

sentence constituted adequate specific performance of a broken plea agreement is a

mixed question subject to independent determination by federal court).

6.3.5 Review Where State Court Did Not Reach Merits of Properly Raised Issue

Where a state court has not reached the merits of a properly raised issue, there is no

state court decision on which to accord deference. Therefore, the issue will be reviewed

de novo by the federal habeas court.

Ninth Circuit:

Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2002) (agreeing with holdings of Third and

Fifth Circuits that when it is clear that a state court has not reached the merits of a

properly raised issue, the federal habeas court must review it de novo; recognizing,

nevertheless, that factual determinations by the state court are presumed correct and can

be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 916 (2003).

6.4 Section 2255 Review: Habeas Corpus Review of Federal Convictions

For habeas relief from a federal conviction, a federal prisoner must make a motion to

vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The procedural

rules governing § 2255 motions differ in some respects from those governing habeas

corpus petitions under §§ 2241-2254.

A federal district court has jurisdiction to entertain a § 2255 motion only if
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the movant is in custody under federal court sentence. Motions must be filed in the

district court in which the prisoner was sentenced. Section 2255 provides four grounds

justifying relief for a federal prisoner who challenges the imposition or length of

federal detention: (1) “that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or

laws of the United States,” (2) “that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such

sentence,” (3) “that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law,” or

(4) that the sentence is “otherwise subject to collateral attack.”

In 1996, the AEDPA amended § 2255 to include a filing deadline and

restrictions on filing successive petitions. See supra §§ 6.2.1, 6.2.2. In United States v.

Valdez, 195 F.3d 544 (9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit held that § 2255 is not limited

to constitutional relief, but includes statutory relief as well. The Valdez court also held

that the one year statute of limitation for a § 2255(3) claim begins to run on the date the

Supreme Court determines retroactivity, not on the date the Court initially recognizes

the asserted right. 

Supreme Court:

Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522 (2003) (holding in noncapital case that when a

defendant in a federal prosecution takes an unsuccessful direct appeal from a judgment

of conviction, but does not petition for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court, for

purpose of starting the clock on § 2255's one-year limitation period, the judgment 

becomes final when the time expires for filing a petition for certiorari contesting the

appellate court's affirmation of the conviction).

Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) (accepting district court’s treatment of

pre-AEDPA petition filed pursuant to § 2241 as a § 2255 motion).

Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 221 (1969) (clarifying that § 2255 revised

procedure by which federal prisoners seek relief but did not restrict scope of habeas

corpus writ).

Ninth Circuit:

Matus-Leva v. United States, 287 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding in noncapital case

that petitioner may not resort to coram nobis because a petition under section 2255 is

time barred due to the petitioner’s failure to meet the AEDPA’s gatekeeping

requirements), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1022 (2002).
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United States v. Seesing, 234 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that when a federal

prisoner files a pro se request of the court, the court cannot recharacterize the request as

a § 2255 motion without giving the prisoner either the option to consent or the option to

withdraw the motion so that the prisoner does not lose the right to file a comprehensive

first motion).

United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that district court has

jurisdiction to reconsider order granting § 2255 motion when court initially ordered a

new sentencing hearing which had not occurred; holding Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)’s 10 day

time limit–governing motions to alter or amend judgments–does not divest district

court of jurisdiction to reconsider because order initially granting petitioner’s motion

was not a final order), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1002 (2001).

United States v. Garcia, 210 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the one year

limitation period– for a federal prisoner who does not file a certiorari petition to the

Supreme Court–begins to run when the time for filing the petition (90 days) expires). 

United States v. Colvin, 204 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a judgment

becomes final for a federal prisoner who was resentenced after appeal–triggering the

one year filing deadline under § 2255–when the time passes for appealing from the

district court’s entry of judgment).

United States v. Valdez, 195 F.3d 544 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the “right” initially

recognized under §2255(3) need not be a constitutional right; holding that one year

statute of limitation for § 2255(3) claim begins to run on the date retroactivity is

determined, not on date that right initially recognized).

United States v. Pirro, 104 F.3d 297, 297 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a federal habeas

petitioner authorized to seek relief under § 2255 may not petition for habeas relief

pursuant to § 2241 unless it appears that the § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective

to test the legality of petitioner's detention).

Tripati v. Herman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that the authority of

federal courts under § 2241 is limited by § 2255).

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) (providing mechanism for habeas relief from federal

conviction).
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28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000) (providing for writ of habeas corpus).

See generally:

Matthew S. O’Connell, Habeas Relief for Federal Prisoners, 84 Geo. L.J. 1451 (1996)

(summarizing procedural rules for § 2255 motions).

6.4.1 No Fourth Amendment Claims

In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Supreme Court held that when a state

prisoner has a full and fair opportunity to litigate Fourth Amendment claims, a federal

court will not grant a § 2254 petition based on those claims. See supra § 6.3.2.3. The

Ninth and Tenth Circuits have extended the Stone holding to federal prisoners

petitioning for relief under § 2255. Other circuits have declined to do so.

Supreme Court:

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (holding that where state has provided an

opportunity for full and fair litigation of Fourth Amendment claims, federal habeas

corpus relief is not available for Fourth Amendment claims).

Ninth Circuit:

United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding prisoner’s Fourth

Amendment claim not cognizable under § 2255 when federal prisoner had full and fair

opportunity to litigate claim at trial and on direct appeal).

Other Circuits:

United States v. Cook, 997 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that invalid search

warrant claim is not cognizable under § 2255).

Campino v. United States, 968 F.2d 187, 189 (2d Cir. 1992) (rejecting Fourth

Amendment claim under § 2255 for failure to raise on direct appeal or show cause and

prejudice).

Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F. 2d 255, 262 n.8 (7th Cir.) (limiting Stone to
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Fourth Amendment claims under § 2254), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990).

6.4.2 Exhaustion and Procedural Bar

Section 2255 does not contain a provision requiring a prisoner to exhaust other

available remedies. Nevertheless, a movant must usually complete a direct appeal as a

prerequisite to filing a § 2255 motion. In limited circumstances, courts do not enforce

this requirement. Failure to raise a claim at trial or on direct appeal generally results in

a waiver of the claim, necessitating a showing of cause and prejudice or miscarriage of

justice to obtain collateral review of such claims. See supra § 6.2.5.

Supreme Court:

Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003) (holding in noncapital case that failure

to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal does not bar claim

from being brought in a later, appropriate proceeding under § 2255).

United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 162–66 (1982) (stating that a claim is waived

unless presented at trial or direct appeal; holding that to obtain habeas review of a

waived claim, a federal prisoner must show cause for the failure to object at trial and

actual prejudice resulting from the alleged error).

Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 179, 181 (1947) (stating that federal prisoner may obtain

habeas corpus relief without exhausting direct appeals only in exceptional

circumstances when an error is flagrant and no other remedy is available).

Ninth Circuit:

United States v. Montgomery, 998 F.2d 1468, 1472 (9th Cir. 1993) (consolidating direct

appeal and appeal of § 2255 motion when both appeals contained same issue).

United States v. Deeb, 944 F. 2d 545 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a prisoner may not

file a habeas motion when direct appeal is pending).
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6.4.3 Successive Petitions

Ninth Circuit:

Moore v. Reno, 185 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (extending Greenawalt v.

Stewart, 105 F.3d 1287, 1287–88 (9th Cir.)–which holds that state prisoner may not

avoid the limitations imposed on successive petitions by styling his petition as one

pursuant to § 2241 rather than § 2254–and holding that dismissal of a successive §

2255 motion does not render federal habeas relief an ineffective or inadequate remedy

so as to allow petitioner to bring claim under § 2241), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1178

(2000).

United States v. Lorentsen, 106 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1997) (denying to certify postAEDPA successive § 2255 motion but suggesting without deciding that a petitioner

could use § 2241 to make a newly available Bailey claim).

Other Circuits:

Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 1999) (distinguishing Davenport,

Triestman and Dorsainvil, but avoiding the issue of whether § 2241 is available for a

successive motion otherwise barred under § 2255).

United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that § 2241 habeas relief

remains available for federal prisoners in limited circumstances).

Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1999) (declining to allow § 2241 petition to

escape procedural bar under § 2255).

In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 608 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that a § 2255 motion does

not become inadequate or ineffective so as to permit the use of § 2241 merely because a

prisoner cannot meet the AEDPA's successive petition requirements).

Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the AEDPA bars

successive § 2255 motions under the guise of § 2241; holding, however, that where the

underlying claim was actual innocence a prisoner could bring a successive § 2241

petition despite the fact that prisoner could not, for whatever reason, bring a successive

§ 2255 motion).

In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that inadequacy or

ineffectiveness is not established by mere inability to meet the AEDPA's gatekeeping
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requirements; holding that § 2241 relief is available to federal prisoner in the unusual

circumstance where application of the AEDPA's successive filing restrictions would

result in a “complete miscarriage of justice”).

In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 n.5 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (same).

District Courts in Other Circuits:

Wilson v. United States, 969 F. Supp. 1054 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (holding that pro se

letter requesting that federal sentence run concurrently with related state sentence was

properly considered a first petition, making petitioner’s subsequent petition attacking

the underlying sentence a second petition barred by the AEDPA absent appellate court

authorization).