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- c v ( L) In R e : A p p lic a tio n o f th e N .Y . T im e s C o . to U n se a l W ire ta p & S e a r c h W a r r a n t M a te r ia ls UN ITED STA

TES CO URT OF AP P EALS F OR TH E S ECO N D CI RCU IT Aug us t T er m 2 008 (A rgue d: J un e 16 , 20 09 Dec id ed: Aug us t 6 , 20 09 Ame nd ed: Aug us t 2 0, 2 009 ) Docket Nos. 09-0854-cv (L), 09-1164-cv (CON)

I N T HE M

AT T ER OF T HE A P P L I CA T I ON OF T HE N E W Y O RK T I M E S C OMP A NY T O U NSEAL W I RE TAP & S EA R CH W

ARRAN T M

AT ERI ALS B ef or e: W I NT ER , C AB R ANES , and H ALL Circuit Jud ges . The United States appea ls fr om a final order of the United States Distr ict Court for the So uther n D is tr

ict of New Yor k ( J ed S . Rak of

f, Judge ) gr ant in g anapp lic ati onby the N ew Yo r k Tim es Company (the “Times”) to access s eale d wiretap a pplica tions r elating to the investigation of the “Emperor’s Club,” a pros titution ring once patronized by the former G overnor of New York, Elliot Sp it ze r. W e h ol d th a t th e Ti me s ha s no t sho wn “g oo d c a use ” t o u nse a l wire ta p a pp li ca ti on s, o rde rs, and relate d documents purs uant to Title II I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Sa fe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U. S.C. § 2518(8)(b). We a lso hold that the Times does not have a First Amendment right to ga in a cc ess t o wire ta p a pp li ca ti on s. Rev ersed. D ANI EL L. S T E IN , As s is tan t U ni te d S tat es At to r ney (Lev L. Dassin, Acting United State s Attor ney, a nd Jess e M. Furman, As s is tan t U ni te d S tat es At to r ney , on the brief ), So uther n D is tr

ict of New Yor k, N ew Yo r k, N Y, for Appella nt U

nit ed Stat es o f A mer ic a. D A V I D E. M C C RAW (I taiM ayt al, on the brief ), The New York T im es Com pan y, L egal

Dep ar tm ent , N ew Yo r k, N Y, for Appelle e t he New Yo rkT

ime s Co mpany .2 M ARC F AL CONE (M

ich ell e Hi r s hm an an d J ame s L. B r ochin , on the brief ), Paul, We iss , Rifkind, W harton & Garris on LLP , New Yor k, N Y, for Mo vant an d Am icus Cu riae Elliot Spitzer
. J OS É A. C AB R ANES , Circuit Jud ge : The United States appea ls fr om a final order of the United States Distr ict Court for the So uther n D is tr

ict of New Yor k ( J ed S . Rak of

f, Judge ) gr ant in g anapp lic ati onby T he N ew Yo r k Tim es Company (the “Times”) to gain acc ess t o sealed wiretap applic ations relating to the investigation of the “Emperor’s Club,” a pros titution ring once patronized by the former G overnor of New York, Elliot Spitzer. This appeal raises two questions: (1) Does Tit le III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe St r eet s Act

of 196 8, 1 8 U. S.C. § 25 18( 8) (b ) ( “Tit le I I I ”) —whichper mi ts di s clo s ur e of wir et ap applic ations, orders , and rela ted documents only upon a showing of “g ood cause”—a llow disclosure of those types of documents based solely on the ne ws media’s interest in publishing the infor mation containe d in those documents? (2) Do the news media ha ve a c ommon law or Firs t Amendment right to gain a cce ss to wiretap appli cations that overrides any statutory r equirement of good ca use for

a cc ess? BAC KGROUND T he u nd erlyi ng f

act s of th e cas e ar e no t i n dis pu te . I n M ar ch 2 008 , the g ov er nm ent char ged fo ur peo pl e with r un ni ng apr os ti tu ti onr in g calledth e “Em per or ’s Clu b. ” So onaf te r , the n ews media identified Governor Spitzer as a cli ent of the ring; Spitzer resigned his off ice within days. Attac hed to th e go ver nm ent ’s cr

im in al co mp lai nt

was an af fi dav it s ign ed b y a Sp ecial Ag ent of th e F ede r al B ur eau of Invest igation setting forth evidence i n suppor t of the charges aga inst the four defendants, including evidenc e obtaine d purs uant to wiretaps on cellul ar telephones used in connec tion with the prost itution ring. The four

people c harged a s a result of the Emperor’s Club investigation a ll wa ived indic tmentThe Di stri ctC ou rt su mma riz ed the co nte nts o f th e wire ta p a pp li ca ti on ma te ria ls a s fol lo ws: 1 In the case of the two wiretaps, the initial applic ations were supported by affidavits s etting forth the evide nce that e stablished the prerequisit es for the taps, and the requests f or renewa l were supported by interim reports detailing information that had been le arned thus fa r andth e r eas on s fo r

fu r th er mo ni to r in g. In re N.Y. Times Co. , 600 F. Supp. 2d 504, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2 009). 3 andpl eade d gu

ilt y witho ut r equ es ti ng o r

r ecei vin g di s cov ery. The wiretaps used in the Emperor’s Club investigation were obta ined pursuant to or ders
ent er ed b y s ever al j ud ges of th e So uther n D is tr

ict of New Yor k p ur s uan t t o the p r ov is io ns of T it le I I I
. Under that statute, each wiretap applic ation and order was plac ed under judicia l seal and, at the 1 direction of the iss uing district judge, held by the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern Di s tr ict of New Yor k f or s af ekee pi ng. See

18 U.S.C . § 2518(8)(b) (requiring that wiretap material s be place d under judicia l seal). In the ordinary course, wiretap orders and applica tions are unsealed during
cr im in al p r oce edi ngs or

di s cov ery. See 18 U.S.C . § 2518(9) (requiring disclosure of a wiretap applic ation andor der to a par ty bef or e in te r cep te d co mm unicat io ns may be u s ed ag ain s t the p ar ty

incou r t)
. Ho weve r , b ecau s e t he f

ou r peo pl e ch argedinth e cr

im in al co mp lai nt

waiv ed i ndictmen t an d p lead ed guilt y inth e lat e s pr

in g an d s um mer

of 200 8, the w

ir et ap m ate r

ial s r emain ed u nd er

s eal. In December 2008, the Times submitted an applica tion to the District Court to uns eal the gov er nm ent ’s wir et ap an d s ear ch w ar r ant app lic ati on s inth e Em per or ’s Clu b i nv es tigat io n. T he Tim es cl a im ed (1 ) a co mmo n l aw rig ht o f a cc ess t o j ud ic ia l re co rds, a nd (2 ) a Fir st A me nd me nt rig ht o f a cc ess to th e r eco r ds . T he g ov er nm ent agr eed to di s clo s e t he search warrant app lic ati on s , b ut op po s ed

un s eali ng wi

retap materials on the ground that disclosur e wa s pr ohibited by Title III. Specifically , the government argued tha t Title II I only permitted disclosur e of sealed wi retap applic ations for

“good

caus e,” andth at agen er al j ou r nal is ti c in te r es t i n i nf

or mat io n did no t c on s ti tu te “go odcaus e” u nd er4

T it le I I I
. See 18 U.S.C . § 2518(8)(b) (“Applic ations made and orders granted under this chapter shall be

s eale d b y t he j ud ge. Cus to dy o f the ap pl icat io ns andor der s s hall b e wh er ever th e ju dge di r ect s . Su ch applic ations and orders s hall be disclosed only upon a showing of goo d cau se before a judge of competent ju r is di ct io n . . . . ” ( emp has is add ed) ). T he D is tr ict Cou r t h ear d ar

gum ent onth e Tim es ’s app lic ati ononJ anu ary 27 , 20 09. T he Tim es agr eed at the h ear

in g that th e Go ver nm ent

could “r edac t[

] the n ame s andid ent

if yin g in fo r mat

io n o f all
customers ” whose name s appear in the materia ls. Accordingly , the Distr ict Court ruled that “[t]he

s cop e of th e mo ti onwas . . . lim it ed t o s eeki ng the r elea s e of th e wir et ap m ate r

ial s s o r edac te d. ” In re N.Y. Times Co. , 600 F. Supp. 2d 504, 506-07 (S.D.N.Y. 20 09). In a February 19, 2009 Opinion a nd Or der , the D is tr

ict Cou r t gr ant ed the Tim es ’s app lic ati onto un s eal the w ir et ap ap pl

icat io ns as r edac te d
to pr ot ect th e id ent it ies of Emp er or ’s Clu b cl

ien ts . Id
. The District Court off

ered four r easons for

its dec is io n. Fir st, the Di stri ctC ou rt c on cl ud ed tha t th e wire ta p a pp li ca ti on s we re “j ud ic ia l re co rds” be ca use th ey ar e “r elev ant

to th e pe r fo r man ce o f the j udici al f un ct io n an d u s ef

ul inth e ju di cial

pr oce s s .” Id

. at 507 (quo ti ng United Sta tes v. Amodeo , 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995) (“ Amodeo I ”) (setting for th the definition of “judicia l records,” and apply ing that definition to a seal ed investigation report regarding lab or unio n co r r up ti on

))
. Se co nd , t he Di stri ctC ou rt h el d th a t a t c om mo n l aw a nd un de r th e F irstAm en dm en t, the pre ss enj oye d a “ r

igh t o f a cces s ” t o j udici al r eco r ds , am ou nt in g t o a “ pr es um pt

io n i n f avo r of di s clo s ur e.” In re N.Y. Times Co. , 60 0 F . Su pp . 2dat 5 07. T he D is tr ict Cou r t r eas on ed that

this pr es um pt

io n r each ed its zenith “when, a s here, the documents are directly relev ant to the exercise of a c ourt’s Article III ju di cial po wer .” Id

. (c it in g United Sta tes v. Amodeo , 71 F.3d 1044, 10 49 (2d Cir. 1995) (“ Amodeo II ”) (“ [T ]h e wei ght

to be g ive n the p r es um pt

io n o f a cces s mu s t b e go ver nedby the r ol e of th e ma te r ial at5

issu e i n th e e xe rc ise of A rti cl e I II ju di ci a l p ow era nd the re sul ta nt v a lu e o f suc h i nfo rma ti on to t ho se
mo ni to r in g the f ede r al co ur ts .”) ). Third, the District Court balanced the assert ed strong pr esumption in favor of dis closure of ju di cial r eco r ds agai ns t the g ov er nm ent ’s in te r es t i n m ain tai ni ng c on fi den ti ali ty andpr ot ect

in g pr iva cy. In this case, the District Court concluded (1) there wa s no longer any conc ern about confidential ity bec aus e t he i nv es tigat

io n h ad co ncl ud ed, and(2) any co nce r ns abo ut pr iva cy co ul d b e mi tigat ed th r ough r edac ti on s . In re N.Y. Times Co. , 600 F. Supp. 2d a t 508. Because the a ss erted str ong presumpt ion in favor of disclosur e outweig hed the gove rnment’s int erests , the Court granted the T im es ’s app lic ati on . Id

. Fourth and finally , the Distr ict Court rejected the government’s argument that Title II I’s “good cause” requirement c reated a statutory presumpt ion again st di s clo s ur e. U nd er

th e go ver nm ent ’s definition, “good c ause” requires a “nee d for dis closure” and an “ aggriev ed person,” and is not satisf ied by me re journalistic interest or curiosity. In the Dis trict Court’s view, “there is no reason to believ e that Cong ress intended ‘good c ause’ to be any thing other than a synonym for the balanc ing di ct ate d b y t he af

or eme nt io nedcon s ti tu ti on al an d co mm onlaw p r in cip les .” In re N.Y. Times Co. , 600 F. Su pp . 2dat 5 08. This appea l followed. Before this Court, the government renews its argument that (1) the text, context, and l egislative histor y of Title II I create a strong presum ption again st di s clo s ur e of

wir et ap app lic ati on s , whichmay

be o ver com e on ly u po n a s ho win g of “go odcaus e,” and(2) “ goo d cau s e”
mea ns , es s ent

ially, nec es s it

y. T he Tim es r es po nd s th at ( 1) th e Di s tr ict Cou r t ap pl

iedth e co r r ect definition of “good ca use” (as incorporating the common law presumption in fa vor of disclosur e of ju di cial mat er ial s ), and(2) e venif

T it le I I I has a mo r e r es tr

ict ive mea ni ng o f “ goo d cau s e,” th e s tatut e is
tru mp ed by

the ne ws m ed ia ’s Fi rst A me nd me nt rig ht o f a cc ess t o j ud ic ia l re co rds.6 DISCUSSI ON A. S ta nd ar d o f R evi ew Because the District Court’s February 19, 2009 Opinion a nd Order involved solely a que stion of law, w e reviewthat decision de novo
. See, e.g. , Willi am s v. Be emiller, Inc. , 527 F.3d 259, 26 4 (2d Cir. 2008). B. T itle III It is undisputed by the parties that there is a qualified common la w “right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicia l records and documents,” which c ourts administer by bal anci ng the g ov er nm ent ’s in te r es t i n co nf id ent ial it y andpr iva cy again s t the p ub lic ’s in te r es t i n in s pec ti on . Ni

xo n v. War ne r Co mmunic

ati o ns , 435 U.S. 5 89, 597 (1978) (footnote omitted). We a ss ume arg ue ndo th at w ir et ap ap pl

icat io ns ar e ( a) j udici al r eco r ds and(b ) i ncl ud ed i n thi s qu ali fi ed c om mo n l aw
r igh t o f a cces s , an d tur n o ur att ent io n t o Tit le I I I , whichs up er s ede s any a rgua bl e co mm onlaw r igh t. Se e Ci ty o f M ilw auk ee v. I lli no is , 451 U.S. 3 04, 313-14 (1981) (“[F]ederal c ommon law . . . is res orted to [only] in absence of an applic able A ct of Congress.” (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration marks omitt ed)). Title II I provides, in r eleva nt part: [Wi r et ap a] pp lic ati on s mad e andor der s gr ant ed u nd er this chap te r

s hall b e s eale d b y t he j ud ge. Custody of the applica tions and orders shall be whe rever the judge direc ts. Such applica tions and orders s hall be disclosed only upon a showing of good c ause before a judge of competent ju r is di ct io n an d s hall n ot

be d es tr oye d ex cep t o n o r der of th e is s ui ng o r

denyin g ju dge , an d i n a ny ev en t sha ll be ke pt f

or t en ye a rs. 18 U .S. C. § 2 518 (8 )(

b)
. Ins tead of beginni ng with the statute, the District Court cons idered principal ly the contours of th e co mm onlaw an d F ir s t A men dm ent r igh ts of acces s to ju di cial

r eco r ds , an d thenin te r pr et ed Tit le I I I ’s “go odcaus e” r equ

ir eme nt ina man ner

con s is te nt

wit h the p er ceiv ed r

igh ts . See In re N.Y. Times Co. , 600 F. Supp. 2d a t 508 (“[T]here is no r eason to believ e that Cong ress intended ‘good c ause’ to be7

anything othe r than a synonym for the balanci ng dictate d by the aforementioned c onstitut ional a nd common lawprinciples.”). Howev er, where there is a statute on point, we be gin our consideration th er e. I n co ns trui ng the t ext of any f ede r al s tatut e, we fi r s t c on s id er th e pr eced ent s th at b in d u s as an in te r mediat e app ell ate cou r t, whi ch p r ov id e de fi ni ti

ve i nt er pr et ati on s of

other wis e am bi guo us lan gua ge. Ins ofar as thos e precede nts f ail to resolve an a pparent ambiguity , we e xamine the text of the st atute it s elf , in te r pr et in g pr ov is io ns inlig

ht of th eir or di nar y me ani ng a ndth eir

con te xtual

s et ti ng. See United St ate s v . M ag asso uba , 54 4 F .3d387 , 40 4 ( 2d Cir . 20 08) (“ I n d et er mi ni ng whether s tatut or y lan gua ge i s ambiguous, we ‘ reference . . . the l angua ge itself, the specific conte xt in which tha t langua ge is used, andth e br oad er

con te xt of th e s tatut e as a who le. ’” (qu ot in g Robin son v. Shell Oil Co. , 51 9 U. S. 3 37, 341 (1997))). Where the statutory languag e remains ambiguous, “we resor t to canons of construction and, if th e me ani ng s till r emain s amb igu ou s , t o l egi s lat ive hi s to ry.” Ma

gass o uba , 54 4 F .3dat 4 04 ( in te r nal alt er ati on s andqu ot ati onmar ks om it te d)
. T he c entr al ques ti onof

s tatut or y in te r pr et ati oninthis cas e is th e me ani ng o f “ goo d cau s e” within the contex t of Title III . Congress did not define the term, and we a re awa re of no Supreme Cou r t c as e t hat

has do ne s o. Ho weve r , o ur Cou r t c on clu deda qu ar te r -c entur y ago th at “ goo d cau s e”

could be f ou ndwhe r e t he ap pl

ican t s eeki ng t o u ns eal w

ir et ap ap pl

icat io ns was an “ aggr

iev ed p er s on ,” bu t n ot up onany l es s er

s ho win g. See Nat’l Broadcastin g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 735 F.2d 51, 55 (2d C ir. 1984) (“ NBC

”) (also noting that NBC had not demonstr ated a need for the materials). In that case, the National Broadca sting Company, Inc. (“NBC” ) appea led a de cision by Chi ef Judge T.F. Gilroy Daly of th e Unit ed S tat es Di s tr

ict Cou r t f or th e Di s tr ict of Con nec ti cut , d eny

in g N B C’s app lic ati onto un s eal wir et ap ap pl

icat io ns fo r lack of “go odcaus e.” NB C argue d that it s ati s fi ed Tit

le I I I ’s “go odcaus e” requirement beca use “it ha[d] shown a nee d for dis closure [in that] the materials will ce rtainly lea d toThe underlying libe l action w as filed by W ayne Newton ag ainst NBC after thr ee tele vision 2 new s br oad cas ts lin kedNew to n t o G ui do Pe no s i an d F r ank Pi cco lo , wh o we r e all eged ly i nv ol vedin organize d crime. As Chie f Judge Feinberg expla ined: T he O ct ob er

198 0 b r oad cas t s tat ed that New to n h ad calle d P eno s i f or hel p wi th“a problem” and that the la tter had contacted a nother “mob boss ”, Frank Piccolo, to solve the problem. The broadcast report ed, among other things, that P iccolo ha d “taken c are of New to n’ s pr ob lem , an d h ad b eco me ahi dd en p ar tn er inth e Ala ddinho te l d eal. ” NBC , 73 5 F .2dat 5 2. 8 di s cov er y of adm is s ib le ev

id enc e in[that

] l ib el ac ti on .” Id

. (quotation marks omitt ed). 2 We observed that C ongress enac ted Title II I in the wake of Katz v. United Sta tes , 38 9 U. S. 3 47, 353, 355-56 (1967), w hich held tha t, absent prior author ization by a court, wiretapping

violated the Fo ur thAme nd men t’ s pr oh ib it io n ag ain s t u nr eas on abl e s ear ch an d s eizu r e. See NBC , 73 5 F .2dat 5 3. We further commented that, in lig ht of the Supreme Court’s concerns about pr ivac y, Title III created a
str ong presumption again st di s clo s ur e of

th e f r ui ts of wir et ap ap pl

icat io ns . See id. (c it

in g 18 U.S .C. § 2515 (“[N]o part of the contents of [intercepted] communica tion and no evide nce de rived therefrom may be receive d in evide nce in a ny trial, hea ring or other pr ocee ding in or before any c ourt . . . if the disclosur e of that information would be in viola tion of this chapter.”)). C hief Judge Feinberg add r es s ed the ar

gum ent of NB C th at “ it

is s om eho w un s eem ly that on ly the g ov er nm ent

can t ake adv ant age o f w

ir et aps .” Id

. at 5 4. “ T hi s argum ent ,” h e co ncl ud ed, “do es no t h ave m uchfo r ce.” Id
. He expla ined: “Unde r Title III , with few e xceptions not here releva nt, no one other than the government can l awf ully en gage inwir et app in g an d i t ther ef or e is no t s o u nu s ual

th at o nly t he g ov er nm ent can enj oy i ts frui ts .” Id

. Acc ordingly, we conclude d that “turning Title II I into a general c ivil discovery
mec hanis m wo ul d s im ply ig no r e t he p r

iva cy r igh ts of th os e wh os e co nv er s ati on s ar e ov er hear d. We agr ee wi thth e go ver nm ent th at thi s was no t the i nt ent io n o f Co ngr es s .” NBC

, 73 5 F .2dat 5 4. Tur ning to NBC’s request to disclose wiretap appli

cat io ns , as op po s ed t o the f

r ui ts of wir et apWe no te th at the p lai n l ang uag e of th e s tatut e in di cat es th at ther e is a cat ego r ical 3 presumpt ion again st di s clo s ur e of

s eale d wi r et ap ap pl

icat io ns . See 18 U.S.C . § 2518(8)(b) (permitting di scl osu re of se a le d wire ta p a pp li ca ti on s “ only upon a showing of good ca use” (emphasis added)). Because of the plain la nguage of the st atute, our holding in In re Appl ic ati o n o f N ew sda y , I nc ., 895 F.2d 74 (2d Ci r. 1990) (“ News day ”), is not r eleva nt to this case, de spite the Times ’s s uggestion to th e co nt r ary. I n that

cas e, we con clu dedth at adi ff er ent pr ov is io n o f Tit

le I I I , 18 U.S .C. § 251 7, did no t dir ect ly p r oh ib it

a r igh t o f a cces s to in fo r mat

io n o bt ain ed w

ith a wi r et ap that

was th en p lace d i n a s ear ch w ar r ant

app lic ati on . Id

. at 75. It was only a fter we determined that that provision of the s tatut e di d n ot

pr oh ib it this r igh t o f a cces s th at w e be ganou r in quir y in to th e r

igh t o f a cces s un der th e co mm onlaw. Id

. at 76-78 (“[Title III

] does not . . . address the issue of public acce ss to in te r cep te d co mm unicat

io ns whe n tho s e co mm unicat io ns bec om e par t o f apu bl ic d ocu men t. ”)
. B ecau s e t he s tatut e di d n ot di r ect ly ad dr es s th e qu es ti onpr es ent ed ther e, we app lie d co mm onlaw pr in cip les to det er mi ne i f N ews day h ad a r igh t o f a cces s . Id

. T he s tatut e at

is s ue i n the i ns tan t c as e, 18 U.S.C . § 2518(8)(b), on the other hand, cl early e stablishes a pres umption agai nst dis closure by pe rmi tti ng

the di scl osu re of se a le d wire ta p a pp li ca ti on s “ only up ona s ho win g of goo d cau s e,” id. , andth er ef or e t her e is no occ as io n f

or us to con s id er

or app ly the c om mo n l aw. Although this difference is suf ficient to distinguish Newsday fr om this cas e, the c as es di ff er in other im po r tan t r es pec ts . I mp or tan tly, N ews day s ought th e fruits of a wir et ap, whi ch w er e in clu ded inan ap pl icat io n f or a s ear ch w ar r ant

—a p ub lic do cum ent . News day , 89 5 F .2d at 75. Here, the Times s eeks the wiretap app lications th ems elv es —d ocu men ts whi ch h ave n ever bee n p ub lic
. Additionall y, in News

day , the g ov er nm ent

di d n ot ob ject to un s eali ng the d ocu men ts , id. , wh er eas her e t he g ov er nm ent

—the o nly par ty

th at “ can l awf

ully en gage inwir et app in g [ th us mak in g] it
. . . no t s o u nu s ual

th at o nly t he g ov er nm ent can e nj oy i ts frui ts ,” NBC , 73 5 F .3dat 5 4— do es ob ject
. Aga in, though the express terms of § 2518 are sufficient to distinguish this case from News day , it is wor thno ti ng that

th e t wo c as es als o dif

fe r inth es e im po r tan t r es pec ts .

9 sur veilla nce, w e conc luded that 18 U.S .C. § 2518(8)(b) reflected the same presumption again st disclosur e. “[W]e be lieve that Congress also did not intend this section to be used as an ave nue for

3 di s cov er y by all pr iva te lit igan ts inciv

il c as es , u nl es s th ey ar e di r ect ly ag gr iev ed b y a wi r et ap. ” Id

. at 5 5. We rea ched this conclusion regarding wiretap applic ations relying, in pa rt, on the legislative history of Title II I: [T]he Senate R eport on the 1968 ena ctment of Title II I s tates that “applic ations and orders f or autho r izat io n s hall b e tr eat ed c on fi den ti ally. . . . [ T hey ] m ay no t b e di s clo s ed e xcep t i nci den tal to th e di s clo s ur e or

us e of th e r eco r ds th ems elv es af te r s ho win g of

goo d cau s e, f

or exam pl e, un der [s ub s ect io n] (1 0) (a)
. . . .” S . Rep . N o. 109 7, [ 90th Co ng. , 2dSes s . 67 ], at 1 05, [r epr in te d in] 1968 U.S. C ode Cong . & Ad. New s [2112,] 2194. Subsection (10)(a) provides for standing fo r an “ aggr iev ed p er s on ” t o m ov e t o s up pr es s “the c on te nt s of any i nt er cep te d wi r e or

or al com mu ni cat

io n . . . o r evi den ce d er

ive d ther ef

r om . . . .”10

Id
. NBC was not an “a ggrieved pe rs on” beca use, acc ording to the express terms of Tit le III, it was not “‘a p ar ty to any i nt er cep te d wi r e or or al co mm unicat

io n o r a per s onagai ns t who m the i nt er cep ti onwas di r ect ed. ’” Id

. (quo ti ng 1 8 U. S.C. § 25 10( 11) (d ef inin g “ag gr iev ed p er s on ”) ). We f ur th er agr eed with the D is tr

ict Cou r t that , inaddit

io n t o n ot hav in g an y claim as an “agg rieved person,” NBC had not eve n made the le ss er showing that they had a ny nee d for the
mat er ial s . NBC , 735 F.2d at 55 (“In any

event, NBC ha s not s hown why it cannot defend its br oad cas ts . . . witho ut

th e s eale d m ate r

ial , thr ough the i nf

or mat io n i t h as init s ownfiles andth r ou gh the sources that were a vaila ble to it at the time it prepared the ne ws st ories at iss ue . . . .” ). Under the statute, one must s how “good c ause,” whi ch “mea ns that, at least minimally, there must be a need for di s clo s ur e.” In

re Appl ic ati o ns o f K ans as Ci ty St ar , 666 F.2d 1168, 1 176 (8th Cir. 1981). If, after all, a party does not have a ne ed for the materials, then there is no good cause to disclose them. InNBC , we fu r th er r ef in ed the r equ

ir ed s ho win g of

“go odcaus e” b y r equ

ir in g that th e par ty clai mi ng a cces s be an “aggr iev ed p er s on .” NBC

, 735 F.2d at 55. In our Circuit, then, the required showing tha t a cla imant be an“aggr

iev ed p er s on ” as s um es th at ther e has bee n a s ho win g of nee d. B ecau s e NB C was no t an aggriev ed person under the st atute, showing nee d was irrelevant—they still could not gain a cce ss to the wir et ap ap pl

icat io ns . Id
. Nonetheless, our pass ing reference to the fac t that NBC had not demonstr ated nee d buttres sed the argument that it was not an “a ggrieved pe rs on” in either the
statutor y or colloquia l sense. Accordingly , we he ld that, in that context, NBC ha d not shown “good

caus e” f or un s eali ng the w

ir et ap ap pl

icat io ns . Id
. The Times argues that, unlike NBC, it is not a civil litiga nt, and therefore the reasoning in NBC does not apply. R ather, the Times pos its that, unlike a “priva te litigant,” it has a “public interest in the
mat er ial s or th e co mm onlaw o r

Fi r s t A men dm ent

r igh t o f a cces s ” t o them . Ap pellee’ s B r . 14 -1 5. Howeve r, we see no reason why our ana lysis in NBC that Title II I’s “good cause” requirement11

demands a showing of an “ aggriev ed person” should not also apply to the instant case. It is ir relevant fo r th e pu r po s es of

T it le I I I th at the Tim es is a new s pap er inves tigat in g a m att er

of pu bl ic i mp or tan ce. Like NBC, the Times does not s uggest, much less show, that it is an “a ggrieved pe rs on” within the express t erms of

the statute—that is, like NBC, the Times does not clai m to be “a pa rty to any in te r cep te d wi r e or

or al co mm unicat

io n o r a per s onagai ns t who m the i nt er cep ti onwas di r ect ed. ” NBC , 73 5 F .2dat 5 5 ( qu ot

in g 18 U.S .C. § 251 0( 11) ). T he Tim es fu r th er

as s er ts th at Tit

le I I I cann ot

be r ead t o s up pl ant

or fo r bi d en ti r ely the p r eexisting common lawright to access judicial records unless the statute’s intent t o abrogate the c ommon law rul e is “ev

id ent .” A pp ell ee’s B r . 13 . I n the Tim es ’s vie w, the D is tr ict Cou r t p r op erly i nt er pr et ed Title II I to be consis tent with the common lawpresumpt ion in favor of disclosur e. Howe ver, our decision in NBC

, whichis a bi ndin g pr eced ent of ou r Cou r t, pr eclu des this in te r pr et ati on . I n that cas e,
we c oncluded tha t the structure and purpose of Title III —including the provision governing disclosur e of wir et ap ap pl

icat io ns —r evealeda manif

es t c on gr es s io nal

in te nt th at w ir et ap ap pl

icat io ns be tr eat ed

con fi den ti ally andclea rly n egat ed a p r es um pt io n i n f avo r of di s clo s ur e. Fo r all of th es e r eas on s , we c on clu de that th e Tim es has no t d emo ns tr ate d “g oo d cau s e” u nd er Title II I to uns eal the wiretap a pplica tions authorized as part of the gove rnment’s invest igation of the Emperor’s Club. C. F ir stAm en dm en t R

ig htof Acc ess We turn now to the second question presented: Do the news media have a Firs t Amendment right to gain ac cess to wiretap applica tions that overr ides any statutory requirement for acc ess? The go ve rnm en t a rgu es t ha t i ts i nte rpre ta ti on of Ti tl e I II is c on sist en t w it h th e F irstAm en dm en t be ca use there is only a “qua lified” constitutional right of acce ss to judicial records, and that right does not extend to wiretap a pplica tions. T he Times replies that, although this Court has not decide d whether a12

Fi r s t A men dm ent

r igh t o f a cces s app lie s to wir et ap ap pl icat io ns , s im ila r

do cum ent s —s uchas s eale d do cum ent s ina s um mar

y ju dgm ent

mo ti onands eale d d ock et s —ar e s ub ject to th e pu bl

ic’ s
con s ti tu ti on al r

igh t t o i ns pec t j udici al r eco r ds
. See, e.g. , Lugosch v. Pyr am id C o. of Onondaga , 43 5 F .3d110 , 120 , 12 4 ( 2d Cir . 20 06) (ac kn owl edg in g a “qual

if iedFi r s t A men dm ent

r igh t t o at te ndju di cial proceedings and to a cce ss certain judic ial doc uments,” and extending that right to “documents

s ub mi tt ed t o [a] c ou r t i n co nn ect io n wi tha s um mar

y ju dgm ent

mo ti on ”) ; Hartford Couran t Co. v. Pelle gr ino , 380 F.3d 83, 93 (2d C ir. 2004) (recognizing the existence of a qualified First Amendment right of acces s to s eale d d ock et

s hee ts of s tat e co ur ts ). T he Tim es als o n ot es th at a t l eas t o ne o th er Cir cui t has held that there is a First Amendment right of acc ess t o documents filed in support of searc h wa rr ant app lic ati on s , al th ough that dec is io n did no t c on s id er

acces s to th e war r ant

app lic ati on s th ems elv es . See In re Searc h War ran t f o r S ec retar ial Ar ea O uts ide Off ic e o f Gu nn , 85 5 F .2d569 , 57 3 ( 8th Ci r . 19 88)
. We ha ve previously endorsed two approac hes to determine whether the First Amendment right of acces s ext end s to par ti cul ar ju di cial r eco r ds . F ir s t, th e pu bl

ic h as a r igh t t o gainacces s to ju di cial

r eco r ds (1 ) that

“ha ve his to r ically b eenop en t o the p r es s andgen er al p ub lic ,” an d ( 2) whe r e “p ub lic

acces s pl ays a s ignif

ican t p os it

ive r ol e inth e f

un ct io ni ng o f the p ar ti cul ar

pr oce s s inqu es ti on .” Hartford Couran t Co. , 38 0 F .3dat 9 2 ( cit in g Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court , 478 U.S. 1 , 8-9 (1986) (“If the par ti cul ar pr oce edi ng i n ques ti onpas s es th es e t es ts of exp er ien ce an d l ogi c, a qua lified

Firs t Amendment right of public acc ess attaches.” (emphasis added)). Second, w e have held that the First Amendment protects access to judicial records that are “derived from or a necessary corollary of the ca pacity to att endth e r elev ant

pr oce edi ngs .” Hartford Couran t Co. , 38 0 F .3dat 9 3; see also United States v. Suarez , 88 0 F. 2d 626 , 63 0- 31 (

2d Cir . 19 89) (e xp lai ni ng that th e qu ali fi ed F ir s t A men dm ent r igh t o f a cces s app lie s to “do cum ent s filedincon nec ti onwith cr im in al p r oce edi ngs ”)
. Reg arding the first

approach, the government argues that the Times cannot satisf y the13

r equ ir eme nt s of

either (1 ) his to ry or

(2) l ogi c ( i.e. , p ub lic po lic y) . I n the g ov er nm ent ’s vie w, wi r et ap app lic ati on s ar e a cr eat ur e of s tatut e andon ly ca me i nt o ex is te nce in196 8, whenT it le I I I was enac te d in the aftermath of Katz v. United Sta tes , 389 U.S. 3 47. In addition, C ongress expressly crafted the wir et ap p r ov

is io ns of T it le I I I to ens ur e co nf

id ent ial it y andpr iva cy, i ndicat

in g that pu bl ic p ol icy i s
s er vedby l es s di s clo s ur e r ath er th an gr eat er

di s clo s ur e. Reg arding the second a pproach, whic h derives a right of acce ss to documents fr om a right to attend judici al procee dings, the government argues that beca use wiretap appli cations are presented to a di s tr ict ju dge ex parte

and in cam era , and there is no public right to attend the relev ant proceeding s, there is n o p ub li c rig ht t o g a in a cc ess t o th e d oc um en ts pr od uc ed a t th ose pro ce ed in gs. T he Tim es r es po nd s th at the “ hi s to ry andlo gic ” r equ ir eme nt s ar e s ati s fi ed i n the i ns tan t c as e. Wir et ap ap pl

icat io ns , the Tim es clai ms , ar e me r ely j udici al r eco r ds th at, lik e s ear ch w ar r ant s or do cket

s hee ts , h ave b eenhi s to r

ically o pento pu bl

ic ac ces s . See App ell ee’s B r . 6- 7; see also Hartfo rd Couran t Co. , 380 F. 3d at 9 3 ( der

ivi ng “ hi s to r

ical s up po r t f or th e pu bl ic av ail abilit

y of cer tai n j udici al d ocu men ts in th e Am er icancom mo n l aw he r

it age” of acces s to ju di cial

r eco r ds ). I n ad di ti on , the Tim es argue s th at public polic y we ighs in favor of monitor ing the gove rnment’s intrus ions on pers onal privac y and the

r ol e of th e co ur ts inacqu

ies cin g t o the g ov er nm ent ’s r equ es ts . See App ell ee’s B r . 15 -1 7, 2 4- 26. The Times does not address the second approac h identified by the c ourts , which c onditions access to ju di cial do cum ent s onacces s to th e r elev ant ju di cial pr oce edi ngs . See Hartford Courant C o. , 38 0 F .3dat 93 (expla ining the a ttendance -at-judicial-procee dings rationale for recognizing a First Amendment right). I n o ur

vie w, b oth ap pr oach es to a con s id er ati onof th e F ir s t A men dm ent

qu es ti onpr es ent ed here favor the government. Wiretap applic ations were crea ted in 1968 in response to a Supreme Court dec is io n that

pr oh ib it ed the u s e of

elec tr onic s ur

veilla nce at the s ol e di s cr et io n o f l aw en fo r cem ent . SeeNonpublic procee dings are common throughout the judiciary. A lthough most court 4 pr oce edi ngs ar e pu bl

ic, se e, e. g , Ric hmo nd N ew spa per s, In c. v. V ir gi nia , 448 U.S. 5 55, 577 (1980) (“The right of access to places traditionally ope n to the public, a s criminal trials have long be en, may be 14 Katz v. United Sta tes

, 3 89 U. S. a t 3 55 -56 . A lt ho ug h w ire ta ps th em selve s pre -da te wi re ta p a pp li ca ti on s, th e in tr od uct

io n o f w ir et ap ap pl

icat io ns is a mo r e mo der n i nv ent io n an d, s in ce the t

im e of th eir creation in Title III, have been subjec t to a statutor y presumption again st di s clo s ur e. Ac cor di ngl y, we
con clu de that

th es e wir et ap ap pl

icat io ns hav e no t his to r

ically b eenop en t o the p r es s andgen er al pu bl ic. I n ad di ti on , the Tim es do es no t p r es ent a go odr eas onwhy

it s pr ef er r ed p ub lic po lic y (“ lo gic ”) —m onit or

in g the g ov er nm ent ’s us e of wir et aps andpo te nt

ial pr os ecu ti on s of

pu bl ic officials—is mor e compel ling than C ongress ’s concern for confidentiality and priva cy, w hich are

r ef lect ed i n the t ext

of T it le I I I andinit s leg

is lat ive hi s to ry. See NBC

, 73 5 F .2dat 5 4- 55. Acco r di ngl y, the firs t approach to the First Amendment question—the “history and logic ” ana lysis—weighs in favor of no t r eco gni zin g a F ir s t A men dm ent r igh t o f a cces s to wir et ap ap pl icat io ns . See Hartford Courant C o. , 380 F. 3d at 9 2 (

r equ ir in g “b oth ‘ lo gic ’ and

‘ex per ien ce’ i n es tab lis hi ng the p ub lic ’s andpr es s ’s qu ali fi ed Firs t Amendment right of acce ss ” (emphasis added)). Reg arding the second a pproach—based on a ttendance at proceeding s—there is no question th at the p ub lic andth e pr es s ar e no t p er mi tt ed t o at te ndth e ex parte , in cam era proceedings whe re wiretap a pplica tions are pres ented to a district judge. As we have e xplaine d this s econd a pproach, “the media’s and publi c’s qualified right of acc ess t o judicia l documents [is] derived fr om or a necessary corollary of the ca pacity

to attend the releva nt proceedings,” so that “the right to inspect documents der ive s fr om th e pu bl

ic n atu r e of

par ti cul ar tr ib un als .” Hartford Couran t Co. , 38 0 F .3dat 9 3. I n thi s
cas e, ther e is no Fi r s t A men dm ent r igh t o f a cces s un der

th e at te nd ance -a t- ju di cial -p r oce edi ngs app r oachbec aus e t he r elev ant pr oce edi ngs —ex parte , li ke gr andju ry pr es ent ati on s , an d b ef or e a di s tr ict ju dge in cam era

—ar e no t p ub lic
. 4s eenas as s ur ed b y t he am alga m o f the F ir s t A men dm ent gua r ant ees of

s pee ch an d p r es s . . . .”) , thi s r igh t o f p ub lic acces s to cr

im in al p r oce edi ngs is no t ab s ol ut e. Id
. at 581 n.18 (“[A

] trial judge [may

], in the interest of the fair administration of jus tice, impose reasonable limitations on acce ss to a tr ial .”) . Cr im in al t r ial s , f ur th er mo r e, ar e no t the o nly pr oce edi ngs th at m ay be no np ub lic inpar t. An ar r ay of pr oce edi ngs may

be n on pu bl

ic wh en, andto th e ext ent , ci r cum s tan ces war r ant s ecr ecy. All gr andju ry pr oce edi ngs , f

or exam pl e, tr adi ti on ally hav e be en n on pu bl ic. See, e.g. , Fed. R. C rim. P. 6( d) -( e) (p r ov

id in g that on ly “ [t ]h e f ollo win g pe r s on s may

be p r es ent

while the gr andju ry is in sess ion: attorneys for the gove rnment, the witness being questioned, interpreters when ne eded, a nd a court reporter or

operator of a recording device ” and imposing a g eneral rule tha t grand jury pr oce edi ngs be k ept

s ecr et ); Douglas Oil C

o. v. Petrol Sto

ps Northwest

, 44 1 U. S. 2 11, 218 (1 979 ) ( “We consistently have recog nized tha t the proper f unctioning of our grand jury syst em depends upon the s ecr ecy o f g

r andju ry pr oce edi ngs .”) . I t i s wor thno ti ng that att emp ti ng t o co nt act

or in fl uen ce a gr andor pet it ju r or con s ti tu te s a cr

im e. See 18 U.S.C . § 1503 (c riminalizing attempting to contac t or in fl uen ce a j ur or

); see also 18 U. S. C . § 15 04 (de cl a rin g t ha t a tte mp ti ng to c on ta cta ju ror i n w ritin g i s a sep a ra te crim e) . S im il a rly , o the r pro ce ed in gs m a y b e n on pu bl ic un de r c er ta in ci rc um sta nc es, in clu di ng p r ot ect

ing a d ef end ant ’s r igh t t o a f air tr ial
. See, e.g. , Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court , 47 8 U.S . 1, 9 ( 198 6) (d es cr

ib in g ci r cum s tan ces un der whi ch p r oce edi ngs may

be n on pu bl

ic) . Wh en litigation requires disclosur e of trade secrets, the court may disclose certain materials only to the att or ney s invo lve d. See

Fe d. R. Civ . P . 26 (c)( 1) (G ) ( “T he c ou r t m ay, f

or goo d cau s e, i s s ue anor der to protect a party or pers on from annoyance , embarrassment, oppr ession, or undue burden or expense, inc luding . . . requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, devel opment, or commercial information not be revealed or be reve aled onl y in a spec ified wa y . . . .” ). I n o th er s ens it ive s ituat io ns , s om e ma te r

ial s , in clu di ng the n ame s of th e par ti es , m ay be un der ju di cial s eal. See ge ne ral ly In re Richard

Roe, Inc. , 68 F.3d 38, 39 n.1 (2d Cir. 1995) (employi ng the pseudonym “R ichard Roe” bec aus e nam e of

par ty is un der s eal) . F in ally, j ud ges may r evi ew o th er

fo r ms of s ens it ive information in c

amer a and ex parte . To prot ect confidentia l information or s ensitive evide nce, for example , a judge may a sk one party to appea r ex parte to submit the evide nce for in c

amer a r evi ew bef or e t he j ud ge r et ur ns th e evi den ce t o the p ar ty . See, e.g. , In re Gr and J ur y Subp o en as D ate d M

arc h 19 , 200 2 and A ug

us t 2 , 20 02 , 318 F.3d 379, 38 6 (2d Cir. 2003) (describing the presentation of documents for in camera reviewas a “practic e both long-standing and routine in ca ses involving clai ms of privilege” and citing

illustrative cases). In thes e various proceedings, the courts seek to balanc e the nee d f or tr ans par enc y inth e ju di ciar y with the e ff

ect ive pr ot ect

io n o f s ens it

ive in fo r mat

io n. 15 In s um, under either the “history and logic” or public attendanc e approac h, the Times does not enjoy a Firs t Amendment right of acce ss to wiretap appli cations sealed unde r 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(b). CONCLUSI ON For the foregoing reasons, we R EVE RSE the February 19, 2009 order of the Distr ict Court and enter judgme nt for

the government.