Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on Military Readiness, Committee on

Armed Services, House of

Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

June 2001 MILITARY

READINESS

Management Focus

Needed on Airfields

for Overseas

Deployments

GAO-01-566
Page i GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

Letter 1

Appendix I Responsibility for the En Route System Is

Fragmented Among Many Organizations 27

Appendix II Scope and Methodology 29

Appendix III Comments From the Department of Defense 30

Appendix IV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 33

Tables

Table 1: Planned U.S. Funding Sources for ERS Projects, Fiscal

Years 1997 through 2006 14

Figures

Figure 1: Location of En Route System Airfields 5

Figure 2: Reductions in U.S. Overseas Troop Strength, Fiscal Years

1988-99 10

Figure 3: Project Costs by Type 12

Figure 4: Construction Costs for Pacific Bases, Fiscal Years

1997-2006 12

Figure 5: Construction Costs for European Bases, Fiscal Years

1997-2006 13

Figure 6: Funding Sources and Construction Costs by Region,

Fiscal Years 1997-2006 14

Figure 7: Percentage of Funding Spent on ERS Construction

Projects and Project Status 16

Figure 8: Organizations with Responsibility for the ERS 20

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

ERS En Route System

Contents
Page 1 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

June 14, 2001

The Honorable Curt Weldon

Chairman

Subcommittee on Military Readiness

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The National Military Strategy calls for the Department of Defense (DOD)

to maintain the transportation capability to quickly move the large

amounts of personnel and equipment needed to win two nearly

simultaneous major theater wars anywhere in the world. To provide this

mobility, DOD relies on a transportation system that includes an airlift

fleet of cargo aircraft and a critical network of overseas airfields that

provide logistical support to aircraft on their way to the war zones. DOD

calls this network of bases the En Route System (ERS). Although the twowar requirement and other aspects of the National Military Strategy are

currently under review by the new Administration, the ERS remains

critically important as the primary means of quickly moving U.S. soldiers

and equipment to areas of conflict around the world. Because of concerns

about the adequacy of U.S. mobility capabilities, the former Chairman of

the Subcommittee asked us to assess whether U.S. airlift capabilities and

the supporting ERS infrastructure are up to the task of carrying out the

National Military Strategy.

This report is the third in a series to address the Subcommittee’s request.

The first two reports addressed DOD’s shortage of airlift and aerial

refueling capability needed to meet the two-war requirement of the

National Military Strategy.1

 This report addresses (1) whether en-route

airfields have the capacity to meet the requirements of the National

Military Strategy, (2) what are the causes of any shortfalls and DOD’s

plans to correct them, and (3) whether DOD has the information and

management structure needed to ensure that the operations of the En

Route System can be carried out efficiently and effectively.

 1 Military Readiness: Air Transport Capability Falls Short of Requirements

(GAO/NSIAD-00-135, June 22, 2000) and Military Readiness: Updated Readiness Status of

U.S. Air Transport Capability (GAO-01-495R, Mar. 16, 2001).

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

DOD predicts a significant shortfall in the capacity of the En Route System

airfields to meet the delivery schedules required by the National Military

Strategy.2

 The airfields do not currently have enough ramp space, fuel

pumping capacity, and other infrastructure elements to move the large

amounts of personnel and equipment needed to win two nearly

simultaneous major theater wars. This means that required military forces

and equipment would arrive in the war zones later than planned,

increasing the risk that operations would not be executed as planned and

casualties could increase. DOD believes that projected improvements to

the En Route System will largely eliminate the shortfall by 2005. However,

the assumptions and modeling approach used to analyze airfield capacity

raise some uncertainty about the precise size of the shortfall. Some

assumptions tend to underestimate the shortfall, while the modeling

approach used could overestimate it. The net effect of these factors on

estimates of system capacity is unclear.

DOD transportation officials attribute the shortfall to the shrinkage in U.S.

overseas presence and increased reliance on the remaining 13 bases of the

En Route System. Many of these bases are 60 year-old legacies of World

War II, with inadequate parking space and/or antiquated, deteriorating fuel

systems increasingly prone to breakdowns. During our review, DOD’s cost

estimates of the improvements in facilities and fuel systems that are

needed increased from $1.2 billion to about $2 billion. Most of the costs

(58 percent) are associated with bases in the pacific region. DOD plans to

have over half (55 percent) of these costs funded by host nations and

allies, with the remainder to be paid for by a variety of U.S. fuel projects,

military construction, and other funding programs. The large majority of

the funding (86 percent) is associated with projects that had not yet begun

construction as of October 2000. During the drawdown of U.S. overseas

forces in the early 1990’s, little concern was voiced about the shrinking En

Route capacity. Calendar year 1997 was named the “Year of the En Route

System” to draw attention to the problem and obtain increased funding

priority. U.S.-funded En Route System projects in Europe face competition

for funding from projects in the Pacific and from elsewhere in DOD,

against a backdrop of concerns about significant underfunding of DOD’s

infrastructure. Host nation involvement can create additional uncertainties

in construction timetables.

 2

 The specific amount of the shortfall is classified. DOD’s requirements are identified in the

Mobility Requirements Study 2005, released in January 2001. The study is an extensive

update of DOD’s 1992 and 1995 analyses of air, sea, and land transportation requirements

for the United States to mobilize for war.

Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

Despite the En Route System’s strategic importance, DOD does not have

the basic information and coherent management structure needed to

ensure that the system’s operations can be carried out efficiently and

effectively. These weaknesses raise questions about the system’s plans and

operations and subject it to unnecessary risk and inefficiencies. For

example, despite growing estimates of the cost and other uncertainties

over the system’s construction projects, DOD has not developed an overall

cost-benefit study to document the rationale for its decisions and

demonstrate that its proposed projects represent the best solutions.

Similarly, despite concerns about aging and deteriorating facilities and

equipment, the En Route System has no centralized oversight system to

provide data on airfield deterioration and failure rates. No one

organization is responsible for managing and coordinating the En Route

System: operation of the system is fragmented among a host of military

commands, subcommands, and other organizations with differing interests

and priorities. As a result, there is also no formal, system-wide strategic

plan to identify long-term plans and guiding policies, operating priorities,

and performance goals and strategies. Finally, DOD does not discuss how

En Route System shortfalls affect overall strategic mobility performance in

its annual performance plan and report, resulting in an incomplete picture

of mobility capabilities.3

To increase management focus on the En Route System, we are

recommending that the Secretary of Defense make one organization

responsible for strategic management and coordination of overarching

ERS issues, and develop a formal strategic plan and overall cost-benefit

study of its plans for the ERS. We are also recommending that the

Secretary include information on ERS limitations and how they affect

strategic mobility in DOD’s annual performance report. In written

comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed to consider making one

organization responsible for certain ERS matters, and to try to improve the

integration, presentation, and documentation of its plans for the ERS.

However, it did not agree that the ERS lacks a coherent management

structure requiring an overall cost-benefit study to document the

rationales for plans to repair and improve the ERS, or the need to include

 3

 The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 required federal agencies,

including DOD, to submit to Congress annual performance plans and reports. In essence,

annual performance plans are to establish performance goals and measures covering a

given fiscal year and provide direct linkage between an agency’s longer-term goals and dayto-day activities. Annual reports are to subsequently identify the degree to which those

performance goals were met.
Page 4 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

information on ERS limitations in its annual performance report. It stated

that the existing organization, coupled with the readiness reporting,

planning and budgeting, and overall strategic mobility reviews amount to a

robust management structure and strategic plan for the ERS, and provide

adequate information on its cost-benefit rationales and the impact of ERS

limitations on strategic mobility. The individual organizations and

processes cited by DOD may provide some of the elements needed to

effectively manage the ERS. However, we believe the implied

management structure described by DOD cannot substitute for the

strategic clarity, comprehensiveness, and organizational commitment

provided by a formal, unified management structure. Because DOD is

generally unwilling to take action, the Congress might consider directing

the Secretary to implement our recommendations, and periodically report

on DOD’s progress to ensure that it implements prudent improvements to

ERS management.

The ability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars is

the cornerstone of U.S. defense strategy. For planning purposes, the

military assumes that the two most likely places where these wars would

take place are Korea and Southwest Asia. Mobilization of U.S. forces for

such conflicts requires a global system of integrated land, sea, and air

resources, and supplies already stored overseas. The fleet of civilian and

military passenger and cargo aircraft and the En Route System (ERS)

airfields provide the critical air component. ERS airfields provide the

primary “throughput” services for aircraft as they move from U.S. bases

through ERS airfields and on to their eventual destinations at bases

located in or near the war zones. As each aircraft lands at an ERS airfield,

the base must have the ramp space to park the aircraft and perform

required maintenance, the equipment to load and unload cargo if needed,

and the equipment needed to quickly refuel the aircraft and speed it to its

final destination. However, the ERS also provides the capabilities needed

to handle ongoing peacetime operations and requirements associated with

smaller-scale contingency operations. For example, ERS bases were used

extensively during recent operations in Kosovo. We discussed issues

related to the basing of combat aircraft in our recent report on Kosovo

operations, but not ERS operations.4

 4 Kosovo Air Operations: Combat Aircraft Basing Plans Are Needed in Advance of Future

Conflicts (GAO-01-461, May 29, 2001).

Background
Page 5 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

As shown in figure 1, the 13 ERS airfields are located mostly in Europe and

throughout the Pacific.5

 DOD selected the 13 ERS bases according to their

proximity to the anticipated war zones, the host nation’s willingness to

allow the use of its bases, and other factors such as climate. Each is

planned to be within an area 3,500 nautical miles from the United States

and from the war zones. This distance is based on the maximum efficient

range of the C-17 cargo aircraft without refueling.

Figure 1: Location of En Route System Airfields

Source: DOD.

Operation of the ERS airfields is shared between the host nation, which

owns the airfield, and a number of DOD organizations. Host nation

responsibilities vary and are documented in the Status of Forces

Agreement for each country. U.S. organizations with responsibility for the

 5

 The figure omits Rhein Main air base in Frankfurt, Germany. Although the United States is

currently using facilities there, it has agreed to withdraw by December 31, 2005, in

exchange for German construction of additional facilities at Spangdahlem and Ramstein.

• 

• 

• 

• 

• Spangdahlem

• Ramstein

• Fairford

• Mildenhall

(Spain) • Rota

• Moron

• Elmendorf AFB

 (Alaska)

•

• Andersen AFB 

(Guam)

Hickam AFB

(Hawaii)

• Misawa

• Yokota

• Iwakuni

• Kadena • (Japan)

(Germany)

(England)
Page 6 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

airfields include the Air Force, who provides day-to-day operations for all

but two of the airfields, and the U.S. Transportation, Air Mobility,

European, Central, and Pacific Commands, which have various functional

or geographical responsibilities. According to U.S. Transportation

Command officials, while space is sometimes shared between the host

nation and the United States, many airfields are primarily for U.S. cargo

and refueling operations. U.S. fighter aircraft are generally located at

separate bases because of the specialized equipment needed. The airfields

are normally staffed for the peacetime flow of aircraft. Additional

personnel and equipment would be brought in to handle the increased

flow of aircraft in the event of contingency operations or full-scale war.

According to DOD’s January 2001 estimate, in the event of overlapping

major theater wars in Korea and Southwest Asia, the 13 ERS airfields

would not currently have enough capacity to move the required amounts

of personnel and equipment to the war zones in the time required (the

specific requirements and capacities are classified). DOD expects the

shortfall to be largely eliminated by 2005. But the assumptions and

modeling approach DOD uses in its calculations raise some uncertainty

about the precise size of the shortfall. Some study assumptions tend to

underestimate the shortfall, while the modeling approach used could

overestimate it. The net effect of these factors on estimates of ERS

capacity in 2005 is unclear.

DOD officials believe their analyses of ERS requirements and capacity are

accurate. The capacity requirements of the ERS are defined in the recent

Mobility Requirements Study 2005, which estimated the mobility assets

and supporting infrastructure needed to deploy for the two-war scenario

and compared them to current capabilities and those planned for 2005.

The study concluded that current capacity is significantly short of

requirements but that improvements to the ERS would largely eliminate

the shortfall by 2005. According to DOD officials, the effect of the shortfall

would be that required military forces and equipment would arrive in the

war zones later than planned, increasing the risk of operations not being

executed as planned and of higher casualties. The study estimated the

shortfall by simulating the movement of troops and equipment needed for

each war with a series of models6

 and calculated capacity in terms of the

 6

 We are currently reviewing the approach used by these models to estimate requirements.

Shortfall in Capacity

Predicted, Precise

Amounts Unclear

Precise Size of Shortfall Is

Unclear
Page 7 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

amount of cargo weight that could move through ERS bases in the first

40 days of a conflict (the period of highest demand).

We found that some of the study’s assumptions tend to underestimate the

size of the shortfall. For example, despite concerns about their old age and

deteriorating condition, DOD assumes that ERS airfields would operate

without breaking down. In addition, because the construction projects are

expected to run through 2006, the capacity of several airfields will still be

short of requirements at the end of 2005. The study at least partially offsets

these assumptions by calculating the capacity of ERS bases in Europe on

the assumption that DOD would lose access to one of six bases during

mobilization (the so-called “six-lose-one” strategy). A similar strategy is

being considered for the Pacific, but it has not yet been approved.

Additional study assumptions that tend to underestimate the shortfall are

classified.

Capacity requirements for the ERS could be raised even higher if other

ongoing missions (such as peacekeeping) were added, further increasing

the shortfall. The Mobility Requirements Study 2005 analyzed the capacity

of the mobility system to handle additional missions occurring

concurrently with two wars and found that in general, the additional

requirements could raise airlift capacity requirements by about 7 percent.

The ability of the ERS to handle this extra requirement, however, is

unclear. According to the study, DOD needs to reanalyze the ERS to

determine whether there might be any extra capacity available to handle

the additional missions or whether more capacity must be built. Officials

were unsure when this issue would be tackled.

In contrast to the assumptions that tend to underestimate the shortfall, the

model DOD uses to simulate ERS operations—the Airlift Flow Model—

could overestimate the size of the shortfall. Air Mobility Command

officials acknowledge that the Airlift Flow Model, although designed to

simulate or describe complex systems such as the ERS, does not

necessarily identify the best or optimal solution to mobilization

requirements. The model repeatedly simulates cargo movements until it

reaches a solution to the identified mission, but the solution may or may

not be the optimal one.

There are other types of models, called optimization models, that officials

say are designed to seek the best or optimal solutions to mission

Some Assumptions

Underestimate Shortfall

Model Used Could

Overestimate Shortfall
Page 8 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

requirements by identifying the best allocations of cargo to aircraft,

aircraft to routes, and ground resources to airfields.7

 For example, in

analyzing the movement of cargo aircraft through the ERS the Airlift Flow

Model would only be aware of what cargo is available for pickup at the

moment, while an optimization model would be aware of all cargo

available for pickup throughout the mission being modeled. As a result, in

a situation where 10 tons of cargo are ready to be loaded right now and

40 more tons several hours in the future, the Airlift Flow Model would

schedule an aircraft to pick up the 10-ton cargo immediately since it is

focused on current conditions. It would then schedule another aircraft to

pick up the remaining 40 tons later when another plane became available.

However, an optimization model would likely wait a few hours until an

aircraft was loaded with all 50 tons before sending it off.

In 1997 DOD sponsored an ERS capacity analysis that compared the

results of an optimization model with those of the Airlift Flow Model.8

 The

optimization analysis agreed with the basic Airlift Flow Model conclusion

that there would be a capacity shortfall. However, the optimization

analysis also concluded that a better distribution of ERS resources could

significantly increase the flow of cargo compared with the flow predicted

by the Airlift Flow Model. For example, the optimization model predicted

that by redistributing the existing ramp space and fuel, DOD could boost

cargo deliveries by an estimated 12 to 13 percent. A second DODsponsored study used an optimization model to analyze the impact of

proposed construction projects designed to increase the fuel handling

capacity at ERS bases.9

 The study concluded that the increase in

throughput capacity provided by the projects would be small and that

using existing resources more effectively may be the best way to increase

fuel deliveries.

Although DOD officials believe that optimization models have promise,

they also believe that they have drawbacks and did not use them to

analyze the ERS in the Mobility Requirements Study 2005. They believe,

for example, that optimization models can come to unrealistic conclusions

 7

 One example of an optimization model is the Naval Postgraduate School/RAND

Corporation Mobility Optimization Model.

8 Documented Briefing: Analyzing the Effects of Airfield Resources on Airlift Capacity,

RAND Corporation, 1999.

9

 Correspondence with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Summary of Research

Findings: Fuels MILCON Impacts on Air Mobility, RAND Corporation, 1998.
Page 9 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

because they cannot simulate random events and may use information

(such as longer-range plans for an entire mobilization) that may not be

available to commanders early in the mobilization. Officials further state

that loading data into optimization models can be very labor intensive,

making the models relatively inflexible and slow, and that it is difficult to

introduce variables into analyses because optimization models attempt to

analyze all possible permutations. For their part, Air Mobility Command

officials responsible for operating the Airlift Flow Model believe that by

repeated analyses over time using their model, they were able to identify

the best solutions for mobilization missions. Officials from the Office of

the Secretary of Defense stated, however, that because optimization

models show promise, DOD is continuing to sponsor projects to further

develop their use.

We were unable to quantify the overall impact of all these factors on the

size of the shortfall. As a result, their net effect on estimates of ERS

capacity in 2005 is unclear.

DOD officials attribute the shortfall in ERS capacity to the shrinkage in the

U.S. overseas presence since the end of the Cold War and to increased

reliance on the 13 remaining old and deteriorating ERS bases. DOD’s latest

estimate of ERS construction to eliminate the shortfall consists of 516

projects and costs about $2 billion. This revised figure is substantially

higher than the estimated $1.2 billion that DOD reported to us at the

beginning of our review in July 2000. Most (58 percent) of the costs are

associated with bases in the Pacific region. Host nations and U.S. allies are

expected to fund about 55 percent of the total, and the United States is

expected to fund the rest. But it is unclear whether all the projects will be

completed as planned, as the projects must compete with each other and

with other DOD projects for funding and face other uncertainties. Most of

the costs (86 percent) are associated with projects that had not yet started

construction as of October 2000.

Since the end of the Cold War, many U.S. military locations overseas have

been closed and their personnel relocated to bases in the continental

United States. Transportation Command officials state that with this

drawdown (see fig. 2) in the 1990s, the ERS lost many of its facilities and

much of its flexibility. Today, the ERS has access to only 13 locations,

compared with 45 in the early 1990s. As a result, the remaining bases have

become much more important as the only airfield options available for enroute mobilization support.

Repair Estimates

Face Large Increases

and Funding

Uncertainties

Overseas Presence

Reduced After Cold War
Page 10 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

Figure 2: Reductions in U.S. Overseas Troop Strength, Fiscal Years 1988-99

Source: DOD.

In July 2000, DOD officials told us that the cost to eliminate the shortfall in

ERS capacity was about $1.2 billion for fiscal years 1997 through 2006.

However, shortly after that the estimate was changed to $2.0 billion.

According to Transportation Command officials, no one is responsible for

monitoring the overall cost to eliminate the shortfall. The $1.2-billion

estimate was simply carried forward from an estimate developed in the

mid-1990s in conjunction with a major review of overall mobility

requirements.10 That estimate was based on a quick world tour by a team

of engineers who covered what at the time were about 35 ERS bases, with

sometimes only half a day spent at each base. Following our request for an

updated estimate, the Air Mobility Command agreed to query all of the

various commands involved in the ERS to determine the current cost to

eliminate the shortfall and found that the estimated cost had grown to

about $2 billion. According to officials, the increase reflects changes in the

bases making up the ERS since the mid-1990s, increases in the costs of

repairing/improving system components due to aging, and a more in-depth

and accurate analysis of costs.

 10 Mobility Requirements Study Bottom Up Review Update, 1995.

Estimated Costs to

Eliminate Shortfall Have

Increased Substantially

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

Fiscal year

Troop strength

(thousands)
Page 11 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

Transportation Command officials told us that most ERS airfields were

built during or immediately after World War II, and some components

were built by host nations even earlier. The $2 billion will fund repairs and

improvements to fuel systems, runways, ramp space, and other base

elements needed to bring system capacity up to requirements. As shown in

figure 3, the largest construction cost category is associated with fuel

system repair and improvement. According to Transportation and Air

Mobility Command officials, the standard fuel systems at current ERS

bases were designed and built during the early 1950s and had an estimated

life span of 30 to 40 years. At some bases refueling must be carried out by

trucks, rather than by more modern pipeline and hydrant systems. At other

bases, hydrants are antiquated or have deteriorating lines that slow and

sometimes interrupt fueling operations altogether. Bases in the Pacific are

the worst off. As shown in figure 6, repairs and improvements at bases in

the Pacific region total about $1.14 billion (58 percent), compared to about

$825 million (42 percent) for the European bases.
Page 12 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

Figure 3: Project Costs by Type

Source: Our analysis of DOD data.

Figure 4: Construction Costs for Pacific Bases, Fiscal Years 1997-2006

Source: DOD.

398.2

230.3

147

147

128.3

69.4

19.5

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400

Yokota

Misawa

Andersen

Elmendorf

Hickam

Kadena

Iwakuni

Dollars, in millions

Bases

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800

Fuel systems

Runways

Facilities

Ramp space

Environm ent

Other

Pacific, as a percentage of regional total Europe, as a percentage of regional total

20%

21%

28%

14% 23%

3% 29%

1%

2%

6%

Dollars, rounded in millions

53%
Page 13 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

Figure 5: Construction Costs for European Bases, Fiscal Years 1997-2006

Note: Although the United States has agreed to withdraw from Rhein Main by 2005, the base is

included here to show the costs to prepare it for return to German use.

Source: DOD.

Officials emphasize that the proposed projects are intended largely to

replace capability lost due to deterioration or base closures, not to

increase overall capacity. In fact, only 25 of the 516 projects provide

additional capacity. The remaining projects either upgrade existing

capacity to current environmental, safety, or operational standards or

replace/repair equipment due to obsolescence or failure.

DOD plans call for about 55 percent of the $2 billion in ERS construction

funding to come from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

($132.6 million) and host nations such as Germany ($430.8 million) and

Japan ($523.9 million) (see fig. 6). According to officials from the U.S.

Transportation, European, and Pacific Commands, funding commitments

from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Germany are contained in

formal agreements. Japanese funding is provided under the Japanese

Facilities Improvement Program. Japan has provided some $21 billion for

projects under this program, which started in 1979 to ease the financial

burden of stationing U.S. forces in Japan. However, funding for projects

under this program is voluntary, and there are no written agreements

associated with the ERS projects. Moreover, the level of funding has been

Host Nations and Allies

Expected to Fund Over

Half of Costs

326

234.6

82.2

72

60

28.4

22.1

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350

Ramstein

Spangdahlem

Rota

Mildenhall

Fairford

Moron

Rhein Main

Bases

Dollars, in millions
Page 14 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

declining somewhat since the early 1990s, and is also constrained by

prohibitions such as using the funds for projects viewed by the

government of Japan as increasing war-fighting capacity.

Figure 6: Funding Sources and Construction Costs by Region, Fiscal Years 1997-

2006

Source: Our analysis of DOD data.

The remaining 45 percent ($878 million) is expected to come from a

variety of U.S. programs (see table 1). The largest contributors are the

Defense Logistics Agency and the Air Force Operation and Maintenance

and Military Construction programs.

Table 1: Planned U.S. Funding Sources for ERS Projects,

Fiscal Years 1997 through 2006

Dollars in millions

Funding source

Defense Logistics Agency $505.2

Military Construction 141.4

Operation and Maintenance 138.0

Transportation Working Capital Fund 70.7

Air Force Material Command Equipment 14.5

Mobility Enhancement Funds 5.1

Contingency Funds 2.9

Total $877.8

Source: Our analysis of DOD data.

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200

Construction costs

Funding sources

United States (878)

Host country/NATO (1,087)

European bases (825)

Pacific bases (1,140)

Dollars in millions
Page 15 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

It is unclear whether all the construction projects will be completed as

planned. According to Transportation Command officials, funding for the

projects covered by U.S. programs has been formally requested through

the DOD budget process, and they believe the projects will be funded

within planned time frames. However, U.S.-funded ERS projects in Europe

must compete for funding against Pacific projects and others within DOD

in an environment of concern about a growing backlog of facilities

maintenance and repair projects. According to these officials, DOD

infrastructure is grossly under funded, with facilities currently funded for

replacement every 250 years. (See p. 18 for a discussion of DOD problems

in infrastructure management.) Projects planned in later years are more

vulnerable to funding changes since they have not yet been spent and they

must continue to compete against other projects in a highly competitive

budget environment. Officials also note that host nation involvement in

funding can create some uncertainty in construction timetables. For

example, DOD had to reassign fiscal year 2002 funding for construction

projects at one ERS airfield in Europe to other DOD projects because of a

2- to 3-year delay in host government approval of funding requirements.

According to officials, the host government was concerned about

sovereignty issues involved in its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization. Formal approval has now been received for these projects,

and funding has been shifted by about 1 year.

Most of the projects have not yet started construction. As shown in

figure 7, as of October 2000, about 4 percent ($75.0 million) of total

funding had been spent on completed projects with another 10 percent

($194.6 million) spent on projects in progress. The remaining 86 percent

($1.7 billion) of funding was associated with projects in various stages of

planning, programming of funds, and engineering design running out

through 2006. Funding for such projects is subject to future budgetary

constraints and uncertainties. Projects funded by U.S. programs have

progressed somewhat faster than those funded by host nations and allies.

About 19 percent of funding under U.S. programs was associated with

projects that had either begun or completed work, compared to about

10 percent of host nation and allied funding.

Projects Face Funding

Competition and Other

Uncertainties
Page 16 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

Figure 7: Percentage of Funding Spent on ERS Construction Projects and Project

Status

Source: DOD.

According to Transportation Command officials only recently has the ERS

begun to receive high priority for funding. In the first few years after the

end of the Cold War and during the military drawdown, little concern was

voiced about shrinking ERS capacity. But as contingency operations began

to place increasing demands on the remaining airfields, Air Mobility

Command leaders realized how critical the airfields were and how they

needed higher resource priority. To publicize the problem and obtain

higher priority, the Air Mobility Command proclaimed 1997 the “Year of

the En Route System” and funding began to increase. However, even with

the increased priority, officials told us that it still takes many years to

move projects through the budget process, obtain funding, and begin

construction.

86%

4%

10%

Com pleted = 95

In construction = 76

Planning, programm ing,

and design = 345
Page 17 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

Despite the strategic importance of the ERS, critical information on ERS

plans and operations is not available, and the system is not managed as a

coherent whole. For example, notwithstanding the increase in

construction cost estimates, DOD has not carried out overall cost-benefit

studies to document the rationale for its decisions and demonstrate that

its proposed projects represent the best solutions. Similarly, despite

concerns about aging and deteriorating facilities and equipment, the ERS

has no centralized oversight system to provide data on deterioration and

failure rates. It has no formal strategic plan to identify long-term plans and

strategies, guiding policies, and operating priorities for the ERS. No single

organization is responsible for managing and funding the ERS. These

weaknesses raise questions about system plans and operations, and

unnecessarily increase the risk of operational problems and inefficiencies.

Moreover, DOD does not include information on ERS shortfalls in its

reports on the performance of the overall strategic mobility system,

resulting in an incomplete picture of mobility capabilities.

Despite the increased cost estimates and other uncertainties surrounding

ERS construction projects, DOD has not developed overall cost-benefit

studies or other prudent assurances to demonstrate either the rationale for

its decisions or to show that the planned $2 billion in projects represent

the best solutions for correcting the shortfall.

According to Transportation Command officials, the process DOD used to

determine the en-route infrastructure was primarily focused on satisfying

mission war-fighting requirements while attempting to minimize costs

where possible. An overall cost-benefit analysis was not done, they said,

because the ERS evolved over many years in response to changing military

and political conditions and to hundreds of mobility and engineering

analyses of capacity trade-offs under different combinations of bases.

Officials stated that they attempted to make cost-effective decisions by,

for example, choosing to repair or improve existing bases rather than

building new ones. Because of the age of the facilities, many of the

planned projects had already been identified and justified in the military

construction budgeting process.

Moreover, despite concerns about aging and deteriorating facilities,

Transportation Command officials also told us that they could not provide

data on deterioration and failure rates. The ERS has no centralized

oversight system to provide readily available, up-to-date data on the

condition and readiness of the airfields, and officials said that they could

not identify any worthwhile measures that they could accurately produce

without an extended research effort.

Critical Information

and Management

Structure Lacking

Overall Cost-Benefit

Studies Not Developed
Page 18 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

Sound strategic planning that clearly lays out missions and goals, needed

resources, priorities, strategies, measures of performance, and assigned

responsibilities is crucial to achieving program success. According to

officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, some strategic

guidance for the ERS is expressed through the DOD budget process.

However, these officials acknowledged that DOD has no formal strategic

plan for the ERS. Without such a plan, DOD does not have the

information—such as the elements discussed above—or management

structure needed to ensure the success of the ERS. Over the years, we

have noted similar gaps in DOD’s overall strategic planning processes that

have led to difficulties in assessing performance in a variety of areas. As a

result, we have classified DOD strategic planning as a major management

challenge.11

We also classified DOD management of support infrastructure as a major

management challenge because of DOD’s problems in this area. DOD has

reduced force structure since the end of the Cold War, but it has not

achieved similar reductions in infrastructure costs. At the same time, DOD

acknowledges that it has not been spending enough money to offset the

growing backlog of facilities maintenance and repair projects. We

concluded that reducing unneeded infrastructure could free up the funding

needed to ensure that critical assets such as the ERS airfields are

adequately funded.

In accordance with the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993,

DOD reports annually on its performance in managing strategic mobility

capabilities by using three measures (airlift capacity, sealift capacity, and

overseas prepositioning of equipment). However, it does not include data

on ERS shortfalls in the report, despite the major effect such shortfalls

have on airlift capacity. Officials from the Office of the Secretary of

Defense said that they do not include ERS shortfalls because the report

covers only the highest-level measures of performance. They

acknowledged the importance of ERS airfield capacity but stated that it

has not been considered a primary criterion for measuring performance in

strategic mobility. According to the Air Mobility Command, the chief

limiting factor on deployment operations is not usually the number of

available aircraft but the capability of the en-route or destination

infrastructure to accommodate the ground operations of the aircraft.

 11 Performance and Accountability Series: Major Management Challenges and Program

Risks: Department of Defense (GAO-01-244, Jan. 2001).

Basic Management

Structure Lacking
Page 19 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

According to Transportation Command officials, the absence of elements

such as an overall strategic plan is the result of no single organization

having overall responsibility for the ERS. Figure 8 illustrates the difficulty

in managing and coordinating the ERS. Management of the ERS is

fragmented among at least four unified commands and six subcommands,

three services, host nations, and other organizations such as the Defense

Logistics Agency—each with its own functional interests and priorities.

(See app. I for more details on the various responsibilities of these

organizations.)
Page 20 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

Figure 8: Organizations With Responsibility for the ERS

Note: NATO refers to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Source: Developed from DOD information.

Because of the absence of centralized responsibility for the ERS, the

European and Pacific Commands established separate steering

committees (the En Route Infrastructure Steering Committees) to provide

a forum for coordination and resolution of ERS issues in each region.

These two committees are not required by any DOD-level guidance but are

a collaborative effort sanctioned by the geographical commands to solve

ERS operating issues. The committees are composed of all the

organizations in each region with responsibility for ERS airfields in the

area (the European steering committee also includes the Central

Command). The Transportation Command co-chairs both steering

committees. While these committees perform an important function,

Central

Command

Navy

Pacific

Fleet

Pacific

Command

Marine

Forces

Pacific

Pacific

Air

Forces

Pacific Command

En Route

Infrastructure

Steering Committee

European

Command

Navy

Europe

Air

Force

Europe

European Command

En Route

Infrastructure

Steering Committee

Transportation

Command

Air Mobility

Command

Air Force

Navy

Marines

Host country

State

Department

Defense

Logistics

Agency

European

airfields

Pacific

airfields

NATO
Page 21 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

officials said that no organization is responsible for formally coordinating

and overseeing overall ERS operations.

The growth in importance of the En Route System has not been matched

by a commensurate improvement in its information and management

structures. Establishing the European and Pacific steering committees was

an important first step in organizing regional operations, but does not go

far enough. While the war-fighting responsibilities and authorities of the

geographical commands must be respected, one overarching organization

with responsibility for strategic operations and coordination of overall

ERS operations during peacetime is needed. Without such structure ERS

operations are prone to a higher risk of inefficiency in the form of

confusing and overlapping lines of authority and accountability for key

decisions, a lack of coordination and duplication of effort among

responsible organizations, and wasteful competition for resources.

A formal, written strategic plan that lays out missions and goals, guiding

principles and priorities, performance measures, and monitoring

mechanisms is also needed. This plan would help ensure that ERS

operations are governed by a coherent worldwide vision and not by

limited regional or service notions and perspectives. Without the vision

and order provided by a formal strategic plan, decisionmakers do not have

the information they need to ensure that ERS resources and operations are

focused on the right goals and outcomes. Without a system for ongoing

monitoring of key aspects of ERS operations, decisionmakers do not have

the real time, readily available information needed to quickly identify and

correct problems, including the status of projects needed to ensure that

strategic requirements are met and planned troop movements will not be

delayed.

DOD also needs to develop an overall cost-benefit study of its construction

plans for the ERS. Without this information, DOD cannot compare options

and alternatives for improving the ERS, and document that the solutions it

chooses are the best ones. Moreover, DOD needs to be able to ensure that

the guiding principles and rationales at play in allocating scarce funding

dollars are not lost in the many individual decisions made by different

organizations to serve different interests and priorities. This study would

also serve as a useful review of ERS construction plans and projects in

light of the ongoing review of the National Military Strategy.

Finally, DOD needs to ensure that ERS problems and issues receive a

visibility consistent with their critical strategic importance. Omitting data

Conclusions
Page 22 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

on ERS limitations from DOD’s plan and reports on strategic mobility

presents an incomplete picture of DOD capability and tends to obscure

ERS problems and the resources needed to resolve them. Efforts to reduce

shortages of DOD cargo aircraft will have limited impact if those aircraft

do not have adequate airfields to land on.

To improve the visibility of the ERS and reduce the risk of management

problems and inefficiencies, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense:

• make one organization responsible for strategic management and

coordination of overall ERS operations during peacetime,

• develop a formal strategic plan and monitoring system for the ERS,

• develop an overall cost-benefit study to document the rationales for plans

to repair and improve the ERS, and

• include information on ERS limitations and how they affect the

Department’s strategic mobility performance in DOD’s performance plan

and report.

Because DOD indicated in its written comments that it generally would

not implement the recommendations made in this report, the Congress

may wish to consider directing the Secretary of Defense to implement the

recommendations, and periodically report on DOD’s progress to ensure

that these prudent improvements to ERS management are carried out.

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally disagreed

with our conclusions and recommendations. In particular, DOD did not

agree with our view that the ERS lacks a coherent management structure,

our description of the growth in costs of eliminating the shortfall in system

capacity, or our description of the modeling approach used to analyze ERS

capacity.

Regarding our first recommendation, DOD believes that the existing

organization, in particular its ERS steering committees, readiness

reporting processes,12 planning and budgeting system, and reviews of

strategic mobility already provide a “robust” management structure for the

ERS. Nonetheless, it partially agreed with our recommendation to make

one organization responsible for overarching strategic issues. It believes

 12 We reviewed these readiness reports and processes and considered them in our analyses.

Recommendations for

Executive Action

Matter for

Congressional

Consideration

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
Page 23 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

that base-level management of ERS airfields is best performed by the

responsible services but agreed to consider whether one organization

should be designated as responsible for some matters.

We remain convinced that the ERS needs a better management structure.

We agree that some elements of ERS operations are individually managed

by various organizations and processes and that some elements, such as

base level operations, fuels projects and readiness reporting, may be

managed quite intensively. We in fact describe examples of many of these

organizations and processes and their responsibilities for parts of ERS

operations in our report. However, “robust” management in one or even

several areas does not constitute a coherent and coordinated overall

management structure. Our recommendation is intended to assign

responsibility for overarching issues—such as development of an overall

strategic plan, cost-benefit study, and monitoring system—to one

organization to help provide a clear, coordinated, and comprehensive

management structure for all ERS operations. It should be noted that

during our review this recommendation received strong support from

officials at organizations currently involved in ERS operations, including

the Transportation and Central commands.

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to develop an overall ERS

strategic plan and monitoring system. It stated that the recent Mobility

Requirements Study 2005 already includes a strategic plan for the ERS.

DOD said it would nevertheless try to improve the integration,

presentation, and documentation of the plan to help outside organizations

understand its provisions.

We disagree that the January 2001 Mobility Requirements Study 2005

contains a strategic plan for the ERS. Moreover, there seems to be some

confusion in DOD over this issue. During the course of our review we

asked repeatedly for copies of any strategic plan and DOD officials

repeatedly told us that no formal strategic plan for the ERS existed. In

fact, during our formal closeout meeting in April 2001 officials told us that

a formal strategic plan was being developed as a result of our review. The

document cited by DOD in the January 2001 Mobility Requirements Study

2005 is identified as the ERS “Infrastructure Analysis,” not as a strategic

plan. It is simply an analysis of current shortfalls in capacity and whether

planned construction projects will remedy those shortfalls by 2005—if

they are completed on schedule. The analysis does not include many of the

elements needed for sound strategic plans, which need to lay out missions

and goals, necessary resources, assigned responsibilities for

accomplishing goals, priorities and strategies to be followed, and

performance measures for gauging progress toward identified goals.
Page 24 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

In addition, the analysis does not identify the expected cost to remedy the

capacity shortfalls, or the organizational or procedural responsibilities for

achieving ERS goals. Similarly, the analysis does not identify priorities

between regions, bases, or projects to help identify strategies to be

followed in case of funding or other problems. Finally, the analysis also

does not identify any system of performance measures and monitoring

mechanisms to help decisionmakers gauge progress and problems in

carrying out strategic goals. For example, it simply assumes that projects

will be completed on schedule without any measures of actual progress.

In fact, during our review Transportation and Air Mobility Command

officials could not tell us how many projects were behind their original

schedule because there is no centralized monitoring system.

The Department also disagreed with our recommendation for an overall

cost-benefit study to document the rationales for plans to repair and

improve the ERS. DOD believes the guidance it provides through the

planning and budgeting process is sufficient to optimize the list of

construction projects to be funded. We disagree. We understand that

developing a formal cost-benefit analysis of the overall ERS infrastructure

is difficult because of the size of the ERS and the influence of diplomatic

considerations versus strictly economic considerations. However, our

experience has shown that relying exclusively on the budget process to

document funding rationales often results only in inferences as to why

decisions were made. This process lacks the benefit of clear information

on the pros and cons of available choices or on the guiding principles used

to make those decisions. DOD’s annual requests for funds contain no

evidence that projects are prioritized by importance or that progress

toward an established goal, such as modernizing the ERS, is being made in

an efficient and timely fashion.

DOD disagreed with our recommendation to include information on ERS

limitations in its annual performance plan and report along with the other

elements of strategic mobility: airlift, sealift, and prepositioned equipment.

DOD stated that information on ERS performance is already included in

other documents such as the mobility requirements studies, the annual

budget justification documents, and quarterly readiness reports. We

disagree that it is appropriate to exclude information on ERS performance

from the annual report while including information on the other elements

of strategic mobility. The ERS is an integral aspect of strategic mobility. In

fact, Air Mobility Command reports cite ERS infrastructure as the top

limiting factor in deployment operations. Omitting ERS information from

the key annual performance report gives an incomplete and misleading

view of strategic mobility capabilities.
Page 25 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

DOD also disagreed with our description of the growth in estimated costs

for improving the ERS. DOD stated that the different cost estimates we

were provided are not directly comparable because they were produced

several years apart and were premised on different sets of bases and

analytical methodologies. Our report clearly lays out these differences.

Moreover, DOD further claimed that we were using the comparison to

point to “unexplained” cost growth. Whether DOD was aware of the

reasons behind the increased estimate was not the primary point we were

trying to make. Our primary point is that DOD did not know how much it

would cost to bring ERS capacity up to requirements because it does not

monitor overall costs. Air Mobility Command officials had to make a

special query to all the commands to find out what the current costs were

and whether they had changed over previous estimates. Similarly, when

we requested an updated estimate late in our review, officials responded

that obtaining such an update would be very labor intensive and time

consuming. We believe that the lack of a strategy or system for monitoring

progress and overall costs is symptomatic of the weaknesses in DOD’s

management of the ERS.

Finally, DOD disagreed with our description of the modeling approach it

used to analyze ERS capacity. DOD stated that our report asserted that the

approach it used is “flawed” and overestimates the shortfalls. DOD further

stated that any modeling provides only an approximation of real-world

systems and that no analysis can provide solutions that are 100-percent

accurate. DOD believes that it has applied the best tools available and that

it will continue to refine its capabilities, as new modeling tools become

available.

DOD appears to have misunderstood our point. Our report does not assert

that the modeling approach was flawed or that it overstated the shortfall.

We state that the assumptions and modeling approaches DOD used could

underestimate or overestimate the size of the shortfall, but that we could

not measure the precise effect of these factors on DOD’s estimate. Our

report does not attempt to endorse one modeling approach over the other.

We point out the uncertainties of both approaches—including DOD

officials’ comments on the pros and cons of each—so that the reader can

clearly understand the degree of precision in DOD’s estimate. It is

important to fully consider all options in such analyses to ensure that,

should an optimal solution be available, it is identified.

DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD also provided

technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
Page 26 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional

committees and the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense.

Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

Please contact me at (757) 552-8100 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. The major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix IV.

Sincerely yours,

Neal P. Curtin

Director

Operations and Readiness

Defense Capabilities and Management Team
Appendix I: Responsibility for the En Route

System Is Fragmented Among Many

Organizations

Page 27 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

According to Transportation and Air Mobility Command officials, all of the

organizations with responsibility for the En Route System

(see fig. 8) play some combination of three basic roles: owner/manager,

funder, and/or advocate in support of various ERS needs. The

Transportation Command has functional responsibility for managing the

entire Defense Transportation System, with the airlift portion handled by

its air component, the Air Force Air Mobility Command. The

Transportation Command plans and coordinates movements through the

overall transportation system. The Air Mobility Command uses the ERS

airfields to help provide aerial refueling and airlift through its fleet of air

tankers and cargo airplanes. Both commands may act as advocates for the

resource needs of the ERS. However, even though the Transportation

Command has functional responsibility for managing the entire Defense

Transportation System, it is not in charge of the ERS airfields and can

provide only limited funding for repair and improvement projects. The

needs of the geographical commands (such as the European, Central, and

Pacific commands) take precedence over those of the functional

commands (such as the Transportation Command) because of the

geographical commands’ war-fighting responsibilities. The North Atlantic

Treaty Organization may also use the bases to assist in carrying out its

strategic operations. Conflicts can and do occur. For example, in the late

1980s, the European Command had planned to return U.S. facilities at two

ERS airfields to the host nations, in part because of budget reductions.

However, Transportation Command officials believed the airfields were

needed for mobilizations to the Middle East and asked the Joint Chiefs of

Staff to oppose the European Command’s plans. The airfield facilities were

ultimately retained.

Overall management of a particular ERS airfield is shared between the

command with responsibility for that geographical area and the military

service that operates the airfield on a daily basis. The Air Force operates

11 ERS airfields; the Navy operates the airfield in Rota, Spain; and the

Marines operate the airfield in Iwakuni, Japan. The airfields are located on

bases owned by the host country, under agreements for support

negotiated by the State Department. Each military service must operate

the airfield in accordance with its primary service mission but may act as

advocate for the airfield’s ERS-related needs.

However, each service must also manage the airfield in accordance with

the policies set forth by the geographical command. These commands are

responsible for supporting and achieving U.S. interests in their particular

region and for planning and maintaining war-fighting capabilities in the

event of an outbreak of hostilities. They include component commands

Appendix I: Responsibility for the En Route

System Is Fragmented Among Many

Organizations
Appendix I: Responsibility for the En Route

System Is Fragmented Among Many

Organizations

Page 28 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

drawn from each of the military services to manage the support associated

with each. For example, U.S. Navy Europe and U.S. Air Forces Europe

provide support for their naval and air bases in the region. The U.S. Navy’s

Pacific Fleet, Marine Forces Pacific, and Pacific Air Forces provide similar

support in the Pacific. These commands may act as an advocate for ERS

needs consistent with their contribution to the commands’ mission of

maintaining war-fighting capabilities. In Europe, both the European and

Central commands may act as advocates for the ERS airfields. The

airfields are in Europe, but their ERS purpose is to act as a conduit for

aircraft headed to war zones in the Middle East, which is managed by the

Central Command.

While the unified commands have some management responsibilities for

the airfields, they have no funding programs for base operations and

construction. The military services and the Defense Logistics Agency

generally provide U.S. funding for these purposes. For example, the Air

Force provides funds for the operation of its ERS airfield in Fairford,

England. If the base command needs funds for a construction project, it

requests them from its parent command in the region, U.S. Air Forces

Europe, which is under the European Command. Air Forces Europe would

validate the project and request funding through the various programs

available. These would be primarily Air Force programs funding military

construction, operations, and maintenance, or, in the case of fuels

projects, the Defense Logistics Agency. The Defense Logistics Agency has

responsibility for funding fuels projects across all services. In deciding

whether to include a project in funding requests, the services and the

Defense Logistics Agency assign their own priorities to the project in

terms of its relative contribution to their own missions, as well as its

contribution to the overall Department of Defense mission.
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

Page 29 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

To determine whether the ERS airfields have the capacity needed to meet

the requirements of the National Military Strategy, we obtained briefings,

reviewed documents, and interviewed officials at the Office of the

Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S.

Transportation Command, the European Command, the Central

Command, the Pacific Command, the Air Force Mobility Command, the

RAND Corporation, and the Naval Postgraduate School. Much of our

analysis was focused on reviewing the requirements and ERS capacity

analyses set forth in the Mobility Requirements Study 2005 and in earlier

similar studies. We did not independently verify DOD’s estimate of system

capacity.

To identify the causes of any shortfalls and DOD’s plans to correct them,

we reviewed the processes DOD used to identify deficiencies and

corrective actions and discussed them with officials at the offices

identified above, as well as at DOD’s Office of the Inspector General. We

reviewed deficiencies and corrective actions identified in DOD Joint

Monthly Readiness Review Reports, Air Mobility Command reports, and

reports and other documents produced by the European and Pacific

Steering committees and the Inspector General. We obtained lists of

construction projects at each ERS airfield and analyzed them from a

number of different perspectives, including the total costs by base, by

region, and systemwide; the purpose; and the expected source of funding

and discussed them with DOD officials.

To determine whether the ERS has the information and organizational

structure needed to ensure that its operations are carried out efficiently

and effectively, we analyzed data and reports on a variety of basic

management issues and discussed information gaps with DOD officials.

We identified all organizations with responsibility for or management

duties at ERS airfields and reviewed the scope of their individual

responsibilities with DOD officials.

We conducted our review from July 2000 through April 2001 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
Appendix III: Comments From the

Department of Defense

Page 30 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

Appendix III: Comments From the

Department of Defense
Appendix III: Comments From the

Department of Defense

Page 31 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness
Appendix III: Comments From the

Department of Defense

Page 32 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and

Staff Acknowledgments

Page 33 GAO-01-566 Military Readiness

William C. Meredith (202) 512-4275

John W. Nelson (404) 679-1949

In addition to those named above, Katherine Chenault, Lawrence E. Dixon,

Richard G. Payne, Stefano Petrucci, and Gregory J. Symons, made key

contributions to this report.

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff

Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts

Staff

Acknowledgments

(702039)

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