In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 18-1564 

TERRENCE MOORE and DIXIE MOORE, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Wisconsin. 

No. 16-CV-656 — William M. Conley, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 14, 2018 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 7, 2018 

____________________ 

Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. 

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs Terrence and Dixie 

Moore sued Wells Fargo Bank as Mr. Moore’s mortgage servicer under the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 

and a similar Wisconsin statute. The Moores allege that Wells 

Fargo failed to respond adequately to a “qualified written request” for information under those laws. The district court 

granted summary judgment for Wells Fargo, and we affirm. 
2 No. 18-1564 

Terrence Moore’s claims fail on their merits; Dixie Moore’s 

claims fail for lack of standing. 

I. The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act and Wisconsin Law 

The facts of this case are better understood after a brief 

overview of the laws at issue. The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., also known as RESPA, is 

a consumer protection statute that regulates the activities of 

mortgage lenders, brokers, servicers, and other businesses 

that provide services for residential real estate transactions. 

One provision, § 2605, addresses numerous aspects of the servicing of mortgage loans, including transfers from one servicer to another and the administration of escrow accounts 

that lenders use to ensure that insurance and property taxes 

are paid for the mortgaged property. 

Section 2605(e) imposes duties on a loan servicer that receives a “qualified written request” for information from a 

borrower. Written correspondence triggers RESPA if it “includes, or otherwise enables the servicer to identify, the name 

and account of the borrower; and includes a statement of the 

reasons for the belief of the borrower ... that the account is in 

error or provides sufficient detail to the servicer regarding 

other information sought by the borrower.” § 2605(e)(1)(B); 

Catalan v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 629 F.3d 676, 687 (7th Cir. 2011) 

(“Any reasonably stated written request for account information can be a qualified written request.”). 

Section 2605(e)(2) requires the servicer to do one of the following three things no later than 30 business days after receiving a qualified written request from a borrower: (1) make 

appropriate corrections to the borrower’s account and provide written notice of the corrections to the borrower; (2) after 
No. 18-1564 3

investigating the borrower’s account, provide a written explanation as to why the servicer believes the account does not 

need correction; or (3) after investigating the borrower’s account, provide the requested information or explain in writing why the information cannot be obtained. The servicer 

must also include with the response the contact information 

for an individual who can provide assistance. Id. In § 2605(f), 

RESPA provides a private right of action for actual damages 

resulting from violations of § 2605. 

Wisconsin law provides similar protection under Wis. 

Stat. § 224.77, which prohibits mortgage brokers from engaging in a wide range of conduct, including anything that would 

“violate any provision of this subchapter ... or any federal or 

state statute.” § 224.77(1)(k). This language “essentially points 

back to the alleged RESPA violation by prohibiting mortgage 

bankers and brokers from violating any federal statute that 

regulates their practice.” Diedrich v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, 

LLC, 839 F.3d 583, 587 (7th Cir. 2016). The Wisconsin statute 

requires mortgage servicers to maintain the competence necessary to maintain their role as a servicer and prohibits them 

from “engag[ing] in conduct ... that constitutes improper, 

fraudulent, or dishonest dealing.” § 224.77(1)(i), (m). Wisconsin law authorizes private civil actions to recover actual damages for violations of § 224.77. Wis. Stat. § 224.80(2); Diedrich, 

839 F.3d at 594. 

II. The Facts for Summary Judgment

The plaintiffs appeal the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment, so we review the decision de novo, considering all 

evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs as the nonmoving parties. Carmody v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Illinois, 

893 F.3d 397, 401 (7th Cir. 2018). “While we must construe all 
4 No. 18-1564 

the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable 

to the nonmoving party, our favor toward the nonmoving 

party does not extend to drawing inferences that are supported by only speculation or conjecture.” Monroe v. Indiana 

Dep’t of Transportation, 871 F.3d 495, 503 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

Under this standard, summary judgment is appropriate 

when no admissible evidence shows any dispute of material 

fact that could lead a jury to rule in the non-moving parties’ 

favor, entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of 

law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it “affects the 

outcome of the suit.” Monroe, 871 F.3d at 503 (citation omitted).

We begin with the undisputed facts of Mr. Moore’s default 

on his mortgage, his and the lender’s attempts to modify the 

mortgage, and the foreclosure on the mortgage in state court. 

We then turn to the qualified written request and response 

themselves. 

A. Mortgage and Loan Modification Agreements 

The Moores’ RESPA claims arose after years of struggles 

to keep up with mortgage payments. Terrence Moore purchased the home he shares with his wife, Dixie Moore, in 2006 

with a 30-year adjustable mortgage owned at all relevant

times by Deutsche Bank and serviced by Wells Fargo. The 

loan had a principal balance of $208,050 with an initial interest 

rate of 7.95% subject to change every six months beginning in 

2008, with rates ranging anywhere from 5.625% to 13.95%. 

Mrs. Moore used an inheritance from her mother to help buy 

the house, but she was never named as a party to the title of 

the property, the mortgage, or the promissory note.
No. 18-1564 5

In late 2007, Mr. Moore began having difficulty paying his 

mortgage. As the servicer for the mortgage, Wells Fargo offered one forbearance plan in December 2007 and, as Mr. 

Moore’s difficulties continued, another in September 2008. 

During this time, Mr. Moore fell so far behind in his payments 

that Deutsche Bank filed a foreclosure action. Deutsche Bank 

voluntarily dismissed that first foreclosure action, though, after Wells Fargo agreed to a loan modification with Mr. Moore 

in 2009. Despite the loan modification and dismissed foreclosure, Mr. Moore again failed to make the necessary payments. 

Wells Fargo negotiated a second loan modification agreement 

in December 2010. 

The terms of the 2011 modification set the principal balance as $272,481.95, extended the loan term to 40 years, and 

changed the loan from an adjustable rate mortgage to a “Step 

Rate” mortgage with interest set at 2.0% for the first five years, 

2.5% in year six, 3.0% in year seven, and 4.0% for the remainder of the loan term. The first payment under the 2011 modification was due March 1, 2011. 

B. Foreclosure and Bankruptcy Proceedings 

Mr. Moore failed to comply with the terms of the 2011 

modification.1 Deutsche Bank filed a second foreclosure action. The most critical event for our purposes came on November 13, 2012, when the state trial court entered a judgment 

 

1 The Moores now contend this is not true and that the foreclosure 

judgment was erroneous because they had been current in their mortgage 

payments through June 2011. We agree with the district court that “this 

purported dispute is not material because the issue of default was previously adjudicated by the state court” and cannot be relitigated here. Moore 

v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., No. 16-CV-656-WMC, 2018 WL 922370, at *8 

(W.D. Wis. Feb. 15, 2018).
6 No. 18-1564 

of foreclosure against Mr. Moore. He did not appeal the state 

court’s judgment of foreclosure.2

A sheriff’s sale was initially scheduled for June 4, 2013 but 

was rescheduled numerous times while the parties tried to 

find a solution that would allow the Moores to remain in their 

house. Those efforts included consideration of yet another 

modification and an attempt to mediate through the state 

court’s foreclosure mediation program. When these attempts 

proved unsuccessful, the sheriff’s sale was rescheduled for 

December 3, 2013.

One month before the rescheduled sale, Mr. Moore filed 

for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, resulting in an automatic stay of 

the sale. Negotiations continued. In June 2015, the parties entered into a third modified payment agreement that required 

Mr. Moore to pay Wells Fargo a lump sum of $9,000 by June 

30, 2015. Mr. Moore again failed to do so, prompting Deutsche 

Bank to seek relief from the stay on December 7, 2015. The 

sheriff’s sale was rescheduled for March 22, 2016.

Mr. Moore responded by converting his Chapter 13 bankruptcy into a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. That triggered another 

automatic stay only twelve days before the scheduled sale. On 

July 13, 2016 the bankruptcy court entered a discharge for the 

 2 The judgment of foreclosure was an appealable final judgment in the 

state courts. See Anchor Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Coyle, 148 Wis.2d 94, 435 

N.W.2d 727, 729–30 (1989); Shuput v. Lauer, 109 Wis. 2d 164, 325 N.W.2d 

321, 325–26 (1982). The rule is different in foreclosure proceedings in federal courts, at least in the Seventh Circuit. See Bank of America, N.A. v. Martinson, 828 F.3d 532, 534 (7th Cir. 2016) (Wisconsin mortgage); HSBC Bank 

USA, N.A. v. Townsend, 793 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2015) (Illinois mortgage). 
No. 18-1564 7

Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and the sheriff’s sale was rescheduled 

for October 11, 2016.

C. The RESPA “Qualified Written Request” 

We now turn to the facts at the center of the Moores’ statutory claims in this appeal. On August 15, 2016, nearly four 

years after the foreclosure judgment was entered and two 

months before the scheduled sale, Mr. Moore sent a letter to 

Wells Fargo explaining the history of the loan and foreclosure 

from his point of view. Most relevant for RESPA, his letter also 

asked twenty-two wide-ranging questions about his account. 

His questions included the identities of whoever owned his 

mortgage, details about how payments were applied 

throughout the duration of the loan, the creation of his escrow 

account, a list of all charges and late fees, and “an identification of each and every modification, forbearance, forgiveness, 

reinstatement, or other debt-relief or mortgage-relief type 

program, whether in-house or government-mandated, for 

which I have ever been considered by any servicer or lender, 

including the dates on which such program or plan was considered.” 

Wells Fargo received Mr. Moore’s letter on August 18, 2016 

and immediately treated it as a qualified written request. A 

representative from Wells Fargo called to confirm receipt the 

next day. Wells Fargo told Mr. Moore that it would respond 

on September 30—the last day to submit a written response to 

Mr. Moore within the 30-business-day deadline under 

§ 2605(e) 

D. This Lawsuit 

Facing the October 11, 2016 sheriff’s sale, the Moores decided to continue efforts in both state and federal courts to 
8 No. 18-1564 

remain in their foreclosed home. On September 28, two days 

before Wells Fargo’s deadline to respond under RESPA, the 

Moores filed a motion in state court titled “Defendant’s Counterclaims Maturing After Pleading” in an effort to reopen the 

2012 foreclosure case. They sought “damages, costs and fees 

as are reasonable, and offset such damages against any 

amount owed to Deutsche Bank under the judgment of foreclosure before the sheriff’s sale.” They also requested an indefinite stay of the sheriff’s sale while they litigated these 

counterclaims. The state court did not stay the sheriff’s sale 

indefinitely, but the sale was delayed yet again while the state 

court heard the matter. 

Also on September 28, the Moores filed this action in federal court, two days before Wells Fargo’s response was due.

In both the state and federal court, the Moores alleged that 

Wells Fargo violated RESPA and Wis. Stat. § 224.77 by failing 

to respond to the qualified written request. The Moores 

claimed they were harmed by Wells Fargo’s failure to respond 

to the qualified written request because they “were going to 

use the responses to plan their next steps” regarding the 

looming sheriff’s sale, but instead had to fight the foreclosure 

action with “no answers.” The Moores also claimed that Wells 

Fargo’s lack of response was causing them to suffer emotional 

distress because they feared losing their home unfairly, without knowing whether the lender had a right to foreclose. 

(They also raised other issues that are no longer part of the 

case.) 

As Wells Fargo had promised, though, on September 30 a 

Wells Fargo representative called Mr. Moore and told him 

that the bank’s response would be mailed that day. The response was a three-page letter with 58 pages of attachments. 
No. 18-1564 9

The response addressed most of Mr. Moore’s questions to 

some degree, but not all of them. For instance, the letter included information about the loan’s current status, details 

about the most recent modification review, and insurance 

premium information. The letter also discussed the bankruptcy stipulation agreement and included an account history 

going back nearly three years from the date of the request. 

However, the letter and attachments did not address several 

of Mr. Moore’s questions, such as the ones requesting every 

“modification, forbearance, forgiveness, reinstatement, or 

other debt-relief ... for which [he had] ever been considered.” 

Wells Fargo wrote that the questions it did not answer were 

“too broad” but invited Mr. Moore to provide further details 

about his requests so the bank could review them again. 

Nothing in the record suggests Mr. Moore followed up on that 

invitation. 

On November 23, 2016, the state court held a hearing in 

the foreclosure suit. The court dismissed the Moores’ new 

counterclaims as untimely. The sheriff’s sale finally took place 

on November 29, 2016. In a further effort to remain in his foreclosed home, Mr. Moore filed for bankruptcy again on December 27, 2016. He admitted in his summary judgment affidavit in this case that the bankruptcy filing was a tactical 

move intended only to stall foreclosure. “I filed bankruptcy in 

2016 to stop the sale of my house ... the only reason I filed a 

bankruptcy petition at all a second time is because Wells 

Fargo was insisting on selling my house ... I had no choice but 
10 No. 18-1564 

to file for bankruptcy, since that was the only way to avoid 

losing my house.”3

In February 2018, the district court granted Wells Fargo’s 

motion for summary judgment. The court found that Mr. 

Moore had standing under both federal and state law (and 

assumed Mrs. Moore had standing under state law), but that 

the Moores had not provided any evidence that Wells Fargo 

had actually violated RESPA or the Wisconsin statute. The 

court went on to conclude that even if Wells Fargo had failed 

to answer each and every one of Mr. Moore’s questions completely, the Moores had failed to show how any failures had 

caused them any harm. In addressing the Moores’ appeal, we 

consider the plaintiffs’ standing before addressing the merits 

of the RESPA and state-law claims. 

III. Standing 

Standing is an element of subject-matter jurisdiction in a 

federal civil action, so we address that issue first. See Steel Co. 

v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998). To have 

standing, Mr. and Mrs. Moore must each show that he or she 

has “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to 

the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely 

to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. 

v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). 

To meet this burden at the pleading stage, “the plaintiffs’ 

complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations of an injury resulting from the defendants’ conduct, accepted as true, 

to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Diedrich 

 3 Due to the automatic stay from this most recent bankruptcy, the 

sheriff’s sale has not yet been confirmed. As of oral argument before this 

court, the Moores were still living in the foreclosed house.
No. 18-1564 11

v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 839 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2016), 

citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “The alleged injury must be concrete and not just a procedural violation divorced from any harm.” Diedrich, 839 F.3d at 588, citing 

Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548. We conclude that Dixie Moore does 

not have standing, but Terrence Moore does.

A. Standing of Mrs. Moore 

Dixie Moore does not have standing to bring claims under 

RESPA or Wis. Stat. § 224.77. She is not named on the property’s title or the mortgage or the note. She was not a party to 

any of the bankruptcies, was not a party to the 2011 loan modification, and even conceded in her interrogatory answers that 

Wells Fargo had no legal duty or obligation to her under 

RESPA. She cannot satisfy the Spokeo requirements because 

she has no legal interest that could have been harmed by 

Wells Fargo. 

Mrs. Moore contends that she has standing under Wisconsin law as a “person aggrieved” by Wells Fargo’s failure to 

respond fully to each of the questions in Mr. Moore’s qualified 

written request. On this question of state law, we do not believe the Wisconsin courts would interpret the statute to recognize such claims by someone who is not a party to the property title or the mortgage loan. 

Under Wisconsin law, “[a] person who is aggrieved by an 

act which is committed by a mortgage banker, mortgage loan 

originator, or mortgage broker in violation of [§ 224.77] may 

recover ... in a private action.” Wis. Stat. § 224.80(2). While the 

legislature did not provide a definition of “aggrieved” in this 

context, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has clarified that an 
12 No. 18-1564 

aggrieved party under § 224.77 is “‘one having an interest ... 

which is injuriously affected’” by the alleged violation. Diedrich, 839 F.3d at 594, citing Liebovich v. Minnesota Ins. Co., 310 

Wis. 2d 751, 751 N.W.2d 764, 775 (2008). 

Mrs. Moore’s assertion seems to stem primarily from the 

claim that she used her inheritance to help purchase the home 

she shares with Mr. Moore, and because of this “she will lose 

her house if the lender is allowed to sell it.” We assume the 

truth of these points, but she still is not an owner of the property or a party to the mortgage and promissory note at the 

center of the statutory claim. We do not believe the Wisconsin 

courts would interpret § 224.77 to provide individual claims 

for all residents of the house and family members of the borrower. Having provided no evidence that she has any legal 

interest in this proceeding, and conceding that she does not 

have standing under RESPA, Mrs. Moore cannot bring a challenge under § 224.77.4

 

4 Even if Mrs. Moore did have standing for the § 224.77 claim, none of 

her alleged harm could be traced back to Wells Fargo’s response to Mr. 

Moore’s letter, for reasons we explain below with respect to Mr. Moore. 

To support her claim of actual harm, Mrs. Moore alleges that it had been 

“extremely upsetting to have to wonder why the lender claims we owe 

this much money” and that she has “had trouble sleeping since we nearly 

lost the house in the fall of 2016.” Additionally, she “did not want Terrence 

to have to file a new bankruptcy. When I learned that this was the only 

way we had to save our house, I became extremely upset. I began crying 

and got very emotional.” She alleges Mr. Moore’s bankruptcy filing also 

led to fighting and general disruption in their marriage. None of these can 

be traced to the alleged RESPA violation. Mrs. Moore herself identifies 

that these injuries stemmed from the bankruptcy and the foreclosure, not 

the answers or lack of answers to Mr. Moore’s written questions. 
No. 18-1564 13

B. Standing of Mr. Moore 

Terrence Moore meets the requirements for standing under RESPA and the state statute. See Diedrich 839 F.3d at 590, 

citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. He brought this action as the 

borrower on a mortgage loan serviced by the defendant. Unlike Mrs. Moore, there is no dispute of his status as a party in 

any aspect of this case. Next, he alleged he was injured in fact 

by having to fight the state court case without all the information he needed from Wells Fargo. He claimed this caused 

him to “worry that we would lose our house ... and I was substantially emotionally disturbed. I had trouble controlling my 

breathing and had headaches, and became extremely upset 

when I had to relay to my wife what had happened.” Finally, 

he claimed Wells Fargo caused this harm and asked the court 

to award damages. This is sufficient to meet the low bar of 

standing, regardless of the ultimate merits of his statutory 

claims. 

IV. Mr. Moore’s Claims for Damages 

The central issue in this appeal is whether a borrower can 

recover damages under 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f) when the only 

harm alleged is that the response to his qualified written request did not contain information he wanted to help him fight 

a state-court mortgage foreclosure he had already lost in state 

court. RESPA is meant to protect borrowers from the potential 

abuse of the mortgage servicers’ position of power over borrowers, not to provide borrowers a federal discovery tool to 

litigate state-court actions. Even if Wells Fargo’s incomplete 

response violated RESPA, Mr. Moore has not presented any 

 

Therefore, she cannot show she was “aggrieved” by Wells Fargo’s actions 

for the purposes of § 224.77. 
14 No. 18-1564 

evidence that there is a material dispute regarding any harm 

he suffered due to this violation. 

RESPA provides in relevant part: “Whoever fails to comply with any provision of this section shall be liable to the borrower for each such failure ... In the case of any action by an 

individual, an amount equal to the sum of ... any actual damages to the borrower as a result of the failure.” 12 U.S.C. 

§ 2605(f)(1)(A). RESPA does not provide relief for mere procedural violations. Plaintiffs bringing claims under RESPA must 

show actual injury. See Diedrich, 839 F.3d at 589. 

We assume for purposes of argument that at least some 

aspect of Wells Fargo’s response was incomplete and might 

have violated § 2605(e).5 Even with the benefit of that assumption, Mr. Moore needed to come forward with evidence supporting an award of actual damages. Diedrich, 839 F.3d at 591. 

While he adequately alleged an injury for the purpose of 

standing, he has not provided any evidence to survive summary judgment on the merits of those claims. Id. (“[T]aking 

the [plaintiffs’] facts as true, they must allege enough to 

demonstrate, not just that [the servicer] was responsible for 

 5 Wells Fargo’s response did not answer any of Mr. Moore’s six questions regarding his loan modifications. The response incompletely answered three questions about the escrow account for the mortgage, three 

questions regarding Mr. Moore’s account activities, and one question 

about the history of the mortgage’s interest rates. In the letter to Mr. 

Moore, the only explanation Wells Fargo offered for these omissions was 

that his requests were “too broad.” The district court found there was insufficient evidence to show this incomplete response violated RESPA in 

light of all the other actions Wells Fargo took to comply with the statute. 

Wells Fargo and the district court may well be right on this score, but we 

do not base our decision on that reasoning. 
No. 18-1564 15

these injuries, but specifically, that [the servicer’s] failures to 

comply with RESPA section 2605(e)(2) caused their injury.”). 

Here, Mr. Moore alleges his actual damages stem from 

out-of-pocket expenses and emotional distress. We analyze 

both and find no merit to either. 

A. Out-of-Pocket Expenses

The only out-of-pocket expense Mr. Moore claims he incurred due to the alleged RESPA violations is the $900 he paid 

an attorney to review Wells Fargo’s response to the qualified 

written request.6 This theory would allow a borrower to create a RESPA claim that pulls itself up by its own bootstraps, 

creating the required damages by pursuing the inquiry itself, 

at least with the help of a lawyer. RESPA should not treat such 

attorney fees as sufficient to support a claim under § 2605(e). 

First, § 2605(f) requires Mr. Moore to provide evidence of “actual damages to the borrower as a result of the failure” of Wells 

Fargo to comply with RESPA. § 2605(f)(1)(A) (emphasis 

added). This causal connection is a critical element when 

bringing a RESPA claim. Catalan v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., 629 

F.3d 676, 694 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Wirtz v. Specialized Loan 

Servicing, LLC, 886 F.3d 713, 719 (8th Cir. 2018) (“Congress’s 

use of the phrase ‘as a result of’ dictates that there must be a 

causal link between the alleged violation and the damages.”) 

(citation omitted). We do not see how having an attorney 

 6 In his brief, Mr. Moore argued that his out-of-pocket costs also included attorney fees for drafting the qualified written request itself and 

the cost of filing for bankruptcy, but in oral argument his lawyer clarified 

that the only out-of-pocket expenses Mr. Moore seeks are attorney fees for 

reviewing Wells Fargo’s response.
16 No. 18-1564 

review the response could be a cost incurred as a result of an 

alleged violation. 

Even if Mr. Moore’s attorney fees were directly 

attributable to Wells Fargo’s actions, they would not 

constitute actual damage under RESPA. We have noted that 

“simply having to file suit, however, does not suffice as a 

harm warranting actual damages.” Diedrich, 839 F.3d at 593 

(citations and quotation marks omitted). Also, attorney fees 

are addressed in another section of the statute. We see no need 

to stretch the actual damage provision to cover attorney fees 

as well, at least those directly related to the RESPA issues. See 

12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(3) (prevailing plaintiffs can collect attorney 

fees). Such a finding would render § 2605(f)(3) superfluous, 

which is, all other things equal, a result courts generally try to 

avoid. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“cardinal 

principle of statutory construction” is that “no clause, 

sentence, or word shall be superfluous”).7 Accordingly, Mr. 

 

7 There are good reasons not to rely too heavily on the canon against 

surplusage. See Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 

1967–2011, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 1317, 1448, 1469 (2014) (citing evidence that 

“repetition (i.e., surplusage) is typically what supporting institutions and 

groups want from the legislative process,” so the canon against surplusage is “antidemocratic in a serious way”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The 

New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 531, 579 (2013) 

(“[T]he rule against surplusage ... is especially problematic because the 

legislative process operates under the opposite assumption and so that 

canon will often thwart legislative deals rather than enforce them.”); Brett 

M. Kavanaugh, The Courts and the Administrative State, 64 Case W. Res. L. 

Rev. 711, 718 (2014) (“[M]embers of Congress often want to be redundant 

[because] they want to ‘make doubly sure,’” so courts should be more 

careful in applying canon); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation— in 

the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 812 (1983) (“[A] 
No. 18-1564 17

Moore has failed to show that he suffered out-of-pocket 

expenses as a result of any alleged RESPA violation by Wells 

Fargo. 

B. Damages for Emotional Distress 

Mr. Moore also claims damages under RESPA for emotional distress. We have held that emotional distress can support a claim for damages under RESPA. Catalan, 629 F.3d at 

696. To survive a motion for summary judgment on the issue, 

the plaintiff must offer evidence that the emotional distress he 

suffered was caused by the claimed RESPA violation. Diedrich, 839 F.3d at 593. In Diedrich, we noted that Catalan does 

not specify “what amount of evidence is sufficient to link an 

injury to a mortgage company’s failure to respond properly 

to a qualified request for information.” Id. We held in Diedrich

that a statement merely alleging that the servicer injured the 

plaintiffs because of everything the plaintiffs had endured 

throughout the course of litigation was insufficient. Id.

In Catalan, we reversed summary judgment for the defendants partially on the ground that there was dispute of material fact as to the plaintiffs’ allegations of emotional distress 

damages resulting from the defendant’s egregious RESPA violations. 629 F.3d at 696. The plaintiffs in Catalan were actually 

making their mortgage payments. The RESPA violations were 

the source of their stress about the prospective loss of their 

 

statute that is the product of compromise may contain redundant language as a by-product of the strains of the negotiating process.”). Those 

criticisms carry less weight in a case like this one, however, where the statute specifically authorizes a fee award for a prevailing plaintiff, separately 

from the provision for damages, as is so common among fee-shifting statutes. 
18 No. 18-1564 

home. Id. Medical records reflected one of the plaintiffs was 

suffering from increased stress due to her “house situation,” 

and the plaintiffs “described their emotional turmoil in reasonable detail and explained what they believe to be the 

source of that turmoil.” Id. One plaintiff in Catalan testified 

that she suffered from loss of sleep, headaches, sadness, shakiness, nervousness, and other signs of depression that she attributed to being ignored by the defendants. Her husband testified that he felt useless when watching his wife cry every 

day due to the situation and his inability to console her made 

him feel helpless. This testimony was sufficient to preclude 

summary judgment as these non-conclusory statements were 

made with personal knowledge.

Here, Mr. Moore alleges in his complaint that he suffered 

emotional distress because he had to fear “losing their home 

[without knowing] whether the lender has a right to [foreclose]” and had to worry that “their home will be sold improperly or illegally.” In his brief, Mr. Moore also states he 

had to “break the news to his wife that they were unsuccessful 

in state court and would have to file bankruptcy.” He further 

claimed in his affidavit in response to defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment that after the judge refused to reopen the 

state court case, he “began to worry that we would lose our 

house ... and I was substantially emotionally disturbed. I had 

trouble controlling my breathing and had headaches, and became extremely upset when I had to relay to my wife what 

had happened.” This is simply not enough to show damages 

caused by any RESPA violation. 

To be clear, we recognize that the prospective and even 

imminent loss of a home can be highly stressful. The problem 

here is that Mr. Moore’s stress had essentially nothing to do 
No. 18-1564 19

with any arguable RESPA violations. The obvious sources of 

his stress were the facts that he was not able to make timely 

payments toward his mortgage, that the lender had won a 

judgment of foreclosure, and that sale and eviction were 

imminent. 

Mr. Moore directly links his headaches and breathing 

trouble to the state court’s decision not to reopen the 2012 

foreclosure case. He argues that having all the information he 

requested from Wells Fargo would have given him a greater 

chance of success in state court and that appearing in the state 

court’s November 2016 hearing without this information 

caused him emotional distress. This theory is too attenuated; 

it relies too much on speculation about what a state court 

might have done under other, unknowable circumstances, to 

qualify as actual harm under RESPA. See Perron on behalf of 

Jackson v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 845 F.3d 852, 858 (7th 

Cir. 2017) (alleged harm from RESPA violation must not be 

“too attenuated from the alleged violation.”). RESPA was not 

intended to give people who cannot pay their mortgages the 

means to engage in burdensome fishing expeditions in the 

hope of somehow passing the blame for their foreclosure onto 

the mortgage servicers in state court. 

There is no need to prove the emotional distress was 

caused solely by the alleged RESPA violation. But nothing here 

suggests that the emotional distress Mr. Moore faced was 

caused by anything but the foreclosure, which occurred four 

years earlier. Likewise, having to tell his wife that they had to 

sell their house and file for bankruptcy are traceable back only 

to the 2012 judgment of foreclosure, not to any alleged RESPA 

violation in 2016. The district court correctly found that Mr. 
20 No. 18-1564 

Moore failed to provide evidence of actual injury sufficient to 

survive summary judgment on his RESPA claims. 

V. Wisconsin Law Claims Under Section 224.77 

Finally, the district court correctly granted summary judgment on the state-law claims under § 224.77. In addition to 

prohibiting servicers from acting improperly and operating in 

an incompetent manner, § 224.77 “essentially points back to 

the alleged RESPA violation” and does not expand the servicer’s liability. Diedrich, 839 F.3d at 587. In this case, most of 

Mr. Moore’s claims under § 224.77 are barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine. 

“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents lower federal 

courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by 

state-court losers challenging state-court judgments rendered 

before the district court proceedings commenced.” Mains v. 

Citibank, N.A., 852 F.3d 669, 675 (7th Cir. 2017). Especially relevant here, Rooker-Feldman bars claims that could have been 

argued in state court. D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 

462, 482 n.16 (1983); Jakupovic v. Curran, 850 F.3d 898, 902 (7th 

Cir. 2017) (whether a claim that could have been brought in 

state court is barred under Rooker-Feldman “hinges on 

whether the federal claim alleges that the injury was caused 

by the state court judgment, or alternatively, whether the federal claim alleges an independent prior injury that the state 

court failed to remedy.”). 

Mr. Moore’s never-say-die attitude is impressive, but there 

are limits, and Rooker-Feldman is one of them. Mains, 852 F.3d 

at 677 (Rooker-Feldman barred RESPA claim in federal court 

because the “claims could be sustained only by disregarding 

or effectively vacating the state [court’s] judgment of 
No. 18-1564 21

foreclosure.”); see Shuput v. Lauer, 109 Wis. 2d 164, 325 

N.W.2d 321, 326 (1982) (Wisconsin judgment of foreclosure is 

final for purposes of appeal before sheriff’s sale). Mr. Moore 

argues that the 2011 modification was unjust, the foreclosure 

was entered on flawed grounds, the foreclosure amount was 

incorrect, and the state court should have reopened his case. 

None of these arguments belong in federal court. 

Mr. Moore insists he can bring these claims before us because he seeks damages rather than reconsideration of the 

state court decision, but that assertion denies the substance of 

what he actually seeks in federal court. To find in favor of Mr. 

Moore, we would be required to contradict directly the state 

court’s decisions by finding that Deutsche Bank was not entitled to the final judgment of foreclosure. This we simply cannot do.8 

 

8 Mr. Moore argues that Rooker-Feldman should not apply because 

Wells Fargo was not a party in the state court action. That argument does 

not change the fact that a judgment in favor of the petitioner would overrule the state court’s decision, and Mr. Moore’s state-court complaint concedes Wells Fargo was in privity with Deutsche Bank: “Wells Fargo was 

at all times acting with the express or implied approval and direction of 

[Deutsche Bank].” Mr. Moore’s action would alternatively be barred under claim preclusion. See Berry v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 865 F.3d 880, 883 

(7th Cir. 2017) (finding petitioner’s claim against mortgage servicer was 

barred under claim preclusion because servicer was in privity with mortgager); see also Lewis v. Citibank, N.A., 179 F. Supp. 3d 458, 463 (E.D. Pa. 

2016) (claim against servicer was barred because servicer was in privity 

with mortgagor and “res judicata also precludes claims that were not actually litigated, but that could have been litigated, during the previous proceedings.”). 
22 No. 18-1564 

Even if Mr. Moore’s claims were not barred under RookerFeldman, Wisconsin law would preclude us from ruling in his 

favor. In A.B.C.G. Enterprises, Inc. v. First Bank Southeast, N.A., 

the Wisconsin Supreme Court held ABCG could not bring 

counterclaims alleging the mortgagee was really to blame for 

the conditions leading to its foreclosure after the judgment 

was already entered because “a favorable judgment for ABCG 

in this action would nullify the prior foreclosure.” 184 Wis. 2d 

465, 515 N.W.2d 904, 909–910 (1994). Even though ABCG was 

asking for damages rather than the overruling of the foreclosure decision, the court explained that “judgment in favor of 

ABCG would ... directly undermine the original default judgment in which the court held that under the circumstances, 

foreclosure was proper.” Id. at 911. Similarly here, federal 

courts could not award Mr. Moore damages without making 

findings that would directly undermine the state court’s foreclosure judgment. 

Mr. Moore’s assertion that his attorney fees constitute actual harm under § 224.77 fails for the same reasons explained 

above under RESPA. See also In re Lofton, 569 B.R. 747, 754 

(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2017) (rejecting argument that attorney fees 

constitute actual damages under § 224.77 because “costs, expenses, and reasonable attorney fees ... are in addition to and 

do not constitute actual damages ... Merely having an attorney make phone calls or file suit does not suffice as harm warranting actual damages”). 

The judgment of the district court dismissing this action is 

AFFIRMED as to Terrence Moore on the merits and as to Dixie 

Moore for lack of standing.