US POLICY TOWARDS SECESSION IN THE 

BALKANS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF 

DE FACTO PARTITION 

Evelyn N. Farkas 

and 

IMPROVING US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS 

THROUGH PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 

Beth L. Makros 

Jeremy C. Saunders 

INSS Occasional Paper 40 

Regional Security Series 

June 2001 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

USAF Academy, Colorado 
ii
iii

The views expressed in this volume are those of the authors and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Air 

Force or Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. The papers are approved for public release by the Marine Corps 

Staff College (Farkas) and SAF/PA (Makros/Saunders); distribution is 

unlimited. 

******* 

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited; please forward to: 

 Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

 HQ USAFA/DFES 

 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27 

 USAF Academy, CO 80840 

 phone: 719-333-2717 

 fax: 719-333-2716 

 email: james.smith@usafa.af.mil 

Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at 

http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss

ISBN: 0-9710900-3-3 
iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Forward vii 

Executive Summary- Farkas xi 

Executive Summary- Makros/Saunders xiii 

US POLICY TOWARDS SECESSION IN THE BALKANS AND 

EFFECTIVENESS OF DE FACTO PARTITION 

Introduction 3 

Bosnia 5 

 -Security 6 

 -Political Institutions and Processes 11 

Kosovo 17 

 -Security 18 

 -Political Institutions and Processes 24 

Conclusion and Recommendations 27 

Endnotes 31 

IMPROVING US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS THROUGH 

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 

Introduction 41 

 -Significance of US-Russian Relationship 42 

 -Improving the US-Russian Relationship Through Peacekeeping 44 

Assessment of Russian Peacekeeping 46 

 -Russian Political Environment 46 

 -Russian Peacekeeping Forces 49 

 -Russian Peacekeeping Doctrine 51 

Case Studies of Russian Peacekeeping 54 

 -Case Study of Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR) 55 

 -Lessons Learned in Bosnia 62 

 -Case Study of Abkhazia (UNOMIG) 64 
v

 -Lessons Learned in Abkhazia 70 

The Future of Russian Peacekeeping 72 

Recommendations 73 

 -Recommendations for Bosnia and Combined Operations 73 

 -Recommendations for US Support in Abkhazia 76 

 -Overall Recommendations 78 

Summary 81 

Endnotes 81 
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vii

FOREWORD 

We are pleased to publish this fortieth volume in the Occasional 

Paper series of the US Air Force Institute for National Security Studies 

(INSS). The decade following the Cold War has seen a rise in ethnic conflict, 

and the United States military has found itself involved in a range of 

humanitarian intervention situations. The US Commission on National 

Security Strategy/21st Century—the Hart-Rudman Commission—has forecast 

a continuation in this type of conflict and in concomitant calls for United 

States military intervention at some level. While the US military has 

expressed mixed attitudes toward this type of political-military mission, and 

while they have had to climb a relatively steep learning curve gaining 

experience and expertise in the range of “peacekeeping” operations, several 

issues have been identified as important to the success of current operations 

and to planning for future situations. These two papers identify, explain, and 

analyze two very important sets of those issues. They are presented here not 

as endorsements of US military intervention or as a “cookbook” of keys to 

successful peace operations, but as solid and sobering examinations of the 

complexity of this operational realm and of the unique military requirements 

and opportunities it presents. 

In the first paper, US Policy Towards Secession In The Balkans And 

Effectiveness Of De Facto Partition, Evelyn Farkas addresses inherently nonmilitary contextual challenges encountered by military forces during NATO 

efforts to make or enforce peace in Bosnia and Kosovo. She highlights 

significant problems that have emerged in both former Yugoslavian states; 

namely, that the initial progress towards establishing stable multiethnic states 

has been stalled by criminal networks and the lack of functioning central 

governments. She concludes that civil and military peace implementers must 

be more aggressive in administering the protectorates NATO has established 

in order to advance the political and economic reforms that are needed to 
viii

achieve a lasting peace. Her efforts help to detail the struggle of institutionbuilding that accompanies peace enforcement and peacekeeping efforts. 

In the second paper, Improving US-Russian Relations Through 

Peacekeeping Operations, Beth Makros and Jeremy Saunders use Bosnia and 

Abkkhazia peacekeeping interventions as case studies to show the need for, 

and possible strategic benefits from, improving cooperation during combined 

or multinational peacekeeping operations. Not only do they outline the major 

weaknesses of Russian peacekeeping efforts and spell-out the differences 

between Russian and American peacekeeping doctrine, but they identify a 

major US weakness in combined settings: the lack of US peacekeepers’ 

knowledge of the Russian language and culture and how such knowledge 

would improve the ability of US troops to effectively function in the field with 

their Russian counterparts within these combined settings. Their paper 

highlights both the wider potential benefits that can be gained from 

multinational operations and the further complexity and requirements they 

generate in order to ensure such broad success. 

It is hoped that the issues and lessons highlighted by the authors of 

both papers will enable US policy makers and military commanders to identify 

means to more effectively lead or participate in such interventions for as long 

as the international situation and United States policy dictate a need for 

military intervention. 

About the Institute

 INSS is primarily sponsored by the National Security Policy 

Division, Nuclear and Counterproliferation Directorate, Headquarters US Air 

Force (HQ USAF/XONP) and the Dean of the Faculty, USAF Academy. Our 

other sponsors currently include the Air Staff’s Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance Directorate (XOI) and the Air Force's 39th and 23rd 

Information Operations Squadrons; the Secretary of Defense’s Office of Net 

Assessment (OSD/NA); the Defense Threat Reduction Agency; the Army 

Environmental Policy Institute; and the Air Force long-range plans directorate 
ix

(XPXP). The mission of the Institute is “to promote national security research 

for the Department of Defense within the military academic community, and 

to support the Air Force national security education program.” Its research 

focuses on the areas of greatest interest to our organizational sponsors: arms 

control, proliferation, aerospace planning and policy, information operations, 

and regional and emerging issues in national security. 

INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various disciplines 

and across the military services to develop new ideas for defense policy 

making. To that end, the Institute develops topics, selects researchers from 

within the military academic community, and administers sponsored research. 

It also hosts conferences and workshops and facilitates the dissemination of 

information to a wide range of private and government organizations. INSS 

provides valuable, cost-effective research to meet the needs of our sponsors. 

We appreciate your continued interest in INSS and our research products. 

JAMES M. SMITH 

 Director
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US POLICY TOWARDS SECESSION IN THE BALKANS AND 

EFFECTIVENESS OF DE FACTO PARTITION 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

During the decade of the 1990s, as ethnic conflicts obtained greater salience 

and demonstrated renewed ability to destabilize the international order, 

successive US administrations fostered cautious multilateral policies. 

Washington advocated interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo that were designed 

to end conflict and restore order in the short-run while firmly denying the right 

to partition the original state. Partition—the creation of one or more new 

independent states from an existing one—was normatively and practically 

rejected. Instead, the US and its NATO allies opted for de facto partition as 

the “best of the worst” policy choices. 

 The de facto partitions in Bosnia and Kosovo are short-term military 

and political expedients involving the use of non-sovereign boundaries to 

divide states ethnically, geographically and politically. Simultaneously, the 

regimes imposed by the Dayton Accords in Bosnia and the UN protectorate in 

Kosovo emphasize the use of political and economic incentives to bridge 

military and territorial boundaries. The following study examines the two 

major ongoing civil-military attempts to manage ethnic conflict in the Balkans 

via de facto partition. The analysis focuses on the extent to which policy 

implementation bolsters the underlying objective—to maintain a multiethnic 

sovereign state and prevent secession or partition. The study assesses the de 

facto partition regimes in Bosnia and Kosovo in terms of their short-term 

effectiveness containing conflict and the long-term prospects for state 

preservation. In each case, the analysis begins with a brief review of the 

objectives of the intervenors. Subsequent sections focus on the military and 

political aspects of the intervention, and the extent to which they are 

reinforcing partition or integration. The conclusion offers a blunt final 

assessment of international efforts in the Balkans and policy recommendations 

addressing current shortcomings. 
xii

 The evidence demonstrates that some progress has been made 

towards achieving the underlying objective in both cases—to establish 

multiethnic democracy and prevent secession or partition. De facto partition 

has brought short-term gains to Bosnia and Kosovo. It has proven to be an 

effective post-conflict mechanism to separate formerly warring parties. The 

international forces have restored peace to Bosnia and Kosovo. However, 

progress towards establishing a stable multiethnic state and territory in Bosnia 

and Kosovo, respectively, has been slowed and is in danger of stalling. The 

continued presence of war criminals and associated mafias in both states 

provides a sustained threat to internal security. The criminal networks prevent 

true freedom of movement of peoples, goods and capital, affecting long-term 

economic prospects as well. Finally, in Bosnia the lack of a functioning 

central government leaves the state out of the European integration process 

and continues to prevent compromise and a power shift from nationalists to 

more moderate politicians. 

 The study recommends that the implementers in Bosnia and Kosovo 

move quickly and assertively to: 1) remove internal security threats, 2) begin 

to reform the economic system and 3) in Bosnia, rewrite the constitution to 

strengthen the central government. The author asserts that de facto partition 

cannot become the basis for policy, if civilian and military peace implementers 

are unwilling to aggressively administer the protectorates that result. Firm 

international administration is required to implement the political and 

economic reforms that will bridge the de facto partition. Imposing reform 

upon these ethnically divided societies is the only “shock-therapy” that will 

allow for relatively quick political change and conditions conducive to a 

removal of the international forces that enforce the de facto partitions. 
xiii

IMPROVING US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS THROUGH 

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The post-Cold War era has seen a rise in the number of international 

peacekeeping operations undertaken by the world community. While these 

missions have often consumed the world’s attention, the US-Russian 

relationship still plays a crucial role in world affairs. This paper seeks to answer 

three main questions: 

1. Can relations between the US and Russia be improved through combined 

peacekeeping operations and support for Russian peacekeeping in the near 

abroad? 

2. In what areas can the US most effectively use resources to enhance 

cooperation in peacekeeping? 

3. What actions should the US take to initiate or improve relations in these 

areas?

Cooperation in Peacekeeping 

The US has several vital and important interests involved in 

maintaining a cooperative relationship with Russia. While the current 

relationship is somewhat tense, one of the most promising ways to improve 

the overall strategic relationship is through cooperation in peacekeeping 

efforts. These efforts provide an opportunity for higher level political figures 

to interact and allow the US and Russia to promote their mutual interests. 

Assessment of Russian Peacekeeping 

To find the areas where the US can most effectively use its resources 

to enhance cooperation in peacekeeping, this paper assesses: 1) where Russia 

is most likely to participate, 2) Russian peacekeeping training and equipment, 

3) Russian peacekeeping doctrine, 4) a case of participation in an international 

operation, Bosnia, and 5) a case of involvement in the near abroad with a low 

level of UN supervision, Abkhazia. 
xiv

Participation: Russia’s economic and political situations limit them to 

participation in peacekeeping missions in the near abroad, the Balkans, and, to 

a limited extent, UN operations. 

Training and Equipment: The training Russian forces receive for these 

missions is adequate, but their equipment is outdated and poorly maintained. 

Doctrine: Russian peacekeeping doctrine, at least in practice, differs from US 

doctrine in three areas: 1) a greater propensity to use force, 2) an often-times 

partial approach to promote Russian interests, and 3) the inclusion of 

combatants in the peacekeeping force. 

Performance in Bosnia: As an example of Russian participation in combined 

operations with the US under NATO auspices, Bosnia shows that Russian 

troops perform adequately. The major issues in Russian performance include 

setting up a mutually agreeable command and control structure, questions of 

Russian partiality and lack of professionalism, equipment and maintenance 

problems, and language and cultural barriers.

Performance in Abkhazia: In Abkhazia, Russian forces act under CIS auspices 

with UN supervision. They perform the minimum task of maintaining 

stability reasonably well, partly because of their heavy-handed approach. 

Russian troops have frequently acted with partiality towards the Abkhaz, and 

have been unable or unwilling to completely fulfill their mandate to provide a 

secure environment and to facilitate the return of refugees. 

The US has an opportunity to improve the overall strategic relationship with 

Russia by improving cooperation in the Balkans and finding areas to support 

Russian peacekeeping in the near abroad. 

Bosnia 

The US should seek to improve cooperation and communication in Bosnia by: 

increasing the number of LNO’s (liaison officers) to the Russian Brigade, 

including a Russian Representative in PfP command post exercises, and 

restarting the combined patrolling missions that the Russian and US troops 

perform. To reduce cultural misunderstandings and break down language 
xv

barriers, the US should set aside more time to brief incoming American 

commanders (down through platoon leaders and NCO’s) and develop phrase 

books on various differences in military culture, terminology, and procedures. 

Abkhazia 

The US can support Russian peacekeeping in the near abroad by allowing 

American UN observers more freedom to travel in the conflict region and 

increasing their interactions with CIS peacekeeping forces. The US should 

also encourage and support other CIS nations, such as the Ukraine, 

Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia, to take a more active role in CIS 

peacekeeping missions, bolstering the CIS and improving its peacekeeping 

capabilities and legitimacy.

Overall Recommendations 

These recommendations can improve the US-Russian relationship in the 

context of any type of peacekeeping operation: 

1) Define each nation’s participation in the operational planning of 

multinational peacekeeping operations by the level or amount of their 

participation in the operation. 

2) Restart educational exchanges between US and Russian military personnel. 

3) Perform combined exercises of staff level officers under the established PfP 

program. 

4) Improve Russian language and cultural expertise among US officers. 

5) Increase cultural training for officers and NCOs assigned to work with 

Russian units. 

6) Give more credit to Russia for its peacekeeping operations in recognition of 

improved performance in desired areas. 
xvi
US POLICY TOWARDS SECESSION IN THE BALKANS 

AND EFFECTIVENESS OF DE FACTO PARTITION 

Evelyn N. Farkas 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

USAF Academy, Colorado 
2 
3 

US POLICY TOWARDS SECESSION IN THE BALKANS 

AND EFFECTIVENESS OF DE FACTO PARTITION 

INTRODUCTION 

Issues of separatism in its extreme form—secession—are a direct challenge to 

the international system, as the 1999 Kosovo crisis vividly illustrated. The 

decision to allow, facilitate, support or obstruct efforts by ethnic or communal 

groups to carve their own states out of existing entities is the most difficult 

and controversial one confronting powerful states and the international 

community. This is particularly true in Europe, where ethnic conflict affects 

the viability and credibility of NATO, the uniquely operational transatlantic 

political-military alliance. As the NATO operation in Kosovo demonstrated, 

miscalculations threaten to shatter alliances, bring great powers to blows, and 

render international organizations (chief among them the UN) irrelevant. 

 During the decade of the 1990s, as ethnic conflicts obtained greater 

salience and demonstrated renewed ability to destabilize the international 

order, successive US administrations fostered cautious multilateral policies. 

Washington advocated interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo which were 

designed to end conflict and restore order in the short-run, while firmly 

denying the right to partition the original state. Partition—the creation of one 

or more new independent states from an existing one—was normatively and 

practically rejected. Instead, the US and its NATO allies opted for de facto

partition as the “best of the worst” policy choices. 

 The de facto partitions in Bosnia and Kosovo involve the use of nonsovereign boundaries to divide states ethnically, geographically and 

politically. Diplomats advocate de facto partition for several reasons having 

to do with justice, demonstration effects, and most obviously, halting and 

preventing conflict. De facto partition does not fully reward secessionists for 

adopting violence or criminal means such as genocide and “ethnic cleansing.” 
4 

Policymakers regard it as less precedent setting than outright partition, and as 

such less likely to cause demonstration effects (attempts by other secessionists 

to achieve results in a similar fashion). Finally—and most significantly—de 

facto partition has been portrayed by US and European officials as an interim 

solution, a means toward reinstating or establishing a tolerant multiethnic 

state. 

Policymakers regard de facto partition as a short-term military and 

political expedient formulated to allow a return to rational interest-based, as 

opposed to nationalist, politics. The fundamental assumption driving US 

policy towards secession and de facto partition is the notion that ethnic 

conflict is instrumental. While nationalists may appeal to primordial instincts, 

ethnic conflict itself is not inevitable and immutable; it can be managed based 

on an appeal to interests.1

 Political and economic mechanisms can be 

employed to reduce the benefits of ethnically-based politics. 

 The regimes imposed by the Dayton Accords and the UN protectorate 

in Kosovo emphasize the use of political and economic incentives to bridge 

military and territorial boundaries. The following study examines the two 

major ongoing civil-military attempts to manage ethnic conflict in the Balkans 

via de facto partition. The analysis focuses on the extent to which policy 

implementation bolsters the underlying objective—to maintain a multiethnic 

sovereign state and prevent secession or partition. The study assesses the de 

facto partition regimes in Bosnia and Kosovo in terms of their short-term 

effectiveness containing conflict and the long-term prospects for state 

preservation. 

 The evidence demonstrates that some progress has been made 

towards achieving the underlying objective in both cases—to establish 

multiethnic democracy and prevent secession or partition. However, 

integration or multiethnic coexistence has not gained the upper hand against 
5 

separatism. Peace has been restored to both Bosnia and Kosovo; NATO and 

its allies have completed the fundamental security assignments, reinforcing 

cease-fires and boundaries against major incursions or excursions. Yet, on the 

political and legal front much remains to be done. Bosnia is not functioning as 

a unified state; its central government barely functions. In Kosovo, there is 

still less ethnic tolerance and Serbs and Albanians fail to even cooperate on 

the question of elections. In both cases the rule of law is weak, interethnic 

trust is low, and only international edict has been able to bring about the 

minimal progress that has occurred. This paper examines the peace 

implementation efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo. In each case, the analysis 

begins with a brief review of the objectives of the intervening organs. 

Subsequent sections focus on the military and political aspects of the 

intervention, and the extent to which they are reinforcing partition or 

integration. The conclusion offers a blunt final assessment of international 

efforts in the Balkans and policy recommendations addressing current 

shortcomings. 

BOSNIA 

The 1995 Dayton Peace Accords established the framework for maintaining 

peace in Bosnia, preserving the sovereignty of the Bosnian state—albeit in a 

much diluted form—and for forging a democratic system of government. The 

agreement divides Bosnia into two non-sovereign political “entities” or 

nationalist boundaries. The cease-fire line, with some modifications, became 

the Inter-entity Boundary Line (IEBL) designating 49 percent of Bosnian 

territory as the Republika Srbska and 51 percent as the Bosnian-Croat 

Federation. The peace accords consist of eleven articles and thirteen annexes. 

The first two annexes outline the partition, including the role of NATO and its 

allies in enforcing the separation of the warring parties. The remaining eleven 

annexes comprise the civilian program for establishing a confederation, 
6 

securing justice (including the right of refugees to return) and respect for 

human rights.2

 US negotiators accepted de facto partition as an undesirable but 

necessary way to achieve Serbian acceptance of an agreement ending the war. 

The NATO military forces would oversee the separation of the military forces, 

while the creation of the entities ensured that the political elites would 

maintain local control. At the same time, the negotiators intended to bridge 

the territorial and military divisions through state institutions, and provisions 

related to human rights, refugee return and property rights. 

Security 

In 1996 NATO and its partners sent 60,000 troops into Bosnia to keep the 

peace. By D+120 they succeeded in securing the IEBL, separating the 

warring parties and moving weapons into cantonment sites. Their success 

enabled subsequent reductions so that by May 2000 the Stabilization Force 

(SFOR)’s total strength had tapered off to 23,000 troops, including 4,600 US 

troops (about 20 percent of the total.) The cease-fire holds, and the 

boundaries are set. The status of Brcko—straddling the strategic Posavina 

corridor, which potentially links north-central Bosnia to eastern Bosnia and 

Serbia—was arbitrated and declared without any armed resistance.3

 Brcko, a 

single demilitarized unit of local self-government outside of the entities and 

directly under the sovereignty of Bosnia and Hercegovina, is functioning as a 

multiethnic district.4

 Beyond Brcko, there is one country, but there are 

currently three armies in Bosnia, which absorb about forty percent of all 

public spending.5

 Finally, Bosnia’s borders remain unregulated and “probably 

the greatest revenue source for criminal elements and hard-line nationalists in 

Bosnia and Hercegovina.”6

 In a step toward creating a unified military the international 
7 

community pushed the entity armed forces to establish a functioning 

Secretariat for the Dayton mandated Standing Committee on Military Matters 

(SCMM) in July 1999, and is pressuring the entities to forge—via the 

SCMM—a common state security policy. International officials assert that the 

Bosnian leadership should be focused on joining European organizations. 

Yet, there cannot be any question of association with NATO, much less 

membership, if Bosnia has three militaries and no defense policy.7

 To date, 

Bosnia still has no national security strategy. The international politicalmilitary leadership did, however, manage to convince the entities to plan and 

implement a 15 percent reduction in military personnel and budget. As of 

May 2000, according to SFOR, the reduction was complete.8

 Meanwhile, the 

January 2000 elections in Croatia yielded a change of government and a 

pledge to cut off support to the Herceg-Bosna extremists. The US, Croatia 

and the Federation signed an agreement in the spring of 2000 asserting that all 

security assistance would be channeled through the SCMM.9

 But as of now—

even with the international community’s recent seizure of the banks funding 

the Bosnian Croat nationalist movement—none of this has removed the threat 

of independent Bosnian Croat military action. 

 On the internal security front, there are also three de facto police 

forces, and all three ethnic groups manage to employ illegal secret police. 

Political patronage is the thread holding this system together. The UN 

Mission in Bosnia, with the mandate for police restructuring and reform, is 

trying to tear holes into this venal web. On the entity or federal levels the UN 

is actively working to foster multiethnicity. The UN established a Standing 

Committee on Police Matters and on 3 May 2000 the entities signed an 

agreement to facilitate the redeployment of 200-300 police across the IEBL to 

their pre-war assignments. At about the same time, a specially trained twelvemember multiethnic police unit was sent to East Timor. In addition, the UN 
8 

Special Representative and Head of Mission established a small multiethnic 

border police force, which deployed to the Sarajevo airport on 6 June 2000. 

The UN, with the help of the Austrian government, hopes to expand this force, 

ultimately, to address the porous nature of Bosnian borders.10 

 Unfortunately, while it is possible for the UN to take decisive action 

at the highest levels to create state-level cooperation, or structures, the UN is 

severely restricted by its mandate on the local level. The UN International 

Police Task Force (IPTF) only has a mandate to advise and observe the local 

police, not to enforce the law themselves. As a result, though they routinely 

review police organization and behavior, they cannot force implementation. 

Nonetheless, the IPTF audits local police and conducts human rights training. 

The IPTF attempts to work with local police to help them deal with organized 

crime and corruption, but in most cases police are part of the patronage 

systems, and even criminal networks. The Office of the High Representative 

(OHR) bolsters these efforts by removing cantonal ministers and local police 

chiefs for noncompliance.11 Meanwhile, SFOR made one of the most 

significant contributions to crime fighting, successfully “busting” an extensive 

criminal network in West Mostar. This is another way to attack the 

obstructionist political actors, shaking the socioeconomic foundation of its 

power. 

 The environment in Bosnia is generally secure, although ethnically 

motivated violence is still common, especially in areas where minorities are 

returning. Local criminal rings serve their own economic interests, 

intimidating refugees and others who represent a threat to their objectives. 

Many of the ringleaders are war criminals who control formal and/or informal 

patronage systems, much like Mafia dons. They often act in collusion with 

local nationalist political leaders, and since NATO forces have not 

apprehended them, their influence remains without serious challenge. As of 
9 

June 2000 the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 

(ICTY) reported 67 indictees. Of those, 41 had surrendered or been captured 

and were in proceedings. Twenty-five remain at large.12 

 The shaky security situation—with many key war criminals at 

large—has directly impacted the refugee issue. Article 7 of the Dayton 

Accords is the single most significant integrating mechanism established by 

the US and its allies. Its promise, however, goes unfulfilled. Refugees, 

especially those returning to areas where they will be in the minority, are 

afraid to return. The war left Bosnia with over 2 million refugees and 

displaced persons. Since 1996, however, 310,000 refugees returned to Bosnia 

and an additional 250,000 displaced persons went home. At the start of 1999 

experts estimated that about 400,000 refugees and 800,000 displaced persons 

were still waiting to return.13 The international community has only made 

half-hearted, toothless attempts to address this situation. OHR’s 

Reconstruction and Return Task Force has been gradually working to address 

administrative and legal obstacles to return and has used economic leverage in 

targeted areas to encourage and support returns. Still, while the UN declared 

1998 the Year of the Refugee, only 100,000 Bosnians, half of the official 

target, went home. Of that group only 30,000 returned to areas where they 

would be in the minority. In the following year about 70,000 minority returns 

occurred. Most of the remaining one million or so displaced persons and 

refugees are potential minority returns. However, unorchestrated returns have 

been increasing over the last year, signaling a shift of initiative to the 

population. Perhaps in response to this phenomenon—and to international 

pressure—the ethnic Serb leadership has demonstrated more willingness to 

address the issue of resettlement.14 

 Current criticism of NATO’s efforts focuses on the issue of civil 
10 

violence and arson in refugee resettlement areas, and SFOR’s reluctance to 

apprehend war criminals.15 For the first two years of the mission, NATO 

commanders interpreted their mandate to capture war criminals “during the 

course of normal duties” in the strictest fashion. Indeed, they went to great 

lengths to avoid coming across war criminals during normal operations. From 

July 1997 onward, however, SFOR began staging raids aimed at capturing 

them. British troops were the first to act, conducting two operations in July 

1997, which led to the capture of one war criminal and the death of another. 

Since then several others have been apprehended by British or US troops. The 

French commanders have been most reluctant to act, and most of the 

remaining indictees are believed to be in their sector, including the former 

Bosnian Serb President, Radovan Karadzic.16 In April 2000, under acute 

pressure from their allies, the French finally seized Momcilo Krajsnik, a senior 

deputy to Karadzic and the Serb member of the first Dayton Presidency. 

 Meanwhile, after SFOR troops had demonstrated a hampered ability 

to respond to various civil disturbances in Brcko in 1997 and elsewhere, the 

Peace Implementation Council (PIC) members and NATO agreed to establish 

the Multinational Special Unit (MSU). The MSU, initially 800-strong and 

composed mainly of European police units, is the SFOR Commander’s 

emergency force in the event of riots or other civil disturbances.17 In 1998, 

the international political and military leadership began to develop a more 

cooperative and coordinated approach. The High Representative began to 

remove local officials who were violating electoral laws or otherwise blocking 

the implementation of Dayton. SFOR and the IPTF stepped in to ensure that 

OHR’s decisions were implemented. The MSU provided confidence that this 

could achieved with minimum unrest. There were some successes, most 

notably the Westar operation.18 Nevertheless, change—especially of the 

demographic sort—is strongly resisted by local nationalists and war criminals. 
11 

It is this de facto alliance that prevents most refugees from returning and 

blocks implementation of Dayton beyond Annex 1A. “As long as these 

criminals remain at liberty, the rule of law is incomplete—police and judges 

are intimidated, corruption is rife, normal democratic politics is impossible.” 19

Political Institutions and Processes 

Politically speaking, Bosnia is a shell of a state. Indeed, the federal 

government exists largely on paper. Over the last six years the international 

community has been unable to transform the constitution into reality. Bosnia 

does not exist as a united functioning federal state. Instead, there are two 

entities grudgingly co-existing, but not cooperating. Indeed, the Spring 2001 

secession declaration by the nationalist Croats in western Bosnia highlights 

the serious division within the Bosnian-Croat Federation; there are three 

competing groups preventing the government from functioning. The federal 

government is “at the mercy of three entities; two don’t want the central 

government to function and the central government needs the entities for the 

authority to function.”20 The central government remains hostage to 

nationalism. After more than $5 billion in foreign aid, including over $1 

billion from the US, this is where Dayton has failed most. 

 Yet Dayton has failed on this score partly because it has 

acknowledged nationalism and ethnic interests. In the compromise between 

the nationalist Serbs and Croats, who wanted as much separation as possible, 

and their Muslim counterparts, who insisted on integration and a unified state, 

the negotiators created a European government unlike any other. The entities 

were to resolve their differences through an ethnically divided assembly and a 

tripartite Presidency representing the major Bosnian ethnic groups. “The 

entire constitution enshrines ethnic discrimination as a principle of law.”21 

Under this system the basis for all politics remains ethnic. Not only has it 

proved unworkable, but also experts point out that it is incompatible with 
12 

European human rights law. Bosnia cannot join the Council of Europe or the 

European Union with such a constitution (and joining NATO would require 

the creation of a single Bosnian army). 

 From 1996 to 2001, three OHR administrations have worked to 

establish common institutions and to invest them with power. After two 

frustrating years where the OHR struggled simply to bring the three Presidents 

together—literally in one room—the international community adopted a 

harder line toward the Bosnian leaders. In 1997-98 at the meetings of the 

Peace Implementation Conference (PIC) in Sintra (Portugal) and Bonn, the 

OHR obtained support for a stronger interpretation of its mandate (Article 5 of 

Annex 10 of the DPA.)22 As a result, in the face of extended stalling and 

contention, the High Representative, Carlos Westendorp, was able to impose a 

common license plate, flag and currency upon the Bosnian Presidency. The 

PIC reaffirmed the authority of the OHR and the Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to remove obstructionist officials from 

office or ballots. This practice has been exercised with some vigor ever since, 

though OHR and OSCE decisions often must be enforced by police forces, 

and even after problematic individuals are removed from office they generally 

continue to function behind the scenes. The Sintra/Bonn decisions brought 

about the single most dramatic change in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Suddenly, 

freedom of movement existed. From 1998 onwards the climate shifted. The 

prevalent fear for one’s physical safety gave way to concern about long-term 

economic viability. 

 Meanwhile, the central institutions meet infrequently and usually to 

no effect. The Parliamentary Assembly passed over twenty laws over the 

course of three years, but only due to coercion from the international 

community. Few of these laws have proper provisions for enforcement.23 As 

a result, the state legislature has failed to alter the political or economic 
13 

landscape in Bosnia. Despite all of this, at the end of 1998 the PIC members 

agreed that the subsequent two years would involve “the authorities in BiH 

[Bosnia and Hercegovina] increasingly assuming greater responsibility.”24 

Then, in September 1999 Wolfgang Petritsch was appointed High 

Representative. His tenure marked the shift from the aggressive quasiprotectorate-style Westendorp espoused, to a coaxing effort Petritsch 

characterizes as “ownership.” According to the OHR, this concept 

“emphasizes the fact that it is the leadership and authorities of BiH who are 

primarily responsible for the implementation of the Peace Agreement, and not 

the International Community.”25

 Petritsch’s deputy concedes that there is an apparent contradiction 

between ownership and unity, in as much as the “owners” are not interested in 

unity. However, he explains that, “local indigenous politicians need to be 

more responsible, because if we can’t succeed, they will develop a readiness 

to depend on the International Community for decisionmaking.”26 Indeed, 

OHR officials state that the Bosnian politicians hide behind international 

officials and refuse to take blame or credit themselves. They stonewall until 

the internationals impose a solution. Of course, these nationalist leaders have 

everything to lose from the provisions aimed at strengthening the central 

government and establishing a multiethnic system of government. They have 

no interest in furthering change and therefore achieve their objectives by 

stalling and hoping that the passage of time will favor their interests. It 

generally has. Therefore, it is not surprising that ownership looks relatively 

ineffectual. Its critics maintain that Petritsch’s approach is “like 

Vietnamization—it provides the US with cover so we can leave.”27 General 

Wesley Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe reckons, 

“Ownership is a step backwards.”28

 As a result, the burst of progress in 1998 has been followed by far too 
14 

plodding efforts, as the OHR makes an “effort to continue to resist stepping in 

too early.”29 OHR officials aim to encourage the development of a successor 

generation of politicians. Faced with indigenous opposition, they insist, 

“[if]...people don’t cooperate we need to take people off the table. If people 

obstruct, they need to be removed. Maybe that encourages successors.”30 

Indeed, Petritsch has exercised this power much more frequently than his 

predecessor, removing a total of forty-five officials between November 1999 

and September 2000; Westendorp only removed one obstructionist politician. 

It is unclear whether this has encouraged cooperation, or merely increased 

public disgust with politics. Nonetheless, the modus operandi is to push the 

Bosnian leaders or wait them out on more urgent issues, hoping that they 

might be forced to take action under the threat of public embarrassment. 

 In the meantime, the OHR has made progress on the issue of creating 

new ministries. Quietly, it has also been formulating a solution to deal with 

the fact that the rotational Presidency is unconstitutional. The Social 

Democratic Party of Bosnia proposed a new ethnically blind electoral law, so 

that, for example, a Serb living in the Federation can become a President too. 

They explain, “If the Presidency is made up of three representatives of three 

peoples, then this does not reflect the civic principle. That principle exists to 

the extent that individuals feel that they are first of all citizens of BosniaHerzegovina. But according to the Constitution and the structure of the 

electorate, the national principle is absolutely dominant.”31

 In theory, the most encouraging development is the 4 July 2000 

decision by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Hercegovina that it “shall 

have exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether any provision of an Entity’s 

Constitution or Law is consistent with this Constitution.”32 The exercise of 

this right would be truly exciting. In the meantime, OHR and the UN (under 

the auspices of its Judicial Assessment Program) have focused on pressuring 
15 

the entities to reform their judicial systems. Reform legislation has been 

adopted by the parliament; similar legislation was imposed by OHR on the 

Federation in May 2000. The objective is to establish a judicial selection 

commission to review the appointments and dismissals of judges and 

prosecutors, and to review all sitting judges and prosecutors. In an effort to 

tackle the criminal problems from another angle, OHR imposed a law 

directing the Federation to establish a first instance criminal court to try 

criminal, terrorist and organized crime cases. The court was established in 

February 2000, but the Federation did not authorize funding for it.33 

Developing a robust independent judiciary does not appear to be on the 

agenda of the Federation leadership. Naturally, this does nothing to establish 

respect for law and justice. 

 There is no escape from the fact that, “Very few [Bosnian leaders]—

Silajdzic and Izetbegovic excepted—want the central institutions to work.” 34 

And even the Bosnian Muslim leadership is unwilling to make significant 

changes that might jeopardize its grip on power. In short, as Jacques Klein the 

head of the UN mission sees it, “The leaders that got us into war, can’t get us 

out.... Here in Bosnia, things are frozen.”35 The electoral process is partly to 

blame, as it has reinforced ethnic divisions and made it difficult for moderates 

to attempt to gain large multiethnic constituencies. The nationalist parties 

control the machines, which include the jobs, the media and business. OHR 

addressed this conundrum by instituting a regulation prohibiting members of 

any government from simultaneously holding positions as business managers 

or board members of state-owned or private enterprises. Nonetheless, change 

is slow. “The April municipal elections demonstrated that hard-line nationalist 

parties remain a powerful force, even though their grip is weakening.”36

 Indeed, the fall national elections brought more moderates to power 
16 

among the Muslims, but Bosnia’s problems go beyond security and ethnic 

harmony. The economic foundation upon which the entire Dayton structure 

rests, arguably, is rotted through and incapable of supporting a robust 

multiethnic democratic state.37 OHR officials cite fewer attacks on returnees 

in 2000 and early signs of an increasing return rate as encouraging trends.38 

Nonetheless, “as each year passes, the clock runs out. The economic situation 

hinders the process because of the lack of employment.”39 The private sector 

in Bosnia is at a standstill; corruption and red tape prevent new enterprise. 

Foreign investors are deterred by corruption and communist-era red tape. 

Domestic investors are also inhibited by the patronage systems; they also 

suffer for lack of capital and an open banking system. Unfortunately, the 

internationals only began to express concern about such issues about two 

years into the peace implementation process. Now, new reform proposals 

must contend with the fact that economic assistance to Bosnia is shrinking. 

More disturbingly, the Bosnian government appears uncommitted to working 

with the Stability Pact, the international community’s latest proposal for 

bolstering the economies of Southeastern Europe.40 Sadly, this only bolsters 

assessments that the Stability Pact itself “is likely to remain a framework 

organization.”41

 The internationals have concluded that in Bosnia, “It’s easier to turn 

an aquarium into fish soup than to make fish soup into an aquarium.” 42 It 

certainly took less time to rip Bosnia apart than it is taking to reconstruct a 

stable, nominally democratic multiethnic state. Nonetheless, much progress 

has been made—especially from 1998 on. Mistakes were made and lessons 

learned. The civilian and military components of the IFOR operation did not 

have a close cooperative or collaborative relationship. In fact, IFOR 

commanders resisted pressure by the OHR, the civilian coordinating authority, 

to interpret the Dayton mandate more broadly. IFOR commanders provided 
17 

minimal assistance to civilian agencies implementing Annexes 2-11 of the 

Accords. Moreover, the lack of civil-military cooperation was compounded 

by the fact that the OHR did not have its own operational arm at the outset, 

and had no direct authority over the other civilian institutions operating in 

Bosnia. OHR’s coordinating function, in short, was weak. Ultimately, de 

facto partition was enforced within a few months. Yet, the measures that were 

to soften the boundary lines did not begin to be implemented until 1998. 

Today, after more active SFOR-OHR coordination, there is freedom of 

movement, but progress on refugee returns remains tentative. Four years later, 

the international community has realized that keeping people (especially 

educated youths) in Bosnia, much less returning them, requires addressing not 

only security, but also economics. Bosnia is in dire need of judicial and 

economic reform. 

KOSOVO 

The multinational peace operation, headed by the UN, aims to maintain the 

boundaries and stability of the province of Kosovo and to establish an 

autonomous democratic government for the territory. UN Security Council 

Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 authorizes and establishes the framework for 

achieving those objectives. The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is charged 

with coordinating the effort “to provide an interim administration for Kosovo 

under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”43 UNMIK’s mandate includes establishing a 

transitional administration to run the province, ostensibly until a future date 

when Kosovo’s political and territorial status will be definitively settled. In 

the meantime, a NATO-led international Kosovo Force (KFOR) provides for 

overall security. 

 Though the first head of UNMIK, Bernard Kouchner, assumed office 

asserting that a multicultural society must be established in Kosovo within six 
18 

months, he was referring to achieving “coexistence” among Serbs, Albanians, 

Roma (Gypsies), and others. The goal now is to establish mono-ethnic 

communities through which other communities can move freely. 

The final disposition of Kosovo has been put off into the indefinite future; the 

first prerequisite was regime change in Belgrade—removal of Milosevic, 

which has occurred. Nonetheless, the Kostunica government must also be 

willing and able to negotiate with the Kosovar Albanians; conversely the 

Albanians must be willing to meet with representatives of the government in 

Belgrade. Even the new regime may not be able to solve the long-term selfdetermination issue. For now, the Kosovars must settle for de facto autonomy, 

enforced by the international de facto partition of Serbia. 

Security 

KFOR troop strength is approximately 50,000, with 42,500 troops from 28 

countries in Kosovo and another 7,500 supporting troops in Macedonia, 

Albania and Greece.44 The US contributes about 5,500 military personnel, 

roughly a 14 percent contribution. KFOR’s mission is to “establish and 

maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, including public order” until 

UNMIK can assume this responsiblity. KFOR is also responsible for 

enforcing the Military Technical Agreement reached with the Yugoslav 

military—providing for their pullout from Kosovo—and demilitarizing the 

Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA.) Significantly, one of three KFOR mission 

objectives is to “provide assistance to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 

including core functions until they are transferred to UNMIK.”45 The KFOR 

command asserts that “KFOR and UNMIK are Partners in the international 

effort to restore Kosovo and to help the local population to transfer the 

province into a free and democratic society.” 46 Thus, though KFOR’s main 

function is to provide security, it will provide resources and manpower to 

directly assist the various organizations and entities working under UN 
19 

auspices or coordination.47 Unquestionably, this language is a direct outcome 

of a lesson learned in Bosnia, where lack of coordination or even cooperation, 

especially during 1996-97 led to slow implementation of the nonmilitary 

annexes of Dayton, and even victories for nationalists.48 

 KFOR has managed to prevent major military incursions or 

excursions through Kosovo’s boundaries. The Yugoslav army in accordance 

with the Military Technical Agreement and KFOR has established military 

dominance over the territory. Yet, there are still external security challenges 

in the form of incursions by the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and 

Bujanovac (UCPMB), a military organization mirroring the KLA with a 

mission to wrest majority Albanian towns just southeast of Kosovo from 

Serbian/Yugoslav control. UCPMB militia use Kosovo as a base or safe 

haven and a weapons transit point. Through attacks on Serb police units in the 

Presevo valley inside Serbia, the UCPMB hopes to wrest this eastern border 

area from Yugoslav control and to attach it to Kosovo. Increased military 

activity in the buffer zone separating Kosovo from Yugoslav territory led 

KFOR to conclude an agreement in early 2001 allowing Yugoslav troops to 

reenter the zone. KFOR officials insist, “KFOR is determined to prevent any 

action that would make Kosovo a staging area for exporting violence.”49 They 

have been sorely tested by the UCPMB and also by the related ethnic 

Albanian militia elements crossing back and forth between Kosovo and 

Macedonia. 

 On the internal security front, the KLA and associated Kosovar 

Albanian extremists have posed the greatest challenge. On 21 June 1999 the 

KLA Commander-in-Chief signed the “Undertaking of Demilitarization and 

Transformation,” which effectively disbanded the KLA. KLA forces were 

divided into a new Kosovo Police Service (KPS), and the Kosovo Protection 

Corps (KPC, functioning), and some KLA members formed the Party of 
20 

Democratic Progress of Kosovo (PPDK). Still others returned to civilian life. 

The 5,000 man KPC, though it functions akin to a national guard with a civil 

relief mission, is also aimed to “defuse possible resistance to the KLA’s 

demilitarization by providing ex-KLA fighters and commanders with jobs and 

a quasi-military structure.”50 By September 1999 the demilitarization of the 

KLA was complete. Tons of weapons and ammunition have been seized or 

relinquished. However, informed observers insist that the KLA still exists as a 

de facto organization, and that its access to arms remains unobstructed. “No 

one in Kosovo believes that the KLA has simply disappeared: it remains as a 

powerful and active element in every aspect of Kosovo Albanian life.” 51 

Nevertheless, the KLA, formerly a large grass-roots military organization, has 

shrunk and the new leaders of the PPDK and KPC no longer have the popular 

appeal they had two years ago. 

 The former KLA elements have proved troublesome in as much as 

they are suspected to be behind organized and ethnically motivated crime. The 

international community has not been able to ascertain the extent to which 

violence against Serbs, Roma, Slavic Muslims and others has been 

coordinated. In addition, it is also unclear how many perpetrators are 

masquerading as KLA members. Most analysts believe that “criminal groups, 

including some from Albania, have taken advantage of the slow deployment 

of international police and the lack of a functioning judicial system.”52 While 

not all of the criminals are former KLA, “anecdotal and circumstantial 

evidence has made it harder to believe that the KLA is entirely clean at any 

level.”53 There have been countless allegations against KPS members for 

unmandated or criminal activity. KFOR initiated 95 investigations of 

individuals, and subsequently expelled four men from the KPS and suspended 

a further nine.54
21 

 The single biggest challenge to achieving a peaceful security 

environment within Kosovo are the acts of intimidation and violence directed 

at ethnic minorities, especially Serbs and Gypsies. Most of the roughly 

830,000 ethnic Albanian refugees in neighboring countries returned to Kosovo 

in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, leaving only 25,000 Albanian, Serb 

and Roma refugees in the Balkan region and several thousand others outside 

the region.55 However, since NATO troops entered Kosovo in June 1999 

approximately 190,000 Serbs have left—about three-quarters of the pre-war 

population of 200-250 thousand.56 This exodus of the largest minority 

population in Kosovo is generally attributed to intimidation by Kosovar 

Albanians, who are seeking retribution for past individual or collective Serb 

actions.57 At the onset of the mission the interethnic murder rate averaged 

about 50 per week. About a year later, in the summer of 2000 the rate of such 

killings was 1-2 per week.58 Lesser ethnically motivated crimes have 

continued at a higher rate than that of homicides. 

 Most of the ethnic Serbs live in northern Kosovo, with about 

55,000—about half the total—in the town of Mitrovica.59 Yet Mitrovica is 

also home to Albanians who have resisted Serb pressure to leave entirely. 

Still, in February 2000 there were hundreds of Albanians expelled from the 

north side of town. KFOR was unable to prevent this population shift, and 

their attempts at quelling the concomitant violence highlighted alliance and 

coalition weaknesses. Several countries had let their troop contingent number 

fall and had significantly circumscribed their activities to prevent them from 

undertaking potentially dangerous tasks. The French KFOR troops in 

Mitrovica were unable to cope with the turmoil and requested US assistance. 

The US forces were subsequently attacked by rock-throwing mobs, and this in 

turn provoked a DoD decision to bar US troops from moving outside their 

sector in non-emergencies.60
22 

 In the aftermath of the February violence the town and the two ethnic 

groups were clearly divided by the Ibar River, with the Serbs in the north and 

Albanians in the south. Low-level unrest continued and on 22 March 2000 

KFOR established a “confidence area” within the town. This measure was 

adopted “with the purpose of providing a visible reassurance of their security 

to the general population of Mitrovica, protecting minorities, controlling 

access to the Confidence Area, and improving the freedom of movement of 

those living or working in the Confidence Area.”61 When it came to the last 

objective, freedom of movement was only secured within each side of the 

river. The UN and KFOR ultimately solidified the de facto partition of the 

town. This was far from the original intent; indeed, the UN intended to 

establish a “united city” with a joint administration including Serbs and 

Albanians. Since then, frustrated at every turn by the hard-line pro-Milosevic 

Serbs in Mitrovica, the UN has focused on economic mechanisms for 

achieving a sustainable level of coexistence. On 14 August 2000 the UN 

authorized KFOR to seize the mining facilities at Trepca, in the immediate 

proximity of Mitrovica. Also on that date, UNMIK signed an agreement with 

a French-Swedish-American consortium to rehabilitate the mining and 

metallurgical complex. The UN now manages it as a public enterprise. On 

this front at least the UN had moved closer to one final objective of their 

strategy for coexistence—establishing an industry that can attract investment 

and provide employment for the province.62 Indeed Kouchner declared, “By 

providing jobs and income for Kosovo, Trepca could be a key to achieving 

coexistence in northern Kosovo.”63

 Mitrovica stands as a stark symbol of the failure to achieve 

multiethnicity. Undeniably, for the internationals, “their signal failure, so far, 

has been to get the [Albanian] Kosovars to live with the remaining [Kosovar] 

Serbs.”64 According to one UN official, “The UN had lost [this battle] by 
23 

August because we came in too slow.”65 In the eight months it took the UN to 

install their personnel and take control of local administration, the KLA 

leaders managed to place their people in influential positions, where they 

continue to shape current political struggles. The fact that there was 

effectively no judicial system until the spring of 2000 benefited extreme 

nationalist and criminal elements. Ultimately, a common refrain among 

international observers and minorities in Kosovo was that the UN and KFOR 

effectively favored the Albanian Kosovars. 

 Since the spring of 2000, however, UNMIK and KFOR have made 

concerted attempts to address the persecution of the ethnic minorities, as well 

as the related rule of law vacuum. The internationals reached out to the 

moderate Serbian National Council located in Gracanica, central Kosovo. On 

28 February US Secretary of State Madeline Albright met with Bishop 

Artemije, the leader of the Serbian National Council, and secured his 

agreement to support a US government project to gradually return 

approximately 440 internally displaced Serbs to Kosovo. In March KFOR and 

the UN International Police (UNIP) initiated Operation Trojan I to provide 

security to Serbs traveling to and from church, market and as they worked 

their fields. In May a joint committee on returns, including UNMIK, KFOR 

and moderate Serbs, was established.66 And finally, during July 29 Serbs were 

returned to Slivovo in the predominantly Albanian area of eastern Kosovo.67

In a significant departure from, and improvement based on, UN 

experiences in Bosnia, the UN civil police in Kosovo are responsible for law 

enforcement and for developing a professional impartial Kosovar police force. 

Unlike the IPTF, its counterpart in Bosnia, UNIP does not simply monitor the 

local police. As of 29 March 2000 only 2,734 of the 3,500 police authorized 

by the international community had been deployed to Kosovo.68 By April, in 

response to pressure from Kouchner and the UN Secretary-General (who 
24 

recommended a force strength of 3,110), the deployed police force had grown 

to 3,954.69 In addition, only somewhat more than half of the special police 

unit for riot control—similar to the MSU in Bosnia—had been deployed by 

late-spring 2000.70 Even with the OSCE graduating approximately 800 new 

recruits from its police school and planning to train 4,000 by early 2001, 

security demands outpaced the international and local police supply.71

Political Institutions and Processes 

UNMIK, currently headed by Hans Haekkerup, is responsible for running the 

transitional administration for Kosovo and preparing the province for elections 

and local autonomy. The UN coordinates its efforts with those of the OSCE 

and EU. Under the “pillar” system UNMIK provides the roof or umbrella, 

with the head of each organization responsible for implementing a portion of 

the mandate reporting to Haekkerup. The UN itself is responsible for civil 

administration, the OSCE handles democratization and institution building, 

and the EU focuses on economic development. Humanitarian assistance, a 

fourth pillar run by UNHCR, completed its work in the spring of 2000. Its 

remaining longer-term development projects were absorbed by UNMIK. 

 On 16 July 1999 UNMIK established a Kosovo Transition Council of 

Kosvar Albanians and minority ethnic group political leaders to serve as a 

consultative body. Six months later, on 15 December 1999 UNMIK and three 

Albanian leaders (of the PPDK, LDK and LBD parties) signed an agreement 

establishing a Joint Administrative Structure (JIAS.) The agreement also 

stipulated that all monies of the former shadow government and parallel 

government structures be transferred to the JIAS. This organization is 

composed of an Interim Administrative Council of three Albanians, one Serb, 

four UNMIK representatives, and 19 administrative departments. It has been 

boycotted off and on by the Serb National Council (whose representatives 

joined the administrative departments in June 2000 as observers), as well as by 
25 

the Albanian PDK party. Nevertheless, it meets twice a week, has appointed 

administrative department heads and has approved measures to increase 

security and improve the judicial system.72 On the municipal level, UNMIK 

officials tout the establishment of representative municipal councils, including 

minorities, as a key success.73 Certainly, measures to include minorities and to 

address their security concerns, while a bit belated, have somewhat dispelled 

the notion that UNMIK is Albanian-partisan. 

 UNMIK was given a robust mandate with clear civilian lines of 

authority in order to avoid the delays in implementation experienced in 

Bosnia. “The international effort to organize the civil implementation mission 

in Kosovo drew heavily on the lessons learned from Bosnia.”74 Nonetheless, 

almost a year later, US officials conceded that UNMIK “has not fully 

established its authority over civil administration.”75 The experience in 

Bosnia proved that the first three months make or break a mission, but the UN, 

greeted in 23 out of 29 municipalities by self-appointed KLA administrators, 

scrambled to gain control.76 Administrative services arrived slowly and 

complaints regarding UN management of utilities and public services were 

rampant during the first six months of the mission. Since then UNMIK 

appears to have settled these issues, but as of July 2000 it was only 60 percent 

staffed.77 Nonetheless, one distinguished Kosovar Albanian asserts, “The 

truth is that in Kosov[o] there is no political system. There is a vacuum and 

not only in politics. There is a vacuum also in security, in the administration, 

and in the economy. We are the only country in Europe today that I can think 

of that is ruled by the self-constraint of its citizens rather than by the rule of 

law.”78

 The JIAS will be replaced sometime after province-wide elections are 

held. UNMIK is currently holding negotiations among Kosovar Albanians 

and Serbs regarding Kosovo’s internal legal structure. Meanwhile, the 28 
26 

October 2000 municipal elections yielded victory for the moderate Democratic 

League of Kosovo (LDK) party, run by Ibrahim Rugova, the former shadow 

President of Kosovo. This is significant, signaling that a significant number of 

Kosovar Albanians no longer remain as militantly nationalist as they were 

during the war in 1999. “In contrast to Bosnia immediately after the war, 

political trends in post-war Kosovo seem to be moving in favour of moderate 

political leaders and parties and away from the party most closely associated 

with the war-time KLA.” 79 Seen in this light, elections are a positive step for 

Kosovo, clearly transferring authority from the more radical nationalists to the 

moderates. Unfortunately, few ethnic Serbs registered or voted and no Serb 

parties participated.80

 The elections provided an impetus for politically motivated violence 

throughout Kosovo, with the local media fueling vigilante killings of Serbs 

allegedly guilty of war crimes during the 1999 war.81 This only serves to 

highlight the fact that the rule of law is virtually absent in Kosovo. When the 

UN entered Kosovo, it “was devoid of laws and institutions. There were no 

police, no judicial system, no prisons.”82 Since then, UNMIK appointed 242 

local judges and 75 local prosecutors, and re-established the court system. 83 

Six foreign judges were brought to Kosovo to preside over the most sensitive 

interethnic cases. “But after more than a year, the courts are still barely 

working.”84 There are shortages of facilities, local and international judges, 

and prison space.85 Even if they do function, they do not do so impartially, 

especially when it comes to the Kosovar Serbs. 

 Kosovo “remains a poor, disorganized society with a long-term 

security problem.”86 The UN together with KFOR has made some progress 

addressing the sources of instability most notably by providing overall 

security for the province, ensuring against large incursions or excursions. 

Other successes include organizing Operation Trojan I and II to protect the 
27 

Serbs, as well as seizing the Trepca mining facility, placing it under UN 

supervision and beginning to clean up and reorganize the enterprise. The de 

facto partition of Serbia—as well as the localized de facto partition of 

Mitrovica—has kept the peace. 

 In the meantime, achieving multiethnicity has been replaced by 

securing coexistence as a long-term objective of the UNMIK mission. Yet, 

aiming for coexistence is not conceding defeat or capitulating to extreme 

nationalist forces. In Kosovo the largest ethnic groups—the Serbs and the 

Albanians—may have worked together over time, but they did not have a high 

rate of intermarriage and lived instead, side-by-side, coexisting until outside 

forces or opportunities prompted them to try to take the upper hand and seize 

military and political control of the territory.87 Thus, the original language 

was a misstatement and misunderstanding of Kosovar history. It is surely not 

in the UNMIK mandate to attempt to create something that has never existed 

before. The current effort in Trepca is on the right track. As one KFOR 

officer explained, “If the Serbs in the north will cooperate we will have 

various sites working without multiethnicity at the site level, but at the higher 

level.”88 This is certainly a stable scenario. 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

De facto partition has brought short-term gains to Bosnia and Kosovo. It has 

proven to be an effective post-conflict mechanism to separate formerly 

warring parties. The international forces have restored peace to Bosnia and 

Kosovo. However, the presence of war criminals and criminal networks has 

stalled the prospects for long-term change. In Bosnia, the baseline 

requirement for establishing any type of unity is the capture of persons 

indicted by the ICTY. SFOR and KFOR must increase their operations in this 

area. Radovan Karadzic, foremost among others, must be brought to trial, 

even at the risk that his revelations might tarnish Western European and 
28 

American reputations. In both Bosnia and Kosovo the criminal networks must 

be broken so that refugees can return and foreign investment can resume. The 

international police forces in both operations must be expanded and directed 

towards Westar-type operations, where the local criminal networks are 

threatening the physical security of returnees. In other cases, economic 

reform—coupled with law enforcement—may be sufficient means to deal with 

local mafias. 

 If the long-term objective in Bosnia and Kosovo is reintegration and 

coexistence, respectively, it is imperative to remove the internal security 

threats to all minorities. Beyond that, the basis for genuine stability is the 

overall reform of the economic systems so that there are employment 

opportunities for all ethnic groups in every corner of the state or territory. The 

security measures must be taken in the near-term even if there is no movement 

in dealing with the political structures and questions of sovereignty. At the 

same time, however, political reform is a prerequisite for long-term stability in 

Bosnia. The federal government is not functioning and has not done so for 

over four years. Moreover, the nationalistic principles used to award quotas 

and ethnically based representation only serves to stymie liberalization efforts. 

The recent Bosnian Constitutional Court decision that Serbs, Croats and 

Muslims must enjoy full legal equality everywhere on Bosnian territory” must 

be enforced; undoubtedly such thinking should become reflected in the 

constitution itself.89 In short, the constitution must be revised. Bosnia must 

prepare for a future within Europe. Its current ethnically divided institutions 

only hold it back. 

 The future status of Kosovo is currently in limbo. There have been 

vocal calls for a decision to prepare for independence or reintegration. The 

change in regime in Serbia has provided an opportunity to open negotiations 

about Kosovo’s future within the context of a long overdue redrafting of the 
29 

Serb/Yugoslav constitution. However, most Kosovar Albanians are still bent 

on achieving full independence; they might take military action if forced to 

accept anything short thereof. They should not be forced to remain within 

Yugoslavia. They must be given incentives to remain, but at the end of the 

day the most sustainable outcome may be a negotiated departure arrived at 

with the full participation and acquiescence of the government in Belgrade. 

 The ouster of Slobodan Milosevic, unfortunately, did not provide 

hope for an immediate breakthrough on the question of Kosovo. Yugoslav 

President Voijslav Kostunica is a true nationalist, committed to avoiding 

further territorial losses. More significantly, the bulk of the Serbian 

population is still unprepared for the concession that forfeiting Kosovo entails. 

Until the Serbs of Yugoslavia are convinced that it is in their political and 

even nationalistic interest (given demographic trends) to allow Kosovo to split 

off from Serbia, it will be political suicide for any federal or Serbian leader to 

make such a proposal. Yet, it is up to moderate Serbian leaders to prepare the 

groundwork, and to provide antidotes to the virulent nationalist arguments of 

the past that have so sickened the Yugoslav body politic. Strong decisive 

leadership focused on contemporary political realities is required. The 

Kosovo problem will be on the road to resolution when Serbian leaders realize 

that power today is derived from links to the global and European economy 

and not from possession of territory and stringent control of minorities. 

 The implementation of international policy in Bosnia and Kosovo has 

not sufficiently furthered the ultimate objective in both cases—fostering the 

multiethnic state. In a desire to avoid establishing a protectorate in Bosnia and 

a fear of violent backlash, political and military implementers have not been 

consistently firm and aggressive. In Kosovo, the fear of a military response 

from either local ethnic group or their allies has had a similar—though less 

intense—braking effect. Four years into peace implementation in Bosnia and 
30 

a year into the effort in Kosovo, US politicians are eager to pull American 

troops out and turn the field operations entirely over to the Europeans (who 

currently shoulder 75-85 percent of the total cost of both operations.) Yet, as 

the military generals have stated time and again, in peace operations the 

military needs to “get in to get out.” The US military—with its unparalleled 

capabilities and credible deterrent force—is needed in order to maintain 

stability and deter large-scale violence if the international community is to 

make a final push to achieve its objectives. But it is US political leadership 

that is most crucial. The US government can provide the will and resources to 

fuel an international push based on the recommendations stated above. 

 To summarize the recommendations of this study, the implementers 

in Bosnia and Kosovo must move quickly and assertively to: 1) remove 

internal security threats, 2) begin to reform the economic system and 3) in 

Bosnia, rewrite the constitution to strengthen the central government. The 

first recommendation entails the capture of war criminals, a task for 

SFOR/KFOR. It also includes breaking the mafias, a job of the international 

police with the help of law enforcement agencies such as the FBI and the 

gendarme forces of the MSU. The second measure involves legal and political 

reform and should be orchestrated by the UN and OHR. The third 

recommendation, applying to Bosnia alone, would fall to OHR with heavy 

input from professionals representing the Council of Europe and other 

European institutions. Again, capture of war criminals, especially in Bosnia, 

would begin to create a more secure environment for refugee returns, and in 

both Bosnia and Kosovo economic liberalization will bring investment and 

competition and a reason for ethnic groups to cooperate. 

 In the meantime, the international community must not encourage the 

Kosovar Albanians, and by extension Albanians in Macedonia and other 

nationalists in the region. Would-be separatists must not be tempted to follow 
31 

the Kosovo pattern, provoking military operations by their central 

government, hoping for US or international intervention.90 It is clearly in the 

US interest to prevent further state fragmentation in Europe. Yet, de facto

partition cannot become the basis for policy if it is nothing but a vehicle for 

stalemate. The civilian and military peace implementers must put more energy 

into bridging ethnic divisions at the outset of their operations, even as they 

enforce territorial divisions. Then, over time, political and economic reforms 

can soften territorial divisions through a gradual process of liberalization. In 

the short term, international implementers must be honest about the degree of 

control they possess. They must openly concede that these entities are 

protectorates and administer them in an aggressive fashion, while at the same 

time empowering and cultivating moderates who can take over sooner rather 

than later. Imposing reform upon these ethnically divided societies is the only 

“shock-therapy” that will allow for relatively quick political change and 

conditions conducive to a removal of the international forces that enforce the 

de facto partitions. 

ENDNOTES 

 

1

 The terms “instrumental” and “primordial” refer to two schools of thought 

regarding the theoretical basis for nationalism and ethnic conflict. 

Instrumentalists tend to believe that nationalism is created by manipulative 

leadership, whereas primordialists generally believe that nationalism is an 

inborn trait or instinct that cannot be manipulated or created from something 

that did not already exist. Since US policy generally follows the assumption 

that Milosevic manipulated the Serbian masses which greatly contributed to 

the problems in Bosnia/Kosovo, undoing his efforts over time by first 

separating the parties and allowing de facto partition, then later reuniting the 

policy organs of each nation (Serb/Croat/Bosnian Muslim or Serb/Albanian) 

into each of the respective states (Bosnia and Serbia/Yugoslavia), the 

manipulations can be undone and the ethnic groups will once again over time 

be able to live together in multiethnic societies. 
32 

 

2

 U.S. Department of State, The Dayton Peace Accords: General Framework 

Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina (Washington, DC: US 

Department of State, Office of Public Communications, Bureau of Public 

Affairs, 1995). 

3

 The district was established on 8 March 2000 by the arbitration final award 

as stipulated in the Dayton Accords. 

4

 A multiethnic district assembly, judiciary, mayor’s office and police force 

are governing, enforcing and adjudicating based on an increasingly 

harmonized (between Yugoslav and entity laws) legal regime. This is a 

significant development, in as much as it represents the general arrangement 

the US hopes to achieve Bosnia-wide.

5 Draft Report of President to Congress in compliance with Section 7 of Public 

Law 105-174 on the Latest Developments in the Efforts to Achieve Sustainable 

Peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina, July 2000. Other estimates place spending 

lower at approximately twenty-five percent. Alan J. Carlson, Second 

Secretary, US Embassy, Sarajevo, Bosnia, email correspondence, 20 October 

2000. 

6

 Jacques Klein, The Activities of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and 

Hercegovina, Statement to the OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, Austria, 3 

February 2000, 6. 

7

Ambassador Ralph Johnson, Deputy High Representative, Office of the High 

Representative, interview, Sarajevo, Bosnia, 22 March 2000, and Ambassador 

Jacques Klein, Special Representative of the Secretrary General and 

Coordinator of United Nations Operations in Bosnia and Hercegovina, 

interview, Sarajevo, Bosnia, 23 March 2000. 

8 Draft Report of President to Congress, 2. 

9

 Ibid. 

10 Klein interview. 

11 The UN Security Council is responsible for appointing the OHR, who is the 

ultimate civil authority in Bosnia responsible for monitoring the 

implementation of the Dayton peace settlement. He has power to establish 

subordinate civilian commissions and also is tasked to meet in a Joint 

Consultative Committee with the IFOR Commander. However, he cannot 

interfere with the military authorities under IFOR (now SFOR). See Dayton 

Accords, Annex 10. 
33 

 

12 Online at http:///www.un.org/icty/glance/indictlist-e.htm and Carlson, email 

correspondence, 20 October 2000 regarding suicide of Janic Janko on 13 

October 2000. 

13 Ray Wilkenson, “Decisive Year,” Refugees, vol. 1, no. 114 (1999), 4-10. 

14 Ambassador Johnson explains that most of the returns in the early part of 

2000, even those recorded, are spontanteous. See also Report of President to 

Congress, 6-7. As an encouraging example, for the first time since 1996 

Muslims (about 20 families) have returned to Serb-held Kopaci, a village 

designated by IFOR as a top-ten hotspot during the 1996 elections. Also, in 

April 2001 RS officials opened a resettlement office in Sarajevo to assist 

Serbs who want to return to homes in the Federation. 

15 Steven R. Bowman, Bosnia: U.S. Military Operations, CRS Issue Brief 

(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 20 July 1993), 3. 

16 Charles Trueheart, “A New Kind of Justice,” The Atlantic Monthly (April 

2000), 80-90. 

17 Bowman, 3. 

18 As of October 1999, the MSU had conducted over 260 public disorder 

operations, and numerous information gathering patrols. MSU contributed to 

Operation Westar, which struck at illicit intelligence and criminal activity. 

MSU commanders also credit the unit with seizing two internationally-wanted 

terrorists, supporting ICTY exhumations and investigating the Arizona market 

and Stolac car market, human organ theft and PWICS. Maj. J.S. Hoffman, 

SFOR After-Action Review: April - October 1999, slide presentation. 

19 Jacques Paul Klein, “Commentary: War Criminals,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 

28 February 2000. 

20 James Lyons, Director, International Crisis Group, interview, Sarajevo, 

Bosnia, 22 March 2000. 

21 Is Dayton Failing? Bosnia Four Years after the Peace Agreement 

(International Crisis Group, 1999), 16. Only the Brcko constitution meets 

European standards. 

22 Office of the High Representative: Information, online at 

http://www.ohr.int/info.htm (Accessed on 7 March 2000). 

23 Is Dayton Failing? 53. 

24 Office of the High Representative: Information. 
34 

 

25 Ibid. 

26 Johnson interview. 

27 Lyons interview. 

28 General Wesley Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 

interview, Washington, DC, 7 November 2000. 

29 Johnson interview. 

30 Ibid. 

31 Sabrija Pojskic, Member, Steering Committee of the Social Democratic 

Party of Bosnia-Hercegovina, South Slavic Report, RFE/RL, March 2, 2000, 

vol. 2, no.9, online at http://rferl.org/southslavic/index.html. 

32 SFOR Transcript: Joint Press Conference, 4 July 2000 received from 

NATODATA@LISTSERV.CC.KULEUVEN.AC.BE, 4 July 2000. 

33 Report of President to Congress, 3. 

34 Klein interview. 

35 Ibid. 

36 Report of President to Congress, 2. 

37 For more on the dismal investment climate in Bosnia see, Why Will No One 

Invest in Bosnia and Hercegovina: An Overview of Impediments to Investment 

and Self Sustaining Economic Growth in the Post Dayton Era, International 

Crisis Group Report, No. 64 (21 April 1999). 

38 Johnson. 

39 Ibid. 

40 Ibid. 

41 Andrew J. Pierre, De-Balkanizing the Balkans: Security and Stability in 

Southeastern Europe, United States Institute for Peace Special Report, 20 

September 1999, 13. 

42 Klein interview. 

43 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), online at 

http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc1244.htm (accessed on 17 April 

2000). 
35 

 

44 KFOR Online: Structure, Objectives, MNBs, online at 

http://www.kforonline.com/kfor/objectives.htm (accessed on 3 March 2000). 

45 Ibid. Author’s emphasis. 

46 Ibid. 

47 According to one UNMIK administrator, the Norwegian commander in the 

Oblic area asked during the first KFOR-UNMIK meeting “What can I do for 

you?” Laura Dolci, Deputy Civil Administrator, Oblic region, UNMIK, 

interview, Pristina, Kosovo, 30 March 2000. 

48 One example of a victory for nationalists occurred in February 1996 when 

Serb extremists organized the burning of the Serb inhabited areas of Sarajevo 

that were being turned over to the Muslim-Croat Federation for 

administration, and forced the Serb population to evacuate to the Republika 

Srpska. The UN Secretary General reports, “UNMIK and KFOR have 

established close working relationships and have put I place a comprehensive 

structure of coordination mechanisms...,” Report of the Secretary General on 

the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, 12 July 1999, 

online at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1999/s1999779.htm. 

49 KFOR Daily Press Release 2 August 2000, from NATODOC 

(natodo@HQ.NATO.INT). 

50 Ibid., 3. 

51 For details on this process see What Happened to the KLA? International 

Crisis Group Balkan Report, No. 88, Pristina/Washington/Brussels, 3 March 

2000. 

52 Woehrel and Kim, 3. 

53 Ibid., 14. 

54 James W. Pardew, Jr., Principal Deputy Advisor to the President and 

Secretary of State for Dayton and Kosovo Implementation, U.S. Department 

of State, Statement, Kosovo: One Year After the Bombing, Foreign Relations 

Committee, United States Senate, 8 June 2000. In March 2000 two KPC 

members were dismissed after it was proven that they were assisting the 

UCPMB. See Bernard Kouchner, Weekly Situation Report for 21 to 27 March 

2000, UNMIK-247, 28 March 2000, 10. 

55 Woehrel and Kim, 9. 

56 Mark Baskin, Deputy Regional Administrator, Prizren, Plan for Community 

Development in the Tusus Area of Prizren, 19 March 2000. 
36 

 

57 However, during a March trip to the region the author heard internationals 

blame Serbs for some of the cleansing by “ceding” certain areas to the 

Albanians. Serb realtors were pressuring their co-nationals to sell their 

properties at prices drastically lower than market value. 

58 Michael Ignatieff, “The Reluctant Imperialist,” NY Times Magazine, 6 

August 2000, 44. 

59 Ignatieff, 44. 

60 Woehrel and Kim, 6. Given the high potential for escalation, this begs the 

question: what constitutes an emergency? 

61 UNMIK Executive Decision No. 2000/1 On the Confidence Area in the City 

of Mitrovica, 16 March 2000. 

62 Mitrovica - A Strategy Towards Coexistence, UNMIK planning document. 

63 UNMIK Assumes Responsibility for Operations at Zvecan Smelter, UNMIK 

Press Release, 14 August 2000, online at 

http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/press/templ.pr312.html (accessed on 22 

August 2000). 

64 Ignatieff, 44. 

65 Mark Baskin, Deputy Regional Administator, UNMIK, Prizren, Kosovo, 

interview, 30 March 2000. 

66 Bernard Kouchner, Weekly Situation Report for 21 to 27 March 2000, 10. 

67 The author attended a 28 March 2000 Operation Trojan planning meeting. 

68 Bernard Kouchner, Weekly Situation Report for 21 to 27 March 2000, 6. 

69UN Interim Administration in Kosovo, Deployment, August 4, 2000 online 

at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo_status.htm (accessed on 14 

August 2000). 

70 Pardew, 6-7. 

71 Pardew 6-7. 

72 Woehrel and Kim, 7. 

73 J.F. Carter, Deputy Civil Administrator, Pristina Region, UNMIK, 

interview, Pristina, Kosovo, 27 March 2000. 

74 Pardew, 4. 

75 Pardew, 9. 
37 

 

76 Carter interview. 

77 Pardew, 9. A year later the pressure was on to downsize the mission. 

78 Surroi Wants Concepts, Radio Free Liberty/Radio Europe Balkan Report, 

Vol. 17, No. 1, 29 February 2000. 

79 Elections in Kosovo: Moving Toward Democracy? International Crisis 

Group, 7 July 2000, 25; online at 

http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/kosovo/reports/kos37erep.htm (accessed on 

1 August 2000). 

80 Meanwhile, more than 30 ethnic Albanian parties have registered. Starting 

From Scratch in Kosovo: The Honeymoon is Over, International Crisis Group, 

10 December 1999 online at http://www.intl-crisisgroup.org/projects/sbalkans/reports/kos31rep.htm (accessed on 9 March 

2000). 

81 Kosovo’s Interim Administrative Council Condemns Recent Spate of 

Violence, online at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/news/kosovo2.htm

(accessed on 14 August 2000). 

82 Pardew, 3. 

83 Ibid. 

84 Richard Mertens, “Justice a Foreign Term in Kosovo,” Christian Science 

Monitor, 1 August 2000, 6. 

85 Pardew, 10-11. 

86 Morton I. Abramowitz, Board of Trustees, International Crisis Group, 

statement, Kosovo: One Year After the Bombing, 25. 

87 See Noel Malcom, A Short History of Kosovo (New York: University Press, 

1998). 

88 Lt. Col. Joseph Abbott, USAF, J-5 Plans, HQ KFOR, interview, Pristina, 

Kosovo, 29 March 2000. 

89 Three Overlooked Stories, Radio Free Liberty/Radio Liberty Balkan Report, 

Vol. 4., No. 50 (4 July 2000). 

90 This is not to lift the blame off of Slobodan Milosevic’s government for its 

decade-long suppression of the Albanians and the brutal execution of 

Operation Horseshoe in the spring of 1999. 
38 

 
IMPROVING US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS THROUGH 

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 

Beth L. Makros 

Jeremy C. Saunders 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

USAF Academy, Colorado 
40
41

IMPROVING US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS THROUGH 

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 

INTRODUCTION 

More than a decade after the Cold War, the US-Russian relationship maintains 

an axiomatic position in international affairs. Due to the important roles of 

both countries, it remains in US interests to improve its relationship with 

Russia. The election of the Bush administration provides a fresh opportunity 

to shape US-Russian relations. One of the key areas where cooperation is 

feasible is in peacekeeping efforts, which play an important role in the postCold War world. By cooperating with Russia in combined peacekeeping, as in 

Bosnia and Kosovo, and providing support for Russian peacekeeping efforts in 

its near abroad,1

 as in Georgia, the US has the opportunity to improve the 

overall strategic relationship. 

The authors seek to provide an academic basis for improving combined 

peacekeeping (PK) efforts and supporting Russian PK operations in their near 

abroad by answering three main questions: 

1. Can relations between the US and Russia be improved through 

combined peacekeeping operations and support for Russian 

peacekeeping in the near abroad? 

2. In what areas can the US most effectively use resources to enhance 

cooperation in peacekeeping? 

3. What actions should the US take to initiate or improve relations in 

these areas? 

We begin by analyzing the significance of US-Russian relations and the 

impact combined peacekeeping and support for Russian peacekeeping efforts 

have on the US-Russian relationship. After examining the importance of 

cooperation in peacekeeping, we then assesses Russian peacekeeping policy 

and forces to determine the quality and nature of Russian peacekeeping and 

where it will most likely be applied in the future. Next, we provide two case 

studies, Bosnia and Abkhazia (Georgia), to evaluate Russian peacekeeping in 

each of the two main peacekeeping arenas where Russia is likely to engage: 
42

combined operations in the Balkans and Commonwealth of Independent 

States’ (CIS) activities in the near abroad. Using insights from each of these 

cases, we then look at ways the US is able to and would most benefit from 

providing support for Russian peacekeeping. Finally, based on this 

assessment, we recommend specific courses of action to improve cooperation 

within combined peacekeeping and support for peacekeeping in the near 

abroad, as well as the most robust recommendations that can be applied across 

both arenas in order to improve relations. 

Significance of the US-Russian Relationship 

While the relationship between Russia and the US has deteriorated over the 

past five years, the importance of the relationship remains evident because of 

Russia’s nuclear strength. Many scholars argue that the future of a reforming 

Russia, if not handled correctly, is one of the greatest threats to US national 

interests.2

 Although the effectiveness of its military equipment continues to 

diminish, Russia maintains significant military might and influence, with its 

vast nuclear arsenal and its military dominance over the former Soviet states. 

In addition, there are a number of issues of concern to national security shared 

by both Russia and the United States. Transnational problems such as 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism can best be solved 

through a cooperative relationship between the two countries. Given Russia’s 

significant position in global affairs and its ability to influence and assist 

proliferating nations, an uncooperative relationship would be detrimental to 

US national security. 

At the end of the Cold War, Russia and the United States had high 

expectations for a close, cooperative partnership to be achieved. Russia 

looked to the US to provide economic support and advice for its developing 

democracy, and the US sought cooperation on the nuclear drawdown and 

security and other transnational issues. At the height of this partnership was 

the success of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program (CTR) to draw down 

and secure nuclear forces and the successful agreement incorporating Russia 

into the peacekeeping force sent to implement the Dayton Accords in BosniaHerzegovina. Relations between NATO and Russia also took a positive turn 
43

in May 1997 with the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and 

Security between NATO and the Russian Federation. The Founding Act 

established the Permanent Joint Council made up of NATO countries and 

Russia. The act provides a mechanism for consultation, coordination and, 

where appropriate, for joint decisions and actions with respect to security 

issues of common concern.3

 The Founding Act places Russia at a higher 

status with NATO than other non-NATO countries in the Partnership for 

Peace program (PfP). 

Since the initial successful cooperation between the US and Russia in 

Bosnia, the relationship has deteriorated. Russia’s dismal economy, due in 

part to poor advice from the West and disillusionment with democracy, 

coupled with their perception of a hostile, expanding NATO and the West’s 

treatment of them as a secondary power, has led to distrust and a state of noncooperation. While discussion on START III has increased, the US and 

Russia frequently disagree over START II and the ABM treaty, a key 

component of the Bush administration’s foreign policy. Deeply engulfed in 

the Chechnya conflict, Russia resents Western, and particularly US, criticism 

over their methods of waging war and has increased its anti-West and antiNATO rhetoric. The US, for its part, has chosen not to give Russia a place at 

the table in NATO and has been reluctant to provide any further support for 

Russia’s transition to a free market, while at the same time contemplating the 

construction of a national missile defense system that has greatly upset Russia. 

Recent revelations of continued espionage efforts and the expulsion of foreign 

diplomats from both countries have further exacerbated the situation. The 

relationship with Russia is judged by many to be at a post-Cold War low with 

little hope for improvement. 

However, recent political changes inside Russia have provided the 

US and Russia with an opportunity to expand relations. Although the 

relationship between Presidents Bush and Putin remains uncertain, Putin 

commented on his desire to work with NATO as “equal partners” after a year 

of tensions over issues such as Kosovo and Chechnya.4

 Putin enjoys a high 

enough level of domestic support from the Russian people to allow him a 
44

significant role in shaping the future of Russia’s security and economy, and 

the new US administration should seize the opportunity to reinvigorate the 

post-Cold War cooperation. 

Improving the US-Russian Relationship Through Peacekeeping 

Given the significance of the US-Russian relationship and the present tension, 

the US should look for areas to improve this relationship. The recent increase 

in peace operations in the second post-Cold War era provides the US and 

Russia just such an opportunity. Russia has and continues to be an important 

player in these operations in the Balkans, its near abroad, and UN missions 

worldwide. With a lack of more conventional threats, peacekeeping 

operations are the most visible and likely way to increase cooperation between 

US and Russian forces. 

Currently, the US and Russia are successfully working together in 

SFOR in Bosnia, KFOR in Kosovo, and to a lesser extent, in several UN 

missions. Two former Cold War enemies working side by side in 

peacekeeping operations provides evidence to the world of the professionalism 

and capabilities of both military forces and enriches the US-Russian 

relationship.5

 The more often the two militaries are able to operate together, 

the more likely they will be able to close both operational and cultural gaps 

that hamper successful missions. For example, Brigadier General Peterson 

(US Army) attributes much of his successful cooperation with the Russian 

troops in the beginning of KFOR’s establishment to his working with the 

Russians in Bosnia and thus understanding their peacekeeping forces and 

doctrine.6

 If the two countries are to work together in future peacekeeping 

efforts or other low-intensity conflicts, then well-planned and efficient 

operations today will aid in effective operations in the future. 

The interaction between the two militaries in peacekeeping operations 

provides an area of engagement between higher political figures. Regardless 

of other events affecting the relationship, involvement in peacekeeping 

operations offers, at a bare minimum, a reason for interaction because both 

nations are committed to a number of peacekeeping operations. While there 

are often disagreements over political issues that may be harmful to the 
45

relationship, it is nevertheless important that dialogue occurs and there is a 

continued agreement on the involvement of the two countries. 

 US-Russian cooperation provides a special degree of impartiality and 

legitimacy to the peacekeeping operation, whether real or perceived, in the 

world arena. Joint involvement gives both sides a greater chance of being 

accepted as part of an impartial peacekeeping force. This is particularly 

important to the US in the NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Kosovo 

because it dampens criticism of Western partiality and heavy-handedness. The 

coming together of the Cold War superpowers provides a sense of legitimacy 

and commitment to resolve conflict. This show of commitment will perhaps 

encourage more hesitant states to participate in peacekeeping activities when 

they might otherwise choose not to, and it will decrease the likelihood of any 

party opposing the peacekeeping action. 

 In addition to being important for the US-Russian relationship, 

cooperation in peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans and the near abroad helps 

the US protect and promote its interests in those areas. The Balkans continue 

to be a flash point for European security. The US already has a strong 

commitment in the region, with troops participating in peacekeeping 

operations in both Bosnia and Kosovo. Considering the US ties with Europe, 

developing and maintaining peace in the Balkans is of great importance to the 

US. Conflicts in the Balkans threaten not only mass atrocities and large 

refugee flows, but also a possible spread of the conflict into other regions of 

Europe. 

 US interests in the near abroad do not justify as strong a commitment 

of resources as in the Balkans. For the most part, recent US policy in Russia’s 

near abroad has been to offer economic and political support for nascent 

democracies, while acknowledging Russia’s prominence in the region and 

encouraging them to solve some of the crises left behind when the Soviet 

Union broke apart. Russia’s suspicion of US designs on the region has caused 

the US to defer to Russian prerogatives on many occasions. However, while 

they should not be overstated, the US does have several interests in the near 

abroad that should be protected: (1) preventing the conflicts from spreading 
46

into neighboring countries such as Turkey (a NATO ally) or Iran and growing 

into regional conflagrations, (2) helping these new countries develop strong 

democracies and free market economies where the rights of the citizens are 

respected and opportunities for investment are protected, (3) securing the 

developing Transcausasus oil pipeline, and (4) ensuring that the peacekeeping 

missions carried out respect the human rights of the inhabitants. These 

interests in the near abroad must be balanced with the implications any US 

actions will have on the US-Russia relationship. 

ASSESSMENT OF RUSSIAN PEACEKEEPING 

Although combined peacekeeping efforts and support for Russian 

peacekeeping will benefit the US-Russian strategic relationship, the US must 

balance this interest with its interest in successfully accomplishing its 

peacekeeping tasks. The US must therefore assess Russian peacekeeping to 

decide what areas of cooperation in peacekeeping efforts would be most 

beneficial for achieving US objectives, both to improve the relationship and 

ensure the success and legitimacy of the peacekeeping operation. This 

assessment analyzes the Russian political environment, forces, and doctrine 

for peacekeeping operations. 

Russian Political Environment 

Russian Goals and Objectives in Peacekeeping Activities 

Russia’s involvement in peacekeeping activities stems from its national 

interests and the perceived threats to those interests. According to the Russian 

Federation National Security Concept, the basic external threats to Russian 

national security are due to, among other factors: 

1. the danger of a weakening of Russia’s political, economic and military 

influence in the world; 

2. the appearance and escalation of conflicts near the Russian state border 

and CIS external borders; and 

3. an attempt to minimize the role of existing mechanisms for ensuring 

international security, above all the United Nations and the Organization 

for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).7
47

These threats provide the rationale for Russia’s involvement in peacekeeping 

in the near abroad, the Balkans, and UN operations under UN, CIS, or OSCE 

auspices. 

Since the demise of the Soviet Union, one of Russia’s primary 

security concerns has been to demonstrate to the rest of the international 

community that it remains a powerful state and will play an important role in 

the New World Order. As part of this effort, Russian leaders actively seek a 

peacekeeping role for their military. Involvement in peacekeeping is seen as 

necessary if Russia is to continue to maintain significant influence and prestige 

in the international community.8

 Russia’s participation in peacekeeping 

operations in the near abroad, the Balkans, and within the UN illustrates its 

desire to be a contributing member of the world community. 

Another of Russia’s primary security concerns is to contain any threat 

that appears on its borders. These conflicts in former Soviet states have 

occurred frequently in recent years as a result of a decline in the population’s 

standard of living and as a result of ethnic, interreligious and other conflicts.9

 

Russia often gets involved in these conflicts because no other security 

apparatus is willing or available to take on the mission and the conflicts 

threaten to spill over into Russian territory or endanger the Russian population 

in the state. 

Russia also has an interest in maintaining its influence in these 

regions. Peacekeeping forces allow Russia to maintain influence, as well as 

military bases, in these former Soviet states, providing an arena to shape the 

region and maintain access to natural resources. The Russian forces in the 

near abroad act under CIS auspices so that they appear more legitimate to the 

rest of the international community. For the most part, however, only a 

negligible number of forces from other CIS nations ever participate in these 

missions. Although Russia maintains that it becomes involved in 

peacekeeping efforts on CIS territory at the request of other CIS states seeking 

Russia’s assistance in settling the conflict,10 it has been accused of strongarming these former Soviet republics into accepting peacekeeping forces. This 

quite possibly happened in Abkhazia, where Georgia was left with little choice 
48

but to join the CIS and accept a CIS peacekeeping force that ensured 

continued Russian presence on its territory.11 One of the primary reasons 

Russia pursues zealous peacekeeping forms and mechanisms in the UN and 

regional organizations is to support these interventions in the near abroad with 

a conceptual, legal and practical framework. The actual peacekeeping 

mandates in the near abroad demonstrate that Russia is focused on keeping the 

conflict to a minimum and is less likely to pursue more ambitious objectives to 

resolve the crisis and thus remove the need for Russian troop presence. 

Further threats to Russian security stem from Russian perceptions of 

NATO’s actions in Kosovo. According to the Russian National Security 

Concept, “NATO’s transition to the practice of military operations of force 

without UN Security Council (UNSC) sanction is fraught with the threat of 

destabilizing the entire strategic situation in the world.”12 While the working 

relationship between NATO and Russian forces in SFOR and KFOR remains 

on a successful and steady path, Russian policy maintains that it is not willing 

to transform its equipment and safety procedures to NATO standards of 

operation. Therefore, according to the primary Russian military representative 

to the UN, Russia will not look to participate in any further joint operations 

with NATO.13 However, as mentioned previously, President Putin has 

expressed a willingness to cooperate with NATO as long as Russia was 

considered an equal partner in the operation.14 This may be seen as 

encouragement that Russia is willing to work through some of the difficulties 

and compromise to enhance NATO-Russian cooperation. 

Together, the Russian security interests and threats to those interests 

have led to its foreign policy focus on strengthening key mechanisms for 

multilateral management of world political and economic processes, and 

keeping Russian assistance in settling conflicts under the aegis of the UN, 

OSCE, or CIS.15 Russia has been particularly interested in strengthening the 

UNSC, where it has veto power, and in receiving UN mandates and money for 

its CIS peacekeeping forces in the near abroad. 
49

Russian Military in the Political Forum 

The military plays a significant role in Russian politics. Recent 

military operations like Kosovo and Chechnya provide examples of the type of 

pressure ranking military generals are able to put on politicians. In November 

1999, Russian generals were pressing publicly for an all-out military victory 

against Chechen rebels, and in “unusually strident fashion warning Russian 

politicians to get out of the way.”16 In interviews, Russian commanders stated 

that they would not be robbed of their victory as politicians had allowed in 

1996. General Anatoli Kvashin, then Chief of the Russian General Staff, 

threatened to resign when President Yelstin’s administration proposed sending 

out peace feelers to Aslan Maskhadov, the Chechen leader. General Vladimir 

Shamanov, commander of the western group of forces in Chechnya, warned 

that if an order came down from Moscow “to stop the army, there would be a 

massive defection of officers of all ranks from the armed forces, including 

generals.”17 

 A similar situation arose in June 1999 when some 200 Russian troops 

left their posts in Bosnia and headed into Kosovo, taking over the Pristina 

airport. This move forced the rest of the international community to face the 

frightening possibility that Russia’s military, which has been under-funded and 

humiliated for years, may now be forcing the Kremlin to bend to its views.18 

To many, the fact that the Russian military was able to “bypass most of the 

country’s top civilian decision-makers showed that Yelstin had a new set of 

favorites—Russian generals with a bleak view of the outside world and its 

designs.”19 For the US, this military influence on political affairs makes 

cooperation with the Russian military even more important for improving 

security relations. 

Russian Peacekeeping Forces 

Since the Cold War, the Russian military has been in turmoil. While the US 

forces underwent a significant drawdown in the 1990’s, the Russian military 

cutbacks have been described as a virtual freefall.20 Their forces went from 

numbering 4.3 million active duty personnel in 1986 to 1.27 million in 1996.21 

Along with force cutbacks has come an enormous drop in military 
50

expenditures. In 1999, the military was allocated $3.7 billion, or 2.3 percent 

of Russia’s GDP, down almost $2 billion from the original presidential 

decision of $5.6 billion, but it failed to receive even that amount.22 This 

underfunding has caused severe payment delays and underfunding of defense 

sector needs, thus undermining military training programs, research and design 

projects, production and supplies of new types of military equipment, and the 

maintenance and repair of equipment in service.23 With the current state of the 

Russian military, any peacekeeping effort is certain to be challenged by 

insufficient funding, a lack of training, outdated equipment, poor equipment 

maintenance, and morale problems due to payment arrears and other personnel 

issues. 

 Although it suffers from great financial problems, the Russian 

military maintains two different types of training for peacekeeping forces: UN 

peacekeepers and the airborne and motorized rifle divisions designated for 

deployment to peacekeeping operations. Those going to participate as UN 

observers must be trained at the Vystrel Academy near Moscow for a period of 

two to three months. The Academy trains three groups of students per year 

using UN doctrine and guidelines for training its forces.24 According to US 

General John Reppert, former defense attaché to Moscow, this is one of the 

only academies of its sort with this type of extensive training exclusively using 

UN materials.25 The school is taught in English and includes exchange 

students from several nations, including the US, although currently there are 

no US students there. It has both political and military faculty, often bringing 

in foreigners to help teach UN doctrine and practices. The UN observers 

produced by the Vystrel Academy have been noted as quality participants in 

UN peacekeeping operations. Russia has recently designated two battalions 

and their required support structure to be at the UN’s disposal.26

 The forces Russia uses for other peacekeeping situations (working 

with NATO, the CIS, or unilaterally) are led by the Airborne Forces (VDV). 

VDV forces are equipped with light armor, which are deployable by standard 

military transport aviation and have maintained a high level of discipline, 

training, and combat experience.27 The peacekeeping environment 
51

corresponds to the VDV’s wartime mission to work far in enemy rear areas cut 

off from main lines of logistical support and to learn to deal with the local 

populace.28 As Commander of the VDV, Colonel-General Shpak has 

designated unilateral and multilateral peacekeeping as his units’ main 

peacetime mission and has put his effort towards the development of 

command, control and intelligence systems and the maintenance of discipline 

and effectiveness at the small unit level.29 The Russian airborne divisions 

have better training and mobility than most of the Russian troops, though they 

suffer from logistical problems and have not been able to maintain their units 

at full strength. Along with the VDV, Russia has designated two motorized 

rifle divisions (MRD’s) for service in peacekeeping operations. Officers sent 

to peacekeeping missions receive three months of training prior to 

deployment, while enlisted troops receive six months of training.30 The 

training program gives considerable attention “to preparing personnel for 

independent actions in an environment and in situations where use of weapons 

is prohibited.”31

Unlike the conflict in Chechnya, Russia uses only volunteer soldiers 

for its peacekeeping missions. While personnel have for the most part been 

sufficiently trained for their missions, many of the other essentials for a 

successful mission have been lacking. The units are often at low strength 

when called upon, as in the example of Georgia when the 145th Motorized 

Rifle Division was called to provide forces for the Abkhazia conflict and it 

only had 3,000 of its allotted 13,000 troops.32 When the troops do arrive, they 

often lack the necessary equipment to complete their assigned task, as they did 

after the taking of the Pristina airport when the Russian troops were soon 

asking the British troops for water.33 Russian equipment is old and the 

military’s ability to maintain it often inadequate, with the result that many of 

their vehicles and machinery are simply unusable. The Russian forces, though 

capable, are hampered by insufficient finances and outdated equipment. 

Russian Peacekeeping Doctrine 

The Russian peacekeeping doctrine springs from its experience in the field. 

Russia’s peacekeeping experiences are much different from those of most 
52

other nations. Having been influenced by Russia’s initial experience after the 

Cold War, they bear more of a counter-insurgency flavor.34 Russian 

operations have differed from typical peacekeeping operations in several ways. 

First, all of Russia’s operations were in “Russia’s backyard,” where Russia is 

the strongest player in the region and the military commanders are very 

familiar with the environment. Second, Russian activities were not 

constrained by anything besides the available means, the resolve of the 

command in Moscow, and political infighting or indecisiveness.35 Problems 

of legitimacy, rules of engagement, collateral damage, and public scrutiny 

were raised but did not have a significant effect on operations as compared to 

most other UN operations.36 A third difference is that indecisiveness, and at 

times incompetence, of political leadership often forced or allowed local 

military commanders to act autonomously with little guidance or support.37 

These differences have led to a uniquely Russian view of peacekeeping 

operations that looks at the issue as primarily a military rather than political 

problem and thus bypasses the creation of a political solution. 

The Russian term most often used for peacekeeping operations is 

“miro-tvorcheskiye operatzii,” or peace-creation operations, showing Russia’s 

penchant towards a greater use of force in keeping the peace. Russia has 

recently developed a new military doctrine for peacekeeping. According to 

Lieutenant-General Meleshkov, the Russian military representative to the UN 

Military Staff Committee, this policy breaks peacekeeping into three main 

tasks: (1) separate the warring parties, (2) ensure provision of humanitarian aid 

and evacuation of refugees, and (3) carry out the provisions of the mandate.38 

The Russians do not use a doctrine that complies with the three UN principles 

of consent and invitation of all parties, impartiality, and use of force only in 

self-defense.39 Instead, their actions more resemble the criteria put forth by 

former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his Agenda for Peace: 

the peacekeeping force may intervene without the consent of all parties, the 

force does not necessarily seek to be impartial, and offensive use of weapons 

may be required.40 
53

While Russia’s peacekeeping methods derive naturally from some of 

their experiences in the field, the West has often criticized Russian methods. 

Three main issues cause frequent conflict between the Russian and Western 

philosophies of peacekeeping: (1) Russia’s extensive use of force, (2) 

criticisms of Russian partiality, and (3) the use of belligerents in the 

peacekeeping force. Each is examined below. 

1. Extensive Use of Force: The Russian doctrine allows for the use of 

force to separate belligerents and force them to the negotiating table, a 

different approach than that of the UN, which requires the consent of all the 

parties to the conflict.41 This approach is more similar to the Western concept 

of peace-enforcement. Colonel-General Aleksandr Lebed, former commander 

of the Russian Federation’s 14th Army, describes the necessary approach this 

way: “If a decision is made to use troops, they must be employed decisively, 

firmly, and without delay. And it must be clear to everyone that a force has 

arrived capable of putting every insolent, encroaching bandit in his place.”42 

While this doctrine allows for the more frequent and heavy-handed use of 

force, it is not that different from the direction the international community is 

headed in peace operations such as Kosovo. It allows Russia, a far superior 

force to those in its near abroad, to come in and force the two sides to reach an 

agreement. Indeed, Russia has shown great restraint in its use of force in the 

past. According to US Lieutenant Colonel Tom Wilhelm, in Tajikistan “the 

Russians had the means of overwhelming force—tanks, helicopters, and 

fighter aircraft; they never brought them to bear in any decisive manner, 

choosing instead to try to secure through consecutive diplomatic summits a 

peacekeeping force in accordance with internationally-recognized norms and 

standards.”43 A danger in the approach of using force to separate belligerents 

is when it is combined with the second criticism of Russian forces—partiality. 

2. Partiality: Russia has been accused frequently of showing 

partiality in a conflict in accordance with the interests of the Russian 

Federation. In several cases, the Russian government has forced local 

authorities into compromise to allow the deployment of Russian peacekeeping 

forces or manipulated local groups to obtain settlement terms favorable to 
54

Russian interests.44 Russia’s interests in the near abroad often cause it to take 

a somewhat less than neutral role in conflicts. However, the US is often 

considered a partial force in conflicts such as Haiti or Kosovo, and its interests 

are often a driving factor. While Russia’s ultimate goal is almost always to 

settle the conflict, it also uses the situation to promote its policy interests, as in 

the case of Abkhazia where it pressured Georgia to join the CIS.45 At times, 

Russian forces have played a direct role in some conflicts. They provide 

weapons to belligerents, carry out punitive strikes against local forces, or 

perform other actions favoring one side over another.46 In many regions, even 

if the Russians acted impartially, it would be difficult for the belligerents to 

accept them as an impartial force because of their history in the region. This is 

certainly the case in Georgia, where Russia aided both the Abkhazians and the 

Georgians at different times during the fighting, making it impossible for the 

Russians to be regarded as impartial.47 In several cases, Russian partiality, 

whether real or perceived, has harmed the peacekeeping mission. However, 

Russia has often helped its appearance of impartiality by including belligerents 

in the peacekeeping force. 

 3. Use of belligerents in peacekeeping forces: In Russian 

peacekeeping doctrine, direct control of peacekeeping forces in a region is 

exercised by a joint staff composed of representatives from Russian forces as 

well as the combatants in the conflict zone.48 These forces take part in 

policing the zone of separation and other activities.49 The UN and NATO do 

not have any legal agreement on belligerent participation, but it has generally 

not been a part of traditional peace operations. Including belligerents may put 

peacekeeping forces at risk of being caught in the middle of renewed fighting, 

but it also may have the benefit of creating cooperation between the parties, 

allowing for an eventual opportunity for the third party to slowly withdraw its 

forces.50 Russians believe that combatant participation has the potential to 

build relationships and mechanisms for resolving future conflicts.51

CASE STUDIES OF RUSSIAN PEACEKEEPING 

Russian peacekeeping forces and doctrine can best be analyzed in terms of 

their actual participation in peace operations. Looking at the Russian forces in 
55

the light of a multinational operation, Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR), provides an 

opportunity to see how they perform within a UN/NATO framework. This 

allows an analysis of how their participation in combined peacekeeping 

efforts, particularly within the NATO structure, can be improved. The case of 

Russian troops in Bosnia was selected because of the wealth of information 

available. In addition, the length of the mission allows for more thorough 

analysis of the case. The second case study looks at the operation in 

Abkhazia, Georgia, to analyze Russian performance in the near abroad under 

the CIS aegis in coordination with UN military observers. Since Russia’s 

priority is to maintain stability along its borders, it is more likely to be 

involved first in operations in its near abroad before involving itself in 

peacekeeping efforts elsewhere. Abhkazia was selected because of the 

interaction between CIS forces and UN observers. 

These case studies provide the framework for our recommendations 

to improve combined operations and support for Russian peacekeeping efforts 

in the near abroad. 

Case Study of Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR) 

On 14 December 1995, the Bosnia Peace Agreement was signed in Paris, after 

its negotiation in Dayton, Ohio. On 16 December, NATO launched the largest 

military operation ever undertaken by the Alliance, Operation Joint Endeavor. 

NATO was given a mandate to implement the military aspects of the 

agreement based on UN Security Council Resolution 1031. Although NATOled, the multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) included 16 non-NATO 

nations. IFOR was given a one-year mandate and began its operations on 20 

December 1995.52 As a part of IFOR, The Russian Brigade operated as one of 

the five maneuver brigades under Task Force Eagle, led by an American 

commander. Its area of responsibility covered 1,750 square kilometers. 

Following the peaceful conduct of the September 1996 elections, 

IFOR successfully completed its missions. In November/December 1996, 

NATO foreign and defense ministers concluded that a military presence, 

although reduced, would be needed in Bosnia. Therefore, NATO created the 
56

Stabilization Force (SFOR, also known as Operation Joint Guard), which was 

activated 20 December 1996, the date the IFOR mandate expired. 

 SFOR operates under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (peace 

enforcement).53 SFOR has the same rules of engagement as IFOR, allowing 

the “robust use of force,” as it is necessary to accomplish the mission and 

protect the forces.54 SFOR’s size is approximately half the size of IFOR, at 

just under 32,000 troops, including 1,500 Russian airborne troops. 

Including the Russians in IFOR 

The decision to include Russian forces in the operation in Bosnia was 

plagued with a number of difficult political and military issues. While both 

governments felt Russian participation was necessary, overcoming command 

issues proved troublesome. The possible role of Russian troops ranged from 

various “special operations” tasks such as engineering, transport, and 

construction, to full fledged peacekeeping.55 Eventually it was decided, due to 

political constraints, that Russian forces, acting in their own area within the 

US sector, would be placed under American General George Joulwan acting as 

Commander of US Forces in Europe, not under NATO. Another obstacle 

involved who maintained operational and tactical control. Operational control 

refers to the selection of tasks a given unit is assigned, while tactical control 

refers to the daily orders to do something or go somewhere called for by the 

operational control tasks. Since the Russians were most concerned with 

operational control, it would be necessary to develop a solution that allowed 

the Russians to maintain operational control, while still giving the US 

commander tactical control. Therefore, the chain of command needed to be 

redefined by separating tactical and operational control. Russian General 

Shevtsov and General Joulwan were able to create such a solution by placing 

the Russian troops under tactical control of the Multi-National Division 

Commander, in this case an American, while operational control remained in 

the hands of Russian General Shetsov as General Joulwan’s Deputy 

Commander for Russian Forces.56 

 The ability to resolve these military command and control issues 

made it possible to avoid a political disaster. This was due in large part to the 
57

defense-to-defense cooperation. In the few years leading up to IFOR, 

Secretary Perry and Defense Minister Grachev established a working 

relationship which, when combined with the relationship between General 

Joulwan and General Shevtsov, made it possible to win support within a 

critical constituency: the militaries themselves.57

Training for Combined Operations in IFOR 

Combined troop training is vital for the military and political success 

of a peacekeeping contingent. Prior to the Dayton Accords, US and Russian 

troops had engaged in two Field Training Exercises (FTX): Totsk, Russia in 

1994, and Ft. Riley, Kansas in 1995. The pre-deployment phase of the trainup began on 17 November 1995. Elements of the Russian force were brought 

to Germany to participate in the planning process. Russian forces training took 

place within the parent divisions of the Airborne Troops and was conducted in 

accordance with the Guidelines for the Russian Federation (RF) Armed Forces 

Actions as UN Troops, and the training program for the peacekeeping units of 

the Airborne Troops.58 

There was a variety of additional components in the training of the 

Russian peacekeeping forces devoted to unconventional actions in emergency 

situations. This included working with professional psychologists in order to 

determine good psychological compatibility in forming squads and teams. 

Only personnel with six months in service were selected for the brigade59 and 

approximately forty percent of the personnel were combat veterans.60 Legal 

training was also strongly emphasized with legal briefings and consultations 

with international lawyers. This training provided a basis for understanding 

international legal standards for Russian personnel. 

 One specific joint training event, the participation of Russian officers 

in the command post exercise conducted in the 1st Armored Division in 

Germany, is often noted as an exercise that increased the ability of the two 

militaries to work together in the multinational operation. During this 

exercise, Russian officers, in concert with their American counterparts, were 

able to clarify certain details of the joint tasks and define the situation in the 

conflict zone in greater detail.61 Combined peacekeeping force training, 
58

including firing exercises, seminars, and sharing of experiences and lessons 

learned, has continued throughout the operation, though the amount of training 

depends on Russia’s ability to finance it. 

 Once IFOR was established, a high level of cooperation continued as 

the forces were deployed. American and Russian forces worked together in 

the areas of air and ground logistics. Since both the US and Russia utilize air 

and rail transportation for the deployment of troops, such coordination is 

essential and, if handled properly, can help avoid early problems in performing 

this massive task. A Russian liaison officer in Vicenza, Italy, coordinated air 

movement. Russian officers also helped to coordinate movement of rail with 

the Movement Control Center of NATO. These initial actions of coordination 

in both training and deployment of forces set the stage for a fairly cohesive 

combined peacekeeping force. 

Working with the Russian Brigade 

 Upon arrival in Bosnia, Major General William Nash, Commander of 

the US sector (Task Force Eagle), and his Russian counterparts found 

immediate means to cooperate. Both Russian and US military leaders have 

been insistent upon developing, planning, and carrying out a robust series of 

combined exercises within the Bosnian area of operations. Cooperation on the 

ground is evident as US troops have provided fire support for Russian 

platoons, while Russian units have served as a covering force for US 

infantry.62

The majority of duties assigned to the forces relate to the show of 

force, blockades and the armed presence of forces in conflict regions. The 

most common task of ground forces is patrolling in the area of responsibility. 

These patrolling missions, consisting of ten to fifteen soldiers, were designed 

to investigate the areas beyond the limits of control posts in the base areas, 

demonstrate IFOR/SFOR presence, gather information, and protect freedom of 

movement. Ground troops are also used in escorting representatives from 

various international organizations helping to resolve the conflict. In addition 

to each country doing patrols independently, Russian and US troops also work 

in combined patrols. The frequency of these patrols ranged from once a week 
59

to once a month. Intelligence and counter-intelligence operations, as well as 

the majority of intelligence sharing, are planned and conducted in order to 

support these tasks. However, due to political fallout over the NATO bombing 

of Serbia, combined patrolling has been halted. 

Problems in Working with the Russian Brigade 

Although the Russians serve a larger strategic purpose in Bosnia, 

differences in operating procedures, language, military cultures, and 

equipment continue to create tension in the working relationship of soldiers in 

the daily operations of SFOR. At the operational level, the command and 

control system was often ineffective and inefficient. Operation participants 

noted that, in the initial format of IFOR (now SFOR), due to the large size of 

the force and the many participating countries: 

Individual elements of this design must be optimized to 

emphasize the following: the unique features of multinational cooperation; the scope and complexity of the MNF 

missions; the quantity of information and operations 

documents developed and used for troops; command and 

control; and troop coordination.63

Due to the newly established command structure, military-political 

tasks were to be carried out upon coordination with the Deputy SACEUR for 

the Russian Contingent, leaving for discussion whether a significant number of 

orders were narrow tactical or political-military issues. This problem caused 

the Russian Brigade to react more slowly to orders and caused friction 

between the command of the Russian Brigade and higher headquarters, 

especially on politically sensitive issues. Another reason for slow reaction to 

headquarters commands arose from the need of the US liaison officers 

(LNO’s) to interpret the tasks for the Russian commander. While American 

officers are used to generating “implied tasks” from verbal orders, the Russian 

forces were often confused and spent a great deal of time having the LNO call 

back and forth to the US Divisional Headquarters in Tuzla, officially the 

Multinational Division (North)—MND(N), to get the order refined to list each 

specific item in great detail.64
60

The sharing of intelligence is another often-cited concern. Russian 

and American military personnel jointly collected, exchanged, and processed 

intelligence information in their zone of responsibility, thus allowing the 

sharing of information and experiences between the two forces.65 The sharing 

of such information between groups allowed both groups to become more 

aware of events in the sector without duplication of effort. Currently, the 

sharing of intelligence between US and Russian forces has decreased due to 

mistrust developed during NATO’s bombing of Serbia in 1999.66

Before the deployment of IFOR/SFOR, many politicians and military 

commanders doubted the ability of the Russian troops to remain impartial in 

Bosnia due to the Russian reputation in peacekeeping activities elsewhere. 

Measures were taken to ensure the impartiality of the Russian contingent by 

placing one of the Russian battalions in Serb territory and the other in the 

Muslim region.67 To many that worked with the Russians, they were 

considered to be just as impartial to the warring factions as any part of Task 

Force Eagle. General Nash points out that during an incident in the Russian 

area of responsibility where Bosnian Serbs were behaving provocatively, the 

Russians were “even-handed in their approach, treated all parties with dignity 

and respect, and were firm in pursuit of their assigned mission.”68 General 

Nash further explained in an interview that Russian troops treated Serbs with 

the same distrust as the other military forces, as almost no one trusted any of 

the warring factions.69 On the other hand, many US officers interviewed 

responded negatively when asked about the impartiality of the Russian 

peacekeepers. The presence of Russians, according to one Colonel who 

served in Bosnia as a troop commander, provided a safe haven for the 

violation of the Dayton Peace Accords by harboring Serb criminals.70 

However, the Balkan Task Force has seen no overt reporting of Russian 

partiality and maintains that it is often difficult to find reports that are 

completely truthful and reliable.71

 There is also concern over the Russian procedures for performing 

inspections of weapons storage sites within its area of responsibility within 

US-led MND (N). In discussing US-Russian cooperation with US military 
61

officers who have participated in SFOR, many expressed their concern over 

the lack of inspections done by the Russian Brigade. Evidently, there was 

little value placed on this action by the Russian brigade. In fact, the US 

soldiers often performed the inspections within the Russian area of 

responsibility.72 However, one LNO pointed out that while some officers feel 

that Russians are not executing up to standard, they are executing to their own 

standard, which is no better or worse.73 

The overall level of professionalism of Russian members has also 

been questioned. A number of officers responded with instances of high levels 

of alcohol abuse by Russian soldiers and the creation of a brothel in the 

Russian area of responsibility.74 However, as Colonel Kaufmann, commander 

of the Balkan Task Force, points out, while these types of instances are 

harmful to the overall peacekeeping mission of SFOR, they are not uncommon 

in any multinational operation, even with other NATO countries.75 

The Russians also reportedly had problems with their equipment and 

maintenance. The US provided some of the necessary communication devices 

for the Russian Brigade since they did not own or operate any communications 

devices that were compatible with the US system. However, the US provided 

similar equipment to all of the participating forces operating in the US sector.76 

The Russian Brigade also suffered further problems with equipment, 

especially vehicles, which were old and unusable for operations because the 

Russians did not have the necessary maintenance upkeep.77 This not only 

meant that the Russian Brigade would be slower to respond, but also that the 

US commander would often have to compensate in other ways. Problems with 

the poor quality and short range of the Russian radios caused difficulties in 

their ability to communicate and report quickly to MND (N). US forces were 

unable to pick up a phone or radio and speak with the person they were trying 

to contact from the Russian contingent. This caused a great deal of frustration 

for the US forces, who were used to instantaneous communication. 

 The language barrier was, and continues to be, one of the biggest 

problems between the Russian Brigade and US forces. Since communication 

is paramount to combined missions, the language barrier can have a large 
62

impact on the effectiveness of the combined force. Currently, US liaison 

officers receive approximately eighteen months of language training, but some 

are put into liaison positions before their training is complete.78 Upon their 

arrival to SFOR, LNO’s live and work with the Russian Brigade. However, 

for those who did not receive this amount of training, communicating and 

establishing rapport with the Russians is more difficult. 

 Overall, the working relationship in SFOR between the US command 

of the US-led MND (N) and the Russian Brigade has been cooperative and 

effective since it began in 1995. Although there are still issues of concern that 

cause friction between the two forces, they are not crucial to the overall 

effectiveness of the peacekeeping forces in Bosnia. 

Lessons Learned in Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR)

Lesson 1: Russia and the US can work together under NATO and 

with the international community. Having Russian forces under a US 

commander five years after the Cold War ended was an unexpected event. 

After conducting the two major peace operation exercises and their experience 

in IFOR/SFOR, the two forces have learned more about each other’s operating 

procedures. In the course of conducting operations, Russian and US troops 

expanded their military cooperation, including joint combined-arms training. 

They were able to develop unified procedures and standards, as well as 

increase tactical-level liaison, thus increasing both coordination and security.79 

Numerous mine locating and clearing activities were performed together, 

especially since there were an estimated 1000 mine fields located in the 

Russian sector alone.80 Coordination also occurred in places where the 

warring parties might use toxic substances. Working contacts were set up 

between the Russian and American CBR (chemical-biological-radiological) 

defense services, including periodic environmental checks at the permanent 

base camps and smaller units. These examples demonstrate just a few of the 

many instances of successful coordination between the two forces. 

Lesson 2: Once there is a political will expressed and the US 

Secretary of Defense and Russian Minister of Defense sign the agreement that 

lays out the terms of the mission, the militaries must be able to execute plans 
63

as they see necessary. Both US and Russian troops have been able to conduct 

a number of integrated operations to resolve military aspects not specifically 

addressed in the accords. A study conducted by the Foreign Military Studies 

Office discussing the Russian and NATO forces in Bosnia, indicates that, “in 

the overall opinion of the operation participants, the partnership of NATO and 

Russia in Bosnia symbolized the obligation that the world community had 

taken itself to end the war there.”81 Generals Joulwan and Shevtsov were able 

to overcome issues of command and the forces in Bosnia have been able to 

conduct a successful combined peacekeeping operation. The relationship 

between the two forces suffers greatly when forced apart by politics at higher 

levels. 

Lesson 3: A successful operation requires a common strategic 

objective and the professionalism of soldiers. Despite different national 

interests and a competitiveness in pursuing those interests in the region, the 

mission of effective peacekeeping requires a high level of coordination and 

cooperation between the American and Russian forces. Regardless of the 

various cultural and military differences, the two groups were most often able 

to present and act as a unified force, showing the Bosnians that a soldier is a 

soldier, no matter what uniform he or she wears. 

Lesson 4: Russian and American soldiers are in agreement on a 

number of issues vital to the peacekeeping effort. In a survey of US and 

Russian officers conducted by a joint US-Russian research team,82 there was a 

broad area of professional consensus among both populations. Both groups 

agreed that the success of multinational peace operations depends on how 

carefully such operations are prepared and both emphasized the need for 

continued attention to operational planning, organizing supply and logistics, 

and maintaining coordination in order to secure success. Both groups of 

officers also supported, although to a differing degree, the need to improve 

coordination between commands and staffs and among the various national 

military contingents and with civilian agencies.83 Improved training and 

support for training for civil affairs to enhance cooperation was given a high 

priority.84 The survey revealed that both groups oppose having the OSCE 
64

assume responsibility for conducting multinational peace operations and felt 

that multinational peace operations should not be entrusted to the military of a 

single nation, nor should the multinational staffing be extended down to 

brigade-battalion level. 

These results highlight the fact that the two militaries agree on a 

number of important issues affecting their performance as peacekeeping 

forces. However, the areas of disagreement, especially those concerning 

strategic and operational command and control of multinational peacekeeping 

forces, illustrate the need to engage in US-Russian and NATO-Russian 

dialogue on the issue of future command arrangements for these operations. 

As this cooperation and teamwork becomes the norm in Bosnia, future 

operations will benefit from the lessons learned in IFOR/SFOR. 

Lesson 5: Developing and maintaining working relationships 

between US and Russian leaders, especially the US Secretary of Defense and 

the Russian Ministry of Defense and other top military leaders, makes a 

significant difference in combined peacekeeping operations. The success of 

IFOR/SFOR is due in large part to the hard work and personal interest in 

building relationships between Secretary Perry, Minister Grachev, General 

Joulwan, General Shevtsov, and many others. Their ability to develop a 

partnership between the two militaries and work out issues of concern to both 

sides proved invaluable to the success of IFOR/SFOR. Had there not been 

such a desire to work together, Russia would not have participated and SFOR 

may not have achieved the same level of success it has as of this writing. 

Case Study of Abkhazia (UNOMIG) 

While the conflict in Abkhazia had been building since 1989, it began in 

earnest in early 1992, when the Abkhaz minority (17 percent of the population, 

about 93,000 people) began pressing for complete independence from Georgia 

after nationalist rhetoric from the Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia 

encouraged them to seek greater autonomy.85 Georgian forces stormed the 

Abkhaz capital city, Sukhumi, in July 1992, claiming their purpose was to 

restore order.86 Fighting then broke out between the two sides in August 1992. 

During that portion of the conflict, the Russian military aided the Abkhaz side 
65

by providing equipment and expertise, although it is unclear whether the 

military was acting independently or following orders from Moscow.87 At that 

point the Georgian military was more of a renegade band of local clan leaders 

than a professional fighting force.88 From August 1992 to October 1993 the 

Russian government brokered three cease-fire agreements, all of which were 

subsequently breached. The breaking of the third agreement highlights the 

convoluted involvement of Russian forces. 

 On 27 July 1993 the third agreement was reached, which provided for 

disarmament, withdrawal of Georgian troops, and restoration of the legitimate 

government to Sukhumi but made no decision as to the political status of 

Abkhazia.89 Neither the Georgians nor the Abkhaz disarmed, and Abkhazia 

attacked Sukhumi in September 1993, when Georgia was vulnerable because 

they were embroiled in a conflict in South Ossetia. At the same time, Russia 

was in the midst of a constitutional crisis, making it difficult for Russian 

troops to receive clear direction from Moscow. The Abkhaz offensive used 

military equipment the Russians had supposedly rendered useless.90 The 

Russians gave at least tacit assent to the Abkhaz and are alleged to have 

provided aircraft and other heavy equipment for the offensive.91 During this 

offensive, the Abkhaz were able to take control of all of Abkhazia. Only at 

that point did the Russians threaten the Abkhaz with economic sanctions in 

order to broker a cease-fire. If Russia’s government had not been in turmoil at 

the time, perhaps they would have acted more quickly and decisively, as 

Georgian President Shevardnadze claims, “If the events of the third and fourth 

of October [referring to the crisis in Moscow] had happened earlier, then 

Sukhumi would not have fallen.”92 

The fourth cease-fire agreement, reached in Moscow in 1994, has 

held to date. The situation remains volatile, with frequent clashes between 

paramilitary groups and acts of terrorism and sabotage committed by criminal 

organizations and paramilitary groups. Most of these paramilitary groups are 

semi-organized Georgian freedom fighters trying to regain the territory 

claimed by the Abkhaz in the final conflict before the Moscow Agreement. 

No agreement has been reached on the political status of Abkhazia or the 
66

repatriation of the 300,000 Georgian refugees driven from the region during 

the conflict.93 Since the cease-fire, Abkhazia has held “presidential elections” 

and established its own constitution, further exacerbating differences on its 

political status, and Georgian paramilitary groups heighten tensions through 

frequent disturbances in the security zone.94 At present, attempts to achieve a 

political solution have produced only limited success. 

The UN maintains 101 military observers in the UN Observer 

Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). The UN’s mandate is to “(a) monitor and 

verify the implementation by the parties of the Agreement on a Cease-fire and 

Separation of Forces signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994; (b) to observe the 

operation of the CIS peacekeeping force within the framework of the 

implementation of the Agreement; (c) to verify through observation and 

patrolling that troops of the parties did not remain in or re-enter the security 

zone and heavy military equipment did not remain or was not reintroduced in 

the security zone or restricted weapons zone;” and several other stipulations to 

ensure compliance with the agreement and the return of refugees.95 

 Under the aegis of the CIS, Russia maintains about 1,500 forces in 

the region, although the authorization calls for the presence of 3,000 troops. 

The Russians have frequently called for the support of other CIS nations, but 

none have responded. At the CIS meeting in which the Moscow Agreement 

was concluded, the other CIS nations agreed to return to their respective 

governments and request troops for the operation. However, each government 

responded negatively to the request. This is due to the poor condition of many 

of the CIS countries’ militaries and economies, their desire not to be involved 

with a Russian-dominated force at least perceived to be partial, and the tension 

between these governments and Russia. The Ukraine and several other CIS 

nations have only been willing to send observers to the UN observer mission, 

not troops to the CIS peacekeeping force. 

According to UNOMIG official Wolfgang Weber, the UN mandate is 

sound and does not over-stretch UN capabilities as in some other 

peacekeeping missions. The Russian/CIS forces maintain a stable 

environment for the political settlement to be worked out, or, at the very least, 
67

keep armed conflicts to a minimum. Weber says that the UN and Russian/CIS 

forces work together successfully and the Russian troops are relatively well 

disciplined, equipped, and fed. However, the former Russian commander in 

Georgia, General Bobkin, claims that the force is not large enough or 

adequately equipped to take on a more ambitious mission of policing 

throughout Abkhazia and ensuring the safe return of refugees.96 To perform 

that mission, he claims, would require eight to ten thousand troops.97 

Although the effectiveness of Russian forces is in question, Weber believes 

that without continued Russian presence, or the presence of an equally capable 

UN force, fighting would resume almost immediately. 

UN forces perform regular patrols, man checkpoints, conduct regular 

weapons inspections, and monitor the performance of Russian/CIS forces. UN 

actions are limited by the size of the force and the security risks of being 

unarmed in an unstable environment. Weber believes that the fact that the UN 

troops are unarmed improves the impression of impartiality, though at times 

there have been security problems. One such problem in which seven UN 

members were taken hostage by a criminal group on 13 October 1999 caused 

the US to recall its military observers to Tbilisi, the Georgian capital,98 where 

they remain to date in accordance with US policy. Because of this and other 

incidents, the UN attempted to introduce a UN protection force in 1998. 

However, Russia struck down the proposal at the UNSC, claiming that the 

Russian/CIS forces were acting as a protection force for the UN and thus the 

introduction of 300 additional UN troops was unnecessary. Russia has been 

extremely suspicious of any attempts to get them out of Georgia, fearing 

NATO or US attempts to increase their influence in Russia’s backyard. As an 

alternative to the UN Protection Force, the UN has augmented its staff with 17 

international and 34 locally-hired security personnel. The lack of security for 

UN troops has forced them to close several team bases situated in isolated 

locations and has forced them to conduct only limited patrolling, leaving their 

mission only partially fulfilled. In particular, the US observers cannot perform 

their part in the mission adequately while being forced to remain in Tbilisi for 

security reasons. 
68

The UN task of monitoring the Russian/CIS peacekeepers has proved 

delicate because the Russian forces are also the only protection the UN 

members have from the warring factions. Regular UN-Russian troop exercises 

are conducted to maintain a high degree of readiness for security back up, and 

information of mutual interest is frequently exchanged.99 The UN has actively 

encouraged Russia to perform more extensive mobile patrols and to be 

proactive in ensuring the dismantling of the military positions of both sides, 

which Russia has done to some degree. The UN would still like to see 

additional Russian and combined Russian-UN patrols, and has often 

coordinated with the Russians in performing minesweeping operations or in 

doing patrols in mine-laden areas. However, security concerns of both the 

UN, who does not want to be perceived as partial by doing patrols with the 

Russians, and Russia, often a target of partisan groups, have caused both 

forces to take more limited actions. Therefore, both are not completely 

fulfilling the mandate to secure the area, facilitate the return of Internally 

Displaced Persons (IDP's), and ensure that no heavy weapons are brought into 

the restricted weapons zone.100 

UNOMIG has had only limited success in ensuring the 

implementation of the stipulations of the cease-fire agreement. The main 

obligations in the agreements on the separation of forces made in Tbilisi on 25 

June 1999 have been fulfilled.101 The number of skirmishes on both sides of 

the cease-fire line has also decreased.102 A system of joint investigations with 

the UN, Russia, and both parties to the conflict, has been set up to investigate 

violent incidents, with thirteen successful investigations already complete. 

However, a number of the key aspects of an eventual resolution have not been 

resolved. The return of refugees to Abkhazia, the political status of Abkhazia, 

and the establishment of a more secure environment will be necessary before a 

more permanent resolution can be achieved. 

The 1,500-man Russian/CIS peacekeeping force has received 

recognition from a UN mandate for its role in maintaining security in the 

region in accordance with the 1994 Moscow Agreement. The UN mandate 

has provided some much-desired legitimacy for the Russians, although they 
69

have been unable to secure any UN funding for the operation. The US and 

other nations have been skeptical of providing any further legitimacy to the 

Russian force because of its alleged partiality and questionable performance. 

 Major Owen Cheney, US Army officer and UN Military Observer in 

Georgia, evaluates the Russian performance as a successful effort at 

completing the minimum task of keeping people from fighting.103 They have 

performed reasonably well at maintaining security in an extremely volatile 

region. UN requests of Russia are generally followed, though they are usually 

limited only to what the UN knows Russia is willing to perform. Russia’s first 

priority is force protection. Russian troops sometimes suffer equipment 

shortages or maintenance problems, several incidents due to Russian soldiers 

selling fuel on the black market, and have occasional discipline problems. 

Maintenance problems often result in valuable equipment eventually becoming 

unusable. 

According to Weber, the primary drawback of the Russian/CIS 

peacekeeping force is Russia’s strong political interest in the region, thus 

making it difficult, if not impossible, for them to be neutral. Russian forces 

are perceived as too dominating and party to the conflict, often making them a 

target for both sides at various times during the fighting. This limits the 

Russian forces’ ability to perform routine patrols for fear of the safety of their 

troops. At present, they are only able to man checkpoints and maintain large 

clusters of forces to provide a separation between the two sides. According to 

Cheney, 

The CIS (Russian) Peacekeeping Force (PKF) 

continues to be unable or unwilling to fulfill its mandated 

tasks. In particular, Russian inactivity in patrolling and 

delays in expanding its AOR [Area of Responsibility] to 

include both the security zone (SZ) and restricted weapons 

zone (RWZ) have failed to create security conditions 

conducive to the return of internally displaced persons 

(IDP's) to their pre-war homes. The CIS PKF appears 

content to maintain the pre-May [1998] fighting status quo 

in the SZ and conduct operations to support only those CIS 

mandated tasks which minimize the threat to their own 

forces in the conflict zone. After the recent fighting in May, 
70

the Russian PKF appears to be taking a more active role in 

Gali with increased patrolling and establishment of new 

checkpoints. However, these actions are more likely linked 

to the PKF command’s desire to minimize casualties than to 

fulfill its mandated tasks.104

The Russian peacekeeping forces on the ground argue that they need a more 

robust force to completely fulfill these mandates, but such a force remains 

unlikely in the foreseeable future. 

In addition to its inability to fulfill its mandate, Russia has frequently 

come into question for its partiality to the Abkhaz. According to Etery 

Astemirova, Chairwoman of the Human Rights Commission of the Abkhazian 

Autonomous Republic, there are specific accounts of “peacekeepers detaining 

citizens and handing them over to Abkhaz authorities who then jailed, beat, 

and tortured them; threatening and robbing citizens at gunpoint, sometimes 

claiming to be collecting ‘pay’ for protecting Georgian interests; providing 

cover for Abkhaz paramilitaries conducting punitive combat operations; and 

even killing individual citizens.”105 Though these allegations are disturbing, 

Weber believes that in recent times the impression of the Russians as partisan 

has slightly decreased and their leadership is better at ensuring disciplined and 

professional performance.106

Russian involvement provides a more secure environment and 

maintains the status quo but does little to provide for a more lasting peace. 

The military forces are inadequate for a more ambitious mission, and the 

political will, both in Russia and internationally, has not been sufficiently 

committed to resolving the conflict. The Abkhaz, bolstered by the Russian 

presence, have little incentive to negotiate a solution. The Russians have no 

desire to leave and thus lose their influence in the region. Until a concerted 

political effort is made to find a solution, the status quo will remain 

indefinitely, with its high costs to Georgia, Russia, and the UN.

Lessons Learned in Abkhazia 

Lesson 1: The US should expect Russian involvement in operations in 

Russia’s near abroad. The Russians will be heavily engaged in the near 

abroad, promoting their interests and often times acting as a partial force or a 
71

domineering parent controlling its children. Russia spends over $526,000 per 

month maintaining forces in Abkhazia, placing a difficult burden on the 

Ministry of Defense.107 Despite this high economic cost and the political 

pressure from Georgia for the Russians to leave, Russia has continued and will 

continue to maintain its presence in keeping with its interests. Any solution to 

the situation in Georgia or elsewhere in the near abroad must therefore include 

Russian participation. 

Lesson 2: Russia’s forces are adequate for maintaining peace and 

stability, but greater political effort is required to broker a more 

comprehensive peace settlement. The Russian forces in Abkhazia prevent a 

re-escalation of the conflict, but many observers claim that until Russian 

forces leave, Abkhazia has no incentive to reach an agreement on either its 

status within the sovereignty of Georgia or the return of refugees, thus 

preventing a resolution. The problems of Russian partiality and heavyhandedness encourage the continuation of the status quo. Russian troops can 

maintain because of superior force and the threat of even greater force, but 

if a resolution is not in Russian interests, it will not happen. 

Lesson 3: Russian/CIS and UN forces need to improve cooperation 

and coordination. The situation in Abkhazia is extremely unstable and any 

small conflict has the potential to incite a larger one. The UN and Russia must 

coordinate to make sure all required areas are watched and adequate patrols 

are performed so that they do not miss a build-up of troops or minor 

altercation that may lead to a larger conflict. The UN cannot perform all these 

missions without Russian protection, and Russian forces are unlikely to 

perform many of them on their own. In addition, many of the missions that 

might facilitate a political solution, such as the return of the IDP's, can only be 

performed through joint efforts. One positive example of this is the UN’s 

recent success in setting up a joint investigating team with Russia and the 

warring parties to investigate terrorist or criminal incidents in the region. 

However, only a small number of incidents have been investigated. The 

Coordination Council, a forum for the four parties to discuss implementation 

of the agreement, has had minimal success and has often stalled in the 
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negotiation process. The UN and Russia do little to coordinate activities 

except when the UN requires protection to accomplish an activity. 

Lesson 4: Any apparent pressure to replace the Russian mission with 

UN or other international troops will be met with fierce Russian resistance. 

Russia believes that the CIS peacekeeping force is a legitimate force that 

should receive full UN recognition and funds. UN protection forces will 

continue to be vetoed in the UNSC. While Russia theoretically approves of 

using the UN and OSCE as peacekeeping bodies, they have resisted most 

efforts to use them in the Russian near abroad. Anything that they perceive as 

Western encroachment into their sphere of influence will meet with strong 

resistance. 

The Future of Russian Peacekeeping 

After looking at Russia’s interests, political environment, peacekeeping forces, 

doctrine, and case studies from combined operations in Bosnia and CIS 

operations in Abkhazia, it is possible to draw several conclusions about where 

and how Russia is likely to involve itself in future peacekeeping operations. 

According to Russian President Putin, territorial integrity and domestic order 

are his top priorities.108 Conflicts on Russia’s borders, most likely to occur in 

the near abroad, will take precedence among Russia’s peacekeeping missions 

because of the potential they have for destabilizing areas within Russian 

territory and because of Russia’s desire to maintain its sphere of influence in 

the near abroad. Outside this region, however, Russian peacekeeping will not 

take a high priority for the next several years. Russia still fears a weakening of 

its influence in the world, and thus will remain engaged with NATO in the 

Balkans and, to a certain extent, with UN missions, but its resources will be 

much more limited for such endeavors. 

 In the near abroad, Russia will prefer to work under the aegis of the 

CIS while striving to receive a UN mandate and funding for its operations. It 

will most likely be unwilling to sacrifice control of the operation for a full UN 

mandate and funding,109 but will continue to request funds and troops from 

other CIS states. Despite the high costs of involvement, Russia will continue 

to get involved in conflicts in the near abroad to protect its interests and 
73

maintain influence in the region. At the same time, it will seek to keep the US, 

and especially NATO, out of its sphere of influence. 

 Russia will maintain its commitment to the Balkans out of pride and a 

desire to protect its interests in the area. Russia desires to remain an important 

player in the world arena. However, the military may seek to reduce the level 

of commitment because of financial constraints and the high level of 

operations they have had to sustain. As Putin announced, they will continue to 

work with NATO,110 desiring a more equal voice in the operation. Despite this 

desire, the military is unlikely to devote many of its scarce resources to 

conform its equipment and procedures to NATO standards of operation. They 

will continue to put pressure on the US and other NATO countries to work 

through the OSCE and the UN as a conflict resolution body, rather than 

performing operations outside the purview of the UN. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

With the future of Russian peacekeeping in mind, this section recommends 

actions to be taken to improve combined operations in Bosnia and to support 

Russian operations in Abkhazia, with consideration given to those actions 

most likely to improve the US-Russian strategic relationship. The final 

portion of this section looks at the more robust options that are effective in 

both spheres and can be used in future operations to build and maintain a 

cooperative relationship. 

Recommendations for Bosnia and Combined Operations 

Most of the combined operations problems in US-Russian relations stem from 

a lack of understanding or communication between the two militaries. This 

gap exists on every level of the relationship, from the highest levels of the US 

Department of Defense (DoD) and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to 

interactions between individual soldiers. Therefore, the following 

recommendations have been divided at various levels to address such issues. 

Operational Level Recommendations 

Problem: Misunderstandings of military-political tasks between the 

Russian Brigade and MND(N) headquarters causing difficulties in their 

abilities to respond to tactical orders.111 US commanders are accustomed to 
74

verbal orders. However, the Russians would prefer to have all tasks published 

in the form of Implementation Instructions (IMPIN's) before they act. In 

addition, the Russians interpret some tasks as political-military tasks, not 

solely military tasks. Therefore, they must get permission through the Russian 

chain of command, which is time consuming.112 

Recommendation: Increase the number of liaison officers to the 

Russian Brigade to five or six, three or four with the Russian Brigade and two 

in Tuzla. Currently, there are three LNO’s stationed with the Russian Brigade 

at the Russian Headquarters in Ugljevik and one working at the US division 

Headquarters in Tuzla. Their job is to maintain connectivity between the 

Russian Brigade and MND(N) HQ by serving as translator and interpreter 

between the two headquarters. Additional LNO’s would be tasked with jobs 

similar to those currently in service. LNO’s are indispensable to the operation 

for translating and offering professional opinions to the Russian Brigade. 

Civilian translators are not able to translate the military concepts and do not 

have the same level of experience as LNO’s. 

Moreover, a Russian Representative should be included in PfP 

command post exercises. During these command post exercises, focus should 

be placed on coordinating staff organizations and developing practical 

recommendations on the use of military force and on the basic premises for 

assessing the effectiveness of its use. A mobile staff made up of US and 

Russian officers should be created from these exercises to work issues in case 

of necessary emergency deployments to conflict regions. Russian officers can 

provide experience from their peacekeeping operations (with the CIS, NATO, 

or the UN) that may be helpful in dealing with combined peacekeeping 

operations. Furthermore, they will be able to troubleshoot possible operational 

problems concerning Russian units in combined operations, such as the 

difficulty of understanding “implied tasks” assigned by MND(N). 

Tactical Level Recommendations 

Problem: Lack of professionalism and partiality shown on the part of 

the Russian soldiers, as well as differences in military culture and a lack of 

coordination. 
75

Recommendation: Restart combined patrolling missions with US and 

Russian forces. Continual reevaluation of NATO and other participating 

countries’ actions towards the former warring parties shows that it was not 

always completely balanced.113 Currently, the US and Russian forces do not 

perform any combined patrolling missions due to political fallout during the 

summer of 1999.114 Before this, the Russians and Americans did 

approximately six combined patrols per month, three in the American sector, 

and three in the Russian area of responsibility with one LNO present with the 

patrol to facilitate the mission and communication. Combined patrols help the 

relationship in two ways: they serve as a way to present a unified front to the 

people in Bosnia who were hoping to drive a wedge between the two forces, 

and they allow the soldiers to learn more about each other. One LNO called 

the combined patrols the biggest “money-maker for US-Russian military 

relations.”115 Additionally, Set aside more time to brief incoming American 

commanders (down through platoon leaders and NCOs) on various differences 

in military culture, terminology, procedures, etc. This can be done by the 

Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) in the area that have served with the Russian 

Brigade, if available. 

Problem: Language barriers affect all levels of operations. Typically 

only the LNO’s speak any amount of Russian, and few Russians speak 

English. This problem has been recognized as one of the biggest issues that 

continues to cause difficulties in combined operations.

Recommendation: DoD should ensure that liaison officers receive 

adequate training in the necessary language. Also, DoD should develop 

phrase books that provide essential information on carrying out common or 

shared tasks in both Russian and English. Captain Leyde, a current LNO in 

SFOR commented that “a LNO who arrives with a high proficiency in Russian 

has a much easier time establishing rapport and proving his professional 

competency.”116 The current Air Staff emphasis on raising Air Force language 

abilities among officers to 10 percent is thus rightly justified. Other branches 

of service should set and achieve similar goals. 
76

Recommendations for US Support for Peacekeeping in Abkhazia and the 

Near-Abroad 

With US interests in mind, this section looks at how the US can improve the 

US-Russian strategic relationship through supporting Russia in performing its 

peacekeeping functions in the near abroad. The analysis lists several of the 

problems in Abkhazia and gives recommendations for solving or improving 

them that provide the best combination of positive impact on the situation and 

on the US-Russian relationship. 

Problem: The UN Observers are not able to completely fulfill their 

mandate due to travel restriction and security concerns. The UN observers, 

because they are unarmed, have become targets of criminal groups and 

partisan forces. The limitations on UN observers allow for a more unstable 

environment because the observers cannot ensure the guidelines for restricted 

weapons’ zones are completely followed or that there is not a build-up of 

troops preparing for an attack in certain areas of the security zone. 

Recommendation: Allow US UNOMIG observers more freedom to travel 

to certain areas within the conflict regions and increase the number of US 

observers from two to five. The US troops can only perform their mission if 

they are able to more directly view the conflict zone. The UN observers have 

taken adequate precautions to protect their troops while still performing the 

mission. US troops should not show a lack of commitment to the region by 

being unwilling to perform the tasks that the rest of the observers perform. 

While the DoD may deem it necessary to restrict them from isolated regions 

because of security concerns, they should at least be allowed to visit Sukhumi, 

where Russian/CIS and UN headquarters are located, as well as the more 

protected areas around Zugdidi and Gali. 

Many in the UN and Russia see a lack of US commitment because of their 

unwillingness to bear the same risks as the other UN observers. Lifting the 

restriction and increasing the number of observers will show more support for 

the UN mission and will enable the US observers to better monitor the 

belligerents’ compliance with the mandate and the performance of 

Russian/CIS forces. By remaining in Tbilisi, US observers give the Abkhaz 
77

the impression that the US is partial to the Georgians, decreasing Abkhaz trust 

in US efforts to resolve the crisis. Increasing the number of observers and 

allowing them to interact with the Russian/CIS forces will improve the 

familiarity with and understanding of the Russian military. If the US is 

unwilling to allow its observers to actually observe the conflict, their presence 

hurts UN and Russian perceptions of US troops because it highlights the fact 

that US presence is more for political purposes than an actual sign of 

commitment. 

 The DoD must necessarily be concerned with the security risks to its 

personnel. Another hostage crisis, if it involved an American, could be much 

more serious than the previous incident where seven UN observers were taken 

hostage by a criminal group and later released unharmed.117 None of the UN 

observers have been seriously harmed to date, and the UN has taken 

precautions to improve security by limiting patrols and not manning 

checkpoints in isolated locations. The UN has also increased security by 

hiring armed guards from both within and outside the region, which should 

help to convince the DoD to loosen restrictions on its observers.118 

 Problem: The Russian/CIS Forces are not able to completely fulfill 

their mandate and sometimes act (or are perceived to act) with partiality to 

the Abkhaz. 

Recommendation: Increase US UNOMIG observers’ interactions 

with CIS peacekeeping forces. The US observers should increase the amount 

of time spent with Russian forces to improve the relationship and assess what 

areas the UN and/or US might be able to provide help either through education 

and training in necessary subjects, encouragement to undertake certain 

activities, or logistical support for operations. In the future, the US may be 

able to use that knowledge in offering education and training in facilitating the 

return of IDP's and policing the conflict zone, though the US has its own 

difficulties with this. In addition, by understanding the weaknesses of the 

Russian peacekeepers, US observers may be able to interact with the Russians 

to develop solutions for fulfilling the mandate and moving towards a 

resolution of the conflict. 
78

Additionally, the US should encourage and support other CIS nations, 

such as the Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia to take a more active 

role in CIS peacekeeping missions. Both politically and militarily, the US can 

support these nations in an effort to make the CIS an organization less 

dominated by Russia and more capable in its peacekeeping efforts. The US 

should give political encouragement for these nations to provide troops for the 

operations. In addition, the DoD can provide increased funding through the 

Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) initiative to improve 

facilities, equipment, and training for CIS countries, including Russia. In 

1999, the US spent $1million through EIPC on the Ukraine’s peacekeeping 

capabilities. This funding could also be given to Russia, Azerbaijan, 

Uzbekistan, Georgia, and other CIS states. Outside of EIPC, whose mission is 

to “increase and improve the pool of capable peacekeepers,”119 the US can also 

support countries like the Ukraine and Azerbaijan with funds for participation 

in peacekeeping activities in the near abroad. This would cost in the range of 

$3-5 million per year per country. 

Overall Recommendations to Improve US-Russian Relations through 

Peacekeeping 

Recommendation 1: Define the circle of participants in the 

operational planning of multinational peacekeeping operations by the level or 

amount of their participation. While the involvement of non-NATO countries 

in the policy planning stages of an operation would only create additional 

congestion and cause the policy planning to be more difficult than it currently 

is, NATO should look to include all participants in the operational planning of 

missions. Although the inclusion of Russia in the planning of combined 

peacekeeping operations like IFOR and KFOR involves changing NATO 

policy and not solely US policy, it would be beneficial for the US to ask for 

the inclusion of Russia in the operational planning process. 

During the planning for IFOR and KFOR, there was a lack of 

coordination and involvement with Russia on a political and operational level 

regarding its participation in the joint peacekeeping missions. This lack of 

coordination and planning for IFOR was one of the top concerns expressed by 
79

the Russian military once they were established in Bosnia.120 In the future, 

greater Russian participation in the planning of operations can reduce their 

overall concern in becoming a part of a multinational peacekeeping force. By 

enlarging the planning circle, Russia and other participating countries gain a 

vested interest in the Peacekeeping operation and this allows contributing 

countries to express and work through areas of concern before the 

commencement of the mission. In addition, working together to plan the 

operation facilitates the development of relationships at a higher level of 

political and military structure. Evidence suggests that such combined 

planning is very important in the success of IFOR/SFOR implementation. 

The planning structure will depend greatly on how the multinational 

force is structured. If it is a NATO force, the NATO allies will be hesitant to 

include Russia in operational planning because of concerns about sharing 

intelligence.121 Including non-NATO countries in combined peacekeeping 

efforts is an ad-hoc process that requires extensive planning and coordination 

each time it occurs. Although the inclusion of Russia in IFOR was difficult, it 

was not nearly as complicated as the more formal Helsinki Agreement reached 

during summer 1999 before the introduction of Russian forces to KFOR. 

Formal political agreements require a considerable amount of political and 

military effort to find solutions to both Russian and American concerns. In 

addition, certain members of NATO prefer little Russian involvement and do 

not want to provide Russia with any form of veto power in the planning 

process. There is already an opportunity for Russia to voice its opinions 

through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) or the Permanent Joint 

Council. NATO is obligated to respond to such concerns and either justify the 

action or make a change in the planning. However, because of Russia’s large 

contribution to the peacekeeping effort, it should be given more opportunity to 

provide input than simply reviewing the final operational plan and 

commenting on it. All non-NATO participants who make significant 

contributions to the peacekeeping effort and whose forces will be used in the 

operation should be given a larger voice in the operational planning. 
80

Recommendation 2: Restart educational exchanges between US and 

Russian military personnel. Educational exchange programs and funding are 

already established for Russian officers to the US in the International Military 

Education and Training (IMET) Program. The current funding for Russia in 

FY00 is $900,000, which includes the tuition costs, travel expenses, 

supplemental living allowances, and medical expenses of students.122 

However, Russia suspended its participation in IMET programs after summer 

1999. Russia should reestablish its participation in those courses.123 In 

addition to Russian participation in American courses, US Army officers 

should be sent to the Vystrel Academy in Russia, which teaches peacekeeping 

courses. 124 The Academy has made offers to accept international students, but 

the US has not sent its officers to the program for several years. 

Recommendation 3: Perform combined exercises for staff level 

officers under the established PfP program. Exercises should include the 

active participation of Russian staff level officers in the planning and 

implementation of peace operations. Combined exercises in the early 1990’s 

are credited for making the inclusion of Russia into IFOR possible. 

Recommendation 4: Improve Russian language and cultural 

expertise among US Foreign Area Officers. Already suggested above, we 

want to emphasize again that working together in peacekeeping and on other 

transnational issues requires an ability to communicate. The military should 

allow FAO’s to receive language training earlier. FAO’s are often not given 

language training and designated as FAO’s until their 6th or 7th year of service, 

when they are often near age 30. To become truly fluent, language training 

needs to occur earlier in their careers. In addition, the military should ensure 

that FAO’s are not put in liaison positions before they have received adequate 

training. According to Captain Leyde, those US officers who have not 

received enough training and are not proficient in the Russian language have a 

difficult time establishing a good rapport with the Russian military.125 

Recommendation 5: Increase cultural training for officers and NCO’s 

assigned to work with Russian units. US officers sent to the Balkans receive 

training in understanding the Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats, but not necessarily 
81

their fellow Russian peacekeepers. US officers and NCO’s sent to work with 

Russian units should be taught the cultural differences as well as the 

differences in the way Russian military units operate. This does not have to be 

an extensive training program, but could be done by Russian FAOs in a day’s 

training during mission preparation for a mission in Bosnia, Kosovo, or in any 

future US-Russian combined operations. 

Recommendation 6: Give more credit to Russia for its peacekeeping 

operations in recognition of improved performance in desired areas. 

When Russia successfully undertakes an activity with the encouragement or 

approval of the US, the US should give them credit in the international arena 

for their actions. The Russian forces have performed reasonably well in areas 

such as Moldova and South Ossetia, and they should be given credit for it.126 

In situations like Abkhazia, the US should recognize positive steps Russia 

takes toward facilitating the return of IDPs and accomplishing other tasks that 

provide for a more lasting solution. Russia has frequently expressed its desire 

for international recognition for its significant efforts to stabilize the near 

abroad. In fact, recognition seems just as important to the Russians as 

receiving funds for their operations.127

SUMMARY 

Peacekeeping operations provide an excellent opportunity for the US and 

Russia to improve their strategic relationship. While the US should be careful 

not to exaggerate the impact this cooperation can have on the relationship, it 

should commit itself to making the best possible strategic use of peacekeeping 

cooperation and providing the necessary resources to accomplish that goal. 

This paper has provided several recommendations for improving US-Russian 

relations through these peacekeeping operations. By making efforts to 

improve the relationship now, the Bush administration can alleviate 

misunderstandings and pave the way for future cooperation with Russia. 

ENDNOTES 

 

1

 The near abroad refers to the former Soviet states surrounding the Russian 

Federation. 
82

 

2

 Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventative Defense (Washington 

DC: Brookings Institute Press, 1999), 15. 

3

 “Russia-NATO Founding Act,” online at 

http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/fndact-a.htm, para 5 (Accessed 4 January 

00). 

4

 Martin Nesirky, “NATO and Russia aim to improve relations,” Boston 

Globe, 17 February 2000, World Section, A20. 

5

 Interview with Major General William Nash, US Army, Commander of Task 

Force Eagle, 3 December 1999. 

6

 Interview with Colonel Greg Kaufmann, US Army, Director of the Balkans 

Task Force, OSD, 20 January 2000. 

7

 “Russian Federation National Security Concept,” 11 Nov 1996, 5. Approved 

by the members of the RF Security Council on 5 October 1996. 

8

 Micheal Croft, Russia’s Peacekeeping Policy, Part II: Differences in 

Approach and Obstacles, (Peacekeeping and International Relations, Ottawa, 

Sept/Oct 1996), 34. 

9

 Ibid, 34. 

10 Lieutenant General Anatoly Meleshkov, Representative of the RF Armed 

Forces to the UN Military Staff Committee, 25 January 2000. 

11 See Abkhazia case study for further discussion of this issue. 

12 Russian National Security Concept. 

13 Interview with Gen Meleshkov. 

14 Dominic Evans, “Putin: If treated fairly, Russia could join NATO,” Reuters, 

6 March 2000. 

15 Russian National Security Concept. 

16 Celestine Bohlen, “Russian Military, Usually Silent, Urges Hard Line on 

Chechnya,” New York Times, 7 November 1999, International Section. 

17 Ibid. 

18 John Thornhill and John Lloyd, “Yeltin’s Balkan Question,” Financial 

Times, 14 June 1999, Comment and Analysis Section, 24. 

19 “Yeltsin’s Fast Breaking Generals,” Time, 28 June 1999, World Section. 

20 Interview with Col Kaufmann 

21 Stuart D. Goldman, “Russian Conventional Armed Forces: On the Verge of 

Collapse?” CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 

4 September 1997), Table 1. 
83

 

23 Nikolia Novichkov, “Russian Defense Budget Eaten up by Huge Debts,” 

Jane’s Information Group, June 1999, 25. 

24 Ibid. 

25 Information on Vystrel and other information about the training of their 

forces comes from the interview with Gen Meleshkov. 

26 Interview with General John Reppert, US Army (retired), former Defense 

Attache to Russia, November 1999. 

27 Interview with Gen Meleshkov. 

28 James Yentz, “Peace Operations as Reaction to the New World Disorder: 

Russian and Ukrainian Approaches,” unpublished paper, 14 December 1998. 

29 Ibid. 

30 Ibid. 

31 Interview with Gen Meleshkov. 

32 Colonel Vladimir I. Krysenko, “Military Aspects of Peacekeeping and the 

Participation of Russian Armed Forces in Areas of Armed Conflict on the 

Territory of the CIS and Russia.” Unpublished text of an oral presentation 

given at a TRADOC Peacekeeping Conference in December 1993, Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas, online at 

http://call.army.mil/call/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/peace.htm (Accessed on 20 Jan 

2000). 

33 Kevin O’Prey, “Keeping the Peace in the Borderlands of Russia,” 

Occasional Paper #23, Henry L. Stimson Center, July 1995, 29. 

34 Interview with Col Kaufmann. 

35 A. Raevsky and I.N. Vorob’ev, Russian Approaches to Peacekeeping 

Operations, UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR/94/31), 

Research Paper 12 (New York: UN, 1994), 5. 

36 Ibid. 

37 Ibid. 

38 Ibid, 6. 

39 Interview with Gen Meleshkov. 

40 Raymond C. Finch, III, “The Strange Case of Russian Peacekeeping 

Operations in the Near Abroad 1992-1994,” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign 

Military Studies Office, July 1996). 

41 Ibid. 

42 Roy Allison, “Peacekeeping in the Soviet Successor States,” Chaillot Paper 

#18, November 1994), 14; online at 
84

 

http://www.weu.int/institute/chaillot/chai18e.htm (Accessed on 20 Jan 2000). 

43 O’Prey, 8. 

44 Tom Wilhelm, “Russian Peacekeeping Forces in Tajikistan,” (Carlisle, PA: 

US Army Peacekeeping Institute), 11. 

45 Yentz. 

46 O’Prey, 9. 

47 Ibid. 

48 See Abkhazia case study for more information on Russia’s perceived 

partiality in the region. 

49 Allison, 14. 

50 Yentz. 

51 Interview with Gen Reppert. 

52 For a good analysis of using combatants in peacekeeping forces, see Tom 

Wilhelm, “Using Belligerents as Peacekeepers” (Carlisle, PA: US Army 

Peacekeeping Institute). 

53 “History of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina,” NATO homepage, 1 October 1999, online at 

http://www.nato.int (Accessed on 5 Mar 00). 

54 Ibid. 

55 Ibid. 

56 Carter and. Perry, 43. 

57 Ibid, 45. 

58 Ibid. 

59 “Lessons and Conclusions on the Execution of IFOR Operations and 

Prospects for a Future Combined Security System: The Peace and Stability of 

Europe after IFOR,” Joint US/Russian Research Project of the Foreign 

Military Studies office (FMSO), Center for Army Lessons Learned, US Army 

Combined Arms Center, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas and the Center for MilitaryStrategic Studies (CMSS), General Staff of the Armed Forces, Moscow, 

Russia, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 1998), 

Chapter 3. 

60 Ibid. 

61 Major Fernando Buesa, “Russians Homeland Defense Day in Ugljevik,” 

SFOR Informer #31, 11 March 1998, 1. 

62 Ibid. 
85

 

63 “Lessons and Conclusions on the Execution of IFOR Operations,” Chapter 

4. 

64 Ibid. 

65 E-mail interview with Major Warren, US Army (served as FAO in SFOR 

Aug-Dec 1998), 22 March 00. 

66 Ibid. 

67 Interview with anonymous US officer. 

68 Ibid. 

69 General William Nash (US Army, Retired), “Give the Russians a Chance,” 

New York Times, 22 June 1999, Op-Ed Section. 

70 Interview with Gen Nash. 

71 Interview with anonymous US officer. 

72 Interview with Col Kaufmann. 

73 Ibid. 

74 E-mail interview with Captain Eric M. Leyde (current LNO to the Russian 

Brigade), 28 Mar 00. 

75 Interview with anonymous US officer. 

76 Interview with Col Kaufmann. 

77 Interview with Gen Nash. 

78 Interview with Col Greer. 

79 Interview with Capt Leyde. 

80“Lessons and Conclusions on the Execution of IFOR Operations,” Chapter 4. 

81Ibid. 

82Ibid. 

83 The research team was composed of members from The Center for MilitaryStrategic Research of the Russian General Staff and the Foreign Military 

Studies Office of the US Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned. The 

survey was conducted during August-October 1997. 

84 Dr. Jacob W. Kipp, “US-Russian Military Cooperation and the IFOR 

Experience: A Comparison of Survey Results,” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

Foreign Military Studies Office, September 1998). 

85Ibid. 

86 Finch, 3. 

87 Ibid. 
86

 

88Ibid. 

89Finch, 3. 

90 Ibid. 

91 Ibid. 

92 According to Finch, there exists a considerable body of evidence that the 

Abkhazians received support from a number of different Russian groups. For 

examples, see Catherine Dale, “Turmoil in Abkhazia: Russian Responses,” 

(RFE/RL Research Report, 27 August 1993), 48-57; Dr. Tamara Gragadze, 

“Conflict in the Transcaucasus and the Value of Inventory Control,” Jane’s 

Intelligence Review (February 1994), 71-73. 

93 Misha Glenny, “The Bear in the Caucasus,” Harpers (March 1994), 49. 

94 “The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeping,” (New 

York: The United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 576-7. 

95 “Report of the Secretary-General Concerning the Situation in Abkhazia, 

Georgia” (S/1999/1087), 22 October 1999. 

96 “The Blue Helmets,” 578. 

97 Interview with UN official Wolfgang Weber, 24 Jan 2000. 

98 Interview with Major Owen Cheney, US Army, UN Military Observer in 

Georgia, 19 Jan 2000. 

99 “Report of the Secretary-General Concerning the Situation in Abkhazia, 

Georgia.” 

100 Ibid. 

101 Interview with Maj Cheney. 

102 “Report of the Secretary-General Concerning the Situation in Abkhazia, 

Georgia.” 

103 Ibid. 

104 Interview with Maj Cheney. 

105 Owen Cheney, “UNOMIG Mandated Observance of CIS Peacekeeping 

Forces in Georgia,” 5 August 1998. 

106 Irakli Zurab Kakabadze, “Russian Troops in Abkhazia: Peacekeeping, or 

Keeping Both Pieces?” Perspectives on Central Asia, Vol II, No. 6 (September 

1997), Center for Political and Strategic Studies, online at 

http://www.cpss.org/casianw/perca0997.txt (Accessed on 20 Jan 2000). 

107 Interview with Weber. 

108 O’Prey, 29. 
87

 

109 Henry E. Hale, Russian Election Watch No. 8, March 15, 2000, 

(Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, Harvard University), 2. 

110 O’Prey, 29. 

111 Evans. 

112 For a more detailed discussion, see pages 58-62. 

113 “Lessons and Conclusions on the Execution of IFOR Operations,” Chapter 

4. 

114 Interview with Capt Leyde. 

115 Interview with Maj Warren. 

116 Interview with Capt Leyde. 

117 “Report of the Secretary-General Concerning the Situation in Abkhazia, 

Georgia.” 

118 Because the attempt to introduce a UN protection force was refused by 

Russia, the UN mission hired seventeen international and thirty-four local 

armed guards. Contracting armed guards is cheaper than a UN protection 

force and does little to harm the US-Russian relationship. UN observers 

would then be able to expand their patrols and maintain more team bases with 

less fear of criminal groups or partisans. They would thus be able to fulfill 

more of their mandate and provide more stability in the region. The armed 

guards will require a commitment of funds (around $1M/year) from the UN, 

but without the added security, UN observers will continue to be unable to 

fulfill their mandate. 

119 “The Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) Initiative.” 

Briefing slides, Office of the DASD for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian 

Assistance, May 1998, 3. 

120 “Lessons and Conclusions on the Execution of IFOR Operations,” Chapter 

4. 

121 Problems arose in the summer of 1999 when many questioned if the 

Russians were passing information to Serbian President Milosevic. 

122 Peacetime Engagement Planning Reference Book, Joint Staff Publication, 

June 1999, 308. 

123 The following levels of Russian participation in US courses were submitted 

as part of the FY 00 IMET proposed training plan: Civil-Military Strategy for 

International Development (2 persons), Language Instructor (6 persons), 

Executive Program in Civilian Military Relations (3 persons), and Legal 

Considerations in Military and Peace Operations (4 persons). 

124 Interview with Gen Reppert. 

125 Interview with Capt Leyde. 
88

 

126 Interview with Maj King. 

127 O’Prey, 29.