alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                        SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Tofutti Brands Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-QSB for the period ending June 28, 2003 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, David Mintz, Chief
Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:


        (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

        (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.


/s/David Mintz*
---------------
David Mintz
Chief Executive Officer
August 18, 2003


* The originally executed copy of this Certification will be maintained at the
Company's offices and will be made available for inspection upon request.
### IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10

- 14

- 00115

- CR

KENNETH BELL

, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

, Appellee

From the County Court

Navarro County, Texas

Trial Court No. C34388

- CR

ORDER

This appeal was abated to the trial court to determine the proper contents of the

clerk’s record in this appeal, order the trial court clerk to submit a new clerk’s record, if

necessary, and prepare oral or written findings. Those findings have been made and

filed with this Court. No new clerk’s record was required to be submitted.

Accordingly, this appeal is reinstated. Appellant’s brief is due 30 days from the

date of this Order.

PER CURIAMBell v. State Page 2

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Appeal reinstated

Order issued and filed March 1 9 , 2015
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 12, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-20885

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

BILAL TROY FARAHKHAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:96-CR-24-1

--------------------

Before KING, WIENER, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Bilal Troy Farahkhan, federal prisoner # 72541-079, appeals

the district court’s dismissal of his motion to modify his

sentence, purportedly filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b)(2)(B)

and FED. R. CRIM. P. 35. The Government argues that the district

court lacked jurisdiction to consider Farahkhan’s motion to

modify. As the Government notes, “§ 3582(b)(2)(B)” does not

exist. A district court may modify the imposed term of

imprisonment under limited circumstances. § 3582(c). Because

Farahkhan’s motion did not fall under any of the provisions of
No. 05-20885

-2-

§ 3582(c), it was unauthorized and without jurisdictional basis.

See United States v. Early, 27 F.3d 140, 141-42 (5th Cir. 1994). 

To the extent that the district court construed the motion as an

attempted successive § 2255 motion, dismissal for lack of

jurisdiction was proper because Farahkhan had not received

permission from this court to file a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255

motion. See United States v. Key, 205 F.3d 773, 774 (5th Cir.

2000). 

The instant appeal is without arguable merit and is

therefore dismissed as frivolous. Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215,

219-20 (5th Cir. 1983); 5TH CIR. R. 42.2. Farahkhan is hereby

warned that any further repetitious or frivolous filings,

including those attempting to circumvent statutory restrictions

on filing second or successive § 2255 motions, may result in the

imposition of sanctions against him. These sanctions may include

dismissal, monetary sanctions, and restrictions on his ability to

file pleadings in this court and any court subject to this

court’s jurisdiction. 

APPEAL DISMISSED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

In re: JEREMIAH W. BALIK,

Petitioner

______________________

2021-186

______________________

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States 

Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.

______________________

ON PETITION AND ON MOTION

______________________ 

PER CURIAM.

O R D E R

Jeremiah W. Balik has filed a submission entitled 

“Preemptory Appeal [and] Motion for Writ of Mandamus,”

in which he asks the court to “compel [the] Board of Veterans’ Appeals . . . to render a timely decision.” ECF No. 2 at 

3. He also files a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and a motion for an extension to file IFP and 

notice of what he characterizes as a related district court 

case. 

To obtain mandamus, a petitioner must show (1) that 

there are no adequate alternative legal channels through 

which the petitioner may obtain that relief; (2) that he has 

a clear legal right to relief; and (3) that the grant of 

Case: 21-186 Document: 20 Page: 1 Filed: 11/17/2021
2 IN RE: BALIK

mandamus relief is appropriate under the circumstances. 

See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380–81

(2004). 

Mr. Balik has not met that standard here. To the extent that Mr. Balik believes that the Board has unreasonably delayed the processing of a pending claim, he can file 

a petition for a writ of mandamus at the United States 

Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims to compel the Board 

to take appropriate action. See Martin v. O’Rourke, 891 

F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2018). This court reviews those 

decisions on appeal from the Veterans Court. Mr. Balik 

therefore has an adequate alternative channel to obtain 

the relief that he appears to seek from this court. 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

(1) The petition is denied.

(2) All pending motions are denied as moot.

November 17, 2021

Date

FOR THE COURT

/s/ Peter R. Marksteiner

Peter R. Marksteiner

Clerk of Court

s24

Case: 21-186 Document: 20 Page: 2 Filed: 11/17/2021
#### § 1.958 Finality of decisions.

A decision by the regional office Committee, operating within the scope of its authority, denying waiver of all or part of a debt arising out of participation in a VA benefit or home loan program, is subject to appeal in accordance with 38 CFR parts 19 and 20. A denial of waiver of an erroneous payment of pay and allowances is subject to appeal in accordance with § 1.963a(a). There is no right of appeal from a decision rejecting a compromise offer.

(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 501 and 7104).

[69 FR 62201, Oct. 25, 2004]
###### Editorial Note on Part 1

#### Editorial Notes:

1. In Patent and Trademark Office publications and usage the part number is omitted from the numbers of §§ 1.1 to 1.352 and the numbers to the right of the decimal point correspond with the respective rule numbers.

2. For nomenclature changes to part 1, see 68 FR 14335, Mar. 25, 2003; 87 FR 68904, Nov. 17, 2022.

#### § 1.113 Final rejection or action.

(a) On the second or any subsequent examination or consideration by the examiner the rejection or other action may be made final, whereupon applicant's, or for *ex parte* reexaminations filed under § 1.510, patent owner's reply is limited to appeal in the case of rejection of any claim (§ 41.31 of this title), or to amendment as specified in § 1.114 or § 1.116. Petition may be taken to the Director in the case of objections or requirements not involved in the rejection of any claim (§ 1.181). Reply to a final rejection or action must comply with § 1.114 or paragraph (c) of this section. For final actions in an *inter partes* reexamination filed under § 1.913, see § 1.953.

(b) In making such final rejection, the examiner shall repeat or state all grounds of rejection then considered applicable to the claims in the application, clearly stating the reasons in support thereof.

(c) Reply to a final rejection or action must include cancellation of, or appeal from the rejection of, each rejected claim. If any claim stands allowed, the reply to a final rejection or action must comply with any requirements or objections as to form.

[65 FR 14872, Mar. 20, 2000, as amended at 65 FR 76773, Dec. 7, 2000; 69 FR 49999, Aug. 12, 2004]

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 2 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 6 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 7 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 1 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 3 pertaining to both patents and trademarks is placed in the grouping pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 4 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 5 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.
**EXHIBIT 31.1****CERTIFICATIONS**I, Brian T. Beckwith, certify that:1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Peoples Educational Holdings, Inc.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controlsand procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material informationrelating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us byothers within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;  b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controlsand procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and  c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions): a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;and  b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.Date: October 10, 2007   /s/ Brian T. Beckwith   Brian T. Beckwith,  President and Chief Executive Officer  
23
#### § 87.8 How may a grantee use grant funds?

A grantee shall only spend funds it receives under this part according to the approved application and budget, the authorizing legislation, the terms and conditions of the grant award, the applicable cost principles specified in subpart Q of 45 CFR part 74, and the regulations of this part.
§ 233.2 Limitation on proceedings. ( a ) *Maximum number of proceedings.* The number of Copyright Claims Board proceedings that may be filed by a claimant and the number of proceedings that may be filed by legal counsel or law firms on behalf of claimants in any 12-month period shall be limited in accordance with this section. A proceeding shall count toward the numerical limitation as soon as it is filed, regardless of how the proceeding is resolved, whether it is found to be noncompliant under § 224.1 or unsuitable under § 224.2 of this subchapter, voluntarily dismissed, or fails to become active due to a respondent's opt-out. Neither amendments to a claim, nor counterclaims filed in response to a claim shall count as additional claims in determining whether the limit has been reached. The following limitations shall apply: ( 1 ) A claimant, including a corporate claimant's parents, subsidiaries, and affiliates, shall file no more than 30 proceedings in any 12-month period.
( 2 ) A sole practitioner or a legal counsel associated with a law firm shall file no more than 40 CCB proceedings on behalf of claimants in any 12-month period.
( 3 ) A law firm shall file no more than 80 CCB proceedings on behalf of claimants in any 12-month period.
( b ) *Circumvention of limit.* If a claimant files a claim in excess of the limitation set forth in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, such claim shall be dismissed without prejudice. If a sole practitioner or legal counsel associated with a law firm files a claim in excess of the limitation set forth in paragraph (a)(2) or (3) of this section, the legal counsel or law firm at issue shall be ordered to withdraw from the proceeding and the Board may stay the proceeding for 60 days, which may be extended for good cause shown, for the claimant to retain new legal counsel. It may be considered *bad-faith conduct* under § 232.3 for a party to take any action for the sole purpose of avoiding the limitation on the number of proceedings that may be filed as set forth in this section.
( c ) *Law students, law clinics, and pro bono legal services.* The limitations in this section do not apply to law students or a law clinic or *pro bono* legal services organization with a connection to the participating law student's law school.
( d ) *District court referrals.* In calculating the number of proceedings that have been filed by a claimant, sole practitioner, legal counsel, or a law firm under this section, claims referred by district courts will not be considered.
[87 FR 30092, May 17, 2022; 87 FR 36061, June 15, 2022; 87 FR 77521, Dec. 19, 2022]
```

[House Document 107-170]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                     

107th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 107-170

 
GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL FISHERY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF 
        AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA

                               __________

                             COMMUNICATION

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA EXTENDING THE AGREEMENT OF 
 NOVEMBER 12, 1992, CONCERNING FISHERIES OFF THE COASTS OF THE UNITED 
   STATES, WITH ANNEX, AS EXTENDED (THE 1992 AGREEMENT). THE PRESENT 
AGREEMENT, WHICH WAS EFFECTED BY AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES AT VILNIUS ON MAY 
    18, 2001, AND WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 26, 2001, EXTENDS THE 1992 
     AGREEMENT TO DECEMBER 31, 2004, PURSUANT TO 16 U.S.C. 1823(a)

 January 23, 2002.--Referred to the Committee on Resources and ordered 
                             to be printed

                                           The White House,
                                      Washington, January 16, 2002.

Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: In accordance with the Magnuson-Stevens 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act (16 U.S.C. 1801 et 
seq.), I transmit herewith an Agreement between the United 
States of America and the Government of the Republic of 
Lithuania extending the Agreement of November 12, 1992, 
Concerning Fisheries Off the Coasts of the United States, with 
annex, as extended (the 1992 Agreement). The present Agreement, 
which was effected by an exchange of notes at Vilnius on May 
18, 2001, and Washington on December 26, 2001, extends the 1992 
Agreement to December 31, 2004.
    In light of the importance of our fisheries relationship 
with the Republic of Lithuania, I urge that the Congress give 
favorable consideration to this Agreement.
            Sincerely,
                                                    George W. Bush.

```
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-4017

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus JASPER JABARI EDWARDS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham. Frank W. Bullock, Jr., District Judge. (CR-05-66) Submitted: January 5, 2007 Decided: January 23, 2007 Before NIEMEYER and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Jeffrey B. Welty, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Michael A. DeFranco, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Jasper Edwards was convicted of conspiracy to distribute less than 50 grams of crack and distribution of 30.6 grams of crack. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841(b)(1)(B), 846 (West 1999). He was sentenced to 240 months imprisonment and urges on appeal that he is entitled to a new trial on four grounds. We have reviewed the four issues raised by Edwards and find only one merits discussion. During trial, the district court excluded evidence proffered by Edwards regarding his future plans and intentions. Edwards offered testimony from his father about conversations they had about his future plans and Edwards’s handwritten notes about legitimate job opportunities he was interested in pursuing. Edwards contends this evidence should have been admitted under the then-existing state of mind exception under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3). We hold that even if there were error, any error was harmless. See United States v. Nyman , 649 F.2d 208, 212 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding that the test of harmlessness was whether the Court believed it “highly probable that the error did not affect the judgment” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we find no reversible error and affirm Edwards’s sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED
#### §§ 15.141-15.148 [Reserved]
42053.

#### DAWN MEMORIAL PARK, INC. v. SOUTHERN CEMETERY CONSULTANTS OF GEORGIA, INC.

Argued June 9, 1966

Decided June 10, 1966.

*Moretón Bolleston, Jr.,*for appellant.

*William G. Grant, Mitchell, Clarke, Pate & Anderson, Stephens Mitchell,*for appellee.

Jordan, Judge.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the trial court overruling the defendant’s motion to dismiss count 2 of the plaintiff’s petition. *Held:*

The record before this court discloses that count 1 of the petition is still pending in the trial court. Accordingly, the judgment appealed from is neither a final judgment nor one which would have been final if rendered as contended for by the appellant *(Code Ann.*§ 6-701); and the appeal must be dismissed as being premature. *Code Ann.*§ 6-809 (b); *Johnson v. Henry & Co.,*178 Ga. 542 (174 SE 140); *Bailey v. United Life &c. Ins. Co.,*25 Ga. App. 301 (103 SE 184); *McFarland v. Lumpkin,*108 Ga. App. 370 (133 SE2d 117).

*Appeal dismissed.*

*Bell, P. J., and Eberhardt, J., concur.*
#### § 17.157 Definitions.

For the purposes of this part:

*Adaptive equipment* means equipment which must be part of or added to a conveyance manufactured for sale to the general public to make it safe for use by the eligible person and enable that person and the conveyance to meet the applicable standards of licensure. Adaptive equipment includes any item specified by the Under Secretary for Health or designee as ordinarily necessary for any of the classes of losses or combination of such losses specified in 38 CFR 17.156, or as deemed necessary in an individual case for an eligible person for the continued safety and functionality of a modified automobile and adaptive equipment. Adaptive equipment includes, but is not limited to, a basic automatic transmission, power steering, power brakes, power window lifts, power seats, air-conditioning equipment when necessary for the health and safety of the veteran, and special equipment necessary to assist the eligible person into or out of the automobile or other conveyance, regardless of whether the automobile or other conveyance is to be operated by the eligible person or is to be operated for such person by another person; and any modification of the interior space of the automobile or other conveyance if needed because of the physical condition of such person in order for such person to enter or operate the vehicle.

*Altered vehicle* means the same as in 49 CFR 567.3.

*Alterer* means the same as in 49 CFR 567.3.

*Manufacturer* means the same as in 49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(6).

*Modifier* means a motor vehicle repair business that modifies a motor vehicle to enable a person with a disability to operate, or ride as a passenger in, the motor vehicle. VA does not approve, endorse, or assess the abilities of any modifiers to perform any requested or represented modification services.

*Registered provider* means a manufacturer, modifier, or alterer registered with the Department of Transportation's National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) Modifiers Identification Database currently available at *https://www.nhtsa.gov/apps/modifier/index.htm.* Any manufacturer, modifier, or alterer who is not registered is considered an *unregistered provider.*

*Roadside service* means emergency roadside services provided to an eligible person performed in connection with the repair, reinstallation, or replacement of adaptive equipment already installed in the automobile or other conveyance. The term is limited solely to services provided to make the adaptive equipment operational and does not include mechanical repair of the engine or other vehicle systems, towing, providing essential fuels and fluids such as gasoline necessary to operate the vehicle, or providing locksmith services.

*VA Adaptive Equipment Schedule for Automobiles and Other Conveyances (“Schedule”)* means the VA schedule that contains the maximum allowable reimbursement amounts for the listed adaptive equipment. The Schedule also includes the maximum hourly labor rates for installation, repair, reinstallation, and replacement of this equipment and allowable fees that VA will pay.

[89 FR 51232, June 17, 2024]