J-A12009-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ERIC KRASSNOSKY,

Appellant No. 2873 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 20, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0005332-2006

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ERIC KRASSNOSKY,

Appellant No. 2874 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 20, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0007673-2012

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ERIC KRASSNOSKY,

Appellant No. 2875 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 20, 2015
J-A12009-16

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In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0007676-2012

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ERIC KRASSNOSKY,

Appellant No. 2876 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 20, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0007680-2012

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ERIC KRASSNOSKY,

Appellant No. 2878 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 20, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0005312-2006

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 14, 2016

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Appellant, Eric Krassnosky, appeals from the judgments of sentence 

imposed in five separate cases, after his terms of probation in each case 

were revoked based on his pleading guilty to burglary in a new prosecution.1 

On appeal, Appellant contends that the court erred in deeming him ineligible 

to participate in the Recidivism Risk Reduction Incentive (RRRI) Act, 61 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4501-4512. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the pertinent procedural history of 

Appellant’s case as follows:

On March 31, 2015, Appellant entered into a negotiated 

guilty plea in front of the Honorable James Bradley on docket 

#263-2015. Appellant pled guilty to Count 1: Burglary (F1)2; 

Count 5: Access Device Fraud (F3)3; Count 6: Conspiracy to 

[Commit] Burglary (F1)4; and Count 7: Conspiracy to [Commit] 

Access Device Fraud (F3)5. Appellant was sentenced to 18-36 

months.

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(2).

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4106(a)(1)(ii)[.]

4 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903[.]

5 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903[.]

The new charges resulted in a request for Gagnon II[2]

hearings on Appellant’s five previous convictions, #5312-2006, 

5332-2006, 7673-2012, 7680-2012, and 7676-2012. This 

[c]ourt conducted the Gagnon II hearings on August 20, 

2015[,] at which time this [c]ourt heard from counsel for the 

Commonwealth, counsel for Appellant, and from Samantha Salini 

from Delaware County Adult Probation and Parole Services.

____________________________________________

1 This Court sua sponte consolidated Appellant’s appeals in each of his five 

underlying cases by per curiam order on October 7, 2015.

2 See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
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This [c]ourt followed the recommendation from Adult 

Probation and Parole. Appellant was sentenced to an additional 

15-30 months[’ incarceration] on four of the [cases]; all 

concurrent with each other but consecutive to [case] #263-

2015. Due to Appellant’s prior conviction for Burglary graded as 

an F1, this [c]ourt determined that Appellant was not RRRI 

eligible.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and [a Pa.R.A.P.] 

1925(b) statement of [errors] complained of on appeal. 

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 11/9/15, at 1-2 (citations to the record omitted).

Herein, Appellant presents the same issue as set forth in his Rule 

1925(b) statement: “Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred when it pronounced 

that [Appellant] was not eligible for relief under the [RRRI Act], 61 Pa.C.S. 

[§] 4501, et seq. (RRRI)[?]”3

Appellant maintains that the trial court erroneously concluded that he 

was ineligible for the RRRI program because he has a “history of past or 

present violent behavior” premised on a single conviction of first-degree 

burglary. See Appellant’s Brief at 9 (quoting 61 Pa.C.S. § 4503(1) (defining 

“Eligible Offender” as an individual who “[d]oes not demonstrate a history of 

present or past violent behavior”)). Appellant concedes that his burglary 

conviction constitutes “violent behavior” under our Supreme Court’s decision 

in Commonwealth v. Chester, 101 A.3d 56, 65 (Pa. 2014) (holding that “a 

____________________________________________

3 We note that Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion asserting this 

claim. However, this Court has considered issues involving RRRI eligibility 

as non-waivable questions of law that implicate the legality of sentence. 

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tobin, 89 A.3d 663, 669 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(construing a court’s “failure to impose a[n] RRRI sentence” as a legality of 

sentence issue) (citations omitted).
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conviction for first-degree burglary constitutes ‘violent behavior’ under 

section 4503(1)” of the RRRI Act). He stresses, however, that the Chester 

Court explicitly left open the question of whether a single, first-degree

burglary conviction amounts to a “history” of violent behavior, so as to 

disqualify Appellant from RRRI eligibility under section 4503(1). See 

Chester, 101 A.3d at 65 (declining to decide whether one first-degree 

burglary conviction constitutes a “history” of violent behavior, as Chester 

was actually convicted of three counts of first-degree burglary, which was 

“more than sufficient to form a ‘history’ of ‘violent behavior’ under [s]ection 

4503(1)”). Appellant then contends that such a single conviction does not 

amount to a “history” under the RRRI Act, presenting several arguments in 

support. 

We need not address Appellant’s specific claims, as our Court recently 

decided the precise question left unanswered in Chester, and which 

Appellant argues herein. In Commonwealth v. Cullen-Doyle, 133 A.3d 14 

(Pa. Super. 2016), we held that “[t]he legislature’s use of general terms to 

describe the disqualifying conduct set forth in § 4503(1) persuades us that a 

single conviction for first-degree burglary, an admittedly violent act under 

long-standing Pennsylvania law, is sufficient to establish a present history of 

violent behavior.” Id. at 22.4 In light of Cullen-Doyle, we conclude that 

____________________________________________

4 We acknowledge that on June 7, 2016, our Supreme Court granted CullenDoyle’s petition for allowance of appeal on the following issue:

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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the trial court did not err by deeming Appellant ineligible for the RRRI 

program due to his single conviction for first-degree burglary. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/14/2016

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

(1) Whether Petitioner is eligible for the RRRI program where he 

is convicted and being sentenced for a single count of first 

degree burglary, which he admits is a crime of violence, but 

where he has no other convictions demonstrating a “history of 

present or past violent behavior,” as that term is used in the 

RRRI Act?

Commonwealth v. Cullen-Doyle, No. 63 WAL 2016 (Pa. filed June 7, 

2016) (per curiam). However, until our Supreme Court issues a decision in 

Cullen-Doyle, this Court’s decision remains binding precedent.