alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Cite as 2014 Ark. 31

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS

IN RE ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT

AND COURT OF APPEALS RULE 6-3

Opinion Delivered January 23, 2014

PER CURIAM

Effective this date, Arkansas Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Rule 6-3 is revised

and republished to read as follows.

Rule 6-3. Anonymity in certain appellate proceedings, opinions and case styles.

(a) Scope. The record and accompanying briefs, motions, or other filings in all

adoption appeals and all appeals originating in the juvenile division of circuit court shall be

sealed. The Clerk shall ensure that the public docket use initials to identify juveniles in those

appeals. Counsel and the Court shall preserve the juvenile’s anonymity by using initials in all

subsequent captions, opinions, motions, and briefs, as well as in oral argument, if any. The

record and papers on appeal shall be open for inspection only to counsel and parties of

record, or, only upon order of the Court after review of a written motion. In any other

appeal in which counsel for either side believes that a person’s identity should be protected

by the Court, counsel may move the Court to do so.

(b) Appellant as Movant. If the movant is the appellant in the case, the motion shall be

filed at the time the transcript is tendered for filing to the Clerk. The person whose identity

is sought to be protected shall be referred to using the initials of the first and last names in the
Cite as 2014 Ark. 31

motion and on the cover of the transcript, if applicable. Upon filing the motion, the Clerk

shall seal the record pending the Court’s decision on the motion.

(c) Appellee as Movant. If the movant is the appellee in the case, the motion shall be

filed within 5 days, excluding weekends and holidays, of the date the record is filed. The

person whose identity is sought to be protected shall be referred to using the initials of the

first and last names in the motion. Upon filing the motion, the Clerk shall seal the record

pending the Court’s decision on the motion.

(d) Service. A copy of the motion must be served upon opposing counsel who will

have 10 days to respond and serve the movant. Opposing counsel shall also use only the

initials of the first and last names of the person at issue in any response.

(e) Motion Granted. If the Court grants the motion, the Clerk shall ensure that the

cover of the tendered transcript complies with the Court’s order. Counsel and the Court

shall preserve the person’s anonymity by using initials to identify the protected party in all

subsequent captions, opinions, motions, and briefs, as well as in oral argument, if any. The

records and papers on appeal shall be open for inspection only to counsel and parties of

record, or, only upon order of the Court after review of a written motion. 

(f) Motion Denied. If the Court denies the motion, the Clerk shall substitute the

person’s full name on the cover of the transcript, if applicable, and the appeal shall proceed

in accordance with these Rules.

It is so ordered.

2
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

DA 21-0154 

DENIS AGUADO, 

MAY 0 9 2022 

Petitioner and Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Respondent and Appellee. 

Bowen Greenvvoucl 

Clerk of Supreme Court 

State of Montana 

ORDER 

Appellant Denis Aguado has filed a motion for an extension of time within which to file 

his reply brief. Good cause appearing, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant's motion for extension is GRANTED. 

Appellant has until May 31, 2022, within which to file his reply brief. 

No further extensions will be granted. 

DATED this 14/j ay of May, 2022. 

For the Court, 

Chief Justice 

05/09/2022

Case Number: DA 21-0154
Exhibit 35.1



Servicer Compliance Statement of John Deere Capital Corporation





I, Katrin Watkins, Assistant Secretary of John Deere Capital Corporation,
state:



A review of John Deere Capital Corporation’s activities for the
period from November 2, 2020 through October 31, 2021 (the “Reporting Period”) and of John Deere Capital Corporation’s
performance under the Sale and Servicing Agreement dated as of July 22, 2020 among John Deere Capital Corporation, John Deere Receivables
LLC and John Deere Owner Trust 2020-B has been made under my supervision, and to the best of my knowledge based on such review, John Deere
Capital Corporation has fulfilled all its obligations under all relevant agreements in all material respects throughout the Reporting
Period.







|Date: January 10, 2022 |     | John Deere Capital Corporation
|---------------------- | --- | ------------------------------
|                       |     |                               
|                       |     |                               
|                       | By: | /s/ Katrin Watkins            
|                       |     | Katrin Watkins                
|                       |     | Assistant Secretary
Addendum to the Employment Agreement Between Pan American Bank & John J. Warren



 EXHIBIT 10.113 
  
 August 4, 2003 
  
 Mr. Jim Warren 
 25965 Terra Bella 
 Laguna Hills, CA 92653 
  
 Re: Addendum to May 14, 2003 Employment Agreement 
  
 Dear Jim: 
  
 This agreement, (the “Agreement”) sets forth the terms and conditions of your employment with Pan American Bank, FSB (“Employer”) and
its subsidiary United Auto Credit Corporation (“UACC”), both of which may be referred to interchangeably hereinafter as “Employer”. By signing this Agreement, you will be agreeing to these terms. It is important that you
understand clearly both what your benefits are and what is expected of you by the Employer. The effective date of this Agreement (the “Effective Date”) shall be December 1, 2003, and will replace your previous Agreement. 
  

	 	1.	Term. This Agreement shall have a term of one (1) year, commencing December 1, 2003 and ending on November 30, 2004. 

  

	 	2.	Compensation.  

  

	 	a.	Base Salary. The Bank will pay you $150,000 per annum from December 1, 2003 through November 30, 2004. 

  

	 	b.	Bonus. You will be paid your full bonus for 2003 on or before February 29, 2004. 

  

	 	c.	Automobile Allowance. Your automobile allowance of $200 per month will stop on November 30, 2003. 

  

	 	d.	Vacation. Your vacation accrual of three (3) weeks will stop on November 30, 2003. You will be paid for all unused accrued vacation on November 30, 2003. 


 

	 	e.	Floating Holidays. Your floating holiday accrual will stop on November 30, 2003. You will not receive the floating holidays for 2004. You will be paid for all unused accrued
floating holidays on November 30, 2003. 

  

	 	f.	Medical/Dental Benefits. You will continue to receive medical/dental benefits until November 30, 2004. 








 Mr. Jim Warren 
 Employment Agreement 
 August 4, 2003 – Page 2 
  

	 	g.	Life, Supplemental, Long Term Disability. You will continue to receive these benefits until November 30, 2004. 

  

	 	h.	40l(k). Your 401(k) Employee Deferral and Employer Match will continue until November 30, 2004. 

  

	 	3.	Options. The 180,000 options issued to you at $10.00 per share will only vest through March 31, 2003 or 40% vesting i.e. 72,000 shares. Vesting will discontinue after this
date. 

  
 Very truly yours,

  
 /s/ Ray Thousand 
  
 Ray Thousand 
 President/CEO 
  
 I agree to the terms of employment set forth in this Agreement subject to approval of the Board of Directors of Pan American Bank. 
  

	     /s/ John J. Warren

	  	 August 5, 2003


	 Employee’s Signature
	  	 Date
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 10.2

                                                OSI Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
                                                58 South Service Road, Suite 110
                                                Melville, NY 11747
                                                T  631.962.2000  F  631.752.3880
                                                www.osip.com

(O S I)(TM) PHARMACEUTICALS

January 5, 2004

Mr. Gabe Leung

Re:  Addendum to Employment Agreement Dated May 16, 2003

Subsequent to our mutual agreement with regards to your Employment Agreement
dated May 16, 2003, changes have been made to OSI's Bonus component of our
Compensation Program. The following document remedies this change against your
current agreement and modifies your agreement with OSI as follows:

Current Agreement: (b) In addition to the Base Salary, for each fiscal year of
the Company ending during the Term of the Agreement, beginning with the 2004
fiscal year, you will be eligible to receive a target bonus of up to 50% of the
Base Salary, determined and payable in accordance with the Company's practices
applicable to bonuses paid to its executives. The Company's bonus system is a
discretionary annual performance-based incentive bonus system, approved by the
Company's Board, and is based upon a combination of personal and corporate
performance contributing to your maximum target.

Revised Agreement: (b) In addition to the Base Salary, for each fiscal year of
the Company ending during the Term of the Agreement, beginning with the 2004
fiscal year, you will be eligible to receive a bonus of typically up to 50% of
the Base Salary, determined and payable in accordance with the Company's
practices applicable to bonuses paid to its executives. The Company's bonus
system is a discretionary annual performance-based incentive bonus system,
approved by the Company's Board, and is based upon a combination of personal and
corporate performance contributing to your maximum target.

If the forgoing accurately sets forth our agreement for an addendum to the
original agreement, please so indicate by signing and returning this document to
me.

/s/ COLIN GODDARD   1/9/04          /s/ GABE LEUNG    1/12/04
--------------------------          -------------------------
Colin Goddard       Date            Gabe Leung        Date
§ 62.74 How much credit will a Program participant receive for monetary repayments made, or for approved service performed, before beginning service under the Special Repayment Program? ( a ) Prior approved service performed by a Program participant will be credited to the Program participant for the purpose of calculating the Program participant's remaining service obligation under this Program. Thus, the Program participant's remaining service obligation will be calculated by subtracting the number of days of the Program participant's prior approved service from the number of days of the Program participant's original service obligation under the PH/NHSC Scholarship Training Program and/or the Scholarship Program. If a Program participant has made monetary payments, his or her remaining service obligation will be reduced by converting the monetary payments into days of service credit as set forth in paragraph (b) or (c) of this section, whichever is applicable.
( b ) Program participants who elect to serve pursuant to section 204(b) and section 204(c)(2) of Pub. L. 100-177, will not receive a refund of any amounts previously paid but will receive service credit for those payments as follows: ( 1 ) The number of days of service credit will be calculated by dividing the total amount paid by the Program participant prior to the Program participant's service start date by the total debt as of the service start date and multiplying the result of that division by the number of days of the participant's remaining service obligation (as determined by the formula set forth in the second sentence of paragraph (a) of this section).
( 2 ) If the Program participant defaults on a contract under this Program, prior monetary payments will not be credited to service but will be applied to the monetary debt owed by the Program participant.
( c ) Program participants who elect to serve under section 204(c)(1) of Pub. L. 100-177 must pay an amount equal to the scholarship amount. Any amounts paid by the Program participant prior to or after entry into the Program, in accordance with § 62.76 of this subpart, will be used to reduce the Program participant's financial obligation incurred under section 204(c)(1) of Pub. L. 100-177. In some cases, the amounts paid before or after entry into the Program will exceed the scholarship amount. These payments in excess of the scholarship amount will be converted into days of service credit under the formula set forth in paragraph (b)(1) of this section. If a Program participant defaults on a contract under this option, the monies paid in excess of the scholarship amount will not be credited to service but will be credited toward the monetary debt owed by the Program participant under section 338E(b) of the Act or section 225(f)(1) of the Act, as in effect on September 30, 1977. The scholarship amount paid upon entering this option will be forfeited.
#### Matter of the Estate of Francis Hathaway, Deceased.

(Surrogate’s Court, New York County,

May, 1899.)

Transfer tax — Jurisdiction to appoint appraiser of the estate of a nonresident who leaves property in different counties.

Where a nonresident of the State of New York dies leaving prop- ■ erty in two of its counties, that surrogate who first issues ancillary letters upon the estate acquires exclusive jurisdiction to appoint an appraiser for the purposes of the transfer tax, and this although the proceedings before, that surrogate were irregular in that the ancillary letters were obtained without citing the county treasurer, as required by law.

Motion to vacate the appointment of a transfer tax appraiser.

T. Frank Brownell, for motion.

Emmet R. Olcott, opposed.

Varnum S.

This matter was originally submitted to Surrogate Arnold, and subsequently, after reargument, submitted to me. The decedent, who was a nonresident, died in 1895, leaving property in the county of Chemung, and also in the county of Hew York, Ancillary letters were obtained in the former county,, but without citation to the county treasurer, as required by law.. . In August, 1895, on application by the comptroller of the county of.Hew York, a transfer tax‘appraiser was appointed in that county. The. present *475motion is made to vacate such appointment, on the ground that the surrogate of this county had no jurisdiction to make the order. In reply, it is urged that the jurisdiction of both surrogates to issue ancillary letters of administration, and to enforce the transfer tax, was originally concurrent, and that the failure on the part of the surrogate of Chemung to cause the county treasurer to be cited, while only an irregularity so far as the validity of the ancillary letters themselves are concerned, nevertheless caused him to fail to obtain jurisdiction for transfer tax purposes. The surrogate of New York was, therefore, according to this contention, the first surrogate to obtain jurisdiction for such purposes when he made the order sought to be vacated. This claim cannot, I think, be maintained. Section 10 of chapter 399 of the Laws of 1892 furnishes the law applicable to the matter, and makes jurisdiction to assess the transfer tax thereunder depend upon jurisdiction to grant letters testamentary or of administration or to “ give ancillary letters,” etc. The surrogate of Chemung county having issued ancillary letters, although there appears to have been irregularity in the proceeding, the surrogate of this county would have no jurisdiction to issue them. § 2477, Code Civ. Pro. He, therefore, would have no jurisdiction for transfer tax purposes, and the application to vacate order appointing appraiser is granted.

Application granted.
#### § 93.227 Secretary or HHS.

*Secretary* or *HHS* means the Secretary of HHS or any other officer or employee of the HHS to whom the Secretary delegates authority.
#### Isaac Kaplan, Respondent, *v.*Joseph Wein, Appellant.

Appeal- from ax judgment rendered in' favor of the-plaintiff and .-against the défendant in the Municipal Court, fourth district, - borough- of Manhattan.

Rudolph Marks, for appellant.

K. S. Levy,, for respondent.

Freedman, P. J.

This was -an action for an alleged conversion of personal property. - There was a conflict of evidence upon the trial as to whether the goods claimed by the plaintiff to have been converted by defendant were returned ■ or -not, and the' trial "judge gave judgment for the plaintiff. The testimony on thé part of the plaintiff shows that the defendant was a traveling salesman in the employ of the’ plaintiff, that the plaintiff had delivered to the defendant a quantity of wrappers and dressing sacques, to be used in obtaining orders for their sales,- that these were the property- of t-lie plaintiff, and when the employment of the defendant .was ended, were to be returned to the plaintiff, that the employment of the ■defendant ceased in September, 1898, and that although requested -several times to return the samples, he had not done so. The value of the goods, was shown without objection to be $41.05; for which amount the plaintiff had a judgment. Several objections- were *791made to the introduction of testimony,, and exceptions were taken to the rulings of the trial judge, but a careful examination of the evidence does not show that the testimony objected to was improper, nor was it of such a character as to prejudice the defendant. Upon the whole case it does not appear that injustice has been done. The judgment should be affirmed.

MacLeae and Leveetbitt, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed, with costs to respondent.
Document Headings

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                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
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###### Department of Homeland Security

###### Federal Emergency Management Agency

          - [Internal Agency Docket No. FEMA-1857-DR; Docket ID FEMA-2008-0018]

# AGENCY:

Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS.

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

This notice amends the notice of a major disaster declaration for the State of New York (FEMA-1857-DR), dated  September 1, 2009, and related determinations.

# DATES:

*Effective Date:*                         September 4, 2009.                    

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Peggy Miller, Disaster Assistance Directorate, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street, SW., Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646-3886.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The notice of a major disaster declaration for the State of New York is hereby amended to include Individual Assistance for the following areas among those areas determined to have been adversely affected by the event declared a major disaster by the President in his declaration of September 1, 2009.

Cattaraugus, Chautauqua, and Erie Counties for Individual Assistance (already designated for Public Assistance).

The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance Grant; 97.048, Disaster Housing Assistance to Individuals and Households In Presidentially Declared Disaster Areas; 97.049, Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance—Disaster Housing Operations for Individuals and Households; 97.050 Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance to Individuals and Households—Other Needs; 97.036, Disaster Grants—Public Assistance (Presidentially Declared Disasters);  97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant.

W. Craig Fugate,

Administrator,  Federal Emergency Management Agency.

[FR Doc. E9-22110 Filed 9-14-09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 9111-23-P
41616.

#### TUCKER v. THE STATE.

Submitted November 2, 1965

Decided November 9, 1965.

*623
      *Ben R. Freeman, James E. Weldon,*for appellant.

*Wright Lipford, Solicitor General,*for appellee.

Eberhardt, Judge.

Since the ground of the demurrer and the objection to the evidence which is the basis of the amended motion for new trial are the same these must stand or fall for the same reasons.

We cannot agree that the description of the hubcaps is too indefinite to support the charge. It is true that charges of the taking of “one shovel of the value of one dollar,” *(Melvin v. State,*120 Ga. 490 (48 SE 198)), or “one black leather sample case, one black fiber sample case, one tan fiber sample case . . . eighty pounds of assorted candies . . . , one book *624photographs of candy . . with values stated, have been held too indefinite. *Pharr v. State,*44 Ga. App. 363 (161 SE 643). If the indictment here had simply charged the defendant with taking two automobile hubcaps it would have been subject to the criticism made for “[i]t is not sufficient for the indictment merely to charge the defendant with having stolen a chair, a shovel, a table, a watermelon, or a pocket-knife. The marks, quality, or kind of the property must be incorporated in the description, or the transaction in some way individualized.” *Bright v. State,*10 Ga. App. 17, 18 (72 SE 519). But we hardly see how it could have been made more definite when in addition it. was charged that the hubcaps were from a 1965 Chevrolet car, from the particular model known as the Impala, of the Supersport type and made of chrome. Much of the great mass of property is without any particular identifying mark or number, e.g., corn, cotton, lumber, gasoline, chickens, etc. Consequently, a demurrer calling for identifying *marks or numbers*generally calls for an impossibility. But one who has asported that type of property is not to be immune from prosecution on that account. He is entitled to have identifying characteristics which are sufficient to inform him of the instance meant and to enable the jury to determine that the article taken was indeed that which the owner lost. *Ayers v. State,*3 Ga. App. 305 (1) (59 SE 924). The identification here was sufficient. Compare *McNatt v. State,*27 Ga. App. 642 (3) (109 SE 514).

An indictment for the larceny of “a lot of cord wood” was too indefinite because there was no statement of quantity, a “lot” simply meaning a great deal *(Walthour v. State,*114 Ga. 75 (39 SE 872)), and one charging the taking of “two- and one half gallons of syrup” was lacking since the defendant was entitled to know the kind of syrup he was charged with stealing. *Mathis v. State,*27 Ga. App. 229 (107 SE 629). Here the defendant was apprized of the quantity and the particular type and kind of hubcaps taken and sufficiently to withstand the demurrer. His objection to admission of the hubcaps in evidence must fail for the additional reason that he had taken the deputy sheriff to their hiding place and admitted that he had removed them from the Phillips car.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Nichols, P. J., and Pannell, J., concur.*