United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Government Management,

Information and Technology, Committee on Government

Reform and Oversight, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

11 a.m.

Wednesday,

June 10, 1998

YEAR 2000 COMPUTING

CRISIS

Actions Must Be Taken Now

to Address Slow Pace of

Federal Progress

Statement of Joel C. Willemssen

Director, Civil Agencies Information Systems

Accounting and Information Management Division

GAO/T-AIMD-98-205

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are pleased to join you again today to discuss the computing crisis—of

which you are well aware—posed by the upcoming change of century. No

major organization, public or private, is immune from potential disruption,

including a wide spectrum of government programs vital to Americans. As

the world’s most advanced and most dependent user of information

technology, the United States possesses close to half of all computer

capacity and 60 percent of Internet assets.1

 As a result, the year 2000

presents a particularly sweeping and urgent challenge for entities in this

country.2

For this reason, in February 1997 we designated the Year 2000 problem as

a high-risk area3

 for the federal government, and have published guidance4

to help organizations successfully address the issue. Since that time, we

have issued over 40 reports and testimony statements detailing specific

findings and recommendations related to the Year 2000 readiness of a

wide range of federal agencies.5

 The common theme has been that serious

vulnerabilities remain in addressing the federal government’s Year 2000

readiness, and that much more action is needed to ensure that federal

agencies satisfactorily mitigate Year 2000 risks to avoid debilitating

consequences.

My testimony today will discuss the results of the most recent reports

submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on the slow

progress made by the federal government in achieving Year 2000

compliance. In light of the pace of this progress, I will then provide our

views on what needs to be done now to minimize disruptions to critical

services.

1

Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructures (President’s Commission on Critical

Infrastructure Protection, October 1997).

2

For the past several decades, automated information systems have typically represented the year

using two digits rather than four in order to conserve electronic data storage space and reduce

operating costs. In this format, however, 2000 is indistinguishable from 1900 because both are

represented only as 00. As a result, if not modified, computer systems or applications that use dates or

perform date- or time-sensitive calculations may generate incorrect results beyond 1999.

3

High-Risk Series: Information Management and Technology (GAO/HR-97-9, February 1997).

4

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: An Assessment Guide (GAO/AIMD-10.1.14, September 1997), which

includes the key tasks needed to complete each phase of a Year 2000 program (awareness, assessment,

renovation, validation, and implementation), and Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Business Continuity and

Contingency Planning (GAO/AIMD-10.1.19, March 1998 [exposure draft]), which describes the tasks

needed to ensure the continuity of agency operations.

5

A listing of our publications is included as an attachment to this statement.

Page 1 GAO/T-AIMD-98-205
Progress in

Addressing Year 2000

Continues at Slow

Pace

As our chart illustrates, since May 1997 OMB and the government’s 24

largest departments and agencies have reported slow progress in

achieving Year 2000 compliance of their mission-critical information

systems.6

 In May 1997, OMB reported that about 21 percent of the

government’s mission-critical systems (1,598 of 7,649) were Year 2000

compliant.7

 A year later—as of last month—these departments and

agencies reported a total of 2,914 systems as compliant—about 40 percent

of the 7,336 mission-critical systems in their current inventories. Unless

progress improves dramatically, a substantial number of mission-critical

systems will not be Year 2000 compliant in time.

6

OMB has required the following departments and agencies to report their Year 2000 readiness

progress on a quarterly basis since May 1997: the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense,

Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Justice,

Labor, Transportation, Treasury, State, and Veterans Affairs, and the Agency for International

Development, Central Intelligence Agency, Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Emergency

Management Agency, General Services Administration, National Aeronautics and Space

Administration, National Science Foundation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Personnel

Management, Small Business Administration, and Social Security Administration. The Central

Intelligence Agency’s reports are classified.

7

The Social Security Administration’s (SSA) mission-critical systems were not included in these totals

because SSA did not report in May 1997 on a system basis. Rather, SSA reported at that time, and again

in August 1997, on portions of systems that were compliant. For example, SSA reported on the status

of 20,000-plus modules rather than 200-plus systems.

Page 2 GAO/T-AIMD-98-205
A great deal of work likewise remains for agencies to meet OMB’s interim

target dates for renovation and validation of systems (September 1998 and

January 1999, respectively). For example, according to last month’s agency

reports, nine have renovated less than 40 percent of their mission-critical

systems due to be fixed, with two agencies having renovated less than

15 percent. This leaves little time for critical testing activities that leading

Page 3 GAO/T-AIMD-98-205
organizations estimate will require at least 50 percent of total Year 2000

program time. As of last month, 16 of the 24 agencies reported that less

than half of their systems requiring Year 2000 changes have completed

validation.

Also of concern is that OMB, the President’s Council on Year 2000

Conversion, and the Congress lack sufficient information with which to

judge the progress of systems to be replaced. Agencies are not required to

report on the status of specific mission-critical systems due to be replaced

rather than renovated—more than 1,000 (23 percent) of the government’s

noncompliant mission-critical systems—unless those systems are 2

months or more behind schedule. As we have been reporting, given the

federal government’s poor record of delivering new systems capabilities

when promised, and the immutability of the Year 2000 deadline, these

replacement efforts are at high risk; it is therefore essential that reliable

information that accurately reflects agencies’ progress in implementing

replacement systems be available. Accordingly, we previously

recommended that agencies report to OMB on their progress in

implementing systems intended to replace noncompliant systems.8

Agencies will also need a significant amount of time for essential

end-to-end testing of multiple systems that have individually been deemed

Year 2000 compliant. Such end-to-end testing seeks to ensure that systems

collectively supporting a core business function or area operate as

intended. Without such testing, systems individually deemed as compliant

may not work as expected when linked together with other systems in an

operational environment. These systems include not only those owned and

managed by the organization, but also any external systems with which

they interface. For example, the Federal Aviation Administration’s

Enhanced Traffic Management System monitors flight plans nationwide,

controlling high-traffic situations and alerting airlines and airports to bring

in more staff during times of extra traffic. Since it must exchange data

with airlines’ flight planning systems in order to accomplish this,

end-to-end testing is essential, and would include systems for all entities

involved, as well as their supporting telecommunications.

Last month’s quarterly reports also disclosed other indicators that

agencies and departments may not be operationally ready for the year

2000. For example:

8

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Potential for Widespread Disruption Calls for Strong Leadership and

Partnerships (GAO/AIMD-98-85, April 30, 1998).

Page 4 GAO/T-AIMD-98-205
• Five agencies (the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services,

Justice, Transportation, and the Treasury) reported that they had not

completed assessment of their systems—almost a year behind OMB’s

governmentwide target of June 1997. Because these departments have

taken so long to assess the readiness of their systems, it will be

increasingly difficult for them to renovate and fully test all of their

mission-critical systems in time.

• Only 11 of the 24 agencies reported that they had completed inventories

and/or assessments of their telecommunications systems. Without

compliant telecommunications systems, agencies will find it extremely

difficult to carry out basic operations.

• Only six of the agencies reported that they had completed inventories

and/or assessments of their embedded systems. These are special-purpose

computers built into other devices; they are important because many

devices built or renovated within the last 20 years use them to control,

monitor, or assist in operations.

Risk of Year 2000

Disruptions Requires

Leadership and Action

As a result of federal agencies’ slow progress, the public faces the risk that

critical services could be severely disrupted by the Year 2000 computing

crisis. Financial transactions could be delayed, airline flights grounded,

and national defense affected. The many interdependencies that exist

among the levels of governments and within key economic sectors of our

nation could cause a single failure to have wide-ranging repercussions.

The February issuance of an executive order establishing the President’s

Council on Year 2000 Conversion was an important step in addressing

these risks. The council Chair is to oversee federal agency Year 2000

actions as well as be the spokesman in national and international forums;

coordinate with state, local, and tribal governments; promote appropriate

federal roles with respect to private-sector activities; and report to the

President—in conjunction with OMB—on a quarterly basis.

As we testified in March,9

 the council must take strong action to avert this

crisis. In a report issued in April, we detailed specific recommendations.10

We are encouraged by action taken in response to some of our

recommendations. In other areas, however, the Chair has disagreed, and

some actions have not been initiated.

9

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Strong Leadership and Effective Public/Private Cooperation Needed to

Avoid Major Disruptions (GAO/T-AIMD-98-101, March 18, 1998).

10GAO/AIMD-98-85, April 30, 1998.

Page 5 GAO/T-AIMD-98-205
The current Year 2000 progress reports of most large agencies reinforce

the need for the council to implement these recommendations. At this

point, I would like to review the major areas in which we continue to

believe that action is essential, and update the Subcommittee on what has

been done.

Priority Setting We previously testified that it was unlikely that all mission-critical systems

could be made Year 2000 compliant in time.11 We therefore recommended

that the Chair of the Conversion Council establish governmentwide and

agency-specific priorities for the most mission-critical business processes

and supporting systems, using criteria such as the potential for adverse

health and safety effects, adverse financial effects on American citizens,

detrimental effects on national security, and adverse economic

consequences.

In response, the Chair stated that agencies have established priorities by

identifying their mission-critical systems. He further said that the council’s

focus at this time should be to assist agencies as they work to ensure that

all of their mission-critical systems are ready for the year 2000, adding that

it may be necessary at a later date for agencies to further prioritize these

systems.

This approach is inconsistent with the crisis nature of the problem and

does not reflect the lack of progress of the 24 agencies in correcting their

mission-critical systems. The most recent set of quarterly reports

reinforces our view that the time to make difficult decisions and set

priorities is now, while agencies can still correct, validate, and implement

essential systems. If priorities are not clearly set, the government may find

that less critical systems are compliant but that some of its highest priority

functions are unavailable—but could have been corrected had appropriate

resources and attention been properly focused earlier.

In contrast to our country’s approach, Canada has established national

Year 2000 priorities. Currently, it has 44 national priorities covering areas

such as national defense, food production, safety, and income security.

According to Canada’s Year 2000 program director, Canada wants to

ensure that, at a minimum, these priority areas are fully addressed in the

time remaining before 2000.

11GAO/T-AIMD-98-101, March 18, 1998.

Page 6 GAO/T-AIMD-98-205
End-To-End Testing Agencies must also ensure that their mission-critical systems can reliably

exchange data with other systems and that they are protected from errors

that can be introduced by external systems. To achieve this goal, agencies

must perform end-to-end testing for their critical core business processes.

The purpose of end-to-end testing is to verify that a defined set of

interrelated systems, which collectively support an organizational core

business area or function, work as intended in an operational

environment. For example, agencies that administer key federal benefits

payment programs, such as the Department of Veterans Affairs, exchange

data with the Department of the Treasury, which, in turn, interfaces with

various financial institutions to ensure that benefits checks are issued. In

addition, Department of Defense systems interface with thousands of

systems belonging to foreign military sales customers, private contractors,

other federal agencies, and international organizations such as the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization.

In the case of the year 2000, many systems in the end-to-end chain will

have been modified or replaced. As a result, the scope and complexity of

the testing—and its importance—is dramatically increased, as is the

difficulty of isolating, identifying, and correcting problems. Consequently,

agencies must work early and continually with their data exchange

partners so that end-to-end tests can be effectively planned and executed.

We therefore recommended, for the selected priorities, that lead agencies

be designated to take responsibility for ensuring that end-to-end

operational testing of processes and supporting systems is performed

across organizational boundaries, and that independent verification and

validation of such testing likewise be ensured.

In response to our recommendation, the Chair stated that agencies are

currently developing such plans and obtaining independent verification

and validation for their systems. He added that the council and OMB will

monitor these activities and that if any difficulty arises in getting agencies

to cooperate with respect to end-to-end testing, either he or OMB will

intervene to resolve the matter.

Because time is short and thorough end-to-end testing of Year

2000-compliant systems and processes across organizational boundaries is

essential to ensuring that services will be delivered, a more active

approach is needed to ensure accountability and timely decision-making.

Unless responsibility is clearly assigned, it will be difficult to ensure that

all organizations participate constructively and without delay. Further, the

Conversion Council will also have to assume leadership and take whatever

Page 7 GAO/T-AIMD-98-205
actions are warranted should difficulties arise in obtaining needed

participation and cooperation from state and local governments and the

private sector.

Central Reporting Issues OMB’s reports to the Congress—based on quarterly agency progress

reports—have not fully reflected the true progress of the federal

government toward Year 2000 systems compliance because not all

agencies have been required to report and, further, OMB’s reporting

requirements have been incomplete. Accordingly, we recommended

(1) requiring that additional agencies that play a significant role, such as

the Securities and Exchange Commission, also report quarterly to OMB,

(2) requiring agencies to report on the status of their efforts to replace

systems, not just on renovating those being fixed, and (3) specifying the

particular steps that must be taken to complete each phase of a Year 2000

program (i.e., assessment, renovation, validation, and implementation).

OMB has acted on these recommendations. Specifically, on March 9 and

April 21, 1998, OMB issued a memorandum to an additional 31 and 10

organizations, respectively, requiring that they provide information on

their Year 2000 progress. The resulting reports from these organizations

can further assist the Conversion Council, OMB, and the Congress in

gauging progress to date, identifying risks, and raising additional issues.

For example, the report submitted by the U.S. Postal Service shows that it

plans to spend over $500 million on its Year 2000 effort and intends to

implement its mission-critical projects by September 1998. However, the

report also indicates that 21 percent of its 335 mission-critical systems are

still in the assessment phase. This raises questions about whether the

Postal Service’s own target of this September is realistic.

In addition to requesting reports from other organizations, in its April 28,

1998, quarterly reporting guidance, OMB requested that agencies provide

information on the oversight mechanism(s) used to ensure that

replacement systems are on schedule. It also specified that agencies

should ensure that their reporting on the completion of phases is

consistent with the CIO Council’s best practices guidance and our

enterprise readiness guide.12

While we acknowledge the actions that have been taken to improve the

agency reporting process, it is clear that the progress of several major

departments and agencies toward ensuring Year 2000 compliance

12GAO/AIMD-10.1.14, September 1997.

Page 8 GAO/T-AIMD-98-205
continues to be insufficient. Accordingly, the Chair of the Conversion

Council and OMB must begin requiring more frequent reporting, especially

for those agencies not making sufficient progress. Such reporting would

enable problems and delays to be surfaced more quickly so that necessary

actions could be taken immediately. Accordingly, we now recommend that

the Chair and OMB require, at an absolute minimum, monthly Year 2000

reports from those agencies not making sufficient progress.

Business Continuity and

Contingency Planning

Business continuity and contingency plans should be formulated to

respond to two types of failures: predictable (such as system renovations

that are already far behind schedule) and unforeseen (such as a system

that fails despite having been certified as Year 2000 compliant or one that,

it is later found, cannot be corrected by January 1, 2000, despite appearing

to be on schedule today). Therefore, agencies that develop contingency

plans only for systems currently behind schedule are not addressing the

need to ensure the continuity of even a minimal level of core business

operability in the event of unforeseen failures. As a result, when

unpredicted failures occur, agencies will be without well-defined

responses and may not have enough time to develop and test effective

alternatives.

Moreover, contingency plans cannot focus solely on agency systems.

Federal agencies depend on data provided by business partners, as well as

services provided by the public infrastructure (e.g., power, water,

transportation, and voice and data telecommunications). One weak link

anywhere in the chain of critical dependencies can cause major

disruptions to business operations. Given these interdependencies, it is

imperative that contingency plans be developed for all critical core

business processes and supporting systems, regardless of whether these

systems are owned by the agency. Further, those program managers

responsible for core business processes should take a leading role in

developing business continuity and contingency plans because they best

understand their business processes and how problems can be resolved. In

this manner, business continuity and contingency planning generally

complements, rather than competes with, the agency’s Year 2000

remediation activities. Accordingly, we recommended that the Chair

require agencies to develop contingency plans for all critical core business

processes.

Page 9 GAO/T-AIMD-98-205
The Chair agreed. In addition, in March 1998, OMB clarified its contingency

plan instructions,13 stating that such plans should be developed for all core

business functions. Moreover, OMB and the CIO Council adopted our draft

guide providing information on business continuity and contingency

planning issues common to most large enterprises as a model for federal

agencies.14 Further, in its April 28, 1998, instructions, OMB asked agencies

to describe their processes and activities for developing such contingency

plans. Although these are positive steps, much work on contingency

planning remains to be completed. In their May 1998 quarterly reports to

OMB, only four agencies reported that they had drafted contingency plans

for their core business processes.

Independent Verification OMB’s assessment of the current status of federal Year 2000 progress is

predominantly based on agency reports—reports that have not been

consistently reviewed or independently verified. Without such

independent reviews, OMB and the Conversion Council have little

assurance that they are receiving accurate information.

We have, in fact, found cases in which agencies’ systems conversion status

as reported to OMB has been inaccurate. For example, the Department of

Agriculture reported 15 systems as compliant, even though they were still

under development or merely planned.15 (The department plans to delete

these systems from its list of compliant systems in its next quarterly

report.) In another example, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service

had not performed adequate testing to assert that certain systems it had

reported as compliant were capable of transitioning into the year 2000.

Specifically, managers of three systems reported as compliant indicated

that they had performed some tests on the transfer and storage of dates,

but had not completed all necessary Year 2000 compliance testing.16

Agencies’ May 1998 quarterly reports describe current or planned

verification activities, which include internal management processes,

reviews by agency inspectors general, and contracts with vendors for

independent verification and validation. While this has helped provide

13Progress on Year 2000 Conversion, U.S. Office of Management and Budget, as of February 15, 1998.

14GAO/AIMD-10.1.19, March 1998 [exposure draft].

15See Year 2000 Computing Crisis: USDA Faces Tremendous Challenges in Ensuring That Vital Public

Services Are Not Disrupted (GAO/T-AIMD-98-167, May 14, 1998).

16Defense Computers: DFAS Faces Challenges in Solving the Year 2000 Problem (GAO/AIMD-97-117,

August 11, 1997).

Page 10 GAO/T-AIMD-98-205
assurance that some verification is taking place, the full scope of

verification activities required by OMB has not been articulated.

Accordingly, we recommended that the Chair require agencies to develop

an independent verification strategy to involve inspectors general or other

independent organizations in reviewing agency Year 2000 progress.

The Chair agreed that independent assessments of agencies’ Year 2000

programs and their testing and planning approaches are important, and

stated that he and OMB will consider issuing more explicit directions to

agencies on independent verification, especially with regard to

establishing standards for the type of verification and evaluation desired.

We are not aware that any such directions have yet been issued.

Workforce Issues Obtaining and retaining adequate and skilled staff for the Year 2000

challenge has been an increasing concern. In their current quarterly

reports, 10 of the 24 agencies and departments describe problems that

they or their contractors have encountered in obtaining and/or retaining

information technology personnel. However, no governmentwide strategy

has existed to address recruiting and retaining information technology

personnel with the appropriate skills for Year 2000-related work.

Accordingly, we recommended that the Chair of the Conversion Council

develop a personnel strategy to include (1) determining the need for

various information specialists, (2) identifying needed administrative or

statutory changes to waive reemployment penalties for former federal

employees, and (3) identifying ways to retain key Year 2000 staff in

agencies through the turn of the century.

The Chair agreed. On April 30 he stated that the Council would be working

with several agencies, including the Office of Personnel Management

(OPM), to examine options for ensuring an adequate number of qualified

people to perform Year 2000 work. One specific action was taken on

March 30, when OPM issued a memorandum stating that the Year 2000

problem was an “unusual circumstance” that would allow it to grant

agencies waivers to allow them to rehire former federal personnel on a

temporary basis without financial penalty. The memorandum also advised

agencies of their ability to make exceptions to the biweekly limitation on

premium pay when the head of an agency or designee determines that an

emergency involving a direct threat to life or property exists. In addition,

the Council has formed a Year 2000 workforce issues working group

chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Labor. We have an ongoing review

focused on assessing overall Year 2000-related personnel issues.

Page 11 GAO/T-AIMD-98-205
The Nation’s Year 2000

Status

Beyond the federal government, no one knows the overall extent of our

nation’s vulnerability to Year 2000 risks, or the extent of our readiness. No

nationwide assessment that includes the private and public sectors has

been undertaken to gauge this. Accordingly, we recommended that the

Council orchestrate a broad assessment of the nation’s Year 2000

readiness, to include identifying and assessing the risks of the nation’s key

economic sectors, including risks posed by international linkages and by

the failure of critical infrastructure components. Although the Chair did

not directly address this recommendation in his response to our report, we

are aware that the council has no plans to develop such an assessment.

Without a nationwide assessment of the nation’s Year 2000 status, the

council will not be in a well-informed position to identify or prioritize

areas of weakness and develop mechanisms to solve or mitigate those

weaknesses.

Also, a coordinated, public/private effort, under the leadership of the

executive branch, could provide a forum and bring together the major

players in each key economic sector to effectively coordinate the nation’s

Year 2000 efforts and ensure that all sectors, as well as sector

interdependencies, are being adequately addressed. Further, public/private

forums, under the direction and oversight of the Conversion Council,

could be instrumental in developing business continuity and contingency

plans to safeguard the continued delivery of critical services for each key

economic sector. While we do not foresee the federal government as

dictating policy or requiring specific solutions, it is, however, uniquely

positioned to publicize the Year 2000 computing crisis as a national

priority; take a leadership role; and identify, assess, and report on the risks

and necessary remediation activities associated with the nation’s key

economic sectors. Such plans would be all the more effective because they

would bring to bear the combined and considerable influence of the

federal government, state and local governments, and the private sector.

Although the Chair agreed that the Conversion Council should view the

Year 2000 crisis as more than a federal systems problem and should adopt

a global perspective, he disagreed with our recommendation to establish a

national coordination structure using public/private partnerships in

appropriate sector-based forums. He stated that the Council needs to be a

catalyst, facilitator, and coordinator, but not creator and direct manager of

new national forums for specific sectors of the economy.

Nevertheless, in April and May 1998, the Chair established five working

groups (telecommunications, energy, financial institutions, emergency

Page 12 GAO/T-AIMD-98-205
preparedness, and workforce issues) composed of federal agencies. In

addition, he has identified 29 sectors headed by federal agency sector

coordinators. The Chair has not provided these groups with formal,

written guidance, objectives, or expectations. He has, however, told them

to focus on developing a coordinated outreach plan and establish

communications with public and private parties within each sector, and to

monitor the Year 2000 readiness of each sector. In order for these

outreach efforts to be fruitful, the working groups and coordinators will

need accurate and complete information on the Year 2000 status and plans

of these sectors.

It will not be enough for the Conversion Council to act as catalyst,

facilitator, and coordinator. The council must also posture itself to provide

Year 2000 leadership for the nation as a whole. To provide such

leadership, the council must develop an approach to receiving the best

guidance directly from the private sector and state and local government

bodies, in addition to views and perspectives garnered by federal agency

executives.

In summary, as the amount of time to the turn of the century shortens, the

magnitude of what must be accomplished becomes more daunting.

Greater leadership and coordination of disparate efforts is essential if

government programs are to meet the needs of the public 19 months from

now. The Conversion Council must play a central role in ensuring that

agency action not only stays on track, but accelerates significantly.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond

to any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee may

have at this time.

Page 13 GAO/T-AIMD-98-205
GAO Reports and Testimony Addressing the

Year 2000 Crisis

Defense Computers: Army Needs to Greatly Strengthen Its Year 2000

Program (GAO/AIMD-98-53, May 29, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: USDA Faces Tremendous Challenges in

Ensuring That Vital Public Services Are Not Disrupted (GAO/T-AIMD-98-167,

May 14, 1998).

Securities Pricing: Actions Needed for Conversion to Decimals

(GAO/T-GGD-98-121, May 8, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Continuing Risks of Disruption to Social

Security, Medicare, and Treasury Programs (GAO/T-AIMD-98-161, May 7, 1998).

IRS’ Year 2000 Efforts: Status and Risks (GAO/T-GGD-98-123, May 7, 1998).

Air Traffic Control: FAA Plans to Replace Its Host Computer System

Because Future Availability Cannot Be Assured (GAO/AIMD-98-138R, May 1,

1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Potential for Widespread Disruption Calls for

Strong Leadership and Partnerships (GAO/AIMD-98-85, April 30, 1998).

Defense Computers: Year 2000 Computer Problems Threaten DOD

Operations (GAO/AIMD-98-72, April 30, 1998).

Department of the Interior: Year 2000 Computing Crisis Presents Risk of

Disruption to Key Operations (GAO/T-AIMD-98-149, April 22, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Business Continuity and Contingency

Planning (GAO/AIMD-10.1.19, Exposure Draft, March 1998).

Tax Administration: IRS’ Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Request and Fiscal Year

1998 Filing Season (GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-98-114, March 31, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Strong Leadership Needed to Avoid

Disruption of Essential Services (GAO/T-AIMD-98-117, March 24, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Federal Regulatory Efforts to Ensure

Financial Institution Systems Are Year 2000 Compliant (GAO/T-AIMD-98-116,

March 24, 1998).

Page 14 GAO/T-AIMD-98-205
GAO Reports and Testimony Addressing the

Year 2000 Crisis

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Office of Thrift Supervision’s Efforts to

Ensure Thrift Systems Are Year 2000 Compliant (GAO/T-AIMD-98-102,

March 18, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Strong Leadership and Effective

Public/Private Cooperation Needed to Avoid Major Disruptions

(GAO/T-AIMD-98-101, March 18, 1998).

Post-Hearing Questions on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s

Year 2000 (Y2K) Preparedness (AIMD-98-108R, March 18, 1998).

SEC Year 2000 Report: Future Reports Could Provide More Detailed

Information (GAO/GGD/AIMD-98-51, March 6, 1998).

Year 2000 Readiness: NRC’s Proposed Approach Regarding Nuclear

Powerplants (GAO/AIMD-98-90R, March 6, 1998).

National Weather Service: Budget Events and Continuing Risks of Systems

Modernization (GAO/T-AIMD-98-97, March 4, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s

Efforts to Ensure Bank Systems Are Year 2000 Compliant (GAO/T-AIMD-98-73,

February 10, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: FAA Must Act Quickly to Prevent Systems

Failures (GAO/T-AIMD-98-63, February 4, 1998).

FAA Computer Systems: Limited Progress on Year 2000 Issue Increases

Risk Dramatically (GAO/AIMD-98-45, January 30, 1998).

Defense Computers: Air Force Needs to Strengthen Year 2000 Oversight

(GAO/AIMD-98-35, January 16, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Actions Needed to Address Credit Union

Systems’ Year 2000 Problem (GAO/AIMD-98-48, January 7, 1998).

Veterans Health Administration Facility Systems: Some Progress Made In

Ensuring Year 2000 Compliance, But Challenges Remain (GAO/AIMD-98-31R,

November 7, 1997).

Page 15 GAO/T-AIMD-98-205
GAO Reports and Testimony Addressing the

Year 2000 Crisis

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: National Credit Union Administration’s

Efforts to Ensure Credit Union Systems Are Year 2000 Compliant

(GAO/T-AIMD-98-20, October 22, 1997).

Social Security Administration: Significant Progress Made in Year 2000

Effort, But Key Risks Remain (GAO/AIMD-98-6, October 22, 1997).

Defense Computers: Technical Support Is Key to Naval Supply Year 2000

Success (GAO/AIMD-98-7R, October 21, 1997).

Defense Computers: LSSC Needs to Confront Significant Year 2000 Issues

(GAO/AIMD-97-149, September 26, 1997).

Veterans Affairs Computer Systems: Action Underway Yet Much Work

Remains To Resolve Year 2000 Crisis (GAO/T-AIMD-97-174, September 25,

1997).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Success Depends Upon Strong Management

and Structured Approach (GAO/T-AIMD-97-173, September 25, 1997).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: An Assessment Guide (GAO/AIMD-10.1.14,

September 1997).

Defense Computers: SSG Needs to Sustain Year 2000 Progress

(GAO/AIMD-97-120R, August 19, 1997).

Defense Computers: Improvements to DOD Systems Inventory Needed for

Year 2000 Effort (GAO/AIMD-97-112, August 13, 1997).

Defense Computers: Issues Confronting DLA in Addressing Year 2000

Problems (GAO/AIMD-97-106, August 12, 1997).

Defense Computers: DFAS Faces Challenges in Solving the Year 2000

Problem (GAO/AIMD-97-117, August 11, 1997).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Time Is Running Out for Federal Agencies to

Prepare for the New Millennium (GAO/T-AIMD-97-129, July 10, 1997).

Veterans Benefits Computer Systems: Uninterrupted Delivery of Benefits

Depends on Timely Correction of Year-2000 Problems (GAO/T-AIMD-97-114,

June 26, 1997).

Page 16 GAO/T-AIMD-98-205
GAO Reports and Testimony Addressing the

Year 2000 Crisis

Veterans Benefits Computers Systems: Risks of VBA’s Year-2000 Efforts

(GAO/AIMD-97-79, May 30, 1997).

Medicare Transaction System: Success Depends Upon Correcting Critical

Managerial and Technical Weaknesses (GAO/AIMD-97-78, May 16, 1997).

Medicare Transaction System: Serious Managerial and Technical

Weaknesses Threaten Modernization (GAO/T-AIMD-97-91, May 16, 1997).

USDA Information Management: Extensive Improvements Needed in

Managing Information Technology Investments (GAO/T-AIMD-97-90, May 14,

1997).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Risk of Serious Disruption to Essential

Government Functions Calls for Agency Action Now (GAO/T-AIMD-97-52,

February 27, 1997).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Strong Leadership Today Needed To Prevent

Future Disruption of Government Services (GAO/T-AIMD-97-51, February 24,

1997).

High-Risk Series: Information Management and Technology (GAO/HR-97-9,

February 1997).

(511460) Page 17 GAO/T-AIMD-98-205
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