J-S24018-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: N.S., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.S., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 710 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Decree Entered February 8, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000043-2022

IN THE INTEREST OF: R.N.G.S., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.S., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 711 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Decree Entered February 8, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000617-2021

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED AUGUST 12, 2022

S.S. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees,1 entered in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, terminating her parental rights to her 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 We have consolidated Mother’s appeals, sua sponte. See Pa.R.A.P. 513.
J-S24018-22

- 2 -

minor children, R.N.G.S., born July 2015, and N.S., born December 2008

(collectively, “Children”). After our review, we affirm.

This family originally came to be known by the Department of Human 

Services (“DHS”) in 2015. In February 2019, DHS received a report that 

Mother had left Children home alone, unsupervised, for three days. See

Petition for Involuntary Termination, 10/21/21, Exhibit A at ¶ h. The report 

alleged that “the home was in a deplorable state; that there were dirty dishes 

and debris throughout the home; and that there might be decaying matter 

inside the home because the home was infested with houseflies.” Id. Children 

“were not attending school for those days. And they were also starving. They 

didn’t have [any] food to eat.” N.T. Termination Hearing, 2/8/22, at 21. 

During the period Children were left alone, Mother was in New Jersey. Id. at 

23. Children informed members of the Philadelphia Police Special Victims Unit 

that their maternal grandfather was supposed to have been caring for them, 

but had not visited the home in several days. See Petition for Involuntary 

Termination, 10/21/21, Exhibit A at ¶ i. 

On February 19, 2019, DHS obtained orders of protective custody for 

Children and, at a February 21, 2019 shelter care hearing, the court ordered 

Children’s temporary commitment to stand. Id. at ¶ m. An adjudicatory 

hearing was held on April 2, 2019, after which the court adjudicated Children 

dependent and committed them to the custody of DHS. See Order of 

Adjudication and Disposition, 4/2/19. The court referred Mother to the Clinical 

Evaluation Unit (“CEU”) for a dual-diagnosis assessment and random drug and 
J-S24018-22

- 3 -

alcohol screens. Id. The court also ordered Mother to comply with the 

criminal court’s DUI program, engage in anger management, sign necessary 

releases, and referred her to Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”) for 

appropriate services. Id. The court granted Mother weekly supervised 

visitation. Id.

The court held multiple permanency review hearings for Children, at 

which time it regularly re-referred Mother to CEU for dual-diagnosis 

assessments and random screens, and to ARC for services including anger 

management. Mother never progressed beyond supervised visitation with 

Children. 

DHS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate Mother’s rights to Children 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). On February 

8, 2022, the court held a hearing, by which point Children had been in care 

for three years. Children were both represented by Jo-Ann Braverman, 

Esquire, who also acted as guardian ad litem (“GAL”).2 At the hearing, 

Milenika Colon, CUA case manager, testified that Mother’s case plan objectives 

were to: follow all court orders; maintain visits with Children; comply with 

her probation; participate in anger management and parenting classes; 

engage in mental health treatment both alone and with Children; and ensure 

Children’s medical and dental were up to date. N.T. Termination Hearing, 

____________________________________________

2 See In Re: T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092 (Pa. 2018) (“[D]uring contested 

termination-of-parental-rights proceedings, where there is no conflict between 

a child’s legal and best interests, an attorney-guardian ad litem representing 

the child’s best interests can also represent the child’s legal interests.”).
J-S24018-22

- 4 -

2/8/22, at 21-22. Colon testified that Mother completed four cycles of anger 

management in 2019, but never went back, and her case was closed on 

November 12, 2019. Id. at 22. Mother attended one day of parenting classes 

and failed to complete the course. Id. She also failed to: engage in mental

health treatment, either individually or with Children; comply with her courtordered drug and alcohol screens; or maintain Children’s medical and dental

care. Id. at 23-24, 26. Colon testified that she had no reason to believe that 

Mother was aware of any of the educational, therapeutic, or medical needs of 

Children. Id. at 26-27. She also was unaware of any holiday cards or gifts 

sent by Mother to Children. Id. at 27. In short, Mother has failed to comply 

with any of her single case plan objectives. Id. at 24.

Colon testified that she personally supervised one of Mother’s visits with 

R.N.G.S. and two of her other Children in September 2021.

3

 Colon stated

that, during that visit, “[M]other was not too . . . focused on the visit. She 

was on the phone. And it was just—she was not too . . . interested in seeing 

the kids at that moment.” Id. at 28. Colon testified that she last spoke with 

Mother in December 2021, after she arrived late for a visit with Children at 

the agency. Colon stated:

I went to talk to [Mother] to tell her that the visit was canceled 

because she arrived late and the kids were not there, and [M]other 

____________________________________________

3 Mother has a third daughter, as well as a son, who have also been removed 

from her care. They are not the subjects of the instant termination 

proceedings. N.S. does not attend visitation with her Mother, as she “does 

not want to have contact with mom at all.” N.T. Termination Hearing, 2/8/22, 

at 29. 
J-S24018-22

- 5 -

got really upset and started saying that we always change the 

date and time and she’s not aware and that she . . . works. And 

I explained to [Mother] that in order for her to have a visit, she 

needs to arrive on time because we only give them 15 minutes to 

arrive late.

And I also . . . explained to her all of the objectives that she needs 

to complete in order to get her kids back, but [M]other . . . was 

still being mad at me because I canceled the visit and didn’t tell 

her until she arrived at the office. . . .

And I also asked [M]other—since she was so upset that the day 

was changed for the visit, I asked [M]other what day worked for 

her better, and she [kept] the same day[.]

Id. at 25-26.

Colon testified that she had not been able to contact Mother since midDecember 2021 because “the phone number that I have [for Mother] . . .

doesn’t work.” Id. at 26. Mother never reached out to Colon, despite having 

Colon’s phone number. Id.

Finally, Colon testified that both Children are in foster homes that are 

pre-adoptive resources, and that Children’s foster mothers meet their 

emotional, educational, spiritual, and medical needs. Id. at 30, 32. Colon 

stated that it would cause neither child irreparable harm if Mother’s rights 

were terminated and that it would be in Children’s best interests to change 

the goal to adoption. Id. at 30-33. 

Mother also testified at the termination hearing. She stated that she 

had finished parenting classes and “ha[s] the letter at home[.]” Id. at 42. 

She further testified that she attended therapy for approximately four months, 

but was told that it was “no longer necessary.” Id. at 43. She stated that a 

psychiatrist at Congreso “said that I was fine.” Id. Mother testified that she 
J-S24018-22

- 6 -

“took about ten samples of urine in the city” and is currently enrolled in anger 

management. Id. at 44. Mother presented the court with a purported lease 

for a residence on North Third Street, but the court refused to admit it because 

“[i]t’s not self[-]authenticating. It’s a standard lease that anybody can pick 

up in a[n] Office Depot and fill out themselves.”4 Id. at 47. Mother stated 

____________________________________________

4

In addition, the following exchange occurred on cross-examination of Mother 

by Children’s counsel/GAL:

Q: Ma’am, you said that you live in a house, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. But this lease that you purported to have, it says 

apartment, second floor apartment.

A: Yes, the house is divided. I live upstairs. Downstairs is for 

other people, another family.

* * *

Q: Okay. And you said you returned from Florida last month? 

So[,] where were you living for the last—

A: Well, I have lived here longer than one month. I moved to 

this place a month ago because I’m working and I moved to this 

place.

Q: Okay. So why does the lease say the starting date is February 

1

st?

A: I moved in a month ago, but the payment is going to start on 

February 1st.

Q: Okay. You also said you live alone?

A: I lived alone in Miami, and I live alone here now.

Q: So who is Benny Martes?

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S24018-22

- 7 -

that she was not able to attend visits with Children because “the schedule they 

gave me conflicts with my work schedule.” Id. at 50. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court terminated Mother’s parental 

rights under subsections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8)5 and (b), indicating that it 

____________________________________________

A: He’s a friend who helps me as a cosigner.

Q: He’s listed as a tenant on this purported lease?

A: He just recommended me. He put in a word for me.

N.T. Termination Hearing, 2/8/22, at 53-54.

5 The relevant grounds for termination set forth under section 2511(a) are 

as follows:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least 

six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition 

either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform 

parental duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent.

* * *

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent 

by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency 

for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led 

to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, 

the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S24018-22

- 8 -

found Mother’s testimony “non-believable . . . created, manufactured, [it] has 

nothing to do with the reality of this case.” Id. at 57. The court concluded 

that:

the real evidence[] remains that [M]other has . . . done little or 

nothing to remove the impediments that brought [C]hildren into 

care when they were brought in after being abandoned by 

[M]other for a three-day period. The same pattern continued and 

emerged. That is, [M]other never took the time to be a parent to 

these children. . . . 

What does exist after the smoke is cleared is that these children 

have been parented by someone else. . . . And these children’s 

needs were met by someone else during the period and after when 

the children were removed from [M]other.

Id. at 57-58.

____________________________________________

a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance 

reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy 

the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the 

child within a reasonable period of time and termination of 

the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare 

of the child.

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent 

by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an 

agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of 

removal or placement, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to exist and 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) & (8).
J-S24018-22

- 9 -

Mother filed a timely notice of appeal and Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. She raises the following issues 

for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in determining that the parental 

rights of [Mother] are forever terminated insofar as[:]

a. Under 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(1)[,] Mother’s consistent 

compliance with her visitation schedule evidenced to the 

court a settled purpose of maintaining an ongoing 

relationship with [C]hild[ren].

b. Under 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(2)[,] the conditions 

which led to the placement of [C]hild[ren] were[,] in 

fact[,] being addressed by [] Mother through her 

successful mental health treatment, and as such, no 

evidence existed that [] Mother could not, or would not, 

remedy these conditions.

c. Under 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(5)[,] there was no 

evidence submitted that the conditions which led to the 

removal of [C]hild[ren] could not, or would not, be 

remedied within a reasonable amount of time, insofar as 

Mother submitted documentation that clearly illustrated 

her consistent compliance and dedication to her mental 

health[,] as well as [her ability] to provide a stable home 

for [C]hild[ren] with a lease she attempted to submit[,] 

as well as a letter from her employer.

2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that[,] under 23 

Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(8), termination of parental rights would 

best serve the needs of [C]hild[ren], insofar as Mother had 

involuntarily [gone] to see a psychiatrist and did an intake for 

anger management, consistently was available to visit with 

[C]hild[ren], and evidenced the ability to provide a stable 

home, all of which were objectives of her Single Case Plan, in 

the hope of being reunified with [C]hild[ren].

Brief of Appellant, at [7] (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
J-S24018-22

- 10 -

Our standard of review in cases involving the involuntary termination of 

parental rights is well-settled:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result.

Interest of M.V., 203 A.3d 1104, 1111 (Pa. Super. 2019), quoting In re 

T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

In a proceeding to terminate parental rights involuntarily, the 

burden of proof is on the party seeking termination to establish 

by clear and convincing evidence the existence of grounds for 

doing so. The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined 

as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty[,] and convincing as 

to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” It is well 

established that a court must examine the individual 

circumstances of each and every case and consider all 

explanations offered by the parent to determine if the evidence in 

light of the totality of the circumstances clearly warrants 

termination.

In re adoption of S.M., 816 A.2d 1117, 1122 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). See also In C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520 (Pa. Super. 2006) (party 

seeking termination of parental rights bears burden of proving by clear and 

convincing evidence that at least one of eight grounds for termination under 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a) exists and that termination promotes emotional needs 

and welfare of child set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)). 
J-S24018-22

- 11 -

A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the 

parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in 

resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parentchild relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for 

a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental 

responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her 

physical and emotional needs.

In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).

Before filing a petition for termination of parental rights, the 

Commonwealth is required to make reasonable efforts to promote 

reunification of parent and child. However, the Commonwealth 

does not have an obligation to make such efforts indefinitely. The 

Commonwealth has an interest not only in family reunification but 

also in each child’s right to a stable, safe, and healthy 

environment, and the two interests must both be considered.

In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 507 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations 

omitted).

We address Mother’s claims together, as she does so in her brief.6 

Mother asserts that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights, 

where the Agency failed to meet its burden by clear and convincing evidence 

as to any of the four argued statutory grounds for termination. Prior to 

addressing the merits of Mother’s claims, we must determine whether she has 

waived them.

____________________________________________

6 We note that the argument section of Mother’s brief includes a challenge to 

the trial court’s grant of a goal change to adoption. However, Mother did not 

preserve this claim in her Rule 1925(b) statement, nor did she include it in 

her statement of questions involved. Accordingly, the claim is waived. See 

In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 466, n.3 (Pa. Super. 2017) (appellant 

waives issues that are not raised in both his concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal and the statement of questions involved in his brief 

on appeal); Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (issues not included in Rule 1925(b) 

statement are waived).
J-S24018-22

- 12 -

When briefing the issues that have been preserved for appeal, it is an 

appellant’s duty to present arguments that are sufficiently developed for our 

review. In re R.D., 44 A.3d 657, 674 (Pa. Super. 2012). “The brief must 

support the claims with pertinent discussion, with references to the record[,] 

and with citations to legal authorities.” Id., quoting Commonwealth v. 

Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007). This Court “will not act as 

counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant. When 

defects in a brief impede our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, 

we may dismiss the appeal entirely or find certain issues to be waived.” 

Hardy, 918 A.2d at 771. 

Here, Mother’s argument as to the four relevant subsections of section 

2511(a) consists of one sentence each, with no citations to the record, or to

any authority other than the subsections themselves. Indeed, Mother simply 

restates, verbatim, her statement of questions involved. 

Because Mother’s argument consists only of bald claims, unsupported 

by either citations to the record or to relevant case law, we are constrained to 

conclude that she has waived her claims. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b)-(c) 

(requiring citation to legal authority and reference to the record in appellate 

briefs); Commonwealth v. Hunzer, 868 A.2d 498, 516 (Pa. Super. 2005) 

(holding appellant waives claim upon failure to cite any legal authority in 

support of argument in appellate brief).

Even if Mother had not waived all of her claims, she would be entitled 

to no relief. Nearly all of the points raised by Mother in support of her 
J-S24018-22

- 13 -

appellate claims were refuted by caseworker Colon’s testimony at the 

termination hearing, which the trial court found to be “clear, persuasive, and 

credible.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/3/22, at 22. Conversely, the trial court found

Mother’s testimony to be “self-serving and not believable.” Id. Moreover, the 

documentation Mother presented to the court was of questionable 

provenance, to say the least. See, e.g., supra note 3 (cross-examination of 

Mother regarding purported lease). It is readily apparent from the evidence 

adduced at the termination hearing, and discussed supra, that the conditions 

which led to Children’s placement continue to exist, and that Mother cannot 

or will not remedy them within a reasonable period of time. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(5); see also In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) 

(en banc) (we may affirm trial court’s decision regarding termination of 

parental rights with regard to any single subsection of section 2511(a)). 

Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights to Children.

Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/12/2022