2014 UT App 281

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### T H E 

### U TA H 

### C O U RT O F 

### A P P E A L S

K I M R. B RE HM

, Peti tioner,

v. D E PAR TM E NT OF W ORKF ORC E S E R VI C E SAND S TAT E OF U TAH , Respondents.

Opin i on No. 20130947-CA Filed N ov ember 28, 2014

Or i gin al Proceeding i n thi s Court

Lauren I. Scholnic k and Rachel E. Otto , Att or neys

for Petiti oner
Suzan Pi xto n, Atto rney fo r Respondent Department o f Work force Se rv i ces

S E N I OR J UD G E P AM E L A T. G RE E NW O ODauthore d thi s Opini on, in whi ch J UD G E S G RE G OR Y K. O R M Eand J. F RE D E RI C V OR O S J R

. concu rr ed. 1

GREENWOOD, Senior Judge:

¶1 Kim R. Brehm petiti ons for judi ci al rev i ew of the Wor kfor ce Appeals Board’ s (the B o a rd) deci si on to deny her clai m for unempl oyment benefi ts. We do notdi sturb the Boar d’s deci si on.

BACKGRO UND

¶2 Peti tioner was employed by the judi ci al branch of the St ate of Utah (Empl oye r) from July 3, 1995, thro ugh June 11, 2013. Pri or

1. The Honor able Pamela T. Greenwood , S e nio r Judge, sat by speci al assi gnment as authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-201(6)

.Brehm v. Department of Work force Ser vices

to her ter minati on, she work ed as a Senior Probation Offi cer in the Thi rd Di stric t Juveni le Court, where she had acces s t o t he court’s juve ni le tr acking database refer red to as “CARE.” Thi s database i s used by authorized cour t personnel to acces s a var i ety of information, inclu ding demogr aphi cs, calendars, inci dent repo rt s, e-ci tations, case relat i o ns hips, assi gnments, relat ed people in inci dents, case di sposi tions, gener al accoun tin g, case notes, or ders, minutes, documents, c ri ti c a l m e s s a ge s, s oc i a l s u m m a ri e s, s ubs tance abus e evaluations, and petiti ons. Most of the information stor ed in CARE i s not acces si

ble by the publi c; however , the juve ni le courts allow acces s to some of these recor ds via a di fferent database called “MyC ase,” wh i ch inclu des a speci al secti on that i s access ible by a juve ni le’s parents.

¶3 On May 24, 2013, Peti tioner met wi th her supervis or s to di scu ss her use of the CARE database. In that meetin g, she was asked to explain why she had used CARE to repeat edly acces s two of her chi ldren’s case fi les, the case fi le of one of her chi ldren’s co- 2 defendants, the fi les of cases assi gned to another probat i on offi cer, and t he fi les o f six o ther su p e r v isors. The meet ing culm inated in 3

a formal request for a wri tte n explanation from Petit ioner reg ardin g her access of these fi les.

¶4 Peti tioner prov i d e d h e r e xplan ation in a lette r dated May 29, 2013. In that lette r, Peti tioner admi tte d that she had used CARE to

acces s her chi ldren’s case fi les. She explain ed that she had done so in or der t o ma k e su re that their fines were pai d, that one of her chi ldren’s fines had been reduced becau se of goo d gr ades, and that the chi ldren ha d no t mi ssed any hearin gs. She also admi tte d to

2. Peti tioner’s chi ldren had apparently been the subjects of juve ni le delinquency cases in the juv eni le court system.

3. Although somewhat confus ing, the recor d refer s to two sets of supervis or s: Peti tioner’s supervi s or s an d supervis or s who were cowork ers of Peti tioner. Consi stent wi th the recor d, our opin i on refer s to both sets of supervis or s, and we wi ll atte mpt to preserv e the di stincti on between the two sets as clearly as possi ble.

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acces sing the case fi les o f t he o ther probat i on offi cer in or der to “find out what the typical consequen ce was for someone who had commi tte d a shopli fting offense” li ke her chi ld.

¶5 She then admi tte d that she had also acces sed the fi le of one of her chi ldren’s co-defendants, explain ing that she had done so at the request of the co-defendan t’s father, who was an acquaintance of hers. Accordi ng to Peti tioner, the father beli eved that a warrant had been i ssu ed for hi s son’s arr est, whi ch p r ompted hi m to approach her for advic e about what to do. Peti tioner asserted that she advis ed the father to contact hi s son’s probat i on offi cer and that she gave himthe offi cer’s contact i nformation.

¶6 Fin ally, Peti tioner also admit t e d t hat she had acces sed the

case fi les of si x co-worker s becau se she wanted to di scover whether her supervis or was tr eating her di fferently from the ot he r supervis or s. S peci fi cally, Pet i tioner sus pected that her supervis or
was giving her ext ra work and requiring her to perfor m addi tional tasks in ret ali ation for her taking leave under the federal Fami ly and Medic al L e a ve Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 to 2654 (2012). Accordi ngly, she acces sed the case fi les of her co-worker s in or der to di scover whether their work assi gnments were the same as hers. Throughout her lett er, Petiti oner ar gued that she was unaw are of any policy or rule that prev ented thi s sor t of acces s and that such

acces s was commonplac e among probat i on offi cers. Never theless, she als o admi tte d, “I already know your response to t he major i ty of thislette r, y ou are going to say t hat each indi vidu al [probation offi cer] has a ri ght t o privacy and I respect that. . . .”

¶7 After rev i ewing Peti t ioner’ s explanation, Employer i ssu ed

a wri tte n ter minati on notic e dated June 11, 2013. In that notice , Employer gave a detailed accoun t of Peti tioner’s use of the CARE database, as well as a numb er of reasons why i t had conclu ded that ter minati on was appro priate. The notic e stated that, a cc o r d ing to Employer’ s information and technology department, Peti tioner

a c cess ed her chi ldren’s case fi les on ten di fferent occasi ons betw e e n Mar ch 28, 2013, and Ma y 1 0 , 2013. And although Peti tioner had clai med that she was merely look ing up fines and court dates, the

acces s hi stor y indi cated that she had also view ed other information

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in her chi ldren’s fi les, inclu ding “demogr aphi cs, calendars, inci dents, .

. . repo rt s, e-ci tat ions, case relat i onshi ps, assi gnments, calendar, calendar event li st, relat ed people in inc ide nts, case di sposi tions, gener al a cc o unt ing, or der accoun t sum mary, notes,

or ders, documents, cri tic al mess ages, asses sments, and PI lette rs.”

¶8 Peti tioner ’s access hi stor y of her chi ld’s co-defendant’s file also di ffered from her explanation. Although Peti tioner clai med that she had merely prov i ded t he co-defendan t’s father wi th the contact information of the co-defendan t’s p r o ba t i on offi cer, her

acces s hi stor y rev ea l e d t ha t she had acces sed the fi le on four di fferent occa sio ns and had view ed “inci dents, demogr aphi cs,
or ders, minutes, accountin g, a sub stance abus e eva l uati on, soci al

sum mari es, court repo rt s, pet it i ons, and case notes.” Employer further indi cated that Peti tioner’s acces s hi stor y made i t clear that she had also acces sed the fi les of the other probat i on offi cer and si x other supervis or s.
¶9 Employer conclu ded that Peti tio ne r’s acces s of these fi les

was not “for the purposes for whi ch they were intended” and that she “had no legiti mate bus iness r e a so n to acces s the information contai ned in these cases .” E mployer then conclu ded that Peti tioner’s acces s of these fi les violated var i ous statutes, rules, and poli ci es, inclu ding Utah’s Go v e r nment Records Acces s and Management Act (GRAMA), see Utah Code An n. §§ 63G-2- 101 to -901 (Lexi sNexi s 2011 & Supp

. 2 013), the Pub li c Offi cers’ and Employees’ Ethi cs Act, id. §§ 67-16-1 to -15, the Utah Rules of Judi ci al Admini strat i on, and the poli ci es contai ned in both Employer’ s Human Resources and Probation Offi cer Poli cy
manu a l s

. Af

te r e xp l aining each violati on, Employer conclu ded that “nothin g in [Peti tioner’s] justifi cati on

. . . ov ercomes the enormo us wei ght of gui dance from St atute, Rule and Poli cy prohibi tin g employees from using personal information of other s, obtained by systems [und er an employee’s] contro l for purposes other than t hey were intended.” Accordi ngly, Employer ter minat e d Peti tioner’s employment.

¶10 After her di sch arg e, Peti tioner appli ed for unempl oyment benefi ts. The Department of Wor kfor ce Ser vic es (DWS) deni ed her

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clai m, conclu ding that “ she knew or should have known look ing up thi s information was wrong.” Peti tioner appealed DWS ’s deci si on, and a hearin g was held before an admini strat i ve law judge (the A L J)

. E mp loyer di d not partici pate at the hearin g, but the ALJ di d take sworn testim ony from Peti tioner. In her deci si on, the A L J co nc luded that Peti tioner’s testim ony that she was not

awar e that she was violating any rule or poli cy was not credible, becau se “Employer prohibi ts acces sing computer fi les for no nbus iness purposes.” The ALJ further conclu ded that “ E mp l o yer ris ks l i ab i l i ty an d p ubli c tr ust i f employees acces s computer recor ds for personal reasons. The [pub li c] expects gov ernment and court

recor ds to be kept confi denti al.” Addi tion a l l y , the ALJ observe d that Peti tioner “knew or sh o ul d have known that acces sing computer recor ds wi thout a legiti mate bu sin ess purpose or authorizati on was prohibi ted,” beca us e “ [i]t i s

. . . univer sal knowledge among gov ernment employe es that ac cess ing records for personal or non-bu siness purposes i s p ro hibi ted.” Accordi ngly, the ALJ affi rmed DWS’s deni al of benefi ts.

¶11 Pet itioner then appealed the ALJ’s deci si on to the Board, whi ch affi rmed the ALJ ’s d e c i s i on

. The Board agr eed wi th the ALJ’s deter minati on that “i t i s not credible that [Peti tioner] di d not know she could not acces s the fi les or cases of her cowork ers and supervis or s,” becau se “i t i s inconcei vable that any state employee would not know th a t s ta te employees cannot acces s private recor ds unles s there i s a legiti mat e bu sin ess purpose for doin g so.” The Board fu rther determined that “thi s was n ot an is olated inc i dent” and that the potent i al harm to Employer was “so egr egious as to warrant i mmed ia t e di sch arg e,” despi te Peti tioner’s long work hi stor y. Petiti oner no w asks u s to r eview the Board’s deci si on.

ISS UE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶12 The central i ssu e in thi s case i s whether the Board acted proper ly when i t deter mined that Pe t i tioner was ineli gib le for

un employment benefi ts becau se Employer had just caus e fo r di s ch a rg in g h er. “Whether an employee i s ter minated for just caus e i s a mi xed questi on of law and fact.” Southeastern Utah Ass'n of Local

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Go v’ts v. Work

force Appeals Bd. , 2007 UT App 20, ¶ 6, 155 P. 3 d 9 3 2 (ci tation and internal quotat i on marks omi tte d). Never the l ess, “[d]u e to the fact-in tensi ve inqui ry involv ed at the agency level,”

cases involv ing unempl oyment benefi ts do “not lend [themselves] to consi stent resolution by a uni form body of appellate precedent.” Carbon County v. Work

force Appeals Bd. , 2013 UT 41, ¶ 7, 308 P.3d 477. Therefore , these cases are more “fact-li ke” than “law-l i ke,” see id. ; In re adopt ion of Baby B. , 2012 UT 35, ¶ 42, 308 P.3d 382 (explaining thi s dis tin cti on in cases dealing with mi xed questi ons
o f l a w and fact), and the Board’ s deci si on to award or deny unempl oyment benefi ts i s entitled to deference, see Carbon County, 2013 UT 41, ¶ 7. Accordi ngly, wi thi n the context of unempl oyment benefi ts, “we wil l not dis turb the Board’ s applic ation o f law to i ts factual findings unles s i ts deter minati on e x ceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rat i onali ty.” J ohnson v. Department of Emp’t Sec. , 782 P.2d 965, 968 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

ANALYS IS

¶13 Peti tioner arg ues that becau se she di d not violate any of the statutes, rules, o r poli ci es cit e d by Employer and because she di d not vi olate a reasonable employment rule or a uni ver sal standard of conduc t, the Board wrongly deni ed her clai m for unem p l oyment benefi ts. In the alter nati ve, she ar gues t hat even i f she d id v iolate any of those rules o r standards, Employer fai led to show that she di d so knowi ngly o r wit h the degr ee of culp abi li ty required by Utah law. For the reasons stated below, we rej ect these arg uments and uph old the Boar d’s deni al of unempl oyment benefi ts.

I. The Standar d for Denyin g Unemployment Benefits Under the Utah Admi ni strat i ve Co de Di ffers from Peti tioner’s Desc ripti on.
¶14 Peti tioner asserts that bec ause Employer di d not meet the req uir e ment s of rule R994-405-208(1) of the Utah Admini strat i ve Code, the Board er red in deny ing her unempl oyment clai m. That secti on prov i des tha t “ [i]f a clai mant violates a reasonable employme nt rule and just caus e i s establi shed, benefi ts wi ll be deni ed.” Utah Admin. Code R994-405-208(1) (emphas i s added).

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Peti tioner arg ues that her unempl oyment clai m should have been g r anted becau se Employer fai led to prov e a violati on o f a “reasonable employment r ule.” We di sagree.
¶15 Pe titi one r’ s re l i an c e on ru l e R994-405-208(1) i s mi splac ed. As i ts capti on indi cates, rule R994-405-208 merely prov i des “examples of re a so ns for di sch arg e.” Id

. It does not, however , describe the only reasons for a “di sch arg e.” In fact, rule R994-405-208 expr essly incorpor ates other secti ons of the rule—namely, secti ons 201 and 202—when i t states, “In the following examples, the basi c elements of just caus e must be consi dered in deter mining eli gib i li ty for benefi ts.” Id

. (emphas i s added). Accordingly, we look to sec tions 201 and 202 of rule R994-405—not sectio n 208—in or der to understand what an e mployer i s r equir e d t o show before a clai m for unempl oyment benefi ts can be proper ly d e nie d. See id

. R994- 405-203 (stating that an employer bears the burden of prov ing just

caus e).

¶16 Our case law i s in accord wi th thi s approach in deter mining whether unempl oyment benefi ts ar e war ranted. Our cases have consi stently look ed to secti ons 201 and 202 of rule R994-405 to deter mine what an employer mus t prov e before DWS i s justifi ed in denyi ng a clai m for unempl oyment benefi ts. See, e.g. , Spen cer Law Offic e, LLC v. Department of Work force Servs. , 2013 UT App 138, ¶ 4, 302 P.3d 1257; Peyton v. Department of Work force Servs. , 2013 UT App 130, ¶ 3, 302 P.3d 1255; Dinge r v. Department of Work force Servs. , 2013 UT App 59, ¶ 15, 300 P.3d 313; Nicol v. Department of Work force Servs. , 2012 UT App 360, ¶ 3, 293 P. 3 d 1 1 0 1 ; Provo City v. Department of Work

force Servs. , 2012 UT App 228, ¶ 6, 286 P.3d 936. We are unaw are of—and Peti tioner does not p r ov i de a ci tation to—any Utah case where the standard for denyi ng unempl oyment benefi ts was derived di rectly from rule R994-405-208. Ac cordin gly, we analyze thi s case under the standards set fort h in sections 201 and 202, not secti on 208.

¶17 Und e r r ule R994-405-201, in or der to proper ly deny unempl oyment benefi ts, the clai mant mus t have been dis charged for “just caus e.” See Utah Admin. Code R994-405-20 1 ; see also

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Spen cer Law Offic e, 2013 UT App 138, ¶ 4. To show “just caus e,” the employer mus t prov e three elements: culp abi li ty, knowledge, and contro l. Utah Admin. Code R994-405-202 (setti ng forth defini tions of culp abi li ty, knowledge, and contro l); id. R 994-405-203 (plac ing burden of proo f on the employer ); see a lso Spen cer Law Offic e, 2013 UT App 138, ¶ 4.

¶18 Gi ven the foreg o ing , Peti tioner’s arg ument that i t was
necess ary for the Board to fi rst deter mine whether she had violated

a speci fi c statut e , rule, poli cy, or uni ver sal standard of conduc t before denying her clai m for unemployment benefi ts i s mi staken. Under secti ons 201 and 202 of rule R994-405, the Board’ s task was to asses s whether there was “just caus e” for Peti tioner’s di sch arg e, whi ch entail ed deter mining whether Employer had shown culp abi li ty, knowledge, and contro l. The major i ty of the Board conclu ded that each of these elements had been adequately shown and, consequen tly, deni ed Peti tioner’s clai m. We there fore do not focus on Peti tioner’s arg uments about speci fi c violat ions but instead rev i ew the Board’ s asses sment of each of the elements of “just cause.”

II. The Boar d Di d Not Er r in Its Conclu si on that Employ er Had Adequately S hown “Ju st Cause” for Peti tioner’s Di sch arg e.
¶19 Peti tioner arg ues that becau se Employer di d not adequately show culp abi li ty or knowledge, i t fai led to establi sh just caus e and the Boar d acc or dingly er red in d enyin g her claim . We di sagree.

A. The Board’ s Conclus i on that the Sev erity of Peti tioner ’ s Acti o ns Outwei ghed Her Wor k Hi stor y Was Not Unreasonable or Irr ational.

¶20 In o r der to demonstrate culp abi li ty, the employer mus t show the following:

The conduc t caus ing the di sch arg e mus t b e s o seri ous that conti nuing the employment relat i onshi p would jeo p a rdize the employer ’s rightful intere st. If the conduc t was an i solated inci dent of poor judgment

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and there was no expectati on i t w ould be conti nued

or repeat ed, p o tential harm may not be shown. The clai mant’s prior work recor d i s an i mport ant factor in deter mining whether the conduc t was an isolated inci dent or a goo d fai th err or in judg ment

. An

e mployer mi ght not be able to demonstrate t ha t a single violati on, even though harmful, would be repeat ed by a long-ter m e mp loyee wi th an establi shed patter n of c omp l yi n g w i th the e m p l oy e r’s rules. In thi s instance, depending on the seri ousness of the conduc t, i t may not be neces sa r y for the employer to di sch arg e the clai mant t o avo i d future harm.

Utah Admin. Code R994-405-202(1)

. Pe titi oner arg ues that i t was
err or for the Board to conclu de that her work hi stor y—containing only i solated inci dents of di sci pline , no ne of whi ch relat ed to

acces sing private fi les for personal reasons—di d not outwei gh the severity o f her ac tions

. Employer r esponds b y ar guing that it was nei ther unreasonable nor i rr ational for the Board to c onclude that the severity of Peti tioner’s acti ons was such that ter minati on was
necess ary in order to pr ote ct i ts “rightful intere sts.”

¶21 In Kehl v. Boa rd of Review of the Indus tr i al C ommission , 700 P.2d 1129 (Utah 1985), an employee was ter minated after fai ling to follo w he r employer ’s safety poli ci es and procedures for tr ansporting explosives across a set of railroad t r a cks. Id. at 1131–32. Although t he employee’s ter minati on was based upon a single instance of mi scondu ct, the Utah Supreme Court ulti mately conclu ded that the employer had adequately shown culp abi li ty. Id. at 1134. Speci fi cally, t he court o bserved that“a single violation of

a safety rule may be suffi ci ent to show t ha t the potent i al harm to the employer ’s int e r e st s warrante d di sch arg e.” Id. It also emphas i zed that the analysi s of culp abi li ty should not focus “upon the numb er of violati ons” but rat her upon the “problem of whether the di sch arg e was necess a r y to avo i d actual or potent i al harm to the employer ’s ri ghtf

u l in te re s t. ” I

d

. ( c i ta tion and internal quotat i on marks omitted).

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¶22 In thiscase, the Bo ard deter mined t hat despi te Petiti oner’ s gener ally favor able wo r k history , her conduc t was “so egr egious

as to warrant i mmedi ate di sch arg e.” Thi s i s so becau se, according to both the Board and the ALJ, Employer had a rightful intere st in preserv ing the publi c tr ust and avo i ding any li abi li ty that mi ght

ensue i f court employees acces sed private fi les for personal

reasons.
¶23 The Uni ted St ates Supreme Court has observe d that the power of th e judi ci al branch li es “in i ts legiti macy, [wh i ch i s] a produc t o f sub stance and perception that shows i tself in the people’s acceptanc e of the Judi ci ary as fi t to deter min e what the Nation’s law means and t o d e clare what i t demands .” Planned Parenthoo d of Se. P a. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992). We beli eve that thi s i s especi ally tr ue wi th respect to our juve ni le courts, whi ch aspi re to “act in the best intere sts of the minor in a l l cases and preserv e and strengt hen fami ly ties,” whi le acting “consi stent wi th the ends of justic e.” Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-102(5) (g) (Lexi sNexi s 2012). As an employer , there fore, the state judi ci ary has a “rightful intere st” in preserv ing a legiti mate, posi tive publi c perception of the j ud i ci ary by demanding that judges and judi ci al employees conduc t themselves wi th the highes t lev els of integr i ty.

¶24 Co ns o na nt wi th thi s goal, the judi ci ary has adopted rules si mi lar to GRAMA reg ardin g court recor ds, exhib i ts, and fi les. See Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-202. In fact, port i ons of these rules speci fi cally address juve ni le court recor ds and restr i ct acces s to juve ni le court “soci al” and “lega l ” r e co rds. Id. R. 4-202.02(6) –(7), -202.03(5) –(6) (clas si fying certain recor ds as juve ni le “soci al” or “legal” recor ds and restr i cting acces s to them). Speci fi cally, rule 4- 202. 0 3 o f the Utah Rules o f Judi ci al Admini strat i on permi ts court personnel to acces s court recor ds “only to achi eve the purpose for wh ich the recor d was sub mi tte d.” Id

. R. 4-202.03. And finally, as poin ted out by Employer, there are also poli ci es in place gov ernin g t he conduc t of juve ni le probat i on offi cers t hat encourage t he m t o

“ o bser ve hi gh standards of conduc t so that the Judi ci ary i s preserv ed, and publi c confi dence [in] the judi ci ary is p r o moted.” Thus, i t cannot be di spute d t ha t Peti tioner’s acces sing CARE

recor d s for purposes outsi de of her employment responsibi li ties

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was inconsi stent wi th rules and poli ci es restr i cting such acces s and desi gned to ensure confi denti ali ty.

¶25 In li ght of the foreg oin g, the ALJ corr e ct l y o bserved that “[t]he publi c expects gov ernment and court r ecords to be kept confi denti al” and that “Employer ris ks li abi li ty and [loss of] publi c tr ust i f employees ac cess computer records for personal reasons.” We also defer to the Board’ s finding that given the presence of the statutes, rules, and poli ci es di scu ssed above, i t i s inconcei vable that any state employee—much less an employee wi th ov er ei ghteen year s of exper i ence as a publi c servant wi thi n the judi ci al branch—w ould not realize that acces sing confi denti al case fi les for personal reasons violates the publi c’s tr ust and ulti mately serves to undermine the legiti macy of t he judi ci ary

. Accordi ngly, i t was nei ther unreasonable nor i rr ational for the Board to concl ude that despi te her favor able work hi stor y, Peti t i oner’ s acti ons were “so egr egious as to warrant i mmedi ate di sch arg e.” Indeed, even though Peti tioner may have been able to acces s some of the same information thro ugh the parental secti on of the MyC ase webs i te, i t i s clear that most of the informa t io n she acces sed—inclu ding the sub stance abus e evalu a ti on of her chi ld’s co-defendan t and the fi les of another probat i on offi c e r an d h e r c o-work ers—was not availab le to other parents thro ugh MyC ase and that acces sing t he m was there fore a seri ous violati on. Thus, the Board’ s deter minati on that Employer adequately dem onstrat ed culp abi li ty was both rati onal and reasonable.

B. It Was Not Erro r for the Board To Conclude that Peti tioner Knew that Her Conduct Was Unac ceptable.

¶26 Peti tioner also arg ues that the Board err ed in conclu ding that Employer had adequately met the “knowledge” requirement of j ust caus e. Speci fi cally, she arg ues that she never received any tr aining or wri tte n poli ci es reg ardin g the use of the CARE database and that Employer never i ssu ed a warning reg ardin g her conduc t. As noted above, however , the Board conclud e d that “i t i s inconcei vable that any state employee would not know tha t state emp l oy e e s c annot acces s private recor ds unles s there i s a legiti mate bus iness purpose for do ing so.”

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¶27 In or der to show “kno w ledge,” an employer mus t show that the employee “had k no wledge of the conduc t the employer expected.” Utah Admin. Code R 9 9 4-405-202( 2). In thi s case, Peti tioner’s own admi ssi ons show that she knew that the fi les of the other supervis or s she was a cces sing were private and that those supervis or s were entitled to a “right to privacy.” In her lette r dated May 29, 2 0 13, she stated, “I already know your response to the major i ty of thi s lett e r , y ou are going to say that each indi vidu al [probation offi cer] has a right to privacy a nd I r e sp e ct that

. . . .” Thi s admi ssi on i s suffi ci ent to establi sh knowledge becau se i t shows that Peti tioner knew that both Employer and the other supervis or s expected these fi les to remain private. Thi s conclu si on i s further buttressed by the observat i ons made in the prior secti on of thi s opin i on reg ardin g t he ne ar-uni ver sal knowledge among both gov ernment employees and the public a t large that many gov ernment recor ds—and particu larly many juve ni le court

recor ds—are confi denti al, that acces sing them for non-bu siness purposes i s prohibi ted, and that suc h acces s can lead to seri ous consequen ces. Accordi ngly, i t was nei ther i rr ational nor unreasonable for the Boar d t o conclu de that Employer had adequately pr ov en the “knowledge” e lement of just cause.

CONCLUS ION

¶28 The Board di d not err by fai ling to fi rst det ermin e whether Peti tioner had violated a speci fi c statute, poli cy, rule, or univer sal standard of conduc t. Rather , i t corr ectly appli ed the “ j us t caus e” standard for denyi ng unempl oyment benefi ts, and its analysi s of the elements of that standard do not depart from t he “bounds of reasonableness an d ra ti on a l i ty

. ” Ac c or d ingly, we decline to di sturb the Boar d’s deni al of Peti tioner’s clai m.

20130947-CA 12 2014 UT App 281