alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                           6,076
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                         119,491
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     46,321
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                        101,870
<ALLOWANCE>                                      1,369
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 162,810
<DEPOSITS>                                     141,778
<SHORT-TERM>                                     4,305
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              1,971
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         4,485
<OTHER-SE>                                      10,271
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 162,810
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                  3,978
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                1,484
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                    71
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                 5,533
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               2,400
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,443
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            3,090
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                      102
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   8
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  3,721
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    222
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                         222
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       180
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.40
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.40
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    4.42
<LOANS-NON>                                        892
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                    263
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 1,368
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                      140
<RECOVERIES>                                        39
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                1,369
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                               470
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                            899


</TABLE>
N OTE : This order is nonprecedential

. 

# United States Court of Appeals **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________

RICARDO JOSE CALDERON LOPEZ, Plaintiff

- Appellant

v.

HOWARD M. KAUSNER, dba Amor Arm Apartments, et al., Defendants

- Appellees

______________________

2024

- 2011

______________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of California in No. 2:05

- cv

- 00397

- NM

VBK, Judge Nora M. Manella.

______________________

P ER C URIAM

.
O R D E R

Ricardo Jose Calderon Lopez brought suit against the
various appellees in California state court and then sought
to remove the case to federal court. The appellees moved to dismiss. On May 23, 2005, the district court ordered that
the last such motion was submitted for consideration, and

o n May 24 , 20 05 , the district court granted the motions

. On June 1 7 , 2024, Mr. Calderon Lopez filed a notice of appeal directed to this court from a decision entered
“0 5 / 23 /20 05 ” in the district court action. Case: 24-2011 Document: 6 Page: 1 Filed: 07/24/2024CALDERON LOPEZ v. KAUSNER 2

“ [T] he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement,” Bowles v. Russell , 551 U.S.205, 214 (2007), and, in order to be timely, a notice of appeal must generally be filed within 6 0 days after entry of final judgment when the case involves United States agencies and officers , 28 U.S.C. § 2107; Fed. R. App. P. 4. Here, Mr. Calderon Lopez’s notice of appeal, filed over 19 years after the district court’s May 23 , 20 05 decision, is clearly untimely. For at least this reas on, we and any other court of appeals lack jurisdiction.

Accordingly,

I T I S O RDERED T HAT :
(1) The appeal is dismissed.

(2) Each party shall bear its own costs.

July 2 4

, 202 4
Date F OR THE C OURT Case: 24-2011 Document: 6 Page: 2 Filed: 07/24/2024
I 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2177 

To establish certain requirements relating to area mail processing studies. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 3, 2007 

Mr. STUPAK introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

A BILL 

To establish certain requirements relating to area mail 

processing studies. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. DEFINITIONS. 

4 For purposes of this Act— 

5 (1) the term ‘‘AMP study’’ means an area mail 

6 processing study (as further defined in any manual 

7 or handbook prepared by the Postal Service) which 

8 relates to consolidating the operations of 2 or more 

9 postal facilities; and 

10 (2) the term ‘‘Postal Service’’ means the United 

11 States Postal Service. 

mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with BILLS

2 

•HR 2177 IH

1 SEC. 2. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO AMP STUDIES. 

2 (a) DEADLINE FOR COMPLETION OF AN AMP 

3 STUDY.—The results of an AMP study shall not be cog4 nizable for any purpose unless such study is completed on 

5 or before— 

6 (1) the 180th day after the date on which such 

7 study is initiated (as determined under applicable 

8 provisions of the manual or handbook referred to in 

9 section 1(1)); or 

10 (2) such later date (following the 180th day re11 ferred to in paragraph (1)) as the Postal Service 

12 may determine, if— 

13 (A) that later date is not more than 60 

14 days after the 180th day referred to in para15 graph (1); and 

16 (B) notice of that later date is provided, on 

17 or before the 180th day referred to in para18 graph (1), to persons likely to be affected by 

19 the results of the study. 

20 (b) PRESERVATION OF STATUS QUO PENDING COM21 PLETION OF A STUDY.—The Postal Service shall ensure 

22 that no reduction in the workforce of, and no removal of 

23 equipment from, any postal facility occurs during the pe24 riod beginning on the date on which an AMP study is initi25 ated in connection with such facility and ending on the 

26 earliest of— 

mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with BILLS

3 

•HR 2177 IH

1 (1) the date on which such study is completed; 

2 (2) the deadline for completion of such study 

3 under subsection (a); or 

4 (3) the date as of which the Postal Service re5 scinds its plans for the consolidation involved. 

6 SEC. 3. APPLICABILITY. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—This Act shall apply with respect 

8 to— 

9 (1) any AMP study which is initiated on or 

10 after the date of the enactment of this Act; and 

11 (2) any AMP study which is initiated before, 

12 and which remains pending on, the date of the en13 actment of this Act. 

14 (b) SPECIAL RULE.—In the case of an AMP study 

15 described in subsection (a)(2), section 2 shall be applied 

16 by treating any reference to the 180th day after the date 

17 on which such study is initiated to refer to such 180th 

18 day or the 60th day after the date of the enactment of 

19 this Act, whichever is later. 

Æ 

mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with BILLS
#### Frederick Goll, Plaintiff, *v.*John H. Delesderniers et al., Defendants.

(Supreme Court, New York Special Term,

March, 1899.)

Libel — Statement that a business man has had “ one or more unsatisfactory fires ”.

The words “ Our home offices have called our attention to the fact that the assured has had one or more unsatisfactory fires ” are not libelous when written of a business man, as they do not naturally import any crime, nor do they import a dishonesty of action so derogatory to his character or standing in business as to make them actionable.

Demubbeb to complaint.

W. Bennett Marx, for plaintiff. ■

Michael H. Cardozo and Raymond Reubenstein, for defendants.

Russell, J.

Demurrer to complaint. Are these words written of a business man libelous? Viz.: “ Our home offices have called our attention to the fact that the assured has had one or more unsatisfactory fires.”

The ordinary import of the language is not changed by the averment of any extrinsic facts or circumstances which would give it any other than its ordinary significance. Presumably the readers of the letter would derive the same meaning from the words used as would ordinary persons, whatever uncertainty was left in the mind as to what was really meant. It will not answer to merely surmise that the writer intended to convey a charge which was *550libelous, if the mind of the reader would not naturally arrive at such a conclusion.

It would be inferred from these words that the fires were unsatisfactory to some one concerned in their occurrence. If that person were the plaintiff no libel is charged, for the words would import a loss to him. If the want of satisfaction was on the part of the insurance companies we might easily infer, without recourse to the reflection that all fires are unsatisfactory to insurance companies where losses are sustained, that those insurance companies were not- satisfied with the ratio of premium for the hazard to the loss incurred, the proof of damage or from doubts arising upon the information furnished as to any violation of the terms of the policy, or carelessness attendant upon the circumstances of the fire. There are so many occasions, naturally possible on the part of the insurance companies, for honest dissatisfaction with the incidents attending the insurance, the fire and the proofs of loss, that the words used do not, in the absence of a special direction otherwise, import naturally any crime, or such a dishonesty of action on the part of the plaintiff as to make them so derogatory to his character or standing as a business man that they constitute :a libel as recognized by law. Demurrer sustained, with leave to amend on payment of costs.

Demurrer sustained.
# Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed October 18, 2023. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________ No. 3D 2022 -1 489 Lower Tribunal No. 21 -2 3917

________________ 

### Heritage Property & Casualty Insurance Company , Appellant,
vs. 

### Century Park Condominium No. 2 Association, Inc. , Appellee.
An appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for MiamiDade County, Pedro P. Echarte, Jr., Judge. Rubinton Simms P.A., Lesley Simms, Jeffrey A. Rubinton (Hollywood), Link & Rockenbach, P.A., David A. Noel, and Kara Rockenbach Link (West Palm Beach), for appellant. Florida Advocates, Christopher Tuccitto, James D. Underwood, and Yasmin Gilinsky (Dania Beach), for appellee. Before FERNANDEZ, SCALES, and MILLER, JJ. MILLER, J

.2

In this Hurricane Irma
- related laws uit , a ppellant, Heritage Property & Casualty Insurance Company, challenges an order compelling the appraisal of a claim filed by appellee, C entury Park Condominium No. 2 Association, Inc. The trial court ordered the unresolved coverage determination and
a ppraisal to proceed on a dual
- track basis. Consistent with our decision in Sunshine State Ins

. Co

. v. Rawlins , 34 So. 3d 753 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), we impute no abuse of discretion in this approach. The trial court preserved the insurer’s defenses to covera ge, while simultaneously paving the way for a relatively expeditious and cost
- effective decision as to the amount of loss. Id. at 754

– 55 ; see also Paradise Plaza Condo. Ass’n v. Reinsurance Corp. of N.Y

. , 685 So. 2d 937, 94 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) ( concluding dual
- track approach avoids “adverse effects on the expeditious, out of court disposition of litigation” and saves “ judicial resources which might otherwise be required in resolving the factual and legal issues involved in [c overage disputes]”); Castle Key Ins. Co. v. Wooden Fam. Tr. , 321 So. 3d 346, 347 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (“[The] motions were reasonable under the circumstances , [and the] participation in the litigation did not imply a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of [a] contractual right to compel an appraisal .

. . .”); Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Branco , 148 So. 3d 488, 494 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (noting that lawsuit to establish coverage after coverage has been denied is not action3

inconsistent with right to appraisa l because appraisal need not be sought prior to litigation). Accordingly, we affirm the order under review. Affirmed.
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

****CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18. U.S.C. SECTION1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the QuarterlyReport of Parkway Properties, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q forthe period ended June 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Sarah P. Clark,Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, asadopted pursuant to 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to myknowledge:

(1)       The Report fully complies with therequirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and

(2)       The information contained in theReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of the Company.

|  | /s/ Sarah P. Clark      |
|--|-------------------------|
|  | Sarah P. Clark (*)      |
|  | Chief Financial Officer |
|  | August 5, 2005          |

*A signed original of thiswritten statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Parkway Properties,Inc. and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities andExchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I
Editorial Note: Part 2 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I
Editorial Note: Part 6 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I
Editorial Note: Part 7 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I
Editorial Note: Part 1 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I
Editorial Note: Part 3 pertaining to both patents and trademarks is placed in the grouping pertaining to patents regulations.

Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I
Editorial Note: Part 4 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I
Editorial Note: Part 5 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

§ 41.123 Default filing times. ( a ) A *motion,* other than a miscellaneous motion, may only be filed according to a schedule the Board sets. The default times for acting are: ( 1 ) An *opposition* is due 30 days after service of the motion.
( 2 ) A *reply* is due 30 days after service of the opposition.
( 3 ) A *responsive motion* is due 30 days after the service of the motion.
( b ) *Miscellaneous motions.* ( 1 ) If no time for filing a specific miscellaneous motion is provided in this part or in a Board order: ( i ) The opposing party must be consulted prior to filing the miscellaneous motion, and
( ii ) If an opposing party plans to oppose the miscellaneous motion, the movant may not file the motion without Board authorization. Such authorization should ordinarily be obtained through a telephone conference including the Board and every other party to the proceeding. Delay in seeking relief may justify a denial of the motion.
( 2 ) An opposition may not be filed without authorization. The default times for acting are: ( i ) An *opposition* to a miscellaneous motion is due five business days after service of the motion.
( ii ) A *reply* to a miscellaneous motion opposition is due three business days after service of the opposition.
( c ) *Exhibits.* Each exhibit must be filed and served with the first paper in which it is cited except as the Board may otherwise order.
###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 2 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 6 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 7 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 1 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 3 pertaining to both patents and trademarks is placed in the grouping pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 4 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter I

#### Editorial Note:

Part 5 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to patents regulations.

#### § 41.40 Tolling of time period to file a reply brief.

(a) *Timing.* Any request to seek review of the primary examiner's failure to designate a rejection as a new ground of rejection in an examiner's answer must be by way of a petition to the Director under § 1.181 of this title filed within two months from the entry of the examiner's answer and before the filing of any reply brief. Failure of appellant to timely file such a petition will constitute a waiver of any arguments that a rejection must be designated as a new ground of rejection.

(b) *Petition granted and prosecution reopened.* A decision granting a petition under § 1.181 to designate a new ground of rejection in an examiner's answer will provide a two-month time period in which appellant must file a reply under § 1.111 of this title to reopen the prosecution before the primary examiner. On failure to timely file a reply under § 1.111, the appeal will stand dismissed.

(c) *Petition not granted and appeal maintained.* A decision refusing to grant a petition under § 1.181 of this title to designate a new ground of rejection in an examiner's answer will provide a two-month time period in which appellant may file only a single reply brief under § 41.41.

(d) *Withdrawal of petition and appeal maintained.* If a reply brief under § 41.41 is filed within two months from the date of the examiner's answer and on or after the filing of a petition under § 1.181 to designate a new ground of rejection in an examiner's answer, but before a decision on the petition, the reply brief will be treated as a request to withdraw the petition and to maintain the appeal.

(e) *Extensions of time.* Extensions of time under § 1.136(a) of this title for patent applications are not applicable to the time period set forth in this section. See § 1.136(b) of this title for extensions of time to reply for patent applications and § 1.550(c) of this title for extensions of time to reply for *ex parte* reexamination proceedings.

[76 FR 72298, Nov. 22, 2011]
§ 301.2 Official addresses. All claims, pleadings, and general correspondence intended for the Copyright Royalty Board and not submitted by electronic means through the electronic filing system (“eCRB”) must be addressed as follows: ( a ) If sent by mail (including overnight delivery using United States Postal Service Express Mail), the envelope should be addressed to: Copyright Royalty Board, P.O. Box 70977, Southwest Station, Washington, DC 20024-0977.
( b ) If hand-delivered by a private party, the envelope must be brought to the Copyright Office Public Information Office, Room LM-401 in the James Madison Memorial Building, and be addressed as follows: Copyright Royalty Board, Library of Congress, James Madison Memorial Building, 101 Independence Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20559-6000.
( c ) If hand-delivered by a commercial courier (excluding Federal Express, United Parcel Service and similar courier services), the envelope must be delivered to the Congressional Courier Acceptance Site (CCAS) located at Second and D Street NE., Washington, DC, addressed as follows: Copyright Royalty Board, Library of Congress, James Madison Memorial Building, 101 Independence Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20559-6000.
( d ) Subject to paragraph (f) of this section, if sent by electronic mail, to *crb@loc.gov .*
( e ) Correspondence and filings for the Copyright Royalty Board may not be delivered by means of: ( 1 ) Overnight delivery services such as Federal Express, United Parcel Service, etc.; or
( 2 ) Fax.
( f ) General correspondence for the Copyright Royalty Board may be sent by electronic mail. Claimants or Parties must not send any claims, pleadings, or other filings to the Copyright Royalty Board by electronic mail without specific, advance authorization of the Copyright Royalty Judges.
[82 FR 18570, Apr. 20, 2017]