IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Anthonee Patterson, :

Appellant :

:

v. :
: Kenneth Shelton, individually and : in his capacity as President of the : Board Of Trustees, of the Church : of the Lord Jesus Christ of the : No. 2147 C.D. 2014 Apostolic Faith, Inc. : Submitted: July 2, 2015

BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS

, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE McGIN LEY FILED: December 18, 2015

Anthonee Patterson (Patterson) appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County ( trial court) which granted Bishop Kenneth

Shelton ’s (Shelton) motion to dismiss on the trial court’s determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

I. Factual and Procedural Background This procedural and factual history is recounted in this Court’s memorandum opinion in the case of Patterson v. Shelton , (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 2396
C.D. 2011, filed March 6, 2013), slip opinion, appeal denied , 78 A.3d 1092 (Pa.
2013).

This marks the [ f ifth ] time this Court has been called upon to review action by the [trial court] in the underlying tangle of c ontroversies involving a religious schism which has spanned over two decades

. In all,2 seven lawsuits were instituted by various parties against a church, its corporate trustee and various officials in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County , Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County , and United States District Cou rt for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 1

The key players involved in th e present offshoot of the controversy are: (1) the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith ( the “ Church ” ), a n unincorporated association

, founded in 1919; (2) the

“ Trustees of the General Assembly of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc. ”

, ( the

“ Corporat e Trustee ” ), a Pennsylvania nonprofit corporation formed in 1947 to act as the trustee and hold property in trust for the Church 2 ; (3) Pat terson, a life

- long member , elder, and minister of the Church ; and (4) Shelton, the current “Bishop” and/or “Overseer” of the Church and “President” of the Corporat e T rustee

. The dispute began in 1991 when then

- Bishop S. McDowall Shelton, died, leaving v acancies in the offices of “Overseer ” of the Church and “President ” of the Corporat e Trustee

. Immediately u pon Bishop S. McDowall Shelton’s death, Shelton and his “faction” took control of the accounts, trusts and properties of the

1 These lawsuits are recounted in more detail in this Court’s previous opinion in Church of the Lord Jesu s Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc. v. Shelton , (Pa. Cmwlth. Nos. 376 C.D. 2000 and 559 C.D. 2000, filed April 10, 2001)

. See also Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc., et al, v. Roddy Shelton, II , 740 A.2d 751 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999) , for an insightful history of this complex and protracted dispute. See also Joseph Askew v. Trustees of the General Assembly of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc. , 644 F.Supp. 2d 584 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (“ Askew I ”) and Joseph As kew v. Trustees of the General Assembly of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc. , 776 F.Supp. 2d 25 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“ Askew II ”)

.

2 The Corporat e Trustee’s Charter provided that the purpose for which it was formed was to “take, receive, have and hold and manage real and personal property in trust for the uses and purposes specified by the General Assembly of the Church” and that said purposes did “not contemplate pecuniary gain or profit incidental or otherwise to its members.” Charter , June 27, 1947, at 1; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 266a.3 Church and Corporat e Tr ustee . After extensive litigation initiated by two other dissident factions of the Church congregation [ 3 ] over the leadership of the Church and Corporat e Trustee

, t he trial court ultimately determined, and this Court later affirmed, that Shelton and his B oard of Trustees were in control. 4

[ II. Patterson’s Prior Appeal To This Court ]

O n July 24, 1995, Patterson , as life

- long member, elder and minister of the Church, commenced a n action in equity against Shelton

, in Shelton’s individual capacity and as the President of the Board of Trustees of the Corporat e Trustee

. 5 Patterson alleged that since taking control of the Church and Corporat e Trustee in 1991

, Shelton and his Board of Trustees have misappropriated funds, “looted the Church’s assets,” paid themse lves salaries in contravention of Church By

- Laws , and funded private expenditures, lavish vacations , lingerie, cars, homes and other personal incidentals with assets which were donated and designated for Church religious and charitable missions

. 6

Patters on requested, inter alia : (1) the appointment of a receiver to take control of the assets of the Church held

3 Patterson was the leader of one such faction.
4 See Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc. v. Shelton , (Pa. Cmwlth. Nos. 376 C.D. 2000 and 559 C.D. 2000, filed April 10, 2001).

5 Erik Shelton was also named as a Defendant but on November 30, 2005, he was voluntarily dismissed from the lawsuit.

6 Specifically, Patterson alleged that Shelton took physical possession of cash offerings designated for the Ch urch from church es throughout the Eastern United States and converted them to his own use; converted $111,537 from the Gresham Trust, a fund held for the benefit of Church members in need of social services; converted $111,533 from a Church account held at Fidelity Nation al Bank; converted $10,585 from the Church’s “Bus Rally Money Account;” converted $64,000 from a Church account at Commonwealth Federal and Loan which was dedicated for youth studies; and converted $8,000 from two accounts at Mid Atlantic Bank donated by C hurch members for the purpose of financially assisting the Church’s international missions. Complaint, ¶¶12(a)

- (f) at 5

- 7; R.R. at 127a

- 129a.4 by the Corporat e Trustee ; (2) an order requiring Shelton to issue annual financial reports for the years 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994; and (3) an acc ounting.

The parties engaged in discovery. Patterson retained James A. Stavros, CPA (Stavros), a forensic financial investigator

, to analyze the finances and expenditures of the Church and the Corporat e Trustee

. Stavros author ed a report which detail e d his findings that Shelton and his Board of T rustees withdrew hundreds of thousands of dollars from Church accounts with no accounting of where the funds went and that they expended Church funds on a significant amount of “ personal ” items and expenditures that appeared to be outside the normal course of business and outside Church laws and

cu stoms

. 7 He concluded that Church accounts had declined by nearly $1 million under Shelton’s control

. 8

In January 2006 , the parties agreed to submit to binding arbit ration. The Arbitrator concluded that the credible evidence established that Shelton had engaged in various acts of fraud, mismanagement, conspiracy, breach of fiduciary responsibilities, [and] violations of By

- laws and the Articles of Incorporation in se izing corporate funds and assets and depleting bank accounts designated for Church

- related purposes

. The Arbitrator concluded that Shelton had diverted Church funds and assets to himself and others for his and their benefit. The Arbitrator appointed a re ceiver and directed Shelton to account for all Church funds removed by him or those acting with him.

Shelton filed a motion to vacate the award which the trial court denied

. On appeal, t his Court overturned the arbitration award because the arbitrator went beyond the

7 This included vacations all over the world including, but not limited to: Cannes, France, Disney World , Switzer land, and purchases from stores such as Victoria’s Secret.

8 Shelton did not retain a financial expert to counter Patterson’s report.5 scope of his authority in fashioning relief. See Shelton v. Patterson , 942 A.2d 967 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) . This Court remanded the matter to the trial court to determine whether Patterson was entitled to relief under the [Nonprofit Corporati on Law of 1988 , 15 Pa. C.S. §§ 5101

- 5997] NCL

.
On remand, Shelton moved for s ummary j udgment on the ground that Patterson lacked “ statutory standing ” under Section 5782 of the NCL , 15 Pa.C.S. §5782

. Shelton argued that only an officer, director, or memb er of a nonprofit corporation has “ statutory standing ” to enforce a right of a nonprofit corporation through a derivative action. Section 5782 of the NCL

, 15 Pa. C.S. § 5782, which is contained in Subchapter F governing “derivative actions,” provides:

Ac tions against directors, members of an other body and officers

(a ) General rule

– Except as provided in subsection (b), in any actio n or proceeding brought to enforce a secondary right on the part of one or more members of a nonprofit corporation against any present or former officer, director or member of an other body of the corporation because the corporation refuses to enforce rights that may properly be asserted by it, each plaintiff must aver and it must be made to appear that each plaintiff was a me mber of the corporation at the time of the transaction of which he complains. (Emphasis added

. )

15 Pa. C

. S

. § 5782

.
S helton pointed to the Corporat e Trustee’s Articles of Incorporation which limit ed its membership in the nonprofit corporation to its B oard of Trustees. Shelton asserted that because Patterson was never a member of the Board of Trustee s he was never a “ member ” of the Corporat e Trustee , and thus, he had no “ statutory

s tanding ” to bring claims that are derivative of the Corporat e Trustee’s rights.6 T he trial court agreed that under Section 5782 of the NCL, Patterson could only bring suit if he was a member of the Corporat e Trustee at the time of the alleged events outlined in the Complaint. The trial court looked to Article IX of the Art icles of Incorporation which states: “membership in the corporation [Corporat e Trustee] shall consist of those persons serving as members of the Board of Trustees.” The trial court concluded that because Patterson had never been a member of the Board of T rustees he was not a member of the Corporat e Trustee

. The trial court reasoned that because the NCL created the cause of action and designated who may sue; standing was a jurisdictional prerequisite to any action. Grom v. Burgoon , 672 A.2d 823 (Pa. Super . 1996). The trial
court “finding no possible way to affirm that [Patterson] has standing” granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. Trial Court Opinion, January 25, 2012, at 3.

Patterson , slip op inion at 1

- 6.

III. This Court’s An alysis And Disposition Of Patterson ’s Prior Appeal
[ This Court rationalized in Patterson ] :
An example of derivative claims previously asserted against th e Corporat e Trustee and Shelton (and others) is found in the related case commenced by Joseph Askew (Askew) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 2009. See footnote 1

In Askew I

, Askew , who claimed to be a member of the Church, brought an eight

- count complaint against Shelton , the Corporat e Trustee and the oth er managers of the Corporat e Trustee (collectively “Defendants” ). In Count II, Askew alleged breach of fiduciary duty owed to the Corporat e Trustee . In Count IV, Askew alleged that the Board of Trustees failed to present the members of the Corporat e Trus tee with an annual report containing specific financial information under Section 5553 of the7 NCL. In Count V, Askew sought the removal of Shelton as President of the Corporat e Trustee.

Defendants moved to dismiss these counts because Askew lacked stan ding under the NCL to bring derivative claims.

T he [ United States ] District Court agreed that these claims were derivative because any alleged f ailure to satisfy a supposed dut y of loyalty and care owed to the Corporat e Trustee would “ injure [] only tha t corporation. ” Askew I

, 644 F.Supp. 2d at 590. The United States District Court determined Count IV was also a derivative claim because that section guarantees a nonprofit corporation “the right to self

- knowledge” and that “[a]ny right that Section 5553 may confer is a right of the corporation , and a claim to encore [sic] this section necessarily falls within the ambit of Section 5782.” Askew I , 644 F.Supp 2d at 590 (Emphasis added

. ) As for Count V, the [ United States ] District Court found that under S ection 5726 of the NCL, a court is only empowered to remove a director “upon petition of any member or director” of the nonprofit corporation. Id.

. . . . The [ United States ] District [ C ] ourt concluded that since Askew was not a member or director of the Corporat e Trustee, he did not have “statutory standing” to seek these kinds of relief.

Even though the [ United States ] District Court found that Counts II

, IV and V w ere derivative claims , the [ United States ] District C ourt explained that Askew’s claim s in Counts I and VI for breach of fiduciary duty to the Church and unjust enrichment for misappropriation of Church funds were not derivative of the C orporat e Trustee ’s rights

. Therefore, they were not claims “that only the Corporation’s [ Corporat e T rust ee] members directors or officers can bring.” Askew I , 644 F.Supp. at 590.

. . . .8 Similarly, i n Askew I , the [ United States ] District Court determined, and this Court concurs, that the members of

a Church ’s congregation suffer injury when the Church’s
assets , which were held in trust, are misused

. Askew I

, 644 F.Supp. 2d at 591. T he [ United States ] District Court clarified that only through Askew's membership in the Church was he qualified to bring a n action on behalf of the Church under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23.1 (governing standing to bring derivative actions on behalf of unincorporated associations ). [ 9 ]

Here, there is no question that Patterson was a member of the Church when he instituted the action. [ 10 ] A s a member of the Church congregation, Patterson w as part of the beneficiary class for which the Corporat e Trustee held the Church’s assets in trust. As such, he ha s standing to bring this action to enforce his own rights and the rights commonly held by all beneficiaries to obtain restoration to the Chur ch of its full losses. Thus, the action should not have been dismissed due to lack of standing under the NCL.

As noted, the Church is an unincorporated association. This Court notes that its conclusion that Patterson has standing is also wholly consis tent with principles governing standing to sue on behalf of an unincorporated association

. S ee Pa.R.C.P. No. 2152 (action by unincorporated association must be brought in name of member as trustee ad litem)

. [ 11 ]

9 In Askew II , the District Court went on to find that Askew was not a “member” of the Church because he was expelled thr ough the procedures in Article XIII of the Church’s By

Laws.
10 Shelton argues that Patterson was not a member of the Church congregation because he “abandoned” the Church. However, the record demonstrates that the Church never took any action to remove Patterson. Article XIII of the Church By

- laws provided a method for the expulsion or suspension of members. The Church could have used those procedures to remove Patterson who Shelton alleges abandoned the Church, but it did not do so

.

11 To hol d otherwise would, as a practical matter, insulate these most serious allegations from judicial review.9

Patterson , slip opinion at 9

- 10 and 16

- 17.

Th is court r e versed the order of the trial court and remanded to the

trial court to conduct a trial on the remaining factual and legal issues raised in Patterson’s complaint.

I V. Patterson’s Present Appeal

On July 15, 2014, the trial court commence d a non

- jury trial. Patterson offered the following proof regarding Rita Bolognese’s (Bolognese) testimony , a senior paralegal and records custodian for BNY Mellon. “She will testify to bank records which we have in our possession, that they’re authenti c, and that from there, certain transactions we will be questioning with other witnesses once we’ve established that they are true and correct copies of those records.” Trial Transcript, July 15, 2014, (T.T. 7/15/14) at 29; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at

694 a. The trial court responded “[s]o your argument is that she is going to testify about these records . . . [a]nd I assume it’s the operative time of 91 to 94?” T.T.
7/15/14 at 30; R.R. at 695a. Patterson ’s attorney 12 responded “[t]hat’s correct.”

T.T. 7 /15/14 at 30; R.R. at 695a.

Bolognese recoun ted that she was authorized to serve as records custodian for the bank. T.T. 7/15/14 at 34; R.R. at 699a. Bolognese was provided with an affidavit from Susan McGivern, her supervisor, as to the scope of what she could testify to as custodian of records for BNY Mellon. T.T. 7/15/14 at 35

- 36;

R.R. at 700a

- 71a. Following a lunch break, the trial court stated that “[t]his case

12 In order to avoid confusion between Bishop Kenneth Shelton and Fincourt B. Shelton, this Court will refer to Fincourt B. Shelton as Patterson’s attorn ey.10

has a real problem in that plaintiff’s attorney [Patterson] has not produced all of th e records recently to the defendant [Shelton]. This is a 20

- year

- old case. This case is going slowly.” T.T. 7/15/14 at 40

- 41; R.R. 705a

- 06a. The trial court adjourned for the day and ordered the parties “to provide to the other s ide c o pies of every sing le document that party in t ends to introduce into evidence, as well as a list of every single witness t hat attorney intends to call in this case. Failure to provide copies of the document today to opposing counsel will result in my precluding the

document from be ing introdu c ed into evidence.” T .T. 7/15/14 a t 41; R.R. at 706a.

On July 16, 2014, before the commencement of Bolognese’s testimony, the trial court issued the following order, “I’m denying the motion to

deem the admissions admitted for a varie ty of reasons, including the fact that . . .
[y]ou [ Patterson’s attorney] did not include in this motion even what the req u e s t

for admissions of th e third set were, you included the second set .” Trial Transcript, July 16, 2014, (T.T. 7/16/14) at 12; R.R. at 720a. At that time, Bolognese again

took the stand and stated that “[w]hen we [took] over the bank [Mellon PSFS], we
took over the records of PSFS . . . [a]nd in course of . . . cha n ging over the accounts, we had possession of t he PSFS documents.” T.T . 7/16/14 at 23; R.R. at

23a. In response to the trial court’s query, Bolognese adm i tted that she was unable to testify that “this document was prepared in the course of business of PSFS.”
T.T. 7/16/14 at 24; R.R. at 732a.

On cross

- examination, defe nse counsel , Danielle Banks (Banks) asked the following question:

Q: So with regard to this particular document

- -

A: Right.11 Q: This particular document was not

- - you don’t have knowledge yourself that it was kept in the normal course, correct? A: No.

Q: And did someone else tell you that it was kept, in the normal course?

A: Well, it would be someone from legal support that would tell me. Someone did tell me, yes.

T.T. 7/16/14 at 41

- 42; R.R. at 749a

- 50a.

At the conclusion of Bolognese’s testimon y, the trial court ruled: And everyone is in agreement that the testimony from Mrs. Bolognese would be that she does not have any direct knowledge regarding how these documents were made or whether the record was made at or near the time or from informatio n transmitted by someone with knowledge . So based on her inability to provide that testimony, I’m sustaining the objection to any questions

or the introduction into evidence of those documents. (Emphasis added.)

T.T. 7/16/14 at 76

- 77; R.R. at 784a

- 85a.

Joseph Sweeny (Sweeny), an employee of Firstrust Bank, testified

that he was familiar with financial transactions at Firstrust Bank. Sweeny stated

that the withdrawal pr o cess for removal of funds from an account “would be where

a n individual or individu als would sign a withdrawal order and it would be processed at the teller station and they would either get cash or a check.” T.T. at
86; R.R. at 794a.12 On cross

- examination, Sweeny testified that he h a d personal knowledge concerning Exhibit B “because my initials are on there.” T.T. 7/16/14
at 90; R.R. at 798a.

The trial court ruled that “I’m going to allow the document [Exhibit 9 was ‘copies of two withdrawals, two different account numbers’] to be introduced

into evidence. It’s not relevant for him to read what’s in there. It’s already into

evidence.” T.T. 7/16/14 at 93

- 95; R.R. at 801a

- 03a. At the conclusion of Sweeny’s testimony, the trial court directed Patterson’s attorney to proceed with

his next witness

. Patterson’s attorney was unable to call his next wit ness because none of his witnesses responded to t h e subpoenas. The trial court adjourned for the day and stated that “[s]o what we’re going to do tomorrow, we’ll start court at 10:15 . . . [a]nd Mr. Shelton you’ll tell us who your ne xt witnesses are.” T.T.

7/16/14 at 121

- 22; R.R. at 829a

- 30a.

On July 17, 2014, Patterson’s attorney called Bishop Kenneth Shelton

to the stand. At that time, Banks stated to the trial court that “ I have two objections . . . [o]ne a procedural argumen t, and one a Constitutional one.” Trial Transcript, July 17, 2014, (T.T. 7/17/14) at 3; R.R. at 832a. More specifically, Banks stated that Pa. R.C.P. No. 234.2 “says the notice shall be served reasonably i n advance of the date upon which attendance is re quired.” T.T. 7/17/14 at 4; R.R. at 832a.
“And here, Your Honor, when we have po sed a subject matter jurisdictio n challenge to the Bishop being here

- - this is not just a ny trial. This is about a church and the goings

- on in the church.” T.T. 7/17/14 a t 4

- 5; R.R. at 832a

- 33a. The trial court responded that “ [a]s an initial matter, I need to make a decision whether or not I have subject matter jurisdiction in this case . . . .” (Emphasis
added.) T.T. 7/17/14 at 25; R.R. at 838a. Again, the trial cou rt adjourned and13

reiterated “ l et me just say this one more time. We’ll get an e

- mail from [Patterson’s attorney] by 7:00 tonight whether or not he’ll be calling any f ac t ual

witnesses t o establish subject matter juris d icti o n .” (Emphasis added.) T.T.

7/17 /14 at 33; R.R. at 840a.

On July 28, 2014, the trial court entertained arguments concerning two motions, the “first with the defendant’s [Shelton’s] motion to strike the portion of the caption that identifies the plaintiff [Patterson] in the capacity as the corporate trustee . . . .” Trial Transcript, July 28, 2014, (7/28/14) at 3, R.R. at 847a. After argument, the trial court ordered that “I will grant the motion to strike the caption. The plaintiff [Patterson] did not ask leave of court, and it coul d potentially make a difference. However, I will grant leave to amend the caption at this point.” T.T. 7/28/14 at 21; R.R. at 852a. The trial court then addressed “the motion for subject matter jurisdiction.” T.T. 7/28/14 at 22; R.R. at 852a. After

ar gument, the trial court stated “I’m going to defer my decision on this issue . . . [a]t this point, I’m still struggling, and I think I’m struggling because I don’t have that much evidence, at which point I’ll let counsel know that I want to hear further

a rgument on this issue.” T.T. 7/28/14 at 55; R.R. at 860a.

On July 29, 2014, the trial court continued to hear argument on whether it had subject matter jurisdiction. Patterson argued:

I think there’s more than enough here for you to find that there’s a neutral principle, that you can look at the bank records, that you can look at what the title on the account is, and if it says bus rally and you find that three or four trustees personally went to the bank, took it out as cash, whatever and however they did it, and the records reflect that, then you would have to, I think, come to the decision that not only did Kenneth Shelton, but those14 trustees serving under him were all involved in misappropriation of church funds during those years

. Trial Transcript , July 29, 2014, (T.T. 7/29/14) at 20; R.R. at 891a.

Banks responded:

I want to make sure also that the record is clear . . . . It is Article 18, wherein the bylaws specifically say . . . ‘[t]he tithes and offerings of whatever kind, nature or collect ion by any elder, local minister, or any officer or member is the property of the general elder, who is the general overseer, and that all tithes and love offerings are the personal property of the general overseer.’. . . .

Here, Your Honor , even without the bylaws, the Court wouldn’t have jurisdiction. With the bylaws there can be no question, the Court has no jurisdiction. Under these bylaws, Bishop Shelton as the general overseer is the church’s highest adjudicatory body. I submit to you that by deny ing the allegations, he has spoken to them and that is the end of this matter.

T.T. 7/29/14 at 27; R.R. at 893a.

T he trial court concluded : Based upon the arguments, based upon the case, I am granting the motion to dismiss. I do not have subject

m atter jurisdiction. In order for me to make a determination in this case, I would have to interpret religious doctrine of [sic] this court and the First Amendment prohibits me from doing so.

T.T. 7/29/14 at 40; R.R. at 896a.15 V. Issues

Before this C ourt, Patterson essentially argues 13 : 1) that the trial court failed to follow this Court’s express directive and conduct a trial on the merits; 2) that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to add ress Patterson’s claim of mismanagement and diversion of Church assets and funds by Shel t on; 3) that the trial court erred when it de nied

admission of various financial records and documents as business records under Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 803 (Exc eption to the Rule against Hearsay); 4)

that the trial court erred when it denied Patterson’s motion in limine “to deem [Patterson’s] request as admitted based upon [Shelton’s] inadequate answers”; and 5) that the present matter should be remanded back to the trial court. 14 Brief of Appellant, Statement of Questions Presented at 5

- 6.

13 This Court’s review is limited to a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion or erred as a matter of law. Mid Valley Taxpayers v. Mid Valley School , 416 A.2d 590 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980). Furthermore, the decision of the trial cour t will stand “if there exists sufficient evidence to justify the findings and logically sound, reasonable inferences and conclusions derived therefrom.” Groff v. Borough of Sellersville , 314 A.2d 328, 330 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984).

14 The trial court made the fo llowing rulings on the evidentiary motions presented by both parties: Evidentiary Motions

1.The court denied the Plaintiff’s [Patterson’s] Motion in Limine to Deem as Admitted Plaintiff’s Requests for Admissions. 2. The court granted the Defendant’s [Shelt on’s] Motion in Limine to preclude any evidence regarding expenditures beyond the time period of 1991

- 1994. 3. The court granted Defendant’s [Shelton’s] Motion in Limine to Preclude any Evidence Regarding the Vacated Arbitration in this Matter. 4. The cour t deferred until trial its decision in the Defendant’s [Shelton’s] Motion in Limine to Preclude the Presentation of Testimony by Plaintiff’s [Patterson’s] Expert. The court now dismisses without prejudice the motion because it is moot. 5. The court deferr ed until trial its decision in Defendant’s [Shelton’s] Motion in Limine to Preclude Irrelevant Witness (Footn ote continued on next page...)16 The issue of subject matter jurisdiction was raised and argued before the trial court and ably disposed of in the opinion of the Honorable Alice Beck Dubow, Judge of the Cour t of Common Pleas of Philadelphia First District of Pennsylvania Civil Trial Division. Therefore, this Court shall affirm on the basis

(continued...)

Testimony. The court now dismisses without prejudice the motion because it is moot. 6. The court deferred until trial its decision in the Plaintiff’s [P atterson’s] Motion in Limine Seeking an Adverse Inference against Defendant’s [Shelton’s] Due to Spoliation of Evidence. The court now dismisses without prejudice the motion because it is
moot. 7. The court denies without prejudice the Plaintiff’s [Patter son’s] Motion for Reconsideration it [sic] ruling on the Records of Regularly Conducted Business Exception to the Hearsay Rule as
moot.

Motions Regarding The Caption 8. The court granted Defendant’s [Shelton’s] Motion to Strike the Plaintiff’s [Patterso n’s] Unilateral Caption Change and struck the portion of the Caption that refers to the Defendant [Shelton] as the President of the Board of trustees of the General Assembly of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apolistic [sic] Faith, Inc. 9. The c ourt granted Plaintiff’s [Patterson’s] Motion for Leave to Amend the Caption to include the Defendant [Shelton] in his capacity as the President of the Board of Trust e es of the General Assembly of the Church of the Lor d Jesus Christ of the Apolistic [sic] Faith, Inc.

Motions Regarding Subpoenas 10. All subpoenas served for these proceedings and any findings of contempt are hereby vacated. 11. The court dismisses without prejudice the Motion to Quash the subpoena duces tecum of Nathaniel Shelton

- Bailey as m oot. Order of the Trial Court, July 31, 2014, at 1

- 2.17

of Judge Dubow’s opinion. 15 Patterson v. Shelton , (July Term, 1995, No. 2945),
filed November 10, 2014

.

_ ___________________________ BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge

15 Because the trial court properly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, Patterson’s remaining arguments are moot.IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Anthonee Patterson, :

Appellant :

:

v. :
: Kenneth Shelton, individually and : in his capacity as President of the : Board Of Trustees, of the Church : of the Lord Jesus Christ of the : No. 2147 C.D. 2014 Apostolic Faith, Inc. :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 18 th day of December , 20 1 5

, the order of the Court

of Common Plea s of Philadelphia County in the above

- captioned matter is

affirme d.

____________________________ BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge