GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, 

Subcommittee on Defense, 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives

July 1999 BATTLEFIELD 

AUTOMATION

Performance 

Uncertainties Are 

Likely When Army 

Fields Its First 

Digitized Division 

GAO/NSIAD-99-150

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-150 Battlefield Automation

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-282617 Letter

July 27, 1999

The Honorable Jerry Lewis 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Over the next decade, the Army plans to field dozens of new and improved 

battlefield systems through its “digitization” initiative. Digitization involves 

the application of information technologies to acquire, exchange, and 

employ timely information throughout the battlespace. Use of digitization 

on the battlefield is expected to increase the Army’s survivability, lethality, 

and tempo of operations.1

 The Army plans to equip its first digitized 

division with high-priority equipment by December 2000 and its first 

digitized corps by the end of fiscal year 2004.

This report responds to the former Subcommittee Chairman’s request that 

we review the Army’s progress toward its goal of fielding a digitized 

division by the end of 2000. Specifically, the Chairman asked us to 

(1) identify the high-priority systems needed to accomplish the digitization 

fielding goal, (2) determine the acquisition status of these high-priority 

systems, and (3) identify any performance uncertainties that could 

confront the Army after its first digitized division is fielded.

Results in Brief The Army’s first digitized division will be the 4th Infantry Division. While 

the Army’s overall digitization initiative involves over 100 systems, its 

December 2000 digitization goal is to field 16 high-priority systems to 3 of 

the division’s 4 brigades. In general, these 16 systems can be described as 

command, control, and communications systems, the majority of which 

will support decision-making by commanders located in tactical

1

Tempo of operations generally refers to a commander’s ability to conduct operations at a time and 

place of the commander’s choosing.

Letr
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operations centers2 at battalion, brigade, division, and corps levels. 

Examples include the Maneuver Control System (MCS), upgrades to 

Mobile Subscriber Equipment, and satellite communication systems. One 

system, however, represents an entirely new capability that is intended to 

accomplish an important digitization objective of sharing battlefield 

information with the thousands of soldiers operating outside tactical 

operations centers. This system is the Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade 

and Below (FBCB2) system and is the critical component of the digitization 

initiative.

The acquisition status of each of the 16 high-priority systems varies. For 

example, fielding of the Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control, and 

Intelligence (FAADC2I) system, with the first digitized division objective 

software and upgraded hardware, was completed in fiscal year 1998. On 

the other hand, the delivery of the Global Broadcast Service (GBS) 

Transportable Ground Receive Suite terminals was delayed because the 

contractor’s initial design required too many terminal transit cases. While 

there will be a delay in the delivery of the terminals, the Army expects 

fielding to the first digitized division to be completed during 2000. 

Although the high-priority systems are being acquired independently of 

each other, the Army is coordinating and synchronizing individual fielding 

schedules to enable it to meet its goal of fielding the first digitized division 

by December 2000.

There are four key performance uncertainties that the Army will confront 

when the division is fielded at the end of 2000. First, and most importantly, 

the operational effectiveness and suitability of FBCB2 will be unknown. 

Because the Army has recently restructured the system’s test and 

evaluation program, a determination of the operational effectiveness and 

suitability of the FBCB2 system has been postponed until at least fiscal 

year 2002. Second, the operational performance of other fielded systems 

may be unknown because the results of scheduled operational tests will 

not be complete by December 2000. For example, these tests include the 

follow-on operational test and evaluation of the MCS and the follow-on 

operational test and evaluation of the Milstar satellite system’s tactical 

communications. Third, the capability of automated sharing of Army 

Tactical Command and Control System data within tactical operations 

2

Tactical operations centers generally refer to fixed and relocatable command posts throughout the 

battlespace where commanders and their staffs prepare, monitor, and alter the execution of battle 

plans.

Letr
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centers will not have been conclusively demonstrated. Insight into the 

resolution of this issue is not likely to occur before April 2001 when a 

digitized brigade participates in an exercise at the National Training Center, 

Fort Irwin, California. Fourth, it will be uncertain whether digitization, 

with the expected interoperability of related information systems, has 

achieved the expected increases in lethality, survivability, and tempo of 

operations. This uncertainty is not likely to be resolved any earlier than 

fiscal year 2002—after the FBCB2 initial operational test and evaluation.

This report contains recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to 

minimize the risks associated with fielding FBCB2 without the benefits of 

operational testing and to develop a plan for determining that digitization 

objectives have been achieved before fielding high-priority systems to units 

beyond the first digitized division.

Background Throughout the next decade and beyond, the Army plans to modernize its 

forces through an overarching initiative called Force XXI. The components 

of this initiative are Army XXI, which extends to about the year 2010, and 

the Army After Next, which is looking beyond the year 2010. Included 

within the modernization objectives of Army XXI is the integration of 

information technologies to acquire, exchange, and employ timely 

information throughout the battlespace. The integration of information 

technologies objective of Army XXI is called digitization and will be 

implemented throughout the Army by the development, production, and 

fielding of over 100 individual systems. The Army’s digitization effort 

includes a mix of high-priority systems, lower-priority systems, and other 

modernization systems. For example, FBCB2 is a high-priority system, 

whereas the Battlefield Combat Identification System is a lower-priority 

system. The Javelin anti-tank weapon system and the Gun Laying 

Positioning System are examples of modernization systems not designated 

as priority systems. According to the President’s fiscal year 2000 budget 

request, the Army plans to invest $20.8 billion for digitization for the period 

of fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005.

In general, integrated situational awareness and command and control 

information technologies available to Army commanders currently extend 

to tactical operations centers at the brigade and battalion levels. By 

extending information technologies to the thousands of soldiers operating 

outside the tactical operations centers, the Army expects to increase the
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lethality, survivability, and operational tempo of its forces.3

The Army plans to digitize its first division by December 2000 and field its 

first digitized corps by September 2004. The first digitized corps will be

III Corps, consisting of the 4th Infantry Division, the 1st Cavalry Division, 

and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. The Army intends to digitize its 

remaining divisions by the 2010-2012 time frame.

First Digitized Division 

Requires Fielding of 16 

High-Priority Systems

In August 1997, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans 

announced that the 4th Infantry Division would be the first digitized division 

and that, at a minimum, fielded equipment would include the Army Training 

and Doctrine Command’s list of priority one systems and associated 

equipment. The Training and Doctrine Command has identified 16 priority 

one systems. They consist of command, control, and communications 

systems. Each is considered a critical element within the Army’s 

digitization effort because of the expected contribution it makes to achieve 

the required capabilities for the digitized battlefield. Approved by the Joint 

Requirements Oversight Council of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in January 

1995, these capabilities are 

• integrated battle command from platoon to corps, 

• relevant common picture of the battlespace at each level,

• smaller units that are more lethal and survivable,

• more responsive logistics within and between theaters, and

• joint interoperability at appropriate levels. 

Fielding of the high-priority systems will contribute to improving the Army 

Battle Command System, which currently includes the (1) Global 

Command and Control System-Army located at strategic and theater levels, 

which interoperates with other theater, joint, and multinational command 

and control systems, and with Army systems at the corps and levels below 

and (2) Army Tactical Command and Control System, which meets the 

command and control needs from corps to battalion. FBCB2 will be the 

principal digital command and control system for the Army at the brigade 

level and below and will constitute the third major component of the Army 

Battle Command System. While FBCB2 is only 1 of the 16 high-priority 

3

The Army has framed its digitization expectations in the form of a hypothesis: if within a digitized force 

different technologies and doctrine are properly integrated across the force, then increases in lethality, 

survivability, and tempo will be gained across the force.
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systems, it is the centerpiece of digitization because of its potential to 

contribute significantly to achieving the capabilities articulated by the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff in 1995.4

 Nearly all of the other high-priority systems are 

dedicated to enhancing the Army Tactical Command and Control System.

Collectively, the 16 high-priority systems represent a mix of systems that 

have been in development or production for many years as well as systems 

that began development more recently. Each of these systems is in one of 

three general categories: a component system of the Army Tactical 

Command and Control System, a communications or support system for 

the Army Tactical Command and Control System, or FBCB2 and its 

supporting communications system.

Army Tactical Command 

and Control System 

Includes Five High-Priority 

Systems

Components of the Army Tactical Command and Control System are found 

in tactical operations centers and are expected to provide commanders 

from corps through battalion with an automated capability to perform 

maneuver, intelligence, fire support, air defense, and logistics functions 

across the battlefield. The specific component subsystems are MCS, All 

Source Analysis System (ASAS), Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data 

System (AFATDS), FAADC2I, and Combat Service Support Control System 

(CSSCS). Each of these component systems is considered a high-priority 

system for the first digitized division and corps. Each component system 

uses computers, software, and communications interfaces to support the 

commander’s decision-making. The functionality of each system is 

expected to increase as new software is developed. 

When the first digitized division is fielded, there will be 27 tactical 

operations centers with varying configurations of the Army Tactical 

Command and Control System components. There are also plans to add 

other component systems to some tactical operations centers in the future. 

For example, the Digital Topographic Support System, when fielded at the 

corps and division tactical operations centers, is expected to allow 

commanders to perform terrain analysis and produce topographic products 

in support of the mobility/survivability battlefield function area.

4

For background information on the FBCB2 program, please see Battlefield Automation: Acquisition

Issues Facing the Army Battle Command, Brigade and Below Program (GAO/NSIAD-98-140, June 30, 

1998).
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Eight High-Priority Systems 

Are Intended to Improve 

Communications and 

Management of Tactical 

Operations Centers

Tactical operations centers require communication and support systems to 

acquire, exchange, and employ timely information throughout the 

battlespace. The first digitized division requires the fielding of six 

communication systems and two support systems for its tactical operations 

centers. 

The main communication system between tactical operations centers is the 

Army’s Mobile Subscriber Equipment. This line-of-sight radio 

communication system provides secure voice, data, and facsimile 

communications services, as well as a packet switch network5

 for rapid 

data communications. Two high-priority programs are expected to 

enhance the Mobile Subscriber Equipment: (1) the Asynchronous Transfer 

Mode (ATM), a new, commercial switch that will replace the packet switch 

and improve the rates of data communications and (2) the High-Capacity 

Line-of-Sight (HCLOS) radio, which will replace the existing radios and 

provide increased transmission capacity between switches. The first 

digitized division requires 21 ATM switches and 72 HCLOS radios.

The Army will also enhance its land-based communication system by 

fielding a Near-Term Data Radio (NTDR). This radio will operate at tactical 

operations centers and will also provide a data communications capability 

while tactical operations centers are moving and Mobile Subscriber 

Equipment is being put in place. The first digitized division requires the 

fielding of 94 NTDRs. Since this radio is viewed as an interim radio, no 

additional procurement is planned beyond the first digitized division. It is 

expected that data radios needed after the first digitized division will be 

provided through the Department of Defense’s Joint Tactical Radio System 

program. However, the Joint Tactical Radio System architecture 

development and validation is not expected until late this year and a 

decision on whether that program will proceed as a major defense 

acquisition program is not expected until fiscal year 2001.

To overcome the inherent limitations of land-based, line-of-sight 

communication systems, the Army will be fielding three satellite 

communication systems to the first digitized division. The first system is 

the GBS. It is a joint Air Force-Army program intended to provide all 

5

Packet switching is distinguished from message switching. Message switching involves the 

transmission of entire lengthy messages through the nodes of a network; packet switching involves the 

transmission of smaller message parts through the network. Packet switching has become the 

dominant technique for transmitting messages through a network. Please see Gary Dickson and Alan 

Lloyd, Open Systems Interconnection, Prentice Hall, 1992.
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service users with a one-way, high-speed information flow of high-volume 

multi-media information such as imagery, maps, weather data, logistics, air 

tasking orders, and operational orders. The Air Force is the executive 

service for this program and has designated the Army responsible for the 

terminal portion of the program. The first digitized division requires one 

transmit terminal, called a Theater Injection Point terminal, and 27 

Transportable Ground Receive Suite terminals.

The second satellite communication system is the Secure, Mobile, Antijam, 

Reliable Tactical Terminal (SMART-T). This system uses the evolving 

Milstar satellite constellation. Thus far, the system has achieved a low data 

rate capability. The next step is to achieve a medium data rate capability.6

 

This medium data rate capability is considered critical for tactical users 

like the Army. The first medium data rate satellite is scheduled to be tested 

with an on-position satellite in March 2000. The Army requires 12 

SMART-Ts for the first digitized division. 

The third satellite communication system scheduled for fielding is an 

enhanced manpack terminal called Spitfire. These terminals provide 

communications through ultra-high frequency satellites and are also 

capable of line-of-sight terrestrial communications. While Spitfire is a 

mature system, enhancements are currently being made to make it more 

efficient. The first digitized division will require 67 Spitfire terminals.

The two systems that will support the management of tactical operations 

centers are the Integrated Systems Control (ISYSCON) and the Tactical 

Operations Center (TOC) systems. ISYSCON is a new system that is 

expected to provide signal operators an automated capability to manage 

the communications network. The first digitized division requires the 

fielding of one system with 8 to 10 remote terminals or workstations. The 

TOC program is intended to provide common operational and system 

architectures that can be tailored to meet the specific needs of 

commanders at different levels. The first digitized division requires 27 of 

the new “digitized” TOCs. 

6

Milstar’s low data rate transmissions are at speeds of 75 to 2,400 bits per second. Milstar’s medium 

data rate transmissions are at speeds ranging from 4,800 to 1,544,000 bits per second, thus significantly 

increasing the volume of data processed through the satellites.
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FBCB2 and Its Two 

Supporting 

Communications Systems 

Extend Information 

Technology Beyond Tactical 

Operations Centers 

When fielded, FBCB2 is expected to provide enhanced situational 

awareness to the lowest tactical level—the individual soldier—and a 

seamless flow of command and control information across the battlespace. 

As the principal command and control system for the Army at the brigade 

level and below, it is the linchpin of the future digital battlefield. FBCB2 

will be composed of:

• a computer that can display a variety of information,7

 including a 

common picture of the battlefield overlaid with graphical depictions 

(icons) of friendly and enemy forces;

• software that automatically integrates Global Positioning System data, 

military intelligence data, combat identification data, and platform data 

(such as the status of fuel and ammunition); and 

• interfaces to communications systems.

Battlefield data will be communicated to and received from users of FBCB2 

through a “Tactical Internet.” This is a radio network comprising the 

Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) and the Single 

Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS). By connecting 

platforms through this Tactical Internet, data needed for battlefield 

situational awareness and command and control decisions can be made 

available to commanders at all levels of the Army Battle Command System.

Both EPLRS and SINCGARS have undergone recent improvements in 

support of the first digitized division. EPLRS has incorporated very 

high-speed integrated circuitry and an engineering change that has 

increased its data transmission rate. The SINCGARS system improvement 

program radio has provided enhanced data and voice communications, and 

allows SINCGARS to interface with EPLRS. An advanced SINCGARS 

system improvement radio enhances the synchronization capability in a 

package that is one-half the size and weight of the current SINCGARS 

system improvement radio. The first digitized division will require an 

estimated 1,300-1,400 EPLRS radios, an estimated 5,000 SINCGARS radios, 

and about 2,000 FBCB2 systems.

7

Platforms such as the M1A2 Abrams tank with system enhancements and the M2A3 Bradley fighting 

vehicle, which already have an on-board data processing capability, will not require another computer. 

Instead, the FBCB2 “embedded battle command” software will be used to interface with existing 

software. Other platforms will require FBCB2 computers. In November 1997, the Army’s acquisition 

objective was 2,604 embedded FBCB2 systems and 59,522 systems requiring computer installations.
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Acquisition Status of 

High-Priority Systems 

Vary

Each of the high-priority systems is being acquired independently of each 

other. As a result, the acquisition status of each system varies. For 

example:

• The Army fielded MCS to III Corps test units in fiscal year 1996 with an 

earlier version of the software than will be used by the first digitized 

division. However, based on a recent initial operational test and 

evaluation, the Department of Defense (DOD) Director of Operational 

Test and Evaluation characterized the earlier software version as not 

being operationally effective or operationally suitable. As a result, a 

full-rate production decision was not authorized and limited production 

of MCS, sufficient to field the first digitized division and corps, is now 

being sought.

• Fielding of the FAADC2I with its first digitized division objective 

software and upgraded hardware was completed in fiscal year 1998.

• The contract for the first digitized division ATM switches was awarded 

in June 1998. Fielding is scheduled for March through June of 2000.

Although the high-priority systems are being acquired independently of 

each other, the Army is coordinating and synchronizing individual fielding 

schedules to enable it to meet its goal of fielding the first digitized division 

by December 2000. Appendix I describes the acquisition status of all 16 

high-priority systems.

Performance 

Uncertainties Will 

Exist on Planned 

Fielding Date

There are four key performance uncertainties that the Army will confront 

when the first digitized division is fielded at the end of 2000. First, the 

operational effectiveness and suitability of FBCB2 will be unknown. This 

uncertainty will persist until the system’s initial operational test and 

evaluation in November 2001. Second, between now and November 2001, 

nearly every other high-priority digitization system will be undergoing 

some type of operational evaluation. Since fielding of the first digitized 

division is scheduled to be completed by December 2000, individual system 

performance uncertainties will exist when the first digitized division is 

fielded. Third, the capability of automated sharing of Army Tactical 

Command and Control System data within tactical operations centers will 

not be conclusively demonstrated. Insight into the resolution of this issue 

is not likely to occur before April 2001 when a digitized brigade participates 

in an exercise at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. 

Fourth, it will be uncertain whether digitization has achieved the expected 
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increases in lethality, survivability, and tempo of operations. This 

uncertainty is not likely to be resolved any earlier than fiscal year 2002.

Operational Test and 

Evaluation of FBCB2 Is the 

Most Critical Individual 

System Performance Event 

Scheduled 

Given its importance to achieving the objectives of digitization, the initial 

operational test and evaluation of FBCB2 in November 2001 is the most 

critical operational event scheduled. This test will occur nearly a year after 

the first digitized division is fielded because of the Army’s goal to equip the 

first digitized division by December 2000. The FBCB2 test event is also 

significant because the previous initial operational test and evaluation date 

of October 1999 was to have been the first opportunity to evaluate the 

performance of the NTDR, TOCs, and new versions of the EPLRS and 

SINCGARS radios. There may now be opportunities to evaluate the 

performance of these other systems during the FBCB2 force development 

test and evaluation in April 2000 as well as FBCB2 limited user tests and the 

division capstone exercises8

 conducted prior to November 2001. However, 

we believe these systems will not be exposed to the full rigor of operational 

testing until the FBCB2 initial operational test and evaluation itself. We 

believe the acquisition strategy of fielding FBCB2 before completing 

operational testing exposes the overall digitization initiative to greater risk. 

If the risk materializes into performance problems, costly fixes to FBCB2 

may be required.9

 In addition, FBCB2 performance problems could result 

in continued uncertainties about expected increases in the lethality, 

survivability, and operational tempo of a digitized force.

The Army’s digitization initiative has been driven by the expectation that 

information dominance and enhanced battle command capabilities will 

result in increases in lethality, survivability, and operational tempo across 

the force. The Army has tried to evaluate force effectiveness at several 

different times; however, the results have been inconclusive. The FBCB2 

system evaluation plan acknowledged the need to evaluate force 

effectiveness, but proposed employing force-on-force modeling and 

simulation as a primary tool for the force effectiveness evaluation. After 

reviewing the FBCB2 system evaluation plan, the Director, Operational 

Test and Evaluation, expressed concerns about this approach as well as 

8

Division capstone exercises are training events for maneuver units. Under the restructured FBCB2 

test program, there will be two division capstone exercises: the first at the National Training Center in 

April 2001 and the second at Fort Hood in October 2001.

9

For examples of such systems, please see Weapons Acquisition: Low-Rate Initial Production Used to

Buy Weapon Systems Prematurely (GAO/NSIAD-95-18, Nov. 21, 1994).
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other aspects of the plan. His concerns were sufficiently serious to cause 

the Army to reevaluate its FBCB2 test and evaluation strategy, resulting in 

the revised strategy that postpones the initial operational test and 

evaluation event for 2 years.

The Army considers increasing the functionality of its units as 

expeditiously as possible a top priority. However, as illustrated by its 

FBCB2 acquisition strategy, this high priority has translated into significant 

quantities of equipment being acquired and fielded before conclusive 

testing has been completed. The fiscal year 2000 budget submission 

requests $66.4 million to procure 1,640 FBCB2 units. The budget 

justification documentation also projects a request in fiscal year 2001 of 

$62.1 million to procure an additional 1,458 units. The total of the fiscal 

year 2000 budget request and the projected fiscal year 2001 budget request 

is $128.5 million for 3,098 units. While the 3,098 units account for only 

about 5 percent of the projected total Army buy of about 60,000 units, the 

justification10 for the low-rate initial production is unclear at this time. 

Conditional approval for FBCB2 engineering and manufacturing occurred 

in July 1997 and included an approval for 3,000 low-rate initial production 

units, then identified as 10 percent of the total production quantity. 

However, the acquisition decision memorandum did not state the 

justification for the low-rate initial production approval. The justification 

should be clarified later this summer when an Army or Defense System 

Acquisition Review Council makes a decision on the revised FBCB2 

acquisition strategy. 

Other Individual 

High-Priority Systems Will 

Undergo Operational 

Testing During or After 

Fiscal Year 2000

In addition to the FBCB2 initial operational test and evaluation, other 

critical operational evaluations include the follow-on operational test and 

evaluation of MCS, the multi-service operational test and evaluation of 

GBS, the follow-on operational test and evaluation of the SMART-T, and the 

follow-on operational test and evaluation of ISYSCON. Figure 1 shows the 

planned evaluations of each of the 16 high-priority systems, as well as 

evaluations of Army Tactical Command and Control System 

interoperability and digitization force effectiveness.

10DOD Regulation 5000.2R states that low-rate initial production quantities shall be minimized. The 

regulation states that the objective of this activity is to produce the minimum quantity necessary to

(1) provide production configured or representative articles for operational tests, (2) establish an initial 

production base for the system, and (3) permit an orderly increase in the production rate for the 

system. The regulation also notes that the low-rate initial production quantity shall be determined as 

part of the program’s engineering and manufacturing development approval.
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Figure 1: Testing Schedules of High Priority Systems

System acronym 

O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S

1. MCS

2. AFATDS

3. FAADC2I

4. ASAS

5. CSSCS

6. ATM

7. HCLOS

8. NTDR

9. GBS

10. SMART-T

11. Spitfire

12. ISYSCON

13. TOC

14. FBCB2

Force Effectiveness Analysis

(Lethality, Survivability, 

and Tempo of Operation) 

15. EPLRS

(Very high speed integrated circuit

value engineering change proposal)

16. SINCGARS

(Advanced system 

improvement program)

Army Tactical Command and 

Control Systems Interoperability 

Test

(Army Battle Command 

System Software)

Limited User Test

FBCB2

IOT&E

IOT&E

DCX 2

IOT&E

FBCB2

Customer Test

DCX 2

DCX 1

DCX 2

DCX 2

IOT&E

FBCB2

DCX 1

FBCB2

DCX 2

MOT&E

IOT&E

FOT&E

MOT&E

FDT&E

OA/T

LUT 3

Division Capstone Exercise

FOT&E

IOT&E

Fiscal year 2002

CT

Fiscal year 2000

OA/T

OA/T

CT

DCX 1

IOT&E

Modeling and Simulation

Target date for fielding First Digitized Division

DCX 1

DCX 1

LUT 3

DCX 2

IOT&E

DCX 1

Fiscal year 1999 Fiscal year 2001

OA/T

FOT&E

FDTE

LUT 2

FDTE

LUT 2

DCX 1 DCX 2

IOT&E

FBCB2

Initial Operational Test and Evaluation

Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation

Multi-service Operational Test and Evaluation

CT

LUT

Operational Assessment/Test

Force Development Test and Evaluation

DCX
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In addition to the operational testing that will conclude after December 

2000, the complete fielding of priority equipment to the 4th Infantry Division 

as well as new equipment training will remain unfinished in December 

2000. Even if the FBCB2 low-rate initial production acquisition strategy is 

approved, not all 4th Infantry Division units will be fielded with high-priority 

systems by December 2000. The 4th infantry Division has three maneuver 

brigades and an aviation brigade; the 1st and 2nd maneuver brigades are 

located at Fort Hood, Texas, and the 3rd brigade is located at Fort Carson, 

Colorado. The digitization schedule calls for the 1st and 2nd brigades and 

the aviation brigade to be fielded by December 2000; the 3rd maneuver 

brigade will not be fielded until 2003 when the III Corps’ 3rd Armored 

Cavalry Regiment, also located at Fort Carson, is fielded.

Officials from the 4th Infantry Division told us that the 1st and 2nd brigades 

would probably be “equipped” rather than “fielded” by December 2000, the 

distinction being that fielding includes new equipment training. Although it 

is not certain when FBCB2 new equipment training will be completed for 

the 1st and 2nd brigades, it will probably be some time after December 2000.

Army Tactical Command 

and Control System 

Interoperability Test Has 

Been Rescheduled to Fiscal 

Year 2001

Thus far, even with the introduction of new software versions for individual 

systems, the Army has been unable to exploit the full potential of the Army 

Tactical Command and Control System because component systems 

cannot be automatically updated when a change is made to an individual 

component system’s database. The component systems have achieved 

some degree of success by sharing the same functional data “vertically” at 

different command levels, but the long sought-after capability to share data 

“horizontally” across functional areas within the same command level has 

not yet been achieved. The updates are accomplished either through 

manual inputs to other related databases or through an electronic message 

to those databases. For example, if the MCS database is changed to show 

a new position location of friendly forces, that change would have to be 

manually entered or changed through a message to the AFATDS or 

FAADC2I databases. In addition, it presently takes 12 to 15 weeks and 

requires the assistance of civilian engineers to establish each component 

system’s original database. The Army intends to resolve these database 

issues with the development and fielding of a software package called 

Army Battle Command System software.

The Army planned to test the Army Battle Command System software at 

the FBCB2 initial operational test and evaluation event. The ability of 

FBCB2 data to be integrated into the Army Tactical Command and Control 
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System component systems was also to have been tested. As a result of the 

restructuring of the FBCB2 testing program, version 6.2 of the Army Battle 

Command System software will undergo an operational evaluation during 

the division capstone exercise scheduled for April 2001 at the National 

Training Center. Additional operational evaluations will probably be 

conducted during another division capstone exercise scheduled for Fort 

Hood, Texas, in October 2001 and the rescheduled FBCB2 initial 

operational test and evaluation, also scheduled for Fort Hood, in November 

2001.

Force Effectiveness 

Determination May Not Be 

Known Before Fiscal Year 

2002

After the Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment in March 1997, 

which culminated in a brigade-size experimental force engaging an 

opposing force at the National Training Center,11 officials at the Army 

Operational Test and Evaluation Command concluded that they could not 

identify any significant increase in force effectiveness over baseline units 

that had also engaged the opposing force at the National Training Center. 

The Training and Doctrine Command’s Analysis Center at White Sands 

Missile Range, New Mexico, used the data collected during the Advanced 

Warfighting Experiment to model the performance of the experimental 

force assuming that the experimental force had relied more heavily on the 

data and information available to it through digitized systems. The Training 

and Doctrine Command analysts concluded that the modeling showed 

increased force effectiveness. The Training and Doctrine Command’s 

Analysis Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, analyzed the results of a 

Division Advance Warfighting Experiment in November 1997 and 

concluded that the experimental force was more lethal, survivable, 

sustainable, and able to better control tempo than a non-digitized force. 

However, the experiment was a simulation-driven command post exercise 

without maneuver units in the field. In our opinion, the efforts thus far 

designed to measure force effectiveness have produced inconclusive 

results with maneuver units in the field showing no significant increase in 

lethality, survivability, and operational tempo while modeling and 

simulation do show increases.

The 4th Infantry Division’s brigade-size exercise at the National Training 

Center during the third quarter of fiscal year 2001 is described as a division 

11To explore the FBCB2 concept, the Army acquired and installed sufficient quantities of equipment to 

field a brigade-size experimental force in June 1996. The experimental force then used FBCB2 

prototype equipment in an Advanced Warfighting Experiment, which culminated in March 1997 during a 

2-week deployment to the National Training Center.
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capstone exercise and is expected to be a rich source of data for 

determining force effectiveness. The Army expects that the data derived 

from a maneuver brigade engaging an opposing force coupled with 

modeling and simulations will provide insight into digitization’s expected 

increases in lethality, survivability, and tempo of operations. While some 

early analysis can be expected within 120 days after the conclusion of the 

exercise, we believe the length of time needed to analyze all the exercise 

data and complete the required modeling and simulations will likely result 

in conclusive force effectiveness determinations no sooner than fiscal year 

2002. This means that if current procurement plans proceed, the Army will 

have obligated $128.5 million in fiscal year 2000 and 2001 FBCB2 

appropriations to buy and install about two-thirds of the systems needed 

for the first digitized corps without such conclusive determinations.

Conclusions Based on the acquisition status of the designated high-priority systems, the 

Army will consider the 4th Infantry Division as digitized by December 2000. 

However, there will be limitations to this first digitized division. 

Specifically, (a) not all 4th Infantry Division units will be equipped or trained 

by December 2000 and (b) the performance of many individual systems, 

particularly FBCB2, delivered to 4th Infantry Division units will be uncertain 

until the completion of their respective operational tests and evaluations. 

Therefore, while the Army will have outfitted a digitized division, its 

operational capability will not have been demonstrated. Furthermore, even 

if all individual system operational testing is successful, uncertainty about 

system interoperability and the overarching force effectiveness issues of 

increased lethality, survivability, and operational tempo will persist. 

Resolution of these issues will require time, perhaps as much as 2 or

3 years. Between now and then, the Army will be seeking funding to 

continue acquisition and fielding to its second digitized division and 

eventually its first digitized corps. 

Balancing the competing demands of multiple acquisitions based on 

operational test results and the objective of increasing the functionality of 

Army units as expeditiously as possible poses a significant challenge for 

Army acquisition executives. Because of the high priority the Army places 

on digitization, significant quantities of individual systems such as FBCB2 

are being procured prior to conclusive testing. We believe that such an 

acquisition strategy is highly risky. Furthermore, in our view, the resolution 

of performance uncertainties should be a key determinant in the pace of 

fielding throughout III Corps and the Army. Unless it develops a plan 

defining when and how the first digitized division will validate that 
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digitization has enabled the high-priority systems to interoperate 

effectively and enable increases in lethality, survivability, and tempo of 

operations, the Army runs the risk of fielding unproven systems beyond the 

three brigades of the 4th Infantry Division.

Recommendations To optimize the multi-billion dollar investment needed to digitize all Army 

units, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Army to: 

• Establish schedules and procurement quantities that minimize the risks 

associated with fielding FBCB2 without the benefits of operational 

testing by seizing on the opportunity provided by the current 

reassessment of the FBCB2 acquisition strategy.

• Develop a plan defining when and how the first digitized division will 

validate that digitization has enabled the high-priority systems to 

interoperate effectively so that expected increases in lethality, 

survivability, and tempo of operations have been achieved. The plan 

should provide for validation to be completed before digitization is 

extended to units beyond the first digitized division.

Agency Comments In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD did not agree nor disagree 

with our recommendations. In its response, DOD made two points. First, 

DOD indicated that Overarching Integrated Product Teams—chaired by 

high-level DOD officials—are addressing the issues discussed in our report 

and that a Defense Acquisition Executive review of the FBCB2 program 

should be conducted during August 1999. The review, DOD stated, will 

include the acquisition strategy, cost, testing approach, spiral requirements 

and acquisition approaches, low-rate initial production approval request, 

and a determination of the appropriate acquisition category. Second, DOD 

stated that the Army’s master schedule of tests and exercises will provide 

intermediate confirmation of interoperability and performance and that the 

FBCB2 initial operational test and evaluation is the culmination of the test 

and exercise process that includes the high-priority systems addressed in 

our report. DOD also stated that the Office of the Secretary of Defense will 

continue to perform its oversight function of Army digitization by 

maintaining test oversight and improved reporting on the progress of 

digitization.

While it appears that many critical FBCB2 issues will be addressed at the 

Defense Acquisition Executive review, we remain concerned about the 
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number of FBCB2 units that will be acquired before a determination is 

made in fiscal year 2002 of the system’s operational effectiveness and 

suitability. We remain equally concerned about the quantities of other 

high-priority systems that will be acquired through fiscal year 2002, before 

the completion of the digitization test and exercise process. We continue 

to believe that until the Army validates that digitization has achieved 

increases in lethality, survivability, and tempo of operations, there is a high 

risk of fielding unproven systems beyond the first digitized division.

DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II, along with 

our evaluation. In addition, DOD provided technical comments that have 

been incorporated, as appropriate, in the report.

Scope and 

Methodology

To identify the high-priority systems being acquired to accomplish the 

digitization fielding goal and determine the acquisition status of each 

system, we reviewed the objectives of the Army XXI and Army After Next 

initiatives, the fielding plans for the 4th Infantry Division, and individual 

system cost, schedule, and performance data. We obtained briefings from 

program managers, testers, and users. We also analyzed the acquisition 

strategy of each high-priority program, critical program milestones, and the 

relationship between critical program milestones and fielding plans for the 

first digitized division. Our designation of high-priority systems was 

established in the following manner. During the course of our review 

different Army organizations identified 15 to 19 systems as high-priority 

systems. For example, when we met with Training and Doctrine Command 

officials in November 1998, they identified 17 priority one systems. One of 

those systems, Digital Topographic Support System, was not identified as a 

priority one system by other Army organizations. The 16 systems 

presented in this report represent a consensus of what systems were 

characterized as high-priority as of November 1998.

To identify any performance uncertainties that could confront the Army 

when its first digitized division is fielded, we reviewed the test and 

evaluation schedules of each high-priority system. We then compared 

these schedules with the fielding schedule for the first digitized division. 

We also analyzed the revised FBCB2 schedule, including test events and 

production decisions, regulatory criteria for low-rate initial production 

decisions, and 4th Infantry Division personnel and organizational changes 

that could impact test and fielding plans. We also reviewed the overall 

objectives of the FBCB2 initial operational test and evaluation event, 

including Army Tactical Command and Control System interoperability 
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objectives, and plans to use new and upgraded versions of communication 

equipment, weapons platforms, including Abrams tanks and Bradley 

Fighting Vehicles with FBCB2 embedded battle command software, and 

tactical operations centers during the test. We reviewed Army evaluations 

that have studied digitized force increases in lethality, survivability, and 

operational tempo, and plans to conduct future evaluations, including 

those contained in the final draft of the FBCB2 system evaluation plan.

In the course of our work, we interviewed program officials and examined 

program management and budget documents, system requirements, test 

plans, acquisition plans, and other program documentation. We performed 

our work primarily at the Army Digitization Office, Arlington, Virginia, and 

the Army Communications and Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, 

New Jersey. We also gathered data from the Director, Operational Test and 

Evaluation, Arlington, Virginia; Army Training and Doctrine Command, 

Norfolk, Virginia; Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command, 

Alexandria, Virginia; the 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; and the 

Army Signal Center, Fort Gordon, Georgia.

We performed our review from September 1998 to July 1999 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to Representative John P. Murtha, 

Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee; Representative C.W. Bill 

Young, Chairman, and Representative David R. Obey, Ranking Minority 

Member, House Committee on Appropriations; and other interested 

congressional committees. We are also sending copies of this report to the 

Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Louis 

Caldera, Secretary of the Army; and General James L. Jones, Commandant 

of the Marine Corps. Copies will also be made available to others upon 

request.
B-282617

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-150 Battlefield Automation

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions 

concerning this report. Key contacts and major contributors to this report 

are listed in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

Allen Li 

Associate Director,

Defense Acquisitions Issues
Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-150 Battlefield Automation

Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I

Summary of 

Acquisition Status of 

High-Priority 

Digitization Systems

22

Appendix II

Comments From the 

Department of Defense

24

Appendix III

GAO Contacts and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments

28

Figures Figure 1: Testing Schedules of High Priority Systems 12
Contents

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-150 Battlefield Automation

Abbreviations

AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System

ASAS All Source Analysis System

ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode

CSSCS Combat Service Support Control System

DOD Department of Defense

EPLRS Enhanced Position Location Reporting System

FAADC2I Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control, and Intelligence

FBCB2 Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below

GBS Global Broadcast Service

HCLOS High-Capacity Line-of-Sight

ISYSCON Integrated Systems Control

MCS Maneuver Control System

NTDR Near-Term Data Radio

SINCGARS Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System

SMART-T Secure, Mobile, Anti-jam, Reliable Tactical Terminal

TOC Tactical Operating Center
Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-150 Battlefield Automation

Appendix I

Summary of Acquisition Status of 

High-Priority Digitization Systems ApendxIi

System Acquisition status

MCS The Army fielded MCS with a software version called Block III to III Corps test units in fiscal year 1996 and 

planned to field a Block IV software version to the first digitized division in fiscal year 2000. However, the 

results of a recent initial operational test evaluation with the Block III software did not permit the Army to 

proceed to full-rate production. The Army is currently requesting authorization to proceed with a limited 

production of MCS sufficient to field the first digitized division and corps, using the Block IV software.

AFATDS The software versions of AFATDS are designated by year. The Army fielded AFATDS 95 to the 4th Infantry 

Division in fiscal year 1996 and the system achieved an initial operational capability in January 1997. Annual 

software versions have been fielded to the 4th Infantry Division and the objective first digitized division 

software fielding is AFATDS 99. In addition, the 4th Infantry Division’s AFATDS hardware is scheduled for 

upgrade during fiscal year 1999. 

FAADC2I Fielding of the FAADC2I with its first digitized division objective software and upgraded hardware was 

completed in fiscal year 1998. 

ASAS The ASAS has two main components: a Remote Workstation and an Analysis Control Element. The first 

digitized division requires Remote Workstations and the Army is currently completing operational testing of 

these workstations. The Army plans to field the Remote Workstation to the 4th Infantry Division during fiscal 

year 2000. While the Analysis Control Element is not required for the first digitized division, its operational 

testing is scheduled for fiscal year 2000. 

CSSCS The Army fielded CSSCS to the 4th Infantry Division in fiscal year 1996 and received approval for low-rate 

initial production in fiscal year 1998. The program has a new software release planned for fiscal year 1999. 

The 1999 release, version 4.1, is scheduled for fielding to the first digitized division. 

ATM The contract for the first digitized division ATM switches was awarded in June 1998. Fielding is scheduled for 

March through June of 2000. 

HCLOS The contract for the first digitized division HCLOS radios was awarded in June 1998. Fielding is scheduled 

for April 2000. 

NTDR The contract option for 174 NTDR radios was awarded in fiscal year 1998. Deliveries, including the 94 radios 

for the first digitized division, are expected in fiscal year 2000. 

GBS The delivery of the GBS Transportable Ground Receive Suite terminals was delayed because the contractor’s 

initial design required too many terminal transit cases. The initial design, which required 10 to 14 transit 

cases, was considered operationally unsuitable. A redesign has resulted in the number of transit cases being 

reduced to six for the standard configuration and seven for the extended configuration. While there will be a 

delay in the delivery of the terminals, the fielding to the first digitized division is still expected to be completed 

during 2000. 

SMART-T Currently, there are two Milstar satellite designs: the low data rate version called Milstar I and the medium 

data rate version called Milstar II. Through 2006, the Milstar constellation will consist of two Milstar I 

satellites, which were launched in 1994 and 1995, and four Milstar II satellites, which are being launched from 

fiscal years 1999 through 2002.1

 The Army needs a medium data rate capability for the first digitized division. 

As a part of the approved SMART-T acquisition strategy, the Army is fielding SMART-Ts to the 4th Infantry 

Division in fiscal year 1999 so that they will be available when the first Milstar II satellite becomes operational. 

Spitfire The Army awarded the Spitfire production contract in 1994 and will have fielded about 50 percent of its 

planned 2,402 units throughout the Army by the end of fiscal year 1999. The first digitized division units are 

scheduled for fielding in fiscal year 2000. 

ISYSCON The Army awarded the ISYSCON development contract in 1992 and plans to field a software version 1 to the 

first digitized division in April 2000. However, a 1998 initial operational test and evaluation identified three 

significant problems: network planning, spectrum management, and network monitoring. The system was 

retested at the start of fiscal year 1999 and, while some deficiencies persisted, the system was approved for 

full-rate production in March. The Army plans to begin ISYSCON fielding in fiscal year 2000. 
Appendix I

Summary of Acquisition Status of 

High-Priority Digitization Systems

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-150 Battlefield Automation

1

For additional information on the Milstar program, please see our November 1998 report, Military

Satellite Communications: Concerns With Milstar’s Support to Strategic and Tactical Forces

(GAO/NSIAD-99-2, Nov. 10, 1998).

System Acquisition status

TOC The Army awarded its TOC hardware integration contract in February 1999. However, a competing 

contractor protested the selection. The protest resulted in a stop work order to the winning contractor in 

March. The program management office is currently assessing the impact of the stop work order on the 

digitization schedule.

FBCB2 The acquisition status of FBCB2 has changed significantly. The system’s initial operational test and 

evaluation, originally scheduled for October 1999, has been postponed until November 2001. Despite the 

test restructuring, the Army still plans to start FBCB2 production in order to field the first digitized division by 

December 2000. This procurement was projected in last year’s budget request, but was to have been made 

as a full-rate production decision after the October 1999 FBCB2 initial operational test and evaluation. Now, 

the Army plans to proceed with low-rate initial production of 5,100 systems over a three-year period. 

Approval of this acquisition strategy is expected in August 1999. The low-rate initial production phase 

decision is expected prior to the completion of the FBCB2 initial operational test and evaluation. 

EPLRS

(Very High Speed 

integrated circuit, value 

engineering change 

proposal)

The EPLRS began full-rate production in fiscal year 1997. About 450 units have been fielded to the 4th

Infantry Division and the balance is scheduled for fielding between March 1999 and July 2000. While there 

are no further operational tests of the EPLRS planned, additional testing of the EPLRS is planned as part of 

the FBCB2 initial operational test and evaluation.

SINCGARS

(Advanced system 

improvement program)

The SINCGARS is in its twelfth year of production, with over 165,000 radios fielded to date. The advanced 

system improvement program SINCGARS is scheduled to be fielded to the 4th Infantry Division by December 

1999. The advanced system improvement program SINCGARS is scheduled for a customer test with the 

82nd Airborne Division in fiscal year 1999 and, like EPLRS, will be evaluated as part of the FBCB2 initial 

operational test and evaluation.
Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-150 Battlefield Automation

Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense ApendxIi

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those 

in the report text 

appear at the end of 

this appendix.

See comments

1 and 2.
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-150 Battlefield Automation

Now on p.16.

See comment 1.

Now on p.16.

See comment 2.
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-150 Battlefield Automation
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-150 Battlefield Automation

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

letter dated July 12, 1999.

GAO Comments 1. We believe that DOD’s review by the Integrated Product Team should 

also include the analysis included in this report.

2. We believe that specificity and timeliness is critical to the overall 

evaluation process. The Army has framed its digitization expectations in 

the form of a hypothesis that, if within a digitized force different 

technologies and doctrine are properly integrated across the force, then 

increases in lethality, survivability, and tempo will be gained across the 

force. That hypothesis still needs to be proven. We recognize that proving 

the hypothesis involves both objective and subjective dimensions. As we 

recommended to the Secretary of Defense, the Army should specify how it 

intends to prove the hypothesis and build a consensus on an accepted 

methodology among material developers, users, testers, those providing 

oversight within DOD, and congressional decision-makers. Without an 

accepted methodology, questions on the benefits of digitization will persist. 

These questions, left unanswered, could weaken efforts to provide 

potentially beneficial systems to soldiers as expeditiously as possible.
Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-150 Battlefield Automation

Appendix III

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxIi

GAO Contact Charles F. Rey (202) 512-4174

Acknowledgments In addition to the name above, Robert J. Dziekiewicz, Christopher P. Galvin, 

Subrata Ghoshroy, and Paul G. Williams made key contributions to this 

report.

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