alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### William F. Brenner, Plaintiff, *v.*Archibald L. Lawrence et al., Defendants.

(Supreme Court, New York Trial Term,

June, 1899.)

Bills and notes — Bankers liable as makers on a check drawn On them by their cashier.

Where indebted bankers direct their cashier to draw a check to the order of their creditor, and the cashier in accordance with the custom of bankers, draws a check upon them, and signs it in his own name as cashier, his act is their act, and they are liable to the creditor as makers.

Action on bank check alleged to have been made by defendants.

*756McElhinney & Martin, for plaintiff. '

N. B. Levensoh, for defendants.

McAdam, J.

The defendants conducted a banking-house under thé name of “ Lawrence & Simonds.” They were indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $425, and plaintiff calling upon them for the money, they instructed their cashier to make out a check in favor of the plaintiff for the amount due. The cashier, according to the custom of bankers, drew a check upon his principals, signing it “H. M. Moore, Cashier.” The defendants .failed shortly after-wards, so that the check was not paid, and the action is against the defendants as drawers of the check to recover the amount due. The act of Moore, according to the plain intention of the parties, was the act of the defendants, done in their business, by their' direction, for their benefit, and bound them as effectually as if the check had been signed by the defendants themselves. Elwell v. Dodge, 33 Barb. 336; Bank of New York v. Muskingum Branch Bank, 29 N. Y. 619; Lockwood v. Coley, 22 Fed. Repr. 192; Melledge v. Boston Iron Co., 59 Mass. 158; Houghton v. First Nat. Bank, 26 Wis. 663. Whether in the hands of a. *bona fide*third person, having no knowledge of the .facts, the signing by Moore would hold him individually (the word “ cashier ” being' regarded merely as *descriptio*personae) is a question that need not be considered, for the plaintiff, who had the transaction, sues upon, it, and he knew that Moore was a mere agent, performing an act in the line'of Ms duty for his employers, the defendants, for their benefit and on their account; and it is for this reason that the act is in law theirs —not his. The verdict in favor of the plaintiff was properly directed, and the motion for a new trial must be. denied.

Ordered accordingly.
§ 18b.20 Form of documents to be filed. Documents to be filed shall be dated, the original signed in ink, shall show the docket description and title of the proceeding, and shall show the title, if any, and address of the signatory. Copies need not be signed but the name of the person signing the original shall be reproduced. Documents shall be legible and shall not be more than 81 ⁄ 2 inches wide and 12 inches long.
115 STAT. 2412 PUBLIC LAW 107–132—JAN. 16, 2002

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—H.R. 3348:

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 147 (2001):

Dec. 4, 5, considered and passed House.

Dec. 20, considered and passed Senate.

Æ

Public Law 107–132

107th Congress

An Act

To designate the National Foreign Affairs Training Center as the George P. Shultz

National Foreign Affairs Training Center.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION OF THE GEORGE P. SHULTZ NATIONAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS TRAINING CENTER.

(a) Section 701(a) of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C.

4021(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following: ‘‘The

institution shall be designated the ‘George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center’ ’’.

(b) Any reference in any provision of law to the National Foreign

Affairs Training Center or the Foreign Service Institute shall be

considered to be a reference to the ‘‘George P. Shultz National

Foreign Affairs Training Center’’.

SEC. 2. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

(a) Section 53 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act

of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2725) is amended—

(1) in the section heading by inserting ‘‘GEORGE P. SHULTZ’’

after ‘‘THE’’; and

(2) by inserting ‘‘George P. Shultz’’ after ‘‘use of the’’.

(b) Section 708(a) of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C.

4028(a)) is amended by inserting ‘‘George P. Shultz’’ after ‘‘director

of the’’.

Approved January 16, 2002.

7 USC 1766b, 10

USC 2002, 22

USC 2056, 4001

note, 4003, 4021

note, 4171, 4171

note, 4903, 6101,

6473.

Jan. 16, 2002

[H.R. 3348]
#### Kolb Estate

*208*Pepper, Bodine, Frick, Scheetz & Hamilton, Whitney & Thornton*and *Frederick C. N. Littleton,*for ex-ceptants.

*Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young, Souser, Schumacker, Kleeb & Lunkenheimer*and *Gilfillan, Gilpin & Brehman,*contra.

July 3, 1956.

Klein, P. J.,

We agree with the conclusion of Judge Hunter, the auditing judge, that testatrix’s direction to her trustee “to divide the said principal of the Trust estate ... to and among my remaining right heirs” created contingent *and not*vested remainders.

*209In our opinion this case is a classic example of the application of the so-called “pay and divide” rule.* There is no separate and antecedent gift which is independent of the direction and time for payment, and the gift can only be implied from the direction to the trustees to divide the principal: Edmunds Estate, 374 Pa. 22 (1953) ; Wilson Estate, 369 Pa. 583 (1953).

A careful study of this will from its four corners, however, leads us to the conclusion that the remainder gifts in question must be held to be contingent even if we disregarded the “pay and divide” rule completely.

It is axiomatic and requires no citation of authority that testator’s intention is the pole star of testamentary construction. All of the circumstances of this case indicate that the testatrix was referring to heirs ascertainable only in the future.

This is particularly true because the daughters had complete power of disposition of the principal by their wills. We must also not lose sight of the fact that when testatrix executed her will in 1904, more than a half century ago, there was no transfer inheritance tax imposed on lineals in this State and the citizens of our country were not plagued with the complexities of the onerous Federal estate tax. Little did she dream that the day would come when the right to appoint by will, in itself, would impose heavy tax liabilities upon the estate of a person possessing such right and that it might become much more advantageous to surrender the right than to exercise it. It, therefore, seems apparent that the testatrix fully expected her daughters to exercise the powers of appointment which she gave to them, if they should have no issue. It is quite unrealistic to assume that she contemplated that her daughters would designate the estates of persons, who *210died many years before them, to receive any share of her estate.

The natural meaning of the phrase “my remaining right heirs” is those remaining or surviving when the event terminating the trust occurred: Estate of Andrew Berg, 96 Pa. Superior Ct. 125 (1930). See also Judge Gest’s comment in Buckman’s Estate, 13 D. & C. 653, 654 (1930). Testatrix’s use of this language is most persuasive. She clearly contemplated that only those of her heirs who were living at the date of distribution should participate in such distribution.

The exceptions are all dismissed and the adjudication is confirmed absolutely.

*

 The “pay and divide” rule has been severely and justly criticized by Mr. Justice Bell in his concurring opinion in Edmunds Estate, 374 Pa. 22 (1953) and in Bald Estate, 385 Pa. 176 (1956).
# Fou rth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

October 22, 2019

No. 04

- 19

- 00501

- CV

IN THE MATTER OF M.M.C.D.

- E.

From the 150th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2017

- PA

- 01118 Honorable David A. Canales, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

Appellant’s motion for an extension of time to file the appellant’s brief is granted. We order counsel for appellant, Amanda Wilhelm, to file the appellant’s brief by October 28, 2019. This is an accelerated appeal of an order terminating the appella nt’s parental rights which must be disposed of by this court within 180 days of the date the notice of appeal is filed. TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 6.2. Given the time constraints governing the disposition of this appeal, further request for extensions of time wil l be disfavored.

_________________________________ Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

cou rt on this 22nd day of October, 2019

.

___________________________________ L uz E strada

, Chief Deputy Clerk
#### § 104.24 Demands or requests in legal proceedings for records protected by confidentiality statutes.

Demands in legal proceedings for the production of records, or for the testimony of employees regarding information protected by the confidentiality provisions of the Patent Act (35 U.S.C. 122), the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a), the Trade Secrets Act (18 U.S.C. 1905), or any other confidentiality statute, must satisfy the requirements for disclosure set forth in those statutes and associated rules before the records may be provided or testimony given.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                            OSI PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of OSI Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2005 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Robert
L. Van Nostrand, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

Date: May 10, 2005                   /s/ Robert L. Van Nostrand
                                     -------------------------------------------
                                     Robert L. Van Nostrand
                                     Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
Editorial Note on Part 84
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 84 appear at 69 FR 18803, Apr. 9, 2004.

§ 84.83 Timers; elapsed time indicators; remaining service life indicators; minimum requirements. ( a ) Elapsed time indicators shall be provided for apparatus with a chemical oxygen source, except: ( 1 ) Apparatus used for escape only; or
( 2 ) Liquefied breathing gas apparatus equipped with gages visible to the wearer which indicate the remaining liquid content in the container.
( b ) The timer or other indicator shall be accurately calibrated in minutes of remaining service life.
( c ) Timers shall be readable by sight and by touch during use by the wearer.
( d ) Timers shall be equipped with automatically preset alarms which will warn the wearer for a period of 7 seconds or more after the preset time has elapsed.
( e ) Remaining service-life indicators or warning devices shall be provided in addition to a pressure gage on compressed gas self-contained breathing apparatus, except apparatus used for escape only, and shall operate automatically without preadjustment by the wearer.
( f ) Each remaining service-life indicator or warning device must give an alarm when the remaining service life is reduced to a minimum of 25 percent of its rated service time or any higher minimum percent value or values as specified in the approval. Open-circuit demand and pressure-demand respirators must alarm continuously until depletion of the breathing air supply. The percent value set for indicator activation must be identified by labels and/or markings on each respirator unit.
[60 FR 30355, June 8, 1995, as amended at 78 FR 2622, Jan. 14, 2013]
p. 1 

# OAR Box 1828 Prepped by Ollie Stewart



### Document

Number: 

# 48 ) ll-K - (B ) -3 6 Docket Number: 

# A-83-2 7

Printed 11/12/2008 11:12:49 AM Sheet 48 of 325P. 2 

# ' A Pl
II-K-(B)-3 6
NE W ENERGYSCENARIO . Lette r fro

m T . Hogan , EEA , t o R . Short , EPArSASD . Jun e 5 , 1980 . THI S INFORMATION

CA N B E FOUNDI

N DOCKE T A-79-02 , ITE

M II-K-(B)-3 6
11 TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND

, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Reginald Genell Johnson, * From the 104 th District Court

of Taylor County,

Trial Court No. 21591B

.

Vs. No. 11

- 1 9

- 00 137

- CR * April 8 , 20 2 1

The State of Texas

, * Memorand um Opinion by W illiams , J.

(P anel consists of: Bailey , C.J.,

Trotter , J. , and W illiams, J.)

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there is

error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this court ’ s opi nion,

we modify the judgment of the tr ia l court to reflect that Reginald Genell Johnson

pleaded “TRUE” to the first enhancement paragraph and that the jury found the

enhancement paragraph to be “TRUE.” As modified, we affir m the judgment of

the trial court.
# Official Journal C 372A/10 N

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 372A |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 5810 November 2015 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 372A

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 5810 November 2015

---

| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | V   Announcements |
| | ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES |
| | Council |
| 2015/C 372A/1 | Notice of vacancy CONS/AD/119 | 1 |

Notice No

Contents

page

V   Announcements

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

Council

2015/C 372A/1

Notice of vacancy CONS/AD/119

1

---

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN
Message Information Date 07/18/2011 08:45 AM From TomZ TEA Party Account <TomZPortageCountyTEAPartycom> To ray.iahood@dot.gov ; LisaP Jackson/DC/USEPAIUS@EPA Letter from the Portage County TEA Party

untitledpdf 

### Dear Secretary LaHood and Administrator Jackson, Please read the attached PDF of a letter from the Portage County TEA Party concerning CAFE standards. We would greatly appreciate your attention. Best Regards, Torn Zawistowski Executive Director Portage County TEA Party 4682 State Route 43 Kent, OH 44240 TomZ@PortageCountyTEAParty.com www.PortageCountyTEAParty. corn 330-673-4671 Ext 104 This e-mail transmission contains information that is confidential and may be privileged. It is intended only for the addressee(s) named above. If you receive this e-mail in error, please do not read, copy or disseminate it in any manner. If you are not the intended recipient, any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of this inforrnation is prohibited. Please reply to the message immediately by inforrning the sender that the message was misdirected. After replying, please erase it from your computer system. Your assistance in correcting this error is appreciated.

OEX Processing Information Processed Date: Processed By P0 Office Message Count

# Portage County TEA Party 4682 State Route 43 • Kent, Ohio • 44240 • 330-474-3878 • 3 30-673-467 1 (Fax)

Secretary LaHood US. Department of Transportation 1200 New JerseyAve, SE Washington, DC 20590
Administrator Jackson Environmental Protection Agency 633 3rd Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20001 Dear Secretary LaHood and Administrator Jackson, We represent the Tea Party movement in Portage County, Ohio and we are writing to express our deep concern at the proposal to readjust and increase the corporate average fuel efficiency (CAFE). We feel that this proposal is completely unnecessary and in fact undemocratic. The car industry, especially here in Ohio, has been hit hard by the recession and the global economic downturn. Many people around here rely on the industry for their jobs and livelihoods. The last thing that they need is for Washington to impose a new CAFE standard that would lead to the cost of manufacturing new cars to increase exponentially. We also have real concerns that people would be forced to buy smaller, lighter cars that comply with the new regulations, but are much less safe in terms of "crashworthiness". We also feel that no one drawing up these proposals is taking the time to listen to people like us who have real concerns. It seems that this will be just another example of the government pressing ahead with an expensive, misconceived idea that we, the taxpayer, will end up paying for and ultimately suffering for as the consequences of job losses and higher costs in the car industry filters down to Main Street. We hope you take the time to read our concerns; we would urge you to reconsider these proposals and talk to people, like us in Portage County, about how they could affect our lives.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 00-7009
In Re: WILLIAM FRED MCDONALD, Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (CR-93-244, CA-97-154) Submitted: February 9, 2001 Decided: March 6, 2001 Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. William Fred McDonald, Petitioner Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: William Fred McDonald petitions this court for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to act upon his motion filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2000). The district court entered a final order on January 29, 2001, denying relief on McDonald’s § 2255 motion. Accordingly, although we grant McDonald leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we deny the mandamus petition as moot. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit _____________

No. 22-50713

consolidated with

No. 22-50715

Summary Calendar

_____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Andres Ajualip-Pablo, 

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

USDC Nos. 4:22-CR-147-1; 4:22-CR-181-1

______________________________

Before Higginbotham, Graves, and Ho, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Andres Ajualip-Pablo appeals his sentence of 27 months of 

imprisonment and three years of supervised release imposed following his 

guilty plea conviction for illegal reentry after removal, as well as the 

revocation of the term of supervised release he was serving at the time of the 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 12, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 22-50713 Document: 00516608273 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/12/2023
No. 22-50713

c/w No. 22-50715

2

offense. Regarding the illegal reentry sentence, he argues that 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1326(b) is unconstitutional because it allows a sentence above the otherwise 

applicable statutory maximum of two years of imprisonment and one year of 

supervised release based on facts that are neither alleged in the indictment 

nor found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Because Ajualip-Pablo does 

not address the revocation or the revocation sentence, he has abandoned any 

challenge to them. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).

Ajualip-Pablo has filed an unopposed motion for summary disposition 

and a letter brief correctly conceding that the only issue he raisesis foreclosed 

by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). See United States 

v. Pervis, 937 F.3d 546, 553-54 (5th Cir. 2019). He explains that he has raised 

the issue to preserve it for possible further review. Accordingly, because 

summary disposition is appropriate, see Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 

F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969), Ajualip-Pablo’s motion is GRANTED, and 

the district court’s judgments are AFFIRMED.

Case: 22-50713 Document: 00516608273 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/12/2023
§ 1.920 Referral of VA debts. ( a ) When authorized, VA may refer an uncollectible debt to another Federal or State agency for the purpose of collection action. Collection action may include the offsetting of the debt from any current or future payment, except salary (see paragraph (e) of this section), made by such Federal or State agency to the person indebted to VA.
( b ) VA must certify in writing that the individual owes the debt, the amount and basis of the debt, the date on which payment became due, and the date VA's right to collect the debt first accrued.
( c ) This certification will also state that VA provided the debtor with written notice of: ( 1 ) The nature and amount of the debt;
( 2 ) VA's intention to pursue collection by offset procedures;
( 3 ) The opportunity to inspect and copy VA records pertaining to the debt;
( 4 ) The right to contest both the existence and amount of the debt and to request a waiver of collection of the debt (if applicable), as well as the right to a hearing on both matters;
( 5 ) The opportunity to enter into a written agreement with VA for the repayment of the debt; and
( 6 ) Other applicable notices required by §§ 1.911, 1.911a, 1.912, and 1.912a.
( d ) The written certification required by paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section will also contain (for all debts) a listing of all actions taken by both VA and the debtor subsequent to the notice, as well as the dates of such actions.
( e ) The referral by VA of a VA debt to another agency for the purpose of salary offset shall be done in accordance with 38 CFR 1.980 through 1.995 and regulations prescribed by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in 5 CFR part 550, subpart K.
(Authority: 31 U.S.C. 3711; 38 U.S.C. 501)
[52 FR 42108, Nov. 3, 1987. Redesignated and amended at 69 FR 62196, Oct. 25, 2004]